University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

National identity and the right to self-government

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National identity and the right to self-government

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT

by

Hsin-Wen Lee

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)

May 2011

Copyright 2011 Hsin-Wen Lee

ii

Dedication

For My Family

iii

Acknowledgements

This doctoral dissertation would not have been possible without the supervision of
my advisor, Andrei Marmor. I am truly grateful for his support and advisement. I owe my
deepest gratitude to Mark Schroeder, who never runs out of useful advices and great
suggestions. It is a pleasure to thank the members of my dissertation committee and
qualifying exam committee, who read my drafts carefully and offer valuable comments--
Scott Altman, John Dreher, Robert English, Sharon Lloyd, and Dallas Willard.
I would also like to thank the participants of the following conferences for their
helpful comments and suggestions-- New Jersey Regional Philosophy Conference at
Montclair State University, November 2009, The Seventh Annual Intermountain West
Philosophy Conference at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, March 2010, and
the Third International Global Ethics Association Biennial Conference at the University
of the West of England, Bristol, UK, July 2010.
Lastly, I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents and my siblings for their love
and support.

Hsin-wen Lee

December 2010

iv

Table of Contents

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Abstract

ii

iii

v

Introduction National Identity and the Right to Self-
Government

Chapter One The Moral Significance of National Identity

Chapter Two Does a National Community Have the Right
to Establish a Sub-state Autonomous
Government?

Chapter Three Does a National Community (As Such) Have
a Right to Establish an Independent State?

Chapter Four Rights of National Communities to Establish
Independent States: Is It Feasible?

Chapter Five Institutional Morality and the Right to Secede

Bibliography

1

10

41

83

135

176

217

v

Abstract

In this dissertation, I consider whether the interests in national culture, identity,
and membership are sufficient to justify the right of a national community to self-
government. I argue that in a multination state, membership in a minority nation can
undermine the equal distribution of political power and opportunity. Thus, social
institutions should be arranged in a way that helps equalize relevant goods. Nevertheless,
I go on to argue that the value of national identity is not enough to justify the right to self-
government, both in the form of an independent, sovereign state and an autonomous, sub-
state government. My thesis is somewhat unusual, as most philosophers who affirm the
value of national identity also endorse the right of a national community to some form of
self-government, and most philosophers who deny that a national community has the
right to any form of self-government also deny the value of national identity.

1

Introduction----National Identity and the Right to Self-Government

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community should
receive certain rights and recognitions so that its members can collectively manage their
group affairs. Many questions arise when we consider this principle: What justifies the
principle? What makes it the case that national communities should be self-determining?
What interests are involved in one‘s national membership and identity? Why are the
usual civic liberties in constitutional democracies not enough to protect these interests?
How should we protect these interests? Would relevant institutional arrangements give
rise to unequal citizenship? What type of institutional arrangements would be the
appropriate? Does a national community, just by virtue of being a national community,
have the right to self-government? What about the right to establish an independent,
sovereign state?
Here, national self-determination is understood as a principle which prescribes
that a national community should be given certain rights and recognitions, either by a
domestic constitution or international law, so that its members can make decisions for
themselves by themselves. Accordingly, national self-determination encompasses any
measure or policy that gives only the members of a national community-- and no one
else-- substantive power to decide.
1
In this dissertation, I will focus especially on
discussing whether national communities have rights to self-government, both in the form

1
Some philosophers, such as Margalit and Raz, understand the right of national self-determination to mean
something more limited. By a right to national self-determination they mean the right of a national
community to decide whether a certain territorial area should become an independent state. Here, I take
the right of national self-determination to mean the broader right of a national community to make

2

of a sub-state, autonomous government (such as a tribal reservation or a federal state) and
an independent, sovereign state.

By national community, I mean a group of people who share an encompassing
culture. This usually includes, but is not limited to, a shared language, history, and
customs as well as traditions and practices.
2
Members of a national community also
identify with it and value its cultural heritage. National communities can be further sub-
categorized into several different types of groups. As will become clearer in this
dissertation, these differences may account for their different claims of self-government.
Depending on their historical origin, some groups are indigenous, and the others are non-
indigenous. An example of an indigenous group is North American Indians, and an
example of a non-indigenous group is the Quebecois Francophones. Depending on the
geodemographic distribution, some groups are territorially concentrated, some
intermingled, and some dispersed. The Flemish in Belgium are territorially concentrated;
the Roman Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland are intermingled; the Kurds are
dispersed. Some national communities, such as the Quebecois, aspire to establish their
own sovereign states; others, such as North American Indians, are relatively satisfied
with a more limited form of autonomous government.
In principle, there are three different ways to respond to a demand of a national
community to self-government—the statist theory, the sub-statist theory, and the
irrelevance of identity thesis. Philosophers who endorse the statist theory, e.g. Simon
Caney, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, David Miller, Kai Nielsen, and Yael Tamir,

2
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, pp. 443-7.

3

argue that, under certain circumstances, a national group has the right to build its own
independent, sovereign government.
3
The statists argue that there is something special
about national communities that make them especially suitable for establishing
independent states. Being a national group gives the group at least a prima facie right to
do so. Nonetheless, the right is defeasible—it can be overruled by other equally or more
important rights. For example, a national group cannot exercise this right if its members
live intermingled with members of another group. In this case, the group‘s right to
establish its own state is in conflict with the right of another group.
In contrast, other philosophers, such as Allen Buchanan, David Copp, Jeremy
Waldron and Christopher Wellman, argue that national cultures or identity are irrelevant
to determine whether a group has the right to self-determination.
4
According to Buchanan,
a national community is not much different from other types of communities, such as a
religious or a gay community. No matter how important a national culture is to its
members, it is not relevant in determining whether such a group has the right to create its
own state. Although Buchanan, Copp, and Wellman propose different theories of
secession, they agree that a national group as such does not have the right to secede.
Waldron‘s position is even more radical: he denies the moral worth of national identity. I
will call the proposition that national identity is irrelevant in determining whether a group
has the right to establish an independent state the irrelevance of national identity thesis.

3
See Caney, 1997, pp.351-372; Margalit and Raz, 1990, pp. 439-61; Miller, 1995; Moore, 2001; Nielsen,
1998, pp.103-33; Tamir, 1993.

4
See Buchanan, 1996, pp.283-310; Copp, 1997, pp.277-300; Waldron, 1992, pp.751-93; Wellman, 2005.

4

On the other hand, there are philosophers who recognize that national culture and
identity are indeed important. However, they deny that a national group per se is entitled
to establish its own state. Following Chaim Gans, I call these theories the sub-statist
theories. While both the statist and the sub-statist theorists agree on the importance of
national culture and identity, the views differ as to how institutions should protect these
interests. Sub-state theorists believe that national self-determination entails only certain
limited forms of recognitions, not independent statehood. For instance, Gans holds that a
national community has the right to cultural preservation, special representation, and sub-
state self-government. However, it does not have the right to establish its own state.
5

Patten‘s position is somewhat different. He argues that national groups should be
recognized by the multinational constitution which gives national groups rights to sub-
state self-government within the current state border. However, if a state fails to
adequately recognize the identity of a national group (that is, if the state does not allow
the group to establish its own sub-state government), the group thereby acquires a right to
unilaterally secede.
6
Allen Patten does not rule out the right of a national community to
secede completely. However, the right is warranted only when the state constitution fails
to give the national community the right to sub-state self-government.
Before I explain the problems discussed in each chapter, I should point out that, my
discussion is limited to national communities in liberal democracies. National groups in
non-liberal or non-democratic societies may have other reasons for demanding self-

5
See Gans, 2003.

6
See Patten, 2002, pp.558-86.

5

determination. In addition, even though the dissertation recognizes the value of national
culture, identity, and membership, it does not argue that its significance is fundamental or
indisputable. The dissertation aims to find out how, from a liberal democratic point of
view, the international community or a liberal democratic society should respond to the
demands of a national community for self-determination. Institutional recognition of
national culture, identity, and membership is acceptable only to the extent that it is
compatible with liberal values of freedom, equality, and human rights. Customs, practices,
policies, or institutions that violate these basic liberal values may not be protected.
7

In Chapter One, I describe what a national group is and explain why identity with
such a group is important. My main task is to explain and defend the moral value of
national cultures. I argue that the rise of an encompassing national culture is often the
result of social institutions. These institutions—the language, laws, spoken and unspoken
rules and norms of a society—constitutes the rules of life in this society. Accordingly, in
order to lead a successful life (or even to be a good critic of one‘s own society), a person
must master these rules. Naturally, when one‘s national culture is in decline, her well-
being will in turn be negatively affected. Therefore, institutional arrangements should be
in place to protect these interests. I also explain and respond to four possible objections to
my argument.

7
To say that certain illiberal aspects of national cultures may not be protected by the right to national self-
determination is not to say that these aspects of their culture should be legally prohibited. We might have
other reason, such as respect for personal autonomy, to respect or tolerate certain practices.

6

After defending the value of national identity, the next question is whether its value
is sufficient to justify a group‘s right to govern itself. Thus, in Chapters Two and Three, I
examine in detail arguments in favor of such a right.
In Chapter Two, I discuss arguments in favor of a group‘s right to create its own
sub-state, autonomous government, including those from Kymlicka, Gans, Patten, and
Moore. I argue that Moore‘s argument for indigenous self-government provides the
strongest defense for giving an indigenous group the right to rule itself. Unfortunately,
while her argument applies to indigenous communities, it does not apply to non-
indigenous groups such as the Quebecois Francophones. Does a non-indigenous group
have the right to create its own sub-state government? I argue that it does not. My
examination of these arguments reveals that they adopt a problematic assumption, namely
that equal treatment of different national groups requires equal benefits— in this case, a
group‘s own nation state. However, this assumption is based on the false premise that (1)
a state belongs only to the majority group but not the minority, and (2) a multination
state can never treat different national minorities equally. Accordingly, these arguments
fail to justify the right of a national group to create its own sub-state government.
In Chapter Three, I examine arguments that defend the right of a national group to
create its own independent, sovereign state. These include the Instrumental Value, the
Intrinsic Value, and the Institution arguments. I argue that they do not justify even a
prima facie right of a national group to establish its own state. My analysis reveals that
the soundness of these arguments depends on what I call the Optimal Protection
Principle. However, while this principle applies to cases of individual autonomy, it does

7

not apply to cases of collective autonomy, i.e. the self-determination of a national group.
In addition, even if we recognize that an interest is profoundly valuable, this fact cannot
by itself tell us how this interest should be protected or which institutions should be in
place for its protection. To determine whether institutions should formally recognize a
group‘s right to secede, we also need to evaluate the feasibility of institutionally
implementing this right. Important factors that must be taken into account include the
conditions necessary for its implementation, the goods it may bring about, and the side-
effects it can cause.
In Chapter Four, I discuss four types of problems commonly associated with
institutionally recognizing the right to national self-determination. Philosophers worry
that recognizing this right would corrupt important democratic institutions or even result
in injustice in the following ways. (1) Is there enough land for each nation to create its
own state? If not, then would the recognition of this right not lead to an unequal state of
affairs in which some groups have their own states while others do not? (2) Effective
democracy requires that people be willing to communicate and compromise in the face of
conflicting interests. If a group had the right to secede, would it still be willing to
communicate and compromise? Moreover, would recognizing the right to secede lead to
serious social instability? (3) Would it create unfair burdens on members both inside and
outside the new state? (4) Would it create unfair burdens on the remaining state? To solve
these problems, I argue that we must distinguish between two types of affairs, the
political and the cultural. Once the distinction is made, it becomes clear that the interest
in cultural affairs justifies the right to govern these affairs only, but not non-cultural,

8

political affairs. This means that the right of a national group to secede should be
regulated and restricted. However, it does not mean that we should rule out recognizing
this right altogether.
In Chapter Five, I consider Buchanan‘s methodological framework for theories of
secession and his criticisms of the national self-determination theory that flow from this
framework. He claims that, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any
adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional
morality. In particular, such an analysis must consider in a holistic manner a right‘s
overall impact on existing institutions. To provide more specific guidance, Buchanan
proposes five specific criteria the function of which is to expose theories that fail to meet
the requirements of institutional morality. He then argues that, because the national self-
determination theory blatantly lacks an analysis of institutional morality, it is
fundamentally flawed. This, however, does not prove that this theory is incompatible
with the demands of institutional morality. To show that it is, Buchanan argues that the
national self-determination theory fails to meet several of his specific criteria.
Although I generally agree with Buchanan‘s methodology, I think we should reject
his specific criteria because a principle that fails to meet his criteria can nevertheless
bring about institutional moral progress. Upon closer examination, his criteria reflect only
a right‘s practical, and not its moral, value. Therefore, his specific criteria fail to reflect
the demands of institutional morality and should be rejected. Nonetheless, I believe that
Buchanan is right to demand that any theory of secession must consider its general
impact on existing institutions. I then consider three objections from supporters of the

9

national self-determination theory and defend Buchanan‘s framework against them. In
doing so, I propose a new and improved interpretation of the idea of holistic institutional
morality. This reading helps solve a serious problem commonly associated with
Buchanan‘s theory, namely, its tendency to entrench the status quo.

10

Chapter One— The Moral Significance of National Identity
Many nationalists appeal to the importance of a national culture and identity to
justify the right of a national group to self-determination. What is so special about a
national community? Why should it, but not other types of groups, be entitled to the right
to self-determination? In this chapter, I will explain what a national group is and why
national identity is morally significant. I will also explain what the demand for the right
to national self-determination involves. The aim is to understand the moral significance
of national identity.

1.1 What is a Nation?
Any discussion of national self-determination must begin by defining the word
nation. Supporters of this right—Can, Margalit and Raz, Miller, Moore, Nielsen, Patten
and Tamir—all spend some time trying to define the relevant groups and clarify possible
misunderstandings.
8
This is necessary first because people use the word nation to refer to
several different types of groups; thus, a clear characterization of a national community
will help us identify the right type of group. That is, we will be able to recognize those
groups that should be granted the relevant rights and recognitions. Second, a clear
description of the important features of a national community will help us see why they
are morally significant—how they are importantly different from other types of groups
that do not require similar recognition. Third, identifying the right kind of group will also

8
See Caney, 2005, pp.14-5; Margalit and Raz, 1990, pp.442-7; Miller, 1995, pp.21-7; Moore, 1998, pp.5-9;
Nielsen, 1998, pp.104-10; Patten, 2002, pp.558-86; Tamir, 1993, pp.63-69.

11

help us observe the kind of problems and challenges these groups face, which, in turn,
will help us find the right solution.
The word nation is used in different contexts to mean different things, which may
lead to different interpretations of the right to national self-determination. Sometimes
nation is taken to mean a state, sometimes a minority national group, and sometimes an
ethnic group. However, these three are different. In this section, I will first discuss some
important features of a national group and then contrast such a group with others that are
often confused with it. In this dissertation, I follow the terminological conventions from
the literature. I take the word nation to refer to a group which has certain objective and
subjective features described in the following sections (1.1.1 to 1.1.5).

1.1.1 Objective Features
Nationalists generally emphasize that members of a national community share a
national culture. This culture usually includes, but is not limited to, a common language,
certain customs, such as rituals governing major life events of birth, death, marriage, and
certain widespread practices, e.g., traditional music, literature, art, costumes, festivals
and holidays. Unlike other types of cultures or identities, such as the gay community or
teen culture, a national culture, according to Margalit and Raz, is a pervasive one;
9
it
encompasses a wide range of activities and events in the lives of its members. Kymlicka

9
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.448. Some may wonder if a religious culture or identity may be pervasive
in the same sense—a religious culture often includes similar elements: its own music, literature, art, etc.
Indeed, it is possible for a religious culture to be so entrenched in the public life of a society that it
constitutes the national culture of a society. However, a national culture need not be a religious one, and a
religious culture need not be pervasive. It is possible, in a secular society, for people to leave their religious
identity in the private sphere and for the religious culture to be not entrenched in the public life.

12

suggests that it is a culture that ―provides its members with meaningful ways of life
across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres [italics
added].‖
10
Thus, a national culture is sometimes referred to as an encompassing culture,
11

sometimes a societal culture,
12
and sometimes a public culture,
13
indicating its broad and
all-embracing character.

1.1.2 The Historical Dimension
Margalit and Raz suggest that ―it is through a shared history [italics added] that
cultures develop and are transmitted.‖
14
A nation becomes what it is today because of the
efforts and decisions, whether good or bad, made by its ancestors.
15
The lives of the
current generation are heavily influenced, if not completely determined, by the cultural
traits they inherit from their ancestors. Hence, national culture is an important medium by
which the current generation connects to its ancestral roots. Miller suggests that national
identity is ―an identity that embodies historical continuity … In the course of this history,
various significant events have occurred, and we identify with the actual people who

10
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.76.

11
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.443; Nielsen, 1998, p.110.

12
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.76.

13
See Miller, 1995, p.25.

14
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.445.

15
See Miller, 1995, p.24.

13

acted at those moments, reappropriate their deeds as our own [italics added].‖
16
Tamir
also suggests that the emphasis on the historical roots of one‘s national culture reflects
―the urge for continuity, the desire to see at least some parts of social life as unchanging
and invariant.‖
17
Because these historical ties can also serve a certain legitimizing
function, many nationalists emphasize the historical dimension of their national culture.
18

Naturally, a national community often wishes to preserve its historical heritage, which
includes both its past and future existence.
19

1.1.3 The Institutional Dimension
Moreover, the spreading of a national culture, such as a common language and
practices, is usually secured via certain public institutions such as governmental policies
or school systems.
20
A national culture includes a wide variety of dimensions and can
hardly become encompassing or a public without somehow being institutionalized.
21

In his discussion of the rise of the ides of nations and nationalism, Ernst Gellner
suggests that nations arise because the modern economy requires a homogeneous

16
See Miller, 1995, p.23.

17
See Tamir, 1993, p.64.

18
For instance, Tamir suggests that, ―Through this alleged connection with the past, culture supports the
nation‘s pretention to be natural, genuine, and unique. See Tamir, 1993, p.64. See also Miller, 1995, p.23,
34.

19
On the interest in preserving the future existence of a national culture, see Gans, 2003, pp.49-58.

20
Kymlicka also suggests that a nation is ―a historical community, more or less institutionally complete.‖
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.11.

21
The requisite institution need not be a legal or governmental one. Even in the case of a tribe where there
is no established legislature or government, the tribe may still institutionalize certain cultural elements,
such as the language or important customs in its public life.

14

workforce that gave rise to the ideas of nations and nationalism. To conduct business
with each other, different segments of society must be able to communicate with each
other. Moreover, a democratic society requires a high degree of solidarity among
citizens—only when citizens identify with the state will they be willing to pay taxes or
provide other services that are necessary for a functioning democracy. The requisite
homogeneity and solidarity are effectively achieved by public institutions, especially the
education system, where relevant knowledge is disseminated and an official language
introduced.
22
A common national culture is thereby formed and reinforced in the public
life of a society. As a result, a member who grows up in a national community has to
have sufficient knowledge of the rules and norms implicit in its culture to fit in in the
society.
23
Understanding the national culture becomes a prerequisite for success.
Likewise, for a national culture to be preserved, it must be preserved in the public
institutions of the society. Kymlicka suggests that, ―for a culture to be embodied in social
life means that it must be institutionally embodied… in schools, media, economy,
government, etc.‖
24
Without institutional protection, a national culture may gradually
decay and even vanish
25
. Therefore, public institutions are important media via which a
national culture is formed, spread and preserved.

22
See Gellner, 1983, Nations and Nationalism ; see also Taylor, 1997, 32-3.

23
In discussing Taylor‘s theory of nationalism, Kymlicka suggests that an important reason to have an
encompassing culture in society is that it enhances equal opportunity in society as well. See Kymlicka,
1997, 56-7.

24
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.76. See also Kymlicka, 1997, pp.56-7; Taylor, 1997, pp.32-5.

25
Miller suggests that the protection of a national culture may be subject to the collective action problem,
―national cultures can decay without anyone intending this should happen, and the only way to prevent this
is to use the power of the state to protect aspects that are judged to be important.‖ See Miller, 1995, p.87.-8

15

1.1.4 Subjective Features
Miller suggests that ―national communities are constituted by belief [italics added]:
nations exist when their members recognize one another as compatriots, and believe that
they share characteristics of the relevant kind.‖
26
Members of a national community
usually identify with the group. They regard their membership in the group as an
important part of their personal identity.
In addition, members of the same group tend to feel proud of the good deeds of
other members and ashamed of the bad ones. Miller suggests that, ―nations are
communities that do things together, take decisions, achieve results, and so forth…. The
nation becomes what it is by the decisions that it takes--- some of which we may now
regard as thoroughly bad, a cause of national shame‖
27
Additionally, as is mentioned in
1.1.2 , members of the group reappropriate the deeds of their ancestors as their own and
feel responsible for the collective actions and decisions of the group.
Moreover, members of the same national group usually value their own cultural
heritage and wish to preserve the traditions they inherit.
28
Notice that identifying with a
group is not the same as identifying with its cultural character. Kymlicka points out that
there is a distinction between the existence of a national culture and its characteristics— a
national culture may persist while its cultural characters change with time.
29
For instance,

26
See Miller, 1995, p.22.

27
See Miller, 1995, p.24.

28
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, pp.453-454. Miller, 1995, pp.21-27; Moore, 2001, pp.5-9. Tamir,1993,
pp.63-69.

29
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.104.

16

during the Quiet Revolution, Quebec transformed from a rural and religious society to an
urban and secular one. Furthermore, members of a national community may identify with
the group while wishing to reform certain aspects of its culture.
Lastly, because a national group is very large, members of such a group may not
have personal relationships with each other. Their relationships are secured by the belief
and mutual recognition that they participate in the same national culture.
30
According to
Tamir, ―[t]he ideal of national fellowship symbolizes a belief in the existence of special
ties and obligations binding the members of a nation.‖
31
Benedict Anderson suggests that
a national community is an imagined community, as the relationships between members
are not personal but mostly imagined.
32

1.1.5 A Homeland
A national community must have a historical homeland where their shared culture
was formed and developed.
33
This is another feature that distinguishes a national
community from other types of identity-based group. The formation and development of
a national culture is always related to a homeland.
34
Without geographical proximity, an
encompassing culture can hardly be formed and permeated in the public life of a

30
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.445- 447; Miller, 1995, p.22-3.

31
See Tamir, 1993, p.65.

32
See Anderson, 1983.

33
See Miller, 1995, p.24; Kymlicka, 1995, p.11.

34
This is almost always true, with perhaps one exception, namely, the Roma. However, it is questionable if
the Roma count as a national culture. Thanks to Professor Marmor for pointing this out to me.

17

community. Thus, national communities are almost always territorially concentrated, and
a national identity is always intimately connected to its historical homeland.
Although this description is very rough, I hope that it provides readers sufficient
guidance to identify a national group. Next, I will further clarify the notion of a national
community by contrasting it with other types of communities that are often confused with
it: a state and an ethnic group. The aim is to clarify the terminological conventions in the
literature. These terms are sometimes used interchangeably in ordinary language, but in
the nationalist literature they refer to different things.

1.1.6 What a Nation is Not
Many use the word nation to refer to a state. A state is a political entity. It has
sovereignty over a defined territorial area.
35
Examples of states are Mexico, France, and
Japan. States are the main actors in the international arena. State governments effectively
govern the people residing in their defined territories and have the authority to represent
their citizens when dealing with other sovereign states. States are eligible for membership
in international organizations and can make treaties with each other.

In this case, the
concept ‗state‘ is the same as the concept of a ‗country‘, when we ask a person which
country he is from. The two terms both designate the political entity occupying a certain
territorial area.

35
The use of the term ‗state‘ here is different from that of Rawls‘s. In his book, The Law of Peoples, Rawls
uses ‗people‘ instead of ‗state‘ because, Rawls suggests, ‗state‘ seem to imply unlimited sovereignty. See
Rawls, 2001, p.27-28. I do not intend to use the word state in this sense. When I use the word state, I do not
mean to suggest that this entity enjoys unlimited sovereignty.

18

A nation is, therefore, different from a state. The two words are sometimes used
interchangeably; nonetheless, they denote different things. For example, what we call the
United Nations is actually composed of multiple sovereign states, but not multiple
national communities as characterized earlier in this section. Another commonly used
term is international relations, which refers to the relations between different states, not
different nation groups. Yet another example is the nationality column in a passport. One
should fill out the name of the state or the political entity of which one is a citizen. It is
not a question about one‘s cultural affiliation.
For the sake of clarity, I will use these two terms differently in this dissertation. I
will use the word state to refer to a political entity conventionally defined as consisting of
a piece of territory, people, and sovereignty. I will use the word citizenship to designate
membership in a state.
Accordingly, a national community may or may not have its own sovereign state.
Examples of stateless nations are the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, North American
Indians, and the Uygur and Tibetan people in China. On the other hand, Korea, France,
and Italy are considered nation states because, not only do their members share an
encompassing culture rooted in history, but they also have sovereign authority over their
homeland. A national group is not eligible for membership in international organizations,
unless it is also a state. Neither is a national group eligible to make treaties with other
national groups or states, unless it also is a state. This explains why national communities
sometimes try to pursue political independence by demanding the right to become states.

19

In addition, a state may have one or more national communities residing in its territory.
The former is called a nation state while the latter a multination state.
Another cause of the confusion between nations and states is that states usually
aspire to be nations. Not only do nations aspire to become states, states may aspire to
become nations as well. For instance, in the United States, government officials
sometimes refer to the U.S. as ―one nation under God.‖ The usage has its inspiration from
the idea of civic nationalism, according to which the state government should foster some
sort of common culture among citizens from diverse national backgrounds.
36
The
motivation behind the usage is to create the impression that citizens are not just a group
of unrelated individuals who happen to be under the same sovereign authority. The union
of citizens is not merely an association of self-interested, egoistic individuals. Using the
word nation would presumably suggest that the citizens identify with the same state or
share some common culture. These expressions promote a sense of community and make
the union more endearing by implying that there is an important element, i.e., a shared
culture, in the union.
In addition, a national group is not the same as an ethnic group. Here, following
Nielsen, Michel Seymour, etc., I take an ethnic group to mean one that is defined by a
common ancestry.
37
Given the fact of common ancestry, members of the same ethnic

36
See Van De Putte, 1996, pp.161-3; Yack, 1999, 103-18. Gans uses a different label to discuss this type of
nationalism, i.e., the statist nationalism, see Gans, 2003, pp.23-6. I will discuss the concept of civic
nationalism in the next section.

37
See Nielsen, 1997, p.44; see also Couture, Nielsen, Seymour, 1996, p.3.

20

group often share the same language, culture, homeland, etc.
38
Nonetheless, there are
quite a few ethnic groups which do not share the same culture. In any case, membership
of such a group is determined by birth and is purely objective. That is, members of an
ethnic group are share similar physical traits. This conception of group membership is,
according to Nielsen, exclusionist and for this reason bad. In contrast, a national group
need not be exclusionist in this sense: a person growing up in a national community can
be considered a member even if she has a different ancestral genealogy from other co-
nationals.

1.1.7 Different Types of National Communities
Several different types of communities may fall under the category of a national
group, according to the description provided earlier in this section. Depending on their
historical origin, there are indigenous and non-indigenous national communities. An
example of an indigenous community is North American Indians or aboriginal
communities in Australia; an example of a non-indigenous community is the
Francophone in Quebec. Depending on the geodemographic distribution, there are
territorially concentrated, intermingled, and dispersed national communities. The
Flemish in Belgium are territorially concentrated; the Roman Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland are intermingled; the Kurds are dispersed. Depending on whether they
have their own state, there are stateless nations, such as the Basque in France, or Catalans

38
Ibid.

21

in Spain.
39
There are nation states, such as Japan or Thailand. Finally, there are also what
Kymlicka calls polyethnic groups, i.e., immigrants whose cultural origin is different from
that of their host society. Examples are Chinese immigrants in the U.S., or Muslim
immigrants in Europe.
I hope that the above discussion can help the readers identify the kind of group I
am focused on in this dissertation. The principle of national self-determination I will be
discussing is to be applied to national communities only, not other groups. Next, I will
discuss the moral significance of a national identity.

1.2 The Moral Significance of a National Culture and Identity
Now that I have clarified the type of groups I will focus on in this dissertation, I
will move on to discuss the moral significance of these groups. Some philosophers
question why a national group or identity should be singled out for special recognition.
For instance, Buchanan argues that ―to single out nations as such for rights of self-
government that are denied to other groups is morally arbitrary, and this arbitrariness
violates the principle that persons are to be accorded equal respect [italics added].‖
40

Waldron, too, suggests that ―a freewheeling cosmopolitan life, lived in a kaleidoscope of
cultures, is both possible and fulfilling‖
41
This means, according to him, that people do

39
See Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford University Press,2000,
pp.19-20.

40
Buchanan raises two objections to the nationalist principle: the Infeasibility Objection and the Equal
Respect Objection. See Buchanan, 1996, pp.291-9.

41
See Waldron, 1992, p.762.

22

not need to adhere to their cultural roots.
42
Thus, governmental institutions should treat
national identity in the same way they treat religious beliefs—that is, as the business of
individuals, not the government.
In this section, I will discuss the moral significance of national identity and then
defend it against some possible objections and challenges. Membership in a national
community plays a very important role in the self-identity of persons; the well-being of
an individual is intimately related to that of the group.
As I mentioned in 1.1.3, the rise of an encompassing national culture is often the
result of social institutions. These institutions—the language, the laws, and the spoken
and unspoken rules and norms of society – constitute the rules of life in a society. Thus, a
person growing up in such a society needs to learn these cultural norms in order to fit in;
mastering these norms is a prerequisite for a successful and flourishing life. Naturally,
members of a national community strive to excel in these cultural norms, not merely to
acquire knowledge of impersonal facts, but to incorporate and internalize these rules in
their daily lives and even their personalities.
Consequently, a person growing up in a national community will be heavily
influenced by its national culture. Her national culture shapes her conceptions of the good
life and what is worth pursuing. Accordingly, a national identity is a constitutive part of
personal identity because it is the foundation of one‘s conceptions of the good and what
is worth pursuing in life. Thus, Nielsen suggests that ―[e]ncompassing cultural groups are
cultures which pervade the whole range of an individual‘s major life activities and

42
See Waldron, 1992. p.762.

23

function as an indispensible source of self-identification and self-definition.‖
43
Our well-
being depends also on that of our national culture.
Identifying with a national group is thus very different from identifying with other
types of group or culture. For instance, to be a member of a fiction reading group, all one
needs to do is to read a fiction.
44
To be a good Muslim, one must practice the Five
Pillars—to declare one‘s faith in God, pray five times a day, give to the poor, fast during
Ramadan, and make a pilgrimage to Mecca—but she need not have a home there or even
have grown up in a predominantly Muslim country.
45
However, to be a member of a
national community is quite a lengthy and complicated matter—one needs to grow up in
the society and absorb its culture. This is why national identity has ―a high social
profile‖
46
— not only do we normally know a person‘s national membership, but
generally we also form expectations of him accordingly. This is not completely baseless,
because we do expect a national culture to have a huge impact on the values and beliefs
of its members, at least in most cases.
This does not mean that a member must always accept her cultural heritage without
ever questioning it. Incorporating and internalizing a national culture in one‘s personal
identity does not entail unconditional acceptance; the fiercest critic or a reformist are
often experts on their national cultures. One can advocate for reform of her national

43
See Nielsen, 1998, p.110.

44
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.445.

45
This example is from Miller‘s discussion of the relation between a national identity and a nation‘s
historical homeland. See Miller, 1995, p.24.

46
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.446.

24

culture without losing her national identity. Nonetheless, being a member does mean that
one internalizes the culture, deliberately or unintentionally, in her self-identity.
In addition, another way to understand the moral significance of national identity is
by considering its contribution to an important liberal value— personal autonomy.
Liberals value individual freedom not because they value abstract freedom, but because
they value personal autonomy, i.e., an individual‘s capacity to lead a meaningful life.
47

Personal autonomy allows individuals to live meaningful lives according to their
conceptions of the good. Accordingly, to be consistent, a liberal who values personal
autonomy should try to preserve the conditions that make personal autonomy possible.
Several philosophers argue that one‘s national culture provides the requisite
conditions. Nielsen suggests that our national identity ―functions to encompass our other
identities by integrating them and making them cohere together.”
48
Kymlicka also
suggests that, ―[u]nderstanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making
intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives.‖
49
Not only does our national culture
provide us with options, it also ―provides the spectacles through which we identify
experiences as valuable.‖
50
National cultures are important because they provide the
context in which individuals can learn to make sense of different choices and ultimately
make meaningful decisions. Without this, there would be no constraint to our behavior

47
See Kymlicka, 1989, p.48.

48
See Nielsen, 1998, p.124.

49
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.83.

50
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.83.

25

and personal autonomy would be empty.
51
Thus, if a liberal values individual autonomy,
she should also try to preserve the conditions that make individual autonomy possible.
Because national culture plays such a crucial role in supporting personal autonomy, we
should try to help a national group preserve its culture.
If a person internalizes her national culture in her self-identity—if her national
culture helps shape her personal autonomy and her conception of the good life—then it is
not difficult to see how the prosperity of her national culture can effectively impinge on
her well-being. If the national culture is flourishing, she will have a secure sense of
belonging and be able to pursue her conception of the good life without doubting the
worth of her pursuit. However, if her national culture is in decline, then the options and
opportunities open to its members will diminish with it.
52
Even worse, a member may
begin to question if her pursuit is worthless and if what she has learned from the national
culture she grows up with is true. She may also experience anomie--- when the conditions
that support the value of her life project are gone, her pursuits and efforts would appear
meaningless as well. Thus, it is understandable why Tamir suggests that ―[t]he self-image
of individuals is highly affected by the status of their national community.‖
53
The well-
being of members hinges on that of the national community. Therefore, if national
identity is a constitutive part of personal identity, and if the prosperity of national cultures

51
It would be empty in the sense that it would be meaningless. For an action to be meaningful, it has to
conform to certain constraints or limits. Charles Taylor suggests that, without such constraints, ―complete
freedom would be a void in which nothing would be worth doing, nothing would deserve to count for
anything.‖ See Taylor, 1979, p.157. See also Kymlicka, 1989, p.47.

52
See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.449.

53
See Tamir, 1993, p.73.

26

affects the well-being of a nation‘s members, then, for the sake of individual well-being,
we should protect the interests people have in national identity.
Next, I will consider four different questions and challenges to the claim that people
have important interests in preserving their national identity.

1.2.1 First Objection
As I mentioned earlier, both Waldron and Buchanan question whether we need to
protect the national culture one actually identifies with. If personal autonomy requires
that a person be exposed to some national culture, then so long as some national culture is
available, a person can adopt that culture as her source of personal autonomy. Why must
we protect the culture of one‘s ancestry?
54
Why not just adopt some other culture?
Indeed, a child whose identity has not yet been affected by any national culture
may adopt a national culture that is different from that of her ancestors. This is feasible
so long as she has not internalized the cultural norms of her ancestral heritage or shaped
her conceptions of the good or herself accordingly. In this case, so long as a national
culture is in place, the child may adopt this culture and use it to develop her personal
autonomy. Her need for a national culture to help shape her autonomy would be taken
care of, even if the need is met by a culture different from her ancestry.
However, this is not so in the case of an adult person whose identity has already
been marked by her national culture. As mentioned earlier, a person‘s conception of the
good and her self-identity are often deeply affected, if not thoroughly determined, by the

54
See Buchanan, 1995, p.357. See also Waldron, 1992, pp.751-93.

27

national culture she grows up in. The formation and adoption of a national identity is a
lengthy and complicated process. Acquiring a new national identity means going through
a similar process again. A person would need to learn not only the language but also all
the spoken and unspoken cultural norms of the new national culture. It is a very difficult
task. Think about the effort necessary to learn a new language and be able to use it in
one‘s daily conversation. It usually takes years before a native speaker can master the art
of her language and sound artistic, humorous, or witty. Imagine doing this, plus learning
all of the spoken and unspoken norms of a different national culture. Because there are
usually no specific instructions for doing so, one would have to carefully observe the
lives of these people, etc. Even if there were a handbook on how to acquire a new
national identity, I assume that it would contain several volumes of books comparable to
an encyclopedia. It would take several semesters of time and effort to absorb a new
national culture. Thus, switching to another national culture requires that we make major
changes and perhaps also give up certain important values or even personal goals. Such a
process is, according to Moore, ―possible but costly and disorienting.‖
55
In addition, past
policies of assimilation normally fail—instead of assimilating into the new national
culture, such policies actually lead to a higher jobless rate and other social problems in
national minorities.
Thus, Kymlicka suggests that expecting a person to leave her own culture is similar
to expecting her to take a vow of perpetual poverty— it is not impossible for a person to

55
See Moore, 2001, 62-3.

28

live in perpetual poverty, but it is not reasonable for us to expect that she do so.
56

Switching national cultures is not an easy task and requires years of effort. Thus, it is not
reasonable for us to expect a person to leave her national culture and adopt a new one.
The cost is unbearably high.

1.2.2 Second Objection
Moore raises a different challenge—if we should protect a national culture because
we should protect personal autonomy, then we should only protect those cultures that
protect or enhance personal autonomy, but not those that undermine it.
57
This means that
we need not protect the national culture one actually identifies with, if the culture does
not also protect personal autonomy. Rather than being in favor of national self-
determination, this argument can at times be opposed to it, since it seems to entail that
sometimes we should not protect the national culture a person actually identifies with—
after all, if it is personal autonomy that justifies the right to national self-determination,
we do not have reason to protect a national culture which does not enhance autonomy, let
alone one that actually undermines it.
To answer this challenge, we may recall Kymlicka‘s distinction between a national
culture and its character. While its character may vary from time to time, a national
culture may remain the same. Likewise, we may distinguish a national culture from the

56
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.86

57
Moore suggests that ―The problem that is identified by this line of criticism is that it seems unfair to limit
cultural protection only to groups that protect autonomy. This is counter-intuitive because, while the
argument ostensibly is designed to give recognition to a particular culture by the state, what this argument
in fact ends up showing is that cultural recognition is unjustified in many cases. It justifies cultural
recognition only when the culture is a liberal one.‖ See Moore, 2001, p.55.

29

norms or practices it includes. There are national cultures that contain norms or practices
that clearly weaken personal autonomy. However, this constitutes only a reason to reject
that particular norm or practice, but not a reason to reject the whole national culture.
Even if there were evidence that a national culture includes certain bad norms or practices,
this fact is a reason for reforming the national culture, not rejecting it completely.
Accordingly, the question raised by this challenge is the limit of a nation‘s right to
cultural preservation. This right allows a national group to preserve the traditions,
customs, and practices they inherit from its ancestors. Moore‘s challenge would imply
that aspects of a national culture that harm personal autonomy should not be
institutionalized. This challenge poses a threat only to the extent to a group may defend
its right to a certain practice in the name of cultural preservation. It does not entail that
the group should not be given other types of group-rights, such as the right to special
representation, or the right to preserve other traditional practices, which still promote
personal autonomy.
58

Moreover, this challenge is, according to Tamir, self-defeating. The value of
national identity for the autonomy of an individual depends on its being accepted by the
individual.
59
When one identifies with a national culture and incorporates its norms and
other elements into his personality—even in spite of certain norms that undermine
personal autonomy—, this culture actually supports his autonomy. Therefore, to protect
personal autonomy, we need to protect its actual basis, namely, the national culture with

58
A different response is discussed by Tamir, who suggests that this challenge is self-defeating.

59
Tamir suggests that ―... this is a self-defeating proposition since the instrumental value of a culture is
contingent on its being accepted. It is only when we choose to accept our cultural affiliations as well as the
values suggested by them, that culture can indeed assume its instrumental value.‖ See Tamir, 1992, p.36.

30

which one actually identifies. There is no identity-independent criterion to determine if a
national culture enhances one‘s autonomy. So long as one identifies with a national
culture, the culture constitutes the basis for her personal autonomy and empowers her.
On the other hand, a national culture that is not accepted, valued, or identified with
by a person cannot be the source of autonomy for that person, even if it would in general
enhance the autonomy of persons (when accepted).
60
As mentioned in the last section, if a
person has to switch to another national culture, she has to undergo a lengthy and
complicated process. Instead of empowering the person, such a process usually hinders
her autonomy. Thus, we still have reason to protect the national culture people actually
identify with because another culture, no matter how valuable, cannot improve an
individual‘s autonomy. Here, the lesson is that a national culture is valuable not because
it promotes individual autonomy, but because for a person who identifies with the culture,
it is a pre-condition for her personal autonomy.
61

1.2.3 Third Objection
Many have questioned whether the claim that a national culture is a precondition for
personal autonomy implicitly assumes an implausible conception of the person—what
Michael Sandel calls the embedded self, and Tamir the contextual individual. This
conception of personhood assumes that people are profoundly affected by their national

60
This point can be compared to Dworkin‘s endorsement constraint, see Kymlicka, 1995, p.81.

61
Gans discusses a similar argument where he suggests that the argument from autonomy (or what he calls
the argument from freedom) by itself cannot justify a right to protect the national culture of our actual
identity. However, the argument from autonomy and the argument from identity together can do so. See
Gans, 2003, pp.39-46.

31

background and can hardly ever reflectively think about their national identity or detach
themselves from such attachment. This seems to be a rather questionable conception of
personal identity, as it implies that national membership cannot be a matter of choice.
Most of us do not feel that we are completely determined or constrained by our national
culture. As mentioned earlier, most of us can reflect on our national attachment; it is not
unusual for a person to question the norms and practices in her culture. How could the
conception of personal identity described here account for the possibility of such
reflective thinking? Wouldn‘t it entail that we cannot reflect on or question our national
identity?
According to Kymlicka, the fact that the self-identity of a person is profoundly
shaped by her national culture does not mean that a person cannot reflectively think about
her national attachment. It still is possible for her, upon reflection, to be detached from
some, if not all, parts of her personal identity, so that she can examine particular aspects
of her attachment— ―the process of ethical reasoning is always one of comparing one
‗encumbered‘ potential self with another ‗encumbered‘ potential self.‖
62
Even though a
person cannot be completely detached from her conceptions of the good, this does not
mean that she cannot reflect on them. A person can, through reflection, keep or discard a
part of her attachment, and this includes her attachment to different aspects of her
national culture. This allows the person to reflectively examine the value of the
constituent elements of her national identity. Thus, national identity can be a matter of

62
See Kymlicka, 1989, pp.52-3.

32

choice.
63
Even though national identity constitutes an essential part of personal identity,
this does not mean that national identity can never be altered or modified.

1.2.4 Fourth Objection
Because most members of the same national group do not have personal
relationships with each other, and because they often have different interpretations of
their national history and culture, one‘s relationship with other members of the group is,
as Anderson puts it, imagined.
64
A nation is not a real community like a family, whose
members are connected by blood ties. The relationships between members of a national
community are preserved by the relationship one has with the national community. This
relation is imagined, as individual members may have rather different interpretations and
expectations of their own culture. Still, in their minds, they believe that they have certain
special relations with each other by virtue of sharing the same national culture.
65
Doesn‘t
this imply that national identity is irrational and not defensible?
First, Miller suggests that ―it may not be rational to discard beliefs, even if they
are, strictly speaking, false, when they can be shown to contribute significantly to the
support of valuable social relations.‖
66
Myths regarding the origin of a nation are usually
false. However, if they enhance the well-being of individuals, then so long as they do not

63
See Tamir, 1993, p.33.

64
See Anderson, 1983.

65
Margalit and Raz make a similar point, when they suggest that nations are ―anonymous groups with
mutual recognition secured by general characteristics.‖ See Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.447.

66
Miller believes that the myth of nations has at least two merits: first, it represents ―a real continuity
between generations‖; second, it plays a moralizing role by encouraging us to look up to the virtue of our
ancestors. See Miller, 1995, pp.35-6.

33

hurt anyone—if individuals do not take the myths literally
67
— such myths can be an
acceptable part of life.
In addition, it might be irrational for a person to believe that she has a special tie
or even duty toward a complete stranger just because the stranger shares her national
membership. Nonetheless, a person can still have a special, meaningful tie to her national
culture. There are two different relationships in play— one between a person and her co-
national, and one between her and her national culture. It may not be clear if a person
has a special tie with another individual just by virtue of their common membership in a
national culture. Nevertheless, because one‘s national culture normally has a deep impact
on one‘s conception of the good and her self-identity, it is only human for a person to
want to preserve her national membership.
Moreover, as Tamir argues, even if one‘s relationship with her national culture is
imagined, this does not mean that it is imaginary.
68
Many of the most important forms of
relationships of life are imagined. For instance, the friendship between two best friends is
secured by their shared belief. Thus, even though one‘s relationship with her national
culture is imagined and a national community is an imagined community, one‘s
relationship with her national culture can still be meaningful.
Finally, although members of the same national community may have different
understandings of their own national culture, this difference need not undermine the unity
of a nation. Consider again Kymlicka‘s distinction between a national culture and its

67
Thank Professor Marmor for pointing this out to me.

68
See Tamir, 1995, p.423; Moore, 2001, pp.13-14.

34

character.
69
Even though its character varies from time to time, the national culture stays
the same. Thus, even if members have different conceptions of their national culture, or
even if the character of this culture changes from time to time, members can still identify
with the same national group.

1.2.5 Autonomy and Identity
Before I move on to the next section, I should discuss one commonly accepted way
of categorizing the moral significance of a national identity. Some philosophers, such as
Gans and Moore, divide the arguments for national identity into two categories: one
based on the interest a person has in having some source of autonomy and the other on
the interest in preserving one’s existing national identity.
70
These two interests
presumably are distinct and provide different justifications for protecting people‘s
interests in national identity.
Nevertheless, I believe that the first argument cannot justify the right to protect the
culture one actually identifies with without appealing either to the fact that people
actually identify with the culture, or to the fact that the culture has already shaped one‘s
autonomy. There are two ways to understand the first type of argument: one is to read it
as suggesting that people need some national culture to construct and shape their personal
autonomy; the other is to read it as suggesting that a person‘s national culture is the

69
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.104.

70
Gans divides arguments for national identity into two arguments: freedom-based and identity-based
arguments. See Gans, 2003, pp.40-9. Moore makes a similar division and suggests that one version
―focuses on the internal relationship between culture and autonomy‖, while the other focuses on the claim
that ―cultures are important to individual self-identity or individual self-respect.‖, See Moore, pp.53-73.

35

actual source of her personal autonomy. The first reading cannot justify the right to
adhere to the culture one actually identifies with, because so long as some national
culture is available, this interest would be protected adequately. On the other hand, as we
see in 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, to protect the interest people have in national identity, the culture
has to be the one people actually identify with. Thus, only the second reading, which
implies that one‘s national culture is the source of her autonomy, can explain why she has
an interest in adhering to the culture she actually identifies with (or as Gans puts it,
―adheres to‖) – namely, because it is the source of her autonomy.

1.3 What is National Self-Determination?
Now that I have clarified what a national group is and its moral significance, I
will go on to explain what national self-determination is. Essentially, it involves solving
the problems of a national community or culture by appealing to political means, namely,
by obtaining more rights or more political authority. For instance, there are many
different reasons why members of a national culture would demand self-determination.
The reasons usually refer to some correlation between the condition of their national
culture and the well-being of its members. Because their national cultures are neglected,
marginalized, endangered, denigrated, or oppressed, members of the national group can
undergo a great deal of inconvenience or even suffering and humiliation in their own
domestic society. To safeguard their culture and to secure the well-being of its members,
national communities sometimes need to eliminate or at least reduce external
interferences from non-members. They need more rights so that they can have more

36

control over their own lives and wellbeing. Rights of self-determination can help
eliminate external interference from non-members. They give the members of the
national group more control of their own public affairs and allow them to protect their
interests. Hence, national groups often demand rights to self-determination.
Many other different political ideas or ideals also share the name of national self-
determination. In the following paragraphs, I will clarify the principle of national self-
determination by contrasting it with three other principles: civic nationalism, ethnic
nationalism, and democratic self-rule.

1.3.1 Cultural v. Civic Nationalism
Gellner suggests that ―Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds
that the political and the national unit should be congruent [italics added].‖
71
This
characterization is very brief and sketchy. Depending on the justification for this
arrangement, two different principles can be seen as satisfying this description: the
principle of cultural nationalism and the principle of civic nationalism. Cultural
nationalism differs from civic nationalism in both its subject matter and its demands.
Cultural nationalism holds that members of the same national community should also
belong to the same political community, be it a sovereign state or a sub-state, tribal
government. This theory takes the thriving of a national culture as the end. Demands for
the relevant political powers, such as rights to self-government or special representation,
are seen as merely means to achieving the end.

71
See Gellner, 1983. p.1.

37

Civic nationalism, on the other hand, holds that citizens of the same state should
share to a certain degree the same public culture. Here, the prosperity of the state is seen
as the end, while forming a common (political or non-political) culture among citizens
from diverse national backgrounds is seen as the means to secure the interests of the state.
Civic nationalism holds very important insights for the smooth functioning of
modern pluralistic societies. Where citizens have diverse or even conflicting personal
values, sharing some civic culture can help to resolve most of the apparent clashes me
effectively. Besides, the shared civic culture need not be comprehensive. Even a very thin
consensus among citizens to submit themselves to the authority of the government
whenever disputes arise can greatly enhance the stability of a society.
Nonetheless, my focus in this dissertation is on cultural nationalism, not civic
nationalism. I will not discuss the extent to which governments are allowed to foster a
common civic culture among their citizens. My interest is in knowing whether a national
community can ever be justified in demanding certain political power to protect its
national culture. I am primarily concerned with figuring out if and how, from a liberal
point of view, the international community should respond to or accommodate the
demand of a national community to protect its culture. In this dissertation, I use ―national
self-determination‖ to mean ―cultural nationalism‖. I will use these two terms
interchangeably.

38

1.3.2 Cultural v. Ethnic Nationalisms
As mentioned in 1.1.6, the concept of a national group is often confused with that
of an ethnic one. It is, therefore, not surprising that cultural nationalism is often mistaken
for ethnic nationalism.
72
While cultural nationalism involves the demand of a national
community to be given the political authority to collectively govern their group affairs,
ethnic nationalism involves a demand of the ethnic group to rule itself. Unlike cultural
nationalism, which involves a more complicated process of acquiring membership, ethnic
nationalism, according to Nielsen, ―defines membership in the nation in terms of
descent.‖
73
Membership in an ethnic group is determined entirely by objective criteria.
The principle is, as Nielsen describes it, exclusionist. It sees difference in ethnicity as
justifying the exclusion of members of another ethnicity. This is a form of racism: it is
morally arbitrary and intrinsically bad.
On the other hand, cultural nationalism regards ethnicity as neither necessary nor
sufficient for membership. What determines membership in a national group, according
to cultural nationalists, is a combination of both subjective and objective factors.
74
A
person is a member if she identifies with the national culture. Membership depends
mainly on subjective identity, and persons of other ethnicites may become members if

72
A distinction was made between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. See Coulture, Nielsen,
Seymour, 1996, p.3. See also Gans, pp.26-9; Moore, 2001, p.6. Tamir uses the word ‗people‘ to designate a
group defined by common ancestry, see Tamir, 1993, p.65.

73
See Nielsen, 1996-97.p.44.

74
Some philosophers make a distinction between cultural and national identity. For example, Moore
suggests that national identity is a form of political identity while cultural identity is not. See Moore, 2001,
p.70-71.

39

they come to share and identify with the national culture. Cultural nationalism need not
be exclusionist.
1.3.3 National Self-Determination v. Democratic Self-Rule
Lastly, national self-determination is often confused with the idea of democratic
self-rule. Tamir points out that there is an important distinction between the cultural and
the democratic version of national self-determination.
75
The former advocates the right of
national communities to preserve their cultural uniqueness. The latter advocates the
rights of individuals to participate in the governing of their public affairs. It is not
confined to members of national communities and is mainly concerned with giving
people the power to participate in democratic decision-making. Specifically, it is
concerned with government by the people, while the people are not necessarily members
of the same national community.

1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defined what a national community is—it has an
encompassing culture, a history, a culture formed and preserved by public institutions,
members who identify themselves with the group and culture, and a historical homeland.
I have also explained the significance of national identity—it is important because there
is an intimate correlation between a national culture and the well-being of its members. I
have also explained what a demand for national self-determination involves—it is a
request by a national group to be given the authority to determine their group affairs. It is

75
See Tamir, 1993, p.69.

40

a demand to either the current state government or the international community for
political autonomy. The aim is to be free from the political control or influence of others
who are not also members of the group. The objective is ultimately to be free from the
political control or influence of non-members.

41

Chapter Two—Does a National Community Have the Right to Establish a Sub-state
Autonomous Government?

In Chapter One, I discussed the importance of national identity and explained why
the relevant interests should be recognized and protected by political institutions.
Naturally, the next step in our inquiry is to discuss which political institution(s) would be
appropriate to protect these interests, or to what kind of rights they give rise.
One of the rights frequently demanded by national communities is the right to self-
government.
76
Members of the same national community often wish to establish their
own autonomous government so that they can collectively manage their public affairs and
be free from the interference of nonmembers.
The right to self-government can refer to more than one type of right: the right to
establish an independent, sovereign state and the right to establish a sub-state,
autonomous government. In this chapter, I will discuss arguments for the right of a
national community to build a sub-state government. The right of a national community
to build an independent, sovereign state will be discussed in Chapter Three.
To be clear, a sub-state, autonomous government is one that is under the
jurisdictional authority of a sovereign state. It has limited sovereign authority. Some
examples are the Indian tribal reservations across North America and the province of
Quebec in Canada. In general, these governments have substantive political power over

76
In this chapter, I use ―the right to self-government‖ and ―the right to build a sub-state government‖
interchangeably to mean the same right of a national community to establish a sub-state, autonomous
government.

42

the internal affairs of their societies. For instance, they often have authority over
linguistic and educational policies. Different sub-state governments may also have
different degrees of political authority. Some forms of sub-state governments are a tribal
government, an autonomous district, and a state in a confederation. They have different
degrees of authority over different types of affairs.
Many philosophers, e.g., Kymlicka, Gans, Patten, and Moore, argue for the right of
a national community to build a sub-state government.
77
In general, these arguments
appeal to the value of historical claims, some understanding of democratic equality, or
some combination of both. Because these arguments cannot be divided neatly according
to the values they appeal to, I will discuss them according to the strategies employed by
these philosophers. I will argue that Moore‘s historical argument for indigenous self-
government provides the strongest defense for giving indigenous groups the right to self-
government. However, although the argument applies to indigenous communities, it does
not apply to other non-indigenous national groups such as the Francophone in Quebec.
Does a non-indigenous national community, then, have the right to sub-state self-
government?
I will argue that it does not. Under certain circumstances, it may be a good policy to
allow a non-indigenous national community to build its own sub-state government.
However, this is not a right.
Because I discussed the arguments for national identity in Chapter One, I will not
repeat them in this chapter. Instead, I will assume that the importance of national identity

77
See Kymlicka, 1995; Gans, 2003; Patten, 2002, pp.558-586; Moore, 2003.

43

is established and move on to discuss arguments for the right of a national community to
establish a sub-state government.

2.1 Three Different Types of National Communities
Before I start, I should point out that there are three different types of groups
which may fall under the category of a national community: an indigenous group, a
national group, and a polyethnic group. From the standpoint of national identity, these
groups may appear similar, as all three are defined by national identity. Nevertheless,
they are different in at least one important aspect. Specifically, they have all become a
part of the current society via different routes.
An indigenous group is a group that has historically been residing in its current
territorial area. These groups have been labeled thus precisely because settlers or
immigrants subsequently moved into the area. Examples of an indigenous group are the
Indian tribes across North America. They came to be a part of the society by deceit,
settlement, and/or colonization. An indigenous group has a commonly recognized
historical claim over the area of their historical residence.
On the other hand, there are national groups that are not the historical residents of a
current territorial area. They become permanent resident via voluntary immigration or
settlement into the area. For the sake of convenience, I will label them national
communities in this chapter. Members of such a group often share a common language
and culture. An example is the Francophone Quebec in Canada. A national group may

44

have some kind of claim over the current territorial area. However, it lacks the kind of
historical claim an indigenous group has.
78

A polyethnic group consists of immigrants who are of a different national origin
than the mainstream society, for instance, residents of Chinatown or Thai town. Although
they give up their original citizenship and voluntarily join the new society, they still want
to preserve certain aspects of their national identity and practice some of their traditions
or customs.
As we will see, although national identity plays an important role in defining these
groups, the means by which they enter into the current society will have an important
effect on their claims to self-government. In the following section, I will begin with a
discussion of what I believe is the strongest defense of the right to self-government,
namely, Moore‘s historical argument for indigenous groups.

2.2 Moore‘s Historical Argument
While members of other types of national groups became part of the current
society because they voluntarily joined or immigrated, many indigenous groups were
involuntarily incorporated into the current society. Though we might not have a detailed
account of how indigenous communities were incorporated, Moore suggests that ―the
basic facts of indigenous dispossession, marginalization, conquest, and colonization in

78
This is not to say that they have no claim over the current jurisdictional territory. They may come to have
claim over the area by reverse possession. However, they do not have the kind of historical claim an
indigenous group has.

45

the America and Australasia are undisputed.‖
79
These events lead to the disadvantageous,
minority status of most indigenous communities today. Thus, Moore suggests that, so
long as these facts are true, an indigenous group has a claim based on rectifactory justice.
That is, they should be compensated because their disadvantageous status has been
caused by these events. Because Moore‘s historical argument appeals to the value of
historical claims, her argument applies only to groups with these claims, i.e., indigenous
groups, but not to other non-indigenous national communities.
Even so, the historical claim (to rectify past injustice) does not automatically justify
the right of an (involuntarily incorporated) indigenous group to self-government. To
rectify past injustice, other forms of reparation are available. Why is the right to self-
government necessary?
80

Regarding this point, Moore emphasizes that there is a second important factor we
should take into account—that is, the jurisdictional authority of the current society.
Moore points out that the jurisdictional authority of the current society over indigenous
groups is questionable for two reasons. First, the current society has manifestly failed to
work in the best interest of these groups.
81
Second, the indigenous groups were excluded
from the process by which the current state government was created.
82
That is, they never
agreed to be a part of the current society. For these two reasons, an indigenous group can
reasonably question or perhaps even reject the jurisdictional authority of the society.

79
See Moore, 2003, p.90.

80
See Moore, 2003, p.99.

81
See Moore, 2003, p.100.

82
See Moore, 2003, p.101.

46

Because the jurisdictional authority of the current society over the indigenous
government is questionable, Moore concludes that an indigenous group has the right to
renegotiate the terms of incorporation with the current government, and this includes the
right to self-government.
One might wonder if the historical claim also justifies a prima facie right of an
indigenous group to establish its own independent state. Moore did not discuss the
issue.
83
Instead, she seems to believe that it ―makes more sense‖ for an indigenous group
to pursue self-government within the framework of the current state.
84

In any case, Moore‘s argument of historical claim provides the strongest defense
for the right of an indigenous group to self-government. Indeed, if an indigenous
community were unjustly incorporated into the current society, they have at least a prima
facie claim to restore the status quo ante. This claim is not enjoyed by other types of
national groups that do not have a history of dispossession or colonization. This claim is
not absolute, but has to be weighed against other claims of the current society.
If Moore‘s argument applies only to an indigenous group with a historical claim,
then what about a non-indigenous group which does not have this claim? Does it also
have the right to self-government? In the following sections, I will discuss arguments in
favor of this right. I will begin with a discussion of Kymlicka‘s equality argument.

83
See Moore, 2003, pp.89-118. In addition to this historical argument, Moore also has a different argument
in favor of drawing state boundaries in such a way that gives expression to the aspiration of nationalists to
self-government. See Moore, 2001.

84
See Moore, 2003, p.104.

47

2.3 Kymlicka‘s Equality Argument
In his book Mulcicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka defends the right of a national
community to build a sub-state, autonomous government.
85
This right, along with special
representation and polyethnic rights, is included in a package of group-differentiated
rights given to national communities.
86

2.3.1 Justifying Group-Differentiated Rights
Kymlicka‘s justification for the right to self-government is a part of his larger
project to justify the group-differentiated rights given to national communities. These
rights are meant to protect the interests people have in national culture, membership, and
identity. They are referred to as group-differentiated because, unlike those assigned to
individual citizens, they are assigned to a group or members of the group.
87
One can
enjoy these rights only by virtue of being a member of a national minority.
Because Kymlicka‗s support for the self-government right of a national community
is derived from his support for group-differentiated rights, to understand his argument for
the right of a national community to establish a sub-state government, we first need to

85
The right to special representation is the right of a national community to have special representation in
the legislature. Polyethnic rights are rights that protect people‘s interests in the practice of their traditions
and customs. See Kymlicka, 1995, pp.26-33.

86
Kymlicka uses the term group-differentiated right and group-specific right interchangeably. I will follow
his terminology here. See Kymlicka, 1995, pp.26-33.

87
When I say that group-differentiated rights are assigned to a group or members of the group, some might
understand it as suggesting the right-holder is the national group as a whole but not the individual members.
However, this is not the case. According to Kymlicka, ―What matters is not whether the right is collective
(as opposed to individual), but that it is group-differentiated…Whether these group-specific rights are
attributed to individual Indians or Indian bands/tribes is, for critics, largely irrelevant.‖ In short, Kymlicka
needs not assume that the right-holder is the collective. See Kymlicka, 1995, pp.45-48.

48

understand his argument for group-differentiated rights. Kymlicka‘s argument for this
right involves three crucial steps. First, he explains why a national community is singled
out. Because the right is group-differentiated according to national membership,
Kymlicka has to explain why national culture, membership, and identity are significant.
88

That is, he has to explain why we should be concerned with national membership or
identity. Second, Kymlicka explains why the usual basic rights or civic liberties assigned
to individuals are not enough to protect their group-specific interests. That is, he explains
why individual rights are not enough and why we also need rights that are group-specific
according to national membership. Lastly, Kymlicka explains why a national community
should be granted the right to self-government in particular.
Because I discussed Kymlicka‘s argument for national identity, i.e., his answer to
the first question, in Chapter One, I will not repeat his argument again. Here, I will
assume that his arguments successfully justify the value of national identity. The question
I am interested in is, assuming that national identity is indeed important, does this justify
the right of a national community to establish a sub-state government?
While the first step explains why national identity matters, the second step explains
why this particular type of group should be granted certain group-differentiated rights.
This step explains why the relevant interests should be protected and recognized in
institutional settings. Kymlicka‘s argument for recognizing group-differentiated rights for
a national community is composed of three different arguments: the value of cultural

88
There can be other types of group-differentiated rights, too. For instance, in some societies, women are
given the right to have special representation in the legislature. Another example would be the elder
citizens‘ right to certain social welfare.

49

diversity (the diversity argument), the role of historical agreements (the historical
argument), and the equality argument.
89
Among these three, the equality argument is the
most crucial.
First, the diversity argument appeals to interests the mainstream society has in
cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is regarded as valuable because it allows members of
the society to have more options. Polyethnic groups often appeal to the value of cultural
diversity to defend polyethnic rights.
90
However, this argument cannot explain why a
national community should be allowed to establish an autonomous government or why it
should be granted rights which protect its culture, as these rights would limit cultural
diversity within the national community and restrict the options available to its own
members.
91
In addition, Kymlicka suggests that ―[b]ecause [the diversity argument]
appeals to the interests of the larger society, it cannot explain why minorities should be
able to decide for themselves whether or how to maintain their culture.‖
92
Even if cultural
diversity is indeed valuable, its value cannot explain why the larger society would be
willing to limit its own freedom for the sake of cultural diversity. Although the diversity
argument may support polyethnic rights, it does not provide a solid defense for the right
of a national community to self-government.

89
See Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 107-30.

90
Polyethnic rights refer to rights of polyethnic groups to practice their culture. An example is the
exemption of motorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs in Canada. For a detailed discussion, see Kymlicka, 1995,
pp.30-31.

91
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.123.

92
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.123.

50

What about historical agreements? While Moore‘s historical argument focuses on
the historical claims indigenous communities have over the territory of their historical
residence, Kymlicka‘s historical argument focuses on the role of historical agreements
actually made between various national communities and the current society.
93
Kymlicka
points out that these agreements have often been blatantly ignored or unilaterally
suspended by the government.
94
A reasonable response to this phenomenon would be to
honor these historical agreements. However, according to Kymlicka, many historical
agreements are unfair or outdated. Thus, the value and status of these agreements is not
clear. Consequently, we should not rely solely on historical agreements. We have to take
into consideration what the principle of equality would say about these agreements.
Kymlicka thus suggests that historical agreements should be reinterpreted, and that when
talking about group-differentiated rights, both the principle of equality and historical
arguments should be taken into account.
Because the diversity argument cannot justify a national community‘s right to self-
government and because historical agreements do not provide decisive guidance,
Kymlicka‘s argument for group-differentiated rights depends crucially on the equality
argument. This argument holds that members of a national community are systematically
treated unequally and that this inequality needs to be redressed.

93
Moore criticizes Kymlicka for failing to recognize the historical claims indigenous communities have.
See Moore, 2003, p. 92.

94
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.116.

51

To show how members of a national community are treated unequally as a group,
Kymlicka points out the problems ignored by the view of benign neglect.
95
According to
this view, because individual citizens are given equal rights and resources, the
government should not give any national community any special, group-specific rights,
as these arrangements would undermine equality and give members of the community an
unfair advantage. We should ignore the cultural differences within a society, and if a
group wants to preserve its national culture, it should use its own rights and resources.
However, Kymlicka argues that the view of benign neglect is not benign at all
because it actually leaves a national community in a disadvantageous position.
[G]overnment decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and
state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting
the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state
unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages
others [italics added].‖
96

While the benign neglect view suggests that equal rights and resources given to
individual citizens are enough for liberal equality, Kymlicka shows us how members of a
national minority are treated unequally systematically, even if they have the same rights
and resources as everyone else. In other words, with regard to certain social institutions,
policies, or affairs, it is impossible for a society to refrain from making a decision and
remain completely culturally neutral. In those cases, social institutions cannot avoid
favoring one national group, often the majority group, over others.
97
As a result, those

95
See Kymlicka, 1995, pp.107-8.

96
See Kymlicka, p.108.

97
See Kymlicka, pp.108-115.

52

whose national identity is different from that of the majority are relegated to a
disadvantageous position: they are often outvoted by the majority, their language and
culture marginalized and in decline. To maintain their national culture, members of the
minority group have to spend a part of their resources on the preservation of their culture.
This is a cost that members of the majority do not have to bear; they can take for granted
the recognition of their language and culture.
98

Consequently, we have reason to redress this inequality arising from national
membership. Because one incurs this disadvantage as a result of one‘s national
membership, only members of the relevant national communities suffer from this
inequality. This is why the relevant rights are group-differentiated according to national
membership.
So far, the equality argument explains why, in addition to the equal rights granted to
each citizen, equality requires that we recognize rights that are group-specific according
to national membership.
99
Kymlicka‘s argument demonstrates clearly how members of a
national community can suffer from inequality by virtue of their national membership.
This provides a solid reason for redressing this particular inequality, which happens only

98
Kymlicka makes a similar point in the book Liberalism, Community, and Culture. There, Kymlicka asks
us to consider the circumstances of two boys with different national memberships. One boy is from the
Anglophone community, which is the dominant majority group in Canada. The other is an Inuit boy, whose
community is a minority and whose culture is in decline. Even if we give these two boys equal rights and
resources, we can imagine that, to protect his culture from decline, the Inuit boy would have to spend more
resources to save his culture, and this is a price that the Anglophone boy would not have to pay. See
Kymlicka, 1989, p.189.

99
Kymlicka argues that ―it is legitimate, and indeed unavoidable, to supplement traditional human rights
with minority rights. A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state must include both universal
rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights, or
‗special status‘ for minority cultures.‖ See Kymlicka, 1995, p.6.

53

to members of a minority group. Individual rights are not enough to offset this inequality;
group-differentiated rights should be in place as well.

2.3.2 Why Self-Government?
Lastly, Kymlicka has to explain why self-government right should be given to a
national community. Even if we can prove that a national community is unfairly treated,
as Moore suggests, we do not yet know how it should be compensated.
100
Likewise, even
if we know that members of a national community suffer from inequality as a result of
their membership, we do not yet know how we should redress this inequality or which
institution should be set up to compensate for their loss.
101
Why, then, should a national
group be given the right to build an autonomous government?
We can find a short discussion by Kymlicka on why the right to self-government is
justified. His primary reason is that equality calls for equal benefits and opportunities for
different national minorities.
[W]e should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to
maintain themselves as a distinct culture, if they so choose. This ensures that that
good of cultural membership is equally protected for the members of all national
groups. In a democratic society, the majority nation will always have its language
and societal culture supported, and will have the legislative power to protect its
interests in culture-affecting decisions. The question is whether fairness requires
that the same benefits and opportunities should be given to national minorities.
The answer, I think, is clearly yes.
Hence group-differentiated self-government rights compensate for unequal
circumstances which put the members of the minority cultures at a systemic

100
See Moore, p.99.
101
Several philosophers argue that we cannot defend a particular institution merely by defending the
intrinsic worth of an important value. See Gans, p.41; Marmor 233-4;. Tamir .

54

disadvantage in the cultural market-place, regardless of their personal choices in
life.
102

Therefore, to give members of a national community equal opportunity to protect their
national culture and to give them benefits equal to those received by the majority, a
national community should be given the right to self-government.

2.3.3 First Critique of Kymlicka‘s Argument
Does Kymlicka‘s argument successfully justify the right of a national community to
establish a sub-state government?
Kymlicka‘s argument successfully shows us how members of a national minority
can suffer from systematic and structural inequality, even if they have the same rights and
resources as other citizens. As expected, the principle of equality requires that we redress
these inequalities. Even so, it is not clear why doing so must entail granting the right to
self-government. To redress these problems of inequality, other measures of
compensation are available. For instance, if a national minority lacks substantive political
power, they could be given the right to special representation in the legislature. Their
language could be recognized in governmental institutions and taught in school.
Additionally, because their cultures, traditions, and practices are in decline, they could be
granted rights that protect these interests. A society could treat different national groups
equally by officially recognizing all of their languages and cultures.
103
For every

102
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.113.

103
Or, a society can treat different national groups equally by recognizing none of their languages, as is the
case in Singapore. In Singapore, to show equal concern for all the ethnic groups in the society—Chinese,

55

disadvantage a national group faces, we can, in principle, find a corresponding
compensation to redress that inequality. Why, then, is the right to self-government
necessary?
Buchanan raises a similar objection. Whereas Kymlicka holds that a national
community should be granted special representation, self-government, and polyethnic
rights, Buchanan questions if it is necessary to grant all three:
[E]ither ‗polyethnic rights‘ protect a culture well enough so that it can supply a
meaningful context for choice for its members or they do not. If they do, then why
do any cultural groups, including nations, need rights of self-government in
addition? If ‗polyethnic‘ rights do not protect cultures well enough to provide a
meaningful context for choice, then every cultural group must have self-
government, and ‗polyethnic rights‘ are simply a waste of time.
104

In any case, Kymlicka needs to explain what it is that the right to self-government can do
but polyethnic rights cannot. Otherwise, if polyethnic rights provide adequate protection
for a national culture, it is not clear why a national community is also entitled to the right
to self-government. It may make for a good policy, but it is hardly a right.

Kymlicka can respond to this challenge by distinguishing between two different
types of goods that are unequally distributed among different national communities: those
that can be redressed without the right to self-government, and those that cannot be
redressed without this right. Whenever we say that there is inequality, we mean that there
is some good that is not equally distributed among members of different groups. The

Malay, and Indian—the official language is English, which is not the native language of any of the ethnic
groups. The important holidays for each of the national communities are equally recognized.

104
See Buchanan, 1996, p.301.

56

unequal distribution of the goods of language, culture, and political power among
different national communities can be redressed by granting a national community
special representation and polyethnic rights. These rights are enough to ensure that the
disadvantages a national group incurs are made up for and that the national group has
equal rights and resources as the majority group.
On the other hand, there is also a second type of good that is unequally distributed
among different national communities. Inequality in this case cannot be redressed without
the right to establish an autonomous government. To defend the right of a national
community to self-government, Kymlicka must explain what this good is. The answer to
this question is the key to justifying the right to self-government. What exactly is this
good?
Unfortunately, Kymlicka does not clarify what this particular type of good is, or
even what it could be. Nonetheless, there are two clues one can follow to figure out the
answer. First, the answer can most likely be found if one analyzes what equal benefit,
opportunity, or circumstance for different national communities entails.
105
In the passage
cited earlier, Kymlicka talks about equal ―opportunity for all national groups to preserve
their cultures‖, ―equal distribution of the good of cultural membership‖, and
―compensating for unequal circumstances‖. However, he does not explain in detail what
equality in these areas means. Thus, it still is not clear how concerns for equality would
entail the right to self-government.

105
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.113.

57

Nevertheless, there is a second clue we can follow, namely, the right Kymlicka
intends to argue for. Because the right Kymlicka intends to argue for, i.e., the right to
self-government, is supposed to offset some benefit that the majority group enjoys while
the minority group does not, we may reasonably infer that Kymlicka believes that the
majority group enjoys the benefit of self-government in some sense, and that the same
benefit should also be granted to a national minority. This second clue should
presumably provide a more straightforward explanation why the right to self-government
would be justified. It should explain why special representation and polyethnic rights are
not enough, and why the right to self-government is also necessary.
I am not sure if this is the explanation Kymlicka has in mind, but given the
information available, it seems to be the best, though not the only, explanation. This
explanation would presume that the current belongs to the majority national group. This
is a questionable assumption because, as pointed out earlier, the state can recognize all of
the languages and cultures of different national communities. If a state officially
recognizes all of the national communities in its social institutions, it is not clear in what
sense a minority group can complain that its culture is not properly recognized.
Presumably, the only reason left would be that the majority has its own state, or a state
where it is the majority, but the minority does not.
There are two problems with this claim. First, it would entail that there is something
intrinsically bad about a multination state because no matter what the government does, it
cannot adequately recognize both the national culture and the identity of a minority. This
implies that the only way to treat different national communities equally is to give each

58

of them the right to build a state. Any multination state where one group is the dominant
majority and the other is not would be unfair to the minority group.
Second, it would entail not just the right of a national minority to establish a sub-
state government, but perhaps also the right to build its own state. If equal recognition of
national identity entails equal benefits and opportunities, shouldn‘t a national community
also be given the right to establish a state? This would give it even more substantive
power over its own affairs and ensure that its members receive the same benefit and
opportunities. It is not clear why we should stop at the right to sub-state government. The
right to build a state can better approximate the ideal of equal treatment. Presumably,
Kymlicka would not be bothered by this suggestion, as in his discussion of the right to
self-government, he suggests that we should be more open to the option of secession.
106

Alternatively, Kymlicka could have drawn the conclusion that multination states
should adopt a confederation system, such as the one in Switzerland, where each of the
constituent national communities is treated equally, as each has its own sovereign
government and is equally recognized at the state level.
In any case, if equal recognition requires that each national community receive the
same benefits, to be consistent, Kymlicka must hold that either a national group has the
right to establish a state or that a multination state should adopt a confederation system
where each constituent national community has its own autonomous government and
equal political power in the legislature. Both conclusions are somewhat different from
Kymlicka‘s original conclusion.

106
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.186.

59

Lastly, even if this theory of equal recognition can explain why the right to self-
government is justified, it still needs an argument. That is, we still need an explanation
why equal recognition of different national communities requires that each be given the
right to self-government. Kymlicka‘s argument is based on concerns for the
disadvantages members of a group incur by virtue of their national membership. As long
as the society can redress these disadvantages, these inequalities are rectified. However,
the claim that equal treatment of different national community requires that each have its
own government is different from the claim that the group is treated unfairly and that this
inequality needs to be redressed. This is s unless we can prove either that a state
government is the recognition of the dominant majority culture, or that each state can
only recognize one nation group. Otherwise, if the state government can recognizes every
national culture, how can we deny that the state is a multination state? In what sense can
we say that a national community is not properly recognized? The claim that a group has
the right to build a government entails more than the right to be redressed. We need to
know why we cannot recognize national identity in the usual political/social institutions
(such as language or cultural rights), but must also recognize it by granting the right to
self-government.
So far, the discussion is mere stipulation. I am not sure what Kymlicka would say in
response. Although Kymlicka does not have an argument for the claim that equal
recognition of national identity or culture requires that each national group be given the
right to self-government, Patten does discuss it. I will discuss Patten‘s argument in 2.5.
Next, I will move on to my second critique of Kymlicka‘s argument.

60

2.3.4 Second Critique of Kymlicka‘s Argument
The second problem in Kymlicka‘s general strategy is that the treatment he
prescribes for national and polyethnic groups leads to some difficulty. Since these group-
differentiated rights are rooted in national identity and culture, all types of national
communities— indigenous groups, national groups, and polyethnic groups— can enjoy
these rights. Notice that although Kymlicka distinguishes between national minorities and
immigrant, polyethnic groups, he does not distinguish between indigenous and non-
indigenous national communities.
107
In addition, because his argument for group-
differentiated rights is mainly defined by national culture, the rights entailed by his theory
apply to all three types of communities. As we will see very soon, this lack of distinction
leads to some confusion in the distribution of rights.
According to Gans, Kymlicka‘s argument cannot explain how we can justify our
differential treatment of national and polyethnic groups.
108
While many believe that a
national community should be granted the right to self-government, many do not believe
that a polyethnic group should enjoy the same right. However, in Kymlicka‘s discussion,
what is said of a national community, i.e., the importance of identity and the
corresponding inequality, applies equally to a polyethnic group. Thus, if a national
community should be granted the right to self-government because it suffers from certain
disadvantages, then a polyethnic group, which suffers in a similar manner and sometimes
to a greater extent, should equally be granted the right to self-government. In other words,

107
See Kymlicka, 1995, pp.11-25.

108
See Gans, 2003, p.48-9.

61

what Kymlicka says applies equally to national and polyethnic groups. Thus, if his
argument justifies the right to self-government for one group, it justifies the same right
for the other.
Kymlicka has a response to this objection. To begin with, he believes that there is
nothing inherently unjust about such arrangements.
109
That is, granting a polyethnic
group the right to self-government is acceptable. However, immigrants voluntarily move
into the host society, and in that case their claim to self-government is greatly
diminished.
110
In addition, they are usually too dispersed to form a government.
Nevertheless, if the society can afford to grant them the right to self-government,
Kymlicka believes that there might be circumstances under which this is acceptable.
I think that this response is not satisfactory. First, as Gans suggests, ―If the voluntary
nature of immigration is a good enough reason to silence claims to self-government, why
is it not sufficient grounds to also silence demands for polyethnic rights?‖
111
In other
words, Kymlicka‘s response would also entail that polyethnic groups do not have any
culture-based rights. This is in contradiction with his original conclusion. In addition, if a
polyethnic group had the right to self-government, this would entail that settlement is
justified. This contradicts almost every liberal theory of land entitlement.
112

Second, there is a good reason to question an immigrant group‘s right to self-
government. In Moore‘s argument of historical claim, we can find reasons why an

109
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.95.

110
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.63, 95.

111
See Gans, 2003, p.61.

112
See Buchanan, 2003.

62

indigenous group is justified in demanding the right to self-government. The reasons are
that the government fails to represent their interests and that they did not participate in
the creation of the current society. However, in the case of non-indigenous groups, if
their members voluntarily joined the society and if the government grants them special
representation and polyethnic rights—on what basis could they demand the right to self-
government? According to Buchanan, each part of the society has a legitimate
expectation for the long-term cooperation of its constituent parts.
113
Without any
supporting historical claim, recognizing the right of any group to self-government will
unjustifiably disrupt such expectation.
Thus, Kymlicka‘s response is not satisfactory. In the end, Kymlicka cannot say that
a polyethnic group does not have the right to self-government, but has to suggest that this
right is defeated or cannot be exercised for some reason. However, we do not think that
immigrant polyethnic groups have such a right at all. It is not that they have this right but
for some reason cannot exercise it. Rather, an immigrant group does not have the right to
self-government. Thus, Kymlicka‘s equality argument cannot account for the differential
treatments of national and polyethnic groups.

2.4 Gans‘s Argument
Gans adopts a strategy similar to that of Kymlicka‘s. According to Gans, national
self-determination involves three important theses: the adherence thesis, the historical

113
See Buchanan, 1991, pp. 87-90.

63

thesis, and the political thesis.
114
The adherence thesis holds that people have an
important interest in adhering to or preserving their national identity; the historical thesis
holds that people have an important interest in preserving the multi-
generational aspect of their national culture. The political thesis holds that these interests
should be protected by political institutions.
In his discussion of the political thesis, Gans takes for granted the idea that these
interests should be protected in the political institutions in society:
115

If it is true that the role of politics is to protect basic human interests, then the
political thesis according to which people‘s interest in adhering to their national
culture and in its existence for generations must be protected politically follows
from [italics added] the first two theses.
116

He believes that, so long as he can justify the adherence and the historical theses, the
relevant package of rights, which includes the right to self-government, would naturally
follow.
117
His main concern, then, is with explaining why a national community, but not a
polyethnic one, has the right to self-government. Gans gives two reasons why this is so.
First, in the case of a national group, its freedom-based interest should be realized via its
original culture.
118
Second, people have an important interest in protecting the

114
See Gans, 2003, p.39.

115
See Gans, 2003, pp.39-40; p.58.

116
See Gans, 2003, p.40.

117
Gans‘s package of right is slightly different from Kymlicka‘s. In addition to the right to special
representation, the right to self-government, and polyethnic rights, Gans believes that there is also a fourth
type of right, i.e., the right to cultural preservation. See Gans, pp.58-60.

118
See Gans, 2003, p.42, p.48.

64

meaningfulness of their endeavours.
119
Next, I will explain what Gans means by these
two reasons.
The adherence thesis includes two different types of interests: freedom- and identity-
based interests. The former refers to the interest people have in having access to some
national culture, so that they can construct and shape their personal autonomy.
120
The
latter refers to the interest people have in preserving their existent national identity.
121

According to Gans, both a national and a polyethnic group have identity-based interests
in their national cultures, and this explains why people need to be able to practice their
own national culture, traditions, and customs, whether they live in their homeland or not.
To the extent that people‘s interests in a national culture are identity-based, they should
be granted equivalent protection. Therefore, we cannot account for the differential
treatment of national and polyethnic groups by looking at identity-based interest, as it
justifies equal protection.
122
Identity-based interest cannot explain why a national group,
but not a polyethnic one, is entitled to the right to self-government.
On the other hand, we might justify differential treatment by looking at the freedom-
based interests of different groups. Gans suggests:

119
See Gans, 2003, pp.52-55.

120
See Gans, 2003, pp.40-3.

121
See Gans, 2003, pp.43-6.

122
According to Gans, if a philosopher tries to justify the right to self-government by referring to identity-
based interest, then the only way she can explain why a national but not a polyethnic group has a right to
self-government is to suggest that the right to self-government is the best while polyethnic rights the second
best way to protect the identity-based interest. This leads to the difficulty mentioned in 2.3. See p.18-9 of
this chapter. See Gans, 2003, pp.60-1.

65

[W]hen people‘s original culture is not distinct from the culture of their
endeavours, then their freedom-based interest in culture should be concretized by
means of this culture. This is why they should then be granted rights to self-
government and not just polyethnic rights.
123

Here, the original culture refers to the culture in which one was raised. The culture of
one‘s endeavour refers to the culture in which one makes her efforts in life.
124
For most
people, national groups included, these two cultures are the same. However, for an
immigrant, or a polyethnic group, they are different. Freedom-based interest is, to repeat,
the interest people have in having access to some national culture.
125
A person needs
access to some national culture because without it, her freedom or autonomy would be, as
Gans puts it, ―empty‖.
126
A national culture provides the material with which people can
construct and shape their freedom or autonomy.
127
In the case of a polyethnic group, this
is provided by the national culture of the new society into which they move. However, in
the case of a national group, its own culture should serve as the source of autonomy for
its members.
This claim sounds sensible enough because, in this case, the culture available to
them is their own original culture. Gans acknowledges that freedom-based interest cannot,
by itself, tell us how this interest should be distributed, or which culture should provide
the source of freedom. Nevertheless, there still are good reasons for a national

123
See Gans, 2003, p.48.

124
See Gans, 2003, p.47.

125
See Gans, 2003, pp.40-3.

126
For a detailed discussion of freedom-based interest, see Chapter One.

127
See Kymlicka, 1995.

66

community to realize this interest via its original culture: first, most people do identify
with this culture; second, ―the fruits of people‘s endeavours are normally produced and
continue to exist within their own national culture.‖
128

Gans‘s second reason why a national group should be given the right to self-
government is that people have an important interest in preserving the meaningfulness of
their endeavours.
129
While Moore and Kymlicka‘s historical arguments are based on the
claims a national community had in the past and are for that reason backward-looking,
Gans‘s historical thesis focuses on the interest a culture has in its future existence, and is
therefore, forward-looking. He believes that a national group has an interest in preserving
the multigenerational aspect of their culture. The reason that people strive to accomplish
something meaningful during their lifetime is because of the assumption that their
endeavours will make a difference in the world. Thus, people have an interest in
preserving the meaningfulness of their endeavours.
130
To protect these interests, we need
to preserve the cultural framework that makes these endeavours meaningful.
Cultural frameworks …do not only provide them with materials to construct their
lives and concretize their freedom, and do not only give meaning to the options
with which they provide people, .. but also form the sphere where the fruits of
human freedom take root, and where individuals‘ endeavours have a chance of
leaving their mark. Such cultural frameworks offer the prospect that others might
benefit from their endeavours or continue them. People living their lives,
expressing their personalities, or pursuing their projects within the frameworks of

128
See Gans, pp.42.

129
See Gans, 2003, p.55.

130
See Gans, 2003, p.53.

67

such cultures thus have a fundamental interest in the existence of such cultures
and in their endurance, independently of their own existence.
131

Therefore, to protect people‘s interest in preserving the meaningfulness of their
endeavours, we should also protect the cultural framework that allows their efforts to be
meaningful. For these two reasons, Gans suggests that a national group, but not a
polyethnic group, has the right to self-government. In addition to explaining why a
national group has the right to self-government, Gans also explains why a polyethnic
group does not have such a right. Very roughly, his reason is that an immigrant‘s life
efforts take place in her new culture. That is, the culture of her endeavours is the culture
of her new society, rather than her original society. Thus, she does not need her original
culture to preserve the meaningfulness of her endeavours.
132

2.4.2 Critique of Gans‘s Argument
The merit of Gans‘s argument is that it identifies the interest that distinguishes a
national group from a polyethnic one. While both national and polyethnic groups have an
interest in identifying with their original national culture, only a national group has an
interest in realizing its freedom-based interest via its original culture. In addition, the

131
See Gans, 2003, pp.53-4. In addition, Gans argues that ―the endeavour-based interest people have in
their culture is a key for answering these questions, because self-government is the optimal way to serve
this interest.... Yet, it does seem desirable to aspire ...for every nation to have one place in the world in
which such optimal protection is provided to its members‘ interest in the meaningfulness of their
endeavours. See Gans, p.64.

132
To be clear, Gans believes the first generation polyethnic group has the right, but is realized by the self-
government it enjoys in its homeland. The second generation polyethnic group does not have such a right.
See Gans, 2003, pp.52-55;61-3 .

68

interest in preserving the meaningfulness of its members‘ endeavours may justify a
national group‘s right to preserve its culture.
There may be several objections to this theory. For instance, one commonly raised
objection to the freedom-based argument is that so long as some national culture is
available, why does a person need her original national culture as her source of
autonomy?
133
There also are some questions about Gans‘s second reason: to what extent
can we reasonably expect our descendants to preserve our endeavours? Does this interest
entail a right to limit their freedom? I will not discuss these objections. Here, for the sake
of argument, I will assume that Gans is right: a national group‘s freedom-based interest
should be protected by its own original culture and people have an important interest in
preserving the meaningfulness of their endeavours. Does this justify the right of a
national group to self-government? I believe it does not.
Although Gans successfully identifies the different interests a national and a
polyethnic group have, he has yet to explain why a national group has the right to build a
sub-state government. The first reason, which suggests that the source of a national
community‘s autonomy should come from its original culture, only identifies the culture
which should serve as the source of autonomy for a particular group. Even if we agree
with Gans that, in the case of a national community, the source of autonomy for its
members should be its own culture, this does not tell us how we should preserve this
culture, or why this entails the right to self-government.

133
Gans discusses this point in his argument. See p.41.

69

Gans acknowledges that the first reason is not the most crucial justification for the
right of a national group to self-government. However, he believes that the second reason
provides the crucial justification; that is, the interest people have in preserving the
meaningfulness of their endeavours justifies this right. Still, even if one acknowledges
that people have an important interest in preserving the meaningfulness of their
endeavours, and even if this means that we need to protect the cultural framework that
allows them to do so, this still does not mean that the group should be entitled to the right
to self-government. As I suggested in my criticism of Kymlicka‘s argument, even if we
acknowledge that people have important interests in national culture and identity, and
even if we acknowledge that these interests should be protected in political institutions,
this does not immediately justify the right of a national group to self-government. There
may be alternative ways to preserve the meaningfulness of our endeavours; it is not clear
from Gans‘ argument how this interest entails the right to self-government. This right
might be the best or the easiest way to achieve the goal of preserving a cultural
framework, but this does not mean that a national group is entitled to this right.
In other words, even if the political thesis is correct, and the role of politics is to
protect the interests people have, this does not mean that the right to self-government is
justified, too. We have yet to decide which political institutions should protect these
interests and how society should protect them. Gans makes the same mistake as Kymlicka.
They both take for granted the assumption that, so long as they can prove the value or
importance of national culture or identity, the right to self-government will follow. This
is not an assumption they can make without argument.

70

2.5 Patten‘s Equal Recognition Argument
Patten‘s argument for national self-government is based on the interest people have
in having their national identity recognized. He believes that the recognition of national
identity is a good whose distribution should be regulated by the government. Thus, any
political institution that can promote the equal distribution of this good would, for this
reason, be justified. Because a multinational constitution, which recognizes the right of a
national group to (sub-state) self-government, is the best way to equalize the distribution
of recognition, any multination state should adopt such a constitution.
134

2.5.1 The Target Societies: Societies with Identity Pluralism
Before I explain his argument, I should first specify the kind of society Patten
intends his theory be applied to. His focus is on societies characterized by identity
pluralism. Upon hearing this label, one might immediately associate such a society with a
multination state. This would be imprecise. Although a multination state is often also a
society with identity pluralism (and vice versa), there is a subtle but important difference
between the two. The former is defined mainly by the identification with a culture; the
latter is defined mainly by its political aspiration, which, in turn, is rooted in its
identification with the culture.
Identifying with a group means having certain dispositions and attitudes toward that
group. For instance, members of a national group typically feel proud or ashamed of the

134
See Patten, pp.558-86.

71

conduct of other members, or of the achievements and failures of the group.
135

Furthermore, this identity involves a desire that the group ―enjoy some significant degree
of collective self-government as a group‖.
136
The focus on the desire for self-government
is what distinguishes Patten‘s argument from that of others.
Patten further clarifies that a society is identity-pluralistic if a part of the citizens
identify with the larger state, S, while the others identify with a subunit of the state, T.
137

An example of an identity-pluralistic society in this sense is Northern Ireland: some
citizens identify with the sub-unit of Ireland, while the others identify with the larger
state of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, a multinational society is not necessarily
identity-pluralistic if its constituent national groups do not aspire to establish its own
government. To my knowledge, Singapore can be considered multinational (as it is
composed of citizens with different national backgrounds) but not identity-pluralistic (as
none of the constituent group aspires to establish its own government).

2.5.2 The Good of Recognition
Now that I have explained the kind of societies Patten has in mind, I will assume
that my readers have some understanding of what he means by ‗a society with identity

135
See Patten, 2002, p.563-4.

136
According to Patten, ―To have a national identity focused on S or T, … is to have a set of attitudes and
dispositions with respect to the group of citizens who live in S or T. These attitudes and dispositions
include identification with the group, a propensity to feel pride and shame about actions on behalf of the
group, and the identification with some territory as the ‗homeland‘ of the group. One of the most important
attitudes associated with national identity is a more or less settled desire that the group should enjoy some
significant degree of collective self-government as a group: it is this desire—shared by most members of
the group— that helps to distinguish a national identify from other forms of identity that people might
share.‖ See Patten, 2002, pp.563-4.

137
See Patten, 2002, p.563-4.

72

pluralism‘ and will go on to explain how he justifies the right of a national group to self-
government. Patten argues that, in this type of society, the government should try to
actively equalize the distribution of the good of recognition in political institutions. He
does so by first explaining why the recognition of national identity is a good, and then
why the distribution of this good should be governed by political institutions. First, the
recognition of identity is a good because it would fulfill the identity-bearer’s aspiration
to self-government. The group may govern its affairs collectively and make decisions that
better ―reflect its beliefs about value, cultural priorities, traditions.‖
138
This would in turn
promote the value of communal integrity, i.e., a ‗fit‘ between the values of the members
and the policies that govern them.
139
Thus, the recognition of national identity is a good.
Still, even if the recognition of identity is a good, why should it be regulated by the
government? Why not adopt a policy of non-interference? Patten suggests that this is
because, with regard to certain political arrangements, such as territorial boundaries or
official holidays, the government cannot avoid making decisions that are more favorable
to one group: it is not difficult to see how the way state boundaries are drawn would
allow the majority more substantive political power/influence, and how political
institutions almost always reflect the needs or preferences of the same majority group.
This leads to de facto inequality— these political arrangements are in fact more
advantageous to one group and disadvantageous to the others.

138
See Patten, 2002, p.568.

139
See Patten, 2002, p.569.

73

In such a society, the government can either adopt a policy of complete non-
interference, or it can be actively involved in these affairs and try to equalize the
distribution of the relevant goods. The policy of non-interference would, in substance,
amount to the recognition of the identity of the majority. Because certain political
arrangements can hardly avoid favoring one group over the other, Patten believes that
non-interference is unfair and active involvement is justified.
When it is impossible not to recognize at least one identity, then it seems
reasonable to think that equal recognition of the different identities—as far as this
is possible—becomes the response most in tune with the principle of equal
respect.
140

Therefore, as a response to the lack of neutrality regarding the distribution of identity-
recognition, the government should adopt a more aggressive policy and try to equalize
the distribution of recognition.

2.5.3 The Institution that Best Equalizes the Good of Recognition
Now that Patten establishes that the equal recognition of national identity requires
active governmental regulation, the next step in his inquiry is to look for the arrangement
that would best promote equal recognition. Patten considers two possible options: the
plebiscitary theory and his failure-of-recognition condition. He argues that his failure-of-
recognition condition would provide a more equalized distribution of recognition than the
plebiscitary theory.

140
See Patten, 2002, pp.571-2.

74

Patten believes that, in an identity-pluralistic society, the government should adopt a
multinational constitution that recognizes the right of a national group to build its own
sub-state government. Only when the government fails to recognize this right, that is,
only when the failure-of-recognition condition is met, can the group be justified in
seceding unilaterally. Recognizing the right to self-government would allow the good of
recognition to be distributed to those who identify with the group.
Their identity is recognized in the sense that political boundaries are drawn, and
powers assigned, in such a way as to acknowledge the group as a group and give
it a space in which to enjoy self-government.
141

However, if a state failes to recognize this right in its political institutions, then the state
would fail to grant proper recognition to those who identify with the group. In that case,
the group would be justified in establishing its own independent state, because its identity
should be recognized, and the original society has manifestly failed to accommodate its
national identity. Patten suggests that, in this situation, the ‗failure-of-recognition‘
condition is met because the state fails to properly recognize the national identity of the
group. This would justify the right of the group to establish its own state.
Many believe that the plebiscitary theory provides the best resolution for the equal
distribution of national identity. The theory holds that, so long as the relevant conditions
are met, members of a group have the right to vote in a referendum and decide if they
should establish their own state.
142
Having this right would put the group on a par with

141
See Patten, 2002, p.565.

142
Different philosophers propose different conditions for the right to unilateral secession. Some, such as
Beran, allow secession even in the case of individuals; others, such as Philpott, require that more conditions

75

the dominant majority, as it is also granted the right to have a state in which it becomes
the dominant majority and with its cultural preferences reflected in public institutions.
However, Patten argues that the plebiscitary theory is not the best way to equalize
the distribution of identity recognition. Without the ‗failure-of-recognition‘ condition,
simply allowing a group to vote in a referendum and decide if it wants to establish its
own state would lead to a less equal distribution of national identity: assuming that most
members of the sub-unit T vote for the independence of T (from the larger state S), this
result would give recognition only to those who identify with T, but deny identity-
recognition to those residents of T who also identify with the larger state S. Once T
became an independent state, their identity with the larger state S is completely
suppressed. Thus, the plebiscitary theory would sanction an unequal distribution of the
good of recognition—it may lead to a situation in which only the identity of some (those
who identify with the seceding group) is recognized, but the identity of others (those who
identify with the larger state) is disregarded.
On the other hand, Patten‘s theory would not sanction such an unequal distribution
of the good of recognition. According to Patten, we should prefer his failure-of-
recognition condition to the plebiscite theory because his theory gives priority to an
arrangement that provides a more equalized distribution of the good of recognition. It
requires that a national group be given the right to sub-state self-government first, and
only when this right is denied can the group be justified in demanding the right to build
its own state. When T has the right to establish its own sub-state government, those who

be met. For instance, they may require that the new state honor the demands of human rights or pay its fair
share of the national debt. See Philpott, 1995, pp.352-85.

76

identify with T can express their identity through the sub-state government of T, and
those who identify with S can express their identity via the state government of S. This
arrangement is superior because ―a distribution in which all get some of what they want
should be regarded as superior to one in which a majority gets all of what they want
while the minority get none.‖
143
Patten‘s failure-of-recognition condition prioritizes an
arrangement that grants recognition to both those who identify with T and those who
identify with S. On the other hand, the plebiscitary theory completely ignores this
arrangement. It gives recognition only to those who identify with T, or only those who
identify with S. Therefore, Patten suggests that, his failure-of-recognition condition
allows the good of recognition to be more equally distributed.

2.5.4 Comments on Patten‘s Argument
Does Patten‘s argument successfully justify the right of a national group to sub-state
self-government?

2.5.4.1 First Critique: the Good in Question
Patten‘s strategy involves showing that the good of recognition is in fact unevenly
distributed among majority and minority groups, and that this fact by itself discredits
policies of non-interference and warrants active governmental regulation. This strategy is
very similar to that of Kymlicka, which involves denouncing the benign neglect view.
Both strategies involve showing that, regarding the de facto unequal treatment of a

143
See Patten, 2002, p.579.

77

minority group, it is wrong not to do anything to correct it. Thus, to compensate for this
inequality, certain rights should be granted to the minority group.
In my discussion of Kymlicka‘s argument, I explained that the equality argument
justifies a right (in Kymlicka‘s case, a group-differentiated right) by appealing to the
disadvantage a group receives as a result of its minority status. That is, this argument
justifies a right (to compensation) by pointing out that one receives a lesser share of a
particular good because of one‘s national membership. Thus, were a person to justify the
right to self-government by appealing to this argument, she would need to explain that (a)
there is a good that a minority group receives a lesser share of exactly because of its
minority status, and (b) the lesser share of the good can be compensated only by granting
the right to self-government to the minority group.
144
That is, if the point of the right is to
equalize an unbalanced distribution of goods, one needs to explain which good it is that
this right is supposed to help equalize. Thus, one crucial task in appealing to the equality
argument is to identify the good under discussion. I argued earlier that because Kymlicka
does not explain what this good is, his argument fails to justify the right of a national
group to self-government.
Patten‘s discussion somewhat addresses this issue. Although Patten does not
acknowledge the above methodological requirement, he does explicitly specify that his
focus is not on recognition in the ‗common‘ or ‗cultural‘ sense, such as the recognition of
the group‘s language, history or custom in governmental institutions.
145
Rather, he is

144
See 2.3.3.

145
See Patten, 2002, 565-6.

78

concerned with addressing the desire of the group to self-government. This
straightforward focus on the aspiration to self-government allows Patten to focus his
discussion on how a multination state should equally distribute this good, i.e., the
aspiration to self-government. Does this mean that his argument successfully justifies the
right of minority nations to self-government?
I believe that there are good reasons to question Patten‘s theory. First, we have
reason to question his conception of the good of recognition. Patten defines national
identity as involving ―attitudes and dispositions‖ toward a group, or a ―propensity‖ to feel
shame and pride for this group.
146
However, it is not clear why we should take these
attitudes, dispositions or propensities seriously. People may also have similar attitudes
toward other types of groups, such as a political party. It is not clear why people‘s
attitudes, dispositions, or propensities toward a national group deserve special
recognition. In any case, Patten needs to explain the moral significance of these
dispositions.
This is not the most serious problem in Patten‘s theory. Many philosophers have
tried to answer this question. I will not go into depth on this issue. In any case, what
matters the most, in Patten‘s argument is not why these attitudes and dispositions require
special recognition, but why we should recognize a national group‘s aspiration to self-
government. Why should we be concerned with a national group‘s aspiration to self-
government? Why is this an issue that the government should address?

146
See Paten, 2002, p.563-4.

79

Patten does try to answer this question. He discusses Buchanan‘s challenge that
political institutions should not arbitrarily single out some identity for special recognition
when they can treat different identities in an unbiased way.
147
This is when he points to
the de facto inequality among majority and minority national groups. Patten agrees that
political institutions should not arbitrarily recognize one identity and ignore the others.
Nevertheless, he believes that we still have a good, non-arbitrary reason to do so in the
case of national identity: the de facto inequality between the majority and the minority
groups. The culture of the majority group is recognized by the state, but the culture of the
minority group is not.
Does this response explain why we should recognize a minority group by giving it
the right to self-government? As I argued earlier, in order to justify this right to self-
government by appealing to the equality argument, the most important question one has
to answer is what the good is that is being compensated. Patten‘s answer is the political
aspiration to self-government.
However, there is a good reason to question whether Patten answers the question
satisfactorily. His answer assumes that the majority national group‘s aspiration to self-
government is achieved. Depending on how the state was established, one might question
the plausibility of this assumption. Were the state a result of unjust colonization or
settlement by the majority group, the minority group can of course re-negotiate the terms
of cooperation with the current state government, as Moore and Kymlicka suggested in
their historical arguments. However, if the state was born as a result of fair cooperation

147
See Patten, 2002, p.571.

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among citizens, it is not clear on what basis the state can be considered the realization of
the aspiration of self-government of one particular group.
In addition, as I suggested earlier, if a state government recognizes the language,
history, and culture of all the national groups in the state officially and gives each group
special representation in the legislature to equalize the distribution of political power and
influence, in what sense can the state be understood as a nation state, but not a
multination one?
Patten‘s response to Buchanan‘s challenge would be that the way the state boundary
is drawn has a different impact on different national groups. However, this does not
answer Buchanan‘s challenge: Buchanan can be understood as saying that, the way the
state boundary is drawn can have a different impact on various identity groups, not just
national groups. It may also affect the aspiration of Democrats and liberals, people who
have different religious beliefs, or even people who support different industries. Were the
boundary drawn differently, many Democrats‘ aspiration for national health care would
readily be recognized. Were the boundary drawn differently, many religious believers‘
aspiration to prohibit abortion or preserve traditional marriage would be recognized by
the state. Were the boundary drawn differently, different people‘s political aspirations
would receive more recognition. Why should we evaluate its impact solely on members
of different national groups? Why not also evaluate its impact on, say, liberals and
conservatives? They have their political aspirations as well. Thus, Patten‘s answer to the
question ―what is the good that is being redistributed to the minority group?‖ is not
satisfactory.

81

2.5.4.2 Second Critique: Failing to Distinguish between National and Polyethnic Groups
Patten‘s strategy makes him vulnerable to the same objection as Kymlicka. The
second problem I find in Patten‘s argument is that, if the political aspiration to self-
government of different national groups should be equally distributed, then recognizing
this right would entail that polyethnic groups (i.e., immigrant groups) have the right as
well. Patten‘s conception of national identity is defined by people‘s dispositions and
attitudes toward a group. This characterizes both the identity of a national group and a
polyethnic one. As I explained earlier, recognizing the right of a polyethnic group would
amount to a sanction of settlement policies. Such policies are blatantly in contradiction
with most liberal theories of land entitlement.
Thus, Patten‘s argument fails to justify the right of a national group to self-
government. His strategy leaves him vulnerable to the same criticism as Kymlicka.

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed Moore, Kymlicka, Gans, and Patten‘s arguments
for the right of a national community to sub-state self-government. I believe that Moore‘s
historical argument provides the best defense for the right of a national group to sub-state
self-government. If a group involuntarily merged into the current society, it has a right to
re-negotiate the terms of cooperation with the current state.
On the other hand, I argue that Kymlicka‘s equality argument would entail the
implausible conclusion that even a polyethnic group has a right to self-government. This
is implausible because such a right would entail that policies of settlement are acceptable,

82

which is in contradiction with every liberal theory of entitlement. Gans‘s argument,
which appeals to the interest people have in preserving the meaningfulness of their
endeavours, cannot explain why self-government is necessary. Even if people have
important interests in preserving the meaningfulness of their endeavours, this does not
justify the right of a group to self-government. Lastly, Patten‘s equal recognition
argument is questionable in the same way as Kymlicka‘s: if equal recognition of a
national group requires that we grant the group the right to self-government, this would
entail that a polyethnic group has this right as well. Thus, I believe that, we should
recognize national groups not because of their national identity, but because of their
historical claims. This is not to say that a state government should never grant a national
group the right to self-government. Under certain circumstances, it might make a good
policy, but it is hardly a right.

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Chapter Three-- Does a National Community (As Such) Have a Right to Establish an
Independent State?

In this chapter, I will consider arguments that attempt to justify the right of a
national community to establish its own independent state. According to Nielsen, ―In a
liberal democracy, there is always a presumption [italics added] that every nation has a
right to its own sovereign state.‖
148
To determine whether this claim is justified, I will
consider in detail two types of arguments: the instrumental value and the intrinsic value
arguments. In 3.1 I discuss the instrumental value arguments, including the civic duty
argument (3.1.1) and the effectual democracy argument (3.1.2). In 3.2, I discuss the
intrinsic value arguments, including the identity argument (3.2.1) and the institution
argument (3.2.2). I will show that none of them successfully justify the right of a national
group to establish an independent state. The right to create a state is essentially the right
to an institution; the justification of such a right cannot be complete without an evaluation
of the possible consequences of its implementation.

3.1 The Instrumental Value Arguments
The instrumental value arguments try to justify the right of a national community
to establish an independent state by showing how a national culture or identity plays a
crucial role in maintaining certain important liberal democratic institutions. Because a
national culture or identity can contribute instrumentally to many different liberal or

148
See Nielsen, 1998, p.110.

84

democratic values, there can, in principle, be many different instrumental value
arguments.
149
Here, I will discuss two arguments specifically: the civic duty argument and
the effectual democracy argument.

3.1.1 ―Common Sympathies‖: the Civic Duty Argument
The civic duty argument stems from a communitarian/ nationalist critique of
liberalism. It holds that a national community is a proper candidate for establishing an
independent state because national identity or camaraderie provides the kind of incentives
indispensable to enforcing civic duties in a liberal democracy.
According to David Miller, for a liberal democratic society to function well, the
government needs its citizens to fulfill certain civic duties. For instance, an institution
essential in a liberal society is the resource distribution system. Distributive justice may
require that resources be transferred from richer populations (or areas) to poorer ones. In
addition, to maintain the normal functioning of society, a liberal democracy will from
time to time need its citizens to fulfill certain duties, such as paying taxes, serving on
juries, or serving in the military. A successful liberal democracy depends on not merely
the justice of important social institutions, but also on the willing cooperation of citizens
to fulfill these civic duties.

149
In addition to the civic duty and the effectual arguments discussed here, there are many other
instrumental value arguments for the right of a national community to establish an independent state. For
instance, Margalit and Raz consider the argument that building an independent state is a way for a national
community to avoid persecution. Interestingly, they conclude that even persecution is not a sufficient
reason for granting a national community the right to establish an independent state. Here, I will not
consider this argument, because even if it is sound, it applies only to nations being persecuted. My interest
here is to determine whether a national community as such has a right to establish an independent state.
That is, I am interested in arguments thath advocate the right of a national community to establish an
independent state even if the community is not persecuted, discriminated against or treated in any way
unfairly by the state.

85

Can we be sure that citizens will willingly comply and perform these duties?
According to Miller, liberals cannot explain how or why citizens would willingly
cooperate and fulfill these civic duties instead of free-riding. In a liberal society,
individuals do not necessarily share feelings of camaraderie. In such a society, citizens
are likely to see the demands of civic duties as burdens or even sacrifices.
This kind of mentality is especially widespread among those who perceive
themselves as members of different national communities. Miller considers the example
of the former Yugoslavia and questions how the government would be able to justifiably
demand that rich Slovenes transfer their resources to Serbs, especially when each group
feels that it is entitled to the resources owned or created by its own members.
150
If Miller
is right, we can imagine how difficult it would be to maintain a smoothly running liberal
democracy if citizens were not willing to fulfill their civic duties.
Some may think that the problem is not particularly damaging. To enforce the
demands of justice, a government may use further legal sanctions or punishments to
penalize disobedience and force its citizens to comply. Citizens would thus be
discouraged from noncompliance if doing so would result in a punishment, especially a
severe one. Where there is a lack of willing cooperation, a government can increase the
severity of legal punishments to enforce the demands of civic duties. Thus, so long as a
government can use legal punishments to solve the problem of noncompliance, one need
not worry about citizens not fulfilling their civic duties.

150
See Miller, 1995, p.84.

86

This response to the communitarian—nationalist challenge is question-begging. The
effectiveness of legal punishments does not emerge from nowhere, but presupposes the
willing cooperation of the relevant parties. That is, unless willing compliance or
cooperation is already in place, increasing the severity of legal punishment cannot be
effective. The problem of willing cooperation cannot be solved by another measure that
also depends on willing cooperation. In other words, appealing to legal sanctions and
punishments cannot solve the problem of noncompliance. Besides, the more a
government relies on legal sanctions and punishments to enforce civic duties, the more
resource it has to spend on the relevant institutions, and the more costly the enforcement
of civic duties becomes. Therefore, legal punishments, even severe ones, do not
guarantee a satisfactory degree of willing cooperation.
To be clear, Miller is not questioning whether a liberal can justify the fairness of the
demands of civic duties. He is concerned that even if a liberal society could justify the
fairness of its political institutions, it still would not receive the willing conformity of
citizens. In that case, even if the relevant social institutions were just, they would not be
effective because the citizens would not be willing to comply. The liberal distributive
justice system would work only if citizens would comply with the demands of justice.
Unless (at least) most of the citizens would be willing to cooperate, the relevant social
institutions would not fulfill their functions. Thus, for a liberal society to run smoothly, it
also needs to ensure that its citizens would be likely to fulfill their civic duties.
How does a liberal society do that? What argument can a liberal government use to
convince its citizens that they should pay taxes or serve in the army? What can a liberal

87

say to a citizen who feels that the distributive system is burdensome or even unfavorable
to her? According to Charles Taylor, it is not good enough to say that the liberal
distributive justice system is just.
151
Why should one care about justice if justice is
burdensome or even requires a lot of sacrifice?
The problem is especially perceptible in societies composed of different national
communities. In a society where citizens belong to different national communities, the
government would have a serious problem justifying the requisite duties and
implementing the relevant social institutions. In the case considered by Miller, if the state
border were different, that is, if the Slovenes were to have a state of their own, they
would not need to devote a part of their resources to support the welfare of the Serbs. It is
not surprising that the Slovenes saw the transfer of resources to the Serbs as pure
sacrifice. Miller believes that, in such cases, we can be assured that citizens would not be
likely to cooperate, the relevant social institutions would not perform satisfactorily, and
as a result the political institutions would fail. How, then, can a government solve this
problem and make liberal democracy work?
According to Miller, citizens would willingly comply with the demands of civic
duties only if they shared a sense of reciprocity or mutual-trust. For instance, when
resources are to be transferred from a richer to a poorer region, the richer citizens will
comply willingly only if they feel a sense of reciprocity between them and the poorer
region, or if citizens of the richer region trust that those of the poorer region would do the

151
See Taylor, 1985, p.213.

88

same for them if they (the rich) needed assistance.
152
Without a sense of mutual trust or
reciprocity, the demands of justice would be seen by the citizens as burdensome and the
demands of civic duties would likely not be met.
This is where national identity can make a substantial contribution. To address the
problem of willing cooperation, some nationalists, such as Miller and Taylor, argue that
national feelings or national ties may provide the right kind of motivation. As Mill
suggested:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality, if they are united
among themselves by common sympathies [italics added], which do not exist
between them and any others—which make them cooperate with each other more
willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and
desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves,
exclusively.
153

Mill‘s description seems to fit our observation of national communities in general.
Members of the same national community usually share a strong sense of brotherhood or
fraternity; they usually trust each other more and recognize that they have certain
obligations towards one another. This sense of trust and obligation does not exist between
them and non-members. National identity can thus motivate compliance with civic duties.
It tells us why we should comply with the demands of civic duties. Thus, Miller
concludes that:
Provided then, that we endorse ideals of social justice, and recognize that these
take hold mainly within national communities, we have good reason for wanting

152
See Miller, 1995, p.93.

153
See Mill, p.427.

89

the political systems that can realize these ideals to coincide with national
boundaries.
154

In short, national identity, or what Mill calls ―common sympathies‖ among members of
the same national community, can help strengthen the willingness of its citizens to
comply with the demands of civic duties. However, this is the case only if the citizens are
also members of the same national community. That is, citizens are more willing to
comply with the demands of civic duties if the boundaries of the state correspond to the
boundaries of the national community. Where citizens are not of the same national
membership, the sense of identity and common sympathy may not exist. Therefore, if we
care about the successful functioning of a liberal democracy, then for the sake of its
efficient operation, we should acknowledge that a state composed of members of the
same national community can do a better job of consolidating its social institutions as the
citizens are more willing to comply with governmental policies and fulfill their civic
duties. Therefore, we should recognize that a national community is a good candidate for
establishing an independent state.

Is this civic duty argument sound? Does it justify the right of a national community
to establish an independent state?
I believe that the answer is no. To begin with, even though it is true that members of
the same national community share the same language, culture and history, it is not clear
whether this entails that they also share a sense of mutual trust or reciprocity. It may be
true that, in most national communities, members share a sense of trust with each other.

154
See Miller, 1995, pp.84-5.

90

Nonetheless, it is not true that all national communities are like that. Whether members
of the same national community share a sense of trust or reciprocity is a contingent fact
that can vary from one national community to another and, perhaps, also from one
generation to another. Sharing the same language, history, or culture does not guarantee a
stronger sense of reciprocity or mutual trust. Therefore, even if mutual trust and
reciprocity enhances a group‘s qualification for establishing an independent state, not all
national communities would be proper candidates for establishing independent states.
Additionally, trust and reciprocity are both matters of degree. It is not clear to what
extent these exist among members of the same national community. It may be true that,
compared with a non-member, a member of a national community is more willing to trust
and reciprocate with another member. However, this does not mean that the trust or
reciprocity amongst the members is unconditional or all-encompassing. We have to be
careful about the kind of trust and reciprocity that exists among members of a national
community and the kind that is necessary for the fulfillment of civic duties. Although
both involve trust and reciprocity, they are distinct. The kind of trust and reciprocity
members have for each other may concern issues about their ways of living or the
national cultures of their community. However, the kind of trust and reciprocity
necessary for civic duties is a different matter. Willing compliance with the demands of a
government requires trust of the government, patriotism, and perhaps the belief that civic
duties are, in the long term, beneficial for the person. It is not clear how the trust and
reciprocity among members of the same national community can help strengthen any of
these beliefs. It is possible for members of the same national community to be willing to

91

trust and reciprocate with each other, while unwilling to trust their own political
institutions. There are many possible reasons for this distrustful attitude, and some of
them are rooted in national culture. For instance, there are some national communities
which, throughout history, have never been effectively ruled by the law. To get things
done, a person has to go through some kind of ‗backdoor.‘ A member of this kind of
national community may indeed trust another member of his national community.
However, it is likely that he would distrust his own government, not to mention the fact
that he would not be willing to fulfill the duties this government would demand of him.
In addition, even within a nation state, there can still be members who, for whatever
reason, want to free-ride. The problem of free-riding exists not only in a multi-nation
state, but also in a nation state. It is not clear how identifying with a national community
can solve the problem of free-riding, or how this identification can be transformed into
patriotism or an identification with a state government, which presumably would
discourage free-riding. In other words, national identity and patriotism are distinct. While
it may be self-evident that patriotism can motivate citizens to comply with the demands
of a government, it is not clear if national identity can serve the same function.
Most importantly, even if a group does demonstrate a strong sense of mutual trust
and reciprocity, this does not mean that it is a good candidate for building an independent
state. Consider other types of communities whose members demonstrate an even stronger
sense of trust and reciprocity, for instance, the believers of a religion or the members of a
particular clan. Members of these groups also demonstrate very strong senses of mutual
trust and reciprocity, and are even willing to sacrifice their personal interests for the

92

interest of the group they identify with. Does it mean that these groups are good
candidate groups for establishing independent states? Do they have the right to establish
independent states? If we say ‗no‘ to those cases, then it is not clear in virtue of what we
can say ‗yes‘ to the case of a national community. Commenting on Miller, Caney
suggests, ―we have no reason to accept his assumption that nationality is the only or best
form of trust‖.
155
The type of trust and reciprocity one is looking for concerns the
fulfillment of civic duties. Many different communities demonstrate qualities such as
mutual trust or fraternity. However, it is not clear if the trust engendered by these
qualities is the kind of trust necessary for performing civic duties.
Thus, even if a liberal government does not provide the kind of motivation necessary
for the smooth running of its political institutions, or if members of the same national
community demonstrate a strong sense of reciprocity and mutual trust, the civic duty
argument does not justify the right of a national community to establish its own
independent state. At best the argument suggests that, for political institutions to work
effectively, a liberal government should try to find, or even form, some ―common
sympathies‖ among citizens. That is, a liberal society needs to encourage identification
with the government or patriotism. This may justify certain nation-building policies, such
as education programs, that aim at forming common sympathies, or in this case,
patriotism, among citizens.
156
However, just because members of a national community
identify themselves as members of the community, this does not mean that they

155
See Caney, 2002, p.357.

156
See Moore, 2000, p.185.

93

demonstrate the kind of trust necessary for civic duty or that they have the right to
establish an independent state.

3.1.2 ―Free Institution‖: the Effectual Democracy Argument
The second instrumental value argument for the right of a national community to
establish an independent state is the effectual democracy argument. This argument holds
that a national community is the proper unit for establishing an independent state because
it is the kind of group in which the ideals of democracy can best be realized. There are
two aspects of democracy to which membership in a national community can make
substantive contribution: deliberative democracy and representative democracy. I will
begin with a discussion of how national membership can contribute to deliberative
democracy.
Deliberative democracy essentially involves the collective deliberation of citizens to
work out resolutions concerning the public affairs of their society. Because citizens are
likely to disagree with each other, a decision satisfying each participant may be difficult
to obtain. To reach even a preliminary agreement by democratic deliberation, citizens
need to be committed to communicating and collaborating with each other. Given the
probability of disagreement, concessions and compromises may at times be necessary.
According to Miller,
[To] the extent that we aspire to a form of democracy in which all citizens are at
some level involved in discussion of public issues, we must look to the conditions
under which citizens can respect one another‘s good faith in search for grounds of
agreement[italics added].
157

157
See Miller, 1995, p.98.

94

That is, for deliberative democracy to be effectual, a society needs its citizens to be
committed to working together. This can be achieved only if citizens are willing to follow
the same rules of negotiation and make concession when necessary.
158
Would the citizens
be willing to do that?
This, again, is a challenge not of the fairness, but of the efficacy, of a democratic
institution. The concern is how or where we can find the basis of the commitment
necessary for deliberative democracy. Why would citizens be motivated to engage in the
protracted process of overcoming their differences in order to achieve compromises?
According to Miller,
[o]nly a common nationality can provide the sense of solidarity that makes this
possible. Sharing a national identity does not, of course, mean holding similar
political views; but it does mean being committed to finding terms under which
fellow-nationals can agree to live together.
159

Members of the same national community usually recognize that they owe special
obligations to one another. In that case, the commitment they have could serve as the
basis of the commitment necessary for deliberative democracy, as members of the same
national community would be willing to work with one another to resolve the problems
of their society through democratic deliberation.

Does the effectual democracy argument justify the right of a national community to
establish an independent state?

158
See Miller, 1995, pp.96-7.

159
See Miler, 1995, p.98.

95

This argument points out an element essential to deliberative democracy, namely,
the commitment of citizens to communication and compromise. For deliberative
democracy to work, citizens must be committed to working with one another to deliver
solutions to the problems of their society. Can the basis of the commitment be found in
national identity?
Some philosophers argue that national communities are communities of obligations.
They argue that national partiality, or the special obligation members of a national
community have toward one another, is defensible at least to a certain extent.
160
If their
arguments are successful, and members of the same national community owe obligations
to one another, then these obligations might be utilized to make a substantive contribution
to deliberative democracy. Here, I cannot determine whether membership in a national
community entails any special obligation, either toward other members or the community
itself. The soundness of those claims requires a more detailed discussion than is possible
here. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that there is a distinction between the
obligations one owes her national community and the commitment necessary for
democratic deliberation. Commitment to deliberative democracy essentially requires the
belief that it is an activity worth engaging in, and perhaps also the belief that other
participants are equally committed. It is not clear how identifying with a national
community by itself can promote these beliefs.
A defender of the deliberative democracy argument may object that those who make
this comment fail to see the obvious. She might suggest that, if we take a look at a

160
See Hurka, 1997, pp.139-157; Miller, 1995; Gilbert, 1996.

96

national community engaged in a struggle for self-governnance and listen carefully to the
demands and aspirations of its members, we can see clearly that these are people who are
willing and ready to make sacrifices to establish an independent state. These facts visibly
demonstrate their commitment to working with each other. Otherwise, why go through all
the trouble— the demonstrations, the conflicts, or even the bloodshed? These seem to be
very good proof of their commitment and readiness to collaborate with one another and
establish their own state.
Still, even if a person is very zealous about his own national community, this does
not mean that he would be equally committed to democratic deliberation. As I explained
in the previous section (3.2.1), national identity, i.e., the commitment to one‘s national
culture and community, is different from patriotism, i.e., the commitment to one‘s
government and its relevant political institutions. Even if members of the same national
community trust one another, this does not mean that they would also trust the political
institution established by members of their own community. Likewise, even if members
of the same national community recognize certain obligations they have toward one
another, this does not meant that this will enhance their commitment to the enterprise of
deliberative democracy. We need to be careful about what exactly it is that a person
identifies with or is committed to. It is not difficult for us to imagine a group of
nationalists who are so eager to preserve their national culture and identity that they are
willing to adopt any measure necessary for that purpose, including less democratic or
even undemocratic ones. When a person puts her national identity on top of the list of the
things she values, other considerations are at best of secondary importance. It is possible

97

for the identification with a national community to be detrimental to democratic
deliberation.
In addition, there are other types of groups whose members demonstrate
commitment and solidarity; however, we do not think of them as good candidate groups
for establishing democratic states. Consider again the case of religious communities. It
does not seem that the commitment and solidarity of the members makes them good
candidates for establishing independent states. Again, the kind of commitment and
solidarity necessary concerns democratic deliberation, and so far nothing about a national
community shows a clear bearing between the commitments of a national group and
democratic deliberation. Thus, we have yet to see the instrumental value of national
identity fo the effectiveness of deliberative democracy. The deliberative democracy
argument does not justify the right of a national community to establish an independent
state.
The second argument for the instrumental value of national identity to democracy is
the representative democracy argument. Democracy effectively involves either direct
participation in the public affairs of a society, or in most cases where direct participation
is not feasible, indirect representation in the government. For representatives to properly
represent the interests of the citizens, the citizens must be able to communicate with and
trust these representatives, and the representatives must be able to understand and
sympathize with the citizens they represent. How can we be sure that such trust and
understanding exist between citizens and representatives? When would this relation be
available? Under what circumstances?

98

Many believe that the ideal relationship between citizens and their representatives
exists only between people who belong to the same national community. In Kymlicka‘s
discussion of the right of a national community to special representation, he suggests that
this right presupposes that ―people can only be fully represented by someone who shares
their gender, class, occupation, ethnicity, language, etc.‖
161
This assumption is at least
prima facie justified. When a representative does not share the same national membership
as the citizens she represents, the language barrier and/or cultural differences between
them could substantially undermine her capacity to understand and communicate with
those citizens she represents. In such a case, it is highly doubtful that she could properly
represent their interests. On the other hand, members of the same national community,
due to their shared language, history, and culture, are likely to be able to communicate
with each other well and, therefore, understand each other better.
In addition to the shared language and culture, they also share a set of common
interests. There can be cases in which the interests of different national communities are
in competition or even in conflict. Because members of the same national community
share the same interest in the preservation of their national culture and identity, it seems
rather sensible to assume that, under normal circumstances, a representative who is a
member of the same national community would be more likely to advocate the interests
of her national community than a representative who is not. As Mill said, ―The ideally
perfect constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is

161
See Kymlicka, 1995, p.138.

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entirely coincident with his duty.‖
162
Therefore, it is in general more desirable that a
representative and her constituents share the same national membership. National
membership is a crucial qualification for a representative; even if it is not a sufficient
condition for a good representative, it definitely is a necessary one.
This argument applies not just to the case of representatives, but also to any
governmental official or public servant. To serve the people, a public servant needs
similar capabilities to do her job satisfactorily—sympathy and understanding. Sharing the
same language and culture definitely makes it easier for her to sympathize with and
understand the citizens, while not sharing them makes it more difficult for her to do her
job. Thus, national membership is also an important qualification for public servants in
general.
Likewise, it is in general better to have a government whose public servants share
the same national membership as the citizens. If government officials shared the same
national membership as the citizens, they could not only do a better job at serving the
citizens, but could also work together to preserve their common interest in national
identity. Thus, a national community is a good candidate group for a state. It is the kind
of community in which the ideals of representative democracy can best be realized.
If citizens need representatives who share their identity to represent their interests,
why not just give each national group the right to special representation? Why should a
national community also be granted the right to establish an independent state? A liberal
society may not only grant special representation rights to national communities, but also

162
See Mill, p.228.

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allow the same right to other types of groups, such as women or the handicapped, whose
interests affect the whole community. Isn‘t the right to special representation enough?
Why the right to build a state?
One crucial assumption in the representative democracy argument is the
disadvantage inherent in minority status. Where a state is composed of multiple national
communities, the interests of the communities will be in competition or even conflict.
This is unfavorable for members of the minority nation because in the competitions for
social resources, a minority nation is highly likely to be outvoted by the majority. It is in
principle possible for them to never win such competitions. Therefore, because of the
disadvantages inherent in being a minority group, it is always better, according to Miller,
for a national community to establish its own state.
163
If a national community could
establish an independent state, this could best guarantee that it would not be taken
advantage of by other majority groups. It would also make it easier for members to
protect their own interests, as it precludes the interference of non-members. Thus,
national communities should be given the right to establish independent states.
Therefore, if we care about how well representative democracy works, and if we
care about how well public servants serve their citizens, we have to acknowledge that it is
better to have a state where citizens and public servants are of the same national
membership. This ideal can best be realized if the border of a state corresponds to the
border of a nation. Thus, a national community is a proper candidate for establishing an

163
See Miller, 1996, p.272. ―The assumption guiding our discussion is that there is a value to each member
in being a citizen of a state that embraces your nation; to be part of a minority, although by no means
always a disaster is generally a worse option.‖

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independent state, because it is the kind of community where the interests of citizens
could best be protected.

Is the representative democracy argument sound? Does it justify the right of a
national community to establish an independent state? First, in section 3.1.1, I questioned
the claim that members of the same national community necessarily trust each other.
Does this mean that the democratic representation argument does not work, as trust does
not necessarily exist among members of the same nation?
Not necessarily. The kind of trust we discussed in the civic duty argument is the
trust that each citizen will fulfill his duty. On the other hand, the trust we have here is the
trust that the representative will defend the interests of the people he represents. To the
extent that a representative shares the same interests as those he represents, it seems
sensible to say that we can trust this representative more than someone who does not. The
problem of free-riding usually occurs because of competing or conflicting interests. Thus,
the problem of free-riding may occur even within a national community. However,
because members of the same national community share a set of common interests, there
is at least one good reason to assume that members of the same group will defend the
same interests.
There can indeed be situations in which the interests of a person are in conflict with
those of his national community. However, in general, barring the unusual examples of
traitors, it seems sensible to assume that members of the same national community share

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an interest in the survival and flourishing of their culture. Their interests are in agreement
at least to that extent.
Some may object to the assumption that co-nationals can represent each other better.
They may suggest that it is based on the false assumption of national homogeneity and
ignores the internal divergence among co-nationals.
The soundness of this argument depends partly on the truth of the claim that co-
nationals represent each other better than non-members. This assumption is questionable.
Still, I am willing to concede that, due to their shared interest in national membership,
other things being equal, members of the same national community can represent each
other better than representatives of a different national background.
164
Does this entail the
right to establish an independent state?
I believe that it does not. The idea underlying the representative democracy
argument is that, when a group of people (1) share a set of common interests and (2) is
the minority group in a society, the group should be given the right to establish an
independent state so that they can escape the disadvantages of their minority status.
However, there are groups which may fit these criteria but do not seem to be entitled to
this right. Consider the case of gender identity. It is often assumed that a woman can
better represent the interests of women. As a minority, women face challenges and
discrimination that men do not. Thus, being a woman is essential for sympathizing with
the female experience and understanding how to protect women‘s interests. Thus, women
should be represented by another woman. So far all these sound rather sensible.

164
See Kymlicka, 1995. p.144-149.

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Moreover, being a minority is inherently disadvantageous. It is always better to be a
member of the majority than the minority. Does this mean that women should be given
the right to establish an independent state? I believe that most of us would say no. It
indeed is important for governmental officials to share the same interest as the governed.
However, this does not seem to justify the right to establish an independent state.
Even though the effectual democracy argument fails to justify the right of a national
community to establish an independent state, it is still worth considering. As the example
of gender identity illustrates, representative democracy requires a conformity of interests
between the representatives and the represented. In that case, when we need to decide
administrative boundaries—namely, when we have to decide which group of people
counts as a group and should be assigned one or more representatives, we need to take
into consideration the interests they represent. Decisions concerning administrative
boundaries should take into consideration the national membership of the relevant
population. In spite of these insights, the representative democracy argument does not
justify the right to establish a state.

3.1.3 Considerations on the Instrumental Value Arguments
Before moving on to the next section, I would like to make one last comment on the
instrumental value arguments. These arguments try to defend the right of a national
community to establish an independent state by explaining how certain qualities of a
national community could make substantive contributions to certain important liberal
democratic institutions. To determine whether an instrumental value argument

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successfully justifies this right, one first needs to determine whether national culture or
identity does indeed contribute to the efficiency of these institutions, and subsequently if
that justifies the right of a national community to establish an independent state.
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, the assumption that
members of a national community have the relevant qualities—mutual trust, reciprocity,
sympathy, and commitment to communication and compromise—is questionable. Second,
even if members of a national community do demonstrate these qualities, it is not clear
how these qualities could contribute directly to the liberal democratic institutions of civic
duties, deliberative democracy, and representative democracy as some philosophers
suggested—civic duties, deliberative democracy, and representative democracy. Third,
even if a national community does demonstrate these qualities, and these qualities do
contribute to these liberal institutions, it still does not justify the right of a national
community to establish an independent state. Members of many other types of groups
demonstrate similar qualities, but we do not think that these groups are also proper
candidates for establishing independent states.
A supporter of the instrumental argument may argue that this does not successfully
refute his argument. He may suggest that the last claim in the previous paragraph is
wrong. He may insist that any communities demonstrating these same qualities should
also be given the right to establish an independent state. The lesson to be learned, then, is
not that a national community does not have the right to establish an independent state,
but that it is possible for other types of communities to have the same right if they
demonstrate the relevant qualities.

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This may sound far-fetched, as there does not seem to be any actual examples. Still,
the lack of an example does not refute the normative principle. In addition, the supporter
would remind us that the right is a prima facie right, and can thus be overruled by other
more important rights. This may explain why we do not see any examples of other types
of communities exercising these rights—because their rights are overruled by those that
are more fundamental. Nevertheless, it does not mean that these qualities are not
sufficient to justify the right. The instrumental value of these communities does justify
the right to establish an independent state. Any type of community, so long as the
community has qualities that could contribute substantively to these liberal democratic
institutions, is a good candidate and should be given the right to establish an independent
state.
Perhaps. It may be true that certain qualities are so important to liberal justice that
they make the group a good candidate for being an independent state. However, even
being a good candidate does not justify the right. For instance, a person may have the
qualities essential to being an astronaut, or the qualities essential to being a governor.
Still, these qualities do not give him the right to be an astronaut or a governor. He may
also have the right to participate in the selection of astronauts, or the election of a
governor. However, he does not have the right to be an astronaut or a governor. No one
should be granted a right just because of his qualifications. Similarly, no group should be
granted a right just because of its qualification.
The fundamental problem with instrumental value arguments is that this is not how
we think about instrumental values. There are various cases in which a moral agent could

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be of instrumental value to certain important institutions or fundamental values. However,
even in those cases we do not think that the instrumental value by itself gives rise to any
right, moral or legal. Instrumental values do not justify rights. Thus, citing the
instrumental value of national cultures to liberal democratic institutions cannot justify the
right of a national community to establish an independent state.
At best the instrumental value arguments show that there are some problems in
liberalism that can be solved by looking at the model of national communities. They
justify certain policies that encourage citizens to identify with the state government. They
also give us good reasons to draw administrative boundaries that correspond to national
boundaries. However, they do not justify the right of a national community to establish an
independent state.

3.2 The Intrinsic Value Argument(s)
While instrumental value arguments try to justify the right of a national
community to establish an independent state by appealing to the instrumental values that
national identity may contribute to important liberal democratic values, intrinsic value
arguments do so by appealing to the intrinsic value of national identity. According to the
intrinsic value argument, because national identity is intrinsically valuable, its protection
justifies a national community‘s prima facie right to establish an independent state.
Supporters of the intrinsic value argument include Caney, Margalit and Raz, Nielsen,

107

MacCormick, and Tamir.
165
There are two types of intrinsic value arguments: the identity
argument and the institution argument. In the following section, I will begin with a
discussion of the identity argument.

3.2.1 The Identity Argument
The identity argument tries to justify the right of a national community to establish
an independent state by appealing to the interest individuals have in expressing their
national identity. There are three major steps in the identity argument. The first is to
defend the intrinsic value of national culture, membership, and identity. A national
community is a community in which members share an encompassing culture.
166

Membership in such a community is deeply connected to the self-respect and self-
identification of persons. Thus, the members of a national community have an important
interest in protecting their own community. Because I explained and defended this
interest in Chapter One, I will not go into detail about the justification of national identity
again. Here, I will assume the profound significance of national identity and ask, ‗Given
the profound importance of national identity, does this justify the right of a national
community to establish an independent state?‘
The second step begins to link the importance of national identity with its
institutional protection. Here, the main task is to explain why a shared forum or political
institution is necessary to protect the relevant interests. Because national identity is

165
See Caney, 1997, pp.351-372; Margalit and Raz, 1990, pp.439-61; Nielsen, 1998, pp.103-33; Tamir,
1993; MacCormick, 1991.

166
See Margalit and Raz,1990, pp.443-7; Miller, 1995, pp.17-48; Tamir, 1993, pp.13-34; Nielsen, pp.108-
110.

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intimately linked to the self-respect and self-identification of persons, people need to be
able to express their national identity not just in private, but also in public. They must be
able to speak openly in their own language, practice their culture, and follow their
traditions and customs. In addition, people should not be subject to discrimination or
intolerance as a result of openly engaging in these activities. Moreover, they also need a
shared forum where they can collectively make decisions concerning their group affairs
and work together to protect their relevant interests.
167
These cannot be achieved by
individual, private efforts, but require the protection of some public or political institution.
According to Nielsen,
the very existence of such a culture requires social structures and a complex
cluster of interdependent institutions. Without this being in place in the lives of
human beings, there can be no secure and stable sense of who they are and
without that there will be little in the way of human flourishing. Instead people
will experience anomie and alienation. These encompassing cultures—these
nations—will have a fragile and insecure existence if they do not have a
substantial degree of self-government.
168

Similarly, Miller suggests that the preservation of a national culture may also be a
type of coordination problem—a national culture can decay even when no one intends
this to happen.
169
Consequently, institutional arrangements should be in place so that
members can coordinate with each other to protect their community and culture.

167
See Tamir, 1993, p.73.

168
See Nielsen, 1998, p.110.

169
See Miller, 1995, p.87.

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If the first two steps are both successful, then any political institution that can
contribute substantively to the protection of national identity would at least be prima
facie justified. As a result, the last step in the argument is to point out that, because a state
is a political institution that can provide a national community the resources and authority
necessary to protect its national culture, a national community has a prima facie right to
establish an independent state. The state endows a national community with the most
complete autonomy and the highest political authority necessary to preserve its culture.
An independent state is a political institution with which a national community can
express and protect its culture.
So far the argument sounds plausible. If national identity is intimately connected to
the self-respect of persons, and if its preservation requires some political institution, then
it naturally follows that a national community is justified in pursuing the status of a state,
as it is one of the institutions that can help protect their relevant interests. However, there
are many possible political institutions that can serve the same purpose. Why not stop
there and conclude that any institution that can perform the function is prima facie
justified? Why then do nationalists focus specifically on sovereign states?
One possible answer is that this is what members of national communities actually
want. As Tamir points out, ―[t]he ability to conceive of certain social and political
institutions as representing a particular culture and as carriers of the national identity is at
the heart of the yearning for national self-determination.‖
170
Most nationalist movements
aspire to establish states of their own members of the same national community often

170
See Tamir, 1993, p.74.

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desire to build a state that recognizes their language as the official language, teaches their
history in schools, and protects their national culture with governmental institutions. The
wish to build its own state is an essential driving force behind nationalist movements.
Thus, the recognition of national identity requires that we recognize this aspiration as
well.
Although this response truthfully characterizes the aspiration of national
communities, it cannot satisfactorily answer the question. There is still the question of
what it is that makes people want to build a state, and what their reasons are for wanting
to do so. And most importantly, what is their justification? Even if it is true that national
identity is intrinsically valuable and that its protection requires some sort of shared public
space—does this justify recognizing the right to establish an independent state? There
seem to be other alternative institutions that can perform the same function satisfactorily.
For instance, both the right to special representation and a sub-state government provide
members of a national community the shared forum to protect their national identity and
collectively manage their affairs. Even if national identity has to be protected by social
institutions, it is not the case that this can be achieved only by building a state. The shared
public space can come in many different, less disruptive, forms. Is there any particular
reason why the shared public space must be an independent state? Can it not be replaced
by the right to a substate government? Why does a national community need the utmost
control or the highest recognition?

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Indeed, there are many alternative institutional arrangements that can serve to
protect national communities. However, it seems that there are certain functions that can
be performed only by an independent state. Here, I will discuss four such functions.
First and foremost, a state is an institution that can provide a national community the
fullest political autonomy and the highest political authority. To protect its national
culture, a national community needs as much political autonomy and as little external
interference as possible. It needs the utmost authority over its own affairs so that its
members can have as much control of their own destinies as possible. Otherwise, the
group may be vulnerable to the interference of others who are not also members of the
group. Full political autonomy is achieved only when a group is recognized as having the
highest political authority, which, given the structure of current international society, can
only be provided by a sovereign state. Thus, Tamir suggests that
The right to national self-determination can be fully realized only if …this
recognition is followed by political arrangements enabling members of the nation
to develop their national life with as little external interference as possible…. this
requires granting members of the widest possible degree of autonomy, namely the
right to establish their own sovereign nation-state.
171

Only a state government can provide the fullest political autonomy and the highest
political authority; other political institutions cannot match the kind of authority had by a
state.
Second, relating to the previous point, given the structure of current international
society, a sovereign state is the best possible institution to protect a national community.
According to Nielsen, from the point of view of ensuring the prosperity of national

171
See Tamir, 1993, p.74.

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cultures, an independent, sovereign state is the best institutional arrangement, while other
alternatives, such as special representation or a sub-state self-government, are merely
second best.
172
The right to establish an independent state provides the best possible
protection for a national community. It offers its members the most substantive control
over their own affairs and the highest authority against external interference. Thus, no
institution is better than a state for protecting national identity.
Still, one might wonder: if we grant that a multination state could provide equivalent
protection—that is, whatever protection a nation state could offer, a multination state
could do the same—in what sense would a nation state be better?
This challenge can be answered by the third function unique to a state. According to
Caney, a nation state has both symbolic and expressive value.
173
Establishing an
independent state constitutes a form of recognition. It means that the group is recognized
as an active member of the international community having an international personality,
and that it constitutes an autonomous political unit whose domestic affairs cannot be
interfered with by others. The state is a symbol of the national community, representing
its members in international society. In such a state, the language, culture, and history of
the group will be recognized in governmental institutions. On the contrary, in a
multination state, the culture, language, and history of a group cannot be recognized as
uniquely representing the state. Thus, even if a multination state can provide equal
protection, it cannot provide the sort of recognition a nation state can.

172
See Nielsen, 1998, p.120.

173
See Caney, 1997, p.363.

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Lastly, as Tamir points out, ―[t]he self-image of individuals is highly affected by the
status of their national community.‖
174
That is, the self-respect of individuals is intimately
connected to the status of the national community—if their group were not recognized by
others, or if their culture were in decline, the self-respect of individual members would
decline with it. In contrast, if the national community were recognized by the
international society as an autonomous, sound political entity, then its members would
have a secure sense of self-respect and identity. If a national community does not have its
own state, then members may be subject to the political authority and interference of
other non-members, leaving them vulnerable to the power of outsiders. Thus, a state
provides members of a national community a secure sense of self-respect and identity
that other forms of institutions cannot match.
Despite the four functions uniquely served by a state, some may still question
whether the protection of national identity requires a state whose boundaries coincide
with those of the nation. This, however, is separate issue.
175
The right of a national
community to establish an independent state is not equivalent to the right of the
community to establish a state whose boundaries coincide with those of the national
community. A national community may have the right to the former but not the latter.
Thus, this question does not constitute a refutation of the identity argument. How the
boundaries should be drawn is an issue that can be separated from the right to create a
state.

174
See Tamir, 1993, p.73.

175
Thanks Professor Marmor for pointing this out.

114

To sum up, supporters of the identity argument advocate a modest, prima facie right
of a national community to establish an independent state. They do not claim that this
right is absolute or that a national community can always exercise this right regardless of
any other considerations. The actual implementation may depend on an evaluation of all
of the relevant factors. Establishing an independent state is not always necessary for the
sake of protecting a national culture and identity. Depending on the actual conditions,
some national communities might be better off staying with their current multination state.
Nonetheless, given the importance of national culture for the identity of persons, we have
a very strong reason to give people the right to protect their interest(s) in national identity,
and since a sovereign state is the best way to secure the prosperity of a national culture, a
national community has a prima facie right to establish an independent state.

Does the identity argument justify the right of a national community to establish
an independent state?
The identity argument explains very well why national identity is important and
warrants institutional protection. Indeed, given its importance, certain political
institutions should be set up for the sake of its protection. Although not every intrinsically
valuable interest warrants institutional protection,
176
given the comprehensive nature of
national culture and its importance for personal identity and autonomy, I believe that the

176
According to Marmor, ―not every aspect of a person‘s well-being should be protected by rights, that is,
by the imposition of duties on others. Some aspects of a person‘s well-being are too trivial to deserve such
protection; they simply do not justify the imposition of any burden on others. Other aspects of a person‘s
well-being, in spite of being important and worthy of protection, such as, for example, a person‘s interest in
being loved and cherished by others, cannot be plausible protected by the imposition of duties on others,
because the duty would either be disproportionately burdensome or practically impossible to impose.‖ See
Marmor, 2007. p.233-34.

115

interest in national identity does justify institutional recognition and protection.
177
A
national community has a right to some kind of shared public space where they can
collectively express their voice in society and manage the public affairs of their national
culture. The question is, then, does this right also entail the right to any specific
institution that could serve as the shared public forum? That is, does the right to a shared
public forum also entail, in this case, the right to build a state?
I think that it does not, at least not yet. The last step in the identity argument is rather
questionable. Even if national identity is intrinsically valuable and its protection requires
some political institution(s), this does not justify the national community‘s right to build a
state. The main reason is that the intrinsic value of national identity does not
automatically justify a prima facie right to its best or optimal protection. In the following
section, I will explain in detail why it does not. Moreover, I will support this conclusion
with a short discussion of what it means to have a right to build a state, for without an
evaluation of the impacts of an institution, any claim about a right to establish that
institution (in this case, an independent state) is hollow.
First, let us examine exactly how the identity argument justifies a national
community‘s right to build a state. The first two steps of the identity argument establish
that, to protect their interest in national identity, a national community has the right to
some sort of institutional protection. This has not yet explained why a national
community also has the right to build a state. To do so, the philosophers have come up
with reasons explaining why certain functions can be served only by an independent state

177
For a detailed justification of this claim, see Chapter One.

116

but not by other institutions. Essentially, these four reasons account for the uniqueness of
an independent state. They explain how a state is not replaceable by other forms of
institutions that may also serve the function of protecting the interests people have in
their national identity. The uniqueness of a state depends essentially on the assumption
that it provides the best or optimal protection for the interest in national identity, as it
provides the widest possible autonomy and authority.
The soundness of the identity argument depends crucially on this assumption.
Unless this assumption justifies the right of a national community to build a state—that is,
unless the importance of national identity justifies the right to the best or optimal
protection, the conclusion that a national community has the right to establish an
independent state does not follow. This assumption is based on a hidden premise, which
holds that an interest justifies at least a prima facie right to its best or optimal
protection.
178
I will call this premise the Optimal Protection principle.
To determine whether the identity argument is sound, we need to see if the Optimal
Protection principle is applicable when it comes to the protection of national identity.
While the intrinsic value of an important interest may justify at least an adequate level of
protection, it is not clear whether or not it also justifies the best or optimal protection. In
the case of national identity, its intrinsic value justifies, at the minimum, the right to a
shared public forum or special representation. However, it is not clear how it also
warrants the best protection, namely, an independent state. If some sort of paternalistic,
iron-fisted policy can most effectively protect a national culture, does this mean that the

178
This principle may not be applied to all sorts of interests, but supporters of the identity argument must
assume that it applies to the case of the interest in national identity.

117

national community has a prima facie right to that policy, too? I would assume that most
of us do not think so.
Consider again the parallel case of religious beliefs. We know that people have an
important interest in adhering to their religious beliefs. We also know that establishing a
state church, or better yet, a religious state, is one of the best ways to protect their interest
in these beliefs. Does this mean that the interest in adhering to one‘s religious beliefs
justifies the right to establish a state church or a religious state? Does it mean that a
religious group has a prima facie right to either a state church or a religious state? Most
of us do not think that people‘s interest in their religious beliefs justifies a prima facie
right to a state church, not to mention a religious state. It is not that people have a prima
facie right to a theocracy based on religious interests that would then be overruled by the
same interest of believers of other religion. There is no such right to begin with.
179

179
To illustrate the problem in the Optimal Protection Principle, consider the following hypothetical
situation. Suppose Cynthia is physically abused by Bill. Cynthia‘s interest in bodily integrity, according to
the Optimal Protection Principle, would justify its best form of protection, unless it is somehow overruled
by other more important interests. This would entail that Cynthia has a prima facie right to the best form of
protection. Suppose in this case it is to cut Bill‘s arm, so that Bill cannot hit her again. Surely most of us
would deny that Cynthia has such a right. The question is, how do we explain our disapproval here? If one
accepts the Optimal Protection Principle, then one would have to suggest that it is because Bill‘s right to
bodily integrity overrules Cynthia‘s prima facie right to the best protection of her bodily integrity. That is,
Cynthia has a prima facie right to cut Bill‘s arm, but she cannot exercise this right because Bill has a right
to life and physical integrity. This explanation, I think, is not plausible, as Bill can reasonably protest that
―even if I hit you, it does not give you the right to cut my arm!‖ A more plausible explanation of the
disapproval would be one that suggests that even if Cynthia has very important interest in preserving her
bodily integrity, it does not justify a prima facie right to cut Bill‘s arm.
In addition, consider two of the stories discussed by Thomson in ― A Defense of Abortion‖. In one
story, a person can save a famous violinist by having her circulatory system plugged into that of the
violinist. It would be very nice if the person decides to stay attached to the violinist, but the violinist does
not have the right to the use the person‘s body, even if the violinist clearly has a right to life. In other words,
the right to life does not automatically entail the right to all the means to save one‘s life.
In another story, Thomson asks us to consider a hypothetical situation in which Thomson‘s life could
be saved if she can touch Henry Fonda‘s hand. Again, in this case, even if we acknowledge that Thomson
has a right to life, it does not give her the right to touch Fonda‘s hand. In both cases, even though a human
life is in danger, we do not think that the dying person has a right to the means necessary for sustaining her
life, even if that is the only means. See Thomson, 1971, pp.47-66.

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Likewise, even if people have an important interest in preserving their national
identity, the fact by itself cannot justify even a prima facie right of a national community
to establish an independent state. Or, to put it in a different way, even if a national
community were justified in establishing a state, it would not be because building a
nation state is the best way to protect its interest in national identity. Moreover, this is not
because their right can be overruled by the same right of another national group or
somehow restricted by some more fundamental rights. The community does not have that
right, at least not yet.

Defenders of the identity argument may argue that this critique misses the point.
They would agree with the above analysis about the interest in religious beliefs, but deny
that the analysis implies that the interest in national identity does not justify the right to
its best protection. The interest in autonomy, or self-determination, is different. Unlike
other types of intrinsic values, interests in autonomy or self-determination do justify a
prima facie right to their optimal protection.
Consider the case of personal or individual autonomy. Liberals agree that personal
autonomy is intrinsically valuable and that this interest justifies the right of a person to do
whatever she wants, so long as her actions do not interfere with another‘s autonomy or
inflict harm upon another. That is, interests in autonomy warrant the best protection and
widest autonomy; the burden of proof is on those who want to restrict personal autonomy.
The interest in autonomy justifies a prima facie right to the best or the optimal protection;
any restriction requires further justification.

119

Likewise, the autonomy, or self-determination, of a national community warrants
the optimal protection of its national culture. The burden of proof is on those who want to
limit the right of a national community to optimal protection. The right to national self-
determination, just like the right to personal self-determination, justifies the prima facie
right to optimal protection; therefore, it justifies the right to build a state. Similar
limitations apply— the right to national self-determination is limited by the same right of
another national community to self-determination, and it can be exercised only if doing
so would not cause harm. In short, the Optimal Protection Principle applies to cases of
autonomy, both individual and collective.

Moore questions the validity of this kind of reasoning. She tries to undermine the
case of collective autonomy by undermining its basis, i.e., individual autonomy. She does
so by questioning an important distinction this principle presupposes, namely, Mill‘s
distinction between self- and others-regarding behaviors.
180
Unless we can draw a clear
distinction between actions that affect only an agent and those that also affect others, we
cannot say with certainty that one‘s self-regarding behavior does not regard anyone else
and that she should therefore be granted full autonomy with regard to her self-regarding
behaviors.
Similarly, if the distinction between self- and others-regarding behavior is
problematic when applied to the case of individual persons, then it is even more so in the
case of national communities. To begin with, who is the ‗self‘? Is it defined by

180
See Moore, 2001, p.61.

120

membership in the community or territorial boundaries? Who is the right-holder, the
individual members of the group or the group as a whole? What would be the self-
regarding behaviors of a national community? What would be others-regarding? It is a
fact that in most parts of the world, people of different national membership live
intermingled with one another. As a result, no matter how we conceive of this right, the
exercise of this right necessarily affects non-members, unless there are no non-members
in the defined territory. Still, even if there are no non-members in the defined territory,
there is the problem of dividing resources and other types of property, which also affects
others. Exercising this right can never be a merely self-regarding matter.

This is not a decisive objection against applying the Optimal Protection Principle to
the case of autonomy. Although it points out a problem in the implementation of the
principle, it does not refute the principle itself. Here, I do not intend to challenge the
principle‘s application to cases of individual autonomy. I believe that the intrinsic value
of personal autonomy does justify the prima facie right to its optimal protection and that
the burden of proof is on those who wish to limit it. Nevertheless, I believe that the same
assumption should not be adopted in the case of a national community. The comparison
between individual and collective autonomy is problematic. Although individual
autonomy justifies the prima facie right of an individual to the widest possible freedom,
collective autonomy does not. First, it is not clear if the autonomy of a national
community is also intrinsically valuable. Second, even if the autonomy of a national

121

community is intrinsically valuable,
181
this does not mean that it is intrinsically valuable
in the same way as individual autonomy is. At least this is how it appears so far—we
value the autonomy of a national community because we value its contribution to the
autonomy of individuals, not because we see it as a major source of value that is
independent of its contribution to individual well-being.
182

In addition, part of the reason why individual autonomy justifies the right to its
optimal protection is that in individual cases it is more important for a person to decide
for herself than to decide correctly.
183
According to Waldron, having a right implies
having the right to do wrong as well. According to Marmor, this right ―pertains to cases
in which one of the main interests grounding the right in question is that of personal
choice. By this [he refers] to those cases where we think that it is more important for the
agent to choose for herself than to choose correctly.‖
184
Is this true of a national
community? Do we think that it is more important for a national community to make a
decision for itself than to make the right decision?
I think that the answer is no, and should be no. A national community should be
given full autonomy over its cultural affairs, but this does not mean that it should also be
granted full autonomy over its political affairs. Granting a national community the right

181
Some philosophers argue that a national community is intrinsically valuable. See Hurka, 1997, pp.139-
57.

182
Tamir makes a similar comment in discussing whether the collective can be a right-holder. According to
Tamir, ―The existence of collectives may indeed be of value and their preservation could impose certain
duties, but unless one is ready to claim that collectives are the kind of agents whose existence is of ultimate
value, the Razian definition collapses.‖ See Tamir, 2003, p.194.

183
See Marmor, 2007, p.218.

184
See Marmor, 2007, p.218.

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to build a state bestows on it not only the right to autonomy over its cultural affairs but
also over its non-cultural, political affairs. This is very problematic. To begin with, some
philosophers believe that, as a policy, granting this right to national communities may be
dangerous. Depending on the character of its culture, a national community may still
maintain certain aspects of its culture that may undermine the equality or personal
autonomy of its members. In addition, according to Tamir, such policies will give the
majority the de facto right to define and interpret their culture.
185
This may in substance
suppress the view of the dissenting minority and impede cultural reformation.
These may be problems in actual implementation, but they do not explain why we
should not give a national community the right to full autonomy. Many individual
persons are of problematic personality or character, but even they are granted full
personal autonomy. They can still do whatever they want so long as they do not harm or
undermine the autonomy of others. Similarly, even if a national community has a
problematic cultural character, it should still be given full autonomy, so long as doing so
does not violate the relevant constraints.
186

However, the problem with giving a national community full autonomy is not only
empirical but also conceptual. In any society, there are various types of public affairs that
need to be taken care of. Some affairs concern a national culture, but not every public
affair is like that. Granting the right to full autonomy gives a national community not
only authority over cultural affairs, but also over other non-cultural, political affairs.

185
See Tamir, 2003, p.184.

186
The limit of individual autonomy is, most liberals would agree, the harm principle. It is more
controversial what the limit of collective autonomy is.

123

While a national group should be given authority over its cultural affairs, it is not clear
on what basis it should also be given authority over political affairs. The interest people
have in national membership and identity warrants rights to the former, but not the latter.

How persuasive this argument is ultimately depends, perhaps, on the theory of right
a philosopher believes in. If one believes in the Newtonian concept of right, then
presumably she would also believe that every right warrants its optimal protection unless
it is in conflict with another more important right. However, if one believes in the interest
theory of right, then interest in national membership and identity constitutes its own
constraint, and this interest does not justify authority over other non-cultural affairs.
Here, I cannot settle the dispute between the Newtonian and interest theories of right.
Nonetheless, I believe that the discussion so far shows that we should be in favor of the
interest theory of right. As we see in the discussion of religious beliefs, the Newtonian
theory of right would entail that a religious group has a prima facie right to build a
religious state, and this seems implausible. On the other hand, the interest theory of right
would not imply that a religious group has a right to build a state. According to the
interest theory of right, the interest a right is meant to protect works also as a constraint
on this right. This entails, then, that the right to autonomy in cultural affairs warrants the
protection of cultural affairs, but no more than that. Thus, this interest would not justify
the right to autonomy in other non-cultural, political affairs.
Therefore, the autonomy of a national community, or national self-determination,
does not warrant optimal protection. It does not justify the right to build a state.

124

I have tried to explain why a national community does not have the right to build a
state by arguing that not every important interest justifies the right to its optimal
protection. Some still may not be convinced by this argument, as it seems rather intuitive
that an important interest justifies at least a prima facie right to its best protection. In the
following section, I will try to defend my position in a different way. I will do so by
considering the idea involved in the right to establish an independent state.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that we could derive a prima facie right to an
institution by demonstrating its contribution to the protection of some important interest.
This would imply, for instance, that the interest in religious belief justifies a prima facie
right to create a religious state, or the interest in health care justifies a prima facie right to
the best health insurance program. Were this true, many different interests could possibly
entail prima facie rights to different institutions. Furthermore, because establishing a state
could be the best way to protect many different kinds of interests—, e.g., the interest in
national identity, the interest in religious belief, and the interest in the possession of
natural resources—so long as one can prove that a state best protects that interest, the
Optimal Protection principle would entail that that interest would justify a prima facie
right to establish a state. Were these inferences valid, the resulting claims about a prima
facie right to establish a state would be hollow, as many different interests could also
justify exactly the same right, and different types of groups would have rights to build
their own states.
Thus, I agree with Tamir when she says ―Rights language should delineate basic
liberties, powers, and immunities; it should not specify the particular political

125

arrangements [italics added] that must be installed in order to realize and protect these
rights.‖
187
The right to build a state is a right to establish an institution. Any institution is
supposed to protect an array of interests, not just the interest in national identity. To
determine whether an institution should be established, we need to evaluate its impact on
all the relevant rights and interests, especially those that are fundamental or basic. The
protection of national identity, though important, is but one concern. One cannot justify
the right to establish an independent state merely by pointing to one particular interest
that the state protects (in this case, the interest in national identity).
188
Thus, even if one
can prove that national identity has intrinsic value and that a nation state best protect this
interest, it is not enough to justify the right to build a state.
Consider an analogous case with private property. As Sen points out, even if we
acknowledge that people have an important interest in private property, this fact by itself
does not automatically justify the institution of private property. The fact that people have
an important interest in private property by itself cannot tell us how we should distribute
this interest, how we should protect this interest, or what kind of institution should be set
up for its protection.
189
Whether an institution that protects private property ownership is

187
See Tamir, 2003, p. 183. For a discussion of why it is inappropriate to talk about a right to an institution,
see also Baubock, 1999, pp.137-8.

188
The claim deserves more detailed discussion. Here, due to the length of this chapter, I cannot go into
detail about the justification of this claim.

189
Sen,says, ―But even if we do accept that property rights may have some intrinsic value, this does not in
any way amount to an overall justification of property rights, since property rights may have consequences
which themselves will require assessment. Indeed, the causation of hunger as well as its prevention may
materially depend on how property rights are structured. If a set of property rights leads, say, to starvation,
as it well might, then the moral approval of these rights would certainly be compromised severely. In
general, the need for consequential analysis of property rights is inescapable whether or not such rights are
seen as having any intrinsic value.‖ See Sen, 1998, pp.57-68; see also Gans, pp41-2. ―The resolution of

126

acceptable depends on an evaluation of the consequences of its implementation. For
instance, it depends on whether the system gives rise to serious problems such as poverty
or hunger. In short, no matter how important an interest is, by itself it is not enough to
justify the right to an institution.
Therefore, even if we acknowledge that people have an important interest in national
identity, this fact by itself is not enough to justify a national community‘s right to build a
state. The fact that a state may offer the best or optimal protection for a national
community proves only that it is rational for a national community to pursue that status,
as the state can best protect its interest in national identity. However, this does not justify
any duty on the part of the international community to recognize this interest. Any right
that does not justify any duty is hollow.
From the discussion above, it is safe to conclude that the identity argument either (1)
does not justify the right of a national community to establish an independent state, or (2)
justifies the right, but this right is hollow, as there are other types of interests that may
equally justify the same right.

3.2.3 The Institution Argument
I have been discussing the right of a national community to establish an
independent state as if it were a right that belongs to a national community. Some may
object that this is not the right way to understand the claim made by these arguments.
Many philosophers do not talk about the right of a national community to establish an

these issues is not inherent in the freedom-based right to private property. Rather, they must be sought in
other standards that are external to freedom.‖

127

independent state. Instead, they talk about the intrinsic value of national self-
determination. That is, their intention is not to point out that a national community has a
right to build its own state. Rather, they want to prove that a world in which state
boundaries correspond to national boundaries is better. Thus, an alternative way to
understand the intrinsic value argument is to understand it as a claim about institutional
arrangement. A national community is said to have the right to create its own state not
because it has a right to do so, but because the corresponding institutional arrangement is
better.
This seems to be Caney‘s understanding of the intrinsic value argument. According
to him, national self-determination is intrinsically valuable because a nation state is an
institution that can improve its people‘s well-being.
190
Unlike the identity argument,
which begins with the value of national identity and asks how we can best protect
people‘s interest in it, the institution argument begins with a quest for an institution that
can improve the well-being of individuals and asks which institution can best do so.
Caney begins with an undeniable premise: (P1) political institutions that improve the
well-being of persons are pro tanto valuable. He then argues that (P2) membership in a
national community improves the well-being of its members. He then argues that because
(P3) a nation state can best promote a national culture, therefore, (Conclusion) a nation
state is, other things being equal, valuable.
191

190
See Caney, 1997, p.361.

191
See Caney, 1997, p.361.

128

The first premise is indisputable. Therefore, in order to prove that a nation state is
valuable, all Caney needs to do is to prove that a nation state is the kind of political
institution that can improve the well-being of persons. This step, presumably, is achieved
somewhere in (P2) and (P3). Next, I will discuss whether Caney has successfully proven
this point—that a nation state is the kind of political institution that improves the well-
being of persons.
The problem I notice, first in this argument is that (P3) does not entail Caney‘s
conclusion, at least not directly. From his statement that ―a nation state can best promote
a nation‘s culture‖, we cannot conclude that ―a nation state is valuable‖ unless we can
show that promoting a nation‘s culture also enhances the well-being of its members.
To be clear, I am willing to concede that (P3) is true, that is, that a nation-state can
best protect a national culture. However, I doubt that this would lead to the conclusion
Caney draws. The reason is that (P3) has not yet satisfied the criterion in (P1). That is,
(P3) shows only that a nation state can best promote a nation’s culture, but it has not yet
proven that it can also improve the well-being of persons. However, for the sake of this
argument, whether a nation state can best protect the national culture is only a secondary
concern. The most important point is to prove that a nation state is the kind of institution
that can best improve the well-being of persons. It does not matter very much whether a
nation state improves the culture of a nation. What is more important is whether it
improves the well-being of individuals.
Presumably, Caney would appeal to (P2) to prove that it does. Caney may argue that
he has proven so by pointing out in (P2) that membership in a national community

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improves the well-being of its members. However, this claim is based on a hasty
generalization. The preservation of certain aspects of a national culture—its language,
traditions, values, etc—, does improve the well-being of its members. However, not
every aspect of a nation‘s culture is worth preserving. Many aspects of a nation‘s culture
are actually quite harmful—i.e., child marriage, polygamy, sexism—and do not improve
the well-being of persons. Therefore, unless every aspect of a nation‘s culture enhances
personal well-being, it is not true that national membership furthers the well-being of
persons, nor is it true that national self-government is valuable.
192

In short, if (P2) is questionable, whether (P3) is true (i.e., a nation state can best
protect a national culture) is beside the point. If national membership does not necessarily
improve the well-being of its members, it does not matter whether a nation state best
protects the nation‘s culture—even if it does, it does not necessarily help protect the well-
being of its members. Then, according to (P1), it is not necessarily the kind of institution
that is pro tanto valuable. Thus, this argument is not successful. National self-
determination is, other things being equal, valuable.
Some might think that this is not a very generous interpretation of Caney‘s argument.
Of course Caney is aware of these harmful aspects of national cultures. However,
acknowledging these aspects of national cultures does not mean that these cultures are
not valuable. These bad traditions or customs are factors that can count against a case in
the actual implementation. That is to say, a nation still has a prima facie right to build a
state, but its right would be denied if the character of its culture were harmful to certain

192
I do not mean that national self-government cannot be valuable. I only mean that it is not valuable for
the reason Caney suggests.

130

important interests of persons. This right can be exercised only if its implementation is
consistent with the demands of the liberal values of freedom, equality, and human rights.
If a national community violates any of these, then they cannot adequately protect
people‘s well-being. As Caney himself suggests, ―national self-determination is desirable
because and to the extent that it furthers people‘s well-being.‖
193

However, even when understood in this way, the argument cannot be sound because
it makes a similar mistake as the identity argument. A nation state is said to be pro tanto
valuable because it is the institution that best protects a national culture, and the
protection of a national culture is important because national membership is important for
individual well-being. According to the same reasoning, a religious state would be said to
be pro tanto valuable, because it is the institution that best protects a religion, and a
religion is important because religious belief is important for individual well-being.
Because the two cases apply the same rule of inference, we have to conclude that both
arguments are either equally sound or unsound. I believe that they are both unsound
because I believe in the separation of church and state. Likewise, we should separate
nation and state, or culture and state. We should not allow the power of a national culture
to cross over from that of the culturalto that of the political.
In addition to this main argument, Caney tries to support his argument with an
additional argument. To strengthen his claim that a nation state is pro tanto valuable,
Caney compares two possible states of affairs an individual could be in.
194
In the first

193
See Caney, 1997, p.361.

194
See Caney, 1997, p.363.

131

case, an individual is a member of a multination state that respects her basic rights. In the
second case, the same individual is a member of a nation state that respects her basic
rights and uses non-coercive means to uphold her national culture. According to Caney,
the second scenario is clearly better than the first—in both cases, the basic rights of the
same individual are equally protected. However, the individual ―flourish[es] to a greater
extent‖ in the second scenario.
195
Therefore, Caney concludes that a nation state is,
ceteris paribus, valuable.
I find this argument questionable as well. To make the claim that this individual
flourishes to a greater extent in the second case, Caney must have implicitly adopted
some criteria with which he can make this judgment (about better or worse), but I am not
sure which. He seems to believe that the judgment is rather intuitive. Most likely, Caney
presupposes that this is what the individual wants.
196
Therefore, it is better for an
individual to live in the first scenario than the second one, as the wish of national self-
determination is realized.
However, the truth of the claim depends on the presumption that the individual is
also a nationalist. If an individual is not a nationalist, but is instead, say, a believer of
cosmopolitanism or anarchism, then the claim that ―this individual will flourish to a
greater extent in a nation state‖ would not necessarily be correct. Caney‘s argument
depends on what individuals actually want. As their wishes change, so too does their

195
See Caney, 1997, p.363.

196
I am not sure if Caney has in mind some other explanation, if his explanation were different, then the
resulting judgment would be different.

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conclusion about which institution is better. If this is the case, then it is not true that a
nation state is, other things being equal, valuable.
Caney might think that this is not a particularly serious problem. He may be willing
to concede that, if we were in a world of cosmopolitanism, then national self-
determination might not be valuable. Caney might claim that this does not defeat his
argument, because given the facts about the world, his conclusion stands. This is what
people in fact want, so a nation state is better than a multination state. Caney is not
claiming that it will always be better, but merely that it is better.
However, this concession renders the conclusion insubstantial, as a multination state
could be equally valuable, too. For this additional argument to be successful, Caney
would need to prove that a nation state is, other things being equal, valuable. However,
this concession makes it difficult for him to do so. Therefore, Caney‘s argument is not
successful. A nation state is not intrinsically better than a multination state.
Can it nonetheless be the case that a nation state is better than a multination state,
regardless of what an individual thinks?
197
I think that it cannot. The value of national
identity lies in the identity part. That is, a national culture is valuable because its
members actually identify with it. Were this false, (P2) would be wrong as well, and
membership would not improve the well-being of individuals. If people did not identify
with a culture, the value of this culture would become impersonal. The value of the
culture could be historical, anthropological, or educational, but its preservation would not
contribute to the well-being of persons. Policies enforcing this culture upon non-

197
Thanks to Professor Marmor for making this point.

133

identifying persons would be considered tyrannical. Thus, the willing identification of
members is essential for this argument.
Finally, I think that the spirit of this argument is inconsistent with the value of
multiculturalism. This argument, if sound, implies that a multination state is less valuable
than a nation state. This conclusion is anti-pluralistic, and may have other undesirable
implications on domestic affair policies. Thus, a nation state is not pro tanto valuable.

3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argue that both the instrumental value and the intrinsic value
arguments fail to justify the right of a national community to establish an independent
state. The instrumental value arguments try to justify this right by appealing to the
instrumental values that national identity and membership can have for important liberal
democratic institutions. The claim about the instrumental values of national identity, even
if true, cannot justify the right of a national community to establish an independent state,
as instrumental values do not justify this right.
The intrinsic value arguments try to justify this right by explaining the importance of
national identity and membership, and how a state can best protect the relevant interests.
However, merely pointing out one interest is not enough to justify the right to an
institution, as a state is supposed to protect not just the interest in national identity but
also other important interests.
I also discussed an alternative understanding of the claim that a national
community has the right to build a state—that is, the claim that a nation state is, other

134

things being equal, a valuable institution. I have explained why this claim is wrong.
Therefore, a national community does not have the right to establish an independent state.
Finally, I do not mean to suggest that a national community can never be justified in
establishing a new state. My point is only that none of the arguments discussed in this
chapter provides solid ground for a national group‘s right to establish a state. The right to
build a state, again, is a right to an institution. Without an evaluation of its consequences,
this kind of claim cannot be substantiated.

135

Chapter Four— The Right of National Communities to Establish Independent States: Is It
Feasible?

4.1 Introduction
In Chapter Three, I considered arguments that attempt to justify the prima facie
right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state.
198
They do
so by pointing out that members of a national community have an important interest in
their membership and identity, and that creating an independent state is an important way
of protecting these interests. I argued that these facts are not sufficient to justify the
institutional recognition of a national group‘s right to self-government: although we
know that national identity is an important good, this fact does not by itself tell us how to
distribute this good in political institutions.
199
To determine whether institutions should
recognize a national group‘s right to self-government, we must evaluate the cost of its
implementation. What we must know is not just whether recognizing this right would be
an effective way to protect people‘s interests in national identity. We also need to know
whether we can afford the costs, risks, and side-effects involved in the implementation of
this right.

198
In this chapter, I will use the terms ‗the right to establish independent states‘, ‗the right to secede‘, and
‗the statist theory‘ interchangeably to refer to the right of a national community to build a sovereign state.

199
Gans makes a similar point when he discusses freedom-based interest in national cultures. He compares
it with the interest in private property and suggests that ―… one of its [private property‘s] possible
justifications revolves around its contribution to human freedom... Acknowledging a general right to
private property on this basis, however, does not resolve issues concerning its concrete regulation… The
resolution of these issues is not inherent in the freedom-based right to private property. Rather, they must
be sought in other standards that are external to freedom.‖ See Gans, 2003, pp.41-2.

136

Although many philosophers endorse the principle of national self-determination,
not as many agree that the international community should institutionally recognize the
right of a national community to secede unilaterally. Many worry that there would be
grave consequences if such a right were recognized. Affirming that people have an
important or even fundamental interest in some good does not mean that we have to
affirm every means necessary for its protection, let alone give them the right to these
means. As Marmor suggests, some interests, ―in spite of being important and worthy of
protection, … cannot be plausibly protected by the imposition of duties on others;
because the duty would either be disproportionately burdensome or practically impossible
to impose.‖
200

Likewise, even if we endorse the principle of national self-determination, this
does not mean that we must also endorse every institutional arrangement that contributes
to its realization. To determinate whether international law or a domestic constitution
should recognize the right of a national group to establish its own state, we must also
consider what is involved in its implementation: What would it take to recognize this
right? What would the prerequisites be? What duties would it give rise to? What impact
would it have on members, non-members, or international society? Would it inspire more
secessionist movements? Would it lead to instability or even injustice?
In this chapter, I will discuss four types of problems commonly associated with
recognizing the right of a national community to establish an independent state. The first
concerns a necessary condition and its implication: is there enough land for each national

200
See Marmor, 2007. p.233-34.

137

community to establish its own state? If not, then not all nations can have their own states.
Would this not be unfair? The second type of problem concerns the side-effects of
implementing this right. Would the recognition of the right give rise to political
instability?
201
Would it encourage secession and discourage negotiation whenever
conflicts arise?
202
The third type of problem concerns possible burdens on the members,
both inside and outside the border of the potential nation state. The fourth type of
problem concerns the cost that would be imposed on the remaining state. In the following,
I will explain these objections and the limits of them. I will argue that, even though many
of the objections can justify restricting or regulating a national group‘s right to secede,
they do not provide sufficient reason to deny a national group the right to establish a state.

4.2.1 A Necessary Condition—Sufficient Land
The first objection concerns a condition necessary for recognizing the right of a
national community to establish an independent state. If any of the conditions necessary
for the recognition of the right is not available, the right of a national community to
establish an independent state cannot begin to be realized, even if it is based on sound
political morality.
Gellner claims that at least one of the conditions necessary for the statist theory is
not available.
203
He argues that, if this theory were to be carried out, then there has to be

201
See Buchanan, 1996, p.293.

202
See Horowitz, 1998, p.187.

203
See Gellner, 1983.

138

enough land for each national group to build its own state. However, it seems that there is
not enough land for this to be done.
To put it in the simplest possible terms: there is a very large number of potential
nations on earth. Our planet also contains room for a certain number of
independent or autonomous political units. On any reasonable calculation, the
former number (of potential nations) is probably much, much larger than that of
possible viable states. If this argument or calculation is correct, not all
nationalisms can be satisfied, at any rate at the same time. The satisfaction of
some spells the frustration of others.
204

The passage includes two different points: the first is about the amount of land
necessary for implementing the statist theory, and the second is about the necessary
differential treatments of different national groups, if the statist theory were to be carried
out in spite of the first problem. In the following, I will discuss the implications of these
two points.
Here, Gellner implicitly equates the statist theory of national self-determination
with the principle of ―one nation, one state‖. This seems necessary because, other things
being equal, if one national group is given the right to establish an independent state for
itself, other national groups should be granted the same right. This leads many to the
worry that, given the number of actual or potential national communities in the world,
there may not be enough territorial area for each to build its own state.
To this, Copp responds that, even if every nation had the right to establish its own
state, it is not the case that they would all exercise that right.
205
As we can see, some
national communities, such as Native American communities in the US or Canada, are

204
Ibid, p.2.
205
See Buchanan, 1996; Copp, 1979, pp. 71-95.

139

not inclined to establish their own sovereign states. Native American communities in
both countries enjoy a very high degree of political autonomy. They have their own
reservations and tribal councils, and only members of those communities have the right to
decide certain important issues concerning their communities. Many national
communities seem to be relatively satisfied with their status quo. It is fair to say that not
all national communities aspire to establish independent states.
Still, the response cannot diminish the worry completely. If the international
community were to recognize rights of national communities to build their own states, we
should anticipate the worst case scenario in which numerous national communities
exercised their rights. Would it be possible for each of them to establish its own state? It
is difficult for us to imagine how this could be feasible, given the fact that members of
many national communities live intermingled with members of other communities, and
some are so dispersed that there is no territorial area where they could form a state. In
these cases, recognizing the right of one group amounts to denying the same right to
others. Buchanan thus suggests that we should understand this argument as suggesting
that rights have to be practicable in some sense.
206
There are times when a society cannot
afford to recognize a right due to its lack of a necessary material condition. For instance,
a society can afford to recognize the right of a citizen to health care only if it can afford
the costs of recognizing the right. If the society cannot afford the cost, it may not be able
to recognize this right. Similarly, unless we have enough land for each national

206
Buchanan, 1996, p.292.

140

community to build its own state, we cannot afford to recognize the right of a national
community to establish an independent state.
4.2.1.1 Scarcity of land?
The first point about the sufficiency of land is often taken literally. Because
Gellner talks about there not being enough land for viable states, his argument is
sometimes interpreted as saying that there is literally not enough land in the world to
satisfy all the demands of actual or potential national communities to establish
independent states. One question immediately arises: if there is enough land for all the
people in the world, then in what sense is there not enough land for all the nations to
build states?
The simplistic description that there is literally not enough land is imprecise. This
claim would be literally true only if we needed to find some additional land or some
piece of new territory for the prospective states. However, this does not seem to be what
the statist nationalists have in mind. Instead of looking for new territory, most national
groups plan to stay where they are right now. This demand for additional land might be a
correct description of the situation when the Europeans first moved to North America.
They were looking for a new place to build a new society outside of the previous one. But
the description does not reflect the demand of recent statist nationalists, who do not want
to emigrate out of the jurisdictional area of their current state. Rather, they want to
change the jurisdictional area of the current state.
Instead, another interpretation of Gellner‘s argument is as follows: because there
are so many national groups in the world, if each nation were to build its own state, then

141

the size of the resulting states would be too small to be viable.
207
The assumption
underlying this argument is that the number of national groups and the amount of land
available for the realization of the statist theory is in reverse proportion: the greater the
number of national groups, the smaller the share of land each can receive to establish its
own state. The fewer number of national groups, the bigger share of land available for
each to build its own state.
Whether this interpretation of Gellner‘s argument successfully weakens the statist
theory depends on if it is a correct description of the world. The demographic
distribution of the world can differ from time to time—if the number of national
communities can increase or decrease just as the population can. Whether the statist
theory is feasible at a given point in time may depend on the geodemographic distribution
of the world at that time. For Gellner, the planet contains room for a certain number of
viable states. Presumably, if the number of actual national communities is lower than that
number, Gellner may not have a problem with national groups establishing their own
states. However, if the number of national communities exceeds the threshold, Gellner
believes that implementing the right would lead to a serious problem.
208

Still, even if it is true that our world has too many national groups and that the
size of new states would be very small—the viability of such small state does not seem to

207
There is a different concern about the possible consequences of a continuous break-up of societies.
Some philosophers seem to believe that there is something intrinsically wrong with a world with a vast
number of states. Their concern seems to be less about the viability of these states, but about the huge
number of resulting states. See Beiner, 1998, pp.159-60.

208
The thesis that there is a threshold number of possible states seems to me to be implied in Gellner‘s
suggestion that ―Our planet also contains room for a certain number of independent or autonomous political
units.‖

142

be a problem in this era of globalization when international trade and regional alliances
are commonplace. Gellner was worried that, if a state were too small, it might not be
viable. However, there are many examples of small but viable states: Singapore,
Lichtenstein, the Vatican. Not only are these states viable, they are sound as well. A
small territory might mean fewer natural resources and higher dependence on trade and
importation, but this does not mean that the state would not be viable.
209
Thus, whether a
state is viable does not seem to depend on its size. It may depend on other factors. For
instance, it depends on whether there are sufficient resources to sustain the regular
functioning of society and whether the state has the capacity to defend itself against
external aggression. Still, in this age of global trade and regional cooperation, these
problems are not insurmountable. States lacking resources can trade with other states by
joining the WTO, and states with weak military power can form regional military
alliances with other states (e.g., NATO). Consequently, even if the statist theory led to a
situation where the resulting states were very small, this does not mean that these states
would not be viable.
What‘s worth mentioning in the discussion of the viability of states is the idea that
even if a group does not have enough military strength to defend itself, this should not
immediately disqualify the group from becoming a state. Philpott points out that if
economic or military strength is a requirement for statehood, then a national group
seeking self-determination may be subject to blackmail from neighboring states.
210
Were

209
See Philpott, 1995, p.366; Moore, 1997, p.909.

210
See Philpott, 1995, p.366.

143

military strength a necessary condition for statehood, even many sound, legitimate states
would fail the test. In the nuclear power era, no state can defend itself against nuclear
weapons. The fact that another military power can defeat a national group does not make
the group‘s right to establish a state legitimate. We also have to bear in mind that some
societies have more peaceful societal cultures and are usually unwilling or unable to
defend themselves against malicious military attack. Why should military power
determine the soundness of a claim to establish an independent state? The underlying
assumption seems to give too much advantage to groups with military ambitions. Even if
military power is quite important for the protection of a society, by itself a lack of
military power cannot undermine the soundness of a group‘s claim to establish an
independent state.

4.2.1.2 Necessary Inequality
Gellner‘s second criticism implicit in the passage quoted earlier suggests that,
because some national communities have serious difficulty establishing their own states,
recognizing the right of a national community to establish an independent state will lead
to a situation where some groups have their own states while others do not. This seems
unfair.
In the last section, I argued that even if the some nations can only build very small
states, this does not mean that these states will not be viable. Thus, we can rule out size as
the explanation for why some groups cannot establish their own states. What then is the
reason why some national communities cannot establish their own states? Is there any

144

other explanation of why not all national communities can establish their own states? Or
is Gellner wrong, and is it possible for each national community to establish its own state?
I believe that Gellner is correct to suggest that not all national communities can
establish their own states. Now that I have ruled out reasons related to the size of
prospective states (4.2.1.1), I would like to discuss another explanation for why some
national communities cannot establish their own states. The reason has to do with the
geodemographic conditions of certain national communities.
Depending on geodemographic distribution, there are three types of national groups:
territorially-concentrated, intermingled, and dispersed national groups. Members of a
territorially-concentrated national group, such as the Flemish in Belgium, live closely
together in a given territorial area. Members of intermingled national groups, such as
Roman Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, live intermingled with members of
other national groups. Members of a dispersed national group, such as the Roma people,
live dispersedly around the globe.
Being territorially concentrated or dispersed is a matter of degree. Even when a
national group is territorially concentrated, as is often the case in its historical homeland,
this does not mean that there are no non-members residing in the territory. In addition,
depending on how the boundary is drawn, a national group can have a majority or even
an exclusive presence over a certain territorial area. However, if the boundary were
drawn in a different way, the same group would become a minority. At any rate, it seems
that if national communities were given rights to secede, it would be relatively easy for
territorially-concentrated groups to exercise this right because it would be relatively easy

145

for them to draw the state border to encircle the members of their community. On the
other hand, intermingled or dispersed national communities would have serious difficulty
exercising this right, as it is not clear how the state border could be drawn.
In the case of a dispersed national community, members of the group do not live
very close to each other. Besides, there is no place in the world where there is a high
territorial concentration of members. Thus, it is very difficult for them to demarcate
possible territory. Accordingly, it is not clear how the group could build its own state—at
least not in a democratic way. How can these dispersed groups exercise their right? Is
there anyway they can establish their own states?
The situation with intermingled national communities is not any easier. Even if the
group is the numerical majority in a certain territorial area, there is still a strong minority
intermingled with it, and the minority has substantive influence over and interest in the
same territorial area. In addition, there may be a competing claim from another national
community. Some territorial areas include more than one group whose national identities
are closely attached to the area. For instance, both Israelis and Palestinians have very
deep attachments to Palestine. In these cases, there is no way we can satisfy the statist
demands of both groupsat the same time.
211
Here, how do we decide which group is
entitled to establish a state? Granting only one of them the right amounts to denying the

211
What I mean here is that there is no way to satisfy the demand of both groups if we use national identity
as the criteria for determining the distribution of territorial claims, which is presumably by the principle of
national self-determination. However, if we adopt some other principle of distribution, we might be able
to accommodate the demands of both. There is indeed one way to settle the dispute, which involves
granting custody of the land to both sides. However, this kind of arrangement allows the decision to be
made not just by members of a national group but by members on both sides. It is difficult to see in what
sense this solution can be seen as a form of national self-determination. For example, some philosophers
argue that, in the case of the territorial dispute between Israel and Palestine, a multination state or some
sort of partition may be adopted. For a discussion of the multinational arrangement, see Nielsen, 1998,
p.120,. For the partition option, see Moore, 2001, p.234.

146

same interest of the other.
212
How can we satisfy the statist demands of both? Is it even
possible to do so?
Philosophical arguments for the statist theory justify the right of a national
community to establish an independent state by referring to the interests it has in the
preservation of its national culture or identity. In that case, if these interests are important
enough to justify the right to establish independent states, then any national group,
territorially-concentrated or not, should be granted this right. In other words, if the
interest in preserving national cultures and identity is important enough to justify the
right to build a state, then all national groups should have the right, regardless of their
population distribution.
To help national communities preserve their cultures and protect their interest in
identity, many liberal societies grant national communities the right to cultural
preservation. This right allows national communities to preserve their cultural heritage.
As Buchanan suggests, either the right to cultural preservation is sufficient to protect the
interests people have in their national culture and identity, or it is not.
213
If it is sufficient,
then why should any national group also be given the right to build a sovereign state? If it
is not sufficient, then is it not unfair that some national groups can build their own states
while others cannot? If dispersed and intermingled communities cannot establish their
own states, does this harm any of their pertinent interests? What can we do for dispersed
and intermingled national groups? Is there any way we can make up for their loss?

212
See Buchanan, 1996, p.292.

213
See Buchanan, 1996, p.301.

147

Even though many philosophers argue for national self-determination in the form
of an independent state, none of them insists that this right can be exercised in the case of
dispersed or intermingled national groups. Presumably, this is because they notice that
there will be insurmountable difficulties for these groups to exercise their right. To
address the problem, many philosophers, such as Nielsen, Margalit and Raz, Miller, and
Tamir, modify their theories by moving from defending a right of a national community
to establish an independent state to defending a good claim or prima facie right.
214
What
this revision implies is that the right of a national community to establish a state should
be weighed against other interests or the competing rights of other national communities.
Even though a national community has the right to establish its own state, this right may
be overruled by other more important interests or more basic rights. These philosophers
recognize that national communities with dispersed or intermingled populations may not
be able to exercise such a right. Nevertheless, this does not mean that other national
communities cannot exercise their rights. The right to establish an independent state is
not absolute, but has to be weighed against other rights.
215

There is one way to salvage the rights of those dispersed or intermingled national
groups that, due to their geodemographic condition, cannot establish their own states. We
could relocate people so that members of the same national community form a territorial
concentration: Israelis on one side, Palestinians on the other. In this way even those
national communities with dispersed populations can come to form a majority or even

214
Miller suggests that national groups have a good claim to secession, see Miller, 1996, p.265. Tamir and
Nielsen believe that the right of a national community to secede is a primary right, and it can be realized so
long as the benefit outweighs cost. See Tamir, 1993, P.74-5; Nielsen, pp.120-3.

215
See Miller, 1996, p.265.

148

have an exclusive presence in some territorial area. This can be done via voluntary or
involuntary methods: forced, involuntary relocation of people is, of course, not
acceptable.
216
It violates very important interests and changes people‘s lives drastically.
On the other hand, it is not clear how effective voluntary relocation is. Most likely,
people would ask, ―why should members of our group move? Why shouldn‘t they be the
ones to be relocated?‖ Subsidies could be provided to encourage voluntary relocation, but
it is not clear whether any group could afford the costs, or how effective this measure
would be. In addition, relocation requires the willing cooperation of both members and
non-members: not only does a group have to encourage its members to move into the
area of the prospective state, but they also have to encourage non-members to move out
of the area. Lastly, there is one serious problem with this type of policy— its ethnocentric
flavor. This type of policy welcomes some groups but not others. It is not clear how we
can justify such a policy without reference to some arbitrary ethnocentric criteria. Is there
any good reason why only persons of a particular national background should live in a
certain territorial area? Is there any good reason why persons of a different national
background should move out of the same territorial area? This type of policy smacks of
ethnocentrism and is for that reason opposed to cultural pluralism. Therefore, population
relocation is not acceptable: not only is the cost too high, the measure itself is anti-
pluralistic. We should not adopt massive relocation just to ensure that each national
community can build its own state. Proponents of the statist theory must accept the status
quo. No massive relocation should happen.

216
In a footnote, Miller discusses a real example of mass relocation: Greece and Turkey in the 1920‘s. See
Miller, 1996, p. 276.

149

In that case, Gellner‘s claim is still pertinent. Given the demographic condition of
our world, recognizing the right of a national community to establish an independent state
necessarily leads to a situation where some national groups, i.e., territorially-concentrated
groups, can exercise their rights, but others, i.e., intermingled or dispersed groups, cannot.
Is this unfair?
Echoing Gellner, Gans argues that, ―[p]rima facie, it seems unjust to promote the
right to self-determination by granting independent statehood and, consequently,
international status with regard to some national groups while simultaneously
condemning other national groups to an inferior normative status.‖
217
Gans, however,
does not explain what he means by describing stateless national groups as being in ‗an
inferior normative status‘. I assume he thinks that this is a case of differential, or even
worse, preferential treatment. It gives only some national groups the chance to realize
their pursuit of an independent state but in substance denies others the same benefit. This
is unfair, because the reason why we cannot give all national groups the same right is
arbitrary from the point of view of justice. It is a matter of arbitrary fact that members of
some national groups happen to live closely together while members of other groups do
not. The way people live is a fortuitous happenstance that should not determine the fate
of their national group.
218

Still, some philosophers believe that this is not a problem. So long as the different
consequences are not the result of unfair human manipulation, we can reasonably accept

217
See Gans, 2003, p.74.

218
Gans calls this unequal outcome global injustice. It is in contrast to ‗domestic injustice,‘ where the
injustice happens inside the state border. Global injustice has a global dimension as it can happen across
state borders. See Gans, 2003, pp.74-8.

150

the fact that some nations simply cannot establish their own states. For example, Tamir
argues that, ―As long as the variance only reflects the unequal distribution of the chance
factors.., it is hard to claim that a wrong was done.‖
219
Just as everyone has a right to buy
a car but not everyone can afford it, each national group has the right to build their own
state, but not all of them can afford to exercise this right. The fact that some cannot afford
to buy their own cars is not a sufficient reason to deny others the right to buy one.
Similarly, the fact that some national groups cannot exercise their right to build their own
state is not sufficient reason to deny other nations their right to do so. Though there will
be different outcomes for different national communities, this does not mean that nations
are treated unequally. The outcome is not unfair because it is the result of different luck,
not defective institutional design or unfair human manipulation. Therefore, this is not
unfair for some groups to be able to exercise this right while the others cannot do so.
I agree with Tamir that, even though the outcome is uneven, it is not unjust. I
want to further repudiate the claim that there is inequality in the outcome by arguing that
dispersed or intermingled national groups cannot claim that pertinent interests of theirs
are harmed if they cannot establish their own states. The right to build a state protects a
group‘s interest in political affairs. Only territorially-concentrated national groups have
an interest in public/political affairs concerning a territorial area. Members of a dispersed
national group do not share an interest in political affairs, and in the case of intermingled
national communities, they share that interest with members of the other national
community who live intermingled with them.

219
―As long as this variance only reflects the unequal distribution of the chance factors mentioned above, it
is hard to claim that a wrong was done.‖ See Tamir, 1993, p.75.

151

Here, it is important for us to distinguish between two different types of interests:
interest in cultural affairs and interest in political affairs. Both territorially-concentrated
and non-territorially concentrated national groups have interests in cultural affairs.
However, only territorially concentrated groups have an interest in political affairs.
Consider the interest in political affairs. Political affairs concern matters such as
where to build a power plant, how to deploy the military, or how to regulate monetary
policies. They are affairs that arise because people share the same living space. We grant
only citizens and no one else the right to participate in determining the political affairs of
a state because they live in the same state and share a common living space. Public affairs
there have a direct impact on their daily lives. It is not unfair for the Japanese government
to deny a non-permanent resident, such as a Puerto Rican, the right to vote for the prime
minister of Japan, as this decision concerns primarily the welfare of those living in Japan.
Those who are not citizens or permanent residents, even if they are ethnic Japanese or
have a deep respect for Japanese culture, are not deprived of any fair interest if they
cannot vote for the prime minister of Japan or decide where in Japan to build a subway.
Political affairs concern the collective living of permanent residents. Thus, it matters
where and with whom a person lives.
In the case of dispersed national communities, members of the group do not share
an interest in political affairs: they do not share a common living space, they do not need
to build roads or bridges together, and they do not have an interest in sharing the same

152

military or monetary policy.
220
In short, they do not need a government that takes care of
their public affairs. Unlike a territorially-concentrated national group, a dispersed
national group does not have an interest in establishing a new state. Thus, it is not clear if
and how a dispersed national group could be harmed if it cannot establish its own state. If
their interests are not harmed, then it is not clear how failing to recognize the right of a
national community to build an independent state makes them normatively inferior.
In the case of intermingled national communities, members of two or more
national groups share the same interest in the political affairs of the same territorial area.
Decisions about the political affairs of the area affect every resident, regardless of her
national membership: e.g., the construction of highways, the building of public schools,
and the policies concerning military or monetary affairs. In that case, every permanent
resident, regardless of her national membership, should have a say about the public
affairs of her society.
221
If a person were prohibited from participating in public affairs
due to her national membership, then she could reasonably object to this prohibition.
Thus, an intermingled national community may not establish its own state, as doing so
may undermine the interests of non-members in public affairs. Does this mean that an
intermingled national community is normatively inferior, compared to national groups

220
Philpott mentions a similar point when he discussed why ‗geographical libertarianism‘ cannot work,
―street cleaning, managing the environment and infrastructure, defense, education, and so on—the social
tasks which require government--- are done together: in neighborhoods, cities, larger regions.‖ 1995, p. 369.

221
Consider a relevant argument explaining why citizens should be given equal rights to participate in
democratic decision-making procedures. According to Marmor, part of the justification for the political
authority of these procedures is that they demonstrate equal respect for individual autonomy. Who then has
the right to participate in the decision-making of a domestic society? Marmor suggests that ―Plausibly, we
may hold that in the political domain people deserve respect as the subjects of political authorities and as
members of a body politic, namely, as citizens. Citizenship I take to be a morally significant concept: From
a moral perspective, citizens are bearers of rights and duties vis a vis the state and each other.‖ See Marmor,
2007, p.63.

153

that have their own states? Does this create inequality? Clearly not. If what I said about
dispersed national groups in the last paragraph is sensible, then even if a national
community could not establish its own state, none of its pertinent interests would be
harmed. It is, then, difficult to see how recognizing the right of a national community to
establish an independent state could be unfair to a dispersed or an intermingled national
community.

4.2.2 Side-effects
The second kind of problem that is likely to arise in recognizing the right of a
national community to establish an independent state involves the possible side-effects of
implementing the relevant policies. First, if secession is available, people might choose
secession over communication, resulting in a series of incessant break-ups. Second,
during the process of secession, different groups could be in constant conflict due to
disputes over territory. This may lead to unceasing instability.

4.2.2.1 Undermining Democratic Communication
Some philosophers worry that recognizing the right of a national community to
establish an independent state can lead to unceasing break-ups of states. They argue that
it is in principle possible for people to continue to form new national identities
indefinitely. Eevery possible national identity gives rise to the possibility of a potential
state. Accordingly, even after all the current national groups had exercised their rights to
establish new states, there could still be a process of identity forming and secession.

154

Furthermore, with unceasing break-ups come unceasing instability.
222
Given the
estimated break-ups and this tendency toward instability, recognizing the right of a
national community to establish an independent state does not seem to be a good idea. In
this section, I will discuss the possibility that recognizing such a right may give rise to
unceasing break-ups. The problem of instability will be discussed in the next section
(4.2.2.2).
The argument of incessant secession applies to the recognition of the right to secede
in general. Its target is not just national communities, but also any other kind of group.
No matter what the criteria for secession are, in order to secede a group can always find a
way to satisfy these criteria. Accordingly, if a national group was entitled to secede, then,
in order to secede, secessionists could always somehow form a new national identity and
claim that they constitute a national community. Is there any way we could stop the
forming of new national identities? What could stop potentially incessant secessions?
Perhaps it is true that the recognition of the right to secede could lead to incessant
secession. We can still ask, what would be so wrong with incessant secession? Why
should we be wary of incessant secession? Is the problem the size of the resulting states?
Or the instability it would cause? Or would secession simply be a bad thing, not to
mention incessant secession?
In 4.2.1.1, I discussed the objection that, if rights of national communities to build
their own states were recognized, the size of the resulting states may become too small to
be viable. As a response, I argued that the viability of a state does not depend on its size. I

222
See Beiner,1998, pp.159-60.

155

will talk about the instability associated with secession in the next section (4.2.2.2). Here,
I want to focus on one particular argument that may explain why incessant secession is a
bad thing: the argument that recognizing the right to secede can undermine democratic
communication. This argument is especially worthy of our attention given the fact that
most liberal societies are multi-national or cultural-pluralistic, and most secessionist
movements allude to cultural differences and conflicting values as an important part of
their justification.
According to Hirschman, the availability of exiting may not only resolve conflicts,
but also assure a continued process of break-ups.
223
The argument is based on the
possibility that recognizing the right of a national community to secede may create
incentive to pull away and may diminish people‘s willingness to communicate and
compromise whenever conflicts arise. Consider an analogous situation in divorce. As we
can see, ever since divorce became legal and feasible, instead of meeting each other half
way many struggling couples have given up communication and gotten a divorce.
Similarly, if secession were too easy, instead of working on reconciliation, a national
group might choose to break the coalition.
This argument can perhaps provide a good reason why an unlimited right to
secede may dampen people‘s willingness to communicate; however, this does not mean
that the right to secede should not be recognized at all. Most liberal democracies are
culturally pluralistic. Most states are not nation states but multination states. Thus, it is

223
The conflict is resolved, not in the sense that there is a solution that both parties find satisfactory or
acceptable, but in the sense that both sides leave each other alone and stop disturbing each other about with
the disputed issue. See Buchanan, 1997, p. 48. See also Hirschman, 1978, pp.90-107

156

not surprising that we find conflicting values and cultural differences among the national
communities in liberal democracies. To allow a group to secede too easily may indeed
undermine people‘s willingness to communicate. This cannot be a good thing as it would
create a tendency to break up culturally pluralistic societies. An important task for a
pluralistic society is to communicate and compromise. Without a willingness to
communicate and compromise, how could a pluralistic society deal with cultural
differences?
Nevertheless, I believe that the argument does not provide us a conclusive reason
to deny the right of a national community to establish an independent state. Consider
other types of policies: would unemployment benefit policies encourage people to
become jobless? Would national health insurance encourage people to become ill? I
believe that the answer is no. Unemployment benefits do not encourage people to become
unemployed unless the policy provides people with a higher pension than the salary they
would receive from work. National health insurance does not encourage people to
become ill, either, unless the benefit they would receive by becoming sick is greater than
that which they receive by staying healthy.
Likewise, the availability of exiting only presents people with an option; it does
not immediately make it the preferred option, let alone the rational option. Whether
splitting is the rational course of action for a national community depends on other
factors, too. For instance, it also depends on the estimated financial health or military
strength of the community after secession. It is not true that whenever a person could
solve the problems in her marriage by divorce, she should get a divorce just to solve

157

those problems. A sane person would weigh the cost and benefit of her divorce. In
addition, consider another case of separation: as we can see, emigration is available and
feasible for many people, but most of them do not emigrate. Whether it is a good thing
for a person or a national community to break off depends on many factors. It is not clear
that mere recognition of the right to secede would encourage secession.
Moreover, one of the most important lessons social contract theories teach us is
that social cooperation is more beneficial than is working alone. In that case, it is, in
general, more rational for people (and national communities, too) to stay in a cooperative
regime than to leave and do their work alone. Nevertheless, whether it is wiser to stay
also depends on who one‘s neighbors are. Consider the case of Switzerland. The German,
French, and Italian-speaking peoples have a history of mutual respect and trust. In this
case, it is clearly unwise for any of them to withdraw from their current coalition, as they
would lose all the benefits emerging from their coalition. On the other hand, if two
groups have a history of distrust or even hatred— then it would clearly be better for them
to split from the coalition. There is no way we can clearly determine if the relationship
between two groups is respectful or discriminatory. Much depends on their understanding
and interpretation of the actions of each other.
The claim that national groups would rush to secede if we recognized their rights
to build states is questionable. As we can see, Native Americans are among the clearest
case of groups entitled to secede, as they were involuntarily merged into their current
society. If Native Americans chose to secede, most people would not question whether

158

they have the right to do so.
224
Nonetheless, Native Americans are not particularly
enthusiastic about building their own states. Why? Presumably because, compared with
secession, staying in the US or Canada is more beneficial for them. Thus, it is not true
that recognizing rights of national communities to secede will necessarily encourage
them to secede. Whether secession is preferable depends on how the group is treated in
their domestic society.
Nevertheless, even if recognizing the right to secede would not necessarily
encourage secession and discourage negotiation, one can imagine that a recognize of the
right to secede could create bargaining leverage for some groups.
225
This may obstruct
fair cooperation in the social collaborative regime. Certain groups could take advantage
of this bargaining leverage and threaten to secede if the rest of the society did not give
them what they want. This seems unfair.
This is indeed an important concern. Here, although I cannot discuss the problems
of uneven bargaining power within democratic societies in detail, I would like to talk
briefly about several different ways in which we can think about this problem. To begin
with, we can ask how serious the threat of secession is. Unless a group is already very
serious about secession, it is not likely that they would secede if they did not receive what
they want. Cities or states rarely secede just because they lose one competition for social
resources. On the other hand, there are, in some societies, persistent minority groups that
rarely, if ever, win the competition for resources. Leverage is important for them, as it

224
This does not mean that the Native Americans have unlimited authority of the whole territory. Their
claims to territory have to be weighed against the claims of the Americans currently living here.

225
I would like to thank Professor Marmor for raising this objection to me.

159

may give them the bargain power they need to compete. Moreover, secession is not risk-
free for the seceding group, either. This group may lose certain important benefits they
would receive had they stayed with the original society. Further, if the threat worked and
society succumbed to the threat of the seceding group, the threatening group would be
very likely to use the same tactic again. This would mean that it is in general unwise for
the larger society to succumb to the threat of secession. In addition, it is not clear how
important the rest of the society should consider the seceding region. How bad would the
break-up be for the remaining state? What would be so wrong about letting them
establish their own state? Finally, even if a group had the right to secede, this would not
mean that they could do so in a way that would disregard the interests of the remaining
society. I will discuss this in detail the last section (4.2.4).
In any case, the lesson we should learn from Hirschman‘s argument is that when
secession is easy, people tend to choose separation over communication or compromise.
This does not mean that we have to preclude secession completely. If we are worried that
unceasing break-ups would ensue if secession were too easy, then the institutions
governing secession could be arranged in a way that would produce results that would
reflect the informed and considered decision of people. We do not need to make the
process too easy. According to Norman, for the sake of stability, we need to discourage
secessionist movements by institutionalizing a burdensome procedure of secession.
226
If a
procedure was burdensome, it could perhaps discourage reckless and irresponsible

226
See Moore, 2001, p.147.

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secession. At any rate, what matters is that exiting be regulated. There is no need to ban it
altogether.
227

4.2.2.2 Instability
National movements receive a lot of media attention mainly because of the
violence associated with them. Not surprisingly, many philosophers are worried that,
once the right of a national group to secede was recognized, instability would ensue—not
to mention that some philosophers also believe that there would be unceasing break-ups,
leading to even more insecurity. Citing Horowitz,
228
Buchanan suggests that secession
almost always exacerbates existing territorial disputes and ethno-national conflicts.
229
To
justify their right to establish an independent state, nationalists tend to focus on the
difference between themselves and the rest of the state. They emphasize their suffering
and sometimes even exaggerate it. In addition, where members of different national
communities intermingle, non-members may object to the building of a new nation state,
as demonstrated by the example of Kosovo‘s independence.
230
The Serbian population in
Kosovo has resisted and denied the existence of new state throughout and even after
Kosovo‘s independence was achieved.

227
I will discuss Norman‘s argument in the next chapter. Norman seems to believe that a burdensome
process is necessary to deter reckless secession. However, Moore points out that this might not be realistic,
as many national groups who have good claims of self-determination may not have enough resources to go
through the lengthy process. I will argue that the process has to be necessarily burdensome. For example, it
should include a step where the seceding group agree to pay the debt they owe the remaining state as a
condition of secession. It should be a process that will produce the best result for the group.

228
See Horowitz, 1998.

229
See Buchanan, 1996.

230
See New York Times, February, 18, 2008.

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Horowitz discusses several examples of actual nationalist movements to support
his claim. According to him, the success of the Eritrean secession was fortuitous, the
breakup of the Soviet Union was partially accounted for by the consent of the state and is
exceptional, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which he describes as ‗non-consensual
and violent‘, is more usual. The lesson we should learn from these examples, according
to Horowitz, is that statist nationalism has a tendency to cause conflict and instability.
I believe that Horowitz‘s analysis is misleading and at best inconclusive. In
addition, even if this analysis were correct, this does not mean that it could forecast the
development of future statist national movements.
First, the way Horowitz draws his conclusion is questionable. What, according to
him, counts as usual? Why is the Yugoslavia example the more usual example, but not
the former USSR or the Eritrean case? Moreover, there is the much acclaimed example of
the secession of Norway, where one liberal society peacefully divided into two.
231
Other
than the number of cases Horowitz has provided for his argument, it seems to me that
there is nothing inherently unstable about nationalist movements. It seems to me that
there is no ‗usual‘ example of national self-determination, only different national groups
situated in different societies. Their success or failure occurs for different reasons. None
is more usual or unusual than the other.
It may be true that, if we really count the actual cases of nationalist movements in
history, more than half of them, or even almost all of them, are related to serious

231
Both Nielsen and Kymlicka praise the secession of Norway from Sweden as a good example of a
(roughly) peaceful break-up of one liberal society into two. See Nielsen, 1996, p.113; Kymlicka, 1995,
p.186.

162

instability. Still, this does not mean that there is any necessary connection between
nationalist movements and instability. Secession movements can be peaceful, as
demonstrated by the Norwegian example. The important task is to learn the causes
behind the instability. Resisting colonial rule can lead to instability, too. However, we do
not tell people to stop resisting colonial rule just because it would definitely lead to
instability.
Likewise, even though nationalist movements are often associated with instability,
this does not mean that we must reject them right away. Of course, if the instability were
the result of some unreasonable demand, we would have to reject that demand even if it
would not create instability. In addition, even if a demand is reasonable, the way the
demand is made needs to be proper, too. When a demand can be met with peaceful
negotiations, peaceful measures should always be preferred to unstable ones. However, in
some cases, instability can be the result of a last resort attempt to fight against injustice.
Indeed, many nationalist movements rise against the background of oppression or
discrimination. For instance, the recent Chinese settlement in Tibet has deeply affected
the lives of Tibetans and caused much anger and frustration among them. In this case, the
Tibetans are justified in resisting Chinese settlement, even if their resistance would cause
instability. Unless one believes that the value of stability trumps all others, even justice,
we can, under certain qualified circumstances, accept some instability.
At any rate, I believe that the important thing to learn from successful examples
of secession is which elements contribute to peaceful dissociation. With a careful study of
these cases, we can follow the example of successful cases and avoid the difficulties of

163

the more problematic ones. For instance, in his analysis of the dissolution of the former
USSR, Horowitz points out that there has been a change in the attitude of both the people
and the ruling class. These elements made the society more receptive to the dissolution of
the union.
232
When a society is willing to embrace dissolution, there woill be less
resistance and as a result less instability. Horowitz also points out that the movement
started from the Baltic states and caused a domino effect on the other republics. Very
quickly, the USSR completely disintegrated. Even though there was still dissent and
resistance, due to the change of attitude in society, the process was more peaceful and
stable than it might have been. Even though the dissolution of the USSR happened very
quickly, the disintegration itself did not seem to be such a bad thing.
Undeniably, the attitude of a society is a very important factor in determining
whether the implementation of an institution will bring instability. Many principles and
policies are rejected by a society when they are first introduced: suffrage of women,
equal rights of slaves, etc. The relevant policies are resisted and instability follows as a
result, but this does not mean that there is anything wrong with the policies themselves.
What we should do to prevent instability is not to give up the policies altogether but to
educate the public. In order to carry out a policy, we need to seek the understanding and
acceptance of the society. If a society is ready to embrace a given policy, there will be
less resistance and instability. Instability should not be a conclusive reason to reject a
statist demand. For statist nationalists, the more important task is to prevent resistance by
engaging in peaceful negotiation and letting society understand their nationalistcause.

232
See Horowitz, 1998, p.188.

164

Certain national communities have a history of hostility. In these cases, secession
may indeed intensify the conflict. For the sake of stability, it may be prudent for a
national group to postpone the building of a new state and wait for the society to change
its attitude. Patience is a virtue in these cases, even if the national group is justified in
demanding secession. Still, the tendency to instability does not mean that the national
group cannot establish a new state. If we reject a justified demand only because it may be
resisted with violence, we are succumbing to the threat of violence. We should not
surrender to the threat of violence.
In short, the tendency to instability is not a sufficient reason to resist granting a
nation the right to secede. Resisting the right of secession because of its tendency to
instability would encourage resistance of secessionist movements because it would show
a strong fear of instability and a willingness to exchange justice for stability. To
circumvent instability, alternative measures such as negotiation and communication
should be considered first. Drastic measures or unilateral secessions should be a last
resort.

4.2.3 Internal Burdens
Recognizing the right of a national group to secede can have certain negative
impacts on members of the group: first, depending on the character of a nation‘s culture,
it may allow the group to institutionalize certain reprehensible aspects of its culture. This
may harm important interests of a certain subgroup of members. Second, the building of a

165

nation state can hamper the participation in cultural affairs of members outside of the
state border.

4.2.3.1 Members Who Will Also Be Citizens
Many people oppose any form of nationalism because many national communities
have customs, traditions, or practices that undermine important interests of thier own
members. Some practices even violate basic human rights. For example, it is not unusual
for national groups to have practices that violate important basic rights of women. In
these cases, if we give such national groups the right to preserve their culture, then they
have a chance to institutionalize these harmful traditions and customs. What is even
worse, if we give them the right to build their own states, they might design the political
infrastructure of their societies according to these cultural characteristics. The resulting
public institutions would undermine important interests of those who would be the targets
of these customs. Therefore, national self-determination should not be recognized, not to
mention the right to secede.
The merit of this argument is that it warns us against the dangerous aspects of
national cultures. Not every aspect of a nation‘s culture is worthy of institutional
protection. The preservation of national cultures may be important, but it is important
only to the extent that it contributes to the well-being of people. Certain aspects of
national cultures are quite harmful. If the recognition of a certain custom, tradition, or

166

practice harms the interest of people, we may have reason not to recognize it.
233
When a
practice violates important human rights of a citizen, we have reason to forbid it.
Accordingly, in determining if national self-determination implies the right to secede, we
have to take into consideration whether the right helps protect the reprehensible aspects
of national cultures.
Even though the principle of national self-determination stresses the importance
of national cultures, it does not imply that national groups should be given unlimited
rights to protect their cultures. We recognize national identity because it is essential for
individual well-being. In that case, customs and practices that violate the important
interests of people should not be protected. When a practice violates basic human rights,
there is very strong reason to forbid it. In addition, as Marmor suggests, rights to cultural
preservation ―are not rights to have the culture in question…., but the right to the
material conditions which render it possible for their culture to flourish.‖
234
In short,
national self-determination does not imply the right of national communities to preserve
every custom, tradition, and practice of their national cultures.
In addition, the right to establish an independent state does not imply the right to
do whatever the group wants. As Rawls points out in The Law of Peoples, a state does not

233
To say that certain illiberal aspects of national cultures may not be protected by the right to national self-
determination is not to say that these aspects of their culture are forbidden. We might have other reason to
respect or tolerate them. For instance, liberals accept that a meaningful life can only be lived from within.
Only when a person is convinced of the meaning of an action can the action be meaningful to him.
Otherwise, the same action cannot be meaningful to him. We cannot make a person‘s life meaningful by
forcing him to do things that he does not find valuable. Thus, we may sometimes have to tolerate illiberal
cultures.

234
See Marmor, 2007, p.245.

167

have unlimited power, even over its own domestic affairs.
235
States, including nation
states, do not have the right to legally maintain cultural practices that violate the basic
human rights of its citizens. Even existing states are not immune from the evaluation of
their human rights record. Accordingly, even if a national group can establish a state for
itself, it does not follow that it has the right to disregards the basic human rights of its
members.
One way to respond to this concern for human rights is by considering
Buchanan‘s theory of recognitional legitimacy. According to Buchanan, we can
distinguish the right to secede from the right to be recognized as a legitimate state.
236

Many assume that the right to secede implies the right to be recognized as a legitimate
state. This, according to Buchanan, is questionable. Consider this: under certain
circumstances— for instance, when a national community is oppressed or discriminated
against— international society may agree that the group has the right to secede from the
society that oppresses it. However, this does not mean that the resulting state should be
recognized as legitimate immediately. Whether international society should recognize the
legitimacy of this state may depend, inter alia, on whether the state protects the basic
human rights of its citizens. If the state ignores the basic human rights of its own
members, the international community may have reason not to recognize the legitimacy

235
I use the word state to refer to what Rawls calls peoples. Rawls avoids using the word ‗state‘ because he
feels that the word ‗state‘ as it is traditionally construed implies unlimited sovereignty, which includes ‗the
right to go to war in pursuit of state policies‘. However, ‗peoples‘ do not have such rights. See Rawls, 2001,
pp.23-25.

236
See Buchanan, 2004, pp.261-289, pp.334-5.

168

of the state. Moreover, this does not mean that we can recognize the legitimacy of groups
that observe human rights.
One may dispute the soundness of Buchanan‘s distinction. It seems to be
generally accepted that a bad human rights record is not a sufficient reason for denying
legitimate statehood. Almost all sovereign states, the US included, have, to different
degrees, violated the human rights of their own citizens. International institutions do not
seem to question or deny the legitimacy of these states. In this case, it is not clear if
human rights violations constitute a sufficient reason to deny the right of a national group
to establish an independent state. This does not mean that we can take violations of
human rights lightly. Human rights are indeed very important and worthy of extensive
protection. Nevertheless, there are other ways to protect them. Sovereign states may not
be the best institutions to protect human rights. They may be best protected by a
combination of domestic and international institutions.

4.2.3.2 Members Who Are Not Citizens
When a national group establishes a state of its own, its border may make it more
difficult for those outside it to participate in the national culture of the group. This may
generate certain disadvantages for those members of the group who live outside the
boundary of the potential state. According to Gans, if we recognize that national groups
are entitled to build their own states, this right might give members of the nation inside
the state border privileged status over affairs concerning their national culture.
237
This

237
See Gans, 2003, pp.80-83.

169

could hamper the interests of those outside the border, as they would not have equal
access to the cultural affairs of their nation.
This disadvantage, which Gans calls intra-national injustice, is the result of
comparing the powers and influences of members on different sides of the border. This
comparison brings to light the fact that the statist theory cannot treat those inside the
nation state and diaspora groups equally. Conceivably, it would be unfair to allow only
Jews living in Israel the right to make decisions concerning Jewish culture, while denying
the same rights to Jews outside Israel. It gives only members living inside the nation state
the right to decide cultural issues concerning the entire group; those outside the state
border are excluded. However, people should not be excluded from participating in the
cultural affairs of their nation just because of where they live. From the point of view of
national identity, what matters is the identification of a person with the group, not where
she lives. The interest in national culture and identity springs from the identity of its
members. In this case, those who share this identity should be given equal access to the
national culture, regardless of where they live.
To begin with, Gans‘s worry here seems to be that if a national group were to
establish its own nation state, then only members living inside the nation state could
decide issues concerning their national culture. Members outside the nation state might
have less or even no influence over cultural matters. However, this assumes that the right
to establish an independent state also implies the right to authoritatively dictate all the
cultural affairs of the nation. This is not the case.

170

Earlier I argued that we should distinguish between the interest people have in
political affairs from that in cultural affairs. When a national group is allowed to
establish a state, the members inside the state are given the right to decide their own
political affairs. This does not mean that they should also be given privileged status over
the cultural affairs of their group.
Consider again the difference between the two types of affairs. We grant only
citizens and no one else the right to participate in and determine the political affairs of a
state because they live there and these public affairs have a direct impact on their daily
lives. On the other hand, cultural issues concern all the members of a national group,
regardless of where they live. Since these issues may concern every member of the
national culture, not just those living inside the national state, all members should be
given equal right to participate in the decision-making process. For instance, if an
important decision regarding Jewish culture were to be made, all Jews inside and outside
of Israel should be granted the right to participate in the decision-making procedure. Even
if a Jew does not live in Israel, decisions concerning Jewish culture would still have
profound impact on her lifes as a Jew. Where one lives does not affect how much she
values her national culture.
Thus, the creation of state boundaries should not give any person or group inside
that boundary privileged status concerning the cultural issues of the nation. Still, we need
to be careful about states that abuse their authority. The important task is to make sure
that people would not be excluded from participating in their own national culture just
because of where they live. Moreover, this discriminatory practice can happen even if no

171

new nation state is created. To prevent intra-national injustice, we should focus less on
whether a new state boundary is created and more on how to help people participate in
their national cultures across state boundaries.
Here, I think it‘s fair to say that Gans over-estimates the power of state
boundaries. State boundaries may separate and thus limit something, but they don‘t
separate and limit everything. Though it is not unusual for state governments to abuse
their political authority, it is not the norm in international society. Again, states do not
have unrestricted authority. Therefore, even if a national community can establish a state
of its own, this does not mean that the state can unilaterally determine the cultural affairs
of the nation or limit access to its culture.

4.2.4 External Burden: The Impact On the Remaining State
When a national group establishes a new state, it changes not only the borders of
the original state but also its original institutional arrangements. This would have a
profound impact on the interests of the remaining state. Whenever secession happens, not
only would the state boundary be redrawn, but the original system of social cooperation
would also disintegrate with it. Military affairs, monetary affairs, foreign affairs, national
debt, and resource distribution, etc, would all require reorganization. When secession
happens, the original military, which was composed of citizens from both sides, would
have to be relocated, the weapons divided, and the defense system re-deployed. The
monetary policy would change, too, as one economic entity would be broken into two.
Foreign relation policies would change, as each state would have to create its own foreign

172

relations with other states. The collective national debt would have to be somehow
divided. In addition, there would be change in the transfer of important resources. For
example, if the seceding area includes a power plant that was the main or only supplier of
electricity for the remaining state, this would have a serious impact on the remaining state
once secession took place. Certain infrastructures, such as freeways, bridges, or
reservoirs have to be somehow divided. In short, when a group secedes, it withdraws
from a collaborative system, and such a move has a serious impact on the remaining state.
According to Buchanan, citizens have legitimate expectations for the stable
cooperation of each part of the state over time.
238
If any part of a society were to
withdraw and somehow disrupt the cooperative regime, then the proper functioning of the
society would for that reason be thwarted. For the sake of a stable society, each part of
the cooperative regime is expected to perform its function properly. Unless there is
something unfair about the original cooperative system, the disadvantaged part could
legitimately complain that the system of cooperation is not fair for them. And if the
complaint is not properly addressed, the disadvantaged group can have unilateral
secession. Otherwise, no part of the society has the right to withdraw from it.
Perhaps the remaining state has legitimate expectation of stable cooperation from
the seceding group. However, even if people have legitimate expectations of stable
cooperation among each part of the state, this does not mean that secession cannot
happen. According to Wellman, secession need not obstruct cooperation between the
seceding group and the remaining state: when a group secedes, it does not mean that it

238
See Buchanan, 1991, p.87.

173

has to stop the transfer of resources to the remaining state. To maintain order in both
societies, the seceding group and the remaining state can still form some kind of alliance
to make sure that both societies run smoothly. What matters is not whether a state
remains a monolith, but if, after the break-up, both the seceding and remaining state can
properly perform their functions.
239
Accordingly, if the remaining state depends on the
supply of electricity from the power plant controlled by the new state, then some
arrangement has to be made so that the seceding area continue supplying electricity to the
remaining state. Or, if the remaining state would become too weak to defend itself due to
the break-up, the seceding group has a duty to provide military defense for it. In other
words, the building of the new state need not and should not obstruct the proper
functioning of the remaining state. Secession should happen in a way that minimizes the
impact on the remaining state. The process and consequences should at least not harm the
important interests of the remaining state.
Because secession is a complicated issue encompassing multiple aspects of a
domestic society and international law, I cannot deal with it in detail in this chapter. The
point I want to emphasize is that the recognition of the right to establish an independent
state need not thwart the transfer of important resources between the separating groups.
What should be limited is not secession itself, but the conditions for secession.

239
Many philosophers believe that, even if a certain group has a right to secede, this does not mean that
they can do so without considering the impact on the rest of the state. A common analogy among these
theories is, not surprisingly, divorce. Even if a divorce is granted, this does not mean that the two parties
should stop the transfer of property. Likewise, even if two national groups separate, this does not mean that
they have to stop transferring or supplying important resources to each other. See Gauthier, 1994, pp.357-
372; Wellman, 1995, pp.142-171.

174

Recognizing the rights of a national community to establish an independent state does not
mean that this group can disregard the interests of the remaining state.

4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed four types of objections against recognizing the
right of a national community to establish an independent state. Concerning the challenge
that there may not be enough land for the implementation of the right, I have argued that
even if the size of the resulting states would be very small, this does not mean that these
small states would not be viable. Regarding the claim that not every national community
can build its own state, I have argued that this does not mean that recognizing rights of
national communities to establish independent states will lead to inequality. Concerning
the claim that recognizing the right may encourage exit and discourage communication,
and the claim that recognizing the right may lead to political instability, I have argued
that these do not constitute sufficient reasons to preclude rights of national communities
to establish independent states. Concerning the potential burdens on the members of a
national community, I have argued that the right to establish an independent state does
not imply a right to maintain indecent or inhumane customs or practices of the group.
Concerning the interest of members who will not become citizens of the nation state, I
have also argued that access to national cultures should not be limited by state borders.
Concerning the cost of secession on the remaining state, I have argued that granting
national communities rights to establish independent states does not mean that they can
do so without proper regard for the interests of the remaining state.

175

I hope that I have successfully demonstrated that, though these objections provide
good reasons to restrict and regulate the right of national communities to establish
independent states, they are not reasons to rule out the right altogether. Given the
importance of membership in national communities, we still have very strong reason to
recognize the rights of national communities to establish independent states.

176

Conclusion— Institutional Morality and the Right to Secede

5.1 Introduction
The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community,
simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to decide whether
it should create its own sovereign state. In the literature, any theory that endorses this
principle or affirms the said right is referred to as the national self-determination theory
(hereafter the NSD theory). It is considered a theory of secession because it specifies the
conditions under which a group is morally justified in seceding from the current political
sovereign regime and creating its own.
Since the publication of his book, Secession, Buchanan has developed a
methodological framework with which he evaluates different theories of secession,
including the NSD theory.
240
An important claim Buchanan makes is that, because the
right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include,
as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality.
241
Those failing to do so can
hardly be satisfactory. Because the NSD theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, he
argues that this theory is flawed. However, even though this theory lacks the required
analysis, this does not immediately mean that it would be incompatible with the

240
See Buchanan, 1991. Most of Buchanan‘s arguments discussed in this chapter are from his 1997 article
―Theories of Secession‖ and his 2004 book Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. There is an
apparnt switch of tone in Buchanan‘s argument from emphasizing the institutional aspect of the right to
secede. In his earlier article, he prioritizes the institutional aspect because he thinks that, in practice, it is
the more urgent question. In his recent book, he provides a stronger argument and suggests that we must
study its institutional dimension because this right is inherently institutional. See Buchanan, 1997, pp.32-3;
2004, p.347.

241
See Buchanan, 2004.

177

requirements of institutional morality. Buchanan thus proposes five specific criteria for
determining the adequacy of different theories of secession. He then shows that the NSD
theory fails to adequately fulfill them and should thus be rejected.
In this chapter, I will consider Buchanan‘s framework and his critiques of the
NSD theory. While I agree that the right to secede is inherently institutional, I think that
there are two problems with his conception of institutional morality. First, there is some
confusion regarding the moral value of existing institutions; second, his specific criteria
fail to reflect the real demands of institutional morality. As a result, his objections to the
NSD theory, especially those based on these two ideas, are not completely justified.
There are three parts in this chapter. In 5.2, I give an overview of Buchanan‘s
framework, including his idea of institutional morality along with his specific criteria. In
5.3, I consider Buchanan‘s evaluation of the NSD theory based on his criteria and explain
why it is inadequate. In 5.4, I present an improved interpretation of the idea of
institutional morality and explain how it provides a stronger and more plausible critique
of the NSD theory.

5.2 An Overview of Buchanan‘s Framework
In this section, I will explain the methodological framework with which Buchanan
evaluates different theories of secession. Its three important features include the
following: (1) The right to secede is inherently institutional; accordingly, any adequate
theory must examine how the inclusion of this right would affect existing institutions. (2)
To determine this right‘s impact on current institutions, we must engage in holistic

178

institutional moral reasoning, which involves first identifying the morally defensible
elements of these institutions and then considering in a holistic manner whether the
recognition of a new right would be compatible with them. (3) To determine whether a
theory of secession is acceptable, Buchanan proposes five specific criteria to test whether
a theory satisfies the methodological requirements of institutional morality. In the
following paragraphs, I will explain these ideas.

5.2.1 The Right to Secede is Inherently Institutional
In order to get a clear picture of Buchanan‘s framework, we must begin by
considering his claim that the right to secede is inherently institutional. Buchanan
suggests that, whenever a group claims to have the right to create its own state, this claim
implies two things: first, the group is morally justified in attempting to create its own
legitimate state; second, others are morally prohibited from interfering with its so doing.
He points out that both claims are claims about institutions-- they equally invoke the
concept of a legitimate state, which is quintessentially an institutionally defined entity.
―[T]o be a legitimate state is to be an institutionally defined entity, an entity that has a
certain status according to the institutions of international law.‖
242
Thus, to assert a right
to secede is to make a claim concerning relevant institutions. Consequently, any assertion
of a right to secede is inherently institutional.
243

What does this mean for the recognition of a nation‘s right to create its own state?

242
See Buchanan, 2004, p.15.

243
See Buchanan, 2004, 14-8; 345-8.

179

How does it affect different theories of secession? Buchanan suggests that, because such
a right is unavoidably institutional, its incorporation would inevitably have some
impact— positive, negative, or both—on existing institutions. Thus, to determine whether
relevant institutions should recognize the right, we must first look at its impacts on these
institutions and see how well it fits with them. If the inclusion of a new right would lead
to institutional improvement, then we should include it. On the other hand, if its inclusion
would lead to the deterioration or regression of these institutions, then we should not
include it. How, then, could we know whether the recognition of the new right would
lead to progress or regress? How should we decide whether a new right should be
institutionally recognized?

5.2.2 Holistic Institutional Morality
In order to determine whether the formal recognition of a right would lead to
progress or regress, Buchanan suggests that philosophers must engage in what he calls
institutional moral reasoning.
244
It is rather difficult to grasp the content of this idea
partly because it is composed of a wide variety of complicated values and principles that
govern different institutions, and partly because Buchanan never explicitly explains or
defines this idea. When employing this idea to criticize other theories, he seems to think
that its meaning is self-evident. This lack of clarity, as we will see very soon, results in
serious confusion in the debate between Buchanan and his opponents. Regardless, I find
in his discussion several clues we can work with to better understand this idea. Here, I

244
See Buchanan, 2004, p.345.

180

will try to construct what I take to be the best interpretation of the idea of institutional
morality.
First, we must begin by identifying factors and elements of existing institutions
that would be affected by the inclusion of a new right; that is, we must look at what
would be affected. Buchanan suggests that we start by looking for what he calls the
morally defensible elements of existing institutions, namely, the moral principles and
values that guide our actual practice.
245
Existing institutions are created to preserve
certain important moral principles and values; accordingly, these principles and values
could serve as guidelines to help us determine a right‘s impact on current institutions.
Thus, to see how a right would affect existing institutions, we must first identify the
moral principles and values that guide them.
Second, after identifying these principles and values that would be affected, we
must estimate how they would be affected as well as the extent to which they would be
affected. The inclusion of a new right would inevitably affect existing institutions in a
variety of ways. To use a highly simplified example, two important moral values in
existing political institutions are stability and equality. The institutional recognition of a
new right may lead to the disruption of stability, but greatly enhance equality; or, it may
enhance stability slightly, but undermine equality greatly; or, it may equally undermine or
enhance both. To determine which theory of secession is the most plausible, we must
estimate how the rights they propose to include affect those moral principles and values
individually. This step would allow us to see which moral values would be harmed and

245
See Buchanan, 1997, p. 32.

181

which preserved. That is, it would allow us to preview what would be gained and what
would be lost if a right were recognized. Without this step, we could neither estimate a
right‘s impact nor determine whether its inclusion would lead to progress.
Third, after identifying the moral principles and values of existing institutions and
evaluating a new right‘s possible impact on them, the next step is to compare the
estimated results. Notice that when we consider a right‘s impact, what we consider is not
merely its impact on some particular institution; rather, we should consider its overall
impact on existing institutions. Buchanan calls this holism
246
. It requires that we consider
whether a right‘s formal inclusion would be compatible with ―what is being assumed
about the other principles that it will coexist with, how they fit together, and what the
effects of their joint implementation [italics added] is likely to be.‖
247
The implementation
of a right would affect not just some particular institution; it often has a far-reaching
impact on a wide variety of institutions. Accordingly, we must consider its impact on all
of them.
To be clear, this is not to say that we value these moral principles and values
equally. Some principles are certainly more important than others, and we should assign
them different weights accordingly. In addition, estimating a right‘s impact is hardly a
precise science. Much would depend on the most reasonable conjecture or even
speculation on the matter. Nonetheless, in order to determine whether the recognition of a

246
See Buchanan, 2004, p.28, p.345.

247
See Buchanan, 2004, p.17.

182

new right would lead to progress or regress, we must try our best to measure a right‘s
general impact on existing institutions.
Lastly, some of the important factors that should be taken into consideration while
engaging in institutional moral reasoning include a right‘s feasibility as well as its likely
consequences. To determine whether a principle is feasible, one must take into
consideration whether this right or principle could be ―embodied in institutions.‖
248
Some
very important interests or moral rights cannot be feasibly protected by institutional
recognition; for instance, the right to have friends. Moreover, we must also consider the
likely consequences of incorporating such a right—whether its inclusion would lead to
serious human rights violations or other highly undesirable consequences.
249
In other
words, we need to evaluate the possible costs of a right‘s implementation.
These features of institutional morality are still very abstract and have yet to give
us any specific guidance on how to assign values to different principles and values or
how to estimate their impact. For the time being, it suffices to see that Buchanan‘s
methodology puts great emphasis on a right’s overall, holistic impact on institutions. I
will revisit this idea in 5.4 when I consider an opponent‘s critique of Buchanan‘s
methodology.

5.2.3 Specific Criteria
While many theories blatantly lack an analysis of institutional morality, this does

248
See Buchanan, 2004, p.12.

249
See Buchanan, 2004, p.14.

183

not immediately mean that they must be incompatible with the demands of institutional
morality. Consider the following analogy: some drivers never take a driver‘s license test;
in spite of this, they could be good drivers. Likewise, although most theories of secession
never investigate the demands of institutional morality nor examine its compatibility with
these demands, this does not mean that they must be incompatible. Because the content of
institutional morality is yet to be determined, it is still possible that a theory that fails to
consider its compatibility with institutional morality is actually compatible with its
demands.
In view of this lack of clear guidance on the demands of institutional morality,
Buchanan proposes five specific criteria to help us examine which theories are
compatible with these demands and which are not. The function of these criteria is to
make explicit some of the most important requirements of institutional morality. He
acknowledges that these criteria are not exhaustive and do not reflect the complete
requirements of institutional morality. Nonetheless, they are enough to expose theories
that are incompatible with these requirements. Their main function is to make known
theories that are seriously flawed when considered as ―elements of an institutional
morality articulated in a system of international law.‖
250
These criteria are:
251

250
See Buchanan, 1997, p.41.

251
See Buchanan, 1997, pp.42-4; 2004, p.348-50. I should clarify that these five criteria come from
Buchanan‘s book Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination. They are, presumably, developed and
revised from the four criteria from his earlier article, ―Theories of Secession‖—minimal realism,
consistency with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law, absence of perverse
incentives, and moral accessibility. Although he names those criteria differently, Buchanan‘s earlier criteria
include the last two of his newer version-- incentive compatibility and moral convergence. The criterion
that a theory be consistent with well-entrenched, morally progressive principles of international law is
reflected in his methodological requirement that a theory engage in holistic institutional moral reasoning.
There is one criterion that I am not sure whether Buchanan still holds on to— the criterion of Minimal

184

(1) A cogent theory of territorial claim: Buchanan argues that, because secession
involves making claims of territorial sovereignty, a seceding group must prove that it has
a legitimate claim to the territorial area where the new state would be created.
252

Accordingly, a good theory of secession should also include a cogent theory of territorial
sovereignty.
(2) Progressive conservatism: The implementation of a theory should lead to the
improvement of existing institutions without undermining their morally defensible
elements. According to Buchanan, ―Other things being equal, if two rival theories each
would achieve moral progress if implemented, but one is consistent with some of the best
features of the existing system and the other is not, the former is preferable.‖
253

(3) Moral accessibility: The implementation of a theory should not require
unacceptable moral costs. Institutional improvement often comes with costs; however,
the cost should be reasonable. For instance, if a theory would result in serious human
rights violations, then its cost would be considered unacceptable.
(4) Incentive compatibility: A good theory of secession should not create perverse
incentives when implemented. In particular, it should not create incentives to disintegrate
valuable democratic institutions that already exist.
(5) Moral convergence: A good theory should be able to acquire a wide variety of
audiences. This is not to say that it has to be accepted by everyone. Nonetheless, it should
be acceptable by persons with diverse ethical views or beliefs.

Realism. See my discussion in this section.
252
See Brilmayer, 1989, p.4; Buchanan, 1991, pp.71-2; 2004, p.348.

253
See Buchanan, 2004, p.349.

185

Lastly, I should mention that, there is one criterion that I am not sure whether
Buchanan still holds because he does not mention it in his new book— the criterion of
Minimal Realism. This criterion requires that a theory be both morally progressive and
minimally realistic. The former idea seems to be preserved in the idea of progressive
conservatism; however, the criterion of minimal realism is not reflected by any of the five
criteria just mentioned. This criterion requires that a principle have ―a significant
prospect of eventually being adopted in the foreseeable future, through the process by
which international law is actually made.‖
254
I will say more about this criterion in 5.3.1.

5.2.4 Buchanan‘s Critiques of the National Self-Determination Theory
Now that we have some rough idea of Buchanan‘s methodological framework, I
will briefly explain his objections to the NSD theory.
255
The details of these objections
will be explained in the following sections. The gist of Buchanan‘s objections is that, first,
the NSD theory fails to take seriously the institutional dimension of the right to secede;
as one would then expect, it also fails to engage in (holistic) institutional moral reasoning.
Moreover, it fails to meet several of Buchanan‘s specific criteria. Let me begin by
considering how these criteria affect the NSD theory.

254
See Buchanan, 1997, p.42.

255
Notice that Buchanan‘s criticism of the national self-determination theory is rather extensive. Not only
does he use the above framework to criticize the theory, but he also raises other objections to it— the
Infeasibility Objection and the Equal Respect Objection. The former holds that the principle of national
self-determination is infeasible, and the latter holds that the theory‘s focus on one particular type of identity,
i.e., national identity, violates the principle of liberal neutrality.
255
Because I discussed problems related to
the feasibility of the national self-determination theory in Chapter Four, and explained why national
identity is different from other types of identities in Chapter One, I will not discuss these objections again.
Here, I will only discuss the part of Buchanan‘s objection that flows from the framework just sketched.

186

5.3. Questioning Buchanan‘s Criteria
Although Buchanan acknowledges that the NSD theory may be widely supported
and thus fulfill the requirement of moral convergence, he argues that it fails to fulfill
several others.
256
In particular, he believes that it fails to meet the requirements of
minimal realism, incentive compatibility, and a good theory of territorial claim.

5.3.1 Failing Minimal Realism?
Buchanan draws our attention to two important facts about existing institutions—
that the lawmakers of international law are actual states, and that almost all states are
composed of two or more national communities. Accordingly, implementing the rights
and principles recommended by the NSD theory would likely lead to the dissolution of
actual states. Conceivably, these lawmakers would not approve of such a right.
257

Therefore, the theory does not have a reasonable prospect of being accepted. Accordingly,
it fails to satisfy the criterion of minimal realism.
Many supporters of the NSD theory acknowledge that their theory may not be
accepted by actual states and would likely fail the criteria of minimal realism. However,
they are not convinced that this provides a good reason to reject their argument. Nielsen
suggests that this requirement is based on realpolitik considerations, not moral ones.
258

256
See Buchanan, 1997, p.55.

257
One might suspect that actual states would not sanction policies that would contribute to their own
disintegration merely because the power-holders would like to hold on to their power. True as it may be,
Buchanan suggests that it is also because a legitimate state is the guardian for both its current and future
generation of citizens and thus has to the right to territorial integrity. See Buchanan, 1997, pp.46-9.

258
See Nielsen, 1998, p.129.

187

Moore argues that the requirement of minimal realism is unfair because many important
civil rights once failed to meet this requirement.
259
For instance, there was a time when
the rights of slaves and women did not have a reasonable prospect of being accepted by
actual lawmakers. However, this does not mean that these rights should be rejected. The
fact that a right does not have a good chance of being recognized by actual lawmakers
does not mean that it should not be accepted. Accordingly, even if the NSD theory is not
likely to be incorporated by international law very soon, this does not matter. It should
eventually be incorporated.
At any rate, it is likely that Buchanan himself has given up this criterion, since he
does not mention it again when he discusses specific criteria in his more recent book.
Because we cannot expect every sound moral principle to satisfy this criterion, failing
this requirement does not immediately undermine the moral value of a theory.
Before moving on to the next section, I should clarify that, although Buchanan is
wrong to require that a right have a reasonable chance of being accepted by actual law-
makers, there is a sense in which he is right to demand that institutional reform be
minimally realistic. What matters is, however, not whether it has a realistic chance of
being incorporated by existing institutions. Rather, our focus should be on finding out
what makes it the case that it has a better or worse chance of being incorporated. There
are different reasons why the inclusion of a new right would not be feasible. It might be
the result of some defective design of existing institutions. It might be due to certain
unjust factors, such as personal interests, which get in the way of its implementation. If a

259
See Moore, 2001, p.205.

188

right is not feasible because of such unjust factors, we should reform our institutions and
get rid of the factors that make them unjust. On the other hand, if the relevant factors are,
in general, morally sound, but the right is not feasible for some other reason—say,
because it is based on some unusual assumption about human psychology—then we
should not formally recognize the right. In other words, in deciding whether to
institutionally recognize a right, we must look at the cause of its infeasibility and
determine what we should discard—the cause of its infeasibility or the right itself. Indeed,
it matters whether a right has a realistic chance of being institutionally implemented.
However, we must consider not just whether a right has a good or bad chance of being
institutionally recognized, but also whether the causes are such that they need reform as
well.

5.3.2 Creating Perverse Incentives?
In addition, Buchanan argues that the formal recognition of a nation‘s right to
secede could possibly create perverse incentives on the part of state governments to
suppress national groups. In order to ensure its continued existence and prevent its own
dissolution, a state government may wish to eliminate institutional arrangements that help
preserve a nation‘s culture and its group identity.
260
This way it nips in the bud the
formation of national identity and protects its own survival. Accordingly, the NSD theory
would actually create incentives to institutionally suppress a group‘s identity; it therefore
fails to meet the requirement of incentive compatibility.

260
See Buchanan, 1997, p.52-5.

189

In responding to this challenge, Nielsen suggests that his claim applies only to
limited cases. His theory advocates the right to secede for national groups in liberal
democratic societies only. In these societies, recognizing a national group‘s right to
secede would not create the type of perverse incentive that Buchanan was concerned with,
because these governments would respect the rights of these groups.
261

It is not clear how persuasive Nielsen‘s response is. His claim would entail that
what a national group is entitled to depends on the kind of society it is in—if it were in a
liberal democratic society, it would have more rights. On the other hand, if it were not in
a liberal democratic society, it would have fewer rights. This statement may truthfully
describe what happens in reality; however, are these facts just? It is not clear why a
group‘s rights, claims, or entitlements should be determined by the type of society it is in.
If national identity is important, then, both democratic and non-democratic societies
should respect people‘s interests in it. The interests of a national community should not
weigh less just because the group is in a non-democratic society.
In any case, I agree with Buchanan that in the process of law making, legislators
should take into consideration whether the inclusion of a new rule or policy would create
perverse incentives. However, we should be careful about the significance of these
incentives and how we should respond to them. Given the possibility of perverse
incentives, should we abandon a policy that would give rise to these incentives, or try
other ways of implementing it so that these incentives would be eliminated? Consider, for
example, the following policies and the perverse incentives that are possibly associated

261
See Nielsen, 1998, p.113.

190

with them. Do unemployment pensions motivate people to stop working? Do democratic
theories create perverse incentives on the part of totalitarian regimes to suppress
democratic institutions? Does gay-rights activism create the perverse incentive on the
part of conservatives to suppress the rights of gays and lesbians? In some cases, the
answer is yes. Does this mean that the government should not provide unemployment
pensions? Does it mean that we should abandon democratic theories? Does it mean that
we should not legalize same-sex marriage? Presumably not. Even if a policy would create
perverse incentives, this only implies that we should be more careful when carrying it out
in public institutions. It does not mean that we should immediately abandon this policy.
Here, the solution Buchanan prescribes for solving the relevant issues is
inadequate. Even if a state government had an incentive to eliminate the rights of national
communities, it would not have the right to do so. National communities have rights to
institutional arrangements that protect their cultures. States do not have the right to
eliminate these institutions. Instead of relinquishing a good institutional arrangement that
could possibly lead to undesirable motives, we should try to design it in a way that would
discourage this type of move. Moreover, what does it mean to ―create perverse
incentives?‖ There is no necessary connection between the NSD theory and the
incentives that Buchanan is concerned with. Different agents may respond differently to
institutional changes. Some suggest that gay-rights activism creates perverse incentives
because, by advocating gay-rights, the activists put pressure on conservatives to create
laws that deny their rights. These activists may be imprudent, unwise, or even thoughtless,
but should we therefore ask them to discontinue their activism? Factors about people‘s

191

responses and motives should be considered by governmental officials who are
concerned with how to effectively propagate a law. However, these factors do not
undermine the (moral) soundness of a right. Accordingly, it is in general unfair to accuse
theories of creating perverse incentives—these incentives are the products not of these
theories but of the persons who have them. Thus, it is not right for Buchanan to suggest
that the NSD theory should be rejected because it creates perverse incentives.

5.3.3 Contradicting the Most Cogent Theory of Territorial Claim?
Buchanan argues further that the NSD theory contradicts the most cogent theory
of territorial claim, namely his Just-Cause Theory.
262
According to this theory, a state that
adequately performs the function of protecting human rights, democracy, and justice is
entitled to the right of territorial integrity. Buchanan argues that every claim of a right to
secede involves a claim to a piece of territory that belongs to some existing state. Thus, to
claim the right to secede, the seceding group must prove that it has a legitimate claim to
this territorial area and that its claim overrides that of the state.
263
However, such a claim
can only be obtained when the state fails to fulfill important requirements of justice.
264

On the other hand, the NSD theory does not require that a national group prove
that it has a legitimate claim. Without requiring such a proof, the NSD theory would

262
For a detailed account of Buchanan‘s theory of territorial sovereignty/claim, see Buchanan, 1999.

263
See Brilmayer, 1989.

264
See Buchanan, 1999, p.54. Some ways of proving a group‘s entitlement to land include if it was unjustly
incorporated into the current society by war or colonization, if the state government engages in genocide or
other activities that involve serious human rights violations, or if the state constitution includes relevant
clauses that acknowledge a group‘s right to secede.

192

sanction a national group‘s secession even when the state performs the requisite functions
satisfactorily. This clearly violates the just-cause theory of territorial claim, which holds
that just states are entitled to territorial integrity.
While the just cause theory of territorial claim does not require that a state prove
or justify its claim to territorial sovereignty, it requires that the seceding groups do so.
Thus, Nielsen suggests that this theory assumes the principle of territorial integrity ueber
alles, and that such a principle is to be rejected because it is based on a morally arbitrary,
statist conception of territorial sovereignty.
265
However, Buchanan argues that there are
non-arbitrary reasons to accept his just-cause theory of territorial sovereignty.
266
His
theory may be statist; however, there are good reasons to adopt it.
Setting aside the question of whether a statist conception of territorial sovereignty
is reasonable, supporters of the NSD theory may still object that Buchanan‘s theory of
territorial claim is not the most cogent one exactly because it fails to include what they
think a good theory of territorial claim should include— that is, a national group‘s claim
to its own territorial area. For instance, Moore believes that an adequate theory of
territorial rights would demonstrate due respect for the aspirations of national
communities by formally acknowledging their rights to create their own states.
Here, Buchanan‘s objection to the NSD theory can only convince those who
already subscribe to his just-cause theory. His theory of territorial claim is his theory of
secession, i.e., the just cause theory. Saying that the NSD theory fails because it fails to

265
See Nielsen, 1998, p.128.

266
For Buchanan‘s argument, see Buchanan, 2004, p.371.

193

meet the requirements set by the just-cause theory is not much different from criticizing
socialism for failing to meet the requirements of free market— of course socialism fails
when judged by libertarian criteria! Likewise, the NSD theory does not fulfill the
requirements set by the just-cause theory. However, this does not mean that we have to
reject it yet.
To be clear, my objection is not that Buchanan‘s argument for the just-cause
theory of territorial claim is not persuasive. What is not convincing is his critique of the
nationalist theory based on the just-cause theory. Unless one accepts the just-cause theory
of territorial claim, one does not have reason to accept its corresponding theory of
secession or the critiques that follow from this theory. Therefore, to criticize the NSD
theory, Buchanan needs some independent, objective criteria to evaluate the soundness of
it. Here, he has yet to give us any reason to prefer his theory over the NSD theory.

5.3.4 The Values of a Principle: Practical vs. Moral
While many philosophers agree with Buchanan that an adequate theory of
secession should include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality, not as
many believe that his specific criteria help us determine whether a theory is compatible
with the demands of institutional morality. To begin with, one may agree that the NSD
theory fails to fulfill the requirements of minimal realism as well as incentive
compatibility. But this does not seem to undermine the moral value of the NSD theory—
many other morally defensible theories once failed to satisfy these two requirements. If
we were to abandon these theories because they failed to fulfill these two requirements,

194

we would not have made moral progress with our institutions. In other words, a theory
can contribute to institutional improvement in spite of failing to meet these criteria. This
clearly proves that these two requirements are not essential to institutional morality.
Here, Buchanan seems to confound two different types of values a political
principle or theory can have—moral and practical. The former concerns a principle‘s
moral justifiability, the latter its practical feasibility. Buchanan‘s criteria seem to be
concerned with the latter, but not so much with the former. The requirements of minimal
realism and incentive compatibility highlight the problems that would likely arise if the
NSD theory were to be carried out in practice. That is, they reflect the theory‘s low
practical value. However, as mentioned in the last paragraph, many morally defensible
principles once failed to satisfy these two requirements; nonetheless, we still made moral
progress by formally including these principles in institutions. This shows that a
principle‘s low practical value does not undermine its moral value; even a principle with
low practical value can have high moral value.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that minimal realism and incentive compatibility
can be ignored. Rather, I am only clarifying their value—they have practical value, not
moral value. Buchanan‘s criteria can help us determine the practical value of a theory;
however, they cannot help us determine its moral value or whether it is compatible with
morally defensible elements of existing institutions. To provide a convincing account of
institutional morality, Buchanan‘s primary focus should be, as he suggests, on the moral
principles and values that guide our institutions. That is, he should be concerned with
those principles that have moral values. Yet, his criteria fail to include these values, for

195

an account of a principle‘s practical values does not help us determine their moral value.
Thus, even if we agree with Buchanan that institutional morality matters, we need not
accept his criteria.
Accordingly, Buchanan‘s critiques of the NSD theory based on these specific
criteria are not justified. Specifically, because these criteria do not reflect the
requirements of institutional morality, they do not help us determine whether a theory is
compatible with morally defensible elements of exiting institutions. In other words,
failing to meet these criteria do not mean failing to meet the requirements of institutional
morality.

5.4 Lacking Holistic Institutional Morality
Because Buchanan‘s criteria do not accurately reflect the content of institutional
morality, he fails to show that the NSD theory would be incompatible with the demands
of holistic institutional morality. Nevertheless, there is a concern that the NSD theory
fails to include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Notwithstanding
Buchanan‘s failure to provide specific guidance on the demands of institutional morality,
his methodological framework still seems generally sound—the right to secede is
inherently institutional, and thus an adequate theory of secession must consider its overall
impacts on existing institutions. Buchanan may fail to articulate the specific demands of
institutional morality, but he seems to be right to demand that theories of secession
engage in holistic institutional moral reasoning. If so, wouldn‘t the NSD theory still be
considered defective?

196

This claim presents a serious problem for the NSD theory, which does not discuss
its impact on or compatibility with existing political institutions. Although supporters of
the theory clarify that their theory concerns only the prima facie right of a national group
to secede and thus allows institutional impacts to be weighed in actual decision-making,
this is not an integral part of their theory. That is, in deciding whether a group has the
right to secede, the NSD theory does not take into consideration how this right affects
existing institutions. According to Buchanan‘s methodology, the analysis of a right‘s
overall impact must be an integral part of any adequate theory of secession. Without it,
an argument for the right to secede would be incomplete and cannot justify a right to
secede. How should the NSD theory respond to this challenge?
Although I disagree with Buchanan‘s specific criteria, I agree with his critique
that the NSD theory is flawed due to its lack of an investigation of institutional morality.
The right to secede is essentially institutional, and we cannot decide whether there is such
a right until we determine its impact on the relevant institutions. In this section, I will
discuss how supporters of the NSD theory respond to this particular challenge. To defend
their theory against Buchanan‘s objections, supporters of the NSD theory have come up
with different responses. Here, I will discuss three. The first argues that Buchanan‘s
claim, which holds that the right to secede is inherently institutional, is based on an
implausible concept of right. The second argues that the NSD theory attempts to justify a
purely moral, non-institutional right to secede; hence, Buchanan‘s criticism is irrelevant.
The third acknowledges that, although the right to secede is institutional, Buchanan‘s
methodology for institutional morality is wrong.

197

5.4.1 A Problematic Concept of Right
Moore believes that Buchanan‘s theory presumes an implausible conception of
right. Buchanan claims that the right to secede is inherently institutional; thus, to
determine whether a national community has this right, one must first examine the impact
of formally recognizing this right. This, according to Moore, presupposes that the moral
rights and duties we have flow from the institutional structure of our society.
267

However, Moore suggests that this is an implausible presumption. Were it true,
then prudential considerations, such as whether a right‘s recognition would result in bad
consequences, would have to be taken into account when we decide whether to recognize
the right. This, in turn, implies that it would never be imprudent to exercise a right—if
consequential considerations must be taken into account in determining whether there is a
right, then imprudence would be inhibited in the process. It could hardly be the case that
a person could imprudently exercise a right, because considerations of prudence were
supposed to be taken into account when deciding whether or not there is such a right.
However, one may reasonably claim that a person has a right, but that would be
imprudent or unwise for her to exercise this right. For instance, every U.S. citizen has the
right to pursue a career as a U.S. Congressperson. However, if a person lacks the
requisite resources or qualifications, it would be quite imprudent for her to exercise this
right. In other words, it would not be implausible to suggest that a person has a right that
it would be imprudent for her to exercise. Therefore, there is something wrong with

267
See Moore, 2001, p.204.

198

Buchanan‘s claim that the right to secede is inherently institutional; it rules out the
possibility that a person may imprudently exercise right.
There are, I think, two problems with Moore‘s argument. First, regardless of the
conception of right that is involved, prudential considerations for institutions are quite
different from prudential considerations for individuals. The interests of a collective
entity are not always reducible to the interests of individuals. It is good for the U.S. to
have Congressmen and Congress women. However, it does not mean that it would also
be good for each individual U.S. citizen to become a Congresperson. Those are two
separate issues. When insisting on examining a right‘s impact on institutions, Buchanan‘s
concern is only with a right‘s impact on institutions and perhaps also on the society as a
whole; he does not say anything about the impact on individual right-holders. Thus, he
does not say whether it is prudent for the right-holder to exercise the right.
More importantly, Buchanan‘s claim that the right to secede is inherently
institutional does not apply to all types of rights, but only to the right to secede, which he
proves to be inherently institutional. Here, it would be useful to make a distinction
between what are commonly called moral and legal (or institutional) rights. The former
includes rights an agent has by virtue of the qualities he or she has or by some voluntary
action. For instance, a person has human rights just by virtue of being a human being;
rights and duties can also be created by an exchange of promises. On the other hand, legal
or institutional rights are those granted by social or political institutions. One enjoys
these rights only if they are formally recognized by public institutions. Not all moral

199

rights are institutionally recognized, for instance, the right to have friends.
268
Similarly,
not all legal rights are moral rights, e.g., the right to operate motor vehicles. So long as
Buchanan‘s claim applies only to institutional rights, but not to moral rights, his claim
will not have the kind of implausible implication Moore is concerned with.

5.4.2 The Right to Secede—Moral vs. Institutional
Both Miller and Moore argue that, although the NSD theory lacks an investigation
of institutional morality, it can nevertheless be justified. They believe that their theory
justifies a purely moral and non-institutional right to secede; thus, Buchanan‘s criticism,
which applies only to institutional rights, does not apply.
In the end of the last section, I briefly mentioned two possible kinds of rights, i.e.,
moral and institutional. Here, to understand the response from the NSD supporters, we
must look at the corresponding distinction between two possible kinds of rights to secede.
Here, I will utilize Buchanan‘s formulation from his earlier article. There, he
distinguishes between two closely related but separate questions:
1. Under what conditions does a group have a moral right to secede,
independently of any questions of institutional morality and, in particular,
apart from any consideration of international legal institutions and their
relationship to moral principles?
2. Under what conditions should a group be recognized as having a right to
secede as a matter of international institutional morality, including a morally
defensible system of international law? [italics added]
269

The first question concerns the moral justifiability of a group‘s claim to secede, and the

268
See Marmor, 2007, p.233-4.

269
See Buchanan, 1997, pp.31-2.

200

right that it focuses on is a moral one. On the other hand, the second question concerns
the right‘s institutional adequacy, and the right in question is institutional. For the sake
of brevity, I will call the first question the moral question and the second the institutional
question.
According to Buchanan, the moral question can be answered in an ―institutional
vacuum.‖
270
That is, it can be studied even if there is no corresponding institution.
Moreover, even if corresponding institutions exist, it can be studied without considering
its impact on or compatibility with these institutions. In Altman and Wellman‘s words,
this question is pre-institutional.
271
Accordingly, a philosopher can study and answer the
moral question without first considering the institutional question, which requires a study
of relevant institutions.
On the other hand, because the right considered in the institutional question is
meant to be formally included in political institutions, such as international law or
domestic constitutions, philosophers working on this question must take into
consideration its feasibility. In particular, because this right is expected to be incorporated
by current legal and political institutions, a theory must take into account the right‘s
impact on and compatibility with these institutions. This is a task that can be ignored by
those working on the moral question.
If the above distinction between moral and institutional rights to secede makes
sense, then to defend the NSD theory, a supporter could argue that her project is different

270
See Buchanan, 1997, p.32.

271
See Altman and Wellman, 2009, p.54.

201

from Buchanan‘s—while Buchanan‘s theory aims to addresses the institutional question,
the NSD theory attempts to answer the moral question. In other words, the NSD theory is
concerned only with justifying a moral right to secede. Because this right does not have
any institutional implication, it can be worked out without considering its impact on
existing institutions. This moral right can be entirely independent of these institutional
issues. Therefore, Buchanan‘s objection is utterly irrelevant.
This is how Miller defends the NSD theory. In responding to Buchanan‘s
criticism, he insists that the NSD theory still provides a sound answer to the moral right
question and should thus be taken into account when deciding whether a group should be
recognized as having the right to secede.
272
He believes that a purely institutional
approach like Buchanan‘s cannot be satisfactory because it is likely to be biased in favor
of some procedural criteria for deciding whether a group has the right to secede.
However, such an approach necessarily ignores the substance of the identity of the
seceding group, which Miller believes is absolutely relevant to determining relevant
claims. Arguing that a nation has good reasons to become an independent state and that a
state has good reasons to become a nation, he emphasizes that his argument does not
argue explicitly in favor of an institutional right to secede, although it does justify a
group‘s prima facie right, or a presumptive right to self-government.
273
At any rate, this
right is not necessarily institutional, but is purely moral.

272
See Miller, 2000, p.264.

273
See Miller, 2000, pp.261-82.

202

In responding to this suggestion, Buchanan argues that those working on the
moral right question make a mistake concerning the priority of these questions.
274
What
matters most, according to Buchanan, is the institutional question. There are two reasons
for its priority. First, there is practical urgency for solving the institutional question; on
the other hand, the moral right question can wait. In his early article, Buchanan observes
that secessionist movements ―tend to have international consequences that call for
international responses.‖
275
Accordingly, there is practical urgency for working out
adequate institutional responses to these movements. Since a theory of secession is
meant to be incorporated by relevant legal or political institutions, it should not merely be
abstract philosophical theorizing. Instead, a desirable feature such a theory ought to
possess is that it can be feasibly implemented by relevant institutions or that it can
provide useful guidance for institutional reform. If a theory was infeasible, or if the costs
of its implementation were unreasonably high, then it could hardly provide helpful
guidance for institutional reform. Regardless of the soundness of such a theory, it would
be useless and thus unattractive.
276
Second, as explained in 5.2.1, the right to secede is, as
a conceptual matter, inherently institutional. Therefore, for both practical and conceptual
reasons, Buchanan believes that we should prioritize the institutional aspect of the right
to secede.
In addition to criticizing the NSD theory for wrongly prioritizing the moral
question, Buchanan also suggests that, if the NSD theory is purely moral and has no

274
See Buchanan, 1999, p.34.

275
See Buchanan, 1997, p.32-3.

276
See Buchanan, 1997, p.59-61.

203

institutional implications, it is even more irrelevant to our institutional design that it
would otherwise be.
277

Notice that Buchanan never denies that it is possible to defend a non-institutional,
moral right to secede.
278
He never denies that, although supporters of the NSD theory are
mistaken about the priority of the moral question, they may nevertheless successfully
justify the moral right of a group to secede.
279
For Buchanan‘s criticism to apply, the
question is not whether the NSD theory justifies a moral right to secede, but whether the
right it claims to justify is institutional. Recall his argument for the thesis that the right to
secede is inherently institutional. Any claim of a right to secede implies both that the
group has the right to create its own state and that others have the duty not to interfere,
where both the right and duty involve an institutionally defined entity. If so, then a non-
institutional right to secede, be it moral or not, would be utterly incomplete. Therefore,
unless the right to secede that the NSD theory defends does not imply the right to create a
state and duty of other states not to interfere as we normally assume it does—
Buchanan‘s requirement of institutional morality still applies.
To defend their approach, some supporters of the NSD theory bite the bullet and
suggest that the right their theory justifies does not have the institutional implications that
Buchanan‘s argument assumes. In this way, they avoid the problems that Buchanan

277
See Buchanan, 2004, p.347.

278
Buchanan does claim that ―both ideal and nonideal theory must be institutional because the right to
secede is inherently institutional.‖ However, this claim seems to be about the methodology for determining
whether there is a right to secede. It is not directly a claim about the right itself. See Buchanan, 2004, p.346.

279
See Buchanan, 1999, pp.31-4; 2004, p.384. For arguments against the moral right of a national group to
create an independent state, see Chapter Three.

204

attributes to them. Unfortunately, the price of biting this bullet is rather considerable; it
results in the marginalization of their theory in institutional reform. As Buchanan
suggests, if the theory does not have any institutional implications, it is not clear how it
can provide useful guidance in institutional reform. The theory then becomes irrelevant.

Thus, supporters of this theory must explain why or how this theory is still
pertinent— they must explain how a purely moral, non-institutional theory could
nevertheless be relevant to institutional reform. To do so, some supporters suggest that
their methodology is different from Buchanan‘s. What they try to do is defend a moral
right first, and then consider how to institutionally implement this right. They believe that,
as long as they justify a moral right of a national group to secede, this automatically
implies that institutions should be reformed so that this right receives adequate
recognition. In the following section, I will consider whether this response successfully
defends the NSD theory.

5.4.3 Defending the Normative Superiority of Ideal Theory
One way to defend the NSD theory is by defending its methodology, i.e., ideal
theory. Some philosophers acknowledge that the right to secede is in some sense
institutional; however, this does not entail that we must follow Buchanan‘s method of
institutional morality. Buchanan‘s theory begins by examining existing institutions and
then considering whether the inclusion of a new right or principle would be compatible
with these institutions. It is commonly believed that his approach is that of nonideal

205

theorizing. However, nonideal theory is problematic because it tends to entrench the
status quo. The NSD theory, on the other hand, begins by considering what would happen
in ideal situations and is therefore a form of ideal theorizing. Ideal theory, supporters of
the NSD theory claim, is free from those unjust elements in the status quo and thus is
normatively superior to nonideal theory. Consequently, it should guide institutional
reform.
This is how some philosophers defend the NSD theory. They acknowledge that
the right to secede is institutional, and that the NSD theory lacks an analysis of its overall
impact on and compatibility with existing institutions. However, they see nothing wrong
with their approach. Their theory is based on a different methodology. Consider, for
instance, Moore‘s strategy:
While I think we shouldn't adopt an institutional theory of secession in
Buchanan's sense, he is right to suggest that one goal—although not necessarily
the pre-eminent goal—in reasoning normatively about secession is to consider
how to institutionalize a right to secede in a state or in international organizations.
Indeed, many of the theories that Buchanan criticizes attempt to do just that.
Unlike Buchanan, however, they attempt to establish basic principles: first, and
then try to implement them in ways that will avoid the negative effects. They are
not trying to develop ‗a morality that is free of all institutional constraints‘, in
Buchanan's phrase. Rather, they are trying to develop principles that should be
incorporated (ideally) in international legal regimes or in domestic constitutions
and are sensitive to these constraints when they apply the principles. [italics
added]
280

Nielsen, too, argues the NSD theory purports to be
an ideal theory, for liberal democratic societies, which involves thinking
institutionally about what international law concerning secession would look like
under ideal conditions [italics added], i.e. under conditions in which states in such
societies actually behaved in accordance with the moral principles embedded in
the very idea of liberal democratic society, e.g. respected human rights, were

280
See Moore, 2001, pp.205-6.

206

committed to a principle of equal respect for all persons with its prohibitions on
exploitation, manipulation, and the like and is, as well, a society committed to
achieving and sustaining autonomy and indeed as much as possible equal
autonomy.
281

Although supporters of the NSD theory acknowledge that nonideal theory is, as
Buchanan suggests, more urgent because it tells us how we can move toward the ultimate
goal for institutional reform, they nevertheless argue that ideal theory is normatively
superior because it specifies the ultimate goal.
In addition to defending the superiority of ideal theory, Nielsen also suggests that
nonideal theory would be inadequate because it is likely to be biased in favor of the status
quo, and it is not clear why the status quo should be given such preferential status.
282

This type of presumption would likely ignore existing injustices and allow them to be
preserved by nonideal theorizing. The resultant theory would be conservative in an
inadequate way —it would be likely to preserve many unjust or undesirable features, i.e.,
morally indefensible elements, of actual institutions. For instance, a much criticized point
in Buchanan‘s argument is his emphasis that the NSD theory is not likely to be accepted
by the lawmakers of real international law, i.e., actual states. True as this may be, it is not
clear why this fact should be given so much weight in normative theorizing. It arbitrarily
favors the interests of actual states while ignoring those of national communities.
Buchanan‘s non-ideal theory readily yields to the demands of actual power-holders.
283

How could such a theory help us make any moral progress? Accordingly, starting from

281
See Nielsen, 1998, p.130.

282
See Nielsen, 1998, p.128.

283
See Buchanan, 1997, p.42.

207

non-ideal theory is unjustifiable because it necessarily gives a free pass to factual
injustices. Therefore, philosophers should still consider these issues by engaging in ideal
theorizing and letting the resulting theory guide our practice.
Consequently, the NSD theory, with its methodological foundation in ideal theory,
is considered normatively superior and should in some sense guide our institutional
reform. Supporters of this theory believe that, as long as they can prove that this right
would be recognized in an ideal situation, they would have provided adequate
justification for the moral right of a group to secede.
284
In that case, institutional
provisions should be made so that this moral right receives suitable recognition.
Moreover, if existing institutions were not compatible with such a right, these institutions
should be reformed so that this moral right would be adequately recognized.
285
We
should not abandon this right only because it would be incompatible with existing
institutions.

Is ideal theory normatively superior? Does nonideal theory necessarily entrench
the status quo? Does this mean that Buchanan‘s methodology is defective?
Not necessarily. Whether this is so depends on what makes a theory ideal or
nonideal one. Although both Buchanan and the NSD theorists speak as if there were a
clear-cut and commonly accepted distinction between ideal and nonideal theories, I
believe that this is not the case. As I will show very soon, evidence shows that Buchanan

284
For arguments against a moral right of a national group to secede, see Chapter Three.

285
See Nielsen, 1998, p. 128.

208

and his critics have very different understandings of the distinction between ideal and
nonideal theory. Thus, both sides are talking pass each other. Before I explain how this is
so, let me first consider what I believe to be the fundamental problem with the
methodology adopted by the NSD theory. Here, Buchanan explains very well what is
wrong with the particular type of reasoning the NSD theory employs:
[t]he simple but neglected point is that one cannot go from a moral argument for
the soundness of a particular course of action in a single (usually highly idealized)
type of case to a general principle that is suitable for institutionalization [italics
added].
286

Buchanan is right to suggest that one should avoid justifying a right or principle by
considering one single, highly idealized situation. This type of reasoning inevitably
ignores those problems that would likely arise when practiced in the real world along
with other existing principles. The effect of including a new right is not always a matter
of adding something new on top of a wholesome aggregate that is the status quo; it often
cause expected or unexpected chemical change.

Still, even if the NSD theory is defective in this respect, it does not mean that we
must prefer Buchanan‘s theory. Although he points out a problem with the NSD theory,
this still does not explain why we should favor his theory. As Nielsen suggests, nonideal
theorizing often ignores existing injustices and is thus deeply flawed. If so, we do not
have good reason to prefer Buchanan‘s theory over the NSD theory. We are left with two
theories, each with their own problem.
I believe that there is a way for Buchanan to avoid the problem his opponents are

286
See Buchanan, 2004, p.23.

209

concerned with. Before I explain how it works, I must first clarify a misconception shared
by both Buchanan and his opponents—the assumption that Buchanan‘s theory of
institutional morality is nonideal theory and must favor the status quo. I will show that
this is a wrong assumption and that institutional morality would not necessarily entrench
the status quo.
In the literature, it is commonly assumed both by Buchanan and his opponents
that the NSD theory is ideal theory, and Buchanan‘s theory is nonideal theory. Given
these equations, both also seem to agree that, if one successfully defended the normative
superiority of ideal theory, she would then effectively justify the NSD theory; similarly,
if she successfully defended the superiority of nonideal theory, she would then effectively
justify Buchanan‘s institutional morality. Not surprisingly, both sides spend a
considerable amount of time arguing for the superiority of ideal and nonideal theories
respectively.
Buchanan never denies theses equations. In fact, given his strong criticism of
NSD‘s ideal theorizing, we can safely infer that he also believes his theory to be based on
nonideal theory.
287
In addition, a rather surprising fact is that he never even tries to
dissociate his theory from the problems that his opponents are concerned with in nonideal
theory, namely, existing injustices. His arguments are mainly focused on explaining why
the NSD theory is useless and how his theory directly addresses issues in institutions.
Naturally, many philosophers are still worried about the entrenchment of the status quo
and its association with actual injustices.

287
See Buchanan, 1997, p.60.

210

However, I think there are good reasons to question the equations-- must the NSD
theory be ideal theory? Must Buchanan‘s theory be nonideal theory? In particular, there
is good reason to question whether NSD theorists and Buchanan even share the same
notion of what makes a theory ideal or nonideal. As I will show in the next paragraph, an
examination of their debate reveals that the parties in this debate have very different
notions of what makes a theory ideal or nonideal.
288
Recently, John Simmons points out
that there are actually several different types of distinctions between ideal and nonideal
theory; there are also different types of nonideal theories.
289
If so, then unless Buchanan
and his opponents share the same notion of the ideal/nonideal distinction, an objection to
ideal theory will not automatically imply that the NSD theory is wrong. Likewise, an
objection to nonideal theory will not immediately mean that Buchanan is wrong. In other
words, unless one rightly points out the problem in the kind of ideal theory that the NSD
theory is based on, her critique of ideal theory will not explain why the NSD theory is
wrong. Similarly, unless one attacks the kind of nonideal theory Buchanan‘s theory‘s
theory is based on, her objection of nonideal theory will not imply that we should reject
Buchanan‘s theory.
Let us consider how Buchanan and his opponents understand the distinction
between ideal and nonideal theory. First, consider Buchanan‘s objection to the NSD
theory. He argues that because the NSD theory is based on the ideal theoretical
assumption of perfect compliance, it can hardly provide useful guidance for actual

288
See Buchanan, 1997, p.60; Nielsen, 1998, pp.130-1; Simmons, 2010.

289
Simmons distinguishes between three types of ideal theory and their corresponding nonideal theories:
basic structures, individuals, and nations. He also further distinguishes between two different types
nonideal theories, i.e., deliberate and unfortunate noncompliance. See Simmons, 2010, p.17.

211

institutional reform because our world is not really like that.
290
In responding to this
challenge, Nielsen clarifies that, although the NSD theory is ideal theory, this does not
mean that it must also assume strict compliance.
291
His methodology is ideal theory
because it involves a counterfactual ideal conception of a liberal democracy, not because
it must assume perfect compliance. As we can see, Buchanan might have correctly
pointed out a problematic feature of a certain type of ideal theory; however, even if this
objection successfully demonstrates the problem with that type of ideal theory, it does not
show that the NSD theory shares this feature or has the same problem. In other words, his
argument against ideal theory, even if successful, does not refute the NSD theory.
Let us also consider how Nielsen criticizes Buchanan‘s institutional morality. His
main concern with nonideal theory is that it tends to entrench the status quo and allow
unjust features of the real world to be preserved. However, if Buchanan‘s institutional
morality can dispense with these elements—that is, if it can be free from those unjust,
morally indefensible elements of institutions— then it need not be blamed for problems
that certain nonideal theories have. The most important question is whether his
institutional morality can be free from these features that we do not like about nonideal
theory, namely the entrenchment of the status quo. If it can be, then there is no reason for
Buchanan to defend nonideal theorizing or dwell on the complicated debate regarding the
priority of ideal or non-ideal theories. In other words, an argument against nonideal
theory would not necessarily be an argument against Buchanan‘s theory; it would be an

290
See Buchanan, 1999, p.60.

291
See Nielsen, 1998, p.130-1.

212

argument against it only if they shared the feature that is under attack. However, if this
were the case, philosophers should directly discuss the problematic feature and explain
why it undermines the theory‘s credibility; there would be no need to take a detour and
tackle the complicated debate between ideal and non-ideal theories.
Here, we can see that, in the examples I just mentioned, Buchanan may have
pointed out a problem of some type of ideal theory, and Nielsen may have pointed out a
problem of some type of nonideal theory. However, neither successfully points out a
problem in the NSD theory or Buchanan‘s theory. Buchanan and Nielsen apparently have
very different understandings of ideal and non-ideal theories—one seems to think that it
is about the assumption of perfect compliance, the other about counterfactual conditions.
The fact that they have different conceptions of ideal and non-ideal theories is not
surprising given the fact that philosophers today are still debating what makes a theory
ideal or non-ideal one. In any case, to engage in a substantive debate concerning
secession, philosophers should directly tackle the problems in Buchanan‘s institutional
morality or the NSD theory, not the problems in ideal or non-ideal theory in general.
There is no need to take a detour and defend ideal or nonideal theorizing.

Regardless of the conceptual confusion involved in ideal and nonideal theory, the
most important task for defending Buchanan‘s methodology is to explain how it can be
free from a commitment to upholding the unjust elements in existing institutions. Here, I
would like to defend a new and improved conception of the idea of institutional morality.
This conception would explain why, even though we should be concerned with

213

institutional morality, we are not required to favor the status quo or accept injustices in
existing institutions.
In 5.2.2, I constructed what I take to be the best interpretation of Buchanan‘s
methodology of institutional morality. Very briefly, one begins by identifying the moral
principles that guide existing institutions, then considering how the inclusion of a new
right affects these institutions, and then considering in a holistic manner the overall
impact of this right‘s implementation. Now, assuming that we have a rough estimation of
a right‘s general impact on existing institutions, how do we decide which result to choose?
In principle, there are many ways in which one can look at the result and make
this decision. Here, I will discuss two possible guiding principles that could help us settle
this matter. They are discussed because they concern an adequate understanding of
institutional morality and its primary objective. The first holds that we should choose the
right that would generate an overall result that best preserves the moral values embraced
by existing institutions. The second holds that we should choose the right that would
bring about the best overall result, which may or may not be the one that best preserves
the moral values embodied by existing institutions. The first principle would not likely
sanction drastic changes in existing institutions. However, under the second principle,
drastic changes in existing institutions would be acceptable if they would, by and large,
bring about a better (or even the best) overall outcome. While the first option prioritizes
the status quo, the second does not.
Which principle should we choose? One common understanding of Buchanan‘s
theory is to read it as choosing the first principle. There is indeed strong evidences that

214

indicate that this is Buchanan‘s real choice. For instance, he puts strong emphasis on a
right‘s impact on existing institutions. In addition, as saw in 5.2.3, his specific criteria for
institutional morality, such as Progressive Conservatism, Minimal Realism, and arguably
a cogent theory of territorial claim, show strong tendency toward conservatism. Close
reading of his work supports this conservative understanding of his methodology.
Nonetheless, given Buchanan‘s emphasis on holism with respect to institutional
morality, I think he should choose the second principle.
292
That is, we should go after the
best overall outcome. There is no plausible reason to assume that he must prioritize or try
to conserve the moral principles and values of existing institutions.
293
There is also no
good reason why he should not sanction trade-offs between new and old principles if they
would lead to a better overall outcome. Conservatism with regard to institutional reform
is not necessary to make sense of the idea of holistic institutional morality. In other
words, institutional morality need not entrench the status quo. So long as its focus is on
the best overall outcome, it will not necessarily favor existing institutions.

Now, one might suspect that there is a more subtle way to be conservative about
institutional reform without blatantly requiring that the process result in minimalized
impact on existing institutions. That is, one can assign greater weight to the moral

292
This part of my interpretation is inspired by Simmons‘s interpretation of Rawls‘s ideal theory. See
Simmons, 2010, p.22.

293
My claim that there is no reason why Buchanan cannot choose the second option is based only on the
fact that he stresses holism. At this stage, there is no reason why he can‘t opt for the best overall result.
However, as we will see very soon in 5.2.3 and 5.3.1, there indeed are several pieces of evidence that
indicate that he might have something more conservative in mind.

215

principles and values of existing institutions. This would still prioritize the status quo
even though it does not appear that way.
Whether we should assign greater weight to those moral principles and values of
existing institutions depends on our judgments about their moral weights or importance.
It might be the case that some of them are indeed more important, in which case we
surely should assign them greater weight in our calculations. Some of these principles
and values may not be that important, and there is no reason why we should grant them
greater weight in our estimation. At any rate, there is no reason to assign a moral
principle or value a greater weight just because it is a part of the status quo. In other
words, institutional morality need not entrench the status quo.

5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained Buchanan‘s methodological framework and his
objections to the NSD theory that flow from this framework. He argues that, because the
right to secede is unavoidably institutional, an adequate theory of secession must include,
as an integral part, an investigation of a right‘s impacts on and compatibility with existing
institutions. To provide more specific guidance, Buchanan provides specific criteria with
which we may evaluate different theories of secession. I have argued that, Buchanan‘s
specific criteria fail to reflect the true requirements of institutional morality. Thus,
although the NSD theory actually fails to meet his criteria, it does not mean that it also
fails to satisfy the demands of institutional morality.

216

Although I reject Buchanan‘s specific criteria, I believe that he is right to require
that we investigate a right‘s overall institutional impact before recognizing it. I
considered three objections from supporters of the NSD theory and argued that they fail
to show that this requirement is inadequate. I also presented a new understanding of the
idea of institutional morality that addresses the concern that Buchanan‘s theory would
arbitrarily favor the status quo.

217

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Abstract (if available)

Abstract In this dissertation, I consider whether the interests in national culture, identity, and membership are sufficient to justify the right of a national community to self-government. I argue that in a multination state, membership in a minority nation can undermine the equal distribution of political power and opportunity. Thus, social institutions should be arranged in a way that helps equalize relevant goods. Nevertheless, I go on to argue that the value of national identity is not enough to justify the right to self-government, both in the form of an independent, sovereign state and an autonomous, sub-state government. My thesis is somewhat unusual, as most philosophers who affirm the value of national identity also endorse the right of a national community to some form of self-government, and most philosophers who deny that a national community has the right to any form of self-government also deny the value of national identity.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Lee, Hsin-wen (author)

Core Title National identity and the right to self-government

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publication Date 02/02/2011

Defense Date 12/01/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag institutional morality,national culture,national identity,OAI-PMH Harvest,optimal protection principle,self-determination,self-government

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Marmor, Andrei (committee chair), Altman, Scott (committee member), Schroeder, Mark (committee member)

Creator Email hsinwenl@usc.edu,numerein@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3637

Unique identifier UC1182399

Identifier etd-Lee-4228 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-435110 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3637 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Lee-4228.pdf

Dmrecord 435110

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Lee, Hsin-wen

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Location Los Angeles, California

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