Ethnic resistance and state environmental policy: Uyghurs and Mongols

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Content ETHNIC RESISTANCE AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: UYGHURS AND MONGOLS by Laura N Stahle ____________________________________________________________________ A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES) August 2009 Copyright 2009 Laura N Stahle ii Table of Contents List of Figures iii Abstract iv Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Environmental Challenges in Xinjiang 3 Historical Overview 3 Physical Geography 4 Historical Background and Water Resource Development 7 Environmental Impact in the Tarim River Basin 13 Chapter 3: State Efforts to Mitigate Environmental Degradation in Xinjiang 18 Chapter 4: Environmental Challenges in Inner Mongolia 28 Historical Overview 28 Environmental Degradation and State Policy 29 Grasslands to Agricultural Lands 30 Chapter 5: State Efforts to Mitigate Environmental Degradation in Inner Mongolia 37 Post Mao Era Reforms in Grazing Practices 37 Rehabilitation of Non-Grazing Lands 43 Why Does the State Persist with Failed Policies in Inner Mongolia? 48 Chapter 6: The State Response to Environmental Degradation and Its Relationship with Ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Mongols in Inner Mongolia 52 Uyghurs 52 Mongols 59 Chapter 7: Conclusion 62 Bibliography 64 iii List of Figures Figure 1: The Tarim Basin 6 Figure 2: Uyghur Village Along the Lower Tarim 6 Figure 3: Wasteful Irrigation Practices in the Tarim Basin 11 Figure 4: The Natural Ecology of the Lower Tarim 15 Figure 5: Tree Mortality in the Lower Tarim 16 Figure 6: Canal Reconstruction 22 Figure 7: The Taklimakan Desert 25 Figure 8: The Lower Tarim River Following the Environmental Releases between 1998 and 2004 26 Figure 9: Plowing the Steppe 31 Figure 10: Grassland to Farmland 31 Figure 11: Desertification in Inner Mongolia 33 Figure 12: Dust Over the Yellow Sea and Korean Peninsula 34 Figure 13: Dust Reaches the Western United States 35 Figure 14: Tree Planting on the Edge of the Gobi Desert 46 Figure 15: Northern and Southern Xinjiang 53 iv Abstract Many regions in China face severe environmental degradation. The government response to these problems has varied from region to region. In particular, environmental rehabilitation in the Tarim River Basin in southern Xinjiang has been much more successful than in the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. In this study, I examine the causes of environmental degradation and government efforts to mitigate that destruction in both areas. I analyzed scientific, sociological, and historical literature as well as reports prepared by Chinese ministries and international organizations. My research suggests the most significant factor contributing to the discrepancy in the effectiveness of environmental rehabilitation in these two regions is the seriousness with which the Chinese state considers the threat of Uyghur separatism. Unlike the ethnic Mongols of Inner Mongolia, who make up a very small percentage of the population and who have not engaged in political unrest, there is a large Uyghur population in the Tarim River Basin, which has a history of participation in overt separatist activities. While I believe this is the most important factor in Beijing’s varying response to environmental degradation in these places, there are other factors as well. They include, the presence of Han dominated Bingtuan farms in the upper Tarim River Basin, the dismissive discourse among officials that blames Mongols for environmental decline in the grasslands, the Chinese state’s preference for agriculture over pastoralism, and the government partnership with international organizations in the restoration of the Tarim River. My analysis suggests these factors combined with the more prominent issue of the threat of ethnic unrest in southern Xinjiang has prompted a more effective response to the environmental degradation of the Tarim River Basin than that of the Inner Mongolian grasslands. I believe my study has implications for how we understand the myriad ways in which Beijing attempts to simultaneously pacify and neutralize Uyghurs in an effort to bring Xinjiang more firmly under its control. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions both face severe environmental problems. The Tarim River in southern Xinjiang and the grasslands of Inner Mongolia stand out for the enormity of their ecological challenges. The environmental degradation of the Mongolian steppe and the Tarim River Basin is a direct result of state land use policies. The Mao era (1949- 1976) wrought incredible destruction on the Chinese landscape. However, reform era policies after 1978 have often been just as damaging, especially in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese government is well aware of the environmental degradation in these two regions and has taken a number of steps to address it. However, the polices implemented to mitigate these problems differ greatly in their effectiveness and sustainability. This is in large part a result of Beijing’s relationship with the dominant ethnic minority groups in each region. The degradation of the Tarim River Basin in Xinjiang appears to have been an altogether more serious matter in the eyes of the Chinese state than the widespread degradation and desertification of the once vast grasslands of Inner Mongolia. Uyghur separatism is a very important issue for the Chinese authorities and they believe it has the potential to cause serious political instability. Mongol separatism, on the other hand, is a nonissue because there is no cohesive Mongol separatist movement. Inner Mongolia has also been flooded with Han Chinese farmers who dominate the politics of the region. The threat Uyghurs pose to Chinese rule in Xinjiang, perceived or otherwise, has been a catalyst for a serious program of agricultural reform and river restoration in the Tarim Basin. As such, the efforts to reverse environmental degradation in southern Xinjiang have been far more extensive and successful than those in Inner Mongolia. State efforts to curb the destruction of the Inner Mongolian grasslands have been a failure, even though billions of dollars have been devoted to the problem. Here it will argued that heightened Chinese concern for political control over problematic ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs has dictated government spending and environmental actions. This paper will first describe the environmental issues confronting Xinjiang and the 2 government attempt to mitigate environmental degradation there. Next, it will describe Inner Mongolia’s environmental problems and the government response to them. I will then go on to discuss the important role that concern for ethnic separatism has played in state environmental policy in Western China. 3 Chapter 2: Environmental Challenges in Xinjiang HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is the largest province-level region in China today. The name “Xinjiang” means “New Frontier” and was the title the Qing administrators gave to the region when it was incorporated into the empire as a province in 1864. For a century prior to being made a province, the region, like Tibet and Outer Mongolia, was a protectorate of the Qing empire. Since the 18 th century Qing and subsequent Chinese authorities have expanded agricultural capacity in the Tarim River Basin through vigorous development of irrigation and other hydraulic works (Millward 8). Present day southern Xinjiang (Nanjiang) where the Tarim Basin is located was never tied very closely to the Qing empire and to this day is only lightly penetrated by Han Chinese. Nanjiang was the sight of the Eastern Turkestan Republic 1 in 1933 (Millward 201). The modernizing, nationalistic, Islamic republic was short lived and in 1934 southern Xinjiang came under the rule of Sheng Shicai, a Chinese warlord based in northern Xinjiang. It was Sheng who gave “Uyghur” its first official currency (Millward 208). Prior to his rule, the preferred term for the Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang was “Türk” or “Türki” (209). Sheng did not invent the term Uyghur, however; it has roots at least as far back as the 9 th century CE. Sheng Shicai responded with brutality to potential rivals, especially Turkic leaders with suspected nationalistic leanings. Detentions and executions fell heavily on a whole cohort of Uyghur and Hui intellectual and political leaders. Estimates of the number of people killed in Sheng’s purges range from 50,000 to 100,000 (Millward 210). Facing a shortage of qualified bureaucrats after these eradication campaigns, Sheng turned to the Chinese Communists in Yan’an for assistance. Sheng was welcomed under the Communists’ “united front” philosophy, but he was by no means a communist sympathizer. On the contrary, he was a ruthless opportunist. Throughout the 1930s and 40s he bounced back and forth between the CCP, Guomindang (GMD)                                                          1 There is some confusion over whether the name of the new nation state was “Eastern Turkestan Republic” or “Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic”. See Millward 2007, 202-203. 4 and the Soviets always looking for the ally that could give him the firmest grip on the territory he controlled. The GMD finally removed him from Xinjiang in 1944 (Millward 211). In 1944, a second Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR), that like the first one had both Islamizing and secular modernizing impulses, was founded exactly 11 years to the day after the first one (Millward 216). Soon this ETR and the GMD agreed to form a coalition government. It never ran very smoothly and in 1949 the GMD was defeated by the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. The GMD governor quickly switched his allegiance to the CCP and the leaders of the ETR cabled their surrender to Mao Zedong. In August 1949, Mao Zedong invited a delegation from the former ETR to attend the National People’s Consultative Conference in Beijing (Millward 233). A group of five representatives boarded a plane to Beijing. Conveniently for Mao and the CCP, their plane went missing and a new Xinjiang delegation was quickly appointed and went to Beijing in their place. The new delegation abandoned all calls for autonomy. Later that year, PLA troops moved into Xinjiang and the Communist hold on Xinjiang was solidified. Only afterwards did Chinese authorities report that the plane carrying the original delegation had crashed in the mountains near Lake Baikal killing all on board (Millward 234). There were localized anti-CCP riots in Nanjiang and elsewhere in the 1950s, but the CCP never lost control of Xinjiang and continue to rule the “autonomous” region today. Uyghur opposition to Chinese rule also continues to the present. PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY The Tarim Basin is a large arid region in southern Xinjiang. Its main geographic features are the Taklimakan Desert and the Tarim River. The basin is flanked by the Kunlun Mountains on the southern side and the Tianshan Mountain Range to the north. The Taklimakan Desert is, in terms of size, the dominant feature of the region. Comprising an area of 480,000 km 2 (185,329 m 2 ) it is the second largest desert in the world (Lyle and Mu 2). However, the great majority of the desert is simply uninhabitable. Thus, in terms of importance to human habitation the region’s 5 most important feature is the Tarim River. It occupies a surface area of 33,340 km 2 and has an annual runoff of 4.6 x 10 9 m 3 (Feng, Endo and Cheng 231-232). At 1321 km (820 miles) the Tarim River is the longest inland river in China and the second longest in the world (Chen, et al. 2004, 1054). The primary source of water for the Tarim River is glacial and snow melt from the Kunlun and Tianshan ranges. As a result, the flow of the river is highly seasonal, with summer flows far outpacing those in winter and spring. The Yarkant, 2 Aksu and Hotan rivers are the three main tributaries of the Tarim (Figure 1). These tributaries are very important to the Tarim River. Simply put, without these tributaries there is no Tarim River. It does not generate any runoff of its own and so the mainstream of the Tarim River (beginning at the confluence of the Hotan and Tarim rivers) is completely dependent on headwater streams for replenishment (Hao, Chen and Li 437). The Aksu River supplies nearly 75 percent of the flow of the Tarim River while the Hotan River supplies just over 20 percent (Lei, et al. 616). Since 1976 the Konqi River 3 has also supplied water to the Tarim River via the manmade Kuta Canal (Ye, Xu and Song 16). It accounts for about 4.7 percent of the Tarim’s mainstream flows (Lei, et al. 616). The Tarim is a desert river (Figure 2). The climate here is acutely arid. The average annual rainfall in the middle and lower reaches of the river is 50 - 70 mm or 2 - 2.75 inches (Feng, et al., 202). In the lowest reaches of the river it is a mere 17.4 - 42.0 mm which translates into only 0.66 - 1.65 inches a year (Chen, et al. 2004, 1054). Consequently, settlements in the region are dependent on the Tarim River for survival. However, like many of the great rivers in Asia, the Tarim has experienced severe, long-term degradation. Given the extremely arid climate of the region it is not surprising that the river ecosystem is very sensitive to any changes in the environment.                                                          2 There are a number of variant spellings of this river including Yarkand and Yerqiang. 3 The Konqi is also sometimes spelled Kunque. 6 Figure 1: The Tarim Basin This is a map of the Tarim Basin showing the Tarim River and its principle tributaries the Yarkant, Aksu and Hotan. The Tarim River terminates in a low laying basin of interior basin in the Taklimakan Desert. Source: Wallace and Zhang 2002 Figure 2: Uyghur Village Along the Lower Tarim This is a photo of a Uyghur settlement along the lower Tarim River. Source: Into Xinjiang 7 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT Human impact on the Tarim River has been devastating. Many varied but interrelated processes of environmental degradation have taken place in the last sixty years. From the 1950s through the 1970s dam and reservoir building, irrigation farming, and an ever-growing population have depleted the river. In 1972, after the completion of Daxihaizi Reservoir the water flow into the lower reaches of the Tarim was cut off and a 321 km (200 mile) section of the Tarim River dried up completely (Wang Jian; Chen, et al. 2006, 9). Soil salinization of irrigated farming land, the death of vast stretches of the riparian ecosystem, desertification in the lowest reaches of the river where there was no longer water, and seriously degraded water quality have been the most prominent and problematic outcomes of the increase in human activity along the Tarim River since the early 1950s. There is no doubt that the degradation of the Tarim River and its surrounding environment is the result of human activity (Feng, et al. 2005, Hao, Chen and Li 2009). The years Mao Zedong was China’s ruler, from 1949-1976, were particularly unkind to the Tarim. As Judith Shapiro (2001) has documented, the Mao years were marked not only by human tragedies on a grand scale, but also by unmitigated environmental devastation. Although the worst environmental degradation of the Tarim River took place during the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, degradation by no means ceased after Mao’s death. Population growth, an increasing number of dams, intensive irrigation practices by the expanding population, and a shift in crop regime are the main anthropogenic activities that led to the deterioration of the Tarim River. Eight reservoirs were constructed during the 1950s-1970s period (Hao, Chen and Li 436). The dam at Daxihaizi Reservoir wrought the most damage to the Tarim ecosystem cutting off flow to the lower Tarim River and reducing groundwater levels. As noted above, the annual rainfall in this region is only 17.4 - 42.0 mm a year, but the annual potential evaporation rate is between 2500 and 3000 mm or 98 - 118 inches (Chen, et al. 2006, 9). The potential evaporation rate is a theoretical number used to estimate aridity. Potential evaporation approximates how 8 much moisture could be evaporated if it were available, and is based on surface temperature, air temperature, solar insolation and wind, which together determine the water vapor content of the near surface atmosphere. In this case, the evaporation potential (PE) is over two orders of magnitude greater than the current observed rate of precipitation (P). Thus, the annual moisture deficient is extremely large (eg. P - PE = 25 mm – 2500 mm = -2475 mm). Consequently, the highly arid lower reaches of the Tarim River, which is so thoroughly dependent on the flow of its tributaries, were severely depleted after the completion of the Daxihaizi dam and the heavy diversion of stream flow. The Tarim River dams have not only created an increase in environmental stress for the river, the management of the water resources has also been extremely wasteful. It should come as no surprise that these reservoirs lose a great deal of water to the atmosphere. Until recently, water utilization efficiency of Tarim’s reservoirs was as low as 50 percent (Zhou, Song and Hu 134). Meaning that as much as 50 percent of the water earmarked for irrigation was lost to evaporation, seepage and other factors before it reached the intended agricultural fields. In a place already strapped for water, this is a terrible waste of such a precious resource. In addition to dam construction and evaporation losses from reservoirs, irrigation is another human activity that has putting great strain on the Tarim River. The overwhelming majority of water consumption from the Tarim water has been for irrigation. To be precise, 95 percent of the total utilized water is for irrigation (Zhou, Song and Hu 133). In some years the percentage is even higher. In 1998 the total water consumption was 26.46 ×10 9 m 3 , while agriculture irrigation consumption was 26.29 ×10 9 m 3 , or 99.36 percent of total consumption (Zhou, Song and Hu 133). Irrigated areas along and near the Tarim River have been steadily increasing since the 1950s. In the fifty years between 1950 and 2000 the amount of irrigated land increased by a factor of three (Ye, Xu and Song 22). This is due in part to population increases in the Tarim Basin and in part because of the change in crop regime led by the switch from food crops like grains to commercial crops like cotton. 9 Until recently, use of the Tarim River for irrigation was extremely wasteful. Feng, Endo and Cheng report that 60 to 65 percent of irrigation water is wasted. This is in part a result of the high evaporation rate, but poor irrigation practices have been a major cause of waste. In the past poor irrigation practices were driven by a lack of regulations. With historically weak regulation and enforcement there has been a kind of “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) effect that has taken place with regard to utilization of river water resources. In 1968, Garrett Hardin wrote an influential piece in the journal Science in which he argued that when pasture land is open to all it is in the interests of herds people to keep as many animals as possible and so eventually the number of people and animals exceeds the carrying capacity of the land (Hardin 1244). The idea is that without private ownership or government regulation, pastoralists do not have incentives to practice sustainable animal husbandry. In the Tarim Basin, a similar effect developed with regard to utilization of water resources for irrigating cropland. Farmers in the Tarim Basin have long used flood irrigation. This practice involves diverting river water via irrigation canals and allowing the water to flow into fields until there is standing water covering the field creating a “flooding” effect. Because there was little regulation of water use farmers operated under the philosophy “use as much as possible before someone else does.” Flood irrigation is a primitive and extremely wasteful practice in such an arid environment. It also often leads to increasing the salinization of cropland soils and the degradation of farmlands. Since the 1950s, the population growth in the Tarim Basin has been dramatic. Over the past five decades there has been a four-fold increase in the population (Hao, Chen and Li 438). In the 1950s the population of the Tarim Basin was about 3 million (UNESCO 2007). Today 8.26 million people live in the basin (HELP Newsletter, 8). As population has increased so has the amount of land under cultivation as well as the pressure put on the river to irrigate the increasing acreage under development. The growth is a result of in migration of Han Chinese, who typically were incorporated into Bingtuan farms, as well as the higher birth rates for Uyghurs (permitted by Chinese authorities due to their status as an ethnic minority). The Bingtuan or Xinjiang 10 Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is a secretive organization under the administration of the central government in Beijing rather than the regional Xinjiang government. Its members are mostly demobilized soldiers, convicts and migrant farmers from China “proper.” XPCC settlements are organized as large farms and are supposed to be self-sustaining, but in actuality they require large subsidies from the central government to operate (Bovingdon 2000, 20). Scholars generally agree that the purpose of the Bingtuan is to increase the presence of Han Chinese in Xinjiang. Despite the existence of Bingtuan farms the ratio of Han Chinese to Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin has changed little, with Chinese making up less than five percent of the population (Becquelin 2004, 372). While dam and reservoir construction led to a deterioration of the ecology of the Tarim River during the Mao years, irrigated agriculture has contributed to ecological decline during the reform era (Figure 3). Large scale agriculture in the Tarim Basin began in the 1950s and especially took off during the Great Leap Forward between 1959 and 1961 (Zhou, Song and Hu 137). However, river water utilized for irrigating cropland began to increase to a truly unsustainable pace after 1990 (Zhou, Song and Hu 133). This was a direct result of the changing crop regime of the Tarim Basin. 11 Figure 3: Wasteful Irrigation Practices in the Tarim Basin This is an aerial photograph showing agricultural fields in the Tarim Basin. Dune lands can be seen in the upper left hand side of the photo. There is a lot of water sitting on top of the fields demonstrating the wasteful irrigation practices of some Tarim farmers. Source: Into Xinjiang In the 1990s, cotton began replacing food crops in southern Xinjiang. This commercial crop, just like food crops, is sustained exclusively by the Tarim River and so as more land went under the plow for cotton production more water has been diverted from the Tarim to sustain it. The Tarim Basin has become the largest cotton-producing region in the country. An estimated 17.1 percent of China’s cotton and 3.7 percent of the world’s cotton is grown in the basin (Zhou, 12 Song and Hu 131). The Chinese government, as part of the Great Western Development initiative launched in 1999, is committed to the economic development of western China, including Xinjiang. Cotton is seen as a cash crop and the government hopes that increased cotton cultivation will lead to higher standards of living in the Tarim Basin. Poverty is widespread in southern Xinjiang (Lyle and Mu 1). In the 1990s the average annual income for farmers in the five prefectures that comprise the Tarim Basin was only RMB 1,946 (US $234 at the 1995 exchange rate; World Bank Assessment 2007). This works out to only 64 cents a day. From the Chinese government’s point of view cotton has the potential to pull a number of farmers out of poverty. Indeed cotton cultivation has increased as food crop cultivation has decreased. The amount of land under cultivation for economic crops has grown from less than 50,000 hectares (ha) in 1957 to over 150,000 ha in 2004 (Hao, Chen and Li 443). As noted above, the quantity of cropland has steadily increased since the 1950s. It is not simply the case that cotton has been sown where food crops once were, but cotton and other commercial crops (like oil seed crops) have broken new ground. Since the 1990s, to support the growing cropland, the use of underground water resources for irrigation agriculture has increased quickly (Zhou, Song and Hu 133). Prior to the 1990s only river water was utilized. Tapping groundwater for irrigation can potentially be unsustainable. No one is suggesting that irrigated agriculture cease in the Tarim Basin. But the finite source of water and high rate of evaporation are obviously issues that farmers in this region must contend with, and there are many things that can and have recently been done to reduce water wasted by irrigation. There are also technologically advanced solutions that can greatly increase water productivity. Nevertheless, there is no question that wasteful use of precious water resources has taken place over the last fifty years and has changed the natural water cycle of the Tarim River. 13 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT IN THE TARIM RIVER BASIN The environmental impact of the dam building, irrigation practices, increase in population, increasing amount of land utilized for agriculture and the changing crop regime created a host of negative environmental impacts on the Tarim River. Among them are diminishing quality of river water, salinization of cropland, the death and deterioration of large swath of the riparian ecosystem, and desertification. The quality of the Tarim River’s water has deteriorated over the past few decades. Total dissolved solid (TDS) content is one of the main indicators of river water quality. Because of increasing irrigation, including canal building and channel diversion, the TDS has risen sharply and for many months of the year the Tarim River becomes highly saline. The TDS in the Tarim River prior to the Mao years was 1.0 gallons per liter (Chen, et al. 2003). Recently the level of TDS has risen as high as 6.3 g/L during the dry season (Hao, Chen and Li 440). The Tarim is freshwater river only during late summer and autumn when glacial and snow melt replenishes river flow via the Tarim’s tributaries (Hao, Chen and Li 439-440). Increasing salinity of the Tarim River is directly related to the way irrigation has been managed in the last few decades. There is a small amount of water which flows back into the river after the fields are irrigated. The quality of this drainage effluent is very poor and typically has a TDS of 8-10 g/L (Lyle and Mu 1). This poses a threat to native riparian plants that cannot survive on water with such a high salinity, not to mention the crops of downstream farmers. Not surprisingly the salinity rises the further downstream you go. This problem was being felt by the mid-1970s. In 1976, for example, the salt content was above 1g/L for six months out of the year. In 1984, nine months were above 1g/L and in 1991, all twelve months of the year were above 1g/L in the middle and lower reaches of the river (Zhou, Song and Hu 135). Salinity levels in the middle and lower Tarim have exceeded human health guidelines (Lyle and Mu 5) and the water in downstream reservoirs has become unfit for drinking (Feng, et al. 206). However, cotton is rather resistant to salinized water. Cotton is tolerant of salinity levels up to 2-3g/L (Lyle and Mu 14 5). Most horticultural, or food crops suffer significantly at levels of 1-2g/L (Lyle and Mu 5). So as salinization levels have risen in the Tarim River some farmers have turned from food crops to more saline-resistant cotton. Unfortunately, cotton requires a lot of water so the threat of increasing salinity attends the wider cultivation of cotton. Salinization of the river and of cropland go hand in hand. In places where flood irrigation is practiced the soil becomes salinized over time. In such an arid environment a lot of water is lost to evaporation, but the solids do not evaporate. After practicing flood or other water-intensive agriculture techniques for a number of years the saline content of the soil rises as dissolved solids build up. This is the same process that produces a bathtub ring. Zhou, Song and Hu report that one-quarter to one-third of farmland in the Tarim Basin has a salinity problem (135). A UNESCO report puts the figure at 40 percent (8). To combat this problem Tarim farmers flush their fields in the off season (Lyle and Mu 4). This involves diverting water from the river, emptying it onto fallow fields and quickly draining the fields. Some of the salts leave the soil, are dissolved in the water and then flushed out of the fields and back into the river. Obviously dumping this now highly salinized water back into the river increases the salinity of the Tarim River and is a hazard for native plants as well as downstream farms. One of the most detrimental outcomes of the unsustainable use of the Tarim River has been the “drying out” of the last 321 km of the river since the completion of the Daxihaizi Reservoir in 1972. This stretch of former river is what the Chinese government has recently dubbed Xinjiang’s “green corridor.” Prior to the 1950s, there was a thriving and diverse riparian ecosystem here. At the rivers edges were marshy grasses and meadows, a little further away from the banks were forests of Euphrates poplar (Populus euphratica), and further still were tamarisk shrubs (Tamarix spp.) (Figure 4). Between 1958 and 1978 the biomass of Euphrates poplar decreased by half, while the total area covered by the trees declined by two-thirds (Feng, Endo and Cheng 229) (Figure 5). Some 3820 km 2 have been lost in the lower reaches of the Tarim 15 River. That is an area over three times the size of Los Angeles. 4 In 1996, the so-called green corridor was estimated to be only 13,300 ha (just over 50 square miles, or about one-tenth the size of Los Angeles). This is 75 percent smaller than it was prior to the 1950s (Lyle and Mu 4). These trees and shrubs are extremely important in riparian ecosystems surrounded by desert. Figure 4: The Natural Ecology of the Lower Tarim This figure shows the typical ecology of the lower Tarim River prior to the completion of the Daxihaizi dam which cut of flow to the lower reaches of the river in 1972. Source: Zhao, et al. 2006                                                          4 LA is 469 m 2 , or 1,214sq km 2 16 Figure 5: Tree Mortality in the Lower Tarim This photo shows the degradation of Euphrates poplar in the lower Tarim River. Source: “China: Tarim Basin II Project” 2005 The loss of trees and shrubs is particularly devastating to the environment because these plants stabilize sandy soils and sand dunes, which might otherwise migrate. After the widespread die off of Euphrates poplar woodlands and tamarisk shrubs lands, these formerly fixed- and semi- fixed dunes have become mobile. Mobile dunes are hazardous for a few reasons. Where dunes are fixed in place by vegetation the incidence of dust storms is much lower than where mobile dunes are present. With the loss of Euphrates poplar and tamarisk the fragile top soil in the lower Tarim has been overtaken by loose sand particles. The fine sands of the dry alluvial plain and on dry riverbeds were easily swept up by the wind and formed mobile sand dunes. These dunes are 1.0 to 4.0 meters (3.2-13 feet) tall (Feng, et al. 207). This change in the surface soil has affected the 17 system of exchange and replenishment of aquifers and altered the ability for native plants to reproduce. This has exacerbated desertification in this the lower Tarim River area. The hydrological and ecological changes that were wrought by the Daxihaizi dam and associated irrigation systems have resulted in a marked degradation of the riparian ecosystem of the lower Tarim and have caused substantial desertification. Some 12,300 km 2 (4,750 m 2 ) of desertified lands formed between the 1960s and 1990s (Feng, Endo and Cheng 229). Land threatened by desertification is classified in four ways: at risk for potential desertification (PRD), on-going desertification (OGD), moderate desertification (MD), and severe desertification (SD). Recent desertification in the Tarim is reflected by the fact that PRD and OGD lands have decreased over the last five decades while MD and SD lands have increased. Moderately desertified lands in the Tarim Basin have grown from 43 percent in 1958 to 71 percent in 2000 (Feng, et al. 207). There is no question that in the arid Tarim Basin desertification is a serious health and environmental hazard. 18 Chapter 3: Policies to Mitigate Environmental Degradation Xinjiang The ecosystem of the lower reaches of the Tarim has been thoroughly degraded. The most detrimental effect has been the absence of water in the lower 321 km of the river. In the last decade Chinese scientists have been warning that a similar fate could be in store for the middle Tarim if effective management and regulations are not introduced. Lei, et al. argues that from 1966 to 1995 water consumption in the middle reaches outstripped that of the upper reaches by 1.57 times and thus in terms of river regulation, water use in the middle reaches should be restricted (2001, 624). Ye, Xu and Song contend that the middle reaches could soon experience seasonal drying and if deterioration continues it could cause more serious problems (22). They too argue that ecological restoration and reconstruction should not focus solely on the lower reaches but that ecological protection is necessary in the middle reaches too as they “may be more sensitive than that of the lower” reaches (22). Fortunately the Chinese government has taken notice of the situation in the Tarim Basin and is trying to address it. In the mid to late 1990s the central government became increasing concerned about the environmental degradation of the Tarim River. This, not coincidentally, coincided with the launch of the Great Western Development program. More environmentally sustainable regulations began to be drafted at this time To deal with water distribution and management of the Tarim River in 1998 the government of Xinjiang established the Tarim Basin Water Resources Commission (TBWRC) (“Tarim Basin”). The autonomous region’s government directly leads this body. However, there are numerous other bodies such as the Water Resources Bureau of Xinjiang Government, the Five Prefecture’s (of the Tarim Basin) Water Resources Bureaus and the Environmental Protection Agency of Xinjiang Government that all have certain concerns and interests when it comes to water use. In the 1990s this bureaucracy and their various regulations were convoluted and it was difficult to know what exactly the rules were and who had the power to enforce them. However, 19 in the 2000s, with the help of international organizations, and importantly, the full backing of the central government, the bureaucracies were streamlined and now function much more cohesively. China’s central government has partnered with the World Bank as well as the Hydrology for the Environment, Life and Policy (HELP) program, a joint UNESCO-World Meteorological Organization (WMO) initiative. The central government has spent 10.7 billion RMB (US $1.5 billion) on reconstructing the Tarim River Basin (Liang; Wallace and Zhang 36; Lyle and Mu 6). The money has gone toward a number of projects including restoring the flow of the 321 km stretch of dry river by releasing water from Bosten Lake, improving water use efficiency in irrigation agriculture, and restoring the ecosystem of Bosten Lake itself (“Xinjiang’s Lake”; Liang). While money certainly helps repair the Tarim Basin’s environment, importantly the Chinese government and its aforementioned partners have taken steps to improve the management, regulation and administration of the Tarim Basin as well. Historically, the various bureaucracies in the Tarim Basin have made implementation of regulations difficult. The water bureaus of the five prefectures in the basin in particular have been an impediment to regulation. Another big impediment has been the division between water managers and stakeholders, the administrators who manage water use and the people who use the water, and scientists and policymakers who have certain ideas about how water should be used. The Xinjiang autonomous region government, with the assistance of the HELP program, has had quite a bit of success in overcoming these problems. The basic premise of the HELP program in Xinjiang was that a lack of integrated water management played a big role in the inefficient use of water and contributed to ecosystem degradation (Wallace and Zhang 28). And so the program concentrated on providing a forum for scientists, managers, administrators and water users to meet in order to come up with a water use plan that could realistically be implemented. With the help of the World Bank and HELP, the Tarim Basin Water Resources Commission (TBWRC) has been vital in organizing all parties, making policy, and implementing regulations. 20 There has been a dramatic turn around in the fortunes of the river and many of those who rely on it for their livelihood. The World Bank project, Tarim Basin II (1998-2004), has been particularly successful. In fact in 2007, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development Water Action Network Database (UN CSD WAND) released a report on the World Bank’s Tarim project that minced no words proclaiming, “At completion, the project showed itself to be one of the most successful examples of sustainable river basin management in China, if not the world” (“United Nations”). Indeed, the World Bank reported that the outcome of the project was “highly satisfactory,” the highest rating a World Bank project can receive (ICR, 3). Tarim Basin II succeeded in increasing the incomes of poor farmers, implementing restrictions on agricultural water use, increasing productivity of water usage in irrigation agriculture, as well as realizing significant environmental reconstruction in the lower reaches of the river. Under the auspices of Tarim Basin II one of the first actions of the TBWRC was to implement quotas on water diversions for irrigation. This was a very important step because one of the problems in the Tarim River and its communities was the overuse of water for irrigation, especially upstream. The quota system has brought a significant decline in water allocation for irrigation in the basin, as high as 20 to 30 percent for some prefectures (Lyle and Mu 6). These quotas were a very important first step in restoring the river. Compliance with the quotas has been very high among water users. This in large part because of the mechanisms Tarim Basin II and HELP put in place for local farmers to participate in the creation of new regulations. Both the World Bank and HELP have made consultation with local water users a priority. These organizations argue that without the support of water users any new regulations and management schemes would be only marginally successful. Tarim Basin II integrated both “top- down” and “bottom-up” approaches to management and regulation. And so the Chinese government finds itself in the unfamiliar position of listening to the concerns and ideas of local farmers. Farmers have organized Water User Associations (WUA) and elected their own leaders (ICR 7). WUA leading groups were then established for each prefecture (ICR 12). The WUAs 21 were then able to participate in the creation of regulations and the ongoing management of water resources. This was achieved through the creation of a community based Land and Water Management Plan (LWMP). A fundamental tenet of the LWMP is that farmers should take responsibility for operating and maintaining the tertiary irrigation systems within their designated area of responsibility (ICR 7). The LWMP includes a management board involving farmers and government officials and a formal planning process with extensive community consultation (Lyle and Mu 7). The WUAs have been so successful that the XUAR government decided to extend the program to all of southern Xinjiang (Nanjiang). Originally 15 WUA were developed on a trial basis, today an additional 1,325 have been established (ICR 7). Lyle and Mu argue that through the WUAs and LWMP “impressive progress” has been made in integrating farmers into river basin management (8). Educating and mobilizing water users involved a comprehensive training program for technical staff and farmers. A total of 479,000 person-days of agricultural training for technical staff and 568,000 training days for farmers were conducted. The majority (517,000 or 91 percent) of the farmer training days were directed at women (151,000 days) and ethnic minorities (366,000 days) (ICR 6, 11). Although there are some Hui and Mongols in the Tarim Basin, the vast majority of people belonging to an ethnic minority in this region are Uyghurs. So most of the farmers who received training under this program are Uyghurs. Tarim Basin II has also succeeded in increasing water use efficiency in irrigation agriculture. This has been very beneficial for another goal of the project and the Chinese government—environmental reconstruction. The canals delivering water from the river and lakes to fields were loosing a tremendous amount of water to seepage because they were most often unlined dirt ditches (Figure 6). Through the course of the project 433 km (269 miles) of canals were upgraded. Dirt ditches were first replaced with concrete canals and then the canals were lined with 0.5 mm thick sheets of geo-membrane (ICR 5). Another method that has increased efficiency has been the use of laser-guided land-leveling equipment on cropland. It turns out that 22 in uneven fields a significant (20-25 percent) amount of irrigation water is lost during application (Dept of Soil and Water). Prior to the early 2000s bulldozers were used to level land in the Tarim Basin. The laser leveling system has provided a 57 percent cost reduction over the bulldozer (ICR 9). It has also led to increased water efficiency because on average fields use 20 percent less water to irrigate the same amount of land after the field has been leveled using the laser system (ICR 9). A level field means increased productivity yields as well. In the Tarim Basin the productively yield for cotton in laser-leveled fields has increased 16.8 percent while wheat has increased 34 percent (ICR 9). Figure 6: Canal Reconstruction These photos show the canal reconstruction that took place under the Tarim Basin II project. Prior to the rebuilding of irrigation systems as much as 50 percent of water intended for irrigation was lost to seepage and evaporation before reaching agricultural fields. Source: ICR 2005 The project brought about not only a reduction in the total volume of irrigation water used but also an increase in the value of agricultural production such that on average the irrigation 23 water productivity index increased by an impressive 43 percent (ICR 4). The education, training and improved irrigation system made this possible. The yields of wheat, cotton and other crops have increased significantly since the beginning of this decade. Compared to the World Bank’s appraised projections prior to the launch of Tarim Basin II, the actual yields by the end of the project for wheat and corn were better by 41 percent (4400 kg/ha compared to 6210 kg/ha) and 25 percent (1260 kg/ha compared to 1580 kg/ha), respectively (ICR 3-4). This means not only that the productivity of the same parcels of land rose dramatically in a mere six years, but that it rose much higher than scientists and policymakers had expected. Increased water efficiency has meant increased productivity for farmers and thus has led to growing incomes. Across the five prefectures of the Tarim River Basin, farmers’ per capita annual average income increased from RMB 1,946 (US $234) to RMB 2,515 (US $302) over the six-year period of the Tarim Basin II project (“United Nations”), a 29 percent increase. Crop diversification, encouraged by both the XUAR government and World Bank, has played an important role. Whereas before cotton and wheat made up almost 90 percent of the crops cultivated in the Tarim Basin, now they make up less than 75 percent (ICR 6). The cultivation of orchard fruits, melons, vegetables (beets, corn and rice) and alfalfa has increased (ICR 3, 4). These crops often fetch a higher price than cotton and wheat. The amount of money farmers spend on water has declined since the beginning of Tarim Basin II, which has meant higher personal incomes. There are a couple of reasons for this. Overall water use in the basin has declined. In fact, an estimated 600-800 million cubic meters of water is been saved annually (ICR 5), a gross water use reduction of 16.8 percent (ICR 8). Water use has declined because canals have been reconstructed and lose less to seepage and farmers are now more educated so wasteful and counterproductive practices like flood irrigation have ceased. Also, water distribution is now much more transparent, reliable and equitable (ICR 8). Fines for using going over quota are also enforced. Consistent use of more water than is allowed according to quotas results in a temporary loss of water rights (ICR 11). Before, because of a convoluted 24 bureaucratic system, confusion over water distribution, and frequent disregard for distribution regulations there was a kind of “tragedy of the commons” with regard to water resources. Farmers were using much more water than they needed because their neighbors and those upstream were using much more than they needed. That wasteful cycle was finally broken by the Tarim Basin Water Resources Commission and the new management and administrative scheme implemented under Tarim Basin II. The third goal of the Tarim Basin II project was to partially restore the “green corridor” in the lower reaches of the Tarim River. The so-called “green corridor” refers to the vegetation belt in the middle and lower sections of the lower reaches of the Tarim River. Indeed, the “green corridor” is situated in the area below Daxihaizi Reservoir which has received no river flow since 1972. Its location is made more important by the fact that it is in the vegetative zone separating the Taklimakan and Kuluk deserts (Figure 7). Unlike some of the Chinese government’s strategies to halt or reverse desertification in Inner Mongolia, the concept of this green belt is not at odds with the ecology of the region. However, restoration ecology is always a tricky matter, and once an environment as precariously balanced between desert and riparian ecosystem as this experiences as significant as shock as this one has, it is not so easy to restore. After the water stopped flowing vegetation that could not access groundwater had no chance for survival or regeneration (Chen, et al. 2006, 8). In 1996, after 24 years of being cut off from the Tarim’s flow, the green corridor was estimated to be only 13,300 ha, 75 percent less than its original extent (Lyle and Mu). 25 Figure 7: The Taklimakan Desert This image shows the Tarim River Basin including the Tarim River as well as the location of the green corridor in between the Taklimakan and Kuluk Deserts. Satellite Image Source: NASA Beginning in 2000, six separate water deliveries have been made to the lower reaches of the Tarim. These have involved the release of water from the Daxihaizi Reservoir. The goal behind these transfers is to revitalize the green corridor. As mentioned above, a great deal of water has been saved from the improvements in administration, management and regulation put into place between 1998 and 2004. Much of the water was redirected for environmental use in the lower Tarim (Figure 8). Over the course of the six releases 1.7 billion cubic meters of water was released from the Daxihaizi Reservoir (ICR 4). Significantly, the terminal lake systems at Taitema, which had turned to a dust bowl in the almost 30 years that the lower Tarim went without water, has refilled. It now occupies 200 km 2 of land (ICR 9). The World Bank’s Implementation and Completion Report claims that 25 species of native birds and 11 species of fish have returned to the lower reaches of the Tarim River (ICR 9-10). 26 Figure 8: The Lower Tarim River Following the Environmental Releases between 1998 and 2004 This photo shows the lower Tarim River after the environmental releases from Bosten Lake between 1998 and 2004. Trees and shrubs along the river bank have responded well, however, questions remain about new poplar growth. Source: “China: Tarim Basin II Project” 2005 The partnerships between the Chinese government, the World Bank and HELP have by no means fixed all problems in the Tarim Basin. The reinforced canals have eliminated the problem of seepage, but they still lose a great deal of water to evaporation. Uncovered canals in one of the most arid climates in the world are not ideal. The water delivery systems employed by farmers also have room for improvement. Again, because evaporation is such a big issue and water resources are limited, a system that delivers water directly to the roots of crops would be much better than the current system of watering the cropland surfaces. The situation with the “green corridor” is more complex. How much the water transfers have rehabilitated the vegetation in the lower Tarim River remains a point of contention among 27 specialists. This region is no longer inhabited by farmers. They were forced to leave after the completion of the Daxihaizi Reservoir. The viability of the green corridor seems to be important for environmental reasons and does not seem to play a role in the government drive to improve the socio-economic situation for Uyghur farmers in the rest of the Tarim Basin. 28 Chapter 4: Environmental Challenges in Inner Mongolia: Grassland Degradation HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Inner and Outer Mongolia were first deemed separate entities by the Qing dynasty in the 18 th century (Sneath 2000, 1). The division was administrative. Outer Mongolia was ruled indirectly through a military governor. Inner Mongolia, closer to the seat of government, was directly administered. Like Xinjiang, in the period between the impending fall of the Qing dynasty and the consolidation of power by the Chinese Communists, Inner Mongolia was caught in between the powerful players in the region. The Soviet Union, imperial Japan, and the Guomindang all vied for a foothold in a region five times the size of Britain. Prior to the 19 th century Qing policy barred Han Chinese from settling in Inner or Outer Mongolia in an attempt to keep Han and Mongols strictly separated (Bulag 56-57). However, by the 19 th century this policy had collapsed and Chinese dominated the economy of Inner Mongolia. Many Mongols, commoners as well as nobles, had gone into debt to Chinese merchant firms (Sneath 10). As the power of the Qing diminished a Mongolian independence movement emerged driven in large part by widely shared resentment of the Chinese. In 1912, after the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Russians and Japanese signed a secret treaty dividing Mongolia into two spheres of influence—Inner Mongolia was recognized to fall within Japan’s sphere and Outer Mongolia in Russia’s (Sneath 11). After the demise of imperial Russia, the Soviet Union continued to honor this secret accord. For this reason the Mongolian independence movement in Inner Mongolia never stood much of a chance of merging with Outer Mongolia to create a greater Mongolian state. Imperial Russia and then the Soviet Union continually blocked all attempts at a unification between the two Mongolias after 1912. In 1915, Japan gained concessions in Inner Mongolia from China’s Republican government then under the control of Yuan Shikai (Sneath 11). Their influence in the region grew as a result. The Guomindang formally assumed power and gained control of Inner Mongolia in 1928. In an attempt to counter Mongol ambitions for a pan- 29 Mongolian state, the GMD forcefully pursued Han colonization of Inner Mongolia (Sneath 13). In 1933, the movement for Inner Mongolian autonomy was formed. This group never enjoyed any real power and until the Chinese Communists gained control of Inner Mongolia in 1947 they often shifted their alliances between the Japanese, Soviet Union, GMD and the Chinese Communists. By 1949, it was clear that a pan-Mongolian state would be practically impossible. Through the Mao era, Han immigration to Inner Mongolia continued and policies to “sedentize” Mongols were pursued. By the reform era the movement for Mongol independence had faded away. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND STATE POLICY Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) is the third largest province-level administrative unit in the PRC. It accounts for one-eighth of China’s total land area and traditionally three-fourths of the region was grassland (Zhou and Byrne 124). Sadly the once- great grasslands of the Mongolian steppe have deteriorated severely over the past six decades. Like the environmental degradation of the Tarim Basin, the worsening quality of Inner Mongolian grasslands is a direct result of human—almost always state-initiated—activities. Overplowing and changes in livestock grazing practices have been the two most devastating practices. The Great Leap Forward began a downward spiral in the health of Inner Mongolia’s grasslands. Unlike the Tarim Basin, the once great grasslands have not experienced any recovery in recent years. Chinese state policy has played an important role in the degradation of Inner Mongolian grasslands (Sneath 1998, 1147-1148; Williams 1996 and 2000; Longworth and Williamson; Zhang). In the 1950s, under the direction of the state, pastoralists in Inner Mongolia were collectivized and People’s Communes established. The Han Chinese preference for agriculture over pasture led to disastrous consequences in the Mao era (Williams 1996). The state initiated a campaign, especially feverish during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, to turn 30 Inner Mongolian grasslands into cropland (Williams 1996, 673). An estimated 21 percent of the total rangeland in IMAR was lost to agricultural production between 1953-1979 (Longworth and Williamson 305). The reform era state policies have been no kinder to grasslands. The People’s Communes were dissolved in the early 1980s and pastoralists gained ownership of livestock (Sneath 1998, 1148). By the end of the 1980s, pasture land had been divided into individual allocations and distributed among herding households (Ho 2000a, 242). The effect has been to confine Mongol herders to “their” 5 parcels of land and has virtually eliminated large-scale pastoral movement between seasonal pastures and increased the year-round grazing of livestock in specific areas (Sneath 1148). The end of nomadic herding has increased grazing pressure and damaged grasslands especially around rural settlements. Grasslands that were once a biologically diverse mix of perennial grasses, forbs and shrubs are now inhabited by low-producing annual grasses and weeds, or worse, sand (Majerus 2006). GRASSLANDS TO AGRICULTURAL LANDS Grasslands have continually fallen under the plow in the reform era (Figures 9 and 10). In 1994, new regulations were put in place by the central government which required all cropland lost to urban expansion and development to be offset with new cropland elsewhere (Majerus 2006). Fast-growing eastern coastal cities paid northern and inland provinces to plow up new cropland to meet the offset requirements. This new cropland was usually developed by plowing up native grasslands in sites that, in terms of soil quality and climate, were often marginal for crop production (Majerus 2006). This policy resulted in a 22 percent increase in cropland in Inner Mongolia alone (Majerus 2006).                                                          5 Pasture land in Inner Mongolia, like farmland in China “proper,” is owned by the state and leased to households. So technically the land is owned by the state, not by herders. 31 Figure 9: Plowing the Steppe Figure 10: Grassland to Farmland In these two photos Chinese farmers are shown plowing grasslands to make way for farmland. Huge swaths of Inner Mongolia’s native grasslands have come under the plow in the last century. Mao and reform era agricultural expansion has been particularly devastating to the grasslands. Source: Majerus 2006 32 Plowing native grasslands and replacing them with cropland is a major cause of desertification in Inner Mongolia. The fragile topsoil of the steppe has been degraded in large part due to the increase in agriculture. A tremendous amount of topsoil literally blows away in the wind. After crops are harvested in the fall cropland is extremely susceptible to wind erosion as the ground lays dormant through the harsh, windy winter and spring months. Scientists with the Institute of Desert Research in Lanzhou report soil losses in Inner Mongolia of between 109 and 642 tons/acre during the winter and spring months (Majerus 2006). Newly plowed grasslands are much more severely affected with up to 1,700 tons of topsoil lost for every acre plowed (Majerus 2006). From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, officials report a loss of 3,400 km 2 (2,112 sq miles) of grasslands every year (Williams 504). The best estimates are that only 32 percent of the total grassland area still exists in an undeteriorated condition (Williams 504). In a recent study of landscape change in western Inner Mongolia using remote sensing analysis, Hong Jiang (2006) found that the groundwater table has dropped by 2 to 3 meters since the 1980s, and mobile sand has expanded considerably. Indeed, the intensity and number of dust storms have increased steadily over the past 6 decades and at least one researcher has argued that Inner Mongolia is headed for “a dust bowl of historic dimensions” (Brown 2003). Whether or not that prediction will come to fruition is not clear, but Inner Mongolia undoubtedly has a very serious land degradation problem. Scientists have identified seven areas in China where deserts are expanding by 4 percent a year or more (U.S. Embassy). Of these seven, three are in Inner Mongolia. Central and southern IMAR has experienced the worst degradation (Figure 11). The expansion of the Gobi Desert has been particularly alarming. China's Environmental Protection Agency reports that the Gobi Desert expanded by 52,400 km 2 (20,240 sq miles) from 1994 to 1999 (Brown 2003). That is an area half the size of Pennsylvania. 33 Figure 11: Desertification in Inner Mongolia This figure shows the vegetation cover in Inner Mongolia. The orange color indicates land at risk for desertification while the dark orange indicates land that has already become desertified. Source: Zhang 2006 The increasing desertification combined with the high wind erosion rates for agricultural land has led to an increasing number of dust storms originating in Inner Mongolia. Beijing has always experienced dust storms in the spring when the prevailing west wind carries sand particles from the Gobi Desert to the city (U.S. Embassy). However, there has been a steady increase in the number and severity of dust storms (Zhang 47). According to the China Meteorological Administration, the number of “strong” sand and dust storms recorded grew from just 5 per year in the 1950s to 8 in the ‘60s, 13 in the ‘70s, 14 in the ‘80s and 23 in the ‘90s (U.S. Embassy). Yang Weixi, the chief engineer of China's Desertification Control Center reported that 40 sandstorms struck China between 2000 and 2004 (Blanchard). Meteorologists confirm that the 34 recent rash of dust storms has come not from historic desert areas but from recently desertified regions (U.S. Embassy). These sandstorms have become an international issue. In April 2002 one such storm swept across the Yellow Sea and into Korea causing schools to close, grounding air traffic and sending many people to health clinics with difficulty breathing (Figure 12; Brown). NASA reports dust from Inner Mongolia has made vistas hazy for visitors to Death Valley, California on at least one occasion (Figure 13; “Asian Dust Arrives”). Figure 12: Dust Over the Yellow Sea and Korean Peninsula This image, taken by a NASA satellite in April 2005, shows dust sweeping over the Yellow Sea on its way toward the Korean Peninsula. Dust from Inner Mongolia plagues the Korean Peninsula every April. Source: NASA <http://veimages.gsfc.nasa.gov/19963/YellowSea_TMO_2005110.jpg> 35 Figure 13: Dust Reaches the Western United States This satellite image shows Inner Mongolian dust as far away as the western United States. In the lower right hand corner of the image dust can be seen hovering above the Channel Islands and Southern California. Source: NASA <http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view_rec.php?id=1682> The overplowing that has resulted in land degradation in Inner Mongolia is a consequence of population growth. Inner Mongolia has seen a huge influx of Han Chinese settlers over the past century. The population of Inner Mongolia in 1912 was roughly 2.04 million, with a ratio of 1.3 Han to every Mongol (Ma 111). By 1990, the total population had risen to 21 million, with a ratio of six Han to every Mongol (Williams 1997a, 334). Today 23 million people live in IMAR, only 12 percent of whom are ethnic Mongols (Radio Free Asia). The Mao era saw the largest and fastest immigration. The population of Han Chinese migrants more than tripled between 1949 and 1982 from 5.2 to 16.3 million (Williams 1997a, 334). Williams argues that 36 “population pressure constitutes the general explanation for regional intensification of land degradation processes” (Williams 1997a, 334). The Chinese who moved to the region almost exclusively took up farming (Williams 1996). As such, much of the land degradation caused by agriculture and the increasing amount of grassland that came under the plow is a direct result of Han in migration. There is a popular perception among the Chinese and some of outside observers that overgrazing has been a chief cause of land degradation in Inner Mongolia (Williams 1996). Indeed stocking rates have jumped dramatically in recent decades. Since the Chinese Communists gained control of Inner Mongolia in 1947 livestock totals have risen by around 280 percent (Sneath 1148). The Chinese government has concluded that the region’s ecological problems stem from the high number of domestic animals. But a recent comprehensive scientific study has demonstrated that, in fact, this is not the case. The increase in pastureland-turned-cropland in formerly rich grasslands has been one factor. The second factor has been the steep decline in mobile grazing. Low-mobility grazing has put tremendous pressure on the thin topsoil of the Mongolian steppe (Sneath 1148). A Cambridge, UK-based research project, Environmental and Cultural Conservation in Inner Asia (ECCIA), found that the highest levels of land degradation were in districts with the lowest livestock mobility (Sneath 1148). It turns out, mobility indices are a better guide to reported degradation levels than livestock density. This pattern corresponded with the experience of local Mongol pastoralists (Sneath 1148). One of the many mistakes the Chinese government has made in their attempt to mitigate the environmental degradation of Inner Mongolia has been to implement policies that have fixed herders and their livestock in place rather than allow them graze nomadically. 37 Chapter 5: Policies to Mitigate Environmental Degradation in Inner Mongolia The state has a three-pronged approach to rehabilitating Inner Mongolian grasslands: making grazing more sustainable, closing certain degraded lands to grazing, and expanding environmental green belts (i.e. green corridors) mostly through tree planting campaigns. Noticeably absent from this agenda is reform of the agricultural practices which have caused desertification in Inner Mongolia. The overwhelming consensus among scientists and scholars is that the Chinese state’s attempt to mitigate the very serious environmental degradation in Inner Mongolia has been a failure. POST MAO ERA REFORMS IN GRAZING PRACTICES The environmental consequences of the Mao era were devastating for Inner Mongolia. A huge percentage of the native grassland was destroyed between 1949 and 1976. Beginning in the 1980s, but more especially in the 1990s, the Chinese central government became concerned about the state of rangelands in Inner Mongolia. Scientists and policymakers concluded that grassland degradation during the commune period was caused by a “tragedy of the commons” (Williams 1996; Zhang 44-45). Most of the rangeland regulation in Inner Mongolia has been heavily influenced by Garrett Hardin’s thesis that without private ownership or government regulation, pastoralists do not have incentives to practice sustainable animal husbandry. Unfortunately for ethnic Mongols and the Inner Mongolian grasslands, the tragedy of the commons model has been widely rejected by pastoral specialists (Sneath 1148). Furthermore, in the case of collectivized China, it has been argued that the “commons” model does not apply. The tragedy of the commons posits a conflict between private ownership of animals and unregulated communal rangeland, but under the People’s Communes both animals and rangeland were in the hands of the state and everyone depended on the Work Point system to earn a living (Zhang 45). Therefore, according to this viewpoint, there was no incentive to overgraze. However, in the 1980s, based on the faulty assumption that the cause of rangeland degradation in the Mao era was communal ownership, the 38 Chinese government attempted to institute pseudo private ownership of pasture (Zhang 45). Long-term use rights of Inner Mongolian rangeland were allocated to individual households in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ho 2000a, 242). As detailed in Part IV, nomadic herding has virtually ceased, while overstocking and land degradation have increased. A true tragedy of the commons has ensued since the advent of fencing regulations in Inner Mongolia. In order to combat the perceived problem of common ownership of rangelands, the Chinese government implemented regulations promoting the fencing of pastures leased to individual households. In the 1980s when the policy was first promulgated the government encouraged but did not require fencing. Erecting fences was (and continues to be) expensive and only very well-off families could afford to fence their pastures. Contrary to policy guidelines, residents graze their animals as sparingly as possible on enclosed land (Williams 1997, 775). Those households who can afford enough fencing to protect their pasture allotments have faced little pressure to alter their extensive grazing habits and so they keep livestock outside enclosures as long as forage is available on the wide, unenclosed range. These herders literally pick clean the grass of those too poor to fence, saving their own land for hay production or emergency grazing during winter and spring. As privately enclosed pastures have expanded since 1980, a minority of residents have increasingly diverted excessive number of livestock onto highly vulnerable, unfenced rangeland, thereby exacerbating wind and soil erosion processes across vast territories only to protect their own isolated pastures (Williams 1997, 775). In this way, the poorest residents are made to bear the brunt of ecosystem decline. By 1997 it was clear that the fencing of rangeland was a failed policy (Williams). A decade later Zhang reports the situation has changed little (84). The only modification of the policy has been to require, rather than just to encourage fencing. This has hardly helped and in fact the income gap between poor and well-off herders has grown (Zhang 81). Fencing costs 7 RMB (just over $1) per meter, which is prohibitively expensive for most herders (Zhang 84). In 2000, the per capita annual net income of herders in IMAR was a meager US $241 (Zhou and 39 Byrne 124). As a result of the requirement to fence, most families use cheap materials and poor construction and usually cannot prevent free grazing on their land as the upkeep of fences in minimal and vandalism is common (Zhang 84; Williams 1997b). Furthermore, even well-built fences suffer encroachment and break-ins when fence lines are long because there is no efficient way to monitor the length of the enclosures (Zhang 84). Recently local governments have attempted to address this problem with padlocks. A researcher from the USDA reported seeing up to 8 padlocks on some fenced pastures (Majerus 2006). Whether fences perform their function effectively or not, the fencing policy has not halted land degradation. In Shilingol 6 League, 7 a large prefecture in central Inner Mongolia that in the past was dominated by the Shilingol grasslands, the percentage of degraded rangeland rose from 48 percent in 1984 to 64 percent in 2000. Vegetation coverage decreased from 35.5 to 27 percent and average vegetation height declined from 41 to 26 cm (Zhang 81). All this despite, or perhaps because of the government’s fencing policy. The long-term land use leases coupled with the fencing policy is part of a larger move on the part of the Chinese government to “sedentize” nomadic Mongols. However, confining animals that previously grazed without restriction has had unintended consequences. The sedentarization of nomads has led to a rapid decline of nomadic pastoralism and has concentrated land degradation around settlements. In addition to land degradation, some herders have complained of the declining quality of their animals’ wool. For example, on the Ordos Plateau of south-central Inner Mongolia herders-turned-fodder-feeders complain that the quality of wool from their cashmere goats has declined since they have been barred from grazing, confined to pens and fed fodder (Majerus 2006). The respected specialist of Chinese rangeland law Peter Ho                                                          6 Also spelled Xilin Gol 7 In areas with a large Mongol populations the names of administrative units reflect the Mongol administrative tradition. A league is equivalent to a prefecture and banner to county. Uradyn E. Bulag has a fascinating discussion of this issue and others. See “Municipalization and Ethnopolitics in Inner Mongolia” in Mongols From Country to City: Floating Boundaries, Pastoralism and City Life in the Mongol Lands edited by Ole Bruun and Li Narangoa. 40 (2000) argues that in the Chinese political context, nomadic pastoralism cannot coexist with the pasture contract system and the former is vanishing under the pressure of the latter's dogmas. The “Close Rangeland and Resettle Pastoralists” program is another outgrowth of this agenda. The government believes that letting the range rest is the best way to avert possible “ecological crisis” (Zhang 49). Like the pseudo privatization of pasture land and the fencing regulations, this program is meant to mitigate the environmental degradation of the grasslands on the Mongolian steppe in Inner Mongolia. This policy has gone even further than the other two in the sedentarization of nomads. The “Close Rangeland and Resettle Pastoralists” program is one of the largest of the state’s programs to reverse the trend of deteriorating grasslands. Thousands of hectares of grassland have been cleared of herders and their animals (Majerus 2006). Under the program many pastoralists have been moved out of severely desertified areas and organized into villages whose main livelihood is cow milk production. The state calls them “ecological immigrants.” Each family is provided with a small house and up to two milking cows (Majerus 2006). They have the option of purchasing up to three more cows using loans provided by the government (Zhang 73-74). The villages are provided with a communal milking facility. They are supposed to also be provided with communal grassland for grazing and haying but in reality they rarely have access to these pastures (Majerus 2006; Zhang 76). The Chinese government itself purchases the milk and trucks it to distribution and processing centers (Majerus 2006). In an attempt to support these small dairies, a countrywide “Drink Milk” campaign was launched at the insistence of the government (Majerus 2006). However, in a study of two “milk cow villages” Zhang Qian (2006) discovered that the ecological immigrants are worse off than before. Their lives are much more precarious than when they were pastoralists because they are now vulnerable to market influences on the price of milk and fodder. They must purchase fodder to feed their cows because they are often barred from grazing the rangelands (76). Villagers report that they are poorer than before. They complain that one or two cows cannot support a 41 family and that they cannot afford the loans that would enable them to purchase more cows (77). Many families are now forced to send men to urban areas to work as migrant laborers. The implementation of measures such as the closure of certain grasslands and resettlement of pastoralists have not been free of skepticism, both on social and ecological grounds. Many scientists and scholars argue that these policies have diminished the quality of life of resettled Mongols (Jiang 2006, Williams 1996; Zhang 2006, Tàbara, et al. 2008). In addition to the increased financial burden many ecological immigrants face, there are the harder to quantify emotional effects of being forced out of herding. For many of these Mongols, herding has been the dominant livelihood of their families for generations and they feel deep resentment toward the Chinese government for being forced to abandon it (Williams 1996; Zhang 73-77). The Chinese government has not been particularly successful in securing Mongol compliance to regulations intended to mitigate environmental degradation and rehabilitate grasslands. A number of investigators have pointed to the Mongol experience during the Mao years as one explanation for the low levels of compliance (Williams 1997a, Ho 2000b, Zhang 2006). They argue that because of the failure Mao era large-scale land use policies, the Mongols have little faith that the current programs will be any more successful. Clearly, another reason for low compliance is the distastefulness of many of the reform era polices. Being forced out of herding has embittered many Mongols toward Chinese government officials and scientists. Their lives have often not improved and in many cases they have become more vulnerable because of these policies. The government has implemented stocking rates regulations to limit the number of animals each household is allowed. Mongols routinely stock more animals than dictated by the regulations (Zhang 85). Because of declining incomes, most households prefer to take the risk of having more animals than the regulations allow (Zhang 85). During inspections, violators conceal their over-quota animals. Mongols also regularly ignore policies which forbid grazing in certain areas. Ma and Fan argue that grazing prohibitions have often been carried out at the expense of 42 pastoralists (134). As a result, many pastoralists herd animals on land where grazing has been forbidden whenever possible (Zhang 86; Williams 1997a). Often these rule-breakers graze their animals at night in order to evade authorities. Rich households with better transportation can afford to take their animals to graze illegally in neighboring banners (Zhang 86). Because there is not a sufficiently strong mandate from the central government to reverse grassland degradation in Inner Mongolia, considerable corruption has arisen with regard to grazing in restricted areas. Violators with enough disposable income can easily buy off enforcers. In this way defiance to grazing bans has become institutionalized. Mongols have little incentive to comply with stocking rates or restrictive grazing policies. Unlike the situation in the Tarim Basin, local herders have not been consulted in the process of writing grazing regulations and do not feel like they have a stake in the rules. By involving water users in the process of drafting regulations in Xinjiang, the levels of compliance to water restriction regulations is very high in the Tarim Basin. In contrast, Inner Mongolian herders have rarely if ever been consulted and compliance levels are much lower. As a result, the efficiency of the new regulatory institutions has been much lower. Another reason for low compliance is that Mongols are skeptical that the Chinese government’s strategies for mitigating grassland degradation are effective. These are a couple of the important reasons why the rehabilitation of the rangeland has been a failure in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese government has not attempted to incorporate indigenous resource management knowledge and techniques into programs to combat environmental degradation in Inner Mongolia. This has been an oversight on the part of policymakers. Many researchers (including a handful of Chinese) have noted the value of indigenous knowledge for sustainable resource management (Williams 1996; Zhang 2006; Longworth and Williamson 1993). Mongol traditional grazing practices are more environmentally friendly than the Han “scientific” methods. No one is romanticizing indigenous Mongol grazing practices, it is simply the case that Han Chinese state management of Inner Mongolian rangeland has been at best neutral and at worst an 43 unmitigated failure. Mongol management on the other hand has been more sustainable. The best examples of sustainable use of pasturelands in recent years have been when Mongol herders have taken it upon themselves to take down fences and use the land jointly. Zhang Qian reports that groups of households in a handful of northern banners who, seeing the degradation trend in their contracted rangelands, took it upon themselves to initiate new arrangements for rangeland use (92). They dismantled fences, redivided the rangeland into separate seasonal pastures, and began to move their herds jointly (92). Zhang argues that this pasture sharing arrangement had a positive affect on the local environment and communities. This rotating use of pastureland is more sustainable and because the animals are jointly managed overgrazing is curtailed (93). Furthermore, Zhang argues that this land and labor sharing deal has a positive impact on the wealth gap since the economy of scale brings down prices for the group as a whole. Also, of course, there are no fence upkeep costs and the animals of both the rich and the poor have equal access to the pastures. Furthermore, Zhang argues, the quality of the rangeland is better under this arrangement than in the prior, pseudo privatized scheme (93). It is not clear if this arrangement could be implemented for the whole of Inner Mongolia. Probably it could not be because land degradation has already advanced to such a serious degree. Nevertheless, these cases demonstrate that bottom-up regulation has far better prospects for sustainability than the top-down “scientific” initiatives ordered by the state. REHABILITATION OF NON-GRAZING LANDS In order to combat the ever more frequent and severe dust storms, the Chinese government has initiated a huge tree planting project in Inner Mongolia. The largest initiative is the so called “grain for green” project, also known as “Returning Farmland to Forestry.” This is a misleading title since prior to being turned to farmland by migrant Han Chinese farmers the land was not covered by forests, but by native grasses and forbs. The preoccupation with planting trees is likely one of many reasons why the “grain for green” campaign has so far been a failure. 44 From the outside, the Chinese government seems to be committed to reversing desertification in Inner Mongolia. In 1981, the country's top legislative body, the National People's Congress (NPC), passed a resolution to make it the duty of all citizens above the age of 11 to plant trees annually (“20% of Land Green-Covered by 2010”). Ten years ago China stopped cutting down natural forests, 8 which the National Greening Committee claims has helped to preserve 95.33 million hectares (235.5 million acres) of forests (“20% of Land Green-Covered by 2010”). And yet, in any given year, less than 40 percent of the newly planted trees and shrubs survive (Jiang 1917). In some places the success rate is as low as 25 percent (Jiang 1917). The State Forestry Administration (SFA) claims to have planted 24 million hectares of forests across China, resulting in protection of 60 per cent of cultivated land (Levin 13). Since 2001, the authorities have promised to release program evaluation data through foreign agencies; to date, however, none have been made public. This is because the data apparently does not yet exist (Levin 13). In 1995 the SFA approached GTZ, an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development, to use remote sensing data and on-ground verification surveys to evaluate the tree-planting data. However, over a decade later, the SFA has yet to hand over basic data such as tree survival rates to GTZ (Levin, 13). More seriously, the science that underpins the tree planting initiative has numerous problems. Hong Jiang argues that the campaign is not based on a realistic appraisal of how many trees the dry landscape can support and how much water is available for irrigation (1910). According to Jiang, the government has over-estimated the capacity of the landscape. Consistent with this argument, tree seedlings have a high failure rate (Jiang 1910). Evidence from the ADAM (Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy 2006-2009) fieldtrip suggests that in many cases trees are dying because they have been planted too close together (Tàbara, et al.. 4). Even more disturbing, the ADAM scientists discovered that in some                                                          8 While this ban has preserved some of China’s last remaining forests, it has meant sharply accelerated rates of logging in Southeast Asia to quench the Chinese demand for lumber. The environmental impact has simply been exported. 45 cases the wrong species of tree had been planted. Instead of hardy, drought-tolerant species, tree species with high water requirements were planted (Tàbara, et al.. 4). In most cases, the newly planted trees cannot survive without supplemental irrigation (Majerus 2006). On the edge of the Gobi Desert pole plantings of cottonwood and willows are being used to stabilize dunes (Figure 14). Three meter long saplings are driven one meter into the sand and periodically watered through the growing season (Majerus 2006). A group of European researchers visited Inner Mongolia in 2007 and local government officials and scientists escorted them to a “successful” demonstration forest where they were told that desert expansion had been reversed. However, the European scientists reported that even here, in a place clearly viewed as a successful anti- desertification initiative, there were dying trees (Tàbara, et al.. 4). Zhang Qian argues the government’s tree planting polices are not sustainable (83). Hong Jiang notes that some areas where tree planting campaigns have been conducted have seen worsening degradation (1910). 46 Figure 14: Tree Planting on the Edge of the Gobi Desert On the edge of the Gobi Desert in Inner Mongolia the Chinese government has initiated tree planting campaigns. Here newly planted cottonwood and willow saplings are being watered by hand in the arid region. Source: Majerus 2006 There are two main problems with the tree planting campaigns. First, trees are not native to much of the degraded land. The annual rainfall is less than 300 mm (11.8 inches). Because these trees cannot get enough water from the atmosphere to survive, they will utilize groundwater if it can be accessed. The second major problem is that these trees do not provide as effective a shield against sandstorms as previously thought. Observations in early spring demonstrate that just as much sand moves around during serious sandstorms as did before the trees were planted (Zhang 83). This one of many reasons why the “grain for green” initiative has failed—it has been far too preoccupied with planting trees rather than concentrating on native perennial grasses, forbs and shrubs. In the past, prior to degradation, the grasses of the Mongolian steppe grew much taller above ground than they do today, but more importantly, their root systems extended 47 much deeper into the soil than today (Majerus 2006). These deep, intricate root systems held the soil in place far more effectively than the trees that have been planted over the course of last 15 years. Lack of commitment by the central government has been a major reason for the failure of the environmental rehabilitation in Inner Mongolia. They have been content to stick with failing policies since the 1980s, sugar coating the “achievements” and downplaying the setbacks. Local governments themselves flout the “Return Farmland to Forestry” policy. Zhang Qian has documented cases where useable rangeland was integrated into the program at the behest of local officials so they could enrich themselves with program funds (87). Williams has documented numerous abuses and unscientific practices on the part of state-sponsored scientists supposedly investigating grassland rehabilitation in Inner Mongolia, including using government funds to buy livestock cheaply in rural villages and then selling it at higher prices in cities for personal profit (2003, 511). Based on my own experience, the number and quality of scientific articles published in English by Chinese scientists on land degradation in Inner Mongolia is low. Many more high quality scientific articles have been published by Chinese scientists about the Tarim Basin. I am not arguing that the Chinese government does not want to see Inner Mongolian grasslands rehabilitated, but they do not seem to be as committed to it as they are to the rehabilitation of the Tarim River Basin. The majority of the environmental rehabilitation projects in Inner Mongolia disproportionately target Mongol herders (Zhang 72), but they are ineffective and often counterproductive. So while the main benefactors of the Tarim River restoration are overwhelmingly Uyghur, the poorly designed environmental policies in Inner Mongolia actually disadvantage Mongols over Han Chinese. Institutions and regulations for Inner Mongolian pastoral areas have been implemented in an almost exclusively top-down fashion, not only in the Mao era but in the reform era as well. These top-down policies have failed to take advantage of 48 the internal ethnic institutions, specific socio-economic realities, and the ecological conditions in Inner Mongolia. Policies such as returning farmland to forestry, prohibition of grazing, and resettlement of farmers have been the primary principles for regulating land degeneration in desertified areas. But these strategies have not improved the quality of degraded land, much less of the lives of the people who inhabit it and in some cases have exacerbated the environmental problems. The Chinese government has thrown a lot of money at this problem. In 2001, the government pledged RMB 4.7 billion (US $569 million) over ten years (U.S. Embassy). Despite this, the consensus among scientists, sociologists and investigators is that the government response to these problems has been a failure. As Williams points out, “Although the current regime may have devoted more money and bureaucratic attention to the problem of desert expansion than previous governments, it does not necessarily follow that it has intensified efforts on the ground to control desert expansion in meaningful ways” (1997a, 345). Even though the government would like to see environmental degradation remedied, the policies enacted to deal with it have often resulted in outcomes opposite of what was originally intended, leading to increased environmental degradation and the marginalization of pastoral communities (Zhang 96). Indeed, the government’s approach to land degradation is inconsistent with the ecology of the Inner Mongolian drylands. Consequently, it has led to unintended grassland degradation, thus undermined environmental sustainability (Jiang 1907). According to one investigator, the government’s initiatives in Inner Mongolia have been an “astounding failure” (Jiang 1917). WHY DOES THE STATE PERSIST WITH FAILED POLICIES IN INNER MONGOLIA? The government has pursued fencing of rangeland and tree planting campaigns for two decades. Neither strategy has reversed grassland degradation in Inner Mongolia. An important issue then is why the government continues to encourage these policies. My main argument is the potential for separatist leanings among Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang has spurred the government 49 into action to mitigate environmental degradation in the Tarim River Basin, while the fact that there is little threat of a similar separatist movement among Mongols has led the state to be less diligent in addressing environmental destruction of the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. But there are at least two other factors that I believe contribute to complacency on the part of the state in addressing grassland degradation. First, the Chinese government does not seem to take the Mongols very seriously. This has translated into a discourse among scientists and officials which paints the Mongols as ignorant and backward and blames Mongols for environmental destruction. A second factor seems to be the Han Chinese preference for agriculture over pastoralism. There is a long standing derogatory perspective among Han Chinese officials that tends to view ethnic minority peoples as ignorant and backward (Williams 2000). Much of the discourse paints minorities as childlike and in need of assistance for their big brothers, the Han (Gladney 2004). D.M. Williams (2000) argues there is a widespread discourse among Chinese officials and many scientists which blames the Mongols for grassland degradation. This official discourse views the Mongols as “ignorant, irrational, backwards and uncooperative” (Williams 2000, 508). Often the supposed “lower level of culture” among Mongols is portrayed as the cause for the declining quality and presence of grasslands. Mongol pastoralists are often seen as lazy. An official report listed “maladaptive thinking” and “lack of initiative” as two of the greatest hindrances to development of Mongols in one banner in Inner Mongolia (Williams 1997s 337). The government land use policies, especially fencing and resettlement, seek to manage and contain the perceived destructiveness of Mongol pastoralists. Another possible explanation for the state’s persistent pursuit of failed land use policies in Inner Mongolia is the Chinese preference for agriculture over pastoralism. This preference grows out the Han spatial identity which values intensive spatial regimentation (Williams 1996). Wall building has long been an important aspect of Chinese civilization. The great agricultural plain of North China has been meticulously partitioned, controlled and shaped down to the last square meter. Agriculture is highly valued from the Han spatial perspective, while pasturelands 50 are of little value. Williams argues Chinese leaders view agricultural lands as “civilized” and the pastoral economy as “primitive” (1996, 672). Increases in the amount of grasslands giving way to the plow during the Mao era and afterward reinforces this view. In addition to the Han Chinese preference for agriculture and settlement, it seems that the imperatives of a modern nation-state do not sit comfortably with nomadic pastoralism. The Chinese state’s desire to sedintize Mongol herders in Inner Mongolia seems not only to be born out of the Han Chinese preference for agricultural over pastoralism, but also due in part to the demands of a modern nation-state. Pastoral nomadism frustrates the modern nation- state’s preference for clearly delineated space and fixed populations. It is not only the PRC that had enacted initiatives to settle Mongol pastoralists and turn them into agriculturalists or at least only part-time pastoralists. The Republican government under the direction of the GMD, the Soviet Union, as well as the administrators of the late Qing empire 9 all sought to settle nomadic Mongol pastoralists. (Sneath 1998; Millward 2007). The fencing policies, closure of grasslands, and settlement of pastoralists seems to derive in part from the discourse among government officials and scientists that blames Mongols for degrading the grasslands and the Han Chinese and modern nation-state preference for agriculture and clearly delineated spaces. The tree planting campaigns are more difficult to explain. The persistent use of this tactic may have something to do with the post-reform era (over)emphasis on science. Aerial seeding began in 1979 and has long been held up as an example of the power of science to solve environmental problems (Williams 1997a). It is also possible that some very important cadre in the CCP advocated for the tree planting campaign and that for this reason it remains too a politically sensitive of a subject for today’s policymakers to revisit. However,                                                          9 Although the Qing empire does not fall under the category of modern nation-state per se, in the late Qing the imperative to function more like a nation-state was ever more powerful and certain policies strongly resembled those enacted by modern nation-states, including agricultural policies in present-day Inner Mongolia. See chapter 3 in Justin Tighe’s Coustructing Suiyuan and Millward 2007. 51 whether or not this is the case and who might be behind the persistence of the tree planting campaign is mostly speculation. D.M. Williams argues that the central government is not truly committed to addressing Inner Mongolian grassland degradation and so has not implemented policies to adequately tackle the problem. With dust storms plaguing Beijing every spring it is hard to imagine that the government would not be fully committed to addressing grassland degradation, but this does seem to be the case. In a five year period the government spent over twice as much on the rehabilitation of the Tarim River than they have in ten years on mitigating Inner Mongolian desertification (RMB 10.7 versus 4.7 billion). It would seem that the comparative disregard the government has shown for Mongols and the continued pursuit of failed policies in Inner Mongolia are in line with my main argument. If Mongols posed a serious separatist threat to the Chinese state that would possibly override the numerous imperatives keeping the state from seriously attend to grassland degradation in Inner Mongolia. 52 Chapter 6: The State Response to Environmental Degradation and Its Relationship with Ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Mongols in Inner Mongolia UYGHURS From the Chinese central government’s perspective, Xinjiang is made up of two broad regions—Nanjiang (southern Xinjiang) and Beijiang (northern Xinjiang) divided by the Tianshan mountain range (Figure 15). By the early 1990s Beijiang was seen as fairly closely tied to the rest of China. Most of the Han immigrants to Xinjiang during the Mao years settled in the north. Ürümqi, the heavily Han-dominated capital, is in Beijiang. The north is also where the majority of the autonomous region’s rail and road links are located. Nanjiang, on the other hand, has only scarcely been penetrated by Han Chinese—95 percent of the population of this region is non-Han (Becquelin 2004, 372). Kashgar and the western Tarim Basin were not linked to the national rail network until 1999 (Millward 297). Standards of living in southern Xinjiang are much lower than in the north and, importantly, this region has been much more prone to ethnic unrest than Beijiang (Becquelin 2000, 68). Nanjiang has been the heart of the Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule since 1900. Both the first and the second East Turkestan Republic enjoyed their strongest support in the south. Although these republics were short lived neither Uyghurs nor the Chinese central government have forgotten them. 53 Figure 15: Northern and Southern Xinjiang This map shows the division of Xinjiang into Beijiang (the north) and Nanjiang (the south). The Tarim Basin is in Nanjiang. Almost 90 percent of the population of southern Xinjiang is Uyghur. Han Chinese make up less than 5 percent of the population there. Source: Becquelin 2000 The Tarim Basin is firmly situated in Nanjiang. Because this region has been more problematic to Beijing than Beijiang, the stakes are higher here for any policy implementation. Rehabilitating the Tarim River is an important priority for Beijing for two interconnected reasons. First, the ecological disaster that the river had become by the 1990s was in large part due to the irrigation practices of upstream farmers, many of who were Han immigrants from central China working for the Bingtuan or Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). So Beijing 54 hoped that rectifying this environmental degradation would erase any resentment Uyghur farmers had over the perceived Han destruction of their environment. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Tarim River was singled out for rehabilitation because the central government believes that raising the living standards of dissatisfied ethnic minorities is the best strategy for stamping out unrest. The Chinese government has embraced the notion that environmental degradation in the Tarim River Basin and the living standards of its inhabitants are directly correlated. The Chinese government has been very deliberate in tying environmental reconstruction of the Tarim River to rising incomes and living standards of the farmers who make a living along its banks. The strategies of both the HELP and World Bank programs have made material improvement in the lives of Tarim farmers a priority. Indeed, as explained above, this is paying off. Uyghurs make up the vast majority of farmers in the Tarim Basin. Some 85 percent of people in Tarim Basin are Uyghurs while less than 5 percent are Han (Hui and Mongols are also present in the Tarim Basin; ICR 49). The World Bank report on the Tarim Basin II project explicitly states that Uyghur farmers benefited greatly from the improvements to infrastructure as well as the management, administration and regulations that the project engendered (6; 35; 49). The report explains, “almost 90 percent of the project beneficiaries belonged to minority nationalities” (35). Two groups of people conduct most of the farming in the Tarim Basin: indigenous Uyghurs and Han Chinese in the XPCC. The Bingtuan farms are mostly in the upstream region and clustered around reservoirs where water is abundant. The majority of Uyghurs are settled in the downstream area (Radio Free Asia). The highest quality water is in the Tarim’s tributaries and in the upstream area near where the Hotan and Aksu Rivers flow into the Tarim. Here water is plentiful and relatively clean, but the farming practices of the upstream farmers reduce runoff and increase salinity. Historically, the Uyghurs have bore the brunt of worsening water quality and supply caused largely by the Han Chinese who populate the XPCC farms. 55 The Xinjiang PCC is one of Beijing’s most strategically important institutions. Liu Shaoqi, then a top leader in the Politburo, was behind the creation of the Bingtuan in the early 1950s. Inspired by the Qing civilian and penal colonies and military farms of the tuntian system, Liu suggested settling demobilized People’s Liberation Army and Guomindang soldiers in large farms along the Inner Mongolian and Xinjiang frontiers in order to enhance border security (Millward 251). The PCC no long exists in Inner Mongolia but remains an important institution in Xinjiang. During the Mao years the Bingtuan promoted land reclamation and permanent settlement along the border. The population of the Bingtuan in Xinjiang grew rapidly during this period expanding from 200,000 to 300,000 between 1954 and 1957, and on the eve of the Cultural Revolution Bingtuan members numbered between 500,000 and 600,000 (Millward 253). By 1974, members reached 2.26 million, or one-fifth of the total population and two-fifth of the Han population of Xinjiang (Bovingdon 27). The Mao era increase in the agricultural land under cultivation in Xinjiang was led in large part by the XPCC. Cotton was a popular crop on Bingtuan farms. Gardner Bovingdon argues that the influx of Han during the Mao years, many of whom settled on XPCC farms, caused resentment among the Uyghur population of the region (19). The influx during the Great Leap Forward famine coupled with the resentment of Great Leap policies drove over 60,000 Uyghurs and Qazaqs to flee across the border into the Soviet Union in 1962 (Bovingdon 20). The Bingtuan was disbanded in 1975 but by 1981 it was being reassembled (Shichor 125). In 2001 it had almost returned to its former size with 2.2 million members, 88.3 percent (1.9 million) of whom were Han (Bovingdon 27). Today Bingtuan members number 2.48 million and make up over 35 percent of the total Han population of Xinjiang (Becquelin 366). It manages 174 agricultural and animal husbandry regiment farms and 427 industrial, transport and commercial enterprises (Becquelin 367). Yet, information on the secretive organization is hard to come by and there is disagreement among scholars as to the exact mission of the Bingtuan. Yitzhak Shichor (2004) contends that even though it is comprised of “demobilized soldiers who are at the 56 same time reserve officers organized according to military structures and designated with military ranks” it is not a military organization and is in no way affiliated with the PLA (125). Michael Clarke (2007) calls the Bingtuan a “quasi-military organization” (335). Finally, Nicolas Becquelin (2004) sees the XPCC as a “powerful colonizing force” and argues that its mission is to protect the Chinese state from internal “ethno-nationalist unrest” (366-367). Most of the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang remains concentrated in the east and north, while Uyghurs predominated in the south and southwest, but the Bingtuan has established a foothold throughout the region (Millward 253). According to Millward and Tursun (2004) the significance of the Bingtuan derives in large part from the enclaves of Han settlement it created around the Tarim Basin because “these new settlements brought sizeable numbers of Chinese settlers to the southern oases for the first time in history” (90). Beijing arguably has a vested interest in keeping the peace between the Han Chinese farmers, demobilized soldiers, convicts and others who make up the XPCC and the Uyghur farmers in the region. Reconstruction of the Tarim River Basin may be considered one way to accomplish that goal. One of the primary reasons the central government has seriously invested in environmental reconstruction of the Tarim River has been to defuse potential Uyghur unrest and separatism. Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s tentative moves to raise living standards in the early 1980s, the Chinese government’s main strategy for consolidating its hold on power has been to encourage polices that increase the incomes of the Chinese people. The environmental reconstruction of the Tarim River Basin in Xinjiang during the 2000s decade is directly in line with this strategy. Because the group that has suffered the most detrimental effects from diminished water quality and supply from the Tarim River has been Uyghurs, environmental reconstruction is important not only because it aims to raise the incomes and living standards of the Uyghur farmers, but also because it further aims to lessen the potential for ethnic unrest. Mao era polices in Xinjiang were very repressive. The reform period (1978- present) initially ushered in less oppressive policies. From 1978 until around 1989 there was greater 57 latitude for Uyghurs (“Practicing Islam” 6-7). However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent emergence of Central Asian states caused Beijing to reconsider its comparatively lax policies in Xinjiang (Moneyhon 498). The fall of the Soviet Union was not the only event that led the central government to remake its Xinjiang policy. The specter of Uyghur separatism had (re)emerged a few years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1985, several thousand Uyghur students at Xinjiang University boycotted classes and marched in the streets of Ürümqi to protest the removal of the chairman of the XUAR government (Bovingdon 7). Especially unsettling for Beijing were the chosen slogans of the students: “Hans out of Xinjiang” and “Independence, Freedom, and Sovereignty for Xinjiang” (7). In December 1988, Uyghur students in Beijing protested inequality between Hans and Uyghurs in Xinjiang and demanded true autonomy for the region (Dillon 2004). The Baren uprising in April 1990 called for the overthrow of communism (Bovingdon 8). It took three days for security forces to put down the uprising and resulted in 30 deaths (Becquelin 2000, 69). Through the 1990s there were a number of demonstrations, protests and clashes with police in Xinjiang, including very notable ones in Ili and Khotan (Bovingdon 8; Starr 317). Eventually Beijing concluded that the best way to combat separatism in Xinjiang was to raise the incomes and living standards of Uyghurs (“Economic Improvement”). Separatism in China proper has not been a problem for the PRC, but raising the incomes of Han Chinese, beginning in eastern coastal provinces, in order to combat dissatisfaction and shore up support from the population has been a very important and successful policy in the reform era. Beijing is hoping the same policy will work among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This is why rehabilitation of the Tarim has been so important. It simultaneously rectified discontent over inequitable water distribution between the Han-dominated XPCC and Uyghur farmers, and has served to significantly raise the incomes of Uyghurs famers. Farm incomes in the Tarim Basin rose 29 percent in the first half of the 2000s, and income growth was even more dramatic for the poorest farmers, rising almost 50 percent (“United Nations”). 58 Beijing takes Uyghur separatism extremely seriously. Becquelin reports that the Politburo’s Standing Committee issued a confidential document in 1996 stating, “the main dangers threatening the stability of Xinjiang are ethnic separatism and illegal religious movements” (2000, 79). Moneyhon argues the central government “recognizes separatists in Xinjiang as China’s most serious internal security threat” (499-500). As early as 1996 top officials were making the connection between material gain and separatism. Liu Mingzu, the party secretary of Inner Mongolia at the time argued separatist movements gnawing away at Chinese control in ethnic border regions could only be silenced by an increase in material wealth among local populations (“Economic Improvement”). In an article published in Qiu Shi (Seeking Truth) magazine Liu wrote, “Only a strong economy and improved material and cultural living standards can show the advantages of socialism…and promote the unification of all peoples towards the Communist Party” (“Economic Improvement”). Three years later a massive development program was initiated in western China. China’s “Great Western Development” (xibu da kaifang) program was launched in 1999. The fact that Beijing’s recognition that something needed to be done to address the environmental degradation of the Tarim River coincided with the Great Western Development was not a coincidence. Moneyhon argues the Chinese central government launched the Great Western Development program specifically to combat separatist rumblings in Tibet and Xinjiang (492). The comprehensive rehabilitation of the Tarim River is one of the two most critical projects of the Western Development program 10 (Becquelin 2004, 366). The Tarim River had become so degraded that many farmers (over 90 percent of whom are Uyghurs) could only eke out the most difficult of lives. As the Yale lecturer Kahar Barat said, “with the annual income here, you cannot feed a guinea pig” (“Practicing Islam” 25). From Beijing’s perspective, this situation had the potential for unrest written all over it, not to mention the potential for enormous improvement.                                                          10 The other is the east-to-west natural gas pipeline stretching from Lunnan in the Tarim Basin to Shanghai—a total of 4,200 km. 59 Rehabilitating the river has meant rising incomes and standards of living, which Beijing believes dampens separatist leanings. Furthermore, the degradation of the environment in what Uyghurs see as their homeland had hardly endeared the Han Chinese to them. Jonathan Lipman reported that the Uyghurs who he has talked with expressed concern that the Chinese have the power to destroy the environment of Xinjiang, an environment that the Uyghurs see as theirs (“Practicing Islam” 26). In an interview about the water releases into the lower Tarim River, Liu Ning, the chief engineer of Xinjiang’s Ministry of Water Resources went out of his way to point out the human benefit of the releases saying, if the green corridor can be revitalized the lower Tarim “will once again become a promising land for the people of Xinjiang” (“Quenching Thirst”). Beijing believes that rehabilitating the Tarim River will reflect very well on the central government. By remedying environmental degradation, caused in no small part by the Han farmers in the XPCC, Beijing can, in effect, score points with local Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin and southern Xinjiang in particular but also in Xinjiang as a whole. MONGOLS It may be going too far given the social and political repression that accompanies such a dubious designation, but in a way it is unfortunate for ethnic Mongols in Inner Mongolia that Beijing does not view them as posing a separatist threat. If they did, then the environmental rehabilitation of Inner Mongolia’s severely degraded grasslands would likely have been much more serious and successful. As it is, however, the state’s efforts to mitigate land degradation in Inner Mongolia have been a failure. The grasslands have not been the only victim of this failure, but the peoples who inhabit them have also been negatively affected. The Mongols of the Inner Mongolian grasslands have not only seen further degradation of the environment to which they feel a deep, historic tie, but many have experienced worsening standards of living as a result of the state’s failed attempts at environmental rehabilitation. This is in striking contrast to the 60 Uyghurs of the Tarim Basin. The difference may largely be attributed to Beijing’s concern over the potential separatist leanings of Tarim Basin Uyghurs and their lack of concern over unrest among Mongols in Inner Mongolia. An important reason for Beijing’s low level of concern about Mongol separatism is the demographic advantage the Han Chinese enjoy in this autonomous region. Whereas in Xinjiang the majority of the population is Uyghur, in Inner Mongolia, Mongols are far outnumbered by Han Chinese. Han migration into border regions populated by ethnic minorities has long been a key strategy of domination by the Chinese state. Over a century of Guomindang and PRC employment of this strategy has resulted in a population ratio skewed in favor of the government as Mongols make up only 12 percent of the total population (Radio Free Asia). Perhaps more importantly, Mongols have not demonstrated the separatist tenacity of the Uyghurs. The government reported only a handful of “separatist activities” in Inner Mongolia between 1981 and 1993 (Liao). Dru Gladney argues that most of these incidents were very small and had almost certainly been trumped up by the Chinese government in a bid to promote Han unity (1996). D.M. Williams has studied and written about Mongols in Inner Mongolia for almost two decades. He has described a deep distrust and dislike between Han Chinese and Mongols, but has not encountered separatist aspirations or activities among the Mongols of IMAR. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s political prisoner database records that in the past five years only 11 Mongols have been detained, seven of whom were sentenced to jail time. However, it is believed that China has is holding hundreds of Uyghur political prisoners. Amnesty International reports that between 1997 and 2006 over 200 Uyghur “separatists” were executed. There are no reports of any Mongols being executed for separatism in the past two decades. Mongol separatism is a nonissue for the Chinese leadership in Beijing. Thus, with regard to ethnic unrest, the stakes do not appear to be as high in Inner Mongolia as they are in Xinjiang. Raising the living standards of Uyghurs has been a major goal of the government’s efforts to address environmental degradation in the Tarim Basin. However, in Inner Mongolia, the 61 living standards of Mongols have taken a back seat to state-initiated ecological rehabilitation projects. Inner Mongolia has one of the lowest per capital GDPs in the country (Sachs, et al.. 51). Per capita annual net income of pastoralists is about $241, while for urban residents in IMAR it is about $574 (Zhou and Byrne 124). More than six percent—1.6 million people—of households are without electricity (Zhou and Byrne 124). Furthermore, the deterioration of the grassland environment in Inner Mongolia has often led to a negative impact on the pastoral economy, reduced the income and lowered the living standards of many Mongols. The state policies aimed at mitigating environmental degradation in IMAR have backfired in many cases. Many Mongol “ecological immigrants” have been forced out of their traditional pastoral lifestyles and turned into sedentary and marginal dairy farmers. The fencing policy has also exacerbated the wealth gap between rich and poor herders. So rather than improving environmental quality and living standards, the state orchestrated environmental rehabilitation in Inner Mongolia has made life worse for many ethnic Mongols. 62 Chapter 7: Conclusion Historical policies of the Chinese state regarding water resources, agricultural development, and population growth have contributed to ecological and socio-economic decline in the Tarim Basin and the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. The recent environmental response of the government has had mixed results and appears to have been motivated in part by the perceived relative risk of ethnic unrest in the two regions. The contrast between Mongol pastoralists on the Inner Mongolian grasslands and Uyghur farmers in the Tarim Basin is stark. China’s central government seems to recognize the importance of addressing the environmental problems in both regions, but the state response in southern Xinjiang has been much more vigorous and effective than in the grasslands of Inner Mongolia. This discrepancy appears to be due in large part to the separatist threat that the Uyghur majority is believed to present to the Chinese government. However, there are other factors which are likely contributing to the differing government response in each region. The fact that international organizations like HELP and the World Bank partnered with the Chinese government in the restoration of the Tarim Basin likely provided increased accountability and unbiased measurement of results. The presence of Han dominated Bingtuan farms in the upper reaches of the Tarim River is likely a contributing factor. The difference between the traditional livelihoods of Uyghurs and Mongols probably had an impact on how the state responded to ecological decline. Many Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang are traditionally farmers and many Mongols on the Mongolian steppe are traditionally pastoralists. The Chinese state has a strong preference for agricultural over pastoralism. Most modern nation-states arguably share this preference. In Inner Mongolia this has resulted in policies that have not mitigated environmental degradation and in some cases have exacerbated it like pseudo privatization of rangeland, fencing of pastureland and settlement of herders. Additionally, there is a widespread discourse among government officials and many scientists that Mongols are responsible for environmental degradation of the Inner Mongolian grasslands. In the Tarim Basin, on the other hand, the government seems to have acknowledged that 63 degradation was caused by dams built in the Mao era, poor irrigation practices, and changes in the crop regime resulting in a boom in cotton cultivation mostly on Bingtuan farms. There seems to be no comparable discourse that accuses Uyghurs of being the culprits responsible for environmental decline. Perhaps a more honest appraisal of environmental degradation in the Tarim Basin has been one factor behind a more effective government response to mitigating that degradation. 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Creator Stahle, Laura N. (author)

Core Title Ethnic resistance and state environmental policy: Uyghurs and Mongols

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 07/15/2009

Defense Date 05/26/2009

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Tag Environmental degradation,environmental policy,Ethnic relations,grasslands,Inner Mongolia,OAI-PMH Harvest,Tarim Basin,Xinjiang

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