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When transparency fails: investigating the complexities of managing transparency in organizations

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When transparency fails: investigating the complexities of managing transparency in organizations

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WHEN TRANSPARENCY FAILS:
INVESTIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF
MANAGING TRANSPARENCY IN ORGANIZATIONS

by

Alyssa Ju Rie Han

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION)

August 2021

ii
Table of Contents

List of Tables ……….………………………………………………………………………….... iii

List of Figures ……….…………………………………………………………………………... iv

Abstract ……………….…………………………………………………………………………. v

Introduction …….………………………………………………………………………………... 1

Theoretical Background …………………………………………………………………………. 3
Defining Transparency ……………………………………………………………..……. 3
Perceptions of Transparency …………………………………………………………..… 4
The Overlooked Social Component of Transparency ………………………………..….. 6
The Preexisting Relationship between the Information Provider and Recipient ………... 7
The Mediating Role of Perceived Motive ……………………………………………… 10
Attenuating the Effect of a Bad Relationship …………………………………...……... 15
Downstream Implications ………………………………………………………………. 17

Overview of Studies ………………………………...…………………………………...……... 18
Study 1 ……………………………...…………………………………...……………... 19
Study 2 ………………………...…………………………………...…………………... 25
Study 3 ………………………...…………………………………...…………………... 32

General Discussion ………………...…………………………………...……………………… 44
Theoretical Implications ..…………………………………...………………...……….. 46
Practical Implications ..…………………………………...…………………………….. 47
Limitations and Future Directions ..…………………………………...……………….. 47
Conclusion ……………………………...…………………………………………......... 50

References …………………………...…………………………………………………………. 51

iii
List of Tables
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations by Relationship x Voluntariness (Study 3) ………… 41

iv
List of Figures
Figure 1. Theoretical Model ……………………………………………………………………. 18
Figure 2. The Effect of Relationship on Perceived Degree of Transparency Mediated by
Perceived Motive …………………………………………………………………….. 31
Figure 3. The Effect of Relationship on Perceived Value of Transparency Mediated by
Perceived Motive …………………………………………………………………….. 31
Figure 4. Perceived Degree of Transparency by Relationship x Voluntariness (Study 3) ……... 40

v
Abstract
In the midst of increasing calls for greater transparency in organizations, scholars have also
begun to recognize cases in which transparency attempts fail to be effective or even backfire. I
propose that investigating the recipient perspective of transparency may provide insights into
when and why transparency attempts fall short. Whereas much of the extant work on
transparency has devoted attention to how characteristics of the information being shared may
influence the success of transparency attempts, I examine the influence of interpersonal concerns
on recipient perceptions of transparency. Specifically, I examine how the preexisting relationship
between an information provider and recipient may influence recipient perceptions of
transparency. I demonstrate through three empirical studies that having a good relationship with
the information provider leads to more favorable evaluations of the provider’s act of
transparency, and that this effect is mediated by the extent to which recipients attribute prosocial
motives to the provider for their transparency. I also explore whether the negative effect of a bad
relationship may be attenuated to some degree when the provider’s act of transparency is
attributed to external influences and is thus perceived as not voluntary.

1
Introduction
Organizational transparency has become a topic of growing interest for both scholars and
practitioners. Recent years have seen increasing calls for greater transparency in organizations in
efforts to bolster trust, increase accountability, improve decision-making, and more (Auger,
2014; Craven, 2015; The Economist, 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen &
Meijer, 2012; Kaptein, 2008; Lipman, 2013; Patel, 2014; Popick, 2015; Rawlins, 2008a;
Rawlins, 2008b; Richman, 2016; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016). Indeed, research has
shown that transparency can produce many beneficial effects. Within an organization,
transparency can improve trust and perceptions of leader effectiveness (Auger, 2014;
Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Norman et al., 2010; Rawlins, 2008a; Rawlins, 2008b).
Transparency with external stakeholders can increase customer satisfaction, improve the
perceived value of services provided, and promote consumer intentions to purchase from a
certain company (Buell et al., 2017; Buell & Norton, 2011; Mohan et al., 2020).
However, recently, scholars have also begun to recognize cases in which transparency
attempts either fail to be effective or even backfire by producing unintended negative
consequences (Balkin, 1999; Bernstein, 2012; Bernstein, 2014; Birkinshaw & Cable, 2017; Cain
et al., 2011; Christensen & Cheney, 2015; Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015; De Cremer, 2016;
Etzioni, 2010; Fenster, 2006; O’Reilly, 1980; Strathern, 2000). For example, transparency can at
times lead to information overload, decrease efficiency, harm decision-making, diminish trust,
and even promote blaming and envy within the organization (Balkin, 1999; Bamberger &
Belogolovsky, 2017; Birkinshaw & Cable, 2017; Cain et al., 2011; De Cremer, 2016). This work
has provided valuable insights in terms of identifying some of the specific contexts in which
transparency attempts may fall short. However, the existing literature still lacks a broader

2
integrated theory on when and why transparency attempts may fail.
I propose that in order to better understand when and why transparency attempts fall
short, there need to be further examinations of the ways in which information providers and
recipients may differ in their perceptions of transparency. Across a number of different contexts,
the social psychology literature has extensively documented asymmetries between actors and
observers in how they perceive the same event (Adams & Inesi, 2016; Baskin et al., 2014; Jones
& Nisbett, 1972; Zhang & Epley, 2009). To the extent that providers and recipients differ in their
perceptions of transparency, providers may often believe they are being transparent when in fact
they are being perceived otherwise by recipients. However, while the current literature on
transparency has devoted ample attention to the actor perspective of transparency (Healy &
Palepu, 2001), less attention has been dedicated to examining the recipient perspective of
transparency. This dissertation therefore aims to address this shortage in the literature by
examining one factor that may frequently influence recipient perceptions of transparency.
In investigating a factor that may influence recipient perceptions of transparency, the
current research focuses on an aspect of transparency that I argue has been largely overlooked in
the transparency literature. Whereas existing research on transparency has primarily focused on
characteristics of the information shared (e.g., the quantity or quality of the information), I
propose that interpersonal concerns (e.g., the preexisting relationship) between the information
provider and recipient can also influence the way in which transparency is perceived.
Specifically, I start by examining how the positive versus negative nature of the preexisting
relationship between an information provider and recipient may influence recipient perceptions
of the provider’s act of transparency. I test the prediction that whereas a good relationship
between the two will lead to favorable evaluations of the provider’s act of transparency, a bad

3
relationship will lead to less favorable evaluations of the same act of transparency. Additionally,
I examine whether this tendency occurs because a bad relationship leads recipients to be less
inclined to attribute prosocial motives to the actor for their transparency. Finally, I explore one
potential way to attenuate the harmful effect of a bad relationship on recipient perceptions of
transparency, namely by diminishing the actor’s voluntary role in their act of transparency.
Altogether, I aim to make three contributions. First, the current research contributes to the
transparency literature by broadening the prevalent conceptualization of transparency and
extending it beyond merely the information itself to also include the interpersonal concerns
between the party sharing the information and the party receiving it. In doing so, I provide
evidence for how focusing solely on the information in transparency may hinder one’s ability to
anticipate when recipients may not receive an actor’s transparency as positively as one might
expect. Second, this research seeks to address the paucity of research on the recipient perspective
of transparency by providing insights into factors that may influence the way in which recipients
make evaluations about an actor’s transparency. Lastly, I contribute to the research on person
perception and mental state inference by demonstrating one way in which the perceived motives
of an actor can have implications not only for how the actor is perceived but also for how their
actions are perceived.
Theoretical Background
Defining Transparency
With the growing interest in transparency, scholars and practitioners have often
conceptualized transparency in various ways. In many discussions, transparency is rarely defined
beyond common sense understandings (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015; Wehmeier & Raaz,
2012). When transparency is explicitly defined, there is often a lack of clear agreement regarding

4
its definition (Bernstein, 2017; Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson,
2016). Some scholars conceptualize transparency as a passive state in which information is
available, accessible, or visible – either to members within or outside of the organization
(Bandsuch et al., 2008; Bernstein, 2017; Birkinshaw & Cable, 2017; Bushman et al., 2004; Clair
et al., 2005; De Cremer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Kaptein, 2008; Madhavan et al., 2005).
For example, passive forms of transparency might include open floorplans, live surveillance and
virtual monitoring of employees, or the general availability of information to those who would
seek it (Buell et al., 2017; Buell & Norton, 2011; Liu et al., 2015).
Meanwhile, others conceptualize transparency in more active terms, specifically as the
deliberate disclosing or providing of new or previously secret information (Bandsuch et al.,
2008; Bernstein, 2017; Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015; Rawlins, 2008a; Schnackenberg &
Tomlinson, 2016). Examples of this active form of transparency might include managers
informing employees of impending layoffs or sharing how certain decisions were reached. It may
also involve employees sharing intentions to leave the company, providing updates on the status
of a project, or even disclosing a mistake they may have made. Often times, this form of
transparency may involve disclosing information that might be considered sensitive, and possibly
difficult or unpleasant to share with others. In this dissertation, I focus on this latter form of
transparency, limiting the scope of my study to situations that involve the unidirectional sharing
of information by one individual with another.
Perceptions of Transparency
In examining how recipients may perceive transparency, I aim to investigate two types of
assessments that recipients may make regarding an actor’s transparency. The first involves the
degree to which recipients actually believe the actor is being transparent. Scholars have

5
identified numerous qualities that may characterize transparency and have widely varied in terms
of how they define high quality transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016). For example,
Heise (1985) argues that transparent communication involves sharing “all legally releasable
information – whether positive or negative in nature – in a manner which is accurate, timely,
balanced, and unequivocal” (p. 209). Others have focused on characteristics such as the
completeness, clarity, or accessibility of the information (e.g., Kaptein, 2008; Madhavan et al.,
2005; Rawlins, 2008a). Given that the current research is part of a relatively early effort in the
literature to better understand recipient perceptions of transparency, I adopt a broad
conceptualization of perceived transparency that captures its multifaceted nature. Based on
Rawlins’ (2008a) efforts to construct a measure of organizational transparency, I examine the
extent to which recipients perceive an act of transparency as relevant, timely, easy to understand,
reliable, complete, detailed, and including the whole story. In many ways, these assessments
capture perceptions of the quality of the information itself (e.g., reliable, complete) as well as the
way in which it was delivered (e.g., timely, easy to understand). Altogether, they reflect overall
perceptions of the degree to which the actor is transparent.
Second, I investigate the extent to which recipients may value or appreciate the act of
transparency. For instance, recipients may be able to concede that reliable information was
shared with them in a timely manner, yet still experience that they do not value or appreciate the
act of transparency – perhaps because they perceive the information as not actually useful to
them or because they feel the actor had ulterior motives for sharing the information. I therefore
distinguish the perceived degree of transparency from the perceived value of the act of
transparency. However, taken together, I broadly refer to these two assessments as recipient
perceptions or evaluations of transparency.

6
The Overlooked Social Component of Transparency
Among the limited existing work that does discuss the recipient perspective of
transparency, much of this research has devoted attention to the ways in which characteristics of
the information being shared – such as the content, quantity, or quality of the information – can
influence the success of transparency attempts (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000; Auger, 2014;
Rawlins, 2008b). For instance, in examining how much information is an optimal amount for
transparency, scholars have shown that too much information can lead to information overload,
obfuscation, decreased efficiency, and even diminished levels of trust (Balkin, 1999; Birkinshaw
& Cable, 2017; De Cremer, 2016). Other researchers have shown how transparency around
wages (i.e., the content of the information) can be harmful by increasing envy of higher-paid
colleagues and in turn diminishing helping behaviors within the organization (Bamberger &
Belogolovsky, 2017). Although such research provides valuable insights, focusing solely on the
characteristics of the information limits our understanding of when and why transparency efforts
may backfire. Indeed, Albu and Flyverbom (2016) suggest that the existing literature on
transparency has maintained a relatively narrow focus on information and the quality of
information, thus overlooking other important dynamics of transparency.
If we are to conceptualize transparency as the sharing of information by one party with
another, the existing literature has then largely overlooked how aspects of the relationship
between the information provider and recipient may also influence perceptions of transparency. I
therefore propose that in addition to the information itself, transparency also consists of a social
component given its interpersonal nature. This social component between the information
provider and recipient may consist of the preexisting relationship between the two parties or the
actual or inferred motives of the information provider for being transparent with the recipient.

7
Indeed, research on other interpersonal acts like helping, favor exchange, and gift-giving has
suggested that such exchanges involve not only the value of the deed or item given but also what
the exchange signifies regarding the relationship between the actor and recipient (Ames et al.,
2004; Flynn & Brockner, 2003; Zhang & Epley, 2012). The present research therefore aims to
broaden the study of transparency beyond the information itself by exploring how interpersonal
concerns may also play a role in recipient perceptions of transparency.
The Preexisting Relationship between the Information Provider and Recipient
Regardless of the goal of an act of transparency – whether it is to aid decision-making,
increase accountability in the organization, increase trust, or a host of other potential goals – for
an act of transparency to have its desired effect, recipients must first view the act of transparency
in a positive light. When individuals in organizations receive information from a manager or
even a coworker, they are likely to make assessments about the quality of the information they
have received, and accordingly, they are likely to value or appreciate the act of transparency to
varying degrees. Whereas information providers may be more knowledgeable about the objective
quality of the information they are sharing, given the information asymmetry that necessitated
transparency in the first place, information recipients are in a worse position to evaluate the
quality of the information in the way providers can. For instance, recipients may be less able to
gauge how reliable the information is or how much of the available information providers are
sharing with them. As such, other aspects of the transparency exchange may inform recipients’
evaluations of the transparency attempt.
I propose that the nature of the preexisting relationship between the information provider
and recipient will influence recipient perceptions of and appreciation for the provider’s act of
transparency. As the literature on actor-observer asymmetries suggests, certain information is

8
more perceptually salient to people depending on the role that they occupy in a given interaction.
(Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Taylor et al., 1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1975; Taylor & Fiske,
1978). In the context of transparency, recipients are in a position to not only receive the
information but also to be attuned to the actor who is sharing the information with them. As
such, they are likely to be influenced by interpersonal concerns, such as the relationship they
possess with the information provider. Specifically, in this research, I compare good
relationships that may be characterized by mutual liking and respect versus bad relationships in
which two individuals may not like or respect one another.
Although this has yet to be examined in the context of transparency, the potential for the
existing relationship between two parties to influence recipient perceptions is certainly not novel.
Research in other domains has shown that the extent to which people are receptive to
information or a proposal can depend upon who is presenting it. For example, research in
negotiations has demonstrated the phenomenon of reactive devaluation, in which the very fact
that an offer comes from an adversary diminishes the attractiveness or value of the offer in the
eyes of recipients (Ross, 1995; Ross & Stillinger, 1991; Ross & Ward, 1995). This research has
shown that people’s receptiveness to a proposal depends upon the person suggesting it, such that
the same proposal tends to be perceived more negatively when offered by an opposing party
rather than by someone of the same party or even a neutral third party (Ross & Stillinger, 1991;
Ross & Ward, 1995). I propose that in the context of transparency as well, the preexisting nature
of the recipient’s relationship with the provider will influence recipients’ perceptions of the
information and the act of information sharing more broadly.
The influence of the preexisting relationship may manifest through a couple of different
processes. On the one hand, this may occur through a direct and more automatic process in the

9
form of a cognitive bias, as in the case of reactive devaluation. Early impressions of a target
individual can serve as a schema, shaping the ways in which people perceive and interpret the
target individual’s later behaviors (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Nickerson, 1998; Planalp, 1987).
The preexisting relationship that recipients have with a provider may therefore function as a
heuristic that influences perceptions of the provider’s act of transparency and the information
shared.
Alternatively, this may occur indirectly through a more deliberate process of deduction,
in which the recipient makes inferences about the potential quality and value of the provider’s
transparency based on the nature of their relationship. For example, in discussing the cognitive
bias of reactive devaluation in negotiations, Ross and colleagues acknowledge that such a
tendency is quite reasonable given that the authorship of a proposal is likely to be informative to
recipients about the value of the proposal to the recipient (Ross & Stillinger, 1991; Ross & Ward,
1995). When two parties are on opposing sides, recipients can infer from these adversarial
positions not only that the other party is likely acting out of self-interest, but also that these
interests are likely to conflict with their own. In turn, it is easy for recipients to conclude that a
proposal coming from their opponent is likely to be disadvantageous for themselves and
therefore view it negatively. In the context of transparency as well, the preexisting nature of the
relationship between the information provider and recipient may signal to the recipient the
potential quality and value of the information they are receiving. Those who receive information
from someone with whom they have a bad relationship may infer that the actor is not sharing
information for prosocial reasons – a mechanism which I elaborate upon further in the following
section. This in turn may lead to more negative perceptions of the actor’s transparency. As such,
while recipients who have a good relationship with the information provider may be more likely

10
to perceive the act of information sharing more favorably, recipients who have a bad relationship
with the provider may be more likely to perceive the act of information sharing more negatively.
It also bears noting that transparency differs from negotiations in that the information
provider and recipient are not on opposing sides. Therefore, it is not as obvious that those who
are presenting the information should necessarily be self-interested when sharing information or
seeking to gain advantages for themselves that are likely to result in relative disadvantages for
the recipient. In fact, there exists a widespread assumption that transparency is, or at least should
be, beneficial for the recipient (e.g., Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Rawlins, 2008a; Stohl, Stohl, &
Leonardi, 2016). As such, to the extent that recipients of transparency are influenced by the
existing relationship, this would further underscore the importance of interpersonal
considerations when it comes to transparency. I therefore examine in this research whether a bad
relationship might lead to worse perceptions of a provider’s act of transparency. Additionally, I
examine whether this occurs through the motives that recipients attribute to the provider for their
act of transparency.
The Mediating Role of Perceived Motive
The Preexisting Relationship and Perceived Motive
Given the prevalent belief that transparency is (or at least should be) beneficial and
helpful, people are generally likely to believe that an actor’s transparency is driven by prosocial
or benevolent motives. This is particularly likely to be the case when the recipient has a good
relationship with the provider. However, when recipients have a bad relationship with the
provider, recipients may find themselves more inclined to question why this information is being
shared with them. Indeed, people can have varying motivations for being transparent. For
instance, one may have truly prosocial motives for being transparent, such as intending to further

11
the recipient’s understanding of a situation or to enable the recipient to make more informed
decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2001). However, one may also have more self-interested motives for
being transparent, such as to persuade or influence someone, to seek the reputational benefits one
would gain from being able to say they were transparent, to shield oneself from potential
litigation, or to feel licensed to act in a self-interested manner in later interactions (Healy &
Palepu, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2011). Individuals may even have malicious or nefarious
motives, such as to place blame on someone else.
It is not surprising then to expect that recipients will be attuned to the potential
motivating factors behind a provider’s act of transparency. People are generally concerned with
the underlying causes of others’ behaviors (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973). Years of research on
attribution theory, person perception, and mind perception have shown that people care a great
deal about the motives and intentions of others, utilizing inferences about others’ mental states to
navigate their social environments (Ames, 2004; Epley & Waytz, 2010; Fein, 1996; Malle, 2011;
Reeder, 2009; Reeder et al., 2002; Reeder & Trafimow, 2005). Additionally, extant research
would suggest that these motivational attributions are likely to be influenced by the preexisting
beliefs that recipients hold about the actor. Research in various domains has demonstrated that
preexisting perceptions of an actor can influence the motives attributed to them for their
behaviors. For example, a negotiator’s reputation will influence the intentions attributed to them
by their counterpart (Tinsley et al., 2002). Additionally, an actor’s reputation can influence the
motives that observers attribute to the actor’s helpful behaviors (Johnson et al., 2002). This latter
research demonstrated that when an actor had a positive reputation, observers were more likely
to view the actor’s helping behavior as altruistic rather than instrumental (Johnson et al., 2002).
Moreover, whereas reputations may be based on attributes ascribed to an individual by others

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(Raub & Weesie, 1990), a direct and personal relationship with the provider may be all the more
salient in people’s perceptions of the actor’s behaviors.
As such, the relationship between an information provider and recipient may endow the
recipient with certain expectations regarding the provider’s behaviors and thus influence the
motives that they attribute to the provider for their act of transparency. Recipients who have a
good relationship with the provider may find the provider’s act of transparency congruent with
their previous expectations, which in turn may lead recipients to easily attribute prosocial
motives to the provider’s transparency. However, recipients who have a bad relationship with the
information provider may find that their expectations of the actor are incongruent with the
seemingly helpful act of transparency. Considering the past research that has extensively
demonstrated the greater weight that negative information carries over positive information (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 2001), I predict that the preexisting bad relationship will lead recipients to be
less inclined to attribute truly prosocial motives to the provider’s transparency.
Transparency may also lend itself to more complex motivational attributions given its
organizationally embedded nature. Research has shown that helping behaviors in an
organizational context are less likely to be attributed to the actor’s personal characteristics and
motives given the increased potential for the behavior to have been driven by external forces
such as role and work obligations (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015). Because organizations are strong
situations (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989), recipients may infer that the act of transparency was
simply motivated by work obligations rather than truly prosocial or benevolent intentions. This
may be particularly the case when recipients receive information from someone with whom they
have a bad relationship. Therefore, there are various alternative motives recipients may ascribe to
a provider’s act of transparency when they have a bad relationship with the provider. However,

13
for the purpose of the current research, I remain agnostic as to these potential alternative
motives, limiting my examination to recipient perceptions of whether or not the actor is
motivated by prosocial reasons.
Perceived Motive and Perceptions of Transparency
In turn, I expect that the extent to which an actor’s transparency is perceived as truly
motivated by prosocial reasons will influence how the recipient perceives the act of transparency.
A host of existing research has examined the implications of perceived motives in various types
of interactions. This research has demonstrated that when individuals are suspected of having
ulterior or strategic motivations for their behaviors, this can have a number of implications for
how they are perceived by others and can even result in relational costs. This, of course, is
particularly the case when the behavior in question is meant to be prosocial or virtuous. For
example, research has shown that when people perceive an actor’s altruistic deeds as selfishly
motivated, they perceive the actor as less moral and give the actor less credit for their charitable
deeds (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012; Newman & Cain, 2014). Alternatively, when people attribute
helping behaviors and organizational citizenship behaviors to prosocial motives, they tend to
have more favorable evaluations of the actor and are more willing to allocate rewards to the actor
(Eastman, 1994; Halbesleben et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2002). Research has also shown that
perceptions of a helper’s motives will influence beneficiaries’ attitudes towards future
interactions with the helper (Ames et al., 2004).
Although a myriad of existing research has examined how the perceived motives behind
an action can influence dispositional inferences made about the actor and the resulting
implications for the relationship, less research has explored how perceived motives might affect
perceptions of the action or deed itself. On the one hand, perceptions of the deed itself may

14
simply serve as an indirect route through which recipients may in turn make evaluations of the
actor. On the other hand, perceptions of the deed itself may also be important when considering
that individuals and organizations may engage in transparency for various reasons other than to
improve trust. For instance, organizations may have other goals in mind such as promoting
accountability or informed decision-making among employees, which may be more directly
influenced by perceptions of the information provided. In such cases, to the extent that recipients
view the act of transparency negatively and are less likely to trust the information received, these
perceptions may hinder the organization’s efforts to accomplish such goals.
I propose that the perceived motive for the act of transparency will also influence
perceptions of the act of transparency itself, in that when recipients view the provider’s
transparency as motivated by prosocial reasons, they will in turn view the act of transparency
more favorably. Specifically, considering that prosocial motivation is the desire to expend effort
to benefit other people (Batson, 1987; Grant, 2008), and effort is often associated with better
performance (e.g., Blau, 1993), recipients may infer that actors whom they perceive as having
prosocial motivations will expend greater effort in their act of transparency, thus sharing
information that is higher in quality and potential value. In fact, research on operational
transparency has shown that when people perceive that greater effort has been exerted on a
service, this in turn increases not only their appreciation for the service but also their perceived
value of the service (Buell & Norton, 2011; Buell et al., 2017). As such, to the extent that
prosocial motives signal greater effort exerted on behalf of the recipients, recipients may
perceive the act of information sharing as more transparent and value the act of transparency to a
greater degree. Taken together, I propose:
Hypothesis 1: The nature of the relationship between an information provider and

15
information recipient will influence recipient perceptions of the provider's act of
transparency, such that a good (vs. bad) relationship will lead recipients to
(a) view the act of information sharing as more (vs. less) transparent and
(b) value the act of transparency to a greater (vs. lesser) degree.
Hypothesis 2: The nature of the relationship between an information provider and
information recipient will influence the extent to which recipients attribute prosocial
motives to the provider for their act of transparency, such that a good (vs. bad)
relationship will lead recipients to perceive the provider as being more (vs. less)
motivated by prosocial reasons.
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which recipients perceive the provider as being motivated by
prosocial reasons will mediate the effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of
the provider’s transparency. Specifically, I predict that a good (vs. bad) relationship will
lead to recipient perceptions of the provider as being more (vs. less) motivated by
prosocial reasons, which in turn will lead recipients to
(a) view the act of information sharing as more (vs. less) transparent and
(b) value the act of transparency to a greater (vs. lesser) degree.
Attenuating the Effect of a Bad Relationship
Unfortunately, not all relationships in organizations are of a positive nature, and people
are likely to encounter situations in which they need to share information with or receive
information from someone with whom they have a bad relationship. Actors may therefore seek
to find ways for their transparency to be better received. As such, I explore one potential way to
attenuate the effect of a bad relationship on perceptions of transparency. Specifically, I examine
whether invoking external influences for one’s transparency, to in turn diminish the perceived

16
voluntariness of their act of transparency, will moderate the effect of the relationship on recipient
perceptions of transparency.
Classic attribution theory has long held that when inferring the cause(s) of a behavior,
people may attribute the behavior to internal causes or external influences (Heider, 1958; Kelley,
1973). Additionally, attribution theory maintains that when people are considering whether an
individual’s behavior was caused by internal versus external factors, they tend to operate under a
discounting principle (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; McClure, 1998). While there are certain
conditions under which this discounting may be more likely to occur (see McClure, 1998 for a
review), the general logic underlying this principle is that the role of a particular cause for a
given effect may be discounted when there are also other plausible causes present. This
discounting may occur either through attributors becoming less confident that a certain cause
was responsible for the given effect, or through attributors concluding that the cause had a lesser
magnitude in determining the effect (Kelley, 1972).
Generally, one might think that attributing an actor’s transparency to internal causes
would be seen more favorably. However, when recipients possess a bad relationship with the
provider and may be less inclined to perceive the provider as having genuine motives for their
act of transparency, a causal attribution that lessens the role of the individual may result in more
favorable perceptions of the act of transparency. In fact, research in trust repair has suggested
that when the violation in question concerns matters of integrity and is likely to be particularly
detrimental to trust, apologizing with an external attribution rather than an internal attribution
may help mitigate blame (Kim et al., 2006). In a similar vein, in bad relationships, providing
external attributions for the provider’s act of transparency may attenuate the tendency for
recipients to view the provider’s transparency negatively.

17
Further, given the organizationally embedded nature of transparency, providers are likely
to have numerous opportunities to cite forces external to themselves – such as an order from
upper management or company policies – as their reasons for sharing certain information with a
recipient. And according to the discounting principle, as the perceived influence of these external
forces grows, the role of the provider would be discounted in the eyes of recipients. Moreover,
research suggests that discounting may be more likely to occur when people perceive the
alternative plausible cause as necessary or sufficient for bringing about the given effect
(McClure, 1998). To the extent that fulfilling work obligations is a sufficient reason in and of
itself for actors to engage in transparency, recipients may be even more likely to discount the
provider’s internal motives for sharing the information and may therefore be less affected by the
negative relationship with the provider. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis 4: The effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of transparency will
be moderated by the perceived voluntariness of the act of transparency. Specifically, I
predict that in a good relationship, recipients will evaluate the act of transparency more
favorably (i.e., more transparent and more valuable) when it is seen as voluntary rather
than not voluntary. However, in a bad relationship, recipients will evaluate the act of
transparency more favorably when it is seen as not voluntary rather than voluntary.
Downstream Implications
Finally, I explore how perceptions of the act of transparency might have downstream
implications for trust. Transparency has often been invoked as a way to improve trust in
organizations (e.g., Auger, 2014; Norman et al., 2010; Rawlins, 2008b). As such, when
mistrusted individuals or organizations seek to improve trust, they may engage in greater efforts
to be transparent. However, to the extent that voluntarily engaging in transparency may actually

18
result in unfavorable perceptions of the act of transparency when already in a bad relationship,
and to the extent that perceptions of the act of transparency may influence trust in the provider,
transparency initiatives founded upon the hopes of improving trust may be a misguided effort. I
therefore examine how perceptions of the act of transparency may affect trust.
Hypothesis 5: I predict that perceptions of transparency will influence trust in the
provider in that perceptions of the act of transparency will mediate the effect of
relationship on trust in the provider.
Altogether, these predictions are laid out in the theoretical model in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Theoretical Model

Overview of Studies
I tested my hypotheses across three studies. Study 1 first examined whether recipients
who have a good (vs. bad) relationship with the information provider would perceive the act of
information sharing as more transparent (Hypothesis 1a) and value the act of transparency to a
greater degree (Hypothesis 1b). Study 2 replicated the effect from Study 1 and investigated
whether recipients who have a good (vs. bad) relationship with the information provider would
perceive the provider as being more motivated by prosocial reasons (Hypothesis 2). Study 2 also

19
tested whether the extent to which recipients perceive the provider as being motivated by
prosocial reasons would mediate the effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of the
provider’s transparency (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Study 3 replicated the findings from Studies 1
and 2 and explored whether the effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of transparency
would be moderated by whether or not the provider’s act of transparency was done voluntarily
(Hypothesis 4). And finally, Study 3 also examined the potential downstream effect of
perceptions of transparency on trust in the provider (Hypothesis 5).
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to examine whether recipients who have a good relationship with
the information provider would perceive the act of information sharing as more transparent
(Hypothesis 1a) and value the act of transparency to a greater degree (Hypothesis 1b) compared
to those who have a bad relationship with the provider.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and fourteen participants from the United States were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were each paid $.60 to complete the study.
1
I excluded
from analysis four participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check question.
Excluding these participants did not affect support for the predicted effects. The final sample
consisted of 210 participants (68 female, 141 male, 1 declined to answer). On average,
participants were 36.07 years old (ranging from 19 to 68, SD = 10.37).

1
I stated in my preregistration (As Predicted #67074) that I would collect data from 210 participants but ended up
with 214 participants.

20
Research Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions: (1)
control condition with no information about the relationship with the information provider, (2)
good relationship with the information provider, and (3) bad relationship with the information
provider.
Prior to constructing the scenario for this study, I conducted two pretests, one with an
undergraduate sample from a private west coast University and one with an MTurk sample, in
order to gather people’s experiences with transparency. In these pretests, I asked participants to
describe in detail a time in which they felt that someone either was transparent or failed to be
transparent with them. These responses produced a number of different contexts and situations in
which participants dealt with matters of transparency. Based on some of these responses, the
scenario created for this study reflected an amalgamation of a few different responses that
specifically involved transparency (or the lack thereof) surrounding hiring and promotion
decisions. Issues of hiring and promotion are commonplace in organizations and understanding
how to navigate them is essential to maintaining employee satisfaction as well as company
reputation.
Participants therefore read a scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves as
an analyst working at a consulting firm, who recently applied for a promotion. Participants read
that their manager called them in for a meeting. In the good relationship condition, participants
were told that they have always had a great relationship with their manager. In the bad
relationship condition, participants were told that they have always had a very strained
relationship with their manager. In the control condition, participants were not given any
information regarding their relationship with their manager. Later in the meeting, participants

21
were informed by their manager that they did not get the promotion. Participants were told that
although they were very qualified and one of the top candidates for the promotion, they did not
get the job because they are needed at their current position and an asset to the company where
they are now.
Measures
Manipulation and Attention Checks. Following the scenario, participants responded to
a manipulation check that assessed whether they understood the nature of their relationship with
their manager. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate which of the following was true
according to the scenario they read: (a) you have always had a good relationship with your
manager, (b) you have always had a bad relationship with your manager, or (c) your relationship
with your manager is not explicitly mentioned in the scenario.
Participants later responded to an attention check that asked them to select a certain
answer for that particular item to indicate that they were reading carefully: In order to show that
you are reading carefully, please select "(2) Disagree" for this question. This item was
purposefully included among the other measures of interest in order to gauge whether
participants were reading the items carefully.
Perceived Degree of Transparency. I assessed participants’ perceptions of the actor’s
degree of transparency using a multi-item scale adapted from Rawlins (2008a, 2008b). The eight
items included: (1) My manager provides information that is relevant to me, (2) My manager
provides information in a timely fashion, (3) My manager provides information in a way that
makes it easy to understand, (4) My manager provides information that is reliable, (5) My
manager provides information that is complete, (6) My manager provides information that is
detailed, (7) My manager provides information that includes the whole story, and (8) My

22
manager is transparent with me. Participants rated these items on a 7-point Likert scale
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Although this measure was adapted from an existing
validated measure, because it was shortened from the original lengthier measure, I conducted an
exploratory factor analysis with these eight items. The factor analysis extracted only one factor
with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which explained 51.37% of the variance. Factor loadings for
all eight items exceeded .63. Responses on these eight items were averaged to compose a scale
(a=.86).
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. I developed a multi-item scale to assess
participants’ perceptions of the value of the act of transparency. The five items included: (1) I
appreciate my manager’s transparency regarding the situation, (2) I believe this type of
information sharing is important, (3) I value my manager’s transparency, (4) I am grateful for my
manager sharing this information with me, and (5) I do not value my manager’s act of sharing
this information (reverse-coded). Participants rated these items on a 7-point Likert scale
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Because this was a newly developed scale, I conducted
an exploratory factor analysis with these five items to examine whether the scale was
unidimensional. The factor analysis extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1,
which explained 55.65% of the variance. Factor loadings for all five items exceeded .54.
Responses on these five items were averaged to compose a scale (a=.75).
Results
Manipulation Check
Of the initial 214 participants who completed the study, 147 participants (68.69%)
successfully passed the manipulation check which asked them to indicate the nature of their
relationship with their manager. The largest percentage of incorrect responses came from

23
participants in the control condition, suggesting that despite not being provided information
regarding their relationship with their manager, participants in the control condition may have
inferred the nature of the relationship from the scenario.
Perceived Degree of Transparency
I conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the prediction that the
nature of the recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the degree to which
recipients would view the provider’s act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 1a).
This analysis revealed a significant effect of relationship (good vs. bad vs. control) on the
perceived degree of transparency, F(2,207) = 8.28, p < .001.
Additionally, to test the more specific prediction that recipients who have a good
relationship with the information provider would perceive the provider’s act of information
sharing as more transparent compared to those who have a bad relationship with the provider, I
conducted a planned contrast comparing just the good relationship condition against the bad
relationship condition. This revealed a significant effect of relationship (good vs. bad) on
perceived transparency, t(207) = 4.04, p < .001, η
"
#
= .073. Participants in the good relationship
condition (M = 5.82, SD = .70) evaluated the act of information sharing as significantly more
transparent than those in the bad relationship condition (M = 5.28, SD = .92).
Lastly, in order to examine how providing no information regarding the relationship with
the information provider may differ from either a good relationship or a bad relationship, I ran
supplemental analyses in the form of contrasts comparing the control condition to each of the
experimental conditions. Contrasting the control condition against the good relationship
condition revealed a significant effect of condition on perceived transparency, t(207) = 2.42, p
< .05, η
"
#
= .028. Participants in the good relationship condition (M = 5.82, SD = .70) evaluated

24
the act of information sharing as significantly more transparent than those in the control
condition (M = 5.50, SD = .78). Contrasting the control condition against the bad relationship
condition did not reveal a significant effect of condition on perceived transparency, t(207) =
1.60, p = .112.
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency
I also conducted a one-way ANOVA to test the prediction that the nature of the
recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the perceived value of the provider’s
act of transparency (Hypothesis 1b). This revealed a significant effect of relationship (good vs.
bad vs. control) on the perceived value of the act of transparency, F(2,207) = 8.38, p < .001.
Additionally, to test the more specific prediction that recipients who have a good
relationship with the information provider would perceive the act of transparency as greater in
value compared to those who have a bad relationship with the provider, I again conducted a
planned contrast comparing the good relationship condition to the bad relationship condition.
This contrast revealed a significant effect of relationship (good vs. bad) on the perceived value of
the act of transparency, t(207) = 3.98, p < .001, η
"
#
= .071. Participants in the good relationship
condition (M = 5.73, SD = .90) indicated that they valued the act of transparency to a
significantly greater degree than those in the bad relationship condition (M = 5.09, SD = .95).
Lastly, supplemental analyses revealed that contrasting the control condition against the
good relationship condition did not show a significant effect of condition on the perceived value
of transparency, t(207) = 1.13, p = .260. However, contrasting the control condition against the
bad relationship condition did reveal a significant effect of condition on the perceived value of
transparency, t(207) = 2.83, p < .01, η
"
#
= .037. Participants in the bad relationship condition

25
(M = 5.09, SD = .95) indicated that they valued the act of transparency to a significantly lesser
degree than those in the control condition (M = 5.55, SD = 1.01).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide support for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b by
demonstrating that the nature of the relationship between an information provider and
information recipient will influence recipient perceptions of the provider's act of transparency,
and even more specifically that a good (vs. bad) relationship will lead recipients to perceive the
provider’s act of information sharing as more transparent and to value the act of transparency to
a greater degree.
Study 2
In addition to replicating the findings from Study 1, Study 2 was designed to investigate
whether recipients who have a good (vs. bad) relationship with the information provider would
perceive the provider as being more motivated by prosocial reasons (Hypothesis 2). Study 2 also
tested whether the extent to which recipients perceive the provider as being motivated by
prosocial reasons would mediate the effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of the
provider’s transparency (Hypotheses 3a and 3b).
Method
Participants
One hundred and ninety-nine participants from the United States were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were each paid $.75 to complete the study.
2
I excluded
from analysis five participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check questions.
Excluding these participants did not affect support for the predicted effects. The final sample

2
I stated in my preregistration (As Predicted #67328) that I would collect data from 200 participants but ended up
with 199 participants.

26
consisted of 194 participants (65 female, 128 male, 1 other). On average, participants were 37.44
years old (ranging from 21 to 87, SD = 10.52).
Research Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions: (1) good
relationship with the information provider and (2) bad relationship with the information provider.
In order to increase the generalizability of the results, I utilized two different scenarios in
this study. Participants were randomly presented with one of the two scenarios. The first scenario
was the same as the one in Study 1, in which participants imagined themselves as an analyst at a
consulting firm, whose manager informed them that they did not receive the promotion for which
they had recently applied.
The second scenario was newly constructed to examine situations involving layoffs. A
few of the responses from the aforementioned pretests suggested that many organizations
struggle with finding the most appropriate way to convey potential layoffs, particularly when
there is still much uncertainty surrounding the decision. I constructed this scenario largely based
upon one particularly compelling response from the pretests. A participant recalled an instance in
which he/she felt that his/her employer failed to be transparent. He/she wrote:
My previous employer halted all of our normal sales and daily work activities and cited
the pandemic as the reason. They felt that the organization should not attempt to 'shop for
new business' because of the hardships many organizations were experiencing. We
understood the circumstances and we were placed on other projects. We began to be
concerned that we were not participating in any revenue generating activity so we kept
asking when we would return to our normal duties. Leadership assured us we would get
back to normal soon and we were okay to continue working on special projects but
specifically asked not to sell. Other partners in various department however expressed
that they were given clear ok's, even in writing to proceed with sales activities but our
department specifically was excluded. Suddenly, months after us being concerned that we
were not selling and asking when we would be back to our normal duties, the entire
department was laid off with no clear reason or explanation. This is a time I felt
leadership failed to be transparent.

27
This new scenario therefore asked participants to imagine themselves as a salesperson working at
a tech firm, where there have recently been budget cuts and a round of layoffs. Participants read
that they were scheduled to have their monthly one-on-one meeting with their manager later in
the week. As in Study 1, in the good relationship condition, participants were told that they have
always had a great relationship with their manager; whereas in the bad relationship condition,
participants were told that they have always had a very strained relationship with their manager.
In the meeting, participants were informed by their manager that there may be another round of
upcoming layoffs. Participants were told that there is a possibility that one entire department
might get laid off, although it is still being discussed as to which department that might be.
Measures
Manipulation and Attention Checks. As in Study 1, following the scenario, participants
responded to a manipulation check that assessed whether they understood the nature of their
relationship with their manager. Participants were asked to indicate which of the following was
true according to the scenario they read: (a) you have always had a good relationship with your
manager, or (b) you have always had a bad relationship with your manager.
Participants later responded to two attention checks that asked them to select a certain
answer for each question to indicate that they were reading carefully: (1) In order to show that
you are reading carefully, please select "(2) Disagree" for this question, and (2) In order to show
that you are reading carefully, please select "(7) Strongly Agree" for this question. Respectively,
these two items were placed towards the middle and end of the study in order to gauge whether
participants were reading the items carefully throughout the entire study.

28
Perceived Degree of Transparency. I assessed participants’ perceptions of the actor’s
degree of transparency using the same eight-item scale as in Study 1. Responses on these eight
items were averaged to compose a scale (a=.90).
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. I assessed participants’ perceptions of the
value of the act of transparency using the same five-item scale as in Study 1. I again conducted
an exploratory factor analysis, since this was a newly developed scale. This factor analysis
extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which explained 58.58% of the
variance. With the exception of the one reverse-coded item, factor loadings for all items
exceeded .74; the reverse-coded item had a factor loading of .31. Responses on these five items
were averaged to compose a scale (a=.74).
Perceived Prosocial Motive. I developed a multi-item scale to assess participants’
beliefs regarding whether the actor had prosocial motives for his act of transparency. The five
items included: (1) My manager had good intentions in sharing this information with me, (2) My
manager shared this information with me for my benefit, (3) My manager was looking out for
my best interests in sharing this information, (4) My manager had genuine motives for sharing
this information, (5) My manager did not have my best interests in mind when sharing this
information (reverse-coded). Participants rated these items on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly
disagree, 7=strongly agree). Because this was a newly developed scale, I conducted an
exploratory factor analysis with these five items to examine whether the scale was
unidimensional. The factor analysis extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1,
which explained 58.44% of the variance. With the exception of the one reverse-coded item,
factor loadings for all items exceeded .79; the reverse-coded item had a factor loading of .23.
Responses on these five items were averaged to compose a scale (a=.75).

29
Results
Manipulation Check
Of the initial 199 participants who completed the study, 157 participants (78.89%)
successfully passed the manipulation check which asked them to indicate the nature of their
relationship with their manager.
Effect of Relationship
I conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine the effect of relationship on recipient
evaluations of transparency. Although participants were randomly assigned to one of two
scenarios, I anticipated that the scenarios would not make a difference in the results and therefore
did not include scenario as a factor in the analyses. However, I did conduct supplemental
analyses controlling for scenario, which showed that controlling for scenario did not affect the
results.
Perceived Degree of Transparency. I first tested the prediction that the nature of the
recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the degree to which recipients would
view the provider’s act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 1a). The ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of relationship (good vs. bad) on perceived degree of transparency,
F(1,192) = 12.62, p < .001, η
"
#
= .062. Participants who imagined having a good relationship
with the information provider (M = 5.55, SD = .81) evaluated the provider’s act of information
sharing as significantly more transparent than those who imagined having a bad relationship with
the information provider (M = 5.04, SD = 1.13). Additionally, supplemental analyses revealed
that controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(1,191) = 12.60, p < .001, η
"
#
= .062.
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. I also tested the prediction that the nature
of the recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the perceived value of the

30
provider’s act of transparency (Hypothesis 1b). The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
relationship (good vs. bad) on the perceived value of the act of transparency, F(1,192) = 14.38, p
< .001, η
"
#
= .070. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the information
provider (M = 5.60, SD = .85) indicated that they valued the act of transparency to a significantly
greater degree than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the information provider
(M = 5.07, SD = 1.07). Again, supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario
did not affect the results, F(1,191) = 14.21, p < .001, η
"
#
= .069.
Perceived Prosocial Motive. I tested whether the recipient’s relationship with the
provider would influence the extent to which recipients perceived the provider as having
prosocial motives for his act of transparency (Hypothesis 2). There was a significant effect of
relationship (good vs. bad) on the perceived prosocial motive of the actor, F(1,192) = 23.04, p
< .001, η
"
#
= .107. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the information
provider (M = 5.43, SD = .93) believed to a significantly greater degree that the provider had
prosocial motives for his act of transparency than those who imagined having a bad relationship
with the information provider (M = 4.74, SD = 1.06). Supplemental analyses revealed that
controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(1,191) = 23.33, p < .001, η
"
#
= .109.
Mediation
To test whether the extent to which recipients perceive the provider as being motivated
by prosocial reasons would mediate the effect of the relationship on the degree to which
recipients perceive the provider’s act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 3a) and
the degree to which participants value the act of transparency (Hypothesis 3b), I conducted
bootstrapped mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrap samples using the PROCESS macro
(Model 4; Hayes, 2018). These analyses provided support for a significant indirect effect in

31
which perceived motive mediated the effect of relationship on perceived degree of transparency
(B = -.311, SE = .083, 95% CI [-.485, -.163]), as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2
The Effect of Relationship on Perceived Degree of Transparency Mediated by Perceived Motive

These analyses also provided support for a significant indirect effect in which perceived
motive mediated the effect of relationship on the perceived value of the act of transparency (B =
-.464, SE = .101, 95% CI [-.671, -.273]), as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3
The Effect of Relationship on Perceived Value of Transparency Mediated by Perceived Motive

32
Discussion
The results of Study 2 provide further support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b by
demonstrating that the nature of the relationship between an information provider and
information recipient will influence recipient perceptions of the provider's act of transparency,
specifically that a good (vs. bad) relationship will lead to more (vs. less) favorable evaluations of
the act of transparency. The results also provide support for the prediction that the relationship
between an information provider and information recipient will influence the extent to which
recipients perceive the provider as being motivated by prosocial reasons, with a good
relationship leading to the perception that the provider is more motivated by prosocial reasons
(Hypothesis 2). Finally, the results from Study 2 provide support for the prediction that the
extent to which recipients attribute prosocial motives to the information provider mediates the
effect of the relationship between the provider and recipient on the degree to which recipients
perceive the act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 3a) and the degree to which
recipients value the act of transparency (Hypothesis 3b).
Study 3
In addition to replicating the findings from the previous studies, Study 3 was designed to
investigate whether the effect of the relationship on recipient perceptions of transparency would
be moderated by whether or not the provider’s act of transparency was done voluntarily
(Hypothesis 4). Specifically, Study 3 tested the prediction that in a good relationship, recipients
would evaluate the act of transparency more favorably (i.e., more transparent and more valuable)
when it is seen as voluntary rather than not voluntary; whereas in a bad relationship, recipients
would evaluate the act of transparency more favorably when it is seen as not voluntary rather

33
than voluntary. Additionally, Study 3 examined the potential downstream effect of perceptions of
transparency on trust in the provider (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Participants
Four hundred and one participants from the United States were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were each paid $.75 to complete the study. I excluded
from analysis six participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check questions.
Excluding these participants did not affect the results. The final sample consisted of 395
participants (171 female, 224 male). On average, participants were 40.55 years old (ranging from
18 to 75, SD = 11.76).
Research Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2x3 between-subjects
design. The study manipulated the recipient’s relationship with the information provider (good
vs. bad) and the voluntariness of the act of transparency (voluntary vs. not voluntary vs. control
condition with no information regarding voluntariness).
As in the previous study, in order to increase the generalizability of the results, I again
utilized two different scenarios. Participants were randomly presented with one of the two
scenarios. One of the scenarios was the same as the second scenario in Study 2, in which
participants imagined themselves as a salesperson working at a tech firm, whose manager
informed them that there may be another round of upcoming layoffs. However, in Study 3, the
scenario was revised so that participants in the voluntary condition read that their manager was
willingly sharing this information about potential layoffs despite being unsure as to whether all
of the higher-ups would want him to do so. In the not voluntary condition, participants read that

34
their manager would rather not share this information but was sharing it only because he had
been instructed to do so. In the control condition, participants were not provided with any
additional information that would indicate whether or not the act of transparency was voluntary.
The second scenario was a newly designed scenario that was constructed from a number
of responses from the pretests which involved various types of potential changes in their
workplace that would drastically affect people’s abilities to do their jobs. This scenario was also
inspired by anecdotes involving limited research funding as a result of the pandemic, which I
would anticipate has been a common issue recently across organizations. This scenario asked
participants to imagine themselves as an engineer at a tech firm. Participants read that they
received an email from their manager marked as important. As in the previous studies, in the
good relationship condition, participants were told that they have always had a great relationship
with their manager; in the bad relationship condition, participants were told that they have
always had a very strained relationship with their manager. In the email from their manager,
participants read that there have been talks of cutting funding to certain projects due to limited
funds. In the voluntary condition, participants read that their manager was choosing to share this
information despite being unsure as to whether all of upper management would want him to do
so. In the not voluntary condition, participants read that their manager was only sharing this
information because he had been instructed to do so. In the control condition, participants were
not provided with any additional information that would indicate whether or not the act of
transparency was voluntary.
Measures
Manipulation and Attention Checks. Following the scenario, participants responded to
two manipulation checks. As in Study 2, the first manipulation check asked participants to

35
indicate whether the nature of their relationship with their manager was good or bad. The second
manipulation check asked participants to indicate which of the following was true according to
the scenario: (a) your manager shares information with you even though he’s not sure whether
upper management would want him to do so, (b) your manager shares information with you only
because upper management has instructed him to do so, or (c) cannot be determined from the
scenario.
As in Study 2, participants later responded to two attention checks that asked participants
to select a certain answer for each question to indicate that they were reading carefully. Again,
these two items were placed throughout the study in order to gauge whether participants were
reading the items carefully throughout the entire study.
Perceived Degree of Transparency. I assessed participants’ perceptions of the actor’s
degree of transparency using the same eight-item scale as in Studies 1 and 2. Responses on these
eight items were averaged to compose a scale (a=.88).
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. I assessed participants’ perceptions of the
value of the act of transparency using the same five-item scale as in Studies 1 and 2. I again
conducted an exploratory factor analysis, since this was a newly developed scale. This factor
analysis extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which explained 58.13% of
the variance. With the exception of the one reverse-coded item, factor loadings for all items
exceeded .73; the reverse-coded item had a factor loading of .41. Responses on these five items
were averaged to compose a scale (a=.75).
Perceived Prosocial Motive. I assessed participants’ beliefs regarding whether the actor
had prosocial motives for his act of transparency using the same five-item scale as in Study 2.

36
I again conducted an exploratory factor analysis, since this was a newly developed scale. The
factor analysis extracted only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which explained
67.56% of the variance. With the exception of the one reverse-coded item, factor loadings for all
items exceeded .88; the reverse-coded item had a factor loading of .45. Responses on these five
items were averaged to compose a scale (a=.85).
Trust. I assessed the perceived trustworthiness of the actor using a multi-item scale
adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999). The five items included: (1) My manager is trustworthy,
(2) If I had my way, I would not let my manager have any influence over issues that are
important to me at work (reverse-coded), (3) I would be willing to let my manager have control
over my future in this company, (4) I would want to have a good way to keep an eye on my
manager (reverse-coded), (5) I would be comfortable giving my manager a task or problem that
is critical to me, even if I could not monitor his actions. Participants rated these items on a 7-
point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Responses on these five items were
averaged to compose a scale (a=.71).
Results
Manipulation Check
Of the initial 401 participants who completed the study, 333 participants (83.04%)
successfully passed the first manipulation check which asked them to indicate the nature of their
relationship with their manager. Of the 401 participants, 257 participants (64.09%) successfully
passed the second manipulation check which asked them to indicate whether their manager’s
transparency was done voluntarily. The largest percentage of participants who failed to pass the
second manipulation check came from those in the control conditions, which had provided no
information regarding whether or not the manager’s act was voluntary. This suggests that despite

37
not being explicitly informed of the voluntariness of the manager’s transparency, participants
may have nevertheless inferred this information from the scenario.
Main Effect of Relationship
I conducted a two-way ANOVA to examine the effects of relationship and voluntariness.
Although participants were randomly assigned to one of two scenarios, I anticipated that the
scenarios would not make a difference in the results and therefore did not include scenario as a
factor in the analyses. However, I did conduct supplemental analyses controlling for scenario,
which showed that controlling for scenario did not affect the results.
Perceived Degree of Transparency. I tested the prediction that the nature of the
recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the degree to which recipients would
view the provider’s act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 1a). The ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of relationship on perceived degree of transparency, F(1,389) =
45.90, p < .001, η
"
#
= .106. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the
information provider (M = 5.54, SD = .83) evaluated the provider’s act of information sharing as
significantly more transparent than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the
information provider (M = 4.89, SD = 1.06). Additionally, supplemental analyses revealed that
controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(1,388) = 45.76, p < .001, η
"
#
= .105.
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. I also tested the prediction that the nature
of the recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence the perceived value of the
provider’s act of transparency (Hypothesis 1b). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main
effect of relationship on the perceived value of the act of transparency, F(1, 389) = 46.77, p
< .001, η
"
#
= .107. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the information
provider (M = 5.74, SD = .84) indicated that they valued the act of transparency significantly

38
more than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the information provider (M =
5.10, SD = 1.00). Again, supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not
affect the results, F(1,388) = 46.66, p < .001, η
"
#
= .107.
Perceived Prosocial Motive. I tested whether the recipient’s relationship with the
provider would influence the extent to which recipients perceived the provider as having
prosocial motives for his act of transparency (Hypothesis 2). The results revealed a significant
main effect of relationship on the perceived motive of the actor, F(1, 389) = 139.75, p < .001,
η
"
#
= .264. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the information provider
(M = 5.59, SD = .87) believed to a significantly greater degree that the provider had prosocial
motives for his act of transparency than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the
information provider (M = 4.34, SD = 1.21). Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for
the scenario did not affect the results, F(1,388) = 140.97, p < .001, η
"
#
= .267.
Trust. I tested whether the recipient’s relationship with the provider would influence
trust in the provider. There was a significant main effect of relationship on trust, F(1, 389) =
170.91, p < .001, η
"
#
= .305. Participants who imagined having a good relationship with the
information provider (M = 4.88, SD = .81) evaluated the actor as significantly more trustworthy
than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the information provider (M = 3.59, SD
= 1.11). Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the
results, F(1,388) = 170.93, p < .001, η
"
#
= .306.
Main Effect of Voluntariness
I did not make any predictions regarding a main effect of voluntariness, given that I
predicted that voluntariness would produce opposite effects in good relationships versus bad
relationships. However, I report these results below for the sake of thoroughness.

39
Perceived Degree of Transparency. The ANOVA revealed there was no significant
main effect of voluntariness on perceived degree of transparency, F(2,389) = 1.90, p = .15,
η
"
#
= .010. Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the
results, F(2,388) = 1.90, p = .15, η
"
#
= .010.
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. There was also no significant main effect
of voluntariness on the perceived value of the act of transparency, F(2,389) = 1.01, p = .36,
η
"
#
= .005. Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the
results, F(2,388) = 1.00, p = .37, η
"
#
= .005.
Perceived Prosocial Motive. There was no significant main effect of voluntariness on
the perceived motive of the actor, F(2,389) = .55, p = .58, η
"
#
= .003. Supplemental analyses
revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(2,388) = .50, p = .61,
η
"
#
= .003.
Trust. There was no significant main effect of voluntariness on trust, F(2,389) = .19, p
= .83, η
"
#
= .001. Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect
the results, F(2,388) = .18, p = .84, η
"
#
= .001.
Relationship x Voluntariness Interaction Effect
Perceived Degree of Transparency. The ANOVA revealed no significant relationship x
voluntariness interaction effect on perceived degree of transparency, F(2,389) = 2.44, p = .089,
η
"
#
= .012. These results are illustrated in Figure 4. Additionally, supplemental analyses
revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(2,388) = 2.43, p = .090,
η
"
#
= .012.

40
Figure 4
Perceived Degree of Transparency by Relationship x Voluntariness (Study 3)

Note. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

However, because the p-value might be considered as approaching significance, I
conducted post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction to probe this interaction. These post hoc
tests revealed that among participants who imagined having a bad relationship with the provider,
there was a significant difference between those who perceived the provider’s act of
transparency as voluntary versus not voluntary, p < .05. Specifically, participants who imagined
having a bad relationship with the provider and perceived the provider’s transparency as
voluntary (M = 4.67, SD = .96) evaluated the provider’s act of information sharing as
significantly less transparent than those who imagined having a bad relationship with the
provider and perceived the provider’s transparency as not voluntary (M = 5.09, SD = 1.03). Post

41
hoc tests indicated that no other pairwise comparisons among conditions were significantly
different. See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations by relationship x voluntariness.

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations by Relationship x Voluntariness (Study 3)
Relationship with Provider

Bad
M (SD)
Good
M (SD)
Total
M (SD)
Voluntariness
Control
M (SD)
Perceived
Transparency
4.91 (1.16) 5.39 (.87) 5.16 (1.05)
Perceived Value
of Transparency
5.09 (1.14) 5.63 (.88) 5.37 (1.05)
Perceived
Motive
4.24 (1.30) 5.55 (.89) 4.90 (1.28)
Trust 3.59 (1.13) 4.81 (.81) 4.21 (1.15)
Not
Voluntary
M (SD)
Perceived
Transparency
5.09 (1.03) 5.60 (.77) 5.35 (.94)
Perceived Value
of Transparency
5.19 (.94) 5.83 (.88) 5.52 (.96)
Perceived
Motive
4.47 (1.30) 5.59 (.88) 5.04 (1.24)
Trust 3.64 (1.11) 4.90 (.77) 4.29 (1.14)
Voluntary
M (SD)
Perceived
Transparency
4.67 (.96) 5.61 (.84) 5.14 (1.01)
Perceived Value
of Transparency
5.02 (.94) 5.75 (.77) 5.39 (.93)
Perceived
Motive
4.30 (1.02) 5.63 (.85) 4.97 (1.15)
Trust 3.53 (1.12) 4.92 (.86) 4.23 (1.21)
Total
M (SD)
Perceived
Transparency
4.89 (1.06) 5.54 (.83) 5.22 (1.00)
Perceived Value
of Transparency
5.10 (1.00) 5.74 (.84) 5.43 (.98)
Perceived
Motive
4.34 (1.21) 5.59 (.87) 4.97 (1.22)
Trust 3.59 (1.11) 4.88 (.81) 4.24 (1.17)

42
Perceived Value of the Act of Transparency. There was no significant interaction
effect on the perceived value of the act of transparency, F(2,389) = .32, p = .73, η
"
#
= .002.
Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the results,
F(2,388) = .32, p = .73, η
"
#
= .002.
Perceived Prosocial Motive. There was no significant interaction effect on the perceived
motive of the actor, F(2,389) = .37, p = .69, η
"
#
= .002. Supplemental analyses revealed that
controlling for the scenario did not affect the results, F(2,388) = .38, p = .68, η
"
#
= .002.
Trust. There was no significant interaction effect on trust, F(2,389) = .26, p = .77,
η
"
#
= .001. Supplemental analyses revealed that controlling for the scenario did not affect the
results, F(2,388) = .26, p = .77, η
"
#
= .001.
Mediation and Moderated Mediation
Mediation by Perceived Motive. I conducted bootstrapped mediation analyses with
5,000 bootstrap samples using the PROCESS macro (Model 4; Hayes, 2018) to test the
prediction that perceived prosocial motive would mediate the degree to which recipients perceive
the provider’s act of information sharing as transparent (Hypothesis 3a) and the degree to which
participants value the act of transparency (Hypothesis 3b). Although I did not make predictions
regarding moderated mediation, I conducted supplemental analyses examining whether these
mediation models might be moderated by the voluntariness of the provider’s act of transparency
(Model 8; Hayes, 2018).
The mediation analyses provided support for a significant indirect effect in which
perceived motive mediated the effect of relationship on perceived degree of transparency (B =
-.684, SE = .077, 95% CI [-.840, -.537]). However, the moderated mediation analyses provided
no evidence that this mediation was moderated by voluntariness (95% CI [-.13, .14]).

43
Additionally, the mediation analyses provided support for a significant indirect effect in which
perceived motive mediated the effect of relationship on the perceived value of the act of
transparency (B = -.704, SE = .085, 95% CI [-.875, -.544]). Again, the moderated mediation
analyses did not provide evidence of significant moderated mediation (95% CI [-.14, .14]).
Downstream Effect on Trust. I then conducted bootstrapped mediation analyses with
5,000 bootstrap samples (PROCESS Model 4; Hayes, 2018) to test the prediction that
evaluations of the act of transparency would have downstream effects on trust in the provider by
mediating the effect of relationship on trust. Again, although I did not make predictions
regarding moderated mediation, I conducted supplemental analyses examining whether these
mediation models might be moderated by the voluntariness of the provider’s act of transparency
(Model 8; Hayes, 2018).
I found a significant indirect effect in which the perceived degree of transparency
mediated the effect of relationship on trust in the provider (B = -.304, SE = .055, 95% CI [-.421,
-.202]). However, I found no evidence that this effect was significantly moderated by
voluntariness (95% CI [-.004, .23]). Lastly, I found a significant indirect effect in which the
perceived value of the act of transparency mediated the effect of relationship on trust (B = -.285,
SE = .057, 95% CI [-.404, -.178]), but again did not find evidence of moderated mediation (95%
CI [-.06, .15]).
Discussion
The results of Study 3 provide further support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b by
demonstrating that the nature of the relationship between an information provider and
information recipient influences recipient perceptions of the degree of transparency (H1a) and
the value of the provider's act of transparency (H1b). The results also provide additional support

44
for Hypotheses 2, 3a, and 3b by demonstrating not only that the relationship between an
information provider and recipient influences the perceived prosocial motive of the actor (H2),
but also that perceived prosocial motive mediates the effect of relationship on perceptions of the
degree of transparency (H3a) and the value of the act of transparency (H3b).
For the most part, the results from Study 3 do not lend much support for the prediction
that the voluntariness of the act of transparency moderates the effect of relationship on
perceptions of transparency (H4). However, although the majority of the predicted interaction
effects were not statistically significant, the results may provide some preliminary evidence that
voluntariness could moderate the effect of relationship on perceptions of the degree to which the
provider was transparent. While the interaction effect on the perceived degree of transparency
was not significant, among individuals who had a bad relationship with the provider, the
statistically significant difference between those who perceived the provider’s act of
transparency as voluntary versus not voluntary lends tentative support for the prediction that
when in a bad relationship, transparency that is perceived as voluntary may actually be perceived
more negatively than transparency that is viewed as not voluntary. Finally, the results did
provide evidence for a downstream effect on trust by demonstrating that the perceived degree of
transparency and the perceived value of the act of transparency mediate the effect of relationship
on trust in the provider, thus lending support for Hypothesis 5.
General Discussion
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the recipient perspective of transparency,
as well as to investigate how interpersonal concerns may influence recipient perceptions of
transparency. Although previous research has examined the ways in which characteristics of the
information being shared may influence the success of transparency attempts, this existing work

45
has largely neglected the potential influence of interpersonal factors in transparency. The present
research therefore demonstrates how one interpersonal factor, namely, the nature of the existing
relationship between an information provider and recipient, can influence recipient evaluations
of the provider’s act of transparency. Across three studies, I consistently found that a good
relationship with the provider tends to lead to more favorable evaluations of the provider’s
transparency, whereas a bad relationship leads to less favorable evaluations. Specifically,
recipients who had a good relationship with the provider not only perceived the provider’s act of
information sharing as more transparent, but they also valued the act of transparency to a greater
degree. Additionally, I found that this tendency occurs because a good relationship with the
provider leads recipients to perceive the provider as being more motivated by prosocial motives,
which in turn results in more favorable evaluations of the provider’s transparency. Alternatively,
a bad relationship with the provider tends to lead recipients to view the provider as lower in
prosocial motivation, which in turn results in the perceptions that the provider was less
transparent and that the provider’s act of information sharing was less valuable.
Finally, I explored one potential approach to attenuating the harmful effect of a bad
relationship on perceptions of transparency. I tested whether the perceived voluntariness of the
provider’s act of transparency might moderate the effect of the relationship. For the most part,
my findings did not support this prediction. However, there was some tentative evidence that
when a recipient has a bad relationship with the provider, acts of transparency that are seen as
not voluntary may be perceived in a more positive light than acts of transparency that are seen as
voluntary. This would present a surprising finding in that it would suggest that while
transparency is generally perceived as a positive thing, providers may at times benefit from
downplaying their role in the decision to be transparent when they have a negative relationship

46
with the recipient. However, to draw such a conclusion would require corroboration by further
research.
Theoretical Implications
This work makes several contributions to the transparency literature. First, the present
research broadens the conceptualization of transparency to go beyond just the characteristics of
the information to also incorporate the social or interpersonal component of transparency.
Whereas previous work has understood transparency as primarily involving matters of the
information being shared, such as the quantity or quality of the information, the current work
demonstrates that transparency must also be understood as an interpersonal act.
Second, this work adds to the yet limited research on recipient perceptions of
transparency. For one, much of the existing work has focused on the actor perspective (Healy &
Palepu, 2001). Additionally, even among the existing work that has examined the recipient
perspective, there is very little work that has looked at how recipients perceive the act of
transparency itself; rather, much of this past work has focused on various other outcomes that
transparency may produce (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Cain et al., 2011; Fenster,
2006). The current research therefore provides insights into the ways in which recipients
perceive transparency, which is a vital step to better understanding why providers and recipients
may experience disconnects in their perceptions of transparency.
Finally, the current research contributes to the literature on person perception and mental
state inferences. While extensive research has demonstrated how perceptions of an actor’s
motives can influence perceptions of the actor and willingness to interact with the actor in the
future, less work has examined how perceptions of an actor’s motives underlying a given
behavior might influence evaluations of the behavior itself. This research therefore extends this

47
existing work to suggest that perceived motives can not only affect perceptions of the actor but
also their actions. This is particularly important to the extent that perceptions of a provider’s
transparency may influence important organizational goals aside from trust.
Practical Implications
The findings of this research have important practical implications for how individuals
and organizations might manage transparency. For one, the current research suggests that
whereas those who are engaging in transparency may want to focus their attention on the
information that is being shared, it is crucial to also consider the nature of the relationship one
has with the expected recipients of one’s transparency. Information providers who neglect to
consider interpersonal factors when sharing information may be surprised to find their
transparency attempts poorly received.
Additionally, the current research would caution that introducing transparency initiatives
may not always be an effective way to remedy issues of distrust within an organization. Rather, it
may be more prudent to focus on ways to first repair the relationship prior to sharing
information. However, when a bad relationship is unavoidable, the current research tentatively
suggests one potential way of minimizing the negative effects of a bad relationship on recipient
perceptions of the act of transparency. Specifically, this research tentatively suggests that
downplaying one’s role in the decision to be transparent may help overcome some of the
challenges brought on by a bad relationship and may facilitate a more positive reception of the
provider’s transparency efforts.
Limitations and Future Directions
One of the limitations of this work is that I adopted a broad conceptualization of good
and bad relationships, and I did not explore how the various potential underlying causes of a

48
good or bad relationship might differentially influence recipient perceptions of transparency. For
instance, a bad relationship between two individuals resulting from issues of competence (or the
lack thereof) may have a different effect on perceptions of transparency than a bad relationship
resulting from an egregious integrity-based violation of trust. Future research may therefore
explore how certain nuances in the nature of the preexisting relationship may influence
recipients’ perceptions of transparency. In a similar vein, given the multifaceted nature of
perceived transparency, future work might delve into how the relationship between an
information provider and recipient may have a greater impact on certain aspects of perceived
transparency than others. Additionally, the current research focused on the perception of
prosocial motives for transparency and did not explore the various alternative motives that
people might attribute to the actor for their act of transparency. Investigating these other
potential motives may provide further insight into when and why efforts to be transparent are
met with unfavorable evaluations.
This research also had a couple limitations in the study designs. For one, all three studies
were conducted online and employed vignettes. While vignette studies are helpful in providing a
more controlled setting to test for specific effects, they are less representative of real-life
contexts and may therefore not accurately reflect the complexities of relationships in the
workplace. In reality, workplace relationships are built over multiple interactions and may be
much more nuanced than what participants read in a scenario. In-person studies may therefore
better capture the ways in which relationships may influence the attribution of motives and
perceptions of transparency.
There was also a potential limitation in the design of Study 3. There is a possibility that
the manipulation of voluntariness in this final study may have signaled something other than just

49
voluntariness – specifically, the legitimacy of the information being shared. In the voluntary
condition, the scenario stated that the actor was sharing information despite being unsure as to
whether he should do so; in the not voluntary condition, the scenario stated that the actor was
only sharing information because he had been instructed to do so. This manipulation may have
therefore influenced perceptions of the legitimacy of the information (i.e., whether it was
approved or sanctioned by upper management). Although the good relationship conditions did
not differ as a function of the voluntariness of the act of transparency, a closer examination of the
potential interpretations of the scenarios may elucidate what other factors might potentially serve
to attenuate the harmful effect of a bad relationship.
Future work may build upon the current work by further investigating the role of
interpersonal influences in transparency. The present research was meant to serve as an early
investigation into the previously underexplored interpersonal influences on transparency.
Therefore, future work might explore how interpersonal influences may interact with
characteristics of the information being shared, such as the quantity or valence of the
information. Additionally, the present research was intended to provide initial insights into the
recipient perspective of transparency, but a thorough understanding of transparency would
require directly comparing and examining how actors and recipients may differ from one another
in their perceptions of transparency. Exploring these potential asymmetries may in turn reveal
when and why certain transparency efforts fall short of their desired effects.
Finally, future research might examine how interpersonal concerns may influence
perceptions of transparency across different contexts. For instance, given the increasing
prevalence of remote working, research may examine how interpersonal influences like the
preexisting relationship may affect perceptions of transparency in such virtual contexts. Future

50
directions may also involve exploring additional downstream consequences of perceived
transparency other than trust.
Conclusion
This research aims to expand our understanding of transparency by exploring a
previously overlooked component of transparency, as well as investigating the way in which
recipients evaluate transparency. The current work suggests that for transparency efforts to be
successful, it is imperative to consider not only characteristics of the information being shared,
but also the nature of the relationship between the information provider and recipient.
Ultimately, this dissertation highlights the importance of better understanding the recipient
perspective of transparency, and sheds light on some of the complexities of managing
transparency in organizations.

51
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Abstract (if available)

Abstract In the midst of increasing calls for greater transparency in organizations, scholars have also begun to recognize cases in which transparency attempts fail to be effective or even backfire. I propose that investigating the recipient perspective of transparency may provide insights into when and why transparency attempts fall short. Whereas much of the extant work on transparency has devoted attention to how characteristics of the information being shared may influence the success of transparency attempts, I examine the influence of interpersonal concerns on recipient perceptions of transparency. Specifically, I examine how the preexisting relationship between an information provider and recipient may influence recipient perceptions of transparency. I demonstrate through three empirical studies that having a good relationship with the information provider leads to more favorable evaluations of the provider’s act of transparency, and that this effect is mediated by the extent to which recipients attribute prosocial motives to the provider for their transparency. I also explore whether the negative effect of a bad relationship may be attenuated to some degree when the provider’s act of transparency is attributed to external influences and is thus perceived as not voluntary.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Han, Alyssa Ju Rie (author)

Core Title When transparency fails: investigating the complexities of managing transparency in organizations

School Marshall School of Business

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Business Administration

Degree Conferral Date 2021-08

Publication Date 07/18/2021

Defense Date 06/18/2021

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag actor-observer asymmetry,OAI-PMH Harvest,perceived motive,perceived transparency,Relationship,transparency

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Kim, Peter H. (committee chair), Hollingshead, Andrea B. (committee member), Wiltermuth, Scott S. (committee member)

Creator Email juriehan@marshall.usc.edu,juriehan57@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC15602431

Unique identifier UC15602431

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Rights Han, Alyssa Ju Rie

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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