China' s fragmented political structure and the effect on environmental policy enforcement on the water pollution control in the tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area

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CHINA’S FRAGMENTED POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THE EFFECT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENFORCEMENT
– ON THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE TRIBUTARIES IN THE
THREE GORGES RESERVOIR AREA

by

Min Rui

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)

August 2008

Copyright 2008 Min Rui

ii
Acknowledgements
I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Stanley Rosen,
Director of East Asian Studies Center and Professor of the Department of Political
Science, University of Southern California, for his help, understanding, encouragement
and guidance throughout my two-year academic studies at the East Asian Studies Center,
USC. His rich knowledge of East Asian societies and his profound understanding of the
Chinese political system have been of great value for my studies on China issues. I am
also deeply grateful to Dr. Rosen for his important guidance and detailed comments on
this thesis.
I am also deeply grateful to my two supervisors, Dr. Daniel Lynch, Professor of
the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, and Dr. Tang
Shui-yan, Professor of the School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of
Southern California, for their detailed review, constructive criticism and excellent advice
on this thesis, and for their important support throughout this work.
I also wish to express my warm and sincere thanks to my colleague, Miss Mary
Lagdameo, for revising the English of my manuscript and for her valuable comments and
advice on this thesis.

iii
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ii
List of Figures iv
Abbreviations v
Abstract vi
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Overview: China’s Water Pollution 1
Research Question and Purpose of Study 2
Overall Structure and Research Methods 3
Chapter 1 Endnotes 4

Chapter 2: Fragmented Authoritarianism 5
Overall Governance Structures 5
Fragmented Authoritarianism 6
Impacts on Environmental Policy Enforcement 9
Chapter 2 Endnotes 21

Chapter 3: Water Pollution Control for the Tributaries of the Three Gorges
Reservoir Area: A Case Study of Liangtan River 24
Efforts and Challenges 25
Overview: the Liangtan River 29
Water Pollution of the Liangtan River 29
Table 1: Sources of Water Pollution of the Liangtan River
in Chongqing (2007) 30
Efforts with regard to the Liangtan River Pollution Treatment 35
Analysis of the Liangtan River Case 40
Chapter 3 Endnotes 53

Chapter 4: Conclusion 59
Chapter 4 Endnotes 66

Bibliography 68

iv
List of Figures
Figure 1: China’s Overall Governance Structure 5
Figure 2 Governments Involved in Water Resource Management in the
Three Gorges Reservoir Area 28

Figure 3 Governments Involved in the Control of Water Pollution in the
Liangtan River 32

Figure 4 Chongqing Governmental Bureaus Involved in the Control of
Water Pollution in the Liangtan River 33

Figure 5: District governments of Chongqing Involved in the Control of
Water Pollution in the Liangtan River 34

Figure 6: Overall Governance Structure for the Control of Water Pollution
in the Liangtan River 34

v
Abbreviations
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EPB Environmental Protection Bureau
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
IDB Immigrant Development Bureau
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection
MLR Ministry of Land and Resources
MOC Ministry of Construction
MOH Ministry of Health
MWR Ministry of Water Resources
SDRC State Development and Reform Commission
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration
SOEs State-Owned Enterprises
TGPCC the Three Gorges Project Construction Commission
TVEs Township and Village Enterprises
WPPC the Water Pollution Prevention and Control
YRWRC the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission

vi
Abstract
China’s rapid economic growth has led to severe environmental degradation.
Despite numerous laws, regulations, and policies to regulate and direct the country’s
environmental performance, the enforcement of these policies and regulations has been
far from effective.
Why has China been unsuccessful in implementing environmental policies and
regulations? This thesis emphasizes the importance of China’s fragmented structure of
governance as the crucial explanatory variable and examines the major features of this
structure. Using an analysis of the water pollution control in the Liangtan River, one of
the major tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area, as a case study, this thesis
concludes that the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of different governmental
agencies, the poor inter-agency coordination and cooperation, and the strong local
protectionism all reveal the disadvantages that stem from the fragmented authoritarian
political system, which hinders the control of water pollution in the Three Gorges
Reservoir area.

1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Overview: China’s Water Pollution
Although China maintained its annual economic growth rate around 8% in the last
two decades, this impressive growth has also led to severe environmental degradation.
Among various environmental pollutions, water pollution is especially serious. Various
official reports indicate that the seven largest rivers in China, including the Yangtze River
and the Yellow River are all severely polluted. Over 70% of the water running through
the urban area of the country is unsuitable for drinking and fishing. Nearly half the
ground water in urban areas is heavily polluted. Forty-three percent of lake water was
classified as Level 5+ (Level 5+ means the water is useless).
1
“Of 222 drinkable water
resources in 113 major Chinese cities, only 72 percent reached national standards.”
2

According to Ma Jun, author of China’s Water Crisis and director of the Beijing Institute
of Public and Environmental Affairs, “(w)ater pollution is the biggest threat in the short
term”, and “water pollution is at or even beyond the crisis point.”
3

The Three Gorges Dam project is considered by China’s government as the
showcase of China’s achievement and the strength of the country. Therefore, the water
environment of the Three Gorges reservoir area has been the major concern of China’s
government. In the past two decades, China’s government has invested billions of dollars
to address the issue of water pollution in the reservoir area. However, since the Three
Gorges reservoir started to store water in 2003, the overall water environment has
worsened. The pollution of the tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area is becoming
so serious that there is an increasing threat to the water environment security of the Three

2
Gorges area. In September 2007, the Chinese government admitted for the first time that
the Three Gorges dam project may cause a potential ecological catastrophe if no
immediate treatment action is taken.
4

In recent years, China’s government is fully aware of the significant effects of
water pollution to China’s sustainable economic and social development. In order to
prevent and control pollution, China has enacted numerous laws, regulations, and policies
regarding water pollution control. Unfortunately, in practice the enforcement of these
policies and regulations are far from effective. Why is water pollution in China so
difficult to address? In addition to factors such as the lack of funds, facilities and
technologies, this paper focuses on China’s governance structure to explore why China’s
environmental regulations and policies often fail to be enforced efficiently.

Research Question and Purpose of Study
This study is conducted to explore two research questions as follows: Why is
China always inefficient in implementing environmental policies and regulations? This
thesis focuses on the theory of fragmented authoritarianism, and examines how China’s
governance structure regarding water environment management is fragmented as well as
how this fragmented structure influences the enforcement of environmental policies and
regulations. This thesis argues that the structural fragmentation leads to severe and
complicated conflicts of interest between different governmental agencies at various
levels. The lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of different governmental agencies,
the poor inter-agency coordination and cooperation, and the strong local protectionism

3
contribute to the inefficient enforcement of the state’s environmental policies. The
purpose of this study is to reveal how and why the disadvantages that stem from a
fragmented authoritarian political system hinder water pollution control in the Three
Gorges Reservoir area.

Overall Structure and Research Methods
In terms of the two research questions above, this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 1 describes the overall water pollution in China and introduces the research
questions, structure and research methods. Chapter 2 focuses on fragmented
authoritarianism and discusses the main features of China’s fragmented governance
structure and its effects on policy enforcement. Chapter 3 introduces a case study on the
water pollution control in the Liangtan River, one of the major tributaries in the Three
Gorges Reservoir area, and further explores how and why the disadvantages of the
fragmented authoritarian political system hinder the control of water pollution in China.
This study relies on scholarly books and papers, e-journals, news reports and
government documents. Data for the case study was mainly collected from the news
reports and government documents of recent years. The major limitation of this study is
the lack of any first-hand investigation at the site or any interviews with the key actors
involved in the case of the Liangtan River pollution control project.

4
Chapter 1 Endnotes

1. Day, K.A., ed. China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development.
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.

Khan, Haider A. & Liu, Yibei. "Ecological Economics of Water in China: Towards a
Sustainable Water Quality Management Regime."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004632 (Aug. 2007).

Wang, Yi. "China’s Water Issues: Transition, Governance and Innovation."
http://admin.citaaragon.es/pub/documentos/documentos_WangYi_286d0ba6.pdf.
(2007).

2. Day, K.A., ed. China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development.
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.

"SEPA: Pollution Control Requires Accountability."
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/200832.htm (February 27, 2007).

3. "Waking up to China's Water Crisis."
http://www.caijing.com.cn/20070912/30024.shtml.

4. Liu, Jianqiang. "The Three Gorges: A Wiser Approach."
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/1417-The-Three-Gorges-a-
wiser-approach (Oct. 23, 2007).

5
Chapter 2 Fragmented Authoritarianism
To understand the factors that hinder environmental policy enforcement in China,
it is necessary to first examine China’s overall bureaucratic structure and the role of
“fragmented authoritarianism” in this structure.

Overall Governance Structure
Originally adopted from the former Soviet Union in the 1950’s, China’s
governance structure looks like a set of linked multi-layered pyramids as follows:

Figure 1: China’s Overall Governance Structure

6
In this structure, the highest layer is the central government. Below the central
government, there are four levels of local government: the region (including province and
municipality directly under the central government), city, district/county, and town. The
basic structure of the central government is duplicated by the local government at each
lower territorial level. The top of each pyramid is the leadership of the government, and
each cell at the bottom of a pyramid represents a functional unit within the government.
Commands are issued vertically from the top to the bottom, namely, from the leadership
of the government at each level to the functional units within its jurisdiction. At the
Center, this functional department is called a “ministry”, and at the local level (no matter
at which level it is located), it is called a “bureau”. The relationship between “ministry”
and “bureau” is normally called a “xitong” or “tiaotiao” relationship whereas the
relationship between a local unit and other government agencies within the same
jurisdiction is called a difang or kuaikuai relationship.
1

Fragmented Authoritarianism
The key feature of this governance structure is that the administrative authority is
fragmented both vertically within ministries and horizontally within local governments.
2

According to Kenneth Lieberthal (1997), fragmented authoritarianism refers to the
situation where “authority in China is fragmented by function, by territory and by rank”
in the process of policy making and implementation.
3
Within this structure, each unit
should follow the commands from both the territorial government and the upper
functional bureaus. In other words, “(b)ureaucratic control is exercised by function using

7
line relationships and within geographic regions using area relationships.”
4
Taking the
environmental protection xitong as an example, at the top of this system is SEPA (State
Environmental Protection Administration, which was just upgraded to be the Ministry of
Environmental Protection in March 2008). Under the SEPA are the EPBs (Environmental
Protection Bureau) with different administrative ranks, such as provincial, city, or county
EPBs. Out of the environmental protection system, EPBs are also the organs of local
governments. Local EPBs should accept the leadership of local governments and report
their work to local governments. This bureaucratic structure indicates that EPBs are
under the dual leadership of both the SEPA and local governments. The following
passages will explain how the authority of the government units is fragmented by rank,
territory and function.
Rank. Rank is an important reflection of power and status in the Chinese political
hierarchy. Government agencies at the same administrative rank cannot issue binding
orders to each other.
5
As Figure 1 indicates, the internal structure of the local government
at each level is almost the same as the central government. It means the government at
each level has the same hierarchical system as the central government. Figure 1 also
shows that within the same layer, the governments of various territories are at the same
rank. Similarly, within the same local government, each functional bureau has the same
administrative rank. One point of note is that, from Figure 1, the ministries of the central
government seem to be at a higher rank than regional governments. However, in terms of
the actual administrative rank, these ministries are at the same rank as the regional
governments (including the municipalities directly under the central government, such as

8
Chongqing). Within this structure, “units of the same rank cannot issue binding orders to
each other.”
6
This means that the leaders of each ministry have no direct authority over
those of other ministries, and the same is true of the relationship between local
government leaders and ministry leaders, or between the leaders of various bureaus at the
same rank. For example, Chongqing is actually at the same administrative rank as SEPA.
So, even though SEPA has administrative authority over the Chongqing EPB regarding
environmental issues, SEPA has no authority to issue any commands related to
environmental issues directly to the Chongqing municipal government.
Territory. The authorities of government agencies are also divided by territory.
According to this fragmented structure, the government at each level can only issue
orders to the governments within its own jurisdiction one level lower. Thus,
governments of different territories cannot issue orders to each other. In Figure 1, the
solid arrow from the top of a pyramid to a pyramid one layer lower suggests that the
government at the upper level has the authority to appoint or remove the leader of the
local government one rank lower, including the leaders of various functional bureaus
within its jurisdiction. For example, the mayor of the Chongqing municipal government
has the authority to appoint the leaders of counties or districts within Chongqing or the
leaders of the Chongqing EPB.
Function. Similarly, within the same ministry (xitong), the functional department
can issue orders to a functional bureau one rank lower. But the ministries or bureaus of
different functions (xitong) cannot issue orders to each other. In Figure 1, the dotted
arrows from the cell at the bottom of a pyramid to that at the bottom of a pyramid one

9
layer lower suggest that the functional department at the upper level has no authority to
appoint or remove the leaders of the functional department one rank lower. In other
words, only the government to which this functional department is subordinated has such
authority. For example, even though SEPA has an administrative relationship with the
Chongqing EPB, SEPA has no authority to appoint the leaders of the Chongqing EPB.
Instead, it is the Chongqing municipal government that has such authority.

Impacts on Environmental Policy Enforcement
This fragmented governance structure has a significant impact on Chinese
government policy making and enforcement. This fragmented structure makes the
relationships among various government units very complicated. It means that the policy
making and enforcement of any major project inevitably needs the involvement of
multiple government units. In other words, no single government unit is able to push a
major project alone. Therefore, “units often need to negotiate with each other so as to
build consensus.”
7
However, owing to the problems of the ambiguous division of
responsibility, ranking, and conflicts of interest, these inter-agency or inter-governmental
coordination and cooperation are usually poor. Moreover, this fragmented structure also
provides conditions for the expansion of local protectionism that is characterized by local
governments’ resistance against the Center’s commands regarding environmental
protection. In a word, the fragmented authoritarian model and the institutional structure
that this model produces is one of the primary factors that contribute to the inefficient
environmental enforcement in China. The following passages will focus on the

10
environmental protection system and examine the impact the fragmented governance
structure has on environmental policy making and enforcement in China.
The Lack of Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities of Government Units
Because the authority is divided by rank, territory and function, the functions of
each government unit are very complicated. There is often a lack of clarity of the roles
and responsibilities of different government units. In terms of water environment
management, for example, although SEPA is the chief organ at the central level solely
responsible for the nation’s water environmental issues, many other ministries also have
some responsibility for water environmental protection. But the specific responsibilities
and duties of each organ are actually not clearly defined. According to the Water
Pollution Prevention and Control (WPPC) Law (1996 revision), SEPA and EPBs are the
leading organs in charge of water resource protection. However, based on the Water Law
(2002 Revision), the Ministry of Water Resource (MWR) also has the responsibility for
the protection of water resources.
8
In reality, the water resource that SEPA and the MWR
deal with only refers to the surface water, such as river and lake waters. But underground
water is managed by the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). Therefore, the
authorities of China’s water resource management are seriously fragmented: water
quality is monitored by SEPA, but the Ministry of Health (MOH) also has the
responsibility to oversee the quality of drinking water. Water quantity is managed by the
MWR, but river basin commissions at various levels are also in charge of the allocation
and distribution of water resources. Water supply and sewage facilities construction are
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Construction (MOC), but the water supply related

11
to the ground water belongs to the work of the MLR. According to the World Bank report
(2006), there are over 10 authorities and ministries at the national level involved in water
environment management.
9
Evidently, many responsibilities of these units are duplicated
or overlap with each other. Moreover, the consistencies of these laws and regulations
weaken the institutional capacity of environmental agencies in enforcing and
implementing these laws and regulations.
Poor Trans-jurisdiction Coordination and Cooperation
This governance structure also leads to the difficulty of coordination and
cooperation between local governments of various regions as long as severe and
complicated conflicts of interests exist between these authorities. The failures of the
water pollution treatment in many major rivers and lakes in China result from such poor
inter-governmental coordination and cooperation. For example, we can examine the
pollution control of the Huai River. The Huai River flows across four provinces,
including Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong, and 21 cities and 91 districts and
counties within the jurisdiction of these four provinces. About 150 million people live
along this river and its tributaries. Owing to the blind economic development of the cities
and towns along the Huai River, the Huai River has been seriously polluted since the late
1970s. Especially with the growth of the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in
this region in the late 1980s, the pollution of the Huai River became even more severe.
Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has expended great efforts in addressing the
pollution of the Huai River. The total investment for pollution control in this region
amounts to 19.3 billion yuan in the past decade. Unfortunately, the Huai River has

12
witnessed only some minor improvement in its overall water environment. One of the
major causes for the lack of success is the poor cooperation between the provinces along
the Huai River. In the coordination meetings hosted by the State Council and SEPA, each
province always blamed the others, and demanded the other three to compensate its loss
or pay for the cleanup. While the controversy among these provinces continued, the cities
and towns as well as the factories in this region also continued to discharge waste water
directly into the Huai River.
10

Tensions in Inter-agency Relations
Currently, China lacks special organizations that function as coordination organs
between environmental protection agencies and other governmental agencies at the same
level. In reality, this coordination role is played by SEPA. However, in terms of the
actual power and status of SEPA among other ministries in the central government,
SEPA has encountered great challenges in playing its function as a coordinator in many
major environmental issues.
11
In the Chinese political system, ranking in the political
hierarchy is a crucial factor that affects the efficiency of policy enforcement. Ranking
determines how much authority a government agency can have to carry out its
responsibilities, and determines whether or not policies are enforced. As noted above, a
government agency of lower rank has no authority to enforce compliance to the organ at
its upper rank, nor can government agencies at the same rank issue directives to each
other. For almost three decades, rapid economic development has been the leading task of
the Chinese government. It is because Chinese leaders believe economic growth is the
key to social and political stability and to national security. In this context, the

13
ministries/bureaus in charge of economic and industrial affairs enjoy a de facto higher
status than other ministries/bureaus in the process of policy making and implementation.
In contrast, environmental organs have always held a relatively lower status than those
ministries responsible for key industries.
For example, before SEPA was upgraded to be the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) in March 2008, it was just a deputy ministerial-level agency directly
under the State Council. SEPA still has less authority than other central agencies with full
fledged ministerial status in terms of allocation of budget and approval of projects. In
addition, SEPA is challenged by its funding and staffing limitations compared with other
ministries. Most importantly, since rapid economic growth has been the top priority on
the Chinese government’s agenda, the ministries/bureaus in charge of economic affairs or
key industries actually enjoy a more favorable status than SEPA in policy making and
enforcement. If SEPA policies run counter to the interests of ministries responsible for
economic activities, it is extremely difficult for SEPA to gain the necessary support from
these ministries for its policy enforcement. Sometimes SEPA has even been excluded
from policy making regarding some key projects involving multiple key industrial
ministries. For example, long before the construction of the Three Gorges Dam project,
SEPA had already organized experts to conduct research and investigations on water
environment protection in the Three Gorges Dam area. SEPA also compiled a number of
research reports regarding the environmental impact of the dam project. Unfortunately,
the opinions and suggestions from SEPA were largely ignored. On the issue of the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the dam project, SEPA “seemed to

14
play a minor role and held little authority in the development and implementation of the
Three Gorges Project environmental policy.”
12
As the only state-level environmental
protection organ, SEPA was excluded from submitting an EIA report for the dam project.
Instead, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the MWR each presented an EIA
report. Finally, the EIA report made by the MWR was adopted, but the MWR was the
biggest supporter of the Three Gorges Dam Project.
Expansion of Local Protectionism
The political reform of decentralization in the 1980s weakened the authority of the
central government over local authorities and the ministries over local functional bureaus.
Through economic development, local governments gained more resources to use as
leverage in bargaining with the central government protecting their interests at the local
level. Local protectionism has been criticized as one of the major causes for
environmental problems. According to Pan Yue, the executive vice minister of SEPA,
local officials are interested in promoting large industrial projects with high energy
consumption and pollution so as to gain short-term economic returns; at the same time,
they protect local enterprises which may be wasting energy and producing pollution as
long as these enterprises can help to increase revenue for the local economy.
13
If state
policies are contradictory to their interests in economic development, local officials will
always put their own interests above those of the state. As Premier Wen Jiabao pointed
out in his report on the work of the government at the fifth annual session of the 10
th

National People’s Congress on March 5, 2007, one of the major causes for the
inefficiency of these national policies is that “some local governments and enterprises

15
failed to comply strictly with the laws, regulations and standards for energy saving and
environmental protection.”
14
Based on years of studies on China’s environmental policy
enforcement, environmental researcher Elizabeth Economy argues that “for more than a
decade, primary responsibility for environmental protection has rested with local
officials. Thus, if China’s environmental enforcement is to improve significantly, it will
have to arise largely from local officials.”
15

After institutional reform in the 1980s, authority over the budget was
decentralized from the central government to local governments. This reform gave the
local government more flexibility, not only in managing economic development policy
but also in retaining fiscal resources at the local level.
16
Meanwhile, rapid economic
growth became the primary goal of the state. GDP has become the top criteria for
assessing local officials’ achievements and for determining local officials’ promotion.
17

In this context, local officials feel that economic priorities should over-ride
environmental concerns. With their increased budget and greater economic
independence, “localities exercised some of their increased autonomy in ways that ran
against the broad policy priorities favored by the Center.”
18
The tax-sharing relationship
between local governments and local enterprises as well as the embedded structure of
local EPBs to local governments further enhance the ability and likelihood that local
governments will take a confrontational attitude to the environmental policies of central
governmental agencies. Local protectionism is very serious in some areas. For example,
when an official supervision team from SEPA went to a copper company in Tongling, a
city which is located in eastern Anhui province and which has been suffering serious

16
water pollution, to inspect its environmental protection facilities, this team was even
denied entry by this company. Pan Yue noted that this case showed SEPA’s lack of
authority. He said, “If even SEPA, exercising the authority of the central government,
cannot gain access, then how could environmental protection departments under the local
government ever get in?”
19

In fact, it is the fragmented governance structure that is responsible for this strong
local protectionism. Jean Oi has written of China’s state-led growth model as “local
corporatism.”
20
In other words, a local government is like a corporation, and the
functional bureaus within its jurisdiction and the government one rank lower are like
companies of this corporation. Driven by the pursuit of economic profits, local
government officials have changed their roles gradually from policy regulators into
entrepreneurs. Consequently, the relationship between functional bureaus or among local
authorities becomes a relationship of competitors for economic resources and profits.
This situation makes the coordination and cooperation among these government organs
even more difficult than previously on some major environmental protection initiatives.
21

Moreover, it is evident that the new role of local governments is contradictory to
their established role as functional administrators. As entrepreneurs, their emphasis is on
the maximization of profits through the generation of more natural resources. But what
administrators, especially the officials of EPBs, are concerned with is the prevention of
natural resources from being excessively exploited or damaged. Although many local
officials consider themselves as both administrators and entrepreneurs, in essence they
have shifted the focus of their responsibility more to entrepreneurship than
administration.

17
Since “Regulations on the Transformation of the Management Mechanism at
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)” was issued in 1992, Chinese SOEs have become more
and more autonomous in making decisions regarding management, production, sales and
investments. Theoretically, these reforms suggest that the control of local government in
economic affairs has been greatly reduced. However, in actual fact the authority of local
government over local enterprises still remains powerful. Since the budgetary authority
was decentralized to local governments in the 1980s, local governments have obtained
greater control over issues such as levying local taxes, issuing local licenses and permits,
granting local lands, providing scarce energy and materials for production, and so forth.
22

Local governments and local enterprises have established a kind of tax-sharing
relationship. On the one hand, “government revenues come from enterprises in the form
of income taxes, industrial and commercial taxes, and extra budgetary fees;”
23
on the
other hand, enterprises always negotiate with local governments on the amount and rate
of tax so as to retain a large share of profit to cover their cost of production or to pay back
bank loans.
24
This tax-sharing relationship implies that the more profit local enterprises
generate, the higher income local governments can receive. As a result, local officials are
strongly motivated to expand the local economy so as to increase the local budget.
Furthermore, rapid economic growth can not only increase income, but can also provide
more job opportunities for local laborers. Therefore, local officials often turn a blind eye
to the regulations from the central agencies, and adopt their own policies so as to protect
polluting enterprises.

18
Local protectionism by officials at the township level is especially serious. Many
township enterprises are collective enterprises in name, but indeed they are owned by
township governments. A number of township enterprises have been established by the
township government, and the township government is massively involved in virtually all
aspects of their operation, including management, sales, and personnel management.
Because of the 1980s’ agricultural reform, “(t)ownship governments do not receive a
regular budgetary allocation from higher levels of the state apparatus.
25
Therefore,
township governments rely heavily on township enterprises to generate funds for their
operation. In this context, “local governments have entrepreneurial interests in TVEs and
act as their advocates, rather than their regulators.”
26
However, TVEs are usually the
most polluting sector in China. Due to a shortage of funds, staff and technology, most of
the Chinese TVEs are not equipped with waste treatment facilities. Therefore, TVEs are
also the most difficult sector to regulate for pollution control and prevention. However,
few local governments are willing to close down the polluting TVEs, invest money to
install environmental facilities in these TVEs, or construct environmental infrastructures.
First, many local governments themselves are stakeholders of these enterprises, from
which they collect taxes and other charges to increase local revenues and their own
income. Second, the economic returns and remarkable environmental improvement from
these new facilities and infrastructures may not be obtained in the short term, so local
government officials may not enjoy either economic or political benefits while they serve
in the government.

19
To ensure that local high-polluting and energy consuming enterprises can
maximize their profits, local governments have become even more lax in their role as
regulators for the central government; at the same time they even limit the role of local
EPBs in terms of finance and personnel. As noted above, under a fragmented
authoritarian system, local governments are responsible for providing the operational
budget and funds, salaries and bonuses to local EPBs. In addition, the leaders of local
government have the authority to appoint and remove the leaders of local EPBs.
27
Since
local EPBs are embedded in the local bureaucratic structure as organs of local
governments, local EPBs have closer relationships to local governments than to the
SEPA. By contrast, though local EPBs should follow the decisions and orders concerning
environmental issues from the SEPA, the SEPA has no real authority over local EPBs in
terms of financial support and personnel arrangement.
In this context, the situation of environmental protection in a city is closely linked
to the attitudes and decisions of the government of that city. Local governments usually
worry that investments in environmental protection will affect the growth of the local
economy. Therefore, when local governments refuse to provide budget support for
environmental protection programs or even oppose the implementation of these
programs, local EPBs usually lack effective measures to implement their policies.
Similarly, because of the tax-sharing relationship between local governments and
enterprises, local governments protect local enterprises. Driven by the need to boost
economic growth and increase local tax revenue, local governments sometimes tolerate
environmental violations of local enterprises, or refuse to fulfill environmental

20
responsibilities in environmental law enforcement. As a result, the EPBs’ total
dependence on local governments weakens the EPBs’ ability to enforcing environmental
policy. Even though an EPB has the authority to regulate an enterprise’s activities of
environmental protection, if the EPB does not gain any support from its local
government, then this EPB usually finds it difficult to make the enterprise comply with
its regulations. Similarly, when a big environmental project requires the active
coordination between various departments of the local government, local EPBs have to
rely on the authority of local governments to build “consensus” with relevant
governmental departments. Due to this embedded structure of local EPBs, local EPBs
always take a non-confrontational and cooperative manner in dealing with its relations
with local governments and other governmental organizations.
28
In sum, the fragmented
authority, the financial dependency between local governments and enterprises, the lax
enforcement of local EPBs, and increased economic independence of local governments
contribute to an increasing force of local protectionism against the implementation of the
environmental policies from the central government.

21
Chapter 2 Endnotes

1. Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure, and
Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Sinkule, B.J., & Ortolano, L. Implementing Environmental Policy in China. Westport:
Praeger, 1995.

2. Lieberthal, Kenneth, & Oksenberg, M. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure,
and Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

3. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." p.4 www.adb.org/Vehicle
Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf (1997).

4. Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
p.36.

5. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." www.adb.org/Vehicle-Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf
(1997).

6. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." p.3 www.adb.org/Vehicle-
Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf (1997).

7. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." p.4 www.adb.org/Vehicle-
Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf (1997).

8. The World Bank. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional
Considerations."
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACI
FICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:21049869~pageP
K:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept. 2006).

胡若隐. "地方行政分割与流域水污染治理悖论分析" 环境保护3.
www.gsdkj.net:90/~kjqk/hjbh/hjbh2006/0606/060620.htm - 3k - (2006).

22
9. The World Bank. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional
Considerations."
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACI
FICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:21049869~pageP
K:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept. 2006).

10. "我国十年累计投入193亿元治理淮河流域污染" http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-
06-20/10492856115s.shtml (2004年6月20日).

11. Jahiel, Abigail R. "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." The
China Quarterly 156.Special Issue: China's Environment (Dec.1998): 757-87.

12. Jahiel, Abigail R. "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." The
China Quarterly 156.Special Issue: China's Environment (Dec.1998): 757-87.

13. Heggelund, G. Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges
Project. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.

14. "Report on the Work of the Government [Full Text]."
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/17/content_830171.htm
(2007年3月17日).

"At the Centre of China’s Environmental Storm: Interview with ‘Hurricane Pan’ - Liu
Jianqiang."
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/01/at_the_centre_of_chinas_environmental_stor
m_interview_w.php (February 2007).

15. Day, K.A., ed. China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development.
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.

16. Oi, Jean C. "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy." The
China Quarterly 144.Special Issue: China's Transitional Economy (Dec., 1995):
1132-49. p.26.

17. "SEPA: Pollution Control Requires Accountability."
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/200832.htm (March 2008).

18. Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure, and
Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

19. "Lack of Clout Hits Chinese Pollution Agency."
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b539450-2b0d-11dc-85f9-
000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1 (July 5 2007).

23
20. Oi, Jean C. "The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy." The
China Quarterly 144.Special Issue: China's Transitional Economy (Dec., 1995):
1132-49.

21. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." p.4 www.adb.org/Vehicle-
Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf (1997).

22. Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Sinkule, B.J., & Ortolano, L. Implementing Environmental Policy in China.Westport:
Praeger, 1995.

23. Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

24. Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Sinkule, B.J., & Ortolano, L. Implementing Environmental Policy in China.
Westport: Praeger, 1995.

25. Lieberthal, Kenneth. "China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental
Policy Implementation." p.5. www.adb.org/Vehicle-
Emissions/PRC/docs/ces1a.pdf (1997).

26. Jahiel, Abigail R. "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." The
China Quarterly 156.Special Issue: China's Environment (Dec.1998): 757-87.

27. Lieberthal, Kenneth., & Oksenberg, M. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structure,
and Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Sinkule, B.J., & Ortolano, L. Implementing Environmental Policy in China. Westport:
Praeger, 1995.

28. Ma, X. Y., & Ortolano, L. Environmental Regulation in China: Institution,
Enforcement, and Compliance. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Sinkule, B.J., & Ortolano, L. Implementing Environmental Policy in China.
Westport: Praeger, 1995.

24
Chapter 3 Water Pollution Control for the Tributaries of the Three
Gorges Reservoir Area-----A Case Study of Liangtan River
Since the Three Gorges Dam was constructed, there have been debates and
criticism over the environmental effects of this dam project on the Yangtze River Basin.
One of the major concerns is whether the water quality of the Three Gorges area will
worsen after the completion of the project. Chongqing, the nearest and biggest metropolis
to the Dam, is unquestionably considered a primary source of possible water pollution to
the Three Gorges reservoir area.
1
Since the Three Gorges Dam started to store water in
June 2003, although it is reported that water quality in the reservoir area has not changed
much from before, the situation in its tributaries has worsened, especially the rivers in the
Chongqing section.
2
In effect, the water contamination of these tributaries will
increasingly threaten the water environment security of the Three Gorges Reservoir area
in the near future. Both the central government and local governments claim that they
have invested great efforts and funds to address the water pollution problems in the Three
Gorges area. But why does the water pollution of the Three Gorges area continue to
worsen? In addition to factors such as the shortage of funds and lack of treatment
facilities and technologies, this chapter will argue that the local fragmented governance
structure is the key factor responsible for the failure of water pollution control. This
chapter will first examine the efforts made by the Chinese government in the pollution
control and overall challenges that the government faces in water pollution control. Then
this chapter will make a case study on Liangtan River, one of the largest tributaries in the
Three Gorges area, and further explore how the local fragmented governance structure
hinders water pollution control at the local level.

25
Efforts and Challenges
In the past two decades, China’s government always considered this giant
hydraulic project as the “showcase of China’s accomplishments and the overall strength
of the nation.”
3
To ensure that the TGDP is able to bolster China’s international image,
China’s government has been increasing its efforts in the water pollution control of the
reservoir area. In the 10
th
year plan, the Three Gorges Reservoir area and the upper
reaches of the Yangtze River was identified as the Environmental Protection Key Area of
China.
4
Instructed by the State Council in July 2001, SEPA, SDRC (State Development
and Reform Commission), MOC, TGPCC (Three Gorges Project Construction
Commission) office, IDB (Immigrant Development Bureau) of TGPCC, the YRWRC
(the Yangtze River Water Resource Commission), and the provinces and cities involved,
started to compile the plan for water pollution control in the Three Gorges Reservoir area
and Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River. Under the leadership of Premier Zhu Rongji
and Premier Wen Jiabao, the central government convened numerous meetings that have
addressed the problems of pollution in the reservoir area. In 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao
and Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan issued ten important instructions that urged local
governments to strengthen the water pollution control of the reservoir area.
5
Moreover,
the central government has made huge investments for water pollution control in the
reservoir area. According to the Plan for Control of Water Pollution in Three Gorges
Reservoir Area and the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River (2001-2010), the central
government’s planned investment for control of water pollution in the reservoir area
totaled an estimated 40 billion yuan.
6

26
Owing to the great efforts made by the central government, the water quality of
the Three Gorges should have improved significantly. However, the reality is
disappointing. The water quality of many tributaries in the Three Gorges reservoir area
has degraded to Level 5 or even Level 5+. In September 2007, China’s media released a
warning from the central government of a potential ecological catastrophe caused by the
Three Gorges dam after a forum was held on the Three Gorges Dam project at Wuhan. It
was the first official admission of the negative impacts of the dam project on the Three
Gorges Reservoir area as well as the Yangtze River Basin. The officials and experts who
attended the forum emphasized that “unless steps are taken quickly to solve the
environmental problems caused by the project, an ecological catastrophe could be just
around the corner.”
7

In recent decades, since the water pollution control primarily focused on industrial
wastewater control in the main channel, the pollution from non-point sources in the
tributaries has been largely ignored. Therefore, quality of the main body water in the
Three Gorges Reservoir area has improved a bit, but water quality in several tributaries is
worsening.
8
Because the self-cleaning capacity of the Yangtze River has decreased
sharply since the reservoir started to store water in June 2003, the pollutant
concentrations in the reservoir area have become more and more severe. The intrusion of
pollutants from the main channel of the Yangtze River has triggered algae blooms at
estuaries of several tributaries in the reservoir area. Moreover, animal and poultry
breeding have become the leading source of pollution in the tributaries of the Three
Gorges reservoir area. According to the statistics of Chongqing EPB in 2003, the total
excrement produced by poultry and livestock farms in the Three Gorges reservoir

27
area is over 75 million tons a year. In Chongqing city proper, the total excrement
produced by poultry and livestock farms is over 5.74 million tons a year. The total COD
(Chemical Oxygen Demand) discharge from poultry and livestock farms has exceeded
the combination of the industrial COD discharge and residential wastewater COD
discharge. The uncontrolled discharge of poultry and livestock excrements into the rivers
has resulted in serious eutrophication in dozens of tributaries in the Three Gorges
reservoir area. It is reported that many tributaries in the Chongqing section are identified
as Level 5 water or even lower.
9
The water environment management structure regarding the Three Gorges
Reservoir area is characterized by fragmentation and complexity. Over 13 central
ministries and agencies, four provincial governments and one municipality, including 276
district and county governments, are involved in the water environment management of
the Three Gorges area. Currently, there is no special river basin management organ set up
for the Three Gorges Reservoir area (See Figure 2). According to the Water Law (2002
Revision), the Yangtze River Water Resource Commission under the MWR is the leading
agency responsible for the river basin management for the Yangtze River Basin,
including the Three Gorges area. In addition, according to the Water Pollution
Prevention and Control (WPPC) Law (1996 revision), the regional governments at each
level along the Yangtze River Basin also have responsibilities for the water environment
protection for the river sections within their jurisdiction.
10
This management structure
makes the authority of water environment management seriously fragmented. In China,

28

Figure 2: Governments Involved in Water Resource Management in the Three Gorges
Reservoir Area

this fragmented water management framework is termed as “Jiu Long Zhi Shui”
(九龙治水: nine dragons control one river). It suggests that multiple government
agencies are involved in the river management simultaneously, but each of them is only
responsible for one section or one field regarding the river management. Therefore, the
following scene is common in the water environment management in China: “huanbao
bu xiahe, shuili bu shangan, haishi zhi guanchuan”
(环保不下河，水利不上岸，海事只顾船: the environmental protection department
never goes into the river; the water resource department never moves onto the land; the
marine department only takes care of boats).
11
Obviously, this fragmented structure,
which runs counter to the integration approach needed for the river basin management,
usually results in inefficient enforcement of water management related policies.

29
Overview: the Liangtan River

The Liangtan River, located in Chongqing Municipality, starts from the Liaojia
Valley Reservoir and flows into the Jialing River across 3 administrative districts,
including 15 towns. The Liangtan River is 88 kilometers long, and it has 55 branches.
The total river basin area is 510.1 km
2
. The total population along the river is about
200,000. The total GDP generated in this area was 2.83 billion yuan in 2003. Most of
industries in this river basin are small and medium SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and
TVEs (Township and Village Enterprises). Industries such as paper making, textile,
printing and dyeing, electroplating, and chemicals are some of the main sources of water
pollution in this river basin. Currently, average discharge of residential wastewater is
about 30,000 tons per day, and industrial wastewater is about 3,000 tons per day. The
Liangtan River is one of the major branches of Jiangling River, which is the second
largest tributary of the Upper Yangtze River. Since the Three Gorges Reservoir is located
at the Upper Yangtze River, the water quality of the small rivers like the Liangtan River
in the Jianglin River region, which terminates at the Three Gorges Reservoir area, have
significant influences on the water environment security of the Three Gorges Reservoir
area.
12

Water Pollution of the Liangtan River
Until the early 1990s, Liangtan River was still very clean. But since the mid-
1990s, its water environment has been damaged.
13
A 2003 statistic indicated that the

30
water quality of the Liangtan River was already degraded to Level 5. According to
Chinese water quality classification system, Level 5 Water means the river is almost
useless.
14

The water is clear at the Liaojia Valley Reservoir, the headwater of the Liangtan
River. But only about two miles away from its headwater, the river begins turning black.
At the end point, the water becomes dark black and gives off an unbearable odor.
15
In
1998, a report from the Jiulongpo District, the first district that the Liangtan River passes
through, showed that the value of COD of the water was 10 times the maximum COD
concentration in a river.
16
According to Chen, the director of the Natural Ecological Protection Department
of the Environmental Protection Bureau of Chongqing, the pollution sources of the
Liangtan River include poultry farming, residential sewage, industrial waste, agricultural
waste, and urban garbage (See Table 1).
17

Pollution
source
Poultry
Farming
Residential
Sewage
Industrial
Waste
Agricultural
Waste
Urban
Garbage
Proportion 40% 30% 10% 10% 10%

Table 1: Sources of Water Pollution of the Liangtan River in Chongqing (2007)
Among all these sources, poultry farming, especially duck farming, and residential
sewage are the two largest sources of water pollution of the Liangtan River.
18

31
Poultry and livestock farm pollution have become the leading sources of
pollution in the Liangtan River. By the end of 2007, there were 78 livestock and poultry
farms in the Liangtan River basin, among which 34 farms were duck farms that raised 10
million ducks each year. The pollution of farm industry accounts for over 40% of the
total pollution of the Liangtan River. Moreover, the pollution of residential wastewater is
severe. This kind of pollution accounts for 30% of the total pollution. To provide an
example, Baishiyi Town’s total discharge volume of residential wastewater is 3,000 tons
per day. All of the wastewater is discharged into the Liangtan River directly without
being treated. With the expansion of livestock and poultry farm industry in Chongqing,
such pollution is becoming increasingly detrimental and is seriously threatening the
quality of drinking water for the 100,000 people living in the lower reaches of the
Liangtan River.
19

Governments Involved in the Control of Water Pollution in the Liangtan River
According to the web sites of the governments, at least 20 government agencies
both at the central level and at the local level are involved in the water pollution treatment
of the Liangtan River.
20
The central government ministries like SDRC and SEPA are
responsible for approving the planning of the treatment project, providing treatment
funds, and making inspection, etc, whereas the local government units like Chongqing
EPB deal with specific coordination, supervision, planning, and treatment (See Figure 3).

32

Figure 3 Governments Involved in the Control of Water Pollution in the Liangtan River

Chongqing Governmental Bureaus Involved in the Liangtan River Treatment
As Figure 4 shows, there are at least 6 functional bureaus involved in the control
of water pollution in the Liangtan River. The main responsibilities these 6 bureaus take
for the Liangtan River pollution control include:
• Chongqing Development and Reform Commission: assessing the feasibility
studies report of the pollution control project and approving the funding plan for
the project.

33
• Chongqing EPB: monitoring and controlling polluting sources in this river area,
including industrial polluting and urban residential polluting, and monitoring the
water quality of the river within the jurisdiction of Chongqing.
• Chongqing Water Resource Bureau: involved in water and land conservation
work, monitoring water quantity and protecting water resources.
• Chongqing Agriculture Bureau: responsible for the ecological environment in
agriculture, monitoring water pollution related to farming and fishing.
• Chongqing Urban Planning Bureau: providing guidance and planning regarding
the location, size and arrangement of the wastewater treatment facilities.
• Chongqing Urban Construction Commission: responsible for constructing sewage
and wastewater treatment facilities.

Figure 4 Chongqing Governmental Bureaus Involved in the Liangtan River
Treatment

34
As Figure 5 shows, three district governments are involved in the Liangtan River
pollution treatment. Within the jurisdiction of each district government, 6 district-level
functional bureaus are involved in this treatment project.

Figure 5: District governments of Chongqing Involved in the Control of Water Pollution
in the Liangtan River

Figure 6: Overall Governance Structure for the Control of Water Pollution in the
Liangtan River

35
Figure 6 shows the major governmental agencies at the city-level and district-
level involved in the Liangtan River water pollution treatment (See Figure 6), but this
chart does not include all governmental authorities and organs involved in this pollution
control project. Since the water pollution in the Liangtan River is threatening the Three
Gorges Reservoir, the MEP also exercises direct supervision over the treatment of this
river. In addition, there are 15 township governments that are also involved in the
Liangtan River treatment project. But these township governments are not indicated in
Figure 6. In total, there are 40 governmental agencies involved in the Liangtan River
pollution treatment.

Efforts with regard to the Liangtan River Pollution Treatment
Based on the media reports and government documents, this thesis makes a
summary of the major actions and measures taken by the Chongqing municipal
government and its functional bureaus in the past 10 years for the water pollution control
of the Liangtan River.
• In 1998, the Liangtan River was listed on the Chongqing government’s major
treatment agenda.
21

• In 1999， Chongqing EPB compiled the water pollution control plan to treat the
water pollution of the Liangtan River.
• In November 2001, the Liangtan River was listed in the Plan for Water Control
and Prevention Program in the Three Gorges Reservoir and Upper Reaches of

36
the Yangtze River(2001-2005). According to this plan, the central government
would invest 1.14 billion yuan in total to make a comprehensive treatment to the
Liangtan River and other 11 tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area.
During the 10
th
Five-Year Plan period, the treatment program focused on the
Liangtan River and other 4 rivers. The total state investment was 750 million
yuan.
22

• In early 2002, 18 representatives of Chongqing People’s Congress presented a bill
and urged the treatment of the Liangtan River. At the end of 2002, Chongqing
EPB and Chongqing Development and Reform Commission instructed the district
governments of Beibei, Shapingba, and Jiulongpo to be responsible for the
treatment project jointly.
23
According to one deputy director of Chongqing EPB,
the total investment for the treatment, based on the Plan for Water Control and
Prevention Program in the Three Gorges Reservoir and Upper Reaches of the
Yangtze River(2001-2005), would be 109.91 million yuan.
• In 2002, the Chongqing municipal government established the coordination
leadership team for the Liangtan Comprehensive Water Pollution Treatment
Project, including the leaders of the three district governments, and set up the
system of joint coordination meeting, which is held on a regular basis to address
the problems in the comprehensive treatment, three cities and three departments
of Chongqing government with the vice mayor as the team leader.
24

• In January 2003, the Chongqing municipal government completed the survey and
investigation work for the Liangtan River. According to the planning of the

37
Chongqing municipal government, the Liangtan River was expected to become
clear again in 2005.
25

• In 2004, the feasibility studies report for the Liangtan River Water Pollution
Treatment Project was completed, and passed the evaluation by the experts of the
State Investment Project Evaluation Center. Meanwhile, the Liangtan River,
together other 8 tributaries, was listed into the first group of rivers that started the
construction work for the treatment project.
26

• In March 2005, in the Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Campaign
by SEPA, the Liangtan River and other 22 rivers in Chongqing were put on the
warning list of SEPA for the failure of launching the construction work on the
date as planned. SEPA also informed this failure to the entire state.
27

• In July 2005, The Liangtan River Basin Water Pollution Comprehensive
Treatment Plan passed the expert evaluation. The total investment for this
comprehensive treatment plan is 1.993 billion yuan. Fifty large treatment projects
will be constructed. According to this plan, the small electroplating factories and
small cement factories will be closed. The residential garbage will be treated
through constructing 7 waste transfer stations.
28

• In October 2005, the Chongqing government launched the Clean Water Project.
The water pollution treatment of the Liangtan River was also a part of this project.
According to the 2005 Chongqing Clean Water Project Implementation Plan, the
total fund for the comprehensive water pollution treatment for the tributaries in
Chongqing is estimated to be 3.8 billion yuan. This implementation plan indicates

38
clearly that the fund for the tributary pollution treatment primarily relies on the
state investment, and the local governments involved provide corresponding
funds.
29

• In November 2006, a major Liangtan River water treatment project was assigned
to a state-own company, Chongqing Water Resource Investment Ltd. The first
phase of the project will be completed by 2010. The total cost is about 300 million
yuan. The funds come from the central government and bank loans.
30

• In early 2007 and early 2008, instructed by the leaders of SEPA, the China
Environmental Journalist Association twice organized media groups to visit
Chongqing, and conducted interviews and investigations centering on the
pollution of the Liangtan River. The results of these two investigations were
similar. Meanwhile, Chongqing EPA identified the Liangtan River as Level 5+
Water. It means that this river is almost useless.
31

• In November 2007, the Chongqing EPB and Chongqing Agriculture Bureau
jointly issued Opinions on Improving the Poultry Farming Pollution Control in
the Liangtan River. Based on this document, the district governments of
Jiulongpo, Shapingba, and Beibei were required to finish the planning of the
poultry farming- banned area, farming- restricted area and farming-permitted
area. According to this document, the major sources of residential pollution and
livestock & poultry farming pollution will be addressed by 2010. All the pollution
sources will be totally controlled in 2012. The water quality of the Liangtan River

39
will reach Level 4. But this plan runs counter to the requirement of SEPA. SEPA
requires the Chongqing EPB to address this pollution problem as soon as
possible.
32

• In January 2008, the Liangtan River was listed in the state treatment plan again.
According to the 2008 Revised Plan for the Three Gorges Reservoir and Upper
Reaches of the Yangtze River, 11 projects were identified as experimental
projects for the comprehensive pollution treatment of the tributaries in the Three
Gorges Reservoir area. The total planned state investment is 2. 032 billion yuan,
which almost doubles the total planned investment in the 2001 Plan.
33

• In January 2008, the Chongqing Urban Planning Bureau organized experts to
evaluate the research report on Studies on the Planning for Protection of the
Tributaries in Urban Chongqing. It is the first time that all the 17 tributaries in
urban Chongqing are included in the protection planning.
34

• On March 27
th
2008, a few days after its promotion to be Ministry of
Environmental Protection, the MEP sent an inspection team secretly to
Chongqing and investigated the water pollution in the Liangtan River. According
to the MEP, it was the first key case that the MEP supervised directly after it was
upgraded to be a ministerial-level organ. The MEP emphasizes that it will carry
out the authority of vertical and direct supervision on this case.
35

• On April 10
th
2008, the Chongqing EPB announced that a new Liangtan River
pollution treatment project started.
36

40
Analysis of the Liangtan River Case
During the past 10 years, the people living along the Liangtan River made
numerous reports, complaints, and petitions to the government about the pollution of the
Liangtan River. SEPA has also sent inspectors to Chongqing in order to monitor
Chongqing to make rectifications. Within these 10 years, about 2 billion yuan has been
spent in the pollution control of the Liangtan River, but such efforts have produced little
results and the degradation of the Liangtan River is irreversible. Who should be
responsible for this failure? Through analyzing the key actors involved in the Liangtan
River pollution treatment, this thesis emphasizes that the local fragmented governance
structure and strong local protectionism are the key factors leading to the deterioration of
water environments of the Liangtan River basin. The fragmented water environment
management system weakens the enforcement authority of Chongqing EPB. Chongqing
EPB, Chongqing Agriculture Bureau, and some district and township governments of
Chongqing were lax in the enforcement of the nation’s environmental laws and
regulations. These government authorities and departments shunned each other’s
responsibilities as long as the problems occurred. For the sake of developing the local
economy, Chongqing government lacked the motivations to invest heavily in protecting
the tributaries within its jurisdiction. To increase local incomes and address the problem
of unemployment, the district governments, especially the township governments, blindly
expanded the scales of the livestock and poultry farm industries and encouraged the
operations of small paper-making plants, electroplating plants, plastic plants, and textile
plants, which were the leading sources of pollution in the Liangtan River.

41
Fragmentation and Accountability
As discussed, authority over water environment management in Chongqing is
highly fragmented. For example, multiple bureaus oversee and manage the pollution of
the Liangtan River. The Chongqing EPB is primarily responsible for monitoring and
controlling the industrial pollution and urban residential wastewater pollution in the
Liangtan River Basin; but, the pollution control of non-point sources, like livestock and
poultry pollution treatment, is the responsibility of the Chongqing Agriculture Bureau. If
the farmers living along the river need the river water for irrigation, it is the Chongqing
Water Resource Bureau’s duty to regulate the quantity of water for irrigation. The
Chongqing Urban Construction Commission is responsible for constructing wastewater
treatment infrastructures along the river, but the number, location and arrangement of
these treatment facilities need the involvement of the Chongqing Urban Planning Bureau.
The authority of water management is also fragmented among district and township
governments. Three district governments, including 15 township governments are
involved. Each district government has the same water environment management
structure as the Chongqing municipal government.
Under this fragmented system, the Chongqing EPB does not have the authority to
issue binding orders either to other bureaus at the same rank or to the three district
governments, because these district governments are at the same rank as the Chongqing
EPB. Therefore, when asked why the Chongqing EPB failed to control the pollution of
the Liangtan River, one of the officials of the Chongqing EPB complained, “Chongqing
EPB can do nothing but coordinate between multiple departments involved. These

42
departments always escape accountability if the things they are responsible cannot make
any profits or even create troubles. On the contrary, if the things can take benefits to
them, they became profit-competitors.”
37
As early as 2002, the Chongqing Municipal
government established the coordination leadership team for the Liangtan
Comprehensive Water Pollution Treatment Project. The team leader was the vice mayor
of the Chongqing municipal government. The team members included the leaders of
three district governments and three functional bureaus of the Chongqing municipal
government. This team established the joint coordination meeting system. The
coordination meeting was held on a regular basis to address the problems in the
comprehensive treatment.
38
The Chongqing EPB was responsible for organizing the
meeting each time. However, the fact shows that this team failed to play any effective
role in improving coordination or cooperation among various government authorities or
functional departments. Nearly no agreements were concluded in these meetings. One
district government leader admitted, “The new proposal raised in these meetings has
some conflicts with our original district plan for economic development. We need to
make some major adjustments before we accept this proposal.”
39

This fragmented structure allows the Chongqing EPB and the Chongqing
Agriculture Bureau to escape accountability for the failure of the duck farm pollution
treatment. The poultry and livestock farm pollution has become the leading source of
pollution in the Liangtan River. By the end of 2007, there were 78 livestock and poultry
farms in the Liangtan River basin, among which 34 farms were duck farms, which raised
10 million ducks each year. The pollution of farm industry accounted for over 40% of the

43
total pollution of the Liangtan River.
40
The pollution caused by duck excrements was
especially serious. Since the proportion of salt in duck excrements is very high, the duck
excrements would easily damage soil if they were used as fertilizer in agricultural fields.
While more and more farmers prefer using chemical fertilizer to using animal excrements
as fertilizer, duck excrements are being directly discharged into the river.
41
In the two
towns of Shapingba district, approximately 60,000 tons of duck excrements are
discharged directly into the Liangtan River per day. Regarding the duck excrement
pollution control, the Chongqing EPB and the Chongqing Agriculture Bureaus give the
following arguments to defend themselves:
• Chongqing EPB: According to the Environmental Law, the duck farm with over
10,000 ducks is identified as the large-scale farm. The Chongqing EPB can only
enforce compliance to the large-scale farm, but does not have the enforcement
authority over farms with less than 10,000 ducks. Most of the farms along the
Liangtan River are small-scale farms. Almost none of them are farms with over
10,000 ducks. This law is the loophole of the state regulations.
42

• Chongqing Agriculture Bureau: compared with industrial pollution, poultry and
livestock farming pollution are much more difficult to control. Most of the farms
are small-sized and scattered. It is difficult to monitor and manage them. Because
the duck excrements are harmful to the soil, they cannot be applied to the
cultivated land. Farming industry is a low-profit industry. There is a shortage of
funds for the duck farmers to build septic tanks which can make the poisonous
elements in the duck excrements disintegrate. Most importantly, poultry and

44
livestock farming industry is an important way to lift farmers out of poverty.
Restricting the development of poultry and livestock industry may affect the
implementation of the “San Nong” policy (Nong Ye, Nong Cun, and Nong
Min农业、农村、农民), the state policy which aims to develop agriculture and
rural economy to ensure the social stability of the rural area.
43

However, these arguments are just an excuse for their lack of supervision and lax
enforcement. Counter to the Chongqing EPB’s data, journalists who conducted
interviews with farmers and township leaders living along the Yangtan River found that
quite a number of duck farms were large-scale farms. Each of these farms had over
50,000 to 60,000 ducks, and some of them even had over 100,000 ducks.
44
It is not clear
if the Chongqing EPB has conducted any investigation on the number of ducks for each
of the major duck farms in the Liangtan River Basin. In addition, the Environmental
Protection Law is not the only law that the Chongqing EPB can follow to regulate the
duck farm pollution. According to the Solid Waste Pollution Control Law (2005), large-
scale farms have responsibilities to collect, store and dispose properly the wastes
produced by farming. They are not allowed to discharge wastes freely into the river. If
their discharges pollute the river and surrounding environment, the EPBs at/above the
county level have the authority to enforce them to comply with proper regulations within
the required period and to impose a fine under 50,000 yuan.
45
Furthermore, according to
Item 6, Article 53 in Section 4 Legal Responsibility of Chongqing Three Gorges
Reservoir Area Water Pollution Control Regulations, if poultry or livestock farms
discharge animal wastes into the river without treating the poisonous elements of the

45
wastes, the Chongqing EPB and related supervision departments, such as the Chongqing
Agriculture Bureau, have the authority to enforce farmers to comply with proper
regulations within the required period and to impose fines. If the pollution is especially
serious, the EPB and related supervising departments have the authority to impose the
closure of the farm which violates the regulation. Given these two laws, it is apparent that
both the Chongqing EPB and the Chongqing Agriculture Bureau fail to implement both
the state and the local regulations.
46
One official of the Chongqing EPB also admitted
that none of the farms were fined in the past.
47

Local Protectionism
In order to increase local incomes, the district and township governments along
the Liangtan River gave full support to TVEs and poultry farm industry. There are over
hundreds of small plastic plants, electroplating plants, paper-making, and textile factories
in the upper reaches of the Liangtan River. Due to the lack of industrial wastewater
treatment facilities, nearly all the industrial wastewater from these small plants is
discharged into the river directly without being treated. About 10 % of the pollution of
the Liangtan River is produced by these small plants. According to the Plan for Pollution
Control in the Three Gorges Reservoir and the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River
(2001-2005), all these kind of small plants which produce serious pollution to rivers and
lakes should have been closed before the Three Gorges Reservoir started to store water in
2003. But up to today, these small plants are still operated along the Liangtan
River.
48
Moreover, promoting livestock and poultry farm industry has been one of the
major means for the district and township governments to address the problem of poverty

46
of farmers. For many towns along the Liangtan River, duck farms are the key industry.
With the increasing consumption of poultry and livestock meat in urban cities, poultry
and livestock farms are becoming more popular. Since the second half of the year 2007,
the price of duck meat has been rising quickly. This leads to a significant increase in the
number of duck farmers within a short time. The average number of duck raised along the
Liangtan River is 4 million, but at the peak time last year, the total number reached 7
million.
49
Although the Plan for Pollution Control in the Three Gorges Reservoir and the
Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River (2001 version & 2005 version) and The Liangtan
River Basin Water Pollution Comprehensive Treatment Plan (2005) made by the
Chongqing government specified clearly that the expansion of poultry and livestock farm
industry needed to be planned and regulated. However, until the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) sent an inspection team to Chongqing for a secret
investigation, there were not any clear and comprehensive plans and regulations made by
either district governments or the Chongqing Agricultural Bureau. According to one of
the officials in the MEP inspection team, local protectionism is the key factor that hinders
the treatment of poultry and livestock farm pollution of the Liangtan River. This official
emphasized that these local governments blindly expanded the scale of poultry and
livestock farms, but did not provide any funds and technological means to guide and
assist farmers to address animal excrements pollution.
50

One of the best solutions to decrease animal excrements pollution is to build
septic tanks. Septic tanks can disintegrate the poisonous elements in duck excrements.
The duck excrements which have been treated in septic tanks can be applied into the

47
fields as fertilizer. The main issue is who should provide funding for building such tanks.
The cost of building one septic tank is at least 10,000 to 20,000 yuan. But the average
annual income of one duck farmer is just about 20,000 yuan. It is apparent that farmers
cannot afford building such septic tanks without subsidies from the government. To
provide a pertinent example, the township government of Tuzhu Town in Beibei District
did not want to provide the financial support for building such tanks. Then the
governments suggested that both the government and farmers share the cost. But the
farmers complained it was the township government that encouraged them to raise ducks,
so the government is therefore obliged to afford the costs. In the end, the government
failed to pay for the costs. This example shows that the local governments did not pay
any attention to the consequences of the poultry and livestock farm pollution before they
blindly encouraged the expansion of farms, neither did they make any prevention and
control plans for this pollution problem.
51
In November 2007, the Chongqing EPB and
the Chongqing Agriculture Bureau jointly issued “Opinions of Improving the Poultry
Farming Pollution Control in the Liangtan River”. The district governments of
Jiulongpo, Shapingba, and Beibei were required to finish the planning of the poultry
farming-banned area, farming-restricted area and farming-permitted area. According to
this document, all new duck farms are banned to build in the area within 100 meters to
the bank of the Liangtan River, and the old duck farms will be relocated or even forced to
close. However, key questions, such as how to address the problem of duck excrement
discharge after relocation and how to help the farmers find a new way to make a living
after their small farms are closed by the government, are not discussed in this

48
document.
52
Also, none of the district governments or township governments have raised
detailed measures to address these problems. Given the discussion above, it can be
assumed that to increase local incomes, the district and township governments are,
indeed, unwilling to relocate or remove the duck farms. But to protect their own
economic benefits, they also do not want to invest money to help the duck farmers treat
duck farm pollution. Either the relocation or the removal of old farms suggests new funds
are needed. But given this new pollution treatment plan, it is likely that duck farm
pollution still cannot be controlled effectively, and the duck farmers remain the biggest
losers in the new treatment project.
Local Governments vs. Central Agencies
From 1999, the Chongqing EPB started to compile the water pollution control plan
for the Liangtan River. It was not until 2004 that Chongqing started construction work for
the water pollution treatment of the Liangtan River. The Chongqing EPB merely finished
the feasibility studies report for the Liangtan River Water Pollution Treatment Project.
53

In March 2005, the Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Campaign by SEPA,
the Liangtan River and the other 22 rivers in Chongqing were put on the warning list of
SEPA for failing to launch construction work on the date as planned. SEPA also
informed this failure to the entire state.
54
Then from March 2005 to the end of 2007, the
situation of the Liangtan River worsened continuously. From December 2007 to February
2008, with only four months from the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, Pan Yue,
vice minister of the MEP, made four important instructions on serious pollution problems
in Chongqing, two of which were about the water pollution in the Liangtan River.
55
It is
not

49
common for a minister to make instructions on the same problem within such a short
time, but this fact shows that the pollution of the Liangtan River has nearly reached the
breaking point of a crisis. For nearly 10 years, billions of RMB have been spent on the
Liangtan River, but why is this river becoming even worse than before? What
accountability should the Chongqing EPB take for the failure of treatment?
Given the facts above, it is apparent that the Chongqing EPB did not fully follow
the commands from SEPA. In effect, what the Chongqing EPB was doing can be
described by the following formula: “making a plan/report---bargaining for funds---
making a plan/report again----bargaining for funds again”. On the one hand, it raises the
amount of funds it wants to obtain from the central government higher and higher; on the
other hand, it delays the implementation of the treatment project again and again.
When the Liangtan River was listed in the state plan (the Plan for Water Control
and Prevention Program in the Three Gorges Reservoir and Upper Reaches of the
Yangtze River) for the first time in 2001, the total planned state investment for the
Liangtan River and four other rivers was 750 million yuan.
56
Four years later, in the
Liangtan River Basin Water Pollution Comprehensive Treatment Plan made by the
Chongqing EPB, the total planned investment for the Liangtan River alone reached 1.993
billion yuan.
57
In October 2005, the Chongqing government launched the Clean Water
Project. The water pollution treatment of the Liangtan River was also a part of this
project. According to the 2005 Chongqing Clean Water Project Implementation Plan, the
total fund for the comprehensive water pollution treatment for the tributaries in
Chongqing was estimated to be 3.8 billion yuan. This implementation plan indicated

50
clearly that funding for the tributary pollution treatment primarily relied on state
investment, and the local governments involved provided corresponding funds.
58
In
January 2008, the Liangtan River was listed in the state treatment plan again. According
to the 2008 Revised Plan for the Three Gorges Reservoir and Upper Reaches of the
Yangtze River, eleven projects were identified as experimental projects for the
comprehensive pollution treatment of the tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area.
The total planned state investment was 2.032 billion yuan, almost double the total
planned state investment in the 2001 Plan.
59

Based on the data collected for this thesis, it is not clear how much money the
Chongqing government successfully obtained from the central government for the
pollution treatment of the Liangtan River. But there is no controversy over the following
two points: first, the more serious the pollution of the river is, the more funds the local
government can obtain from the central government. Second, as long as the funds it
bargains for are not provided, the local government postpones the implementation of the
pollution treatment program. When the officials of the Chongqing EPB and the
Chongqing Agriculture Bureau were asked by a correspondent for China 1
st
Finance
Daily why the pollution of the Liangtan River failed to be addressed, their explanations
were almost the same-----the shortage of money. For example, the Chongqing EPB
complained about the shortage of funds to build residential wastewater facilities for the
towns along the Liangtan River and to maintain the operation of these facilities. The
Chongqing Agriculture Bureau emphasized the lack of funds to relocate the poultry and
livestock farmers from the riverside to other areas as well as to build excrement treatment

51
devices for the poultry and livestock farmers, etc. With the excuse of scarcity of funds,
the Chongqing EPB delayed the deadline of completion for the Liangtan River pollution
treatment project again and again. According to an investigation report made by the
Chongqing EPB in 2003, the Liangtan River was expected to become clear in 2005.
Then in the The Liangtan River Basin Water Pollution Comprehensive Treatment Plan in
2005, the Chongqing EPB adjusted its goal. According to this plan, the entire
comprehensive plan was expected to be implemented by two phases: Phase 1 was from
2005 to 2010, and Phase II was from 2010 and 2020. In 2005, Chongqing was finally
warned and criticized by SEPB in its delay of the treatment work.
60
Urged by SEPA, in
November 2007, Chongqing adjusted the target again. It promised that the major sources
of residential pollution and livestock and poultry farming pollution would be addressed
by 2010. All the pollution sources would be totally controlled in 2012. The water quality
of the Liangtan River would reach Level 4. But this plan ran counter to the requirement
of SEPA. SEPA required the Chongqing EPB to take immediate actions to address this
pollution problem as soon as possible.
61

This example also indicates that the Chongqing EPB failed to play a
comprehensive role in controlling the sources of pollution. The efforts they made focused
merely on using technical means to address the problems of pollution, e.g. building
wastewater treatment facilities, drainage pipe network. They tackled the pollution only
after it occurred, rather than prevented it by controlling its sources. Moreover, this
example shows that Chongqing government and SEPA were not consistent with each
other on the issue of tributary pollution control. To protect local economic profits, the

52
Chongqing government was not willing to invest more money into the pollution treatment
for the tributaries. Instead, they depended on the central government to provide the funds.
To some extent, obtaining funds from the central government became the major incentive
for the Chongqing government to deal with the pollution problem. On the other hand, as a
functional bureau which finance and staff were controlled by the Chongqing municipal
government, the Chongqing EPB lacked motivations to fully follow the decisions and
commands from SEPA. One official of the Chongqing EPB admitted that the funds they
obtained from the central government were primarily used to build wastewater treatment
facilities and garbage treatment plants for controlling the pollution in the main channel
area of the Yangtze River. The treatment of the tributaries was not of concern to the
Chongqing government in the past.
62

To sum up, the failure of water pollution treatment for the Liangtan River is
attributed to the fragmented local water environment management structure and the
strong protectionism of local government authorities and departments. After the MEP
sent an inspection team to Chongqing and investigated the pollution of the Liangtan
River on April 10, 2008, the Chongqing EPB announced that a new Liangtan River
pollution treatment project would begin soon.
63
It was the third time within the past 10
years that the Chongqing municipal government officially declared its decisions and
measures to address the pollution problem of the Liangtan River. However, without any
major changes in the fragmented political structure, it remains unknown whether these
new measures taken by the Chongqing municipal government this year can be
implemented successfully in the near future.

53
Chapter 3 Endnotes

1. Heggelund, G. Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges
Project. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.

"Three Gorges Area to Handle Pollutant Treatment”
http://english.people.com.cn/200103/08/eng20010308_64403.html (Mar.2001).

"WB Offers 180 Million Us Dollar Loan for China's Infrastructure Project.”
http://english.people.com.cn/200506/22/eng20050622_191744.html (June 22,
2005).

2. Xiao, Fan. "Three Gorges Revisited”
http://www.probeinternational.org/catalog/content_fullstory.php?contentId=3002
&cat_ (May 03, 2006 ).

3. "New Environment Protection Facilities Planned at Three Gorges Dam"
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6356152.html (Feb.18, 2008).

4. "The National Tenth Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection (Abstract)”
http://english.sepa.gov.cn/plan/Tenth.htm (Jan, 2002).

5. "重庆三峡库区水污染防治情况汇报" http://www.ynepb.gov.cn/html/zt/doc/cqs.htm
(2004年5月).

6. "Pollution Control" http://english.gov.cn/2006-02/08/content_182520.htm (2006).

7. "The Three Gorges: A Wiser Approach”
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/1417-The-Three-Gorges-a-
wiser- approach (Oct.23, 2007).

8. "SEPA Report: Three Gorges Main Water Body Slightly Cleaner, Branches Worsening
" http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6356872.html (Feb.20, 2007).

"6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

9. WB. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional Considerations”
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACI
FICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:21049869~pageP
K:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept. 2006).

54
10. "三峡库区水质安全的问题与对策建议"
http://www.93.gov.cn/czyz/lianghuizhuanti/zheng200524.htm (2005).

11. 杨光. "重庆环保局的鸭尴尬"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008)

"20亿让梁滩河碧波荡漾”
http://www.beibeiny.gov.cn/detail.asp?page=1&pubID=171482 (2005年7月6日).

12. 杨光. "重庆环保局的鸭尴尬"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008)

13. "20亿让梁滩河碧波荡漾”
http://www.beibeiny.gov.cn/detail.asp?page=1&pubID=171482 (2005年7月6日).

14. 杨光. "重庆环保局的鸭尴尬"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008)

15. "梁滩河资料" http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-
12/03/content_11831157.htm (2007年12月3日).

16. "色泽如墨的重庆梁滩河"
www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14265 - 42k -
(2008年4月1日).

17. "重庆都市次级河流严重污染危及主城饮水安全"
http://www.mysteel.com/gc/gnscfx/gdrd/2008/01/29/085305,0,0701,1716931.htm
l (2008年1月29).

18. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬”：养鸭场污染河水10年"
http://www.caepi.org.cn/industry-news/544.shtml (2008年4月22日).

19. "重庆市九龙坡区人民政府” http://jlp.cq.gov.cn.

"重庆市沙坪坝区人民政府” http://spb.cq.cqedu.net.

"重庆市北碚区人民政府” http://bb.cq.gov.cn/.

20. 杨光. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008)

55
21. "重庆投资百亿防治三峡水污染规划获得国家批准"
http://news.sohu.com/20070720/n251154681.shtml (2007年7月20日).

22. "梁滩河治污工程启动" http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/sports/2003-
01/25/content_179582.htm (2003年1月25日).

23. "重庆市市长公开信箱：关于梁滩河水污染"
http://www.cq.gov.cn/PublicMail/Citizen/ViewReleaseMail.aspx?intReleaseID=3
4717 (2007年4月5日).

24. "梁滩河治污工程启动" http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/sports/2003-
01/25/content_179582.htm (2003年1月25日)

25. "梁滩河5年前就已编制整治规划现仍污水横流"
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-12/03/content_11830609.htm
(2007年12月日).

26. "重庆23环保项目久拖不治被环保总局全国通报"
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2005-03/23/content_3924018.htm
(2005年3月23日).

27. "重庆市人民政府关于梁滩河流域水污染综合整治规划的批复(渝府[2005]140) "
http://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfwj/20050715333.HTM (2005年7月5日).

28. "重庆市人民政府关于印发重庆市碧水行动实施方案的通知"
http://www.cepb.gov.cn/ghjh/zxgzjh/14555.htm (2005年10月8日).

29. "重庆市梁滩河流域环境综合整治项目土主污水处理项目"
http://www.sasaccq.gov.cn/news/show_content.asp?id=716&class=00010006000
3 (2006年10月3日).

30. 杨光. "重庆环保局的鸭尴尬"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008)

31. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局"
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

32. "三峡库区及其上游水污染防治规划（修订本）2008”
www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huangfa/200802/W020080203462094746002.pdf -
2008.

56
33. "重庆都市次级河流严重污染危及主城饮水安全"
http://www.mysteel.com/gc/gnscfx/gdrd/2008/01/29/085305,0,0701,1716931.htm
l (2008年1月29).

34. 杨光. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008).

35. "重庆市切实推进三峡库区水污染防治工作”
http://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxx/98562.htm (2008年4月10日).

36. "中央电视台：“那条梁滩河” http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-
12/03/content_11830555.htm (2007年12月3日).

37. "重庆市市长公开信箱：关于梁滩河水污染”
http://www.cq.gov.cn/PublicMail/Citizen/ViewReleaseMail.aspx?intReleaseID=3
4717 (2007年4月5日).

38. "100亿治理10条小河为什么治理迟缓环保局给说法”
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-12/03/content_11830606.htm
(2007年12月3日).

39. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬”：养鸭场污染河水10年”
http://www.caepi.org.cn/industry-news/544.shtml (2008年4月22日).

40. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

41. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

"梁滩河见闻：整治未见效果排污肆虐污染依旧”
http://www.ce65.com/news/detail_78971.html (2007年12月3日).

42. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

"梁滩河见闻：整治未见效果排污肆虐污染依旧”
http://www.ce65.com/news/detail_78971.html (2007年12月3日).

43. "重庆梁滩河要治污上千万只鸭子要挪窝” http://cq.QQ.com (2007年12月6日).

57
44. "[今日说法]: 那条梁滩河"
http://www.cctv.com/program/lawtoday/20050422/102031.shtml
(2005年4月22日).

45. "重庆市长江三峡库区流域水污染防治条例"
http://www.clapv.org/new/show.php?id=1127 (2002年1月1日).

46. "梁滩河见闻：整治未见效果排污肆虐污染依旧”
http://www.ce65.com/news/detail_78971.html (2007年12月3日).

47. "梁滩河见闻：整治未见效果排污肆虐污染依旧”
http://www.ce65.com/news/detail_78971.html (2007年12月3日).

48. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬”：养鸭场污染河水10年”
http://www.caepi.org.cn/industry-news/544.shtml (2008年4月22日).

49. "国家环境保护部首次垂直督查重庆河流污染问题”
http://it.sohu.com/20080331/n256003681.shtml (2008年3月31日).

"6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).
.
50. "中央电视台：“那条梁滩河”“ http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-
12/03/content_11830555.htm (2007年12月3日).

51. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

52. "梁滩河5年前就已编制整治规划现仍污水横流 "
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-12/03/content_11830609.htm
(2007年12月日).

杨光. "重庆环保局的“鸭尴尬”“
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14909 (2008).

"重庆23环保项目久拖不治被环保总局全国通报”
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2005-03/23/content_3924018.htm
(2005年3月23日).

58
53. "重庆23环保项目久拖不治被环保总局全国通报”
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2005-03/23/content_3924018.htm
(2005年3月23日).

54. "国家环境保护部首次垂直督查重庆河流污染问题”
http://it.sohu.com/20080331/n256003681.shtml (2008年3月31日).

55. "梁滩河5年前就已编制整治规划现仍污水横流 "
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-12/03/content_11830609.htm
(2007年12月日).

56. "20亿让梁滩河碧波荡漾”
http://www.beibeiny.gov.cn/detail.asp?page=1&pubID=171482 (2005年7月6日).

57. "重庆市人民政府关于印发重庆市碧水行动实施方案的通知”
http://www.cepb.gov.cn/ghjh/zxgzjh/14555.htm (2005年10月8日).

58. "三峡库区及其上游水污染防治规划（修订本）2008”
www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huangfa/200802/W020080203462094746002.pdf -
2008.

59. "梁滩河治污工程启动 " http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/sports/2003-
01/25/content_179582.htm (2003年1月25日)

60. "20亿让梁滩河碧波荡漾”
http://www.beibeiny.gov.cn/detail.asp?page=1&pubID=171482 (2005年7月6
日).

61. "6万吨鸭粪难住重庆环保局”
http://www.cfej.net/Environment/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14264 (2008年).

62. "100亿治理10条小河为什么治理迟缓环保局给说法”
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007/lth/2007-12/03/content_11830606.htm (2007
年12月3日).

63. "重庆市切实推进三峡库区水污染防治工作”
http://www.cq.gov.cn/zwgk/zfxx/98562.htm (2008年4月10日).

59
Chapter 4 Conclusion
In recent years, China’s one-sided pursuit of GDP growth rate and its negligence
of environmental protection have received harsh criticism. Facing pressure from both
domestic and international communities, the Chinese central government is fully aware of
the significant effects of water pollution on China’s sustainable development. In 2006,
Premier Wen announced that the GDP growth rate was lowered by 2%. Moreover, energy
consumption per unit of GDP will be cut by 4% and pollutant emissions by 2% annually.
By 2010, energy consumption per unit of GDP will be reduced by 20% and emissions by
10% from 2006.
1
Unfortunately, China failed to fulfill its two mandatory targets in both
2006 and 2007. Meanwhile, China’s natural environment has been continuously
worsening. Water pollution has become especially serious. Massive algae blooms have
spread out in several of China’s large lakes, including Lake Taihu, Lake Chaohu, and
Lake Dian Chi in 2006 and 2007. China has been warned that water pollution is at or has
reached the crisis point.
By analyzing the water pollution treatment of the Liangtan River, an important
tributary in the Three Gorges Reservoir area, this thesis explores the key factors that
contribute to the failure of the Chinese government in controlling and preventing water
pollution. This thesis stresses that China’s fragmented authoritarianism hinders the
enforcement of environmental regulations in China. This fragmented structure results in
poor inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination and cooperation, strong local
protectionism, and inefficient implementation and compliance with environmental
policies and regulations.

60
In order to overcome the obstacles of this fragmented institutional structure, the
central government has conducted a number of experiments to improve officials’
accountability and to curb local protectionism. Regarding environmental protectionism,
the central government has taken three major measures into account: 1. Promoting SEPA
to become a ministerial level organ; 2. Implementing the Environmental Quality
Administrative Leadership Responsibility System; and 3. Introducing a Green GDP
system. In March 2008, SEPA was upgraded to become the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP).
First, the upgrading of SEPA shows that the MEP will be more involved in the
overall policy-making with other key ministries at the same rank. It is unquestionable that
the MEP’s authority and capability of enforcement will be improved significantly. But
without changing the fragmented political system, this upgrading does not guarantee the
MEP to have more power over local EPBs. As long as local EPBs remain attached to
local governments, which control their budget and staff, it is still difficult for the MEP
and local EPBs to enforce environmental laws and regulations efficiently.
Second, the Environmental Quality Administrative Leadership system was set up
to increase the officials’ awareness of protection of the environment and their
accountability for the enforcement of environmental policy. According to this system,
environmental performance is one of the criteria for the annual assessment of local
leaders’ performance. Poor environmental performance may negatively affect the
promotion of local leaders.
2
Chongqing is one of the first regions in China that has
formulated criteria to judge the environmental performance of government leaders. The

61
results of the assessment are publicized by local media, and local leaders are rewarded or
punished according to the results of the assessment. In Chongqing, the officials whose
performances are judged poorly for two consecutive years will not be promoted, and
those who are judged poorly for three consecutive years will be demoted.
3
But the
problem is that in many places, such an assessment is not taken sufficiently seriously and
thus still fails to act as a decisive factor in affecting the promotion and demotion of
officials.
Third, the Green GDP refers to the balance after deducting the cost of
environmental loss and resources consumption from the traditional GDP. Theoretically,
the Green GDP is a good concept that can raise both local governments’ and the public’s
environmental awareness and performance. However, China has difficulty in calculating
the value of natural assets which are not traded in the market as well as the loss of
environmental and natural resources caused by economic activities. Politically, the
implementation of the Green GDP also faces some constraints. To protect their economic
profits, some local officials appear to resist the implementation of the Green GDP
system. In effect, the Green GDP system has been delayed in its implementation because
of sharp conflicts between various interest groups.
4

The measures discussed above may be effective, to some extent, in promoting
government officials’ performance regarding the enforcement of environmental policies
and regulations. But the problem is that in all these measures, only the role of the
government officials is emphasized. Other factors such as public participation, public
disclosure, and market mechanism are excluded. As discussed, the ultimate goal of

62
China’s government in adopting these innovative measures is to prevent China from
further environmental degradation and resource depletion. If these measures only focus
on the statistical data of the Green GDP or the promotion or demotion of government
officials, these measures definitely will have a very limited impact on the improvement of
Chinese environmental protection. It does not matter who is promoted or removed if there
is no one who can be held responsible for restoring the damaged environment and
resources back to the original state before they were excessively exploited. Most
importantly, the serious detriment caused by environmental pollution on human health
usually can only be detected a long time after the pollution has occurred. Since none of
the government leaders can stay in the same position or within the same jurisdiction for
such an extended period under the current political system, who can be held accountable
for the loss of people’s health and even lives?
Undoubtedly, the strong political will of senior government leaders or even the
very best official performance system cannot guarantee a reversal in the environmental
crisis in China. Presently, China’s most urgent need is to establish a more comprehensive
and integrated institution to tackle this crisis. The new institution should overcome the
disadvantages that stem from the fragmented political structure. The environmental issue
is related to almost all aspects of government, so it is necessary for the environmental
authorities and other departments to work closely together. But the promotion of SEPA
does not empower the new MEP with the authority to issue binding orders to other
governmental agencies at the same rank. To control the pollution in China’s major river
basins, China needs to implement an “integrated river basin management” approach,

63
which “combines the conservation, management, and development of water and related
resources across sectors within a river basin.”
5
China actually established river basin
commissions as early as in the 1950s for the seven major river basins. However, because
jurisdictional management has been the primary water resource management approach in
China, these river basin commissions actually failed to play the role of managing China’s
major rivers in an integrated way. In practice, they were reduced to being organs which
were primarily responsible for controlling floods in these river basins.
6
The river basin
management approach was fully endorsed at the legislative level in the Water Law of
2002. It shows that China’s government is fully aware of the significance of integrated
river basin management in water pollution control and prevention in the river basins.
However, as discussed in this thesis, the Water Pollution Prevention and Control
(WPPC) Law (1996 revision), which emphasizes the jurisdictional management of water
resources, is contradictory to the Water Law (2002).
7
Therefore, to address this conflict,
the legal structure regarding water pollution management needs to be improved so as to
reduce the extent of contradictions of the laws related to water pollution control.
No matter what new approaches and innovations the Chinese government might
adopt, without public participation and information transparency, none of these reforms
can reach the desired goals. To make a substantial improvement in China’s water
environment, a proper mechanism needs to be established to allow for proactive public
participation and effective media supervision in the enforcement of the nation’s
environmental laws and regulations. According to Pan Yue, the vice-minister of the
MEP, "The public is the most interested party when it comes to the environment and has

64
the biggest incentive to protect it", and “people should be given the right to know, to
express, to participate and to supervise."
8

Many environmental protests in China have proven that a lack of public
participation and information transparency inevitably causes conflicts between the
government and the people. One of the most famous environmental protests occurred in
Xiamen, in June 2007, when thousands of Xiamen residents took to the streets to protest
against the Xiamen government’s plan to construct a chemical project close to local
residential areas. This large-scale protest by the urban residents finally forced the Xiamen
administration to suspend the project pending further environmental assessments. The
Xiamen protest has sent a signal that the environmental movement by the grassroots will
likely become a driving force to prevent environmental degradation in China.
9

However, there is still a lack of standardized mechanisms for communication and
information sharing between the public and the government. It is reported that there are
about 600 laws and regulations in China that mention the right of public participation, but
few of these laws and regulations provide detailed and effective mechanisms with regard
to implementation. A project initiated in 2000 and supported by the World Bank perhaps
provides a new model for China’s government on the mechanism for public participation.
This project held dozens of regular roundtable meetings in nine cities involved in the
project. Representatives from all walks of life, such as government officials,
businessmen, industrial entrepreneurs, and community residents were invited to attend
these meetings. These meetings were shown to be effective in improving the transparency
of local policy making. However, these meetings are just one kind of practical measure.

65
To turn these measures into a regular mechanism, China needs a special law that
guarantees public participation, especially when it comes to environmental issues.
10

To sum up, given the existing fragmented political structure, environmental
improvement needs the proactive involvement and coordination of all the major
stakeholders. A more comprehensive and integrated institution needs to be established to
overcome the obstacles caused by the fragmented political structure. Integrated river
basin management should be at the top of the government’s agenda. The adoption of
economic mechanisms, the involvement of the private sector, and perhaps most
importantly public disclosure and public participation should also be significant parts of
optimal water pollution management solutions.

66
Chapter 4 Endnotes

1. "China to Set up Energy Consumption Evaluation System."
http://english.people.com.cn/200701/18/eng20070118_342576.html (January 18
2007).

2. Jahiel, Abigail R. "The Organization of Environmental Protection in China." The
China Quarterly 156.Special Issue: China's Environment (Dec.1998): 757-87.

3. "重庆连续7年开展党政“一把手”环保实绩考核, 巨大压力变成前进动力"
http://www.envir.gov.cn/info/2007/7/723590.htm (2007年7月23日).

"党政“一把手”环保考核无差生全部达标" 重庆日报
http://www.cq.xinhua.org/news/2008-06/05/content_13464056.htm
(2008年6月5日).

"环保实绩考核：促进科学发展的利剑"
http://news.163.com/08/0304/15/4671680K000120GU.html (2008年3月14日)

4. "China's 'Green GDP' Index Facing Technology Problem, Local Protectionism."
http://english.people.com.cn/200404/03/eng20040403_139355.shtml (April 3
2004).

5. The World Bank. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional
Considerations."http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:
21049869~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept.
2006).

6. The World Bank. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional
Considerations."http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:
21049869~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept.
2006).
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5325
7. The World Bank. "Water Quality Management: Policy and Institutional
Considerations."http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:
21049869~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502886,00.html (Sept.
2006).

67
8. "Watchdog Pan Yue Calls for Environment Renewal"
http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=435 (May 16 2007).

"SEPA Calls for More Public Involvement"
http://english.people.com.cn/200706/22/eng20070622_386678.html
(June 22 2007).

9. "SEPA Calls for More Public Involvement"
http://english.people.com.cn/200706/22/eng20070622_386678.html
(June 22 2007).

10. "SEPA Calls for More Public Involvement"
http://english.people.com.cn/200706/22/eng20070622_386678.html
(June 22 2007).

"The third Environmental Economic Policy --Guide to Green Securities--Unveiled
2008-02-25 "
http://english.sepa.gov.cn/News_service/news_release/200803/t20080319_11945
4.htm (February 25 2008).

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Asset Metadata

Creator Rui, Min (author)

Core Title China' s fragmented political structure and the effect on environmental policy enforcement on the water pollution control in the tributaries in the Three Gorges Reservoir area

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 07/31/2008

Defense Date 07/01/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Environmental protection,fragmented political structure,local protectionism,OAI-PMH Harvest,water pollution control

Place Name China (countries), reservoirs: Three Gorges Reservoir (geographic subject), rivers: Liangtan River (geographic subject)

Language English

Advisor Rosen, Stanley (committee chair), Lynch, Daniel C. (committee member), Shui-yan, Tang (committee member)

Creator Email mrui@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1466

Unique identifier UC1169240

Identifier etd-Rui-20080731 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-89407 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1466 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Rui-20080731.pdf

Dmrecord 89407

Document Type Thesis

Rights Rui, Min

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email uscdl@usc.edu

Abstract (if available)

Abstract China's rapid economic growth has led to severe environmental degradation. Despite numerous laws, regulations, and policies to regulate and direct the country's environmental performance, the enforcement of these policies and regulations has been far from effective.