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A review of transparency as it correlates with trust in crisis communication

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A review of transparency as it correlates with trust in crisis communication

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A REVIEW OF TRANSPARENCY AS IT CORRELATES WITH TRUST IN
CRISIS COMMUNICATION

by
Nooneh Hambarsoomian

A Thesis Presentation to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS)

May 2008

Copyright 2008 Nooneh Hambarsoomian

Table of Contents

Abstract ii.

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Educational Institutions 3

Chapter 3: Religious Institutions 29

Chapter 4: Nonprofit Organizations 43

Conclusion 63

References 67

Appendix A 70

Appendix B 71

ii

Abstract

This paper examines the need for nonprofits and other non-traditional businesses
to operate crisis communication in a transparent manner. Drawing from case studies
of Virginia Tech, Columbine, The Catholic Church and The Getty Trust, this thesis
offers an analysis of the comments made by the various organization spokespersons
to uncover flaws or holes in the crisis communication campaign. These mistakes are
hypothesized to result in a loss of trust on the part of key audiences. Based on
research from content analysis and interviews with public relations practitioners,
recommendations on better ways to confront the crisis will be offered.
1

Chapter 1: Introduction

Trust. Defined by the assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or
truth of something, trust is the fundamental quality of nonprofit organizations, as well
educational and religious institutions. The common thread that these groups share lies
in the support they receive from their community and supporters. As a result of such
support, image management becomes a matter of maintaining trust and continuing to
fulfill the mission that was promised to the community.
When for-profit corporations hire a public relations firm to manage their
images, they seek to persuade a public that has no reason to trust their intentions. A
nonprofit, however can earn trust while in its launch phase by explaining its mission
and finding an audience with which that message resonates. In times of crisis,
nonprofits such as universities and churches, face a disappointed public which had
high expectations and trust in the organization. In the face of scandal or tragedy,
conducting crisis communication in nonprofits is an almost insurmountable task,
seeking to instill faith at a time when trust is lost.
In the case of a crisis or tragedy, an organization is tasked with communicating
with its publics to regain trust. The purpose of crisis communication for such
organizations is not to prevent the loss of revenue rather to prevent the loss of support.
A school is non-existent without its student body. A church cannot serve the faith
without parishioners and a museum cannot operate without patrons. These examples
2

illustrate the need for strategic public relations similar to the form of PR that
corporations rely on to sustain – or repair - a brand image.
In my quest to determine the effects of advancements made in the field of
public relations, I wanted to know if there is a line which a nonprofit communication
team crosses in protecting the organizations reputation, and if crossing the line
resulted in the loss of trust on behalf of stakeholders and community members. In
order to uphold its position in the community, I wanted to know when and how a
spokesperson responded to a crisis, based on content analysis of statements addressing
the media. I chose four classic cases of severe crises that occurred outside of the for-
profit business model. The four cases I will explore epitomize what to and what not do
when you are a communication professional for a nonprofit, based on conclusions
drawn from media coverage.
My hypothesis is that a nonprofit PR team that fails to manage a crisis in a
transparent manner is likely to face criticism in the form of a backlash from the
community and key audiences. The result may be a loss of support from donors,
employees and volunteers.

3

Chapter 2: Educational Institutions

Traditionally, public relations and education have not seemed like a natural fit
for one another. As public relations aims to connect internal and external audiences of
an organization through media placement and other visibility techniques, school
administrators believe public relations services to be unnecessary and frivolous. In
times of crisis, turning to public relations to solve communication problems can seem
like cheating or unnecessarily spending hard-earned funds, since parents and students
expect genuine responses from school officials, not from trained specialists. They also
expect school officials to be conversant in the methods of communicating with
reporters, city officials, residents and other stakeholders.
The danger in treating a school like a brand lies in the expectation of the
target audience for honesty and transparency. Parents who rely on a school to care for
and educate their children do not appreciate having information withheld, especially
during crisis. They seek for facts and trust that no information is being withheld,
regardless of communication strategy.
The function of public relations is to provide facts in a strategic, yet transparent
manner. Problems may arise when public relations practitioners go too far and begin
formulating plans for school using the same strategies that would apply to a business.
The danger here is the plans could backfire if audiences became aware that they were
the subjects of a business plan to improve the school’s reputation. Trust for the
institution as well as the industry has been jeopardized when school attacks such as
Columbine and Virginia Tech prompted aggressive media relations and updates
4

concerning a school’s standard, off-the-shelf operational crisis communication plans.
Parents may begin to feel that they no can no longer trust the school’s progress in a
given case when it is delivered by a trained spokesperson or that it is obvious a school
official is delivering “the party line.” A delicate balance must be established between
providing the facts of the case and ensuring that the school’s spokespersons are trained
to deliver these facts so as to avoid further tarnishing the school’s reputation.
For my thesis, I plan to examine two tragedies that took place within a school
setting to determine if a communication team was present to disseminate information
and how effectively they did so. The first is Columbine High School, where I hope to
determine if there existed any sort of PR plan to respond to the crisis based on
statements made by Columbine spokespersons and how their prepared statements
attempted to maintain school support. My review will also include recommendations
for ways educational institutions must shore up their communication strategies to
reinstate the trust that parents and other stakeholders once held.
Columbine High School Case

On April 20, 1999, in the small town of Littleton, Colorado, two high-school
seniors, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, assaulted Columbine High School during the
middle of the school day. The boys' plan was to kill hundreds of their peers. With
guns, knives and bombs, the two boys walked the hallways of the school and killed.
Columbine ranks as the fourth-deadliest school killing in United States history, after
the 1927 Bath School disaster, 2007 Virginia Tech massacre and the 1966 University
5

of Texas shooting.
1
After Columbine, with the nation in mourning and shock, it
became the media’s responsibility to deliver the facts. For the community, it became
the responsibility of the designated school spokespersons to relieve fears and assure
the public that the school was safe and running.
Media coverage
Media coverage of the incident included grim visuals, which were omnipresent
in the media. Accounts in news stories came from students, often expressing sadness
over the loss of friends or the shock of the attack. ''The whole feeling was that two
gunmen took our school, and we're going to take it back”
2
Stories filled newspapers
and newscasts with personal accounts and reactions to the tragedy.
The type of stories that were released in the weeks and months following the
shootings mainly focused on gruesome details of the event as well as the ongoing
mourning for the loss of friends, siblings and children. Hardly any spokespersons
were present. School administrators were slow to make their own statements.
President Clinton was first to address the nation in an unscheduled live statement in
the afternoon of the shooting.
3
No official statement was released by any school
official the day of the attack. The following day, however, Superintendent David

1
See Columbine Report: Retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/columbine.cd/frameset.exclude.html

2
Terror in Littleton: The Seniors, April 24, 1999 New York Times
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE3D9113AF937A15757C0A96F958260&sec=&s
pon=&pagewanted=1

3
See Littleton Saga Becomes America’s by Phil Kloer, Atlanta Journal-Constitution

6

Hornbeck made a statement on about measures in place to keep students and teachers
safe. They included safety and crisis plans for every school; random metal detector
scans of students; surveillance cameras; safe corridor programs and a hotline to report
unsafe conditions in and around schools. "On behalf of the entire School District
family, I extend our sympathy and prayers to the students, staff, families and the entire
community there," Hornbeck said. "In an increasingly violent society, it is an
unfortunate reality that rare incidents such as today's shooting can happen anywhere."
4

The latent reaction from the school’s administration sent the signal that this
case would have lasting and damaging effects for the school’s image. In this case,
they should have made themselves available for comments immediately, even if only
to express shock and describe potential next steps. If there was no crisis plan in place,
they should have made it known that a plan was in progress. This transparency would
have given the school credibility to a nation riddled with questions and concerns.
Principal Frank DeAngelis told the Governor’s Columbine Review
Commission he had met Klebold when the teen was helping out with lighting for a
school play. Both youths did well in class, participated in some extracurricular
activities and stayed out of trouble at school, DeAngelis said. When questioned about
“red flags” — including essays and video depicting violence — that may have
signaled the teens’ intent, DeAngelis said he had “the utmost confidence” that

4
See Violence Kills More in Cities by Mensah M. Dean Philadelphia Daily News
7

authorities had no prior knowledge of a planned attack.
5
He further maintained that it
is not the school authorities’ responsibility to identify or prevent mental illnesses or
sociopathic behavior. In this instance, it becomes the job of the spokesperson to make
sure the school’s message does not focus on fighting off blame. A suggestion for
Columbine in this case would have been to express sorrow and attempt to regain the
trust of the community by showing that the administration is also mourning a loss, not
attempting to win a legal battle.
In the weeks following the attack, public relations should have been a major
concern for the administration. The school should have had a communication plan that
outlined the steps to take in case of an emergency in terms of who would speak and
when. Although Columbine is a public high school that does not depend on private
contributions, this case marked the first major school shooting in American history
that drew the attention of the entire nation and its reputation was strictly jeopardized.
The notion of public relations in the school was new at the time because no schools
were dealing with issues of this magnitude. Columbine served as an example of what
can happen to a school that avoids media attention rather than learning techniques to
address it.
On the eve of the six-month anniversary of the shootings, a Columbine senior
was arrested for threatening to finish the job of the shooters. This sparked a response
from the official school spokesperson in the wake of falling attendance. With 25

5
See ABC News: Columbine Principal Remembers Slaughter:
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=96036&page=1
8

percent of the student body missing the day of the six-month anniversary, the school’s
administrators should have found a way to reassure the students of their safety,
regardless of confidentiality concerns. School district spokesperson Marilyn Saltzman
said rumors of the threat began swirling through the school Monday, and were quickly
reported to faculty.
6
School officials worked closely with the sheriff's office, and the
parents of the 17-year-old agreed to being questioned. Tight-lipped sheriff's
department spokesmen refused comment on the document. It was reported that the
spokesmen for the school district had been similarly restrained, because of
confidentiality restrictions imposed by state law on felonies by minors. In this case,
Saltzman made the mistake of allowing the concerns for confidentiality to prevent her
from communicating with the students and the community. In this case, a statement to
the community explaining the need to respect confidentiality would have proven more
effective and put students at ease, thereby preventing the dramatic attendance
decrease.
While the name and reputation of the school were in danger (and attempts to
regain attendance were being made) it may have been wiser to allow students the
freedom to decide for themselves when they were ready to return. Efforts at
communication by school’s administration, however, should not be lacking because
the school is in mourning. Columbine made few efforts to engage in proactive
communication as attendance was declining. The type of reactive strategies they

6
See Attendance Down at Columbine After Threats:
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/10/22/columbine/
9

engaged in with the media shows how unprepared the school’s communication team
was to handle a crisis. The school’s communication team needed to devise a strategic
plan to engage in public discussion regarding the incident. Simply put, Columbine
officials failed to acknowledge that the whole nation was watching their every move.
This is often the case in corporate communication, where well-meaning executives
believe the crisis is over when the strike ends, or the fire is put out or the bomb is
defused.
In an interview in summer 2007, Principal Frank DeAngelis was quoted as
saying that his “greatest downfall had been a failure to create an environment where
students felt comfortable confiding dangerous problems to faculty and staff. He said
changing that environment would be a top priority for the fall, and a series of pilot
measures have been implemented.”
7
DeAngelis is calling for a policy change, which
should have been reinforced by Saltzman to the media. The principal is one of the
school’s various spokespersons, yet he is not the communication specialist. The job of
the internal communication team should have been to build this message in the media
in order to show how policy changes will be put in place to reestablish credibility for
the school. The fact remains, however, that this was not a case where communication
strategies were implemented to quickly implement damage control. In today’s 24/7
news cycle, educational institutions must be and ready to conduct bona fide crisis
communication.

7
See Attendance Down at Columbine After Threats:
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/10/22/columbine/

10

Damage Control
The day following the tragedy, Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley made
a statement about Columbine and gun control. His words were well chosen and
identified high-risk groups who required tailored messages to inspire change. He
reached out to gun owners with direct advice: “lock up your guns today. Think hard
about what has just happened and please don't assume anything. Time and again,
young people, who have caused these types of tragedies in our schools, have been able
to get access to guns. America needs to realize that kids and unsupervised gun use do
not mix.”
8

He also addressed parents and asked them to “reach out to your children and
listen to them. We have to do everything we can to connect even to the most angry and
alienated young person. Young people who are cut-off and isolated can be, as we have
seen, deeply disconnected.”
8
Riley identifies parents as primarily responsible for
preventing these crimes. He does not, however, incriminate the school or any of its
faculty, alleviating some of the blame that they have had to endure. This is credible
because it comes from a source outside of the school. The professionals in
communication in this case had the power to awaken the nation and make them
accountable for their own children and families, in turn protecting school
representatives from being held accountable for student behavior.

8
See Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_puca/is_199904/ai_816327873/pg_1

11

"How could we let this happen?" a shaken Howard Cornell, the school district's
security director, told ABC News. "I don't think anybody has the answer."
9
This
message demonstrated the inexperience of school officials in the wake of the tragedy.
The apologetic admission of failure is human, yet it is devastating to the school’s
reputation.
One of the pivotal people to train as a spokesperson is the security director.
This statement is sincere, yet it seems to divulge information that could result in the
school being blamed for allowing the shooting to take place. The message needs to
stress the numerous factors that also contributed to the tragedy, such as the months of
calculation and preparation the boys needed to do in order to carry out their plan. The
bottom line does not need to change: the school security failed the students. Placing
the director in front of the camera with nothing prepared to say, however, is a costly
mistake that could have been prevented had the school developed a training session for
key positions.
For each case, I will apply a trusted communication tool, the SWOT analysis in
order to draw meaningful conclusions for each case. In addition, this tool will allow
for comparisons across cases that may not appear to have common characteristics on
the surface.

9
Harsh reality hits shocked Littleton, Colo.
Cox News Service, April 21, 1999, Domestic, non-Washington, general news item, Mike Williams
12

SWOT
Strengths:
• The small-town ideals of Littleton, Colorado allowed a strong sense of
community in the face of tragedy. The support of the community eased
the pressure on the school in terms of communication efforts. Officials
leveraged this trust
• The magnitude of the case may have also helped serve as a strength, for
communication efforts only, because of the high levels of shock
experienced worldwide in response to the tragedy. Key audiences could
not have expected the school to anticipate such an unspeakable tragedy,
which made it acceptable for the school to shy away from the media.
People tend to be more forgiving in the initial wake of a tragedy.
Weaknesses:
• The fact that Columbine was a public high school dealing with a crisis of
this magnitude prevented the school from being able to afford help from
specialized PR experts.
• School officials as well as the parents of the shooters had difficulty
defending their failure to acknowledge warning signs exhibited by the
shooters. Ranging from gun purchases to disturbing behavior, the
behavior of the two shooters should not have gone ignored. Reporters
and the public began to wonder why no one in authority seemed to have
any warning or inkling about the mindset of the two students.
13

Opportunities:
• The Columbine administration had the opportunity to set new guidelines
for security standards throughout schools nationwide. The administration
should have taken this opportunity to revamp their security practices and
communicated the new standards they set to the media.
• Columbine officials also had the opportunity to pioneer efforts to build
mental-wellness programs and school-wide evaluations of mental health
for all students to ensure that troubled individuals did not feel abandoned
by their school.
Threats:
• Law suits against the parents of the victims and the school threatened the
progress that Columbine officials could make in repairing their
reputation in the community. The suits lowered morale and gave the
administration an extra burden that prevented time and effort from being
allocated to communication tactics.
• The bombardment of the media was another threat to Columbine’s
communication abilities because of the overwhelming nature of media
inquiries.
• Lingering negativity about the school; people made statements like, “we
don’t want another Columbine” as the generic for horribly handled
school crisis.

14

Strategic Implications
The communication efforts of Columbine officials were lacking in the sense
that the lack of preparation for a crisis resulted in a slow recovery process for the
school’s reputation. Spokespersons for the school needed to engage in proactive
communications following the tragedy in order to generate some positive coverage to
counter the criticism they endured. Outreach to the community needed to be more
present as school administrators strived to gain support from parents who had lost faith
in the school’s practices.
Conclusion
As Columbine officials began receiving internet threats following the shooting,
they decided to shut the school down two days before the end of finals. School
officials devised a crisis plan following the attacks. In response to the internet threats
made in the night, Saltzman said 30 security personnel were already present at the
school by 8 a.m., with ninety expected by noon, under existing plans.
10
The decision
to reveal this information shows that the administration felt compelled to reassure the
public that a plan was in place. This could be attributed to criticisms they faced that
not enough was being done to reclaim the school and its reputation.
The role of public relations in this crisis could have helped save Columbine’s
reputation. As attendance began to decline, it became apparent that schools need to do
more in training their administrators to speak publicly and recognize the national – and

10
See Columbine High School Shut Down, Dec 16, 199.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/12/16/columbine/index.html
15

global – impact of tragedies such as this. The communication plan for Columbine was
operational and used on a needs basis. In the following section, I plan to investigate
differences in the handling of a similar crisis at Virginia Tech University.
Columbine and Virginia Tech Correlation
My hypothesis for the case of Virginia Tech is that in the eight-year span that
separated the two tragic events, strategic communication became much more
prevalent. Clearly, a new belief system that calls for training and grooming of
spokespersons within the school setting has emerged. One factor, however, that
cannot be controlled in the case review is the fact that Virginia Tech is a university
with greater resources than Columbine, a public high school with a less sophisticated
internal communication team. This comparison will also seek to explore how schools
should operate communication departments more like companies yet maintain the
transparency that is required of them.
Virginia Tech Case
In 2007, another mass killing occurred on April 16 at the Virginia Tech
campus in Blacksburg, Virginia. The shooter was identified as Seung-Hui Cho, a
mentally-disturbed student who shot and killed 33 people, including himself, in the
deadliest school shooting in United States’ history. Immediately following the
shooting, university officials were blamed for a number of errors in the way they
handled the tragedy. Among many other faults, the school administration withheld
knowledge of Cho’s mental illness from teachers, citing confidentiality concerns.
School officials also failed to inform students about the shootings in the few hours of
16

inactivity following the first two deaths, resulting in the death toll rising from two to
33. When Virginia Tech began to come under fire, the communication team stepped
in to ensure that these issues were dealt with properly. Statements began to pour in
from many sources and parts of the world regarding the incident. The media did not
focus on students as was the case during Columbine. Rather, media coverage
consisted of school and public officials delivering prepared statements.
On Monday afternoon, after the fatal shooting of 21 students, Virginia Tech
President Charles Steger read the following statement:
Well, today the university was struck with a tragedy that we
consider of monumental proportions. There were two shootings which
occurred on campus. In each case there were fatalities. The university is
shocked and indeed horrified that this would befall us, and I want to
extend my deepest and most sincere and profound sympathy to the
families of these victims, which include our students.
We are currently in the process of notifying next of kin. The
Virginia Tech police are being assisted by numerous other jurisdictions
including Montgomery County. Crime scenes are being investigated by
the university police, the FBI and the state police.
We continue to work to identify the victims that have been impacted
by this tragedy. I cannot begin to convey my own personal sense of loss
over this senseless and incomprehensible heinous act. The university will
immediately set up counseling centers. So far, centers have been identified
in Ambler Johnston and the Cook counseling center to work with our
campus community and their families.
Now here are some of the facts as we know them. At about 7:15
this morning, a 911 call came to the university police department
concerning an event in West Ambler Johnston Hall. There were multiple
shooting victims. While in the process of investigating, about two hours
later, the university received reports of a shooting in Norris Hall. The
police immediately responded.
The shooter in Norris Hall is deceased. There are multiple
fatalities. The number of fatalities has not been confirmed. Victims have
17

been transported to various hospitals in the immediate area in the region to
receive emergency treatment. And we will proceed to contact the next of
kin as the victims' identities are available. All classes are canceled and the
university is closed for the remainder of the day.
The university will open tomorrow at 8:00 a.m., but classes will be
canceled on Tuesday. The police are currently staging the release of
people from campus buildings. Families wishing to reunite with their
students are suggested to meet at the Inn at Virginia Tech, the building
that we're in today. Were making plans for a convocation tomorrow at
noon in Cassell Coliseum for the university to come together to begin the
healing process from this terrible tragedy.

That ends my prepared comments.
11

As Steger addressed the media, students, their families and a tense nation, he
was clearly distraught. His ability to deliver his statement, however, was not affected.
He began by extending his condolences and expressing his own pain and fears. He
followed this with a statement of the facts that were known at the time and he gave
notice about what would happen in the future. Noting that he was making “prepared”
comments, Steger indicates that a school official need not speak more than was
intended and recorded. This is a strategy often employed by companies facing a crisis
because it prevents leakage of information that might incite blame for the organization
or hinder police efforts to investigate the situation.
Steger’s immediate response to the shooting gave the school’s officials some
credibility for accepting the challenges that lay ahead. This differs from the
Columbine in that the high school’s staff seemed to have no grasp on delivering

11
Statement by Virginia Tech's President
Associated Press Online, April 16, 2007 Monday 5:24 PM GMT, DOMESTIC NEWS, By The
Associated Press
18

details of the case. The lack of details gives off an air of secrecy, which is damaging
at a time when students and parents already have lost faith and trust in the institution.
Press coverage of Virginia Tech
As reports became available, it became apparent that the police department
pursued another suspect they believed was no longer on campus following a shooting
in the dormitories. The Virginia Tech Police Department failed to request a “campus-
wide notification that two persons had been killed and that all students and staff
should be cautious and alert,” said a state report by an eight-member panel convened
by Governor Tim Kaine to discuss the university’s response.
12

The panel also included former U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge.
Virginia Tech President Charles Steger said he believed police responded quickly and
"to the best of their abilities. Still, we acknowledge the findings and recommendations
of the panel." Steger told reporters, "Nobody can say for certain what would have
happened if different decisions were made. However, to say that something could have
been prevented is certainly not to say that it would have been."
12

The President’s response functioned as a calculated tool to refute the claims
that the panel made while respecting that the families of the victims are likely to share
the panel’s viewpoint. He was stern and confident in his delivery, which prevented
accusers from taking advantage of his vulnerability. In a time of tragedy, this strategy

12
See Report Faults Virginia Tech response in shootings:
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2925438020070830?feedType=RSS&feedName=
domesticNews&pageNumber=3&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true

19

allows a spokesperson to deflect his or her own fears and continue to deliver key
messages.
Other Schools React
The response of universities throughout the nation included “what if”
scenarios in which the schools placed themselves in the position of Virginia Tech in
order to create an emergency preparedness plans that could be enacted if a shooting
took place elsewhere. The University of Texas at Arlington, for example, issued a
statement on the school’s website explaining how UT at Arlington would respond to a
crisis of similar magnitude. The statement opens with recognition and condolences for
the families and students at Virginia Tech. The public affairs website includes a
section for the president under the heading “statements and frequently asked
questions.” The following is the introduction to the Public Affairs frequently asked
questions:
I want to remind you that UT Arlington takes seriously our responsibility to
maintain a safe and secure environment on the campus. For example, our
campus is patrolled around the clock by the largest concentration of police
officers anywhere in Arlington. This force is augmented by guards, and we
work closely with the Arlington Police Department and other area law-
enforcement agencies. In addition, we are in the process of hiring additional
police officers and security guards.
13

The lesson to be learned here is that the communication team and public
affairs officers recognize the uncertainty that every community feels about their local

13
See Virginia Tech Tragedy and Campus Safety: http://www.uta.edu/public-affairs/official-
statements/stories.php?id=2137
20

institutions. This step is vital for strategic planning because it comes before “after-
the-fact” communication to allow potential students and parents to see that this school
engages in proactive solutions to crisis preparedness. This is not unlike a corporate
response to an industry challenge.
Issuing a statement that positions a company as a socially responsible citizen
is now rather common. The University of Texas is following this model in order
position itself as a leader in campus safety to increase their appeal to current and
potential students. This is one of several ways that strides have been made between
post-Virginia Tech as far as modeling communications plans after companies as
opposed to other universities. Based upon the example set by Virginia Tech and
Columbine, other universities nationwide took part in an effort to evaluate and tighten
security and tolerance policies, and later took the time to publicize them. UT
Arlington is one example of such schools following the business model of strategic
public relations.
Addressing the Media
One of the major differences between the techniques of crisis communication
among the two schools is the availability of statements made by school and
government officials regarding the Virginia Tech shootings. Granted, Virginia Tech is
a university with an undoubtedly better understanding of public relations, yet the
similar severity of the two instances necessitates that both schools follow a crisis
21

communication model that ensures the recovery of their respective reputations. It is
important to note that Virginia Tech happened years later than Columbine when web
technology was more advanced and accessible. Still, the statements that poured in
prove that educational public relations had made considerable headway since the
1990s. In response to school violence, schools have adopted a proactive approach to
security and are communicating such upgrades to their audiences.
In order to ensure that official statements made by school administrators and
government officials were easily found on the web, MSNBC featured a drop down
menu of names of various politicians and school administrators with reactions to the
incident. The various contributors included Virginia Tech President Charles Steger,
President George W. Bush, Senator Barack Obama, and Senator Hillary Clinton.
14

The website was updated on the day of the shooting with a total of fourteen statements
expressing sympathy, shock, pain and the need for prevention. This incident sparked
the need for an immediate response and administrators were quick to oblige. The bar
had been raised since the days of Columbine when students and parents were the
source of information.
The communication environment at Virginia Tech demonstrated control.
Accusations of neglect or failure to inform incident victims circulated in the media for
months following the attack. School officials, however, refuted each claim by
defending police for doing whatever they could or by reminding the community and

14
See Reaction to Virginia Tech Shootings: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18138719/
22

the nation that they too, were in mourning. It is evident in this case that the strategies
for handling the media were discussed prior to the school officials’ address to the
media.
As university officials learned about the shootings, it became necessary to
form a communication team and plan as quickly as possibly to manage on of the
country’s largest gathering of national and international media in recent history.
Within hours of the initial announcement, media from all over the world were arriving
on the campus. Jeffrey Douglas, communication director of Virginia-Maryland
Regional College of Veterinary Medicine, discovered rather quickly that they were in
need of professional help. Douglas, who has over 30 years of experience in the public
relations industry, said one of the challenges was conveying information on a rapidly
developing story that was in the very early stages of a major police investigation.
Despite limitations on what could be said, he believes they did a good job of being
transparent and immediate with disseminating information. "In the earliest moments of
the crisis while our president and leadership team were trying to get their arms around
what was happening, the media were just pouring in," Douglas said.
15
Douglas’
account of the communication team positions the school as any large corporation
would in a tragedy. A coalition would be created and decisions would be made about
how to handle the media swarm.

15
See Virginia Tech creates comms team in wake of tragedy: http://www.prweekus.com/Virginia-Tech-
creates-comms-team-in-wake-of-tragedy/article/56865/
23

Gary Koops, the head of Burson-Marsteller's media practice, praised the
University for doing so well in a situation that is unique on almost every level. He
explained, "You have different audiences, whether it's alumni, faculty, students and
parents." Koops said, "Watch any of the coverage and reporters are talking to students,
law enforcement officials, administrators, and faculty. It's not as controlled a situation
as you would have in a government or private industry setting."
13
The spread of
audiences is important to consider because it further demonstrates how complicated
the scenario becomes when an educational institution is given the task of controlling
the messages of its community. In this regard, it becomes evident that the university is
legitimately seeking outside counsel to devise and execute a strategic plan because it is
serving a much larger audience base than ever before.
Various websites and public relations pundits examined the way in which the
disaster was handled. Many critics blamed Virginia Tech for neglecting the possibility
of an impending disaster on the University Relation’s site, which features the school’s
crisis communication plan. The plan details its purpose, objectives and procedures
and it was last updated in February 2002. The criticism Virginia Tech faced is a result
of the failed attempts to communicate with students in the instance of an emergency.
There is no mention in the plan of the steps that the school will take to make sure
students are safe before considering communication with the media. In his response to

24

missing portions of the crisis communication plan, Director of News and Information
at Virginia Tech Mark Owczarski contends:
I would say [the guidelines] were adapted, because the crisis communication
plan helps identify who should be at the table, where to meet, when to meet,
how to meet. As soon as that team is convened, you have the sharing of
information from all the parties engaged in that crisis.
16

Owczarski is demonstrating his knowledge of the plan’s elements by focusing
the attention to the elements of the plan that did work, rather than addressing the
missing elements. This tactic If Owczarski has no evidence to the contrary, he will
focus on the positive elements contained in the crisis communication plan that did
work during and after the shooting. Instead of addressing the issue of what the plan
may be missing, he focuses on elements that are present, such as the formation of a
crisis communication team. There is an obvious level of transparency on behalf of the
university, which is a standard public relations strategy today. The school is aware that
they are appearing to the public as an institution that continues to care and invest in its
image and that shows the intent of the school to maintain its student body using the
means necessary to achieve this end.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths:
• The availability of comments and statements from various key school
figures, including President Steger, were well prepared and gave the

16
See Virginia Tech Tragedy: Evaluating VT Web Crisis Communication Plan. Retrieved from:
http://collegewebeditor.com/blog/index.php/archives/2007/04/18/virginia-tech-tragedy-evaluating-vt-
web-crisis-communication-plan/
25

impression that the school had control over the situation following the
shooting.
• The school’s communication team also had a variety of messengers and
messages to its various audiences, which prevented specific groups from
feeling abandoned during the crisis.
Weaknesses:
• The school’s failure to alert the students that a murder had taken place in
the dormitories hours before the shooter continued his shooting spree
presented a major mistake on behalf of school security policy. It gave
the impression that school’s administrators were directly responsible for
the shooter’s continued rampage.
• Virginia Tech also faced blame for neglecting to acknowledge Cho’s
history of disturbing behavior along with his record of mental illness.
Opportunities:
• Virginia Tech officials had the opportunity to create a coalition with
Columbine officials who were present during the crisis in order to
determine a set standard practices to prevent such disasters and
communicate key learnings with the nation.
• Virginia Tech’s communication team had the opportunity to gather
support from its large network of students, faculty and alumni in its
quest to raise awareness about the changes that would be made to the
school’s various policies.
26

Threats:
• In this case, parents were the biggest threat to the school’s
administration because they had trust that their child would be safe while
attending classes that they themselves paid for. When school officials
failed to send a campus-wide alert to students, that trust level dissolved.
• Advancements in technology may have weakened Virginia Tech’s case
because of the timing in which the shooting took place. In 2007, the
multitude of ways in which information could have disseminated to
students made in inexcusable for the school’s communication team to
claim that an email notice was sufficient in alerting students about the
first murder.
Strategic Implications
The various weaknesses and threats in this case might have resulted in a
permanent loss of faith in the abilities of the school’s staff to care for its student body.
The university, however, was able to combat the various points of blame from
numerous sources by preparing themselves to address criticism head-on. The presence
of Virginia Tech officials in the media made an apparent statement to the nation that,
although the school’s policies needed to be changed, everything that could have been
done was done at the appropriate time. This message allowed the school’s
communication team to function as any for-profit business would when a crisis
threatens its customer and support base.

27

Conclusions
Upon reviewing the communication strategies employed by the administrators
at Columbine and Virginia Tech, it is clear that many improvements have been made
in educational public relations. During the 1990’s, there seemed to be no strategic
crisis communication planning in place schools. Columbine served as an example for
future tragedies like Virginia Tech to begin planning how the communication team
would handle a tragedy.
A variety of community activities and support groups helped nurse Columbine
back into a state of normalcy. At Virginia Tech, however, public relations were
transparent in every step of the coping process. From initial statements to the
formation of crisis communication coalitions to the administration convincingly
defending their actions and choices, the Virginia Tech tragedy proved that operational
public relations plans were no longer sufficient to rebuild a school’s tarnished
reputation. Advancements have clearly been made between then and now for the main
purpose of preventing school enrollment and support from declining. In this sense, the
school is operating as a company, attempting to prevent market share loss and staying
ahead of competitors. While the university system is not nonprofit, it functions much
like one in the sense that their business goal is not to generate revenue. The goal is to
educate its students and maintain a credible, reputable standing in the academic
community.
Educational units are not the only institutions that face challenges when a crisis
occurs in our 24/7 news cycle. One of the most famous and widely covered crises of
28

recent times is the ongoing investigations into the Catholic Church’s knowledge and
cover-up of alleged child molestation.

29

Chapter 3: Religious Institutions
The Catholic Church Case
In early 2002, after years of silent accusations and worldwide speculation, the
Catholic Church came under fire for charges of pedophilia brought forth by young
boys who served in the church. This sparked an ongoing investigation that uncovered
numerous priests who had for years being sexually abusing young boys. To make
matters worse, it was also discovered that such cases were being overlooked by high
ranking archbishops, many of whom later chose to step down as a result of
permanently tainted reputations.
In my research, I reviewed the press coverage surrounding the pedophilia crisis
in order to determine what, if any, public relations plans were put into practice. My
aim is to uncover at which point public relations came into play and what effect it had
on a public whose opinion of the church may had been severely damaged.
The primary concern in this case is the extent to which secrecy hurts an already
troubled organization. I will attempt to determine if the choice to implement a public
relations plan followed a similar strategy of handling communications as any
corporation might in the face of a crisis. Would transparency in public relations
backfire if audiences feel like the church has corporatized itself in order to regain the
faith of previous followers? Can the teachings from Columbine and Virginia Tech be
applied to properly manage crisis communication for an organization with an entirely
different mission?

30

The First Attempt
Although life as the archdiocese's cabinet secretary for public relations and
communication might seem to be a position that guaranteed plenty of free time and a
9-to-5 work life, Donna Morrissey came to understand that her choice to accept this
job would prove to be far from that. An article showcasing the personal life of this
public relations professional appeared in The Boston Globe in May, 2002. It outlined
the tendencies of even the church’s communication staff to shy away from the media.
Morrissey is “often the public face of the diocese at the center of the mushrooming
crisis that has engulfed the global Catholic Church. She is the one with brow furrowed
more deeply than an Iowa cornfield as she tries to be heard over the protesters. And,
until recently, she has been the one to deliver a neat ''no comment'' for the church,
should there be a comment at all.”
17
This highlights the biggest PR mistake made by
the church and potentially explains the lack of momentum the Catholic Church
experienced in fighting off blame, anger, disappointment and ridicule worldwide.
The failure to implement a plan to address the media during the accusations
could be explained by the hope that these accusations could not be proven, and
therefore may disappear. The church seemed to be in denial for much of the first
months that the men came forward to discuss the abuse they endured for years as boys.
The Dayton Business Journal criticized the church for following a misguided public
relations strategy by refusing to take responsibility for decades of alleged cover ups.

17
See Caught in the Crossfire. Retrieved from:
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories2/050902_morrissey.htm

31

This resulted in an instant loss of credibility as the nation became aware that the
accusations existed for years prior to the media frenzy occurring at the time.
While I criticized Columbine High School’s administrators for their failure to
deliver official statements during a critical point in the crisis, they recovered much
quicker than the Church in that they spoke one day after the shooting. The Church’s
spokesperson may have contributed to the loss of follower support by declining to
comment when she had opportunities.
What was expected at this point, at the very least, was an acknowledgement on
behalf of the church. The article continues, “Several dioceses around the country have
hired PR firms to advise and often speak for them on this publicity nightmare. But
either the advice is weak or it's falling on deaf ears, because [their] statements simply
shift blame and alienate victims and the public in general.”
18
Although PR strategies
may have been in practice at the time, they proved to be ineffective due to the
avoidance tactic being used during initial interactions with the media.
In covering the mistakes made by communication executives of the church, PR
Week explains, “If there is one thing on which even the most ardent Catholic Church
supporters must agree, it is that its leaders have done an appalling job of handling the
current child-abuse crisis.”
15
An article appeared in Newsday apparently authored by a
former church public relations executive was headlined “Diocese should tell truth,

18
See Catholic Church PR a Nightmare. Retrieved from:
http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2002/04/15/editorial1.html

32

without PR spin.”
19
Clearly, internal opinions about public relations did and continued
to affect the church’s ability to communicate with its public in a way that is honest, yet
still serves their purpose.
Yet another mistake that the Church was criticized for making during the first
few months that accusations were resulting in sensationalized media was the church
choosing to threaten its followers for believing the accusations, claiming that they
were a disgrace to the church. The internal communication team seemed to be more
concerned with instilling shame in those who came forward with stories of abuse
rather than addressing the problem at hand. Paul Holmes, President of the Holmes
Group, points out, “That's a common failing, particularly among institutions
convinced of their own authority and righteousness, and it's easy to see how it might
be exacerbated in an organization that believes its leader is infallible and its teachings
divinely inspired.”
20

The Church’s strategy backfired tremendously when the public began to notice
that the Catholic Church was relying on nothing more than their history and the fear of
God. If the only tactic being employed to dissuade attention from the accusations
relied upon the power of religion, the result was likely to cause even the most devout

19
See The Catholic Church has made many errors of late, but hiring a PR Firm isn't one of them.
Retrieved from: http://www.prweekus.com/The-Catholic-Church-has-made-many-errors-of-late-but-
hiring-a-PRFirm-isnt-one-of-them/article/44373/

20
See ANALYSIS: PAUL HOLMES - The fact that the Pope is CEO doesn't change how the Catholic
church should handle crisis. Retrieved from: http://www.prweekus.com/ANALYSIS-PAUL-HOLMES-
--The-fact-that-the-Pope-is-CEO-doesntchange-how-the-Catholic-church-should-handle-
crisis/article/44189/
33

believer to question these priests. Why wasn’t the matter of the actual abuse being
addressed? Avoiding the question led the public to conclude that dodging the
allegations implied blame. This matter was far too severe to rely on fear to make the
public feel too ashamed to demand answers.
Outside Help Steps In
In June 2002, Catholic bishops in Dallas drew international press attention as the
church unveiled new policies regarding sex offenders in the priesthood, and began an
effort to publicly polish its tarnished image. This marked the beginning of a new
approach that the church had long been avoiding. In July 2002, PRWeek made the
following observation: “The coming months are likely to be an uncomfortable test of
just how committed the church is to entering a new era of openness and oversight, as it
fights to change a reputation crafted by years of neglect.”
21
The subsequent months
also resulted in the ramping up of public relations efforts, ranging from the hiring of
new public relations agencies to spokesperson training throughout the Church.
The most apparent and important of new directions that public relations
practitioners recommended was apology. Throughout the country, bishops,
archbishops and priests began making public apologies. Their purpose? To make it
known that the first step toward improving public perceptions was underway.

21
See ANALYSIS: Catholic Church Scandal - Church starts long journey to PR redemption in Dallas.
Retrieved from: http://www.prweekus.com/ANALYSIS-Catholic-Church-Scandal---Church-starts-
long-journey-toPR-redemption-in-Dallas/article/44673/
34

Cardinal Bernard Law, who was accused of covering up scandals, apologized
publicly for his negligence in dealing with abusive priests. Law admitted knowing of
abuse allegations against priests who were allowed to remain on active church duty for
years. Facing an estimated 450 abuse claims, the archdiocese was also said to consider
declaring bankruptcy.
In evaluating the reaction of the public on message boards posted on the
website of The Boston Globe, I concluded in this instance, while faith does not seem to
be lost forever, the magnitude of the anger that public is experiencing is not likely to
quickly dissipate. The Boston Globe highlights the reactions of people following the
story about keeping faith in a time of betrayal: “To allow priests to do what they have
done and get away with it is some of the worst crimes I have ever heard of. Molesting
children to me is a horrible crime, getting away with it, even worse. As a Catholic, I
cannot believe this is happening in my church. We have to all act now and get rid of
Cardinal Law. He is a disgrace to our religion.”
22

The severity of these opinions regarding the church scandal made it vital to
begin rebuilding the Church’s reputation through help from crisis communication
experts rather than veteran internal PR practitioners who had long neglected the need
for strategic crisis communication. Local, national and international efforts began
replacing media attacks on the church with news stories that were obvious efforts at

22
(2002, December 2). Message board [page 1] Message posted to
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/boards/dec0502/msg1.shtml
35

rebuilding a positive image. All Catholic Church organizations were now under
scrutiny and cases of abuse were being publicized internationally.
Following the admission of guilt, church councils in each country formed
individual public relations plans to tackle the media frenzy. One example is the
Catholic Church of England and Wales, which instituted its first set of public relations
guidelines to effectively manage child sex-abuse scandals in May, 2002. According to
PR Week, “The guides are due to be in place within weeks, and come as the church
battles to improve its global image following the recent U.S. pedophilia scandal.”
23

As the US Church began improving its public relations efforts and made a conscious
effort to communicate with the media and begin the long process of image rebuilding,
other churches within numerous nations followed. This signaled the need for the
church to act as a single unit for the first time since the abuse cases were exposed.
The turn of events around this time came as result of employing more
sophisticated public relations strategies with the help of firms that specialize in crisis
communication. This also signaled that the church’s image had been severely
impacted, regardless of whether or not specific churches faced any charges. The need
to act as a single unit worldwide by taking measures to improve the overall perception
of the church shows how the church functioned in a manner similar to a corporation
with several entities. The church was acting as the parent company, whose select
chains were involved in a crisis. As the “company” faced the issue, the “brand” as

23
See: US scandal prompts UK church's PR drive. Retrieved from:
http://www.prweekus.com/INTERNATIONAL-NEWS-US-scandal-prompts-UK-churchs-PR-
drive/article/44170/
36

whole needed to realign their message and stand together in order to revive its
reputation.
In September, 2002, the Los Angeles Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic
Church made attempts to win some positive PR with the opening of the Cathedral of
Our Lady of Angels. A week of ceremonies for the downtown cathedral that cost more
than $200 million drew media from around the country for some much-anticipated,
much-needed positive press. The head of the Los Angeles archdiocese, Cardinal Roger
Mahony, had faced intense scrutiny and criticism in past months over a slew of alleged
abuse cases in his jurisdiction. The church's image crisis became so dire that Mahony
hired crisis communication specialists Sitrick & Company earlier that year to help
publicize new policies regarding sexual offenders in the clergy.
24
Although it seemed
disturbing that opening a new cathedral might be a means for turning attention away
from a pedophilia case, the idea was to apply PR tactics to the church without
limitations or hesitation, as would occur in a traditional business.
Key Timeline of Events
During the length of the crisis, the timeline of events (See Appendix A)
suggests that the conviction of priests began around January, 2002. Around June of
that same year, America's Catholic bishops adopted a policy that would strip abusive
clergymen of their authority but not automatically oust them from the priesthood.
This fell short of the zero tolerance policy that victims were demanding in settlements.

24
See New cathedral helps rebuild LA Archdiocese's reputation. Retrieved from:
http://www.prweekus.com/New-cathedral-helps-rebuild-LA-Archdioceses-reputation/article/45164/
37

The Church should have been careful to protect this fact from being publicized
because it demeans the appearance of remorse that Church leaders were striving to
display.
The months between January and September 2002 marked the beginning of mass
exposure for the abuse cases within the Catholic Church and the slow progress of
creating a crisis plan to address the media. A traditional business in this position
would not survive this lack of urgency and the months of silence. The fact that the
Church had devout followers served as a placeholder for PR until the public grew
intolerant and began to lose the ability to use their faith in order to forgive the
allegations before they were proven. The use of public relations in this case became
more advanced and aggressive as more experienced firms began handling the issue.
At this time, the use of PR might have been perceived as going too far to mend a
reputation because audiences may be unaware they are being targeted, regardless of
how aggressive the tactics. The audience of the Church relies on their faith in order to
be a follower. If Catholicism is no longer putting its own messages out, the ethics of
the church are on the line.
At this juncture, it is important to again apply the trusted communication tool, the
SWOT analysis to the situation in order to show how the external and internal
environment of the church affected its communication strategy.

38

SWOT Analysis
Strengths:
• History of the church - the fact that the Church has survived for
generations with millions of followers and donors shows that the loss of
donor support was likely to be temporary.
• Devotion – most members and staff belonging to the Church are bound
for life by their own choosing. This creates a loyalty that is unmatched by
any other institution.
• Resources – although the Church is not a for-profit business, the amount
of resources it can access is endless. This made it possible to later hire
the top crisis communication firms for advice and execution.
Weaknesses:
• Pope John Paul II – accused of failing to meet with or apologize to any
of the victims of the sex abuse scandal.
25

• Time – the loss of time in addressing the media hurt the Church because
all eyes were on the institution at the time. The length of time that
passed was too great and the public had grown frustrated with the lack of
statements and lost interest in the case.

25
See Debate continues over pope's reaction to sex-abuse scandal: Retrieved from:
http://www.snapnetwork.org/news/vatican/debate_continues_pope.htm

39

• Silence – the spokesperson for the Church was urged to give no
comments during the investigation period. It took Cardinal Law nearly
10 months to speak out and apologize. The public had heard enough.
26

• Over-apologizing – Bernard Law spent years covering up the abuse
claims. He later went on record several times to publicly apologize to
followers who, in their minds, finally found someone to blame.
Opportunities:
• Catholic network. The Church expands across numerous variables to
reach nearly every country, class, age, socioeconomic status and
occupation. Therefore, the network of support that exists despite scandals
remains impermeable.
• Image revamping. While this crisis causes severe damage to the Church’s
reputation, it also resulted in the need for added communication and
transparency in Church practices, something the Church was notorious
for avoiding.
• Faith – this served as a chance for the criminals to come forward and be
punished while the rest of the priests took the opportunity to unite
followers by emphasizing their own good work.

26
(2002, December 2). Message board [page 1] Message posted to
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/boards/dec0502/msg1.shtml

40

Threats:
• In a time when books such as The Golden Compass and The Da Vinci
Code were being adapted into films and creating buzz, the public became
less and less convinced of the “pure” intentions of the Church.
• As the attention for news in our country focuses highly on problems
overseas, American concerns are taking a backseat.
• More potential scandals among church “employees.” There is still
concern that pedophiles are lingering undetected in parishes all over the
world.
Strategic Implications
In light of the information above, it is clear that the PR efforts of The Church
need to continue to increase and become more aggressive if the Catholic community is
to regain their confidence in their leaders. The lost time clearly had a negative effect
in that no information was coming from the source during the most pivotal moments
of the case. If the Catholic community felt abandoned because of the “no comment”
attitude of the spokespersons involved in the case, the only way to reverse the
sentiment is to compensate for lost time. The Church must continue to be omnipresent
in the media and gain positive press, regardless of the initial reaction. The only way to
change the public’s opinion is to gather information from the source and address is
appropriately.

41

Conclusions
While the Catholic Church suffered in terms of their ability to address the
media, they eventually learned that their communications team alone was not
equipped to manage the crisis. Their spokespersons were continuously for failing their
public in the most basic task: providing information. Being that The Church is headed
by bishops and archbishops who are of a much older generation, their school of
thought is derived from a different era; one in which public perception is not viewed
as malleable or dependent on the efforts of the organization. Also, the nature of the
organization, being among the largest religious institutions in the world, also creates
an altered perception of media relations as unimportant or intrusive.
In light of the two school cases discussed, the main element that makes The
Church’s case unique and also more challenging is the blame that the entire
organization endured. The crisis could have been better managed if the spokespersons
responsible for repairing the lost trust would have advised the organization to at least
address the blame, without necessarily accepting it.
Clearly, the Catholic Church was not prepared to handle a crisis of this
magnitude. Yet, considering a case as disturbing as this, it may be unreasonable to
expect a programmed response from even the most sophisticated corporation. As a
nonprofit, The Church faced numerous challenges in adopting the industry standards
required today by crisis communication firms. It was only after the hire of such a firm
that The Church was able to respond strategically and go forth with public apologies.
The timing of the apologies may have arrived too late into the case, but the important
42

point here is that The Church realized that its standing as a divine institution does not
make it exempt from needing professional efforts to win back public approval in the
same fashion as a multi-national corporation.
As the Church continues on its path toward image recovery, its representatives
have proven to learn crisis communication the hard way. The Getty Trust is another
example of a nonprofit that was in need of a strategic crisis communications in order
to combat the internal and external issues that arose in past years and challenged the
organization to follow more sophisticated PR methods than most other nonprofits.

43

Chapter 5: Nonprofit Organizations
The J. Paul Getty Trust Case
In this case, I wish to examine the questionable ownership of art by one of the
world’s most prominent art organizations. The Getty Trust case is a historic case in
public relations because of the various issues that simultaneously plagued the
organization, namely legal issues as well as internal policy issues. The combination of
these problems led to continued efforts to revamp the reputation of the Trust. I will
investigate the attempts made to prevent the loss of donor support and analyze the
effectiveness of such attempts.
The relevance of the Trust’s case, as it pertains to the cases discussed above, is
that it shows how a nonprofit can operate when they have access to large funds. Given
that luxury, I plan to draw conclusions about the risks and benefits of paying for crisis
communication and determine if the Getty Trust’s communication staff succeeded to
communicate strategically.
Lavish Spenders
It has been argued that executives in the nonprofit world should be the exception
to the rule when it comes to modest salaries. Were it not for their connections and
wealthy acquaintances, how would a non-profit maximize the dollars that donors are
willing to contribute to a given cause? The value that the CEO brings to the
organization is priceless, therefore, they deserve the sometimes massive salaries and
perks they request. However, the Internal Revenue Service tax code states that non-
profits must use their resources for public good. The IRS considers excessive pay,
44

travel and perks to be “self-dealing:” the illegal use of tax-exempt resources for
private benefit.
27
Yet Barry Munitz, Chief Executive of the J. Paul Getty Trust, had no
problem living lavishly on of the trust. An article in the Los Angeles Times in June,
2005 uncovered the spending habits, stating, “Munitz is a man of grand appetites, a
player among Los Angeles' elite whose effusive personality and risk-taking
management style have won praise even as they have alienated some of the trust's
most respected staff members”
27

Munitz was said to push the limits for how nonprofit organizations use their
resources. In 2003, Munitz's total compensation totaled over $1 million, placing him
among the highest-paid foundation chiefs, museum directors and university presidents
in the nation, according to published salary surveys and a review by the Los Angeles
Times. That same year, as the Getty eliminated raises for other employees, Munitz
asked for an increase that brought his 2004 pay package to more than $1.2 million. In
order to justify his compensation, Getty explained that the trust is a uniquely complex
institution that places extraordinary demands on its leader. Yet, he somehow managed
to find the time to serve on the boards for numerous other corporations or nonprofit
organizations which led his critics to accuse him of blurring the line between his own
interests and those of the organization he leads. In a time of financial crisis, these
accusations marked the beginning of the troubles that the organization faced while the
public – including donors – watched closely.

27
See The Munitz collection: Retrieved from: http://www.latimes.com/news/local/cl-me-
getty10jun10,0,6266289,full.story

45

As the public began forming their opinions of Munitz, he addressed the issue in
an interview:
This is an institution that takes risks. That's what we're in business for. The
board says often: If we're blessed with these resources, we should be nimble
and we should be opportunistic. If I was sitting with you here in seven years,
and you'd say, 'What do you regret, what you think went wrong, what surprised
you?' — if there was nothing on that list, I would tell you I had failed.
28

Munitz’s choice of words was bold and spoke directly to the issue without revealing
excess information or resulting in him appearing feeble or apologetic. He had the
ability to go on record and dispel any beliefs that his actions were borderline criminal.
He also referred to Getty as a risk-taking organization to defend his visionary
perspective. Although the interview occurred at the start of the numerous problems
the Getty Trust would soon face, Munitz was in his seventh year as CEO and evidently
was well-versed in communication, as his statement portrays. The ability to deliver a
speech that defends a perspective was not, however, a reflection of the level at which
the PR department was equipped to handle a crisis.
In August, 2005, the California Attorney General's office began an
investigation into the spending habits of Barry Munitz as a result of the articled
published by the Los Angeles Times. The reason for the investigation was that
nonprofit status is government-conferred and taxpayer-supported. In order to enjoy
that status, nonprofits have to abide by certain standards. Public scrutiny is part of

28
See The Munitz collection: Retrieved from: http://www.latimes.com/news/local/cl-me-
getty10jun10,0,6266289,full.story
46

keeping nonprofits accountable for their special position.
28
Upon being contacted by
the Times, Getty officials would not respond, but issued a written statement through
their public relations consultant saying that the Trust would fully cooperate. "Counsel
to the Getty has already met with representatives of the Attorney General's office to
ensure that information or documents responsive to any request are produced as
quickly as possible," the statement said. The use of the title “public relations
consultant” on behalf of the Getty shows that PR continued to be considered an entity
separate from the functions of the organization. In corporate legal matters, the name
of the spokesperson, as well as his or her title within the communication department
would be provided.
The Getty’s first statements regarding their legal matters were a result of
recommendations made by PR consultants. Although bringing in outside counsel is
advisable in times of crisis, the organization spent many of their years in the public
eye because its turnover rate was so high, particularly in the communication
department. Earlier that year, the trust paid more than $250,000 to Sitrick and Co., a
high-powered public relations firm best known for steering the prominent through
times of crisis, to manage their PR alongside the internal team.
In an interview with nonprofit PR expert, Elizabeth Hinckley of Rogers &
Cowan, I was told that since the Getty had the money to hire the firm, they were right
to do so (E. Hinckley, personal communication, March 20, 2008). The fact that the

28
See State Examines Spending at Getty: Retrieved from: http://www.latimes.com/news/local/cl-me-
getty2aug02,0,3413624.story
47

Getty Trust remains a private company prevents the need for further disapproval from
the public on how their executives spend donor dollars.
Questionable Ownership of Art
Additional problems arose during the same summer in 2005 when Getty curator
Marion True was charged by Italian prosecutors in Rome of criminal conspiracy to
receive stolen goods and illegal receipt of archaeological artifacts after a decade-long
investigation. In 1999, True and the Getty made the unusual and much-publicized
decision to return three artifacts to Italy that they had determined were stolen years
before. True continued to deny charges in court and the Getty supported her saying,
“We trust that this trial will result in her exoneration and end further damage to the
personal and professional reputation of Dr. True.”
29

The attention that the Getty received as a result of this trial should have
immediately sparked the decision to engage in proactive communication that would
breathe new life into an organization that needed new life after numerous hardships.
However, evidence of the new communication plan backfired due to the high cost that
the Getty was paying for outside counsel. The faltering communication team was not
able to ease the tensions of the trial as the international art world watched closely. The
choice to hire the best that money can buy may have done more damage than good.
According to Hinckley, if a nonprofit should wish to pay for outside PR
counsel, they need to be quiet about it. Therefore, the decision to pay the high cost for

29
See Getty Curator On Trial Over Stolen Artifacts. Retrieved from:
http://www.elginism.com/20050719/173/
48

crisis communication management was not the problem per se; rather, it was the
failure to keep the information from the media.
Tax Dollars for PR Spin?
The lack of a proactive communication plan could be directly linked to the
internal turmoil facing the communication team at the Getty. According to the Los
Angeles Times, “The latest to leave is Pamela Johnson, Vice President for
Communications and Corporate Relations, who was responsible for both internal and
external PR, overseeing a department that in 2003 had an operating budget of more
than $4 million.”
30
She confirmed in a statement to the Times that the decision to leave
was hers alone and that she regretted leaving the Getty in a time with such promising
opportunities ahead. Considering the less-than-stellar reputation of the Trust in 2005,
Johnson’s departure signaled the start of more grave difficulties in communication
department.
In addition, several upper-level executives left the Getty since museum Director
Deborah Gribbon abruptly resigned in October, 2004, including her interim
replacement and the Trust's longtime head of publications. These high-ranking
positions attract press coverage that is detrimental to the already-frail reputation of the
organization. The choice to hire a crisis communication firm at the time did not save
them from unwanted media attention, as articles in the Times also uncovered details
about the Getty’s decision to go to Michael Sitrick for additional PR help. Sitrick's

30
See Getty PR VP Pamela Johnson Exits. Retrieved from:
http://spinfluencer.blogspot.com/2005/08/getty-pr-vp-pamela-johnson-exits.html
49

firm represented the Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles during their sex scandal
allegations. “Records show that his firm has charged the Getty as much as $650 an
hour to design strategies to respond to questions posed by the Times and other media
outlets, draft letters to Times editors on behalf of Munitz and Getty board Chairman
John Biggs, and confer with Munitz's chief of staff, Jill Murphy.”
31
This information
did more harm to the Getty’s reputation for employing lavish spenders. The
organization as a whole is known to be one of the wealthiest nonprofits, making its
every move a public one. For this reason, the organization endured criticism for its
spending. Despite the fact that it is a wealthy organization, the Getty remains a
nonprofit organization. Spending should be minimal in order to prevent donors from
questioning their contributions.
Sitrick's firm also coached friends of Munitz likely to be interviewed by the
newspaper, creating "talking points" for former Paramount studio chief Sherry
Lansing, records show.
30
This phenomenon of training executives to serve as
company spokespersons is not new. Companies engage in this practice on a regular
basis to prevent reporters from taking control of the interview situation by
manipulating the untrained CEO into misrepresenting the company.
The practice of spokesperson training, however, has recently become more
common in nonprofits, as the cases discussed show. This training could potentially
serve as a threat to the organization because audiences are unaware that they are

31
See More PR Work Awaits Getty. Retrieved from:
http://www.calendarlive.com/printedition/calendar/cl-et-getty13aug13,2,774095.story

50

receiving messages encoded by “spin artists” for the simple fact that they trusted the
nonprofit to be more honest. Donors, in particular, are likely to want the whole truth
with no polish because they trust the organization and invest their resources in a cause
to which they feel a strong connection. This is also true in the case of schools and
religious institutions because of the tremendous level of faith and monetary support
being allocated to such organizations.
When a for-profit business engages in the polishing of communication specialists,
it is expected because the aim of the organization is to make a profit. The aim of a
nonprofit, however, is supposed to be the mission of the particular organization, not
retaining or increasing donor support to maintain organizational wealth.
Some experts called the Getty's spending on outside spin control an improper use
of tax-exempt money. The frivolous spending on the Getty’s behalf is difficult to
justify. Sitrick’s hire clearly served the image of the Getty only. The money came
from tax support and did not complete its duty for public good. The tax exemption
that the organization enjoys renders the high fees paid to Sitrick’s useless, a loss of
important funds. The fees should have been paid for art or the preservation of the
museums, as the donors intended.
Others, however, argue that it is legitimate for embattled tax-exempt
organizations to use message managers to protect their reputations or to assess risk,
much as their for-profit counterparts do. This argument raises the question, “should
nonprofits pay top dollar to protect their image, just as companies do?” A yes answer
can be justified by the fact that the organization’s vitality may be at risk after the
51

numerous crises that the Getty endured. If that is the case, and there is significant risk
involved, it may be in the Getty’s best interest to pay the money and invest in
communication training in order to salvage the trust.
"I don't think it's wrong that they hired a crisis-management consultant," attorney
Betsy Buchalter Adler said of the Getty. "You're looking at an institution that needs to
be taken seriously in the community to function.”
32
Considering the position of the
organization, it is safe to assume that the Getty is vital to the arts community not only
in Los Angeles, but worldwide. The works of art that the museum owns represent
several nations; therefore attendance numbers are directly related to the representation
and awareness of world art. A nonprofit of this magnitude may not fall under the
same category as your neighborhood nonprofit that cannot afford to pay its staff, much
less spend hundreds of thousands on crisis communication. Referring again to my
interview with Elizabeth Hinckley, if the nonprofit has the luxury to pay top dollar for
guidance, they should do so.
Betsy Buchalter Adler is a partner at a San Francisco firm that specializes in
nonprofit law. "Whether $650 an hour is the right price to pay, I have no clue. It's a
question of what expertise costs in the market," she said.
32
The Getty's prestige and
internal morale was critical at the time that it was moving to fill its highest-profile job,
the directorship of the museum. The argument used here is an example of what
happens in a market where image is everything. The Getty’s lawyer is asking the

32
See More PR Work Awaits Getty. Retrieved from:
http://www.calendarlive.com/printedition/calendar/cl-et-getty13aug13,2,774095.story

52

public to forget about the nonprofit status of the organization and remember the high
costs that the Getty must pay in order to maintain its position in art preservation.
In recent months, the trust was publicly taken to task by Sen. Charles E. Grassley
whose committee is leading a push to tighten rules governing nonprofits, and became
the subject of an inquiry by the Council on Foundations, the industry group that
represents nonprofits. "So much in the nonprofit world is about appearance," said
Marie Malaro, a former professor at George Washington University's museum studies
program. "People start losing confidence."
33
This raises the issue that all nonprofits
are currently experiencing the result of what can happen when image management
becomes more important than the actual mission of the organization. Malaro suggests
that this issue applies to all nonprofits and that the end result is a loss of trust on behalf
of people. By “people”, Malaro is referring to audiences who receive information
from the media about the latest attempts nonprofits are making to win public attention.
If nonprofits are all constantly concerned about appearance, how can they devote their
time to complete the work they set out to do?
Returning Art to Improve Relations
In October, 2005, Getty officials agreed to return three artifacts to Italy, which
were allegedly stolen in the late 1990s. Prosecutors believe the items were illegally
excavated or stolen and later acquired by the Getty, including a prized ancient Greek
statue of Aphrodite. In July, Italian prosecutors charged the curator Marion True of

33
See More PR Work Awaits Getty. Retrieved from:
http://www.calendarlive.com/printedition/calendar/cl-et-getty13aug13,2,774095.story
53

conspiracy to receive stolen goods and illegal receipt of archaeological artifacts. True
denied the charges and the museum defended her. Although, Italy wants the Getty to
return 42 artifacts, only three were returned in 1999 prior to this agreement.
34

The decision to return the pieces was said to allow the museum to avoid
admitting wrongdoing in the acquisition of the object. Italian culture ministry
spokesman Walter Guarracino said, however, that this does not change Italy’s position
in its trial against True.
In this case, PR was more evident in the actions the Getty took as opposed to
the statements made. The decision to return the art may have been part of a larger
settlement, but my research does not conclude that returning the pieces were
mandatory. The Getty did, however, release a statement on their media relations page
explaining their decision. On November 7, 2005, a statement was released containing
the following remarks:
Today, the Getty transferred three objects from its collection to the
Italian government, only one of which was the subject of a formal complaint
by the Italian government. Although the Getty believes that it had valid
defenses to the claims asserted in the petition, it reached an agreement with
the Italian authorities to return the Asteas krater in the interest of settling the
litigation and demonstrating the Getty’s interest in a productive relationship
with Italy.
35

34
See Getty to Return Disputed Artworks: Retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4306162.stm

35
See Statement Regarding Returned Object From the Getty. Retrieved from:
http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/statement05_getty_returns_objects110705.html
54

By returning two pieces that were not subjects of formal complaint by the
Italian government, the Getty expressed its willingness to cooperate with the
government and repair their relationship. This reflects a PR tactic that was likely
developed by specialists and agreed upon by executives. It is not in the best interest of
an executive to give away any assets, nor is it common for senior management to
decide to implicate itself by returning the art. A seasoned PR expert, however, would
recognize the need for long-term image management, thereby advising the trust to
make this gesture and explain its purpose.
The returned items were unveiled publicly in Rome, yet the Italians continued
to have harsh words for the museum community. Italian Minister of Culture Rocco
Buttiglione noted that the Getty had “known about the illegal origins of the works. All
three pieces had once been stolen, one even taken directly from the ground at a site
near Naples.”
36
His tone became friendlier when he mentioned negotiations with the
Getty over the return of other art treasures. But such gestures will do little to rectify
the damage to the Getty's image. The legendary institution has since turned into a
hotbed of crisis.
36
While the cases of Columbine and Virginia Tech centered around
one major crisis event, the ongoing struggles of the Catholic Church and Getty Trust
are more challenging for PR teams to attempt to solve due to the years of damage.
Reversing the appearance of internal issues that threaten an organization may seem

36
See Stolen Art: Italy Goes After the Getty. Retrieved from:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,385007,00.html

55

less damaging on surface, but they degrade the reputation of the organization in the
mindset of donors and potential supporters.
New Policy Statement
In October, 2006, the Board of Trustees at the J. Paul Getty Trust adopted new
policies on acquisitions and went public with the statement. Under the heading
“Conditions for acquisitions”, a few of the policy listings are follows:
1. No object will be acquired without assurance that valid and legal title can be
transferred.
2. The museum will undertake due diligence to establish the legal status of an
object under consideration for acquisition, making every reasonable effort to
investigate, substantiate, or clarify the provenance of the object.
3. No object will be acquired that, to the knowledge of the Museum, has been
stolen, removed in contravention of treaties and international conventions of
the United States is a signatory, illegally exported from its country of origin or
the country where it was last legally owned, or illegally imported into the
United States.
37

This detailed commitment on behalf of the Getty to prevent further instances of
questionable art retrieval came at a critical time during the legal proceedings of the
Getty case. This action was as much a PR tactic as it was a policy-making mandate.
Regardless of whether or not the Getty was advised to revisit their previous policy,
this decision was helpful to the Getty’s image because it serves as a proactive
approach to their current crisis. In order to boost public awareness of this document, it

37
See Policy Statement – Acquisitions by the J. Paul Getty Museum. Retrieved from:
http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdfs/acquisitions_policy.pdf
56

was made available in PDF format online as a stand-alone document for searched
terms such as the Getty and “policy” or “stolen art.”
The policy points outlined above emphasize the decision made by the Getty to
take extra steps in order to ensure that the origins of their newly acquired pieces are
well-researched and documented. In order for the Getty to attempt to reestablish its
reputation in the art world, it must first win the trust of its stakeholders. The donors,
as well as the museum patrons who are following the story, must have faith that the
organization will change its policies in order to prevent future mistakes. As a
nonprofit, the Getty is different from for-profit businesses in that its stakeholders were
likely to have believed that the organization would be true to its mission, being that it
is a nonprofit. This statement is an attempt to win the favorability of stakeholders
once again and prevent future disappointment on their behalf.
Investing in Communication
After the departure of former Vice President of Communications and
Corporate Relations, Pamela Johnson, Ron Hartwig joined the trust as the new Vice
President of Communication in December, 2006. The Getty released a statement
announcing the arrival of Hartwig crediting him with bringing both a global and local
approach to communication, and serving as a wonderful strength to the team. The
new spokesperson for the Getty stated: “I look forward to joining Barry Munitz and
the Board of Trustees as together we work to demonstrate the Getty’s leadership in the
57

arts community in Southern California and around the world. The significant work
being done by the Getty's four Programs offers an incredible opportunity to
communicate the ways in which the arts can make a positive impact on society," he
added.
38

The announcement of Hartwig’s arrival came at a time that the Getty needed to
be transparent about its PR practices. Following the criticism of excessive spending
on crisis communication, the Getty might have been playing with fire by publicizing
Hartwig’s impressive background. This is due to the fact that speculation about salary
is likely to fly after the issue of the release. Since, however, the Getty cannot resort to
hiring anything less than the best in the business, plan B would be to engage in more
transparent PR practices and join the ranks of the wealthy corporations that have
nothing to hide when it comes to discussing their investments in public relations.
The amount of money that Hartwig made or how long he remains an employee
was not what the Getty should have been concerned with addressing. Rather, if
questioned about the funds the Trust dedicates to communication, the Getty could
have simply distanced itself from the nonprofit label and emphasize its standing as one
of the world’s top arts institutions. So long as the Getty is preserving the arts, it is
using its funds for the good of the cause.

38
See Ron Hartwig New V.P. of Communications. Retrieved from:
http://www.getty.edu/news/press/center/ron_hartwig_release05.html
58

Further Steps to Reconciliation
Beginning in 2006, the Getty reestablished dialogue with Italian Cultural
Ministry officials to discuss Italy’s request to return the 44 items that it believes were
stolen. On the eve of the visit, Getty spokesman Hartwig said it was too early to
speculate about what, if any, objects the museum might return. Museum director
Michael Brand said in a statement aired on CBS news, “The Getty's objective is to
develop a fuller sense of all the evidence available regarding the objects in question.
We want to be in a better position to continue our dialogue with the Italian
government." The role of PR here is evident. The museum wanted to appear as
though they were cooperating with the Italian government, yet wished to also appear
in control of the situation by demanding dialogue and evidence.
As months passed following these discussions, the Getty came to a tentative
agreement with the Italian government over stolen artifacts in June, 2006. A statement
delivered by Hartwig explained, “The Italian government will receive from the Getty a
number of very significant objects, including several masterpieces. In return, as a sign
of fruitful dialogue and collaboration among the parties, Italy will provide loans of
objects of comparable visual beauty and historical importance.”
39
By positioning the
proceedings as collaborations, the Getty continues to distance itself from the crisis in
order to appear as though it is moving toward creating a better collection for museum

39
See Getty Announces Tentative Deal with Italy in Antiquities Dispute. Retrieved from:
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20060621-1626-ca-getty-italy-antiquities.html
59

patrons. The PR tactic used here turned the negative coverage into a chance to get
audiences excited about the new pieces that came from the proceedings, regardless of
the fact that the pieces will be loaners. This is a classic example of tailoring the story
to reflect the positive rather than the negative. Based on Hartwig’s comments, the
reader almost forgets the fact the museum is essentially on trial and is forced to forfeit
its prized possessions and begins to focus on the potential of these new acquisitions of
historical significance and beauty.
In addition to the loan deal, the Getty agreed also to return two ancient
sculptures at the center of a major cultural heritage dispute with Greece immediately
after the tentative deal discussion with Italy. Getty officials, along with Greek Culture
Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis said in a joint statement that negotiations would
continue on the return of two other ancient masterpieces Greece claims were illegally
excavated and smuggled out of the country. The statement said, “The decision to
return the two ancient artifacts to Greece was based on a thorough internal
investigation carried out by the Getty Museum, which concluded that it would be right
to return the works.”
40

The level of cooperation that the Getty is showing is allowing for positive
media relations in a time of crisis. The use of shelved PR plans would not work in this
case as new information unfolds each day, with various countries demanding

40
See Getty Museum to Return Sculptures to Greece. Retrieved from:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13801315/wid/6448213/
60

discussions about questionable ownership. Upon realizing that the evidence could not
be refuted, the Getty became more complacent in their dealings, granting talks with
various nations instead of claiming innocence as they had in the past.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths:
• As one of the nation’s wealthiest nonprofit organizations, the Getty
Trust was able to tap into its resources to form a coalition of the
world’s top attorneys and executives, enabling the organization to
overcome the various crises they have endured.
• The reopening of the Getty Villa in Malibu in January, 2006 served as a
way for the organization to deflect a bit of attention from the negative
press coverage it was receiving and instead focus on this high-profile
event.
• The timing of the crises benefited the Getty because of the attention
more hard news stories were receiving at the time. Hurricane Katrina
occurred in August, 2005, the same time that the Los Angeles Times
broke its stories about the various issues that the Getty was facing. The
news stories covering the hurricane were endless and became the
primary concern for Americans for months following the catastrophe,
preventing concerns about the Getty and its troubles.

61

Weaknesses:
• The high turnover rate among high-level executives at the time gave the
public the impression that the organization was not worth staying and
fighting for when troubles arose, according to its key players. This
reflected poorly on hopes for the revival of the organization.
• The reputation of the trust as the one of the most well-known arts
organizations became a weakness during the past years due to the fact
that the news media watched over the organization with a microscope,
waiting for the next piece of news to add to the already-infamous
reports.
• The amount of funds dedicated to the PR efforts of the organization, in
addition to the charges against Munitz for his spending habits equated
to further loss of trust among audiences who were invested in the
organization.
Opportunities:
• Changing the perceptions of nonprofits as media-challenged
organizations to demonstrate that nonprofits need to compete on the
same level as big business, would have justified the choices made by
the Getty trust to spend top dollar on public relations.
• The Getty can establish itself as a forward-thinking nonprofit that
actively engages in communication with its audiences by defending
62

their choice to hire a crisis communication firm as a way of ensuring
that communication between the organization and its publics is optimal.
• The Getty can collaborate with arts organizations throughout the world
in order to discuss what constitutes acceptable practices. This will
show the public that the Getty is making efforts to evaluate their own
practices by taking advice from similar groups.
Threats:
• The continued perception of PR professionals as “spin doctors” serves
as a threat to the organization due to the fact that the public became
aware of the trust’s decision to employ PR professionals to help
improve its image. The current trend in PR for transparency resulted in
the Getty’s stakeholders becoming distrustful of its need to become
trained in communication.
• The audience is a threat in this case because, as is the case in most
nonprofits, the audience perceives the organization as one with
relatively pure intentions and a clear mission. Once this trust is lost, it
can be impossible to regain.
• The number of people who have left the Getty or been terminated are
threats to the organization because the media is looking for their
personal accounts of the internal practices at the trust that led to their
departure.
63

• Other large-scale nonprofits, especially in the art community who are
vying for the same donor dollars as the Getty.
Strategic Implications
Due to the multitude of complications facing the Getty, the choice to hire
outside help and replace the communications leader role was effective in allowing the
Trust to maintain the crisis relatively quickly. Considering the majority of internal
problems are related to turnover, the Getty must revisit its own policies and make
changes that will keep employees satisfied in their positions. The external issues they
face can be handled properly by PR professionals, therefore, the Getty’s
communication team must be sure to engage in communications with key audiences,
while de-emphasizing the fact that they hired outside help.
Conclusion
The case of the Getty Trust is unique in that the PR was identified as a
contributor to the crisis. In the case of Columbine, the presence of public relations
was minimal. My findings show no evidence of strategic planning for interview
training, speech delivery or dollars spent on professional crisis communication. The
communication team at Virginia Tech demonstrated more preparation and a proactive
approach to communication during and following the crisis, but no details were leaked
as to whether or not a crisis firm was hired to assist the university’s PR team.
64

The staff at Virginia Tech did an excellent job of controlling communication
and repeating key messages without appearing overly polished or insincere to its
audiences. It is my belief that the university’s officials overcame the crisis by taking
the opportunity to speak to the media whenever appropriate or possible. They did not
avoid the cameras, as Columbine administrators or the Church’s staff did. This
avoidance prevented the repairing of reputations for both Columbine High School and
the Catholic Church because there was little attempt made to develop or deliver key
messages at a critical time.
Of all the cases I studied, The Catholic Church’s communication team
performed most poorly at the onset of the allegations. Its spokesperson should have
taken every possible opportunity to deliver the institution’s perspective, without fear
of implicating blame. The legalities of the case were not an acceptable reason to shy
away from the media. Additionally, a trained PR professional should know how to
deliver key messages without referring to legalities for a crisis that is undergoing trial.
This action implicated the Church worse than commenting on legal proceedings
possibly could.
Among the four case studies, the Getty serves as the example of an
organization that had a communication team that adopted standard practices similar to
for-profit businesses. My findings suggest that the problem in this case was not
necessarily the amount spent on outside help, but rather the fact that the plan to hire
help was made public. Granted, the information may have been leaked by internal
65

sources, but the failure to protect this information resulted in audiences becoming
skeptical of the Getty’s attempts to deliver information to its stakeholders.
In sum, the conclusion I was able to draw conclusions that supported my
hypothesis. When nonprofit organizations are in crisis, their executives risk losing
support from their donor base and volunteers, as well as the members of the
organization they serve, depending on their style of crisis communication. Should
they operate too similarly to for-profit companies and enlist communication channels
only when necessary, they give the impression that they are withholding facts, which
causes a break in trust among supporters. In the case of the Catholic Church, the
choice to operate crisis planning in secrecy resulted in the loss of faith and trust among
Catholics worldwide. PR professionals needed to be more available to the media to
deliver key messages that acknowledge the investigation that was taking place.
Should the organization ignore the need for strategic crisis communication and
PR, the public is forced to feel as though no action is taking place. In the case of
Columbine, the lack of sophistication of the spokespersons resulted in the community
serving as a news story. This was detrimental to the recovery of the school’s
reputation because of the continuous stories of struggling families taking the place of
proactive communication on behalf of the school’s officials.
All of the cases outlined above indicate that public relations practitioners, as
well as internal communication team members for nonprofits, need to be mindful of
66

the sensitivities of their audiences. The level of transparency employed in crisis
communication must be higher than that of a for-profit company in order to maintain
trust levels and assure audiences that their interests are met. There is no reason for
public relations efforts to be scaled back, simply because the organization in question
is a nonprofit. So long as PR is ethical, and the move to dedicate funds to it is kept
confidential, the benefits of strategic communication will ensure the longevity of the
organization, school or religious institution.

67

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70

Appendix A
Jan.18, 2002
Defrocked Boston priest John Geoghan, 66, was convicted of indecent assault
and battery. Geoghan, 66, has been accused of abusing 130 children while he
was actively serving as a priest in the Archdiocese of Boston over a 30-year
period. He faced more criminal and civil suits.
Feb. 21, 2002
Geoghan was sentenced to 9-10 years in prison as the archdiocese continued to
reel from the scandal. The extent of the cover-up and the sheer number of
priests involved shocked Boston's large Catholic community, leading to calls
for Cardinal Bernard Law to step down. Meanwhile, new cases were being
reported in several other states.
April 16, 2002
Pope John Paul II summoned America's cardinals to the Vatican to discuss the
sex scandal and efforts to prevent future cases.
June 14, 2002
America's Catholic bishops adopted a policy that will strip abusive clergymen
of their authority but not automatically oust them from the priesthood. The
policy fell short of the "zero tolerance" plan demanded by some abuse victims.

71

Appendix B
Primary Research: Interview with Elizabeth Hinckley
Q: Please list a few of the clients you have worked with
A: Museum of Contemporary Art, L.A. Chamber Orchestra, Chapman
University.
Q: How long have you worked in nonprofit PR?
A: 12 years.
Q: Have you also worked in PR for businesses or large corporations?
A: Yes; Mont Blanc, Atlantic Records, UBS Bank.
Q: What considerations do you think (if any) need to be made when it
comes to messaging for target audiences of non-profits?
A: People who are interested in attending a museum or volunteering at a
nonprofit have an interest in the cause. You have to consider emotions
as well. People are buying into what you’re doing as well. People who
go volunteer for PETA, for instance, have a rooted interest in saving
animals; they are action-minded individuals. That said, you need to talk
about how they can impact the consumer, you need to make a heart-
connection.
Q: Describe the biggest difference in doing PR for nonprofit clients from
for-profits. What do you need to be most sensitive to?
72

A: Nonprofits will have earned revenue streams but mostly, they rely on
donations. You’re always having to consider how its balancing its profits
with the goal of the organization. For-profits don’t have to talk about
their finances, nonprofits do. The business purpose in for-profits is
making money and being the best company for what it does. The goal of
nonprofits is to do good.
Q: In terms of messaging for audiences of nonprofits, is there a
heightened need to appear transparent?
A: Absolutely. Leadership does not like it and hopes the need for
transparency will go away but you do you do need it. When an
organization is dealing with a financial crisis, they need to be transparent
about how they’re going to fix it. They must have a strategic plan in
place because the media would like to know what the plan is.
Q: In the event of a crisis at a nonprofit, do you feel that hiring a crisis
communications firm is always the right answer?
A: Not necessarily. Sometimes they do more damage than good. The
group you hire needs to understand how nonprofits work, above all.
They need to understand nonprofits and their special needs.
Q: Describe your familiarity with the problems at the Getty in 2005-
2006.
73

A: They had so many problems. I am relatively familiar with most of
their challenges. They had a number of staffing problems, policy
problems; their chief curator had policy problems as well.
Q: Do you think the amount of money spent on PR (hiring Michael
Sitrick at a rate of $650/hr rate) was too much considering they are a
nonprofit?
A: Well, they are a private institution with enormous resources so they
work on a different money spectrum. If I were the Getty, I would
always pay for the absolute best. Now if L.A. County Museum of Art
wanted to pay that much, it would be considered too much, since they
are a public institution.
Q: Do you think the Getty should act as a nonprofit in terms of its
communications, considering the organization’s wealth?
A: They have a staff communications staff of 40 people, which is huge.
They do not need that large of a communications team but they handle a
lot, not just that museum on the hill. If a nonprofit has the luxury of
being able to operate as close to how a corporation operates, that’s a
good thing. They could make more money.
Q: At what point do you find it acceptable to pull out all stops for a PR
campaign, regardless of funding?
A: What I see organizations do is say “let’s raise money for our
communications efforts.” It would be nice if you could always hire
74

Rogers & Cowan but that’s expensive. So, it would be great for
nonprofits to get PR help all the time, but it’s just not always possible.
Q: Any recommendations you would offer to the Getty communications
teams?
A: I think they’ve been handling it very well with Ron in charge. He is
just such an easy guy to talk to and he is also very good at what he does.
He is very good at saying just enough and not saying too much when its
appropriate without looking like he is withholding any information.
Q: Since the LA Times received the leaked facts about the Getty’s
internal issues, should the Getty’s media relations staff have gotten
involved and attempted to damage control by contacting those same
writers with stories designed to rescue their image?
A: It was such a serious situation. So many people within the
organization were so unhappy. When that many people are unhappy
with their work environment or colleagues, you get leaks all the time. If
that is happening, you really just need leadership changes. With such a
huge organization hiding so much, nobody knew what everyone else was
doing. It was a very dysfunctional organization. LA Times writers were
receiving angry letters from Sitrick’s staff, criticizing the writers for
publishing the articles. The writers were insulting the writers, which
made them want to write even more.
Q: What PR tactics do you think were essential in this case?
75

A: I don’t know how I would have handled it at the time. In hindsight, I
know what should have been done but at the time, I wouldn’t know
where to turn. The communications person is just getting beat up at a
time like that. They just keep getting slammed until they get fired.
Things that need to happen are happening now because they learned
from their mistakes. But there was nothing that communications could
have done at the time. Too many people were arrogant and didn’t care
until they got called on it, in a major way.
Q: Are there any PR tactics you shy away from in your practice because
of the nature of your clients? Why/Why not?
A: If you bring in outside counsel, you want to be quiet about it. Board
members are a problem because they always talk too much. You’re
dealing with people in the arts and culture world who think they’re
sophisticated but they’re not. Too often, they use their power and
influence to go media and give insider information about the
organization they serve. It’s challenging to prevent that from happening.
Q: Do you think PR needs to be at all transparent in non-profits? Any
specific cases in which it does?
A: Hiring outside help. You also don’t want to be transparent about
hiring and firing of personnel. I never talk about it. The L.A. Chamber
Orchestra, for example, had a cellist leave so the LA Times called asking
“what happened.” The way to answer is to say that we don’t discuss
76

personnel issues. Not only for legal ramifications but also because an ex-
employee can go to the media and complain about an organization, the
PR staff is tempted to make statements in response, which only results in
negative press. It’s easier just to say we don’t discuss personnel issues.
Q: Can you offer any case examples where you felt your client wanted
to do “too much” and you had to persuade them that PR can only do so
much?
A: Every single client on my roster. They think hiring a public relations
firm will make them global overnight, when sometimes we think only a
local campaign will fit. I always say to clients from the beginning that I
can’t promise huge results and they say they understand. But they
always expect overnight results.
Q: Overall, how realistic are clients’ expectations?
A: Totally depends on the client. I’d say 50% are realistic, 50%
unrealistic in their expectations.
Q: Do you/have you ever had to explain to your clients why an idea
might be too invasive for audiences or are they generally conservative?
A: It depends on the personality of the organization. If it’s known for
risk-taking or if it needs to be shook up. Sometimes you deal with
clients without good taste or more outrageous organizations. MOCA
consistently pushes the envelope but always manages to do it
appropriately so they appear smart and savvy.

77

Q: Any words of advice for nonprofits in crisis?
A: It depends. If they’re already in crisis without a plan, they’re in
trouble. If you don’t have a spokesperson, you need one. Financial
issues are also a crisis but they unfold slowly so you can get a handle on
it. The PR person should always know how to read and understand the
client’s financial statements. Always ask for audited financial
statements. Also the 990 form which reports finances is something that
the media can get their hands on, so be familiar with it. Talk to the
CEO, that way you are trusted and involved in the decision-making
process.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This paper examines the need for nonprofits and other non-traditional businesses to operate crisis communication in a transparent manner. Drawing from case studies of Virginia Tech, Columbine, The Catholic Church and The Getty Trust, this thesis offers an analysis of the comments made by the various organization spokespersons to uncover flaws or holes in the crisis communication campaign. These mistakes are hypothesized to result in a loss of trust on the part of key audiences. Based on research from content analysis and interviews with public relations practitioners, recommendations on better ways to confront the crisis will be offered.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Hambarsoomian, Nooneh (author)

Core Title A review of transparency as it correlates with trust in crisis communication

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 08/06/2008

Defense Date 06/05/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Catholic Church,Columbine,crisis communication,OAI-PMH Harvest,Public Relations,the Getty Trust,transparency,Trust,Virginia Tech

Place Name Columbine (city or populated place), educational facilities: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (geographic subject)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Floto, Jennifer D. (committee chair), Cray, Edward (committee member), Durbin, Dan (committee member)

Creator Email hambarso@usc.edu,nhambars@yahoo.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1552

Unique identifier UC1256053

Identifier etd-Hambarsoomian-2019 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-104986 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1552 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Hambarsoomian-2019.pdf

Dmrecord 104986

Document Type Thesis

Rights Hambarsoomian, Nooneh

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu