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In pursuit of liberty: the civic liberalism of Frederick Douglass

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IN PURSUIT OF LIBERTY:
THE CIVIC LIBERALISM OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS

by
Nicholas Buccola

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)

December 2007

Copyright 2007 Nicholas Buccola

ii
Dedication
To the memory of my cousin,
Catharine Martinet,
my friend, my inspiration.

iii

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my family and friends. My mom and dad, Kathy
and Tony Sr., have been sources of constant support and encouragement. My
brother Tony Jr. has been a great friend. My brothers Craig and Scott and my sister
Michelle, as well as my many aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews and friends,
have reminded me of what really matters. And thank you Emily for being such a
wonderful source of love in my life.
Second, I would like to thank my committee. Mark Kann has gone above
and beyond the call of duty as my advisor and mentor. Without Mark’s wisdom,
encouragement, and responsiveness, this project would not have been possible. He
has taught me so much about writing, teaching, and what it means to be a political
theorist. In addition to being a member of my committee, Alison Renteln taught me
that the formulation of a research agenda is, and ought to be, an exercise of mind and
heart. Jim Kincaid has provided me with great feedback on this project and has
inspired me to think about the vocation of a scholar in a new light.
Third, I would like to thank others who have supported this project in one
way or another. The Institute for Humane Studies and the Acton Institute have
provided financial support that has allowed me to dedicate more time to the project.
Thanks to my many colleagues and teachers at USC – especially Howard Gillman,
Sharon Lloyd, Jonathan O’Hara, Dave Bridge, Jillian Medeiros, and Art Auerbach –
for their intellectual and emotional support.
iv

Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgements iii

Abstract v

Chapter 1: Frederick Douglass & the Search of Civic Liberalism 1

Chapter 2: Douglass’s Liberal Politics 26

Chapter 3: The Foundations of Douglass’s Liberalism 70

Chapter 4: Civic Responsibility in Douglass’s Liberalism 119

Chapter 5: Good Citizenship in Douglass’s Liberalism 162

Chapter 6: Civic Education in Douglass’s Liberalism 208

Chapter 7: Conclusion 247

Bibliography 263
v

Abstract

Critics contend liberals fail to pay sufficient attention to the moral goods of
community and civic responsibility. Liberalism, they argue, is a morally shallow
doctrine grounded in a conception of human beings as “atoms of self-interest.” This
leads to a conception of politics that amounts to little more than “zoo-keeping” – the
establishment of institutions to prevent individuals from mauling one another in their
quest for personal satisfaction. Several contemporary thinkers have taken these
criticisms to heart and embraced versions of “civic liberalism” – hybrid theories that
combine the liberal emphasis on individual rights with a concern for community and
civic responsibility. In an attempt to explore the possibility of civic liberalism, some
scholars have turned to the ideas of earlier thinkers who attempted to infuse
liberalism with robust conceptions of civic responsibility. My aim is to contribute to
the ongoing attempt to explore the possibility of civic liberalism by reconstructing
the political thought of Frederick Douglass. He drew on the liberal language of
individual rights and a moral vocabulary of human brotherhood and civic
responsibility. Why did Douglass infuse his liberalism with a robust civic
vocabulary? How did he synthesize these ideas? Is his synthesis morally and
politically coherent? My aim is to show that the experience of slavery led Douglass
to appreciate the ways in which the liberal aim of securing freedom depends on a
robust conception of civic responsibility. I conclude that although Douglass does not
“solve” liberalism’s problems, he offers an “imaginative recovery” of natural rights
philosophy that is attentive to the importance of community and civic responsibility.
1
Chapter 1
“From This Little Bit of Experience”:
Frederick Douglass & the Search for Civic Liberalism

I. Introduction

In this dissertation, I argue that Frederick Douglass formulated a civic liberal
political morality. By this, I mean that he synthesized liberal commitments to
personal freedom and individual rights with robust conceptions of community and
civic responsibility. In what follows, I explain why and how Douglass infused his
liberalism in this way and what implications his project has for contemporary
political theory and practice. I argue that his appreciation for both the value of
freedom and his recognition of the importance of civic responsibility is rooted in the
experience of slavery. He was forced to assess liberalism from the perspective of an
outsider – first as a slave, then as a social reformer. This perspective allowed
Douglass to achieve great insight into the immense challenge of achieving and
maintaining the liberal promise of freedom for all individuals.
This project was born out of an interest in the debate among contemporary
political theorists about the merits of liberalism as a political morality. An
ideologically disparate group of critics has attacked liberalism for its moral
shallowness and for failing to pay sufficient attention to the goods of community and
civic responsibility. In the wake of the feud between liberalism and its critics a
group of synthesis or hybrid theorists has emerged under the banner of “civic
liberalism.” In this chapter, I will offer a brief explanation of three “problems” that
confront liberalism and explore the civic liberal response before suggesting how I
2
think a recovery of Douglass’s political thought can contribute to this ongoing
debate.

II. Three Interrelated Problems for Liberalism
The Foundational Problem
The root of the case against liberalism is the attack on its foundations.
According to critics, liberalism is grounded in a shallow conception of human nature.
This shallow conception, critics contend, leads to unacceptably low expectations of
political life. The traditional story about liberalism’s foundations goes something
like this: human beings are inherently selfish creatures who are willing to trample on
the rights and well-being of others in their quest to satisfy their personal desires. In
order to prevent these “atoms of self-interest” from mauling one another in their
quest for satisfaction, critic Benjamin Barber contends, liberal theorists have
conceived of politics as “zookeeping” – the establishment of norms and institutions
that will limit the frequency and severity of collisions between selfish individuals.
1

The liberal approach has been to bridle human selfishness by carving out spaces of
non-interference (individual rights) that are to be respected and protected by limited
government.
Most critics stop short of saying that liberalism’s foundations are morally
empty. After all, the liberal commitment to individual rights is a moral one: liberal
theorists contend that a system of “ordered liberty” is morally preferable to an

1
Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 3.
3
anarchic state in which individuals are permitted to maul one another. Instead of
saying liberalism is morally empty most critics say it is morally “thin” or “shallow.”
Because human beings are conceived of as selfish creatures, liberal theorists have
very low moral expectations of political life. According to critics, the most liberal
theorists usually ask of individuals is to acknowledge one fundamental duty: respect
the rights of others. Beyond this fundamental duty, little is expected of individuals.
Thinkers who have accused liberalism of moral shallowness come from
across the ideological spectrum. In a strange meeting of the minds, conservative Leo
Strauss and socialist C.B. Macpherson offered similar arguments about the moral
shabbiness of liberalism. According to Strauss, the fathers of modern liberalism –
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke – stripped natural law theory of its emphasis on
“perfect duties” and placed a “primacy” on “perfect rights.”
2
There is, in both
Hobbes and Locke, a belief in “innate” and “absolute” natural rights and an
abandonment of the traditional natural law idea of “innate” and “absolute” duties.
Strauss argued that the foundation of liberalism is in “the low but solid ground of
selfishness” and that liberals accept a chastened view of the possibilities of political
life: “One must take one’s bearings not by how men should live but by how they do
live.”
3

2
Leo Strauss, Natural Rights and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 184.
Against the view that Locke offered a morally robust theory than Hobbes, Strauss argued that “Locke
deviated considerably from the traditional natural law teaching and followed the lead given by
Hobbes.”
3
Ibid., 247.
4
Macpherson contended that modern liberalism was rooted in a “possessive
individualism” that reduces society to “a series of market relations.”
4
This, he
argued, was a morally shallow foundation indeed: “Hobbes saw, accurately, that in a
possessive market society, all values and entitlements are in fact established by the
operation of the market, and all morality tends to be the morality of the market.”
5

Similarly, “Locke’s achievement” was to erase “the moral disability with which
unlimited capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped.”
6
On
Macpherson’s reading, Locke stripped liberal-democratic theory of even its core
moral commitments to natural freedom and equality by offering a justification for
“differential rights” on the basis of “differential rationality.”
7

Contemporary political theorists have expressed similar concerns about the
shabbiness of liberalism’s foundations. Michael Sandel, for example, has dedicated
a significant amount of attention to the moral basis of liberal ideals. According to
Sandel, the two main options for grounding liberalism – utilitarianism and
Kantianism – are problematic. Utilitarianism, he argues, “is not always as liberal as
it first appears” because hedonic “calculation is precarious and contingent.”
8
In
other words, the pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number does not always
lead to respect for personal freedom. Sandel argues that the most powerful
alternative to utilitarianism was offered by Immanuel Kant, who defended freedom

4
C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1962), 275.
5
Ibid., 85-86.
6
Ibid., 221.
7
Ibid.
8
Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 9.
5
and rights by arguing for the “inherent dignity of persons.”
9
In order to elaborate on
this view, Sandel cites contemporary Kantian liberal John Rawls, “Each person
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as
whole cannot override…. The rights secured by justice are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.”
10
According to Kantians like
Rawls, liberalism is best rooted in a theory of justice that emphasizes the primacy of
individual rights and secures a “fair framework within which individuals and groups
can choose their own values and ends, consistent with liberty for others.”
11
Freedom
is safest, Rawls argued, when the public philosophy is morally minimalist – a just
“basic structure” should be secured, but the state must be neutral on questions of “the
good.”
Leo Strauss, a “neo-classical conservative,” C.B. Macpherson, a democratic
socialist, Benjamin Barber, a “strong democrat,” and Michael Sandel, a civic
republican, represent just a small sampling of those who have argued that liberalism
rests on morally thin foundations.
12
These thinkers and many others have coalesced
around the idea that liberalism is rooted in a morally shallow conception of human

9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 10.
11
Ibid., 11.
12
See, e.g., Sheldon Wolin, “The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism,”
Political Theory, Vol. 24, No.1 (Feb., 1996), 97-8; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, (New York:
Basic Books, 1984); Charles Taylor, Sources of Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)
and The Ethics of Authenticity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Michael Sandel, Public
Philosophy: Essays on Morality and Politics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Benjamin
Barber, Strong Democracy; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (South Bend: Notre Dame University
Press, 1984); Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973); Robert Bellah, Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk, (New York: Free Press, 1993); Amitai Etzioni, The New
Golden Rule, (New York: Basic Books, 1998).
6
nature that leads to exceedingly low expectations of citizens and the possibilities of
political life. Liberalism’s “foundational problem” is a philosophical one. It brings
into focus the question of how liberal commitments are justified and what is lost in
conceiving of politics in this way. In response to this line of criticism, one may
concede that liberalism relies on a morally thin foundation, but this foundation, to
borrow Strauss’s felicitous phrase, is “low but sturdy.” The problem with this
response, critics contend, is that while liberalism’s thin foundations may be sufficient
to justify a framework of individual rights and fair procedures, they are not strong
enough to sustain the “sense of community and civic engagement” that is necessary
to secure those liberal ideals.
13
It is to the interrelated “community” and “civic
responsibility” problems that we now turn.

The Community and Civic Responsibility Problems
Liberalism’s allegedly shabby moral foundations are problematic not just for
philosophical reasons, but practical ones as well. Liberalism’s foundational problem
has a direct bearing on two other problems that I am calling the community and civic
responsibility problems. The community problem can be stated in a variety of ways:
what are the moral bonds of community in a liberal polity? What is the “moral glue”
that unites liberal citizens to one another? Does liberalism have any sense of
solidarity, fraternity, or civic friendship? This question is related to the foundational
problem described above. If Strauss, Macpherson and the other critics of liberalism

13
Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 6.
7
are correct to say that the doctrine rests on a view of human beings as selfish,
interest-seeking, and willful, it is difficult to imagine anything approaching a robust
sense of community. At best, liberal community would be best understood as a sort
of peace treaty – an agreement between individuals to abide by certain rules in order
to secure the best conditions for each to pursue his or her interests.
The civic responsibility problem is this: what obligations do liberal citizens
have to one another? The core of the liberal conception of justice is the claim that
individuals are obligated to respect the rights of others, but what responsibilities do
individuals have beyond this? Is an individual being a good liberal citizen if he
simply refrains from violating the rights of others? It is easy to see how the civic
responsibility problem is related to the foundational and community problems. If
liberals rely on morally thin foundations and are unable to give reasons why
individuals should feel a sense of connection to one another, it is difficult to imagine
how a compelling case can be made that liberal citizens have very extensive
obligations to one another.

Why are the Community, & Civic Responsibility Questions Important?
The community and civic responsibility problems are “problems” in two
senses. First, there are instrumentalist arguments that can be made about why
liberals should care about these issues. By instrumentalist, I am referring to the
contention that liberalism’s failure to attend to the concerns of community and civic
responsibility is problematic because this failure may undermine the liberal promise
8
of personal freedom. The instrumentalist argument is this: modern liberalism is
inadequate because it does not secure the conditions necessary for the exercise of
personal freedom. In Sandel’s words, liberalism “cannot secure the liberty it
promises because it cannot inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government
requires.”
14
In other words, community and civic responsibility are valuable as
means to the end of securing personal freedom and therefore liberalism’s failure to
address these goods is problematic.
A second line of argument holds that liberalism’s failure to address the
community and civic responsibility questions is worrisome for intrinsic (or non-
instrumental) reasons. According to this view, the failure to attend to the importance
of community and civic responsibility is problematic for reasons independent of the
central liberal concern with personal freedom. A strong sense of community and
feelings of obligation to one’s fellow citizens are intrinsically valuable to the well-
being of individuals. Arguments of this sort often have their roots in ideas expressed
by Aristotle, who held that human beings are only able to develop and flourish as
members of a community. Sandel also offers intrinsic arguments in his case against
liberalism: liberal society undermines the fulfillment of human beings because its
individualistic ethos leaves them feeling anxious, disempowered, and unhappy.
The claims that liberalism fails to pay adequate attention to the community
and civic responsibility problems are not solely criticisms of liberal institutions.
Instead, many critics are concerned with something more intangible – liberalism’s

14
Ibid., 323.
9
inattention to “moral ecology.” The idea of “moral ecology” has been described by
political theorist Allen D. Hertzke as a “philosophical, empirical, and practical
construct” that imagines a moral environment that is roughly analogous to the
physical environment. To explain the idea, Hertzke gives the example of the Navajo
“way of life,” which holds that “living an ecological life meant not only living in
harmony with nature but also with one another.”
15
Sociologist Robert Bellah
contends that the concern with moral ecology is rooted in a belief that “human
beings and their societies are deeply interrelated, and the actions we take have
enormous ramifications for the lives of others.”
16
The shortcomings of liberalism,
some critics contend, can be traced back to the fact that the doctrine focuses on
securing the political conditions (rights, the rule of law, etc.) necessary for the
exercise of personal freedom without paying adequate attention to the “moral fabric”
at the foundation of this project and the “moral energies” necessary to sustain it.
17

The central point of moral ecologists is that the behavior of individuals and
the operation of political, cultural, and economic institutions can promote a healthy
or an unhealthy moral ecology. The “health” of the moral ecology can be assessed
by the extent to which the “moral conditions” promote or undermine the basic aims
of the political community. In a liberal polity, the primary aim is to “secure the
political conditions necessary for the exercise of personal freedom,” so the health of
the moral ecology should be determined by its relationship to that aim. If there are

15
Allen D. Hertzke, “The Concept of Moral Ecology,” Review of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn
1998), 629.
16
Robert Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 284.
17
Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 3, 24.
10
moral conditions – senses of community and conceptions of civic responsibility –
that are more conducive to the security of personal freedom, then liberals should be
concerned with the state of the moral ecology.

III. The Civic Liberal Response
Many liberals have acknowledged that community and civic responsibility
are important goods. Some have even conceded that many formulations of
liberalism are insufficient because they fail to attend to, or are at odds with, these
goods. A group of “hybrid” theorists has emerged – calling themselves “new
liberals,” “civic liberals,” “communitarian liberals,” “republican liberals,” and
“virtue liberals” – with the hope of combining a robust language of community and
civic responsibility with the liberal commitments to individual freedom and rights.
18

According to civic liberals, the goods of community and civic responsibility are
intrinsically valuable to individuals and essential supports for the liberal aim of
securing personal freedom.
First, civic liberals contend that community should matter to liberalism.
According to political theorist Thomas Spragens, community, which he calls “civic
friendship,” is intrinsically and instrumentally valuable for liberal citizens.
Community is intrinsically valuable because it makes us feel better about ourselves

18
Examples of civic liberals include Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990) and Diversity and Distrust, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); William Galston,
Liberal Purposes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Steven Kautz, Liberalism and
Community, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Thomas Spragens, Civic Liberalism, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999); Richard Dagger, Civic Ideals, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
11
and life in general. Feeling as though one is a member of a community is, in other
words, an essential part of a good life. Community is instrumentally valuable, from
a liberal perspective, because it promotes a sense of interconnection, which
encourages individuals to care about the security of each other’s rights. In sum, civic
liberals contend we should care about community because it is important for human
flourishing and it serves the liberal end of securing personal freedom by encouraging
individuals to care about the rights of their fellow citizens.
Second, civic liberals contend that civic responsibility is an important good.
The moral character of liberal citizens is important because the security of personal
freedom and the functioning of free institutions depend on the prevalence of a moral
ecology supportive of these aims. The fact is very little of our behavior is only “self-
regarding.” Many of the things we do each day impact the lives of others. As a
result, it is important that individuals practice certain “virtues” that are supportive of
freedom. Civic liberals believe that if individuals do not exhibit certain qualities of
character – respect for the rights of others, tolerance, independence, and, perhaps
more problematically, a willingness to stand up for the rights of others – then the
liberal polity will not flourish and, indeed, it may not survive.

Approaches to the Study of Civic Liberalism
There are two major approaches to the examination of civic liberalism: one
that is primarily philosophical and one that is primarily historical. The philosophical
approach, which has been adopted by a number of contemporary thinkers, consists in
12
offering a philosophical defense of the synthesis of liberal commitments to freedom
and rights with robust notions of community and civic responsibility. The approach
is “philosophical” in the sense that it is primarily an attempt to offer abstract
normative arguments in defense of civic liberalism. Stephen Macedo, for example,
has offered detailed defenses of liberal conceptions of community and civic
responsibility in Liberal Virtues and Diversity and Distrust.
19
In these works,
Macedo lays out a philosophical case for why community and civic responsibility
ought to matter to liberals and offers a liberal case for civic education.
The historical approach relies less on original normative argument than a
careful reconstruction of civic liberal thinkers in the history of political thought.
Peter Berkowitz, for example, offers an account of how “the makers of modern
liberalism” – Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill – articulated a language of virtue along
with a language of freedom and equality.
20
This approach is more self-consciously
“historical” in the sense that it is grounded in a belief that we can learn much about
the coherence and attractiveness of civic liberalism by examining the ideas of
historical figures who offered versions of the doctrine.
There is no firm line separating the philosophical and historical approaches.
Contemporary scholars who adopt a primarily philosophical approach often draw
support from thinkers within and outside the liberal tradition in order to buttress their
arguments. Contemporary scholars who adopt a primarily historical approach

19
Ibid.
20
Peter Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000). Another example of this approach is Nathan Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
13
usually do so with a normative agenda. Berkowitz, for example, turns to the “makers
of modern liberalism” in order to support the claim that “making liberalism work
today requires either the renewal of…old sources for the cultivation of the necessary
virtues or the creation of new ones.”
21

III. The Road to Frederick Douglass
Some scholars who adopt the historical approach have focused on ideas
expressed by the “makers of the American tradition.” For students of American
thought, there are fewer “philosophers” to examine than there are political actors
who offered some philosophical explanation for their actions.
22
Much of the work
that has been done interpreting the political thought of the American founders, for
example, has been animated by a desire to trace the foundations of liberalism and
civic republicanism to thinkers in the early republic.
23
On one side, many scholars
have emphasized the prevalence of the liberal language of individual rights, private
property, and limited government in the writings of the founders.
24
On the other
side, “Republican revisionists” have demonstrated the importance of the civic
language of virtue and the common good for the American revolutionaries.
25
A third

21
Peter Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998), xiii.
22
Morton Frisch and Richard Stevens, American Political Thought: The Philosophic Dimension of
American Statesmenship, (Dubuque: Kendall-Hunt Publishing, 1976).
23
James P. Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
24
See, e.g., C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty, (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 2002) and Jean Yarbrough, American Virtues: Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a
Free People, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998).
25
See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1992); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton: Princeton University
14
group has focused on the ways in which liberal, republican, and other ideological
traditions blended in the political thought of the founders.
26
Some of the scholars in
this third group have relied on their synthetic interpretations to draw support for civic
liberalism.
Scholars utilizing the historical approach as a way into the debates between
liberalism and its critics have not focused exclusively on the founding. John Patrick
Diggins and J. David Greenstone, for example, have explored the synthesis of ideas
in the works of several nineteenth century figures. The studies of both Diggins and
Greenstone culminate in praise for Abraham Lincoln’s synthesis of liberal and
Calvinist ideas. Diggins argues that this synthesis is admirable because Lincoln
relied on “the brooding tenets” of Calvinism to serve as the “conscience” of his
liberalism. According to Diggins, Calvinism provided liberalism with its “moral
content” and “psychological depth.”
27
Greenstone claimed that Lincoln represents
the high point of American thought because he was able to infuse pragmatic liberal
politics with the moral humanitarianism of New England Calvinism.
28
I believe both
of these projects were attempts to use the historical approach to defend versions of
liberalism that were more attentive to the foundational, community, and civic
responsibility problems discussed above.

Press, 2003); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1998).
26
See, e.g., James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998) and Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
27
John Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986), 7.
28
J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
15
In this dissertation, I employ the historical approach to recover the civic
liberalism of Frederick Douglass. My project is part interpretive and part normative.
As an interpretive matter, I am arguing that Douglass is best understood as a civic
liberal; he was a thinker who was simultaneously a liberal champion of freedom and
individual rights as well as a practitioner and promoter of strong notions of
community and civic responsibility. In addition to defending this interpretation, I
demonstrate why and how Douglass conceived of liberalism in this way. I argue that
Douglass’s civic liberalism was rooted in the problem of slavery, which was at the
center of his thought. I contend he rooted his liberalism in an “imaginative
recovery” of natural rights philosophy. First, his recovery was imaginative in that he
drew on the experience of slavery to articulate a comprehensive and compelling
defense of the liberal idea of self-ownership. Second, his recovery was imaginative
in that he drew on the challenges he faced as a reformer to make the case that
freedom for all people could only be achieved if the liberal project was conceived as
a common one that was animated by a strong ethos of civic responsibility. In sum,
my interpretive thesis is this: Douglass’s ends were fundamentally liberal, but he
believed those ends could only be achieved in a strong civic community made up of
responsible citizens.
Like others who have employed the historical approach, this project is
animated by normative concerns as well. I think civic liberal thinkers are correct to
take seriously the concerns raised by the critics of liberalism. Liberalism is haunted
by a paradox. On the one hand, it promises to secure a robust sphere of freedom in
16
which we can pursue projects of our own choosing. On the other hand, this robust
sphere of freedom can only be secured if we are actively engaged as citizens. In
other words, liberals want to free us from politics but the achievement of such
freedom requires conscientious political engagement. I do not think this riddle can
be solved, but I do think the civic liberal attempt to grapple with it is a worthwhile
project.
As a normative matter, then, I stop short of saying that Douglass offers us
solutions to liberalism’s problems. There are, however, three interrelated reasons
why Douglass’s civic liberalism is worthy of our consideration. First, and most
obviously, Douglass is interesting because he attempted to infuse liberalism with
strong notions of community and civic responsibility. His central commitments were
quintessentially liberal: he believed in a robust sphere of personal freedom, religious
toleration, the institution of private property, and limited government. Douglass
infused these traditional liberal commitments with a robust language of human
brotherhood and obligation to others. The very fact that Douglass attempted a
synthesis at all is intriguing to scholars interested in the possibility of civic
liberalism.
Second, the reasons why Douglass articulated this civic liberal vision make
him an interesting subject for study. I argue that his embrace of civic liberalism can
be traced back to the experience of slavery. As a former slave, he had an acute
appreciation for the value of the liberal commitments to freedom and individual
rights. I contend that Douglass’s articulation of traditional liberal ideas such as self-
17
ownership and natural rights have added moral force because they were articulated in
the shadow of the cruelties of slavery. Furthermore, his experience as an
abolitionist and social reformer enabled him to appreciate the importance of
community and civic responsibility. Douglass’s aim was to achieve a more inclusive
liberalism and to do this he had to convince his fellow citizens that they had an
obligation to close the gap between the moral ideals expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and the realities of American life. In other words, he had to convince
free people to feel a greater sense of responsibility to those whose freedom was
being denied. Douglass’s crucial insight is this: freedom cannot be achieved or
maintained in a culture of selfishness and immorality. Instead, the realization and
security of freedom depends on the creation and maintenance of a “humanitarian
culture” in which the respect and protection of every individual’s rights is a matter of
common concern.
Douglass’s outsider status forced him to confront difficult questions about the
“fundamental principles” of political life. Why is it wrong for a nation to be half
slave and half free? Why should an individual in a liberal polity care about the rights
of others? The language of rights can take us only so far in response to these
questions. In order to build bridges of interconnection between individuals,
Douglass was forced to articulate an understanding of liberalism that was attentive to
the problem of moral ecology.
Third, how Douglass infused his liberalism with a robust civic philosophy is
interesting. One difficulty confronting any theorist attempting to formulate a civic
18
liberal synthesis is the fact that there is a deep tension between the liberal focus on
freedom and strong notions of community and civic responsibility. Liberalism is, by
definition, skeptical of coercive attempts to “make men moral.” I argue that the
“civic” spirit in Douglass’s thought is consistent with fundamental liberal
commitments. He offered a vision of civic liberalism that emphasized the building
of moral ecology from the bottom up. In other words, Douglass believed the moral
ecology of civic liberalism was developed and fostered primarily by the
conscientious actions of individuals operating outside of governmental machinery.
This bottom-up approach to moral ecology is more easily assimilated into liberalism,
which is wary of state-centered soulcraft.
Although Douglass emphasized the importance of the precepts and examples
of conscientious individuals, he did believe the state has some role to play in
developing the moral ecology of civic liberalism. His endorsement of top-down
soulcraft did not, however, violate the core commitments of liberalism. Instead,
Douglass emphasized less coercive state mechanisms such as the use of the bully
pulpit by statesmen and the process of civic education through schooling, public
ceremonies, and democratic politics. Douglass was careful to only endorse
legislation and the use of force when fundamental rights were at stake, never to
coerce virtue.
In sum, Douglass is a different kind of liberal. He infused the traditional
liberal language of rights and freedom with a robust understanding of community
and responsibility in order to create an appealing civic liberal vision. The fact that
19
his insights are rooted in the concreteness of the experience of slavery gives his
arguments added moral weight and persuasive power. His emphasis on the bottom-
up cultivation of a humanitarian culture makes his vision easier to reconcile with
liberalism than visions that emphasize top-down soulcraft. As we attempt to assess
the moral foundations of liberalism and the possibility of infusing it with more robust
conceptions of community and civic responsibility, we would do well to consider the
thought of this civic liberal.

IV. Literature Review
No scholar has offered a systematic response to the questions animating this
dissertation. Why did Douglass offer a civic liberal vision? How did Douglass
combine liberalism with a robust civic philosophy? Is his synthesis morally and
politically coherent? What are the implications of his thought for contemporary
political theory and practice? There has, however, been a limited amount of work
done on how best to categorize Douglass ideologically. In this section, I would like
to provide a brief overview of these findings.
Interpreters are divided on how to classify Douglass, but the majority
identifies him with the classical liberal tradition.
29
In the only book-length study of
Douglass produced by a political scientist, Leslie Friedman Goldstein argued that
Douglass’s views on government are “an almost exact replication of those of John

29
By “classical liberalism,” I mean the strand of liberal thought that envisions a free society governed
by a “night watchman state.” Classical liberals tend to emphasize negative liberty, the sanctity of
property rights, and strict limitations placed on government power.
20
Locke’s Second Treatise.”
30
Intellectual historian Waldo E. Martin identifies
Douglass as an advocate of “classic” or “laissez-faire liberalism.”
31
In American
Citizenship, Judith Shklar placed Douglass within the classical liberal “party of
individual effort” that “hopes the government will do nothing more than ensure fair
play for all.”
32
John P. Diggins associates Douglass with the “liberal individualism”
embraced by contemporary Black conservatives such as Thomas Sowell and Shelby
Steele.
33
Philosopher Bill E. Lawson argues that Douglass accepted “a libertarian
conception of justice.”
34
David F. Ericson contends that Douglass’s “fundamental
arguments were liberal.”
35
David E. Schrader compared the centrality of natural law
in Douglass’s thought to liberals such as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.
36
Gayle
McKeen has drawn attention to the importance of “self-ownership” and “self-help”
in Douglass’s liberalism.
37
Most recently, Peter C. Myers has described Douglass as
a “natural rights constitutionalist.”
38

30
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass,” Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Department of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell, 1974), 55.
31
Waldo E. Martin, The Mind of Frederick Douglass, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
1984), 71, 256.
32
Judith Shklar, American Citizenship, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 97.
33
John P. Diggins, On Hallowed Ground: Abraham Lincoln and the Foundations of American
History, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 275.
34
Bill E. Lawson, “Frederick Douglass and Social Progress,” in Frederick Douglass: A Critical
Reader, (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 383.
35
David F. Ericson, The Debate over Slavery, (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 42.
36
David Schrader, “Natural Law in Douglass’s Constitutional Thought,” in Frederick Douglass: A
Critical Reader, (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).
37
Gayle McKeen, “Whose Rights? Whose Responsibility? Self-Help in African-American Thought,”
Polity, Volume XXXIV, Number 3 (Summer 2002), 415.
38
Peter C. Myers, “Frederick Douglass’ Natural Rights Constitutionalism: The Postwar, Pre-
Progressive Period,” in The Progressive Revolution in Politics and Political Science, John Marini and
Ken Masugi, eds. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
21
A smaller group of scholars classifies Douglass as a “reform liberal.”
39
J.
David Greenstone had planned to write a chapter on Douglass in The Lincoln
Persuasion in which he would argue that Douglass was a reform liberal – a term
defined by Greenstone as a thinker who professes that “individuals have an
obligation…to cultivate and develop their physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral
faculties” and who believe this obligation “extends to helping others do the same.”
40

Greenstone associates the reform liberal view with a more activist state that supports
increased funding for educational and cultural programs. Historian Daniel Walker
Howe agrees with this interpretation: “Douglass’s political thought illustrates
beautifully David Greenstone’s conception of reform liberalism as a philosophy
dedicated to national regeneration.”
41
Howe takes this interpretation a step further
by recruiting Douglass into the cause of contemporary reform liberalism: “Douglass
can speak to the issues of today if we want him to: compensatory education, head
start, measuring how far students have come instead of what point they have reached
– these contemporary issues find an advocate in Frederick Douglass.”
42

An even smaller group of scholars has suggested Douglass’s thought is closer
to civic republican and communitarian traditions. Historian Daniel McInerney has
argued that Douglass and other abolitionists adopted the language of republicanism

39
By “reform liberalism,” I mean the strand of liberal thought that shares the classical liberal
commitment to individual freedom and the institution of private property, but that envisions a more
robust, positive role for the state in enabling individuals to exercise their freedom. Reform liberals
tend to emphasize positive liberty (liberty as not just free from, but empowered to) and usually do not
believe property rights are as fundamental as other personal rights.
40
J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 59,
190.
41
Daniel Walker Howe, Making the American Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997),
155.
42
Ibid.
22
(which includes “classical theory, civic humanist thought, and radical whig
traditions”) to make the case against chattel slavery.
43
In a similar vein, Michael
Sandel identifies Douglass with the civic republican “political antislavery” strand of
thought (as opposed to the liberal “abolitionist” strand of William Lloyd Garrison
and others).
44
In The Idea of Fraternity in America, Wilson Carey McWilliams
suggests that Douglass was “devoted to the ideal of human fraternity,” an idea
McWilliams believes is antagonistic to the liberal doctrines of “individualism” and
“self-reliance.”
45

Although I am undertaking this project with the aim of making a contribution
to broader debates within political theory, my thesis will contribute to debates about
the nature of Douglass’s thought by showing how both the liberal interpretation and
fraternal interpretation are partially correct. He did not believe he had to choose
between the ideals of liberalism and the ideal of fraternity; he chose both. As Gayle
McKeen has suggested, Douglass’s liberalism is too complex to fit into the
categories established by Greenstone, Sandel, and others.
46
As the classical liberal
interpreters suggest, he was deeply committed to liberal ideas such as natural rights,
self-ownership, self-reliance, and limited government. At the same time,
McWilliams was correct to suggest that Douglass’s experiences led him to appreciate
that the freedom cannot be achieved or maintained by isolated individuals. I hope

43
Daniel McInerney, The Fortunate Heirs of Freedom: Abolition & Republican Thought, (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 1.
44
Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 177-181.
45
Ibid., 582.
46
Gayle McKeen, “A ‘Guiding Principle’ of Liberalism in the Thought of Frederick Douglass and
W.E.B. DuBois,” in The Liberal Tradition in American Politics, David F. Ericson and Louisa Bertch
Green, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 107-8.
23
this project will help us gain a deeper understanding of how these two strands of
thought intertwined in Douglass’s mind and what implications his synthesis may
have for contemporary political theory and practice.

V. Outline of the Argument
Now that I have provided a brief explanation of the genesis and aims of this
project, let me provide a preview of how my argument will proceed. I begin, in
Chapter 2, by defending a largely uncontroversial but important claim about
Douglass: he was a liberal. He was committed to individual rights to life, liberty,
and property, he celebrated ethnic and religious diversity, and he believed in limited,
democratic government. Making the case that Douglass was a liberal is important
because it provides a framework for a discussion of the more interesting aspects of
his thought. If McWilliams, McInerney, and Sandel are correct to say that Douglass
was, in some important sense, outside of the liberal tradition, then his attentiveness
to the importance of community and civic responsibility would be less remarkable.
In Chapter 2, I will demonstrate that Douglass’s politics place him firmly in the
liberal family.
In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the foundations of Douglass’s
commitment to personal freedom. Like many other thinkers in the liberal tradition,
he relied on a philosophy of natural rights, placing particular emphasis on the right to
self-ownership. I contend that Douglass’s articulation of natural rights philosophy is
distinctive because of the ways in which he drew on the experience of slavery to
24
defend it. He described the physical and metaphysical horrors of slavery as well as
the universality of human desires and capacities, to make the case that all human
beings have rights that must be respected and protected. I argue that because he
draws on the concrete experience of slavery to defend self-ownership and he re-
imagines natural rights philosophy in a way that includes all people, his articulation
of fundamental principles is an important contribution to the American liberal
tradition. Furthermore, I contend that the uncompromising, deontological nature of
his commitment to natural rights served as the foundation of his claim that all human
beings have natural duties not only to respect the rights of others but to use their
moral and political powers to ensure that all people are free.
In Chapter 4, I explore how Douglass attempted to bridge the divide between
his belief that all human beings have rights the respect and protection of which is
required by natural law and the national problem of slavery. This marks the
beginning of my examination of why and how Douglass addressed the problems of
community and civic responsibility. I attempt to determine how Douglass defended
the claim that all American citizens had obligations to use their moral and political
powers to emancipate every slave in the Union.
After showing why Douglass adopted such a robust conception of civic
responsibility and demonstrating the strategies he employed to justify it to his fellow
Americans, I turn my attention to the question of how he thought a stronger ethos of
civic responsibility could be developed. In Chapter 5, I examine his views of good
citizenship. According to Douglass, good citizens develop the moral ecology of
25
civic liberalism from the bottom up. Good citizens move society closer to realizing
the ideals of liberalism and they promote responsible behavior by contributing to the
cultivation of what Douglass called “a humanitarian culture.” In Chapter 6, I turn to
Douglass’s endorsement of several top down forms of “civic education” to promote a
healthy moral ecology. Through the use of force, the promulgation of law, political
persuasion, the celebration of civic ceremonies and the maintenance of a robust
educational system, Douglass thought the state could contribute to the task of
developing a humanitarian culture. In Chapter 7, I offer some conclusions about
how Douglass’s political thought is best understood and what its implications are for
contemporary political theory and practice. After describing to an audience an
episode from his life as a slave and drawing broader lessons of political morality
from it, Douglass said: “From this little bit of experience – slave experience – I have
elaborated quite a lengthy chapter of political philosophy, applicable to the American
people.”
47
It is to Douglass’s lengthy chapter of political philosophy that we now
turn.

47
Frederick Douglass, The Frederick Douglass Papers, John W. Blassigame, ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1979-1992), Volume 4, 160. [Cited hereinafter as: The Frederick Douglass Papers,
Volume number: page number].
26

Chapter 2
“The Basis of All Social and Political Right”:
Douglass’s Liberal Politics

I. Introduction
My aim in this dissertation is to demonstrate why and how Frederick
Douglass infused the traditional language of liberalism with a civic language of
community and responsibility. In order to do so, the first thing I must show is that
Douglass was a liberal. In this chapter, my aim is to demonstrate that the core
characteristics of Douglass’s politics place him within the liberal family.
The liberal tradition is broad and deep, but there are several “core”
commitments that are shared by thinkers within it. First, liberals believe in the
primacy of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Second, liberals believe
religious and moral diversity ought to be tolerated or even celebrated. Third, liberals
reject anarchism as a viable option and endorse limited government to protect
individual rights. Fourth, liberals believe that democratic government is most likely
to protect individual rights. In sum, members of the liberal family emphasize the
primacy of individual rights, the importance of toleration, the necessity of limited
government to secure rights, and the belief that government ought to be democratic
in form.
In order to determine whether or not an individual ought to be identified with
the liberal tradition, it is necessary to examine where he stands on these central
commitments. In what follows, I demonstrate that Douglass accepted each of these
27
ideas. First, I provide a brief explanation of the core commitments of liberalism.
Then, I show that Douglass adopted each of these core commitments.

II. The Core Commitments of Liberalism
The fundamental moral commitment of liberalism is to the dignity of the
individual. Judith Shklar captured the political consequences of this core liberal
affirmation when she wrote: “Liberalism has only one overriding aim: to secure the
political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom.”
1
Wilson
Carey McWilliams echoed this description when he described individual liberty as
the “lodestar” of liberal political morality.
2
Liberalism’s fundamental moral
commitments to human dignity and personal freedom provide the foundation for a
series of interrelated political commitments: a commitment to the primacy of
individual rights, a commitment to toleration of moral and religious diversity, a
commitment to the idea that rights ought to be protected by limited government, and
a commitment to democratic political institutions. In this section, I will provide a
very brief explanation of where each of these commitments fits into liberal political
morality.

1
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, Stanley
Hoffmann, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3.
2
Wilson Carey McWilliams, “Ironies and Ambiguities,” in Moral Values in Liberalism and
Conservatism, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 180.
28
The Primacy of Individual Rights
At the center of the liberal universe is the commitment to individual rights.
Individuals are thought to be endowed by God, nature, or convention with rights to
life, liberty, and property. Governments, according to liberals, are created to secure
these rights. The classic formulation of this idea in the American tradition is found
in the Declaration of Independence, where it is claimed that “all men are created
equal” and that “they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,”
including the rights to “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” More recently,
legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has reasserted the primacy of rights in liberal
political morality by describing them as “trumps” that are supposed to protect
individuals from illegitimate interference by others.
3

The central controversy within liberalism is over what rights should be
deemed fundamental and which should be subject to limitations by the will of the
majority. As Kenneth Dolbeare has pointed out, “The principal tension within the
liberal tradition has been conflict over the assigning of priorities among the natural
rights of individuals.”
4
Perhaps the most contentious debate within liberalism is over
the status of private property rights. On one side, liberals usually classified as
“classical” or “libertarian” liberals contend that the right to private property is every
bit as fundamental as the rights to life and liberty and, as such, should only be
interfered with in rare circumstances. On the other side, liberals usually classified as

3
Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps,” in Theories of Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), 153-167.
4
Kenneth Dolbeare, “Introduction: American Liberalism – An Overview,” in American Political
Thought, (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 5.
29
“progressive” or “reform” liberals argue that property rights are not as fundamental
as the rights to life and liberty and, as such, the majority ought to be empowered, in
more circumstances than the libertarian is willing to grant, to interfere with these
rights.
This controversy within liberal rights theory and practice is not the only one.
“Conservative” liberals, for example, express concern that the right to liberty has
been taken to excess, permitting individuals to behave in immoral ways. These
controversies within liberalism are worth pointing out because it would not be
accurate to say that the liberal commitment to individual rights is a monolithic one.
Instead, there are longstanding debates about the meaning and relative value of
liberal rights and these tensions must be acknowledged. These controversies
notwithstanding, my main point here is to suggest that individual rights are at the
core of liberal political morality. When we seek to determine whether or not a
thinker is to be identified within the liberal tradition, it is wise to start with his
position on the sanctity of individual rights.

The Importance of Toleration
Liberalism was born out of the “cruelties of the religious wars” and, as a
result, toleration of religious diversity has always been a core commitment of its
adherents. In Shklar’s words, “liberalism’s deepest grounding is in place from the
first, in the conviction of the earliest defenders of toleration, born in horror, that
30
cruelty is an absolute evil, an offense against God or humanity.”
5
The individual,
liberals claim, should be free from coercive meddling with his soul. As liberalism
developed during the nineteenth century, particularly in the writings of John Stuart
Mill, the case for toleration was extended to the moral sphere, as liberal thinkers
argued that toleration of moral diversity also follows from the commitment to
personal freedom. In Shklar’s words, liberals contend that “social diversity and the
burdens of freedom must be endured and encouraged to avoid the kinds of misery”
that follow from “organized repression.”
6

The liberal commitment to toleration of religious and moral diversity is
obviously related to the primacy of rights. Individual rights, liberals believe, provide
individuals with the social space necessary to worship God and pursue happiness
according their own conceptions of the good life. Although the two ideas are related,
it would be a mistake to conflate them. As Shklar has pointed out, the philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes reminds us that it is possible to emphasize natural rights without
believing in toleration and the philosophy of Michel de Montagine reminds us that it
is possible to defend toleration without advocating a liberal politics of rights.
7
The
important point is that liberals have always been skeptical of coercive attempts to
enforce religious or moral conformity. There are some matters, liberals contend, that
are properly left to the conscience and discretion of individuals.
8
The commitment
to toleration of religious and moral diversity is an essential part of the liberal project.

5
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 5.
6
Judith Shklar, Legalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 6.
7
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 5-6.
8
Ibid.
31

A Commitment to Limited Government
The overriding liberal commitment to personal freedom has led Benjamin
Barber to contend that liberal democratic theory is rooted in an “anarchistic
disposition” that is hostile to government and politics.
9
According to Barber, liberals
regard the individual as sovereign and, as a result, they flirt with an anarchist
rejection of government and politics, but stop short of taking this step. While it is
certainly true that many liberal theorists are attracted to the fantasy of absolute
freedom from politics, it is also true that what makes them liberals and not anarchists
is their belief that this is not a realistic possibility. Liberals believe that limited
government is necessary to secure the conditions necessary for personal freedom.
Locke is a prime example of this phenomenon. As Sheldon Wolin has
pointed out, Locke’s true ideal was the “perfect state of nature,” in which free and
equal men interact according to the dictates of natural law without the need for
coercive government.
10
But this was not to be, Locke argued, because the state of
nature is corrupted by the “viciousness of degenerate men” and, as a result,
government is necessary to protect our natural rights. In Madison’s language, “if
men were angels, no government would be necessary,” but men are not angels, the
liberal contends, so we must have civil government limited by the rule of law.
11

9
Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984), 6.
10
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1960), 306-308.
11
James Madison, Federalist #51.
32
The liberal belief that civil government is necessary and the commitment to
the rule of law are essentially interrelated. Liberals believe that civil government
ought to be limited to specific ends, the most fundamental being the protection of
individual rights. In order to limit the power of government, liberals endorse the rule
of law, which “is meant to put a fence around the innocent citizen so that she may
feel secure” in the exercise of her rights.
12
In other words, the rule of law functions
within liberalism to order the actions of both private and public actors. In Locke’s
famous words, the end of law is “to preserve and enlarge freedom.”
13
The rule of
law should embody the liberal commitment to individual rights and serve as a check
against the depredations of vicious men inside and outside of government. In
Shklar’s words, liberalism may seem to be “very close to anarchism,” but the rule of
law is “the original first principle of liberalism” and “it is not an anarchistic
doctrine.”
14
In sum, the devotion to personal freedom leads liberals to flirt with
anarchism, but their distrust of human nature causes them to pull back and endorse
limited government under the rule of law.

The Marriage to Democracy
While it is certainly possible to imagine non-democratic liberalism and one
can find examples in history of relatively robust spheres of freedom under non-
democratic regimes, the fact remains that liberalism and democracy have in theory

12
Judith Shklar, “Political Theory and the Rule of Law,” in Political Thought and Political Thinkers,
22.
13
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 6, Section 57.
14
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 18.
33
and practice been wedded together more often than not. This is not a coincidence.
Shklar has argued that a liberal society is
of necessity a democratic one, because without enough equality of power to
protect and assert one’s rights, freedom is but a hope. Without institutions of
representative democracy and an accessible, fair, and independent judiciary
open to appeals, liberalism is in jeopardy…. It is therefore fair to say that
liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, and permanently married to
democracy – but it is a marriage of convenience.
15

From the liberal perspective, democracy is usually seen as the form of government
most likely to serve the overriding aim of securing freedom. The democratic
commitments to free elections, representative and transparent political institutions,
checks and balances, and equality before the law are more compatible with the core
commitments of liberalism than any of the alternatives.
The union between liberalism and democracy is not without its tensions. As
Wolin has pointed out, there is a “liberal-democratic divide” that must be
acknowledged.
16
On the one side, there are liberals like Shklar whose primary
devotion is to liberty and who view democracy as instrumentally valuable. On the
other side, there are democrats like Wolin whose primary devotion is to the process
of collective self-government and who define and defend liberty in relation to this
primary commitment. Liberal democrats attempt to reconcile commitments to
individual liberty and democracy but tend to put their strongest emphasis on
defending the liberal side of the divide.

15
Ibid., 19.
16
Sheldon Wolin, “The Liberal-Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” Political
Theory, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Feb., 1996), 97.
34
III. The Liberal Politics of Frederick Douglass
My aim in this part is to demonstrate that Douglass’s political commitments
place him within the liberal family. I focus on his politics here and explain the moral
foundations of his politics in the next two chapters. First, I will argue that
Douglass’s primary political commitment was to individual rights to life, liberty, and
property. Like others within the liberal tradition, he demonstrated some ambivalence
about the sanctity of private property rights, but he never abandoned liberalism for a
socialist alternative. Second, I contend that Douglass was committed to toleration of
moral and religious diversity. His was an ideology that accepted moral and religious
diversity as natural and inevitable and he was not tempted by “ideologies of
agreement” that seek religious or moral conformity.
17
Third, I show that Douglass
rejected anarchism in favor of limited government. Although many of his
abolitionist colleagues followed their opposition to coercion to its logical conclusion
and embraced utopian anarchism, Douglass’s firsthand knowledge of human evil
made him unable to indulge such fantasies. Fourth, I demonstrate that Douglass
embraced a “genuine democratic republic” as the best form of government. I argue
that his attitude toward democracy was closer to the instrumental appreciation of a
liberal than the romantic devotion of a democrat.

17
Judith Shklar, Legalism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 66.
35
Douglass’s Declaration: The Primacy of Individual Rights in His Thought
Douglass interpreted the American Founding as an essentially liberal moment
in human history and saw his project as an attempt to extend the liberal promises of
the Founding to all people. Throughout his writings, we find praise for the liberal
principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence. “The right of each man to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” Douglass said, “is the basis of all social
and political right.”
18
On another occasion, he told an audience “our Moses and our
prophets, so far as the rights and privileges of American citizens are concerned, are
the framers of the Declaration of Independence.” Douglass believed the natural
rights philosophy at the heart of the Declaration of Independence ought to be the
guiding compass of our political life.
Douglass argued that the movements for abolition and women’s rights were
heirs to the revolutionary ideology of natural rights expressed in the Declaration.
These principles, he contended, possess truth that transcends time and place.
The science of government has received no very great alteration, illustration
or illumination, since the signing of the Declaration of Independence by the
American people. We are not here now to force any new consideration upon
the public. We are especially proud to endeavor to carry out the great
fundamental principles of the American government – to carry out those great
truths long ago uttered by the Fathers of this Republic.
19

Douglass described his “mission” as an attempt “to hasten the day when the
principles of liberty and humanity expressed in the Declaration of Independence and
the constitution of the United States shall be the law and the practice of every

18
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:557.
19
Ibid., 3:91-2.
36
section, and of all the people of this great country without regard to race, sex, color,
or religion.”
20

Douglass embraced the traditional liberal triad of right to life, liberty, and
property as well as the related right to pursue happiness. The first right listed in the
traditional triad is the right to life. Douglass described the right to life as “the great
primary and most precious and comprehensive of all human rights.”
21
He said that
one “of the first features which mark the distinction between a civilized, and a rude
nation, is the value attached to human life, and the protection given it by the
former….”
22
The primary importance of the right to life is easy enough to explain.
If the right to life is not secure, then liberty and property cannot be enjoyed and
happiness cannot be pursued.
The second right in the liberal triad, the right to liberty, was crucially
important to Douglass. He claimed that the right to liberty is “self-evident” in the
sense that the “desire for it is the deepest and strongest of all powers of the human
soul.”
23
The right to liberty, Douglass believed, is rooted in the eternal and universal
nature of man.
It existed in the very idea of man’s creation. It was his even before he
comprehended it. He was created in it, endowed with it, and it can never be
taken from him. No laws, no statutes, no compacts, no covenants, no
compromises, no constitutions, can abrogate or destroy it. It is beyond the
reach of the strongest earthly arm, and smiles at the ravings of tyrants from
its hiding place in the bosom of God. Men may hinder its exercise – they

20
Ibid., 5:373.
21
Frederick Douglass, The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Philip S. Foner, ed. (New York:
International Publishers, 1950-1975), Volume 5, 418. [Cited hereinafter as: The Life and Writings of
Frederick Douglass, Volume Number: Page Number].
22
Ibid., 5:456.
23
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:261-2.
37
may act in disregard of it – they are even permitted to war against it; but they
fight against heaven, and their career must be short, for eternal providence
will speedily vindicate the right.
24

Douglass’s natural law justification for the right to liberty will be discussed at some
length in the next chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, what is important to note
is that the right to liberty was of the foremost importance in Douglass’s politics.
Douglass’s understanding of liberty is well within the liberal tradition. He
endorsed a view of the legitimate limitations on liberty that is almost identical to
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle.
All admit that the right to enjoy liberty depends upon the use made of that
liberty; hence Society has erected jails and prisons, with a view to deprive
men of their liberty when they are so wicked as to abuse it by invading the
liberties of their fellows. We have a right to arrest the locomotion of a man
who insists upon walking and trampling on his brother man, instead of upon
the highway. This right of society is essential to its preservations; without it
a single individual would have it in his power to destroy the peace and the
happiness of ten thousand otherwise right minded people.
25

Douglass, like Mill, suggested that the individual’s right to liberty ends where the
rights of others begin. Whereas Mill justified this view in the permanent interests of
man as a progressive being, Douglass relied on the idea that men are “free by the
laws of nature.”
26
Because freedom is rooted in the laws of nature, Douglass
thought, it is also limited by those laws. As such, he adopted a view reminiscent of
John Locke’s “fundamental law of nature,” which held that liberty is limited by the
lives, liberties, and possessions of others.
27

24
Ibid.
25
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:285.
26
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:317.
27
John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chapter 2, Section 6.
38
Douglass’s understanding of liberty is further illuminated by considering how
he related it to virtue. The traditional dichotomy between liberal and conservative
thinkers is on the precedence of liberty and virtue in their thought. Liberals believe
that the overriding aim of government is to secure the conditions necessary for the
exercise of liberty. Conservatives believe that the overriding aim of government is
to cultivate moral virtue. Douglass came down on the liberal side of this dispute.
Rather than agreeing with the conservative argument that the state should be
authorized to coerce moral behavior, he contended that freedom is a necessary pre-
condition for virtue and religious piety. When asked if money should be spent to
send slaves Bibles, Douglass responded: “The first thing is freedom. It is the all
important thing. There can be no virtue without freedom – there can be no
obedience to the Bible without freedom.”
28
Douglass repeated this argument in his
advocacy of women’s rights. Many anti-feminists defended the exclusion of women
from the public sphere by arguing that the denial of equal rights was necessary to
protect women from degradation.
[I]f seclusion and absence from contact with the outside world were the best
protection to womanly dignity, the harem would surpass the home. The
caged, veiled, and cushioned women of the East, never allowed to be seen by
the vulgar crowd, watched over by eyes as vigilant as the suspicions of
despotism, would furnish the highest example of refinement and virtue. But
such is not the case. Enforced morality is artificial morality. It is the safety
that never drowns because it never goes into the water, the virtue that never
falls because never tempted.
29

28
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:183.
29
Ibid., 5:257-8.
39
After extensive world travel during the late 1880s and witnessing the treatment of
women in Egypt, Douglass warned Americans not to “enforce this Mahometan idea
of woman upon American women – an idea in which woman has no recognized
moral, social, or religious existence…. She is deemed incapable of self-direction – a
body without a soul. No more distressing thing confronted us during our recent tour
in Egypt than this social and religious annihilation of woman.”
30
In short, Douglass
rejected the view that individual freedom ought to be constrained in the name of
virtue or religion. Instead, he argued that rather than being in tension with individual
freedom, authentic morality and religious piety require it. In sum, Douglass adopted
a classically liberal understanding of the right to liberty.
The last right in the liberal triad is the right to property. In the previous
section I noted the controversial status of this right within the liberal tradition.
Douglass’s ambivalence on the status of private property rights is a manifestation of
the complex relationship between property and freedom that has troubled numerous
thinkers within the liberal tradition. The key question for my purposes is this: did
Douglass’s attitude toward private property lead him to leave the liberal family and
embrace socialism? In what follows, I argue that Douglass expressed reservations
about the inequality that followed from the unregulated free market, but that he
rejected the socialist alternative that was adopted by some of his fellow abolitionists.
Douglass endorsed the right to private property. His justification of the right
to property is nearly identical to the views of John Locke: “The theory of property in

30
Ibid., 5:382.
40
the soil,” Douglass said, “runs thus: that man has a right to as much soil as is
necessary for his existence; and when a human being has incorporated a portion of
his own strength and that which belongs to his personality into that soil against the
universe.”
31
Like Locke, Douglass relied on his theory of self-ownership to argue
that individuals are entitled to the fruits of their own labor. Against this view,
Douglass was confronted with many utopian socialists within the anti-slavery
movement, but he consistently rejected their ideas. At a meeting of the Rhode Island
Anti-Slavery Society, a speaker attempted “to show that wages slavery is as bad as
chattel slavery” and Douglass responded by declaring this argument to be “arrant
nonsense” because to “own the soil is no harm in itself. It was given to man. It is
right that he should own it. It is his duty to possess it – and to possess it in that way
in which its energies and properties can be made the most useful to the human family
– now and always.”
32

Douglass’s embrace of the right to private property is evidence that he
rejected the utopian socialist alternative that was championed by some of his
abolitionist colleagues. During the nineteenth century, many activists in various
reform movements were attracted to the ideas of Charles Fourier. According to
historian Carl J. Guarneri, “Fourierism” – a utopian socialist doctrine offered by a
thinker who “rejected liberal capitalism at its takeoff point and championed in its
place his ‘New Industrial World’ of justice, harmony, and personal fulfillment” –

31
Ibid., 2:165. This similarity was recognized by Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “The Political Thought
of Frederick Douglass,” 55.
32
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:106.
41
was “the most popular and dynamic secular communitarianism of the nineteenth
century.”
33
American Fourierists proposed to “sidestep politics” by creating utopian
cooperative communities in which individuals would share all things in common.
These communities, or “phalanxes,” would evolve, Fourier said, toward “Harmony,”
which represents the “full maturity of the race.”
34

Several abolitionists accepted this condemnation of liberal capitalism and
argued that the battle against chattel slavery was too narrow. All forms of slavery,
including “wage slavery,” ought to be opposed as well. John A. Collins, who was a
close associate of Douglass during his first few years on the abolitionist lecture
circuit, was a prominent promoter of this view. Collins believed “that private
property was the root of all evil” and founded a utopian community, Skaneateles, in
Western New York.
35
Guarneri has demonstrated that there was a split within the
abolitionist movement between thinkers who “believed that northern free labor was
inherently sound and emphasized the opportunities and openness in American
society” and utopian socialists, who “insisted otherwise.”
36

Douglass’s embrace of the right to private property was not absolute and a
strong case can be made that he was closer to the reform liberal view described
earlier in the chapter than he was to the classical liberal view. He voiced his
concerns about early capitalism in an essay entitled “The Labor Question.” The
“labor question” was a term that was used as a catch-all for issues related to

33
Carl J. Guarneri, The Utopian Alternative: Fourierism in Nineteenth Century America, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994), 17, xii.
34
Ibid., 18.
35
Ibid., 255.
36
Ibid., 256.
42
economic justice. Prior to the publication of this important essay, Douglass had
expressed the view that although he was committed to the institution of private
property, “the mode of holding” property and “the amount held” were legitimate
political questions with respect to which “various opinions may be honestly
entertained.”
37
Unlike classical liberals committed to putting the right to property on
the same level of sanctity with the rights to life and liberty, Douglass believed it was
legitimate for the political community to consider the question, “What manner of
holding property in the soil is best, which best secures the happiness of the whole
human family?”
38

The essay on “The Labor Question” reveals Douglass’s discomfort with the
inequality within “our industrial civilization.”
The real object [in addressing the labor question] must necessarily be to
arrive at the principles that affect society in its relations to production, and
especially to comprehend those laws which govern the distribution of labor’s
results, and which, it must be apparent to the most superficial thinker, now
operate so unequally. The profound truth conveyed in the apparently
paradoxical utterance of Jesus, when he said, “That unto every one which
hath shall be given; and from him that hath not, even that he hath shall be
taken away from him,” receives daily and literal illustration in all the
operations of our industrial civilization. The non-producers now receive the
larger share of what those who labor produce. The result is natural.
Discontent culminates in exactly the same ratio that intelligence sustains
aspiration.
39

Douglass’s response to the labor question reveals that it would be a mistake to read
him as a liberal who was devoted to possessive individualism.

37
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:106.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
43
The question, whether civilization is designed primarily for Man or for
Property, can have but one direct answer, whatever may be the methods each
may think desirable by which to attain that end. The happiness of man must
be the primal condition on which any form of society can found a title to
existence. The civilization, then, looked at in its material aspect alone, which
on the one hand constantly increases its wealth-creating capacities and on the
other as steadily leaves out the benefits thereof to at least seven-tenths of all
who live within its influence, cannot have realized the fundamental condition
of its continuance. That society is a failure in which the large majority of its
members, without any direct fault of their own, would, if any accidental
circumstances deprived them for a month of the opportunity of earning
regular wages, be dependent upon private or public charity for daily bread.
Yet such is the actual condition of even favored American labor.
40

Although Douglass seemed to transcend the confines of classical liberalism in his
appreciation for the fundamental unfairness and legitimate discontent of the
burgeoning industrial capitalist system, he seemed to struggle when searching for
“equitable remedies.”
41
From the perspective of the Hartzian reading of American
political thought, this was probably rooted in an irrational devotion to liberal ideas.
It may be the case, however, that Douglass’s failure was due to a sincere
commitment to both liberty and equality. On the one hand, he was committed to the
institution of private property and the idea of free labor as pillars of individual
liberty. On the other hand, he was disturbed by the gross inequalities being produced
by “our industrial civilization.” I will return to Douglass’s proposals on how the
labor question ought to be addressed in Chapter 6. For now, it is important to note
that his concerns about economic inequality did not cause him to abandon the liberal
family’s devotion to individual rights to private property.

40
Ibid., 4:284.
41
Ibid.
44
Within the abolitionist movement there were those who looked at the “labor
question” and responded by rejecting private property and wage labor in favor of
common property and cooperative labor. The split between American Fouierists and
apologists for early liberal capitalism has been well documented.
42
Although it is
clear that Douglass had reservations about the material inequalities of early
capitalism, he defended the institution of private property and the “free labor” system
of the North rather than joining the socialists. His consistent defense of the
institution of private property and the idea of free labor is further evidence that he is
best understood as a member of the liberal family.
In this section, I have made the case that Douglass was devoted to the
traditional liberal triad of rights to life, liberty and property. Like others within the
liberal tradition, he believed the security of the right to life was a crucial foundation
for the exercise of other rights, the most important of which is the right to liberty,
which was the lodestar of Douglass’s thought. He accepted a traditional Lockean
justification for the right to private property. Although he expressed some concern
about the economic inequality of early capitalism, he did not abandon the liberal
family and embrace socialism at any point. In sum, Douglass’s devotion to
individual rights as “the basis of all social and political right” places him firmly
within the ideological tradition of liberalism.

42
See Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 57-76; Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998),
69-114; Carl J. Guarneri, The Utopian Alternative.
45
Conformity or Pluralism? Douglass on the Toleration of Diversity
Several prominent liberals including John Rawls and Judith Shklar have
made a compelling case that one of the core commitments of liberalism is to
toleration of moral and religious diversity. Shklar has pointed out that liberalism
was born in opposition to the cruelty of religious coercion and that, at least since
Mill, liberals have extended this logic to the moral sphere and been committed to the
view that “it is in diversity alone that freedom can be realized.”
43
Similarly, Rawls
made the case that moral and religious pluralism is a fact of social life and that one
can respond to this fact in one of two ways. First, there is the liberal response: to
tolerate this religious and moral pluralism. Second, there is the illiberal response: to
attempt to combat this pluralism and enforce religious and moral unanimity.
44
A
thinker’s response to the fact of pluralism is very telling.
So where does Douglass come down on the question of moral and religious
diversity? Did he adopt a liberal attitude or did he embrace an illiberal ideology of
agreement? There is little question that Douglass adopted a quintessentially liberal
attitude toward moral and religious pluralism. Far from being uncomfortable with
moral and religious disagreement, Douglass embraced disagreement as an essential
protector of personal freedom. In other words, he was much closer to Mill than he
was to Hobbes. In order to make this case, I will focus on two manifestations of this
commitment: his discussion of moral pluralism in the context of the debate over

43
Judith Shklar, Legalism, 5.
44
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 37.
46
women’s suffrage and his discussion of religious pluralism in the context of the
debate over Chinese immigration.
One of the arguments offered by those resistant to women’s suffrage was that
granting women the right to vote “will introduce strife and division into family” and,
therefore, “peace and tranquility will no longer dwell under the family roof.”
45
In his
response to this argument, Douglass went beyond the discussion immediately at hand
to draw lessons for society as a whole. He described the conservative view in this
way.
It is assumed that difference of opinion in the State may be more safely
tolerated than difference of opinion in the family, bound together by respect,
tenderness, and love, and therefore more able to sustain such difference. It
holds that in order to have peace and tranquility in the family, the woman, the
wife, the daughter, and the sister, must have no opinions of their own, or
must not be allowed to express such opinions if they have them; that they
must deny their intellect and conscience, and become moral, social, and
intellectual monstrosities, bodies without souls; in fact, like gods of the
heathen, have ears, and hear not; have eyes, and see not; and have tongues,
and speak not.
46

Douglass responded by saying that “a principle which requires such self-abnegation,
such stultification and self-abasement, cannot be sound, or other than absurd and
vicious.”
47
His response to this principle reveals much about his attitude toward
pluralism.
Douglass did not believe moral disagreement would lead to the “dire
consequences” predicted by conservatives.
48
“Husbands and wives,” he said, “differ
in opinion every day, about a variety of subjects, and yet dwell together in love and

45
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:260.
46
Ibid., 5:261.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
47
harmony. How insufferably flat, stale, and unprofitable is that family in which no
difference of opinion enters? Who on earth can want to spend his or her days as a
simple echo?”
49
Rather than leading to chaos, Douglass argued that disagreement
can lead to a discordant harmony.
A difference of opinion, like a discord in music, sometimes gives the highest
effects of harmony. A thousand times better is it to have a brave, outspoken
woman by one’s side, than a piece of mincing nothingness that is ashamed to
have an opinion. For myself, from what I know of the nature of human
understanding, I at once suspect the sincerity of the man or the woman who
never has an opinion in opposition to mine. Differing, as human minds do, in
all their processes and operations, such uniform agreement is unnatural, and
must be false, assumed, and dishonest. The fact is no family or State can rest
upon any foundation less than truth and honesty.
50

Douglass’s language anticipates Rawls’s idea of reasonable pluralism.
51
Like Rawls,
Douglass believed that the free exercise of human reason will not lead to universal
agreement. Instead, the free exercise of reason is likely to lead to a variety of moral
views. Douglass thought moral and religious disagreement should be accepted as a
fact of social life. Rather than being a cause for panic, he believed this fact should
be celebrated as a natural consequence of human freedom.
Douglass also adopted the tolerant attitude typical of liberalism when
confronted with the issue of religious pluralism. In a discussion of the place of
religion in public schools, Douglass embraced a strict separationist stand on church-
state relations: “my command to the church, and all denominations of the church
whether Catholic or Protestant is, hands off this Government. And my command to

49
Ibid.
50
Ibid. Italics mine.
51
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4.
48
the Government is hands off the church.”
52
In addition to this statement against
excessive entanglement between church and state, Douglass argued that it was a
“gross injustice” to compel a man to support a form of worship “in which he not only
feels no interest” or “which he really hates….”
53
Not only did Douglass believe in
religious toleration, but he celebrated religious pluralism. In his defense of the right
of Chinese people to immigrate to the United States, this view is evident.
Even the matter of religious liberty, which has cost the world more tears,
more blood and more agony, than any other interest, will be helped by [the
Chinese] presence. I know of no church, however tolerant; of no priesthood,
however enlightened, which could be safely trusted with the tremendous
power which universal conformity would confer. We should welcome all
men of every shade of religious opinion, as among the best means of checking
the arrogance and intolerance which are the almost inevitable concomitants
of general conformity. Religious liberty always flourishes best amid the
clash and competition of rival religious creeds.
54

Douglass welcomed the diversification of American religious life as a greater
safeguard for religious liberty. In language reminiscent of John Stuart Mill’s
celebration of diversity in On Liberty, Douglass welcomed the “clash and
competition” of moral and religious ideas as an essential part of a flourishing free
society.
In this section, I have argued that Douglass’s attitude toward moral and
religious pluralism provides further evidence of his membership in the liberal family.
He defended moral and religious freedom on both deontological and consequentialist

52
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:48. For more on this controversy, see William L.
Van Deburg, “Frederick Douglass: Maryland Slave to Religious Liberal,” in By These Hands: A
Documentary History of African American Humanism, Anthony B. Pinn, ed. (New York: New York
University Press, 2001), 92.
53
Ibid., 1:167-8.
54
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:258.
49
grounds. As a matter of principle, he adopted the liberal view that the right to liberty
includes the right to adopt moral and religious views according to the dictates of
one’s own conscience, not the heavy hand of the magistrate. As a matter of utility,
Douglass held that the clash and competition of rival moral and religious creeds
ought to be defended because it is among “the best means” to protect personal
freedom. In sum, Douglass’s embrace of toleration of moral and religious diversity
is an important indication that he is best understood as a member of the liberal
family.

Up from Anarchism: Douglass’s Defense of Limited Government
Earlier in the chapter, I noted that because of their devotion to personal
freedom it is typical of liberals to be drawn toward anarchism. What ultimately
makes a thinker liberal, however, is the fact that he ends up rejecting anarchism as
the best way to achieve the promise of personal freedom. Douglass was confronted
with the anarchist possibility and rejected it in favor of limited government. This
rejection of anarchism is yet another indication that Douglass ought to be grouped
with the liberal family.
Douglass began his pubic career as an associate of William Lloyd Garrison,
the most prominent abolitionist in the United States. Garrison was committed to
natural rights, but took this commitment to a radical level by embracing a utopian
anarchist view of human nature and social relations. Garrison’s case for anarchism
was remarkably simple.
50
Premise A: All use of force is unjust.
Premise B: All governments rely on the use of force.
Conclusion: All government is unjust.

Although there is little or no evidence to suggest Douglass ever embraced the
anarchist part of the Garrisonian program, he made his rejection of anarchism
explicit in an 1851 essay “Is Civil Government Right?” In this essay, he responded
to the Garrisonian anarchist Henry C. Wright, who criticized Douglass and other
abolitionists who were joining the Liberty Party, an antislavery political party
formed in the 1840s. According to Wright, all government is illegitimate: “To speak
of a righteous human ruler is the same as to speak of a righteous thief, a righteous
robber, a righteous murderer, a righteous pirate or a righteous slaveholder.”
55

Douglass and Wright agreed that the basic starting point for all questions of political
morality should be the natural rights of individuals, but they parted company on the
question of how best to secure those rights. The anarchist Wright believed natural
rights would be best served by the elimination of all government. The liberal
Douglass believed the dark side of human nature makes limited government
necessary to secure natural rights.
Wright was one of the most important anarchist thinkers in the abolitionist
movement. He disputed the idea “that man can have the right to dictate law to his
equal brother” and believed that government rules by force alone: “the government is
but an embodiment of death.”
56
Wright contended that all government violates
divine and natural law: “The history of all attempts of man to rule over man, to

55
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:208-9.
56
Henry C. Wright, “Anthropology,” (Boston: E. Seepard, 1850), 68-69.
51
dictate to him a rule of life, and to punish him if he disobeys, demonstrates that an
assumption of [government] power is opposed to nature and to natures God. They
have made earth a scene of blood and carnage.”
57
According to historian Lewis
Perry, abolitionist anarchists “insisted that they were striving for, and placing
themselves under, the only true and effective government: the government of God.”
Abolitionist anarchists believed they were the only ones offering a complete and
consistent philosophy of liberty: “Slavery, government and violence were considered
identical in principle: all were sinful invasions of God’s prerogatives; all tried to set
one man between another man and his rightful ruler.”
58

Douglass’s journey up from the anarchism of his Garrisonian associates
began with a fundamental disagreement about human nature. He believed human
beings to be naturally social and endowed with rational and moral capacities, but he
also thought that each of us is “constantly liable to do evil” and, perhaps of greater
concern, there are “hardened villains” among us who are willing to trample upon the
natural rights of others.
59
The liability within each of us to do evil is rooted in the
selfish, passionate, and willful side of human nature. We are willing to disregard the
rights of others, Douglass thought, when our moral judgment has been clouded by
selfishness. In addition to this natural tendency within human beings to disregard
their moral obligations to others, there are those who habitually disregard these
obligations. Douglass called individuals who continually or habitually violate the

57
Ibid., 69.
58
Lewis Perry, “Versions of Anarchism in the Antislavery Movement,” American Quarterly, Vol. 20,
No. 4 (1968), 770, 772.
59
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:212-3.
52
fundamental law of nature “hardened villains.” Because hardened villains ignore or
disregard their distinctively human capacities of reason and moral judgment,
Douglass called them “outcasts of humanity,” “monsters,” and “bloodhounds.”
60

The presence of these hardened villains and the potential for villainy within all of us
caused Douglass to reject as unrealistic the anarchist vision of harmonious life
without government.
Douglass’s primary concern was to see to it that the natural rights of all
individuals were respected. The existence of villainy in human nature made it
necessary to establish government to protect these rights. Douglass believed that
civil government was the solution to the problem of villainy in human nature. The
civility of government, he argued, is determined by its respect for and protection of
the natural rights of all individuals. According to Douglass, the flaw in the anarchist
argument was its failure to distinguish between righteous and unrighteous force. He
agreed with the anarchist contention that force wielded in violation of natural rights
is unjust. Force wielded in defense of natural rights, he thought, is morally
legitimate. This fundamental distinction allows us to distinguish between arbitrary
and righteous government. A government that violates or fails to protect natural
rights is “arbitrary, despotic, tyrannical, corrupt, unjust, [and] capricious.”
61
A civil
government, Douglass claimed, committed to “liberty, justice, and humanity” would
refrain from violating natural rights and would act to protect innocents from villains.

60
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:458, 2:286; The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:207.
61
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:209-10.
53
The fallacy and fatal error which form the basis of [anarchist] reasoning, are
the assumptions that human government is necessarily arbitrary and absolute;
and that there is no difference between a righteous and a wicked government.
Human government, from its very nature, is an organization, like every other
human institution, limited in its powers, and subject to the very wants of
human nature which call it into existence.
62

The legitimacy of government, Douglass argued, is contingent upon its respect and
protection of natural rights. Indeed, he believed that only civil government is
entitled to be called government at all: “Human government is for the protection of
human rights; and when human government destroys human rights, it ceases to be a
government, and becomes a foul and blasting conspiracy; and is entitled to no
respect whatever.”
63
Douglass argued that this view was shared by the “Fathers of
this Republic,” who “told us, and told a then listening world, that, according to their
sense of civil Government, fit for the name and fit to exist at all, should secure [the]
fundamental rights [to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness].”
64

The use of force by the government, according to Douglass, is legitimate if it
is used to protect the natural rights of individuals. Individuals have an obligation to
respect the rights of others and if they do not, the government has an obligation to
protect innocents. Douglass believed individuals and the government were morally
permitted to use force to defend rights.
65

This, then, is our reasoning: that when every avenue to the understanding and
heart of the oppressor is closed, when he is deaf to every moral appeal, and
rushes upon his fellow-man to gratify his own selfish propensities at the

62
Ibid., 5:210.
63
Ibid., 2:208.
64
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:223-4.
65
For Douglass’s views of capital punishment, see The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass,
5:218.
54
expense of the rights and liberties of his brother-man, the exercise of physical
force, sufficient to repel the aggression, is alike the right and duty.
66

“Common sense,” Douglass wrote, teaches “that physical resistance is the antidote
for physical resistance.”
67
When “government fails to protect the just rights of an
individual man, either he or his friends may be held in the sight of God and man,
innocent, in exercising any right for his preservation which society may exercise for
its preservation.”
68
Like his liberal predecessor Locke, though, Douglass believed
effective civil government was preferable to the use of private violence in defense of
natural rights: “The true object for which governments are ordained among men is to
protect the weak against the encroachments of the strong, to hold its strong arm of
justice over all the civil relations of its citizens and to see that all have an equal
chance in the race of life.”
69

In typical liberal fashion, then, Douglass viewed government as a necessary
evil.
Because there are hardened villains, enemies to themselves and to the well-
being of society, who will cheat, steal, rob, burn and murder their fellow
creatures, and because these are the exceptions to the mass of humanity,
society has the right to protect itself against their depredations and
aggressions upon the common weal. Society without law, is society with a
curse, driving men into isolation and depriving them of one of the greatest
blessings of which man is susceptible. It is no answer to this to say that if all
men would obey the laws of God, lead virtuous lives, do by others as they
would be done unto, human government would be unnecessary; for it is
enough to know, as Mr. Wright declares, that ‘there are no crimes which man
may not and will not perpetrate against his fellowman,’ to justify society in

66
Ibid., 5:213-4.
67
Ibid., 214.
68
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:286-7.
69
Ibid., 5:369.
55
resorting to force, as a means of protecting itself from crime and its
consequences.
70

Douglass shared the anarchist love of freedom but doubted the anarchist faith in
human nature. If men were always moved by the conscientious side of human
nature, no government would be necessary. Alas, Douglass believed, nature has
“two voices” and the voice of evil in human nature makes anarchism an unattractive
option.
It is important to note that just as Douglass’s partial distrust of human nature
led him to be suspicious of anarchism it led him also to be suspicious of government
power. The Liberty Party program, he reminded his anarchist critics, rejected the
absolutist idea that governmental power ought to be “unlimited and unrestricted” in
favor of the liberal idea that government ought to be granted “limited and restricted
power.”
71
The power of government, Douglass argued, ought to be limited to the
ends for which it was created: “the Liberty Party concedes no governmental
authority to pass laws, nor to compel obedience to any laws against the natural rights
and happiness of man.”
72

Douglass’s attitude toward government, then, is best described as one of
qualified or conditional acceptance. If the Constitution is against the natural rights of
man, then its subversion is justified. This is the view that animated Douglass during
his time as a Garrisonian abolitionist when he rejected the Constitution as proslavery
and called for its overthrow. In the early 1850s, when Douglass changed his view of

70
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:212-3.
71
Ibid., 5:211-2.
72
Ibid., 5:212.
56
the Constitution, he said, “My position is now one of reform, not of revolution.”
73

Once he viewed the Constitution as fundamentally antislavery, he still held that
obedience to individual laws was contingent on their respect for natural rights. In
1854, for example, after Douglass argued that the Fugitive Slave Law ought to be
actively resisted by Northerners, the Rochester American newspaper criticized him
for advocating “revolution.” In response, Douglass wrote: “So, however, we do not
regard it. Revolution implies a subversion of the Government; this is a simple
resistance to the enforcement of one enactment, standing alone.”
74
Douglass’s
changing attitude toward the Constitution and his contention that unjust laws should
not be obeyed (and that they should be actively opposed) are indications that he
viewed all matters of political morality through the lens of natural rights philosophy.
It was for this reason that he endorsed limited government against the anarchists but
qualified that support against conservatives who believed even unjust laws ought to
be obeyed.
Douglass’s rejection of anarchism was rooted in the dark side of his dualistic
view of human nature. He recognized that all human beings have the capacity for
evil and, as such, limited government is necessary to secure natural rights. “With all
the drawbacks upon government which fancy can depict, or imagination conjure up,
society possessing it, is a paradise to pandemonium, compared with society without
it.”
75
Douglass’s belief that limited government is preferable to anarchy is yet

73
Ibid., 2:480.
74
Ibid., 5:328.
75
Ibid., 5:212.
57
another indication that he is best understood as a liberal political thinker. While
Douglass’s distrust of human nature committed him to the view that civil
government was necessary, his faith in human nature led him to believe that the form
of that government ought to be democratic. It is to Douglass’s embrace of
democracy that we now turn.

Douglass’s Embrace of Democracy
Douglass was a liberal democrat. As noted above, the relationship between
liberalism and democracy is a close one, but it is not without its quarrels. Although
liberalism and democracy are in many ways mutually supportive, Wolin is right to
say that there is a fundamental divide between liberals, who prize individual liberty
above all else, and democrats, who prize collective self-government above all else.
It is possible to be a democrat without being a liberal or to be a liberal without being
a democrat. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the nature of Douglass’s
commitment to democracy. In this section, I argue that he tried to reconcile his
commitments to liberty and democracy but his priorities are revealed by the fact that
he put his strongest emphasis on defending liberal values. In short, Douglass’s
attitude toward democracy is consistent with the liberal attitude described above and,
therefore, it is another indication that he should be identified as a member of the
liberal family.
In the last section, I described how Douglass’s distrust of the selfish side of
human nature led him to believe government was necessary. Interestingly, it was
58
Douglass’s faith in the goodness of human nature that led him to endorse democracy
as the best form of government.
Why is this respect to be shown to the majority? Simply because a majority
of human hearts and intellects may be presumed, as a general rule, to take a
wiser and more comprehensive view of the matters upon which they act than
the minority. It is in accordance with the doctrine that good is the rule, and
evil the exception in the character and constitution of man. If the fact were
otherwise, (that is, if men were more disposed to evil than to good), it would,
indeed, be dangerous for men to enter into a compact, by which power should
be wielded by the mass, for then evil being predominant in man, would
predominate in the mass, and innumerable hardships would be inflicted upon
the good.
76

One might wonder whether or not the suspicious side of Douglass highlighted in the
last section can be squared with the trusting side of Douglass being explored here. It
is important to note that Douglass did not lose sight of the fact that the dark side of
human nature would be entering the democratic arena, but he did believe hardened
villains were the “exceptions to the mass of humanity” and he declared himself to be
“such a believer in the preponderating good in human nature that I believe that all the
bad can be trusted with all of the good.”
77

Douglass embraced democracy as a better form of government than
monarchy or oligarchy. These other forms of government rely on dark views of
human nature to make the case for despotic rule.
The old assertion of the wickedness of the masses, and their consequent
unfitness to govern themselves, is the falsehood and corruption out of which
have sprung despotic and tyrannical conspiracies, calling themselves
governments, in the old world. They are founded not in the aggregate
morality and intelligence of the people, but in a fancied divine authority,

76
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:210-1.
77
Ibid., 5:212-3; The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:396.
59
resulting from the inherent incompetency [sic] of the people to direct their
own temporal concerns.
78

Douglass rejected the premise relied upon by the despots and tyrants of the old
world. He acknowledged that “if human nature is totally depraved, if men and
women are incapable of thinking or doing anything but evil and that continually,”
then we “should abandon our Republican government, cease to elect men to office,
and place ourselves squarely under the Czar of Russia, the Pope of Rome, or some
other potentate who governs by divine right.”
79
Douglass did not accept this view.
Instead, he believed “human nature is more virtuous than vicious” and “governments
are best supported by the largest measure of virtue within reach.”
80
Therefore, he
concluded, it is safer to place the power of government in the hands of the people
than in the hands of one man.
Douglass also rejected the notion that aristocracy is the best form of
government. In an 1871 essay, “Is Politics an Evil to the Negro?” he rejected the
view that all benefit from the rule of an elite group.
The standing objection to American institutions, and to free institutions
generally, is that they tend to retard industry and endanger public order and
safety by drawing the laboring classes away from quiet and useful
occupations to mingle in the whirl and excitement of political agitations,
where their passions are enflamed and their respect for the majesty of law is
undermined. For ourselves, it is scarcely necessary to say that we are
opposed to all aristocracy, whether of wealth, power, or learning. The beauty
and perfection of government in our eyes will be attained when all the people
under it, men and women, black and white, shall be conceded the right of
equal participation in wielding its power and enjoying its benefits. Equality
is even a more important word with us than liberty.
81

78
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:210-1.
79
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:387.
80
Ibid.
81
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:271-2.
60

Prior to the Civil War, Douglass’s priority was securing liberty for the millions of
enslaved men and women in the United States. After the Civil War, Douglass
believed the only way to secure that liberty was by securing equal rights, including
the right to participate in self-government.
Douglass grounded his argument for the right of the people to govern
themselves in his theory of human nature. Human beings, he argued, are endowed
with the capacities necessary for self-government. In a speech advocating extension
of the right of suffrage to women, Douglass pointed to several universal
characteristics of human nature to make his case.
The question which should be put to every man and which every man should
put to himself is, Who and what is woman? Is there really anything in her
nature and constitution which necessarily unfits her for the exercise of
suffrage? Is she a rational being? Has she knowledge of right and wrong?
Can she discern good and evil? Is she a legitimate subject of government? Is
she capable of forming an intelligent opinion of public men and public
measures? Has she a will as well as a mind? Is she able to express her
thought and opinions by words and acts? As a member of society and a
citizen of the State, has she interests like those of men, which may be
promoted or hindered, created or destroyed, by the legislative and judicial
action of the Government?
82

Douglass believed the right to govern ourselves collectively is grounded in the same
characteristics of human nature that make us fit to govern ourselves individually:
rationality, moral judgment, free will, intelligence, the ability to communicate with
others, and the possession of individual interests.
Douglass’s understanding of the right to participate in self-government, like
his view of natural rights, was universal; no one was excluded. He distinguished

82
Ibid., 5:253.
61
between “bastard republicanism,” which is republicanism that excludes individuals
on the basis of arbitrary characteristics such as gender, race, or religion, and
“genuine republicanism,” which promises equal rights and imposes equal
responsibilities upon all people.
83
Douglass laid out his vision of genuine democratic
republicanism after the Civil War.
I am here tonight as a democrat, a genuine democrat dyed in the wool. I am
here to advocate a genuine democratic republic; to make this a republican
form of government, purely a republic, a genuine republic; free it from
everything that looks toward monarchy; eliminate all foreign elements, all
alien elements from it; blot out from it everything antagonistic of
republicanism declared by the fathers – that idea was that all governments
derived their first powers form the consent of the governed; make it a
government of the people, by the people, and for all the people, each for all
and all for each; blot out all discriminations against any person, theoretically
or practically, and make it conform to the great truths laid down by the
fathers; keep no man from the ballot box or jury box or the cartridge box
because of his color – exclude no woman from the ballot because of her sex.
Let the government of the country rest securely down upon the shoulders of
the whole nation; let there be no shoulder that does not bear up its proportion
of the burdens of government. Let there [be] no conscience, no intellect in
the land not directly responsible for the moral character of the government –
for the honor of the government. Let it be a genuine Republic, in which
every man subject to it is represented in it, and I see no reason why a
Republic may not stand while the world stands.
84

Just as Douglass believed only a government that protected human rights was worthy
of being called a government, he argued that only a republic that recognizes the
equality before the law of all people is worthy of being called republican. The use of
the terms “bastard” and “genuine” was no mistake. Douglass believed republicanism
that included everyone was genuine in the sense that it is grounded in the true
foundation of universal human nature. Non-egalitarian republicanism, on the other

83
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1:81; 2:63.
84
Ibid., 4:158.
62
hand, is bastardized in the sense that it is disconnected from its roots in universal
human equality.
Douglass’s views of human nature, the right to liberty and the right to vote
were intimately connected to one another. In an 1870 essay on “Woman and the
Ballot,” Douglass explained this connection.
The grand idea of American liberty is coupled with that of universal suffrage;
and universal suffrage is suggested and asserted by universal intelligence.
Without the latter the former falls to the ground; and unless suffrage is made
co-extensive with intelligence something of the natural power of society
essential to its guidance and well-being is lost. To deny that woman is
capable of forming an intelligent judgment concerning public men and public
measures, equally with men, does not meet the case; for, even if it were
granted, the fact remains the same that women, equally with men, possesses
such intelligence; and that such as it is, and because it is such as it is, woman,
in her own proper person, has a right for herself to make it effective. To
deprive her of this right is to deprive her of a part of her natural dignity, and
the State of a part of its mental power of direction, prosperity, and safety; and
thus a double wrong is perpetrated.
85

Douglass grounded the right to vote, then, in both deontological and consequentialist
reasons. First, as a matter of principle, he claimed it is a violation of the natural
dignity of women to exclude them from equal citizenship. This exclusion does
“positive injury” to women because it is a denial of their humanity.
86
Second, the
exclusion of women is harmful to society as a whole because they are unable to
include their wisdom and virtue in the process of self-government and, hence,
contribute to the common good.
Although Douglass was a fervent advocate of universal suffrage and genuine
republicanism, he was not a thinker who embraced romantic conceptions of political

85
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:236.
86
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:262.
63
participation associated with the radical democratic tradition. Unlike the thinkers
within that tradition, who are drawn to the nobility of political participation,
Douglass emphasized the idea that political participation is necessary as a means of
self-protection. After the Civil War, when giving a speech on black suffrage,
Douglass said: “To the race to which I belong the ballot means something more than
a mere abstract idea. It means the right to live and protect itself by honest
industry.”
87
In a speech on women’s suffrage, he made a similar point, but added a
nod to the republican notion of civic virtue: “She needs the ballot for her own
protection, and men as well as women need its concession to her for the protection of
the whole.”
88
Douglass’s reference to the “protection of the whole” is related to his
belief that the infusion of the wisdom and virtue of women into the political sphere
would be beneficial to all. His argument for the ballot as a means of self-protection
is a manifestation of his persistent fear of the potential for villainy in human nature.
He believed universal suffrage was a necessary and important step toward making
democracy safe for minorities: “I believe majorities can be despotic and have been
arbitrary, but arbitrary to whom? Arbitrary when arbitrary at all, always to
unrepresented classes. What is the remedy? A consistent republic in which there
shall be no unrepresented classes. For when all classes are represented the rights of
all classes will be respected.”
89

87
Ibid., 4:175.
88
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:238.
89
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:165.
64
Like so many other aspects of his political thought, Douglass’s chastened
view of democracy was grounded in personal experience.
I, myself, once had some high notions about this body politic and its high
requirements, and the kind of men fit to enter it and share its privileges. But
a day’s experience at the polls convinced me that the ‘body politic’ is not
more immaculate than many other bodies. That in fact it is a very mixed
affair. I saw ignorance enter, unable to read the vote cast. I saw the
convicted swindler enter and deposit his vote. I saw the gambler, the horse
jockey, the pugilist, the miserable drunkard just lifted from the gutter,
covered with filth, enter and deposit his vote. I saw Pat, fresh from the
Emerald Isle, requiring two sober men to keep him on his legs, enter and
deposit his vote for the Democratic candidate amid the loud hurrahs of his
fellow-citizens. The sight of these things went far to moderate my ideas
about the character of what is called the body politic, and convinced me that
it could not suffer in its composition even should it admit a few sober,
industrious and intelligent colored voters.
90

Douglass’s “sober” assessment of the body politic combined with his view of voting
as a means of self-protection undermine characterizations of his thought as civic
humanist or classical republican.
91
Douglass’s view of the political realm was much
closer to liberalism. He believed individuals engage in political conduct with enough
reason, sociality, conscience and moral judgment to make them worthy of governing
their own affairs, but that they also enter the political sphere with passion,
selfishness, and potential for villainy so we should not expect the process of self-
governance to be particularly virtuous.
In the end, Douglass relied on the language of power, not virtue, to ground
the right to participate in collective self-government.

90
Ibid., 3:579.
91
Daniel McInerney, The Fortunate Heirs of Freedom: Abolition and Republican Thought, (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
65
Power is the highest object of human respect. Wisdom, virtue, and all great
moral qualities command respect only as powers. Knowledge and wealth are
nought [sic] but powers. Take from money its purchasing powers, and it
ceases to be the same object of respect. We pity the impotent and respect the
powerful everywhere. To deny woman her vote is to abridge her natural and
social power, and deprive her of a certain measure of respect…. We despise
the weak and respect the strong. Such is human nature. Woman herself loses
in her own estimation by her enforced exclusion from the elective franchise
just as slaves doubted their own fitness for freedom, from the fact of being
looked upon as only fit for slaves. While, of course, woman has not fallen so
low as the slave in the scale of being, (her education and her natural relation
to the ruling power rendering such degradation impossible,) it is plain that,
with the ballot in her hand, she will ascend a higher elevation in her own
thoughts, and even in the thoughts of men, than without that symbol of
power. She has power now – mental and moral power – but they are fettered.
Nobody is afraid of a chained lion or an empty gun.
92

In Judith Shklar’s words, Douglass viewed the right to vote as being essential to the
individual’s “standing” as an American citizen.
93
To deny an individual the basic
rights of citizenship is to deny her a modicum of power and, as such, to deny her a
fundamental pillar of respect.
Douglass’s attitude toward democracy is best understood through the lens of
his natural rights philosophy. Just as he did not adopt romantic views of the
democratic process, he was careful to point out that he believed the scope of that
process was limited by the natural rights of individuals. He differentiated his view
from advocates of “popular sovereignty” like Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas.
The issue of slavery in the territories, Senator Douglas argued, ought to be resolved
by popular vote in those territories. Douglass refused to accept that individuals can

92
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:237-8.
93
Judith Shklar, American Citizenship, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
66
be deprived of their natural rights “by a simple vote.”
94
Douglass traveled to Illinois
to deliver a speech on his “namesake” and asked: “What is meant by Popular
Sovereignty?” According to his understanding, “It is the right of the people to
establish a government for themselves, as against all others. Such was its meaning in
the days of the revolution. It is the independent right of the people to make their
own laws, without dictation or interference from any quarter.”
95
Senator Douglas’s
theory of popular sovereignty, Douglass argued, takes this idea in another direction:
“The only shadow of popular sovereignty is the power to give people of the
territories by this bill to have, hold, buy and sell human beings. The sovereign right
to make slaves of their fellow-men if they choose is the only sovereignty that the bill
secures.”
96
Douglass wondered how the Senator from Illinois could justify this view
philosophically: “Whence does popular sovereignty take rise? What and where is its
basis? I should really like to hear from the author of the Nebraska bill, a
philosophical theory, of the nature and origin of popular sovereignty. I wonder
where he would begin, how he would proceed and where he would end.”
97

Douglass argued that the theory of popular sovereignty endorsed by Senator
Douglas and others was unintelligible because it violated the moral foundation of
democratic self-governance – the principle of universal human equality.
The only intelligible principle on which popular sovereignty is founded, is
found in the Declaration of Independence, there and in these words: We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal and are endowed
by their Creator with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness….

94
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:288-9.
95
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:556.
96
Ibid., 2:557.
97
Ibid.
67
The right of each man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, is the basis
of all social and political right, and, therefore, how brass-fronted and
shameless is that impudence, which while it aims to rob men of their liberty,
and to deprive them of the right of the pursuit of happiness – screams itself
hoarse to the words of popular sovereignty.
98

For Douglass, popular sovereignty was justified as the best way to secure natural
rights. Like human government itself, popular sovereignty was only legitimate
insofar as it served this supreme end. Senator Douglas’s theory, then, turned popular
sovereignty against its own foundation; it empowered some of the people to trample
on the rights of others, if they so chose.
By a peculiar use of words, he confounds power with right in such a manner
as to make the power to do wrong the right to do wrong. By his notion of
human rights, everything depends upon the majority. It is not a bit more
absurd and monstrous to say that the first settlers in a Territory have the right
to protect murder, than that they have the right to protect slavery. The right
to do the one is just as good as the right to do the other. The right of the
slaveholder is precisely the right of the highway robber. The one says your
money or your life, and the other says your liberty or your life, and both
depend on superior force for their existence.
99

According to Douglass’s way of thinking, all human institutions are to be judged
according to their impact on the natural rights of individuals. Democracy is the best
form of government, he thought, because it is the most consistent with the rights and
capacities of human beings. Senator Douglas’s understanding of democracy lacks
this moral foundation in universal human equality and natural rights. As a result, it
amounts to little more than a democratic version of might makes right.
A brief word must be said on how Douglass thought a balance should be
struck between the will of the democratic majority and the rights of minorities. As a

98
Ibid., 557-8.
99
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:516. Italics in original.
68
general matter, Douglass believed that constitutions should be established “defining
the powers of government” and specifying the rights of individuals. Without a
constitution, Douglass argued, “government is nothing better than a lawless mob.”
100

Constitutions ought to be crafted in a way that appreciates both good and bad human
beings will have access to political power: “we ought to have our government so
shaped that even when in the hands of a bad man we shall be safe.”
101
The
constitution, he thought, should only empower government to pass laws consistent
with the natural rights of individuals: it should concede “no governmental authority
to pass laws, nor to compel obedience to any laws, against the natural rights and
happiness of man.”
102
Once rights are articulated in a constitution or subordinate
laws, Douglass contended, they must be backed up by civil government: “Pen, ink,
and paper liberty are excellent when there is a party behind it to respect and secure
its enjoyment. Human laws are not self executing. To be of any service they must
be made vital, active, and certain.”
103

Douglass’s marriage to democracy was monogamous, faithful and
permanent, but it was not entirely romantic. He viewed democracy as the best form
of government for the security of individual freedom, but his fear of majority tyranny
led him to view democratic governance as a complement to, rather than a
replacement of, his devotion to individual rights. Like others within the liberal
family, Douglass offered “two cheers for democracy.” He viewed democracy as

100
Ibid., 1:375.
101
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:167.
102
Ibid., 5:210-11.
103
Ibid., 4:255.
69
freedom’s best hope and a potential threat at the same time. This half-hearted
embrace has all the markings of a liberal democrat.

IV. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Douglass is best understood as a
member of the liberal family. He believed the individual rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit happiness are the “basis of all social and political right,” moral and
religious diversity ought to be embraced, limited government is necessary to secure
individual rights, and the best form of government is democratic. Demonstration of
this thesis is a necessary foundational step, but it is, in a sense, the least interesting
part of this project. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, most of the previous explorations
of Douglass’s thought have concluded that he was a liberal. What is more
remarkable is the way he grounded his liberalism as well as why and how he infused
it with a moral vocabulary of community and civic responsibility. It is to these
matters that we now turn.
70

Chapter 3
“Every Man is Himself and Belongs to Himself”:
Slavery & Self-Ownership as the Foundations of Douglass’s Liberalism

I. Introduction
My aim in this dissertation is to explain why and how Frederick Douglass
offered a political vision that infused the liberal language of liberty and individual
rights with a moral vocabulary of social unity and civic responsibility. In Chapter 2,
I made the case that Douglass’s politics were essentially liberal: he was committed to
individual rights, toleration, and limited, democratic government. In this chapter, I
show how Douglass grounded these liberal commitments. Both this chapter and the
next are concerned with “why” questions: in this chapter, I explore why Douglass
was a liberal and in the next I explain why he brought the idea of civic responsibility
into the heart of his liberalism. My contention in both chapters is that Douglass’s
civic liberal politics were profoundly impacted by the experience of slavery; both his
personal experience as a chattel slave and his reflections on the national problem of
slavery. In this chapter, I show how he drew on the experience of slavery to ground
his liberal commitments. I argue that slavery was the summum malum of Douglass’s
thought and that his hatred of the institution served as the foundation for the first
imperative of his political morality: each person’s right to self-ownership ought to be
respected and protected. My aim is to show how Douglass drew on the experience
of slavery to ground self-ownership, an idea he believed to be the “post in the center
71
of all other rights” including the rights to life, liberty, property and equal
citizenship.
1

I have several aims in this chapter. First, I want to show how Douglass
grounded his liberal politics. I argue that he rooted his politics in the idea of self-
ownership, which he believed provides the physical and metaphysical freedom
necessary to pursue “all that makes life worth living”: love, friendship, intellectual
development, moral excellence, spiritual striving, and material comfort. Second, I
want to show why Douglass grounded his liberalism in this way. I contend that his
case for self-ownership is rooted in the “negative” claim that slavery is morally
wrong as well as the “positive” claim that personal freedom is morally good.
2
Third,
I will make the case that Douglass’s formulation of the idea of self-ownership is
different from other liberal thinkers. Unlike John Locke and Robert Nozick, for
example, Douglass formulated self-ownership in the shadow of slavery, a fact that
gives his argument different emphases and, I contend, makes his formulation less
susceptible to common criticisms of the versions offered by other thinkers. I
conclude this chapter by suggesting that the foundations of Douglass’s liberalism
provide the basis for the civic philosophy explored in the next three chapters. The
experience of slavery animated his intense devotion to the idea of self-ownership
while at the same time causing him to view the achievement and maintenance of

1
Douglass attributed this description of self-ownership to the abolitionist minister Theodore Dwight
Weld, see The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:462-3.
2
For a fabulous discussion of the importance of “negative” foundations in political theory, see
Jonathan Allen, “The Place of Negative Morality in Political Theory,” Political Theory, Vol. 29, No.
3, (June 2001), 337.
72
universal freedom as a common project that requires a strong sense of
interconnection and mutual responsibility.
This chapter and the next are grounded in a fundamental claim about political
theory: in some cases, understanding the experiences of the theorist can provide us
with some insight into the foundations of their thought. Before proceeding, a brief
word must be said in defense of this view. I think Sheldon Wolin was correct when
he wrote, “A philosopher’s thought is influenced to a great extent by the problems
agitating his society.”
3
We should remember that Thomas Hobbes wrote Leviathan
in the context of the turmoil of seventeenth century England and John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty was written amidst the stifling moral rhetoric of Victorian England. One
might take Wolin’s insight a step further and say that the philosopher’s thought is
often influenced by the extent to which social problems impact him personally. It is
often pointed out, for example, that Mill’s case against social conformity was, at
least in part, inspired by the experience of his controversial relationship with Harriet
Taylor.
In the case of Douglass, there can be little doubt about the personal and
contextual factors that animated his thought. He was born into slavery and, after
escaping, spent the rest of his life agitating on behalf of equal rights for all people. It
is fair to say that Douglass spent most of his life outside and at the margins of
American citizenship. His understanding of the promises and shortcomings of
liberalism was rooted in this outsider status. Douglass’s account has particular moral

3
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1960), 22.
73
force because it is grounded not only in his personal experience but in the nation’s
experience. Slavery and its aftermath were the major moral and political problems at
the center of American life during Douglass’s career. This is important because the
problem of slavery led to a national crisis that compelled political thinkers and actors
to grapple with first principles. The Civil War was a moment of great destruction
and, at the same time, great possibility. As Wolin has pointed out, during periods of
turmoil the “range of possibilities appears infinite, for now the political philosopher
is not confined to criticism and interpretation; he must reconstruct a shattered world
of meanings and their accompanying institutional expressions; he must, in short,
fashion a political cosmos out of political chaos.”
4
In 1864, Douglass captured the
essence of Wolin’s insight when he identified the Civil War as a moment of re-
founding: “The public mind is now everywhere grappling with fundamental
principles. We are looking for solid rock, upon which to rest the foundation of the
state…. Four years of war arising out of old political and moral errors, must induce
[citizens] to inquire diligently for the true path to permanent peace and prosperity.”
5

In sum, it was in the context of the personal and national experience of slavery that
Douglass developed his understanding of the moral foundations of liberalism.
In this chapter, I retrace Douglass’s intellectual journey that took place after
he made the physical journey from slavery to freedom. I begin, as he did, with the
experience of slavery. In Part II, I examine his definition of slavery, what he
believed to be its origins in human selfishness, and explain why he thought the

4
Ibid., 8.
5
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:49.
74
institution was so cruel. In Part III, I reconstruct Douglass’s case for self-ownership,
which he believed was the foundation for individual rights to life, liberty, property
and equal citizenship. I demonstrate that although his philosophy of natural rights is
similar to his liberal predecessors he separates himself by offering an understanding
self-ownership that is deeply moralistic and comprehensive. In Part IV, I conclude
with some reflections on the significance of the moral foundations of Douglass’s
liberalism and its relationship to his philosophy of civic responsibility. I argue that
his “imaginative recovery” of previously articulated ideas is an important
contribution to the liberal tradition and that the morally robust foundation of his
liberalism is intimately connected to the civic philosophy explored in later chapters.

II. “The Greatest Injury This Side of Death”: Douglass’s Summum Malum
Political theorist Sharon Krause has written that behind every “political
theory stands a summum malum, the one thing in political life its author most fears or
despises.”
6
There is little question about the summum malum in the political thought
of Frederick Douglass. “The greatest injury this side of death,” he wrote, “which one
human being can inflict on another, is to enslave him….”
7
Because Douglass
formulated his understanding of self-ownership and other natural rights in the
shadow of his experience as a slave, it is appropriate to begin this chapter with an
examination of his reflections on the institution of slavery. I argue that Douglass’s
reflections on the meaning, causes, and cruelties of slavery provide the “negative

6
Sharon Krause, Liberalism with Honor, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), ix.
7
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:348.
75
foundation” of his thought.
8
The condition of slavery was the negative foundation of
his thought in the sense that it was the thing he most feared and despised. In this
part, I provide a detailed account of Douglass’s reflections on the meaning of
slavery, the root of slavery in human selfishness, and the nature of slavery’s
cruelties.

What is Slavery?
Douglass defined slavery as “one man claiming and exercising an
uncontrolled right over the body and soul of another.”
9
On another occasion he
defined it as the “granting of that power by which one man exercises and enforces a
right of property in the body and soul of another.”
10
There are many important ideas
packed into these short definitions. First, slavery is a system in which one person
claims to have a property right in another. Douglass compared the nature of this
rights claim to the status of property rights in livestock.
[This is the] condition of a slave at the will and caprice of the master who
claims him to be his property; he is spoken of, thought of, and treated as
property. His own good, his conscience, his intellect, his affections are all set
aside by the master. He is as much a piece of property as a horse. If he is
fed, he is fed because he is property. If he is clothed, it is with a view to the
increase of his value as property.
11

8
For a discussion of “negative foundations” in political theory, see Jonathan Allen, “The Place of
Negative Morality in Political Theory,” Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June, 2001), 338.
9
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:528.
10
Ibid., 1:273.
11
Ibid., 1:273.
76
The transformation of free man into slave is constituted by the individual “losing his
manhood and being converted into a merchantable commodity….”
12
Elsewhere,
Douglass said, “The first work of slavery is to mar and deface those characteristics of
its victims which distinguish men from things, and persons from property.”
13
The
first part of Douglass’s definition of slavery, then, is the idea that it is a system that
treats persons as if they were property.
Second, it is worth noting the unlimited nature of the enslaver’s claim.
According to Douglass, the relationship between master and slave knows no law
higher than the will of the master. “The law,” Douglass said, “gives the master
absolute power over the slave. He may work him, flog him, hire him out, sell him,
and, in certain contingencies, kill him, with perfect impunity.”
14
The absolute nature
of the master’s right over the slave is the reason Douglass rejected defining slavery
as “a system whereby a man is compelled to work.”
15
The point is not that the slave
is compelled to work, but rather that the “law of slavery” says that the slave can be
compelled to do anything the master wishes.
Third, the claim of the master is to both body and soul. Not only is the slave
denied the physical rights of bodily integrity and locomotion, but he is denied rights
of mind and soul such as the freedom to pursue an education and worship God
according to the dictates of his conscience. This fact of slavery follows from the
absolute nature of the master’s claim over the slave. Although the acceptability of

12
Ibid., 2:258.
13
Ibid., 2:255.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., 1:183.
77
baptism and religious instruction for slaves underwent some “liberalization” over the
course of history, the will of the master was always the ultimate arbiter of these
matters.
It is worthwhile to point out some of the things that did not qualify as slavery
in Douglass’s mind. During the 1840s, he lectured a great deal on the meaning of
slavery. Douglass thought it was necessary to provide a precise definition of the
institution because there seemed “to be a great want of information regarding it” and
it bothered him when the term was used in ways that deviated from its “real and
intrinsic meaning.”
16
The misuse of the term was problematic, Douglass argued,
because it diluted its rhetorical power. The relationship of slave to master, he
contended, was unlike any other human relationship and for this reason Douglass
thought use of the term slavery to describe other phenomenon was “an awful
misnomer.”
17

No term is more abused, or misapplied, than that of Slavery. It is frequently
connected with drunkenness, hard-working, legal disabilities, and many other
things. Men are said to be slaves of their propensities, passions, or of
circumstances; but none of those are applicable to slavery in the strict sense
in which [I] would bring it before [you].
18

The four “misapplications” of slavery discussed by Douglass most frequently are the
use of “slavery” to describe hard work, the deprivation of a particular political right
or privilege (such as the right to vote), poverty, and intemperance.

16
The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One: Speeches, Debates, and Interviews, 5 Volumes, John
W. Blassingame, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 1:183. Ibid., 1:39.
17
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1:183-4.
18
Ibid., 2:528.
78
Although it is natural to associate the idea of hard work with the condition of
slavery, it is not hard work itself that constitutes slavery. Difficult physical labor
was a central part of the lives of most slaves, but Douglass thought it was crucial to
point out that hard labor does not, by itself, qualify as slavery. It was not the labor
itself, but rather the relations of labor that concerned him. He believed hard work
was often necessary and could be laudable if undertaken for noble ends. Indeed,
Douglass said the two things are not only distinct, but in a sense, antithetical. He
often told audiences that he worked much harder as a freeman than he did as a
slave.
19
In My Bondage and My Freedom, Douglass described the significance of the
transition from slavery to hard work in this way.
I found employment, the third day after my arrival in New Bedford, in
stowing a sloop with a load of oil for the New York market. It was new,
hard, and dirty work, even for a calker, but I went at it with a glad heart and a
willing hand. I was now my own master – a tremendous fact – and the
rapturous excitement with which I seized the job, may not easily be
understood, except by some one with an experience something like mine.
The thoughts – ‘I can work! I can work for a living; I am not afraid of work;
I have no Master Hugh to rob me of my earnings’ – placed me in a state of
independence, beyond seeking friendship or support of any man. That day’s
work I considered the real starting point of something like a new existence.
20

In the condition of slavery, Douglass had no hope of reward or personal
advancement so he worked only hard enough to avoid punishment. As a free
laborer, however, he knew his labor could go toward “benefiting those he loved, his

19
Ibid., 1:134-5.
20
Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 256-7.
79
wife and child. In these circumstances there was no work too low, too dirty, too
menial for him.”
21

The second rhetorical abuse challenged by Douglass was the attempt to
describe the deprivation of a particular political right or privilege as slavery.
“Slavery,” Douglass argued, “is not to be deprived of any political privilege. It is not
to be deprived of the right of suffrage, otherwise all women were slaves, because
they were universally deprived of this right.”
22
Slavery, rather, “consisted not in
taking away any of the rights of man, but in annihilating them all….”
23
Although
Douglass was a staunch opponent of all forms of invidious discrimination, he did not
believe the condition of an average free woman or child was analogous to the
condition of the average slave.
A third misuse of “slavery” was its equation with poverty. Defenders of
slavery often argued, for example, that “the condition of the people of Ireland is
more deplorable than that of the condition of the American slaves.”
24
Although
Douglass sympathized with the plight of the poor in Ireland and elsewhere around
the world, he argued that poverty and slavery should not be confused.
The Irishman is poor, but he is not a slave. He may be in rags, but he is not a
slave. He is still the master of his own body, and can say with the poet, ‘The
hand of Douglass is his own.’… The Irishman has not only the liberty to
emigrate from his country, but he has liberty at home. He can write, and
speak, and co-operate for the attainment of his rights and the redress of
wrongs.
25

21
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1:134-5.
22
Ibid., 1:135.
23
Ibid., 1:78.
24
Ibid., 2:258.
25
Ibid.
80
Douglass’s rejection of the conflation of poverty and slavery is evidence of his
acceptance of a “negative” conception of freedom.
26
According to his reasoning, a
poor Irishman is not a slave because he is free from the restraints of slavery. Unlike
the slave, the poor man is at least formally free to emigrate and agitate for political
rights.
The fourth and final common misuse of the term slavery was its frequent use
in connection with drunkenness and other manifestations of moral weakness.
Temperance advocates were fond of comparing the condition of the intemperate man
to that of the slave. Even though Douglass spoke on behalf of temperance early in
his career, he came to reject the conflation of intemperance and slavery. According
to Douglass, slavery is, properly speaking, a social phenomenon. An individual
cannot, then, be a slave to himself.
In this section, I have tried to show that Douglass’s definition of slavery was
precise. It is important that we grasp the precise definition he accepted because the
meaning of slavery was so crucial to his thought. In sum, slavery is the exercise of
absolute dominion by one human being over another.

“The Very First Element of Slavery”: The Spirit of Selfishness in Human Nature
In order to gain a full understanding of slavery in Douglass’s thought it is
necessary to provide some explanation of what he thought moved one human being
to enslave another. His assessment of this question is important because it provides

26
For a discussion of the abolitionist embrace of negative freedom, see Eric Foner, Politics and
Ideology in the Age of the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 64
81
the foundation for his belief in the inherent precariousness of human freedom, a topic
discussed at length in the next chapter. Douglass believed the phenomenon of
slavery was a manifestation of the spirit of selfishness in human nature. Because he
believed this spirit is an essential part of human nature, it has foundational
importance for his moral and political thought.
Douglass believed the spirit of selfishness in human nature makes men
“constantly liable to do evil.”
27
He held that although reason, conscience, and
revelation direct man to respect the rights of others, the spirit of selfishness has the
potential to morally blind him and make him unwilling to respect any authority other
than his own will. The omnipresence of selfishness in human nature, Douglass
argued, is evident from both “the facts of human nature, and by the experience of all
men in all ages.”
28

From the earliest periods of man’s history, we are able to trace manifestations
of that spirit of selfishness, which leads one man to prey upon the rights and
interests of his fellow-man. Love of ease, love of power, a strong desire to
control the will of others, lay deep-seated in the human heart. These
elements of character, over-riding the better promptings of human nature,
[have] cursed the world with Slavery and kindred crimes.
29

The love of ease creates a temptation to exploit the labor of others rather than
laboring for oneself. For Douglass, the most nefarious manifestation of this
tendency was the institution of slavery, under which the slave “toils that another may
reap the fruit; he is industrious that another may live by idleness….”
30
Slavery was
not, however, the only avenue available for the exploitation of others. After the Civil

27
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:209.
28
Ibid., 5:213.
29
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:73.
30
Ibid., 2:255.
82
War, Douglass continued to identify ways in which the love of ease led men to act
unfairly. In his 1871 essay on “The Labor Question,” for example, Douglass argued
that it was the “selfishness” of economic elites, rather than an inherent defect in
capitalism, that caused the vast disparity between rich and poor in “our industrial
civilization.”
31

Douglass contended that human beings are also tempted by a love of power
and a desire to control the will of others. Man, he argued, has a “disposition to
trample upon the weak and play the tyrant.”
32
Again, Douglass said that one need
not engage in abstract speculation to reach this conclusion because human history
provides all the evidence one needs. “No fact is more obvious,” he said, “than the
fact that there is a perpetual tendency of power to encroach upon weakness, and of
the crafty to take advantage of the simple.”
33
The facts of human history make clear
that there will always be “hardened villains” who “will cheat, steal, rob, burn and
murder their fellow creatures.”
34
Although Douglass pointed to hardened villains as
particularly blatant manifestations of the spirit of selfishness in human nature, he did
not believe these habitual offenders had a monopoly on evil in humanity. Instead,
Douglass argued that the capacity to do evil resides within every human heart.
In order to demonstrate the existence of the selfish tendency in human nature,
Douglass pointed to what he thought were the most obvious manifestations of it in
human behavior. “The very first element of Slavery,” he said, “is selfishness,

31
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:282.
32
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:252.
33
Ibid., 5:360.
34
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:212-3.
83
extreme and bitter selfishness – selfishness that destroys the happiness of one man,
to increase that of another.”
35
Douglass also argued that the American policy of
“manifest destiny” was an example of “the low, the selfish, the ambitious and
rapacious side of human nature.”
36
A third example of the spirit of selfishness
operating in human nature is the late nineteenth century resistance to Chinese
immigration. In 1882, Douglass said, “I have no sympathy for the narrow, selfish
notion of economy which assumes that every crumb of bread which goes into the
mouths of one class is so much taken from the mouths of another class; and hence, I
can not join with those who would drive the Chinaman from our borders.”
37
One
need not develop a sophisticated theological or philosophical theory to demonstrate
that there is a selfish streak in human nature. All one needs to do, Douglass said, is
look around.
Douglass believed the spirit of selfishness emanated from the human heart.
By this, he meant that the will to power has its roots more in our passions than in our
reason. He referred to selfishness as a “tendency” and a “propensity.”
38
Reason is,
though, an important tool that can be put to use by those who desire to exploit,
control, and dominate others. Those who are animated by the spirit of selfishness
seldom act without justification for their evil deeds. Douglass pointed out, for
example, that selfish individuals often attempt to justify their behavior by appealing
to widely held prejudices. Racial, religious, ethnic, and gender prejudice have been

35
Ibid., 3:127.
36
Ibid., 4:344.
37
Ibid., 5:51. Italics mine.
38
Ibid., 5:213-4, 5:360.
84
ready weapons for those wishing to satisfy their selfish desires at the expense of
others. Prejudice is, on Douglass’s view, an instrument of subordination, not the
cause of subordination. The philosophical, political, economic, and pseudo-
scientific construction of racial hierarchy, for example, served as a means by which
individuals could satisfy their natural desire to dominate others. “Pride and
selfishness,” Douglass said, “combined with mental power, never want for a theory
to justify them.”
39

The existence of selfish tendencies in human nature was, to Douglass, as
obvious as it was regrettable. Selfishness can blind men to moral rules and make
them capable of acting like hardened villains. There is no clearer manifestation of
this fact than the existence of human slavery. Under the institution of slavery, one
human being disregards the humanity of another and seeks to subject him to his will.
What remains to be seen is why Douglass thought this was morally wrong. It is to
this question that we now turn.

The Annihilation of the Self: The Physical and Metaphysical Cruelties of Slavery
With Douglass’s definition of slavery and what he thought to be its causes in
mind, it is possible to explore his critique of the institution. In Chapter 2, I
demonstrated that he accepted the core liberal commitment to personal freedom as
well as its accompanying institutional expressions. This commitment to freedom
was rooted, in part, in his deep hatred of slavery. Slavery is a profoundly illiberal

39
Ibid., 2:507.
85
institution in two senses. First, slavery authorizes some individuals to restrain other
individuals. Slaves are held, in effect, by the command, “your liberty or your life.”
This is a violation of the traditional liberal notion of freedom as the absence of
restraint. Second, slavery is profoundly illiberal in the sense that it authorizes some
individuals to control others. To be a slave is not only to be restrained, but also to be
controlled by the will of another. Slaves are deprived of their liberty and they are
forced to do things commanded by the master.
40

It is fair to say that slavery served as the antithesis to Douglass’s fundamental
liberal commitment to personal freedom. Whereas liberalism exalts the individual
and makes his freedom the overriding aim of politics, slavery permits the
annihilation of some individuals by others. Under the institution of slavery, the
selfhood of the enslaved individual is obliterated. Douglass’s arguments against
slavery are, in a very important sense, arguments for liberalism. He relied on the
condition of slavery as his summum malum. I believe Douglass’s case against the
cruelties of slavery is an important contribution to the tradition of liberal political
morality.
The language employed by Douglass in his condemnations of slavery is
striking and, upon reflection, it is clear why the idea of self-ownership became the
foundation of his liberalism. He said that the “paramount evil” of the institution is
that it denied the individual’s right to “look upon himself as his own.”
41
Because it

40
This distinction is discussed by Mark Blitz, “Liberal Freedom and Responsibility,” in Public
Morality, Civic Virtue, and the Problem of Modern Liberalism, T. William Boxx and Gary M.
Quinlivan, eds. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 110-1.
41
Ibid., 1:46, 2:3.
86
denied the significance of the slave’s reason, conscience, affections and will, it is fair
to say that the institution was an attempt to destroy “his identity.”
42

Only look at the condition of the slave: stripped of every right – denied every
privilege, he had not even the privilege of saying ‘myself’ – his head, his
eyes, his hands, his heart, his bones, his sinews, his soul, his immortal spirit,
were all the property of another. He might not decide any question for
himself – any question relating to his own actions. The master – the man
who claimed property in his person – assumed the right to decide all things
for him….
43

In short, the very selfhood of the slave is crushed by the “absolute power” the master
has over him.
44
In Douglass’s words, “The will and wishes of the master are the law
of the slave,” who has “no voice whatever in his destiny.”
45

The “denial of [the slave’s] personality” ranged from the mundane to the
profound.
46
On a day-to-day basis, the master decided for the slave “what he should
eat and what he should drink, what he should wear, when and to whom he should
speak, how much he should work, how much and by whom he is punished….”
47
In
addition to these day-to-day matters, slaveholders had control of aspects of the
slave’s destiny that are of more lasting importance such as familial bonds,
intellectual and moral development, and religious aspiration.
Slaveholders determine when a man shall marry, how long he shall continue
married; they also claim the right of tearing the babe from the arms of the
frantic mother. Conscience, which God has planted in the heart of man, all
his religious aspirations, all his hopes, are subject to the will of him who
dares claim man as his property.
48

42
Ibid., 1:78.
43
Ibid., 1:344.
44
Ibid., 2:73.
45
Ibid., 1:273; 1:135.
46
Ibid., 3:11-12.
47
Ibid., 1:78.
48
Ibid., 1:183-4.
87

The slave is an individual who “having a mind, he may not cultivate and improve it;
having a soul, he may not call it his own; having moral appreciations, he may not be
guided by them; having a conscience, he may not walk by its admonitions; having an
immortal spirit and a soul to aspire, he may not aspire, humbly as his Master did.”
49

Under the institution of slavery, all of those matters which an individual might
consider to be constitutive of his or her identity – family bonds, association with
friends, religious commitments, moral choices, intellectual cultivation, and so on –
are controlled by the will of another. For Douglass, the annihilation of the slave’s
selfhood was the core of the moral criminality of slavery.
Douglass believed slavery was at war with the nature of man. Slavery
attempts to deny the rationality, the capacity for moral understanding, sociality, and
the inclination to liberty of its victims. Because the institution of slavery is in direct
conflict with these aspects of human nature, it can only be maintained through
extraordinarily cruel measures. According to Douglass, “Cruelty marks every part of
the system. The slave cannot be held without cruelty.”
50
Cruel means are necessary
to establish and maintain the system because “man was not made for [the] condition
[of slavery], nor did he ever like to submit to that condition.”
51

Slavery is a cruel system, because the slave is held by no power but physical
force. The slave does not go voluntarily and take the condition of a slave.
He is a man and has the feelings of a man. As a man he is not only conscious
of the right to liberty, but deep down in his own soul is planted a love of

49
Ibid., 1:318.
50
Ibid., 1:321.
51
Ibid., 2:10.
88
liberty which is ever awake in his bosom; and loving liberty he can never be
kept in the condition of a slave without force.
52

Because human beings have a natural desire to be free, slaveholders “are forced to
resort to all the unnatural means we have associated with slavery as its necessary
concomitants….”
53

The unnatural means employed by slaveholders took on both physical and
metaphysical forms. The physical cruelties of slavery are well known. Perhaps the
most memorable scenes from Douglass’s autobiographies are his descriptions of the
physical brutality of slave masters and “overseers.” In My Bondage and My
Freedom, for example, Douglass described the brutal beating of a slave named
Esther at the hands of Douglass’s “old master” named Captain Anthony. Esther was
being courted by a slave named Edward, but Captain Anthony, probably motivated
by jealousy, ordered her to stop seeing him. “This unnatural and heartless order,”
Douglass wrote, “was, of course, broken. A woman’s love is not to be annihilated by
the peremptory command of any one, whose breath is in his nostrils.”
54
One
morning, the young Douglass awoke to this scene.
Esther’s wrists were firmly tied, and the twisted rope was fastened to a strong
staple in a heavy wooden joist above, near the fireplace. Here she stood, on a
bench, her arms tightly drawn over her breast. Her back and shoulders were
bare to the waist. Behind her stood old master, with cowskin in hand,
preparing his barbarous work with all manner of harsh, coarse, and
tantalizing epithets. The screams of his victim were most piercing. He was
cruelly deliberate, and protracted the torture, as one who was delighted with
the scene. Again and again he drew the hateful whip through his hand,
adjusting it with a view of dealing the most pain-giving blow.… The whole

52
Ibid., 3:8-9.
53
Ibid., 1:183-4.
54
Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, 65-6.
89
scene, with all its attendants, was revolting and shocking, to the last degree;
and when the motives of this brutal castigation are considered, language has
no power to convey a just sense of its awful criminality. After laying on some
thirty or forty stripes, old master untied his suffering victim, and let her get
down. She could scarcely stand, when untied.
55

The beating of Esther is illustrative of the ways in which physical cruelty was used to
punish slaves who attempted to establish independent identities. Old master
attempted, if you will, to beat the personality out of Esther. In this case, a desire to
prevent two slaves from pursuing a romantic relationship seems to have been the
justification, but there were several other reasons offered by slave masters and
overseers for physical beatings. According to Douglass, the most common reason
given for the physical punishment of a slave was “impudence,” which “may mean
almost anything, or nothing at all, just according to the caprice of the master or
overseer, at the moment.”
56
The point is that no matter what the slave did, his bodily
integrity was constantly under threat. Through this regime of physical intimidation
and systematic torture, masters and overseers attempted to “blot out his personality,
degrade his manhood, and sink him to the condition of a beast of burden….”
57

In addition to beatings, the physical integrity of slaves was regularly violated
by the sexual aggression of their masters. Slave women were subject only to the will
of their masters and, to make matters worse, the temptation to sexually abuse slaves
was increased by the potential profitability of such behavior. In Douglass’s words,
“This arrangement admits of the greatest license to brutal slaveholders, and their

55
Ibid., 67.
56
Ibid., 70.
57
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:348.
90
profligate sons, brothers, relations and friends, and gives to the pleasure of sin, the
additional attraction of profit.”
58

As terrifying as these depictions of physical brutality are, Douglass did not
believe they constituted the “paramount evil of the infamous institution.”
59
Instead,
he argued that the greatest cruelties of the slave system were metaphysical in nature.
There is still a deeper shade to be given to this picture. The physical cruelties
are indeed sufficiently harassing and revolting; but they are put as a few
grains of sand on the sea shore, or a few drops of water in the great ocean,
compared with the stupendous wrongs which it inflicts upon the mental,
moral, and religious nature of its hapless victims. It is only when we
contemplate the slave as a moral and intellectual being that we can
adequately comprehend the unparalleled enormity of slavery, and the intense
criminality of the slaveholder.
60

According to Douglass, the first work of slavery is to dehumanize the slave. There is
a systematic attempt to deny the existence and development of the characteristics
that distinguish human beings from other animals. Slaves are deprived of the
opportunity to develop their intellectual faculties, to “decide what is morally right
and wrong,” to cultivate “filial affection,” and so on.
61
In other words, the “first
aim” of slavery is to reduce “man to a mere machine.”
62

Douglass described many forms of metaphysical cruelty. First, there is the
obvious emotional cruelty of tearing families apart at a moment’s notice. Some of
the most powerful imagery of antislavery literature including Douglass’s Narrative
and Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin is provided by incidents of familial

58
My Bondage and My Freedom, 46.
59
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1:46.
60
Ibid., 2:255.
61
Ibid., 1:78 and My Bondage and My Freedom, 47.
62
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:255.
91
destruction. In My Bondage and My Freedom, Douglass described being introduced
to his brothers and sisters at a young age. “We were brothers and sisters, but what of
that? Why should they be attached to me, or I to them? Brothers and sisters we were
by blood; but slavery had made us strangers…. [S]lavery had robbed these terms of
their true meaning.”
63
Of his mother, Douglass wrote, “My poor mother, like many
other slave-women, had many children, but NO FAMILY!”
64
Many slaves never
had the opportunity to develop bonds with their families and those who did had to
live in constant fear that those bonds would be shattered by the whims of the master.
Douglass also drew attention to what he believed was the greatest cruelty of
slavery: the psychological agony of being in bondage.
Whipping is not what constitutes the cruelty of Slavery. To me the thought
that I am a slave is more terrible than any lash, than any chain. A slave to-
day, to-morrow, next year, all the years of my life, - my manhood denied,
ignored, despised, - this being eternally shut up to a single condition, no
outgoing, no progress, no future, this is more horrible, more distressing than
any whip. The mental agony of a slave is never appeased.
65

Because human beings have a natural desire to decide for themselves how they will
live their lives, the condition of slavery is psychologically terrifying. Not only does
the slave know he is in a condition of bondage today, but he has little reason to
believe that his condition will improve in the future. The absence of a sense of
possibility and hope, the very things that fuel the human desire for freedom, leaves
the slave in a condition of deep despair. To Douglass, this agony was the most
abominable cruelty of the slave system.

63
My Bondage and My Freedom, 39.
64
Id.
65
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:11-12.
92
In response to accusations of cruelty, defenders of slavery often claimed that
inhumane treatment was the exception and not the rule of the institution. A good
master or overseer, these defenders argued, related to his slaves as a feudal baron
related to peasants. Rather than relying on a system of fear and intimidation, he
relied on feelings of mutual obligation. According to these defenders, benevolent
slavery was not only possible, but it was beneficial to both master and slave.
Douglass disputed the possibility of benevolent slavery. First, he contended
that physical cruelty was often necessary because slaves did not desire to be in
bondage. As such, there was a natural desire to attempt escape and, because there
was no hope of reward, there was a natural desire to avoid work. In order to combat
these natural tendencies, masters and overseers often relied on physical abuse to
break the will of the slave. Furthermore, Douglass believed that even if a slave
master was somewhat humane, moral corruption would follow from the possession
of absolute power. The inevitability of this corruption followed from the
unnaturalness of the master-slave relationship.
Cruelty was inseparable from the system, and it could not be otherwise. The
most humane man in the world – aye, if they could conceive of an angel from
heaven becoming a slaveholder, he would be compelled to be cruel because
he would have to keep man in the condition of a slave.… Man was not made
for that condition, nor did he ever like to submit to that condition. His
tendencies were to freedom – his happiness was dependent upon progress,
elevation, and improvement.
66

In other words, the relationship between master and slave is, by definition, a cruel
one. Even a totally benevolent slaveholder who takes great care of his slave’s

66
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:10.
93
physical being perpetrates a great act of cruelty. “Kindness,” Douglass said, “is no
substitute for justice. Care for the slave as property is no compensation for denial of
his personality. You may surround the slave with luxuries, place him in a genial
climate, and under a smiling and cloudless sky, and these shall only enhance his
torment, and deepen his anguish.”
67
Attending to the slave’s physical needs, whether
done out of compassion or desire to increase his value as property, is not true
kindness. Either way, Douglass argued, the master fails to respect the humanity of
the slave: “To talk of kindness entering into a relation in which one party is robbed
of wife, of children, of his hard earnings, of home, of friends, of society, of
knowledge, and of all that makes life desirable, is most absurd, wicked and
preposterous.”
68

According to Douglass, slavery, which is the exercise of an uncontrolled right
to the body and soul of a person, is rooted in the selfishness of human nature and it is
unjust because it violates the physical integrity and annihilates the personality of the
slave. Just as many late twentieth century political thinkers are best understood
when it is remembered that they wrote in the shadow of totalitarian mayhem, I would
argue that Douglass is best read as a thinker animated by the horrors of slavery. His
account has moral force not only because it was rooted in his personal experiences,
but also because his personal experiences were representative of the nation’s
experience. Read in this way, I believe Douglass’s descriptions of the physical and
metaphysical cruelties of slavery contribute to the liberal case for personal freedom.

67
Ibid., 3:11-12. Italics mine.
68
Ibid., 2:267.
94
III. “Free by the Laws of Nature”: Self-Ownership as a Moral Imperative
Slavery was the summum malum of Douglass’s thought; his understanding
and critique of that institution provides what I would call the “negative foundation”
of his politics. The personal and national experience of slavery was what appalled
Douglass as a political thinker and actor. In this part, I examine the “positive
foundation” of his thought: his belief in the moral imperative of self-ownership. In
Chapter 2, I argued that the fundamental moral commitment of liberal thinkers is to
the idea of personal freedom. This is certainly true of Douglass. As historian Eric
Foner has pointed out, for Douglass and other abolitionist thinkers, “freedom meant
self-ownership.”
69
It is therefore fair to say that freedom and self-ownership were
synonyms in Douglass’s vocabulary. He believed slavery was morally criminal
because it is the very antithesis of the deepest yearning of the human soul: the desire
to be free. In what follows I explain Douglass’s positive case for the foundational
liberal commitment to freedom.
Douglass’s case for freedom was rooted in natural law. According to
political theorist Paul Sigmund, natural law thinkers are distinguished by “a belief
that society should be restructured in a way that is more in keeping with the
requirements of human nature.”
70
Douglass drew on his belief that human beings are
naturally freedom-loving to make the case that slavery was a profoundly unnatural
institution and the realization of slavery’s opposite, self-ownership, was required by

69
Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1980), 64.
70
Paul Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought, (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1971), v.
95
natural law. He supported this claim by appealing to two aspects of human nature:
human desires and human capacities. Human beings desire to own themselves and
they have capacities – reason, moral judgment, and free will – that make them fit for
self-ownership. Self-ownership, Douglass contended, is the foundation for
individual rights to life, liberty, and property as well as the right to participate in
democratic governance. If we respect that an individual owns himself, he argued, we
should refrain from depriving him of his life, we should resist interfering unduly
with his liberty, we should not violate his legitimate claims to property, and we
should treat him as a political equal.
I argue that Douglass’s positive case for self-ownership is interesting and
important because it is not a simple reproduction of his liberal predecessors.
Although he offers a philosophy of natural rights that is reminiscent of John Locke
and the American founders, Douglass’s articulation of the foundations of liberalism
is worthy of special consideration for three reasons. First, Douglass’s rooted his
moral arguments in the experience of slavery and this give his articulation of liberal
principles an added moral force and persuasive power. These personal and
contextual factors inspired Douglass to offer what Sheldon Wolin calls an
“imaginative recovery” of previously articulated ideas.
71
Second, his formulation of
and reliance on the idea of self-ownership as the basis for the right to liberty is unlike
other thinkers in the liberal tradition. Rather than privileging the economic
dimension of self-ownership, Douglass offered a version of the idea that is

71
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, 24.
96
comprehensive and deeply moralistic. Third, as you will see in the next chapter,
Douglass’s blended his quintessentially liberal commitment to self-ownership with a
strong commitment to civic responsibility. The same cannot be said of many other
liberal thinkers who neglect to emphasize the ways in which liberty depends on a
strong ethos of civic responsibility. Understanding why and how Douglass
attempted to combine these ideas are the central tasks of this dissertation.
In the rest of this part, I explore the idea of self-ownership and its centrality
in Douglass’s thought. I begin by providing a working definition of self-ownership,
a brief introduction to its use by other liberals, and a short description of common
criticisms of the idea. I then show how Douglass grounds this and other natural
rights in the desires and capacities of human beings. I conclude by arguing that
Douglass’s understanding of self-ownership is less susceptible to common criticisms
of the idea.

Self-Ownership: A Very Short Introduction to the Idea & Its Critics
Douglass’s positive case for freedom is rooted in a belief that each individual
owns himself. The idea of self-ownership is usually traced back to Locke, who
claimed that “every Man has a Property in his own Person; this no Body has any
Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his.”
72
In contemporary political theory, the idea is typically

72
John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, 2:27. Tom G. Palmer argues that the idea of
self-ownership can be traced back to the ideas of Franciso de Vitoria, a Sixteenth century Spanish
thinker who defended the rights of Indians by contending that by “natural law, every man has the right
to his own life and to physical and mental integrity.” See Palmer, “Saving Rights Theory from its
97
associated with libertarians like Robert Nozick, who criticized economic
redistribution programs because they “involve a shift from the classical liberals’
notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in other people.”
73

Philosopher Daniel Attas has provided a concise working definition of the idea:
“Plainly stated, the principle of self-ownership asserts that each person is his own
property.”
74
The claim that an individual owns himself is usually set up as the
alternative to the claim that another individual or a group (“society” or “the state”)
has legitimate claims of ownership over him.
The idea of self-ownership has been criticized on many fronts. Rather than
providing an exhaustive catalogue of these criticisms, I would like to provide brief
explanations of common moral critiques offered by thinkers on the Right and the
Left. Neo-classicist conservative Leo Strauss expressed concern that Lockean self-
ownership invites liberation from the moral constraints of natural law.
75
Cultural
conservative Robert Bork opposes the libertarian conception of self-ownership
because it can be used to justify “radical individualism,” a doctrine that celebrates
“liberty without constraints imposed by morality, law, family, and community.”
76

Conservatives like Strauss and Bork worry that self-ownership is an invitation to
“dispose of oneself as one pleases.”
77
This is problematic, Bork contends, because

Friends,” in Individual Rights Reconsidered, Tibor Machan, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
2001), 66-7.
73
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 172.
74
Daniel Attas, “Freedom and Self-Ownership,” Social Theory and Practice, (Spring 2000), 26: 1.
75
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 202-251.
76
Robert Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah, (New York: ReganBooks, 1996), 5-6, 56-65.
77
Robert S. Taylor, “A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership,” The Journal of Political Philosophy,
(March 2004), 12:65.
98
unrestrained individualism causes the liberal polity to slide toward “rot and
decadence.”
78
In sum, many conservatives reject the notion that individuals should
be thought of as self-owning because the community has a right to restrict even self-
regarding “licentious” behavior when it erodes the “common moral culture.”
79

On the other side of the ideological spectrum, egalitarian thinkers condemn
self-ownership as “the demon seed of liberalism, the pernicious source of the
bourgeoisie’s selfish commitment to ‘possessive individualism.’”
80
Socialist theorist
G.A. Cohen contends that the idea of self-ownership is morally problematic because
it implies that individuals have “no duty to help others.”
81
If individuals own
themselves, egalitarians contend, they are freed from any sense of responsibility to
others in the community. This is problematic because it justifies a state of affairs in
which there is little or no support for economically depressed and excluded
individuals. A society of self-owners is likely to be a collection of atomized
individuals who view their fellows with suspicion.
In sum, self-ownership – the idea that each individual owns himself – is
usually associated with the classical liberal philosophy of John Locke and the
libertarian philosophy of Robert Nozick. Thinkers on the Right worry that this idea
undermines the moral fabric that is the foundation of a stable and orderly
community. Thinkers on the Left are concerned that the idea of self-ownership

78
Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah, 63.
79
Ibid., 64.
80
James Oakes, “Radical Liberals, Liberal Radicals: The Dissenting Traditions in American Political
Culture,” Reviews in American History, 27.3 (1999), 508. Oakes attributes this view to C.B.
Macpherson.
81
G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 228.
99
undermines the moral basis for an egalitarian community with a strong social safety
net. What is missing from these formulations and critiques is a proper appreciation
for the contributions of abolitionist thinkers like Douglass.

A Life of One’s Own: Douglass’s Case for Self-Ownership
Discussions of self-ownership rarely address the formulations of abolitionist
thinkers. The typical history of self-ownership is captured by political theorist
Robert S. Taylor who says Locke “effectively launched the literature of self-
ownership” and the concept “did not come to play a major role in political theory
again until the publication of Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia….”
82

When we reduce the idea to the classical formulation of Locke and the contemporary
formulation by Nozick, we ignore a crucial period when the idea was at the center of
a “language of insurgent popular politics.”
83
An appreciation for Douglass’s
understanding of self-ownership can serve as a morally powerful response to both
conservative and egalitarian condemnations of the idea. Douglass’s formulation was
not an invitation to the libertinism feared by conservatives or the cold-hearted
individualism feared by egalitarians. Instead, it was a comprehensive and deeply
moralistic idea that was born out of the experience of slavery and served as the
foundation of his belief in natural freedom and responsibility. In this section, I
examine the meaning and justification of self-ownership in Douglass’s thought.

82
Robert Smallman Taylor, “The Theory and Practice of Self-Ownership,” Ph.D. Diss., University of
California, Berkeley, 2002), 10-11.
83
Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age
of Slave Emancipation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18.
100
Abolitionists were often described as “men of one idea.” This may be true,
Douglass responded, but our “one idea was immensely comprehensive, and capable
of manifold applications.”
84
The “one idea” Douglass had in mind was the doctrine
of self-ownership.
[There] was one idea, rule or principle, call it what you will, which entirely
took possession of me, even in childhood, and which stood out strongly,
invincible against every argument drawn from nature and scripture in favor of
slavery. What was the idea, rule, or principle? This it was: Every man is the
original, rightful, and absolute owner of his own body; or in other words,
every man is himself, is his self, if you please, and belongs to himself, and
can only part from his self ownership, by the commission of a crime.
85

It is important to note that Douglass’s embrace of self-ownership cannot be
understood outside of the context of natural law. He believed that each individual
belongs to himself and that he cannot surrender his self-ownership without violating
natural law. Rather than embracing the view that the individual is the source of his
own moral laws, Douglass sided with natural law thinkers who contend that
transcendent moral law limits the sovereignty of the self. In other words, there are
certain things, Douglass thought, that are wrong even if the individuals involved
consent to them.
Douglass said the claim to self-ownership contains within it “a whole
encyclopedia of argument.”
86
Indeed, he relied on the doctrine of self-ownership to
champion a range of progressive causes including the abolition of slavery, universal
suffrage, women’s rights, immigration reform, and religious liberty. Surprisingly, in

84
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:442.
85
Ibid., 4:42.
86
Ibid., 5:386, 5:253.
101
the analysis that has been done of Douglass’s political thought, there has been scant
discussion of this central idea.
87
Although he believed that no “simpler proposition,
no truth more self-evident or more native to the human soul, was ever presented to
human reason or consciousness,” he recognized that argument was necessary
because “against prejudice, custom, and superstition, nothing is self-evident.”
88
It
was for this reason that Douglass believed it was incumbent on friends of freedom to
explain why self-ownership was required by natural law.
Although Douglass’s writings and speeches are replete with references to
self-ownership, there is no formulation more powerful than the one offered in an
open letter he wrote to his former master, Thomas Auld. I will use this formulation
as the basis for the explanation provided in this section. In the letter, Douglass relied
on self-ownership to defend his decision to escape from slavery.
The morality of the act, I dispose as follows: I am myself; you are yourself;
we are two distinct persons, equal persons. What you are, I am. You are a
man, and so am I. God created both, and made us separate beings. I am not
by nature bound to you, or you to me. Nature does not make your existence
depend upon me, or mine depend upon yours. I cannot walk upon your legs,
or you upon mine. I cannot breathe for you, or you for me; I must breathe for
myself, and you for yourself. We are distinct persons, and are each equally
provided with faculties necessary to our individual existence. In leaving you,
I took nothing but what belonged to me, and in no way lessened your means
for obtaining an honest living. Your faculties remained yours, and mine

87
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “The Political Thought of Frederick Douglass” and David F. Ericson,
The Debate Over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America, (New York:
NYU Press, 2000), for example, either do not mention Douglass’s commitment to self-ownership
(Ericson) or mention it in passing when discussing his view of property rights (Goldstein). Two
essays that do discuss the importance of self-ownership in Douglass’s thought are Gayle McKeen,
“Whose Rights? Whose Responsibility? Self-Help in African-American Thought,” Polity, Volume
XXXIV, Number 3, (Summer 2002), 409 and C. Bradley Thompson, “Introduction,” Antislavery
Political Writings, 1833-1860, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).
88
Ibid.; 5:253
102
became useful to their rightful owner. I therefore see no wrong in any part of
the transaction.
89

This passage is extraordinarily powerful because it reveals the real-life importance of
self-ownership for Douglass. His arguments were not merely abstract musings, they
were offered in defense of his decision to escape from slavery. In addition, this
passage contains the central claims that constitute Douglass’s contention that each
individual belongs to himself: each human being is separate and distinct from every
other, an individual’s selfhood or personality is unique to him, all human beings are
equal in morally relevant ways, and each individual is provided with the faculties
necessary to maintain his individual existence. Let us consider each of these claims
in turn.
First, Douglass emphasized that he and Auld were “distinct” and “separate”
persons. This may seem like a rather innocuous ontological claim, but it is an
essential part of Douglass’s case for freedom. His focus on the physical separateness
of human beings is similar to other thinkers within the liberal tradition who have
assumed the truth of “atomism.”
90
According to this doctrine, society is best viewed
as a collection of separate individuals, not an organic whole. Like other liberals,
Douglass relied on the atomistic ontology as a starting point for a political morality
that emphasizes the primacy of individual rights and responsibilities.
When Douglass declared that he and Auld were separate and distinct beings,
he was making a claim about the separateness of their bodies and the distinctiveness

89
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 1:339.
90
Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
25-27.
103
of their personalities. In other words, his case for self-ownership rested on beliefs in
both physical and metaphysical individuality. When Douglass defended self-
ownership, he discussed both “form and features” – physical individuality – and
“thought and feeling” – metaphysical individuality.
91
Indeed, as noted earlier in the
chapter, the violation of physical integrity was less revolting to him than the
violation of metaphysical dignity. It is precisely because each human being is
rational and capable of moral choice that deprivation of self-ownership was so
utterly appalling to Douglass. During the debates over slavery and suffrage, he
repeatedly asserted that the “selfhood” of each individual is “absolute” and
“complete” in the sense that each human being has a personality that is unique. Each
individual’s personality – his intellectual faculties, sentimental capacities, and will –
is separate and distinct from every other’s. Douglass understood that the recognition
of physical and metaphysical separateness, while an important foundational step,
does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of a right to self-ownership. In order to
make the case for this right, it was necessary for Douglass to argue that human
beings have a special dignity that entitles them to respect.
This leads us to the second major claim made by Douglass in his letter to
Auld: “we are two…equal persons. What you are, I am. You are a man, and so am
I.”
92
Douglass’s argument for self-ownership rested not only on the separateness
and individuality of human beings but also on a belief in universal human equality.
According to his understanding of equality, all individuals possess rights by virtue of

91
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:255.
92
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 1:339.
104
their “natural dignity” as human beings.
93
Human beings, Douglass believed,
possess dignity above the rest of creation because they have “natural powers” that
distinguish them in morally relevant ways.
94
More specifically, Douglass thought
the capacity of human beings to reason and to distinguish right from wrong dignified
their existence. The natural dignity of human beings provides the basis for their
rights. Because humans are intellectual and moral beings, there are certain things
that should not be done to them. Most fundamentally, Douglass believed that
because human beings possess natural dignity, they should not be deprived of the
right to direct their own lives.
Douglass believed the equal right to self-ownership has its source in two
aspects of human nature: desires and capacities. First, Douglass argued that personal
freedom is rooted in human desires. He said this is “self-evident” in the sense that it
is obvious that most human beings exhibit a natural desire to be free. “Human
rights,” he wrote, “stand upon a common basis…all mankind have the same
wants.”
95
Douglass argued that the “existence of [the natural right to liberty] is self-
evident. It is written upon all the powers and faculties of man. The desire for it is
the deepest and strongest of all powers of the human soul.”
96
Douglass explained the
idea of self-evidence in this way: “I have said the right to liberty is self-evident. No
argument, no researches into moldy records, no learned disquisitions, are necessary
to establish it. To assert it, is to call forth a sympathetic response from every human

93
Ibid., 4:236.
94
Ibid., 4:233.
95
Ibid., 2:307.
96
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:261-2.
105
heart, and to send a thrill of joy and gladness around the world.”
97
When an
individual reflects on his own nature, Douglass thought, he is able to recognize his
own desire to be free. The recognition of this desire in oneself, Douglass hoped,
would provide the basis for sympathy with others who claim these rights, but he
recognized that human beings are often reluctant to “apply the same rules and
maxims” to others that they apply to themselves.
98

Douglass did not believe the right to self-ownership was rooted in human
desires alone. He recognized that grounding rights in “wants” lacked moral force.
His more compelling argument for self-ownership was that human beings are fit to
be free. In other words, because human beings have intellectual and moral
capacities, they are capable of directing their own lives. Because human beings are
capable of free choice and moral responsibility, it is a moral crime to deny them the
opportunity to direct their own lives. Douglass’s argument from human capacities is
a distinctively moral one. Rather than embracing liberalism as merely the best
means to channel human desires and keep the peace, he relied on the requirements of
natural law to make the case that universal freedom is a moral imperative.
Douglass applied the moral imperative of self-ownership to a number of
political controversies. Most obviously, he relied on the moral argument for self-
ownership in support of the abolition of slavery. Douglass went beyond saying that
abolition was appropriate because slaves wanted to be free to say that abolition was
morally required because slaves were fit for freedom. Prior to emancipation,

97
Ibid., 2:261-2. Italics mine.
98
Ibid., 3:7.
106
Douglass responded to the anxiety many whites felt at the prospect of the slaves
being “turned loose.”
We are asked if we would turn the slaves all loose. I answer, Yes. Why not?
They are not wolves nor tigers, but men. They are endowed with reason –
can decide upon questions of right and wrong, good and evil, benefits and
injuries – and are therefore subjects of government precisely as other men
are.
99

Slaves are fit to be free because they are endowed with reason, possess the ability to
tell right from wrong, and they have free will to choose how they will act. Douglass
believed that although slaves were raised in extraordinarily inhumane conditions,
they retained their humanity and would, once liberated, be fit for self-government.
Douglass’s moral case for self-ownership is also illustrated by his arguments
in the debate over women’s suffrage. His responses to two common arguments
against female suffrage are fine examples of how he used self-ownership as the basis
for his progressive political goals. First, those opposed to female suffrage often said
that women did not need to participate in politics because they were virtually
represented by their fathers and husbands. Douglass responded to this argument by
appealing to self-ownership:
If man could represent woman, it follows that woman could represent man,
but no opponent of woman suffrage would admit that woman could represent
him in the government, and in taking that position he would be right; since
neither can, in the nature of things, represent the other, for the very obvious
reason that neither can be the other. The great fact underlying the claim for
universal suffrage is that every man is himself and belongs to himself, and
represents his own individuality, not only in form and features, but in thought
and feeling. And the same is true of woman. She is herself, and can be
nobody else than herself. Her selfhood is as perfect and as absolute as is the

99
Ibid., 3:505.
107
selfhood of man. She can no more part with her personality that she can part
with her shadow.
100

The separateness and individuality of women was not the only basis for their rights.
Douglass was also confronted with a second argument against female suffrage: they
are not entitled to an equal right to participate because they “cannot perform military
service.” His response reveals how he relied on the intellectual and moral capacities
of all human beings to make the case for natural rights. Setting aside the validity of
the claim that women cannot perform military service, Douglass argued that it ought
to be rejected because it “founds one of the grandest intellectual and moral rights of
human nature upon a purely physical basis. According to it, the basis of civil
government is not mind, but muscle; not reason, but force; not right, but might; it is
not human, but bestial. It belongs to man rather as a savage, than as a civilized
being.”
101
Douglass contended that the very idea of individual rights and civil
government are rooted in human intellectual and moral capacities: “The foundation
of all governments and all codes of law is in the fact that man is a rational creature,
and is capable of guiding his conduct by ideas of right and wrong, of good and evil,
by hope of reward and fear of punishment.”
102

Douglass believed self-ownership should be respected and protected because
human beings have a natural desire to be free and because their rational and moral
capacities make them fit for freedom. He thought the obligation to respect the
natural rights of others is “easily rendered appreciable to the faculty of reason in

100
Ibid., 5:255.
101
Ibid., 5:259.
102
Ibid., 3:577.
108
man, and that the most unenlightened conscience has no difficulty in deciding in
which side to register its testimony.”
103
He recognized, though, that the human
ability to comprehend the truth of this obligation does not, by itself, lead to social
peace and harmony. The difficulty is this: “In whatever else men may differ, they
are alike in the apprehension of their natural and personal rights. The difference
between abolitionists and those by whom they are opposed, is not as to principles.
All are agreed in respect to these. The manner of applying them is the point of
difference.”
104
As pointed out in the last chapter, the unwillingness of some
individuals to apply these principles consistently is what makes civil government
necessary.
So far, I have discussed Douglass’s appeal to human separateness,
individuality and equality as the bases for the claim to self-ownership. The other
claim made by Douglass in the letter to Auld is that nature “does not make your
existence depend upon me, or mine depend upon yours” and that we “are each
equally provided with the faculties necessary to our individual existence.”
105
At first
glance, this seems like a rather radical view of human independence. It may appear
that Douglass was suggesting that human beings are self-sufficient. If he embraced
such a view, he may be accused of advocating the sort of atomistic individualism that
has made the idea of self-ownership the target of such virulent criticism. It would be
a mistake to read Douglass’s assertion of independence from Auld as an embrace of

103
Ibid., 3:46.
104
Ibid.
105
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 1:339.
109
cold-hearted individualism. Instead, as I will show in detail in the next chapter,
Douglass’s commitment to independence existed along side a belief in the natural
sociality and interdependence of human beings. What Douglass rejected was any
understanding of interdependence that violated his core commitment to personal
freedom.
It is easier to understand Douglass’s view of independence and
interdependence when we consider these ideas in context. He denounced the idea of
human interdependence when it was used to rationalize slavery and other oppressive
practices. Violation of the natural rights of minorities and women, for example, was
often justified by their alleged dependence on white men. When Douglass argued
that “independence belongs to our nature” he was attempting to combat the notion
that some types of people are more dependent than others.
106
All human beings, he
believed, are endowed with the capacities that enable them to be as independent as
their fellows. This view of independence should not, however, be equated with the
position that individuals are completely self-contained or “atomistic” as some critics
of liberalism have claimed.
107
Douglass understood that individuals need one
another to survive and flourish, but he refused to accept the notion that
interdependence justified excessive interference with individual liberty.

106
Ibid., 2:536.
107
Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 187.
110
Douglass’s view of independence is illuminated by a consideration of the
theoretical alternative offered by defenders of slavery. George Fitzhugh, for
example, rejected individualism in favor of an organic, collectivist theory.
Some animals are by nature gregarious and associative. Of this class are
men, ants and bees. An isolated man is almost as helpless and ridiculous as a
bee setting up for himself. Man is born a member of society, and does not
form society. Nature, as in the cases of bees and ants, has it ready formed for
him. He and society are congenital. Society is the being – he one of the
members of that being. He has no rights whatever, as opposed to the
interests of society; and that society may very properly make any use of him
that will redound to the public good.
108

Douglass rejected the idea that individual rights are subordinate to “the interests of
society” or “the public good.” Like other liberal thinkers, when there was a conflict
between individual rights and collective claims, Douglass operated under a
“presumption of liberty” rather than deference to social utility.
109
Individuals need
one another to survive and flourish, Douglass argued, but they ought to interact on
cooperative, not coercive, terms.
Before concluding this section, it is important to emphasize the deontological
basis of Douglass’s case for self-ownership. “Rights,” he argued, “do not have their
source in the will or grace of man. They are not such things as he can grant or
withhold according to his sovereign will or pleasure.”
110
Douglass believed
individuals have an obligation to respect the natural rights of others regardless of the

108
George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, reprinted in Antebellum: Three Classic Works on
Slavery in the Old South, (New York: Capricorn, 1960), 57. Italics mine.
109
Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2004), 253.
110
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:383.
111
consequences. Rather than embracing a consequentialist justification for rights,
Douglass was, one might say, a “Hell or High Water” liberal.
Whether men should be slave or free, does not depend on the success or
failure of freedom in any given instance. Some things have been settled
independently of human calculation and human adjudication. One of these
things is, that man has by nature a right to his own body, and that to deprive
him of that right is a flagrant violation of the will of God. This is settled.
And if desolation and ruin, famine and pestilence should threaten,
Emancipation would still be the same urgent and solemn duty that it ever
was. When the God of all the earth ordained the law of freedom, He foresaw
all its consequences. Do right though the Heavens fall. We have no right to
do evil that good may come, nor to refrain from doing right because evil may
come.
111

Human beings are bound by the fundamental law of nature because individual rights
are not social experiments, as pragmatists might describe them, but rather moral
truths rooted in the nature of human beings. “Liberty,” Douglass contended, “is not
a device or an experiment, but a law of nature dating back to man’s creation, and if
this fundamental law is a failure, the responsibility is not with the British Parliament,
not with the British people, but with the great author of this law.”
112

In this section, I have made the case that Douglass’s commitment to self-
ownership was rooted in his beliefs in ontological individualism, individuality,
universal human equality, and independence. He justified each of these beliefs by
appealing to human nature. Douglass’s natural law case for self-ownership can be
summarized in the following way: he believed the desires and capacities of human
beings entitle them to ownership of their selves. Respect for the principle of self-
ownership requires that other individuals refrain from depriving one another of

111
Ibid., 3:223.
112
Ibid., 3:219.
112
individual rights to life, liberty, property, and to participate in democratic
governance. An individual who owns himself has all of the rights that are denied to
a slave: the right to physical integrity, the right to locomotion, the right to form a
family, the right to acquire property, the right to pursue an education, the right to
worship God, and the right to participate in self-government. In short, an individual
who owns himself has the rights of a liberal citizen.

What is Special about Douglass’s Theory of Self-Ownership?
Now that I have offered a detailed description of Douglass’s view of self-
ownership and how he justified it, I would like to say a brief word about how his
account differs from other formulations of the idea. The differences in his
formulation are important because they make him less susceptible to common
criticisms of the idea and direct us to the ways in which he makes important
contributions to the liberal tradition. Douglass’s account differs from the accounts of
his predecessors in three important ways: his grounding of self-ownership in the
experience of slavery, the comprehensiveness of his formulation, and his willingness
to argue that all people own themselves.
First, Douglass was able to buttress his normative arguments with real-life
illustrations from the experience of slavery. As pointed out earlier in this chapter,
Douglass viewed slavery as the total annihilation of the selfhood of slaves. In order
to support this claim, he drew on his personal experiences. When he spoke of the
criminality of being “robbed of wife, of children, of his hard earnings, of home, of
113
friends, of society, of knowledge, and of all that makes life desirable” he was not
speaking in the abstract.
113
Furthermore, Douglass’s personal experience was
reflective of the national problem of slavery. As he attempted to articulate the
“fundamental principles” which should be the “solid rock, upon which to rest the
foundation of the state,” he drew on the lessons drawn from the personal and national
experience of slavery. This foundation provided Douglass’s case for self-ownership
with extraordinary moral force and persuasive power.
Second, Douglass formulated and defended the idea of self-ownership in a
more comprehensive way than other liberal thinkers. Both Locke and Nozick, for
example, have been accused of privileging the economic aspect of self-ownership.
Locke introduced the idea in his discussion of the labor theory of value and Nozick
discussed the idea in his arguments against economic redistribution. The focus on
the economic aspect of self-ownership provides critics of liberalism with fodder for
the claim that the idea is nothing more than a justification for possessive
individualism. Douglass did not privilege the economic aspect of self-ownership.
Instead, he discussed several aspects of human life that are impacted by the
deprivation of self-ownership: physical integrity, sexual integrity, marriage, family
life, intellectual development, moral flourishing, religious striving, and economic
independence. The comprehensive nature of Douglass’s formulation makes him less
susceptible to the claim that self-ownership is nothing more than a bourgeois
rationalization of possessive individualism.

113
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:267.
114
Third, Douglass separated himself from most of his predecessors in the
liberal tradition by making the case that all people ought to be free. “Upon
reflection,” Joyce Appleby writes, “we can see that the soft underbelly of any
society, at least in ideological terms, is the gap between its shared moral
commitments and day-to-day fidelity to those unifying principles.”
114
The gap in
America’s liberal society was between the promise of freedom expressed in the
Founding documents and the day-to-day exclusion of a vast majority of individuals
from that promise.
115
Douglass relied on a universal formulation of the idea of self-
ownership to make the case that this gap ought to be closed. By incorporating a truly
universal understanding of human equality into his understanding of self-ownership,
he broadened earlier formulations. As political theorist Anthony Arblaster has
pointed out, for example, “it did not occur to anyone except a few radicals and
‘extremists’ that [the principle of self-ownership] might also apply to female human
beings.”
116
We can include Douglass among those radicals and extremists who took
the important step of declaring that the common nature of all human beings provides
the basis for a universal right to self-ownership.
A critic may still wonder if Douglass’s formulation is any better able to
withstand conservative and egalitarian moral criticisms of self-ownership. Recall
that some conservatives oppose self-ownership because they believe it is an

114
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, (New York: New York University Press,
1984), 85.
115
For discussions of the exclusion of most Americans from the liberal promise of freedom in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1999); Mark Kann, On the Man Question, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
116
Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 27.
115
invitation to licentious behavior. This criticism is not appropriate for Douglass
because he did not endorse self-ownership as a means to liberate individuals from
moral restraint. Indeed, he did quite the opposite. You may recall from Chapter 2
that Douglass believed there was an intimate connection between freedom and moral
virtue. “There can be no virtue,” he contended, “without freedom….”
117
On another
occasion, he argued “that freedom is fundamental condition of accountability and the
foundation of all manly virtue.”
118
An individual who is recognized as a self-owner,
Douglass held, feels a stronger sense of moral responsibility because he is the
“author” of his own actions. Individuals who do not own themselves, he argued, do
not feel responsible for their own behavior.
Unable to contract valid marriage, the negro felt himself unrestrained, and
licensed to do as he pleased. He was not expected to limit his conduct by any
rule or principle of morality or decency, but took to himself the freedom of
the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air. He had in law no wife, no
family, no children, and did not own himself.
119

Douglass’s view of self-ownership was not concerned solely with liberation from
restraint. Rather, the realization of self-ownership brings with it a heightened sense
of moral responsibility. Douglass’s self-owning individual is not the libertine feared
by Bork and other conservatives. He is, rather, an individual who is freed from the
arbitrary restraint of ownership by another, but constrained by the heightened sense
of moral responsibility that accompanies personal freedom.

117
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:183.
118
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:212.
119
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:440-1.
116
Egalitarians worry that self-ownership is an invitation for individuals to turn
their backs on one another and pursue lives of possessive individualism. As I have
already pointed out in this chapter, Douglass did not privilege the economic
dimension of self-ownership and, as I pointed out in the last chapter, he did not
embrace an absolutist view of property rights. Instead, he attempted to couple his
embrace of self-ownership with a strong view of moral obligation to others. His
views of human brotherhood and moral obligation are the focus of the next chapter
so I will not develop them in detail here. Suffice it to say that his understanding of
self-ownership did not entail a belief that human beings have no positive obligations
to one another.
Douglass believed the right to self-ownership was the “post in the center of
all rights – strike that down, and down go all rights.”
120
A violation of this right
constitutes nothing less than the greatest crime short of murder: “man-stealing.”
121

According to Douglass, the denial of the right to self-ownership is a rejection of
human dignity. The worst manifestation of this phenomenon was the institution of
slavery, but Douglass thought a similar evil was present in the deprivation of the
rights of women and members of minority groups. When we consider Douglass’s
experiences as a slave, his embrace of self-ownership is imbued with added moral
appeal.

120
Douglass was quoting the abolitionist minister Theodore Dwight Weld, The Frederick Douglass
Papers, 2:462-3.
121
Ibid., 1:330.
117
IV. Conclusion: From Slavery to Self-Ownership
In this chapter, I have explored Douglass’s reflections on slavery and his
moral argument for self-ownership in order to demonstrate how he grounded his
liberal commitments. I argued that he is best understood as a part of the natural
rights strand of liberal thinking, but that he separated himself from others in this
tradition by drawing on the experience of slavery to articulate the commitment to
self-ownership in a comprehensive and morally compelling way. According to
Douglass, slavery deprives individuals of “all that makes life desirable”: physical
security, familial affection, friendship, physical and social mobility, opportunity for
intellectual development, access to material comfort, and the space necessary to
pursue happiness, moral excellence, religious piety, and other ends. Because slavery
denies individuals a voice in their own destinies, it is the antithesis of the liberal
promise of freedom. Douglass thought that slavery was wrong because it permitted
the annihilation of the human personality and that the recognition of each
individual’s right to self-ownership was required by natural law. His hatred of
slavery and attraction to self-ownership are at the foundation of his liberal politics.
His articulation of an experientially-based, universal, moralistic, and comprehensive
theory of self-ownership is an important contribution to the liberal tradition.
In this chapter and the last, I have provided a detailed explanation of
Douglass’s liberal political commitments and the moral foundations of those
commitments in the summum malum of slavery and the justice of self-ownership.
What remains to be seen is why and how he infused this liberalism with a moral
118
vocabulary of civic responsibility. Douglass believed that the “human heart is a
constant seat of war.”
122
Part of human nature is selfish and makes men liable to
violate the rights of others. The other part of human nature is humane and respectful
of the rights of others. This divide in human nature led Douglass to view history as
an “eternal conflict between right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and slavery, truth
and falsehood, the glorious light of love, and the appalling darkness of human
selfishness and sin.”
123
In short, the existence of selfishness in human nature makes
liberty difficult to achieve and maintain. Just as there is a war between selfishness
and humanity going on inside each one of us, there is a struggle between these two
forces in society. As we face these constant personal and social struggles, we are
confronted with an important question: should we go it alone? Douglass did not
think so. The experience of slavery led him to a deep devotion to the liberal idea of
self-ownership while at the same time causing him to believe that the achievement,
maintenance, and promotion of universal freedom best understood as a project that
requires a robust sense of obligation to others. It is to Douglass’s embrace of a
strong theory of civic responsibility that we now turn.

122
Ibid., 3:437-8.
123
Ibid.
119

Chapter 4
“Each for All and All for Each”:
Civic Responsibility in Douglass’s Liberalism

I. Introduction
Frederick Douglass worried about what philosopher Sibyl Schwarzenbach
calls “the problem of social unity – of what it is that generally binds persons together
in a just society.”
1
For Douglass, this problem was concrete and urgent: his primary
political aim was to move Americans to feel a sense of civic responsibility that was
strong enough to move them to take action to close the gap between the moral ideals
of the Declaration of Independence and the realities of American life. In order to
accomplish this task, he infused his liberalism with a moral vocabulary of civic
connection and responsibility. Douglass believed the respect and protection of the
natural rights of all individuals was required by natural law, but the language of
liberal individualism offered insufficient answers to a pressing question of political
morality: what responsibility does a free person have to a slave? He argued that it
was the “first duty” of every American citizen “to use his political as well as his
moral power” to emancipate every slave in the Union.
2
In order to achieve and
maintain liberty, he thought, it is necessary for individuals to behave in responsible
ways. The liberal experiment is best conceived, Douglass thought, as a common
project in which citizens feel a sense of responsibility to one another beyond the duty
to respect rights.

1
Sibyl Schwarzenbach, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics 107 (October 1996), 99.
2
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:155-6.
120
The problem of social unity is notoriously difficult for liberals because
“moral glue” is an elusive substance in an ideology that is individualist and pluralist
in nature. While devotees of collectivist ideologies are more readily able to invoke
the language of solidarity as the basis for a robust philosophy of civic responsibility,
core liberal commitments seem to be in tension with this idea. What reasons do
liberal citizens have to feel a sense of concern about the rights of their neighbors?
The multi-faceted nature of Douglass’s response to this question was a reflection of
the complexity of the subject for liberal thinkers as well as his own dualistic view of
human nature. Over the course of his career, he offered four major rationales for
civic responsibility: human brotherhood, commitment to founding principles, respect
for virtuous action, and self-interest. Douglass appealed to these reasons in order to
infuse his liberalism with a robust commitment to the idea that the project of
achieving and maintaining freedom is best understood as a common one: “each for
all and all for each” became the motto of his civic liberalism.
In this chapter, my aim is to explain the origins, nature, and development of
Douglass’s multi-faceted theory of civic responsibility. I make three central
arguments. First, I contend that Douglass’s attentiveness to civic responsibility was
rooted in the problem of slavery, which brought to center stage the question of what
moral and civic responsibilities individuals have to one another in a liberal
democracy. Second, I argue that Douglass’s understanding of civic responsibility
was complex and evolved over time. Early in his career, he relied on the moral force
of human brotherhood and the founding promise of freedom to make the case that
121
individuals ought to care about others. Later, as he began to appreciate the power of
selfishness in human nature, he emphasized the slightly less morally inspiring basis
of self-interest. Third, I contend that Douglass’s philosophy of civic responsibility is
a crucial part of his attentiveness to moral ecology, an idea described by Robert
Bellah in Habits of the Heart: “Human beings and their societies are deeply
interrelated, and the actions we take have enormous ramifications for the lives of
others.”
3
When we consider this theory of civic responsibility along side the liberal
commitments discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, we begin to get a sense of how these
ideas were so closely linked in his mind. Without a strong ethic of civic
responsibility, Douglass thought, universal freedom cannot be achieved or
maintained and a strong ethic of civic responsibility is developed through the
conscientious actions of individuals.
Before proceeding, I need to clarify what I mean by “civic responsibility.” I
am using this term to describe Douglass’s understanding of what responsibilities
individuals in a community owe to one another. The term “civic” is meant to be
broad enough to include both the political sphere and other social spheres such as the
marketplace. In a sense, Douglass’s understanding of responsibility covered all of
what we might call “public.” The term “responsibility” is intended to capture a
moral vocabulary that includes virtue, duty, and obligation. This moral vocabulary is
made up of the language we use when we talk about what individuals owe to one
another. Taken together, then, Douglass’s theory of civic responsibility is his view

3
Robert Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 284.
122
of what responsibilities individuals have to one another in the political, economic
and other social spheres.
In Part II, I begin my explanation of Douglass’s philosophy of civic
responsibility with a discussion of the problem of slavery, a moral and political issue
that made it necessary for him to explain why free people should care about those
who are not free. The traditional liberal language of individualism offered limited
explanation of why individuals ought to feel responsible to one another, so Douglass
infused it with a strong case for interconnection and mutual responsibility. In Part
III, I offer a detailed explanation of Douglass’s philosophy of civic responsibility. I
argue that his understanding of civic responsibility was complex and multifaceted.
First, I examine his reliance on the idea of human brotherhood. I show that early in
his career, Douglass appealed to the natural bond between human beings and
expressed hope that universal freedom could be achieved through moral suasion.
Second, I explore his arguments rooted in commitment to founding principles. As
Douglass lost some faith in the power of moral suasion, he turned to politics and
attempted to move his fellows to behave in responsible ways by emphasizing the
principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. He
argued that a principled commitment to freedom should lead us to care about the
rights of our fellow citizens. Third, I discuss Douglass’s hope that civic
responsibility might emerge on the basis of respect for virtuous action. After the
many setbacks of the 1850s led him to doubt the efficacy of conventional political
action, he expressed hope that individuals excluded from the promise of freedom
123
could earn the respect and concern of their fellow citizens by exhibiting virtues such
as courage and independence. Fourth, as Douglass became less optimistic about the
willingness of individuals to act on the basis of humanitarian reasons, he began to
appeal to self-interest as a basis for obligation to others. I show that he appealed to
self-interest by arguing that failure to behave in responsible ways weakened “the
sheet anchor of common safety” that protects all of us.
4
In Part IV, I conclude with
some reflections on how Douglass incorporated his case for civic responsibility into
the liberalism described in Chapters 2 and 3. In short, I suggest that he believed the
liberal aim of securing the political conditions necessary for the exercise of personal
freedom could only be achieved in a community of responsible citizens.

II. Civic Responsibility & the Problem of Slavery
Like his basic liberal commitment to universal self-ownership, Douglass’s
attentiveness to the importance of civic responsibility was rooted in the problem of
slavery. His experiences as a slave and abolitionist led him to ask several important
and difficult questions. What responsibilities do free individuals have toward
slaves? Have I fulfilled my obligations as a liberal citizen if I do not own slaves? If
I have civic responsibilities beyond forbearance, what are the reasons for these
responsibilities? The problem of slavery made these questions of civic responsibility
urgent in Douglass’s mind.

4
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:233.
124
Douglass often compared the situation of the slave to that of an innocent
person on a pirate ship. He used the pirate ship analogy to combat alternative
notions of moral and civic responsibility offered by Garrisonian advocates of
disunion and Northern moderates. The pirate ship analogy can be a useful way of
explaining Douglass’s view that there “is no freedom from responsibility for slavery,
but in the Abolition of slavery.”
5

To leave the slave in his chains, in the hands of cruel masters, who are too
strong for him, is not to free ourselves from responsibility. Again: If I were
on board of a pirate ship, with a company of men and women whose lives
and liberties I had put in jeopardy, I would not clear my soul of their blood by
jumping in the long boat, and singing out no union with pirates. My business
would be to remain on board, and while I never would perform a single act of
piracy again, I should exhaust every means given me by my position, to save
the lives and liberties of those against whom I had committed piracy. In like
manner, I hold it is our duty to remain inside this Union, and use all the
power to restore [to the] enslaved millions their precious and God-given
rights. The more we have done by our voice and our votes, in times past, to
rivet their galling fetters, the more clearly and solemnly comes the sense of
duty to remain, to undo what we have done. Where, I ask, could the slave
look for release from slavery if the Union were dissolved?
6

Each character in Douglass’s analogy represents a different segment of antebellum
society: the pirates are the slaveholders, the men and women whose lives and
liberties are in jeopardy are the slaves, and the “I” in the narrative represents
everyone else. He suggested that everyone had some complicity in putting the slaves
“in jeopardy.” This claim was rooted in his belief that both the free and slave states
were to blame for the existence of slavery. In 1846, for example, Douglass told an
audience in London, “I am here to maintain that slavery is not only a matter

5
Ibid., 3:173.
6
Ibid., 3:173-4.
125
belonging to the states south of the line, but is an American institution – a United
States institution – a system that derives its support as well from the non-slave-
holding states, as they are called, as from the slave-holding states.”
7

The central moral question presented by the pirate ship scenario is this: what
is my obligation to the men and women whose lives and liberties are in jeopardy on
the pirate ship? The Garrisonian response is to jump ship and sing out “no union
with pirates.” According to Garrison’s reasoning, if I remove myself from
association with sin, I am no longer complicit in it. Hence, leaving the ship would
absolve me of responsibility. Another response would be to promise that “I never
would perform a single act of piracy again.” This represents the Northern moderate
position of non-extension. According to this perspective, I would be absolved of
responsibility if I left the innocents under the dominion of pirates but promised to not
perform or support piracy in the future. Douglass rejected both of these options in
favor of a strong view of moral responsibility. My “business,” Douglass contended,
would be to stay on board and do all that I can to save the lives and liberties of the
innocents. This view represents the political abolitionist perspective: our obligation
is to commit ourselves morally and politically to combat this gross violation of
liberal principles. From Douglass’s point of view, it was not enough to simply
denounce slavery as immoral or to promise to not allow slavery to extend into new
territories. Instead, it was the obligation of every good liberal citizen to stay in the
Union and work to bring about the abolition of slavery.

7
Ibid., 1:270.
126
In response to the problem of slavery, the language of liberal individualism
can take us only so far. It is certainly true that slavery violates the essential liberal
commitment to personal freedom. Indeed, as Judith Shklar has pointed out, if
universal freedom is essential to liberalism, then “the United States was not a liberal
state until after the Civil War, and even then often in name only.”
8
What is less clear
is how one can rely solely on the language of individualism to make the case that a
free person has any obligation to combat slavery. The problem of slavery presented
Douglass and his contemporaries with a challenge that could not be met by the
language of rights alone. In order to make the case individuals had a moral and
political obligation to abolish slavery Douglass had to develop a philosophy of civic
responsibility that linked liberal citizens to one another. This philosophy of civic
responsibility had implications beyond the task at hand. It also became the basis for
conceiving of the task of maintaining freedom as a common project; it became the
basis for civic liberalism.

III. “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Civic Responsibility in Douglass’s Thought
Above, I argued that the problem of slavery made it necessary for Douglass
to articulate a theory of civic responsibility. In other words, he needed to make a
case that liberal citizens are linked to each other in relevant ways and that they ought
to feel a sense of responsibility to one another beyond mutual forbearance. In this
part, I explain the substance of Douglass’s theory of civic responsibility and argue

8
Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” Political Thought and Political Thinkers, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press), 4.
127
that his case for a strong sense of civic responsibility was multifaceted and complex.
He offered four major reasons for civic responsibility: human brotherhood,
commitment to founding principles, a sense of respect based on virtuous action, and
self-interest. The multi-faceted nature of Douglass’s case is rooted in both
contextual and philosophical factors. Historical context mattered in the sense that as
time went by he became less confident that moral suasion and conventional political
action were going to be sufficient to bring about social change. Philosophically, the
complexity of his case was a reflection of his dualistic view of human nature.
Douglass believed that “nature has two voices,” one that is humane and just and
another that is selfish and prone to injustice.
9
Human beings are essentially good –
they are naturally humane and rational – but they are also “constantly liable to do
evil” – their selfishness can lead them to disregard the voices of humanity and
rationality.
10
The dualism in human nature led Douglass to offer a multifaceted case
for civic responsibility: the idea of human brotherhood appeals to our natural sense
of fellow feeling, the idea of commitment to founding principles to our rationality,
the idea of respect for virtuous behavior to our natural sympathy, and the idea of
self-interest to our natural selfishness. In what follows, I explain Douglass’s view of
civic responsibility and I consider each of the rationales he offered for responsible
behavior.

9
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:251.
10
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:209.
128
What Do Individuals Owe to One Another? Douglass’s View of Civic Responsibility
Before explaining the foundations of civic responsibility in Douglass’s
thought, I must offer a brief explanation of what this idea entailed in his mind. A
responsible citizen is someone who does at least three things: respects the rights of
others, cares whether or not his neighbor’s rights are respected, and treats others
fairly. A society in which individuals did these three things would, in Douglass’s
mind, be well on its way to achieving the promise of freedom.
The first aspect of civic responsibility is clear and requires very little
explanation. As I demonstrated in the last chapter, Douglass believed in the moral
imperative of universal self-ownership and the first duty of every individual is to
respect the natural rights of other individuals. The duty to respect the rights of others
is the fundamental obligation of liberal political morality. As I discussed in Chapter
2, the question of which rights are considered fundamental is a matter of some
dispute. For Douglass, the natural rights to life and liberty were sacrosanct. An
individual is not behaving in a responsible way, then, if he fails to respect his
neighbor’s rights to life or liberty. Furthermore, individuals have conventional rights
that are fundamental within the context of a republican political community. Civil
rights and liberties protected by the Constitution and rights of equal political
participation were also fundamental in Douglass’s mind. As such, an individual fails
to behave in a responsible way if he is complicit in a system that deprives those
rights to individuals on the basis of irrelevant characteristics such as race or sex.
129
Respecting the rights of others was not, for Douglass, the sum of our civic
responsibility. The second aspect of civic responsibility requires that individuals
concern themselves with the rights of their neighbors. With respect to rights,
Douglass believed there are sins of commission and omission. First, an individual is
irresponsible if he commits an act that violates his neighbor’s rights. But an
individual is also irresponsible if he stands by and does nothing while the rights of
his neighbor are being violated. The question of what responsibilities an individual
has when his neighbor’s rights are being violated was at the center of the slavery
controversy and it is the focus of what follows.
Third, Douglass’s understanding of civic responsibility included the idea of
“fair play.” Although his first priority was to see to it that the fundamental rights of
all individuals were respected and protected, he recognized that the promise of
freedom could not be realized by an individual who is subject to systematic
unfairness. Part of the promise of freedom, in Douglass’s view, is that if an
individual works hard and behaves virtuously, he can live a life of relative comfort
and respectability. This part of the promise can not be realized as long as systematic
unfairness persists. After the Civil War, for example, Douglass protested against the
“new slavery” of sharecropping, which set out to keep the negro “landless” and
hence “crush out all aspirations, all hope of progress” and the trucking system,
“which never permits” the laborer “to see or to save a dollar of his hard earnings.”
11

These new economic arrangements were systematically unfair to the freedmen and,

11
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:363-7.
130
as such, undermined the promise of freedom. Failure to challenge unfair forms of
economic organization constituted, on Douglass’s view, irresponsible behavior.
Because the fundamental aim of the liberal polity is to secure the conditions under
which freedom can be realized, failure to address these forms of unfairness is
irresponsible.
Douglass’s understanding of civic responsibility is well within the liberal
family of ideas. Unlike collectivist ideologies that define responsibility in relation to
the state, he always conceived of civic obligations in relation to other individuals and
he linked the idea of civic responsibility to the fundamental aim of protecting and
promoting freedom. The difficulty for Douglass, as with other liberals, is the
question of how to justify even this relatively thin theory of civic responsibility.
While fascists can appeal to the glory of the state, communists can appeal to the
solidarity of the working class, and civic republicans can appeal to organic notions of
the common good as the bases for robust theories of civic responsibility, liberals face
a more complicated task. On what bases can an individualist and pluralist ideology
justify a robust theory of civic responsibility? It is to Douglass’s responses to this
question that we now turn.

131
“Nature Makes Us Friends”: Brotherhood as the Basis for Civic Responsibility
The first set of arguments Douglass offered as the basis for a strong sense of
civic responsibility were rooted in universal human brotherhood.
12
Unlike liberal
thinkers who believe that human beings are naturally asocial or antisocial, he
believed in natural sociality. “Man,” he wrote, “is a social as well as an individual
being” and “individual isolation is unnatural, unprogressive, and against the highest
interests of man” and “society is required, by the natural wants and necessities
inherent in human existence.”
13
In addition to positing the natural sociality of man,
Douglass contended that human beings are endowed with natural love for one
another. He believed that “nature makes us friends.” His autobiographical writings
provide several examples of what he interpreted as the exhibition of the feeling of
“natural love in our fellow creatures.”
14
In My Bondage and My Freedom, for
example, Douglass pointed to evidence for natural human goodness by drawing on
his experiences with children. When he was a young boy, he refined his reading
skills by bribing his white playmates with bread. During these sessions, he liked to
discuss slavery with the white children. “I wish I could be free, as you will be when
you get to be men,” Douglass would say. He described the scenes that followed.
Words like these, I observed, always troubled them; and I had no small
satisfaction in wringing from the boys, occasionally, that fresh and bitter

12
When Douglass used the term “human brotherhood” he intended for women to be included. When
Douglass was thinking of changing the name of his newspaper, one of the possibilities was “The
Brotherhood,” but he rejected this name because he worried it “implies an exclusion of the
sisterhood.”
13
Ibid., 5:209.
14
Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, 113. Goldstein calls this the “Divinely or
naturally implanted sentiment of human brotherly love.” See Goldstein, “The Political Thought of
Frederick Douglass,” 60-1.
132
condemnation of slavery, that springs from nature, unseared [sic] and
unperverted [sic]. Of all consciences, let me have those to deal with which
have not been bewildered by the cares of life. I do not remember ever to
have met with a boy, while I was in slavery, who defended the slave system;
but I have often had boys to console me, with the hope that something would
yet occur, by which I might be made free.
15

Children provided Douglass with an image of human nature uncorrupted. The fact
that the children he encountered had a natural abhorrence of slavery was evidence to
him that human beings are endowed with a natural affection for others.
Although children are the most likely to embody natural affection, adults are
able to exhibit this tendency as well. When Douglass was about ten years old, he
was sent to live with Thomas and Sophia Auld in Baltimore. Sophia Auld, who had
not been a slaveholder prior to Douglass’s arrival, seemed to him to be the
embodiment of innate human goodness: “She was, naturally, of an excellent
disposition, kind, gentle, and cheerful.”
16
Although Mrs. Auld was eventually
corrupted by “the natural influence of slavery customs,” her initial reaction to
Douglass’s arrival was one of “natural sweetness.” “At first,” Douglass wrote, “Mrs.
Auld regarded me simply as a child, like any other child; she had not come to regard
me as property.”
17
Auld’s natural affection for Douglass led her to treat him much
like one of her own children. She fed him well, treated him with respect and even
began teaching him to read before her husband forbade her from doing so. Although
Sophia Auld ended up becoming cold and bitter toward Douglass, his initial

15
Ibid., 115-116.
16
Ibid., 105.
17
Ibid., 107.
133
experience with her contributed to his view that human beings have a natural
tendency toward goodness.
Douglass also thought natural human goodness was shown by our tendency
to shudder at the sight or thought of physical violence. In a speech given after John
Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry, Douglass offered these thoughts.
Every feeling of the human heart was naturally outraged at [the raid on
Harper’s Ferry], and hence at the moment the air was full of denunciation and
execration. So intense was this feeling that few ventured to whisper a word
of apology.… Let no word be said against this holy feeling; more than to law
and government are we indebted to this tender sentiment of regard for human
life for the safety with which we walk the streets by day and sleep secure in
our beds at night. It is nature’s grand police, vigilant and faithful, sentineled
[sic] in the soul, guarding against violence to peace and life.
18

Douglass made a similar argument in a speech after a mob killed a man who was
attempting to capture a runaway slave:
The shedding of human blood at first sight, and without explanation is, and
must ever be, regarded with horror; and he who takes pleasure in human
slaughter is very properly looked upon as a moral monster.… These tender
feelings so susceptible to pain, are most wisely designed by the Creator, for
the preservation of life. They are, especially, the affirmation of God,
speaking through nature, and asserting man’s right to live.
19

Rather than offering a dark picture of human beings as naturally depraved, wolf-like
creatures that enjoy doing violence to one another, Douglass argued that affection for
human life is a part of our nature.
Douglass offered both divine and secular versions of the argument for human
brotherhood. Early in his career, when he was convinced that slavery continued to
exist because it was considered religiously “respectable,” he emphasized the idea of

18
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:10.
19
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:285.
134
Divine Fatherhood. Emancipation, he argued, ought to be motivated by “the pure,
single-eyed spirit of benevolence” rooted in “the heavenly teachings of Christianity,
which everywhere teaches that God is our Father, and man, however degraded, is our
brother.”
20
By the 1890s, his arguments were more secular in character. Reflecting
on his career as a humanitarian reformer, he described his motivation in this way: “In
the essential dignity of man as man, I find all necessary incentives and aspirations to
a useful and noble life. Manhood is broad enough, and high enough as a platform for
you and me and all of us.”
21
Human brotherhood was, for Douglass, a powerful
moral idea. Whether one believes that all human beings are children of God or that
all men are dignified by virtue of their humanity, the appeal to human brotherhood is
one possible basis for a strong notion of civic responsibility.
Douglass usually discussed the idea of human brotherhood in connection
with the abolitionist movement. Abolitionists were moved by two fundamental
beliefs: the inviolability of the right to self-ownership and the universal brotherhood
of humanity. He believed the idea of human brotherhood was enough to move
morally good men to feel a sense of responsibility to others. “Every well-formed
man,” Douglass said, “finds no rest to his soul while any portion of his species
suffers from a recognized evil.”
22
True humanity, he argued, consists “in a
disposition of the heart” to remedy such evils “as they unfold.” True virtue, he
continued, “should prompt men to charitable exertions in correcting abuses.”
23
If

20
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:195.
21
Ibid., 5:625.
22
Ibid., 5:129.
23
Ibid., 4:190. Douglass was paraphrasing the words of British abolitionist Charles James Fox.
135
only the rest of the nation would follow their hearts, Douglass thought, slavery
would fall.

“Our Civic Catechism”: Founding Principles as the Basis for Civic Responsibility
Douglass once called the Declaration of Independence our “civic catechism.”
The fundamental commitment of the Declaration, as he read it, was to universal
freedom. One way to link the individuals to one another was by way of appeal to
this central founding principle. The second major rationale for civic responsibility
offered by Douglass is what I am calling commitment to founding principles.
According to this argument, one’s feeling of obligation is rooted less in a sense of
connection with others than it is in a devotion to the idea of freedom. In making the
case for abolition and full citizenship, Douglass often appealed to this commitment
as the basis for linking individuals together. In other words, he thought that even if
you do not love your neighbor you may love freedom enough to care if his rights are
violated.
Douglass’s understanding of the power of moral commitment was rooted in
his reflections on the Southern “slaveocracy.” He argued that slavery was able to
persist in the South because it begot “a character in the whole network of society
surrounding it, favorable to its continuance.” The “friends of slavery,” he said, “are
bound by the necessity of their system to do just what the history of the country
shows they have done – that is, to seek to subvert all liberty, and to pervert all the
136
safeguards of human rights.”
24
The friends of freedom, Douglass argued, ought to
learn a lesson from the friends of slavery. In order to achieve and maintain a
political ideal, a moral ecology supportive of its existence must be developed. This
moral ecology “shapes” individuals in a way that promotes the political ideals.
Just as the friends of slavery acted in ways consistent with their devotion to
the idea of slavery, the friends of freedom, Douglass contended, should be devoted to
the idea of freedom and act accordingly. During the periods of Civil War and
Reconstruction, he often appealed to founding principles as the basis for civic
connection and responsibility.
In order to have union, either in the family, in the church, or in the State,
there must be unity of idea and sentiment in all essential interests. Find a
man’s treasure, and you have found his heart. Now, in the North, freedom is
the grand and all-comprehensive condition of comfort, prosperity, and
happiness. All our ideas and sentiments grow out of this free element. Free
speech, free soil, free men, free schools, free inquiry, free suffrage, equality
before the law, are the natural outgrowths of freedom. Freedom is the center
of our Northern social system. It warms life into every other interest, and
makes it beautiful in our eyes. Liberty is our treasure, and our hearts dwell
with it, and receive its actuating motives.
25

Douglass’s hope was that men could be so devoted to freedom – the value he
identified as the center of the Northern social system – that they would be moved to
action on behalf of their neighbors. They would conceive of their “interests,” he
hoped, in such a way that concerned them with the liberty of others.
To a liberal mind, this may seem like a decidedly more promising rationale
for civic responsibility than human brotherhood. Whereas language like fraternity

24
Ibid., 3:444.
25
Ibid., 3:480.
137
and community often seems to be rooted in irrational or emotional interpersonal
affection, civic connection based on commitment to founding principles appeals to
our reason.
26
I express concern when my neighbor is deprived of his liberty not
because I love him as a brother, but because I am deeply committed to personal
freedom as an ideal of political morality. This may seem like a more reasonable
basis than brotherhood and it seems better suited to a pluralistic society, where
inclusive bases for interpersonal affection are hard to find.
But is the conversion of minds to the idea of freedom possible? Douglass
thought so. He argued that the rational faculty enabled human beings to understand
the truth of the natural rights philosophy at the foundation of liberalism. According
to his view, these truths are “easily rendered appreciable to the faculty of reason in
man.”
27
He contended that the “human mind is so constructed as that, when left free
from the blinding and hardening power of selfishness, it bows reverently to the
mandates of truth and justice.”
28
This belief provided Douglass with some hope that
a just social order could be achieved if “free discussion” was allowed.
[L]ittle hope would there be for this world covered with error as with a cloud
of thick darkness, and studded with all abounding injustice, wrong,
oppression, intemperance, and monopolies, bigotry, superstition, King-craft,
priest-craft, pride of race, prejudice of color, chattel-slavery – the grand sum
of all human woes and villainies – if there were not in man, deep down, and it
may be very deep down, in his soul or in the truth itself, an elective power, or
an attractive force, call it by what name you will, which makes truth in her

26
For a discussion of the irrational element of many theories of community, see Robert Booth Fowler,
The Dance with Community, 3.
27
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:46. See also, Goldstein, “The Political Thought of Frederick
Douglass,” 41.
28
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:437.
138
simple beauty and excellence, ever preferred to the grim and ghastly powers
of error.
29

Douglass seemed to think there is something mysterious about the human attraction
to truth. Whatever the source of this attraction, he believed that something in the
human constitution was drawn to it. If human beings realize the moral rightness of
universal freedom, Douglass hoped, they might feel a sense of connection with and
responsibility to those deprived of it.
Could commitment to founding principles serve as an actuating motive for
civic responsibility? Particularly in the 1850s, Douglass expressed some hope that it
could. His emphasis on commitment to founding principles manifested itself
politically in his shift from the Garrisonian focus on moral suasion to the political
abolitionist case for state action to abolish slavery. In the late 1840s, Douglass
rejected the Garrisonian reading of the Constitution as proslavery and, in 1851, he
announced his conversion to the antislavery reading developed by Lysander Spooner,
Gerrit Smith, and William Goodell.
30
The question of whether Douglass converted
to antislavery constitutionalism on the basis of principle or pragmatism is beyond my
scope here. What is important for my purposes is the ways in which the conversion
impacted his case for civic responsibility. When he announced his conversion in The
North Star, Douglass wrote that he now believed it was “the first duty of every
American citizen, whose conscience permits him to do so, to use his political as well

29
Ibid., 3:553.
30
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:54.
139
as his moral power for [slavery’s] overthrow.”
31
The basis of this “first duty,”
Douglass could now argue, was devotion to the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution – the two basic expressions of American political morality.

“We Must Be Respected”: Proving Oneself Worthy of Civic Respect & Concern
So far, I have described two bases of civic responsibility in Douglass’s
thought: human brotherhood and commitment to founding principles. The third
foundation is what I am calling respect for virtuous action. Rather than being based
on natural love or human reason, this sense of civic responsibility is based on respect
gained through action. In other words, even if I do not believe you are entitled to
rights simply because you are human, I may come to believe you are entitled to them
as a matter of merit. As a foundation for civic responsibility, respect for virtuous
action is intriguing from a liberal perspective because it emphasizes the importance
of individual initiative. This behavior-based argument is rooted in the notion that
individuals can “earn” the respect of others by acting in particular ways. The idea
that the moral and civic behavior of others can be impacted by individual initiative
may seem like a more promising basis for civic responsibility than the bases
described above, which rely on human sentiment and reason respectively. In this
section, I provide an explanation of Douglass’s discussions of the types of behavior
that can earn the civic respect and concern of others.

31
Ibid.
140
Douglass’s belief that individual behavior could impact self-respect and
shape the attitudes and proclivities of others was rooted deep in his own experience.
His famous fight with Edward Covey, a man “who enjoyed the execrated reputation,
of being a first rate hand at breaking young negroes,” served as the foundation for
this view.
32
As a young slave, Douglass began to exhibit “character” and “conduct”
that was troubling to his master, Thomas Auld. In order to correct this, Auld sent
Douglass to live with Covey, a man who was charged with the task of breaking the
wills of “difficult” slaves. Douglass endured several beatings at the hands of Covey
before he famously “resolved to fight” back. Douglass claimed that the next time
Covey attacked him, they engaged in an epic battle, Douglass prevailed, and Covey
never set a finger on him again.
In Douglass’s first autobiography, Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Douglass, An American Slave, published in 1845, he concluded his description of the
fight with Covey with these words:
This battle with Mr. Covey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It
rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense
of my own manhood. It recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired
me again with a determination to be free. The gratification afforded by the
triumph was a full compensation for whatever else might follow, even death
itself. He only can understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced,
who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never
felt before. It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the
heaven of freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold
defiance took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I might remain
a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact. I
did not hesitate to let it be known of me, that the white man who expected to
succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me.
33

32
Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies, (New York: Library of America, 1994), 256.
33
Autobiographies, 65.
141

Ten years later, in My Bondage and My Freedom, Douglass’s account of the fight
with Covey is nearly identical, but he added a couple of lines that are important for
the argument I am making here: “I was nothing before; I WAS A MAN NOW…. A
man, without force, is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so
constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even
this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not arise.”
34

The importance of this example for the argument I am making here may not
be clear, so allow me to explain. Although it would not be fair to say that Douglass’s
courageous behavior earned him the respect of Covey (or any third party), he drew
some important lessons from the episode. After a particularly savage beating at the
hands of the slave-breaker, Douglass went to his master, Thomas Auld, “humbly to
invoke the interposition of his power and authority, to protect me from further abuse
and violence.” Douglass hoped that Auld might be moved to intervene by “motives
of humanity” or even “selfish” concerns about abuse to his property. According to
Douglass, Auld responded by “finding excuses for Covey, and ending with a full
justification of him, and a passionate condemnation of me.”
35
The appeal to Auld’s
humanity and reason failed to liberate Douglass from Covey’s lash, so he was moved
to action. Douglass’s heroic fight with Covey enlivened in him a sense of self-
respect that he described as a “resurrection.” Through action, he proved to himself
that he was worthy of respect. It is clear that the lines added to Douglass’s account

34
Ibid., 286. Emphases in original.
35
Autobiographies, 274-5.
142
in My Bondage and My Freedom are intended to endow his existential
transformation with broader moral and political significance. By 1855, Douglass’s
optimistic view of human nature was already beginning to fade. Although he had
once expressed hope that slavery could be abolished by appealing to the reason and
humanitarian sentiments of human nature, he was now prepared to say that the
recognition of human dignity may require something more. The fight with Covey
taught Douglass that when reason and morality fail to bring about change, action
may be necessary. Although it is probably too much to say that Douglass’s action
earned him the respect of Covey, it is clear that his respect for himself grew and
Covey’s changed attitude led Douglass to reach important conclusions about human
nature.
The inclusion of the emphasis on the relationship between action, dignity,
and honor in My Bondage and My Freedom paralleled changes in Douglass’s
antislavery rhetoric. During the 1840s and 1850s, he appealed to human brotherhood
and founding principles because he thought American hearts and minds would
respond and do the right the thing. After the many setbacks of the 1850s, his faith
was wavering. In an important 1860 essay, “The Prospect in the Future,” Douglass’s
shift to an emphasis on earning concern and respect is evident. He began the essay
by acknowledging that abolitionists had “reached a point of weary hopelessness.”
Whereas Douglass had once believed that enlightenment would bring about
emancipation, he now recognized that this was not to be. The American people
acknowledge the “horrid truths” of slavery, “but they are not moved to action.”
143
An able advocate of human rights gratifies their intellectual tastes, pleases
their imaginations, titillates their sensibilities into a momentary sensation, but
does not move them from the downy seat of inaction. They are familiar with
every note in the scale of abstract rights, from the Declaration of
Independence to the orations of Charles Sumner, but seem to regard the
whole as a grand operatic performance, of which they are mere spectators.
You cannot relate a new fact, or frame an unfamiliar argument on this
subject. – Reason and morality have emptied their casket of richest jewels
into the lap of this cause, in vain.
36

Douglass’s loss of faith in reason and morality is striking, but not surprising. The
1850s were difficult for abolitionists. The Congressional compromises, the Dred
Scott decision, and the execution of John Brown were, for abolitionists like
Douglass, indications that most Americans were not sufficiently moved by appeals to
human brotherhood or the “civic catechism of the Declaration of Independence” to
do the right thing. The big question was why: “What is the explanation for this
terrible paradox of passing history?”
37

Douglass said the problem is not that the American people “fail to appreciate
the value of liberty.” History, he wrote, demonstrates that they “have shown great
courage and patriotism in defending their own freedom, but have utterly failed in the
magnanimity and philanthropy necessary to prompt respect for the rights of another
and a weaker race….” It is not, he continued, “because we fail to appreciate or lack
the courage to defend our own rights that we permit the existence of slavery among
us, but it is because our patriotism is intensely selfish, our courage lacks generosity,
and our love of liberty is circumscribed by our narrow and wicked selfhood, that we

36
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:494.
37
Ibid., 2:495.
144
quietly permit a few tyrants to crush a weak people in our midst.”
38
Douglass
declared that our national character was based on the selfish philosophy of Cain.
We, as a nation, look at the plight of the slave and ask, “Am I my brother’s keeper?”
Where, in the midst of such a moral abyss, could the slave turn? “The motive
power which shall liberate the slave must be looked for in slavery itself – must be
generated in the bosom of the bondman. Outside philanthropy never disenthralled
any people.”
39
Douglass said that while “our” philanthropy, sense of justice, religion,
and politics have all failed to motivate action, “there is a latent element in our
national character which, if fairly called into action, will sweep anything down in its
course. The American people admire courage displayed in defense of liberty, and
will catch the flame of sympathy from the sparks of its heroic fire.”
40
Unlike the
sympathy based on human brotherhood which is rooted in the simple fact of shared
humanity, the sympathy based on merit depends upon action.
41
Throughout the
1850s, Douglass had doubted the practical wisdom of slave revolts, but by late 1860,
his state of “weary hopelessness” led him to conclude that “the mere animal instincts
and sympathies of [the American] people will do more for [American slaves] than
has been accomplished by a quarter of a century of oratorical philanthropy.”
42

Douglass concluded the essay by expressing regret that we had reached this point,

38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., 496.
40
Ibid., 497.
41
In philosophical terms, sympathy from brotherhood is an a priori view of human dignity and
sympathy from merit is an a posteriori view of human dignity.
42
Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies, 497.
145
offered some hope that once slavery was abolished and the moral ecology of
American society was changed, a more humane politics might emerge.
We can never cease to regret that an appeal to the higher and better elements
of human nature is, in this case, so barren of fitting response. But so it is, and
until this people have passed through several generations of humanitarian
culture, so it will be. – In the meantime the slave must continue to suffer or
rebel, and did they know their strength they would not wait the tardy growth
of our American sense of justice.
43

The shift in Douglass’s rhetorical emphasis from reason and morality to courageous
action mirrors the transformation that had taken place years earlier in his battle with
Covey. If the higher elements of human nature do not actuate a change in the
behavior of others, he concluded, courageous action may be necessary. Such action
can serve to endow the oppressed with a sense of self-respect and it may move third
parties to feel oppressed groups are worthy of concern.
During the Civil War, Douglass relied on a similar argument as one of
reasons for black enlistment. Your enlistment, he told his audiences, may give others
reason to respect you as a human being and fellow citizen. Douglass fifth, sixth, and
seventh reasons for enlistment provide great examples of his arguments for earning
the civic respect and concern of others.
Fifth. You are a member of a long enslaved and despised race. Men have set
down your submission to Slavery and insult, to a lack of manly courage.
They point to this fact as demonstrating your fitness only to be a servile class.
You should enlist and disprove the slander, and wipe out the reproach. When
you shall be seen nobly defending the liberties of your own country against
rebels and traitors – brass itself will blush to use such arguments imputing
cowardice against you.
44

43
Ibid.
44
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 3:342.
146
Sixth. Whether you are or are not, entitled to all the rights of citizenship in
this country has long been a matter of dispute to your prejudice. By enlisting
in the service of your country at this trial hour, and upholding the National
Flag, you stop the mouths of traducers and win applause from the iron lips of
ingratitude. Enlist and you make this your country in common with all other
men born in the country or out of it.

Seventh. Enlist for your own sake. Decried and derided as you have been
and still are, you need an act of this kind by which to recover you own self-
respect. You have to some extent rated your value by the estimate of your
enemies and hence have counted yourself less than you are. You owe it to
yourself and your race to rise from your social debasement and take your
place among the soldiers of your country, a man among men. Depend upon
it, the subjective effect of this one act of enlisting will be immense and highly
beneficial. You will stand more erect, walk more assured, feel more at ease,
and be less liable to insult than you ever were before. He who fights the
battles of America may claim America as his country – and have that claim
respected. Thus in defending your country now against rebels and traitors
you are defending your own liberty, honor, manhood and self-respect.
45

First, Douglass connected “manly courage” with “fitness” for freedom. By taking
action in defense of the Union, black men could demonstrate themselves to be
worthy of the respect of others. Second, Douglass made the related point that service
to the country would entitle black men to “all the rights of citizenship” enjoyed by
other Americans. Just as the display of manly courage should demonstrate that black
men are not fit for slavery, so it should demonstrate that they are fit for equal
citizenship. Third, Douglass connected enlistment with self-respect. Just as he
identified his fight with Covey as a moment of existential transformation that made
him worthy of honor and respect, Douglass hoped that the black man could become
“a man among men” by fighting for his rights.

45
Ibid., 342-3.
147
Douglass’s reflections on the fight with Covey, the speech on “The Prospect
in the Future,” and his arguments for black enlistment provide evidence that he
believed exhibition of courage might foster self-respect and the respect of others.
Through action, those excluded from the promise of freedom could undermine the
notion that they were content with their condition and, hence, gain the respect of
others. We must, Douglass declared, “struggle and make sacrifices for our rights. I
hold that next to the dignity of being a freeman, is the dignity of striving to be
free.”
46
If one’s dignity is not acknowledged on the basis of human brotherhood or a
moral commitment to freedom, perhaps it might be acknowledged in response to
courageous action.
Courage is not the only virtue Douglass thought could lead to greater civic
concern and respect. Throughout his writings, he emphasized the importance of
independence for self-respect and the respect of others. This is yet another example
of Douglass offering a merit-based argument for civic responsibility. Prior to the
Civil War, he urged a black audience to demonstrate by their behavior that slavery
and other forms of subordination were unjust.
The world says the black man is unfit to live in a mixed society – to enjoy,
and rightly appreciate the blessings of independence – that he must have a
master, to govern him, and the lash to stimulate him to labor. Let us be
prepared to afford, in our lives and conversation, an example of how
grievously we are wronged by such a prevailing opinion of our race. Let us
prove, by facts, not by theory, that independence belongs to our nature, in
common with all mankind, - that we have intelligence to use it rightly, when
acquired, and capabilities to ascend to the loftiest elevations of the human
mind. Let such examples be given in the mental cultivation, and moral

46
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:210.
148
regeneration of our children, as they increase in knowledge, in virtue and in
every ennobling principle in man’s nature.
47

On another occasion, Douglass put this point in even starker terms: “Men are not
valued in this country, or any country, for what they are; they are valued for what
they can do. It is in vain that we talk about being men, if we do not the work of men.
We must show that we can do as well as be…. Society is a hard-hearted affair.”
48

Statements like these are an indication that Douglass believed the concern and
respect of one’s fellows does not always follow from the dictates of reason or
morality. Sometimes this concern and respect has to be earned through virtuous
action. After the war, Douglass continued to offer this message as an essential part
of the quest for full citizenship and assimilation into American society. The
American people “can pity us as they can sympathize with us. But we need
something more than sympathy – something more than pity. We must be respected.
And we cannot be respected unless we are either independent or aiming to be.”
49

The importance of what we do, as opposed to what we are, as a part of
Douglass’s understanding of civic responsibility is also evident in his decidedly
unsentimental understanding of friendship. In 1854, Douglass delivered an address
to the Odd Fellows Festival in Rochester, New York. The Odd Fellows are a
fraternal organization and the Festival was held to collect funds for indigent blacks.
50

The Odd Fellows called themselves “United Friends” so Douglass took the occasion
to speak to the group about the subject of friendship. “The central idea of

47
Ibid., 2:536. Italics mine.
48
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:224.
49
Ibid., 4:394.
50
Ibid., 2:451.
149
friendship,” Douglass said, “and the main pillar of it is ‘trust.’ Where there is no
trust, there is no friendship. We cannot love those whom we cannot trust. The basis
of all trust is truth. There can be no trust – lasting trust – where truth is not. Men
must be true to each other, or they cannot trust each other.”
51
An alternative
explanation, he said, is that love forms the basis of friendship. Douglass rejected this
idea and says that love “simply crowns and glorifies a friendship already established
on the basis of ‘TRUTH and TRUST.’” Furthermore, love is not the basis for the
“perpetuation” of a friendship already established. A friendship is perpetuated,
Douglass said, when men are “true to each other.” “Do all that you promise to do,”
he instructed, “and as much more as you can.” This is “of vital importance” because
no society “can hang together without” friendship.
52

Douglass’s trust-based account of friendship is relevant to the account of
civic responsibility being explored in this section. His claim that no society can hang
together without friendship is an indication that he accepted the importance of “civic
friendship.” Civic friendship, which was introduced into the Western tradition by
Aristotle and is part of many contemporary communitarian and civic liberal theories,
is said to exist when individuals within a polity feel a sense of mutual affection,
concern, respect, and trust with their fellow citizens. Rather than relying on mutual
affection as the basis of friendship, Douglass relied on mutual trust, which is
developed on the basis of action: Do all you promise to do and as much more as you
can. Rather than appealing to common humanity or mutual love, Douglass urged us

51
Ibid., 2:452. Emphasis in original.
52
Ibid., 2:453.
150
to prove ourselves worthy of friendship, civic or otherwise, by acting in ways that
will earn the respect and trust of others.
Douglass believed respect could be developed as a result of virtuous action.
Once respect is “earned,” Douglass hoped, individuals might be willing to feel a
stronger sense of connection with and responsibility to fellow citizens. This action-
based theory of civic responsibility may be less morally inspiring than the appeals to
brotherhood and freedom, but it may be more realistic. In an ideal world, our
common humanity or belief in freedom would be enough to move men to behave
justly and act against injustice, but as a former slave and a frustrated reformer,
Douglass was unable to entertain such idealism for long. When argument fails to
convince people that their fellows are worthy of concern and respect, action may be
necessary to demonstrate merit.

“The Sheet Anchor of Common Safety”: The Appeal to Self-Interest
We have now seen that Douglass’s arguments for a strong sense of civic
responsibility underwent some transformation over time. As a young and idealistic
Garrisonian abolitionist, he believed that the moral appeal of universal human
brotherhood would move men to action on behalf of their enslaved brethren. As he
began to lose faith in Garrisonian moral suasion, he turned to politics and began to
make the case that abolition was required by the moral commitments embodied in
the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. As antislavery politics continued
to suffer setbacks throughout the 1850s, Douglass admitted to feeling a sense of
151
hopelessness. Reason and morality had been exhausted on behalf of the slave, but to
no avail. With reason, morality, and conventional politics having done little to
advance the cause of the slave, Douglass began to appeal to “mere animal instincts
and sympathies.” If reason and morality have not moved men, he thought, perhaps
the oppressed could prove themselves worthy of respect by acting courageously.
Perhaps if slaves rise up against their oppressors, Douglass hoped, Northerners
would deem them worthy of respect and a sense of civic connection and
responsibility would develop.
The final basis for civic responsibility in Douglass’s thought appeals to an
essential part of human nature, “the spirit of selfishness.” When all else fails,
individuals might be moved to behave in responsible ways, he thought, by appealing
to their self-interest. Douglass argued that a stronger sense of civic responsibility
would benefit everyone. A moral ecology of civic responsibility, he reasoned, makes
all of our rights more secure and makes our communities more hospitable to
economic, intellectual, and moral progress. In this section, I examine Douglass’s
appeal to self-interest as a basis for civic responsibility.
As Douglass became more and more frustrated with the lack of antislavery
progress during the 1850s, he relied increasingly on self-interest as a rationale for
responsible behavior. How could self-interest be used to motivate free people to feel
a stronger sense of responsibility to the slaves? In order to appeal to the fear of
Northerners, abolitionists often warned of a “slaveholders’ conspiracy” – a plot by
152
the Southerners to extend slavery over as much of the nation as possible.
53
This
conspiracy was a threat to free Northerners not because they were likely to be
enslaved but because slaveholders would be willing to trample on the rights of all
Americans in order to accomplish their nefarious aims. Douglass’s use of the
“slaveholders’ conspiracy” is an example of appealing to the self-interest of an
audience in order to get them to feel a stronger sense of civic responsibility.
Douglass appealed to self-interest by making arguments that everyone
benefits from responsible behavior. This is a sort of “we are all in the same boat”
argument for civic responsibility. Douglass often defended the principle “each for
all and all for each” by appealing to self-interest: “The principle involved [in the
struggle for equal rights] is one for which every man ought to contest. It involves the
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and it is the business of every
American citizen, white and black, to stand for this principle, each for all, and all for
each, as the sheet anchor of common safety.”
54
It is my business to stand up for the
rights of others, Douglass seemed to be saying, because my willingness to do so
would strengthen the “sheet anchor” that protects my rights. Responsible behavior by
citizens, he suggested, was the foundation of the freedom protected by republican
government. Rather than feeling threatened by the inclusion of more individuals in
the civic community, Douglass argued that we should welcome this development
because it strengthens our freedom.

53
For Douglass’s discussions of “the slave power,” see The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:97, 114.
54
Ibid., 4:233.
153
The old doctrine that the slavery of the black is essential to the freedom of the
white race, can maintain itself only in the presence of slavery, where interest
and prejudice are the controlling powers, but it stands condemned equally by
reason and experience. The statesmanship of to-day condemns and
repudiates it as a shallow pretext for oppression. It belongs with the
commercial fallacies exposed long ago by Adam Smith. It stands on a level
with the contemptible notion, that every crumb of bread that goes into
another man’s mouth, is just so much bread taken from mine…. As with
political economy, so with political rights. The more men you make free, the
more freedom is strengthened, and the more men you give an interest in the
welfare and safety of the State, the greater is the security of the State.
55

Douglass was, in effect, transforming one of Smith’s classical economic ideas into
political terms: it is not from the benevolence of our neighbor that he feels a sense of
responsibility to us, but from his regard for his own self-interest. If each person lives
by the principle “each for all and all for each,” Douglass argued, all of our rights will
be more secure.
Douglass extended the self-interest argument to economic matters as well. In
1889, as blacks were still being systematically discriminated against in the South, he
delivered a speech on the so-called “Negro Problem.” He was hopeful that
Northerners would intervene once again on behalf of Southern blacks: “There is yet
good reason to believe in the virtue of the loyal American people. They hate fraud,
loathe rapine, and despise meanness.”
56
He expressed less faith in the virtue of
Southerners, but there was still some basis for hope that they would begin to behave
in responsible ways. A great moral revolution would not take place over night but
perhaps, Douglass thought, the selfish side of human nature might move them to
alter their treatment of blacks.

55
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:48.
56
Ibid., 5:424.
154
There is still another ground of hope for the freemen of the southern states. It
is that the good citizens of these states cannot afford, and will not consent, to
lag far behind the old free states in all the elements of civilization. They
want population, capital, invention, and enterprise. They have rich resources
to be developed, and they want both men and money to develop them and
enhance their prosperity. The wise and loyal people in these states know
very well that they can never be prosperous; that they can never have their
share of immigration at home or abroad, while they are known and
distinguished for intolerance, fraud, violence, and lynch law…. Thus the
self-interest of the people of these states will yet teach them justice,
humanity, and civilization.
57

Twenty years after the conclusion of the Civil War, Douglass had little hope that
Southern culture would be reformed on the basis of humanitarianism or a
rediscovery of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Instead, he
thought, the best hope for Southern blacks was an appeal to the self-interest of their
white oppressors.
In this section, I have suggested that the last reason offered by Douglass in
his case for civic responsibility was self-interest. He appealed to the self-interest of
Northerners by warning of the rise of the “slave power,” which sought to extend its
dominion throughout the Union. The second dimension of the self-interest argument
was more positive in nature: a stronger sense of civic responsibility in our
communities will benefit all of us in both political and economic terms. Politically,
the prevalence of civic responsibility will benefit all of us because it will strengthen
“the sheet anchor of common safety,” which is the best protection for all of our
rights. Economically, responsible behavior will establish conditions that are more
hospitable to development and prosperity. Development and prosperity, Douglass

57
Ibid., 5:424-5.
155
contended, is beneficial to the community not only because of the material comfort it
provides but also because it provides the basis for intellectual and moral
flourishing.
58

IV. Conclusion: The Moral Ecology of Civic Liberalism
For Douglass, a responsible citizen is an individual who respects the rights of
others, treats others fairly, and cares if the rights of others are being violated. He
believed responsible behavior could be justified by human brotherhood, commitment
to founding principles, respect for virtuous action, or self-interest. This multi-
faceted view was rooted in both contextual and philosophical factors. Contextually,
Douglass’s faith in human nature and hope for peaceful social change waned as
abolitionists failed to make progress through the 1840s and 1850s. Philosophically,
the complexity of his view was rooted in his dualistic theory of human nature. Part
of human nature is good – rational, humane, and responsive to moral truth – but there
is also a part of human nature that selfishly disregards rationality, humanity, and
moral truth. Although the duality of human nature is inescapable, the battle between
the spirit of humanity and the spirit of selfishness is influenced by moral ecology.
Douglass believed human beings are, to some extent, shaped by the moral
atmosphere that surrounds them. The task of achieving and securing liberty requires
the creation and maintenance of a moral ecology that promotes responsible behavior.

58
I will return to this matter in Chapter 5.
156
Douglass’s concern for moral ecology was rooted in his belief that there is a
constant struggle between liberty and slavery that follows from the battle within
human nature between humanity and selfishness. In order to achieve and maintain
liberty, he argued, men must act in responsible ways.
Men have their choice in this world. They can be angels, or they can be
demons. In the apocalyptic vision, John describes a war in heaven. You
have only to strip that vision of its gorgeous Oriental drapery, divest it of its
shining and celestial ornaments, clothe it in the simple and familiar language
of common sense, and you will have before you the eternal conflict between
right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and slavery, truth and falsehood, the
glorious light of love, and the appalling darkness of human selfishness and
sin. The human heart is a constant seat of war…. Just what takes place in
individual human hearts, often takes place between nations, and between
individuals of the same nation. Such is the struggle now going on in the
United States.
59

The experience of slavery made Douglass unable to take the promise of freedom for
granted. His belief in the duality of human nature led him to place a premium on the
importance of moral ecology in a liberal polity. Freedom is not a given; it is an ideal
that must be fought for and defended. We are better off if we do not have to engage
in this fight alone. The achievement of a liberal community, he thought, requires
individuals to view the task of securing liberty as a common project that requires
responsible citizenship.
What Douglass wanted was a liberalism that was consistent: all individuals
ought to be free and all individuals ought to care about the freedom of their
neighbors. His belief that human nature was divided led him to offer a multifaceted
justification for civic responsibility. Some might feel compelled to act in responsible

59
Ibid., 3:437-8.
157
ways on the basis of feelings of human brotherhood, others on the basis of a moral
commitment to the idea of freedom, still others on the basis of respect for the
virtuous behavior of their fellows, and some on the basis of self-interest.
Douglass believed the moral atmosphere in which an individual finds himself
plays a crucial role in nurturing his moral and civic character. His appreciation for
the importance of moral ecology was rooted in observations of the institution of
slavery, which shaped the individuals around it in the direction of selfishness.
Slavery in the United States was but a small thing seventy years ago, but
going onward it has gained strength, till not it threatens wholesale destruction
to everything connected with it. It may be seen corroding their vitals, their
morals, and their politics, and linking itself with the very best institutions of
America. It destroys all the finder feelings of our nature – it renders people
less humane – leads them to regard cruelty with indifference, as the boy born
and bred within the sound of the thundering roar of Niagara, feels nothing
strange because he is used to the noise; while a stranger trembles with awe,
and feels he is in the presence of God – in the midst of his mighty works.
People reared in the midst of slavery become indifferent to human wrongs,
indifferent to the entreaties, the tears, the agonies of the slave under the lash;
all of which appear to be music to the ears of slaveholders. Slavery has
weakened the love of freedom in the United States – they have lost much of
that regard for liberty which once characterized them. It has eaten out the
vitals from the hearts of Americans.
60

Douglass contended that the moral ecology of slavery molded individuals in ways
that were adverse to freedom and in direct opposition to the understanding of civic
responsibility described above. Slavery teaches people that the rights of some
individuals need not be respected, that those who stand up for the rights of others are
to be regarded as enemies of the community, and only some individuals ought to be
treated fairly. Douglass’s assessment of the impact of slavery on individuals who

60
Ibid., 1:210.
158
lived in its presence led him to believe that institutions “educated” people to “look
upon” and treat their fellows in particular ways. Just as the moral ecology of slavery
had “taught” people to behave in vicious ways that undermine liberal ideals, so too
might a moral ecology of freedom teach people to behave in ways supportive of
these aims.
61

Douglass thought that each of the foundations for civic responsibility
discussed above was impacted by moral ecology. First, although a sense of human
brotherhood and mutual affection is natural, it can be destroyed by a “moral
atmosphere” that “renders people less humane.”
62
Just as the sense of human
brotherhood can be eroded by a corrupt moral atmosphere, it is also possible that
“humanitarian culture” can make individuals more responsive to “the higher and
better elements of human nature.”
63
Second, our devotion to freedom is affected by
moral ecology. Because human beings are, at least in part, responsive to truth, he
expressed hope that men could be educated to love freedom: “The more men know
of the essential nature of things, and of the true relation to mankind, the freer they
are from prejudice of every kind….[I]gnorance is full of prejudice, but it will
disappear with enlightenment.”
64
This education, Douglass thought, should take
place not just through formal education institutions, but from the day-to-day civic
education that takes place through the interaction of citizens. Third, Douglass
believed that moral ecology impacts how we define and respond to virtuous

61
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:89.
62
Ibid., 1:210.
63
The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass., 2:496-7.
64
Ibid., 4:251.
159
behavior. The moral atmosphere of the community determines what virtues we
admire and what sorts of character we honor. Finally, the moral atmosphere of the
community affects the way individuals conceive of their self-interest. One of the
difficult tasks for liberals is to establish an atmosphere in which most individuals
believe it is in their interest to care about the well-being of their neighbors.
Douglass’s attentiveness to moral ecology is evident throughout his writings.
Before the Civil War, he focused on altering the moral ecology in a way that was
conducive to reform because his first task was to close the gap between the ideals of
the Declaration of Independence and the realities of American life. After the war,
Douglass turned his attention to the problem of securing newly-attained liberty and
offering arguments about what was necessary for the freedmen to flourish. He
viewed the task of achieving and maintaining freedom as an ongoing and difficult
moral project.
The arduous task of the future will be to make the Southern people see and
appreciate Republican Government, as a blessing of inestimable value, and to
be maintained at any and every cost. They have got to be taught that slavery
which they have valued as a blessing has ever been their direct calamity and
curse. The work before us is nothing less than a radical revolution in the
modes of thought which have flourished under the blighting slave system.
The idea that labor is an evil, that work is degrading and that idleness is
respectable, must be dispelled and the idea that work is honorable must take
its place. Above all they must be taught that the liberty of a part is never to
be secured by the enslavement or oppression of any…. Time, experience, and
culture must gradually bring society back to the normal condition from which
long years of slavery have carried away under its iron sway.
65

Douglass believed that the achievement and security of freedom has an important
moral dimension. He thought the transformation of moral ecology was necessary not

65
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 3:292.
160
only for the oppressors but also for the oppressed. When Martin Delany, a black
abolitionist, Union soldier, and trial justice in post-war South Carolina wrote to
Douglass to complain of “the changed manners of the colored people of South
Carolina,” Douglass responded by urging Delany to be patient. Moral
transformation takes time. “If there be this offensive insolence in the manners of the
colored people of South Carolina of which you complain – the result of sudden
elevation – time and enlightenment will surely correct the evil. Liberty has its
manners as well as slavery, and with those manners true self-respect goes hand in
hand with a just respect for the rights and feelings of others. Have patience, my old
friend.”
66

In sum, Douglass offered a deeply moralized liberalism. The problem of
slavery led him to believe that the achievement and maintenance of liberty is a
difficult and never-ending task. In order to shape responsible citizens willing to take
on this task, Douglass believed it was important to be attentive to moral ecology.
Throughout his writings, we see him go beyond a formalistic concern with rights and
institutions to emphasize the importance of “the soul,” “the moral sense,” “the moral
atmosphere,” and “conscience” of the American polity.
67
This attentiveness to moral
ecology gives his liberalism a civic dimension that is not emphasized in many
formulations of the doctrine. What remains to be seen is how a healthy moral
ecology can be developed. In the next two chapters, I discuss citizen-driven “bottom

66
Ibid., 4:279.
67
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:191; Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:308; The
Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:193-4, 5:596.
161
up” and state-driven “top down” ways in which Douglass thought the moral ecology
of civic liberalism could be fostered.
162

Chapter 5
“Friends of Freedom”:
Good Citizenship in Douglass’s Liberalism

I. Introduction
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that Douglass infused his liberalism with a
multifaceted theory of civic responsibility. He believed the achievement,
maintenance, and flourishing of a liberal polity depends upon the willingness of
individuals to behave in responsible ways. Douglass’s civic liberal vision is
distinctive because of his attentiveness to the importance of moral ecology; he was
concerned with what he called the “moral life,” “moral atmosphere,” “moral
feeling,” “moral tone,” “moral sense,” and “soul” of the nation.
1
He thought it was
necessary to develop a moral ecology supportive of liberal aims and the civic
responsibilities necessary to secure those aims. What remains to be seen is how
Douglass believed such a moral ecology might be developed.
In this chapter, I explore Douglass’s belief that the practice of good
citizenship is crucial to the development of the moral ecology of civic liberalism.
Good citizenship develops this ecology from the bottom up in the sense that the
beliefs and behavior of citizens creates and maintains the “humanitarian culture” he
viewed as essential to a healthy liberal polity.
2
I address Douglass’s responses to
several questions. First, what constitutes good citizenship? Second, who are the

1
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:46, 5:191, 4:12, 4:468-9, 5:17; The Life and Writings of
Frederick Douglass, 5:210-1,
2
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:496-7.
163
great citizens worthy of admiration and emulation? Third, what motivates good
citizenship?
In Part II, I provide a general overview of what Douglass took to be the
essential components of good citizenship. I contend that his idea of good citizenship
requires individuals to be just, fair, virtuous, principled, and responsible. His
account of good citizenship has both “public” and “private” dimensions; he exalted
individuals who practiced and promoted civic virtues like principled political
engagement as well as private virtues like self-reliance. A good citizen is a “friend
of freedom” because he contributes to the project of achieving and securing the
conditions necessary for the exercise of individual liberty.
In Parts III and IV, I develop Douglass’s view of good citizenship in greater
detail by exploring two ideal types that are central in his thought: the Reformer and
the Self-Made Man. I start with Douglass’s Reformer because he engages in the
crucial first task of achieving liberalism. The Reformer goes above and beyond good
citizenship by dedicating his life to closing the gap between moral ideals and
political realities. He is the model of the public dimension of good citizenship. The
Reformer is crucial to the development of the moral ecology of civic liberalism
because of the tangible impact he has on the lives of his fellow citizens and because
of the more intangible impact he has on the moral ecology. I conclude Part III with a
discussion of what “ordinary” people can learn from the Reformer about what it
means to be a principled and responsible citizen.
164
In Part IV, I turn my attention to the private dimension of Douglass’s
understanding of good citizenship by examining his exaltation of hard work, self-
reliance and other bourgeois virtues. If the model of the Reformer provides a guide
for how to achieve and maintain the political conditions supportive of freedom, one
could say that the matters dealt with in Part IV address what Douglass believed to be
the social conditions that are supportive of freedom. The ideal of the Self-Made
Man served as Douglass’s model of personal responsibility and development. He
contended that the Self-Made Man is the “best representative” of the “powers and
possibilities” of human nature.
3
The Self-Made Man, in Douglass’s mind,
exemplified the “good life” born of liberty. He dignifies his freedom by using it in a
virtuous way in order to achieve individual, familial, and community flourishing.
Using one’s liberty virtuously is a form of good citizenship because it demonstrates
the dignity of human freedom and, at least in theory, strengthens the community’s
commitment to its protection.
Douglass’s discussions of the Reformer and the Self-Made Man provide a
detailed picture of his conception of good citizenship. A civic liberal citizen respects
the rights of others, honors the promise of freedom by treating people fairly,
dignifies freedom by behaving virtuously, and exercises the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship in a principled way. At the center of Douglass’s
understanding of good citizenship is an emphasis on personal responsibility. The
morally responsible actions of individuals are of the utmost importance because of

3
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:548.
165
the tangible impact they have on others and the intangible impact they have on the
moral ecology of the community. As you will recall from the last chapter, the idea
of moral ecology, according to Robert Bellah, entails the belief that individuals “are
deeply interrelated, and the actions we take have enormous ramifications for the lives
of others.”
4
The link between good citizenship and the idea of moral ecology was
expressed by the philosopher Michael Novak when he described moral ecology as
“the ethos that must be cultivated and preserved if liberal democratic societies are to
survive.”
5
Douglass’s discussions of great citizens are expressions of his belief that
there is a certain ethos that contributes to the moral health of a free society.
Throughout the chapter, I also address the difficult and important question of
what motivates good citizenship. Like Douglass’s account of civic responsibility, his
understanding of the actuating motives of good citizenship is complex. The
spectrum of motivation ranges from moral benevolence to self-interest. When
discussing reformers, for example, he described some as being moved by “religious
duty” and the “laws of nature” while others were moved by a more selfish desire to
achieve “the approval” of their “fellow men.”
6
Douglass also believed that the
behavior of self-made men was motivated by a variety of factors. Rather than
believing that most men were moved by a desire for wealth or fame, he thought the
vast majority of individuals were motivated by a desire for individual, familial, and
communal well-being. Just as Douglass believed that the actuating motives of good

4
Robert Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 284.
5
Michael Novak, Cultivating Liberty: Essays on Moral Ecology, (New York: Rowan & Littlefield,
1999).
6
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:203.
166
citizenship were multiple, so he believed that the “seedbeds” of virtue were
numerous. The public and private dimensions of good citizenship, he thought, are
cultivated by family, political engagement, labor, law and education. In this chapter,
I am concerned with the “bottom-up” development of the moral ecology of civic
liberalism so I will limit my attention to the relatively informal educative
mechanisms of family, labor, and emulation of great citizens.
In sum, Douglass’s account of good citizenship has two major components.
First, he emphasized the political attitude that animated the Reformer: a commitment
to principled civic engagement and political participation. Second, he praised the
social virtues of the Self-Made Man, who dignifies freedom by laboring faithfully in
order to promote individual progress as well as familial and communal well-being.
The practice of civic liberal citizenship, Douglass hoped, would go a long way
toward building a “humanitarian culture” that is supportive of freedom. By building
this moral ecology from the bottom-up, citizens can create a solid foundation for the
liberal project.

II. What Civic Liberalism Requires: Douglass’s Idea of Good Citizenship
In Chapter 2, I made the case that Douglass’s politics were essentially liberal.
He was committed to individual rights, the celebration of moral and religious
diversity, and limited, democratic government. In Chapter 3, I argued that his
liberalism was rooted in a morally comprehensive theory of self-ownership
developed in response to the experience of slavery. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that
167
Douglass believed the project of achieving freedom is one that requires individuals
to behave in civically responsible ways. At this point, I would like to pull these
things together to offer an explanation of Douglass’s idea of good citizenship. There
are five central components of his view of good citizenship: justice, fairness, virtue,
principle, and responsibility.
The first component of Douglass’s theory of good citizenship is justice. In
Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrated that his understanding of justice was in the classical
liberal mold. Classical liberals such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill offer
theories of justice that emphasize a basic duty of non-interference. For Locke, the
duty of non-interference is rooted in natural law.
The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one,
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one
omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign
Master, sent into the world by His order and about his business; they are His
property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one
another's pleasure.
7

Mill relied on a utilitarian foundation to arrive at a similar conclusion.
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the
conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence

7
John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chapter 23.
168
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.
8

At the core of Douglass’s theory of justice is a similar claim that citizens should
observe a principle of non-interference. In response to the common question of what
the American people ought to do with “the Negro population,” he said:
We ask nothing at the hands of the American people but simple justice, and
an equal chance to live; and if we cannot live and flourish on such terms, our
case should be referred to the Author of our existence…. Now, in the name of
a common humanity, and according to the laws of the Living God, we simply
ask the right to bear the responsibility for our own existence. Let us alone.
Do nothing with us, for us, or by us as a particular class. What you have
done with us thus far has only worked to our disadvantage. We now simply
ask to do for ourselves. I submit that there is nothing unreasonable or
unnatural in this request.
9

This statement was rooted in Douglass’s belief that the “great majority of human
duties are negative in character.”
10
Given the violent nature of human history,
moving closer to the realization of simple justice would be a major accomplishment.
The first obligation of the liberal citizen is simple justice: refrain from violating the
rights of others.
The second component of Douglass’s theory of good citizenship is fairness.
Although some theorists incorporate fairness into their understanding of justice,
Douglass usually discussed the ideas as separate but interrelated. He often coupled
the idea of “simple justice” with a discussion of the importance of “fair play.” After
the Civil War, Douglass said:

8
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 10.
9
Frederick Douglass Papers., 3:499.
10
Ibid., 3:190.
169
My politics in regard to the negro is simply this: Give him fair play and let
him alone, but be sure to give him fair play. He is now a man before the law.
I rejoice at it. What we want, what we are resolved to have, is the right to be
men among men; men everywhere…. I demand for him the same right to the
land, the same opportunity, and the same chance to get possession of the land
that other people have. All over the South, it is well known, notorious, that
the old planters, who own their ten and fifteen thousand acres of land, have
banded together and determined not to sell it in small parcels or in large
parcels to colored men - to keep possession of the land. Therefore, this
government is bound to see, not only that the negro has the right to vote, but
that he has fair play in the acquisition of land; that when he offers a fair price
for the land of the South, he shall not be deprived of the right to purchase,
simply because of his color.
11

Douglass’s conception of fair play was relatively straightforward: give every
individual an equal opportunity to pursue material well-being and happiness. This
requires citizens to refrain from “rigging the game.” After the Civil War, Douglass
lamented the fact that freedmen were being systematically denied a fair chance to
make material progress. In 1888, he delivered a speech entitled “In Law Free; In
Fact, a Slave.” In that speech Douglass said the freedman had not made much
progress since emancipation “because he is systematically and universally cheated
out of his hard earnings. The same class that once extorted his labor under the lash
now gets his labor by a mean, sneaking and fraudulent device.”
12
The sharecropping
and “trucking” systems were the major devices of this “new slavery.” The trucking
system, under which the freedman was paid in “scrip” that had purchasing power at a
high-priced “store” owned by his employer, made it impossible for him to
accumulate savings. Without any money, freedmen were unable to purchase land.
Their only option was to rent land and enter into a sharecropping arrangement, which

11
Ibid., 4:202.
12
Ibid., 5:363.
170
placed them in perpetual debt to white landowners. In Douglass’s words, “To my
mind these landlord and tenant laws are a disgrace and a scandal to American
civilization. A more skillfully contrived device than these laws to crush out all
aspirations, all hope of progress in the landless negro could not well be devised.”
13

According to Douglass, the systematic subordination of freed slaves was
inconsistent with the promise of freedom. This promise, as he understood it, was
that individuals who work hard and behave virtuously should have a good chance to
achieve material security. Once individuals have material security, he hoped, they
would be free to pursue other forms of progress. As you will see in the discussion of
self-made men, Douglass believed the accumulation of property was an important
means to intellectual and moral development. The trucking and sharecropping
systems were systematic attempts to deny freedmen the opportunity to gain material
security and, therefore, to pursue intellectual and moral progress. Without fair play,
Douglass believed, the promise of freedom must be deemed a lie. Unless individuals
are given a “fair chance,” he said, they will be “theoretically” free, but “practically”
slaves.
14

The third component of Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship is
virtue. By “virtue,” I have in mind hard work, self-reliance, perseverance and other
bourgeois virtues. His commitment to self-reliance and other bourgeois virtues
constitutes the “private” dimension of his understanding of good citizenship. While
Douglass thought it was necessary for society to secure the conditions of fair play, he

13
Ibid., 5:367.
14
Ibid., 3:211.
171
believed advancement was largely the work of individuals. In 1883, he told an
audience, “our destiny is largely in our own hands. If we find, we shall have to seek.
If we succeed in the race of life, it must be by our own energies, and our own
exertions. Others may clear the road, but we must go forward, or be left behind in
the race of life.”
15
Douglass wanted individuals to have “a fair chance to be authors
of our own elevation.”
16
In these statements, we can see how the ideas of fairness
and self-reliance fit together in his mind. Fair play is required to “clear the road,”
but it is left to individuals themselves to “author” their own “elevation.”
What is the relationship between bourgeois virtue and good citizenship? As
historian Joyce Appleby has pointed out, as early as the 1790s, the meaning of
“virtue” had undergone some transformation from its classical republican
understanding as “the quality that enabled men to rise above private interests in order
to act for the good of the whole.”
17
The liberal understanding of virtue that was
popularized by Jeffersonian Republicans, Appleby argues, was quite a departure
from the classical republican understanding: “by the end of the century virtue more
often referred to a private quality, a man’s capacity to look out for himself and his
dependents – almost the opposite of classical virtue.”
18
The “brilliance” of the
liberal view, Appleby contends, was that it connected self-interested behavior to the
classical concern for the common good. If men commit themselves to working hard
for themselves and their families, the entire community would benefit. “No less a

15
Ibid., 5:74.
16
Ibid., 3:211.
17
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, (New York: New York University Press,
1984), 14.
18
Ibid., 15.
172
sober thinker than Locke,” writes Appleby, held the “visionary hope that if everyone
in the world had to work every day, the world’s work could be done with just half a
day’s labor.”
19
In sum, classical liberals exalted bourgeois virtues without arguing
that selfishness should subsume civic virtue. Instead, bourgeois virtue became a
form of civic virtue.
Although it was not the sum of his view of virtue, Douglass bought into the
classical liberal notion that bourgeois virtue was part of good citizenship. The
“private” virtues of the self-reliant individual have important public consequences.
First, citizens who are self-reliant contribute to the moral ecology of civic liberalism
by fostering a culture of personal responsibility, hard work, and perseverance. This
culture is crucial to the flourishing of a free society that values individual
independence. In order for individuals to achieve independence, they must pursue
the ideal of self-reliance by practicing the virtues supportive of this ideal. These
virtues are implanted and spread in the culture, first and foremost, by the behavior of
individuals. Second, Douglass thought the practice of bourgeois virtue contributes to
the material well-being of the community. Echoing the sentiment expressed by
Locke, Douglass said, “If each man in the world did his share of honest work, we
should have no need of a millennium. The world would teem with abundance, and
the temptation to evil in a thousand directions, would disappear.”
20
Third, the
practice of bourgeois virtue can strengthen the civic community because individuals
are more likely to express concern for one another if there is some level of mutual

19
Ibid., 33-5.
20
Ibid., 5:564.
173
respect. In other words, Douglass thought an individual who practiced the bourgeois
virtues might enhance the amount of respect that others have for him. This
heightened sense of respect, he hoped, would lead to a stronger sense of civic
responsibility. In sum, virtuous individuals exemplify the private dimension of
Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship because they contribute to the moral
ecology of civic liberalism by promoting a culture of well-directed, hard work, they
contribute to the well-being of society by doing their share of honest work, and they
encourage a stronger sense of civic responsibility.
The fourth component of Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship is
what I am calling principle. Principled citizenship requires individuals to engage the
social and political world without abandoning their fundamental moral
commitments. In other words, rather than avoiding politics and other forms of civic
interaction, Douglass advised critical engagement. One should not be blindly loyal
to institutions, but should assess them through the critical lens of the natural rights
philosophy. Douglass applied this attitude to political parties at the 1852 Free Soil
Convention when he said: “We need a body who will be faithful and who will apply
the principles of truth continually. I have engaged for life in this work, but I am
going to be a man. A free man. Free to adopt any views, any instrumentalities,
which I think will advance the good cause, and although I vote, I believe that the
great instrumentality after all, is the ‘foolishness of preaching.’”
21
In 1883, Douglass
reiterated his point that devotion to party should never trump devotion to principle:

21
Ibid., 2:395-6.
174
“If the Republican party can not stand a demand for justice and fair play, it ought to
go down. We were men before that party was born, and our manhood is more sacred
than any party can be. Parties were made for men, not men for parties.”
22
In 1894,
after serving in several Republican administrations, Douglass pointed out his
agreement with Democratic President Grover Cleveland on the Hawaii controversy
and said, “I am a Republican, but I am not a ‘Republican right or wrong.’”
23

At the core of Douglass’s claim that good citizenship requires individuals to
engage the political world in a principled way was his belief in the sanctity of
individual conscience. In 1852, as the American political party system slid into
disarray, Douglass said “I always want to be independent” because “numbers should
not be looked to so much as right. The man who is right is a majority. He who has
God and conscience on his side, has a majority against the universe. Though he does
not represent the present state, he represents a future state. If he does not represent
what we are, he represents what we ought to be.”
24
Good citizenship, on Douglass’s
view, is principled citizenship.
The last component of Douglass’s view of good citizenship is responsibility.
By responsible citizenship, I am referring to the idea of civic responsibility discussed
in Chapter 4. Civic responsibility entails the moral obligations individuals have to
one another as citizens. On Douglass’s view, civic responsibility requires
individuals to respect the rights of others, to treat others fairly, and care about the

22
Ibid., 5:95.
23
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:490.
24
Ibid., 2:209.
175
rights of others. In other words, in order to achieve and secure freedom, individuals
must refrain doing unjust things and they must resist the temptation to rest on the
“downy seat of inaction” when the rights of others are being violated. The problem
of slavery led Douglass to believe that the achievement and security of freedom for
all human beings is an arduous, never-ending project. Unless individuals behave in
responsible ways, he argued, the fundamental liberal aim of achieving and securing
freedom cannot be achieved. Each of the four components discussed above are parts
of Douglass’s understanding of civic responsibility. The inclusion of responsibility
among the components of good citizenship is meant to suggest that individuals must
act on the basis of these civic obligations in order to realize the promises of
liberalism.
In this part, my aim has been to provide a brief description of the five
components that make up Douglass’s view of good citizenship: justice, fairness,
virtue, principle, and responsibility. The good citizen is an individual who respects
the rights of others, treats others fairly, behaves virtuously, engages the world in a
principled way, and feels a strong sense of civic responsibility. This sketch has been
brief and many questions about this view of citizenship remain to be answered. In
order to offer a complete picture of Douglass’s vision of how the moral ecology of
civic liberalism can be developed from the bottom-up, it is useful to consider two
ideal types that provide greater texture to his view: the Reformer and the Self-Made
Man.

176
III. Achieving Liberty: The Reformer as a Model Citizen
Douglass’s writings are replete with references to “the Reformer.” A
discussion of the Reformer is an appropriate starting point for an inquiry into his
understanding of ideal citizens because the Reformer engages in the crucial first task
of “achieving liberty.” In other words, the Reformer’s project is to achieve
liberalism: to secure the conditions necessary for all people to exercise personal
freedom. Once freedom is achieved, then one can focus upon what is necessary to
maintain it and for individuals to flourish under these conditions. The Reformer is a
model citizen in two senses. First, his actions are intrinsically valuable because they
help bring about a state of affairs in which all human beings are free. Second, the
Reformer’s actions are instrumentally valuable because he serves as an example for
others and, hence, has a positive impact on the moral ecology. Although he goes
above and beyond what most citizens will contribute to the common good, he can
teach people about the requirements of good citizenship. In Douglass’s words, the
Reformer does his work by the “power of precept and example.”
25
In what follows, I
provide a detailed account of Douglass’s idea of the Reformer by addressing several
questions. First, who is the Reformer? Second, what does the Reformer do? Third,
how does the Reformer distinguish himself from other citizens? Fourth, why is the
Reformer so important?
First, who is the Reformer? Douglass began his response to this question
with a basic dictionary definition of reform: “to put in a new and improved

25
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:139.
177
condition; to bring from bad to good; to change from worse to better.”
26
A reformer,
then, is an individual who engages in the work of bringing society into a new and
improved condition; he attempts to change it from worse to better. For Douglass,
bad and good were determined by natural rights theory. He believed the
fundamental law of nature is that the natural rights of all individuals ought to be
respected and protected. So Douglass’s Reformer is an individual who attempts to
bring society into a state of affairs in which the natural rights of all individuals are
respected.
Second, what does the Reformer do? Throughout his career, Douglass
offered a consistent description of the “mission” or “work” of the Reformer. In
1855, he described the Reformer’s “work.”
The moral life of human society – it cannot die, while conscience, honor and
humanity remain. If but one man be filled with it – the cause lives. Its
incarnation in any one individual man leaves the whole world a priesthood –
occupying the highest moral eminence – even that of disinterested
benevolence. Whoso ascended this height, and has the grace to stand there,
has the world at his feet, and is the world’s teacher, as of divine right. He
may sit in judgment on the age, upon the civilization of the age, and upon the
religion of the age; for he has a test, a sure and certain test, by which to try all
institutions, and measure all men.
27

The Reformer’s “sure and certain test” is his philosophy of natural rights.
Institutions and men are measured by the impact they have on the natural rights of
individuals. Does the institution or individual violate the natural rights of
individuals? Does the institution or individual promote the security of natural rights?
In other words, natural rights philosophy provides the Reformer with the critical lens

26
Ibid., 5:127.
27
Ibid., 3:45.
178
through which to view his society. Social criticism is not, though, the sum of the
Reformer’s task. “The great work,” Douglass continued, “to which he is called is not
that of judgment.”
His great work on earth is to exemplify, and to illustrate and to engraft those
principles upon the living and practical understandings of all men within the
reach of his influence. This is his work; long or short his years, many or few
his adherents, powerful or weak his instrumentalities, through good report, or
through bad report, this is his work. It is to snatch from the bosom of nature
the latent facts of each man’s individual experience, and with steady hand to
hold them up fresh and glowing, enforcing, with all his power, their
acknowledgement and practical adoption.
28

The Reformer’s task is to remind citizens of the moral requirements of natural law,
to shed light on the gaps between those requirements and political reality, and to take
action to close those gaps. Each component of this task is important.
First, the Reformer engages in the task of reminding citizens of the
fundamental moral truths of natural law. In the case of the United States, those
commitments are most clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence, which
Douglass called our “civic catechism.” The Reformer is a high priest of our civil
religion in the sense that he is animated, first and foremost, by an orthodox devotion
to the fundamental moral principles expressed in that sacred civic text.
Second, the Reformer engages in the important task of calling attention to the
gaps that exist between our civic catechism and political reality. With the civic
catechism of the Declaration of Independence as his basis, the Reformer points out
all of the ways in which the society has fallen short of its ideals. In Douglass’s

28
Ibid. 3:45-6.
179
words, the Reformer commits himself to “blistering” the public “conscience.”
29
The
Reformer passes judgment on his fellow citizens for failing to live up to their creed
and scolds them for their moral and civic hypocrisy.
Third, the Reformer engages in the difficult task of acting to close the gap
between moral ideals and political realities. The ideal type Douglass has in mind
transcends the confines of social criticism into the pracitical world of political action.
Engaging in the arduous task of acting to close the gap is, he said, the true “work” of
the Reformer. Douglass’s emphasis on civic engagement and political action is what
separates him from a “joyful stoic” like Ralph Waldo Emerson who offered social
criticism of slavery but was reticent to take action to abolish it.
What separates the Reformer from other citizens? The Reformer is,
according to Douglass, the embodiment of the commitments to principle and
responsibility that are crucial components of good citizenship. The Reformer is
animated, first and foremost, by an intense devotion to the idea that all human beings
should be free and by a commitment to the notion that responsible behavior is
necessary to turn this idea into a reality. The moral principle that animates
Douglass’s Reformer is a devotion to natural rights. The Reformer is not the creator
of moral truths as much as he is a discoverer and a messenger. In a discussion of the
anti-slavery movement, Douglass explained the relationship between the Reformer
and moral principle.
It is an error to speak of this venerable movement as a new thing under the
sun. The causes producing it, and the particles composing it, like the great

29
Ibid., 2:6.
180
forces of the physical world, fire, steam, and lightning, have slumbered in the
bosom of nature since the world began…. They are all there, though he
knows it not, awaiting the thoughtful discoverer, and the skillful workman to
bring them forth in the varied and multitudinous forms of beauty, power, and
glory, of which they are capable. And so it is with the elements of this
history. They are prior to the present Anti-Slavery movement. Whence are
these elements? I trace them to Nature and Nature’s God…. In the very heart
of humanity are garnered up, as from everlasting to everlasting, all those
elementary principles, whose vital action constitutes what we now call the
Anti-Slavery movement.
30

The Reformer’s role, Douglass thought, is to draw attention to the moral truths
inherent in human nature, to shed light on the gap between those truths and political
reality, and to move men from the “downy seat of inaction” to close the gap.
31

The uncompromising commitment to moral principle and the strong sense of
responsibility exhibited by the Reformer are what separate him from other citizens.
Because of John Brown’s unwavering moral conviction that every man ought to be
free and his willingness to take on the responsibility of pursuing this ideal, Douglass
described him as “our noblest American hero.”
32
Like Socrates and Jesus, Brown
was a man “born in advance” of his times. He set out to “disturb the moral sense” of
those around him by practically illustrating his undying devotion to “the sacredness
and value of liberty.” Douglass compared Brown’s creed of “liberty for others” to
Patrick Henry’s exhortation “Give me liberty or give me death.”
33
When we
compare the two figures, Douglass thought, it is hard not to admire Brown’s
altruism. Although Brown’s means seemed repugnant to most of his contemporaries,
Douglass believed he would be judged positively by history because of his deep

30
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:20-1.
31
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:494.
32
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:13.
33
Ibid., 5:22.
181
commitment to moral principle and unwavering willingness to speak truth to power.
In this sense, Brown was an embodiment of Douglass’s ideal of the Reformer.
Finally, why is the Reformer so important? There are two primary reasons
why the Reformer was a model figure in Douglass’s conception of good citizenship.
The first reason has to do with the direct impact of the Reformer’s actions on the
ongoing struggle between good and evil. Second, the Reformer is important because
of the example he provides for others. At this point, I will address each of these
contributions in turn.
First, it is necessary to discuss Douglass’s view of the direct impact of the
Reformer on social progress. It is important to remember that he held a decidedly
humanistic view of social change. By this, I mean that he believed the fate of the
world is largely (if not entirely) in human hands. Just before the outbreak of the
Civil War he said, “All the progress towards perfection ever made by mankind, and
all the blessings which are now enjoyed, are ascribable to some brave and good man,
who, catching the illumination of a heaven-born truth, has counted it a joy, precious
and unspeakable, to toil, suffer, and often to die for the glorious realization of that
heaven-born truth.”
34
In 1883, Douglass affirmed this strongly humanistic theory of
social progress.
It may not be useless speculation to inquire whence the disposition or
suggestion of reform; whence that irresistible power that impels men to brave
all the hardships and dangers involved in pioneering an unpopular cause?
Has it a natural or a celestial origin? Is it human or divine or both? I have no
hesitation in stating where I stand in respect to these questions. It seems to
me that a true philosophy of reform is not found in the clouds, or in the stars,

34
Ibid., 3:437.
182
or any where else outside humanity itself. So far as the laws of the universe
have been discovered and understood, they seem to teach that the mission of
man’s improvement and perfection has been wholly committed to man
himself. So he is to be his own savior or his own destroyer. He has neither
angels to help him nor devils to hinder him.
35

Douglass went on to offer explicit criticisms of Christian doctrines that emphasize
prayer and worship rather than political action. Instead of praying and hoping that
God will bring about social change, he argued that human beings must exercise their
free will in order to make progress. It was particularly important, Douglass thought,
for reformers to push their fellow citizens to close the gap between their professed
moral ideals and concrete political realities.
The importance of human action in Douglass’s philosophy of reform was
rooted in his belief that there is a constant struggle between the spirit of selfishness
and the spirit of humanity within human nature. Although human beings are
essentially good, they are “constantly liable to do evil.”
36
In order for good to
prevail and progress to be made, individuals must choose to act righteously.
Men have their choice in this world. They can be angels, or they may be
demons. In the apocalyptic vision, John describes a war in heaven. You
have only to strip that vision of its gorgeous Oriental drapery, divest it of its
shining and celestial ornaments, clothe it in the simple and familiar language
of common sense, and you will have before you the eternal conflict between
right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and slavery, truth and falsehood, the
glorious light of love, and the appalling darkness of human selfishness and
sin. The human heart is a seat of constant war.
37

35
Ibid., 5:137.
36
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:209.
37
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:437-8.
183
The constant battle that occurs within individuals manifests itself between
individuals. The “dignity of the anti-slavery movement” is revealed, Douglass said,
when we think of it as part of the eternal struggle between good and evil:
It must be looked at as a part of that eternal and universal conflict everywhere
in progress between human justice, enlightenment and goodness on the one
hand, and human pride, selfishness, injustice and tyrannical power on the
other; a conflict that has gone on from the beginning and must go on forever
until, by truth and love, the baser nature of man shall be subdued and refined
and become subject to his higher and better nature.
38

“If there is no struggle,” Douglass said, “there is no progress.”
39
Reformers are on
the frontlines of the eternal struggle between liberty and tyranny.
The second major contribution of Reformers is through the example they set
for other citizens. The Reformer offers an alternative to the classical republican
conception of civic virtue, which emphasizes the willingness of the individual to
sacrifice his interests for the good of the community. The model of citizenship
offered by the Reformer is not completely removed from this classical republican
formulation, but it differs in important ways. Reformers are alienated from their
fellow citizens in a moral sense because they are devoted to universal principles of
morality that have not been realized in the world. The moral alienation of the
Reformer does not, though, lead to political quietism. Instead, the Reformer engages
in the difficult task of closing the gap between his moral ideals and political reality.
The critical disposition of the Reformer can serve as a model for other citizens.
Douglass recognized that most citizens would not attain the moral heights of the

38
Ibid., 5:200.
39
Ibid., 3:204.
184
Reformer, but he hoped that the average person would incorporate at least some of
the Reformer’s commitment to principle as an essential part of good citizenship.
According to Douglass, the American Founders embodied classical
republican virtue. In his famous 1852 oration “What to the Slave is the Fourth of
July?” he said,
[The American Founders] loved their country more than their own private
interests; and, though this is not the highest form of human excellence, all
will concede that it is a rare virtue, and that when it is exhibited, it ought to
command respect. He who will, intelligently, lay down his life for his
country, is a man whom it is not in human nature to despise. Your fathers
staked their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, on the cause of their
country.
40

It is clear Douglass admired classical republican virtue, but it is important to note
that he did not believe it is the “highest form of human excellence.” In his mind, the
form of human excellence embodied by the Reformer was higher. After speaking
bluntly about the cruelties of slavery, Douglass identified with the understanding of
“true virtue” offered by British abolitionist Charles James Fox:
I have now spoken plainly, but not more than the case requires. If any have
been shocked at my plainness of speech, I beg them to remember that true
delicacy does not consist in a squeamish ear. In the language of the eloquent
Fox, I would remind them ‘that true humanity does not consist in shrinking
and starting at such recitals, but in a disposition of the heart to remedy evils
they unfold. True virtue belongs to the mind rather than to the nerves, and
should prompt men to charitable exertions in correcting abuses. To shudder
at enormities, and do nothing to remove them, is little better than to stamp
ourselves with the most pitiful and contemptible hypocrisy.’
41

Douglass believed true virtue is animated by principled devotion to the universal
moral truths of natural law, not simple devotion to one’s country. The Reformer’s

40
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:364.
41
Ibid., 4:190.
185
devotion to these truths and his commitment to bringing the world closer to their
realization make him the embodiment of true virtue. As a conception of civic virtue,
this view requires individuals to adopt a critical attitude within the political sphere
and to devote themselves to using all means available to them to close the gap
between moral ideals and political realities.
In this chapter, I am arguing that good citizens can contribute to the
development of the moral ecology of civic liberalism from the bottom up. How does
the Reformer contribute to this project? In other words, what does his conception of
civic virtue offer in terms of guidance for other citizens? Douglass’s discussions of
“true patriotism” and “true citizenship” demonstrate that he believed the critical edge
of the Reformer was essential to the “public” dimension of good citizenship.
We have heard much of late of the virtue of patriotism, the love of country,
and this sentiment, so natural and so strong, has been impiously appealed to,
by all the powers of human selfishness, to cherish the viper which is stinging
our national life away…. I, too, would invoke the spirit of patriotism; not in a
narrow and restricted sense, but I trust, with a broad and manly signification;
not to cover up our national sins, but to inspire us with sincere repentance;
not to hide our shame from the world’s gaze, but utterly to abolish the cause
of that shame; not to explain away our gross inconsistencies as a nation, but
to remove the hateful, jarring, and incongruous elements from the land; not to
sustain an egregious wrong, but to unite all our energies in the grand effort to
remedy that wrong.
42

Douglass’s understanding of patriotism does not emphasize the subordination of
one’s interests to the interests of the state but an uncompromising devotion to moral
principle. This devotion, he argued, may lead to harsh criticism: “Love for

42
Ibid., 2:270.
186
America…is not inconsistent with the strongest rebuke of its crimes.”
43
True
patriotism sometimes requires a good citizen to annoy his neighbors:
I admit that we have irritated [our fellow Americans]. They deserve to be
irritated. I am anxious to irritate the American people on [the slavery]
question. As it is in physics, so in morals, there are cases which demand
irritation and counter-irritation. The conscience of the American public
needs this irritation, and I would blister it all over from center to
circumference, until it gives signs of a purer and a better life than it is not
manifesting to the world.
44

The true patriot, Douglass believed, does not always strive for popularity. At the
beginning of the Civil War, he began a speech by saying: “My purpose to-night is
not to win applause. I have no high-sounding professions of patriotism to make. He
is the best friend of this country, who, at this tremendous crisis, dares tell his
countrymen the truth, however disagreeable that truth may be; and such a friend I
will aim to be to-night.”
45

In an 1867 speech entitled “Dangers to the Republic,” Douglass offered an
important account of what he called “true” citizenship. Rather than focusing on
dangers posed from outside of the country, he discussed the dangers posed by
bastard (or incomplete) republicanism. Douglass argued that a crucial part of good
citizenship is a willingness to criticize one’s own government; we should take “a
little less extravagant view of the excellences of our institutions” and offer honest
criticism when it is appropriate. He said such criticism could be offered in the

43
Ibid., 2:11.
44
Ibid., 2:61.
45
Ibid., 3:473-4.
187
“spirit” of a “true citizen” who has an interest in “the welfare, the stability, the
permanence and the prosperity of our free institutions.”
46

Douglass believed the Reformer’s devotion to principle, critical attitude, and
commitment to political engagement could serve as a model for other citizens.
Although few individuals could live up to the high moral standards of the Reformer,
Douglass hoped average citizens would adopt some of his critical edge. By viewing
political realities through the moral lens of natural law, the Reformer has the critical
distance necessary to point out the shortcomings of his society. Social criticism was
only half of the Reformer’s task. His true “mission,” Douglass said, was to do the
responsible thing and encourage others to do the same: take action to close the gap
between shared moral ideals and political realities.

IV. Douglass’s Bourgeois Dream: Self-Made Men & the Manners of Liberty
A complete consideration of Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship
requires some reflection on his commitment to the ideal of the Self-Made Man and
his defense of the bourgeois virtues. The Self-Made Man exemplifies the “good life”
born of liberty: he labors faithfully so that he can secure a home for his family and
acquire the material foundation necessary for moral and intellectual development.
Furthermore, he contributes to the moral ecology of civic liberalism by exemplifying
the virtues of personal responsibility, industriousness, and perseverance. Douglass
was a firm believer in the free labor ideology that animated nineteenth century

46
Ibid., 4:152.
188
Republicanism: the system of ideas that held free individuals who work hard and
behave virtuously should be able, in most circumstances, to attain middle class
respectability.
47
Douglass’s “bourgeois dream” was that free and virtuous
individuals who labored faithfully would be able to “secure a home” for themselves
and their families. What he wanted for himself and all Americans were those things
that slavery denied: the stability of home and family, the opportunity to enjoy the
fruits of one’s labor, the enjoyment of friendship, and the satisfaction of intellectual
and moral development. Securing this dream was an immense challenge, but
Douglass believed two things would go a long way toward making it a reality. First,
he thought “fair play” was essential. Under unfair conditions, hard work, virtue, and
perseverance would be of little consequence. Without fair play, Douglass believed,
the promise of freedom must be branded a lie. Second, Douglass thought individuals
needed to behave virtuously in order to secure the material foundation instrumental
to intellectual and moral development.
Before proceeding to a consideration of Douglass’s ideal of the Self-Made
Man, a word must be said on how this discussion fits with my aims in this chapter.
Above, I discussed how the Reformer served as a model of critical and active
citizenship. The Reformer was, for Douglass, an ideal type for the political sphere;
he embodies the “public” dimension of good citizenship. The actions of the
Reformer are essential to the achievement of liberty and the traits he possesses are
crucial to the security of that liberty. In this part, I am turning my attention to the

47
See generally, Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
Before the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
189
“private” dimension of Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship. The private
dimension of good citizenship embodied in the Self-Made Man contributes to the
moral ecology of civic liberalism in three interrelated ways. First, the Self-Made
Man serves as a model of honest, well-directed labor, self-reliance, and
perseverance. Second, the Self-Made Man contributes to the well-being of society
by “doing his part” to secure individual, familial and communal well-being. With
material well-being as the foundation, individuals could pursue the intellectual and
moral cultivation that dignifies their humanity. Third, emulation of the virtues
embodied in the Self-Made Man can strengthen the bonds of civic community by
enhancing the sense of mutual respect between citizens. In other words, Douglass
believed those who practiced the virtues of the Self-Made Man were more likely to
be accepted as equal citizens. Taken together, these three contributions are crucial to
civic liberalism because they affirm the centrality of personal responsibility for the
moral health of the liberal order.
According to historian John Blassingame, Douglass delivered his lecture
“Self-Made Men” more than fifty times between 1859 and 1893.
48
In this oft-
delivered speech, he aimed to “awaken” in his audiences “a sense of the dignity of
labor” and “the value of manhood.”
49
The idea of the Self-Made Man is worthy of
discussion in this chapter because it provides a crucial aspect of Douglass’s
understanding of good citizenship.
50
The virtues exhibited by the Self-Made Man

48
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:545.
49
Ibid., 5:575.
50
The importance of the Self-Made Man in Douglass’s thought has been largely ignored by students
of his thought (particularly political scientists). The glaring exception to this is historian Waldo E.
190
contribute to the development of a healthy moral atmosphere and are worthy of
respect and emulation. In Douglass’s words, self-made men “are entitled to a certain
measure of respect for their success and for proving to the world the grandest
possibilities of human nature” and every instance of their “success is an example and
help to humanity.”
51
Self-made men contribute to the development of the moral
ecology of civic liberalism by dignifying the virtues of hard work, self-reliance, and
perseverance.
Douglass began his discussion of the Self-Made Man with a significant
caveat. This caveat is particularly important because it gets to the core of one of the
central arguments of this dissertation. It concerns the relationship between the
quintessentially liberal idea of “individual independence” and the quintessentially
communitarian ideas of “brotherhood and inter-dependence.”
52
Douglass’s lecture
on the Self-Made Man is a decidedly liberal text, but his discussion of
interdependence at the beginning of the speech is an indication that he did not see
individualism and a strong sense of civic connection as mutually exclusive.
It must in truth be said though it may not accord well with self-conscious
individuality and self-conceit, that no possible native force of character, and
no depth or wealth of originality, can lift a man into absolute independence of
his fellow-men, and no generation of men can be independent of the
preceding generation. The brotherhood and inter-dependence of mankind are
guarded and defended at all points. I believe in individuality, but individuals
are, to the mass, like waves to the ocean. The highest order of genius is as
dependent as is the lowest. It, like the loftiest waves of the sea, derives its

Martin’s excellent discussion of this idea in The Mind of Frederick Douglass, (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1984), 253-278.
51
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:550.
52
Ibid., 5:549.
191
power and greatness from the grandeur and vastness of the ocean of which it
forms a part. We differ as the waves, but are one as the sea.
53

Douglass’s speech focuses on a class of human beings that seem to embody the
virtues of liberal individualism but he thought exaltation of the Self-Made Man was
consistent with beliefs in brotherhood and interdependence. Rather than seeing self-
reliance and interconnection as antagonistic, he saw them as closely related.
54

With this caveat on the table, Douglass offered his definition of self-made
men: “Self-made men are the men who, under peculiar difficulties and without the
ordinary helps of favoring circumstances, have attained knowledge, usefulness,
power and position and have learned from themselves the best uses to which life can
be put in this world, and in the exercises of these uses to build up worthy
character.”
55
Self-made men are individuals who have succeeded, in one way or
another, without the benefits of being well-born or socially privileged. “They are in
a peculiar sense,” Douglass said, “indebted to themselves for themselves.”
56

After offering this definition, Douglass explored various theories of the
success of self-made men. First, Douglass rejected the idea that human greatness
could be explained by “superior mental endowment.” This theory, he said, “has truth
in it, but it is not the whole truth.”
57
Some great men are blessed with superior
mental endowments, but some are not. Douglass thought it mattered less what men
began with than what they did with it.

53
Ibid.
54
I will return to this matter below.
55
Ibid., 5:549-550.
56
Ibid., 5:550.
57
Ibid., 5:552.
192
Next, Douglass offered a strong rejection of both the “good luck” and the
“supernatural intervention” theories of self-made men. No theories were more
foreign to Douglass’s worldview than these. The good luck theory, he said,
“divorces a man from his own achievements, contemplates him as a being of chance
and leaves him without will, motive, ambition, or aspiration.” Similarly, the divine
hand theory makes man “a very insignificant agent in his own affairs.”
58
As noted
above, Douglass rejected the “celestial” explanation of human progress because he
believed God gave human beings free will to shape events in the world. The good
luck and divine hand theories of self-made men are simply individualized versions of
the celestial theory of human progress. “Faith,” he said, “in the absence of work,
seems to be worth little, if anything.”
59
Douglass was a strong believer in
voluntarism: human beings have free will and although luck plays a role in the
world, it should not be “made to explain too much.”
60
He concluded that both the
good luck and divine hand theories ought to be rejected as explanations of self-made
men.
Instead of good luck and divine intervention, Douglass contended that the
success of self-made men can be explained “mainly by one word and that word is
WORK! WORK!! WORK!!! WORK!!!! Not transient and fitful effort, but patient,
enduring, honest, unremitting and indefatigable work, into which the whole heart is
put, and which, in both temporal and spiritual affairs, is the true miracle worker.”
61

58
Ibid., 5:552-3.
59
Ibid., 5:555.
60
Ibid., 5:553.
61
Ibid., 5:556.
193
The Self-Made Man is the embodiment of hard work, perseverance, determination,
and self-reliance. As noted above, Douglass did not believe human beings could be
completely independent of one another. He did, however, think individuals are more
likely to be assisted by others if they demonstrate themselves to be worthy of
assistance: “He who does not think himself worth saving from poverty and
ignorance, by his own efforts, will hardly be thought worth the efforts of anybody
else.”
62
Douglass did not shy away from the individualistic implications of this
view: “Personal independence is a virtue and it is the soul out of which comes the
sturdiest manhood. But there can be no independence without a large share of self-
dependence, and this virtue cannot be bestowed. It must be developed from
within.”
63

In his response to the “superior mental endowments” theory of self-made
men, Douglass offered the core of his view. The key thing self-made men possess is
not superior brain power or physical prowess, but soul.
Sound bodily health and mental faculties unimpaired are very desirable, if not
absolutely indispensable. But a man need not be a physical giant or an
intellectual prodigy, in order to make a tolerable way in the world. The
health and strength of the soul is of far more importance than that of the
body, even when viewed as a means of mundane results. The soul is the
main thing. Man can do a great many things; some easily and some with
difficulty, but he cannot build a sound ship with rotten timber.
64

Douglass’s belief that the strength of the soul is the most important thing is a
reflection of his focus on the moral dimension of human life. Like his contention

62
Ibid. This is reminiscent of the ideas popularized by Horatio Alger.
63
Ibid., 5:557.
64
Ibid., 5:561.
194
that the health of the political community depends upon its moral life, he believed
the success of individuals was, first and foremost, a matter of soul.
Douglass summarized his theory of self-made men in this way: “My theory
of self-made men is, then, simply this; that they are men of work. Whether or not
such men have acquired material, moral or intellectual excellence, honest labor
faithfully, steadily and persistently pursued, is the best, if not the only, explanation of
their success.”
65
Because the idea of self-made men is often associated with material
wealth, it is worth noting that Douglass held a broader view. Self-made men, he
said, are moved by a variety of “commanding objects.” Rather than saying that
material wealth is the commanding object of self-made men, Douglass included this
end as one among many and said it is not what moves most men.
All are not moved by the same objects. Happiness is the object of some.
Wealth and fame are the objects of others. But wealth and fame are beyond
the reach of the majority of men, and thus, to them, these are not motive-
impelling objects. Happily, however, personal, family and neighborhood
well-being stand near to us all and are full of lofty inspirations to earnest
endeavor, if we would but respond to their influence.
66

This is the essence of Douglass’s bourgeois dream: he envisioned a society of free,
industrious individuals who seek personal, family and neighborhood well-being and
respect the right of others to do the same.
Two additional points about the lecture on self-made men are worth making.
First, in the middle of the lecture, Douglass discussed how this idea applies to former
slaves. His reflections on this question are significant because they demonstrate his

65
Ibid., 5:560.
66
Ibid., 5:564.
195
belief that the ideal of the Self-Made Man only makes sense under conditions of fair
play. In response to the question of how the theory of self-made men affects
freedmen, Douglass said: “Give the negro fair play and let him alone.” It is
important to understand, he said, that by this “I mean a good deal more than some
understand by fair play.” We must remember, Douglass said, that the freedman did
not begin the race of life from the same starting line as his fellow citizens. So while
he advised the freedman to practice the virtues of the Self-Made Man, he also
demanded the rest of society observe the requirements of “simple justice” (do not
violate the rights of others) and “fair play” (treat similar cases equally). Douglass
believed a society in which the rights of individuals were respected, the rules were
not rigged to advantage or disadvantage a particular group, and individuals worked
hard and behaved virtuously would be ideal.
Second, it is worth noting that Douglass offered a brief discussion of the
ideas and institutions that are supportive of self-made men. He argued that America
is the “home and patron of self-made men” because “labor is so respected and so
honored,” there is not much class strife, there is a broad commitment to “the
principle of measuring and valuing men according to their respective merits,” there is
a rough “equality of rights,” there is not an excessive amount of respect for elders or
family names, and there is a relatively large amount of social mobility.
67
Douglass’s
discussion of the institutional conditions supportive of self-made men is further

67
Ibid., 5:562-572.
196
evidence of his belief that justice and fair play are essential for the ideal of the Self-
Made Man to be realistic.
Douglass’s devotion to the ideal of the Self-Made Man is a manifestation of
his deep commitment to bourgeois virtues.
68
He believed that the ideal of personal
independence could only be achieved if individuals practiced virtues supportive of
this ideal. In order to become an independent, respectable member of society,
Douglass advised, individuals must be hard-working, temperate, honest, modest,
well-mannered, respectful of just laws, and willing to engage in politics in order to
protect their freedoms. Douglass’s “free man” is not an amoral libertine, but the
embodiment of moral responsibility. Indeed, contemporary readers may find
Douglass’s rhetoric on these matters decidedly conservative in nature. As I have
been arguing throughout this dissertation, he was a deeply moralistic liberal who
believed that the promise of liberty could only be realized if individuals behaved in
responsible ways. At this point, it is appropriate to explore Douglass’s defense of
bourgeois virtues.
In Chapter 4, I referred to a letter Douglass wrote to Martin Delany in which
he said, “Liberty has its manners as well as slavery, and with those manners true self-
respect goes hand in hand with a just respect for the rights and feelings of others.”
69

The manners of liberty include not only the obligations to respect the rights of others
and to treat others fairly, but also the bourgeois virtues of self-reliance,

68
For a detailed account of this philosophy, see Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics
for an Age of Commerce, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
69
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:
197
industriousness, sobriety, integrity, orderliness, and a desire for self-improvement.
70

Douglass believed the practice of the bourgeois virtues was essential to the
achievement of independence. In an 1886 speech on the “progress of the colored
race,” he said:
We have but to toil and trust, throw away whiskey and tobacco, improve the
opportunities that we have, put away all extravagance, learn to live within our
means, lay up our earnings, educate our children, live industrious and
virtuous lives, establish a character for sobriety, punctuality, and general
uprightness, and we shall raise up powerful friends who shall stand by us in
our struggle for an equal chance in the race of life.
71

This passage points to the complex relationship between self-reliance and
interdependence in Douglass’s thought. I think Carey McWilliams was mistaken
when he classified Douglass as a devotee of “fraternity and humanity” as opposed to
“individualism and the doctrine of self-reliance.”
72
Unlike McWilliams, Douglass
did not believe these ideas were necessarily antagonistic. As this passage indicates,
he believed individuals could “raise up powerful friends” by striving to be self-
reliant.
Douglass’s emphasis on the relationship between self-respect and gaining the
respect of others is evident in his speeches to freedmen after the Civil War. His
frustration with Reconstruction had three major elements. First, he was angered by
the lack of energetic action by the State.
73
Second, he was infuriated by the lack of
fairness in the relationships between freedmen and their former masters. Third, and

70
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:534.
71
Ibid., 5:238.
72
Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America, (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1973), 573.
73
I will discuss Douglass’s views of the tate at length in Chapter 6.
198
most relevant to my theme here, he was disappointed with the lack of moral progress
of the freedmen. Just after the war, he told Martin Delany to “have patience”
because the manners of liberty would take time to develop. By the 1880s, though,
Douglass began to offer sharp criticisms of freedmen for failing to behave virtuously.
In 1891, he expressed frustration at the lack of progress of freedmen compared to
Chinese and German immigrants:
When I walk the streets and see Lung Wung hard at work at his wash tub, and
see our Teutonic friends stropping their razors and plying the barber’s trade, I
can’t help but think that they are taking away the occupations that belong to
us. Do you know why they can do it? It is because our people, instead of
attending to their business, will buy a banjo and spend most of their time
thumping it.
74

In the speech on self-made men, Douglass repeated this message when he said, “I do
not desire my lecture to become a sermon; but, were this allowable, I would rebuke
the growing tendency to sport and pleasure. The time, money and strength devoted
to these phantoms, would banish darkness and hunger from every hearthstone in our
land.”
75

Douglass’s stern moral rhetoric was rooted in his belief that the practice of
bourgeois virtues was a necessary part of the path to independence. He wanted
individuals to behave virtuously so they could acquire property, which he hoped
would serve as the material foundation for intellectual and moral progress.
Accumulate property. Yes, accumulate property. This may sound to you like
a new gospel. You have been accustomed to hear that money is the root of
all evil; that it is hard for the rich to enter the kingdom of Heaven; that this
world is of no account; that we should take no thought for to-morrow, and

74
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:484.
75
Ibid., 5:564.
199
much more of the same sort. In answer to all which I say: that no people can
ever make any social or mental improvement whose exertions are thus
limited. Poverty is our greatest calamity…. [P]roperty, money, if you please,
will purchase of us the only condition upon which any people can rise to the
dignity of genuine manhood; for, without property, there can be no leisure.
Without leisure, there can be no thought. Without thought, there can be no
invention. Without invention, there can be no progress.
76

In order to develop self-respect and the respect of others, Douglass believed it was
necessary for individuals to acquire property. This, he argued, is largely the work of
individuals themselves.
We must improve our condition. And here the work is ours. It cannot be
done by our friends. They can pity as they can sympathize with us. But we
need something more than sympathy – something more than pity. We must
be respected. And we cannot be respected unless we are either independent
or aiming to be. We must be as independent of society as society is of us,
and lay society under as many obligations to us as we are under to society.
We cannot be paupers and be respected, though we may be paupers and be
pitied. The fact is, my friends, we must not only work, but we must make
money – not only make money, but save it; and when we use it, we must use
it wisely.
77

Confronted with the question of what individuals must do to realize the promise of
freedom, Douglass’s response was the same as his theory of self-made men: WORK!
WORK!! WORK!!! WORK!!!! The toil of individuals should be directed toward the
acquisition of property, which can serve as the basis for intellectual and moral
improvement.
This last point is an important one because it indicates that Douglass did not
embrace the bourgeois virtues as ends in themselves, but rather as means to the
higher end of personal cultivation. For Douglass, in the words of contemporary

76
Ibid., 4:393.
77
Ibid., 4:394.
200
political philosopher Gayle McKeen, “work, and the economic progress that was its
intended consequence, was but the foundation for the cultivation of moral and mental
faculties; it is only with wealth that one can enjoy leisure and education and that one
has the opportunity to pursue the most important thing: the cultivation of the human
soul.”
78
In Douglass’s words,
[Man’s] true dignity is not to be sought in his arms or his legs, but in his
head. Here is the seat and source of all that is of especially great or practical
importance to him…. There is power in the human mind, but education is
needed for its development. As man is the highest on earth it follows that the
vocation of the scholar is among the highest known to man. It is to teach and
induce man’s potential and latent greatness. It is to discover and develop the
noblest, highest and best that is in him. In view of this fact that no man
whose business it is to teach should ever allow himself to feel that his
mission is mean, inferior or circumscribed. In my estimation neither politics
nor religion present to us a calling higher than this primary business of
unfolding and strengthening of the human soul. It is a permanent vocation.
79

This passage provides us with evidence that it would be a mistake to interpret
Douglass’s embrace of bourgeois virtue as an endorsement of shallow materialism.
Douglass did not offer a recipe for life that, as Leo Strauss put it in his famous
critique of liberalism, was a “joyless quest for joy.”
80
Instead, Douglass hoped that
individuals would transcend possessive individualism to the “true dignity” of
intellectual, moral, and spiritual development.
Confronted with this prescription for self-development in the private realm,
one may ask what Douglass identified as the “seedbeds of virtue.”
81
How do

78
Gayle McKeen, “A ‘Guiding Principle’ of Liberalism in the Thought of Frederick Douglass and
W.E.B. DuBois,” in The Liberal Tradition in American Politics, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 104.
79
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:622.
80
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 251.
81
Mary Ann Glendon, Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in
American Society, (New York: Madison Books, 1995).
201
individuals learn the virtues associated with the private dimension of good
citizenship? The argument in this chapter is that good citizenship can encourage
good citizenship. In other words, Douglass believed individuals who act in
responsible ways serve as models for others to emulate. Beyond emulation, there are
several other aspects of Douglass’s understanding of the bottom-up cultivation of
good citizenship. First, I think it is clear Douglass thought economic relationships
have an important impact on moral ecology and character development. The slave
system, for example, produced an unhealthy moral ecology because it degraded
labor, dignified idleness, and encouraged vicious behavior by both masters and
slaves. Slavery, he argued, “is adverse to freedom” because it “sets a premium on
idleness, and degrades both labor and laborers.”
82
Under the Southern system, it was
considered desirable to own slaves so that one did not have to degrade oneself by
working. Under such a system, idleness was a sign of distinction. The idle hands of
the masters were free to indulge their vicious appetites. On a trip to Washington,
D.C. after the Civil War, Douglass described the moral atmosphere of the city when
it had slavery: “Like most slaveholding communities, Washington was tolerant of
drinking, gambling, sensuality, indolence, and many other forms of vice, common to
an idle and lounging people. It was the home of the bully and the duelist.”
83
On
another occasion, Douglass pointed out that the deleterious moral effects of slavery
extended to the slave. Because the slave was denied self-ownership, he argued, he

82
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 2:545.
83
Ibid., 4:455.
202
was unable to feel a strong sense of personal responsibility and he was also denied
“every safeguard to virtue” including the institution of marriage.
84

Douglass was hopeful that the free labor system would have a positive impact
on the morality of former masters and slaves. He recognized, though, that nothing
short of a cultural revolution would be needed to transform attitudes in the South.
The work before us is nothing less than a radical revolution in the modes of
thought which have flourished under the blighting slave system. The idea
that labor is an evil, that work is degrading and that idleness is respectable,
must be dispelled and the idea that work is honorable made to take its place.
Above all they must be taught that the liberty of a part is never to be secured
by the enslavement or oppression of any…. Time, experience, and culture
must gradually bring society back to the normal condition from which long
years of slavery have carried away all under its iron sway.
85

Douglass expressed a similar view of the need for moral transformation among the
freedmen.
Freedom has brought duties, responsibilities and created expectations which
must be fulfilled. There is no disguising the fact that the price of liberty is
eternal vigilance, and if we maintain our high estate in this republic, we must
be something more than driftwood in a stream. We must keep pace with the
nation in all that goes to make a nation great, glorious and free.
86

The ideal of the Self-Made Man is important, in part, because it dignifies labor.
Given the “values” of the slave system, the exaltation of labor was crucial to the
development of a liberal moral ecology. Douglass hoped that the arena of free labor
would be a seedbed that could teach individuals the bourgeois virtues.
A second seedbed of virtue is the home. As noted above, Douglass did not
believe most self-made men are motivated by grand illusions of wealth or fame.

84
Ibid., 5:540-1.
85
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 3:292.
86
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:57.
203
Instead, most self-made men are motivated by a modest desire to achieve a secure
home for themselves and their families. In this sense, the home represents a
“commanding object” that can motivate men to practice the bourgeois virtues. In
1894, Douglass put this point strongly and succinctly when he said, “Every man who
thinks at all must know that the home is the fountain head, the inspiration, the
foundation and main support not only for all social virtue, but of all motives to
human progress and that no people can prosper or amount to much without a
home.”
87
In addition to serving as the primary motivation for social virtue and
progress, Douglass believed the home plays a crucial role as a moral restraint on the
tendency to indulge in vice. He argued that Washington, D.C. was a city with a low
“moral tone” because members of Congress did not have their families present to
keep them in check: “In the absence of good women and the family, man sinks
rapidly to barbarism. In the olden times Members of Congress came here and left
behind them all the restraints and endearments of home. Their manners and morals
were shaped by those of the restaurant, the hotel and the gambling hall, and other
resorts of men of the world.”
88

Last, Douglass believed the schoolhouse could be a seedbed of moral virtue.
I will discuss the importance of education in some detail in the next chapter, but it is
worth noting here that Douglass believed the virtues of good citizenship could be
developed through educational institutions. Indeed, he believed there was a direct
connection between intellectual and moral development: “With increased

87
Ibid., 5:599.
88
Ibid., 4:468-9.
204
intelligence and a wider dissemination of earnest thought and sound reasoning will
come also the moral advancement. Ignorance and immorality usually go hand in
hand. So intelligence and self-respect are almost synonymous.”
89
Although
Douglass vacillated on the question of whether former slaves should receive a
primarily practical or liberal education, he believed either would contribute to their
moral development.
In sum, Douglass believed the virtues embodied in the Self-Made Man were
essential to good citizenship. Whereas contemporary liberals often shy away from
discussing the moral dimension of the private sphere, he thought it was of the utmost
importance. The private behavior of individuals impacts others and the moral health
of the community and, therefore, it is within the scope of good citizenship. Like the
public dimension of his understanding, the private dimension of Douglass’s view of
good citizenship is rooted in his strong view of moral responsibility. In the private
realm, individuals are practicing good citizenship if they are behaving in what
Douglass believed was a morally responsible way: working hard and behaving
virtuously in order to achieve personal, familial, and community well-being. A good
citizen is either independent or striving to be; this, he thought, was crucial for self-
respect and the respect of others. In order to become independent, individuals must
labor with focus, intensity, and perseverance. In addition, achieving and sustaining
independence requires individuals to be virtuous. Without prudence, honesty, thrift,
and temperance, the gains of individuals are insecure. Douglass exalted the Self-

89
Ibid., 5:483.
205
Made Man and the bourgeois virtues because he hoped American society would
reach a point when individuals who worked hard and played by the rules would have
a good chance to achieve material security. With secure homes as their physical and
spiritual foundations, he hoped individuals would pursue intellectual and moral
development.

V. Conclusion: Douglass’s Measure of Men
Douglass offered a civic liberal vision of good citizenship. He believed the
conditions necessary for the exercise of personal freedom could only be achieved
and maintained if citizens behaved in responsible ways. Good citizenship requires
individuals to respect the rights of others, to treat others fairly, to behave virtuously,
to remain faithful to fundamental moral principles, and to be willing to meet the
obligations of civic responsibility. Douglass identified individuals who did all or
some of these things as great citizens who are worthy of admiration and emulation.
Who a society identifies as “great” is a telling commentary on its moral health. “No
nation,” Douglass said, “has yet produced a higher standard of morality than that
embodied in the character of its great men.” The greatness of men, he continued, is
determined by what the community truly holds dear. “In a community where men
love freedom, that man only will be popular who is sacredly and continually engaged
in shedding the blessings of freedom upon mankind around him.”
90
A community

90
Ibid., 2:172.
206
that truly loved freedom, he thought, would exalt individuals with the character of
reformers and self-made men.
The Reformer’s greatness is to be found in the fact that he is animated to
action by his deep devotion to the moral principles at the core of the liberal project:
universal freedom and equality. On one occasion, Douglass said that abolitionism
had made him a “great man” in the sense that it “delivered” him from the “bondage”
of self-interest and “race pride” to a belief in the equal dignity of “every man under
the wide canopy of heaven.”
91
As noted above, from Douglass’s perspective, the
greatness of John Brown was not to be found in his actions but in the fact that he
“loved liberty for all men…for those most despised and scorned, as well as those
most esteemed and honored.”
92
The Reformer embodies the devotion to moral
principle and willingness to meet civic responsibilities that are essential parts of
good citizenship. Although not all citizens can emulate the moral devotion and
altruism of the Reformer, Douglass hoped the average citizen would adopt some of
his critical edge, commitment to principle, and vigilance.
While the virtues embodied in the Reformer are essential to the achievement
and security of basic liberal rights, the virtues embodied in the Self-Made Man are
essential to the flourishing of a liberal society. Douglass believed that once rights
are protected and the conditions of fair play are ensured, individuals who work hard
and behave virtuously have a good chance to achieve material security. The Self-
Made Man is a model of self-reliance, moral uprightness, and perseverance. He

91
Ibid., 2:396.
92
Ibid., 5:22.
207
serves as an inspiration for others because he is able to achieve greatness against all
odds. The Self-Made Man serves as evidence that hard work animated by a healthy
soul can lead to success. He dignifies freedom by demonstrating the heights that can
be achieved by exercising liberty virtuously. For individuals to flourish in a free
society, Douglass thought, it is necessary for them to practice the virtues exhibited
by the Self-Made Man.
During his fifty plus years of public life, Douglass was preoccupied with the
moral health of the American republic. Late in life, far removed from the optimism
of his days as a Garrisonian abolitionist, he said that he had come to realize that it “is
hard for men to be just.”
93
In order to help men find and stay on the path of virtue, it
is crucial to cultivate a healthy moral atmosphere. The development of a moral
ecology supportive of personal freedom is not, Douglass thought, a task that should
be left entirely to the state. Instead, the project of achieving and flourishing under
conditions of freedom is one that is primarily the responsibility of citizens
themselves. Citizens can be “friends of freedom” by acting in responsible ways. If
citizens were perfect, no government would be necessary. Because human beings
fall short of perfection, the state has some role to play in creating and maintaining a
moral ecology that is supportive of freedom through various forms of civic
education. It is to Douglass’s thoughts on the top-down cultivation of moral ecology
that we now turn.

93
Ibid., 4:570.
208

Chapter 6
“Man is neither Wood nor Stone”:
Civic Education in Douglass’s Liberalism

I. Introduction
Frederick Douglass was not a systematic political thinker. He did not offer a
detailed account of the role institutions play in the development of good men and
good citizens. Indeed, as I argued in the last chapter, Douglass is best understood as
a bottom-up thinker. His central concern was with the role that active citizens play
in securing the conditions necessary for the exercise of personal freedom. Douglass
was not, though, completely silent on top-down forms of civic education. By top-
down, I mean those forms of civic education that originate with state institutions and
officials or that have a more formal character than the regular interaction of citizens.
In this chapter, my aim is to show that although Douglass was primarily a bottom-up
thinker, he recognized the importance of top-down mechanisms for the achievement
of freedom and the cultivation of a healthy moral ecology. More specifically, he
thought citizens could be “taught” to behave in responsible ways by the threat of
force, the promulgation of positive law, the rhetoric of statesmen, the celebration of
political ideals in civic ceremonies, and through a robust system of elementary,
secondary, and higher education.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting where this chapter fits with what has
preceded it. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that Douglass’s politics were essentially
liberal. This is important for what I am doing here because it establishes some limits
on the forms of civic education Douglass can embrace. Civic education is a
209
challenge for liberals because they are committed to limited government and tend to
be skeptical of state attempts to shape the character of citizens. In this chapter, I
argue that Douglass’s suggestions for civic education do not violate his liberal
commitments. In Chapter 3, I argued that Douglass’s thoroughgoing commitment to
natural rights was rooted in the experience of slavery. The deontological and
universal nature of his commitment to natural rights philosophy provided a strong
basis for both bottom-up and top-down action in pursuit of liberal ideals. In other
words, Douglass believed the respect and protection of individual rights was required
as a matter of natural law. This firm commitment provided the basis for his belief
that the state had an obligation to act affirmatively to encourage individuals to
behave in responsible ways. In Chapter 4, I argued that Douglass offered a
multifaceted case for the claim that individuals in a free society should feel a strong
sense of responsibility to one another. Civic responsibility, on his account, requires
individuals to respect each other’s rights, treat one another fairly, and feel a sense of
duty to intervene when the rights of others are being violated. In Chapter 5, I
discussed Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship in order to show the ways in
which he believed civic liberalism could be achieved and supported from the bottom
up. The matters discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 have a direct bearing on my task here.
As I said at the end of the last chapter, if citizens were perfect, no top-down
mechanisms would be needed to achieve a political culture that promotes freedom
and responsibility. Douglass recognized that individuals sometimes fail to live up to
the expectations of civic responsibility. Whether or not individuals are disposed to
210
act in responsible ways in support of liberal ideals is not a matter of chance. Instead,
Douglass believed men could be encouraged to behave in responsible ways through
various mechanisms of civic education. Implicit in this belief is the claim that “men
are improvable,” an idea Douglass called “the grand distinguishing attribute of
humanity.”
1
Civic responsibility, he held, can and must be encouraged by state
action.
In what follows, I discuss several top-down mechanisms of civic education
that are part of Douglass’s liberalism. I begin with an exploration of his defense of
the use of physical force by the state as an educative measure. He defended the use
of force by the state and by private parties in defense of rights not only as a matter of
justice but also as a way to “teach” others about the requirements of liberal political
morality. In Part III, I examine various “public messages” sent by the state and its
officials through positive law, the rhetoric of statesmen, and civic ceremonies. In
Part IV, I discuss Douglass’s hope that a robust system of public and private
education would make individuals better citizens. Realizing the promises of
liberalism is ultimately up to the citizens but, Douglass believed, the state has some
role to play in teaching individuals about what it means to be a responsible citizen.

II. “We Are Writing the Statutes of Eternal Justice”: Civic Education by Force

Liberals are suspicious of civic education because they value autonomy and
usually doubt the legitimacy of state attempts to make men moral. According to

1
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:255.
211
contemporary civic liberal Thomas Spragens, liberal suspicions of civic education
are rooted in “epistemic humility,” “respect for individual autonomy,” and
“insistence on the equal moral worth and political standing of all liberal citizens.”
2

As a result of these suspicions, liberals believe “character development” should
occur, if at all, through “education and habituation rather than through coercion or
indoctrination.”
3
Although the liberal discomfort with civic education is evident, it
would be a mistake to say that liberals completely reject civic education through
coercive state action. This is because liberals believe coercion is justified in defense
of individual rights. When Douglass defended the use of force, he often appealed to
the educative value of violence in defense of natural rights.
Douglass’s belief in the educative value of force was rooted in his
fundamental assumptions about human nature. “The foundation of all governments
and all codes of laws,” he said, “is the fact that man is a rational creature, and is
capable of guiding his conduct by ideas of right and wrong, of good and evil, by
hope of reward and fear of punishment.”
4
In “Is Civil Government Right?” Douglass
reiterated this idea: “rewards and punishments are natural agents for restraining evil
and promoting good, man being endowed with faculties keenly alive to both.”
5

According to this view, human reason enables men to understand what is right and
wrong and when this is not enough to move them to act justly their reason also
enables them to understand that acting unjustly may lead to punishment. The

2
Thomas Spragens, Civic Liberalism: Reflections on our Democratic Ideals, (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1999), 232.
3
Ibid., 234.
4
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:577.
5
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 5:209.
212
promulgation and enforcement of positive law, Douglass believed, is justified
because human beings are endowed with rationality, which allows them to
understand the potential consequences of disobeying the law.
For Douglass, the “governmental authority to pass laws” and “compel
obedience to any laws” is limited by the “natural rights and happiness of man.”
6

“Human government,” he said, “is for the protection of human rights” and it is
sometimes necessary for the state to “repel aggression by force.”
7
As demonstrated
in Chapter 2, Douglass’s commitment to natural rights led him to reject anarchism
and endorse limited government: “Society without law is society with a curse,
driving men into isolation and depriving them of one of the greatest blessings of
which man is susceptible.”
8
The use of force is necessary and justified, on
Douglass’s view, because there are “hardened villains” who “will cheat, steal, rob,
burn, and murder their fellow creatures, and because there are these exceptions to the
mass of humanity, society has a right to protect itself against their depredations and
aggressions upon the common weal.”
9
The creation of laws to combat hardened
villains is only effectual, he said, when there is a state strong enough to enforce
them: “Pen, ink, and paper liberty are excellent when there is a party behind it to
respect and secure its enjoyment. Human laws are not self executing. To be of any
service they must be made vital, active, and certain.”
10

6
Ibid., 5:212.
7
Ibid., 2:208; 5:213.
8
Ibid., 5:212-3.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., 4:255.
213
What does Douglass’s embrace of the use of state force in defense of natural
rights have to do with civic education? His discussions of just force almost always
include some reference to what “lessons” are “taught” by the enforcement of law. In
the essay on civil government cited above, Douglass wrote:
Men need to be taught, not only the happy consequences arising from dealing
justly, but the dreadful consequences which result from injustice; their fears,
therefore, may be as legitimately appealed to as their hopes, and he who
repudiates such appeals, throws away an important instrumentality for
establishing justice among men, and promoting peace and happiness of
society. All tyrants, all oppressors should be taught, by precept and by
example, that, in trampling wantonly and ruthlessly upon the lives and
liberties of their unoffending brother-men, they forfeit their own right to
liberty….
11

In response to William Lloyd Garrison’s pacifism, Douglass repeated his case for the
educative value of force: “There are lessons needful to mankind, which will be
learned only when written in blood; and however it may be deplored, it is which can
secure ‘peace,’ to the sons of man.”
12
The use of force in defense of natural rights,
Douglass hoped, would teach individuals to behave justly.
Douglass’s belief that government action in defense of natural rights could
contribute to a moral ecology that is supportive of freedom was rooted in his
reflections on the “education” of slavery, which had the opposite effect.
[Slavery] destroys all the finer feelings of our nature – it renders the people
less humane – leads them to regard cruelty with indifference, as the boy born
and bred within the sound of the thundering roar of Niagara, feels nothing
strange because he is used to the noise; while a stranger trembles with awe,
and feels he is in the presence of God – in the midst of his mighty works.
People reared in the midst of slavery become indifferent to human wrongs,
indifferent to the entreaties, the tears, the agonies of the slave under the lash;

11
Ibid., 5:213-4.
12
Ibid., 5:221-2.
214
all of which appear to be music to the ears of slaveholders. Slavery has
weakened the love of freedom in the US – they have lost much of that regard
for liberty which once characterized them. It has eaten out the vitals from the
hearts of the Americans.
13

Just as slavery lessened respect for the dignity of man by allowing the rights of
individuals to be violated, the use of force in defense of natural rights can deepen the
community’s respect of human dignity. In 1894, when Douglass spoke about the
problem of lynching in the South, he reflected on the enduring impact of the
education of slavery. Many Northerners, he said, doubted the veracity of lynching
stories from the South because they had a hard time understanding how individuals
could “shoot and hang their fellowmen without just cause.” The mistake of Northern
skeptics, Douglass said, was “in their assumption that the lynchers are like other
men.” They “overlook the natural effect and influence of the life, education and
habits of the lynchers. Their institutions have taught them no respect for human life
and especially the life of the negro. It has in fact taught them absolute contempt for
his life. The sacredness of life which ordinary men feel does not touch them
anywhere.”
14
The culture of slavery excluded some individuals from the protection
of the law and in so doing taught the rest of the population to disregard their dignity
as human beings. The inclusion of all human beings under the shield of the law,
Douglass hoped, would strengthen the community’s respect for human dignity.
Douglass’s hope was that the creation of a just society in which the natural
rights of all individuals were protected under law would contribute to the

13
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1:210.
14
Ibid., 5:590.
215
development of a “humanitarian culture” in which the dignity of all human beings is
respected.
15
Perhaps paradoxically, he thought the use of force could contribute to a
greater appreciation for the dignity of human life. When the state uses force in
defense of natural rights, Douglass argued, it teaches its citizens that there are
“dreadful consequences” for acting unjustly. He hoped these dreadful consequences
would have a deterrent effect on would-be villains and he thought the use of force in
these circumstances would have a beneficial effect on the moral atmosphere.
Douglass believed the use of force to protect natural rights was the first
“office of government.”
16
When the state acts to defend the natural rights of
individuals, it sends a message about the dignity of human beings. Failure to respect
human dignity, the liberal state instructs us, will lead to “dreadful consequences” for
the perpetrator. The failure of Southern governments to protect the natural rights of
some individuals had a deep impact on the moral atmosphere of the South for
decades after the Civil War. By declaring that some individuals were outside the
protection of the law, Southern governments cultivated an inhumane culture. The
civic education provided by the use of force in defense of natural rights, Douglass
thought, would take time to sink in. In 1860, he predicted that it would take “several
generations of humanitarian culture” to alter the moral ecology of the South.
17
“Men
are not changed from lambs into tigers instantaneously, nor from tigers into lambs

15
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:496-7.
16
Ibid., 5:212.
17
Ibid., 2:496-7.
216
instantaneously,” he said, but a strong state commitment to the protection of natural
rights is a necessary first step in the civic education of a liberal citizenry.
18

III. Laws, Statesmen, & Ceremonies: Education by Statute, Rhetoric, & Ritual
Douglass believed the use of force by the state could serve as a blunt
instrumentality to teach men the dreadful consequences that follow from violating
the rights of others. At this point, I would like to explore other forms of civic
education that he believed the state and its officials use to communicate messages to
citizens about proper behavior in a liberal polity. First, I discuss his belief that
positive law could play an important educative role. Second, I explore Douglass’s
idea of statesmanship and show that he believed it was important for political leaders
to utilize the bully pulpit to educate individuals about the rights and responsibilities
of citizenship. Third, I examine Douglass’s belief that civic ceremonies can play a
key role in reminding citizens about the shared moral commitments that should
animate their political lives.

“This Law, Though Dead, Did Speak”: Civic Education through Positive Law
Douglass believed positive law could play an important role in the civic
education of liberal citizens. Positive law, he thought, has an impact on the moral
atmosphere of a community. He argued that even when a positive law is, or seems
to be, unenforceable it plays an important educative role because it is a formal

18
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 4:487.
217
statement of the political morality of the community. From his perspective, then,
laws can serve as moral ideals to which members of the community ought to aspire.
Contemporary scholars call this an “aspirational” view of law. According to legal
scholar Philip Harvey, an aspirational law is “a kind of law by means of which
human societies ‘legislate’ goals for themselves. By asserting that everyone has
[human] rights, even when we are not prepared to honor them in practice, we
challenge ourselves to live up to our own aspirations and pre-authorize actions…to
bring our practice into compliance with our aspirations.”
19
In this section, I explore
several examples Douglass offered of how positive laws can communicate
aspirational messages to citizens and, as such, serve as important means of civic
education.
The first example of Douglass adopting an “aspirational” attitude toward
positive law is his antislavery reading of the Constitution. Once he rejected the
proslavery reading of the Garrisonians, he began to view the Constitution as an
important statement about the aims of the American union. Douglass was
particularly fond of pointing to the Preamble’s call “to secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity” as a moral message from the Founders to later
generations. Each generation’s task, Douglass argued, was to move America closer
to the ideal of freedom for all human beings. Citizens and statesmen can appeal to
the Constitution as an authoritative text that teaches us about the goals of the

19
For a contemporary explanation of this idea, see Philip Harvey, “Aspirational Law,” 52 Buffalo Law
Review, 118-9 (2004).
218
American political project. Douglass believed the text itself could serve as a civic
teacher for those who would read or listen to its words.
Similarly, Douglass viewed the Emancipation Proclamation as an important
symbolic gesture in the fight against slavery. Although the Proclamation did little to
actually liberate slaves from their masters, it offered an important moral message
about the mission of the Civil War. The Proclamation communicated to the nation
that the war was about slavery and that Northern victory would mean abolition. The
Proclamation gave a deeper moral meaning to the violence that was taking place.
After the Civil War, Douglass argued that the 13
th
, 14
th
, and 15
th

Amendments to the Constitution established not only political but moral standards by
which citizens ought to abide. Even though the government ability and willingness
to enforce these amendments was called into question almost immediately, these
laws played an important aspirational role – by promising the end of slavery, due
process, equal protection, and the right to vote to all men, these amendments played
an important role in establishing goals for post-War America. Another example is
provided by Douglass’s attitude toward the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In 1883 the
Supreme Court struck down the Act, which guaranteed equal treatment in “public
accommodations.” Many observers said the Supreme Court’s decision was of little
consequence because the Civil Rights Act had not been enforced in the South.
Douglass disagreed:
It is said that this decision will make no difference in the treatment of colored
people; that the Civil Rights Bill was a dead letter, and could not be enforced.
There is some truth in all this, but it is not the whole truth. That bill, like all
advance legislation, was a banner on the outer wall of American liberty, a
219
noble moral standard, uplifted for the education of American people. There
are tongues in trees, books, in the running brooks, - sermons in the stones.
This law, though dead, did speak. It expressed the sentiment of justice and
fair play, common to every honest heart. Its voice was against popular
prejudice and meanness. It appealed to all the noble and patriotic instincts of
the American people. It told the American people that they were all equal
before the law; that they belonged to a common country and were equal
citizens.
20

“Advance legislation” is Douglass’s term for “aspirational law” – it is law that, even
if not enforced, sends a moral message to citizens; it establishes moral ideals to
which individuals ought to aspire. In the case of the Civil Rights Bill, Douglass
believed that Congress sent an important message about justice and fair play. Even
if the law had little immediate practical impact, he thought it might contribute to the
cultivation of a humanitarian culture.
Douglass’s belief that positive law should promote moral ideals such as
justice and fairness is also evidenced by his endorsement of legislative action on the
“labor question.” As noted in previous chapters, the “labor question” was a catch-all
phrase used during the nineteenth century for matters related to the working
conditions, compensation, and opportunities of the working class. Douglass worried
about the growing gap between rich and poor and endorsed a bill offered by
Representative George F. Hoar of Massachusetts that would create a Commission to
“investigate the subject of the wages and hours of labor, and of the division of the
joint profits of labor and capital between the laborer and the capitalist, and the social,
educational, and sanitary conditions of the laboring classes of the United States, and
how the same are affected by existing laws regulating commerce, finance, and

20
Ibid., 5:121-2.
220
currency.”
21
This Commission would be charged with the task of offering legislative
suggestions in response to issues raised by the labor question.
As noted in Chapter 2, Douglass’s concerns about the compensation and
conditions of the working class belie the claim that he was a Social Darwinist
thinker.
22
His endorsement of legislative action to ensure that “American
civilization” was designed “primarily for Man” and not “Property” is evidence that
he believed the state had some role to play in promoting fairness that goes beyond
the laissez-faire embrace of the night watchman state. In addition to general
concerns about the labor question, Douglass believed the state had an important role
to play in combating the systematic unfairness of the post-War economy in the
South. After lamenting the nefarious impact of the sharecropping and trucking
systems, he said, “The true object for which governments are ordained among men is
to protect the weak against the encroachments of the strong, to hold its strong arm of
justice over all the civil relations of its citizens and to see that all have an equal
chance in the race of life.”
23
Even a limited liberal state, he argued, must have
enough power to secure the basic rights of individuals.
I know it is said that the general government is a government of limited
powers…. If the general government had the power to make black men
citizens, it has the power to protect them in that citizenship. If it had the right
to make them voters it has the right to protect them in the exercise of the
elective franchise…. If it has not this right, it is destitute of the fundamental
quality of a government, and ought to be hissed and hurried out of the

21
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 4:284.
22
Waldo Martin, The Mind of Frederick Douglass, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1984).
23
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:369.
221
sisterhood of governments, for it is then only a pretended government, a
usurper, a sham, a delusion, and a snare.
24

Douglass believed the state had an important role to play in promoting fair play.
Like his defense of the use of force to protect natural rights, he endorsed state action
in pursuit of fairness because of its direct impact on the lives of individuals as well
as its impact on the moral ecology of the community. Legislative action to combat
discriminatory and systematically unfair labor practices sends a message about the
liberal commitment to equal opportunity and the importance of rewarding merit.
Douglass’s discussions of the Constitution, the Emancipation Proclamation,
the Civil Rights Bill, and labor legislation provide evidence that he believed positive
law can be a useful instrumentality of civic education. According to his reading, the
Constitution’s preamble sends a moral message about the duty to secure the
blessings of liberty to all people, the Emancipation Proclamation sent a message
about the meaning of the Civil War, the Civil Rights Bill established a moral ideal
for the social sphere, and labor legislation articulated a message to the American
people about the importance of fairness in the economic sphere. Taken together,
these examples provide evidence that Douglass believed positive law could play an
important educative role in a liberal society. Even those laws that are not enforced,
he claimed, communicate valuable messages that can have an impact on the moral
ecology.

“Teach the People for Once”: Statesmen as Civic Educators

24
Ibid.
222
Drawing on Aristotle’s political thought, contemporary civic liberal thinker
Thomas Spragens contends the task of nurturing a just and virtuous political
community is the “special business” of political leaders.
25
Statesmen are able to
impact the civic attitudes of citizens through legislation and by articulating moral
and political messages about the fundamental values of the community. Douglass
believed statesmen have a crucial role to play in the civic education of liberal
citizens. Throughout his public career, he maintained a firm faith in the power of
language to move human beings to act. A good statesman, he thought, is an
individual whose rhetoric defends the value of freedom and reminds citizens of the
civic responsibilities that are supportive of freedom.
Douglass’s belief in the importance of statesmanship was, at least in part,
rooted in his faith in the power of speech. “Great is the miracle of human speech,”
he said, “by it nations are enlightened and reformed; by it the cause of justice and
liberty is defended, by it evils are exposed, ignorance dispelled, the path of duty
made plain, and by it those that live today are put into the possession of the wisdom
of ages gone by.”
26
As I pointed out in Chapter 4, by the end of the 1850s, Douglass
had lost some of his faith in the power of speech to move men from “the downy seat
of inaction,” but he never completely abandoned his belief in the power of
“preaching.”
27
In 1884, as many civil rights advocates were in a state of despair over
the abandonment of Reconstruction, Douglass remained hopeful: “[There is] one

25
Thomas Spragens, Civic Liberalism, 201.
26
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:476-7.
27
Ibid., 2:494-5.
223
very strong ground of hope I have for the negro. It is this: the discussion of his
claims to consideration still goes on. Happily for him, we live in a country governed
by ideas as well as by laws, and these ideas are constantly changed and modified by
the light of discussion…. While there is one voice heard in behalf of justice and fair
play, the negro need not despair.”
28

It is clear that Douglass believed the art of rhetoric is an important tool of
statesmen, but what is it that statesmen ought to say? Like so many other aspects of
his thought, Douglass assessed statesmen by the presence of “moral feeling” in their
rhetoric. After reading President Lincoln’s infamous letter to Horace Greeley in
which he said he would “save the Union without freeing any slave” if he could,
Douglass declared, “Our chief danger lies in the absence of all moral feeling in the
utterances of our rulers.”
29
At the time Lincoln wrote these words, Douglass read
them as appalling evidence of his moral shallowness. Rather than denying claims
that the point of contention between the North and the South was the issue of
slavery, Douglass thought an honorable statesman should admit this to be true and
attempt to rally the people to the cause of liberty. During the war, Douglass said,
“The lesson for the statesman at this hour is to discover and apply some principle of
Government which shall produce unity of sentiment, unity of idea, unity of object.
Union without unity is, as we have seen, body without soul, marriage without love, a

28
Ibid., 5:164-5.
29
Ibid., 4:12.
224
barrel without hoops, which falls at the first touch.”
30
What principle of government
should the statesman appeal to as the moral glue of the Union?
We want a country, and we are fighting for a country, which shall not brand
the Declaration of Independence as a lie. We want a country whose
fundamental institutions we can proudly defend before the highest
intelligence and civilization of the age…. We want a country, and are
fighting for a country, which shall be free from sectional political parties –
free from sectional religious denominations – free from sectional benevolent
associations – free from every kind and description of sect, party, and
combination of a sectional character. We want a country, and are fighting for
a country, where social intercourse and commercial relations shall neither be
embarrassed nor embittered by the imperious exactions of an insolent
slaveholding Oligarchy, which required Northern merchants to sell their souls
as a condition precedent to selling their goods.
31

These passages are evidence that Douglass accepted the Aristotelian notion
described above that it is the “special business” of statesmen to nurture a sense of
civic community by talking about the values that unite us. For Douglass, the values
at the core of the American polity are the commitments to liberty and equality and he
believed these commitments should serve as the touchstones of political discourse
and action.
Douglass’s own speaking and writing is a model of the sort of moralized
rhetoric he hoped American statesmen would adopt. His reflections upon and
discussions of the “soul of the nation” are models of righteous statesmanship.
During the Civil War, Douglass said: “What our rulers at Washington stand in need
of, in order to a speedy end of this slaveholding rebellion, and to place the nation on
a firm foundation of peace and prosperity, is neither men nor money, but a living and

30
Ibid., 4:14.
31
Ibid., 4:15.
225
all-controlling faith in the principles of freedom avowed in the Declaration of
Independence, and which are the foundation of the Government….”
32
In 1894,
Douglass continued to express his concern about the health of the American soul:
Could I be heard by this great nation, I would call to mind the sublime and
glorious truths with which, at its birth, it saluted a listening world…. It
announced the advent of a nation, based upon human brotherhood and the
self-evident truths of liberty and equality…. Apply these sublime and
glorious truths to the situation now before you…. Recognize the fact that the
rights of the humblest citizen are as worthy of protection as those of the
highest, and your problem will be solved; and, whatever may be in store for it
in the future, whether prosperity or adversity; whether it shall have foes
without, or foes within, whether there shall be peace, or war; based upon the
eternal principles of truth, justice and humanity, and with no class having any
cause of complaint or grievance, your Republic will stand and flourish
forever.
33

Statesmen, like the Reformers discussed in the last chapter, play the important role of
reminding their listeners of the “eternal principles” expressed in the Declaration of
Independence and encouraging them to observe them in practice.
In addition to reminding citizens of these fundamental principles, statesmen
have the difficult task of motivating citizens to practice the civic virtues supportive
of these principles. For a statesman in a liberal regime, this task is complicated by
the factors discussed in Chapter 4. Liberals are, by definition, uncomfortable with
coercion and indoctrination and, as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation,
the moral vocabulary of solidarity within liberalism is limited. It is necessary,
therefore, for liberal statesmen to offer a series of justifications for civic
responsibility that are similar to those offered by Douglass. In order to cultivate a

32
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 3:116.
33
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:607.
226
sense of civic community and responsibility, liberal statesmen must appeal to the
variety of “actuating motives” that influence human beings. Appeals to human
brotherhood, founding principles, respect for virtuous action, and self-interest are all
potential instruments for liberal statesmen engaged in the “special business” of
crafting the souls of citizens in ways supportive of freedom.
It is worth noting that Douglass believed statesmen had an opportunity to
teach these important moral lessons through the bully pulpit of elected office as well
as the platforms provided during political campaigns. Soon after the creation of the
Republican Party, he wrote: “Teach the people for once in a political campaign the
sacredness of human rights, the brotherhood of man, and expose to all the living light
of day the soul and terrible abomination of Southern slavery, and your Republican
party will deserve success, which is better even than success itself.”
34
For Douglass,
political campaigns were great opportunities for civic education. Through the
debates, pamphlets and speeches that are part of every campaign, he hoped, righteous
statesmen would teach their listeners important lessons about the fundamental
commitments of liberal political morality.
Like the practice of good citizenship, good statesmanship is crucial to the
development of a healthy moral ecology. Good statesmen can serve as civic teachers
that remind citizens of the moral ideals of the polity and the civic ethos that promotes
those ideals. Good statesmen separate themselves from Reformers by demonstrating
the political skill necessary to navigate the complex waters of democratic politics.

34
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:492.
227
Although Douglass expressed frustration with Lincoln’s lack of moral feeling in the
early 1860s, he grew to believe that he was “the greatest statesman that ever presided
over the destinies of this Republic.”
35
At times, Lincoln fell short of the moral
righteousness of the Reformer, but Douglass came to appreciate how he combined
his pragmatic political skills with a devotion to the moral principles of the
Declaration. “Viewed from the genuine abolition ground,” Douglass said, “Mr.
Lincoln seemed tardy, cold, dull, and indifferent: but measuring him by the
sentiment of his country, a sentiment he was bound as a statesman to consult, he was
swift, zealous, radical, and determined.”
36
Although Douglass was a reformer who
was primarily concerned with how good citizens contribute to social justice, he
appreciated the role of good statesmen, who are at their best when they use their
position of prominence to “teach the people” about the “sacredness of human rights”
and the “brotherhood of man.”
37

“It is More Than Ribbons, or Stars, or Garters”: Civic Education by Ritual
Douglass believed civic ceremonies could serve as valuable moments of civic
education for the American people. On certain days of the year, such as the Fourth
of July and Memorial Day, he thought it was necessary and appropriate to reflect on
the meaning of our civic life. Although civic ceremonies are not necessarily state
sanctioned or directed, he believed it was legitimate for the state to offer official

35
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:78.
36
Ibid., 4:436. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Douglass and Lincoln, see
James Oakes, The Radical and the Republican, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007).
37
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 2:492.
228
recognition of such holidays as a way of encouraging citizens to engage in civic
reflection. These occasions, he hoped, would afford citizens time and space in which
they are encouraged to think about and discuss the meaning of their political lives.
Douglass’s well-known “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?” oration is one
example of utilizing a civic ceremony to provoke citizens to think about the gap
between the moral ideals of the Declaration Independence and the realities of
American life.
38
After the Civil War, Douglass was a vocal advocate of the rituals
associated with “Decoration Day” (now known as Memorial Day), a day featuring a
“bevy of flags, floral wreaths on soldiers’ graves, and brightly uniformed marchers
in a large parade.”
39
Although the celebration of civic holidays blurs the line
between bottom-up and top-down civic education, I am discussing it here because it
has a more formal character than the practice of good citizenship discussed in the
previous chapter. So why did Douglass believe Decoration Day was such an
important opportunity for civic education?
In 1882, Douglass delivered a speech entitled, “We Must Not Abandon the
Observance of Decoration Day.” In it, he offered a detailed defense of the civic
ritual of memorializing American soldiers. “Annual memorial occasions,” he began,
“have deep and sacred significance” because they are about “more than ribbons, or
stars, or garters.” To be invited to participate in such a ceremony, he continued, is an
immense honor because it makes an individual “a man among men, a full partaker in

38
For an extensive discussion of this speech, see James Colaiaco, Frederick Douglass and the Fourth
of July, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
39
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:38. For a history of Decoration Day, see David Blight,
“Decoration Days: The Origins of Memorial Day in the North and South,” in The Memory of the Civil
War in American Culture, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 94.
229
the rights, duties, privileges, and immunities of American citizenship – a citizenship
of having a grander future than any bestowed by any other country in the world.”
40

Douglass’s connection of the ceremony with the “rights, duties, privileges, and
immunities of American citizenship” is significant. On occasions such as Decoration
Day, individuals are able to participate in a ritualized celebration of the idea of
American citizenship. This ritual is a celebration of the rights that are promised in
American founding documents and it is a reminder of the duties of citizenship.
Indeed, the day is a microcosm of the civic responsibility that Douglass placed at the
center of the liberal project. On Decoration Day, citizens are invited to set aside
their private concerns so they can contribute to the discussion and celebration of
public ideals. Decoration Day, as Douglass understood it, was a truly civic liberal
occasion.
Douglass’s began his defense of Decoration Day by asking a series of
questions:
Does any man question the right or the propriety of this annual ceremony?
Can any man who loves his country advise its discontinuance? Is there
anywhere another altar better than this, around which the nation can meet one
day in each year to renew its national vows and manifest its loyal devotion to
the principles of our free government? Is there any eminence from which we
can better survey the past, the present, the future?
41

Douglass responded, “For my part I know no other such day. There is none other so
abundant in suggestions and themes of immediate national interests as this day.”
42

The celebration of Decoration Day, he argued, was a crucial part of the ongoing

40
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:38.
41
Ibid., 5:42.
42
Ibid.
230
struggle over the soul of the nation; it was an attempt to push the souls of citizens in
the direction of freedom. “While good and evil, loyalty and treason, liberty and
slavery remain opposites and irreconcilable, while they retain their fighting qualities,
and shall contend, as they must contend, for ascendancy in the world, their respective
forces will adopt opposite emblems and tokens.”
43
For Douglass, the meaning of
Decoration Day was clear: it was an opportunity to honor the sacrifice of those who
fought and died for the cause of freedom in the Civil War. Some argued that it was
time to forgive and forget, but Douglass said he could not accept this suggestion “to
the extent of abandoning the observance of Decoration Day. If rebellion was wrong
and loyalty right, if slavery was wrong and emancipation right, we are rightfully here
today.”
44

Douglass’s explanation of the moral meaning of Decoration Day has
implications beyond memorializing the Civil War. Indeed, Decoration Day was, for
him, a celebration of the civic virtues necessary to secure freedom.
We come around this national family altar, one day in each year, to pay our
grateful homage to the memory of brave men – to express and emphasize by
speech and pageantry our reverence for those great qualities of enlightened
and exalted human nature, which in every land are the stay and salvation of
the race; the qualities without which states would perish, society dissolve,
progress become impossible and mankind sink back into a howling
wilderness of barbarism. In a word, we are here to reassert and reproclaim
[sic] our admiration for the patriotic zeal, the stern fortitude, the noble self-
sacrifice, the unflinching determination, the quenchless enthusiasm, the high
and measureless courage with which loyal men, true to the Republic in the
hour of supreme peril, dashed themselves against a wanton, wicked and
gigantic rebellion, and suppressed it beyond the power to rise again.
45

43
Ibid., 5:43.
44
Ibid., 5:44.
45
Ibid., 5:44-5.
231

Against those who sought to abandon Decoration Day out of deference to the
wounded ego of the South, Douglass argued that the day was less about the sins of
the Confederacy than the virtues of the Union. He wanted to use Decoration Day as
a way to vindicate what historian David Blight calls the “emancipationist vision” of
the Civil War as a revolutionary moment in the history of freedom. According to
Blight, Douglass was the “intellectual godfather” of the emancipationist
understanding of the war. Events like Decoration Day were, for Douglass,
opportunities to shape “postwar ideological memory” in a way that understood the
Civil War as “an American second founding” that transformed the meaning of the
Union.
46
In sum, civic ceremonies were, for Douglass, opportunities for the
education of American citizens.
In addition to the celebration of civic ceremonies like Decoration Day,
Douglass offered support for monuments that offered a tangible recognition of the
civic virtue demonstrated by citizens. Toward the end of the Decoration Day speech,
he said:
It is fit and proper that [Rochester] should have a monument to the virtues
developed in her in the momentous crisis wherein was involved the life and
death, the salvation and destruction of the Republic. This monument,
symmetrical and beautiful, would be a tribute to the dead, and a noble
inspiration to the living. It would stand before your people mute but eloquent
– a sacred object around which your children and your children’s children
could rally, and draw high inspiration of patriotism and self-sacrifice by
studying the deeds of their fathers, which saved their country to peace, to
union and to liberty.
47

46
David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory, (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
2002), 15.
47
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:51-2.
232

A monument dedicated to the memory of the Union soldiers who fought in the Civil
War, Douglass hoped, could serve as the basis for a moral, even religious, education
for future generations. Such an object would, in his view, be “sacred” and could
inspire future citizens to study the virtuous deeds of their predecessors. Like a
preacher blessing a place of worship, Douglass offered this strong endorsement of a
civic holy site where individuals could reflect upon the costs of freedom.
Like so many other aspects of his thought, Douglass rooted his defense of
civic ceremonies and monuments in his understanding of human nature.
I base my views of the propriety of this occasion not upon partisan, partial
and temporary considerations, but upon the broad foundations of human
nature itself. Man is neither wood nor stone. He is described by the great
poet, as a being looking before and after. He has a past, present and future.
To eliminate either is a violation of his nature and an infringement upon his
dignity. He is a progressive being, and memory, reason, and reflection are
the resources of his improvement. With these perfections everything in the
world, every great event has an alphabet, a picture, a voice to instruct.
48

As I pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, Douglass believed in the
malleability of human nature. There are core characteristics that all human beings
share, he thought, but human nature can be altered by the moral atmosphere.
Douglass hoped occasions like Decoration Day would promote freedom by
contributing to the development of a humanitarian culture in which individuals
would be sensitive to the rights of others and aware of the civic responsibilities upon
which freedom depends.

48
Ibid., 5:45. The “great poet” is William Shakespeare.
233
Douglass’s faith in the transformative power of civic ritual was not unlimited.
After extolling the virtues of Decoration Day, he pointed out that the impact of such
ceremonies is necessarily limited.
But even here in this broad domain of memory, reason, experience and
reflection, upon which man moves so grandly and so like a god, he is still a
circumscribed and limited being. He can only travel so far. The ocean is
large, but it has its beyond which it may not pass. The same is the case with
man. The strongest memory gives him at last only a vague, confused, and
imperfect impression of the facts and experiences of the past. He at last sees
men in that direction only as trees walking.
49

Civic ceremonies, like moral ecology itself, have an impact on the behavior of men,
but they do not determine human behavior. Memorializing and celebrating the
sacrifices of those who fought for freedom, Douglass thought, has only a slight
impact on the mindset of citizens, but it is a tradition well worth continuing.
Douglass’s staunch defense of Decoration Day is a manifestation of the civic
spirit that animated his liberalism. His case for the celebration of the holiday is
replete with arguments that tie freedom and civic responsibility together. Freedom is
not a given, he insisted, it is an ideal that must be fought for and defended. “Eternal
laws of rectitude are essential to the preservation, happiness and perfection of the
human race,” Douglass proclaimed, and they do not enforce themselves. Instead, it
is left up to human beings to see to it that they are observed in the world. Civic
holidays are worth celebrating, he believed, if they serve to deepen our devotion to

49
Ibid.
234
the ideal of freedom and to remind us of the vigilance that is needed to maintain that
freedom.
50

IV. “Education Means Emancipation”: Educating Citizens for Freedom
The last mechanism of civic education I wish to discuss is universal
education. By universal education, I mean the state guarantee that all individuals
will receive at least a primary and secondary education. The two major obligations
of government, Douglass thought, are to ensure that all citizens are protected from
violations of their rights and to see to it that all citizens are educated. He believed
intellectual development was a crucial foundation for both freedom and virtue. In
My Bondage and My Freedom, he explained his belief that knowledge and freedom
were connected was born the moment his master said “knowledge unfits a child to be
a slave.”
51
There is something about enlightenment, he thought, that makes human
beings fit to be free. Douglass also believed that intellectual development and moral
virtue were connected. He often said that “ignorance and immorality” go hand-in-
hand so the enlightenment of individuals can serve the end of promoting moral
virtue.
Universal education, Douglass argued, is required as a matter of justice to
individuals and in the interest of the greater good. For individuals, education is a
crucial tool for realizing the promise of freedom. “Knowledge,” Douglass said, “is
power” because theoretical and practical knowledge empowers individuals to secure

50
Ibid., 5:48.
51
Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, (New York: Penguin, 2003), 109.
235
and enjoy their freedom.
52
For the political community, the education of every
individual should be a concern because educated human beings, he believed, are
more likely to contribute to the economic and moral well-being of society: “the
whole country is directly interested in the education of every child that lives within
its borders. The ignorance of any part of the American people so deeply concerns all
the rest that there can be no doubt of the right to pass a law compelling the
attendance of every child at school.”
53
In what follows, I explore three questions.
Why was universal education so important to Douglass? Did he believe education
was a state responsibility? How do these views fit into his civic liberalism?
Douglass’s deep commitment to universal education was rooted in his belief
that the intellectual and moral capacities of human beings are only potentially great.
Human beings are endowed with reason and the capacity for virtue, he thought, but
these attributes must be developed through various forms of education.
In his natural condition…man is only potentially great. As a mere physical
being, he does not take high rank, even among the beasts of the field…. His
true dignity is not to be sought in his arms or in his legs, but in his head.
Here is the seat and source of all that is of especially great or practical
importance in him…. There is power in the human mind, but education is
needed for its development. As man is the highest on earth it follows that the
vocation of the scholar is among the highest known to man. It is to teach and
induce man’s potential and latent greatness. It is to discover and develop the
noblest, highest and best that is in him. In view of this fact no man whose
business it is to teach should ever allow himself to feel that his mission is
mean, inferior or circumscribed. In my estimation neither politics nor
religion presents to us a calling higher than this primary business of
unfolding and strengthening the powers of the human soul. It is a permanent
vocation.
54

52
Ibid., 4:390-1.
53
Ibid., 5:103.
54
Ibid., 5:622.
236

In the background of Douglass’s belief in the power of education to move men
toward virtue was his conviction that the culture of slavery had educated individuals
toward vice. After Thomas Auld, his former master, released his slaves in 1849
Douglass wrote him a letter in which he discussed the relationship between
education and virtue.
I congratulate you warmly, and I rejoice most sincerely, that you have been
able, against all the suggestions of self-interest, of pride, and of love of
power, to perform this act of pure justice and humanity. It has greatly
increased my faith in man, and in the latent virtue of the slaveholders. I say
latent virtue, not because I think slaveholders are worse than all other men,
but because, such are the power and influences of education and habit even
upon the best constituted minds, that they paralyze and disorder, if not
destroy their moral energy; and of all persons in the world, slaveholders are
in the most unfavorable position for retaining their power. It would be easy
for me to give you the reason of this, but you may be presumed to know it
already. Born and brought up in the presence and under the influence of a
system which at once strikes at the very foundation of morals, by denying – if
not the existence of God – the equal brotherhood of mankind, by degrading
one part of the human family to the condition of brutes, and by reversing all
right ideas of justice and brotherly kindness, it is almost impossible that one
so environed can greatly grow in virtuous rectitude.
55

It was Douglass’s belief that Southern education and habits sapped the moral energy
from citizens. His hope was that a new system of education that inculcated the idea
that all human beings are born equal and endowed with natural rights could serve as
the basis for a “humanitarian culture” in which freedom would be more secure.
There are three major reasons why Douglass believed education was so
important. First, education serves the end of providing individuals with tools that are
supportive of the ideal of personal freedom. The intellectual and practical skills

55
The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, 1:404.
237
acquired through the process of education better equip individuals to achieve the
material security necessary to survive and, potentially, flourish. In order to achieve
material security, Douglass believed, individuals do well to get educated so they
equip themselves to be versatile contributors to the marketplace. “Men are not
valued in this country, or in any other country, for what they are; they are valued for
what they can do.... Society is a hard-hearted affair.”
56

One may wonder what sort of education Douglass thought was appropriate
for cultivating independent and responsible citizens. Early in his career he
emphasized the importance of practical or industrial education. In 1853, when
Harriet Beecher Stowe expressed a desire to use her wealth to “do something which
should permanently contribute to the improvement and the elevation of the free
colored people in the United States,” Douglass urged her to help establish “an
Industrial College in which shall be taught several important branches of the
mechanical arts.” He argued that “the colored men must learn the trades” in order to
serve “new modes of usefulness to society.” By becoming skilled workmen,
Douglass contended, black men would be able to offer their communities services
that are not easily provided by others. The development of a skilled, black working
class would serve that class well in material terms and, perhaps more importantly, it
would contribute to the quest for racial equality. “The most telling, the most killing

56
Ibid. 2:224.
238
refutation of slavery,” Douglass wrote, “is the presentation of an industrious,
enterprising, thrifty, and intelligent free black population.”
57

Later in Douglass’s career, he began to emphasize the importance of a more
liberal education than industrial colleges had to offer. By the 1890s it was evident
that he did not believe an “education of the hands” was sufficient.
While I have no sympathy with those who affect to despise labor, even the
humblest forms of it, and hold that whatever is needed to be done, it is
honorable to do; it is nevertheless plain that no people, white or black, can, in
any country, continue long respected, who are confined to mere menial
service for which but little intelligence or skill are required, and for which but
the smallest wages are paid or received, especially if the laborer does not
make an effort to rise above that condition.... In my opinion there is no
useful thing that a man can do that can not be better done by an educated man
than by an uneducated man.
58

With strong hands and strong minds, Douglass thought, individuals are best
equipped to operate in the world. In addition to equipping men to compete in the
marketplace, the development of the mind, he believed, is a crucial part of the task of
demonstrating that one is worthy of concern and respect. Douglass thought it was
essential that individuals move from the realm of argument to the realm of action in
order to assimilate into the American polity.
The world says the black man is unfit to live in a mixed society – to enjoy,
and rightly appreciate the blessings of independence – that he must have a
master to govern him, and the lash to stimulate him to labor. Let us be
prepared to afford in our lives and conversation, an example of how
grievously we are wronged by such a prevailing opinion of our race. Let us
prove, by facts, not by theory, that independence belongs to our nature, in
common with all mankind, - that we have intelligence to use it rightly, when
acquired, and capabilities to ascend to the loftiest elevations of the human
mind. Let such examples be given in the mental cultivation, and the moral

57
Ibid., 2:229-235.
58
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 5:621.
239
regeneration of our children, as they increase in knowledge, in virtue and in
every ennobling principle of man’s nature.
59

The acquisition of both practical and intellectual skills, Douglass believed, was
crucial to the development of self-respect and earning the respect of others. As
pointed out in Chapter 4, he thought individuals could earn the respect of others
through virtuous action. By developing one’s intellect, an individual may be able to
gain the respect and admiration of his fellow citizens.
The second major end served by universal education is the promotion of
moral virtue. “With increased intelligence,” Douglass said, “and a wider
dissemination of earnest thought and sound reasoning will come also the moral
advancement. Ignorance and immorality usually go hand in hand.”
60
Douglass was
a natural rights thinker who believed moral facts were out there and human beings
were capable of catching hold of them and acting accordingly. Education, he hoped,
would develop the rational capacity of individuals and make them better able to
acquire moral knowledge.
It is not only the substance of education that promotes moral goodness, but
also the setting and process. Douglass viewed the schoolhouse as an important site
of civic character formation. Just being present at that site with others, he thought,
could serve as the basis for civic relationships in the future. It was for that reason
that he was so adamant about the necessity of racial integration. “Let the colored
children be educated and grow up side by side with white children, come up friends

59
Ibid., 2:536.
60
Ibid., 5:483.
240
unsophisticated and generous childhood together, and it will require a powerful agent
to convert them into enemies, and lead them to prey upon each other’s rights and
liberties.”
61
Once the bonds of humanity between individuals are developed in the
innocence of youth, Douglass hoped, they would not be easily broken upon reaching
adulthood. The education of young people of all races is crucial to the development
the “humanitarian culture” he believed must be at the foundation of a free society.
The development of the intellectual and moral capacities benefits individuals
and, Douglass thought, it has a positive impact on the community. Well-educated
individuals are better able to contribute to the economic well-being of society, he
argued, because all jobs are better done by individuals who have been trained in “the
use of both mind and body.”
62
Even physical labor, Douglass believed, was likely to
be done better and more efficiently by individuals who have received some “book
learning.” In addition to having a positive impact on the economic well-being of the
community, Douglass believed universal education would be beneficial to the moral
atmosphere of the community. As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation,
he was acutely concerned with the “moral health” of the American polity and
believed a variety of mechanisms were needed to direct individuals toward the path
of virtue. The education of all individuals without regard to race or sex was one such
mechanism. An educated citizenry, Douglass thought, was more likely to be a
morally responsible one.

61
Ibid., 1:302-3.
62
Ibid.,5:621.
241
In sum, universal education was valuable to Douglass for three primary
reasons. First, a good education equips individuals with the practical and intellectual
skills necessary to have a decent chance to achieve material security. Second,
education promotes moral virtue. Third, these effects of education have a positive
impact on the economic and moral well-being of the community. A year before he
died, Douglass said: “Education…means emancipation. It means light and liberty. It
means the uplifting of the soul of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by
which men can only be made free.”
63
In this statement, we see Douglass articulate
his belief that knowledge, freedom, and moral truth are closely related to one
another. Because education serves both freedom and virtue, it is not surprising that
Douglass was so deeply devoted to the idea that all individuals must be educated.
The second question raised above – whether or not universal education is a
state responsibility – directs us to the institutional implications of Douglass’s
devotion. First, he offered clear endorsement of compulsory education laws when he
said “there can be no doubt of the right to pass a law compelling the attendance of
every child at school.”
64
Second, Douglass was a “Radical Republican” who
supported an activist role for the federal government in promoting the safety and
well-being of all citizens. Among the measures he supported in pursuit of these ends
was the Blair Education Bill, which proposed a large amount of federal support to
build public schools throughout the Union. The Bill called for the money to be
allocated according to illiteracy rates, meaning that the former slave states would

63
Ibid., 5:623.
64
Ibid., 5:103.
242
have received a bulk of the funds. The Blair Bill passed the Republican Senate
several times throughout the 1880s but failed to get through the House of
Representatives. The failure of the Republicans to get comprehensive education
funding passed was a source of great frustration for Douglass, who complained that
the party had been “converted” into a “party of money rather than a party of morals,
a party of things rather than a party of humanity and justice.”
65
Congressional
leadership of the 1880s, he contended, abandoned the zealous humanitarian spirit of
Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner in favor of an emphasis on economic growth.
In 1890, he lamented that “this Congress has preferred protection to commerce and
property to protection of personal and political liberty. We had hoped that it would
adopt the Federal election bill and the Blair educational bill. It has done neither.”
66

In sum, Douglass believed it was essential that the government provide the material
support necessary for the education of all citizens.
How does Douglass’s strong embrace of state-supported education fit within
his civic liberalism? It is clear that he believed education was crucial for the
development of free and responsible citizens. Education contributes to freedom by
equipping individuals with the practical and intellectual skills necessary to achieve
material security that can serve as the foundation for the “unfolding and
strengthening of the powers of the human soul,” which he called “the very end” of
man’s “being.”
67
Also, education encourages the forms of moral responsibility that

65
Ibid., 5:596.
66
Ibid., 5:454-5.
67
Ibid., 5:623.
243
are essential to civic life. Education promotes responsible behavior because
educated people, Douglass believed, are less likely to behave immorally and it can
contribute to the development of stronger bonds of civic connection by bringing (or
forcing) citizens together into a public space where they must interact with one
another. Douglass hoped that this forced interaction might lay the groundwork for a
strong culture of civic responsibility. If individuals from diverse backgrounds are
educated together they will gain an appreciation for their common humanity. In
addition to all of the other forms of civic education discussed in previous parts of this
chapter, Douglass believed a robust system of universal education was an essential
part of the civic liberal project.

V. Toward a Free & Virtuous Society: Douglass on Civic Liberal Education
Although Douglass did not offer an extensive program of civic education, he
did discuss a variety of formal and informal mechanisms by which citizens could be
“taught” to behave in ways that promote civic liberal ideals. The first aim of a
liberal regime should be to secure the natural rights of all citizens. Douglass
believed men could be taught to respect the rights of others by using force against
those who violate this fundamental liberal duty. Although this is a rather crude form
of education, he thought the security of individual rights was an essential baseline for
just political life.
In addition to teaching men to respect the rights of others by threatening and
punishing them with force, Douglass believed it was important to send a variety of
244
public messages about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The state sends
such messages in a formal way through positive law, which he believed ought to be
used to communicate moral ideals to which the citizenry should aspire. For example,
even though the Civil Rights Bill was not being enforced in the South, Douglass
thought it was worth keeping on the books because it offered a clear statement about
how individuals should behave in the social sphere. He admitted that the aims of the
Civil Rights Bill seemed unrealistic at the time of its passage, but this law “did
speak” to citizens. The use of positive law to educate citizens, Douglass believed,
was an indispensable part of the civic liberal project.
Statesmen use positive law to communicate messages to the citizenry, but
they are also able to use the art of rhetoric to “teach” their listeners about the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship. Although Douglass theorized quite a bit more on
the role played by reformers in promoting social justice, he also reflected on the
importance of good statesmanship. While campaigning and while serving in
positions of power, good statesmen remind citizens about the moral commitments
that are supposed to unite the political community and the actions that must be taken
to close the gap between those ideals and reality.
A fourth mechanism of civic education that Douglass thought was essential is
the celebration of civic ceremonies such as Decoration Day. Although this need not
be state initiated or supported, it has a slightly more formal character than the day-to-
day practice of good citizenship discussed in the last chapter. Civic ceremonies
provide important “teachable moments.” As rational beings capable of reflection
245
and moral understanding, human beings are subject to the influences of habit and
ritual. Through the celebration of the lives and deeds of great citizens of the past,
Douglass thought, we can deepen our commitment to the ideals that animated them.
When we celebrate something like Decoration Day, he argued, we ask ourselves and
each other questions about the meaning of our civic lives. When we reflect upon
these questions and discuss them with our fellow citizens, we engage in an important
form of civic education that, at its best, can serve to deepen our commitment to civic
ideals and to strengthen the bonds of community that support those ideals.
The fifth mechanism of civic education Douglass discussed is a robust system
of public and private schools. Universal education is an important part of the civic
liberal project for three reasons. First, the practical and intellectual skills developed
equip individuals to be free. Because the primary aim of civic liberalism is to secure
the conditions under which individuals can exercise personal freedom, the education
of all citizens is essential. Second, because “ignorance and immorality usually go
hand in hand,” the process of education can promote the morally responsible
behavior that is central to civic liberalism. For Douglass, the central problem in
American political life was the lack of a strong moral atmosphere. Because
ignorance and immorality usually go hand in hand, it is crucial to develop a robust
system of education. In Douglass’s mind, education was linked to both freedom and
virtue. In order to achieve freedom, individuals must acquire the intellectual and
practical skills provided by a liberal education. In order to develop the moral and
civic virtues that are supportive of freedom, individuals must be liberated from the
246
vices of ignorance. Third, because a good education contributes to the intellectual
and moral development of individuals, the education of all people has a positive
impact on the economic and moral well-being of the community.
Douglass was not primarily a top-down political theorist. His primary
concern was with the moral and political responsibilities of citizens. He did, though,
offer a series of reflections about how individuals are “taught” to be good citizens.
As a liberal, the mechanisms of civic education available to him were limited.
Without betraying the fundamental liberal commitment to personal freedom,
Douglass offered a strong case that the state had an important role to play in
encouraging men to be responsible citizens. Through the use of force, the
promulgation of law, the rhetoric of statesmen, the celebration of civic holidays, and
the promotion of a robust educational system, the state can direct individuals toward
the path of good citizenship.
247

Chapter 7
“The Business of Every American Citizen”:
Conclusion

I. Introduction
Frederick Douglass’s political thought defies easy categorization. Most
scholars focus on his commitment to natural rights and self-reliance in order to make
the case that he is best understood as a liberal. In the Idea of Fraternity in America,
Wilson Carey McWilliams deviated from this consensus when he suggested that
Douglass’s experiences as a slave brought him “closer to a true recognition of human
weakness and dependence,” and enabled him to “understand what is really to be
feared in human affairs is isolation.” This led Douglass, McWilliams argued, to
reject liberalism in favor of “the ideal of fraternity.”
1
In this dissertation, I have
argued that both the liberal reading and McWilliams’s fraternal reading are partially
correct. Douglass’s project was to convince his fellow citizens to extend the promise
of natural rights to all human beings and this required him to infuse his liberalism
with robust conceptions of fraternity and civic responsibility. In other words, he was
a civic liberal. In what follows, I return to the questions with which I began in order
to explain why and how Douglass infused his liberalism with strong conceptions of
civic connection and responsibility, and what implications his thought has for
contemporary political theory and practice.

1
Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America, (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1973), 99.
248
II. Douglass’s Civic Liberal Vision
Frederick Douglass’s project was to extend the promise of freedom to all
Americans. He imagined a racially, ethnically, and religiously inclusive republic in
which the rights of all individuals were respected and protected by a limited and
democratic government. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Douglass’s aims were
undoubtedly liberal – he was committed to individual rights, toleration of moral and
religious diversity, and limited government. But as I demonstrated in Chapters 3 and
4, the problem of slavery led him to offer a liberal vision that was distinctive in two
respects. First, the existence of “incomplete liberalism” in the United States – a
doctrine that protected the rights of some while denying them to others – made it
necessary for Douglass to offer an “imaginative recovery” of natural rights
philosophy.
2
His recovery was imaginative in that he drew on the horrors of slavery
to make the case that natural rights belong to all human beings and that the respect of
each individual’s basic rights was required by natural law. Second, the problem of
slavery led Douglass to emphasize the importance of civic responsibility in a way
that most liberals do not. His primary political aim was to bring about the abolition
of slavery and this required him to convince Northerners that they ought to care
about the plight of Southern slaves. In order to do this he articulated a version of
liberalism that emphasized the importance of encouraging civic connection and
responsibility. Douglass thought about the liberal promise of rights in the shadow of
his personal experience as a slave and he thought about civic responsibility from the

2
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, (Boston: Brown, Little, and Company, 1960), 23.
249
perspective of a reformer who was faced with the daunting task of convincing his
fellow citizens that they ought to abolish slavery. In the remainder of this section, I
provide a more detailed explanation of why and how Douglass offered this
distinctive liberal vision.
The first major aspect of Douglass’s thought is his “imaginative recovery” of
natural rights philosophy. He made the case that all human beings – including slaves
and women – possessed natural rights that must be respected and protected under
law. The “one idea” at the center of Douglass’s natural rights philosophy was self-
ownership. Unlike liberals who emphasize the economic aspect of this idea, his
defense of self-ownership is comprehensive in nature. He drew on his experience as
a slave to demonstrate that the deprivation of self-ownership takes away the
individual’s ability to pursue all that makes life worth living. In order to make the
case that all human beings should be respected as self-owners, he emphasized the
universality of human desires and capacities. No one, he argued, would want to be
subjected to the physical and metaphysical cruelties of slavery and all human beings
are endowed with intellectual and moral capacities that make them fit for freedom.
Douglass’s imaginative recovery of natural rights philosophy is also
distinguished by its uncompromising and demanding deontological morality. He
argued that the respect of the rights of all individuals was required by natural law,
regardless of the consequences. This “hell or high water” argument for liberalism
may seem uncomfortably absolutistic to contemporary readers, but it was an
essential part of Douglass’s thought. In order to deny enemies of freedom all
250
practical “outs” in the debates over slavery, the rights of women, and the rights of
other minority groups, he framed the case for freedom as a moral imperative: all
human beings are entitled to be free and it is the duty of every individual to respect
every other individual’s right to freedom and to take action if it is violated by others.
Although Douglass’s case was rooted in this uncompromising duty-based ethic, it is
worth noting that he did not believe desolation and ruin would follow if the rights of
all people were respected. Indeed, he believed the liberation of all people would lead
to a more prosperous and virtuous society. The realization of natural rights,
Douglass thought, would promote the common good.
The deontological nature of Douglass’s liberalism provided the basis for his
strong conception of civic responsibility, which builds on the traditional liberal
emphasis on the duty to respect rights. In addition to respecting rights, Douglass
contended, individuals have a duty to use their moral and political powers to see to it
that the rights of others are respected and protected. He used the national problem of
slavery to illustrate that the project of achieving and securing freedom is best
understood as one that requires a strong ethos of civic responsibility. The problem of
slavery brought a difficult and important question of political morality to center stage
in national life: what obligations do free people have to their enslaved neighbors? In
order to make the case that it was the “business of every American citizen” to worry
about the respect and protection of every other person’s rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, Douglass had to articulate a strong conception of civic
responsibility.
251
In order to defend the infusion of a strong conception of civic responsibility
into liberalism’s moral vocabulary, Douglass offered a series of justifications for a
robust sense of civic connection. First, he emphasized the idea of human
brotherhood – individuals ought to care about one another because they share dignity
endowed by God or nature. Recognizing that many Americans were unwilling to
accept racial minorities as their brothers, Douglass also articulated a defense of civic
responsibility based on devotion to founding principles. Even if you do not love the
slave as a brother, he said to his fellow Americans, your love for the principles
expressed in the Declaration of Independence should move you to feel a sense of
responsibility to liberate him. As time passed without much change in the American
moral and political landscape, Douglass began to wonder about the efficacy of
arguments rooted in fellow feeling and rational adherence to principles of political
morality. Just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, he contended that civic
responsibility could be based on respect developed as a result of virtuous action by
the slaves themselves. In other words, Douglass thought a sense of civic connection
could be earned by slaves if they took courageous action in pursuit of liberty.
Finally, because he recognized the presence of selfishness in human nature, Douglass
also argued that responsible citizenship was in the interest of individuals. If we live
by an ethos of “each for all and all for each,” he contended, all of our rights will be
more secure. If I watch your back and you watch mine, Douglass urged, we will
both be better off.
252
The substance of Douglass’s justifications for civic responsibility may be less
interesting than what the multifaceted and dynamic nature of his arguments tell us
about the challenge of encouraging responsible behavior in a liberal political culture.
The language of liberalism is heavy on individualistic notions such as rights,
freedom, and self-reliance but it is light on the moral vocabulary of solidarity, duty,
obligation, and virtue. Douglass’s experience indicates that the task of urging our
fellow citizens to behave in more responsible ways is a challenging one that requires
dynamism and an appreciation of the diversity of “actuating motives” that move
people from the “downy seat of inaction.”
In addition to offering justifications for why individuals ought to feel a strong
sense of civic responsibility, Douglass offered some explanation of how an ethos of
civic responsibility could be cultivated. I have argued that his concern with the
community’s “moral atmosphere” is a crucial element in his thought. Douglass
worried about what contemporary thinkers call “moral ecology” – the idea that like
the natural ecosystem, there is a “moral ecosystem” that is impacted by the choices
individuals make and that, in turn, influences the well-being of the community.
Douglass, like other believers in the idea of moral ecology, believed the security of
rights is affected not only by the political conditions but also the moral conditions
that exist in society. Slave societies were supported by a culture of inhumanity, he
argued, and free societies must be supported by a “humanitarian culture.” The
cultivation of a moral ecology supportive of liberal ideals occurs from both the
bottom up by good citizens and the top down by well-directed statecraft. In Chapter
253
5, I discussed Douglass’s understanding of good citizenship. He believed a good
citizen behaves in just, fair, principled, virtuous, and responsible ways. His two
ideal citizens – the Reformer and the Self-Made Man – embody this understanding of
good citizenship. The Reformer is distinguished by his unrelenting, principled
commitment to achieving a just and fair social order. He takes the call to civic
responsibility to extraordinary lengths, dedicating his life to the achievement of
freedom for all people. For Douglass, the Reformer is the embodiment of devotion
to principle and active citizenship that is essential to civic liberalism. The Self-Made
Man’s relationship to the civic liberal project is more complex, but I suggest that this
ideal is important for two major reasons. First, the bourgeois virtues exemplified by
the Self-Made Man can serve to dignify freedom because he demonstrates the
excellence that can be achieved by free men who behave in virtuous ways. By
practicing the bourgeois virtues, individuals have a greater chance of achieving
material security, which can serve as the foundation for intellectual, moral, and
creative excellence. In short, the Self-Made Man demonstrates the possibility of the
good life that can be born of liberty.
In addition to thinking of the Self-Made Man as a model of the good life that
can be born of liberty, Douglass exalted the Self-Made Man because he believed the
exhibition of bourgeois virtues could promote a greater sense of civic responsibility.
Like his argument that sympathy could be developed out of respect for courageous
action in pursuit of liberty, Douglass contended that using one’s freedom virtuously
increased the likelihood of an individual’s acceptance into the political community.
254
Just as he thought slaves could earn the sympathy of Northern whites if they rose up
against their masters, he believed freedmen could earn the respect and acceptance of
their fellow citizens if they practiced bourgeois virtues such as hard work,
perseverance, cleanliness, honesty, and self-reliance.
The practice of good citizenship can contribute to the civic liberal project in
two fundamental ways. First, good citizens can have a direct impact on the
achievement of the political conditions necessary for the exercise of personal
freedom. Douglass’s hope was that the Reformer’s active citizenship, for example,
would contribute to the emancipation of slaves and women. The practice of
bourgeois virtue would not only help the individual secure material well-being, but
also, it would increase the sense of connection felt by his fellow citizens. Second,
good citizens contribute to the civic liberal project through the impact they have on
the achievement of moral conditions that are supportive of freedom. Although
human beings have free will, the choices they make are influenced by the moral
atmosphere in which they choose. In a moral atmosphere that prizes respect for
rights, treating others fairly, standing up for the rights of others, and behaving
virtuously, individuals will be better able to exercise personal freedom. Douglass’s
concern with the moral atmosphere was rooted in his belief that there is a constant
struggle going on within individuals and societies between the spirit of humanity and
the spirit of selfishness. A “humanitarian culture,” he argued, provides individuals
with the optimal moral conditions to realize the promises of freedom. Good citizens
are on the frontlines of the “culture war” between humanitarianism and selfishness.
255
They push the moral ecology in the direction of an appreciation for the ideal of
universal freedom and an acceptance of the responsibilities that must be fulfilled if
this ideal is to be realized.
Although Douglass was primarily concerned with the role good citizens can
play in achieving freedom and cultivating a healthy moral ecology, he did offer some
reflections on top down mechanisms as well. Throughout his career, he endorsed a
series of ways to “teach” good citizenship through the use of force, the promulgation
of law, the rhetoric of statesmen, the celebration of civic ceremonies, and the
maintenance of a robust educational system. First, like other liberal thinkers,
Douglass believed the first duty of the state is to protect the rights of individuals. In
carrying out this responsibility, he thought, the state “teaches” an important civic
lesson: failure to respect the rights of others will lead to dreadful consequences. The
use of force in defense of natural rights is the first important instrumentality of civic
education. Second, Douglass believed the promulgation of positive law could play
an important educative role. Even laws that are not actively enforced, he thought,
send messages to citizens about the moral ideals of the community. Third, Douglass
thought statesmen could teach lessons about the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship through their rhetoric. By utilizing the bully pulpit of elected office and
the platforms of political campaigns, good statesmen can contribute to the cultivation
of a healthy moral ecology by teaching people about the sacredness of human rights
and the responsibilities of citizenship. Fourth, Douglass believed the celebration of
civic ceremonies was an important way to cultivate devotion to political ideals and to
256
remind citizens of the virtues that are necessary to achieve those ideals. Douglass’s
arguments anticipate contemporary thinker Robert Bellah, who defends civic
ceremonies as “ways of giving form to time, reminding us on particular dates of the
great events of our past or of the heroes who helped teach us what we are as a free
people.”
3
Fifth, Douglass believed a robust system of education was crucial to the
development of a healthy moral ecology. He thought educated people were more
likely to behave morally and he believed schools could serve as sites for the
cultivation of civic community. Douglass hoped that the education of children
together would serve as the foundation for the development of a strong basis for just,
fair, and responsible behavior in the future.
Douglass did not think it was possible to “make” men good citizens, but he
did think the state could do certain things to contribute to the goal of securing liberty
by contributing to the cultivation of a healthy moral ecology. Douglass’s
suggestions for civic education were relatively modest because of his discomfort
with coercion and commitment to limited government. That said, he did believe the
state had some role to play in discouraging those who would behave in irresponsible
ways and encouraging individuals to be good citizens. The result was a version of
liberalism that included a more robust role for the state than the minimalist, night
watchman model endorsed by some of his contemporaries.
4
The health of the
nation’s soul was ultimately a matter determined by the “moral energy” of the

3
Robert Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 282.
4
Douglass’s political abolitionist colleagues Gerrit Smith and Lysander Spooner, for example,
embraced a much more limited role for the state. Smith rejected state involvement in education and
the development of transportation infrastructure and Spooner was an opponent of the federal postal
system and most “morals” legislation.
257
citizenry, but the state has some role to play in pushing that citizenry in a civic
liberal direction.
Douglass’s civic liberalism places human agency at the center of the political
universe. Freedom, he thought, is not a given or a goal that, once achieved, is
secure. Instead, the project of achieving and securing freedom is an extraordinarily
difficult and never-ending task. The perpetual precariousness of freedom is rooted in
human nature. The human heart, Douglass thought, is “a seat of constant war”
between justice and selfishness. The achievement of sound political institutions and
“pen and ink liberty” is only part of the battle. Liberal institutions do not run
themselves and freedom has not been achieved when it is guaranteed by positive law.
Instead, the task of securing liberty is forever committed to human beings, who must
act in responsible ways in order to achieve it and maintain it for themselves and
others.

III. Douglass & Liberalism’s Problems
In Chapter 1, I identified three interrelated “problems” confronting
liberalism: a foundational problem, a community problem, and a responsibility
problem. The foundational problem has to do with how liberal commitments are
grounded. What are the foundations of liberalism? Are these foundations morally
shallow or deep? The community problem has to do with the question of what moral
glue binds liberal citizens to one another. In other words, where is liberalism’s
language of solidarity? The responsibility problem has to do with the question of
258
what obligations liberal citizens have to one another beyond the basic duty to respect
rights. I call these questions interrelated because how liberalism is morally grounded
will affect how well it deals with the community and responsibility problems – the
moral basis of the liberal project should speak to the bonds that unite citizens to one
another and the obligations they have to one another.
In response to these problems, some contemporary theorists have offered
philosophical defenses of civic liberal theories that combine traditional liberal
commitments with robust conceptions of civic connection and responsibility. In
order to determine the coherence and normative appeal of civic liberalism, some
scholars have suggested we turn to history to find examples of thinkers who have
articulated versions of the doctrine. I have argued in this dissertation that Douglass
is one such thinker and that consideration of his thought can deepen our
understanding of the civic liberal idea.
So what can Douglass’s thought contribute to contemporary debates about
liberalism’s foundational, community, and responsibility problems? First, I
demonstrated that his case for the basic liberal commitment to personal freedom is
distinctive in various ways. Rather than relying on abstract arguments in favor of the
freedom and equality of human beings, Douglass drew on the experience of slavery
to make the case that universal self-ownership is a moral imperative. He argued that
the right to self-ownership should be respected because the physical and
metaphysical cruelties of slavery are so horrifying and because freedom is consistent
with the desires and capacities of all human beings.
259
It would be too much to say that Douglass’s re-articulation of natural rights
philosophy solves liberalism’s foundational problem. It is fair, however, to say that
he offers an important contribution to the ongoing debate about the moral
foundations of liberalism. Rather than relying on an abstract state of nature or an
“original position,” Douglass articulated a defense of natural rights that was rooted in
the concreteness of his personal experience as a slave and as a political actor
confronting the national problem of slavery. This fact alone gives his defense of
liberalism a different spirit. The unique lens through which he assessed foundational
questions of political morality separates his thought from others in the liberal
tradition and the peculiarity of his perspective is a good reason to consider him an
important voice in the history of American liberalism.
In addition to the uniqueness of his perspective, his imaginative recovery of
natural rights liberalism is distinguished by its egalitarianism and its call to action. It
would be too much to say that Douglass is the first thinker to offer a truly egalitarian
version of natural rights theory, but he is certainly a major figure in the long project
of achieving a more inclusive liberalism. One of the most remarkable things about
Douglass’s vision is its consistency. He thought of himself as a defender of a truly
universal creed: “My sympathies are not limited by relation to any race. I can take
no part in oppressing and persecuting any variety of the human family. Whether in
Russia, Germany, or California, my sympathy is with the oppressed, be he Chinaman
or Hebrew.”
5
As many scholars have pointed out, American liberalism has existed

5
Id.
260
along side or incorporated racial and gender hierarchies.
6
Douglass was a vocal
advocate of purging liberalism of these profoundly illiberal tendencies. In order to
close the gap between core liberal commitments and reality, he tied his
egalitarianism to an uncompromising argument about the moral obligation to take
political action to realize those commitments. All human beings have natural rights,
he argued, and each individual is obligated to respect those rights and to take action
when those rights are being violated by others.
As a matter of political philosophy, Douglass’s response to liberalism’s
community and responsibility problems was rooted in natural law. In his mind,
natural law provided the moral glue that should unite individuals to one another and
make them feel a strong sense of mutual responsibility. As a matter of political
action, Douglass’s response to the community and responsibility problems was more
complex. He realized that not all human beings were moved by the truths of natural
law and, as such, moral suasion was insufficient to unite citizens together and to
motivate them to behave in responsible ways. In addition to appealing to the moral
truths of natural law, Douglass thought it was necessary to appeal to a variety of
other actuating motives including devotion to principles of political morality (like
those expressed in the Declaration of Independence), respect for the virtuous
behavior of others, and self-interest. His case for why free people in the North
should feel obligated to use their moral and political powers to liberate slaves in the
South does not provide contemporary liberals with an airtight theoretical basis for a

6
See generally, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Mark Kann,
A Republic of Men, (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
261
more robust conception of civic community and responsibility. Instead, Douglass’s
example provides contemporary citizens and statesmen with a model of how they
might justify and engage in the difficult task of motivating civic responsibility in a
liberal political culture.
Upon reflection, it is not surprising that Douglass did not offer a definitive
answer to liberalism’s community and responsibility problems. For him, the
problem of cultivating a humanitarian culture in which individuals respect and care
about one another’s rights is one that has no easy solution. Perhaps Douglass’s most
important contribution is his emphasis on the idea that liberals must be attentive to
the political and moral conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal
freedom. The achievement of a robust system of individual rights, free institutions,
and fair procedures may all be for naught if liberals do not also pay attention to the
moral atmosphere in which we live our lives as citizens.
Although Douglass’s primary aim was, in a political sense, one of liberation,
his liberalism offers anything but a flight from responsibility. Indeed, he had
extraordinarily high moral expectations of liberal citizens and statesmen. I think
Douglass would agree with Judith Shklar’s contention that “far from being an amoral
free-for-all,” liberalism, properly understood, is “extremely difficult and
constraining.”
7
What Douglass leaves us is not a series of solutions to liberalism’s
problems, but a series of challenges. Without struggle, he argued, freedom cannot be
achieved or maintained. But one of the most appealing and problematic things about

7
Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 5.
262
liberalism is that, when we are true to its principles, we refrain from forcing one
another to engage in this struggle. Instead, each individual is left with a choice and,
in Douglass’s words, free men can choose to “be angels, or they can be demons.”
8

The cultivation of a humanitarian culture, he hoped, would encourage individuals to
choose wisely.

8
The Frederick Douglass Papers, 3:437-8.
263
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Asset Metadata

Creator Buccola, Nicholas (author)

Core Title In pursuit of liberty: the civic liberalism of Frederick Douglass

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publication Date 10/14/2007

Defense Date 08/20/2007

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag communitarianism,Frederick Douglass,liberalism,natural rights,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Advisor Kann, Mark E. (committee chair), Kincaid, James R. (committee member), Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee member)

Creator Email buccola@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m868

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Document Type Dissertation

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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