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The implementation of corporate social responsibility initiatives as a strategy for post-crisis rebuilding and renewal

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The implementation of corporate social responsibility initiatives as a strategy for post-crisis rebuilding and renewal

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES
AS A STRATEGY FOR POST-CRISIS REBUILDING AND RENEWAL

by
Rachel Ann Saffitz

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS)

May 2010

Copyright 2010 Rachel Ann Saffitz
ii
DEDICATION
I proudly dedicate this thesis to my parents, Gary and Lori Saffitz, who have
taught me – among many things – curiosity, perseverance and passion, which have been
so essential in my professional and personal endeavors.
Mom and Dad, you encouraged me to follow my dreams, while assuring me that I
could not and would not fail. Behind my every success, you have been there, with
unwavering love and support, an endless supply of bad jokes and humorous anecdotes to
brighten my day, an arsenal of encouraging stories of challenges I’ve overcome and
accomplishments I’ve made thus far in life (everything from potty-training to living in a
foreign country) and of course, a willingness to put sushi take-out on your credit card.
I am here because of you – and I am so proud to say that I am me because of you.
Thank you for guiding me and helping me to become who I am today.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis would not be as complete or successful without the expert guidance
and support of many individuals.
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my committee chair, Professor
Jennifer Floto, for being a constant source of encouragement and ideas. From our very
first meeting to that very final hour, it was a gift to have you by my side. I would like to
thank my committee members, Professor Jerry Swerling and Adjunct Faculty Brenda
Lynch, for their tremendous professional insight and personal support. It was an amazing
opportunity to collaborate with Jenn, Jerry and Brenda; I respect you so very much and
you constantly inspire me to learn more and explore new interests, and to work harder
and reach higher in my career. So much of my passion for this thesis and for the PR
profession would not exist if were not for them.
I consider this thesis to be true culmination of my time here at the Annenberg
School for Communication and Journalism – an experience made richer by the teachers
and students I had the privilege of studying alongside.
I must thank the following outstanding individuals – working and learning with
you has helped me grow into a better PR practitioner and undoubtedly a better person. I
sincerely hope our paths cross again in the near future. Matthew Leveque, Megan Jordan,
Laura Min Jackson, Melissa Robinson, Thomas Goff and Gail Light – thank you.
To the SPR class of 2010 – my colleagues and my good friends during this
program – it would not have been the same without your support, camaraderie and
laughter. I wish you endless successes and I know we will continue to support each other
for many, many years – thank you.
iv
A special thank you to my roommate and classmate, Jillian Smillie, for her
constant companionship, unwaveringly positive attitude, and endless encouragement.
You were always there to listen and give advice and, when all else failed, to open a bottle
of wine and toast a s’more. In many ways, it was a memorable experience to go through
the thesis writing process together – congrats to us, and thank you so very much.
It is so important that I acknowledge several individuals and scholarship funds
that enabled me to earn my degree and follow my professional and educational
aspirations. Thank you to my grandparents, Jack and Beverly Spector, for your
tremendous financial (and emotional) support. Thank you Mr. Ron Rogers and Ms.
Marcia Ross of the Henry C. Rogers Endowed Scholarship; Mr. Richard Kline of the
Occidental Petroleum Scholarship; Ms. Nela Wilkinson and Mr. Roger Pondel of the
Cecilia Wilkinson Endowed Scholarship; and Mr. Michael Rouse of the Toyota Strategic
PR Fellowship for your financial assistance.
Finally, to my family (Mom, Dad, Karen, Benson and Daphne) and my friends
who have spoiled me rotten as my personal cheer squad – thank you for the endless
encouragement and support. Lastly, a big thanks to the 24-hour Ralph’s on Wilshire and
Hauser, always well-stocked with Diet Coke and Peanut M&M’s no matter the hour.

Thank you for your tremendous contributions to and support of this thesis.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ii

Acknowledgments iii

Abstract vi

Introduction 1
Corporate Social Responsibility 3
Crisis 6

Chapter One: Literature Review 8
Analysis of Literature Review 15
Crisis as an Opportunity for CSR 16

Chapter Two: Primary Research 18
Case Study: FIJI Water 18
Focus Groups 34
Key Findings: Focus Group 1 39
Key Findings: Focus Group 2 45
Analysis of Focus Group Findings 50

Chapter Three: Implementing Post-Crisis CSR 62
Corporate Social Responsibility…An Effective Post-Crisis Strategy? 62
Determining if CSR is a Viable Post-Crisis Strategy 63
Implementing Post-Crisis CSR: Guidelines and Suggested Best Practices 70

Bibliography 74

Appendices 78
Appendix A: Newspaper Article, Neutral Reputation Manipulation 78
Appendix B: Newspaper Article, Poor Reputation Manipulation 80
Appendix C: Media Alert 82
Appendix D: CSR Advertorial 84
Appendix E: Guided Discussion Questions 85

vi
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the tensions and interactions of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) strategies and crisis events – two activities that have significant
reputational implications for a corporation. CSR has the potential to enhance a
company’s reputation, and a crisis event has the potential to tarnish it. While the effects
of CSR and crisis on corporate reputation have been studied extensively in isolation, the
two concepts have less often been studied together.
There exists evidence to support the notion that CSR has the potential to inoculate
a corporation from the most damaging reputational effects of a crisis event. What has yet
to be examined is whether or not CSR can be implemented as a post-crisis strategy. In
other words, can a corporation without prior CSR effectively mitigate long-term brand or
reputation damage and ultimately rebuild and renew its reputation and relationships
among consumers by launching CSR efforts? This thesis attempts to answer this
question.
This thesis will ultimately conclude that not only can CSR act as an insurance
policy against the worst reputational effects of a crisis, but CSR initiatives can indeed be
implemented as a post-crisis rebuilding and renewal strategy for a corporation with no
prior CSR – albeit with some substantial challenges and caveats.
The study and analysis presented in this thesis includes a review of relevant
literature examining how CSR can positively affect a company’s experience in a crisis; a
case study of FIJI Water; and an original experiment conducted in focus groups which
captures consumer attitudes and intentions in a post-crisis environment and how they are
vii
influenced by CSR. This experiment offers an innovative and novel study of crisis and
CSR, contributing to the growing body of CSR knowledge.
Applicable outcomes of this thesis are presented in the form of a guide for
implementing post-crisis CSR. The guide will help corporate communication strategists
determine if a post-crisis CSR program should be considered as a viable or appropriate
option for a company seeking to rebuild and renew its brand, reputation and stakeholder
relationships in a post-crisis environment. It also provides suggested best practices for
how to implement a post-crisis CSR program for the best results.
1
INTRODUCTION
Never before has the United States experienced such high levels of consumer
skepticism – and worse – cynicism. According to the 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer,
77% of informed publics (25-to-64 year-olds) surveyed in the U.S. trust corporations less
now than they did in 2008.
1
To put the situation in perspective, “trust in American
business – at 38% down from 58% [in 2008] – is the lowest in the Barometer’s tracking
history…even lower than in the wake of Enron and the dot-com bust.”
2
For corporations,
these figures are alarming because trust significantly “affects consumer spending [and]
corporate reputation,”
3
both of which are essential for any business to succeed.
This problematic increase in consumer distrust is amplified by increased access to
information about corporate operations. As businesses respond to calls for increased
transparency and their operations become more visible to stakeholders, companies are
expected to conduct business more responsibly since they are more likely to face
judgment by consumers and other constituents. Compounding these complex business
challenges, increased competition among companies across the globe means that the
ability to attract and maintain consumers (and build loyalty and trust) is an important and
significant competitive advantage. The critical factor is reputation – a less tangible
corporate asset, but one by which a company may thrive or languish. In today’s volatile
business environment, companies engage in practices to bolster and protect reputations,
which are constantly tested and challenged.

1
Edelman, 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Executive Summary: The Tenth Global Opinion Leaders’ Study
(2009), 1.

2
Edelman, 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Executive Summary, 2.

3
Ibid., 4.
2
This thesis explores the tensions and interactions of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) strategies and crisis events – two activities that have significant
reputational implications for a corporation. CSR has the potential to enhance a
company’s reputation, and a crisis event has the potential to tarnish it. While the effects
of CSR and crisis on corporate reputation have been studied extensively in isolation, the
two concepts have less often been studied together. Some conclusive evidence supports
the notion that CSR has the potential to inoculate a corporation from the most damaging
reputational effects of a crisis event. What has yet to be examined is whether or not CSR
can be implemented as a post-crisis strategy. In other words, can a corporation without
prior CSR effectively mitigate long-term brand or reputation damage and ultimately
rebuild and renew its reputation and relationships among consumers by launching CSR
efforts?
The 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer provides suggestions for corporate behavior
given the dismal business trust outlook. One of the “four pillars” in its suggested plan is
“mutual social responsibility,” meaning that “companies must realign their business
practices so they deliver dual objectives: benefit society and the bottom line.”
4
In other
words, CSR is a vital component on the “road to rebuilding trust.”
5

Regardless of the nature of a specific crisis event, in its wake a company is likely
to experience a greater crisis – that of lost trust. Furthermore, it can be said that any
company operating in the U.S. today is suffering from an overarching consumer
sentiment crisis: lack of trust in American business. Therefore, it is essential to study the

4
Ibid., 6.

5
Ibid.
3
experience of post-crisis CSR and how it may be a strategy for rebuilding company trust
and renewing company reputation.
What follows is an introduction of the concepts CSR and crisis and how they
impact corporate reputation; a review of relevant literature examining how CSR can
positively affect a company’s experience in a crisis; and the presentation of original
research examining the challenges and opportunities of post-crisis CSR. It will ultimately
be determined that not only can CSR act as an insurance policy against the worst
reputational effects of a crisis situation, but CSR initiatives can indeed be implemented as
a post-crisis rebuilding and renewal strategy for a corporation with no prior CSR – albeit
with some challenges and considerations. Applicable outcomes of this study are
presented in the form of a guide for implementing post-crisis CSR, including a decision-
making tool and suggested best practices.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Corporate Social Responsibility encompasses a “corporation’s social, ethical and
environmental obligations to its constituencies and greater society,” and prompts
corporate leadership to “look beyond its traditional bottom line at the social implications
of its business.”
6
It demonstrates a corporation’s “respect for society’s interests…by
taking ownership of the effect its [operational] activities have on key constituencies
including customers, employees, shareholders, communities and the environment.”
7
Put
another way, CSR involves “voluntary and proactive” actions that are relevant to the

6
Paul A. Argenti, Corporate Communication, 5
th
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 105-106.

7
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 106.
4
corporation, integrated into its business model and “focus on long-term success and
sustainability, rather than short-term financial returns.”
8

CSR is often meshed with corporate philanthropy, but experts now agree that it is
a distinct business concept and practice. CSR makes “concerted attempts to reduce
negative social and environmental” operational effects through “thoughtfully developed
strategy implemented over the long-term,” rather than “temporary, band-aid measures
such as monetary contributions to charitable causes.”
9

CSR benefits both society and business. Many corporations engage in CSR for
pragmatic reasons – it “makes good business sense.”
10
Business researchers have found
positive correlations between “CSR and corporate financial performance.”
11
Noteworthy
secondary benefits of implementing a CSR strategy include “attracting and retaining
customers, identifying and managing reputation risks, attracting the best quality
employees and reducing costs.”
12
The 2007 Harris Interactive poll on social responsibility
revealed that “the average person’s decisions about what to buy and whom to do business
with are influenced by a company’s reputation for social responsibility.”
13
Furthermore,
because “business depends on society for its existence, continuity and growth,” by

8
Ibid., 107.

9
Ibid.

10
Ibid., 111.

11
Elisabet Garriga and Domènec Melé, “Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory,”
Journal of Business Ethics 53, no 1-2 (2004): 53.

12
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 111.

13
Ibid., 113.
5
“integrating social demands… [into] business operations” a corporation can work toward
ensuring long-term success and sustainability for its business.
14

While CSR has long been considered a “nice-to-have element of business
strategy,” it has more recently “evolved to must-have status.”
15
American “consumers
have come to expect companies” to give back to society in a meaningful way.
16
In a 2008
study, 97% of Americans believed a company has responsibilities that go beyond
generating profits.
17
Sal Palmisano, Chairman of the Board and CEO of IBM notes that
“businesses now operate in an environment in which long-term societal concerns…have
been raised to the same level of public expectation as accounting practice and financial
performance.”
18
Given this shift, CSR has “become a cost of entry for corporations.”
19

CSR also has implications for and effects on corporate reputation. Corporate
reputation is the “sum of an organization’s constituency perceptions built up over time.”
20

CSR is “an increasingly significant contributor to corporate reputation”
21
as it can be a
“critical means to build trust with constituents”
22
and there is evidence of a positive

14
Garriga and Melé, “Corporate Social Responsibility Theories,” 57.

15
Terry Catchpole, “CSR Graduates to ‘Must-Have’ Status,” PR Week, April 13, 2009.

16
Erica Iacono, “CSR Programs in Good, Bad Times Reap Companies Long-Term Benefits,” PR Week, April 20,
2009.

17
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 106.

18
Ibid., 108.

19
Iacono, “CSR in Good, Bad Times Reap Companies Long-Term Benefits.”

20
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 105.

21
Ibid.

22
Ibid., 113.
6
correlation between CSR practices and corporate image.
23
Reportedly, “over one-half of
business executives believe that a recognized commitment to CSR contributes ‘a lot’ to a
company’s overall reputation.”
24

Crisis
Crisis situations for corporations come in many forms, but regardless of the nature
of the crisis, one thing is certain: “no organization is immune to crisis.”
25
A crisis can be
broadly defined as a “perceived unpredictable event” that “can seriously impact an
organization’s performance” by presenting “real or potential negative outcomes for
organizations, their stakeholders and their industries.”
26
A crisis may “occur either
naturally or as a result of human error, intervention or even malicious intent.”
27
There are
many different types of crises and sources for potential crises; examples include
accidents, natural disasters, product or service failure, technological breakdowns,
economic and market forces, and employee tensions.
28

Crises are almost always accompanied by damage or loss, in forms such as
“financial loss…injuries or deaths of stakeholders, structural or property damage,
tarnishing of a reputation and environmental harm.”
29
Crisis damage can thus be

23
Prabu David, Susan Kline and Yang Dai, “Corporate Social Responsibility Practices, Corporate Identity, and
Purchase Intention: A Dual Process Model,” Journal of Public Relations Research 17, no. 3 (2005): 308-311.

24
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 113.

25
W. Timothy Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication: Planning, Managing and Responding, 2
nd
ed.
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 1.

26
Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication, 2-4.

27
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 259.

28
Harvard Business School, Crisis Management, Harvard Business Essentials series (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 2004), 4-8.

29
Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication, 4.
7
“tangible devastation, such as the destruction of lives or assets, or intangible devastation,
such as the loss of an organization’s credibility or other reputation damage.”
30
Crises are
a threat to corporate reputation and image. Since “crises have the potential to create
negative or undesirable outcomes,”
31
they are “considered dangerous to organizations’
reputations.”
32
A crisis can “violate expectations that stakeholders hold about how
organizations should act…resulting in people becoming upset and angry, which threatens
the relationships between the organization and its stakeholders.”
33
Regardless of the
“specifics of the situation, crises typically result in negative publicity, which threatens the
corporate image.”
34

30
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 259.

31
Coombs, Ongoing Crisis Communication, 4.

32
Ibid., 3.

33
Ibid.

34
Dwane H. Dean, “Consumer Reaction to Negative Publicity: Effects of Corporate Reputation, Response and
Responsibility for a Crisis Event,” Journal of Business Communication 41, no. 2 (2004): 192.
8
CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW
Studies have shown that CSR can foster positive public perceptions and build a
“reservoir of goodwill”
35
toward an organization. Indeed, those corporations that practice
CSR tend to better weather the negative effects of a crisis. The following literature
review will explore how it is that employing a CSR strategy helps a corporation to fare
better in a crisis situation.
Engaging in CSR can actually reduce risk for potential crises in the first place.
According to expert Bryan Husted, CSR projects are an “essential element in the risk
management of a corporation,” because they “provide a way of reducing the downside of
business risk of the firm.”
36
This risk management utility of CSR stems from the
likeliness that those organizations practicing CSR also engage in activities such as
“environmental assessment and stakeholder management,” which “tend to anticipate and
reduce potential sources of business risk, such as potential government regulation, labor
unrest, or environmental damage.”
37

In addition to benefits of crisis- and risk-reduction, practicing CSR can also be a
means to build up goodwill among stakeholders, enhance corporate reputation and
thereby act as an insurance policy against lasting negative crisis damage. The 2007 Public
Relations Generally Accepted Practices (GAP) Study conducted by the Strategic Public
Relations Center at the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism

35
Michel Haigh and Frank Dardis, “Impact of Crisis on Corporate Social Responsibility and Organization-Public
Relationships” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association,
Montreal, Canada, May 21, 2008).

36
Bryan W. Husted, “Risk Management, Real Options and Corporate Social Responsibility,” Journal of Business
Ethics 60, no. 2 (2005): 176.

37
Husted, “Risk Management, Real Options and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 176.
9
concluded that CSR has a “pragmatic role as a reputation insurance policy against the
worst outcomes of a crisis or other calamity.”
38
Founder and chairman of Golin/Harris
International Al Golin describes this concept of an insurance policy as the “trust bank” in
which a corporation can build up “deposits of goodwill” (an accumulation of good works
the company has done) and use those deposits or withdraw from that goodwill bank when
necessary – such as in a time of turmoil of crisis.
39

Researchers Michel Haigh and Frank Dardis elaborate on the concept of the trust
bank in times of crisis. They explain that CSR can both protect an organization from “the
backlash of crisis,” and also “nurture the organization-public relationship,” because CSR
activities “build a reservoir of goodwill toward the organization” that proves helpful
when in a crisis event.
40
Husted elaborates:
CSR projects provide strategic flexibility…by the indirect benefits they generate
from goodwill fostered by CSR investments within the community and among
consumers. CSR investment creates the option, but not the obligation, for the firm
to call upon stakeholders for resources it needs [and] possibly the most dramatic
instances of proactive CSR creating the option to call upon the support and
resources of stakeholders occurs in times of crisis.
41

The halo effect explains how CSR has a positive effect on corporate reputation,
builds up goodwill and trust among a corporation’s stakeholders and can offset crisis
damage. The halo effect states that “previous reputation affects the acceptance and
interpretation of new information,” making it so that “once a positive view of…an

38
Jerry Swerling et al., Fifth Annual Public Relations Generally Accepted Practices (G.A.P.) Study: 2007 Data,
GAP V (Strategic Public Relations Center: University of Southern California, Annenberg School for
Communication, 2007), section VII/G, 17.

39
Al Golin, “Trust or Consequences,” (annual distinguished lecture for the Institute for Public Relations, New
York, NY, November 20, 2003).

40
Haigh and Dardis, “Impact of Crisis on Corporate Social Responsibility and Organization-Public
Relationships,” 7-8.

41
Husted, “Risk Management, Real Options and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 178.
10
organization is established people ignore information that contradicts the favorable
reputation” and “tend to select information that is consistent” with their original
impressions and judgments.
42
Using the halo effect as an interpretive lens, CSR practices
could potentially influence and frame how consumers perceive an organization and
understand its actions.
43

Illustrating the power of a CSR halo effect, a 2006 study conducted by research
team Sankar Sen, C.B. Bhattacharya and Daniel Korschun shows that “stakeholders’
awareness of CSR impacted beliefs and attitudes…toward the firm.”
44
The study found
that respondents more aware of CSR initiatives made more positive associations and
more strongly identified with the company as well as felt more inclined to “purchase
products, seek employment and invest in the company” than those participants unaware
of CSR initiatives.
45
Furthermore, CSR was proven to affect “consumers through their
resilience to negative information about the company.”
46
Therefore, according to the halo
effect, a history of CSR “may serve to reduce the negative consequences generated by a
crisis,” and this “favorable history can act as a buffer against crisis damage.”
47

The effect of CSR history on corporate reputation vis-à-vis crisis has been studied
in greater depth by researchers Hye Kyung Kim and Sung-Un Yang. In a 2009

42
Hye Kyung Kim and Sung-Un Yang, “Cognitive Processes of Crisis Communication: Effects of CSR and
Crisis Response Strategies on Stakeholder Perceptions of Racial Crisis Dynamics,” Public Relations Journal 3,
no. 1 (2009): 6-7.

43
Ibid., 7.

44
Haigh and Dardis, “Impact of Crisis on Corporate Social Responsibility and Organization-Public
Relationships,” 8-9.

45
Ibid.

46
Ibid., 8.

47
Kim and Yang, “Cognitive Processes of Crisis Communication,” 6.
11
experiment among university students in the U.S., the researchers presented a racial
discrimination crisis case and a manipulation of a CSR history story – good versus bad
CSR history – as well as four test variables of crisis response strategy: mortification,
corrective action, shifting blame, attacking the accuser. Kim and Yang measured for
perceptions of crisis responsibility, emotional response, and organizational reputation.
It was discovered that CSR history does have a significant affect on
organization’s reputation; Kim and Yang’s study found that a company with an
established history of CSR was “afforded the benefit of the doubt in a time of crisis.”
48

This sort of CSR-generated “halo of favorable pre-crisis performance history” indeed
worked to “lessen the damage from the crisis itself.”
49
Kim and Yang observed that when
a company “possesses a strong CSR reputation,” consumers tend to judge it as “less
responsible for a crisis,” and therefore less vulnerable to brand damage in a crisis.
50

Joëlle Vanhamme and Bas Grobben examined the impact of the length of time of
a company’s involvement in CSR on its ability to leverage that CSR history in a crisis.
They performed an experiment in 2009 with 125 Dutch consumers via an at-home
questionnaire. Participants read stimulus materials including a press release describing a
company, its products and its CSR activities – with a manipulation of long versus short
CSR history – and a newspaper article accusing the company of using animal testing in
its product development. Vanhamme and Grobben measured respondents’ perception of

48
Ibid., 21.

49
Ibid.

50
Joëlle Vanhamme and Bas Grobben, “‘Too Good to be True!’ The Effectiveness of CSR History in Countering
Negative Publicity,” Journal of Business Ethics 85, (2009): 274.
12
the company’s integrity, its products, and the level of respondents’ support for CSR as
well as the respondents’ degree of skepticism.
Vanhamme and Grobben found that the length of history of CSR matters greatly.
Building up goodwill, trust and corporate credit occurs over time, therefore “companies
with only a recent involvement in CSR initiatives…do not enjoy [the] buffer of goodwill
earned over the years.”
51
However, companies with a longer-established history of CSR
are afforded the opportunity to use “CSR claims in crisis communication as a means to
counter negative publicity.”
52
The researchers established that “corporate communication
about [CSR] could help a company build a reputation that might help protect its image
against negative publicity or help restore it,” given a crisis situation.
53

Furthermore, the time length of CSR history is often used by consumers as an
informational cue regarding a company’s motivations to engage in CSR.
54
To elaborate,
“short-term company CSR involvement seems to act as a cue that triggers skepticism
about [the company’s] underlying motivation, which leads to more negative perceptions
of the company, its products and its integrity.”
55
Attempting to spotlight a brief CSR
history in defense of a corporation’s reputation is often interpreted as a “gimmick or
quick fix.”
56
In contrast, “companies with a long CSR track record can dismiss a crisis as

51
Vanhamme and Grobben, “‘Too Good to be True!’ The Effectiveness of CSR History in Countering Negative
Publicity,” 275.

52
Ibid., 273.

53
Ibid.

54
Ibid., 276.

55
Ibid., 280.

56
Ibid.
13
a one-time incident, and consumers will tend to believe their more credible CSR
claims.”
57

This study of short-term and long-term CSR history introduces the variable of
consumer skepticism into the discussion. Consumer skepticism is a significant variable in
how a corporation and a CSR strategy are perceived. Consumer skepticism interacts with
CSR, as “skepticism about companies’ true motivation to engage in CSR emerges in
several consumer surveys,” and there exists a tendency to “perceive for-profit companies’
motivations as mainly self-serving.”
58

Researchers Jiyang Bae and Glen T. Cameron explored other variables and factors
of consumer perceptions of CSR, specifically the conditioning effect of prior reputation
on perception of corporate giving. They conducted an experiment with 72 undergraduate
students at a Midwestern university in 2006; stimulus material included two news stories
describing a company’s reputation (good or bad reputation manipulation) and a news
story describing the company’s recent charitable giving. Bae and Cameron measured
participants’ perception of the company’s reputation, motive behind the philanthropic
activity, and attitude toward the company.
Findings from this study supported that “prior corporate reputation…affects
public perceptions toward corporate philanthropic messages and ultimately affects public
attitudes toward the company.”
59
Respondents perceived charitable giving as “a mutually

57
Ibid., 281.

58
Ibid., 275.

59
Jiyang Bae and Glen T. Cameron, “Conditioning Effect of Prior Reputation on Perception of Corporate
Giving,” Public Relations Review 32, no. 2 (2006): 144.
14
beneficial activity” only for the company with the good reputation.
60
Furthermore, when
respondents perceived the company to have a more “altruistic motive for charitable
giving,” they exhibited a much stronger positive attitude toward it.
61
In contrast,
respondents presented strong negative attitudes toward a company they perceived as
operating with a “self-interested motive for charitable giving.”
62

Karen L. Becker-Olsen, B. Andrew Cudmore and Ronald Paul Hill also studied
consumer perceptions of CSR, focusing on perceptions of “fit” (similarity between
corporate mission and CSR initiative), “motive” (profit-centered or other-center) and
“timing” (reactive or proactive announcement) of CSR initiatives.
63
In studying the
interactions of these variables, Becker-Olsen et al. discovered that low-fit CSR initiatives
had a negative effect on consumers’ beliefs, attitudes, and intentions toward a company,
regardless of what they perceived to be the company’s motivation for the CSR.
64
In
addition, high-fit CSR initiatives, if perceived as motivated by profit interests, also
negatively impacted beliefs, attitudes and intentions toward the company.
65
Furthermore,
it was determined that consumers use the timing of the CSR initiative, whether proactive
or reactive, as an informational cue regarding motive and fit. The research team found
that “only the high-fit, proactive initiatives led to an improvement in consumer beliefs,
attitudes and intentions,” thus suggesting that while “greater than 80% of respondents

60
Ibid.

61
Ibid.

62
Ibid.

63
Karen L. Becker-Olsen, B. Andrew Cudmore, and Ronald Paul Hill, “The Impact of Perceived Corporate
Social Responsibility on Consumer Behaviors,” Journal of Business Research 59, no. 1 (2006): 46.

64
Ibid.

65
Ibid.
15
believed that firms should engage in social initiatives…it is unlikely that consumers will
blindly accept social initiatives as sincere action and thus may or may not reward the
firm.”
66

These findings support the concerning trend mentioned at the introduction of this
thesis: Americans are not only skeptical, but alarmingly cynical about U.S. corporations.
Further analysis will reveal how these findings can be useful to public relations and
communications professionals.
Analysis of Literature Review
The literature review has established evidence to support the idea that CSR can
help protect a corporation from negative reputational effects of a crisis. Strategic CSR
programs can work to identify and neutralize risks before they become crises, foster more
positive perceptions of an organization, build more trust among stakeholders of the
organization, and thus build up a ‘reservoir of goodwill’ that can be drawn upon in a time
of crisis. However, factors such as the length of CSR history prior to the crisis, the
perceived fit, motive and timing of CSR initiatives, and consumer skepticism were shown
to have an effect on how beneficial CSR could be in a time of crisis. These factors have
implications for another interaction of CSR and crisis – that of implementing a post-crisis
CSR initiative as a strategy for reputation rebuilding and renewal.
In particular, Vanhamme and Grobben’s findings regarding the length of CSR
history have implications for post-crisis implementation of CSR. Vanhamme and
Grobben explain that companies with a shorter history of CSR prior to a crisis will not
have as sizeable a “goodwill reservoir” and will not enjoy the same damage buffer as

66
Ibid.
16
companies with longer-established CSR. This has potentially negative implications for a
company with either limited or no CSR history trying to implement CSR after a crisis.
Taking consumer skepticism into account, a company with no CSR history may be
interpreted as engaging in post-crisis CSR with less genuine intentions. The CSR may be
received less favorably and the company may be perceived even more negatively, based
on the findings from Bae and Cameron.
The Becker-Olsen et al. team’s discoveries on the interactions of perceived fit,
motive and timing of CSR on consumers’ attitudes and behaviors pose potential
challenges for post-crisis CSR implementation. It is possible that a post-crisis CSR
program will have less of a positive effect on consumers’ attitudes and intentions toward
a company. In fact, it may be perceived as less genuine due to the reactive nature of its
timing and potentially see-through motive of damage-control and profit-protection.
Crisis as an Opportunity for CSR?
It has been established that a history of CSR can help to protect a company during
a crisis. The opportunities and challenges of post-crisis CSR implementation are still to
be determined and examined, however. To begin to think about how post-crisis CSR can
be a means for organizational rebuilding, it will help to understand crises as change-
events for organizations.
Communication scholars Matthew W. Seeger, Robert R. Ulmer, Julie M. Novak
and Timothy Sellnow suggest “viewing crises as change-inducing events with the
potential to fundamentally alter the form, structure and direction of an organization.”
67

Seeger et al. explain that this is because “crises can serve as powerful forces of

67
Matthew W. Seeger et al., “Post-Crisis Discourse and Organizational Change, Failure and Renewal,” Journal
of Organizational Change Management 18, no. 1 (2005): 78.
17
organizational change, learning, normative readjustment and in some cases, renewal.”
68

The researchers argue that a crisis may present an organization with the “opportunity to
fundamentally reframe a crisis, focusing on the opportunities that arise from these
events.”
69

This viewpoint provides the opportunity for a crisis to be reframed as a learning
experience for a company and a benchmark from which to change and improve for the
future. Seeger et al. elaborate:
Crises often precipitate radical, rapid and occasionally positive change. Crisis
may become critical lessons for organizations regarding shortsightedness, greed,
over-reliance on technology, indifference, hubris or mere stupidity. They may
also create unprecedented levels of cooperation and support, help the organization
shed outdated assumptions, technologies and products and point out directions for
growth and renewal.
70

This idea can be fused with the idea that post-crisis CSR may help an organization
rebuild itself and repair any reputational damage after a crisis. If crisis can be
“understood as a force of organizational change,”
71
then it may indeed be an opportunity
to redirect a company’s efforts, rebuild its image and renew its reputation with the
implementation of CSR.

68
Ibid., 78-79.

69
Ibid., 78.

70
Ibid., 79.

71
Ibid., 80.
18
CHAPTER TWO: PRIMARY RESEARCH
The following original research attempts to answer the question of whether or not
it is possible for a company with limited or no prior CSR history to successfully
implement post-crisis CSR to rebuild its reputation.
Case Study: FIJI Water
FIJI Water is a company with a positive reputation which mere months after
facing a crisis event (criticism for the environmental impact of its product and its
operations) initiated a CSR program to maintain and enhance its reputation, renew its
brand image and continue to engage consumers, thereby counteracting the potentially
damaging effects of the crisis. It is important to note that this case began in 2007 and is
still unfolding as FIJI Water experiences a mix of responses and outcomes.
FIJI Water
Bottled water “barely existed as a business in the United States” 30 years ago –
but today, Americans “drink more bottled water than milk, coffee or beer,”
72
and they
drink more bottled water than any other country; in 2008, Americans consumed more
than 8.65 billion gallons of bottled water and spent approximately $11.17 billion on the
product.
73
FIJI Water, a “natural artesian water bottled at the source in the Fiji Islands,” is
the “number one imported bottled water brand and the top-selling premium bottled water
in the United States.”
74
The company, launched in 2005, is privately owned under Roll
International by Lynda and Stewart Resnick – a Beverly Hills, California power-couple

72
Charles Fishman, “Message in a Bottle,” Fast Company, July/August 2007.

73
John G. Rodwan, Jr, “Confronting Challenges: U.S. and International Bottled Water Developments and
Statistics for 2008,” Bottled Water Reporter, April/May 2009.

74
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Products, Press Release (Los Angeles) April 9, 2008.
19
who made their billions from agribusiness and are well-known socialites and
philanthropists.
75

Brand marketing and communications suggest that drinking FIJI Water helps spur
economic development and prosperity for Fijians. In Fiji, the company’s operations
comprise approximately “20% of exports and 3% of Gross Domestic Product, which
stands at $3900 per capita.”
76
The bottling plant on the island “employs 200 islanders –
most with just a sixth- or eighth-grade education” to work in its modern factory and
“even the entry level jobs pay twice the minimum wage.”
77
FIJI Water attempts to
“operate like a local company in Fiji,” using local suppliers for engineering services,
printing and packaging, landscaping, security and even a transportation system for
employees.
78

FIJI Water’s immense rise in popularity in 2006 and 2007 was borne out of its
star quality and trendy appeal. Described as “the Mercedes Benz of bottled water,” it has
“emerged as the bottled water choice among the rich and famous,” including President
Obama, Paris Hilton and Oprah Winfrey.
79
FIJI Water has been described as living at
“the nexus of pop-culture glamour and progressive politics,” and a product positioned
“not just as an indulgence, but as an outright necessity for an elite that can appreciate its
purity.”
80
While FIJI Water has “spent millions…pushing the seemingly life-changing

75
Anna Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle,” Mother Jones, August 12, 2009.

76
Ibid.

77
Fishman, “Message in a Bottle.”

78
Ibid.

79
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

80
Ibid.
20
properties of the product,” it also heavily promotes its “green creed and it charity
work,”
81
shifting from a “luxury product to a product where you’re ecologically and
socially responsible if you drink it.”
82
It also is important to note that this latter
environmental emphasis was spurred by a crisis situation.
The Crisis
In July 2007, a series of negative newspaper articles and exposés on the bottled
water industry – including much negative attention focused on the operations of FIJI
Water – marked the start of an onslaught of criticism and crisis for the bottled water
industry and the FIJI Water brand in particular. FIJI Water was scrutinized for everything
from the environmental impact of its product and operations to the hypocrisy of its
product in relation to the water crisis in Fiji.
FIJI Water was attacked for the environmental impact of its water when it became
“fashionable for consumers to calculate the carbon footprint of the products they buy and
the amount of greenhouse gas emitted in manufacturing and distribution.”
83
Given that its
product is bottled in Fiji and shipped as far away as to the United States and Europe, FIJI
Water was guilty of an especially large carbon footprint compared to other bottled water
companies.
The company was criticized for “using staggering amounts of energy, water and
fossil fuels to take a naturally occurring product, put it in an inherently problematic

81
Ibid.

82
Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, “‘Spin the Bottle’ - Exposé Raises Alarming Questions about FIJI Water’s
Ties to Military Junta, Environmental Record and Impact on Fijians,” Democracy Now! Radio Program,
September 3, 2009.

83
Jesse Ellison, “Save the planet, Lose the Guilt; Just because we all Sin Against the Environment Doesn’t Mean
we Should Believe Every Green Idea,” Newsweek International Edition, July 14, 2008.
21
container and then have that forever-container tossed into landfills or incinerators all over
America and Asia.”
84
It was estimated that in a single year FIJI Water moves
approximately 1.3 billion gallons of water, which must be shipped at least “5,500 miles
per trip from Fiji to Los Angeles” (the closest FIJI Water destination point in the US)
requiring “46 million gallons of fossil fuel and releasing 216 million pounds of
greenhouse gases.”
85
The FIJI Water plant, which runs 24 hours a day, requiring “an
uninterrupted supply of electricity” from “three big generators running on diesel fuel”
86

was also highlighted on the list of environmental grievances.
While FIJI Water was singled out, the entire bottled water industry was also
chided for its wasteful manufacturing and use of plastic bottles. Plastic bottle production
is an “energy-intensive” process that releases “toxic byproducts,” and once consumed,
more than 85% of bottles end up in landfills, “where they take up to 1,000 years to
degrade” or burned in incinerators, which again releases toxins into the atmosphere.
87
In
a growing effort to be more environmentally conscious, “cities such as Seattle and San
Francisco have told their municipal offices to stop buying water in small plastic
bottles…and high-end restaurants in Los Angeles and New York City” have stopped
pushing bottled water on diners.
88
The FIJI Water bottle in particular is created from very

84
Heidi Siegelbaum, “FIJI Water by the Numbers,” The Greenwash Brigade Blog – American Public Media,
posted June 6, 2008.

85
Siegelbaum, “FIJI Water by the Numbers.”

86
Fishman, “Message in a Bottle.”

87
Michael I. Niman, “Bottled Insanity,” Artvoice, February 7, 2007.

88
Christopher Palmeri and Nanette Byrnes, “Bottled Waters Lose their Effervescence,” BusinessWeek, January
30, 2009.
22
heavy and thick plastic, sourced from China, which adds to the carbon footprint of its
manufacture and shipping.
Lastly, FIJI Water was attacked by environmentalists for its shipping process,
deemed overly-damaging to the environment. Once bottled and put into cardboard
packaging (often sourced from the rainforest), FIJI Water products begin a long overseas
journey from the bottling plant in FIJI to warehouses all over the world, and then
eventually, to stores and consumers. According to one researcher, “environmental-
impact-wise, you might as well be swigging down a pint of oil.”
89
Indeed, “half the
wholesale cost of FIJI Water is transportation – which is to say, it costs as much to ship
FIJI Water across the oceans and truck it to warehouses in the United States as it does to
extract the water and bottle it.”
90

Aside from its environmental transgressions, FIJI Water also must combat
negative public attention toward the alarming water crisis and other social, environmental
and economic problems occurring in Fiji – for which the company has come to be viewed
as hypocritical in its actions. A feature article in Fast Company in 2007 highlighted the
fact that the FIJI Water plant produces “more than a million bottles a day of the hippest
bottled water on the U.S. market…while [a significant population] of Fiji does not have
safe, reliable drinking water.”
91
Somewhat hypocritically, “it is easier for the typical
American in Beverly Hills or Baltimore to get a drink of safe, pure, refreshing Fiji island
water than it is for most people in Fiji.”
92

89
Niman, “Bottled Insanity.”

90
Fishman, “Message in a Bottle.”

91
Ibid.

23
Fiji Island’s water problems include “crumbling pipes, a lack of adequate wells,
dysfunctional or flooded water treatment plants, and droughts.”
93
Reportedly, “half the
country has at times relied on emergency water supplies, with rations as low as four
gallons a week per family.”
94
Furthermore, dirty water has caused “outbreaks of typhoid
and parasitic infections” and hospital patients reportedly have to “cart their own water to
hospitals.”
95
The “irony of shipping a precious product from a country without reliable
water service is hard to avoid.”
96

One reason that Fijians do not have access to clean water is that FIJI Water holds
“nearly exclusive access to the 17-mile-long aquifer” on the island and the “notoriously
corrupt and chronically broken government has not been able to come up with the money
or infrastructure to tap the water for its people.”
97
Apparently, if the company were not
tapping the aquifer, “the underground water would slide into the Pacific Ocean,” but “the
corresponding reality is, someone else –the Fijian government or an NGO – could be
tapping that supply and sending it through a pipe to villagers who need it.”
98

Furthermore, while the company claims that it is a “key component of the economic

92
Ibid.

93
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

94
Ibid.

95
Ibid.

96
Fishman, “Message in a Bottle.”

97
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

98
Fishman, “Message in a Bottle.”
24
development for Fiji,” the bottling water process is “fairly automated… [and] the plant is
…filled with computer-controlled bottle-making and bottle-filling equipment.”
99

Compounding its problems, in December 2008 FIJI Water “had to lay off 40%” of
its approximate 500-employee workforce, “due to a weakened sales outlook.”
100
In light
of all this information and the rise of trendy eco-friendly reusable water bottles, a
measurable proportion of the American consumers are changing their bottled water
consumption habits.
101

Rebuilding FIJI Water through CSR
FIJI Water Sustainability Manager, Barbara Chung, claimed that “environmental
stewardship has always been a core value for FIJI Water [and] the breadth and depth of
[the company’s] sustainable growth program cannot be thrown together in the course of a
few months in response to a magazine article.”
102
If FIJI Water did indeed have a CSR
program in place before the reputation crisis, it was virtually unknown to consumers and
media. FIJI Water did not begin to aggressively market itself as environmentally
conscious, nor implement its CSR initiative, until after the negative publicity began. FIJI
Water officials used this crisis as an opportunity for change and renewal; the company
management rolled out its Sustainable Growth Initiative in a CSR effort to rebuild and
enhance the brand, reposition it as environmentally responsible, and mitigate the worst
damage from this reputation crisis.

99
Ibid.

100
Palmeri and Byrnes, “Bottled Waters Lose their Effervescence.”; Roll International Corporation, “FIJI
Water,” http://www.roll.com/fiji-water.php.

101
Palmeri and Byrnes, “Bottled Waters Lose Their Effervescence.”

102
Adrianne Jeffries, “Is It Green?: Fiji Bottled Water,” Inhabitat.com, September 25, 2008.
25
From the start, company leadership played an active and important role in crisis
management and implementation of its CSR – they “met the backlash head on”
103
with
the FIJI Water Sustainable Growth Initiative in November 2007 (a mere five months after
the first negative news articles), announcing in a press release the company goal to “make
its products carbon-negative” by 2010
104
as part of its “commitment to help mitigate
global climate change.”
105
The press materials outlined FIJI Water’s plans to “account for
[its] carbon footprint throughout the entire lifecycle of its products and then, through a
combination of meaningful reductions and carbon-reducing land use and renewable
energy projects.” This afforded claims that “the production and sale of each bottle of FIJI
Water will actually result in a net reduction of carbon in the atmosphere.”
106

In addition, FIJI Water communicated plans to protect and preserve the “largest
remaining area of pristine rainforest in Fiji.”
107
Locally, the company created the FIJI
Water Foundation to protect the Sovi Basin, “Fiji’s most important land ecosystem.” FIJI
Water explained that engaging in “native species restoration on sparse grasslands,” also
will generate carbon offsets, helping to “safeguard the climate, support habitats for
biodiversity, and support community livelihoods.”
108

103
Ellison, “Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt.”

104
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Products.

105
Conservation International, FIJI Water Announces Sustainable Growth Initiative with Commitment to Help
Mitigate Global Climate Change, Press Release (Los Angeles) November 7, 2007.

106
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Products.

107
Ibid.

108
Ibid.
26
In a September 2008 interview with Inhabitat.com, FIJI Water Sustainability
Manager Barbara Chung outlined the environmentally conscious aspects of the product.
Chung explained that consuming a “one-liter bottle [of FIJI Water] results in the removal
of about 115 grams of carbon dioxide” from the atmosphere, and based on sales figures,
“more than 20,000 tons of carbon dioxide” were removed in 2008 – “equivalent to
planting over 500,000 trees.”
109
Chung also noted that the iconic square FIJI Water bottle
is more environmentally friendly; a greater number of square bottles (versus round
bottles) can be packed into a shipping container and the square bottles reportedly “result
in 10% fewer shipping containers than would otherwise be required.”
110
Furthermore, she
explained that the product “travels on ships that would be making the trip anyway,” and
the FIJI Water product “only causes [ships] to use 2% more fuel.”
111

Chung also delivered messages about progress, benchmarks and future outlook,
describing sustainability as “a journey rather than a destination.”
112
Chung spoke of new
recycling programs and infrastructure at the bottling facility both for the company’s
waste and nearby villages’ waste. Counteracting criticism of its local operations, Chung
defended the company, stating that local Fijians must “trade with the rest of the world” in
order to achieve “the benefits of economic development,” and FIJI Water enables

109
Jeffries, “Is it Green?: Fiji Bottled Water.”

110
Ibid.

111
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

112
Jeffries, “Is it Green?: Fiji Bottled Water.”
27
economic prosperity, responsible for “3% of Fiji’s GDP, 20% of its exports and several
hundred of its best-paid manufacturing jobs.”
113

In April 2008, the company publicly reported its progress made since November
2007 - the implementation start date of its Sustainable Growth Initiative.
114
In that same
month, the company “unveiled FIJIgreen.com to report progress on its carbon negative
commitment,” and changed its product packaging to reflect its green commitment.
115
It
created a “dedicated section on its website to educate consumers and policy-makers about
this opportunity and report on progress made.”
116

The company made information about its green initiatives CSR programs and
Sustainable Growth Initiative readily available to consumers on its main webpage, and
offered “detailed carbon-footprint estimates on its websites.”
117
As of December 2009,
the FIJI Water homepage contained a prominent green droplet on which to “click and
learn why our water is green,” and the navigation menu included links to FIJIgreen.com
and a separate corporate philanthropy page.
118
The website also contained a link to the
FIJI Water blog, which posts information and updates regarding CSR efforts and allows
for reader feedback and commentary, enabling a two-way dialogue between consumer

113
Ibid.

114
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Product.

115
Ibid.

116
Conservation International, FIJI Water Announces Sustainable Growth Initiative with Commitment to Help
Mitigate Global Climate Change.

117
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

118
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water, http://www.fijiwater.com.
28
and brand.
119
As of December 2009, FIJIgreen.com outlined the company’s Promise and
Progress in its sustainable initiatives; this site included information via a blog, FAQ,
glossary and option to sign up for an email newsletter.
120

FIJI Water also engaged in partnerships and joined collaborative organizations to
advise and validate its methods and help measure progress, including:
• A partnership with ICF International, a “global leader in analyzing emissions
inventories and providing advice on climate strategy” to “independently
review and verify the company’s carbon footprint.”
121

• A partnership with Conservation International, having recruited the
organization to counsel the company on it sustainability initiative.
122

Conservation International approved the company’s method of forward
crediting – a sort of “carbon financing” incorporating “offsets generated over
30 years” to achieve its carbon-negative goal.
123

• A partnership with the Carbon Disclosure Project, joining its “Supply Chain
Leadership Collaboration,” as the “first privately-owned US company” (and
“first bottled water company”) to “fully disclose the carbon footprint of its
products.”
124
The CDP helped FIJI Water calculate its carbon emissions

119
FIJI Water Company LLC, “FIJI Blog,” http://www.fijiwater.com/blog/.

120
FIJI Water Company LLC, “FIJI Green,” http://www.fijigreen.com.

121
Conservation International, FIJI Water Announces Sustainable Growth Initiative with Commitment to Help
Mitigate Global Climate Change.

122
Ibid.

123
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Products.

124
Ibid.
29
“across every stage in the product lifecycle” and also to identify “where to
focus resources to [further] reduce carbon emissions.”
125

Outcomes and Response
FIJI Water is enjoying some positive outcomes from engaging in CSR. Remarks
one journalist and FIJI Water critic: “Even as bottled water [came] under attack as the
embodiment of waste, FIJI Water [still] seems immune.”
126

The company received praise and positive recognition for its CSR Sustainable
Growth Initiative from Fiji’s Environment Minister, Bernadette Rounds Ganilau. In a
public statement, Rounds Ganilau applauded the company’s “leadership and corporate
responsibility in committing to making their operations carbon [negative]
and…protecting Fiji’s natural resources.”
127
She urged “other businesses in Fiji…to
follow FIJI Water’s example.”
128

However, the company’s CSR initiative is not without its shortcomings. Reported
in August 2009, “some of FIJI Water’s good works are more hope than reality: though
Lynda Resnick insists that ‘we only use biofuels,’ the FIJI plant runs on diesel generators,
and a project to protect 50,000 acres of rainforest…has yet to obtain a lease.”
129
The
company is still criticized for using more than “double the amount of plastic as a lot of

125
Ibid.

126
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”

127
Conservation International, FIJI Water Announces Sustainable Growth Initiative with Commitment to Help
Mitigate Global Climate Change.

128
Ibid.

129
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle."
30
other bottles,” which makes the goal of reducing packaging 20% by 2010 deceivingly
simple and superficial, “given the bottle’s above-average heft.”
130

Furthermore, the method of “forward crediting” used by FIJI Water “takes
decades to even take effect…[so that] when the company says, ‘every drop is green,’
what [the consumer is] buying right now is not green.”
131
Further compounding this
issue, “most experts say that the whole premise of carbon offsets is based on dubious
math (how to measure a carbon footprint?) and morals (paying others so you can
pollute?).”
132

FIJI Water has also been accused of “greenwashing” or “misleading consumers
regarding [its] environmental practices…or the environmental benefits of [its] product”
133

by media and consumers alike. The Sustainable Growth Initiative has been described as
“a sea of green hype,”
134
“another lipstick on a pig story,”
135
and a “marketing blitz
which brazenly urges consumers to drink imported water to fight climate change.”
136

Many experts say FIJI is playing on the morals and guilt of American consumers; “guilt
over the environment is at a historic high, generating a flood of makeshift fixes, false
claims and doomed schemes to achieve redemption…these green ideas suffer mainly

130
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”; Goodman and Gonzalez, “‘Spin the Bottle’ - Exposé Raises Alarming
Questions about FIJI Water’s Ties to Military Junta, Environmental Record and Impact on Fijians.”

131
Goodman and Gonzalez, “‘Spin the Bottle’ - Exposé Raises Alarming Questions about FIJI Water’s Ties to
Military Junta, Environmental Record and Impact on Fijians.”

132
Ellison, “Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt.”

133
Greenpeace, Greenwashing, http://www.stopgreenwash.org.

134
Ellison, “Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt.”

135
Siegelbaum, “FIJI Water by the Numbers.”

136
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”
31
from over-hype, and contain in them the kernel of a scheme that could work very
well.”
137

Learning from FIJI Water
While FIJI Water’s post-crisis CSR was indeed met with a degree of consumer
skepticism and critical backlash, the cynicism against it has still not overturned the
success the program has achieved for the brand. Given what was discovered in the
literature review, FIJI Water’s Sustainable Growth Initiative should have been challenged
in its ability to bring about positive consumer perceptions, attitudes and intentions, due to
the inferred timing of the CSR and the motive behind the CSR. However, FIJI Water was
able to combat skepticism about its CSR (and ultimately protect its reputation) due to
several factors and circumstances of its CSR implementation.
Although FIJI Water’s CSR was reactive in the sense that it was implemented
after FIJI Water was the subject of negative press, FIJI Water was able to position its
CSR so that it was perceived less as reactive and more as timely, even proactive, in some
views. When the criticism hit, the environmental issues discussed were just starting to
gain U.S. consumer awareness and become part of the collective consumer
consciousness. Therefore, FIJI Water’s Sustainable Growth Initiative was viewed as a
timely response to an emerging and pressing global energy and resource crisis. FIJI
Water’s CSR rise to action was also seen as proactive, because it was the first company
in the bottled water industry to make a public effort to track, report and improve its
carbon footprint.

137
Ellison, “Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt.”
32
Furthermore, as a private company, FIJI Water is not held to the same
transparency laws and expectations as a public company; FIJI Water conveyed a
proactive, above and beyond approach to CSR when it voluntarily pursued transparency
and accountability to report its operations like a public company is required to do. Recall
that FIJI Water was the first private company to join the Carbon Disclosure Project – a
reflection of CEO Lynda Resnick’s belief that private companies should still engage in
“very public conduct.”
138
FIJI Water was able to position itself as not only a CSR leader
in its industry, but among all private companies as well.
This viewpoint of FIJI Water as proactive in its willingness to engage in
environmental impact reporting also helped to promote a more positive perception of the
motive behind the program. Now it can be argued that the FIJI Water brand is perceived
as more altruistically committed to sustainability than its competitors - consumers
desiring environmentally conscious water are likely to reach for FIJI Water before Evian
or Dasani.
Another success factor for FIJI Water’s Sustainable Growth Initiative is its CSR-
brand integration. The best way that FIJI Water tells consumers about its CSR is through
the actual product and printed bottle label. FIJI Water has integrated its Sustainable
Growth Initiative with its brand and product so well that it has become part of the brand
story: it is on the bottle, it is top-most in consumers’ minds when they think of FIJI
Water, and “Every Drop is Green.” By integrating its CSR with its brand in this way, FIJI
Water empowers consumers to feel good about their self by drinking FIJI Water, a brand
of bottled water that will give back to the environment and lessen that individual’s

138
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”
33
environmental impact, just by virtue of drinking it. Here it becomes more than CSR; it
becomes an empowered lifestyle choice for consumers and it engages consumers to
connect with FIJI Water on a more emotional level.
Peter Seligmann, CEO of Conservation International explains: “As consumers
become more environmentally aware and active, they are looking toward leadership
brands like FIJI Water that support their efforts to live a greener lifestyle and reduce their
own environmental footprint.”
139
Thomas Mooney, Senior Vice President leading the
Sustainable Growth Initiative, emphasizes that FIJI Water is providing consumers with
“the information they need [in order to] make environmentally responsible purchasing
decisions.”
140

This interaction between consumer and brand is significant, and FIJI Water
arguably becomes more favorable in consumers’ eyes for the empowerment to use their
purchasing power for positive change. Furthermore, this integration gives FIJI Water a
competitive advantage of further differentiation of product benefits over its competition.
It can be deduced that FIJI Water’s reputation has remained intact and perhaps even
improved, due to the integration of its Sustainable Growth Initiative with its brand and its
brand story.
The halo effect can also help to explain why FIJI Water’s CSR Sustainable
Growth Initiative has received overall positive support and the company’s reputation has
been sustained in light of the criticisms of its operations. The strong, positive reputation –
trendy, exotic, pure, elite – that FIJI Water experienced prior to the crisis made brand

139
Conservation International, FIJI Water Announces Sustainable Growth Initiative with Commitment to Help
Mitigate Global Climate Change.

140
FIJI Water Company LLC, FIJI Water Becomes First Bottled Water Company to Release Carbon Footprint of
its Products.
34
consumers more resistant to negative information about FIJI Water. At the same time,
these consumers were primed to give FIJI Water the benefit of the doubt and attribute
greater value to even small improvements, because of the halo of its reputation prior to
the crisis.
The company leadership played an important role in contributing to this halo; the
lifestyle of CEOs Lynda and Stewart Resnick primed consumers to believe FIJI Water
more genuine and sincere in its CSR Sustainable Growth Initiative. The Resnicks have
given “millions to museums, environmental organizations and other charities,” and are
“major players on the political scene, giving more than $300,000 each year over the past
decade” to presidential campaigns.
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Since the CEOs are well-known philanthropists,
FIJI Water’s CSR may be interpreted as reflecting the personal passions of the company
leadership and, therefore, important to the company. The highly visible involvement of
the CEOs in their commitment to philanthropy makes the company’s Sustainable Growth
Initiative seem more genuine and also as a core part of the company.
In addition to taking a leadership role on the issues, fully integrating its
Sustainable Growth Initiative into its brand and enjoying the positive halo effects from its
brand reputation and CEOs reputations, FIJI Water’s CSR thrust helped combat
consumer skepticism and promote positive perceptions by way of validating its claims
and substantiating its pledges.
Focus Groups
The experience of CSR as a post-crisis strategy has yet to be studied in great
depth. Therefore, it was deemed necessary and beneficial to conduct an original

141
Lenzer, “Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle.”
35
experiment via focus groups in order to capture and study the nuances of stakeholder
attitudes, feelings, behaviors and intentions in crisis and post-crisis environments – and
how CSR may have an impact. Two focus groups simulating a crisis situation and a
subsequent CSR initiative were conducted to specifically measure consumer attitudes and
intentions regarding the company in question. The focus groups provided rich qualitative
data that shed light on opportunities and challenges for CSR as a post-crisis reputation
renewal and rebuilding strategy.
Methodology and Material Design (Focus Group Materials Included in Appendix)
In November 2009, two separate focus groups featuring a mix of male and female
USC graduate and undergraduate students were held. Fictional stimulus materials
included:
• A crisis simulation: a newspaper article providing company background and
information about a breaking crisis situation; a media alert providing an
official company statement regarding the crisis situation
• A CSR simulation: an advertorial outlining a new CSR initiative from the
company three months after the crisis broke
The manipulation variable was company reputation prior to the crisis – either
neutral or poor – and this was manipulated in the newspaper article. Participants engaged
in a guided discussion after the crisis simulation and again after the CSR simulation.
Questions that framed the guided discussion measured participants’ attitudes toward the
company, trust of the company, intentions to purchase from the company and how this
might change from immediate post-crisis to after post-crisis CSR implementation – to
ultimately map changes in the company’s reputation.
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Detailed in the newspaper article, the crisis was a product recall for Benson
Builders (BB), a fictional, publicly held manufacturing company of children’s outdoor
play-sets and playhouses, with a history of manufacturing dog houses. The recall entailed
tainted paints and varnishes used in the products which caused skin rashes in children
after prolonged exposure and illness in children and animals (family pets) if ingested. BB
violated two chemical product safety and testing laws in this situation. For the neutral
reputation manipulation, this was the company’s first nationwide recall, with only one
prior minor recall more than ten years ago in the Midwest. For the poor reputation
manipulation, this recall was one of several nationwide recalls for the company over the
past ten years. The company did not practice CSR prior to the recall.
A media alert from company officials addressed the recall; for the purpose of the
experiment, this material was the same for both reputation manipulations, as was the CSR
advertorial, which outlined BB’s plans to partner with Habitat for Humanity (providing
raw materials for projects) and with Sierra Club (reforestation efforts). Participants in
both groups also were provided with a set of images to supplement reading materials and
better situate them in the context of the crisis and CSR. Images of two BB products (an
outdoor playhouse and play-set) and of children and family pets affected by the product
recall were shown.
The focus groups were specifically designed to elicit and record responses to
situations that are common in the U.S. business climate. Furthermore, traditional public
relations strategies and tactics were employed to mimic standard best practices.
In the crisis simulation, BB was undoubtedly at fault. This is a least-forgivable
situation for a company, when it is unable to displace blame, and, therefore, poses the
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potential to do the most damage to the company’s reputation because of the violation of
stakeholder trust. According to marketing scholar Dwane H. Dean, a “corporation will
lose social legitimacy if it is seen as being irresponsible, dishonest, breaking the law, or
acting in a manner that exhibits little concern for the community.”
142
Paul Argenti also
explains that human-induced crises “can be more devastating than natural disasters” in
terms of financial and reputational cost to a company because human-induced crises tend
to be perceived as preventable.
143
Therefore, if the focus group results showed that post-
crisis CSR could help a company wholly-responsible for said crisis to rebuild and
mitigate some reputational damage, then it could be argued that this finding would be
applicable to companies with varying degrees of culpability.
The populations at risk in the crisis simulation were children and family pets –
two vulnerable populations which generally evoke very emotional responses. The
rationale for targeting these groups as victims was, again, an attempt to make the findings
more applicable. To eliminate confounding variables of effective crisis communication
and management, and to isolate CSR as the determining factor for the company’s success
or failure, an attempt to control for best-possible crisis management was engaged. In the
focus group materials, BB officials took responsibility, made apologies, spoke
transparently, provided comprehensive information, offered channels for feedback and
two-way communication, offered product refunds and communicated plans to ensure that
a similar crisis would not happen again. Finally, in an attempt to eliminate bias, sources

142
Dean, “Consumer Reaction to Negative Publicity,” 193.

143
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 258.
38
(The Chicago Tribune) and locations (Indiana) with fairly neutral associations were
selected to be integrated into the simulation.
Limitations
Before revealing the focus group findings, it is imperative to acknowledge the
inherent limitations in this type of simulation. The first limitation is that the stimulus
materials pose a hypothetical situation and are examined and discussed in an artificial
setting – a vacuum of manipulated time versus real time. It ignores real-world factors and
dynamics; perhaps if this played out in real time a majority of consumers would forget
about the crisis situation or become less emotional about it by the time they learn of the
CSR programs. Moreover, not all consumers may know about the crisis and/or not all the
consumers may know about the CSR program if this were a real world situation.
A second limitation is the composition of focus group participants. While the
neutral reputation manipulation focus group had the requisite six participants, the poor
reputation manipulation focus group had only five participants. Eight of the nine total
participants were female, which may have skewed the findings overall. Furthermore, all
participants were public relations/communications majors, making communication issues
salient for them. More limiting, participants were not reflective of the audience that
would really be affected by this crisis, i.e. purchasers of the product, mothers, fathers,
young children, and pet owners. These particular focus group participants had no stake in
the situation. Overall, a more representative sample of participants would have resulted in
more generalized findings.
Discussions and tangents emerged from the focus groups that prompt significant
ideas for further study. In subsequent focus groups on this topic, it would be interesting to
39
introduce different types of program responses, such as general philanthropy, CSR
initiatives, and/or targeted corporate donations to ascertain if it matters what type of
action is taken or if anything philanthropic or “good” in nature will promote positive (or
negative) feelings toward the company.
Key Findings: Focus Group 1
Manipulation: Neutral Reputation Prior to Crisis
Post-Crisis Simulation Discussion
To simulate a crisis event, participants read the newspaper article and the
company (BB) media alert, as detailed in the Methodology and Material Design section
above. To manipulate a neutral reputation for BB prior to the crisis, the newspaper article
explained that it was BB’s first nationwide product recall. After individually reading the
stimulus materials, participants engaged in a guided discussion.
After the crisis simulation, a majority of participants expressed a “wait-and-see”
attitude regarding their intentions to interact with BB. They explained that before making
firm judgments about how much they trust BB, whether or not the company operates with
responsibility, and whether they would purchase a BB product, they would wait to see
what the company does next. The emphasis was on actions needing to match words; the
company made apologies and pledged that it would fix the problem, but without specific
details and without seeing the changes themselves, participants were hesitant to trust the
company’s word completely.
Overall, participants were willing to give BB the benefit of the doubt – not
entirely against purchasing its products in the future, merely wanting to base immediate
decisions on what the company did next. Participants noted that feelings and attitudes are
40
developed and can change over time. In the meantime, all participants said that if they
knew someone interested in buying a BB product, they would warn them about the
product recall.
A subset of participants’ wait-and-see reaction was a desire for more information
about the company – and especially about its competitors – to best understand the
situation, decide whether to put their trust in the company, and ultimately make
purchasing decisions. Participants expressed a desire to compare BB’s products and
performance with its competitors’; they would be more forgiving if the circumstances of
the crisis turned out to be a common problem with that type of product or was an
industry-wide problem rather than BB-specific. In the wake of the product recall, a
majority of participants expressed reluctance to buy a BB product, with preference for a
comparable product from a different company, if available.
When asked what BB should do to right the situation, participants said that as
consumers they would want detailed information and honest explanations about what
happened and what will change in the future. Reassurances from company officials about
product safety would also be necessary. It is important that the company take some action
above and beyond merely fixing the problem. Participants agreed that BB should act
immediately to best repair the damage, but they emphasized that its actions in the
aftermath of the crisis need to match any pledges it makes to consumers.
Post-CSR Simulation Discussion
To simulate post-crisis CSR, participants read the company’s CSR advertorial
outlining its partnerships with Habitat for Humanity and the Sierra Club, as detailed in
41
the Methodology and Material Design section above. After individually reading the
advertorial, participants engaged in a guided discussion.
The company’s post-crisis CSR program was perceived positively, although
realistically. Participants were pleased to see the company engage in this sort of activity,
but all agreed the company’s motive behind the CSR was profit-driven. They
immediately identified that the need to make a profit, continue to stay in business and fix
its reputation or change public perception was BB’s motivation for implementing the
CSR programs.
One participant acknowledged the profit motivation yet did not allow that to
diminish the goodness and possible genuineness of the CSR; based on what she knew
about BB and its reputation prior to the crisis, she interpreted the CSR as an indication of
a good company trying to make up for the harm it had caused. Even though participants
identified the pragmatic business and profit-driven reason behind the CSR program, they
still appreciated the company’s pursuit of doing-good in the form of CSR.
Although the CSR was perceived as somewhat self-serving, participants agreed
that it fit very well with the company. The believability factor of the CSR helped
participants to judge the CSR as thoughtful, smart and positive because of its strong fit
with the company. Furthermore, due to its fit and believability, the CSR was interpreted
as a way for the company to progress forward rather than viewed as a quick-fix measure
or a Band-Aid solution to the crisis problem. Participants agreed that the CSR seemed
less about the company’s mistake and more about the future of the company – it took
focus away from the mistake and served as a bridge to help the company reinvent itself in
participants’ minds.
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Participants believed that the CSR initiative spoke to the character of the company
– what it aims to be as a brand and the relationship it aims to have with its stakeholders.
Participants applauded the company for taking an approach which they felt embodied a
more strategic and long-term vision, rather than engaging in crisis-specific philanthropy
or CSR (e.g. donations to a children’s hospital or veterinary clinic) – short-term fixes that
would not have encouraged them to re-engage with the brand as much. From a public
relations perspective, one participant explained that because people tend to have a short
memory and media is so cluttered, transitioning into a new CSR program to kick-start the
brand after the product recall is a smart way of moving forward successfully. However,
participants’ enthusiasm of the company’s CSR forced them to express curiosity – and
skepticism – of why the company was not engaging in this sort of behavior prior to the
crisis.
The CSR program was also met with skepticism about the company’s ability to
deliver on its pledges, given the product crisis. Participants were slightly turned off at the
idea that BB might be lending its poison paint and tainted products as the raw materials in
a Habitat for Humanity home, and thereby putting people’s lives at risk. Participants said
that within the three-month time span between the crisis and the CSR announcement, the
company had to offer consumers some sort of public explanation about what happened
and how the problem was fixed. In other words, they felt a CSR program alone would not
be suitable; the crisis itself first needs to be resolved and explained.
When asked about purchasing intentions after the CSR, participants discussed the
influence, or lack thereof, of CSR on purchasing decisions. One participant remarked that
while she might see the company as more socially responsible, it did not necessarily
43
mean that BB was the right manufacturer for the product she wanted to buy. This
participant explained that BB’s competitors, regardless of CSR, may create a better or
safer product that she would rather purchase.
Another participant challenged: “I’m paying for the product. I’m not paying for
them to go plant trees. I don’t really care if they are helping Habitat for Humanity – I care
about the product and how it is going to work for me and that I can trust it won’t poison
my children.” Two participants did agree that the CSR program made them feel slightly
more inclined to purchase a product from the company.
One participant discussed her feelings about the scale of the campaign versus
what matters to her on a personal level. She explained that CSR would not likely change
her opinion of the company: “It comes down to me in the end, and if I had a bad
experience with the products once, CSR or no CSR, I just won’t buy them again.” She
elaborated that she does not devote a significant amount of time researching a company’s
CSR before buying a product, nor does she believe most other consumers engage in such
research. Her point of view on CSR is that it is something all companies need to be doing
to “play the game because everyone else is doing CSR.” This prompted some agreement
from the group; another participant remarked: “I’ve never recommended a product
because a company has good social responsibility practices,” whereas “I’ve made product
recommendations because the product is exceptionally good.” Another participant felt
that CSR only gets noticed and makes an impact when it is either exceptionally bad or
exceptionally good.
Across the group there was emphasis on product or service quality and price
being more important than CSR in purchasing decisions, although there was also
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agreement that all things being equal, participants would rather spend money with a
company with a good CSR program. One participant explained that she thinks CSR
makes the biggest impact when it is fully integrated into the product’s actual existence
and marketing. Citing FIJI Water as an example, she explained that FIJI Water is
specifically designed to “appeal to people slightly more conscious of social initiatives”
and looking for products and ways to use their wallet to make a difference.
The group concluded among themselves that they would rather do business with a
socially responsible company; however, quality and experience mattered more to them
than CSR. They tended not to notice CSR or let it influence their purchasing decisions
unless it is exceptionally good or exceptionally bad. For those companies with
exceptionally bad CSR or a history of operating with little social responsibility,
participants would be less inclined to purchase. They weighed socially irresponsible
business practices as a stronger reason to avoid a brand than good socially responsible
business practices as a reason to engage with a brand.
Drawing upon their backgrounds in communication, participants also engaged in
conversation about the content and wording of the CSR advertorial. Had the participants
been consulting the company about its CSR announcement, they identified several
changes they would make. Participants did not think it was a good idea to use the heading
“Changes at Benson Builders,” feeling it conveyed that the company is trying to cover
something up or that highlighting the fact that it is making changing implies that
something was amiss before and draws attention back to the crisis. Participants agreed
that the crisis management and the CSR roll-out should be two separate items: the
advertorial should only promote new partnerships with Habitat for Humanity and Sierra
45
Club, rather than implying that something is wrong and that the company still isn’t where
it ought to be.
The discussion concluded with overall agreement on the future value of the CSR
program – as both a way for the company to rebuild and move on from the crisis and
regain consumer trust – and also as something they can draw or call upon if needing to
prove that they are a good and responsible company in spite of mistakes – and in a way,
show its responsibility to the community in case of future crises.
Key Findings: Focus Group 2
Manipulation: Poor Reputation Prior to Crisis
Post-Crisis Simulation Discussion
Participants in the second focus group read the same newspaper article and
company media alert as participants in the first focus group. The only difference was the
variable of a poor reputation for BB prior to the crisis; this was manipulated in the
newspaper article, which explained that the current recall was just one of several
nationwide product recalls for the company over the past ten years. After individually
reading the stimulus materials, participants engaged in a guided discussion.
Participants generally agreed that the company’s response to the crisis seemed
insincere; they coined the term “superficial responsibility” and used it to describe BB
throughout the discussion. Noting that the company had experienced continuous product
recalls over the last ten years, participants felt BB had no actual concern for its
consumers. The accumulation of mistakes disintegrated participants’ trust in the company
and made participants interpret BB’s apologies and attempts to take responsibility as
insincere and superficial.
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Participants did not trust BB’s management team to do the right thing. They were
skeptical of the company’s ability to manage its business and they did not trust claims
that BB would conduct investigations into the problem. Furthermore, they did not believe
that such investigations would make a difference, given the company’s history of product
recalls. Overall, the company was interpreted as incapable. Participants said they would
not buy products from the company, given its performance history and the perceived risk
associated with a BB product. They also felt compelled to advise others against
purchasing a BB product.
When asked what the company could do to make the situation better, participants
identified several activities that they would demand the company perform. They wanted
to see the company CEO take a more proactive role and be involved in fixing the
problem. Participants also wanted detailed evidence about the problem, the results of the
investigation, and how it will be fixed. They wanted to have resources available to them
to easily find this information.
Regarding quality assurance, participants felt that BB should focus heavily on
product safety and testing activities since it put consumers’ health at risk and blatantly
violated laws. In addition, because BB’s products had a history of poor quality prior to
the most recent toxic product recall, thorough inspections for a multitude of product
issues were warranted. Participants wanted BB to hire independent safety inspectors and
report to supervisory organizations or authorities, claiming a loss of trust in the
company’s own ability to inspect products.
Lastly, participants felt it was absolutely necessary for the company to
immediately provide financial assistance to those affected by the product recall, and that
47
monetary compensation must go above and beyond a product refund. Participants thought
the company should cover consumers’ medical or veterinary bills. One participant
remarked, “Vet bills are not cheap, and if a dog needs surgery and needs to get its
stomach opened up, that’s going to cost a lot of money. Some people might have had to
put their animals down because of this.”
Post-CSR Simulation Discussion
Participants in the second focus group read the same CSR advertorial outlining
BB’s partnerships with Habitat for Humanity and the Sierra Club as participants in the
first focus group. After individually reading the advertorial, participants engaged in a
guided discussion.
Since the company was perceived so negatively given its history and reputation,
any actions to rebuild as a more responsible company, including the CSR, were met with
participants’ distrust and disfavor. After reading the CSR advertorial, participants became
even more frustrated with BB’s actions and concerned about its ability to conduct
business benefiting consumers and benefiting the company itself. They immediately
interpreted the motivation behind the CSR as a means for BB to rebuild its public image
and reputation, but once again cited their concept of “superficial responsibility.” They did
not view BB’s efforts as sincere – but rather as a way to avert attention from the crisis.
Participants did not think CSR was an appropriate action for BB, given its
operational reputation. Explained one participant, “at this point, it’s kind of like, who
cares? If you can’t take care of your own products first then CSR is not going to improve
your image that much.” Furthermore, they interpreted the CSR program as a misfit with
the company. Participants were especially alarmed by the partnership with Habitat for
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Humanity, concerned that BB would provide toxic or faulty raw materials for houses for
the needy.
Overall, participants believed philanthropic efforts directly related or relevant to
the crisis would be more appropriate than CSR. One participant interpreted the CSR
efforts as “not connected to the core of the company,” and cited philanthropic efforts
such as volunteering with Big Brothers Big Sisters of America as more appropriate, since
the company constructs play items for children. Another participant suggested that BB
build kennels for the city animal shelters (although with hesitation, given the company’s
tarnished reputation for quality products) as a way to make up for the harm its products
caused to animals. Several participants felt partnerships with Habitat for Humanity and
Sierra Club were irrelevant because those organizations have little to do with the targeted
consumers of the company’s products. Overall, participants disliked the CSR effort,
found the initiatives irrelevant, and as a result, perceptions of the company did not
improve with the introduction of the CSR effort.
After reading the CSR advertorial, participants interpreted BB as more out of
touch with reality and its consumers than it had been before the CSR announcement. One
participant remarked that she felt worse about BB, explaining that even if it were sincere
in its CSR efforts, the company seems “incapable – in this crucial moment they can’t
figure out what to do – they’ve taken the completely wrong approach.” Other participants
chimed in, interpreting the company as “out of touch with what is going on” and “foolish
and confused” about what consumers want. One participant admitted, “I appreciate that
they are trying to do something…but this is the wrong approach, they are seriously
lacking direction.”
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One participant was especially outraged at the decision to implement CSR,
explaining that the amount of money the company spent on CSR should have been spent
on improving the manufacturing process to create better products and reduce future
product risk or to compensate those harmed by the recent recall. She thought it was
actually irresponsible of the company to attempt to alleviate large-scale social and
environmental issues, while its own products had problems needing to be fixed.
Another participant was irritated with the use of an advertorial as the
communication tool used to deliver the CSR message. She remarked that a paid
advertorial continues to drain money from the company – money that should be
appropriated toward internal resolution rather than external philanthropic pursuits.
Furthermore, she felt strongly that an advertorial, as a communication vehicle, sends the
wrong message when tied to a CSR campaign. She explained: “The point of doing CSR is
so that a company can do good as a corporate citizen. The fact that BB paid for an
advertisement just to demonstrate that it has a good CSR program makes the company a
bit sleazy in my mind.”
The discussion of “superficial responsibility” reemerged regarding the language
and content of the CSR advertorial. Four of the five participants were outraged at the use
of the word “responsibility,” noting it was ironic and insensitive. The group also was
critical of the fact that the advertorial did not “say a single thing about how they are
getting involved,” and “did not give specifics, just pledges – but how can I take their
word?” Overall, the content was interpreted as superficial.
The group agreed that given what they know about BB’s history and reputation,
the recent crisis, and the newly conceived CSR initiatives, they would not buy a product
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from the company. At the same time, participants conceded that if a consumer did not
know about the company’s recall history or was perhaps unaware of the recent crisis,
then the CSR initiative would likely be attractive and foster more positive perceptions of
the company. Participants further conceded that “even people who knew about the recall
might read this and think the company is doing something good and trying to
change…some people might be distracted by this.”
Finally, participants discussed whether or not CSR might work to better the
company’s reputation, by any degree. Participants agreed they do care about CSR overall,
but they would have a greater appreciation for a company that delivers quality products
and conducts its business responsibly and doesn’t engage in CSR, over a company that
practices CSR but cannot meet consumer needs and expectations.
Analysis of Focus Group Findings:
Challenges, Opportunities and Implications for Post-Crisis CSR
Comparing, contrasting and analyzing the findings from the two focus groups (the
neutral reputation manipulation group and the poor reputation manipulation group) will
provide insights into the challenges, opportunities and overall implications for post-crisis
CSR as a rebuilding and renewal strategy.
A neutral reputation prior to the crisis proved to be an asset for fictional company
Benson Builders, as participants perceived the company as seeming genuinely distraught
at the crisis situation, and as an overall good company that wants to do right by its
consumers. The company’s reputation prior to the crisis mattered greatly, and positively
affected subsequent perceptions and judgments of the company’s actions, as well as
feelings associated with post-crisis CSR as a viable option. Participants overall exhibited
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greater approval and acceptance of the CSR; the company emerged in participants’ eyes
with perhaps minor damage in the short-term, but on a path of improved reputation for
the future. Therefore, for a company with neutral-to-positive reputation prior to a crisis,
implementing post-crisis CSR has strong potential for positive reception and reaction
among consumers. Such a company stands little to lose in terms of reputation by
choosing to implement post-crisis CSR, and may gain incremental to significant boost to
its reputation over the long-term.
As for the poor reputation manipulation, the halo effect of the BB’s poor
reputation prior to the crisis strongly influenced the perceptions and reactions of the
participants. Participants formed a negative judgment of the company upon learning of its
history and this colored all further interpretations of BB’s actions and motivations. The
poor reputation of the company influenced participants to interpret improper crisis
response, inappropriate measures of apology and care, insincerity and superficial
responsibility and most important, very low approval and acceptance of the CSR.
The halo effect of the poor reputation even led participants to criticize the
company as out of touch with consumers and incapable of conducting its business. Thus,
overall results show that a company trying to rebuild after a crisis with a negative (or less
than neutral) reputation beforehand is likely to be judged more strongly, and it will be
difficult for that company to create more positive perceptions of itself after those initial
negative judgments. Such a company will face a greater challenge of consumer
skepticism regarding the sincerity of its actions and communications and its rebuilding
strategy and tactics than would a company with a more neutral or positive reputation.
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The wait-and-see attitude exhibited by participants in focus groups has
implications for the time and process required in both initially building – and more
important for post-crisis applications – rebuilding a reputation. The emphasis was on
actions matching words, and an underlying skepticism that BB would not follow through
on pledges and promises, given that participants’ trust was already shaken from the crisis.
Essentially this implies that a company will need to prove itself to consumers to regain
trust, and earning trust may take longer than immediately after the start of a CSR
initiative. Participants expressed a desire to see measurable results before opening their
wallets. It is important to understand that post-crisis CSR needs to have a long-term focus
to bridge from crisis to renewal, because bringing about attitudinal and behavioral change
is a process, not an immediate reaction.
Company leadership has an impact on the process of rebuilding trust and most
certainly in the acceptance and approval of a post-crisis CSR initiative. As observed for
the poor reputation manipulation, participants felt that the company’s management gave
no real indication that it cared about making a quality product, and thus gave no reason
for participants to trust its CSR claims and plans for renewal. Moreover, it made these
efforts meaningless. As for the neutral reputation manipulation, participants felt that the
company management, while guilty of mistakes, was sincerely upset and wanted to do
better by its consumers. They afforded this company the benefit of the doubt and credited
its management with having a long-term vision in its CSR. The critical role of company
leadership in substantiating the importance and integrity of a CSR initiative to a company
was not just evident in focus groups; recall that the personal philanthropic endeavors of
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FIJI Water’s CEOs primed consumers to believe in the company’s desire and
commitment to do good.
In discussions of intent to purchase a BB product, it became apparent that what
the competition is doing matters almost as much as what the company is doing – both in
business operations or products and in CSR. The company’s position vis-à-vis its
competition is very important. For example, FIJI Water’s CSR has been so successful
because when compared to its competition in the bottled water market, it is going above
and beyond in responding to environmental issues and reporting on progress. FIJI
Water’s brand reputation has reaped the benefits.
In the neutral reputation manipulation focus group, participants wanted to use
information about BB’s competitors to help formulate judgments of the company and
provide context to the crisis and the CSR. Such information would influence their
decision whether to buy a BB product or a comparable product from a different
manufacturer. These same participants understood CSR as something a company is
pressured to engage in because its market competition is doing it. CSR is no longer a
point of differentiation or a competitive advantage. Thus, most CSR often goes
unnoticed, getting lost in the current CSR clutter.
CSR vis-à-vis competition is, therefore, very important. The opportunity to take a
leadership role to combat a problem inherent in an industry, such as what FIJI Water did,
can significantly boost a company in the public sphere, putting it ahead of competitors. It
may be rare that this opportunity is available, and thus companies are challenged to
engage in CSR that is meaningful and significant, rather than seemingly tacked-on as
54
necessary in order to stay competitive. This is especially so in a post-crisis climate when
trust expectations are tested between an organization and its stakeholders.
It is important to note that even if one company’s CSR does get mixed in the
clutter of competitors’ CSR programs, there is still potential for any CSR initiative to be
scrutinized under a microscope. This is particularly true for CSR implemented post-crisis,
given the context it is likely to be more talked about among stakeholders exhibiting wait-
and-see anticipation regarding what the company will do next in an effort to recover.
Regardless of CSR, if a company’s products or services are not of satisfactory
quality, then its reputation will suffer. The 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer measured a
series of responsibility factors on importance to overall reputation of a company. The top
five most important factors included “offers high quality products or services (94%),”
and “gives value for money (91%).”
144
Factors related to CSR, including: “has a strong
commitment to protect the environment (87%),” and “commits times, money and
resources to the greater public good (85%)” were not as highly ranked relative to factors
of product quality and value.
145
These CSR factors are still highly valuable to a
corporation’s reputation, but the key learning is that engaging in CSR does not
automatically equal having a good reputation. Factors of CSR can contribute to a good
reputation, but these factors are ultimately not as important as trust that products are of
quality and value. This was evident in focus group participants’ emphasis on product
experience over CSR initiatives, and disapproval of allocating company funds to CSR
when the products were failing to satisfy their needs and expectations.

144
Edelman, 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Executive Summary, 4.

145
Ibid.
55
In both focus groups, participants could almost immediately identify the motive
behind CSR as profit and reputation-driven. However, this did not mean that participants
disapproved of the CSR. Those in the neutral reputation manipulation appreciated that
BB was doing CSR, and while it did not strongly influence short-term purchasing
decisions (they waited to base judgments on actions and measurable results rather than
baseline communications), it laid the groundwork for future, long-term potential. Just
because a motive is interpreted as less altruistic does not mean the CSR or the company
will go unappreciated for attempting to improve the larger experience of its stakeholders.
For the poor reputation manipulation, participants did not approve of the CSR, but this
had more to do with the company’s reputation and participants’ feelings of improper
crisis handling.
Regardless of BB’s reputation prior to the crisis, across the board participants
expressed concern and curiosity of why the company, if committed to the causes of
Habitat for Humanity and Sierra Club, had not been engaging in similar CSR programs
before the crisis occurred. Especially since CSR has evolved to “must-have status,”
146

those companies that don’t engage in CSR or choose to only during a troubling time, are
perceived as less genuine and more self-serving.
For the poor reputation manipulation, the CSR was interpreted as reactive,
irrelevant and ill-conceived to fit the situation. It can be assumed that if a company has a
poor performance history and no history of CSR, its post-crisis CSR will be more
strongly challenged, harshly judged and criticized. For the neutral reputation
manipulation, CSR was known to have been implemented ultimately as a reaction to the

146
Catchpole, “CSR Graduates to Must-Have Status.”
56
crisis, but was given credit for being proactive - perceived as more long-term in vision
and a step forward, rather than positioned as a response to the crisis.
Communications officials must consider how the method of communication may
affect the message content; the communication vehicle is almost as important as the
communication itself, especially in conveying CSR. Focus group participants expressed
distaste for the use of a paid advertorial to promote CSR, explaining that it sends the
wrong message about the company and its priorities. Participants questioned why BB
spent money on an advertorial when it could have allocated the same funds to the actual
CSR program, or to even improve its manufacturing and safety assurance processes,
given the nature of the product recall.
More important, participants held strong opinions that a company should not
engage in CSR so that it can brag about it or blatantly use it for competitive advantage;
creating a paid advertisement devoted to CSR made participants feel that BB was less
sincere and genuine in its efforts and didn’t really understand what CSR should be. The
issue of choosing a strategic communication vehicle also brings to light the challenge of
communicating CSR without seemingly boasting about achievements for a competitive
edge. This is a challenge for any company reporting on its CSR, but it will require greater
consideration for a company coming off the heels of a crisis, when actions, claims and
turn-around tactics will be judged with greater skepticism.
Overall consumer skepticism is a challenge to any CSR program, and will likely
be an even greater challenge for post-crisis CSR given how recent company events may
affect the company-stakeholder relationships and prime for skepticism and distrust. There
is serious danger in empty boasting, over boasting or in making false of empty claims, as
57
“NGOs and corporate critics are quick to criticize and pinpoint any inaccuracies…[and]
constituents continue to be skeptical about companies’ motivations and realities behind
CSR claims.”
147
Companies must be aware that their CSR activities have the potential to
be scrutinized under a microscope by various individuals, groups and agencies, whose
findings or opinions can have serious impact on company reputation.
However, even a company operating with honesty and transparency and ensuring
accuracy in results and reporting can be criticized for over-boasting. Thus there exists the
tension of how a company can report its “citizenship activities…share lessons learned
with peers and stakeholders, and challenge others to do as well or better,” without making
it seem that “publicity was the primary reason for pursuing the initiative.”
148
Especially in
a situation of post-crisis CSR, a company may face increased criticism for trying to boost
its reputation by reporting its good works.
Other public relations and communications efforts may achieve the same result of
public awareness of CSR, but without the same backlash for the communication tool. For
example, issuing a press release with CSR benchmark results would allow for a journalist
to write a story about the CSR achievements. While this does not afford the same
message control as paid placement, if the company is responsibly and accurately tracking,
recording and reporting its CSR activities, then there should be no concern of what may
run in a newspaper. A CSR report, much like a company’s annual report, is also an
appropriate communication vehicle that is perceived as more credible and allows for
much more detailed and substantive data.

147
Argenti, Corporate Communication, 128.

148
Catchpole, “CSR Graduates to Must-Have Status.”
58
If a company partners with a non-profit organization in its CSR effort, there are
more opportunities for promoting the CSR in a way that does not provoke skepticism
about motivations or priorities. Communications about the CSR could be placed on the
partnering non-profit’s website, in its direct-to-members communications, via a joint
press release or a press release issued from the non-profit, and other countless ways in
which the message can come from the seemingly more credible and genuine voice of the
partnering organization.
The ideal communication vehicle for CSR is the actual product or brand – that is,
when the CSR is fully integrated into the brand story and brand communication. Recall
that FIJI Water integrated its CSR story into its actual product packaging. Its Sustainable
Growth Initiative is so embedded in the brand life itself, that it is printed on the bottle:
“Every Drop is Green.” Similarly, in focus groups, participants suggested post-crisis or
CSR measures integrated into product development or product packaging. One
participant cited the example of Johnson & Johnson creating a safety-seal for Tylenol
bottles after the cyanide crisis of the 1980s. The participant recommended that BB
consider placing something similar to an “EPA-approved” sticker on its product
packaging which would reassure consumers that it had been inspected by a higher
authority. Expert third-party assurance on the product also lends credibility to the CSR,
the product and the company.
Focus group participants recognized Habitat for Humanity and Sierra Club as
reputable and credible organizations, and this helped to reassure participants that BB’s
CSR claims would be enforced and validated. Partnerships such as these helped to
substantiate the company’s work and alleviate some skepticism. However, this level of
59
integration is not easy to achieve, nor is it always applicable or relevant. Whatever the
communication vehicle, it should not distract from the CSR message.
For the neutral reputation manipulation, participants interpreted BB’s CSR as
indicative of progress and gave reason to believe in the company for the future, so long as
operational actions met communication pledges. For the poor reputation manipulation,
participants were so emotional about the crisis that they were disturbed and outraged that
the company was seemingly trying to distract consumers with a quick-fix CSR program
rather than effectively resolving the crisis. In the wake of the crisis, they interpreted CSR
as a direct response to the crisis, rather than as a separate post-crisis activity. Participants’
feelings support that a crisis should be fully managed and resolved before a company
implements CSR, otherwise it may face criticism for improper crisis response.
Post-crisis CSR should not be a response to the crisis, but should be a step
forward toward renewal after the crisis. The crisis should be understood as the change-
inducing-event from which CSR should move forward, rather than be a part of the
retroactive crisis management. For a company with a poor reputation, or perhaps
depending on the severity of the crisis event (scope of its devastation and negative
impact) a crisis needs to be met with above and beyond resolution before the company
can transition to CSR.
In the focus group, poor reputation BB needed to engage in crisis-specific
philanthropy in order to best respond to its impact on stakeholders and their needs. CSR
can enter the picture only after the company meets (or exceeds) stakeholder’ expectations
in the wake of the crisis – noting that stakeholder expectations may not match company
60
ideas of what is right or necessary. This may mean that a substantial amount of time
passes between crisis and post-crisis CSR strategy implementation.
Post-crisis CSR should not be confused with litigation and settlements or
corporate philanthropy (donations to a relevant cause) that stakeholders are expecting in
an immediate crisis response. For example, if BB decided to make large donations to
children’s hospitals and veterinary clinics as a way to mollify consumers, then this is part
of its crisis management. The CSR program developed and unveiled three months after
the crisis, with partnerships with Habitat for Humanity and Sierra Club, has a strategic
long-term vision and is brand and product mission relevant.
CSR is a process, not a cure - evident in long-term vision and approach to move
the company forward in a sustainable way and to make positive advancements for the
benefit of the company and the benefit of the greater good. CSR should only be engaged
when the company itself is operating soundly and has a strong foundation. It should be a
positive additional element to an already sound business, rather than a quick fix to a
flailing company
This brings to light the question of whether or not CSR is an appropriate action
for a company to take, especially one with a poor reputation prior to the crisis.
Participants in the poor reputation manipulation expressed that a company needs to start
at the basics – at its reason for being and its products or services – and that only when it
achieves quality and value in the eyes of its consumers should it consider implementing
CSR. If a company cannot conduct its business effectively then it has no business doing
CSR. Focus group participants were disturbed that company money was being put toward
61
external programs rather than toward fixing company problems and reassuring the
stakeholder community.
62
CHAPTER THREE: IMPLEMENTING POST-CRISIS CSR
After an extensive study of the interactions of crisis, CSR, and corporate
reputation through analysis of relevant literature and original primary research presented
in this thesis, it is suggested that CSR can indeed be implemented as a post-crisis
rebuilding and renewal strategy for a company with no prior CSR. Given the right
conditions, post-crisis CSR has the potential to mitigate long-term brand or reputation
damage and repair tested stakeholder relationships. Now that CSR is presented as a viable
post-crisis strategy option, how can company decide if post-crisis CSR is the appropriate
strategic action? Moreover, if CSR is the chosen course of action, how can a company
best implement CSR to achieve success? What follows is a guide to aid in the evaluation
of CSR as a post-crisis strategy and the implementation of such a strategy.
Corporate Social Responsibility…An Effective Post-Crisis Strategy?
It has been proven that an established history of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) has the potential to inoculate a company from the most damaging reputational
effects of a crisis event…but does CSR also have the power to circumvent such crisis
outcomes if implemented after a crisis occurs? How can a company with no prior CSR
possibly implement CSR as a post-crisis strategy and reap the reputational benefits? Can
launching post-crisis CSR efforts rebuild and renew stakeholder relationships and overall
reputation? It can, provided that it is done with care.
As a company resurfaces from a crisis, transitioning into a new CSR initiative to
re-energize a corporate reputation may seem like an attractive, strategic idea. Like any
attractive idea, it is easy to rush to the implementation stage, but like any strategic idea,
such program development takes time, resources, and critical thought and evaluation
63
before being carried out. CSR initiatives can indeed be implemented as a post-crisis
rebuilding and renewal strategy for a corporation with no prior history of CSR – albeit
with some substantial challenges and caveats.
This guide was created to help corporate communication strategists determine if a
post-crisis CSR program should be considered as a viable or appropriate option for a
company seeking to rebuild and renew its brand, reputation, and stakeholder relationships
in a post-crisis environment. What follows is a list of considerations and questions that
communication officers and company leadership should approach together. Answering
these questions will help the PR professional determine if CSR is a viable option. If a
post-crisis CSR strategy is identified as the appropriate course of action, the last section
of this guide includes suggested best practices for how to implement a post-crisis CSR
program for the best results.
Determining if CSR is a Viable Post-Crisis Strategy
Assess Crisis Management Results
It is essential that before selecting and transitioning into any post-crisis strategy,
the company assesses the extent to which the crisis has been dealt with from an internal,
operational standpoint. Furthermore, in order for CSR to be a rebuilding and renewal
strategy for a company emerging from a crisis, the CSR launch must be a distinct event
from the crisis after immediate crisis effects are mitigated, rather than a part of the crisis
management and resolution. Answers to the following questions will help the
management team understand the environment in which the company is currently
operating, to best identify viable post-crisis strategies.
64
1. Have any internal problems that triggered or exacerbated the crisis been fully
identified and addressed?
2. What internal, operational or structural changes are being made at the
company as a result of the crisis event?
a. How will these changes affect operations, company resources and the
bottom line for the short-term? For the long-term?
3. What is the company’s current crisis risk?
4. Were senior management’s motivations or values called into question? Are
they still are under scrutiny?
Evaluate Where the Company Stands with its Stakeholders
Strategic decisions are informed decisions. Before making any moves, the
management team must understand how the company is perceived by its stakeholders. It
is vitally important to evaluate company reputation in order to assess key stakeholder
sentiment and needs, and how to best address these. Ideally, such reputation audits are
conducted periodically, integrated into routine business activities to benchmark
positioning. If no pre-crisis reputation audit can be referenced, a retroactive reputation
audit among stakeholders must be attempted to gauge how the company was perceived
prior to the crisis.
At the present, to capture a clear picture of how the company is perceived post-
crisis, conduct a reputation audit among key stakeholder groups. Answers to the
following questions will provide the management team with insights to help determine if
a post-crisis CSR program is relevant.

65
1. Who are the company’s stakeholders? Advocates? Detractors?
2. What is important to stakeholders? What is the nature of their relationship
with the company?
3. How did stakeholders perceive the company before the crisis?
4. How do stakeholders perceive the company now?
a. How would they describe the company?
b. What level of trust do they have in the company?
c. How likely are they to use the company’s products/services? To
recommend it?
d. What are their inclinations to engage with company products/services
in the future?
e. How firmly entrenched are their opinions?
5. What changes can be identified in the company’s reputation among
stakeholders from pre-crisis to post-crisis?
6. Will advocates remain advocates? Will detractors become louder?
7. What are stakeholders’ expectations of the company? Have those expectations
been violated? How?
8. What is the tone and theme of stakeholder feedback in the wake of the crisis?
a. Where and how did stakeholders provide feedback?
b. Did the company enable this dialogue?
9. Are stakeholders making explicit demands for action from the company?
10. What is the level of employee morale?

66
Identify How the Company Might be Challenged and How a Post-Crisis CSR Strategy
Might be Perceived
There are many challenges to post-crisis CSR implementation and success. Such
challenges need to be identified in order to determine if CSR is the right approach for the
company’s path to rebuilding and renewal. Depending on stakeholder sentiment and the
scale or scope of crisis damage, CSR may not be perceived by stakeholders as the “right”
action for the company to take. Building off the previous question set, answers to the
following questions will more clearly map potential challenges for the company and post-
crisis CSR.
1. How will CSR meet stakeholders’ post-crisis needs or expectations?
2. Can company resources be better allocated to internal crisis resolution
management activities that would likely bring about positive changes in
consumer attitudes and behaviors?
a. Comparable to idealized outcomes of CSR?
b. From what area of the company will resources be allocated?
3. Have stakeholder concerns about product/service quality and performance
been adequately met?
a. Enough so that introducing CSR is a strategic move forward?
b. Will stakeholders question the allocation of company funds into
external CSR programs over internal operational or process
modifications?
67
4. Are corporate donations specific to the crisis – e.g. to a crisis-related cause or
organization – necessary (demanded/expected by stakeholders) or prudent as a
part of crisis resolution?
a. Is it possible that corporate donations could satisfy stakeholders to the
degree that an overarching CSR program may not be needed?
5. Why has the company not implemented CSR yet?
a. Has the company ever considered a CSR program? If so, why was the
CSR not fully developed?
6. Why engage in CSR activities now?
a. Is CSR a last-ditch effort or a knee-jerk reaction intended to restore
reputation for the short-term? Will it be perceived by stakeholders as a
band-aid measure?
b. Will CSR be a long-term commitment for the company?
7. What has changed in the company to support the decision to implement CSR?
a. How will management and company leadership support CSR?
b. How will company dedicate resources (time, capital, people) to CSR?
c. What internal structure is in place, or can be put in place, to support a
CSR program?
d. What is the long-term commitment to CSR as part of the three-year or
five-year plan for the company?
8. What does the company hope to achieve with CSR?
a. What does success look like?
b. How will success be measured?
68
Know the Competition
Every company, product or service exists in the context of its competitors. In the
wake of a crisis, when trust has been tested, stakeholders are more likely to compare the
company to its competitors, seeking explanations, alternatives or reassurance in choice.
This affects consumer loyalty and brand interaction and moreover, corporate reputation.
Conduct competitive analyses to answer the following questions, which will provide
insight into competitor operations, as well as opportunities and challenges in the
marketplace.
1. Where did the company stand vis-à-vis competition before the crisis?
a. In terms of financial performance and market share?
b. In terms of reputation and stakeholder perception?
2. Where did the company stand vis-à-vis competition during the crisis and in
the wake of the crisis?
3. How and to what degree are competitors engaging in CSR strategies?
a. What issues are competitors tackling?
b. How are these activities being reviewed in the media and perceived by
stakeholders? With criticism? Applause?
4. How did competitors react to the company’s crisis?
a. Were they exposed to the same risks?
b. Did they take corrective action?
c. Did they take advantage of the crisis for their own benefit? If so, how?

69
5. How can CSR be a point of differentiation from competitors?
a. Can CSR offer competitive advantages?
b. Is there an opportunity for a truly unique position?
c. What would success look like? How will it be measured?
d. To what extent (if any) might CSR get lost in the clutter of what
competitors and others in the industry are doing?
6. Is there an opportunity for the company to spearhead CSR on an industry-
wide issue?
Consider the Necessary Logistics and Components of CSR
Implementing an effective CSR program that is relevant to the company’s core
business, creates positive and meaningful change, and benefits the company, its
stakeholders and society is a challenge under the best of circumstances. This challenge is
made exponentially more difficult in a post-crisis environment. The first step in
implementing an effective CSR program is to brainstorm some core CSR logistics and
components to determine if the company has the resources and ability to develop and
execute a successful CSR program.
1. Conceptually, what should be the focus of the company’s CSR initiative(s)?
Ask both internal and external stakeholders for input.
2. How will management and company leadership support the effort?
3. What internal structure is in place, or can be put in place, to support a CSR
program?
4. To what extent can the company dedicate resources (time, capital, people) to
the effort?
70
5. What recipient and/or partnering organizations (non-profits, NGOs, etc)
would be willing to work with the company?
6. Where does the company have allies – what credible organizations, experts or
influentials?
7. What organizations, experts, or influentials might be enemies?
8. How will the company ensure transparency and accuracy in reporting?
9. How will the company track and measure progress?
10. How will the company report CSR program results and activities to public?
Making the Call – Is CSR a Viable, Cogent Strategy?
After working through the above question sets, the result should be a
comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the situation. With this detailed situation
analysis in hand, now an informed decision can be made as to whether or not CSR is a
strategic, viable, and relevant/appropriate post-crisis strategy for rebuilding and renewal.
Implementing Post-Crisis CSR: Guidelines and Suggested Best Practices
Program Development and Long-Term Operation
• Select a CSR issue or cause to champion that is relevant to the core business.
• Position CSR as a fully-integrated, high-priority business strategy that is
backed up by policies and metrics for which management will be held
accountable.
o Ensure that company leadership is visibly involved (if not ideally
actively involved) in CSR initiatives to convey this priority to internal
and external stakeholders.
71
• Pursue and secure strategic partnerships with credible and relevant non-profit
organizations.
• Set measurable goals and objectives and create a calendar of benchmarks.
Decide how progress will be tracked and reported and recruit independent
CSR consultants or third-party verification audits if necessary to assure
compliance, validity and accuracy.
• Establish an oversight position with a job title, description, reporting line and
degree of authority that reflects the company’s commitment.
• Keep a pulse on stakeholder perception of the company and the CSR before
and during its implementation to gauge feelings, attitudes, and approval, as
well as to identify opportunities, threats and weaknesses.
• Approach CSR with enough flexibility to accommodate shifts in stakeholder
approval and recalibrate to meet new expectations or incorporate new program
elements.
• Provide CSR updates and information to employees via internal
communications pipeline – employees are the company’s front-line advocates
and ambassadors.
• Ensure that the CSR program fosters appropriate degrees of collaboration and
participation across all corporate functions, i.e. operations, marketing,
communication, legal, human resources, executive leadership, etc.

72
Communicating CSR to Stakeholders
• Communicate from top-level company leaders as well as the company CSR
authority. Company leadership must have a visible role irrespective of who
serves as a spokesperson for the CSR program.
• Strive for transparency, clarity and accuracy. Back up communications and
prove success and progress with data and evidence. Do not try to “spin” data.
• Clearly communicate defined measurable objectives and goals, including
benchmark dates.
• Report activities and progress at regular intervals corresponding to benchmark
deadlines; stakeholders must know that CSR reports are forthcoming.
o Consider producing an annual CSR report much like an annual
financial report.
• Release CSR updates strategically and with purpose. Pick and choose
newsworthy CSR items with care; select promoting innovative advances or
achievements over announcements of activities now considered expected and
run-of-the-mill. For example, implementing a company-wide recycling
program or retrofitting an office with motion-sensor lights to reduce energy-
use as part of broader CSR initiatives is no longer considered noteworthy)
• Give careful consideration to the medium, vehicle and style of communication
o Select a communication mode that will not distract from the message
and CSR content. Choose a communication method consistent with the
CSR initiative and be aware of what communication methods may
backfire. For example, a CSR program focused on forest conservation
73
and paper waste-reduction should not engage in communications via
print, but rather via online or digital communications.
o Explore whether the CSR communication may be integrated into the
product packaging and/or brand story.
• Utilize online, digital communications and social media platforms to engage
stakeholders in a dialogue about the CSR program.
o Make information and updates readily available and easily searchable
for stakeholders. Include CSR on the home-page of the company or
brand web site. Create linked web pages for the CSR initiative.
o Create channels that enable 2-way communication and feedback
regarding CSR efforts. Stakeholder-company dialogue is especially
important.
74
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78
APPENDIX A: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE, NEUTRAL REPUTATION
MANIPULATION

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
NOVEMBER 2, 2009

Nationwide Recall of Backyard Play-sets
Benson Builders Putting Children’s and Family Pets’ Health at Risk
By Daphne Flit, Reporter

This morning, Benson Builders, a leading manufacturer of children’s play-sets and
playhouses, announced a nationwide recall of any products purchased after June 1,
2009, due to health concerns over varnishes and paint treatments. The recall affects all
products with manufacturer’s stamp: “44-263-37-09” and the company is offering a full
refund.

Benson Builders outdoor, wooden play-sets and playhouses were treated with paints
and varnishes that may cause skin rashes among children after prolonged exposure.
There is also evidence to suggest that mild illness in humans and animals can result if
the paints or varnishes are ingested. Symptoms of mild illness include fever, nausea and
stomach ache. Regulatory agencies have reported that Benson Builders manufacturing
plants violated two chemical product laws; the paints and varnishes had not been
thoroughly tested for a full-range of health risks.

The link was first discovered by a veterinarian in Maryland. Dr Lori Arbor explains, “I had
several sick dogs come in, all exhibiting the same symptoms of vomiting and exhaustion.
Some required surgery and upon opening the stomach, I discovered pieces of
undigested wood. In talking with pet owners, we discovered that the dogs had been
chewing on backyard play-sets or playhouses and they all had one thing in common:
they were made by Benson Builders.”

Dr. Arbor cross-checked her reports with pediatric reports of local children’s illnesses
and rashes, and certain overlap and patterns were discovered. Nationwide, at least 850
cases of children’s rashes and at least 520 cases of pet illness have been reported to
date.

Benson Builders began receiving incident reports from doctors, veterinarians and
consumer watchdog groups several days ago, and upon conducting further testing, the
company was able to confirm that these concerns are serious enough to warrant a
nationwide product recall.

“Our business is bringing joy to kids - to learn that one of our products is doing the exact
opposite, bringing harm to our children, is very troubling for all of us. As soon as we
confirmed the risks, we began to pull the product,” said CEO, Gary Benson.

Benson Builders is a publicly-held company with headquarters in Rockland, IN. It began
as a family business in 1990 building dog houses and in 1998 transitioned into children’s
play-sets and playhouses. Last year the company donated more than 50 play-sets to
elementary schools in underprivileged, urban neighborhoods. This is the first nationwide
79
recall for the company, which has only had one prior regional recall, in the Midwest in
1993 for faulty screws.

In a statement, company officials said they would conduct enhanced investigations into
product safety to ensure this incident does not happen again.
80
APPENDIX B: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE, POOR REPUTATION
MANIPULATION

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
NOVEMBER 2, 2009

Nationwide Recall of Backyard Play-sets
Benson Builders Putting Children’s and Family Pets’ Health at Risk
By Daphne Flit, Reporter

This morning, Benson Builders, a leading manufacturer of children’s play-sets and
playhouses, announced a nationwide recall of any products purchased after June 1,
2009, due to health concerns over varnishes and paint treatments. The recall affects all
products with manufacturer’s stamp: “44-263-37-09” and the company is offering a full
refund.

Benson Builders outdoor, wooden play-sets and playhouses were treated with paints
and varnishes that may cause skin rashes among children after prolonged exposure.
There is also evidence to suggest that mild illness in humans and animals can result if
the paints or varnishes are ingested. Symptoms of mild illness include fever, nausea and
stomach ache. Regulatory agencies have reported that Benson Builders manufacturing
plants violated two chemical product laws; the paints and varnishes had not been
thoroughly tested for a full-range of health risks.

The link was first discovered by a veterinarian in Maryland. Dr Lori Arbor explains, “I had
several sick dogs come in, all exhibiting the same symptoms of vomiting and exhaustion.
Some required surgery and upon opening the stomach, I discovered pieces of
undigested wood. In talking with pet owners, we discovered that the dogs had been
chewing on backyard play-sets or playhouses and they all had one thing in common:
they were made by Benson Builders.”

Dr. Arbor cross-checked her reports with pediatric reports of local children’s illnesses
and rashes, and certain overlap and patterns were discovered. Nationwide, at least 850
cases of children’s rashes and at least 520 cases of pet illness have been reported to
date.

Benson Builders began receiving incident reports from doctors, veterinarians and
consumer watchdog groups several days ago, and upon conducting further testing, the
company was able to confirm that these concerns are serious enough to warrant a
nationwide product recall.

“Our business is bringing joy to kids - to learn that one of our products is doing the exact
opposite, bringing harm to our children, is very troubling for all of us. As soon as we
confirmed the risks, we began to pull the product,” said CEO, Gary Benson.

Benson may be “troubled” but this incident is just one of several recalls from Benson
Builders over the past 10 years, for everything from faulty screws to non-weatherproof
vinyl and unsafe ladders.

81
Benson Builders is a publicly-held company with headquarters in Rockland, IN. It began
as a family business in 1990 building dog houses and in 1998 transitioned into children’s
play-sets and playhouses.

In a statement, company officials said they would conduct enhanced investigations into
product safety to ensure this incident does not happen again.

82
APPENDIX C: MEDIA ALERT

*MEDIA ALERT*

Benson Builders Issues Nationwide Recall of Products Manufactured
After June 1, 2009: Evidence of Health Risk from Paint, Varnish

(Rockland, IN) – NOV. 2, 2009 – Benson Builders is issuing a nationwide product recall
of wooden play-sets and play-houses manufactured after June 1, 2009 due to evidence
of health risks to children and animals from specific paints and varnishes. Recalled
products can be identified by the manufacturer’s stamp on the underside of the play-set
or play-house roof: “44-263-37-09” Consumers may return a recalled Benson Builders
play-set or play-house to Home Depot, Walmart, or Kmart for a full refund.

After receiving incident reports from doctors and consumer groups between October 28,
2009 and November 1, 2009, it became evident that prolonged exposure to certain
paints and varnishes used on Benson Builders play-sets and play-houses was linked to
outbreaks of rashes among children. Other incident reports, internal investigations and
further testing revealed mild illness occurrences for both children and animals if the
paints and varnishes are ingested. The company recommends that individuals exhibiting
mild symptoms of rash, stomach ache, fever or nausea contact a doctor.

Gary Benson, CEO of Benson Builders, explains:

“Our business is brining joy to kids - to learn that one of our products is doing the
exact opposite, bringing harm to our children, is very troubling for all of us. As soon
as we confirmed the risks, we began to pull the product. Our first instinct and
responsibility is to protect our consumers from potential harm.”

This week Benson Builders will begin to conduct enhanced investigations into product
safety and the tainted paints, varnishes and recalled tainted products will be disposed of
in a safe and proper manner.

“On behalf of everyone at Benson Builders, I offer our sincere apologies and deep-felt
regret for this situation. We aim to provide you with quality play products and our recent
performance is unacceptable. We will be making significant changes to ensure this does
not happen again,” said CEO Benson.

For more information, visit www.bensonbuilders.com which contains the most up-to-date
information, as well as Frequently Asked Questions and comment forms. Knowledgeable
customer service professionals are also available at 555-146-1710.

About Benson Builders:
Benson Builders is a publicly-held manufacturing business specializing in children’s
outdoor wooden play-houses and play-sets. Benson Builders has 10 manufacturing
plants throughout the US, with its headquarters and main manufacturing facility in
Rockland, IN. Benson Builders was founded by the Benson family in 1990, first as a dog-
house company and in 1998 transitioned into children’s play products. Benson Builders
83
products can be found in over 1.6 million backyards nationwide. For more information
visit www.bensonbuilders.com.
84
APPENDIX D: CSR ADVERTORIAL

Changes Happening at Benson Builders
Conducting Business with a Focus on the Future:
Sustainability, Growth, Responsibility and Impact

Lending our Resources for Positive Change in Communities
Benson Builders is partnering with Habitat for Humanity, supporting program
goals to build homes for underprivileged people all around the world.

As a leading manufacturer of outdoor, wooden children’s playhouses, Benson
Builders has the existing infrastructure, capabilities, resources and raw
materials to greatly enhance Habitat for Humanity activities.

Benson Builders has a responsibility to act as a good neighbor and a good
citizen in the communities in which we operate – which includes donating our
expertise and our resources to evoke positive change.

Lessening our Global Footprint
Benson Builders is partnering with the Sierra Club to combat the serious
global issue of rapid deforestation. Trees are a precious natural resource and
with each passing year, more forest acreage disappears.

As a company that requires these natural resources to create our products,
we are also charged with the responsibility to replenish resources and help
forests thrive.

We pledge to operate with a focus on sustainability and preservation of
natural resources. We are increasing our use of recycled materials for product
manufacture from 10-percent to 50-percent over the next two years.

Benson Builders will support reforestation projects through donations and
strategic resource allocation in an effort to make only positive impacts in local
and global communities.

To learn more: www.BensonBuilders.com/CorporateSocialResponsibility

Advertisement Paid for by Benson Builders
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
FEBRUARY 1, 2010
85
APPENDIX E: GUIDED DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Focus Group Discussion Guide
(Duration: 1 Hour)

Introduction (5 minutes)
• Explain to participants that the situation is entirely fictional
• Set “ground rules” for discussion

Distribute Newspaper Article and Company Statement (10 minutes)
Participants read individually

Questions (15 minutes)
• What words would you use to describe Benson Builders?
• How do you feel about Benson Builders and this situation?
• How would you describe the business people who manage Benson Builders?
• How responsible of a company do you think Benson Builders is?
• What level of trust do you have for Benson Builders?
• How likely would you be to buy a Benson Builders product?
• How likely would you be to tell your friends to buy a Benson Builders product?
• How likely would you be to buy stock in Benson Builders? If you already had
stock in Benson Builders, how likely would you be to sell it?
• What can Benson Builders do to make the situation better?
• When should Benson Builders act?

Distribute CSR Announcement (5 minutes)
Participants read individually

Questions (15 minutes)
• What do you think was Benson Builder’s motivation to do this program?
• Does the program change the way you think about or feel about Benson
Builders?
• What words would you use to describe Benson Builders now?
• How would you describe the business people who manage Benson Builders
now?
• How responsible of a company do you think Benson Builders is?
• What level of trust do you have for Benson Builders?
• How likely would you be to buy a Benson Builders product?
• How likely would you be to tell your friends to buy a Benson Builders product?
• How likely would you be to buy stock in Benson Builders? If you already had
stock in Benson Builders, how likely would you be to sell it?

*any final thoughts, things you’d like to share and didn’t have the chance to?

Abstract (if available)

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The making of a crisis communication plan for a large, public, national professional services company

Asset Metadata

Creator Saffitz, Rachel Ann (author)

Core Title The implementation of corporate social responsibility initiatives as a strategy for post-crisis rebuilding and renewal

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 05/09/2010

Defense Date 05/09/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag corporate reputation,corporate social responsibility,crisis management,CSR,FIJI Water,OAI-PMH Harvest,post-crisis communication,post-crisis management,stakeholder relationship management

Place Name Fiji (countries), USA (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Floto, Jennifer D. (committee chair), Lynch, Brenda (committee member), Swerling, Jerry (committee member)

Creator Email rasaffitz@gmail.com,saffitz@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3060

Unique identifier UC1275728

Identifier etd-Saffitz-3308 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-336980 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3060 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Saffitz-3308.pdf

Dmrecord 336980

Document Type Thesis

Rights Saffitz, Rachel Ann

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu