Informal consent: the complexities of public participation in post-civil war Lebanon

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INFORMAL CONSENT:
THE COMPLEXITIES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POST-CIVIL WAR
LEBANON

by

Tala Nasr Stevenson

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PLANNING)

December 2007

Copyright 2007 Tala Nasr Stevenson

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people who contributed to this dissertation through
various means and allowed it to come together in the way it has. As we say in
Lebanon, One hand doesnt clap. I would like to start by thanking Dr. Amin Nasr
and Mr. Nizar Azar for opening so many doors for me. I would like to thank all of
the participants in this study who not only graciously donated their time for me to
interview them but also took part wholeheartedly, frankly, and passionately.
Many thanks to Dr. Tridib Banerjee and Dr. Eliz Sanasarian for their precise
comments and invaluable feedback. A special thank you to my advisor Dr. Niraj
Verma for his guidance and support throughout the entire Ph.D. voyage. I have
learned so much from you about planning and academia but most importantly about
family, life, dignity, ethical conduct, kindness, generosity, and the respect of others.
Thank you to Dana, Shada, and Imad for all your help in all its forms and for
just being there always. Thanks to my parents Khaled and Sossy Nasr for your
constant and consistent help and never-ending encouragement and for providing me
with the desire to pursue knowledge and determination to fulfill my aspirations. I am
so lucky to have you both. Thank you Kit for the strength, guidance, love, and
mental support you have dedicated for me to overcome the ups and downs along the
way. I started this journey on my own and now we are four at the glorious
destination which is just another beginning. I have so much to look forward to.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ii

Abstract vi

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

Chapter 2 Public Participation: A Review 16

2.1 Multiple goals of participation 18
2.2 Participation in planning 24
2.3 Institutionalization of participation 27
2.4 Pathology of legitimacy 34
2.5 Crisis of legitimacy 41
2.6 Communicative action 43
2.7 Summary 52

Chapter 3 The Context of Lebanon: A History of Conflict 56

3.1 A brief chronological review 57
3.1.1 Multiplicity of civilizations (pre-1975) 58
3.1.2 The disastrous civil war (1975-1991) 63
3.1.3 Rebuilding post-disaster (1990-2006) 68
3.2 A sociopolitical legacy of identities 74
3.2.1 Colonization 76
3.2.2 Religious identity 78
3.2.3 Globalization 80
3.2.4 The civil war and regional instability 83

Chapter 4 Research Design 88

4.1 The problem of method 89
4.1.1 The problematic context 91
4.1.2 The nature of the research 97
4.1.3 The case study approach 101
4.2 Interview protocol 103
4.2.1 The target group 105
Table 1: Detailed interviewee data 110
4.2.2 Location and duration of interviews 111
4.2.3 Issues of language and translation 115

iv
4.2.4 Interviewer-interviewee relations 115
4.2.5 Pre-test interviews 118
4.2.6 Documenting and recording of interviews 119
4.2.7 Interview questions 120

Chapter 5 Planning and Public Participation: Case Examples from 123
Lebanon

5.1 Planning in the post-civil war context 123
5.2 Planning and public participation 127
5.3 Examples of public participation from Lebanon 131
5.3.1 Informal discontent and eventual consent in the Beirut 131
Central District
5.3.2 Formal non-consent in Elyssar 134
5.3.3 Informal non-consent in Monsif, Jubayl 136

Chapter 6 Results and Discussion 140

6.1 Frequency of issues 141
6.1.1 General Institutional constraints 142
6.1.2 The Lebanese public 142
6.1.3 The political system 143
6.1.4 The planning bureaucracy 144
6.1.5 The Civil War 145
6.1.6 General political instability 146
6.2 Complexities of public participation: an institutional 146
analysis
6.2.1 The purposes of public participation 147
6.2.2 Historical institutions 155
6.2.3 Political institutions 164
6.2.4 Socio-cultural institutions 170
6.3 Managing complexities: a broader understanding of public 174
participation

Chapter 7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 179

References 191

Appendices 203

Appendix A: Interview 1 203
Appendix B: Interview 2 210

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Appendix C: Interview 3 229
Appendix D: Interview 4 251
Appendix E: Interview 5 269
Appendix F: Interview 6 282
Appendix G: Interview 7 295
Appendix H: Interview 8 315
Appendix I: Interview 9 334
Appendix J: Interview 10 341
Appendix K: Interview 11 355
Appendix L: Interview 12 362
Appendix M: Interview 13 381
Appendix N: Interview 14 396
Appendix 0: Interview 15 410
Appendix P: Verbal Consent Form 423

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ABSTRACT

This study is an in-depth analysis of the case of post-civil war planning in
Lebanon through the personal accounts of urban planners living and working there.
Interviews with these planners engender a deeper understanding of the issues facing
public participation on the ground in this setting. An institutional analysis of the
interviews then provides us with insight into the historical, political, social, cultural,
psychological, and religious institutions that influence public participation in post-
civil war Lebanon.
Lebanon is a country that has been perennially and somewhat continuously in
the throes of conflict. Post-civil war contexts offer more intensified and concentrated
circumstances that can provide planning with new information about public
participation because some things do not become apparent except in extreme
situations. Although the purposes of public participation are often similar to those
under normal circumstances, in post-civil war situations they become more delicate,
critical, and time-sensitive.
The various complications and complexities facing participation in Lebanon
as catharsis and healing, as time-sensitive, as interwoven in the context, and as
institutionally-based enlighten our understanding of the nuanced, multifaceted, and
highly intricate nature and practice of public participation. Everyday rational
planning in other societies can better understand the intricacies of participation from

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the extraordinary case of Lebanon. The challenge for planning scholars and
practitioners is in the endogenization and utilization of this knowledge.

1
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

Post-war societies pose special circumstances onto urban planners,
particularly in the case of civil wars. Issues that prevail post-civil war include
poverty, homelessness, displacement, diseases, and a lack of resources such as food,
clean water, medicine, and electricity. Other than the physical destruction, the dead,
and the injured, there are also the psychological traumas and memories of war that
have been caused by other groups within the same nation. This is imprinted in the
minds of the post-civil war population even when the residual tensions remain latent
and unexpressed by violent means. Unlike external wars with an outside aggressor
where the attacked population bands together, civil wars present fragmented societies
occupied with enduring hatreds.
After the occurrence of a natural disaster, rebuilding in the same location and
in a similar way as the pre-existing state is the norm (Foster 1980, Passerini 2000). In
the case of war that is not as viable. Civil wars can last for long periods of time
even tens of years during which generations emerge and people and societies
change. Post-civil war reconstruction that is the same as what was in existence pre-
war will not represent the natural physical evolution of a city (what would be in
place if the war had not occurred). Also, it will not take into account the events that
took place in the conflict or the needs of the post-civil war society such as
reconciliation and healing in order to decrease the possibility of a return to war and

2
for citizens to move forward in peaceful coexistence and cohesive coordination. It
can, therefore, be obviously understood that the role of urban planners in these
circumstances is extremely sensitive and multifaceted whether in physical
reconstruction or in the rehabilitation of the post-civil war society itself. But what is
not well understood in this context is the role of the public within the post-war
planning process. There are many questions that come to mind when contemplating
the public in this context. After recovery from civil strife how does public
participation happen? In fact, can it happen at all? What are its mechanisms? Is
public participation genuine or token? Should it be something to strive for under
these difficult circumstances or should the purposes of participation such as
legitimacy and information-gathering be achieved some other way?
The discussion of public participation is very western. Is it a legitimate
expectation in other contexts such as that of third-world post-civil war Lebanon?
Lebanon is a special case in the Arab world because of the increased freedoms and
democracy enjoyed by its citizens (comparatively). Also, due to the war Lebanon has
a large number of planners educated in western schools and that can potentially
impact their thoughts on public participation. The public in Lebanon is a small,
close-knit, well-informed society that tends to be vocal in its response to undesirable
planning decisions. This is particularly emphasized at the local level where
municipal council members are elected and in the universities of Beirut with scholars
and students. These attributes allow the U.S. model of public participation to be

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applicable in theory in Lebanon, but to what extent? This study will look at the
different kinds of public participation in planning in Lebanon at various levels taking
the country as a case study to highlight the complexities of participation. The
conclusion is that planning is flexible enough in its notions of public participation to
lend itself to the application of various methods in Lebanon as long as an
institutional understanding of the context is achieved.
The culture of direct public participation has become engrained in the urban
planning literature. From Davidoffs concept of advocacy (1965); to Arnsteins
Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969); to the work of John Forester (1999) to
encourage the participation of all groups in planning and decision-making; and, more
recently, to the principles of communicative action and collaborative planning (Innes
and Booher 2004), the significance of public participation is well documented in the
urban planning literature. It is desired mainly for the substantive input the public
provides planners, the information it disseminates to the public, as well as to increase
the publics acceptance of decisions and projects and the legitimacy of the planning
process.
But are the images of public participation that are presented in the literature,
such as Arnsteins Ladder, a bit too neat and structured, perhaps even too
mechanical? I suspect that in the process of theorizing about participation we may
have simplified it in ways that may well limit the reach of our theories. In a post-civil
war society such as Lebanon, public participation is important and useful and it is

4
alive but most of the time it does not fit Arnsteins mold. In chaotic circumstances
such as those presented after Lebanons civil war public participation can be
connected to fear, religious identity, the vulnerability of the public sphere, local
traditions, the instability of the local and regional political situation, and other
institutions. It can be a function of the religious and political leadership in the area
and of the religious demographic volatility. It can also be a reflection of the purposes
of participation such as information gathering or information dissemination.
Specifically in post-conflict situations like this participation may well become the
medium for mediation or catharsis. Knowledge of the historical, social, and political
institutions of the context and of its public is therefore pertinent in the
conceptualization and implementation of public participation measures.
There are, therefore, other ways of thinking of public participation that bear
inclusion. The literature on public participation focuses on public participation as a
legitimating activity. It recognizes that it may also serve in an information gathering,
dissemination, or stake building role but only parenthetically. These rather restrictive
theoretical purposes can be reflected in our thoughts on methodology as they can
confine and narrow their scope. My research has led me to believe that public
participation is too complex to be given a singular meaning that fits all contexts. Its
meaning differs depending on the exigency of the situation, the nature of the
problem, the psychological status of the population, and the immediate and long-
term purposes of the planning process. Certainly, at the philosophical level the

5
literature on public participation reveals that it is supple enough to lend itself in spirit
to these various situations. But at the methodological level and the level of
professional application, this theoretical possibility rarely gets enacted. For example,
there is a remarkable literature on the problem of identity and identity politics
(Castells 1997), yet when it comes to calculating and implementing participatory
measures during challenging circumstances identity becomes too much of a luxury to
be given any kind of prominence in the equation. Is this because we are too bogged
down in currently used methodologies for participation, some of which (such as the
public hearing) have proved time and again to be ineffective (Innes and Booher
2004)? Or is this linked to our need to have methods that go beyond time and space
and can thus be replicated?
When we think of participation in the richer context of the emotions and
psyche of the public, identity, history, society, politics, purposes, etc. the
institutional elements of public participation we endogenize institutions and we
illuminate the possibilities of both post-war planning and planning in every-day
circumstances. The question shifts, then, from whether people participate in post-war
planning to whether they are capable of participating physically, mentally, and
emotionally. How can they participate if they dont know what democracy is or what
participation is? How can they participate if they are suspicious of the intent of
planners or if they refuse to communicate with the other groups involved in the
process? How can they voice their needs and concerns if they are afraid of the

6
consequences? Can participation in a planning process that one may not understand
or trust be anything more than tokenism? What do planners, who are a part of the
post-civil war society, think of public participation? Do they think it is an important
aspect of planning? How do they see themselves as legitimate public servants? Can
a planning system that does not use conventional means of public participation be
democratic in certain instances? Can planners who understand the public and the
context tailor public participation processes for particular cases so that they can
achieve more success than conventional methods?
My goal in this dissertation is to show that public participation is much more
nuanced than what we normally assume by the term and this applies to questions of
why, where, and how it occurs, as well as the consequences of its happening. I will
do so by using Lebanon as an example of a post-conflict context that is traditional
and unique but also the most democratic Arab country in the Middle East and thus
the most likely to adopt western notions such as public participation in its planning
processes. The case of Lebanon can be used to bring institutional factors to public
participation and to highlight its complications and this will engender a better
understanding of its intricacies in post-civil war situations. This will also illuminate
the need to combine these concerns at a methodological level, that is to say how
concerns of identity, politics, psychology, social ties, and other institutional
considerations can be integrated within the mechanics of public participation. Part of
my contribution in this dissertation is to show how these ideas can be garnered and,

7
in rare cases, have been enacted at times of civil strife. This would not only help to
identify and tailor appropriate methods for societies in civil strife, but it would also
help us comprehend how a more nuanced approach to public policy and a better
understanding of the social, political, and historical context of the public can
integrate sentiments, environment, social interactions or relationships, identity, and
other such hard-to-measure attributes into the public participation process.
To this end, the study is divided into six chapters. It begins with a review of
the literature on direct public participation in Chapter Two. Chapter Three presents
the historical context of the case study of Lebanon. Chapter Four describes the
methodology of the study: in-depth interviews of urban planners who are involved in
the post-civil war planning process in Lebanon. Chapter Five presents three case
examples that describe the way public participation takes place in Lebanon. Chapter
Six analyzes the results of the interviews and Chapter Seven closes with the main
conclusions of the dissertation and recommendations for policy.
Citizen participation is not a new phenomenon as it is pervasive in a wide
variety of areas of public life and at all levels of government. What makes it
particularly significant in planning is its contrast to the rational comprehensive
model as the need for democracy through direct citizen involvement in decision-
making eliminates rational model notions of the urban planner as the sole,
independent, and objective decision-maker and dispels the idea of decisions based on
unemotional, technocratic, and quantifiable information. Chapter Two discusses the

8
purposes public participation sets out to accomplish in practice in a democratic
system of governance: legitimacy, pluralism, information gathering from the public,
informing and educating the public, trust-building, dispute resolution, consensus
building, and community building just to name a few. However, public participation
can also be purposefully manipulated or inadvertently influenced to create a token or
symbolic process that exerts various forms of power and control over the population.
This kind of tokenism can be detrimental in public outcomes of antagonism,
frustration, discouragement, distrust of government, and disengagement from the
participatory process. This crisis of legitimacy leads to a discussion of the
legitimation crisis (as described by Habermas) and communicative action and what
these bring to planning and public participation in terms of better knowledge of
oneself and dialogue and agreement with others.
The gap between the philosophy of direct public participation and its actual
practice is wide and this is well-documented in the literature. Chapter Two argues
that it is useful to separate between the spirit of participation and its mechanics. Even
when the spirit is alive in the hearts and minds of planning scholars, practitioners,
and public officials, the practical outcome can still be token and destructive. This
discussion also highlights the deficiency of methodological applications in this
literature except in increasing legitimacy and exchanging information. Complexities
and complications of the conceptualization and implementation of public
participation methods in different sociocultural and geopolitical contexts are not

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really highlighted in the literature, or at least not to the level that gives an adequate
portrayal of the associated intricacies involved.
Chapter Three provides a detailed history of Lebanon spanning from ancient
times to the current post-war period. In this specific case, the historical review gives
us insight into the political, economic, ethnic, and religious factors that come
together to influence the Lebanese society today. This population has survived a long
history of strife from wars with different conquering civilizations, to natural
disasters, to religious conflict since the time of the Roman Empire. The historical
context has had an impact on the formation of the Lebanese identity through
influences of colonization, religion, globalization, and the Civil War in particular.
Understanding these factors and the different identities and characteristics of the
Lebanese people which they help to shape leads to a better comprehension of the
public under investigation and this can be reflected in the purposes of public
participation as well as in the conceptualization and implementation of its processes
in the context of Lebanon.
Chapter Four discusses the methodology of the dissertation within the
environment of division, conflict, and instability presented in Chapter Three.
Drawing on this context, the research design discusses why I specifically chose
Lebanon as a case study of the complexities of public participation. The emotional
response that this type of post-civil war research evokes prompted a realistic decision
to provide a research design structure that takes into account the biases involved and

10
does not attempt to be detached. The study illustrates the personal stories of urban
planners working in post-war Beirut. The comprehensive first-person delivery of the
detailed interviews conducted and the consequent qualitative analysis provide depth
to the study that would not have been achieved by other means such as surveys. The
problems of the method: the complex context, the specific nature of the research, and
the perceived cons of the case study method are also discussed. Also presented are
the details of the interview protocol: the target population, the location and duration
of interviews, issues of language, the relations between the interviewer and the
interviewees, pre-test interviews, the documentation and recording of interviews, and
the questions asked.
Chapter Five describes the environment of public participation and planning
in the case study of Lebanon. Public participation in Lebanon occurs in the
geographically allocated areas of central, regional, and local levels and can be both
formally and informally. At the level of the central government there exists overlap
and confusion as to the responsibilities and powers of the different groups involved
in planning. Regionally, planning occurs at a very basic level of coordination and
cooperation among municipalities which can form federations. The local level is the
most representative as municipal officials are directly elected by the population.
Planning occurs formally when channels for public involvement are
mandated by legislation as a compulsory part of the process. This kind of
participation is limited in Lebanon because public participation is generally left to

11
the discretion of private planning companies which carry the bulk of the
reconstruction burden. In comparison, informal public participation is neither
legislated by the central government as obligatory within a plan nor is it structurally
formalized and overseen by a public planning organization. It occurs through back
channels and usually arises as mostly negative feedback in the publics reaction to
plans proposed by the government. The structure of the small and close-knit
Lebanese society enables this form of public participation because the high social
capital and large number of personal relationships facilitate a high level of
information exchange between the public, planning practitioners, and decision-
makers. Upon knowledge of certain projects or of pending decisions (through
various channels and contacts), the public mobilizes all its resources to influence
decision-making including the use of any relationships with political, religious, and
municipal figures.
Chapter Five describes three case examples to bring about a better
understanding of public participation and how it occurs in Lebanon. First, the
example of the Beirut Central District highlights how, when formal public
participation is ignored, informal means can be used to achieve the publics goals.
Second, the example of Elyssar describes a case of formal public participation that
was enveloped within the planning process but that failed in its attempts at
implementation. The third example involves the central decision to locate a landfill
in Monsif, Jubayl. The precipitation of knowledge down from the central level to the

12
local population through informal means and then their consequent reaction and the
contacts used to reverse their fate is documented.
Chapter Six is an analysis and discussion of the interview results. The major
issues related to public participation and presented frequently in the responses to the
interviews are: the political aspects of planning, corruption, political change and
instability in the region, local planning, the public perception of the planning
domain, the civil war, religious sectarianism, the Lebanese mentality, informal
participation, and the lack of institutions that enable or encourage public
participation. These can all be better understood under the broader spectrum of an
institutional analysis of participation.
Chapter Six also examines what the interview results mean within the broader
context of public participation in urban planning. This analysis focuses on the
multiple layers of complexity presented by public participation in post-civil war
planning but is not limited to post-war contexts alone. First, the purposes of public
participation for the specific case of post-war Lebanon is discussed. Next, the social
context and political institutions are highlighted in relation to their implications for
citizen participation. A discussion of socio-cultural institutional considerations which
includes traditions, beliefs, values, and informal modes of participation ensues. The
chapter concludes with a synopsis of what all of the mentioned institutional factors
of the context mean for our understanding of public participation in urban planning

13
both in post-civil war societies and under the general day-to-day conditions
practitioners are more accustomed to.
As well as the purposes and timing of public participation, planners need to
understand the overlapping local social, political, and historical institutions of
participation of which both the population and the planners are a product and a part.
This applies to all contexts but is particularly critical in post-war and post-civil war
situations because the consequences of failure are so great. Detailed descriptions of
the post-war Lebanese society highlight how complicated and multi-layered public
participation can be. The historical and religious backgrounds, psychology,
identities, communal relationships, and characteristics (level of trust and openness,
etc.) of the population are very important. The recognition of any tensions among the
various groups within the public on one hand and between the citizens and the
government (including planners and decision-makers) on the other hand enables
planners to mold the participatory process to better suit the locality and to facilitate
success.
A comprehension of the relationship between planning and politics in the
particular context of public participation is also important in post-war as well as any
context. This includes political institutions of power, bureaucracy, jurisdiction, and
corruption in the political decision-making system of which urban planning is a part.
The instability of the political situation in the country and in the region is also
relevant as it influences the livelihoods, mindsets, and priorities of citizens. Stable

14
political situations may thus allow for a higher likelihood of formal and direct public
participation. Religious institutions also interfere in politics through the influence of
religious figures. This power can be garnered to aid public participation measures in
planning and other domains.
Knowledge of local socio-cultural institutions in the form of values,
traditions, customs, and beliefs of the population and of the various groups within it
is a must particularly in post-civil war situations where ignorance can deter
participation and even cause conflict. But in all circumstances, an institutional
understanding of context is beneficial for the planner and can aid their
conceptualization and implementation of public participation. Institutions explain the
publics perception of planning and participation and clarify why some people chose
to take part in the process while others do not or cannot. The publics ideas of and
experiences with democracy and freedom are also institutional considerations.
Institutionalized public participation methods within urban planning processes as
well as informal means of public involvement and influence in decision-making
cannot be separated when planners investigate democratic representation within the
planning system. This applies in both post-war and day-to-day planning situations.
Although they occur behind the scenes, informal modes of participation can aid
democracy and public involvement in decision-making.
Post-civil war contexts offer more intensified and concentrated circumstances
that can provide planning with new information about public participation. This is

15
because some things do not become apparent except in extreme situations such as
disaster or war that have their own dynamics. Although the purposes of public
participation are often similar to those under normal circumstances, in post-civil war
situations they become more delicate, critical, and time-sensitive. Lebanon is a
country that has been perennially and somewhat continuously in the throes of war,
conflict, hardship, or instability. This makes for different meanings of public
participation and even different mechanisms and purposes of implementation.
Public participation in the post-civil war context is highly multifaceted,
complicated, and sensitive. However, participation is complex not just in and of
itself. The complexities of the story of this case of Lebanon add not only to our
understanding of the intricate and delicate nature of public participation but also to
the importance, robustness, and malleability of the urban planning field and its
ability to reinvent itself in situations of war. Everyday rational planning in other
societies, that have not experienced such continuous conflict and instability, can
better understand the intricacies of participation from the extraordinary case of
Lebanon. The challenge for planning practice and its scholarship is going to be how
to develop this new knowledge and deeper understanding of public participation as
catharsis and healing, as time-sensitive, as interwoven in the socio-political context,
and as institutionally-based in practice without the context of war.

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Chapter 2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A REVIEW

This chapter focuses on a review of the vast literature on direct public
participation, a subject that appears in a variety of fields from public health to
education to environmental studies. Here we will concentrate on a discussion of
public participation in planning, while drawing on some other domains such as
public administration and political science.
As in other fields, citizen participation in planning is not a new phenomenon.
But what makes it particularly significant in planning (as compared to other
domains) is its contrast to what has been called the rational comprehensive model.
The acute and obvious factors participation brings into equations of the planning
discourse are critical to the evolution and longevity of the field in democratic
societies. The need for democracy dispels the idea of decisions based on
unemotional, technocratic, and quantifiable information and extinguishes notions of
the urban planner as the sole, independent, and detached decision-maker. This type
of early rational model mode of thinking has been vastly modified or even replaced
by new models of planning such as communicative or collaborative planning.
Public participation can also be viewed from the perspective of the critical
theory of Habermas as a way to learn about oneself through self-examination.
Participation in negotiations, for example, will bring about a greater realization and
better understanding of ones preferences and priorities. There exists a well-known

17
chasm within the literature between theories of public participation and its
applications. As Habermas transferred notions of critical theory such as
ideologiekritik and self-examination to public life, participation as a form of
democracy and as a source of communication with oneself as well as with others
was actually strengthened. Communicative action (in planning) can thus be seen as a
continuum from these critical theory notions (as exhibited by Verma and Shin 2007).
It is a coming together in consensus that takes the place of revolution as a form of
change.
This chapter will study the literature on public participation leading to
communicative action in planning. First, I will highlight the importance of public
participation by discussing its purposes and the goals it sets out to accomplish in a
democratic system of governance. Second, the appearance and evolution of citizen
participation are described particularly in the planning field and the contrast to
rational planning is made. Third, the institutionalization of public participation
within the public decision-making system is highlighted. This adds to our knowledge
of how current institutionalized methods emerged. Fourth, a criticism of some of
these methods entails a discussion of tokenism and its pitfalls. This crisis of
legitimacy leads to a discussion of Habermass critical theory legitimation crisis and
communicative action and what this latter brings to planning and public participation
in terms of better knowledge of oneself and dialogue and agreement with others.
Fifth, communicative action is studied as a model of public participation in planning.

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2.1 Multiple Goals of Participation

Public participation is an integral part of civic life in the United States. Direct
citizen participation in public affairs is based on the ideal of democracy the
foundation of the political system and it is enabled by cultural, structural, and
political institutions (Day 1997). Participation comes in various forms (voting, public
meetings, surveys, etc.) and can be direct (where citizens participate directly) or
indirect via public representatives. It spreads across numerous fields from education,
to urban planning, to the environment, to health sciences, to political science, and to
public administration, etc. (Roberts 2004). It also spans all levels of government
from federal to local (Roberts 2004).
However, the citizen or public participation literature is complicated and
untidy (Kweit and Kweit 1981, Roberts 2004). Definitions of basic notions such as
citizenship remain unclear (Roberts 2004). For some citizenship is a legal or political
status (Cooper 1984), while for others it goes beyond that and has ethical and
sociological meaning. It is like John Deweys idea of community, Ernest Bakers
concept of duty, and Walter Lippmanns emphasis on civility all rolled into one
(Dimock 1990: 21). This conception of citizenship requires going beyond a focus on
the individual to more collective virtues and moral principles (Roberts 2004). Its
scope is broader than the legal definition and it extends not only to formal
governmental arrangements, but it also includes proactive voluntary organizations

19
and community involvement. Its focus is on building and sustaining all facets of
community political, economic, and social and the development of a
communitys values, norms, and traditions (Roberts 2004: 319).
If describing citizenship is not an easy task, then defining public participation
is no simpler. According to Pateman (1970), participation can refer to an array of
various actions of different people. At a very basic level, to participate means to
have a share in common with others, to partake with others. Or it signifies the
fulfillment of ones legal rights and duties as specified in the Constitution or
alternatively, active involvement in substantive issues of government and
community (Roberts 2004: 319). However, this definition leaves out the level of
influence of the public on the outcomes of the political decision-making apparatus.
For Albrechts (2002), a central theme of public participation is to increase the
inclusiveness in and the accessibility to the participation process in order to achieve
pluralism and to empower weaker, underrepresented, and marginalized groups. In
her definition of public participation Sherry Arnstein (1969) incorporates notions of
race, class, and gender into the political system. Participation becomes the
redistribution of power required in order for the marginalized have-nots to be
included in the decision-making process and to have a hand in the determination of
their own futures. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how
information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated,
programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled

20
benefits of the affluent society (Arnstein 1969: 216). Roberts (2004) prefers to
adopt a definition that is more inclusive of both haves and have-nots. For
Roberts (2004), direct citizen participation is advantageous not only in its pluralism,
but in the effects that kind of inclusiveness can bring. It decreases elitism and the
potential for abuse in a representative system.
The planning literature on public participation is problematic mainly because
there is no consensus about what participation looks like in practice and what it aims
to accomplish (Day 1997). Suppose we look at the latter question. Public
participation has many diverse purposes. These are addressed in a wide variety of
literatures and depend on the objectives of the field of study: environment, policy
analysis, public administration, urban planning, etc. For instance, practicing public
participation experts Beierle and Cayford (2002) analyzed 239 cases of public
participation (over the course of 30 years) based on five social purposes: (1)
incorporating public values into decisions, (2) improving the substantive quality of
decisions, (3) resolving conflict among competing interests, (4) building trust in
institutions, and (5) educating and informing the public.
Similarly, Creighton (2005) posits eight benefits of public participation after
participating in and studying approximately 300 cases in the field. Participation
aided in: (1) improving the quality of decisions, (2) minimizing cost and delay, (3)
building consensus, (4) increasing the ease of implementation, (5) avoiding worst-
case confrontations, (6) maintaining credibility and legitimacy, (7) anticipating

21
public concerns and attitudes, and (8) developing civil society as a better-educated
society is achieved via participation and this will enable citizens to be more active in
the public arena.
Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller (2000: 352) proposed purposes for public
participation that are oriented towards the requirements of public administration. The
first purpose of citizen involvement in the decision-making process is discovery.
Public involvement can aid decision-makers in the search for definitions or
alternatives. The second purpose is education: participation can be use as a tool to
educate the public about certain issues. Third is measurement: participation can be
used to measure and assess public opinion on different issues. The fourth rationale
for participation is persuasion. The participation process can be used to persuade the
public of a certain point of view or alternative. Last but not least public participation
can be used in legitimization to justify decisions and actions when complying with
legal requirements.
Roberts (2004: 323-24) also studies the benefits of direct citizen participation
in public administration. First, direct citizen participation is developmental in that it
allows people to develop an active moral character and to achieve their potential.
Second, participation is educative as democracy is learned through its practical
application. Third, it is therapeutic and integrative as participants heal by discussing
their emotions and opinions and leave the participatory experience with a sense of
purpose and of belonging to community. Fourth, public participation is legitimating.

22
It is also protective of freedom as participants in the process guard their own rights
and decision-makers react to that by being more cautious of treading on them in the
future. Sixth, participation is instrumental in providing those without power a chance
to level the playing field by allowing them to influence decision-making. Finally,
direct citizen participation is realistic. It minimizes delays and can be a source of
new ideas and approaches for decision-makers (Barber 1984).
In planning, Innes and Booher (2004) state that there are seven purposes that
public participation can be used to achieve. The first is information gathering from
the public for decision-makers to ascertain the needs and preferences of the public
they serve in order to incorporate these findings into decisions. The second is to use
the knowledge of citizens to improve the quality of decisions in the decision-making
process. These two purposes are becoming ever more important as government
continues to grow in size and to increase in distance from its citizens. Third, public
participation advances justice and fairness by including within it those that are
underrepresented. There are systematic reasons why the needs and preferences of
many groups, particularly the least advantaged, are not recognized through the
normal information sources and analytic procedures. These needs may only come
onto the radar screen during an open participation process (Innes and Booher 2004:
422-23). Fourth, public participation achieves legitimacy for government and its
decisions. For example, If a planner can say We held a dozen public hearings and
reviewed hundreds of comments and everyone who wanted to had a chance to say

23
his piece, then whatever is decided is, at least in theory, democratic and legitimate
(Innes and Booher 2004: 423). Fifth, public participation is conducted in many cases
because it is a legal requirement.
Innes and Booher (2004) contend that the first four purposes mentioned (all
other than the legal requirement) are not getting accomplished with the current
legally-required methods pervasive in practice. They believe that collaborative
methods fulfill these purposes better than those currently used. Emerging
collaborative practices also attain two additional purposes for citizen participation in
the building of civil society and the creation of an adaptive, self-organizing polity
capable of addressing wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) in an informed and
effective way (Innes and Booher 2004: 423). The new paradigm proposed by Innes
and Booher (2004) for public participation requires a reframing and
reconceptualization at the theoretical level that will eventually lead to changes in
practice. The current dichotomy of participation into citizens versus government and
the somewhat one-sided information-gathering constrains the level, scope, and
purposefulness of participation (King et al. 1998, Innes and Booher 2004). When
public participation is seen as a multi-sided dialogue that is both formal and
informal, participation becomes a collaborative form of decision-making where all
sides are represented and action in the public arena can be influenced by the citizenry
(King 1998, Innes and Booher 2004).

24
2.2 Participation in Planning

The origins of writings and professional work in planning go back to at least
the middle of the Twentieth Century. In 1955, Meyerson and Banfield studied the
Chicago Housing Authority and discovered that the location of public housing
projects was more likely to be influenced by political rather than technical factors.
Ghetto riots in U.S. cities in the late 1960s turned a skeptical lens onto urban
planning and the way it was practiced at that time (Hague and McCourt 1974).
Criticism of urban renewal programs in particular led to the emergence of advocacy
planning particularly for the poor. As planners were exposed to the needs and
aspirations of the poor they were faced with conflicting interests (those of the poor
versus those of other groups) and they had to deal with the major dilemma of
whether it really is possible to identify any unifying public interest and
consequently whether planning can truly be comprehensive (Hague and McCourt
1974: 144).
During the early 1960s, a reevaluation of the notion of community occurred.
Wirth (1933) had predicted the disintegration of ties within communities in cities
(Evans 2001). This had not occurred everywhere. These ties remained strong in some
areas such as inner-cities. The emergence and the thriving of urban villages are
documented in two well-known cases: Young and Willmotts (1957) study of
Bethnal Green in Family and Kinship in East London and Herbert Gans (1962)

25
portrayal of Bostons West End in Urban Villagers (Evans 2001). Young and
Willmott (1962: 113) wrote that There is a sense of community, that is a feeling of
solidarity between people who occupy the common territory, which springs from the
fact that people and their families have lived there a long time (Evans 2001). In The
Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), Jane Jacobs strongly criticizes the
contemporary planning orthodoxy for ignoring the vital roles played by the existing,
often vibrant, inner-city neighborhoods, in favor of large scale, utopian planning
developments that left more social problems in their wake than they solved (Evans
2001: 3).
The criticism of urban renewal projects and of perceptions of inner-cities led,
in the early 1960s, to the onset of the critique against rational planning. In a study of
decision-making processes in Minneapolis and St. Pauls, Altshuler (1965)
determined that the main functions of the planner were creating the master plan,
supervising and evaluating the subsequent smaller specialist plans, and coordinating
the planning of specialist agencies brought into the process in order to ensure that the
public interest was protected. Altshuler thus deduced that planners must assume they
know the public interest at some level in order to take this all upon themselves and
leave the public out. He then concluded that this idea cannot be sustained in practice
(Hague and McCourt 1974).
Hague and McCourt (1974: 154) launch a direct attack on the political and
inequitable nature of rational planning:

26
We conclude that planning is political in the broad sense, and that to function
with any effectiveness it must be attuned to the inequities of power within
present society. This is an uncomfortable realization for planners who have
been sheltered behind their various roles as professionals, technical experts,
government officials and administrators, for what it means is that any
theories of planning, and hence any legitimacy that planning can claim must
be explicitly political. This conclusion doubts the usefulness of concern with
`process methods' or `rational cycles' of planning when they are explained out
with their operational or ideological contexts. We suggest then that the
planner needs to have a long cold look at his operations in pursuance of the
public interest in relation to his notions of public participation and
comprehensiveness. It may be that he must reassess both his role in
government and his notions of professionalism to embrace values such as
`democracy' and `equality' rather than `efficiency' and `rationality.'

It is important to emphasize here that participation in urban planning is
similar in many ways to participation in other areas of civic life such as politics and
the environment. However, given the history of the planning domain, public
participation has a special meaning over and above the rest of civil life because it is
so much in contrast to the rational comprehensive model. This contrast continues in
the planning literature to this day and public participation remains a major dilemma
for planners both in theory and in practice. The idea of citizen participation is a
little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you
(Arnstein 1969: 216). Still, some like Friedmann (1987) and Stivers (1990) are
apprehensive of the ability of the public to participate effectively and constructively
(Day 1997). Planning cannot be successful without public participation, but it cannot
proceed if it is dominated by it. This is why Beneviste calls participation the
Achilles heel of planning (1989: 145).

27
Day (1997) refers to this tension between the exigencies of planning as a
field that demands technicality and impartiality and the democratic social culture
and political system as a wicked problem (Rittel and Webber 1973). Recently,
Chaskin (2005) highlighted the tension between democratic, associational action and
rational-bureaucratic action in the implementation of revitalization efforts in poor
areas. Collaborative and participatory planning efforts continue to battle the
institutionalized rational planning ideology embedded in bureaucracy and planning
practice.

2.3 Institutionalization of Participation

The interest in public participation in the field of urban planning has varied
over time (Day 1997). Fagence (1977) has even stated that there has been a tendency
for participation in planning to be treated as a fad (Day 1997). Interest in
participation flourished in the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. and then decreased during
the recession of the early 1980s as economic issues came to the forefront of the
planning agenda (Grant 1994). Today, direct citizen participation is pervasive in all
arenas of civic life and at all levels of government (Roberts 2004). The growth of
public participation in the planning domain has been explosive. This is mainly due to
federally-mandated legislation that obligated its inclusion in the decision-making

28
process and to the perseverance of both academics and practitioners in the creation of
methodologies to incorporate it (Roberts 2004).
The concept of public participation has an extensive history going back to the
time of the ancient Greeks. It was first mentioned and recorded in the Ecclesia of
Athens (Roberts 2004). Aristotle saw citizen participation as a technique that
develops the potential of humans to the fullest (Stivers 1990). After the fall of the
Roman Empire in the Middle Ages, participatory processes materialized in practice
as urban artisans formed associations in order to influence public issues that affected
their work (Roberts 2004). The democratic theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
John Stuart Mill rely mainly on the participation of individuals in the political system
(Pateman 1970).
The Virginia and New England colonies launched their own versions of
public participation. The cornerstone of this process was the Magna Carta of 1215,
which guaranteed due process for all citizens and the self-rule of church
congregations (Roberts 2004: 320). In addition, the New England colonists held
their own town meetings. These meetings bestowed some decision-making powers
on citizens that were free, white, adult, and property-owning. The process was thus
dominated by the elite but nevertheless, town government was democratic in form
and neighborhood-oriented in practice (Roberts 2004: 240). The 19
th
century, from
the beginning of Andrew Jacksons presidency, witnessed an increased breadth of
democratic practice both at the federal and at the state level. In this case, Property

29
qualifications were dropped and self-educated citizens, rather than elites, became
part of the civil service (Roberts 2004: 240).
The early 20
th
century brought the institutionalization of the urban and
regional planning process and this is where participation emerged more explosively
an as we know it today (Williams 1976). The first three decades of the 20th century
witnessed the growth of new forms of direct citizen participation. This included
voluntary city and regional planning as well as environmental improvement
highlighted the most in the City Beautiful Movement and the eradication of slums
(Day, 1997).
By the end of the Second World War, the federal government had returned to
the paramount role in social and economic life that it had established for itself in the
1930s (Roberts 2004). Roberts (2004) describes the institutionalization of public
participation in process and legislation in great detail. Public participation through
hearings first became required in urban renewal programs in the U.S. with The
Housing Act of 1949 (Roberts 2004). The ensuing Housing Act of 1954 (The
Workable Program 320 ARPA / December 2004 for Community Improvement) and
Juvenile Delinquency Demonstration Projects involved the public mainly through
advisory committees composed of leading citizens of the city (Hallman 1972,
Roberts 2004).
The Urban Renewal Act of 1954 mandated citizen participation. For most
renewal agencies this meant the formation of advisory boards made up of seven to

30
fifteen citizen leaders. These members were chosen on the basis of their access to
those who could aid development such as contractors, legislators, bankers, and
developers (Day 1997, Roberts 2004). According to Stenberg (1972) however, real
direct participation of citizens was very slight or did not occur at all as these boards
involved non-indigenous, blue-ribbon citizens who leant a hand at an advisory
capacity only. Day (1997: 423) suggests that some participation at the grassroots
level did occur but only after it became expedient for housing and business
rehabilitation and after it was obvious that citizen cooperation was necessary for
projects to succeed. Legislators hoped that the involvement of citizens would lead to
their having a stake in the process and their possessing goals that coincided with
those of the renewal agency (Burke 1979, Day 1997, Williams 1976).
Beginning with the War on Poverty of the 1960s, the requirements of public
participation changed (Day 1997, Roberts 2004). Participation was no longer just a
means to achieve the cooperation of the public; the role of citizens became more
active as they were expected to have some opinion over their own futures (Burke
1979, Catanese 1984, Day 1997). This new ideology was embodied in The Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 which established the Community Action Program. This
program contained a very controversial (Roberts 2004) clause that required:
maximum feasible participation of the residents of the areas and members of the
groups served (Day 1997: 423). The vehicle of their participation was the nonprofit
Community Action Agency (Callies 1976, Stenberg 1972).

31
Although the origin of this clause has not been identified, support for direct
citizen participation emerged from various sources (Roberts 2004). The civil rights
movement was a proponent of participatory democracy. Those working on a
National Service Corps believed that the poor should have a voice determining their
own futures through local programs. Robert Kennedy and the youth in the Kennedy
administration championed maximum involvement of the poor (Boone 1972). The
national projects Head Start and Legal Aid also attracted the participation of local
poor people who were recruited to develop and manage the programs (Roberts
2004). The characteristics of the citizens participating in these programs shifted from
elite and white to poor and minority (Roberts 2004). The Community Action
Program specifically decreed that a third of the people on the Community Action
Program board of directors should be representatives of the poor (Roberts 2004).
However, the practical application of this program at the local level resulted in many
recorded cases of conflict, violence, and chaos (Catanese 1984, Kasperson 1977,
Kweit and Kweit 1981).
The face of participation was changed again with the Demonstrations Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, commonly known as the Model Cities
Program, which combined urban renewal with the war on poverty. In an effort to
avoid the chaos experienced with the 1964 act, this program only provided for
widespread citizen participation (Day 1997, Roberts 2004). The ultimate authority
and control was to remain in the hands of local government so that it could tailor the

32
program to its needs (Hallman 1972, Kweit and Kweit 1981). City governments were
obliged to involve the citizens in their planning, but the emphasis was on bettering
communication between the public and the local officials and not a redistribution of
power (Day 1997, Frieden and Kaplan 1975). To further complicate this situation,
some Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials who favored power-sharing
pressured local governments for this purpose during the term of the Johnson
administration.
During the Nixon presidency, the department of HUD shifted its attention
from power-sharing to the restructuring of local government and thus mayors
programs emerged (Day 1997). The disillusionment with the Great Society programs
of the Johnson era became evident. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
instructed the Presidents Council on Environmental Quality to consult with the
Citizens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality and other groups as it
deems advisable (Day 1997, Roberts 2004). Mandatory participation had thus gone
from maximum feasible to widespread only to be completely replaced with the
encouragement of the public in the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and the
adequate opportunity for citizen participation in the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 (Day 1997, Roberts 2004).
Despite this apparent shift in emphasis from mandatory to advisable
participation, the 1970s were not completely exempt from federally-mandated citizen
involvement (Roberts 2004). For example, the Federal Advisory Committee Act of

33
1972 required citizen advisory boards throughout the Federal bureaucracy and
encouraged the participation of organized interests. A symposium on Citizen
Participation in Public Policy cited that: 137 or 61% of the 226 federal public
participation programs had been adopted during the 1970s (Rich and Rosenbaum
1981: 439). Similar statistics were exhibited with The Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (1979): 124 or 80% of the 155 federal grant-in-aid
programs that necessitated participation were produced in same decade. Gormley
(1981) estimated that 75% of state utility regulatory commissions had a high level of
citizen participation and Cole (1974) deduced that opportunities for public
involvement were increasing (Roberts 2004).
While the main face of participation in the 1970s shifted to become more
advisable and less mandatory, it also changed in other aspects. While the focus of
citizen involvement during the Johnson era had been issues of the Great Society
programs such as welfare, housing, and education, the appearance of consumer
advocacy groups and the emergence of environmental awareness meant that the
public was no longer content to allow government experts to leave them out of
decisions concerning more current problems such as nuclear power, hazardous
waste, air pollution, and DNA research (Day 1997).
Although the federal government did not pursue one well-outlined policy
toward public participation (Stenberg 1972), it did intervene enough to allow direct
citizen involvement to become more of a feature in projects such as urban renewal,

34
juvenile delinquency, poverty, neighborhood health centers, and community mental
health programs (Roberts 2004). Funding was provided at the national level and
implementation at the local level of the neighborhood with the public exercising
varying degrees of control depending on the context (Roberts 2004).
Demands for direct citizen participation in all issues of basic welfare and
quality of life grew in the 1980s and 1990s (Roberts 2004). The voices of students,
union members, government workers, environmentalists, feminists, and consumers
have amplified the movement (Roberts 2004). Even some minorities have become
more active in voicing their opinions (such as Latinos on the issue of immigration in
2006). The public is becoming more suspicious of the increasing size of government,
the power of experts, and the effects of technology. Activists of all persuasions are
demanding and going after more direct control and power over decisions that
influence the present and future generations (Roberts 2004). So far, according to
Roberts (2004: 322), these voices and their demands have not shown any signs of
abating.

2.4 Pathology of Legitimacy

The previous sections underscored that public participation is pervasive in the
literature and recently in application, mandatory or otherwise. However, there remain
many problems with participation in practice. Ambivalence characterizes the role of

35
public participation throughout U.S. history for Although the political system in the
United States is designed to reflect and engender an active citizenry, it is also
designed to protect political and administrative processes from a too-active
citizenry (King et al. 1998: 318). Public participation is seen by administrators as
desirable but inefficient as it is time-consuming, it creates delays, and it is seldom
effective. Citizen participation is on the decline as the public feel more alienated
from administrative processes and more distrustful of government (King et al. 1998).
The literature is full of criticisms of public participation and its methodology.
King et al. (1998) observe problems of: citizen discouragement and indifference
(Box 1996, Putnam 1995, Timney 1996, Thomas 1995); the lack of influence of
participation on decision-making and action in the public arena (Crosby et al. 1986);
and the ineffectiveness of current participatory methods (Crosby et al. 1986;
Kathlene and Martin 1991; Kweit and Kweit 1981, 1987; Parsons 1990) either as a
result of inadequate planning or poor implementation or because of the nature of the
bureaucratic system (deLeon 1992, Fischer 1993, Forester 1989, White and
McSwain 1993).
In the public participation literature the main problem cited with application
is that the process is rarely truly democratic. If planning practice is supposed to
increase the level of democracy in government then it must be inclusive of citizens
for a pluralistic process to occur (Davidoff 1965). Planning has been criticized time
and again for its deficiency in adequate and integrated representation of all factions

36
of society as it lacks in its representation of disadvantaged sectors of society,
particularly minorities and the poor (Alfasi 2003, Dahl 1989, Forester 1999, Healey
1997, Sandercock 1998, Sanders 1997). In fact, Alfasi (2003) states that the
exclusion of individuals from planning processes which affect them goes back as far
as the Athens Charter (Le Corbusier 1941-1973), which stated that The ruthless
violence of private interest provokes a disastrous upset between the thrust of
economic forcesand the powerlessness of social solidarity (Princuple 73). The
charter concludes that private interest will be subordinate to the collective interest
(Principle 95) and, similarly, modern urban and district planning is primarily
concerned with protecting the public from wild private interests (Alfasi 2003:).
Much has been written about planning as a tool that has been utilized in the
exercise of various forms of power and control over citizens (Harvey 1985, 1989;
Yiftachel 1998). In Sherry Arnsteins (1969) much-cited article Ladder of Citizen
Participation, levels of citizen participation are categorized from manipulation to
citizen control. The use of public participation solely for the purpose of informing
the citizenry or consulting the public constitutes tokenism. Tokenism is considered a
symbolic, empty ritual that does not benefit participants (Arnstein 1969: 216-7).
Shared power with citizens is the objective versus power over citizens (Follett 1940,
Roberts 1991). Direct public participation necessitates power-sharing between
citizens and public officials. It is not a form of control that enables those in
authority to get citizens to do what they want them to do (Roberts 2004: 320).

37
A process of public participation that does not include a redistribution of
power is not only useless to citizens, but it can also be detrimental. Innes and Booher
(2000: 3) describe public hearing sessions in the U.S. as follows: Three-minute time
limits are often placed on speakers They have to stand in a humble way before a
council, or legislative committee or commission They have to speak quickly. They
cannot get answers to their questions nor even know what anyone thought of their
perspective because the responses come three months later. It is not surprising,
therefore, that elected officials pay little attention to the comments of the public
at hearings, often talking among themselves or leaving the room.
Tokenism can thus be frustrating for citizens (Arnstein 1969). It can also lead
to the birth of government distrust as Forester (1989) illustrates. The exercise of
power can occur at the level of agenda setting (Forester 1989) and then during the
participation process itself. If people see that their concerns or issues are taken
seriously at that level, they will participate (Albrechts 2002). If, as the process is
happening, participants feel that their input is leading to results they will be more
likely to want to be included again in the future. Therefore, guarantees are shaped
mainly through practice (Albrechts 2002) as is the process of trust building (Smith
1999).
Public participation conducted to diffuse authority and responsibility can be a
different kind of tokenism. To take an example from section A of this chapter, If a
planner can say We held a dozen public hearings and reviewed hundreds of

38
comments and everyone who wanted to had a chance to say his piece, then whatever
is decided is, at least in theory, democratic and legitimate (Innes and Booher 2004:
423). This can be legitimating of the process, but not necessarily of the outcomes.
Some administrators have also been accused of cooptation because they have
appeared to delegate authority and responsibility while still retaining control over the
processes and its outcomes (Arnstein 1969, 1972; Roberts 2004).
Lowry, Adler, and Milner (1997: 178), discuss facilitation within the public
participation process and analyze how it can be used intentionally or
unintentionally to influence outcomes despite the fact that planners think that they
create processes that usually are open, deliberative, and fair. Facilitated group
processes in planning have a potential for manipulation that can be exploited. This
can be done purposely or even inadvertently for a variety or reasons: to deflect
discussion from certain issues, to control certain individuals that seem problematic or
difficult, or to limit participation and boost consent (Lowry et al. 1997).
Just as in the case of facilitation in group processes, there are certain methods
of public participation that are known to be particularly unsuccessful. For example,
the public hearing is the most ineffective method of citizen participation (King et al
1998). A low attendance at these meetings is usually misconstrued as a reflection of
either the publics general apathy or their satisfaction with the status quo (Kathlene
and Martin 1991, King et al. 1998). However, this is usually more likely to be a

39
result of the structure of these meetings and when, where, and how they are
conducted (King et al. 1998).
Methods of public participation such as the public hearing:
Do not achieve genuine participation in planning or other decisions; they do
not satisfy members of the public that they are being heard; they seldom can
be said to improve the decisions that agencies and public officials make; and
they do not incorporate a broad spectrum of the public. Worse yet, these
methods often antagonize the members of the public who do try to work with
them. The methods often pit citizens against each other, as they feel
compelled to speak of the issues in polarizing terms to get their points across.
This pattern makes it even more difficult for decision makers to sort through
what they hear, much less to make a choice using public input. Most often
these methods discourage busy and thoughtful individuals from wasting their
time going through what appear to be nothing more than rituals designed to
satisfy legal requirements. They also increase the ambivalence of planners
and other public officials about hearing from the public at all (Innes and
Booher 2004: 419).

According to King et al. (1998), the current participatory framework includes
four major components: (1) the issue, (2) the administrative system or structures in
which participation occurs, (3) the administrators, and (4) the citizens. In this
instance, the administrative system is closest to the issues under consideration, the
citizens are farthest away, and the administrators or experts are the link between
system and the citizens. Participation in this context happens too late in the process,
after the issues have already been chosen and framed. It is also structured in a way
that maintains a dominance of the administrator in a practitioner-client hierarchy
(Fischer 1993: 165) or a falsely dualistic relationship (King et al. 1998: 320).
Participation is thus ineffective and token.

40
As Arnstein (1969) differentiated between public participation and
manipulation and tokenism, others have distinguished it from cooptation (Dryzek
1990, Selznick 1949). The connection between control, social structure and planning
has also been widely discussed (Forester 1989; Harvey 1985, 1989). Healey (1993,
1996), Forester (1989, 1999) and Innes and Booher (2000) have clearly stated that
the urban planning systems of the U.K. and the U.S. have failed in achieving true
public participation (Alfasi 2003). Participation in the planning domain is thus a
messy situation and a challenge for study (Baum 1996: 129, Saarikoski 2002,
Sandercock 1998, Haraway 1996):
Concerns about public participation appear consistently within the academic
study of planning, from both normative and empirical vantage points. One of
the difficulties that scholars must face is that planners relate to publics in
ways that are complex, multivocal, and unevenly representative, not only in
their intentionally participatory strategies but also throughout their mundane
routines. These relations are somewhat incomprehensible since they involve
multiple types and interpretations of data, various personalities and individual
talents and interests, multiple and conflicting values and priorities, inequities
of power and access to information, and constant circumstantial changes
from local to global (Carp 2004: 243).

According to King et al. (1998) and to Innes and Booher (2004), a resolution
of the issues mentioned above will require not only a rethinking of the methodology,
but a reframing of theory particularly of the relationship between citizens and
administrators in the participatory process. For the purposes of this study, we can
deduce from this section that it makes sense to separate between the spirit of
participation and its mechanics. The spirit of citizen involvement is pervasive in the
literature and in the hearts and minds of urban planners and public officials who

41
believe that it is necessary (Albrechts 2002). For public participation to be real and
democratic in practice the spirit of participation must be alive and strong. If it is
weak, then even if conducted, the outcome can still be symbolic and the
methodology invalidates itself.

2.5 Crisis of Legitimacy

The tokenism that is described in the previous section can easily be seen as a
pathological reaction to participatory efforts. There exists a chasm between the ideal
of direct citizen participation and the practical implementation of this concept (Day
1997, Roberts 2004). This gap appears in participatory methodology and has been
exemplified extensively by Lowry et al. (1997), King et al. (1998), and Innes and
Booher (2003, 2004) among others. However, there are also structural issues within
the rational bureaucratic system of urban planning that impede public participation.
Chaskin (2005: 418) explains as follows:
The translation of policy ideas to social action is always imperfect. The ideas
that frame policy approaches and the rhetoric used to explain them are often
generally stated on the basis of broad principles meant to guide but not
dictate implementation on the ground. When such ideas come into play in the
complex social reality in which they are to be realized, contextual factors and
the existing, highly political dynamics among players combine with those
promoted by the institutional structures through which an effort is to be
implemented in complex and often confounding ways (e.g., Pressman and
Wildavsky 1984; Lipsky 1980; Brodkin 1990, 2000).

42
The tension between democratic ideals and the rational bureaucratic approach
to planning impedes implementation (in the form of collaborative participation) of
revitalization projects in poor areas (Chaskin 2005). Chaskin (2005: 418) describes
the difficulties that this systemic tension incurs: Within the strategic context
provided by initiative structure and organization, this convergence generated a
complex dynamic in which practical action was propelled and constrained by the
ideology that was to guide it and by the interpretations and actions of the participants
in its unfolding. This led to an ongoing interplay between orientations: a dynamic
push-and-pull between democracy and bureaucracy, top-down and bottom-up, inside
and outside, long term and short term.
There are also other structural issues within the system that cause what
Habermas (1975) refers to as a legitimation crisis. In modern capitalist societies
where efficiency is idolized, the state is unable to meet the needs of its individual
citizens and thus the crisis. Social programs such as welfare are a problem for the
state because they are inherently inefficient. If the state provides these programs it is
wasteful and inefficient in its provision. If it does not, the state is deficient in some
of its responsibilities towards its citizens. The public reacts to this legitimation crisis
by coming together and interacting in what Habermas terms communicative
action. This allows people to communicate with each other and reach agreement on
mutual goals. It also initiates some sort of common public action that leads to change
(via peaceful means as opposed to Marxist revolution).

43
Public participation in Habermass critical theory is about self-examination
and reexamination and learning about oneself. When you communicate with others,
rationalize with others, and negotiate with others you learn about yourself.
Ideologiekritik is essentially the criticism of ones own ideologies. As Habermas
transferred the notions of ideologiekritik, self-examination, and the ensuing
communicative action to public life (Verma and Shin 2004), his aim was to maintain
the spirit of public participation. Communicative action based on dialogue and
agreement results in the exorcism of tokenism from the system. Due to the work of
Habermas, communicative action in planning can be seen on a continuum from
critical theory.

2.6 Communicative Action

Communicative planning has the support of a plethora of theorists. John
Forester, Judith Innes, Patsy Healey, Jean Hillier, Charles Hoch, Helen Liggett,
Thomas Harper and Stanley Stein, Seymour Mandelbaum, Tore Sager, and Jim
Throgmorton, Fischler (2000), Kemp (1985), and McGuirk (2001) are mentioned by
Verma and Shin (2007). Communicative planning has been identified as the
ascendant theory in planning (Beauregard 1996) or even as a new paradigm
(Innes 1995) (Verma and Shin 2007). As previously mentioned, communicative
planning can be considered on a continuum with the critical theory of Habermas. In

44
planning, it sprouts from the works of John Forester (Verma and Shin 2007)
beginning in the 1980s. Forester (1980, 1993, 1999) has argued for communicative
planning as a replacement for rational-comprehensive planning (Verma and Shin
2007).
According to Verma and Shin (2007) the problem with communicative
planning is its contrast to communicative action as exhibited by Habermas.
Noticeably missing in the naming communicative planning is the term action
which is central to the critical theory of Habermas. This is framing is reflected
further as planning theorists seem to be content with the communicative planning
methodology as long as it is entails some form of dialogue. However, the purpose-
driven common action that stems from communication and agreement and brings
about change in Habermas is less visible as the end in planning literature. Rather, the
means has become the end with communicative planning being more about
communication than about action.
This lack of a link to action may in part explain the recent rise in public
disillusionment with participation and the consequent reevaluation of methods of
public participation that is taking place. Callanan (2005) advanced numerous reasons
for involving a wide range of stakeholders in decision-making: (1) Declining
turnouts at elections public bodies need to provide other avenues for participation,
which may in turn stimulate greater interest in the political process; (2) Allowing
people to have a say in between elections that democracy should not just be about

45
casting a vote every four to five years; (3) Acknowledgement that government does
not always know best, and that stakeholders can bring their own expertise to the
process; and (4) Creating greater ownership of public policy if stakeholders are
involved.
Innes and Booher (2004) cite what they call the failures of public
participation. They say planners have to face the facts that are on the ground: that
the citizen participation methods legally required in the U.S. have not been working.
As mentioned in section E of this chapter, current participatory methods fail in
achieving genuine participation and democratic results in planning. They also cause
feelings of frustration, discouragement, and antagonism for the public (Innes and
Booher 2004). However, these practices occur and continue despite all of these
obvious failures.
In the U.S. a general public dissatisfaction with the political representative
process has lead to a decline in participation in the form of voting. The general
public sentiment is that government is not only unresponsive to their needs and
concerns, but also more likely to be responsive to those of special interest groups that
are funding the increasingly expensive political campaigns of public officials (Nye et
al. 1997). On top of this all, legislation that obligates certain forms of public
participation seems to have aggravated the situation (Innes and Booher 2004). This
public feeling of alienation is mirrored in popular life in comic strips (Innes and
Booher 2004), where people feel that their votes in political elections dont have an

46
impact on their lives. More votes were cast for the 2006 finalists of the popular
television show American Idol than for the 2004 presidential election.
Innes and Booher (2004) attack the literature on public participation for its
ambivalence. They discuss this literature focusing on three fields: planning, political
science, and public administration. First, they describe pubic participation in
planning as a fundamentally contested concept (citing Day 1997). They portray the
literature on citizen participation as ambivalent (citing King et al. 1998) and the
public as lacking the adequate power required for participation processes to succeed
(citing Arnstein 1969 and Davidoff 1965). The literature since then has centered
mainly on discussions of the problems with participation and the way its techniques
can be improved. However, Innes and Booher (2004: 420) are disappointed that
even critics of participatory efforts (Tauxe 1995) stop short of directly challenging
the public hearing or review and comment process as methods. Most planning
literature seems to assume the problem is just that we are not using the methods
correctly.
Although there are some scholars in the political science arena that have
argued against direct citizen participation because it is impracticable in the current
bureaucratic system (Dahl 1989), many have championed deliberative democratic
principles (Benhabib 1996; Bohman 1996, 1998; Bohman and Rehg 1997; Dryzek
1996; Gutman and Thompson 1996). The scholars of the latter group concur that
public participation adds value to deliberative democracy, but there is no agreement

47
on the extent that involvement processes can function within modern institutions.
This literature also disregards commonly-used methods of citizen participation
(Innes and Booher 2004).
Third, the theorists of public administration are categorized by Innes and
Booher (2004) as falling in between those of planning and political science. Some
argue for indirect citizen participation while others feel that the current levels of
direct participation are insufficient (Roberts 1997). The new managerialism
literature which has recently emerged in public administration to principles of
reinventing government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) suggests that government
should be run like a business. Within this theoretical movement, a debate over the
status of citizens has been transpiring. The essential question is: within this new
managerial system are citizens the customers or the owners of government? A
customer would be a passive recipient of services, and the job of the manager is to
provide for needs and wants efficiently (Innes and Booher 2004: 421). While the
owner is more like a stockholder model where citizens set some direction, although
not necessarily in a hands-on way (Innes and Booher 2004: 421). In either case, the
conclusion of Innes and Booher (2004) is that the literature on public administration
literature remains ambivalent towards citizen participation with many scholars
finding it the subject contentious (Kettering Foundation 1989).
After looking at the literatures on public participation in the above three
fields, Innes and Booher (2004: 421) conclude that:

48
Anyone can participate, but in reality the powerful and the organized drown
out other voices and succeed in private deal-making processes. Planners and
public officials may believe in democracy, but be skeptical about
participation (Gruber 1987, Schumpeter 1942). The more open the process
the more polarized an issue can become. Participation is the right thing to do,
but it causes delays, and if citizens are listened to, it may result in bad
decisions. Planners and administrators can be out of touch with communities
and local knowledge, but citizens can be out of touch with political and
economic realities and long-term considerations for a community or resource.
Ultimately, Olsons argument that the broad but shallow interests represented
by citizens will always be trumped by the narrow and deep interests
represented by organized groups suggests that this whole approach to
participation is doomed (Olson 1965).

When dilemmas dominate a topic, then it is time to reframe it (Laws and Rein 2003,
Schon and Rein 1994). This is exactly what Innes and Booher (2004) set out to do by
looking at the practical application of public participation world-wide. The intention
is to reconceptualize participation in a way that resolves the dilemmas set forth. They
both perceive and resolve the issues in a manner that is similar to King et al (1998).
As mentioned previously, participation happens too late in the process, after the
issues have already been chosen and framed, and it is structured in a way that
maintains a dominance of the administrator in a practitioner-client hierarchy
(Fischer 1993: 165) or a falsely dualistic relationship (King et al. 1998: 320).
Consequences of these flawed mechanisms of public participation include lawsuits,
wars at the ballot box and stalemates (Innes and Booher 2004: 425).
As things currently stand in the practice of public participation, The power
that citizens yield is aimed at blocking or redirecting administrative efforts rather
than working as partners to define the issues, establish the parameters, develop

49
methods of investigation, and select techniques for addressing problems (King et al.
1998: 320). The example that is heralded here is the public hearing as an often
ineffective method of participation. What is required is a rethinking of the techniques
needed for authentic participation to occur and that can only happen when public
participation is reframed theoretically. Participation is currently seen too
simplistically as a duality that exists between citizens and the government and this
perception incurs an adversarial kind of process as a by-product (Innes and Booher
2004). It also ignores other groups or actors that can take part and the special interest
groups that are known to influence the decision-making process and thus its
outcomes (Innes and Booher 2004). Therefore, The pluralist and participation
models coexist uneasily in theory and practice. The first lacks legitimacy with
citizens, but is often effective, and the second is seldom effective, but has
considerably more legitimacy (Innes and Booher 2004: 422).
The new paradigm proposed by Innes and Booher (2004) for public
participation requires a reframing and reconceptualization at the theoretical level that
will lead to changes in practice. The current dichotomy of participation into citizens
versus government and the somewhat one-sided form of information-gathering
constrains the level, scope, and purposefulness of participation. When public
participation is seen as a multi-sided dialogue that is both formal and informal,
participation becomes a collaborative form of decision-making where all sides are
represented and action in the public arena can be truly influenced by the citizenry.

50
With this reframing of citizen participation it becomes a collaborative process
that involves citizens, organized interests, profit-making groups and non-profit
organizations, urban planners, and public administrators in an arena where
communication, learning, and action intersect and all the actors involved in the
participatory process co-evolve (Innes and Booher 2004). In planning practice, the
implementation of genuine public participation is better served by the collaborative
model: Ultimately the differences between the methods legally required in the US
and collaborative approaches include: one-way talk versus dialogue; elite or self-
selected versus diverse participants; reactive versus involved at the outset; top-down
education versus mutually shared knowledge; one-shot activities versus continuous
engagement; and use for routine activities versus for controversial choices (Innes
and Booher 2004: 430).
For participatory methods to be effective they must include collaboration,
dialogue, and interaction:
They are inclusive. They are not reactive, but focused on anticipating and
defining future actions. They are self-organizing both in content and
membership. They challenge the status quo and ask hard questions about
things otherwise taken for granted. They seek agreement or at least build
shared knowledge and heuristics for collaborative action (Innes and Booher,
2003). This framework is not based on the mechanistic imagery of citizens
pushing on government, but on the complex systems imagery of a fluid
network of interacting agents, gathering information from each other and the
environment and acting autonomously based on their needs, understandings,
and shared heuristics (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999; Kelly, 1997). This system
can be adaptive instead of stalemated. It can build societal capacity and
produce innovative responses to seemingly intractable problems. It can move
us beyond the current dilemmas of practice and scholarship (Innes and
Booher 2004: 422).

51

Three keys to successful public participation in practice are set forth by Innes
and Booher (2004). First, true dialogue is necessary. This occurs among an inclusive
set of citizens that are equally empowered and informed, can listen and be heard
respectfully, have their own agendas, and are working on a mutually interesting
assignment. Second, networks that are established during collaborative processes are
essential to its success. Third, the networking that results from collaboration
engenders institutional capacity, which is a combination of social, political, and
intellectual capitals.
These kinds of collaborative pursuits entail major institutional changes which
will be difficult and slow to occur and will evolve as a result of planners and leaders
who take the initiative to introduce new methods of practice (Innes and Booher
2004). Public participation methods must therefore endeavor to include three steps in
order to become authentic: (1) the education and empowerment of the public where
all citizens are represented, have access to the process, and know that they will have
an impact on decisions and that the outcomes are apparent and visible; (2) the re-
education of administrators to change their role from the experts and managers to
that of collaborators and cooperative participants; and, the most difficult step, (3) the
enabling of administrative structures and processes which requires a change in
institutional habits and procedures to enable more democratic and non-bureaucratic
processes (King et al 1998).

52
2.7 Summary

Public participation is pervasive in a wide variety of areas of public life and
at all levels of government mainly due to its institutionalization through federal
mandate. Scholars, urban planners, and other public officials have also played an
important role in the creation and implementation of different methods of
participation in practice. Although the conceptualization and execution of public
participation is similar in all areas of public life, in urban planning it is particularly
meaningful because of its distinction from the rational planning paradigm. The
planner can no longer be seen as the technical, impartial expert that takes decisions
independently of the polity and prizes efficiency and rationality instead of equality
and democracy. The advantages of inclusiveness within the decision-making process
have become well-known.
Direct citizen participation has numerous benefits: it can legitimate the
decision-making process; it can increase pluralism in representation particularly of
marginalized groups, it aids in information gathering from the public to enable more
informed decisions on the part of public officials thus decreasing cost and delay of
implementation; it can help in informing and educating the citizenry about the
democratic process and important issues; it can enable public officials to better
understand the public they serve and to anticipate future concerns; it can build trust
of government within citizens; it protects the freedoms of citizens; it can be

53
therapeutic as citizens voice and discuss their concerns and feel heard; and it can
assist in communication, dispute resolution, and consensus building. Public
participation can also increase social capital as enduring networks are created during
the participation process. It can also boost the moral character and self-worth of
citizens. Civil society or community building is another by-product of direct citizen
participation as informed citizens are more capable of handling the difficult problems
that the public is faced with today.
However, public participation can also be purposefully manipulated or even
inadvertently influenced to create a token or symbolic process that exerts various
forms of power and control over the citizenry. Citizen participation that does not
grant the public power in decision-making constitutes tokenism. Participation
processes can be used as a façade that legitimates a process that is purely token in
that decisions have already been made. This way authority and responsibility for
government actions appear to be diffused. Citizen participation can also be used to
persuade the public of certain perspectives or to influence their opinions, to deflect
discussion away from certain issues, to control problematic individuals, or to limit
participation and boost consent. Tokenism can be detrimental as can lead to
antagonism, feelings of frustration and discouragement, and distrust of government
and the participatory process. Distrust can also decrease the likelihood of citizen
involvement in future participatory efforts.

54
Therefore, the gap between the conceptualization of direct public
participation and its practice is wide and obvious. This chapter reveals that it makes
sense to separate between the spirit of participation and its mechanics. At the surface
the spirit of citizen involvement is alive in the literature and in the hearts and minds
of urban planners and public officials who, in most cases, believe that it is an
essential and indispensable part of civic life. But at a deeper level, for public
participation to be real and democratic in practice the spirit of participation must be
alive and strong. If it is not, then the outcome can be token and destructive.
In urban planning, communicative action has replaced rational-
comprehensive theory as the new paradigm. Unfortunately, this focus on
communication rather than on communicative action can be dangerous as it can lead
to the disillusionment of the public. King et al (1998) and Innes and Booher (2004)
believe that for problems of implementation to be resolved in practice, notions of
public participation need to be reevaluated and reframed in theory. Collaborative
methods of participation are based on principles of pluralism, democracy,
information, access, and reciprocal dialogue. All of these ideas assume that at the
basic level of the individual planner or public official or citizen the spirit of
participation is alive and strong. But this cannot be taken for granted, particularly in
the citizenry. This is why Innes and Booher warn that the institutional change
required will be lengthy and difficult. This is also why King et al. necessitate
educating administrators about collaborative processes and its theoretical ideologies

55
as a part of the process required to achieve this higher form of participatory
methodology.
But this is not enough. Communicative action entails common action that
results from this form of dialogue that Innes and Booher and King et al. describe.
The absence of this action can in the long-term kill the spirit of public participation.
The spirit of participation survives and strengthens through action and
implementation. Its depth cannot be understood without a discussion of how far the
public is willing to go via action to demand it or how far planners or decision-
makers will go to guarantee democratic citizen participation. In this sense, the spirit
of participation is inseparable from action.

56
Chapter 3 THE CONTEXT OF LEBANON: A HISTORY OF CONFLICT

The aim of this chapter is to describe the context of the case study of
Lebanon in order to understand the public planners belong to and are dealing with
and the situation within which planning takes place. The basic idea is that a
comprehension of the context and the population enables a deeper analysis of public
participation. First, I will provide an overview of the history of Lebanon spanning
from ancient times and the pre-war era to the current post-war period. Second, the
implications of this historical background on the identity of the Lebanese population
are elicited.
It is important to mention here that I thought long and hard about sources for
the section on Lebanese history, particularly the civil war. I felt that I needed to find
an unbiased interpretation that did not take sides or attempt to assert blame. With this
in mind, I did not choose a source from Lebanon or the Middle Eastern region.
Instead, the bulk of the section is taken from the Library of Congress Country Study
of Lebanon (1989), which I felt presented neutral and unbiased descriptions of its
historical background.
1
More recent information to reflect the rapid political
evolution that Lebanon is experiencing at the moment is taken from more up-to-date

1
Unless otherwise stated, the source of most of section 3.1 is: Collelo, Thomas (ed). 1989. Lebanon:
A country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lbtoc.html. More recent information is taken from other reliable citations
for news such as Times and Newsweek.

57
sources such as Times and Newsweek. The English-language Lebanese daily
newspaper, the Daily Star, is also used and is cited accordingly.

3.1 A Brief Chronological Review

Lebanon is a small republic in the Middle East with a population of about 3.5
million.
2
It is a country that possesses a history extending over a period of more than
5000 years as it is almost as old as the earliest evidence of human existence. The
civilizations that have controlled it included the Assyrians, Babylonians, Armenians,
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, and French. These did not hesitate to
leave their mark behind and this is evident in both the architectural landscape and the
psyche of the people of Lebanon. Gavin (1998) summarizes the main architectural
and archeological layers of the capital, Beirut, as follows: The Phoenician (1200-
550BC), the Roman (64BC-295AD), the Medieval (1300-1500), the Ottoman (1516-
1920), the French Mandate (1920-1943), and the Wartime (1975-1991). The current
period is that of Reconstruction (1995+).
For the purposes of this study, I have divided the history of Lebanon into the
pre-war, civil war, and post-war eras. This will allow for an ease of description as
well as better suit our purpose: an understanding of the background of the public

2
A 2003 estimate by the UNDP (accessed on 7/1/06): www.pogar.org/countries/stats.asp?cid=9.

58
under investigation through the recognition of the historical impact on the culture
and identity of the Lebanese society.

3.1.1 Multiplicity of Civilizations (pre-1975)

The earliest recorded history of Lebanon goes back to around 3000 B.C. The
Semitic Cannanites, called Phoenicians by the Greeks, named the country Lebanon
and inhabited mainly coastal cities such as Tyre, Sidon, and Gubla (modern-day
Byblos or Jubayl). Because of the geographic location of the country on the
Mediterranean Sea between Europe and the rest of Asia the Phoenicians survived
on maritime trade and navigation. This kind of mercantilism, particularly with Egypt,
was very prosperous and enabled them to found colonies (in Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete,
and Carthage), circumnavigate Africa, and create trade routes to Europe and western
Asia. The production of crafts such as textiles, metals, and particularly glass, was
advantageous for trade.
In 875 B.C., the Phoenicians were invaded by the Assyrians who subdued
and oppressed the rebellious people until they were replaced by the Babylonians.
Babylonian rule (685-36 B.C.) brought more revolt from Phoenician cities against
foreign dominance. These became part of the Persian Empire (539-38 B.C.) when
Babylon was captured by the Persians. The Persian Empire fell to Alexander the
Great, King of Macedonia, in 333 B.C. During this time the Phoenicians being a

59
cosmopolitan people amenable to outside influences, adopted aspects of Greek
civilization with ease.
3

After the death of Alexander in 323 B.C., Phoenicia fell to Seleucus I one of
Alexanders Macedonian generals. Seleucid rule lasted until 64 B.C. when the Syria
and Lebanon were conquered by the Romans. The area was introduced to
Christianity and prospered once again. In 395 A.D., the Roman Empire was divided
into two and Lebanon became part of the Byzantine Empire. Here Lebanon
flourished for more than a century until in the sixth century a series of earthquakes
demolished the Baalbek temples and the city of Beirut, killing nearly 30,000 people.
In addition, the abuses and corruptions of the empire and the religious conflict that
emerged within it produced chaotic circumstances that allowed the Arab conquest of
Lebanon by newly converted Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula (634-636).
As the Arab Empire expanded into Lebanon it brought with it Islamic tribes
that settled on the coast of Lebanon. During the Umayyad (660-750) and Abbasid
(750-1258) periods the foundation of the current ethnic and religious landscape of
Lebanon was laid as the ancestors of the present Maronite, Roman Catholic, and
Greek Catholic Christians as well as the Druze settled in different areas of Lebanon.
The Arab rulers of the time were tolerant of Christians and Jews. The Abbasid era
produced an intellectual renaissance and an economic boom in the area.

3
Collelo, Thomas (ed). 1989. Lebanon: A country study / Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress. See http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lbtoc.html

60
During the Middle Ages, Lebanon became heavily involved in the Crusades
(1095-1291) and bitter conflicts arose among the various regional and ethnic groups
in Lebanon. The European Crusaders, the Mongols of Central Asia, and the Egyptian
Mamluks fought over supremacy of the area. Although the Holy Land fell to Saladin
in 1190, it was not until much later that Lebanon came into Muslim rule under the
Mamluks. During the Mamluk period (1282-1516) the Shiite Muslims from Iraq,
Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula immigrated to Lebanon. Despite the religious
conflicts among the different factions, the area flourished economically mainly due
to the large volume of lucrative trade with Europe.
The Ottomans vanquished the Mamluks in 1516 and ruled Lebanon through
emirs from two Druze feudal families, first the Maans and then the Shihabs, until the
middle of the nineteenth century. Under the Ottoman Empire the practice of
administering non-Muslim groups as separate communities called millets was
developed. This laid the groundwork for the system that still continues today with
each religious community organizing under its own head (such as the Maronites
under Patriarch Nassrallah Sfeir) and observing its own laws related to civil matters
such as divorce and inheritance. During the nineteenth century, Lebanon became a
hub of silk production and trade with Europe enriched the region (particularly the
Maronite Christians) and elevated Beirut to the status of the most important port in
the area.

61
In 1788 Bashir Shihab II, a Maronite, was elected Emir. In his attempt to
dissolve the feudal system that existed at the time and in doing so weaken his rivals
he raised the ire of another Bashir, Bashir Jumblatt, who had large support
particularly in the Druze community that he was a part of. This caused tension
between the two men that would lead to a sectarian conflict with a massacre of
Maronites by the Druze that is still remembered today. Battles raged from 1821 until
Jumblatt was killed in 1825 by Bashir II. The latter consequently went on to suppress
the Druze and this caused a large economic gap and tense sectarian rift between the
Druze and the Maronites which became particularly rebellious between 1839 and
1841. In 1841 another massacre of Christians by the Druze (with some help from the
Ottomans) took place.
The Ottomans attempted to achieve peace by dividing Mount Lebanon into
separate Christian and Druze districts, but this only created geographic powerbases
for the parties that plunged the region back into full-scale war by 1860. The
Maronites openly opposed the Ottomans and leant on the France of Napoleon who
sent troops to their aid. This instigated British support of the Druze which only
succeeded in exacerbating the situation. The battles escalated until the Congress of
Europe intervened and imposed their decision to accept Druze control via the
Ottoman Empire. This stabilized the region for the remainder of the nineteenth
century. Things changed in the approach to World War I with the need for political

62
reform. World War I was particularly difficult time for present-day Lebanon with a
locust attack that destroyed crops and wide-spread famine and death.
At the end of World War I and the consequent collapse of the Ottoman
Empire, the League of Nations mandated French control over Lebanon. This was
implemented in 1922. At the time Syria was already controlled by the French and
was scheduled to achieve independent status in a Class A Mandate. The French, who
controlled Lebanon in a Class B Mandate (which gave them primacy over
administration), drew a Lebanese-Syrian border that enlarged Lebanese territory at
the expense of Syria by adding to it the Beqaa Valley. This had consequences for the
Lebanese demographics as the citizens of the added areas were predominantly
Muslim or Druze. It shifted the religious composition of the population in Lebanon
so that the Christians (mostly Maronites) constituted barely more than half, while
Sunni Muslims saw their numbers increase eightfold and the Shiites quadrupled. The
constitution of the modern Lebanese state, drawn up in 1926 by the French,
necessitated a balance of powers among the religious groups mainly for France to
guarantee the dominance of its Christian allies. The president was required to be a
Christian and the prime minister a Sunni. On the basis of the 1932 census,
parliamentary seats were divvied on a ration of six Christians to five Muslims. The
president was given veto power over any legislation approved by parliament,
virtually ensuring that the six to five ratio would not be revised in the event that the
religious demographics changed. By 1960, Muslims were thought to compose the

63
religious majority of the population and this contributed to their unrest and
disapproval regarding the political system in place.

3.1.2 The Disastrous Civil War (1975-1991)

Lebanon gained its independence from France on November 22
nd
, 1943 and
French troops withdrew in 1946. The new republic quickly became known as the
Paris of the Middle East and enjoyed a prosperous economic period that lasted until
the outbreak of the civil war. The region, however, was in turmoil and this leaked
over. After the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, 110,000 Palestinian refugees flooded into
Lebanon, higher numbers than those who fled to any other Arab country. These were
followed by more Palestinians after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and after their defeat
in the civil war of Jordan. Led by Yasser Arafats Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), Palestinian militiamen grouped in Lebanon and as of 1968 used
the southern areas of the militarily weaker country to launch attacks on Israel. This
had enormous implications for the nations future.
In 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an
El Al flight bound for Algiers in July and attacked an El Al plane in Athens in
December killing two people. In retaliation Israeli agents destroyed 13 airliners
belonging to Arab carriers later that month at Beirut International Airport. The
Israelis maintain that these actions were meant at encouraging a crackdown on the

64
Palestinian militants via the Lebanese government but what they succeeded in doing
in Lebanon was to polarize the society into pro-Palestinian (mainly Muslim) and
anti-Palestinian (mainly Maronite) camps the vast majority of the Palestinian
refugees are Sunni Muslims. This added to the already present and increasing
tensions between the religions over political power in Lebanon and the burgeoning
Palestinian population (which had reached 300,000 by 1975). Residues of the
colonial period constitutionally guaranteed Christian control of the Lebanese
government, but changing demographics in favor of the Muslims had them calling
for a new census and a consequent revision of powers. These political tensions, when
compounded with the afore-mentioned external forces, would translate militarily into
the outbreak of civil war in April of 1975.
In 1976, the Maronites asked the Syrians to intervene in the civil war. This
summoned Syrian troops into Lebanon and brought about an Arab summit on the
issue. But the situation escalated with clashes between the PLO and the Israelis in the
south. In 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon up to the Litani River and this
resulted in the evacuation of around 100,000 Lebanese people from that area (Smith
2001) and the death of 2000 (Chomsky 1982). After U.N. Security Council
Resolution 425 was passed, Israel withdrew from Lebanon later that year. The
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created to confirm the
withdrawal, restore security, and reaffirm Lebanese control of the south.
4
But tension

4
For more information see the UNIFIL website (accessed on 7/1/06) at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/

65
remained between the Israelis and Palestinians on one hand, and the Syrians and the
Israelis on the other. The Phalange (a Lebanese Maronite Christian militia) fell out
with Syria and was backed by Israel. These conflicts, on top of intra-Palestinian
fighting negated all efforts made in the name of long-term peace.
Israel invaded Lebanon again on June 6, 1982, and this time did not stop in
the south but reached Beirut. Approximately 20,000 people (on all sides and mostly
civilians) were killed. Yasser Arafat negotiated an evacuation for his PLO and an
international force (of Italian and French troops and U.S. marines) arrived in Beirut
to ensure this occurred smoothly without loss of more civilian life. About 15,000
Palestinians were evacuated by September 1 and the President of Lebanon, Bashir
Gemayel, agreed to send troops from his Phalange into Palestinian camps to remove
2000 more PLO members. He was assassinated on September 14. Two days later the
Phalange entered the camps and, in what is now known as the Sabra and Shatila
massacres, killed more than 700 Palestinians none apparently members of any PLO
unit (Smith 2001).
All the efforts of President Amin Gemayel (who succeeded his brother) to get
both the Israelis and Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon failed. In 1983, the Israelis
withdrew to the south and established a security zone in Lebanon where they
would remain until 2000. Attacks against U.S. interests, including two truck
bombings of the U.S. Embassy (in 1983 and 1984) and the well-known attack on the
U.S. Marine barracks (October 23, 1983), initiated in 1984 an American withdrawal

66
and a virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army. The fighting only intensified between
1985 and 1989. The Shiite militia Amal was fighting the Palestinians. The latter later
joined forces with the Druze and leftists against Amal and drew Syria into the midst
of the conflict. Battles then began to flare between Amal and Hezbollah.
The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rashid Karami, was assassinated on June 1,
1987. When President Amin Gemayels term expired in September 1988, he
appointed the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces a fellow Maronite Christian as
his successor, as was his constitutional right. General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime
Minister, was met with vast disapproval among Muslim groups who chose to support
Selim al-Hoss a Sunni who had replaced Karami. Lebanon was thus without a
president and split into two with a Christian government in East Beirut and a Muslim
government in West Beirut.
In February 1989, General Aoun launched the War of Liberation using the
Lebanese Armed Forces in his attempt to expel the Syrian Army from Lebanon. He
was not aided by any other Lebanese militia in his pursuit. In fact, Syria was at the
time backed by the U.S. and pro-Syrian groups in Lebanon. In October 1990, the
Syrians attacked the Presidential Palace in Lebanon (where Aoun was taking refuge)
and forced Aoun to flee to the French Embassy and then into exile in Paris where he
remained until 2005. The civil war thus ended with Syrian troops in Lebanon to
maintain order and prevent a return to violence. The goal was for them to aid

67
Lebanon in this critical transition and then to hand over the reigns to the newly
formed Lebanese government.
The Taif Agreement, ratified on November 4, 1989, has therefore been
considered the beginning of the wars end. Rene Mouawad was elected president the
following day, but was assassinated less than three weeks later. He was succeeded by
Elias Hrawi who remained in office until 1998. After the end of most of the conflict
in 1990, elements from the Taif Agreement began to materialize when the Lebanese
parliament and president amended the constitution to reflect its political reform. The
parliament was enlarged to 128 seats that were divided equally between the
Christians and Muslims. An amnesty law was also passed to pardon most of the war
crimes that had occurred during the civil war. In May 1991, all militias except
Hezbollah were dissolved and these militias handed in their weapons to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. But the situation in Lebanon did not become peaceful and safe
overnight. In late 1991 a car carrying 220 pounds of TNT exploded in Beirut killing
at least 30 people including the former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. It was only in
May of 1992 that Hezbollah released the last of the Westerners that they had
kidnapped during the mid-1980s.

68
3.1.3 Rebuilding Post-Disaster (1991-2006)

Immediately post-war, the Lebanese population was rampant with
homelessness, poverty, trauma, and tragedy. It is estimated that 100,000 people were
killed and an equal number maimed in the war. Around 900,000 people were
displaced with 250,000 emigrating permanently. During the war at least 3,641 car
bombs had gone off leaving 4,386 casualties and thousands of people injured.
5

Thousands of dangerous landmines remain concentrated in the areas of conflict. Tens
of thousands of victims of wartime and kidnapping have disappeared. This is all
other than the physical losses of the country in terms of housing, infrastructure,
buildings, roads, etc.
Bulldozers now replace machines of warfare in the effort to
reconstruct Beirut and the rest of the nation. The barricades of the
Green Line, which divided the capital into Christian East Beirut and
Muslim West Beirut, are gone. Never has Beirut attracted so much
attention whether that of writers, politicians, or investors as it did
immediately after the end of the war. Its reconstruction is seen to be
the first step towards that of the whole country.

Since the end of the civil war, Lebanon has attempted to rebuild itself
politically as well as physically but this has been anything but easy. The
restructuring of the political system more equitably among the Christian and Muslim
sects (according to the Taif Accord) was the first step in that process. However, the
situation in Lebanon was still unstable socially, politically, and economically (with

5
http://www.newsobserver.com/nation_world/mideast/story/2276550p-8655366c.html (accessed on
6/13/06)

69
the collapse of the currency). In May 1992, the Prime Minister Omar Karami
resigned. He was replaced by Rashid al-Sulh who presided over the parliamentary
elections of 1992, the first in over 20 years.
The chosen Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a Sunni billionaire businessman,
then formed a Council of Ministers. He also played a large role in linking the
reconstruction of the country to private investment and in the formation of
SOLIDERE the company that manages the rebuilding of the downtown area of
Beirut. Hariris strategy was to focus on rebuilding that area, the Beirut Central
District (BCD), in an effort to increase economic activity and then investment
potential that will in turn spillover to the rest of the nation. During the time of Hariri,
rebuilding flourished only to slow down when he was replaced by Salim al-Hoss in
1998. In the two years until Rafiq Hariri came back to the position of prime minister
(in 2000), the reconstruction process slowed considerably.
Progress since the end of the war has thus been mixed. The Lebanese enjoy
more democratic representation and freedoms than the rest of the Arab world. Public
participation at the local level of municipal elections is high. Parliamentary elections
have gradually become better attended and more transparent over the years since the
end of the war. However, the country still has its political problems. In January 2002,
Elie Hobeika a former member of the Lebanese Forces associated with the massacres
of Sabra and Shatilla was assassinated via car-bomb in Beirut. Also, the presence of

70
around 15,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon and the effective Syrian dominance and
interference are well-known.
The Syrians justified their continued presence in Lebanon so many years after
the Taif gave them legitimacy by maintaining that the Lebanese Armed Forces (the
army) were too weak to handle the tensions that existed. Hezbollah is still armed
despite numerous U.N. decisions calling for its disarmament and the Israelis still
occupied the south. Problems persisted along the Lebanese-Israeli border and in
April 1996 the Israeli Defense Forces launched Operation Grapes of Wrath. Air raids
on the towns of Southern Lebanon led to the flight of between 300,000 and 500,000
people, the death of 170 civilians, and 350 injuries. The damage to infrastructure and
housing as well as the tourism industry was substantial and estimated in the billions
of U.S. dollars. When Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 2000, Syrias
argument weakened considerably. The Maronites, Druze, and Sunnis called for the
withdrawal of Syrian troops. The majority of Shiites (who are represented by
Hezbollah), on the other hand, supported Syria and its presence in Lebanon.
On May 22, 2000 Israel completed its withdrawal from Lebanon that was
certified by the U.N. A 50 square kilometer area known as the Shebaa Farms remains
under Israeli control and this has been contested by Lebanon. Although the U.N. has
recognized the Shebaa Farms as belonging to Syria, the Lebanese government
contends that the area is part of Lebanon. This view has been used to justify the
continued armament of Hezbollah (as they were needed to liberate the part of

71
Lebanon still under Israeli control). On September 2, 2004, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1559 which called for all remaining foreign forces to
withdraw from Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias. However, Hezbollah has not yet disarmed. They have
and violated the Blue Line drawn between Lebanon and Israel with incursions into
the Shebaa Farms area and the Israelis have reciprocated with air strikes into
Southern Lebanon and consistently trespassing into Lebanons airspace. The area is
thus anything but stable.
In September 2004, the Lebanese Parliament (many, including the U.S., say
under the pressure of Syria) voted to amend the constitution to allow President Emile
Lahouds term to be extended. The prime minister at the time, Rafiq Hariri, resigned
in protest against the amendment which was directly opposed to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1559 that called for new presidential elections in Lebanon. A
spiral of violence and consequent change began in the nation when on October 1,
2004, the Druze ex-parliament member Marwan Hamadeh (who had resigned in
protest of the amendment) was the target of a car bomb attack in which he and his
bodyguard were wounded and his driver killed.
On February 15, 2005, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated
in a car bomb attack that killed 22 and wounded 100 in Beirut.
6
This sparked the

6
SYRIA: Year in Brief 2005 - A chronology of democratic developments, in The Daily Star,
Damascus, Jan. 12 2006:
http://www.10452lccc.com/daily%20news%20bulletin/january.english13.06.htm (accessed on
6/13/06).

72
beginning of what is termed the Cedar Revolution where tens of thousands of
Lebanese rallied in protest. Massive protests such as these have been quite
uncommon in the Arab world, and while in the 90s most anti-Syrian demonstrators
were predominantly Christian (and put down by force), the new demonstrations were
distinctly non-sectarian.
7
Although there is still no conclusive evidence of who is to
blame for Hariris murder, public outrage against Syria heightened and calls for its
withdrawal from Lebanon increased in frequency and volume. International pressure
on Syria was also multiplied. On February 28, the government headed by pro-Syrian
Omar Karami resigned.
As more nations came together to pressure Syria, its President Bashar Assad
declared on March 5 that his troops would withdraw to the Beqaa Valley and then to
the Syrian-Lebanese border. However, he did not outline a timetable for this
withdrawal. Hezbollah in turn demonstrated in the hundreds of thousands (400 to
500) against Resolution 1559. The show of power demonstrated Hezbollah's
influence, wealth and organization as the sole Lebanese party allowed to hold a
militia by Syria. But the fight was not over. After weeks of international and local
pressure, a perceived U.N. showdown on the horizon, and a massive rally of about
one million people in Lebanon one month after Hariris death, Syria finally caved in.
By the end of April 2005, all Syrian troops had left the country.

7
From the BBC article at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4315223.stm (accessed on 6/13/06).

73
The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, however, did not mean that its
problems were over. Tensions remained between the pro-Syrian (Hezbollah) and
anti-Syrian groups. Syria still exerts influence on Lebanon through Hezbollah and
other pro-Syrian politicians. Border skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel still
occur and destabilize the region. Notably, in November 2005, Hezbollah launched
the heaviest attack along the Lebanese-Israeli border since Israel withdrew from
Lebanon in 2000. The attack was a failed attempt to cover for Hezbollah troops in
order for them to abduct Israeli troops to use as pawns in prisoner exchange.
Lebanon is also not a safe place because of the violence that has escalated
since the beginning of Syrian withdrawal in the region (with the Israelis and
Palestinians and the escalating sectarian violence in Iraq) and in Lebanon. In March
2005, a series of bombs went off in the Christian suburbs of Beirut killing three
people and wounding dozens. In June Samir Qaseer, a prominent anti-Syrian
journalist for the daily An-Nahar newspaper, was killed in a car bomb in Beirut.
George Hawi, anti-Syrian former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party, was also
killed in a Beirut car bomb that same month. Both killings are popularly blamed on
Damascus, which staunchly denies responsibility.
In July, Elias Murr, the Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister,
survived an attempted assassination. Later that month, a bomb exploded on Mono
Street which is the center of nightlife in the Christian area of Beirut just hours after
the departure of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In September, a

74
broadcaster for the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation who presented anti-Syrian
programs, Mae Shadiak, was maimed by a car bomb in Beirut. This was followed up
in December by the murder via roadside bomb of Gibran Tueni, the publisher of An-
Nahar newspaper and a prominent and vocal anti-Syrian member of the cabinet. This
has also been widely blamed on Syria.
8

It is in the midst of all this violence, political change, and instability that
Lebanon finds itself now. The region is also in turmoil with continued sectarian
violence in Iraq, escalating conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians in 2006,
and the tensions between the U.S. and both Syria and Iran in part because of their
financial and military support for Hezbollah (which the U.S. views as a terrorist
organization). The tensions of this existence affect the daily lives of the Lebanese
people and they cannot be studied or understood without a look at the history of their
country and how it got to where it is now. A better understanding of the
consequences of history and context for the Lebanese identity ensues.

3.2 A Sociopolitical Legacy of Identities

A look at the history of Lebanon gives us insight into the political, social,
ethnic, and religious factors that come together to influence the Lebanese society

8
The source for this paragraph and the one preceding it is The Daily Star newspaper article SYRIA:
Year in Brief 2005 - A chronology of democratic developments, Damascus, Jan 12 2006 (IRIN)
accessed on 7/3/06. It can be found at:
http://www.10452lccc.com/daily%20news%20bulletin/january.english13.06.htm.

75
today. Knowledge of the public that planners deal with is a key ingredient that can
add to the success of direct citizen participation efforts. In this specific case study,
the historical context hints to characteristics of the population and the different
identities and groups present within it. The history of Lebanon demonstrates a
background of people used to survival in harsh times, to oppression, and even to
revolt (since the time of the Phoenicians against the Assyrians and Babylonians). It
shows a kind of people that acclimates quickly since the time the Phoenicians where
dominated by the Greeks. Even today, the main occupations of the Lebanese are
trade and tourism and most speak two languages or more (Dagher 2000).
The Lebanese people have survived a long history of strife: from wars with
different conquering forces, to natural disasters (numerous devastating earthquakes
and a locust attack which lead to widespread famine during World War I), to
religious conflict since the time of the Romans to the Arabs, Crusades, Ottoman
Empire, French Mandate, and civil war. It seems like practically every major
religious sect or ethnicity in Lebanon has had some sort of conflict with at least one
other group at some point in time and often with foreign military or financial
interference. The Druze and Maronites have fought bringing in the Ottomans,
French, and British. The Muslims and Christians clashed during the French Mandate.
During the civil war many foreign and domestic groups engaged in the fighting:
Palestinians (the PFLP and PLO), Israelis, Syrians, Maronites (Phalange and their
armed division the Lebanese Forces), Shiites (Hezbollah and Amal), Druze, leftists,

76
and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Even international forces (from France, Italy, and
the U.S.) and the U.N. (through the UNIFIL for instance) have become involved on
the ground to try to stop the combating and bring about peace.
All these influences are apparent in the identities of the Lebanese people. If
you were to question Lebanese citizens of their identity you would most likely be left
perplexed by the diversity of responses. Lebanon is a mosaic of many identities:
Arab, Phoenician, Mediterranean, French, global/western, Muslim, or Christian (with
their various sects) just to name a few. In this section I will discuss the Lebanese
identities through four factors that have had a hand in their formation: colonization,
religion, globalization, and the civil war. An understanding of these influences on
identity and of the different identities and characteristics of the Lebanese people can
lead to a better comprehension of the public under investigation.

3.2.1 Colonization

The French Lebanese identity appears to be a product of the French
colonization of Lebanon and the maintenance of strong ties between the two nations
even after the occupation was dissolved. In the introduction to The Colonizer and the
Colonized (Memmi 1965), Jean-Paul Sartre emphasizes the denial of human rights,
deprivation and oppression suffered by colonized cultures. He tells us that while
colonialism breaks down the social ties among the subjugated, it also creates a form

77
of patriotism: unity in the face of the oppressor. But what becomes of a society that it
is consistently projected as inferior and uncivilized; that is depersonalized and
debased time and again? Memmi (1965) answers that it starts to see itself through the
eyes of the colonizer and ultimately adopts the view. Charles Taylor (1994: 25)
discusses how our identity is shaped by others: our identity is partly shaped by
recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or
group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people of society
around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture
of themselves.
The colonized internalize the image they see in the eyes of the colonizer and
are weighed down by self-hatred and low self-esteem. In The Wretched of the Earth
(1968), Frantz Fanon describes this self-depreciating self-image and asserts that the
colonized must forcefully rid themselves of it before they can be truly free of the
oppressor. In Lebanon, the French proved their political supremacy in issues that
ranged from the physical transformation of Beirut and renaming the streets to the
compulsory utilization of the French language in official circles. The Lebanese were
thus not only self-depreciating, but also violently torn away from their past identity
and their culture.
Suddenly the French, their culture and all its characteristics became
something to aspire to. Memmi (1965: 127) says of the colonized: He has been torn
away from his past and cut off from his future, his traditions are dying and he loses

78
hope of acquiring a new culture. He has neither language, nor flag, nor technical
knowledge, nor national or international existence, nor rights, nor duties. He
possesses nothing, is no longer anything, and no longer hopes for anything. With
nothing to lose, the colonized revolts, abandons attempts at assimilation and turns to
what he knows. In Lebanon, the French Mandate brought a distinction between
religions in their favoring of the Christians over the Muslims that increased
preexisting sectarian tensions. This influenced religious identities as, generally
speaking, the Christians took on the identity of the colonizer while the Muslims
rebelled against it and returned to their Arab roots.

3.2.2 Religious Identity

During the French colonization, Christians in Lebanon and predominantly the
Maronites were considered privileged compared to the rest of the population (Dagher
2000). Although they were also oppressed, they were treated better by the French
and given higher positions (Dagher 2000). As mentioned previously, this was
reflected in the constitutional powers Christians were given over the Muslims in
terms of the presidential position and parliamentary majority. (Even after
colonization collapsed, the French still maintained and continue to preserve their ties
with Lebanon in general and the Maronites in particular.) As a consequence of these
inequalities, social conflict emerged between the Muslims and the Christians.

79
In Bring down the Walls (2000) Dagher highlights this issue in depth. She
discusses the close proximity of Lebanese Christians, especially Maronites, to a
francophone existence and their problematic relationship with Arabism. For Dagher
(2000), Arabity is a culture, a history, a civilization, a language, and a perception.
Since Arabic is the mother tongue of Islam it is no surprise that Arabity is associated
with Muslims. Many Lebanese Christians have long struggled with and taken offense
to the perception or, to borrow Taylors term, misrecognition derived
predominantly from parts of the western world (especially the U.S. and particularly
after September 11, 2001) that Arab equals Muslim, Islam equals extremism, and
extremism brings terrorism implies Arabs bring terrorism. This sentiment is a source
of ire to many moderate Muslims and not just in Lebanon, but the Lebanese
Christians who feel more associated with French or western culture than Arabity and
Islam can take more offense to being grouped together with fundamentalist
extremists. Consequently, some Christians in Lebanon have come to dread the
meaning the West has related with Arabity and wearily avoid being associated with
the term Arab, preferring its substitution with the term Phoenician. Edward Said
highlights the Western fallacy of Arab identity in Orientalism (1978).
Martha Nussbaum discusses Western arrogance and the fact that the Western
designation of the East as nonrational, superstitious, and amoral stem from an
attitude that assumes Western values to be normative for morality and culture
(1997: 116). In both cases of conflict: between the two endogenous religions of

80
Lebanon and between the internal and external notions of identity, the source of the
dilemma and difference seems to be the association in some way with Western ideals
and culture or with assimilation to them. This is all the more powerful today as a
consequence of the onset of the globalization era and Islamic fundamentalism.

3.2.3 Globalization

In Lebanon the significance of todays one-world view is apparent. Many
Lebanese Christians are influenced by the West, particularly the francophone and
English-speaking portions. But this is not exclusively a Christian trait in Lebanon.
Dagher (2000) stresses that French-speaking is on the rise in Lebanese Muslims and
that this group has become more enthusiastic in its teaching of the French culture to
its children. Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri declared, While being proud of its
Arabic culture and its Mediterranean heritage, Lebanon perceives francophony as a
way of life and thinking (2000: 26). According to a study conducted in 1996, 44.4%
of the Lebanese population spoke French (and Arabic), 22.2% spoke English (and
Arabic), and 20.5% were trilingual speaking Arabic, French and English (Abou,
Kasparian, and Haddad 1996 in Dagher 2000). In addition, a more Westernized
education system is in place in Lebanon, and it is attended by both religions,
although with the Christians in higher proportion (Dagher 2000).

81
Lebanon is the sole non-Muslim Arab country (the entire population is not
governed by Islamic rule) and this can be seen as a factor that has mediated the
evolvement of a more liberal society. The Lebanese enjoy the most freedoms and
highest levels of democracy in the Middle East save for Israel (The Economist
2006).
9
Many Arab traditions are still in place and people remain conservative but
global markets exist and new technologies are rapidly being adopted. As Kabbani
(1998) highlights, soon after the civil war was over in Lebanon the McDonalds and
Burger Kings began sprouting on every corner. The Internet is the young
generations new best friend. Cable TV is affordable and allows the Lebanese the
luxury of more than one hundred international channels (in addition to the local) that
range from CNN, BBC, and TF1 (France), to Egyptian, Turkish, and Indian
channels, Fashion TV, The Disney Channel, and the ever precious MTV. Radios
blare with assorted musical styles in a variety of languages. Shopping malls have
replaced the traditional souks and are gathering places for the public. Restaurants
have acquired global cuisines and nightclubs diverse scenes. This resonates with a
familiar sound. The effect is what Barber has called a McWorld. This is the world
of the global consumer. Kabbani (1998) underlines this global scheme with the
advertisement for The Hard Rock Café which opened a few years after the end of the
war in Beirut. What was interesting was the East West identity merger presented:
Abou-al-Abed (a Lebanese comic figure), in traditional Lebanese clothing, holding

9
Smiley, Xan. 2006. Plenty of seeds, but still a long way to fruition: Arab democracy in 2006, in
The World in 2006, The Economist 20
th
edition.

82
in one hand a traditional water pipe (argileh) and in the other hand a microphone
extending from the pipe (Kabbani 1998: 258).
Barber has advised caution in similar circumstances and Lebanon presents
the epitome of the case presented in Jihad vs McWorld (1996). The dire
consequences of technology being allowed free reign also concerns Selznick (1992).
He claims that traditional crafts have no chance of surviving one round in the ring
with the technology of industrialized nations: In such cases the key to cultural
destruction is the loss of motivation that occurs when activities are robbed of their
symbolic meaning. Loss of motivation brings with it personal disorganization
(1992: 7). McWorld is thus both an explanation and a prerequisite motivation for the
emergence of Jihad. Jihad must exist in order to tend to the soul that McWorld
ignores: Moral preservationists have no choice but to make war on the present, to
secure a future more like the past: depluralized, monocultured, unskepticized,
reenchanted (Barber 1996: 215).
Lebanon thus signifies Barbers New World Disorder. The nation is a
battleground for the ongoing war between Jihad and McWorld, personalized by a
minority of Islamic fundamentalists who clash with the westernized population.
This militant strand of Islam fights against the corruption manifested by the West
and the modernization epitomized by Westernization. This currently visible
struggle is further burdened by the distinct religiousness of identity particularly after
the Lebanese civil war.

83
3.2.4 The Civil War and Regional Instability

The expression civil war is invariably associated with unspeakable mayhem
and violence. Unlike an external war, where the population of the country under
attack unites to face the alien offender, an internal war is a violent conflict of
society with itself (Kabbani 1998: 241). In Lebanon this translated as house-to-
house combat, snipers, and bombing that left buildings in rubble or skeletons. Add to
that the 170,000 fatalities, twice that number of injured, twelve to fifteen billion
dollars in damages (by 1982, according to UN experts), and an economy left in
shambles. By 1998, one third of the Lebanese population was in poverty and the war
had uprooted two thirds from their homes (Khalaf 1998).
The far worse symptoms of the war are psychological. The civil strife
Lebanon witnessed left an aftermath of post-stress disorders mixed with feelings of
hopelessness and despair and the dissolving of societal ties. Khalaf summarizes the
most detrimental side-effects as follows: Virtually the entire population of Lebanon
has witnessed or directly experienced all forms of random violence, anarchy,
disorder, terror, homelessness and recklessness and senseless destruction of life and
property. A sizeable portion of the Lebanese are either victimized, traumatized or
demoralized (1983: 19). The demise of civility that transpired led to the adoption of
the selfish every-man-for-himself attitude which to this day prevails. Dishonesty is
now the norm in a country whose hospitality and courteousness were once its

84
exchange. The current deceit and corruption knows no boundaries. Samir Khalaf
points to the insatiable appetite for profit among the bourgeoisie, and the
vengeful feeling of entitlement to unearned privileges among the disenfranchised
(1998: 148).
The ruined landscape also deprived the Lebanese of their identification with
and familiarity to place. They were thus left homeless in more ways than one. Apart
from obviously being dislocated, they were separated from their nostalgic memories
and attachments to physical objects, structures, and landscape. In order to survive
and overcome this circumstance of war (as well as others), desensitization was
necessary. The citizens therefore learned to numb their feelings during the war and
this explains the current callousness, disengagement, and disinterest that tend to
prevail.
The Lebanese also distanced themselves from the war by returning to their
roots and reestablishing solidarities in communities. Khalaf refers to this vital issue,
Lebanon has been experiencing the dismemberment of a society. The most
elementary social ties which normally hold a society together ties of trust, loyalty,
confidence, compassion, and decency have in many respects been fatally eroded
(1998: 19). Reverting to group and community for comfort may have facilitated the
Lebanese survival of the war, but at the same time it generated ghettoization.
Friedman states, The Lebanese individual traditionally derived his social identity

85
and psychological support from his primordial affiliations family, neighborhood, or
religious community, but rarely from the nation as a whole (1989: 46).
There are 17 main religious sects that are recognized by the government in
Lebanon. According to the CIA World Factbook (2005), the Lebanese population is
59.7% Muslim (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite or Nusayri) and 39%
Christian (Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian
Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic,
Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, and Protestant). The remaining 1.3% of the population is
classified religiously as other. These sects tend to be closely-knit and in agreement
on major political issues. Many have their own political parties (Amal and Hezbollah
for example are mainly Shiite) and religious leaders assume a major role in political
arenas (such as the Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir).
10

The Lebanese escapism into small communities as a result of the war is thus
clearly understandable (Khalaf 1983, 1998; Friedman 1989), but the same ties that
kept the society alive during the civil conflict have ultimately added to its current
division and instability. The civil war has thus affected the present mentality of the
Lebanese public in ways that cannot be reversed or overcome without a great deal of
time and effort. The psychological dilemmas, the fragmentation of society, and the
loss of civility and hope are all serious issues that are important for public
participation and reconciliation efforts.

10
UNDP-POGAR (accessed on 7/3/06): http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=9

86
The people of Lebanon have witnessed prolonged strife and conflict. Since
World War I under Ottoman rule, they have experienced internal clashes (between
the Druze and the Maronite Christians for instance), a famine, the French Mandate,
the fight for independence, more internal struggle, the Arab-Israeli wars, the influx
of Palestinian refugees, Israeli-Palestinian conflict within Lebanese territory, the
Israeli takeovers of Southern Lebanon (and then of Beirut), and the Lebanese Civil
War. Since the end of the war in 1991, the situation has not exactly been stable.
Syrian dominance that was legitimated in the Taif oppressed freedoms and
democratic rights of the Lebanese. Israeli attacks such as Grapes of Wrath in 1996
have killed civilians and negatively influenced the political and economic situation in
Lebanon. The numerous assassinations, bombs, and attempted assassinations that
have occurred in 2005 in addition to the ongoing skirmishes and tensions at the
border between Hezbollah and Israel add to the uncertainties faced by the civilians in
Lebanon. Recently escalating violence in Iraq and between the Israelis and
Palestinians has destabilized the entire Middle Eastern region. The high instability,
uncertainty, and perceived risk concern the people of Lebanon and weigh heavily on
them both mentally and physically. They are also impacted economically as foreign
tourists are less likely to visit when such instability is perceived, and most of the
countrys current economy relies on tourism.
Throughout the lives of the people that make up the public in this case study,
they have witnessed much fighting and experienced extended strife and harsh living

87
conditions. The population has resiliently survived extensive bombing, killing, and
maiming and deficiencies in water, gas, electricity, and food resources. As a result of
our study of Lebanons history and the identities of the Lebanese people, we can
begin to understand the obstacles for public participation in the current post-war
planning process. In addition to and because of issues among the religious sects
and the internal and regional political conflict and instabilities, the post-war
Lebanese public is complex and multifaceted. An understanding of the
characteristics and identities presented can be reflected in the purpose,
conceptualization, and implementation of participatory processes in the context of
Lebanon. A further understanding of how planning occurs in this environment is also
helpful in placing public participation in an even more specific context within the
domain of planning practice in Lebanon.

88
Chapter 4 RESEARCH DESIGN

A study of any war-torn society is bound to present a new set of
complications for urban planners. In the case of societies torn by civil war, planning
is even more intricate and more poignant. Residual internal hatreds and divisions
make the objectives of post-war planners mainly reconstruction and rehabilitation
more difficult to achieve. Lebanon is a country that has experienced 15 years of
internal conflict, that remained under Syrian occupation for about 15 years more, and
that even today remains highly unstable politically and economically. Due to the lack
of data in planning (as in other fields) in this climate, this study is very personal and
specific. The emotional response that this type of research evokes prompted a
realistic decision in this study to provide a research design structure that takes into
account the biases involved and does not attempt to be impassive.
Lebanon is taken as a case study, with three case examples from within it,
that exemplifies the complexities of public participation and its institutional nature.
The study illustrates the personal stories of post-war urban planners working in
Beirut, Lebanon. My impressions of the mindset of the interviewees, of the customs
and traditions, and of the cultural biases all put these stories into perspective. The
comprehensive first-person delivery of the detailed interviews conducted and the
consequent qualitative institutional analysis provide depth to the study that would not
have been achieved by detached means such as surveys. The access I had to people

89
due to my Lebanese citizenship, my contacts in Beirut, and my shared culture and
language (with most of the interviewees) was a definite advantage particularly in a
society that tends to distrust outsiders and a political context ripe with instability and
danger.

4.1 The Problem of Method

The atmosphere of hatred and blame, religious sectarianism, and political
instability that prevails in Lebanon is tangible and undeniable and an impediment to
post-war urban planning efforts and research. Since this study was conducted in a
post-war context and is a product of it, this context impacts the choice of
methodology used. The context has in some way or another molded me and all those
who participated in the study as we have all lived it. Most of the participants have
experienced the Lebanese civil war as have I. All of them have experienced and
worked in post-war Lebanon.
It is difficult to see the suffering of the Lebanese public and to remain
dispassionate. The experienced and witnessed poverty, homelessness, immigration,
and psychological traumas and the losses of livelihoods and ways of life due to the
Civil War are unquantifiable and heartbreaking. It is difficult if not impossible to
conduct a study under these conditions and to remain the scientific, unemotional,
detached observer. This is not the intention here. The research presented is a first

90
person account of the post-war experiences of urban planners working in Beirut,
Lebanon. The story of public participation in post-war Lebanon cannot be told
without underlining the biases of the storyteller and the sources of her story (the
interviewees).
Studies of war-torn societies that remain politically unstable can be
potentially hazardous or unsafe. In this case there was substantial risk in being in
Lebanon during the time the interviews took place. The U.S. Department of State has
been advising U.S. citizens not to travel to Lebanon for years and renewed the travel
warning for Lebanon in November 2005 and more recently in May 2006.
11
Case
studies in post-war conditions can also be time-consuming and costly particularly
when primary data is relatively rare or very difficult to get a hold of. Post-civil war
societies also tend to be distrustful of strangers and suspicious of their intentions and
I encountered my share of questions surrounding the dissertation, its objectives, and
the university.
Another issue with case study work is its lack of generalizability. However,
the goal in this study is not to generalize the results of the analysis in Lebanon but to
attain a better understanding of public participation in post-civil war planning, to
highlight its complexities, and in turn to provide a clearer picture of public
participation in general. In an effort to highlight the issues of methodology, I will

11
U.S. Department of State. 2006. Travel Warning for Lebanon. This is updated periodically at:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_2123.html (accessed on 7/7/06).

91
discuss in more detail the problematic context, the nature of the research, and the
chosen case study method.

4.1.1 The Problematic Context

The planning problems in Lebanon are highly complicated and difficult.
Lebanon has survived a 15-year civil war and remains politically divided and
unstable. As a result of the internal conflict, the Lebanese people have separated into
societies of religious sects under the umbrella of one multi-confessional nation. The
unresolved residues of the war are still apparent: the hatreds, blame, atrocious
memories, religious identities, and the fears and vulnerabilities including a general
distrust of government and of other groups. All of these things compound to make
Lebanon a case study that is ripe with the difficulties that highlight the complexities
of public participation.
In external war (interstate war or war between two different states) the people
of the attacked nation band together in the face of the attacker who is seen as the
malevolent enemy (Kabbani 1998). A good example of this would be the case of
England when it was attacked by Germany in World War II. Indeed, war against an
external aggressor can be seen as a unifying force (Benevolo 1988, Kabbani 1998).
Internal or intrastate war, also termed civil war, is more violently disruptive. It is a

92
classic case of We have met the enemy and he is us.
12
In Lebanon, the enemy so
to speak is from within the same nation. Civil war pits brother against brother and
crumbles the ties that hold a civil society together with long-term implications.
Whatever the underlying reasons for internal violence financial, political, ethnic, or
religious the atrocities witnessed are too close to home to be easily forgiven or
forgotten.
For these reasons, recovery from civil war is more complicated than that from
external war. For instance, after World War II England recovered and rebuilt with a
unity and a sense of purpose that is well-known. People suffered during the
bombings of London, but they fought together against the aggressor and after the war
was over they were able to band together, reconstruct, and look forward to their
future. In 1990 the civil war in Lebanon was declared over, but people still lived with
the enemy and the memories of the war. Hatreds that fester for fifteen years (1975
1990) dont vanish overnight. An essential part of the post-civil war planning process
is the rehabilitation of society and that includes mediation and bringing the different
factions back together. This added complication is an element of civil strife that
augments the difficulties of public participation in the post-war planning process.
How do we, for example, get the public to sit together and participate when in reality
you are dealing with not one public but many segregated and diverse publics some of

12
Cartoonist Walt Kelly first used this now famous quote in 1970 on a Pogo the possum poster for
Earth Day.

93
whom refuse to talk to each other at all or even would much prefer to annihilate each
other?
One might ask how this context these post-civil war and religious tensions
can impact research. The characteristic distrustfulness of people (that can come
from war) becomes apparent if one is just to scratch under the surface. For instance, I
was asked by the participants of the study numerous questions about my background,
the dissertation, my advisor, and the University of Southern California as much to
ease their minds, I feel, as to settle their curiosities. Participants seemed to prefer this
face-to-face verbal dialogue to build their trust in me to anything written. The Verbal
Consent Form was read to the last word by only two interviewees while as many
others showed no interest in it at all. The majority asked me to explain its contents
verbally but all interviewees accepted that they would be recorded. Only one person
refused to answer one question on one occasion and on others there were some
details that I was told off the record about some local political issues for instance.
Some questions I was asked such as where I have studied I felt were asked to
size me up in a way. The fact that I have graduated from the American University
of Beirut before going abroad for graduate studies indicates that I have lived in
Lebanon and I had not been abroad for too long. Most interviewees saw this as a plus
as I felt they saw me more as one of them the more they knew about my background
especially that I had lived in Lebanon and had experienced the civil war first-hand.

94
My sense was that they felt some sort of kinship that I would understand the
realities of post-civil war life and not be too idealistic or judgmental or western.
Just as the social and political context plays a role in this study, religious
tensions were also dwelling just beneath the immaculately displayed surface that
Lebanese society portrays. I was often asked what part of Lebanon I am from
particularly by the older Lebanese people (who tended in the study to be men). The
origin of ones residence in Lebanon, along with the family name, can be an
indicator of religion and sect. As my name gives no indication either way of my
religion (it can be Christian or Muslim or can belong to multiple sects), I suspect this
may have prompted the questioning. A couple of times I was asked about my
religious sect outright. It was interesting to me that none of the female participants
(all of whom are in their early thirties or thereabouts and are educated in the west)
asked any questions about my religious background but seemed more interested in
the study or in the academic aspects of my life. Some of the younger men and most
of the older Lebanese men asked much more detailed questions about my
background.
I felt that some of the older men were suspicious of my research and its
objectives. This is particularly true for those who worked on the reconstruction of
downtown Beirut. I felt that some interviewees (and not all) were worried that my
aim was to show the companies they worked for in a bad light. This may be in part
due to their past negative experiences with media and public criticism. I was able to

95
settle their minds at ease over this matter, but I must say that this did take some time
and effort before the interviews and even during the interviews themselves. As
people were exposed to the questions I posed they seemed to realize that I was not
out to criminalize anyone. The questions of post-war public participation, however,
seemed to slightly put a couple of participants on edge as I sensed they were worried
they were being personally blamed for the lack of participation. I felt that they went
on the defensive immediately. This innate sensitivity to the deficiency in public
involvement that some companies (particularly SOLIDERE) have been criticized for
in the past makes it a touchy subject which I approached very cautiously.
This highly sensitive political and religious context was taken into serious
and careful consideration while composing the questions. I did my best to make sure
that the questions could not be taken in any way to be accusatory or political in
nature and that I did not show political or religious bias in anything I said or did. For
example, SOLIDERE is a company that is very much connected with the deceased
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who was Sunni. The Future movement, a
Lebanese political party led by his son Saad, tends to be pro-Hariri. The majority of
Sunni Muslims support this party. They also look upon the late Rafiq Hariri with
reverence for a variety of reasons including his role in the reconstruction of
downtown Beirut. Because my interviews were conducted just a few short and
eventful months after his death, I was sure to tread carefully around any discussions

96
of his part the rebuilding and made no comments either way (for or against) if the
interviewee did broach the subject (which a couple did).
In addition to the residual hatreds and religious biases left behind by the 15-
year civil war, there are the political troubles and tensions that remain in Lebanon to
this day. One of the attempted assassinations that of Defense Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister Elias Murr in July 2005 occurred a few hundred meters from where
I was residing in Antelias, Lebanon while conducting the interviews. The bomb was
so powerful that the whole apartment shook and windows in neighboring buildings
shattered. The many dangers of living and conducting research in such an
environment are apparent and remain etched in your mind. There safety is an issue,
the risks are high, and the threat of death is so haphazard and uncertain that you think
twice about menial tasks such as visiting the grocery store.
On top of all these problems that Lebanon faces internally, it is also impacted
either directly or indirectly by political instabilities in the Middle Eastern region in
general. For instance Lebanon is impacted directly by the Iranian and Syrian support
and funding of the Lebanese armed, and mainly Shiite, political party Hezbollah. The
debate surrounding the disarming of Hezbollah is very heated on both sides and the
nation is split over whether or not this needs to be done and the methods this entails.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Iraq, and the potential for problems with
Irans nuclear program, all keep the region unstable and on edge. As a result of these
internal and external uncertainties the economic situation in Lebanon has been

97
impacted. It is within this context affected by the political situation and religious
sectarianism that research occurs.

4.1.2 The Nature of the Research

In circumstances such as those presented above in the case of Lebanon,
research is presented with many obstacles. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
conceptualize a study under the umbrella of these problems and issues within a
formalized hypothesis-testing framework. In this case, it would also be impossible
for the researcher to conduct a study, maintain distance, and remain impersonal. For
this reason I have chosen an up-close and personal study instead.
The inability to be impartial applies particularly to me, for as my background
enables me to form a kinship with interviewees and a better appreciation of the
context and situation, this understanding is also painful in the memories it brings
back of the war and sorrowful at the state of Lebanon and the Lebanese people. This
method of study may be more personal, painful, and difficult but there is no other
way possible. It would be pointless to achieve unemotional dispassionate true
results from the interviewees that are ultimately irrelevant because one has to be very
knowledgeable of the culture and circumstances and very tactful in questioning to
illicit true responses not what-you-want-to-hear answers and to know when you
have them. This implies the ruling out of surveys and other detached methods in

98
favor of deeper one-on-one face-to-face interviews that accomplish more meaningful
and useful results such as the expressions and states of mind of participants and my
impressions of them things that one cannot deduce in surveys or on paper by
reading transcripts.
Being Lebanese, I am no stranger to various religious identities under one
roof, to the disturbing memories than remain engrained in the people, to the fear and
distrust, and to the hatreds and prejudices that still linger in some cases. I am also
familiar with the country and the region; with the Arab, western, and Lebanese
cultures (as there are interviewees from all three origins); and with the Arabic and
English languages. All of these characteristics put me in a unique position that
enables me to have better access to people and to reach a better understanding of the
participants and of the issues presented. This will add to and enrich both the
interviews and my analysis of the research results so that they are clearer and more
useful and relevant.
As mentioned above, my understanding of the Lebanese culture and identity
and the fact that I speak Arabic fluently definitely aided my research both in the
information-gathering phase and in the analysis of the results. Some Lebanese people
reflect the post-civil war circumstance with underlying skepticism and a distrust of
outsiders. My Lebanese background enabled me to make contacts, to gain access to
people, and to interview them when I may not have been trusted to do so otherwise
had I come from different circumstances. I felt that most of the interviewees were

99
more relaxed with me after they understood that I was Lebanese, that I spoke Arabic,
and that I had graduated from the American University of Beirut (that my education
was not exclusively western as some of them had presumed before meeting me).
Also, my first-hand knowledge of the war allowed me to better understand the
interviewees who had shared this experience and to be more sensitive and empathetic
as a listener.
The experience of the civil war in Lebanon and the impacts of its aftermath
on me are undeniable. The indelible images of war remain. The memories of feelings
of fear and uncertainty evoked by the experience remain. Although I was barely a
teenager at the time, I still recall the panic I felt as I saw the alarm and fear in the
faces of my parent as they rushed us downstairs to what was perceived as the safest
part of the house as the our ears rang and the walls shook from the bombs falling
haphazardly around us. I remember us all (my family of six and my uncles family of
four) sleeping in one room, on the floor that was always prepared with sheets, and
huddling around with cups of hot cocoa to watch the eight oclock news (when the
power was on) with a desperation for information and in horror.
Now that I am older and a parent myself, I can look back at that experience
and imagine how difficult it must have been for parents to cope with the added
responsibilities if it had been that hard for me. They had to provide their families
with food and drinking water. Electricity and water were scarce. Horrifying stories of
people losing their homes, of whole families dying, and of brother meeting and

100
killing brother in combat were abundant. At the height of the war, road blocks were
formed in some areas were people were killed based on the religion on their ID
cards. Tales of gruesome findings and mass executions reached and affected the
entire population in some way or another. How do you ask someone about this
experience by sending out a list of questions in a survey?
The rebuilding of Lebanon after the war is very close to the hearts of the
Lebanese people despite the problems that the country remains plagued with. It is a
highly emotional process, the results of which are critical to the rehabilitation of the
nation. The urban planner in Lebanon is now faced with what one could easily call a
complicated task of enormous magnitude: to reconstruct an entire country and to
rehabilitate an entire population that is fragmented, passionately in disaccord, and
highly distrusting. At the immediate end of the war, this was compounded with
rampant homelessness, poverty, and the lack of adequate infrastructure, utilities, and
nutrition.
Through interviews, I felt that I attained a more intimate knowledge of the
experiences of the individual planners and therefore a better understanding of what
kinds of internal conflicts and conversations are taking place that can only be
achieved through interpersonal and in-depth dialogue. When the experience of the
war is well understood (especially firsthand), it is easy to see how critical the post-
civil war planning process becomes. Even though outwardly the population seems
distant, underneath the surface they are very passionate about the issue and they care

101
very much about the rebuilding of Beirut and of the nation. The same applies to the
urban planners that have more power than the average citizen in the direction the
planning process takes.
The post-civil war participation process is complicated not only in how,
where, and why in occurs but also in how it is perceived by the planners themselves
under the constraints they experience such as corruption, power struggles, and the
lack of funds. The richness of the context not only demanded but necessitated more
detailed and up-close study. The methodology of the dissertation therefore centers on
a comprehensive, mainly qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews of those deeply
involved in the continuing post-war planning process in Lebanon.

4.1.3 The Case Study Approach

When this study began, I was interested in whether participatory planning
processes emerge when planners are faced with post-civil war exigencies and
realities. I assumed that they did not that post-civil war participation was
nonexistent. Based on this assumption, I was tempted to examine the psyche of the
planner: What allows an educated planning practitioner to turn his or her back on
what is now understood as the corner-stone of the planning domain the public? I
was fascinated with what made the planner tick in post-civil war circumstances, how
they could plan in that situation day-to-day, and how in the case of Lebanon they

102
could accept this as a normal process ten years into post-war reconstruction. To this
end, I chose in-depth interviews with urban planners in the post-war context of
Lebanon and an institutional analysis of the results as the methodology. The
advantages I possessed in understanding the culture and language to gain access to
interviewees and the interesting and complicated backdrop I felt Lebanon provided
made it the obvious choice as a case study.
The main criticism of case studies is that their results are not generalizable
like those of surveys (Lincoln and Guba 1979, Hammersley et. al. 2000). This form
of methodology is generally viewed as lacking in rigor, replicability, and
comparability (Barzelay 1993). The outcomes of case studies are not easily applied
elsewhere and may not even be relevant in other cases due to the unique and varying
characteristics of different locations. However, The trouble with generalizations is
that they dont apply to particulars (Lincoln and Guba 1979). The goal in this study
is not to generalize the results of the analysis in Lebanon and to apply them to all or
other post-war societies. My aim is to attain a better understanding of public
participation in the post-civil war planning process and to highlight its complexities
in this situation. An investigation of the case of Lebanon achieves this as it brings
out many difficulties quite clearly. Any results that are generalizable are a good side-
benefit, but not the key objective.
Case studies have been known to uncover deeper social interactions and
causal relationships that enlighten our knowledge on human behavior (Burgess 1927,

103
Waller 1934, Connolly 1998). Even though the aim of this study is not to generalize
the results of the case study, the attained understanding of the difficulties involved in
public participation in the post-civil war planning process challenges not only our
assumptions of participation in these circumstances specifically, but also the broader
understanding of public participation in general. The meaning of public participation
as it is understood in the literature is too narrow and it becomes much more nuanced
and intricate as it is linked to the institutional character of the context. One sense of
participation is no longer enough. Public participation comes to have a unique
meaning in each case and context, it takes on multiple facets and characters, and it
means different things in diverse cases.

4.2 Interview Protocol

The in-depth interviews allowed me to gather qualitative data on the internal,
as well as external, dialogues and conflicts faced by planners in the post-war
reconstruction process. In order for me to achieve this, the interviews needed to be
semi-structured to allow interviewees to add their own comments and tell their own
stories as well as answer a small number of preset questions and any follow-up
questions that arose depending on the direction the dialogue took. This allowed for
rich first-person accounts that added considerably to my analysis, as well as provided
me with the factors that affected the planners general situations during the post-civil

104
war planning process of decision-making and implementation that I may not have
considered or expected.
The interviews took the form of one session with the possibility of a second if
the need arose (which it did not). The session required one to two hours and was
composed of two parts: (1) a preliminary portion where I gathered some information
on the background of the interviewees in planning including education and
experience i.e.: number of years of experience, place of employment and position,
etc. (2) The formal interview portion is longer in duration and more in depth. I ask a
few open-ended questions and follow-ups as necessary. I am interested in teasing out
the planners view of public participation in the planning process in general and
particularly in post-civil war circumstances. I am also trying to see how planners
derive legitimacy and whether they compromise on their own standards when it
comes to public participation in post-civil war planning. Do they feel that they are
representing the constituents they serve, even though the public may not be
participating in the planning process in the traditional formal sense of going to the
polls, or voting on plans, or voicing opinions through public meetings? It could be
that planners have so many exigent needs they need to meet after war that non-direct
participation is not even seen as a compromise. Does the need to feel legitimized
bother them at all? Does having a western education make a difference in how
important planners perceive participation to be?

105
4.2.1 The Target Group

The methodology of the dissertation centers on a detailed, mainly qualitative
analysis of in-depth interviews (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Weiss 1994) of those
involved in the continuing post-war planning process in Beirut, Lebanon. The main
criterion in the selection of an interviewee is that he or she must have a great
knowledge of or practical, hands-on experience in the post-war planning process in
Lebanon. The interviewees could be (1) male or female, (2) formally educated in
urban planning or in a different discipline, (3) educated in the east or west or both,
(4) Lebanese or non-Lebanese, (5) working in either the private or the public sector
or both or in the public-private domain, or even one who is not working in the
practical domain but has a vast knowledge of the planning process in Lebanon (such
as Professors of Planning at various universities). In this way, I tried to achieve the
greatest amount of dissimilar forms (Weiss 1994).
Being from the area, I already had some contacts who either worked in the
urban planning arena or knew someone who did. These people introduced me to or
put me in contact with persons whom I could interview. At the interviews, the
interviewees would name more people for me to see in a snowball effect. Some of
them even furnished contact information. Out of the 20 people I contacted, not a
single person turned down an interview. Unfortunately, however, I was not able to
directly contact five of these people (leaving phone messages for them, or emailing

106
them etc.) and they never responded. I found out that four of them had actually left
the country and that the fifth was traveling at the time. I assumed that this was at
least partially due to the highly volatile political situation in Lebanon which had, in
the latter part of 2005, escalated to threatening levels of violence.
I was therefore able to contact and interview fifteen persons who are related
to the filed of urban planning. I classified these participants according to (1) gender,
(2) country of origin, (3) kind of education, (4) kind of experience, and (5) number
of years of experience
13
. Three of the fifteen interviewees are female (20%). At first
it seemed that this is a low number. Note that in Lebanon women comprise 29% of
the workforce.
14
Although I was unable to locate any specific statistics on the ratio of
men to women working in the planning field, I am sure that it is less than 1:1. From
my observations of the offices I entered during the interviews I conducted, it seemed
that this number was actually higher as I had estimated. From my observations, only
10% of the workforce was female.
15
My impression is that the planning field in
Lebanon is composed mostly of middle-aged or older experienced male architects
who have made a name for themselves over the years. Only recently have graduates
in urban planning, especially female graduates, appeared on the scene.

13
I felt that this was a better indicator than age. I also had more data on experience within the
planning field and did not want to estimate age from this.
14
According to UNDP-POGAR (Programme on Governance in the Arab Region) at their website:
http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=9
15
This is a rough estimate I established on the basis of three offices I walked into in Beirut. There
were women working as receptionists, etc. but most of the architects and urban planners were men I
would say about 90%. Note that these offices are the largest in the country.

107
As for nationality, three of the participants interviewed were non-Lebanese,
while the rest were from Lebanon. The non-Lebanese are male. Of the three, two are
European and one a non-Lebanese Arab. I felt that this ratio 20% of urban planners
working in Lebanon are foreign was a bit high. However, I dont see this as a
disadvantage for three reasons. First, one of the participants is an Arab with very
similar reasoning as those who are Lebanese. Second, it was interesting to gain the
perspective of westerners with a western education as opposed to easterners with a
western education who resided and worked in Lebanon. Third, it must be
mentioned that in Lebanon much of the post-war planning, particularly in the initial
stages, was out-sourced to foreign consultants and urban planners who conducted
research and proposed designs. All three foreign interviewees played a role in the
post-war planning. Interviewee C mentioned that in the Arab world in general
foreign planners, particularly westerners (Americans and Europeans), are more in
demand or can be perceived as more skilled than locals and are paid much more to
do the same job. That participant felt that projects with foreign planners on board
were thought of in a better light.
The first two questions posed in the interviews tackle the issues of education
and experience. From the responses of the interviewees, I was able to analyze the
kind of educations those fifteen individuals working in the planning domain had
received. Twelve of the fifteen (or 80 %) were architects. Architecture as planning, I
feel, is very common in Lebanon so I was not surprised by this. Ten of the twelve

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had gone on to further study urban design or urban planning. The other two had
gained knowledge of urban planning through practice. The three individuals who had
not studied architecture at all had diverse educations. One studied sociology and then
urban planning. One studied urban planning at both under- and post-graduate levels.
The third individual who is an infrastructure planner studied agriculture, water
resources planning and management, and environmental engineering. The diversity
of educational backgrounds of these participants or, in actuality, the lack thereof
seems to be a true reflection of planning practitioners in Lebanon. I have been unable
to find any data on the matter, but the notion of practicing planners in Lebanon being
mostly architects was commented on in the interviews (see Interviewee H for
example).
I also classified the interviewees on the basis of their education as those who
had received only a western education (in Europe for example), only an eastern
education (in Lebanon for example), or a combination of both (for those who had
studied in European or American universities for instance). Of the fifteen individuals
interviewed, two had western only and two eastern only educations. Eleven had
received educations that were a combination of both. I felt that this was a diverse and
true representation.
16

On average the interviewees had around nineteen years of experience in
planning ranging from five years to thirty three years in the field. Based on the

16
I felt that the kind of education received (western vs. non-western) may influence conceptions of
public participation and its importance in planning.

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information gathered in the interviews, I estimated that four interviewees had five to
ten years of experience, three had ten to nineteen years, four had twenty to twenty
nine years, and four had more than thirty year of experience. This allowed for a
diversity in the ages and experiences of the participants and therefore in their
responses to my questions.
When describing the kinds of experience the interviewees possess, I run into
some difficulty because in Lebanon planning is neither as conventional nor as
rewarding or lucrative as it is in the U.S. All of the interviewees have experience in
the planning field. But, for instance, one particular participant Interviewee N is a
planning practitioner who has a private practice, teaches at a university, and also
serves on a public planning council. So this person works in both the private and the
public domains and in academia. One interviewee works in the private domain, but is
also a member of a local municipal board. Three of those interviewed are university
professors exclusively, but they have all practiced in the field at some point or
another or worked as private consultants on projects in practice. So they are
academics with some practical experience. Only five of those interviewed are in the
private domain only, which involves mainly consulting on projects but not actual
building. The five remaining interviewees belong to a company established by the
government and can be described as public-private: SOLIDERE.
Two of the academics interviewed were younger (and less experienced than
some of the other participants) and female. These two females were instrumental in

110
shifting the planning program at the university from architecture towards more social
and policy-oriented concerns. The third female participant was also close in age to
the other females in the study. Two of the three had an educational background that
involved urban planning at the post-graduate level. I feel that the younger age of the
females involved in planning practice is a reflection of what is going on in Lebanon
in general and the field in particular in terms of more females joining the workforce
and younger people training to become urban planners. See Table 1 (below) for a
more detailed summary of the individual interviewee data.
Interviewee Gender Citizenship Education Type of Experience Experience (years)
A Male Lebanese Both Private 30
B Male Lebanese Both Private/Public Local 30
C Male Arab Both Private 30
D Male European West Private 33
E Male Lebanese Both Private 13
F Female Lebanese Both Public-Private 5
G Male Lebanese Both Public-Private 17
H Male European West Public-Private 27
I Male Lebanese East Public-Private 7
J Male Lebanese East Public-Private 7
K Female Lebanese Both Academic 5
L Male Lebanese Both Private 20
M Female Lebanese Both Academic 10
N Male Lebanese Both Private/Public/Academic 27
O Male Lebanese Both Academic 22
Table 1: Detailed Interviewee Data

Note that The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction
of Beirut Central District better-known by its French acronym SOLIDERE is the

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publicly-owned public-private company established by the Lebanese government
directly after the war to oversee the planning of the Beirut Central District by
producing the master plan for that area, managing the awarding of contracts, and
supervising the rebuilding process. I consider SOLIDERE public-private because
even though it may operate like a private company it also is related to the
government. It works in close coordination with the Prime Minister of Lebanon
(particularly at the time of Rafiq Hariri) and its plans are reviewed and approved by
the Higher Council of Urban Planning. In this sense, SOLIDERE cannot be
considered an exclusively private company even though many people see it as such
or though it may run its business as such i.e. to make profit.

4.2.2 Location and Duration of Interviews

The interviews were conducted in the period between July 2005 and January
2006. Two interviews (with my primary contacts) occurred in July 2005, while the
bulk of the interviews took place from October of that year until January 2006. The
timing of the interviews depended upon the political situation in Lebanon, the
availability of the interviewees, and my presence in the country. Because of the
perceived risks, it was difficult to schedule interviews and many had to be
rescheduled on various occasions due to a bombing or threat.

112
The interviews took place in locations chosen by the interviewee and at their
convenience. In this way I made sure that the interviewees were inconvenienced as
little as possible and felt comfortable in their surroundings. Most of the interviews
(twelve of the fifteen) were conducted in the offices of the participants. There the
participants in higher positions offered me something to drink which I tried to
respectfully decline but accepted at times upon insistence. The office atmosphere
was very conducive to setting the tone of the interviews, but there were some
obvious consequences to being in a place of business. There were more interruptions
there, such as knocks on the office door or phone calls or emails that had to be
answered, than in the other interview settings. Although the interruptions disturbed
the chain of thought of the participants, they were not very frequent (there were
rarely more than two in one interview), never lasted more than a few minutes, and
gave me some time to regroup and get the interviewer back on track when their task
was complete.
Two interviews were conducted at the homes of the interviewees upon their
request. One of these interviewees is a primary contact and a friend of my family, so
I felt comfortable going to his house to interview. The second participant I had never
met and thus I felt some hesitation in being a female going to a strange males home
with no background information on him and no knowledge of whom else would be
there. I felt safer taking my sister with me and this was also culturally appropriate.
The interviewee (who was with his family) was very gracious and accepted this with

113
no comment other than offering her refreshments as well. The two interviews
conducted in the homes of the participants were slightly more relaxed than those held
at the offices. I felt that these two participants preferred this atmosphere. There were
less interruptions and, in living up to the Lebanese standard for hospitality, more
offers of food and drink.
One interview took place at a café in Beirut the participant chose. This
provided a relaxed atmosphere and refreshments on demand, but there were several
small disadvantages. Meeting someone in their place of work or at there home at a
specified time meant that they would probably be there already and that the variable
was my arrival which I had a measure of control over. In Lebanon people are known
to be notoriously late and I did have to wait on a few occasions to see someone in an
office. In this particular case the interviewee was only a few minutes late. The major
discomfort was the high level of noise at the café. I had to strain to hear the
participant and the recording was decipherable but not as clear as the others. The
participant insisted on picking up the tab.
All in all I did my best to ensure the least inconvenience to the interviewees
when it came to the timing and location of the interviews. As for the duration, I let
them know that the interviews would take between one and two hours. The
interviewees who protested this the most were the ones who wanted to meet at their
place of business and felt that they were not going to be able to give me that much
time. As I was able to witness firsthand how busy the participants are, I am grateful

114
they were able to give me that much time. The participants who protested the most
were actually the ones who ended up with the longest interviews. I feel this is partly
because they tended to have more experience on the job and higher positions than
others and thus seemed busier.
The interviews lasted an average of fifty four minutes. The longest interview
lasted ninety one minutes and the shortest twenty minutes. The length of the
interview is reflective of the number of years of experience of the interviewee.
Typically, more experienced interviewees were more likely to have experienced the
planning process during the war. These interviews were usually longer because more
questions pertained to the individuals with this kind of knowledge. None of the
interviewees cut the interviews short or asked me to leave before the interview was
over. At some points during the process because the interviews were mostly
conducted in the offices of the interviewee and during business hours I had to
pause the recording for a few minutes and then resume as the interview was
interrupted. This is reflected in the transcriptions of the interviews that appear in the
appendices section. The duration of the interview is measured from the beginning of
the first question until the end of the response to the final question. It does not
include any preamble (about my background or the project) or any parting
discussions.

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4.2.3 Issues of Language and Translation

Out of the fifteen interviews conducted, the language spoken in fourteen was
English. A few expressions or words or small phrases were referred to here or there
in Arabic (which I translated) in most of these interviews, but the participants in
large part adhered to English. These expressions and my knowledge of Arabic were
very useful when the interviewees couldnt think of a word in English or needed to
clarify a thought or to elaborate on an idea. Only one interview was conducted in
Arabic because the interviewee did not speak English very well. This participant
preferred either Arabic or French, and as my knowledge of French is limited we
settled on mutual ground Arabic. I found this a little bit more challenging than the
other interviews because I had to translate the questions and ask follow-ups in
Arabic. Since until the interview I had always thought of terms such as public
participation in English, I was a bit rusty on the technical terms in Arabic. But as the
interview progressed I was able to overcome this with a little help from the
interviewee. I have personally translated this interview into English.

4.2.4 Interviewer-Interviewee Relations

All of the participants in this study were very gracious, friendly, and
generous with their time. I had not met thirteen out of the fifteen interviewees before

116
the interviews except to schedule them (which was usually done by phone or by
email, or on three occasions in person). After the initial meeting and a discussion of
the study and its background though, the interviewees became more at ease and
comfortable as the interview proceeded and they became more familiar with me. I
felt that all the participants tried to help in any way they could even putting me in
contact with more planners or giving me the contact information of potential
interviewees. They were not compensated for their contributions in any way but they
welcomed me into their offices and homes anyway and took the process very
seriously.
It is important to note that during the interview process I was exposed to
biases that may have affected the pace of the interviews. I feel that some of the older
interviewees may in some cases have underestimated my understanding of the urban
planning field or of how things happened on the ground. My gender (female) or my
youth were perhaps a disadvantage on some occasions in a male-dominated work
force such as the field of planning in Lebanon. This may explain why some of the
interviewees acted paternalistically, sometimes inordinately explaining very basic
things to me. During the course of the interview, however, after I was able to follow-
up and ask more questions, this behavior dissipated as the interviewees and I came to
an understanding of our discussions.

117
My western education also seemed to count against me in some instances, as
I felt I was sometimes seen as the outsider. At other times there was a presumption
that I had left Lebanon during the war or had never lived there because the
interviewees were unaccustomed to Lebanese citizens being fluent in English. I felt
that I had to share my background with the interviewees before I was fully accepted.
When I let them know that I was a Lebanese citizen who had lived the war and had
graduated in Lebanon before leaving to continue my studies abroad, I felt that they
were able to be more trusting of me and my ability to understand their circumstances.
After this initial period of reaching acceptance and understanding, I felt that
the interviews progressed smoothly, with the interviewees getting more and more
comfortable as the questions flowed and dialogue proceeded. Some interviewees felt
very comfortable throughout, were very casual, and did not need this period as much
as others. But by the end of the interviews all of the participants were very much
involved in the process. While some were more animated than others, I felt that they
were all passionate about planning practice, the obstacles it encounters, and their role
in the development and reconstruction of Lebanon.
Some of the participants seemed reluctant to promise me one to two hours for
an interview, but their interviews were the lengthiest. When we began discussions
they became engrossed in the topic at hand. I feel that what we were doing sitting
down, thinking, and talking about planning and public participation was not
something that they did often or had the luxury to do or dwell on. Some interviewees

118
were so passionate when discussing their stories they were hard to stop. Or they
veered off topic and I had to gently guide them back.
In general the interviewees were very engaged in the interviews. Some may
have been surprised to be as if they were not expecting the interview to go so well. I
felt that a few of the interviewees were impressed with the questions and that they
had to ponder their responses in appreciation. I did receive a few remarks about how
a participant had never had to think about this or that before or had never had time
to. The participants were very generous in their responses. The stories that they
shared were in many cases very personal particularly those surrounding their
experiences and emotions during and immediately after the civil war.

4.2.5 Pre-test Interviews

After I had set the preliminary interview questions at the beginning of 2005, I
conducted two pre-interviews with my primary contacts to better equip myself for
the interviews. They took place in an informal setting and were not recorded. This
process enabled me to go through a trial-run and prepared me for the formal
interviews for which I was much more confident and certainly more comfortable.
The pre-interviews helped me to develop an idea of what the interviews would
actually be like (the rhythm of the interview, the interaction with respondents, the
follow-ups, etc.) and to formulate the final set of questions and make any

119
amendments. I was particularly careful of leading questions or of asking the
questions in ways that inadvertently directed the answers of the interviewees. I was
able to adjust any questions as such.

4.2.6 Documenting and Recording of Interviews

The interviewees were curious about the study and I gave them detailed
explanations of the dissertation and of my background. All the interviewees were
given a chance to read the Verbal Consent Form (Appendix P)
17
which also
described the study and the rights of the persons interviewed. Some did read it while
others declined. Some of those who declined asked for me to explain its contents.
Others seemed content in the fact that a Verbal Consent Form was made available
and were willing to trust their own judgement on the issue.
All the interviews were recorded. As per the Verbal Consent Form, all the
interviewees were notified of this very clearly and verbally consented to the
recording. The recorder was always placed on the table as close as possible to the
interview and in clear and plain sight. Only the first interview was tape recorded. All
the rest were digitally recorded and the files stored. They have all been transcribed
and can be seen in Appendices A to O (corresponding to Interviewees A to O
respectively).

17
USC UPIRB # 05-03-084 dated March 18, 2005

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4.2.7 Interview Questions

It is important to note that the following interview questions are more of a
template that I followed rather than set in stone. For example, questions of planning
practice during the war do not apply to the practitioners who are younger (in their
early thirties). Also, questions of personal planning practices did not always apply as
much for some as for others, for the academics for instance. I also frequently asked
follow-up questions that could not be prefabricated but depended on the particular
context of the discussions, on the direction the conversation was headed (to get the
interviewee back on track for instance), and on the specific knowledge,
qualifications, and characteristics of the interviewee. This happened when I did not
understand something or when I wanted the interviewee to elaborate on a certain idea
or to give an example from practice or when I felt that the interviewee
misunderstood or did not adequately answer a question.
With this in mind, the questions I used as a foundation for the interviews are:
1-What is your background in planning (work experience)?
2-Where were you educated? What degree?
3-What did your education teach you about the role of the public in planning?
4-Does this education contradict or does it validate what you experienced after the
war?
5-Describe to me how the war affected your day-to-day work.

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6-What was the major challenge you faced that was brought on due to the war? Why
was this a challenge?
7-What was the one major thing you feel you had to give up when you were faced
with post-war circumstances and why?
8-Is there a conflict between participation and implementation in post-war planning?
Please explain.
9-How would you rate public participation in the post-war planning process in
Lebanon on a scale from one to ten? Was this a problem in your opinion? Or was it a
blessing in disguise?
10-What do you think would have aided in public participation (in the traditional
western sense of the term)? (Did you do anything at all to encourage more
participation? Why or why not? Could more public meetings have benefited the
planning process by aiding in the acceptance of plans, or are they a double-edged
sword?)
11-Now that you look back, would you have done things differently?
12-Do you feel that you have done a good job of representing the public in your
planning activities?
13-Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview if needed?

There is very little, if any, primary data available on the post-civil war
planning process and the experiences of planners during that time. I can say without

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any doubt that all interviewees exhibited some display of emotion during the
interviews: a sense of regret over the war, a sense of victory and achievement in
surviving it, a sense of hope for the future of post-war planning, helplessness and
frustration in the lack of power to influence the process, passion over the current
state of planning in Lebanon, anger and dismay over the events of 2005 that wreaked
havoc over the country, etc. I am confident that the kinds of personal responses I
received the emotions residual of the civil war and the passions pertaining to
various convictions surrounding the post-war process could not have been captured
without the personal face-to-face contact of the interviews.

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Chapter 5 PLANNING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: CASE EXAMPLES
FROM LEBANON

5.1 Planning in the post-war context

Post-war planning began in earnest with the reconstruction project for the
Beirut Central District (BCD). Under the law of December 7, 1991, the Lebanese
government granted the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction
of the Beirut Central District, better-known by the French acronym SOLIDERE, the
legal and managerial rights to the reconstruction of the BCD area for 25 years.
Much has been written in both scholarly and media sources about the
political and economic contexts of post-war planning efforts in Lebanon and
particularly in Beirut and of SOLIDERE (Makdisi 1997, Theroux 1997, Rowe and
Sarkis 1998). Because I want to concentrate on the obstacles and issues of public
participation faced in the Lebanese planning processes, I will turn to an in-depth
discussion of the planning system in which participation occurs rather than dwell on
political power struggles, injustices, or corruption. The planning system itself or
how planning, and under its umbrella public participation, takes place is not as well
known, discussed, or documented and will be highlighted here if from more limited
resources.

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The planning system in Lebanon is convoluted and complicated in many
aspects. For all that it is a small country of 10,452 square km (4035 square miles),
planning occurs at three main levels: the central, the regional, and the local. At the
central level there are several key players in the urban planning arena. The
Directorate General for Urban Planning (DGUP) falls under the auspices of the
Ministry of Public Works and Transport and develops planning regulations and
master plans. It also issues building permits for municipalities that are not authorized
to do so, i.e.: most of the municipalities of Lebanon with the exception of those of
Beirut, Tripoli, and the municipal federations (regional government). The Council
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) which was established in 1977 is linked
to the Council of Ministers and is responsible for the allocation of approximately
85% of all the funds earmarked for the reconstruction of Lebanon. It plans and
oversees reconstruction projects and is mandated to produce a master plan for urban
planning and supersedes all other public institutions in implementation decisions.
Under the supervision of the CDR, the Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP)
makes recommendations on planning regulations and large-scale development
projects. The HCUP is composed of the Director Generals of several ministries
(including the Ministries of Interior and Municipalities, Housing, Public Works,
Transport, Justice, and Environment), representatives from institutions involved in
planning (such as the CDR), and planning experts. In addition to these three main

125
players at the central level, different ministries (such as the Ministry of Environment
for instance) are regularly consulted by the DGUP on planning issues.
18

At the local level (municipalities) and the regional level (collaborations or
Federations of Municipalities of Jubayl, Kesrouan, and Metn) planning
responsibilities are more confined to geographic territorial limits and to issues of
day-to-day maintenance than at the central level. Their main duties are concerned
with local issues such as cleanliness and public health, water works, public
transportation, and tax collection. In certain cases, they receive and can issue
building and construction permits. They can ask for master plan details and
clarifications from the DGUP. They can hypothetically (and with the approval of the
DGUP) implement planning projects if they possess the necessary resources.
The current weakness in the implementation power at the local government
level is unfortunate considering its record. According to UNDP-POGAR
19
, Lebanon
has historically had strong local governments and commitments to decentralization,
but this changed during the civil war when decision-making became more
centralized and some public services were either eliminated or privatized. Since the
Taif Agreement was ratified in 1989, decentralization priorities have once again
come to the forefront. In 1998, municipal elections were held in Lebanon with broad

18
The source for the information in this paragraph and the one following it is a publication by the
Lebanese Ministry of Environment: Lebanon State of the Environment Report for 2001, specifically
Chapter 13: Land Management. It can be found at: http://www.moe.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/0C8B6622-
40C3-4585-9468-1ABD93AE7878/0/Chap13LandManagement.pdf (accessed on 7/1/06).
19
This information (in this and the next paragraph) is cited from the UNDP-POGAR (Program of
Governance in the Arab Region) website at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/decentralization.asp?cid=9 and accessed on 7/1/06.

126
participation by most political parties in which 7,662 representatives were elected to
around 700 municipal councils in six regional governorates: Beirut, Beqaa, North
Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, and Nabatiyeh. In May 2004, the most
recent municipal elections were held and 15,300 local mayors (mukhtars) and
municipal council members were elected.
Unfortunately, despite the high level of local representation the system
remains highly centralized due to its confessional nature, the small size of the
country, and the impact of Syrian dominance which tended to emphasize centralized
governance (UNDP-POGAR). Although municipalities enjoy budgetary autonomy
they receive some funds from the central Independent Municipal Fund but are barred
from borrowing money and only about 30 of the 700 possess an adequate tax base to
enable them to perform local services (UNDP-POGAR). They also receive funds
from more than 35 different sources and this only adds to complexities in the
financing and budgeting of local operations. Part of the difficulty is that
municipalities are governed by a uniform system of regulations and laws that do not
allow for flexibility based on capacity and capability Most municipal governments
are not functional because they cannot collect revenues or provide services; most
municipal projects have been assumed by the central government or private industry
(UNDP-POGAR). Less than 30% of municipalities even have a telephone line and
approximately 50% have annual revenues and expenditures in the 6,000 to 60,000
U.S. dollar range (UNDP-POGAR). Local governments, therefore, remain under-

127
used resources as the central government undertakes more projects on the behalf of
municipalities.

5.2 Public Participation in Lebanon

Public participation takes place within the planning system outlined above by
planners and with the involvement of a society that belongs to and have experienced
a turbulent historical, social, political, and religious context that has been described
and will continue to be elaborated upon throughout this case study. Public
participation in Lebanon also occurs both formally and informally. When I say that
participation occurs formally I mean that there are channels for public involvement
that are part of the planning process, limited though they may be in scope and depth.
An example of this kind of public participation would be the recent public meeting
conducted by SOLIDERE in the BCD for the design of the Martyrs Square in
downtown Beirut.
This kind of formal public participation is limited in Lebanon because, unlike
the U.S., it is not institutionalized by legislation as a part of the public planning
process. Instead, it is left to the discretion of private planning companies to conduct
participatory processes and therefore it rarely occurs. The example cited above from
SOLIDERE is one of the few cases throughout its 15-year history where it has
practiced the implementation of participatory methods. The public does not need to

128
be consulted regarding their opinions and ideas for a certain area. Rather,
participation sessions seem to be used more to inform the public of intended plans
than to gather information. Public participation is stipulated by international donors
like the World Bank, United Nations (U.N.) or the European Union (E.U.) as a
condition of funding projects. Although this involves more information gathering, it
is unclear to what extent opinions of the public need to be taken into consideration in
decision-making. Participation also takes place on a small scale with NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) and particularly and more recently on
environmental issues. However, large-scale public participation efforts that give
some power to the people especially public ones remain rather scarce. This is
somewhat counterintuitive in a culture and society that is the most democratic in the
region (save for Israel).
20

In comparison to formal means, informal public participation occurs through
back channels and is not formalized through a public or private organization that
conceptualizes it, frames it, and then implements it. Rather, it is participation that is a
form of feedback that comes from the publics reaction to plans proposed or
approved by the central government. It usually takes the form of public
dissatisfaction with decisions or proposals and the consequent endeavor by the
displeased population to alter projects or dismiss them altogether. A good example of
this kind of participation would be the reaction of the Lebanese public to the first

20
Smiley, Xan. 2006. Plenty of seeds, but still a long way to fruition: Arab democracy in 2006, in
The World in 2006, The Economist 20
th
edition.

129
master plan of the BCD by Henri Eddeh that was proposed by SOLIDERE. The
consequent uproar of disapproval originated from different sources: the media,
scholars, planning experts, students, etc. It then spread and reached the ears of
decision-makers and the plan evolved through stages to what is much better accepted
today. In fact, Bill and Springborg (2000) argue that these kind of pre-modern
informal channels of public participation are better in the Middle East than modern
western models. However, in Lebanon, the prevalence if informal participation and
its apparent successes in some cases seem to be used as an excuse for the lack of
formalized public participation where Lebanon (as compared to the rest of the
Middle East Arab states) has a more democracy.
The small and close-knit Lebanese society enables this form of public
participation because the high social capital and number of personal relationships
lead to a high level of information exchange between the public, urban planning
practitioners, and decision-makers. The impact of the large role of the various media
outlets and the freedoms they enjoy (especially compared to other countries in the
region) cannot be discounted as well.
21
The Lebanese population also uses its
relationships with political, religious, and municipal figures to influence decision-
making. Upon knowledge of certain projects or of pending decisions, the public
mobilizes all its resources to fight for their needs. A good example (detailed below)
of this is a case of environmental planning decisions that were eventually overturned

21
Note that the media though free still has restrictions, particularly those imposed during the post-
war era of Syrian rule. See UNDP-POGAR at: http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=9
(accessed on 7/3/06).

130
in Monsif, Jubayl after the public fought back on many levels. Note, however, that
this kind of participation is not always successful in its aims and is dependent on the
power of the protesting population (its religious sect and size and therefore its
contacts and voting power) in influencing decisions.
This chapter puts forward three case examples of different areas within
Lebanon in order to highlight various aspects of the way planning occurs in practice
in this context. The first example is of urban planning in the Beirut Central District
(BCD) in the period immediately after the end of the Civil War; the second is the
case of Elyssar, a poverty-stricken area at the south-western outskirts of Beirut; and
the third is that of Monsif, Jubayl, which is a more recent illustration of public
participation in a much smaller locale and at the municipal rather than the central
level (as opposed to the other two examples). The aim is to shed light on the various
methodologies (i.e.: what happens) within urban planning practice in Lebanon.
Much has been written about the planning that occurred in the BCD right
after the end of the civil war.
22
A look at this case better informs us of the way
planning took place at that time: with no formal public participation and little
apparent thought of the needs of the public (Kabbani 1992, 1998). However, the
informal public participation that did occur via public uproar was extensive enough
to cause major shifts in the general plan for the BCD. Elyssar is an example of public
participation that was a more formalized and integrated part of the planning process

22
See for example the edited collection by Rowe and Sarkis (1998).

131
as the public was included from the start. Still, the project yielded few tangible
results in terms of implementation because of the interference of political and
personal interests in planning. The case of Monsif can be used to appreciate the pros
of informal public participation and the details of how it works and what it can
yield at the very local level of a small town.

5.3 Examples of Public Participation in Lebanon

5.3.1 Informal Discontent and Eventual Consent in the Beirut Central District

The largest-scale example of the success of informal participation in Lebanon
is one mentioned often by scholars in general and the participants of this study in the
interviews: that of the planning of the Beirut Central District in its opening stages. In
1992, after the end of the civil war, the Lebanese Parliament created the Lebanese
Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District better
known by its French acronym SOLIDERE with the primary objective of master
planning and managing the reconstruction of the BCD. The SOLIDERE-controlled
area currently covers around 472 acres: 292 acres of the Beirut city center and an
extension of 180 acres reclaimed from the Mediterranean Sea.
23
The entire project
involves clearing the rubble, restoring some of the old buildings which could be

23
See http://www.solidere.com/project/stats.html (accessed on 04/29/07) for more details.

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saved, rebuilding the infrastructure, and constructing new buildings and is expected
to be completed by 2018 when SOLIDEREs 25-year charter expires (Raschka
1996). SOLIDERE itself is not a construction company, but it provides the master
plan for the BCD with the areas designated for rebuilding. Construction firms that
receive the rights to build are then required by SOLIDERE (in its managerial
capacity) to maintain certain building regulations and standards of quality.
Plans for the reconstruction of the BCD had already begun immediately after
the war without the inclusion of either the local population or the rest of the
Lebanese, the majority of which has a stake in the capital or commute there for work,
etc. Ownership of land or property in the BCD was withdrawn from individuals with
and in exchange (for proof of ownership) and with disregard to the consequent
outcry they were given shares in SOLIDERE. The first plan for the BCD area was
drawn up in 1991 by Henri Eddeh who was commissioned by Dar Al-Handasah, an
engineering consultancy firm. The first Eddeh plan entailed a beaux-arts style formal
design (Kabbani 1998) of three main north-south axes, a government center, and a
man-made island that would be connected to the mainland via bridges and would
hold two tall towers in the image of the World Trade Center (Makiya 1996). This
was met with very vocal and wide-scale criticism from scholars, experts, and the
media and this quickly spread and gained momentum in the form of public outrage.
For instance, the plan was criticized as too monumental (Kabbani 1998) and not
preserving enough of the citys history and memory (Saliba 1991). It would have

133
transformed the city center into an island of modernity (Tabet 1993). It would have
fallen short on the provision of adequate public spaces (Kabbani 1992). This kind of
negative feedback was also vocally expressed via various media sources (television,
newspapers, etc.) by scholars, journalists, students, and members of the public in
general. Informal means of participation through the kinds of social ties and
networks present in Lebanese society enabled the overwhelming disapproval of the
plan to filter its way to the top.
This informal network of negative reactions eventually forced decision-
makers to rethink the original plan and to take drastic measures. The Eddeh plan has
been changed numerous times and significantly since that time to an end result that is
drastically different: a more public-friendly plan that is not as formal and rigid, that
better celebrates history and memory, and that boosts pedestrian usage, public open
space, and public buildings and structures over the original plan.
24
The results of the
informal public participation in the BCD are considered successful in general by
most of the urban planners interviewed in this study. Although not ideal for the
public, the new plan is considered an improvement over the original plan and a
compromise between the management at SOLIDERE and public needs and demands.

24
Interviewee H discusses from personal experience the struggle (between planners and management)
to increase public buildings and public open space in the BCD plan.

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5.3.2 Formal Non-Consent in Elyssar

A good example of a more formalized participatory effort within the planning
process (and one that is mentioned by most of the study participants) is the case of
Elyssar. The Elyssar public project was aimed at the reorganization and
rehabilitation of 586 hectares
25
of the derelict suburbs of Beirut via the establishment
of the Public Agency for the Planning and Development of Beirut South-Western
Suburbs in 1996
26
. At the immediate end of the civil war, this area was inhabited
predominantly (but not entirely) by poor, illegal squatters mainly from the Shiite
faction of Islam who had been displaced during the war. Contrary to what occurred
in the BCD planning process, no attempt was made to by-pass the local population.
In fact, studies of the existing conditions in the area were conducted (such as the
socio-economic survey of Jnah discussed by interviewee D) and the conditions and
aspirations of the public living in the area were assessed.
The project aimed at the relocation of squatters and their provision with
housing (and thereby clear ownership rights but not monetary compensation) in
return for the right to demolish and redevelop part of the land (330 hectares)
particularly the high-potential coastal area (Harb el-Kak 1998). The local population
was suspicious of the governments intent but participatory efforts were enabled by
enlisting the help of the political leaders in the area. The Shiites in that region

25
See www.elyssar.com for more details (accessed on 4/30/2007).
26
The public agency was established per Decree No. 9043 on 8/30/1996.

135
support and are represented mainly by Hezbollah, and to a lesser extent the Amal
movement. However, these two groups were at the time antagonistic to the third
major player in the conflict that arose over the project: Rafiq Hariri (Harb el-Kak
1998).
After concessions were made for Amal and Hezbollah in the project (Harb el-
Kak 1998), it remains mainly unimplemented due to reasons that remain vague.
Interviewees alluded mainly to a lack of available financial support for the publicly-
funded project, complications associated with land appropriation and financial
compensation, and political problems among the three main players in the
negotiations. Interviewee D mentioned that the aims of Hezbollah and Amal may not
always have coincided with those of the local population and that more stakeholders
should have been involved in the process in order to increase the potential for
success. In the opinion of Interviewee D, assuming that Hezbollah and Amal
represent the entire population of the area was an oversimplification.
In many ways, Elyssar can be viewed as a case of post-war public
participation that was to a certain extent successful in involving the public and
gauging public needs and aspirations. The project did attempt to include stakeholders
on a large scale through their perceived representatives (as discussed by Interviewee
M). However, the plan for the area seem to have been pre-set and the idea of
participation was more one of negotiation to achieve the materialization of this plan
rather than to gather information and generate one that better suits the needs of the

136
public. The plan fell through even after financial compensation was offered to the
local population. Elyssar has therefore, since its establishment, failed when it comes
to the implementation of the major portions of the project.

5.3.3 Informal Non-Consent in Monsif, Jubayl

In the case example of Monsif, a small village in the Jubayl area with a
population of around 500 people, informal participation and the active involvement
and intervention of the population have led to major success: achieving the publics
goals in the relocation of a landfill out of the pristine village. This example is
highlighted with the aim of taking a closer look at how public participation occurs
informally in practice in Lebanon at the local level. It clearly illustrates how personal
social relationships and connections can be powerful and can lead to change even at
a small local scale.
Despite recent developments in public participation in Lebanon,
27
there
remain few official venues that allow for direct public participation in the countrys
decision-making processes. In spite of all these obstacles, the Lebanese public has
found indirect or informal and sometimes effective and successful ways of
voicing its concerns and priorities mainly through municipalities or by means of
political influence. Constitutionally, Lebanons municipalities the sole authority of

27
The Ministry of Environment is said to be currently drafting new legislation to include public
participation within the decision-making process.

137
the governments executive branch that is directly elected by the people are
considered to be the main representative venue for the public.
However, the countrys highly centralized government and the impacts of its
civil war
28
shifted the role of the municipality from decision-maker to implementer.
Despite attempts to strengthen local capacities and decentralized governance
following the end of the war, such as those included in the Taif Agreement of 1989,
little development has been made to officially augment the municipal role in
planning processes through amendments to the legal and institutional framework
(UNDP-POGAR).
29
Moreover, the role of the public through the municipal venue
remains informal, springing from the dependency of those elected on public support.
In support of the argument above, the Solid Waste Management Plan of
Lebanon repeatedly illustrates the means and measures adopted by the Lebanese
public to participate in decision making. Due to their reduced technical and financial
capabilities, the municipalities of Lebanon were collectively relieved of their
responsibilities to manage municipal waste within their jurisdiction by the Council of
Ministers.
30
This task, coupled with a request to propose a National Plan for Solid
Waste Management, was assigned to the Council of Development and
Reconstruction (CDR). The Council of Ministers also decreed that a technical

28
Municipal councils were highly impacted by the civil war since no municipal elections were held
from the year 1963 until 1998 and councils received little to no funding from the central government
during that time.
29
More information on decentralization and municipalities can be found at the UNDP-POGAR
website: http://www.pogar.org/countries/decentralization.asp?cid=9 (accessed on 7/3/06).
30
Council of Ministers Decision No. 16, dated 14/8/2003.

138
committee, consisting of the directors of relevant ministries, would assist in the
preparation of the plan.
31
Upon the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Solid
Waste Management Plan would be implemented in Lebanon. No provisions were
made for the contribution or approval of either municipalities or the public they
serve. As of July 2006, four versions of the National Solid Waste Management Plan
proposed by CDR were rejected by the Council of Ministers
32
despite the urgent
need for the plan to be adopted. During a news conference in June 2006, Jacob Saraff
the Minister of Environment warned that Lebanon will drown in solid waste if we
don't implement an adequate treatment plan within six months (Sfeir and
Zeineddine 2006)
33
. However, all plans were greeted by public opposition translated
through various means.
The Municipality of Monsif, selected as a site for a landfill for the
Governorate of Mount Lebanon, was successful in its efforts to impede the approval
of the fourth plan put forth by the CDR. Monsif is a quaint and pristine village on the
Mediterranean Sea full of pine, fruit, and olive trees. In classic NIMBY fashion, its
residents did not take too kindly with the idea of a landfill site that would destroy the
natural beauty and the environment of that area and drastically reduce their land
value. Members of the Municipal Council in Monsif, with the help of some
concerned citizens, expressed their strong opposition to the plan. They were able to

31
Council of Ministers Decision No.1, dated 6/1//2003.
32
Council of Ministers Decisions No. 1, dated 13/11/2003; No. 22, dated 18/3/2004; No. 12, dated
8/4/2004; and No. 68, dated 20/5/2004.
33
Sfeir, T., and M. Zeineddine. June 21, 2006. Sarraf: 'Lebanon will drown in solid waste.' The
Daily Star Newspaper, Lebanon.

139
effectively fight it by: (1) Contacting influential and affluent individuals and
requesting that they pressure the Council of Ministers to reject the proposed plan; (2)
Contacting representatives of the political parties to which they are affiliated and
requesting that they pressure the Council of Ministers to reject the proposed plan; (3)
Conducting interviews with various media sources such as the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation and disparaging the selection of the site; and (4)
Collaborating with neighboring municipalities and organizing a meeting attended by
the elected Deputies of the region and concerned citizens.
Plans for Monsif as a landfill location have thus been recently scrapped due
to pressure put by the public in the area on the relevant decision-makers. It should be
noted that the Municipality of Monsif was not formally notified by any public
authority of these plans for it during the entire planning process starting with the
formulation of the plan and until its review by the Council of Ministers. Even the
seeping of information from the central level to members of the local population in
Monsif was informal. Moreover, the Municipality was only successful because the
head of the executive branch of the government, the President of Lebanon Mr. Emile
Lahoud, was able to intervene upon the request of the Head of the Municipal
Council, Mr. Aarif Mansour. Municipalities that lacked such powerful connections
were not successful in their attempts. The example of Monsif provides a quick
glimpse into how planning occurs in Lebanon and how public participation is able to
exist and even to thrive in some cases in such locations.

140
Chapter 6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before going into the details of the interview responses, it is important to
mention some general impressions that stood out to me during the interviews. First, I
felt that some of the respondents who were in the public-private sector were
aggressively defending their company almost as if they were marketing the
company. I later found that this was an implicit part of the job requirement in some
cases. This was particularly pronounced in the participant that felt that his education
on participation was validated by what he had witnessed in the post-war planning
process in Lebanon.
Second, all three women I interviewed seemed more frustrated with the
current situation of planning in Lebanon than the men I spoke with. I felt that they
were more concerned than the men when it came to increasing public participation
via various methods and that all three were more passionate about womens issues
and social issues in general. All three women have been educated in both the east
and west and all believed that participation could be achieved by both traditional and
non-conventional means formally and informally and were very vocal in
conveying this.
As Lebanon is the most democratic Arab nation in the Middle East
34
(The
Economist 2006) the female citizens enjoy freedoms unavailable elsewhere in the

34
Smiley, Xan. 2006. Plenty of seeds, but still a long way to fruition: Arab democracy in 2006, in
The World in 2006, The Economist 20
th
edition.

141
region. The female academics I encountered during the interview process were
actively engaged in highlighting and treating social problems within civil society,
particularly womens rights, with the help of groups such as the United Nations, the
European Community, World Bank, and various NGOs. The freedoms enjoyed by
women in Lebanon are high when compared to the rest of the Middle East, but not
the western world. For instance, one dilemma discussed was that the spouse and
children of a Lebanese woman cannot get citizenship from her, that only males can
give the citizenship to their dependents. The increasing number of women in the
Lebanese work-force in general, and in the planning domain in particular, may be a
key factor in the future resurgence of public participation and social issues on the
planning scene in Lebanon.

6.1 Frequency of Issues

The interviewees mentioned several issues the impact public participation in
Lebanon. Here I have grouped together the most frequently mentioned problems
according to the study participants themselves.

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6.1.1 General Institutional Constraints

When it comes to public participation in the post-war planning process in
Lebanon, the only thing that all fifteen interviewees unanimously mentioned was the
issue of institutional constraints. Institutional problems appeared in the responses in
three different forms: either the public was not mature enough, i.e. it was not ready
for nor educated in participation; or the government was not equipped to accept or
handle public involvement in the reconstruction process; or the institutional structure
of the planning system was too complex and problematic to encourage and enable
participation the forums and arenas for discussion were not present). At least one of
these three institutional considerations was mentioned by all interviewees.

6.1.2 The Lebanese Public

Some interviewees perceived that obstacles to participation were not only
structural or systematic. The Lebanese people were also thought of as a potential
hindrance to public participation. This can be viewed as a constraint on public
participation caused by historical, political, and socio-cultural institutions. (1) Eight
interviewees pointed to the divided and sectarian nature of the post-civil war society
as a factor that can lead to difficulty in the participatory process. (2) The majority of
interviewees thought the public lacked maturity, as some called it, or education in

143
participation, or what I would call the institutional culture of public participation. In
general we are not educated yet to defend our own rights, as interviewee O said. (3)
The Lebanese mentality was cited as a hindrance to participation in six interviews.
These six participants felt that the Lebanese people tend to be too distrustful, too
critical, too unforgiving, or too judgmental. This could be a residue of the civil war
that has been institutionalized into the Lebanese identity. (4) The way the field of
urban planning is perceived in Lebanon does not help public participation either.
Three interviewees highlighted the issue that planning in Lebanon is still viewed as
mainly architecture, i.e.: more related to the physical domain than it is to policy- and
decision-making. It is still part of the architecture departments at most Lebanese
universities.
35

6.1.3 The Political System

While all interviewees pointed to an insufficiency in institutions that enable
and encourage public participation, two of them thought that this deficiency was not
at the level of the public, but at that of the government and the system. They felt that
true public participation was unlikely as long as the system was too politicized and
that those in positions of authority were unwilling to give up power in any way.
These two respondents felt the responsibility for the lack of public participation in

35
The American University of Beirut is in the process of converting the name of the department under
which the Urban Planning program falls from the Department of Architecture to a more policy-related
department.

144
the process rested on the shoulders of the government and the system it had done
nothing to change.
In general the political system was seen as too problematic and convoluted
as well. It allowed for the level of corruption that is present (cited as a problem by
six interviewees). Fourteen out of fifteen interviewees discussed various political
aspects that impacted the planning process. This materialized in the form of powerful
politicians interfering in decision-making for instance by aiding in the passage of
building permit on a small localized scale or the adoption of a new planning law at a
larger scale. This could be for the politicians personal gain or to the benefit of
supporters. Also mentioned was the power of the political/religious parties and their
(sometimes negative) impact on implementation that may lead to outcomes that are
not necessarily in the public good.

6.1.4 The Planning Bureaucracy

The planning system was seen as deficient in institutional structures that
enabled participation within the process. It was too convoluted and confusing in its
bureaucracy and the jurisdictions of the governmental bodies the CDR, the DGUP,
and the Higher Council at the central level, and the regional and local municipalities.
Eight of the interviewees thought more decentralization would increase the
possibility of genuine participation since local governments municipal councils

145
are directly elected by the people and are seen as more accountable and
representative than appointed, often poorly-paid and overwhelmed, government
employees.

6.1.5 The Civil War

The Lebanese civil war is also cited in three cases as a particularly more
destructive and divisive kind of war. The impacts of civil war were seen as
impediments to participation: the distrust of the government and of other political or
sectarian groups; the residual tensions between groups; the fear, hatreds, and
traumatic memories that remained; the other critical priorities that superseded
participation and planning that people had to deal with directly after the war such as
death, homelessness, trauma, and famine; etc. Two respondents thought that public
participation immediately after the war was over was impossible in practice because
of the potential explosiveness of bringing warring factions together. Two
respondents felt that the level of tensions that remain even today impede the potential
for different factions sitting down together to discuss planning issues.

146
6.1.6 General Political Instability

Seven respondents felt that another factor in the participation equation had to
be mentioned: the current political instability and change in the region. Both the
Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 and the Syrian withdrawal from
Lebanon in 2005 had a vast local impact on urban planning. The former caused a
demographic upheaval as refugees were able to return to their homes in the south and
even more commotion when some chose not to return after more than twenty years
of absence. The latter changed the local play of power, politics, and corruption
within the planning process and increased the level of freedom enjoyed by the
Lebanese people (to potentially enable participation). The bombings and the
attempted assassinations and assassinations of the anti-Syrian deputies, ministers,
and journalists (all via car bombings) throughout 2005 put the country and the people
of Lebanon in a high state of emergency and alert. This atmosphere of fear prevailed
in most of 2005 and lowered the planning efforts taking place on the priority lists of
the public.

6.2 Complexities of Public Participation: An Institutional Analysis

In this section I analyze the interview results from an institutional perspective
and examine what they mean within the broader context of public participation in

147
urban planning. The central question is: What are the similarities and differences
between post-civil war public participation and participation under normal
circumstances and what does this comparison teach us about participation in all
contexts? The institutional nature of participation and its complexities are
underlined.
The interview results pointed to multiple layers of complexity of public
participation in the context of post-civil war planning that include the purposes of
participation and the issues that impact it. An institutional analysis of participation in
Lebanon envelopes all the issues mentioned by the interviewees in the previous
section. The problems of participation become much more clear when they are
explained with underlying historical, political, and socio-cultural institutions.

6.2.1 The Purposes of Public Participation

Public participation is complicated by the need for the clarification of the
reasons behind the implementation of its methods. When the needs and nature of the
public and the goals of the participation process are highlighted, the planner is better
equipped to choose appropriate tools and techniques for participation. Direct citizen
participation has numerous benefits that are well-known and widely discussed in the
literature, the four main or more cited purposes behind it being: (1) the legitimation
of the decision-making process, (2) information-gathering in order for decision-

148
makers to make decisions that better suit the needs of the public, (3) public education
on decisions and actions, and (4) the inclusion of underrepresented portions of the
population in decisions.
In the case of Lebanon, legitimation of the post-war government may have
been aided by public participation in general. Information-gathering from the public
as well as the dissemination of information to the citizens at the critical first stage of
post-war planning may also have boosted the legitimacy of the process, increased
transparency and trust in the government, and achieved a planning outcome closer to
the hearts of the Lebanese population and more suitable to their needs. The inclusion
of underrepresented groups such as the poor in planning decisions, for example in
Downtown Beirut, would have augmented the equity and fairness of the plan. The
perceived inequity of the BCD plan was mentioned on more than one occasion in the
interviews.
Participation and Reconciliation
But public participation can also be used for other purposes under normal
conditions that can be meaningful in the case of post-war Lebanon. It is a means to
achieve ends that are highly important in post-war conditions particularly post-civil
wars. These goals are self-exploration, community-building, and catharsis.
Participation enables individual citizens to develop an active moral character and to
achieve their potential (Roberts 2004). It allows them to discover and learn about
themselves and their priorities as they discuss their values and beliefs and as they

149
formulate their needs and negotiate for what they want. This new knowledge of
oneself also leads to a better understanding of the issues and of others. The potential
for post-civil war populations is the discovery that other groups are not so different
in their needs and aspirations and that in fact some common ground exists. This
common ground can be used by planners in the reconciliation process that is a part of
recovery after this kind of conflict.
Participation and Community
Public participation can also aid in community-building. This can be seen on
a continuum from self-exploration as a better knowledge of oneself (achieved
through participation) can lead to a better understanding of others and this in turn
leads to better integration and a higher likelihood of the establishment of community.
Participation increases social capital as enduring networks are created during the
participation process. It can boost the moral character and self-worth of citizens as
the give and take of dialogue transpires. Civil society or community-building and
integration are more by-products of direct citizen participation as more informed and
more confident citizens are better capable of handling the difficult problems that the
public is faced with today (Roberts 2004). Bringing the public together around the
issues of urban planning in Beirut the capital of Lebanon and the city where all
sects and religions have a stake in the future could have potentially been an
exercise in public participation that led to better integration and unity.

150
Participation and Healing
Participation is also therapeutic as it provides forums and arenas for citizens
to voice and discuss their concerns and to feel heard and validated (Roberts 2004).
This kind of public discussion has been known to aid in communication, dispute
resolution, and consensus building. In the post-civil war context, the end results of
public participation under usual circumstances consensus building or dispute
resolution for instance are often not as important as the participatory process itself.
The benefits of participation and its communication and dialogue become the
therapy, catharsis, and healing needed and achieved by the citizens. Getting different
factions to sit down and communicate after a civil war is in itself a small victory and
a step forward for planners. The discussions within the arenas of public participation
have the potential to be therapeutic and integrative as participants heal by discussing
their emotions and leave the collaborative participatory experience with a sense of
belonging to a larger community (Roberts 2004).
The outlining of visions of the future of the BCD could have been utilized as
the umbrella under which the coming together of the various segregated groups
occurred. Planning practitioners trained in conflict mediation would have been able
to make the potential common ground of the different factions a reality. Under the
auspices of design, the trained planner can use his or her judgment as to when to
bring different factions together and who should be involved. For instance in the case
of Lebanon, immediately after the war ended (when wounds were still raw) may not

151
have been a good time to bring the divergent and conflicting groups together. The
timing depends on the situation and can be assessed by the practitioner. The planner
also can decide how participation needs to proceed and at what pace. Whether the
entire public or only the representatives of the groups should be brought in at a
preliminary stage to diffuse tensions in a more intimate setting is another question
practitioners must answer.
The application of this kind of participation to the post-civil war context has
the potential for healing and catharsis that cannot be discounted. The need for
forgetfulness in this situation is similar to if more poignant than others in
planning. Baum (1999) accentuates the need to forget in order to plan. He dictates
that the past is lost it is inevitable and has already occurred and that people must
deal with and let go of past grievances in order to lead a healthy future. He
admonishes that the present doesnt exist; that it is merely a transition from the
future to the past. Planners manage this transition and they cannot reach good
planning for the future unless and until they help people deal with and let go of the
past.
The future has three components that should be taken into account in
planning (Perloff 1980). The past component in the future exists due to the
importance given to what is inherited from the past when pondering the future and
planning for it. Although decisions affect the future, they are taken in the present
with all the influences of current ideologies, technologies, and images of the future.

152
There is therefore an important present component in the future. Perloffs future
component of the future is everything new (or what is generally viewed as the
future). According to Perloff, these three components of a future form a single future
and each of the elements must be studied by planners to give insight into how the
future of a society can be planned for.
In Visions of the Beirut of Tomorrow (Serof 1983) provides a vision of the
Lebanese capital that stresses the importance of relating the Beirut of tomorrow with
that of yesterday thereby indicating the importance for the future of dealing with the
past. This is a common theme in post-war reconstruction literature. However, it
exemplifies the post-war dialogue of past and future elements in the design of the
inanimate and rebuilding of the citys structures as one that neglects this dialogue in
the people (and thus the reconciliation and rehabilitation in the citys residents). The
fact that so many urban planners involved in the post-war efforts in Lebanon are
architects may have some influence on this focus on design. Sociologists (such as
Samir Khalaf for instance) do not share this fascination to the same extent.
When applied to the post-civil war circumstance the teachings of Perloff and
Baum make sense. The past must be investigated and analyzed discussed and dealt
with as a component of the future before the public can move on. Forgiving, if not
completely forgetting (in Baums terminology), is a part of the process of letting go
and resuming ones life. It follows that the more grievous the past the more lengthy
but necessary this process of catharsis becomes. Immediately after war ends and a

153
peaceful phase emerges, the sustainability of peace is fragile. For societies that have
experienced civil war in particular the risk of renewed conflict is likely to be high in
the first decade after the conflict has ended Collier (2000). Unless the sustainability
of peace is linked to attempts to alleviate the issues that led to the war in the first
place, the potential for reemergence of conflict is ever present. Green (2000) offers a
choice as such: to go from a lull in conflict to a more permanent peace or to return to
war. War and post-war situations have directed attention towards issues of conflict
avoidance, mediation and future prevention (Green 2000: 343) that can be seen as
the aims of planning, with public participation as a means to achieve them.
Green (2000: 343) names three essential and interrelated elements of
sustainable peace - reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (or RRR) where:
Reconciliation is perceived as a social and political process of building or
rebuilding non-violent relationships, needing the suspension of total distrust and
overt hatred to build functional co-operation and social capital and re-legitimating
and re-capacitating state and social institutions. Reconciliation is especially
pertinent in the aftermath of a civil war (Collier 2000) and public participation may
be seen as an arena that offers the potential for the dialogue and catharsis that is
critical for peace. In Lebanon, the lack of reconciliation and catharsis and the
subsequently highly divided society may be one of the factors that play a large role
in the tensions and instability witnessed in the current political situation.

154
Participation and Timing
As was mentioned in the interviews, however, these goals of participation
may not always be attainable immediately after war is over. This timing of
participation methods cannot be separate from their purposes. They can be
introduced tactfully, slowly, and when the time is right. Timing in this post-civil war
context can be critical. Beginning a participation process at the wrong time can at
best be useless. It can, however, be detrimental for future participation efforts if it
fails. Even worse in the extremely sensitive post-civil war situation, it can be
explosive. As some participants in the study attest, the potential for violence in a
heavily-armed, greatly volatile, sectarian post-civil war society can be perceived as
very high. According to Interviewee O, public participation was just not possible at
the beginning of the post-civil war phase. The questions of when we can begin to
participate and when it will be beneficial and not detrimental to do so are so context-
specific that the answers have to be left for planners on the ground to answer.
Public participation in post-civil war planning can thus have similar purposes
as under normal situations including legitimation, information gathering and
dissemination, plurality or inclusion, self-exploration, and community building.
Purposes and aims of post-civil war participation are more poignant and profound,
however, and go above and beyond the day-to-day consensus-building and conflict
resolution as they require the implementation of methods at appropriate times with

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the purpose of achieving the emotional healing and catharsis necessary for social
reconciliation.

6.2.2 Historical Institutions

There are many factors that intermingle to compose the social context of
Lebanon. The countrys past colonization, civil war, and Syrian rule and the current
unstable post-Syrian era all make for a rich historical background. The outcomes of
civil war are both psychological: the losses, hatreds, fears, and traumas; and
physical: death, poverty, displacement, destruction, and devastation. These
consequences are vast, all-encompassing, deep, and enduring. In addition, the civil
war residues of religious identities that have been espoused so strongly by the
citizens of Lebanon are close to their hearts and minds and part of their psyche. All
of these factors come together to influence the Lebanese public and the potential for
their involvement in planning processes. Public participation cannot be conceived of
without a thought to the kind of society the planner is part of and dealing with.
The history of Lebanon has influenced the current Lebanese society in ways
that cannot be discounted. These reflections of history on identity and thus on
public participation are termed historical institutions. From the harsh times of
famine and Ottoman rule, to colonization by the French, to the struggle for
independence, to the devastating civil war, to the subsequent Syrian dominance, and

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to the problems and instabilities that continue to prevail, the historical context is ripe
with conflict, pain, and strife. The present uncertainties and the current doubts
surrounding the political future of the nation in an unstable Middle East is one the
Lebanese population is familiar with as it has been hoping and waiting for things to
change for the better for many years now.
Resilience
The civil war that erupted in 1975 continually influences the citizens of the
nation. The experienced and witnessed poverty, homelessness, immigration, and
psychological traumas are indescribable and unquantifiable. Even today people are
paying the price of this war in shattered lives and scattered families, lost livelihoods
and ways of life, and visits to the psychiatrist, or just in repressed memories,
bitterness, or cynicism. Thousands of people are still missing after being forcefully
taken from their homes by armed men and imprisoned in Lebanon or Syria. Their
families are still looking for them and suffering for it. The extreme memories are still
ripe in the minds of the people and influence every aspect of their lives, their view of
the world, and the decisions they make.
The lack of electricity, running and potable water, food and adequate shelter
that was experienced by those Lebanese that did not flee during the war makes for
one hardened population with a steely will to survive. Interviewee C highlights the
kind of resilience required to go through and survive not just any war but a civil war
specifically:

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You have to be of a character that can adapt to the situation not only if you
work in planning but if you are living. So, if you are a character who cannot
stand it, you will leave. A lot of people left. If you are a character who can
live with it youll last as long as you can and hide. And if you are a type of
character who somehow adapts so well to it that you live with it positively
and you stay and produce as if there is nothing happening. That is what is
frightening about human beings, the way they can adapt to things and then
restart and start producing positively within it and thats what was happening
in Lebanon. Thats the dynamics of it. It was not a total collapse. Everyone
was waiting and hoping for a total collapse so that things would have to
change. But there was no total collapse. There was like a new type of living
under a different situation. A lot of people who live under war for years and
years, they get used to it in a way that they adapt to it. So I was the type who
could adapt. So I lasted and I stayed So your daily life becomes like an
hourly life You can tell by the direction and the noise whether they [the
bombs] are going to be deadly or not. You start to live on instinct as well
more than intelligence, because if you are intelligent youll leave [laughs].
You cannot be logical any more. If you are logical what are you doing here?
So you start living on your instinct.

Coping with Civil War: Impacts on Identity
Interviewee B discusses coping with the war, the kinds of things people had
to deal with at that time, and how the civil conflict impacted their view of risk and
danger:
Well, I dont think people cope with believe me, I dont think people can
ever overcome things that happen in war. Its always in the back of your
mind. I mean, a lot of times I of course, when the war first started I
remember that at our house (we were at Sadat Street) they said there was a
sniper at Sadat. Our hearts stopped! And we stayed at home and we didnt
move and things like that. After four months the bombing started. One person
in the building next to us was hurt, I put him in the car under the bombs and I
took him to the American University Hospital. Then we used to think you
get used to things. A bomb fell, where? Lets say Comodore Street Oh, its
far its not important its far, not important.

Yes, you get used to losing people, to dying, to getting a bomb on the house
and it getting burnt. Theres a story called The Plague by Albert Camus

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that talks about what happens when a city gets isolated from the world due to
anything just like we were isolated due to this internal war what peoples
feelings become like Its okay this person died he died in the war, but
were still surviving, were still alive. Do you remember there was a
program called Were still alive, say thank God!? Your appearance and
your looks get the least priority And one of the things, really, that
continues probably with you for a long time the very judicious use of
available resources. I mean, I used to have a shower, collect the water, use it
for bathroom flushing (Interviewee B).

All of the interviewees who had practiced planning during the war discussed
how they came into work every day even with the great risk (or as often as it was
physically possible for them to do so) and how they felt they had to work if just for
them to maintain some semblance of normalcy.
I cant stop. I feel that nothing can stop me. I have a colleague who is an
architect. Everyone here was fainting from fear, and she and I got a truck and
brought it here from Gemayzeh under gunfire. This is the strength of our
people. Its unbelievable. And there are a lot like me who didnt stop.
(Interviewee N)

Interviewee L also discusses the influence of the war on his work and how
people coped with the atrocities of conflict. Below is an excerpt from the interview
with L that highlights the kind of continuing impacts the civil war has had. It gives
us insight on the characteristics of the Lebanese population:
Interviewee (L): I think I would say the war affected my work in the way it
affected me as an individual the way I think rather than the way I practice.
A war society is a very much a politicized and protective society. You have
to protect yourself in a way, you know. You have to learn how to shield
yourself in different ways, either physical or emotional
Interviewer (TNS): Survival
L: If you want to survive, absolutely. My feeling is this sort of shielding
effect gave you a distance from pressure. You can be pressured by work, but
at one point you have the ability to stay very far and just
TNS: To normalize?

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L: To normalize it or sometimes shut it off totally. And thats I think thats
a skill of survival that many people who managed to survive in a decent way
the war to be able to shut it off that its out there but its not affecting
me, you know. Particularly when the continuous shelling and bombing etc
You simply say
TNS: Its not happening.
L: Its not happening.
TNS: Denial?
L: It could be denial. Youre right. When it comes to work, I think with the
level of pressure that we do in planning working with a lot of people, at least
when in the evening personally I know how to shut it off, to zone it out. It
stays in the office. The moment I go out I can have a life in a way.
TNS: Okay.
L: And also from a practical point of view, I think we understand the politics
of people very well. We simply are not people that can see things the way
they are. We always know that theres another story somewhere thats not
told, and thats also I would say its either a war, or a Lebanese, or an
occidental, I dont know but theres always this sense of not doubt but you
always want to see beyond whats evident.
TNS: Behind the scenes.
L: Theres always something, you know, particularly also when it comes to
large-scale planning. Theres always a story of power somewhere. Okay?

The above discussions with interview participants underline the kinds of
issues that remain alive in Lebanese society and that planners working in the post-
war environment presented in Lebanon have to deal with. The kind of emotional and
physical resilience required to overcome the civil war has its influences even today.
Witness for instance the characteristics of the Lebanese identity as mentioned or
implied (directly or indirectly) by the interviewees. The people of Lebanon tend to
be distrustful (L talks about how people believe there is always something happening
beyond what they are told), protective (L), instinctual (C), adaptive to new situations
(B and F), interested in short-term gains (F below), emotionally detached or in denial
(L). They are also risk-taking and tend to have a skewed perspective of danger (B

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and N). Six interview participants discussed what they termed the Lebanese
personality or mentality. Interviewee F not only does so, but identifies the
mentality of the public as the major challenge faced today by post-war planners in
practice because the lengthy civil war had such a large impact on the people:
I think you have to distinguish between wars that were short and wars that
lasted longer. We had a 15-year civil war That means that you learn how to
live with the war with the crisis on a day-to-day basis. You live for the
moment; youre a short term planner because you might be here today, you
might not be here tomorrow. You want to live it fully so for the partying and
the entertainment section that it fantastic because the Lebanese they tend to
have a very social and active night life, which is actually one of the attractive
aspects to tourism. But the problem is that you cant plan and urban planning
is difficult in that context of somebody who wants quick profit, that does not
want to think ten years down the line.

The Lebanese public today is experiencing a kind of escapism that is
understandable (Khalaf 1983, 1998; Friedman 1989). But the same ties that kept the
society alive during the war ultimately led to its current instability. The civil war has
thus affected the Lebanese public in ways that cannot be reversed or overcome
without a great deal of time and effort. The psychological dilemmas, the
fragmentation of society, and the loss of civility and hope are all serious issues of
paramount importance in the post-civil war planning efforts and these can only be
corrected using a strategy that recognizes these as problematic and as detrimental to
the development and success of public participation processes.
Another aspect of the Lebanese mentality that influences public participation
and is a residue of the war is the prejudice that still exists between the religious sects
in many cases. The unresolved hatred and distrust of other groups that was so high in

161
the immediate aftermath of the war has dissipated but not disappeared. It remains an
obstacle for public participation albeit one that can be resolved through collaborative
dialogue and mediated discussion, i.e. through the kind of public participation
discussed in the previous section of this chapter. A knowledge of the existence and
details of the problems among the various sects is critical for planners to take the
necessary steps in the right direction without faltering or committing a costly faux
pas. The sensitive subject of religion can be broached lightly by knowledgeable
practitioners. Their understanding increases the possibility of success in the
participatory process as they will know who they can bring together, when, and what
to aim for.
The attributes of the Lebanese identity mentioned by the interviewees such as
distrust, detachment, and protectiveness, along with the live-for-the-moment attitude
combine to form an impediment for planners when it comes to the formulation and
implementation of public participation. The point here is not that these obstacles can
or cannot be overcome as much as it is to highlight the importance of encompassing
an understanding of the relevant society when planners conceptualize public
participation and devise its methods. The deeper the knowledge of the society and
the more the devised methods encompass this understanding, the more likely the
success of the participative process. This can be as applicable in other situations in
planning as it can be for post-civil war contexts.

162
Compounded with these direct influences of the Civil War on the psychology
of the Lebanese society are more recent historical events of great significance. The
Syrian rule that began at the end of the civil war stifled the many freedoms that the
Lebanese had grown accustomed to. The right of the public to gather and protest was
eliminated. Freedoms of speech and of press were threatened by the increased
censorship by the government and the decision in 1996 to close some of the fifty
television stations that had propagated during the war only six of which remain
today.
36
For instance, in September 2002, Lebanese security officers raided and
forcibly shut down the private Lebanese television station Murr TV (MTV) and
Mount Lebanon Radio Station.
37
Both stations are owned by an anti-Syrian member
of parliament, Gabriel Murr, and were vocal in their opposition to and criticism of
Syria.
The stifling situation gradually deteriorated and reached its pinnacle in
February 2005 with the murder of Rafiq Hariri. At this point tensions heightened to
the extent that other politicians and journalists who opposed Syria were killed or
threatened. Even a murder list of targeted politicians was publicized in the latter part
of 2005. Still, under all of these dangers and risks, Lebanon remains the most
democratic Arab country in the Middle East (The Economist 2006)
38
which is a
testament to the strength and resilience of its citizens.

36
See the UNDP website: http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=9
37
See http://www.cpj.org/news/2002/Lebanon05sept02na.html
38
Smiley, Xan. 2006. Plenty of seeds, but still a long way to fruition: Arab democracy in 2006, in
The World in 2006, The Economist 20
th
edition.

163
This kind of inner strength of the people combines with the residues of
oppression and the rebellion against it that recently occurred to form an edgy
situation for the Lebanese public. This tension needs to be considered by planners
within the participatory framework in the kinds of freedoms the public expects or is
accustomed to for instance. During the era of Syrian dominance, many people were
afraid to voice their political particularly anti-Syrian opinions. The stories of
people who vocally opposed Syria being kidnapped or disappearing (or more
recently being threatened or killed) were abundantly heard through the Lebanese
grapevine. It is not difficult to understand why at least some portion of the public
would have some trouble vocalizing freely, confidently, and without inhibition or
suspicion within a participatory arena. Planners would have to work hard to build the
trust of the public in a participatory process that provides feelings of safety and
immunity to participants.

The historical context, in the case of Lebanon as in other cases, is very
important in the conceptualization of public participation and the formulation of its
processes. Much more could have been said about the impact of pre-war history as
well as the Civil War and post-war tensions on the Lebanese identity and psyche. But
what has been outlined is meant to adequately give a taste of the kinds of difficulties
urban planners deal with when it comes to the implementation of public participation
procedures. The detailed descriptions of the historical institutions present in the post-

164
war Lebanese society given above emphasize how complicated and multi-layered
public participation can be.

6.2.3 Political Institutions

The political institutions that influence public participation and complicate
the implementation of participatory processes in post-war Lebanon include the
complex structure of the political system (for planning) and the lack of formal
participation within it, the vulnerable political situation, and the impact of religious
institutions on politics.
The Political System
The general political milieu was seen as too problematic or convoluted by
fourteen out of fifteen participants in this study. These interviewees discussed
political aspects of the planning process pinpointing many disadvantages. For
instance, interviewee E talks about politicians interfering in decision-making or even
bypassing the legal avenues of planning for material gain and sees this kind of
interference as an impediment to public participation. Corruption was also cited as a
problem by six interviewees. This blatant and often publicized (via the media) abuse
of the system causes cynicism and suspiciousness of the government in the
population. Unfortunately, this distrust leaks to the planning domain and thus to
participation efforts.

165
All the participants in this study thought that the political system itself is also
a problem for planning and for the implementation of public participation
procedures. The system is deficient in institutional structures that encompass or
demand participation within the planning process. For instance, interviewee A
thought that direct public participation would become part of the process of planning
if it were formalized and obligated by law in Lebanon (as environmental assessments
have become more of a routine in many cases in the country).
Two interviewees felt that the responsibility for the lack of participation in
the post-war planning process rested squarely on the shoulders of the government
that had not changed the system. The compulsory inclusion of public participation
within the planning process as in the case of environmental assessments for
instance would bring participation to the forefront of the planning discussion and
would obligate planners to allocate time and money to its practice. This in turn could
spark interest in the population, more dialogue on public involvement, and encourage
participation.
The political system in the planning domain is also confusing in its
bureaucracy and the jurisdictions of the governmental bodies and this has negative
consequences for urban planning and its applications including public participation.
The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Directorate General
for Urban Planning (DGUP), and the Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP)
are the major players involved in planning at the central level of planning

166
governance. These request or formulate all the major plans for all of Lebanon.
However, other governmental bodies can also be involved on a case by case basis
and where applicable such as the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Public
Works. Plans are also approved by the Council of Ministers.
Then there are both regional federations of municipalities that enable a group
of municipalities to work together and local municipalities. The functions of the
latter are dependent on the particular locality and can sometimes be unclear. Local
municipalities, of which there are more than 700, have the highest level of
representation as the members of municipal councils are directly elected by citizens
of the locality every four years. Unfortunately, although these municipalities are
funded they are governed by a system of regulations that does not allow for much
flexibility based on their capacities or capabilities. Syrian dominance in Lebanon has
also tended to centralize government and reduce their role (UNDP-POGAR).
39
Most
municipalities are not functional because they cannot collect revenues or are unable
to provide services and most municipal projects have thus been assumed by either
the central government or by private industry (UNDP-POGAR).
The confusion over jurisdiction and authority makes planning practice more
difficult for practitioners. Centralized conceptualizations of planning can also
decrease the likelihood of effective public participation as the elected municipal
council has a higher stake (than at the central level) in direct public participation and

39
http://www.pogar.org/countries/decentralization.asp?cid=9

167
in the provision of adequate levels of local representation, needs, and demands as the
reelection of its members depends on the satisfaction of the local electorate.
Political Instability and Diversions from Planning
Seven respondents felt that another factor in the participation equation had to
be mentioned: the political instability and change in the region. Interviewee D
describes the situation best: You never know whats going on in Lebanon anyway
with regards to political stability. The war currently going on in Iraq, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the problems between Israel and both Iran and Syria, and issues
of who is arming and funding Hezbollah and of disarming the group, all take center
stage in the minds of the people. They politically destabilize and economically
impact not only Lebanon, but the entire Middle Eastern region.
When questioned on whether increased participation immediately after the
war would have changed the planning environment, Interviewee A replied:
No, I think at that time people had a lot of other worries. And there were a lot
of priorities for rebuilding, for solving the problems of the displaced, for
reorganizing the state, for reorganizing the army that within the overall set of
priorities after the war planning or the system of planning and the way
planning was conducted was not really imperative. Anything was fine as long
as documents were there and I dont think that it has changed very much. In
fact, these changes are coming a bit later now.

This kind of perception on behalf of the planners that the public has more
important priorities on its mind immediately after the end of the war had begun to
change until the recent political events of 2005. This atmosphere of fear prevailed
until the first part of 2006 and was compounded again recently with the division of

168
the country as the government heatedly debated the problem of disarming Hezbollah.
This atmosphere of instability prevails today and lowers the planning efforts taking
place and the need for formal participation on the priority lists of the public.
Religion in Planning
Also discussed by interviewees is the power of the political parties and their
at times negative impact on the implementation of plans or on outcomes that are not
necessarily in the public interest. A good example (and one that is mentioned by
most of the study participants) is the case of Elyssar. Elyssar illustrates how the
political parties in Lebanon in fact many elements of politics are closely related
to the religious sects and can be seen, as in the case of some planners involved in this
study, as impediments to planning. Politics and religion in Lebanon have a very
complicated but close relationship. It is an affiliation that is thorny and sensitive at
best. For instance, interviewee D sees the major challenge of post-war planning as
such: The one thing that we dont have or we didnt have was data and youve
never had data in Lebanon. Youve got no population data, youve got no economic
data, again because of the political implications. The religious situation in Lebanon
is so tense and such a part of politics that any element that can threaten the
precarious religious balance (such as census data) will undermine political stability.
Religion is related to political parties and religious figures are highly
involved in politics. Most of religious sects are associated with one or more political
parties, for instance the Shiites with Hezbollah or Amal or the Sunnis with Hariris

169
Future movement. In Lebanon there is no separation between Church and State as in
the U.S. To the contrary, the two are so intertwined they are inseparable and political
stability in the country depends on that. Religious sectarianism in Lebanon formally
occupies a central role in governance with the National Pact that guarantees
Maronite Christians the presidency, the Sunni Muslims the prime minister, and the
Shiite Muslims the speaker of the parliament (El-Khazen 1991, Makdisi 1996). This
sectarianism filters to all public positions from members of the Cabinet to the
government employee at the bottom of the organization chart as political parties
constantly argue about the filling of these positions based not on skill but on sect.
Sectarianism is therefore pervasive in politics and in all facets of public life.
This kind of political influence of religion is one that cannot be discounted by urban
planners when it comes to the conceptualization and implementation of public
participation measures. In a post-civil war environment particularly this increases the
tenseness of the situation and the potential for the reemergence of violence. Planners
must in this case be very knowledgeable of the political institutions in the milieu,
aware of the implications of their actions, and understanding of and sensitive to the
problems between the parties within the participatory process.

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6.2.4 Socio-Cultural Institutions

Socio-cultural institutions can predispose people to democratic thinking and
can explain why some people chose to participate while others dont. In Lebanon
there exists an institutionalized public perception of planning as architecture. All of
these factors predispose people to have set beliefs or values that influence their take
on participation. Planners knowledge of local institutions including customs, beliefs,
values, and traditions enable a better understanding of the kind of participation that is
likely to emerge in the locality and thus increases the likelihood of implementation
of successful methods.
Some interview participants mentioned that the Lebanese public lacked
maturity, or education in participation, or what I would call the institutional culture
of public participation. The main idea is that there is little civic identification with
the ideals of direct citizen democracy when it comes to issues of urban planning. As
interviewee O stated, In general we are not educated yet to defend our own rights to
the end by our own means. We always depend on a network of contacts in order to
reach what we want. For all that Lebanon is one of the most democratic countries in
the Middle Eastern region (The Economist 2006)
40
, this does not necessarily apply at
all levels of governance (such as planning for example) and definitely not in a formal
and direct manner.

40
Smiley, Xan. 2006. Plenty of seeds, but still a long way to fruition: Arab democracy in 2006, in
The World in 2006, The Economist 20
th
edition.

171
Social Networks and Informal Participation
Under these same conditions, interviewees have mentioned that the Lebanese
tend to be complicated and complex (N). Some have also called them a display
society (L). Lebanon is a small country with very close-knit ties and extensive
networks. It is uncommon if you are Lebanese and you go to a public place for you
not to see at least one person you know. This kind of social scene may require
planners to be aware and to beware of people who have qualms about voicing their
opinions in front of others (particularly those who know them) and of people who
may put on a show just to be seen and heard or to incite the crowd.
Lebanon is a very small country both in area and population. According to
the UNDP Human Development Report, the latest data from 2003 estimates a
population of 3.5 million for the entire nation.
41
Therefore, the social context is such
that many people are likely to know each other. Social institutions that are present in
such as small society indicate that the Lebanese have large extended families, close-
knit ties and communal networks, and active social lives. They are thus more likely
with the current lack of formal, direct, and institutionalized participatory measures to
voice their opinions face-to-face at social events or informal private gatherings than
in more public settings. This is in part due to the tightness of social ties, but could
also have something to do with the deficiency in formally institutionalized public
participatory processes. Still, informal participation does exist, is strong, and in many

41
See UNDP-POGAR: http://www.pogar.org/countries/morestats.asp?cid=9&gid=1&ind=29
accessed on 02/27/07.

172
cases gives power to those who seem powerless. The examples of informal public
participation in the BCD or in environmental planning in Monsif highlight the
effectiveness of this mechanism.
I am not trying to claim here that informal participation is adequate in and of
itself or better than formal means of public participation. That being said, however,
informal forms of participation do exist in the case of Lebanon (and likely in many
others). Thus, they must be taken into account by planners as they prepare formal
participatory methods. Formal direct public participation has its own benefits, for
instance, in catharsis, in enabling the participation of those who do not have access
to informal methods, in information-gathering that decreases the time wasted in the
formulation of plans the public are against (and that are eventually halted via
informal methods). Due to the social ties that exist in the close-knit communities, the
relative ease of and familiarity with informal participation, and the deficiency in
formal processes, portions of the public may still choose to participate informally
even when participatory methods that are institutionalized become more available to
them. Planners in practice need to be aware of these impediments to direct and
formal public participation and to keep them in mind in order to devise appropriate
methods and to better assess the success of this kind of process.
Culture
Just like in any other country, Lebanese society (and the different groups that
compose it) has its own customs, traditions, values, and beliefs. Urban planning in

173
Lebanon is erroneously perceived by the general population as architecture on a
larger scale. This widely institutionalized belief and perception of planning that is
more related to the physical than it is to policy- and decision-making does not aid
public participation in any way. An understanding of this situation (why it is as it is
and how this came about) is needed for planners to endeavor to change it.
On a smaller scale, one of the interview participants (D) indicated the
Lebanese hospitality by the vast amounts of tea D was forced to drink when
conducting a study in a poor residential mainly Shiite area. Lebanon as a whole tends
to be very hospitable. Whether you are offered tea or coffee a refusal of hospitality in
the form of the drink can be perceived as an insult by the host. D also understood
that the study undertaken by the company D works for needed to be cleared with the
representatives of the local population. The general distrust of strangers turns to
offers of tea if the actions of the urban planner are okayed by local representatives.
Planners that understand local customs and social channels such as these can act in
ways that encourage a larger repertoire of interactions with the public and enable
more genuine participation and better success.
The customs of the different religions also need to be understood and
respected for planners to succeed and thrive in Lebanon. As a non-Muslim female
planner particularly, I am conscious and respectful of Islamic traditions and
although in Lebanon there is not as much of a need to wear headdress as other Arab
nations I tend to dress more conservatively in Muslim areas. I do this to respect the

174
traditions of others and to garner their respect as a married female professional. I also
do not wear any religious symbols when conducting planning studies to try to the
best of my ability to take the religion out if it so to speak. This kind of understanding
of local institutions particularly in small sectarian societies facilitates and enables
the work of planners and increases the potential for success. Planners that have
knowledge of local customs, traditions, values, beliefs, and other institutions aid the
successfulness of public participation measures.

6.3 Managing Complexities: A Broader Understanding of Public Participation

The post-civil war context can be seen as a case of public participation where
compared to normal planning situations everything is more vivid and extreme.
However, this does not mean that this particular case of post-war planning in
Lebanon is irrelevant for wider planning circumstances or that we cannot learn
something from it. Post-civil war and every-day or normal planning situations can
have a mutually beneficial relationship in terms of learning from each other.
Post-civil war contexts offer more intensified and concentrated circumstances
that can provide planning with new information about public participation. This is
because some things do not become apparent except in extreme situations such as
disaster or war that have their own dynamics. Although the purposes of public
participation are often similar to those under normal circumstances, in post-civil war

175
situations they become more delicate, critical, and time-sensitive. The aims of
participation such as self-exploration and community-building are more pronounced
in these conditions because of the consequences of failure. The complicated
circumstances of post-civil war societies also present needs that demand more
critical purposes for public participation in recovery and reconciliation such as
catharsis and healing. The timing of public participation efforts can also be important
in the highly sensitive post-war period (particularly in the case of civil wars). These
two conclusions reached from post-civil war research can have implications for
wider implementation of participation procedures in day-to-day planning.
As well as the purposes of public participation and its timing, planners need
to understand the overlapping local socio-cultural, political, historical, and religious
institutional contexts of public participation of which both the population and the
local planners themselves are a part. This applies to all contexts but is particularly
critical in post-war and post-civil war situations because the consequences are
greater should planning efforts (such as participation) fail. The detailed descriptions
of the post-war Lebanese society presented above highlight how complicated and
multi-layered public participation can be. The past history (Civil War, colonization,
occupation, oppression, etc.), religious background, psychology, identity, and social
relationships and ties of the population are important. The recognition of any
tensions among the various groups within the public on one hand and between the
citizens and the government (including planners and decision-makers) on the other

176
hand enables planners to mold the participatory process to better suit the locality and
to facilitate success.
A comprehension of the relationship between planning and political
institutions in the particular context of public participation is also important in post-
civil war as in any context. This includes issues of bureaucracy, jurisdiction, and
corruption in the political decision-making system of which urban planning is a part.
The instability of the political situation in the country and in the region is also very
important as it influences the livelihoods, mindsets, and priority lists of citizens and
the position of planning on these lists. Stable political situations thus allow for a
higher likelihood of formal direct participation of citizens. The relationship between
religion and politics is also crucial post-civil war. Interestingly enough, we have seen
that this has garnered its own significance recently in the U.S. in hotly debated issues
such as embryonic stem-cell research and gay marriage.
Knowledge of local socio-cultural institutions in the form of values,
traditions, customs, and beliefs of the population and of the various groups within it
is a must particularly in post-civil war situations where ignorance can deter
participation and even cause conflict. But in all circumstances, an institutional
understanding of context is beneficial for the planner and can aid their
conceptualization and implementation of public participation. Endogenizing
institutions into planning understanding institutions better, what they are, how they
work, etc. and incorporating them into our knowledge of public participation to

177
better identify and comprehend its nuances and complexities, will enable us to seek
purposes and methods for participation that are more specific to context and thus
more likely to succeed.
Institutions explain the publics perception of planning and of public
participation and clarify why some people chose to take part in the process while
others do not or cannot. The publics ideas on and experiences with democracy and
different freedoms (of speech, of demonstration, of the press, etc.) are also important
institutional considerations. Institutionalized public participation methods within
urban planning processes as well as informal means of public involvement and
influence in decision-making cannot be separated when planners investigate
democratic representation within the planning system. This applies in both post-civil
war and day-to-day planning situations. Informal modes of participation (as opposed
to formalized, within the system, forms) such as direct contact with planners through
various ties and networks and outside of the planning arena in social or private
circles, can aid democracy and public involvement in decision-making. Although it
occurs to a certain extent behind the scenes it does influence the planner and thus
planning decisions and actions. This is present in the U.S. with the more recent
desire to have planners who reside in the communities they serve and thus have a
finger on its pulse and a stake in its future.
Lebanon is a country that has been perennially and somewhat continuously in
the throes of war, conflict, hardship, or instability. This makes for different meanings

178
of public participation and even different mechanisms and purposes for
implementation. Public participation in the post-civil war context is highly
multifaceted, complicated, and sensitive. However, participation is complex not just
in and of itself. The complexities of the story of this case of Lebanon add to our
understanding of the intricate and delicate nature of public participation and the
importance, robustness, and malleability of urban planning itself and its ability to
reinvent itself in situations of war. Everyday planning in other societies that have not
experienced such continual disaster can better understand the intricacies of
participation from the extraordinary case of Lebanon. The challenge for planning
practice and its scholarship is going to be how to develop this new knowledge and
better understanding of public participation as catharsis and healing, as time-
sensitive, as interwoven with socio-cultural, historical, and political framework, and
as institutionally-based without the context of war.

179
Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Urban planners deal with various serious difficulties when practicing in post-
war conditions. In the case of Lebanon, they were faced with the daunting tasks of
rebuilding the physical infrastructure and reconstructing the urban fabric. This is
complicated by competing visions in society of a modernistic future and of nostalgic
memories of the more traditional past. But the remnants of a civil war also include a
physically fragmented and politically and religiously divided society, and this means
there is a need for forgiveness, catharsis, and reconciliation of the different groups
and a rehabilitation of society in general which goes beyond the physical domain of
planners. Within this environment public participation in planning is complicated,
convoluted, and sensitive in the extreme when compared to normal everyday
planning situations.
A review of the literature on direct public participation in various domains
particularly in planning, political science, and public administration reveals the wide
gap between the conceptualization of public participation in theory and its
implementation in practice or between the spirit and the method. The complications
of methodology are mentioned but not so well-covered in detail. Participation in the
literature sounds easier than it really is, and this is highlighted in a case that is
condensed and extreme such as the one presented and studied here. Lebanon is a
country that seems to have been perpetually in some kind of conflict; where nearly

180
every religious sect has had problems with at least one other, settled or rather
unsettled by violence in many cases. The post-war state, although not void of
conflict or stable by any means, provides an opportunity to look at examples of
public participation and planning under these unusual and extreme circumstances
where U.S. methods cannot really apply as they are but can still be contemplated and
analyzed as Lebanon is the most democratic Arab country. Delving into the
institutional context of public participation allows us to better understand its
intricacies in order to bridge the gap between its theory and practice.
A look at the historical institutions that mold the Lebanese provides some
insight into the psyche of the public under investigation. The citizens have survived a
past of religious conflict, civil war, and occupation under harsh conditions and
experienced much hardship and strife. The various ethnicities and religious sects that
are present have not coexisted peacefully. Economic and political disparities between
the Muslims and the Christians as well as foreign influences have succeeded in
dividing the population and causing head-on collisions in some cases. Past
colonization and current globalization have also influenced the Lebanese people
unevenly and caused rifts.
Compounded with these historical factors that impact the identity and
psychology of the public are political institutions such as the instability that currently
exists both locally and regionally. Locally, there are problems between Lebanon and
Syria on the one hand even after the Syrian pullout in 2005, and Lebanon and Israel

181
on the other hand even after the Israeli pullout in 2000. Particularly in the case of
Israel, there are still unresolved issues of occupied territory (Shebaa Farms),
prisoners of war, and landmines that remain planted in the south. These problems are
tied in Lebanon to the existence and armament of Hezbollah. Regionally, the
conflicts in Iraq and the Palestinian territories have extended reach and influence and
have recently escalated in violence and scope. The perceived potential for political or
military ramifications for Iran and Syria at the hands of the U.S. and the international
community also leads to instability in the Middle East.
How planning occurs in Lebanon and how public participation is able to exist
and even in some cases thrive in this extreme environment is extraordinary and a
testament to the importance, inventiveness, robustness, and malleability of the
planning domain. Public participation in post-war planning is more vital and intense
than under normal conditions. It is also more sensitive to time and institutional
constraints of the context under study. It thus provides an arena for us to learn about
public participation more graphically in practice. The conclusions regarding the
nature of public participation drawn from the case of Lebanon can be applied
elsewhere, but that is not the real point here. The objective is to highlight how public
participation is much more nuanced than we normally assume and that this applies to
why (purposes), where (context and level of government), when (timing), and how
(methodology, formal or informal participation, etc.) it occurs as well as to the
consequences of its happening (whether intended or unintended).

182
The interviews conducted in this study brought out the factors which the
participants felt impacted public participation and planning in post-civil war practice.
The issues mentioned included: the political aspects of planning, corruption, political
change and instability in the region, local planning, the public perception of the
planning domain, the civil war, religious sectarianism, the Lebanese psyche,
informal participation, and the lack of institutions that enable or encourage public
participation. The interviews therefore brought about a discussion of the various
aspects of planning and the context that impacts public participation and explain
where, when, and how it occurs in the post-civil war environment and why it
happens the way it does. Participation is thus linked to its purposes and the historical,
socio-cultural, political, and historical institutions of the context in which it takes
place. It is obviously closely related to the population of which both the public and
the planners are a part and a product of.
This study concludes that public participation is much more nuanced,
complex, and multifaceted than normally assumed. A deeper institutional analysis of
public participation in a condensed case such as that of Lebanon has lead to a
discovery of different layers within the description and character of participation that
have added to its meaning, scope, and significance in all contexts. As unveiled in the
case of Lebanon, public participation is intimately related to emotions of the public
like fear and hate and trust or distrust. It is also linked to issues of identity and
psychology such as the level of openness of the society, its short-term live-for-the-

183
moment thinking, its skewed perception of risk and danger, its protectiveness, its
emotional escapism, and its emotional and physical resilience. These characteristics
and concerns of the public can be integrated into methodological conceptualization
and implementation. Misconceptions of the public, such as the perception of
planning as architecture in Lebanon, can provide impediments for planning and
participation that planners need to be aware of in order to be overcome.
Public participation is also related to the weakness of the public sphere in
Lebanon as private companies which carry the heavier burden in planning practice
are more capable of financing and conducting participatory efforts but may have less
incentive to do so than public agencies, particularly without legislation that explicitly
mandates direct citizen involvement. Participation is also linked to the political
institutions and the planning system that is in place. Corruption, confusion in
bureaucracy and jurisdiction (particularly at the central level of governance), and
complexities of representativeness (at the decentralized local level) are part of this
decision-making system in Lebanon. Elyssar exemplifies the convoluted political
party system and its influence on various aspects of civic life in Lebanon including
planning and public participation. In addition, Lebanon is an excellent case to bring
out the level of influence of religion on politics, planning, and public participation
due to the enormous powers that the various sects and religious figures possess.
Participation can be more successful if this influence is garnered by planners.

184
Public participation is a function of the level of democracy and
representativeness of the decision-making system and of the power the public
possesses to influence outcomes within it. The case of Monsif provides a glimpse of
the different ways power can be attained and utilized to bring about successful
participation so that the needs of the public are met. The purposes of public
participation are also critical in the post-civil war planning process in Lebanon.
Scholars and practitioners of planning need to provide more challenging purposes
that push participation to its limits both in Lebanon and elsewhere as restrictive goals
can constrict the outcomes of the participatory process. Self-exploration, community-
building, therapy, healing, forgiveness, and catharsis are important in the
reconciliation of post-civil war factions to achieve more cohesiveness and
cooperation in the Lebanese society.
In addition to why (purposes) participation occurs is when or the timing of
participatory efforts which can be critical post-civil war. How the implementation is
conducted who is brought in when, whether it is formal or informal, etc. and
where it happens in what context, and whether at the local, regional, or central
level also influences the outcomes of the process in Lebanon. The consequences of
the occurrence of participation even if unintended cannot be discounted and include
possible conflict if done when the timing is wrong or with ambitions of bringing
diverse groups together that are too grand too soon. But they could also mean

185
increased hope and optimism in the public for the future as well as catharsis, healing,
and a more cohesive society if implemented cautiously and successfully.
The institutional nature of public participation has immense and wide-
reaching impact on its implementation and this understanding is important for
planning. The urban planners who participated in this study mentioned the lack of
education of the public in participation or their maturity, what I termed the
institutional culture of participation, as an impediment to successful implementation.
An understanding of the customs, norms, traditions, beliefs, and culture of the
society as a whole and of the different groups within it is also significant for planners
as it can affect the planners relationship with the public and the success of
participatory efforts. Institutional analysis enables a deeper understanding of why
some people participate while others do not. The institutionalization of both formal
(through legislation for instance) and informal (through years of practice)
participatory means is also a part of a broader institutional endogenization in
planning.
Public participation is a function of the characteristics and institutions of the
society itself. The types of social interactions, the level of closeness in society, and
the numbers of close personal relationships and the political clout these contacts
possess have proven to be invaluable in Lebanon as observed in the case of Monsif.
The power to influence decisions and outcomes in planning is directly related to the
high social capital and the close-knit nature of the small society in the country.

186
Informal public participation is enabled by these social, religious, and political ties
and has become institutionalized as part of the planning system after years of
practice. This kind of public participation, although it has its cons in that it is
dependent on powerful contacts (which not all groups have), has in some cases made
possible the will of the public. The Lebanese society is also so closely-knit and so
outgoing and social in nature that urban planners there may have a better hand on the
public pulse through their relationships and interactions at social events. The
planning system in Lebanon is therefore more democratic that it appears to be on the
surface.
As well as its contributions to theory, this kind of in-depth analysis of the
case study of Lebanon lends itself to some normative conclusions
42
for policy even
though this is not the main focus of the dissertation. For instance, public participation
is inherently difficult in multi-sectarian contexts because of issues of distrust and the
struggle for political power and dominance. As mentioned by interviewees,
decentralization in cases such as Lebanon can be more successful in terms of the
implementation of plans that are in the benefit of the locality. Lowering the planning
context to the level of the local neighborhood increases homogeneity so that you
remove some of the problems between sects and are more likely to achieve some sort
of consensus. Municipalities that are better empowered and financed by the central
government can better achieve basic functions such as road maintenance and tax and

42
The recommendations mentioned here are aided by the problems for participation mentioned by the
interviewees as well as the suggestions they made for the improvement of public participation in
Lebanon.

187
trash collection. Difficulties arise when more central-level planning problems must
be tackled such as in the case of the National Plan for Solid Waste Management.
However, regional level (multi-municipality) negotiations can occur in situations like
these so that landfills etc. can be assigned to locations that can be compensated by
other means in a tit-for-tat kind of exchange.
Another recommendation in the case of Lebanon would be for planners and
municipalities to consciously play a more active role in garnering and utilizing
informal means of public participation. In the current circumstances of high tension
between political and religious parties direct formal public participation can be a
problem as the different parties may be better off separated than together and getting
them together may cause unnecessary conflict. Using informal means of participation
such as discussions between the planners and various groups in informal settings off
the record may help planners understand what various groups need and enable them
to spot any potential commonalities. Tensions are so high in some cases that if one
group wants something the opposing group would be against it even if it did them no
harm. At the moment, the timing for formal public participation methods is off
(particularly at the central level) as the tensions now seem to be nearing the levels of
immediately post-civil war (after having decreased considerably between the end of
the civil war and 2005). This provides even more incentive for a focus on informal
methods of public participation that can and have worked in certain circumstances.

188
Still, formalized public participation can occur at the local level where
populations are more homogeneous as the municipal areas are so small. Even
planning at the central level can benefit from formal cooperation with municipalities
that have a hand on the pulse of the local population they serve. Involving localities
directly or indirectly (through municipalities) in the planning process from the
preliminary planning stages and then gathering information from them and keeping
them informed is much more efficient than the way planning is done in Lebanon in
many cases. In the case of Monsif, for example, plans for the potential landfill were
heard through the grapevine (and not directly from the central level to the people or
the municipality), a process that does not garner trust or allow for feedback from the
public. Bringing the public in from the beginning would have minimized the time
and effort wasted making the plans and thus increased efficiency. The public also
would not have felt left out at the local level, forced to scramble in search of
information, and then resorted to using social and political connections to achieve
their goals. Eventually the government can begin to gradually require formal
participation as a part of public and private planning projects until it is
institutionalized within the planning system.
The institutional nature of participation if understood by planners can be
useful to policy as well. For instance, in Lebanon there is a need to educate the
public about what planning is (it is not solely physical) and of their rights as citizens
when it comes to planning. The public referendum can be introduced to increase

189
democratic means of participation. The public needs to be well-informed of the steps
that they can take in a formalized participation process (if at the local or at the
central level) to protest plans. Issues of transparency from the early stages of
planning are also important in decreasing corruption and political interference in
planning and in diminishing suspiciousness, building trust, and fostering enduring
relationships between planners and the public. Once these relationships are
established they can provide the stepping stones to the rebuilding of tentative ties
among the various sects and groups where planners can act as mediators to foster an
increased social cohesiveness. Also, encouraging the involvement of NGOs, the
media, universities, etc. in planning can potentially add to the others mentioned to
build and engage an active civil society.

This study is an in-depth analysis of what historical, political, social, cultural,
psychological, and religious institutions influence public participation in Lebanon
and how. Through these various complications and complexities in Lebanon we have
been able to enlighten our general understanding of the nuanced, multifaceted, and
highly intricate nature and practice of public participation in general. Lebanon is a
country that has witnessed perennial conflict. Still, public participation has grown
and in some cases flourished in an environment that can be seen as arid for this
species of democracy. This is a testament to the strength of the spirit of participation
and to how deeply rooted the participatory practice is in the planning domain.

190
Lebanon provides a case of post-war participation in planning that enriches our
understanding of the complex meaning and institutional nature of public
participation and the translation of this in implementation measures both in Lebanon
and beyond. The challenge for planning scholars and practitioners is in the
endogenization and utilization of this knowledge.

191
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APPENDIX A: Interview 1

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): I want to ask you first of all, were you educated in
Lebanon in planning or where?
-Interviewee A (A): In architecture Im an architect from the American University.
-TNS: Okay. AUB?
-A: AUB.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Then I studied urban planning and urban design in the UK.
-TNS: Okay. What do you think is the general role of the urban planner in
Lebanon in general, not necessarily post-war but in general?
-A: Just like everywhere else, it is to improve the quality of living, plan for the
future, and just to pave the way for large urban development.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Thats what it is.
-TNS: Do you think that the role of the planner in postwar development changes or is
it the same?
-A: In postwar development it becomes more urgent.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: And more important because what you need to do is see very quickly act to
rebuild what has been destroyed because a lot of businesses wont have
accommodation. A lot of main facilities like the airport, like the port, were
destroyed vital economies. So you have to act quickly to rebuild your economy
and also provide housing for people who have lost their homes, shelter I mean, not
only homes but shelter really. The urgency becomes important and the role of
planning becomes more urgent.
-TNS: What is the planners relationship to the public he or she serves?
-A: The planners relationship to the public is a consultation. The problem with
consultation is that now this consultation causes, here for example in the case of the
BCD there were meetings, a lot of public pressure groups but it is not formally
structured in Lebanon.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: You know, we made the effort to do it because there was a lot of opposition in
the beginning because people did not understand the objectives why would a real
estate company come and develop. Why? There was a little bit of distrust and there
was a little bit of confusion about whether They thought they were going to
develop everything. They didnt understand that they were there to manage the
development which is a different concept.
-TNS: Oh, okay.
-A: They thought that the master planner was going to actually design all the
buildings. They didnt know that the master plan is only a framework for other

204
people architects, engineers to use to work on it. There was all this confusion
especially with the first large projects in Lebanon.
-TNS: Especially after the war people didnt trust each other.
-A: Exactly. They didnt. But I think public participation is very important. In all
countries it is formalized. Here it is not formalized but it happens in an informal way.
For instance, you have to go and meet with the core of Engineers and with other
professional bodies they ask us to make presentations and they gave us their
ah
-TNS: Feedback?
-A: Feedback. But there was no follow up. Seldom, we get an article in the press and
all this. But really we benefit a lot from these things because sometimes they expose
to you things you never thought of before. Okay?
-TNS: Of course.
-A: So its very important how people perceive these things. Unfortunately, this
procedure needs to be more
-TNS: A part of the process?
-A: A part of the process of planning, yes. A lot of master plans are done without
participation. The master plans that are prepared by the Ministry of Public Works a
lot of them they dont include this.
-TNS: No participation at all?
-A: No public participation. Even in municipalities sometimes there is a lack of
complete coordination. Thats very, very dangerous because it is leading now to a lot
of the master plans for small segments rural segments being not being
implemented because the municipalities refuse to implement them if they are not in
approval.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Eventually the municipalities should be in charge of these operations, but
unfortunately their revenues are low and the things are centralized here in Lebanon
its a small country and they have no means to do it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: So thats why there is now a dilemma between the central authority which
prepares the master plan and the local population.
-TNS: Yeah, who need to give excuses for
-A: They need a different way to approach things. I think the local community
eventually will be the only proper way to do these master plans otherwise they will
not be implemented.
-TNS: So more power at the local level?
-A: Yes.
-TNS: How do you think you are seen by the public you serve, you specifically?
-A: Well, we dont like to expose ourselves too much, you know.
-TNS: As soon as they know you work for Dar-El-Handasah do they start to
complain to you or what?

205
-A: No, no. Some people are very appreciative. Some people are very, sort of,
critical. Theyre critical before even they hear you. But then, you know, because
everything is informal here there are a lot of things that change when you talk to
people and you try to understand somehow. I wouldnt say that the planner in that
respect is different from anybody else.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: Some people hate doctors and some people love doctors [Laughs]
-TNS: Some people hate bankers, etc. No its not specifically the planner! Its none
of your business.
-A: [Laughs]
-TNS: Is there a conflict between the two goals of participation and implementation
in post-war planning?
-A: No, no, because participation helps implementation. If you dont let people
participate, sometimes it is counterproductive. But, at the same time, in a country
in the specific case of Lebanon a country which is multi-confessional, and that
plays a lot into the implementation of projects because whatever you do people look
at it that you have done them a favor, you havent done me a favor. Why are you
doing this for them not for us? That is a very specific problem to Lebanon and this
hinders a lot the work of the state. And hopefully, I dont know, one day people will
realize that there is no difference between them. [Laughs]
-TNS: Do you think some form of social planning would have been helpful for the
urban planner? If there had been something that parallel to the urban planner, some
thing that works on bringing people together to participate?
-A: Well, of course it would be helpful. We dont practice physical planning here as
physical planning on its own. We always take socioeconomic considerations into
play. But we take them as we perceive them, not always as other people see them.
The social perceptions, were aware of them, but it is different when you go directly
to the people and work with them to know exactly what they want. If this is not built
into the process because you see your contract allows you only to spend so much
time on doing things like that and assigns you some tasks and if you really want to
do these things it takes more time, more effort.
-TNS: And more money.
-A: Yes. If it is not formalized and approved by government and it cant be
incorporated into the contract a consultant cannot do it because hes not paid to do
it.
-TNS: Yeah. For example, Environmental Impact Statements are a part of the
process in construction. Youre saying that if this was a part of the process like that
maybe it would be implemented?
-A: Exactly, exactly. Environmental Impacts are not in all projects now. Theyre
starting to be.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think if there had been more increased participation in the BCD
that would have changed the environment of the planning in Lebanon?

206
-A: No, I think at that time people had a lot of other worries. And there were a lot of
priorities for rebuilding, for solving the problems of the displaced, for reorganizing
the state, for reorganizing the army that within the overall set of priorities after the
war planning or the system of planning and the way planning was conducted was not
really imperative. Anything was fine as long as documents were there and I dont
think that it has changed very much. In fact, these changes are coming a bit later
now.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Theyre coming now. People are asking for them now. Theyre asking for them
now. Theyre realizing, you know, that some things in the legislation have to be
changed. For example, Lebanon is the only country in the world where every
contractor has the right to develop land whether there is or no master plan.
-TNS: Really?
-A: Of course. The constructions laws are allow them.
-TNS: To do what they want?
-A: No. Outside of areas which are master planned, you can build or you have a right
to build 30 percent of coverage, 90 percent of your area and if you have a slope you
have an additional thats all the mountains.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: In a country where the resources are limited and population growth is fast with
problems of displacement and war All the problems of the environment have
resulted from that period because nobody can tell anybody, Why did you build
here? This is my land. I built on it. This results in a lot of areas five-story
buildings you increase the infrastructure costs because when you build outside a
planned area the state has to take the infrastructure to you.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: This is an extra cost. There is an awareness of this now, but legally you cannot
say, You cannot build on land, because otherwise you have to compensate.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: So therefore theyre trying to make it quite difficult for people to do financially
by lowering the AFR.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: To classify the areas: areas where you can have it the way it is now and areas
where you shouldnt have it with division of areas into urban areas, rural areas, areas
with natural landscapes, agricultural areas where there should be less buildings.
-TNS: There is more of a kind of zoning?
-A: Yes.
-TNS: Okay. If there had been increased participation in could it have been used to
increase unity in the postwar period?
-A: To increase what?
-TNS: Unity.
-A: Unity? [Laughs]

207
-TNS: [Laughs] I knew you were going to laugh.
-A: This is a political question.
-TNS: What I mean is if you could have gathered the Lebanese people around
something it would have been planning. I think theoretically it is a brilliant idea to
bring them together over something they might agree on, for example how to rebuild
Beirut. Unfortunately, maybe in practice it was more difficult or easier said than
done?
-A: No, no. I dont think this works because there are a lot of vested interests in
development and the problem in Lebanon is that each one wants to maximize his
interest.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: He will take any position not to lose his privilege. It takes a lot of work yet to
build a community spirit in Lebanon I mean, a community outside
confessionalism that it is in the public interest things that are in the public
interest. Anything done by the public authority is looked at as an infringement on
private rights,
-TNS: Property rights.
-A: Which is completely wrong because at the end of the day, in the long term, it
leads to a loss in the value of property. If its not planned well it will lower its value.
-TNS: Of course.
-A: The public domain if there are no parks, no proper
-TNS: No public space.
-A: The roads are too small, they have no Well this result in terrible problems:
parking problems, traffic problems, which affect very badly the environment. So its
a peculiar thing to Lebanon because every time you want to come and have a
public a really well-thought public domain in the plan, you find that you are
constricted.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: In the BCD, that was an exception. The usual planning law here says that if you
are planning a development, you can take up to 25 percent of the area of any project
without compensation to the public domain: to make your roads, your open space,
and facilities.
-TNS: Public infrastructure.
-A: Its nothing. Everything else you have to compensate.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: So a lot of subdivisions and developments abide by this rule because they
become less profitable and less economically feasible if they provide more. In other
countries its up to one third. Of course if you want to take more, you compensate
them. Here this 25 percent has proved to be very little. The result of it especially
where you have hills and mountainous areas which we have a lot of in Lebanon, you
take up more space for roads and retaining walls and things like this.
-TNS: Yeah.

208
-A: It ends up cutting trees, not preserving trees, and providing very little open space.
It is now, after all, all families here complain that they dont know what to do with
the children. There is no open space for them to play. Everything is private and you
have to pay for it. The beaches are private. Theres no public parks. A lot of the
population which has no possibility to pay for this is really
-TNS: Left out.
-A: Suffering. They are suffering because they dont have really any way to breathe.
-TNS: To de-stress.
-A: Yes. Its very difficult to change here. In other countries, for example Egypt, you
dont have this problem.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: They have parks, wider roads
-TNS: Why during the formation of the plans were more parks involved? Why didnt
they put more on the beach? Was it possible?
-A: It was possible to be decreed at the beginning.
-TNS: This needed to be done by government?
-A: At independence, Lebanon had about one million people population. It wasnt
really a very dense country.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: And the people that came and decreed this didnt have the experience, I think,
didnt look fast forward. And because, you know how things were, at the end of the
day they couldnt revise it. Its a religious system.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: Its a religious system. Its not very easy to change legislation.
-TNS: You have to amend the constitution.
-A: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Okay?
-TNS: I have just one more question.
-A: One more.
-TNS: One more?
-A: It looks like you have more. [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah. [Laughs] Did your formal education or theoretical background
influence your perspective on the legitimacy of the planners? I know its very
difficult to be trained in post-war development and the reason Im asking you this is
because I feel like you can be trained as a planner but you cant be trained as a post-
war planner. Its a difficult situation and, in general, I feel that people are not trained
in this type of circumstance.
-A: I mean, all government is there to serve, to organize society and all this. You
cannot look at planning as a separate item. Its part of the work of the public
authority to organize the space where people live. Now, a successful way to organize
people you have to look at the environment they live in, their situation and you

209
have to help them. I mean, if you leave people on their own they will organize
themselves as they would like to.
-TNS: Okay.
-A: Theres nobody to say what are the interests of the poor. So the poor will end up
in bad shape.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: The private sector will not provide all the amenities. It will only provide
amenities for people who can pay.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: So the planning has this aspect of looking after everybody, giving the minimum
facilities for all and not only the rich. Of course if you are rich you can find your
own accommodation and build your own house. You can find an empty plot of land
and not bother anybody else if you want to.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: You can also bother everybody else by not allowing them to do anything!
-TNS: Yeah. [Laughs]
-A: So, planning cannot be dissociated from it is part of the government to look
after the physical planning. It is the government that opens roads, that does big
projects, airports, that does big subdivisions. If it doesnt do them correctly, or
doesnt do them in time, then the programs Of course if your government has the
financial means that makes it easier for planning because you can equip an
infrastructure before you build.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: With a lack of financial means, people will build and the infrastructure has to be
put in afterwards.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: Or they put infrastructure but its substandard.
-TNS: Yeah.
-A: It doesnt work properly.
-TNS: Then you have to pay.
-A: Yes. So
-TNS: Okay. I have one last not question really. I am going to come back to
Lebanon is it okay to come see you again?
-A: Yes, of course. No problem. Public participation I will tell you all about it by
then that theres none!
-TNS: [Laughs] Thank you.

210
APPENDIX B: Interview 2

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): So you have no problem with being recorded?
-Interviewee B (B): I have no problem with anything actually.
-TNS: Okay.
-B: I dont have, I mean, classified information and I dont care.
-TNS: [Laughs] Nothing important!
-B: I mean really! [Laughing]
-TNS: What is your background in planning?
-B: I dont have I mean, I mean Let us agree on something I did not take any
course in planning. I took courses in, for example, water resources planning, not
planning physical planning. I took some courses in water resources planning. I
took some courses in economics and I have my experience I mean I mean in the
firm I work for provided me with good insights into costs and implementation of
infrastructure. So I am not a planner, I am an infrastructure planner.
-TNS: Okay. At Dar Al-Handasah?
-B: Of course, at Dar Al-Handasah Consultants.
-TNS: Okay. How long have you been with Dar Al-Handasah?
-B: 29 years so far.
-TNS: Oh my God! A long time!
-B: [Laughs] Very bad actually!
-TNS: Its not bad!
-B: No really!
-TNS: And your degree was not in planning?
-B: My first degree was in Agriculture. My second I got a Post-Graduate
Certificate in Water Resources Planning and Management from Colorado State
University. And I got a Masters in Environmental Engineering from the American
University of Beirut.
-TNS: So basically you are a water planner but you are working mostly in
infrastructure planning.
-B: Mostly, yes. Actually, I am a water planner, and mostly I work with
infrastructure in water infrastructure. I mean, I am not a planner for electrical
works definitely the water sector in infrastructure.
-TNS: When you studied all of this, since you didnt exactly study urban planning,
what kind of role did the public play - participation-wise- in your education?
-B: What kind of role did the?
-TNS: In your education, what role was given to public participation? Water
planning maybe is a little bit different than planning?
-B: You know, in few and only few courses I carried from Colorado State
University. I mean, when I took water resources planning, water resources
engineering, (what was the course? something like this) I mean, water resources
economics, and in that course we were exposed to so many things related to planning

211
and advanced planning of water resources. I mean, how do we charge for water, how
do we allocate water between different sectors of the economy, how do we tax water,
for example. I mean, it was a very nice and challenging course at the time. It
introduced me to ways of thinking of how to, for example, levy charges on water and
how to levy charges on pollution, things like that. This gave me an insight into the
planning process. What other courses? I carried a course in development economics.
This was another course that, you know, gave me insights into the development of
different sectors of the economy or looking into ways and means of how to improve
performance of public organizations and things like that.
-TNS: So you feel like they benefited you in your career?
-B: Yes, definitely. These two courses really benefited me and, of course, my
engineering background. The economics I took plus my engineering background that
I have, I studied and I practiced gave me an insight into, for example, if you want to
carry water into Beirut, how do you do it? What parts of things do you look for?
How do you evaluate your performance are you doing a good job in getting a
least-cost approach to serving different infrastructure sectors? The first challenge, in
infrastructure planning, was when we started the Emergency Recovery Program for
Lebanon.
-TNS: This is after the war?
-B: Yes, just after the war. Around 1992, I think, 1993 or 1994. After 1993. I was
interested - as a part of a bigger team in the firm - to look after water, sewage,
drainage, irrigation, and environment. These were my prime concern, and I was
assisting the project manager in management for the whole job, which included
definitely all other sectors we had social sectors other than infrastructure sectors,
and other infrastructure sectors such as roads and railways and power (but I didnt
know much about power, I had the chance to get involved in roads). The social
infrastructure, such as government buildings, schools, education, hospitals, and the
like This participation in the Emergency Recovery Planning and Horizon 2000 in
Lebanon gave me a good insight into infrastructure planning. There was the
challenge of identifying and preparing project profiles for development Not only
preparing the project profile, but also giving an associated course because we were
concerned with economics. So we had to think and make, I dont know what you call
it - some kind of sketch designs for infrastructure and then price it and go to the
economists and sit with them to see if it is too much. After Emergency Recovery
Planning I started as a prime Infrastructure Planner and Engineer for new cities
developed outside Lebanon. For example, the city of Kurm.
-TNS: Where is it?
-B: Angola. Some people tell you I want to develop this shoreline and build a city
on it. Give me ideas.
-TNS: So you start from the basic infrastructure?
-B: What we do is we start from going to the town planner and asking for a good
town plan. Once we get the approval from the town planning department for a

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layout and for a population distribution, where the schools are, where the services
are, and where the public services are etc., we start working on the roads and water,
sewage, drainage, electricity, and telephone. I did around five or six cities in Angola.
Edge of the world at times but I had to go because this was part of my assignment.
-TNS: Did they have public participation in Lebanon, lets say, in the Emergency
Recovery Program?
-B: In the Emergency Recovery Program, no they did not have. There was
although we tried our best I mean, two types of data or sources to fall back on.
One was the government Ministries. We went each one and asked them to give us, to
start on, what is your plan. How do you plan? You have a shattered Ministry.
-TNS: Basically, you have no finances.
-B: You have no finances. You dont really know what you have. You dont really
know whats working properly and whats not working properly. You dont have
money to operate your systems. So give us a list.
-TNS: You have people who have not been doing much for the last so many years.
-B: For the last so many years and are now behind the times. So give us, to start with,
give us your vision for bringing this ministry from where it is now to a place where
we would like it to be, similar to countries when we started this planning our
ambitions were not to make Lebanon like Switzerland
-TNS: Yes. You werent expecting that much.
-B: Yes, but we were planning so that Lebanon would become a country like some
other Mediterranean countries that we liked and aimed to be like such as Greece.
Lets have our infrastructure, for example, similar to that of Greece the lower
income of the European community. We used Greece as an example; Portugal as an
example. We got data from Southern Italy and data from Malta. So, for example,
how much water do they use? How many phones are there in Malta? Or Portugal or
Greece? The penetration is what it is called 25% penetration of a permanent
network of phones. How high is it in the second world? You can go from 60-70%
penetration in Sweden or Japan to 20% penetration. We aimed for something in the
middle. Greece, for example, was at 35-40% penetration, so each 2.5 people have
one telephone. What is happening here is the same. You see that in the villages the
telephone penetration is very high. We started from the Ministries and what we can
do to become like which people and which countries to see where our inspirations
would take us and later we collected data. At times we didnt know, so we had our
teams go and make field surveys at least to have something to work with.
-TNS: An idea.
-B: An idea of whats going on. How bad is it? The General Manager of Miyah
Beirut [Water of Beirut] or Zgharta Water how much money do you need to
improve your water network? The whole network is rotten, the reservoirs are
broken down etc.
-TNS: Okay, so how much money do you need?

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-B: How money much do you want? How do we know if the reservoirs are broken
down? So we have to go do surveys. We did surveys in the beginning and after we
performed them we put them in the Emergency Recovery Program and we made the
Emergency Recovery Program on this basis: How much money you want to spend
on each sector so that you will bring the country from its terrible status to an
acceptable level of operation from which we can start planning. People have water
and now we can start planning for the future, for the next 15-20 years. The second
stage of planning was the Horizon 2000. Horizon 2000 also in Lebanon was a
continuation of the Emergency Recovery Program. Once we tried to implement and
spend money on the Emergency Recovery Program, we were breathing and not out
of breath completely, we started planning for the future. And there was also a lot of
infrastructure planning here. We also started looking at other countries Malta,
Portugal, Greece, and several places Tunis and Morocco, we were not looking at
countries like Egypt because we know their infrastructure is in very bad shape. We
continued and prepared a very good report that was implemented in 1995, I think,
and on. But these programs are not what put us in debt! [Laughing] Other things did.
Some people think that this money spent by the government is what put the country
into such debt, but it is not true. The money spent by the government did not exceed
$9 billion if you stick to infrastructure. I mean
-TNS: Compared to
-B: Yes, compared to 30 billion that went to other sector that infrastructure planning
and recovery planning had no effect on, like the army for example and Internal
Security and weapons etc.
-TNS: Not really recovery.
-B: Not really productive expenditures.
-TNS: How about during the war? What was the planning like at the time? Was there
much planning?
-B: Zilch! I mean, I say when we started in 1994 no but in truth in the 1980s, in
1982, the United Nations jumped in and spent some money with the WHO for
infrastructure recovery planning but most of it was water, sewage, and drainage. It
was all in the water sector. And CDM worked on it (an American company) and we
represented the Lebanese government, but I did not participate in that study. At the
time I was working as a Water Resources Planner for the Jordan Valley Authority. It
gets most of its water from Yarmuk River which is part of the shared water between
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Yarmuk River flows from Syria to south of
Tabbariya, but there is a tributary that passes from Lebanon. There was a big
irrigation project of 36,000 hectares or an annual demand of 360 million cubic
meters of water and they were not all available. There was a lot of pressure on the
Jordan Water Authority to give water to Amman through water supply, so we were
trying to put these conflicting demands together and find out how much water can
we deliver to the irrigation sector, how much water we can deliver to Amman, and
once we deliver water to Amman were treating it and putting it in a dam and from

214
the dam it goes downstream. So we were pumping to Amman 45 million a year and
give back from Amman 30 million a year but this 30 million will be made available
to southern parts of the irrigated areas. This was a nice project that started with us I
think in 1980 or 1981. Based on the verification that we can, if we improve the
efficiency of existing irrigation schemes and make sure that we allow reasonable
sewage treatment in Amman to be diverted to King Talal Dam, we will be able to
irrigate at least one winter season in the South of Al-Ghor, which is a region of an
area of about 10,000 hectares. So this one winter season in 10,000 hectares on
average was able to produce 200,000 tons of food for Jordan.
-TNS: This was during the war?
-B: This was during the war in Lebanon. I did not participate in Lebanon at that time
in the infrastructure planning and master planning that was taking place because I
was busy doing something else for the Jordan Valley.
-TNS: So you didnt work at all during the war here in Lebanon?
-B: Of course, in Lebanon during the war here in 1975?
-TNS: Was there much going on during the war?
-B: No, in Lebanon no. No, no. Except for this project.
-TNS: Except for the U.N.
-B: The U.N. came in. Other than that, in the infrastructure sector I know nothing
nothing, nothing at all. There was no expenditure except for emergency things. For
example: a water line from Damour to Beirut (we shouldnt say these things, but its
okay) because at one point in time the Muslims were afraid that the Christians had
the water.
-TNS: Okay. What was it like to work under these conditions?
-B: I was going to get hysterical because I was in Lebanon in 1982. Its true that I
was not working on projects in Lebanon, but it was a complete mess. The
infrastructure was deteriorating, the government had no money, the government split
on itself, and whatever we had was destroyed as a result of the war. As an example,
when the war first started the electricity would never go out in Beirut for two
reasons. First, because we had generation more than we needed and second, the
electricity used to come to Beirut from at least seven or eight different
-TNS: Sources?
-B: Sources. I mean, I dont know if even more from several different places. If
one line is out, another is used in its place. We had standby for anything. I mean, we
had more than 100% standby. All of this was ruined. Of course within these 20
years, and the electricity is the greatest example, within the 20-25 years of war that
passed in 1975-1995 the demand for power increased. The electricity company did
not increase neither its generation nor was it able to improve on the networks and the
transmission. So now what we are going through in Lebanon, even now, even when
we said we need badly two more generation sources and they were put in regions that
also do not fit in with sectoral [religious] equality even then the networks were not
yet done. The distribution or transmission from these plants is not finished and we

215
still have a shortage in electricity and we still have all our factories that work on
Diesel and the Diesel they get is bad and this is producing lots of pollution. The
Diesel they get they get only in ships and these ships at times we have two problems
in the winter: sometimes the ships cannot dock to empty them, and the other problem
is that these factories are close to the sea and their cooling comes from sea water if
the water ducts for cooling get clogged the plant stops. Nothing was done. This is
one of the things they did nothing about. The same for water: nothing (additional)
was done until after 1995.
-TNS: So basically nothing was done in the war to any of the infrastructure.
-B: No, no, not at all. Maybe a few things to maintain we may have fixed up the
roads here to build the Autostrade [Highway] I dont know what year. This was
may have been before the war.
-TNS: Halat I remember they did?
-B: Halat was a road they closed and made an airport illegally. They took our house
in 1971 to build the Autostrade in 1971 and it was complete in 1974 maybe.
-TNS: But was there any real planning going on, or was there no real planning? Was
it more like this person wants a road here so lets do it, thats how it was?
-B: Ill tell you what happened. We know that during the war there were a few
developments such as Aramoun or Bshamoun or such places for new cities or new
parcelation plans for regions.
-TNS: Was there no infrastructure?
-B: There were drawings and partitions for roads. In 1978 or actually in 1995 when
we started the infrastructure upgrading around Beirut, we discovered that Aramoun
was a city with a population of 20,000 with three small towns surrounding it. They
were planned but they didnt have water! They had no water! People came, divided
up the roads, and some people started to build. The electricity did not arrive in time
so some had electricity. But none had water. We brought water to Aramoun
-TNS: During the war or after the war?
-B: After the war.
-TNS: So during the war they built all these places? No water?
-B: Yes! What started happening was people living near the museum [Beirut], their
homes were destroyed they want to escape where do they live? They wanted to get
out of Beirut so they went up to these planned cities and build homes but there was
no infrastructure.
-TNS: They were building before the infrastructure.
-B: Yes, yes.
-TNS: And that was you think the major problem during the war for planning or
what?
-B: No, it was not a major problem for planning, but planning like any other sector in
the government was practically uh
-TNS: Shut down?

216
-B: Shut down! Frozen! Nothing was done except like this. They would for
example a developer would come to the planning department to get a town planner
or road engineer (like Gharzouz) and tell them I have a piece of land 200,000 meters.
What shall I do with it? I will parcel it and make roads and have the town planner
sign on it and the story is over. When this parcelation is approved, the person starts
to sell. But they had no water. They had no water! They used to buy water! I know
people at Dar Al-Handasah who used to live this way at Dawrat El-Hos. There is no
water. Theres a road. They gave them electricity little by little. Why did the
electricity start coming on? Because there was power generation in the south, and no
transmission to Beirut so they had no power then they need when they generate. So
they started bringing them electricity and selling it to them. But planning in the sense
that this is the city of Beirut and it will grow in this direction or the village of
Monsef will grow in this direction, when it grows we now have 200 cubic meters per
day of water that will become 400 where do we get sources or where do we get
power
-TNS: Future planning
-B: There was a place built up in Tripoli I think for the same reason, the Urban
Planning Department started on it I think after 1972. I forgot what they call this
region in the beginning of Tripoli. It was planned but it was not implemented until
after 1995.
-TNS: So there was some planning that was on paper?
-B: On paper only and it was not planning, it was parcelation and only parcelation. I
mean, we were unable to find a single report by the planner of Aramoun that
included how much power was needed, how much water was needed, what was
going to be done with the sewage, and a traffic study to see if traffic was a problem
or not. There was none of this.
-TNS: How would you say the war affected your work day-to-day?
-B: [Pauses] Day-to-day? Several aspects: one, I mean, reducing efficiency; two,
reducing the volume of work in the country, definitely; and three, it kept us away
from development. We didnt have communication with the rest of the word. For
example, in 1981 there was no mail in the country. I applied to go do a
environmental engineering at Utah State University and in the application letter I
sent them more money than the application fee and I told them please send me any
response by telex (then there wasnt any fax maybe?) or by fax because the postal
services in the country were not working. We didnt get, for example, journals from
abroad. To get the journals we had to get them to London and then wait for the
Company post that comes from London to Beirut to bring us the mail.
TNS: So you felt like you were cut off from the rest of the world?
-B: Oh yes! Actually we were! Actually we were, I mean. Phones were few, the
electricity was cut off a lot of course, and then there was no let me put it this way -
little contact with the outside world. So many times we were obliged to travel to

217
Amman and the Airport would be closed. Wed go to Cyprus to go to Amman or
wed go by land via Syria and sometimes we would be humiliated.
-TNS: Emotionally, how did you cope with this?
-B: Well, I dont think people cope with believe me, I dont think people can ever
overcome things that happen in war. Its always in the back of your mind. I mean, a
lot of times I of course, when the war first started I remember that at our house
(we were at Sadat Street) they said there was a sniper at Sadat. Our hearts stopped!
And we stayed at home and we didnt move and things like that. After four months
the bombing started. One person in the building next to us was hurt, I put him in the
car under the bombs and I took him to the American University Hospital. Then we
used to think you get used to things. A bomb fell, where? Lets say Comodore
Street Oh, its far its not important its far, not important.
-TNS: Your fear diminishes much...
-B: Yes, you get used to losing people, to dying, to getting a bomb on the house and
it getting burnt. Theres a story called The Plague by Albert Camus that talks about
what happens when a city gets isolated from the world due to anything just like we
were isolated due to this internal war what peoples feelings become like Its
okay this person died he died in the war, but were still surviving, were still
alive. Do you remember there was a program called Were still alive, say thank
God!? Your appearance and your looks get the least priority. I remember once when
we tried to run out of Beirut in 1982 we were going through a convoy with the
American University. We gathered close to the American University to move in this
convoy. I remember I was traveling with my wife, and my wife was pregnant, and
we offered that some people can come with us. One of the wives of the doctors, her
husband was on the other side, she refused to come with me because my beard was
long. I had a beard, I didnt look very smart[laughs] but this was the least you can
think about, I mean! You wear a t-shirt
-TNS: Its the least of your worries.
-B: Its the least of your worries. And one of the things, really, that continues
probably with you for a long time the very judicious use of available resources. I
mean, I used to have a shower, collect the water, use it for bathroom flushing.
-TNS: There was a limited amount of water.
-B: A limited amount of water. This was part of it stayed with me when we were
planning for our infrastructure. How much water do you need everyday? For
example, 250 liters. What do you need it for? [laughs] If youre living in an
apartment, what do you need 250 liters for?
-TNS: If you shower, collect the water, and use [laughs]
-B: I mean we were very much aware
-TNS: Water conservation becomes part of your
-B: Part of your everyday life. We were very much aware of how much water you
consume for example if you want to have a shower. Even if you dont want to
economize how much if you want to wash your clothes. Did you know how much

218
water do you need for washing one load of clothes? No? I had to read and discover
that that ah this takes 160 liters [laughs].
-TNS: Really? Thats a lot of water.
-B: Its not. If you flush every time, and you have to flush probably and rinse, you
know, its up to 160 liters. We had to learn these things. Water conservation became
probably something thats a part of our day-to-day life. Probably after the war we
were not able to maintain all these things but still in the back of our mind I mean
now we dont collect water and use it from one place to another of course not, but
still we know how much water
-TNS: You value water much more.
-B: We value water much more.
-TNS: What would you say was the major challenge you faced that was brought on
because of the war in your work?
-B: In my work the major challenge?
-TNS: That was brought on because of the war.
-B: That was brought on because of the war. [pauses]
-TNS: I mean, because of the war what made your job most difficult would you say,
during the war?
-B: You know, I think it was the, you know, making sure that you deliver on time.
During the war people they dont get sloppy, but their priorities differ a lot. I mean,
you have a report to produce and submit on Friday and you need your secretary or
typist to finish this report but on Friday morning when she or he wakes up they feel
that the situation around is not very good or they hear on the news they hear that
along the way they want to use there were some minor fights they will not come.
So people used to, definitely we all value our life and our life is the
-TNS: Priority
-B: The priority but, what should I call it but the danger on the road or whatever
was used as a reason for people to become more sloppy.
-TNS: So its particularly unreliability
-B: Its unreliability and how to
-TNS: Maybe inefficiency?
-B: Definitely there was some inefficiency, but the challenge was how to make sure
that you deliver. So we always wanted to have redundancies. And we said if this job
will be finished or needs to be submitted say on the 15
th
of June no we have to finish
it on the 7
th
of June to make sure that you have to put so many series of
contingency plans to make sure that you deliver on time because people may not
come. So we used at times to keep our drivers with us so that if Nizar needs to go
home at 12 oclock at night lets try to get him. We used to at times bring people in
from other offices and put them in Beirut in the same building. We had our
guesthouse, I mean, our building of course during the war the size of the volume
of work was reduced and the size of the business was reduced so we didnt have the
same number of employees. So, we modified or we transferred the upper floors of

219
the building to guesthouses. The people used to feel safer working. Im in the
office
-TNS: If I cant get home I can always stay.
-B: I can always stay here. We had to hedge against so many things and part of it was
making new guesthouses, making sure that drivers are with us, at times getting
people from there homes to work and leave as early as possible. We changed the
working hours.
-TNS: Now lets talk a little about post-war planning. In the post-war situation, what
did you feel when you started planning I mean, you told me you went into the
Emergency Recovery program and things like that because everything was so
urgent what did you have to give up as part of the plan?
-B: Economics in the emergency recovery plan we felt we had to give up
economics.
-TNS: What do you mean? Not to be more expensive?
-B: Yes, I mean, let me put it this way. If to get water to a certain place or to get
power to a certain place you need, say, for water for example a pipe of 400mm
diameter but at times this pipe is not available. You had to work with whatever was
available. This is to start with. So with these things you can either give up economy
at times and at times you give up the level of service. You give up on the level of
service. I need to get water or power to this place. Say its water at a pressure of 10
meters, I get it at one meter.
-TNS: So as long as they get something
-B: As long as they get something. You dont have to get
-TNS: Its better than nothing.
-B: Its better than nothing. Yes. The improvement so that they can at least start
getting their basic needs and they dont have to fetch water for example from 500
meters away. Or at times you see a sewer line break somewhere and you cannot even
wait for and get the least cost tender for repair. So you send somebody for repair you
use day works, day works basis. The person day work basis definitely is not the most
economical way to address these things.
-TNS: Okay. Now in my education obviously I was taught that there is a definite big
emphasis in planning on participation. I feel that this may or may not always be the
case.
-B: Its not always been the case. Participation in infrastructure planning in Lebanon
is made through for example municipalities.
-TNS: They decide on?
-B: No. For example, if you want to build by law if you want to build anything
within the municipality jurisdiction area you have to get the approval of the
municipality. And we think that this, at least since municipalities represent theyre
elected by popular vote and they represent the end users. So this was one of the ways
to get public participation in these things. The other way after the war at times we
make hearings in municipalities or in public areas for, for example, if you want to

220
build a sewage treatment or if you want to mine gravel. You make these public
hearings and at times you distribute questionnaires to the municipalities. Now, how
much of this was authentic and really adopted or accepted as a part of the planning
process I cannot say. But, generally municipalities, for all major infrastructure
projects, are advised that there will be this and they always have the chance we
always give them the chance to comment on these projects.
-TNS: Or object?
-B: Or object.
-TNS: In general, how big is a municipality in Lebanon?
-B: You know ummm
-TNS: What Im trying to ask is: Does a municipality usually have a generally good
idea of what the public wants in that area?
-B: In principle, municipalities should have a good idea because theyre local
counsels elected from communities
-TNS: Local government?
-B: Theyre not government because they dont have a lot of authorities. But they are
elected from small communities. Monsef we have a municipality and we are how
many probably resident population 800.
-TNS: Okay.
-B: There are smaller communities with municipalities. Berbara, next to us, is
probably 400 inhabitants and they have their own municipality.
-TNS: Theres a very big municipality: Beirut. Its huge.
-B: Beirut is the biggest. The population of Beirut, based on what we used to know,
is something like 580,000 and they have one municipality. Tripoli has one
municipality also Antelias. Municipalities in principle should have a very good
idea about the requirements and the problems because its part of their duties.
-TNS: And in general they are elected from within the community?
-B: Within the community.
-TNS: And they belong to that community.
-B: And they belong to that community. I mean, you cannot if youre a Deputy if
you want to run for a member of the Parliament, you can be registered in Beirut and
run for a post in Jbeil. But if you want to run for the municipality, you have to be a
part of the community itself. You cant be registered somewhere else. So, they
should be from the community and in principle as I told you they should know and
be well aware of the community needs and not aspirations but probably future needs.
-TNS: Youre a member of the Municipality here in Monsef. I would say that you
definitely have a good idea of whats happening around you. If anybody has any
problem in Monsef, do they have an issue coming to anybody in the Municipality
and discussing any of their issues?
-B: No. They can come to anybody and discuss it.
-TNS: And they do?
-B: And they do.

221
-TNS: They are not scared?
-B: No, no. They are not and they do. I even before I became a member, every
Sunday this placed used to host at least three or four people coming here to discuss
things. I want to make a road here, I think this is a good idea. Of course, and
actually they are welcome to do this.
-TNS: Okay. In the United States for example, you have a general impression in
planning that sometimes when you have a lot of participation it can slow down
implementation of projects in certain aspects. Do you believe that this is the case in
Lebanon?
-B: Yes. Yes, definitely. A good example of this is the collective sewage treatment
plants were trying to do. Were trying to build one in the east of Beirut, one to the
south of Beirut, one here in Jbeil (between Jbeil and Amchit), one next to Batroun,
one in Tripoli on the coast, coastal treatment plants. And theyve become a very
big problem. I, myself, Ive participated in killing one of the locations in Tabarja. I
prepared a report. I was sitting here at this table, a car came and parked here and I
didnt know the people. I didnt know them at all. They turned out to be from the
Municipality of Tabarja and somebody told them there is this fellow Nizar Azar in
Monsif if you go to talk to him he will probably help you how to stop the treatment
plant in your area or how to stop the process of locating the treatment plant in your
area. So they came and they asked me Can you help us? I told them Yes, I can
definitely help you. I listened to them and said, Definitely I can help you and I
think this is not a very good idea to get sewage all the way from practically Faraya
Faytroun to Nahr El-Kalb and then pump it along the shoreline from Nahr el-Kalb
through Jounieh to Tabarja. I told them the first thing I will try to do is minimize
flow from going to the coast. Because if we build treatment plants in higher areas,
we can reduce the size thats going to the coast and we can use the treated water
from these plants because it is treated water and you can discharge secondary treated
water into water courses. You can discharge into any water course and this will be
used for irrigation, it can be used to recharge ground water and things like that. I
prepared for them a report which probably was one of the key studies that forced the
authorities to look into another location. If you go into smaller treatment plants in
villages where you have for example a village like ours, which produces probably
800 divided by 5 150-200 cubic meters of sewage a day, if you make a treatment
plant for 150 cubic meters a day actually the area will be a small you can site it in
so many different spaces and everybody or people in the village or community
cannot complain about its location as much as they can if this plant is coming from
several other villages up. Why will these people
-TNS: Youll treat your own sewage but not your neighbors sewage.
-B: Yes. We go back to that
-TNS: Not in my back yard.
-B: NIMBY approach. I think theres a big trend now in the country to adopt this
approach to adopt localized services even at the expense of economy of scale

222
because, you know, definitely if you have a larger treatment plant I mean, this
does not apply to power as much as it applies to sewage and probably solid waste.
-TNS: Do you think this is a reflection maybe of a post-war atmosphere where
-B: It is partly, yes. I think partly it is.
-TNS: Because they are used to to each his own basically.
-B: Partly it is a reaction to this and partly the problem is the fear from poor
operation of the facilities.
-TNS: So they feel that they would have more control if its within their own
community?
-B: Its not like this. It is, you know, somebody will come and tell you When I
make this treatment plant there is no smell. We have places like Monaco they have it
underground you know above buildings and you go to Berlin their treatment plants
inside the city. But these people have a certain level of operation and theyre
dedicated and theyre forced to adopt and here we cannot guarantee the good
operation of the plants and as such you cannot guarantee the good performance. So
these places become like sources of nuisance, offense odors etc. so the cost of land
around it will go down. People dont like it and they dont want it in their area. Not
even people whose land is expropriated to site these facilities first will not get,
generally, a fair trade.
-TNS: Compensation.
-B: A fair compensation. So they dont like it. Their neighbors will definitely be
affected.
-TNS: Lost property value.
-B: Loss of property value. Also they dont like it. So it becomes a big problem. The
third thing is, for example and this is a true story, we were trying to build some
infrastructure in Antelias. We wanted to secure the approval of the municipality. So
what did the mayor tell us? You want to build this channel to reduce flooding?
Okay fine. I will not allow you to do this until you clean and make sure this channel
so and so that is getting sewage from Bikfaya is diverted properly to sewage outfalls.
I will not allow you to do anything until you make this channel. And what do you
do? Devise a new project for the implementation of that channel to be able to do the
other works required. And this man was saying Youre asking me to improve the
road so that people in Bekfaya can drive safely from here to Bekfaya. Good. But
people in Bekfaya are throwing their sewage at me. Why dont you do something
about it? I will improve their situation, they didnt improve mine. This is one of the
projects that we had to do in Antelias. But the problem is still there because we were
not able to engineer proper outfalls to the Sea and now we have a very, very long
collector which is not working.
-TNS: How would you rate public participation in post-war planning process in
Lebanon on a scale from 1 to 10?
-B: Three. Maximum.
-TNS: [Laughs].

223
-B: Maximum three.
-TNS: One is the lowest and
-B: Yeah, I know one is the lowest
-TNS: And 10 is, lets say, the United States.
-B: A scale of one to ten.
-TNS: Three? Why?
-B: Because you know, most of the standard planning is still with the government
and the government, you know, at times Let me correct myself. For example, in
infrastructure planning, only one municipality in Lebanon is allowed to design its
own projects.
-TNS: Beirut.
-B: If I come to Monsef and I want to design a project for Monsef now definitely
theres an advantage in central planning for collective systems and in using economy
of scale to reduce costs. However, at times you dont have funds for the projects. Big
projects get lots of conflicting interests from participants. As a Municipality now,
Monsef cannot have its own sewage system. And if they have their sewage system it
comes from the government from somebody who designs this we dont know how
good is it and the Municipality has no authority to look into whats going on and
supervise the work or to complain about faulty or bad workmanship. And, finally,
you will find out that some of the systems are placed, the main collectors are placed
in the roads and some are not connected at all. So we have now networks in Lebanon
where or areas in Lebanon where you have a good sewage collection network but
you dont have any connections to the houses and you dont have any outfills.
-TNS: For somebody to complain, lets say, to the central planner
-B: Yes.
-TNS: Do it have to go through the municipality?
-B: Definitely it has to go through the municipality, but no you can go and complain.
You can go on personal basis. You can go and file a complaint with the Central
Planner for any of these services, but the way or whether your complaint is well-
taken and looked into and things like that
-TNS: So youre saying
-B: What Im saying is that the influence of the Local Counsels in the planning
process is still very low.
-TNS: And you think that the local municipality is more or less a reflection of what
the community would want to a certain extent. What I mean is the participation of
the local area in the municipality is high, but the participation of the municipality
within the central government is where the problem is?
-B: Yes.
-TNS: Okay. Is that a problem? Is it a problem that participation is low?
-B: I mean
-TNS: Do you think if it were higher it would help things?

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-B: In some sectors I think the level of service can be substantially improved if we
get more participation, higher participation, from the local governments. Let me put
it this way. An example from this community once more: this community made lots
of efforts to raise funds to drill a well upland in Kour to make sure that we get water
all through the year. We got the funds, we drilled the well, and provided the pumps
necessary. But this community cannot operate the well because the authority for
operation of these is with the Water Supply Authority in Jbeil. So we had to give this
well as a present to the Water Supply Authority telling them Listen, now we have a
good water source in this area. We got the funds, we had the Ministry of Water
Resources supervise the works so these works were done according to procedures.
The works were finished; we delivered the well to the Water Authority. Now, this
community has no control over the well at all. We dont get enough water because
the Central Authority has not planned for the increase in population probably or
dont want to provide a generator because the electricity is cut off or they dont want
to operate the system except during office hours at times. I mean, suppose we dont
have power and we have power at 11 at night, nobody is willing to go and start this
well at 11 at night start the pumps and people are a little but skeptical about
using automatic controls. So
-TNS: They basically do not want to provide neither the funds nor the manpower.
-B: They dont want to provide the manpower to ensure that you know, a flexible
manpower to make sure that we get water whenever theres electricity. And they say
that we dont have the funds to provide a generator and if our Municipality provides
a generator some people will say that why will funds from the Municipality of
Monsef will have to be spent so that somebody from another municipality gets his
water. I am a proponent of this. I raise money from this community to spend it on
this community, not on somebody else. I mean I am not the government. This is a
small example of how central government or central control does not provide us or
does not allow us to enjoy the level of service which is possible through the available
resources.
-TNS: So you think that more participation at the local to central level will help more
implementation? Because before you said that sometimes a lot of participation can
slow down implementation.
-B: Yes it can. It depends on where it is. Definitely, as you said, if youre building a
central plan for something you have lots of conflicting interests this may delay the
process. I was trying to tell you the second time that our influence as a Municipality
and the operation of this system is low and I was trying to give an example. Its not
the level of participation. And yet, if these people allow us, if there is a mechanism
that Monsef pays only we share in general there is no mechanism
-TNS: So they dont even provide an umbrella that you can work under.
-B: No.
-TNS: So if they brought you with other municipalities to the table and told you to
divide the costs among you and you work it.

225
-B: You work it out. Or tell us were willing to get this generator please you have to
pay, for example, so many thousands a month. We do. But it immediately stops.
Theres no mechanism to do this. Thats it; we cannot do it. And what happens now?
What happens? We dont get enough water and people keep on buying water. The
same thing with power probably, but power is a little bit more different because
power
-TNS: Is there much local control?
-B: Is very much local. Power is privatized, practically. Only in Beirut you are not
allowed to have your own generator and distribute from it to houses. But in Monsef
here and all other places youll find that somebody comes in, buys a generator 50
KVA, distributes power to houses: 5 amperes, 5 amperes, 5 amperes and uh
-TNS: And he takes money.
-B: He takes You cannot do this with water because the resource you cannot
relay take the water resource and relay water.
-TNS: What do you think would have aided in public participation in Lebanon post-
war? What would have changed, maybe
-B: Please repeat the question.
-TNS: In the post-war planning could something different have been done to increase
public participation?
-B: [Pauses]
-TNS: Decentralization for example?
-B: Definitely, I think in post-war planning had enough funds been given to, you
know we have local, we have central, we have something in between or mid-
central I dont know what to call it intermediate organizations or intermediate
level authorities like
-TNS: Like Jbeil?
-B: Like Jbeil, for example. I mean, why cant I dont know why but, probably it
would have been better if the Water Authority in Jbeil has enough funds to go by
because they would probably spend more money to improve the situation. Theyll be
under more pressure. Now, Jbeil will tell us Oh, I dont have funds. Why dont you
have funds? This community pays all their dues for water. There are other
communities they dont pay their dues. And our budget comes from the central
government and the central government does not provide us with enough funds so
we cannot really improve our level of service. I think, definitely, if there is a little bit
more decentralization whereby local authorities are able to not only collect but to
levy charges they think are reasonable, I believe things will get either a lot better
-TNS: Or a lot worse [laughs].
-B: Or a lot worse because some of the communities dont pay anything! These
communities they dont pay anything so they dont get any services.
-TNS: So communities such as Monsef, for instance, where you have maybe a higher
income of people than other communities and people pay their dues, they are missing

226
out maybe a lot more in the centralization process than communities that are a lot
poorer.
-B: It is not the wealth.
-TNS: Its also the willingness to pay.
-B: Its the willingness to pay. There are communities that are willing to pay their
dues and find out that in the community in Monsif everybody pays his dues for his
water, for his electricity. You go to other places for example, lets take the whole
of Jbeil. Jbeil is run by a private electricity authority or semi-private. They buy
power from the government and they distribute power. Everybody pays electricity in
Jbeil. The collection is 95%. You go to some other places where the government is
the provider in, for example, Kadisha and I know this I dont have the statistics,
but I was told this by the Secretary General the collection is 10-15%.
-TNS: Oh my God!
-B: So what happens in a community that provides 100% collection? With another
community that provides say 20% collection? These will come to one source and be
distributed. Definitely, those who pay will not be getting the service they deserve.
But its not what we deserve. If I pay for these services, I will have enough money to
operate my system and to plan for the future and for my future needs. If I am
deprived of funds I cannot do it and this is what is happening. So the systems are
not most of the areas the systems are developed progressively with the additional
needs with time. And you find out that probably some other areas there are lots of
disparities in Lebanon in lots of areas they spend money like hell. And I remember
that when we were working in the southern suburbs we spent $180 million on a
community which is probably half a million say 600,000. I mean it turns out to be
how much? $300 probably per capita on infrastructure. In Monsef here we did not
spend anything. There, the political pressure forced the government to divert these
funds to other the areas. Had they spent, for example, $100 per capita here we can do
some things for our water system, we buy a generator!
-TNS: Do you feel like you could have done anything to encourage participation?
-B: Oh [pauses].
-TNS: Or is it more institutionalized?
-B: I think it is more institutionalized. I dont think that these things the standing
laws do not take this into consideration. I do not think individuals can do anything.
Unless you go into lets say an NGO type of approach and get funds from/through
these NGOs for your system.
-TNS: Do you feel that you represented the public in your work? When you work in
huge public infrastructure projects, do you feel you have a sense of what the public
wants? While youre working do you meet people from there?
-B: When youre working with the upgrading of systems we used to go and meet
with the municipalities every now and then you know, probably once a month. At
times we have regular meetings with them if you have, for example, some pressures:
if you need to complete a job in a certain time either because, you know, of weather

227
problems (I have to finish this drain by September otherwise I will not be able to
complete it). So probably at times we used to make regular meetings with
municipalities. Now, the question do you think when I was doing this I represented
the public? Uh You know, we always assume not we 100%, I let me put it
this way. Its not me. You know, when youre doing something and youre trying to
provide a level of service in the most cost-effective manner I think youre
representing thats what the people want. People want a service at least cost and
with the most reliability and when designing things this is what we try to do.
-TNS: What I want to know is if you feel you regret anything? Do you wish you had
done anything differently?
-B: [Long pause]
-TNS: [Laughs] Im not saying you have to!
-B: No, no! Im just thinking. Im thinking and just trying to find examples of
-TNS: If anything has past that you feel on this project I wish maybe I had spoken to
this person, or I wish I had done something differently.
-B: You know, personally I have not come across any project that Ive worked on in
infrastructure provision that proved that the concept we have adopted is not correct
or that somebody came and said that had you done this differently you would have
benefited more. But, in some aspects I think that we have probably how should I
put it overestimated the willingness of people to adopt our systems. And, at times,
projects failed because of this. If you say, for example, and this is not in Lebanon
this is outside Lebanon you assume that people are willing to adopt the technology
which will improve on water conservation.
-TNS: You didnt realize how little people are adaptive to technology.
-B: And/or how much they are entrenched into their old ideas. And then you find out
that this applies more to irrigation schemes. You find out that you design a scheme
for a family to live on a farm and work out of the farm and then you find out that the
whole in this part of the world, you know, and especially the East Mediterranean,
in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon probably Jordan and Lebanon people are not willing to
work. And a farmer he buys a piece of land and he leases it to an Egyptian to run it
for him and the Egyptian (if youre educated and youre willing to adopt the new
technologies that will ensure water conservation and ensure that, you know, this
conserved water will be used for further development downstream) you find out the
people are not willing to do it theyre not willing to invest in new technologies and
you will find out that the governments are not willing to instate laws that will force
people or that will give people the incentive to save on water. This is mostly in water
conservation. So, for example, if you have a (I dont know if this is within the
subject but its ok) if you have a farm that uses 40,000 cubic meters a year there is no
place in this part of the world that will tell you Listen if you use 40,000 I will
charge you say 1 cent per cubic meter, but if you use 30 I will reduce the charge
from 1 cent per cubic meter to 0.9 cents per cubic meter to give you the incentive
-TNS: To use less water.

228
-B: To use less water; to give you the incentive not to be wasteful. These are the
things that in our through the fiscal year I discovered that if you make the best
designs and the best schemes and people dont have the incentive to run it properly
or to adopt what you are recommending in your scheme, things may not be very
successful. This is basically more for water in irrigation schemes rather than water
supply in domestic use.
-TNS: Thats it!
-B: Uh, I hope I have benefited you.
-TNS: Yeah, very much. If I need any more questions or anything can I call you?
-B: [Nods]
-TNS: Thank you

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APPENDIX C: Interview 3

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Do you have a problem with the recording?
-Interviewee C (C): No, its all right.
-TNS: Its all right. Okay. What is your background in planning?
-C: I am basically an architect.
-TNS: Okay.
-C: I studied in England and did some thesis with a group of people in planning. My
main interest really was urban design not planning first. So I joined Dar Al-
Handasah in 1975, came to Beirut, and the moment I arrived the war started.
-TNS: Nice!
-C: And I got stuck with it. After living for 15 years in England I came back to
Lebanon and the war started. My background in planning was then very limited, in
fact it was zero.
-TNS: Before you joined Dar Al-Handasah.
-C: I joined Dar Al-Handasah planning department as opposed to the architecture
because I was more interested in urban design and really the social aspect of design
because planning hits on that more than architecture, which usually deals with
buildings as opposed to dealing with people. So this is the main interest I had and
thats how I started this aspect here.
-TNS: And youve been working at Dar Al-Handasah for how many years?
-C: Now thirty years. Mainly in urban and town planning.
-TNS: And not just in Lebanon, but also?
-C: Mainly our work is in the Middle East. In Lebanon we have very limited work
which is really the BCD after the war and the area around the airport which is
Elyssar. The vision or the view of planning in Lebanon differs from other places. I
dont think they believe in it. Its not part of their character. The Lebanese never had
a master plan. The only master plan they had for the whole country is 1964. They
never had census because of political issues. Here you have the real effect of politics
in planning. Census was not allowed because none of the sects that controlled the
government would want to know the number. So planning without census especially
regional planning on a regional basis is difficult.
-TNS: So planning without census was a major problem you think?
-C: Well, no. You cant do any forecasts for the growth of any place without the
population. Census does not only mean the population it means a lot of community
facets: what they desire, what they require, cultural status of families and people, the
economic side of it. It is really the most important part of any aspect of planning
because basically its about what they deal with. In Lebanon maybe now it might
happen.
-TNS: Really? Theyre considering it?
-C: Actually, it has happened in two ways. One way they did it is through a time in
the 80s when Hariri passed around boxes of donations to every single family in

230
Lebanon and the box had some food, a blanket, this and this and that. Through that
because everyone who does it has to sign and they would not give it to anyone but
the family living in the building it was all spread around and people would go,
usually university students would go to the building, twenty flats there twenty boxes.
Some people started accusing the whole thing saying this was one way of knowing.
Through it there was a guideline to the census although certain areas refused to take
it because they were controlled by political factions against Hariri, so they said either
we take it to spread it or we dont, distribute it or not. So they did not, but they could
do it. There was also regional study done by we just finished it, I dont know
whether Bassem has mentioned it to you, which is the Regional Master Plan of
Lebanon done by the French Le Rive. Now these are foreign planners involved in
post-war Lebanon planning. They are based in France. They came here and stayed
with us for two years and their work has come out. They did a whole post-war
Lebanon vision for the year, I dont know, two thousand and something. They are a
good reference for you if you want. Bassem has the address in Paris if you want of
the guy in charge. Hes a Lebanese. His name is Fouad eh I forgot his surname.
Yeah. Fouad would be interesting because he had as well a pre- and a post-war
experience in planning. He lives in France now. Thats beside the point. What else?
-TNS: I wanted to ask you. You said you were educated in England in architecture,
yes?
-C: Umm hmm.
-TNS: What university in England?
-C: Manchester College of Arts.
-TNS: Ive been to Manchester. I did my masters in Landscape Design at Newcastle.
-C: Ah! Youre a landscape designer. Well, come. We need a landscape designer!
Youre laughing a lot, but really! Were looking a lot but we cant find any. There
arent any in Lebanon.
-TNS: [Laughs] There arent many no. I have a good friend of mine whos a good
landscaper designer.
-C: Well bring them and tell them! Please tell them.
-TNS: I will. [Laughs] What did your education teach you about the role of public in
planning. I know you said you were in architecture
-C: I was not in planning, but my education taught me in one way or another that
architecture is lacking in the education towards the role of the public in planning. So
you get types of planners who are more public-oriented than other planners: peoples
planners, peoples architects sorry. Im in architecture. This is because of their
background convictions. I would like to be a peoples planner because my
background convictions and beliefs take me that way as opposed to the other way
which is this is my building.
-TNS: My business?
-C: Yes, architectures purely form and function. Interestingly, in education in the
late 60s and 70s in architecture with the social movement in England, the west, and

231
even America, you know the days of the anti-system stuff and flower power that
effects your vision and views on whats the role of everyone.
-TNS: Did you study things like this?
-C: Role of planners, role of architects in the 50s and 60s its different. So
probably I was a product of that, of moving out of my egoistic part of thinking and
moving to urban design and planning.
-TNS: So you think this is more your personal preference versus
-C: It is personal because in school I had problems. I had to leave Manchester and go
to London to finish because they wanted me to do buildings when I was thinking the
building is not important any more for architects. Lets do something more
interesting and I had a problem with that. In the end I had to do a building.
-TNS: [Laughs] Just to graduate!
-C: Yeah.
-TNS: Does this education contradict or does it validate what you experienced after
the war?
-C: What education? This doesnt really apply?
-TNS: Okay. But did you feel that the lack of a description of a more public planning
was detrimental to your experience after the war here?
-C: I really cant answer that because I didnt study planning as such. People who
studied planning can answer you. I am more what you would say a self-made thing.
My involvement really was more out of my convictions than out of education.
-TNS: Okay. I assuming that practicing during the war was difficult. Can you
describe what it was like day to day?
-C: Well, practicing during the war was very difficult for many people. Here are the
reasons why. Its not the war. It wasnt the war. Here it wasnt a war. Here it was
what we call an inter-militia type of warring.
-TNS: A civil war?
-C: A civil type of war. So you get areas where you can function very well and areas
which are under bombardment 24 hours. You get areas which are so safe and
suddenly they dont become So, whats the danger? You have to be of a character
that can adapt to the situation not only if you work in planning but if you are living.
So, if you are a character who cannot stand it, you will leave. A lot of people left. If
you are a character who can live with it youll last as long as you can and hide. And
if you are a type of character who somehow adapts so well to it that you live with it
positively and you stay and produce as if there is nothing happening. That is what is
frightening about human beings, the way they can adapt to things and then restart
and start producing positively within it and thats what was happening in Lebanon.
Thats the dynamics of it. It was not a total collapse. Everyone was waiting and
hoping for a total collapse so that things would have to change. But there was no
total collapse. There was like a new type of living under a different situation. A lot of
people who live under war for years and years, they get used to it in a way that they
adapt to it. So I was the type who could adapt. So I lasted and I stayed. Others

232
couldnt, they left. Dar Al-Handasah half closed almost because there were only a
few people who could be able to sustain. So your daily life becomes like an hourly
life. If we are here suddenly there are rockets coming in.
-TNS: This is not a very good office for that!
-C: No. You have to check from the danger. You can tell by the direction and the
noise whether they are going to be deadly or not. You start to live on instinct as well
more than intelligence, because if you are intelligent youll leave [laughs]. You
cannot be logical any more. If you are logical what are you doing here? So you start
living on your instinct. It comes to two things. How politically motivated you are to
feel that you belong and youre a part of this and if youre not what the hell are you
staying here for? The hell with Lebanon you know.
-TNS: So some sort of patriotism maybe?
-C: Yes. Some of it is. You are entering the realm of emotion more, emotional
decisions. Some people had to because economically they had no chance.
-TNS: They had no other choice.
-C: Yes, thats it. A lot of people had this, no choices. The Lebanese had more
choices, I suppose, than in another country because of the dynamics of their
secular
-TNS: Social network?
-C: Yes. Those who couldnt leave stayed. Those who didnt believe they should
leave stayed. The worst part of it was not really the civil war period, but the Israeli
occupation. Not really the occupation but, what do you call it, when they placed
Beirut under siege.
-TNS: When they took over Beirut?
-C: Before they took over Beirut, that period of two three months bombarding Beirut
like hell because they didnt want to enter it with of pockets of resistance. That was
the worst because that emptied Beirut of a lot of people who couldnt stand it any
more. Those who stayed did so out of defiance because the Israelis really wanted us
to leave. They were throwing by air pamphlets Youd better leave, youd better
leave because it makes it easier for them to enter. So a lot of people stayed because
of that. They were not fighters. And we were operating. I used to come to the office
and sit in the office.
-TNS: Even during that time?
-C: Yeah, and this is the part that tells us that we are normal. So you try and do
stupidly
-TNS: You hold on to a sense of normalcy?
-C: Yeah.
-TNS: To keep sane.
-C: Yeah, to feel that you are normalized by doing things like that. So you come here
one or two hours, you go home. My apartment was near. Others were not lucky
because they were far, they could not come. So Dar Al-Handasah, in the end, as a
company they never closed. Throughout, they never closed.

233
-TNS: Wow.
-C: Yeah. Besides that we had a system, because all of our work is outside and all of
our correspondence is outside, we had a very tight system of sending
correspondences, a network of people.
-TNS: By mail?
-C: By mail, using airports, using the sea, through Damascus, etc. A very, very well
worked out network, all the time. Everything produced had to leave. Things had to
come. We got all our work from outside. So that was something that the company
had to really achieve and achieved very well, this network of corresponding with
other outside offices. Until a time when it became really bad: they tell you okay, you
go, your department no longer operates from here, you operate from there now. And
thats why I left. When the Palestinians left Beirut and the Israelis started coming in,
I left.
-TNS: Where did you go?
-C: I left with the company because the company said, Thats it. We cannot operate
now. So they took us to Damascus and then to Cairo. We had an office in Cairo so
we were operating from Cairo. Then we went to London because my section went to
London, the planning section went to London, so we started operating from London.
We stayed for five years there. We came back to Cairo until they reestablished the
planning section here in 1993 again to open up and Bassem Nsouli came. So, in fact,
when you say operating under the war effect, theres no simple answer to that. And,
stupidly enough, I was doing work say for a little town of 12,000 in Nigeria, a master
plan, while Im being bombed by the Israelis here. So my mind was on how this little
village would survive and live, and all these things, and what industry we have to
specify for it, agriculture, whatever it is and I can hear the airplanes hovering
above me. Its different and thats the reason why, probably, you survive. I say, I
am working normally, putting your head under the sand and
-TNS: So in denial in a way?
-C: Actually it was not that To me it was the same process. At the same time when
I go home I put a canvas and work on something and I like to see done in Beirut for
instance. Its not self denial, its real part of psychology. Its like someone in the war
who rings his wife and asks How are the kids? Did you feed them? and he is
probably bombing the hell out of people. This is the problem of human beings I think
or maybe not the problem, but the ability to be so multi-faceted in your thinking.
And actually planners have to be that normally operating because there are so
many problems you have to deal with. Especially planning in the Middle East is
unlike planning in the west. I mean, your thesis would be much better if it were
Planning in the Middle East. Whats planning in the Middle East or in the third
world? Planning in the third world is our major experience. I did it for thirty years. I
do not compare it with planning in the west because I do not have experience
planning in the west except living there for twenty years and seeing what it is. The
experience of planning in the Middle East is entirely unwritten about. In fact, it has

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never been researched as such. It might have been but I doubt it because first you
have multinational planners mostly from Eastern Europe, maybe from Japan,
working on planning aspects in the Middle East. So you have an incredible umbrella
of planners who can give you a lot of different visions. You have British, Americans,
Canadians, Australians, you know all. Second, in the Middle East you have?, in fact,
South America the Americans probably have experience in it thats a common
type of attitude towards planning. Besides the attitude towards planning, what does
planning mean? Because planning is something modern planning created in the
west and is being transported or transferred to the third world as in any fields. It is
not something that came out of us. Of course we did plan cities in the old days. Im
talking about modern day planning and the attitude towards it. And you have
international organizations working as well. You have the World Bank, ESQUA,
UNDP, you have a lot. But I dont know whether someone has done something about
this really. It is really interesting: What is planning in the Middle East and what does
a planner experience when he works in the Middle East? Especially for Western
people! [Laughs] Well, they dont know what to say!
-TNS: They dont know how to say it! [Laughs]
-C: Yes, because first of all as a planner you have to (Im talking about this because
it effects you indirectly) believe in the theory of chaos. If you dont believe in it you
have a problem.
-TNS: Do you mean that theres a sort of order in the chaos?
-C: Yes. Its a theory that chaos must have an order. Besides that, planning is usually
handled by governments. I mean all planning in the Middle East is handled except
for private developments, but mainly planning is handled world-wide even by
governments. So you have to deal with the regime and the attitude of the regime and
it moves from that as a whole. And this is also in Lebanon. So you have to deal with
the attitude of the regime as a whole and of the person in charge of within regime,
like the Minister of Planning or the Prime Minister or the head. In post-war Lebanon,
basically the person who came and took the banner of redevelopment and growth of
is one person. He came with an agenda. He started the agenda before he became the
Prime Minister. He started it when he opened Oger Lebanon, and I think you should
interview people from it, because they put forward the first master plan done for
Central Beirut in 1978-79 or 80-81. They did the master plan for it. This was shown,
he did it for himself
-TNS: He had a vision.
-C: Yeah. He came and said, I am going to rebuild Lebanon. We were dealing with
a guy who had this vision and a strong will. So in planning when you have some
money or a regime or person who has this, you find the operation easier for the
planners because their goals are set.
-TNS: When there is a vision already in place?
-C: Yes, and its a two-edged knife. The other edge of it is if you feel that the vision,
or what they think is the vision, doesnt really relate properly to the situation or the

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future then you have a problem. You have a problem and thats what some planners
did have.
-TNS: Yeah, which is a main reason for a lot of the criticism of the master plan.
-C: The Prime Ministers vision was more physically oriented towards quick
development. Lets get back on our feet, lets get a lot of the investors in because
that would trigger investments coming in from abroad. Others said, No, lets look
at the socio-cultural side of this.
-TNS: They wanted more social planning.
-C: Lets see whether this thing is really what it is now after the war. Lets do a
study of it. Now this is easy to say, and no one can say they are right or hes right
because they could never produce a plan to oppose what he wanted. They never did.
They would pretend if you asked these people, but none of them has really produced
a comprehensive alternative plan to what they are saying. They are more like
academically objective, which is easy to do.
-TNS: Academically inclined, yeah. Theoretical more than practical?
-C: It is easy to do. You can spend 2-3 years doing surveys of all the Lebanese
regional situations and then you start saying what? The BCD the center of all Beirut
no longer operates and we should not develop it so well? We should go to other
areas? What are we saying? If we say okay, what do we do then? This is one aspect.
Another aspect in planning, this is very important, is the implementation and
management procedures of it: who does what and how it happens and who carries
through. Now this is really one of the biggest stumbling blocks in planning in the
Middle East because you can produce incredible plans the consultants come and
they give you beautiful things, thats it, fabulous, lets do it theres no machinery
that could make it work as such. And that is really what we couldnt pick up from the
west.
-TNS: So we dont have the building technology?
-C: No, no. Not the building technology. Im talking about the management and
implementation procedures of it. Not the building. The building we have. Theres no
problem. We can bring foreign companies to build. But what would make a city
center like that developable after the war? And that is why SOLIDERE came in.
SOLIDERE is the name of the company not the name of the place.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: They have a company where I think you do have the details of how it works
-TNS: Yes.
-C: Part private, part government. And the biggest problem they had in the planning
of BCD was not the plan, it was not the master plan it was this: that the owners of all
these places in the town area suddenly became shareholders and in the process and a
lot of them lost what they thought they would be coming in owning. Someone who
had ten meters squared would not get a share that would make him anything. So they
had to sell out shares at a digit. The developers who had the big money who could
buy the big shares were the ones who were built to benefit.

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-TNS: To gain.
-C: So the problem became that the owners rights were taken. Now, Lebanon is very
individualistic. Each one says, This is mine. I dont care They dont know how to
work in groups. They dont believe in a lot of these people. They didnt believe in
the cause to bring back Lebanon and say, Okay, Im going to sacrifice for the BCD
to become a symbol of Lebanon coming back to the world. There was no such
thing. Each one wanted money.
-TNS: They wanted their individual gain.
-C: The problem was ownership and ownership is the most complicated aspect of
planning especially in the Middle East. In the west ownership has been solved by
law, by history. Every single thing is documented, everything. Here, we have a
problem. If you leave the town as it is no one is going to develop it. This one might
build it in five years and he will build it as he likes, etc. So you regulate
development. If you put regulations run by usually the Municipality, it doesnt have
the power to make people develop well because youre going to have to develop
areas, youre going to have to develop streets, you have to do infrastructure to start
with, some buildings have to come down for other purposes, some developments
which have historic aspects might have to come down because of other things or do
they stay and sacrifice All these things could not have been solved without
establishing a company that regulates only this area, has its own laws, responsible
only to the Prime Minister not to the Municipality, not to the Ministry of Planning,
not to the Ministry of Housing, but mainly to one person who says do it. That one
person, who was the Prime Minister, and the CDR or the controlling council for
development can bypass a lot of regulatory things and they can create their own.
Thats what allowed the center to work like that, otherwise it would be still right now
half there. Now there were a lot of people against this, because it meant the power of
the developer and the capitalistic attitude towards development as opposed to the
socialistic attitude and Lebanon still had only third world houses. This is one of the
main struggles they had between the two sides. Youre going to interview a lot of
people theyre going to tell you, Oh, they pulled down a lot of historic buildings.
Or they were doing this and this. But that was not the reason. The reason is that it
was a power struggle over who controls development and how it was done and the
few people and the families who used to own part of Beirut have lost and now have
shares worth nothing and even they have not gone up to what they thought they
would. But if they kept them in power probably most likely their property wouldnt
have been developed because their property is being rented by plenty of people and
by law you cant get these people out. And to get them together, and each one wants
to make a million out of it, it would never have happened. That is one of the aspects
and problems of urban regeneration after war. Its interesting to see how the
Germans did it, how the Japanese did it, as a comparison because here it was
government takes over, private comes and takes over from government and it
happens. But it was the will of a single person. If he didnt have this vision and will,

237
if it wasnt his baby (and the ministers were changing), it wouldnt have happened.
When he left one time Hariri left another minister came and they stopped
development for two years. And they are all full of pretences, not interested. Now
this is an aspect of it. To complicate it, probably not many people will talk about it,
we were invaded not by the Israelis but by the Syrians and the Syrians had to have
some part of it.
-TNS: Their cut.
-C: It comes in all sorts of forms.
-TNS: A percentage.
-C: A percentage that costs a lot. A percentage that goes to the Minister, a percentage
goes to the President, this sort of thing. And thats planning in the third world. There
were times when wed go to Nigeria, for instance, where wed say that this would
cost you a million and a half, theyd tell us, Put five million, give me two million
and take the rest yourself. Thats why Nigeria is one of the countries that collapsed
because of corruption and you discover corruption through planning. And, in fact, in
the west America is the ultimate in corruption in planning, with the big corporations
taking over areas and double-dealing. They are so sophisticated and powerful, they
can do it without people knowing. There are cities you know, with areas that have
suffered a lot because of this up to know. Developers dont care. They want to make
money. They dont care whether they are doing it in Boston or whether they are
doing it in Iraq. They are for the money. Planning enters the domain of corruption.
How do you relate planning with corruption? Its there a lot because when planning
is done by the private sector usually there is corruption because the private sectors
incentive and reason for doing something is money not the user.
-TNS: Of course.
-C: The user, in fact even with the government, the user or the people are the last
thing anyone cares about. And this takes us to our problem in planning whether it be
post-war or not. In ISO-9000 they tell you that ISO is a certificate they give to
companies that have excellence in the quality and procedures of their product and
you cannot get it without going through quality control measures and this is
something very routine it started in America and now even as a consultant you might
have to get an ISO-9000 since some people ask for it. If you have an ISO it means
you have quality procedures. One of the things about this is that the purpose of any
product is to satisfy the user and the success of any product is just by the user. A
product can be successful whether it is A-class or C-class as long as it satisfies the
user of that category. An example, you can produce a Mercedes at the top and there
are users and you can produce a Volkswagen at another level and there are users,
both of them successful. So the aim is the user. You come back to consultation
planning. Who is the user? The users are the people you deal with. Youre doing a
housing development or a city
-TNS: The people you plan for.

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-C: Yeah. Now, when you do consultation planning these people are never there.
You do it for government or people in the government in the planning ministry or in
the housing ministry. Back to my dilemma. Whats my dilemma? Whether be it post-
war or not, especially that I am here to satisfy the user and in many cases the
planning requirements go against my opinion. When Im given a problem to solve
and I look at it and analyze it and you cannot go and tell him this goes against the
interest of the user. You cannot tell that to a politician in power. He will throw you
out straight away. You can advise and say how about doing this and this without
saying why. Now if they buy it than fantastic and if they dont buy it than you have
to do your best to reduce the negative aspects of the planning on the user. A simple
example, they have a city they want a bridge to go through there. You look at the city
and you see that thats wrong and there are reasons why. If you shift it south he
doesnt want to shift it south. First you start with technical reasons no, we want it
here. But its going to ruin a lot of traditional areas, people and social networks will
have to move a lot, a lot of expropriation, etc. Now, as a planner I can only suggest
the reasons why they shouldnt and put it in the report and the implementation is
their job. Now as a planner I should say, No. I want to get out. Im not putting my
hand in this. I cant because once it gets to be known that I rejected this minister
and this minister no one is going to give me any job. After all, Im a planner getting
a salary, working for a company that needs to survive. So I dont make the decisions
and if you personally say, I dont want to do the project, which you can do, another
person will come and do it. This is what happened with the design of the BCD. A lot
of things were imposed to the extent that you either say, I am not doing it, or Let
me do it the best I can. For instance, they had to get rid of so many traditional
buildings so that they can build higher buildings so that they can make money for the
investor. The investor cannot keep a two or three story building. He will knock it
down and build a higher building. There should have been a balance. Instead of 5000
buildings to stay only 2000 buildings stay. Which 2000? This is the reality of
planning. Not the overall theories and philosophies, the actual implementation of
things. Where is the compromise? Then you learn that planning has a big word in
front of it with a capital C: Compromise. Its political compromise and it means a lot
because it deals with the people and its usually the social and cultural aspects which
get compromised a lot. The physical is easy. You can create beautiful surroundings
like the suburbs created in America for certain people and a lot of people dislike and
hate them because they lead the developers away from developing in bad areas and
developing them well. So the bad areas get dilapidated in the center because it is
easier to develop outside and make money and leave the hell out of this the poor
people. And this happens, you know, in inner cities in America.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: So, our problem is that there is a moral aspect of consultancy. People are not a
product, they are people. So even with this ISO-9000, when it comes to consultants
they cannot solve the problem, because it is based on the quality of production of

239
items, things. In consultancy, especially planning, there are no items or things. There
are people you have to deal with. This aspect hits us a lot in the third world. I mean,
someone comes and says, I want you to make me a town for a million. You make a
study and think, Why would he want a million? He probably needs half a million. It
will work No, he wants a million. And then you get to know why. He either belongs
to the town or, like the bridge aspect, we found that people from the president to
whatever it is have bought all this land and when you put the bridge you have to pay
compensation and he makes money from it. This thing happened in the Ring Road
outside Amman. It got to the Parliament because of the corruption and the alignment.
The alignment has to go through there but the study says no. Its the worst place to
go through. Then it was realized that people had already bought property there, so
they want to make money out of it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: And this happens in the west as well. Planning enters the realm of morality, Im
not saying something new conspiracy. It enters the realm of politics and the
planner has to always be the acrobat.
-TNS: Juggling everything?
-C: No. Im dramatizing it of course. We dont have this all the time. But, I tell you
in the Middle East 70 percent of your work is that way. I mean, you wouldnt believe
it. Ive had to go bribe the deputy minister to give me three data books on the town in
which we were working, and theyre supposed to give them to us and he wouldnt.
-TNS: Just basic information?
-C: Yeah. I mean, theyre supposed to supply us with this information on schools,
essentials, etc. which is standard, I mean, he has them. He put his hand on it and you
can tell you have to hand him something. And this happens in the west on big
operations in a big way. The president has to sign on something So when you talk
about planners experience post-war or pre-war, whatever it is, it all ends up almost
the same. Planning in the Middle East is like planning in a war zone in one way or
another because the factors are there all the time. Its volatile and unpredictable.
Decision-making is not studied. Usually it is supposed to be studied within a national
plan for a country. No, suddenly it has nothing to do with it and suddenly you find it
contradicts the national plan. Now in the west this happens, but in the west there is a
system that gets people themselves involved and this is what was lacking as well. In
the west now you have something called public participation that is strong. In the
east there is no such thing. In Lebanon there is no such thing at all. Even NGOs are
trying now to start and university professors, etc. But it is not yet into this.
-TNS: Is it because of the Lebanese mentality in general? They dont care?
-C: No, its not that. I think, if anything, that in Lebanon there is more realization of
this thing than in the rest of the Arab world. Its the attitude. Its just a reflection of
cultural and political practice.
-TNS: Is it because after the war and under Syrian occupation it was not allowed to
have public?

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-C: In this matter the Syrians didnt bother. I mean, the BCD was a big, big boiling
point in the newspapers daily. No one stopped this. On one hand, it was in the
interest of the Syrians this happens, because the more it gets volatile against Hariri
the better it is for them and the more they can move in as problem-solvers and the
more money they will make. Exactly what the Americans are doing in Iraq now but
in a different way. So there is no problem with that under the pretense of democracy
and all these things. In Lebanon has been pretending we have democracy for years
and its true. Its the most democratic in the Arab world in that aspect. But theres no
powerful public presentation.
-TNS: So they can have opposition but they cant do many things about it?
-C: No, not power. They have the parliament and the parliament is led by corrupt
people. Thats it.
-TNS: So there is no way for the public to stop the implementation of a project or to
do anything about it?
-C: Except if they find they can pressure it through parliament which is very rare and
not that easy. This is true. Not only this, in more vital aspects its true not only in
planning its true. I mean, even in the west, up to the 70s they started having
these I mean, I remember the 60s in Europe there was no such thing as public
power to stop anything. Until they started residence societies they started slowly
some other power groups, okay they had some access to parliament and to congress
or whatever, but in effect there was nothing. Only in the 70s slowly the west became
more aware of the public participation force and up to now even in American cities
public participation is very limited to almost not being able to improve a terrible life
in the biggest city in the world like New York in certain areas. You question why?
-TNS: How about here specifically, did you ever refuse to work on a project?
-C: Oh yeah. I did many. I did many. I mean now I refused to work in Iraq for
instance. Im an Iraqi. I refused. Weve got projects in Iraq now planning, very
interesting, very vital. I refused. This is a personal thing.
-TNS: Is it because of
-C: No, I did that because it is all done under the Americans and the Americans are
not in Iraq for the best of it. Its really for moneymaking. Theyll give a billion
dollars to do a study on a city which I cannot enter! What does that mean? Put the
billion dollars in your pocket and thats what happened to all these American
companies. They made billions, billions, in areas they know you cant enter. How do
you do it? And it says in the contract when its safe. Ill tell you when its safe!
-TNS: [Laughs] Never maybe!
-C: And this is an aspect of planning which is frightening because now they are
talking about doing a master plan for Iraq and Baghdad. Its ridiculous! You can see
behind it, it is a moneymaking machine and unfortunately American companies they
dont care. Western governments they dont care. Even Iraqis they dont care. They
go and deal with it. They want to survive; they want to live. What the hell! Lets do
it.

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-TNS: They want to make money.
-C: So this is a critical aspect of being a planner, whether post-war or not, is how
much do you enter from your moral aspect because you are not an engineer doing a
road or something. Really, there is an aspect of morality in planning, how you find it,
what school you belong to, and these types of things. There are people who are
socialist planners who are against any planning process by government because they
know what it means, who refuse to work in planning because of that.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: And there are planners who dont care. They really believe, and that is sad, that
the physical aspect of planning makes people better. And they believe that they give
them beautiful surroundings, nice streets, nice landscape, nice apartments, all these
things real middle class aptitude
-TNS: Everything will be better.
-C: Yeah, which happens in certain places because they have a very strong backing
system for social and cultural aspects.
-TNS: But gentrification is a problem also. People leave these places and sell
because theyre poor and
-C: Yeah. Its really very complex to dramatize it. But whats nice in our work in
Dar Al-Handasah, for instance, is that I get a lot of variety. I get touristic
developments like these on the sea, so I spend the year just doing beautiful layouts
and hotels and chalets and islands this is a pure developers dream. But it doesnt
affect me in any way more except one aspect which is the environment because
sometimes this happens in areas where you know you should not put an island, for
instance.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: Theres a problem not of people but of the environment and thats why we insist
on an environmental assessment before we do things. Theres another aspect we have
to deal with. So the variety: we do housing developments, we do urban regeneration
in all parts. Fantastic!
-TNS: So have you been able to make more choices or maybe you feel happier with
your choices?
-C: No, Im lucky. Im lucky I had choices. The choices keep me going on. Like you
go to a country which is well off like, for instance, Qatar and it has an old urban area.
They just want to have a study to renew it. We know they wont do it to start with.
Thats a good job. We go and do and they will accept what we do exactly. Thats
good, but if theyre going to do it or not is something else. Its different than if you
are really affecting directly people.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: This is not really. This is just a government. At the end of the year the ministry
wants to say that we have done A, B, C, D, to show off. Okay, but at least part of it
might happen and part of it does happen. Most of the time it happens entirely
different than what you project and advise, most of the time. This is our problem a

242
lot in the Middle East. We do things and we go back by chance to see and by God
theres nothing there that youve recommended! And its always worse not better
because usually you do something and after five years it gets revised maybe and a lot
of times it is revised by other consultants. They will do a good job, but usually it is
revised by the local government people and its always with directives of Give me
here a twenty-story building. Give me here a shopping center. Get these people out.
Let them go and deal with themselves. And we have this because we have in Africa,
the Middle East, and Far East (we dont have any in South America, but for America
South America is like a third world country).
-TNS: How about this: in the United States a lot of people think that when public
participation is high you have a problem with implementation, say it is slowed down.
-C: Yes, you have to pass new laws to get acceptance, but
-TNS: Can it be problematic at the same time is what I am trying to say?
-C: Participation, there are two types. Theres a positive participation when the real
reason behind it is there. The real reason is to affect directly the people. Theres
another type of participation behind it is political reasons of a group that wants to
control and the only way to control an area the only way to control the people in
that area is to control its development. That we have in the south of Lebanon near the
airport area, thats another part of our post-war problems. We have a group who can
only control that area through the control of the people and its development. If
someone else comes to develop it and its better, the people wont follow them as
such. Thats their mentality and thats why we had the problems in the development
of Elyssar whereby a very good scheme was worked out and we had a survey from
the people I mean, thats what I insisted on for satisfaction, and they were all for
it because they were going to get better houses, better places. Their kids were going
to have schools. Now they live in shit, literally. Sorry for the word, but you cannot
be disgusted of that.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: Not only that, the land was available; everything was available to do it. And the
political group said no. Then they said yes, because they were paid. How much will
it cost you to say yes, thirty million, forty million? Here it is. Then they changed
their minds again and nothing happened. Thats group participation in a different
way.
-TNS: Yeah. Even to the detriment of the group itself.
-C: It doesnt matter. Thats politically motivated, not really people motivated
participation. Now in the west I dont think you have as much political motivation as
much as really true motivation. Thats the problem of public participation. It does
stop development in certain instances. Besides that, you can get groups who are very
locked in and very narrow-minded. Theyre thinking of their own street but theyre
not thinking of their own area. You get that.
-TNS: Yeah.

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-C: And they mess up the whole thing because of that. There are, of course, negative
aspects to this, but [Shrugs].
-TNS: How would you rate public participation in Lebanon lets say on a scale from
one to ten, one being the lowest and ten the highest?
-C: It depends on the issue, the location of the issue, its political importance to the
country strategically. I.e. public participation for the BCD was the highest. I would
rate it up to eight. But there was opposition like hell because of the status, the
location, the type of issue involved. You get other things like environmental issues
like the cleaning of the waters of the coastal areas of Lebanon, which is a huge issue
because we had hell during the war. Thats a participation that would reach maybe 5
because university professors and NGOs got into it, but hardly public. These are
organized types of opposition.
-TNS: Is it private?
-C: No.
-TNS: More like NGOs.
-C: More by intellectual, the people who are involved, etc. than by the real public.
Even in the BCD there was a bit of the public because of the landowners in the area,
the families involved, etc. But in an environmental issue like this, which is a slightly
abstract to the ordinary person because he is trying to survive and live and you know.
So it varies. And there may be local issues, Nizar might have mentioned in his area,
public participation goes through the municipal elects.
-TNS: The municipalities.
-C: Yeah. The municipality. The smaller it is the more active the public participation
is in it because they wanted access to their little village, or they wanted some sort
of infrastructure
-TNS: A road
-C: But on the whole, public participation in the third world is much below, much,
much below expected. Its almost nil. Yeah, you can say it is nil because even if it is
highly successful, how is it gauged? According to how much it can achieve.
Achievement is almost nil because in the end even if they have a voice they have no
power to carry it through. And thats a problem with the west as well, but the west
has become more open over time in this. Whereby in certain countries the public is
number one like, maybe, say in Switzerland. Also England.
-TNS: Okay. What do you think would have aided in public participation?
-C: Sorry?
-TNS: What do you think would have aided in increasing it or achieving it? What
would have helped after the war?
-C: After the war, basically awareness about issues.
-TNS: Education?
-C: Education is a big thing.
-TNS: Transparency?

244
-C: Transparency is number one. Transparency means the killing of the double-
dealing effect. Transparency means democracy two big words not even achieved
properly in the west. I mean, I compare to the west because thats the only thing we
can do either America or Britain, or Germany or France. Probably its fifty percent
there. I mean, what do you expect in these regimes running countries here in the third
world? Its difficult. But awareness helps.
-TNS: Awareness of whats happening you mean?
-C: Awareness of the issues because post-war you have issues. You have issues class
A, issues class B theres no such thing, Im saying that there are issues that are
highly important that are national and there are issues that are lower. The national
issues become more in Lebanon because it is a small country, three or four million
people its nothing if you compare it to Egypt for instance so, in fact, if instead of
rebuilding the country they had paid each family one or two million dollars it would
have cost them less. And family can do
-TNS: [Laughs] Whatever they want!
-C: Whatever they want! But no, they have a national loan of 33 billion.
-TNS: National debt, yeah.
-C: Give them. Each one can build a hotel and live in it. Thats it. But corruption
doesnt allow that because post-war is linked to corruption and corruption is linked
to post-war development even in the west.
-TNS: Because theres an absence of control in a way?
-C: And the people who manage and control power. I know the people here. I mean,
even in the idealistic sense of peoples revolutions, the people who came to power
are hardly different than the ones who were before. They talk a different language,
but in the end its power and power is corruption.
-TNS: And power is corruption.
-C: You know. Your professor might mind.
-TNS: No, no.
-C: Is he powerful? [Laughs]
-TNS: No, hes nice. [Laughs] Now that you look back would you have done
anything differently?
-C: Than planning?
-TNS: No. Within what you did during the post-war period, the projects that you
took, what you worked on. Do you feel that there is anything that you regret doing or
not doing?
-C: Now lets get back. In planning usually when you work you know you are
working projects that are not private, not your choice. I say, okay I am working in an
office in a company with its own agenda and if its agenda doesnt go with mine
when it comes to planning I have to leave it. But they dont have an agenda for
planning because as the project comes, as the client comes, they have to deal with it
and namely government. So, regrets there are in the way that regrets not with
myself as much as with the company that it couldnt take any stands and say, We

245
dont need this. Dont get into this. After all you are an Arab company working for
the Arab world, you can take a different stand than an American company working
in the Arab world.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: You know, this sort of thing. But maybe, on the other hand, through experience
you realize that if this is the case we all have an inherent problem working as an
Arab country in the Arab world as planners and this is another part of the problem of
our planners working in the third world in planning which doesnt face the western
planners. Because the western companies when they come to a client, lets say as a
developer. They sit with them, with their agenda, and he just gives them what they
want because to him they are the superior. They are the ones who when they say
something you listen and even the contracting this is not theory, this is actual fact
of western companies, even in planning, is much more ludicrous and easier for them
than for us as an Arab company. Because our problem to the client, What are you
an Arab trying to do me planning? We have to prove to them that we are twice
better than any competitor from Britain or America or Germany or France for them
to believe us. And we have this problem even with the World Bank and we are the
biggest international company in the world for the last ten or twenty years in every
aspect of engineering. And in certain jobs we have problems with the World Bank
because we are an Arab company. And sadly enough, certain clients when we send
them the names of the people working in planning, Why dont you have any British
or American planners?
-TNS: Yeah, they want to see international people on the list.
-C: Not international, no. If you put an Indian name they dont see it. If you put
Philippinis or Malaysians, third world people, they dont want to see third world
people. They want to see the first world people and thats really a sad aspect of
planning we have met all the time. Many times we had to put a name and we put a
guy, pretty face, to sit with us in a meeting and he speaks good English. Thats a sad
aspect of planning, unfortunately. While we know that we would do better, because
we are a part of the culture, we know the cultural traditions. We can obtain data
better than the Europeans because the Europeans cannot get them especially they
have a language barrier which we dont have.
-TNS: Theres a language barrier and a cultural barrier too.
-C: And we can access data and information in surveys, they cannot. Of course, they
come and employ locals but the locals dont appear to the client. So in many ways
we bring the names of European companies with us and many times I have had my
card printed on it, I belong to an American company so and so, because we have
American companies with us and Dar Al-Handasah has bought companies all over
the world. So I go under the name of another company, an American company. I
come from Chicago! The client looks at it, he looks at me differently. Thats our
problem in the third world, were so retarded in that way and this increases the
arrogance of the west in that way. I tell you we get fantastic planners from the

246
west Americans weve met them, we deal with them. They admit, they are
aware of this problem. They are aware of the fact that if the client asks them for one
extra work they say, Sorry the contractor says you pay more. If we do that, they go
crazy. So they ask us to do ten times more, Do me this and this. Even Do me our
house, the prince said, Do a plan for my house. Invite me, well come to Lebanon
and work it out. They dont do it with western companies. They wouldnt dare. So
thats an aspect of planning in the third world. People always look and they say,
Where did you study? In England. See? Thats why youre a good planner. If I
told them I studied in Cairo or in Turkey [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah. They wouldnt care.
-C: There might be a truth in it to a certain extent, but even so our company is
international in that way and planning is one of I mean, this is a hypocrisy of
something like the Syrian regime who claims they are anti this and anti that and they
are Arabs, when we applied to do a town the first thing they said, You dont have
any British or American planners. We had to put names, and thats in Syria which
claims its being, you know Its not because of Syria. This is an attitude.
Unfortunately, this is an attitude. Now this is generalizing. Some of them no. Some
of them they say, We like to see Arab planners, yes we do, because they have
enough experience with western planners. In Kuwait and the Gulf theyve had a lot
of experience with western planners and the let down they had and they know that
Dar Al-Handasah we usually are called to salvage work because we have a
different approach. We are more driven in the way that westerners are not. I dont
blame them in that sense. Again cultural attitude: the Americans have the attitude
that their way is the way. The British dont have it; the French dont have it that
much. But the British have a different attitude than the French in planning concepts
because of different schools of thinking. The Americans always say, This is it. This
is how we do it in America. It should apply to the world. This is an attitude. Not all,
but a lot of planners from America believe that, not all. Some do understand, very
much understand here. They come and firstly they appoint our Arab planners to help
them see things right. Some no, they have their agenda. So, again, its an attitude of
the planner as well, and this happened here in post-war planning the same thing.
Attitude did play a game in it where it begins classified in political terms
unfortunately. Ah, this is why he does this because he belongs to this, he does this
because he belongs to that as a planner.
-TNS: To factions?
-C: Yeah. And there were always problems so the had to bring foreign planners.
-TNS: They would be more
-C: They said they would be more objective in that aspect.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: But its not necessary that they will produce the proper stuff.
-TNS: One final question: Do you feel that you, in your practice, that you have been
a true representative of the public?

247
-C: Public, no. As I said, the public [Laughs] unfortunately in the third world the
public No, a true representative of the public indeed yes, because I do what I
believe and if I believe that this is what is goof for the public then I will represent
them myself or the public through me. Now I might be mistaken, thats something
else. But I do believe what I do is with all intentions of really doing the best, the best,
I feel I can do for the situation and the people.
-TNS: Within the constraints that you have.
-C: Yeah, because, you see, there are different kinds of people. The type that get
involved personally in a project and the type who dont, they just do it. They do it
right, but they do it. Im the type who really gets involved personally, really
personally. Even when I go site visiting, Ill always go jump straight away to the
people, talk to them and this and this. I have British planners who are like this and I
have British planners who dont care: This is a job. Im doing my best and thats it.
Detached. And there are, no, there are people who
-TNS: Are very involved?
-C: Very involved and all these things and they do the same work, but at least the
background is satisfactory more. Now this is a personal thing. I have Arab planners
who do not care the hell about them. They just go, do their job. Im going where?
Yemen? Im going to Nigeria? Im going to Angola? I dont care. Thats why I got
into planning, not because I studied it. It wasnt a profession for me. Im basically an
architect but I got to it because of my views of things, you know. But there are
planners who work there because they got a degree in planning and its their job and
theyre doing it to the best theyve learned. And its not that they dont do a good
job, its just that its different what youre doing. Its like any other job really.
Doctors will get involved even though they cant afford to get involved personally. I
mean, there are issues which sometimes international planners will sit together and
talk about. We decide not to get involved because definitely it has a lot of loopholes
like hell.
-TNS: It has a lot of what?
-C: Holes, like you can see its not going to benefit the user easily but we say, Lets
just get together and do our best. This happens at work. It does happen.
-TNS: Sometimes do you feel that its better not to get emotionally involved with
planning?
-C: Umm, yes. Yes. Especially if you come to the stage where you have already got
involved. You cannot withdraw and theres a stumbling block in front of you. You
cannot really, you cannot, you have to go through. You go with the minimal the
most compromise you will ever give normally and the minimum loss you can do to
the project and this again, will get to the impossible. This is what Henri Edde got
into in planning. He went against all opposition and he did his plan.
-TNS: The first plan?
-C: Yeah. Then he it came to the point when he could not give any more into Hariris
demands so he withdrew and we took over. But taking over means a completely new

248
plan, because his vision is not the vision of the new planners. It was thrown away
and a compromise plan came out of it and this was also thrown away. A third
compromise plan came out. This happens, you know. We had problems when we
were doing the capital city of Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan. It was coming
out of the communist regime into the free market and thats a very interesting thesis
in the experience of planning in the eastern European countries and places like
Kazakhstan, which was under the Soviet domain. When there was absolute, 100
percent, within planning control, to sudden change within few months into what they
called free market control and development. And we had to go through this
experience. It was a very interesting experience for all of us, economists, planners,
sociologists because this is something interesting for someone to do a thesis about.
Go to these countries, Eastern Europe maybe not as much, but these other countries
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, whatever it is, which is now literally taken over by the
Americans anyway and look at how planning is. Its very interesting. You can write
a book about it.
-TNS: [Laughs]
-C: We had to go through this because certain aspects of the mentality who
controls planning it was one government controlling planning, absolute no one
else but this to another government who think they have something to do with it, but
the mentality of the planners in it is the same as in the old days and they become
almost schizophrenic about it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: That was interest for us. To go from almost semi-utopian Soviet type of planning
to planning physical planning because I think they had the best in terms of these
things. Only we get back to the main thing: its the management and implementation
and planning of the whole thing which they didnt have and the corruption. And, you
know, when you dont know land value you cannot plan well within a capitalist
system. Land value is the most important aspect in planning, even more than people.
So that was interesting. We spent a year doing that and we had to make decisions,
which is interesting. Ill tell you this: planning in the third world is nothing you
know of and can imagine if you have not practiced it. Its an entirely different thing
than anyone would study it or know it in the west. Still, it is like maybe any other
thing because it is a process which is complex and no one understands it. Not many
understand it. Planning is not part of our character. Who plans ahead, five years
ahead? In the west you do. In the west, I remember in England, you plan your
holidays in summer during winter. Now this is an aspect of a character that plans
about six months ahead.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: Where hes going to go, what hes going to spend, exactly what budget he needs,
what airplanes is he going to take, what hotel, what does the room look like, the
whole thing. Come to the east and see one person who does this.
-TNS: Me!

249
-C: [Laughs] On a personal level? Youve lived in America.
-TNS: No, Ive always been a planner I think. I think people are amazed that I would
be that way!
-C: This is not only a character, but because of the unpredictability of what happens.
I, in an international company up until now, I can never plan my holiday, never.
Never! Up until now I havent had my summer holidays and theyll probably go.
-TNS: Its not summer any more! [Laughs]
-C: Yeah! Because suddenly a client picks up the phone and says, I want this in
two, three days. Now he knows it takes three, four months. He doesnt care.
-TNS: He wants it yesterday.
-C: If Dar Al-Handasah says no they wont be happy. If an American company says
no, Oh yes, we understand. So he doesnt pick up a phone to the Americans or the
British, he picks a retarded company like us! [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs]
-C: And the thing is we do it. We work under pressure most of the time. Most of our
work is overtime. Most of our jobs done throughout the years are on overtime basis
because of the way we work. If you dont do it this way And this is very difficult
to work through, very difficult. Thats why you have a lot of Arab people leaving
Arab companies and working for American or British companies.
-TNS: Much more comfortable, and the salary is better.
-C: Ah! Nine to five and I get ten days off respectability, and I go there, a taxi
will be waiting for me, fax, and hotels. If I need information, I go with someone who
gives money because I dont know the language.
-TNS: Yeah.
-C: So its easier for them. I mean, Ive seen things that are disgusting. People sitting
and working on a master plan of a country, of a real region like Lebanon but they
cannot enter Lebanon. They sit in Cairos five-star hotels getting paid lots of money,
literally pocketfuls of money, and they are writing about the planning aspects of
Lebanon. Who are the slaves? Dar Al-Handasah. You go to Lebanon, bring this.
The guy comes, he wants to talk about tourism policy in Lebanon which is the most
important aspect... the biggest industry. He opens the maps saying, Where are the
hotels? And then he writes the report. But his name is American: Bechtel. We did
the work, but the Bechtel name goes on because the developers in the world, the
investors, wont look except at Bectels name and thats an aspect of planning.
Thats clever marketing. So they, what, took millions?
-TNS: So, basically, Bechtel would subcontract it and youd do the work or
something like that?
-C: Yeah. I mean, theyd do the work in the end, and theyre nice people but how can
you do it by remote control and without caring and just enjoying it? Okay, Im not
blaming them. Bechtel has done a lot of good work, but thats our job. A lot of
times we have to put names of others so that the job is passed. And some people
come and ask us to do the job and want to put an American name or Dar Al-

250
Handasah because it is so well known in the Arab World, theyre sure well get it
because they know we are doers even if they have all these conceptions that dont
work. In planning we will never know. Planning, again, as business planning is
business, big business. Through planning we get half the company working, but in
planning we dont get much money. The guy gives us peanuts. But behind it if I get
half a kilometer of roads and some infrastructure it lasts millions. That makes the
company work for years. So there are certain aspects of planning geared for business,
for infrastructure and implementation more than the plan. The plans got lost. If there
is a road in the whole plan, the whole plan is lost. Nobody cares about the residential
areas and this and this and that, the community services that road, which is five
kilometers, is what they want. And to justify it for the budget, Well, theres a master
plan done by an international company. Thats why this road is important. They
forget about everything else. Why? Because they make about twenty million out of
it. A million here, a million to this guy, a million to the pocket of the... So planning
as business as well this is another aspect. It happens. You see that a lot. In fact,
you see it more obviously in the third world than in the first world. The first world is
usually more sophisticated in the way they manipulate planning issues into making it
into business. They have their own congressmen; they have their own systems. In the
Arab world it is less sophisticated. It is obvious. We understand; we see why they
want this. I see why they want this road through here. Its so obvious!
-TNS: Its more obvious. Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up
interview if I need it?
-C: Yes, of course, any time
-TNS: Thank you very much.
-C: My pleasure. I hope its useful to you.

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APPENDIX D: Interview 4

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Okay. Youre okay with being recorded and youve
read the approval notice and youre fine with that?
-Interviewee D (D): Yes, I am.
-TNS: Good. What is your background in planning?
-D: I have a first degree in planning.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: I have a post-graduate diploma in planning.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: In fact, planning is my education. Ive not come in as a post-graduate. You were
talking to Haitham the other day; he was in electrical engineering or mechanical
engineering
-TNS: Architecture.
-D: And then he studied architecture and hes come in that way. No, I came into it.
-TNS: So your undergrad degree was in planning?
-D: It was in planning, physical planning, and then my postgraduate degree was in
planning and then that got me exemption from examinations at the Royal Planning
Institute. So its the same professional structure as the syndicate or the Royal
Institute of Architects or the American Institute of Planners.
-TNS: Okay. What university did you attend?
-D: The University of Cardiff.
-TNS: Both? For both degrees?
-D: Both of them, yeah. Its a single course. It was a sandwich course.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: And there was a three-year undergraduate and then one year out in practice and
then one year back for the diploma.
-TNS: Thats interesting.
-D: Its a diploma/MA course.
-TNS: Yeah, thats nice.
-D: Because we were on financial support from the local authority we were not able
to convert the course to a Masters.
-TNS: So its a post-graduate diploma versus a Masters.
-D: It was a diploma. But people on the same course
-TNS: Its pretty much the same.
-D: And they still wont convert it either.
-TNS: Really?
-D: Mmm. They still wont convert it, because I asked them about two years ago if
theyre going to and they wouldnt.
-TNS: Okay. Youve worked at Dar Al-Handasah for how long?
-D: About 21 years.
-TNS: Oh my God!

252
-D: Yeah, well.
-TNS: Not all of them have been in Beirut though.
-D: No. Well, Ive worked in London, Ive worked in Qatar, Cairo thats in
periods, you know. Cairo, Qatar
-TNS: So mostly around the Middle East?
-D: And Africa. The companys major interest until very recently was the Middle
East, North Africa, and West Africa.
-TNS: Okay. So you said you were educated in planning. What did your education
teach you about the role of the public in planning?
-D: Well, I did my education before public consultation became very much the thing.
So, none of it, nothing at all.
-TNS: Nothing at all?
-D: Nothing at all. We didnt consider the public during my period of education.
-TNS: So it was just physical planning?
-D: No, no. It was just something that didnt concern the public. Planning in Britain
was essentially a middle class business. So people were able to make their
representations known through the democratic system. Plans were advertised in the
classified sections of local newspapers. So, we used to do in those days town plans
and we used to do county plans and the county plans were site-specific. They
identified those actions that the County Authority, the Upper Tier Authority, would
carry out during any one period of time. So they were all budgeted. They showed the
precise sites of schools, roads So people knew, or supposedly they knew exactly
where they were. But there was no obligation to buy these sites and there was no
mechanism to allow people to become part of the system. The only opportunity they
had was when plans, like comprehensive development plans, were discussed at
public tribunals. So there was very up to about 1973-4, there was very little
mechanism, very little process for the people, for the public to become involved in
planning very, very little. And the first one was oh God, what was it called?
Skeffington, Skeffington Report. It was produced about 69 and Skeffington started
the process of changing planning in the United Kingdom to involve more discursive
elements and the public came in on the back of that. Things were not specific cut and
dry. Sites became less specific. A school would be located in a particular area rather
than on a particular site and the public were encouraged to make their
representations. And since then its changed to the point where its no longer
consultation, its participation.
-TNS: Okay. What year did you graduate?
-D: What year did I graduate? My first was in 66 and I got my degree in 69 and
then I got my diploma in 71.
-TNS: Okay. So even then there was not much of a
-D: No, very little.
-TNS: Interesting.

253
-D: We used to put development control. It used to be all planning applications refer
to the Parish Council and although they had no powers, they could make their
feelings known about the applications.
-TNS: So, most of what you have learnt about participation has been through
experience?
-D: Yeah.
-TNS: Versus education.
-D: Yeah. When I worked for the second period when I worked in the UK 1990-
94, I worked as a Regulatory Officer in minerals and waste disposal, which was as
you can imagine fairly an area of conflict and there the public intruded. They had a
right to be aware of what was going on, but they intruded. They were very proactive,
very proactive. We have a responsibility to inform them about what was actually
before us, but local companies would often put exhibitions on. So, if we had a
planning application for a major new quarry, the company that was making the
application would often put on a local site exhibition to show them what was
involved and they would only come to us for clarification. But we had a statutory
process that we had to follow. So we had to notify everybody, not what was
happening but that there was an application happening. If they wanted to they could
come and see the planning application. And the planning application was usually
quite different from what the applicants used to show. Theyd provide cups of tea
and sandwiches and cakes and things in a nice marquee, whereas we just gave them
the application file.
-TNS: And they had the right to do something about it?
-D: Object? They had a right to object. Ah, that was about it they had a right to
object and a right to representation.
-TNS: But was their objection necessarily taken into consideration?
-D: Oh yeah. Their objection was taken into consideration. It was taken into
consideration. In Britain, I dont know whether its the same here, but in Britain a
planning officer has a statutory obligation a legal obligation to consider only the
planning merits of any particular development. He cant consider the social side of it,
he cant consider If youve got a beautiful house overlooking the sea and some
guy comes and puts a house in front of you, the only thing we can consider is
whether the vehicles he would generate would cause problems, whether it would
generate conditions which would damage amenity, reasonable public amenity. So if
you say, Well hes taken away my view of the sea, that wouldnt be a sufficiently
strong reason to stop the development providing all other matters were okay.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: So, all we did often people would tell us that we were blinking narrow-minded
planners who werent taking things into account.
-TNS: The whole picture.
-D: And planning is not democracy. So if the whole town objected to a particular
development, which was perfectly all right in planning terms, it would have to go

254
through for approval. And many people felt we had a lot of contentious
applications in the United Kingdom in the little town I live in where people are a bit
NIMBY.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: You know, a bit NIMBY in their approach. And they dont want it and if they all
get in and say they dont want it then, because democracy is democracy, I dont see
why they shouldnt have their own way. But it didnt work that way. So the idea of
participation and consultation is sometimes difficult to implement.
-TNS: Okay. Were you practicing planning here at any time during the war?
-D: No. No, I came here in 95.
-TNS: 95. How about since then? What has been your experience you would say?
-D: The only job Ive worked on here was maybe Elyssar and, I think I told you, we
did a fairly comprehensive socio-economic survey there down in Jnah and the
communities down there. And when we started doing those we had a lot of trouble,
wed a lot of trouble.
-TNS: Because was it like a census you would say?
-D: Yeah, it was a census. It was an attempt to determine what the social conditions
were, what conditions people were living in, how many bedrooms they had, what
size the bedrooms were, whether they had water
-TNS: To use them for projections?
-D: Well the idea was to determine exactly what the conditions were then and put
together an argument for relocating or reducing densities showing that the
community was large, but there was merit in relocating them to accommodations.
But the first thing was to determine what the existing conditions were like down
there, and they would ultimately be used as a part of a much wider package of
proposals to show that people would ultimately benefit. But when we went down
there people were very suspicious... that this was just a government ploy to get rid of
them because then there was still problems in southern Lebanon. So the people
down there didnt have security of tenure, they were squatters, the place was in very
poor condition, there were very few utilities, it was really the main aim of the
exercise was to determine existing conditions a prelude to producing a plan for the
wider area around the golf course and to build new houses, new apartments to try to
improve the lot of people who were in very substandard accommodations down
there and to lease some of the land...
-TNS: Is that the area next to the airport?
-D: Yeah.
-TNS: But nothing was really done about that.
-D: Nothing was done, but thats a different matter.
-TNS: Yeah. But you did this? You finished this study?
-D: Oh, yeah, yeah. We did the study, then we produced the document which went to
the government, and it was accepted and I think the majority of the local community
accepted it. The idea was to release land on the foreshore so that money could be

255
generated to pay for some of the other developments. The coast down there is really
very nice. The idea was really to improve the whole of the area and, at that stage, to
build a new road along the coastal road to improve and upgrade the coastal road.
There was going to be a low road and a high upper road.
-TNS: Two roads. Each in one direction?
-D: No, the idea was to have a fly-over.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: You could take traffic on the top and then have a local road
-TNS: With exits and things like that.
-D: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: But it was quite a complex project. We did at the same time, although I wasnt
involved in it, the CDR was trying to do something with northern suburbs as well up
around Antelias, coming in from Antelias, again to try and release land on the coast
for things like reclamation to pay for environmental improvements and to try to get
some money into the coffers to start the regeneration process after the war. Because
it really was, this place was so drab.
-TNS: It looked terrible.
-D: Oh! And Jnah and the area around the airport, it was really in a bad way. It was
in a bad way and people were in a bad way. There was the aftermath of war, very
much the aftermath of war.
-TNS: Dont you think that area would be where you would see that the most
maybe?
-D: People were frightened of it as well. I think, as a foreigner, people talked about
Shiites not as a potential political threat but as a potential physical threat and Im
sure people here would disagree with me. But as a foreigner they never caused me
I mean, we got we used the word kidnapped but we werent kidnapped we were
taken several times by people when we were surveying because they didnt know
what the hell we were doing. We were taken to people who were quite obviously
figures of authority.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: And towards the end of the exercise, these people were getting extremely angry
with those who had taken us because it had all been cleared, they knew what we
were doing, nobody was concerned about it, they knew what the process was, it was
all being done through Hariri, everybody knew what was going on.
-TNS: So everybody who needed to know knew.
-D: Yeah and Ive drunken more bloody tea down there than I can tell you!
-TNS: [Laughs]
-D: Everybody was just so nice and so apologetic and weve members of staff who
lived down there so we were always about. But people were frightened. I think in 95
you got a feeling that everybody was frightened. A potential boom had started in

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Verdun and places like that, but there were other areas that were just not going
anywhere and the Israelis were still down in the south.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: There were still all sorts of potential threats. The Syrians had a really tight grip
on the place. There were problems.
-TNS: Politically it wasnt stable.
-D: You never felt that it was. You never know whats going on in Lebanon anyway
with regards to political stability.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: I mean, in a way, you felt that people were frightened. They were frightened of
what could happen. I think as organizations like Hezbollah have become politically
structured, people I may be wrong but people down there now feel more
comfortable.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: Because they know that to change what is in fact the status quo would have to be
political now, not a military thing. The military thing could have been back in 95.
-TNS: What did you feel? Were you ever scared? Worried?
-D: Never. No, I dont get scared for some reason from things like that. When we
started the job, I went through I was told to take my tie off, I was pushed in the
back of a four-wheel drive, and you had a feeling that you should be frightened. But
when I went down with the company that ran the surveys I forgot his name now, he
was of Greek extraction, Greek Orthodox from AUB no, never once, never ever
once. No one ever, ever gave me reason to believe Im going down there now.
Nobody ever makes me feel threatened. As a foreigner, Ive never, ever felt
threatened anywhere in Lebanon, ever. So, no, not at all.
-TNS: Thats good.
-D: Not at all.
-TNS: What would you say, in Elyssar or something you practiced in post-war
Lebanon, what would you say was your major challenge?
-D: Getting people to trust you. Getting people to trust you. That was really an and
theres always a political dimension here. But the project overall would have
generated you see whens theres a war, when theres a change in the status quo, if
something is going to be regularized, people begin to think of what they can get out
of it regardless of whether theyve been through a normal purchasing process to
obtain the right to land. Theyve suffered in the process of holding onto the land and
they feel as if they have some moral obligation to it. And at that time, as I said, the
Israelis were still in southern Lebanon and it was going to be many years before
anybody got their hands back on the land. In that intervening period, I think people
felt that they had a right to be squatting. You certainly felt that when you were there.
And we were talking about creating a new development which they would have had
a right, a clear tenure right, to. But there would have been others who would have
lost that right, people who were on the coastal edge particularly. They would have

257
lost the right to what they had there and theyd have moved somewhere else. What
the exchange would have achieved on the coastal edge would have been to generate
very high values and people were intelligent enough to believe that they would lose
out simply by going the way the government said they should do: relinquish what
informal right they had to take a formal right somewhere else. This generated
suspicion and it make me, anyways, feel that people were going to be bloody money-
oriented because they thought if they stuck out here theyd make more money. And
when you came back into the office, I think everybody felt this but it was the way
you translated it. I can understand people doing it because they do it back home
during the compulsory purchase program, but here they would turn it into something
that was bad you know that this was a reflection on the nature of these people, this
is what they would always do these people. So, because of what Lebanon is,
because of its confessional nature, there was a potential for some sort of conflict
between the groups like there is now. Do you know how many people talk about that
they dont pay their electricity bills in the south?
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: The same sort of thing was applied. Down there we never felt that, the way they
explained what they felt about the area. They sounded very reasonable when you
came in from the outside. But people outside the community but in Lebanon perhaps
thought about it as a something for nothing account.
-TNS: Probably.
-D: But they have suffered. I mean, the idea of doing up Elyssar I remember
another point, which has to be made. If you remember airplanes used to fly in over
the top of the city which, because of the orientation of the runway, affected the
regulations regarding building heights all the way back into the city. When the new
runway was open, which was very much built in part as a result of the Elyssar
problem, it meant that you could increase the building heights all the way back into
the city and all the way down to the airport. So that was more money that could be
made, more regeneration, more improvement could be achieved. So you were talking
about a whole pot of money being made as well. Planning here is never done to
improve the lot of people. Planning here is done to make money.
-TNS: And nothing ended up happening there at all?
-D: Not really, no. Not on the scale that it was proposed. Part of the road was
improved, the road that you go down here.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: But no. Nothing
-TNS: No sort of redevelopment at all?
-D: No.
-TNS: And that was for political reasons?
-D: Ah, Im not sure. I think a bit more than political. There were one or two
physical problems: that the land that was to be used for redevelopment was a landfill

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so it would have been difficult not impossible but it would have been difficult. It
would have increased the cost.
-TNS: What was the one major thing that you felt you had to give up when you were
faced with post-war circumstances?
-D: I didnt have to give up anything.
-TNS: You felt that planning in post-war circumstances was just regular planning?
-D: There is no planning here! Planning no there is no planning here. I cant think
of anything really. The one thing that we dont have or we didnt have was data and
youve never had data in Lebanon. Youve got no population data, youve got no
economic data, again because of the political implications. And here you had an area
which we should glom, as most of Lebanon had as a direct consequence of the war. I
mean, Kasliks the way Kaslik is because of the war, and so is Jounieh. Not to my
surprise when I went to Tripoli for the first time, the other side of Byblos, the
autostrade suddenly takes on 8-10 lanes. It was the old airport for the Lebanese
Forces youre driving down a bloody airport! So the country in 1995 was still no
matter what you saw apart from some of the mountains and some of the villages
that were growing like they should have been but Tripoli hasnt, Kaslik hasnt,
Jounieh hasnt, Beirut hasnt. Its a mess! Verduns supplanted Hamra because of
Hamras involvement in the war. Retail development in Ashrafieh has changed
because of the different rates of growth and the different rates of confidence
returning into the commercial market. So Ashrafieh is quite different post-war to
what it was pre-war. And west Beiruts changed because of the political sensibility,
the political sensitivities of the Muslim community. When I first came all the bars
were here and then they all closed. You cant get beer any more, you cant get
alcohol in the morning any more, you cant get wine from Goodies any more.
-TNS: Really?
-D: Yeah. They dont sell alcohol at all now.
-TNS: Here?
-D: They did pre-war, yes. So, the nature of things has changed and with it new areas
of interest have emerged. And Verdun has really begun to supplant Hamra as the up
market...
-TNS: Shopping district.
-D: Shopping district like in Ashrafieh and Hamra now has become a low-value good
shopping center, but still a low-value shopping center compared to what it was and
its attracting a different person, arguably a person from the Shiite or the Sunni
population Shiite mainly because it is lower cost. They tried to open one or two
nice coffee shops down there and theyve all closed. And yet, if you go to Ashrafieh
its all
-TNS: Much more high-class.
-D: Yeah, much more high-class.
-TNS: Okay. In general, do you feel like theres a conflict between participation and
implementation in post-war planning?

259
-D: Yeah probably, probably. Ive not worked here at all since, I think, in Elyssar.
But I think if you go back to that premise of somebody always wins and somebody
always loses then, yes, there always will be because development here is so
uncoordinated and so damaging to everything that development the government
cant stop the persons right to develop land in virtually every part of the city. Youre
only limited by building regulations of how high you can go and what youve got to
do. So development is not judged on its merits and people, therefore, have an
inalienable right to do whatever they want.
-TNS: So you think thats because of the type of land-ownership that exists?
-D: Type of right to develop land; that the developer has a right to do what he wants
to do virtually subject to moderating influences within the building regulations.
-TNS: With some bribing or something like that?
-D: Yeah, maybe. I mean, the system is potentially corrupt; the way that its
structured encourages corruption. In the UK planning is based on a plan-led system.
So somebody produces a plan; there is legislation which determines how
development will fit into that plan, how the plan will be implemented; and there is a
democratic structure which oversees that. So its a big and heavy and complex
system. So its very slow, but it does allow the people to participate in the system
whether you think thats a good thing or a bad thing, theyre still allowed to
participate. But here participation has got to either be done politically, not
technically
-TNS: What do you mean politically and not technically?
-D: Well, if I wanted to open lets get silly I wanted to open a casino
-TNS: Okay.
-D: In Jnah or right the way down by the airport the government would prefer to
issue me a license because Id bribe somebody enough for there to be two: thered be
the Casino du Liban and the one down there.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: And it was right next to a mosque or right in the middle of the Shiite heartland it
would be a political structure Amal or
-TNS: Hezbollah.
-D: Hezbollah and they would honestly come out and kill everybody. There would
be political and social reasons it wouldnt be or it might be a group of people, but
the group of people would be articulated by the politics. In the UK its not. Its not a
conservative or a labor, its generally peoples natural response and they generally do
it in a stale way they write letters. Its very unusual for people in Britain to go out,
or Europe for that matter, or the States really to go out they write it down. Its a
middle class participation in planning is generally a middle class pastime. But here
it has to be politically.
-TNS: So if you dont have political representation or strong political backing you
dont think that
-D: I dont think you achieve anything here.

260
-TNS: Okay. So its mainly through knowing somebody in politics?
-D: Yes. I think so.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: But again, I think that often objection comes at a political level, not necessarily
at an individual level, at a political level there is something which effects... ah, I
dont know anything about Lebanon to be able to put a finger into the political
system here, but I think wasta is a major, major player. And its only those people
attached to politics that have wasta.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: If theres a guy whos had an accident in his car and he cant penetrate the
insurance system hes being thrown lie after lie after lie. They see me a foreigner,
they dont want to pay any money, so theyre giving him all hell. People in the office
who know the system, who have connections
-TNS: They can make one phone call.
-D: One phone call and its all sorted. And its the same in planning.
-TNS: How would you rate public participation in Lebanon post-war? High, low, on
a scale of one to ten?
-D: About two.
-TNS: Two as being very low.
-D: When we looked at Elyssar people were very enthusiastic, but they were still
frightened. They wanted to live in better conditions.
-TNS: They were suspicious?
-D: Yes, very suspicious. But for me, you see, they were fine with me because I was
a foreigner so theyd talk to me. They knew what I was, they knew what I was doing,
but they would always say that it wont happen because itll get stopped if they
think this is going to happen then theyll stop it, if they think thats going to happen
then theyll stop. And it was always they, never a name, it was always they.
-TNS: [Laughs]
-D: This is the land of the conspiracy. But people did have aspirations. I mean people
are no different, no different at all: they want better things for their children, they
want more comfort for their children, they dont want their roof to leak, they want
hot water but they would participate with me, theyd tell me, but they would tell
George George Moussa who was a Greek Orthodox Christian. I dont know why
they got on with the folks at AUB so well because they were also Christian. They
were very good with them. So I dont know why. I think at the end of the day the
majority of people thought nothing would happen, and theyve been proved correct.
But they were very low on the list of priorities.
-TNS: I guess thats what theyre used to really?
-D: I dont know whether they are used to it. Its a young population down there.
Theyve been subject to upheaval during the war, so they were traumatized. They
were safer there in numbers because they knew theyd passed the critical mass that
the army would never be able to come in and get them. So I think they felt safe in

261
that respect, or no Im not sure that they did. I mean I think again I would go back
to politics, politically they were united and any participation wasnt being done by
them. It was being done by Birri or it was being done by Nasrallah; if it wasnt
Nasrallah than it was being done by people within whether it was Syrian that was
actually pulling the strings or Iran. But it was political rather than Mrs. Smiths little
group of people that will go out for tea and discuss what was going on, like they do
back in England and I suspect parts of the States where a group of people get
together and discuss how to keep their neighbor in the plot. There was none of that.
-TNS: It was maybe a realization that if we stick together we have more political
clout?
-D: People at the lower level wanted to stick together because they felt safe, but
politically you stuck together because you knew it would get you authority and
power and thats been proven quite correct. In the whole of this area theres Shiites
and they stick together. In fact, I think they still stick together because of fear,
although theyre beginning to realize that politically theyre a real organization, a
very real power. But thats not participation. I mean eventually you might, when the
political and social system levels itself out. As I said, the same things that affect
Christians up in the north or a Sunni here in parts of Beirut or a Shiite down there
theyre all the same. I mean, if you get whacked by a murderer going 25mph or your
child gets whacked by a murderer because the roads are bad, theyre still going to
kill the child and youre still going to be upset. So you need to sort out the basic
planning problem: put car parks somewhere, sort junctions out, make sure shops
have a decent frontage so that you dont have to stand in the middle of the road,
make sure that houses have some space around them so kids can play. Theyre all the
same for that.
-TNS: They all want electricity and water.
-D: Thats right! Eventually, once people begin to feel safe, they need an
environment that has not got these political differences. Then they will begin to
come down to the lowest common denominator, which will be comfort, safety, and
the rest of it. Youll never get participation to operate in a place like this. In the
United Kingdom, which is another example, you find that in areas that are severely
run down you dont get participation until recently, we do now. Again politically
or racially theres lots of blacks who will, you know, organize themselves to
improve their conditions or Asians and the white community do it in their own way
also, so they become interest groups. Here, I think theyre a long way off from just
that. I think theyre still political groups.
-TNS: So mainly areas that have maybe not stronger representation, but whose
political leaders are more powerful usually most planning gets done in those areas?
-D: I think so, generally speaking. I mean the electricity never used to go off, if you
lived near Hariris place in the old days your lights never went off. If you had a
Minister living in your block, the lights didnt go off and it was more secure and it

262
was often quieter. I dont know whether that is the case these days, I really dont,
because there really is a lot of regeneration work going on now.
-TNS: Lets hope that it helps.
-D: Its starting. Its the revolution thats made a big difference. But its always a
process, isnt it? Its an evolutional process. Its all people your age now; youve got
more younger people coming back here with different perceptions and different
backgrounds the communitys become less insular. But, I dont thing theres been
participation here for a long time, not meaningful participation.
-TNS: Do you think that its a problem that public participation is very low?
-D: As a planner it would be nice not to have public participation. It makes our job
much, much easier because everybody can be a planner its the easiest thing in the
world. If you just move that over there and you cant hear anything then youre fine,
it may look better over there but it doesnt work that way. A lot of people have their
own very polar view of what should happen in the world. I have some very dear
friends at home in our little town that has a population of about 30,000.
-TNS: What is it called?
-D: Its called Livingston Downs. Its old-age people who play golf; they call it the
coast of geriatric groups... where people go to die. Its a pretty little town right by the
seaside and theres a planning application before the authority to virtually double, or
potentially double, the size of the town. There are two armed camps: those who think
it would be a good thing and those who think it would be a bad thing, and they are all
quite convinced that they know exactly what is right because it transcends just the
mechanics of the thing. So we have these two armed camps and if you dont agree
with one armed camps then youre a myopic
-TNS: So youre either with us or against us kind of mentality?
-D: Thats right. No half way, no half way. And you can virtually split them down
the middle: those who have a lot of money who dont want to see anything change
those with big gardens and houses that theyve paid a lot of money for
-TNS: They dont want the traffic or the noise.
-D: They dont want the traffic and they dont see that if you develop something you
have to do something, you have to improve: you have to widen the road, you have to
put in more in more infrastructure, you have to make sure that you dont create
conditions which are bad and thats what planning physical planning is about, but
they dont see that. No, no, that will never happen. Somebody will put these big
houses there and thats it. But you cant discuss that with them. So participation to
try to move something forward is a bad thing oh, its a terrible thing. At the end of
the day when this matter is resolved, half the population will be aggrieved and the
other half will be ecstatic. So the process will not satisfy the demands of both parties
and may not even satisfy the demands of either party. So participation, to me, there
has been a complete waste of time. It would have been better if you had just got on
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-TNS: Well thats because you know I think to a certain extent if youre thinking
of having the development but at the same time ameliorating some of the adverse
side effects of that, then in a sense participation maybe is working in that area... I
would think because youre doing something to ameliorate the side effects of that.
Maybe its a sort of forward thinking of participation this is what theyre going to
think about, so I might as well do this in advance.
-D: In this particular business development is generated from the development
sector. Planners put together a plan which they believe contains sensible land-use.
But the system in Britain is described as a plan-led system, so development must
comply with the plan unless other I dont know what expression they use now
something like other significant elements intervene. So if you come along with a
better idea, then okay. Its not dead in the water. So if you have an area there which
was originally shown in a plan for employment and you want to build houses on it, if
you can put together a good enough case in planning terms then theres no reason
why you shouldnt build your houses there and make necessary adjustments or
contributions to make sure everythings all right. This is where the
consultation/participation becomes a problem and this is where the planning system
is being changed by others who are outside it. As a planner Im not changing, Im
being asked to adjudicate from it, and in the adjudication process all those people are
participating the general public. Thats when it starts to get very confusing.
-TNS: Is it the general public who are participating?
-D: Yes.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: They may have articulated themselves into organizations with titles, and they
may have professional support and guidance, but theyre still effectively the general
public which is what theyre supposed to be. And the same should apply here. If
somebody comes along a builds a big house next to me or lets say hes going to
build a big factory next to me, well its going to make a hell of a lot of noise for me.
Or lets say we have a taxi park next to me and the telephones are ringing all night
and there are vehicles moving around all the time, I mean its going to upset me.
Now, at the present time, (a) nobody advertises developments put to the
municipality
-TNS: Theres no transparency at all.
-D: Theres no transparency and if you go to the municipality and ask what people
are doing theres no obligation for the municipality to tell you whats happening. So
you cant find out whats going on. Its got to be on a big scale and the press has got
to get a hold of it or the developers want people to be aware of whats going on.
-TNS: As long as they have their license then you have no right to stop them.
-D: Yes. And the problem here is you cannot refuse people a license. There have to
be very, very major issues involved so a license can be refused. And thats what,
mind you, planning is all about: the relationship of land-uses. Just to drive through
here youll see so many land-uses that would not normally be considered good

264
bedmates here. But that again is in northern Europe theres one set of standards, in
southern Europe theres another set of standards. So in Italy theres a mixed-use
environment where people work at a shop and down the block is their apartment. I
dont know how the hell people in Italy sleep! But they do and people are used to it,
its a part of their lives. There are differences in London in the relationships between
activities there are differences with our place. In our place at night [Falls silent]
-TNS: [Laughs] Theres nothing there.
-D: [Whispers] Theres complete silence.
-TNS: [Laughs] Its good in a way.
-D: Absolute silence. Except in the center now, were starting to get pubs and pubs
are in the center because young people are very active and have got a lot of money
and people are extremely unhappy about that. And weve got license changes in the
UK and people who dont take advantage of these licenses, elderly people
particularly, are objecting. Now, are they right in saying that pubs and clubs should
close by one lets say and not three oclock? Are they entitled to anything? Can they
not have triple glazing? Or can car parks be relocated? Or can we expect people to be
quiet when they come out of a licensed premise at three oclock in the morning?
-TNS: Probably not. You can expect it but its not going to help any.
-D: I mean in the UK they fight and they No. So youve got the real situation and
the perceived situation. So what do you do? Do you say were not going to have any
of these places? Then you prejudice and affect half of the population for another part
of the population. Participation was originally supposed to be a process which
ensured that there would be adequate debate between parties.
-TNS: Especially parties like the younger generation or less affluent people in
general
-D: Yeah. People didnt suffer as a consequence of that the state, in fact, made it
their business to tell them what was happening more often than not in the UK,
particularly in the UK. I think here the way people know about anything is that a
lorry arrives and the guys get off and start building. Still theres a network here so
people do know more than I know, but in England you didnt. First thing somebody
arrives and is digging, hes at work you couldnt do anything about it. So
participation, in that sense, is absolutely essential to people.
-TNS: But it makes the planners life more difficult?
-D: But it does make it difficult because it makes the process more complicated.
-TNS: And it makes implementation more difficult?
-D: It makes implementation slower.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: Now bear in mind, like I said, that Skeffington was in 69 and its changed from
consultation to participation, but the system is slow to follow it. And if you do get
into a situation where you politically decide that you want the public to be involved
and that you identify the benefits, which are protection against being sued or legal
certainties, certainties about type of exposure of real problems that might otherwise

265
be hidden, and the system itself it has got to be sufficiently flexible to be able to deal
with those things otherwise it just goes slower and slower and slower. When I
worked for Lancashire County Council, a major application would perhaps have
100-120 consultees, and we would not be able to process with that application until
weve received until a response from those consultees. It used to take a week to send
out the 120! And we have to search for consultees and we likely to be culpable by
law if we didnt consult all those parties who had a relevant interest in the
development. Imagine how long it takes you... if you have a planning application for
lets say a waste facility with a capacity of two to three million cubic meters the
number of people or how big an area do you consult? Do you consult people on the
routes that vehicles will take to get to that site? Because the site at that site will be
running for many years and that will carry a heavy volume of traffic. Do you consult
the Highway Authority and regulation history because its going to affect the amount
of wear that these roads will take? So it just keeps getting bigger and bigger and
bigger and bigger. It makes the working system that much more complicated.
-TNS: Okay. What do you think would have aided public participation in Lebanon?
-D: Well, just remove the confessional system and the already-established system of
individual pressure groups if you like. Theres so many pressure groups here.
-TNS: Political groups?
-D: Yeah. This is all esoteric here. Im accepting that the benefits to people from
physical planning would help, but there are other things. You know them without me
telling you.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: Transparency, faith, belief, trust, then it will develop but not until then. Its such
a long way off and its all in people. Nobody trusts anybody here when it gets to the
government. And who the hell can you trust? Theyre all bloody fools.
-TNS: So mostly its a systemic problem?
-D: I think so, at the moment. But again its your generation that will ultimately clear
it.
-TNS: Thats what everybody tells me. Its the pressure!
-D: But it will be. It will be. It will be; it has to be. The atmosphere in here when the
Syrians were being removed I couldnt see the difference when the bloody Syrians
were here or not. Nothing has changed since the Syrians left, but its creating little
levels.
-TNS: Its more hopeful.
-D: Yeah, it has to be. It has to be otherwise everyone will leave, you see. We did
some work in 1995; we did a study of all the quarries in Lebanon, and that report is
still under lock and key. And the guy that ran it was threatened, warned. We did not
consult anybody, we were told that we were not to consult with anybody; it was a
purely technical evaluation of the industry and the recommendations were purely
technical and they werent particularly harsh. One of the main concerns was
reclamation because weve got a lot of limestone so if you scrape any surface in a

266
place like Douma itll never... itll take hundreds of years before it regenerates. So
we made suggestions about how you can quarry in such a way as to reclaim without
causing the visual scars. Oh my God, what a bloody nightmare that was! [Sighs]
-TNS: Thats nice!
-D: That was the Department of the Environment.
-TNS: The Ministry of Environment?
-D: The man who was running that was one of the biggest culprits. He had a big
involvement. If that sort of thing exists then does anything we say make a
difference?
-TNS: Highly doubtful. When you worked on Elyssar, did you do anything to
encourage more participation?
-D: No.
-TNS: Other than just go there and talk to the people?
-D: No, no. We didnt talk to them specifically in terms of participation. By
contributing to the survey that was being done they were participating at a general
public level, but it was already sensed that the participation was being done at a
much higher level by political leaders.
-TNS: The clearance?
-D: Yes, by political groups. People would not answer questions unless they had
been told internally by, their own community leaders, that they could do.
-TNS: So, more or less, you had cleared it with the leaders and that allowed the
participation to occur?
-D: Thats right. We didnt, somebody else did. So when I went out there everybody
was really very friendly.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think more meetings public meetings would have benefited
the process?
-D: Not under those circumstances they wouldnt; but if you ease them then yes. I
suspect that establishing routines to give people the opportunity to be vocal or at
least to be aware of whats going on would be very, very helpful.
-TNS: Okay.
-D: Because the public can be a positive element as well as a negative one.
-TNS: Yeah, definitely. Now that you look back on your Elyssar experience, would
you have done anything differently?
-D: Well I would have learnt Arabic and I would have learnt French.
-TNS: [Laughs] That would have helped a lot.
-D: That would have helped, yeah, a hell of a lot.
-TNS: Speaking Arabic?
-D: Yes.
-TNS: Do you feel that in general in your planning experience, do you feel that you
have done a good job of representing the public?
-D: Yeah, I like to think I have. Yes, I think so. Its very difficult to say Ive done it
here because Ive not done any real work here, but in the UK the problem that Ive

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explained about trust is the same. People do not trust institutions. They do not trust
the government. So for someone like me to come up and recommend a particular
course of action that theyve no faith in, theyre quite reasonable to tell me to take a
running jump.
-TNS: Yes.
-D: And because I have faith and because I have faith not so much in the individual
but in the law, if somebody says hes going to do something specific I have to
believe him I have no choice but to believe him. Now if during the course of what
hes contracted to do he starts doing it in another way, then there are legal
procedures available to make him do it in the way he said he would do it. So in that
sense I have complete faith. I have to otherwise I shouldnt be doing the job that Im
doing.
-TNS: Yeah.
-D: But people who live in areas that are likely to be affected do not have this sort of
faith because they are far more realistic than I am. I may know that if a guy starts to
be naughty it may take me two years to get him back on the straight and narrow
during which time the people who live there may have gone through a living hell. So
the reality of the situation is that people have this perfectly reasonable right to stand
up for themselves. But I used to turn up to meetings in my own time, so always in
the evening, and I would be slide-rocked, Id be abused, Id be criticized, Id be
sworn at, Id be threatened, and at the end of the day Id say, Well why are you
telling me? I could be in the bloody pub. I dont have to be here talking to you
buggers. I could be in there. And yet youre screaming at me because Im simply
telling you what the situation is. If you want to Ill go away. So if you want
participation somebodys got to trust somebody. And if somebody says, I think
youd be well-advised to do this, then theyve got to have sufficient knowledge or
advice or guidance to say, The guys right, or The guys wrong, this is the course
of action we ought to take. So, whichever way you look at participation, one of the
things that should be available and in the United Kingdom it pretty much has been
developed its called Planning Aid, where an institution the Royal Town Planning
Institution has started to fund with government aid a free service like legal aid. So if
youre a person who lives in an area which is subject to change, you can ask for a
physical planner to come and provide you or your organization with guidance on
what action they should take or on whether whats being offered is legal or
appropriate and what steps you can take to change.
-TNS: So they answer questions more or less?
-D: No, they provide you with a full service like you might go and see a lawyer if
youre thinking of selling your house. So a planner will come and he will sit with
you and youll discuss the development and hell offer you advice on what should be
done.
-TNS: And thats a free service?

268
-D: Thats a free service. Its through an NGO. The government provides funding,
the Royal Town Planning Institute. If you want to find out more about that, if you
would go onto the Royal Town Planning Institutes website theyve quite a bit about
Planning Aid.
-TNS: Its interesting.
-D: And this is the sort of thing that you need to do to make participation valid. You
know, as I said, you have to bring it up to a level where you can deal with the
institution. The institution cannot deal with emotion. Do 100 emotional objections
equal one technical objection? One of the big emotive things in Britain are bail
hostels or hostels for young offenders, rehabilitation clinics and people are
frightened to death.
-TNS: Yeah. NIMBY.
-D: Thats right. Absolutely frightened to death. But theres a genuine fear that these
kids will break into their houses because theyve got a habit to support or theyll
cause damage or theyll fight on the streets. So you need somebody who can find out
what the thing is all about, have the knowledge to be able to penetrate the system,
come back with real evidence, tell people what the real situation is, and if they say at
the end of the day, We still dont like it even though weve had all this, well then
look at how you can deal with that and disabuse them of the belief that they can
achieve unreasonable ends. Its a pretty busy list: this is what you can do; this is what
you cant do. And this is really it to me: that participation has got to be a realistic
process.
-TNS: So it gives them maybe tools to participate?
-D: It gives them tools to participate, yes, within the system.
-TNS: Okay. I think thats it. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up
interview if I need to?
-D: Yeah, if you wanted to. It depends on what Im doing. At the moment Im not
doing anything. My sons coming today.
-TNS: Really? Thats great.

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APPENDIX E: Interview 5

-Interviewee E (E): [Looking at questions] Ill keep this to refer to it.
-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Okay. So youre okay with being recorded and youve
read the consent form?
-E: Yes, yes, I have. No problem.
-TNS: Whats your background in planning, your work experience?
-E: My work experience? Well, ah, I graduated in 91 actually, but since 1990 I
started working as a research assistant at the University of Buffalo and then I moved
back to Beirut in 1993, worked as an architect for a year or a year and a half and then
I joined Dar Al-Handasah since September 1995, so it has been ten years ten plus
years.
-TNS: They pass by fast?
-E: Yeah, very quickly.
-TNS: [Laughs] You were educated you said at the University of Buffalo. What
degree?
-E: I was educated at the University of Buffalo. I have an Architecture degree a BS
in Architecture with a minor in Computer Science.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: And I have a Masters in Urban Planning all from the University of Buffalo.
-TNS: So you were educated in planning?
-E: Yes.
-TNS: Eventually at the masters level.
-E: Yes.
-TNS: What did your education teach you about the role of the public in planning in
general?
-E: Youre planning for the public so you have to be aware of the public needs. You
do that through surveying the public entity I dont know, but the public opinion is
very important. In real life its not always taken fully into consideration but, you
know, it needs to be considered because sometimes they are not aware of the
political issues in planning and the public opinion is very important as well as public
awareness, of course.
-TNS: So you would say that public participation was part of the process in your
education?
-E: Ah, an interesting question, not really. I mean, only in a few courses that were
related to social economics where the public was where we had to deal with the
public. We had to go to the streets and talk to them and interview people and then
after the project was finished, you know, public enlightenment had to be conducted,
etc. but not in all But you learn that public opinion in planning for the public
you are trying to solve their problems so its important to be aware and to be in
contact with them whenever you are planning throughout any process. And this is
what we do in real life now. It is part of any project. We meet with the public, collect

270
data, conduct socio-economic surveying, we go to the streets The public comes
and they ask you what the project is and then throughout the planning process you
hold constant meetings not with the public as a public, basically with the
stakeholders.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Who are from the public; they represent the public supposedly.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Various agencies, various authorities where we explain the priorities of the
project, we explain what we did, what we want to do. They review the work, so
supposedly they represent the public. And towards the end of the master plan thats
when the public is [Phone rings] Excuse me.
-TNS: Okay. So you say that your education validates what you experienced in
participation?
-E: To some extent really the real recreation of planning is from real life experience.
A lot of things we are doing now we have learned the trade as
-TNS: As it comes along.
-E: As it comes along, yes a lot of things that we have learned or not so to some
extent, yes. I dont know what you are trying to
-TNS: What Im trying to see is if you feel that Well I think youve already sort of
answered the question so to speak. What I want to see is whether you feel that your
education helped you tackle the issue of public participation better whether it
made it clearer to you. But since you are saying that you feel that most of your
education comes more from practice then it sort of answers it a little bit. In practice
is where you learn most of?
-E: In college they bring your attention to the importance of consulting with the
public.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: They dont tell you what to do. Some of the projects that you do in school you
had to do with the public. This is the only contact with the public. The real, real
learning is real life learning, real life experience.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: We do projects in Africa I was in Yemen and I just came back two weeks
ago we dealt with people in Nigeria, in Angola. We spent months and months
there, now in Yemen and in many parts of the world... the third world. In Lebanon
we did a lot of projects in Lebanon in the 1990s.
-TNS: Do you feel that your education since you had a western education do you
feel that that helped you more in dealing with the public?
-E: I dont know. I feel that my eastern background helped me more.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Working in this part of the world. I mean its a combination. A western education
just teaches you the basics but dealing with the public is not easy.
-TNS: Yeah.

271
-E: You know to be patient, to deal with the public in the parts of the world that I just
mentioned like Nigeria, etc. its a very difficult task. You have to be very patient.
You have to try to give them the impression that what theyre saying is important,
that it will be taken into consideration although it may be total nonsense.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: But, you know, you get a general impression from all this: peoples awareness of
things, peoples awareness of planning. Like in Yemen, for example, we used for this
project four reports with a small executive summary, a thirty-page summary in
Arabic, and even the Arabic version most of them didnt read. Even those who read
it most of them dont understand whats going on. So its really very difficult and me
knowing Arabic and having dealt with such projects, I mean you get some
experience in dealing with such parts of the world. Its a difficult task and I think my
eastern background, in combination with my western education, it helped but to
pinpoint exactly where it helped
-TNS: You cant really tell?
-E: I cant really tell.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: I dont know if Im answering...
-TNS: No, youre answering but I I understand what youre saying but what I
really wanted to know is if you feel that it sort of planted the seed of you know
what I mean to a certain extent that the public is important or did you just have a
general sense of that or did you feel that in part of the planning process it was
important?
-E: No it planted the seed that the public is important. Again, as I started this
interview I told you that we are planning for the public.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: So public opinion, the concerns of the public are very important.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: You know? If you are not satisfying the needs of the public, of parts of their
needs in planning at least to provide them with the basics services: of roads and
public spaces and schools and hospitals then who are you planning for? So it is
important part of planning the public. So, yes, you could say my western education
planted the seeds but you know...
-TNS: The experience is what
-E: The experience you know I have a little experience dealing with the public
when I was in the states in college the experience
-TNS: Thats what brought it on.
-E: Yeah.
-TNS: How about I know that you didnt practice during the war because you
were too young; you hadnt even graduated then, so Im going to ask you about your
post-war experience. What was the major challenge that you faced in the post-war
circumstance?

272
-E: Actually I left Lebanon in the middle of the war, 1983.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: And didnt return I used to visit every year or so and I told you I came for a
period of 11 months.
-TNS: Yeah, for one year.
-E: Almost one year in 88 until 89.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: My experience really started in 87 working in the States working as an architect
right after I graduated, part-time because I was pursuing a masters degree. When I
came to Lebanon for a year I did not work as a planner or as an architect. I entered
the family business which has to do with trade.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: So my real experience I returned after the war ended, in 1993.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: So my experience really started in the States as an architect then as a research
assistant. Then I came to Lebanon and I worked for a year or so as an architect. This
was in the booming years
-TNS: Post-war.
-E: The post-war booming years between 94 until the middle of 95. This is when I
joined Dar Al-Handasah.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: And I started working on real planning projects. So pre-war experience I was a
kid.
-TNS: Yeah. How about what did you feel was the major challenge at the time
when you started work at Dar Al-Handasah? What was the major challenge that was
due to the war?
-E: As far as planning was concerned a major challenge was, you know, we started
doing the Elyssar project.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: You know, during that period Lebanon was still occupied and we were dealing
with an area that is mostly occupied by people from the south who had migrated
-TNS: Been displaced.
-E: Who are really refugees or have been displaced
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: It was really difficult going to the crowds, speaking to them; we were stopped
many times somehow, interrogated many times, some areas we could not enter.
These are some of the problems that we faced. And the same when we did the
Baalbak master plan.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: The same when we started a project called Kadmous, which is the Carantina area
along the coastal line along the Nahr El-Mot area.
-TNS: Okay.

273
-E: After we started doing the land-use plan the project came to a halt basically due
to political reasons. They suspected that we would be changing things and
demolishing illegal settlements mainly occupied by Armenians and I dont want to
mention names but people who were basically in control of the area politically
decided to stop this project although it was a very important project because they
didnt want to upset the Armenian population. So these are the types of difficulties
we faced and this project in particular came to a halt in 1997 and never restarted.
-TNS: So you feel like the major challenge was more political?
-E: Political, yes, political. Another problem was financial. Like when we started the
nationalistic planning effort for example that was supposed to begin in 1998. It
didnt start; it didnt take off because they thought that the company had overpriced
the cost. It was delayed for two, two and a half year and then after they guaranteed
some funding from the World Bank and other agencies the project took off again and
we finished it last year. This is one of the issues: financing such projects, large
planning projects.
-TNS: So mostly financial and political?
-E: Political, mainly political.
-TNS: So you had difficulties in implementing the projects like going into Elyssar
but mostly?
-E: Not no, we dont implement. In the early stages of the study in planning we
dont supervise implementation. We plan for twenty, thirty years and most of our
clients are governments so
-TNS: Its long-term planning.
-E: Its long-term planning. Usually planning projects are phased into three phases:
short, medium, and long-term. We do short when we want to solve some of the
problems the public is going through by trying to find immediate solutions and then
long-term planning we try to improve the infrastructure, the welfare, and the living
conditions of the people by proposing or trying to implement the proposed roads and
infrastructure because all of this is proposed in the plan, the master plan.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Another example was the Baalbak master plan, for example. During the planning
process it is due to political although we mentioned we were asked many times to
make changes to the plan although it did not sound logical at all due to political
reasons. You know Baalbak is controlled politically by which political party.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: So we had to go changing their minds time after time after time and we reached a
point in various projects where we had to do something that we were not completely
convinced of from a technical point of view
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Just because the client insists on it. And again a client is a client and you have to
finish the project within a time-frame. Hes insisting on something You try to
convince him and you try to convince him and hes not convinced. We tried to solve

274
the issue the best way possible by satisfying him, sometimes doing almost what he
wants because you have no other choice. You cannot back out from a project because
they will withhold payments, they will So its all related to political ah
-TNS: Powers?
-E: Not powers, political issues.
-TNS: Constraints?
-E: Constraints.
-TNS: What was the major thing you felt that you had to give up when you were
working in post-war planning?
-E: [Chuckles] Things I had to give up Remember most of the projects were
working on now, although the office is in Lebanon, Im working on projects outside
Lebanon. So really were not giving up anything besides we travel to such remote
areas. We give up our personal lives.
-TNS: What about here, when you were practicing here?
-E: We are practicing here. Do you mean when the projects are?
-TNS: Yeah, how about the projects that you worked on inside Lebanon?
-E: Inside Lebanon.
-TNS: Yeah, the projects that you worked on inside Lebanon post-war, what do you
feel you had to give up? Or what do you feel you couldnt include in the process or
something like this?
-E: Thats a difficult question to answer.
-TNS: Do you feel like you were giving anything up?
-E: Not really, not really. I mean, Im not giving anything up. Ah Youre planning;
youre trying to find a solution to an existing problem.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Ah ah Not really, I cant say Im giving up anything.
-TNS: For instance when you were talking about Baalbak, you said that sometimes
you feel that you have to give up some technical, you know, something that you as a
planner would prefer to have a certain way because of the political powers or
something like that. Do you feel that at certain points in certain projects you had to
settle on something or give up maybe a technical level or something like that?
-E: Its not a technical level, I mean. Sometimes we have to sacrifice time. Some
projects are due to be delivered on a certain month. Sometimes theyre delayed a
year or two and they keep coming after us to make changes and make modifications.
They withhold payments sometimes. So this is time-consuming.
-TNS: And it takes a toll?
-E: It takes some toll. Its nerve-wracking; its time-consuming. As far as giving up
part of our work ethic, no were not giving up any of that. You know, we work with
conscience. We try to follow the national or international standards in planning. We
dont really give up any ethics in planning or we dont really sacrifice anything
based on ethics. But really were not I mean the word give up is too strong a word.
-TNS: Yeah.

275
-E: To use here. Were not giving up we dont give up! [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah, definitely not.
-E: Thats the thing: we dont give up. You know, we keep
-TNS: Compromising maybe?
-E: We dont back up. We compromise but we dont back up from projects. Its
not well, probably years ago but its not you know, our reputation the
reputation of the company
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Is very important and again, you know, you cant pull back because most of the
time the client owes us money so we try to prevent we try to do what they want.
But working in Lebanon has been a difficult again mainly due to political pressures.
-TNS: Is there a conflict between participation and implementation in post-war
development? I mean, when you include people in the process do you feel that that
conflicts with the implementation of the project?
-E: We are not responsible for implementation. Usually we plan the project
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Usually we plan a project for the CDR thats the Committee for Development
and Reconstruction, something like this or the Planning Department.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: So they are to approve the project and the final approval is by the government, by
the Prime Minister to be approved by the Cabinet.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Once its approved we dont this is not like architectural work we have to start
right away.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: You know you build a building, you design a hotel and then they say, Okay, you
designed it we want you to supervise it. We dont design and build. We dont do
any construction.
-TNS: I know, but what I mean with the implementation is not the building process.
What I mean is
-E: The implementation of the project.
-TNS: No, no. Lets say your study: if youre performing the study thats what I
would consider your implementation. You know what I mean? Lets say youre
doing a survey or a study of Elyssar. Does public participation help in that process or
can it sometimes make it more difficult?
-E: No, it doesnt make it more difficult when we talk about public participation, no.
It helps, certainly it helps. Again when we plan we depend on the public and on the
locals to help us because they know the area; they know how to deal with the people
better than us.
-TNS: Yeah.

276
-E: We only spend a few months there, so by the time we get acquainted with the
local culture, we get acquainted with the way of dealing with the population, its
time for us to get out and come back to the main office and start doing the planning.
-TNS: Yeah
-E: We plan on the In all projects that are taken abroad its always in the contract
to hire at least 30 or 40 percent of the locals professionals. So we are dealing with
them, they are interpreting the public perception of things, of the project, if the
public is aware of the project. But again, there are we are talking about the people
who work with us not the people that deal with us
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: And I mean here local authorities, decision-makers So when we do socio-
economic surveys its the locals who do that.
-TNS: So you bring them into the process?
-E: We bring them into the process, we train them, and we supervise them. When we
do transportation surveys we do transportation surveys to track the traffic and plan
if an area has any traffic problems in the early stages of a plan most of them do
especially in this part of the world.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: So we hire local surveyors. They work for hours and hours and days and days
counting traffic, doing entry... so we deal with the public. They dont participate with
people; they dont participate in the planning process; they participate in the early
stages of the project collecting the data, doing the surveys. When we get to the
planning process, we start doing scenarios then we consult with the local authorities.
We hold workshops like the one we did in Yemen three weeks ago.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: We did a presentation. There will be questions, answers, and we take notes and
they raise different questions. Then after they read the reports they will send, you
know
-TNS: Feedback?
-E: Their comments if they disapprove of our forecasts on the population, on
economics, on employment, on unemployment theyre supposed to reveal all that
and they say, We dont agree with that. So there is a lot of back and forth and
exchange of
-TNS: So there is a dialogue?
-E: Oh, of course. Its constant dialogue.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Now in this project in Yemen they asked us to be present so I have to go there for
two months in three weeks time. Bill has to go; another guy has to go as well. So we
have to be there to consult with them on a daily basis in the planning process to see
what they want. So, the question was again
-TNS: Is there a conflict between participation and implementation?

277
-E: There isnt a conflict; there is a hardship there is a hardship. Its not easy
especially when there is a language barrier for example not myself more than
-TNS: Bill?
-E: Bill, for example.
-TNS: Yeah, he already told me.
-E: Even myself, I mean when youre hearing a Yemeni speak
-TNS: Yeah, even in Arabic its difficult.
-E: Its so difficult. We had an institutional expert we had to bring in from India
our company there purchased an Indian firm with a few hundred employees they
deal with infrastructure and sewage and all that and they have an institutional expert,
hes a Harvard graduate, hes an Indian, so he had to meet us in Yemen, so I had to
do all the translation and it was difficult for me to understand the Indian one he
spoke English and it was difficult to understand the Yemenis when they were
speaking Arabic.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: So its not a conflict, its more like difficulties and hardships. But I dont see any
conflict really.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: I dont know if this will satisfy you.
-TNS: No, no. I mean, youre entitled to what you believe and I want your opinion
thats what matters. How would you rate public participation in post-war Lebanon,
lets say on a scale of one to ten where one is the lowest and ten the highest possible?
How would you rate public participation in Lebanon in post-war planning?
-E: Participation in the sense of expressing their opinion or
-TNS: And having an influence on
-E: Having planners take into consideration their opinion?
-TNS: Having an influence on the process of planning and affecting the process and
maybe being able to voice their opinions and having them taken into account.
-E: Maybe three.
-TNS: Why?
-E: Why? I mean, I Im judging my answer based on personal experience. The
town I come from, for example
-TNS: Koura?
-E: Its called Anfeh in Koura
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Its bordered by Shikka, where the cement factories are. [Draws a diagram]
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: And its also bordered here by tourist areas like the Las Salinas resort. [Points to
drawing]
-TNS: Okay, I know where it is.
-E: And here you have all the olive groves that extend all the way to Balamand.
-TNS: Okay.

278
-E: So Anfeh is growing even though a large part of the population in the last few
years has immigrated to the States and Australia and all that. They have asked a local
planner to change the zoning. So what he did was he increased the industrial area to
reach the town without taking into consideration that he should create some kind of a
buffer zone.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: And he has changed the zoning in all of these olive groves from ten percent to
two percent, which means you cannot build anything. If I own a land here and I want
to build a house, it has to be 2,000 meters for me to build an apartment of 200
meters.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Okay?
-TNS: No.
-E: Im sorry it has to be 10,000 meters for me to build 200 meters. Its ridiculous!
Nobody owns a land
-TNS: That big to build a house that small.
-E: So in the future and not only that in addition they have lowered the floor
area or what we call the footprint from 50 percent to 40 percent, I mean. You know?
You do this at the expense of something else. Where will the town expand? Into the
Sea? It cant. Into the tourist area? It cant. Into the industrial area? And even this
way it cant. Okay? But we will reach a point I mean at least, at least, keep this at
50 percent. You know? I understand that in the future some of the empty land will be
filled here, but these empty lands are owned by the locals. You have somebody with
twenty pieces of land and he has his house and he is probably married, so hes not
going to sell them. Its not like youre designing an area and selling it to fill it in. So
we objected to that and they did not take into consideration so much our opinion.
-TNS: And this was a local planner?
-E: It was a local planner hired by the Planning Department.
-TNS: So he was hired at the central level?
-E: At the central level, yeah, but its a small project, its a town project.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Im not sure he conducted a proper population count, or some kind of economic
survey
-TNS: Or study
-E: Or polled this town to see how this town or proper land-use survey to assess
the vacant land in this town, to assess the existing zoning, the existing building
patterns of the town I dont think they did that.
-TNS: And you dont think that they got any valid feedback maybe from the locals?
-E: I dont think they did. I dont think they did.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: If they did, not to the extent that they should have.
-TNS: Okay.

279
-E: Okay? So this is an example.
-TNS: A good example.
-E: As planners in Lebanon, I mean, Im a planner but Im also from the public.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Im from them.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: In any, any, plan you cannot satisfy everybody because youre always proposing
additional roads, additional public facilities, additional public spaces and this will be
at the expense of somebody or something. There is a problem we are trying to solve
and, you know, if you have a population of 10,000 you will improve the general
welfare and the lives of most of them but some people will be affected. They will
claim that their land was confiscated or was taken by the government and they
cheated them of payment and so on and so on. See, you cannot satisfy everybody but
at least in the planning process, you know, you see what the public wants and you try
to solve their problems. In Lebanon I think I would grade three, maybe four, but not
more than that. Its below average.
-TNS: Okay. What do you think can increase public participation? Lets say in this
exact example what would have helped to increase public participation? Lets say
holding more meetings, town meetings in this case, would have helped?
-E: Certainly, thats number one. Holding more meetings, holding not only meeting
to see what the public wants but holding workshops to explain why they took such
decisions. It just has to be explained. There should be logic behind it. Youre
planning for me, you have to convince me. You have to be logical or to convince me
or to convince most of the population. You have to have a general impression, a
general consensus that the population, the public, agrees to this plan.
-TNS: Yeah, its on board.
-E: No matter how arrogant they are or intellectual they are. You cannot satisfy
everybody but you have to have a general you have to have more people who
agree with the plan than those who dont.
-TNS: Against, yeah.
-E: Number two would be maybe less interference by political figures. A lot of the
planning here is conducted to satisfy a certain politician.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: For example, I was reading in the paper two days ago that there is a
Representative from Ras El-Andeel Theyre saying in the paper that they know
that they would classify an area he just confiscated a piece of land and he
pretended that hes building that he has some kind of a construction material
factory and when the government was trying to build a road and pay the people he
received a half a million dollars because he just pretended that he had although
they know he did not.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: But he was backed by the Syrians who control

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-TNS: So theres corruption?
-E: And they forced whoever was in charge in the government to pay him that
amount of money and they split the money between him and the Syrian government.
So these you know
-TNS: These things.
-E: This is just a simple example. Sometimes politicians you know, its against the
law for any local politician to even purchase a piece of land knowing in advance that
a road or a highway will be passing through. Its illegal.
-TNS: Inside information.
-E: Its inside information. Its against the law. If you know if you own the land,
fine. If you know that a certain road is being planned then you cant especially if you
are in office, if you are a current minister or Prime Minister or a deputy. So these
things happen a lot in Lebanon. Even some roads are altered sometimes to
-TNS: Just because of that.
-E: Just because of that, yeah.
-TNS: To gain more. Do you feel, now that you look back on the ten years that
youve been at Dar Al-Handasah, do you feel that youve done a good job of
representing the public?
-E: Ah, I think so, yes.
-TNS: You feel that youve represented them, that youve been? Im not saying
that youre not!
-E: No, no, no, no. I understand the question. We not only do we try to represent
them, we try to do whatever we can possible to improve the living standards,
although we know that many times and many projects such projects no way to be
-TNS: Theyre not going to happen.
-E: Implemented not because were trying to although it could be a simple design
or just within the infrastructure Were just realistic; we dont take this into
consideration. We dont say, We dont care. Lets just try to do this and then
No, we try to work with conscience to improve the town they are living in, the
infrastructure maybe, and we propose schools, we propose, you know, community
services, community facilities, we propose this and this and this. Sometimes we deal
with remote areas like in Nigeria for example where people go from between one
village to another by boat to the mangroves. We propose schools. We take the
population into consideration.
-TNS: You do your best regardless?
-E: We do our best regardless... although there is maybe a 70 percent illiteracy rate
there is only maybe 50 percent school attendance we try to raise it to 80 percent
like in other parts of the world although we know they cannot reach that. This is how
they should be.
-TNS: Okay.
-E: Okay? So lets in the short-term lets increase the attendance rate in the school-
age population from 40 to 60 percent in fifteen years it will be 70 percent in 20

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to 25 years, which is the age of the project, lets work on it to be 80 or 85 percent. So
we calculate on this vision and we propose all the major facilities, major public
facilities: schools, hospitals, whatever based on that although we know its almost
impossible.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: Because they need funding, they need discipline and they are mainly corrupt
governments like in Nigeria, Yemen...
-TNS: Here?
-E: Well, no. Here we have good schools. We have good hospitals. We have
-TNS: Yeah. Im talking about corruption.
-E: Yeah. So I mean, here the thing is they build but they, you know They built
a lot of things which are good but we are 43 billion dollars in debt.
-TNS: Yeah.
-E: So how do you? So, yes, we try to satisfy the population and we work with
conscience although we know that these projects most likely will not be
implemented.
-TNS: Okay, thank you.
-E: Thats it!
-TNS: [Laughs] Thats it. I just wanted to ask you one If I have a follow-up
interview or anything would you mind if I came back?
-E: When would that be because Im traveling?
-TNS: I dont know, probably in the next few months.
-E: Oh certainly. I have no problem.
-TNS: If I will come I will give you a call.

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APPENDIX F: Interview 6

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): So Ameera have you read the verbal consent form and
you are ok with everything?
-Interviewee F (F): Yes I have.
-TNS: Ok good. You told me you were educated in Cornell?
-F: Yes.
-TNS: What was your degree?
-F: It was a Masters in Regional Planning. I got my BA at AUB in Sociology. I had
more focus on Urban Sociology and then I continued right after. my Masters at
Cornell, Class of 2000.
-TNS: So you are really interested in Urban Planning obviously to go from
Sociology to Regional Planning?
-F: Yeah. I think I felt that Sociology was a little bit too theoretical which is also
why I chose Cornells Program which is more of a professional planning program
and its Masters of Regional Planning allows you to also look at the interconnections
between rural and urban development which I think is particularly interesting to this
part of the world.
-TNS: Okay and since you graduated from Cornell what have you been doing?
-F: I worked for a year at UNDP in New York and I was part of a special unit called
Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries where we worked on social
policies in the Arab World to handle the World Trade Organization, to basically join
the World Trade Organization. I was also working on Japanese Development Fund
that funded third world developing countries and since then I moved back to Beirut. I
worked in marketing research for about three months and then for the past three
years I have been at SOLIDERE in the Urban Development Division at the Town
Planning Department.
-TNS: Are you happy at SOLIDERE?
-F: Ah Yeah.
-TNS: Im not trying to get you to say no! How is working here? Is it nice?
-F: Yeah, I mean I am lucky to have gotten the job because I came in at a time when
they werent really hiring and the interesting thing is they had a Town Planning
Department but they dont have planners so the town planning tends to be done by
the architects really. Its an architecture-oriented department and the kind of work we
do, so it was an opportunity to be offered a job to put together the Martyrs Square
competition for the Martyrs Square at the East of Beirut not you dont often
get Planning is relatively a new field and in this part of the world where we are
still coming to terms with the role of a planner, I got lucky actually with the job.
-TNS: Okay. What did your education I am assuming at Cornell teach you about
the role of the public in planning?
-F: Well Cornells department is also very leftist, so my advisor Lotis Veneria is
also from the sort of communist Latin American shes Catalan Spanish but her

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work on Latin America managed to be much more participatory planning. She is an
economist and a feminist-economist which means she looks beyond the formulas and
the numbers. So I actually community planning was a big part of my background
at Cornell gender planning definitely we did workshops in also using GIS to do
community planning in Harlem and the South Bronx to sort of partnership
universities with NGOs in less privileged areas. So, you know, it was there that you
learn the roles of empowering communities to plan and design their own spaces in
such a way that meets their needs on a daily basis because, I mean, as we all know as
much as an architect or a politician or a businessman might claim to know or learn
about their vested interest in the space. It is not until the people who look at it that
really know, you know, the problems with the garbage disposal, the problems with
traffic, vacant builds, etc. etc. So it was a big part of my education.
-TNS: Definitely there was a special emphasis on that?
-F: Yeah, for sure.
-TNS: Okay. Does this education contradict or validate what you experienced at
SOLIDERE or not at SOLIDERE but in general in post-war design in Lebanon?
-F: When you learn in a Western context and you come to a non-Western context its
inevitably Sorry I just have to check [Interview is interrupted and paused] In
this part of the world you tend to have Ministries of Planning in most cases. If you
look at Egypt, I think it has one. Jordan relatively even Palestine has sort of put
together something of that sort. We dont have one here in Lebanon because, that
responsibility was passed on to the CDR the Center for Development and
Reconstruction and then you have the making of SOLIDERE as a private company
in public partnership with the government to redevelop the Beirut City Center. So
thats also a very unique form of planning. Definitely, if I think on a percentage how
much I am applying of what I learnt there I dont know actually maybe 30%.
Yeah its definitely a very different ballgame here. And you also you have to
prove the importance of planning and also because in a lot cases they are not sure
what my skills are so I sort of have to say, No I can help out with this or I can do
that. Its been running for many years without that. You have urban designers and
you have architects so you dont really need the planning because you have the sort
of the politicians in the business aspect taking that part on.
-TNS: And you have a master plan thats already in place so to speak?
-F: Yes that was passed on through a decree in 1994 that allows us to build. But I
mean thats the other thing is one of the problems that we are facing now after
about 30% of the project is complete is we are working on a land-use plan now
2005. My boss whom I worked with, there was a decision made back in 1995 not to
have a land-use plan back then, which I think was a big mistake because obviously
the market fluctuates and nowhere does it fluctuate as sporadically and unpredictably
as Lebanon especially with the bombing which took place on February 14
th
. You
know regional peace or war, and things like that effect us on a daily basis. So the fact
that you did not have a sort of land-use plan that would sort of obviously if you

284
did something in 1994 it would have to be updated and the market is going to dictate
a certain type of direction in which you are going to head. I dont think it should
have been the land-use plan which got carved in stone but it could have been
something that could have been continuously updated. GIS has been difficult to work
on. We finally hired somebody to now put together this in a more comprehensive
way. So because of that, you know, planning tends to be the added-on that comes
after the problem.
TNS: Okay. So basically you are trying to patch things up as they are needed?
F: Yeah. But I think it is natural in any field that you are not sure how it applies.
Luckily I worked with people that do believe in planning and tried to empower me to
do the work that I can but at the same time if the system does not really acknowledge
or account for planners then its difficult. Youre falling between the cracks often
and how do you argue with the sales that know the fact that this building is
residential in a highly prominent site where you want activity 24 hours is a serious
problem. Its difficult.
-TNS: Okay. What do you feel was the most major challenge that you faced in post-
war planning?
-F: Post war planning I got here in 2001, December 2001, so its almost ten years
after the war. The difficult thing is that everything is a mess and I can even say that
ten years later although I am sure it is much less than it was. I mean, I hear that from
my colleagues and friends that have been here from the beginning the kind of
work that they used to have to do that it was pretty intense and crazy But I think
Lebanon society is particular in what you have post war. I think you have to
distinguish between wars that were short and wars that lasted longer. We had a 15-
year civil war.
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: That means that you learn how to live with the war with the crisis on a day-to-day
basis. You live for the moment; youre a short term planner because you might be
here today, you might not be here tomorrow. You want to live it fully so for the
partying and the entertainment section that it fantastic because the Lebanese they
tend to have a very social and active night life, which is actually one of the attractive
aspects to tourism. But the problem is that you cant plan and urban planning is
difficult in that context of somebody who wants quick profit, that does not want to
think ten years down the line. They want to do temporary buildings They want to
do what Manal Khoury calls Manal is an architect the architecture of the moment
which is really problematic in terms of sustainability, environmentalism, just a sound
planning approach.
-TNS: So you think the major challenge would be the actual mentality of the
Lebanese public?
-F: For sure, for sure. I mean, if we look at also the interaction with the public
spaces of course at first SOLIDERE was often attacked for not providing enough
public space whereas actually in the city center we have more public space

285
percentage per the area than the rest of Beirut does for their area. But then you
finally do provide the pedestrian passages at Maarad, the Roman Bath gardens, and
in different public places and it took a while for people also learn how to use them
the public benches, the public signs, these kinds of amenities that you are not used to
having in a war zone where everything is torn apart the trash, the little trashcans,
etc. But I think it is also exciting to see the changes and the positive changes because
I think we all know that no matter how much you design and you build and you plan,
in the end it is the people that appropriate these spaces and it is how they use them
that really is testimony to whether it is a success or its not. So I think that is the
other thing is learning how to interact with the public space. For example, the
citizenship rights. You know? You cant talk about planning an isolation of
individual sense of civil rights, etc. But it is also interesting because I think what we
saw in the past six months in which the people and SOLIDERE were sort of on the
same side following the assassination of the former Prime Minister and his
companions was that you saw the people being protective over the public spaces
so when you had some of these massive demonstrations a lot of the greenery was
destroyed a lot of the signage, you saw people climbing on the traffic lights. It was
really crazy. It was really enjoyable to see people feeling that they were violated that
this was their proper road that was not being treated properly and even when people
marched in other ones saying, Be careful dont break this. You know its a sort of
coming of age I think with the society and with the planning together. So I dont
know if I have answered your question.
-TNS: No, No. I mean this is very subjective so definitely there is no right or wrong
answer. You know, I just wanted to know how you dealt with this challenge of the
short-term gains. How would you say that in general?
-F: Its difficult, I think. We are continuously struggling too because you feel like
you have to especially now at a time when the market is really very fast right now.
-TNS: Unstable?
-F: Well for us here right now we are selling a lot of land.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: We are in a moment where land sales are very high. People are just sort of eating
up the land and so the planning and the design aspect means you have to catch up
with that and unfortunately, like I said, I dont think we accounted for this to take
place. So as we see a certain trend, an over-demand for residential in places were
clearly a residential neighborhood should not be in the midst of that you have to find
ways in which to convince investors and to convince our sales department to market
in a different direction. You know, so this is
-TNS: Because this is a city center and you dont want it to be full of people?
-F: No, no. You know, we are working on a mixed use city center. So a mixed use
means you need that mix. If it is all residential and in this area it seems to be high
value this also means a certain types of residents and tenants that probably dont live

286
here all year round, which means a certain vacancy during the year which in certain
sites is really problematic for the kind of activities
-TNS: You dont want a ghost town either.
-F: For sure, especially key locations like Martyrs Square where it tends to be a
public meeting point We are working with a Greek firm the won the design on
ways in which to create some theme along the axis. If you create a bunch of
residential buildings its a problem.
-TNS: Yeah. What did the design consist of at the Martyrs Square?
-F: The one that won. Well the land-use really were ending up doing the land-use
because we have a better understanding of the space. But what it consisted of was a
very interesting break of the space into different parts as opposed to seeing it as one
whole linear axis.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: They have the threshold area which is fades from Monot and Bashoura into the
Down Town and a very nice sort of porous building in the middle of it and then you
had something in the middle that I cannot remember what they called, but they have
a very interesting hardscaping and landscaping of the Martyrs Square itself with
water elements joining one side of the road to the mosque and the burial site to make
a pedestrian.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: So its also creating pedestrian linkages east and west that allow because it is
quite a large boulevard, I think about 71.
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: So its to sort of break up that place and at the very tip it brings in the water to the
archeological park museum that will take place so that is also very interesting
element that we hadnt thought about. And I think probably theyre from Greece and
probably their understanding of the Mediterranean climate, etc, etc. so its actually
really exciting. But as far as the land-use were having to bring in other consultants
right now to put together a strategy that would respond to the investors demand at
the moment.
-TNS: Okay. What was the one major thing you felt you had to may be not give up
but compromise when you were faced with post war circumstances?
-F: You cant keep saying that this is the way its done because you have to adapt to
the way the system is without, at the same time, lowering the standard of quality of
output.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: So its you can sit and dwell on the fact that its so great to do GIS analysis in
the U.S. where the data is downloadable from the government website in just a quick
flash of a second and you have machines that can handle that amount of data versus
here where you are still fitting in the pixels (data) at this stage. You have to make do
with what you have and you have to adapt it. I mean, I think one of the biggest
obstacles in a post-war planning really which I probably did not mention, is the

287
problem of governance. Planning is very related to a governance and often the
structures of planning and planning commissions and planning committees, the rules
and regulations follow from a certain line of governance knowing there is still a
certain accountability in a certain system. We have that but it is not a planners
domain and the fact that you dont have such a clear system is very frustrating.
Because we have yet to find a way
-TNS: Is there a structure of governance?
-F: Yes. The institutionalization of planning governance is not clear at all and in
some cases it is rather absent at all and it has to be brought about in a round about
way.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: So adapting to this system, not knowing the channels, knowing that you can work
on something and propose it to I mean in this case we are working with a private
company so then it depends on the upper management, whether they adopt it or not,
and whether they can sell it to the investor who may or may not adopt it. One of the
difficulties right now, were working on a cultural strategy knowing that there is no
support from the government. You cant I mean when you are a profit breaking
company, how do you justify the financing of a maritime museum, and a
contemporary art centre, and a...? You know, where is that money going to come
from? So thats another one of the difficulties the lack of resources at some level,
but at the same time there is a lot of resources, so its just knowing how to tap into
the right thing at the right time.
-TNS: So there are more resources being put up right now for residential areas versus
museums?
-F: Well for the residential areas you have a private investor. Right? So, for museum
if you want to build it whos going to build it? Are we going to build it? How are we
going to finance building it?
-TNS: Okay.
-F: Okay we can finance parts of it, like we can finance construction of the Garden of
Forgiveness, we can finance the Archeological Trail which is really interesting, but
how much of these can you finance? And at the same time much of the work that we
do is really about promoting Beirut and yet we work in a very small part of Beirut.
Thats another one of the difficulties is on some level you have to project onto the
entire city but at some time the cultural strategy just works on a small street in Down
Town is not sufficient. That kind of thing should be done for the rest of Beirut in
ways that will bring you out to Hamra, that will bring you out to Ashrafiyeh, to Al-
Saifi.
-TNS: In a way that connects the BCD to the rest of the city?
-F: Exactly, exactly.
-TNS: There is not much of that kind of?

288
-F: There is a will to do that, but it is so controversial right now for us to step outside
of our boundaries because there is so much attention and worry about ownership, etc
that really we are not at liberty to do that.
-TNS: Is there that kind of sense of planning at the central level?
-F: No.
-TNS: Not much of it?
-F: No.
-TNS: Okay. Can you give me an example of something that you had to compromise
on like lets say on the long term? Like on a project that you felt you couldnt
because what I am feeling from you is that sometimes if you ask for participation
you might not get what you expect as a planner long term planning, things like
this so you might actually end up doing something which goes against your
planning grain in general, you know what I mean? So just because you ask
somebody to participate does not mean that you are likely to like what they say they
want as a planner or it goes against all the principles that we learn in planning. So
did you ever have to work on a project where you felt that you had to compromise
what youve learned, not necessarily give it up completely but sort of find an in
between or something like this?
-F: Well, one of the most complicated things about Beirut is that you have a multi-
confessional system and that means a very politicized public that is divided along
confessional lines, political parties, political alliances and often the ways in which
we have perceived as a company is a ramification of those lines. So for example, we
did something very interesting following the Martyrs Square competition we did our
first public forum in which we invited the public to come and discuss the designs.
But there is such a thirst for public discussion with authorities that often we would
get comments that had nothing to do with anything really.
-TNS: Its just that people want to be heard.
-F: Yeah, which is understandable. So we had the public forum in which there was a
report and we wanted to incorporate it and continue a continuous process of
dialoguing with the public on the process that we are undergoing at Martyrs Square.
The truth of the matter is that: we are selling the land to investors who dont really
care, or if they do its not like you can involve the public in the way in which they
will build or develop their area. I mean they can barely just deal with us as an entity
that is interfering in the way they develop let alone public that includes the
intelligencia, that includes just the average lay person who wants a say in how its
going. But at the same time it is definitely a good exercise because I think when we
start planning the public space of Martyrs Square we definitely want the public in
with us at that level to take a look at whats being designed, to take a look at some of
the reactions of how were perceived. It is difficult though. The compromise is in
understanding You know that there are some planning tools you just dont know
how to use them in this context.

289
-TNS: Because there is no governance thats institutionalized enough for it to be very
obvious?
-F: Well lets look at I mean since both you am I have studied in an American
planning context lets look at I mean I did a GIS project in Boston in a
neighborhood that I cant remember the name escapes me right now in which
the government gave because there were so many vacant lots that was actually
really hurting the neighborhood that the community was given jurisdiction over this
small neighborhood in which they could plan how they would handle the vacant lots
in terms of if there were tenants to buy them out etc. And you ended up as a planner
providing them with tools that they could then lobby with their governor and, you
know, senator and whatever to do what they wanted to do. This system does not
apply here at all. Its not even first of all you dont have I mean SOLIDERE we
did it as a sort of tabula rasa its not like there were a people that were living here
and they stayed on throughout the project. Thats the other thing: you are working
with new buildings, bringing in new tenants, to whom you sold There are very few
old tenants
-TNS: But you have shareholders?
-F: Yes, there are shareholders but I wouldnt say that all of them are living here in
the Down Town. This is also a different kind of approach to planning.
-TNS: Okay. So you feel like you dont know whom you are supposed to be
planning for the shareholders, or the tenants or?
-F: Oh no. You know that you are planning for the city. But the city is whoever buys
into it. Its not whos living in it right now. And this is also the difficulty too with
this. You are serving a certain class because the real estate value of being in the city
center and you have to find creative ways in which to attract people of different
classes knowing that eventually real estate values will
-TNS: Probably skyrocket or something like that?
-F: Yeah, exactly, but then they possibly go back down. You know I mean its a
cycle.
-TNS: Yeah. How about for the Martyrs Square competition, did the public have
anything to do with choosing the winner?
-F: No. The Martyrs Square was an international design competition.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: This meant that it had to be accredited by the Union of International Architects
with UNESCO and this means that the jury was an internationally selected jury,
internationally-approved no SOLIDERE member on the jury and they were the
ones who really selected. What we did do was that we had an exhibit in which
comments were allowed to be made about the designs. But also that whole public
participatory approach is a relatively new one.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: So that takes time as well.

290
-TNS: Okay. Do you feel that there is a conflict between participation and
implementation in this kind of planning?
-F: Could you repeat that?
-TNS: Do you feel that there is a conflict between participation and implementation
in projects in planning thats like that going on now?
-F: What does that mean? A problem with the participation of who?
-TNS: The public.
-F: And implementation.
-TNS: And implementation of projects. Would you say that because a lot of
people say that participation in general hinders a project? It makes it slower, it takes
much longer time, sometimes no resolution is reached and you dont have any
implementation at all.
-F: Right.
-TNS: On the other hand a lot of people say, Yeah, but without participation at all
the implementation you have is sort of invalid. It might not even be useful in the
end because it may not even serve the needs of the public and nobody will use the
space.
-F: Well thats the argument against the company which is that it didnt take into
account the people, that it was sort of a machine that went forward. You have to take
it in context. The area was very derelict. I mean, you are talking about no
infrastructure whatsoever, no water, no electricity... I mean the entire mess. And
there is a cause I mean democracy is definitely democratic participation is a
more slower process. Is there a conflict? For sure there is a conflict. Is there a
conflict that should be resolved only by allowing for participation always? I dont
think so because especially I bring you back to the Lebanese community which is
also very different than a more homogenous environment where the invested
interests are multi-communal. I mean, the founding of the company was difficult in
terms of finding all the tenants let alone bringing in the public. But the Lebanese are
also very opinionated and very self-righteous in the way they feel about their spaces.
So also you have a strong media sector that is very vocal about what they agree with
and what they dont agree with.
-TNS: So you feel in general that most people who plan would know more or less the
public opinion on anything?
-F: Would know more or less? Yeah, for sure. I mean the thing is that I think one
of our faults has been a lack of communication. But apparently our policy usually
does that because we are such a high profile to the company that we would rather
just let the built area speak for itself.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: But at the same time with transparency to a lot of things that are misinformed,
mislabeled, in which there is a lot of animosity thats just not
-TNS: Misplaced?

291
-F: Totally misplaced can be dealt with that and, actually, since I have been with the
company we have worked a lot on that. You can ask Angus about that because also
our background and some of our colleagues backgrounds is from an architectural
background from AUB our connections with AUB were part of the community
as well. We are Lebanese as well. So also a lot of discussions, dinner, lunches
-TNS: You meet people and they dont hesitate to...
-F: All the time! Oh for sure! I tell them you need to pay me partly for PR really.
And were also more of a village than a city. You know somebody is like, My store
is on this street. Theres a light bulb that is out
-TNS: Yeah! [Laughs]
-F: I mean this is [Laughs]
-TNS: They dont hesitate to let you know.
-F: Okay, I will change the light bulb. So in my opinion this was definitely the fastest
solution for Beirut City Center given the inability of the government to take the role.
-TNS: Financially?
-F: Financially mainly financially, but even
-TNS: Probably politically?
-F: Politically it would have been a deadlock a gridlock. I mean the airport to this
day is not being maintained. To this day the company that built the airport cannot
hand it back to the government because they cannot afford to maintain it. So and
this is so many years later and its in these frustrations that we need to create
alternative vehicles for planning or implementation. Is it always the best way? No,
there are lots of problems in it, but you sort of decide I mean, my decision to be
here is one in which I say, Okay well, I see good and I see bad and we are going to
try and erase the bad and work more on the good.
-TNS: You do the best you can.
-F: And do the best you can. Yeah, I mean sometimes you just want to throw in the
towel
-TNS: [Laughs]
-F: And wait for another day and other times you really happy and proud of
something that went through the right way. But planning is a process And also
knowing that even the wrong decisions will maybe made right at a later point And
the public will appropriate where it needs to. You know?
-TNS: How would you rate public participation in post-war planning? Lets say on a
scale of one to ten, one being the lowest and ten being the highest ever?
-F: How much is there here?
-TNS: Yeah. How would you rate it?
-F: Well the thing is if we were to talk about the public as like the general layperson,
definitely it is a zero. But it does not work that way because you have the multiple of
Lebanese architects you work with, the Lebanese contractors, the Lebanese
consultants for various things. I mean these are all part and parcel of the project and

292
theyre all part of the public. So how would I rate it? At this rate I would say were at
a ten being the most? I would say we are at a four or five.
-TNS: Okay, because of the things you spoke about, people knowing each other and
the networks?
-F: Yeah exactly, yeah. Even just the employees of the company alone are about
300 that make up, you know, a lot of the different communities.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: Yeah, so I think we here its not like we are working in isolation. We are part
of the communities. We hear the criticisms; we bring them in. Some of the architects
that used to criticize us are now working with us and so its a give and take.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think that anything could have been done to aid a public
participation, in a traditional western sense of the term?
-F: To aid in it, meaning?
-TNS: To aid participation do you think anything could have been done before?
-F: Like I said, participation is a very sensitive and difficult mechanism especially
where there is no institutions. You know? I mean at least you can think sometimes in
the U.S. you have like a neighborhood committee and representatives of the
neighborhood committee. You dont have that here at all.
-TNS: A city council...
-F: A city council You know what I mean? You dont have that here at all. Could
it be aid? For sure you can. There is nothing that you cant do. Its just that you
have to create alternative ways and you have to weigh the pros and the cons. Also if I
know that the impact of the public participation is very minimal, I dont want to set
myself up to further disappoint the public by making them feel that they are going to
be part of a process in which really theyre excluded from.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: There the public is best served to react whether positively or negatively and to
use all that they can to fight it or not fight it.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: Yes, you can always use the public. I mean when we did the public forum,
definitely there was an extra baggage that was just more of a pain just to put together
and to bring it together but it was important. Opening an exhibition to the public was
also important.
-TNS: The public forum what was it for? I mean, what were your?
-F: It was to discuss the three designs that were selected as winners and to see
peoples reactions and sort of what people want in their space.
-TNS: Would you say that it was a helpful thing for the public?
-F: For sure. For sure.
-TNS: They though it was a good thing?
-F: Yeah. I mean, some of them felt, because we did it inside the dome, so some of
them felt that the acoustics werent very They definitely were happy with the
effort. It was also at a strange time. Samir Aseer had been assassinated the day of

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and we ended up postponing it to the next day and he was supposed to be coming
and
-TNS: A part of the process?
-F: He was supposed to be coming and proposing a war memorial space with an
NGO that they had formed. So it was just a very it was a strange time for sure and
as we were sitting in there was a certain activity going on at Martyrs Square.
-TNS: In general it was a beneficial thing then?
-F: I think so. For us for sure. I mean for me it was also for the management to see
that something like that could be useful.
-TNS: Okay.
-F: But they some of them did. I dont know if all of them felt that!
-TNS: [Laughs] Okay. Now that you look back on the three years or so that you have
been at SOLIDERE do you feel three or four years?
-F: No three three and a half.
-TNS: Okay. Theyll be four in December?
-F: No, because I did not join right away. I went for marketing research which
actually was very useful to do feasibility studies.
-TNS: So you can see more or less how things happened?
-F: Yeah.
-TNS: Well now that you look back on that experience, all together, do you feel that
you would have done things differently?
-F: Um No. I am not one to regret because you do things because you were of a
certain frame of mind and space at that time.
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: Its hard Its hard to be inspired all the time and sometimes it just takes a
while to just keep going and later But no I mean, part of it is I am learning the
system. I dont know its sort of like I studied planning but now I am learning
planning and so part of the process of working in planning is just learning it and how
it works. So, no.
-TNS: You dont have regrets. Do you think you have done a good job of
representing the public in your work?
-F: Yeah, for sure. To some extent I think they think I over-represent the public!
-TNS: Okay.
-F: I start the tantrums when we dont get what we need!
-TNS: So you are balancing out effect kind of? [Laughs]
-F: I think so. I am not your quintessential corporate. But I am also I think the role
of a planner is one in which you are really the middle person. You have to
understand the investor. You have to understand the architect and everything. I am
lucky in that a lot of my contacts I end up meeting a lot of these investors, you know,
in social events and because we dont interact with them here directly So a lot of
the times I end up being able to have certain conversations with them in which, you
know There was a case of a residential building in Wadi Abu-Jmeel in which the

294
investor from Abu Dhabi, whos a friend of mine. and we had proposed a certain
architect because it was in a very prominent site and he had put another architect,
local, who had done a horrible design. And, you know, he was just very upset
because he had just bought this land and he wanted it to be the fastest built building
in down town and the work was very slow I said, Rashid, you know for you it is
very easy. You have your people build your building ugly, pretty, whatever you
get your requirement because you live back in Abu Dhabi.
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: But we have to drive by this building ever single day. Well have to walk, well
have to see it, it will be looking at us, we will be looking at it and if it is ugly
thats ugly for a long time. You need two months to wait for this other architect to
give you Whats two months in the grander scheme of things? He says, Okay,
alright. You know? It is also an interesting interaction in which you sort of weasel
your way in and try to figure out a way to meet them where theyre at. So now they
ending up having a much nicer design and hes satisfied with it. But also the other
thing about planning in post-war Beirut, the difficulty is you are in a region in which
the real estate boom in the Gulf. Its unbelievable.
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: Were also in a region in which the money coming from oil is really
overwhelming because it can basically buy out the whole city the kind of money
-TNS: Especially the Lebanese economy.
-F: Yeah, exactly. But at the same time, how do you balance planning and
development in a way that it doesnt make you intimidated by the speed at which
things are happening in Dubai and Qatar and Bahrain and at the same time keeping
in mind the way the system takes place and needs its time in Europe and the U.S.?
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: And this is one of the difficulties because a lot our investors come from the Gulf
and they are used to a certain type of planning, a certain type of... So also
instituting this is one of the things that I think SOLIDERE is quite revolutionary in
doing in instituting this master plan and telling the developer, This is the maximum
height and this is what you can You want it, youre welcome. You dont want it,
youre in the wrong place. Dont buy into here and think you can build like a castle.
Its not
-TNS: Yeah.
-F: Its a fight. Its a constant fight. Yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview if I need
anything?
-F: Sure. Youre welcome any time.
-TNS: Okay. Thank you.
-F: Youre welcome.
-TNS: That was great.

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APPENDIX G: Interview 7

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Okay. So you dont mind being recorded? Im just
making sure.
-Interviewee G (G): No, no, I mean.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But nothing confidential.
-TNS: [Laughs] Actually its all confidential so [Laughs]
-G: Oh, okay. [Laughs]
-TNS: Whatever you say is confidential. What is your education? Your education is
in architecture?
-G: Im an architect.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Specialty in Urban Design.
-TNS: Okay. So you studied in France?
-G: No, I studied in École Polytechnique dArchitecture et dUrbanisme.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: A French school but in Algeria.
-TNS: Where?
-G: Algeria.
-TNS: Algeria? Wow. Thats interesting.
-G: [Laughs]
-TNS: So then your basic study was Architecture?
-G: Architecture.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Architect.
-TNS: Okay. You didnt do Urban Planning later on or anything like that?
-G: Not Urban Planning, Urban Design.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Urban Design within the same
-TNS: Program?
-G: University. They did specialty in three categories: Urban Design or Organic
Architecture or Modern Architecture.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But for me I chose to do Urban Design.
-TNS: Urban Design. Okay.
-G: The school is the École dArchitecture and Urbanism.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Both and you finish your study, your education, with urban design.
-TNS: Okay. And since you graduated, what have you worked in?
-G: I went to Paris.
-TNS: Okay.

296
-G: Directly. And in Paris I worked with a lot of small offices.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Architecture
-TNS: In architecture.
-G: In architecture.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And I spent some time in a construction firm doing or preparing the files for
competitions.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Architectural competitions.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And at the end I worked with some time ADP (Aéroport de Paris).
-TNS: Okay
-G: Paul Andrew.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Hes an architect, a very well-known architect for a period of time on several
projects but not on contract basis on intervene basis. That means I worked with him
basically for projects.
-TNS: Kind of like free-lance?
-G: Yes, if you want free-lance but in their office.
-TNS: When did you join SOLIDERE?
-G: No, before SOLIDERE I worked for a company named SEMAPA.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: SEMAPA is Société Economie Mix [Phone rings and G answers. TNS halts
interview and then resumes]
-TNS: You were saying SEMAPA.
-G: I worked with SEMAPA. SEMAPA was in charge it is a company in charge of
the development of 120 hectares of the 13
th
arrondissement of Beirut.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Of Paris.
-TNS: Paris.
-G: Paris.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: It was exactly the same, you know, the same duties, same issues, same structure
we had a master plan, competition, whatever we had exactly the same structure
as SOLIDERE.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Not from a financing point of view. Financing, even financing, there are banks,
the SNCF the company that owned the trains and the railways also the
Municipality of Paris they grouped a bunch of money.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: They owned the land and 120 hectares of development.

297
-TNS: They wanted to develop it. Okay.
-G: All sorts of activities exactly like SOLIDERE we had.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: We had infrastructure, building, master planning
-TNS: There was nothing there? They were doing it from nothing?
-G: No they were doing it from nothing. They demolished what exists.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And we built a very big structure over the rail, train rail.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: A big structure, a very big concrete valve to transfer the valve and we built on
top of it.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And now it Francois Mitterrand its already built. We have the Bibliothèque
de France in the middle of this area.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I worked with them and I worked with APUR.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: APUR is Agence Parisien dUrbanisme.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: A redevelopment. Its something we started doing the master plan from the
beginning: master planning, distribution of land-use, the height of the buildings, the
roads all the functions of urban design within this area in Paris.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I mean, I spent about six years with them.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And I came from SEMAPA
-TNS: To SOLIDERE?
-G: With the same background to SOLIDERE.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: To work with SOLIDERE for the same kind of project. I mean, when I came
here it was exactly the same issue. Some organization is different, but exactly the
same problem. You have all the problems of preparing base maps, preparing the
master plan, understanding the master plan itself
-TNS: Okay.
-G: How the master plan can be evolved and how we can bring activity into the
city Exactly the same thing as, you know...
-TNS: Concept as SEMAPA.
-G: Concept, yeah same type of form.
-TNS: So how long have you been here?
-G: Since 1995.
-TNS: 1995. So youve been here ten years?
-G: Yes, ten years.

298
-TNS: Wow. They pass by fast.
-G: They pass too fast!
-TNS: [Laughs]
-G: The problem is SOLIDERE is the same things as Paris but the problem here is
you have a lot of pressure in work.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: And this makes things accelerate
-TNS: Very fast
-G: Very fast, yeah, up and down, up and down. I was always in Town Planning. I
wasnt Town Planning Manager before. I am not coming here directly as Town
Planning Manager.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I was in Town Planning, I did a lot of studies and I became Manager when
Oussama Kabbani left the company.
-TNS: Okay. So how long ago was that? When was that?
-G: In 2000.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: 2000. He started to prepare himself to leave the company and for me to take his
place.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And Angus became Division Manager in 2001. He was Chairman Advisor
before.
-TNS: Okay. In your education, in your Architecture/Urban Design education, was
there any emphasis on public participation as a part of the education process?
-G: Of course.
-TNS: There was?
-G: Of course. Public yes, of course. In my education I remember we had from
day one we had an urban planning school from the beginning they insist on it a lot.
And we have a lot of courses also What is course in English? Not course.
-TNS: Course.
-G: Social activity. We say al-mawad. How do they say it in English?
-TNS: Course or subject. The subject of the class?
-G: No, no. Course for one year.
-TNS: Oh, you have one year courses not semesters?
-G: Semesters, but you take it twice. Two-semester courses. Four semesters for urban
planning. Urban planning is something completely different. Its a mix between
sociology and urban planning. I remember it was two different professors, but it
was urban planning was too much about society
-TNS: So they did emphasize it even then? Usually in architecture programs Ive
heard that there is not much of an emphasis on this subject.
-G: Because our university was both. They had two disciplines.
-TNS: Yeah.

299
-G: And because Algeria had this problem of really big differences in society.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: After the independence from France, they had From an architectural point of
view you see two completely different types of architecture that settle in next to you.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: You have the colonial.
-TNS: French colonial, large
-G: The new city and you have next to it the
-TNS: Old, traditional city?
-G: Old and not really organized an organic city.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: These people and these people. It was clear the social aspect of it and the social
evolution of Algeria is really affecting very well the architecture and urban design.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Especially within the same country you can compare between the cities and there
is a clear difference. There is a richness of this country was that. I mean in
Bodighordaya you see something, you go directly next to it a small city where the
French were there you see there are very well-defined grids. This phenomenon is
very, very important. They emphasized also how when you build a city we had a
project, a big project, to rebuild part of Algiers also and we did a lot of research and
we contacted the people living there, what do they need
-TNS: Questions and surveys?
-G: Questions, surveys, a lot of social study also about the people.
-TNS: What they need, what they want?
-G: What they need, what they want.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: This was very, very important.
-TNS: This was very advanced I think at the time. When was this?
-G: 1986.
-TNS: 1986?
-G: 1986 I finished.
-TNS: Wow, okay. So it was nearly around 1986.
-G: Yes.
-TNS: 1985-86. Wow, it was pretty advanced for then. Because what Ive heard from
most people is that they didnt have much of an emphasis on participation. Maybe
because it was a French school?
-G: It was a French school and it emphasized it a lot. I dont know, but it was a
French school and I remember we did a lot of study on
-TNS: On the public needs and things like that?
-G: Yes. Especially we also did a I, myself, did some research on bidonville. Do
you know what is this?
-TNS: No.

300
-G: A bidonville is you have it in India. You have it in cities part of the cities
you have homeless people?
-TNS: Oh, you mean slums?
-G: Slums?
-TNS: Yeah, thats when you have housing thats on the streets basically.
-G: Yeah, its not structured. Its whatever, wood or
-TNS: Slum dwellings.
-G: Slum dwellings bidonville in French.
-TNS: Okay. So you went there?
-G: I went there and I did a lot of study about how they build their city, how they live
on it, what their requirements are, are they happy like that or do they need I mean,
a lot of things if they need a house what is the quality of the house.
-TNS: What kind of housing they would want.
-G: Yes. I did this research around the whole city of Algiers; how much there are and
what the government can do for them. So this is kind of the
-TNS: Thats very good. Would you say that this education what you were taught
in college would you say that that would contradict or validate what you
experienced after the war in Lebanon?
-G: In Lebanon?
-TNS: Yes.
-G: Of course validate. Of course validate. A lot of things I see like yesterday
my education in school all this systematic approach, how we approach the city,
how we approach the social aspect of it, the history of it its very, very direct. Of
course now I dont remember really what kind of level I have in my mind, but now it
is more deep and it is more concrete, its more direct.
-TNS: Do you feel your western education helped you understand eastern culture
better?
-G: Western?
-TNS: Yes. Your western education in a French school, did it help you understand
better the eastern culture? I mean, you were in Algeria so Im sure that helped
because you have
-G: Lots of culture.
-TNS: Yeah. And it helped you very much?
-G: Yes, but even in France also because I did I entered a I didnt say that
because I didnt finish it.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I entered a university in Paris: Université de Paris. I did two years there, an
education in urban design.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: It was a Masters degree in Urban Design. No it was not. It was more than a
masters because in Algeria I finished my masters. It was the equivalent of a masters,

301
but I needed to emphasize my study in France. I went to a university in Paris and I
registered to continue also to have a French, if you want, degree.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: To be able to work in France. But it was four years.
-TNS: The program was four years long?
-G: Three years. I made two years and I worked and married and
-TNS: [Laughs] And thats it. I know what its like. What do you feel, when you
came to SOLIDERE, what was the major challenge you faced because of the war?
-G: Because of the war the major challenge?
-TNS: Yes, you faced.
-G: That I faced, that I feel. I remember I was there where there are big problems of
the displaced people. You know, part of SOLIDERE, all this area
-TNS: The BCD?
-G: Wadi Jmeel area was occupied by displaced people from the south and I was in a
relationship directly with Jean-Paul Lobain. Jean-Paul Lobain is the Director of
Development and we discussed this with him. It was a very big discussion if we
pay them, we dont pay them; its something related what we will do
-TNS: Should we relocate them? What are we going to do with them?
-G: Yeah, exactly. And at the end I make some it was in the business plan I
cant remember very well but it was something really important I mean, how we can
let these people go outside to get the area empty from them and to be able to be
developed very well.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: This was the channels. In the end they decided to pay them.
-TNS: To relocate them?
-G: We paid about 240 million dollars.
-TNS: Wow.
-G: For these people only to displace them outside of SOLIDERE. At the end I made
this declaration that will affect the cost of land that affected the cost of land that
we get rid of this problem. And another one is the demolition of the buildings. I was
not in charge to approve of which buildings would be demolished, but sometime I
was a little bit against. I felt something you destroy it.
-TNS: Yeah, you feel some kind of connection to the building.
-G: A connection to this type of building. Now you see it but its not really as it was.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I wasnt really involved on that very well, but it was something affecting me.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: The third issue is everybody hating you. [Laughs]
-TNS: So the social perception?
-G: The social perception.
-TNS: The negative social perception.
-G: The negative social perception.

302
-TNS: [Laughs]
-G: Especially that people dont understand.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I mean, when I came from Paris first of all I studied the mechanism of how
SOLIDERE is structured from a financial point of view Development I know the
master plan and the master plan here was a very detailed master plan not like Paris.
Paris you do only the alignment involved and you do only
-TNS: Land-use.
-G: Land-use. Not a detailed master plan like here. Here its too much detailed.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And I asked why its to much detailed. Its something wrong. We definitely
have it seems the government asked I dont know. Anyway
-TNS: The negative social
-G: The negative social when I read how SOLIDERE was structured and I know
the relationship between people here, between people and the government, the
relationship between bureaucracy and the government
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I felt that this was the best and only solution. I was one of the defenders of this
solution.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I know that people that owned the land before SOLIDERE lost money, of course.
They lost their property also and their property transferred a share only with a big
company. They dont know how
-TNS: Whats going to happen.
-G: Yes. This is something You know, I always say that the war has happened.
People lose money in the war. People lose also their sons.
-TNS: Yeah. They lose their family.
-G: They lose their life. But some others lose part of their money. But this part is not
completely lost because we will rebuild this city, we will rebuild Beirut, and we will
rebuild the country. And essentially if you dont build the City Center, Lebanon is
too small. And in Lebanon the entire economy is in Beirut and the most important
area in Beirut is the City Center.
-TNS: The BCD.
-G: If you dont build the city center, you will not build Beirut, as simple as that.
And at that time we talked about negotiation and peace, negotiation with Israel,
competing with other cities
-TNS: Dubai.
-G: No, even Haifa, Jaffa Israel was a competitor. After the peace, we had to
think
-TNS: Forward thinking.
-G: Forward. There will be competition between Lebanon and Israel.
-TNS: In everything.

303
-G: Also Damascus, also
-TNS: Turkey.
-G: Turkey, whatever. To have this ability to compete with others we had to build
and quickly.
-TNS: How did you deal with the negative social perception?
-G: Like always in Lebanon, Lebanese people are negative. Okay?
-TNS: They are distrusting? Is that what you mean?
-G: Distrusting, they have they have better solutions. Everyone has better
solutions! [Laughs] At the end when you come to the reality, you dont have better
solutions.
-TNS: You do your best right?
-G: We did our best. I think I always said that with time things will change.
-TNS: People will see whats happening more?
-G: Yeah, of course.
-TNS: Over time? Thats the best way?
-G: And we had to have a very strong company and we had to do something very,
very high quality to prove to everyone that this was a very good solution.
-TNS: What did you feel was the one major thing that you had to give up or
compromise when you were faced with post-war circumstances at SOLIDERE? Do
you feel that there was part of the plan or part of the process that you usually do that
you had to let go in order to get things done at SOLIDERE?
-G: Yeah, of course. We cannot deny that if you didnt have this circumstance the
war, and rebuilding the city after the war, and the short time that you had too
-TNS: The rapid needs?
-G: The rapid needs and the economy and the worry about political changes.
Especially in this country always there are changes, no stability. Never ever you will
have stability. You will have to do something quickly. Of course there is other
experience. I know other experiences in the development of city centers like Aleppo.
It is piece by piece; it is very small; it is rebuilding of societies.
-TNS: Slower?
-G: But you rebuild with a society existing there. You deal with what exists there and
you develop. But it is a very, very slow mechanism.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Also you have Fez in Morocco. Also you can have planning, you can take your
time, you can manage with society, you can approach a social effect properly and
with much more human, you know
-TNS: Contact?
-G: Contact, with history, whatever Of course it will be much more rich and much
more you know
-TNS: Suitable to the publics needs?
-G: Yes, of course. Yeah, but you will do it in 15 years.
-TNS: Yeah.

304
-G: Its a balance. You have to compromise. But even so here after the war we put in
a good road network. It wasnt like this. The road network is an advanced road
network, a modern road network.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: If you leave the city as it was you will not be able to put a road network like that.
You have to demolish. You have to sacrifice certain areas and you will face
problems also.
-TNS: In transportation.
-G: Like Fez now. Fez built a big boulevard in the city center. Everybody protested
but you have to modernize.
-TNS: For transportation.
-G: You have to sacrifice a little bit. Here we had an empty land. You preserve only
buildings. You dont preserve a
-TNS: Empty lots?
-G: No, the urban fabric.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: You create a new city with a historical asset. Okay? But you dont keep the
historical asset and try to improve it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: It is something, I mean, that adds value to the city itself, not like You know
just now in Aleppo the developer or the retailer they leave Aleppo to outside the city
for more modern means. Now the Municipality of Aleppo they try to
-TNS: Modernize?
-G: Modernize more the city center. Its really difficult to do it without demolishing
a lot of buildings and pavement and many things. Here we did it. I know that one of
the advantages is that we have a more modern at least traffic or street network that is
very good.
-TNS: Okay. Do you feel that there is a conflict between involving the public in a
plan and the implementation of the plan?
-G: Always, always. Even in France. You know I spent the first three years working
for the master plan in Paris and we started implementing the master plan, we started
paying money for the road and whatever and we presented to the public. It was
obligatory to get the community for the 13
th
arrondissement approval and they
refused completely. Why they refused it? Because they need more green area and
they need more bicycle tracks and they need low height buildings. Low height
buildings were not a requirement, but they cancelled the master plan! Lets say today
at SOLIDERE we have a master plan and it is cancelled. There is no SOLIDERE any
more. It was SEMAPA was completely stopped.
-TNS: Wow.
-G: By the decision of the community and we felt that we are completely out. Now,
this is one experience. Another experience you see it in our world of course, it is not
contradictory. It has to be within the process.

305
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But the process itself you have to always go first. Do your field work and
research and you study the need of the society and prepare a master plan related to
the society. But never ever, never ever if you ask the society if they approve of the
master plan even if it comes from them never ever there will be
-TNS: Complete approval.
-G: Yes, complete approval.
-TNS: There will still be parts of it.
-G: Because they will not understand. It is difficult to understand a study and
difficult to understand the whole idea and difficult to understand that you take into
consideration everything.
-TNS: And everybody.
-G: And everybody. And especially when you develop want it or not you have to
get a feasible development.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: That means you have to get an investor and from the financial point of view you
have to have a financial plan. If the financial plan doesnt work
-TNS: Its a waste of time basically.
-G: Its a waste of time. Even wherever you ask people about their opinion they will
not look at the financial plan. They will look at, you know
-TNS: Their own needs?
-G: Their own needs, their luxury needs.
-TNS: They wont think about the feasibility of the implementation?
-G: Never. In my own experience you know in Paris we did a lot of what do you
call it big
-TNS: Public forums?
-G: Public forums. In public forums always, always they in Paris especially they
ask about their view, their greenery, where they will walk, how they will park their
car It is very, very blind. And you know in Paris they decide. They have to sign. It
is not like in Lebanon. In Lebanon you dont have this rule. In Lebanon you can ask
them, you can make a forum, or you can make publicity but it is additional. You do it
yourself; you are not obliged to do it. In Paris we were obliged to do it.
-TNS: And obliged to take it into account also.
-G: Obliged to not always because there is a judge.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And the judge he decides.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Not I mean, you have a case, you have the community, you have law. You
present your project and the community will express their need and then there is a
judge.
-TNS: To decide what
-G: If there is not that otherwise you will never get it. [Laughs]

306
-TNS: [Laughs] You wont do anything.
-G: Yeah, I tell you what we did in France, in Paris, for this project at first the
judgment cancelled the master plan. We extended we asked for another judgment.
How do you say that?
-TNS: Its like a protest?
-G: A protest, yeah. We protested. The second time the judge approved the master
plan.
-TNS: Okay. Its interesting.
-G: It is really I mean you read every book in urban design. They will tell you of
course that you have to go through this process.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I, for me, the best experience is Aleppo. I didnt work there, but I read a lot about
it. And another experience I read about is one street in Cairo, Fatimid Street. They do
it in a way that it is something like a historical asset, you have to keep it.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: It is not a very big operation of urban design. The Souk of Aleppo is a historical
asset. You develop it and you improve it you improve the situation there. Its not
an urban design for a new kind of city, you know. This experience, both of them,
was successful. I think so. But if you ask me if from day one we did a lot of study in
Beirut to get the opinion of people and how we will work and take it into
consideration too much, never ever, ever will you finish.
-TNS: Okay. How would you rate public participation in post-war planning in
Lebanon? Lets say on a scale of one to ten one being the lowest, ten being the
highest how would you rate it?
-G: Rate it? After the war?
-TNS: After the war.
-G: You know after the war the war was 1990.
-TNS: Yeah, so since then until now.
-G: Fifteen years.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: Okay? Fifteen years I think I will rate six.
-TNS: Okay. Why?
-G: In 1990 did you come to Lebanon?
-TNS: I was in Lebanon always.
-G: You were in Lebanon. You know the way it was. All the infrastructure in
Lebanon didnt work at all.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: All road connections in Lebanon didnt work at all. It was a very big problem.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: It would take you three hours to get to Tripoli and especially in the tunnel.
-TNS: Shikka?
-G: No, not Shikka, Jounieh.

307
-TNS: The Tunnel. Okay. Yeah, I remember. Traffic was crazy.
-G: Telephones we didnt have telephones. We didnt have cell phones, we didnt
have internet. The Airport was really catastrophic.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: Everything the infrastructure was catastrophic. Beirut itself you cannot live
in Beirut because I spent two years here after coming from Paris. You dont have
places to walk, where you can make your business. It was very difficult in 1990. I
will not say in 15 years because, you know, we lost about four years without
construction from 1998 until 2002 when the government was changed. Lahoud came
and the government stopped the reconstruction, everything.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: Everything. They stopped. That means I will calculate 11 years and less than that
because now we spent a year with these events. I will say ten years with real work,
real work its ten years. In ten years we have a country now. We have a very good
road structure. You have a very nice city developed with too much activity. It is
Beirut breathing if you want again.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: Tourists are coming again. You have this feeling that you love this country again
and you love living in this country again. You ski, you have a lot of things within
this
-TNS: Society?
-G: Society started to be rebuilt and you have, I remember, a lot of companies that
came back to Lebanon.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: We stopped the problem is we stopped in 1998. And just now, after 1998, in
2001-2002 I mean, after 9/11
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I mean, I mean, I dont know but we have to say it: because of
-TNS: 9/11? Things changed?
-G: Because of 9/11 things restarted to move again.
-TNS: In Beirut?
-G: In Beirut.
-TNS: Because there were more tourists from Arab
-G: Yes. Imagine that in 1998 when they stopped everything there was no demand.
Lebanon will be dead.
-TNS: So what was it about public participation that made you decide you would
give it a rating of six?
-G: I didnt understand.
-TNS: When I asked you about public participation rating, you told me you would
rate it at around six. Do you feel
-G: Public? No. You asked me about public participation?
-TNS: Yes.

308
-G: I didnt understand. I thought you asked me about building rate.
-TNS: No, no. I was asking about public participation.
-G: Public participation!
-TNS: On a rating from one to ten, how would you rate public participation?
-G: In construction?
-TNS: No yeah, in the planning process.
-G: Not too much.
-TNS: Less than six?
-G: Ah, of course. Public participation is I would say about two to three, not more.
-TNS: Why? Why do you say two to three?
-G: There is no public participation in Lebanon.
-TNS: Since 1990 until now?
-G: Public participation in
-TNS: In the planning process.
-G: In the planning process? No, there is no public participation.
-TNS: Was there in the master planning process?
-G: No, not at all.
-TNS: But the master plan changed many times.
-G: We changed it.
-TNS: But was because of
-G: Not for the public.
-TNS: Because of different planners?
-G: From different studies we did. No, the master plan is something I followed. I am
responsible for the master plan.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: The master plan in 1994 it was if you want the first master plan. It gave a lot of
ideas. But a lot of things were really general. What we had to do was make a detailed
master plan for each sector.
-TNS: So was it changed or was it more updated?
-G: More updated.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: It wasnt changed, it was more updated. A lot of things were there and are still
there, but what we did was a detailed master plan for each sector. We worked with
Sector J, with SOM, we did a lot of study on the evolution of the master plan.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And then when we finished our detailed master plan study we asked for a decree
amendment and we changed the master plan accordingly.
-TNS: Okay. But what were the studies about? Were they about the needs?
-G: Urban design.
-TNS: Okay.

309
-G: Urban design. There are a lot of detailed urban design you have to carry on
before starting the development. The master plan there was a concept behind the
master plan that it was a little bit general.
-TNS: General. The first one?
-G: The first one. And you see I can show you
-TNS: The evolution of it?
-G: Yes, the evolution of it from the urban design real urban design.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: In how we defined the height, how we defined the massing, how we parcel, the
parking, testing the use and mix of uses This is kind of, you know, master
planning or detailed design a detailed master plan.
-TNS: Okay. So it became more detailed over time?
-G: It became more precise and more defined as massing distribution.
-TNS: Land use?
-G: Land use no. Land use we need it always market-driven.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But now we are working in Martyrs Square and we are trying to define land-use
strategy in the Martyrs Square.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But there is no public participation.
-TNS: There is no public participation. Would you say thats a good thing or a bad
thing?
-G: It is You give it to a specialist it is I cannot imagine how the public in
Lebanon can participate.
-TNS: Its difficult?
-G: Its difficult.
-TNS: But in general would you say you already told me that too much public
participation can delay implementation so during the post-war process do you think
that public participation was kept low because rapid implementation was required?
-G: Because rapid implementation was required and I dont think we we
cannot Either we have to do a competition to let specialists
-TNS: Judge the outcome?
-G: Judge the outcome. I think this is much more rich than what you can do with
some research. We did some research about the market market research.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: We did about land-use research but not about having a forum and letting people
talk about what they prefer to have.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: We will be too much criticized. The political, also, the political situation of
Lebanon because you have too different I mean, you have Hariri and you
have
-TNS: Special interests.

310
-G: You have communities who will be against you without an objective.
-TNS: Without a specific reason except that they are politically against Hariri?
-G: Yes, I feel that. Maybe not, but
-TNS: The political situation was not stable?
-G: It was not stable and it was difficult to see that you can have a very you can
have it with some The problem is that you have elite in Lebanon.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: You have very educated people in Lebanon, and even then to let them participate
was difficult. You know, AUB students and AUB professors they were all against
SOLIDERE and they were all against all this, you know cultural what do you
name it, not elite I dont want to say elite people
-TNS: Educated people?
-G: Educated people who are part of society. Also they cannot participate positively
in discussions of the master plan.
-TNS: Because you think of the civil war and the problems it created in society?
-G: No, because we dont have this habit.
-TNS: Okay. The institutional structure is not there.
-G: Its not there. We have to rebuild it and I think you rebuild it with competitions,
with open forums. When we did the open forum for Martyrs Square Lebanese
participation was very low. We had lots of participants from outside Lebanon,
architects and urban designers from foreign
-TNS: Why?
-G: I dont know. When we did the forum itself, you know, I counted people coming
to the forum. They were really small. According to the importance of
MartyrsSquare
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: The participants there we were expecting 500.
-TNS: Its not similar in ratio, you mean.
-G: We had not even
-TNS: Not even 100?
-G: Not even 100. You see. You see it. People came to criticize you because you are
from this party or to criticize Hariri, you know, because until now there are people
from the government and people that say that SOLIDERE is Hariris image and
SOLIDERE costs the government a lot. They dont know that SOLIDERE doesnt
cost anything, any penny, for the government.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: They dont know that Hariri lost money in SOLIDERE more than he he
-TNS: He made money.
-G: He made money. Of course. Everybody knows. When you buy a share you lost
money.
-TNS: Yeah.

311
-G: This is kind of a behavior I dont know something like the only one who
did something important, Robert Saliba, he did some he let people participate in
his book. I like the book. He let people only draw what their memory
-TNS: I remember that study what they remember of Beirut.
-G: What they remember of Beirut. I love this study.
-TNS: And people older than a certain age remembered certain areas, people younger
than 20 dont remember so much.
-G: Yes. They remember other areas.
-TNS: Because the war was so long, yeah.
-G: Yeah, but all of them drew what we kept the redeemable buildings and the
redeemable City Center.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: Outside Place de lÉtoile, Martyrs Square, Waygan and Foche-Allenby, you
dont have any memory.
-TNS: Except Hamra.
-G: [Laughs] And Hamra. But you dont have any memory. Let people participate,
we let them participate in competition. I also I mean, why we will be different is
because you are not building in a rural or you are not building in a stable city like the
United States. You know this group, American group, they wrote a full book about
public participation. Okay? But they talk about cities built 200 years ago and theyre
stable. The growth of the city is very, very minimal and you dont have this
movement. You can, I mean. This is something we can do. We can do some research
about this.
-TNS: Yeah. Theoretically?
-G: To participate but participate professional-wise and if we want to participate
professional-wise we do a competition. We did a competition for Martyrs Square.
Lebanese participation was very, very, very low.
-TNS: What do you think would have aided, would have helped, public participation
in general?
-G: Stability.
-TNS: Of the political situation?
-G: Political stability.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: To think about something else now [Laughs]
-TNS: Its too late.
-G: Were talking about Martyrs Square and they have a lot of things on their mind,
much more important things.
-TNS: They dont even care.
-G: It is something like all the educational level, all the kinds of whenever
something needed attention
-TNS: They have different priorities right now?
-G: Exactly.

312
-TNS: Okay. Now that you look back would you have done things differently?
Anything during your experience at SOLIDERE?
-G: From an urban design point of view? Or from
-TNS: No, from the public point of view.
-G: The public point of view?
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: I will do more competition.
-TNS: You would open more of the areas
-G: I am always for competition competition of architects professional
competition. Even when you do a competition even international, national, or the
key people okay and you publish it, people start being interested in what is
happening here.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: And their being interested brings more publicity about
-TNS: Whats happening.
-G: Whats happening.
-TNS: Have you ever considered doing one just a national competition?
-G: National competition not international? Yes. We did one by invitation. We did
but by invitation. We invited four or five people, architects, Lebanese, to do a
competition. But unfortunately it wasnt very successful.
-TNS: Really? Thats too bad. Do you feel you have done a good job of representing
the public in your work at SOLIDERE? I know you say that the public participation
was low, but that doesnt necessarily mean that, you know, you dont feel that you
represented the public. Do you feel that you represented the public?
-G: Ah ah
-TNS: I know its a difficult question.
-G: Ah We represent a lot of what the public want, yes, or what the public I
think we represent what the public merit to have. You know, we have a very
critical I mean, the people really criticize us about how high of a quality we
provide for this area: high quality in urban furniture, urban design, façade building,
quality of streets
-TNS: Lighting
-G: Lighting is high. We have a lot of green area, we have public domain. You
know? And we have people we heard from people that why do we differentiate
this area from other areas? This way people will behave in the SOLIDERE area as
they behave outside the SOLIDERE area. As a result, what happened? How
Lebanese people using a very good high quality area at a high level.
-TNS: They use it differently than another area that is.
-G: They use it differently than another area and they are happy to use it in that way.
That means, I think, that we you provide people at their level also. I mean that
you know this comparison
-TNS: You raise the level?

313
-G: You raise the level but the Lebanese people also their level is very high because
they are very sensitive to what the beauty is and what the quality is.
-TNS: They care a lot about the aesthetics?
-G: They care a lot about it. We dont have a big vandalism. We dont have a lot of
it. People are there and they are happy and they found themselves. Its not very
strange for them.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: The only issue is that it is expensive.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: But expensive you can walk on the street and go to a garden and its not
expensive. When you see that three million people visited the City Center in 2003
we counted, we know this number really that means we give them something they
like. I dont know what you mean by representing the people. We give them
something they like.
-TNS: No. What I mean by representing is do you feel you gave them what they need
or what they want?
-G: The proof is there. Thats what Im talking about.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: We gave them. Yes, I think so because you have three million visitors. All
Lebanon is four million.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: We had three million visitors to the City Center in 2003 and they are walking,
dinking
-TNS: Theres activity.
-G: Everybody comes here. Everybody goes to show their cousin who is coming
from the United States or their friends They are told to show this area. They are
very proud of it and they make lots of stories about the City Center. They came to
City Center on February 14, to Martyrs Square.
-TNS: Yeah.
-G: All of them, they really they love it. I think so. People love it. So yes, we have
represented them very well and we have given them something they merit they
merit I mean
-TNS: They deserve?
-G: They deserve and up to their level.
-TNS: Okay.
-G: I see it as up to their level, never over their level. I mean, SOLIDERE is never
over the level of the Lebanese.
-TNS: It is not elitist or anything?
-G: No, no, no. This issue of our expenses, expenses will change in time.
-TNS: I hope so.

314
-G: We didnt build a society. This is something difficult to build a society. We
built a social network a social life if you want. Society we will not build a
society. That takes lots of time.
-TNS: You built the fabric?
-G: We built the fabric and later on well be there hopefully.
-TNS: Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview if I need to
come back?
-G: Yeah, of course.
-TNS: Thank you very much.

315
APPENDIX H: Interview 8

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): So youve consented verbally to take part in this study?
-Interviewee H (H): Yeah, I dont mind as long as it doesnt take two hours.
-TNS: No, no. It wont take two hours.
-H: [Laughs] Okay.
-TNS: Do you have a degree in planning?
-H: Yes, I have. Well, I have a Masters in Urban Design from Harvard.
-TNS: Okay. And were you an architect before?
-H: My first degree is from Cambridge, England and my first degree was in
architecture.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: BA and MA.
-TNS: So you did two MAs?
-H: I guess. I mean, the Cambridge MA comes after completing the theres a BA
after completing three years the first three years, then you go out and do some
practical work in an architects office, then you go back for two years. You get a
Diploma in Architecture, but that becomes an MA automatically in Cambridge. So,
obviously the Harvard degree is a Masters in Urban Design. At Harvard you can get
a Masters in Urban Design if youre an architect or a city planner or a landscape
architect.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: So there were a variety of different disciplines. Its a good school, a good degree.
-TNS: How about your work experience since you graduated?
-H: Well, since Harvard I concentrated on large-scale, Ive worked mainly on large-
scale projects but also on the urban planning scale. I mean the reason I went to do
that degree is that I always felt, you know, that the real problems are not really at the
architectural scale and not on the scale of the individual plot. Theyre at the larger
scale, you know at the scale of the city or a piece of the city. And it always seemed
to me that if you make a mistake at that scale its likely to last 100 years; it can be
quite serious.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: [Laughs] And there are lots of examples of rather bad mistakes. So I always
thought it was a scale more important to be involved in. So, you know, Ive really
worked mainly at that scale... some, you know, some large-scale architectural
projects, for example the British Library. The original British Library project was
facing the British Museum and it was basically the last eight city blocks of Old
Linsbridge. So as an urban project, it was inserting a new institution into an urban
context, retaining some of the you know, preserving some of the existing fabric
and uses and also, for example, reintroducing some of the existing retail. It was a sort
of an urban project it became the library that was actually built that ran into
problems but the library that is actually being built was much more straight-

316
forward as a very large project and I think very successful. But, I dont know, Ive
been involved in working, for example, in West Africa and Nigeria on town
expansion schemes in Northern Nigeria.
-TNS: When did you start working in Lebanon?
-H: I came here in 92. It came out of a contact I had made at Dar Al-Handasah. I
had actually been working in the Gulf I think I met I think it was at Dar Al-
Handasah when I was working in Qatar this was quite a long time ago, working
for an American company planning the building of the New District of Doha.
-TNS: Oh, okay.
-H: Yeah. And Dar were sort of heavily involved out there, so I got to know them
and I then went back to the UK and I set up my own practice an urban
design/urban planning practice and they called me in as a consultant on several
projects, some very interesting. One was Amman, Jordan, which basically started out
as an urban design strategy for the master plan for the whole city and then it focused
on the action area plan for the historic core. It was quite interesting. I did other
projects in Bahrain, a big reclamation project with a series of islands on a coral reef.
It hasnt been built but it was an interesting project. I also worked on various projects
in Dubai. So, after these were intermittent projects some of them went on for
maybe six months, something like that. I then kind of lost touch with Dar because I
got some work with the London Docklands Development Corporation, which started
out consultancy work and then kind of became a full-time job. I spent probably two,
two and a half years with the Corporation working in the roll docks, the Eastern-most
part of the docklands where the London City Airport is.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: I was responsible for the urban planning and I was actually Development
Manager for one large chunk. We split the rolls up into about four big pieces. The
biggest was about the size of this project, but I was responsible for the Royal
Victoria Docks and the Thames Barrier land. All together it was about maybe 60
hectares or something like that. [Clears throat] I suppose I almost came here directly
from there because there was a, while I was working at the Docklands, there was a
boom and then a bust there was a big recession.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: I didnt realize it was coming. It just got rather boring because nothing was
happening, so I went back into practice. Then I got this call from Dar, and Dar of
course were the consultants for the master plan here.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: But they got into trouble. They got into problems. The first plan was prepared by
Henri Edde and its a bit strange. I mean, Henri Edde is an architect; hes not a
planner. He didnt have a planning background and this is part of the problem, I
think. One of the problems in urban planning is architects think they know how to do
cities. [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah.

317
-H: And they dont really!
-TNS: They just do buildings really.
-H: They have a kind of architects have a three-dimensional view of the city. You
know, cities are systems and if youre going to get in the business of city-making,
youre going to have to appreciate many other areas. Its not just architectural and a
big mistake that architects make is that they believe that it is. They think that its just
three dimensional, just architecture at large. Architects dont understand about
transport issues, they dont understand about economics of cities, they dont really
understand about the social issues, you know. And Henri Edde was an architect
doing the plan and he felt it was he was a very arrogant sort of person anyway.
That [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs] I wont tell.
-H: I got sort of off the subject, but anyway He fell out with his client. He fell out
with Rafiq Hariri, but he also produced a plan which was very impractical.
-TNS: Thats the first plan, right? The one that looked like a petit Manhattan or
something like that?
-H: Yes. Well, there was an island, an off-shore island.
-TNS: Yeah, I remember that.
-H: But they didnt even think about any of the defenses or engineering problems, or
anything like that. It was a completely mad idea. He drew this plan as a kind of
architectural image of lots of buildings and discovered that the density was about
3.5:1. So he applied to reduce the density in the city center. Its an area which has an
exportation of 5:1. I mean, the clients made reasonable comments about this: one
was that you cant just reduce the density, you know, its a legal requirement.
Certainly they made a lot of comments, like they didnt want an off-shore island, and
he wasnt prepared to make any changes. This is my plan and Im I know best.
-TNS: Thats it.
-H: [Laughs]
-TNS: Its set in stone.
-H: So he fell out with the client and Rafiq Hariri said to Dar, Look you have to if
you want to keep the job, youd better put a new team on it. One of things that,
inexplicably, Henri Edde had not done was he had not involved Dars own planning
department. They have a whole division that deals with planning entirely.
-TNS: They have a transportation division also.
-H: Yes and they werent involved in this. He did it himself without going to
anybody. So what Dar did was to go to their planning division, which then was very
thin in Cairo. when I had been involved earlier, during consulting, their main office
was in London actually. Now it was Hosni Iskandar, who was Head of Planning,
who got in touch with me. He was the guy who was previously my contact really and
he said, Come to Beirut and sort this out. I said, Beirut? What are you talking
about? [Laughs]
-TNS: I dont think so.

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-H: He said, It might interest you. And he basically told the Dar directors that Ill
take this on if I can handpick my own team, and that includes me. And I said, Im
coming if I can bring my team! [Laughs] So basically thats what happened.
-TNS: When did you start at SOLIDERE?
-H: Well I started at SOLIDERE since the beginning of SOLIDERE. In fact, I didnt
get here until July 94 and the company was formed in May.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: So I spent about a year out here doing the plan and then about ten months away
and then came back for SOLIDERE basically.
-TNS: Okay. Going back to your urban planning, I mean urban design background at
Harvard I dont know if I would only talk about this, but within the program how
much emphasis was there on public participation? Would you say within the
architecture program in Cambridge there was any?
-H: No.
-TNS: So it would be more at urban design?
-H: Architecture at Cambridge is very straight, down-the-line architectural education.
-TNS: How about the urban design program?
-H: The urban design program was much broader obviously. It emphasized
economics, which for me was a new discovery I mean, I always new it was there.
It was very, very interesting courses at Harvard Business School as well.
Sociology, the social issues, broad planning, regional planning, landscape, transport
planning I mean we did a most interesting And it was still fairly early although,
you know, public participation was growing it certainly you can say it
originated in the States.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: In fact, it was when I was there at Harvard, thats when the whole public
participation process started with battles over urban highways. Okay? And we did a
project, very interesting. The big issue at the time in Boston was the inner belt, the
completion of the inner belt, the inner ring, the premier of public roads. You know
the whole highway system in the States was very strong from 1959 to 79 or
whatever it was The Highway and Defense Act linked the construction of the
highways with defense. The federal policy said that any city with a population of
more than, I dont know, a quarter of a million or a half a million had to be
connected by an inter-city highway system to enable populations to be moved
rapidly in case of war. I mean the whole things crazy.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: And the federal government would pay 90 percent of the cost, the states 10
percent so it was a 90:10 split. But all the highways had to be planned by the states
working in coordination. So, of course, they went ahead and build all the networks in
between the cities first that was easy. Then they started to do the difficult bits right
at the end of the program! And thats what happened in Boston. What had happened
was that they had brought the highways in and they had started the inner belt they,

319
you know, they cut through Chinatown and they built the crass through the Italian
community and they built this section which is now being on the grounding in a way.
The last bit with the exception of, of course, Cambridge came a causeway
across Cambridge and Summerstown and tied the whole thing up. And they had to
build that. They were down to the last two or three years of the program and if they
didnt get it done they wouldnt get the funding from the federal government.
-TNS: Oh no.
-H: [Laughs] So there was a lot of pressure and the federal bureau got this down to
three options. They were all running through downtown Cambridge. So we has a
very interesting studio with a guy called Joseph Pashnar who had just come from
Chicago where hed done a fascinating study about the (what do you call it, the
urban link, what was it called) cross-town expressway in Chicago, where he really
looked at the right way to build an urban highway: how to measure the impacts on
property takings, impacts on business trade areas. He was the most interesting guy.
He brought all this know-how and we set about doing a project on the inner belt, you
know, and we did various options. I got involved and we did a transportation model
and we discovered, the first thing we discovered was that we didnt need an inner
belt because most of the traffic was traffic passing down the Eastern Seaboard. It
wasnt heading into downtown Boston. It was using the network to bypass and then
it got on again. So it didnt matter; you didnt need to have a tight ring around the
city center. You could just as easily do a link across here, you know. So we looked at
another option that was way out and in the study that we did, that was the one I
worked on, of course it scored a very low score on public taking or impact on
housing or trade areas and businesses and it created huge opportunities. We did this
traffic model and also this economic model. It showed the benefits and and so the
result of our study was basically that we dont need an inner belt and if you do it like
this you will gain all sorts of development benefits and youll have none of those
horrendous social impacts involved with getting right in the middle of an urban area.
Its tremendous. So in a way community action and public participation came out of
those urban highways in the States. And actually it followed me, if you like, when I
went back after Harvard, to the UK. Thats when I started to work on the British
Library project, which was another big urban project in the heart of the city which
was going to have a big impact.
-TNS: So you would say it was more something you experienced than you studied?
-H: Yeah, I guess. Well, in a way we studied that highway project. We didnt go
and interview people but it was all about obviously to do this sort of project
properly you had to take full account and pay proper compensation and identify the
impacts, you know, and model them. All these impacts, generally speaking, had been
totally ignored.
-TNS: This looks better on the map.
-H: It was developing a methodology where basically if you were going to do your
big urban project, what is the right, just way to do it? And we had the same in the

320
British Library project for example. I went around and interviewed every single shop
owner in the it was 18 blocks. Its a very lively area. There was hundreds of
bookshops, etc. They all assumed this project, the British Library, hanging over this
part of London since the Abercrombie Plan which was in about, I dont know, pre-
war or something 1942 or something so thats why all these shops were there:
theres been planning blight. And there were whole blocks demolished in the second
World War and damaged and that had never been rebuilt because this project was
hanging over. So you had all these very interesting uses which were surviving there
and very low rent because of the planning blight. And I thought to myself, You
shouldnt come in I mean, the lesson I learnt from the highway project was that
you shouldnt come in and just drive the whole place out. I mean, youve got people,
youve got stakeholders there. All these antiquarian bookshops are there because of
the British Museum, because of the connection it works.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: So why dont we try and keep them, you know? So I developed an approach
where you couldnt use I suppose this was the Thatcher government it probably
was you couldnt talk about subsidy, you know. I persuaded the government client
that the purpose of this project was to build the British Library. So lets assume that
you take all the land acquisition costs and ascribe that to the library and they said
fine, no problem. So we then developed a scheme which had all these like retail
arcades and, you know, a lot of retail space around the library. We kept housing, etc.
it was a good project. In my interviews will all these shops I went around saying,
Would you be interested in staying? and they all said, Well, we cant possibly
stay because well never afford the rent. So the issue was the rent. The study I did
showed that if you took off the land value element and you say well, the library will
need show space as part of its own structure. The shops have to come around and fit
out. So you basically develop the rental value based on what it would cost to build
that show space. This worked out at about ₤2.50-2.80 a square foot, which was about
the level of rents they were paying at the time. So I went back to the them with If
we can get you back in here for ₤2.50 a square foot would you stay? They said,
Sure, of course. So thats the project we designed a design project with all these
existing stakeholders still in the project! And they were, you know But the
problem was the Americans! [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs]
-H: The same time you had the Convent Garden inquiry going on and the key figures
who came to fight the case for the community were Americans. They came out of
this experience of fighting highways in the States and I got partly involved in that.
But because of this, the Convent Garden experience, where the whole project in
their view was changed completely because they salvaged a lot more buildings
anyway, the government decided that they werent going to face that same problem
with the British Library so they gave it up. They went and found another site, so it
didnt happen probably just as well. But if they had done it that way, it would have

321
been a very interesting in my opinion the right way to go about large-scale
development in the inner city.
-TNS: Taking their existence into account
-H: Taking account of these stakeholders, the context, trying to work and thats
I suppose this is public participation in a way.
-TNS: What do you feel, when you first joined SOLIDERE, what was your first or
your major challenge?
-H: Well the major challenge was the plan itself, which was terrible. After Henri
Edde there was a lot of pressure to get a decree because in order to form SOLIDERE.
-TNS: What Im trying to ask is
-H: My impression about the place?
-TNS: No, no. What was your major challenge that was because of the war, so to
speak? Like, what is specific about a war-torn society that would have made it more
challenging for you than if this project had been anywhere else, where there was no
war involved?
-H: Okay, all right. Well, you know, there were major, major problems. I mean, it
was an extraordinary challenge. The idea of planning, rebuilding an entire city center
was an extraordinary challenge anyway, as an urban designer. But obviously here
there were many, many aspects. I mean, the city center had been effectively
abandoned. There were very few original stakeholders still left. There were one or
two still in Saifi. There were effectively none in the whole of the rest. The whole
place was occupied by refugees mainly from the south, or squatters, or whatever you
want to call them about 40,000 people. And they were living in derelict
accommodations. Some buildings were very, very badly damaged, you know,
structurally unsound. There was this huge rubbish dump on the waterfront absolute
environmental disaster really. The city itself this area of the city was
extraordinary. It struck me as it was like I imagined. Ive never been to Angola but it
seemed to me like that because the drains were broken and the streets were flooded
with water.
-TNS: Intensely busy?
-H: Well, there were rats everywhere, and there were trees. Some of these streets you
couldnt get through, they were just choked with vegetation. It was like a city in a
jungle, like Angola. It was striking and quite severely damaged, even this area the
devastation. But also, when I got to know the place a bit, it was obvious that the
Downtown was this sort of historically has been the common ground. This is
where all the religious institutions are. I mean, its the most dense conglomeration of
religious institutions anywhere in the world. Its the one part of Lebanon which
belongs to all the different groups, so the project has enormous symbolic bearing and
I could see that. You could read this if you read the metropolitan plan for Beirut, it
was done in 86 I think; its a very interesting document because in those days the
fashion was the polynucleated city. Nobody talked about city centers. At that time
the center was a disaster area. So everyone talked about the polynucleated city, about

322
subcenters, and... Now, the planners who worked applied a current methodology and
you see this new Beirut with these different centers. You can read into that, and Ive
talked to the people who worked on it and theyd never admit this, basically they
were setting up city centers in the different confessional areas.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: And this pattern was somehow going to reinforce the polarization of the city
thats what I felt.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: However, they recognized the importance of the center and it days when it was
not fashionable to talk about city centers, they said that this city center is the top of
the hierarchy and symbolically it has enormous importance. It must be reconstructed
for the sake of, you know it has in that plan you had this expression of the
symbolic value of the city center and the crucial nature of the post-war situation.
Reconstruct the city center to reconstruct this idea of the place the common
ground, the symbolic area to create a meeting point. All of those aspects are very
particular, I think, to the situation here and to the post-war situation. An example,
this is why in the planning when I got involved we started putting more and more
public space into the project.
-TNS: For this specific challenge? To face that challenge more or less?
-H: Yes, because we knew that it was going to be a private development corporation
which would, you know, take over the public role and revitalize the city center.
Probably it was therefore going to be driven by I mean, the difficult role of private
development corporations would somehow have to take it all and public
responsibilities, you know. We didnt know how that worked, would work. I think
there were some things that were working Id say the jurys still out in that issue,
but its not bad whats happening. One thing we did in the planning was, in order to
secure at least some major public projects, we wanted to put a lot of public space in
the process. So we kept increasing the amount of public space and I kept expecting
the client to say, What the hell are you doing getting rid of all this development
land? [Laughs] And I never got this. So we ended up putting a lot of public space so
that we have, in this project, a very high standard of provision by any international
standard. I mean, there are lots of reasons why we did this. One, was because Beirut
is very, very dense and thats happened because you dont have squares and parks in
the traditional Arab city it doesnt exist, its a western European concept you
know, the open space is in the courtyards of houses but all those have gone because
theyre all 12-story apartments.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: So youve ended up with a city thats immensely dense. So the public spaces like
the Corniche are absolutely essential and really work. But what we wanted to do was
provide these spaces in the city center to at the least recreate this idea of a meeting
point. People would come there because theres public space. Public space is free.
-TNS: Yeah.

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-H: And its also to do with the climate. Its Mediterranean.
-TNS: Mild.
-H: Its a Mediterranean climate, and the Mediterranean position all around the
Mediterranean they just
-TNS: People like to be outside.
-H: Yeah. You see it in Italy. In Italy they call it the piazza. In Spain they call it
something else. But basically its the idea of parading in public space. This is where
the city meets. I mean, in every Italian city you have the Coso Majore. This is where
every weekend the whole population goes and they walk up and down and they all sit
down and chat up the girls, you know. I mean thats just where it all happens. Its
because of the climate, its because of the
-TNS: Attitude.
-H: The Mediterranean attitude. Its attitude. Its the same here. The same in Italy,
the same with Spain. So what were trying to do now is really bring these public
spaces alive and make them Anyway, thats what we did in the planning because
we thought that it would somehow help create this idea of a meeting point.
-TNS: It creates livelihood in the city?
-H: Yeah, but I always wondered why the hell the client wasnt coming down and
saying, Why are you losing us all this land?
-TNS: With the real estate value you mean?
-H: Yeah, because we were taking it off, you know, the land bank. And basically
-TNS: Youre trying to chip off as much as you can!
-H: [Laughs]
-TNS: Maybe he wont notice.
-H: Exactly! [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs]
-H: Thats exactly what I was doing! So now we have like 49 percent of the whole
land area is in the public domain. Okay, a lot of its roads and streets and so on. So
its 51 percent development land. Thats a pretty good balance; you dont find that
-TNS: You do find it a pretty open area in general.
-H: If you go to any new planned city somewhere, youll find something like that
and probably a bit less. Of all that space theres something like 38 hectares which are
in green space. Now, when you look at the rest of Beirut theres only 39 hectares in
green space. This area, the city center, is 10 percent of the area of Beirut. So in 10
percent of the city youve got 50 percent of the public space. Surely this is going to
make people I mean, this is where you have the park and all the Corniche on the
seaside its a lot of that area and these are going to be fantastic spaces for people
to come and stroll and meet and you know. Theyre really where theyll come. This
is the idea and I think its working. Its working in the historic core. People come
there in the thousands and stroll around the pedestrian streets and they meet and this
is the area where this Mediterranean lifestyle happens in downtown Beirut.

324
-TNS: Did you feel like you had to compromise on anything in the plan, the planning
stage?
-H: Yeah, sure. I mean there were some bizarre things which were [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs]
-H: Yeah. I mean, we did a lot of work on the residential. I mean, one of the ideas
was that we have to or a very important part of the planning thinking was: were
doing this project in a time when city centers are in real deep trouble. All right? I
mean, they dont work, especially in North America. I mean, you find downtown
areas like Detroit, Michigan, which are about as bad as this was at the end of the war.
[Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: They dont look much different, or they didnt look much different. Theyre all
just trashed with dirt and burnt out buildings, you know. I mean, there have been
some good projects in the States. There are some cities which are doing very well. I
mean, Boston is very successful and there are good examples because people are
getting better now. Theres a big learning curve on inner cities regeneration. I mean,
if you go back thirty years and you look at urban renewal in the States it was
dreadful, absolutely appalling. Nobody understood theyd even brought some
architects in those days [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah in those days.
-H: Now everybody understands. Everybody in this business knows that cities are
quite complex.
-TNS: And that you need to bring somebody in who knows what hes doing?
-H: And that you need lots of different people with different skills. I mean, its very
complicated.
-TNS: Theres a bigger acceptance of urban planners.
-H: Yeah, yeah. And there is a I suppose whats important is I dont know
whether humility is the right word, but you need to understand that you have to work
with other disciplines.
-TNS: You need to understand systems and the connections between them.
-H: Yes, exactly. You need to understand where other people are coming from.
Transportation is one of my very bad because politicians all think they
understand, architects think they understand.
-TNS: [Laughs]
-H: Its actually very complex.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: It is really complicated and I have a lot of admiration for
-TNS: Transportation planners?
-H: The grasp that transportation planners have.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: How they can model and how they can grasp the very complex systems the way
they do.

325
-TNS: Its very mathematical in many ways.
-H: Yeah. But you need to work with transportation planners. You need to work with
economists. You need to work with sociologists. You need to have with cultural
things.
-TNS: You need to know how to work in groups definitely.
-H: You have to work in groups and you have to be a bit less arrogant. There is no
one profession that can master all this. I mean, I like to think that urban design is
where it should come together as a coordinating role.
-TNS: But you always tend to grasp one more than the other or have a little leaning
towards one.
-H: Yeah. Its true. You need the coordination is essential, but you need all these
different skills. There is nobody I know who has them all, and dont fool me. I mean,
there isnt. If you have a transport planner or, I dont know, an economist you have
to get them together and find the right balance and probably the balance is different
in different cultures.
-TNS: And depending on who the project manager is! [Laughs]
-H: But here we were grappling with this idea of what is a new kind of city center?
Its obviously no longer the central business district so its boring and it doesnt
work and there are no parks and no parking and the retail doesnt work. So what
were talking about is a mixed-use city center and lots of people are trying to do this
now. It is the new idea. So thats what were really working at: a new model for the
city center which is very mixed, its also residential which is very important. So we
worked a lot on the residential and we looked at the different you know, what
would be a target mix for example luxury, middle income, and some social housing.
We came up with a model which included something like I think it was 8 percent
social housing, and maybe about 12 percent luxury housing and a large area of you
know. So I addressed it to the client and said, you know, Well we need some social
housing. Youre going to have some low-paying jobs. Youre going to have people
servicing and all that. They said, No, were not interested. [Laughs]
-TNS: They just want luxury housing?
-H: Well, they didnt want any social housing. So thats the first thing. [Laughs]
-TNS: So no low-income housing?
-H: No low-income housing.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: Its not insolvable because just across the street here in Basta youve got a huge
area and what we need to do is connect make that connection.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: And work together with the rest of the city because there are other parts of the
city which are providing a lot of things which are not going to work here. Theres no
economic way out reality.
-TNS: Yeah.

326
-H: Another thing which didnt really work out was, you know, when you plan as a
city planner you have to normally think about public facilities its one of the
requirements of a plan.
-TNS: Parking and these things?
-H: Well, social and cultural infrastructure.
-TNS: Public restrooms and things like that?
-H: Yeah. But Im thinking mainly about schools, and cultural and social clubs and
there are sort of planning norms. In the plan we did some analysis and population
projections and in the two main traditional residential areas Saifi and ? we put
public facilities, identified them on the plan, and they were supposed to be special
sites which would take for example some type of community it might be a local
crèche, a local school, or a health center or youth club or something. This is what
you would normally do. We also put some, one or two major sites. This site here for
example [points to map] is a public facility and that we always thought of as the site
for [phone rings] a National Center for the Performing Arts. [Phone rings, H
answers, cut off recording and then resume] Yes, so and then we had it all went
through and was in the approved master plan. Then when I came back and joined the
started up planning department in SOLIDERE, then things started to get difficult.
The lawyers caught hold of it and asked, What is a public facility? Define it. Does it
mean public land or private? Now, I dont mind. I mean, I can envisage a privately-
designed public facility.
-TNS: Like a school, for instance?
-H: Yes. I mean, we have in Saifi a little kindergarten. We brought one in. So, you
know, so I said, No, it doesnt have to be. They were worried it meant public land
because the site would have to go to the government.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: Anyway, it became a very difficult kind of legal issue this. So in the end all this
stuff was struck out of the plan. So we have a plan with no requirements for any
public facilities no legal requirement you know, additional schools or something.
I mean, you know, in the planning side when we were doing the early planning we
projected a need for additional primary school. We do a projection and we figured
we needed another primary school and we started looking for a site and the client
wasnt interested in a new school. [Laughs]
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: So thats an area which, you know, if you take a conventional planning approach,
it was something that should have been in the plan.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: Look, lets see what happens because we are working right now on a land-use
strategy for the Martyr Square corridor and that includes a cultural center. They have
a whole series of projects which we are I am attempting to get into the scheme and
they include quite major cultural facilities of one sort or another plus smaller pieces
distributed. We are beginning to get individual investors to incorporate in their

327
schemes. So were asking for, we have one project for example where they are
proving us a small music arena for music events. So I havent given up on it and
were sort of hoping we can get some World Bank funding and various tricks that we
can play mainly increase floor areas the Red Cross obviously and the Ministry of
Cultures supporting us on this. We argue that its a cultural facility that happens to
be provided by the private sector, youre going to have to allow some more its
like in America its like the incentive zoning. If you provide a theater district in
New York, if a developer provides a theater you get additional 20 percent floor area
in your office tower.
-TNS: Yeah, you give them incentives.
-H: And thats how theater thats how Broadway has been saved for New York
with these sorts of techniques. If it wasnt for that kind of thing, you wouldnt have a
Broadway because theaters do not make money.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: So, were trying to use some of them here.
-TNS: Good luck. [Laughs] Do you think there is a conflict between participation
and implementation?
-H: Well, you know, youre coming from where are you coming from, L.A. or
something?
-TNS: California.
-H: So all this stuff is normal, you know. But youre also Lebanese.
-TNS: Yeah. I can understand. [Laughs]
-H: So you know that you dont have nothing like that here! Yet people are
beginning to talk about it. It hasnt really happened. I think its going to come. It has
to.
-TNS: How would you rate it? How would you rate public participation in Lebanon
on a scale, lets say, of one to ten?
-H: Right now?
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: Very low. One, two.
-TNS: You mean when I say public participation you mean public participation in
the traditional sense?
-H: Yeah. There are ways that things happen differently here. I came and did this
plan. I arrived here and there was like a media
-TNS: Frenzy.
-H: Frenzy over the Henri Edde plan. People wrote books about it! I met all these
guys who had written up books about how horrible it was.
-TNS: Criticizing the plan.
-H: This was people like Jad Tabet and the white book, I dont know if you ever
came across this famous called the white book. There were basically a series of
papers written by intellectuals criticizing a plan and it was all in Arabic so I had it
translated. You know, I agreed with about 95 percent of what everybody said of it.

328
These guys were absolutely right: the plan was dreadful. And when I was working at
Dar it was strange, Dar Al Handasahs reaction to this public outcry we had to
go out and sell the plan. [Laughs]
-TNS: So you have to convince them that its terrible but thats okay!
-H: Yeah! Mind you this was an even worse plan. After the Henri Edde plan, they
cooked up something very quickly and got the density up to 5:1 by putting towers
everywhere.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: It was really terrible; it was even worse by a long way. Thats the plan they went
out and tried to sell. However [Laughs]
-TNS: It didnt work out?
-H: It didnt work out, but what it did do was generate a lot of public discussion in
universities, etc. The criticisms were pretty good.
-TNS: Do you feel then that public participation was happening through those
different channels maybe?
-H: It was. Listen, in Europe and in the States you would have a public inquiry going
on that would take three years and the community would somehow be involved in an
a lot more formal way. But, in my opinion, the whole thing happened here much
faster and with greater impact. Id been here for about two or three weeks, just going
through all the old plans and trying to catch up and I got called for a meeting with
Nasser Shamah. What had happened was there was a technical company called
SESDERE, which was set up by Rafiq Hariri, which was really the precursor to
SOLIDERE, and our official client was the CDR but the day-to-day client was
SESDERE. We made the formal submissions to the CDR, but they werent really
interested so, you know But SESDERE was there. Hariri had put Nasser Shamah
there, so I got called in the first time by Nasser Shamah. It was the first time I met
him and he had some excuse for the meeting which was there had to be a
presentation in Paris. We had already started working and I had let it be known that
we couldnt we had something like three weeks before we had to present it in Paris
and you had to work on the basis of the existing plan. So I said, We cant do
everything at once. First well do one thing: try and build a new model which has a
new idea and one new idea which is we want to get rid of these towers. The towers
were there because it was basically kind of a modernist style of thinking.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: Its a very, very inefficient way of distributing floor space. So I said, Look,
were going to build a city of streets. Were back to the idea of the street, so were
going to the garden form where you build around the edge of city blocks to create
streets. This is a very efficient way of using space and I guess if we do that then we
can take about two thirds of the towers out. So we built the model and we did all the
calculations. The last thing we did was do the calculations and we found out that we
had even more than 5:1. We had more floor-place than was necessary and we had
really taken about 60 percent of the towers had gone from the scene. Thats the only

329
thing we did; everything else was left. Thats the model that was shown in Paris.
Nasser Shamah really it was a very interesting meeting he sat down and he said,
Look, what do you think of this plan? Because youve got all these televisions,
these papers, all this stuff everybodys complaining about it. Im not a planner.
Whats wrong with it? [Laughs]
-TNS: He doesnt get it? [Laughs]
-H: Well no, he wasnt as bad as that. I mean hes a very, very bright chick in the
garden. I had to think very quickly. I had been here about three weeks and on paper
my job was we had a master plan amendment approved by the government my
job was to do detailed sector plans break it up into pieces and to basically take a
section and do the detail. I still didnt know because nobody was saying and I had
this flat, what am I going to say? Am I going to say that my job is to take the plan as
is and work on it? And I thought to myself, No, I cant say that. Ill tell him the
truth. So I said, I think its a very bad plan. And he said, Well, what can you do
to improve it. This is actually before we worked on the model. I said, Well, look,
Ill give you three ideas to start with. One is we have to move away to a different
kind of built form and create traditional streets while building around city blocks and
I have a feeling that if we do that we can eliminate a lot of these towers. Thats very
important because there are far too many towers. Its not popular. Everybodys
complaining. [Laughs]
-TNS: Lets put it that way.
-H: And he says, Good idea. Do it. [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs] Dont go to the next two, I dont even want to know.
-H: No, he did. I said, Well, look, in this scheme you still had this idea of an east-
west you had all this greater area and you had this highway coming across cutting
off the historic core from the waterfront. Originally it had been there and then you
had the island, but it was still there! And I said, This is crazy. I mean the model
they brought showed decking and you know. I said, Thatll never happen.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: And they had buildings going across the sea thats air-rights development.
This only happens when you have very high value in New York or Boston itll
never happen here. If you build that highway it will completely cut off the shorefront
from the historic core and the whole thing is not going to work. I said, What you
need to do is connect the rest of the city into the city center. What you need to be
thinking about is bringing the Corniche right into the city center and link it into the
city center and get rid of this highway in effect. He said, Do it. [Laughs] I cant
remember, there was something else I said as well. But, you know, why Im saying
this is because there was a lot of public debate the client, Nasser Shamah and
certainly Rafiq Hariri Rafiq Hariri was very, very good and he was very involved
in this whole process personally, so he really knew what it was about.
-TNS: So he understood it really well?

330
-H: Absolutely. So the client was reacting to the public debate very, very quickly and
I was told to go and do a change of plan whatever you do, do it.
-TNS: So as long as there was a democratic sort of debate, you felt that things were
taken into account?
-H: Yes, and this whole process took about six months. In Europe or the States it
would have taken three years.
-TNS: Much longer time. Do you think there was anything that could have been done
that would have aided public participation?
-H: You know, the way things are set up here, especially then
-TNS: It was a mess?
-H: No. Its just the It just was not the done thing. The whole planning system is
set up here in a very old-fashioned way. Its master-planning top-down. Weve
broken that mold because every year we go through amendments and change it.
-TNS: It evolves.
-H: It evolves as it has to.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: Weve broken the mold of the idea of this fixed master plan. But thats the way
everyone thought. Everybody thought you had to have a master plan. The
government would pass it. The public had no importance. But of course it was and
the public was We did try, you know.
-TNS: [Coughs] Im sorry.
-H: Prince Charles is very interested in post-war development and in Lebanon.
-TNS: Really?
-H: Yeah. Hes very intrigued by Lebanon for a lot of reasons. He sees modern
Britain as a multi-religious state and he finds Lebanon fascinating because its multi-
religious and it even had a war about it and now its trying to get back. Its
fascinating. He used to send around these projects, the urban taskforces, to do
groundwork. So they did a project in Tripoli, a project in Saida, and a project here.
And they came to talk to me about what to do and I suggested we make connections
between the city center and the rest of the city. So they did that and they did a public
action plan. Hes very much interested in that. He loves people who work that field.
A very close friend of mine people like John Thompson whos one of the leaders
in action planning. So they organized a project.
-TNS: [Coughs] Im sorry.
-H: So this whole process finished up with a public meeting.
-TNS: Here? In Beirut?
-H: [Laughs]
-TNS: Shock!
-H: [Laughs] The Prince of Wales taskforce was invited here by the Prime Minister.
-TNS: When was that?
-H: Ah
-TNS: In the 90s.

331
-H: It mustve been about 98.
-TNS: In the late 90s. How did it go over?
-H: Well, they came here and they did all the work and there were all these students
and people running around Basta and interviewing people. [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs] Good luck!
-H: And then we organized this public meeting and where were we going to have a
public meeting? Luckily the Sisters at the Byzantian School were wonderful and
said, Of course you can have a public meeting in our school.
-TNS: That was nice.
-H: So the idea was to invite people who were representatives of the community
from all these areas to come and discuss their needs etc. All the people wanted to
know who was going to come: Can we see an invitation list? So they wanted to
know the names of all the people who were going to be there.
-TNS: No way.
-H: And they were worried that it was going to be taken over by Hezbollah.
-TNS: Oh, okay.
-H: So we had to take the lists and give out some names upon request. They were
very stiff about this.
-TNS: They were very suspicious I guess.
-H: Yes. Very suspicious and I would say about 80 people turned up. Now a lot of
them were sort of intellectuals. There werent many ordinary people.
-TNS: Was it well publicized? Not really?
-H: At universities But John Thompson ran the meeting and he applied the
technique hes developed for working with the public. Its a very interesting action-
planning approach and it was actually, I think, a very successful meeting and it
produced a whole list of very practical demands, requests.
-TNS: Did you have journalists there?
-H: [Shakes head]
-TNS: No press, okay.
-H: [Laughs] But after the event the whole thing was shushed up.
-TNS: Okay. Dont tell anybody that we did this. Let them not get ideas or
something?
-H: I thought it was quite successful. It wasnt crazy or embarrassing. But its still
early days. Im not quite sure how its going to happen really.
-TNS: Do you feel that, in general, youve done a good job of representing the
public? You personally, not SOLIDERE.
-H: Well, look, weve done our small bits and I feel somewhat embarrassed about it.
In this day and age, one shouldnt really proceed without public participation. I
would like to have it, but it is sort of difficult to do. But I made, lets say, a small
victory over the Martyr Square thing. I got them to do first of all lots of press and
then I got them to do a public forum. So we had this public forum and about 100
people came. People came and went, but it was a very good discussion and it was

332
quite positive and constructive. People asked if we could meet again later. I think we
will do more of this kind of stuff.
-TNS: Would it help if there were maybe some more institutional structure for it
maybe some government structure?
-H: Do you mean legislation requiring it?
-TNS: Maybe not legislation requiring it, but maybe an urban planning department
whose function was to get this feedback or, you know, do some more studies of what
the public needs are.
-H: Here the municipalities are very powerful. In Europe you could argue that the
local governments represent the people. They do, thats what they do. When I was in
a government office, we dealt with the local authority as representatives of the local
community. We negotiated with the local authority with what was known as social
compacts, which was a list of their demands in our property.
-TNS: Okay.
-H: And that was very successful because we started to feed these demands into our
process and these were huge projects. The biggest one was 150 acres, which is
about... well you know acres.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: It was a really big thing: a business park and a regional shopping center and
the local authorities said, We need social housing. Its our biggest need. We have
the highest unemployment rate and the highest birth rate in the country and we dont
have any public housing. So these very fancy developers got to work on how to do
social housing. Theyd never done it before; theyd never been asked to it. They
work in high values.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: It was a very interesting project. When you get these really sudden cases that get
financed with these huge developers thinking about social housing, you get some
very interesting results. They built what was then the biggest social housing scheme
in the UK. And it was mixed. You could rent a bit or buy a bit. It was all very
flexible. And because we had the local authority support, when these big schemes
came in the Planning Commission, it was not enough because we were a landowner,
we had to pass on to the Ministry of Environment to decide whether there needed to
be a public inquiry or not. So these huge schemes went through to the government,
the central government, and they wrote to all the parties, any objections? No. They
were surprised. No objections. So they passed it on and it came back to us to deal
with. So it took six months to get planning consent for this huge scheme. That saved
at least three or four years for the developer. So it worked. Anyway, but here the
municipality is not like that. You cant say they cant theyre not interested in
representing it seems to me.
-TNS: But they are local representatives really. I mean people vote for them.
-H: They should represent I mean I waiting for this notion of planning to reach
Lebanon. Why the hell doesnt the municipality do this? I mean, thats the way we

333
used to do it to our developers in the Docklands. Why cant they do it here? So the
Higher Council of Planning is another institution which is not something that works
as well as it should. I dont know. I have a feeling that its going to work here. Its
going to develop through citizens pressure and just the fact that the Lebanese are
very vociferous.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: They talk a lot and they argue a lot.
-TNS: They dont do much.
-H: No, but you have to take a chance with that. Thats a process that will emerge
just like it did.
-TNS: Yeah.
-H: We changed the plan because people made a
-TNS: Big ruckus.
-H: Yeah. So we accommodated, and we actually found in the process that they
made some pretty sensible comments so it made sense. I think thats more the
process that will probably we dont have very high we dont hold public
institutions in very high esteem here. I mean, they will get better gradually.
-TNS: Hopefully. Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview if I
need something?
-H: Yeah, okay.
-TNS: Im going to let you go, I know you have to leave. Thank you very much.

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APPENDIX I: Interview 9

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Okay, so is it okay if Im recording the conversation
and youve read the verbal consent and everything?
-Interviewee I (I): Yeah, sure.
-TNS: What is your background in planning, your work experience in planning?
-I: Eventually Im an architect. My education is in architecture.
-TNS: Okay. [Phone rings, I answers; TNS halts recording and then resumes] So you
come from an architecture background?
-I: Yes. I started practicing architecture. I worked in an architecture and design firm
for three years. Meanwhile I was doing research in urban design and urban planning
at AUB.
-TNS: Okay, so you did study urban design for a little bit?
-I: It was not study; it was research. Or it was not a study program.
-TNS: What did you study and whom did you do your research with?
-I: With the Chairman of the Architecture Department Jamal Abed. It was on the
Shoueifat area. Another project was on greater Beirut.
-TNS: Okay. So you studied architecture at AUB?
-I: Yes.
-TNS: What year did you graduate?
-I: I graduated in 98.
-TNS: Oh, like myself. I graduated in 98 also. I was in agriculture.
-I: Where? At AUB?
-TNS: Yes. My sister was in the architecture program at AUB, Dana Nasr.
-I: I know Dana!
-TNS: No.
-I: Yes. But she didnt finish maybe.
-TNS: No, she transferred to agriculture.
-I: But Dana doesnt look like you. Her eyes
-TNS: Not at all, not at all.
-I: How is she?
-TNS: Shes fine.
-I: Are you recording this?
-TNS: We can erase this if you want. Dont worry. So you finished your architecture
degree and then you worked in an architecture firm? So what brought you to
SOLIDERE?
-I: What brought me to SOLIDERE?
-TNS: Yeah.
-I: Ah, after doing this research in urban design I worked on a freelance project for
urban planning of the Ajaltoun area.
-TNS: Oh, really?

335
-I: It was a project by the Lebanese Government. Then I was introduced to
SOLIDERE and
-TNS: So you were interested in urban planning?
-I: Yes.
-TNS: This is unusual.
-I: In urban design. Im not an urban planner; Im an urban designer.
-TNS: Okay. How many years have you been at SOLIDERE?
-I: Three years.
-TNS: Okay. When you were at AUB, when you were studying architecture, did you
really learn about the role of the public?
-I: About?
-TNS: The public.
-I: Yes, sure, sure.
-TNS: What did you learn?
-I: We did many courses in urban design and urban planning. It was part of our
education.
-TNS: It was part of the program in architecture?
-I: Yes, sure.
-TNS: Interesting.
-I: Some of them are theoretical, others are design courses, design studios, and there
are also I mean you know at AUB you have mandatory classes and elective courses
and also some of the elective courses were in urban design. Now architecture is
always, when you want to do architecture or a certain building you have to always
take it into consideration within an urban setting.
-TNS: Within an environment
-I: So urban design was always one part of architecture, maybe at the first phases
when you do the site analysis, the context analysis.
-TNS: So what specifically were you taught about the public role in planning? Or not
in planning, I mean were you taught to think about the public as a client?
-I: This is one aspect of it, but there are other aspects. The public you mean the
people?
-TNS: The people.
-I: The people, the people living in a certain area.
-TNS: Yeah.
-I: Yes. This was always one consideration in design: to analyze the living
population there, what are their requirements, their lifestyle, how they move, their
jobs, their classes
-TNS: Yeah.
-I: And the design should respond to that. It should not be a rupture or imposed on a
population because always a design might affect the lifestyle of this population. You
can take many examples where imposing certain highways or type of buildings or

336
land-uses which change the character of a whole district or area so that has always
been taken into
-TNS: Into account?
-I: Into account.
-TNS: Thats good. What you learned in this case with regards to the public, what
you were just saying, does it contradict what you experienced during your work or
does it validate it?
-I: We always try to apply what we think is the right thing and what we learnt in our
work, but sometimes there is the market that tries to force us in a certain direction.
-TNS: Okay.
-I: I think were being able to apply to a certain extent what we think is
-TNS: Can you give me an example of when it did work and when it didnt work or
something like this?
-I: When it did work and when it didnt work?
-TNS: Yes.
-I: Ah I cant remember anything now! [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs]
-I: I can give you an example thats not my work but something Ive seen. Its a
project Ive worked on, its a research project I worked on in the Burj Hammoud
area and we did analysis for the that was when I was at AUB, it was not part of
the
-TNS: The program?
-I: The program. We did analysis for the population living in Burj Hammoud, the
type of architecture, and I see this new highway that is connecting Burj Hammoud
now with Jal El-Dib.
-TNS: Yeah, yeah. I know the one.
-I: I think as a transportation project its a good project because it links
-TNS: The two areas.
-I: Yeah, but it really destroys the fabric of Burj Hammoud. So I think this is one
place
-TNS: Where its more the market force?
-I: Yes. Its not only the market force; its other forces. I mean, the market force
might be financial, engineering, social
-TNS: Transportation?
-I: Transportation.
-TNS: You did not work during the war, so Im going to ask you: after you started
working at SOLIDERE what do you feel was the major challenge that was due to the
fact that we were in a post-war environment? Do you know what I mean.
-I: Yes.
-TNS: I mean, because Lebanon was in a post-war phase, what challenges did that
cause when you started working here challenges to urban planning?

337
-I: In our case, SOLIDERE is I mean, we are working in the area that witnessed
the war.
-TNS: The worst part of the war.
-I: Exactly, yes. And that has been most of it destroyed. So, although I have joined
SOLIDERE at a later stage where the master plan was enforced I mean, in the
design work was at a later stage, but keeping the image of the past and dealing with a
city that was destroyed and dealing with a city that was a Green Line that connects
the East and West was always present in our mind and it always affected our job.
-TNS: Would you say that that was the major challenge, linking the past or the
traditional part of the city with the more modern part of the city?
-I: Excuse me, I didnt understand.
-TNS: Would you see that as the major challenge, I mean, the largest challenge you
had?
-I: It was not reflected very much in this master plan.
-TNS: Okay.
-I: I mean, most people wanted not most people, some of the people say that you
have to reconstruct it as it was. So this was one argument and you had to deal with it.
While, on the other hand, you can see that you are reconstructing a new city and you
cannot just renew what was existing in it. Many things have changed. Life has
evolved and the city has evolved. So, I believe that we didnt have to reconstruct the
city as it was because it wouldnt have responded to the requirements of the present
situation. But, at the same time, you cannot start from scratch, I mean. We have to
save some of the past maybe at the architectural level some buildings, some
elements. If we could have been able to save a whole street that would have been
wonderful. So, at many times when we have buildings that are half destroyed that
usually have mutation we do our best trying to preserve these buildings although
some of the buildings should be preserved by the master plan but their structural
situation or the market force tends into they try to demolish and start from scratch.
So we try as much as we can to preserve these buildings.
-TNS: What was one major thing you felt you had to give up or compromise because
you were faced with post-war circumstances?
-I: I havent been in this situation. I dont remember.
-TNS: You didnt feel like you had to compromise anything? You felt like you were
planning under normal circumstances?
-I: Ah, I told you I joined this company or urban planning maybe in 2001 where
things move... war ended in 98, so most of the decisions had been taken.
-TNS: Already.
-I: Already.
-TNS: Okay. Do you feel like theres a conflict between public participation and the
implementation of a project in general?
-I: There have been?
-TNS: A conflict between public participation and the implementation of projects?

338
-I: Ah
-TNS: I mean, do you feel that public participation would make implementation
slower or faster or has any effect at all on implementation?
-I: Of course, I mean, its an ideal situation for public participation for me. And
moving in a slow track I think in reconstruction is much better than moving forward
very fast because the growth of the city should go hand in hand with the
collaboration of the public otherwise it would be artificial. Now, of course public
participation had a great effect on this project although the image is not like that.
-TNS: Yeah, I know.
-I: But even if it not official, as
-TNS: Yeah.
-I: But forums, critics everybody here looks at them. We all look at them; we all
care for the public requirement.
-TNS: So, it might not be in a formal way, but a bit more of an informal way?
-I: Yeah.
-TNS: Yeah, but you feel that in general public participation helps?
-I: No, no if you go to Martyrs Square public participation in design, in the last
competition we did public participation I believe was a great part of it.
-TNS: The forum?
-I: The fact of doing a competition where everybody was free to participate was one
part. Creating the forum with the discussion was another part; presenting all the
projects to the public also. So, we try our best to interact with the public. Now, of
course the public sometimes has needs not needs his ideas which do not go
-TNS: Criticisms?
-I: Yes, which do not go with the policies that are implemented which sometimes are
affected by the market forces. So this is why sometimes there are conflicts and were
criticized.
-TNS: Okay. [Laughs] So in general you feel like participation helps
implementation?
-I: Sure. It should.
-TNS: Okay. How would you rate public participation in Lebanon right now lets say
on a scale of one to ten, one being the lowest ten being the highest.
-I: Three.
-TNS: Three? Why?
-I: Because there is only one section, one part of the public they are the same
people who are interested
-TNS: Is it intellectuals?
-I: Intellectuals mainly, not all parts of intellectuals
-TNS: Okay.
-I: Not all intellectuals also who are interested in this debate about the
reconstruction of the city. At the same time their ideas are not always taken into
consideration. In fact, the problem that our government is in debt and has financial

339
problems and is not able to create public projects like any other city pretty much
affected the public participation.
-TNS: Okay.
-I: So many public projects you cannot expect from a private company to
-TNS: To have the same consideration that a public company would?
-I: Even if it has the consideration to provide money to finance such projects, I
believe that a huge amount of work should be done on the private sector like NGOs
in order to do the role where the public
-TNS: Has a larger
-I: Has a larger say. This has not been done. I mean, we are nothing constructed is
done its been mostly critics. So this is what I believe. The government should,
even though they are not able to finance, they should introduce laws or encourage
people to
-TNS: Force private companies to
-I: Yeah. Its not force, encourage.
-TNS: Okay.
-I: Some aspects of the public
-TNS: So they have different ways of participation.
-I: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think that since you rate public participation at a three, do you
see that as a problem?
-I: Yes.
-TNS: Okay. What do you think would have aided in public participation. You told
me the government having more of an influence on private companies?
-I: I told you the government has influence on private?
-TNS: No, no. Do you think that would have helped public participation?
-I: The government having influence on private? No, no. Having influence in what
sense?
-TNS: You were saying that they could maybe force private companies to take more
public
-I: No, no. This is not what I said.
-TNS: Okay.
-I: The government might encourage private companies not force, like tell them if
you do this you can gain like if you provide this amount of money or this space for
a cultural activity you will be compensated in another place or other types of
activities.
-TNS: So an agreement between the government and private companies?
-I: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Did you do anything to encourage public participation in your work?
-I: No.
-TNS: Okay. [Laughs] Why or why not? Why?

340
-I: Ah, Im not into public I mean, Im not the person who is involved in public
activities and I usually attend, but Im not a leader and the type of people who
are active in it.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think more public meetings would have helped the planning
process?
-I: Sure.
-TNS: Okay. Now that you look back, would you have done anything differently?
-I: I mean yes.
-TNS: Yes? What? You dont have to say: Yes. I mean, you can say, No, Im
happy. [Laughs] Dont feel like you have to answer: Yes.
-I: [Laughs] No, its yes. But I will not say what. Okay?
-TNS: But there are things
-I: So many things could have
-TNS: Done something differently?
-I: Basically on the land-use and enforcing land-uses and on marketing land-uses.
-TNS: So on a project-by-project basis?
-I: Sorry we have to wrap it up a little bit.
-TNS: Okay. Do you feel you have done a good job of representing the public?
-I: Of representing the public?
-TNS: The public in your planning activities?
-I: Ah, of course I believe this I mean, as much as I could.
-TNS: You feel youve done the best that you could do?
-I: Yeah, sure.
-TNS: How?
-I: Because I am part of the public at the same time.
-TNS: You live in Beirut?
-I: I live in Beirut; I interact with so many people; I attend all or most of the
debates and intellectual activities about the city or, not only about the city, about
music, art, anything.
-TNS: So you feel you have a good idea in general.
-I: So I have a good idea and I get comments from
-TNS: All the time! [Laughs]
-I: All the time. [Laughs] Theyre part of my system, so
-TNS: I know. So you feel that you have a good idea of what people want?
-I: Yeah sure.
-TNS: And you feel that that affects your work?
-I: Definitely.
-TNS: Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview if I need to?
-I: Yes, sure. You are most welcome.
-TNS: Thank you.

341
APPENDIX J: Interview 10

-Interviewee J (J): [Looks over interview questions] These are the answers I have to
answer?
-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): These are the questions
-J: The questions I have to answer, sorry.
-TNS: Yeah, and you dont mind being recorded?
-J: No.
-TNS: And youve read the verbal consent form?
-J: Yes, Ive read it. Ive read it.
-TNS: If you have any problem with answering any of the questions you tell me.
[Laughs]
-J: Okay. Basically Ill answer numbers one and two in one go.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Ah, Im an AUB graduate.
-TNS: In architecture?
-J: Architecture 1998.
-TNS: Oh, so you were in the same class as Wassim.
-J: As Wassim, yes, yes.
-TNS: So you graduated in 1998 from AUB in architecture.
-J: Yes. Its a professional degree in Architecture. Its five years long.
-TNS: Yeah, I know.
-J: And then I graduated I got my Masters in Urban Design also from AUB.
-TNS: Okay. So you actually did study urban design,
-J: Oh yeah. Lucky me!
-TNS: [Laughs]
-J: I got my degree after struggling
-TNS: Real hard?
-J: Between work and that.
-TNS: Oh you were working?
-J: Yeah, yeah. In February 2005.
-TNS: Oh, you got it now. Congratulations!
-J: Thank you.
-TNS: [Laughs] How long have you been working at SOLIDERE?
-J: Since 2001. 1/1/2001.
-TNS: Wow, you started really
-J: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Before that did you work in architecture?
-J: Before that I worked with a firm called Millennium Development.
-TNS: Okay, where Oussama Kabbani works.
-J: Oussama, yes. Basically we switched.
-TNS: Yeah, he left and you came.

342
-J: In fact I came before he left.
-TNS: Okay. How long did you work there?
-J: Ah, since 1999.
-TNS: Okay. And
-J: What else?
-TNS: Lets see. What did your education teach you about the role of the public in
planning your education at AUB?
-J: A lot.
-TNS: Both architecture and urban design?
-J: Not architecture.
-TNS: Okay, more urban design.
-J: More urban design. In fact, theres a specific reason why. Specifically, we had
its a dual program: Urban Design and Urban Planning.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Most of the professors have Ph.D.s or advanced post-graduate studies in Urban
Planning.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: And we had some professors in Urban Design, so you would imagine the courses
were veered more into planning.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Participation, public/private overlaps; we got a lot of case studies from Lebanon
and other countries. Ah
-TNS: So there was a big emphasis on participation?
-J: Yes.
-TNS: On the role of the public and how to participate and all these things?
-J: Yeah. And there was a yearly seminar for participation like a ring, something like
that
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Where people were invited from different backgrounds, different political
affiliations, different positions in government or NGOs or whatever and they sat
discussing issues related to planning in general: participation of the public, roles,
stakeholders, etc. So that was really, for me at least, that was really something to
sit there and participate, hear others explaining their position, governmental policies,
etc.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Ah, and I give credit to basically two or three people in the department, maybe
Ive mentioned them before: Mona Harb, Mona Fawaz, and Houeida Harisi.
-TNS: The last person?
-J: Houeida Harisi, the Chairperson of the department. Mona Harb was the Program
Coordinator, the Graduate Program Coordinator, and before her was whats his
name?
-TNS: Abed.

343
-J: Correct, Jamal Abed. Okay? And then the Acting Program Coordinator was Mona
Fawaz.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Both Monas are Ph.D.s in Urban Planning and I think Mona Fawaz was an
architect who graduated from AUB. Mona Harb Im not sure about her background.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: They created a certain platform and a kind of awareness about planning in
general, policy-making, and the role vice versa between public and private
institutions.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Ah, lets see. Number three.
-TNS: What you learnt at AUB
-J: Yes.
-TNS: About the role of the public, does it contradict or does it validate what you
have experienced since then?
-J: Basically what I learnt from AUB was experiments in public participation...
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Which was based on European or American examples.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Now these sessions or these examples etc basically introduced us to the public
role in Lebanon which was face-value it was minimum but when you really look
at it and dissect the situation all the way it is really deep. This is because politics play
a big role in decision-making and policy-making. To explain or to illustrate more
-TNS: Okay.
-J: I mean, if you belong to a certain political party, or what may have you, you
could influence the people in ah
-TNS: Decision-making?
-J: In decision-making to gear them, if you like, towards
-TNS: Certain decisions?
-J: Certain decisions regarding planning. This is the most obvious discovery if you
like from what we figured out in these sessions. Its that although people think in this
part of the world, in Lebanon specifically, that they dont have the power to make
changes however these changes are happening through indirect channels.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Because we couldnt pinpoint a direct channel. I mean, we are supposed to be
living in a democratic situation where you can talk to your representative in the
parliament and ask one, two, three, four, five. But, I mean, its not that simple.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: You know? Its a bit more intricate. Whats your affiliation? Whats your, you
know background?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: How many people in your family? How much you could affect the elections

344
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: And then youll be a decision-maker.
-TNS: More powerful?
-J: More powerful in the decisions.
-TNS: Okay
-J: So that was interesting because that meant for us you could do and be anything
you want as long as you push and affect these
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: And if you dont, you know somebody who
-TNS: Who does.
-J: And, you know?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Things will happen but it might take more time than what we could compare with
other examples from Europe of the States. And we figured out something else: that
people usually have misconceptions on the level of what they could do, what theyre
allowed to do, what they not misconceptions, lack of awareness.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: That would be a better description: lack of awareness of what they could do to
change things to their benefit.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: And whenever you start to grasp that concept, you either start to become a
politician [Chuckles]
-TNS: Yeah, you know how to work the system.
-J: Yeah, exactly. Its a primitive type of lobbying.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: [Mumbles as he reads next question]
-TNS: Well, you didnt practice during the war
-J: No.
-TNS: So Im going to ask you after the war
-J: Yes, yes, after the war.
-TNS: Just after the war, what do you feel was the major challenge that you faced
because of the war? I mean, how did the war impact you? What was the major
challenge you faced?
-J: As a planner or?
-TNS: Yes, as a planner.
-J: As a planner, I think the war created some kind of discontinuity a certain gap or
something of that sort that you could sense in doing research and you could sense it
physically on the ground. I mean, at one point there was certain development in the
urban condition of the city and of Lebanon in general and then suddenly there was a
gap. For me specifically BCD was a kind of and for me on the eastern section of
Beirut it was like that. However, I feel very relaxed after the war that I was always,
you know, trying to investigate and figure out what happened on the western side

345
and, you know, a couple of years passed by and then I know Ashrafiyeh better than
the Ashrafiyeh people do.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: So were catching up, and I think we did catch up with what was happening all
around us. I mean, we even had problems getting magazines. You know?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: To see whats happening outside.
-TNS: So there was a disconnect between us and the rest of the world?
-J: Yes.
-TNS: And even different parts of the country?
-J: Yeah, I mean thats part of what the war does.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Now luckily, or Im not sure if I am choosing the right word, we had the option to
travel outside and to look at things, etc. My parents I mean we were kids we
were just taken to another country. Sometimes we come back. Then we experience
something, turbulence or something, and then we leave to anther city.
Geographically we know Lebanon better. I can tell you that.
-TNS: [Laughs]
-J: Listening to the radio and, you know, going between Beirut, Sidon, the
mountains, further south, further north So it had its pros and cons but in general, I
think, professionally I think there was a discontinuity. And one thing our parents
always stick on was that you have not experienced the city. I mean, theres a lack of
such... other cities like Sidon and Tyr sorry Tyr and Tripoli theyre not cities for
them.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Beirut was the city. Its a lost opportunity, etc, etc.
-TNS: Beirut was the city that at the time that you felt like you needed to experience
better?
-J: Ah, I mean this is hearsay from our parents. Now Im not sure. Maybe we were
lucky enough to be involved in reproducing the city as we see it today. They say it
had a lot of transportation problems, smelly, congested, etc, etc. But, I mean, we
havent experienced it so we cant really say. [Very noisy background] But what I
can tell you is that there is a discontinuity and maybe we were lucky or not. I dont
know. Im sorry for this. [Referring to the noisy background]
-TNS: Its okay. What was the one major thing you felt like you had to give up or
compromise after the war? [Sneezes]
-J: Bless you. Sorry can you?
-TNS: What was the major thing that you felt you had to compromise or give up
after the war in your work?
-J: [Sighs and pauses]

346
-TNS: Lets say, were you taught something theoretically at the university level that
you felt you didnt implement or you didnt have time to implement because of the
post-war condition?
-J: Ah, yeah. We didnt have enough time to get our ideas to become mature.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: There was a problem with time always. This is more evident for me in the type of
companies Ive been involved with which are into urban development more than
urban design. They are both geared towards urban development and I think the main
issue was time. We had little time to really mature our ideas so sometimes we were
stuck, I mean, presenting stuff we couldnt, if you like, extend them 100 percent or
we werent convinced of them 100 percent. We had to do compromises and thats a
pity, I mean. But it was a general political mood, a policy deal, governments that
would tell you we want to eradicate all features of war and we want to come in and
inject blah blah blah, we want the economy to, you know
-TNS: To develop?
-J: To develop etc. and they wanted to inject a lot of money They wanted to create
or recreate a platform where everybody would come in and find themselves getting
interested in whatever there is and they wanted yesterday.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: You know? Thats, I mean, such hasty decisions if you like on the planners level
are obvious today. I mean I will give you one example: transportation. It is simple
and straightforward. There is transportation a problem in Lebanon. Nobody could do
it because everybody said lets privatize transportation. But you cannot privatize
transportation without setting up privacy policy and making sure that these
companies that are privatizing go to all the networks in the city and the ones that are
weak as well as... You know?
-TNS: Yeah. Where its less maybe gainful to do it?
-J: Exactly. So basically what were ending up with is that everybody is passing by
the, you know, the main roads the roads that are high-gain etc. Nobody is passing
through the secondary roads and this is like one of the major... Everybody said,
Well this is secondary. We can use private etc, etc. And now were having the
problem of too many cars; were having problems of not enough parking spaces, etc,
etc. And now after twelve years almost
-TNS: Yeah, more.
-J: They say lets see what we can do for transportation. Although if make
calculations, if you do your homework, you see that it is a very profitable sector.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: So this is one example of of
-TNS: The lack of time.
-J: Yes.
-TNS: Is there in general is there a problem between public participation and the
implementation of a project? Is there a conflict between the two?

347
-J: Of course. Public participation but in what sense you mean? Like having a
problem that interests the community and getting their their?
-TNS: Their feedback.
-J: Opinion?
-TNS: Yeah. Is there a conflict between that and implementing a project?
-J: Its an issue of I think its an issue of there isnt any precedence in that
sense. Why do I say this? I mean this is very general and not the perfect word to
explain but I want to highlight this issue.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: There isnt any precedence because when you come in people start to look at
projects and they start to suggest issues: Well this looks bad, Well this closes the
view, Well this color is I dont know what. Now you dont usually expect from
people to give you alternatives.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Although sometimes you are in desperate need and sometimes they do give you.
But these suggestions are too personal and for specific needs and hence there is a
lack of generalization Okay this is good for the country. Theyre using the not in
my back yard kind of, you know
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: This is very hurtful for projects, projects of urban city-wide or community-
wide. And I guess two results come out of such participation: either a political
decision that Okay I dont care about all these small, trivial if you like objections.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Lets see what we can do with whatever we have from suggestions to
incorporate them into the general concept and go ahead and implement it. And
usually they either pay money for people to leave a certain area so they could have
for example a bridge or something or implement a design or they go into political
pressure pressuring different parties and, you know, they know that this party of
people are affected by these leaders and then we talk to the leaders and convince
them etc. and then suddenly the problem dissolves and they dont have any more
objections.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: I mean, I can give you one example which is Elyssar.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: This is a very striking example about how participation is not even a two-way
its a three-way issue.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: You have two main people facing each other and then there is this invisible link
between people that affect the people that are facing I mean, if Im talking to you
and I know that your reference is somebody else we discuss everything, things and I
cant say yes upon. Ill convince your reference to convince you then, you know, you
might retract or he might play a little game and, you know, we resolve the issue.

348
-TNS: Okay.
-J: So sometimes its resolved by money; sometimes its resolved by giving options;
a third time its resolved by convincing the references which are usually political
parties or influential political figures. This, for example, happened a lot with the
squatters.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: You know?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: It happened obviously in Elyssar. Elyssar is a good example of public-private
partnership in a sense that they had a public Board of Directors or Board of
Trustees I dont know the form but the head of the board is appointed and the
other members are elected by the society.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: And until now it is dysfunctional because at the political level they havent
resolved how they want to envisage the southern entrance of the city.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: You know about Elyssar?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Im giving an example. Personally I think all these problems with Dbayeh and all
these issues that they havent had this conversation with the other people. I think
this is why whatever they have targeted for as clientele for their project was
misdirected because they had maybe a lack of conversation with
-TNS: A conflict.
-J: Yeah. Maybe.
-TNS: So do you think that public participation in general helps?
-J: It definitely helps if its geared in the right direction.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: If its geared towards a global understanding of the, you know, project, if it helps
the global need of the area, and of the sense of collectivity not of a personal need or
not one persons need. Its not like the background is set. I think talking to the public
and having public participation will be an excellent approach to all planning projects.
-TNS: How would you rate public participation in post-war planning in Lebanon?
Lets say on a scale from one to ten one being the lowest and ten the highest.
-J: Youre talking about participation in Beirut, BCD, or in Lebanon in general?
-TNS: Lets talk about the BCD.
-J: Okay. First let me then talk a bit about at the national level. On the national level
I think it wasnt that bad. It was around six or seven.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Specifically issues related to Christians going back to their villages and Druz, you
know
-TNS: Yeah.

349
-J: Coexistence and things like that. It wasnt bad. Theres a lot of talk about people
stealing from the funds from these issues, but that is another issue.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: On the BCD level, they did once or twice public participation in the process and
then books like these: Reconstruction and Public Participation.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: If you didnt see them yet I think they are excellent references.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Okay?
-TNS: So these are?
-J: These are critics of SOLIDERE and what were proposing etc, etc.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Now this is I think primarily because people didnt usually see public planning
before on a large scale, one. Two, I think youre dealing with a city and identity of
the Lebanese people, Beirut specifically. And theres a lot of talk of identity and it
becomes a little bit scary that youre taking out the identity and I dont know what.
Now the first sections that people havent experience planning before planning on
a large scale it has two folds. The first one is that planners themselves were
encouraged or pushed to a certain point where they had to make a visual statement of
what their plan was and that created a lot of negative criticism.
-TNS: Criticism.
-J: Like when that posted this large huge criticism of the Martyrs Square or the
buildings etc. I mean, they havent designed them. They just told someone build us a
three-D model of something. Now of these three this is a problem with the planner
and it is also a problem with the public. I mean a public that is experienced with
these issues would understand that well that what they are seeing is just one
example and its not the final image of the city. And they got these images because
their representation and this is how the general public would see it. They got stuck
there and all the conversation from that point forward is that, Okay, youre
abolishing all our memories, all our I dont know what and presenting us with a dead
architecture with no value for us, no social precedence, I mean nothing. Its totally
strange and its not beautiful above it all.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: So, the other fold is that the role of the government in the BCD development was
to give this to a private company to do. Now this I think is a fresh start for the
government at that point because they couldnt do it financially and they didnt have
the know-how to do that. They had a lot of plans and presentations and, you know,
projects but they were never implemented. For this to be implemented they had to be
geared towards a private company with, you know, with capital at stake. You know,
if you do that you will gain money, if you dont youll lose a lot of money.
-TNS: Yeah.

350
-J: This kind of market-level urbanism was the key issue to reach where we reached
here. That obviously created a set of public concerns that says, Well through this
market-driven gesture, if you like, you might have created a giant that wants to eat
everything up and you have diluted or even deleted the small group of people that are
interested in investing or have some land or property here in the BCD.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: But from that point onward we are still hearing these criticisms.
-TNS: So you feel that the participation in the BCD was lower than the rest of
Lebanon?
-J: Oh yeah.
-TNS: How much lower?
-J: Ah, at the start I think it was about four and then I think it dropped to about two.
-TNS: Did it drop just because people lost interest in the whole thing?
-J: No, because it seemed that every time there was participation it would drag the
project backwards.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: And that defied the logic of the project itself which was, Lets do this quickly,
make money, and while were doing all that were recreating the whole city.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Rebuilding it, reconstructing it, relaunching it all these, you know, re-s.
-TNS: Redevelopment, yeah.
-J: And then, I mean, after a while we figured out Well, we have stepped down from
where we originally started from, which is that the public should have a say and
slowly were climbing back up I think to where the public has a say. One example is
the Martyrs Square competition and the presentation afterwards and the
participation afterwards.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: I mean, I could hear well-informed public with quite some interesting questions
and ideas and coming from professionals maybe from different fields. And I was not
surprised at all to hear some of the old-school old citizens popping out and but it
was okay. It was an old criticism and it was answered by the existing spaces that
SOLIDERE has created.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Ah still some universities like AUB and others are still, you know, hammering
the projects with questions regarding several issues: space, culture, sociology, urban
policies, etc. and that the city still lacks. But I can, I mean, I can understand how a
city evolves and it takes a lot of time. You know?
-TNS: So do you think that the lack of participation is a problem or is it a good
thing?
-J: I think its a problem. Its not a good thing; its not a healthy thing. But it needs, I
mean, participation needs to, for me, it needs to occur at the point where the public
are aware of what they could do with such a procedure.

351
-TNS: So it needs to be more educated?
-J: A more educated participation, yes.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: In a sense that, I mean, at one point it has to happen regardless of whether its
educated or not and were happy to have it. It was like a flagship SOLIDEREs
original master plan was like a flagship to see and to experience firsthand public
participation. But it was too aggressive, one. Two, it was we didnt I mean
-TNS: It was unemotional in a way.
-J: Yeah and as a company we hadnt I mean, it was a learning experience. You
know?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: For us and the planning side and the public participants. So
-TNS: It evolved all of it evolved together.
-J: Yeah, and there was this, Okay, whats happening? Were drifting apart. And
then with maturity and with physical experience on the ground you find out that
well now after ten years of experience we are coming back to the original ideas
and were seeing eye-to-eye on several subjects, were disagreeing on other subjects.
I mean, but there is
-TNS: More awareness on the planners side?
-J: Both actually, also in the public. Dont forget, I mean, that you were asking
people to participate in something democratic if you like and they were going
through a 15- to 17-year civil war where there wasnt anything like democracy.
-TNS: Yeah, they were more interested in other things at the time.
-J: Exactly. They were interested in their homes, in getting good schools for their
kids, etc.
-TNS: What do you think would have aided in public participation? Is there anything
that could have been done?
-J: Then?
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Yeah. First I want to reconfirm the issues that everyone was still immature in this
process.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: I mean, even the ideas. The target was a good target. They wanted to do this
sharing of ideas, etc. and it was very healthy. I think both the participants and the
planners they were too young, you know, to go through the process.
-TNS: They lacked experience?
-J: Yeah.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Probably I would have imagined I mean, if we were to do this again and go
back in time I would ask people to get consultants in these issues to prep everybody
and then do that.
-TNS: Okay.

352
-J: I mean, I think it would have been much more productive and constructive also in
the sense that you wouldnt have this gap I talked about.
-TNS: Yeah. It would have maybe provided some type of link?
-J: Exactly. I mean, probably the production or the end-product would have got this
scared instead of that. Yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Did you personally do anything to encourage more participation?
-J: I, I mean, I personally got involved in the open competitions that SOLIDERE did
when I was with them. In the university I prepared a couple of sessions for
participation on talks about public participation in Beirut, in Lebanon I mean. And
with SOLIDERE I was involved in preparing the Martyrs Square competition and
all the conferences later on. Basically thats it.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think more public participation could have benefited the
planning process? Like the one for Martyrs Square?
-J: Definitely and if Im not mistaken I think we promised them to have follow-up
sessions on that.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: You know? However, the planning process takes time.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: This is the process. So Im not sure if people will be as enthusiastic as they were
the
-TNS: The first one.
-J: The first presentation. Maybe theres a general issue in the country where people
are more interested to hear about and to talk about...
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Than the presented subject something that happened in the Martyrs Square. I
dont know, Im not sure if you were here
-TNS: No, I wasnt here.
-J: But there was a lot of events: Hariri, etc.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Things were still not getting enough
-TNS: There are things that are more of a priority?
-J: Yeah, and were not getting enough time to build a solid base
-TNS: Continuation?
-J: For continuation. Unfortunately, were still like
-TNS: Grappling?
-J: Grappling.
-TNS: Okay. Now that you look back on your years at SOLIDERE would you have
done anything differently? You told me maybe you would have brought in
consultants at an earlier stage.
-J: Yeah, that was before my time. Im talking about ten years ago.
-TNS: Yeah, when they started with the master plan.
-J: Yeah. Would I have done anything? On the participation level?

353
-TNS: Yes.
-J: Yeah, definitely. I would I mean although its time-consuming, but I would get
more and more universities involved in whats happening here.
-TNS: Okay. In projects that the students can take part in?
-J: Possibly.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: I could I mean, SOLIDERE usually gets international architects, planners, etc.
where we can, you know, if you like cross-breed this kind of knowledge and
designing capabilities and planning capabilities. So we would be giving something to
the community and in return we could get from them some feedback.
-TNS: They could definitely help in doing the research.
-J: Oh definitely, and it would take whatever level these students or these
professionals have to one step up because they have this first-hand contact with, you
know, well-experienced well-known architects, planners, designers and such an
assemblage, if you like, could be flipped and presented to the public to see what they
would have to say about it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Because eventually they are the people who are going to experience such a design
and spaces and places, etc. And theyre a good judge, I suppose, especially now with
12 years of maturity, of planning, of having a lab inside the city trying to put up
projects. They have experienced pedestrian areas, you know, they have seen how
things have I think that the platform is ready the public platform is ready to re-
receive if you like these projects but, you know, presented with the mix between
whatever is happening
-TNS: So they feel that its actually coming from them in a way?
-J: Yeah. I mean, these are their kids in the schools. You know?
-TNS: Yeah. It makes a difference.
-J: And were gearing it up and taking it one notch up with an international name and
then present to them this way. So, this will be dually beneficial. How? Theyll see
themselves as part of this and the company itself and the development projects
themselves will be benefiting from these big names, etc, etc.
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Which will make the project happen and workable and, you know, people
interested to see it.
-TNS: Yeah.
-J: Buy it, etc.
-TNS: Okay. Do you feel that you have done a good job of representing the public in
your work?
-J: Ah I would I dont want to answer that.
-TNS: You dont want to?
-J: No.
-TNS: Is that because its good or bad or?

354
-J: Well because I dont want to answer it. [Laughs]
-TNS: Okay.
-J: Ill tell you off the record.
-TNS: Off the record, okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up
interview?
-J: Oh, of course.
-TNS: Okay. Thank you.
-J: Youre welcome.

355
APPENDIX K: Interview 11

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): Okay. You told me actually you didnt tell me, your
background in planning, your education in planning?
-Interviewee K (K): Okay, I did a Bachelor in Architecture here at AUB and then I
went to MIT. I did a Masters and then a Ph.D. at MIT.
-TNS: Both in urban planning?
-K: Yes.
-TNS: Okay. Well Im not going to ask you what your education taught you about
the role of the public in planning because Im pretty sure that at MIT its pretty
intense. But I wanted to see from your experience in Lebanon, does your experience
validate or does it contradict what youve learnt about public participation at MIT?
Dont laugh.
-K: [Laughs] Well, no, the thing is the Ph.D. program at MIT was not at all about
like participation is a great thing and it always works.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: When I came here after the Masters actually I came here and I tried to work
for a couple of months and I remember going to Zahle to the Municipality and the
Mayor there was talking about doing the master plan for the area and he was looking
for planners. In the middle of the meeting my fathers a planner and so I was with
him and we were sort of trying to talk about how to do a plan and I said, Well but if
you want to do a plan the first thing you need to do is you need to have a
participatory process and etc. And the mayor got really offended and he said, Im
not hiring you for that. I know what people want. Im the mayor; I represent them.
Your job is to give me the technical stuff.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: So that was pretty disillusioning a lot of disillusion. But by the time I started in
the Ph.D. and I started reading and become more critical, you kind of know that
planning doesnt really happen the way its talked
-TNS: Not here definitely.
-K: Yeah, exactly. And much of the literature anyway talks about that. So Im not
like first of all I didnt come here expecting wow, theres going to be participation.
-TNS: Yeah. You werent very heads in the clouds?
-K: No, no.
-TNS: Okay. What do you feel is the most major challenge for planners in Lebanon
that is because we are a post-war society?
-K: I think that politically it doesnt work in Lebanon and thats the main problem. I
mean, for me this is how it happens. Like if you look at all the planning projects if
I wanted to be critical and if you look at all the big planning projects that are
happening, a lot of it happens because particular offices are hired because they know
particular politicians who have particular visions of how the city should work.
-TNS: Okay.

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-K: So planning doesnt work in the sense that you hire someone who has the
credentials to do something. You hire someone because hes the friend of someone.
And this is already I mean, you appoint someone politically not because they have
the credentials as a minister not because they know anything about housing or
political issue but because you have to have a sectarian balance and then you have to
have someone whos from a certain family. And that person continues to run
planning in the same way. So I would say that one of the main impediments to
actually even initiating a planning process in Lebanon is that people are very much
appointed on the basis of who knows who and how and, I mean, the social networks
we were just talking about.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: I think in that sense it really backfires against us. Now even when its like an
international organization that comes and theyre trying to fund something different
and they hire different people
-TNS: So theyre a third party so to speak
-K: You see that the same mistakes often get done. I mean, one of the examples to
me thats very striking is that the Five Cities Project that was initiated by the
World Bank you heard about it? Its in cultural heritage and urban development
and basically its about taking five cities other than Beirut Tyr, Tripoli, Sidon,
Baalbak, and Jbeil and doing in them planning interventions that are definitely not
just participatory but actually involve the local community to try to use their heritage
in ways that can extract economic opportunities that would go to the local
communities.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: But then if you look at who the offices that were hired were predominantly
architects who are big names in the city.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: So if you go to Tyr, you hire (God rest his soul now) Pierre El-Khoury whos an
unbelievable architect but hes not a planner.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: And so a lot of the way things happen is basically because people who go to
names of architects that are very well-known and people still conceptualize planning
very much in terms of the physical...
-TNS: Okay.
-K: The architectural stuff. So I think these are the kinds of the issues. I mean,
planning in the way you would think about it in the States as a non-physical thing is
not very common here. In fact, I mean, even here we changed the name of the
Planning program. Were about to make it Urban Planning and Policy to signify that
we are not only an extension of architecture and that there is a non-physical
dimension of it that needs to be activated. So its kind of funny because if you look
at whats happening now in the States, the planning departments are trying to back to
architecture

357
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: And say that there is something spatial about them. But we havent even
transitioned out of architecture here to go back to it. So a lot of our students here get
shocked after their first semester. They come here and theyre like, What are you
teaching us? So the whole word planning is conceptualized as very, very, very
physical.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: I dont know if that answers you.
-TNS: No, no, thats great. Do you feel that the planner working in Lebanon needs to
compromise on their beliefs lets say?
-K: For sure. Definitely. Definitely. I mean, if I talk about my own experience
working on this project the Five Cities in Baalbak or again the we did Ikleem El-
Tuffah with Mona Harb definitely I mean, every project that I submit has like a
two-page front that says why the methodology of the project was extremely
problematic. Its always like they find the money at the last minute then you only
have two weeks. And if you can do it that would be great but otherwise its not going
to really happen. So youre constantly doing things like that. Now, we also are
academics. We tend to have higher ideals
-TNS: Of course. Of course.
-K: Than most people. But I would say that if you interview a lot of planners they
would tell you yes. Yeah. Yeah, definitely.
-TNS: In the specific example you gave me, the Five Cities, what did you feel you
had to compromise on? The participation factor?
-K: Definitely theres never, never a structure of participation because anywhere
when you want to do participation the way you think it should happen, you should
not be an outsider hired to go for two months and do a project. People should
conceptualize planning as a very long thing where master plans are done not a
finished product. Do you know how they do it here?
-TNS: Yeah, they finish it and then they
-K: And then after 20 years they go back to revisit it.
-TNS: Want to try and sell it. Yeah.
-K: Thats it. And yeah, even the way the master plan is done its exactly like youre
saying. In theory [Phone rings] Sorry I need to
-TNS: Its okay. [Stops recording and then resumes] So you feel that
-K: I forgot what I was saying.
-TNS: You were talking about the participation factor in Five Cities and you were
saying something like
-K: Yes. That they do the master plan and then they in theory its the Municipality
that should ask the DGU to do the master plan; in practice the DGU decides which
area needs planning and very often the Municipality will hear about it years later and
then its a whole problem and this is what had happened in Baalbak. When they
hired us to do sort of a participatory project and we did very micro interventions

358
we did a set of very micro interventions, which were basically about picking the
small areas in the city and trying to help residents transform part of their own houses
into a restaurant or something like this. By the time we came to do this the whole
fight between the CDR and the Municipality was obviously about the master plan
essentially it was about the ratios that were given for constructability in the different
areas of Baalbak. So they were fighting about money basically, while we came in
and we were really interested to initiate something which was more like not
participation in the sense that you go to the local community and you just say what
you want but you initiate small planning interventions that were very micro which
would really involve the local community.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: And there was a lot of negotiations and back and forth between us and them and
we wanted these interventions and the Municipality would say, But you cant do
them because if you do seven of those how would you pick the seven families?
-TNS: Okay.
-K: They had more concerns about these kinds of things than always it went back
to the FAR (the floor area ratio) and the constructability basically.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: That was their whole obsession. And the Italian consultants with whom I was
working did not really care for more than basically doing a project that was kind of
okay and getting the money out. So they were willing to respond to the pressures of
their client, which was the CDR, while were not because we were there more of our
interest in the project. We were all academics from our side. So there was a lot of
this kind of pushing where you see at the end that even if you impose a set of choices
and options which are more participatory and small-scale and involving local
communities, then they prioritize all the interventions from one to 20.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: And ones we had suggested, everything that was about giving power to the local
community etc., was left for phase five of the project or phase three.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: While everything that was more designing an alleyway and doing the parkway
and things like this was prioritized as we got to do it; this is what we need.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: And we knew this was totally problematic. But the way I understood it was from
talking to people in the CDR and even talking the teams that were hired didnt find
the World Bank to actually commission this project. These are civil engineers, these
are people who do physical things, these are people who are trained in rational
planning and to them these interventions are things they know how to do. While
when you talk to them about doing small bread and breakfasts and small hotels they
feel that these are very small piecemeal things that they dont know how to manage.
-TNS: Yeah.

359
-K: They dont have the requisite access. So a climate of being sort of and then
you go back to local authorities and its not only that they are interested in the Floor
Area Ratio and things like that, its also that they dont want you to report any new
way of managing the city.
-TNS: They dont want the change to happen.
-K: No. I mean, they dont know how to manage it. So we said, Look the way you
have the building law theres a table in Lebanon and you have to do A, B, C, D, we
dont think this table can apply in this area which has a different way of
understanding building law which is more about general guidelines.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: And that they totally could not understand. Obviously the person who hired you
at the end gets really upset with you because they dont want to experiment. They
want to respond to their clients and they can get other big projects. So it ends up
being a mess in between the interests of people from outside, the training of the
engineers themselves, and the local authorities have different constraints than those
that we cared for. You see what I mean?
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: So thats basically how something that started out very grass-root and
participation
-TNS: And thats how it turned out in the end.
-K: Ended up prioritized year 2009!
-TNS: [Laughs] By then the plan would have finished anyway. Okay. Do you feel
that there is a conflict between participation and implementation in post-war
planning thats different maybe than regular planning?
-K: I dont know. I havent worked elsewhere.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: But what I can tell you is that from what I read in the literature theres always a
lot of trouble doing participation.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: Its not so simple.
-TNS: Its not very specific to Lebanon.
-K: Its not, no. I dont think that, yeah, were very third world. Then even if you
think about conflict and civil war, I mean, its very third world, I mean.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: Most third world cities have had their civil war at one point or another.
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: So, I dont know.
-TNS: Okay. How would you rate public participation in Lebanon right now in the
post-war process?
-K: I think its exactly what you said. Its through social networks. This is how I
would understand it.
-TNS: Okay.

360
-K: The only participation that really happens is what they do through social
networks. I mean, if you know someone you would call them, you would tell them,
they will tell you something something like that. But now projects with funding
from the World Bank they are forced to do public participation.
-TNS: But they do it in their own way?
-K: You know how they do it? Like they invite the Municipal Council and they ask
everyone on the Municipal Council to give their opinion and theyve done and
represented the process. Things like this happen all the time.
-TNS: So its not actually the people, more their representatives?
-K: Or they try at one point in Tripoli its always Ive yet to have heard I
know that in the south in one of the municipalities they tried to do a participatory
budget, I really dont know what happened with it but in Jheem. But by and large,
in general, no I dont think theres an actual participatory process in planning where
planners are hired or have like the community hire someone.
-TNS: Okay. So lets say on a scale of one to ten how would you rate participation
right now?
-K: [Laughs]
-TNS: [Laughs] Very low?
-K: Yeah, yeah.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think there could have been anything that would have aided in
public participation?
-K: Definitely. Definitely, I think that in some ways its if you think of the
informal settlements at the southern suburbs to go back to Beirut, if there was a real
will to create a contract with the local population and really do something there was
a lot of ways to do participation because theres a lot of self-help projects in the
informal settlements. I mean, all these areas in the southern part of Beirut grouped
through resident councils or resident communities and they installed very often their
own self-help sewers, they got their own water, they so there was for a very long
time a very active civil society
-TNS: Grass-root?
-K: Or grass-root, whatever you want to call it, that was very involved in the making
of these neighborhoods. They could have been involved as partners and you could
have had free participation, but what they preferred to do is probably for expediency,
probably because this is how they do things, they definitely preferred to take the
political I mean, it was to the interest of the way the government saw things would
happen to bring in the political parties and accept them as mediators with the local
community because it makes it go faster.
-TNS: Okay.
-K: More expedient and the political parties then speak to the residents. Now,
undeniably the political parties have different interests from the community. I mean,
theyre third parties; theyre not the community. You see?
-TNS: Yes.

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-K: But its very convenient to take them as the community and then you can work,
which is kind of what you were saying.
-TNS: Okay. Do you think things like public meetings, public forums could have
helped? What Im trying to say is: are the Lebanese people receptive to these things?
-K: I actually think so, yeah. I actually think so. I think that I think that I mean,
I dont know if this is the format and this is the format that happens in the States
where you go to the town halls and things like this
-TNS: Yeah.
-K: Im not sure this is the format. But what you can see is like when there is a big
project about to go in a community or something like that, you do see the residents of
the local community getting together trying to gather information. They also gather
information from social networks. They respond to the projects by going to visit the
politicians also through social networks; they get an appointment with one of their
representatives etc. So in these kinds of situations it is possible to involve the local
community. I dont know if it would be in a public meeting where you post up
signs but definitely I think theres an interest especially now I dont know
enough about everyone, but I can tell you inside the informal settlements of Beirut
because Ive done a good amount of research in several of them there is a
modernized civil community that tries to learn about the project and tries to get
involved in them and there there is room to do things that also involve people. But
Im not sure its through hearings, I mean, Im not sure whats the tool would be I
think.
-TNS: Maybe it would be different with different communities.
-K: Yeah, you have to experiment. You have to test things. We cant just
-TNS: Okay. Would you allow me to return for a follow-up interview maybe?
-K: Yeah.
-TNS: Thank you.

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APPENDIX L: Interview 12

-Tala Nasr Stevenson (TNS): So youve read the verbal consent and youre okay
with the script and everything?
-Interviewee L (L): Yeah, its fine.
-TNS: Okay. What is your background in planning?
-L: Ah, in planning actually Im
-TNS: An architect?
-L: Originally Im an architect and I studied urban design.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Not urban planning. I got involved in urban planning through practice more than
anything else. I started working for the Boston Redevelopment Authority for years
and then being a planner, I mean a planner and an urban designer for Downtown
Beirut since its inception.
-TNS: So when did you start working with SOLIDERE?
-L: Immediately after the almost the civil war was officially declared open
ah, over in 1991 and I started my job with SOLIDERE in 1992.
-TNS: Okay. So that was basically after the inception of the master plan?
-L: It was, yeah, when the first version of the master plan was announced and there
was a public debate about it. It was not an officially approved master plan. There was
division.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: So that was directly after division was announced, yeah.
-TNS: Okay. You were educated in urban design at Harvard?
-L: At Harvard Graduate School of Design.
-TNS: Okay, and what was was there an emphasis in that education on public
participation in planning?
-L: Yeah, pretty much, you know, its the American or the western philosophy of
both practice of urban design and urban planning to public involvement and
community building and community involvement, you know, groups etc. That was
definitely quite applied in Boston.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Particularly when we worked on the Big Dig, the central artery, which is the
biggest project still on-going in Boston where all the community groups involved
had to be brought in, talked to, we had to build consensus. It was the actual way
business was done over there.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Which obviously in Beirut was not the case.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: You know?
-TNS: In the beginning of the master plan?

363
-L: Til now. I think it is not the difference between the western application and
where we are is in the west its now an institutionalized process: the citizen knows
his right and the authority knows their limitations so they both discuss.
-TNS: They balance.
-L: Exactly. The authorities always would like not to do more than what they need to
do if they can
-TNS: Exactly, in Lebanon.
-L: But thats not possible because of, you know, its a quasi-transparent democracy.
People know they cannot get away with murder in a way.
-TNS: Yeah.
-L: In our part of the world, at least in Beirut, Beirut is quite a city where people are
vocal but they are vocal not necessarily they can become politicized, more than
vocal for their own benefit.
-TNS: How?
-L: As citizens.
-TNS: So more or less for the good of their political parties?
-L: Yeah, it could be. I mean now it became more evident as time passed. When
things started in Beirut back in 1991, I think the people who were vocal were
genuinely vocal because of their personal interests in the project like anywhere else.
And we have to remember it was just the end of a war where all the political parties
were coming out very weak. You know? They were totally out of
-TNS: Exhausted.
-L: Exhausted. So what happened when a project like this in Beirut when a big
planning project is announced because we have a free press here people talk to each
other through the press. They dont talk to each other in a meeting. So it becomes
criticism most of the time and it becomes, you know, sort of
-TNS: So the pubic debate happens within the media?
-L: Within the media mostly.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: So the media is very, very active because it goes talking to, you know, whoever
has a voice who wants to say something.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: So, in a way, this becomes the platform the media either TV or press or
whatever. Its not through a one-to-one dialogue between the authority and the
Also because we dont have anything called community groups.
-TNS: Yes.
-L: The notion of community does not exist. Back in the west you realize youre
sitting, youre living in a particular community. It has limitations, it has a stature, it
has a
-TNS: A representative.

364
-L: A representative. These things dont exist. So the notion of community is the one
big community or there are religious communities, but you dont have the notion of a
physical community that the
-TNS: Yeah.
-L: And thats very important.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: You know? When you want to discuss with someone you say, Get me the
community representative. The community representatives are very much political.
-TNS: Religious?
-L: Yeah, religious or parties. Theyre not the civil society representatives per se.
Now, my feeling is that over the years lots of things positive things have
happened in this country. There are now civil society representatives. There are
Its a bit more mature, but its not still as institutionalized as it is in the west.
-TNS: Okay. Did you work during the war here? No, you didnt. You came after the
war?
-L: No, I did.
-TNS: You did?
-L: I worked until I left Beirut in 86.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: So from 75 until 86
-TNS: You worked as an architect?
-L: No, I was still quite young actually.
-TNS: Yeah. [Laughs] Youre not that old!
-L: [Laughs] No, no. I did work as an architect only for two years after graduation.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Okay? I finished in
-TNS: And that was during the war?
-L: Yeah. I studied during the war and I practiced during the war.
-TNS: You graduated from AUB?
-L: No, from the Beirut Arab University. I still remember we had to study under the
kerosene lights; there was no electricity you know, the stories you hear about
people. But at that time, I think, many of us were fortunate to have the opportunity to
travel.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Today when you compare our situation to some of our colleagues that did not
have the opportunity to go out for higher education, which is now almost 20 years
after the event, you see that your career has logarithmically excelled and theirs is
just simply
-TNS: Yeah, it makes a huge difference.
-L: A big difference, and I think thats good fortune because many of us who
traveled did not have even the means to travel. It was so expensive at that time
because of inflation and we had an institution, which was the Hariri Foundation,

365
which gave scholarships to everyone whos willing and able to travel and that
changed a lot the
-TNS: It changed your whole future.
-L: Absolutely! Individually and collectively, you know, of a good 50,000 people
had this chance.
-TNS: Yeah.
-L: So nowadays when you go around you find many, many people in this country
who are educated. I personally think that a lot of the credit goes to that foundation
that gave them that opportunity during the war: just to escape, go somewhere, have a
good education.
-TNS: Have a good education
-L: And then to decide for themselves
-TNS: To have at least a choice to come back.
-L: If they want to come back or not.
-TNS: To contribute to society. Okay. How did the war affect your work?
-L: Its an interesting question. I think I would say the war affected my work in the
way it affected me as an individual the way I think rather than the way I practice.
A war society is a very much a politicized and protective society. You have to
protect yourself in a way, you know. You have to learn how to shield yourself in
different ways, either physical or emotional
-TNS: Survival
-L: If you want to survive, absolutely. My feeling is this sort of shielding effect gave
you a distance from pressure. You can be pressured by work, but at one point you
have the ability to stay very far and just
-TNS: To normalize?
-L: To normalize it or sometimes shut it off totally. And thats I think thats a skill
of survival that many people who managed to survive in a decent way the war to
be able to shut it off that its out there but its not affecting me, you know.
Particularly when the continuous shelling and bombing etc You simply say
-TNS: Its not happening.
-L: Its not happening.
-TNS: Denial?
-L: It could be denial. Youre right. When it comes to work, I think with the level of
pressure that we do in planning working with a lot of people, at least when in the
evening personally I know how to shut it off, to zone it out. It stays in the office. The
moment I go out I can have a life in a way.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: And also from a practical point of view, I think we understand the politics of
people very well. We simply are not people that can see things the way they are. We
always know that theres another story somewhere thats not told, and thats also I
would say its either a war, or a Lebanese, or an occidental, I dont know but theres
always this sense of not doubt but you always want to see beyond whats evident.

366
-TNS: Behind the scenes.
-L: Theres always something, you know, particularly also when it comes to large-
scale planning. Theres always a story of power somewhere. Okay?
-TNS: Yes.
-L: No one does things just for the benefit of I mean some people do.
-TNS: Very little.
-L: But very little. Theres always a power somewhere thats trying to do something
for its benefit one way or the other. So this is really, we got to learn it because also in
our day-to-day life you have to see beyond the cliché titles of politics. You need to
go see beyond and thats also affected us the way I see work.
-TNS: Okay. What was the major challenge that you after you started working at
SOLIDERE in the post-war planning, what did you feel was the major challenge that
you faced that was brought on due to the war?
-L: Ah, okay, I can slice the question also in different categories. First, you could not
find appropriate clear-thinking or open-minded professionals.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: So most of the people that we hired were people that were brought from outside.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Which was problematic to a point because we were seen as the outsiders to the
community.
-TNS: They were not part of the community.
-L: They were not part the professionals that were, I mean, a lot of the department
that I did establish I would say more than 95 percent came from abroad. I mean,
Lebanese obviously but they came from abroad; they were educated somewhere in
the France, England, U.S., you name it and they came back home and we hired.
We were not able to hire lots of locals because the problem was still too close to
them. They could not see the bigger picture. Second, we had to create a whole
different culture of practice the way things are practiced really. I still because
this a country that is corrupt to its core and when youre in a planning decision-
making position you can always affect wealth of individuals through zoning,
changing the plan, you know there are little small decisions that you can make that
you can create or you can make someone wealthy, as simple as that.
-TNS: Or very poor.
-L: Or very poor. Okay? So we were subject, I remember at that time, to a lot of
temptations.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: And a country that is all a mercantile country like Lebanon, believe me people
know how to tempt you.
-TNS: Of course.
-L: They have all kinds of things
-TNS: [Laughs]

367
-L: Everything, you name it: from, you know, getting a big invitation to travel
somewhere to having really nice golden gifts to even coming with a straightforward
saying you can make x amount of money!
-TNS: Right.
-L: Now, we had personally I understood that this had to be dealt with.
-TNS: Okay.
-L: Okay? Because thats how the country was functioning. Okay? And what had to
be made clear in a way to bring this culture of resistance almost to corruption, to the
individuals that were starting because, you know, people can be tempted.
-TNS: Of course.
-L: When youre telling someone who is, I dont know, 26 years old he can make a
million dollars just by saying something thats very tempting! You know?
-TNS: Of course!
-L: You know? And its not like you get the you get it in cash. Its straight.
-TNS: Its on your desk.
-L: On your desk if you want. So, and also a lot of our work was in cash. When we
had to deal with the refugees problems, we had to pay in cash. At certain points you
would have in your office 20 million dollars in cash and you had to distribute cash to
people who had certain agreements to how much they... it wasnt through checks. So
when youre dealing with cash, imagine its like being in a mob scene.
-TNS: Yeah.
-L: Okay? Fortunately, I think, many of us at that time were idealists. We had an
ideology saying things in this country were still I would say young and happening
and we want to change, you know, like any youth. We made sure to make the group
understand that were different that this breed of people that is doing the
reconstruction has a mission. Were the new generation, were not corrupt, we will
say things the way they are, we will say no in your face, we will be diplomatic it
worked! I will say it did work because for the longest time Im not sure at the
moment to tell you the truth where we are in the perception towards SOLIDERE and
Im here to comment on that, Im starting to hear some news of, you know, bad
smells here and there but during that period, I think, this was a big challenge: how
to shield yourself and how do you create an internal transparent culture. There were
different techniques employed within the group, employed outside, but the moment
you cut one or two people short from outside coming to do it, trust me the news
spreads out that these people are you cannot do anything with them.
-TNS: Yeah. You cant bribe them.
-L: At that time, the moment we did that, things normalized. We started talking
-TNS: Were there any threats or anything like that?
-L: No, no, no. It was all no, I would not say. There was no threats. There was no
point of threatening anyone. If there were threats they could have happened at a
much higher level.
-TNS: Okay.

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-L: At our level of practice it was just individuals trying to make a buck.
-TNS