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Waves of Japanese foreign policy: from constrained bilateralism and political multilateralism to reinforced bilateralism in the post-Cold War era

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Waves of Japanese foreign policy: from constrained bilateralism and political multilateralism to reinforced bilateralism in the post-Cold War era

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Content WAVES OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: FROM CONSTRAINED BILATERALISM AND POLITICAL MULTILATERALISM TO REINFORCED BILATERALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA by Daniel Koichi Nagashima Jr. A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES) August 2007 Copyright 2007 Daniel Koichi Nagashima Jr. ii EPIGRAPH "Creating a new path to the future through compassion, Binding a good relationship through harmony." ---presented to Dr. Daisaku Ikeda by Premier Wen Jiabao iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to the many individuals at the University of Southern California who have helped me develop my academic abilities and capacities following my education at Soka University of America (SUA). Many individuals have constantly encouraged me through their strict, yet compassionate guidance and supervision. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Saori Katada of the School of International Relations and Dr. Apichai Shipper of the Department of Political Science. Moreover, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to SUA for allowing me to realize my mission in life. My training and experience at SUA serves as the foundations for my academic studies today and through my education at SUA, I have come to realize the true significance of one individual’s limitless capacity. Finally, as SUA’s founder and my mentor in life, Dr. Daisaku Ikeda has constantly served as a source of inspiration both intellectually and spiritually, and I am deeply indebted to his continuous encouragement and guidance. iv Table of Contents Epigraph Acknowledgements Abstract Introduction Chapter 1: Gaiatsu to Antimilitarism: Theories of Japanese Foreign Policy External Stimulants: Gaiatsu, Reactive States, and Alliance Dilemmas Domestic Stimulants: Cultures of Antimilitarism Chapter 2: Domestic Volatility and Crisis in the Post-Cold War Era Prelude to Japan’s Lost Decade: The Bursting Bubble End of the 1955 System: Political Corruption in Japan Chapter 3: Too Little, Too Late: Japanese Foreign Policy and the Gulf War Factor in the Post-Cold War Era Chapter 4: Constrained Bilateralism and Multilateral Diplomacy: Dualism in the Post-Cold War Era U.N.-Centered Diplomacy: UNTAC and the PKO Bill Regional Forums and Multilateralism: APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3 Disappointment in Tokyo: Setbacks to Multilateral Diplomacy Chapter 5: Towards Reinforced Bilateralism: Evolution in the 21 st Century Towards Assertion: The Iraqi War and the Gift From Heaven Regional Stimulants: Rising Instabilities in East Asia The Rise of China: Anxieties Posed to Japan and Regional Stability Insecurity in East Asia: The Erratic North Conclusion Bibliography ii iii v 1 6 6 9 12 12 15 19 23 25 29 34 41 43 47 48 54 62 70 v ABSTRACT The post-Cold War era forced Japan to reassess its foreign policy and play a more proactive role in global affairs. Japanese foreign policy has greatly evolved in the post-Cold War and this paper seeks to examine the waves of Japanese foreign policy by beginning with an analysis of postwar theories articulating Japan’s reactive and minimalist state. Subsequently, this paper examines domestic factors supplementing external factors which triggered Japan’s foreign policy evolution. Next, this paper outlines Japan’s first wave of evolution based on Japan’s “constrained bilateralism” with the United States and its efforts towards multilateral activism. This paper further explores the failures of multilateralism and analyzes Japan’s second wave of “reinforced bilateralism” under the Koizumi administration which saw the emergence of Japan’s independent, proactive, and comprehensive foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. This paper concludes by analyzing the wavelet of Abe’s “reverse course” and its implications to Japanese foreign policy. 1 INTRODUCTION Months before Koizumi Junichiro’s tenure as Prime Minister reached its finale, President Bush and Koizumi engaged in a “Sayonara Summit” in Washington. Knowing that Koizumi was an avid fan of Elvis Presley, President Bush invited Koizumi on a tour to Graceland following two days of consultations and discussions on bilateral relations. The visit to a tourist hotspot by the Heads of State was a symbolic gesture of the intimacy between the two leaders and the robust nature of the bilateral alliance. Like the Ron-Yasu relationship in the eighties, the George-Jun relationship was grounded on a firm and trustworthy bond between the two leaders which ultimately echoed into their policies as well. Indeed, Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States has never been stronger, and the Koizumi administration successfully nurtured and fostered its relationship with Washington. The solid alliance evident during the Koizumi administration came after an era of instability in Japan. Following the end of the Cold War, Tokyo was showered by a plethora of setbacks and obstacles. After its postwar rise as an economic giant, Japan’s sudden hiccup during the nineties seemed like an enigma. In addition to the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy, the stability and dominance of the so-called 1955 system came to a crashing halt when the LDP lost the majority with the rise of coalition governments. 2 Following such a decade of hardships and obstacles, Koizumi succeeded in reinforcing Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States and fostering a sense of confidence deficient in Japanese politics and foreign policy. What then triggered such a drastic transformation, and what triggered such a change in the nineties? To understand the nature of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, it is vital to comprehend the waves of Japan’s foreign policy during the “lost decade.” First, this paper begins by examining the theories which have articulated the characteristics and strategies of Japan’s postwar foreign policy. Due to Japan’s asymmetrical dependence on the United States for extended deterrence, Japan inherited a reactive and minimalist policy. Beginning with Kent Calder’s definition of reactive states, this paper examines the primary theories which embodies Japan’s minimalist strategy in foreign affairs during the postwar era, including Michael Blaker’s interpretation of Japan’s minimalist strategy, Victor Cha and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama’s explanation of Japan’s alliance dilemmas based on its fears of abandonment and entrapment, and Thomas Berger’s analysis of postwar Japan’s culture of antimilitarism. Analyzing the theories articulating Japan’s postwar foreign policy clarifies the restructuring that Japan’s foreign policy underwent in the midst of the post-Cold War era. Secondly, this paper examines the domestic instabilities which rained on Japan prior to the drastic changes evident in the nineties. Japan’s rise as an economic giant will be evaluated in addition to the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy. 3 Afterwards, a discussion will elaboration on the disintegration of Japan’s political stability. By examining the end of the 1955 system and the LDP’s failure in stabilizing Japan’s political arena, this paper elucidates how domestic instabilities plagued Japan and resulted in a “lost decade” which forced Japan to begin altering its foreign policy in the advent of the post-Cold War era. Thirdly, this paper analyzes the reaction of the international community regarding Japan’s Gulf War response and the sense of urgency Japan felt to respond to gaiatsu. Due to increased gaiatsu evident in the post-Cold War era, Japan began re-examining its foreign policy and taking active measures to assert itself in the international community as a “normal country.” By outlining the events of the Gulf War, this paper asserts that the international environment became hostile to Japan’s postwar foreign policy of bandwagoning with the United States. The Gulf War was symbolic of the international hostility and gaiatsu Japan received in the post-Cold War era which ultimately ignited a shift in Japanese foreign policy. Fourthly, this paper examines Japan’s foreign policy transition in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Following the Gulf War, Japan sought to cautiously and incrementally alter its foreign policy by continuing to maintain its bilateral framework with the United States, albeit in a constrained manner. Following the Gulf War, Japan saw no alternative to its security alliance with the United States. Due to its extreme dependence, Japan was forced to maintain “constrained bilateralism” with the United States while seeking to expand its foreign policy 4 through multilateral frameworks. Japan began taking active measures to respond to gaiatsu and expand its international political role by engaging in institutions like the United Nations, APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3. The evolution of Japan’s “lost decade” clarifies Japan’s shift from postwar re-activism towards greater participation in multilateral institutions and the maintenance of its bilateral alliance with the United States, albeit in a constrained manner. Fifthly, I examine how the idealism of multilateral diplomacy was short lived and its failures led the Koizumi administration to re-establish a bold and assertive foreign policy which shifted from constrained to “reinforced bilateralism.” In this regard, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 served as a convenient raison d'être for the Koizumi administration to launch a proactive and assertive foreign policy. This paper further examines the regional instabilities that began emerging in the late nineties, including the rise of the People’s Republic of China and the threat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Both served to arouse anxiety and fear in Japan, thus serving as further pretexts towards greater engagement and activism based on a reinforced alliance with the United States. In addition, Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine will also be discussed to clarify the changing domestic environment which has allowed greater assertion and proactivism in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy. This paper concludes by examining the recent wavelet the Abe administration has generated in the post-Koizumi era. While still early to conclude, Abe’s “reverse 5 course” has focused on mending strained ties with East Asian neighbors and re- defining its foreign policy in a wider scope. Abe has sought to reverse Koizumi’s course of centering solely on its bilateral alliance by expanding Japan’s political presence in East Asia. The post-Cold War era saw drastic changes in the international arena. In particular, Japan faced a new era in which its identity came into question. Examining the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era sheds light on Japan’s newfound identity based on Japan’s reinforced bilateralism with the United States. The current shift evident in the Abe administration exemplifies the drastic transformation Japan has made since the end of the Cold War. By exploring the waves of Japanese foreign policy, it is evident that Japan has moved from a reactive and acquiescent nation in the postwar era to a more aggressive and independent nation seeking greater acceptance in the international community based on assertive and proactive foreign policy. 6 CHAPTER 1 GAIATSU TO ANTIMILITARISM: THEORIES OF JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY External Stimulants: Gaiatsu, Reactive States, and Alliance Dilemmas Gerald Curtis asserted that three common themes have symbolized Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar era: “(1) an emphasis on a minimalist strategy in its foreign policy; (2) the importance of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States; and (3) the challenges posed to Japanese foreign policy in relation to its status as an economic superpower.” 1 As Curtis delineated, it is within such a comprehensive framework and overview that one is able to observe Japan’s enigmatic foreign policy in the postwar era. In addition, to comprehend Japanese foreign policy, it is vital to examine Japan’s evolution based on the prism of its bilateral alliance with the United States. 2 In particular, Japan has been extremely sensitive and reactive to American gaiatsu. Gaiatsu refers to an “explicit or tacit attempt by foreign countries to make Japan do what it would not otherwise do.” 3 In Japan’s postwar foreign policy, gaiatsu has been an effective stimulant which determines the direction of Japanese policy making and 1 Gerald Curtis, introduction, Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald Curtis (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993) xv-xxvi. 2 Michael Blaker, “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,” Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald Curtis (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993) 3. 3 Akitoshi Miyashita, “Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1999) 697. 7 foreign policy. In particular, Japan has been highly responsive to gaiatsu from the United States. Edward Lincoln from the Brookings Institution asserted that “The U.S. government has been the principal source of the outside pressure, a role that has come about as a result of historical legacy (the war and occupation), a vague sense of international hierarchy (the Japanese still view the United States as more prestigious and powerful than their own country, an overwhelming focus on maintaining access to American markets for goods and investment (given the large shares of exports and investment destined to the United States), and a concern for maintaining the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.” 4 Kent Calder defined states which respond to gaiatsu as reactive states, and Calder further defined reactive states based on two attributes: “(1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.” 5 Furthermore, Michael Blaker clarified that Japan’s postwar foreign policy was based on a minimalist and a strategy of coping, or “…carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the minimal adjustments needed to neutralize or overcome criticism and adapt to the existing situation with the fewest risks. If it is determined that a sufficiently major change has occurred in the environments or factors relevant to Japanese interests, then and only then are changes in Japan’s own policies considered desirable.” 6 4 Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993) 5 Kent Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Jul 1988) 519. 6 Blaker 3. 8 As asserted by Curtis and Blaker, reactive diplomacy has been the hallmark of Japan’s postwar foreign policy. Moreover, Japan’s “asymmetrical dependence” on the United States served as a primary reason which led to Japan’s submissive and reactive nature to American gaiatsu. Asymmetrical dependence “provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.” 7 In this regard, Washington has continued to maintain considerable bargaining leverage over Tokyo, and “it is Japan that would suffer more if the bilateral alliance were abandoned.” For Japan, there is “simply no alternative to the United States as the provider of security to Japan.” 8 Miyashita’s argument supplements theories of Japan’s “alliance dilemma” and its fears of abandonment and entrapment. Scholars including Victor Cha and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama have articulated Japan’s alliance dilemma based on its asymmetrical relationship with the United States. 9 Abandonment refers to “the fear that the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.” In contrast, entrapment occurs when “an alliance commitment turns detrimental to one’s interests. It is the entanglement in a dispute over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or 7 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) 10-11. 8 Miyashita, 703. 9 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Why Japan is Allied: Politics of the US-Japan Alliance,” Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System, ed. Saori N. Katada, Hanns W. Maull and Takashi Inoguchi (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004) 75. 9 values only partially.” 10 While hoping to avoid heavy involvement in U.S. demands, Japan’s asymmetrical dependence and fear of being abandoned forces itself to maintain its alliance with the United States. 11 Domestic Stimulants: Cultures of Antimilitarism Japanese foreign policy initiatives must also be understood from a domestic scope, and examining domestic pressures and social trends illuminates Japan’s reactive nature during the postwar era. Thomas Berger argued that latent within Japanese society is a culture of antimilitarism which serves as a buffer against the use of force and the revival of Japanese militarism. Berger affirms that the disastrous results of the Pacific War led to an antimilitarist culture which provides unstinting evidence that a rearmed Japan would be highly unlikely. Berger argues that Japan suffers from collective amnesia regarding the war due to their perception of “dual victimization.” The Japanese feel victimized not only by its own militarist regime, but also by the imperialistic motives of the West. “On the one hand, the Japanese felt they had been victimized by the blind ambition of Japan’s wartime military leadership. On the other hand, they also felt victimized by the United States and other foreign nations which, in the 10 Victor Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun 2000) 265. 11 In addition, Japan’s sensitivity to gaiatsu stems from domestic factors. Domestic constraints have restricted Japan’s ability to play a more proactive role in international diplomacy. Calder asserts that Japan’s fragmented nature of state authority, lack of cohesive leadership, vague ministerial jurisdiction, and domestic interest-group pressures all contributed to the domestic constraints which influenced Tokyo’s foreign policy initiatives. For a detailed analysis on the domestic constraints of Japan’s foreign policy initiatives, see Kent Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Jul 1988) 528-535. 10 Japanese view, had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquest in order to increase their own power.” 12 Through experiences suffered during the Pacific War, there is a profound distrust and negative view permeating Japan regarding its military. Based on such collective memories of Japan’s militarist takeover and the consequent disasters it unleashed, Berger asserts that Japan has maintained and institutionalized a culture of antimilitarism. 13 Berger and others have argued that a revival of militarism and the acceptance of the use of force would be highly unlikely, and the memory that continues to survive within the minds of the Japanese is the experience of victimhood. 14 Indeed, Japanese antimilitarism has served as a hadome ( ), or brakes against the revival of militarism and military buildup. Centering on this sense of antimilitarism and supplemented by its asymmetrical dependence on the United States, Japan has played a nominal role in international security affairs and limited proactive involvement through a minimalist, coping strategy. Most symbolic of Japan’s reactive nature to gaiatsu and its fears of 12 Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 7. 13 Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993) 120. 14 Similarly, Eugene A. Matthews asserts that postwar Japan originally upheld a “fear of itself.” The failures of the militarist regime in World War II, along with the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, left deep scars on the Japanese citizens who wanted to avoid rearmament at all costs. This “nuclear allergy” was a motivating force distinct from the occupation by the United States to both demilitarize and disarm Japan. For more details, see Eugene A. Matthews, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, (Nov/Dec 2003) 74-90. 11 abandonment is the Gulf War crisis in the post-Cold War era. Despite its high degree of dependence on oil from the region, Japan fell into a state of “policy paralysis” and responded minimally. Berger argues that Japan’s “lack of response” was a result of its antimilitarist culture and “torn by internal dissention, [was] unable to make even a minimal contribution of personnel, military, or nonmilitary.” 15 While Japan made various contributions to the Gulf War, the outcomes of the Gulf War forced Tokyo to re-examine and drastically alter its foreign policy. Before examining external factors such as the Gulf War, it is constructive to examine the domestic triggers which supplemented external stimulants which ultimately led to Japan’s reassessment of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War. 15 Berger, Cultures 2. 12 CHAPTER 2 DOMESTIC VOLATILITY AND CRISIS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA To understand the evolution of Japan’s postwar foreign policy, it is vital to analyze the domestic instability which haunted Japan during the end of the Cold War. After rising to become one of the world’s leading economic powers, Japan faced a decade of economic stagnation with the bursting of its bubble economy. During this “lost decade,” Japan faced various obstacles and setbacks including political instability. The so-called 1955 system reached its demise with the rise of coalition governments in the early nineties, and the LDP’s downfall symbolized an era of political instability. Despite its rise as an economic giant during the postwar, Japan was awakened to an austere reality in the wake of the Cold War. In the midst of international calls for increased burden sharing, Japan was rocked by domestic chaos with a magnitude which forced Japan to eventually alter its identity in the post-Cold War era. Prelude to Japan’s Lost Decade: The Bursting Bubble Since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, Japan has been heavily dependent on the United States for its security. Japan has often cited its peace constitution as a pretext against rearmament, and Article 9 affirmed that as a nation “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 13 Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” 16 By depending on the United States for its security, Japan was able to focus all its energy towards economic development. Japan’s emphasis on economic growth was symbolized by the Yoshida Doctrine which served as a vehicle to opportunely allow Japan to return to the international community. “In addition to providing military protection against potential external threats, the bilateral security treaty allowed postwar Japan to stay lightly armed while putting efforts and resources into economic recovery from the devastation of World War II.” 17 By depending on the United States for its security and working closely with its capital, markets, and investments, Japan quickly ascended the ranks and became an economic giant. Centering on what Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato called “GNPism,” Japan’s economy grew at a momentous pace, with growth rates averaging 9.1% from 1955 to 1960, 9.8% from 1960 to 1965, and 12.1% from 1965 to 1970. 18 In 1950, Japan’s GNP stood at $10.9 billion and reached $202 billion in 1970. 19 By the eighties, Japan was dubbed “Japan Inc.” and its rapid economic growth served as a cogent rationale 16 National Diet Library, “The Constitution of Japan,” National Diet Library, 19 Jun 2007, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html>. 17 Miyashita 702. 18 Kenneth Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996) 244. 19 Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Colorado: Westview Press, 1992) 362. 14 for the international community to demand greater participation from Japan in global affairs. However, despite Japan’s rapid ascent to economic stardom, the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the subsequent appreciation of the Japanese yen gradually led to Japan’s economic bubble. 20 Kingston defines bubble economies as a “collective mania spurred on by contagious optimism that what is bought today can be sold tomorrow for a higher price. At some point the crowd realizes that prices cannot be sustained at catastrophic levels, resulting in panic selling, an implosion in prices and economic crisis.” 21 During the inflation of Japan’s bubble economy in the eighties, the Nikkei stock index tripled and peaked at a value of $4 trillion in December 1989, roughly 44 percent of the world’s equity market. 22 Stock averages doubled between 1987 and 1989, and land prices also quadrupled. 23 With optimism and confidence permeating Japan’s economy in the late-eighties, Japan morphed into one of the most aggressive and dominant economic forces in the world. Yet, Japan’s aggressive rise immediately resulted in an overheated economy, and Japan’s economy rapidly plunged in the early nineties. Referred to as the “lost decade,” Japan’s economic stability collapsed with the bursting of the bubble and Japan experienced a decade of sluggish growth. Stock and land prices plummeted to 20 The Plaza Accord was signed on September 22, 1985 by the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. Among other things, the accord aimed to depreciate the value of the dollar in relation to the yen. 21 Jeffrey Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) 105. 22 Kingston 5. 23 Kingston 105. 15 unprecedented lows in the nineties. Japan’s stock market plunged by upwards of sixty percent in late 1992, and property values in major cities like Tokyo and Osaka plunged by forty to sixty percent. 24 At its worst, GDP growth declined to 0.2 percent in 1993. The bursting of the bubble led to Japan’s worst economic performance in the postwar since the first oil crisis in 1974 when GDP declined by 0.6 percent. 25 Japan’s postwar economic miracle had come to a crashing halt and the sense of national confidence had all but disintegrated. End of the 1955 System: Political Corruption in Japan In addition to the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy, political failures marred Japan and were symbolized by the end of the 1955 system. Since the establishment of the LDP in 1955, Japan had been caught in a web of economic and political conservatism where institutions were utilized to bolster conservative rule and emphasize economic growth. However, corruption was an enduring feature of postwar Japanese politics, and its rampant nature eventually contributed to the end of one-party LDP rule. In particular, two scandals played a key role in the collapse of the 1955 system: the 1988 Recruit scandal and the 1991 Sagawa Kyubin scandal. In the late eighties, real estate and telecommunications company Recruit offered over two million unlisted shares of its real estate affiliate company Recruit 24 Mike Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1995), 5. 25 Mochizuki 25. 16 Cosmos to various Japanese elites. When Recruit Cosmos went public, stock prices soared and resulted in massive profits for those involved, including Prime Minister Takeshita, former Prime Minister Nakasone, Finance Minister Miyazawa, and the LDP’s Secretary-General Abe. The saturation of the Recruit scandal also reached non-political actors, including president of Nihon Keizai, vice president of Yomiuri, chairman of telecommunications giant NTT, a Tokyo University professor, and administrative vice-ministers of education and labor. The Recruit scandal played a crucial function in exposing not only the extensive corruption in the political arena, but also in Japan’s business world, mass media, academia, and bureaucracy. 26 Public discontent against political corruption was further ignited in 1992 when LDP vice president Kanemaru Shin was indicted for receiving over $4 million in illegal political campaign contributions from the parcel delivery company Sagawa Kyubin. In addition, it was further revealed that Kanemaru had previously used Sagawa Kyubin as an intermediary to the Inagawa-kai, a renowned yakuza organization which silenced a right-wing organization harassing Takeshita Noboru’s political campaign in 1987. Afterwards, Kanemaru personally invited the chairman of the Inagawa-kai for dinner. Such symbolic gestures and ties of politicians to yakuza organizations led to greater calls for fundamental reform of Japanese politics. 26 In addition, Recruit provided direct political contributions to various LDP politicians by purchasing nearly $800,000 in tickets to LDP fundraising parties. 17 Kanemaru eventually resigned in October 2002 and was arrested on charges of tax evasion on March 6, 1993. 27 Fed up with the political corruption and failures of LDP rule, thirty-nine LDP members voted in favor of a vote of no-confidence against the Miyazawa administration on June 18, 1993, and another thirty-four members signaled passive support through their absence during the vote. The 1955 system officially came to an end when eight opposition parties joined hands under a coalition which advocated political reforms as a substitute to the failures of the 1955 system. As a result, an unstable multiparty framework came to dominate Japan’s political scene, and one- party dominance disappeared from the face of Japan’s political scene. 28 After the fall of Japan’s once dominant economy and stable political structure, calls for radical reform swept across the mentality of the Japanese. 29 With the collapse of Japan’s economic and political stability, various social problems began to emerge and Japan began to feel a sense of crisis. 30 In such a chaotic domestic state, 27 During a raid on Kanemaru’s residence, a hundred kilograms of gold, 3 billion yen in anonymous bond certificates, and stacks of cash were further uncovered, leading to greater domestic anger and calls for political reform. 28 Despite voter disapproval of the LDP and the enactment of electoral reform in 1994, the diverse ideological variations and desires of the coalition parties led to its downfall in 1994. The LDP returned to power in 1994 through its coalition with the Socialists and Sakigake Party and continued to stay in power through coalition governments. After the demise of the LDP’s alliance with the Socialists, the LDP established a tripartite alliance with the Liberal Party and the New Komeito on October 5, 1999. Today, the LDP continues to maintain the majority through its coalition with the New Komeito. 29 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics: Sources of Change, Prospects For the Future,” The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, ed., Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004) 111. 30 Jeffrey Kingston’s eloquently details Japan’s social mishaps and instabilities which emerged in the nineties following the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy and the collapse of the 1955 system. For a 18 the international community began questioning Japan’s global responsibility. What is Japan’s responsibility and role as one of the world’s most dominant economic powers? Would Japan need to take greater responsibilities equivalent to its economic status? Such questions began to surface in public debates, and the crystallization of such exogenous calls emerged during the Gulf War. detailed analysis, see Jeffrey Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 19 CHAPTER 3 TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GULF WAR FACTOR IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA The Gulf War Crisis began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Japan took immediate action and initiated economic sanctions against Iraq on August 5, a day prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 661 which required member countries to “(1) prohibit imports from Iraq and Kuwait, (2) prohibit cooperation involving exports by the two countries, (2) prohibit exports to the two countries and (4) prohibit service transactions with the two countries.” 31 As one of the world’s most dominant economic forces, the international community, particularly the United States, expected Japan to be a formidable partner in the war efforts by supplying “human contributions” instead of mere financial contributions. However, Japan was hesitant to do so, particularly due to the response by the Japanese public. As evinced in a survey taken in November 1990, nearly 70 percent of Japanese opposed the use of force to resolve the Gulf War Crisis. 32 Antimilitarism had been an enduring trend in postwar Japan’s public consensus, and the Gulf War was symbolic of Japan’s continued belief of antimilitarism. In a survey conducted in 1988, respondents were asked how Japan 31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Response to the Gulf Crisis,” Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, December 1991, 19 Jun. 2007 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-2.htm>. 32 Berger, Cultures 172. 20 should provide its national security, and 67.4% responded that Japan should continue relying on the Mutual Security Treaty in addition to its Self Defense Force. Only 7.2% of respondents believed that Japan should be responsible for its own security. 33 The response of the public exemplifies the antimilitarist culture which had permeated Japanese society in the postwar era. While conservatives favored greater involvement in international security affairs, the lack of domestic consensus limited blatant support and action. 34 Japan initially pledged to provide $400 million to the war efforts, but eventually raised that pledge to $4 billion. 35 However, although Japan took swift economic measures against Iraq’s invasion, it avoided direct human contributions and involvement in international war efforts. Japan was criticized for its “tokenism” and lack of “burden sharing,” and outraged U.S. Congress members accused Japan of free riding on American defense and abstaining from fully supporting the war efforts. During the nineties, America was facing both fiscal and economic woes. In addition to trade frictions with Japan, “the United States was heading into a recession and the federal government was bumping along from shutdown to shutdown, as deficit-spending ceilings were continually breached.” 36 During such a period, Japan’s paltry contributions and nominal involvement, despite its dependence on nearly 70 33 Berger, Cultures 153. 34 The role of domestic consensus is heavily reflected in Tokyo’s decision-making process, primarily due to Japan’s unique electoral system which caters to specific constituents and domestic pressures. 35 Kevin Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2007) 39. 36 Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 2003) 334. 21 percent of oil imports from the Persian Gulf, angered the United States. 37 70% of Americans polled in September 1990 expressed their dissatisfaction with Japan’s paltry contributions to the Gulf War. 38 In response to Japan’s deficiency in contributing to the war efforts, swift measures were taken to express their dissatisfaction. The House of Representatives voted 370 to 53 in favor of annually withdrawing five thousand American troops from Japan unless Japan financed the costs of stationing the troops, which was estimated to run $4.5 billion a year. 39 Japan eventually went on to provide $13 billion in financial contributions and reluctantly sent minesweeping units in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Okamoto Yukio emphasizes that the contributions that Japan made during the Gulf War were significant steps for Japan regarding participation in global diplomatic efforts: “It procured a wide range of supplies in large quantities – from four-wheel- drive vehicles and troop housing to computers – and transported them in its own ships to the Persian Gulf. It arranged for airplanes to carry U.S. troops. The 10 billion dollars donated on top of the supplies and transport in support of the war effort did not include the amounts extended to countries in the Gulf region in the form of economic aid.” 40 Yet, despite Japan’s contributions, the international community interpreted Japan’s sluggish and spasmodic response as “too little, too late.” Japan continued to criticized for its “checkbook diplomacy,” and the sour expression of international 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s Response to the Post-Gulf Crisis Problems,” Diplomatic Bluebook 1991, Dec 1991, 19 Jun. 2007 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2- 3.htm>. 38 Midford 334. 39 R. W. Apple Jr., “Confrontation in the Gulf: Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized For Not Bearing More of Gulf Cost,” The New York Times, 13 Sep 1990, 25 May 2007, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE3D81331F930A2575AC0A966958260>. 40 Yukio Okamoto, “Toward Reconstruction Aid For Iraq,” Gaiko Forum (Summer 2003) 5. 22 condemnation was felt on March 11, 1991 when Kuwait placed a full page advertisement in both The New York Times and Washington Post expressing appreciation for countries who had aided Kuwait during the crisis. Japan was conveniently forgotten and left off the list. 41 Despite its enormous financial contributions, Japan’s unwillingness to provide humanitarian contributions outraged the international community, and the unrelenting condemnation forced Japan to incrementally redefine its security in the aftermath of the Gulf War. 41 Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii Kuni He (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2006) 136. 23 CHAPTER 4 CONSTRAINED BILATERALISM AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DUALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA Although Japan contributed an enormous sum in financial contributions, its lack of political involvement led to a barrage of international criticism. In such an environment, Japan feared that it would become further isolated and possibly abandoned, primarily from the United States. In this regard, the Gulf War was a watershed in the history of postwar Japan’s debate on defense and national security. Japan was forced to “realize that they had to face up to the new realities calling for a departure from the decision-making patterns that had become established over a period of decades.” 42 Fearing that serious ruptures in Japan’s bilateral relationship would be seriously threatened, Michael Green asserts that a growing sense of “reluctant realism” began to emerge in Japan in the post-Cold War era. Fearing that continued free riding may lead to increased consequences, Tokyo felt a dire need to expand its foreign policy beyond its dependence on the hub-and-spoke bilateral system. 43 Yet, Japan was caught in a dilemma because of its heavy dependence on the United States. While Japan seeks to take on greater political initiatives to respond to gaiatsu and 42 Berger, Cultures 177. 43 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003). 24 assert its foreign policy, it continues to depend on the bilateral alliance with United States. I posit that this dilemma characterizes Japan’s constrained bilateralism with the United States. Sato Yoichiro asserts that Japan’s foreign policy has distinctly been a “‘compliant’foreign policy” rather than a “‘consensual’ foreign policy.” 44 Although seeking to respond proactively, its decision to make “reluctant concessions” signifies Japan’s constrained bilateralism with the United States. Yong Deng further asserts that “despite its towering economic status in the region, Japan has deliberately avoided any direct confrontation with the U.S., and has been cautious not to appear as a competitor or challenger to the U.S. in the political exercise of shaping the regional political economy.” 45 The constrained nature of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States forced Japan to maintain a low-key posture and still seek to wield political leadership. In the post-Cold War era, Japan aimed to do so through multilateral diplomacy. Rather than taking unilateral approaches, Japan believed that it was crucial to continue maintaining its bilateral alliance with the United States and expand leadership roles through multilateral frameworks. Thus, Japan sought to expand its global role by actively partaking in both international and regional multilateral 44 Yoichiro Sato, conclusion, Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, ed. Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 200-01. Gerald Curtis, introduction, Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, ed. Gerald Curtis (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993) xv-xxvi. 45 Yong Deng, “Japan in APEC: The Problematic Leadership Role,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4, (Apr 1997) 358. 25 institutions. In addition to its U.N.-centered diplomacy, Tokyo began to actively promote multilateral institutions, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, and the ASEAN+3 in 1997. Prior to the establishment of APEC in 1989, regional multilateral forums were all but absent in the region. While Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir advocated an East Asian economic grouping in the early nineties and other minor organizations like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) had existed, a stable multilateral framework had yet to emerge. In this regard, the establishment of multilateral institutions like APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3 was new to the region, and engaging in multilateral frameworks allowed Japan to play a more visible role while taking on greater political activism. U.N.-Centered Diplomacy: UNTAC and the PKO Bill U.N.-centered diplomacy has always been a critical component and pillar to Japanese foreign policy in the postwar era, and Japan’s role mostly came through financial contributions. Yet, following the Gulf War, Japan began to interpret the United Nations as an essential multilateral forum to contribute to the global community. The Gulf War served as an initial stimulus in the post-Cold War era for Japan to begin engaging in global responsibilities. “Concerned with the isolation of their country in the international community, Japanese leaders concluded that they had to 26 overcome the country’s traditionally parochial approach to military issues.” 46 Japan sought to do so by using the United Nations as a step towards expanding its foreign policy, and the peace efforts in Cambodia initiate such changes in Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Japan began to proactively participate in the reconstruction and peace negotiations in Cambodia, and Japan’s political and financial role in the Cambodian Peace efforts exemplifies the shift Japan made towards a more proactive foreign policy. In June 5, 1990, Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference on Peace in Cambodia and invited four Cambodian factions to begin peace talks. Although the Security Council had been drafting a resolution, Japan’s efforts culminated in the signing of a six-point communiqué which outlined an early cease fire and the creation of the Supreme National Council. In February 1991, Japan further contributed to Cambodian peace efforts by proposing an agreement to the peace talks to end the fighting in Cambodia. The agreement would allow the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to “verify the successive stages of the military arrangements of the plan – cease-fire, cantonment of forces, uncovering of arms caches, disarmament of troops, and demobilization.” 47 The proposal further stated that any faction which violated the agreement would lose its right to participate in the election process. 46 Berger, Cultures 191. 47 Yasuhiro Takeda, “Japan’s Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance,” Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 6 (Jun 1998) 556. 27 The proposal received criticism from the United States because it believed that it would create confusion to international efforts being pushed by the Security Council. However, countries including France and Indonesia, who were co-chairs of earlier peace talks in Paris, expressed consent and by August 1991, the four Cambodian factions had agreed to a new agreement which heavily incorporated aspects of Japan’s proposal. Japan had also financed a considerable portion of the UNTAC budget and resumed grant aid to Cambodia in 1992. Furthermore, Japan hosted major international conferences centered on Cambodia and also wrote off all Cambodian IMF debts in 1993 with France. Lastly, Japan’s active involvement was also highlighted through Yasushi Akashi, who was appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNTAC and played a crucial role in the U.N. mission in Cambodia. In addition to Japan’s political and financial contributions, Japan made a major step in its foreign policy by allowing the dispatching of its SDF abroad through the passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law. After nearly 180 hours of deliberation in the Diet, the “PKO bill” was passed on June 15, 1992 and allowed the dispatching of the SDF to U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations, noncombatant activities and humanitarian relief operations. The bill required a Diet approval for every mission, prohibited the use of aggression except for self-defense, 28 and restricted the dispatching of SDF forces to regions where a cease-fire had already taken place. Following its passage, Japan began sending its SDF to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief operations, and its first full-scale deployment was in Cambodia through the UNTAC mission. UNTAC played an active role in a wide range of areas including cease-fire surveillance, the organization of elections, inspections of administration, the repatriation of refugees, and logistical support. Japan dispatched SDF personnel as cease-fire observers, electoral observers, and civilian police officers, and a total of 1,300 Japanese personnel including 1,200 SDF troops were dispatched to Cambodia through UNTAC. 48 While constrained to its pacifist constitution, the Japanese public has accepted peacekeeping operations of the United Nations as a means to insure Japan’s active role in the global community. In a survey polled by the Japanese Cabinet in October 1994, nearly 60 percent of those surveyed responded favorably to Japan’s peacekeeping activities. By the year 2006, that number had increased to 76 percent. 49 In this regard, the Cambodia mission served as “a turning point that broke the taboo against Japanese overseas military deployments for non-combat purposes,” and the 48 International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Cambodia,” Japan’s Contributions to International Peace, 22 May 2007, <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/cambo_e.html>. 49 Cabinet Office, “Gaikou ni kansuru yoron chousa,” Yoron Chousa, 7 Jun 2002, 19 Jun 2007, <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h06/H06-10-06-08.html>. 29 multilateral framework of the United Nations allowed Japan to take on greater political roles. 50 In contrast to the postwar era where Japan reluctantly responded to gaiatsu, Japan began to take on greater political roles, exemplified through its successful role in mediating and bringing about the peace process in Cambodia. Tokyo interpreted U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations as a vital outlet to contribute to international diplomatic efforts, and after the successful completion of UNTAC, Japan actively engaged in additional peacekeeping activities sponsored by the United Nations, including in Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, and East Timor. 51 Regional Forums and Multilateralism: APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3 In addition to the success of Japan’s role in the United Nations, further interests in multilateralism emerged in the nineties. This was exemplified through Japan’s involvement in APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3. Japan’s institutional activism following the post-Cold War era stemmed from Tokyo’s desire to take on greater regional leadership in institution-building while forging a proactive foreign policy agenda which would allow Tokyo to strengthen its political clout. Indeed, Japan’s desire to go beyond the hub-and-spoke bilateral system, which was characteristic of 50 Midford 343. 51 For a detailed account and list of Japan’s contributions in PKOs, humanitarian relief operations, election monitoring, and financial contributions, see International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, “Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Japan’s Contributions to International Peace, 19 June 2007, <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/cooperation/results_e.html>. 30 Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar era, and move towards greater multilateralism exemplifies its commitment to play a more proactive role in international affairs. 52 By actively engaging in multilateral arrangements, Japan sought to advance a new vision for its foreign policy. By emphasizing regional multilateralism in the mid-to-late nineties, Japan hope to assume a more proactive political role and display its leadership. Previously, Japan’s presence in the region primarily came through investment, foreign aid, and government loans. By 1989, Japanese ODA to ASEAN countries totaled over $2.1 billion and in 1991, and over 60% of Japan’s total contribution of $11 billion in ODA was allocated to countries in Asia. Furthermore, Japanese investment and trade in the region also sheds light on Japan’s economic role. In 1989, Japanese imports from Asia surpassed the United States and by 1992, Japanese foreign direct investment in Asia totaled $60 billion. 53 Japan’s dominant economic function in the region served as sufficient clout for Japan to seek greater roles in regional affairs. APEC was officially established as the first regional multilateral economic forum in November 1989 after a 1988 proposal by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to promote economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific through a loose consensus-based consultative forum. Australia 52 Kuniko P. Ashizawa, “Japan, the United States, and Multilateral Institution-Building in the Asia- Pacific,” Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (California: Stanford University Press, 2004) 248-9. 53 Yong Deng, “Japan in APEC: The Problematic Leadership Role,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4, (Apr 1997) 354. 31 responded to Japan’s proposal with added enthusiasm and began to promote the establishment of an economic forum for the Asia-Pacific region. Although the U.S. reaction was initially “restrained,” the United States eventually endorsed the idea of a regional multilateral institution promoting economic cooperation. Japan believed it was essential for the United States to be an active member of the forum and strongly promoted the incorporation of the United States. After the rise of APEC as an economic institution, the idea of establishing a regional security framework began to emerge in the early nineties. With the end of the Cold War and the possibility of American disengagement looming, ARF served to reduce the uncertainty evident in the region. With the end of the Cold War, Japan believed that a multilateral security framework would greatly improve the security in the region and in 1991, Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro proposed a region-wide forum focusing on security. Tokyo hoped that such a regional forum would “move forward from transparency measures, to actually policy coordination, and finally to collective action.” 54 The ASEAN Regional Forum was eventually established on July 1993, and its purpose was “to create a region-wide, inclusive forum for discussion of regional, political and security issues, and develop cooperative measures which might be taken to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the region and to the avoidance of conflict as a formal government process which is a cooperative security approach.” 55 54 Green 219. 55 Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999) 147. 32 Similarly, ASEAN+3 was established in 1997 as an informal consultative forum to expand economic cooperation between the nations of ASEAN and the Northeast Asian giants: Japan, China, and South Korea. As one of the only regional institutional frameworks incorporating East Asia, ASEAN+3 has been identified as an ambitious and comprehensive effort towards solidifying regionalism in East Asia. Yet, although Japan has engaged in regional multilateral forums, the burdens of history have been an enduring factor which continues to put a cap on Japan’s regional role. Japan’s historical legacies of colonialism and militarism have been an enduring hedge between Japan and its neighbors, and many of Japan’s victims are wary of Japan’s desire to take on greater leadership in the region. “Whenever Japan tried to assert itself and assume a leadership role, Asian leaders recalled its culpability in the Second World War and repeatedly warned of its ‘new ambition’ and aspiration towards becoming a ‘military giant’ once again.” 56 In this regard, Japan’s decision to be a part of multilateral institutions and emphasize collective consensus has allowed Tokyo to take on greater leadership without arousing fears from other regional neighbors. By participating in consensus- based multilateral frameworks, Japan has been able to interact and engage in foreign diplomacy with its neighbors and begin transitioning towards greater activism. As Pempel states, “multilateral involvement allowed Japan to temper residual images of its prewar military aggression and to convince the rest of the world that 56 Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1991-2) 63. 33 contemporary Japan could be counted on to pursue its national interests in accord with internationally established procedures and with sensitivity to global consensus.” 57 Paradoxically, Japan engaging in multilateral institutions, Japan needed to also maintain its bilateral alliance with the United States. After the end of the Cold War, particularly following the Gulf War, Japan felt anxiety due to its fears of severing its indispensable bilateral alliance with the United States. Although Japan sought to expand its political role and seek greater independence in its foreign policy through multilateral institutions, Japan was dependent on the United States for its security and defense. Thus, maintaining U.S. presence and influence in the region was vital to Japanese interests. By undertaking regional multilateral forums and pressing for U.S. involvement in regional multilateral frameworks, Japan hoped to secure bilateral ties with the United States. Maintaining its bilateral framework with the United States would also assure Asian neighbors that Japan would be contained and would not become a threat to the region in the post-Cold War era. Thus, albeit in a constrained manner, Japan firmly held on to its bilateral alliance with the United States. 57 T.J. Pempel, “Challenges to Bilateralism: Changing Foes, Capital Foes, and Complex Forums,” Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, ed., Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (California: Stanford University Press, 2004) 29. 34 Disappointment in Tokyo: Setbacks to Multilateral Diplomacy While participating in multilateral institutions in the post-Cold War era has allowed Japan to play a more constructive role, various impediments in multilateralism have also surfaced to cast doubt on the applicability of such institutions. Japan’s failure to receive greater roles in the United Nations such as a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council serves to weaken Japan’s enthusiasm towards the United Nations. The sudden shift in APEC’s focus and its failures to actualize Japan’s original objectives weakens and de-legitimizes APEC’s political role. And although still in its adolescence, both the ARF and ASEAN+3 have produced limited results as regional frameworks in Asia and have led many to question the validity of whether the multilateral institutions can play a vital role. Consequently, Japan’s interests in seeking greater multilateral frameworks have been both disappointing and discouraging. Throughout the postwar era, Japan has served as a core financial contributor to the United Nations and has been the largest contributor following the United States. In 1995, Japan contributed 14.01% of the United Nations budget and by 1997, that sum increased to 15.66%. 58 More recently, Japan contributed 19.5% of the United Nations assessed budget from 2004 to 2006. 59 Despite Japan’s enormous financial contribution to the United Nations, Japanese policymakers and bureaucrats 58 Fukushima 93. 59 United Nations Reform, “Reform of the UN Security Council: Why Japan should become a permanent member,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar 2005, 22 May 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/pamph0503.pdf>. 35 question whether Japan has received a commensurate role in the organization and as one of the largest donors, Japan believes that it has the right to be given greater roles and responsibilities. In 1993, Japan announced its candidacy for a permanent seat in the Security Council and although the United States has backed Japan’s proposal, the difficulty in coming to consensus towards Security Council reform has served as a primary factor limiting Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Various proposals towards Security Council reform have been proposed. In 1997, Malaysian ambassador Razali Ismail proposed that the Security Council be expanded to twenty- four seats. Other proposals include rotating permanent membership of the Security Council. 60 Yet, although proposals and recommendations have been suggested, none has gained the full support of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In addition, China, who is a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, has also continuously blocked Japan’s bid to be incorporated as a permanent member in the Security Council, citing Japan’s historical ambivalence and inability to come to terms with its past as a source of concern. In 2004, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan commented that the United Nations Security Council was not “a board of directors,” and despite Japan’s enormous financial contributions, membership should not be decided based on financial contributions. Kong further asserted that China understood Japan’s expectation to 60 Green 205. 36 play a greater role in global affairs, but “if a country wishes to play a responsible role in international affairs, it must have a clear understanding of the historical questions concerning itself.” 61 Although Japan will continue to utilize the United Nations as a key arena to implement and initiate its foreign policy, there is no doubt that Japan has been frustrated by the limitations of the United Nations. The disappointments reflect Tokyo’s realization that multilateral frameworks pose grave limitations and in the future, there remain possibilities that interests and U.N.-centered diplomacy may ebb. In addition to the difficulties posed by the United Nations, regional multilateral institutions have also disappointed Tokyo. The collapse of APEC as an economic institution illustrates Japan’s disappointment in multilateral frameworks. APEC’s initial goals formulated by MITI emphasized the promotion of economic cooperation through a gradual consensus-oriented approach which was “based on consensus, a recognition of diversity, and open regionalism.” 62 However, a sudden shift occurred in the early nineties in which APEC’s goals would be to promote the liberalization of trade and investment which the United States had championed. Symbolic of this transition was the Bogor Declaration in 1994, which set regional goals towards complete regional liberalization by 2020. This drastic shift in APEC’s focus was a source of concern for Tokyo who wanted to protect specific domestic 61 Shenzhen Daily/Agencies, “China: United Nations ‘not a board of directors,’” People’s Daily Online, 23 Sep 2004, 15 Jun 2007, <http://english.people.com.cn/200409/23/eng20040923_158023.html>. 62 Green 210. 37 sectors like agriculture, forestry and fishing. To counter the Bogor Declaration, Japan promoted and gained consensus towards the concept of a “concerted unilateral approach” at the Osaka Summit. Japan asserted that each member had the freedom to decide when and what sectors would be liberalized. While Japan pushed forward its idea of a concerted unilateral approach in APEC, the failures of the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization initiatives and the inability to deal with the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 “considerably discredited APEC’s significance and diminished enthusiasm for and expectations of APEC among many policymakers and the general public as well.” 63 In addition, the rise of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) has greatly discouraged Japan to continue advocating multilateralism. After securing a FTA with Singapore in 2002, Japan has been active in seeking additional FTAs with countries like South Korea and Canada. Rather than depending solely on a multilateral framework, Japan has taken advantage of bilateral discussions to advance its economic needs and objectives. Finally, the September 11 terrorist attacks also led to significantly weaken APEC as a multilateral economic institution as APEC has turned into a gathering to discuss political and security affairs. Many have begun to interpret APEC as merely an opportunity for Heads of State to conveniently gather and conduct bilateral summit meetings. 63 Ashizawa 260-61. 38 Although still in its developing stages, both ARF and ASEAN+3 have to date produced limited results. The establishment of ARF in 1994 offered an opportunity for Japan could to engage in security issues at a multilateral level without depending on the United States. While Japan hoped that ARF would move from “(1) confidence-building, (2) preventive diplomacy, and (3) conflict resolution,” ARF meetings to date have produced limited results. 64 As the only security institution in Asia, ARF remains a vital multilateral forum for the region. ARF’s weak institutionalization and the heterogeneity of Asia have resulted in members being called “participants,” reflecting the lack of institutionalization and the avoidance of institutional permanency. 65 An additional factor limiting ARF’s progress has been the September 11 attacks. Like APEC, the sudden focus on international terrorism in the post-911 era has limited discussion and engagement on regional security concerns. Regional issues have remained unanswered. In this regard, China’s reluctance to discuss dire regional issues regarding Taiwan and the Spratly Islands also limits the ability of ARF to institutionalize into a fruitful institution which is capable of resolving regional security issues. The lack of dialogue on addressing the conflicts evident on the Korean Peninsula also reflects the inabilities of ARF to produce fruitful results. Although Taiwan and the Korean peninsula serve as remnants of Asia’s Cold War, 64 Ashizawa 262. 65 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005) 141. 39 the ARF has yet been able to make progress regarding such regional security issues. Katzenstein asserts that “regional security institutions in Asia do not seriously encroach on the principle of noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states on issues of either internal or external security.” 66 Thus, although ARF has a wealth of potential, it has yet to blossom into an effective institution to challenge regional security issues. To date, a setback Japan faces with ASEAN+3 is its inability to integrate effectively into the promising institution. As evinced earlier, the ambivalence of Japan’s response to its militarist past continues to serve as a primary factor leading to distrust in Japan. Although Japan plays a vital role to Asia’s economy, Asian nations continue to harbor unresolved claims towards Japan. 67 In particular, China and South Korea have been most responsive to issues pertaining to Japan’s historical legacies. In this regard, although incorporated into the ASEAN+3 framework, Japan will continue to struggle with issues regarding its historical ambivalence. Paul Evans also asserts additional obstacles Japan faces within the framework of ASEAN+3. In addition to the diversity of the political and economic systems in the region, various differences exist between the governments. For instance, “the inherent asymmetry between the economic clout of ASEAN and the Northeast Asian three is considerable, with the combined GDP of the latter some nine times higher 66 Katzenstein 145. 67 Kent Calder, “Securing Security Through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar 2004) 151-2. 40 than the former.” 68 Due to the multifaceted and diverse nature of East Asian institutions, Japan will face difficulty making use of ASEAN+3. And while the prospects of ASEAN+3 continues to maintain its lofty ideas and goals, the process towards an efficient and effective multilateral structure will continue at a steady and incremental rate. 68 Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity,” Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, ed., T.J. Pempel (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005) 201. 41 CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS REINFORCED BILATERALISM: EVOLUTION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY Michael Blaker characterized Japan’s diplomatic response during the post- Cold War era as “relatively unconcerned with the multilateral regime or the bilateral alliance regime,” and by basing its diplomacy on a minimalist coping strategy, Japan responded minimally to international demands and took a “passive, watch-and-wait, damage-limiting approach.” 69 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama further asserted that following the post-Cold War era, the fear of abandonment and a desire to avoid the bitter memories of its Gulf War failures influenced Japan to take a more proactive role in global diplomacy. By seeking to establish its political role through multilateral frameworks, Japan actively engaged in both regional and international institutions and sought to solidify its political clout in the international community. Yet, such efforts have come up short, and Japan has struggled to establish a solid foreign policy based on a the duality of Japan’s constrained bilateral alliance with the United States and the promotion of multilateral institutions. In the advent of the 21 st century, the Koizumi administration sought to drastically transform and alter Japan’s foreign policy and national identity. Koizumi became Prime Minister on April 26, 2001 and brought a sense of euphoria into 69 Blaker 27. 42 Japanese politics. Widely hailed as a maverick, the Japanese public viewed Koizumi as an eccentric and charismatic politician capable of lifting Japan’s historic taboos and leading Japan towards greater assertion and independence. 70 After facing various disappointments with multilateral institutions, Koizumi pressed forward a novel strategy to its foreign diplomacy: Japan would uphold an aggressive foreign policy and portray Japan as a nation independent in its decision-making process by basing its strategy on a robust alliance with the United States. Under the leadership of Koizumi, Japan began shedding its reactive diplomacy and began embarking towards “a more active, involved, and independent diplomacy” which seemed most appropriate following a decade of instability and fragility. 71 To comprehend Japan’s transformation, two aspects must be analyzed. To begin with, following the terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing Iraqi War, Japan was given an opportunity to reverse the images of Gulf War failures and actualize an assertive foreign policy by emphasizing “reinforced bilateralism” with the United States. In addition, Japan began to face varying degrees of anxieties due to the emerging instabilities evident in the region. China’s drastic rise in the nineties has been a source of anxiety while the erratic acts of the North Korean regime served to implant fear in Japan. Thus, the Koizumi administration was able to utilize the 70 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics: Sources of Change, Prospects For the Future,” The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, ed., Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2004) 116. 71 Dennis Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) 45. 43 terrorist attacks and the emerging instabilities in the region to transform Japan’s archaic image as an antimilitarist nation pressured by gaiatsu and shape a new national identity: a Japan which proactively and independently asserts its foreign policy by emphasizing “reinforced bilateralism” with the United States. Towards Assertion: The Iraqi War and the Gift From Heaven The world was taken aback when the terrorist attacks took place on September 11, 2001. As the World Trade Center crumbled in front of international eyes, the global community was confronted with a novel form of warfare based on terrorist strategies. Facing such an appalling reality, the United States sought to stand firm and united to fight back against such evil acts and asserted its will to reply back with force and commitment. Immediately following the terrorist attacks, the Koizumi administration took swift and active measures to respond to the international crisis. In Japan’s eyes, the terrorist served as an opportune means to parry its former reactive image created during the Gulf War Crisis and assert itself as a formidable ally in the global community. Koizumi was one of the Bush administration’s most avid and enthusiastic supporters who affirmed his nation’s commitment to support the United States. In his policy speech during the 153 rd Session of the Diet, Koizumi reinforced Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States was “the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy” and that Japan would work to “function even more effectively and to 44 engage in constructive dialogue with the United States in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity.” 72 The grave security threat posed by terrorism therefore served as a catalyst for Japan to take swift and assertive measures to respond to United States calls and evade its image of being passive and reactive in its foreign policy. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks served as a tennkei ( ) or an enlightenment or gift from heaven, for the Japanese government. After the 9/11 attacks, Japan immediately proposed and quickly enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, 2001. Unlike the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 which took nearly 180 hours of debate, the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was debated for a mere 62 hours. 73 The swiftness with which the law was passed exemplified not only the changing domestic political environment, but also the firm desire of Tokyo to reinforce its alliance with the United States and assert itself as a formidable partner in the global community. The law provided support measures for the United States and its allies by allowing the SDF to operate in non-combat areas and provide fuel and supplies, transport weapons and ammunition by sea, and provide medical care to wounded soldiers and refugees. 74 Following the passage of the law, deployments of Japanese naval vessels began with the dispatching of the supply ship Hamana and two 72 Junichiro Koizumi, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 153 rd Session of the Diet,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 27 Sep 2001, 1 Jun 2007, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0927syosin_e.html. 73 Gavan McCormack, “Japan’s Afghan Expedition,” Japan in the World, 5 Nov 2001, 13 May 2007, <http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/Afghanexpedition01.html>. 74 Tsuchiyama 71. 45 Japanese destroyer escort ships, the Kurama and Kirisame. 75 While the Anti- Terrorism Special Measures Law retained stringent limitations and was debated within the Japanese public for some time, the passage of such a controversial law symbolized a fresh departure for Japan’s foreign policy and opened doors towards greater cooperation in international war efforts. In addition to the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, various steps were taken by the Japanese government in the early stages of the war on terror to ensure its engagement and assert its active presence in the international conflict. In addition to providing Pakistan a grant aid of $300 million, a $37 million aid package was provided to assist internally displaced refugees in Afghanistan, and Japan decided to use Japanese military forces to guard American military bases in Japan. 76 The Japanese Diet followed the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by passing the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq on July 26, 2003. The law outlined Japan’s ability to “make an appropriate contribution to assist in the prompt reconstruction of Iraq by Iraqi people, based upon the requests of United Nations 75 Richard Tanter, “Japan’s Indian Ocean Naval Deployment: Blue Water Militarization in a ‘normal country,” Japan Focus, 19 Jun 2007, <http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1700>. 76 For a list of Japan’s contributions in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, see Edward Lincoln, “Japan in 2001: A Depressing Year,” Asia Survey, Vol. 42 (Jan-Feb 2001) 78. 46 Security Council Resolutions.” 77 The law eventually led to the dispatching of Japanese SDF to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Iraq. The dispatching of Japan’s SDF to Iraq can further be interpreted as a symbolic gesture to provide human contributions to international efforts, thereby minimizing criticism and displaying a novel approach to its foreign policy which contrasts to its past hesitation. In addition to its human contributions, Japan announced its financial assistance package for Iraq at the International Donors’ Conference on the Reconstruction of Iraq held in Madrid, Spain on October 24, 2003. Announcing that it would contribute a total of $5 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) towards the reconstruction of Iraq, the package made Japan the second largest contributor towards the rebuilding of Iraq behind the United States. While still negligible, Japan’s swift and assertive response following the terrorist attacks contrasted remarkably to its Gulf War failures in the early nineties, and Tokyo’s proactive policy in supporting Washington symbolized Japan’s foreign policy evolution under the Koizumi administration. Yukio Okamoto argues that in contrast to Japan’s slow and spasmodic response during the Gulf War, the Koizumi administration’s proactive support following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 has led to the deepening of mutual trust between Japan and the United States, and the vicious 77 Junichiro Koizumi, “Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Concerning the Establishment of the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 26 Jul 2003, 24 May 2007, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/07/26danwa_e.html>. 47 cycle which Japan experienced during the Gulf War has been transformed into a virtuous circle. 78 In a news conference held on June 29, 2006, President Bush praised Koizumi’s tenure as Prime Minister. “You have led with courage. You had made hard decisions. You’ve helped us change our relationship so that Japan and the United States will be able to work even closer together in the 21 st century.” 79 Bush’s acclamation of Koizumi symbolizes Japan’s “reinforced bilateralism” with the United States and that by proactively engaging in the war against terror, the Koizumi administration portrayed a novel image of Japan as a firm ally committed to engaging in global affairs. Doing so has reinforced Japan’s alliance with the United States and strengthened Japan’s political clout in the international arena. Regional Stimulants: Rising Instabilities in East Asia In addition to Japan’s assertive response to the terrorist attacks, the late nineties saw the reshaping of East Asian regional security dynamics which obliged Japan to reinforce its bilateral alliance with the United States. According to Kamiya Matake, Japan in the postwar era has maintained a reactive policy in the region. While its financial contributions to the region merits acknowledgement, 78 Okamoto 8. 79 George W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Washington: Vol. 42, Iss. 26 (Jul 3 2006), 1242. 48 “without autonomous military power, Japan has not been capable of controlling the political and strategic atmosphere in the region, or, put in others words, the degree of amicability and hostility between the two Korean states, between China and Taiwan, and among the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia), and China.” 80 In this regard, Japan has often been forced to adjust itself in the regional environment and maintain equidistance with neighboring countries. Yet, the end of the Cold War brought regional insecurities which led to increased anxiety in Tokyo. In particular, two developments greatly influenced Tokyo’s decision to reaffirm its bilateral security framework with the United States: the rising anxiety caused by the People’s Republic of China and the grave threat the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea began to pose on the security and stability of Japan. Regional instabilities have served as essential stimulants to ignite Japan’s sense of fear and insecurity and following an era of “constrained bilateralism” in which Japan sought to attain stability based on multilateralism, the emergence of regional threats have given the Koizumi administration more room to alter and assert its foreign policy posture. The Rise of China: Anxieties Posed to Japan and Regional Stability During the postwar era, particularly after China’s open door policy in 1979, Japan took the stance of seikei bunri ( ), or separation of politics and 80 Matake Kamiya, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader, ed., Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 246-7. 49 economics with China. While China remained a socialist state, economic relations allowed the two nations to maintain a close partnership in the postwar era. Yet, while economic interdependence served as a critical component of Sino-Japanese relations, China’s political, economic, and military rise in the nineties posed a grave concern to Japan. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the ensuing liberalization of China’s market, and the burgeoning of China’s economic growth, Chinese and Japanese economic interdependence significantly increased. Foreign direct investment in 1989 stood at $438 million but by 1995, that number had increased to $4.5 billion. 81 Trade between the two nations significantly increased from $18.2 billion in 1990 to over $62.4 billion in 1996. In 1992, China was Japan’s fifth largest trading partner. Following the United States, China had become Japan’s second largest trading partner by 1993. Indeed, while tensions between the two nations have endured, seikei bunri and economic interdependence has clearly allowed the two nations to maintain strategic relations during the post-Cold War era. However, the nineties also saw rising conflicts and tensions between the two nations. On the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, China conducted an underground nuclear explosion in Lop Nur on May 15, 1995. In March 1996, China held military exercises and launched a series of missile tests across the Taiwan Straits to intimidate Taiwanese elections and assert its willingness 81 Green 77. 50 to use force against calls for Taiwan independence. Such conflicts were accompanied by the continued territorial disputes of the Senkaku Islands, China’s objection to Japan’s participation in a joint study of theater missile defense with the United States in 1994, and China’s protests against Japan’s revision of Japan’s 1976 National Defense Program Outline in 1995. China has continued to question Japan’s regional ambitions and harbored suspicions regarding Japan’s attempts to assert its regional leadership. Furthermore, President Clinton’s decision to visit China in 1998 without stopping by Japan was emblematic of the anxiety Japan began to face with the incremental rise of China as an economic, military, and political power. Clinton’s “Japan passing” epitomized Japan’s fear of abandonment, and after Koizumi came into power in 2001, Tokyo strove to strengthen its bilateral security framework with the United States and prevent further isolation in a region where China’s rise was inevitable. To bolster Japan’s image as an independent and assertive nation, Koizumi also parried the increasing anxiety by igniting nationalist sentiment in Japanese identity. Koizumi began to assert a new national identity by pursuing “consistently provocative, even confrontational, policies with China, South Korea and Russia over everything from land disputes to unresolved colonial and World War II history.” 82 Koizumi hoped to portray an assertive and confident image of Japan which was 82 Jim Frederick, “After Koizumi,” Time Asia, 26 Jun 2006, 20 May 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501060703/story3.html>. 51 unwavering to international demands. In particular, Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine led to great confrontation in East Asia and symbolized his resolute desire to reassert Japan’s new image. Since becoming Prime Minister in 2001, Koizumi has visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year in a nonchalant manner. The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto war shrine which enshrines the lives of millions of Japanese soldiers. As a religious facility, the Yasukuni Shrine has been the center of controversy because shrine visits by politicians have been interpreted as breaching the division between state and religion. This has been a particularly sensitive issue in Japan because Shintoism was directly linked with state imperialism and Emperor worship was directly used to garner loyalty and mobilize popular support during the war. In addition, fourteen Class-A war criminals from the Pacific War were also enshrined in 1978, further reinforcing the image of the shrine being symbolic of militant nationalism. To Japanese eyes, Shintoism is “tainted,” and the Yasukuni Shrine is considered a symbol of “ultra-conservative nationalism where the most regrettable aspects of Japan’s militarist past continue to be venerated.” 83 To many of the victims of Japan’s wartime atrocities, prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine symbolize veneration to Japanese militarism and imperialist aggression. When Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro visited the shrine on the fortieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender, regional neighbors were furious about his 83 Kingston 237. 52 visit and since then, the shrine has been tainted as a symbol of Japanese militarism. When Koizumi made his annual visits to the shrine, Beijing and Seoul were infuriated by his insensitive and demeaning attitude. Throughout his five year term, Koizumi visited the shrine annually and affirmed that his reasons for visiting the shrine was not in support of Japanese militarism, but in honor of the countless, nameless individuals who sacrificed their lives for the sake of the nation. However, despite Koizumi’s justification, Japan’s regional neighbors have continued to be “extremely sensitive about Japan’s reluctance to face up to its checkered past, come clean on its war crimes, and issue an unequivocal apology.” 84 The doggedness with which Koizumi made his visits has led to a deterioration in relations between Japan and its East Asian neighbors. The pilgrimage by Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine has ignited a fury of anti- Japanese sentiment which has become rampant throughout East Asia. Indeed, anti- Japanese sentiment has been a tool used by the Chinese Communist Party to arouse nationalism and unity from the Chinese. Incidents such as the mass prostitution tour by Japanese businessmen in September 2003 and the Xi’an Incident in October 2005 further ignited anti-Japanese sentiment which culminated into massive anti-Japanese demonstrations. 85 In 2004, a survey conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies in 84 Kingston 236. 85 The mass prostitution tour refers to an incident on September 16 to the 18 th in 2003 where over four hundred Japanese businessmen stayed at the Zhu Hai International Conference Hotel and hired nearly five hundred Chinese prostitutes. The incident infuriated many Chinese, particularly due to the timing as September 18 th was the anniversary of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The Xi’an Incident refers 53 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences revealed that over 53.6 percent of Chinese respondents had adverse views towards Japan, citing “Japan’s militarist past as reasons for their unfavorable view.” 86 Katzenstein has asserted that Japan’s inability to come to terms with its past has been a major setback in the region. “In Japan, the memory of Japanese atrocities in Asia is largely silence or subject to incessant controversy. The unwillingness of Japanese leaders to apologize publicly has undermined greatly the trust Japan enjoys in Asia and hampered the emergence of a regional collective identity in Asia.” 87 Inagaki Hisakazu asserts that Koizumi utilized the Yasukuni Shrine to unify Japan and expose a confident and assertive Japanese identity. “The easiest way of making national identity for the Japanese nationalists is to take advantage of Yasukuni Shrine in the name of commemoration. This trend increased each time there are protests from China and Korea, making Yasukuni more and more the symbol of Japanese nationalism.” 88 In addition, Balbina Y. Hwang, Senior Policy Analyst of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, further asserts that Koizumi understood the political ramifications of his visits and used his visits as a convenient tool to meet his vision of Japan’s political needs. 89 By augmenting nationalist sentiment, Koizumi sought to to a incident on October 29, 2005 where three Japanese exchange students and a Japanese professor at Xi’an’s Xibei University performed a skit at the university’s culture festival. In the skit, the students and professor wore a red bra over a white shirt with cups hanging around their waists and threw the items into the crowd while dancing. The performance was interpreted as a disgrace to the Chinese people. The event led to massive demonstrations throughout the campus and city. 86 Xiao Qiang, “Anti-Japanese Feeling Growing In China, Polls Show,” China Digital Times, 23 Nov 2004, 21 Apr 2006, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2004/11/antijapanese_fe.php>. 87 Katzenstein 87. 88 Hisakazu Inagaki, Yasukuni Jinja Kaihouron: Honntou no Tsuitou towa Nanika? (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006) 277. 89 Masakazu Kobayashi, Oubei Media Chinichiha no Nihonnjinron, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006) 218- 220. 54 augment Japan’s “reinforced bilateralism” and assert a new image of Japan’s independent and proactive identity. China’s rise in the wake of Japan’s instability during its “lost decade” has been a constant source of anxiety for Japan. With China’s political, economic, and military rise as a foreseeable reality, Koizumi focused on reinforcing Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States while working to construct a new national identity based on independence and assertion. While his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have led to increased tension, Japan’s foreign policy posture has clearly shifted from its constrained nature during the nineties. Although economic interdependence has remained vital to both nations, the rising tensions which emerged in the nineties have clearly led to ambivalent relations. Insecurity in East Asia: The Erratic North Factor While the rise of China planted seeds of anxiety within Japan, the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a more immediate source of concern for Japan. The erratic behavior of the North Korean regime served as a convincing rationale for Japan to reinforce its bilateral alliance with the United States and take on a more independent and assertive policy to counter the regional threats posed by the North. During the early nineties, Japan-North Korea relations were on amicable terms and talks towards normalization had also surfaced. However, North Korea 55 began to pose a grave threat to Japan’s national security and stability due to its erratic behavior in the post-Cold War era. Beginning with the nuclear crisis in 1993 and the Taepodong-1 missile launch in 1998, various events led many in Japan to feel threatened by the North. In particular, the abduction issue crept inside the mentality and psyche of the Japanese and became the focal point for Japan’s assertive and proactive foreign policy with the North. Most recently, North Korea launched the Taepodong-2 missile in July 2006 and further threatened the international community when it tested a nuclear device in October 2006. North Korea’s erratic and capricious behaviors have been perceived as threatening behaviors for Japan and in response, Japan has sought to reinforce its bilateral ties with the United States and advocate an independent and assertive foreign policy. In early 1993, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team conducted inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and found numerous inconsistencies with IAEA agreements. 90 Pyongyang’s subsequent withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in March 12, 1993 and its refusal to comply with IAEA inspection standards heightened tensions of possible nuclear activities. 91 90 One of the inconsistencies identified was that between “’the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] (obtained from melting fuel rods) and the IAEA’s test results. The second discrepancy was between the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory and liquid waste samples…’” For a detailed chronology, see Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict Fact Sheet, “Nuclear North Korea & Six Party Multilateral Negotiation,” SSPC Fact Sheet, No. 2, October 2005. 91 Ironically, the two Koreas signed a Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula two years earlier in December 1991 in which they pledge to avoid testing, manufacturing, producing, receiving, possessing, storing, deploying, and using nuclear weapons. The two nations agreed to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and maintain nuclear facilities for pure nuclear 56 The threat of a nuclear North alarmed the entire region and the United States had also discussed preemptive strikes against the North. However, the Clinton Administration ultimately chose engagement with Pyongyang and together signed the Agreed Framework on October 1994. 92 Japan was a leading financial contributor to the agreement and arranged to contribute $1 billion towards the construction of two light-water reactors through the international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The nuclear crisis in 1993 was only the tip of the iceberg and the North Korean regime began to pose a direct and grave threat to Japan’s national security. On August 31, 1998, Pyongyang brazenly launched its medium-ranged ballistic missile, the Taepodong-1, over the Japanese archipelago and into the Pacific Ocean. The launching of the Taepodong-1 over Japan was interpreted as a coercive and provocative move by Pyongyang and became a grave security threat for Japan. Tokyo took an independent, hard-line approach against Pyongyang by freezing reprocessing and uranium enrichment. For more information on the Joint Declaration, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002, 18, Jun 2007, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/koreanuc.pdf, JD-1>. 92 The 1994 Agreed Framework stated that North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors would be replaced with light-water reactors incapable of producing plutonium; North Korea would be supplied with up to 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually; the two nations would work to achieve normalization of political and economic relations; both the United States and would work for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; North Korea would return to international nuclear non-proliferation agreements and eventually stabilize, store, and dispose all nuclear fuel already produced. 57 chartered flights to the North, stopping humanitarian aid, suspending KEDO contributions, and halting talks towards normalization. 93 While the Taepodong-1 missile launch implanted collective fear in the minds of the Japanese, Pyongyang’s confession of abducting Japanese citizens has been the largest factor contributing to Japan’s sense of national insecurity. In September 2002, Koizumi engaged in a one-day summit in Pyongyang where Kim Jong Il confessed to abducting thirteen Japanese nationals during Kim Il Sung’s regime. Pyongyang’s admission aroused public antagonism and resentment in Japan and left most Japanese psychologically terrorized by North Korea’s erratic and unpredictable behavior. “As Kim Jong Il’s September 17 admission of his country’s responsibility settled into Japanese consciousness, and personal stories of Japanese abducted by North Korea filled the media, the mood toward Pyongyang grew more antagonistic.” 94 With over 83.4% of respondents to a MOFA survey regarding the abduction issue as their greatest concern, the issue became the most pressing case for Japanese foreign policy in the 21 st century. 95 Since the revelation of Pyongyang’s abduction of Japanese civilians, Tokyo has taken an even greater proactive and assertive stance against North Korea, particularly with the leadership of Abe Shinzo. During his capacity as Chief Cabinet 93 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Policy Toward North Korea: Interests and Options,” The Future of Korea, ed., Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 83. 94 Gilbert Rozman and Noah Rozman, “The United States and Asia in 2002: Needing Help against ‘Evil,’” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2002) 7. 95 Cabinet Office, “Gaikou Ni Kan Suru Yoron Chosa,” Yoron Chousa, Oct 2002, 19 Jul 2007, < http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-gaikou/2-1.html >. 58 Secretary for the Koizumi administration, Abe was a key player who established the task force Kyuu Rachi Giren ( ) in 1997 which began dealing with the abduction issue. 96 After being inaugurated as Prime Minister, Abe further established the Rachi Mondai Taisaku Honbu ( ), a headquarters focused solely on the abduction issue, which was headed by himself. 97 Indeed, the abduction issue has become a key factor in Japanese foreign policy, and Tokyo has been adamant towards resolving the abduction issue. The crystallization of Tokyo’s independent and proactive foreign diplomacy came on July 5, 2006 when the DPRK conducted two rounds of missile tests, firing seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, including the Taepodong-2. 98 While Pyongyang insisted on its sovereign right to test its missiles, its actions were swiftly attacked by the international community, particularly Japan. In the wake of North Korea’s missile launches in July 2006, Abe was the first to suggest developing preemptive strike capabilities to safeguard Japanese interests, thereby illustrating his unwavering policy towards the DPRK. 99 Tokyo enforced unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang 96 Abe, Utsukushii 45. 97 Shinzo Abe, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 165 th Session of the Diet,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 20 Sep 2006, 19 Jun 2007, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/09/29speech_e.html>. 98 Anthony Faiola and Dana Priest, “North Korea Test Long-Range Missile: Controversial Rocket Fails as Other Types Are Fired; U.N. Session Set After U.S., Japan Condemn Action,” Washington Post, 5 Jul 2006, 22 Jun 2007, < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/07/04/AR2006070400649.html >. 99 Christopher Griffin, “Honest Abe,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 11, No. 47 (Sep 4, 2006) 17. 59 and banned entry of the passenger cargo ferry Mangyongbong-92. 100 In addition, Japan took active measures in the Security Council, which coincidentally was serving as a non-permanent member of the Security Council under the leadership of Oshima Kenzo, Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. Japan initiated and unanimously passed Resolution 1695 at the United Nations Security Council on July 15, 2006. The Resolution called member states to “prevent the transfer of missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s missile or weapons of mass destruction programmes, as well as procurement of such items and technology from that country...[and] also addressed the transfer of financial resources in relation to those programmes.” 101 Following the Taepodong-2 launch, North Korea further aggravated international security on October 9, 2006 when it tested an underground nuclear device despite warnings from the international community. Japan announced further unilateral sanctions and closed off all ports to the North, restricted entry of North Korean nationals, banned North Korean imports, and imposed export sanctions on twenty-four luxury goods. In addition to its unilateral actions, Tokyo asserted the need for greater financial sanctions against the North at the United Nations and on October 14, 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718. The Resolution called member states to prohibit 100 The passenger and cargo ferry Mangyongbong-92 was believed to be smuggling amphetamines, counterfeit cash, and also technological components for North Korea’s missile development program. 101 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Condemns Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006),” United Nations Department of Public Information News and Media Division, July 15, 2006, 10 Jun 2007, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm>. 60 “the provision of large-scale arms, nuclear technology and related training to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as luxury goods…[and called upon all States] to take cooperative action, including thorough inspection of cargo, in accordance with their respective national laws.” 102 As noted earlier, Japan has used the United Nations to advocate its assertive and independent foreign policy and has continued to push forward its beliefs not only in the United Nations, but also in other multilateral frameworks, including the Six Party Talks. In doing so, Japan has maintained a healthy bilateral relationship with the United States and actively taken initiatives to press forward a new foreign policy posture. The threat posed by Pyongyang allowed Tokyo to take on a more aggressive foreign policy and embody what Prime Minister Abe called Japan’s “proactive diplomacy.” 103 North Korea’s erratic and threatening behaviors have served as opportune tools for to push forward an assertive foreign policy and position itself at the forefront of international diplomacy. Moreover, the bilateral alliance with the United States continues to serve as a means to reinforce its aggressive stance against Pyongyang. While most efforts at preventing Pyongyang’s erratic and uncivilized 102 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006),” United Nations Department of Public Information News and Media Division, 14 Oct 2006, 10 Jun 2007, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. 103 Abe, Prime Minister. 61 acts have been unsuccessful, Japan’s reinforced bilateralism with the United States allows Japan greater room to coercively negotiate with Pyongyang. 104 The recent tensions that have emerged in the region have allowed Japan greater leeway to enact and assert an aggressive foreign policy. The sense of insecurity and regional anxiety have greatly increased domestic support towards a more assertive stance regarding its foreign policy which does not simply respond to gaiatsu, but has the ability to assert itself in international diplomacy. Japan’s “reinforced bilateralism” has been a crucial element solidifying Koizumi’s proactive foreign policy. The changing regional tides of East Asia has been a source of concern, and “given uncertainties about China’s growing economic and military power and mounting concerns about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the United States and Japan need this alliance now more than ever.” 105 104 Takashi Inoguchi, “The Evolving Dynamics of Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy Role,” Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System, ed., Saori N. Katada, Hanns w. Maull and Takashi Inoguchi (Vermont: Ashgate, Publishing Company, 2004) 46. 105 Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “Common Values: A New Agenda for U.S.-Japan Relations,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer 2006, Vol. 7, No. 2 (International Module) 47. 62 CONCLUSION The post-Cold War era has given Japan an opportunity to re-visit its foreign policy and examine how to engage in international affairs. During the Cold War, Japan was able to depend on the United States for its security while providing the United States a bastion to prevent the spread of Communism in East Asia. Along with the Japanese public’s enduring culture of antimilitarism, Japan was able to enjoy a period of relative peace and stability at home based on its reactive and minimalist posture. Yet, the end of the Cold War brought drastic changes to the international environment and following Japan’s economic ascent, its global responsibilities and roles began to be questioned. While the early stages of the postwar era witnessed a nation feebly dependent on the United States, Japan had drastically transformed into an economic giant by the post-Cold War era and its postwar strategy of bandwagoning came into question. Although Japan upheld a reactive and minimalist foreign policy during the postwar era, Japan’s “lost decade” in the nineties compelled a reexamination of Japan’s state of affairs. Domestically, Japan was plagued by economic and political instability, evinced by the bursting of its bubble economy and the downfall of the 1955 system. As Japan’s economy struggled to recover after the bursting of the bubble, corruption scandals rampantly plagued Japan’s political scene and ultimately 63 led to the end of one-party-LDP-rule and the rise of unstable, conservative coalition regimes. In addition, Japan began to face severe gaiatsu and condemnation from the international community which demanded greater burden sharing and an end to Japan’s otsukiai gaiko ( ), or foreign policy for the sake of friendship. 106 Due to the intense criticism faced during the post-Cold War era, particularly following the Gulf War, Japan began to fear a rupture in its bilateral alliance with the United States. As was the case during the postwar era, Japan clearly understood that its bilateral security framework with the United States was essential in maintaining security and stability. Yet, Japan understood that it was necessary to alter its policy and respond assertively to gaiatsu by engaging in international affairs. In this regard, Japan’s strategy in the wake of the post-Cold War was to continue upholding its alliance with the United States through “constrained bilateralism.” Simultaneously, Japan sought to take on greater political roles in international affairs by augmenting its leadership role in multilateral institutions. By actively engaging in multilateral frameworks like the United Nations, APEC, ARF, and ASEAN+3, Japan sought to expand its foreign policy and develop its political leadership in global affairs. Japan’s aims were to solidify its image as a formidable partner in the international arena while sustaining its bilateral alliance with the 106 Keiko Hirata, “Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan’s Foreign Policy Toward Indochina,” Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, ed., Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 76. 64 United States, albeit in a constrained manner. However, multilateral institutions have continued to expose clear limitations, and Japan has become frustrated and discouraged by the inability of multilateral forums to be utilized as a tool to reinforce its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The Koizumi administration rose to power in the advent of the 21 st century and advocated a revival of a robust and assertive foreign policy and national identity. Since taking leadership in 2001, Koizumi “ruled with a remarkably consistent vision that has buoyed his popularity at home and boosted Japan's profile abroad.” 107 Yong Deng asserted that Japan’s previous role was “constrained by its diplomatic passivity rooted in part in its lack of a stable definition of national identity between Asia and the West.” 108 However, the Koizumi administration hoped to alter such perceptions by shifting its bilateral alliance from constrained to “reinforced bilateralism.” By emphasizing its alliance as the cornerstone of its foreign policy through its involvement in post-9/11 international affairs, Koizumi has been able to reinforce and strengthen Japan’s alliance with the United States. Indeed, the George-Jun relationship that Koizumi tirelessly fostered echoed relations that were evident during the Ron-Yasu era of the eighties. In addition, regional instabilities began to surface in the nineties. The rising anxieties due to China’s rise and the threats caused by North Korea’s erratic behavior served as further grounds to reinforce Japan’s bilateral security framework with the United States and advocate greater 107 Frederick. 108 Deng 364. 65 independence and proactivism in its foreign policy. While Japan has taken active measures to assert its political role in the international community, “Japan’s security and economic ties with the United States remain one of the highest priorities for Japanese policy makers. 109 Furthermore, the Koizumi administration sought to bolster Japan’s national identity and move away from its image of being a submissive and reactive state. Koizumi hoped to convey a new image of Japan which was independent, self- determined, and assertive. This was evinced through Koizumi’s adamant visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Unfortunately, doing so has distanced Japan with crucial regional neighbors including China and South Korea and due to the increased tensions, Japan became politically isolated in the Asian region during Koizumi’s reign. Nevertheless, despite some setbacks, the steps taken by the Koizumi administration allowed Japan to advance its foreign policy to new heights, and Tokyo has begun to take its first steps towards a consistently assertive and independent foreign policy posture. Inoguchi Takashi comments that Japan achieved great success during the Koizumi administration by “overcoming the powerful streak of antimilitarism and distrust from Asians and upholding the firm commitment as an ally…In its own idiosyncratic fashion, Japan has started to lend its solid hands to shaping global governance if somewhat feebly and with considerable risks involved.” 110 109 Sato 201. 110 Inoguchi 47. 66 Interestingly, the post-Koizumi era led by a more pragmatic Abe Shinzo has seen signs of mending regional ties in East Asia. In contrast to Koizumi’s unwavering commitment to prioritize and reinforce Tokyo’s bilateral alliance while bolstering Japan’s confidence, the Abe administration has taken a more rational approach through a “reverse course.” On October 2006 Abe made China and South Korea his first overseas visits as prime minister, thus displaying his administration’s eagerness and desire to reestablish firm economic and political relations in East Asia. In response, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007 and affirmed China’s commitment to reestablish bilateral ties by building a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship based on a future-oriented outlook. 111 While it is too early to tell how Japan’s foreign policy will engage and adjust to China and the East Asian region, Abe’s “ice-breaking” and Wen’s “ice-thawing” visits serve as appealing gestures towards a new wavelet in Japan’s foreign policy. While Japan’s foreign policy has gone through waves of transitioning during the post-Cold War, the Abe administration is showing a new ripple effect in its foreign policy by advocating intimate ties with regional neighbors. Unlike Koizumi who visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year, Abe has avoided visiting the contentious shrine since becoming prime minister in September 2006. Although Abe did make a controversial offering to the Yasukuni Shrine in April 2007, his decision 111 Yangtze Yan, “Premier Wen begins ‘ice-thawing’ visit to Japan,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, April 11, 2007, 22 May 2007, <http://english.gov.cn/2007-04/11/content_579126.htm>. 67 to avoid visiting the shrine to date seemingly indicates his desire to avoid further confrontations with Japan’s regional neighbors. Indeed, Abe’s more rational and pragmatic approach to foreign policy may result in the forging of regional partnerships in the coming years. Yet, the recent changes evident in Japan have raised brows both at home and abroad. With the successful dispatching of Self Defense Forces in numerous overseas missions, increased discussion has emerged towards enhancing the role of the Self Defense Force. In addition, the Japanese Defense Agency was upgraded to formal ministry status as the Ministry of Defense on January 9, 2007. Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma asserted that the transition of the Defense Agency into a Ministry is a result of the rising importance of defense in national administration as well as the rising understanding and trust of the Self Defense Force and its activities by the general public. 112 More recently, constitutional revision has been aggressively pursued by the Abe administration. However, while domestic discussion continues to shift towards greater independence and activism in Japan’s foreign policy, defense, and security, Abe will be forced to further re-examine how to conduct Japanese foreign policy in the new era. The Northeast Asian region continues to exist as a politically, economically, and militarily dynamic region. As China continues its quest towards political and economic growth, Tokyo will continue to face regional challenges from Beijing. 112 Fumio Kyuma, “Speech by Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma,” Japan Ministry of Defense, 9 Jan 2007, 20 Jun 2007, < http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/lastest/press01.html >. 68 For Japan to bolster its regional influence and expand its political role in the global community, Japan must first and foremost maintain its bilateral alliance with the United States. As Koizumi had previously emphasized, Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States must continue to serve as the bedrock of Japan’s national security and stability. While the international environment continues to morph in shape, Japan must seek to play an active role by making the United States the cornerstone of its foreign policy and effectively working together to stabilize economic and political instability. In doing so, Japan can enhance its political clout and maintain stability in the Asia Pacific. However, in addition to maintaining a reinforced bilateral framework with the United States, it will be crucial for Japan to engage in mending regional relations with its neighbors and establish relationships based on mutual trust. Rather than engagement based solely on a foreign policy aligned with the United States, Japan must seek to transform its regional identity and take on active leadership roles through multilateral institutions and establish robust regionalism in East Asia. On April 12, 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao of China met with Soka Gakkai International (SGI) President Daisaku Ikeda and presented a short, yet meaningful poem in tribute to Ikeda’s efforts to promote friendship and exchange between the two nations. “Creating a new path to the future through compassion, Binding a good 69 relationship through harmony.” 113 As expressed in Wen’s poem, for Japan to continue expanding its international function and solidify its political role, Japan must begin by binding regional relations in East Asia. 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Abstract (if available)

Abstract The post-Cold War era forced Japan to reassess its foreign policy and play a more proactive role in global affairs. Japanese foreign policy has greatly evolved in the post-Cold War and this paper seeks to examine the waves of Japanese foreign policy by beginning with an analysis of postwar theories articulating Japan's reactive and minimalist state. Subsequently, this paper examines domestic factors supplementing external factors which triggered Japan's foreign policy evolution. Next, this paper outlines Japan's first wave of evolution based on Japan's "constrained bilateralism" with the United States and its efforts towards multilateral activism. This paper further explores the failures of multilateralism and analyzes Japan's second wave of "reinforced bilateralism" under the Koizumi administration which saw the emergence of Japan's independent, proactive, and comprehensiveforeign policy in the post-Cold War era. This paper concludes by analyzing the wavelet of Abe's "reverse course" and its implications to Japanese foreign policy.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Nagashima, Daniel Koichi, Jr. (author)

Core Title Waves of Japanese foreign policy: from constrained bilateralism and political multilateralism to reinforced bilateralism in the post-Cold War era

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 07/10/2007

Defense Date 07/02/2007

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag ABE,bilateralism,Japan,Japanese foreign policy,Koizumi,multilateralism,OAI-PMH Harvest,post-Cold War

Place Name Japan (countries)

Language English

Advisor Katada, Saori N. (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Shipper, Apichai W. (committee member)

Creator Email nagashim@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m605

Unique identifier UC1332026

Identifier etd-Nagashima-20070710 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-517548 (legacy record id),usctheses-m605 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Nagashima-20070710.pdf

Dmrecord 517548

Document Type Thesis

Rights Nagashima, Daniel Koichi, Jr.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu