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The history of the submarine controversy between the United States and Germany, 1914 to 1917

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The history of the submarine controversy between the United States and Germany, 1914 to 1917

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Content The History of the Submarine Controversy
between the United States and
Germany, 1914 to 191?
A Thesis
Pre ented to the
Department of History,
University of Southern California
In Partial Fulfillment
of the
Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
By
Vivien G~
1
·ostrom
May 2
1
1933.
This thesis, written under the direction of the
candidate's Faculty Committee and approved by
all its members, has been presented to and ac
cepted by the· Council on Graduate Study and
Research in partial fulfillment of the require
ments for the degree of
Mas t_er ___ o.f __ ~:t;_ij ____________ _ .. ______ .. ___________ . ________ .... _ ·-···---_ ··-.. ___ _ ...
Dean
Date .... June_~ ... 193.3 ..................... .
Faculty Committee
Chairman
- ----~-~---------
e. r-;
/b
- 1
Preface
This short history does not pretend to justify the en
trance of the United States into the torld War, nor does it
intend to give a comprehensive survey of all the various
reasons why the United States became a participant on the
side of the Allies in April, 1917. It is the sole purpose
or this work to relate the many events in the history of the
submarine controversy between the United States and Germany
from 1914 to 1917, thereby showing that the hostility between
the two nations, aroused by this question, was one of the main
reasons for our entrance into the war. Incidentally, it is
hoped that this paper will illustrate how impossible it is
for a nation of today to attempt to carry out a policy of
isolation.
In a discussion of the period from 1914 to 1917, the chief
problem is that of iving a fair tre tment to both sides of
the controv·ersy. Few episodes of history nee _ a more thorough
end unbiased analysis than the diplom_ stic strug le between the
United States and Germany over the use of the submarine. Yet,
today, a great many of our histories of th t eriod h e been
unable to discard the war-time passions and ways oft 1nkin.
This survey will attempt to discuss many policies and events
which are as yet misunderstood in this country, and t the
same time will reject many of the su positions that were cur
rent during the period of thew r.
The writer does not feel th tit is neces ary to evalu te
the policies of either country. Th t 1 to s y, an explana
tion of tl1e acts of either Germany or the tYni ted t tea as
being good or evil will not be fo1•thcom ng. Only an acco,mt
of the events themselves will be considered, and 1n the most
objective manner possible .
In collecting material for this work, the author has con
sulted the most 1m ortant sources coverin the period . The
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United tates,
published in supplement ry volumes forte years 1914 to 1917
by the St te Department, have rovided a most valuable fund of
information. The memoirs and diaries of t he men who partici-
pated in the controversy, Colonel Ed ard
•
ouse, Davi
•
Houston, William Jennins Bryan, James w . Ger rd, Alfred von
Tirpitz, Johann von ernstorff , Adm r 1 Reinhardt Sheer, Chan cellor von Bethmann- Hollweg and others have been consulted.
Much illumination arose out oft e survey of ,h s vo {S.
The writer wishes to ackno· ledge the courtesies exten ed
-
to her by the Los Angeles Public Library an t e Library of
the Univ·ersity of Sout em California. It was by means of
their assistance that the collecti on of er m terial as m de
possible . The errors of fact and composition d es ort-
com·ngs of method would have been greater had it not been for
the helpful criticisms of Dr. E. M . Eriksson, Dr . F.H. rv r
and Dr. E . T. Mohme of the Univer ity of Sou ern Cal forn · , o
rendered invaluable service in rad n the ori inal man script.
Los Ang les, Californi
May 2, 1933.
V. • O.
Contents
Chapter Page
I. The United St ts an the Outbreak of the European
War, 1914. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
A. The neutrality of the United St tes
B. Peace moves
C. Q uestion of the adoption oft e Declaration
of London
II. The Beginnings of the German Submarine Campaign.. 8
A. Disagreements in tha German governmental
departments
B. Germany's war zone proclamation
C. Germany's retaliatory measure ag inst England
D. Attempt at arbitration b the Unite States
E. Attacks on neutral and passenger ships
III. The Lusitania Aff 1r............................. 27
A. The so-called "death notice"
B. Question of the armament of the Lusitania
C. The Lusitania notes
D. Political controv rsy in Germany
IV. Other Cases of Controversy....................... 52
A. Further sinkings of merchant and passen er ships
B. The German pledge of September 1, 1915
C. Attempts to solve the status of armed merchant
ships
v. The Sussex Incid nt.............................. 70
A. The sinkin of the Sussex
Chapter
Page
B.
The Sussex ple
e
c. German
ubmarine
merchantmen
D.
Political crisis
in Germany
E.
Further attacks on
merchant
ships
F.
Peace negotiations
of 1916
VI. The Reslllllption of Unrestricted Submarine 'ar-
fare............................................. 93
A. Germany's memorandum of January 31, 1917
B. The Zimmermann message
C. Severance of diplomatic relations between Ger
many and the United St tes , February 3, 1917
D. Armed neutrality of the United State s
E. Declaration of w r by the United States , April
2, 1917
VII. StllmTlary. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 108
Chapter I
The United States and the Outbreak or the
European W ar, 1914
Since the time of ashington, the policy of the United
States has been largely one of isolation end aloofness from
world politics. This policy was in harmony with the situation
as it existed one hundred and forty years ago, but at the time
of the World War this nation was no longer the "detached and
distant" one of which Washington spoke. Early 1n the conflict,
as 1n former European wars, the Atlantic seemed a barrier
which separated the United States from the struggle, but as
the war continued it became more and more a roadway that might
lead to American participation.
When the war began, the President of the United States,
1
on August 4, 1914, issued a proclamation of neutrality. It
was his opinion that the more carefully this attitude as ob-
.
served, the greater opportunity the United States ould have
to act as impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peace
terma.
2
As the conflict grew fiercer, however, the role of
neutral became more difficult,and the vital interests of t he
United States were involvod to a far greater extent than any
one had foreseen.
1. United States Department of st te, Pa~ers relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States, l 14, Supplement,
547-549.
. ""
2. Latane, J.H., A History of American Foreign Policy,
(New York, 1927), 580.
In spite of the large German population in this country
and the propaganda which the German government carried on, the
invasion of Belgium and the atrocities which the Germane were
said to have coDDnitted soon arrayed majority opinion on the
side or the Allies. This attitude was not a violation of neu
trality. As long as the United States fulfilled her obliga
tions as defined by international law, no charge of departure
from neutrality could be justly made. In order to win the
confidence of any who might oppose his policy of neutrality,
however, President Wilson followed his proclamation with an
address to the American people, issued on August 18, 1914.
"I venture, therefore, my fellow countr,n1en,"
he said in part, "to speak a solenm word of warn
ing to you against that deepest, most subtle, most
essential breach of neutrality which may spring
out of partisanship, out or passionately taking
sides. The United States must be neutral 1n fact
as well as in name during these days that are to
try men's souls. We must be neutral in thought
as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sen
timents as well as upon every transaction that
might be construed as a preferance of one party to
the struggle before another."l ·
The immediate interest of the Un tad States government
in the crisis of 1914 took form in the attempts to open all
possible avenues leading toward peace. The first effort
originated with Ambassador M. P. Herrick in France. He
telegraphed to the President on July 28, 1914 that an expres
sion from the American government would have great weight 1n
the crisis. Europe, he said, would welco1ne a plea for delay
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1914,
Supplement, 552.
end moderation.
1
This idea, towever, did not take root 1n
England, and in London the plan died in the hands of Viscount
Edward Grey. An expression of gratitude and a query as to
whether the offer had been made elsewhere were the only results.
Grey also remarked impressively, "It looks as if Europe were
in the clutch of blind forces."
2
Undaunted by this expression of opinion, President Wilson
made another move toward peace on the 4th of August. He offered
his services as mediator, whenever the opportunity should arise,
to act 1n the interest of European peace. All the belligerent
powers thanked the President and took occasion to justify their
actions. The Kaiser replied on the 14th with a long conmnmi
cation. He contended that Germany had made eveey effort to
keep England out of the war; that he had repeatedly offered
to respect the integrity of continental France if England
would stay out; and that the final decision for war had been
taken as a result of the Russian mobilization. "I am most
grateful for the President's message," he concluded.
3
The
answers from the other countries were in the same tone; not
one of them said anything about peace. President Wilson's
offer came to nothing.
It would seem that, in the face of such declarations,
the United States would give up its efforts. Before many days
had passed, however, a new peace move was made, coming, this
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1914,
Supplement, 18-19.
2. Ibid., 19, 24-25.
3. Ibid., 60-61.
1
time, from .Ambas sador J. von Bernstorff. At a dinner given
in New York by Mr. James Speyer, one of t he guests, Mr. Oscar
Straus, asked Ambassador von Bernstorft if he thought that
Germany would accept mediation at this time. The German ambas
sador replied that a conversation with the Chancellor just
before leaving Berlin led him to believe that the Kaiser would
accept mediation if the other nations also expressed their
willingness. With von Bernstorff's permission Mr. Straus com
municated this statement to the Secretary of State, Mr. William
Jennings Bryan. Mr. Bryan took the matter up, end with Presi
dent Wilson's permission telegraphed to Ambassador J. w. Gerard
at Berlin, asking him to offer mediation in the President's
name. Telegrams were also sent to the American ambassadors
in France and England, stating that the offer had been made
to Germany end adding the following remarks:
The British and French Ambassadors fear that
Germany will not accept any reasonable terms but
even a failure will not rob an attempt at mediation
of all its advantages because the different nations
would be able to explain their attitude, the reasons
for continuing the war, the end to be hoped for and
the terms upon which peace 1s possible. This would
locate responsibility for the continuation of the
war and help to mould public op1nion.2
The fears of the British and French ambassadors were
realized. Their two governments refused to make or accept
any terms of peace which did not completely crush the German
1. This attempt is usually known as t he Straus peace
move because Mr. Oscar Straus acted as the intermediary
between Ambassador von Bernstorff and the United States
Department of State.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1914,
Supplement, 99-100.
war machine. Both denied responsibility for beginning the war.
1
The answer of Germany also turned down the offer. Her excuse
was that acceptance of America's offer of mediation would be
interpreted as a sign of wealmess and would be misunderstood
by both her enemies and the German people.
2
These answers con
vinced the State Department that the time was not yet ripe for
mediation and peace moves.
Meanwhile, other diplomatic questions were arising which
involved the United States in the struggle across the ocean.
In keeping with the program of neutrality, the Department of
State sent instructions to the American ambassadors in the
belligerent countries to inquire if the various countries would
agree to the rules of warfare as laid down in the Declaration
of London in 1909. Austria-Hungary and Germany ag1•eed; Russia
replied that whatever action Great Britain took she would fol
low. Great Britain decided to adopt generally the regulations
of the Declaration, but gave notice that she intended to modify
and add to them at will. It soon became apparent what these
modifications and additions were to be. On August 26, 1914,
new lists of absolute and conditional contraband were published.
It was also announced that a neutral vessel which had carried
contraband to the enemy co\llltries could be detained on its
return voyage. Moreover, the British navy would capture any
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1914,
Supplement, 100, 101.
2. Ibid., 104.
vessel carrying conditional contraband whose ultimate destina
tion was an enemy country. The existerice of a blockade of Ger
many and her allies was "presumed to be known". Because of
this determined attitude on the part o_ Great Britain, the
suggestion of the United states that the Declaration of London
be adopted as a temporary code of naval warfare was withdrawn.
1
The naval superiority of England made it comparatively
easy for her to stop all direct trade in contraband of war
destined for her enemies, but she could not stop Germany from
importing these articles through the neutral ports of Holland,
Italy and the Scandinavian countries. In such a case, an or
dinary blockade of the German coast would have had little effect,
but by enlarging the lists or both absolute and conditional
contraband and by applying the doctrine of continuous voyage,
she was able to cut off large amounts of overseas supplies
2
from Germany. There was no doubt as to England's right to
enlarge the contraband lists, because it was almost impossible
to determine in advance what articles are to be treated as
contraband. Accordingly, such a right is definitely stated
in Articles 23 and 25 of the Declaration of London.
3
But her
use of the doctrine of continuous voyage was open to dispute.
1. United States Department of State, ~it., 1914,
Supplement, 216-220, 257-258. Walter H1nes7>age-;-the American
ambassador at London, exceedingly pro-British, asked that the
United States yield in this matter. "The English," he said,
"will risk a serious quarrel or even war with us rather than
yield."
2. Ibid., 342-343.
3. Ibid., 1909, (1909), 323-325. Article 23 stats:
ttArticles exclusively used for war may be added tote list or
absolute contraband." Article 25 states: "Articles susce ti
for use in war as well as for purposes of peace ••• may be a __ _
to the list of conditional contraband by a declaration."
The United States made a protest against this policy, but could
not give it much force due to the fact that during the Civil
War the American government had used the same policy against
the Confederate States. She continued to in t, hov1ever, th t
the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens
in the war be defined by the existing rules of international
law and the treaties of the United States. She also reserved
the right to enter a protest or demand 1n each c ase in which
those rights and duties were interfered with by the belligerent
authorities.
1
Thus, all efforts at mediation having failed, by February,
1915 it was clearly seen that the war was to be a life and
death struggle between England and her allies on t h e one side
and Germany and her allies on the other. The Britit.m sea power
had be~n carefully developed through many years. Now, in time
of her great need, she determined to bring all of its power to
bear on Germany. It was sea power that made it possible for
Great Britain to extend the doctrines of contraband and con
tinuous voyage, and 1 t was sea power that enabled her to set
up a new doctrine of blockade, what she called a "cordon
blockade". In what ways was Germany going to cope with this
great emergency? . Did she intend to submit to this blockade
of starvation, or did she have some means of retaliation, some
new weapon, ready to use against the powerful British navy?
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1914,
Sup lement, 225-232.
Chapter II
The Beginnings of the German Submarine Campaign
Under the pressure of what was practically a stringent
blockade, the German naval authorities decided to put to use
their strong submarine flotilla, which had by November, 1914
failed to damage the British navy, by attacks on British com-
merce. The beginning of the Germen submarine campaign was not
sanctioned by Admiral A. von Tirpitz. He felt that it was not
yet time to undertake such a move and disapproved of the scope
of the area designated for its oper tion. He wished to delay
submarine operations for one year, and then with an increased
nwnber of vessels to conduct it ruthlessly on a grand scale.
Von Tirp1tz, however, was not the absolute naval authority 1n
the German government, and his opinions were overruled.
On the 3rd of November, 1914, the leaders of the fleet
brought the matter to the attention of the Chief of the Naval
Sta.ff, Vice-Admiral H. von Pohl, as a p,n,ely naval and economic
1
measure. The idea soon, however, took an emotional and poli-
tical turn, and so remained until the war ended. On the 7th
of November, von Pohl discussed the subject with von Tirpitz,
suggesting that the submarine warfare be directed against the
"whole coast of Great Britain and Ireland".
2
Von Tirpitz
objected, pointing out that the legal status of a blockade by
1. Scheer, R., Germany's Higp Sea Fleet in the !/orld W ar,
(London, 1920), 222.
2. Tirpitz, A. von, My emoirs, (New York, 1919), II, 139.
the new weapon had not yet been determined and that Germany
should wait until a greater nlDllber of submarines were avail
able. Moreover, he pointed out, "the blockade of all England
looks too much like bluff; blockade of the Thames to start
with seems to me better."
1
Von Pohl would not listen to von T1rpitz
1
s argmnents and
proceeded to deal directly with the Foreign Office and Chancel
lor T. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor at first refused
to agree to the proposal. While he admitted the legality of
the intended war, he considered the time not yet ripe for such
violent measures. A time more opportune would come, he said,
when Germany's position on the continent had been made absolute-
2
ly secure. However, a naval reverse on January 24, 1915, the
loss of the German cruiser, Blucher, in a battle with British
warships, brought von Bethmann-Hollweg arotmd to von Pohl's
way of thinking. As a direct outcome of the naval defeat, Vice
Admiral von Pohl was transferred from his position as Chief of
the Naval Sta.ff to that of Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea
Fleet. On February 4th, the fleet was inspected by the Kaiser,
and the conn11anding officers of the submarines were presented
to him. After this ceremony, it was rumored that the Kaiser
was about to sign an order declaring the territories around
3
the British Isles to be a war zone. On the same day the
proclamation was issued.
1. Tirpitz, A. von, op. cit., II, 139-140.
2. Ibid., 143.
3. Gibson, R.H., and Prendergast, M., The Ger an Submarine
ar, 1914-1918, (New York, 1931), 27.
The first intimation of this move came to Washington
through a telegram from Ambassador J. w. Gerard on the 2nd of
February: "Informed today by Undersecretary Zimmermann that
as England was trying to gtarve Germany out, quite probably
a submarine blockade of England would be declared soon and
1
the channel closed." On the 4th he cabled the proclamation
with all its details. The war zone was to encircle the British
Isles, including the whole oft e English Channel. It was de
clared that after February 18th every enemy merchant ship found
therein would be destroyed, even if it were impossible to save
the crews and passengers. Neutral ships, too, were warned of
their danger because of the misuse of neutral flags ordained
by the British Admiralty on January 31st, and because of the
hazards of naval warfare, which might make it impossible to
prevent the attacks meant for hostile ships from being directed
against neutrals. Germany justified this order as an act of
retaliation against her enemies, who, she said, were conducting
the war in defiance of all international law. She also defended
it by the conduct of the neutral countries. They, in her opin
ion, had not made any effective protests against Great Britain's
violations of their rights.
2
The government of the United States acted promptly and on
February 10th addressed notes to both Germany and England. That
to Germany was worked out by President Wilson and Robert Lansing.
It was a strong protest, more outspoken than any note yet ad-
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 93.
2. Ibid., 94, 95-9?.
dressed to Englend. The Unite States government called atten
tion to the very serious possibilities or the course of action
which the Imperial government contemplated. It was pointed
out to the German government that a critical situation might
arise if an American vessel were destroyed or an American
citizen killed. Germany was further reminded that visit and
search were the only rights which a belligerent could exercise
in dealing with a neutral on the high seas, unless a blockade
were proclaimed and effectively maintained. In conclusion,
the hope was expressed that Germany would give the assurance
that American citizens and their vessels would not be molested
except for visit and search, even though the ships might be
1
in the war zone.
The protest addressed to England was in regard to the
use of the American flag as a ruse de guerre. By a curious
coincidence Colonel Edward M. House traveled to England on a
vessel that was shortly to assume an important place in the
history of the submarine controversy, the Lusitania. On the
5th of February, as the vessel approached the Irish coast,
the American flag was raised. Colonel House realized that
"many possible complications" might arise out of the incident.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Captain of
the Lusitania on that voyage mapped out a complete scheme for
saving the passengers in case of an attack and believed that
the ship would remain af~oat for an hour unless the boilers
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 98-100.
1
were struck. The episode aroused, according to Ambassador
Gerard, "much indignation" in Germany. He notified the State
Department that if the report were true and no action were
taken by the United States, bitter feeling in Germany would
2
be greatly increased.
It is obvious that the United States government had every
reason to enter a strong protest, particularly since reports
from London indicated that the use of American and. other neu
tral flags was to be a permanent policy. The note called at
tention to the serious consequences which might result if the
practice were continued. It was pointed out that there was a
distinction between the occasional use of a neutral flag under
stress of immediate pursuit for the purpose of deceiving an
approaching enemy, and the general use of the flag with the
resulting exposure of neutral ships and persons to constant
danger. The hope was then expressed that His Majesty's govern
ment would do all in its power to restrain the use of the Amer
ican flag by British merchant vessels within the war zone pro
cla1rned by Germany.3
Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
in his reply to the United States offered an extended justifi
cation for England's use of neutral flags. The action was due,
he said, to Germany's announcement that she intended to sink
British merchant vessels at sight. The ·captain of the Lusitania
1. Seymour, c., ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,
(Boston, 1926), I, 361.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 101.
5. Ibid., 100.
had hoisted the American flag at the request of the American
passengers on board. No general order to use neutral flags
had been issued by the Admiralty, nor did the British govern
ment intend to advise their merchantmen to use foreign flags
as a general practice. They would use them only as a last
resort to escape capture or destruction. Since Germany, how
ever, had annotmced her intention of sinking non-combatant
crews and cargoes,
11
a proceeding hitherto regarded by the world,
not as war, but as piracy
11
, the United States ought not to ask
England to give up the means of escaping not only capture but
the worse fate of sinking and destruction. Finally, Sir Edward
Grey added, if the captors did not fulfill their obligation of
verifying the nationality of a ship and therefore a neutral
vessel were destroyed, the responsibility would lie upon the
1
destroying vessel and not upon Great Britain.
Germany did not answer until February 17th. The reply
consisted largely of denunciation of the "lawless and 1nhmnane
11
conduct or Great Britain, of veiled criticism of the United
States for its tolerance of British violation of neutral rights,
and of a def ehse of the German war zone decree as a measure of
overpowering military necessity and a justifiable act against
Great Britain. Having proclaimed a war zone, Germany was de
termined to close the zone with mines and would endeavor to
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 117-118. Realizing that neutral flags would not
be respected by commanders of the German submarines, owners
of neutral vessels about to sail from New York had their names
painted in huge letters on the sides as a means of identifi-
cation. In several c ses the flag of its country was added.
destroy every hostile merchant vessel found within it. This
action, she realized, necessarily exposed neutral vessels to
danger. Germany hoped th tall neutrals would acquiesce in
these measures. She had given proof of her good will in al
lowing a period of fourteen days to elapse before putting the
war zone decree into operation, in order that the neutral na
tions could make arrangements to avoid the danger of entering
the zone. If, in view of this warning, the neutrals should
suffer injury within these "closed waters", they and not Ger-
many ould be responsible. As the surest means of voiding
mistakes due to the use by British merchantmen of the American
flag, the German government suggested that the United States
provide peaceful convoys for their ships carrying "peaceful
cargoes" throu h the war zone. The note concluded with the
statement that if the United States succeeded in removing the
grounds which made these measures necessary, if she made it
possible for Germany to obtain her legitimate sup ly of food
stuffs and industrial raw materials through the adoption of
the Declaration of London by the belligerent powers, "the
German Government would recognize this as a service which
could not be too highly estimated in favor of more hmnane
conduct of war and would gladly draw the necessary conclusions
from t h e new situation thus created.
111
The difference in the tone of the British and German an-
swers was very obvious. Great Britain offered an extensive
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 112-115.
justification for her use of neutral flags, but contrary to
the German attempt to solve the problem, showed no accomodat1ng
spirit or effort to find a way out of the difficulties. Fur
thermore, she immediately forgot that she had used the argument
of military necessity in establishing her blockade, but denied
the sazne right to Germany.
In the ensuing correspondence the United States alleged
that the high seas were free; that American citizens had the
right to travel and take their ships wherever their legitimate
business called them; and that Germany's proclamation could 1n
no way destroy these rights. To attack and destroy a merchant
vessel on sight the United States regarded as "unprecedented
in naval warfare". The possible destruction of American lives
upon merchantmen was considered "an indefensible violation of
neutral rights". No warning that an illegal end inhuman act
would be connnitted could possibly be accepted as an excuse for
. .
that act. Finally, Germany was reminded that if she suspected
an enemy vessel of using a neutral flag, the exercise of the
right of visit And search was all that was necessary to deter-
1
mine such a question.
Germany's announcement and explanation of her course as
merely retaliation against England aroused a storm of protest
in the American press. Germany, declared the New York Herald,
"is on the brink of her most momentous blunder". Suppose that
1. Editorial, "The Controversy between the Unite States
and Germany over the Use of Submarines against erchant Vessels,"
The American Journal of International Law, IX, (July, 1915),
668.
I •
a Gerrnan submarine "ran emuok like a mad Malay end destroyed
the ships and crew of any neutral, would Germany not then have
to reckon with that neutral as an enemy?" Connnenting on this
suggestion, the Washington Herald said, "The warning may well
startle the people of this country out of their dozing in fan
cied security from the stri~e of Europe; but it is for Germany
to heed it. Let anyone call it premature if he wills. It is
well to be premature; it will be too late when an American ship
1
or a ship with Americans on board is sunk."
When word reached this country that the Lusitania had used
the American flag, it was received with varying and startled
emotions by the press. "The United States cannot tolerate the
misuse of its flag by any of the belligerents without becoming
involved in the war," asserted the Washington Post. The Mil
waukee Free Preas declared it "an act of impertinent and com
promising cowardice for British vessels to fly neutral flags
for the deception of German raiders, and it would be an act of
even greater cowardice if the Government of the United States
should tolerate such use of the Stars and Stripes." Many edi
tors, however, pointed out that neither national or internation
al law at the time prohibited the use of neutral flags by bel
ligerents in order to escape pursuit. Among these were t h e
New York Evening Post, the New York Evening Sun, the Philadelphia
Public Ledger, t J n.e Washington Herald, and the Washington Time!_.
1. The New York Herald and the Washiniton Herald quoted
in Anonymous, "English and German Treatmen of Neutral Flags,"
The Literary Digest, L, (February 20, 1915), 358.
The New York Press was convinced that "for anybody to try and
kick up an international riot over the false-flag issue is ab
surdly futile."
1
The entire German press greeted with satisfaction the
Admiralty's declaration of a war zone around the British Isles.
"Neutral shipping," said the Berlin Post, "is given time to
take refuge 1n safe harbors. Only after a measured period do
all merchantmen going to and from the British Isles run into
danger. Then, to be sure, men and freight, not only on British
ships but under a neutral flag are doome to sink." The Lokal
Anzeiger asserted that England's own weapons were being turned
against her, and that when Germany destroyed the "English yoke
under which the world has suffered for centuries, it will have
accomplished a high historical mission and freed the world
2
from one of its most dangerous enemies." As for the note from
the United States, the Berlin Post believed that "when some
thing does not suit the Yankees they adopt as threatening and
saber-rattling a tone as possible. They think that the person
thus threatened will be frightened, and yield. If he does not,
if he pays no attention and is not scared, the swaggering Yan
kees soon quiet down."
3
1. ashington Post, Milwaukee Free Press, and New York
Press quoted In Anonymous,■ "English and German Treatment or
Neutra.1 Flags," The Literary Di§est, L, (February 20, 1915),
359-360. Vide also Anonymous,Germany
1
s Sub arine Blockade
of England,
11
_'!'.!le Li terarti D!iest, L, (February 13, 1915), 304.
2. Berlin Post and ok Anzeiger quoted in The Ne York
Tirues, February 6,-1915.
3. McMaster, J.B., The United States in the World ar,
(New York, 1919), I, 69.
The controversy, however, between t
United St tes and
Germany over the use of submarines became more serious with
the announcem nt by Germany that she was going to attack Eng
lish merchant ships without warning or visit. In a memorandmn
to the United States Herr J. von Bernatorff, the Germen ambas-
sador, set forth Germany's reasons for taking such a step. It
was due, he said, to the reports that English merchantmen were
going to offer armed resistance in the war zone. They planned
to sail in groups and to rem the German submarines while under
going search, or to throw bombs upon them if they came along
side. Also, they would attempt to overpower searching parties
which might come aboard. Moreover, he stated that the British
goverrunent had offered high prizes for the first English mer
chant ship which destroyed a German submarine. Visit and
search would therefore be out of the question because they
would expose the boarding party end the submarine to destruc
tion. Under such conditions, there could be no further assur
ance for the safety of neutral shipping in the war zone. Ger-
many again most earnestly warned neutral vessels to stay out
of this area. She believed this new method of warfare justi
fied by the murderous character of Great Britain's methods.
England was trying to condemn the German people to death by
starvation through the destruction or their legitimate trade
1
with neutral foreign countries.
1th a view to inducing the governments of Great Britain
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 104-105.
and Germany to modify, in the interest of neutral rights, the
measures adopted against each other, the United States on
February 20, 1916 addressed identical communications to the
two countries. The hope was expressed that they might, through
reciprocal concessions, find a basis for agreement, thus re
lieving neutral vessels engaged in peaceful conm1erce from the
great dangers on the high seas adjacent to the coasts or the
belligerents. The United States government, "as a sincere
friend desirous of embarrassing neither nation involved and
of serving, if it may, the common interests of humanity",
respectfully suggesteds
1. That Germany end Great Britain agree to stop planting
floating mines on the high seas, except within cannon range
of harbors and for defensive purposes only; that all mines
should bear the stamp of the government planting them and
should be so constructed as to become harmless if separated
from their moorings.
2. That neither belligerent should use submarines to at
tack merchant vessels of any nationality, except to enforce
the right of visit and search.
3. That each would forbid their respective merchant ves
sels to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruses
1
.s!2 guerr~.
In a note dated March 1st the Germen government replied
to the American conununication. Germany agreed to abandon the
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 119-120.
19.
use of floating mines and to use only anchored ones. On the
other hand, it was stated that she did not consider it feasible
for belligerents to forego the use of anchored mines for offen
aive purposes. Furthermore, the German government would agree
not to use submarines against the merchantmen of any flag, ex
cept when necessary to enforce the right of search. In case
the enemy character of the vessel or the presence of contra
band aboard should be established, however, the submarine
would "proceed in accordance with the general rules or inter
national law". This offer was made on the condition that the
enemy merchant vessels would stop using neutral flags, or arming
themselves and resisting attacks. In conclusion, it was pointed
out that the inconveniences to which neutral shipping was neces
sarily exposed in maritime warfare might be reduced still fur
ther by prohibiting the conveyance of munitions of war from
1
neutral countries to belligerents on ships of any nationality.
In a memorandum handed to Ambassador w. H. Page on March
15th Sir Edward Grey acknowledged England's receipt of the
note from the United States. It was clear from the reply ot
the German government, he said, that Germany was not prepared
to abandon the practice of sinking British merchant ships by
submarines. It was also evident from the reply that she would
not abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes. This
being so, a further reply from Great Britain was not necessary.
Nevertheless, he felt that the opportunity presented itself
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
upplement, 129-130.
for the British overnment to furnish a fuller statement of
its whole position and feeling in the matter. Secretary Orey
then proceeded to review at length various unlawful acts which
Germany was alleged to have committed in violation of interna
tional law end the laws of humanity since the beginning of the
1
war. Because of these acts, the memorandum stated, the govern-
ments of Great Britain and France were resolved to stop the
shipment of supplies to or from Germany. They proposed to ac
complish their purpose, however, without sacrificing neutral
ships and non-combatant lives or inflicting upon the neutrals
the damage caused when a vessel and its cargo are sunk without
warning, examination or trial. This measure, it was added,
was "a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented
methods, repugnant to all law and morality ••• which Germany
began to adopt at the very outset of the war, and the effects
of which have been constantly accumulating."
2
The efforts of the United States to bring about an agree
ment between Great Britain and Germany having thus failed, both
belligerents proceeded to put their retaliatory measures into
operation. Great Britain seized every merchant vessel suspected
1. The unlawful acts were the cruel treatment of the civil
ian population of Belgitnn; the barbarous treatment of British
officers and soldiers taken prisoners; the laying of mine fields
in the high seas; the sinking of British merchant vessels in
stead of taking them into prize courts, end sometimes without
warning and without making provisions for the safety of passen
gers and crews; the destruction of neutral vessels, etc.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 140-143. According to critics, one important fact
established by these notes is the admission that t e cutting
orf or trade with Germany was a blockade. Of this no neutral
could complain. Vide McMaster, J.B., op. cit., I, Bl.
of carrying supplies directly or indirectly to Germany, and
Germany, true to her threat, which some were inclined to regard
as mere "bluff", proceeded to sink British merchantmen with
their crews and pas sengers, and a number of neutral ships re
ceived a similar fate. Between February 18th, when the German
decree went into effect, and June 25t , s e ty-e1ght British
merchant vessels and eighty-two fishing boats were reported
as having been sunk by submarines, often without warning or
with so little notice that it was impossible for the crews and
passengers to save themselves. Appa.re~tly no effort was made
by the destroyers to provide for the safety of the persons on
board , and in many cases the destruction was accompanied by a
1
loss of life.
For a short time American trade was not disturbed. This
fact was perhaps due to the incidental arrangement between the
State Department and the German Admiralty to lessen the chances
that American vessels would be sunk. By means of co-operation
between the State Department and the Department of Connnerce,
information was furnished the German Admiralty as to the sail
ing of American ships from the United States to England.
2
It
was not long, though, before several incidents occurred which
brought Germany and the United. States to the verge at leas t of
the severance of diplomatic relations. The climactic act of
the first unrestricted submarine campaign was the sinking of
1. Garner, J .w., "War Zones and Submarine arfare," The
American Journal of International Law, IX, (July, 1915), 6 •
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 121.
the Lusitania. It was preceded by several events of lesser
1
importance, which later became legends of great proportions.
On March 28, 1915, when south of st. George's Channel,
the British steamer Falab was sunk by a torpedo fired from
a German submarine. Out of the 160 passengers and 90 in the
crew, 111 were killed, including a Mr. Leon Thrasher, an Ameri
can citizen.
2
According to the testimony of the survivors,
the Falaba endeavored to escape, but on a signal from the
submarine hove to and offered no resistance. The torpedo was
fired within ten minutes, before many of the passengers were
given an opportunity to leave the boat. The submarine offered
no assistance nor did it take notice of the people struggling
in the water and crying to it for help.
3
On April 6th the German :Ejnbassy received an official mes
sage concerning the Falaba. Germany st ted that it was the
intention of the submarine commander to allow t he passengers
and crew plenty of time to save themselves. The captain of
the Falaba, however, disregarded the order to lay to and took
flight, sending up rocket signals for help, whereupon t e Ger
man commander ordered the passengers and crew to leave the ship
within ten minutes. Twenty-three minutes were allowed before
the torpedo was fired, and then only upon the approach of sus
picious steamers.
1. Grattan, C.H., Why We Fought, (New York, 1929), 287.
2. Editorial, "The Controversy between the United States
and Germany over the Use of Submarines against Merchant Vessels,"
The American Journal of International Law, IX, (July, 1915),
667.
3. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 359-360.
The United States refused to accept this explanation as
in any way relieving Germany of responsibility for the loss
of an American life. The effort of an unarmed merchantman to
escape capture and secure assistance did not alter t~e obliga
tion of the submarine in respect to the safety of the lives
of those on board after the vessel had ceased her attempt to
escape. Nothing but forcible resistance or continued efforts
1
to escape were held to forfeit the lives of passengers or crew.
VJb.ile the Falaba case was being discussed by the two
governments, on April 28th the American steamer Cushing, bound
from Philadelphia to Rotterdam with a cargo of petroleum and
oil, was bombarded by bombs from a German airship. Out of the
four bombs which were dropped, only one struck the vessel, in
flicting damages on it.
2
After varied correspondence, partly
in connection with the Lusitania affair, it was established
that the attack on the Cushing was due to mistaken identity.
The German government offered compensation in view of this
serious error.
3
Three days after the bombing of the Cushing the American
oil tank steamer Gulflight, bound from Port Arthur, Texas, to
Rouen, France, was torpedoed by a German submarine but did not
sink. The captain· died of heart failure, and two of the crew
1. Editorial, "The Controversy bet een he United States
and Germany over the Use of Submarines against Merchant Vessels,"
The American Journal of International Law, IX, (July, 1915),
671.
2. Ibid., 667.
3. United States Department of State, OE• cit., 1915,
Supplement, 378.
who jumped overboard were drowned. An investigation showed
that the Gulflight at the time of her torpedoing was in com
munication with a British patrol boat. The German submarine
commender concluded that she was an enemy vessel under convoy.
After an exchange of notes between the German Foreign Office
1
and the State Department, Germany offered compensation.
These cases, particularly that oft e Falaba, were lead
ing to a crisis between the United States and Germany. Many
people saw it coming, but none, perhaps, more clearly than
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. In a letter to
President Wilson, dated April 23, 1915, he pointed out that a
hostile note to Germany over the actions of her submarines
might prove embarrassing to the United States because she had
not protested against certain acts of Great Britain. She had
not contested England's assertion of the right to use the
American flag, nor had she protested against the British de
fense of the right to prevent foodstuffs from reaching non
combatant enemies. Thus, Secretary Bryan felt that a harsh
connnunication would bring on a crisis. He suggested an alter
native, namely, an appeal to the belligerent nations to consid-
2
er terms of peace.
Secretary of State Bryan's suggestion was not heeded, nor
did his desire for peace come true. Before many days passed
by, an event happened which rouse the American people and
government to an intense excitement. It brought the war fever
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 378, 381, 397, 419-436.
2. Bryan, .J. and M.G., Memoirs of W illiam Jennings
Bryan, (Philadelphia, 1925), 396-397.
25.
in the United St tes to a head, and was the beginning of a
series of events which finally caused war between Germany and
the Unit d tates. The sinking of the Lusitania brought home
to the American people the horrors of the war and aroused a
spirit of angry hostility toward Germany which made war with
that country a future possibility.
Chapter III
The Lusitania Affair
In the middle of April, 1915, a meeting was held in New
York City by the leading figures among the German propagandists
and diplomatic officials. On the motion of Dr. Bernhard Dern
burg, it was resolved to issue a simple notice, warning Ameri
cans of their danger in traveling through the war zone on ves
sels of Germany's enemies. The notice was considered as no
more than right and proper in view of the fact that while danger
existed, the United States government still underestimated it
and failed to take any measures of precaution. As a rule, such
a shipping notice was part of the duties of the German Consu
late in New York. Apparently the consul was afraid that it
would be misunderstood and refused to handle the matter. Am
bassador J. von Bernstorft decided to issue it from the Imperial
1
Embassy in Washington.
The notice had no particular reference to any one ship,
but was intended to serve as a general w rn i ng, motivated, as
von Bernstorff said, by humanity and wise policy. It re ad:
Notice!
Travelers intending to embark on the Atlan
tic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists
between Germany end her allies and Greet Britain
and her allies; that the zone of war includes the
waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in
accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial
1. Bernstorff, J. von., My Three Years in America, (New
York, 1920), 1~7.
German Government, vessels flyin t e flag of Gr at
Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to des
truction in those waters and that travelers sailing
in the war zone on ships of Or at Britain or her
allies do so at th ir own risk.
Imperial German Embassy,
Washington, n.c., April 22, 1915.
1
It was intended that this notice appear in the press on April
24th and the two follov,ing Saturdays. It appeared for he
first time, however, on the 1st of May. At the time, the
warning received scant notice. In many papers it was placed
just above or just under the advertisement in which the Cunard
Steamship Company announced the sailing of the Lusitania on
the same day. This circumstance led many to believe that the
notice was a warning directed to the Lusitania. At any rate,
on May 7th one of the largest passenger steamers in the orld,
the British steamer Lusitania, while bound from New York to
Liverpool, was struck by two torpedoes and in a few minutes
went down. Of the 1,959 persons on board, 1,198 were drowned,
2
including 124 American men, women and chiidren.
The Lusitania was a British vessel. It carried a cargo
largely made up of contraband and containing "large quantities
ot ammunition consigned to the British Government, including
4,200 cases of Springfield cartridges containing some eleven
tons ot black powder.
113
Such was the statement of Dudley Field
1. The New York Times, May 1, 1915.
2. Editorial, "The Controversy between the Unite States
and Germany over the u·se of Submarines against Merchant Vessels,"
The American Journal of Intern tional Law, IX, (July, 1915),
667.
3. "Editorial Paragraphs," The Nation, CXI, (November 24,
1920), 579.
Malone, Collector of Customs of the Port of New York, one of
whose duties was to ascertain the cargo of each vessel that
departed. Winston Churchill said, "Included in her cargo was
a small consignment of rifle mmnunition and shrapnel shells
1
weighing about 173 tons."
Whether or not the Lusitania was armed is still a subject
of dispute. The captain categorically denied th t she carried
guns. He said, "She had no weapons of offense or defence and
2
no masked guns." Yet, on the other hand, a contradictory
article had appe red in the New York Tribune of June 19, 1913:
The reason why the crack liner Lusitania is
so long delayed at Liverpool has been announced
to be because her turbine engines are being com
pletely replaced, but the Cunard officials acknow
ledged to the Tribune correspondent today that the
greyhound is being equipped with high power naval
rifles in conformity with England's new policy of
arming passenger boats. So when the great ship,
the third selected by the Government for armament,
next appears in New York Harbor about the end of
August she will be the first British merchantman
for more than a century sailing up the Lower Bay
with black guns bristling over her sides.3
Moreover, Churchill has stated that as soon as the submarine war
started, the "arming of merchantmen was pressed forward. "
4
As early as February 15th the State Department was notified by
1. Churchill, W.L.S., The World Crisis, (New York, 1923),
II, 347. In the manifest of the Lusitania on its voyage of
May 1st it is stated that the boat carried 1,271 cases of am
munition destined for Liverpool and 4,200 cases of cartridges
and emnrunition for London. Vide United States, Congressional
Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., (1916), Vol. LIII, Pt. l, pp. 644.
2. Quoted in Ponsonby, A., Falsehood in War Time, (New
York, 1928), 122.
3. New York Tribune, June 19, 1913 quoted in Barnes, H.E.,
The Genesis of the World War, (New York, 1926), 613.
4. Churchill, W.L.s., op. cit., III, 217.
the German anbassador th at British merchant ves sels had been
ordered to take the offensive against t he submarine~.
1
Never
the less, the officials who investigated the tragedy found that
although the boat carried ammunition, it h ad no masked guns
2
and carried no troops.
Lieutenant Captain Schwieger, commander of the submarine
which sank the Lusitania, in an interview with Lowell Thomas
after the war, stated that he only fired one torpedo, watched
the liner start to keel over, then closed t h e h atch, gave or
ders to dive and headed for Germany. He did not mistake the
liner for an auxiliary cruiser, but did not realize the iden
tity of the ship until after the torpedo was loosed. He did
not dream that the ship would plunge and thou ht that the people
would be rescued by nearby boats. He stated, moreover, that
he had no particular orders to sink the Lusitania; he merely
Cal'ried out orders to s i nk any ship he could in the blockaded
3
waters.
The German press hailed the sinking ~f the Lusitania as
a triumph of the submarine weapon. In t he United States only
the extreme pro-Germans defended the act.
4
The bellicose press
of the country denounced 1 t as an act of barbarism and expressed
the belief that the German ambassador would be given his pass
ports as soon as reports of t he disaster were off icially c on-
--------
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 104-105.
2. The New York Times, July 18, 1915.
5. Thomas, L.,
11
Ra1ders of the Deep," World's vVork, LVI,
(June, 1928), 144-158.
4. Latane, J.H., op. cit., 584.
1
firmed. Yet, the reaction of the American press as a whole
was not in favor of war because of the Lusitania issue. Elmer
Davis, in his History of the New York Times, wrote:
0
It was
the opinion of the Times that in the spring of 1915 the Ameri
can public, as a whole, was not ready to fight over the Lusi-
2
tania." While a few people on the eastern seaboard were
clamoring for war, it was almost the tmanimous opinion of the
country that the situation called for diplomacy and an effec
tive expression of American sentiment.
3
Ambassador J. von Bernstorff realized that the German
government would have to use conciliation in this crisis. On
May 9th and 10th he addressed notes to the Foreign Office re
commending an expression of sympathy from his government f or
the loss of so many American lives. H e even advocated, in
order to conciliate American opinion, the acceptance of Mr.
Bryan's peace treaty.
4
On the 10t h of May the German govern
ment responded. Sympathy was expressed for t he loss of Ameri
can lives on board tl1e Lusitania, but blame was laid on Great
.
Britain for her conduct of the war. Moreover, it was charged
that the vessel was equipped with mounted guns and carried
I
5,400 cases of annnunition. Germany , too, regretted that t he
Americans were more ready to trust English pro ises of safety
1. Anonymous, "America's Response to Germany's Challenge,"
The Literary Digest, L, (May 22~ 1915), 1127.
2. Davis, E., The History of the New York Times, (New
York, 1921), 353. ,
3. Lawrence, D., The True Story of Woodrow Wilson, (New
York, 1924), 197-198. ·
4. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 144-145.
than to pay attention to warnings from the German side.
1
Still the United States made no connnent. Speculation was
widespread as to what the government's policy would be. Eng
land was especially concerned. Every day without news of
definite action by the United States government on the cases
of the Gulflight and the Lusitania convinced England that the
United States would content itself with argumentative protests.
There was a good deal of contempt in British feeling, not
founded upon Great Britain's wish for military aid, but on the
feeling that the United States wa falling short morally in
not condemning German methods. The most conserv tive action
hoped for by the friends of America was that diplomatic rela
tions would be broken until a satisfactory settlement could
be reached.
2
On May 13th the Department of State made public the first
Lusitania note, the first of a series of notes in which the
President stated and defended the principles of neutrality.
Secretary of ar Lindley Garrison was responsible for the
emphatic tone which was adopted.
3
On the other hand, when it
was presented to the Cabinet on May 11th, Secretary of State
¥1111am Jennings Bryan objected to it on the grounds that war
would follow. Accordingly, he sent a letter to President
1. United States Depart1nent of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 389.
2. Ibid., 385-386, 391-392. Ambassador Walter Hines Page
pointed out that the aristocratic element of English life,
which can be called reactionary, consciously or unconsciously
hoped for American inactivity to justify its distrust of de
mocratic institutions.
3. Lawrence, D., op. cit., 150.
Wilson on the 12th, in which he proposed that the principle
of investigation and arbitration be used in this case. He
wished that some unoffici 1 statement should be made to that
effect. On the 13th the President agreed to Mr. Bryan's sug
gestion and drafted a memorandum that was to be given to the
press as soon as the note was published. Later the same day
the President withdrew this agreement because he had "heard
something, indirectly, from the German Embassy, which convin
ces me that we would lose all chance of bringing Germany to
reason if we in any way or degree indicated to them, or to our
own public, that this note was merely the first word in a pro
longed debate." Mr. Bryan signed the note, but he was full
1
of misgivings that war would be the result.
Because of the recent acts of the German authorities in
violation of American rights on the high seas, the note said,
it was clear that the two governments should come to a full
understanding of the serious situation which had resulted.
The United States did not want to believe that the acts of
the German naval commanders had the sanction of their govern
ment.
After complimenting the German government on its humane
and enlightened attitude previously shown in matters of inter
national right, the note, referring to the warning to neutrals
contained in the war zone proclamation, reasserted the right
of American citizens to travel on the high seas. Such a warn
ing could not in any way bring about an abbreviation of their
1. Bryan, w.J. and M.G., op. cit., 399-401.
rights. It there were any infringement of those rights, the
United States government would hold the Imperial German govern
ment responsible. The United States, therefore, called the
attention of that government to the practical impossibility
of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce with
out an inevitable violation of the principles of justice and
humanity.
Referring to the famous "death notice", the note pointed
out that no warning that an illegal and inhumane act would be
committed could possibly be accepted as an excuse for that
act or a decrease in the responsibility for its commission.
Moreover, declaring that the conm1anders who eommitted such
acts against the United States must have done so "under mis
apprehension of orders", it expressed the confident expecta
tion that Germany would disavow the act and make reparation
so far as reparation was possible. In conclusion the note
stated:
The Imperial German Government will not ex
pect the Government of the United States to omit
any word or any act necessary to the performance
of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of
the United States and its citizens and of sr,te
guarding their free exercise and enjoyment.
In general the communication was heartily approved by the
people of the United States. The President, it was said, had
spoken, and there could be no mistake whatever as to the stand
taken by the United States.
2
The leading newspapers the country
1. United States Department of State, op. cit!, 1915,
Supplement, 393-396.
2. McMaster, J.B., op. cit., I, 97-98.
over gave their endorsement to the note. Governors pledged
their states to President W ilson. Senators, Representatives
and public men, in response to newspaper queries, declared it
the duty or every citizen to uphold the President in the firm
stand he had taken.
1
In England, too, the note received the highest commenda
tion, expressed both privately and in the press. The London
Times called it an expression of the best traditions of Ameri
can diplomacy. The stand taken by Wilson, it declared, was
"more than a declaration of national policy. Nothing less
than the conscience of humanity makes itself audible in his
measured and incisive sentences." The editorial closed with
these words: "The moral interests of the United States and
the Allies are henceforward indissolubly linked."
2
The tman
imous belief in England was, however, that Germany would send
an evasive answer and refuse to stop her submarine war against
merchant ships.
3
In Germany, however, newspapers gave support to the policy
of their government. The Lokal Anzeiger seemed quite astonished
that "the American government should call the Lusitania a
harmless packet boat" when, in reality, it was an auxiliary
cruiser carrying arms and ammunition to Germany's enemies.
It went on to say that "the German reply to ashington will
1. The Ne York Times, May 15, 1915.
2. fiie London Times, May 15, 1915.
3. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 397.
make it plain to Mr. ilson, in form alike polite and clear,
that we are obliged to carry on the battle as we are carrying
it on, and that we can carry it on with a clear conscience."
1
The opinion of all was that Ge:rmany could not permit boats
bringing ammunition to kill German soldiers to be protected
from submarine attacks by the presence of American passengers
on board.
The United States note had been sent only a few days when
a rush message came for the President from Colonel Edward M.
'
House, now his personal representative to the European govern-
ments. It was the opinion of Colonel House that war with Ger
many could not be justified unless every possible attempt at
peace had failed. He had the co-operation of Sir Edward Grey,
who was ready to consider any reasonable compromise. In his
message to the President,House asked Wilson if he could not
induce the German government to answer the American note by
an offer to discontinue her warfare on merchant vessels and
her use of poison gases. If Germany agreed to th'is, Great
Britain would cease her food blockade, permitting foodstuffs
to enter neutral ports without question. Colonel House seemed
to think that such a proposal from Germany would be of great
advantage to her, end it would be a grave mistake if she did
not seize it.
Notice of this new attempt at an agreement was sent to
Ambassador J. w. Gerard in Germany, who inunediately had an
1. Lokal Anzeifer quoted in United States Department of
State, op. cit., 19 5, Supplement, 398.
interview with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G. von Jagow.
The proposition of permitting the passage of food in return
for the cessation of submarine warfare met with a brusque re-
fusal. Germany's public protests against the starvation of
her women and children by the British had not diminished, yet
in private, her leaders were evidently unwilling to pay the
price necessary to raise the blockade. Thus, the attempted
1
agreement was of no avail.
While the United States awaited Germany's reply to the
note of May 13th, attention was drawn to the sinking on May
25th of the American steamship Nebraskan off the southwest
coast of Ireland. No warning was given, and the captain saw
no submarine, but he was sure that it was a torpedo and not
a mine which had struck his vessel. The crew took tote boats,
stood by for several hours end then returned to the Nebraskan
2
and headed her for Liverpool. Although no lives were lost,
Americans were astonished that Germany should, 1n view of the
excitement in the United States, allow a submarine to attack
an American vessel and endanger her captain and crew. Feeling
I
again rose high, and was not diminished by the reply or Herr
von Jagow, made public on May 31
1
1915.
The German government, he said, had no intention of sub
mitting neutral vessels guilty of no hostile acts to attacks
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., I, 442-451.
Colonel House the reason for the German refusal
that the United States was not in earnest about
matter.
According to
was the belief
the Lusitania
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 414-418.
by submarines or airships in the war zone. If neutral ships
had suffered such attacks, it was due to the misuse of flags
by Great Britain or to the suspicious action on the part of
the captains of the vessels. Wherever a neutral ship had ac
oidently been damaged by German submarines or flyers, however,
the German government had expressed regret and offered compen
sation.
The Cushing and Oulflight would be treated in that manner.
In the case of the Falaba the connnander of the submarine had
intended to give the passengers and crew time to save them
selves. Only when the vessel tried to escape end summon help
did he order them to leave the Falaba within ten minutes. He
actually allowed them twenty-three minutes and did not fire
the torpedo until suspicious steamers were hastening to her
aid.
In regard to the Lusitania, the note went on, the Germen
government had already expressed keen regret for the loss of
lire occasioned by her sinking. The United States, however,
was assuming that the Lusitania was an ordinary tmarmed merchant
vessel. This fact was not so. The Lusitania was one of the
largest end rastest English auxiliary cruisers carrying guns
and anmnmi tion as 1Jell as mounted guns llllder the decks. Also,
British merchant vessels had received orders to conceal their
identity tu1der neutral flags, and when approached by German
submarines, to attack them by rannning. Finally, the Lusitania
on her last voyage carried Canadian troops and war materials
amounting to 5,400 cases of armnunition intended for the des
truction of "brave German soldiers fighting for the r Father-
land." The German government, therefore, was justified in
protecting the lives of its soldiers with the means of warfare
at its connnsnd.
The English steamship company in taking passengers on
board the Lusitania attempted deliberately to use American lives
to protect the ammunition on board. In so doing it had acted
against the provisions of American law which prohibit the carry
ing of passengers on ships with explosives on board. There
could be no doubt that the quick sinking of the Lusitania was
due to th explosion of this emnnmition. Her passengers would
otherwise in all probability have been saved.
1
The note was disappointing. The claim that the Lusitania
was armed was innnediately denied by Great Britain, and the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the "categorical
assurance" that the boat was not carrying mounted guns and had
2
not done so at any time during the war. New issues were raised
by the assertion that the Cunard Line was using .American citi
zens to protect annnunition and that the Lu-si tania was en auxili
ary armed cruiser.
This reply 0£ the German minister, von Jagow, was followed
on June 1st by a note treating of the cases of the Gulflight
and the Cushing. As to the Gulflight, he said, the commander
of a German submarine on the afternoon of May 1st saw coming
toward him a large merchant steamer accompanied by two smaller
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 419-421.
2. Ibid., 422.
vessels. The position of the latter was such as to give the
impression that they formed a safeguard against submarine at
tacks. Moreover, one carrie a wireless apparatus which was
unusual in small vessels. Judging from appearances, the sub
marine commander concluded that it was a case of an English
convoy vessel and that the steamer must be one of considerable
value to the British government to be so well guarded. The
connnender could see no neutral markings on it of any kind, and
so attacked submerged. The American flag was not seen until
the shot had been fired. The attack was to be "attributed to
an llllfortunate accident" and not to the fault of the commander.
The German government expressed its regret to the United States
and declared itself willing to pay full recompense for any
damage sustained by American citizens.
That the Cushing had been attacked, the note stated, was
still a doubtful matter. From all official reports on hand
only one merchant steamship was attacked in the vicinity of
Nordhinder Lightship. As this vessel carried no flag and had
no neutral markings, the German aviator considered it a hostile
vessel. That the Cushing was the ship attacked was possible,
but the German government desired further evidence.
1
It was now the duty of the Department of State to answer
the notes from Germany. On the 1st of June the American reply
was laid before the Cabinet. Secretary of State Bryan urged
that an equally strong note should be sent to Great Britain,
1. Unite States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 431-432.
protesting against her interference with American trade. Other
wise, it would appear that the United States was favorin the
Allies. The other members of the Cabinet were so hostile to
this suggestion that Mr. Bryan, in the heat of the moment,
l
charged that certain ones were pro-Ally.
Meanwhile, Ambassador von Bernstorff realized that a seri
ous crisis was impending. He had seen from the first that the
sinking of the Lusitania was a possible cause for war. On the
2nd of June he visited President Wilson 1n an effort to appease
any pro-war feeling that the President might have developed.
He took the view that because Germany and the United States
were so isolated from each other, an atmosphere of misunder
standing had come up between the two nations. Von Bernstorff,
therefore, proposed that Meyer Gerhardt, one of the German
propagandists in the United States, be sent to Berlin to pre
sent the American point of view. President ilson agreed and
asked that a compromise on the submarine issue be urged in
Berlin. If German sentiment were favorable, he would take the
matter up with the British once again. This discussion, he
2
hoped, would lead to peace negotiations. Before Meyer Gerhardt
could reach Berlin, however, the second Lusitania note had been
sent by the United States.
Consideration of this note w s still the chief interest
of the Cabinet on June 4th. No conclusions were reached. The
1. Houston, D.H., Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, (Ne
York, 1926), I, 138.
2. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 150-155.
hostility between the positions of President Wilson and Secre
tary of State Bryan slowly reached a crisis. Mr. Bryan let
the President know of his definite intention to resign if the
note were not made more conciliatory in tone. Although the
President and Secretary of the Treasury William G. AcAdoo both
advised him against his proposed action at this crisis, he re
mained firm and on the 8th sent to President Wilson his letter
of resignation. He stated as his reason that the new note
meant war, and he, therefore, could not sign it. The President
1
1mmed1atelv accepted his resignation. Robert Lansing, a well-
lmown authority on international law and counselor for the De
partment of State, succeeded him. Over Mr. Lansing's signature
the note was started on its way to Berlin on June 9th.
The United States noted with gratification that in the
cases of the Gulflight and the Cushing the German government
acknowledged the principle of the freedom of the seas for neu
tral ships and was willing to meet its liability when neutral
ships guilty of no hostile act were attacked. In the sinking
or the Falaba, however, the government of the United States
did not agree with Germany in her contention that an attempt
to escape on the part of a merchant vessel altered the obliga
tion of the attacking ship to respect the safety of the lives
of those on board.
To Herr von Jagow•s charges regarding the character and
outfit of the Lusitania the United States replied that she
1. Bryan, w.J. and M.G., op. cit., 406-408, 422-424.
would have been bound to carry out her duty as a neutral power
and to enforce her national laws.
It was its duty to see to it that the Lusi
tania was not armed for offensive action, that she
was not serving as a transport, that she did not
carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the
United States, and that, if in fact she was a na
val vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive
clearance as a merchantman: and it performed that
duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vi
gilance through its regularly constituted officials.
It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial Ger
men Government that it has been misinformed.
The sinking of passenger ships, the note went on, involved
the principles of humanity and was not a case for diplomatic
discussion or international controversies. The fact remained
that a thousand men, women and children were sent to t heir
deaths in circumstances unequaled in modern warfare, without
a challenge or a warning. The United States was not merely
contending for the rights of property or the privileges of
commerce, but for the sacred rights of humanity. Besides, the
proclamation of a war zone, which warned neutrals to keep away
from a dangerous area, could not in any way take away t he rights
of American citizens to go about on the high seas as passengers
on a belligerent merchantman. Their lives could not be put in
danger by the capture or destruction of such a vessel, provided
it offered no resistance. The United States, therefore, expect
ed the German government to adopt such measures as were neces-
1
sary to safeguard American ships end citizens.
The note was well received in Germany.
2
As week followed
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 436-437.
2. The New York Times, June 14, 1915.
44.
week and Germany m de nor ply, achene in th attitude of
Germany toward the United St ts became noticeable. There
seemed to be littl prospect th t war wou d come out of the
Lusitania affair. Ambassa or von Bernstorff discussed t e pos-
1
sibilities of pe ce with Colonel House. In Germany the chang-
ing attitude was shown by the German press which was now divi-
2
ded on the question of how to treat America. It was shown
by the temporary suppression of the Deutsche Tageszeitung, be
cause of a sava e reply by Count Reventlow to some remarks in
3
the Lokal Anzeiger on the importance of American friendship.
And it was shown by Adm ral Oscar von Truppel, who, in an ar
ticle in Der Tag, warned its readers that a break with the
United States would be a serious matter. A German-American
war, he said, or even the severance of diplomatic relations
would do more harm to German prospect than was generally
4
believed.
The German reply which reached Washington on July 8th
was nonconnnittal. Prefaced by a general statement of the de
sire of the German government to see the principles of humanity
realized 1n the war, it then lam1ched into an arraignment of
Great Britain. She had declared the North Sea a war zone,
planted poorly anchored mines, captured vessels, made the sea
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 7-8.
2. An article appeared in tfie Lokal Anzeiger of June 14th
which rebuked those who insisted on relentless submarine war
fare and pointed out that America was ri ht. Vide United States
Department of State, og• cit. 1915, Supplement, 441.
3. Ibid., 441, 45. Vide The New York Times, July 10,
1915.
4. MeI, ast r, ~.B., op. cit., I, 115-116.
dan erous for neutr 1 vessels and thus blockaded neutral coasts
and ports contrary to international law. On Nov mber 16, 1914
her Prime Minist r had declare in the House of Commons that
to prevent food from reaching Germany was one of the main tasks
of England. Since March 1, 1915, all goods bound to or from
Germany, even thou neutral, had been taken from neutral ships.
Germany wa thus fi hting in self-def nse and for her na
tional existence. The German overnment, 1n proclaim ng a war
zone, realized that neutrals might suf'fer. The Lusitania dis
aster showed that th war methods of her adversaries were lead
ing to a great jeopardy of human lives. The British orders
to ram submarines and the promise of reward for such action
had done away with all distinction between merchantmen and war
ships. Had the German connnander of th submarine which sank
the Lusitania allowed the crew and passengers to take to the
boats before firing the torpedo, his own vessel would surely
have been destroyed. On the other hand, if the Lusitania had
not carried large quantities of explosives, she would have
floated long enough to enable all aboard her to reach the boats
in sai'ety.
The note concluded with a detailed proposal for the pas
sage of passenger steamers bearing special markings throu h
the submarine area with a guarantee that they would not be
molested. The German submarine connnanders, moreover, should
be given advance notice of their sailing. The Imperial German
government also su ested th tin order to have adequate sail
in facilities cross th Atlantic for American citizens a
reasonable number of neutral ships under the American flag be
used. If these passenger ships could not be acquired, the
Imperial government would not object to placing lmder the Amer
ican flag four enemy passenger ships, tor passenger traffic
1
between the United States and England.
The noncommittal nature of the note served as a screen
to hide the controversy between the German Foreign Office and
the naval authorities. As early as May 9th, Admiral A. von
Tirpitz had argued that no compromise be made in the Lusitania
case. The first German note temporized because the Foreign
Office was not sure of its position. On May 31st a conference
was held at General Headquarters. Chancellor T. von Bethmann
Hollweg announced that he would not take the responsibility
for the submarine warfare as it was carried on at the time.
He was supported by General E. von Falkenhayn. Admiral von
Tirpitz and Admiral Bachmann, Ch1ef of the Naval Staff, opposed
the Chancellor's viewpoint end argued in favor of the submarine.
On June 2nd von Bethmann-Hollweg ordered that no more large
passenger ships be sunk. When the admirals objected to this
restraint on the submarines, the Chancellor overrode their
objections. On the 5th he procured the Emperor's assent to
the order. v.'hen this fact became known, the admirals sent in
their resignations, but their action was not accepted by the
Emperor. To pacify von Tirpitz, von Bethmann-Hollweg did not
notify the German ambassador in the United States of the order,
for fear it would look too much like an American diplomatic
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 465.
victory.
1
This policy of evasion was unfortunate for the
German Chancellor because hews looked upon as insincere by
many Americans, a charge of which he was not guilty. The re-
action of Secretary of State Lansing to the German note would
have titted in nicely with the Chancellor's policy of not sink
ing any more passenger ships, if the Chancellor had had the
strength to announce it. On June 13th Mr. Lansing issued or
ders confining the giving out to Germ.an authorities of any
information concerning the sailing of steamships to passenger
2
vessels only.
By the London press the Germen note was called impudent
and evasive. The French Gaulois regarded it as a "masterpiece
of hypocrisy".
3
Much the same resentment was expressed in the
American papers. By one journal it was considered "the extreme
of arrogance", and expressions such as "evasive" and "insult
ing" were common. There was little talk of war, but the gen
eral feeling was that diplomatic relations between the two
nations ought to be severed.
4
It had been hoped that the prin
ciples for which the United States was contending would be
acknowledged by Germany; her failure to do so made any adjust
ment by compromise seem impossible. Furthermore, it was felt
that the note was -intended for home consumption rather than
as a sincere desire to reach an understanding.
5
1. Tirpitz, A. von, op. cit., II, 153-158.
2. United States Department or State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 408.
3. The Gaulois quoted in The London Times, July 12, 1915.
4. The New York Times, July 11, 1915.
5. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 419.
Meantime, the President had been considering the state
of affairs produced by the Germen note or July 8th, end a
strong American note he felt to be the natural outcome of the
situation. It was dispatched to Germany on the 21st of July.
The note from the Imperial German government he found
very unsatisfactory because it ignored the real differences
between the two governments and indicated in no way how the
principles of law and humanity could be applied in the sub
marine controversy. The United States was pleased that Ger
many recognized that the seas were free; that the character
of a merchantman must be ascertained berore she is fired upon
or seized; that the lives of non-combatants must not be placed
in jeopardy unless the ship should try to escape or resist.
It was disappointed, however, because Germany considered her
self exempt from these principles, even in the case of a neu
tral vessel, because of the acts of Great Britain. Illegal
and inhmnan acts against neutrals would not be tolerated, no
matter what the justification. The government of the United
States was willing to make reasonable allowances for the novel
conditions created by submarine warfare, but it could not con
sent to any abatement of the essential rights of its people
"because of a mere alteration 1n circumstances".
Moreover, the United States could not accept the sug es
tion that certain vessels be designated which should be free
from attack. Such an agreement "would, by implication, sub
ject other vessels to illegal attack" and would be "an aban
donment of the principles for which this government contends".
The note closed with this warning:
"Friendship itself' prompts" the government of
the United States ''to say to the Imperial German
Government that repetition by the commanders of
German naval vessels of acts in contravention of
those rights must be regarded by the Government
of the United States, when they affect American
citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."1
That this uncompromising policy of President Wilson was
approved by the majority of American people was shown by the
2
comments made in newspapers the country over. It was regarded
as the final word to Germany and showed that the United States
was in earnest. Germany's actions were now more important
than her words. The future was with Germany.
No reply to this last American note was made. It was the
belief of Ambassador J. w. Gerard in Berlin that the German
government would drag along as long as possible without coming
to a definite break. Germany's great desire was to bring the
war to an end, and she did not wish to bring on any further
complications. Both the press and the Foreign Office were
angry at the American note, and there was much blustering talk
about continuing unrestricted submarine warfare. But it was
Mr. Gerard's opinion that Germany would avoid the tmfriendly
act specified in the American note.
3
There was no further exchange notes on the Lusitania af
fair, although negotiations continued into t _ e following winter.
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 480-482.
2. 'l'he New York Times, July 24, 1915. For Berlin opinion
vide Ibid, July 26, 1915. English views are given in The Lon
don Times, July 23, 1915; July 26, 1915.
3. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Sup lament, 490-491.
On January 10, 1916 newspap rs announced that Secretary of
State Lansing and Ambassador von Bernstorff had reached a
tentative agreement an
fice.
1
This d a£t an
had sent it to the Berlin Forei Ot-
a later one, however, were both rejected
by President ilson because in them Germany refused to admit
legal liability or wrongdoing in the sinking of the Lusitania.
On February 2nd it was reported from Washington that new orders
had come from Berlin, and it was hoped that an agreement would
be reached. The language of the new memorandum was said to
have been approved, and the formula had been made broad enough
to take in all the demands made int e case. These rumors,
2
how v r, proved false; the formula was rejected. The Lusi-
tania case remained llllsettled when the United States entered
the war. The Mixed Claims Commission which had charge of
material damages after the war placed the .American claims
growing out of the sinking oft e Lusitania at $2,409,431.31.
3
So the case ended, and while it was the center of attention
in diplomatic circles, it also served its purpose as was pro
paganda. It is without doubt one of the famous episodes of
the war, although in sheer horror it cannot compare with some
of the well-planned military battles. However, due to the
50.
1. The New York Times, January 10, 1916.
2. McMaster, J.B., op. cit., I, 212, 214. The Berlin press
printed an interview given by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
Zimmermann in which he stated that Germany was willin to do
anything for the United St tes, but that she would not acknow
ledge the illegality of submarine operations in thew r zone.
"If the Unite St tes wanted a break, Germany could do nothing
more to avoid it •••• Germany could go no further than she h d
already gone." Vide United States Department of State, op.
cit., 1916, Supplement, 160.
3. Gr ttan, C.H., op. it., 324.
suppressed facts and conflicting evidence in the case, it
assumed much larger proportions in the minds of many American
people than did the horrible battles. For this reason, it was
an important event in the list of those that finally led the
United States to declare war. After the last American note
of July 21st, 1915, ho ever, the controversy shifted, and other
cases of disagreement between Germany end the United States
became the center of attention in both countries.
51.
Chapter IV
Other Cases of Controversy
While the Lusitania correspondence was still in progress,
that Germany regarded the strained relations with the United
states as a serious matter was shown by a note presented to
the State Department on July 12th. It concerned the case of
the Nebraskan. As yet the United States had made no protest.
The Imperial government, however, had received from newspaper
reports the knowledge of the torpedoing of the Nebraskan off
the southwest coast of Ireland on May 25th. The facts were
that a German submarine had met in that vicinity a steamer
without a flag, neutral markings or any illmnination. In the
twilight the submarine connnander could not see her name. As
suming that only English ships went about in the war waters
without markings, he torpedoed her. Firing, however, was
stopped immediately when the American flag went up. Germany
considered it an \lllfortunate accident and was perfectly willing
1
to make compensation for all damages.
There were other cases of submarine attacks and sinkings
during the smmner of 1915. Some of these were justified, and
others were handled with regard for the legal and humanitarian
principles of which the United States had so often spoken.
One attack, accompanied by the loss of American citizens, which
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 468-469.
was passed over in silence, wa that on the Dominion liner
Armenian. When the facts were revealed, it appeared that on
June 28th, wen off the northwest coast of Cornwall, he cap
tain of h Armenian sighted a submarine and tried to escape.
The subm rine gave chase, a battle ensued, and at t e end of
an hour, when thirteen of the steamer's crew were dead and the
vessel was on fire, t e captain surrendered. Of the nineteen
who were killed or drowned, eleven were Americans. The vessel
was on her way trom Newport News, Virginia, to Avonmouth with
1
1,422 mules. Thus it was a case of a British vessel carrying
contraband of war, and when attacked, seeking to escape. The
United States, therefore, had nothing of which to complain,
save the barbarous method of submarine warfare which made loss
of life so prevalent.
The next boat to be attacked was the Orduna. She sailed
from Liverpool on July 8th with twenty-one Americans among
her passengers. When about thirty-a ven miles south of Q ueens
town, a German submarine without warning fired a torpedo which
just barely missed the stern of the boat. The Orduna fled,
and the submarine pursued her with severe shelling until the
steamer was out of reach. On July 17th she reached Ne York.
Not so fortunate, perhaps, was the case of the Leelana.
While on her way from Archangel to Belfast with a cargo of
flax, the Leelanaw was attacked by a German submarine sixt
miles north of the Orkney Islands. Plenty o time, ho ev r,
1. United States Department of St te, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 457, 459, 463.
was given fo l1e ere 1 to leave t Vs l. ft s
the men were taken aboard the submarine, wit the life boats
1
in tow. Here again there was no cause for com laint.
Nevertheless, in spite of the warn gin the last Lusi
tania note front the United St tes, Germany brought the matter
to a crisis again in August, 1915, through the torpedoing of
the White Star liner Arabic, involving the loss of two Ameri
can lives. The Arabic was a British ship. It was sunk with
out warning and contr ry to the instructions given to the
submarine commanders, on August 19th. The vessel was outward
,
bound from Liverpool to New York. Not only did this event
bring matters to a climax in the United St tes wit regard to
the submarine, but also in Ger any where the settlement of this
case was taken to mean not so much the question of the Ar bic
2
as a settlement of the whole controversy with the United States.
On July 21st Ambassador von Bernstorff had been sununoned
to the offices of the State Department and told by Secretary
of State Lansing that war would be the only result of further
sinkings with the loss of American lives. Consequently, im-
mediately upon receiving word that the Arabic had been sunk,
the ambassador telegraphed to Berlin: "I fee.r I cannot pre
vent rupture this time if our answer in the Arabic matter is
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 486-487.
2. Ibid., 518-520. The testimony oft e survivors and
other pieces of evidence in the case are printed in full in
Editorial, "Diplomatic Correspondence between th United States
and Belli§erent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and
Commerce, The American Journal of International Law, X,
(October, 1916), Special Supplement, 203-209.
not conciliatory; I advise dis tch of instr ctions to me at
once to negoti te whole question. Situation may thus perhaps
be saved."
1
In this opinion von ernstorff was right, and the
attitude he took was in perfect h rmony with the course which
President ilson wished to follow in regard to Germany.
On the 24th of August without waiting for any action by
the United State s government Ambassador von Bernstorff was able
to send a conciliatory message to t h e State Department. In
it he requested the United States to take no definite action
in the matter until hearing both sides of the question. Al
though the Imperial government did not reject altogether the
te timony of t h e survivors, it believed th t since the reports
had been made in great excitement, the wrong impression might
very easily follow. Nevertheless, von Bernstorff assured
Secretary Lansing that if it should prove true that Americans
had lost their lives on the Arabic, it was contrary to the
intention of his government.
2
This announcement indicated a
change in the policy of Germany and paved the way for further
negotiations. The submarine campaign had not seriously hin
dered British commerce,but it had brought Germany to the verge
of a war with the United States.
In Germany the dispute between the Chancellor and the
naval authorities reached a climax. As stated before, the
Emperor had ordered that all submarine attacks on passenger
1. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 173.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
Supplement, 524.
vessels were to cease. On Au ust 26th the two f ctions pre
sented their arguments to the Emperor. The first que tion to
be settled was whether or not Ambassador von Bernstorff should
be notified of this order. Chancellor von ethmann-Hollweg
had by this time reversed hi opinion an wished the order to
be made public. The Emperor agreed, and on the 27th the tele
gram was sent to von Bernstorff. Again Admiral von Tir itz
attempted to resign. His resignation was refused, but he was
relieved of any responsibility in connection with naval affairs
in relation to foreign nations. He declined to remain with
these lessened powers and on the 19th of September was restored
1
to his original position. His chief supporter, Admiral Bach-
mann, Chief oft e Naval Staff , was replaced by Admiral von
Holtzendorff who was supposedly a follower of von Bethmann
Hollweg's policies.
It was clear that the Chancellor was determined to c rry
out his policies and settle the dispute with the United States.
Under orders from him, Secretary of Foreign Affairs von Jagow
on August 25th made the statement to Ambassador Ger _ rd that
reparation and disavowal in the sinking of the Ar bic would
be made if it were true that the vessel ha been torpedoed by
a German submarine. The torpedoin, he said, was contr ry to
2
instructions. In the light of t h e ensuing conflict between
von Bethmann-Hollweg and von Tirpitz , it is obvious th ·the
1. Tirpitz , A. von, op. cit., 164-166.
2. United St ts Department of tate, op. cit., 1 15,
Sup lement, 526-527.
Chancellor took a very brave stand.
Out of all these complications cmne a clear note of con
cession to the United States. On September 1st Ambassador
von Bernstorff gave the following assurance to Secretary of
State Lansing: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines
without warning and without safety of the lives of non-comba
tants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer
resistance." He also informed Lansing that his government
1
had decided on this policy before the sinking of the Arabic.
On October 5th von Bernstorff again wrote to Lansing, in
an attempt to settle the Arabic case. The cormnander of the
submuine which destroyed the vessel attacked because he thought
the Arabic intended to ram the submarine. Germany did not
doubt the affadavits of the British officers that such was not
their intention. The attack, therefore, was made contrary to
the instructions issued to the submarine commanders. For this
reason, Germany regretted and disavowed the act and announced
that she was ready to pay an indemnity for the American lives
lost in the disaster. Secretary Lansing accepted these assur-
2
ances, and the case was closed.
The pledge of September 1st, given in order to avert a
crisis, was not kept in good faith. The German submarines con
tinued their unlawful attacks and on September 4th torpedoed
the Allan liner Hesperian without warning. After an investi
gation of the case, the Imperial government declared that it
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1915,
530-531.
2. Ibid., 560-561, 603-604.
was not a German submarine which had committed the act. First
of all, according to her schedules, no German submarines had
been in the area where the Hesperian was sunk. Furthermore,
according to the description of the explosion a mine might very
1
easily have been the cause. In view of the promise of Septem-
ber 1st, the United States did not press the case, and there
was no renewal of the crisis between the two governments during
the remainder of the year.
The surrender of Germany seemed to be complete. From re
liable sources it appeared that forty-four German submarines
had been captured by Great Britain and that some twenty-six
others had been s11nk. Alarmed at her losses Germany decided
to give up her campaign of ruthless submarine warfare until
she could build up her fleet again. Meantime, the Imperial
government intended to send its submarines to the Mediterranean
Sea to sink transport vessels carrying troops to Salonika and
2
Egypt.
During the relative period of quiet following the German
pledge of September 1, 1915 the United States Department of
State attempted to solve the problem of the status of armed
merchant ships. At the outbreak of the war the United States
had taken the position that the arming of a ship did not neces
sarily make it a man of war. It was up to the owners, however,
to prove that the armament was for defensive and not for offen
sive purposes. Vb.en the Germans began the submarine cam a.ign,
1. United States Department of tat, op. cit., 1915,
upplement, 533-535, 548-549.
2. McMaster, J.B., op. cit., I, 201.
58.
the out~ook of the matter became entirely different. The
United States government continued its assertion that the arma
ment must be proved to be for defensive pur oses. The German
government, on the other hand, declare that under the new
conditions and in view of the fact that the English had ordered
their m rchant ships to resist the submarines all armament was
potentially offensive. Gradually she,with the co-oper tion of
the German press, moved around to the position that armed mer
chantmen were ships of war. This declaration was, of course,
1
violently attacked by Great Britain.
Long before the question became serious, the matter was
debated unofficially by American diplomatic gents and British
officials. On October 2, 1915 Colonel House and Secretary
Lansing discussed the subject. Mr. Lansing took the stand that
if the United States was to hold Germany responsible for the
sinking of merchantmen without warning, she must also demand
that merchant vessels be unarmed. Otherwise, the advantage
2 '
would be wholly on the side of the merchantman.
As a result of a consideration of the question, Secretary
Lansing on January 18, 1916 addressed a circular letter to the
ambassadors to the Allied powers, proposing to them a "modus
vivendi". He stated, in brief, that it was the earnest desire
of the United States to end the dangers to human life which
accompanied the use of the submarine as a destroyer of commerce.
He realized that there was a great loss of life due to the use
1. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 326.
2. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 73.
of the submarine, but he did not feel that a belligerent should
be absolutely deprived of its effectiveness in interrupting
enemy commerce. Moreover, it was his belief that a formula
could be agreed upon which, although it 1night necessitate
slight changes of practice, would appeal to the sense of jus
tice of all the belligerents. Accordingly, he proposed the
following "modus vivendi":
1. A non-combatant should have the right to travel on the
high seas on a belligerent merchant vessel, and could count
upon the observance of the rules of international law and the
principles of humanity if the vessel were ap roached by an
enemy craft.
2. Merchant vessels of enemy nationality would n.ot be
attacked without warning, without an order to stop.
3. An enemy merchant vessel should stop when ordered to
do so by a belligerent submarine.
4. Such a vessel would not be attacked a.i'ter ordered to
stop unless it tried to escape or offer resistance. As soon
as it ceased efforts to escape or to resist, the attack should
be stopped.
5. If the attacking vessel found it impossible to place
a prize crew on board the enemy vessel or convoy it into port,
the vessel might be sunk after the passen ers and crew had
been removed to safety.
After proposing these terms, Secretary Lansing went on
to say that an armament on a merchant ship was an offensive
armament because it made that ship superior to the submarine.
The submarine would most certainly be exposed to destruction
and unable to give warning or visit and search. On the other
hand, he considered it only just that submarines should adhere
strictly to the rules of international law in t h e matter of
stopping and searching merchant vessels and if finding them
belligerent, removing their crews and passengers to safety be-
1
fore sinking the ship.
This proposal was only tentative, and was intended to be
kept a secret. It leaked out, and main points appeared in the
press on January 28, 1916. The matter immediately created a
furore. It was regarded in England as a complete German vic
tory over th.e United States in the submarine is sue. It was
the opinion of Ambassador Walter H. Page that bitter feeling
against the United States would be very tense in the Allied
2
countries.
The discussion of this armament controversy was involved
in three other questions: (1) negotiations for a settlement
of the Lusitania affair were in progress; (2) on February 10,
1916 Germany announced that starting with ]iarch 1st all armed
merchantmen would be tre ated as belligerents; and (3) resolu
tions urging that Americans be warned off armed merchantmen
were introduced into the United States Congress.
As noted before,
3
the Lusitania negotiations had been
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 146-148.
2. Ibid., 151-153. When put before the British government,
it was refused on the ground that it could not be put into prac
tice. Italy also refused to accept it, on the ground that she
could not give up her legal means of defense.
3. Vide PP• 49-50.
61.
going on between Secretary Lansing and Ambassador von Bernstorff
since November 23, 1915, and an agreement had almost been reached.
The German decree of F b uary 10, 1916, however, upset all the
negotiations, an the c se remained unsettled . Mr. Lansing
pointed out in a conversation with the ambassador that there
had been in the Lusitania controversy two questions: one as to
the future conduct oft e subm r ne warfare, and the other as
tote proper amends for past conduct. He had thought that
the assurances given by Germany in regard to the future conduct
of the submarine commanders settled that branch of the question,
1
but now the new proclamation had opened it up again.
Von Bernstorff replied that Germany renewed her pledges
2
of September 1st and October 5th, 1915 and did not consider
these assurances changed by subsequent events . The negotiations
concerning t he Lusitania incident, he said, had never ref erred
to armed merchantmen. In fact, the note of May 13th spoke ex
pressly of "unarmed merchantmen". Also the pledge of September
1st contained the clause, "provided they do not offer resistance".
It was clear to Germany that the presence of an armament on
board meant intention to offer resistance. A submarine com
mander could not possibly warn an enemy liner if t e liner had
the right to fire upon the submarine. Such resistance to a
warning was not the meaning of "armament for defensive purposes",
1. United States Department of t te, op. cit., 191,
Supplement, 172.
2. The pledge of October 5, 1915 referred to th tint
German note on the Arabic case, in which it was st ted: "The
orders issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the comman e f
the German submarines ••• have been made so strin ant that t
recurrence of incidents similar to the Ar bic case is c n
out of he que tion." Vide Ibid., 1915, Supp ment, o.
even if it were universally recognized that international law
permitted defensive armament. The as urances given in the
Arabic case would be observed, except that in the future they
would apply only to unarmed merchantmen. Von Bernstorff con
cluded his communication by saying that his government wel
comed the intention of the American government to bring about
63.
a "modus vivendi" between the belligerents, but could not change
or postpone its new orders to the submarine connnanders. Ger-
l
many was justified in declaring war on all armed merchantmen.
Germany's decision to classify armed merchant shi s as
men of war was apparently an attempt to take advanta e of the
tentative proposal of the United St tesr while at the same time
pacifying the extremists. This effort can best be understood
by an examination of the German political conditions at the
time. Admiral von Tirpitz, it will be remembered, had disap
proved of starting the submarine campaign in the early part
of 1915, in the belief t h t nore time was needed to perfect
the arrangements. He continued in this attitude after the
campaign was under way. Late in 1915, however, agitation for
a renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare was started in
the Navy Department. The naval authorities put their views
before the governm~nt end induced General E. von Falkenhayn
to support their position. It was determined that February 1,
1916 should be the date for starting operations. Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg vetoed the proposal, and t e date was
1. Unite States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 181-182.
removed to March 1st. On Febru ry 11th the fleet received the
armed merchantmen rulin. Seeing that the other proposal or
an immediate unr stricted campaign could not possibly receive
the sanction of the Chancellor, General von Falkenhayn advo
cated the alternative of starting it during the com ng American
presidential campaign. On the 23rd of February it was learned
that the Kaiser supported von Bethmann-Hollweg in opposing the
unrestricted warfare, because of possible difficulties with
1
the United States. Finally a conference was held, and it was
decided to postpone the campaign indefinitely.
2
The immediate result oft e temporary rejection of the
plan was the resign tion of Admiral von Tirpitz, who by now
thought that the time was ripe for such a campaign. He sent
in his resignation on March 8th, expressing regret that he no
longer could stand before t e German people as t e representa
tive of German naval policy. His resignation was accepted on
the 17th, and Admiral von Capella took over his duties.
3
Such
was the atmosphere out of which came the German decision to
consider armed merchant ships as men of war.
As noted before, the German announcement put an end to
the Lusitania negotiations. In addition, it brou ht on a seri
ous struggle between President W ilson and Congress.
Secretary of State Lansing, in beginning his discussion
over armed·merchant ships, considered his tentative position
1. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 329-330. Vide also Scheer,
R., op. cit., 110-111.
2. Tirpitz, A. von, op. cit., II, 175.
3. Ibid., 176.
corr ct, an s ir1 th qu ti n w
obviously back du by Pr siden
an important one, he was
son. Once the matter be-
came public,
gov nm t be an a slow retreat until, in the
en, its form r osition w s pr ctically re udiated . The chang
in attitu w
not v r y skil lful y ma e. At first, it waa
argued that t h naval authorities, looking on the submarine
as a possible weapon in future wars of the United States,
ur ed t
Departm nt of t te to adopt a critical attitude
toward armed merchantmen. Then, it was said that if the Unite d
States showed hostility to armed merchantmen, there would be
immediate prote t from h e Allied Powers, on the ground that
she was violating her neutrality. On the 15th of February,
1916 an \Ulofficial statem nt was sent out to the effect that
the government was surprised at the circulation of the idea
that a change in rules governing armed merchantmen was planned.
On the 20th an attempt was made to place the blame for circu-
1
lating this rumor on the German Embassy . It came to nothing,
as did the rumor of an irreparable breach between Secretary
2
Lansing and Ambassador von Bernstorff, caused by this matter .
In the Lusitania note of May 13, 1915 the President had
asserted the unlimited right of American citizens to tr averse
the high seas on belligerent merchantmen. If, however, the
armed merchantmen assumed the chara ter of auxiliary cruisers,
this right was d ubtful. Consequently, it was a logical result
of Lansing's first p osition, together with Germany's announce-
1. Later, President Wilson, speaking befor Con rs,
placed t e blame on himself and Secretary Lansing .
2. The e York Times, Febru ry 12th to 21st, 191,
sive.
-
65.
ment of 1
4 1
ebru ry 10th, 1916, th t resolutions should be intro-
1
duced into Con ess warning against such travel.
Sert ry Lan in, however, chan ed his osition, end the
country
On F bru
told th t no chan e in the rules was considered.
21 t, when it w s apparent thet the resolutions
w re to be res nt in Con ress, President ilson held a con-
fr nc with t res onsible leaders. In this meeting the
Pr sident's determined attitude in favor of unrestricted travel
le to fears in Congress that he would go to war before giving
2
up his osition.
In an effort to clear up the situation, Senator W illiam
J. tone, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
a resse a letter to President W ilson, in which was stated
t p lie that the Senator felt t e United t tes should
f llo • It read in part:
I find it difficult for my sense of duty and
responsibility to consent to plllllge this nation
into the vortex of this world war because of the
\lllreasonable obstinacy of any of the powers, upon
the one hand, or upon the other hand, .of foolhardi
ness, amounting to a sort of moral treason against
the republic, of our people recklessly risking
their lives on armed belligerent ships •••• I insist
that neither a private citizen nor the President
nor the Congress of the United states can be jus-
ified in driving this nation into war or endanger
ing its peace by any such false gense of courage
or a io al pre stige or dignity.
1. on res en ere receiving many petitions from th ir
stitue • S ea ked Congress to pass laws which would r -
e ct n of t h e nited state to American citiz n
n bel 1 er nt merchant vessels. 0th rs k
s ·~-~ interests of the United a s w
o ardized by Germany be pre rved. Vie ni
ongr i al Record, 64 Cong., 1 Seas., (1916), Vol.
pt. 3, pp. 2680-2681; pt. 14, 416, 671.
2. an, C • • , c t . , 333 •
h
) ,
,
On the same day, the Pr sident replied th t he would do
everything in his power to keep the United I t ates out of war,
but he also asserted th ri ht of American citizens to travel
on armed merchant ships. To follow any other course he con
sidered an "abdication of our hitherto proud position as the
spokesman for the law and for right". In conclusion his letter
read:
It is important to reflect that if in this
instance we allowed expediency to take the place
of principle the door would inevitably be opened
to still further concessions. Once accept a single
abatement of right, and many other humiliations
would rollow, and the whole rabric of international
law might crumble under our hands piece by piece.
What we are contending tor in this matter is of
the very essence of the things that have made Amer
ica a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them
without conceding her own impotency as a nation
and ma.king virtual surrender of her inde~endent
position among the nations of the world.
The letter made clear the Pre ident•s position. There
were divided opinions in Congress as to the foreign _olicy
which the government should follow, and long debates ensued
2
over the question. At the request of President Wilson, it
was arranged that a vote be taken on the Gore-McLemore resolu
tions, forbidding citizens of the United States to travel on
armed merchantmen. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House, pre
dicted that the vote would go two-to-one in favor of the reso
lutions. Moreover, the President was warned by two members of
his Cabinet that any attempt on his part to defeat them would
1. Scott, J.B., ed., President W ilson's Foreign Policy,
(New York, 1918), 176-178.
2. United States, Congressional Record, 64 Cong., 1 Sess.,
(1916), Vol. LIII, Pt. 4, PP• 332l-3323.
67.
result in his defeat and en an er his leadership of the coun-
1
try. Nevertheless, the Presi ent determi ned to carry thro
t e s s
•
I e Senate the resolution was brought up for a vote
on March 3rd. Senator Gore at the last moment amended it to
read in substance that it would be a just cause for ar if
American citizens lost t heir lives through the sinking of armed
merchant1nen. A vote to table this resolution and the whole
matter was taken and passed 68 to 14. In the House, the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations reported the M cLemore resolut on
with the reoomm ndation t hat it be tabled. It was the Com
mittee's opinion that the conduct of foreign relations was a
part of the President's business which should not be inter
fered with by the House of Repre entatives. On March 7th the
House tabled t e resolution by a vote of 276 to 142.
2
The
vote in both Houses was a victory for t he President, and was
regarded as a vote of conf idence in his conduct of foreign
affairs.
England viewed President W ilson's success with satisfac
tion. In Germany, on the othe hand, the vote was taken to
mean that t he United States was supporting En l nd's policies
more t h an ever before. As American dew closer to England,
1. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 335.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916 ,
Supplement, 186-187. That the President considered the at t i
tude of Congress a serious matter in our policy toward Germany
w s shown 1n a letter to Congressman Pou, Chairman of the
House Committee on Rules. The President asked that an early
vote be taken on the resolutions in order to clear away any
"damaging misi..mderstandings."
68.
1
the Germans interpreted her moves as hostile to themselves.
Immediately, resolution af'ter resolution was passed in the
Reichstag tote efrect that the German submarines should be
2
put to work to the utmost of their capacity.
The early months of 1916, although quiet in regard to
submarine warfare, were very trying ones forte Department
of State. Perhaps, they were best described by President
Wilson himself. At a dinner in February he met Miss Ida Tar
bell, who remarked that it was an anxious time. His reply was:
No one can tell how anxious it is. I never
go to bed without realizing that I may be called
up by news that will mean that we are at war. Be
fore tomorrow morning we may be at war. It is
harder because the reports that come to us must
be kept secret. Hasty action, indiscretion,
might plunge us into a dangerous situation when a
little gare would entirely change the face of
things.
Indeed, it was an anxious time. No sooner did the Presi dent win his victory in the fight with Congress than he was
faced with another issue which came dangerously close to
carrying the country into the European War- .
1. Gerard, J.W., Face to Face with Kaiserism, (New York,
1918), 90.
2. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 208-209.
3. White, W.A., Woodrow Wilson, (Boston, 1924), 290.
69.
Chapter V
The Sussex Incident
On March 24, 1916 a German submarine again brought the
relations between the United States and Germany to a crisis
when the Sussex, an unarmed French passenger steamer, was
torpedoed without warning in the English Channel. Although
no American lives were lost, three Americans were injured.
Colonel House again expressed the opinion that war with Ger-
l
many could not be avoided. He had just returned from Europe
af'ter completing plans with the British government for Ameri
can intervention. He innnediately went to the White House to
advise the President in favor of war. Secretary of State
Lansing sent a letter to President Wilson urging that Ambas
sador von Bernstorff be sent home and diplomatic relations be
2
broken with Germany. Dr. Henry Ven Dyke, .Ambassador to Hol-
land, wrote to Ambassador Brand Whitlock in Belgium that from
all appearances a rupture of diplomatic relations was inevi_
table. Whitlock himself said, "We kept our trunks packed and
were ready to go on the short notice we felt would be all that
would be vouchsafed us, and if we were not precisely sitting
on our boxes, we had the impermanent sensation of those in
that cramped and benumbing posture."
3
Ambassador Gerard fully
expected the sinking of the Sussex to lead to war.
4
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 225-226.
2. Ibid., 227.
3. Whitlock, B., Belgitun, _ (New York, 1919), II, 250, 256.
4. Gerard, J.W., Face to Face with Kaiserism, 98.
70.
The Pr sident hesit t d. In the face of the warlike ad
vice he received, he went nto retirement. From New York Colo
nel House again advised a break with Germany. Secretary Lan
sing prepared a note for Germany in which he reviewed the sub-
marine controversy, and which concluded by recalling Gerard
and notifying the Imperial government that von Bernstorff would
be given his passports. President Wilson discarded this note
completely, showed Colonel House the draft of a new one, which
House considered able in its presentation of the case against
the submarines, but not strong enough in its conclusion. Ac
cording to House, the note showed the use of the English sug-
1
gestions which he had brought with him from that country.
Meanwhile, other passenger ships suffered attacks at the
hands of the German submarines. March 16th the British steamer
Berwindale, carrying four Americans, was torpedoed without
------
warning. On March 24th the Englishman was sunk, and several
American citizens were drowned. This attack was followed by
one on the Manchester Engineer on March 27th. The following
day the British steamer Eagle Point with Americans on board
was torpedoed after its surrender. The passengers and crew
were left in two small boats in a heavy sea with a stormy
2
wind blowing.
On the 10th of April the German government sent a note
covering these cases to the United States. As for the Berwin-
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 235.
2. United States Department of tate, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 215, 216, 219, 220.
71.
dale: a steamer, possibly the Berwindale, was encountered by
a German submarine on March 16th. As soon as it noticed the
submarine, the steamer turned and started to run away. It
72.
was called upon to stop but did not heed the shot of warning,
put out its lights, and tried to escape. The vessel was shelled
\llltil she stopped. Boats were lowered, and the ship was sunk
after the crew had had time to enter the boats and pull away.
It was not sunk without warning~ The same was true of the
Englishman. It did not pay attention to shots of warning and
was forced to stop by the submarine after a long pursuit. The
crew was given time to enter the boats before the vessel was
sunk. In the case of the Manchester Engineer Germany was not
sure whether or not the attack on this vessel was traceable
to a German submarine. ore details were needed before she
concluded her investigation. The Eagle Point did not stop
when ordered to do so by a German submarine, and was consequent
ly shelled until she did so. After t h e crew took to the boats,
the vessel was sunk. There was not a "stormy wind" nor a
"heavy sea". The boa.ts were on a much-used steamer route, and
had every prospect of being picked up. If the crew used only
two small boats, they themselves were to blame, for t here were
four large ones on the steamer.
The note next considered the more important case of the
Sussex. A boat of its description was encountered in the Eng
lish Channel. The German commander was c onvinced that it was
a war vessel by five things: (1) the flush deck of the vess 1,
(2) the warship form of its st n, ( ) 1 s l ~ • -like coat
of paint, (4) the h sped of the vessel,18 sea miles, and
(5) the fact that t e vessel did not follow the customary
course of most m rchant shi in. The Sussex was attacked,
end the torpedo c used a severe explosion. Germany, therefore,
concluded that it car ied ammunition on board. On the o her
hand, the plan drawn by the submarine connnan er of t e of the
vessel he attacked was not i dentical with that of the Sus ex.
The German government, thus, was forced to as ume that the
damaging of the Sussex was due to another cause than attack
1
by a German subn1arine, probably to the explosion of a mine.
such a position naturally enraged the American government
more than ever. "It was probably the most unfortunate document
that ever passed from Ber in to Vashington," wrote Count Bern
storff. "Mr. Wilson thou the detected a direct untruth, end
the mixture of an uneasy conscience and clumsiness which the
German Note appeared to betray prompted the sharp tone of the
2
President's reply."
The United States answered on April 18th. The Sussex,
she said, had never been armed. It was known to be used only
to carry passengers. It did not fol ow the route taken by
troop or supply ships. A careful examination by the United
States naval and military authorities conclusively proved that
the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or or ers to surren
der, and that the torpedo was of German manufacture.
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 227-229.
2. Bernstorff, J. von, op. ci~., 247-248.
The German government, the note stated, apparently faile
to realize the seriousness of the situation which had resulted,
not only from the attack on the Sussex, but from the whole
method and character of subma.rin arfare. The Imperial govern-
ment had again and a ain given its solemn assurances that pas
senger ships would not be dealt with in such a fashion; but
no limit of any kind had been set. The roll of Americans who
had lost their lives had grown month by month. The government
of the United States had been very patient. It had accepted
the assurances or Germany in good faith. It had made every
allowance for unprecedented conditions and had been willing
to wait until the facts warranted only one interpretation.
It now owes it to a just regard for its own
rights to say to the Imperial Government that that
time has come. It has become painfully evident to
it t t the position which it took at the very out
set is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines
for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, ot
necessity, because of the very character of the
vessels employed and the very methods of attack
which their employment of course involves, utterly
incompatible with the principles of humanity, the
long established and incontrovertible rights' of
neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combat
ants.
If it were still the purpose of Germany to continue her
relentless and indiscriminate warfare against merchant vessels
by the use of submarines, this government would be forced to
conclude that there was but one course for it to take.
Unless the Imperial Government would now innnediate
ly declare and effect an abandonment of its present
methods of submarine warfare against passenger and
freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the Uni
ted States can have no choice but to sever diploma
tic relations with the German Empire e.ltogether.l
1. United State Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 232-234.
The followin day, April 19th, the President laid the
matter in all of its seriousness before Congress. He was
anxious to commit no act which might make Congress feel that
he was holding back information, for the President was willing
to let it know formally everything that he knew about the situ
ation. He hoped in this way to win its support and that of
the people for any necessary course of action. He rehearsed
the history of the controversy and closed with a statement of
l
the decision he had reached ~and sent to Germany.
If Germany had not sincerely desired peace, this note
would in all probability have caused war. The ambassador to
Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, on his way home from Constantinople,
had passed through Berlin in February. He met Secretary von
Jagow, who remarked to him: "We wish to avoid a rupture with
the United States."
2
In late April, Gerard wrote, "I think
Germany 1s now determined to keep peace with .America as the
plain people are convinced that otherwise the war will be
lengthened - a contingency abhorrent to all."
3
.
On the 28th of April Ambassador Gerard visited the German
General Headquarters and was present at the debate over what
attitude should be taken toward t he American note. Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg was in favor of a statement in compliance
with the American demands. Vice-Chancellor Helfferich also
favored a peaceful policy. General von Falkenhayn, however,
75.
1. Houston, D •• , og• cit., I, 155-156.
2. Morgenthau, H., ~orgenthau•s Own Story, (New York, 1918),
401.
3. Gerard, J.W., Face to Face with Kaiserism, 97.
took the stand t hat "further re ard for {America's] wishes was
not only useless but positively dangerous in consequence of
of loss of time" and
11
demanded th tan immediate start be made
with the unrestricted submarine campaign. nl The Chancell or,
after questioning Gerard as to whether or not Germany might
reserve the right to sink armed merchantmen on sight, said:
"As I understand it, what America wants is cruiser warfare on
the part of t h e submarines." Gerard replied in the affirmative.
"I hope now that if we settle this matter," von Bethmann-Hollweg
continued, "your President will be great enough to take up the
question of peace. "
2
The result of this conference was a note sent to t he United
States by the German government on May 4th. In it Germany de
nied that her submarines were waging indiscriminate warfare,
and insisted that her conunanders had orders to conduct opera
tions in accordance with t h e general principles of visit and
search. It was also pointed out that she had given no assur
ances in regard to enemy trade carried on in enemy ships in
the war zone, and that she could not give up the use of sub
marines against enemy trade. Great Britain had forced her to
resort to her present practices. The government of the United
States should extend her principles of humanity to t he mil
lions of German women and chil dren whom the British, by their
actions, were starving. Germany, however, in t he intere st of
1. Fa.lkenhayn, E. von, General Headquarters: 1914-1916,
(London, 1920), 220.
2. Gerard, J.w., My Four Years in Germany, (New York,
1917), 9'7.
peace and friendship, would make further concessions. The
Imperial government, therefore, notified the United St ts
that its naval forces had received the following orders:
In accordance with the general principles of
visit and search and destruction of merchant ves
sels recognized by international law, such vessels,
both within and without the area declared as naval
war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and
without saving human lives, unless these ships at
tempt to escape or offer resistance.
However, and here Germany attached an apparent condition
to her pledge, neutrals could not expect Germany, fighting for
her life, to give up the use of an effective weapon if her
enemy was allowed to continue at will methods of warfare which
violated the rules of international law. Accordingly, Germany
expected the United States to demand and insist that Great
Britain should forthwith observe the rules of intern tional
law as laid down in the American notes to Great Britain on
December 28, 1914 and November 5, 1915. Should this object
not be attained, "the German government would then be facing
a new situation in which it must reserve {to) itself complete
liberty of decision."
1
And so Germany once again handed out a promise with one
hand and took it back with the other. According to the German
newspapers, the Imperial government had gone more than halfway
in an effort to meet American demands. The Vossiche Ze tung
con idered the reply a sincere desire to avoid a break and
felt that it was now up to the American people to "show their
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 257-260.
far-famed sense of justice". The Lokal Anzeiger stated that
"if America does not declare herself completely satisfied and
use her best efforts to h ve our enemies conform t heir methods
to international law, it will be plain that the break which
we have tried to avoid is a part of the fixed unneutral policy
of that country." The Cologne G~zette characterized the note
as
a final attempt to preserve good relations with
America. The Emperor and his advisers ••• found
no alternative but to impose this sacrifice on us.
They could do so without surrendering dignity, in
the consciousness of our strength which excludes
any suspicion that they were prompted by fear and
1
not the best understood interests of the country.
Opinions expressed in the United States, though, were dif
ferent. Secretary of State Lansing again advised war. Colonel
House, on the other hand, believed that the United States should
accept Germany's concession as a sufficient victory~ It was
the opinion of Pre ident Wilson that the German pledge was not
worthwhile with the condition attached, so a reply was immedi
ately dispatched to that government. The Imperial government's
declaration of a change in policy was accepted, but the condi
tion was expressly rejected. Moreover, the President notified
Germany that he would rely upon a scrupulous execution of her
altered policy and . that it could not be made contingent upon
the course of the diplomatic negotiations between the United St t .
1. Vossiche Zeitung, Lokal Anzeiger, Cologne Gazette
quoted in United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 261.
2. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 242. Gerard's prelimi
nary summary of the German reply overemphasized its unfrien ly
tone, end this fact probably influ need Lan in in vo f
•
and Great Britain. The respect for the ri hts of Americans
by Germany could in no way depend upon the conduct of any other
government. "Responsibility in such matters is sin le, not
joint; absolute, not relative."
1
"And so," wrote Count Bern
storff later, "the differences of opinion remained, which was
bound to become a casus bell! if we reverted to unrestricted
2
submarine warfare."
Germany made no reply to this last note, but Secretary
von Jagow intimated to Ambassador Gerard that no express con
dition had been attached to the offer.
3
The United States
accepted this assurance as an abandonment of the submarine
policy, and for several months there was a marked cessation
of submarine activity.
Early in the period following the Sussex pledge rumors
became current that Germany was about to obtain much needed
articles from the United States by means of submarine merchant
men. On July 8, 1916 the Deutschland arrived off the Virginia
Capes and made her way to Baltimore. Here she was exami ned
by the naval authorities of the United States, and finding that
the vessel carried no guns, the Department of State, in spite
of protests from the Allies, decided that the submarine was a
merchantman and should be treated as such.
4
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 263.
2. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 252.
3. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 266.
4. Ibid., 767-770. Vide also The New York Times, July
11, 1916.
79.
The Deutschland was followed by another submarine, the
U-53, which was fully armed with torpedoes and guns. It sud
denly appeared off Newport, stayed a few hours and then put
to sea. Taking up her station som sixty les south of the
Nantucket Lightship, she waited directly in the route of
European trade. On October 8th and 9th nine merchant ships
were sunk. In these cases, it was evident that the German
submarines intended to act in accordance with the principles
of international law because ample time was iven for the
passengers and crews, many of whom were American, to take to
the life boats. Ambassador von Bernstorff also stated that
these submarine operations off the coast of the United States
would not alter in the least Germany's policy in regard to the
1
pledge given on iay 4, 1916.
Great excitement was caused in the United States by the
arrival of these two boats. At first,feeling on all sides was
openly friendly, and Captain Konig of the Deutschland was very
popular with many American people. On his second ,visit, which
took place in Connecticut, the Captain met with a friendly re
ception, but there was not the same warmth of feeling as was
shown at his first trip to the United States. The visit of
the U-53 created an unfavorable impression. When the news
arrived that it had sunk several ships, its position became
quite serious. The President informed the Ge·rman ambassador
that if similar acts were repeated, he could not be responsible
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 772, 774.
for public feeling, which mi ht become very bitter. Germany ,
however, did not continue her submarine activities off the
coast of the United States, and so the matter ended .
1
During the months of September and October there were
many signs that Germany was contemplating a return to reckless
submarine warfare. Matters between the United States and Ger
many were considered on a temporarily quiet footing when on
September 29th C8lne an unexpected anti-American outburst in
the German press, based on the report of the death or an Ameri
can aviator in the service of France. Full advantage was taken
of this item as a basis of scathing comment on the neutrality
of the United States and to stir up public opinion against
that country. It was hoped to thus weaken the Chancellor in
dealing with the submarine issue in the coming sessions of the
2
Reichstag.
At about the same time news was received that the German
Admiralty was making preparations for the resumption of indis
criminate warfare. The navalists and the military le ders
-
hoped and expected that the political situation in Germany
ould change and develop in such a way as to permit thei plans
3
to be carried out . This party was opposed by the members of
the civil government, who were attempting to arrange a peace
1. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 265-269.
2. Tnited State De rtment of St te, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 285-286. This anti-American outburst in e press
w s condenmed b. the C ancellor and e oreign Office, but
for a time it wa doubtful whether or not ey cou d hold t er
_osition aga nst indiscriminate subm r new f e.
3. Ibid., 293.
81.
offer, either on their own responsibility or through the
United States government. For this reason, they opposed t e
reopening of the submarine campa1 n as the chief menace to
peace between Germany and the United States . The mi it rists
granted that America wou d decl re war 1~ their policy went
into effect, but declared that t e submarine would make it
impossible for her to give any more aid tote Allies.
1
It
was evident that a grave p olitical cri is was i m pending.
The situation in t e Reichstag did not develop as t e
Admiralty had expected. After the Chancellor's openi g speech
on September 28th, twelve days were spent by the Budget Com
mittee of the Reichstag in secret session for t he purpose of
considering foreign affairs. It was during this session that
the Chancellor succeeded in bringing the leaders of the vari
ous political parties to a temporary agreement . The pr ncipal
topic under debate was whether or not it was advisable to be
gin submarine warfare in its extreme form and thereby involve
the neutrals in the war . The opponents of this policy were
Chancellor von B thmann-Hollweg , sup orted byte Emperor , the
Minister of the Interior, Helfferich, von Hindenbur, the For
eign Office, end a majority in the Reichst g . Its advocates
were the entire navy, including von Tirpitz, a large percentage
of the army, the Conservatives and most of the National Liberty
Party in the Reichstag , and above all, the majority of public
opinion, which had been made to believe byte press that in-
1. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 374.
82.
discriminate submarine warfare wa the surest means of brin -
ing about En land's defe t.
1
One of tle strongest speeches in avor oft e Chancellor's
policy w s m de by elfferioh, who brought out the reat impor-
tance or avoiding a break with the Unit Stats. First of
all, he said, Germany would need America's financial aid after
the war, and secon ly, the con1bined forces of En .land and the
United States would be able to ffectively close the frontiers
of Germany's neutral neighbors, thereby putting an end to the
2
importation of supplies across these frontiers.
The result of these arguments wa the vote of the Budget
Committee, 24 to 4, against a general discus ion of the sub
marine issue int e coming open sessions of the Reichstag.
When the time ca.me, there was no bitter debate nor a vote of
lack of confidence in t h e Chancellor. There were only a few
mild speeches by the leaders of the Conservative and Socialist
Labor Parties, the extreme ri ght and left, who had refused to
abide by the resolutions oft e Budget Committee. · These
speeches had no effect. The general opinion oft e Reichstag
was that the decision should be left in the hands of the Em
peror and von Hindenburg. Confidence in the government was
3
restored and the "political atmosphere was cleared".
Although the settlement of the political difficulties 1n
Germany seemed to indicate that she intended to live up to her
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 300-303.
2. Ibid., 304.
3. I~id., 304-305.
83.
pledge to the Unite States , feelin was again roused in the
United States over the sinking of the British steamer Marina.
Dispatches from the American consul at Q ueenstown stated that
the vessel was torpedoed without warning and that six of the
1
fifty-two Americans aboard were drowned. The consul reported
that on October 28th the British steamer Rowanmore with Ameri-
2
cans on board was torpedoed. A few days later, the Peninsu-
lar end Oriental ., ompany' s steamer Arabia, carrying one Ameri
can, was sunk by a torpedo in the Mediterranean.
3
Then came
4
news of the sinklng of t he American ship Coltlll1bian.
/
Instructions were immediately sent to the American charge
at Berlin to make inquiries of the German government concerning
these sinkings, for all signs seemed to indicate that the Ger
man commanders had failed to observe the ple ge given to the
United States. On November 27th Germany sent her note explain
ing the attack on the Marina. The reason for sinking her was
the belief that she was a transport in the service of Great
Britain. The steamer was painted grey, carried no flag, and
.
had a wooden superstructure on deck ror transporting horses.
Should the United States, however, after investigating the
case, find this assumption to be wrong, the act would be a
regrettable mistake, and Germany would not "hesitate to draw
84.
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 299. Vide also Anonymous, "Germen Pledges and the
Marina," The Literary Digest, LIII, (November 11, 1916), 1233.
2. Editorial, "Diplomatic Correspondence between he United
States and Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights
and Commerce," The American Journal of International La~, XI,
(October, 1917), Special Supplement, 98-99.
3. United St tes Dep rtrnent of State, op. cit., 1916,
Supplement, 308-309.
4. Ibid., 310.
1
the appropriate consequences."
As for t he Arabia, the German government on December 4th
stated that it, too, was sup osed to be a transport ship. The
Arabia was painted black and had a black superstructure. It
was off the route of passen er steamers, following the one
used solely for war purposes. On board were a large number
of Asiatics. Supposing them to be worlonen soldiers, such as
were used by the Allies behind the front, the submarine conm1an
der attacked without delay and sank the vessel. Should the
United States be able to prove that the Arabia was an ordinary
passenger vessel, the action of the submarine commander would
not be in accordance with his instructions, and the German
government v1ould "promptly draw the appropriate consequences"
2
from his act.
The American steamship Columbian had been stopped and
carefully examined. The submarine conunander saw that she car
ried the American flag. He also saw that t~ e boat had pre
sumably delivered horses to an English or French port. The
.
Columbian
1
s papers were not examined because of a heavy sea.
The vessel was released. As soon as freed, however, she sent
out wireless messages about the submarine. The latter over
hauled her, and forced the captain of the Columbian to follow
it. The next morning , on examining the steamer's papers, the
subm rine commander decided to sink her for unneutral service .
3
1. United States Department of State , op. ci,t., 1916,
Supplement, 312-313.
2. Ibid., 319.
3. Ibid., 326-327.
85.
In th c e of the Rowanmore, Germany claimed th ts e
was not at rault because the vessel had tried to escape and
had sent wireless messages for help. The sub arine had stopped
firing when the boats were lowered. No shots were fired at
the life boats, shad been claimed by the officers of the
Rowanmore. The subm rine commander saw a de troyer coming in
the distance, so the safety of the crew was guaranteed . he
difficult situation w not due to the action of the subm ine,
but to the attitude of the En lish ship which persistently
1
tried to escape.
In spite of these minor difficulties between the United
States and Germany, the prospects for eace seemed exception
ally good. The German civil authorities were very anxious to
put an end to the submarine agitation by arranging a peace
conference. President ilson was also very desirous of dis
posing of the problems of w r by brining it to an end. It
had been intended at first to make the American peace offer
in May, 1916. Three factors, however, delayed it 'until
December: (1) the hope that the Allies would fall in line to
look with favor on the peace offer; (2) the necessity of wait
ing for the November elections to reinforce President Wilson's
position in th United States and in the eyes of the belligerent
nations; and (3} the Belgian deportation in the fall of 1916
aroused a great deal of anti-German feeling in the United
1. Edi torie.l, "Diplomatic Correspondence bet\l'leen the
St tes and Bellig rent Governments relat n to Neutral Ri
and Commerce," The Ame ican Journal of International L w,
(October , 1917), Special Sup lement, 98-105.
tates
nited
ts
XI,
as well as throu hout the world . Germany had reasons for de
lay too. It was feared that any move coming from her would
be taken as a confession of weakness. When Bucharest fell to
her on the 6th of December, however, the Germans saw no reason
for furthe r delay.
1
Out of this complex situation, one fact remained clear .
The German civil authorities were forced to make advances
toward peace in order to remain in control of the Einpire. The
submarine group was pushing them harder and harder, and this
fact led them to urge President Wilson to act as mediat or
once again. Delay would be fatal to the cause of the German
peace party. It was fear that the President would delay his
peace offer too long that caused Chancellor von Bethmann
Hollweg to formulate one of his own. The Belgian deportation
was the reason for Wilson's hesitation , and consequently caused
the release of t h e German offer on December 12th.
2
The German government, in this note, announced to the
Entente Powers, through President Wilson, its readiness to
open negotiations for peace. The German note was sent by the
3
President to England and France without comment. In order
to keep the Allies from giving a too abrupt and peremptory
refusal to the German offer, Colonel House and Sir William
Wiseman (a messenger from Cecil Spring-Rice) decided to advise
the British to wait a few days before sending an answer. The
1. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 3?8.
2. Ibid., 379, 382.
3. Latane, J.H., op. cit., 591.
meaning of their c able w s somewh t misunderstood. In London
it was taken to mean th t the United States did not actually
want delay but information about the contents of the British
1
reply. Ambassador Walter Hines Page also held the peace offer
in
11
contempt".
2
The result wa that the Allies a.greed upon
an identical reply which was sent on the 29th of December.
The proposal of Germany to consider peace ne otiations was
rejected as insincere and indefinite.
3
Meanwhile, the United States State Department was prepar-
ing a peace offer of its own, which w in no way inspired by
the German project. This note was laid before the Cabinet on
the 15th of December. In short, the note requested all the
warring nations to state definitely what t hey were fighting
for, in the hope that t heir statements of their objects mi ght
become the basis of peace. The President took "the liberty
of calling attention to t h e fact that the objects which the
statesmen of t h e belligerents on both sides have in mind in
this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms
4
to their own people and to t h e world." He pointed out that
the United States was interested in securing peace and would
co-operate in securing the right ends. r rhus, it was hoped that
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 400-402.
2. Hendrick, B.J., ed., The Life and Letters of V alter
Hines Pafe, (New York, 1925J, II, 200-203.
3. atanE(, J.H., op. cit., 591.
4. It is to be no€ed that t h e President did nots
the belligerents were fighting for the same thing , but
the objects as stated by t h e leaders on both sides to
people were, generally speaking, the same.
y that
that
heir
a comparison of bell! erent views would clear the way for a
1
conference and result in peace.
In the Cabinet there was a great differnce of opinion as
to the advisability of s nding the note. William G. McAdoo
end David F. Houston considered it unwise, both feelin that
it should not be sent so soon after t h e German note of the
12th. The Pres dents id, "It may be wise to send nothing,
but I will send this note or nothing." In the face of such
determination the opponents of the note had nothing further
to say.
After the note wa m de public, Mr. Houston's remarks to
A. Maurice Low, American correspondent of the London M orning
Post,show the attitude of McAdoo and Houston himself. Low
believed that the note "would be resented by the Allies; that
it was a peace move, that the President had played into t e
hands of the Germans, and that heh d created a very delicate
situation which might become serious." In replying to these
observations, Houston pointed out that, on the contrary, t h e
Allies could use this move to their own advant ge. They could
now bring the American people "to a fuller realization of the
fact that the Allies were waging a just war and fi hting for
a higher civilization." It was important that this op_ ortun-
1 ty be taken, said Houston, so that the American people would
give their support to the Allies. And he added, "The Allies
are in the right - that is, Great Britain, France, and Bel ium
are. I have been on their side since the first day the ermans
1. Houston, D.F., op. cit., I, 218-219.
moved. "
1
The peace note, sent on December 18th, was for a time
regarded in En land and France a.s meddleso e and as an endorse
ment, in a way, of the German proposal. Sir Henry ilson ex
pressed the English militarist sent ent when he wrote in his
diary that
11
That ass President W ilson has bar ed in and asked
all belligerents their ter s."
2
Lord James Bryce and Sir
Horace Plunkett, both intimate with Colonel Edward M. House,
were quite excited over the fact that the President's note
seemed to place the pretensions of the Allies on the same
3
plane with those of the Germans.
The German overrunent replied on December 26th. The Cen
tral Powers merely said that they were willing to enter into
negotiations, reiterating their proposal of December 12th.
No mention of terms was made , due to t he fact that German
public o inion was not united on the subject of peace and to
the fear that the Allies · ght use the German terms to gain
4
technical advant ges . Thus her reply was quite indefinite.
The Allies, on the other hand, in a noted ted the 10th
of January, 1917, stated quite definitely the mea ure of repar
ation and restitution and the guarantees which they believed
5
necessary conditions of a permanent peace. In their terms
1. Houston, D.F., op. cit., I, 219-221.
2. Cattwell, Sir C.E., ed., Life and Diaries of Field
Marshall Sir Henr~ ilson, (London, 1927), I, 306.
3. Seymour, • , ed., op. cit, II, 407.
4. Bernstorff , J. von, op.ct., 322-323.
5. Uni ed St tes De rtment of St te, op.ct., 1 l?,
Supple ent , 6-9.
90.
it w s p ent, how v r, th t Allies ere to be restored
tot eir status quo antebellum and then freely enlarged in
area at the ex nse oft e Centr 1 Powers.
Meanwhile, it was rumore ht Germany was building newer
and larger subm nes and w s contempl tin a r turn to unre-
stricted submarine w rf re on a more extensive scale than ever
before. In his further efforts to secure eace, President
Wilson, on January 22, 1917, a eared unex ectedly before the
Sen te and delivered a not ble address before that assembly.
It became known as the "peace without victory" speech. In it
he outlined t e principle on which the Unite States would be
willin to enter into a League for Peace, hoping that in this
way peace cou d be est blished and t e war brought to a close.
Victory was, he had concluded, out of h e question for either
side, and any satisf ctory adju tment of international affairs
should not be forced to wait upon tbe results of a long-con-
1
tinued war.
The day after the President read his appeal to the Senate,
he made a fi~al effort to arrange a peace conference wit the
aid of Germany. Ambassador von Bernstorff and Colonel House
were to be the two representatives. They met on January 23rd
to discuss the matter . After asking von Bernstorff to make
another effort to et the German peace terms, House read a
"memorandum of Mr . Wilson's, in v1hich the President formally
offered us to act as medi tor, in order to brin about ape ce
1. Grattan, C.H., op. ci~., 394-395.
91.
by arrangement." On th 27th von Bernstor·f'f cabled the sub
stance of the interview to Berlin. In his summary, the Ger
man ambassador repre sented Colonel House as revealing the
President's st tern nt that "Our [Germany's) enemies had openly
expressed their intpossible peace terms." Von Bernstorff
warned the Foreign Office that if the submarine cam aign were
opened again, "the President will regard this as a smack in
the face, ••• the war party here [in the United States] will
gain the upper hand, and the end of the wa.r will be quite out
of sight, as, whatever people may say to the contrary, the re
sources of the United States are enormous •••• we shall obtain
a better peace now by conferences, than we should if the United
1
States joined t h e rank s of our enemies."
This should have caused t he Geri an peace party to redouble
its efforts. Unfortunately, however, the failure of the peace
move of December 12th converted many German orficials to the
position 1n favor of unrestricted warfare. The pro-submarine
people again demanded that their program be put into effect.
They now had the upper hand. Thus, on January 31st the Ger
man government announced to the United States its resumption
of unrestricted submarine warfare, the final step which led
to war between t he two nations.
1. Bernstorff, J. von, op. cit., 373-375.
92.
Chapter VI
The Resumption of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
At no time during the peace negotiations of December,
1916 was the German govermnent free from the problem of sub
marine warfare. As early as the 20th of that month, Erich
von Ludendorff, taking as en indication that eace would fail
the program set forth by Prime Minister Lloyd George of Eng
land, telegraphed Alfred Zimmermann of the Foreign Office:
"After Lloyd George has refused our peace offer by his declar
ation in the House of Comnions, I am convinced, 1n view of the
impressions I have gained on the Western Front, that t e U-
1
boat campaign must now be inaugurated 1n full force." This
position had the support of von Hindenburg, who communicated
to von Bethmann-Hollweg the stand which they were taking.
The latter replied: "so far as I can bring myself to Your
Excellency's conviction that the adv ~tages of a wholesale
and ruthless submarine campaign outweigh the disadvanta es of
the entry of America into t h e ranks of our enemies, I shall
be prepared to consider even the unrestricted U-boat warfare."
Von Hindenburg's reply was a demand that submarine warfare
2
begin immediately.
On January 1, 1917, the opposing groups c8llle together at
Pless. The Chancellor was sadly reigned to the fact that
1. Ludendorff, E. von, The General St ff and Its Problems,
(New York, 1920), 289.
2. Ibid., 293, 296-298.
93.
"if the m111 tary aut orities reg rd t he U-boat campaign as
necessary I am not in a. position to oppose them."
1
By the
8th, the military lea.des h d decided that unrestricted sub
marine w rfare must be adopted, and th t if von Bethmann
Hollweg stood in thew y, they woul contrive to bring about
his dismissal. The following day, in a eneral conference,
the "final determination w s formally taken~•. All those pre
sent who were implicated in this decision fully realized that
it would end the peace negotiations and inevitably bring the
2
United States into the war.
A member of the German court, Freiherr von Reischach,
came upon Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, sitting alone after
this conference:
I entered the room and found him sitting
utterly broken. To my horrified question, ' Have
we lost a battle?' he replied, 'No, but Finis
Germaniae. I have spoken for an our against the
submarine war, which will bring in the Unite States.
That will be too much for us. W hen I had done,
Admiral von H ltzendorff jumpe p and said,
11
I
guarantee on my word as a naval officer that no
American will set foot on the Continent."' 'You
should resign.'
1
I cannot sow dissension,' re
joined the Chancellor, 'just when Germany is play
ing her last card.'3
The Germ.an Chancellor was broken. Ambassador Gerard's
speech in Berlin on the 6th of January had given him new
hope. The American ambassador had st ted that so long as
the personnel of t h e German civil government remained intact,
1. Ludendorff, E. von, op. cit., 305.
2. Scott, J.B., ed., Official German Documents relating
to the orld War, (New York, 1923), I, 138.
3. Quoted in Gooch, G.P., Recent Revelations of European
~iplomacy, (New York, 1927), 17.
94.
"good relations between the two countries would be maintained."
Moreover, on his return from the United States, Ambassador
Gerard had told the Chancellor that he believed "that the Pres
ident was ready to go very far in the way of coercing any na-
1
tion which refused reasonable peace." This st tement should
have made t e peace party in Berlin stiffen its opposition to
the submar ne, but in spite of it the decision was made. The
attitude of the various groups in Berlin in regard to the fu
ture was interesting. The navy people had great hopes, the
army was convinced that the submarine weapon was a last resort
but it was lacking in e.ny "overweening confidence", while the
politicians were in "a st te of mind which can only be des
cribed as dull resignation. They did not believe in the suc
cess of the submarine war."
2
Such was the atmosphere into which President W ilson's
final peace offer was projected. Nothing was done about it.
The U-boats had already departed for their posts. "It was
'
argued that they could not be recalled because no one was
longer actively interested in having them recalled!" Von
Hindenburg was not even told of the President's attempt, and
did not find out about it until October, 1918.
3
As there were
no military reasons why the subm rine warfare should not be ,in
at once, Ambass dor von Be nstorff was c bled that the U-boat
warfare was to be connn need innnediately, but th t the erman
1. Gerard, J.W., My Four Years in rmanr, 363,
2. Maximilian, Prince of Baden, The ~emo rs
Max of Baden, (New York, 1928), I, 54.
3. Grattan, c • • , op. cit., 398.
95.
government w s "re dy to disc on t nue t h e unr t ric t ec U-boa.t
war the moment we are comple t ely assured that tl1e Pres i ent
I
s
efforts will led to pe ce th t woul be cce table to us. nl
On January 31st t he Ger an ambas a or hande Secretary
Lansing a formal note, announcing a new zone around Gre t
Britain and France and warning that 11 ships found within
the zone after Febru ry 1st, neutr i ncluded, would be sunk.
Thus the guarantees hitherto made to the United St ates, and
especially the pledge of May 4, 1916, were withdrawn.
The note opened with l anguage of friendly regard and com
mendation of t he President's motives and expressed regr et at
the impossibility of realizing his lofty ideals because of
the attitude of Germany's enemies. These observations were
evidently intended to show that the new situation, mentioned
in the Sussex pledge, had been forced upon t h e Imperial Ger man government, which it had to meet with vigor.
A new situation has thus been created w hich
forces Germany to new decisions . Since t w o years
and a half England is usi g her na.val power for a
criminal attempt to force Germany into submission
by starvation . In brutal contempt of internation- .
al law the group of powers led by England does not
only curtail the legitimate trade of their opponents
but they also by ruthless pressure compel neutral
countries either to altogether forego evecy trade
not agreeable to the Entente Powers or to limit it
according to their arbitrary decrees.
After these statements of a general nature, the ambassa
dor concluded the communication with an expression of trust
and hope, which, with the Sussex correspondence in m. nd, he
1. Bernstorff, J. von, op . cit., 378.
96.
should have realized would seem unjustified to the President,
to the Secretary of St te, and to t he American people,
"that the people and the Government of the United
States will understand the motives for this decis-
ion and its necessity," and "that the United States
may view the new situation from the lofty heights
of impartiality, and assist, on their part, to pre
vent further misery and avoidable sacrifice of hu-
man life.
11
Accompanying the note w s a memorandmn. ,. It defined the
boundaries of the barred zones, designated which routes through
them would be open to travel, end st ated the rules which were
to govern American shipping. The steamships were to follow
a certain route; their destination was to be the port of Fal
mouth; the vessels were to bear certain markings; only one
steamship a week was to sail in each direction; and the United
97.
1
States was to guarantee that those ships carried no contraband.
The action of Germany was foreshadowed in the Zimmermann
message of January 19th, addressed to the German minister to
Mexico, which was intercepted on its way through the United
States by American authorities. The message show~d Germany's
determination to carry on her submarine warfare even more
ruthlessly than before, in spite of her assurances to the
United States and the possibility of a rupture with th at nation,
although she affected to believe that the United States might
be kept neutral. In case the Unite States did resent the
repudiation oft e German promise, however, an alliance was
to be made, in time of peace, with M exico on t he following
1. United States Department of St ate, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 97-102.
be.sis: "ake w r to eth r, m e p ce to ether, enerous fi-
nancial sup or d an un rstand n on our {Germ y' s] part
that Mexico is tor con uer t e lost territory in Texas , New
Mexico, end Arizona." Aft r w r wit the Un ed St t had
brok n out , exico wa. to m e an alliance with Ja an and
mediate betwe n Japan
1
plan.
d Germany. Such was t e Zinnne mann
The whole scheme w s rather far-fetched. In the first
place, it w s hi ly im robable th t Japan would desert the
Allies for Germany, and secondly, it w s absurd to think that
Mexico could induce Japan to follow such a course. Also Mex
ico, although somewhat inf vor of Germany, had no desire to
become involved in thew r. Both countries indignantly denied
any knowledge oft e ff ir or any possibility of t .eir join
ing in such a scheme.
2
Nevertheless, full advantage was taken of the affair to
spread war propaganda. Inflaming headlines were found in
many papers in reference tote note. President ii son him self became very excited and took.the Zimmermann note very
"hard
0
• "The Presi ent• s mood," wrote Jane Addams, Chairman
of the omen's Pe _ ce Party, "was stern and f r from tr e schol
ar1 s detachment as he told us of recent disclosures of German
machinations in Mexico and announced the impossibility of any
form of adjudication. He still spoke to us, hov,ever , as to
1. United States Department of State, op. cit., 1917,
Sup lament, 147.
2. Latan,, J.H., op. cit., 593.
98.
fellow pacifists to whom he was fore d to conf ss that war
had become 1nev1 table. ul The note, too, w R used to rouse
thew r entim nt in t he Southwest, normal y an anti-war sec
tion of th country.
2
At this time, eyes of h country wer focuse d on
th President with marked intensity to discover what course
of action he would follow in regard to Germeny
1
s announcement
of Janu ry 31st. Thee w re three possible steps which h
could take: break off diplom tic rel tions at once, give
3
Germany a waring, or await an overt act. On the 3rd of
February, he ap_eared before Congress and addressed its mem
bers upon the situ tion resulting from the proclamation of
January 31st and outlined what, in his opinion, the United
States should do under the changed conditions. The Pre ident
recalled the note of April 8, 1916, referring to the sinking
of the Sussex, in v1hich the United States had declared that
unless Germany ceased her methods of warfare against passenger
and freight ves els, the Unite States would be obliged to
.
sever diplomatic relations. In reply to this warning, Ger-
many had given her pledge of May 4, 1916. The President next
quoted the acceptance of this pled ~ e, contained int e note
of ~ay 8th, rejecting, however, the condition attached to it.
After mentioning that the Imperial government did not r 1
to the note of ay 8th, and quoting its decl r tin of Jan
1. Addams, J., Peace
1922), 64.
din Time of ~ r, (N
2. Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 405.
3. The New York Times, February , 1 17.
,
31, 1917, the President informed Congress that all iplom tic
relations between the United St tes and Germany were severed
and that Ambassador von Bern torff would be given his pass
ports. In closing his address, President Vilson said:
We do not desire any hostile conflict with
the Imperial German Government. e are the sin
cere friends of the Germen people and earnestly
desire to remain at peace with the Government
which speaks for them. We shall not believe that
they are hostile to us unless and until we are ob
liged to believe it; and we purpose nothing more
than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights
of our eople. le wish to serve no selfish ends.
We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and
in action to the immemorial principles of our peo
ple which I sought to express in my address to the
Senate only two weeks ago - seek merely to vindi
cate our right to liberty and justice and an un
molested life. These are the bases of peace, not
war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend
them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of
the Government of Germe.ny.l
In thus severing diplom tic relat ions, the President
did not contemplate war, although he realized that war was a
possibility. He apparently took tis step in order to show
Germany that the United States had not changed its policy and
was ready to back it up by force if force were neces ary. He
hoped, however, that Germany would yield without war with the
United States, if not for t he sake of humanity, at least for
the sake of the friendship which she had repeatedly declared
2
in notes to the United States.
Germany did not renounce the employment of her ruthless
1. United St tes Dep rtment of State, _o~p_._c_i_t., 1917,
Sup lement, 111-112.
2. Scott, J.B., A Survey of International
tween the United States and German Au ust 1
Relations be-
1914 - A ril
100.
•
submarine weapon. American ships continued to be sunk. For
a moment it seemed th t the overt act had b en committed when,
on February 3rd, the American ship Housatonic was sunk off the
Scilly Islands. When, however, the facts were known, it ap
peared that the ship was carrying food to Germ ny's enemies,
was stop ed and searched, and that t e crew was placed in
1
safety.
As time went on, the list of vessels destroyed grew longer
and longer. By February 6th forty-five had been torpedoed.
2
Among those destroyed were two which caused some excitement
in the country, for it seemed quite likely th t they might be
the cause of war. February 5th the British steamship Eavestone
was sunk by gunfire from a German submarine, which fired on
the crew in the life boats, killing the captain and three sea
men. One of the seamen was a negro from Baltimore. This act,
in the opinion of the Secretary of State, was not an overt
act because the Eavestone was an auxiliary to the British fleet,
'
and the American's presence on board made him a member of
3
Great Britain's armed forces. The second case was that of
the liner California, torpedoed wit out warning off t e coast
1. United St tes Department of State, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 115. See also The New York Time~, February 4, 1917.
2. Fess , S.D., The Problems of Neutrality when the orld
Is at War , (Washington, 1917), 169. Up to April 3rd, a total
of 686 neutral vessels had been destroyed and 79 others which
were attacked escaped . Of those sunk, 410 were Norweigian ,
111 Swedish, 61 Dutch, 50 Greek, 33 Spanish, 19 American, 1
Peruvian, and 1 Argentine.
3. United States Dep rtment of St te, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 144-145.
of Ireland.
and children.
Forty-one persons were drowned, includin women
1
The one American aboard was reported saved.
The situation was very grave, but because no American lives
were lost, the United St tes could only await further devel
o ments.
On February 10th an attempt was made by the Swiss minis
ter at W ashin ton to bring about a resmnpt1on of ne otiations
between the Unite States and Germany. In answer to his sug
gestion, the German government stated that it would be willing
to negotiate with the Unit d States on any po nt ex ept s
rds the blockade against England. On the 12th the govern
ment of the United States replied that it would discuss any
question with Germany if she would withdraw her proclamation
of January 31st. The United States, however, would not dis
cuss with Germany the policy of her submarine warfare against
neutrals unless and until t e German overmnent renewed its
assurances of May 4th.
2
'
Because of t he activity oft e German subm rines, Ameri-
can shipowners were unwilling to send their vessels to sea,
and American commerce was tied up in home ports under a prac-
3
tical blockade made by the decree of t he German government.
Under these circumstances, the President again addressed
Congress on Febru ry 26, 1917. After calling attention to
the situation as he understood it, he stated:
1. United St te Departm nt of State, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 122-123.
2. Ibid., 125, 129.
3. Latane', J. H., op. cit., 592.
102.
Since it has unha ily p oved im os ible to
safeguard our neutral ri hts by diplom ic means
against the unwarranted infringements they are
su.ff ering t t e hands of Germany, t e may be
no recour e but to armed neutrality, wh ch we
shall know how to maintain and for wh ch there
is abundant Ame ican precedent.
103.
President ilson then closed with an ex ression of hope that
force would not be necessary. The Am rican peo le did not
desire it, and t h e President w s sure that "they will under
stand the spirit in which I am now acting, the pur ose I hold
nearest my heart and would wish to exhibit in everything I do."
1
The House of Re resentatives, on March 1st, voted over
whelmingly for the resolution giving t h e Pre ident the neces
sary authority to arm American merchantmen, in order th t they
2
might protect themselves when passin through t e danger zone.
In the Senate, a small group of eleven senators, headed by
R. M. La Follette and w. J. Stone, had been filibustering for
several days to prevent the passage of revenue and appropria
tion bills, in order to force the President to call a special
session of the new Congress. They now extended their filibus
ter to the armed ship bill, and prevented ·a vote before the
session ended on March 4th. President W ilson's anger at the
group knew no bounds. His confidence, ho~ever, w s somewhat
restored when seventy-five of the ninety-six members of the
Senate signed a protest, saying that they f vored the passage
1. United States, Congressional Record, 64 Cong., 2 Sess.,
(1917), Vol. LIV, Pt. 5, pp. 4273.
2. The resolution introduced into t e House authorized
the President to supply arms and emmunition and t e means of
usin them to American armed and registered mere ant ships and
to appropriate for the purpose 100,000,000, to be raised by
an issue of 3% bonds. Vide Ibid, pp. 4690, 4692.
104.
of the bill.
1
Acting under e dvice o Colonel E. M . House ,
~. G. McAdoo, J.P. Tumulty and others, the President issued
a statement ot t press in wh ch he denounced the filibusters
as
11
a little group of wilful men , represent n no opinion but
their own", who had "rendered the great Government of the United
States helpless and contemptible."
2
The fai ure oft Sen te to act on this resolution made
it necessary to call an extra session of Congress, which con
vened on April 2nd. The Senate had already assembled in extra
session on March 5th, and under the pressure of public opinion .
had revised its rules, placing limits on debate and making it
impossible for a small group to delay action.
3
Since Congress
had not given 1m t ~e power he desired, President W ilson, in
view of the attitude of a majority of the senators, took mat
ters into his own hands. On the 12th of March Secretary Lan
sing informed all members of t e Diplomatic Corp that because
of Germany's announcement of January 31st, the government of
the United States woul d place armed guards upo all American
merchant ships passing through the barred areas.
4
The Secre-
1. United States, Congressional ecord, 64 Cong., 2 Sess.,
(1917), Vol. LIV, Pt. 5, PP• 4988. According to Franklin K.
Lane, it is unfair to blame the filibuster on the La Follette
group. They only did what the whole Republican machine wanted
done. The Penrose-Lodge people would not allow any bills to
pass either, and were glad to get La Follette's help. Vide
Grattan, C.H., op. cit., 402.
2. Seymour, c., ed., op~ cit., II, 458.
3. Ey a two-thirds vote of the senators present a measure
may be brought to a vote. After that, each senator may debate
the measure only one hour. The question of its passage must
then follow, and no dilatory motions or debate shall be in or
der. Vide United St tes, Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1
Sess., (1917), Vol. LV, Pt. 1, pp. 19, 45.
4. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 458.
tary of the Navy then a ked all newspapers end news a encies
not to publish the s ilings of American ships from home or
foreign ports, and to give no information concernin the arm-
1
ing of ships.
105.
Vvbile the country w s w tchin the roceed ngs of Congress,
Germany was not dle. On the v ry day following the President's
address to Congress, in which he declared that the overt act
had not yet occurred, a sub.marine sank the Cunard liner Laconia
without warning. Twelve ersons perished, of whom two, both
2
women,were American citizens. Two weeks later, on March 12th,
the American steamer Algonquin, carrying foodstuffs from New
York to London, was tor edoed without warning . The crew man
aged to escape, and aft r spending twenty-seven hours in the
open boats, arrived safely at t e Scilly Islands.
3
A week
later, on Monday, March 19th, word w s received that within
twenty-four hours, three American ships, the City of ~emphis,
the Illinois, end the yigilancia ha been sunk by subm rines.
Two of the boats were bound forte Unite States in ballast,
and all three were American owned, built and manned. In the
4
case of the Vigilancia, fifteen members of the crew were lost.
Germany evidently wa bound to de troy every vessel, no matter
what 1 t character·. President Wilson was finally forced to
the conclusion that the a in of merchants ips would not be
1. The New York Times, arch 18, 1917.
2. United State Dep rtment of st te, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 151, 159.
3. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 458.
4. United States Department of St te, op. cit., 1917,
Supplement, 180-184.
sufficient in dealing with the ubmarine terror.
For a week more, the President kept his own counsel.
On March 27th he had an int rview with Colonel House , who ad
vised him of the manner in which to speak before Congres when
it convened on April 2nd. On that day, the two men went over
his speech to Congress call1n for w r. "It is needles to
say," wrote House in his di ry, "th t no address he has yet
made plea es me more than this one." T t afternoon Colonel
House and President ilson w ted at the White House, killing
time until the Pre ident shou d be called before Congress.
In the late afternoon, word was received that Congress would
be ready to receive the President t eight o'clock. Wilson
1
was visibly nervous when he ha dinner at six-t irty.
The President's war mess ge wa delivered on Monday eve
ning, April 2nd, in a very dramatic setting. He was escorted
to the Capitol by a body of cavalry to protect him from any
outbursts by the pacifists, who had rouped themselves around
the a proaches to the Capitol. As the President entered the
Hall of the House or Repre ent tives, he was given an ovation.
2
The Hall w s crowded. Th Senators had marcied into the
build ng in a body, e c one we r·ng a rd, wh te and blue
handkerchief, a present fro
3
Sen tor McLean of Connecticut.
he member of e Supr me Court were int eir places on either
side of the Chief Ju tice. Every diplom tin ~ shington, allie
1. Seymour, c., ed., op. cit., II, 467-4?0.
2. Houston, D.F., op. cit., I, 253-254.
3. L wrence, D., op. cit., 207.
and neutral, attended. All th C bin t m mbers wee pr ent.
The galleries wer p eked. Ther w s n air of ex ectancy
and terseness.
President ilson's nervousn s was now very a parent.
His face w s p le. His fingers trembled as he turned t e
pages of his manuscript. His voice w s neither strong nor
clear. He began red ng as soon s the noise quieted down.
11
There is one choice we cannot mak , we re incapable of
making:" he told his audience, "We will not choose the path
of submission." Chef Justi e White was immediately on his
feet, leading t e entire assembly in plause . As he led
the applause, White's
11
face v, a study . It worked almost
convulsively and great tars began to roll down his cheeks.
From that moment to the end he was vigorously ap lauding
everything." Anot er very interesting figure in the audience
was John Sharp Williams. "He sat, huddled up, listening at
tentively and approvingly, ·with one h d to bis er, removing
it frequently for an instant, just long enough to give a single
clap, for fear of missing something. nl Senator La Follette
nthrew back his head nov, an t hen with a sneering laugh. "
2
President V ilson urged t ~ at Congress declare that a state
or war existed between the United States and Germany, that
it do all in its power to bring the German goverrunent to terms
an. d end the war, and that it imme iately take steps to put the
country in a state of defense .
3
1. Houston, D.F., op. cit., I, 253-255.
2. Lawrence, D., op. cit., 208.
3. Fess, S.D., op. cit., 417.
107.
On April 6th, after discussing for several days the form
that the resolution should take, Congress formally declared
that a state of war existed between the United States and Ger~
1
many.
1. Fess, s.D., op. cit., 423.
108.
Chapter VII
Smmnary
In the preceding chapters, the steps int e submarine
controversy, which probably ore than any ing else led the
United States into the European ~ar, have been pointed out.
When the dispute first started, President Wilson, seconded
by Secretary of State William J. Bryan, did everything in his
power to bring it to a speedy end. The neutrality of the
United States was immediately proclaime . Plans looking toward
peace were then set on foot. The only results of these numer
ous attempts at peace were lengthy notes from the belligerent
powers, containing powerful denunciations oft eir enemies
and expressions of gratitude for the President's kind offers,
but definite refusals to consider peace.
The United States government then turned its attention
toward the safeguarding of its neutral rights on the high seas.
Looking over the existing rules of interna~ional law, it hit
upon the Declaration of London as the most favorable code of
naval warfare. Would the belligerents, however, agree to it?
The answer was soon ap arent. The Central Powers agreed, but
Great Britain announced that she would modify and add to it.
The changes she proposed were an extension of the contraband
lists and the use of the doctrine of continuous voyage. More-
\./
over, a "cordon blockade" of Bermany was announced by the
Allies. It was their avowed purpose to starve Germany into
submission.
109.
In retaliation, Germany in February, 1915 announced to
the world that the British Isles would thenceforward be in
cluded ir.1 a war zone. It was the intention of Germany to sink
by torpedoes from submarines every enemy merchant shi encoun
tered within this war zone. This proclamation and t e subse
quent attacks of the German submarines raised important ques tions of international law and humanity, especially when the
ships were sunk without warning. The United States, finding
that tl1e lives of her citizens were endangered, protested
against Germany's policy in a series of impressive diplomatic
notes. Before long, however, several incidents occurred which
brought relations between Germany and the United States to a
crisis. In the spring of 1915, several British ships, carry
ing American passen ers, were sunk, involving the loss of
several American lives. The climax was reached in the sinking
or the Lusitania.
Over this incident a long diplomatic contest was waged.
In the controversy, the right to sink enemy merchant ships
without warning was based by the Gern1an government on two
grounds: (1) the right of retaliation; (2) the right of a bel
ligerent to intercept the military supplies of an enemy. The
fact that this last act should be carried on by visit and
110.
search was apparently ignored. The position taken by the United
States was thet the introduction of a new weapon did not auto
matically change the rules of international law. Moreover,
it did not take away the right of neutral citizens to travel
on the high seas. Germany w warned that disregard of those
ri ts would b con idered "deliberately unfriendly."
For a while Germany heeded this warning. In August, 1915,
however, more American lives were lost through the sinking of
the Ar bic, and Germany was forced to promise that liners would
not be sunk without warning and without savin the lives of
non-combatants.
When it became known that England intended to rm her
merchantmen, Germany announced in February, 1916 that she would
treat such vessels as ships of w r, sinkin t em without warn
ing. Unarmed and neutral vessels would still operate under
her pledge of the preceding year.
Before long, though, an unarmed pa~sen er steamer, the
Sussex, was sunk in the English Channel. Germany at first de
nied responsibility for the act. Such an attitude enraged the
.American government, and notice was given that unless the sub
marine campaign were completely abandoned, diplomatic relations
would be severed. Germany's reply was the Sussex pledge, which
meant the abandonment of her submarine olicy.
111.
In the lull which followed this assurance, President Wilson
again worked in the interest of peace. This time, too, he was
unsuccessful. The German reply was indefinite, and the peace
terms oft e Allies were such that an agreement between the
belligerents was impossible.
Meanwhile, a stru le, which had gone on since the out
break of the war, between the German civil government and the
Admiralty, reached a crisis. The former, opposed to the sub
marine campaign because of the attitude of the nite t tes,
had been successful so fr in curbing its use. In December,
1916, however, the naval authorities, bee use of the failure
of the peace move, became more powerful, and it was decided
to put their policy into operation. Accordingly, on January
31, 1917 Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted
submarine warfare.
The answer of the United States was the severance of dip
lomatic relations an the arming of merchant ships. Of course,
American ships were sunk, and seeing no other possible course
of action, President Wilson, on April 2, 1917, urged that Con
gress declare war against Germany. The necessary resolutions
ere passed, and on April 6th war was formally declared.
Thus it was proved once ag in that the United States
could no longer adhere to her strict policy of isolation. In
t e of peace, trade and commerce made neces ry contact with
the rest of the world. A war in Europe could not change this
condition entirely. In carrying on its trans-oceanic business,
however, the United States became involved int e w , and the
Atlantic Ocean became t h e hi hway which made that , war at first
a probability in the United States, and then finally, a reality.
,
112..
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Material
Books
Adams, Jane, Peace and Bre d in Ti1ne of ar
The MacMillan Co., Ne Yo k, 1922.
Bernstorff, Johann von, My Three Ye sin
Charles Scribn r 's Sons, New York , 1920.
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theodo e von, Reflections on
Thornton Butte worth, London, 1920 .
Bryan, William Jennings and ary Baird, The Memoirs of
Jennings Bryan
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Asset Metadata

Creator Ostrom, Vivien Grace (author)

Core Title The history of the submarine controversy between the United States and Germany, 1914 to 1917

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program History

Degree Conferral Date 1933-06

Publication Date 06/01/1933

Defense Date 05/02/1933

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Digitized in 2022 (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC112719607

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Legacy Identifier etd-OstromVivien-1933

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Format theses (aat)

Rights Ostrom, Vivien Grace

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