University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Policy and the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia

(USC Thesis Other)

Policy and the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

i

POLICY AND THE ACCULTURATION OF THE ETHNIC CHINESE IN MALAYSIA

by

Chelsea Leigh Mason

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)

August 2009

Copyright 2009 Chelsea Leigh Mason

ii

Table of Contents

List of Figures iii

Abstract iv

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: The Colonial Period 23

Chapter 3: Toward an Independent State 33

Chapter 4: The Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia Today 44

Chapter 5: Conclusion 52

Bibliography 55

iii

List of Figures

Figure 1: The Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia 1

Figure 2: Chinese Populations as Percentage of Total Population 2

Figure 3: The Changing Demographics of the Ethnic Chinese 48

Figure 4: The Changing Demographics of the Ethnic Chinese 48

iv
Abstract

Throughout Malaysian history, governmental policy toward the ethnic Chinese
has had a profound effect on the acculturation of this group. Equally important are the
cultural attitudes that have produced and perpetuated these policies. Because of these
attitudes and policies, tension has developed both between and within the ethnic Chinese
and Malay groups regarding the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese. The Malays, wanting
to assert political dominance over the ethnic Chinese, encouraged the separation of the
ethnic Chinese by marginalizing them socially and economically. The ethnic Chinese
have had to struggle to maintain their right to membership in Malaysian society, trying to
simultaneously preserve their culture while asserting a degree of acculturation into Malay
society. Today, while ethnic tensions have softened between the two groups, relations are
still somewhat strained.

1

Chapter 1:
Introduction
Southeast Asia has a long history of Chinese immigration, and consequently is
home to 80% of ethnic Chinese outside of China, about 19 to 22 million people (though
some estimates are as high as 33 million). While statistics today are at times outdated and
unreliable for several countries, it is clear that the largest communities are in Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia, accounting for three-quarters of all ethnic Chinese living in
Southeast Asia. However, when seen as a percentage of the total population these
communities are not particularly large. Singapore
1
and Malaysia are the countries with
the most dominant populations.
Figure 1: Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia
Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia
6,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
2,100,000
1,000,000
600,000
450,000
350,000
46,000
5,000
Thailand
Indonesia
Malaysia
Singapore
Philippines
Vietnam
Burma
Cambodia
Brunei
Laos

source: Mackie, Jamie (2003). Thinking about the Chinese Overseas, American Asian Review, 21(4), 8.

1
Singapore is a unique case in that it is the only country with a majority Chinese population, having
separated from Malaysia for that very reason as will be discussed below. However, Singaporean identity is
heavily multicultural and influenced by British colonialism, and most ethnic Chinese in Singapore speak
English. See Kwok Kian Woon (1999), Singapore. In Pan, Lynn (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Chinese
Overseas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

2

Figure 2: Chinese Populations as Percentage of Total Population
Chinese Populations as Percentage of Total
Population*
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Indonesia
Philippines
Vietnam
Thailand
Burma
Malaysia
Cambodia
Laos
Singapore
Brunei
Percentage

Source: Mackie, Jamie (2003). Thinking about the Chinese Overseas, American Asian Review, 21(4), 8.
*Total population values are from 1995, because estimates of the ethnic Chinese population range from the early- to
mid-1990s, the most recent reliable estimates available.
2

Today, Malaysia
3
is home to the second-largest ethnic Chinese population in
Southeast Asia, about 30% of the total population. This group is strikingly diverse:
almost half live in rural areas, and are scattered throughout the archipelago.
4
There are
several different ethnic Chinese communities in Malaysia today, differentiated both by
location and ancestral heritage. Migration to Malaya occurred mainly before the end of
World War II. As early as 1400, Hokkien traders came to Malacca, and intermarried with
local women. The children of these unions formed a new ethnic group, the Baba

2
For more on the difficulty of determining ethnic populations in Southeast Asian countries, see Wang
Gungwu (1974). “The Chinese Minority in Southeast Asia.” In Anthony Reid, ed., Community and Nation:
Essays of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books.
3
Called “Malaya” before1963, when the present-day Malaysia was formed. I will adhere to this
terminology.
4
Lee Kam Hing (1997). Malaysian Chinese. In L. Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 75.

3

(sometimes called Straits Chinese or Peranakan, though the latter term can also be
applied to other relatively acculturated Chinese), which survives today in localized
communities in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. This group integrated several aspects
of Malay life and culture into their own, including language, clothing and cuisine.
5
Other
ethnic communities formed once women were allowed to migrate and raise families in
Malaya, resulting in generations of ethnic Chinese without intermarriage.
Today, the term “Peranakan” can more broadly refer to those ethnic Chinese who
have acculturated to the dominant Malay culture, though still retain some Chinese
cultural traits. They speak Malay, even among themselves, and primarily reside in
Peninsular Malaysia. In the northern region of the peninsula, this group may speak Thai
as well, having acculturated to the Thai culture immediately north.
6

In contrast, some ethnic Chinese identify as “pure” Chinese, or relatively less
acculturated. While no specific term for this group is used in Malaysia (they are often
described as not Peranakan), in Indonesia this group is referred to by the Malay word for
“pure”: “totok.” While they may speak Malay, they will rarely do so among themselves.
This group varies more widely than the Peranakan; “pure” Chinese reside all over
Malaysia, and have acculturated at varying rates depending on community size,
intermarriage, and interaction with the indigenous peoples.
7

However, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the Peranakan Chinese in
Malaysia, who historically and currently reside largely in urban areas, and thus were most

5
Tan Chee Beng (2004). Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 69-74.
6
Tan, Chee-Beng (2000). Social-Cultural Diversities and Identities. In Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee-Beng
(Eds.) The Chinese In Malaysia. New York: Oxford University Press, 48.
7
Tan, Chee-Beng (2000), 54.

4

involved in and most affected by political developments. For the sake of simplicity, I will
refer to this group as “the ethnic Chinese” but remain mindful of the variation inherent in
this group.
In Malaysia, several factors have affected acculturation and assimilation, as I will
detail in the following chapters. Initially, the assimilation rate was relatively high as
small numbers of Chinese adjusted to their new surroundings and, without women
immigrants, intermarried with local populations. With the arrival of British colonialism
and a large influx of Chinese immigrants of both sexes, the Chinese found themselves
members of a large and privileged community, and therefore assimilation dropped
drastically. This resulted in animosity between the ethnic Chinese and local Malays, and
with the withdrawal of the colonists, the ethnic Chinese found themselves fighting for
social and political power against a majority that sought to right the wrongs done to them
in the colonial period. But in the following years, as the ethnic Chinese worked with the
Malays and other minority groups to integrate into the mainstream through citizenship
and other negotiations while working to preserve many facets of their heritage, tensions
eased and assimilation rose once again. Therefore, this paper will show that these factors
contributed to policies that either helped or hindered the assimilation of the ethnic
Chinese into mainstream Malaysian culture.

“Ethnic Chinese”
Before beginning the main discussion, a brief discussion of terminology is
required. The debate over the terms used to refer to those of Chinese descent living
outside China was most intense in the 1990s, but continues today. While the use of the

5

term “diaspora” has been debated in many different disciplinary circles for a variety of
different communities, the problem has a unique twist in reference to the Chinese. A
variety of Chinese words and their translations coupled with historical events and
attitudes have resulted in an intense debate within Chinese studies that has yet to find a
total resolution. This debate is especially significant to ethnic Chinese identity, for
historically terminology and classification have been significant means of expressing and
ascribing identity. Curiously, this debate rarely takes into account that the term “Chinese”
itself can include a multiplicity of ethnic groups, some of which do not consider
themselves Chinese. Yet in the context of migration, these groups are often viewed as one
by the host cultures, and therefore the “Chinese” often must function as a single group the
thrive in their new home. However, because the debate does not discuss this problem, the
following overview will by extension omit it as well.
While there are several terms that have made their way into the debate, the two
most important ones are “diaspora” and “Chinese overseas.” Wang Gungwu is one of the
most widely-cited scholars in this debate. Wang and others who espouse the use of
“Chinese overseas” are largely reacting against the use of the term “Overseas Chinese,”
(huaqiao), for its literal translation of “sojourn” from the Chinese incorrectly implies that
this group feels nostalgia for and intends to return to China.
8
“Overseas Chinese” is rarely
if ever used today, except in historical reference to those who actually considered
themselves temporary.
9
For example, during the colonial period in Malaysia, the majority
of ethnic Chinese considered themselves in this category, for they felt stronger ties to

8
Wang Gungwu (1993). Greater China and the Chinese Overseas. The China Quarterly, Special Issue:
Greater China (136), 926-948.
9
Bolt, Paul J. (2000). China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary
Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

6

China than Malaysia. However, many reject the term “Chinese overseas” as applied to
the ethnic Chinese outside of China today because it creates the impression that these
groups are not true members of the countries in which they reside, even if they are born
and raised in those countries. While many still use this term, it has become somewhat
outdated.
Several scholars are in favor of the use of “diaspora” in referring to those of
Chinese descent living outside of China. While this term has been heavily discussed and
utilized outside of Chinese studies, within Chinese studies the term is used with caution
and much qualification. Arguments in favor of the term tend to claim that the definition
of diaspora has evolved and that the model is particularly useful for examining
transnationalism among those of Chinese descent abroad, while those opposed cite the
historical use of “diaspora” to show that connotations of oppression and strong ties to the
homeland still exist when the term is applied. In addition, many argue that the term
implies homogeneity. Adam McKeown in particular seeks to re-conceptualize the term to
apply it to this group, noting that the term “diaspora” is used with an emphasis on
diversity and transnational links rather than the previous conception of diaspora-as-exile,
but notes that the historical context must be retained, and that the idea of “diaspora” is
sure to develop further.
10

Still other scholars strive to find more neutral terms, and this is a growing trend
today. The term “ethnic Chinese,” among others, is preferred in this group. Many would
rather contextualize the term as much as possible to highlight the multiplicity of Chinese
populations outside of China as well as the fact that many of these ethnic Chinese

10
McKeown, Adam (1999). Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas. The Journal of Asian Studies, 58(2), 307.

7

identify more strongly as “Southeast Asian” than as “Chinese”. Preeminent Southeast
Asia scholar Leo Suryadinata has been particularly vocal on this topic, seeing self-
perception and identity paramount in properly identifying Chinese in Southeast Asia as
well as attitudes of the host country, and often uses the term “ethnic Chinese.”
11
Tan
Chee Beng also resists the above terms: “We fear being perceived as scattered
communities without a sense of belonging, whatever the good intentions of the term’s
users.” He concludes that “ethnic Chinese is the most acceptable option because it has
been used in relation to other ethnic groups within the country of residence, and therefore
has a distinctly local meaning.
12

Noting the great diversity of those of Chinese descent outside China, I seek to
follow Suryadinata and Tan’s lead by using the term “ethnic Chinese,” and with as much
contextualization as possible. In some cases, these groups have their own name, such as
the Baba of Malaysia, though for the most part these groups are small and not active in
the political arena and therefore are not immediately relevant to the discussion at hand,
though they will be referred to by appropriate terminology when used. However, the
work on diaspora in recent years has yielded some very useful theoretical insights, which
I will address below, and has been widely applied to a variety of groups. Therefore, while
I acknowledge the value of the term, I find that in this case “ethnic Chinese” to be the
most appropriate terminology.

11
Suryadinata, Leo (1997). Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or
Southeast Asians? In L. Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
12
Tan Chee Beng (1997). Comments by Tan Chee Beng on “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas
Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” In L. Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast
Asians. New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 28.

8

It is important to note that all of these groups, even when broken down within a
country, can vary widely and that some degree of generalization is necessary, but efforts
will be made to avoid this when possible. However, this paper is focused on the urban
ethnic Chinese. Therefore, in the pages following, the term “ethnic Chinese” with
reference to those in Malaysia will refer to the urban ethnic Chinese, while it is noted that
in fact the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are an immensely diverse group.

The Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia
The regional history of these populations is useful in contextualizing the later
political and social situation of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. Factors varying from
economic niches to stereotypes were strongly shaped by history, and these played a large
role in how the ethnic Chinese were treated politically in a colonial and post-colonial
world.
Most of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia can trace their heritage back to
southeastern China. In the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries, when millions of Chinese laborers
arrived in Southeast Asia, the majority of these immigrants originated from the provinces
of Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, and Guanxi. Many of these migrants were from
Chinese sub-ethnic groups, the most represented being Hokkien (Fujianese), Cantonese
and Hakka, which are also the predominant sub-ethnic groups in the Malaysian Chinese
community today.
13

13
Armstrong, M. Jocelyn, R. Warwick Anderson and Kent Mulliner, eds. (2001). Chinese Populations in
Contemporary Southeast Asian Societies: Identities, Interdependence and International Influence. Surrey,
Great Britian: Curzon Press, 3.

9

While the demographics for each country vary (and indeed, within the countries
themselves), a few general points can be made regarding the ethnic Chinese in Southeast
Asia. Most are middle class, relatively well-educated and constitute a notable proportion
of the professional elite.
14
The opportunities afforded the ethnic Chinese in this region,
specifically in business, have led to a stereotype of the Chinese work ethic:
The Chinese, middlemen minority par excellence, are the leaven and lubricant of
Southeast Asian trade, and from there around the world. They cherish a work
ethic that would make a Weberian Calvinist envious, and they somehow pass it on
through richer and poorer from one generation to the next.
15

It is important to note that many scholars have emphasized the need to do away with such
stereotypes that imply certain innate racial/ethnic characteristics, a position I also espouse.
Yet stereotypes are important to the discussion at hand not because of the “truths” they
hold, but because of the ideas they perpetuate which in turn shape ethnic relations and
ethnic politics within many of these Southeast Asian countries. Because many indigenous
populations have historically resented the economic success of the Chinese, this
stereotype has been used as an argument for privileging indigenous groups over the
ethnic Chinese, as we will see in the case of Malaysia.
The stereotype of the ethnic Chinese has also been shaped by Chinese
governmental policies. Despite the fact that Chinese emigration existed as far back as the
tenth century, little is said about them in official records. Because imperial law
essentially stated that without an approved reason for leaving China the emigrant was
considered a criminal, these emigrants were largely seen by the Chinese side as outlaws

14
Armstrong et al. (2001), 5.
15
Landes, D.S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. New York: Norton, 477.

10

and because of cultural differences were seen as temporary in the countries in which they
resided. Yet they were still considered Chinese citizens, a policy that continued until
1955 when the Chinese government gave them the option of becoming citizens of their
country of residence (contingent upon the second country’s agreeing to grant citizenship),
a policy intended to effectively release the ethnic Chinese outside of China from Chinese
governmental protection.
16
Because the Chinese were until this point seen as foreign
nationals, they were not accepted by indigenous ethnic groups as members of that country
in any way. After the policy was announced, many ethnic Chinese were essentially
stateless until new citizenship policies were negotiated in their country of residence,
which in some cases took years and required political negotiation to accomplish.

The History of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia
Though there is no agreed-upon periodization for Chinese activity in the region,
several have posited timelines.
17
J. Norman Parmer describes these periodizations as “the
historian’s way of attempting to organize and find meaning in his or her material in order
to make a subject understood,”
18
and with this in mind has divided the history of the
Chinese in Southeast Asia into five periods. Because these divisions mesh well with the
periodization I apply to Malaysia later in this paper, Parmer’s assessment of Southeast
Asia is a useful approach to contextualizing Malaysia within a broader Southeast Asian

16
Skinner, G William (1959). Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 321, 146.
17
Wang Gungwu’s collection of lectures The Chinese Overseas: from Earthbound China to the Quest for
Autonomy (2000) is a useful historical overview, emphasizing pre-colonial migration.
18
Parmer, J. Norman (2001). Historical Perspectives in Chinese in Southeast Asia. In Armstrong, M.
Jocelyn, R. Warwick Anderson and Kent Mulliner, eds. Chinese Populations in Contemporary Southeast
Asian Societies: Identities, Interdependence and International Influence. Surrey, Great Britian: Curzon
Press, 18.

11

immigration history. While the early years are characterized by few temporary settlers
guided by the Chinese imperial agenda, later periods show greater numbers of
independent settlers seeking new opportunities.
Parmer relies on the primary activities of the Chinese and their scope to define his
five periods. His first is the longest, without a start date and ending at 1500 C.E. During
this time, Chinese activity in the region was largely organized by the state for political or
economic purposes. China claimed suzerainty over Southeast Asia (and theoretically
worldwide) under the principle of Universal Kingship, which was justified on the
grounds of a morally and culturally superior China. Southeast Asian rulers gained
political legitimacy in the support of the Chinese; therefore, acknowledging this Kingship
was in their best interest. Acts of recognition and tribute to China were made as early as
the 5
th
century C.E., and a tribute mission system operated even until the 20
th
century,
though it reached its height during the Tang (618-907 C.E.)
19
Yet evidence of private
merchants stretches back even further, to at least the first century B.C.E. The trading
industry necessitated that some live part-time in other countries to facilitate the seasonal
trade as early Chinese emigrants. During this time, immigrants were few and largely
temporary, as the merchants were.
In the second period, dated 1500 to 1800, Parmer notes three factors that
contributed to the Chinese experience in the region, including Chinese political change,
the expansion of Chinese trade, and a growing number of Chinese immigrants into the
region. The Manchu Qing dynasty was established in the 17
th
century, which resulted in a
large exodus of anti-Manchu Chinese from the southeastern provinces to Southeast Asia

19
Parmer (2001), 20.

12

to await an overthrow of the new dynasty. However, this did not come soon enough, and
many of these emigrants settled permanently in their new homes. At the same time,
Chinese trade in the region expanded dramatically, and several major Southeast Asian
cities enjoyed a thriving economy and welcomed the business of the Chinese merchants,
further increasing immigration into Southeast Asia. Chinese trade was further helped by
the Dutch, who made their way into Southeast Asia during the 17
th
century, pushing out
other South and Southeast Asian traders but allying themselves with the Chinese,
allowing them to continue trading in the region and establish themselves as middlemen
for the Dutch, as they did in Indonesia. Therefore, the Chinese population in these
regions grew further as opportunity increased, and gradually became embedded in the
internal management of these countries.
20

From 1800 to 1941, Chinese shipping declined but Chinese business activities
continued to thrive. This is the period that saw the greatest level of immigration into the
region by far; from 1840 to 1930, millions of Chinese laborers arrived in Southeast Asia.
This drastically changed the ethnic Chinese community in the region, which had
previously been relatively small and assimilated, and consisted mostly of businessmen
and artisans.
21
This influx was due to the European conquest of the region as well as
heavy investment. Initially, the vast majority of immigrants were men, though in 1930
women were encouraged to move to certain areas, including Malaysia. The rapidly
expanding Chinese population was allowed to self-organize, but while trade unions and
sports clubs were relatively innocuous, the secret societies proved far more problematic
as they eventually degenerated into centers of organized crime. In addition, the early

20
Parmer (2001), 22-33.
21
Parmer (2001), 35.

13

1900s were a politically volatile time in Chinese politics, and political movements often
crossed borders to form political parties in the new homeland. Both the Kuomindang and
the Communist movements were strong forces in Southeast Asia within the ethnic
Chinese communities, fueled by covert schools and newspapers.
22

The Japanese occupation and the transitional years of state-building constitute the
fourth period, 1941-1970. While the Japanese occupied Southeast Asia, life was
increasingly difficult for the Chinese. Japan saw the ethnic Chinese residents of Southeast
Asia as an extension of its enemy, China, and made them “objects of extortion,
persecution, torture and execution.”
23
With the end of World War II in 1945, the abrupt
loss of leadership left indigenous groups clamoring for power. Without the protection of
the colonial powers, which largely favored them, the Chinese found themselves at odds
with the indigenous groups resentful of the growing Chinese population in many of their
cities and the economic might they wielded before the Japanese occupation. The
establishment of a Communist government in China in 1949 furthered suspicions toward
the Chinese. These ethnic tensions colored the state-building process, especially in
questions of citizenship, education, and commerce. In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
urged ethnic Chinese to be good residents of their host country and stated that they
should be able to choose their nationality.
24
However, this left many ethnic Chinese
stateless and seeking citizenship protection in their new country of residence. In some of
these developing Southeast Asian states, particularly Indonesia, animosity toward the

22
Parmer (2001), 39.
23
Parmer (2001), 44.
24
Skinner (1959). 146.

14

Chinese was so strong it turned devastatingly violent. Yet the latter part of this period
also saw signs of reconciliation when governments consolidated and tensions eased.
Finally, during the post-1970 period ethnic groups felt their way through the new
systems they had created. Increased prosperity and increased assimilation marked the
ethnic Chinese communities in many areas of Southeast Asia. However, the economic
success widened the rich-poor gap, and in certain countries ethnic tensions flared once
again. As I will demonstrate below, this periodization is applicable to the specific case of
the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia.

Theoretical perspectives
Questions of acculturation and assimilation have long preoccupied scholars from
a variety of disciplines. While studies have largely focused on cases involving ethnic
minorities in the United States, their findings are useful for other settings as well.
“Acculturation” in anthropological literature is generally understood as cultural but not
ethnic assimilation, though outside the discipline assimilation is often used in its place.
25

Milton Gordon’s work on ethnic minorities in the United States is perhaps the
first and most comprehensive work on assimilation theory. He differentiates between
acculturation and assimilation, finding acculturation to be the first step toward
assimilation. Acculturation, for Gordon, is cultural and behavioral assimilation, wherein
linguistic and cultural traits are acquired.
26
Structural assimilation follows as minorities
enter into the institutions of the host society, followed by marital assimilation on a large

25
Tan Chee Beng (2004), 41.
26
Gordon, Milton M. (1964). Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National
Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 71.

15

scale, the development of an identity strongly tied to the local society through
identificational assimilation. The final three stages fully assimilate a minority group into
the mainstream as prejudice, discrimination and power struggles disappear. While
Gordon presents these points as a trajectory, his case studies note that some forms of
assimilation may occur while others do not. For example, he says, at the time of his study
African Americans had culturally and civically assimilated (achieving the first and last
steps), but had not achieved the remaining steps in between.
27
But his studies also
conclude that cultural assimilation, the first step, is very likely to be the first form of
assimilation that a group achieves, and often may be the only form.
Glazer and Moynihan’s 1963 work prefers to look at the development of
subcultures as opposed to Gordon’s mainstream conformity. Their study of the ethnic
communities of New York concluded that even though language and culture largely
disappear by the second generation, minority groups do not thus fade into the mainstream.
Rather, they create something new, forming distinct minority groups and communities
with their own cultural ideas and values. In addition, the “assimilating power of
American society and culture” affects these groups in different ways depending on
certain qualities of both the minority and majority culture, including prejudices and
cultural values on both sides.
28
In short, cultural adaptation is not necessarily a step
toward assimilation, but can be seen as a process by which alternate group identities are
formed.

27
Gordon (1964), 76.
28
Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan (1970). Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans,
Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 14.

16

Tan Chee Beng insists on the role of socialization in the development of ethnic
identity and group dynamics in his study of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and other
Southeast Asian countries, noting that both home and societal environments can influence
the emotional and habitual dimensions of an individual’s identity.
29
In particular, he
references Edward M. Bruner’s idea of dominant cultural majorities, in which Bruner
finds in his study of two Indonesian towns that minority groups express themselves in
different ways depending upon the demography, established local culture, and the locus
of power. In short, a minority group is more likely to assert itself in the absence of a
definitive majority as opposed to a community with several sizable minority groups and
no large, controlling majority.
30
Tan links this idea to acculturation through an emphasis
on social interaction between the dominant and minority groups, noting that in many
countries despite constituting a small minority, the Chinese often remain relatively
unacculturated, speaking little English even after years in the host country.
But G. William Skinner in his work with the ethnic Chinese of Thailand and
Indonesia notes that institutions can control acculturation by controlling paths to
socialization. Without a space in which to interact, the Chinese cannot effectively learn of
and subsequently adjust to the host culture. In Thailand, where the ethnic Chinese are
perhaps the most acculturated of all the Southeast Asian countries, there are defined legal
paths to becoming Thai, and Thai names are given to all. Therefore, the ethnic Chinese in
Thailand are not only acculturated but also assimilated; intermarriage is not strongly
opposed. However in Indonesia, Islam is a formidable barrier to intermarriage, and limits

29
Tan (2004), 108.
30
Bruner, Edward M. (1974). The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia. In Cohen, Abner, ed. Urban
Ethnicity. New York: Tavistock Publications.

17

the interactions between the ethnic Chinese and the Muslim Indonesians. Conversely, as
he notes in the case of Suharto-era assimilation policies in Indonesia, it can also be forced:
the younger ethnic Chinese Indonesians often speak the local languages and little Chinese,
though an important distinction must be made between this acculturation of language and
culture acquisition and assimilation, which includes a greater engagement with the host
culture.
31

However, some contend that assimilation is not linear, nor does it progress in a
single direction. In their work on the ethnic Chinese in Thailand, Chan Kwok Bun and
Tong Chee Kiong conclude that at the very least, assimilation leaves both the host and
immigrant groups with something new.
32
This idea of assimilation as exchange is
important when assimilation is seen as a process sought out by the minority group and
granted by the dominant group, and presents an interesting dimension of choice to a
theory that in its early development overlooked the concept in favor of a more natural,
gradual progression.
Amy L. Freedman’s work on political participation of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the United States draws on ideas of acculturation to show that political
climates can strongly affect acculturation, and vice-versa. In the case of Malaysia, she
notes, the political organization of national parties along ethnic lines has further
reinforced the separateness of the ethnic Chinese as well as other minorities in the

31
Skinner, G. William (1960). Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas: A Comparison of
Thailand and Java. Journal of the South Seas Society, 16(1,2), 94.
32
Bun Chan Kwok and Tong Chee Kiong (1993). Rethinking Assimilation and Ethnicity: The Chinese in
Thailand. International Migration Review, 27(1).

18

country, particularly Indians, and in opposition to the dominant Malays have seen their
political clout increasingly limited.
33

While it is a contentious term, recent work on diaspora can also shed light on
acculturation, especially in terms of identity and culture in the context of migration and
transnationalism. James Clifford defines a diaspora (an ethnic group living outside the
country of their heritage) in contrast to territorially-based norms and values, especially
those of the indigenous peoples, and applies this to the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia.
34

In addition, William Callahan uses this idea as the central concept behind the
“neo-nationalism” of the ethnic Chinese in Thailand in conjunction with sociological
constructivism. He argues that “diasporas thus are not just an economic resource for
home and host countries, but are a symbolic resource in the production of
cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and localism.”
35
Andre Levy and Alex Weingrod,
however, see what they call “the new diasporas” as spaces for intercultural exchange,
where the relationship (often one of opposition) is primarily considered: “diasporas
therefore challenge and may transform the exclusivity of a nation-state: their insistent
voice may ultimately move the society toward a greater acceptance and recognition of
difference.”
36

Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini have argued that the Chinese diaspora should be
understood in the context of multiple geographies. Indeed, Donald Nonini emphasizes the

33
Freedman, Amy L. (2000). Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the United States. New York: Routledge, 26.
34
Clifford, James (1994). Diasporas. Cultural Anthropology, 9(3), 302-38.
35
Callahan, William A. (2003). Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: Diasporic Chinese and Neo-
Nationalism in China and Thailand. International Organization, 57(3), 482.
36
Levy, Andre and Alex Weingrod, eds. (2005). Homelands and Diasporas: Holy Lands and Other Places.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 17.

19

effect of environmental factors: “Transnational practices of modern Chinese persons
cannot be understood separately from the cultural politics of identities inscribed on them
by such regimes in the spaces they traverse and reside in.”
37
In their conclusion to this
anthology, Ong and Nonini write that the concept of diaspora as resistant to the
“disciplinary state and capitalist exploitation” applies to the case of the ethnic Chinese
worldwide.
38
However, their conclusions seem to support an idea of Chinese
exceptionalism, wherein facets of Chinese culture are responsible for the common
experiences of Chinese abroad (primarily focused on the economic dimensions). This is
most clearly demonstrated in the second section of the book entitled “Family, Guanxi,
and Space: Discourses and Practices in the Age of Flexibility,” wherein three essays
discuss these cultural qualities as fundamental to understanding Chinese migration.
Ultimately, however, work on diaspora often suffers from a faulty assumption that
the diasporic group retains a strong connection to the host country. In Malaysia, while the
ethnic Chinese seek to preserve cultural traits in some instances, there is little connection
to China itself within the community. This stems from the fact that the vast majority of
ethnic Chinese today were born in Malaysia, as were the majority of their parents.
Therefore, the connection to “the homeland” is either weak or nonexistent. Because of
this assumption and many other ideas commonly associated with the term “diaspora,” I
find the concept still problematic for specific application to the ethnic Chinese in
Malaysia, as I have also noted above.

37
Nonini, Donald M. (1997), Shifting Identities, Positioned Imaginaries: Transnational Traversals and
Reversals by Malaysian Chinese. In Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded Empires: The
Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism. New York: Routledge, 204.
38
Ong, Aihwa and Donald M. Nonini (1997). Toward a Cultural Politics of Diaspora and Transnationalism.
In Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern
Chinese Transnationalism. New York: Routledge, 324

20

The case of Malaysia presents itself as a unique case of a relatively large minority
of ethnic Chinese within a Southeast Asian state, but we can also draw from it some
general assumptions regarding assimilation and acculturation that stem from the work of
many of the above scholars. The size of the minority in relation to the majority plays a
large part in assimilation rates; the smaller the minority, the more likely it will be
assimilated. In conjunction with this point, intermarriage is also an important factor,
strongly facilitating assimilation. These factors will be important to the experience of the
ethnic Chinese in Malaysia’s pre-colonial period. Social interaction is also important, for
when the minority is largely allowed to live autonomously, there is little incentive to
interact with the dominant culture and acculturate—an important factor during the
colonial period. Political and economic power as well as policy also has a strong bearing
on acculturation and assimilation. These factors can affect each other in that groups with
little power have less control over the policies imposed upon them. This interplay can be
seen in the years during and following the creation of a Malaysian state.

The Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia
The following three chapters consider the history of the ethnic Chinese in
Malaysia in terms of assimilation and policy. As mentioned above, I divide the following
historical examination into three periods, essentially the latter three periods of Parmer’s
analysis. Since I am primarily concerned with policy and assimilation, and since the
Chinese were not present in large numbers until the 1800s, there was little reason for
defined policy. Therefore, the following chapters will discuss the policy attitudes toward

21

the Chinese and their effect on assimilation for the colonial, transitional, and modern
periods, beginning around 1800 and continuing until today.
During the colonial period, Malaya was a place of opportunity for many Chinese.
Immigration allowed several different ethnic Chinese groups and Chinese institutions to
form and exercise influence over the colony. Chapter 2 deals with this period, showing
how British attitudes toward the ethnic Malays and Chinese laid the foundation for ethnic
stereotypes upon which Malaya and then Malaysia would be built. Because the British
saw the ethnic Malays as the ignorant but pleasant native in need of British care, their
attentions toward the Malays embedded themselves in the Malay consciousness, setting a
precedent of Malay privilege for Malays to later claim as a right. In contrast, the British
largely left the ethnic Chinese to themselves, thus leaving the ethnic Chinese to develop
their own forms of social organization and education. During the independence process,
these stereotypes led to the development of a state wherein the Malays were privileged
over the ethnic Chinese, as Chapter 3 discusses.
The Japanese occupation of Malaya began a string of events leading to Malaysian
independence, and with it, more discriminatory practices against the Chinese as opposed
to the indifference of the colonial period. In Chapter 3, I look at how these events resulted
in changing attitudes and policies toward the Chinese, and how this affected acculturation
as the ethnic Chinese fought to preserve their right to a place within Malayan/Malaysian
society. In exchange for this place in the form of citizenship, the ethnic Chinese were
forced to accept a number of concessions that placed the Malay culture and people above
the ethnic Chinese. While the ethnic Chinese sought to demonstrate their acculturation to
Malay society, the Malay policies highlighted the ethnic differences, thus forcing the

22

ethnic Chinese to remain culturally separate from the Malays and preventing further
acculturation. The importance of ethnic politics and the hot-button issue of Chinese
education highlighted the fact that ethnic divisions were very much present in Malaysia
during this time.
Chapter 4 looks at the present day. As the number of ethnic Chinese born in
Malaysia grew, acculturation also increased as more ethnic Chinese spoke Malay and
attended Malay schools. In addition, the memory of the ethnic violence of the transition
period faded, softening ethnic tensions. Yet education remains a contentious issue within
the government, and ethnic politics are alive and well. But at the same time, there has
been a shift in Malay strategy toward the ethnic Chinese; today’s political rhetoric
highlights the multiculturalism of Malaysian society. This has promoted acculturation of
the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, while at the same time allowing the ethnic Chinese to
celebrate their cultural heritage.

23

Chapter 2:
The Colonial Period

While immigration was relatively low until the 19
th
century, when the British took
control of the region in the late 1700s new economic opportunities abounded. In contrast
to other colonial powers in the region, the British allowed open, free trade, which
encouraged Chinese merchants as well as migrants to return to an area they had
abandoned in the face of Dutch monopolies. Singapore became particularly successful as
a center of commerce and immigration, and by 1827 the Chinese became the largest
ethnic group in Singapore.
39
The Opium Wars beginning in 1840 also had strong effects
on migration, as the wars not only expanded Western control of Chinese ports but also
reduced many Chinese residing in coastal areas to poverty, forcing them to emigrate
elsewhere for work.
40
The emigration boom among ethnic Chinese would continue until
the 1920s.
Many of these ethnic Chinese believed their presence outside China to be
temporary, or at least were fully Chinese in ethnic and cultural identity with hope to
return to China. Within the ethnic Chinese communities, divisions were largely made
along dialect lines; the majority of ethnic Chinese at that time had been born outside
Malaysia, and spoke the dialect of their home region (mostly within southern China).
41

New immigrants, called sinkeh (newcomers) in Malay, were mostly poor and
uneducated, and were often exploited until the establishment of the Chinese Protectorate

39
Kuhn, Philip A. (2008). Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. New York: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 100.
40
Kuhn (2008), 111.
41
Tan (2004), 93.

24

in 1877 and the enactment of the Immigrant’s Ordinance in 1880. Victor Purcell notes
that many of the difficulties the British faced in governing the Chinese “arose from the
fact that the governing officials had little knowledge of the usages of the people whom
they had to control.” Indeed, until the establishment of these laws, there was no British
official with any knowledge of the Chinese language.
42

However, in response to the horrific travel conditions the immigrants were
subjected to en route to Malaya and other areas of Southeast Asia as well as incidences of
clandestine coolie traders the first Chinese Protectorate was established in 1873. The
Protectorate was met with opposition by the Chinese community, but the office remained
in place and a second Protectorate was established in 1877 to regulate the immigration
trade and monitor the newly mandatory registration of all labor contracts with Chinese
immigrants. This new office of the British administration consisted of officials trained in
the Chinese language and culture, and was headed by W.A. Pickering, who was well-
known and liked by the Chinese community. The Protectorate worked to penalize anyone
who “by force or fraud induced any migrant to leave the colony for service elsewhere.”
43

In 1880, a Chinese Protector was appointed to Panang, the first of many throughout the
Malay peninsula.
44
This office monitored working conditions and immigration, and also
monitored the Chinese secret societies, which held an important place in Chinese
immigrant society (see below).
45
Local offices monitoring working conditions for the
Chinese workers proved successful; in Perak, where such things were monitored

42
Purcell, Victor (1965a). The Chinese in Southeast Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 253-4.
43
Chai Hon-Chan (1964). The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909. New York: Oxford University
Press, 109.
44
Purcell (1965a), 287.
45
Hooker, Virginia Matheson (2003). A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West. Australia: Allen
and Unwin, 147.

25

beginning in 1883, working conditions were substantially better than in unmonitored
areas, and workers had access to medical treatment.
46

Immigration continued until the promulgation of the Immigration Restriction
Ordinance in 1929 and the Aliens Ordinance in 1933.
47
While these laws applied to all
immigrants, the Chinese were particularly affected as the largest immigrant group by far
to Malaya. But more stringent regulations resulted in a growing illegal immigration trade
which saw mixed results as the newly created Immigration Department worked to prevent
it.
48
These laws restricted male but not female migration, leading to lower intermarriage
with the local community and a more gender-balanced ethnic Chinese community, giving
rise to a local-born second generation that maintained a distinctively Chinese culture as
opposed to the relatively assimilated Baba.
49

These favorable policies toward the Chinese during colonial times suggest a
relatively positive attitude toward the Chinese by the British, and were also described in
letters and diary entries of British officials in Malaya. While the Chinese were certainly
seen as inferiors, the British nonetheless appreciated the industriousness that contributed
to the later stereotypes of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. For example Hugh Clifford, an
administrator in Malaya during this time, stated in the Malay Mail in 1902:
…I do not hesitate to assent that both morally and intellectually they [the Chinese
coolies] are among the lowest of our human stock…neither their characters, their
methods, nor the effects which they have upon their neighbors command our
respect, and those who know the [Malay] Peninsula best will agree with me that
the presence of these people in the Malay villages is to be regarded as a subject
for mixed regret…These men (the capitalist class) have probity, shrewdness, and

46
Chai (1964), 111.
47
Heng Pek Koon. (1999). Malaysia. In Pan, Lynn (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 173.
48
Purcell (1965a), 292.
49
Tan (2004), 33.

26

many admirable commercial qualities… that, however, does not cause the Malay
in his secret heart to rate them much higher than their countrymen, though he is
acute enough to perceive that there is more to be got out of them… I fully
appreciate the advantages of their presence, and I have the greatest admiration for
many of their qualities. It must be confessed, however, that the Chinese, as we
know them in the Peninsula, do not inspire Europeans with anything approaching
to affection—the kind of feeling, I mean, which undoubtedly is very generally
(and often quite illogically) entertained for the Malays by those who have come
into intimate contact with them.
50

It is clear that while Clifford appreciates the Chinese workers in Malaya, he is far
more partial to the Malays despite the fact that the Chinese were thought to be better
workers. These ideas and stereotypes contributed to political systems that favored the
Malays while allowing the Chinese to more or less function independently within Malaya,
resulting in a group both marginalized and insular. Evidence of this independence and its
consequences during colonial times can be seen through the development of secret
societies and education of the ethnic Chinese in Malaya.
Secret societies held an important place in Chinese immigrant culture during this
period. The Triad Brotherhood, which had a strong following in southern China, quickly
made its way to Southeast Asia as Chinese immigrants flooded the region in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This organization is also known by several other
names, including Thian Ti Hui, the Hung League, and Sam Hup.
51
Since the vast majority
of these immigrants came alone, societies such as Triad formed a new social structure
which provided in many ways even stronger support than the kinship structures back
home.
52
Societies often grouped themselves by region or trade, banding together to

50
Clifford, Hugh (1902, Jan. 14). Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur.
51
Purcell, Victor (1948). The Chinese in Malaya. London: Oxford University Press, 155.
52
Blythe, Wilfred (1969). The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya. London: Oxford University
Press, 1.

27

collectively fight for or maintain economic power or control, which was often abused
once obtained, and societies eventually took control of gambling, opium and prostitution
operations.
53
While most were what Wilfred Blythe calls “welfare societies,” others grew
resentful of the British interfering with the self-governance of the Chinese people through
these societies and often clashed with the authorities.
54

Although there were many different branches of Triad and other societies, there
was no established central authority to mediate relationships between branches. If one
branch dominated an area, as did the Ghee Hin Triad in Singapore, this branch may have
had an authoritative standing within the community, but this did not guarantee allegiance
from other branches. Despite efforts of these stronger branches to mediate disputes, all
too often differences were resolved through violence.
55

At first, violence and crime were relatively light and largely regarded as a matter
for the police rather than as a larger social issue to be dealt with by the British
administration. Police work was cursory due to the fact that few policemen spoke even
one of the dialects spoken by the Chinese in his area. Communication was facilitated by
interpreters from the Chinese community, who were often either members of a society
themselves or pressured by one, thereby rendering any information gained through them
suspect.
56

But as many of these groups became increasingly resistant to British authority and
crime rates rose, the British administration decided that further measures were necessary.

53
Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911. New
York: Oxford University Press, 122.
54
Blythe (1969), 3.
55
Blythe (1969), 2.
56
Blythe (1969), 2.

28

In the Malayan Straits Settlements, the 1867 Act for the Better Preservation of the Peace
allowed the Governor in Council greater powers to disperse mobs and institute temporary
weapons bans, and the Act was seen useful in controlling the activities of these societies
and was renewed yearly until 1872, when it was made permanent. The Chinese
Protectorate, mentioned above, also allowed for more friendly relations between the
British and the Chinese as Pickering was able to use his influence in the community to
keep society leaders in line with the law.
57
His strategy was to control the societies
through influence rather than repression, a strategy that was generally followed until the
1880s.
58

Yet despite these efforts, the violence grew. In 1874, a violent war broke out
between two rival societies, forcing the British to step in and ban all societies, driving
them underground. However, membership continued to thrive, growing from over 79,000
in 1881 to over 156,000 in 1888.
59
In 1885, the Dangerous Societies Ordinance of 1882
was amended to distinguish between those ethnic Chinese born in China from those in
Malaya; this law restricted any ethnic Chinese born in China from society activity, and
was the first major legislation separating the foreign and native-born Chinese, for those
born in Malaya were subjects of the British and unable to be banished unlike those born
in China
60
. In 1889, the Legislative Council passed a Societies Ordinance that required
any society to register and empowered the Governor in Council to refuse any
organization. Triad societies and all related paraphernalia were specifically targeted.
61

57
Blythe (1969), 5.
58
Yen (1986), 115.
59
Purcell (1948), 170.
60
Purcell (1948), 171.
61
Blythe (1969), 6.

29

While these measures were successful in controlling violence, the societies continued to
operate either underground or under new names, and the role of these structures within
the Chinese community in Malaya was so fundamental that soon political organizations
would replace them and serve a similar function. I will discuss this transition further in
the following chapter.
During this period education was divided. English schools largely served the
European upper class, and Malay elementary education was intended for the rural Malays.
Primary education was free to ethnic Malays; however, education in English was
prohibitively expensive for the vast majority of non-Europeans, though technically it was
available to anyone.
Therefore, the ethnic Chinese set up their own Chinese-language schools, the first
of which is thought to have been established in 1815, but mainly operated beginning in
the 1880s.
62
Here, the Chinese language could be preserved, as well as cultural and
political ideas. These schools were funded and run by voluntary associations and local
groups, and were heavily oriented toward mainland China.
63

The early schools were organized in the same way as those in China during the
Qing dynasty, where children went to school for basic literacy in Chinese and knowledge
of classical texts learned by memorization and repetition. Because the state was involved
in education only at the level of the national examinations in China, schools were

62
Freedman, Amy L. (2001). The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas
Acculturation: the Case of Malaysia. Modern Asian Studies, 35(2), 425.
63
Tong Chee Kiong (2006). The Chinese in Contemporary Malaysia. In Lian Kwen Fee (Ed.), Race,
Ethnicity and the State in Malaysia and Singapore. Boston: Brill, 99.

30

organized locally and supported by the community.
64
Schools in Malaya took a similar
form, often organized by immigrants from the same region or of the same dialect in
China and serving only that community. Many of these schools were intended to enhance
the skills of migrants already working in a specific industry, like the Shan Wu School
established in 1909 to teach shop assistants basic literacy and bookkeeping.
65
But when
education changed drastically in China at the end of the nineteenth century and both
curricula and structures were modernized, these changes were soon found in the Chinese
immigrant communities in Southeast Asia as well. Schools were larger, in independent
buildings, and offered a much wider variety of subjects. Girls’ schools also soon
appeared. The staggering growth of these schools was due in part to the growing number
of children born in Malaya, which doubled between 1901 and 1921.
66

The British administration had little to no involvement in these schools through
the nineteenth century into the early twentieth century. While they were active in the
education of the Malays, the British felt that “it is not the proper policy for the
Government to undertake the education of the alien, temporary population in their own
languages.”
67

Few ethnic Chinese children had access to English schooling due to the cost and
the elite nature of the schools. The British administration encouraged a few children of
wealthy Malays to attend the schools to be groomed for eventual governmental service,
but other ethnicities found it far more difficult to gain entry to these schools.

64
Tan Liok Ee (1997). The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961. New York: Oxford
University Press, 10.
65
Tan Liok Ee (1997), 11.
66
Tan Liok Ee (1997), 13.
67
W.H. Treacher in his 1901 Report as Resident of Selangor, as cited in Philip Loh Fook Seng (1975),
Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya, 1874-1940. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
45.

31

Compounding the problem was the British unwillingness to establish more schools, for
they feared that a larger number of English-educated people of any ethnic group other
than their own would result in social instability. Consequently, the school system in
Malaya further encouraged a separation of ethnic groups which socialized children into
very different cultural and linguistic norms.
68

But with the May 4
th
, 1919 movement in China, when students protested the
increasingly weak Chinese government and as a result Chinese nationalism surged, the
British saw the Chinese schools in Malaya as a potential breeding ground for political
opposition. The administration quickly introduced a bill requiring all schools and teachers
to register with the administration and empowering it to close any school that did not
meet standards. The Chinese community strongly protested, fearing that the British
would arbitrarily close schools, and the British government conceded grants to eligible
Chinese schools.
69

Ideas developed during this time perpetuated the “otherness” of the ethnic
Chinese and manifested themselves within the social structure of the Chinese through
secret societies and education. While education continued to be of vast importance to the
ethnic Chinese through the decolonization process, the intent and function of the secret
societies would be replaced by the political parties formed in response to both domestic
and international politics. The policies and attitudes toward the ethnic Chinese as well as
toward other ethnic groups set the foundation for a Malayan society of pronounced ethnic
difference, wherein immigrant ethnic groups remained largely separate and

68
Tan Liok Ee (1997), 19.
69
Tan Liok Ee (1997), 20.

32

unacculturated. While during the colonial period the ethnic Chinese were encouraged to
govern themselves unless illegal activity was involved, the Malays were seen as a hapless
yet endearing group in need of British care. These stereotypes privileging the Malays and
exploiting the Chinese created severe ethnic tensions during the mid-twentieth century as
Malaya transitioned to independence, and as a result the acculturation of the ethnic
Chinese into a Malayan society was drastically hindered.

33

Chapter 3:
Toward an Independent State

The ethnic Chinese generally enjoyed autonomy during British rule, and both a
merchant and intelligentsia class rose to strong influence in the ethnic Chinese
community. Assimilation began to slow, and ethnic Chinese communities grew stronger.
However, the Chinese were still considered second-class citizens of Malaya. The
intelligentsia was largely educated at Chinese schools in Malaya, and was therefore
imbued with the nationalistic and anti-imperialistic sentiments of mainland China during
the early 1900s. At this time, the ethnic Chinese community identified much more
strongly with China than with Malaya, and the schools reinforced these ideas.
Following the politics of China at the time, which were divided along Communist
and Kuomindang lines, the ethnic Chinese generally organized within the Kuomintang
Malaya (KMTM) and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The KMTM was formed as
Sun Yat Sen sought to mobilize ethnic Chinese outside of China in his nationalist efforts
against the Manchus that came to a head in 1911. Initially, members of the Chinese
Communist Party were allowed to join the KMT in China as Sun Yat Sen reorganized the
structure of the party, and the Malayan party followed.
70
In 1927, however, the party split
in China, and the MCP formed in 1930. This party became very active in Malaya,
particularly on the issue of self-rule for Malaya.
71

70
Heng Pek Koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association.
New York: Oxford University Press, 21.
71
Heng (1999), 174.

34

But during the Japanese occupation from 1941-1945, the Chinese were treated
especially harshly by the Japanese for their support of anti-Japanese movements in China.
One Japanese operation involved ethnic Chinese being identified and executed, and
estimates of those killed are around 40,000. Others had extra taxes levied on them. Any
activities seen as anti-Japanese were dealt with harshly and usually violently.
72
As a
result, the KMTM disintegrated while the MCP actively resisted the Japanese, creating a
military wing of 7,000 that effectively engaged Japanese troops in the Malay peninsula.
This guerrilla wing of the MCP, called the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, was
trained by the British.
73

Incidentally, it was within the decolonization and independence process that the
ethnic Chinese began to encounter a growing degree of discrimination. Though they had
never been treated as full Malays, British rule had generally allowed the group relative
autonomy. However, in the development of self-rule, the ethnic Malays sought to keep
the Chinese as second-class citizens.
When the Japanese surrendered and the British returned, the MCP was initially
accommodated by the returning power, but was later neutralized through the disbanding
of the military wing and the revival of merchant leadership of other political parties. Yet
the British removal of MCP members from representative bodies sparked a civil war in
1948, which has since been termed “the Emergency.”
74
Determining that the new British
administration was no less imperialist than previous administrations, the Fourth Plenary
Meeting of the MCP in March 1948 decided that the best way to independence was

72
Hooker (2003), 184.
73
Coates, John (1992). Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954. San
Francisco: Westview Press, 10.
74
Heng (1999), 175.

35

through a revolutionary war in which the MCP would take the lead.
75
Violence soon
broke out, and grew steadily until a State of Emergency was declared by the British in
June 1948, as the largely ineffective British police force was unable to contain the
violence. This declaration gave them the authority to hold suspects without trial and to
ban political parties including the MCP, which is banned from politics to this day because
of its resistance and “terrorist activities.” The British also cracked down on the Leftist
Malayan Nationalist Party, which voluntarily dissolved itself in 1949.
76
As a result of
these tumultuous times, non-Chinese in Malaya became fearful of ethnic Chinese,
regardless of their political affiliations. The Emergency officially continued until July
1960, though the MCP’s tactics had been ineffective for some time leading up to the
official end.
The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, now Malaysian Chinese Association)
formed in early 1949. This group was actively encouraged by the British, as it was
largely composed of pro-KMTM merchant leaders and other ethnic Chinese educated
professionals. They were effective in assisting the 570,000 ethnic Chinese resettled by the
British from rural areas during the Emergency (intended to cut off the MCP from supplies
and recruits), but more importantly, they were instrumental in the independence process.
They were amenable to cooperation with the British and ethnic Malays, and its strong
ethnic Chinese support base gave the party credibility.
77

During the initial stages of decolonization upon the return of the British at the end
of WWII, it appeared that the ethnic Chinese would be granted equal political and

75
Coates (1992), 7.
76
Hooker (2003), 194.
77
Lee Kam Hing (1997), 85.

36

economic rights within the Malayan Union in formation; however, the Federation of
Malay agreement in 1948, one of the earliest steps toward independence, granted
automatic citizenship to all ethnic Malays, but for the ethnic Chinese, citizenship was
conditional and difficult to acquire.
78

The British advocated a multiethnic approach to a new, independent Malayan
government, and the MCA in conjunction with the Malayan Indian Congress and the
UMNO were able to hold the country’s first independent general election in 1955 through
a relationship now known as the Alliance.
79
However, the MCA had to make
considerable concessions to the UMNO, including official status for the Malay language
and Islam and special rights for Malays in return for jus soli citizenship laws, one of the
Association’s largest priorities given the Federation of Malaya agreement less than a
decade earlier that restricted their citizenship rights.
80
Even so, these concessions were
widely criticized by ethnic Chinese and led to the development of a short-lived
opposition group that supported equal citizenship rights for ethnic Chinese and official
recognition of Mandarin. Since then, there have been a few other ethnic Chinese
opposition parties in the Malayan and Malaysian government, including the Labour Party
and the Democratic Action Party. However, none of these parties enjoyed as much
political power as the UMNO, whose initial position has ranged from pro-
multiculturalism (espoused by the founder) to “Malaya is for the Malays and should not

78
Tong (2006).
79
Hooker (2003), 204.
80
Heng (1999), 176.

37

be governed by a mixture of races;”
81
but early on, the party decided to become the
Malay communal party, exclusively representing ethnic Malay interests.
Citizenship was a major concern for the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese
outside of China were considered Chinese citizens by the Chinese government until the
Communist takeover in 1949. Though not all ethnic Chinese subscribed to this
identification, it nonetheless shaped the way ethnic Chinese thought of themselves in
their country of residence, and how other ethnic groups in those countries considered
them. However, there was growing animosity between China and the countries of
Southeast Asia. Chinese Communist and Kuomindang parties grew in number and fervor,
and Southeast Asia cut off immigration from China to avoid further growth. The new
Chinese government denounced these areas as pro-Western. Yet in seeking international
recognition, China’s policies and rhetoric soon became driven by the need for
benevolence, and in 1954, Zhou Enlai urged ethnic Chinese to be good residents of their
host country and stated that they should be able to choose their nationality.
82

With the Chinese government renouncing its claim to ethnic Chinese outside of
China, the ethnic Chinese in Malaya found themselves stateless. However, citizenship
was conditional under the Federation (only after eight years’ residence could an ethnic
Chinese apply), and as a result, the ethnic Chinese were relegated once again to second-
class status.
83
Therefore, the stereotype of “unassimilated outsiders whose deepest
loyalties were to China rather than Malaysia” persisted.
84
This translated into increasing

81
Quote from the UMNO’s second leader Tunk Abdul Rahman, as cited in Hooker (2003), 204.
82
Skinner (1959), 146.
83
Skinner (1959), 143.
84
DeBenardi, Jean (2004). Rites of Belonging: Memory, Modernity, and Identity in a Malaysian Chinese
Community. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1.

38

Chinese nationalism among the ethnic Chinese who, marginalized by Malay culture,
sought to have their own. Yet at the same time, this nationalism could no longer hold
direct political links to China, for the government had given up its claim on ethnic
Chinese outside China. Therefore, there was an identity crisis of sorts as the ethnic
Chinese sought to find their place as part of Malaya rather than China.
Nationalism began to grow stronger among the ethnic Chinese, and there was a
strong desire to maintain the Chineseness of their ethnic identity. The Chinese schools
were one locus of this identity issue, and continued to be a major point of conflict
between the Malay-dominated government and the ethnic Chinese.
85
With independence
came the National Education Policy of 1955. Many ethnic Chinese communities and
organizations saw this as an attack on Chinese education, and by extension, the
preservation of Chinese culture since it intended to establish a national education system
and foster national unity.
86

These interests were threatened further as the Federation of Malaysia (the first use
of the contemporary name) which was proposed to include Malaya, Singapore and
Borneo, was formed in the 1960s. Singapore posed a problem in that the addition of its
heavily ethnic Chinese population would result in a marginal majority of ethnic Chinese
in the new Federation. The UMNO was strongly opposed to this dominance, and after
Singapore was admitted to the Federation in 1963, the UMNO organized pro-Malay
rallies in Singapore which led to ethnic tension and riots. In 1965, the Malaysian
Solidarity Convention brought together five opposition parties in Malaysia who
collectively argued against special privileges for ethnic Malays, further angering the

85
Tong (2006), 108.
86
Tong (2006), 108.

39

UMNO. Seeing the Convention as a Chinese construction, Singapore was expelled from
the Federation.
87
This sent a strong message to the ethnic Chinese, and from that point on
the ethnic Chinese political parties would constantly grapple with the Malay majority to
preserve their rights as a minority.
The UMNO continued to fear non-Malay political power, and particularly ethnic
Chinese power, questioning their loyalty.
88
During the May 1969 elections, two
opposition parties serving the ethnic Chinese (the Gerakan, or the Malaysian People’s
Movement) and Indian (the Democratic Action Party) communities formed to address
what they perceived to be a growing problem within the dominant parties: failing to
respond to the needs of the most underprivileged of their constituents. These parties saw
a massive response during the election, and as a result, a sizable majority of the urban
vote went to non-Malay parties. However, the MCA lost a considerable amount of
support. The following two days saw huge celebrations in the streets of Kuala Lumpur,
prompting the UMNO to organize a counter celebration the next day. What resulted was
a three-day race riot that killed 177 and injured 340, according to official statistics.
89
The
actions of the UMNO served to further highlight the boundary between the ethnic Malay
and Chinese, fostering an increasingly nationalistic ethnic Chinese identity set on
preserving their culture as they were torn from their roots.
The riots left a lasting impression on Malaysian politics. In 1974, only two
months before a national election, the National Front was created to ease ethnic tensions.
The UMNO led the Front, which included the MCA and the Gerakan representing

87
Hooker (2003), 220-5.
88
Lee (1997), 89.
89
Hooker (2003), 230-2.

40

Chinese interests. However, the UMNO found that the disenfranchisement of the poor
rural ethnic Malay contributed to the ethnic tension, and sought to fix the problem by
inflating the votes of rural Malay. This effectively boosted Malay voting power to around
70 percent.
90
Indeed, the actions of the National Front were largely on UMNO terms, and
additional measures included prohibiting any expression of racial implication that could
incite problems, thus limiting Chinese actions in working toward more equal standing in
Malaysia and challenging the special rights of the ethnic Malay. Furthermore, the New
Economic Policy was established by the UMNO-dominant government, which was
intended to maximize ethnic Malay economic opportunity, which in turn increased the
overall power of the ethnic Malay within Malaysia.
91
The situation for the ethnic Chinese
only declined further, as more policies were to come as a strong resurgence of Islam took
hold of Malaysia.
In 1970, the New Educational Policy mandated the Malay language in state
schools and universities, and restricted ethnic Chinese access to universities and
scholarship funds.
92
In response, Tunku Abdul Rahman College and Merdeka University
were established as part of an effort to assuage the growing problem the Policy produced.
Thousands of ethnic Chinese unable to gain admission to state schools graduated from
these new schools, which thrive to this day.
93
Though ethnic Chinese were now given
increased access to higher education, the separate nature of these schools only further
entrenched ethnic separation in the consciousness of the ethnic Chinese as well as the
whole of Malaysian society, thus restricting acculturation.

90
Heng (1999), 179.
91
Hooker (2003), 237.
92
Lee (1997), 90.
93
Freedman (2001), 430.

41

In 1971, the National Cultural Policy promoted a national Malaysian culture,
which was essentially based on Islam and ethnic Malay cultural elements. During this
time, the proportion of ethnic Chinese students enrolled in state universities dropped.
94

The Malay language became more pervasive in Malaysian education as part of the new
policies, and by 1980 all secondary and university-level state schools gave instruction
only in Malay, with the exception of language courses. However, Chinese primary
schools were allowed to continue to operate, and Chinese private schools also remained
open for older students.
95
As a result, the ethnic Chinese protested and once again fought
for the preservation of their schools, but this time fought to maintain their system as
independent of the national system, in contrast to the earlier struggle of the 1950s where
the ethnic Chinese were seeking a place within the system (and indeed within Malaysia
society as a whole).
96

The New Economic Policy was also adopted in 1971, which overtly attempted to
redistribute wealth from the ethnic Chinese to the Malays. Malays were given preference
in hiring, scholarships and university placements, and also called for Malays to hold
thirty percent of corporate ownership in Malaysia by 1990.
97

Chinese education was in danger again in 1987 when the Education Ministry
promoted non-Mandarin-speaking teachers in national Chinese primary schools. Sensing
that this might be the first step in fundamentally changing the Chinese schools, the ethnic
Chinese community reacted strongly. The youth wing of the UMNO responded, and the
situation briefly turned violent before the government arrested several leaders of all

94
Lee (1997), 91.
95
Tong (2006), 109.
96
Tan (1997), 291
97
Freedman (2000), 58.

42

parties. During the conflict, the ethnic Chinese community, in an interesting change of
tactics, reflected their gradual but increasing integration into Malaysian society by
arguing that Chinese culture in Malaysia was a part of the nation’s history and that it had
also absorbed Malay features.
98
This move demonstrated that while the Chinese were
making efforts to acculturate into Malay society by emphasizing similarities, the Malays
were promoting the opposite through highlighting difference. Therefore, Malay attitudes
prevented the ethnic Chinese from acculturating further into Malay society.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, stereotypes developed during the
colonial period informed policy during the transitional period in Malaysian history.
Following preconceptions of Malays in need and in danger of economic dominance by
the self-sufficient ethnic Chinese, these policies sought to privilege the Malays over the
ethnic Chinese to even the playing field. This perpetuated Malaya’s cultural ideology of
ethnic difference, which would in turn affect the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese as
well as ethnic politics in general throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first. Thus, during this period ethnic Chinese identity was drastically altered by the
independence of Malaya, the loss of Chinese citizenship, and the search for a place in a
rapidly changing society. This manifested itself in the defense of Chinese culture and in
strong tensions between the ethnic Chinese and Malay, ultimately resulting in fear,
further discrimination, and violence. Yet while the ethnic Chinese sought to preserve
their cultural practices, they also needed to demonstrate that they were part of
Malaya/Malaysia as well to secure their place within the society. At this time, the ethnic

98
Lee (1997), 94.

43

Chinese struggled to find a balance between cultural preservation and acculturation,
while the Malays sought to prevent acculturation by the ethnic Chinese through political,
educational and economic restrictions. This period shows that even though the Chinese
were willing to acculturate to some degree, the views and political policies of the ethnic
majority were enough to prevent this from occurring.

44

Chapter 4:
The Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia Today

In light of the growing institutionalization of discrimination against the ethnic
Chinese, some ethnic Chinese political leaders began suggesting a more multicultural
approach to ethnic minority rights. The MCA, noting the need for a more multicultural
approach to politics, relaxed membership requirements, and today requires that a member
have only one parent of ethnic Chinese descent.

This also points to the MCA’s
recognition that its support base was dwindling; many ethnic Chinese questioned whether
the party was truly representing ethnic Chinese interests. Party Chief Ling Liong Sik’s
campaign “One Heart, One Vision” noted the slow but steady acculturation of the ethnic
Chinese and encouraged Malaysian ethnic Chinese to be more multiculturally oriented.
99

Therefore, ethnic identity was growing less connected to a community, as demonstrated
in the declining confidence and participation in organizations such as the MCA. This also
highlighted a growing tension between preserving Chinese heritage and becoming full
members of Malaysian society, a tension that was first problematic with the
independence movement.
The Chinese reform period in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership also
was marked by new changes in policy. With freer immigration and emigration policies,
new immigrants to Southeast Asia and even more to Western countries coupled with
Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese returning to China changed the picture of Southeast

99
Heng (1999), 181.

45

Asian ethnic Chinese.
100
However, many countries continued to ban travel to China,
though restrictions relaxed in the following decade, and business investments grew.
101

China’s reform allowed freer movement between Malaysia and mainland China,
and less animosity toward China has lessened the need for a defensive, nationalistic
identity. Malaysian-Chinese relations were greatly enhanced as an initial “controlled
relationship” developed into an economic trade relationship in the 1980s. Trade ties have
only continued to be liberalized, and the two economies are strongly linked through
numerous joint ventures, partnerships and agreements.
102
This should be seen as part of
an effort known as Wawasan (“Vision”) 2020, intended to achieve developed status for
Malaysia by 2020. This was the brainchild of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s fourth
prime minister, elected in 1981. Announced in 1991, this effort was driven by both
economic and social aspirations; it intended to place Malaysia into a much stronger
global economic role while unifying Malaysian society.
103
The latter ideal was
exemplified by the “bangsa Malaysia” concept, which imagined a people who would be
united as entirely Malaysian who would in turn help create a stronger and therefore more
successful society. This was intended to highlight, not assimilate, Malaysia’s myriad
cultures and ethnic groups and lead to equal rights among all groups. The ethnic Chinese
response was largely positive, for the idea sought to preserve non-Malay cultures and
foster a new form of Malaysian nationalism premised on multicultural roots, and they
hoped that this would lead to cultural autonomy and acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as

100
Callahan (2003). 491.
101
Lee (1997), 77.
102
Lee (1997), 78.
103
Khoo Boo Teik (2003), Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents. New York: Zed
Books Ltd., 21.

46

full Malaysian citizens.
104
In addition, Mahathir made strong overtures to the ethnic
Chinese community, for example, by attending Chinese New Year celebrations.
105

Yet while the Wawasan ideology permeated Malaysian society, the ideals were
not fully realized. The education debate continued to rage as Chinese education continued
to be marginalized by the state. Amy Freedman notes an interesting pattern in policy:
“Every attempt to tamper with these schools has come after a set of elections in which
promises to the Chinese and Indian communities about the sanctity of their schools have
been made by first the Alliance coalition and then by BN [Barisan Nasional, also known
as the National Front].”
106
In short, after winning the support of the ethnic Chinese
community as well as an election, the attitudes of Malay political figures toward Chinese
education either cooled or were reversed completely. Indeed, the 1987 protests resulting
from government interference in Chinese primary schools came a year after elections
during which the ethnic Chinese and Tamil communities were promised that their schools
would remain untouched.
107

Despite the continued pressures upon Chinese education, the past two decades
have seen a shift in the underlying intentions of the Malay moves to regulate Chinese
education. Noriyuki Segawa notes that since the 1990s, policies have shifted from
“assertive integration” promoting assimilation to “accommodative integration” promoting
multiculturalism.
108
Segawa attributes this to the confluence of several important factors:
the loss of Chinese votes in the 1990 election, the growing importance of China in the

104
Lee (1997), 80-1.
105
Freedman (2000), 65.
106
Freedman (2000), 77-8.
107
Freedman (2000), 83.
108
Segawa, Noriyuki (2007). Malaysia’s 1996 Education Act: The Impact of a Multiculturalism-type
Approach on National Integration. SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 22(1), 31.

47

world economy, the heightened attention to human rights worldwide, and the fact that the
assertive policies were just no longer working. The 1996 Education Act exemplified this
shift, as its multicultural aims amended the more assertive 1961 Education Act. The
amendment loosened government control of ethnic Chinese schools (as well as other
vernacular schools), which pleased many within the ethnic Chinese community while
also promoting a continued ethnic separation of education within Malaysia. However,
some members of the community sympathetic to the government’s previously aggressive
policies believed that vernacular education impeded national unity and opposed the
ethnic divisions the Act maintained. However, the government’s policies stood, and in
the years following, Mahathir stated several times that Chinese education was not in
danger from the state.
109
At the same time, growth of these schools slowed, and few were
established after 1996. In addition, no non-Malay primary school has received a
qualification of exemption, which would essentially protect a school from closure by the
government.
In addition to the change in political tactics, shifting cultural attitudes have been
complemented by an increasingly Malaysian-born and shrinking ethnic Chinese
population. Immigration from China has slowed dramatically, with less than 3 percent of
Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese today born outside of Malaysia. In turn, the ethnic Chinese
population also began to shrink relative to the total population of Malaysia, a trend that
continues today.

109
Segawa (2007), 39.

48

Figures 3, 4: The Changing Demographics of the Ethnic Chinese
Ethnic Chinese Population Relative to Total
Malaysian Population, 1970-2000*
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Percentage of Total
Population
Foreign-Born Chinese as a Percentage
of Total Chinese Population, 1921-1980
0
20
40
60
80
100
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
P ercentage of Chinese
P opulation

*source: Tey Nai Peng (2001), The Changing Demographic Situation of Malaysian Chinese. In L. Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese
In Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

Given the shift in birthplace and identification, it is not surprising that ethnicity is
defined in physical rather than cultural terms today in Malaysia, for ethnic groups are
often easily visually differentiated in the country while cultural practice strongly varies.
In his ethnography of ethnic Chinese identity in contemporary Malaysia, Tong Chee
Kiong found that while almost all informants noted physical characteristics and
bloodlines as criteria for being ethnic Chinese, cultural markers including religion,
language and other customs were given in varying degrees as criteria.
110
This points to
the cultural heterogeneity of today’s ethnic Chinese in Malaysia: while they might be
identifiable physically, cultural practice varies widely.
However, as the ethnic Chinese and Malays interact more and more often with the
declining animosity between the two groups, one cultural practice has become
particularly salient: eating pork. The very definition of ethnic Malay is given in the

110
Tong (2006), 102.

49

Constitution itself as a practitioner of Islam. The Muslim practice of halal forbids the
consumption of pork, while Chinese cuisine incorporates the meat often. This has become
something of a cultural boundary between the two cultures; many Malays define the
Chinese as “makan babi,” or “people who eat pork.”
111

This boundary can also be logically extended to religion, given the religious
significance of halal to Muslims. Few ethnic Chinese have converted to Islam, which in
Malaysia is strongly linked to politics. As the official religion, the fact that the Malay
religion is official while ethnic Chinese beliefs are not contributes to a sense of
marginalization in the ethnic Chinese consciousness.
The tenure of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who replaced Mahathir in 2004,
has been marked by this issue: in his National Day speech in 2004, Abdullah emphasized
that “we are all Malaysians,” an attitude welcomed by non-Malays. Yet soon the UMNO
was insistent on reaffirming the official status of Islam and the economic protection of
the Malays. In 2005, the UMNO insisted on an extension to the New Economic Policy
until 2020, and allowed for additional extensions until their target of thirty percent Malay
corporate ownership was met.
112

However, state-level marginalization is slowly being offset by daily interactions.
With increasingly positive relations between the Malay and Chinese ethnic groups, fewer
ethnic Chinese are experiencing discrimination in their daily lives.
113
Overall, it is clear
that over time ethnic Chinese identity has shifted from a China-based to a Malaysian-
based identity. Ethnic Chinese have risen to prominence, actively working to build

111
Tong (2006). 104.
112
Lee Hook Guan (2008). Malaysia in 2007: Abdullah Administration Under Seige. Southeast Asian
Affairs, 2008.
113
Tong (2006), 107.

50

Malaysian society. While there is still a strong sentiment within the ethnic Chinese
community to preserve elements of Chinese culture through schools and other cultural
practices, this is done within the context of Malaysian society. The liberalization within
China has led to a more favorable view of the ethnic Chinese in ethnic Malay eyes,
offsetting the negative stereotype of Chinese loyalty that had persisted in the past.
Therefore, ethnic Chinese identity also became less reactive as the group was met with
increasing tolerance.

Malay attempts at Chinese acculturation were usually met with resistance because
of its historically coercive nature, yet more recently the ethnic Chinese have instigated
acculturation themselves, seeing the move as essential to maintaining their culturally
unique place within Malaysian society. The ethnic Chinese of Malaysia have sought to
find a balance between preserving an ethnic heritage and becoming full members of
Malaysian society, with pressures from all directions. While ethnic Chinese have fought
for both full citizenship rights and for the preservation of their language and culture
through schooling, the Malays have at the same time worked to maintain ethnic divisions
by limiting ethnic Chinese opportunities and citizenship rights while also pressuring the
ethnic Chinese to integrate through the available schooling. Yet because of changing
demographics, the ethnic Chinese have become more attached to Malaysia than China in
terms of identity, suggesting a slow but steady march toward acculturation and
integration into Malaysian society. In addition, Malay opinion toward the ethnic Chinese
softened as the memory of the 1969 riots faded and as a result the social climate became
more amenable toward the ethnic Chinese, easing interactions from the micro to macro

51

levels. Malay attitudes are also reflected in educational policy, wherein intentions shifted
from assimilation to integration in the 1990s, an approach that can still be seen in today’s
society. However these policies have allowed the ethnic Chinese to remain as a separate
ethnic group in Malaysia, maintaining language and culture while developing more
amenable relations with the Malays, thus creating a social atmosphere of simultaneous
ethnic difference and cooperation today.

52

Chapter 5:
Conclusion

It is clear that throughout Malaysian history, governmental policy toward the
ethnic Chinese has had a profound effect on the acculturation of this group. But equally
important are the cultural attitudes that have produced and perpetuated these policies.
Because of these attitudes, a tension has developed both between and within the ethnic
Chinese and Malay groups regarding the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese. The Malays,
wanting to assert political dominance over the ethnic Chinese, encouraged the separation
of the ethnic Chinese by marginalizing them socially and economically, allowing the
existence of Chinese cultural practices but working to maintain dominance over them.
The ethnic Chinese have had to struggle to maintain their right to membership in
Malaysian society, particularly during the transitional period, trying to simultaneously
preserve their culture while asserting a degree of acculturation into Malay society. Today,
while ethnic tensions have softened between the two groups, relations are still somewhat
strained as issues such as education remain contentious and divisive.
During the colonial period, the British laid the social groundwork for the
development of future policy. The distinctions they made between the ethnic Malays and
Chinese created a sense that the Malays needed and should be given aid over the ethnic
Chinese who proved themselves able to socially and economically fend for themselves.
This preference also established an ideology of ethnic difference and separation within
the Malayan consciousness, one that would remain throughout the course of history and
is still present in today’s Malaysia.

53

During the transitional period, this ideology of difference resulted in strong, often
violent ethnic tensions as various ethnic groups worked to create a single state. Because
of political events in China and the rise of communism, the ethnic Chinese were feared
and strongly discriminated against, despite the fact that the communist movement in
Malaya was instrumental in fighting against the Japanese. As a constitution was drafted,
the Malays were so anti-Chinese that Singapore was forced out of what would become
Malaysia to avoid an ethnic Chinese majority. Yet the ethnic Chinese showed a
willingness to compromise with the ethnic Malays, though this was somewhat forced by
their loss of Chinese citizenship. But even as the ethnic Chinese politicians conceded
language and other privileges to the Malays in exchange for citizenship rights, the general
ethnic Chinese population was angered by the dominance of the Malays. Chinese
nationalism grew, and in this manner institutionalized discrimination against the ethnic
Chinese further perpetuated stereotypes and thus impeded acculturation by the ethnic
Chinese.
Today, while ethnic tensions have eased, the institutionalized discrimination
remains. While Malay politicians have shifted to a more multicultural approach to ethnic
relations, there is evidence that this move is couched more in political calculation than
goodwill. At the same time, the ethnic Chinese have also demonstrated a growing
willingness to acculturate. As almost all ethnic Chinese in Malaysia today are native-born,
their loyalties lie primarily with the country of their birth rather than their heritage. In
addition, ethnic Chinese political strategy has also increasingly seen greater opportunity
in acculturation to Malay society, as the “One Heart, One Vision” campaign
demonstrated. However, education remains the vital issue to the ethnic Chinese

54

community. Policies regarding ethnic education have remained contentious, and any
Malay move to control Chinese education is met with fierce opposition. Therefore, the
ethnic relations in Malaysia today still include a degree of separation, though
multicultural policies have helped to ease tension and encourage acculturation by the
ethnic Chinese through acceptance rather than suppression of difference.
It is important to note that ethnic Chinese acculturation has throughout history
been prevented by the will of the majority, not the will of the minority. Despite the fact
that the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia have been better treated than in other Southeast Asian
countries (Thailand being the exception), dominant Malay policies have repeatedly
prevented the opportunity for the Chinese to acculturate. Repeated demonstrations of lack
of acceptance, as in the rejection of Singapore from Malaysia, have driven the ethnic
Chinese to maintain their status as a separate ethnic group as the presence of their culture
was unacceptable within mainstream Malay society. The unwillingness of the Malays to
include the Chinese language even as an elective within the education system has also
perpetuated the situation. Yet today, while current Malaysian policies continue to
privilege Malays over Chinese, Malaysian society is slowly changing. The role of
globalization cannot be ignored, for the increasing visibility of Malaysia through
international media and politics will likely encourage higher levels of equality. Yet the
change in societal attitudes and a more multicultural atmosphere has also begun to
increase tolerance and encourage acculturation from within. As Malaysia continues to
redefine itself as an increasingly modernized and developed country, the world can only
hope that this peaceful integration will continue.

55

Bibliography

Armstrong, M. Jocelyn, R. Warwick Anderson and Kent Mulliner, eds. (2001). Chinese
Populations in Contemporary Southeast Asian Societies: Identities, Interdependence and
International Influence. Surrey, Great Britian: Curzon Press.

Blythe, Wilfred (1969). The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya. London:
Oxford University Press.

Bolt, Paul J. (2000). China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in
Contemporary Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Bruner, Edward M. (1974). The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia. In Cohen, Abner,
ed. Urban Ethnicity. New York: Tavistock Publications.

Bun Chan Kwok and Tong Chee Kiong (1993). Rethinking Assimilation and Ethnicity:
The Chinese in Thailand. International Migration Review, 27(1).

Callahan, William A (2003). Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: Diasporic
Chinese and Neo-Nationalism in China and Thailand. International Organization, 57(3).

Chai Hon-Chan (1964). The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Clifford, Hugh (1902, Jan. 14). Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur.

Clifford, James (1994). Diasporas. Cultural Anthropology, 9(3), 302-38.

Coates, John (1992). Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency,
1948-1954. San Francisco: Westview Press.

Cohen, Abner, ed. (1974). Urban Ethnicity. New York: Tavistock Publications.

DeBenardi, Jean (2004). Rites of Belonging: Memory, Modernity, and Identity in a
Malaysian Chinese Community. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1.

Fee Lian Kwen (2006). Race, Ethnicity and the State in Malaysia and Singapore. Boston:
Brill.

Freedman, Amy L. (2000). Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese
Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States. New York: Routledge.

––––––––– (2001). The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas
Acculturation: the Case of Malaysia. Modern Asian Studies, 35(2).

56

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan (1970). Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes,
Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press.

Gordon, Milton M. (1964). Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion,
and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heng Pek Koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian
Chinese Association. New York: Oxford University Press.

––––––––– (1999). Malaysia. In Pan, Lynn (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hing Lee Kam and Tan Chee-Beng (2000). The Chinese In Malaysia. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Hooker, Virginia Matheson (2003). A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West.
Australia: Allen and Unwin.

Khoo Boo Teik (2003), Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents. New
York: Zed Books Ltd.

Kuhn, Philip A. (2008). Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. New York:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Kwok Kian Woon (1999), Singapore. In Pan, Lynn (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Chinese
Overseas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Landes, D.S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. New York: Norton.

Lee Hock Guan (2008). Malaysia in 2007: Abdullah Administration Under Seige.
Southeast Asian Affairs, v.2008.

Lee Kam Hing (1997). Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020. In Leo
Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Levy, Andre and Alex Weingrod, eds. (2005). Homelands and Diasporas: Holy Lands
and Other Places. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Loh Fook Seng, Philip (1975). Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya, 1874-
1940. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Mackie, Jamie (2003). Thinking about the Chinese Overseas, American Asian Review,
21(4).

57

McKeown, Adam (1999). Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas. The Journal of Asian
Studies, 58(2).

Nonini, Donald M. (1997), Shifting Identities, Positioned Imaginaries: Transnational
Traversals and Reversals by Malaysian Chinese. In Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini
(Eds.), Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism.
New York: Routledge.

Ong, Aihwa and Donald M. Nonini (1997). Toward a Cultural Politics of Diaspora and
Transnationalism. In Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (Eds.), Ungrounded Empires:
The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism. New York: Routledge.

––––––––– (1997). Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese
Transnationalism. New York: Routledge.

Pan, Lynn (1999), Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.

Parmer, J. Norman (2001). Historical Perspectives in Chinese in Southeast Asia. In
Armstrong, M. Jocelyn, R. Warwick Anderson and Kent Mulliner, eds. Chinese
Populations in Contemporary Southeast Asian Societies: Identities, Interdependence and
International Influence. Surrey, Great Britian: Curzon Press.

Purcell, Victor (1965a). The Chinese in Southeast Asia. London: Oxford University Press.

––––––––– (1948). The Chinese in Malaya. London: Oxford University Press.

Reid, Anthony (1974). Community and Nation: Essays of Southeast Asia and the Chinese,
Hong Kong: Heinemann Educational Books.

Segawa, Noriyuki (2007). Malaysia’s 1996 Education Act: The Impact of a
Multiculturalism-type Approach on National Integration. SOJOURN: Journal of Social
Issues in Southeast Asia, 22(1).

Skinner, G William (1959). Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 321, 146.

––––––––– (1960). Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas: A Comparison
of Thailand and Java. Journal of the South Seas Society, 16(1,2).

Suryadinata, Leo (1997). Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese
Overseas or Southeast Asians? In L. Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast
Asians. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

––––––––– (1997). Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

58

Tan Chee Beng (1997). Comments by Tan Chee Beng on “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast
Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?” In L. Suryadinata (Ed.),
Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

––––––––– (2000). Social-Cultural Diversities and Identities. In Lee Kam Hing and Tan
Chee-Beng (Eds.) The Chinese In Malaysia. New York: Oxford University Press.

––––––––– (2004). Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press.

Tan Liok Ee (1997). The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Tey Nai Peng (2001). The Changing Demographic Situation of Malaysian Chinese. In L.
Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Chinese In Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore: Times
Academic Press.

Tong Chee Kiong (2006). The Chinese in Contemporary Malaysia. In Lian Kwen Fee
(Ed.), Race, Ethnicity and the State in Malaysia and Singapore. Boston: Brill.

Wang Gungwu (1974). The Chinese Minority in Southeast Asia. In Anthony Reid, ed.,
Community and Nation: Essays of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Hong Kong:
Heinemann Educational Books.

––––––––– (1993). Greater China and the Chinese Overseas. The China Quarterly,
Special Issue: Greater China (136).

––––––––– (2000). The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for
Autonomy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya
1800-1911. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract (if available)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

The Chinese film industry's soft power implications

PDF

International brides: cross-border marriage migration in China and Japan through a feminist lens

PDF

Chinese cultural censorship: underlying contradictions and future opportunities

PDF

Ethnic resistance and state environmental policy: Uyghurs and Mongols

PDF

Currency reform in 1930s China and the American silver policy: a case analysis of how Chinese monetary policy was influenced by American policy and contemporary East Asian circumstances

PDF

Human smuggling from Fujian to New York

PDF

Ideological shifts in portrayals of ethnic gangs and gangsters in New York novels and film adaptations

PDF

Political identity and political participation: China's post-80's generation

PDF

The relationship of model minority stereotype, Asian cultural values, and acculturation to goal orientation, academic self-efficacy, and academic achievement in Asian American college students

PDF

The magic mirror: representations of monsters in Chinese classical tales

PDF

From amity to enmity: the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations

PDF

Land usage rights and hukou reform

PDF

Jin Yong's chivalry: gender and ethnicity in wuxia fiction, film, and television

PDF

Signals, tools, and commitments in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute: the role of Japan's domestic political environment in shaping Japanese foreign policy within the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute

PDF

Adjusting the bonds of love: parenting, expertise and social change in a Chinese city

PDF

Independent diplomacy between North Korea and China following the 20th Communist Congress of the Soviet Union

PDF

The many voices of the Lanting poems: society and seclusion in the Eastern Jin

PDF

Gender, family, and Chinese nation: ""leftover women,"" ""foreign f women,"" and ""second wives""

PDF

A grain of sand: Yingzao fashi and the miniaturization of Chinese architecture

PDF

The role of social control in promoting healthy eating behavior among Chinese immigrants: an ecological approach

Asset Metadata

Creator Mason, Chelsea Leigh (author)

Core Title Policy and the acculturation of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 08/06/2009

Defense Date 07/01/2009

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag acculturation,China,Chinese diaspora,Malaysia,migration,minorities,OAI-PMH Harvest

Place Name Malaysia (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Cooper, Eugene (committee chair), Brand, Laurie A. (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Creator Email cmason06@gmail.com,uscichelseamason@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2518

Unique identifier UC1305978

Identifier etd-Mason-3022 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-174111 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2518 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Mason-3022.pdf

Dmrecord 174111

Document Type Thesis

Rights Mason, Chelsea Leigh

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu