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Politics behind appointments: policy, patronage, and party systems in the Andes
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Politics behind appointments: policy, patronage, and party systems in the Andes
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Content
Politics Behind Appointments: Policy, Patronage, and Party Systems in the Andes
By
Maria Daniela Maag Pardo
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
August 2022
Copyright 2022 Maria Daniela Maag Pardo
ii
Acknowledgements
This dissertation is a product of many many hours of intense work, tears, physical therapy, a
visit to the ER, days poring over different books and articles, and years of dedication. Most
importantly, however, it is a product of all the help and support I have been lucky enough to
surround myself by. Gerry Munck is the best advisor and mentor I could have hoped for. He has
been guiding me through the complex maze that is academia and in particular academic
research since day one. I always knew that whatever muddled ideas I had about a certain
project would become clearer with a couple of hours of talking them through with him. He has
been incredibly patient, kind, funny, and supportive throughout this whole process. This project
would simply not exist without his guidance and for that I am incredibly grateful. Carol Wise
and Jeff Nugent have also been great sources of support, encouragement and positivity in days
I needed it the most. Carol, I will never forget our fateful trip to Otavalo and hope that it can be
repeated (though with better a navigation system or driver) sometime in the near future.
A huge thank you to USC’s Program on Political Science and International Relations for
believing in me and taking me in. Veri Chavarin, thank you so much for all your help throughout
these years: for always being there either in person or via email, and for being my go-to hugger
in times of crises! Bryn Rosenfeld, you have been instrumental in defining and fueling my
passion for the study of comparative politics. I am very proud and happy that I was able to have
my very first PhD class with you. Saori Katada, Laurie Brand, Wayne Sandholtz, Jody Vallejo,
Alison Dundes-Renteln, and Jacques Hymans: thank you for your continued feedback and for
including me in your various endeavors!
iii
To my POIR peers: the pandemic has kept us away for two years already and I cannot
begin to imagine how much more I’ll miss you now that we are all parting ways. Shiming Yang,
thank you for being my friend and inviting me for coffee that very first week of classes! You are
such a genuine and kind person. Thank you for keeping me from freaking out too much, making
me laugh, introducing me to diverse kinds of Asian cuisine as well as the world of rock climbing,
and exploring LA’s diverse coffee (and boba) shop scene with me. Evgeniia, Adam, and David
aka part of the restaurant crew, I miss hanging out with you guys so much! Thank for all those
Friday dinner hangouts, movie visits and just generally being there. You guys are truly my LA
family.
Victoria, Nico, María y Sam: gracias por ser mi núcleo hispanohablante dentro de POIR.
Vic, gracias por ser “Mami Vic” y siempre estar cuidándonos y ofreciéndonos comida deliciosa.
To my fellow cohort members: we did it! Thanks for all the laughter. I will never forget those
early bonding moments during our first semester. You are all incredibly special to me and I
cannot wait to see what the future has in store for you. PK and Na Young: I miss hanging out
with you in our dance classes so much! Thanks for all the great memories. I don’t think I’ve ever
laughed as much during those years in LA as I did when I was around you guys. Dat, my
multilingual geography-loving buddy: I am waiting for you in Quito so you can finally try
Ecuadorian cuisine. We also need to find a time and a place to get pasteis de nata. It’s been five
years and I still find myself craving them and it’s all because of that one time you mentioned
getting them.
Margaret (Meg) Burton: there are few things I miss more than your visits to my
apartment and us watching “The Crown” with some scones over mascarpone and lemon curd.
iv
Thank you for being such a loyal and caring friend and for being my LA adventure buddy. Thank
you for helping me get out of my academia shell and actually experience the city, it was much
needed and I am so happy you get to move back there! The city definitely is not the same
without you. Vale Cárdenas: thank you for taking me in as you have and sharing all your
interests with me. You are the person I most enjoy going to the bookstore with. Verónica Cruz,
Mariana Samper, and Giovanni Carrillo, gracias por ayudarme a mantenerme sana tanto en
cuerpo como mente. Sister Kathy: thank you for listening, offering counsel, and understanding.
To my family: you have seen and experienced everything with me. Thank you for
listening to my ramblings, my concerns, and my (often incoherent) brain-storming sessions. I
owe everything to my parents who, though had their reservations about me embarking on such
a seemingly long-winding project, still managed to support, empathize and encourage me every
step of the way. Simply put, they gave me the strength I needed to push on not only during this
stage but throughout my life. GRACIAS. I am also incredibly grateful to Sofía, Gabriel, José
Ignacio, and Alessia who taught me what life is truly all about by: playing hide-and-seek,
breaking out into Disney sing-alongs, sword-fighting, and reading storybooks with me. In short,
thank you for keeping me present. Last but certainly not least, Basilio De San Juan Guerrero:
again, there are not enough words for all the gratitude I have for you. Even though it was
mostly virtually, I have never felt as supported and loved as I have been by you. Thank you for
holding me accountable for my pomodoros whilst also encouraging me to enjoy life. Above all, I
cannot thank you enough for choosing to be my lifetime companion.
v
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................................ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. vi
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Framework ..................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Clean-Up Time? Patronage and Education Reform in Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador 34
Chapter 3: Health Ministry Administration and the Health Sector in Chile, Colombia and Ecuador
2000-2019 ..................................................................................................................................... 92
Chapter 4: Politicizing Diplomacy: Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000-2019) ............. 119
Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 142
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 150
Appendix A: Interviewees ........................................................................................................... 167
Appendix B: Interview Questions ............................................................................................... 168
vi
List of Tables
Table 1. Views of State Capacity ..................................................................................................... 6
Table 2. Indices delineating features of bureaucratic capacity indicators ................................... 27
Table 3. Overall Party System Institutionalization Score in US and Latin America (1990-2015).. 30
Table 4. Main challenges to teacher career policy reform: .......................................................... 43
Table 5. Characteristics of teachers´ unions in Chile, Colombia and Ecuador ............................. 48
Table 6. The argument on education reform and patronage summarized .................................. 55
Table 7. Key education reforms in Chile 1990-2016 ..................................................................... 59
List of Figures
Figure 1. Recap of definitions ......................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Object of Study............................................................................................................... 14
Figure 3. Conceptualizing the argument ....................................................................................... 44
Figure 4. How corruption manifests itself in the health system .................................................. 93
Figure 5. The argument summarized (foreign affairs) ................................................................ 123
vii
Abstract
Why are certain states better able to provide public goods (broadly defined as security,
infrastructure, education and health) than other states? Can democracies succeed in enhancing
state capacity by improving and professionalizing their civil service? What role does patronage
play in enhancing or hampering state capacity? This research agenda focuses on Latin America
to answer these questions. While the literature on state capacity and the relationship between
state and democracy has gained increasing attention in recent years, much is left to be
explored. Specifically, this piece will focus on the prevalence of a trained, professional civil
service as a key indicator of state capacity. In other words, it will look to the presence of
patronage as a way to gauge how weak or strong specific states within Latin America are. It
uses three ministries—health, education and foreign affairs—in three countries— Chile,
Colombia, and Ecuador —to understand the connection between democracy and state capacity
across the region and in different policy areas.
Overall, this study argues that patronage prevails in some countries (and in some
ministries within them) more than others because of two main factors: the degree to which
party systems are institutionalized and the kind of policy area that is being tackled. Generally
speaking, it finds that settings with strong party systems typically have a smaller patronage
presence. For instance, countries with weak party systems, here most clearly exemplified by the
Ecuadorian case, tend to have higher levels of patronage. Conversely, countries with high PSI
levels (meaning they have strong party systems) here represented in the Chilean case, have
proven to be better at creating instruments (such as regulations and agencies) to prevent
patronage from expanding. Moreover, policy areas revolving around social services such as
education are usually prone to more widespread patronage schemes. Aside from providing a
further test to the state-democracy nexus literature, this work also expands our understanding
of how and why state capacity can be built and/or reduced. It also contains important policy
recommendations to continue to reduce harmful patronage structures in the region.
1
Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Framework
The first months of 2010 were marked by two important earthquakes: one in Haiti on January
12, 2010 with a 7.7 magnitude and one in Chile on February 27, 2010 with 8.8 magnitude.
Though these earthquakes were intensely felt by the people in each of the countries, reports
estimate that Haiti lost approximately 300,000 lives and many more displaced. Chile, on the
other hand, had more than 500 casualties (much of this is credited to Chile’s drills where people
had been trained to prepare for this kind of instance). While both countries had problems with
looting and power outages, four years later, Chile had completed most of its rebuilding efforts.
Moreover, because of stringent building codes set up in the past, many buildings were
relatively unaffected by the events. Haiti, on the other hand, was still recovering. Two years
after the fact, half the rubble in Port-au-Prince was still not cleared. By 2014 though the
number of displaced people was halved, approximately 100,000 people remained without
permanent housing (by 2016, this number had decreased to 62,000 displaced)—all of this in
spite of multiple donations by international community (Rafferty and Pallardy, 2020). These
events showcase the vast divergence within the region of Latin America in terms of states’
ability to provide for their own people.
While scholars have argued that Latin America finds itself in a stalemate in terms of its
political and economic growth, the degree to which public administrations differ in their ability
to deliver public goods is evident with countries like Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica on the
higher echelons whereas others like Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti find themselves on the lower
2
end of this spectrum. As it happens, those countries that are less able to provide public goods
are either edging towards authoritarianism or already find themselves in the thick of it.
Thus, one is left to wonder: 1) Why are certain states in Latin America better able to provide
public goods (broadly defined as security, infrastructure, education and health) in an apolitical
fashion? 2) What is the relationship between state capacity and democracy? That is, can
democracies succeed in enhancing state capacity?
1
Motivation and Implications
The purpose of this study is to explain variation in state capacity, more specifically in terms of
the prevalence of patronage, amongst countries in Latin America. This will help clarify the role
that patronage plays in state capacity and also help point out ways in which democracy and
state capacity can go hand in hand. In doing so, one of the most important tasks this
dissertation will tackle is to show the mechanisms by which each country has reached its
patronage levels. It will also be contributing to the sequencing debate surrounding the
relationship between state and democracy. Specifically, it hopes to adjudicate on this debate by
favoring the notion of the co-evolution between state and democracy. Given that the legitimacy
of democracy is tied with its ability to deliver, the study also has implications for the survival of
new democracies. It will further our understanding of this relationship by using Latin America as
region of study.
1
There is a two-way relationship between state capacity and democracy. That is, insofar as state capacity
influences democracy, so does democracy affect state capacity. While understanding both sides of this relationship
is crucial, this study will be focused on the latter part. Thus, for the purposes of maintaining some parsimony in this
study, the question of whether democracies survive if they fail to deliver public goods will be temporarily put in
the back burner.
3
Sequencing and State Capacity
A burgeoning strand within the democracy literature involves analyzing the role of the state in
the consolidation and promotion of democracy. A key issue that continues to be contented is
whether the sequencing of state and democracy matters. On the one hand, Fukuyama (2014)
argues that there must be a strong state to be able to sustain the mass demands that
democracy brings with it. Therefore, in order to have a high-quality democracy, a strong state
must have been put in place prior to the arrival of democracy. In short, Fukuyama’s claim that a
strong democracy needs to have had a strong state first is problematic because it does not
account for how we get to a state first and then transition to democracy. In other words, if we
have a strong state, why should we expect it to transition to a democracy?
Countering Fukuyama’s claims, Acemoglu and Robinson (2016) find that specific state-
society relations and the balance between them can lead to inclusive political institutions.
Along a similar note, Mazzuca and Munck (2014; 2019), argue that state and democracy can co-
evolve. Indeed, even in Western Europe (which tends to be the main region of reference for the
state-first side of the debate), it is clear that state and democracy went hand in hand. That is,
neither state-building nor democracy are completed in a single step. Moreover, while
sequencing can integrate both of these components, it is not unilinear in nature; this means
that it can stall, regress, and is not deterministic.
2
2
This co-evolution of state and democracy can certainly help explain the political development of Latin America.
According to Mazzuca and Munck, “in broad terms Latin America has stalled along the path to a high-capacity
democracy because the state-democracy interaction has not been mutually-reinforcing in positive way, as in more
successful countries” (2021, p.25). Though certain mechanisms have been “positive enough to sustain democratic
gains”, they are also “negative enough to forestall an improvement in the quality of democracy and state’s
capacity” (25). According to these authors, the region has therefore stalled in a middle quality trap. Nevertheless,
even within this range, there is an important degree of variation in terms of countries like Chile, Uruguay and Costa
4
This study therefore seeks to find which of these framings— “state first, democracy later” or
“state and democracy can co-evolve”—is correct. It is testing whether this evolution can either
help support democracy and thereby strengthen the state (meaning it promotes a positive
relationship between the two) or whether the strengthening of one might weaken the other.
The literature on the state-democracy nexus is only starting to take shape and has largely been
theoretical in nature. This dissertation will offer one of the first tests of this state capacity-
democracy nexus in Latin America.
This chapter will proceed as follows. The following section will address the current state
of the literature in terms of the concept of state capacity writ-large and in the context of Latin
America. Next, it will more clearly define the dependent variable of interest: patronage, or the
degree to which countries have a professional civil service where employees make their way
through the ranks on the basis of meeting set standards as opposed to simply being appointed
by someone for their loyalty to the party and/or leader. The third section will establish the
independent variables of interest and the main hypotheses to be tested. Finally, the last section
will detail the empirical strategy to test the theory.
Rica which are in the higher echelons of quality whilst others like Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti find themselves on the
lower end of the spectrum.
One of the key elements that helps illuminate this variation is the degree to which public administrations differ in
their ability to deliver public goods. Put simply, some states are better able to provide public goods such as roads,
health and education, to their populace because they are bureaucratic – in Weber’s sense of the term - in nature.
In patrimonial administrations, on the other hand, “rulers blur the distinction between politics and administration,
and appropriate public resources for private or partisan gains. Hence patronage, nepotism and corruption are
common. In stark contrast, the distinction between politics and administration, and between public and private
roles, is made clear in bureaucratic administrations (Ibid. p. 4)”.
5
1. STATE CAPACITY AS BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY
A common adage in comparative politics is that “institutions matter” not only to strengthen
economic development, but to guarantee the proper functioning of democracies. Though the
institutionalist approach has been prominent in social science research for quite some time and
the study of the state was “brought back in” in the mid-80s (Evans et al., 1985), there is still
much to understand about the impact of state capacity in different policy realms. Perhaps even
more importantly to the field, what is actually meant by state capacity continues to be under
discussion.
As it currently stands, scholars attempting to explain state capacity use a myriad of
measures. To that effect, proxies such as education and literacy levels (Kurtz, 2013; Lee and
Zhang, 2018), taxation and/or revenue extraction (Kurtz, 2013; Soifer, 2016) and electricity
provision (Giraudy and Luna, 2017) are very common. These kinds of analysis are typically
quantitative in nature—with some including a choice set of case studies to support the
findings—and cross-national. Although the work done so far is to be praised by the versatility it
has showcased to tackle this complicated issue, its downside is a lack of cohesion and
consistency amongst the findings that have emerged. This issue is symptomatic of an even
greater problem: the concept of state capacity remains unclear.
The fact that there are multiple ways to view and measure this concept has led to a lack
of clarity in terms of the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from the studies. According to
Centeno, Kohli and Yashar (2017), lack of conceptual clarity has often led to tautological and
normative assessments. In other words, rather than having a set definition, state capacity has
often been conceptualized and measured in terms of what the state has done (or failed to do),
6
leading to circular arguments about the origins of state capacity and the outcomes it yields,
thereby complicating the task of disentangling causes from outcomes:
To make matters worse, desired outcomes are sometimes added to the measures of capacity,
such as quality, efficiency, effectiveness, absence of corruption; as well as normative goals, such
as the rule of law or democracy… Given that, together, the many extant measures analyze ‘at
least six different functions of the state that are relevant for development’—maintaining order,
taxation, protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, providing goods and services, and
coordinating information and measures (Hanson and Sigman 2013, 4) –the stage is set for
considerable conceptual stretching, if not rending (Bersch et al., 2017: 160).
As Table 1 shows, there are four distinct, though at times intermingling, ways the
literature has depicted state capacity: 1) the ability of the state to implement its own goals; 2)
the scope and/or content of the policies that the state ends up pursuing (and how these
policies are chosen); 3) the relationship between state and society, whereby state capacity is
synonymous with power (i.e. the ability to get others to do one’s bidding) and 4) the quality of
the bureaucracy (Centeno et al., 2017).
Table 1. Views of State Capacity
Notions of State Capacity Key Authors
Implementation: Measured in terms of coordination,
planning or coming to a consensus. Related to autonomy.
Implementation is all up to internal factors of the state.
Main question: How able is the state to fulfill its own goals?
Fukuyama (2004)
Scope/Content: What the state pursues. The range and
implementation of state actions which are decided
internally and how they are established (i.e. through
negotiations) within the state. Focused on a specific
mandate or ideology.
Main question: What kind of policies is the state able to
pursue and how is this decided? What are the goals of the
state and how expansive are they?
Lowi (1964); Mann’s despotic
power (1984)
7
Relational Power: Wherein power, or the ability to get
others to do things they wouldn’t otherwise do, is
conceived as state capacity. In other words, state capacity
and power are viewed as basically meaning the same
thing. Gives more emphasis to the relationship between
state and society.
Main question: How able is the state to compel its citizens
and other states to do what they might otherwise not do?
Dahl (1957); Migdal (2001);
Skocpol (1979,1985); Mann’s
infrastructural power (1984);
Geddes (1994)
Bureaucracy: Looks at the quality of bureaucracy as a
means to conceptualize state capacity; hence typically
better at distinguishing state capacity from state
performance.
Main question: What is the organizational competence of
the civil servants?
Weber; Evans and Rauch (1999)
Source: Centeno et al., 2017
Though each of these approaches has its advantages and disadvantages, out of all four
of these views, Centeno, Kohli and Yashar (2017) argue that only one is able to separate and
thus encapsulate state capacity: the quality of the bureaucracy. By focusing on a state’s
organizational capacity, we are truly able to disaggregate causes from outcomes and therefore
separate state capacity from state performance:
If capacity has any meaning in and of itself then it is something that a state should possess
independent of its outcomes. For this reason, we focus on state capacity as the quality of its
bureaucracy, independent of whether it is deployed and to what end; while normatively jarring,
the test might be whether we can and/or should identify and compare state capacity across
politically distinct kinds of states (democratic, developmental, communist, and maybe even the
apartheid state of South Africa, for example) and issue areas (immunization, education, and
genocide, for example). In this sense, state capacity as quality-of-bureaucracy is analytically
neutral, although it can be used to achieve normative ends (both desirable and heinous in
character) (Centeno, Kohli and Yashar, 2017: 6).
State capacity continues to be a black box of sorts. By approaching this concept as a
way to evaluate a country’s bureaucratic quality, this piece will avoid conflating potential or
even normative outcomes typically linked to capacity. This approach will also help solidify the
idea that the state is an instrument used by different groups to achieve multiple objectives. In
8
short, the state is not a goal, but a means to that goal. The Weberian notion that politicians set
goals but bureaucrats implement them further gives credence to 1) the need to look towards
the bureaucracy’s ability to implement governing projects and 2) treating the outcomes that
may stem therefrom as conceptually distinct. With this in mind, Centeno, Kohli and Yashar
(2017) provide two clarifying definitions that will be incorporated into this study. As mentioned
before, state capacity will refer to the “organizational and bureaucratic ability to implement
governing projects” (p.3) and a “constellation organizational qualities” (pp.26-27). More
specifically, it involves the ability to “process information, implement policies, and maintain
governing systems. State capacity is thus a function of the organizational skills and institutions
required for carrying out relevant tasks” (p.9)
3
.
Conversely, state performance is “what, for good or ill, the state is able to accomplish”
(Ibid: 3) which, in turn, is determined by “[the state’s] interaction with a set of inheritances,
policy priorities, and political action” (pp.26-27). State performance, in this sense, usually
results in three overarching outcomes: the provision of order, economic management and
social inclusion. Put differently, state capacity here will refer to what the bureaucracy can do
whilst state performance will be linked to what has been done. In short, state capacity is a
factor which, combined with politics, affects state performance. As mentioned before, it is
important to consider this relationship because at the end of the day, the state is an instrument
of politicians as opposed to a goal in and of itself. Exploring this relationship will thus help us
3
As will evaluated in the following pages, indicators for organizational (hereby considered state) capacity include:
1) The minimum amount of resources to carry out an organization’s functions; 2) The state’s presence in society (ie
its infrastructural power, or ability to penetrate society thus “increasing the level and quality of state interactions
with citizens”); 3) A trained and professional civil service; 4) Coherence of mandates within and amongst different
institutions within the state apparatus (including appropriate oversight whereby corrupt officials are punished and
meritorious civil servants are rewarded) (Centeno et al., 2017).
9
understand how the state is being used, the consequences that might stem therefrom, and
ultimately why it is that there is a large degree of variation in state capacity in Latin America.
Figure 1. Recap of definitions
In nutshell, this study’s main emphasis is to look at whether or not bureaucrats can
implement politicians’ goals, as opposed to whether they do so or not. When thinking about
administrative capacity, it is important to note that we are looking, as Mazzuca (2010) puts it, at
issues of how power is exercised.
4
That is, in any state, regardless of whether it is under a
democratic or authoritarian regime, power can be employed in a myriad of ways which can fit
into a spectrum of sorts. Patrimonialism and bureaucratic administration would lie at opposite
ends of said spectrum. Under a patrimonial administration, rulers not only work to “blur the
lines between politics and administration”, but they also “appropriate public resources for
4
Throughout this study, administrative capacity, state capacity and bureaucratic capacity will be used
interchangeably.
• What has been typically done:
• X → state capacity (read as state performance)
• What I seek to do:
• X → state capacity → state performance
• Do this by following Centeno et al.’s (2017) recommendation: think of state
capacity in terms of the quality of the bureaucracy.
• Thus, for the purposes of this study the corresponding definitions are:
• State capacity: “organizational and bureaucratic ability to implement governing
projects” (Centeno et al., 2017: 3), the ability to “process information, implement
policies, and maintain governing systems. State capacity is thus a function of the
organizational skills and institutions required for carrying out relevant tasks” (p.9).
• State performance: “what, for good or ill, the state is able to accomplish” (Ibid: 3)
which, in turn, is determined by “[the state’s] interaction with a set of
inheritances, policy priorities, and political action” (Ibid: 26-27).
10
private or partisan gains” thus increasing the opportunities for rampant patronage, nepotism
and corruption to exist (Mazzuca and Munck, 2021: 4).
Summarizing Weber (1978), Mazzuca (2010) argues that patrimonialism is “an extreme
form of appropriation and particularism in the exercise of state power”. A bureaucratic
administration, on the other hand, has the “means of administration” completely separated
from the ruler, “which simply means no private appropriation of public resources, and
maximum adherence of rulers to impersonal rules” (p.343; Weber 1978: 220, 1028-29, 1041).
Though few or no state can currently be found to fully be on either side of this spectrum,
certain countries can certainly be said to be found leaning closer to either side. For instance,
Scandinavian and Western European countries are closer to fully bureaucratic organizations
whereas failed states such as Somalia and Haiti are veering dangerously close to fully
patrimonial administrations. Predictably, Latin American countries mostly find themselves in
the middling areas of this range with some such as Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica closer to a
more bureaucratic administration in what some call semi-patrimonial status, while others, like
Venezuela and Nicaragua, closer to patrimonialism.
What determines this seeming status quo? Centeno, Yashar and Kohli (2017: 10) point
to four main indicators to delineate where countries might lie:
1) The minimum amount of resources to carry out an organization’s functions;
2) The state’s presence in society (i.e., its infrastructural power, or ability to penetrate society
thus “increasing the level and quality of state interactions with citizens”);
3) A trained and professional civil service;
11
4) The coherence of mandates within and amongst different institutions within the state
apparatus. This includes having appropriate oversight whereby corrupt officials are punished
and meritorious civil servants are rewarded (Centeno et al., 2017: 10).
Therefore, countries with more of a patrimonial administration (thus a state with
low to no state capacity) will typically have: 1) Few to none of the minimum amount of
resources needed to function; 2) Low or no level of penetration within society. That is,
connections to the populace as well as communication between state and society, if any,
are poor signifying a full disconnect between state and society. 3) All civil servants are
exclusively appointed, promoted and/or demoted by rulers with undivulged or non-
existent criteria. Moreover, there are high levels of patronage and nepotism and no known
trained and professional service. 4) Little to no oversight of officials and high degrees of
corruption. Along these lines, there is also little to no coherence between agencies and
their mandates. The opposite would be true of a bureaucratic administration (thus a state
with high levels of state capacity).
Although all four of these indicators are necessary to fully understand a specific
country’s level of state capacity, this piece will focus on the prevalence of a trained,
professional civil service as a key indicator of state capacity. In other words, it will look to the
presence of patronage as a way to gauge how weak or strong specific states within Latin
America are. The reason for this choice is two-fold: first, the presence of a professional
bureaucratic service is the crux of a Weberian administration. Therefore, it provides a clearer
short cut to see whether a state is on its way to becoming stronger or weaker. Second, of the
four indicators, it is one of the most tangible and measurable. Again, while all these indicators
12
are important to a full understanding of state capacity, zeroing in on the prevalence of
patronage in a given country is an obvious and clear way to see whether there is a departure
from a more Weberian, thus professional, administration.
Minding the Gaps
Aside from lack of conceptual clarity which we already addressed, an important gap which
exists overall in the state capacity literature is a de-emphasis on mechanisms—that is, the
processes by which A yields or affects B. Put simply, we are still not very clear on how we got to
the states we have, nor have we been able to parse out when public failures are due to low
levels of state capacity (that is, bureaucratic/organizational inability to implement a particular
policy) as opposed to a failure due to a specific preference or tactic the leadership adopted. In
both scenarios, placing analytic emphasis on the mechanisms that lead to said failures can help
further disentangle these issues. Moreover, considering the tight relationship between
politicians and bureaucracy, it is only fitting to look at the processes by which political actors
(both individuals and specific parties and/or coalitions) affect this organizational capacity and
thus, in the long run, state performance.
State Capacity in Latin America: What We Know So Far
When it comes to the literature around state capacity in Latin America, the works of Kurtz
(2013), Saylor (2014) and Soifer (2016) have been incredibly important in furthering our
knowledge of state building processes and explaining the relative weaknesses of states in Latin
America. An important part of the causal story of all three pieces is: the manner in which
13
authority is deployed shapes the type of institutions that begin to emerge, thereby affecting
state power. Thus, when authority is deployed from the center, it typically implies that there
are greater levels of state capacity since the center is able to regulate, extract, and provide for
the populace
5
. This kind of institution is what Saylor refers to as unmediated institutions (and
Soifer as “deployed authority”). On the other hand, mediated (or delegated) institutions imply
that political actors defer to local authorities thus diluting power away from the state and
potentially leading to conflict between the center and the periphery and/or amongst
peripheries.
However, although these three pieces are attempting to explain state weakness, in
doing so they are eschewing the topic of state formation in and of itself. Through various
approaches, they have proven that there is much left unanswered when it comes to explaining
why states, especially some more than others, are and remain weak. There is little account in
both Saylor and Soifer as to why certain states were initially able to deploy (or not) authorities
to hold local offices. Neither author is therefore providing a deeper understanding of state
formation because the state is already formed at that point.
Generally speaking then, the overall problem with the literature on state capacity in
Latin America so far, particularly in these works (aside from being conflated with state
performance) is that there is no debate about what it is and more importantly, how this very
fact was achieved. Though the works of the likes of Grindle (2012) and Mazzuca and Munck
(2019) are helping to illuminate this issue, the need to know how processes towards higher
5
One can clearly see here that these authors are equating the provision of goods (that is state’s performance) with
the actual organizational capabilities of the state.
14
capacity work in the region remains imminent. More specifically, this study seeks to connect
the dots between party systems and capacity; to see how actors (politicians, party leaders,
parties) forge state bureaucracies and how that affects capacity and later performance. Looking
at the mechanisms behind state capacity is therefore an important task which this piece seeks
to pursue.
Figure 2. Object of Study
2. DEFINING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PATRONAGE
Patronage is commonly referred to as a system of discretion-based appointments to
governmental or political positions (Webster’s II New College Dictionary, 1995). At the heart of
patronage lies the ability of a client to appoint civil servants through discretionary means.
According to Grindle, patronage becomes a commonplace practice when the main way in which
most government personnel get their positions is purely based on who appointed them to it.
Thus, patronage in the context of this study crops up as a “generalized rule of the game for
holding significant numbers of non-elected government positions” (2012: 19).
As Grindle also points out, patronage is capricious and can therefore appear in multiple
ways; it may even co-exist with more merit-based career hirings and other similar systems. It
State Capacity
(bureaucratic
quality)
Democracy
State
Performance
Mechanisms of interest
15
may also include scenarios where “the political principal appoints someone of the same
political persuasion to a key post or when key civil servants are appointed on the basis of their
loyalty to a particular political party" (Polga-Hecimovich, 2019, p.480). Hence, though most
patronage is done for the sake of an exchange of loyalty of some sort, the need for said
exchange is not always indispensable. In this sense then, clientelism, or the exchange of public
sector jobs for public support or votes more specifically, is but one of the many different forms
patronage appointees perform (Panizza et al., 2019: 148; Roniger 1994). Patronage and
clientelism are therefore conceptually distinct from each other in that under clientelism,
politicians are using the public sector’s resources to increase the likelihood of their own re-
election. Though this might be the case under patronage, it may also be the case that the
appointment is made without this vote-getting expectation. In short, although clientelism and
patronage usually come hand in hand, these terms are kept conceptually distinct from each
other in this study.
16
Normative assumptions of patronage
One of the most common themes surrounding the concept of patronage are the normative
connotations linked to it, some of which include: that it leads to corruption/misuse of public
goods, decreases stability, decreases equality and negatively affects democracy. Alongside
Grindle’s definition of patronage, Panizza et al. (2019) and Toral (2020) are agnostic about its
purpose, scale and normative value. Moreover, all of the above authors also argue that
patronage can be used for several different purposes which are not necessarily corrosive or
harmful to democracy and governance writ-large. They argue in favor of taking a more agnostic
approach to the normative value of patronage. Panizza et al., for instance, define patronage
appointments as “the power of political actors to appoint individuals by discretion to non-
elective positions in the public sector, irrespectively of the legality of the decision” (2019: 148;
Kopecky, Mair and Spirova, 2012) as a way to avoid assumptions about the motivation behind
appointments, roles of appointees, their professional capabilities and the impact of said
appointments in the quality of public administration. By using this conceptualization, the
authors are able to showcase patronage not necessarily as a byproduct or manifestation of
corruption but as a means to recruit skilled individuals into government work when they
normally would not be.
17
Amongst the main reasons as to why patronage continues to exist—to greater or lesser
degree, even in developing countries—is the fact that it can be very useful for promoting
governability. That is, it can operate as an instrument for inter-party cohesion and it can also
help manage government coalitions (Grindle, 2012; Toral, 2020). Patronage can also increase
bureaucratic effectiveness and accountability by providing “access to resources, facilitate
application of sanctions and rewards, align priorities and incentives, increase mutual trust, and
facilitate monitoring” (Toral, 2020: 197). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that
these seeming advantages are highly context-dependent. If, for instance, the country at hand
has a volatile party system, patronage might have the opposite effect or might only truly help
strengthen the ruling party’s hold on power whilst not necessarily implementing policies with
long-term benefits for the country-at-large.
Due to instances like the one highlighted above, patronage is commonly seen as a
"pathology of government" (Toral, 2020: 63). Indeed, studies have found that, among other
things, patronage distorts how public jobs are allocated, decreases performance incentives (Xu,
2018), harms economic development, promotes corruption in the public sector and hampers
the quality of public service delivery, especially in the education sector (Akhtari, Moreira and
Trucco, 2017; Brassiolo et al., 2020; Estrada, 2019; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Lewis, 2008; Bearfield,
2009; Dahlström et al., 2012; Nistotksaya & Cingolani, 2015; Kopecky et al., 2016). Though
recent works, specifically Panizza et al. (2019) and Toral (2020) are more agnostic about the
normative value of patronage and even finding that at times can help, the more nefarious, de-
stabilizing and corrosive aspects might be underplayed.
18
While Panizza et al. (2019) and Kopecky et al. (2016; 2012) look at patronage regardless
of whether the appointment is legal or illegal, it is important to consider the illegal aspect more
seriously. Most, if not all, countries in the world give rulers the ability to freely name whoever
they see fit to certain posts. Many—including those in Latin America—have rules about which
offices are to be appointed and which are not. Not only this, but throughout the 2000s, several
countries in the region undertook a series of reforms to make the civil service more
professional and access to it more meritocratic (Cortázar et al., 2014). Thus, if there is a legally-
sanctioned discretionary appointment, clearly some benefits like the ones Panizza et al. (2019)
and Toral (2020) point to might be found. On the other hand, if rules have been put in place to
restrict discretionary appointments to a specific segment of the public sector (for example,
allowing appointments to high-level offices such as under-secretary and vice-minister only) and
set procedures on how to hire the best fit exist yet discretionary appointments continue to be
made, hence going against the law, then this phenomenon requires a closer look since the
consequences thereof might be pernicious to public administration.
Patronage does not encompass a single pattern. There are various different ways to
appoint and reasons for those appointments. In addition, these can vary within country and
within sector. Because of this, any normative assessments about the value of patronage on
governance should be made in a specific setting: for this study’s context, Latin America
between 2000-2019, patronage has clearly had negative effects. This is especially the case
because in Latin America, patronage can be used to build stronger parties. Thinking of
patronage as it functions and evolves in different sectors within and across specific countries is
19
therefore incredibly useful to unpack the roles patronage plays and reasons for the variation in
its prevalence across the region.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this study is to explain variation in state capacity, more specifically in terms of
the prevalence of patronage, amongst countries in Latin America. This will help clarify the role
that patronage plays in state capacity and also help point out ways in which democracy and
state capacity can go hand in hand. In doing so, one of the most important tasks this
dissertation will tackle is to show the mechanisms by which each country has reached its
patronage levels. With that, while the independent variables are important to explain differing
levels of patronage, the pathways these independent variables lead to are even more so. This
section will proceed as follows: it will first address the main independent variables of study; it
will then discuss the expectations for these variables by establishing the respective hypotheses;
finally, it will point out the implications for each. The succeeding section will then address the
empirical strategy to test the theory.
Independent Variables: Party System Institutionalization and Policy Area
The first independent variable is the degree of party system institutionalization (PSI). According
to Mainwaring, an institutionalized party system is one where a, “stable set of parties interacts
regularly in stable ways. Actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that
the fundamental contours and rules of party competition will prevail into the foreseeable
future”, this kind of system therefore “shapes the future expectations and behavior of political
20
elites, masses and other actors” (2018: 4). In short, the more institutionalized a party system is,
the more predictable it is. In contrast, an inchoate party system often becomes “breeding
grounds for populist leaders who have sometimes used their ascent to power to dismantle
democratic institutions” (Ibid: 6) such as Alberto Fujimori in Perú, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Based on this information, I expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: Where party systems are weak—meaning that they are party vessels for
president/party leader’s political interests—more patronage will be present across all levels of
public administration. In an inchoate party system, the president will use patronage
appointments to secure support for their party. Because in this kind of system there is little to
no distinction between the president and the party, the former can make decisions for the
latter. In other words, party goals become subservient to the party leader/president’s choice.
Consequently, the president will have more autonomy in appointment and will thus be more
likely wield his or her power to give offices to those they trust and have proven their loyalty,
regardless of their partisanship and the qualifications they may or may not have for the job or
any legal considerations that exist to prevent this (Panizza et al., 2019; Kopecky et al., 2016).
Clearly, this is not ideal for democracy and the long-term provision of public goods since it
would mean that state politics (política de estado) would become conflated with party politics
(política de partido/gobierno). Consequently, policies will be directed towards benefitting the
party, especially the party leader, and not necessarily the civilian population. Moreover, by
ostensibly skipping merit-based hiring standards, rule of law is also overlooked which further
undermines democracy.
21
Hypothesis 2: Countries with more institutionalized party systems will enact more
measures to preclude patronage and will be more efficient at curtailing extended presidential
powers of appointment. According to Panizza et al. (2019), where parties are well
institutionalized, party organization will not be subordinated to the leader’s political career.
This is because the party organization has its own independent status and continuity. Simply
put, if there is a highly institutionalized party system, then presidential powers will most likely
be constrained and the president will act as a party agent, this would entail that whatever
appointments are done will most likely be professional in nature and in the upper echelons of
the administration.
The second independent variable is policy area. From bridges, to schools, to hospitals,
the role of the state and the range of public services it provides has expanded exponentially in
the past two hundred years. Given the wide array of ministries that exist in most countries
nowadays, the roles they fulfill and the kinds of goods and services they provide, it is clear that
the way they are organized and the administrative needs will vary.
Hypothesis 3: More technical ministries (such as foreign affairs and finance) will require
more professional staff; thus will have less patronage.
Hypothesis 4: Ministries dedicated to social development (such as education and culture)
will be most prone to more patronage. Rent-seeking in this kind of issue areas is easier because
there are little professional requirements and differentiation between employees. Hence,
there is a higher chance that politicians will use these positions to reward their supporters
22
and/or appoint those who they trust most. In other words, the bigger and less hierarchical the
government entity, the more likely its employees are patronage appointments.
Along with these expectations, the nature of each policy area will also detonate a wide
array of interactions between different actors. It also follows that depending on the issue area,
some actors will be more influential than others. Teacher unions, for example, play a significant
role in education ministries across the region and are a constant fixture in debates surrounding
civil service reform within the realm of education. On the other hand, it is hard to visualize
strong union influence in policy realms like foreign affairs. Because there is such nuance, each
chapter will cover a specific sector where more detailed hypotheses and pathways to variation
will be covered. That being said, it is crucial to keep in mind that the two main variables
mentioned above—degree of party system institutionalization and policy area—will be the
stepping stones from which mechanisms towards differing levels of patronage will exist in each
country. Moreover, as mentioned above and as previous research has shown, I expect that with
higher levels of patronage, the weaker the state and the status of democracy.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN: TESTING VARIATION IN PATRONAGE
The main objective of this dissertation project is to look at the mechanisms that lead to
variation in state capacity in terms of the prevalence of patronage. To test the hypotheses
above, two kind of comparisons will be made: 1) Across cases 2) Across ministries. Process
tracing and comparative historical analysis, alongside in-depth, semi-structured interviews are
the main testing tools. Three case studies, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile, will be used. The time
period of interest will be roughly 2000-2019.
23
All of three of these countries were former Spanish colonies in the Americas which
therefore inherited an administrative template from Spain. The encomienda system and the
sale of titles widely practiced throughout the kingdom and its viceroyalties fostered the
importance of clientelistic practices to ensure political and economic survival. Despite initiatives
that sought to re-centralize power and professionalize the civil service (the most relevant of
which were the Bourbon Reforms), centuries after independence, the roots of patronage have
proven to be deep. Even though most of Spain’s colonies in South America became
independent republics in the 1820s and 1830s, these first years were marked by weak incipient
states, caudillismo, and factional control of government.
Throughout the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries and despite the development of the middle class
and mass-based parties, public administration remained largely based on patronage—the
needs and preferences of presidents, specific groups in society, and (later) parties, greatly
influenced who would be appointed to specific offices. Moreover, with the increased relevance
of mass-based parties, patronage became more closely aligned with partisanship and/or party
leadership. This fact in addition to the inclusion of technocrats above the legislature and parties
and the institutionalization of the executive wound up giving presidents extra patronage power.
Control over patronage therefore became an important component of political campaigns as
well as the expectations of workers and voters. Thus through the power of elections, patronage
melded in with democracy and meant that the electoral payoff would be higher in contexts of
poverty and limited employment opportunities (Grindle, 2012, 161).
This shared administrative experience inherited from colonial times and shaped by the
development of mass-based politics and technocracy is what largely makes Ecuador, Colombia
24
and Chile resemble each other in significant ways. Furthermore, like most countries in the
region, all three cases have had previous experience with authoritarian regimes, they have
relatively heterogeneous populations and economies that rely on commodity exports. Finally,
like most countries in Latin America, they have unitary and presidential political systems thus
making them a representative sample of the region. In addition, the fact that Ecuador and
Colombia (along with Venezuela) were once united as a single country makes for this
comparison between the two even more relevant and tantalizing. How is it that two countries
that were once one proceed to have differing levels of organizational capacity, with Colombia
typically outperforming Ecuador in this regard?
By adding the case of Chile, which, in spite having a very similar background to the
previous two cases, is frequently lauded for having a solid state with a professionalized, flexible
and meritocratic civil service (Grindle 2012; Iacoviello and Chudnovsky 2014; Iacoviello and
Zuvanic 2006; Cortázar et al., 2014) it will provide an empirical counterpoint to further test the
hypotheses against the experience in Ecuador and Colombia. As seen on the tables and figures
below, these countries clearly represent an important degree of variation in terms of how
professionalized its public administration is. By having three similar cases with different
outcomes (Chile with the most professionalized civil service, Colombia ranging in the middle,
and Ecuador amongst the least) this study can get a deeper understanding of what leads to
different levels of state capacity vis-à-vis patronage. The middle case (Colombia) can be
especially useful in gauging the right “mix” of actors and/or circumstances that can contribute
to some improvement in capacity
6
. Simply put, it can help as an extra control for the tests that
6
It is important to note that issue areas might make some states stronger in some areas than others.
25
are done on the more extreme cases. As previously mentioned, the two key independent
variables of interest are: degree of party system institutionalization (the score for each country,
which derives from Mainwaring´s 2018 study, is listed in Table 3) and the kind of policy area.
Measuring Patronage: Indicators
Though fully capturing the number of public servants who were hired on a discretionary basis
as opposed to through more merit-based grounds is a herculean task—and a fruitless one at
that given that these two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive—patronage scholars
have come up with a series of tools to help capture the extent to which countries have a more
professionalized public administration. Amongst the most common measuring tools are surveys
done to experts in specific ministries (Kopecky et al., 2012, Kopecky et al., 2016; Panizza et al.,
2019). Additionally, Zuvanic and Iacoviello (2009) have developed a scale of bureaucratic
development which captures the merit and functional capacity of civil service. This scale has
three main categories. At the very top are institutionalized civil services and officials with
appropriate credentials: Brazil and Chile commonly find themselves on this level. The middle
category, on the other hand, is comprised of countries such as Argentina and Mexico, where
although there is a relatively well-structured civil service, merit tools are not fully consolidated.
Finally, on the lowest level, the bureaucracy is minimally developed and the civil service is so
politicized that it hinders the development of a professional public administration. Ecuador and
Peru commonly find themselves at this stage.
This study will rely on these tools as well reports from INGOs such as the Inter-American
Development Bank and its own expert interviews to provide a fuller picture of the prevalence of
26
patronage for each country of study. Additional indexes and surveys to capture the dependent
variable across the three countries of interest are captured on Table 2.
27
Table 2. Indices delineating features of bureaucratic capacity indicators
Dataset/index Matching State Capacity
Indicators
Country scores
FRAGILE STATES INDEX (0-120
MOST STABLE-MOST UNSTABLE)
FACTIONALIZED ELITES (0-10 MOST
STABLE-MOST UNSTABLE)
7
Presence of state; Coherence CS: 2020
CHILE: 2.2
COLOMBIA: 7.6
ECUADOR: 8.2
TS: 1995-2017
FREEDOM HOUSE (0-120 LEAST
FREE-MOST FREE)
QUESTION C. 3. IN FUNCTIONING
OF GOVERNMENT SUB-CATEGORY:
DOES GOVERNMENT OPERATE WITH
OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY? (0-
4 points, least free to most free)
Presence of state; CS: 2020
CHILE: 4
COLOMBIA: 3
ECUADOR: 2
ICRG QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT
(0-1 LOWER TO HIGHER QUALITY)
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY (PART OF
COMPOSITE SCORE; ORIGINALLY 4
POINTS, SCALED TO 1 FOR TOTAL)
8
Meritocratic Civil Service;
Coherence
CS: 2014
CHILE: 1
COLOMBIA: 0
ECUADOR: 0
TS: 2005-2018
QOG EXPERT SURVEY
IMPARTIAL PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
9
(HIGHER VALUE
= MORE IMPARTIAL)
Coherence CS: 2014
CHILE: 6
COLOMBIA: 4
ECUADOR: 4
TS:N/A
7
Measures the degree of fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, racial/religious lines as well as
power struggles and political competition (Messner et al., 2017).
8
Looks at the bureaucracy’s strength and expertise to govern even when leadership changes. Evaluates the degree
to which the bureaucracy is autonomous from political pressure as well as the established mechanisms for
recruitment and training (PRS Group et al.; 2019) .
9
Measured in terms of the following rule: “When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not
take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law.”
(Dahlberg et al., 2020).
28
PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
10
(HIGHER VALUE
= MORE PROFESSIONAL)
Meritocratic Civil Service;
Coherence
CS: 2014
CHILE: 4
COLOMBIA: 3
ECUADOR: 3
TS: N/A
IACOVIELLO 2006 MERIT-BASED
HIRING (HIGHER VALUE=MORE
MERIT-BASED HIRING)
Meritocratic Civil Service CS: 2004
CHILE: 3
COLOMBIA: 2
ECUADOR: 1
TS: N/A
IACOVIELLO AND ZUVANIC 2006
MERIT AND FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY
(HIGHER VALUE=MORE MERIT-
BASED HIRING, HIGHER
FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY)
Meritocratic Civil Service CS: 2005
CHILE: 62
11
; 57
12
COLOMBIA: 52; 47
ECUADOR: 18;19
TS: N/A
WORLD BANK GOVERNMENT
EFFECTIVENESS, ESTIMATE
13
(LOWER
SCORE=MORE EFFECTIVE)
Meritocratic Civil Service;
Coherence
CS: 2016
CHILE: -1
COLOMBIA: 0
ECUADOR: 0
10
Degree by which the bureaucracy is professional as opposed to political or politicized.
11
Measure for merit-based hiring.
12
Measure for functional capacity.
13
Measures “responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence
of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on the “inputs” for the government to
produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods (Ibid, p. 141).
29
Map 1. Government Effectiveness as of 2019 (World Bank Governance indicators)
14
Source: Kaufmann D., A Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology
and Analytical Issues.
14
This indicator combines public service provision, quality of bureaucracy, civil servants’ competence,
independence of civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
policies (Teorell et al., 2020).
30
Table 3. Overall Party System Institutionalization Score in US and Latin America (1990-2015)
Country
Stability of
members of the
party system
Stability in
inter-party
electoral
competition
Stability of
parties’
ideological
positions
Overall PSI
score
United States 1.10 1.50 — 1.27
Uruguay 1.35 1.10 0.07 1.16
Mexico 1.21 0.81 1.63 1.09
Chile 0.88 0.73 1.95 0.90
Dominican
Republican
1.07 0.54 -0.90 0.72
Honduras 0.46 0.68 0.50 0.55
Brazil 0.45 0.41 1.04 0.48
El Salvador 0.14 0.76 0.75 0.42
Costa Rica 0.18 0.15 -0.80 0.09
Nicaragua 0.21 -0.14 0.21 0.08
Panama -0.23 -0.13 0.61 -0.13
Paraguay -0.38 0.31 -1.42 -0.19
Colombia -0.72 -0.56 -1.11 -0.69
Ecuador -0.71 -0.89 -0.73 -0.78
Argentina -0.99 -0.72 -0.30 -0.81
Bolivia -0.67 -1.24 -0.25 -0.85
Venezuela -1.34 -1.24 0.59 -1.15
Peru -1.18 -1.05 -1.54 -1.16
Guatemala -1.34 -1.39 -0.32 -1.28
Source: Mainwaring, 2018: 58.
How do cases stack up to this according to these indicators? As seen in the table
above and the map below, clearly Chile is ahead, and though Colombia and Ecuador have
similar scores on some issues, Colombia has a lead in others thus confirming that in ter ms
of organizational capacity, and more specifically in terms of how meritocratic/professional
the civil service is, Chile is ahead, Colombia is somewhere in the middle and is Ecuador
somewhat behind though not always the worst in the region. Interestingly, the cases also
differ in similar ways in terms of their party system institutionalization score.
31
For each of these countries, I will be studying the ministries education, health and foreign
affairs. These sectors have and continue to be crucial public goods which, for the most part,
have been expected to be provided by the state. As such, they pose an excellent lens through
which to evaluate state capacity in each country.
Ministries of education in Latin America in recent decades have often been staffed and
presided by actors who had fought against dictatorships back in the sixties, seventies and
eighties. Relatedly, education ministries have often been a place where we see a push to
promote democratic values (Levinson and Berumen, 2007); they can therefore provide an
illustration of the state-democracy nexus at work. Ministries of health, though more technical
in nature, have also been subjected to their fair share of controversy in terms of the amount of
politicization of the staff present in what should be a more neutral policy area needing of highly
specialized and professional staff (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004). Both of these ministries will be
analyzed in a cross-case analysis which includes all three countries.
The third ministry, Foreign Affairs, or Cancillería in Spanish, will be analyzed through a
within-case comparison for Ecuador. The reasoning behind this is that since foreign affairs
ministries usually required highly trained staff, it is widely regarded as one of the most technical
and apolitical ministries (Panizza et al., 2019; Kopecky et al., 2016). Thus, analyzing this case in
particular could provide further evidence as to how much patronage has affected the
Ecuadorian state. Simply put, if this ministry in particular was able to keep a high degree of
professionally trained and merit-based appointees in their midst, then it is robust enough to
work with any kind of leadership—even one of a populist ruler. In other words, the within-case
comparison would provide a final and most-extreme case to test the prevalence of patronage in
32
Ecuador. The implications being that if the most professional of all ministries has fallen prey to
patronage, then other ministries probably also followed suit, all to the detriment of democracy
and overall state capacity.
Data collection
While the above data is useful to get the general picture of where each country lies on each
variable, semi-structured interviews with mid-to-high level ministry employees (current and
former) for each ministry within all three countries will provide a more in-depth look at who the
most crucial actors are and the mechanisms that have led to higher or lower levels of patronage
in each sector and country. Interviews to other strategic decision-makers and policy area
experts regarding the operation and evolution of each of these ministries will also be incredibly
helpful in the analysis.
15
Additionally, I will be drawing upon reports on civil service and specific
policy arenas in the region written by non-governmental agencies such as the IDB.
All of this data will help to outline the mechanisms, or steps, by which each of these countries
attained their current organizational capacity and more specifically, the degree to which
patronage is present. By looking at this data, I will furthermore have a clearer idea of which
variables, actors and points in time are crucial in determining the institutional development of
each country. It will also hopefully yield more theories and hypotheses for future research
agendas.
The rest of this dissertation will proceed as follows: chapter two will study patronage in
the realm of education in Chile, Colombia and Ecuador. It will highlight the tension between
15
The Appendix includes the kind of questions asked during the interviews.
33
teachers’ unions and other civil society organizations play in curtailing patronage in this
particular sector. Chapter three proceeds to analyze the conditions under which patronage in
health ministries wanes or flourishes. Chapter four is a within-case comparison using Ecuador’s
ministry of foreign affairs to further test whether or not increased patronage can affect even
the most technical, meritocratic and professionalized ministries of all. As previously mentioned,
each chapter will come with its own set of hypotheses, mechanisms and conclusions. However,
the dissertation will conclude with chapter five where some general conclusions and
implications will be discussed. It will also highlight a few areas for future investigation.
34
Chapter 2: Clean-Up Time? Patronage and Education Reform in Chile,
Colombia, and Ecuador
Education is commonly viewed as a cornerstone to guarantee any society’s evolution.
Expanding coverage and the quality of education is thus often lauded by professionals and
politicians of all ideologies as a key feature governments should prioritize. Throughout the mid-
to-late 2000s, an Andean wave of education reform emerged, pushing for the expansion of
education services as well as an improvement in the quality of education received by students.
This wave of reforms led to deep changes in Ecuador (starting in 2006), Peru (in 2009), Chile (in
2016, although more gradual reforms had been going on since the 1990s) and, albeit to a lesser
degree, Colombia (in 2002) (Schneider et al. 2019). One of the most remarkable aspects of
these reforms is that they were prioritized by regimes across the ideological spectrum. These
reforms led to increases in education spending and coverage (i.e., student enrollment) and
implementing a more structured selection process for hiring and evaluating teaching personnel
to improve education quality.
Despite these seemingly optimistic prospects, the reasons as to why education is
important and thus prioritized have not always been very noble. Politicians in Latin America
have traditionally used education as political patronage, a means to grant specific members or
groups in society “special favors” in return for electoral success and political longevity. Public
education has commonly taken the form of an employment bank for the ruling party’s
following. In some cases, changes in government have meant that all of education
administration and teachers of the losing party were replaced by the winning party’s team
(Duarte 2001; Hanson 1995; Plank 1990a; Martin 1993; Oxford Analytica 1995). In short,
35
education has frequently been used to “grease the wheels of clientelism” (Brown and Hunter,
2004: 845). Education reform has also often been perceived as “a means to other ends, namely,
political capital in the short-term and often clientelist sense” (Lowden, 2004: 372). Not only this
but the weakness of ministries and the citizenry at large in terms of inspecting and overseeing
public education administration has facilitated the appearance and permanence of patronage,
clientelism, and corruption in this sector (Duarte 2001: 4-5).
Patronage in education has proven to have detrimental effects. Not only does it hinder
educational advances, but it also promotes harmful party politics thereby underscoring the
state’s deficiencies, all of which become self-enforcing. At its worst, patronage in education
translates into meeting the needs of patronage and clientelist networks in lieu of the
pedagogical needs of the population. Engaging in patronage politics also means that
administrations are hit by disorganization and unpredictability. Though this lack of structure
might benefit those partaking in patron-client relations funneling ministry resources to meet
particularistic interests, it underscores weaknesses in providing equal and quality education,
especially to those who need it most. With this in mind, it is clear that something must be done
to address these problems.
While there is a risk that reforms to eschew particularistic appointments and
professionalizing the public teaching career could simply exacerbate the already pervasive
nature of patronage found in most countries of the region. Nevertheless, events transpiring in
the last decade or so have proven that this is not entirely the case. What is more, these reforms
have, by and large, helped at least somewhat mitigate patronage in the education sector. Why
and how was this case?
36
This chapter seeks to answer why patronage in public education, specifically in primary
and secondary schooling, continues to exist in Latin America
16
. More specifically, what are the
key factors that explain their persistence or decay? Using the cases of Chile, Colombia, and
Ecuador, I argue that three central factors set the path for diminished patronage in the
education sector: (1) degree of party system institutionalization, (2) the level of politicization of
teacher ‘s unions, and (3) the strength of civil society groups and policy networks. Overall, this
chapter finds that in countries with historically high party system institutionalization, low union
politicization, and a strong civil society—here exemplified by Chile—patronage in the education
sector has significantly diminished over time. Ecuador, on the other hand, has seen patronage
become more deeply entrenched due to policies taken under the regime of Rafael Correa
(2007-2017). Colombia presents itself as a “mixed bag” of sorts, finding itself curtailing national-
level patronage yet still encountering more nuanced and potentially more pernicious versions
of patron-client relations at local levels.
This chapter has important insights on state-society relations and particularly on the
role education reform can have on patronage. In particular, this study clarifies the relevance of
teacher career reforms and the role they played in cleaning up education politics. Additionally,
this chapter shows the necessity to look at how the politics of education serve state-society
relations as whole. Specifically, it serves as a reminder to look at the dynamics between
education and politics more closely, as they can help demonstrate how patron-client
16
There are two main reasons as to why the focus is kept on primary and secondary education. First, to ensure
balance amongst cross-case analysis seeing that while the ministries of education in Chile and Colombia include
oversight up to tertiary education, Ecuador has a separate government entity for the latter while the ministry of
education oversees education up to secondary level. Second, and most importantly, given that secondary
education is mandatory in all three countries, it is logical to study oversight up to that level in all three countries
since their ministries guarantee that they provide this.
37
relationships might shift and/or evolve over time. As Grindle points out, patronage has many
faces and is incredibly useful for politicians to win votes and push their agendas. Thus,
regardless of the country, it never truly goes away. However, as this chapter shows, there are
ways to mitigate it. In short, through the teaching career reform, we are able to see different
paths that countries in Latin America, exemplified through Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, took to
either do away or heighten patterns of patronage in their societies. The first path, represented
here by Chile, is one where there is less patronage overall. The second, illustrated by Colombia,
shows less patronage at the national level but varying degrees in localities. Finally, in Ecuador a
third path where attempts to professionalize teaching careers, and the public service writ-large,
wind up increasing and exacerbating patronage. The question of why patronage in public
education persisted in some countries more than others thus parallels why teaching career
reforms (which were crafted mainly to mitigate patronage in this sector) are more successfully
implemented in some countries more than others.
The chapter will continue as follows. First, there will be a brief overview of the literature
on the politics of education and education reform. Second, a theory section lays out the various
factors and paths that the case studies in question have followed in recent decades. Third, a
careful evaluation of each case is presented. An important caveat is worth considering:
comparisons of patronage are kept to within the region. Clearly, when compared to other
regions of the world, even Latin American success stories in like Chile, Costa Rica or Uruguay
still have a ways to go. The data collected for this paper is based on reports from different local
and international organizations, official statements and news reports. Moreover, interviews of
current and former ministry officials, policy consultants, and high-ranking members of
38
foundations and universities provided important insights for each case study.
17
The chapter will
close with a synthesis of the main findings and lessons from each case as well as policy
implications.
1. THE LITERATURE ON EDUCATION POLITICS
The study of education is relatively under-explored by political scientists. Nevertheless, recent
years have shown increased interest in it. Different avenues to explore it include: looking at the
effects of education policy and systems on student performance, the political economy of
education and training on society, the internationalization and Europeanization of education
policy (Jakob et al. 2009b; Leuze et al. 2008) and the role of education in comparative public
policy. This latter avenue has had varying strains. The first has looked at the development of
education systems through a historical institutionalist and/or a macro-sociological lens
(Heidenheimer 1973; 1981; Archer 1979). A second more contemporary strain attempts to
identify determinants of public and private investments in education. Therefore, they tend to
focus on testing the effects of distinct independent variables (a common one being education
spending) on education policy outputs.
As such, these studies tend to use large-N samples and are more quantitative in nature.
Examples of this kind of works include Ansell (2008, 2010), Busemeyer (2007) and Boix (1997,
1998). Finally, a third strain studies issues of education governance (Enders 2004; Clark 1983)
by comparing and describing cross-national differences in terms of how education institutions
are organized and govern themselves. Nevertheless, this kind of studies seem to be more
17
For more information on the interviewees and their profile, see Appendix.
39
focused on cases in Western Europe and the sphere of higher education (Busemeyer and
Trampusch 2011).
One key feature of the literature on education politics, especially one that deals with the
developing world, is that it is very slim; a fact that has been bemoaned by several authors
(Schneider et al. 2019; Kingdon et al. 2014; Moe and Wiborg 2016; Gift and Wibbels 2014). Luna
and Mardones (2014) also argue that most of the current literature has focused either on the
politics of education reform or on identifying variables affecting school performance and school
choice, yet there are scarce studies that look at education policy as an arena for clientelistic or
distributive politics (p. 47). More often than not, education is seemingly studied in light of
other topics, usually through an inter-disciplinary approach but not as a whole.
Some authors have discussed reform politics in the context of teacher unions. These
include: Bruns and Schneider, 2016; Bruns and Luque, 2015; Corrales, 1999; Grindle, 2004; Moe
and Wiborg 2017 and Hickey and Houssain, 2018. The aforementioned authors have added to
the literature by exploring the way in which political interests are intertwined and entrenched
with those of unions. Given the complexity and embedded nature of political interests with
teacher unions, there is a need to further study said relationship more closely, an agenda this
chapter hopes to continue. Furthermore, as Kingdon et al. (2014) find, the little literature that
explores the politics of patronage in education focuses more on the problem of patronage as
opposed to potential solutions. In short, a gap exists within the literature whereby the
processes and factors that either mitigate and/or exacerbate patterns of patronage have been
understudied (Duarte 2001). Herein is this chapter’s contribution: to study what and how
reform politics can help diminish patronage, particularly in Latin America.
40
The Politics of Reform: Why Enacting Change is Difficult
Why do politicians and political parties care about education? First, there is a short-term
interest in having control of one of the largest ministries (both in terms of spending and
personnel) in each country. In short, there is significant job availability for political
appointment, which is enticing for teacher unions or other party supporters as a way to trade
appointments for clientelist support (Bruns et al. 2019). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that
“clientelism, patronage and corruption are three of the most intense political forces that push
states to expand education” (Corrales 2005: 18).
In the last 50 years, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have reached
mass expansion of education coverage than most OECD countries in 200 years. While in 1970
there were approximately 53 million enrolled students in primary school across the region, by
2010 this number had increased to 127 million in 2010, and from 1.3 million teachers to 7.4
million (Bruns and Luque 2015: 55). However, relative to its level of economic development, the
region is still underperforming. Teaching quality and salaries in Latin America are low in
comparison to other regions (approximately 3-4% GDP and 15% total public spending across the
region (Ibid, p.79). There are not many incentives to become a teacher; this is partly due to the
fact that increased coverage and the massification of schooling drove salaries down. Because of
this, schools are more likely to hire less-educated teachers. Put simply, teaching, by and large,
has no longer been considered a high-prestige job. However, the fact that it is a stable job with
access to better health and pension benefits than other jobs, makes it a common one.
One of the Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015) was to achieve universal
primary education. Reforms to achieve this objective through the late 1990s to roughly 2015
41
have certainly paid off. Over the past 20 years, every single country in Latin America has
increased education spending. Student-to-teacher ratios have decreased in all countries and in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Panamá and Uruguay it is now 20 to 1; a
number lower than some high-performance OECD countries (Bruns and Luque, 2015, p.296).
This kind of reforms are usually “easier” to implement (or even to measure) and more popular
since it essentially means that parents can get schools closer to home, teachers get more jobs,
and unions get new members (Grindle 2004; Corrales 1999). More importantly, improvements
in coverage are more visible to voters.
18
Nevertheless, shifts in perception of education
provision have led to more pressure for deeper changes.
Between the 1990s and the 2000s, the spread of technology and mass media made
corruption scandals and instances of government failure more visible to the general public
which, in turn, resulted in increased public demand for accountability. As such, politicians in
Latin America started betting more for education reform as a means to get public support. This
stands in opposition to previous and more traditional “quid pro quo” strategies of getting
electoral support from teachers’ unions in exchange for education policies that do not threaten
these unions’ interests (i.e., higher wages). Put differently, increased accountability from civil
society led politicians to have to resort to more all-encompassing policies to deal with failures
in public education and to improve its general quality beyond merely increasing salaries.
18
Throughout the 21
st
century, countries in Latin America have also enacted the following policies: more years of
mandatory schooling, more emphasis on teacher training (increased professionalization of teachers), finding new
forms of financing (such as international organizations such as IDB and UNESCO), establish national systems to
measure and evaluate quality of education (SIMCE in Chile, SABER in Colombia, INEVAL in Ecuador), and joining
international standardized student performance tests such as PISA (Program for International Student
Achievement, sponsored/created by OECD). Notably, the region still ranks on lower end of scorers with Chile
scoring the region’s highest (Gallegos, 2008).
42
Furthermore, as coverage goals have been reached, improving teaching quality remains an
important feature of education policy across Latin America. In fact, the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs, 2015-2030) have captured this need by shifting goals from access-
oriented reform to quality of learning—an arduous task, especially for low and middle-income
countries.
Seeking both more access to education and improving its quality involves engaging with
a crucial sector often considered the most important stakeholder in education reform: teachers
(Bruns and Luque 2015; Grindle, 2004). Quality-based reforms have usually meant reforming
and re-structuring the way teachers are hired, appointed, and evaluated throughout their
careers. Adding to this, Corrales (1999) finds that another problem is high ministerial turnover
rates which prevent a smooth transition when reforms are being proposed or even
implemented. The pacing of reforms is therefore highly important. As will be explored later,
Chile is a good example of pushing reforms forward while keeping different voices on the
negotiation table. Thus, very much in line with Bersch’s argument about the value of
implementing problem-solving reforms, sequencing and gradually implementing policy changes
has proven to be a better strategy to continue to engage civil society and its interests whilst
also effecting and institutionalizing change—all while keeping patronage at bay (2019).
As will be explored later, due to the nature of this kind of reform, it has not gone unchallenged.
Major reform in most recent cases (Mexico, Perú, and Ecuador) has led to confrontation with
unions which, in turn, have affected the rate and success of implementing said changes.
19
19
Within these rifts, either there has been no real space to negotiate or negotiations have been non-starters.
Despite these challenges, Mexico, Perú and Ecuador were still able to push reform through. However, in doing so,
43
Source: Bruns et al., 2019 : 29.
2. THE THEORY
The main argument here is that the interaction of three factors—the degree of party system
institutionalization (PSI), the kind of teacher unions governments face, and the strength of civil
society, help set in motion the type of reform path that will ensue. Reforms, in turn, act as a
vehicle which, depending on the success of implementation, may or may not help do away
patronage (see tables 1 and 3). In short, while the three aforementioned factors are crucial to
determine the success of mitigating patronage, these three ingredients will be carried through
vis-à-vis the reforms. Crucially, though all three elements are important on their own, what is
truly carrying the brunt of the work is the continuous interaction between them. For example,
in the Chilean case, the fact that the country had a long history of institutionalized parties and
its previous experience with authoritarianism combined with a highly professional teacher
union and an active civil society made it so that the reforms taken were gradual and negotiated.
This, in turn, meant that patronage remained low to non-existent. Relatedly, reforms by
the biggest trade-off was an inability to get teachers’ input on the reforms, something which could have improved
the quality of the changes the government wanted to make (Bruns and Luque, 2015).
Table 4. Main challenges to teacher career policy reform:
1. Contentious: usually politically charged because teachers are typically
unionized and therefore easily politicized.
2. Opaque implementation: difficult to monitor (especially at the classroom
level). This is a big issue—In developing countries there is 20% teacher
absenteeism.
3. Long-term effects: harder to sell on short-term. Moreover, difficult to
attribute any kind of success, and thereby reward, to the incumbent so as
to make it beneficial for them (considering politicians have much shorter
time frames than the time it would take to see the outcome of this kind of
reforms).
44
themselves, though a crucial mechanism, cannot be solely responsible for the erasure of
patronage. If that were the case, then all countries who undertook reforms (essentially in all
three cases and most countries in Latin America) would be by-and-large free from patronage
which is clearly not the case.
20
The following sections will give further explanations of what each variable means for the
three case studies: Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.
Figure 3. Conceptualizing the argument
20
Alternative explanations for the persistence of patronage include: 1. High minister turnout only partially explains
it. Even though logically speaking, lower turnout would usually be better to ensure continuity of successful
practices and modify things that need modifying, all these countries still have relatively high turnout rates (average
1 minister every 2 years) thus, not much is explained by this sole factor. However, it still important to keep in mind
and might be an overall regional challenge all countries need to address. 2. Socioeconomic factors: More
money/more spending on education yields better results and less patronage. More industrialized/diversified
countries will have less patronage because businessowners more involved in accountability and wanting to reform
education so as to have a more highly-skilled workforce (Ansell, 2010). This is relative. Businesses have not really
been that involved in education reform, even in countries like Chile where there’s more of an active industrial
sector and a more flexible market. Furthermore, Ecuador experienced an economic bonanza but yet patronage still
remained. All three cases saw an increase in education spending. Nevertheless, more spending does not
immediately mean less patronage or better education. In fact, there is still a widespread concern with improving
education quality. Moreover, because there are many educational options in the private sphere, if the country is
facing a period of economic growth, families with more means might simply choose to enroll their children into
private school, thus there is no guarantee that the public education system would definitively be aided by an
economic bonanza. Poorer groups have also lacked incentives to become more involved in education policy, thus
leaving little pressure to change what might be deficient (Duarte, 2001).
Party system
institutionalization
Degree of politicization
of teacher’s union
Strength of civil society
groups
Reform
Prevalence of patronage
in public education
45
Party System Institutionalization
The history behind these countries’ party systems matters greatly in evaluating whether or not
patronage will persist. A country that has a long history of stable elections where contenders
have clear ideological or programmatic distinctions typically means that there are clearer paths
for voters to voice their concerns. Electoral stability also signals to constituents that the rules of
the game are clear, hence potentially helping voters to trust the system and participate in an
orderly fashion.
Even before the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), Chile had had a long history of
stable partisan alignments and electoral stability. There has also been a long history of
cooperation between the executive, political parties and the legislature. With the return of
democracy, the country has been able to maintain relatively stable partisan alignments based
on two main coalitions (one center-left and one center-right) and a culture of consensus politics
(Carreras 2015; Martínez 2020). Thus, for these reasons clientelism in Chile “remains a
complementary but not core linkage mechanism” (Morgan and Meléndez 2016: 25) with only
some small distributive distortions—which are not nearly close to the levels of other countries
in the region, especially Colombia and Ecuador (Luna and Mardones 2014). Nevertheless, as
the mass protests in October 2019 have shown, some degree of disconnect between the people
and parties has been sown (Carreras 2015). It will be interesting to see how constitutional
reforms help amend this situation.
Although coming from a long history of bipartisanship, Colombia’s two-party system has
now evolved into a multi-party system. Previous abuses of Colombia’s two oldest parties,
46
Conservatives and Liberals, have compelled the people to seek different electoral options
(Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014). The erosion of the two-party system was precipitated by
rampant patronage schemes led by both parties (which also became increasingly less
ideological and more focused on winning votes and political rent), especially in the time of the
National Front (1958-1972). The current system, though still evolving, is characterized by high
electoral volatility and personalistic parties (Albarracín et al. 2018; Gamboa 2020).
Ecuador has a significant legacy of high electoral volatility, personalistic and clientelist
parties in a multi-party system. Like Colombia, Ecuador has had limited experiences with
military dictatorships, which, in turn, were typically shorter and not repetitive. However, the
country’s multi-party system suffers from low institutionalization and the overbearance of party
leaders whose leadership style is highly populist and caudillo-like. For instance, it is not
uncommon to have about sixteen different parties running in presidential elections. In addition,
it is also not uncommon that in the next electoral cycle at least a third of those parties are
replaced with new ones with equally unclear ideological and policy positions.
Political crises in the 1990s and early 2000s made the party system lose legitimacy. This
became the perfect platform for presidential candidate Rafael Correa to criticize and build a
new base of support. Correa and his party, Alianza PAIS (AP), won the 2006 elections and
posthumously dominated Ecuador’s political scene for 14 years (2007-2021). During this time,
AP passed significant reforms related to education by using and exacerbating previous
patronage and clientelist networks. In spite of the reforms, patronage in the country increased,
and still the party system remains highly volatile and filled with caudillo-like figures. In short,
despite the seeming stability brought from one party dominating the political scene for
47
fourteen consecutive years, the problems from before—personalistic parties and low party
system institutionalization—continue (Coppedge 1998; Basabe-Serrano 2018).
Teacher Unions
Why do unions form and why are they powerful? First of all, unions are large relative to the size
of the overall workforce, representing 4% of the overall labor force in Latin America in 2012 and
more than 20% of technical and professional workers (Bruns et al. 2019; Bruns and Luque
2015). Not only this but teachers’ unions in particular are endowed with very little internal
differentiation (other than perhaps seniority) amongst their ranks. They can therefore more
easily have a monopoly on the representation of teachers which, in turn, gives them an
incentive to act as a single unit thus garnering more bargaining power. Second, they have
widespread coverage throughout the territory, making it easier to rally support at a national
level. Finally, due to this high ability to mobilize, strikes and protests are typically disruptive,
often meaning classes being cancelled for weeks or months on end and therefore affecting a
significant proportion of voters (Bruns et al. 2019: 29).
Unlike other countries in Latin America, in Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, a single teacher
union holds the monopoly on representation. As Table 5 (below) shows, there is some variance
between each case as to how these unions operate. While the Colegio (Chile) and FECODE
(Colombia) have managed to stay relevant—mainly by finding ways to negotiate with the
government—tensions with Correa’s regime led to UNE’s dissolution (although the current
administration has reverted the legal dissolution).
48
Table 5. Characteristics of teachers´ unions in Chile, Colombia and Ecuador
Country Teachers’
union
Union
density
Fragmentation Relation
with political
parties
Disruptive
behavior
Education
ministry
capture
Chile
Colegio de
Profesores
53% Monopoly of
representation
Not formally
related to
parties but
supported
candidates of
Concertación
de Partidos de
Democracia
(leftist
coalition).
Low No
Colombia
Federación
Colombiana de
Educadores
(FECODE)
81.6% Monopoly of
representation
Not formally
linked to any
major political
parties but in
recent years
has made
alliances with
leftist parties
(mainly Polo
Democrático)
Intermediate-
level of
disruption.
Disruption
levels have
decreased in
recent years.
No
Ecuador
Unión
Nacional de
Educadores
(UNE)
Density in the
1990s: 79-
90%, after
2000: 79%.
Monopoly of
representation
Has had a very
public
relationship
with leftist
party MPD
(Movimiento
Partido
Democracia)
Intermediate
to high levels
of disruption.
Between 1998-
2007 protests
occurred at
least once a
year.
Traditionally
had significant
influence over
teachers’
careers and
ministerial
appointments.
Dissolved in
2016, now
attempting to
re-surge.
Source: Bruns and Luque, 2015: 298-299
There are many different ways in which teacher’s unions wield their power. As seen
above, teachers’ unions frequently mobilize through strikes. Another important tool in their
arsenal is the linkages they draw with political parties. In a nutshell, parties are attracted to
unions for their size, relative homogeneity and ability to mobilize. Consequently, unions are a
vital entity for parties and are frequently leveraged for political purposes. For instance, leftist
and more radical parties have captured union leadership to build a political base through the
union’s widespread network. Additionally, unions have become “integral cogs of large
49
patronage and rent seeking machines tied to clientelist parties, as political parties exchange
union support for favorable regulation such as monopoly of representation, automatic
membership for all teachers, and universal payroll deductions for union dues” in exchange for,
“administrative prerogatives such as the ability to appoint new teachers (see Zengele 2013 on
South Africa), education officials (see Bruns and Luque 2015 on Mexico and Ecuador), or even
the state legislature (see Kingdon and Muzammil 2009 on Uttar Pradesh, India)” (Bruns et al.
2019: 29). It is no coincidence that unions in Latin America that have helped their party allies
achieve electoral gains get favorable education policies (Ibid: 305).
Yet another way in which unions wield their power is through government capture, or
the degree to which they have access to key positions within the Ministry at local and national
levels. This is especially the case given that, as Corrales (1999) finds, due to the high rate of
turnover among education ministers in the region, union leaders will typically have more
leverage over their counterparts simply because they have been around longer and have more
experience with reform processes. Similarly, Bruns and Luque point out that “unions have long
time horizons, and can wait out reformers to reassert preferences and prerogatives in
subsequent governments” (2015: 29). In the face of weak ministries of education, highly
organized unions are able to dictate policy. However, this means that the space for outside
interlocutors who might be affected by policy choices such as parent organizations, the private
sector and business, is reduced leading to further breaches between policy-making and the
people who are most impacted by them (Duarte, 2001).
Unions also employ legal strategies to push the needle in their direction. FECODE in
Colombia and UNE in Ecuador have been known to challenge the legality of reforms that the
50
government wishes to implement. In the case of Colombia, FECODE worked to reverse a
constitutional reform that would have decreased federal transfers to subnational governments.
In 2009, Ecuador’s UNE challenged a provision for teacher evaluation systems and collected
signatures to have this provision overturned. It is important to note, however, that inasmuch as
this strategy can be wielded, it does not necessarily mean that it will be successful. Finally,
union-sponsored research and policy analysis can also be yet another instrument used to
ensure that their voices are being heard (Bruns and Luque 2015). In Colombia, for example,
FECODE established the Center for Studies and Teachers’ Research (CEID).
Highly political unions, like the ones found in Mexico and Ecuador, are characterized for
having power over teacher hiring and ministerial appointments (including the actual minister).
This particular aspect is incredibly important since it gives union leaders significant power
which they can leverage to politicians or party leaders who want their vote and/or support. For
these reasons, highly politicized unions have the most to lose if reforms about improving
teaching quality are passed and enacted. This is especially the case if the reform at hand is
about more meritocratic hiring and appointment since the reform might threaten the union’s
base of political power. However, because of their numbers and longevity, unions have been
typically able to oppose the reforms in the short run. What Bruns et al. (2019) classify as highly
professional unions (such as the one in Chile and many countries in Europe), conversely, do not
have significant influence on teacher hiring or ministry appointments. These kinds of union are
generally more willing to negotiate reforms to teaching careers. They do, however, typically
defend employment security.
51
Negotiating with unions about specific reforms hence depends on where unions fall in
the spectrum above. Clearly, it is easier to negotiate with a union if it is more professional than
when it is more politicized. As mentioned previously, Chile’s success in gradually introducing
teacher policies is likely linked to the kind of unions they were facing. In this case, Chile’s most
important teachers’ union, Colegio de Profesores or simply, the Colegio, is highly professional
and therefore less politicized than its regional counterparts (Bruns and Luque 2015; Bruns et al.
2019). Not only this, but throughout this time period of reforms, and even afterwards, the
Colegio was included in the negotiations and their feedback very much received (Mizala and
Schneider 2014; interview Rodolfo Bonifaz 2021).
In sum, teacher unions usually look for reforms that will (1) increase salary and benefits
and (2) create better working conditions (for example: smaller class sizes, something parents
typically agree with). Conversely, they will typically oppose anything that might challenge their
tenure: performance-based evaluations, curriculum changes, pressure for accountability, and
student testing. In terms of job tenure, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Perú recently passed new
laws to take out poor-performing teachers and remove civil service job-protection. The process
to pass these laws required some negotiation including increasing salaries, exempting existing
teachers from the evaluations and offering early retirement bonuses.
Teacher Reforms in the Andes and Their Impact on Teachers’ Unions
Teacher evaluation systems have been implemented in Colombia since 2002, in Chile (whose
evaluation system is considered the best in the region) since 2003 and Ecuador in 2007. By and
large, teacher evaluations are helpful in reducing training costs, providing better information on
52
how to train teachers, and increasing accountability. The overall motivation with introducing
teacher evaluations is to shift from rewarding seniority (which continues to be commonplace)
to rewarding performance.
21
Along with these evaluations, differentiated pay scales were
introduced in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the state of Sao Paulo; their
goal is to allow for high performance teachers to get better salaries and/or bonuses. While this
kind of policy can and has helped governments get new allies (as was the case with Ecuador’s
new teaching cohort), unions have traditionally opposed this kind of reform because it might
create distinctions amongst their ranks which would, in turn, weaken their mobilization ability
and therefore their bargaining power. In short, without differentiated scales, unions can more
easily organize everyone because they are all equally poorly paid.
Student performance evaluations have also become quite popular and many countries
have developed their own standardized tests as well as bringing in international examinations
(the most common one being PISA or Program on International Student Assessment). Although
these tests are not immune to criticism, one benefit is that they have yielded important data on
student learning which then helps politicians make a case for reform. Access to this information
gives policy-makers more power and credibility over teachers’ unions when it comes to pushing
for education reform (Bruns and Luque 2015: 290). On a similar note, teacher performance
evaluations, which have become more commonplace through reforms in the early 2000s, have
typically become very controversial and led to strikes in Ecuador and Peru. Incidentally, Chile
21
Evaluations can provide carrots and sticks: In Chile and Ecuador, the Ministry provides bonus pay for teachers
who excel in evaluations. Conversely, in all three cases (as well as in Mexico and Perú) teachers who consecutively
get poor marks on their evaluations are dismissed. While this has been put in place, in reality, statistics show that
not many teachers have been fired due to poor evaluations (Bruns and Luque, 2019: 42).
53
was the only country where having these evaluations did not cause mayor conflict. One
important caveat, nonetheless, is that this kind of appraisals were introduced in Chile a lot
more gradually and through a longer time span. They also began on a voluntary basis. As will
evaluated later, Ecuador’s timing on passing and implementing reform was the complete
opposite to Chile. The timing and the impact of the reform in Ecuador set off tabula-rasa
measures which wound up exacerbating patronage practices.
Along with teaching career reforms, decentralization measures have also been
controversial for unions. Many countries have attempted to decentralize their public education
systems to increase efficiency and also bring education services and responsibility closer to
students. Unions were opposed to these measures because it meant dividing their organization
into smaller (sub)regional units, making it harder to coordinate efforts and therefore decreasing
unions’ bargaining power (Bruns and Luque 2015: 291). Moreover, unions fear decentralization
because subregions might not have the funds to fulfill budgetary commitments such as salaries
and long-term benefits. For these very reasons Colombia’s FECODE opposed decentralization
measures passed in 1989 and 1991 by forming a coalition with municipalities.
22
To summarize,
22
Other measures unions typically oppose include more flexibility in school choice and alternative certification.
Ministries propose open public school education by channeling public funds to private schools through
competition. Unions typically dislike this because in private schools teachers are usually covered by private labor
law as opposed to public sector regulations. Chile is the only country where the publicly subsidized voucher school
sector grew in enrollment from 30% (1990) to 56% which helped decrease union power (or softening it). There was
also less conflict over reform in Chile because post-1990 there has been consistent support for teacher
professionalism and increase teacher compensation (Bruns and Luque, 2015, p.292). Colombia also has (much
smaller) system of concession schools: successful private schools contracted to manage public schools (unions hate
these too and try to resist them). In regards to alternative certification, that is, granting people who do not have
“official” teacher training different certificates to allow them to teach, unions vehemently oppose them because
want people from similar backgrounds so as to avoid any background-based fragmentation. An example of
alternative certification is the Teach for All program (an off-shoot of Teach for America) which was very popular
and successful. However, due to union pressures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Perú TFAs were
not allowed in public schools (Bruns and Luque, 2015).
54
unions generally oppose anything that might minimize their numbers because that means that
would decrease their influence.
Civil Society Participation in Reform Process
Among one of the most important components of a democracy is the balance between an
effective state and a healthy, well-informed, civil society (Migdal 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson
2020). In Chile, civil society (in the form of universities, think tanks, foundations, NGOs and
policy networks amongst other) has actively worked with the Ministry to improve education. It
is not uncommon for the Chilean Ministry of Education to subcontract (using competitive
bidding) different tasks, such as managing teacher evaluations (Mizala and Schneider 2014).
The fact that education is a highly important policy topic in the country facilitates such
exchanges and has contributed to the growth of education-based policy networks.
Though not as widespread as Chile, the Ministry of Education in Colombia has also
presented a willingness to engage with civil society and help expand bottom-up efforts to
improve education efforts in poor city neighborhoods and rural areas. In both these countries,
civil society groups also play a crucial role in holding their respective ministries accountable.
Conversely, civil society in Ecuador has a low degree of participation. Though this is partly
because of the country’s history of low civic engagement, during Correa’s government (2007-
2017) rights to protest and association were severely curtailed. Not only this, but freedom of
press was also restrained through a controversial Communications Law (2013) which meant
that little information about the policy-making process was made available to the general
public (Basabe-Serrano 2018; De La Torre 2011; Luna Tamayo 2010; Appe et al. 2017).
55
Table 6. The argument on education reform and patronage summarized
Table 6. The argument on education reform and patronage summarized
Source: Bruns and Luque, 2015: 298-299.
23
According to Albarracín et al. (2018): institutionalized party systems are characterized by “(1) stability in the
significant contenders; (2) low electoral volatility; and (3) stability in the ideological or programmatic positions of
the main parties” (p.232).
24
According to Bruns et al. (2019): “On the professional end, unions are likely to defend employment security, but
are not averse to negotiating other reforms to teacher careers, especially if salary increases are part of the
package. On the more politicized end, unions often have influence over teacher hiring, which generates substantial
political power for union leaders who can then credibly promise politicians electoral support (in exchange for
government appointments or other political benefits for the union). Unions on the politicized end of the spectrum
have both the most to lose from teacher policy reforms aimed at increasing quality and accountability and the
most power to oppose them, at least in the short run” (p.29).
25
By strength of civil society, I am considering the following factors: how active are civil society groups (think tanks,
NGOs, universities, etc) in education policy? Are civil society groups, such as teacher unions, included in reform
processes? Are different groups consulted when drafting reforms and/or new policies? Is civil society able to
engage with the policy-making process?
Party system
institutionalization
23
Teacher unions
politization
24
Strength of civil
society
25
Resulting
reform
pathway
Prevalence
of
patronage
after
reforms
Chile
2 main coalitions:
Concertación (center-left;
virtually replaced as of
2018 by Convergencia
Progresista and Chile
Digno) and Alianza
(center-right; as of 2015
replaced by Chile Vamos).
Highly institutionalized.
Low; highly
professional
High Gradual and
sequenced
negotiation
with different
interest groups
(especially
teacher’s
union, Colegio
de Profesores)
since return to
democracy in
1990s.
Low
Colombia
Historically 2-party
system: highly clientelist.
Since 1991, smaller
parties appear. Low
institutionalization,
especially since 2002;
currently multi-party
system
Medium/High Medium/High Gradual
negotiation
High at local
level
(depending
on ETC),
lower at
national
level
Ecuador
Highly personalistic,
volatile and clientelistic.
Low institutionalization
High Low Top-down
imposition,
breakdown of
relationship
between
government
and teacher’s
union (UNE)
High
56
Having reviewed the main variables and processes that affect the permanence of
patronage, we now turn to looking at each specific case study to see the theory at work.
3. CHILE: THE VALUE OF SEQUENCED AND NEGOTIATED REFORM
Chile is often praised for its relatively high state capacity and low levels of corruption. In this
regard, the country is usually portrayed as a model of social reform and social policy
implementation (Luna and Mardones 2014; Murillo et al. 2006). All in all, Chile exemplifies how
successful reforms can help keep the country’s record of low to no patronage in education
intact.
26
First, during the nineties, the beginning of a new era of democracy combined with the
vestiges of the dictatorship compelled the newly-elected center-left coalition, Concertación de
Partidos por la Democracia, to negotiate with both the opposition still in government and civil
society. In short, given its entrance into government, Concertación had no option but to
balance and engage with both the pro-Pinochet opposition as well as the new civil society
actors who had supported them in the transition and who had been repressed during the
dictatorship.
Second, the return to democracy meant that the teacher union, Colegio de Profesores,
was now an important actor which the government and specifically the education ministry
(MinEduc) now had to engage with to receive its trust and support. The Colegio’s high level of
26
Though, according to Luna and Mardones (2014), there might be some distortions or “marginal political
targeting” (p.39) these are not as wrought as in other countries in the region.
57
professionalism helped make iterative rounds of negotiations with the MinEduc possible.
27
Finally, high engagement with civil society in developing policies and society’s interest in
education (a rarity in other countries in Latin America) helped keep the MinEduc in check and
promote gradual and negotiated reforms.
Party System Legacy: Constraints and Opportunities
Since the return to democracy, MinEduc had to deal with two fronts: on one hand, the Colegio
wanting to protect teachers in public schools. On the opposing side, the opposition which
wanted to protect school principals hired during the Pinochet era before Concertación. This
situation highlights the importance of studying the legacy parties inherit and where they are
coming from. Because Concertación initially kicked-off a new period of democracy and the
transition had been a pacted one, it could not simply dismiss the opposition. The new regime
still had to deal Pinochet’s legacy since some of his supporters were still in government and/or
were popular with the general public. This need for balance likely led to the reform strategy
which would become the modus operandi in the following years. Policy-making, at least in the
realm of education, “a la chilena” meant negotiated and sequenced reform (Mizala and
Schneider 2014). All in all, decades of negotiation meant that one side sometimes wins and
other sometimes loses but neither side can unilaterally impose its position. This new era was
27
One factor that might have contributed to negotiations upon the return to democracy is that given the high
amount of private-subsidized schools, up until 2016 about 44% of teachers (those teaching in public schools) were
affected by the policies. According to Mizala and Schneider (2020), “In 2015, 56 percent of children were enrolled
in private-voucher schools, 36 percent in municipal schools, and 8 percent in private schools. However, there were
proportionally more teachers in municipal schools (44 percent) and private schools (9 percent) compared to
private-voucher schools (47 percent of teachers)”(p.23; Mineduc 2016).
58
also marked by a discernible effort to make education policy (especially the improvement
thereof) a matter of state policy (“política de Estado”). This phenomenon was mirrored by
different coalitions getting elected—especially during the 2010s.
Negotiating with the Teacher Union
Negotiations between 1990-2010 (and ostensibly beyond) were successful because of the
initiatives the government took to ensure that previously-neglected factions of civil society,
especially teachers, would be heard and included (Interview with Rodolfo Bonifaz 2021).
Incremental reforms enabled the government to gain the teacher union’s trust by first
increasing education funding, including teacher salaries. Furthermore, unlike its counterparts in
the region, the Colegio was not opposed to teacher evaluations and although these
negotiations were often lengthy and long-winding, they set the building blocks for trust and
collaboration between the MinEduc and the Colegio for years to come. Starting from the
2000s, the Colegio also gradually became an important actor in helping to develop and discuss
teacher evaluations in municipal schools.
59
Table 7. Key education reforms in Chile 1990-2016
1. Standardized student testing
2. School-based bonus pay (create and use Sistema de Nacional de Evaluación de Desempeño (SNED) to manage
it) —1995
3. Higher standards for teachers (created through joint commission between MinEduc and Colegio named
Marco de la Buena Enseñanza) —-2004
4. Individual teacher performance evaluations
5. individual teacher bonus pay (Asignación de Excelencia Pedagogica [AEP]—2002-2004; and Asignacion
Variable por Desempeño individual [AVDI] makes evaluation mandatory for all public school teachers)—mid-
2000s
6. Exit exam for aspiring teachers (graduates of education teaching programs—Inicia)
7. Eliminate job stability for poor-performing teachers
8. Plan Nacional Docente: further improve teacher quality, give more support and direct advisory to new
teachers, include teachers in private-voucher system in mandatory performance evaluations.—2016
Source: Bruns and Luque, 2015: 307; Mizala and Schneider, 2014.
The MinEduc designed clever incentive schemes which first aimed collectively (i.e.,
rewarding high-performing schools) and later building up to individual prizes whilst
transitioning from voluntary evaluations to compulsory ones. The gradual pacing of these
policies allowed for them to be increasingly supported by teachers, parents and the general
public (see table 3). In short, the MinEduc managed to create the expectation of many rounds
of negotiations which had a “shadow of further bargaining and compromise in Congress”
(Mizala and Schneider 2014: 89) as opposed to one round of zero-sum games. Even to this day,
many attribute the success and longevity of Chile’s reforms to this gradual sequencing
(interview with former high-ranking government official, 2021).
Some might argue that the success in passing reforms was due to the Colegio’s
weakness. Although it has proportionally fewer members than teacher unions in other parts of
60
the world
28
, the Colegio still has significant organizational capacity. In fact, given the amount of
repression they faced in the Pinochet era, once democracy came back, the Colegio gained
plenty of legitimacy and popularity through its participation in helping end the military
dictatorship. Because the new government feared the Colegio’s mobilizing ability, it got
significant perks in the first round of negotiations. For example, a key reform which laid the
foundation for the cooperative relationship between the ministry and the union was the
passing of the Teacher Statute in 1990 which gave the Colegio more power, restored teachers
to civil servant status, and established parameters to gradually increase teacher salaries. This
first step was a strong signal sent to teachers by the newly democratic government that it could
be trusted (Bruns and Luque 2015).
In subsequent years, the Colegio was present to comment, draft and negotiate in all
major education policies. One of the key innovations in Chile which propelled these
negotiations forward was the creation of commissions. These were spaces held by MinEduc and
other civil society actors where members from each entity would help develop policy proposals.
For instance, the 2000 Marco de la Buena Enseñanza was a joint commission between the
Colegio and the MinEduc which created important guidelines schools should follow to ensure a
high-quality education environment; It continues to be used to this day.
Additionally, a key reform passed in 2016 called the National Teaching Plan (Plan
Nacional Docente, PND) helped further consolidate the Colegio’s position within education
policy-making. The PND, an ambitious and comprehensive reform focused on providing more
28
As of 2019, the Colegio approximately 44% of teachers in municipal (public) schools were members of the
Colegio. However, numbers are disputed (Mizala and Schneider, 2020, p.544).
61
help to new teachers, increasing entry-levels salaries and more, was one of Michelle Bachelet’s
main policy goals when she was running for presidential re-election in 2013. During this time
period, Bachelet ran on a new center-left coalition called the Nueva Mayoría which essentially
replaced Concertación and included smaller leftist parties such as the Communist party.
Bachelet’s win and strong electoral support meant that the inclusion of the Communist party
into government was important to the posthumous passing of the PND seeing as two of its
most prominent members were also involved with the Colegio. One of them, Jaime Gajardo,
was even president of the Colegio between 2007-2016. This incorporation gave the Colegio
more of an “insider” perspective and leverage in education reforms and was incredibly
important to help deal with the protests and unrest that existed at the time of passing.
Furthermore, the Colegio’s position in Congress through the Communist Party put them in a
position where all interested parties had to negotiate (Mizala and Schneider 2020).
However, somewhat ironically, the more radicalized the leadership of the Colegio
became, the less power it was able to wield given how incorporated it had already been in the
policy-making process since the 1990s. It is important to note here that while Colegio was
incorporated in discussions and played an important role, patronage did not increase. Unlike
other cases in the region, the union was not granted extra powers—such as the ability to
control ministerial appointments. This scenario highlights the need to distinguish between
having a consultative role and one where the union’s decisions become the end-all, be-all; once
again, it underlines the importance of the kind of union governments have to deal with. In
other words, the Colegio became an important actor in policy-making as a consultant and
62
interlocutor of sorts because of its ability to negotiate and adapt to different policy
arrangements (Bruns et al. 2019).
Looking inwards to change outwards: changes inside the Ministry and its relationship with
civil society
As opposed to many countries in Latin America, education in Chile is a highly relevant and
contentious topic commonly subjected to public debate. Not only this, but civil society at large
is generally active and well-organized. Think tanks, a well-connected policy network of about
40-50 experts in universities, think-tanks and foundations, student and parent organizations as
well as private school associations all play an essential role.
29
Notably, business does not really
participate in any meaningful way (though they might sponsor a think tank, authors seem to
find no direct business involvement) (Mizala and Schneider 2020). This is contradictory to what
other theories regarding business participation and education reform have to say (Kosack 2012;
Bruns and Luque 2014; Rhodes 2012). A possible explanation is the fact that, though more
diversified and flexible than others in the region, Chile continues to have a commodity and low-
technology driven economy; thus the demand for more skilled workers is lacking (Schneider
2013).
The high-profile nature of education policy and the level of civil society organization has
meant that a significant number of eyes are placed on policy-making and multiple actors,
beyond the Colegio, are involved in decisions made by the ministry. As seen above, the
29
Within the context of Chile, private schools play a crucial role and are well organized because approximately
two-thirds of students attend them. Note that the bulk of student attendance in the country is on private-voucher
schools which are subsidized by the state (Mizala and Schneider, 2020).
63
MinEduc has proven to be ready to negotiate and include potentially contentious voices. It has
also not been afraid to get help when needed. Throughout the 2000s, the Ministry has often
subcontracted independent third-party agencies to fulfill certain tasks (Interview Rodolfo
Bonifaz 2021). For instance, the AEP (Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica), a voluntary teacher
evaluation created in 2004 was highly innovative for various reasons. First, it was created via a
joint effort between the Colegio and MinEduc. Second, unlike most paper-based performance
evaluations testing knowledge, it also includes multimedia components (video recordings of
classroom practice), a teaching portfolio, a self-assessment and evaluations from peers and
principals. Finally, the AEP is managed by a third-party research agency (Bruns and Luque 2015:
309). The creation and implementation of AEP hence highlights the MinEduc’s willingness to
cooperate and work with specific civil society sectors—even ones that have been traditionally
more conflictual than others as is normally the case with unions— in multiple ways, all in an
effort to create instruments which enhance the teaching experience and its quality.
Yet another example of civil society actively participating in education policy comes
from the development of the PND. In 2014, representatives from 20 different civil society
groups formed a group to develop a proposal called the Plan Maestro regarding teacher
careers. Some of the findings and comments from the Plan Maestro were incorporated into the
final PND which passed in 2016. Furthermore, since 1994, Chile joined international and
regional assessments such as PISA, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMMS), American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education (LLECE), and Second
Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study (SERCE) to benchmark the country’s own
education performance. As mentioned previously, the data garnered for these tests proved
64
incredibly useful for the MinEduc to measure the success of current reforms, evaluate what was
needed, draft and substantiate future policy proposals and be better able to leverage them in
case of opposition (Mizala and Schneider 2014; Bruns and Luque 2015; interview with Bonifaz
2021).
This shows an overall effort that started from within the MinEduc, especially since 2000
whereby working groups were created to evaluate past ministry efforts to get a clearer sense of
what practices should be kept and improved upon and what should be eliminated. In this effort,
data from the aforementioned tests became incredibly useful to create better proposals and
gain more leverage (interview with Rodolfo Bonifaz, 2021). Along these lines, the creation of
two different survey-based social indicators, SIMCE and CASEN, also helped with policy
oversight (Luna and Mardones 2014) which, in turn, helped the MinEduc in getting a better
read on the needs of the society and thus adjust policies accordingly. This internal revisionism
leads to a key takeaway which encapsulates the Chilean case: being a minister is a temporary
role; creating strong foundations within the MinEduc and reaching to civil society will allow for
the gradual successes from the past to continue and scaffold to better policies in the future.
4. COLOMBIA: DECENTRALIZING AND ENGAGING WITH SOCIETY
With an approximate population of 50 million, Colombia is a highly diverse country in terms of
its people as well as its geography. It has also had to deal with a 50-year civil war, the impact of
violence in rural communities and consequently massive internal displacement to cities. Ever
since the expansion of education coverage (and the lack of prestige of the teaching career) at
the onset of the twentieth century, this sector has been ridden with patronage practices. The
65
National Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación Nacional, MEN) has been typically seen
as a “catch-all” or placeholder for the incumbent president to pay political favors. Nevertheless,
decades of reform, both bottom-up and top-down, have managed to constrain clientelism and
patronage in education (Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014). Like the case of Chile, some of the most
important factors which contributed to this decline include: (1) the undoing of bipartisan
control of government. More specifically, party leaders in localities were stripped from their
powers due to decentralization laws; (2) The teacher union, FECODE, helped diminish control of
localities by party elites but in doing so became its own patron; (3) Teacher career reforms,
though not perfect, have helped put restrictions on arbitrary hiring; and (4) The Ministry’s
engagement with civil society in different and highly innovative projects and the presence of
think tanks, foundations and universities help keep government in check.
From Two-Party System to Multiparty System
While patronage persists in the country at large, some gains have been made in the education
sector. This is especially the case when compared to the period of traditional party rule (late
1950s to 1970s), since goods—such as teaching positions and teacher transfers—can no longer
be allocated on a purely discretionary basis. In other words, patronage in MEN has become less
institutionalized over time. A crucial factor in explaining this decline lies in the power
Colombia’s two oldest and most important political parties, the Liberals and Conservatives,
wielded throughout the twentieth century.
Born in the 19
th
century, Liberals and Conservatives have had a conflictive relationship
which often led to wars between the two sides throughout the 19
th
and the earlier part of the
66
20
th
century. Not only this, but both inter- and intra-party electoral competition activated
clientelistic networks. Inter-party competition produced a winner-take-all spoils system during
the first half of the twentieth century. The conflict culminated in an agreement between the
two parties known as the National Front (Frente Nacional, FN). Between 1958 to 1972, each
party took turns governing the country, alternating every four years and evenly splitting
charges in the executive and legislative branches. Ironically, because Colombia did not go
through long or repeated periods of military dictatorship, it became “easier” for clientelism to
become deeply embedded in political life. In addition, the parties were internally fragmented
which led to growing feelings of disenfranchisement over the years.
Roughly between 1960s through 1980s, the status quo represented the strength of the
two-party monopoly. Congress had a significant amount of influence in gubernatorial and
mayor appointments. Even though on paper the Minister of Government was in charge of this
duty, the president essentially rewarded individual legislators with the ability to name
governors and mayors in exchange for supporting presidential initiatives. As a consequence,
aspiring politicians found themselves fiercely competing to get those positions. The
competitive nature of the appointments meant, in turn, that turnover rates were extremely
high—about 3 months for mayors—and that mayors essentially had little political say and
functioned as clients to members of Congress (Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014: 101-102). These
patterns repeated themselves in the education sector where teachers became clients of party
bosses only to later become clients of “politicians who used unions and educational resources
to pursue electoral office” (Idem).
67
In sum, while the time during the National Front eased peaceful coexistence and
partisanship parity allowed for more technical expertise within ministries, multiple actors were
also excluded and no major reforms were put in place. This omission is what essentially spurred
a slew of people to seek widespread changes in how things operated and the status quo at
large. The Liberal and Conservative’s centuries-old hold on power hence helped birth social
protest and guerrilla insurgency in Colombia. For instance, the main teacher union, the
Federation of Colombian Educators (FECODE) emerged to counteract clientelist practices of
parties and as a champion for teacher’s rights. Even though both Conservatives and Liberals,
especially the latter, had formed their own regional teachers' unions, these had become
increasingly autonomous from party dominance.
Eventually, in 1959 the smaller unions came together to further consolidate FECODE. At
the same time, FECODE gained strength and got more leftist leaders in its executive committee.
Now a stronger unit, FECODE was able to consolidate ranks, merge with departmental unions
and mobilize to protest throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The FECODE’s effort helped pass the
Teacher’s Statute in 1979 which, amongst other things, granted teachers a ‘special’ labor code
and leveled salaries. Despite these advances, the FECODE itself became a clientelist
organization and a highly political one at that (Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014: 95-102). The
FECODE’s transition into a host for clientelist networks made it lose popular support. Although
it currently continues to wield impressive organizational and disruptive power, it has lost its
ability to enact changes (Diaz Rios 2019).
The extended hegemony of Liberals and Conservatives in the country triggered the need
to make reforms, both in the education sector and the overall governance system. Even after
68
reforms to mitigate the power of both parties were put in place (more on this on the next
section), the legacy of exclusion eventually led to mistrust of both parties on a national level
and gradually ended the two-party system. Though both parties continue to be important
actors, especially regionally, their electoral gains and their organization have gradually eroded
over time (Albarracín et al. 2018). As will be further explored in the section, decentralizing
reforms enacted since the mid-1980s greatly contributed to end traditional parties’ patronage.
Moreover, the new Constitution in 1991, heralded a new era where smaller parties began
cropping up. In addition, it became increasingly less popular for rising politicians to run under
the cadre of the Liberal or Conservative party. The true break from the two-party system,
however, came in 2002 when the first non-Liberal or Conservative, Álvaro Uribe, got elected.
Since then, other parties have come about and become more politically relevant, at least at the
national level, than the former two. A downside of this new party system is that the new parties
are highly volatile and personalistic (Gamboa 2020). Colombia’s party system has thus gone
from aligned to fully de-aligned (Carreras et al. 2015) from relatively stable to increasingly
unstable.
Decentralization Reforms: Causes and Effects
Given the abuses of the party system and increased grievances by the general public,
subsequent governments in the mid-80s began taking a series of reforms focusing on
decentralization to make public goods provision more effective and do away with the deep
patronage patterns that had haunted the system for so long. Starting in 1986, rather than being
appointed by the president, voters were now able to pick mayors of municipalities. By 1991,
69
voters also started electing governors of departments (provinces). In addition, local elections
were moved to take place one year after presidential elections to give mayors and governors
more autonomy and respond more directly to the needs of their constituents. Consequently,
mayors and governors, as opposed to senators, effectively became the new patrons of their
own localities (Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014).
Before 2001, both municipalities and departments were responsible for hiring personnel
as well as investing in infrastructure and school equipment. However, there was no clear
definition of responsibilities in the legislation which caused functions to overlap and therefore
make accountability harder (Elacqua et al. 2019). To correct this, the government essentially
transferred responsibility for health and education to sub-national governments. In 2001, the
government passed Law 715 where ETCs (certified territorial entities) became the main legal
authority to hire teachers and principals.
30
The MEN, however, placed restrictions on the
number of teachers that can be hired. Although ETCs are responsible for paying teacher
salaries, the funding comes from central government transfers, which are managed by a
separate newly-created entity called the SGP (Sistema General de Participaciones or General
Participation System).
31
For everything excluding teacher’s salary payments, ETCs can use funds
30
For reference, municipalities are managed by mayors and a municipal council, both are elected into office.
Departments (the equivalent of a state or province) are headed by governors who are also elected into office.
Governors are in charge of autonomously managing public resources and handling issues that concern their
jurisdiction. They function as an entity between the national government and municipalities. An assembly of
deputies (also elected through popular vote) also helps administer departments. Colombia has 1,123 municipalities
and 32 departmental units (Elacqua et al., 2019, p.2). Also, note that Colombia is officially a unitary state (though
with increasing streaks of federalism). To become an ETC, localities must meet a minimum population of 100,000
inhabitants. Only 46 municipalities out of the 1,122 became decentralized because they met the population
threshold. Colombia currently has 63 total ETCs (the remaining ETCs were granted because they fulfilled other
qualifying criteria).
31
The General Participation System (Sistema General de Participaciones or SGP) was introduced by 2001’s Law 715.
According to Elacqua et al., it is “a set of transfers from the central government to ETCs, in order to fund
education, health, and water and sanitation services. According to current legislation, of the total SGP resources,
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however they want, as long as it is for educational purposes. This was done in part as a
response to criticism of the previous school financing model where resource transfers from
center to periphery were mainly based on the cost of teacher salaries without really considering
the “educational outcomes in terms of access and quality” (Elacqua et al. 2019: 11).
These controls were put in place because prior to 2001, there was a disproportionate
increase in teacher hiring. Before this reform, municipalities were simply used to not having any
hiring restrictions. According to Duarte (2001), teacher contracts were used as a political tool by
leaders at sub-national levels; thus bloating and putting a financial strain on the central
government. In short, over-hiring at some localities became fiscally unsustainable for the state.
The government assumed debts of municipalities that could not pay for salaries which then
exacerbated inequalities between rich and poor municipalities—something that was visible in
student-teacher ratios whereby richer municipalities had lower ratios because they could pay
for more teachers. In short, rather than merely focusing on teacher salaries, financing
structures in 2001 were made to be more linked to enrollment and quality.
One problem arose from these decentralization measures. As Eaton and Chambers-Ju
(2014) point out, by removing power from national party elites and granting it to local leaders,
localities had more power and discretion over funds, an allegorical honey pot which guerrilla
forces such as the ELN and the FARC as well the paramilitaries used to gain more leverage and
ensure their survival. Simply put, more autonomy for local leaders made it easier for violent
groups to maintain their status since all they had to do now was reach out to these leaders.
96% is distributed among the social sectors (i.e., education, health and water and sanitation). Currently, 58.5% is
allocated to education. In 2016, these resources represented two thirds of the funding in the public sector” (p.11).
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Thus, although decentralization measures were more effective in the education sector, their
main consequence is that authority over the same practices and responsibilities that had
previously lent themselves to patronage and clientelism at the national level were transferred
to local officials. Furthermore, the changing nature of the party system while allowing for
different leaders and voices to emerge, also meant that there were greater opportunities for
lesser-known parties in certain localities to use the power over resources given to them vis-à-vis
decentralization measures to gain more support and votes.
Reforming Teacher Careers
Another key aspect of reforms to diminish patronage came in re-structuring the teaching
career. Before 2002, Brutti and Sánchez (2017) describe the legal framework around teaching
having:
very little transparency in procedures, excessive protection of employed teachers, and
lack of incentives towards the improvement of skills and teaching performance.
Clientelism and politicization of teacher appointments were substantial and well-known
issues; far too often public schools were used as ‘placement pools’ for relatives and
connections of influent personalities (p.3).
Since 2002, Colombia’s teaching career operates under two statutes: Decree 2277 (passed in
1979; approximately 44% of current staff are currently under it) and Decree 1278 (passed in
2002; 53% of current staff, applies to people hired from 2002 onwards). This newer decree is
more meritocratic since access to teaching is obtained through comprehensive evaluation and
open contests. As such, this newer regulation guarantees equal opportunities to access to
public service and permanently evaluates teachers and senior staff. Furthermore, unlike the
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other statute where salaries are determined by seniority, Decree 1278 has a gradual salary
progression based on performance evaluations.
Hiring requirements have also become stricter. On the one hand, teachers in Decree
2777 (the 1979 cohort) only needed to have a high-school degree equivalent in pedagogy to
become teachers and no entrance exams were in place; hence making the possibility of hiring
teachers for political purposes all the more likely. As it happens, these teachers were often
assigned by politicians (party leaders and/or local leaders) who could benefit the ruling party in
distributing vacancies. In other words, if an aspiring teacher belonged to a specific party and
that party was governing at the time, it was likelier that they would be hired (Gomez Alzate
2018). In contrast, under Decree 1278 (2002-onwards cohort), new hires need: a bachelor’s
degree or an equivalent degree from a specialized teaching entity (Escuela Normal Superior), go
through a selection process through open-merit contest, and take an evaluation exam. Once
hired, teachers are under a four-month trial period and are subject to annual performance and
competence evaluations from there on out.
Yet another restriction on local and arbitrary use of power comes in the form of
Development Plans (Planes de Desarrollo). These are drafted at the national and local level
(separately) by elected officials upon the beginning of their tenure. Once written, a commission
revises and negotiates the terms of the plan. Leaders are then strictly observed to ensure that
they are fulfilling the plans they had set out at the beginning of their tenure. These measures
have lessened the likelihood of misuse of funds for clientelist purposes. Some, however, find it
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very restricting. Once approved, mayors and governors are essentially “stuck” with that plan for
four years (interview with Andrea Escobar 2021).
32
Part of the decentralization measures in Colombia made it so that the leader of the
ETC—the mayor or governor depending on whether the ETC is a municipality or a
department—appoints Education Secretaries. This means that Secretaries are in charge of
education in that ETC. Prior to 2001, teacher and Secretary assignments were controlled by
political groups. For instance, specific mafias “sold” transfers and appointments. Nevertheless,
even after 2002, patronage still exists. Given that local leaders now have greater naming
authority, though not always the case, there is a likelihood that Secretaries of Education are
appointed based on political needs and means.
New legislation was fairly useful in curtailing patronage at a national level. However,
there are still irregularities within the Secretary of Education, especially in regards to
provisional teacher hiring. An illustrative example follows. Bucaramanga, an important city in
the department of Santander, has been a Liberal stronghold for decades. Councilor Uriel Ortiz,
who has served for 12 years, wields an incredible amount of power and has helped many
people get jobs within the municipality. In return, he has been able to keep a strong grip on
Bucaramanga as a Liberal city, using his influence to help get votes for Liberal candidates.
People who he has assisted to be hired as teachers and principals, for example, are expected to
help whenever elections come around. This could mean anything from donating money to the
Liberal campaign to organizing rallies (sometimes even being expected to fund the rallies
32
This has become problematic in the times of the COVID pandemic because the lack of internet coverage is now a
key determinant for education. However, if increasing internet coverage was not a part of the original plan, it
cannot be added.
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themselves) and helping out in rallies by bringing food. The councilor’s clients are also expected
to pay a mandatory bonus (these are determined by the client’s salary but the minimum is of
50,000 Colombian pesos, roughly 14 USD). Ortiz has direct influence over the education sector
and not a page is turned without his approval. This means that he is essentially the one who
picks the Secretary of Education, who is then beholden to his power if they wish to remain in
office.
Although teacher career reforms which now prevent arbitrary teacher hiring have
whittled away some of Ortiz’s power, he and others like him have found a loophole in
provisional teacher hiring (Azuero and León 2015). According to the law, provisional teachers
do not have to go through open contest or performance evaluations to be hired. This facilitates
hiring temporary teachers when they are needed—so long as the ETC does not go over the
payroll limit the MEN has assigned them (Elacqua et al. 2019). Moreover, there is no time limit
on how long a teacher can work provisionally. As of 2017, 15% of teaching staff in Colombia is
provisional (Ayala and Sánchez 2017; Gómez Alzate 2018). Thus, although laws like 715 and
Decree 1278 have helped reduce discretionary teaching appointments, there are still ways in
which local leaders turn to maintain clientelistic relationships with their constituents.
The Role of Civil Society
Much as though there are specific regions and ETCs like Bucaramanga that continue to have
issues with local leaders abusing their power through clientelist practices, there are other
regions and/or cities such as Medellín, Manizales (interview with Andrea Escobar 2021) and to
some degree Bogotá (Lowden 2004) who have been able to transcend this. Though exploring
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the reasons as to why certain regions are more prone to gross patronage practices is beyond
the scope of this chapter, the degree of civil society’s involvement in education can certainly
explain why patronage practices have at least been restricted.
First and foremost, appointing ministers with technical expertise and experience has
been crucial (interview with María Lucía Casas 2021). Since Uribe’s first term (2002-2006), there
has been a rising trend where more technical ministers with longer tenures have taken charge
of the MEN. Furthermore, 45% of Secretaries of Education have experience both in the public
sector and in education; 94.5% of the 96 Secretaries have either technical experience related to
the public sector or with education writ-large. Moreover, in recent years, ten ETCs have had the
same Secretary (Barbero and Sánchez 2020). This data shows that while patronage might still
exist, at least there has been an effort to get education leaders who are better prepared for the
challenges they might face.
Generally speaking, more technical hires have shown a willingness to bring in ideas and
initiatives from outside the public sector. For example, this readiness to collaborate and
incorporate endeavors with the private sector helped Bogotá’s poorest neighborhoods get
access to high-quality education (Lowden 2004). A foundation’s Escuela Nueva model (an
approach based on multi-grade and student-centered learning) has proven to be extremely
helpful in improving student learning in terms of achievement in Math and Spanish, generating
deeper community involvement and higher absorption rates as well as lower dropout and
repeating rates in rural schools all over the country (Escobar Rodriguez et al. 2006: 270). This
model has been incorporated into MEN’s national plans and has been implemented in
approximately 20,000 rural schools in Colombia. The model has even been exported
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internationally to countries like Chile, Guatemala and Brazil (Colbert 1999; Colbert and
Arboleda 2016).
The government’s readiness to work with different civil society actors can be traced to
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution whereby civil society is conceived as a partner to the state (Appe
et al. 2017). As the above examples show, this partnership has shown itself time and time
again. Similar to the Chilean case, universities, foundations, think tanks and NGOs play an
important role in engaging with MEN, holding it accountable and drafting policy proposals
(interview with María Lucía Casas 2021). It is also not uncommon for different groups to have
an advisory role within MEN, as was the case with the creator of the Escuela Nueva program,
Vicky Colbert.
In short, though still prone to local-level patronage practices, reforms to the education
sector in Colombia paired with technical hires at the ministerial level, successful legislation, and
active engagement with civil society have helped overcome national-level patronage.
5. ECUADOR: MAKING A SPLASH WITHOUT CHANGING TIDES
Between 2007 and 2017, Ecuador’s public education system went through a series of radical
changes. As part of then-president Rafael Correa’s running platform, he vowed that under his
command, the country would not only face a citizen’s revolution, but an educational one as
well. Though crucial changes to teaching careers and the curriculum at large were enacted, the
vestiges of patronage which had haunted the country for decades prevailed and worsened
during this time. Reasons for the permanence of patronage are due to (1) a highly volatile,
corporatist and personalistic party system; (2) the inability (and arguably later the
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unwillingness) of the government to fruitfully engage with the teacher union, the National
Union of Educators or UNE (Union Nacional de Educadores); and (3) the weakness and absence
of civil society groups and associations paired with the government’s efforts to further restrict it
in favor of its own policies.
Volatility and Charisma: Mistrust in the Party System and the Legacy of Corporatism
Ecuador’s party system has long been characterized as one with high volatility as well as
personalistic and clientelistic practices (Basabe-Serrano 2018). The relative absence of an
organized civil society bled into a lack of accountability. For parties, the absence of civilian
oversight meant that they could rely on clientelist and redistributive practices to ensure their
tenure in power. As De La Torre (2011) argues, as early as 1930, corporatism was also widely
used to give special “privileges” to specific groups such as unions, indigenous organizations,
women and public employees. Interest groups were usually able to negotiate these privileges
through the legislative body (formerly known as the Congress, now referred to as National
Assembly). However, during Correa’s regime and under the 2008 constitution, a new form of
hyper-presidentialism implied that these kinds of negotiation were no longer allowed, much to
the chagrin of several civil society groups which led to and included the police protests of 2010.
Up until 1996, coalition-building in Ecuador basically consisted in presidents using their
access to discretionary spending, “gastos reservados” to form ghost coalitions. In a nutshell,
presidents allocated resources to specific legislators and opposition parties in exchange for
their support. Though this helped create stability and the fulfillment of short-term goals, it set
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the stage for deeply-rooted patronage relationships which would be difficult to eliminate.
Moreover, once these practices were eliminated, the political system became highly unstable
and competitive, leading to shorter presidential tenures (Martínez 2020: 15-16). Between 1996
to 2006, Ecuador had seven different presidents—one, Abdalá Bucaram, was impeached due to
“mental instability” and two, Jamil Mahuad and Lucio Gutiérrez, were forcibly removed from
office.
It is noteworthy that after a decade of political and party instability, the following
decade was one marked with stability— one president under one party, leftist leader Rafael
Correa´s Alianza País (AP) effectively dominated the polls in three consecutive occasions.
Nevertheless, this stability and the seeming shift to a more institutionalized party system has
not yielded hoped-for structural changes. AP and Correa proved to recreate and elevate
clientelist practices he had frequently critiqued his predecessors for. In short, though Correa
heavily criticized the damages the “partyarchy” had committed over the past fifty years or so,
the passage of time has demonstrated that AP was not immune to these very practices.
Thus, although Correa used his qualms with Ecuador´s volatile and clientelist party
system to gain power and show himself as the country´s savior (Conaghan and De La Torre
2008), by gaining access to the state and its resources, he was able to use its power to fulfill his
party’s goals. As Duarte argues, populist politicians think about the next election, not the next
generation (2001). As such, short-term priorities, ostensibly to make future electoral gains,
exacerbate patronage practices. Put differently, patronage in Ecuador has worsened since
Correa—partly due to the fact that the state was viewed as a resource to fulfill AP’s agenda
(Interview with Pablo Bustamante 2021).
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Reforms and Education Revolution: A top-down, hyper-presidentialist approach
The political and economic crises of the 1990s and into the early 2000s—a banking crisis
combined with high inflation led to the country’s dollarization in January of 2000—meant that
education was left unattended and chronically underfunded (Araujo and Bramwell 2015). The
need to control government spending during this period meant that the state had been
significantly reduced and with it, much of the Ministry of Education’s (MinEdu) ‘know-how’
(Interview with Pablo Bustamante, 2021). Between 2000 to 2005, four different presidents and
various education ministers (roughly 7 in 5 years) reflected the country’s instability and inability
to push any kind of reforms for education forward. During this time period, the private sector,
NGOs and INGOs (mainly UNICEF and UNESCO) covered the country’s educational needs.
In 2002, for instance, UNICEF launched the Observatory for Children and Adolescent’s
Rights (ODNA) to aid in projects and increase transparency and accountability. This, in addition
to organizations such as Fundación Observación Social del Ecuador and Contrato Social por la
Educación (Social Contract for Education, CSE) helped pressure Congress at the time to
implement more educational proposals. Pressures from below eventually led to a ministry-led
endeavor (in consultation with different local and international actors such as the teacher
union, private school networks and UNESCO amongst others) to draw up the 10-Year Education
Plan
33
(Plan Decenal de Educación-PDE) (Araujo and Bramwell 2015: 4; Bramwell and Cevallos
2015).
33
The goals of the 10-Year Education Plan were: 1) Universalize early childhood education from 0 to 5 years old. 2)
Universalize primary education (“Educació n General Básica”) from first to tenth grade. 3) Increase secondary
school (“Bachillerato”) enrollment until reaching 75% of people in that corresponding age range. 4)Eradicate
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In 2006, the same year that Rafael Correa got elected for his first term, the 10-Year
Education Plan was approved via referendum. The newly-elected president acted swiftly to
implement the plan—even though it was stipulated that if approved through the referendum,
regardless of who was elected, the new government would have to apply it (Araujo and
Bramwell 2015). The feeling of deep crisis in the realm of education gave credence to Correa’s
to quick actions; the fact that the plan had been approved by 60% of the population also meant
that the new regime did not need to mobilize support for new reforms. Given this support, the
first few years of Correa’s government were marked by stability, continuity and a time where
many reforms mentioned under the 10-Year Plan were implemented. This largely happened
because there was continuity in policies and leadership. Raul Vallejo, the director for the 10-
Year Plan and Minister of Education during the previous government, kept his appointment
until 2010. Similarly, Gloria Vidal, who was under-secretary to Vallejo and was also involved in
the creation of the 10-Year Plan, became Minister after Vallejo between 2010 to 2013. This
meant that both ministers were basically implementing the plan they had helped write.
Prior to the 10-Year Education Plan’s approval in 2006, provincial committees of the
Ministry of Education chose their teachers through less-than-meritocratic criteria. Hence, the
period prior to 2006 had brewed the perfect conditions for rampant patronage. With little to no
oversight, different interest groups, UNE being the main one, sunk its teeth into the Ministry of
Education. Much like the Colombian case, teacher hiring was highly linked to patronage
illiteracy and strengthening adult education. 5) Improving the infrastructure and the equipment of educational
institutions. 6) Improve the quality and the equity of education and the implementation of a national system for
evaluating the educational system. 7) Reappraise the teaching profession and the improvement of early childhood
formation, permanent training and working and life-quality conditions. 8) Increase 0.5% annually of GDP in
towards the education sector until 2012 or until reaching at least 6% of GDP.
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practices and the interests of local leaders. Rather than professional credentials, teachers were
often hired based on favoritism, bribery, and UNE membership (Schneider et al. 2019). One of
the incoming government’s main goals was to be rid of these practices as soon as possible.
Though the new reforms were contested, they yielded considerable gains for the
country. Between 2006-2013, Ecuador improved its performance in international tests. For
instance, out of 15 countries taking UNESCO regional tests, Ecuador made the largest gains in
reading scores and second-largest (after Chile) in math. Within 7 years, the country had raised
its math levels from the region’s lowest to above average and from below average to close-to-
average in reading. Between 2005-2013 enrollments, specifically in secondary education which
had historically been low, also increased from 53 to 87 percent (Schneider et al. 2019). Not only
this, but the country also managed to further close the rural-urban gap in terms of coverage
(Araujo and Bramwell 2015).
Contributing factors to these improvements can be tied to the new Constitution. Under
the latter, education was established as a right and its provision “an unavoidable and
inexcusable duty of the State” (Asamblea Nacional 2008, article 26; Bramwell and Cevallos
2015). Article 28 specifically established that education until high-school is compulsory and
free. Access to textbooks and uniforms were also declared free of charge. Overall, the
education sector in this time period had more stability and higher enrollment rates. However,
regardless of this success, patronage continued to persist. At worst, practices were exacerbated
due to dominance of AP in all ministries and its extended period in power.
The main education reforms between 2007 and 2017 were channeled through two key
pieces of legislation. First, the 2009 amendment to Ley de Carrera Docente y Escalafón del
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Magisterio Nacional (1990) orders that: (1) teachers are hired based on competing tests and
clear standards, (2) promotions are based on performance evaluations (as opposed to years of
service), and (3) there is possible dismissal after 2 consecutive “insufficient” performance
evaluations (Schneider et al. 2019). Moreover, this law created “commissions of excellence”
meant to oversee that new teacher selections are done through a meritocratic process. Before
2007, provincial committees of the Ministry of Education chose public teachers who were
generally prone to favoritism and bribery. UNE members, who had traditionally held seats in
this kind of commissions and had an important say in who got hired, were removed from the
new commissions. This sparked a series of protests but led to little if any compromise (Bruns
and Luque 2015: 320).
Furthermore, to do away with patronage practices in teacher hiring, the government
centralized the recruitment process and instituted a national hiring exam. Though initially
teachers were encouraged to take voluntary exams (known as SER) to assess their competence,
upon poor results and a low turnout, the government clamped down. In 2009, Decree 1740,
which was later included in 2009 Ley de Carrera Docente, established that any teacher who
refused to take the evaluation would be fired on the grounds of “demonstrating professional
incompetence” an act which was clearly targeted at UNE members since that organization had
decided to boycott the evaluations (Bruns and Luque 2015: 321; Diariocrítico 2009).
34
Later on,
and taking cues from Chile’s AVDI system, the government began rewarding teachers who had
high performance on the SER evaluation by introducing individual bonus payments.
34
After a 22-day strike, the UNE and the Ministry were able to come to an agreement whereby the criteria for
firing teachers were loosened. For more detail, see Bruns and Luque (2015).
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The second key piece of legislation was the 2011 Ley Orgánica de Educación
Intercultural (LOEI). It included reforms such as: (1) broadening mandatory competency
assessments to school principals, the school curriculum and the system as a whole, (2) more
funding (financed through oil revenues which were at an all-time high until ca. 2013), (3)
granting more power to the government over education policy (including absorbing
responsibility for Early Childhood Education—something that was previously contracted
through NGOs), and (4) limiting teacher union influence by ending mandatory union dues from
teachers. Prior to this, the 2008 Constitution had already scrapped mandatory membership in
unions and other civil society associations. Correa also stripped CONAIE’s (Confederation of
Indigenous Nations) and Pachakutik’s (CONAIE’s party) influence over indigenous education
policy by bringing in the DINEIB (National Directorate for Bilingual Intercultural Education) into
the Ministry of Education. A move that exemplifies is just one example of Correa’s highly
corporatist patterns. The trend would be continuously used over time and in different sectors,
highlighting, in turn, AP’s increasingly clientelist strategies.
Union vs Ministry
As can be gleaned from the previous section, continuous reforms made in the education sector
between 2007 and 2011 put a significant strain between the UNE and the Ministry of
Education. Since its inception in 1944, the UNE had had an important, if at times controversial,
role in Ecuadorian politics. As stated earlier, the UNE had historically wielded a significant
amount of influence in the Ministry, to the point of essentially naming the next minister and
other high-ranking officials. UNE’s government capture came, in part, from its alliance with the
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political party, MPD. Briefly put, MPD was UNE's main communication line with the political
system:
Although MPD’s legislative bench was never larger than 10% of congress, it had the best
distribution of votes around the country (Pachano 2004). Unlike other partisan organizations
based in regional cleavages, the fact that UNE was disseminated around the country gave MPD
access to areas that were considered inaccessible by other parties. Thus, both UNE and MPD’s
radical leftist discourse was successfully positioned in a very small but quite loyal electoral niche
(Basabe-Serrano 2018: 156)
This relationship, while mutually beneficial in terms of expanding patronage and clientelist
networks, was widely perceived as the politicization of the teacher union. With time, the UNE
was increasingly mistrusted by the public-at-large because it appeared to be continuously
prioritizing MPD’s agenda rather than truly fighting for and voicing teacher’s wants and needs
(Hora 25 Ecuador Oficial 2015). All this meant that UNE functioned, for the most part, as a
political platform (Interview with Pablo Bustamante 2021). By 2006, UNE was the biggest union
in the country, representing 90% of teachers (roughly 170,000 people) granting it with great
mobilizing power (Schneider et al. 2019: 273).
Besides teacher career reforms, tensions between UNE and Correa’s government came
to a head for several reasons. First, the newly-drafted Constitution (2008) eliminated
mandatory membership for all civic associations, including UNE, thus hurting its network and
mobilizing potential. Furthermore, a ministerial mandate from 2009 later eliminated mandatory
union dues, essentially stripping the UNE of its funding and income. As previously mentioned,
Correa also stripped UNE of its influence within the ministry in part by creating an autonomous
teacher evaluation system. Furthermore, this kind of legislation meant that the UNE was no
longer allowed to influence teacher appointments (Schneider et al. 2019; Luna Tamayo 2010).
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In addition, after massive protests against teacher evaluations in 2009, the government
passed another law “prohibiting teachers (and consequently the union) from paralyzing
education services as a form of protest. It introduced sanctions for individuals who disrupted
classes” (Bruns and Luque 2015: 321) thus hampering the UNE’s most powerful weapons:
mobilization and protest. It is noteworthy that whenever UNE mobilized, the government
created its own counter-protests.
Yet another devastating blow to UNE’s power came when, in 2010, the government
began persecuting UNE’s leader, Mery Zamora, on grounds of terrorism and sabotage (Basabe-
Serrano, 2018). Over the course of 5 years, Zamora faced several different trials, all with
arguably shaky and nebulous grounds for about 5 years (Plan V, 2015). Other leaders from
other sectors of civil society, including indigenous groups, faced similar fates. By 2014, UNE was
virtually extinct and in 2016, it was legally dissolved through a ministerial resolution. Similarly,
around this time, MPD, UNE’s main political ally, was also dissolved (Idem).
In February of 2015, a rivaling teacher union essentially created by the Ministry of
Education and fully aligned with the government came to the forefront. The Red de Maestros y
Maestras por la Revolución Educativa (Network of Teachers for the Education Revolution) or
Red, for short, had informally existed since 2011 and was made up of pro-Correa teachers. A full
alliance with the government began in 2013, with the new minister, Augusto Espinosa, more
actively supporting and engaging with it (Schneider et al. 2019). Espinosa would posthumously
leverage the support granted from the Red to get elected into the Assembly (Ecuador’s
legislative body) (Rosero 2016). In fact, the Red itself nominated Espinosa for the candidacy.
Since then, Espinosa and his successors have been frequently called upon for their alleged
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negligence over the increasing cases of sexual harassment by teachers to students that
occurred in schools before and during his tenure. Espinosa was also charged with not following
the law’s procedures for hiring school principals, essentially skipping open contests and hiring
principals belonging to Red (Heredia 2018; Santos 2018). It should also be noted that most, if
not all of Correa’s closest political allies and Cabinet members—including Correa himself—are
currently serving time in prison or are on the run for corruption charges.
By 2018, Red had 60,000 members (one-third of all teachers). The creation of the Red de
Maestros highlights Correa’s corporatist strategies. It came into power just as the UNE’s power
was declining and was essentially used as an instrument for the government (interview with
Pablo Bustamante, 2021). The Red was widely vocal about its support for Correa’s reforms—
mainly teacher performance evaluations and other teacher policy reform. Nevertheless, it is still
organizationally weak seeing as it has few resources (members do not pay dues) and it lacks
paid staff and leaders. In conclusion, though reforms to eschew patronage practices in public
education were created during the Correa years, loose implementation alongside ambitious
party expansion meant that these reforms were unable to prevent patronage from escalating.
Though legislation to curtail patronage within the teaching seemed promising, it ultimately
failed to be successfully implemented as the needs of the ruling party seemingly trumped those
of improving quality of education in the country.
Top-Down Efforts and Limited Participation
In its effort to centralize and make education accessible to all, the Correa regime had largely
failed to include civil society. Moreover, attempts to improve education in the country have
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also not guaranteed higher quality (Luna Tamayo 2010). As in decades prior to AP dominance,
patronage and caudillos continue to be a mainstay in Ecuadorian politics. Although promising
“high intensity citizenship”, in reality correísmo presented political participation from the top,
thus creating a highly organized patronage structure (Basabe-Serrano 2018: 163). The Ministry
of Education was one of the prime “victims” of this process, eventually becoming widely
perceived as one of the most infiltrated ministries by correísmo (La Posta 2019).
Center-periphery dynamics only exacerbated this problem. Since zone coordinator
(essentially the Minister’s representative in one of Ecuador’s 9 education zones) appointments
have been known to be highly politicized—often granting people power based on party loyalty
as opposed to their credentials and/or expertise. Similar to Colombia, the political nature of
appointments is especially corrosive in more remote areas of the country where these high-
ranking officials use their positions to exploit patron-client relations. In smaller towns, the zonal
coordinator plays a mayor-like role which, in turn, makes these posts more coveted, not by
people who are education policy experts, but those who seek to wield political power. This kind
of precedent diminishes all incentives to improve the educational environment (Interview with
Fernanda Crespo 2021).
In short, in these sorts of settings, education policy becomes a political game. Though in
recent years and with the change in government, there have been some attempts to change
these patterns (for example, as of this writing, the current minister prioritizes more
meritocratic appointments) actual changes will likely not be seen until years to come.
Furthermore, as the following chapters will show, under correísmo, the government was not
shy about using state resources to control ministries and secretaries. The comptroller, for
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example, has been used to ensure that ministry and municipal officers stay in line with AP’s
agenda (interview with Pablo Bustamante 2021).
Beyond the above-mentioned events with the dissolution of UNE, two main legislations
impeded civil society from engaging with education reforms. In 2013, the government released
the Communications Law which limited journalist’s ability to “damage the reputation of
political leaders and citizens at large” (Appe et al. 2017: 156). The law was widely perceived as a
tool to crack down on press reports and journalists critical of the regime. In 2010, Correa had
infamously issued a 40 million USD lawsuit against journalist and the newspaper for publishing
an opinion piece critical of the regime’s response to police protests in that year. Further
restrictions were put in place to restrict the formation of civil society groups and associations.
These restrictions, specifically Decree 16, granted the executive more discretion to dismantle
said groups.
Previous versions of Decree 16 had mandated the creation of a registry for all civil
society organizations (CSO) that received public funding; they also set regulations for who
would count as an “official” CSO. Finally in 2015, the new Decree No. 739 was released and
while it loosened some of the burdens for registration (including the need for lawyers and other
financial requirements) it was still deemed pernicious due to the large amount of discretion
granted to the government to dissolve organizations (Idem).
Policy networks such as think tanks, university centers and foundations have also not
been visible in reform efforts. A partial exception is Grupo FARO (which is geared to public
policy writ-large) and CSE (Social Contract for Education). The latter, however, has not been
relevant since 2006. Much akin to Chile, the business community was also not involved. This
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absence probably also helps explain the lack of policy networks—put simply, there is no one to
fund NGOs and research organizations. Consequently, the lack of independent research on the
government’s reform programs meant that there was no informed public debate about this
topic. What is more, the little data that has been made publicly available is limited to
discussions about the importance of reform implementation (for example teacher evaluations)
are doing but not much else (Schneider et al. 2019). In sum, the inactivity of civil society in
education means that there is a lack of information on education policy thus making it harder to
evaluate where the country stands and where it should go. It has also meant diminished
accountability from civil society as a whole. In short, the inability to hold the ministry
accountable facilitates the perpetuity of patronage practices.
6. CONCLUSION
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador embarked on a series of
educational reforms. The degree of party system institutionalization of each country, the level
of politization of teacher unions, and the strength of civil society set each country in differing
reform paths. This ultimately affected the levels of patronage in each case: Chile was able to
keep relatively low levels of patronage, Colombia was able to rid itself of some national-level
practices while still having to deal with regional-level patron-client relations, and Ecuador,
though employing radical and swift reforms, still was not able to diminish patronage and might
have even seen it deepen. A crucial takeaway from the Ecuadorian case is that while reforms,
especially in the teaching career, can help chip away at patronage, that in and of itself is not
90
enough to be rid of patron-client tendencies. The stability of the party system as well as the
dynamics and the active involvement of the Ministry with civil society are also crucial.
Moreover, the timing of reforms (and level of impact thereof) also make a difference.
Ecuador passed some deep reforms in just a few years. While the swiftness of the reforms was
done to take advantage of widespread support the government enjoyed, the speed in which
these reforms were introduced prevented society from fully processing them and come to
some sort of negotiation. Rather, as soon as the government saw rising opposition to the
reforms (which given the UNE’s past record of dominance over education, was bound to
happen) it started clamping down on critics and creating its own patronage networks to
counteract the effect of opposing forces. This line of argument echoes Migdal (2001) in that
state and society mutually reinforce each other in different ways.
Furthermore, an over-reliance on one particular president to “fix” everything does not
necessarily lead to sustained growth. This is especially the case in a populist context where the
tendency is to continuously wipe the policy slate clean. Reform processes in Chile, Colombia
and Ecuador have demonstrated that, following Bersch’s (2019) argument, gradual reforms
tend to have better longer-term results and help ensure continuity. In contrast to the Ministry
of Education in Chile, where institutional learning is crucial to scaffold future proposals and
build on previous work (interview with Rodolfo Bonifaz 2021), politicians and reformers in
Ecuador have typically seriously undervalued this kind of institutional sharing (interview with
Fernanda Crespo 2021). As the Chilean case has demonstrated, continuity is key for education
reform to really take hold and to pave the way for fruitful conversations with those who are
affected by it. Without this ongoing discussion, it is truly difficult to enact impactful and long-
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standing change. This chapter thus contains valuable lessons on how reforms to address
patronage in primary and secondary education can help diminish patronage.
The literature on education politics has largely been neglected, especially in terms of
studying the politics behind education reform (Bruns et al. 2019). Given the often-nebulous
nature of these reform processes, especially because of the embeddedness of patronage and
clientelism in which it is often found, it is crucial to study the dynamics of system-wide
education reform to gauge how and when these can be successful—not only in yielding quality
education but also in doing away with harmful patronage practices. Moreover, since scholars
and the development sector consider education policy a crucial component for development, it
is imperative to continue to pay a closer look at the political use of this particular sector and to
search for ways in which reforms might continue to help do away with patronage and
clientelism.
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Chapter 3: Health Ministry Administration and the Health Sector in
Chile, Colombia and Ecuador 2000-2019
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the health sector in countries around the world has
been subject to enormous amount of scrutiny and pressure to keep its constituents healthy.
Though the pandemic has significantly overloaded every country’s health care system, the
resilience of these systems had been laid in the decades prior to 2020. Significantly, the health
system has always been prone to corruption and mismanagement, the pandemic simply
revealed the extent of the damage and the opportunities for re-structuring.
For more than twenty years, the goal in Latin America has been to increase health care
coverage, improve the organization and governance of health systems, and the quality of health
services. As seen in the figure below, corruption is a widespread problem in health care systems
across the globe. These exist not just in the public sector, but at all points in the value chain,
from policy-making to supply procurement. Some of the most common problems both in the
region and other parts of the world include: large-scale fund diversion, doctor absenteeism,
abuse of office by doctors and/or hospital managers (for example, billing the government for
services that were not rendered or selling expired medications) as well as corruption and fraud.
Additionally, publicly employed health providers might refer patients to parallel private
practices (thus working simultaneously in public and private sphere when this is not technically
allowed), create “phantom” patients to claim additional payments or they might also accept
kickbacks for prescribing expensive drugs. Areas that are particularly vulnerable to corruption
include: drug selection and use, any time where medical personnel provide service
procurement, human resources management, regulatory systems, budgeting and pricing, and
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the construction of new medical facilities. Abuses in the health system are generally agnostic of
the kind of health system and country where they might exist. Nevertheless, the form of abuse
might vary depending on how funds are managed, distributed and paid (Savedoff, 2007; Albisu
Ardigó and Chene, 2017).
Figure 4. How corruption manifests itself in the health system
Source: Savedoff, 2007: 3
Patronage in the health sector crops up most commonly when personal relationships
between patients, doctors or key bureaucrats help people gain access to healthcare programs.
In addition, favoritism and nepotism might play an important role in selecting staff at the
ministerial, departmental, and/or facility level. Health center staff might also be certified or
accredited based on bribes, extortion, collusion, nepotism or favoritism. Similarly, at the policy-
making level, patronage might also appear in the accreditation system for health professionals
94
(Albisu Ardigó and Chene, 2017). Indeed, it is far likelier that without an accreditation system
patronage would be more rampant, but, as the case of Chile will show, there is still a chance
that selecting candidates for health ministry positions might be done with other considerations
beyond professional qualifications in mind. Clearly, the effects of patronage on health
undermine the integrity of the health system overall by limiting the quality of health services
and increasing mistrust on the system.
Despite the apparent threat patronage poses for the public health system and health
ministries more specifically, experts have found that corruption tends to be the more pressing
problem (Savedoff, 2007; Albisu Ardigó and Chene, 2017; Kaufman and Nelson, 2004). What is
more, in terms of the proclivity for patronage between the education sector and the health
sector, these diverge significantly. Thus, the key question this chapter seeks to answer is: under
what conditions does patronage in health ministries emerge?
Using the cases of Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, I argue that widespread patronage in
the health sector appears in contexts where there is a high degree of party system instability.
More often than not, patronage tends to be exacerbated when political spoils are to be won
meaning there is a clear political benefit paired with little to no oversight. On the flipside, the
presence of technical and specialized staff can help to create stronger oversight and
transparency. In other words, I argue that unlike the education sector, patronage in health—
especially in health ministries—is not as widespread or widely seen. Though the degree of party
system institutionalization definitely helps to lay better foundations for a more professional
ministerial staff, the nature of the policy area is also an important variable to explain variation
in patronage. This helps confirm two hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: Ministries dedicated to social development (such as education and
culture) will be most prone to more patronage. Rent-seeking in this kind of issue areas is easier
because there are little professional requirements and differentiation between employees.
Because ministries of health require more professional requirements and higher degrees of
specialization, they are less likely to see high levels of patronage.
Hypothesis 2: Due to the complex nature of its sector, health ministries will have multiple
actors and intertwining interests to contend with which will make it more difficult for patronage
to take hold.
Hypothesis 3: Countries with higher degrees of party system institutionalization will have
better tools to prevent patronage strongholds in health ministries. By contrast, the less stable
the party system is, the more motivation there is to use health policy and the ministry itself to
leverage a particular party’s agenda, leading to more patronage.
The chapter will proceed as follows: section one will break down the main differences
between the health and education sectors and how these affect patronage. It will also outline
the factors which contribute to more or less patronage in health ministries. Section two will use
the empirical cases of Chile and Colombia to demonstrate why patronage has not prevailed in
health ministries there. Section three, in turn, looks at the Ecuadorian health ministry and how
patronage has become part-and-parcel of said entity. Section four includes concluding remarks
and an overview of the argument.
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1. HEALTH VERSUS EDUCATION: AN OVERVIEW
Both the health and education sectors share problems of access and quality. They are
also mired by large inequalities in how resources are distributed. Just like with education, the
middle class tends to flee to private health providers and resort to purchasing supplementary
health insurance. Consequently, the middle-class’ stake in improving the public health system is
reduced (Kaufman and Nelson, 2004: 26). These two sectors are typically the main areas
politicians running on elections will highlight as key priorities but yet their import declines once
a new president comes into power.
Health services in particular are commonly viewed as a less urgent policy issue. Kaufman
and Nelson find that during the nineties, annual public opinion surveys placed education as the
first or second most frequently cited public policy problem. Health, in contrast, was only named
by 1 to 2 percent as the most important problem. As of 2018 neither of these topics were in the
top two problems across the region though health did move up a bit further up the ranks
(Latinobarometro, n.d.). One of the reasons as to why health is not commonly the top issue is
that the people who are usually most affected by subpar services belong to the poorer echelons
of society in both urban and rural contexts, which entails that they are often not organized or
active in politics. Thus, more vocal and organized voices in the formal sector and middle classes
are the ones who might push for health sector reform. Even then, however, it is unlikely they
do so because, as mentioned before, they have the option to exit out of the public health
system and find recourse in private health services. In short, there is little incentive from the
middle class to push for reform in public healthcare.
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The health and education sectors diverge in several other ways. First, private and public
interests in the health sector tend to intertwine in ways that are unseen in education. This is
partly due to the fact that the majority of health care systems in the region are segmented
which means that individual needs become “unpredictable, episodic, and highly variable”. Thus,
in contrast to education, “health care lends itself to partial financing through insurance (private,
or social security)” (Kaufman and Nelson, 2004: 26). Private schools and teachers remain
relatively independent of their public counterparts or other public entities. This is not the case
for hospitals, doctors and clinics, which, by contrast, tend to be entangled in a myriad of ways.
This intertwining means that there are also more stakeholders in health policy creation and
implementation. Put bluntly, it is more common to the health sector that everyone is involved,
albeit in varying degrees.
Actors such as unions and associations can balance each other out, can create similar
agendas or compete against each other thus making health policy incredibly complex to create,
reform, and enforce. For example, health providers’ unions often lack the high levels of
organization which frequently characterize teachers’ unions. One reason for this is that doctors’
associations are separate from other non-doctor health care workers’ unions or associations
(such as nurses). Not only this but doctors’ associations are often further divided by
specializations (as of this writing, Colombia has 59 different doctors’ associations ranging from
Neurosurgery to Clinical Hypnosis) which can be further splintered by geographic location and
kind of training (Kaufman and Nelson 2004: 34-35). Furthermore, in countries where private
hospitals provide the bulk of medical services, unions might be discouraged- a phenomenon
which is less likely to occur in settings where education is predominantly public. Nevertheless,
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despite the more fragmented nature of health workers’ unions, the specialized nature of their
work helps them gain leverage thereby making the threat of strikes real and concerning. Yet
another advantage is that doctors often have a significant list of elite contacts. While their
mobilizing and organizational capacity pales in comparison to that of teachers’ unions, these
tools can help health workers’ unions and doctors’ associations stall potentially controversial
reforms when needed.
In addition, because health systems in Latin America typically rely on social security
payments linked to payroll taxes and pensions, this links health policy to the finance ministries
in each country, adding yet another element of complexity to the health sector. The connection
between social security and financing said structure means that more powerful politicians and
members of the economic team will take an interest in health policy and that “sector reforms
often include restructuring financial arrangements to separate payers from providers”
(Kaufman and Nelson: 27). Both of said scenarios are relatively absent in the education sector.
Furthermore, because of the close-knit nature of public and private in the health sector, private
interests are likely to take more active roles in seeking to influence reforms than are their
counterparts in education sectors. In a nutshell, the two sectors’ differing structures lead to
differences in the actors and in the complexity, scope and type of reforms (Ibid).
For all these reasons, health ministries are generally considered less of a political bounty
than other ministries (interview with F. Sacoto, 2021). The multiplicity of actors and the
complex nature of the relationship between public and private, not to mention the high degree
of technical knowledge and training needed to work at health ministries make it more difficult
for a single actor to leverage patronage as a tool of control. In short, since there are too many
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actors, not one has enough weight to wield this tool.
35
That being said, patronage still has been
able to take hold over Ecuador’s health ministry whilst its Colombian and Chilean counterparts
have remained relatively free from it, with Chile more so than Colombia. Thus, the key question
this chapter seeks to answer is under what conditions does patronage in health ministries
emerge? Concomitantly, what advances helped keep patronage at bay in both Chile and
Colombia? Similar to the education sector, the presence of relatively stable party systems help
mitigate patronage practices within ministries of health. Moreover, having trained and
specialized staff at the helm of the ministries contributes in preventing widespread patronage.
2. WANING PATRONAGE: HEALTH MINISTRIES IN CHILE AND COLOMBIA
Although with differing levels of success (some of the reasons of which will be studied in this
section), Chile and Colombia have gradually made steps to improve their public health care
system while also helping diminishing patronage. Three specific factors helped them in these
efforts. First, both engaged in a series of decentralization reforms targeted to better serve the
specific needs of different municipalities. Second, the long trajectory of having highly technical
and professional staff in both health ministries greatly helped forge and continue to strengthen
the health sector. Measures to improve public sector hirings through different institutions have
also been incredibly helpful. All in all, relative party stability—more so in Chile than in
35
That being said, because since the nineties health systems have generally become more decentralized, it is
routinely harder to gauge patronage levels in the health sector, especially in the public sphere (Homedes and
Ugalde, 2005; Nelson and Kaufman, 2004). Moreover, most countries do not have accurate information on the
numbers of people who are in the health workforce “and even when only public sector workers are examined, the
numbers collected at different administrative levels differ (people may move to a different location, and regional
or local governments hire additional staff without reporting to the central authorities)” (Homedes and Ugalde,
2005: 5).
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Colombia—have also paved the way so that the aforementioned reforms could take place.
According to a report for the World Health Organization, Tandon et al., rank Colombia as the
22
nd
most efficient healthcare system in the world with Chile trailing it in 33
rd
place (for
reference, the United States ranks 37
th
). Despite these advances, it is clear that both countries,
as well as the region as a whole, still have a ways to go when it comes to health provision.
Decentralization
Colombia and Chile have decentralized systems with both private and public sectors working
together. Starting from the eighties onwards, both countries engaged in a series of
decentralization measures aimed at better tending to the needs of specific municipalities and
increase resource and management efficiency. A large component of this decentralization
project was granting municipalities large control over health and education. In Chile, primary
health care is fully in the hands of municipalities (or comunas) while in Colombia municipalities
are granted increasing responsibility and oversight over the health care system based on
whether or not they pass certain accreditation criteria (Galilea et al. 2011; Bossert and Leisewitz
2016; Molina et al. 2014). In Chile, each comuna selects a manager or Gerente de Servicio de
Salud. The selection is done through open contests (interview O Arteaga 2021). By contrast, in
Colombia, mayors are typically the ones that select who will manage the localities, which leads
to potential patronage, nepotism and/or favoritism (Roth Deubel and Molina 2013).
Chile and Colombia also resemble each other in the fact that they have developed
different entities to manage the health system. Throughout the 2000s they have also developed
centralized funds to aid the poorer municipalities. As of 2016, roughly 75% of Chileans used the
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public health care system (through the National Health Fund or FONASA) and 25% resorted to
private care (Instituciones de Salud Previsionales or ISAPRES); by 2021, the proportion had
grown to approximately 80% public care to 20% in private care (Vergara Iturriaga and Valdivia
2016; Bossert and Leisewitz 2016; interview O Arteaga 2021). Meanwhile, for Colombia in 2015,
roughly 49% of its citizens were part of the subsidized regime and 43% used the contributive
regime (Dargent 2015).
Aside from tailoring the needs of each municipality, health care decentralization can
also, under certain conditions, be beneficial in that it can, “can contribute to, or at least
maintain, more equitable allocation of health resources among municipalities.” The data in
Colombia, for example, “show that a population-based formula for national allocations is an
effective mechanism for achieving equity of expenditures” which, can in turn, contribute to
health services being used in a more equitable fashion across income groups (Dargent 2015).
Furthermore, decentralization might also in theory be helpful in doing away with patronage, at
least at the ministerial level, since there are little political gains to be had at a more supervisory
role in a decentralized context.
Progress and Challenges in the Colombian Health System
While decentralization contributed to eschewing patronage schemes in Chile’s health sector, ,
decentralization in Colombia has so far had mixed results. In the early nineties, Colombia
embarked on one of the most ambitious and comprehensive health sector reforms the region
has seen (Idem). The 1991 Constitution laid down the legal groundwork for Law 100, passed in
1993, which outlined significant changes to the health sector and continues to be the basis for
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the Colombian sanitary system to this day.
36
Unlike education reforms pushed in the nineties,
health sector reforms were more easily passed for several reasons. For one, as mentioned in
the previous section, it became more of a priority due to its link to pension reform, an area that
was of special interest to the finance ministry and the administration overall economic plans for
the country. Because of the salience of pension reform as linked to healthcare reform, the
executive was able to get consensus on the content of said reform. Additionally, unions in the
health sector did not have a unified position to counter the proposed reforms and were much
less active than the teachers’ unions were when education reforms were being discussed.
Finally, the leading principles of the health reform during this time included combining
universal coverage, equity and efficiency. Given such goals, it was difficult to protest against it
(Ramirez 2004).
Prior to the period of the National Front (Frente Nacional) the health system in
Colombia was characterized as being resource-scarce and patronage-based. Everything
including medicines, facilities and personnel, were distributed according to political loyalty.
Despite some changes to the system between 1958 through 1974 to expand coverage and
ascertain technocratic autonomy, once the competition between Liberals and Conservatives
renewed in 1974, health policy and bureaucratic organizations were once again used for
clientelism.
36
Another important piece of legislation related to sanitary reforms is Law 10 in 1990 where municipal
governments were assigned responsibility for primary health care and primary-level hospitals and health centers.
This means that departmental governments are responsible for secondary level hospitals and coordinate health
campaigns. Meanwhile, according to this law, the central government still has to formulate policy, establish
minimum health standards and manage third level hospitals (Ramirez 2004).
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Politicians saw turning health care into a patronage-based system as particularly
attractive since it could mean little political cost to potentially plentiful electoral gains. There
were no other stakeholders powerful or interested enough in the sector to check the power of
political actors; higher classes were not interested in intervening to prevent such a scenario
from occurring given that they were not beneficiaries of the public system, choosing to exit into
private health care options. Additionally, health experts were divided in terms of how to best
go about in improving the health system—meaning that there was little consensus on policy,
hence facilitating patronage practices by politicians. As a result, one of the key actions made in
terms of healthcare was the creation of new hospitals, a move that did not require much
technical knowledge and was also highly politically profitable. However, it also kept the ministry
weak with little technical expertise and prone to patronage (Dargent 2015).
All this changed with the passing of Law 100 in 1993, considered “one of the most
comprehensive transformations of national health care system in the history of Latin America”
(Ibid: 119). Under this new law, all citizens were placed into a single health care system with
two categories or regimes based on the individual’s ability to pay. With the contribution-based
regime, independent workers and those who are formally employed with sufficient income are
linked to a payroll tax which goes to finance their choice of insurance companies called EPS
(Entidades Promotoras de Salud or Health Promoting Entities). EPS then contract service
providers, either public of private, called IPS (Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios or Health
Service Providers) to attend to the beneficiaries’ health needs. Alternately, people without
sufficient income qualify for the subsidized regime which operates with both EPS and IPS as in
the first regime type. The difference here is that part of the fee paid by those in the
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contributive regime rolls over to finance subsidized system, the remaining balance is covered by
the state (Escobar et al. 2009: 5; Dargent 2015: 121).
Along with Law 100, Law 10, passed in 1991, which gave localities further control over
health and education, ushering in a process of decentralization. These dramatic changes in the
health system further diversified the pool of actors involved in the healthcare system thus
making it harder for traditional groups (such as party leaders) to benefit to the extent they had
done in the past.
Much like the education sector, transferring the responsibility of administering and
overseeing public health care to the localities meant that many mayors and other local leaders
became new patrons—a fact that was further consolidated with the expansion of party lists in
the late nineties to early 2000s since mayors could now use their patronage powers to leverage
votes to get them into Congress. Furthermore, though coverage in the country has significantly
increased since the passing of Law 100 in 1993, quality of health care varies and still remains to
be improved (Manrique-Villanueva & Eslava-Schmalbach 2011).
More significantly, patronage hirings have meant that though there is more funding and
more staff in healthcare facilities, not all of these are actual doctors but rather personnel hired
to do nontechnical administrative tasks such as billing and auditing. In fact, some municipalities
have actually seen a decrease in the number of personnel who directly tend to patients (Molina
and Spurgeon 2007). Not only this, but mayors resorted to using short-term hirings so that
people under these contracts can be easily removed based on changing patronage needs—a
common scenario in Ecuador. Legislation in the mid-2000s helped assuage this by requiring
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that public hospital directors are named every three years following specific technical criteria.
This has helped to maintain experienced and technical professionals in public hospitals.
An additional problem that crops up at the municipal level is some mayors’ use of the
SISBEN—the system which helps determine beneficiaries to the subsidized regime—to include
people based not on need, but political criteria (Eaton and Chambers-Ju 2014: 103; Molina and
Spurgeon 2007). According to Córdoba, some people have appeared more than once on the
SISBEN and at times people who have the ability to pay for insurance are known to appear on
the SISBEN list (2003: 40). A final challenge that has emerged with the decentralization of
healthcare services in Colombia, much like with education, is how armed groups make use of
said administrative autonomy to maintain their control over localities:
For example, in regions where paramilitaries dominate, investigators have uncovered evidence
of contracts between municipal governments and bogus ARS health insurance companies. In
what amounts to a serious misappropriation of decentralized health funds, these companies
submit bills for services they have not provided, and the municipalities then reimburse the
companies in exchange for a cut of the proceeds (Eaton and Chambers-Ju, 2014: 104-105).
Thus, though Colombia’s health ministry has been able to maintain and develop a high level of
technical pedigree, it still has to co-exist with patronage practices at the subnational level.
Institutional Legacy and Accountability Structures
Both countries have had a history of highly technical ministers and staff which has helped keep
institutional knowledge and continue to develop policies driven from sectoral and institutional
know-how throughout the years. The Chilean Ministry of Health (MOH) has historically been
regarded as a solid and prestigious institution. Its Colombian counterpart, while more
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politicized during the fifties and seventies, has taken great strides in the past thirty years to
become a respectable and trustworthy government entity.
One of the prime architects of Colombia’s reform efforts was Juan Luis Londoño, a PhD
in development economics with extensive training in health policy economics, who was
appointed as health minister by president César Gaviria (1990-1994). Londoño had also
previously directed the National Planning Department (NPD) and had already worked on the
proposal he later helped pass. Londoño brought in a number of NPD officials working on social
policy as well as people with postgraduate degrees in public health. The press later dubbed this
team of técnicos as Equipo Cambio (Team Change). Slowly but surely, this group was able to
garner significant presence and autonomy within the ministry. The reforms for what became
Law 100 were also filtered through a process of consultations with the Colombian Medical
Federation, regional authorities, government officials, private health institutions and other
groups to ensure equity considerations were in place. Although the new decentralization
measures increased the complexity and ability to coordinate the appropriate resources,
information, and management from the ministry to localities, Colombia´s ministry of health
continues to be characterized for having a continuing technical presence (Dargent 2015).
Furthermore, despite the flaws and problems at the subnational level with specific
municipalities and/or departments, the Colombian MOH at large is still regarded and respected
as an entity with high levels of professionalism and technical knowledge. It has generally been
able to yield positive results, with nation-wide health care coverage up to 98% in 2021.
Moreover, in spite controversies with specific health care providers in certain localities, the
ministry itself has mostly eschewed controversy and kept a lower profile marked with generally
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positive public perception (interview V Cuellar 2021). Following a study of the most transparent
public entities in the country by Transparencia por Colombia, between January 2015 to April
2016, the Health Superintendency ranked amongst the top 10 most transparent entities,
followed by the Ministry of Health in 17
th
place out of 75. Both of these were deemed to have
moderate risk for corruption. For reference, the lowest ranking entity in place 75 was Análisis
Financiero with high risk for corruption; the Ministry of Education ranked in a middle level in
34
th
place, having medium corruption risk (Transparencia por Colombia, 2019).
One of the main features which helped create these technical MOH was the creation of
institutions meant to strengthen accountability and oversight. For instance, both Chile and
Colombia have health superintendencies meant to oversee the health system as a whole, both
of which are equally trusted and generally regarded for their efficiency and transparency. Both
countries have also created specific entities in charge of making public hirings more accessible
to the general population and thereby more transparent and representative, greatly helping to
reduce patronage appointments.
In 2003, the Chilean government created an autonomous entity called the Sistema de
Alta Dirección Pública (SADP for short) or Public Senior Management System, the goal of which
is to recruit people for top-tier positions in the public sector based on merit. Recruiting is done
through highly transparent open contests. Made as a response to major corruption scandals,
most notably one in the Ministry of Public Works, the SADP kicked off in 2004 by finding 608
appointments. In recent years, approximately 5,000 appointments had been made through the
SADP (“Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública” n.d.). Though no t without its problems, the SADP has
been regarded as a step in the right direction to eschew patronage in the public sector (Fraile
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2018; Llano 2014). What is more, in the realm of health, for instance, Lira (2012) has found that
health services directors chosen through SADP improved on the conditions of centers they led
on indicators such as: average patient stay at hospitals, bed turnover, operating room
occupancy rate and in-patient mortality rate.
Nearly ten years after its birth, the SADP has increased the number of assignments and
the sector it has been used for. This has helped further legitimize its role while also helping the
Chilean Civil Service become one of the most efficient and meritocratic in the region (Llano
2014). When Sebastián Piñera came in for his first term, becoming the first president since the
return to democracy that someone outside of Concertación was ruling, there was fear that the
SADP would no longer going to function as it had or that it would be left by the way side. This,
however, did not happen. What is more, the SADP has only become more relevant as right- and
left-wing governments have come into power thus proving its utility.
From the outside looking in, the Chilean Health Ministry is considered a historically
prestigious institution with solid and technical competencies. It is also highly respected and
regarded by the general populace. Nevertheless, this is not to say that it is not without its flaws.
Experts operating within the health sector have seen that in contrast to the early part of the
2000s, there has been a recent decline in the level. More specifically, although directors are still
widely recruited using SADP, the top candidates from the filtering process are then chosen not
on the basis of their merits but on whether or not their politics align more closely to those of
the incumbent (interview O Arteaga, 2021). Thus, although the SADP continues to work and by
and large patronage has been mitigated, there are still some caveats which can prevent fully
non-partisan appointments to be made (interview O Arteaga, 2021).
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As of 2014, only 1 in every 4 people were satisfied with the public health system-mainly
FONASA- discontent which only grew larger and helped fuel protests in 2019 (Bossert and
Leisewitz 2016). The seeming crumbling of traditional party coalitions since 2018 and 2019 will
be key in seeing how this plays out for the health sector in future years, especially with the
challenges that have arisen due to the COVID pandemic and the coming of a new constitution.
With this in mind, however, Chile continues to be a regional example of whittling away at
patronage appointments in government.
Like Chile, Colombia’s Law 100 (1993) and then Law 909 (2004) respectively established
and reinvigorated the DAFP (Departmento Administrativo de la Función Pública) and the CNSC
(Consejo Nacional del Servicio Civil or the National Council for Civil Service) both of which
employ similar roles as the SADP. These entities have become increasingly relevant and better
at their mandate, with more public hirings being done through these systems than prior to
2004. However, given the complexity of public administration in Colombia, there are still some
improvements and fine-tuning to be done (Strazza 2014).
Hospital Autonomy
Along with the decentralization measures, the Chilean and Colombian health ministries also
granted public hospitals more autonomy. The passing of Law 19,937 in the mid-2000s in Chile
led to the creation of a network of self-managed hospitals (Establecimientos de Autogestió n en
Red‐EAR) which served patients with more complex ailments. The EARs have to comply with set
guidelines relating to cost measurement, quality of care, and user satisfaction. While directors
oversee the execution of programs, the internal organization, and design future plans, each
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institution also has a consultative council (made up of five representatives from the local
community and two staff representatives) to advise on how best to design and evaluate future
plans within each EAR. Given the public nature of these institutions and how they are
organized, the public both drives its organization and it is also an important stakeholder,
helping to keep the administration in check (Vergara Iturriaga and Valdivia 2016).
In Colombia, the Ministry of Health by and large no longer operates hospitals:
“Municipal Health Directorate and mayors are responsible for the municipal public hospitals
and health centers to provide primary health care. Mayors became the political and managerial
leaders of the health sector and coordinators of multi-sector activities in their municipalities”
(Molina et al. 2014: 44). Even though, as explored above, this devolution has led to patronage
problems at the subnational level, it ironically has also helped prevent rampant patronage at
the ministerial level. Additionally, despite giving hospitals more autonomy and thus risking
more patronage at the local level, these hospitals have also managed to experience higher
levels of management capacity (Ramirez 2004). In sum, increased self-management paired with
more open contests for top tier charges have helped improve health services in both Chile and
Colombia while also helping chip away at patronage.
Party System Stability
Though not especially noticeable—especially because of the technical nature of health
governance—party system stability, especially in Chile, was certainly key to help usher in the
aforementioned changes and improvements to the MOH (and arguably the overall healthcare
system operations) in both countries. Chile in particular greatly benefitted from a highly stable
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party system where the Concertación coalition ruled for roughly 20 years during which it helped
set a system of accountability within institutions and develop more professional services. The
fact that by the time that an opposing coalition came to power and was able to continue
building on the previous advances gives credence to the durability of these institutions. Within
this scenario, where power alternation and mutual accountability are to be expected, there is
little incentive to “rig” the system through patronage.
In the case of Colombia, party stability has declined since the 2000s. The creation of
Equipo Cambio during the nineties –which is when party stability remained prominent–and its
embeddedness and autonomy within the ministry since then helped keep the Ministry highly
technical and professional, especially at the national level. While patronage, particularly in the
ministry of health, was kept relatively at bay at a national scale, an increasingly unstable party
system stemming from the rise of new parties helped shepherd and maintain patronage
practices at the subnational level. Because more parties were now vying for more control over
social services at the local level, meaning that there was a bigger honey pot to aim for, the
temptation to use patronage appointments to get support in localities was significant (Molina
et al. 2014; Molina and Spurgeon 2007). Though this predicament is not present in every
locality, it is still an issue which needs resolving. Even then, when comparing the need to deal
with patronage in the health sector to the prevailing corruption, the latter is considered a much
more salient issue needing to be addressed (interview V Cuellar 2021).
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3. INCREASED PATRONAGE: POLITICIZATION OF HEALTH IN ECUADOR 2007-2019
Unlike Chile and Colombia, Ecuador’s MOH has been historically mired with controversy, most
of which goes in tandem with the country’s history of an inchoate party system and general
political instability. There have only been scant scenarios where this ministry has faced stability
with field experts at its helm. Created in 1967, one of the last MOH in the region, this ministry
has faced a revolving door of leadership contributing to subpar medical services and a weak
health care system. Indeed, compared to its regional counterparts, the country is behind in
immunizing the population against diseases such as polio, measles-mumps-rubella, reducing
teen pregnancies and providing safe sanitation.
Many of these issues in the health sector are related corruption issues and more
significantly to the fact that public health issues and primary health care have rarely been
prioritized. This can be attributed by a lack of interest or knowledge of health processes by the
general population to make clear and strong demands. it is also fueled by fact that because
voting is compulsory, candidates running for office will run on what they think the people are
asking for. Thus, if there are weak or unorganized voices surrounding public health issues, it is
less likely that these will be picked up by politicians (Sacoto and Torres 2020). In addition, in a
rather circular manner, widespread mistrust of the system has also meant that few are invested
enough to seek ways to improve it. The constant changes in presidency and legislature in the
nineties in the early 2000s only heightened this mistrust.
Therefore, many hoped that with the period of political stability that ensued with Rafael
Correa’s presidency (2007-2017) that significant changes to the health sector would finally
come about. Although the Correa years symbolized a shift to actually prioritizing health policy
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and, thanks to the commodity boom and increases in the price of oil, the possibility to finance
the health system were as attainable as they had ever been. Indeed, increases in the health
budget were directed towards hospitals in larger cities such as Quito and Guayaquil.
Nevertheless, despite some advances, patronage in the MOH was further entrenched and the
revolving door of ministers continued, with five different ministers in charge at different times
in those ten years. Even more damaging to the structure and organization of the MOH is the
fact that in forty-one years, only nine ministers out of thirty-three have had experience or
specialized knowledge in public health.
37
What is more, in that same time period, only one
minister remained for the entirety of a presidential term (Sacoto and Torres 2020; Chang 2017).
Clearly, such a scenario makes it extremely difficult to design and pass important health policy
and contributes to continued patronage.
The Correa years made the health ministry an “institutional mafia”, a highly politicized
entity made to follow the president’s mandates above all else (interview 2021). Even though in
the past, positions within the MOH had commonly been used as political tokens, this only
continued to be exacerbated between 2007 to 2017. Multiple factors paved the way for this to
happen.
First, the re-drawing of territorial designations in 2012 by Ecuador’s Planning Secretariat
(SENPLADES) created confusion over who would be in charge and bloated government offices.
This piece of legislation which purportedly sought to decentralize health and education
provision, only made centralization more important: it eliminated directories in each province
37
It is also interesting to note that only five women have had the role of minister of health in forty one years
(Sacoto and Torres 2020).
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and replaced them with a total of nine zones, melding together different provinces under the
same authority (Mosquera 2018). Thus, under this statute the ministry now had two vice-
ministries, five undersecretariats, five general coordinations, forty-one national directories,
nine zone coordinations, ninety zone directories, alongside 140 district directories, and four
affiliated entities (Ruiz 2020). Not only has this re-organization led to an inflated bureaucracy,
but it has also made it more difficult for these entities to fully understand and tend to the
needs of each province and locality—especially when the headquarters for each zone are
several hundred kilometers away from the place in need.
For example, the Galapagos Islands’ health governance is dictated by offices nearly
160km away (roughly a two-hour plane ride) in the province of Guayas on the peninsula.
Similarly, the fate of health policy in the rural town of Puerto Quito in the province of Pichincha
is dictated 346km away in Tena, province of Napo (approximately a 5-hour car ride through
various different eco systems leading to quite a large range of health concerns) (interview
2021). Since these reforms, infant vaccination coverage of diseases such as polio, which by
2000 had covered 100% of the population, decreased to 78% in 2013 (Sacoto 2019).
Second, the increasing size of the MOH was also paired with new hiring practices. By
and large, with the new 2012 legislation, there has been increased incentives to hiring
directors, project managers, coordinators, vice-ministers and others without any training and
experience in public health. Much of these short-term contracts have led to high turnover rates,
further draining the ministry of institutional knowledge. Not only this, but some appointments
have been filled by people without an accredited third-level diploma. People in this position are
protected by a provision in article 83 of the public service law (Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público
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or LOSEP) whereby any individual can enter public office without having to have gone through
the public service career nor had the academic qualifications to fulfill such a role. This is a
specific category by the name of “Nivel Jerárquico Superior”, a position designed to be
provisional but that carries with it significant administrative responsibilities. Whoever holds this
position has the legal support to make decisions, in this case in public health, despite not having
the technical capacity to do so hence allowing for political, rather than technical decisions in
this realm to be made. Though there are clearly exceptions, this provision within LOSEP was
used quite frequently both for the health ministry as well as other state entities during the
Correa years and beyond (Ruiz 2020). The existence of such a position naturally lent itself for
highly convenient patronage appointments, which in turn were used to politicize healthcare in
the country and bolster Correa’s hold over health policy.
The Ministry’s shake up was in large part made possible because of the previous
prevalence of an inchoate party system. Prior to the fourteen years of rule by Correa’s party,
Alianza País (AP), Ecuador was ruled by parties that would frequently fall by the way side a
couple of electoral cycles later. It also made the country prone to personalist and populist
parties like AP which, once in power, made use of the state entities to create and expand their
base. No party has been more successful at this than AP, especially because of the longevity of
their time in power. In short, the prevalence of weak and volatile parties made it so that once
one got into power, it would take advantage of the state and its multiple entities to stay in
power thus transforming what should be state policies into party policies.
Part of AP’s takeover in the MOH meant creating a new guard of public servants that
would be loyal to the regime and the party. In the health ministry, this meant that many
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(approximately 400 as of 2011) of people who had worked at the MOH prior to Correa’s first
term were forcefully –some even held at gun point–dismissed from their jobs. The new guard of
people to fill those places, many who were relatively young, did not know how to do things
differently or how they were done in the past. They were thus likelier to toe the line of the
president’s mandates, greatly hampering the possibility of deep institutional development and
gaining institutional knowledge about what had worked in the past and what did not. Instead,
what began to flourish was a kind of top to bottom, one-size-fits-all approach to health
governance. This was aided by short-term contracts which were often given to ministry
personnel. The contracts were renewable every year which meant that they could be used as a
way to test employees’ loyalty. This pressure meant that few if any decisions were made at the
local level, prioritizing instead what the President deemed to be correct, enhancing a very much
top-to-bottom approach to health governance. Moreover, the use of open contests to fill
positions in the ministry waned over time (interview 2021; Chang 2017).
Furthermore, by 2019 even overseeing bodies like the National Health Council
(CONASA), the Agency for Quality Assurance of Health Services and Prepaid Medicine (ACESS)
and the National Agency for Sanitary Regulation, Control and Surveillance (ARCSA) were all put
into question and considered corrupt. This occurred when a whistleblower at ARCSA revealed
that the Ministry of Health, led by María Verónica Espinosa, had compelled an ARCSA-affiliated
laboratory to create an alternate report which would contradict the findings of an original
report. The latter had found that the Ministry had been using faulty HIV tests in public
hospitals. It had also reported that some of the cleaning solution used to sanitize certain
hospitals contained up to 1000% of bacteria count. Finally, the report found that injectable
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paracetamol used in eight hospitals had been compromised, even though it had been
determined that it should not have been distributed in the first place (La Posta 2019).
Despite public outcry and petitions to demote Espinosa for the blatant oversights, then-
president Lenin Moreno (Correa’s successor) was seemingly unwilling to make any moves
against the minister. Incidentally, it was also discovered that Espinosa had a close friendship
with the president’s daughter and wife (interview 2021). It took legislative action initiated by
Congresswoman Mae Montaño to finally have Espinosa removed from office. Interestingly
enough, during the demotion proceedings, a group of MOH workers, who also belong to a
group created by Espinosa, met the minister outside the building to show their support hence
further showing corporatist tendencies of AP cabinet members. As of this writing, many more
stories like this continue to emerge showing the depth of the damage done to the Ecuadorian
health system and of health politicization (Chang 2017).
4. CONCLUSION
As this chapter has demonstrated, the degree of party system institutionalization, though not
the only factor, has certainly played an important role in shaping ministries with higher or lower
levels of patronage. Moreover, the kind of staff choices and the presence of technical directives
in an entity that requires specialized knowledge also greatly helped keep patronage at bay,
especially in Chile. For Chile and to some degree Colombia, having autonomous entities in
charge of leading open contests to recruit the best suited people for high-ranking public offices
also helped prevent patronage not only in the ministry but also in public hospitals.
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Additionally, this chapter has shown that patronage patterns can vary depending on the
policy area. In contrast to the education sector, patronage in health was less prevalent, not only
because of the sheer complexity of the health systems themselves, but also because of the
wide-ranging constellation of actors and intermingling interests involved. Moreover, the
technical nature of work in the health sector made it more difficult for positions therein to be
filled by inexperienced outsiders (although some, especially in Ecuador, did try this). As the
COVID crisis continues, it will be interesting to see whether these patronage-preventing
mechanisms have proven to be resilient. Even then, health governance continues to be a multi-
faceted and ever-changing area the dynamics of which should be closely followed not only by
policymakers but also scholars.
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Chapter 4: Politicizing Diplomacy: Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(2000-2019)
In any given country, diplomacy, or “the activity and set of professional skills serving a national
power center’s relationship with other power centers” is crucial to ensure the physical and
economic well-being of its constituents (Greenstock, 2022: 1). Indeed, it is because diplomats
are regarded as “the extension of a ruler’s reach across his border” (Idem) that Ministries of
Foreign Affairs (MFAs or Cancillerías in Spanish) across the globe are generally considered to be
amongst the most professionalized and technical, even in developing regions such as Latin
America (Panizza et al., 2019; Grindle, 2012; Kopecky et al., 2016). Given the increasing
complexity of international affairs, staff needs to be trained enough to satisfactorily deal with
issues around globalized economics, power distributions, cultural fragmentation, and modern
technology:
The capacity to absorb the complexity of a multipolar world, to understand the main linkages
between the different influences and actors, and to handle unconventional situations can give a
state a marked advantage in realizing its interests…Diplomats, who at their best are trained and
practiced in handling complexity, can play a central role in these processes if given the right
strategic direction and resources within an effective foreign policy bureaucracy (Greenstock,
2022: 16).
As such, MFAs typically have extensive filters to recruit suitable candidates for training whilst
also requiring a rigorous series of steps for trainees to continue to ascend through the foreign
service career ladder. In short, for reasons stated above, the foreign service is usually known to
have more merit-based career systems (Grindle, 2012: 18).
Notably in the case of Ecuador, prior to Rafael Correa’s first term as president, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the few ministries, if not the only, with a proper career
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structure. Not only this, but Ecuador’s Cancillería had been traditionally considered one of the
most solid, congruent and professional of all its ministerial counterparts (La Posta, 2022). Based
on this and the Correa regime’s attempts to further professionalize the civil service through a
new set of legislation by the name of Ley Orgánica de Servicio Público (LOSEP) the stage was
seemingly set for the MFA to continue to build on its trajectory of professionalized service.
Nevertheless, this was not the case. Between 2010 to 2018, the MFA’s reputation was deeply
affected by a series of political decisions. What was once considered an apolitical and
professional ministry became a deeply ideological and partisan one where patronage
appointments became the bread and butter of ministry dealings.
In other words, throughout the mid-2000s, especially between 2007-2018, Ecuador’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) or Cancillería became increasingly prone to patronage politics
resulting on a politicized foreign service. In short, the MFA became vessel for ideologization.
This chapter seeks to explain why this shift happened and its consequences for Cancillería going
forward. The main argument here is that the lack of a stable party system coupled with a high
proclivity for personalist and populist leadership in the form of then-president Rafael Correa
deeply impacted the MFA and turned it into a political and partisan instrument. Additionally,
the need to create a robust party structure for the incumbent through state entities such as
Cancillería meant that state goals were overshadowed by party goals. A key reason to exploring
the case of the Ecuadorian MFA in particular is to provide further evidence as to how much
patronage has affected the Ecuadorian state. Simply put, if this ministry in particular had been
able to keep a high degree of professionally trained and merit-based appointees in their midst,
then it would have been robust enough to work with any kind of leadership—even one of a
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populist ruler. In other words, the within-case comparison provides a final and most-extreme
case to test the prevalence of patronage in Ecuador. The implications being that if the most
professional of all ministries has fallen prey to patronage, then other ministries probably also
followed suit, all to the detriment of democracy and overall state capacity.
Conclusions drawn from this chapter could therefore be useful to further understand
how and why state entities can become vulnerable to patronage practices where these had not
existed before as well as further showcase the dangers of patronage practices. Though there
are few works that have studied the kind of bureaucratic appointments prevalent in ministries
of foreign affairs (such as Panizza et al., 2019; Kopecky et al., 2016; Grindle, 2012), they
typically agree in that MFA staff are typically very professional; they have a clear hierarchy and
steps to rise up the ladder which involves years of experience and training. Moreover, said
training also involves going through a diplomatic academy. Nevertheless, despite this
knowledge, very few studies have focused on how patronage can affect and permeate MFAs,
particularly in Latin America. This chapter hopes to help fill this gap by showing how patronage
got to permeate Ecuador’s Cancillería.
The chapter will proceed as follows. First, there will be an overview of the main
argument and the key hypotheses to be tested. The subsequent sections will analyze and test
the aforementioned hypotheses and explain the two main mechanisms at work which led to
the increased prevalence of patronage in the MFA. Finally, the last section will present some
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research agendas.
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1. ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Like other chapters in this study, party system institutionalization (PSI) clearly affects patronage
patterns in different ministries. Ecuador’s low level of party system institutionalization (-0.78
according to Mainwaring’s calculations), signifies two things for increased patronage across all
ministries, but specifically for the MFA. First, because of party weakness and volatility, the
winning party will have to build its bases from the ground up to ensure its permanence and
relevancy in future elections. Thus, state resources will likely be used to strengthen the party
and hence the president’s hold on everyday policy-making. This then results in party goals
trumping state goals and ensuring that newly hired personnel remain loyal to the party and the
president. Second, whatever parties exist are prone to personalist and often populist
leadership. If this kind of party comes to power, it means that the party leader, now the
president, will be making all of the main policy decisions. Therefore, loyalty to such president
will become increasingly paramount to safeguard the appointees’ position in government (see
Figure 5). While these processes deeply affected ministries which had already had previous
problems with patronage such as education and health, they also deeply altered the fabric of
the ministry of foreign affairs.
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Figure 5. The argument summarized (foreign affairs)
There are three specific hypotheses can further help explain this process. First, the impetus
behind this chapter is to test the following hypothesis (previously found in chapter one of this
study).
Hypothesis 1: More technical ministries (such as foreign affairs and finance) will require
more professional staff; thus, they will have less patronage. This chapter will test this
hypothesis by looking at the case study with the most prevalence of patronage (Ecuador) and
within the most technical ministry to be found. If indeed, patronage became more present in
the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then it will prove that, first, patronage can seep into
even the most professional of ministries and second, the corrosive nature patronage can have
on all state entities.
Hypothesis 2: Where party systems are weak—meaning that they are party vessels for
president/party leader’s political interests—more patronage will be present across all levels of
public administration. In an inchoate party system, the president will use patronage
Low PSI
Personalist and
populist party
leadership
Winning party
build bases
using state
resources
Party-building
goals trump
state goals
Party
leader/president
has full control of
policy-making. Patronage
becomes more
prevalent in
ministries
Personal trust
becomes
increasingly
important for
job tenure
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appointments to secure support for their party. Because in this kind of system there is little to
no distinction between the president and the party, the former can make decisions for the
latter. In other words, party goals become subservient to the party leader/president’s choice.
Consequently, the president will have more autonomy in appointment and will thus be more
likely to wield his or her power to give offices to those they trust and have proven their loyalty,
regardless of their partisanship and the qualifications they may or may not have for the job or
any legal considerations that exist to prevent this (Panizza et al., 2019; Kopecky et al., 2016).
This is clearly not ideal for democracy and the long-term provision of public goods since it
would mean that state politics (política de estado) would become conflated with party politics
(política de partido/gobierno). Consequently, policies will be directed towards benefitting the
party, especially the party leader, and not necessarily the civilian population. Moreover, by
ostensibly skipping merit-based hiring standards, rule of law is also overlooked, further
undermining democracy.
Hypothesis 3: Populist leaders who later become presidents are likelier to have more
patronage appointments during their tenure in power. As Panizza et al. (2019) point out,
politicians who access office with weak parties with little to no organization—a reality often
faced by populist leaders and their parties—may use patronage appointments to build up their
own party structure. Manichean discourse typically associated with populism will give
presidents of this nature the justification to “re-found” the state, do away with the perceived
status quo, and therefore get carte blanche when it comes to staffing their ministries. While in
time these appointments can become more entrenched on keeping institutional integrity,
someone’s permanence in a particular position might also become increasingly contingent on
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whether there is a degree of trust with their higher-ups, and especially the president’s inner
circle thus perpetuating patronage patterns and a lack of professionalization.
Two other hypotheses can also somewhat affect patronage levels in the specific case of
the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be that:
Hypothesis 4: Previous lack of organization/mandate within the MFA also helped pave
way to ideologization during Correa years. Or, relatedly:
Hypothesis 5: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always been political yet this nature
was less blatant or harder to see before the Correa years.
In short, these two final hypotheses are related to the fact that perhaps the MFA was already in
disarray and thus in itself already prone to patronage before the arrival of correísmo. As this
study will show, however, there is little evidence to prove this. Though a more complete
chronological analysis would have to be undertaken to fully test these particular statements—
that is, go further back in time before 2000—even as it stands, Ecuador has historically prided
itself for its diplomatic service and the continuous reforms done, especially between 1988 to
1992, to modernize recruitment processes and make them more widely available for those who
show an aptitude for it. Said reforms have generally been considered successful at mitigating
patronage in this particular ministry (Quintero, 2020).
Furthermore, a common theme in the literature of the country’s foreign policy
administration is that prior to 1998, most of Ecuadorian foreign policy was dedicated to dealing
with the border conflict with Perú. This means that there was a coherence in mandate and the
organization of this particular state entity since such a pressing need required the most
prepared minds and a strict training to ensure the peace process would be reached (interview
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with F Bahamonde, interview with G Ortiz, 2022; Zepeda and Egas 2011). As with the preceding
chapters, process tracing and comparative historical analysis, alongside in-depth, semi-
structured interviews of both active and retired members of Cancillería are the main testing
tools. News reports and INGO reports have also been used for these efforts.
The overall intention in this chapter is to show the dangers of patronage and to see how
it can affect even the most technical of ministries. Moreover, it seeks to highlight the negative
impact a politicized foreign policy can have on a country’s well-being and its relationship with
other countries in the long-run. Having covered the theoretical underpinnings for this study, the
following sections will address each of the mechanisms previously outlined—party dependency
on state resources and populist leadership—to test and explain why the Ecuadorian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in particular became prone to patronage and, with that, the politicization of
foreign policy. The last section will contain some concluding thoughts.
2. PARTY WEAKNESS AND STRONG LEADERSHIP: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
Since his very first day in office back in 2007, Rafael Correa arrived to the presidency with an
ambitious reform agenda meant to “re-establish” the country away from the control of what he
perceived to be the corrupt regime of the partyarchy (the traditional parties) and economic
elites. Increasing state capacities and civil service professionalization, along with changes to
Ecuador’s social, economic and political landscape were paramount to his reform goals.
Through this, Correa also sought—and by and large managed—to undermine Ecuador’s
traditional parties and set up his party, Alianza PAIS (AP) as the new dominant political force in
the country. Two things became very clear once Correa came to power. First, that AP was a
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strongly personalistic party; meaning that Correa was, essentially, the party. The main
objective for AP members was thus subsumed to winning elections and ensuring that legislation
passed without having to resort to parliamentary debate.
Second, although attempts to professionalize and improve civil service, encapsulated
with the passing of a comprehensive civil service law, Ley Orgánica de Servicio Público (LOSEP)
which even included the creation of a stand-alone Institute of Meritocracy, these eventually
came into conflict with the broader reform plan Correa and his followers had in mind. In short,
because civil service reforms clashed with Correa’s hyper-presidentialist agenda and willingness
to control every aspect of public administration to make AP stronger, said reforms largely fell by
the wayside and instead were increasingly used to promote temporary and/or discretional
appointments (Fontaine et al., 2017). Attempts to reform the civil service— which by 2011 had
looked promising (Iacoviello, 2014) — ultimately failed to be enforced and were instead used to
justify patronage schemes.
This is perfectly encapsulated by Correa’s own statements made on June 11
th
2016 on
his weekly broadcast, Enlace Ciudadano, where he instructed public sector officials and political
authorities to create and even use their own personal social media accounts to “refute any lies”
about his regime. He also warned them that, given that they were discretionary appointments,
he could replace them whenever he wished. He then proceeded to outline his regime as a
political project where every public official must be a “highly political technocrat” and vice
versa (TELE CIUDADANA, 2016). Correa was thus expecting to not only professionalize the civil
service, but to make it a political entity. One that, ostensibly, existed to protect and reinforce
the president’s goals. A helpful tool to ensure this kind of loyalty entailed hiring a significant
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number of young professionals, mostly recent graduates with little work experience but
theoretical knowledge regarding policy-making and implementation, who were open to
supporting the regime and its modus operandi. This new workforce came to take over medium
and high-level positions amongst several different government entities. Their tenure in said
office, however, would be contingent upon how much their ideological positions aligned with
that of the government (Fontaine et al., 2017). These actions clearly exemplify Kopecky,
Spirova and Scherlis’ argument that patronage operates both as a mode of government and as
a party-building mechanism (2011: 18).
For the specific case of Cancillería, the ministry faced a largely unprecedented wave of
politicization and ideologization. Two of the founding members of AP, first Fander Falconí and
later Ricardo Patiño were appointed to run the ministry from 2008-2010 and from 2010-2016
respectively. Due to their background, both Falconí and Patiño were given the president’s trust
to re-structure the mechanisms used to appoint diplomats. Moreover, foreign policy essentially
became directed by Correa and his confrontational management style became part and parcel
of Ecuador’s foreign policy approach (Malamud and García-Calvo 2009). More importantly to
the actual management and organization of the MFA, under Ricardo Patiño, who retained his
tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs for a record of six continuous years, the number of
personnel increased from around 700 in 2007 to peaking at approximately 1300-2100 people
(La Posta, 2018; 2022; interview G Ortiz, 2022). Not only this, but the new staff that arrived
between 2007-2017 were by and large allowed to enter without following the usual
recruitment criteria. What is more, the diplomatic academy, a crucial institution that had been
used to recruit and train all incoming applicants and members of the foreign service, was
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essentially dismantled by Correa when he came to power. Instead of going through the
standard filters and procedures, these new additions were mainly hired based on party criteria.
That is, whether they held similar political views to the regime or had an inclination towards AP
itself. Although new members of the foreign service were required to complete a Master’s
program in at a public postgraduate university by the name of Instituto de Altos Estudios
Nacionales (IAEN), this program was viewed more as complementary to the training, and it
lacked the depth that the diplomatic academy had offered. Thus it was subpar in terms of
providing proper training for the new cohort of foreign service servants (Quintero, 2020).
Furthermore, the IAEN itself, especially between 2008-2013, was heavily criticized for a lack of
meritocratic procedures (Campoverde, 2016).
Relatives or acquaintances to known party members were also given a leg up in hiring
processes whilst existing foreign service servants who had worked at the ministry before
Correa’s arrival were asked to either toe the regime’s left-wing ideological proclivities or to
leave (interview G Ortiz, 2022; interview F Bahamonde, 2022). These blatant instances of
patronage were especially prevalent during Patiño’s time as minister. Given his role in the
political wing of the party (and the government) and his involvement with the Sandinista
revolution in Nicaragua during his youth, it is no surprise that these recruitment attempts were
made not in favor of creating a better, more professional foreign service, but to recruit
“soldiers” for Correa and the party’s ‘Citizen’s Revolution’ (Revolución Ciudadana) at home and
abroad (interview F Bahamonde, 2022).
Between 2010 to 2016, which matched with Patiño’s tenure, about 180 to 200 advisors
were brought in by the minister himself. These advisors were scattered all throughout the
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different branches of the Cancillería, inside and outside the country. According to Fontaine et
al., “Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2010 and 2016, for example, had over the
course of 3 years at least 125 advisor positions [widely considered political posts]” (2017:5).
Not only was this an unprecedented number of advisors, but another rarity in their
appointment was that they were often the ones making key decisions, something that is
typically reserved to those who had earned the official designation to do so (interview G Ortiz,
2022; Calderón and Fontaine, 2016). Thus, rather than playing an advisory role, these new
appointees essentially took over the MFA by creating a superstructure above its normal
hierarchy of roles and positions. In so doing, undermining the whole principle of the diplomatic
career and its standard proceedings (La Posta, 2018).
All in all, the lack of properly trained officials and the seeming overflow of political
appointments helped perpetuate a structure where decision-making in the realm of foreign
policy revolved around the president. For example, between 2017 and 2019, 66% of
ambassadors were appointed on political grounds and had not gone through the diplomatic
career hierarchy (Noboa, 2019c). This naturally led to the MFA’s declining performance since
the staff lacked the training they had hitherto been exposed to (interview, 2022). In addition,
the role of the MFA’s staff morphed from one of protecting state interests abroad to supporting
the president’s ideological motives and interests, further compromising the performance and
integrity of the ministry (Quintero, 2020).
Clearly, the need to make AP a dominant force in Ecuador’s political landscape came at
the cost of sacrificing some of the more professional ministries like the MFA. In doing so,
however, AP became a state symbiote; deeply relying on state resources, especially
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government jobs, to mount its support bases. While this was successful when Correa was
president, the power transition from that to his hand-picked successor, Lenín Moreno (AP,
2017-2021), has proven that AP’s strength and unity was ultimately ephemeral and largely
based on the figure of Correa (De La Torre, 2013).
3. CHARISMA AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE: A UNIQUE BREED OF POPULISM
Ecuador has been no stranger to its fair share of populist presidents and/or party leaders.
However, it appears that, at least in the past thirty years or so, the only populist president who
has permitted patronage to take such a widespread or systematic hold on the state has been
Correa. Why has this been the case? The answer is largely based on Correa’s particular brand of
populism. One that combines all the typical features of populism as well as technocratic
legitimacy, thus combining two of Weber’s ideal types of domination: charisma and
bureaucratic- rational (or legal) (Diaz Gonzalez, 2019). Because of this combination as well his
determination to pursue a radical and ambitious reform agenda, Correa was able to maintain
unprecedented high levels of support, especially from 2007 up until 2013 which, in turn,
allowed him to continue leading in that populist and personalist style.
Populism as interpreted by De La Torre, regardless of whether it is right-wing or left-
wing, is “an approach to politics that depicts it as a struggle between ‘the people’ and some
malign elite or set of elites”. Under this context, ‘the people’ is a homogenous entity with a
common identity embodied in a leader “whose mission is to ‘save’ the nation. Populism
includes previously excluded groups, while fostering majoritarian understandings of democracy
that do not always respect the rights of the opposition or the institutional fabric of democracy”
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(2013: 34). While populism normally has a rhetoric of inclusion, populist leaders such as
Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez and Correa himself are also commonly known to be selective in
terms of what procedures and norms of liberal democracy they choose to follow. They have
been known to intimidate the opposition and privately owned media as well as coopting civil
society organizations while building new ones from the top. This kind of leaders have also been
known to replace or shut down national legislatures. Finally, both Correa and Chávez used
elections to displace traditional parties and elites, convened constituent assemblies to write
new constitutions, and used the power of state resources to “blatantly reshape the electoral
playing field to [their] own advantage” (Idem).
Unlike Chávez and his other populist predecessors in Ecuador, Correa used a mix of
populist rhetoric with top-down technocratic policies. His training as an economist and status
as a university professor meant that he took more of a technical approach to policy-making.
This combination of charismatic leadership with a technical background is unique to Correa and
thus makes him fit the profile of what sociologist Carlos De La Torre calls a techno-populist (De
La Torre, 2013; Diaz Gonzalez, 2019). Such a combination turned out to be incredibly successful
in terms of getting a sizable number of votes in every election he and his party participated in.
The fact that he himself possessed technical expertise gave his decision-making more
legitimacy. The combination of techno-populism and his ambitious reform agenda made Correa
a far more powerful kind of populist leader than others that had come before him, thus making
the consequences of his reforms, both positive and negative, more impactful and durable.
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Controversial Foreign Policy Decisions
Correa’s charismatic personality, paired with his academic background and widespread support
allowed him to manage the country’s foreign policy almost exclusively around his wishes and
stipulations (Ramos Hidalgo, 2013; Zepeda and Egas, 2011; Diaz Gonzalez, 2019). Closely
following the ideas of the so-called “twenty-first century socialism” and the steps already taken
by Chávez in Venezuela, foreign policy under Correa, and more directly by his foreign affairs
minister Ricardo Patiño, acquired a strong anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal stance; choosing
instead to establish closer connections to his perceived enemy’s (the United States) enemies,
mainly Russia, China, and Iran (Malamud and Calvo, 2009; Diaz Gonzalez, 2019).
During Correa’s time in power, Julian Assange was controversially granted asylum at the
Ecuadorian embassy in London back in 2012. The Assange case is interesting since it marks a
clear departure from Ecuador’s heretofore use of technical criteria to manage its foreign
relations and into a more political interest on the president’s behalf to position the country as a
challenger to hegemonic powers in the international system. This decision has been widely
regarded as counterproductive to Ecuador’s interests, and Assange’s prolonged presence was
increasingly perceived as an inconvenience and obstacle to more positive relationships not only
with the UK but with other important trading partners (Ghitis, 2018; Diaz Gonzalez, 2019: 13-
14).
38
38
The situation with Assange came to a head when in 2017, a few months into Lenín Moreno’s presidency, he was
granted Ecuadorian citizenship without following all of the procedures dictated by the law. Official MFA
documents, at the time under the helm of María Fernanda Espinosa (her niece María Verónica, was minister of
health and was deposed after a series of controversies, see chapter 3) claimed that Assange had scored 1oo% on
the test to prove his knowledge of the country’s history, geography and fluency in Spanish—a remarkable feat
given that it is known that Assange does not speak the language (Imbaquingo, 2019). Not only this, but Assange
was also granted advisory status to the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and a couple of days later, to the Embassy
in Moscow both of which were not approved by the United Kingdom thus invalidating the appointments. Nine
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Furthermore, relations with the United States, one of Ecuador’s longest-standing and
most important trading partners, continued to cool down when Correa decided not to renovate
a 10-year deal that had been made to allow US military to use an airbase in the city of Manta
for drug and piracy surveillance (El Comercio, 2009). The lack of surveillance proved to be
detrimental, as Ecuador has become an “increasingly popular staging point for the international
drug trade” (Bargent, 2013). Correa viewed the issue of drug trafficking as a public health issue
as opposed to a security one. This view helped justify not renewing Manta as a US military base.
The MFA’s reputation and integrity, however, was once again called into question when, in
February of 2012, Italian authorities found 40kg of liquid cocaine in a diplomatic bag brought
from Ecuador to Milan by artist Christian Loor.
The artist had asked the MFA permission to use the diplomatic bag to bring the pieces
for a play he had created. Why this kind of material got the MFA’s permission to go through
under the protection of a diplomatic bag continues to be unclear as the Ecuadorian Attorney
General acquitted Patiño and his team from any responsibility and instead put the blame on the
artist (Plan V, 2015; El Comercio, 2012). However, years after the incident, Loor has since stated
that he was tapped by higher ups in the government to transport the drugs (Plan V, 2015).
Aside from the scandal this purported for Patiño, the ministry, and Ecuador as a whole, in the
long-run this kind of events served as mounting proof of correísmo’s increasing complicity in
the region’s drug trade, a problem that has become pressing for the country (interview 2022).
months and a new ministerial appointment later, Cancillería nullified the documentation that had validated
Assange’s acquisition of Ecuadorian citizenship. On April 11
th
2019 the Ecuadorian Embassy finally removed
Assange’s asylum status and the London police was able to detain him (Idem).
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Though the new partnerships and policy decisions made the country’s ideological
positions crystal clear, they did little to achieve the goal of “inserting Ecuador in a strategic
position in the world order” (Diaz Gonzalez, 2019: 11). Not only did this personalist and
ideological stance to foreign policy affect Ecuador’s reputation abroad, but it also threatened its
economic opportunities with some of its biggest partners. In 2009, for example, the US
Ambassador in Ecuador, Heather Hodges, stated that “the United States stopped investing in
Ecuador due to a lack of clear rules for companies” (Malamud and García Calvo, 2009: 5). Given
this newfound confrontational style of diplomacy, there was mounting concern that
international credit and investment flows would decrease. Correa addressed these concerns by
seeking investors in China, Iran and Russia, an action which did little to improve the country’s
reputation worldwide, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy in terms of the reputational
costs of taking on a personalist, ideological and confrontational style of foreign policy
(Malamud and García Calvo, 2009).
Up until 2013, Correa enjoyed a high degree of support—a rarity in Ecuadorian politics.
The most important reason for this was the global commodity boom, especially with oil which
“allowed Correa to hire more bureaucrats and launch ambitious infrastructure projects” (De La
Torre, 2013: 35). The increase in living standards meant a steady source of support for the
president and therefore made it easier to overshadow the government’s frequent attacks to
private media, indigenous and peasant communities, as well as other left-wing activists. His
popularity also meant that he had the freedom to dictate what he wanted in terms of foreign
policy. This despite the fact that in a survey conducted in 2010, most surveyed Ecuadorians
viewed the United States in a favorable light—it received the highest ranking above all other
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countries—and about 82% thought it was either important or very important to maintain
positive relations with it (Zepeda and Egas, 2011: 113). Clearly there were some large
discrepancies between the general public’s perception of other countries and actual foreign
policy decisions during this time period. Nevertheless, because foreign policy issues are not
really at the forefront of the general populace´s mind, the government hence got away with
more controversial decisions like the ones mentioned above (Zepeda and Egas, 2011; Malamud
and Calvo; 2009).
Turmoil with Technocracy: What is Truly Technical?
Correa’s technocratic populist strategy became increasingly problematic towards his third term
in power (2013-2017). One of the key reasons for this was, as De La Torre describes it, that:
Under Correa, populism has turned into elitism. Self-described post- neoliberal experts
claim to know how to build a just and rational society, without needing citizen
input…Technocratic reason—with its claims to be true and scientific—replaces the give-
and-take of democratic debate over proposals (2013: 39).
Despite the more eclectic and interdisciplinary approach that Correa’s technocrats had taken to
policy-making, especially in terms of the economy, there was an increased sense that this group
was acting from a position of knowing more than anyone else, of being the only ones willing
and able to pursue an absolute truth to solve issues, and thus to reject or ignore any outside
opinions that might question their role as experts (Diaz Gonzalez, 2019: 12; De La Torre, 2013).
In a nutshell, a healthy give-and-take between society and policy makers was at an all-time low.
Interestingly, correísmo’s usual preference for technocrats was not conveyed in the realm of
foreign affairs, thus posing an interesting contradiction between this particular state entity and
others.
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For one, the appointment of the likes of Ricardo Patiño as minister, who already had
fraud charges against him prior to taking office and had no prior experience or training in
diplomacy, demonstrates where Correa’s priorities lied in terms of having technical staff in the
MFA. Beyond the scandals mentioned above regarding Assange´s asylum and the “narcovailija”,
Patiño has also been heavily criticized for his lack of knowledge or training in foreign diplomacy,
supporting anti-democratic regimes, and questioning the legitimacy of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. Despite all of the controversies surrounding his name, Correa kept
Patiño in charge mostly because of, experts claim, his loyalty to the president and his ability to
mobilize support for the regime (El Universo, 2012).
Other ministers between 2008-2018—note that Moreno’s first year in presidency after
Correa was largely considered a succession of the latter’s playbook—some with more
experience in foreign affairs than other, have been heavily critiqued for compromising the
integrity of the MFA (interview F Bahamonde, 2022; interview G Ortiz, 2022). It was, after all,
María Fernanda Espinosa, appointed by Moreno in 2017, who signed off on the process of
granting Assange Ecuadorian citizenship and diplomatic status, despite concerns from career
diplomats stationed in London (Ortiz, 2018). Espinosa was also heavily criticized for her seeming
negligence when nine journalists covering drug trafficking and guerrilla activity in the northern
border where kidnapped and two were murdered by FARC dissidents—-at the time she was
campaigning to become president of the UN General Assembly, a post she had between 2018-
2019 (La Posta, 2019).
Not only this, but during Espinosa’s tenure, reports have confirmed that Correa, by then
retired in Belgium, had petitioned that three of his secretaries become part of the foreign
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service and continue to work for him. One of them received a salary of upwards of 6000 USD, a
value that is usually paid to someone in a high diplomatic rank. Along these lines, Espinosa was
similarly found to grant positions in different embassies to people linked to controversial
figures from AP. She was also heavily criticized for her inaction and reticence to speak on the
human rights violations occurring in Venezuela (Vistazo, 2018). Finally, between 2008-2018, the
MFA spent approximately 45 million USD just on diplomatic trips. Ministers where often seen
exceeding the number of assistants they were legally allowed to take further showing the lack
of awareness for following proper procedures (Noboa, 2019a; 2019b).
These controversies and ministerial appointments at large have given credence to the
overall sensation that instead of having an open and trained diplomacy, the priority was to have
pro-government supporters throughout the ministry, both at home and abroad, to promote the
regime´s ideologies. Despite the guise of having technical experts, the priority in foreign policy-
making had transformed into serving the regime’s ideological interests in lieu of the country´s
well-being. This process—meaning that someone in an administrative position could be in
charge of a tenured ambassador—has disassembled diplomatic categories and ignored the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Although, in principle, not illegal, the modus
operandi between 2008-2018 has undermined the importance and relevance of the foreign
service and its echelons (Ayala Lasso in Plan V, 2016). By hiring people for what seem to be
mainly political purposes, not only has the institutional integrity of MFA been put at risk, but it
has also meant the loss of many of the most positively regarded and experienced members of
the diplomatic service—many of which were dismissed or quit after they had expressed
concerns with the increased politicization of the ministry or refused to comply with orders from
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the likes of Patiño; hence further compromising the degree of professionalization within the
MFA (Ecuador Transparente, 2010).
4. CONCLUSION
In sum, much like Ecuador’s other less professionalized ministries, the country’s inchoate party
system had severe consequences for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, making it vulnerable to one
of the biggest instances of patronage and ministry politicization in its history. Two key
mechanisms influenced this outcome. First, the weak nature of Alianza PAIS made it reliant on
state resources to mobilize support, win elections, and generally stay afloat. Creating a new
dominant party whilst also ridding the country of its partyarchy required recruiting an
onslaught of young professionals who eventually were expected to become loyal to Correa and
prioritize the regime’s goals above state goals. This was the case for even the most technical
ministries like the MFA whereby, between roughly 2007-2018, several political hires were made
and/or old staff expected to be loyal to the party and ultimately to Correa. Second, Correa’s
particular brand of populism (one that appeals to technocratic expertise) and ambitious reform
programs meant that he got implicit consent from the people to dictate foreign policy
according to his own wishes. This, in turn, meant further politicizing the MFA and undermining
its structural integrity in favor of the president’s political project.
This chapter has therefore confirmed the first three hypotheses it had originally laid out
and demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, patronage can seep into some of the
most professionalized state entities; for the case of Ecuador, it was the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In short, this case study has showcased the corrosive nature patronage can have on all
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state entities as well as it impact on the kind of policy-making that is prioritized once
professional services are disregarded. Hence, one of the most crucial implications for this
chapter is that populism is a powerful tool, especially in settings where inchoate party systems
exist as these two elements have proven to be a potent combination not only in Ecuador, but in
countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. While the ability to properly test hypotheses 4 and 5
(previous lack of organization/mandate also helped pave way to ideologization during Correa
years) was ultimately beyond the scope of this study, future research agendas exploring the
dynamics and evolution of the MFA during the latter half of the twentieth century, especially in
contrast to its regional counterparts, would be incredibly important.
Since the 1940s until 1998, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was almost
exclusively focused on resolving the border conflict with Peru. After signing a peace agreement
in 1998, the MFA went through an important turning point in its foreign policy. Under Correa,
both the management of the Cancillería and foreign policy became a political and ideological
project spearheaded and managed by the techno-populist leader. Moreno’s first year was still
plagued by correísmo and toeing that line—most clearly reflected in the decision to grant
Assange diplomatic status. However, ever since 2018, certain steps have been taken to re-
institutionalize or recover the MFA’s institutional integrity.
One of the biggest advances in this regard was the reopening of the diplomatic academy
in 2019, nearly ten years after it had been shut down (Noboa, 2019d). Moreover, with the
departure of Correa and his controversial cabinet members (like Correa, Patiño for example is
exiled because of an indictment against him) many of the more political advisors have also
gradually left the MFA. Cancillería is going through a process of re-learning and training,
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offering more tools to those who were hired during the Correa years and who had not received
the training from the years when the diplomatic academy was eliminated. Furthermore, as of
this writing, Ecuador´s foreign policy has been taking more of a pragmatic approach, something
that might help in re-establishing positive relationships with countries that had been spurned
between 2008-2018 like Colombia and the United States (interview with G Ortiz, 2022). In sum,
the prospects for the return to a more professional and solid state entity seem positive.
Nevertheless, according to an interviewee, it will take about 10 more years to fully get it back
on its feet, if not in better shape, than when Correa found it.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
As this study has confirmed, the use of patronage in public sector hirings can be quite damaging
to the state’s overall performance. Hiring public officials on the basis of criteria other than
merit can lead to filling offices with less-than-qualified personnel, thus, in turn potentially
harming the quality of public service delivery. Additionally, recruiting political supporters in lieu
of qualified and experienced staff can contribute to undermine “the independence between
elected officials and bureaucrats, and, hence, increase the likelihood of state capture and
systemic corruption” (Brassiolo et al., 2020: 1).
Though patronage and civil service systems might be able to co-exist, the high returns
politicians can receive from patronage appointments (in the form of votes, increased party
discipline, policy support, amongst others) can be tantalizing enough so as to exploit and
expand the number of patronage appointments (Brassiolo et al., 2020; Grindle, 2012). In short,
the presence of patronage, and the potential success that might stem therefrom, can help
create “lock-in and path-dependent effects” where qualified civil service applicants are
systematically excluded from the recruitment process, thus fostering a highly centralized and
particularistic form of governance (Pierson, 2000; Fontaine et al., 2017: 5).
The literature on state capacity, specifically within the context of Latin America, has
generally lacked rigor in explaining how state capacity can be improved or hampered. To this
end, this study has sought to connect the dots between party systems and capacity through the
lens of patronage: to evaluate how actors such as politicians, party leaders, and parties forge
state bureaucracies and how that, in turn, affects capacity and later performance. This study
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has hence paid close attention to the mechanisms behind state capacity to further understand
its development.
1. KEY FINDINGS
Among the most important findings is that two factors, degree of party system
institutionalization (PSI) and the policy area at hand can greatly help determine how prevalent
patronage schemes in a given country and ministry are. Countries with weak party systems,
here most clearly exemplified by the Ecuadorian case, tend to have higher levels of patronage.
Conversely, countries with high PSI levels (meaning there are strong party systems) here
represented in the Chilean case, have proven to be better at creating instruments (such as
regulations and agencies) to prevent patronage from expanding. PSI is thus a crucial factor in
identifying and explaining why specific state entities might become prone to widespread
patronage practices. All chapters have shown that, regardless of the kind of ministry, PSI has
played an important role in either helping to ease patronage practices or heighten them. What
is more, it was especially important in the education sector and the ministry of foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, its importance relative to other factors should not be overstated. As each
chapter underscored, even in the aforementioned ministries, PSI was never the single factor at
work. Chapter two, for instance, explored how attempts to improve the quality of public
education relied upon not just high PSI, but also on the relationship between the government
and teachers’ unions as well as other civil society organizations to curtail patronage in this
particular sector. Similarly, patronage in health was not solely explained by PSI levels, but also
by the very nature of that particular policy area and the myriad of differing actors therein.
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Finally, chapter 4 demonstrated how Ecuador’s low PSI levels along with Correa’s
technopopulist approach to leadership proved to have harmful effects on the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
While an important feature, the Colombian case has highlighted the problems in over-
emphasizing the weight of PSI on patronage: even when there was a high degree of party
stability —through most of the 20
th
century, only two main parties prevailed in the Colombian
political landscape —patronage continued to be rampant. Such was the case that radical action
in the form of a new constitution had to be taken to assuage the situation. While these
measures have somewhat contributed to reducing patronage at the national level by bringing in
new parties and decentralizing public offices, these solutions were not silver bullets and came
with their own trade-offs. Colombia as of this writing has lower PSI levels and certain regions in
the country continue to have serious patronage-related issues. In short, a very fruitful research
agenda could stem from a more detailed examination of the Colombian case. More fine-grained
analysis (i.e., at the departmental or municipal level) would help explain and tease out differing
within-country patronage levels and practices. In sum, the relationship between PSI and
patronage patterns, though highly important, is more accurately captured when studied in
conjunction with other factors that might also be at work at a given country and ministerial
body.
Patronage and the Kind of Policy Area
Beyond PSI, the nature of the policy area each ministry was dealing with also affected the
prevalence of patronage. On the one hand, ministries dedicated to social development (such as
education and culture) are most prone to more patronage. Conversely, more technical
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ministries (such as foreign affairs and finance) typically require more professional staff and thus
tend to have less patronage. Each chapter provided further explanations for each country and
policy area. Studying the education sector, for example, showcased the challenges of reforming
the system and just how easily specific actors or groups (i.e., parties and unions) can capture
this ministry to reap their own benefits.
Chapter three delineated crucial distinctions between the health and education sectors
and emphasized how, despite being more oriented to social services, there are key structural
differences within each of them which, in turn, influences the ability of patronage to creep into
each kind of ministry. Specifically, this chapter found that because of the complex nature of its
sector, health ministries typically have multiple actors and intertwining interests to contend
with which will make it more difficult for patronage to take hold. In sum, because ministries of
health require more professional requirements and higher degrees of specialization, they are
less likely to see high levels of patronage. Lastly, chapter four showed what makes ministries of
foreign affairs more professional and technical than others; it also demonstrated how they
might become vulnerable. Therefore, no policy area is fully immune to widespread patronage,
especially in countries with high degrees of instability and vulnerable to populist leadership. In
addition, and much like with PSI, policy-area explanations are usually most accurate when
explored in conjunction with other factors.
2. IMPLICATIONS
Aside from the findings state above, several important implications can be drawn. First, this
study has demonstrated that states and democracies can, indeed, co-evolve. Not only this, but
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the development of each entity affects the other. In Chile, for instance, the growth of
democratic rule starting in the nineties went hand-in-hand with increased bureaucratic
organization and less patronage. Chile, in short, was able to build the state whilst also re-
building its democracy. Active civil society participation, high stability with two main coalitions
ruling over the course of 30 years helped keep patronage at bay whilst also aiding to re-
consolidate the country’s democracy after almost 20 years of authoritarian rule. Not only this,
but efforts to strengthen Chilean democracy by respecting and working with opposing parties
and coalitions also helped strengthen civil service systems, especially in education. In sum,
efforts in state-strengthening and re-vitalizing democracy complemented and reinforced each
other. Colombia, albeit in a much more muted way, has shown similar patterns to that of Chile.
Though it has maintained democratic rule (though often highly exclusionary at that) for longer
than most countries in the region, semi-successful civil service reforms have largely gone along
with attempts to increase participation and contestation at local levels.
Similar patterns can be seen in other countries in Latin America. With its return to
democracy in 1985, Uruguay has been able to strengthen both its democratic institutions as
well its state capacity. According to Buquet and Piñero Rodríguez (2017), this has largely been
the case due to changes in the party system from one being grounded on clientelist
competition to one reliant on programmatic competition. These changes have also led to
different policy initiatives to prevent patronage and fund misallocation. For example, under
president Lacalle, “social directors” were appointed to the board of the Social Security Bank
(whereby one member represents pensioners, one represents active workers, and a third acts
on behalf of businesspeople) —as a mechanism that enables setting limits on discretionary
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pension allocation. In short, with the return to democracy, as the Uruguayan party system has
become more institutionalized, so have patronage and clientelism declined (Buquet and Pieiro,
2017). Furthermore, since 2013, Uruguay has taken big steps to improving its civil service
through different types of legislation and specifically through the creation of Uruguay Concursa,
an online platform made for open contests (Cortázar et al., 2014: 201).
On the flipside, the Ecuadorian case has shown that efforts to re-build the state to
conform to Correa and AP’s agenda came with democratic backsliding. Attempts to strengthen
the state vis-à-vis a more structured and inclusive civil service were severely undermined by
particularistic interests of the ruling party and its leader. In short, state capture was favored
over bureaucratic professionalization. That is, the more patronage became prevalent in all
areas of the public service, the tighter the grip Correa was able to have on the state and thus on
the country’s socio-political landscape. AP was able to control all aspects of the state; its top-
down approach to policy-making lined up with increasing efforts to eradicate dissenting voices.
Hence, democratic backsliding and diminished state capacity in the form of more patronage can
also be mutually reinforcing. Other more extreme cases of this phenomenon can be seen in
Venezuela and Nicaragua—both of which that have devolved into authoritarian rule
(Abramowitz, 2018; Freedom House, 2021).
For Venezuela, the decline into a military dictatorship has gradually and slowly been
taking place whilst Hugo Chávez’s party, United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV,) has taken
over all aspects of the state (Levitsky and Loxton, 2014; Acemoglu, Robinson, & Torvik, 2013).
This has allowed for issues such as electricity shortages (ironically in a country that has one of
the largest oil reserves in the world) and rampant corruption amongst public officers to take
148
place. This takeover has also permitted the regime to enact deliberately ambiguous laws
intended for easy reinterpretation to benefit those who support chavismo and punish the
opposition. For example, land reform legislation has facilitated expropriation—the National
Guard has been known to seize large private properties, usually those of the opposition, in the
dead of night. Moreover, pro-regime individuals in regions with pro-regime governors are far
likelier to receive land grants from the National Land Institute than those who are unaffiliated
or are in the opposition (Albertus, 2015). Not only this, but public officials—which are now
mostly party affiliates and/or supporters—have also been known to collude with organized
crime networks hence further leading the country into turmoil, deepening authoritarianism,
and worsening living conditions (Freedom House, 2021).
This study has also brought further confirmation that the timing and pacing of reforms,
especially in the education sector, matters to ensure their successful implementation. Lastly,
on an empirical note, this piece has also demonstrated the importance of taking note of
contextual clues and realities to derive more accurate depictions of the mechanisms at work. It
has also contributed to the scholarship on patronage and state capacity by looking more closely
at how ministries, as opposed to subnational agencies, operate; something that has thus far
been relatively understudied (Panizza et al., 2019).
3. LOOKING FORWARD
Despite the advances and findings in this piece, there are several different paths this
investigation could continue to forge. For one, more cases can be added to the study of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to further draw out instances of where and when patronage might
149
infiltrate said entity. For example, adding countries that have had experiences with populism
such as Perú and Venezuela and/or with higher PSI levels such as Uruguay and Mexico would
enrich and provide far more insights into this phenomenon. Adding more cases to understand
how this particular ministry works could moreover strengthen the framework set out in this
dissertation.
Along similar lines, further analysis on other more technical ministries such as finance or
even other kinds of state agencies (Comptroller, taxes, Attorney General) could also be helpful
to continue to promote our understanding of patronage, state capacity and democracy and
more specifically, the ways in which patronage operates depending on the policy area at hand.
Relatedly, other social service ministries such as housing or even sport could also help give this
study’s particular theoretical framework more empirical weight.
In addition, further studies could be done in terms of examining the impact of the
COVID pandemic on recruitment and retention strategies both on the health and education
ministries. In short, using the pandemic as an external shock of sorts could be helpful in gauging
how and if these kinds of disruptions affect patronage patterns. Finally, Latin America is
certainly not the only region dealing with patronage; a cross-regional research agenda
regarding this phenomenon could thus aid our understanding of what is by-and-large a
worldwide issue. Comparing Latin America’ experience with professionalizing the civil service to
that of Eastern Europe and/or Southeast Asia would be especially intriguing given the varying
degrees of state capacity both of these regions have had. In short, the study of state capacity,
particularly through the perspective of patronage schemes, is full of opportunity.
150
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Appendix A: Interviewees
Rodolfo Bonifaz, former coordinator to Ministry of Education and advisor to unions. March 25,
2021.
María Lucia Casas, education administrator and former advisor to Ministry of Education, March
16, 2021.
Andrea Escobar, executive director of foundation in Colombia, March 16, 2021.
Pablo Bustamante, consultant for UNESCO, former high-level government representative.
February 5, 2021.
Fernanda Crespo, former high-ranking official in Ministry of Education, February 2, 2021.
Verónica Cuéllar, health policy consultant. November 29, 2021.
Óscar Arteaga, public health consultant, former public health administrator. December 13,
2021.
Fernando Sacoto, president of health-related organization. December 1, 2021.
Gonzalo Ortiz, advisor to high-level government officials. February 21, 2022.
Franklin Bahamonde, high-level former government official. February 22, 2022.
168
Appendix B: Interview Questions
1. What was your position/relationship with Ministry X? How long were you in that position?
2. In broad terms, how is Ministry X organized?
3. How has Ministry X evolved over time? What have been some of the challenges and
successes you have seen the Ministry experience?
4. To what extent are those challenges and/or successes “inherited” from previous
administrations?
5. What have been some of the key reforms? What has been their relevance?
6. What has allowed/hindered their passing? Why do you think this is?
7. Were there any specific actors that were important to this process? If so, who? Why were
they relevant?
8. What have been some of the effects of these reforms?
9. How common are open contests in the hiring and recruitment process? What do you think
it mostly hinges upon?
10. How meritocratic is this ministry in comparison to others in the country? In comparison to
those in other countries?
11. Do you think there are any clientelist practices still present in Ministry X? Why or why not?
12. Do you think there is enough supervision within Ministry X? Is there a clear Ministry-wide
mandate and how well do you think it is fulfilled?
13. Do you think there has been an effort to increase communication and coordination
between this ministry and others? How has this evolved? How could it be improved?
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Why are certain states better able to provide public goods (broadly defined as security, infrastructure, education and health) than other states? Can democracies succeed in enhancing state capacity by improving and professionalizing their civil service? What role does patronage play in enhancing or hampering state capacity? This research agenda focuses on Latin America to answer these questions. While the literature on state capacity and the relationship between state and democracy has gained increasing attention in recent years, much is left to be explored. Specifically, this piece will focus on the prevalence of a trained, professional civil service as a key indicator of state capacity. In other words, it will look to the presence of patronage as a way to gauge how weak or strong specific states within Latin America are. It uses three ministries—health, education and foreign affairs—in three countries— Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador —to understand the connection between democracy and state capacity across the region and in different policy areas.
Overall, this study argues that patronage prevails in some countries (and in some ministries within them) more than others because of two main factors: the degree to which party systems are institutionalized and the kind of policy area that is being tackled. Generally speaking, it finds that settings with strong party systems typically have a smaller patronage presence. For instance, countries with weak party systems, here most clearly exemplified by the Ecuadorian case, tend to have higher levels of patronage. Conversely, countries with high PSI levels (meaning they have strong party systems) here represented in the Chilean case, have proven to be better at creating instruments (such as regulations and agencies) to prevent patronage from expanding. Moreover, policy areas revolving around social services such as education are usually prone to more widespread patronage schemes. Aside from providing a further test to the state-democracy nexus literature, this work also expands our understanding of how and why state capacity can be built and/or reduced. It also contains important policy recommendations to continue to reduce harmful patronage structures in the region.
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Maag Pardo, Maria Daniela
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Politics behind appointments: policy, patronage, and party systems in the Andes
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