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Goldilocks’ signal for security cooperation in East Asia: China’s rise, hedging, and joint military exercises

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Goldilocks’ Signal for Security Cooperation in East Asia:

China’s Rise, Hedging, and Joint Military Exercises

by

Kyuri Park

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

August 2022

Copyright 2022 Kyuri Park

ii
Dedications

For my grandmother Keum Sook Bae

iii
Acknowledgments

This endeavor would not have been possible without many individuals and communities’ kind support
and help.
First and foremost, I am grateful to my advisor, dissertation committee chair, and lifelong
mentor David Kang for providing unwavering support throughout the process. Whenever I
encountered new challenges academically or professionally, Kang Shifu always made time for a chat
with me and shared his insights on how I could move forward. His words of advice on work-life
balance during brown-bag meetings and warm invitations to thanksgiving and lunar new year
gatherings helped me to navigate my Ph.D. life better.
Also, I would like to sincerely thank two other dissertation committee members. Patrick James
has directed my attention to IR literature which allowed me to strengthen my theoretical discussion,
and he has graciously provided suggestions for future research. I am deeply indebted to Thomas
Valente and his expertise in network analysis. His class on social network analysis has laid a solid
foundation for me to employ network analysis as a key empirical strategy for my dissertation project.
Thanks should also go to mentors, colleagues, and friends at USC. Particularly, I would like to
thank the following individuals of the USC KSI community and US-Asia Grand Strategy predoc
program for their constructive feedback on my research: Gloria Koo, Jonathan Markowitz, John Park,
Jonathan Baron, Justin Canfil, Adam Frost, Ronan Tse-min Fu, Edward Goldring, Carl Huang, Han-
Hui Hsieh, Stephanie Kang, Ellen Kim, Manseok Lee, Alex Yu-Ting Lin, Bridget Martin, Paul Orner,
Stuart Pike, Caleb Pomeroy, Noelle Troutman, and Jackie Siu Hei Wong. From the bottom of my
heart, I would like to thank Miriam Barnum, Gabrielle Chung, Nayoung Lee, and Pongkwan
Sawasdipakdi for their constant encouragement and friendship. I would be remiss not to mention that
Dohun Kim and Aditi Singh’s help were crucial in my research.

iv
Earlier versions of my research were presented at the 2019 USC KSI Graduate Student
Symposium, the 2019 USC CIS Working Paper Series, the 2020 USC KSI Working Paper Series, the
2020 and 2021 USC Bridging Asia Workshop, the 2020 and 2021 American Political Science
Association (APSA), the 2020 CATO Institute Junior Scholar Symposium, the 2021 International
Studies Association (ISA), the 2021 Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) New Faces
Conference, and the 2021 ANU Women in Asia-Pacific Security Research Seminar Series (WIAPSR).
I wish to thank all the participants for helpful comments on earlier drafts of my research. I would like
to extend particular thanks to the discussants of my working paper: Steven E. Miller, James J. Wirtz,
Daryl G. Press, Andrew Yeo, Patricia L. Sullivan, Evelyn Goh, Henry Farrell, and Brandon J. Kinne.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF), USC Center
for International Studies (CIS), and USC Korean Studies Institute (KSI) for their financial support of
my research. Without their generous help, building the dataset of joint military exercises in the Asia-
Pacific would not have been possible.
Furthermore, I wish to take this opportunity to thank my mentors at my alma maters, Ewha
Womans University (BA) and Georgetown University (MA). The experience of working as Leif Eric
Easley’s RA during my undergraduate years provided a nice segue to graduate school, and his strong
encouragement convinced me to pursue post-graduate studies in the United States. The words of
advice that Victor Cha gave me resonated with me powerfully during my doctorate years. Back in 2015,
when I was applying to Ph.D. programs, Dr. Cha told me that “You should go to school where you
can be in a community, with colleagues who share similar research interests with you, and where there
are mentors who will/can guard and support your research.” Indeed, he was right. At USC, I was able
to bloom as an independent researcher and scholar with the unfailing support of the loving community.
Last but not least, I wish to thank my Ui-dong family – my mother Ci Ae Bae, father Si Sa
Park, and brother Jaeha Park – for their unconditional love and support. I am grateful to my parents

v
for countless hours of conversation on research and life. Special thanks to my mother who has been
the best sounding board and critic. I dedicate this dissertation to my grandmother Keum Sook Bae
who has served as a source of inspiration for my dream.

vi
Table of Contents

Dedications ......................................................................................................................................................... ii

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................. iii

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................... viii

List of Figures .................................................................................................................................................... ix

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................ x

Chapter 1. ............................................................................................................................................................ 1
Introduction: China’s Rise and East Asia’s Strategic Choice .................................................................. 1

Chapter 2. .......................................................................................................................................................... 23
Rising Power in Vicinity and Secondary States’ Strategic Options: Balancing vs. Hedging ............ 23
Theory of Hedging: How and Why Do States Hedge ........................................................................... 31

Chapter 3. .......................................................................................................................................................... 44
Indicators of Security Cooperation: Joint Military Exercise as Goldilocks’ Signal ........................... 44

Chapter 4. .......................................................................................................................................................... 57
China’s Rise and Security Cooperation Pattern in East Asia: Joint Military Exercise Ties and
Network Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 57
Introducing New Dataset: Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019) ........................ 61
Empirical Analyses: Joint Military Exercise Pattern of the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019) ...................... 65
Evidence 1: Dyadic Analysis – Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................ 66
Evidence 2: Network Analysis – Node and Network level .............................................................. 71

Chapter 5. .......................................................................................................................................................... 87
Case Studies on China-Southeast Asia Security Cooperation: .............................................................. 87
Qualitative Evidence of Willingness to Cooperate and Build Trust .................................................... 87
Case Study 1. ASEAN-China Security Cooperation .............................................................................. 91
Case Study 2. China-the Philippines Security Cooperation .................................................................. 99
Case Study 3: China-Malaysia Security Cooperation ............................................................................ 103

vii
Chapter 6. ........................................................................................................................................................ 108
Conclusion: Implications for East Asian Security and U.S. Foreign Policy ..................................... 108

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................... 117

Appendices ...................................................................................................................................................... 140
Appendix I: Limitations of Existing Datasets on JMEs ...................................................................... 140
Appendix II: My JME dataset .................................................................................................................. 141

viii
List of Tables

Table 1 Indicators of Alignment or Cooperative Security Ties ................................................................ 46

Table 2 Most Likely Cases for Balancing (i.e., Least Likely Cases for Hedging) ................................... 64

Table 3 Military Personnel and/or Military Assets Featured in East Asia’s JME with China ............. 68

Table 4 Types of Military Operations Featured in China's Exercise with East Asia ............................. 69

Table 5 Measuring JME Network Properties .............................................................................................. 73

Table 6 Network Properties of the Asia-Pacific 1970-2019: Node and Network Level ...................... 76

ix
List of Figures

Figure 1 Hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in East Asia .......................................................... 5

Figure 2 Hedging Theory’s Prediction .......................................................................................................... 10

Figure 3 Balancing Theory’s Prediction ........................................................................................................ 10

Figure 4 Alliance Ties in Asia-Pacific and Europe ..................................................................................... 48

Figure 5 Coverage of JME Dataset of Asia-Pacific 1970-2019 ................................................................. 62

Figure 6 China’s JMEs with the East Asian countries over time (by decade) ........................................ 66

Figure 7 China's JME partners in East Asia (2000-2019) .......................................................................... 67

Figure 8 China's JMEs with East Asia by Military Branches (2010-2019) .............................................. 69

Figure 9 Bird’s Eye View of Evolution of JME Network of the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019) ................. 75

Figure 10 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1970-1979 (weighted) ....................................................... 78

Figure 11 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1980-1989 (weighted) ....................................................... 81

Figure 12 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1990-1999 (weighted) ....................................................... 82

Figure 13 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 2000-2009 (weighted) ....................................................... 84

Figure 14 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 2010-2019 (weighted) ....................................................... 86

Figure 15 Ripe for Cooperation (1970-2019) ............................................................................................ 111

x
Thesis advisor: David C. Kang Author: Kyuri Park

Goldilocks’ Signal for Security Cooperation in East Asia: China’s Rise,
Hedging, and Joint Military Exercises

Abstract
This dissertation examines how East Asian secondary states are responding to the rise of China, and
why they are responding the way they are. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom in
the existing security studies literature that East Asian secondary states are aligning with other states
against China (balancing against China) out of fear for survival. Based on new theory of hedging, I
argue that secondary states are pursuing cooperative security ties with rising China, as well as other
states including its great power patron, the US. Positive relational ties with other states are important
capabilities or social capital that increase a state’s well-being. Thus, from networked perspective,
opting for a rigid single-sided alignment with a single power or bloc is the second-best strategy at best,
and always the optimal strategy is to diversify cooperative security ties. Especially, secondary states
who wish to maintain strategic autonomy are more likely to opt for hedging, rather than balancing. It
is because taking a side with great power patron against rising power under balancing strategy may
provide security protection benefits, but it would come at the cost of strategic autonomy.
Military alliances are an important element of security dynamics in East Asia, but the static nature of
alliance ties does not provide sufficient information to draw accurate inference on how East Asian
countries are coping with its powerful neighbor China. With the aim of providing better understanding
of the changes in the pattern of security cooperation in East Asia along with the rise of China, this
dissertation takes a closer look at joint military exercises in the region. To that end, I introduce an
original dataset of joint military exercises (JMEs) in the Asia-Pacific from 1970 to 2019 (1,447 exercises)
and examine the data using descriptive statistics, network analysis, and case studies.
A systematic examination of joint military exercises in the region reveals that East Asian secondary
states who would be ‘most likely’ to balance against rising China based on our conventional wisdom
– states with major territorial conflicts with China, junior allies and strategic partners of the US, and/or
democracies – have expanded security cooperation with Beijing over the last twenty years. Network
analysis on joint military exercise network in the Asia-Pacific suggests that the region has gradually
moved away from a strict hub-and-spokes structure and evolved to a densely connected, less
centralized, and inclusive multi-nodal meshed network structure that embraces China over time. Often,
diplomatic tensions between China and East Asian countries get the most attention, but certainly it is
not the totality of their relations. Increasingly, East Asian secondary states are sending clear signal that
they are willing to live and let live with rising China and wish to build trust and reduce the risk of
conflict due to miscalculations by working together with Beijing. The findings suggest that hedging is
a much more pervasive than we think, and it is a preferred strategy of the regional countries.

1

Chapter 1.

Introduction: China’s Rise and East Asia’s Strategic Choice

“Given the survival imperative, most of China’s neighbors will opt to balance against it, much the way
most of the countries in Northeast Asia and Europe that were free to choose in the Cold War opted
to join with the United States against the Soviet Union.”

– John J. Mearsheimer
1

“I think not many countries would like to join a coalition against those who have been excluded, chief
of whom will be China…To try and make a line-up, Cold War–style, I don't think that’s on the cards.”

– Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
2

There is no doubt that China is rising to prominence in the 21
st
century, but how East Asian
countries are responding to the rise of China is a matter of debate. The widely accepted view in the
security studies is that the dominant behavioral pattern observed in the region is balancing. As
predicted by realists theories, East Asian secondary states are militarily aligning with the US against
rising China out of fear of domination.
3
John J. Mearsheimer claims that “China’s neighbors
are…worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it” including “join[ing] an
American-led balancing coalition aimed at checking Beijing.”
4
Mearsheimer adamantly ventures that

1
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: Updated Edition (New York: Norton, 2014), 389.
2
John Feng, “Singapore Will Not Join Biden’s ‘Cold War–style’ Coalition Against China, Says PM,” Newsweek,
November 19, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/singapore-will-not-join-bidens-cold-warstyle-coalition-against-china-
says-pm-1548692.
3
Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing toward tragedy?: China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia-Pacific,
and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 52-91, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00176;
Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4
(2015): 697-727, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130; Adam P. Liff, “Whither the Balancers? The Case for
a Methodological Reset,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 (July 2016): 420-459,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1195624; Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 647-731; Zachary Selden,
“Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,”
Security Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 330-364, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.786918; Robert S. Ross, “Balance of
Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 355-
395, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028206.
4
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 384.

2
“Given the survival imperative, most of China’s neighbors will opt to balance against it, much the way
most of the countries in Northeast Asia and Europe that were free to choose in the Cold War opted
to join with the United States against the Soviet Union.”
5
Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper argue that
to mitigate the threats posed by uncertainty over China’s future capabilities and intentions, East Asian
secondary states are “increasingly willing to trade off policy autonomy in return for the security
benefits of closer alignment with the United States.”
6
Adam P. Liff asserts that “China’s rise is eliciting
from key neighbors significant and accelerating balancing behavior”
7
by pointing to the regional
countries’ efforts “to deepen practical defense cooperation, interoperability, and other military ties
with the United States…through measures short of signing conspicuous new treaty alliances.”
8
Robert
S. Ross notes that “East Asia reinforces the traditional realist and neorealist arguments that secondary
states respond to great power capabilities…In this respect, balance-of-power realism explains the
alignment behavior of East Asian states as much as it does that of European states.”
9

However, is this accurate assessment of empirical reality in East Asia today? Are East Asian
secondary states – small and middle powers – balancing against China to deter its rise? The range and
direction of pathways available to states may vary and states may choose either cooperative or
competitive pathways in its relationship with another state within a given context and at certain points
in time.
10
Lim and Cooper argue that “[m]any Asian states have existing treaty alliances with the United
States or major territorial conflicts with China” and this is “creating path dependencies that reinforce
balancing behavior” in the region.
11
If we find substantive evidence that East Asian countries who
would be ‘most likely’ to balance against rising China – junior allies and strategic partners of the US

5
Ibid., 389.
6
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 721.
7
Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 438.
8
Ibid., 434.
9
Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China,” 358.
10
Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2010), 22.
11
Ibid., 696.

3
and/or states with major territorial conflicts with China – are pursuing cooperative security ties with
not only Washington but also with Beijing, how should we make sense of this behavior?

China’s Security Cooperation with East Asia
In October 2018, at the height of the South China Sea disputes, the Chinese and Southeast
Asian navies conducted a joint maritime exercise. 8 navy ships, 3 helicopters, and more than 1,200
military personnel from China and all 10 member states of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) participated in the exercise. This exercise was especially noteworthy because the
Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei, the countries with ongoing territorial disputes with China, sent their
naval vessels to exercise together.
12

In November 2015, South Korea, one of the US allies in Asia, held a bilateral military exercise
with China in the Gulf of Aden to deepen the friendship and mutual trust and facilitate the joint
efforts on anti-piracy missions. South Korean Navy deployed Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin class
destroyer, and China sent missile frigate Liuzhou to the joint drill.
13
In August 2019, Thailand, another
US ally in Asia, conducted a bilateral air force exercise with China at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF) base to promote cooperation and exchanges between the two air forces. Multiple fighter jets
from RTAF and China’s People Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force participated in the exercise to test
combat tactics and methods, promote equipment development, and improve the actual combat
training level of the two sides.
14
Do joint military exercises tell us anything about East Asian security?

12
Wenfang Li, “China, ASEAN begin joint naval drill,” China Daily, October 23, 2018,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/23/WS5bce80d7a310eff303283f68.html; Prashanth Parameswaran, “Why the
First China-ASEAN Maritime Exercise Matters,” Diplomat, October 22, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/why-
the-first-china-asean-maritime-exercise-matters/.
13
“S. Korea, China to hold joint anti-piracy drill in Gulf of Aden,” Korea Herald, September 30, 2015,
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150930000348; “Sino-South Korean joint military drill held in the Gulf
of Aden,” People’s Daily, November 18, 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1118/c90000-8978532.html.
14
“China, Thailand host joint air force exercise “Falcon Strike 2019”,” China Military, August 21, 2019,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/21/content_9597046.htm; Ian Storey, Thailand’s Military Relations with China:

4
In the existing international relations (IR) literature, much has been written about China’s
economic ties with East Asian countries, but there is a lack of empirical research on and theoretical
explanation on whether East Asian countries engage in security cooperation with China, and if so why.
In part, it is attributed to the widely held belief in academic and policy circles that the region is
characterized by a “dual hierarchy.”
15
G. John Ikenberry contends that “East Asia is increasingly
marked by the emergence of two hierarchies. One is a security hierarchy dominated by the United
States, and the other is an economic hierarchy dominated by China. Countries in the region are relying
on the United States to provide security. The American-led alliance system has been playing this “hub
and spoke” role for decades. Allies across the region continue to rely on this alliance system for
security, and for many countries, these security ties are deepening. At the same time, most of the
countries in the region are increasingly tied to China for trade and investment.”
16

Moving from Strength to Strength, Perspective, no. 43 (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019), 7-8,
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_43.pdf.
15
G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State strategies in East Asia,”
Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 1 (2015): 9-43, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12430; Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert
A. Manning, “A Tale of Two Asia: In the battle for Asia’s soul, which side will win – security or economics?,” Foreign
Policy, October 31, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/; Amitav Acharya, “Why Two
Asias May be Better Than None,” World Politics Review, January 8, 2013,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12603/why-two-asias-may-be-better-than-none; Alan S. Alexandroff,
“Looking at the ‘World’ With Two Lens,” Rising BRICSAM, January 27, 2013, http://blog.risingbricsam.com/?p=1638;
Fangyin Zhou, “China’s rise, the transformation of East Asian regional structure, and development direction of the East
Asian Order,” in The World in 2020 According to China, ed. Shao Binhong (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 157–182; Wang Dong,
“Chapter 4. Two Asias?,” in Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia, eds. Robert S. Ross and
Øystein Tunsjø (United States: Cornell University Press, 2017), 100-136; Feng Liu and Ruonan Liu, “China, the United
States, and order transition in East Asia: An economy-security Nexus approach,” Pacific Review 32, no. 6: 972-995,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1526205; “Asia’s Dilemma: China’s Butter, Or America’s Guns?,” Forbes, April
4, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2017/04/04/asias-dilemma-chinas-butter-or-americas-
guns/?sh=488f8a2329d5.
16
Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon,” 2.

5

Figure 1 Hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in East Asia
17

Military alliances are an important element of security dynamics in East Asia, but the static
nature of alliance ties does not fully reflect the reality of changing regional dynamics. Seen through
the lens of formal alliances, there are no significant changes in security cooperation patterns in East
Asia since the end of World War II, and the hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances led by the US
seems to be the archetype of cooperation in the region. After establishing the bilateral alliance system
at the end of the WWII, neither the existing US allies in the region terminated the bilateral alliance
treaty with the US – Japan (1951-), the Philippines (1951-), Australia (1951-),
18
South Korea (1953-),
Thailand (1954-) – nor signed new alliance pact with other countries in the region (Figure 1). This

17
Increasingly, Australia is considered as part of Asia under the framework of ‘Asia Pacific’ identity in recent years. In
1951, Australia and the United States became treaty-based allies as the signatories of the Australia, New Zealand, United
States Security (ANZUS) treaty. However, after the US suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand in 1986,
ANZUS essentially turned into a bilateral treaty between the US and Australia.
18
See U.S. Department of State, The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951, by
Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, Wahsington D.C., https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-
1952/anzus.
South Korea
Japan
Philippines
Thailand
Australia
USA

6
spurred academic debates among IR scholars on why we don’t observe security cooperation patterns
beyond bilateral asymmetrical alliances.
19
Yet, the formation of or abandonment of alliances is in fact
quite rare in IR, and alliance ties alone do not provide sufficient information to draw accurate
inferences on how security relations in the region have changed along with the rise of China.
Historically, China has eschewed building cooperative security ties with other countries,
20
but
in recent years, Beijing is increasingly signaling its interest in engaging security cooperation with East
Asian countries.
21
According to David Shambaugh “A particularly important departure is China’s new
willingness to engage in bilateral [and multilateral] military exercises, breaking its a half-century, self-
imposed prohibition on such efforts.”
22
However, it takes two to tango to make a “joint” military
exercise. Now the question is: Is the signal being reciprocated by its East Asian neighbors? If so, why?

19
Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism
and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3078589; Amitav Acharya, Why Is There No NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins of Asian
Multilateralism, WCFIA Working Paper, no. 05-05 (Massachusetts, CA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, 2005), https://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/1049_why_no_asian_nato_final.pdf; Victor D.
Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 158-
196, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389236; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “‘Why is there no NATO in Asia?’ revisited:
Prospect theory, balance of threat, and US alliance strategies,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 2 (January
2010): 227-250, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110377124; G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon:
America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 1 (2015): 9-43,
https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12430; Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-
Spokes Alliance System in East Asia,” International Security 45, no. 2 (Fall 2020): 7-50,
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00389.
20
Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Monography Reports
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2000), https://doi.org/10.7249/MR1121; Young Nam Cho, 21segi
junggugui dongmaengjeongchaek: byeonhwawa jisok [China’s alignment policy in the 21
st
century: changes and continuities], EAI
National Security Panel (NSP) Report, no. 32 (South Korea, Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2009), 1-40,
http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2009122915453574.pdf; Eun-Jung Hong, “Dongmaengjeongchaege daehan
jungguk hakgyeui insikdamron gochal [A Consideration on Chinese Intellectuals’ Discussions on Alliance],” Ataeyeongu
[Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies] 21, no. 2 (2014), 39-68, https://doi.org/10.18107/japs.2014.21.2.002.
21
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no.3 (Winter
2004/2005): 64-99, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137556; Kenneth Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John Chen, “Chinese
Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” China Strategic Perspectives, no. 11 (2017): 1-81,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-11.pdf?ver=2017-07-17-
153301-093; Brandon Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network,”
International Organization 72, no. 4 (Fall 2018): 799-837, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000218; Xuetong Yan,
Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (New York: Princeton University Press, 2011); May-Britt U. Stumbaum and
Sun Xuefeng, “Chapter 21. China,” in The Handbook of Global Security Policy, eds. Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (United
Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2014), 371-387, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118442975.ch21; Feng Zhang,
“China’s New Thinking on Alliances,” Survival 54, no. 5 (October/November 2012): 129-148,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.728350.
22
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 87.

7
Argument in Brief
This dissertation investigates how East Asian secondary states respond to the rise of China.
By taking a deep dive into the pattern of security cooperation, I challenge the dominant narrative in
security studies that East Asian secondary states are balancing with the US against rising China out of
fear of domination. Rather than opting for balancing strategy, premised on a rigid single-sided
alignment with a single power or bloc, I argue that regional countries are hedging – pursuing
cooperative security ties not only with the US but also China.

Theory of Hedging: How and Why States Hedge
In the face of rising power in vicinity, I argue that secondary states will diversify cooperative
ties (hedging), rather than opting for balancing (or bandwagoning) strategies premised on taking a side.
Under hedging strategy, secondary states will develop cooperative security ties with both rising power
and other states, including its great power patron. The primary goal of security strategies is reducing
risks and mitigating uncertainties because war is costly, and peace is invaluable. Positive relational ties
with other states are important capabilities or social capital that increase state’s well-being.
“[C]apabilities in the networked view rely on connections to other members of the network.”
23
From
this perspective, a state’s capability “is no longer derived solely or even primarily from individual
attributes, such as material capabilities”
24
but relationships with other states. Thus, from networked
perspective, opting for a rigid single-sided alignment with a single power or bloc is the second-best
strategy at best, and always the optimal strategy is to diversify cooperative security ties.

23
Miles Kahler, “Networked Politics: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE,” in Network Politics: Agency, Power,
and Governance, ed. Miles Kahler (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 12.
24
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International
Relations,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 559–592, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40345947.

8
Moreover, balancing theories often conflate uncertainty and threat and assume that
uncertainty always works against cooperation with rising power: “the most powerful state will always
appear threatening because weaker states can never be certain that it will not use its power
to…threaten their survival.”
25
However, I’d like to emphasize that uncertainty and threat are two
different things. Uncertainty can be a motivation for cooperation for states.
26
Uncertainties may induce
secondary states to engage in more cooperation with rising power to mitigate the risk of conflict
between them due to misperceptions and to build strategic trust.
27
On the other hand, when rising
power is a clear threat, especially, existential threat, to secondary states, then it will be treated as an
enemy. Under these circumstances, militarily aligning with other states against the rising power may
be a natural course of action for them, but otherwise it is less likely.
28

Especially, secondary states who wish to maintain strategic autonomy are more likely to opt
for hedging, rather than balancing. I define strategic autonomy as the ability to behave based on one’s
security priorities and self-determine how one wishes to manage its relations with other states.
29
Taking
a side with great power patron against rising power under balancing strategy may provide security
protection benefits but it would come at the cost of strategic autonomy. Hence, secondary states who
wish to minimize the tradeoff between increased security and decreased strategic autonomy pursue
hedging strategy. The ability to connect with more actors increases secondary states’ strategic
autonomy through the accumulation of network power.

25
Randall L. Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics, May 9, 2016,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.119.
26
Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995):
50-90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539079.
27
Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 325-357,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601300.
28
In the words of former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mohamad Mahathir, “Why should we fear China? If you identify
a country as your future enemy, it becomes your present enemy.” See John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast
Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 14.
29
Here, I adopt a defensive conception of autonomy. The concept of autonomy can be divided into two – “aggressive
autonomy being freedom to remake the status quo, and defensive autonomy freedom from entangling alliances.” See
footnote 5 in James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 909, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499.

9
Theoretical Expectations
Then, what are the behavioral patterns that we can ascertain that a secondary state is pursuing
hedging or balancing strategy? First, on a dyadic level, I posit that if a secondary state is hedging, then
we should observe development of cooperative security ties between the rising power and that state.
At the same time, we should observe the continuation of security cooperation between the secondary
states and other states, including its great power patron who is in strategic competition with the rising
power. Second, on regional level, it is very likely that we will observe the emergence of a security
cooperation network that embraces the rising power. For example, if my theory of hedging is right,
we would observe East Asian secondary states’ pursuit of cooperative security with not only the US,
but also with China. Also, we would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network
that China is part of (Figure 2).
On the other hand, if a secondary state is balancing against a rising power, on a dyadic level,
we should not expect to see any development of security ties between the rising power and that state.
Also, we will observe a tight alignment with its great power patron against the ascendant power. Also,
on regional level, we should observe a security cooperation network that the rising power appears as
an isolate. For instance, if balancing theory is correct, we should not expect to see any development
of security ties between rising China and East Asian countries, while the regional countries’ security
cooperation with the US expands. Also, we would observe the emergence of balancing coalition
against rising China in the region (Figure 3).

10

Figure 2 Hedging Theory’s Prediction

Figure 3 Balancing Theory’s Prediction

11
Testing the Theory Empirically: Indicator of Cooperative Security Ties
The contemporary security environment is characterized by multiple forms of cooperative
security ties, not just alliances. These ties can take the form of a formal or informal commitment for
security cooperation between two or more states.
30
The indicators of security cooperation other than
formal alliances include joint military exercises, military education exchanges, signing of strategic
partnerships and the General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA), naval port
calls, establishment of military communication hotlines, high-level official exchanges, arms sales, and
military aid. Hence, for a better understanding of interstate relations in the security dimension today,
there is a dire need for broadening our conceptions and understanding of the phenomenon of security
cooperation as a whole, “rather than confining our attention to the increasingly outmoded formal
military alliance pact.”
31

Joint Military Exercise as a Goldilocks’ Signal for Cooperation
To have a better understanding of the strategic choices of secondary states in the face of rising
power in the vicinity, this dissertation examines joint military exercises. Here, I postulate joint military
exercise as a costly signal that provides credible information on a state’s actual willingness and ability
to cooperate with the other participant in the exercise. This is a costly signal in reassurance context,
where states communicate its benign intentions to the other participant of the exercise via cooperative
military policies.
32
The goal of reassurance signal is to “demonstrate that one is moderate, not out to

30
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1, International Relations Theory and the
Consequences of Unipolarity (January 2009), 86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060222.
31
Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’ – the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: toward a
conceptual taxonomy of alignment,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 54,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000209.
32
Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 325-357; Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 50-90; Andrew Kydd, “Sheep
in Sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 114-155,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429336; Clayton L. Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect
of Interstate Relations on Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (December 2006): 939,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638532; Erik A. Gartzke, Shannon Carcelli, J Andres Gannon, and Jiakun Jack Zhang,

12
get the other side, willing to live and let live, preferring to reciprocate cooperation.”
33
Different from
cheap talk and bluffing, costly signal is rendered credible in international relations, because it creates
costs and risks that the actors who are not committed for the action (in this context, military
cooperation) are unwilling to suffer.
34

Especially, JME is a Goldilocks’ signal for revealing the preference for cooperation and reassurance.
While formation of new alliances may be too costly for that purpose, and mere public statements of
support are costless, joint military exercises are just costly enough to be credible. The cost of
participating in a joint military exercise is quite high for countries in terms of actual financial and
diplomatic costs. For instance, if a State A conducts a joint maritime exercise with State B, State A is
committing to bear not only the financial cost of fueling the ship and mobilizing its navy but also the
diplomatic cost of risking the relations with State C, who is in strategic rivalry with State B.
35
The same
exercise may be costlier for countries with relatively limited economic or military capacity. The exact
financial cost of joint military exercises is a military secret, but adducing from the words of a former
US Admiral, we “really have to consider it not just from the standpoint of the US [great power]…But

“Signaling in Foreign Policy,” in Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Cameron G. Thies (Oxford University
Press, 2017), 10, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481.
33
Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 187.
34
James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political
Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-592, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796; James D. Fearon, “Signaling
Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 New Games: Modeling
Domestic-International Linkages (February 1997): 68-90, https://www.jstor.org/stable/174487; James D. Morrow,
“CHAPTER THREE. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International
Politics,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, eds. by David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 77-114; Roseanne W. McManus and Mark David Nieman, “Identifying the level of major power
support signaled for proteges: A latent measure approach,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 3 (2019): 366-367,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318808842.
35
For example, see Jordan Bernhardt and Lauren Sukin, “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean
Peninsula,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 1 (November 2021): 855-888,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720972180; Elisabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, “China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea
Drills,” New York Times, July 20, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21military.html; Guy Taylor,
“North Korea slams U.S.-South Korea military drills,” Washington Times, August 12, 2019,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/aug/12/north-korea-again-slams-us-south-korea-military-dr/.

13
we have to keep in mind that for some countries, the cost of an exercise can be a fairly significant part
of their budget.”
36

Dataset of Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019)
Despite the prevalence of joint military exercises around the world and their importance for
understanding security cooperation dynamics, surprisingly, there is a dearth of systematic data and
analyses. Filling in the gap in the literature, I construct a dataset on joint military exercises that have
taken place in the Asia-Pacific from 1970 to 2019 (1,447 exercises) to systematically examine the
variations in security ties over time.
There is no clear-cut definition of “Asia-Pacific” or “East Asia,” but often the former has
greater regional scope condition than the latter. Here, I define Asia-Pacific as a region that includes
East Asia (i.e., Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia), the US, and Oceania. My joint military exercises
dataset records bilateral and multilateral JMEs between eleven countries in the Asia-Pacific – United
States (USA), China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Japan (JPN), Philippines (PHL), Thailand (THA),
Vietnam (VNM), Indonesia (IDN), Malaysia (MYS), Singapore (SGP), and Australia (AUS).
The nine secondary states (i.e., non-great powers, states other than the US or China in this
case) included in my dataset are most-likely cases for balancing theory, considering the close
geographical proximity to China, presence of the US as a great power patron, ongoing territorial or
maritime border disputes with China, and ideological distances. If balancing theory is correct, we
should not expect to see any joint military exercise between rising China and East Asian countries. At
the same time, we will observe the expansion of the regional countries’ joint exercises with the US.
Also, we are likely to observe East Asian countries’ joining balancing coalition-led by the US to counter

36
Gary Roughead, “The Evolving Role of Military Exercises in Asia,” by Mira Rapp Hooper, Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative (AMTI), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 4, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/the-evolving-role-
of-military-exercises-in-asia/.

14
the rise of China. In other words, these are least-likely cases for my hedging theory. Hence, despite
the presence of factors that are identified as favoring conditions of balancing behavior, if we observe
hedging behaviors, it will be strong evidence that hedging is much more pervasive and preferred
strategy of East Asian secondary states than balancing. If my theory of hedging is right and regional
countries aim to maximize strategic autonomy by diversifying cooperative security ties, we would
observe East Asian secondary states’ joint military exercise with China, and as well as other countries,
including the US. Also, we would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network
that embraces China, rather than isolating it.

Key Findings
A careful examination of joint military exercises in the region suggests that East Asian
countries that would be ‘most likely’ to balance against China – states with major territorial conflicts
with China, junior allies and strategic partners of the US, and/or democracies – have expanded security
cooperation with Beijing over the last twenty years. Using descriptive statistics, network analysis, and
case studies, I provide substantive evidence that 1) East Asian countries conduct joint military
exercises not only with the US but also with China after the 2000s; 2) the joint military exercise
network of the region has gradually moved away from a strict hub-and-spokes structure and evolved
to a densely connected, less centralized, and inclusive multi-nodal meshed network structure that
embraces China over time. I believe that this is an enduring and overlooked pattern of security
cooperation in East Asia. The findings suggest that hedging is a much more pervasive than we think,
and it is a preferred strategy of the regional countries.

15
So What? Implications for Regional Security and the US Foreign Policy
A thorough understanding of security cooperation patterns in East Asia is imperative given its
implications for regional stability and the US foreign policy. Throughout the post-Cold War period, a
group of scholars projected grim assessments on prospects for stability in Asia along with the rise of
China.
37
Pointing to the lack of “linkages among states” and “recent memory of cooperation” in the
region as a source of instability, Aaron L. Friedberg even said: “for better and for worse, Europe’s
[conflictual] past could be Asia’s future.”
38
Does this prediction hold true for the region in the twenty-
first century? My research suggests not. One reassuring conclusion of this dissertation is that
cooperative security ties between China and secondary states that were absent in the early 1990s are
present and growing in the region today. Does this matter at all? Yes – not all potential adversaries or
countries with diplomatic tensions get along and conduct joint training to build trust. For example,
the last exercise between Russia and multiple NATO countries was in 2011, Bold Monarch drills off
the coast of Spain. Since then, the only NATO member that had bilateral exercise with Russia is
Turkey. As of 2020, a NATO official said: “NATO has no exercise planned with Russia” for the
future.
39
This is what the regions that are having trouble cooperating look like. In other words, East
Asian countries’ security cooperation with China is consequential because not everybody does it.

37
Gerald Segal, “Managing new arms race in the Asia/pacific,” Washington Quarterly 15, no.3 (Summer 1992): 83-101,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550108; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospect for Peace in a Multipolar
Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/4): 5-33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539204; Denny Roy, “Hegemon
on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149-168,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539151; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma
in East Asia,” International Security 23, no.2 (Spring 1999): 49-80, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539294; Thomas Berger,
“Set for Stability? Prospect for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 3 (July 2000):
405-428, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097686; Andrew T. H. Tan, The Arms Race in Asia: Trends, causes and implications
(New York: Routledge, 2014); Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing toward tragedy?,” 52-91.
38
Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 5-33.
39
Trine Jonassen, “Cold Response: Russia Says No to Observing NATO Exercise,” High North News, March 4, 2022,
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-says-no-observing-nato-exercise; “Russian navy to join NATO countries in
drills for first time in decade,” DW, December 10, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/russian-navy-to-join-nato-countries-
in-drills-for-first-time-in-decade/a-55896301.

16
For the future of US foreign policy, accurately understanding how East Asian countries are
responding to the rise of China is crucial. There is a growing bipartisan and multi-administration group
thinking in Washington that China’s rise poses mortal threats to the US and its allies and strategic
partners in the region, and they need to get together to create a balancing coalition aimed at checking
Beijing. In February 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden, a member of the Democratic Party, said in his
first major foreign policy address since taking office, “American leadership must meet this new
moment of advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United
States…” to restore America’s place in the world.
40
During his presidential campaign in 2019, Biden
also said, “We are in a competition with China. We need to get tough with China. They are a serious
challenge to us, and in some areas a real threat.”
4142
This echoes the words of Donald J. Trump, former
President of the US, and a member of the Republican Party. At his farewell speech in January 2021,
Trump said that rallying the support of its allies and friends “to stand up to China like never before”
was a key component of his foreign policy. Trump administration’s national security strategy
document explicitly writes that, “Sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong
commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S.
power and extend U.S. influence. They share our interests and responsibility for resisting authoritarian
trends...”
43

40
Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World” (transcript of speech, U.S. Department of
State Headquarters, Harry S. Truman Building, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-
place-in-the-world/. See also Michael D. Swaine and Sarang Shidore, “Biden pursues China-containment in new Indo-
Pacific Strategy,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 7, 2022,
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/07/biden-pursues-china-containment-in-new-indo-pacific-strategy/.
41
Rebecca Klar, “Biden now labeling China a ‘serious challenge’ to US,” Hill, June 11, 2019,
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/447954-biden-now-labeling-china-a-serious-challenge-to-us/.
42
Donald J. Trump, “Farewell Address: Farewell Address of Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States of
America” (transcript of speech, Blue Room of the White House, Washington, DC, January 19, 2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/farewell-address/.
43
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017), 45,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

17
High government officials of the US national security seem to share this high threat
perception
44
and support this foreign policy approach grounded on militant internationalism.
45
In
September 2021, General James “Mike” Holmes, former Commander of the Air Combat Command
with responsibility for rapid deployment of air, space, cyber and intelligence forces, said China’s rise
poses greater threat to the US security than ever before. According to General Holmes, “September
11 was not an existential event for the United States. It was a terrible tragedy, but as a people we
continued along our path…” but “[t]he threat posed by the People’s Republic of China is a much
bigger threat than that and does pose, literally, an existential threat to the United States.” Hence, “How
we [the US] band together with like-minded people to deter China’s aims…that’s probably the biggest
story for the next 10 years for the US and [the US allies and strategic partners].”
46
Contrasting the
dangers posed by China with those presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, FBI Director
Christopher Wray said that no country poses more danger to the US than China, and warned threats
from the Chinese government is “more brazen, more damaging than ever before, and it’s vital, vital, that
all of us focus on that threat together.”
47

44
Murray Brewster, “U.S. admiral warns of China threat and urges allies to work and train more closely,” CBC,
November 21, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/indo-pacific-aquilino-warning-1.6257200.
45
Militant and cooperative internationalism are two different foreign policy attitudes of leaders and mass public. Militant
internationalism and cooperative internationalism correspond closely to realism and liberalism, respectively. According
to Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau (1990, 96), “Realism views conflict between nations as a natural state of affairs
rather than as an aberration that is subject to permanent amelioration. Such realist concepts as security dilemma, relative
capabilities, and a “zero sum” view of conflict are also basic to the militant internationalism dimension.” On the other
hand, cooperative internationalism grounded on liberalism, “denies that conflict is an immutable element of relations
between nations. It defines security in terms that are broader than the geopolitical-military dimensions, and it emphasizes
the cooperative aspects of relations between nations.” Militant and cooperative internationalists maintain different
attitudes toward communism and the use of force, according to Wittkopf (1994, 381). See Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Faces
of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 376-401,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/174361; Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes
among American Leaders,” Journal of Politics 52, no. 1 (February 1990): 94-125, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2131421;
Eugene R. Wittkopf and Michael A. Maggiotto, “Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Toward
America’s World Role,” Journal of Politics 45, no. 2 (May 1983): 303-334, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2130128.
46
Matthew Cranston, “China an ‘existential threat’ to US and allies: general,” Financial Review, September 2, 2021,
https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/china-an-existential-threat-to-us-and-allies-general-20210902-p58o1d.
47
Mark Moore, “China poses bigger threat to US than any other nation, FBI says,” New York Post, February 1, 2022,
https://nypost.com/2022/02/01/fbi-director-christopher-wray-says-china-is-top-threat-to-us/.

18
Realist scholars are optimistic that East Asian countries will join the US and adopt such
confrontational approach toward China, because they also view China’s rise as a mortal threat. For
example, Mearsheimer writes that “the United States and almost all of China’s neighbors have
powerful incentives to contain its rise, which means they will carefully monitor its growth and move
to check it sooner rather than later.”
48
According to Mearsheimer, “[t]he reason is simple: China poses
a more serious threat to most countries in Asia…and states invariably balance against their most
dangerous foe…China is more threatening for largely geographical reason. Specifically, China is a local
power in Asia; it sits either right next door or within easy striking distance of the countries in the
neighborhood.”
49

This dissertation demonstrates that current thinking in Washington and the realist narrative
are mistaken, and East Asian countries are willing to live and let live with rising China more than we
think. The evidence of joint military exercises shows that the US allies and strategic partners have little
appetite for containing Beijing, and they have made efforts to embrace rising China into the regional
network over the last twenty years, rather than isolating it. The result suggests that there is a chasm in
the US and secondary states’ threat perception of rising China today. East Asian countries do not
necessarily view China’s rise as the most prevailing or imminent security threat that needs to be
deterred at all costs. Borrowing the words of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, “not
many countries would like to join a coalition against those who have been excluded, chief of whom
will be China…To try and make a line-up, Cold War–style, I don’t think that’s on the cards.”
50
To say,
empirical reality in East Asia today is that regional countries are pursuing good relations with both the
US and China, because they believe that their friendly relationship with China doesn’t necessarily have
to come at the cost of their relationship with the US. The result suggests that secondary states view

48
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 684.
49
Ibid., 693-694.
50
Feng, “Singapore Will Not Join Biden’s ‘Cold War–style’ Coalition Against China.”

19
the world differently from great powers, who may view the world in a more zero-sum fashion due to
its strategic interest in maintaining or gaining preponderance in international system.
The finding is consistent with the hedging literature that purports the argument that East Asian
secondary states are reluctant to choose a side between the US and China. Identifying hedging as a
dominant behavioral tendency of secondary states in Southeast Asia, Cheng-Chwee Kuik writes that
the regional countries “do not necessarily view China as the most pressing problem to be tackled
immediately and at all costs…and they do not want any single-sided alignment that would tie them
with one camp against another.”
51
David C. Kang contends that “a U.S. attempt to construct a
balancing coalition against China using East Asian states will be highly problematic,” because “East
Asian states will be extremely reluctant to choose sides...”
52
This is rational response, because as even
neorealist Stephen Walt himself writes, “States will not want to incur the various costs of balancing
(increased military spending, loss of autonomy..., and so on) unless they believe doing so is truly
necessary.”
53
Van Jackson predicts that “hedging will be a longer-term feature of the Asian security
environment, even if states become convinced that China has good intentions, or that the United
States is indeed an enduring ‘Pacific power’”
54
because “issue complexity – the interdependence
among security, economic, and social-normative factors…makes picking sides, whether balancing or
bandwagoning, impractical in the contemporary security environment.”
55
Brantly Womack notes that
“[t]o the extent that the US and China engaged in a zero-sum rivalry it would be prudent for the rest
of the world to reduce their exposure to great power conflict by not choosing sides…”
56

51
Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective,” China International Strategy Review 3 (November
2021): 304, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00089-5.
52
David C. Kang, “Why China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asin Region,” Perspectives on
Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 553, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3689029.
53
Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 103.
54
Van Jackson, “Power, trust, and network complexity: three logics of hedging in Asian security,” International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 3 (September 2014): 333, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu005.
55
Ibid., 348.
56
Brantly Womack, “China and the Future Status Quo,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 132,
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov001.

20
Furthermore, my findings have contributions to the theoretical debate on whether balancing
is a natural tendency of states in international systems, and existing empirical debate about whether
East Asian countries are balancing against rising China. In international relations, states can engage in
two types of balancing behaviors to increase its aggregate material capabilities vis-à-vis a rising power
or threat – internal and external balancing. Internal balancing behavior takes the form of increasing
military spending and procuring arms. External balancing behavior involves forming alliance or
security partnerships with other powers to deter rising powers.
57
Previously, existing works have
focused on the former, and asked whether East Asian countries are engaging in internal balancing
behaviors against China. While pessimists consistently claim that regional countries are arming against
China out of fear of domination,
58
a group of East Asia experts have shown that the alarmist rhetoric
is misleading and “there is no arms race underway in the region.”
59
In this dissertation, I primarily
focused on external balancing or hedging behavior, which is related to alignment patterns in IR, and
demonstrated that empirical reality of East Asia is inconsistent with balancing theories prediction.

The Structure of the Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is largely twofold. On theoretical level, this dissertation aims to
develop a new theory of hedging that explain secondary states behavior in times of rising power in
vicinity. On empirical level, this dissertation aims to systematically examine East Asian secondary

57
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1979); Stephen M. Walt,
The Origins of Alliances (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); James D. Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs
in the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 207-233,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706889.
58
Segal, “Managing new arms race in the Asia/pacific,” 83-101; Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 5-33; Berger, “Set for
Stability?,” 405-428; Liff and Ikenberry, “Racing toward tragedy?,” 52-91.
59
Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” International Security 18, no. 3
(Winter 1993/94): 79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539206; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85; Ronan Tse-min Fu, David James Gill, Eric
Hundman, Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Correspondence: Looking for Asia’s Security Dilemma,” International
Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 181-186, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_c_00220; David C. Kang, American Grand Strategy
and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

21
states’ behavior amid the rise of China by using joint military exercises. Under these two objectives,
the body of this dissertation is structured as follow.
In Chapter 2, I discuss competing theoretical expectations on secondary states’ behavior in
response to a rising power based on different strategic logics. The conventional wisdom in the existing
security studies literature is that secondary states tend to align against (balance against) rising power in
geographical proximity. Yet, increasingly, a nontrivial number of scholars question whether balancing
theories do a good job when they are applied to contemporary international relations or regions other
than Europe. As a new explanation for secondary states behavior in times of rising power in the
vicinity, I present a new theory of hedging and argue that secondary states who wish to maintain
strategic autonomy tend to diversify cooperative security ties in the face of rising power in the vicinity.
Here, I provide a clear concept and operationalization of hedging that allow us to construct a valid
empirical test of hedging propositions. In Chapter 3, I sketch out the observable indicators of
alignment or security cooperation and explain why shedding light on joint military exercise is
important for assessing secondary states’ hedging and balancing behaviors, especially, in the case of
East Asia. In Chapter 4, I discuss limitations of existing empirical studies on joint military exercises in
East Asia and introduce an original dataset of joint military exercises (JMEs) in the Asia-Pacific from
1970 to 2019, which I constructed to systematically examine security cooperation in the region over
time. Then, I analyze the JME data using descriptive statistics and network analysis and present
substantive evidence that in the last twenty years, East Asian countries have expanded security
cooperation with rising China, as well as other states including its great power patron U.S. In Chapter
5, to have a better understanding of East Asian countries’ motivations for security cooperation with
China, I conduct case studies on Southeast Asia-China joint military exercises. While quantitative
analysis of joint military exercise data is apt for identifying large security cooperation patterns, I believe
that qualitative case study is suitable for exploring the countries’ motivations and logics for holding

22
joint military exercises. Here, I investigate the remarks made by high government and military officials
on joint military exercises with China. In Chapter 6, I conclude by summarizing the key findings and
discussing implications of my research for IR theory, East Asian security, and the US foreign policy.

23

Chapter 2.

Rising Power in Vicinity and Secondary States’ Strategic Options:
Balancing vs. Hedging

Interstate relations in the 21
st
century is “a recurrent pattern of balances of power whereby weak states
form balancing coalitions to deter rising powers.”
– Adam P. Liff
60

“In the…post-Cold War period, the traditional realist concepts of balancing…have no longer seemed
the only or most appropriate to make sense of how states are responding to superior power and shifts
in relative capabilities, as well as direct security challenges emanating from rising powers.”

– Ju ̈rgen Haacke
61

Conventional Wisdom: Balancing as the Dominant Response
How do secondary states cope with rising powers in vicinity? The conventional wisdom in the
field is that balancing against rising power is the most dominant behavioral tendency of secondary
states. Traditional security theories suggest that secondary states tend to choose a side in the face of a
rising power – either they align against the rising power with other states (balance)
62
or they take a side
with rising power (bandwagon).
63
Yet, if they are free to choose, secondary states opt for balancing,

60
Liff, “Whither the Balancer?,” 424.
61
Ju ̈rgen Haacke, “The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a
modified conceptual and methodological framework,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (September 2019):
376, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz010.
62
In international relations, states can engage in two types of balancing behaviors to increase its aggregate material
capabilities against a rising power or threat – internal and external balancing. Internal balancing behavior takes the form
of increasing military spending and procuring arms. External balancing behavior involves forming alliance or security
partnerships with other powers to deter rising powers. In this dissertation, I primarily focus on the latter, external
balancing behavior which is related to alignment pattern in IR.
63
Defining bandwagoning as aligning with the source of danger or threatening power, Stephen M. Walt (1987, 21) writes
that “the more powerful the state and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with
it.” Building on to Walt’s discussion of bandwagoning, Randall L. Schweller (1994, 72-107) argues that by aligning with
an ascendant state, the bandwagoners hope to appease and divert threat from the state (appeasement) and thereby
maximize their long-term odds on survival or share the spoils of victory by joining the winning side (reward/profit). Jack
Levy (1989, 231) posits that “weaker states in the proximity of stronger states do what is necessary to survive, which
often involves bandwagoning with the strong instead of balancing against them.” Jeffrey W. Hornung (2014, 99) claims

24
over bandwagoning. In his classical discussion of balance-of-power theory, Kenneth N. Waltz writes,
“Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side [rising
power] that threatens them. On the weaker side [or less threatening side], they are both more
appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they form achieves enough defensive or
deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.”
64

Perils of Proximity: Powerful Neighbor Is Scarier
Especially, secondary states have a greater tendency to balance against rising powers in close
geographic proximity to them out of high threat perceptions. In balance-of-threat theory, Stephen M.
Walt argues that all else being equal, secondary states are more likely to perceive a powerful state
nearby as a greater threat than the ones that are distant due to two reasons. First, it is “[b]ecause the
ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those
that are far away.”
65
Second, “[p]roximity also tends to produce greater conflicts of interest, such as
border disputes, between the states involved,” which induces higher threat perception.
66

Availability of Powerful Friend in Distant
According to realists, out of fear of getting dominated by a rising power in vicinity sooner or
later, secondary states tend to militarily align with another powerful state in distant, and form balancing

that bandwagoning with rising power – taking the side with rising power and conceding to them – will take place only if
a weak state does not have a powerful ally or friend. Overall, the dominant narrative in the field is that historically
balancing has been more common than bandwagoning. On bandwagoning, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, 21; Randall L.
Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer
1994): 72-107, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539149; Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and
Evidence,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War: Volume 1, eds. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C.
Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 231; Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard
Hedge Against China,” Asian Security 10, no. 2: 99, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2014.914497.
64
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127.
65
Walt, Origins of Alliances, 23.
66
Ibid., 24; As an example, see Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 63-86.

25
coalitions to check the powerful neighbor.
67
As an example, Walt notes that, “[t]hroughout the Cold
War, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to the major powers of Eurasia than the United States
did. As “balance-of-threat” theory predicts, these states balanced by allying with the United States,
creating a global coalition...”
68
Also, the end of the Cold War led to the predictions that many
secondary states would balance against the United States, the rising unipolar global superpower.
69

However, according to Zachary Selden, expected balancing behavior did not materialize in situations
where states had a greater concern about proximate threats from regional powers. For example, rather
than militarily aligning against the US, the secondary states bordering Russia have strengthened their
security cooperation with the US as insurance against their strong neighbor.
70

Several scholars claim that secondary states are more likely to balance against a rising power
when alignment with a great power patron is an available option for them.
71
From the perspectives of

67
In the words of Brock F. Tessman (2012, 195), “If second-tier state “B” is in close geographic proximity to rapidly
rising, threatening…state [regional power] “C,” it may choose to bandwagon with system leader [global superpower]
“A,” balance against rising power “C,” and entirely avoid any hedging strategies. This might be even more likely if the
second-tier state “B” considers the current system leader [global superpower] “A” to be relatively benign in contrast to
threatening, rising power “C”.” See Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the
Menu,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 192-231, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.679203.
68
Ibid., vi.
69
For more debates on balancing and under-balancing against the US, see Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander,
“Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 109-139,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137460; Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30,
no.1 (Summer 2005): 7-45, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137457; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,”
International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46-71, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137458; Stephen G. Brooks and
William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72-108,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137459; John M. Owen IV, “Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy,” International
Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 117–152, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092092; G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions,
Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999):
43-78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539338.
70
Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With?,” 341.
71
For example, according to Labs (1992, 396-399), “The Danish War [1864] was a battle in which two Great Powers,
Austria and Prussia, wrested control of two north German duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, from a weak state,
Denmark…Denmark could bandwagon with the Great Powers, capitulate and accede to their terms,” but Denmark
opted for balancing against the two rising powers. “A key element in that decision was slight indications of political and
possibly military support from Great Britain [a great power patron].” See also Walt, Origins of Alliances, 5; Stephen M.
Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs,” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992):
448-482, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419209347478; Eric J. Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon.” Security Studies 1,
no. 3 (Spring 1992): 383-416. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419209347476.

26
capability aggregation model of alignments and burden-sharing,
72
balancing with a great power patron
in distant is an attractive option for secondary states, because it increases their odds of survival in the
event their security is threatened by rising power in vicinity. For example, James D. Morrow writes
that, “The greater a nation’s relative capabilities, the more attractive it will be as an ally [partner] (given
a shared perception of the threat)…All else equal, major powers are the most attractive alliance
[strategic] partners in this view.”
73

You Are Scarier Because You Are Different
Another condition that could increase the likelihood of secondary states’ balancing behavior
against rising power is if the degree of shared identity between them is low. From the construction of
threat perspective, David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero claim that “If the other is
completely unlike the self (i.e., if no shared identity exists), the material balance of power between the
self and the other will be a good predictor of threat perception. However, the higher the level of
shared identity between the self and the other, the less threatening the other will appear. In the extreme
case in which the other and the self are members of the same in-group, the other will not be seen as
a threat regardless of the particular balance of power.”
74
For instance, secondary states with

72
In extreme forms of burden-sharing may include buck-passing. However, scholars posit that it will induce direct
opposite behavior, which is under-balancing. For example, Jennifer M. (2004, 104) claims that “Buck-passers recognize
the need to balance against a threat, but they do as little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of
others.” Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990, 138) argue that some states “may pass the buck, counting on
third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rising hegemon.” See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain gangs
and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792;
Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29,
no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92-121, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137548.
73
Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 907.
74
David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity Power, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National
Experimental Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (October 2007): 749-750,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638576; See also David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Estimating threats:
The impact and interaction of identity and power,” in American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat inflation since
9/11: 1
st
Edition, eds. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2009), 54-78.

27
democracy polity are highly likely to militarily align against rising power that has autocratic regime type
out of high threat perception.
Positing threat perception as a function of regime type, Jarrod Hayes argues that “democratic
identity – the shared understanding within democracies of who “we” are and what “we” expect from
each other – makes it difficult for political leaders to construct external democracies as threats. At the
same time, [Hayes] finds that democratic identity enables political actors to construct external non-
democracies as threats.”
75
In a similar vein, Mark Hass contends that when the ideological distance
between two states is close, “presumption of amity will likely impel decision makers not to be overly
fearful of positions of power inferiority in relation to states within their ideological community. As a
result, leaders in these situations are likely to engage in policies of reassurance to manage interstate
relations rather than adopting hard-line deterrent policies.”
76
In contrary, “The greater the ideological
differences dividing decision makers of different states, the greater the emphasis they will place on
issues of relative power (and thus the more likely they are to adopt various hard-line policies...” such
as balancing.
77

Path-Dependency: Locked-Into Balancing Pathway
In a more recent discussion, some scholars argue that path dependencies limit secondary states
strategic options and lock them into balancing pathway. For instance, Lim and Cooper claim that
“Many Asian states have existing treaty alliances with the United States or major territorial conflicts
with China, creating path dependencies that reinforce balancing behavior” against China.
78
They
postulate resolute allies (U.S. treaty allies with major security dispute with China), reserved allies (U.S.

75
Jarrod Hayes and Schwartzberg, Melissa, Constructing National Security: U.S. Relations with India and China (United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013), i.
76
Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 17.
77
Ibid., 18.
78
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 696.

28
treaty ally with minor/no security dispute with China), and emerging partners (non-U.S. treaty ally
with minor/no security dispute with China) will all balance with the US against China, because
choosing alternative pathways such as building cooperative ties with China beget prohibitive costs.
79

Core Assumptions of Balancing Theories
The core assumptions underlying the balancing theories’ predictions on the secondary states’
behavior are fourfold. First, the primary interest of states in international system lies in maximizing
their long-term odds of survival (security), so they will balance against dangerous concentrations of
power.
80
Second, there are additional factors that weaken or embolden threat perceptions such as
geographic proximity and shared identity,
81
but a perceived threat is primarily a function of power
asymmetry, so states in a weaker position of material capabilities “assess a rising trajectory of power
as inherently threatening.”
82
Third, secondary states cannot independently provide for their security
due to limited material capabilities, so they tend to “owe their independence either to the balance of
power…or to the preponderance of one protecting power.”
83
Fourth, in default, states avoid
cooperation due to fear of getting cheated. They cooperate only when they must, “that is, when they
face common enemies and/or threats.”
84

79
Ibid., 710-712.
80
William C. Wolforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur
Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, and William L. Brenner, “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” European
Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 155-185, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107076951.
81
According to Stephen M. Walt, threat perceptions are a function of geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and
perceived intentions, as well as aggregate power. Social identity theory suggests that the level of perceived threat may
also be influenced by the shared identity (i.e., in-group and out-group dynamics). See Walt, Origins of Alliances, vi;
Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, “Identity Power, Power, and Threat Perception,” 744-771.
82
Janice Gross Stein, “Chapter 12: Threat Perception in International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political
Psychology: Second Edition, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (United States of America: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 366, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0012.
83
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 133.
84
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter
1994/1995): 12-13, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078, quoted in Zeev Maoz, Ranan D. Kuperman, Lesley Terris,
“Structural Equivalence and International Conflict: A Social Network Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5
(October 2006): 667, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706291053.

29
Is Balancing, the Ironclad Law of Secondary States’ Response to Rising Power?
Realist scholars argue that balancing theories explain secondary states’ behavior across time
and space, including East Asian countries’ response to the rise of China in the 21
st
century. For
example, in a recent study, Liff argues that “basic idea that states will balance militarily against
perceived threats is not anachronistic,” and international relations is “a recurrent pattern of balances
of power whereby weak states form balancing coalitions to deter rising powers.”
85

Increasingly, nontrivial number of scholars question whether balancing theories do a good job
when they are applied to contemporary international relations or regions other than Europe.
86
For
example, Daniel H. Nexon writes that it is questionable whether the “balance of power equilibria
represent the “normal condition” or “natural tendency” of international relations.”
87
Problematizing
the Eurocentric basis of many IR theories in strategic studies domain, scholars like Amitav Acharya
and Barry Buzan write that “[b]oth classical and neorealism project onto the rest of world history their
basic Europe-derived story of international anarchy and balance of power politics as a permanent,
universal structural condition. They support this move by citing examples from both Western history
(classical Greece, Renaissance Italy, modern Europe) and samples of non-Western history that run
parallel to the European story…”
88
In a similar vein, arguing against the neo-realist (or structural realist)
claims for the repetitiveness of balancing strategy and its prevalence in international relations, Paul
Schroeder contends that, “It’s insistence on the sameness effect and on the unchanging, structurally
determined nature of international politics make it unhistorical, perhaps anti-historical…Neo-realist

85
Liff, Whither the Balancer?, 423-424.
86
Wohlforth, Little, Kaufman, Kang, Jones, Hui, Eckstein, Deudney, and Brenner, “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory
in World History,” 155–85; Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in
Response to the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies 9, no. 3 (2000): 60–107,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410008429406.
87
For the quote, see the extract of Daniel H. Nexon, “Review Article: The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World
Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009): 330-359. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40263485.
88
Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction.” in
Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia, edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan
(London: Routledge, 2010), 7.

30
theory not only prevents scholars from seeing and explaining the various strategies alternative to
balancing, or the different functions and roles of various actors within the system… It obstructs new
insights and hypotheses, leads scholars to overlook or explain away large bodies of inconvenient facts,
flattens out vital historical distinctions.”
89

Especially, there is a sizable East Asia IR literature that highlights the need for a more nuanced
theory to account for secondary states’ behavior that belie the balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy.
Questioning the applicability of the balancing theories to historical and contemporary East Asia, David
C. Kang contends that, “Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to
understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and
experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. This approach is
problematic at best. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about
conflict and alignment behavior in Asia.”
90
John D. Ciorciari, Ju ̈rgen Haacke and others also point
out that neither balancing nor bandwagoning theories provide convincing explanation of East Asian
secondary states’ response to the rise of China.
91

Hedging as New Analytical Framework for Secondary State’ Behavior
Here, I discuss “hedging” in IR in-depth as an alternative pathway that can be taken by
secondary states in the face of a rising power. The concept of hedging entered the IR lexicon in the
1990s to account for the state behaviors that can’t be explained by balancing or bandwagoning theories.
For example, Ann Marie Murphy writes that “for small states dealing with rising powers, policy choice

89
Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 148,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539150.
90
Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong,” 58.
91
John D. Ciorciari and Ju ̈rgen Haacke, “Hedging in international relations: an introduction,” International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (September 2019): 367-374, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz017.

31
extends well beyond balancing and bandwagoning to include…strategies such as hedging.”
92
Alastair
Iain Johnston notes that “[m]uch of the East Asia IR literature…shows that the typology of state
behavior is much more varied than even the critics of balance-of-power theories acknowledge. In
other words, balancing, bandwagoning…are not the sum total of relevant reactions to superior
power…the East Asia–based research has added terms such as…hedging…”
93

However, despite the usage of the term in both academic and policy circles in the last three
decades, it remains deeply contested what it exactly means to hedge.
94
The conceptual looseness, and
unclear empirical criteria in the existing IR literature make it difficult to construct a valid empirical test
of hedging propositions. Thus, in this chapter, building on to the existing hedging literature, I aim to
present a refined theory of hedging that allows us to differentiate hedging from other behaviors and
ascertain hedging when we see it. This will lay foundation for systematically examining whether
balancing is the dominant behavior tendency of secondary states vis-à-vis rising powers in vicinity.

Theory of Hedging: How and Why Do States Hedge

The primary goal of security strategies is reducing risks and mitigating uncertainties because
war is costly, and peace is invaluable. Positive relational ties with other states are important capabilities
or social capital that increase state’s well-being. “[C]apabilities in the networked view rely on
connections to other members of the network.”
95
From this perspective, a state’s capability “is no
longer derived solely or even primarily from individual attributes, such as material capabilities”
96
but
relationships with other states. Thus, from networked perspective, opting for a rigid single-sided

92
Ann Marie Murphy, “Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand's Response to China’s Rise,” Asian Security 6, no.
1 (2010): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850903471922.
93
Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell US About International Relations Theory?,” Annual
Review of Political Science 15 (June 2012): 60, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.040908.120058.
94
Kuik, “Getting hedging right,” 301.
95
Kahler, “Networked Politics,” 12.
96
Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” 570.

32
alignment with a single power or bloc is the second-best strategy at best, and always the optimal
strategy is to diversify cooperative security ties.
In the face of rising power in vicinity, I argue that secondary states will diversify cooperative
ties (hedging), rather than opting for balancing (or bandwagoning) strategies premised on taking a side.
Here, I squarely focus on the pattern of security cooperation which it is costly signals of states’ strategic
choices. Key behavioral pattern expected under hedging is secondary states’ pursuit of cooperative
security ties with rising power, as well as other states including its great power patron.

Defining Hedging: Diversification of Cooperative Ties
I posit that the essence that makes hedging conceptually distinct from other conventional
balancing and bandwagoning behaviors is that it is a risk management behavior that deliberately
refrains from choosing sides. In a similar vein, Cheng-Chwee Kuik writes that hedging behavior entails
“an insistence on not taking sides or being locked into a rigid alignment…an inclination to diversify
and cultivate a fallback position.”
97
Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya define hedging as a set of
strategies adopted in “a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives
such as balancing, bandwagoning…” Instead, they adopt foreign policy stance that abstains from
“choos[ing] one side at the obvious expenses of another.”
98
Conceptualizing hedging as “a risk
management strategy,” Jurgen Haacke claims that “a government that is actively working really hard
on making a great power or a wider political-military coalition its singular or primary
insurance…should not be taken to be hedging.”
99
Similarly, Brock F. Tessman argues that any

97
Kuik, “Getting hedging right,” 302.
98
Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies. Policy Studies 16
(Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2005), 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06541; Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s
Past Be Its Future.” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 153, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137480.
99
Haacke, “The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia,” 377 and 396.

33
secondary state that are forming an explicit military alliance to counter a predominant power would
not be considered as hedging states, but as balancers.
100

Yet, I’d like to make it clear that hedging is far from passive behaviors such as fence-sitting,
indecisiveness, or “deferring its alignment choice until uncertainties surrounding intentions, potential
threats, and the balance of power become clearer.”
101
Rather, hedging is more proactive in nature,
because it entails a costly signaling behavior that reveal willingness and preference for cooperation
with both rising power and other states including its great power patron. Hence, more accurate way
of conceptualizing hedging is clearly choosing to cooperate with both sides, rather than antagonizing
a certain state. Likewise, John D. Ciorciari notes that the term hedging describes “efforts by states to
provide for their security while avoiding overly antagonistic alliance relationships.”
102

This is not just splitting hairs, but an important distinction that should be noted, because it is
related to the motivations of hedging, and it has implications for how long the hedging trend will
endure. If hedging is the result of indecisiveness as Mearsheimer, Lim and Cooper, and Kei Koga
describe,
103
then hedging will be a transient behavior that appears while secondary states “buy…time
to determine whether the state should balance or bandwagon until the strategic landscape’s future
direction is clarified.”
104
On the other hand, if the intended purpose of hedging is more than just
buying time, and it is grounded on the firm belief that taking sides for security reasons is suboptimal
strategy, then hedging trend will not be just a ephemeral phenomenon.

Operationalizing Hedging: Security Ties as Costly Signals of Strategic Choice

100
Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy,” 211.
101
Lim and Cooper, Reassessing Hedging, 710.
102
Ciorciari, Limits of Alignment, 6-7.
103
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 693; Lim and Cooper, Reassessing Hedging, 710; Kei Koga, “The Concept of
“Hedging” Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift,” International Studies Review
20, no. 4 (December 2018): 637, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix059.
104
Koga, “The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited,” 637.

34
In the existing literature, there are two different perspectives on the scope conditions of
hedging behavior. Scholars like Kuik, Goh, and Kei Koga conceptualize hedging as an overarching
foreign policy strategy and argue that hedging behavior involves various combinations of economic,
military, and diplomatic policies.
105
The most common type of hedging suggested by existing
scholarship is engagement with a rising power through economic and political means, while taking
countervailing protective measures in the security spheres. For instance, Kuik argues that Southeast
Asian countries are hedging in the face of rising China, by aligning with China in economic and
political spheres (bandwagon with China) and tightly aligning with the US in security spheres
(balancing against China with the US).
106

On the other hand, Lim and Cooper assert that the concept should focus “exclusively on state
behavior within the security realm.”
107
They argue that incorporating policies of economic and political
engagement – costless activities that do not require states to face trade-offs in their security choices –
as components of hedging is problematic because it does not offer useful analytical insights into
whether states are truly hedging or balancing.
108
From this perspective, Lim and Cooper argue that the
security behavior of East Asian secondary states in the rise of China resemble balancing behavior,
which is “strengthening security links with the United States” to deter its powerful neighbor.
109

Similarly, Liff also claims that the concept of balancing (and also its comparable concepts such as

105
Goh, Meeting the China Challenge, viii; Kuik, “Getting hedging right,” 302; Koga, “The Concept of “Hedging”
Revisited,” 640-643.
106
See Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Getting hedging right,” 300-315; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Nor Azizan Idris, and Abd Rahim
Md Nor, “The China Factor in the U.S. “Reengagement” With Southeast Asia: Drivers and Limits of Converged
Hedging,” Asian Politics & Policy 4, no. 3, Special Issue: How China’s Rise Is Changing Asia’s Landscape and Seascape
(July 2012): 315-344, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01361.x; Cheng-Chewee Kuik, “Malaysia Between the
United States and China: What do Weaker States Hedge Against?,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1, Special Issue: Regional
Perspective on America’s Changing Asia-Pacific Alliances and Partnerships (January 2016): 155-177,
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12240; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’
alignment behavior towards China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (March 2016): 500-514,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714.
107
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 703.
108
Ibid., 700.
109
Ibid., 697.

35
bandwagoning or hedging) is applicable to only military domain, and it will be too much of a
conceptual stretch to include economic and diplomatic factors.
110

I adopt the latter’s conception of hedging and squarely focus on secondary states’ pursuit of
cooperative security ties with other states, which is costly signals of their strategic choice. To elaborate,
this is a costly signal in reassurance context, where states communicate its benign intentions via
cooperative military policies.
111
The goal of reassurance signal is to build strategic trust, “demonstrate
that one is moderate, not out to get the other side, willing to live and let live, preferring to reciprocate
cooperation,”
112
and reduce of risk of conflict due to misperceptions. Different from cheap talk and
bluffing, costly signal is rendered credible in international relations, because it creates costs and risks
that the actors who are not committed for the action (in this context, military cooperation) are
unwilling to suffer.
113

Motivations of Hedging
Then, what motivates secondary states to opt for hedging in the circumstance of high
uncertainties over rising powers’ intentions and capabilities? Especially, why don’t they just take a side
with a great power patron and balance against rising power? Why do they take this costly pathway of
developing cooperative security ties with both rising power and great power patron?
I argue that secondary states who wish to maintain strategic autonomy prefer hedging over
balancing. Taking a side with great power patron against rising power under balancing strategy may

110
Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 425-426.
111
Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 325-357; Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 50-90; Kydd, “Sheep in
Sheep’s clothing,” 114-155; Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences,” 939; Gartzke, Carcelli, Gannon, and
Zhang, “Signaling in Foreign Policy,” 10.
112
Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 187.
113
Fearon, “Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes,” 577-592; Fearon, “Signaling
Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” 68-90; Morrow, “CHAPTER THREE. The Strategic
Setting of Choices,” 77-114; McManus and Nieman, “Identifying the level of major power support signaled for
proteges,” 366-367.

36
provide security protection benefits but it would come at the cost of strategic autonomy. Hence,
secondary states who wish to minimize the tradeoff between increased security and decreased strategic
autonomy opt for hedging. Here, I define strategic autonomy as the ability to behave based on one’s
own security priorities and to make informed decision on how one wishes to manage relations with
other states.
114

The diversification of cooperative security ties increases secondary states’ strategic autonomy
through the accumulation of network power. As Miles writes, “Network structure inverts the
neorealist view of international structure as a distribution of capabilities; capabilities in the networked
view rely on connections to other members of the network.”
115
Thus, from networked perspective,
opting for a rigid single-sided alignment with a single power or bloc is the second-best strategy at best,
and always the optimal strategy is to diversify cooperative security ties.
Moreover, uncertainty serves as a motivation for security cooperation.
116
Balancing theories
often conflate uncertainty and threat and assume that uncertainty always works against cooperation:
“the most powerful state will always appear threatening because weaker states can never be certain
that it will not use its power to…threaten their survival.”
117
However, I’d like to emphasize that
uncertainty and threat are two different things. When rising power is a clear threat, especially,
existential threat, to secondary states, then it will be treated as an enemy. In this light, militarily aligning
with other states against the rising power may be a natural course of action for them.
118
On the other

114
Here, I adopt a defensive conception of autonomy. The concept of autonomy can be divided into two – “aggressive
autonomy being freedom to remake the status quo, and defensive autonomy freedom from entangling alliances.” See
footnote 5 in Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 909.
115
Kahler, “Networked Politics,” 12.
116
Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 50-90.
117
Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics.”
118
In the words of former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mohamad Mahathir, “Why should we fear China? If you
identify a country as your future enemy, it becomes your present enemy.” See Ciorciari, Limits of Alignment, 14.

37
hand, uncertainties may induce secondary states to engage in more cooperation with rising power to
mitigate the risk of conflict between them due to misperceptions and to build strategic trust.
119

Core Assumptions: Strategic Autonomy, Divided Security Priorities, and Entrapment Fear
The key assumptions of my hedging theory are threefold. First, I assume strategic autonomy
as a key state goal. According to Robert J. Art, “[t]he default position of states, especially when it comes
to military matters, is not dependence, but autonomy and independence, if they can achieve it.”
120

Alexander Wendt writes that secondary states will trade autonomy away only “when the benefits of
dependence outweigh the costs.”
121
Reliance on a powerful protector may increase the prospects of
survival of secondary states in the event their security is threatened but it will come at the cost of their
strategic autonomy (i.e., security-autonomy tradeoff).
122
For example, Steven Chan notes that
secondary states’ dependence on asymmetrical alliances “enable bloc leaders to influence their junior
partners’ security policy, sometimes to restrain the latter from developing their military autonomy...”
123

Victor D. Cha argues that asymmetric alliance designs allow powerful ally “to exert maximum control
over the smaller ally’s actions.”
124
Hence, according to David A. Lake, as states get richer, generally
they are “less willing to trade autonomy for external protection and less likely to enter hierarchical

119
Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 325-357.
120
Robert J. Art, Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, Keir A. Lieber, and Gerard Alexander. “Correspondence: Striking
the Balance.” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006), 185. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.177.
121
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 235-236.
122
Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 904-933; Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test.” The
Western Political Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1984): 523-544. https://doi.org/10.2307/448471.
123
Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia (United States: Stanford
University Press, 2013), 73.
124
Cha, “Powerplay,” 158.

38
relationships.”
125
Lim and Cooper posit that secondary states’ “hedging behavior reflects a choice to
maximize autonomy at the expense of strong alignment.”
126

Second, I recognize that even close allies or strategic partners may have divided security
priorities and interests. In line with Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, rather than treating alliances
and strategic partnerships as “coalitions of “friends” whose interests fully or largely overlap,” I view
that “they embody a mix of interests that can systematically pull their members in opposite
directions.”
127
Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka, and Hugo Meijer also write that due to the existence
of multiple threats, “[m]embers of the alliance system disagree over which threat deserves
priority…”
128

Especially, there can be a divide in security priorities and interests due to a chasm between
secondary states and great power patron’s threat perception toward rising power. A great power patron
who has strategic objective in maintaining predominant position in the international system, may
perceive any rising power, regardless of its intentions and behaviors, as a threat to its primacy and may
wish to deter its rise at all costs. According to Mearsheimer, “Great powers fear each other. They
regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate
danger. There is little room for trust among states…From the perspective of any one great power, all
other great powers are potential enemies.”
129
However, this may be “the tragedy of great power politics”
and same psychology may not be at work for secondary states. Different from their great power patron,
junior partners may not perceive the rise as an imminent existential threat to them, and may think

125
David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International Security 32, no.
1 (Summer 2007): 43, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30129801.
126
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 712.
127
Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, “Divided Priorities” Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention,”
Security Studies 27, no. 4 (July 2018): 581, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483609.
128
Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka, and Hugo Meijer, “Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S. alliance systems
in Europe and East Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 3 (2021): 362-363,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1636372.
129
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 91.

39
militarily aligning against rising power, at the danger of antagonizing their relations, is not a
proportionate response.
130

From a psychological perspective in IR, Caleb Pomeroy argues, ironically, “leaders of
powerful states see more threats, because they feel more able to address threats.”
131
According to
Pomeroy, a close analysis of all speeches in the United Nations General Debate from 1946 to 2019
suggests that great powers are far more likely to discuss threats than other member states. For example,
“the US shows a threefold increase in threat perception in the post-Cold War period. That is, at the
absolute heights of US power, the US describes being more threatened than during the Cold War.”
132

According to Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Actors who are susceptible to hawkish
biases are not only more likely to see threats as more dire than an objective observer would perceive,
but are also likely to act in a way that will produce unnecessary conflict.”
133

Third, the fear of getting dragged into an unwanted great power conflict between a rising
power and a great power patron (entrapment fear) could induce secondary states to act to mitigate
these risks. Much has been written on how entrapment fear affects the behavior of great power
patrons,
134
but less attention has been given in the IR literature to how it affects the behavior of junior

130
On threat to primacy and existential threat, see Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China, Council Special Report, no. 72 (USA: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 3-4,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf; Ted Galen Carpenter, “Paranoid Superpower: Threat
Inflation Is the American Way,” CATO Institute, May 25, 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/paranoid-
superpower-threat-inflation-american-way; Bruce W. Jentleson, “Be Wary of China Threat Inflation,” Foreign Policy, July
30, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/30/china-threat-inflation-united-states-soviet-union-cold-war/; Hugh
White, “China threatens the West’s primacy, not its democratic systems,” Interpreter, August 2, 2021,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-threatens-west-s-primacy-not-its-democratic-systems; Manoj
Kumar Mishra, “Is China an Existential Threat to US Or A Challenge To Its Hegemony? – Analysis,” Eurasia Review,
December 27, 2021, https://www.eurasiareview.com/27122021-is-china-an-existential-threat-to-us-or-a-challenge-to-its-
hegemony-analysis/; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy Toward China,”
Washington Quarterly 43, no. 4 (2020): 79-104, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1849993.
131
Caleb Pomeroy, “The Damocles Delusion: How the Sense of Power Increases Threat Perception in World Politics,”
Working paper (USC Korean Studies Institute, 2021), 2.
132
Ibid., 21.
133
Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Hawkish biases,” in American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear: Threat
Inflation Since 9/11, eds. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (USA and Canada: Routledge, 2009), 79.
134
Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,”
International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 7-48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197; Cha, “Powerplay,” 158-196;
Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 20, no, 3 (August 2011): 350-377,

40
partners in asymmetrical alliances and partnerships.
135
Yet, as Michael Mandelbaum noted in his
discussion of entrapment when he first coined the term, every member of an alliance potentially fears
that “he will be entrapped in a war he does not wish to fight.”
136
Glenn H. Snyder defines entrapment
fear as “being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only
partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be
valued in different degree.”
137
Adopting a narrower definition, Tongfi Kim writes that “Entrapment
is a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or offensive policy not
specified in the alliance agreement.”
138
According to Krebs and Spindel, junior partners that “oppose
powerful partners’ hawkish postures…explore routes to security beyond the alliance.”
139
Iain D. Henry
writes that “If an ally poses risks of entrapment…then it is unreliable, and the state will act to mitigate
these risks. Responses could include hedging…”
140
Jasen J. Castillo and Alexander B. Downes identify
“seeking improved relations with the challenger [rising power/emerging threat] while remaining allied
with the patron” as a form of secondary states’ hedging behavior.
141

https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201; Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, “To Arm
or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” International Security 41, no. 2
(Fall 2016): 90-139, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00250.
135
At best, existing discussion focused on how secondary states’ “abandonment fear” from great power patron (i.e., the
US) affect their alignment behavior. On abandonment fear, see Tongfi Kim and Luis Simón, “A Reputation versus
Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions,” Security Studies
30, no. 5 (December 2021): 725-760; https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.2010889; Krebs and Spindel, “Divided
Priorities,” 575-606; Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 707.
136
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (United States: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), 151.
137
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 467,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183.
138
Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” 355.
139
Krebs and Spindel, “Divided Priorities,” 575.
140
Iain D. Henry, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International
Security 44, no. 4 (Spring 2020): 47, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00375.
141
Jasen J. Castillo and Alexander B. Downes, “Loyalty, hedging, or exit: How weaker alliance partners respond to the
rise of new threats,” Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2020): 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1797690.

41
Competing Theoretical Expectations
Hedging Theory’s Theoretical Expectations on Rising Power in Vicinity
Taken all together, my theory of hedging leads to following theoretical expectations on secondary
states behavior vis-à-vis a rising power in vicinity.
- General Form: Secondary states will diversify cooperative security ties in the face of rising power in
vicinity.
- Conditions Favoring Hedging:
- Secondary states are more likely to opt for hedging when there is a chasm between secondary
states and great power patron’s threat perception toward rising power.
- Secondary states are more likely to opt for hedging when the likelihood of great power
competition between its great power patron and rising power is high.
- Expected Behavioral Pattern:
- Secondary states will develop cooperative security ties with rising power – despite the
geographical proximity, presence of a great power patron, ideological distance, and path-
dependency – as well as other states including its great power patron.
o On a dyadic level, I posit that if a secondary state is hedging, then we should observe
development of cooperative security ties between the rising power and that state. At
the same time, we should observe the continuation of security cooperation between
the secondary states and other states, including its great power patron who is in
strategic competition with the rising power.
o On regional level, it is very likely that we will observe the emergence of a security
cooperation network that embraces the rising power.
o For example, if my theory of hedging is right, we would observe East Asian secondary
states’ pursuit of cooperative security with not only the US, but also with China. Also,

42
we would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network that China
is part of.

Balancing Theories’ Theoretical Expectations on Rising Power in Vicinity
On the other hand, if secondary states are responding to rising power in vicinity as diverse variants of
balancing theories (e.g., balance-of-power and balance-of-threat) predict, we should observe following.
- General Form: Secondary states will align with other states against a rising power (Waltz 1979).
- Conditions Favoring Balancing:
- Secondary states are more likely to balance against rising power in close geographic proximity
from them (Walt 1987).
- Secondary states are more likely to balance against rising power that do not share social identity
with them (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Hass 2005).
- Secondary states are more likely to balance against a rising power when alignment with a great
power patron is an available option for them (Labs 1992).
- Secondary states are more likely to balance against a rising power when they have existing
treaty alliances with a great power patron (in strategic competition with rising power) and/or
when they have major/minor security dispute with the rising power (Lim and Cooper 2015).
- Expected Behavioral Pattern:
- Secondary states will join a balancing coalition-led by a friendly powerful state in distant (Walt
1987; Selden 2013).
o On a dyadic level, we should not expect to see any development of security ties
between the rising power and that state. Also, we will observe a tight alignment with
its great power patron against the ascendant power.

43
o On a regional level, we should observe a security cooperation network that the rising
power appears as an isolate and emergence of balancing coalition against rising power.
o For instance, if balancing theory is correct, we should not expect to see any
development of security ties between rising China and East Asian countries, while the
regional countries’ security cooperation with the US expands. Also, we expect to see
East Asian countries joining a balancing coalition-led by the US aimed at rising China.

44

Chapter 3.

Indicators of Security Cooperation: Joint Military Exercise as
Goldilocks’ Signal

“[A]ll forms of alignment share the property of being cooperative security endeavours.”

– Thomas S. Wilkins
142

“Limited alignments…typically include…joint training exercises…nonaligned [secondary states]
may exchange defense delegations from time to time, and it may share some information with a
great power, but it does not engage in serious joint exercises or training…”
– John D. Ciorciari
143

“[P]articipating in joint exercises and cooperative training programs” is one of the “significant
indicators of the potential costs the second-tier state is willing to bear as part of building a security
relationship with [a great power].”
– Zachary Selden
144

Then, what are the observable indicators of secondary states’ balancing or hedging behaviors?
Simply put, how do we know whether secondary states are aligning against the rising power in vicinity
or pursuing cooperative ties with rising power, as well as other states including its great power patron?
To have a better understanding of their strategic choices, this dissertation examines alignment or
security cooperation pattern. Here, I define alignment as formal or informal forms of cooperative
security ties that exist between two or more sovereign states.
145
According to Glenn H. Snyder, “Any
interaction between states, friendly or hostile, no matter how minor, may create expectations and
feelings of alignment or opposition or both.”
146
Thomas S. Wilkins writes that “all forms of alignment

142
Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’,” 59.
143
Ciorciari, Limits of Alignment, 8.
144
Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With?,” 342-343.
145
Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 86.
146
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 2.

45
share the property of being cooperative security endeavours.”
147
Then, what are the indicators of
alignment or security cooperation between states in IR?

Traditionally Favored Metrics of Security Cooperation: Alliance Ties
Traditionally favored metric has been military alliances.
148
However, as Snyder notes, “[f]ormal
alliances are simply one of the behavioural means to create or strengthen alignment. Thus, alliances
are subset of alignments – those that arise from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in
the form of a treaty.”
149
Maoz et al. also points out that alliance ties are “a key indicator of shared
strategic interests. But alliance ties between states tell only part of the story of strategic affinity.”
150

Contemporary security environment is characterized by multiple forms of alignment or
cooperative security ties, not just alliances.
151
The indicators of security cooperation short of formal
alliances include joint military exercises, military education exchanges, signing of strategic partnerships
and the General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA), naval port calls,
establishment of military communication hotlines, high-level official exchanges, arms sales, and
military aid (Table 1).
152
Hence, for a better understanding of interstate relations in the security

147
Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’,” 59.
148
Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies,” 207-233; Michael F. Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Choosing Sides in
Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 23, no. 1 (March 1979): 87-112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600275.
149
Snyder, Alliance Politics, 8.
150
Zeev Maoz, Ranan D. Kuperman, Lesley Terris, “Structural Equivalence and International Conflict,” 667.
151
Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’,” 53-76; Colleen Chidley, “Towards a Framework of Alignment in International
Relations,” Politikon 41, no. 1 (February 2014): 141-157, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2014.885682.
152
See Brandon J. Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network,”
International Organization 72, no. 4 (Fall 2018): 799-837, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000218; Scott W. Harold,
Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, The
Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific, Research
Report Series (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2019), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR3125; On strategic
partnerships, see H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, “Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional Security
Governance.” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1, Special Issue: Regional Perspectives on America’s Changing Asia-Pacific
Alliances and Partnerships (January 2016): 87-105, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12241; Zhongping Feng and Huang
Jing, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a Changing World,” ESPO Working Paper, no. 8
(European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, June 2014): 1-20, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2459948; Georg Stru
̈ver, “China’s Partnership Diplomacy: International Alignment Based on Interests of Ideology,” Chinese Journal of
International Politics 10, no.1 (Spring 2017): 31-65, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow015; Jiun Bang, “Why So Many
Layers? China’s “State-Speak” and Its Classification of Partnerships,” Foreign Policy Analysis 13, no. 2 (April 2017): 380-

46
dimension today, there is a dire need for broadening our conceptions and understanding of the
phenomenon of security cooperation as a whole, “rather than confining our attention to the
increasingly outmoded formal military alliance pact.”
153

Table 1 Indicators of Alignment or Cooperative Security Ties
Multiple Forms of Security Cooperation in Contemporary Security Environment
Alliances
Joint Military Exercises
Strategic Partnerships
Military Education Exchanges
Naval Port Calls
Intelligence Sharing (General Security of Military Information Agreements)
Establishment of Military Communication Hotlines
High-Level Official Exchanges
Arms Sales
Military Aid

Especially, alliance ties seem to provide insufficient information on how East Asian countries
are coping with its powerful neighbor China. Focusing solely on static alliances ties could lead to
misleading conclusions that there is no evolution of security ties in the region over time. Seen through
the lens of formal alliances, there are no variations in alignment pattern in East Asia since the end of
World War II, and the hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances led by the US seems to be the
archetype of security cooperation in the region. To elaborate, after establishing bilateral alliance ties

397, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw063; Jong Yoon Doh, Dongbanjagwangye(Partnership) oegyoyeongu: hanguk-EU, hanguk-
reosia, hanguk-jungguk munseoreul jungsimeuro [A Study of Partnerships in International Relations: Interpretation on
Diplomatic Documents between S. Korea and EU, Russia, and China], Jejupyeonghwayeonguwon yeongusaeopbogoseo
[Jeju Peace Institute Research Project Report], no. 3 (South Korea: Jeju Peace Institute, 2016), 1-35,
http://jpi.or.kr/?attachment_id=75&dispatch=pages.view; Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 1-255; On regional
institutions, see Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum -
Asian Security Studies (Milton, U.K. and New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2010); Andrew Yeo, Asia’s Regional Architecture:
Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century (California: Stanford University Press, 2019); Ann Marie Murphy, “US Joins
East Asia Summit: Implications for Regional Cooperation: An Interview with Ann Marie Murphy,” by Alan Burns
(National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), November 17, 2011), https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s-joins-east-asia-
summit-implications-for-regional-cooperation/; Rosemary Foot, “The Role of East Asian Regional Organizations in
Regional Governance: Constraints and Contributions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 7, 2011,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/07/role-of-east-asian-regional-organizations-in-regional-governance-
constraints-and-contributions-pub-44420#KeohaneNye.
153
Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’,” 54.

47
with the US at the end of the WWII, neither the existing US allies in the region terminated the alliance
treaties with the US – Japan (1951-), the Philippines (1951-), Australia (1951-), South Korea (1953-),
Thailand (1954-) – nor signed new alliance pact with other countries. Still the junior allies (the “spokes”
or the “client”) do not have security ties with any other country except for the US (the “hub” or the
“great power patron”), and they are indirectly connected to each other through the hub.
154

It poses a stark contrast to the expansion of alliance ties in Europe over time. Since its creation
in 1949 with twelve founding member states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) –
military alliance in Europe led by the US – continuously added new members, and it is a multilateral
alliance with thirty member states today.
155
Just “[b]etween 2001 and 2009, nine eastern European
states sought and obtained membership in NATO, an institution defined by its explicit American
security guarantee. Georgia, several Balkan states, and Ukraine…continue to seek NATO
membership…”
156
The member states that officially joined NATO most recently are Motenegro (June
5, 2017) and North Macedonia (March 27, 2020). In this sense, alliance ties may provide insights on
security dynamics in Europe (e.g., how European countries are responding to its powerful neighbor
Russia), but less so for the case of East Asia due to its invariance (Figure 4).

154
This spurred academic debates among IR scholars on why we don’t observe security cooperation patterns beyond
bilateral asymmetrical alliances led by the US. See Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?,” 575-
607; Acharya, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?”; Cha, “Powerplay,” 158-196; He and Feng, “‘Why is there no NATO
in Asia?’” 227-250; Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon,” 9-43; Izumikawa, “Network Connections and the
Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia,” 7-50.
155
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), What Is NATO?, https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html.
156
Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With?,” 335.

48

Figure 4 Alliance Ties in Asia-Pacific and Europe
157158

Some scholars argue that the absence of formation of new alliances in East Asia despite the
rise of China is the ipso facto evidence that the regional countries do not wish to balance against its
rise. For example, Jackson writes that “While Cold War era alliances have endured, no new alliances
have appeared, and none are on the horizon. This is precisely what we would expect in a region where
states seek to avoid the appearance of balancing…” It is because “Alliances represent the strongest
form of commitment that one state can make to another, and are almost always initiated as an external

157
It is based on COW Formal Alliance Dataset. See Douglas Gibler, Formal Alliances (v4.1) Dataset, 2009. Distributed by
The Correlates of War Project Website. https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances.
158
The slight decline in 1986 is due to ANZUS treaty. In 1951, Australia, New Zealand, United States, these three
countries signed a collective security agreement. However, the treaty turned into a bilateral treaty between the US and
Australia in 1986. In response to Wellington’s declaration of New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone and its refusal to allow
U.S. nuclear-powered submarines to visit its ports, the US suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand. For
more information on the history of ANZUS treaty, see the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, U.S.
Department of State. The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Alliance ties in Asia−Pacific and Europe
Y ear
Number of the alliances ties
1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
Asia−Pacific
Europe

49
balancing coalition against a commonly shared threat…”
159
On the other hand, Liff argues that
concluding that East Asian secondary states are not externally balancing against Beijing based on the
absence of new formal mutual defense pacts in the region is inappropriate. Not only because many of
the secondary states in the region are longstanding US treaty allies (thus, no need to make new
alliances), but also “singular reliance on such a high evidentiary threshold leads one to overlook
substantial and accelerating efforts of both US allies and non-allies to deepen practical defense
cooperation, interoperability, and other military ties with the United States and with one another
through measures short of signing conspicuous new treaty alliances.”
160

Here, I share my view with the latter’s contention, but for different reason. The existing IR
literature and pundits have considered other forms of security cooperation short of formal treaties as
“symbolic rather than substantive in nature”
161
and “cheap talks” because the costs associated with
entry and exit are insignificant.
162
In this chapter, I argue that joint military exercise is a costly signal
of cooperation and trust-building between states that we need to pay more attention to.

For Better Understanding of Security Cooperation Pattern: Joint Military Exercises
In this dissertation, I shed light on joint military exercises (JMEs). JMEs is an important
indicator of for assessing the degree of security cooperation between states due to four reasons. First,
JMEs is a Goldilocks’ signal for cooperation. Second, iterated practices of JMEs indicate strong will
for continued cooperation between states. Third, face-to-face interaction during JMEs indicate
commitment to trust-building. Fourth, JMEs is a long-standing phenomenon of security cooperation.

159
Jackson, “Power, trust, and network complexity,” 337.
160
Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 434.
161
Stru ̈ver, “China’s Partnership Diplomacy,” 36.
162
Anit Mukherjee, “ADMM-Plus: Talk Shop or Key to Asia-Pacific Security?,” The Diplomat, August 22, 2013,
https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/admm-plus-talk-shop-or-key-to-asia-pacific-security/; Murphy, interview.

50
#1 Goldilocks’ Signal for Cooperation: Just Costly Enough to be Credible

I postulate joint military exercise as a costly signal that reveal credible information on a state’s
actual willingness and ability to cooperate with the other participant state of the exercise. To elaborate,
this is a costly signal in reassurance context, where states communicate its shared security interests
with the other participant of the exercise via cooperative military policies.
163
The goal of reassurance
signal is to “demonstrate that one is moderate, not out to get the other side, willing to live and let live,
preferring to reciprocate cooperation.”
164
As Gartzke, Carcelli, Gannon, and Zhang note, “[a]lthough
signaling can help achieve international cooperation by changing the payoffs by unlocking potentially
unrealized gains, this type of signaling is less studied by political scientists” and “[t]raditionally,
signaling in international relations is studied in the context of conflictual foreign policy.”
165
Defining
costly supportive signals as the signals intended to promote friendly relations with the other
government, Clayton L. Thyne notes cooperative military ties as an example.
166
I identify joint military
exercise as a form of costly supportive signal that states use to reveal their shared security interests.
Different from cheap talk and bluffing, costly signal is rendered credible in international relations,
because it creates costs and risks that the states who are not committed for the action (in this context,
military cooperation) are unwilling to suffer. Especially, JME is a Goldilocks’ signal for revealing the
preference for cooperation and reassurance. While formation of new alliances may be too costly for
that purpose, and mere public statements of support are costless, joint military exercises are just costly
enough to be credible. The cost of participating in a joint military exercise is quite high for countries,
in terms of actual financial cost and diplomatic cost. For instance, if a state A conducts a joint maritime
exercise with state B, state A is committing to bear not only the financial cost of fueling the ship and

163
Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 325-357; Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 50-90; Kydd, “Sheep in
Sheep’s clothing,” 114-155.
164
Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 187.
165
Gartzke, Carcelli, Gannon, and Zhang, “Signaling in Foreign Policy,” 7.
166
Thyne, “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences,” 939.

51
mobilizing its navy, but also the diplomatic cost of risking the relations with state C, who is in strategic
rivalry with state B.
167
The same exercise may be costlier for smaller countries with limited economic
or military capacity. The financial cost of joint military exercises is a military secret, so the exact cost
of each exercise is not publicly available. Yet, we can adduce former US Admiral’s words, “you really
have to consider it not just from the standpoint of the US [great power]…But we have to keep in
mind that for some countries [like secondary states], the cost of an exercise can be a fairly significant
part of their budget.”
168

Here, I share my view with several recent studies that claim that joint military exercise is a form
of ‘limited,’ ‘moderate,’ or ‘soft’ security alignment between secondary states and a great power.
Although there are slightly divergent views on the strength of the alignment that can be inferred from
joint military exercises, scholars appear to all agree that joint military exercise is an important indicator
of secondary states’ relations with great powers in security spheres. For instance, Ciorciari identifies
joint military exercises as a form of limited alignment between states. Secondary states’ alignment
options with a great power vary from tight alliances, limited alignments, to no significant security ties
at all (i.e., genuine nonalignment). In the words of Ciorciari, “Limited alignments entail lower
commitment and a less binding security relationship [comparing to formal alliances]. They typically
include arrangements for preferential arms sales, joint training exercises, and other forms of military
aid.” He posits that while genuinely nonaligned secondary states “may exchange defense delegations
from time to time, and it may share some information with a great power, but it does not engage in
serious joint exercises or training, and it usually does not grant great powers access to defense facilities,
even on a commercial basis.”
169

167
For example, see Bernhardt and Sukin, “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula,” 855-
888; Bumiller and Wong, “China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea Drills”; Taylor, “North Korea slams U.S.-South Korea military
drills.”
168
Roughead, interview.
169
Ciorciari, Limits of Alignment, 8.

52
In a similar vein, Lim and Cooper classify “routine joint training, exercises, or combat operations”
as a “moderate alignment” signal that reveal secondary states’ shared security interests with great
powers. They write, “Public statements of support for security policies are the weakest alignment
signal…A stronger signal is sent by joint training, exercises, or combat operations...”
170
Selden also
writes that “participating in joint exercises and cooperative training programs” is one of the
“significant indicators of the potential costs the second-tier state is willing to bear as part of building
a security relationship with [a great power]. Participation in joint exercises and training programs may
appear to be a minimal commitment, but it often involves the temporary placement of [a great power’s]
armed forces in the country, a move that sends a signal to regional powers. More significantly, those
exercises and training programs are explicitly designed to make the military of the second-tier state
more interoperable with [a great power’s] armed forces so that it can participate in future operations.
Thus, it is an important first step that a secondary state can take to demonstrate its potential utility as
a security partner to [a great power.]”
171

# 2 Iterated Practices of JMEs Indicate Strong Will for Cooperation
Joint military exercises may take place as a one-time event, but also it can be conducted on a
regular basis – annually, biannually, or triennially. However, a regularized and iterated practices of joint
military exercises is possible only if there is a strong will for continuing the cooperation between the
participant states. It is because while “alliances represent contractual governance in its formal nature
and legalized enforcement mechanisms” other security partnerships such as joint military exercises
“are akin to relational governance and its informal structure and self-enforcement as founded on social

170
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 704-705.
171
Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing with?,” 342-343.

53
elements such as trust.”
172
Thus, a regularized and iterated practices of joint military exercises between
states is the evidence of strong will for continued cooperation.
Furthermore, iterated practices of military cooperation create a virtuous cycle of developing
the habits of cooperation and nonviolent diplomacy as self-evident way to solving conflict of interests
between the participant states. Cha notes that “iterated practices [of interstate cooperation] can help
to forge and maintain stability by regularizing contact, building trust, and making nonviolent
diplomacy seem like the unquestionable, self-evident way of handling disputes.”
173
Vincent Pouliot
adds that “peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy
the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes.”
174
Geoffrey Till writes that “the habit of
cooperation which develop when they perform these tasks [joint naval operations], increase
transparency between them [navies] and so act in effect as confidence building measures.”
175
To say,
repeated interaction between militaries along contested land and maritime borders can have the effect
of de-escalating any potential crises “by not assuming the worst of intentions in one another” but
cooperating “to find a mutual solution.”
176

# 3 Face-to-Face Interaction Through JMEs: Commitment to Trust-Building
Conducting joint military exercises, which entails face-to-face interaction between militaries,
indicate strong commitment to trust-building between states. The traditional concept of security,
which was dominant throughout the Cold War period, purely focused on the ability of states to defend

172
Bang, “Why So Many Layers?,” 392.
173
Victor D. Cha, “American Alliances and Asia’s Regional Architecture,” in The Oxford Handbook of the International
Relations of Asia, eds. Saddia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (New York: Oxford University Press,
2014), 738-753, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0038.
174
Vincent Pouliot, “The logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of security Communities,” International Organization
62, no. 2 (April 2008): 259, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080090.
175
Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making? (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies: Routledge, 2012), 206.
176
Kyle Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight: How Major Powers Use Multinational Military Exercises to Manage Strategic
Uncertainty” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2018), 27.

54
against external military threats. However, an alternative approach to security, also known as
cooperative security, that is increasingly crucial in the post-Cold War era is geared toward intramural
trust-building and conflict avoidance,
177
and “the development of a region-wide understanding of the
mutuality of security based on mutual reassurance rather than deterrence.”
178
According to Nicholas
J. Wheeler, the process of face-to-face interaction enables even rational egoists or enemies to “see the
‘human’ in their counterpart’s attitudes and behaviour, rather than just a representative of cold state
interests” and generate bonding trust between the parties.
179

Along this line, Wolfley writes that non-traditional exercises that focus on humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping can lead to trust-building between countries with
hostility or conflicting interests. Through these exercises, states “are able to overcome the assumption
that all military behavior from a rival is hostile; by not assuming the worst, officers and soldiers may
be able to manage small crises and prevent escalation into open war.”
180
In an interview, a retired
Indian Army Major General Dipankar Banerjee said interpersonal bonding during joint military
exercises often remove “a sense of enmity and remoteness” even between adversarial states by
providing a “human face,” and prevent soldiers from “demonizing” one another.
181

Moreover, joint military exercises foster trust-building, not only at the time of the exercise, but
also before and after the event. It is because exercise planning processes sometimes begin months or
years in advance and networking among the exercise participants continues afterwards. In an interview,

177
David Dewitt, “Common, comprehensive, and cooperative security,” Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994): 1-15,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749408719067; Amitav Acharya, “Chapter 1. Regional Institutions and Security in the
Asia-Pacific: Evolution, Adaptation, and Prospects for Transformation,” in Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation, eds. Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 23;
Ralf Emmers, “Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices,” In Asia-Pacific Security
Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, eds. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 3-
18.
178
Craig A. Snyder, “Chapter 5: Regional Security Structures,” in Contemporary Security and Strategy, ed. Craig. A Snyder
(United States of America: Routledge, 1999), 114.
179
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2018) 62.
180
Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight,” 225.
181
Ibid., 240-241.

55
former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead said “[a]ll too often we focus on the
exercise proper, when the ships get together at sea and you do various evolutions. But these exercise
are really months in the planning and the activities that take place between the planners from the
United States and the other country of other countries really begin to develop relationships that are
lasting that they are there to be used or to be reenergized for example if there’s a disaster that strikes
the region it is not uncommon, for example, when we have an event an earthquake or tsunami or a
typhoon and we know that we’re going to be working with the other countries, the first place we go
to is your contact list of the planners that you’ve worked with on other exercises. So, the value of
these exercises that we run are significant and they’re very, very valuable and again not just the exercise
itself but the planning process, the discussions that take place, the relationships that build, really
important for our role in the region and they contribute greatly to the security of the region.”
182

# 4 Long-Standing Phenomenon of Security Cooperation: Trace Changes Overtime
Finally, joint military exercises are long-standing practices of security cooperation. One of the
reasons why alliances are widely studied in IR is because alliance data are available for a long period
of time for many countries.
183
Since 1990s, the number of the countries participating in joint military
exercises have proliferated around the world and about 180 countries take part in exercise today.
184

Also, comparing to other security cooperation activities, joint military exercise is a long-standing
phenomenon. While naval port calls and signing of information-sharing agreements between states
are relatively a recent phenomenon, joint military exercise often dates to when the alliances were first

182
Roughead, interview.
183
Brett Leeds, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara Mitchell, and Andrew Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provision, 1815-1944,”
International Interactions 28, no. 3 (2002): 237-260, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620213653; Gibler, Formal Alliances
(v4.1) Dataset, 2009.
184
Jordan Bernhardt, “The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises,” (PhD diss., Stanford University,
2020), 5; Kyle J. Wolfley, “Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics,” Foreign Policy
Analysis 17, no. 2 (April 2021): 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa022.

56
created. I believe that the long history of joint military exercises allows us to trace the changes in
security ties between states over time.
Historically, China has eschewed building cooperative security ties with other countries. China
still abstains from signing formal alliance treaties with other countries,
185
but over the years, Beijing has
relaxed its long-held position of ‘non-alignment’ in security realm.
186
According to David Shambaugh,
“A particularly important departure is China’s new willingness to engage in bilateral [and multilateral]
military exercises, breaking its a half-century, self-imposed prohibition on such efforts.”
187
However,
it takes two to tango to make a “joint” military exercise. Now the question is: Is the signal being
reciprocated by its East Asian neighbors?

185
Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy; Cho, “21segi junggugui dongmaeng jeongchaeg [China’s alignment
policy in the 21
st
century],” 1-40; Hong, “Dongmaengjeongchaege daehan jungguk hakgyeui insikdamron gochal [A
Consideration on Chinese Intellectuals’ Discussions on Alliance],” 39-68.
186
“Should China abandon non-alignment,” People’s Daily, November 4, 2012, http://en.people.cn/90883/8003975.html
187
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 87.

57

Chapter 4.

China’s Rise and Security Cooperation Pattern in East Asia: Joint
Military Exercise Ties and Network Analysis

“The range and direction of pathways…available to states in their interactions with one another may
alter, contingent on the interplay between historical context and human choices…within a given
context and at certain points in time, when a state chooses a particular pathway in its relationship with
another state, access to some roads may close for a time, but entry to others may open.”
– Vidya Nadkarni
188

“New members can join a network, and people can leave it. Within a given network, links can be
added or deleted, and the nature of relationships can change...”
– Thomas W. Valente
189

Critique on Existing Studies on Joint Military Exercises in East Asia
Despite the prevalence of joint military exercises and its importance for understanding security
cooperation dynamics in East Asia over time, surprisingly, there is a dearth of systematic data and
analyses on it. To elaborate, the limitations of existing studies are largely twofold. First, lack of
systematic data. The review of three existing datasets on JME that are publicly available reveal several
flaws in terms of ‘timeframe’, ‘exercise type coverage’, and ‘country coverage.’ Second, the problem
of the selective use of evidence (i.e., cherry picking fallacy) prevalent in the existing realist literature.

188
Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 22.
189
Thomas W. Valente, Social Networks and Health: Models, Methods, and Applications (1
st
Edition) (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 12.

58
Data: Lack of Systematic JME Dataset
Vito D’Orazio’s Dataset
Vito D’Orazio’s dataset purports to record JMEs that occurred around the world from 1970 to
2010 (1,790 exercises).
190
D’Orazio’s dataset is valuable due to its wide country coverage, but it does
not have data on recent ten years (2011-2019) when JMEs increased substantially in East Asia. Also,
the dataset misses some key exercises that did occur, have duplicate entries for some exercise, and
contains exercises that did not take place.

Kyle Wolfley’s Dataset
Kyle Wolfley’s dataset, which borrows most of the observations from D’Orazio’s dataset, includes
only “ground-based exercises between at least one major power and another state” from 1980 to 2016
and excludes air defense and naval exercises from the dataset citing two methodological reasons.
191

However, I believe that excluding these types of exercises would bias the result and lead to
misleading conclusions on security cooperation patterns in East Asia due to three major reasons. First,
the capabilities of navies and air forces in East Asia have increased in an unprecedented fashion in the
twenty-first century through military modernization. Today, air defense and maritime security are key
arenas where the countries in the region are coordinating doctrines and carrying out cooperative
missions. Secondly, maritime security cooperation has huge implications for security relations in East
Asia, not only because these countries share sea lanes of commerce (SLOC), but also because many
of the maritime boundaries in the region remain unsettled and some countries have overlapping claims
over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and islands in the waters. Thirdly, Wolfley’s dataset excludes
computer-simulated exercises based on the ground that these exercises are “far cheaper and easier to

190
Vito D’Orazio, Joint Military Exercises: 1970-2010 Dataset (jme_v3-6), 2013, distributed by Vito D’Orazio’s personal
website, https://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html.
191
Wolfley, “Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics,” 12.

59
administer.” In terms of financial cost, indeed, these exercises might be cheaper than field training
exercises, but these exercises shouldn’t be discounted given its significance. With the development of
technology, increasingly militaries in the region are employing computer-simulated exercises, even for
wargaming. For example, Key Resolve exercise is an annual computer-simulated war game between South
Korea and the US that focuses on “the allies’ contingency plans against North Korean aggression.”
192

Recently, in 2018, Chinese and Southeast Asian navies have staged computer-simulated maritime drill
and worked on search-and-rescue scenarios following a mock ship collision in the South China Sea.

Kenneth Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John Chen’s Dataset
Kenneth Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John Chen’s dataset on Chinese Military Diplomacy
records joint military exercises that China participated worldwide from 2003 to 2016 (around 357
exercises),
193
but misses some exercises between China and the Asia-Pacific countries. To name a few,
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Search-and-Rescue exercise with South Korean navy in 2005, 2007,
2008, and 2011 and two joint counter-terrorism exercises with Vietnam in 2016. Also, the dataset has
limitations when addressing the question of how the overall structure of the security cooperation
network changed over time, because it neither contains data points on ‘the JMEs between the United
States and Asian countries’ nor ‘the JMEs between smaller Asian countries.’

Analyses: Selective Use of Evidence and Hasty Generalization
Limitations in existing empirical works that examine joint military exercises in East Asia is that
often these studies review only secondary states’ joint military exercises with the US. This raises the
problem of the selective use of evidence (i.e., cherry picking fallacy) in these studies and reasonable

192
U.S. Forces Korea, “Key Resolve’ begins in Korea,” U.S. Army, March 10, 2009,
https://www.army.mil/article/18017/key_resolve_begins_in_korea.
193
Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016,” 1-81.

60
doubts on their conclusions. For example, Adam P. Liff identifies East Asian secondary states “joint
exercises and training” as a “Waltzian categories of…external balancing” behavior. In his empirics,
Liff examines East Asian secondary states’ defense cooperation with the US primarily and comes
down to the conclusion that “China’s rise is eliciting from key neighbors significant and accelerating
balancing behavior.”
194
However, without providing equivalent analysis on East Asian secondary states’
joint military exercise with rising China – without telling the other half side of the story – it may be
premature to conclude that regional countries are balancing against China.
Moreover, often existing studies make assessment on East Asian secondary states’ response
to rising China based on a snapshot of the relationship, rather than the trend over time. For instance,
in their analysis of security alignment behavior of East Asian secondary states from 2011 to 2014, Lim
and Cooper find that Singapore is the only state that conducts joint training and exercises with both
the US and China. Based on the observation, they write “fewer states are truly hedging” in the region
and “balancing has actually been the dominant response to China’s rise.”
195
Yet, assessing secondary
states’ behavior in a snapshot has the peril of running into a hasty generalization that states are
balancing or hedging against rising China based on only the fraction of their interstate dynamic. As
Steven Chan points out, what matters is the overall trajectory: “If East Asian states have been reacting
to China’s rise according to realist expectations, one would expect their overtime behavior to move
increasingly toward the balancing end of this continuum. It is important to emphasize that while
isolated observations such as annual readings of defense spending or trade statistics can be faulty, the
overtime trend offers a more reliable indicator – especially if it points consistently in the same direction
and for many countries.”
196

194
Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 438.
195
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 696-727.
196
Steven Chan, “An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing: East Asian States’ Reaction to China’s Rise,”
International Studies Review 12, no. 3 (September 2010): 387-412, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40931114.

61
Introducing New Dataset: Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019)

With the aim of systematically examining the evolution of security ties over time, in my research,
I constructed a unique dataset of joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific from 1970 to 2019 (1,447
exercises). There is no clear-cut definition of “Asia-Pacific” or “East Asia,” but often the former has
greater regional scope condition than the latter. Here, I define Asia-Pacific as a region that includes
East Asia (i.e., Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia), the US, and Oceania.
For data collection, I primarily employed web-scraping of news articles that took place in the last
twenty years (2000-2019). Using the search engine ProQuest, I ran keyword (keyword: joint military
exercise) on worldwide and major newspapers in the Asia-Pacific in English such as Washington Post,
New York Times, Japan News, Korea Times, China Daily, People’s Daily, Strait Times, South China Morning Post,
and Diplomat. All the newspaper articles that contained keywords have been extracted and human
coded. For earlier timeframes (1970-1999), I compiled and addressed the limitations of existing three
datasets by Vito D’Orazio, Kyle Wolfley, and Kenneth Allen et al.
My joint military exercises dataset records bilateral and multilateral JMEs between 11 countries in
the Asia-Pacific – United States (USA), China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Japan (JPN), Philippines
(PHL), Thailand (THA), Vietnam (VNM), Indonesia (IDN), Malaysia (MYS), Singapore (SGP), and
Australia (AUS). To clarify, the dataset contains information of the JMEs that the US or/and China
conducted with the Asia-Pacific countries (e.g., US-South Korea joint military exercises or China-
Thailand joint military exercises), but also all the JMEs among small countries in the region (e.g.,
Philippines-Indonesia joint military exercises or Philippines-Indonesia-Thailand joint military
exercises). The countries included in my dataset are marked in green on the map below (Figure 5).

62

Figure 5 Coverage of JME Dataset of Asia-Pacific 1970-2019

The types of exercises included in the dataset ranges from combat exercise, search-and-rescue,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterterrorism, and anti-piracy. The dataset does not
include the exercises where these countries only participated as an observer. It is based on the exercises
in which these countries have participated by dispatching military personnel and/or military assets.
The data contains both binary and valued information of JME ties between states. It records the
presence or absence of ties, as well as how frequently they conduct exercise with one another.
I have set the timeframe to start from the 1970s, because this is when many of regional countries
started to normalize their diplomatic relations under global détente. I believe that diplomatic
normalization is the prerequisite condition for any type of interstate cooperation to take place.

63
Case Selection Justification and Theoretical Expectations on JMEs in the Asia-Pacific
Then, are East Asian countries balancers or hedgers? What do we expect to observe in the region?
If balancing theory is correct, we should not expect to see any joint military exercise between rising
China and East Asian countries. At the same time, we will observe the expansion of the regional
countries’ joint exercises with the US. Also, we are likely to observe East Asian countries’ joining
balancing coalition-led by the US to counter the rise of China.
On the other hand, if my theory of hedging is right and regional countries aim to maximize
strategic autonomy by diversifying cooperative security ties, we would observe East Asian secondary
states’ joint military exercise with China, and as well as other countries, including the US. Also, we
would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network that embraces China, rather
than isolating it.
The nine secondary states (i.e., non-great powers, states other than the US or China in this case)
included in my dataset are most-likely cases for balancing theory, considering the close geographical
proximity to China, presence of the US as a great power patron, ongoing territorial or maritime border
disputes with China, and ideological distances (Table 2). If balancing theory is correct, we should not
expect to see any joint military exercise between rising China and East Asian countries. At the same
time, we will observe the expansion of the regional countries’ joint exercises with the US. Also, we are
likely to observe East Asian countries’ joining balancing coalition-led by the US to counter the rise of
China. In other words, these are least-likely cases for my hedging theory. Hence, despite the presence
of factors that are identified as favoring conditions of balancing behavior, if we observe hedging
behaviors, it will be strong evidence that hedging is much more pervasive and preferred strategy of
East Asian secondary states than balancing. If my theory of hedging is right and regional countries
aim to maximize strategic autonomy by diversifying cooperative security ties, we would observe East
Asian secondary states’ joint military exercise with China, and as well as other countries, including the

64
US. Also, we would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network that embraces
China, rather than isolating it.
Table 2 Most Likely Cases for Balancing (i.e., Least Likely Cases for Hedging)
Country Relationship with the US
197
Territorial/Maritime
Disputes with China
Ideological Distance
with China
198

(max. 20, min. 0)
South Korea
(Northeast Asia)
Formal Alliance
(1953-present)
Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) in Yellow Sea,
Socotra Rock
15
Japan
(Northeast Asia)
Formal Alliance
(1951-present)
EEZ in East China Sea,
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
17
Philippines
(Southeast Asia)
Formal Alliance
(1951-present)
South China Sea,
Scarborough Shoal, Spratly
Islands
15
Thailand
(Southeast Asia)
Formal Alliance
(1954-present)
8
Vietnam
(Southeast Asia)
Comprehensive Partnership
(2013-present)
199

South China Sea, Spratly
Islands, and Paracel Islands
0
Indonesia
(Southeast Asia)
Strategic Partnership
(2015-present)
200

16
Malaysia
(Southeast Asia)
Comprehensive Partnership
(2014-present)
201

South China Sea, Spratly
Islands
13
Singapore
(Southeast Asia)
Strategic Partnership
(2005-present)
202

5
Australia
(Oceania)
Formal Alliance
(1951-present)
17

197
Designation as major non-NATO allies of the US (i.e., MENA status): In 1987, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. In
2003, Philippines and Thailand.
198
The ideological distance between the country (listed in the first column) and China was computed using the “polity2”
variable in “Polity 5: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018” data by Monty G. Marshall and Teb
Robert Gurr. The distance here is the average polity score distance between the dyad in 2010-2018. It ranges between 0
to 20. The bigger distance means that there is a greater ideological distance or regime type difference between the
country and China. For example, it means that there is a greater difference in China-Thailand (8) dyad than China-
Philippines dyad (15). See Monty G. Marshall and Teb Robert Gurr, Polity 5 Project, Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2018 Dataset, 2018, distributed by Center for Systemic Peace website,
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
199
In August 2021, during her visit to Vietnam, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris offered Hanoi to elevate the US-
Vietnam relationship to a “strategic partnership,” but she failed to get agreement from her hosts. See Gregory B. Poling
and Simon Tran Hudes, “The U.S.-Vietnam Partnership in a Complex World,” Center for Strategic & International Studies
(CSIS), May 5, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-vietnam-partnership-complex-world.
200
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Indonesia: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, April 19, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-indonesia/.
201
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Malaysia: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, April 19, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-malaysia/.
202
Congressional Research Service, US-Singapore Relations, April 7, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10228.pdf.

65
Empirical Analyses: Joint Military Exercise Pattern of the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019)

Then, what does joint military exercise data tell us about East Asian security? A careful
examination of joint military exercises in the region suggests that East Asian countries that would be
‘most likely’ to balance against China – junior allies and strategic partners of the US, states with major
territorial conflicts with China, and democracies – have expanded security cooperation with Beijing
over the last twenty years.
In the following section, using descriptive statistics and network analysis, I provide substantive
evidence that 1) East Asian countries conduct joint military exercises not only with the US but also
with China after the 2000s; 2) the regional security cooperation network has evolved to a structure
that embraces China, rather than forming an isolated bloc against it. Overall, the joint military exercise
network of the region has moved away from a highly centralized and sparse connected hub-and-
spokes structure over time. Gradually, the network evolved to a densely connected, less centralized,
and inclusive multi-nodal meshed network structure as the regional countries diversify their security
ties.

66
Evidence 1: Dyadic Analysis – Descriptive Statistics

#1 East Asia’s Increasing JME with China after the 2000s

Figure 6 China’s JMEs with the East Asian countries over time (by decade)

In the Figure 6, the red line refers to the number of the joint military exercises between China
and nine East Asian countries (South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia) in the past five decades. Up until the 1990s, China had no exercises
with any countries in the region. However, after the 2000s, we observe an upward trend. In the 2000s,
China conducted 20 exercises with the region. From 2010 to 2019, recording approximately 460%
increase from the previous decade, the number of exercises between China and the regional countries
jumped up to 113. This is an enduring and overlooked pattern of security cooperation in East Asia.

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
China's Joint Military Exercises with East Asia (1970-2019)

67
#2 The US Allies and Strategic Partners’ JMEs with China (2000-2019)

Figure 7 China's JME partners in East Asia (2000-2019)

It is worth highlighting that 59% of the exercises between China and regional countries
involved the US allies in the region, such as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand (in blue in the pie chart). Considering that the countries in the non-US ally group, such as
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam (in white color), are also important strategic
partners of the US, China’s expanding cooperation with the region is quite significant (Figure 7).
The result does not include the exercises where these countries only participated as an observer.
It is based on the bilateral and multilateral joint military exercises in which these countries have
participated by dispatching military personnel and/or military assets. Table 3 below shows selected
examples of JMEs recorded in the dataset.

68
Table 3 Military Personnel and/or Military Assets Featured in East Asia’s JME with China
Exercise Participants Military Personnel and/or Assets
2011 South Korea-China
SAREX
South Korea and
China
S. Korean Navy:
4,500-ton Wang Geon destroyer
Chinese Navy: PLA frigate
2012 Blue Strike Thailand and China Royal Thai Navy: 126 military personnel
Chinese Navy: 372 military personnel
2018 ASEAN-China
Joint Maritime Exercise
China and 10 member
states of ASEAN
8 ships, 3 helicopters, and more than 1,200
military personnel
The participating ships:
- China (3): guided missile destroyer
Guangzhou, the guided missile frigate
Huangshan, and the replenishment
ship Junshanhu
- Singapore (1): frigates Stalwart,
- Thailand (1): Taksin
- Vietnam (1): Tran Hung Dao
- Brunei (1): patrol ship Daruttaqwa
- Philippines (1): logistics support ship
BRP Dagupan City
2018 Kakadu Australia, China, and
25 other countries

23 ships and submarines, 21 aircraft, and over
3,000 military personnel
Chinese Navy: PLA frigate Huangshan
2018 Vietnam-China
Border Defense
Friendship Exercise
Vietnam and China Vietnamese Army + Chinese Army: 145
personnel

2019 Japan-China
Friendship Exercise
Japan and China Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force: JMSDF
destroyer JS Samidare
Chinese navy: Chinese destroyer Taiyuan
2019 Exercise
Cooperation
Singapore and China Singapore Armed Forces + Chinese Army:
240 personnel

69
#3 JMEs between East Asian countries and China by Military Branches and Exercise Types

Figure 8 China's JMEs with East Asia by Military Branches (2010-2019)

In terms of the military branches featured in the exercises, 42% of the exercises between China
and regional countries involved joint training of navies and marines (Figure 8). This development is
noteworthy because it came against the backdrop of East Asian countries’ ongoing tension with China
over territories and borders in maritime Asia.

Table 4 Types of Military Operations Featured in China's Exercise with East Asia
Combat/
Combat support
Counter
terrorism
Anti-Piracy Survival Disaster
Relief
Amphibious
Landing
Percentage 20 15.2 5.6 12 42.4 5.6

With respect to the type of exercise, exercises related to Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW) – “operations undertaken by military forces to safeguard their country’s national security
and developmental interests, that do not constitute a war. These include counterterrorism and stability
maintenance, HADR operations, the safeguarding of sovereignty and national interests, safety and
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Special Forces
Air Force
Army
Navy, Marines

70
security operations, international peacekeeping, and international rescue and relief”
203
– were
dominant. According to Wolfley, these types of non-traditional exercises, also known as “shaping
operations,” are carried out with the aim of “chang[ing] perceptions from hostile to friendly to prevent
escalation of inadvertent war” and developing trust.
204
The result suggests that despite the diplomatic
skirmishes, the regional countries have made effort to build trust, reduce uncertainty and risk of
conflict due to miscalculations by working together with Beijing (Table 4).
A closer look at China’s JME partners and the types of exercises raises question on the
argument that “path dependencies” – existing treaty alliances with the United States or major territorial
conflicts with China – limit East Asian secondary states strategic options and “reinforce balancing
behavior rather than hedging.”
205
Rather, the evidence of JMEs suggests that “[t]he range and direction
of pathways available to states in their interactions with one another may alter” over time and it is
“contingent on the interplay between historical context and human choices.”
206

203
Fan Gaoyue and James Char, Introduction to China’s Military Operations Other Than War, Policy Report (Singapore: S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2019), 3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/PR190225_Introduction-to-Chinas-Military-Operations-Other-than-War.pdf.
204
Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight,” 29.
205
Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 696.
206
Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 22.

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Evidence 2: Network Analysis – Node and Network level

To have a better understanding of the changes in security dynamics I visualize the joint military
exercise network of the Asia-Pacific by each decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s) and
compare the security cooperation pattern over time by using social network analysis (SNA). Adopting
the simplest definition, here, I define network as “any set of interconnected nodes.”
207
In JME network,
countries are individual nodes and joint military exercises are ties that connect them.

Why Network Analysis?
I employ network analysis for examination of my JME data largely due to two reasons. First,
network analysis is a methodology appropriate for examining relational data like interstate ties (e.g.,
security ties and economic ties). There are two principal types of data in social science: relational data
and attribute data. According to John Scott, network analysis is apt for examining social phenomenon
that “concern the contacts, ties and connections, and the group attachments and meetings that relate
one agent to another and that cannot be reduced to the properties of the individual agents
themselves.”
208
On the other hand, the methods most appropriate for analyzing attribute data – data
related to the properties, qualities or characteristics that belong to individuals such as income and
material capabilities – are “those of variable and multivariate analysis.”
209

Second, network analysis provides a body of useful measures that help us systematically
examine how central each actor is in network and how has the overall structure of network evolved
over time. In the words of Thomas Valente, “[i]n networks, change occurs at two levels: the individual
and the network. Individuals add and lose connections, and individual indicators of centrality…change

207
Kahler, “Networked Politics,” 5.
208
John Scott, Social Network Analysis: 4
th
Edition (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2017) 4.
209
Ibid.

72
over time. At the network level, the overall network density, centralization, and transitivity (as well as
other indicators) change over time….”
210

IR literature’s attention to and adoption of network analysis is relatively recent, but scholars
appear to concur that it is suitable method for disclosing patterns that are not generally apparent to
human observers in international system, where states are not isolated bubbles but a complex set of
dyadic ties,
211
and useful for going beyond dyadic lens in analyzing international relations.
212

Elements of JME Network and Measuring the Properties
In the following networks, each node is ‘a country in the Asia-Pacific’ and links between nodes
indicate ‘security ties between them.’ Red node refers to China, blue node is the US, and nine East
Asian secondary states are marked in beige color. The security ties indicate the presence (unweighted
network) and frequency (weighted network) of bilateral or multilateral exercise between states. It takes
at least two states (dyad) to make a “joint” military exercise, so all the ties in this network are
undirected.
213
I discuss the changes in the JME network structure (network level) and changes in
position of each country in the network (node level) by decade using the measures listed in Table 5.

210
Valente, Social Networks and Health, 12.
211
Han Dorussen, Erik A. Gartzke, and Oliver Westerwinter, “Networked international politics: Complex
interdependence and the diffusion of conflict and peace,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 3, Special Issue on Networked
International Politics (May 2016): 283-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43920590; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and
Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” 559–592.
212
Paul Poast, “(Mis)Using Dyadic Data to Analyze Multilateral Events,” Political Analysis 18, no.4 (Autumn 2010): 403-
425, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25792022; Skyler J. Cranmer and Bruce A. Desmarais, “A Critique of Dyadic Design.”
International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 2 (June 2016): 355-362. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw007.
213
In undirected graphs, there is no implied directionality. On the other hand, in case of directed ties, there is a
directionality. To say, in directed graphs, A may lead to B, but the reverse may not be true. An example of directed ties in
IR is state visits. In this case, ties refer to the presence or the number of official visits of the chief of state (visitor) to
another country (host).

73
Table 5 Measuring JME Network Properties
Dimension Measure Definition Significance
Node level Eigenvector
Centrality
The extent to which each node is in the
center or the periphery of a network.
High centrality score
means high social
capital a country
possess.
Network level Density The overall level of connectedness in a
network.
High density means
high level of strategic
affinity and trust exist
between countries in
a network.
Centralization The extent to which links are
concentrated among one or few nodes
in a network.

High centralization
means that power and
control is
concentrated on a
single country in a
network.
Inclusiveness The proportion of the total number of
nodes minus the number of isolates.
Isolates refer to nodes that does not have
connection with other nodes in a
network.
214

Perfect inclusiveness
means that every
country has
connection to other
countries in a
network.
Homophily
(Assortativity)
The tendency for nodes to form ties
based on common attributes (e.g.,
alliance membership, regime type).
High homophily
score means that
countries with similar
attributes tend to
conduct JMEs more
often.

214
John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook 2
nd
Edition (London: Sage Publication, 1991), 70.

74
Findings: Security Cooperation Pattern Seen Through the Lens of JME Network
Then, how has the pattern of security cooperation changed over time? Figure 9 is the bird’s
eye view of evolution of joint military exercise network of the Asia-Pacific from 1970-2019. Here, the
JME network is unweighted. The links between country nodes reflect the presence of JME between
them. Circle layout is used to keep each node in same place for the sake of easy comparison across
time.
In this section, by using the network analysis measures listed in Table 6 – centrality, density,
network centralization, inclusiveness, and homophily – I discuss the changes in security cooperation
dynamics in the region over decades in-depth. The bottom line is that the JME network has moved
away from a highly centralized and sparsely connected hub-and-spokes structure over time. Gradually,
the network has evolved to a more inclusive, densely connected, and less centralized structure. The
most noticeable development in the last twenty years, when China’s rise has intensified, is that the
regional network has evolved to a structure that embraces China, rather than forming an isolated bloc
against it.
The finding suggests that the security ties in the region today are no longer demarcated by the
Cold War dynamics. East Asian secondary states are increasingly sending costly signal that they are
willing to live and let live with rising China and they prefer to pursue direct security ties with diverse
countries in the region, rather than relying only on its great power patron US for security protection.
It is because positive relational ties with other states are important social capital that increase state’s
well-being. The logic here is that “nodes that are well-connected in general (high degree or eigenvector
centrality) have more resources to draw upon through their network connection.”
215

215
Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” 568.

75

Figure 9 Bird’s Eye View of Evolution of JME Network of the Asia-Pacific (1970-2019)

76

Table 6 Network Properties of the Asia-Pacific 1970-2019: Node and Network Level

77
1970s JME Network:
High Resemblance to Hub-and-Spokes Structure of Alliances
To elaborate, the joint military exercise networks of the 1970s was highly centralized
(centralization: 0.849)
216
and sparsely connected (density: 0.072). The network structure had high
resemblance to hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in East Asia. The US allies in East Asia,
South Korea, Japan, and Australia (also known as the US spokes), had no other joint military exercise
partner other than the US, and they were only connected indirectly through the hub. Yet, despite the
alliance ties with the US, the Philippines did not have exercise with the US in this period, but only
with Indonesia.
In highly centralized networks, like the hub-and-spokes (star) network, the hub has strong
power and control because the hub “possesses exclusive ties to otherwise marginalized or weakly
connected node or groups of nodes.”
217
On the other hand, the spokes do not have any other
alternatives, so they are often dependent on the hub. In Figure 10,
218
the size of the node reflects the
eigenvector centrality of each node – higher the centrality, bigger the size of the node.
219
Eigenvector
centrality measures the amount of social capital that a node possesses in or the degree of influence
that a node has on a network. For example, in the 1970’s network, the US had the highest centrality
(US’s eigenvector centrality: 1).
Also, the network had low density and inclusiveness because many countries in the region,
including China, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore did not have any JME with other
countries in the region, and remained as isolates (inclusiveness: 0.454). However, it should be noted

216
A completely centralized network has centralization score of one and the more the network is decentralized, it will be
closer to zero.
217
Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” 571.
218
Here, force directed layout is used and isolates are not included in the graph.
219
Eigenvector centrality is calculated by weighing not only the tie values but also the centrality of the attached nodes.
See Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” 565.

78
that many countries did not have even have official diplomatic recognition of each other in the 1970s.
For instance, under the first wave of global détente, China barely normalized diplomatic relations with
Japan and Australia (1972), Malaysia (1974), Philippines and Thailand (1975) in this period.

Figure 10 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1970-1979 (weighted)
1970-1979 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific
AUS
USA
KOR
JPN
PHL
IDN

79
1980s & 1990s JME Networks:
Increasing Connectedness in the Region, but the Cold War Ideological Divide Lingers
In the 1980s and the 1990s, the JME network started to move away from strict hub-and-
spokes structure as the US allies and strategic partners in the region develop joint military exercise ties
with each other (Figure 11 and 12). For example, upon the invitation of the US, Australia and Japan
exercised together in biennial the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) from the 1980s, and South
Korea joined from the RIMPAC 1990. Also, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia joined the network
and left the isolate status (inclusiveness: 0.818). For example, Thailand developed JME ties with the
US, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, and Singapore developed ties with Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Australia.
Overall, the JME network became denser in these two decades as many regional countries
diversify cooperative security ties. The network density recorded 0.291 and 0.455 in the 1980s and the
1990s, respectively. However, the development of new security ties in this period reflected the Cold
War ideological divide because China and Vietnam, the communist countries, remained outside the
security cooperation network and did not have any joint military exercise with regional countries
(eigenvector centrality of both China and Vietnam: 0). Considering that China’s diplomatic
reconciliation with its neighbors came to a halt under the influence of the New Cold War in the
1980s,
220
absence of JMEs between China and East Asian countries are not surprising. With the end
of the Cold War at the start of 1990s, diplomatic normalization between China and the regional
countries resumed under the second wave of détente around the world. In the 1990s, China established
diplomatic ties with Indonesia and Singapore (1990), Vietnam (1991), and South Korea (1992). This

220
The tension between the liberal and communist countries rearose from 1979 to 1985 – epitomized by the Western
bloc countries and its allies’ boycott of Moscow Olympic 1980 and the Eastern bloc countries and its allies’ boycott of
Los Angeles Olympic 1984.

80
created the foundation for cooperation between Beijing and East Asia, but development of security
ties did not materialize.
221

In network analysis, homophily test examines whether the nodes with similar attributes are
more likely to attach to each other than dissimilar ones. Simply put, the test examines whether “birds
of a feather flock together.” Using the test, I examined whether the US allies are more likely to
cooperate with the US allies than with the non-US allies in the security realm. The outcome value
ranges from -1 to 1. Positive value means that there is a high tendency of clustering among actors with
same attribute and negative value means that similarity between the actors don’t necessarily affect their
decision to develop ties in a network. The result suggests that the US allies had higher tendency to
conduct joint military exercise with each other in the 1980s than with non-US allies (homophily score:
0.227), but such tendency got weaker in the 1990s (homophily score: -0.041).

221
Hong, “Dongmaengjeongchaege daehan jungguk hakgyeui insikdamron gochal [A Consideration on Chinese
Intellectuals’ Discussions on Alliance],” 49-54. According to Hong, official Chinese government documents that
explicitly mention the principle of ‘non-alignment’ are the annual government reports of 1986, 1987, 1988, 1996 and the
report on 1997 Communist Party of China (CPR) National Congress. See also Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand
Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, 84.

81

Figure 11 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1980-1989 (weighted)
1980-1989 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific
USA
AUS JPN
MYS
THA
SGP
IDN
KOR
PHL

82

Figure 12 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 1990-1999 (weighted)
1990-1999 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific
JPN
USA
THA
SGP
IDN
AUS
MYS
KOR
PHL

83
2000s JME Network:
Security Cooperation Pattern Beyond the Cold War Dynamics
After the 2000s, security ties in the region are no longer demarcated by the Cold War dynamics.
A noticeable development in this period was the inclusion of China and Vietnam into the joint military
exercise network. Pay attention to the red node and its links. China established direct security ties with
all ten Asia-Pacific countries in the network (Figure 13). To name a few, these exercises included
China-Philippines Cooperation 2004 (sand table rescue exercise with Philippines), Joint Naval Search-and-
Rescue Exercise (SAREX) 2004 (with Australia), SAREX 2007 (with South Korea), Strike 2008
(counterterrorism exercise with Thailand), Cooperation 2009 (counterterrorism exercise with Singapore),
and DME 2009 (disaster management and exchange exercise with the US). Comparing to other
countries, China is not as central in the network, but it is noteworthy that its eigenvector centrality
jumped up to 0.163 from 0 (Table 6).
In this period, the JME network evolved to a new structure, which is highly inclusive and fully
meshed network. In a fully meshed network, every node is directed connected to every other node in
the network. Indicating that all the countries are directly connected to each other through joint military
exercises, the 2000s network recorded density and inclusiveness of 1. As the regional countries
diversify cooperative security ties, the centralization of the networks decreased to 0 (Table 6). The
result suggests that the security ties in the region is no longer concentrated on a single country, the
US, and the East Asian countries have security partners other than the US as well. The result of two
homophily tests, regime type (homophily score: -0.1) or shared ally (homophily score: -0.1) do not
necessarily affect the pattern of security cooperation in the region

84

Figure 13 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 2000-2009 (weighted)
2000-2009 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific
JPN
USA
MYS
IDN
PHL
SGP
THA
AUS
KOR
VNM
CHN

85
2010s JME Network:
The Emergence of Network that Embraces Rising China
In the 2010-2019 timeframe, China moved closer to the center of the network from the
periphery. China’s eigenvector centrality increased to 0.379 in this period (Table 6). The increase in
China’s centrality can also be visibly noted from the change in the size of China node from the 2000s
to the 2010s (Figure 13 and Figure 14).
After President Xi Jinping came into office in 2012, the Chinese government pushed military
modernization and reform. In this period, China’s military expenditure stayed at around 1.7 percent
of its gross domestic product (GDP), but due to its economic growth, in absolute term, China’s
defense spending increased from 105.52 billion (2010) to 240.33 billion (2019). In this light, East
Asian countries’ expansion of security cooperation with China is noteworthy, because if balancing
theory is right, this is the period that we should observe the coalition that isolates rising China out of
fear of staggering economic and military capabilities of Beijing.
222

Moreover, the fully meshed network structure that emerged in the previous decade solidified
in the 2010s. Indicating that every country engages in JME with every other country in the network,
the density and inclusiveness score recorded 1. The US remained as the most central actor in the 2010s
(US’s eigenvector centrality: 1), but the rise of the rest should be noted. For instance, South Korea’s
eigenvector centrality recorded 0.709 and Singapore recorded 0.754

222
World Bank, Military expenditure (current USD) – China,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=CN; Lindsay Maizland, “China’s Modernizing
Military,” Council of Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-
military#chapter-title-0-4; Kartik Bommakanti and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, China’s Military Modernisation: Recent
Trends, ORF Occasional Paper, no. 314 (Observer Research Foundation, 2021), https://orfonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/05/ORF_OccasionalPaper_314_ChinaMilitary.pdf.

86

Figure 14 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific: 2010-2019 (weighted)
2010-2019 JME Network of the Asia-Pacific
IDN
SGP
USA
KOR
MYS
PHL
AUS
JPN
THA
CHN
VNM

87

Chapter 5.

Case Studies on China-Southeast Asia Security Cooperation:
Qualitative Evidence of Willingness to Cooperate and Build Trust

“Vietnam would not ally with one country to fight another, and [wish] to enhance political trust with
China, promote exchange and uphold cooperation.”

– Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh

“[T]he Philippines does not see the need to take sides in the ongoing geo-economic competition
among big powers.”
223

– The Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte
“We are not trying to use China to counter the U.S. Our [Thailand’s] foreign policy is to have no
enemies and to be friends with everyone.”
224

– Thai Deputy Government Spokesman, Major-General Werachon Sukhondhapatipak

The systematic examination of joint military exercises in the region suggests that hedging is much
more pervasive than we think, and it is a preferred strategy of East Asian secondary states in the 21st
century. Rather than choosing a side to ensure security amid China’s rise, the US allies and strategic
partners in East Asia diversify cooperative security ties and engage in security cooperation not only
with the US but also with China. Then, what is driving security cooperation between China and East
Asian secondary states?

223
“Duterte says Philippines won't take sides as US and China tussle,” Nikkei Asia, May 21, 2021,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Future-of-Asia/The-Future-of-Asia-2021/Duterte-says-Philippines-won-t-take-
sides-as-US-and-China-tussle
224
Patpicha Tanakasempipat and Jutarat Skulpichetrat, “China, Thailand joint air force exercise highlights warming ties,”
Reuters, November 23, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-thailand-military/china-thailand-joint-air-force-
exercise-highlights-warming-ties-idUKKBN0TD0CB20151124

88
One of the explanations is the change in ‘China’s grand strategy.’ Shortly after China held its first
joint military exercise with foreign counterpart in October 2002 (with Kyrgyzstan),
225
Beijing expanded
joint military exercises with the Asia-Pacific. Historically, the Chinese government strongly maintained
the principle of ‘non-alignment’ in the security realm. In the late 1970s, even when China embraced
“reform and opening up” in other realm, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained reticent about
cooperation with foreign militaries on strategic and operational matters.
226

However, after the 2000s, the PLA has adopted more proactive regional posture toward Asia. “A
particularly important departure is China’s new willingness to engage in bilateral [multilateral] military
exercises, breaking its a half-century, self-imposed prohibition on such efforts.”
227
Stepping-up official
military-military exchanges with its neighbors after the 2000s is a part of Beijing’s effort to reduce
distrust and anxiety in the region, according to David Shambaugh.
228
Chinese leaders are aware of the
Asian neighbors’ unease towards its rise.
229

Thus, under the ‘strategy of diplomatic reassurance,’ Beijing has made active efforts to signal its
East Asian neighbors that rising China seeks friendly relations with its neighbors and to preempt the
formation of a balancing coalition against Beijing, writes Avery Goldstein.
230
In the similar vein, B.S.
Sacher asserts that “[t]he PLA has taken military diplomacy in a way to dispel ‘fears’ among neighbours
and other countries alike that Beijing is a threat to them.”
231
“In pursuance of this purpose, the PLA

225
“Top ten firsts of Chinese military diplomacy from 2002 to 2012,” People’s Daily, September 26, 2012,
http://en.people.cn/90786/7960693.html
226
Hong, “Dongmaengjeongchaege daehan jungguk hakgyeui insikdamron gochal [A Consideration on Chinese
Intellectuals’ Discussions on Alliance],” 49-54. According to Hong, official Chinese government documents that
explicitly mention the principle of ‘non-alignment’ are the annual government reports of 1986, 1987, 1988, 1996 and the
report on 1997 Communist Party of China (CPR) National Congress.
227
Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, 87; Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese
Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016,” 22.
228
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 72-89.
229
Wilson Chun Hei Chau, “Explaining China’s Participation in Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises,” Security
Challenges 7, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 56-58, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26467108.
230
Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2005).
231
B.S. Sachar, “Cooperation in Military Training as a Tool of Peacetime Military Diplomacy,” Strategic Analysis 27, no. 3
(July/September 2003): 407, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160308450097.

89
is actively engaged in external contacts and exchanges, in a flexible and practical manner, and is making
sustained efforts to enhance mutual trust, friendship and cooperation with the armed forces of other
countries…now practicing military diplomacy as an integral part of its overall diplomacy.”
232

Also, the voices arguing that Beijing should rethink its long-cherished policy of non-alignment
policy arose from the Chinese academic community around the 2010s.
233
Yan Xuetong, Professor of
Tsinghua University and president of Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, contends that “following the rise of
China’s power status, the limitations of the principle of non-alignment have already become
apparent.”
234
Tang Shiping, Professor of Fudan University, asserts that “depriving alliance of its
proper role as a security strategy seriously inhibits China’s strategic thinking, and urges that China
should consider all strategies, whether they involve alliances or not, that can advance its interests, even
though this does not necessarily mean officially terminating the independent foreign-policy line
established in 1982.”
235236
Michael Raska claims that China's joint military exercises with its neighbors
represent a form of defense diplomacy, in the absence of formal alliances.
237

Another factor that drives the PLA’s participation in joint military exercises is China’s
recognition of non-traditional security challenges. Wang Xiangsui states that “China used to be more
concerned about internal security, but that has changed now.”
238
A lot of non-traditional security
challenges such as terrorism and piracy are transnational in nature. Hence, Beijing seeks to address
these challenges by cooperating with the neighbors in the region. Moreover, joint military exercises

232
Ibid.
233
Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power; Stumbaum and Xuefeng, “Chapter 21. China,” 371-387; Zhang,
“China’s New Thinking on Alliances,” 129-148.
234
Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 143; Stumbaum and Xuefeng, “Chapter 21 – China,” pp.378-379.
235
Shiping Tang, “Lianmeng zhengzhi he Zhongguo de anquan zhanlüe [Alliance Politics and China's Security
Strategy],” Lingdaozhe [The Leader], November 30, 2010,
http://21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_2010113025525.html; Zhang, “China’s New Thinking on Alliances,” 134.
236
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nepal, China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, January 13,
2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cenp/eng/zgwj/t1430276.htm.
237
Teo Cheng Wee, “Chinese navy out to raise capabilities,” Straits Times, May 22, 2015,
https://www.asiaone.com/chinese-navy-out-raise-capabilities?amp.
238
Ibid.

90
are valuable platform for the PLA to enhance its modernization efforts by testing key capabilities and
learning new doctrines from foreign militaries.
239

It Takes Two to Tango
However, it takes two to tango to make a “joint” military exercise. The changes in China’s
grand strategy toward Asia only partly explains the changes in security cooperation patterns. If the
regional countries don’t place high value on cooperation with China, we would not observe increasing
inclusion of China in the security cooperation activities in the region. Then, what explains the
willingness of the Asia-Pacific countries to partner with China despite territorial and historical
grievances and potentially at some risk to their relations with the US? Are they aligning together against
common enemy or are they primarily using JMEs as platforms for intramural trust-building and
conflict avoidance between them?

East Asia’s Motivations for Security Cooperation with China
While quantitative analysis of joint military exercise data is apt for identifying large security
cooperation patterns, I believe that qualitative case study is suitable for exploring the countries’
motivations and logics for holding joint military exercises. To better understand East Asian countries’
motivations for conducting joint military exercises with China, I process traced the development of
multilateral joint and bilateral joint military exercises between China and Southeast Asian countries.
Some Southeast Asian countries are more active than others, but it is noteworthy that the countries
in the region are overall open to it – including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, who have
overlapping territorial claims with Beijing in the South China Sea.
240

239
Chau, “Explaining China’s Participation in Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises,” 56-58.
240
Jennifer Dodgson, China’s Security and Defence Cooperation in Southeast Asia, The Multinational Development Policy
Dialogue (MDPD) Studies (Brussels: KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG (KAS), 2021),

91
Qualitative Evidence of Willingness to Cooperate and Build Trust with China
Here, I present three cases: 1) ASEAN’s joint military exercises with China; and 2) the Philippines’
joint military exercises with China; 3) Malaysia’s joint military exercises with China. Primarily using
account evidence, the remarks made by high government and military officials on joint military
exercises with China, I provide qualitative evidence that ASEAN, the Philippines, and Malaysia engage
in security cooperation with China to signal that they are willing to live and let live and build trust with
Beijing and reduce the risk of conflict due to miscalculations in the region.

Case Study 1. ASEAN-China Security Cooperation

“It's always better that you have exercise and you have troops meeting each other, having the same
mission, looking at each other eye-to-eye and planning together, rather than across the table at cross
purposes and contending on issues on the opposite side”

- Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen (October 22, 2018) during his visit to Ma Xie Naval
Base during the first ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise.

“The joint naval exercise is another effort by ASEAN and China to ensure peace and stability in the
region.”

- Malaysia Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu (November 17, 2019) in response to the question
whether China-ASEAN naval exercise would become an annual event.

“The exercise is important…It's very important that there are joint military exercises if only to prevent
accidents and for military-to-military relations to grow so that we can talk to each other better.”

- Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano (August 7, 2018) expressing support for the
first China-ASEAN maritime exercise at a press conference.

“We are concerned by the spillover effect of the situation in the South China Sea…hence, we would
like to invite China's navy to a joint exercise with ASEAN.”

- Indonesia Navy Chief, Admiral Marsetio (March 21, 2013) at the Jakarta International Defense
Dialogue participated by 300 defense officials and observers from 38 countries.

https://www.kas.de/documents/272317/12679622/China%E2%80%99s+Security+and+Defence+Cooperation+in+S
outheast+Asia.pdf/05f04022-2a20-7d41-5128-01373bcb46de?version=1.0&t=1624867669577.

92
In 2019, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conducted the inaugural
ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX) with the US navy from September 2 to 6. As many as 1,260
military personnel, 8 warships, and 4 aircraft from the US and all ASEAN member states took part in
the first AUMX that began in the Gulf of Thailand, continued off the coast of Vietnam, and ended in
Singapore.
241
Vice Admiral Philip G. Sawyer, commander, U.S. 7
th
Fleet, noted that by sailing together
during the exercise, the forces promote shared commitments to maritime partnerships, security and
stability in Southeast Asia.
242

However, this was not the first exercise of its kind that ASEAN as a whole held with a single
country. A year earlier, from October 22 to 28, 2018, China held a similar maritime exercise with
ASEAN off the coast of the southern Chinese city of Zhanjiang, Guangdong province. The first China-
ASEAN Maritime Field Training Exercise was participated by 8 warships, 3 helicopters, and more than
1,200 military personnel from China and all ten member states of ASEAN.
243
Six countries sent their
vessels to take part in the drill. It included three ships from China, and one each from Singapore,
Brunei, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines – the guided missile destroyer Guangzhou, the guided
missile frigate Huangshan and the replenishment ship Junshanhu (China); frigates Stalwart (Singapore),
Taksin (Thailand), Tran Hung Dao (Vietnam); patrol ship Daruttaqwa (Brunei); and logistics support
ship BRP Dagupan City (Philippines).
244

241
Hunter Marston, “The U.S. Navy and Southeast Asian nations held joint maneuvers for the first time,” Washington
Post, September 13, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/13/us-navy-southeast-asian-nations-
held-joint-maneuvers-first-time-what-are-key-takeaways/; Mike Ives, “U.S. Will Drill with Southeast Asian Navies,
Echoing Move by China,” New York Times, September 1, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/01/world/asia/asean-us-navy-south-china-sea.html
242
CTF 73 Public Affairs, “ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise Begins in Thailand,” Commander, U.S. 7
th
Fleet, September 1,
2019, https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1949503/asean-us-maritime-exercise-begins-in-
thailand/#:~:text=SATTAHIP%2C%20Thailand%20(NNS)%20%2D,2.
243
Li, “China, ASEAN begin joint naval drill”; Parameswaran, “Why the First China-ASEAN Maritime Exercise
Matters.”
244
Kinling Lo, “A look at some ships involved in the joint China-Asean naval exercises,” South China Morning Post,
October 27, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2170460/china-asean-maritime-exercise-
assembles-multinational-fleet.

93
The joint naval exercise, co-organized by Singapore and China, involved the application of
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), as well as search and rescue operations and
communications exercises. At the opening ceremony attended by all eleven countries, Singapore chief
of navy, Rear-Admiral (RADM) Lew Chuen Hong emphasized that the region's prosperity is
underpinned by a stable and secure sea. “Asia's phenomenal growth, especially in the last 50 years, has
uplifted all our nations and our peoples. That growth is literally carried on the sea.” Referring to the
practice of the CUES carried out as part of the drill, RADM Lew said that the exercise “enhances
operational-level communication and reduces risk of miscalculations” in the region. Counterpart of
RADM Lew, Vice-Admiral Yuan Yubai, commander of the People Liberation Army Navy's Southern
Theatre Command, said in his speech at the ceremony that “I am confident that the exercise will yield
its expected outcomes, become a predominant platform for deepening mutual understanding and
exchange, and set a new milestone for a community of a shared future between China and ASEAN.”
245

Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen said the first ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise is
significant, because “it’s not a given” that militaries will always cooperate, or they would agree on
everything.
246
In an interview following his visit to the exercise in Ma Xie Naval Base, Zhanjiang,
Defense Minister of Singapore said, “I think multilateral exercises are very useful…During peacetime,
you should be spending a lot of your time building linkages, understanding each other... the more you
cooperate, the more you understand each other, the more you build up mutual confidence…if there's
any mishap, hopefully you can call up the other person and through your personal ties and

245
Lim Linette, “More and larger exercises between China and ASEAN is 'way forward': Ng Eng Hen,” CNA, October
23, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/ng-eng-hen-asean-china-navy-sea-maritime-exercises-
10856854; Lim Min Zhang, “China, Asean kick off inaugural maritime field training exercise in Zhanjiang, Guangdong,”
Straits Times, October 22, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-asean-kick-off-inaugural-maritime-
field-training-exercise-in-zhanjiang
246
Lim Min Zhang, “China, Asean should hold more exercises: Ng Eng Hen,” Straits Times, October 24, 2018,
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-asean-should-hold-more-exercises-ng-eng-hen

94
relationships that you've built up before, reduce miscalculations.”
247
“It's always better that you have
exercise and you have troops meeting each other, having the same mission, looking at each other eye-
to-eye and planning together, rather than across the table at cross purposes and contending on issues
on the opposite side.”
248
The Defense Minister also urged that “the way forward for the ASEAN-
China Maritime Exercise is to have more of them, and larger ones, so that confidence can be built.”
249

The first joint maritime exercise between China and ASEAN shows that security cooperation
takes place between the participants not only at the time of the event, but also before and after the
exercises. To prepare for the six-days field exercise in October 2018, more than 40 naval officers from
ASEAN countries and China came together for a two-day table-top exercise between August 2 and 3.
Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), the participants discussed plans to tackle simulated
maritime incidents, such as search and rescue operations and medical evacuation. Captain Yuthanavi
Mungthanya, deputy chief of staff of the Royal Thai Navy's Frigate Squadron 2, said of the table-top
exercise that "We have learnt how to tackle maritime incidents together as a team effort.” “Together
we came up with good plans and procedures to face maritime incidents... such as how to get to the
incident area as quickly as possible."
250
Colonel Lim Yu Chuan, commander officer of RSN’s 185
Squadron and exercise co-director said that "this table-top exercise has been a good first step for
navies from ASEAN countries and China to work together to deal with maritime incidents at sea."
251

247
Ministry of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces (MINDEF Singapore), Dr Ng: ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise
an Important Milestone in Efforts towards Regional Stability, October 23, 2018,
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-
detail/2018/october/23oct18_nr.
248
Zhang, “China, Asean kick off inaugural maritime field training exercise in Zhanjiang, Guangdong.”
249
Zhang, “China, Asean should hold more exercises.”
250
Lim Min Zhang, “Inaugural Asean-China Maritime Exercise held at RSS Singapura-Changi Naval Base,” The Straits
Times, August 3, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/inaugural-asean-china-maritime-exercise-held-at-changi-
naval-base
251
Lim Vanessa, “First ASEAN-China maritime field training exercises to be held in October: MINDEF,” CNA,
August 3, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/first-asean-china-maritime-exercise-training-navy-
mindef-10586432

95
Less than a year after the first drill, in April 2019, China and Southeast Asian countries
conducted Joint Maritime Drill 2019. 13 warships and 4 helicopters from Thailand, Philippines,
Singapore, Vietnam, and China took part in the drill held in Qingdao, eastern China’s Shangdong
Province. It is noteworthy that Philippines and Vietnam, who have ongoing contesting claims over
Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands with China, participated in joint maritime drills with China for the
two consecutive years. The exercise focused on fleet formation, temporary inspection, visit, board,
search and seizure (VBSS) operations, joint search and rescue, and medical treatment of the wounded
personnel. Indonesia and Laos also sent observers to watch the drill.
252
To the naval parade that was
held before the exercise to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy, the 10
member states of ASEAN sent their representatives. This included five warships and high-level naval
delegation from Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam – all of which have territorial disputes
with China in the South China Sea.
253

In November 2019, Defense Minister of Malaysia Mohamad Sabu said the 10 ASEAN
member states and China have agreed in principle to conduct the second multilateral naval exercise.
When asked whether the maritime exercise would become an annual event, DM Mohamad said it has
not been decided yet, but he reaffirmed that “[t]he joint naval exercise is another effort by ASEAN
and China to ensure peace and stability in the region.”
254

ASEAN countries’ decision to conduct multilateral joint military exercises with China is not
an abrupt event. Since the early 2010s, high government and military officials in the region have
steadily articulated the need for joint military exercises for regional stability. The idea gained

252
“Opening Ceremony of “Joint Maritime Drill 2019” Held in Qingdao,” China Military, April 26, 2019,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-04/26/content_9490179.htm
253
Minnie Chan, “China begins joint naval drills with six Southeast Asian nations,” South China Morning Post, April 26,
2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3007804/china-begins-joint-naval-drills-six-southeast-asian-
nations
254
“Asean, China agree to another maritime exercise, says Mohamad Sabu,” Malay Mail, November 17, 2019,
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/11/17/asean-china-agree-to-another-maritime-exercise-says-
mohamad-sabu/1810682

96
momentum with the development of a region-wide understanding that the countries in the
region need to cooperate more to keep tensions in the South China Sea in check. For instance, in
March 2013, as territorial disputes in the region continue to simmer, Indonesia’s navy chief, Admiral
Marsetio proposed joint naval exercises between ASEAN countries and China to build trust. At the
Jakarta International Defense Dialogue participated by over 300 defense officials and observers from
38 countries, Admiral Marsetio said “we are concerned by the spillover effect of the situation in the
South China Sea” and added “hence, we would like to invite China's navy to a joint exercise with
ASEAN.”
255

At the regional defense dialogue, Admiral Marsetio of Indonesia also noted that such joint
exercises could help bridging the discrepancy in tactical skills between each country's navy that has
different levels of readiness. Echoing the claim, Professor Wu Xinbo, director of the Centre for
American Studies at Fudan University in China, underscored that “if we want a peaceful Pacific, we
should think less about the difference between our navies and more on how we can cooperate.”
Undersecretary for legal affairs and strategic concerns at the Philippine Defense Department, Mr Pio
Lorenzo Batino, said “defense diplomacy is now integral in building trust and confidence between
nations,” and he demanded better security coordination in the region as Asia continues to harbor
extremist groups, which pursue their demands through violent means.
256

In October 2015, China officially and publicly proposed the holding of an ASEAN-China
maritime exercise for the first time. At an informal meeting between defense ministers of China and
ASEAN in Laos, China's Defense Minister Chang Wanquan suggested holding a joint military exercise
in 2016 in the waters of South China Sea. Defense Minister Chang Wanquan said with aim of “jointly
solving disputes and controlling risks,” the drill would mainly focus on unexpected encounters on the

255
“Call for Asean-China joint exercises: Naval drills can build trust and rein in tensions: Indonesian navy chief,” Straits
Times, March 22, 2013, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/call-for-asean-china-joint-exercises.
256
Ibid.

97
sea, countering piracy and terrorism, maritime rescues and disaster relief.
257
However, the drill did not
take off in 2016 due to the ASEAN countries’ internal disagreements on a coordinated response to
China’s offer.
258
For example, some countries were reluctant about setting the contested South China
Sea as the exercise location.
The idea picked up the steam under Singapore’s push as the ASEAN-China dialogue relations
coordinator (2015-2018) and the chairman of ASEAN in 2018.
259
In June 2017, at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, Singapore’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen confirmed that a first ASEAN-China maritime
exercise would take place in 2018 under Singapore’s chairmanship of ASEAN. In October 2017, on
the side-lines of the 4th ADMM (ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting)-Plus in Philippines, Singapore
and China further discussed practical initiatives to advance ASEAN-China relations, including
“planning for conduct of an inaugural ASEAN-China maritime exercise.”
260
When asked about
China's offer to hold maritime exercises, Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen said, “Singapore supports it.”
“We will push it ... for the very reason that all ASEAN and China want that. If you exercise, you at
least build understanding and trust.”
261

In August 2018, Philippines, who has overlapping claims with China over Spratly Islands, also
expressed their support to the first China-ASEAN maritime exercise. At a press conference, Philippine
Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano said that “the exercise is important.” “It's very important that
there are joint military exercises if only to prevent accidents and for military-to-military relations to

257
“China Proposes Joint Exercise in South China Sea with ASEAN Countries,” People’s Daily, October 17, 2015,
http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1017/c90000-8963262.html
258
“China suggests joint South China Sea drills with Asean,” BBC, October 16, 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34546820
259
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Dialogue Coordinatorship: July 2015-July 2024,
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/ASEAN-Country-Coordinatorship-2015-2024.pdf; ASEAN, ASEAN
Chairmanship, 2022, https://asean.org/category/chairmanship/.
260
Raul Dancel, “Singapore, China eye inaugural Asean-China maritime exercise,” Straits Times, October 23, 2017,
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/spore-beijing-eye-inaugural-asean-china-maritime-exercise.
261
Sarah Zheng, “China and ASEAN to go ahead with first joint naval exercise in sign of greater engagement,” South
China Morning Post, October 24, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2116766/china-
and-asean-go-ahead-first-joint-naval-exercise

98
grow so that we can talk to each other better.”
262
According to Carlyle Thayer, a regional defense
expert at the University of New South Wales, ASEAN countries are “signaling that China is not the
enemy.” The joint military exercise is a marker that shows Southeast Asian countries do want to
cooperate with China.
263
Chin-Hao Huang, head of studies for global affairs at Singapore’s Yale-NUS
College, said the exercise reflects ASEAN’s proactive and cohesive approach toward Beijing.
264

Moreover, it should be noted that a lot of security coordination and confidence-building
efforts between China and Southeast Asian countries preceded the successful conduct of the 2018
joint maritime exercise that was participated by all 10 ASEAN member states and China. There were
both multilateral and bilateral exercises between ASEAN navies and their Chinese counterpart. For
instance, on October 31, 2017, China and six ASEAN member states – Brunei, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand – held a joint maritime search and rescue drill at waters off
Zhangjiang, China. Under the theme of “Human Life Rescue and Win-Win Cooperation,” about 1000
personnel, 20 vessels, and 3 helicopters simulated a collision between a Chinese passenger ship and a
Cambodian bulk cargo vessel.
265

262
“ASEAN, China joint maritime drill "important": Philippine FM,” Xinhua, August 7, 2018,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/07/c_137374092.htm
263
“Joint China-Asean naval exercise a way "to build trust”,” Today, October 24, 2017,
https://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/joint-china-asean-naval-exercise-to-build-trust
264
Ibid.
265
Koh Swee Lean Collin, Inaugural ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise: What to Expect, RSIS Commentary, no. 131
(Singapore: RSIS, 2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CO18131.pdf; “China, ASEAN hold
joint maritime rescue drill,” China Military, October 31, 2017, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-
10/31/content_7806871.htm

99
Case Study 2. China-the Philippines Security Cooperation

“The activity allowed Chinese and Filipino personnel to exercise interoperability and strengthen
their capabilities in responding to such crises.”

- The Philippine Coast Guard said in a statement after the first joint drill between their coast
guards in waters off Manila in the South China Sea (January 15, 2020).

“I agree [to the idea]. You can have joint exercise here in Mindanao, maybe in the Sulu Sea.”

- Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte expressing his interests in Sino-Philippine drills while
boarded on a China’s missile destroyer on a friendly visit to Davao City, the Philippines (May
1, 2017).

“There is no sense in going to war. There is no sense fighting over a body of water.”
“It is better to talk than war. We want to talk about friendship, we want to talk about cooperation,
and most of all, we want to talk about business. War would lead us nowhere.”

- Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, in an exclusive interview with Xinhua News Agency,
the official state-run press of China (2016).

Despite the word war between the two countries, “there is still a shared sense that there is a need to
manage the situation...it will be settled in peaceful manner”

- Defense Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment Raymund Quilop in his interview with
Rappler, the Philippines’ leading digital news agency (June 10, 2014)
266

South China Sea dispute is “not the totality of PH-China relations, hence engagement with China
should be maintained.”

- Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta during conversation with his Chinese
counterpart in 2013.

Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines is a latecomer to bilateral security
cooperation with China. However, it is noteworthy that Manila has steadily expanded cooperative ties
with Beijing since the early 2000s, despite the overlapping claims over territories in the South China
Sea. Some Philippines presidents, such as Arroyo (2001-2010) and Duterte (2016-present), were more
proactive than the others, like Aquino III (2010-2016), in terms of pursuing cooperation with China.

266
Carmela Fonbuena, “Little-known fact: PH and China are defense partners,” Rappler, June 10, 2014,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/philippines-china-mou-defense-cooperation

100
Under former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010), Philippines made a
concerted effort with China to develop defense ties as part of the broader relationship, epitomized by
the first official visit of Philippine Navy fleet to China in June 2002 and the first joint sand table rescue
exercise between Chinese Maritime Safety Administration and Philippine Coast Guard in October
2004.
267
In November 2004, the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines
signed in Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defense Cooperation with the Ministry of National
Defense of the People's Republic of China. Under the bilateral defense cooperation MoU, both sides
agreed “to focus their cooperation on the exchange of military delegations, the discussion of non-
traditional security threats such as counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
and the establishment of a regular defense mechanism, which was originally called the Philippines-
China Annual Defense Security Talks.”
268

Relatively, Philippines’ security cooperation with China was less vibrant under President
Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016). The Aquino III administration filed its case before an arbitral
tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, Netherlands, after a standoff with China
in the disputed Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal) in April 2012. By filing the case, President Aquino
dismissed the bilateral talks with China on the South China Sea issue. However, even under Aquino,
Filipino high military officials expressed their interests in sustaining strong relations with Beijing. For
instance, in 2013, Philippines Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta said that the South China Sea
dispute is “not the totality of PH-China relations, hence engagement with China should be maintained”

267
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Philippines, Overview of China-Philippines Bilateral
Relations, March 5, 2009, http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zfgx/zzgx/t180703.htm.
268
Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s With the ‘Revival’ of the China-Philippines Military Dialogue?,” Diplomat,
December 19, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/whats-with-the-revival-of-the-china-philippines-military-
dialogue/.

101
in areas of defense and military cooperation, exchanges of military delegation, and collaboration in
non-traditional security issues, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
269

Since taking office (2016-present), Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has actively engaged
with China in the security realm, including joint drills. In May 2017, Philippine President Duterte
boarded one of three ships of the Chinese Navy on a friendly visit to the Philippines, and said he is
open to joint military exercises with China in Philippine waters. “I agree [to the idea]. You can have
joint exercise here in Mindanao, maybe in the Sulu Sea,” Duterte said after visiting the guided missile
destroyer Changchun, which arrived with the guided-missile frigate Jingzhou and replenishment ship
Chaohu. Duterte added that Chinese fleet's visit to his hometown Davao City, Philippines, is part of
“confidence building and goodwill to show that we are friends.”
270
In November 2018, at a meeting
between Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Chinese President Xi Jinping, who was on state
visit to Manila, the Philippines and China agreed to elevate their ties into a comprehensive strategic
cooperation.
271

Along this line, in January 2020, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) ships conducted their first joint maritime exercise on “search and rescue and combating fire at
sea” in the waters off Manila in the South China Sea. The exercise involved a CCG ship with pennant
number 5204 and Philippine’s a 44-meter (144-foot) multi-role response vessel BRP Tubbataha.
PCG and CCG personnel simulated a scenario where a ship caught fire in its cargo hold while
sailing the West Philippine Sea. The Philippine Coast Guard said in a statement that “[t]he activity
allowed Chinese and Filipino personnel to exercise interoperability and strengthen their capabilities in

269
Fonbuena, “PH and China are defense partners.”
270
Bai Yunyi and Bai Tiantian, “Duterte open to joint Sino-Philippine drills,” Global Times, May 2, 2017,
http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0502/c90000-9209794.html.
271
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China, Philippines agree to upgrade ties, jointly build Belt and
Road, November 20, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1614970.shtml.

102
responding to such crises.”
272
This was the first time in history that the Chinese Coast Guard vessels
paid a friendly visit to Philippine.
273

Moreover, under Duterte presidency, Manila made proactive efforts to make sure that the
South China Sea issue does not block both regional and bilateral cooperation. As the chair of ASEAN
in 2017, Philippines played a constructive role in drawing out consensus among the members of
ASEAN to resolve the South China Sea disputes through peaceful negotiations at the ASEAN summit
in Manila.
274
Also, China and the Philippines confirmed establishment of biannual bilateral
consultation mechanism on the South China Sea and held their first meeting in May that year. In 2016,
in an exclusive interview with Xinhua, President Duterte of the Philippines said that “[t]here is no
sense in going to war. There is no sense fighting over a body of water." Noting that he prefers
negotiation to confrontation over the South China Sea issue, Duterte said “[i]t is better to talk than
war. We want to talk about friendship, we want to talk about cooperation, and most of all, we want to
talk about business. War would lead us to nowhere.”
275

272
Jeoffrey Maitem, “Philippine, Chinese Coast Guards Stage Joint Drill in South China Sea,” BenarNews, January 15,
2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/coast-guards-joint-drill-01152020135718.html
273
Zehra Nur Düz, “Philippines, China hold joint maritime drills in Manila,” Anadolu Agency, January 15, 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/philippines-china-hold-joint-maritime-drills-in-manila/1703503
274
“South China Sea should not block regional cooperation,” China Daily, May 3, 2017,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2017-05/03/content_29183721.htm
275
“Commentary: Visit of Chinese warships boosts relations with Philippines,” Xinhua, May 2, 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/02/c_136251731.htm.

103
Case Study 3: China-Malaysia Security Cooperation

“The exercise [Exercise Aman Youyi 2016, or Peace and Friendship 2016, a China-Malaysia joint
military exercise] was a success…The two sides have been able to work together as a team, despite
cultural and language differences…Bilateral or multilateral cooperation is better for coping with
disasters than a single country dealing with such issues alone.”
– Lieutenant General Dato’ Fadzil bin Mokhtar, of the Malaysian Armed Forces
276

“The exercise is an important platform for mutual learning and exchanges between the two armies…It
has played a significant role in strengthening ties between the two countries and armies, and promoting
regional peace and stability.”
– Li Weiya, Director-general of the Chinese Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department’s
Strategic and Campaign Training Bureau
277

In 2005, China and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense
cooperation. The first bilateral exercises between the People’s Liberation Army and the Armed Forces
of Malaysia took place only after 2014, but leading up to that time, Malaysia developed cooperative
security relationship with China through diverse channels including high-level exchanges, naval port
calls, and military education exchanges.
278

In September 2012, the two defense ministries held their first ever formal defense and security
consultation in Kuala Lumpur.
279
In October 2013, Defense Minister of Malaysia Datuk Seri
Hishammuddin Tun Hussein made his first visit to Beijing and met with China’s Defense Minister
Gen Chang Wanquan. During the meeting, the Defense Ministers of Malaysia and China agreed to
hold exercises that would encompass the three disciplines of land, sea and air. After the meeting,
Defense Minister of Malaysia Hishammuddin said that “Both sides agreed to foster greater

276
Xiadong Wang, “Sino-Malaysia military drill a success,” China Daily, November 26, 2016,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/26/content_27491582.htm.
277
Ibid.
278
Ngeow Chow Bing, Malaysia-China Defence Ties: Managing Feud in the South China Sea, RSIS Commentary, no. 54
(Singapore: RSIS, 2022), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/CO22054.pdf.
279
“First China-Malaysia defense and security consultation held in Kuala Lumpur,” People’s Daily, September 11, 2012,
http://en.people.cn/90883/7943693.html;

104
cooperation in defence, particularly in holding joint exercises, exchange of military personnel,
establishing cooperation in the defence industry and fighting terrorism and transnational crime.”
280

On November 10, 2014, on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Leaders (APEC) meeting in
Beijing, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and reaffirmed
that both countries should boost cooperation in areas including enhancing collaboration between their
two armies and working together on law enforcement and safety.
281

In December 2014, the 40
th
anniversary of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations, China and
Malaysia kicked off bilateral joint military exercise Peace and Friendship 2014, also known as Aman Youyi
2014. The joint table-top exercise (TTX) involved 22 personnel from the Malaysian Armed Forces
(MAF) and 21 from Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). During the exercise, the two sides
coordinated on subjects such as combined joint search and rescue, rescue of hijacked vessel, combined
joint escort, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). At the opening, the two sides
agreed that Peace and Friendship 2014 is an important move to “promote the understanding and mutual
trust between the two sides, enrich the China-Malaysia all-round strategic partnership, improve the
capacity of the two sides in jointly handling challenges and enhance the regional security and
stability.”
282

After the first joint bilateral exercise in 2014, Malaysia and China expanded the scope and scale
of the Peace and Friendship exercise in 2015, 2016, and 2018. From September 17 to September 22, 2015,
China and Malaysia held Peace and Friendship 2015, the first joint live-troop and naval drill exercise
between China and Malaysia. The exercise attracted attention because the Strait of Malacca, one of

280
“Malaysia, China to hold maiden military exercise next year,” Borneo Post, October 30, 2013,
http://www.theborneopost.com/2013/10/30/malaysia-china-to-hold-maiden-military-exercise-next-year/
281
“China, Malaysia to enhance cooperation,” China Daily, November 10, 2014,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014apec/2014-11/10/content_18893800.htm.
282
“Joint table top exercise between armies of China, Malaysia kicks off in Malaysia,” Global Times, December 22, 2014,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/898040.shtml.

105
the world’s busiest waterways that has high geostrategic importance to major powers in the region was
chosen as the exercise location. Under the theme of jointly performing the Military Operations Other
Than War (MOOTW), all three branches of the military forces of both countries – navy, air, and
ground forces – practiced responses to scenarios, such as disaster relief, search and rescue, and
hijackings, and engaged in live-fire drills.
283
From the Chinese side, about 1,160 PLA personnel and a
guided-missile destroyer, a similarly equipped frigate, helicopters and transport aircraft, and Peace Ark
medical vessel were dispatched to the six-day field exercise.
284
In October 2016, during Malaysian
Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak’s visit to China, both sides agreed to renew Memorandum of
Understanding on Bilateral Defence Cooperation to maintain close rapport between them.
285

From 2016, China and Malaysia extended the invitation to Peace and Friendship exercise to
Thailand. Peace and Friendship 2016 conducted near Paya Indah wetlands, Malaysia, between November
22 and 25, involved 410 personnel from the Malaysian Armed Forces and 195 from the Chinese
People's Liberation Army,
286
and 10 observers from the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Themed on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, the third Peace and Friendship exercise was
divided into two phases – desktop deduction and actual-troop drill.
287
At a joint media conference that
followed the closing ceremony, Malaysia Armed Force’s Joint Forces Commander Lt Jen Datuk Fadzil
Mokhtar thanked the Royal Thai Armed Forces observers for taking part in the third Peace and

283
Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, Malaysia to Hold First Ever Joint Live-Troop Exercise,” Diplomat, August 31,
2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/china-malaysia-to-hold-first-ever-joint-live-troop-exercise/
284
Minnie Chan, “China launches joint naval drills with Malaysia in Strait of Malacca with more than 1,000 PLA troops,”
South China Morning Post, September 18, 2015, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1859259/china-launches-joint-naval-drills-malaysia-strait.
285
Ngeow Chow Bing, Malaysia-China Defence Relations: Disruptions Amid Political Changes and Geopolitical Tensions.
Perspective, no. 57 (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2021_57.pdf.
286
“Malaysia, China begin joint aid and relief exercise,” Straits Times, November 24, 2016,
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/malaysia-china-begin-joint-aid-and-relief-exercise; “China, Malaysia begin joint
military exercises amid closer ties,” People’s Daily, November 22, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1122/c90000-
9145448.html.
287
Xiadong Wang, “Sino-Malaysian military drills get underway,” China Daily, November 23, 2016,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/23/content_27463903.htm.

106
Friendship exercise to assess the objective of the program. Malaysia’s commander Fadzil said “[t]hat
is a good start for the exercise to expand (to other countries) eventually.” Noting that the joint exercise
is an effective platform for promoting peace and stability in the region, PLA chief of delegation, Major
General Li Weiya said, “We are looking forward to conducting multilevel joint exercises, including the
Malaysian and Thai Armed Forces in future.” With respect to the exercise, Royal Thai Armed Forces’
Joint and Combined Exercise Planning Office Director, Major General Thitichai Tiantong said it was
a great success as it achieved the goal, reflective of its name “Aman (peace) and Youyi (friendship).”
“It is a good platform with many dimensions. We learned and experienced from the joint exercise on
HADR,” Thai Major General Thitichai added.
288

The 4th Peace and Friendship exercise was held as trilateral exercise between China, Malaysia,
and Thailand from October 20 to 29, 2018 in Malaysia's Port Dickson of Negeri Sembilan, which is
close to the Malacca Strait, Port Klang and the offshore area of Selangor. Taking a step forward from
observer to official participant, Thailand sent a coordinator and command departments for the combat
planning and commanding drills to Peace and Friendship 2018. “I am very proud to be able to participate
in this joint exercise…Through exchanges in tactics, experience, and other fields, Chinese and Thai
militaries will be able to cooperate better in the future,” said the Chief of the Directorate of Joint
Operations of Royal Thai Armed Forces.
289
Chinese PLA dispatched about 692 military staff, a
destroyer and frigate to the drill and the Malaysian Army joined the exercise with 592 military staff,
two frigates and two helicopters.
290
Deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central
Military Commission (CMC), Lieutenant General Ma Yiming, noted that Peace and Friendship 2018 fully

288
“Aman Youyi Exercise hits bull's eye in M’sia-China military diplomacy,” Sundaily, November 25, 2016,
https://www.thesundaily.my/archive/2074109-ITARCH410784
289
Xu Lin, “Feature: Review of China-Malaysia-Thailand "Peace and Friendship 2018" joint exercise,” China Military,
November 9, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-11/09/content_9339674.htm
290
Omer Faruk Yildiz, “China, Malaysia, Thailand start joint military drill,” Anadolu Agency, October 24, 2018,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-malaysia-thailand-start-joint-military-drill/1291942

107
demonstrates “the ability of the three militaries to carry out deep cooperation, joint planning, and
precise actions” and reflects “the firm determination of the three countries to strengthen their defense
capabilities, effectively respond to non-traditional security threats, and maintain regional security and
stability.”
291
A maritime security specialist at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, Collin
Koh, said of the trilateral exercise that “[f]or Malaysia and Thailand it’s a way of showcasing
confidence-building with China and also signals that they aren’t choosing sides in the Great Power
rivalries in the South China Sea.”
292
“Their intention will be to demonstrate the resolve to promote
regional peace and stability with anyone who wishes to do so,” Koh added.
293

291
Xu Lin, “Feature: Review of China-Malaysia-Thailand “Peace and Friendship 2018” joint exercise,” China Military,
November 9, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-11/09/content_9339674.htm.
292
Most recently, in 2021, Malaysia openly expressed disappointments and reservations on the establishment of
AUKUS, trilateral security partnership between Australia-United Kingdom-US, and the US’s decision to sell nuclear-
submarine to Australia. See “Indonesia, Malaysia ‘worried, concerned’ over Aukus nuclear submarine plan,” South China
Morning Post, October 18, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3152794/indonesia-malaysia-
worried-concerned-over-aukus-nuclear.
293
Kristin Huang, “China’s navy to join Thailand and Malaysia for training exercise as military seeks to build bridges
with neighbours,” South China Morning Post, October 15, 2018,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168558/chinas-navy-join-thailand-and-malaysia-training-
exercise-strait.

108

Chapter 6.

Conclusion: Implications for East Asian Security and U.S. Foreign
Policy

Unwarranted bias toward pessimism and competition blindfolds us from seeing crucial
patterns of security cooperation in East Asia. Often, diplomatic tensions between China and East
Asian countries get the most attention, but certainly it is not the totality of their relations. By shedding
light on joint military exercise as an important indicator of cooperative security ties, this dissertation
has demystified misconceptions on East Asian secondary states’ response to the rise of China. A
careful examination of joint military exercises in the region reveals that China’s neighbors who would
be ‘most likely’ to balance against rising China based on our conventional wisdom have developed
cooperative military ties with China after the 2000s, when the rise of China took off. Network analysis
on joint military exercise network of the Asia-Pacific from 1970 to 2019 suggests that the region has
gradually moved away from a strict hub-and-spokes structure and evolved to a densely connected, less
centralized, and inclusive multi-nodal meshed network structure that embraces China over time. I
believe that this is an enduring and overlooked pattern of security cooperation in East Asia.
The finding suggests that the widely held belief in the security studies that China’s neighbors are
balancing against Beijing is mistaken and hedging is the dominant response of the regional countries.
Rather than opting for a rigid single-sided alignment, East Asian secondary states prefer to diversify
cooperative ties. East Asian countries do not view China as existential and imminent threat that needs
to be deterred at all costs. East Asian countries are signaling that they wish to cooperate and build
trust with rising China, as well as other states including its great power patron, the US. This trend of
military cooperation with China is being continued despite COVID-19, as epitomized by Singapore-
China Naval Exercise in February 2021 and September 2021, Indonesia-China Naval Exercise in May

109
2021 and Thailand, Mongolia, Pakistan, and China’s Peacekeeping Exercise in September 2021.
294

Similar patterns are also observed in other security indicators. As an illustrative example, in March
2021, South Korea and China have agreed to install two additional military hotlines to prevent
incidents and enhance trust, and thereby, ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
295
This is noteworthy
because Seoul does not establish military communication hotlines with every other country. South
Korea has a military communication line with only three countries in total: the US, Japan, and China.

Implications for IR Theory and Research on East Asian Security
For Better Understanding of Interstate Security Cooperation in the 21
st
Century
First, in the 21
st
century, there are diverse forms of security cooperation beyond formal alliance
ties, such as joint military exercises, military education exchanges, signing of strategic partnerships and
agreements on intelligence sharing, naval port calls, establishment of military communication hotlines,
high-level official exchanges, arms sales, and military aid. For better understanding of interstate
dynamics, we need to pay attention to these indicators rather than just treating them as symbolic
actions without substance. From the traditional perspective of security cooperation, which is geared
toward aligning together to fight against a common enemy, these forms of cooperation may look
insignificant. However, it should be noted that increasingly, countries are engaging in security
cooperation to build intramural trust and prevent conflicts between them. Clearly, these are signaling
behaviors that countries who are unwilling to cooperate will not demonstrate. Especially, joint military

294
Ryan White, “Chinese and Singaporean Navies Conduct Joint Exercise in the South China Sea,” Naval Post,
September 23, 2021, https://navalpost.com/chinese-and-singaporean-navies-conduct-joint-exercise-in-the-south-china-
sea/; John Feng, “Singapore Holds Naval Drill With China, but U.S. Remains Top Security Partner,” Newsweek, February
25, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/singapore-holds-naval-drill-china-us-remains-top-security-partner-1571940;
Laura Zhou, “China, Indonesia hold joint naval exercises near Jakarta,” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2021,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3132821/china-indonesia-hold-joint-naval-exercises-near-
jakarta; “Thailand joins China’s first multinational peacekeeping exercise,” Bangkok Post, September 15, 2021,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2182379/thailand-joins-chinas-first-multinational-peacekeeping-
exercise.
295
“S. Korea, China agree to establish two more military hotlines,” Korea Herald, March 2, 2021,
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210302001053.

110
exercise is a Goldilocks’ signal that reveal states’ preference for cooperation and trust-building. While
formation of new alliances may be too costly for that purpose, and mere public statements of support
are costless, joint military exercises are just costly enough to be credible.
This is not to say that alliance ties are an outdated indicator of security cooperation, but I’d
like to note that alliance ties are subset of security cooperation, and it is a specific form of cooperation.
Alliance ties may explain certain interstate dynamics or regional security cooperation well, but certainly
not all. For example, alliance ties may be a useful indicator for understanding how European countries
are responding to its powerful neighbor Russia, but less so for how East Asian countries are
responding to rising China. Also, some dyads may prefer more flexible and less formal forms of
security cooperation, than the ones that are contract based. Alliance ties may be a useful indicator for
assessing East Asia’s cooperation with the US, but not so much for East Asia’s cooperation with China.
To say, there may be considerable costs to IR scholarship from discounting these differences and
being unwilling to delve into local knowledge.

Path-Dependency in East Asia’s Strategic Choice
Second, if there are path dependencies in East Asia’s strategic choice, it looks like there is
increasing path dependency effects that reinforce more cooperation with China, not less. Indeed, the
actors’ security cooperation behaviors are not simply a reflection of the constellation of actors’ current
preferences, but rather these are choices bounded and shaped by past events and/or prior decisions.
296

Some scholars like Lim and Cooper argue that existing treaty alliances with the United States or major
territorial conflicts with China limit East Asian secondary states strategic options and create path
dependencies that reinforce alignment behavior against the rise of China. However, as the case studies

296
Georg Schreyogg and Jorg Sydow, “Organizational Path Dependence: A Process View,” Organization Studies 32, no. 3
(2011): 321-335, https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610397481; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social
Analysis (United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 2004).

111
on Southeast Asia show, after normalizing diplomatic relations with China in the 1970s and in the
1990s, the regional countries expanded bilateral or multilateral security dialogues and signed/upgraded
strategic partnerships with China. Often these security dialogues and partnerships have been
disregarded as cheap talks or political rhetoric in IR. However, it should be noted that these choices
laid foundation for stronger forms of cooperation later such as joint military exercises.

Figure 15 Ripe for Cooperation (1970-2019)

On a broader level, we can also say that East Asian countries slowly but steadily broadened
the area of cooperation with China from low politics to high politics through three phases of path-
dependence (Figure 17). Successful diplomatic normalization between China and the Asia-Pacific
countries during the 1970s and the 1990s (Phase 1: Diplomatic Normalization) enabled the expansion
of economic cooperation and trade with China in the 2000s (Phase 2: Economic Interdependence),
2020 1990 2000 1970 1980 2010
Detente 2nd wave
Seoul Olympic (1988)
- almost all IOC
countries participated
LA Olympic
Boycott (1984)
by the Eastern bloc
Establishment of Strategic
Partnership with China:
ASEAN (2003), Indonesia
(2005), Vietnam and
South Korea (2008),
Thailand (2012), Malaysia
(2013), Australia (2014).
China's Diplomatic
Normalization I:
with Japan and
Australia (1972),
Malaysia (1974),
Philippines and
Thailand (1975),
China as #1 Trading Partner:
South Korea (2004),
Japan and Australia (2007),
ASEAN and Malaysia (2009),
Vietnam (2012), Indonesia
(2014), Philippines (2016)
China's Diplomatic
Normalization II:
with Indonesia and
Singapore (1990),
Vietnam (1991), and
South Korea (1992)
The End of the
Cold War (1991)
China's accession
to WTO (2001)
Expansion of joint military
exercises with China
(2010-2019)
Detente 1st wave
Moscow Olympic
Boycott (1980)
by the Western bloc
PHASE 1
Diplomatic Normalization
PHASE 2
Economic Interdependence
PHASE 3
Security Cooperation
New Cold War
(1979-1985)
Thaw in
relations
(1985-1991)
The Asian Financial
Crisis (1997)

112
and all these interactions ultimately created momentum for cooperation with Beijing in security realm
in the recent two decades (Phase 3: Security Cooperation).

Implications for the Future of US Foreign Policy
For the future of US foreign policy, accurately understanding how East Asian countries are
responding to the rise of China is crucial. There is a growing bipartisan and multi-administration group
thinking in Washington that China’s rise poses mortal threats to the US and its allies and strategic
partners in the region, and they need to get together to create a balancing coalition aimed at checking
Beijing. In May 2021, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved Strategic Competition Act
(S. 1169) that “addresses various foreign relations issues, with a focus on China.”
297
East Asia experts
such as Michael D. Swaine laments that this $250 billion bill aimed at countering China “constitutes a
de facto declaration of a cold war with the People’s Republic of China.”
298
“Nowhere in the entire bill
is there anything other than a passing reference to the obvious need to maintain cooperative — or at
the very least non-confrontational — relations with Beijing…Moreover, throughout the document,
U.S. security and well-being are seen as resulting purely from deterrence or counter-balancing efforts
toward Beijing involving the buildup of American military…power.”
299

To quote some parts of the act that reflects balance-of-power logic embedded in the US foreign policy:
“It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC [People’s
Republic of China, to pursue the following objectives: …

(2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains favorable to the United States and its
allies. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including
through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international
law and practice, and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors…

297
U.S. Congress Digital Archive, Summary: S.1169 - Strategic Competition Act of 2021, 117th Congress (2021-2022) (reported
to the US Senate, May 10, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-
bill/1169?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Strategic+Competition+Act%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1.
298
Michael D. Swaine, “The ‘Strategic Competition Act’ is a dangerous declaration of cold war on China,” Quincy Institute
for Responsible Statecraft, May 5, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/05/05/the-strategic-competition-act-is-a-
dangerous-declaration-of-cold-war-on-china/.
299
Ibid.

113

(4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies and partners is strong enough to
demonstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the
potential benefits.”
300

Realist scholars are optimistic that East Asian countries will join the US and adopt such
confrontational approach toward China, because they also view China’s rise as a mortal threat. For
example, Mearsheimer writes that “the United States and almost all of China’s neighbors have
powerful incentives to contain its rise, which means they will carefully monitor its growth and move
to check it sooner rather than later.”
301
According to Mearsheimer, “[t]he reason is simple: China poses
a more serious threat to most countries in Asia…and states invariably balance against their most
dangerous foe…China is more threatening for largely geographical reason. Specifically, China is a local
power in Asia; it sits either right next door or within easy striking distance of the countries in the
neighborhood.”
302

This dissertation demonstrated that current thinking in Washington and the realist narrative
are mistaken, and East Asian countries are willing to live and let live with rising China more than we
think. The evidence of joint military exercises shows that the US allies and strategic partners have little
appetite for containing Beijing, and they have made efforts to embrace rising China into the regional
network over the last twenty years, rather than isolating it. The result suggests that there is a chasm in
the US and secondary states’ threat perception of rising China today. East Asian countries do not
necessarily view China’s rise as the most prevailing or imminent security threat that needs to be
deterred at all costs. Borrowing the words of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, “not
many countries would like to join a coalition against those who have been excluded, chief of whom

300
U.S. Congress Digital Archive, Text: S.1169 - Strategic Competition Act of 2021, 117th Congress (2021-2022) (reported to
the US Senate, May 10, 2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169/text?r=1&s=1.
301
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 684.
302
Ibid., 693-694.

114
will be China…To try and make a line-up, Cold War–style, I don’t think that’s on the cards.”
303
To
say, empirical reality in East Asia today is that regional countries are pursuing good relations with both
the US and China, because they believe that their friendly relationship with China doesn’t necessarily
have to come at the cost of their relationship with the US. The result suggests that secondary states
view the world differently from great powers, who may view the world in a more zero-sum fashion
due to its strategic interest in maintaining or gaining preponderance in international system.
In the light of the situation, shaping US foreign policy based on hawkish ideas such as creating
a balancing (or containment) coalition aimed at China is not advised, because it may be self-defeating.
It is worrisome that over time Washington is moving toward the direction of – “militariz[ing] its
response to China” up to the level “that its actions and policies become repugnant even to U.S. allies”
and strategic partners.
304
As Swaine points out that “such an approach is likely to alienate allies and
partners in Asia and beyond. While many may welcome a U.S. presence in the region…they do not
wish for a polarized, Cold War-like environment where every Chinese action and policy is treated by
the U.S. as malign or threatening.”
305
In a similar vein, Jae Ho Chung warns that “While Sino-American
competition, if not confrontation, is probably unavoidable down the road, whichever power that first
preaches the “us or them” exclusivity is likely to lose more than it will gain since it will ipso facto
constitute a greater threat to the region of East Asia. Sino-American relations are evolving over time
and so are the responses of East Asia to the rise of China.”
306
In an open letter to the US government
and congress, which was also signed by more than 100 China experts, M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton
Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel implored that “the United States cannot

303
Feng, “Singapore Will Not Join Biden’s ‘Cold War–style’ Coalition Against China.”
304
Michael D. Swaine, “China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America,” Foreign Policy, April 21, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/.
305
Nishant Dahiya, “What Trump's Declassified Asia Strategy May Mean For U.S.-China Relations Under Biden,” NPR,
January 23, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/01/23/959683134/what-trumps-declassified-asia-strategy-may-mean-for-
u-s-china-relations-under-bi.
306
Jae Ho Chung, “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations,” Pacific Affairs 82, no. 2 (Winter
2009/2010): 675, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25608969.

115
significantly slow China’s rise without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat
China as an…enemy, it will weaken its relations with those allies and could end up isolating itself
rather than Beijing.”
307
Kang also writes that “an American grand strategy that emphasizes a
confrontational approach to China is unlikely to attract many Asian participants. Rather, it is more
likely that East Asian countries will avoid being caught between the United States and China, and
indeed will back slowly away.”
308
Moreover, the US should guard against inflating China’s rise as an
existential threat to the US and its junior partners
309
and equating China’s rise to as an outright threat
to democracy.
310
As Hugh White writes, “Some people may think that it doesn’t matter much to
exaggerate China’s threat if that helps mobilise support against it. But that’s wrong, because it makes
it harder to manage the contest by seeking a new modus vivendi, and easier to mismanage it by sliding
into war.”
311
Furthermore, overplaying the democracy-versus-autocracy narrative is not only
anachronistic, but it will limit strategic options for the US.
312
“When rivals see the nature of the other

307
M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel, “China is not an enemy,”
Washington Post, July 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-
counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html.
308
Kang, American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century, 189.
309
On dangers of China threat inflation, see Jentleson, “Be Wary of China Threat Inflation”; Minxin Pei, “The China
Threat is Being Overhyped,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-27/u-s-
shouldn-t-treat-china-as-an-existential-threat; Daniel Larison, “No, China Is Not an ‘Existential Threat’,” Eunomia, May
13, 2021, https://daniellarison.substack.com/p/no-china-is-not-an-existential-threat?s=r; Doug Bandow, “Is China or
Fear of China the Greater Threat?,” CATO Institute, September 29, 2019, https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-or-
fear-china-greater-threat; Benjamin H. Friedman, “Pentagon to China: Do What We Say, Not What We Do,” CATO
Institute, March 6, 2008, https://www.cato.org/blog/pentagon-china-do-what-we-say-not-what-we-do; Kishore
Mahbubani, “What China Threat?” Harper’s Magazine, February 2019 issue, https://harpers.org/archive/2019/02/what-
china-threat; Noam Chomsky, “Is China Really a Threat? Noam Chomsky Slams Biden for Increasingly Provocative
Actions in the Region,” by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now!, November 23, 2021,
https://www.democracynow.org/2021/11/23/noam_chomsky_on_bidens_foreign_policy; Anatol Lieven, “Stay Calm
About China,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/china-existential-threat-united-
states-xi-jinping/; Aaron L. Friedberg and Robert S. Ross, “Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?,” National
Interest, no. 103 (September/October 2009): 19-34, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42896248.
310
Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China
(New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2020); Hugh Hewitt, “China is the real threat to our democracy,” Washington
Post, December 27, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/27/china-democracy-biden-trump/;
Robert Fife, “New U.S. ambassador to Canada says China is greatest threat to democracy, urges Ottawa to align with
U.S. to challenge Beijing,” Globe and Mail, December 9, 2021, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-new-
us-ambassador-to-canada-says-china-is-greatest-threat-to-democracy/.
311
White, “China threatens the West’s primacy, not its democratic systems.”
312
On the danger of democracy-versus-autocracy narrative, see Baogang He, “Biden’s misguided framing of US-China
rivalry as democracy versus autocracy,” East Asia Forum, December 7, 2021,

116
side as a threat in itself, a struggle to the death becomes the only alternative” and “mutual coexistence,
or even extensive cooperation on matters of mutual interest are for the most part ruled out, with
potentially catastrophic consequences.”
313

Thus, if the goal of the US is to maintain leadership position in East Asia and promote regional
stability, more constructive direction of American foreign policy will be to take initiatives in creating
platforms for cooperation and confidence building with China.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/07/bidens-misguided-framing-of-us-china-rivalry-as-democracy-versus-
autocracy/; Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy (New York, USA: Hachette
Book Group, Inc., 2020), 16; Damon Linker, “The anachronistic vision behind Biden’s Summit for Democracy,” Week,
November 9, 2021, https://theweek.com/foreign-affairs/1006942/the-anachronistic-vision-behind-bidens-summit-for-
democracy.
313
Stephen M. Walt, “Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War,” Foreign Policy, June 30, 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/30/china-united-states-new-cold-war-foreign-policy/.

117
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Appendices

Appendix I: Limitations of Existing Datasets on JMEs

A review of three existing datasets on JME that are publicly available reveal several flaws and
limitations in terms of ‘timeframe’, ‘exercise type coverage’, and ‘country coverage.’ Vito D’Orazio’s
dataset purports to record JMEs that occurred around the world from 1970 to 2010 (1,790
exercises).
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D’Orazio’s dataset is valuable due to its wide country coverage, but it does not have data
on recent ten years (2011-2019) when JMEs increased substantially. Also, the dataset misses some key
exercises that did occur, have duplicate entries for some exercise, and contains exercises that did not
take place.
Kyle Wolfley’s dataset, which borrows most of the observations from D’Orazio’s dataset, includes
only “ground-based exercises between at least one major power and another state” from 1980 to 2016
and excludes air defense and naval exercises from the dataset citing two methodological reasons.
315

However, I believe that excluding these types of exercises would bias the result and lead to misleading
conclusions on security cooperation patterns in East Asia due to three major reasons. First, the
capabilities of navies and air forces in East Asia have increased in an unprecedented fashion in the
twenty-first century through military modernization. Today, air defense and maritime security are key
arenas where the countries in the region are coordinating doctrines and carrying out cooperative
missions. Secondly, maritime security cooperation has huge implications for security relations in East
Asia, not only because these countries share sea lanes of commerce (SLOC), but also because many
of the maritime boundaries in the region remain unsettled and some countries have overlapping claims
over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and islands in the waters.

314
Vito D’Orazio, Joint Military Exercises: 1970-2010, jme_v3-6 (September 18, 2013), distributed by D’Orazio’s website,
https://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html.
315
Wolfley, “Military Statecraft and the Use of Multinational Exercises in World Politics,” p. 12.

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Moreover, Wolfley’s dataset excludes computer-simulated exercises based on the ground that
these exercises are “far cheaper and easier to administer.” In terms of financial cost, indeed, these
exercises might be cheaper than field training exercises, but these exercises shouldn’t be discounted
given its significance. With the development of technology, increasingly militaries in the region are
employing computer-simulated exercises, even for wargaming. For example, Key Resolve exercise is an
annual computer-simulated war game between South Korea and the US that focuses on “the allies’
contingency plans against North Korean aggression.”
316
Recently, in 2018, Chinese and Southeast
Asian navies have staged computer-simulated maritime drill and worked on search-and-rescue
scenarios following a mock ship collision in the South China Sea.
Kenneth Allen, Philip C. Saunders, and John Chen’s dataset on Chinese Military Diplomacy
records joint military exercises that China participated worldwide from 2003 to 2016 (around 357
exercises),
317
but misses some exercises between China and the Asia-Pacific countries. To name a few,
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Search-and-Rescue exercise with South Korean navy in 2005, 2007,
2008, and 2011 and two joint counter-terrorism exercises with Vietnam in 2016. Also, the dataset has
limitations when addressing the question of how the overall structure of the security cooperation
network changed over time, because it neither contains data points on ‘the JMEs between the United
States and Asian countries’ nor ‘the JMEs between smaller Asian countries.’

Appendix II: My JME dataset
With the aim of systematically examining the evolution of security ties over time, in my research,
I constructed a unique dataset of joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific from 1970 to 2019 (1,447
exercises). There is no clear-cut definition of “Asia-Pacific” or “East Asia,” but often the former has

316
U.S. Forces Korea, “’Key Resolve’ begins in Korea,” March 10, 2009,
https://www.army.mil/article/18017/key_resolve_begins_in_korea
317
Allen et al., Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016.

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greater regional scope condition than the latter. Here, I define Asia-Pacific as a region that includes
East Asia (i.e., Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia), the US, and Oceania.

Data Collection
For data collection, I primarily employed web-scraping of news articles that took place in the last
twenty years (2000-2019). Using the search engine ProQuest, I ran keyword (keyword: joint military
exercise) on worldwide and major newspapers in the Asia-Pacific in English such as Washington Post,
New York Times, Japan News, Korea Times, China Daily, People’s Daily, Strait Times, South China Morning Post,
and Diplomat. All the newspaper articles that contained keywords have been extracted and human
coded. For earlier timeframes (1970-1999), I compiled and addressed the limitations of existing three
datasets by Vito D’Orazio, Kyle Wolfley, and Kenneth Allen et al.

Sample and Case Selection Justification: Countries, Time Frame, and Types of Exercises
My joint military exercises dataset records bilateral and multilateral JMEs between 11 countries in
the Asia-Pacific – United States (USA), China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Japan (JPN), Philippines
(PHL), Thailand (THA), Vietnam (VNM), Indonesia (IDN), Malaysia (MYS), Singapore (SGP), and
Australia (AUS) – from 1970 to 2019. To elaborate, the dataset contains information of the JMEs that
the US or/and China conducted with the Asia-Pacific countries (e.g., US-South Korea joint military
exercises or China-Thailand joint military exercises), but also all the JMEs among small countries in
the region (e.g., Philippines-Indonesia joint military exercises or Philippines-Indonesia-Thailand joint
military exercises). The dataset does not include the exercises where these countries only participated
as an observer. It is based on the exercises in which these countries have participated by dispatching
military personnel and/or military assets. The data contains both binary and valued information of

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JME ties between states. It records the presence or absence of ties, as well as how frequently they
conduct exercise with one another.
The nine secondary states (i.e., non-great powers, states other than the US or China in this case)
included in my dataset are most-likely cases for balancing theory, considering the close geographical
proximity to China, presence of the US as a great power patron, ongoing territorial or maritime border
disputes with China, and ideological distances. If balancing theory is correct, we should not expect to
see any joint military exercise between rising China and East Asian countries. At the same time, we
will observe the expansion of the regional countries’ joint exercises with the US. Also, we are likely to
observe East Asian countries’ joining balancing coalition-led by the US to counter the rise of China.
In other words, these are least-likely cases for my hedging theory. Hence, despite the presence of
factors that are identified as favoring conditions of balancing behavior, if we observe hedging
behaviors, it will be strong evidence that hedging is much more pervasive and preferred strategy of
East Asian secondary states than balancing. If my theory of hedging is right and regional countries
aim to maximize strategic autonomy by diversifying cooperative security ties, we would observe East
Asian secondary states’ joint military exercise with China, and as well as other countries, including the
US. Also, we would observe the emergence of inclusive security cooperation network that embraces
China, rather than isolating it.
I have set the timeframe to start from the 1970s, because this is when many of regional countries
started to normalize their diplomatic relations under global détente. I believe that diplomatic
normalization is the prerequisite condition for any type of interstate cooperation to take place.
The types of exercises included in the dataset ranges from combat exercise to Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW) – “operations undertaken by military forces to safeguard their country’s
national security and developmental interests, that do not constitute a war. These include
counterterrorism and stability maintenance, HADR operations, the safeguarding of sovereignty and

144
national interests, safety and security operations, international peacekeeping, and international rescue
and relief”
318
and anti-piracy. These MOOTW exercises also known as shaping operations tend to
focus on non-traditional security issues and are carried out with the aim of “chang[ing] perceptions
from hostile to friendly to prevent escalation of inadvertent war” and developing trust.
319

318
Gaoyue and Char, Introduction to China’s Military Operations Other Than War, 3.
319
Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight,” 29.

Abstract (if available)

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Asset Metadata

Creator Park, Kyuri (author)

Core Title Goldilocks’ signal for security cooperation in East Asia: China’s rise, hedging, and joint military exercises

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science and International Relations

Degree Conferral Date 2022-08

Publication Date 07/28/2024

Defense Date 06/09/2022

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Alliance,Asia-Pacific,china,East Asian security,hedging,joint military exercise,network analysis,OAI-PMH Harvest,security cooperation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Kang, David C. (committee chair), James, Patrick (committee member), Valente, Thomas W. (committee member)

Creator Email parkyuri@stanford.edu,yhkyuri@hanmail.net

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC111375574

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Source 20220729-usctheses-batch-963 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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