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A two-level analysis of foreign policy decision making: an empirical investigation of the case of China-Taiwan

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A two-level analysis of foreign policy decision making: an empirical investigation of the case of China-Taiwan

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Content A TWO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE OF CHINA-TAIWAN by Yitan Li A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) December 2008 Copyright 2008 Yitan Li ii Dedication To Enyu and my parents iii Acknowledgements During my journey of the graduate school, I have benefited from many individuals and organizations. I would like to thank Beat Kernen, Kenneth Rutherford and Yuhua Qiao of the Missouri State University; Christopher Fulcher, Chong Z. He, Jonathan Krieckhaus, KC Morrison, Marvin Overby, Xinghe Wang, and David Webber of the University of Missouri, Columbia; Laurie Brand, Linda Cole, Daniel Lynch, Indira Persad, Stanley Rosen, Marisela Schaffer, Jefferey M. Sellers, Luda Spilewsky, Alex Venegas, and Geoffrey Wiseman of the University of Southern California; Timur Kuran of the Duke University; John Ishiyama of the University of North Texas; Barbara Arneil, Maxwell Cameron, Brian Job, and Allan Tupper of the University of British Columbia; Jonathan Fox of the Bar Ilan University; and Seung-Whan Choi of the University of Illinois, Chicago. I also would like to say special thanks to my dissertation committee members Nicholas Cull, Robert English, and Steven L. Lamy for their constructive critiques, support and encouragement during the completion of my dissertation. At different stages of my graduate training, I have received funding to complete my research. I would like to thank the School of International Relations, the Center for International Studies, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California; and the Centre of International Relations and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia for providing these research awards. I am particularly indebted to several individuals, without whom I would not have been able to reach where I am today. I would like to thank Dennis V. Hickey of the iv Missouri State University, who inspired my interests in international relations and China- Taiwan relations. His inspiration, guidance and friendship have always been a source of comfort. I also would like to thank A. Cooper Drury of the University of Missouri, Columbia. I am forever indebted to Cooper’s patience and understanding. I have learned so much from the intellectual conversations with him and his hands-on style teaching both inside and outside of the classroom. I owe a special and enormous debt to my advisor Patrick James. Pat’s optimism, creativity, kindness, openness and encouragement have always given me a sense of hope to complete this challenging journey of the graduate school and helped me embark on my professional career. And finally, three people have sacrificed so much for me. I would like to thank my parents who have always believed in me and supported my dreams. Without their unconditional love, I would not have discovered I could go this far. Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife, my best friend, colleague and the love of my life, Enyu, for her infinite love, support and encouragement. I dedicate this dissertation to the three of them. v Table of Contents Dedication ii Acknowledgements iii List of Tables vi List of Figures vii Abstract viii Chapter 1 Foreign Policy Analysis in the Taiwan Strait: An Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Middle-Range Theory Building in Foreign Policy Analysis 17 Chapter 3 Historical Context of the China-Taiwan Relations 41 Chapter 4 Wag the “Dragon”?: The Politics of Diversion in the Taiwan Strait 83 Chapter 5 External Determinants of Foreign Policy Decision Making 126 Chapter 6 Nationalism, Identity Change and Regime Type 157 Chapter 7 Findings, Reflections, and Implications for Cross-Strait Relations 210 Bibliography 228 vi List of Tables Table 3.1 Countries that Maintain Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan 55 Table 3.2 Mini-Three Links: Ships 78 Table 3.3 Mini-Three Links: Passengers 78 Table 4.1 Pro-Independence vs. Pro-Unification 106 Table 4.2 Rhetoric Intensity 106 Table 4.3 President’s Independence Magnitude Examples From Taiwanese Media 108 Table 4.4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Inflation and Unemployment) 118 Table 4.5 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Visits and Trade) 119 Table 5.1 Examples of Events and Weighting Scales 141 Table 5.2 Polity Scores for China and Taiwan 142 Table 5.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regression 145 Table 6.1 The Share of Cross-Straits Trade in Taiwan Total Foreign Trade 167 Table 6.2 Taiwan Investment in Mainland China 170 Table 6.3 Cross-Strait Visits 171 Table 6.4 Cross-Strait Letters 172 Table 6.5 Cross-Strait Telephone Calls 173 Table 6.6 Identity in Taiwan, 1992-2007 191 vii List of Figures Figure 2.1 Middle-Range Theory Building in FPA: The Case of China-Taiwan 40 Figure 3.1 Beijing’s Hostility Toward ROC 66 Figure 3.2 Unification or Independence 70 Figure 3.3 Foreign Ties and Cross-Strait Relations 71 Figure 3.4 Foreign or Cross-Strait Relations as Priority 73 Figure 3.5 Export Dependence Across the Taiwan Strait 75 Figure 3.6 Visits Across the Taiwan Strait 77 Figure 3.7 “One Country, Two Systems” Formula as a Solution 81 Figure 4.1 Export Dependence Across The Taiwan Strait 111 Figure 4.2 Visits Across the Taiwan Strait 112 Figure 5.1 Unification or Independence 151 Figure 5.2 Beijing’s Hostility Toward ROC 152 Figure 6.1 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Sponsored Cultural Activities 174 Figure 6.2 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Cultural Activities 175 Figure 6.3 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Scholar Exchanges 176 Figure 6.4 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Graduate-Student Exchanges 177 Figure 6.5 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese, 1992 - 2007 193 Figure 6.6 Changes in the Unification – Independence Stances of Taiwanese 194 viii Abstract This dissertation is intended to provide some insights on the conditions under which domestic and international factors, respectively, play in foreign policy decision making. Using linkage politics (Rosenau, 1969) and diversionary theory (Coser, 1956) as the main theoretical framework, this dissertation examines the two-level foreign policy decision making processes through the case of China-Taiwan. Empirical evidence suggest that political leaders in Taiwan have incentives to use non-military forms of diversion – primarily verbal rhetoric on their respective positions of unification or independence with China, as a means of diverting attention away from Taiwan’s domestic problems. This is a prime example of domestic determinants of foreign policy. At the same time, however, analysis through events data in the Taiwan Strait shows that the mainland China primarily makes its decisions toward Taiwan based on Taiwan’s internal politics and Taiwan’s political behaviors toward the mainland China, a prime instance of support for external determinants of foreign policy decision making. The events data analysis also reveals that the recent democratic transformation in Taiwan has made Taiwan’s decision making a multi-level process. Domestic politics have become a main driving force behind Taiwan’s foreign policy, including its policy toward the mainland. Nevertheless, the better understanding of the interplay of domestic and international politics must also take issues of cultural, historical and social significance into consideration. Changes of nationalism and political identity, resulted from the different social experiences formed by two distinctive types of political regime, cannot be ignored and must be taken into consideration when studying foreign policy decision ix making processes. Political elites in authoritarian regimes, such as China, must take the opinion and demand of the public seriously when they make foreign policy decisions, especially when the growing nationalism and changes of political identity could potentially threaten their political survival. Overall, the dissertation shows that, regardless of regime type, domestic factors play a relatively more important role in foreign policy decision making. 1 Chapter 1 Foreign Policy Analysis in the Taiwan Strait: An Introduction The relationship between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy has been a widely debated issue in the field of international relations, especially in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. To some analysts, domestic politics and foreign policy are two independent arenas of issues that do not necessarily influence each other. Others have argued that the two respective groups of factors do not stop at the water’s edge. Foreign policy and domestic politics are interdependent and could spill over into each other. While both schools of thought make some convincing arguments about their respective cases, it is prudent to expect that the degree of influence between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy is contingent on different foreign policy contexts. In some cases, international factors play a more important role, whereas in other cases, domestic reasons are more important. Using linkage politics (Rosenau, 1969) and diversionary theory (Coser, 1956) as the main theoretical framework, this dissertation examines the two-level foreign policy decision making game through the case of China-Taiwan. This dissertation is intended to provide some insights on the conditions under which domestic and international factors, respectively, play in foreign policy decision making. Evidence suggest that political leaders in Taiwan have incentives to use non- military forms of diversion – primarily verbal rhetoric on their respective positions of unification or independence with China, as a means of diverting attention away from Taiwan’s domestic problems. This is a prime example of domestic determinants of foreign policy. At the same time, however, analysis through events data in the Taiwan 2 Strait shows that the mainland China primarily makes its decisions toward Taiwan based on Taiwan’s internal politics and Taiwan’s political behaviors toward the mainland China, a prime instance of support for external determinants of foreign policy decision making. The events data analysis also reveals that the recent democratic transformation in Taiwan has made Taiwan’s decision making a multi-level process. Domestic politics, such as public opinion, economic conditions (for example, inflation and unemployment rates) and checks and balances from different branches of government and/or opposition parties, have become a main driving force behind Taiwan’s foreign policy, including its policy toward the mainland. Nevertheless, the better understanding of the interplay of domestic and international politics must also take issues of cultural, historical and social significance into consideration. Changes of nationalism and political identity, resulted from the different social experiences formed by two distinctive types of political regime, cannot be ignored and must be taken into consideration when studying foreign policy decision making processes. On the one hand, democratization in Taiwan has created a social environment in which a unique and independent Taiwanese identity has been formed. On the other hand, the increasing level of nationalism in recent years on the Chinese mainland also has formed a strong sense of national unity among the Chinese public as well as the political leadership. This strong nationalism has in essence strengthened the traditional Chinese identity that is different from the new identity being formed in Taiwan. Its intensity on the mainland has forced political elites in the authoritarian regime to take the opinion and demand of the public seriously when they make foreign policy decisions, especially when the growing nationalism and changes of political identity could potentially threaten their political survival. Overall, the 3 dissertation shows that, regardless of regime type, domestic factors play a relatively more important role in foreign policy decision making. The dissertation contributes to the existing literature on foreign policy analysis in the following ways. First, the project challenges the traditional assumption that Asian countries do not fall under the general theorizing of foreign policy analysis and international relations. Second, most existing empirical studies on foreign policy analysis focus on western democracies and major powers. This project brings both a middle power democracy – Taiwan, and a non-democracy – China into the general testing of foreign policy analysis. Third, the project will directly generate two datasets which can be used to test foreign policy decision making in general and issues in the Taiwan Strait. Fourth, as will become apparent later, the combination of statistical analysis and in-depth case analysis for the case of China-Taiwan will serve as a linkage between quantitative and qualitative research methodology. Fifth, putting the China-Taiwan case in the general context of foreign policy analysis and vice versa is an attempt to answer the continued calls for middle-range theory building, first put forth by Rosenau (1969). Sixth, by examining the case of China-Taiwan at both the individual level and state level, the project challenges the traditional holistic approach which conceives nation-state as a unitary actor (James, 2002) and attempts to unpack the foreign policy decision making process, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, from a “black box”. Seventh, the project will shed light on how social issues such as nationalism and identity change affect individual and state behaviors in the context of foreign policy analysis. Last but not least, the project will explore policy ramifications for China, Taiwan, the United States (US) and foreign policy analysis in general. 4 WHAT IS THE ISSUE AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? Christopher Hill (2003) argues that foreign policy is the hinge of domestic and international politics. Scholars perhaps agree that foreign policy serves as an intersection of domestic and international politics. They do not agree, however, on which group of factors plays a more important role in determining countries’ foreign policies. Some scholars argue that foreign policy is simply an extension of what goes on domestically within a country. Therefore, domestic factors play a more determining role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. Rosenau (1966) suggests internal influences affect external behavior of a country. Hagan (1993: 5) states that “foreign policy makers (at least senior ones) must balance foreign policy concerns with their need to maximize domestic political support for their regime. When foreign policy considerations are inconsistent with the regime’s political situation at home, political leaders must adjust foreign policy to make it more compatible with those domestic realities.” Research on U.S. president’s use of force overseas as a foreign policy tool is a good example to illustrate arguments that fall into the domestic-determinant school. For example, Ostrom and Job (1986) argue that it is domestic, particularly political, factors that are more influential on the president’s decision to use military force than characteristics of the international environment. James and Oneal (1991) concur that domestic political factors remain most consequential in the president’s decision to use force. Among other things, a sagging economy, high inflation and unemployment rates, and low political approval rating of the leadership can all be reasons for U.S. presidents to use force overseas (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Levy, 1989; Russett, 1990; James and Oneal, 1991; DeRouen, 5 2000). This line of reasoning is commonly referred to as the diversionary logic, which views domestic factors as reasons for foreign policy outcomes. The notion of international or external determinants of foreign policy leads to a radically different category of scholarship. While scholars in this school acknowledge the importance of both international and domestic factors, they argue that international factors play a more important role. Take the coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions literature as an example. Drury (2000 and 2001) examines both the relations with the target country and U.S. domestic factors when deciding to impose economic sanctions and find that although domestic factors are important, their role is only marginal. Instead, the relations with the target have a much greater impact on the decision to deploy economic sanctions; therefore, economic sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy (foreign policy behavior) are usually aimed at the target and determined by the relationship with the target; thus they are not driven by White House reaction to domestic demands for action. 1 Clearly, the debate between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy remains an important one. Nevertheless, the testing of the linkage between domestic and international determinants has neglected several major issues of importance. Existing research on this debate has a focus on western states. Non-western actors, particularly Asian states, including both democratic and non-democratic regimes, are often left out of the general consideration of foreign policy decision making. However, it 1 The two studies conducted by Drury (2000 and 2001) examine the U.S. use of economic sanctions against other countries as a coercive strategy. 6 is precisely this gap that may possess the key to a better understanding of the foreign policy decision making process. The present study examines the foreign policy decision making process in the Taiwan Strait. By examining the case of China-Taiwan, this project first adds significantly to the general understanding of foreign policy decision making through a non-Western case. Second, by unpacking the level of analysis from the traditional state level to the individual level and events level, the project challenges the traditional realist’s position, which conceives of the nation-state as a unitary actor where foreign policy decision-making goes through a “black box” (James, 1988; Putnam, 1988; Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, 1989; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Miller 1995; Morgan and Anderson, 1999). Third, the project examines the case of China-Taiwan through both an empirical prism and an in-depth case analysis – a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative evidence alone may not be sufficient to provide a strong linkage to bridge the gap between empirics and policy. But it serves as a starting point to link historical, normative, and empirical evidence to better explain China-Taiwan relations in specific, and foreign policy analysis in general. The in-depth case study picks up at where quantitative analysis cannot achieve. Therefore the combination of the two methodological approaches will benefit from and complement each other. 7 PUTTING CHINA-TAIWAN IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS In this dissertation project, I take a foreign policy analysis approach to analyze the cross-strait relations. An immediate question can be raised about whether the relations in the Taiwan Strait are foreign relations. A detailed discussion of the origin of the Taiwan issue and how the case of China-Taiwan is tied to the general context of foreign policy analysis will be provided in Chapter Two. Nonetheless, a brief justification here is necessary. In 1911, the Kuomintang (KMT) established the Republic of China (ROC) in mainland China after the collapse of the Qing Empire. Ten years later, in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed. In the next three decades, the Nationalist and Communist forces would coexist and fight against each other. Finally, the KMT was defeated by the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. As a result, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded on October 1 st , 1949. To escape further elimination, the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan. However, the ROC government continued to be the legal representative of China in the international community till 1971. In 1971, the United Nations (UN) passed “Resolution 2758” to replace the ROC with the PRC as the sole and legal representative in the UN. The ROC withdrew from the UN and all other related international organizations. In regard to the status of Taiwan, the PRC argues that after the CCP defeated the Nationalist force in the Chinese Civil War, the ROC ceased to exist. The ROC, however, claims that the KMT government was merely moved to Taiwan temporarily at the end of 8 the Civil War. As of now, only about two dozen small countries 2 officially recognize the ROC, while the majority of countries in the international community recognize the government of the PRC as the sole legal representative of China. 3 However, since 1949, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been exercising de facto control of their respective territories. Each side has an effective government, active military, a fixed population and a firm territorial control. The two sides have been acting independently of each other on both domestic and international issues. Thus, the two sides have been two separate political entities to each other. Most decisions and policies across the Taiwan Strait are not coordinated or negotiated by the two sides together. Each side makes its independent policy making process towards the other. It is for those reasons that I treat China and Taiwan as two independent actors. Thus, for the purpose of this project, cross-strait relations are not considered as domestic or internal relations of a greater China. At least, the relationship can be referred to as “partial foreign policy”, because it involves at least one unrecognized state that effectively conducts independent external strategies (Hill, 2003). Treating the cross-strait relations as external ones allows me to conduct a two- level analysis: 1) cross-actor level, which refers to the directional relations between China and Taiwan; and 2) domestic level, which includes Taiwan’s domestic politics and 2 As of June 1 st , 2007, The Republic of Costa Rica officially terminated its diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China and established full diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China, leaving only two dozen countries in Africa (5), Europe (1), Latin America (12), and Oceania (6) maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC. 3 The PRC requires all countries that wish to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing to explicitly accept the position that Taiwan is part of China. 9 those of China’s. In spite of the occasional tensions between the two political entities 4 , mainland China and Taiwan remain closely linked in many ways, such as in areas of economic relations, cultural and technology exchanges, financial investments, just to name a few. The combination of historical linkages and the recent developments in the PRC and ROC have created a virtually controlled environment for studying internal and external factors of foreign policy in a comparative sense. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION This dissertation project includes the following chapters. The current chapter introduces the general description of the research question, theoretical framework, research methodology, and the significance of the project. Chapter Two provides a review of the existing literature on foreign policy analysis and how the case of China-Taiwan can be used as a middle-range theory building process to integrate the study of foreign policy behaviors in the Taiwan Strait and foreign policy analysis in general. The literature review will serve as the foundation for the theoretical framework guiding the dissertation. In Chapter Three, I will discuss the historical origin of the Taiwan issue and the relations between Beijing and Taipei. Specifically, I will address issues pertaining to how general foreign policy theorizing and the China-Taiwan specific case can be synthesized. 4 For example, in 1995 and 1996, in the midst of Taiwan’s first ever direct presidential election, the PRC carried out military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The missile crises were considered a major escalation of crisis between the PRC and Taiwan. Tensions between the two sides could escalate again at any time. 10 The main analyses of the dissertation include three substantively and thematically linked core chapters, Chapter Four through Chapter Six. Chapter Four has a focus on the domestic determinants of foreign policy. This chapter focuses on the issue of non- military diversion of in the Taiwan Strait. Traditionally, diversionary theory scholars argue that when in trouble at home, political elites may engage in using military force overseas or taking advantage of an existing international crisis to divert the public’s attention away from the problem at hand. The reason behind this kind of foreign policy decisions is to react to a domestic problem. In Chapter Four, I study a new form of diversionary, the Taiwanese presidents’ engagement in pro-independence or pro- unification rhetoric as a diversion for domestic problems. I argue, among other things, that Taiwanese leaders have strategically use the issue of independence or unification as a means to address their domestic concerns, such as a sinking approval rating or high unemployment and inflation rates. This shows evidence that foreign policy decisions are determined by domestic reasons. Findings in this chapter show strong evidence supporting the diversionary proposition. Leaders in Taiwan have strategically used the issue of independence/unification as a means to divert the public’s attention away from Taiwan’s domestic problems. In Chapter Five, I focus on external or international determinants of foreign policy by analyzing events data in the Taiwan Strait. Events data analysis is used. The analysis in this chapter reveals that for China, Beijing is very much concerned about Taiwan’s recent process of democratization. Taiwan’s internal political changes, such as the consolidation of a strong multi-party system and the public’s popular participation and contestation in Taiwan’s domestic politics, have had a significant influence on how 11 Taiwan’s mainland policy is made. China, according to the events data analysis, reacts to both Taiwan’s internal political change and Taipei’s overall policy towards the mainland. Beijing seems to be less concerned about what its domestic public demands in regard to the relationship with Taiwan. 5 Beijing appears to react to an international or external issue directly to address it. This shows some evidence of external determinants of foreign policy. Equally important however, the events data analysis further strengthens findings of Chapter Four that as Taiwan continues to consolidate its democracy; domestic concerns have been playing a more important role in shaping Taiwan’s foreign policy. Chapter Six serves as an in-depth case study by accessing the issue of nationalism and identity change to further examine the different findings from Chapter Four and Chapter Five and provide alternative explanations. Democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have caused Taiwanese and Chinese to build two unique types of nationalism and political identity. The changes of nationalism and political identity have led to a growing level of political divergence in the Taiwan Strait. Reunification seems to be drifting away. Taiwan’s democratic transformation has created a different political and national identity for people in Taiwan. People in Taiwan now are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The political divergence has also made the Chinese identity more significantly different than it had been from that of the Taiwanese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has forced the government in Beijing to accommodate citizens’ demand to act 5 This observation, as it will become apparent through the discussion in Chapter Six, is not completely true. Beijing does care about the opinions of its citizens, as China’s nationalism continues to get stronger. More discussion about this point will be provided in later chapters. 12 more toughly towards Taiwan. Even an authoritarian regime like China has to consider domestic demands when making foreign policy decisions. This case study chapter explains the lack of significance of the internal factors in China’s foreign policy decision making process, as shown in Chapter Four. Chapter Six also serves as the theoretical and empirical synthesis of the previous two chapters. And finally in Chapter Seven, I summarize the key findings of the project, provide reflections on lessons learned, explore some ramifications, and discuss directions for future research. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In this dissertation, I use a combination of statistical analysis and in-depth case study. In both Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to test the hypotheses. There are two main reasons that such a dynamic model is used. First, for both the diversionary logic and rally-round-the-flag logic in Chapter Four and the events data in Chapter Five, I expect simultaneous interactions between two interrelated political processes. As a result, interactions in the Taiwan Strait are not sequential interactions, but simultaneous instead. Thus, a dynamic model is more appropriate in these cases. The second reason the SUR model is used is that I expect that errors in each set of the two statistical equations are correlated. Therefore, I use the SUR to control for these errors in both Chapter Four and Chapter Five. Quantitative statistical analysis alone, however, does not tell the full story. Particularly, the case of China-Taiwan is not a cross-national study of all nations in the 13 world. In order to search for alternative explanations for the findings revealed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five and synthesize these results, I will conduct an in-depth case analysis of the issues of nationalism, identity change and regime type in Chapter Six. Chapter Six will provide further discussions about the foreign policy making process in the Taiwan Strait from social and historical perspectives. This chapter will serve as a synthesizing mechanism for the dissertation. It also will provide an alternative framework to help understand the foreign policy decision making in the context of China- Taiwan. SUMMARY Through a combination of empirical analysis and an in-depth case study, this dissertation project takes a close look at the foreign policy decision making process in the Taiwan Strait. For a long time, scholars have debated the impacts of internal and external determinants of foreign policy decision making. Yet, the conditions under which each group of factors is more influential in their respective foreign policy contexts remain undetermined. Moreover, most existing studies have a primary focus on western democracies and/or major powers. Many existing studies are limited to one type of analysis, namely quantitative or qualitative, in their respective cases. This dissertation attempts to address the above mentioned weaknesses by putting the case of foreign policy decision making in the Taiwan Strait in the general context of foreign policy decision making. It examines both levels of foreign policy decision making – external and internal – through the same cases in the Taiwan Strait. By doing 14 so, it creates a controlled environment in which conditions for both external and internal factors of foreign policy decision making are compared and contrasted. The dissertation project also shifts focus from cases primarily involving western democracies and major powers to cases involving middle power new democracy (Taiwan) and non-democracies (China). It contributes to the expanding of theory and literature on foreign policy analysis in general. It also aims at creating or expanding middle range theories to further advance the field of foreign policy analysis. Data analysis confirms the two main hypotheses about internal determinants of foreign policy: Diversionary and Opposition Hypotheses. In regard to the diversionary theory in general, findings provide significant support for such behavior in the Taiwan Strait. In a more general sense, this encourages further breadth of application for at least the diversionary components of the present model; it should be adapted to other contexts, most notably, additional middle powers, and subjected to testing there. Moreover, diversionary behavior should not be understood only in a limited, military sense. Non- military diversionary behavior can be used by foreign policy decision-makers to achieve diversionary effects. Empirical evidence gathered in Chapter Four shows strong evidence for internal determinants of foreign policy. The analysis of the events data in the Taiwan Strait shows even more interesting and promising findings. From a more general foreign policy analysis perspective – the tale tells that from China’s point of view – China’s policies toward Taiwan are largely driven by Taiwan’s internal politics and Taiwan’s China policies, thereby displaying a pattern of external determinants of China’s foreign policy. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, there is strong evidence of domestic determinants of Taiwan’s foreign policies. 15 Taiwan’s policy towards China is more likely to be determined by its domestic relations. Democracy has forever altered the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. Bearing the empirical findings in mind, particularly the counterintuitive observations in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, Chapter Six uses a qualitative approach to examine what has been missing in the quantitative chapters. The chapter examines the issue of nationalism and identity change, which are ultimately linked to the issue of regime type, from a constructivist perspective. Chapter Six suggests that because of Taiwan’s recent democratization and mainland China’s authoritarianism, the different social experiences on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have formed two fundamentally different nationalisms and social identities. Particularly, Taiwanese now view themselves as fundamentally different from Chinese. This difference is social and cultural in essence. In spite of the evidence of continued economic integration, nationalism and identity change have made Taiwan and mainland China drifting further and further away from a potential reunification. Decision making in the Taiwan Strait is indeed influenced by a combination of “internal” and “external” factors. The lack of “spillover” from economic integration into political stability is fundamentally social. The “two level” game is in no way clear-cut - not only between internal and external factors but also between economic (or rational choice) and social factors. But generally speaking, domestic factors seem to carry more weight when political leaders make foreign policy decisions. Finally, the dissertation project will also identify areas of interests for future research. For example, if the non-military diversionary behavior in the China-Taiwan case holds true, one can naturally speculate whether similar behaviors would hold true in other countries’ foreign policy decision making processes. Therefore, as one area of 16 future research, the scope of non-military forms of diversion can be certainly expanded to cases involving other countries as well. Additionally, verbal rhetoric has been used in the China-Taiwan case as a format of non-military diversion. Other forms of diversion could also be examined in the future. Another goal of future research is how to further integrate unique cases such as China-Taiwan and the general theorizing of foreign policy analysis and international relations. The purpose is to continue answer the calls for evaluating middle range theories which involve both substantive and methodological integrations. Through this process, social theories such as constructivism which deals with issues regarding values and ideas should also be included in the study of foreign policy decision making. 17 Chapter 2 Middle-Range Theory Building in Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign Policy Analysis as a subfield of International Relations and Political Science has been in existence for several decades. Unlike the study of international relations in general, foreign policy analysis has a strong focus on the decision making processes and the policy consequences of foreign policy actions. Using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, scholars have studied foreign policy issues ranging from events data (Goldstein, 1992; Schrodt, 1995; Bond et al, 2003; McClelland, 1978), individual cognition and personality 6 (Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Walker Schafer and Young, 1999; Neustadt and May, 1986; Neustadt, 1990), institutional constraints (Allison, 1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; James and Oneal; 1991; James and Rioux, 1998), dyadic interactions between or among nation-states 7 (Oneal, Lian, and Joyner, Jr., 1996; 6 For studies that focus on individual level of analysis, see for example: Jentleson (1992); Trubowitz (1992); Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993); Sylvan, Ostrom and Gannon (1994); Hermann and Kegley (1995); Van Belle (1996); Farkas (1996); Foyle (1997); Bonham, Sergeev and Parshin (1997); Trumbore (1998); Astorino-Courtois (1998); Bjereld and Ekengren (1999); Page and Barabas (2000); Stewart, Hermann and Hermann (1989); Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida (1989); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990); Taber (1992); Mintz et al (1997); Baum (2002); Kanwisher (1989); Marra, Ostrom, and Simon. (1990); Nincic and Hinckley (1991); Jordan and Page (1992); Nincic (1992); Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk (1993); Lian and Oneal (1993); Mintz (1993); Astorino-Courtois (1995); Young (1996); Schafer and Crichlow (1996); Kowert and Hermann (1997); Levi and Whyte (1997); Walker, Schafer, and Young (1999); McGinnis (2000); Geva, Mayhar and Skorick (2000); Gordon and Arian (2001); Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger (2002); Redd (2002); DeRouen and Sprecher (2004); Christensen and Redd (2004); Mintz (2004); Stern (2004); Baum (2004); Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1990); Holsti and Rosenau (1990); Rosati (2000); Lepgold and Lamborn (2003); Kull and Ramsay (2000); Mintz (2005); Brulé (2005); Kinne (2005); Redd (2005); Vasquez (2005); and James and Zhang (2005). 7 For studies that focus on nation-state level of analysis, see for example: Biddle and Stephens (1989); Karvonen and Sundelius (1990); Citrin et al (1994); Meernik (1994); Oneal, Lian, and Joyner, Jr. (1996); Blanton (2005); Remmer (2004); Marinov (2005); Evangelista (1989); Wilkenfeld (1991); Powlick (1991); Ward and Rajmaira (1992); Van Wyk and Radloff (1993); DeRouen (1995); Wang (1996); O'Brien (1996); Bond et al (1997); Morgan and Palmer (2000); Bennett and Nordstrom (2000); Regan (2000); Moore (2000); Chapman and Reiter. (2004); Volgy and Schwarz (1991); James and Hristoulas (1994); Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998); Moore and Lanoue (2003); Miers and Morgan (2002); Brenner, Haney, and Vanderbush (2002); Howard (2004); Signorino and Ritter (1999); Papayoanou (1997); and Kegley and Hook (1991). 18 Wilkenfeld, 1991) to the impact of the international system 8 on foreign policy (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985; Paul, 2005; Page, 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005). Especially in recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. While significant progress has been made in the study of foreign policy analysis, disagreements in several major areas remain. The most unique issue scholars of foreign policy analysis must deal with is the linkage between domestic politics and international relations. Politics never “stops at the water’s edge”. Foreign policies often reflect domestic interests; domestic politics are often correlated with international politics as well. However, scholars have disagreed on which set of factors is more determining and under which conditions each set of factors is more important. Equally important is how country-specific cases can contribute to the general understanding of foreign policy behavior. In particular, how do Asian states, such as China and Taiwan 9 behave differently or otherwise from western ones, especially western democracies? On the one hand, some scholars argue that the cultural, social and historical uniqueness of the Chinese nation has prevented Chinese politics and Chinese foreign policy as well as those of Taiwan from being integrated into the general study of foreign policy analysis. But even Rosenau (1994: 528) points out that “only through a resort to 8 Other examples of system level of analysis include Carlsnaes (1992); Doty (1993); Rajmaira and Ward (1990); and Doran (1989). 9 Here I treat mainland China and Taiwan as two separate political entities for the purposes of this dissertation project. A more detailed justification about why I treat the relationship between Beijing and Taipei as foreign relations is provided in Chapters Three and Four. The main aim is to examine whether Asian countries follow different foreign policy decision making patterns from those of the West, which are the conventional focus of modeling. 19 theorizing can we begin to sort out the competing dynamics that differentiate the important from the trivial dimensions of China’s role and thereby clarify the interplay of the sources which underlie its conduct.” So, should Chinese or Taiwanese foreign policy be considered as just another “sample” in the “large-N” style comparative foreign policy studies? If so, how can the China-Taiwan case be integrated into this generalization process? On the other hand, China scholars have been puzzled by the question of “why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” (Qin, 2007) Is Chinese foreign policy decision making, and more generally, East Asian foreign policy, a unique process? If so, should integration be necessary and beneficial or even possible to the general understanding of foreign policy processes? This chapter first reviews the theoretical development of linkage politics. It will then discuss how the country-specific case of China-Taiwan can contribute to the general understanding of foreign policy analysis as a process of middle-range theory building. The discussion will lay down the foundation for using the case of China-Taiwan as a focal point to further expand the study of foreign policy analysis. LINKAGE POLITICS The central issue of this dissertation is the interaction between domestic and international politics in the context of foreign policy analysis. In fact, several generations of foreign policy scholars have been examining this unique linkage in the past several 20 decades. 10 Among several early explorers of this topic, Rosenau (1969: 2) points out very early on that there has been a lack of “systematic, sustained and comparative inquiry” on national-international linkages. His push for a more intensified study of “linkage politics” has served as a major guiding framework for scholars of foreign policy analysis in the decades to come. Especially in an anarchical international system, the nation-state has been seen as the primary actor in international relations and foreign policy. For example, both traditional realism and liberalism assume that states are the main actors (Morgenthau, 1954; Keohane, 1977). National boundaries have naturally served as a dividing line between domestic and international politics. Serving as an intermediate option, linkage politics 11 has helped scholars to study both the external and internal determinants of foreign policy. To some, there is no strong correlation between foreign and domestic conflict behavior (Rummel, 1963). Yet to others, international relations at the system level could be compared to billiard balls colliding on a table (Morgenthau, 1954; Waltz, 1979). From the latter point of view, therefore what goes on domestically should not matter much for how states behave externally. This might be regarded as a hard-line realist view of the 10 Neack et al (1995: 2-3) divide the existing studies on foreign policy analysis into two generations. The first generation is often referred to as “comparative foreign policy (CFP)”; and the second is “foreign policy analysis (FPA)”. The first generation of foreign policy analysis can be characterized as descriptive; it “had as one of its primary goals a desire to move away from noncumulative descriptive case studies and to construct a parsimonious explanation of what drives the foreign policy behavior of states”; whereas the second generation includes “a broad set of approaches bound together by a common focus on studying foreign policy and an acceptance of eclecticism in theory building”. 11 Scholars, such as Waltz (1959), refer to the nation-state level analysis of foreign policy as the “second image”. Human behavior is referred to as “first image” and international system is referred to as the “third image”. 21 world, in which interstate relations are everything in world politics and fundamentally independent from intrastate processes. But even in a balance-of-power 12 international system, domestic politics could influence state capacities (Fordham, 2004), alliance formation (Walt, 1985) and interest formation (Finnemore, 1996), just to name a few possibilities. The result of balance of power at the system level could also impact on how states behave internally as a result of system balancing. Thus, the linkage between domestic and international politics is still crucial, even if one is inclined toward a primarily state-centric view of the world. By now, however, most of us – even realists - believe that domestic and international politics are often entangled to some degree. The question is not only about whether they are connected and which group of factors would determine which. More importantly, the question is about “when” and “how” such entanglement would occur (Putnam, 1988). This initial conceptualization of this linkage was non-simultaneous. On the one hand, domestic factors could have international effects as described in what Waltz (1959) calls the “second image”. And on the other hand, international factors 12 Recent discussion has shifted focus from the traditional “hard balancing” to the new form of “soft balancing”. For example, T.V. Paul (2005) argues that since the end of the Cold War, second-tier major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, and Russia have mostly abandoned traditional ‘hard balancing’ – based on countervailing alliances and arms buildups – at the systemic level. Instead, they have begun to engage in “soft balancing,” which involves the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the UN, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the US goes beyond its stated goals. In addressing the Bush administration’s foreign policy strategies since the 2001 terrorist attacks and war in Iraq, Pape (2005) argues that the aggressively unilateral U.S. approach has encouraged major powers to begin balancing against the U.S. This is done not through costly hard-balancing, but more economically and low-key soft-balancing measures, such as through the channels of international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements. Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), however, argue that Paul’s and Pape’s respective arguments on soft-balancing are fundamentally flawed. They claim that occasional resistance to U.S. actions does not mean other major powers are necessarily balancing against the U.S. The soft-balancing explanation was reached only because soft-balancing proponents could not provide reasonable alternative explanations for the current international structure. Foreign policy analysis at the system level remains an important factor in explaining international relations. 22 could also have a “second image reversed” effect on domestic politics (Gourevitch, 1978). But is it always so? Putnam (1988), through a game theoretical analysis, introduces a more complex yet realistic conceptualization of how diplomacy and domestic politics interact. In what he calls a “two-level game”, Putnam (1998: 434 and 460) states that: At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign…Unlike state-centric theories, the two- level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what “national interest” requires. Unlike the “Second Image” or the “Second Image Reversed,” the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously [emphasis added]. Therefore, the linkage between domestic and international politics is not only strong but also more sophisticated than what we initially believed. Keep this simultaneous relationship in mind, existing literature on linkage politics can be roughly divided into two groups of studies: domestic determinants of international politics and international determinants of domestic politics. Domestic Determinants of International Politics The national boundaries that allow nation-states to enjoy their sovereign rights make domestic politics a special domain of political importance when it comes to relations with other nations. It is commonly expected that domestic politics play an important role in determining how nations behave externally on the international stage. Rosecrance 23 (1963), after examining nine distinct European systems in the 1740 – 1960 period, argues that “the primary determinant of international stability and peace was internal stability and the resulting security of political elites, whereas domestic turmoil and elite insecurity were associated with war.” (Also see Levy, 1989: 265) Wright (1965: 140) claims that “foreign war as a remedy for internal tension, revolution, or insurrection has been an accepted principle of government.” In the vast literature on domestic determinants of international politics, I mainly use several studies on the use of force, domestic opposition and public opinion as an example to illustrate this causal relationship. Many studies have been done to examine the domestic political constraints on foreign policy. Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, examine the relationship between domestic political factors and the use of force by U.S. presidents. They find that domestic and especially political factors are indeed influential in shaping U.S. presidents’ decisions to use force overseas. Morgan and Bickers (1992: 41 and 45), through a probit analysis, suggest that “the likelihood of a U.S. initiated [military] action increases sharply as the level of partisan support for the president falls”, and the lower the partisan approval the more quickly the U.S. is expected to engage in aggressive actions. These findings suggest that international actions may not be sincere responses to certain international problems. These actions could merely be reactions to certain domestic political needs. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990) examine the impact of domestic political opposition on foreign policy. They argue that “an antagonist’s beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.” (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990: 747) Domestic risks and costs could also be reasons that prompt political elites to take military or other 24 form of actions overseas. Fearon (1994: 577) claims that troop deployments and public threats are public events in which domestic audiences observe and assess the performance of the leadership, and “if fighting entails any cost or risk, then rational leaders would not chose war until they had concluded that attack was justified by sufficiently low chance of an acceptable diplomatic settlement.” Similarly, leaders who put their nation in war would subject themselves to a domestic political hazard that threatens the very essence of the office-holding (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Therefore, they must seriously consider the costs and risks of engaging their nation in war before any actions can be taken. Domestic economic reasons could influence nation-states’ external behaviors as well. DeRouen’s (1995) analysis shows that worsening economy, such as high inflation and/or unemployment rates, increases the probability of the U.S. to enter an international crisis. It is interesting to note that a worsening economy is often correlated with low level of presidential popularity. Therefore, economic reasons are often consistent with political reasons in regard to nation-states’ international behaviors. It is worth noting that a subgroup of the literature on domestic determinants of foreign policy focuses on the issue of diversionary theory. This group of studies will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. In brief terms, diversionary theory argues that leaders take advantage of the rally-around-the-flag effect from the public. This vision of interstate conflict asserts that when a troubled leader pursues international diversionary activities, the domestic public can be expected to rally around its leader against the outside adversary (Mueller, 1973; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Edwards and Gallup, 1990; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; 25 James and Oneal, 1991; James and Rioux, 1998). Political leaders can often “kill two birds with one stone” by diverting the public’s attention away from domestic problems and create a public rally to increase their political approval. For example, some argue that President Bill Clinton authorized the bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 to divert the public’s attention away from the Monica Lewinsky scandal (although convincing evidence is lacking). By the same token, Argentine president Leopoldo Galtieri arguably enhanced his political power, at least temporarily in terms of his popularity, in the midst of severe economic crisis by invading the Falkland Islands (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995: 841). In such cases, foreign policy decisions are usually not made in reaction to international crises but domestic political or economic crises instead. Among all the factors that might lead nation-states to engage in military actions, military capabilities in particular play a crucial role in determining a state’s use of force. With the U.S. as the focus of investigation, Fordham (2004) examines the relationship between military capabilities and American decisions to use force since World War II. By constructing a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model, he suggests that the possession of a very sharp sword (military capabilities) can increase the frequency with which force is used; however, he argues, “there is little evidence that this relationship stems from policy maker’s endogenous anticipation of their choices about the use of force when procuring military capabilities” (Fordham, 2004: 653). He further suggests that: 1) finding that presidents are more likely to use military force when they have greater military capabilities is not the same as finding that military buildups or arms races lead to international military conflict”; 2) use of 26 force should not be equated to militarized interstate disputes; and 3) “international conflict is a systemic outcome, whereas the foreign policy decisions of particular states are unit-level events. Fordham’s findings show that what nation-states can do depends on what they possess. This also partially explains why major powers are more likely to engage in international actions than smaller ones. The above findings significantly challenge the traditional realist, particularly neorealist (e.g. Waltz, 1979) assertion that the international system structure will determine the interactions among states and hence their foreign policies. In other words, states are more than actors that act simply in response to their respective capabilities, such as the balance of power in a structural sense. Domestic politics and foreign policies should not be seen as independent to each other. Politics at home, in short, play an important role in shaping a state’s foreign policy. International Determinants of Domestic Politics It is clear that domestic politics plays a pivotal role in how nation-states behave externally. An examination of the “second image reversed” reveals that what happens outside of a country’s border could have significant impacts on domestic politics as well. From a non-strategic behavior’s stand point, international determinants of domestic politics should be the default option of how foreign policy decisions are made. In the classic work, Essence of Decision, by Allison (1971) and later Allison and Zelikow (1999), three models of foreign policy decision making are discussed. A careful review of the three models points to one key assumption: the United States faced a genuine threat from the Soviet Union during the 13 days in October 1962. Whether it was 27 the rational ranking of possible policy options for specific objectives in the Rational Actor Model, the utilization of the “standard operation procedures” to achieve certain goals in the Organizational Behavior Model, or the “pulling and hauling that is politics” in the Governmental Politics Model (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), the missile threat posed externally by the Soviet Union served as the driving force behind the interactions among different domestic individuals and/or governmental agencies, which eventually produced foreign policies to address the external issue. International crises, including wars, can have far bigger consequences than merely forcing domestic actors to respond. Inappropriately handled foreign crises can spill over into domestic domains and cause radical changes. For example, Laqueur (1968: 501, cited in Levy, 1989: 267) argues that “war appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of revolutionary situations in modern times…[because] the general dislocation caused by war, the material losses and human sacrifices, create a climate conducive to radical change.” At least to some degree, external war can generate internal conflict by exhausting manpower, supplies, and other economic sources, and weakening a government’s domestic commitments (Tilly, 1975). When examining the “second image reversed” relationship, Gourevitch (1978: 911) argues, “the international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them…Economic relations and military pressures constrain an entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms.” International politics should not be taken for granted to bring about changes domestically. Many studies on the U.S. use of force have centered on the issue of the rally- around-the-flag effect. The rally-around-the-flag effect argument assumes that public 28 support for the president is likely to increase in time of crisis. Political elites’ performance in the international arena can affect their political survivability at home (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). If a political leader does well in handling certain international crisis, his popularity is expected to increase. Otherwise, his popularity may fall. For example, President George H. W. Bush’s presidential popularity skyrocketed after he had authorized military actions during the first Gulf War. Similarly, President George W. Bush’s popularity increased dramatically immediately after the 9/11 attacks. However, after the U.S. involvement in the two respective wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly when no major visible changes to the American public have occurred, President Bush’s approval rating has begun to plummet. Especially when casualties begin to increase, not only in the current wars with Afghanistan and Iraq, but also as evidenced in previous wars in Korea and Vietnam, presidential popularity is usually expected to fall (Muller, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; James and Rioux, 1998). Furthermore, the rally effect also seems to depend on the level of presidential response to any given crisis, namely higher level of response is likely to lead to stronger rally effect (James and Rioux, 1998). The studies of the rally-around-the-flag effect is “an important component of second image reversed linkages of international and domestic politics and necessarily lie[s] at the heart of any diversionary theory of war” (Chapman and Reiter, 2004: 886). The implication for the rally effect suggests that political leaders could strategically take advantage of the expected boost in popularity by intentionally engaging in foreign policy behavior that would lead to such popularity spike. This strategic behavior illustrates what Putnam (1988) refers to as the simultaneous interaction between domestic and international two-level game. 29 The recent process of globalization has made issues at the international level increasingly more important and effective in influencing domestic politics. Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe the widely cited “boomerang dynamic” through which domestic individuals channel information to transactional actors in the hope to generate international pressure on the local government to resolve domestic problems, such as human rights violations. Haas (1990) explains how the international environmental cooperation among scientists from16 European member states through the “epistemic community” pressured the national governments and helped save the Mediterranean Sea. Transnational networks, such as the Campaign to Ban Landmines, in collaboration with interested states such as Canada, led major campaigns which resulted the signing of the Ottawa Treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines in 1997 (Rutherford, 2000). China’s long journey to access the World Trade Organization (WTO) is another good example of how international economy regulations can force domestic governments to make economic and political changes. In order to gain entry to the WTO, China must liberalize its market to comply with international economic standards. For a traditionally centrally-planned economy, this means that China must transform its state-directed market into a free economy. Among many steps of reforms, “In December 1996 China brought itself into compliance with the International Monetary Fund’s article 8 by abolishing restrictions on convertibility of RMB to foreign exchange in transactions under current account” (Yabuki and Harner, 1999: 238), bringing China a major step closer to its final entry into the WTO. After years of market reforms, China finally became a member of the WTO in 2001. 30 Linkage politics shows that the relationship between domestic and international politics is a dynamic one. Domestic and international politics have become increasingly interdependent with each other. In spite of the extensive research that has been done on linkage politics, there are still unsolved puzzles in this area, such as what role country- specific cases play in further understanding the process of linkage politics and whether different research methodologies can be integrated to study foreign policy, just to name a few. In the rest of the Chapter, I elaborate how the case of China-Taiwan can be brought in to further unpack the puzzles of linkage politics. IN SEARCH OF THEORY FOR CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY In spite of the significant advancements made by previous foreign policy scholars, two major issues still remain: 1) whether and how should country specific cases (e.g., the Chinese and/or Taiwanese foreign policy case 13 ), be integrated into the general study of foreign policy analysis; and 2) can and should there be ‘Chinese’ international relations and/or foreign policy theory? Because of its unique cultural, social and historical characteristics, the China case, including the foreign policy of Taiwan, has often been viewed by many as an “outlier” which cannot be understood in the same way that we have understood other countries’ 13 In this dissertation project, I treat the relationship between China and Taiwan as external to each other since their de facto separation from 1949. Therefore, Beijing and Taipei make their own foreign policies towards each other and towards other countries. For example, Hickey (2007) discusses in full length the foreign policy decision making processes in Taiwan. For the discussion in this chapter, I use Chinese foreign policy and Taiwanese foreign policy interchangeably. The aim of this section is not to distinguish the different foreign policy decision making processes between Beijing and Taipei. But rather, I aim to argue that East Asian foreign policy, including that of China and Taiwan, can be integrated into the general study of foreign policy. 31 foreign policy decision making processes. In other words, the China case, and many similar Asian cases, can not be theorized. Take East Asian security as an example, the majority of the existing literature on East Asian security has an overwhelming focus on the substantive issues in the region. For one reason or another, there has been a disconnection between East Asian security studies and theorizing. Many scholars have realized the limitation of the lack of theoretical approaches in regional studies, and have attempted to bridge the gap. Buzan and Waever (2003), for instance, take a complex regional approach by introducing the Regional Security Complex (RSC) Theory (RSCT) to study the structure of international security. Specifically, they reject the notion that international relations in East Asia are somehow unique, and that general theories of international system cannot be applied to it (Richardso, 1994; Mahbunani, 1995; Kang, 1995, cited in Buzan and Waever, 2003). In spite of the lack of data and openness, evidence suggests that Chinese, as well as Taiwanese, foreign policy decision making can be compared to those of the western countries. It is indeed an interactive process involving the internal and external dynamics of Chinese politics and that resembles the world in general. Rosenau (1994: 527) points out that the theorizing of Chinese foreign policy “would have to treat Chinese foreign policy as the product of both internal and external pressures and to view those who make and conduct the foreign policy of China as located astride the crucial points wherein the dynamics of international and domestic politics converge and either remain in tension or are synthesized into coherent and enduring behavior.” In other words, what has long been considered as the “black box” of Chinese foreign policy decision making needs to be unpacked and can be unpacked. This speculation has been further strengthened by 32 prospects for understanding policy making within Taiwan’s increasingly more open and democratic system. Taiwan shares many cultural, social and historical similarities with the mainland. As it continues to democratize, the previously “black box” has been gradually opened at least in an indirect way. Both Chinese and Taiwanese foreign policy decision making processes are interactions between their respective internal and external dynamics. The country specific China-Taiwan case should be and can be integrated into the general study of foreign policy analysis. From the research methodology perspective, “most explanations of Chinese foreign policy decisions have emphasized the imperatives of national interests, cultural tradition, or ideology.” (Bobrow, Chan and Kringen, 1979: 21) Most of the subject matter tends to be presented in a historical or normative fashion. As a result, “the study of Chinese foreign relations largely lacks systematic analyses that map policy situations, identify behavior patterns, or estimate the parameters of international interactions.” (Bobrow, Chan and Kringen, 1979: 27) This statement rings true 30 years later. In particular, quantitative analysis of Chinese foreign policy and Taiwanese foreign policy remains very limited. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis is most conducive to the better understanding of the foreign policy decision making in the Taiwan Strait. The quantitative analysis may help identify similar patterns of Chinese/Taiwanese foreign policy decision making to those of foreign policy analysis in general, as will be shown in Chapters Four and Five. The qualitative analysis will help address the uniqueness of Chinese foreign policy, as will be shown in Chapter Six. Nevertheless, the uniqueness should be acknowledged and must be taken into consideration when theorizing about Chinese foreign policy. Several distinctions need to 33 be made with regard to the issue of theory or theorizing. First of all, the concept of theory is somewhat different in the Chinese context from that of the West. In the West, two types of theory are developed: 1) “the harder positivist definition of theory dominant in the United States”, and 2) “the softer reflectivist definition prevalent in Europe.” (Acharya and Buzan, 2007, cited in Qin, 2007: 314) The “democratic peace theory” is one example of the former type of theory and the Marxist theory is an instance of the latter one. In the Chinese context, however, “a theory is not much different from a doctrine, an ideology, or a set of propositions serving as a guiding principle for action…Therefore, international relations theory, as understood by the Chinese, is not only an explanatory tool or a prism through which world affairs are observed, but more importantly a guide for international action and foreign policy” (Wang, 1994: 483). Mao Zedong Thought, often consisting of speeches or writings made by Mao Zedong, is usually considered as of great theoretical value and therefore carried out as supreme guiding principles of the nation. Although many of his speeches had no “theory” in the western sense at all, they are still considered as theories, or doctrines to be more precise. Take Mao Zedong’s theory on the “people” vs. “enemy” as an example, Mao (1975:2-3) asserted: We are confronted by two types of social contradictions – those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people themselves. The two are totally different in their nature…To understand these two different types of contradictions correctly, we must first be clear on what is meant by ‘the people’ and what is meant by ‘the enemy’…At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favor , support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people. 34 Mao’s theory appears to be normative rather than empirical. Most of his theories are often subjective opinions. Nonetheless, they are considered theories in the Chinese context. The different presumption of theory in the Chinese context gives international relations theories different meanings. Wang Jisi (1994: 492) argues that if Chinese politics are basically “an art of adjusting human relationships (guanxi)…,” world politics or foreign affairs are essentially “interstate relations.” Therefore, theories of foreign affairs or international relations are often considered as specific guidelines or doctrines to conduct foreign relations with other countries rather than theories of international relations in the Western sense. Moreover, Chinese politics and foreign policy do not rely on a legalistic approach or a positivist approach. This characteristic is deeply rooted in Chinese political culture. Wang (1994: 493) argues that “the Chinese polity is peculiarly reliant upon ethics more than law, upon moral consensus more than judicial procedure, upon benevolent government more than checks and balances.” Such political culture has made “ambiguity” a deliberate strategy in dealing with both domestic and foreign policy issues (Wang, 1994). The ambiguous relationship with Taiwan is a good example. The PRC and Taiwan particularly under the KMT rule have intentionally left the issue of future reunification ambiguous. The “1992 Consensus”, for instance, allows China and Taiwan to interpret what the “one China” means in different ways. The ambiguity could potentially give space to both sides to save face while they continue their engagement with each other. This has made the theorizing and integrating of Chinese foreign policy into the general study of foreign policy more difficult. 35 Qin Yaqing (2007: 314), another prominent Chinese international relations theory scholar, argues that there are three types of different yet interrelated theory-related research: “(i) original theory, which is new theory incommensurable to the existing theories (Type I), (ii) introductory and critical analysis of an original theory (Type II), and (iii) application and testing of a theory (Type III).” By Type I theory, Qin (2007: 314) refers to theories in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970): a theory that has core assumptions “that are not commensurable with core assumptions in another distinct theory”. A Type II theory often contains no new theory and only gives a good account of the original theory. A Type III theory only verifies or falsifies existing theories. Analysis by Qin (2007) shows that while there has been Type II and Type III theorizing, there has been no Type I theorizing in China, largely due to three reasons: the unconsciousness of “international-ness”, the dominance of Western IR discourse, and the lack of a theoretical core. Qin’s argument may be fundamentally flawed. Grand theories of international relations, such as the balance of power theory (Waltz, 1979) and the balance of threat theory (Walt, 1985) are often country- or case – free in terms of their articulation. 14 Chinese international relations theory of Type I might be too much of an ambition, at least at this moment in time. Especially given the different presumptions for international relations theories articulated by Wang Jisi, Chinese international relations theories are often doctrines rather than theories in the Western sense. Chinese international relations theories are very likely to be culturally and socially Chinese specific. Therefore, they 14 I do not dispute the fact that grand theories ultimately depend on how countries and/regions interact with each other. Grant theories can often be applied without any specific countries/regions involved. 36 may lack the grandness of theorizing. Formulation of a theory of Chinese foreign policy theory, on the other hand, may be possible. Foreign policy theories are often middle- range as of observed even decades ago (Rosenau, 1966). Type II and Type III theorizing has been very active in the community of Chinese politics. Scholars in both mainland China and Taiwan, however, have been quite suspicious about the behavioralist approach, commonly found in Type III theorizing. Many believe that Western [behavioralist] theorists are “‘empty talkers’ or tend to use incomprehensible methods to reach conclusions that finally turn out to be common sense.” (Wang, 1994: 497) I would argue that such suspicion is at least partially caused by the lack of a full understanding about the behavioralist methodology and how it can be used as a complementary research tool to the traditionally historical and normative methodologies. Moreover, Lynch (2006a: 93) points out that “to Chinese IR specialists, the world effectively begins in 1648 at Westphalia, because to them, the Treaty of Westphalia marks the origins of multipolarity…” Arguably, the China-centric world view had already been shaped before the Treaty of Westphalia. Type I grand theory building might be linked to the China-centric world view prior to 1648. However, Chinese IR scholars seem to believe that the ancient world order in East Asia, particularly the one that is centered on China, was largely unipolar. “Yet hegemony and unipolarity, to contemporary Chinese IR scholars, are both immoral and impossible” and only “multipolarity is eternal”. (Lynch, 2006a: 93) Therefore, Chinese IR scholars’ insistence on developing IR theories based on the multipolar world order since Westphalia, coupled 37 with the short time span of Chinese history since 1648, has made the theorizing of Chinese international relations particularly difficult. 15 Additionally, the theorizing of Chinese international relations is also driven by the government’s priorities in pursuing issues of national interests at the international level. For instance, a brief review of the recent Chinese foreign relations reveals that China does seem to have a set of firm strategies in dealing with its foreign relations. Sutter’s (2008: 3) analysis shows that “the Chinese leadership is seen as determined to avoid foreign confrontation as it pursues economic development at home and abroad”. To achieve this priority, the Chinese leadership is believed to be willing to accept the “prevailing international and regional balance of power” and avoid at all costs any disruptive activities that might endanger China’s economic development priority. Christensen (2001), on the other hand, argues that while China does seem to have three main strategic goals, namely “(1) regime security; (2) preserving territorial integrity; and (3) gain prestige, power, and respect on the international stage”, these goals can be just “a rich menu of sometimes contradictory goals in a complex world that does not allow for a unified master plan” (also see Sutter, 2008: 7). Regardless of the presence or the lack of a strategic plan in Chinese foreign relations, most of the issues facing the Chinese leadership today tend to be associated with middle-range theories of foreign policy. Finally, from the methodological perspective, Wang (1994: 500) further argues that “research work on Chinese peculiarities in the PRC’s international behavior has not included enough quantitatively and qualitatively to be theoretically successful.” After all, 15 Another reason Lynch (2006a: 94) offers is that “Chinese IR specialists are reluctant to discuss pre- Westphalian East Asia. The order of affairs that existed at that time was at best impossible and at worst immoral; moreover, the predominantly immoral actor was ‘China’.” 38 theory building is a crucial process to further advance knowledge building. Country specific cases, especially cases involving Chinese foreign policy, should be integrated into the general study of foreign policy. At the same time, the uniqueness of Chinese politics and foreign policy must be taken into consideration. SUMMARY All things considered, mid-theory building remains the best way toward integration and synthesis of the Chinese foreign policy subfield with the general literature of international relations and foreign policy analysis. By and large, foreign policy inevitably involves how individual actors and decision makers behave in the context of nation-states and international system. Actors at individual, nation-states and international system levels interact with each other to form this linkage process or a two- level game. Therefore, the remainder of the dissertation will primarily focus on the individual level data and events data as the main source of information, particularly in Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Six will focus more on changes of nationalism, political identity and regime type at the state level, as a result of people’s behaviors and beliefs at the individual level. Chinese foreign policy, as a unique and important case, needs to be further integrated into the general study of foreign policy analysis. In the meantime, as discussed above, the formulation of grand (Type I) Chinese international relations theory may be less likely to occur. Creation of new mid-range theories and further testing of existing ones in the Chinese context may be the best way to advance the building of Chinese 39 international relations and/or foreign policy analysis theories. To demonstrate how the study of foreign policy decision making in the Taiwan Strait can be a middle-range theory building process to further advance the study of foreign policy, the dissertation will focus on three main issues, namely, strategic diversion and electoral processes; events data of interactions between Beijing and Taipei; and nationalism, identity change and regime type (see Figure 2.1). Most of the existing studies of Chinese and Taiwanese foreign policy decision making processes rely on qualitative research methodology. Quantitative and qualitative methodologies are complementary means to enhance each other. This dissertation project will employ both methodologies. The quantitative analyses aim at seeking the general patterns of Chinese foreign behaviors vis-à-vis the general study of foreign policy analysis. The qualitative analysis aims at integrating the unique characteristics of Chinese foreign policy into the general literature of foreign policy analysis. In the remaining chapters, with a description of the unique cultural, historical and social characteristics of the China-Taiwan case, I will use these three issues and both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to examine the foreign policy decision making in the Taiwan Strait. 40 Figure 2.1 Middle-Range Theory Building in FPA: The Case of China-Taiwan 41 Chapter 3 Historical Context of the China-Taiwan Relations Using the case of China-Taiwan to study foreign policy decision making in general may prompt some questions about the validity of the research design. Specifically, how can this single case be placed in the context of foreign policy analysis? How can the historical and cultural uniqueness of China and Taiwan be preserved, but at the same time, used to understand foreign policy in a general sense? In this chapter, I will first discuss the historical origin of the Taiwan issue. By explaining the story from both China’s and Taiwan’s sides will help understand the uniqueness of and the potential difficulty to resolve Taiwan issue. I will also discuss the U.S.’s role, as an inseparable player, in the Taiwan issue. Both China and Taiwan have to consider the U.S. factor in their decision making processes. The U.S.’s “strategic ambiguity” in the trilateral relations among Beijing, Taipei and Washington has made the Taiwan issue far more complex. Thus, the U.S., as a crucial actor, cannot be ignored. Finally, I will examine several major developments in the recent history of the cross-strait relations. This chapter will lay down the historical foundations for the empirical analysis of Chapter Four and Chapter Five, and the in-depth case analysis regarding the issue of nationalism and identity in Chapter Six. THE ORIGIN OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE The origin of the Taiwan issue is a quite complex one. While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to review the entire history of China-Taiwan relations, it is necessary 42 to examine several periods of significant changes in Taiwan’s relationship vis-à-vis the mainland China. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will briefly discuss the pre-1949 and post-1949 history. The “Taiwan Question” became an issue with the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing on October 1 st , 1949. The PRC claims that after October 1 st , 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) ceased to exist. The ROC, however, argues that the Nationalist government of the ROC simply moved to Taiwan and continued to exist. The establishment of the communist government in Beijing effectively created two “Chinas” 16 ; so began the Taiwan issue. For China, the Taiwan issue is the most important issue in China’s foreign relations with other nations. China claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, thus the Taiwan issue is an internal issue for the Chinese people. No foreign nation should intervene with the resolution of the Taiwan issue. Most foreign nations, including major international relations players, such as the U.S., UK, Canada, generally do not challenge China’s position on the Taiwan issue, but almost all nations that have official diplomatic ties with the PRC also maintain close economic and cultural ties with the ROC on Taiwan. China has been seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; however, it has never renounced the use of force. Military action of any kind in the Taiwan Strait would be viewed as a major threat to international peace and security, particularly in East Asia. For Taiwan, the relationship with the mainland used to be an issue of “sovereignty”, particularly under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule from 1949 to the late 16 In the beginning, both the PRC and ROC claimed their respective regime was the only legitimate regime representing China that includes both the mainland and the island of Taiwan. 43 1970s. Since Taiwan began to democratize in the late 1970s, the Taiwan issue has gradually shifted from a sole sovereignty issue to a more complicated scenario involving both sovereignty and social issues, such as cultural, identity, democratic transformation. Especially since President Lee Teng-hui, a non-mainland born Taiwanese became the president of Taiwan in 1988, “Lee symbolized an end of the mainland Chinese minority’s hold on political authority and a transition to majority or Taiwanese rule” (Copper, 2003: 54). Therefore, the Taiwan issue has become more complex in recent years and its boundaries have shifted. Moreover, the Taiwan issue has been especially and unfortunately complicated by the U.S. involvement with both the PRC and ROC. However, the U.S. is not formally committed to Taiwan’s defense. The U.S. could, but not necessarily will, defend Taiwan if the island is invaded by force. The U.S. claims that the best way to solving the Taiwan issue lies between the Chinese themselves on both sides of the Strait. Although China and Taiwan have been able to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait for the last half century, the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains. Chou (1999) argues that the amount of missiles deployed is considered the world’s heaviest concentration of strategic weapons in a given location. Taiwan remains as one of the flashpoints of the world. 17 In fact, Carpenter (2005) predicts that a war would occur between America and China over Taiwan. How to handle the Taiwan issue remains the key to stable regional security. Therefore, the proper understanding of how foreign policies are made in the Taiwan Strait is not only significant to the three major players - China, Taiwan and the 17 In fact, the U.S. is the island’s principal supplier of arms. 44 U.S. - involved in the region, but also significant to the general understanding of foreign policy decision making and international security. The Pre-1949 History of Taiwan China’s claim to Taiwan’s sovereignty is primarily based in antiquity. However, a close examination of the historical relations with the mainland not only reveals relatively weak support for China’s claim but also the complexity of the issue. Evidence of human life in Taiwan can be traced back to 15,000 years ago and Taiwan’s Aborigines are believed to have migrated from several regions, including Southeast Asia (such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) and mainland China (Copper, 2003; Lieberthal, 2004; Tsung, 1991). Information about Taiwan’s early settlers is hard to verify because written record was rarely kept. Copper (2003: 31) states that the first official contact mentioned in Chinese historical records occurred in “A.D. 239: The Chinese emperor …sent a 10,000-member expeditionary force to Taiwan, apparently to explore the island”; and “this [the expedition], Chinese leaders in Beijing now say, constitutes grounds for a legal claim to the island based on discovery”. But ironically, Copper (2003) further argues that there has been no evidence in Chinese court records to show that the expeditionary force made a territorial claim over Taiwan on behalf of the Han Dynasty (later Three Kingdoms). In the centuries to follow, the Chinese made several more expeditionary trips to Taiwan and Chinese migration to the island began. By the thirteenth century, a significant number of Chinese had settled in Taiwan (Copper, 2003). During the Ming Dynasty (1368 AD - 1644 AD), Zheng He, a close confidant and a Eunuch of Emperor 45 Yongle, landed in Taiwan while on expedition trips to Southeast Asia. Zheng He’s visit to Taiwan was largely considered as evidence of the mainland China’s contact with the Aborigines in Taiwan. However, no record shows that an official territorial claim was made. Copper (2003) concludes that if history is to be used as the basis for a territorial claim, China has the best case to make; however, no evidence could definitively prove that Taiwan had a self-governing and nation-state like system preceding the settlement of the mainlanders. Therefore, Taiwan is not part of China in the pre-history era. Towards the end of the Ming Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty, Dutch sailors were using Taiwan as their bases for their commerce with the Orient. The Dutch East India Company claimed sovereignty over Taiwan on behalf of Holland (Copper, 1990 and 2003). Taiwan became a Dutch colony. As the number of Chinese settlers grew, the Chinese resented and rebelled against the Dutch rule and preferred to be ruled by China instead (Long, 1991). At about the same time, Cheng Cheng-kung, a pirate who had been helping Chinese refuges to flee the Manchurian rule 18 to Taiwan, launched attacks on the Dutch. He effectively ended the Dutch colonial rule and established a Ming-style government on Taiwan (Carpenter, 2005). Some say that Cheng Cheng-kung “established the first Chinese government on Taiwan” and “from 1683 to 1895, Taiwan was ruled by China”. (Copper, 2003: 34; also see Chang, 1973) Many people in both mainland China and Taiwan treat this historical period as the evidence of Taiwan’s sovereign connection with the mainland. From 1894 to 1895, China and Japan fought in the first Sino-Japanese War. China lost. On April 17, 1895, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 18 The Qing Dynasty was ruled by Manchu people. 46 which the Qing government ceded Taiwan to Japan “in perpetuity”. While Taiwan was under Japanese colonization, Japan did help Taiwan to develop and improve its economic infrastructure, such as increasing Taiwan’s agricultural productivity, building roads and improving public health (Copper, 2003; Carpenter, 2005). However, Japanese colonial rulers also forced social changes on Taiwanese, such as changing the education system, forcing students to learn Japanese instead of Chinese, and promoting Japanese culture and customs. Neither the Han Chinese 19 nor the Aborigines liked the Japanese colonization. The Japanese colonial rule lasted until the Japanese defeat in the World War II. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States and United Kingdom agreed with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that after Japan’s defeat, all stolen territories by Japan, including Taiwan, would be returned to the ROC. And when Japan’s defeat became imminent, this position was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 (Copper, 2003). However, in the San Francisco Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed on September 8 th , 1951, Japan simply renounced “all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” without further specifying which government, whether the ROC or the PRC, would take over Taiwan. 20 19 The Han Chinese primarily consisted of the Han ethnic majority from within the province (also known as the Hoklo). The Aborigines consisted of the Plains and Mountain peoples of the original local tribes (see Brown, 2004). 20 Due to the controversy over the legal representation of China, it must be noted that neither the ROC nor the PRC were invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference and neither were parties to the San Francisco Treaty. 47 The Post-1949 History of Taiwan I now turn my discussion to the post-1949 history of the Taiwan issue. I will present both the PRC’s and ROC’s respective views. China’s View of the Taiwan Issue Mainland China and Taiwan have been separated for more than 50 years. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have different interpretations of the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, both people in Taiwan and the mainland believe, historically and culturally, they share the same ancestry and civilization. Chinese history in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a history of foreign invasion, civil conflict and people seeking freedom and democracy. After the KMT and the CCP jointly defeated the Japanese in 1945, China fell into its Civil War between the two parties. With the victory over KMT forces in Nanjing, the CCP’s victory became inevitable. Finally, on October 1, 1949 in Beijing, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the PRC. The KMT fled to the Taiwan Island to escape the defeat at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s central government was moved to Beijing. But the KMT claimed the country’s (ROC) government had moved temporarily to Taipei. As a result, both the PRC and ROC believed their respective regime was the only legitimate regime to represent China. Mainland China has argued that Taiwan is historically and culturally part of China. Taiwan is still considered as a rebellious province, which needs to be reunited to the mainland. The PRC authorities have always claimed that, after the ROC government in 48 Nanjing was finally overthrown by the Chinese people in 1949, the PRC became the sole, legal government of all China, including Taiwan, Hickey (ND). China’s position on Taiwan has gone through several periods of change since 1949. Between 1949 and 1978, Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan was to “liberate Taiwan by force …wash Taiwan in blood.” (Wu, 1994: 19) China conquered the minor offshore island of Tachen in 1955 and bombarded Quemoy in 1954 and 1955 in conjunction of its Taiwan policy during the early years. After the death of Mao, China relaxed its stance on Taiwan and proposed peaceful reunification of China. However, China has never renounced the use of force to take the island. In 1979, China proposed the “Three Links”: direct transportation, direct postal services and direct trade, and “Four Exchanges”: academic, cultural, sports, and technological exchange proposals to promote cross-strait exchanges (Wu, 1994). The “Three Links” and “Four Exchanges” proposal would establish closer ties between mainland China and Taiwan for both symbolic and practical reasons. In order to solve the Hong Kong issue, in early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed the “one country, two systems” formula. The sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao was returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively under the “one country, two systems” framework. The framework is designed to achieve China’s eventual unification, including the unification with Taiwan while allowing Taiwan an even greater deal of autonomy. 21 21 For example, Beijing has given the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special Administrative Region much autonomy except for national defense and foreign policy. Beijing has promised that it would give Taiwan a greater deal of autonomy, should Taiwan return to mainland China under the “one country, two systems” framework. 49 As time went on, China further relaxed its position on Taiwan. Vice Premier Qian Qichen, the top Taiwan policy maker in the mainland, said in his remarks reported on September 29, 2000 that Beijing had never insisted that one China meant the People’s Republic of China; the term “China” did not mean Taiwan nor did it mean the PRC (Klintworth, 2001: 51). A ranking PLA officer, Senior Colonel Zhu Chenghu, said in Canberra on July 7, 2000 that “the term ‘one China’ did not denote the PRC or, for that matter, Taiwan; and that if Taipei accepted the concept of one China in which Taiwan and the mainland could be equal parts, then everything was negotiable, including the name of a future China, the type of government, its structure, the anthem, the flag, and even the location of the capital.” (Klintworth, 2001: 51) However, since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian was elected the president of the ROC on March 18, 2000, China kept its distance with the DPP. On January 24, 2002, Qian remarked “We believe there is a distinction between the vast majority of DPP members and a very small number of stubborn Taiwan independence activists…We invite them to tour and visit in an appropriate status to promote understanding” (Rhoads, January 24 th , 2002, Reuters). Several days later, China reiterated its policy towards Taiwan as being unchanged. In spite of this, Qian’s remark was viewed by many as a softening shift on Taiwan. Since Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 presidential election, particularly after his reelection in 2004, the mainland government in Beijing has strategically distanced itself to the DPP regime and tried to isolate it as well. On the one hand, Beijing found the pro-independence DPP hard to deal with. On the other hand, China wanted to show that it would only work with more cooperative and pro-unification leaders in Taiwan. Beijing 50 has invited top KMT or pro-unification leaders to visit the mainland, while it has refused to extend the same olive branch to DPP officials. In spite of the changes or relaxations made by the PRC over the years about the status of Taiwan, its principal position has remained un-shifted. Even during the last eight years riding out the relatively pro-independence Chen Shui-bian administration, China has been in no rush to resolve the Taiwan issue immediately (Hickey, 2007). Therefore, it has largely favored maintaining the status quo. On March 22 nd , 2008, the pro-unification KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won a decisive election over his DPP counterpart Frank Hsieh. Ma has proposed more cooperative policies in dealing with mainland China. Since the election, mainland China leaders have met former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and the current KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung in Beijing. Although he has promised to return to the 1992 Consensus 22 to engage in talks with mainland China, it remains to be seen whether Ma could carry out more cooperative policies after his May 20 th , 2008 inauguration to mend relations with Beijing. Taiwan’s View of the Taiwan Issue Taipei, on the other hand, has a somewhat different interpretation about the Taiwan issue. Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China also has experienced some major changes, under both the KMT and DPP regimes. 22 The 1992 Consensus is an implicit and informal agreement between the governments of mainland China and Taiwan that both sides belong to one China, though each side has different interpretations over what constitutes that “one China”. 51 As discussed earlier, Taiwan was part of China under the Qing Dynasty, the last dynasty of Imperial China. After China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. Japan’s surrender in the World War II led to the signing of the Cairo Declaration on December 1 st , 1943, in which Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China. 23 Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army would soon be defeated by the CCP between 1948 and 1949. After fleeing to Taiwan, Chiang firmly believed in “national recovery and national reconstruction.” (Copper, 1990: 30) Chiang Ching-kuo, after succeeding his father Chiang Kai-shek as the President of the ROC, also believed the “anti-Communist struggle will never cease until Communism is eliminated from Chinese territory and until the Chinese Communist regime has been destroyed.” (Anonymous, 1979) In an interview with Dennis Hickey (2001) on February 7, 1996, Fredrick Chien, then Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, depicted the Chiang era’s perception toward the mainland as: We took the same position as mainland China. We both said that there was only one China. We both said Taiwan was part of China. And we said only the Republic of China was the legitimate government of China and they said only the People’s Republic of China was the legitimate government of China. So in the early years, Taiwan abided by the one China policy but only had a different understanding of what the one China was. It was widely believed that a national unification under either the PRC or ROC would come soon in the early 1950s. Even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed that “the fall of Taiwan before the end of 1950 still seems the most likely course of future developments.” (Rusk, 1950, cited in Hickey, 2007: 27) However, the outbreak 23 The Republic of China was controlled by Chiang Kai-shek-led KMT on the mainland. 52 of the Korean War prompted the U.S. to send the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, preventing the PRC government to take the island of Taiwan to unify the country. The Cold War isolation that soon followed made the unification impossible. The two sides soon became two separate political entities. Particularly with the further strengthening of the PRC regime throughout the 1950s and 1970s, the ROC eventually realized that the chance to retake mainland China had become increasingly slim. So finally, the ROC unilaterally renounced the use of force to unify China, proclaimed that it would no longer compete with Beijing to represent China in the international community, and acknowledged the PRC’s “de facto authority” over mainland China. After it became clear that the KMT would not be able to unify China under the name of the Republic of China, along with continued calls for economic liberalization and democratization in Taiwan, the KMT gradually allowed the transformation of the regime on the island to a more democratic society. The KMT President Lee Teng-hui became the first directly elected president of Taiwan in 1996. Before leaving office in 2000, he revealed three goals when he had assumed the office of the presidency in 1988: “First, he hoped to democratize Taiwan; Second, he sought to localize the island’s politics; and Third, he planned to strengthen Taiwan’s international status.” (Lin and Tedard, 2002; Hickey, 2007: 89) Lee’s three goals are interrelated to one central aim – to create a new and independent Taiwan both domestically and internationally. Although Lee was a KMT president, he had become increasingly pro-independence. 24 Beijing viewed this shift as very troubling. 24 Lee Teng-hui is the first non-mainland born Taiwanese to become the president of Taiwan. 53 Lee Teng-hui remained in office until 2000. In March that year, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP became the first popularly elected president from an opposition party. President Chen Shui-bian’s stance on the Taiwan issue was even more provocative. As a Taiwan-born native, he played an instrumental role in establishing Taiwan’s largest opposition political party, the Democratic Progressive Party in 1987. During his early political career, Chen took a “pragmatic stance and sought to downplay his support for Taiwan independence” (Hickey, 2007: 100). 25 But as time went on, he became increasingly more provocative in pushing the envelope in dealing with Beijing. It is commonly believed that his provocative and risk-acceptant approach was not effective and even backfired (Hickey, 2007). Even Taiwan’s closest “tactical ally” – the U.S. – had to warn him on several occasions to back down. President George W. Bush (2003) publicly warned Chen that “we [the U.S.] oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo, and the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.” In recent years, Taiwan’s “de-sinification” and the promotion of Taiwanese culture and identity have created tensions with Beijing. Both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian took advantage of the fact they were both born in Taiwan and have tried to de- link Taiwan’s historical, cultural and societal identities from mainland China. Beijing sees Taiwan on the path moving towards independence. 26 25 For example, Chen Shui-bian proposed “Five No’s” to calm down Beijing after he won the 2000 presidential election. A more detailed discussion of these commitments appears later in this chapter. 26 A more detailed examination of this issue is provided in Chapter Six. 54 Taiwan continues to conduct the “pragmatic diplomacy” or “dollar diplomacy” to counter Beijing. 27 Taiwan has avoided confronting Beijing on issues of one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas. Meanwhile, it has been actively seeking opportunities to promote Taiwan’s presence in international communities as an independent state. Currently, only 23 small countries (see Table 3.1) officially recognize the ROC, while the majority of countries recognize the government of the PRC. The countries that do maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan are mostly small countries, including four in Africa, six in the Asian and Pacific region, twelve in Central and South America, and one in Europe. By and large, Beijing has managed to block Taiwan from participating in the international community. However, Taiwan has never given up its effort to rejoin it. 27 Most countries in the world recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Taiwan has been blocked from international organizations where statehood is required. However, Taiwan has been quietly trying to join or rejoin the international community. Such effort is called the “pragmatic diplomacy”. In some cases, Taiwan has been providing generous economic assistance to countries that it maintains diplomatic ties with. Many analysts refer to this action as “dollar diplomacy”. 55 Table 3.1 Countries That Maintain Official Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan Country Region Burkina Faso Africa Gambia Africa Sao Tome and Principe Africa Swaziland Africa Subtotal Africa 4 Kiribati Asia and Pacific Marshall Islands Asia and Pacific Nauru Asia and Pacific Palau Asia and Pacific Solomon Islands Asia and Pacific Tuvalu Asia and Pacific Subtotal Asia and Pacific 6 Belize Central and South America Dominican Republic Central and South America El Salvador Central and South America Guatemala Central and South America Haiti Central and South America Honduras Central and South America Nicaragua Central and South America Panama Central and South America Paraguay Central and South America St. Christopher & Nevis Central and South America St. Lucia Central and South America St. Vincent & Grenadines Central and South America Subtotal Central and South America 12 Holy See Europe Subtotal Europe 1 Total 23 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) Address: 2 Kaitakelan Blvd. Taipei, 10048, Taiwan (R.O.C.); Website: http://www.mofa.gov.tw (As of April 18, 2008) Table 3.1 Countries that Maintain Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan 56 THE US’S ROLE IN THE TAIWAN ISSUE Despite the position changes from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. The U.S. plays a unique and irreplaceable role in the Taiwan issue. Soon after the establishment of the PRC, President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. to leave Taiwan alone. On January 5, 1950, President Truman stated: The United States has not predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or suggestions to Nationalist forces on Formosa. (Hickey, 2001: 125) It was the Korean War that changed the U.S.’s position toward Taiwan. On June 27, 1950, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was “directed to prevent any attack on Formosa (Taiwan) and to see that the Chinese (“Nationalist”) Government on Formosa cease [sic] operations against the mainland People’s Republic of (“Red”) China.” 28 Taiwan’s strategic importance for the U.S. in the Korean War and the containment of the Communist China in the mainland made Taiwan an ally of the U.S. On December 2, 1954, Washington and Taipei signed the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. According to this defense treaty, Taiwan and the U.S. would “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political 28 For further discussion, please see Out Break of the Korean War: Week of Decision, Truman Library, retrieved, February 23, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/koreav1.htm 57 stability.” (Chang, 1986: 187) Each party involved in this treaty recognized “an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety…it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” (Chang, 1986: 188) The Mutual Defense Treaty provided the framework for the U.S. to defend Taiwan militarily should Taiwan be under attack by mainland China. From 1949 to 1979, the U.S. recognized Taiwan as the legal representative of all China. During last stages of the Cold War; however, the U.S. gradually realized the importance that China could play in the containment of USSR. With President Richard Nixon’s ground breaking visit to Beijing in 1972, the U.S.-China normalization process started. Seven years after Washington and Beijing’s first contact, on January 1, 1979, the U.S. and the PRC issued the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relations between the United States of American and the People’s Republic of China, formally recognizing each other and establishing diplomatic relations. On the same day, the U.S. also informed the ROC the termination of diplomatic relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan. All U.S. troops would be removed from the island. This decision came as a major surprise to officials in Taipei (Copper, 2003). Taiwan immediately accused the U.S. of damaging “the rights and interests of the Government and the people of the Republic of China” and the loss of confidence from any nation in the future (Chang, 1986: 200). Before the U.S. switched its recognition from the ROC on Taiwan to the PRC, the U.S. also had helped Beijing to take over China’s seat in the UN Security Council. On October 25, 1971, the UN General Assembly issued Resolution 2758 recognizing “the 58 representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.” 29 At the same time, Taiwan withdrew from the UN and all the related organizations. Legal Foundations of the U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations U.S.-China-Taiwan relations are based on four documents. The first document is the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972. The 1972 communiqué was signed upon President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China that year. It lays down the foundation of the U.S.-China normalization. The second document is the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of American and the People’s Republic of China, January 1, 1979. The U.S. and PRC formally established diplomatic relations on January 1 st , 1979. The PRC and U.S. governments consider the 1979 Communiqué as the base document for the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China. The third document is the United States – China Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. It addresses the center issue on Taiwan regarding long term arms sales to Taiwan. In the 1982 communiqué, the U.S. promised to gradually reduce weapon sales to Taiwan. This document later would become the basis for the U.S.’s conflicting policies towards the PRC and Taiwan. And, the fourth document is the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), passed by the US Congress. It 29 Resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, October 25, 1971, retrieved, February 23, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.taiwandocuments.org/un2758-XXVI.htm 59 created a framework to allow the U.S. and Taiwan to continue to maintain their unofficial cultural and economical ties after the U.S. switched its diplomatic recognition to the PRC. The core issue in the three Communiqués is the position on Taiwan. In all three Communiqués, China states that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. “acknowledges” or “does not challenge” Beijing’s position that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China. However, the U.S. does not necessarily “agree” with China on its position on Taiwan (Hickey, 2007). China firmly opposes “any activities which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ ‘one China, two governments’ ‘two Chinas,’ and ‘independent Taiwan’ or advocate that ‘the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.’” (Chang, 1986: 190-192) After China and the U.S. established diplomatic relations in 1979, the U.S.– Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated. However, the U.S. has maintained unofficial ties with Taiwan. A formal document was needed to guide the relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA explained the U.S.’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. The U.S. is also committed to providing Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.” (Hickey, 1994: 139-141) What conflicts with the 1982 Communiqué is the US will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 60 sufficient self-defense capability. In recent years, the U.S. has been increasing weapon sales to Taiwan both qualitatively and quantitatively. The most troublesome issue in the trilateral relations seems to be regarding the inconsistency between the 1982 Communiqué and the TRA. Hickey (1999: 278) rightly points out that the 1982 Communiqué “focuses on American arms transfers to Taiwan and seems to contradict key elements in the TRA.” The 1982 Communiqué states: It [The United States Government] does not seek to carry out a long- term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. (The 1982 Communiqué) However, the arms sales policies described in the TRA, which is discussed below, have apparent conflicts with the 1982 Communiqués. After George W. Bush took office and before the September 11 th , 2001 terrorist attacks, military ties between the U.S. and Taiwan were significantly strengthened. Washington announced in April 2001 the most comprehensive arms package to Taipei since 1992, including four Kidd-class destroyers, eight diesel submarines and 12 P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft. 30 In March 2002, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Tang Yiau- ming, was granted a visa to attend a private defense summit in Florida to talk about weapon sales and military ties. The post-9/11 bilateral relations between the PRC and the U.S. have made the Bush administration take steps to prevent Taipei from entrapping 30 For more details, please see “Minister Tang Invited to Attend Bilateral Defense Meeting in U.S.”, in Agence France Presse, February 24, 2002, retrieved, February 24, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2002/AFP-022402.htm 61 Washington in any potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait while the U.S. is tied down with the anti-terrorist activities in the Middle East (Hickey, 2007). The four main China-U.S.-Taiwan documents have certainly created a “strategic ambiguity”. By definition, a communiqué is an official announcement. The three joint communiqués between the U.S. and China are presidential announcements. A congressional act is a decision made by a legislative act, in other words, a law. Technically, an act should supersede a presidential announcement. However, “the TRA provides the United States only with an option to defend Taiwan; it does not necessarily commit the United States to protect Taiwan.” (Hickey, 1999: 278) Due to the contradiction between the 1982 Communiqué and the TRA, sale of arms to Taiwan has become the most controversial and debatable issue in U.S.-China relations. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS Cross-Strait Wang-Koo Talks Many analysts suspected that there had been secret contacts at the top governmental level from the 1950s through 1970s; however, overt contacts across the Taiwan Strait have been through unofficial or semi-official channels. It was not until November 2, 1987 that people in Taiwan were allowed to visit the mainland. Even today, Taiwan still strictly restricts mainland people from visiting the island. Cross-strait contact showed the most promising signs in the early 1990s through the Wang-Koo Talks. Since neither government across the Strait recognizes the other, cross-strait communication cannot be conducted through official channels. The Association of 62 Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) led by Wang Daohang in the mainland, and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) led by Koo Chen-fu in Taiwan served as a major communication channel across the Taiwan Strait. In the early 1990s, both sides saw the needs to strengthen contacts to tackle some emerging problems. The number of illegal immigrants from China to Taiwan increased. Fishing disputes in the Taiwan Strait also caused many problems. In a few extreme cases, people from both sides even managed to hijack airplanes to escape to the other side on several occasions. 31 On January 8, 1992 the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF inviting the SEF members to visit the mainland to enhance communications and cooperation. On August 4, the same year, ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan invited the SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu for a meeting to exchange views on economic development and SEF-ARATS affairs and discuss related programs. A week and a half later, on August 22, Koo replied to Wang that the SEF had accepted ARATS’ invitation for a meeting, but suggested they should meet in a third place – Singapore. After extensive preparation, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu met with each other in Singapore during April 27 – 29, 1993. The meeting was productive and constructive. In the end, Wang and Koo signed the following four agreements: 1. Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of Authentication Across the Taiwan Straits. 2. The Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for [Lost] Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits. 31 For example, on November 6 th , 1993, a Chinese man seeking asylum hijacked a Xiamen Airlines Boeing 737 from Guangzhou to Xiamen carrying 140 passengers to Taiwan. It was the fifth such hijacking in seven months. 63 3. Agreement on the System for Contacts and Meetings between SEF and ARATS. 4. Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang Talks. 32 Wang and Koo also agreed to address illegal immigrants, sea smuggling and piracy, fishing disputes, intellectual property, and cooperation between the two legal systems issues in that year. Economic exchange and culture exchange were also discussed during the Wang-Koo Talk. Following the first Wang-Koo Talk, several other rounds of talks were conducted in both the mainland and Taiwan, including Beijing and Taipei. 33 The preparatory meeting announced in May 1995 that a second direct talk by Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu would have been held some time in July in Beijing. However, President Lee Teng-hui visited the U.S. as a Cornell University alumnus during June 7 – 12. Beijing was angered. It saw the granting of visa to Lee by Washington as a major policy change by the U.S. and Lee’s visit as an apparent and intentional challenge to the existing status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In response to Lee’s provocative behavior, Beijing suspended the second Wang-Koo Talk and launched several rounds of missiles tests in the Taiwan Strait. It was not until October 14, 1998 that the SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu led a delegation to visit Beijing. During his 5-day trip, Koo twice met with Wang Daohan. He also met the top Taiwan decision makers Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen. Koo argued the origin of Taiwan issue “lies in the mainland authorities’ denial of one simple fact, which is the existence of the Republic of China.” He also suggested “both Taiwan and the 32 Major Events Across the Taiwan Straits (January 1912 – December 1999), Mainland Affairs Council ROC. 33 Some of the talks were not directly conducted by Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu; however, these series of talks were part of the Wang-Koo Talks. 64 mainland share the same lineage and a common culture, [people from both sides] should hold common expectations and move in the same direction while seeking the welfare of the entire Chinese population.” (Mainland Affairs Council, 1998) 34 But soon the pro- independence DPP would take over Taipei’s executive. After Chen Shui-bian became the president of Taiwan, the Wang-Koo talks were halted. 35 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises Some scholars would argue that if it had not been for the 1995 and 1996 missile crises, the cross-strait relations might have been much better today. On January 30, 1995, President Jiang Zemin issued an Eight-Point speech at the celebration of the Chinese New Year, calling for cross-strait talks and exchanges and accusing President Lee Teng- hui of being insincere in cross-strait talks. 36 Soon President Lee issued his Six-Point response, stressing Taiwan’s sovereignty and calling for Taiwan’s participation in international communities and pressing Beijing to renounce the use of force. Seven months later, Lee was granted a visa to visit the Cornell University as a 1968 PhD alumnus. Lee’s visit to the U.S. “became a public relations coup for the ROC.” (Copper, 1999: 42) Beijing authorized the PLA to conduct missile tests off Taiwan’s coast. In 34 Koo Chen-fu’s remarks at the meeting with Qian Qichen on October 18, 1998, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/CSDialog/qian1.html 35 Chen has largely abandoned the KMT’s cooperative approach in dealing with Beijing. He has adopted more provocative politics to push for a more explicit route of Taiwan independence. 36 Some analysts, such as Susan Shirk (2007), argue that Jiang’s initial approach to deal with foreign policy and relations with Taiwan had been viewed by the Chinese hardliners as too weak and soft, particularly by hardliners in the PLA. Jiang’s “Eight-Point” speech was considered by many as not tough enough. This accusation, arguably, led to Jiang’s decision to authorize military exercises later that year to accommodate the hardliners in the PLA. 65 addition to Lee’s 1995 visit to the U.S., Taiwan’s first ever direct presidential election was scheduled in March 1996. To Beijing, “this election, in addition to representing a big step forward in the democratization process, strongly implied Taiwan possessed national sovereignty apart from China and therefore represented a two-China, or one- Taiwan, one-China policy, an anathema to some Chinese leaders.” (Copper, 1999: 42) Lee eventually won the election on March 23, 1996 with 55 percent of the votes. Weeks before the election, Beijing authorized a large scale military exercise and missile tests off Taiwan again. The 1995 and 1996 crises caused great military tension in the Taiwan Strait. To some, war seemed to be imminent. President Clinton sent the Independence and the Nimitz aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait to monitor the situation, making it the “largest U.S. naval movement in the Asia-Pacific region since the Vietnam War.” (Zhao, 1999: 1) Carpenter (2005) argues that the U.S. and China would probably not go to war with each other intentionally, but miscalculations might occur. Cross-strait relations plummeted seriously and remained low through 1997 and 1998. Although Lee Teng-hui was a member of the pro-unification Nationalist Party, he gradually revealed his pro-independence stance. This is perhaps due to the fact that he is the first non- mainland born Taiwanese president. His take-over of the KMT chairmanship and the presidency of Taiwan effectively ended the mainlander-Nationalists’ control of power in Taiwan. During an interview with Deutsche Welle on July 9, 1999, Lee remarked the cross-strait relations should be considered as “state to state” or a least “special state to 66 state” relations. 37 This remark further angered Beijing. Beijing completely lost confidence in Lee Teng-hui. As showed in Figure 3.1, Beijing’s hostility toward the government on Taiwan was high during both crises. However, it must be noted that the increase in hostility level was mainly targeted at the government rather than the people in Taiwan. Figure 3.1 Beijing’s Hostility Toward ROC 38 The Military Build-up by the PLA One of the most important reasons behind the escalation of hostility in the Taiwan Strait, especially during the mid 1990s, was the continued military build-up by the PLA. The PLA has always played a pivotal role in China’s national security, particularly in 37 For more details about the interview, please refer to President Lee’s Deutsche Welle Interview, July 9, 1999, retrieved, April 6, 2002, from the Taiwan Security Research, on the World Wide Web: http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/SS-990709-Deutsche-Welle-Interview.htm 38 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_7.gif 67 regard to the issue of Taiwan (Lieberthal, 2004). Domestically, it also has intervened in China’s domestic politics on numerous occasions (Hickey, 2001). After all, military capabilities are directly linked to the frequency of use of force (Fordham, 2004). This is true at both home and abroad. The leadership in Beijing considers the PLA as a major pillar of support when it comes to national unity. The PLA, under the direct leadership of the CCP, has two paramount missions: guaranteeing the international security of the PRC and defending it against external attack (Hickey, 2001). In line with Beijing’s position on Taiwan as described earlier in this chapter, Beijing considers the Taiwan issue as domestic. However, because of the involvement of the U.S., China has both internal and external reasons to enhance its military capabilities. From China’s domestic point of view, Beijing sees the military build-up as part of the modernization process which is intended to prepare the PLA from shifting from fighting the traditionally “people’s war” in the Maoist era to fighting modern war under high-tech conditions through the “informationalization” 39 of the PLA (Sutter, 2008; Hickey, 2001). Most analysts believe that the PLA’s military build-up is directly aimed at preventing Taiwan from declaring independence. China has a strong short-range and cruise missile deployment in the southern provinces of Fu Jian and Guangdong to intimidate Taiwan and the U.S. backers (Sutter, 2008). Another domestic reason for the PLA’s recent build-up is related to what Allison (1971) refers to as “where you stand depends on where you sit”. The military faction within the CCP and the government in 39 For example, the PLA has made some significant advances in its command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities in recent years (Hickey, 2001). 68 Beijing has long been calling for a tougher stance on dealing with Taiwan (Shirk, 2007). In order to win the support of the PLA generals on other issues as well as appeasing the public’s demand, the Beijing government has had to support the PLA’s demand for continued modernization and build-up. From the external point of view, Beijing also has good reasons to enhance its military. Because of the U.S. involvement in the region, China needs sufficient military capabilities to deter potential U.S. military actions in the region as well as Taiwan’s unilateral declaration of independence. Ross (2006: 16), for instance, points out that in addition to preventing the U.S. from getting involved in the Taiwan Strait militarily, Beijing also needs to have “sufficient Chinese capabilities and resolve to persuade Taipei that the expected costs of a Chinese retaliation would be greater than the benefits of formally declaring independence for Taiwan.” Beijing’s concern is not entirely groundless. For example, in the early Clinton years, President Clinton followed through President George H. W. Bush’s decisions to sell F-16s ($6 billion worth) to Taiwan. In late 1993, Clinton also authorized the sale of 41 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($68 million) to Taiwan, although he later denied these weapon sales including advanced AEGIS systems (Redd, 2007). Currently, President George W. Bush has promised “additional arms sales to Taiwan including Kidd-class destroyers, diesel-electric submarines, and patrol planes” as well as stronger cooperation between the two militaries (Redd, 2007: 101-02). While the U.S. remains Taiwan’s biggest weapon supplier, the arms-race has made the Taiwan Strait one of the most dangerous regions in the world. Whether the PLA build-up in the 69 region serves as an effective long-term deterrent remains to be seen. But Beijing has good reasons to continue the build-up, at least for now. The Election of Chen Shui-bian Lee Teng-hui’s era came to an end in March 2000 with Chen Shui-bian’s victory. In spite of the mainland’s extensive threats about the election of a pro-independence president, on March 18, 2000, Taiwanese elected Chen Shui-bian, the leader of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to be the new president. He won 39 percent of the vote, with the rest split by KMT’s Lien Chan (23 percent) and independent candidate James Soong (37 percent). 40 Although he did not win a clear majority, Chen’s victory was significant in three respects: 1. It marked only the second time that the ROC had conducted a direct presidential election. 2. It was the first time that a candidate outside the ruling KMT had been elected president of the country. 3. It showed that the Taiwan electorate will not yield meekly to threats or intimidation from Beijing. (Hickey and Li, 2002: 201-202) Despite Chen’s high profile on pro-independence, he seemed to have softened his tone on independence during his campaign. Some argue Chen was elected for his promotion of Taiwan independence. Others disagree and say he was elected for making Taipei a better city and for his opposition to corruption. 41 40 Lien Chan and James Soong would have run on one ticket representing the KMT. Copper (2003) argues that the then-president Lee Teng-hui disliked Soong, therefore did not endorse him. Soong, instead of running as the vice president on the Lien-Soong ticket, decided to run as an independent candidate. The split of the KMT shows that Taiwan is no longer an authoritarian state as it was from 1949 to the late 1970s. Citizens in Taiwan now enjoy great political freedom. 41 Chen Shui-bian was the mayor of Taipei and did an extraordinary job in cleaning up the city while he was in office (Hickey, 2007). 70 In his inaugural address on May 20, 2000, Chen further softened his tone towards Beijing by making a Five No’s promise. He proclaimed “as long as the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan”, he would NOT: 1. Declare independence, 2. Change the national title, 3. Push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, 4. Promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification, 5. Abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines. However, Beijing argued that Chen’s speech was “vague’ and “insincere.” (Hickey and Li, 2002: 207) With Beijing’s threat of invading if Taiwan declared independence under the new administration, the number of people who favor an immediate independence dropped from 5.8 percent in February to 3.9 percent in March. Many supported the idea that Taiwan should maintain its status quo and make decisions later (see figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 Unification or Independence 42 42 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_1.gif 71 Figure 3.3 Foreign Ties and Cross-Strait Relations 43 One year after President Chen took office, he visited some of the countries that formally recognize Taiwan. His trip to several Caribbean countries, in May 2001, demonstrated his willingness to broaden Taiwan’s international recognition. On his way to the Caribbean countries and his way back to Taiwan, he made stopovers twice in the U.S., an apparent move to promote Taiwan’s international status. Beijing angrily protested. In order to calm down Beijing, President Chen unveiled his second Five No’s while he was in Guatemala. Chen proclaimed that: 1. Taiwan’s recent arms purchases and his travel to the US were not intended to provoke Beijing, 2. Taiwan will not misjudge or miscalculate the current state of cross-strait relations, 3. Taiwan is not a vassal state or pawn of the United States, 4. Taiwan will not cease in its efforts to improve relations with the PRC and, 43 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_4.gif 72 5. Taiwan is a sovereign state and will not become a pawn in power politics. (See Hickey and Li, 2002: 205) Beijing had a very cool response to Chen’s second Five No’s. Chen’s quiet approach to gaining international recognition has gained strong support in Taiwan. When asked whether Taiwan should continue to develop foreign ties if developing foreign relations led to rising tension on cross-strait relations, the majority of Taiwanese believe Taiwan should continue to develop foreign ties even if such actions could increase cross-strait tensions (see figure 3.3). However, people in Taiwan clearly understand cross-strait relations are also the most critical relations for Taiwan. As Taiwan becomes increasingly more dependent on the mainland economically, it would not be in the best interests for Taiwan to damage its relations with the mainland. Statistics showed in July 2001, 30.7 percent of people in Taiwan believed that developing foreign relations was more important than cross-strait relations, while 31.0 percent believed the other way around. And 22.8 percent believed both relations are equally important (see figure 3.4). Chen Shui-bian would soon face the daunting task of improving Taiwan’s economy and dragging Taiwan out of the economic recession. Although he was re- elected by a very small margin in 2004, generally speaking, he has not done well in achieving these tasks in the past 8 years. For example, “the Taiwan stock market declined substantially, and during Chen’s term of office the unemployment rate rose to the highest level in over twenty years. Taiwan faced economic recession – unprecedented in recent decades.” (Brown, 2001, cited in Sutter, 2008: 197) 73 Figure 3.4 Foreign or Cross-Strait Relations as Priority 44 The Recent Election of Ma Ying-jeou On March 22 nd , 2008, the KMT defeated the DPP in a landslide election. KMT president-elect Ma Ying-jeou assumed office on May 20 th , 2008. It is largely believed that Ma will be more cooperative in dealing with the mainland government in ensuring a peaceful relationship in the Taiwan Strait. Some economic problems in the recent past were caused by Chen Shui-bian’s rigid rules on investing in mainland China. For example, the Chen government placed a 40 percent cap on each Taiwanese company’s investment in China (Lynch, 2006; Kang, 2007). Certain industries, such as high-tech computer silicon ship production lines were not been allowed to move to the more cost- effective mainland market at all. Such restrictions have severely limited Taiwan’s economic growth. Voters in Taiwan expect Ma to lead Taiwan out of the economic 44 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_5.gif 74 downturn. And mainland China’s vast economic market seems to be the most apparent and convenient solution for Taiwan. Since Ma took office, he has sent several top Taiwanese officials to the mainland to improve relations. Taiwan is currently talking with Beijing to establish the long overdue direct flights between the two sides. It must be noted however, to please the popular demand of Taiwanese citizens, President Ma has explicitly called for the “principle of no unification, no independence and no use of force” and the upholding of Taiwan’s democracy. Maintaining the current status quo and peace and stability seem to be the most desirable goal for the Taiwanese. Cross-Strait Exchanges and Developments Since the cross-strait exchanges started in the late 1980s, exchanges have skyrocketed. Cross-strait exchanges include trade exchanges, people exchanges, culture exchanges, technology exchanges, and more. Among all, trade and people exchanges have become the major cross-strait form of communication. With Taiwan moving towards a high-tech oriented economy and the rapid increasing of labor costs, many of Taiwan’s low-tech and labor intensive industries have moved to the mainland. Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland is increasing dramatically. Before fall 2001, there was a U.S. $ 50 million cap on each Taiwan investment in the mainland. The government feared that the increase of trade and investment in the mainland could bind Taiwan too much to the mainland. In 2000, 24 percent of Taiwan’s exports went to the mainland and Hong Kong, nearly 17 percent to the mainland alone (see figure 3.5). In order to pull Taiwan’s economy out of recession, in November 2001, 75 the government in Taiwan lifted the U.S. $ 50 million investment cap. Tsai Ing-wen, Chairwoman of Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council, said: “the government’s new trade policy imposes no cap on China-bound investments, signifying that a historic new era in cross-strait trade has arrived.” Taiwan’s economic dependence on China has continued in the last several years. In 2004, 67 percent of Taiwanese foreign direct investment went to China. By 2005, over 40,000 Taiwanese companies had made investments in the mainland. And in 2005 alone, 38 percent of Taiwanese exports went to China (Kang, 2007: 96). Figure 3.5 Export Dependence Across the Taiwan Strait 45 Cross-strait people exchanges have also boomed. Statistics in July 2001 indicate, as of November 2000, there had been 17,647,200 visits from Taiwan to the mainland and 556,158 visits from the mainland to Taiwan (see figure 3.6). Despite Taiwan’s 45 Mainland Affairs Council Statistics on Cross-Strait Exchanges, retrieved, March 3, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/CSExchan/9010c.gif 76 restrictions on Mainlanders visiting Taiwan, the number of people visiting Taiwan reached 556,158 in November 2000. Recently, Taiwan further eased the curb on the mainland visitors, allowing “tour groups of mainland Chinese living or studying overseas” to visit Taiwan. However, Beijing argues that Taiwan’s recent decision to ease restrictions on mainland visitors is only a “posture” and authorities in Taiwan should conduct “concrete” and “practical” measures to ease the travel procedures. Another important aspect of cross-strait relations is the Three Links. “Despite the explosion in cross-strait trade, investment, and travel, the ROC continues to prohibit ‘direct’ transportation, trade, and postal linkages with the mainland.” (Hickey and Li, 2002: 204) This has become a major indicator of measuring the effectiveness of Taiwan’s mainland policy by citizens of Taiwan as well as the mainlanders. Likely it will remain as a major issue the new Ma Ying-jeou administration has to work on. On January 2, 2001, CNN News reported: “In a historic step aimed at enhancing relations, two Taiwanese ships docked Tuesday at Chinese ports after making the first legal and direct crossing from Taiwan in more than 50 years.” 46 Taiwan authorized direct traffic between Taiwan and the mainland; however, the traffic is only between the two Taiwan-controlled islands and the two port cities on the mainland. Therefore, the link is referred as the “Three-Mini-Links”. Some in Taiwan argue the Three-Mini-Links is a most significant step forward in the cross-strait relations. Nevertheless, Beijing believes that Chen Shui-bian sent out misleading signals to the international community. Chen purposefully showed that Taiwan had made goodwill gestures to the mainland, and it was 46 For detailed discussion about the opening of the Three-Mini-Links, please refer to “Taiwanese Ships Make History with Quick Trip to China”, CNN News, retrieved April 30, 2001 from the World Wide Web: http://www.cnn.com/2001/ASIANOW/east/01/02/taiwan.china.02/index.html. 77 the mainland that had insisted on not improving cross-strait relations. From January 2001 to January 2002, 205 ships and 13,551 passengers traveled across the Strait through the Three-Mini-Links (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). Figure 3.6 Visits Across the Taiwan Strait 47 47 Sources: Mainland Affairs Council Statistics on Cross-Strait Exchanges, retrieved, March 3, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/CSExchan/emst900701.gif 78 Period Kinmen to Xiamen Matsu to Fuzhou Xiamen to Kinmen Fuzhou to Matsu Year 2001 83 54 34 11 Jan. 2002 11 4 5 4 Subtotal 94 58 39 15 Total Grand Total Ships from Taiwan Ships from Mainland Table 3.2: Mini-Three Links: Ships Number of ships travelling between Kinmen.Matsu and the Mainland (Jan. 1, 2001 - Jan. 31, 2002) Sources: Mainland Affairs Council http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/CSExchan/3link9101.htm 152 54 206 Table 3.2 Mini-Three Links: Ships Period Kinmen to Xiamen Matsu to Fuzhou Xiamen to Kinmen Fuzhou to Matsu Year 2001 9,770 1,998 951 86 Jan. 2002 592 70 84 0 Subtotal 10,362 2,068 1,035 86 Total Grand Total http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/CSExchan/3link9101.htm Table 3.3: Mini-Three Links: Passengers 12,430 1,121 13,551 Sources: Mainland Affairs Council Number of passengers travelling between Kinmen.Matsu and the Mainland (Jan. 1, 2001 - Jan. 31, 2002) Ships from Taiwan Ships from Mainland Table 3.3 Mini-Three Links: Passengers 79 China is not satisfied with Chen Shui-bian’s Three-Mini-Links. In February 2002, the Washington Post reported that “China is willing to drop its pre-condition that Taiwan’s government recognize the ‘one China’ principle before opening what is known as the ‘three links’ with Taiwan…[and] is ready to do so without involving the governments of the either side.” (Pomfret, 2002) To this day, however, “Three-Links” still have not been established. This has inconvenienced many frequent business travelers across the Taiwan Strait. Cross-strait culture and educational exchanges continue to increase. During the 2001 Taipei-Shanghai City Forum held in February 2001 in Shanghai, officials from both sister cities, Shanghai and Taipei, agreed that the student exchange program “should be the first thing implemented, saying it could kickoff this summer if everything goes smoothly.” The exchange programs include students, teachers and lecturers, and resident artists; the hosting of academic seminars in each other’s city; assistance for the education of Taiwan business people’s children living in Shanghai; the holding of sports competitions and performances in each other’s city; the exchanging of visits by business and industrial groups; incentives for investment in each other’s city; and assistance to investors from the other’s city. Schools are to be built soon to help resolve the education problems for school-age children of the Taiwanese business people in Shanghai. 48 As a matter of fact, Shanghai is becoming one of the most favored investment places for Taiwan’s business people. 48 For more details, please refer to “Taipei, Shanghai to Begin Student Exchange Program”, Taipei Central News Agency WWW-Text English February 28, 2001. 80 There are also possibilities of cooperation in some international fora for China and Taiwan. Both China and Taiwan have joined the WTO. 49 Taiwan hopes to make a good use of the WTO as a communication channel to deal with trade problems. However, China insists that trade issues across the Strait be handled internally rather than through any international mechanism. No matter what, the WTO will provide the two sides with more regulated guidelines in economic investment. The mainland will further open its market in many more industries, such as services, banking, insurance, information technology, and intellectual property. SUMMARY Leaders in the mainland and Taiwan still prefer different approaches to address the Taiwan issue. The mainland insists that communications across the Strait cannot start until Taiwan accepts the “one China” principle or at least a more “relaxed” version of the principle. However, Taiwanese authorities argue “one China” should not be a pre- condition for talks; rather, it is something the two sides can talk about for the future China. Although no reliable polling data have been supplied by Beijing, by many analysts (for example, Shirk, 2007; Gries, 2005) as well as the analysis in Chapter Six show that the Taiwan issue remains to be the most important political issue the government in Beijing is facing. In fact, the recent fast growing of nationalism in China has made the Taiwan issue a matter of regime survival for the communist party. 49 Taiwan has been allowed to join the WTO as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu under the name of Chinese Taipei. 81 It is believed that most people in the mainland support the government’s “one China” principle and believe the “one country, two systems” formula can be a good solution to the Taiwan issue. However, people in Taiwan believe otherwise. As shown in Figure 3.7, from January 1991 to July 2001, people who support the “one country, two system” formula in Taiwan never topped over 20 percent. In March 2001, it reached a record-high, with 16.1 percent saying “yes” supporting the formula and 73.9 percent “no”. Four month later, the “yes” percentage dropped to 13.3 percent. Figure 3.7 “One Country, Two Systems” Formula as a Solution 50 Despite the differences, many from the two sides believe in the functionalist approach. As the functionalist David Mitrany (1975) suggests, successful cooperation in one functional setting will enhance the incentive for collaboration in other fields. Many people hope the collaboration in common areas, such as economy and culture, will eventually spill over into the political arena. 50 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 8, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_8.gif 82 Based on the above discussion, mainland China and Taiwan have indeed existed as two separate political entities since 1949. The complex history of China and Taiwan shows that there has been no definitive evidence to show Taiwan is part of China; there has been no definitive evidence to show otherwise either. The similarities and linkages in culture, history and social areas and the recent changes in the political systems across the Taiwan Strait have made the case of China-Taiwan a perfectly “controlled” environment to unpack the foreign policy decision making process. In the next three chapters, I will use empirical evidence to examine foreign policy decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. Chapter Four examines the diversionary behaviors of the Taiwanese presidents in regards to their respective positions on Taiwan unification or independence. Chapter Five uses events data at the individual and events level to study the interactions in the Taiwan Strait. In Chapter Six, I will conduct an in- depth case study to further examine the issue of nationalism and identity change and their impact on the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. 83 Chapter 4 Wag the “Dragon”?: The Politics of Diversion in the Taiwan Strait The linkage between domestic and international politics has always been at the center of debate in foreign policy analysis and international relations. Carl von Clausewitz once famously said: “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, suggesting a direct linkage between what goes on domestically and what political leaders might do internationally as a foreign policy. However, the causal direction of domestic and international politics could go either way. Each direction is of great theoretical and practical importance and could shape policies in different ways. Levy (1989: 267) points out that many previous studies have failed to “distinguish between two distinct processes: (1) the externalization of internal conflict, in which internal conflict has a causal impact on external conflict…, or (2) the internalization of external conflict, in which independently generated external conflict has a causal impact on internal conflict.” In this chapter, I focus on the domestic determinants of foreign policy by examining the diversionary behaviors in the Taiwan Strait. Among many international relations theories, the Diversionary Theory (DT) has received much scholarly attention. However, DT has predominantly been placed in the context of the use of military force, such as war and conflict, by major Western powers, such as the U.S. and the UK (See for example: Mueller, 1973; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Edwards and Gallup, 1990; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; James and Rioux, 1998). DT argues that leaders may resort to international conflict when domestic political and economic situations are troublesome. The goal is to direct public attention away from problems at home and toward conflict with an external adversary, all 84 to the presumed benefit of the ruling elite. This strategic behavior has been vividly portrayed in the 1997 movie “Wag the Dog”. Evidence shows that the conceptualization used in existing DT studies is flawed or limited at best. Diversionary behaviors measured by war or other military conflicts only reflect a limited scope of possible political behaviors by political elites (Levy, 1989). Particularly, non-military diversionary behaviors have been used by political leaders as a means of diversion. Therefore, the study of diversionary behaviors should not be limited to military diversions or only among major western powers. The evidence is especially clear in regard to how political leaders in the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan react to mainland China. March 2004 marked an important occasion for the ROC. For just the third time in its history, the ROC directly elected its president. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the election by a tenuous 0.2% margin. The DPP (a traditionally pro- independence party) coalition and the Kuomintang (KMT, a traditionally pro-unification party) coalition continue to divide on their positions toward mainland China, a preeminent “foreign policy” 51 issue. In the meantime, Taiwan continues to experience an economic downturn, with particularly high unemployment rate, so the domestic situation is problematic. In spite of the difficult economic times, mainland China attracts a large amount of investment from Taiwan. Thus, the close and complex connections of the ROC and China effectively blur the line between domestic politics and foreign policy – a genuine case of “linkage politics” as so aptly described in the classic exposition by Rosenau (1969). 51 How the case of China and Taiwan fits into the domain of foreign policy will be elaborated later on in the chapter. 85 While creation of explicit military conflict in the Taiwan Strait by the leadership in Taipei is deemed quite unlikely as a possible means toward diverting the public’s attention away from domestic problems, more subtle processes of diversion might be expected instead. Have leaders in Taiwan been using these non-military means as a diversion from their domestic problems? How could such new forms of diversion potentially change the scope of DT in the context of foreign policy analysis? Are domestic reasons the most deterministic factors of foreign policy decision making? This chapter will try to answer these questions. DT, most notably in relation to war but also other forms of international strife, “is now a major research program in the field and a good example of how a combination of a statistical, formal-theoretic, and case study research can contribute significantly to the cumulation of knowledge” (Levy and Mabe 2004: 65). However, existing studies of DT primarily focus on the study of war or military conflict involving major western powers. Evidence suggests that other forms of diversionary behaviors also exist. Moreover, diversionary behaviors are not necessarily solely initiated by major western powers. This chapter applies a variant of DT to assess whether leaders in Taipei use Taiwan independence as a form of diversion from domestic problems during the years leading up to the 2004 presidential election. Simultaneously, the chapter also will examine if Taiwan’s position on cross-strait relations influenced competing parties’ prospects in that election. The case of China and Taiwan adds significantly to the empirical testing for DT on several grounds. First, Taiwan is a new multi-party democracy in Asia, so an assessment of DT in this context represents a qualitative addition to the research program. 86 Second, the issue of independence is at the core of Taiwan’s identity, which is described by David Kang (2008) as “undecided” even among Taiwanese themselves. Thus the present study for DT in the context of the Taiwan Strait is a very challenging and inherently interesting one. 52 Third, as China reemerges as a dominant power in East Asia, Taiwan becomes the only “nation” that fears the Chinese use of force (Kang, 2008). The understanding of the interactions in the Taiwan Strait is an important step towards a better understanding of what role China might play in East Asian security and international security. Fourth, using Clausewitz as an analogy, Hudson (2002) argues that foreign policy is simply the continuation of domestic politics by other means. The study of non-military diversionary behaviors in the Taiwan Strait will shed some light on the domestic determinants of foreign policy decision making. Finally, as a closely related actor, the U.S. has official and unofficial ties with China and Taiwan, respectively. Political and economic changes in Taiwan and their subsequent influence on cross-strait relations also are anticipated to influence U.S. relations with both China and Taiwan. This chapter will draw out foreign policy implications for the U.S. government in dealing with Beijing and Taipei. This chapter will unfold into the following sections. First, the general literature on DT will be briefly reviewed to lay down the theoretical foundation of the discussion. Second, how Taiwan fits into the context of DT will be discussed. Third, based on the discussions of the theory, hypotheses, data, variables and statistical procedures will be 52 China, moreover, often is represented as a unique entity not subject to analysis through the means of social science, usually with some reference to its cultural background. This would seem to imply that Taiwan would prove similarly resistant. The path-breaking major study of China, which focuses on international crises and refutes the position just described, is Bobrow, Chan and Kringen (1979). 87 described. Finally, the results of the data analysis will be discussed and conclusions will be drawn. A REVIEW OF DIVERSIONARY THEORY Taiwan’s domestic politics and its linkage to cross-strait relations do not fall within the usual pattern of DT. The diversionary model needs to be extended in order for it to be applicable to the Taiwan case. Such extension of the scope of the DT model serves directly as a possible way to improve problems in DT research identified by Levy (1989). To better understand diversionary behaviors in the context of the Taiwan Strait, it is worthwhile to first review DT in its conventional form. Diversionary behaviors have long been used as a viable strategy by many foreign policy decision makers. For example, “Secretary Seward advised President Lincoln to get into trouble with Great Britain or France in order to prevent the incipient Civil War.” (Wright, 1942, cited in Geller, 1985: 19) Haas and Whiting (1956: 62, cited in Geller, 1985: 20) stated that: In times of extreme domestic tension among elites, a policy of uniting a badly divided nation against some real or alleged outside threat frequently seems useful to a ruling group. Elites, fearful of losing their position in the nation as a result of sharp ideological and group conflict…attempt to displace the attention of the disaffected portion of the nation away from its grievances and toward some outside target… This is all because, as Coser (1956) asserted, that leaders are aware that constituencies become more cohesive during times of conflict with out-groups; and such conflict with the out-group will increase cohesion of the in-group. Thus, ruling elites can have an 88 incentive to pursue diversionary behavior when in trouble at home, commonly known as the “scapegoat” theory. Subsequently, when a troubled leader pursues international diversionary activities, the domestic public can be expected to rally around its leader against the outside adversary (Mueller, 1973; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Edwards and Gallup, 1990; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; James and Rioux, 1998). Previous studies show that a weak domestic economy and sagging public approval rate are possible reasons for leaders to divert attention to an international crisis, including an interstate war, to boost their support among the public (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Levy, 1989; Russett, 1990; James and Oneal, 1991; DeRouen, 2000). Most previous studies of DT have primarily focused on the use of military force as the main proxy of diversionary behaviors, particularly the use of force by the U.S. president (for example James and Oneal, 1991; James and Rioux, 1998; DeRouen, 2000; Meernik, 2000). There are several reasons for this research priority. First, data on the primary dependent variable, U.S. presidents’ use of military force overseas, are readily available. The most prominent independent variables, which measure economic status, presidential approval rate, and other domestic factors, also are available and more accessible for the U.S. as compared to other actors. Second, standing out as an indisputable superpower during the Cold War and is the only one left thereafter, the U.S. is most capable of challenging other states through military means. Third, as the Commander-in-Chief, the U.S. President has the capability to act in both foreign policy and military deployment, albeit within constitutional limitations. This concentration of power in one individual/office makes the assessment of DT more feasible and relevant in the U.S. context. 89 Scholars have studied different aspects of the use of military force in the context of interstate war and international crisis by U.S. presidents. Ostrom and Job (1986), using data from 1949 to 1976, argue that domestic and political factors are more influential on the president’s decision to use military force than international factors. Through a new indicator – the “misery index”, which is a measure of severity for ongoing international crises - James and Oneal (1991) also suggest that domestic political factors are most consequential in the president’s decision to use force. Moreover, James and Rioux (1998) suggest that crisis activity increases the president’s popularity, but only by a very small margin. More interestingly, the outcome of the international crisis responded to by the president does not seem to affect presidential popularity. This finding indirectly reinforces the already established importance of domestic factors in explaining presidential standing. Fordham (1998a and 1998b) takes a closer look at how a different complement of economic conditions, presidential popularity and other factors could have an impact on the president’s decision to use force to attract public confidence. In some cases, the results are mixed. More specifically, his findings suggest that inflation makes the use of force (a) less likely, because war, if it occurs as a result of diversionary behavior, can increase inflation, but also (b) more likely, because the economic welfare of voters is harmed and may make them more willing to support action abroad. These contradictory effects may cancel each other out. Unemployment, by contrast, makes force more attractive by reducing costs (a “supply effect”) and harming voters (a “demand effect”). Methodologically, Fordham’s data analysis of U.S. uses of force from 1949 to 1994 strongly suggests that when using unemployment and inflation as an estimate of 90 economic conditions, the two measurements should be used separately as they may have separate effects on the president’s use of force. DeRouen (2000) reassesses several previous quantitative studies on the DT. His results concur with many previous studies such as Ostrom and Job (1986), Russett (1990) and James and Rioux (1998) on some economic factors, such as the unemployment and inflation rates, and their influences on presidential use of force. The study also suggests that presidential use of military force may produce a limited “rally-round-the-flag” effect to boost presidential approval. Meernik (2000) takes aim at the methodological weaknesses of previous studies on DT and argues that selection effects on presidential use of force may have affected findings from previous studies. Political use of military force is divided into two subsets of studies: those that find evidence of a direct link between domestic conditions and the use of force, and those that argue the link is conditional (Meernik, 2000). Results from Meernik’s study suggest that a lack of modeling for the “crisis-generation process” has hindered the evaluation of DT. As mentioned earlier, studies of DT have focused overwhelmingly on U.S. presidential use of force. Recently, several studies have looked at DT and/or the subsequently related “rally around the flag” effect in the United Kingdom. Morgan and Anderson (1999: 811) apply a revised DT model and argue their results indicate that the British governments “use external aggression as a tool for bolstering their support among the members of their ruling coalition.” Lai and Reiter (2005) show the Falklands War did generate a rally effect in the U.K. 91 Clearly, DT remains a viable but controversial theory of foreign policy. Perhaps the most comprehensive critique of DT so far has been Jack Levy’s review of the DT research program. Several decades have gone by; however, many of the problems identified by Levy in 1989 still remain. The most fundamental limitation of the study of DT concerns with what the appropriate proxy might be for diversionary behaviors. Most previous studies of DT use war or other interstate conflict or crisis as the measurement for diversionary behaviors. Levy (1989: 282) argues that “not all diversionary actions lead to war”; moreover, he rightly points out that DT should not be mistakenly and narrowly linked to the study of war, but rather: The diversionary theory of war is not really a theory of war. It is a theory (although an incomplete one) of the foreign policy behavior of an individual state with respect to one particular issue area. War, on the other hand, generally involves the strategic interaction of two or more states. Thus, the diversionary theory of war is logically incomplete unless it is incorporated into a broader theory of strategic interaction and international politics. Additionally, current empirical testing of DT primarily focuses on a limited set of countries. These countries are often major powers and western democracies. Research shows that small and middle powers can divert too at times (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). For example, recent studies by Sprecher and DeRouen (2002 and 2005) 53 , treating Israel as a middle power, assess whether Israeli military actions increase as a function of (a) domestic unrest and (b) external threat relationships. Both expectations are met for 53 Another example would be Fordham (2005). He produces an extremely insightful account of how “strategic conflict avoidance” could impact upon the degree of confirmation achieved by DT as a result of states being especially careful not to confront the U.S. when it is going through domestic difficulties that might create a disposition toward diversion. This result is not regarded as applicable to the context of Taiwan’s relations with the PRC because it is inconceivable that the PRC would experience the same reluctance to upset Taiwan regardless of the latter’s internal state of affairs. This example serves as a reminder that only some of the previous DT literature can inform the present chapter, which focuses on a middle, not a great, power. 92 the period from 1948 to 1998 (Sprecher and DeRouen 2002: 252). Sprecher and DeRouen (2005) also study Israel and its rival dyads in relation to domestic unrest and the number of parties in the cabinet as a potentially important trait of the country’s system of proportional representation. The number of parties is taken as a proxy for the government’s vulnerability, as incrementally adding to the total increases the risk of falling from power. It is expected that greater domestic unrest and larger numbers of parties in the cabinet are more likely to produce hostile actions. This is confirmed strongly for domestic unrest but only in a marginal way for the number of parties in the cabinet. The present chapter broadens the analysis of DT to include a new form of diversionary behavior and a new actor. This extension is a direct attempt to answer calls by Jack Levy (1989) to expand the scope of DT from the traditionally military form of diversions to non-military ones. It also puts the study of DT in the context of foreign policy analysis rather than the context of war. DT asserts that foreign policy cannot easily be disentangled from domestic politics (James and Oneal, 1991; Redd, 2005: 134). The theory challenges the traditional realist’s position, which conceives of the nation- state as a unitary actor where foreign policy decision-making goes through a “black box” and foreign and domestic policies are independent of each other (James, 1988; Putnam, 1988; Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, 1989; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Miller 1995; Morgan and Anderson, 1999). As it will become apparent, the non-military diversionary behavior in the Taiwan Strait is a prime example of how domestic politics can influence one’s foreign policy. 93 Additionally, I argue, not only weak states, but also non western states can engage in diversionary strategies, building on the noteworthy finding from a large N study by Pickering and Kisangani (2005) suggesting that even weak states (democracies, in particular) can engage in diversionary uses of force. In line with recent concerns about China’s reemergence, the chapter also will shed light on the regional security of East Asia. It almost goes without saying that Taiwan is ever-vigilant about the threat posed by China, with the level of concern always significant in terms of calculations about policy in all areas. In the following section, I will explain how and why Taiwan’s political rhetoric about China can fit into the framework of DT and how the theory needs to be adapted to better explain the Taiwan case. TAIWAN IN THE CONTEXT OF DT Foreign vs. Domestic Relations DT deals with foreign policy decision-making between states. Thus, an immediate question can be raised about the validity of this approach as related to Taiwan and China: Are cross-strait relations foreign relations? The history of the “Taiwan Question” shows why this issue is important. In 1911, the KMT established the ROC in mainland China. In 1949, the KMT lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan while the CCP Chairman Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the PRC. However, for a long time the KMT government continued to exist as the legal representative of China in the international 94 community. Two decades later, in 1971, that the United Nations (UN) passed Resolution 2758 to replace the ROC with the PRC as the sole and legal representative of China in the UN and the international community. The ROC withdrew from the UN and all other international organizations that require legal statehood. The PRC argues that the ROC government ceased to exist after its defeat in the civil war. The ROC, however, argues the KMT government was moved to Taiwan only temporarily after losing the civil war to the CCP (Hickey and Li, 2002). Only a handful of small countries, 23 to be exact as of April 2008, officially recognize the ROC. However, since 1949, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been exercising de facto sovereignty. Each side features an effective government, an active military, a fixed population and firm territorial control. Both act independently on domestic and international issues. Thus, the two sides exist as two separate political entities in relation to each other. For the purpose of this chapter, the fact that both Taiwan and China have separate policies makes the two actors in the Taiwan Strait independent political entities. Taiwan and China then become essentially “external” toward each other, making DT relevant to this case. Military vs. Non-Military Diversions DT treats the use of military force or creation of an international crisis as the primary source for diversion. Nevertheless, evidence suggests the use of military force or the creation of any military crisis in the Taiwan Strait seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. For example, Ross (2006) suggests that there is an effective and stable mutual 95 deterrence in the Taiwan Strait which has prevented military crisis from happening. 54 In the relatively distant past, however, military conflicts occurred on several occasions. Between 1949 and 1978, Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan was to “liberate Taiwan by force [and]…wash Taiwan in blood” (Wu, 1994: 19). China actually had conquered the minor offshore island of Tachen in 1955 and bombarded Quemoy in 1955 and 1958 in conjunction with its Taiwan policy during the early years. Taipei, for a certain period after 1949, also perceived military means as the ultimate solution to the Taiwan problem. After fleeing to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek asserted a firm belief in “national recovery and national reconstruction” (Cooper, 1990: 30). Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek and the third president of Taiwan, also believed that the “anti-Communist struggle will never cease until Communism is eliminated from Chinese territory and until the Chinese Communist regime has been destroyed” (The Republic of China Is on the Move, 1979: 8). Between May 19, 1949 and July 15, 1987, Taiwan was under Martial Law, due to its fear of invasion by the PRC and its self-stated readiness to attack and recover all of China at any time. After the death of Mao, the PRC relaxed its stance on Taiwan and announced proposals for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. The PRC, however, has never renounced the use of force to take the island. Among many other initiatives to promote a peaceful unification, in the early 1980s, the PRC leader Deng Xiaoping proposed the “one country, two systems” formula. Hong Kong and Macau have come back to Chinese 54 Ross (2006: 16) argues that there are two kinds of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: the deterrence of China by the U.S. which requires “U.S. possession of the capabilities and credibility necessary to persuade Beijing that the expected cost of U.S. retaliation would be greater than the benefits of using force for unification”; and the deterrence of Taiwan by China, which requires “sufficient Chinese capabilities and resolve to persuade Taipei that the expected costs of a Chinese retaliation would be greater than the benefits of formally declaring independence for Taiwan”. 96 rule in 1997 and 1999 respectively under this formula, and China has always encouraged Taiwan to accept the same framework and promised that a greater degree of autonomy would be given to Taiwan once it returned to the mainland. The ROC, by contrast, has “unilaterally renounced the use of force to unify China, no longer competes with Beijing to represent China in the international community, and now acknowledges that the PRC exercises ‘de facto authority’ over mainland China” (Hickey, 2001: 18). It has, however, vehemently rejected the “one country, two systems” formula proposed by China. In the mid 1990s, the situation in the Taiwan Strait escalated to crisis. The then- Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit to the U.S. 55 and his remarks about China and Taiwan having “state-to-state” or at least “special state-to-state” 56 relations angered Beijing and triggered the PLA’s live missile tests off Taiwan’s coast in 1995 and 1996. In addition, the missile tests were considered to be intending to influence Taiwan’s first presidential election in March 1996. The situation became acute enough to prompt the U.S. to send aircraft carriers to the region to monitor the situation. Nevertheless, China’s aggressive policy soon appeared to have backfired. 57 Taiwan and China both backed down. Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, both sides have been able to constrain themselves and maintain a very low profile on any military gestures. 55 As part of Lee Teng-hui’s pragmatic diplomacy, a June 1995 visit to Cornell University as an alumnus sparked a series of protests from China. China perceived the visit as part of a “containment-like pattern” in US policies (Garrison 2005: 144). The PRC conducted a series of missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan and other military maneuvers off the coast of Fujian as a response to what it saw as provocative moves by Lee in attempting to “split the motherland.” 56 He made this remark on July 9, 1999. 57 China’s military exercises did not prevent Lee Teng-hui from being elected president. 97 During Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, China only threatened Taiwan verbally. President-elect Chen Shui-bian stated “Five No’s” to placate Beijing. 58 Beijing, too, soon softened its tone. In November 2003, Taiwan’s parliament approved a bill that could allow the island to vote on sovereignty issues. However, the opposition managed to water down most of the provisions that most likely would have angered Beijing. Beijing stated that it was “gravely concerned about the situation surrounding Taiwan’s referendum law” (CNN, November 28, 2003). Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, during a visit to Washington in December 2003, said that possible American military action to help defend Taiwan would not deter China from taking whatever steps it deems necessary to thwart Taiwan independence (CNN, December 9, 2003). Wen made this comment in reaction to Taiwan’s call for an island-wide referendum in March 2004, which could allow Taiwan to vote on its sovereignty issues. In recent years, even though Taiwan has moved closer to declaring formal independence (Ross, 2006), Beijing has yet initiated any military actions against Taiwan, which strongly confirms the evolution of the conflict across the Straits in the direction of hostile verbiage as opposed to specific applications of force. To sum up, in spite of continuing disputes over Taiwan’s political status, exchanges and dependence in the area of low politics – particularly Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on China - have drawn the adversaries closer together than ever before. Military actions of any kind in the Taiwan Strait would not be in the interests of 58 Chen proclaimed that, as long as the PRC did not use military force against Taiwan: he will not declare Taiwan independent of China; he will not support changing the national title of the Republic of China; he will not push for the inclusion of Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” description in the ROC Constitution; he will not promote an island-wide referendum on the island’s status and he will not abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines (See Hickey and Li, 2002 for a detailed discussion.). 98 either side. Military conflict, especially initiated by Taiwan, is therefore very unlikely, given the overall strategic situation. Chambers (2002: 75) argues that: Taiwan of course is the one neighbor that China very seriously threatens. While the PLA currently lacks the air and amphibious naval capabilities to invade the island, it has sufficient missile capabilities to destroy Taiwanese property and lives, and it has a sufficient number of submarines and surface vessels to threaten the island with a blockade, which could severely disrupt the Taiwanese economy…. [T]he PLA is currently seeking to enhance its ability to threaten the island. Of course, given that China has not renounced the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, the potential for military crisis always exists, although at a much lower level than decades ago. The one near-certainty is that Taiwan will not be the one that unleashes a military attack across the Strait, if such an unlikely event should come to pass. 59 All things considered, the argument that leaders in Taiwan would use military diversion against China to boost their domestic political support does not seem appropriate. Therefore, if it is to be applied in this context, DT needs to be altered as such: leaders in Taiwan might be expected to use their positions on Taiwan independence to influence their standing in domestic politics. 60 Political leaders in Taiwan know that 59 Paul (1994: 167-168) draws attention to the possibility that, like some other asymmetric dyads of the past, the lesser party may choose to initiate military conflict. The reason for such surprising behavior is strategic in the sense that limited goals are pursued with the belief that they can be obtained without necessarily producing a wider and more destructive war. Even then, the case of the Taiwan Strait seems to be an unlikely choice because of the danger that Beijing might use any type of military action by Taipei as a justification for a much higher level of escalation. 60 In the first stage of this research, I do not explicitly distinguish between promoting Taiwan independence and promoting a greater degree of autonomy. There is a difference between the two. The former would usually require a formal statement and entail serious military reaction from the PRC, while the latter generally does not change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Although the difference is subtle, the distinction is crucial. I do not challenge the importance of the subtle difference between Taiwan independence and greater degree of autonomy. Instead, I argue that it is precisely the subtle difference that Taiwanese leaders take advantage of in their rhetoric. They know the distinction is hard to make. Therefore, when they are in trouble at home, they have the motivation to use their positions on cross-strait relations to divert attention from domestic problems. 99 “Taiwan can avoid provoking a mainland use of force against the island and its offshore interests by simply avoiding a declaration of permanent legal independence from the Chinese nation.” (Christensen, 2006: 50) Nevertheless, they are also aware of the power and importance of the issue of independence. Therefore, while they try to avoid provoking mainland China, they also have incentives to take advantage of this issue in order to benefit their political interests in the domestic arena. In the next sections, I will introduce the hypotheses, data collection process, variables, and statistical procedures used to test DT in the cross-strait context. This represents a shift in focus from DT as applied to hegemonic (US) or great powers (UK) to a middle power (Taiwan). In particular, the hegemonic or great power can act on its own initiative more often and readily consider the use of force. A middle power, by contrast, will tend to be more reactive to the actions of other states, especially those with greater capabilities. For this reason, the present context represents an especially challenging one for DT. HYPOTHESES Based on the discussions above, I propose the following hypotheses. The first group of hypotheses – the diversionary hypotheses – will test propositions relating to the diversionary effects. The second group of hypotheses – the approval hypotheses – will test propositions relating to the “rally-round-the-flag” effects. 100 Diversionary Hypotheses: Diversionary Hypothesis: The lower the president’s approval rating, the more likely he is to promote Taiwanese independence. Misery Hypothesis: The higher the inflation and unemployment rates, the more likely the president will promote Taiwanese independence. Cordial Relations Hypothesis: The more cross-strait visits and trade, the less likely the president will be to promote Taiwanese independence. The Diversionary and Misery Hypotheses derive in a straightforward way from the idea that leaders are likely to redirect public attention to more favorable areas, presumably international issues, when they are in trouble at home. As shown in previous research, an already unpopular leader or one faced with declining economic conditions becomes more likely to engage in such thinking. In this case, the diversion would be Taiwan’s relations vis-à-vis mainland China. The Cordial Relations Hypothesis acknowledges that a Taiwanese president also could benefit from actions that suggest improved relations across the strait. If the cross- strait relations are stable, political leaders have no incentive to interrupt the existing political and economic stability for their own interests. Therefore, they should have no incentive to provoke mainland China by promoting Taiwan independence. Approval Hypotheses: Independence Hypothesis: The more the president promotes Taiwanese independence, the higher the presidential approval. 101 Opposition Hypothesis: The stronger the opposition’s rhetoric, the lower the presidential approval. Economy Hypothesis: The worse the Taiwanese economy, the lower the presidential approval. Visit Hypothesis: The more cross-strait visits occur, the higher the presidential approval. Trade Hypothesis: The greater cross-strait trade levels are, the higher the presidential approval. The Independence and Opposition Hypotheses are variants on those from DT; in the context of Taiwan, rhetoric about independence takes the place of military force. The Opposition hypothesis, moreover, is in line with the need to build this neglected aspect of DT into the modeling process (Levy and Mabe 2004: 67, 78). The Economy Hypothesis is a corollary to the preceding Misery Hypothesis. Finally, the Visit and Trade Hypotheses acknowledge that more cooperative forms of behavior by the president vis-à- vis China also could be rewarded by the public through higher approval based on the belief that Taiwan’s standing might be improved through such means as well. DATA, VARIABLES AND STATISTICAL PROCEDURES This section briefly explains the data sources, coding procedures for the variables and statistical procedures to be used. 102 Data and Variables in the Cross-Straits Context As explained earlier in the chapter, a direct military conflict initiated by leaders in Taiwan seems unlikely. Taiwan itself does not have the military capability to launch an offensive against mainland China (Ross, 2006). Should Taiwan decide to initiate military actions against China, Taiwan would have to secure explicit support from the U.S. The willingness and readiness of U.S. involvement depends on calculation of its own strategic interests. An explicit military conflict initiated by Taiwan with U.S. involvement would undoubtedly complicate the Taiwan issue for the White House immeasurably. Moreover, both the political risk and policy risk would be immensely high if leaders in Taiwan initiated direct military conflict with mainland China. 61 Therefore, a dichotomous variable (Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991) indicating the use of major or nuclear-capable forces would not be proper in the Taiwan case. Instead, I propose an alternative variable – Taiwan President’s Independence Magnitude. The core of the Taiwan issue is Taiwan’s independence. Since Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996, all presidential candidates have had to deal with the issue of Taiwan independence. Former KMT president Lee Teng-hui openly promoted Taiwan independence in 1995. Other KMT leaders have adopted a more neutral or even pro- China approach by promoting and maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 61 Two types of risks constrain policy makers when making foreign policy decisions – policy risk and political risk. Policy risk is “the probability that the substantive goals of established policy will not be achieved.” Political risk is “the probability that policy choices will have adverse effects on the political position of the policy-making factions” (Lamborn, 1991: 5). For example, Lee Teng-hui’s “special-state- to-state” remarks and his private visit to the U.S. in 1995 angered Beijing. Beijing subsequently ended the cross-strait dialogues which started in the early 1990s. The ending of the cross-strait dialogue posed a policy risk to Taiwan as effective communications were cut. In addition, the KMT was also perceived as not being able to maintain the only semi-official communication across the Taiwan Strait. KMT’s political risk also increased due to the failure to maintain those dialogues. 103 During the 2000 presidential election, the pro-independence DPP party leader Chen Shui- bian also openly promoted Taiwan independence and won that election by a marginal vote. Chen Shui-bian has promoted a new Taiwanese identity and independence since he came to office in May 2000. During Chen’s 2004 reelection campaign, he also promoted a referendum that, if passed, would potentially allow Taiwanese to vote on their sovereignty status and the re-writing of Taiwan’s constitution. Despite Chen’s referendum failure, 62 he managed to win the 2004 election, although with just a 0.2% margin. Many argue the shooting attempt, 63 which injured both Chen Shui-bian and vice president Annette Lu on the eve of the presidential election, also swung some “sympathy” votes for the DPP. 64 Nevertheless, the issue of Taiwan independence certainly played an important role in Chen’s reelection. To some analysts, the “Taiwan issue is not about power but about identity” (Kang, 2008: 93), particularly whether such identity would subsequently lead to an independent Taiwan. 65 Moreover, especially during Chen’s first years in power, “his government had 62 In March 2004, the Taiwanese voted on a referendum that potentially could lead to formal Taiwan independence. Although voters who had cast votes on the referendum voted overwhelmingly in favor of it, the overall turnout of 45.l% did not exceed the 50% of registered voters required to validate the referendum. There were two questions on the referendum. The first question was “The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the Government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?” The second question was “Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Mainland China on the establishment of a ‘peace and stability’ framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?” 63 Both Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were shot during a campaign appearance on the eve of the March, 2004 presidential election. To this day, no arrests or changes have been made against any suspects. Many argue that the apparent assassination attempt, staged or not, won the DPP some sympathy votes. 64 During the 2004 Taiwan presidential election, Chen Shui-bian won 50.02% of the vote. All polls had predicted a defeat for Chen prior to the alleged assassination attempt. So many argue that the assassination attempt was staged (see Ross, 2006: 23 for more details). 65 This issue will be further addressed in Chapter Six. 104 two premiers and three cabinet reshuffles; was widely criticized for mishandling a natural disaster in 2000; his vice president routinely generated unwanted publicity by issuing controversial statements…” (Sutter, 2008: 197). Chen’s persistent effort to create an independent and unique identity for Taiwan and his political and economic trouble at home are likely to give him some incentives to strategically play the issue of independence or unification to his favor. Leaders in Taiwan could be using the issue of Taiwan independence as a mere campaign tool to seek the victory in an election or reelection. They also could use their positions on the issue of Taiwan independence as a diversion from their domestic problems. Taiwan independence is an important factor that can affect Taiwan’s election results and domestic politics. Since Taiwan’s first democratic election in 1996, the issue of Taiwan independence has been brought up during every presidential campaign and even in campaigns by sub-national leaders. Therefore, I will use Taiwan president’s magnitude or intensity on Taiwan independence as a measure of their diversionary behavior. Nevertheless, no existing dataset has defined a measurement for Taiwan president’s independence magnitude. Nor has existing research used Taiwan independence as a quantitative variable. I code this variable from scratch through Taiwan’s Central News Agency, the official English news agency in Taiwan. By searching keywords in the Lexis/Nexis system, all news articles that contain contents related to Taiwan independence, from January 1, 1995 to March 20, 2004, were 105 gathered. 66 At this stage, I am concerned only about official positions of different presidents and their respective parties on the issue of Taiwan independence. 67 Therefore, unofficial rhetoric is dropped. 68 Four major parties are included. The DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) – the pan-green coalitions are coded as the pro-independence party coalitions. The KMT and the People First Party (PFP) – the pan-blue 69 coalitions, plus the New Party (NP) are coded as the pro-unification coalitions. Data are gathered on a daily basis. Each remark regarding a particular party’s position on the Taiwan independence issue is measured for its pro-independence (negative 1) or pro-unification (positive 1) stance (see Table 4.1) and its intensity (low, medium and high; 1, 2 and 3 respectively) (see Table 4.2). For example, if a KMT spokesperson officially makes a remark on future unification under proper terms, this remark is coded as a medium level pro-unification position, i.e., 1 (pro- unification) x 2 (medium intensity) = 2 (see Table 4.3 for examples). The President’s 66 One natural criticism of this chapter would be that it should be extended back in time to the qualitatively different era prior to democratic elections for president to probe for the range over which the findings hold. Such an assessment is deemed very worthwhile, but requires extensive data collection to become feasible. This work is in progress. 67 I acknowledge the point that “barking dogs don’t bite”. Such limitation of data is conditioned by the fact that I am only able to obtain and use open news sources, such as the Central News Agency. As part of the next stage of the project, I will conduct further reliability checks by using other news sources, such as newspapers in Chinese to diminish the potential effects of such limitation. 68 I realize that newspapers in Taiwan vary in their positions regarding the issue of unification and independence. It is particularly true for newspapers published in Chinese. At this initial stage, I use Central News Agency’s English version as the main source. The purpose of this chapter is to capture the official positions of political elites in Taiwan, particularly those of the respective presidents. Central News Agency is the official English language source run by the government in Taiwan. Therefore, it reports the official positions of the government closely. It is precisely because of this reason that I use this news agency as the major data source. Moreover, political elites often use their official media as a channel to convey their political messages to others. Therefore, this source is the most appropriate for the purpose of this project. Further investigation into news sources in Chinese will be conducted later. 69 There are two major political coalitions in Taiwan. The pan-blue represents the pro-unification coalition led by the KMT. The pan-green represents the pro-independence coalition led by the DPP. 106 Independence Magnitude variable then is aggregated by month. 70 A one month lag is also created to capture changes over time. To control for which party is holding the presidency, I create a Party Identification Dummy variable, where KMT is assigned the value 0 and DPP 1. In order to test the opposition’s influence on Taiwan’s presidential approval, I also create an Opposition Magnitude variable. The Opposition Magnitude variable has reversed values of the President’s Independence Magnitude variable. The Opposition Magnitude variable also is aggregated by month and lagged by one time unit. Type Value Pro-Independence -1 Mutual 0 Pro-Unification 1 Table 4.1: Pro-Independence vs. Pro-Unification Table 4.1 Pro-Independence vs. Pro-Unification Type Value Mutual 0 Low 1 Medium 2 High 3 Table 4.2: Rhetoric Intensity Table 4.2 Rhetoric Intensity 70 During the data collection process, the president’s rhetorical remarks are collected as event data on a daily basis. However, the unit of analysis for the presidential approval data and cross-strait trade and visit data is monthly. In order the run the PIM variable together with the rest of the variables, the PIM variable is aggregated to the monthly level. 107 In this chapter, I suggest that Taiwan’s president uses independence to divert the public’s attention away from domestic problems. In turn, pro-independence rhetoric certainly will affect the presidential approval rating. The two related propositions are derived from Levy’s (1989: 279) commentary that “diversionary actions…may be affected by a current political issue, especially in democratic states during election years.” Presidential approval data is collected from several different sources on a daily, quarterly or yearly basis; this variable is aggregated by month. 71 A lagged presidential approval rating is created. Several independent variables will be used to measure Taiwan’s domestic politics and linkage politics. As a measurement for domestic economic performance, the so- called “misery index” has been widely used in many of the previous studies on DT (James and Oneal 1991). Other scholars, such as DeRouen (2000), simply used inflation and unemployment separately as indicators for domestic economic performance. I adopt the latter approach in this case to give me a more detailed analysis of the domestic economic impact. Inflation rate and unemployment rate variables are collected monthly. A one-time-unit lag also is created. 71 During a non-election year, presidential rating is available on quarterly or yearly basis. During an election year, however, presidential rating is available on a daily basis as the election approaches. 108 Date Source Rhetoric Value Justification 3/8/2004 Central News Agency Lien, who is the sole challenger of President Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan's March 20 presidential election, noted that the Republic of China has been in existence for 93 years and said that his "pan-blue alliance" of the opposition Kuomintang and its ally th 2 Pro-unification in general; no clear statement about unification with China, but clearly opposes Taiwan independence 2/3/2004 Central News Agency President Chen Shui-bian said Tuesday that if he is re-elected in March, he will continue to honor his "four noes plus one" pledge and safeguard Taiwan's present status quo, including its sovereign status and peace with mainland China. -1 Pro-independence in general; clear intention to maintain sovereign status Table 4.3: President's Independence Magnitude Examples From Taiwanese Media Table 4.3 President’s Independence Magnitude Examples From Taiwanese Media 109 Despite the tensions between China and Taiwan in the area of high politics, there is a strong and ever growing linkage in the area of low politics across the Taiwan Strait. These linkages are primarily in economic and societal areas. For instance, in terms of cross-strait economic relations, the combined Chinese-Hong Kong market surpassed the U.S. market as Taiwan’s most important export market in 2001; more than 35% of Taiwan’s exports went to the Chinese-Hong Kong market in 2003; and mainland China has attracted more than 55% of Taiwan’s overseas investment (Ross, 2006: 22). In the societal area, more than 500,000 Taiwanese now live in the Shanghai area, and more than 30,000 Taiwan companies are operating manufacturing facilities in the same region (Ross, 2006: 22). Additionally, cross-strait marriages 72 have increased significantly (Lynch, 2006), coupled with increased cross-strait visits for both business and personal reasons. Given the close linkage at the low politics level, it is appropriate to include several variables to account for this effect. First, trade between China and Taiwan is included in the model. This variable includes trade (imports plus exports) across the Taiwan Strait. Figure 4.1 shows the general upward trend of cross-strait trade between 1987 and 2002. Since 1987, cross-strait trade volumes have been on a steady rise. For example, the percentage of Taiwan’s export to mainland China and Hong Kong jumped from 8% in 1987 to 32% in 2002. While controlling for Taiwan’s trade export to Hong Kong, export to mainland China alone increased from almost nothing in 1987 to 20% in 2002. Second, since the 1980s, both China and Taiwan have allowed Taiwanese to visit mainland China. Over the years, the number of visits from Taiwan to China has 72 Especially Taiwanese men marrying Chinese women; see Lynch (2006) for more details. 110 increased dramatically. Exchanges of people have contributed to building a stronger linkage at the low politics level. Thus, it is also proper to include exchange of people as a control variable in the model. Figure 4.2 shows the more dramatic upward trend in cross- strait visits between 1987 and 2002. Since mainland China allowed Taiwanese to visit the mainland, the cumulative Taiwanese visiting to the mainland has increased from just several thousands a year in 1988 to 27,000,000 in 2002. This is the equivalent of saying that every single Taiwanese has visited the mainland at least once in the last decade. This number continues to rise in more recent years. Taiwan, on the other hand, still has strict restrictions for mainland Chinese to visit Taiwan. Therefore, Figure 4.2 shows the number of trips made by the mainlanders have been consistently low. I also expect that the proximity of the presidential election has an impact on either the president’s use of pro-independence (or pro-unification) rhetoric or his presidential approval rating (Levy, 1989). For example, when an election approaches, the incumbent and the opposition candidate might be expected to move to the median voter position to gather more votes. Such action might subsequently influence the candidates’ respective rhetorical positions on independence and unification. To control for this effect, I include an Election Proximity variable in the model. The closer it gets to the presidential election, the smaller the value is for the election proximity variable. Finally, I include Taiwan’s per capita GDP as a standard control variable. As often used in previous literature, GDP per capita provides a sense of the overall economic condition in any given country. 111 Figure 4.1 Export Dependence Across The Taiwan Strait 73 73 Source: Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) website: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/foreign/20.gif, download on December 9, 2003. 112 Figure 4.2 Visits Across the Taiwan Strait 74 Time Frame of the Data Analysis The year 2000 marks Taiwan’s second direct presidential election. The 2000 election also marks the first time a non-KMT party candidate – Chen Shui-bian of the DPP – won a presidential election. 75 However, in 1996 Taiwan already had conducted its first direct presidential election. The 1996 presidential election constitutes a 74 Source: Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) website: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/foreign/28.gif, download on December 9, 2003. 75 Taiwan had been under the KMT rule since the KMT fled from mainland China to Taiwan after losing the civil war. 113 significant change from the past, in which leaders were appointed by their KMT predecessors. Moreover, during the 1996 presidential election, KMT running candidate Lee Teng-hui openly promoted Taiwan independence. After the election, Lee also actively promoted pragmatic diplomacy 76 for Taiwan and advocated Taiwan independence. As noted previously, his pro-independence behavior had led China to conduct live missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Therefore, by including Lee’s administration in the analysis, it would cover Taiwan more fully as a new democracy, at least in terms of how domestic presidential behaviors could influence Taiwan’s policies toward mainland China. Thus, the data span from January 1995 to March 2004. Statistical Procedure As discussed above, I postulate two dependent variables: presidential approval and independence magnitude. Levy (1989: 268) correctly pointed out the testing of the scapegoat theory is “fundamentally dynamic and reciprocal in nature.” Particularly, as the president’s approval sinks, the likelihood of his raising the issue of independence increases; as the president discusses independence, his approval is expected to rise. While this may appear as a simultaneous model at first blush, it is not. The president must learn what his approval rating is before he can react to it. Similarly, the public must hear or read the president’s independence rhetoric before it can affect their opinion of him. Thus, a lag structure exists in the model. 76 Pragmatic diplomacy is a style of diplomacy which emphasizes the pragmatic returns rather than ideological advantage. For example, arguably Lee Teng-hui used financial aids to “buy” several small countries for diplomatic recognition. See Chen, Jie (2002) for details. 114 Fortunately, the time-series data permits to model this lag process and both dependent variables. While the two variables are clearly not simultaneous, they are linked through their error terms. I use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimator to analyze the data to correct for the linked error terms (Kennedy 2003). More specifically, the error terms in the two equations (presidential approval and independence magnitude) are correlated with each other, which make the error variance-covariance matrix non-diagonal. As Meernik (2000) points out in a similar study, by treating the two equations as one large, combined equation, SUR estimation efficiently corrects this problem (see also Kmenta, 1986: 635-636; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981: 333). The rationale is that the PIM and the Presidential Approval, as the two main variables of this study, may have sequential effects on each other. As the president engage in different types of remarks in regard to independence or unification with mainland China, his approval rating may be affected. There is always a lag between what the president says and the public’s reaction to his remarks as reflected in his approval rating. By the same token, when a president’s approval rating changes, he may also change his remarks accordingly regarding the issue of independence or unification. This sequential effect needs to be taken into consideration when statistical analysis is conducted. Therefore, I estimate both models as part of a SUR equation system. 115 DATA ANALYSIS Due to the high level of multicolinearity between the number of visits and trade on the one hand and inflation and unemployment on the other hand, I separate the models into two different estimations. The results appear in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below. Equation 1 in both tables tests the respective independent variables’ influence on the magnitude of the president’s independence rhetoric. The main variable – Lagged Presidential Approval, which tests the Diversionary Hypothesis, reaches statistical significance in both estimations. The coefficients are -8.12 and -6.79 in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. The statistical significance of the variable shows strong support for the Diversionary Hypothesis, namely, as the president’s approval sinks, he is more likely to engage in pro-independence rhetoric. Empirically speaking, this is particularly true for the DPP president Chen Shui-bian. Between the 2000 and 2004 elections, Chen’s low approval rating was often coupled with his increasingly pro-independence remarks. For example, prior to the March 2004 election, Chen had gradually introduced measures that led to the 2004 referendum which, if passed, would have paved the way for a potential mechanism leading to a formal declaration of independence in the future. Chen Shui-bian took a very similar approach in late 2007 and early 2008 by introducing the UN Referendum issue 77 to the public. Creation of the referendum issue, 77 On March 22, 2008, voters in Taiwan are asked two referendum questions on the presidential ballot in regard to Taiwan’s relations with the United Nations. The referendum proposed by the DPP reads: “In 1971, the People’s Republic of China joined the United Nations, replacing the Republic of China and causing Taiwan to become an orphan in the world. To strongly express the will of the people of Taiwan to enhance Taiwan’s international status and participation in international affairs, Do you agree that the government should apply for UN membership under the name ‘Taiwan’?” 94.01% of the voters who voted on this referendum voted “yes”, while 5.99% voted “no”. The referendum proposed by the KMT reads: “Do you agree that our nation should apply to return to the United Nations and join other international 116 successful or not, effectively allowed Chen Shui-bian to divert attention from his low approval rating to the issue of independence. Antonio Chiang, the former deputy secretary-general of the Taiwan’s National Security Council, said that Chen Shui-bian “has never been for independence for ideological purposes. He just played the issue for the election.” (Copper, 2006: 21-22, cited in Hickey, 2007: 101) Similarly, Lee Teng-hui’s “special state to state” relations remarks and his Cornell visit also effectively stimulated a diversion away from other domestic problems and toward the cross-strait relations. Therefore, the model shows strong evidence of diversionary behavior by leaders in Taiwan. The results do not support the Misery Hypothesis, which asserts a weak economy or high unemployment rate will spur the president to discuss independence in a positive light. The lack of significance of the inflation and unemployment variables shows that the president is not using domestic economic problems as a reason to engage in diversionary behaviors towards mainland China. Moreover, blaming an economic downturn on China potentially would enhance the argument that Taiwan depends on the mainland for its economic development, thus weakening the president’s advocacy of a more independent Taiwan. In light of Fordham’s (1998 a, and b) assessment of unemployment (not inflation) as a likely stimulant for the use of force, with support from organizations based on pragmatic, flexible strategies with respect to the name [under which we apply to and participate in them]? That is: Do you approve of applying to return to the United Nations and to join other international organizations under the name ‘Republic of China’, or ‘Taiwan’, or other name that is conducive to success and preserves our nation’s dignity?” 87.27% of the voters who voted on this referendum voted “yes”, while 12.73% voted “no”. However, neither referendum reached the minimum threshold of participation by 50% of all eligible voters to become effective. Therefore, both referendums failed. This again shows that the public in Taiwan is largely willing to shelf the issue of unification or independence for right now. Although the data range does not cover the time period leading up to the 2008 election, Chen’s action is strong evidence to his diversionary behavior. 117 the data in the US context, it becomes interesting to see below, what economic aspect(s) might emerge as important for Taiwan. If there is an economic story to be told, it obviously concerns something other than inflation or unemployment. The results also partially contradict the Cordial Relations Hypothesis. First, the trade variable does not reach statistical significance. Second, the cross-strait visit variable does reach statistical significance; however, it is in the direction opposite from expected. These results may be caused by one or more of the reasons that follow. By independently examining trade and cross-strait visits data, I see that cross-strait trade and visit have been rising steadily over the last several decades. While Taiwan continues to democratize and develop its new identity, its economic dependence on mainland China has become more substantial. The issue of independence versus unification is largely political. Therefore, the low politics issue – trade and people exchange and visits – seems to have become relatively independent of the independence-unification issue. Regardless of the future political status of Taiwan, low politics exchanges will go on in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, cross-Strait visits by residents of Taiwan have allowed them to see the differences in the two political systems in their own eyes, creating more incentive for them to want to maintain a relatively different identity, prompting the president to engage in pro-independence remarks. 118 Equation Observations R-Squared President's Independence Magnitude 92 0.688 Presidential Approval 92 0.846 Coefficient Standard Error P-Value Magnitude Lagged Presidential Approval -8.122864 2.882 0.005 Lagged Inflation -0.2583529 0.156 0.097 Lagged Unemployment 0.1249128 0.306 0.683 Party ID Dummy 1.75186 0.903 0.052 GDP 0.001801 0.001 0.055 Election Proximity 0.0055861 0.015 0.718 Constant -3.367335 3.660 0.358 Equation 2: Presidential Approval Magnitude -0.0040453 0.003 0.207 Lagged Opposition Magnitude 0.0233411 0.004 0.000 Lagged Inflation -0.014094 0.004 0.001 Lagged Unemployment 0.0083223 0.009 0.364 Party ID Dummy -0.1046735 0.029 0.000 GDP 0.0000575 0.000 0.042 Election Proximity 0.0026596 0.000 0.000 Constant 0.2265284 0.107 0.035 Table 4.4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Inflation and Unemployment) Table 4.4 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Inflation and Unemployment) 119 Equation Observations R-Squared President's Independence Magnitude 92 0.691 Presidential Approval 92 0.838 Coefficient Standard Error P-Value Magnitude Lagged Presidential Approval -6.794687 2.552 0.008 Lagged Visit 0.0000267 0.000 0.045 Lagged Trade 0.0004873 0.001 0.335 Party ID Dummy 1.659298 0.980 0.090 GDP 0.001841 0.001 0.030 Election Proximity -0.0045836 0.014 0.747 Constant -5.64759 2.724 0.038 Equation 2: Presidential Approval Magnitude -0.0031916 0.003 0.332 Lagged Opposition Magnitude 0.0290315 0.004 0.000 Lagged Visit 0.00000119 0.000 0.002 Lagged Trade 0.00000995 0.000 0.538 Party ID Dummy -0.0749001 0.033 0.023 GDP 0.0000632 0.000 0.015 Election Proximity 0.002077 0.000 0.000 Constant 0.1645142 0.089 0.065 Table 4.5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Visits and Trade) Table 4.5 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Analysis of Promotion of Taiwanese Independence and Presidential Approval (Visits and Trade) In the mean time, frequent visits by Taiwan residents to the mainland will at least to some degree threaten a pro-independence Taiwan president. As mentioned above, it is estimated that the Shanghai area alone has roughly 500,000 Taiwanese (Ross, 2006). On any given day, there would be somewhere between 500,000 to 1 million Taiwanese out of 120 Taiwan’s total population of 23 million living in the mainland. Taiwan is now clearly strongly dependent on mainland China. For a pro-independence president, this will likely, if not pose a threat, but at least raise some concerns for his China policy; therefore making him more likely to promote Taiwan independence. Note that the control variable of GDP per capita reaches statistical significance in both models, indicating that as the overall economy is getting better, leaders in Taiwan have increasingly greater leverage to promote a more independent Taiwan identity. This result, when combined with the one for approval, puts an interesting twist on things. The situation most disposed toward diversionary rhetoric is one that sees a relatively unpopular leader presiding over a more, not less, prosperous version of Taiwan. It would not go too far to describe the situation as worrisome: If popularity does not come with economic success in the general sense of a higher income per capita, it is likely to be pursued by other means, with rhetoric as a provocative and potentially dangerous option. Overall, while some hypotheses fare better than others, the model performs reasonably well, with R 2 = 0.69 in each instance. The control variable for the president’s party is significant, 78 indicating that the DPP tends to be more pro-independence than the KMT, as expected. It is worthwhile to note that while this effect is very strong, it does not overpower the variables of interest. The Election Proximity variable does not reach statistical significance. But it is consistent with the conventional knowledge that when the real election nears, both DPP and KMT tend to “tone down” their message to move toward the median voter position. In general, I find the results encouraging for the Diversionary Hypothesis in an overall, political sense. 78 Party ID is weakly significant in Table 5. 121 Equation 2 in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 models the president’s approval rating. First, I find a result that contradicts the Independence Hypothesis: as the president increases his pro-independence rhetoric, his approval decreases. This is precisely the opposite of a rally effect. The Lagged Presidential Independence Magnitude variable does not reach statistical significance in either Table 4.4 or Table 4.5. This effect is offset if the opposition becomes critical of the president’s position vis-à-vis independence - the results confirm the Opposition Hypothesis. The more the opposition party uses pro- unification rhetoric, the more the public disapproves of the president. It seems that Taipei’s executive is better served when the opposition holds a pro-unification position. Although Taiwan is officially labeled as a multiparty democracy, it has over the years evolved into a system which has two major party coalitions. The opposition party coalition serves as an effective check and balance against the party in power. Thus, there is a balancing effect between the president and his opposition that can nullify or even reverse the negative impact independence has on approval. I am able to partially confirm the Economy Hypothesis. The inflation variable reaches statistical significance and the sign of its coefficient is the same as expected. Higher inflation in Taiwan does tend to hurt the president’s approval rating. However, the model does not provide evidence that a high unemployment rate will hurt the president’s approval rating. This is a fascinating result, especially given that the inflation variable reaches significance while unemployment does not. The non-finding about unemployment in relation to executive standing with the public is at odds with the connections usually found in other states, i.e., “pocketbook voting”. To the extent that 122 inflation matters and unemployment might not in determining foreign policy positions, a different dynamic than the norm is uncovered and warrants further study. In regard to the control variables, the number of visits does affect the approval rating, while the level of cross-strait trade does not. This may be caused by one or more of the following reasons. Firstly, more visits are associated with an increase in the public’s opinion of the chief executive. Although this effect is small, a one standard deviation increase in the number of visits equals an increase of 1.5% in approval, the impact is significant. Secondly, cross-strait visits could bring more substantial impact than trade on the public. As more people travel to the mainland to see it with their own eyes, they are likely to translate what they see in the Taiwan Strait to their votes on the presidential approval rating. Trade is important, but it is not nearly as visible to the citizenry as visits. Party ID reaches statistical significance in both estimations, indicating a consistency between party and presidential approval. Also, as the overall economic condition gets better, presidential approval increases. Finally, as the election nears, the president also gets a higher approval rating. This is consistent with the lack of significance for the Election Proximity variable in Equation 1. As an election nears, the president becomes less aggressive in his remarks regarding the issue of independence-unification. He tends to move toward to the center of the continuum and therefore obtains a higher approval rating. For example, as election nears, both KMT and DPP candidates move away from their respective pro-unification and pro-independence rhetorical positions and try to avoid talking specifically about what they would do in regard to mainland China if they were elected. They are in reality 123 putting them into the medium voter position. The R 2 for Equation 2 is 0.84 for both estimations, in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS Testing has yielded some interesting findings and implications. Data analysis confirms the two main hypotheses: Diversionary and Opposition Hypotheses. In regard to DT in general, findings provide significant support for such behavior in the Taiwan Strait. In a more general sense, this encourages further breadth of application for at least the diversionary components of the present model; it should be adapted to other contexts, most notably, additional middle powers, and subjected to testing there. Moreover, diversionary behavior should not be understood only in a limited, military sense. Non- military diversionary behavior can be used, as it appears, by foreign policy decision- makers to achieve diversionary effects. Results obtained in this chapter also add depth to DT by showing the theory’s effectiveness in an especially challenging case. Leaders in Taiwan do seem to use their positions on Taiwan independence to divert attention from their domestic problems. However, it is interesting to pause here and note that “problems” do not seem to include some of the usual economic indicators, namely, high unemployment and inflation. Whether pro-unification or pro-independence, the lower the president’s approval, the more he promotes Taiwan independence. This finding also suggests several Taiwan- China specific implications. 124 To begin, most people in Taiwan are not opposed to Taiwan independence or to a more independent Taiwan identity. 79 When leaders are promoting such an identity, people tend to offer more support. In addition, since the discussion of Taiwan independence only becomes intense around election years, the topic has increasingly become a campaign tool for both the DPP and KMT. Leaders from both parties know that an immediate declaration of independence or unification will hurt Taiwan’s interests. A quick settlement of the Taiwan issue is less likely. Therefore, both parties are using Taiwan independence or unification to keep them from losing votes. Both parties try to place themselves at the median voter position in order to win elections. An implication for both mainland China and the U.S. is that they should be aware of the fact that most people in Taiwan are willing to endorse a more independent identity. Thus policies toward Taiwan should become more flexible than before. Prior policies may not reflect the changing nature of the Taiwan issue. Both China and the U.S. should adjust their positions accordingly. Second, the more democratic Taiwan becomes, the greater say its public will have in the unification/independence debate. Decisions on cross-strait relations may no longer be fully controlled by the Taiwan government because the public has increasingly demanded a more important role in the decision-making process. The use of independence as a diversion may lead to leaders losing their effectively oligarchical control of the issue. 79 It is beyond the scope of this aggregate data analysis to probe factors such as differences between mainland and native Taiwanese. Factors such as this one must await a more case-oriented, narrative-based approach. 125 Third, because Taiwan independence or unification has become a bipartisan issue and to some extent a mere campaign tool to win elections, parties have incorporated it into the strategic landscape. Neither party seems sincere about resolving this long-lasting issue. Both parties have clear divisions on this matter. To avoid further escalation, bipartisan cooperation may be conducive to resolving the ongoing Taiwan crisis. Lastly, both China and the U.S. should avoid getting involved in issues related to Taiwan’s elections. Chinese and U.S. involvement can only complicate matters. Fortunately, so far both China and the U.S. have restrained themselves. Nevertheless, China and the U.S. should not signal a lack of interest in resolving the Taiwan issue. Cooperation between and among the various sides may be essential to a final resolution of the Taiwan issue. 126 Chapter 5 External Determinants of Foreign Policy Decision Making The analysis in Chapter Four revealed that political elites in Taiwan strategically use the issue of independence/unification as a verbal diversion for their domestic problems, namely as the president’s approval rating decreases, he is more likely to engage in pro-independence rhetoric. To put this finding in the context of foreign policy analysis, political leaders sometime react to or even “intentionally” create an international crisis not for the sake of the international issue itself. Instead, they are merely reacting to certain domestic needs. Other foreign policy analysis scholars have argued that foreign policy decision makers do not merely make decisions based on what goes on domestically. The public may be “prudent” (Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998), but foreign policies are left to the political elites most of the time and are often political leaders’ solutions to any given international problems. Therefore, foreign policy decisions are usually international or external factor driven. Playing the foreign policy “fire” may be too costly for the leader’s political career. Therefore, the analysis of foreign policy should be focused on the international problem itself rather than domestic politics of the foreign policy initiating country. In this chapter, I take a somewhat unique approach to examine the domestic vs. international determinants of foreign policy by looking at the empirical evidence for the case of China and Taiwan. My focus in this chapter is on the external determinants of foreign policy decision making. 127 Since the mid-1980s, the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) has gradually democratized. 80 The People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, is still a single-party authoritarian state. Before the PRC and ROC split in 1949, the mainland and Taiwan had shared many cultural, historical and societal commonalities. For example, many mainland Chinese and Chinese in Taiwan spoke a similar language and used the same traditional Chinese character system. Many people on both sides shared similar views and practices on history, culture and customs. Since 1949, however, both the mainland China and Taiwan have been able to maintain de facto independence in managing their respective political, economic, and cultural affairs. Taiwan has gone through both economic and political reforms in recent years. Particularly since it democratized, evidence clearly shows that democracy has brought tremendous changes to Taiwan. The PRC, on the other hand, has largely focused on its economic reform efforts since the late 1970s; and remained to be averse to any major political changes. In spite of the occasional tensions between the two, 81 mainland China and Taiwan continue to be closely linked in many ways, particularly in areas of economic relations, cultural and technology exchanges, financial investments, just to name a few. The combination of historical linkages and the recent developments in the PRC and ROC have almost created a controlled environment for studying internal and external factors of foreign policy in a comparative sense. 80 For example, in 1996, Lee Teng-hui became the first popularly elected president. In 2000, Chen Shui- bian became the first directly elected non-Kuomintang (KMT) president. The Democratic Progressive Party’s victory marked the first time an opposition party won the presidency. Eight years later, the KMT, led by Ma Ying-jeou, won the March 2008 presidential election. This symbolized a consolidation of Taiwan’s democratic transition. Moreover, Taiwan’s democratization process continues in all aspects of the society. 81 The 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis is a good example of the tensions between the two sides. 128 Has Taiwan’s democratization and domestic politics influenced the decision making on cross-strait relations? What is driving the cross-strait decision making from both sides? Moreover, can the China-Taiwan case shed light on the study of foreign policy analysis in general? In this chapter, I examine these questions by using events data concerning the Taiwan Strait. The main aim is to assess whether mainland China and Taiwan make policies towards each other based on their respective domestic needs or the need to address problems or issues raised by the actor on other side of the Taiwan Strait. This study will shed some light on the relationship between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy decision making in general, and the relationship between Beijing and Taipei in specific. Findings suggest that, from China’s perspective, Taiwan’s domestic political changes do have significant influence on China’s decision making towards Taiwan. Although such changes may have been caused by Taiwan’s internal democratization, China is not directly reacting to Taiwan’s democratization per se; rather, it is reacting to the policy changes of the ROC as a result of Taiwan’s internal democratic changes. Moreover, China’s policy towards Taiwan does not seem to be directly linked to China’s internal power politics. Rather, Taiwan’s policy toward China and Taiwan’s internal politics seem to be playing a more important role in determining China’s Taiwan policy. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, democratization has significantly influenced Taiwan’s policy and behavior towards China. Cross-strait decisions from both sides are significantly related to Taiwan’s internal relations. Therefore, for China’s Taiwan policy, evidence supports international or external determinants of foreign policy; whereas for Taiwan’s China policy, evidence supports domestic or internal determinants of foreign 129 policy. A direct speculation is that regime type matters in what kind of factors matter more for one’s foreign policy. Democracy makes the government more accountable to its citizens, whereas authoritarianism does not. The chapter unfolds in the following sections. First, I will briefly discuss the history and significance of events data analysis. Second, I will explain how the foreign policy decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait can be studied by using events data. Third, I will introduce the research hypotheses, followed by the dataset and statistical procedures that I will use to test the hypotheses. Fourth, I will analyze the events data in regard to the two-level decision making process in the Taiwan Strait. Finally, I discuss the findings and make some policy recommendations. EVENTS DATA ANALYSIS This genesis of the events data analysis can be traced back to the beginning of behavioralist revolution in the field of political science. In the early 1960s and 1970s, a group of foreign policy analysis scholars wanted to break away from the traditionally history-oriented approach to study foreign policy and international relations (Neack, Hey, and Haney, 1995). The search for a “scientific” way to study international affairs began. Researchers believed that if international events can be systematically recorded, categorized and eventually quantified, these events then could be subjected to “statistical analysis” (Schrodt, 1995) or other systematic means of examination. Researchers then began to create datasets to capture international events in order to analyze them. Events data are essentially “day-by-day coded accounts of who did 130 what to whom” (Goldstein, 1992: 369). They are usually generated by examining thousands of newspaper reports on the day-to-day interactions of nation-states and assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical code (Schrodt, 1995). The basic question behind any events dataset is who does what to whom, when, where, and how (Bond et al, 2003). In most events datasets, who is the initiator, who is the target, and what is the intended action are recorded. 82 Events are technically nominal events. But they can be assigned numerical values for statistical analysis. 83 Schhrodt (1995: 152) points out that there are two main types of events datasets: 1) actor-oriented datasets that record “interactions between a set of actors for a specific period of time”; and episode-oriented datasets that “look at the events involved in a specific historical incident”. 84 Since the beginning of this movement, several events data projects have been developed. One of the earliest events data project is the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978, created by Charles McClelland (1978). WEIS has 63 specific categories, which can be grouped into 22 general categories, such as “Consult”, “Reward”, “Protest” and “Force” (see Schrodt, 1995; and Table 5.1 for examples). These categories are usually actions taken by one actor against the other in any given dyad. In addition to the WEIS project, several other events data projects have been developed, such as the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) dataset (Hermann 82 The most basic and common structure of an events dataset is “<date><source><target><event>” (Schhrodt, 1995: 162). 83 A discussion on this point is provided later in the chapter. 84 An example for actor-oriented dataset is the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project. An example for the episode-oriented dataset is Behavioral Correlates of War data set (BCOW). 131 et al 1973), Behavioral Correlates of War dataset (BCOW) (Leng 1987), Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) project (Bond et al, 2001 and 2003), Protocol on Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) project (Bond and Bond, 1995); the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators project (Russett et al, 1964). These datasets all share the similar assumptions about events data. However, they capture different kinds of events with regard to different issues. 85 Scholars hoped that by collecting data on international events, they could make sense of what went on among these events on the one hand, and forecast future international events on the other. Early events datasets are often coded by human coders. Human coding is typically time consuming and more likely to be contaminated by human errors and subject views about the events being coded by the coders. Recent development in high- power computers has made automated machine coding possible and the usage widespread. Machine coding is not error free, however. Machines can only code sources by the rules established through the coding syntax. It cannot intelligently distinguish the true logical relationship among the subject, verb and object of a sentence. 86 In spite of the problems with events data, event data have been “frequently used to study foreign policy outcomes and some characteristics of the international 85 Many of these projects focus on the issue of international war and crisis. 86 For example, while helping A. Cooper Drury developing the conversion scales between IDEA and WEIS, we discovered that a chemical weapon usage case between China and Taiwan. Upon further examination of the source itself, we determined it was a coding error by IDEA. IDEA picked up a news article which talked about Taiwan’s investment in a chemical factory in mainland China. Machine coding does not prevent similar errors from happening. Because machine coding can gather and code a large amounts of data within a relatively short period of time, events data often use quantity to balance the weakness of quality. See Drury (2005) for more details. 132 environment within which foreign policy decisions occur” Schhrodt (1995: 148). Events data have several advantages. First, traditional state-oriented approach of foreign policy analysis usually treats nation-state – the second image or a dyad as the minimal unit of analysis. Treating nation-state as the smallest unit of analysis ignores the micro-level processes leading to the international event. Events data essentially allow researchers to disaggregate any given international issue to the event level. This helps to reveal more details of the foreign policy decision making process (see for example Drury and Li, 2006). Second, events data can be converted into time series and/or aggregated to other levels of analysis (Goldstein, 1992). This will allow time series analysis be done. Aggregated events data can also be used with other datasets, expanding the possible usage of this kind of data. Third, events data, particularly machine coded events data, often come in large amounts of data points. The large amounts of data points, when aggregated properly, can strengthen the level of robustness of the data, making statistical analysis more reliable. Finally, through disaggregating to the event level, events data can make the unseen seen and the unconnected dots connected. This is especially crucial to help establish certain patterns or speculations about issues that do not have a lot of information to work with. Most events data are coded through open and public news sources, such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Events data do not require users to rely on classified information, nor do they require researchers to conduct field research or 133 interviews. This is a major plus for foreign policy analysis researchers, who would like to establish some initial propositions about certain issues. 87 APPLYING EVENT DATA ANALYSIS IN THE CHINA-TAIWAN CASE Although there has been no study of China-Taiwan relations (that I am aware of) that uses events data analysis, I argue events data analysis can be a valuable tool to unpack the intriguing relationship in the Taiwan Strait. Before I discuss the application of the events data in the context of China-Taiwan, I would like to note that in this chapter I again treat the relationship between Beijing and Taipei as external to each other. In regard to the reason why I put the relations between China and Taiwan in the domain of foreign policy, I have provided a more detailed justification in Chapters Three and Four. Since the separation of mainland China and Taiwan in 1949, the two political entities have existed as two “independent” regimes in a “de facto” sense. Treating mainland China and Taiwan as two separate political entities allows me to assess Beijing’s and Taipei’s respective policy decision processes toward each other. It will also allow me to examine their cross-strait policies as a function of their respective domestic politics. The unique status of the two main actors I evaluate in this chapter makes the use of events data a major advantage. First, the study of cross-strait relations has long been dealt with through the traditional culture/history/narrative way. Rarely have scholars tried to connect the dots through a quantitative way. The current chapter is an effort to 87 I do not argue that events data can be used as a substitute for field research, interviews, process tracing and other research methodologies. These methodologies are better viewed as complementary tools to each other. More on this point will be addressed later. 134 bridge the gap between country-specific cases and the use of quantitative research methodology to examine these cases. It is also an effort to use a Chinese case to test Type III theories as identified by Qin Yaqing (2007) as part of the theory building process for Chinese international relations theory. 88 Second, information about Taiwan’s and China’s foreign policy decision making processes is very limited. Taiwan did not become a democracy until very recently. Although information regarding Taiwan’s foreign policy decision making process has begun to become more available, it could take years for the necessary information to surface. China on the other hand still remains to be an authoritarian regime. The lack of openness in China’s political system has been a major hurdle to study China’s foreign policy (James and Zhang, 2005). On the one hand, Chinese foreign policy decision making process tend to be secretive. On the other hand, there is just not enough information available. The events data on China and Taiwan are all coded through open sources. 89 They conveniently tap into China’s and Taiwan’s foreign policy decision making processes without requiring access to classified information or conducting interviews or field work. The goal of this chapter is to establish certain patterns of linkage between what we observe in the international events in the Taiwan Strait and China’s and Taiwan’s decision making in regard to each other. I am not suggesting that the established linkage is the true reason behind why these decisions are made. I will use 88 Please refer to Chapter Two for the discussion about the three types of international relations theories identified by Qin Yaqing’s (2007). 89 The IDEA dataset is used in this chapter as the major data source. IDEA is coded through open sources, such as the New York Times. 135 these observations as a starting point for further investigation through both quantitative and qualitative means. To sum up, events data provide a unique means to reveal the unknown processes of the decision making in the Taiwan Strait. It also provides a way to synthesize the case of China-Taiwan with a quantitative research methodology. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES Taiwan has democratized while China remains a single-party authoritarian regime. During the period leading up to Taiwan’s democratization, cross-strait relations have gone through several stages of changes. In the early years of the KMT rule on the island, Taipei’s mainland policy could be described as pro-unification. As discussed in Chapter Three, both Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo believed that the Nationalist government would one day return to the mainland and reunify the country under the name “Republic of China”. To avoid any dangwai (opposition party) intervention, the KMT declared “martial law” and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) illegal, so “national unification”, favored by the KMT, could become the universally agreed policy of the “nation”. The Nationalist government under Lee Teng-hui adopted the Guidelines for National Unification in 1991 90 . Based on the Guidelines, Taipei and Beijing eventually reached the 1992 Consensus 91 , achieving the best relationship ever since 1949. 90 The Guidelines for National Unification was adopted by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan in February 1991. The Guidelines have a three step process for the gradual unification of mainland China. Step one calls for the increased exchanges between the two sides; step two calls for the opening of the three links and visits by high-ranking officials on both sides for negotiations on equal footing; and step three calls for a 136 However, Lee Teng-hui’s mainland policy started to change around 1995. His visit to the US 92 and Taiwan’s first poplar presidential election in 1996 were both followed by China’s missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. The 1995 and 1996 missile crises brought cross-strait relations to a low point. Talks between the two sides stopped. In spite of the threats from Beijing, Taiwan’s effort to democratize continued. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, as the first opposition candidate from the DPP, was elected the president of Taiwan. Chen made five promises to people in Taiwan and the mainland that as long as the PRC has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, he would NOT 1) declare independence, 2) change the national title, 3) push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, 4) promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification, 5) abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines. Chen’s words did not match his deeds, however. He replaced the word “China” with “Taiwan” for several governmental agencies, such as “China Post” with “Taiwan Post”. He argued that Taiwan did not need to declare independence and Taiwan was already a sovereign state. He called for an independence referendum during the 2004 consultative organization to be formed for the two sides to map out a constitutional arrangement for unification under a “democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China”. 91 In 1992, China and Taiwan reached the 1992 Consensus. The basic premise is that both sides accept the principle of “one China”. But what “one China” means is up to each side to interpret. The 1992 Consensus allowed the two sides to talk to each other about the Taiwan issue. 92 Lee Teng-hui visited the US for his alma mater in 1995. Lee’s visit angered Beijing. China ordered to suspend all talks with Taiwan and instructed the PLA to conduct missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. 137 presidential election. He also “abolished” the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council in 2006. 93 While Chen Shui-bian’s 8-year rule, democracy flourished in Taiwan. Stockton (2007) describes Taiwan’s political system as a “multi-level” game. Political leaders in Taiwan now take the hard-won democracy, including the public’s voices, seriously when they make decisions towards the mainland. 94 Therefore, I speculate that Taiwan’s democratization has influenced Taipei’s policy towards China. Subsequently, China is reacting to the policy changes as a result of Taiwan’s democracy. Drawing from these discussions, five hypotheses are proposed. Hypothesis A (H A ): The more favorably Taiwan treats China, the more likely China is expected to react in the same way to Taiwan in return. The relationship between Beijing and Taipei is expected to be a reciprocal one. When Taiwan carries out favorable policies towards the mainland, China should have every reason to welcome such gestures and be expected to do the same to Taiwan. H A tests the relationship between Taiwan’s overall mainland policy and China’s reaction to it. Hypothesis B (H B ): The more cooperative Taiwan’s internal relations are, the better China reacts to Taiwan. When Taiwan’s internal relations are cooperative, China should view this internal stability favorably; therefore, Beijing should have no reason to see Taipei as a threat. As a result, it should react to Taiwan’s cooperative behavior in a 93 Technically, Chen Shui-bian did not “abolish” the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council. Instead, he announced in 2006 that the Guidelines for National Unification would “cease to apply” and the National Unification Council would “cease to function”. Beijing strongly condemned Chen’s action however. 94 A more detailed discussion about this point will be provided in Chapter Six. 138 positive way. H B tests if Taiwan’s internal policy cohesiveness has any relationship with how China reacts to Taiwan. Hypothesis C (H C ): The greater extent to which Taiwan democratizes, the less favorable reactions are from China. As Taiwan continues to democratize, its regime type becomes increasingly more different from that of mainland China. The change of regime type will create more incentives for Taiwan to remain as an independent entity. Beijing should be expected to react negatively to this change. H C tests if Taiwan’s democratization has any influence on China’s Taiwan policy making. Hypothesis D (H D ): The more Taiwan democratizes, the less favorably it reacts to China. As Taiwan continues to democratize, the difference between the democratic regime in Taiwan and an authoritarian one in the mainland becomes more apparent. Both the political elites and ordinary citizens in Taiwan are expected to be more resentful to Beijing. H D attempts to test if Taiwan’s democratization has any influence on its own decision making on China. Hypothesis E (H E ): The more cooperative Taiwan’s internal relations are, the less favorably Taiwan reacts to China. As Taiwan continues to build a more cooperative internal identity and relations, both the government in Taipei and citizens on the island should have more incentives to self-determine their political fate. Such internal cohesiveness may lead to differences with the mainland. H E tests if there is any relationship between Taiwan’s internal policy cohesiveness and how it reacts to China. 139 Data and Measurement To test the hypotheses, I conduct a time series analysis for a time period of 9 years from 1991 – 2000. This timeframe is selected because the data source for the main variables in this chapter, the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), covers the time period from 1991 to 2000. Also, during this time period Taiwan had two presidential elections. The 1996 election was the first-ever direct presidential election, in which the KMT candidate Lee Teng-hui was elected the president. The 2000 presidential election was the first time in Chinese history that an opposition candidate from the DPP, Chen Shui-bian, was elected the president. The two presidential elections symbolized the continued consolidation of democracy in Taiwan. Two most significant political events occurred during this time period. Therefore, the time period selection is deemed appropriate for the purpose of this chapter. 95 The level of analysis is daily events. Data are gathered from two major databases - IDEA 96 (Bond et al, 2001 and 2003) and Polity IV Project 97 (Marshall et al, 2000). The IDEA dataset is used to obtain cross-strait daily events and the Polity dataset is used to obtain China’s and Taiwan’ respective democracy scores. Another reason I selected the IDEA dataset is because this dataset includes “nearly all the event forms from WEIS, PANDA, World Handbook, Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) 95 The most recent presidential election in Taiwan occurred in March 2008. I will discus the implications of the 2008 election to this research project later in this chapter as well as in Chapter Seven. 96 For a detailed description of the IDEA dataset, please see (Bond et al, 2003). In this chapter, I used the Dong, Doug, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Lewis Taylor, Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), November 21, 2001 version. 97 I used the Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project. 2000. Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2000], College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland version. 140 (Gerner et al., 2002), and Militarized Disputes (MID) (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996)”. All IDEA variables are nominal variables 98 . I use the weighting scale developed by Goldstein (1992) based on the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) 99 dataset to assign numerical values to IDEA variables. By applying the Goldstein scale, I am able to convert selected events in IDEA into interval data (see Table 5.1 for examples). To measure cross-strait relations, four variables are created. The four variables are China’s internal relations (China-China), China’s external relations towards Taiwan (China-Taiwan), Taiwan’s internal relations (Taiwan-Taiwan) and Taiwan’s external relations towards China (Taiwan-China). 100 The four pairs are unidirectional. This allows me to distinguish the directional influence across the Taiwan Strait and within China and Taiwan. The four variables are also lagged by one day to create four lagged relation variables. The lag variables provide an overtime measurement of changes of the cross-strait relations. The rationale is that an event initiated by China and targeted at Taiwan at any given time, for example, may not receive policy reactions from Taiwan until a later time. The lag process controls for the time lapse in policy reaction cycle in the statistical analysis. 98 Original IDEA database is in Microsoft Access format. Stata 7.0, StatTransfer 6 and Microsoft Excel are also used for data manipulations. All statistical analyses are conducted in Stata 7.0. 99 I used the McClelland, Charles, World Event/Interaction Survey, 1966-1978, ICPSR, version. 100 Each relation variable is the sum of all weighed variables with the same relation pair. For example, the relation variable for China-China is the sum of all variables that measure China-China interactions. See codebook and dataset for details. 141 IDEA Events WEIS Events Descriptions Weight <ULTI> THR4 Give ultimatum -6.9 <SANC> THR2 Sanction -5.8 <REDA> RDC3 Reduce or stop aid -5.6 <PMAR> DEM1 Protest procession -5.2 <DEMA> DMD1 Demand -4.9 <RALL> REJ2 Refuse to allow -4.0 <HALT> RDC4 Halt negotiations -3.8 <DENO> ACC2 Denounce or denigrate -3.4 <WARN> WRN1 Warn -3.0 <COMP> PTT2 Complain -2.4 <REDR> RDC1 Reduce routine activity -2.2 <DENY> DNY2 Deny -1.1 <GASY> GRA3 Grant asylum -1.1 <SAID> COM4 Comment 0.1 <PROP> PPS1 Propose 1.5 <APOL> GRA1 Apologize 1.8 <RELE> GRA6 Release or return 1.9 <VISI> CNS2 Travel to meet 1.9 <ASSR> PRM4 Assure 2.8 <EASS> GRA5 Ease sanctions 2.9 <AGAC> AGR2 Agree or accept 3.0 <ASKM> RQS3 Ask for material aid 3.4 <PRAI> APP1 Praise 3.4 <PROM> PRM3 Promise 4.5 <PROO> PRM1 Promise policy support 4.5 <PRMS> PRM2 Promise material suppor 5.2 Table 5.1: Examples of Events and Weighting Scales Table 5.1 Examples of Events and Weighting Scales Polity scores 101 (Marshall et al, 2000) are used as a measurement for the level of democracy. The Polity Score ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being an absolute 101 For detailed description of the Polity score, see Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr (2000) Polity IV Project, Polity IV Dataset. 142 autocracy and 10 being an absolute democracy. Taiwan’s Polity score changed several times between 1991 and 2000 from -1 to 9 (see Table 5.2 for details), indicating that the island’s political system changed from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. For China however, its Polity score remained a constant (-7) during the 9-year period, suggesting that China remained an authoritarian regime. The nine year period covers Taiwan under both autocracy and democracy, providing enough variation to assess whether Taiwan’s democratization process has any influence on its decision making towards China. Year Polity China Polity Taiwan 1991 -7 -1 1992 -7 7 1993 -7 7 1994 -7 7 1995 -7 7 1996 -7 8 1997 -7 9 1998 -7 9 1999 -7 9 2000 -7 9 Table 5.2: Polity Scores for China and Taiwan Table 5.2 Polity Scores for China and Taiwan DATA ANALYSIS Again, I use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to test the hypotheses. There are two main reasons that a dynamic model is used in this case. First, I expect two- level interactions between China and Taiwan, and within China and Taiwan, respectively. 143 For example, cross-strait visits, trade and cultural exchanges are considered external interactions between Taiwan and the mainland. Taiwanese citizens’ demand on the Taipei government to improve relations with Beijing and ease restrictions on investments in China, for example, is considered as internal relations within Taiwan. As a result, interactions in the Taiwan Strait are not sequential interactions, but simultaneous ones instead. Therefore, a dynamic model is more appropriate in this case. In addition, I expect that errors in the two equations, which measure relations originated from China and targeted at Taiwan and vice versa, are correlated. By definition, a set of equations that has contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation is called a seemingly unrelated regression system. At first look, the equations seem unrelated, but the equations are related through the correlation in the errors. The correlation in the errors would not be a problem in the normal linear regression model, because all specification of the normal regression model is known. Kmenta (1986: 635-636) explains the need to control for the error terms: If there exists some other piece of information that has not been taken into account, then the result concerning the properties of the least squares estimators can no longer be considered established. One such additional piece of information would be that the knowledge that the disturbance in the regression equation under consideration could be correlated with disturbance in some other regression equation. Therefore, SUR seems to be the most statistical procedure for this chapter’s analysis. The SUR model (see Table 5.3) consists of two equations. In Equation 1, the China-Taiwan-relations variable is the dependent variable, with China being the initiator and Taiwan being the target of cross-strait events. Five independent variables are included: Taiwan-China Relations, Taiwan’s Polity Score, Taiwan’s Internal Relations, Lagged China-Taiwan Relations, and Lagged China’s Internal Relations. Equation 1 144 attempts to establish a linkage between China’s actions toward Taiwan and each of the five independent variables listed above. The overall R-square of Equation 1 is 0.9322. This indicates that 93.22% of the variance is explained by the model. Three variables, Taiwan-China Relations, Taiwan’s Internal Relations and Lagged China-Taiwan Relations reach statistical significance. The coefficients of the three variables are all positive. To be precise, the statistical significance of the Taiwan-China Relations variable reveals several results. First, China’s actions toward Taiwan are direct reactions to Taiwan’s actions or policies toward the mainland China. Second, the positive coefficient shows a positive direction of relations across the Taiwan Strait. The relations variable measures several event forms, including rhetorical threats and promises as well as actual actions from both sides (see Table 5.1 for examples of event forms and weighting scales). The value of the variable ranges from -10 to 10 - negative values indicating negative events and positive values indicating positive events. The result shows that the nicer or more favorably Taiwan’s actions or policies toward China are, the better China reacts to Taiwan. On the other hand, the more provocative Taiwan is towards China, the more negatively China reacts to Taiwan. In a game theoretical sense, mainland China and Taiwan seem to be playing the “tit for tat” game (Axelrod, 1984). 145 Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-Square Chi-Square P China-Taiwan Relations 3522 5 1.007495 0.9322 49069.13 0.000 Taiwan-China Relations 3522 3 4.665845 0.1455 683.0453 0.000 Coef. Std. Err. P > |Z| Equation 1 China-Taiwan Relations Lagged China-Taiwan Relations 0.943 0.005 0.000 Lagged China's Internal Relations -0.001 0.000 0.093 Taiwan-China Relations 0.037 0.004 0.000 Taiwan Polity 0.006 0.006 0.331 Taiwan's Internal Relations 0.004 0.001 0.000 Constant -0.082 0.052 0.116 Equation 2 Taiwan-China Relations Taiwan Polity -0.166 0.029 0.000 Lagged China-Taiwan Relations 0.521 0.021 0.000 Taiwan's Internal Relations -0.015 0.004 0.000 Constant 2.565 0.237 0.000 Table 5.3: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Table 5.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regression 146 To put it into perspective, the 1995 and 1996 missile crisis clearly demonstrates that such a relationship exists. In 1995, President Lee Teng-hui visited the US. Even though he had declared his trip as private and unofficial, Beijing saw it as Taiwan’s pragmatic effort to rejoin the international community and a promotion of Taiwan independence. 102 Lee’s visit to the US was clearly seen, by the mainland leadership, as a provocative action to challenge the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In reaction to Taiwan’s provocative call for international recognition, China test-fired “short-range ballistic missiles (M-9s) into the target area, 90 miles off the northern coast of Taiwan”, followed by “successive waves of large-scale military exercises along the Fujian coast throughout the summer months” (Kau, 2000: 241-258). China acted in a similar way prior to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996. 103 Fearing Taiwan would declare independence after its first ever direct presidential election and Lee Teng-hui’s remark about the cross-strait relations being “special state-to-state” relations, Beijing authorized missile tests again in 1996. The missile tests were “within 25 to 35 miles of the 2 principal northern and southern ports of Taiwan, Kaohsiung and Keelung” (Global Security: 2003), a week before the scheduled presidential election in Taiwan. The intense tensions in the Taiwan Strait prompted the US to deploy its Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier battle groups USS Independence and USS Nimitz to the costal waters of Taiwan to monitor the development (Kau, 2000). 102 Prior to Lee’s 1995 visit, no high-ranking Taiwanese officials had been granted visas to visit the U.S. China considered Lee’s visit to the U.S. as a major change of status quo. Moreover, China was particularly angry with the U.S. government, who had promised Beijing that Lee would not be granted a visa. However, lobbyists eventually pressured Washington to grant Lee the visa (see Shirk, 2007). 103 China considered Taiwan’s first direct presidential election of 1996 as a unilateral change of status quo. China saw Taiwan’s move toward a more democratic path as a potential threat to the future relations with the mainland. Therefore, the 1996 presidential election was considered as a negative gesture towards China. 147 When leaders in Taiwan appear to be ‘nice’ and cooperative, such as promising positive and less aggressive policies toward China, China reacts favorably in return. For example, during Chen Shui-bian’s inaugural speech on May 20, 2000, he proclaimed the so called “Five No’s” to calm down Beijing. Subsequently, Beijing reacted positively. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen said on September 29, 2000 that Beijing had never insisted that one China mean the People’s Republic of China; the term “China” did not mean Taiwan nor did it mean the PRC (Klintworth, 2001). Hypothesis A is confirmed. Taiwan’s Internal Relations variable also reaches statistical significance. This means that mainland China closely watches what goes on in Taiwan. Taiwan’s internal politics could include its democratization process, judicial, legislative procedures and administrative politics and party politics, which would eventually contribute to Taiwan’s internal political institutions and policies toward China. The result indicates that when Taiwan’s internal relations are cooperative, China tends to react to Taiwan more favorably. For instance, on August 4, 1992, Wang Daohang of the Association of Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in the mainland invited his counterpart, Koo Chen-fu of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan to exchange views on economic development and SEF-ARATS affairs and discuss related programs. 104 China saw the internal stability in Taiwan at that time and the cooperative behaviors within the KMT as a vital environment to resume cross-strait contacts. Wang and Koo eventually met in April 1993 in Singapore. The Wang-Koo Talk became the most productive and 104 SEF and ARATS are the two semi-official organizations dealing with cross-Strait relations. So far, the most significant contacts across the Taiwan Strait have been made through the two organizations. 148 constructive contact ever across the Taiwan Strait during a relatively stable time in Taiwan. The Wang-Koo Talk produced the following documents: 1) The Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of Authentication Across the Taiwan Straits; 2) The Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for [Lost] Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits; 3) The Agreement on the System for Contacts and Meetings between SEF and ARATS; and 4) The Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang Talks. The documents became the basis for more future cooperation. Hypothesis B is also confirmed. It is interesting and must be noted that Taiwan’s Polity Score which measures Taiwan’s level of democracy does not register any statistical significance in this equation, nor does China’s internal relations variable reach statistical significance. Recall the discussion above that China is reacting to Taiwan’s changes of internal power politics. It appears that China is not directly reacting to Taiwan’s internal democratization process per se. Beijing aware of the potential power of Taiwan’s democratic transformation, the government in Beijing may be still in the state of denial. For example, Beijing did not allow its state controlled newspapers and TV stations to show any pictures of Lee Teng- hui and Chen Shui-bian as well as the campaign processes during the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. It appears that Beijing did not want to address the issue of Taiwan’s democratic transformation. However, mainland China seems to be more interested in Taiwan’s China policies, perhaps as a result of the democratization process. With China still being an authoritarian state, this absolutely makes sense. Although 149 Hypothesis C cannot be confirmed, it provides interesting observation about China’s behavior, which warrants further investigation in the future. 105 In addition to the results of the first three hypotheses, the analysis reveals several other interesting findings. China’s internal relations variable does not reach statistical significance. This is perhaps an indication that China’s Taiwan policy is more or less Taiwan driven. China’s internal politics have not been the major concern for its Taiwan policy; instead, Beijing pays close attentions to Taiwan’s specific behaviors. At least for the 1991-2000 period, China’s Taiwan policy is more reactive or defensive. From a general foreign policy analysis perspective, China’s Taiwan policy is more external- factor driven. As it will become apparent later in the discussion, Taiwan’s decision making toward China is entirely opposite. It seems that democracy has made a fundamental change of Taiwan’s behavior toward the mainland. This issue will be further addressed later in this chapter and in Chapter Six. Finally as expected, the lagged China-Taiwan Relations variable reaches statistical significance. It is an indication that China is listening to and watching carefully Taiwan’s behaviors and making consistent policy reactions to Taiwan. Equation 2 has an overall R-Square of 0.1455. The dependent variable in this equation is Taiwan-China Relations. This equation has three independent variables: Taiwan’s Polity Score, China-Taiwan Relations and Taiwan’s Internal Relations. As shown in Table 5.3, all three independent variables reach statistical significance. 105 A further investigation by including data from 2000 to 2008 and the 2008 presidential election could shed more light on this issue. 150 Taiwan’s Polity Score is inversely related to Taiwan-China Relations, indicating that the more Taiwan democratizes, the less favorably it treats China. During the presidential campaign in 1999, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian actively promoted Taiwan independence. Direct presidential election is considered by many as one of the indicators of democratization as public officials are elected directly by the mass public. Polls show that the percentage of people who would like to declare independence from the mainland right away jumped from 4.2% to 14.3% in a short period of four month (see Figure 5.1). Chen reacted accordingly by promoting Taiwan independence from China. Such behavior is considered by the mainland as extremely provocative. China again threatened that it would use military force if necessary. The statistical result confirms Hypothesis D. This perhaps in some way shows the power of democracy. As Taiwan continues to democratize, political processes based on which policies toward China are made have become increasingly more institution and procedure driven. Political leaders in Taiwan have less manipulative power than they did before and must try to act according to the wills of the public and political institutions, laws, etc. to develop their cross-strait policies. This is what Stockton (2007) calls a “multi-level” game. Moreover, Taiwan’s continuous democratization effort could lead to further de-sinification (Lynch, 2006a) and create more identity confusions (Kang, 2007). The DPP is probably likely to take advantage of Taiwan’s democratic status to gradually remove the forced sinification imposed under the KMT leadership by promoting a unique “Taiwanese” identity (Lynch, 2006a). As the democratization process continues, Taiwan’s policies could become less favorable to its authoritarian neighbor across the Strait. 151 Taiwan’s Internal Relations is inversely related to Taiwan-China Relations. The more internally unstable Taiwan is, the better it reacts to China. This perhaps can be explained by Fravel’s (2005) diversionary peace theory, which argues that internal conflict often creates conditions for cooperation, producing a “diversionary peace” instead of war. During the 2000 presidential election, the fight between the KMT and DPP was intense. Taiwan’s internal relations were conflictual or unstable as their domestic political parties and policies were undergoing significant changes. In order to avoid any potential conflict with Beijing, after Chen Shui-bian won the election, he immediately proposed his conciliatory “Five No’s” in his inaugural speech to calm down Beijing. During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the percentage of the public that favors an immediate declaration of independence was also at one of the lowest points (see Figure 5.1). Thus, in time of internal instability, Taiwan reacts to China more favorably. Figure 5.1 Unification or Independence 106 106 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_1.gif 152 On the other hand, when Taiwan’s internal relations become more stable, perhaps as a result of its continued consolidation of democracy, Taipei may be increasingly more likely to treat Beijing in a tougher way. This is consistent with the previous hypothesis: Hypothesis D. Overall, Hypothesis E is also confirmed. Additionally, China-Taiwan Relations is positively related to Taiwan-China Relations. The better or more favorably China treats Taiwan, the better Taiwan treats to China in return. By the same token, the worse China treats Taiwan, the less favorably Taiwan reacts to China. Such “tit for tat” strategy shows that as long as both sides keep on playing this game, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is likely. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that during the 1999 presidential campaign in Taiwan, in August for example, Beijing’s perceived hostility level toward both the ROC government and people in Taiwan increased from 63.6% to 83.5% and from 47.5% to 66.7%, respectively. Taiwan reacted to China with stronger promotion of independence (see Figure 5.2). Figure 5.2 Beijing’s Hostility Toward ROC 107 107 Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China, retrieved, March 2, 2002, from the World Wide Web: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/POS/9007/9007e_7.gif 153 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS The statistical analysis suggests several main findings. First, China responds favorably to Taiwan’s positive behaviors towards China, and vice versa. Whenever China and Taiwan show friendly signs towards each other, the other reacts similarly in return. This finding suggests cooperation across the Taiwan Strait is conducive to improving cross-strait relations. Provocative behaviors from either side could lead to unfavorable results. Second, China’s policy towards Taiwan is also determined by Taiwan’s internal relations. Mainland officials keep a close eye on Taiwan’s internal policy changes. These changes within Taiwan constitute an important part of China’s Taiwan policy. However, China is more or less only reacting to Taiwan’s policy changes instead of the democratization process which have produced these changes. Officials in Beijing do not seem to be willing to confront the issue of democratization directly. The authoritarian regime in Beijing could be a major barrier for future cross-strait relations. Third, Taiwan’s democratic change has shown signs of influence on its China policy. The more Taiwan democratizes, the more likely its government may be forced to produce policies that China does not like. This is an indication that Taiwan has become a more rule of law and institution-based democracy. Leaders in Taiwan must listen to what the public wants and act according to procedural rules rather than human rules when dealing with China. Fourth, there may be evidence of a diversionary peace phenomenon underway in Taiwan. The greater the degree of instability that exists in Taiwan, the better Taiwan 154 reacts to China. This suggests that Taiwan still relies heavily on its mainland neighbor to maintain economic, political and social stability on the island. This phenomenon also supports the risk choice theory set forth by Lamborn (1991). As Taiwan’s internal relations become more coercive, both Taiwan’s policy risk and its leaders’ political risk increase. In order to reduce these risks, the government of Taiwan tends to react more favorably to China to maintain stability. The interdependence of China and Taiwan (perhaps it is more about Taiwan’s dependence on China) clearly exists. The future of Taiwan is not simply a dichotomous option between independence and unification. It is much more complicated than that. Finally, Taiwan and China do take the cross-strait relations seriously. This is again evidenced by the statistical significance of the two independent variables which measure relations from Taiwan to China and relations from China to Taiwan. The two sides do react favorably to the other when the other side acts similarly. The statistical significance of these two variables suggests that closer communications need to be established across the Taiwan Strait. As the interdependence of the two increases, the lack of direct communication only hinders the development across the Taiwan Strait. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH This chapter uses a quantitative approach to analyze the relations across the Taiwan Strait. Two databases, IDEA and POLITY, are used as the basis of statistical analyses. Findings suggest that cross-strait relations are considered important matters by both sides. Both sides react favorably to the other when the other side acts similarly. 155 The mainland pays close attention to Taiwan’s internal development. Taiwan’s internal relations also affect its decision making towards China. These findings suggest there is a great need to further advance relations across the Taiwan Strait. From a more general foreign policy analysis perspective, the tale tells that from China’s perspective, China’s policies toward Taiwan are largely driven by Taiwan’s internal politics and Taiwan’s China policies, displaying a pattern of external determinants of China’s foreign policy. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, there is strong evidence of domestic determinants of Taiwan’s foreign policies. Taiwan’s policy towards China is more likely to be determined by its domestic relations. The observation about China’s decision making pattern, as an authoritarian regime, is only true based on the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. Evidence shows that leaders in China have become increasingly more aware of the power of the mass public. They therefore do take the opinions of the public seriously. I will further address this issue in Chapter Six through an in-depth case analysis. One thing is clear, however: Taiwan has become a democracy while China still remains authoritarian. The days when decisions were made by top elites behind closed doors are long gone in Taiwan. Top island officials do take domestic politics, including public reactions, seriously when making policy changes towards the mainland. China can no longer ignore the fact that Taiwan is now a democracy. If Taiwan favors independence internally, it may be more difficult for the mainland to influence Taiwan’s China policy, because decisions are no longer solely made by Taiwan’s elites. Results in the chapter also show evidence supportive of the diversionary peace theory, which is in direct conflict with the diversionary use of force theory. The China- 156 Taiwan case could also serve as a springboard for further exploration of diversionary theory. Finally, events data have been applied in the China-Taiwan case. The methodological synthesis of a country/region specific case and the use of events data through quantitative analysis show that gaps in foreign policy analysis can be bridged. 157 Chapter 6 Nationalism, Identity Change and Regime Type In Chapters Four and Five, I have provided empirical analyses of the foreign policy decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. Those two chapters address issues ranging from non-military diversions to other types of interactions in the Taiwan Strait. Those analyses mainly aim at examining a wide range of issues pertaining to the China- Taiwan relations, and the methodology is largely quantitative. In the present chapter, I take a qualitative approach by addressing the issues of nationalism, identity change and regime type. The aim is to provide an in-depth study of the intriguing details of the relationship in the Taiwan Strait and how they have influenced foreign policy decision making on both sides. I will first discuss the recent economic convergence and political divergence between Beijing and Taipei. Then, I will discuss how the changes of nationalism, social identity and regime type (the change of regime type in Taiwan and the lack thereof in China) have altered the current and future dynamics of cross-strait relations. Finally, I will discuss the implications of these changes with regard to the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region. The chapter provides an alternative explanation to the decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. Two significant political events occurred in mainland China and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in 2007 and 2008. The 17 th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress marked further consolidation of Hu Jintao’s power and arguably the beginning 158 of the preparation for a transition of power to the fifth generation of leadership in Beijing. 108 In Taipei, the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Ma Ying-jeou, won a decisive presidential election in March 2008, effectively putting the KMT (Nationalists) back in the game. What lies beneath the two events are Taiwan’s consolidated democracy and PRC’s continuation of authoritarian rule, or perhaps more precisely, a potential “soft authoritarianism” (Fukuyama, 1992; Roy, 1994). Empirical analyses from Chapters Four and Five suggest that the game leaders in Taiwan are playing with mainland China has become increasingly multi-level. Taiwanese leaders “are now subject to the popular ballot box and have lost hegemonic control over the executive and its powerful bureaucracy”; the PRC, in contrast, is still playing a “one-level game of negotiation” with Taiwan and has become extremely “wary of the introduction of the new popular forces in Taiwan cross-Strait policy process” (Stockton, 2007: 56). Political elites in Taiwan are no longer the sole players that can 108 China observers usually agree that there have been four generations of leadership in the central government. The first two generations of leadership were led by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping respectively. Jiang Zemin became the head of the third generation of leadership after Deng passed away in 1997. China is presently headed by Hu Jintao, the core of the fourth generation of leadership. The transitions between the Mao generation to Deng, and from Deng to Jiang were both marked by some level of violence – the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident respectively. The tenure of the first two generations of leadership under Mao and Deng was largely un-institutionalized. Many have argued that the transition from Jiang to Hu was the first peaceful transition of power in mainland China. And the transition of power from Hu’s fourth generation of leadership to the fifth generation is expected to continue to follow an established institutional pattern. 159 decide the fate of Taiwan, while mainland China’s Taiwan polices are still, arguably, decided by top level political elites. To be more specific, Chapter Four reveals that political elites in Taiwan, particularly the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders, have strategically used the issue of unification/independence as a diversion from Taiwan’s domestic problems. Electoral processes in Taiwan have certainly played an important role in Taiwanese leaders’ behaviors and policies toward the mainland. Chapter Five suggests that from China’s perspective, Taiwan’s domestic political changes do have significant influence on China’s decision making towards Taiwan. Although such changes may have been caused by Taiwan’s democratic transformation, China is not directly reacting to Taiwan’s democratization per se; rather it is reacting to the policy changes as a result of Taiwan’s internal democratic changes. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, democratization has significantly influenced Taiwan’s behavior towards China. Cross-Strait decisions from both sides are significantly influenced by Taiwan’s internal political changes. 109 While the evidence provided by Chapters Four and Five is by and large empirical, some of the issues have yet been adequately explained through such analyses alone. In the process of quantification, intriguing cultural, historical and social characteristics may 109 For instance, leaders in Beijing have been extremely careful about not appear to be threatening people in Taiwan. Since the counterproductive 1995 and 1996 military exercises, Beijing has not authorized any similar exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, however, the government, regardless if it is led by the DPP or KMT, has had to carefully listen to the opinions of the public when making its policies towards the mainland. The majority of the pubic now prefers maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 160 have been lost. Furthermore, the need to cover the breadth of the issues has prevented me from going into a greater depth to analyze some issues addressed in the previous two chapters and providing alternative explanations to the decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. In particular, both chapters make several realist and/or liberalist assumptions: 1) actors in the Taiwan Strait are rational actors who can make utility- maximizing decisions; 2) cultural, historical and societal elements are assumed away or assumed to be equal; 3) continued cooperation and engagement in the Taiwan Strait will likely lead to a decreased conflict level; and 4) spillover from “low politics” to “high politics” could occur. However, as Cal Clark (2007: 71) rightly points out, there has been a “lack of ‘spillover’ from economic integration and social communications into the realms of national security and identity” in the Taiwan Strait. In spite of the strong economic integration in the Taiwan Strait in the last three decades, the potential for a high level of conflict between Taiwan and the mainland remains. And increasingly in the most recent past, the idea of unification for the two sides in the Taiwan Strait has drifted further away from political consciousness. This Chapter argues that the issue of nationalism and identity needs to be taken into serious consideration as an alternative approach in explaining the decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. This alternative framework can help link issues at the first, second and third image levels as discussed in previous chapters. 161 Based on the previous two chapters, Realism and liberalism can only go so far in accounting for what has been observed. Social theories, such as Constructivism, can lend a helping hand. Unlike Chapters Four and Five, which assume self-interests are often given and are at the core of human and state behaviors, constructivists investigate what norms and interests are (Finnemore, 1996). They argue that norms and ideas shape interests; and, in turn, interests shape actions of individuals and nation-states (Wendt, 1999). Furthermore, norms and ideas can change people’s perception about nationalism and identity (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996); therefore, they are crucial in explaining actors’ foreign policy behaviors. Moreover, nationalism and identity are ultimately correlated with the issue of regime type. Through an in-depth analysis, I will assess the different decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. The chapter further argues that regime type has a significant impact on the formation of social experiences. Different social experiences in Taiwan and mainland China have subsequently influenced the change of respective nationalisms and identities. Political elites from both sides, especially leaders on the mainland, need to adapt their policies to a multi-level game. Nationalism, social identity creation or re-creation and regime type will have important implications for the future of cross-strait relations. 162 STRONG INTEGRATION, BUT NO SPILLOVER The current relationship in the Taiwan Strait can be characterized as “strong integration, but no spillover”. If political and military relations are “high politics”, recent integration between Taiwan and the mainland are primarily in the areas of “low politics”, particularly economic, cultural and societal integration. Classic functionalists, such as David Mitrany (1975), argue that cooperation in one area could “spillover” to other areas. Liberalists, particularly from the political economy perspective – such as Albert Hirschman (1980), also favor economic integration as the means to reduce the potential for future conflict. For a while, policy makers in both mainland China and Taiwan firmly believed in this Kantian notion of perpetual peace. 110 Analysts of Beijing’s strategy, for example, suggest that Beijing believe that “increasing economic integration will go along with, or eventually lead to, a growing political bridge between the two sides and, eventually political integration” (Hu, 2006: 33). Clark (2007) refers to Beijing’s strategy as “peace by pieces”. Has such a “spillover” occurred? Before we answer this question, let us first examine the integration at the low politics level in the Taiwan Strait. By all accounts, 110 This argument is ultimately linked to Immanuel Kant’s (1795 and 2007) notion of “Perpetual Peace” and the “interdependence” component of Russett and Oneal’s (2001) “Triangulating Peace”. Russett and Oneal (2001) argue that the triangulation of “democracy”, “interdependence”, and “international organizations” will lead to the “perpetual peace”. 163 economic and social interactions between mainland China and Taiwan have been getting closer by the day since cross-strait interactions first began in the late 1980s. Interactions have included in two major areas: economic and social interactions. Economic Interactions Economic interactions are the most significant among all the areas of integration in the Taiwan Strait. Trade and investment are the most two important economic activities. Since cross-strait exchanges began, Taiwan’s exports to mainland China have increased from 1 billion USD in 1985 to an estimated 44.9 111 billion USD in 2004 (Clark, 2007: 75). By a different estimate, the ROC Mainland Affairs Council’s data show that Taiwan’s share of exports to the mainland in Taiwan’s total foreign trade has steadily increased from 1.4% in 1984 to 30.42% in January 2008. Taiwan’s share of imports from the mainland has also increased from 0.58% in 1984 to 13.41% in January 2008 (see Table 6.1). Both exports to and imports from the mainland have increased more than 20 folds since economic exchanges first began. Taiwanese investments have poured into the mainland as well since the late 1980s. Table 6.2 shows that by the end of 2007, Taiwan approved 36,538 cases 112 of investment 111 The number is projected from exports of $41.2 billion for January through November. See Clark (2007: 75) Table 4.1 for details. 112 Each case is an individual investment project, such as real estate development and joint venture projects. 164 projects, in the amount of 64,000 million USD, into the mainland 113 . “The mainland has already become Taiwan’s largest export market and investment site…” and “Taiwan became the mainland’s third-largest import market, just following Japan and the European Union” (Hu, 2006: 22-24). Economic ties between mainland China and Taiwan have become stronger over the years. In addition to the close geographical proximity, which would be an ideal and natural way to reduce transaction costs to the mainland, Taiwan’s outpouring of trade and investment into the mainland has also been backed by “facilitating conditions” in China. Coinciding with Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and export-oriented economic policies, “China had just decided to emphasize precisely the industries that Taiwan was being forced to shed, creating a perfect economic complementarity that had not existed before” (Clark, 2007: 73-74). Moreover, China gave “preferential treatment 114 to Taiwanese businesspeople (compared to other foreign companies and overseas Chinese)”. The cross-strait “cultural affinity” also makes it much easier for Taiwanese businessmen to do business on the mainland (Clark, 2007: 74). 113 The data from mainland China puts the two numbers at 75,164 cases and roughly 46,000 million US dollars. 114 Preferential treatment was intentionally granted to Chinese compatriots from Taiwan. These favorable policies are significant both economically and politically. This point will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 165 Gereffi (1998) refers to the economic integration of China and Taiwan as a “commodity chain” through which the two economies are not “just exchanging goods and services but have developed a functionally linked economy that has integrated into the global division-of-labor” (also see Clark, 2007: 78). For instance, many computer companies in Taiwan often “export” finished high-tech components to the mainland for final assembly, drastically reducing costs. Finished products then are exported to the global market. The economic integration of mainland China and Taiwan possesses global implications as well. By and large, economic interactions in the Taiwan Strait have been “asymmetric”. For several reasons, such asymmetry should not be viewed as the mainland’s intentional strategy to generate a trade and investment surplus to weaken Taiwan’s economy. First, Taiwan as well as the other three “Asian Tigers” 115 have adopted an export- oriented trade strategy. The export-oriented strategy took advantage of Taiwan’s abundant and inexpensive labor resources and focused on exporting goods to other countries, including the mainland, as the major means to advance its economy. Second, the mainland has a huge market, so the exporting of goods and services to China became virtually inevitable (Clark, 2007). 115 The four “Asian Tigers” or sometimes referred to as “Asian Little Dragons” are Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. The common strategy utilized by the four “Asian Tigers” is the so-called export oriented industrialization, as opposed to import substitution widely used in many Latin American countries. The export oriented model usually takes advantage of the abundant and inexpensive labor resources to increase the comparative advantage in low-cost and low-tech products. 166 Third, it was and still has been the Taiwanese government that imposed rigid restrictions on what Taiwanese people and businesses could do regarding trade and investment in China. For example, the DPP administration made it difficult in the past for companies to transfer investment funds to mainland China, mainly through a law that caps a Taiwanese company’s mainland-bound investment at 40% of its net worth. Taiwan still does not allow certain high-tech sectors, such as companies that produce silicon computer chips, to export certain technologies to their mainland factories. Ultimately, the Taiwanese government did not want Taiwan to be overly dependent on the mainland. Social Interactions In addition to stronger economic ties, social interactions in the Taiwan Strait also have increased significantly. Since the government in Taiwan first allowed its residents to visit the mainland in 1987, cross-strait visits have skyrocketed. Table 6.3 shows that by the end of 2007, a total of 47,038,451 Taiwanese residents have visited the mainland. Considering Taiwan’s total population of 22,000,000, this is the equivalent of saying that since 1987, every Taiwanese has visited the mainland at least twice. Cross-Strait visits are again asymmetric. 116 Generally speaking, more Taiwanese have visited the mainland 116 While mainland China has restrictions on its residents visiting Taiwan, the asymmetry is again largely due to Taiwan’s unwillingness or unreadiness to open its border to mainland visitors. 167 than Chinese to Taiwan. However, by the end of 2007, a total of 1,844,840 mainlanders have visited Taiwan. 2006 saw the largest growth rate in the last 5 years (roughly 41%), as compared to the previous year. Year Export Share Import Share Total Trade Share 1984 1.4 0.58 1.06 1985 3.21 0.58 2.17 1986 2.04 0.6 1.49 1987 2.28 0.83 1.71 1988 3.7 0.96 2.47 1989 5.03 1.12 3.31 1990 6.54 1.4 4.23 1991 9.79 0.46 5.57 1992 12.84 1.03 7.31 1993 16.28 1.31 9.19 1994 16.99 2.17 9.93 1995 17.15 2.97 10.36 1996 17.63 2.97 10.79 1997 18.08 3.41 11.03 1998 17.62 3.91 11 1999 17.22 4.07 11 2000 16.46 4.43 10.67 2001 20.27 5.47 13.45 2002 23.3 7.04 15.89 2003 25.43 8.61 17.7 2004 26.83 9.95 18.72 2005 28.36 11 20.04 2006 28.27 12.23 20.65 2007 30.11 12.77 21.95 Jan-08 30.42 13.41 22.22 http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/8.pdf Table 6.1: The Share of Cross-Straits Trade in Taiwan Total Foreign Trade Estimates by Mainland Affairs Council, ROC Unit: % Sources: 1. Hong Kong Customs Statistics; 2. ROC Customs Statistics. Table 6.1 The Share of Cross-Straits Trade in Taiwan Total Foreign Trade 168 As most Chinese, particularly those who are in the urban areas, continue to do well economically, their “spending power” continues to rise at an amazing rate. For example, after the Asian Financial Crisis in Hong Kong, mainland visitors were extremely welcomed to visit the Special Administrative Region, as they brought “tons” of cash to help revive, unintentionally of course, Hong Kong’s economy. During Taiwan’s economic downturn in recent years, some advocates, especially businessmen and the KMT, have lobbied the Taiwanese government to allow more mainlanders to come to visit the island, hoping that their visits could inject much needed cash into Taiwan’s slow economy. At the same time, mainlanders are now not only more willing to spend money but also more capable of doing so to increase their quality of life. Taiwan could be an attractive place for them to do so. Cross-Strait communications have also increased. Table 6.4 shows that communication in the form of postal letters remains an active way of contact. However, the total number of letters across the Taiwan Strait decreased from 17 million in 1995 to 11 million in 2007. This could be due to the increased use of telephone, fax, and emails. Table 6.5 shows that the number of and time-length of phone calls from both directions increased dramatically in the last decades. While the average time per phone call from Taiwan to the mainland is between 2.4 and 2.8 minutes; the same number has increased for phone calls from mainland China to Taiwan from 3.2 to 4.4 minutes. This shows that the phone communications initiated from mainland China have increased at a faster speed 169 than those initiated from Taiwan. The mainlanders now have greater need (such as for business or cultural reasons) and more financial abilities to call people in Taiwan. Cultural and educational exchanges have also been enhanced since the late 1980s. Many policy makers from both mainland China and Taiwan believed that cultural and educational exchanges between the younger generations of mainlanders and Taiwanese would help draw the two political entities closer in the future. For instance, according to the ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), through the MAC’s Chinese Development Fund, Taiwan sponsored cross-strait cultural activities increased from 18 cases in 1992 to 524 cases in 2007; while MAC co-sponsored cultural activities had increased from 6 in 1992 to 2,524 by the end of 2007 (See Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). By the end of 2007, MAC has co-funded 716 out of 1,321 applications to send scholars to mainland China. 117 Among the 716 funded projects, 578 projects have been actualized (See Figure 6.3). In addition to exchanging scholars, the MAC also funded 847 graduate-students, among which 643 of them have studied in mainland China by the end of 2007 (See Figure 6.4). 117 The MAC has only provided aggregated data on its website. Therefore, I am unable, at this stage, to distinguish what projects were denied and what were granted funding. 170 Period Cases Amount Ave. Amount Projects Contracted Amount Ave. Amount Realized Amount Realization Ratio 1993* 9,329 3,168.41 0.34 10,948 9,964.87 0.91 3,138.59 31.5 1994 934 962.21 1.03 6,247 5,394.88 0.86 3,391.04 62.86 1995 490 1,092.71 2.23 4,847 5,849.07 1.21 3,161.55 54.05 1996 383 1,229.24 3.21 3,184 5,141.00 1.61 3,474.84 67.59 1997* 8,725 4,334.31 0.5 3,014 2,814.49 0.93 3,289.39 116.87 1998* 1,284 2,034.62 1.58 2,970 2,981.68 1 2,915.21 97.77 1999 488 1,252.78 2.57 2,499 3,374.44 1.35 2,598.70 77.01 2000 840 2,607.14 3.1 3,108 4,041.89 1.3 2,296.28 56.81 2001 1,186 2,784.15 2.35 4,214 6,914.19 1.64 2,979.94 43.1 2002* 3,116 6,723.06 2.16 4,853 6,740.84 1.39 3,970.64 58.9 2003* 3,875 7,698.78 1.99 4,495 8,557.87 1.9 3,377.24 39.46 2004 2,004 6,940.66 3.46 4,002 9,305.94 2.33 3,117.49 33.5 2005 1,297 6,006.95 4.63 3,907 10,358.25 2.65 2,151.71 20.77 2006 1,090 7,642.34 7.01 3,752 - - 2,135.83 - 2007 996 9,970.55 10.01 3,299 - - 1,774.37 - http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/10.pdf * includes the number of registration of previously unregistered investmnets. Unit: US$million, % Table 6.2: Taiwan Investment in Mainland China * includes the number of the registration of previously unregistered investments. Approved by Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC Official Data from Mainland China Source: 1.Investment Commision, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC.; 2. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, PRC. Table 6.2 Taiwan Investment in Mainland China 171 Year Persons Year-to- Year Growth (%) Cumulation Persons Year-to- Year Growth (%) Cumulation 1993 1,526,969 - 5,726,350 18,445 39.98 37,080 1994 1,390,215 -8.96 7,116,565 23,654 28.24 60,734 1995 1,532,309 10.22 8,648,874 42,295 78.81 103,029 1996 1,733,897 13.16 10,382,771 56,545 33.69 159,574 1997 2,117,576 22.13 12,500,347 73,848 30.6 233,422 1998 2,174,602 2.69 14,674,949 90,387 22.4 323,809 1999 2,584,648 18.86 17,259,597 106,254 17.55 430,063 2000 3,108,643 20.27 20,368,240 116,311 9.47 546,374 2001 3,441,961 10.72 23,810,201 133,988 15.2 680,362 2002 3,660,565 6.35 27,470,766 154,770 15.51 835,132 2003 2,731,897 -25.37 30,202,663 134,811 -12.9 969,943 2004 3,685,250 34.9 33,887,913 138,561 3.36 1,108,504 2005 4,109,187 11.5 37,997,100 172,982 24.14 1,281,486 2006 4,413,470 7.4 42,410,570 243,185 40.58 1,524,671 2007 4,627,881 4.86 47,038,451 320,169 31.66 1,844,840 National Immigration Agency, Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, ROC. http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/20.pdf Table 6.3: Cross-Strait Visits Taiwan Vistors to Mainland Mainland Visitors to Taiwan Sources: China Monthly Statistics and China Travel Yearbook, PRC. http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/19.pdf Table 6.3 Cross-Strait Visits 172 Year Total letters Growth Rate (%) Total Letters Growth Rate (%) Total 1995 6,714,489 -2.51 10,943,909 -10.48 17,658,398 1996 6,532,580 -2.71 11,510,345 5.18 18,042,925 1997 6,018,077 -7.88 10,283,669 -10.66 16,301,746 1998 5,751,680 -4.43 8,930,255 18 14,681,935 1999 5,031,834 -12.52 8,492,073 -4.91 13,523,907 2000 5,409,559 7.51 8,577,556 1.01 13,987,115 2001 5,004,283 -7.49 7,626,377 -11.09 12,630,660 2002 9,224,488 84.33 7,045,970 -7.61 16,270,458 2003 10,268,325 11.32 7,698,078 9.26 17,966,403 2004 9,280,017 -9.62 6,907,013 -10.28 16,187,030 2005 9,398,239 1.27 6,769,875 -1.99 16,168,114 2006 5,985,106 -36.32 6,501,617 -3.96 12,486,723 2007 5,263,948 -12.05 6,331,197 -2.62 11,595,145 http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/17.pdf Letters to Mainland China Letters to Taiwan Table 6.4: Cross-Strait Letters Source: Department of Statistics, MOTC, ROC. Table 6.4 Cross-Strait Letters 173 Year Calls Minutes Average Time Per Call Calls Minutes Average Time Per Call 1995 36,286,354 102,222,867 2.8 41,519,318 133,795,616 3.2 1996 42,956,178 115,162,620 2.7 53,541,006 168,739,603 3.2 1997 56,652,934 151,719,608 2.7 69,077,688 198,068,887 2.9 1998 69,203,243 180,643,371 2.6 79,951,814 236,140,690 3 1999 82,295,197 214,145,259 2.6 96,033,222 286,033,653 3 2000 95,048,691 241,113,377 2.5 111,604,019 342,987,929 3.1 2001 114,970,716 321,953,043 2.8 154,668,202 509,835,107 3.3 2002 169,332,270 473,223,614 2.8 213,866,226 758,784,078 3.5 2003 185,782,187 523,941,755 2.8 250,073,756 987,261,966 3.9 2004 228,595,500 645,109,422 2.8 289,035,219 1,286,702,911 4.5 2005 298,044,463 790,814,715 2.7 318,610,184 1,369,443,937 4.3 2006 358,902,498 875,980,140 2.4 350,297,538 1,505,975,668 4.3 2007 282,248,004 784,836,551 2.8 352,274,657 1,566,245,351 4.4 Table 6.5: Cross-Strait Telephone Calls Source:National Communication Commission, ROC. http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/182/18.pdf Calls to Taiwan Calls to Mainland China Table 6.5 Cross-Strait Telephone Calls As a result of the intensive economic and cultural integration, an estimated 500,000 ROC citizens live for most of the year in Shanghai alone (Clark, 2007). That means that roughly 2% of Taiwan’s total population lives in the city of Shanghai alone at any given time. Lynch (2006a) also reports increased number of cross-strait marriages in the past decade. By all accounts, social interactions in the Taiwan Strait are very strong. And evidently, economic integration has “spilled over” into social integration and vice versa. 174 Figure 6.1 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Sponsored Cultural Activities Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC; http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/ce9701/1.pdf 175 Figure 6.2 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Cultural Activities Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC; http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/ce9701/2.pdf 176 Figure 6.3 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Scholar Exchanges Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC; http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/ce9701/3.pdf 177 Figure 6.4 MAC (Chinese Development Fund) Co-Sponsored Graduate-Student Exchanges Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC; http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/ce9701/4.pdf 178 Increased Tensions In the past several decades, people have seen truly intensive and extensive economic and social integrations in the Taiwan Strait. Although cross-strait relations have become interdependent, in reality, interactions in the economic and social areas have made Taiwan more dependent on the mainland. The conventional wisdom suggests that economic and social interdependence or dependence reduces the probability of potential military conflict and hostility. 118 Looking at the reality in the Taiwan Strait, however, “the burgeoning economic integration between Taiwan and China was accompanied by rising, not diminishing, political hostility and security threats” (Clark, 2007: 80). Examples of increased hostility are not hard to find at all. In 1995 and 1996 Beijing authorized military exercises in the waters near Taiwan. Many analysts believe Beijing’s move was aimed at Taiwan’s first direct presidential election scheduled in March 1996 and Lee Teng-hui’s increasing pro-independence stance. Beijing’s action prompted U.S. President Clinton to send aircraft carriers to the region to monitor and stabilize the situation. Since the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Missile Crises, Beijing has realized its over-threatening strategy could backfire (Shirk, 2007). Since then, China has 118 For more details on trade interdependence and dependence, please see Barbieri (1996) and Oneal and Russett’s (1997; 1999a and 1999b). 179 not conducted any military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in close proximity to Taiwan. 119 However, Beijing has kept its hundreds, if not thousands, of missiles deployed along China’s southern coast as part of a broader deterrence strategy. The Taiwan Strait is now one of the two most dangerous conflict regions in the world. 120 Since the pro-independence DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, tensions in the Taiwan Strait have remained high. The “1992 Consensus” was largely abandoned by Chen. As explained in Chapter Three, the “1992 Consensus” is an implicit and informal agreement between Beijing and Taipei claiming that both sides belong to “one China”, though each side has different interpretations over what constitutes that “one China”. Over the years, the mainland has gradually relaxed its Taiwan policy from insisting on asking Taiwan to first accept the “one China” policy to asking Taiwan to accept the “1992 Consensus” before any negotiation can take place. In spite of this relaxation, Chen Shui-bian refused to accept the “1992 Consensus”. 121 119 The 1995 and 1996 missile crises were authorized by the PRC government to arguably prevent Taiwan from declaring independence after its first direct presidential election in March 1996. This action by the PRC has largely been believed to be counterproductive. 120 Horowitz, Heo and Tan (2007: 1) refer to China and Taiwan, and North and South Korea conflicts as the most dangerous regions in the world. A large amount of live missiles and other ammunitions are deployed in both the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. In each instance, the likelihood of crisis escalation or accidental escalation is high. 121 After Ma Ying-jeou took office in March 2008, he has expressed his willingness to return to the “1992 Consensus” as the basis for cross-strait dialogs. Beijing has responded favorably to this policy shift. 180 Beijing also refused to talk to Taipei’s pro-independence government. At the international level, Beijing has continued its efforts to further isolate Taipei, for example, effectively lobbying the international community to keep Taiwan out of any international organizations that require statehood, including the World Health Organization (Chao and Hsu, 2006; Hickey, 2006). Presently, only 23 small countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan (See Chapter 3 and Table 3.1). Taiwan’s domestic economy remains in a downturn. Chen Shui-bian’s provocative pro-independence policies did not allow Taiwan to take full advantage of the mainland’s burgeoning economy to pull Taiwan out of the economic downturn. Generally speaking, Chen’s mainland policy not only failed to bring about change and recognition among the international community, but also endangered the peaceful relationship with the mainland. Towards the end of the Chen administration, as a result, Taiwanese were to become increasingly dissatisfied with Chen’s mainland policy. Analysts have argued that the increasingly strong integration in the economic and social areas have not spilled over into closer political ties and decreased level of potential conflict (Clark, 2007; Lynch, 2006b; Stockton, 2007; Wu, 2007). This is clearly shown through the analysis in Chapter Four. Statistical analysis shows that increased integration, particularly trade, is neither linked to Taiwanese presidents’ higher approval ratings nor decreased hostility in the Taiwan Strait (See Chapter Four and Table 4.5). On the contrary, Taiwan and mainland China seem to be drifting further apart from each other, at 181 least politically speaking in the DPP era. The relationship between Beijing and Taipei can be characterized as “a paradoxical combination of closer economic convergence and greater political divergence” (Hu, 2006: 34). The lack of “spillover” can no longer be explained by the impressive economic and social integration in the Taiwan Strait. In a theoretical sense, neither the traditional realist balance of power/ threat approach nor the liberalist economic interdependence approach can adequately explain the current status of Beijing-Taipei relations. Other factors must be in play. The rest of the chapter examines issues of nationalism and identity change, from a constructivist perspective, to further explain the decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. The discussion is also a reflection of Collingwood’s (1956) notion that history is about ideas. Changes of ideas in nationalism and identity will influence the future relationship between Beijing and Taipei. The discussion about nationalism and identity change will not only help synthesize issues discussed in previous chapters, it will also provide an alternative way of understanding previously unsolved problems. NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY CHANGE Leaders in Beijing effectively waited out eight years of the pro-independence DPP president Chen Shui-bian. He was replaced by a pro-unification KMT president, Ma Ying-Jeou, who won a landslide victory in the recent election period. Ma is largely 182 believed to be a more pro-mainland and pro-unification leader, who has, along with his vice president Vincent Siew, advocated improving relations with the mainland. Aspects of that shift in policy include returning to the “1992 Consensus”, allowing more mainland visitors to visit Taiwan, starting direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland, and further facilitating trade with and investments in China, just to name a few. For example, less than a week after Ma took office, he sent the Chairman of the KMT – the top leader of the Nationalist Party, Wu Po-hsiung, to the mainland to mend relations with Beijing. 122 Beijing, however, might be in for a surprise. On May 20, 2008, in his presidential inaugural address Ma specifically called for a “principle of no unification, no independence and no use of force” and the upholding of Taiwan’s democracy as the guiding principle to deal with the mainland. He appeared to be inclined not to push for any immediate change of the status quo, including unification with the mainland. So what has changed? Evidence suggests that traditional realist and liberalist schools have failed to explain the combination of economic convergence and political divergence (Hu, 2006) in the Taiwan Strait, as they “do not take sufficient account of actor identity construction and the subsequent effect of that construction on state interests” (Stockton, 2007: 62). Changes of social and national identities can lead to 122 Wu Po-hsiung, Chairman of the KMT, visited mainland China from May 26 th to 31 st , 2008, less than a week after Ma Ying-jeou took office. Wu is the first top party leader to visit the mainland while his party formed the government. While in Beijing, Wu met Hu Jintao, as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Wu’s visit is believed by China observers, to be a gesture of the Ma administration to carry out his campaign promises to improve relations with the mainland. 183 changes of political interests and national security policies (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996; cited in Stockton, 2007: 62). I argue that nationalism and identity change in both Taiwan and mainland China over the decades have fundamentally altered the dynamics of cross-strait relations. Cross-strait relations may continue to improve, especially if a peace accord can be negotiated. However, the traditional unification vs. independence framework has become increasingly more challenging to political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. For leaders in Taiwan, it is turning into the issue of how to maintain peace with Beijing while meeting the popular demands of the Taiwanese in the midst of the island’s continuing effort to democratize. For leaders in mainland China, it is becoming the issue of how to maintain the party-state’s legitimacy while trying to satisfy growing popular desire for national unification. Political elites on both sides must take nationalism and identity change seriously in regard to the future cross-strait relations. In the next sections, I will discuss the respective changes of nationalism and social-political identity in both Taiwan and mainland China and the implications of these changes with regard to the future of China-Taiwan relations. Nationalism and Identity Change in Taiwan For decades in the past, the “Issue of Taiwan” had been an issue of national sovereignty to both Taiwan and mainland China. As discussed in Chapter 3, the PRC has always argued that there is only one China – the People’s Republic of China - and 184 Taiwan is part of China. The issue of Taiwan is an issue of eventual national unification, which was not properly resolved after the end of the Chinese Civil War. Both Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo of the Nationalist government in Taiwan also believed that there was only one China – the Republic of China – and both Taiwan and the mainland were part of the ROC. As time went by, changes gradually occurred to how best to define the Taiwan issue. However, for most part, the issue was still centered around the issue of sovereignty. So, based on these assumptions, on the China side, “the problem [the Taiwan issue] is how to bring Taiwan back into the Chinese nation. On the Taiwan side, the problem is how best to maintain comfortable economic and political trajectories without being swallowed up or bombed by China.” (Brown, 2004: 4) Clearly, each side has its own interpretation of the Taiwan issue. Recent changes in Taiwan, especially since the early 1990s – most apparent towards the end of the Lee Teng-hui administration and the eight years of the Chen Shui- bian administration - have shown that the Taiwan issue has increasingly become an issue of identity: “Han ethnic identity, Chinese national identity, and the relationship of both of these identities to the new Taiwanese identity forged in the 1990s” (Brown, 2004: 1). As it will become apparent later on, Han ethnic identity is directly associated with the identity of the Chinese nation. How both Han Taiwanese and non-Han Taiwanese view the new Taiwanese identity has become the central issue of defining the relationship between China and Taiwan. 185 Moreover, embedded in the issue of identity is the issue of nationalism. Brown (2004: 2-13) further argues that it is a misunderstanding to view “ethnic and national identities” as based on “common ancestry and/or common culture and therefore that identity is grounded in antiquity”; instead she argues that “identity is formed and solidified on the basis of common social experience, including economic and political experience”; and “identities must be negotiated; they are not simply a matter of choice, because identity formation in individuals and groups derives from their interaction with the social and cultural context in which they live” (also see Keyes, 1981; Bentley, 1987; Williams, 1989; Harrell, 1995; Brown 1996). As a result, when common social experiences change, identities change too. Changes of social experiences in both mainland China and Taiwan in the past several decades have altered the two entities’ respective social and national identities. The traditional unification/independence dichotomy has created problems for both Taiwan and the mainland in resolving the “Taiwan Issue”. Historically, Wakabayashi (2006: 6-15) identifies three national identity/nationality changes in Taiwan. The first occurred when Taiwan was annexed by Japan after the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Prior to the era of Japanese colonial rule starting in 1895, Chang (2000: 53-54, cited in Brown, 2004: 7) argues that “people in Taiwan did not think of themselves as a unified group”. However, after the Japanese occupation, Japanese culture was forced upon the Taiwanese. And the “imminent arrival 186 of Japanese troops [be]came the first indication of a pan-Taiwanese identity, and identity limited to Han” and an identity centered on the resistance to Japanese occupation and the formation of a strong nationalism (Brown, 2004: 8). Both local Taiwanese and mainland immigrants became unified against the external Japanese threat. The second change occurred when Taiwan was “gloriously returned” to the Republic of China in 1945 (Brown, 2004). The ROC invoked a “Chinese Nation”, promoting the Han culture as the dominant group and culture (Wakabayashi, 2006). The process was especially intensified after the KMT lost the civil war to the CCP and decided to move the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Many Taiwanese assumed they were simply “Chinese” again. On the day before February 28 th , 1947, a local cigarette vendor was brutally beaten by the Nationalist police as they tried to confiscate her allegedly smuggled cigarettes. The incident sparked an island-wide uprising the next day. In the next few weeks, the KMT executed thousands of Taiwanese. This eventually led the Nationalist government to declare “Martial Law” in Taiwan. 123 The “2.28 Incident” marked the beginning of the second identity change in Taiwan. It became the “historical genesis of a broad Taiwanese nationalism as we see it today” (Wakabayashi, 2006: 11- 12). As a result, “a considerable number of Taiwanese came to see ‘China’ as ‘outside’… ‘they,’ the mainlanders, became the ‘Chinese’; we the Taiwanese became a different community of people from these ‘Chinese’” (Wakabayashi, 2006: 11-12). 123 The Martial Law would only be lifted in 1987. 187 Recent democratization, coupled with the rise of China, has started perhaps the third national identity change in Taiwan. The end of the Martial Law in 1987 and the government’s permission to allow dangwai (opposition parties) to exist since the late 1980s are largely considered as the beginning of Taiwan’s democratization. As a result, “Taiwanese nationalism has assumed considerable prominence, and a cultural uniqueness has been gaining strength” (Wakabayashi, 2006: 3). Taiwan’s democratization was relatively gradual in the very beginning and only accelerated in recent years. Among the most significant changes are the 1996 presidential election, in which Lee Teng-hui of the KMT became the first directly elected ROC president; the 2000 election, in which for the first time in Chinese history an opposition party leader Chen Shui-bian of the DPP became the president; and the 2008 presidential election in which the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou took back the presidency after eight years of DPP rule – symbolizing a full cycle of power transition between the KMT and DPP. Popular elections have also changed low-level politics. For example, the government in Taiwan has implemented mayoral level and county level elections – allowing Taiwanese to directly elect their political representatives at all levels. The government is increasingly more accountable to public opinion for both domestic and international policies, as shown in Chapter Four. Stockton (2007) refers to these changes as a transition from the traditional “one-level” game exclusively played at the elite level 188 to a “multilevel” game involving a combined effort of political elites, popular ballots and state bureaucracy. In recent years, particularly the DPP government has been promoting a series of “de-Sinification” processes. Taiwanese writers and critics have stimulated a discourse of Xiangtu Wenxue (native literature) 124 (Wakabayashi, 2006). Taipei added the word “Taiwan” onto the jacket of the ROC passport after the word “Republic of China”. The government has also changed the name of “China” Post to “Taiwan” Post. Changes have been made in the education system as well to promote the unique cultural and historical characteristics of Taiwan, emphasizing the differences between Chinese and Taiwanese. For instance, in schools, local dialects are encouraged rather than Mandarin Chinese. The pinyin system, a phonetic system commonly used in the mainland and in the international community (such as libraries overseas) to transliterate Chinese characters to western phonetic systems, has been demoted. Instead, the government has emphasized the importance of using the old Tongyong Pinyin system which is only used in Taiwan. The ultimate goal of the “de-Sinification” process is to “Taiwanize” Taiwan by emphasizing the uniqueness of the Taiwanese identity. The recent rise of China, on the one hand, has created much needed economic opportunities for Taiwan. On the other hand, many see the rise of China as a potential 124 Taiwanese Xiangtu writers often write about the insidious effects of capitalism in pre-revolutionary China and valorize their country’s traditionalism (Haddon, 1990). The discourse has been focused on discovering the uniqueness of Taiwan’s literature. 189 threat to the survival of Taiwan. The primary concern for the Taiwanese is that China’s economic development could lead to stronger and more threatening military capabilities, especially when the mainland has yet to renounce the possible use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. In recent years, Beijing has increased the number of missiles deployed in the mainland’s southern coast against Taiwan. Perhaps most importantly, both the people and government in Taiwan have argued that an immediate reunification with the mainland under China’s terms, particularly given its regime type, would certainly mean “the erosion of many hard-won political liberties” (Stockton, 2007: 59). Taiwan’s recent democratization has created a new “common social experience”. It is this common social experience that has altered the national and social identity of the Taiwanese. The new identity has also called for the continued safeguard of Taiwan’s democratization. Cal Clark (2007: 83) asserts that: Taiwan’s democratization, therefore, was widely expected to unleash Taiwanese nationalism on two interlinked but distinct issues: (1) reject of the Mainlander-dominated political regime; and (2) growing hostility toward and the absolute rejection of China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, which was ironically at least tacitly supported by the Kuomintang’s policy of “Mainland Recovery”. Democracy in Taiwan has become a defining issue that marks the political and social difference between Taiwan and the mainland. Such change in identity caused by Taiwan’s democratization is very significant. Table 6.6 and Figure 6.5 show that the percentage of people who consider themselves Taiwanese increased from 17.3% in 1992 to 43.7% in 2004, while the percentage that 190 consider themselves as Chinese dropped from 26.2% to 5.4% respectively. More people in Taiwan now consider themselves as having a different social and political identity than the Chinese. This evidence reveals that Taiwanese increasingly believe they belong to a separate “nation-state” that is fundamentally different from China. Once this social and political identity change is solidified, economic integration can hardly dismantle this new identity. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter Four in regard to the weak significance of cross-strait visits and the lack of significance of cross-strait trade on Taiwanese presidents’ approval rating. Peace with mainland, at some level, is no longer an issue of economic interests. Rather, it has become an issue of how to converge two different identities. Regarding the future status of Taiwan as shown in Figure 6.6, among all the surveyed options, “unification as soon as possible” has the lowest support rate (1.8% as of December 2007) and “maintain status quo, decide at later date” has the highest support rate (37% for the same time period). Generally speaking, most people in Taiwan favor some form of maintaining the status quo and wishing to shelve the Taiwan Issue for the future. 191 Jun-92 Dec-07 Both Taiwanese and Chinese 45.4% 44.5% Taiwanese 17.3% 43.7% Chinese 26.2% 5.4% Non-response 11.0% 6.5% Total 99.9% 100.1% Table 6.6: Identity in Taiwan, 1992-2007 Source: Election Study Center, NCCU (National Chengchi University) http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm Table 6.6 Identity in Taiwan, 1992-2007 One could argue that the recent “Taiwanization” is largely due to Chen Shui- bian’s orchestrated “de-Sinification” efforts. However, a closer examination of these changes suggests that they are due to the recent identity change in Taiwan. After all, even the new pro-unification president Ma Ying-jeou knows that an immediate move to reunify with the mainland would mean nothing but a political suicide mission for the KMT and himself. Popular democracy has taken hold in Taiwan’s politics. Political elites must listen to public opinion and try to answer what its people want. Some would even go as far as to say “the longer that Taiwan remains a democracy, the less actual social basis there is for a reunification”, assuming the mainland maintains its current regime structure (Brown, 2004: 245). 192 Nationalism and Identity Change in China Nationalism and identity change in mainland China have made the potential reunification even more difficult. An old Chinese expression goes, “one hand alone cannot clap”. The increased economic convergence and the lack of political divergence in the Taiwan Strait are due to recent changes regarding nationalism and identity in mainland China as well. I argue that the rise of Chinese nationalism is China’s inevitable reaction, from both its citizens and government, to the alleged “China threat” proposition put forward by the West and the regime’s need for political survival. 125 However, the continued rise of Chinese nationalism in the mainland may have pushed Taiwan further away from potential reunification. 125 For example, Carpenter (2005: 99) argues that “On balance, the political and security environment in the Taiwan Strait is growing more tense and unpredictable…. Washington may have to worry more about Taipei provoking a crisis than Beijing doing so.” 193 Figure 6.5 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese, 1992 - 2007 Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm. 194 Figure 6.6 Changes in the Unification – Independence Stances of Taiwanese Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-3.htm. 195 The ever-growing economic and social interactions between mainland China and Taiwan suggest China’s interest in further integrating Taiwan into a “greater China” system have not diminished but increased. Moody (2007: 41) asserts that “China’s more enduring interests in Taiwan need to be explained in constructivist terms, particularly, of course, contemporary nationalism. For China’s ruling elite, the incorporation of Taiwan is part of what constitutes Chinese national identity.” Conversations with both ordinary Chinese citizens and political elites indicate that most Chinese would be willing to sacrifice economic interests, such as the opportunity to host the 2008 Olympic Games or continued high speed economic growth in order to preserve the unity of the Chinese nation (Shirk, 2007). Therefore, China’s behavior towards Taiwan cannot be explained solely through economic terms. The mainland’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan is based on both historical and cultural grounds. Brown (2004: 22) identifies several assumptions about Han ethnic and Chinese national identities that are often used by mainland Chinese to argue the case of Taiwan. Mainlanders often assume that: First, Han ethnic identity is linked to Chinese national identity. Second, Chinese national identity is linked to Han culture. Third, Chinese national identity has a clear border, and a person or group is located on one side of it or the other; that is, a person or a group is definitively Chinese or not Chinese, Han or non-Han. The Chinese do acknowledge that the Chinese nation is multiethnic. But just like pre- modern tributary system promoted by Confucian idealists, a hierarchical order exists everywhere (Lynch, 2006b). This includes nation-states (pre-modern states) at the 196 international level and among different ethnic groups at the domestic level. The result is that the Chinese view the Han as the “Big Brother”, leading non-Han little brothers and sisters and offering guidance to them (Brown, 2004). The non-Han little brothers and sisters should naturally respect the “Big Brother” and pledge allegiance to him. Based on the above three assumptions, Chinese national identity is linked to Han ethnic identity. If Taiwanese, Han (the Big Brother) or non-Han (little brothers and sisters who have supposedly pledged allegiance to the Han Big Brother) are “culturally Han they should be part of the nation of China” (Brown, 2004: 23-24). Recall an early discussion about the preferential treatment (usually more favorable trade and investment policies) the mainland gives Taiwanese businessmen and investors. The preferential treatment is arguably intentional (for both political and symbolic reasons) because the mainland considers Taiwanese as family members; therefore, they are socially in-group, in sharp contrast to other out-group foreigners, such as American or French businessmen. This Chinese in-group and Han-centric national identity has been strengthened recently by the ever-stronger Chinese nationalism for two main reasons. First, the modern history of China is a history of humiliation by foreign invasions (Lieberthal, 2004; Gries, 2005). Nationalism is both the result and the means to strengthen national unity at times of crises. To many Chinese (not only mainland Chinese but also Chinese in a greater sense including Chinese overseas), one proxy to conceptualize and measure “nationalism” is the government’s ability to retain the country’s territorial integrity. The 1919 May 197 Fourth Movement was precisely an upsurge of Chinese nationalism triggered by the unfair treatment of the Chinese through the Treaty of Versailles - the transferring of German concessions in Shandong Province to Japan rather than returning them to China, among other things. Political elites who end up giving up territories are often labeled as “national traitors”, who bring “national humiliation” to the people and nation. Such political repercussion would be tremendous. For example, Li Hongzhang, a well known general and diplomat in the late Qing Empire, became the symbol of traitors because of his role in signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan “in perpetuity”. Shirk (2007) argues that one of the reasons Jiang Zemin played “tough” with Taiwan during the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan missile crises was he did not want history to view him as a traitor who had lost Taiwan. All political elites will try to avoid such a situation at all costs. Second, China’s recent lightening-speed economic development has triggered the West’s growing fear of China’s rise. The western articulation of the “China threat” has created internal cohesiveness among the Chinese. Nationalism is one way, if not the only way, to defend the Chinese unity. It is a matter of not only the survival of the country, but also the survival of political elites or groups in charge – the CCP in this case (Shirk, 2007). Recent events show how strongly Chinese nationalism has grown. The NATO-led bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999 and the more recent crisis in Tibet and the anti- China Olympic torch relay have demonstrated that the increasingly stronger nationalism 198 in China is no longer solely fanned by the government. Instead, both cases are Beijing’s frantic reactions to the popular nationalism. NATO-Led Bombing of the Chinese Embassy, 1999 On May 7 th , 1999, during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led Operation Allied Force, an American B-2 bomber from the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri dropped precision guided missiles on several targets on the ground in Belgrade. One of the targets hit was the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. The air strike killed three Chinese journalists: Shao Yunhuan, Xu Xinghu and Zhu Ying, and injured 20 others. Both NATO and the U.S. blamed the error on an outdated map. The bombing immediately sparked outrage across China: “Protests erupted in over two dozen Chinese major cities. The American consul’s residence in Chengdu was firebombed.” (Gries, 2005: 14) University students took the streets in major cities to demonstrate. It was the largest public demonstration since the 1989 demonstrations. Many in China believed that the U.S., the superpower in possession of the most sophisticated intelligence and weaponry systems, could not have used an outdated map for such a complex and high-risk military operation. The Chinese government immediately argued that the bombing of the Chinese embassy had to be “deliberate” and severely condemned the “barbaric attack and a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty” (Eckholm, May 8 th , 1999, The New York Times). President Jiang Zemin, having been under 199 tremendous pressure and criticism within the CCP for being too weak and soft in handling China’s foreign policy and relations with Taiwan (Shirk, 2007), refused to take calls from President Bill Clinton during the initial days of the crisis. The incident was not resolved until President Clinton made repeated apologies to the Chinese people. Most western analysts argue that the nationalist protests were fanned by the Chinese government – a traditional top-down approach. Some believe that Beijing took advantage of the bombing incident to divert the public’s attention away from the Falungong protests (which had just happened less than a month ago) and the upcoming tenth anniversary of June 4 th . For example, some argue that the government silently signaled a green light for students to go onto the streets of major Chinese cities and even in some cases bussed students to protest destinations (Shirk, 2007). Beijing also did not report President Clinton’s public apology in the state controlled media, fanning the flames of nationalism and allowing more public protests against the NATO and the U.S. in particular. However, the analysis by Peter Gries (2005: 128) suggests that the 1999 Embassy Bombing protests were actually “an overwhelmingly bottom-up phenomenon; the Party had its hands full simply responding to the demands of popular nationalists”. Unlike in most previous cases of public demonstration where the government would normally use repressive means to control the public, the public reaction to the Chinese Embassy Bombing was overwhelming. Beijing feared that “water can support a boat, but it can 200 also flip it” (see Gries, 2005: 129). Gries believes that the protests were not fanned by the Beijing government, because Chinese overseas in the U.S. and Europe, for example, also put up major demonstrations outside China. Gries (2005) suggests that Beijing’s shift from the traditional suppression to co- optation or even accommodation indicate the emergence of a new popular nationalism in China. This has been previously underestimated by most analysts. Since then, the CCP has struggled to keep up with popular nationalist demands. In order to maintain its legitimacy, both the CCP and the government must take popular demands seriously. To avoid losing control over Chinese nationalism, the CCP must listen to the opinions of the public, even though in a different way from a democratic regime. This finding fills the gap left in Chapter Five with regard to the relationship between China’s internal relations and China’s Taiwan policy. On the surface, China’s Taiwan policy appears to be only decided by top political elites. In reality, however, Beijing increasingly has been paying more attention to the public’s opinion regarding Taiwan due to the growing popular nationalism. This trend is further illustrated by another case on a different substantive issue. Crisis in Tibet and the Anti-China Olympic Torch Relay, 2008 The Chinese welcomed the year of 2008 with great enthusiasm as Beijing would soon host the long-waited Summer Olympic Games in August. The opening ceremony of 201 the Beijing Olympic Games is scheduled to be held at 8:08pm on August 8th, 2008. The number “8” symbolizes luck and prosperity in the Chinese culture. Therefore, the government particularly picked 8 minutes past 8 o’clock on 08.08.2008 as the opening time and date of the Olympic Games, hoping the Olympics would bring luck and prosperity to the nation – or at the very least hoping to promote that mind-set among the populists. Beijing hopes that the Olympic Games would not only bring economic opportunities to China, but also showcase China’s economic development and political stability as a peaceful rising power. Therefore, since the beginning of 2008, the promotion of the Beijing Olympic Games has been at the center of the state and world media. Unexpectedly, on March 15 th , 2008, on the occasion of the 49 th anniversary of the March 10 th , 1959 anti-Chinese Tibetan uprising, Tibetan monks took the streets of Lhasa and put up the largest protests in Tibet in two decades against the Chinese rule. Resistance to the Han presence in the Tibetan region has existed for a long time. The riots became extremely intense. Protestors set Han shops, businesses, government office buildings, and so on and so forth, on fire. Fatalities were reported to have occurred to both Tibetans and Han Chinese. Under the spotlight of the international media and in the midst of preparations for the Olympic Games, the riots in Tibet immediately put pressure on the Chinese government. Beijing sent troops into the region to restore order and meanwhile banned international journalists from traveling to the region. 202 Given China’s poor human rights record and restriction of foreign journalists to go into the region, China immediately drew international criticism regarding the way it had handled the crisis. Some analysts argued the crackdown in Lhasa and the control of information only reminded the world of the old repressive regime. Less than ten days later, on March 24 th , 2008, the Beijing Olympic Committee took over the Olympic torch in the Panathenaikon Stadium at Olympia, Greece. The handover ceremony officially started the around-the-world torch relay. Tibetan supporters interrupted the ceremony and demonstrated against the Chinese rule of Tibet. 126 And between March 24 th in Greece and throughout the entire torch relay route outside China, Tibetan supporters tried on numerous occasions to interrupt the relay by extinguishing the torch. Security became a nightmare at each city the torch visited in Europe and North America. In some cases, such as London and San Francisco, torch bearers had to be sandwiched in between walls of local security and police officers as Chinese supporters and Tibetan protesters gathered to protest. In most previous cases of anti-China demonstrations, both domestic and international incidents, the Beijing government would ordinarily choose to censor the reporting of such incidents. Because of the Summer Olympic Games, China has been under the international spot light since the beginning of the New Year. Moreover, the 126 Many argue the Tibetan Government in Exile had timed the anti-China riots in Lhasa to coincide the ceremony, hoping the Beijing government would compromise more under pressure not to ruin the Olympic Games. 203 widespread use of Internet in China forced the government to report the anti-Chinese riots in Tibet and the anti-China demonstrations (as well as demonstrations supporting the Olympic Games) along the torch relay route. 127 Chinese worldwide are outraged by the Tibetan protestors. 128 Han Chinese, in particular, have always perceived Beijing’s Tibet policy as a favorable economic liberation of the region, as Tibet has long been economically underdeveloped. Tibetans, however, have accused the Beijing government of conducting “cultural genocide” in Tibet (The 14 th Dalai Lama, 2008). The world immediately saw a major surge of Chinese nationalism. Domestically, people demonstrated across the country in various forms. Internet bloggers voiced strong opposition to the anti-Chinese Tibetans. Many Chinese expressed the belief that France did not handle the security of the torch relay well. People across China demonstrated against and boycotted the French supermarket chain Carrefour, causing many stores to shut down temporarily and forcing the Carrefour CEO, Jose-Luis Duran, to publicly deny any support to the Dalai Lama by his company and express support for the Beijing Olympic Games (Duran, 2008). Outside of China, Chinese students and residents overseas formed massive rallies along the torch relay route to show support for the Beijing Olympic Games and 127 Many citizens in China as well as the government also accused the Tibetan Government in Exile and the 14th Dalai Lama of encouraging the anti-Chinese riots to sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games. 128 This is mostly caused by the distorted media. 204 dissatisfaction with the anti-China Tibetan protestors. Chinese demonstrators also formed anti-CNN rallies in Los Angeles, Atlantic and Chicago to demand CNN commentator Jack Cafferty to apologize for his remarks referring to Chinese as “bunch of goons and thugs”. 129 Many ordinary Chinese have hoped that the Olympic Games could be an opportunity to show the world the economic success China has gained in recent years and results from hard work they have put into the preparation for the Olympic Games. The games have become a symbol of national pride and unity – a sign of strong Chinese nationalism. Therefore, the West should de-link the Games with politics, many ordinary Chinese citizens have argued. The popular demonstrations and demands of the Chinese citizens have caused fear among China’s political elites. They have to walk a fine line between not ruining the Olympic Games and accommodating citizens’ popular demands. As the power of the central government in Beijing becomes more decentralized, China no longer has the kind of charismatic strong leader such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who could suppress the opinions of the general public and carry out agendas of their own. 129 Jack Cafferty made the comments on April 9 on CNN’s political program, The Situation Room, in which he referred the Chinese as “goons and thugs” and described Chinese products as “junk”. He was later forced to apologize. 205 Today’s political elites have been forced to listen to the voices of the popular nationalists in order to ensure the party-state’s legitimacy of survival. 130 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS Several implications and conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above in regard to the relationship in the Taiwan Strait. The conventional idea that economic interdependence at the low politics level reduces the likelihood of conflict at the high politics level does not hold in the China-Taiwan case. Nationalism and identity change, and regime type and survival, are key reasons for the lack of spillover from exchange of people and products to political stability in the Taiwan Strait. Qualitative evidence from this chapter is consistent with the statistical findings from Chapter Four in this regard. The issue of Taiwan can no longer be solely viewed through the prism of national sovereignty and economic interests. From Taiwan’s perspective, evidence shows that “sociopolitical experience between Taiwan and China” has formed a “very real [and different] national identity for the people of Taiwan”; and “people in Taiwan act – collectively and individually – on the basis of this identity” (Brown, 2004: 241). This 130 For more discussion on this point, please see Gries (2005). Some would argue that popular nationalism does not arise out of vacuum. To some degree, nationalism would not have become so intense without the government’s silent blessing and support. So Beijing has certainly played an important role in the rise of China’s popular nationalism. 206 shift in national and social identities could be crucial, as they cannot be easily reversed back through further economic integration. The difficulty partially lies in Taiwan’s regime change. Taiwan’s recent democratization has not only made the potential solution of the Taiwan issue (unification with the mainland) increasingly more “outside of the control of the mainland leadership”, but also “outside the control of the individual leaders on Taiwan…” (Moody, 2007: 41-42) As Taiwan continues to democratize, “We [the Taiwanese] are not obliged to take any advice from China” (Eckhom, 2000); and the Taiwanese are “very unlikely to identify with an authoritarian regime” (Brown, 2004: 245). This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Chapter Four – electoral processes in Taiwan have become increasingly more important in shaping Taiwan’s mainland policy. What is more important, and even more surprising, is what the changes of nationalism and identity in mainland China have done to the cross-strait relations. Chinese nationalism can be characterized as “increasingly stronger”, as shown in the 1999 Chinese Embassy Bombing case and the 2008 Crisis in Tibet and the Anti-China Olympic Torch Relay case. One could argue that Chinese nationalism has largely been fanned by the Chinese Communist Party and government to ensure their legitimacy from a top-down approach. Evidence shows that Chinese nationalism has gradually become the product of a more popular-nationalist, bottom-up approach. Gries (2005: 133) cites Chinese author Jin Hui and argues that there are “two Chinas”: the Chinese people’s motherland and the ruler’s state. In China today, Chinese popular nationalists often challenge the state’s 207 hegemony over nationalism. “Nationalism has become even more central to state legitimation.” (Gries, 2005: 134) The issue of national unity (the issue of Taiwan in specific) is, among other things, a major way of ensuring the state’s legitimacy. Shirk (2007) has argued that the issue of Taiwan is essentially “a question of regime survival”; and no regime (party or organization) could survive the loss of Taiwan. If Taiwan was let go, then Tibet, Xinjinag and maybe even Inner Mongolia would follow suit too. The potential disintegration of the country would run against the hierarchical and state-centric world view that has guided Chinese rulers for thousands of years. During the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing and the 2008 crisis in Tibet and the anti-China Olympic torch relay, Chinese “popular nationalists gradually shifted from supporting the CCP to making demands of it” (Gries, 2005: 129). In spite of the fact that China is still a single party authoritarian regime, the CCP may be losing its ground to an increasingly powerful popular nationalism. The party-state must now listen to its citizens. This has been enhanced by more widespread free access to information and a relatively more collective decision making processes at the top level. 131 Shirk’s (2007) analysis shows that Jiang Zemin was widely criticized by hard-line party elites, top PLA generals and even citizens in the mid-1990s for being too soft and weak on Taiwan. This, Shirk argues, was partially 131 Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were strong leaders. But since Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China’s political decision making has been increasingly more collective. 208 linked to Jiang’s decision to authorize military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. This grand strategy of being tough on defending territorial unity has been confirmed by Taylor Fravel’s (2005) analysis of China’s regime insecurity and territorial disputes. Fravel argues that among three kinds of territorial disputes, China has been able to either comprise or maintain the status quo on “frontier disputes” and “offshore island dispute”, but stood tough on “homeland disputes”, namely the issue of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Issues involving homeland disputes are merely issues of regime survival. By all means China cannot afford to let Taiwan go independent without putting up a fight first. Now that preventing Taiwan from declaring independence has become an option, the government must take as China’s nationalism continues to grow into a national identity. Nationalism and identity change have now occurred in both mainland China and Taiwan. Cal Clark (2007: 86) argues that “the eruption of competing nationalisms in both China and Taiwan provides the primary reason for this fundamental disconnect between the growing social and economic integration between them, one the other hand, and the escalation of their conflicts in the security realm on the other.” As two separate nationalisms and identities continue to grow and Taiwan continues to democratize, this reality “might create a situation in which the mainland believes it must undertake a war it knows in advance to be disastrous and that everyone wants to avoid…” (Moody, 2007: 209 41-42). As a matter of fact, this has begun to happen. In 2006, China’s Congress passed the “Anti-secession Law”, which provides a legal framework to allow China’s use of force against Taiwan should the island declare independence in the future. The election of Ma Ying-jeou may bring about new opportunities for mainland China and Taiwan to improve relations in years to come. But both sides must realize the changes that have occurred, particularly changes in social identities. New thinking is required. While peace is possible in the Taiwan Strait, reunification might have become a more remote possibility. 210 Chapter 7 Findings, Reflections, and Implications for Cross-Strait Relations I set out at the beginning of the dissertation to answer several interrelated questions in regard to foreign policy analysis: What is the linkage between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy? If domestic issues do not stop at the water’s edge, how do domestic and international politics impact each other and how could the two policy domains, at home and abroad, be synthesized? Since almost half a century ago, two generations of foreign policy analysis scholars have tried to provide answers to these questions by examining issues at all levels: individual, nation-state and international system; and through different methodologies: both quantitative and qualitative. No consensus has been reached so far. Foreign policy analysis scholars have continued to call for the building of “middle-range” theories to bridge the gap between domestic and international politics (Rosenau, 1969; Levy, 1989). The study of foreign policy remains as a “two-level” game, with solutions regarding the balance between at home and abroad gradually being identified in various contexts. Moreover, existing studies of foreign policy analysis have a primary focus on Western democracies and major powers. The dramatic rise of China has made the formerly isolated communist state an absolutely key player in the arena of world affairs. After all, China now has twenty percent of the world’s population, fourth largest land mass, fastest growing economy, and a staggering demand for more energy in the near 211 future. Yet it remains an authoritarian regime. Just one hundred miles away from the Chinese mainland on the island of Taiwan, however, democracy has thrived, most notably in the last few decades. The Republic of China on Taiwan is now officially classified as a multi-party democracy (Hickey, 2007). As Taiwan consolidates its democratic transformation, it continues to be closely linked to mainland China in economic, cultural, historical and societal areas. In spite of the recent economic integration between Beijing and Taipei, the Taiwan Strait is among the most dangerous regions in the world in terms of the potential for future military conflict (Horowitz, Heo and Tan, 2007). The rise of China will not only have a major impact on the stability in the region, it will also have implications for the security and power structure of the entire world. Therefore, greater understanding of the foreign policies in the Taiwan Strait offers two major contributions. In regard to the foreign policy analysis in general, the study of foreign policy behaviors in the Taiwan Strait brings in two non-Western powers: China and Taiwan. The case of China-Taiwan, examined through both quantitative and qualitative lenses, is a significant addition to the general study of foreign policy. It examines how internal and external factors combine in the foreign policy making process. In this dissertation, the findings have general implications for foreign policy analysis at the cross-national level. Put differently, the study of foreign policy in the Taiwan Strait also contributes to broader theorizing about Chinese international relations and beyond. 212 In regard to the security and stability in the Taiwan Strait in particular, the dissertation makes two contributions. It offers empirical findings about conflict management in the context of diversionary theory, the effects of electoral process, and events data analysis. On the other hand, the dissertation raises normative implications about how changes of nationalism, identity and regime type affect the dynamics of interaction in the Taiwan Strait. In the following sections, I first will summarize the key findings of the dissertation, followed by reflections on major lessons and implications. Finally, I discuss some plans for future research. KEY FINDINGS In the context of the “two-level” game of foreign policy analysis, the dissertation project deals with several substantive issues as well as research methodology and the testing of middle range theories to further comprehend China-Taiwan relations and East Asian foreign policy. Chapter Two outlined the theoretical framework of the dissertation. I began with a brief review of the status of foreign policy analysis. I then discussed in greater detail the issue of linkage politics, the main theoretical framework of this dissertation. The discussion reveals that major progress has been made in the field of foreign policy analysis; however, gaps still need to be bridged. Among the many areas for improvement, 213 how to integrate country or region specific cases with the general study of foreign policy, how to synthesize different research methodologies, and how to further build middle- range theories to advance the field are still lacking progress. Given these weaknesses, I discussed the need to bring the case of China-Taiwan into the general confines of foreign policy analysis. The integration of the China-Taiwan cases will contribute to theorizing of foreign policy analysis in general. The systematic analysis of the China-Taiwan case in the context of foreign policy analysis will also shed light on the understanding of the decision making processes in the Taiwan Strait. To establish the premises of the discussion, in Chapter Three, I detailed the historical origin of the Taiwan Issue, namely how the issue was formed, the two different views held by Beijing and Taipei respectively, recent development in both mainland China and Taiwan, and the implications of the Taiwan issue in the context of regional security and global affairs as well as implications for the China-Taiwan-US trilateral relations. Sensible understanding about the Taiwan issue will help identify the research problems in Chapters Four, Five and Six. In Chapter Four, I examined the issue of diversionary theory in the context of China-Taiwan relations. Conventional wisdom argues that when leaders are in trouble at home, they may strategically redirect the public’s attention towards international crises for political purposes. If so, that would suggest that domestic factors rather than international concerns be the fundamental driving force behind leaders’ foreign policy 214 decisions at least some of the time. Most previous research on diversionary theory focuses on major Western powers. Researchers in this highly active area of investigation often use military action (such as the presidential use of force) as the indicator of attempted diversion of public attention away from home. I have used a variant of diversion, as just described, to transport the theory most effectively into a new setting. I created the President’s Independence Magnitude (PIM) variable, which measures Taiwanese presidents’ rhetorical intensity regarding the issue of unification or independence. PIM assesses political elites’ diversionary behavior in a manner appropriate for the weaker member of a dyad. Statistical analysis in Chapter Four revealed strong evidence for the Diversionary Hypothesis, namely, as the president’s popularity sinks, he is more likely to engage in pro-independence rhetoric. The presumed purpose is to divert the public’s attention away from problems at home and reverse his sinking job approval rating. Examples of that process in action include Chen Shui-bian’s 2000 Independence Referendum and the 2008 UN Referendum. In both cases, Chen strategically used the issue of Taiwan independence as a diversion away from his low job approval rating and other potential political problems. This strategic action, as just described, reveals that political leaders in Taiwan may choose to adopt a particular foreign policy stance (in this case, rhetoric regarding Taiwan independence) to address a specific domestic concern (in this case, declining approval ratings). Thus, for Taiwan, foreign policy decisions 215 sometimes are not reactions to real foreign policy issues or crises overseas but domestic concerns instead. Another key finding of Chapter Four is that electoral processes in Taiwan now play an important role in Taiwan’s politics and policy-making. Specifically, Taipei’s administration is better served when an opposition party plays an active role. Moreover, the more democratic Taiwan becomes, the greater say its public will have in the unification/independence debate. Taiwan’s mainland policy is no longer a one-level game like it was decades ago, when the KMT was running an authoritarian Taiwan. For example, when Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo were in power, Taiwan’s mainland polices were almost exclusively made by KMT elites. The public played little role, if at all, and the opposition voices were not only ignored but also repressed. As Taiwan gradually transformed into a more democratic system, its mainland policy has become a multi-level game. Domestic concerns rather than external demands or threats from the mainland are now the main driving force behind Taiwan’s foreign policy behaviors. The analysis in Chapter Five focused on the external determinants of foreign policy decision making. From aggregated events data, I created four key variables that measure China’s internal relations (China-China), China’s external relations with Taiwan (China-Taiwan), Taiwan’s internal relations (Taiwan-Taiwan) and Taiwan’s external relations with China (Taiwan-China). The statistical analysis showed that Taiwan’s 216 domestic political changes do have significant influence on China’s decision making towards Taiwan. The mainland either reacts to Taiwan’s overall mainland policy or internal policy changes due to Taiwan’s democratization. To be more specific, China reacts to Taiwan more favorably when Taiwan’s mainland policy is ‘nice’ and cooperative. When Taiwan plays tough, the mainland is forced to play tough as a response. Moreover, mainland China closely watches what goes on in Taiwan domestically, particularly Taiwan’s recent democratization process. It is fair to say that Taiwan’s continued effort to democratize has made mainland officials worried. Although Beijing still seems to be in a state of denial about the political changes that have taken place in Taiwan, mainland policy makers now take these political changes in Taiwan very seriously. Based on the analysis in Chapter Five, the mainland is not, however, making its policies towards Taiwan based on China’s internal concerns. China’s Taiwan policy is largely driven by external reasons. There are two primary reasons for this finding. First, the data gathered on China’s foreign policy behavior is somewhat limited. This is due largely to the fact that China’s foreign policy, including its Taiwan-related policy decision making, tends to be secretive. Authoritarianism itself makes China’s foreign policy decision making appear to be driven by external factor. Top foreign policy decision makers in Beijing have appeared to be reacting to Taiwan’s mainland policies 217 more often than policy decisions made by mainland officials to appease or accommodate the domestic public. The second reason is that the statistical analysis in Chapter Five does not take into account the issue of popular nationalism, political identity change and the party-state’s need for political survival. The events data used in Chapter Five do not explicitly control for these factors. This finding seems to be counterintuitive. James and Zhang (2005), for example, suggest Chinese foreign policy decision makers take domestic political costs seriously. When decisions are being made, political leaders first eliminate those unacceptable political options before using a rationality-based approach to evaluate the remaining options. Chapter Six addressed such seemingly unresponsiveness to domestic concerns. Chapter Five produced strong statistical evidence indicating that democracy has fundamentally transformed the relationship between Taipei and Beijing. The more Taiwan democratizes, the more likely Taiwan will react negatively to China’s pressure to reunify under the mainland’s terms. Both the people and government of Taiwan want to preserve the hard-won democratic transformation, making the return of Taiwan to mainland China under the “one country, two systems” framework less popular and thus less likely. Findings in Chapter Five also suggested that the relationship in the Taiwan Strait is strongly reciprocal. Beijing and Taipei have been playing a “tit-for-tat” game. 218 Cooperative behaviors from one side are often reciprocated with similar reactions from the other side. Peace in the Taiwan Strait may be possible if both sides follow this strategy and measures are taken to prevent defection. Finally, Chapter Five showed some signs of diversionary peace to accompany evidence of diversion of war found in Chapter Four. While facing instability (economical or political), leaders in Taiwan tend to be more cooperative with the mainland in order to avoid further escalation of domestic instability. For example, when Taiwan’s economy is in a downturn, leaders in Taipei may cautiously indicate to the mainland that help from China would be welcomed. When leaders are under pressure for one problem domestically, they are expected to have less incentive to open a “second front” with the mainland. Based on the statistical results from Chapters Four and Five, Chapter Six set out to synthesize the findings in the previous two chapters and seek alternative explanations for some unsolved problems. By focusing on two related issues: nationalism and identity change in both mainland China and Taiwan, I concluded that the two different regime types have transformed Beijing and Taipei into two fundamentally different manifestations of nationalism and identity. Democratization in Taiwan and the lack of political change in the mainland have created different social experiences from which new nationalisms and political identities took form. The changes regarding nationalism 219 and political/social identity have forever altered the dynamics of China-Taiwan relations. As a result, the potential for future reunification now seems a remote possibility. For Taiwan, being Taiwanese has grown into a unique cultural and national identity, which is fundamentally different from a Chinese national identity perceived by mainland Chinese. For China, the growing popular nationalism has been pushing the government in Beijing to react to the potential Taiwan independence more and more toughly. The party-state’s reaction to the popular nationalism has become a matter of regime survival. Beijing may be forced into a conflict with Taiwan; perhaps even with the US – the only likely defender of Taipei – even knowing the danger is imminent. Chapter Six explains why, in spite of the strong economic integration in the Taiwan Strait, political divergence has become ever stronger. The conventional wisdom that economic integration will “spill over” into political stability does not hold true in the case of China- Taiwan. Finally, Chapter Six shows that political elites in an authoritarian state do consider domestic politics when they make foreign policy decision. The opinion of the “attentive publics” has a strong impact on how the Chinese leadership makes both foreign policies and policies toward Taiwan (Johnston, 2006). Domestic dissatisfaction can be detrimental even in a single party state. To ensure legitimacy and survival, foreign policy decision makers must take domestic concerns seriously. However, the party-state may 220 make the decision making process appear to be more external driven by controlling the free flow of information and keeping the decision making process secretive. REFLECTIONS, LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS These lessons learned during the development of the dissertation project are concerned with the research program of diversionary theory in general, the implications of diversionary behaviors in the Taiwan Strait, the advantages and problems of events data, the significance of cultural, historical and social factors in understanding foreign policy, and the necessity to bridge different research methodologies. First, from the conventional diversionary theory’s perspective, political elites do sometimes have incentives to engage in diversionary behavior when they are in trouble at home. Existing studies of this strategic behavior have apparent limitations. In particular, the study of diversionary theory should not be limited to major western powers. Small and weak states or even non-democracies may initiate diversionary actions (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). More importantly, the format of diversion should not be confined to military action. Political elites may use non-military actions, such as rhetoric, as a means toward diversion. Second, as is evident from aspects of diversionary behavior in Taiwan, leaders in Taipei have used the issue of independence/unification as a strategic diversion from their 221 domestic problems. Political elites on the island do not appear to be consistently sincere about resolving the Taiwan issue; instead, they have been using this issue strategically for political purposes. Several lessons have been learned from the events data analysis in Chapter Five. On the one hand, events data allowed me to disaggregate foreign policy issues to the individual level. This events level unpacks the traditional holistic approach, which usually treats foreign policy decision making as if going through a “black box”. On the other hand, using events data also has revealed some problems. For example, the four key relationship variables in Chapter Five’s statistical analysis have been created by aggregating daily level events to the monthly level. During the process of quantification, certain aspects of foreign policy decision making may have been lost, such as the cultural, historical and social significance of those daily events. An appropriate interpretation of the statistical results requires taking those aspects into consideration. I have conducted an in-depth case analysis in Chapter Six to address these problems. The most important lesson learned through Chapter Six is that the positivist empirical analysis techniques as advocated by many scholars from the first two generations of foreign policy analysis are extremely valuable in helping understand the foreign policy decision making process. This remains true, in spite of the fact that normative and social theories and issues, such as the issues of identity and ideas, cannot be ignored either. Different social experiences regarding democracy in Taiwan and the 222 lack of it in China have shaped two totally different kinds of nationalism and political identity in these respective environments. These differences are now key reasons for the increasing political divergence in the Taiwan Strait. This observation calls for foreign policy analysis scholars to consciously take steps to consider cultural, historical and social significance of any given foreign policy issues when studying those issues in other settings. With regard to the third main actor in the Taiwan Strait – the United States, the dissertation reveals several issues of significance. A new national identity has begun to emerge in Taiwan. This change is likely to prevent Taiwan from accepting the “one country, two systems” framework and reunifying with mainland China. At the same time, the growing nationalism in China could force Beijing to act toughly towards Taipei. Should an escalation of conflict occur, it would not be in the best interest of the U.S. to entrap itself into a war between Beijing and Taipei. Currently, the major concern is not the U.S.’s intentional involvement in a potentially dangerous conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Rather, it is miscalculation that might tie the hands of both Beijing and Washington. Beijing, Taipei and Washington should keep their dialogs open. The U.S. should continue its current policy towards China and Taiwan. Ultimately, the Taiwan issue is best left to Beijing and Taipei to resolve. However, Washington can continue to play its deterrence card to help maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 223 The substantive lessons learned above naturally lead to the lessons learned about research methodology and beyond. As clearly shown in this dissertation project, quantitative and qualitative methodologies both possess unique advantages and disadvantages. Quantitative and qualitative research methodologies are indeed equally important tools in a “toolbox” regardless of what is being built (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; Gerring, 2004). They should be considered complementary to each other. In this project, quantitative research methodology identified some general patterns of foreign policy behaviors. Qualitative research methodology then helped synthesize these findings and provide more nuanced explanations of what emerged from statistical analysis. Foreign policy, all things considered, is the “hinge” of domestic and international politics (Hill, 2003). So far, the best way to further advance the subfield of foreign policy analysis is still through bridging the gaps between or among different levels of analysis and different subject matter through middle-range theory building and testing (Rosenau, 1966). The further expansion of diversionary theory in the context of China- Taiwan relations, the use of events data to analyze what would traditionally have been a country-specific and case-study-only China-Taiwan case, and the introduction of norms and ideas in regard to nationalism and identity change across the Taiwan Strait show that the building and testing of middle-range theories with different substantive issues and methodologies can be achieved. 224 PLANS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The space and time limit of the dissertation has prevented me from carrying out several tasks that would have made the dissertation project a stronger one. Regarding the diversionary theory project, several issues are of continued interest, including expanding the list of states to include non-Western democracies and small states as well as expanding the scope of diversionary behavior to include more forms of diversion. First, the study of diversionary theory should not be limited to Western major powers, such as the U.S. and UK. The case of China-Taiwan has shown that political leaders of non-Western can indeed initiate diversionary behaviors. So I plan to include different types of states in future study diversionary behavior. Building on this study, examining whether China engages in any diversionary behavior can be a good start. For example, some scholars (Johnston, 2006) have argued that the government in Beijing used the 1999 embassy bombing by NATO and the 2001 EP3 plane collision as diversions for potential protests for the June 4 th anniversaries. Second, the case of Taiwan in Chapter Four clearly showed that the form of diversionary behavior can transcend the military. In addition to the presidential use of force or engagement in military conflict, other forms of diversion may be used by political leaders as a means of diverting attentions. The dissertation shows that political rhetoric can be an alternative form of diversion, particularly for small countries that are 225 not capable of initiating a potentially costly military escalation. Thus, the immediate next step would be to expand the use of rhetoric as a form of diversion to study this form of behavior in countries other than Taiwan. Drury (2000 and 2001), for instance, shows that leaders can use coercive diplomacy, such as economic sanctions, to achieve foreign policy goals as an alternative to military conflict. The rationale is this one: if less costly sanctions can be used as an alternative, why start costly wars? Levy (1989) also points out that future research on diversionary theory should examine international behaviors short of war. Borrowing from this notion, I would like to examine whether economic sanctions (and other forms of coercive diplomacy strategy) can be used as a form of diversion. I also have an immediate plan for the events data analysis of China-Taiwan relations. The Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) project has just released an updated version of the events dataset. It includes data up to the present time. Additionally, on March 20 th , 2008, Taiwan finished its third direct presidential election. The events dataset for the present dissertation project only includes data up till the 2004 election. An immediate task is to add the 2008 presidential election to the newly released IDEA dataset to expand the analysis. Furthermore, the issue of nationalism and identity change as shown in Chapter Six has become a defining one for the social and political differences between mainland China and Taiwan. Brown (2004) asserts that the issue of Taiwan is fundamentally 226 cultural. The pro-unification president Ma Ying-jeou has already started to improve relations with the mainland by working on the issues of direct flight, further economic integration, and returning to the “1992 Consensus”, for example, to enhance the likelihood of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The change in power from a pro- independence DPP administration to the pro-unification KMT administration has again created a perfect “controlled experiment” to study the impact of nationalism and identity change on the relationship between Taipei and Beijing. I plan on studying the new KMT administration’s mainland policy in the years to come to examine whether the change of political party in power in Taiwan has an impact on the formation of the unique Taiwanese nationalism and identity on the island. This investigation will further help examine the argument that the Taiwan issue is all about cultural and identity change. Finally, the dissertation has relied on asymmetric data sources between China and Taiwan. Taiwan, perhaps being a democracy and because of the increasingly popular participation of its citizens in the multi-level game, has more open data sources for researchers to use. Data sources on China, in contrast, remain more limited. For that reason, I plan on conducting interviews and doing archival research in China to improve the quantity and quality of data on China. On a final note, I began with trying to answer several related questions of foreign policy analysis by examining the case of China-Taiwan. The project has not only allowed me to unpack the intriguing process of foreign policy making in the Taiwan 227 Strait, it has also opened many new windows of opportunity for further research. The field of foreign policy analysis is a vast and complex one. 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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation is intended to provide some insights on the conditions under which domestic and international factors, respectively, play in foreign policy decision making. Using linkage politics (Rosenau, 1969) and diversionary theory (Coser, 1956) as the main theoretical framework, this dissertation examines the two-level foreign policy decision making processes through the case of China-Taiwan. Empirical evidence suggest that political leaders in Taiwan have incentives to use non-military forms of diversion -- primarily verbal rhetoric on their respective positions of unification or independence with China, as a means of diverting attention away from Taiwan's domestic problems. This is a prime example of domestic determinants of foreign policy. At the same time, however, analysis through events data in the Taiwan Strait shows that the mainland China primarily makes its decisions toward Taiwan based on Taiwan's internal politics and Taiwan's political behaviors toward the mainland China, a prime instance of support for external determinants of foreign policy decision making. The events data analysis also reveals that the recent democratic transformation in Taiwan has made Taiwan's decision making a multi-level process. Domestic politics have become a main driving force behind Taiwan's foreign policy, including its policy toward the mainland. Nevertheless, the better understanding of the interplay of domestic and international politics must also take issues of cultural, historical and social significance into consideration. Changes of nationalism and political identity, resulted from the different social experiences formed by two distinctive types of political regime, cannot be ignored and must be taken into consideration when studying foreign policy decision making processes.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Li, Yitan (author)

Core Title A two-level analysis of foreign policy decision making: an empirical investigation of the case of China-Taiwan

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Politics

Publication Date 08/29/2010

Defense Date 08/07/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag China,diversionary theory,Foreign policy,International relations,OAI-PMH Harvest,Taiwan

Place Name China (countries), Taiwan (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor James, Patrick (committee chair), Cull, Nicholas (committee member), English, Robert D. (committee member), Lamy, Steven (committee member)

Creator Email liy@seattleu.edu,yitanli@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1583

Unique identifier UC1303266

Identifier etd-Li-2356 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-113062 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1583 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Li-2356.pdf

Dmrecord 113062

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Li, Yitan

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu