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U.S. Navy SEALs resilience needs assessment: an innovation study
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Content
U.S. Navy SEALs Resilience Needs Assessment: An Innovation Study
Daniel P. Luna
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education
May 2023
© Copyright by Daniel P. Luna 2023
All Rights Reserved
The Committee for Daniel P. Luna certifies the approval of this Dissertation
Susanne Foulk
Darline P. Robles
Adrian J. Donato, Committee Chair
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2023
iv
Abstract
The following case study utilized a performance gap closure protocol to support the development
of recommendations intended for increasing the organizational performance goal of improving
resilience for special operations forces. A review of the literature revealed essential resilient
practices specific to PTSD and identified influences that pertain to the stakeholders and the
performance goal. Perspectives and experiences of 94 inactive SEAL operators were gathered
via survey. Additionally, 12 inactive SEAL operators participated in interviews, and POTFF
documents were reviewed to complete data collection. The data were used to validate each
particular influence as an asset or need through triangulation. The study identified knowledge
(factual, conceptual, and metacognitive), motivation (extrinsic value, self-efficacy, and emotion),
and organization needs (culture models, policies and procedures, and resources) for a trauma-
resilience plan as it applies to Navy SEAL operators. Research findings revealed a clear
understanding of resilience education with all 16 influences and a lack of knowledge concerning
resilience and psychological trauma. The findings also identified the need for future research
pertaining to performance trauma through the experiences of other NSW and SOF members,
along with the development of specific implementation and evaluation plans. The lack of
specialized research within the SEAL community is destroying lives, families, and communities
(Stewart & Trujillo, 2020). The findings suggest the importance of a trauma-resilience plan
specific to stakeholder needs and offer strategies for developing trauma-resilience education as a
proactive measure for those that work in an environment classified as psychologically traumatic.
Rigorous triangulation regarding the resilience of SOF operators, particularly U.S. Navy SEALs,
with a magnifying focus on trauma, is the foundation of this study. The findings validate a need
for a plan that makes resilience specific to the needs of the stakeholder. Targeted goals for a
v
trauma-resilience plan must address the hard conversations that come from combat to include
guilt, shame, betrayal, fear, and grief to ultimately improve performance. Addressing trauma
factors with a resilience practice will improve operators' performance which ultimately reduces
the gap for this problem.
Keywords: KMO gap analysis, Navy SEALs, special operations, posttraumatic stress
disorder, resilience, performance, new world Kirkpatrick model
vi
Dedication
To my chair, Dr. Donato, and committee members, Dr. Foulk and Dr. Robles, for the
instrumental role they played in the development of this dissertation, sincerely, thank you. I will
be forever grateful for their mentorship.
To Dr. B. Christopher Frueh, Dr. Joe Thomas, and Thomas Kier for being academic mentors
who led by example, both personally and professionally, while also serving as guides for this
academic journey I extend my deepest gratitude.
To thank my mother, Patricia De Smet for the lifetime of love and support and continuing to be
an inspiration to me. I love you, Mom.
vii
Acknowledgements
This work arose from a 20-year career in the U.S. Navy SEAL Teams; 15 of those years
were actively engaged in or training for combat ... witnessing loss, heroism, and struggles that
might seem beyond human capacity. It must be acknowledged that my career and academic
accomplishments are only obtainable as a direct result of my faith. I was wounded in action in
2014, and a year later, I was transferred to the U.S. Naval Academy to complete my career.
While at USNA, in charge of preparation for future Navy officers, I was compelled by the
question of how to best educate trauma resilience, reduce mental health issues facing today’s
veterans and, in turn, help my SEAL brothers still in the arena. Especially those engaged by the
nature of their work—the forces of war—that is placed upon them in service to our Nation.
This research would not have come to life, first of all, without the support of first my
family. My wife has been a rock for me, not only in this research but through the years of combat
that breaks most families. As well, I am indebted for the support from my SEAL brothers, my
Sayoc brothers, the NSW community, the OCL cohort (specifically my research battle buddy,
Daniel Foley), and also supporting organizations, specifically the Naval Academy, SEAL Future
Foundation, Honor Foundation, and Navy SEAL Foundation. This journey would not have been
completed if I did not have the support of my employer and friend, Justin Douglas, the CEO of
Corvus. Navigating job responsibilities and simultaneously doing the volume of research and
writing necessary to finish this project on time only happened because of the support and
flexibility of his enterprise, one that has a heart for our U.S. military veterans. I thank you all.
A special shout out to my friend and writing coach, Mr. BGood, for his hours and
patience with me from the beginning of this academic journey. This work is ultimately dedicated
viii
to my “little brother” Brad “Cav” Cavner, who died during a parachute training accident. In
closing of this dedication, it only seems fitting to end with his toast:
To those before us
To those amongst us
To those we will see on the other side…
Lord, let me not prove unworthy of my brothers.
—Cav
Love you, Little Brother—I dedicate this work to you and the vision we often spoke
about doing together.
ix
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xii
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. xiv
Chapter One: Introduction ...............................................................................................................1
Organizational Context and Mission ...................................................................................2
Organizational Performance Status/Need ............................................................................4
Related Literature.................................................................................................................5
Importance of Addressing the Problem ...............................................................................6
Organizational Performance SMART Goal .........................................................................7
Description of Stakeholder Groups ......................................................................................8
Stakeholder Group of Focus and Performance Goal for the Study .....................................8
Organizational Mission ........................................................................................................9
Purpose of the Project and Questions ................................................................................10
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework ..........................................10
Definitions..........................................................................................................................11
Organization of the Study ..................................................................................................13
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature .........................................................................................14
Influences on the Problem of Practice ...............................................................................15
Approaches to Measurement of Trauma-Resilience for Navy SEAL Operators ...............34
Conceptual Framework ......................................................................................................37
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences on the Problem of
Practice ...............................................................................................................................39
Summary ............................................................................................................................57
x
Chapter Three: Methods ................................................................................................................59
Conceptual and Methodological Framework .....................................................................59
Overview of Design ...........................................................................................................62
Participating Stakeholders .................................................................................................63
Data Collection and Instrumentation .................................................................................67
Data Analysis .....................................................................................................................70
Credibility and Trustworthiness .........................................................................................71
Ethics..................................................................................................................................73
Role of Investigator............................................................................................................74
Limitations and Delimitations............................................................................................76
Summary ............................................................................................................................77
Chapter Four: Results and Findings ...............................................................................................79
Participating Stakeholders .................................................................................................80
Determination of Assets and Needs ...................................................................................85
Results and Findings for Knowledge Needs ......................................................................86
Results and Findings for Motivation Needs.....................................................................130
Results and Findings for Organization Needs .................................................................147
Additional Findings .........................................................................................................162
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................165
Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations........................................................................170
Organizational Performance Goal....................................................................................170
Description of Stakeholder Groups ..................................................................................171
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study ..................................................................171
Purpose of the Project and Questions ..............................................................................172
Overview ..........................................................................................................................172
xi
Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences ..........................................173
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan ..............................................................190
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach ....................................................................209
Limitations and Delimitations..........................................................................................211
Future Research ...............................................................................................................212
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................213
References ....................................................................................................................................215
Appendix A: Pre-Interview Recruiting Communications............................................................233
Appendix B: Information Sheet for Exempt Research ................................................................235
Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk ........................................................................................237
Appendix D: KMO Survey Protocol............................................................................................239
Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk ....................................................................................247
Appendix F: KMO Interview Protocol ........................................................................................249
Appendix H: Sample Survey Items Measuring Kirkpatrick Levels 1 and Level 2 Immediate
Evaluation Instrument ..................................................................................................................256
Please work through the form and check the relevant box. .........................................................256
Appendix I: Sample Blended Instrument for 35 and 90 Days Post-Training ..............................258
Please work through the form and check the relevant box. .........................................................258
Appendix J: Sample Data Analysis Charts ..................................................................................260
xii
List of Tables
Table 1: Definitions of Resilience 21
Table 2: Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences on Stakeholder’s Ability to Achieve the
Performance Goal 46
Table 3: Summary of Assumed Motivation Influences on Stakeholder’s Ability to Achieve the
Performance Goal 52
Table 4: Summary of Assumed Organization Influences on Stakeholder’s Ability to Achieve the
Performance Goal 57
Table 5: Data Sources 63
Table 6: Interview Question 1 Summary and Keyword Rationale 90
Table 7: Interview Question 2 Summary and Keyword Rationale 92
Table 8: Interview Question 3 Summary and Keyword Rationale 94
Table 9: Interview Question 4 Summary and Keyword Rationale 95
Table 10: Interview Question 5 Summary and Keyword Rationale 99
Table 11: Interview Question 6 Summary and Keyword Rationale 104
Table 12: Interview Question 7 Summary and Keyword Rationale 109
Table 13: Interview Question 8 Summary and Keyword Rationale 113
Table 14: Interview Question 9 Summary and Keyword Rationale 117
Table 15: Interview Question 10 Summary and Keyword Rationale 119
Table 16: Interview Question 11 Summary and Keyword Rationale 120
Table 17: Responses to Item: “Suppose You Were Asked to Apply Protocols for Implementing a
Trauma-Resilience Plan, After the Fact, What Would Be Some of Your Reflections? (Open-
Ended)” 122
Table 18: Interview Question 12 Summary and Keyword Rationale 124
Table 19: Interview Question 13 Summary and Keyword Rationale 126
Table 20: Interview Question 14 Summary and Keyword Rationale 128
Table 21: Knowledge Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data 129
xiii
Table 22: Interview Question 15 Summary and Keyword Rationale 133
Table 23: Interview Question 16 Summary and Keyword Rationale 136
Table 24: Interview Question 17 Summary and Keyword Rationale 139
Table 25: Interview Question 18 Summary and Keyword Rationale 142
Table 26: Interview Question 19 Summary and Keyword Rationale 145
Table 27: Motivation Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data 146
Table 28: Interview Question 20 Summary and Keyword Rationale 150
Table 29: Interview Question 21 Summary and Keyword Rationale 153
Table 30: Interview Question 22 Summary and Key Word Rational 157
Table 31: Interview Question 23 Summary and Keyword Rationale 160
Table 32: Organizational Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data 161
Table 33: Additional Performance Findings Determined by the Interview Data 164
Table 34: Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data
167
Table 35: Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations 174
Table 36: Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations 181
Table 37: Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations 186
Table 38: Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes 193
Table 39: Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation for Operators 195
Table 40: Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors of Navy SEAL Operators 197
Table 41: Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Program 203
Table 42: Components to Measure Reactions to the Program 205
Appendix G: KMO Document Analysis Protocol, 252
xiv
List of Figures
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 61
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework 61
Figure 3: Responses to Demographics Years of Military Service 81
Figure 4: Responses to Demographics Years Assigned to Naval Special Warfare 82
Figure 5: Responses to Demographics Level of Rank Obtained 82
Figure 6: Responses to Demographics Number of Deployments Over Your Career 83
Figure 7: Responses to Demographics Highest Level of Education Completed 83
Figure 8: Responses to Demographics Family Status 84
Figure 9: Responses to Demographics Having Heard of POTFF 84
Figure 10: Responses to Item: “What Is the Best Definition of Resilience? (Choose Only
One)” 87
Figure 11: Responses to Item: “What Is the Best Definition of Trauma? (Choose Only One)” 88
Figure 12: Responses to Item: “The Following Strategies Improve Resilience to Trauma in
Your Opinion (Choose Up to Five)” 98
Figure 13: Responses to Item: “What Kinds of Resilience to Trauma Fundamentals Did You
Learn While in the Teams? (Select All That Apply)” 102
Figure 14: Responses to Item: “What Are Important Strategies to Improve Resilience to
Trauma? (Select All That Apply)” 107
Figure 15: Responses to Item: “What Do You Think Are the Top five Important Categories
of Resilience to Trauma? (Choose Up to Five)” 111
Figure 16: Responses to Item: “In What Ways Have You Monitored Your Resilience to
Trauma? (Choose All That Apply)” 115
Figure 17: Responses to Item: “As an Operator, I Find It Useful for Me to Apply Resilience
to Trauma Skills by (Choose All That Apply)” 131
Figure 18: Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Believe in Your Ability to Identify
Key Factors in a Trauma-Resilience Plan? (Percentage Rating)” 135
Figure 19 Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Believe in Your Ability to
Implement Strategies of a Trauma-Resilience Plan? (Percentage Rating)” 138
xv
Figure 20: Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Feel Good About Identifying
Within Yourself Key Factors in Trauma-Resilience?” (Percentage Rating)” 141
Figure 21: Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Feel Good About Implementing
Strategies That Help You Become Resilient to Trauma? (Percentage Rating)” 143
Figure 22: Responses to Item: “I Trust in NSW for My Education in Resilience to Trauma
(Likert 5-Point Scale)” 148
Figure 23: Responses to Item: “NSW Consistently Provides Me With Clear Procedures
Toward Resilience to Trauma (Likert 5-Point Scale)” 152
Figure 24: Responses to Item: “NSW Provides Me Sufficient Money in My Budget to
Provide Education That Addresses Resilience to Trauma (Yes, No, or Not Sure)” 155
Figure 25: Responses to Item: “The Organization Provides Enough Money to Provide Me
With Educators for Resilience to Trauma (Yes, No, or Not Sure)” 159
Figure 26: Hypothetical Data Report Out: Percentage of Total Operators That Have
Produced a Trauma-Resilience Plan 208
Figure J1: Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Changes 260
Figure J2: Trauma-Resilience Training Implementation 261
1
Chapter One: Introduction
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and its ensuing impact—emotional and physical
suffering, family instability, drug addiction, and risk of suicide—has become a top health issue
facing returning war veterans (McNally & Frueh, 2013). Yet, despite the severity of this crisis,
PTSD treatment remains focused in a reactive prescription mode. Attempts by researchers have
failed to develop effective, preventative, resilience programs that could possibly reduce the
prevalence of PTSD among combat veterans. Accurate data collection can enhance the
effectiveness of program design, yet, as Forneris et al. (2013) stated, evidence-based programs to
treat PTSD are lacking. In 2016, the first empirical study demonstrating reduced rates of PTSD
and depression lowered healthcare costs was published (Vyas et al., 2016). This dearth of
research, particularly preventative/pre-trauma research, is of critical import; pre-trauma, that
timeframe before a potentially traumatic event, is also commonly referred to in terms of
prevention (Richardson et al., 2010; Skeffington et al., 2013; Vyas et al., 2016).
The consequences of ineffective treatment programs, specifically the lack of evidence-
based research on preventative resilience plan, is enormous. The lack of specialized research
within the SEAL community is destroying lives, families, and communities (Stewart & Trujillo,
2020). The consequences can range from high medical costs, e.g., approximately $3 billion
annually for veteran mental health services, and various social costs, mental and physical health
problems, family and marital instability, lost income/joblessness, alcoholism, drug addiction,
individual and family abuse, risk of suicide (Forneris et al., 2013; Vyas et al., 2016). Every
special operations force member that committed suicide in 2014 had sought treatment for
traumatic brain injury, which is also linked to PTSD (Shanker & Oppel, 2014). The paucity of
empirical research into the effectiveness of prevention programs is a primary obstacle to
2
establishing an effective PTSD curriculum and treatment, especially the need for evidence-based
trauma prevention research that can inform preventative PTSD resilience plans.
Organizational Context and Mission
The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the special operations
components of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. This organization was
established on April 16, 1987, at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. The USSOCOM is
tasked and responsible for coordinating strategy, interoperability, and capabilities of the various
special operations commands from the four military branches: U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW), Air Force Special Operations Command,
Marine Corps Special Operations Command, and Joint Special Operations Command. As of
2020, USSOCOM had approximately 70,000 active-duty, reserve, National Guard, and civilian
personnel assigned to its headquarters, four components, and sub-commands (Congressional
Research Service, 2021).
The NSW, one of the four special operation components of USSOCOM, is the U.S.
Navy’s multipurpose combat force. The U.S. Navy SEALs (named because of its fields of
operation: sea, air, and land) are the life force of NSW. The Navy SEALs, or SEAL Teams, are
responsible for a variety of special military operations in all global environments. The SEAL
Teams, a special operations force (SOF), are held to a high level of accountability on multiple
levels. The USSOCOM deems the people as their most precious asset, as General Thomas stated
in 2018 before the House Armed Services Committee (Thomas, 2018). In an effort to balance
operational tempo, boost resilience, time with the teams, and family time, USSOCOM developed
the Preservation of the Force and Family Program (POTFF), which was proposed in 2011 and
implemented in 2013 (POTFF Staff, 2021). Opening the mission statement for POTFF is a quote
3
from General Richard Clarke, Commander, USSOCOM, that “Most importantly, we are staying
true to our first SOF Truth—“Humans are more important than hardware”—by investing in our
people, ensuring a trusted, capable, diverse, and committed force that is ready to meet any
challenge” (POTFF Staff, 2021, p. 1). The objective of the POTFF program is to ensure the
physical, psychological, spiritual, cognitive, and social resilience of personnel serving within the
SOF community. As clearly stated in its mission statement: “The mission of the [POTFF] is to
optimize and sustain SOFs mission readiness, longevity, and performance through integrated and
holistic human performance programs designed to strengthen the Force and Family” (POTFF
Staff, 2021, p. 2).
SEAL Teams, an elite force, specialize in high-stakes missions in environments woven
with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The SEAL Teams, because of popular
missions like the rescue of Captain Phillips from Somali pirates in 2009 and the raid for Osama
bin Laden in 2011, have drawn both national and international attention. This attendant
awareness has brought some scrutiny to the SEAL Teams’ performance, both positive and
negative. Like any unit within a larger organization, the SEAL Teams must constantly evaluate
training programs to demonstrate and justify their effectiveness and value to the organization.
Such accountability is ubiquitous to all organizations and social systems (Frink et al., 2008) and,
if properly applied, can be a powerful tool for change, especially when combined with the new
Kirkpatrick model for change. The new world Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016) will maximize training and provide a chain of evidence communication regarding the
value of the training to the organization and stakeholders.
Currently, there are roughly 2,500 active-duty SEAL Operators, which make up less than
1% of all Navy personnel. Members of the U.S. Navy can apply for SEAL training between the
4
ages of 17 and 28, though special waivers are available through age 33. The current members
who oversee the organization are addressing race diversity within the SEAL Teams. The
majority of the teams are White males at 74%, next is Latinos at 8.8%, and African Americans
only make up 1.3% (Atlamazoglou, 2019). The basic operational SEAL unit is the platoon,
numbering approximately 16 men, these men, known as operators, may be divided into smaller
squads and fire teams as needed. Several platoons of operators, headquarters, and other elements
make up a SEAL team. Each team is assigned to a specific area of the world and may have a
specialized skill set. Active-duty SEAL Teams are components of either NSW Group One, based
at Coronado on the West Coast, or NSW Group Two, based at Little Creek, near Virginia Beach,
Virginia, on the East Coast. The Navy SEAL operator is the stakeholder of focus.
Organizational Performance Status/Need
Currently, in addressing the matter of PTSD as it regards Navy SEAL operators,
treatment is largely reactive, singular, and post-event. This treatment falls into two formats. The
first is an immediate, early intervention within 2 weeks of a traumatic event, and the second is
initiated later outside of the first two weeks. Both remain a post-event, reactive, treatment
approach to trauma to a singular event. Neither USSOCOM/POTFF nor NSW have a needs
assessment for adequately examining trauma treatment as prevention. Such a needs assessment
would set new standards of research and development by way of analyzing the following: how
operators’ resilience manifests as a process as well as an outcome; data contrasting singular or
cumulative events; assessment of trauma/resilience response over their military career; response
beyond their career exit. Clarity from the needs analysis would not just improve the performance
and health of operators; it would save lives and money as well as increase the effectiveness of
NSW and, in turn, USSOCOM and its organizational mission. An innovative approach would be
5
a needs assessment of cumulative trauma on Navy SEAL operators and how it affects resilience
outcomes throughout their career and beyond to improve USSOCOM’s resiliency education and
preventative plans for PTSD.
Related Literature
According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), trauma is “exposure to war as
a combatant or civilian, threatened or actual physical assault (e.g., physical attack, robbery,
mugging, childhood physical abuse), threatened or actual sexual violence, being kidnapped,
being taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war, natural or human
disaster and severe motor vehicle accidents” (p. 274). As a result of traumatic wartime events,
PTSD is now typically associated with veterans of wars but can also be seen in victims of other
traumatic events, revealing that the causes of PTSD are multifactorial. This disorder is among the
top health issues facing veterans from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf War, and
now cumulating in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, there has been an overall rise in PTSD
statistics (McNally & Frueh, 2013). The symptoms of PTSD are re-experiencing the event,
avoidance of anticipated triggers, and negative arousal. Those symptoms can also co-occur with
other disorders: depression, substance abuse, anxiety, marital issues, paternal issues,
unemployment, health issues, and suicide ideation/suicide (Freedman, 2019). A particular set of
healthcare challenges, coined operator syndrome, have been identified as specific to the special
operations communities (Frueh et al., 2020). The unique symptoms of Operator Syndrome
identified in SOF operators are traumatic brain injury; endocrine dysfunction; sleep disturbances;
obstructive sleep apnea; chronic joint/back pain, orthopedic problems, and headaches; substance
abuse; depression and suicide; PTSD; anger; worry; rumination and stress reactivity; marital
6
family and community dysfunction; problems with sexual health and intimacy; being on guard or
hypervigilant; memory, concentration, and cognitive impairments; vestibular and vision
impairments; challenges of the transition from military to civilian life; and existential issues
(Frueh et al., 2020).
Accurate information is crucial for researching resilience as a trainable protective factor
against PTSD/Operator Syndrome and designing a trauma-resilience plan to enhance SEAL
operators’ well-being (Seal et al., 2007). The USSOCOM posted a public internet request in
2020 to improve capabilities of human performance with resilience as a means to evolve mission
effectiveness (USSOCOM, 2020). Research reveals that building adaptive resilience with a
hybrid approach, mental and physical resilience, will equip operators for a variety of potentially
traumatic events, promoting military readiness (Nindl et al., 2018). A needs assessment survey
designed specifically for the SEAL operator’s resilience that assesses enhanced performance,
cumulative trauma exposure, long-term mental and physical health, and intellectual, behavioral,
and emotional capabilities will demonstrate if resilience is an area of focus to reach the goal of
an innovative ecosystem for human performance for USSOCOM.
Importance of Addressing the Problem
The USSOCOM already has programs for resilience in place, yet for their 2020–2030
special operations small unit dominance solution request, the organization still solicited public
recommendations for improving human performance specific to resilience. It is important for the
organization to implement this innovative needs analysis for a variety of reasons: First, to
demonstrate opportunities for performance evolution from current programs to future programs
for operator resilience. Second, to address trauma resilience and promote mental health in
operators for the length of their career and beyond. Third, to look at conceptualizations of
7
resilience processes and outcomes. Finally, to determine the effectiveness of a reactive or
intervention approach versus a preventative approach. Without the needs analysis, the
USSOCOM community might not obtain the unmatched advantage that the discovery and
development of an innovative approach would provide for special operations performance, as
well as promote mental and physical longevity for SEAL operators.
Organizational Performance SMART Goal
By May of 2023, 100% of NSW operators exiting the military within 1 year of service
will participate in research for PTSD prevention to assess the need for a resilience plan to
improve human performance. The USSOCOMM and NSW have partnered with Navy SEAL
operators to elevate resilience education to reduce capability gaps in mental and physical
performance to improve military effectiveness, quality of life, and longevity for the operators.
This research was not provided prior to this date. Hence, there has been a 100% increase in
research for enhancing psychoeducation regarding a resilience plan for USSOCOM. The
assessment of the operators will expose if there is a need for a PTSD prevention plan in relation
to USSOCOM’s solution request for a proposal that improves human performance resilience
capabilities. Using the evidence-based gap analysis framework, which examines the space
between the current organizational performance and desired results, will align with senior
leaders’ desired goals of improving human performance and the organization’s mission
statement. Without this needs analysis being applied, U.S. Navy SEAL operators’ mental and
physical performance and longevity are vulnerable, and, importantly, USSOCOM risks
jeopardizing obtaining an unmatched military advantage in securing its mission objectives.
8
Description of Stakeholder Groups
In researching the viability of a PTSD prevention plan for the military, particularly
focusing on resilience as a cornerstone, there are three stakeholder groups at the epicenter of
power. The stakeholder of focus is the U.S. Navy SEAL operator because operators are required
to perform at optimal levels of performance regardless of risk to accomplish organizational goals
for NSW and higher up to USSOCOM. These frontline operators are also primarily exposed to
wartime traumatic events compounding over the course of many years. The second stakeholder is
NSW because it is responsible for ensuring the SEAL operators are unmatched by their
adversaries at any time and under all conditions in alignment with USSOCOM ’s mission
directive to eliminate threats to the nation. The USSOCOM is the third stakeholder because they
are answerable to the nation ’s policymakers and must ensure that frontline SOF operators can
achieve and implement no-fail missions requiring the highest levels of human performance.
Stakeholder Group of Focus and Performance Goal for the Study
While all three stakeholders (USSOCOM, NSW, and SEAL operators) contribute to the
overall organizational goal of improving human performance with regard to resilience, it is
imperative to identify the Navy SEAL operators as the stakeholder of focus. They are integral to
carrying out the organization ’s mission of defending the nation. The operators are frontline and
most impacted by traumas of warfare. By identifying the organizational goal of improved
resilience and recognizing the operators ’ role in the organizational structure, a needs analysis is
necessary to assess how to design and apply a resilience program. The USSOCOM, NSW, and
the operators are all involved in this process. Operators will engage in semi-annual and annual
evaluations; program participation; officer and senior enlisted observational feedback; and self-
reporting surveys. Given the nature of their work, the stakeholder of focus is most impacted by
9
warfare. The ultimate risk is organizational vulnerability as well as inappropriately prepared and
inadequately supported resources. The USSOCOM deems the people as their most precious
asset. Navy SEAL operators, benefitting from the evolution of resilience plans, decrease the
organizational risk and are better positioned to fulfill their overall responsibility to win the war.
Organizational Mission
Below are excerpts from the SEAL Ethos (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2020b),
which is held as the SEAL operators’ mission statement. The statement is long. Therefore, the
excerpts utilized are to connect with USSOCOM’s human performance resilience objective.
I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My Nation expects me to be
physically harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If knocked down, I will get
back up, every time. I will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to protect my
teammates and to accomplish our mission. I am never out of the fight. We demand
discipline. We expect innovation. The lives of my teammates and the success of our
mission depend on me -- my technical skill, tactical proficiency, and attention to detail.
My training is never complete (paras. 8–11).
Naval Special Warfare Mission Statement
This portion of the mission statement from NSW addresses resilience and performance.
Our people will always be our competitive advantage. Our force and their families are
national assets. We invest deeply in all aspects of an individual’s professional and
personal development. We build strong, resilient families and support their long-term
success (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2020b, paras. 3–4).
10
Organizational Performance Goal
By 2024 100% of NSW, in tandem with USSOCOM, will have a trauma-resilience plan
to improve performance for SEAL operators.
Stakeholder Performance Goal
By May 2023, SEAL Operators will participate in the production of a trauma-resilience
plan. The performance gap is 100%.
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this project was to conduct a needs analysis in the areas of knowledge and
skill, motivation, and organizational resources necessary to reach the organizational performance
goal. The analysis began by generating a list of possible needs and then examining them
systematically to focus on actual or validated needs. While a complete needs analysis would
focus on all stakeholders, for practical purposes, the stakeholder to be focused on in this analysis
is Navy SEAL operators. Two research questions guided this study:
1. What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational performance needs
for U.S. Navy SEAL operators to produce a trauma-resilience plan?
2. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions to
those needs?
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework
“Increasing knowledge, skills, and motivation--and focusing those assets on
organizational goals--are the keys to success in the new world economy” (Clark & Estes, 2008,
p. 2). The knowledge, motivation, and organization (KMO) gap analysis method for evaluating
organizational performance and goals scrutinizes the space between current and preferred, or
desired, performance. To clarify the challenges and opportunities and correlate solutions for the
11
organization, this study was produced by personal knowledge and related literature to be
corroborated by surveys, interviews, literature review, document review or document analysis,
and content analysis. Research-based solutions will be recommended and evaluated
comprehensively.
Definitions
● Comorbidity: The simultaneous presence of two or more diseases or medical
conditions in one person (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
● Mental health disorder: clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition,
emotional regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological,
biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
● NICoE: National Intrepid Center of Excellence is a traumatic brain injury military
health. Facility.
● NSW: Naval Special Warfare operates under the direction of USSOCOM and is the
U.S. Navy’s multipurpose combat force for unconventional warfare, overseeing nine
teams divided into six platoons per team with 150 operators per team (Congressional
Research Service, May 6, 2021).
● U.S. Navy SEALs: Sea, air, and land combatants designated for special military
operations overseen by NSW command. There are nine teams divided into six
platoons per team, with 150 operators per team (Congressional Research Service,
2021).
● Operator: A military combatant who operates in every facet of unconventional
warfare, handling direct action missions, usually in small group units, against high-
12
risk and high-profile targets deep in hostile areas (Congressional Research Service,
2021).
● Operator Syndrome: The natural consequences of an extraordinarily high allostatic
load; the accumulation of psychological, neural, and neuron doctrine responses
resulting from the prolonged chronic stress; and physical demands of a career with
the military special forces (Frueh et al., 2020).
● POTFF: Preservation of the Force and Family
● PTSD: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
● Resilience: Resilience is described as the ability to withstand, recover, grow, and
adapt under changing circumstances (Bates et al., 2010) to improve operational
performance readiness: physically, spiritually, socially, and psychologically (LaCroix
et al., 2021).
● SOF: Special operations forces, military combatants (Army, Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps) who operate in every facet of unconventional warfare, handling direct
action missions, usually in small group units, against high-risk and high-profile
targets deep in hostile areas (Congressional Research Service, 2021).
● Trauma: Results from exposure to an incident or series of events that are emotionally
disturbing or life-threatening with lasting adverse effects on the individual’s
functioning and mental, physical, social, emotional, and/or spiritual well-being
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
● USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, activated in 1987 to oversee all
Special Forces operations for the U.S. military (Congressional Research Service,
2021).
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Organization of the Study
Five chapters are used to organize this study. This chapter provides the reader with the
key concepts and terminology commonly found in a discussion about resilience needs
assessment. The organization’s mission, goals, stakeholders, and the initial concepts of gap
analysis, adapted to needs analysis, were introduced. Chapter Two provides a review of the
literature surrounding the scope of the study. Topics of resilience needs assessments, innovation,
policy, and prevention will be addressed. Chapter Three details the assumed interfering KMO
elements as well as methodology when it comes to the choice of participants, data collection and
analysis. In Chapter Four, the data and results are assessed and analyzed. Chapter Five provides
solutions, based on data and literature, for addressing the needs and closing the performance
gaps, as well as recommendations for implementation and an evaluation plan for the solutions.
14
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
On the front of the Department of Veterans Affairs building in Washington D.C. hangs a
plaque with a guiding adage excerpt from the second inauguration speech of Abraham Lincoln,
16th president of the United States: “To care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his
widow, and his orphan” (Briggs, 2020, p. 325). Mindful words when considering the severity of
PTSD and its consequent costs (Bilmes, 2021). These human and financial costs have challenged
the U.S. military to find solutions beyond the initial path of reactive treatment that have perhaps
had better success in the civilian sector. One corner currently being recommended to, and
explored by, the military can be characterized as preventative under the heading resilience or
training for grit and hardiness. This is an effort to make soldiers and sailors resilient to stress by
focusing on symptoms and behavior—not causes—combined with an approach of holistic
wellness and positive psychology to enhance their functioning optimally in a combat
environment. From there, it is reasoned that the troops would also be more resilient to trauma
(Cornum et al., 2011; Meredith et al., 2011; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019).
This conflation of resilience to stress and trauma is likely erroneous. The inability of such
programs to quell the level and depth of post-event distress currently being experienced in the
ranks, particularly among SOFs and especially following multiple combat deployments, directs
us to address trauma resilience as it is related to, but distinct from, functioning optimally in the
midst of combat. Currently, there is a gap in Navy SEAL operator preparation, education, and
psychological training as regards becoming resilient to the potential traumas that stem from
combat and manifest post-event in a delayed reaction. The work environment for SEAL
operators revolves around traumatic organizational events: exposure to actual or threat of death;
serious injury; threatened or actual physical assault; being kidnapped; being taken hostage;
15
terrorist attack; torture; incarceration as a prisoner of war (Birur et al., 2017). The heightened
awareness of the individual, familial, community, and national costs of PTSD prompted an
increasing breadth of research, yet surveying this research exposed some gaps.
The following sections of Chapter Two provide a review of the literature, including
historical literary texts as well as the most current research and pertinent scholarly contributions
focusing on the military, psychoeducation, and mental health. There will be a review of Navy
SEAL operators’ characteristics; the evolution of trauma resilience as it relates to the operators;
research on resilience as it relates to trauma; the best practices of trauma resilience, existing
strategies for solving trauma resilience; trauma-resilience challenges for Navy SEALs;
approaches to measurements of trauma resilience for operators. These seven sections will be
followed by the explanation of the KMO influences lens used in this study. Next, the literature
review will turn attention to the Navy SEAL operator’s KMO influences and complete the
chapter by presenting the conceptual framework. This research in PTSD prevention to devise a
trauma-resilience plan is critical to effectively examining the instruments of mediation between
trauma in a known combative profession and resilience outcomes for those who have “borne the
battle.”
Influences on the Problem of Practice
Since the onset of the War on Terror in late autumn of 2001, special operations forces
have become one of the better-funded and more respected components of the U.S. military’s
defense of the nation (Schemmer, 2012). This appreciation of the need for unconventional
warfare and the ability to engage effectively in so-called low-intensity conflict was not always
present in the previous decades post-World War II (Halberstadt, 1993). In fact, special operations
were considered by many to be a kind of home for an undisciplined fringe of cowboys whose
16
high-risk and aggressive approach to living in general and battle in particular (Halberstadt, 1993)
often clashed with more conservative regulations that marked the conventional functioning in the
Army and Navy. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, it was considered career suicide to
choose the Special Forces (Dockery, 2004). During the Vietnam War, one was unlikely to make
it past becoming an Army colonel or Navy captain if assigned to special forces (Dockery, 2004).
Individuals who chose that career path did so as a calling out of their own desire to be the best of
the best and an enthusiasm to prove themselves against the highest standards of physical and
mental challenge (Halberstadt, 1993).
As part of the special forces, the Navy SEAL operators begin their careers with a rigorous
selection process which 80% of candidates will not pass (Couch, 2001). This training originated
in 1942, 6 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the designated Amphibious Scouts and
Raiders volunteers started training in beach reconnaissance in response to a projected need for
amphibious assaults in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters (Milligan, 2021), training first at
Little Creek, Virginia and then at Fort Pierce, Florida (Milligan, 2021). Soon, the Naval Combat
Demolition Units were focused on the European Theatre, and the underwater demolition teams
(UDT) were directed toward the Pacific (Milligan, 2021). The pressing need for protecting U.S.
Marines assaulting beaches, as well as the eventual D-Day attack at Normandy, had Navy Lt.
Commander Draper Kauffman assigned to establishing an accelerated combat curriculum for
demolition teams (O’Dell, 2000). At the suggestion of Kauffman, in July of 1943, he had the
Scouts and Raiders condense their 8-week training course into a 1-week introduction for 40
volunteers that placed the potential combatants in a 1-week series of 16-hour days of physical
duress. They lost 40% of their men in what became the first Navy SEAL Hell Week (Taylor,
1997).
17
This rigorous training, and the quality of volunteers who operated in the UDTs, continued
through the waters off of Korea, notably at Inchon (Schemmer, 2012). The value and relevance
of special warfare became highlighted with the rise of communist and anti-colonial insurgencies
throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Milligan, 2021). In particular, the ongoing war by
the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos against the Pathet Lao communists during the 1950s and
the victory by Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 made unconventional warfare paramount
(Schemmer, 2012). These qualities of military training for special tasks finally became
executively recognized with a presidential order in January 1962 when President John F.
Kennedy commissioned Team One and Team Two of the U.S. Navy SEALs (Milligan, 2021;
O’Dell, 2000). Advisors from the teams were sent over almost immediately, and by 1966 at least
six platoons rotating in and out of Vietnam (Whitney, 1971). An estimated 260 operators served
in Vietnam, and at the height of the war, there were about 150 men in country at any one time.
Deployments were usually 6 months in length, with many serving multiple deployments. The last
combat operation was in late 1971 (Whitney, 1971). The last SEAL advisor left in 1973
(Halberstadt, 1993).
Unlike conventional warfare during that era, which largely consisted of firing artillery
into a coordinate location or dropping bombs from 30,000 feet, contact with the enemy by Navy
SEALs was essentially up close and personal (Dockery, 2004). The SEAL units operated within
feet and inches of their human targets and had to kill at very short range, hand-to-hand, and react
without hesitation or be killed themselves. Often at night and in an extremely hostile terrain of
dense, mud-saturated jungle, this environment provided no reprieve (Dockery, 2004). The reason
for this lengthy overview of Navy SEAL operators in Vietnam is that, since the inception of the
teams, the foundational culture for operators and their training was forged by the Vietnam
18
experience (Dockery, 2004). This, in turn, informs the characteristics of individuals who serve as
Navy SEAL operators stemming from that cultural context.
The nature of unconventional warfare, with its dangerous and frequently unsung
missions, its expectation of close and direct lethal contact with the enemy, and highly demanding
training for that reason, requires an elite practitioner (McRaven, 2017). Men who made it into
these ranks have the following characteristics: determined, confident, competitive, dutiful, bold,
resolute, mindful of precision, honor, and perseverance (McRaven, 2017). Additionally, they
hold a desire to measure against high standards and expectations and clarity of purpose combined
with an ability to adapt and thrive under pressure. A strong sense of self-efficacy and autonomy
is woven with a love of family, respect for interdependency, and loyalty as key values with
specific allegiance to teammates and the teams (McRaven, 2017). In summary, these traits
appear to be a willingness to discipline oneself in a continuous effort to master and manifest
excellence.
The characteristics hewed by a willingness to excel are reinforced and magnified by the
bonds of a community. This community is one of like-minded brethren and a culture that
demands constant testing to remain on top of one’s skill set and focus. Even after passing
selection and being assigned to the Teams, the new members have even more intensive training
and schools with every rotation followed by near-constant deployments (Byman & Merritt,
2018). Such testing and training evolve from the knowledge that lives depend on exacting
standards being met and a foundational belief that Luttrell (2007) recounted:
The body can take damn near anything. It’s the mind that needs training … can you
handle such injustice? Can you cope with that kind of unfairness, that much of a setback?
19
And still come back with your jaw set, still determined, swearing to God you will never
quit? That’s what we are looking for. (p. 102)
This scrutiny is not just top-down, as it permeates the ranks, and the small size of the
SEAL Teams results in a unit cohesion known to the members as the brotherhood (Luttrell,
2007). This brotherhood is forged in combat and inspires a passion and care for those serving
alongside one another. The majority of the population will neither experience nor share the depth
of this self-imposed expectation.
Elucidating the characteristics of a Navy SEAL operator exposes the irony of the
predicament. The traits and qualities that are essential to operators’ success in selection, training,
and mission assignments might make them him vulnerable to having an onerous time navigating
traumatic events (Litz, 2007). A SEAL in combat potentially encounters numerous traumatic
events during a deployment, and a career SEAL has the potential to deploy over 10 times (Frueh
et al., 2020). Up to 30% of soldiers who have returned from combat do struggle with
psychological issues, and SOF members are less open in communicating their struggles with
mental health professionals (Park et al., 2017; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019).
The Evolution of Trauma-Resilience in Navy SEAL Operators
U.S. Navy SEAL operators are a unique group due to the nature of NSW and, therefore,
vulnerable to the occupational hazard of PTSD and the sequelae of ensuing pathologies
associated with PTSD. Since WWII, the UDT and the U.S. Navy SEALs have been on the
frontlines of combat, exposed to violence, death, and consequential injury (Couch, 2001). The
classified nature of their occupational tasks and high level of combat exposure means that the
circumstances and consequences are not widely studied, thus creating gaps in training solutions
from which this group would benefit (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). The need for realistic
20
education and training for SEAL operators to develop psychoeducation for trauma resilience will
most likely protect against the development of PTSD, depression, anxiety, adjustment disorders,
suicidal ideation, alcohol use disorder, risky behaviors, and general health problems (Green et
al., 2010; Vyas et al., 2016).
According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013), trauma is “exposure to
actual or threatened death, serious injury” (p. 271). Further clarification of trauma includes
exposure to war either as combatant or civilian, threatened or actual physical assault, threatened
or actual sexual violence, being kidnapped, being taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture,
incarceration as a prisoner of war, natural or human disasters or severe motor vehicle accidents
(APA, 2013; Birur et al., 2017). The definition of trauma taken from the DSM-5, the APA, or
Birur et al., demonstrates that, as a result of their profession, Navy SEAL operators are exposed
to known traumas. Additionally, upon further comparative investigation into the definitions, the
known trauma is not solely from battlefield exposure but may also occur in training.
There is currently no singular definition of resilience, medically or psychologically, that
is agreed upon (Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Shrestha et al., 2018). For
the purpose of this study and in accordance with POTFF, the definition of resilience will be the
same as provided in a recent publication from POTFF. Resilience is the ability to withstand,
recover, grow, and adapt under changing circumstances (Bates et al., 2010) to improve
operational performance readiness: physically, spiritually, socially, and psychologically
(LaCroix et al., 2021). The American Psychological Association defined psychological resilience
as one’s ability to bounce back and adapt in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats, or
even significant sources of stress (APA, 2013).
21
Resilience Definitions from studies relating to the problem of practice are in the table
below. Each definition addresses a stable quality when trauma or adversity is presented. The
definition that is used in research papers from the POTFF is the primary definition for the
stakeholder of focus, Navy SEAL operators. Table 1 shows various resilience definitions and the
authors.
Table 1
Definitions of Resilience
Author Definition
Agaibi & Wilson, 2005 (from
the Oxford English
Dictionary)
Resilience is the activity of rebounding or springing
back.
Connor & Davidson, 2003 Resilience embodies the personal qualities that enable
one to thrive in the face of adversity.
Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018 The ability to adapt to a new or challenging situation.
Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000 Resilience is a dynamic process wherein individuals
display positive adaptation despite experiences of
significant adversity or trauma.
Preservation of the force and
family
Resilience is described as the ability to withstand,
recover, grow, and adapt under changing
circumstances (Bates et al., 2010) to improve
operational performance readiness: physically,
spiritually, socially, and psychologically (LaCroix et
al., 2021).
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As per the definitions of both trauma and resilience, we can assert that resilience has a
crucial relationship to trauma in the degree it is either present or absent as a healthy response to
trauma. Bonanno (2021) has studied trauma and resilience for decades and noticed that, in the
aftermath of traumatic events, the majority of individuals have little to no residual long-term
effects from the event. As a result, these studies have led to the understanding that the events
themselves are not inherently traumatic but “potentially traumatic” depending on how the
individual internally responds to the event (Bonanno, 2021, p. 14).
Combining the two definitions of trauma and resilience (trauma resilience) results in
positive outcomes despite an individual’s exposure to a traumatic event (Bartlett & Steber,
2019). Additionally, it is important to note that resilience is usually divided into two distinct
sections: First, the process, which describes one’s ability to make it through, withstand, or adapt
to changing circumstances. The second addresses the outcome, the ability to “bounce back,”
recover, and grow from the changing circumstances (Litz, 2007; Segovia et al., 2012).
Combat is where soldiers are most likely to encounter multiple traumatic events; it is
sudden, intense, and life-threatening and is the most demanding enterprise physically,
emotionally, and mentally (Castro & Hoge, 2005). Combat trauma is known to have the highest
risk of delayed-onset PTSD and additional mental health concerns for veterans (Armenta et al.,
2018; Prigerson et al., 2001). Modern warfare operations occur in volatile, uncertain, complex,
and ambiguous environments that have characteristics of being set in extreme climates,
demanding, with sleep deprivation, cultural dissonance, physical fatigue, prolonged separation
from family, and the ever-present threat of serious bodily injury or death (Cornum et al., 2011;
Mastroianni et al., 2008; Nindl et al., 2018).
23
As a consequence of their vocational requisites, especially with multiple deployments,
Navy SEAL operators are at higher risk of possibly developing multiple mental health concerns
or comorbidities. The APA (2013) defined PTSD as an anxiety problem that develops in some
people after extremely traumatic events, such as combat, crime, an accident, or a natural disaster.
An additional concern more specific to the Navy SEALs is Operator Syndrome. Operator
Syndrome is described as the cumulative burden of prolonged chronic stress and extensive
physical demands that are the natural consequences of a career relating to military special forces
(Frueh et al., 2020). The syndrome frequently manifests as sleep disturbance, sleep apnea,
endocrine dysfunction, chronic pain, headaches, substance abuse, anger, family dysfunction,
hypervigilance, depression, and suicide ideation (LaCroix et al., 2021; Stewart & Trujillo, 2020).
Defining resilience as the absence of PTSD is narrow-minded and a disservice to
individuals suffering exposure to combat trauma and its severity and extensiveness (Agaibi &
Wilson, 2005; Litz, 2007). A more useful perspective is forging an investigation and ensuing
definition of the degree of substantive distress caused by the trauma and then evaluating the
extent to which daily functioning is compromised (Southwick & Charney, 2018). Or, inversely,
the extent to which an individual’s emotional fortitude and resourcefulness outweigh the
influence of liabilities (Litz, 2007).
Resilience Research As It Relates to Trauma
Psychological problems are not easily diagnosed and elude simple categorization. As of
the most recent count, there are a possible 636,120 diagnoses of PTSD with its various
subcategories, resulting in over 636,120 people sharing the same diagnosis and exuding various
symptoms (Bonanno, 2021; Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 2013). The study of resilience within
today’s modern warfare examines individuals who experience combat trauma but do not develop
24
PTSD (Hoge et al., 2007). Piecing together the puzzle of individual resilient responses has led to
the understanding that factors are functional, meaning that the same characteristic may be
protective in one situation and hazardous in another depending on the trauma severity, time since
exposure, and cumulative traumatic events (Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000; Masten, 2014). In recent
research, chronic guilt and shame have been linked to suicide risk for combat-exposed veterans
with and without the diagnosis of PTSD (Bryan et al., 2013; Vermetten & Jetly, 2018). For the
purpose of the Navy SEAL operator, it is important to have clear definitions of resilience,
trauma, combat and PTSD and how each one relates to the other. Combat-related PTSD is
missing elements such as guilt, shame, and anger (Vermetten & Jetly, 2018). It is difficult to
draw a broad conclusion for studying resilience in Special Forces (e.g., Navy SEAL operators)
because they are understudied and vary widely from traditional military forces (Meredith et al.,
2011).
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the U.S. military has been in two wars, Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Special operation forces make up 1% of the
U.S. military forces; however, during the course of these two wars, SOF sustained 85% of
combat fatalities (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). Unlike conventional warfare, which often
operates largely through tanks, planes, and ships, Navy SEALs are often behind enemy lines in
small units using guerrilla tactics requiring a unique intimacy with violence (Litz, 2007). Couch
(2001) described their transformative selection training from young men to warriors “as the
longest, toughest, most relentless military training in the free world” (p. x). Yet the selection
process is the easiest portion of the actual job of being a Navy SEAL operator. After training,
specifically for those that have been in service just before or since 9/11, the real work required to
dominate on the battlefields begins (Byman & Merritt, 2018). Due to the nature of
25
unconventional warfare, the Navy SEAL operator’s entire being—mind, body, and spirit—
requires a focus and flexibility that must be honed to the clearest calibration (LaCroix et al.,
2021).
Despite the intense rigor and thoroughness of training, these warriors are not impervious
to the impacts of combat. It was concluded in 2017 that SOF has nearly zero risk of suicide, yet
in 2018 suicide rates tripled; PTSD rates were double the rates of conventional forces (Rocklein-
Kemplin et al., 2019). The occupational exposure to trauma, deployment-related separation, and
psychological and emotional stress lead SEAL operators to the consequential sequelae of guilt,
self-loathing, self-handicapping, sabotaging/self-destructive behavior, poor self-care, anhedonia
and withdrawal (Litz, 2007).
Best Practices of Trauma-Resilience
The consensus of resilience research is that it is more than a concept. Resilience is a
practice that can have additional variables added over time, and these added factors may interact
to enhance resilience as the individual practices (Southwick & Charney, 2018). The earliest
works on resilience in terms of psychological injuries from war were adapted from child
psychology (Sinclair & Britt, 2013). From 2000 to 2010, resilience research in the general
population quintupled, and, for the military, resilience research numbers climbed 12 times over
the amount of past research (Sinclair & Britt, 2013). Resilience has been deemed essential to
producing a high-performing military and has the potential to inhibit psychological injuries that
might result from exposure to combat (Sinclair & Britt, 2013).
Efforts to prepare soldiers and sailors for modern combat must utilize task repetition in
training and promote resilience at the group and individual levels (Price et al., 2013; Sinclair &
Britt, 2013). The multidimensional practice of resilience training and education consists of
26
numerous characteristics that are altered through training (Bandura et al., 1982; Seligman et al.,
1988; Sinclair & Britt, 2013). Currently, the USSOCOM, through its sub-unit POTFF, bases its
resilience training regimen upon five pillars: spirit, cognitive, physical, social and family, and
psychological (LaCroix et al., 2021). This format adheres to a belief that non-static resilience
characteristics can be trained individually, within the family, community, and unit (Meredith et
al., 2011), as opposed to static traits that cannot be altered.
These non-static resilience factors that the military trains for do vary and have been
shown to improve resilience (LaCroix et al., 2021). Resilience skills can grow and develop, and
at times, require updates similar to updating software for a computer (Schiraldi, 2017). As a
result of the escalating complex and unpredictable operational demands, resilience training and
education for SOF members and their families is still evolving with the warfighter (LaCroix et
al., 2021).
Existing Strategies for Solving Trauma-Resilience
Current strategies for trauma resilience are valiant efforts revolving around known
protective factors of physical performance, hardiness and grit, social environments, behavioral
health treatment, spiritual practice, and cognitive enhancements. Each of these strategies falls
into place within the POTFF’s five domains of priority: physical; psychological; cognitive; social
and family; and spiritual (POTFF Staff, 2021). This integrated approach of composing and
addressing five aspects of the lives of soldiers and sailors emphasizes the holistic potential for
healing. The genesis of POTFF in 2011 primarily focused on improving resilience; however, in
2020, the request to make warfighters more resilient still remained (USSOCOM, 2020).
Physical fitness improves coping, positive affect, positive thinking, behavioral control,
hormone regulation, and neuroplasticity (Meichenbaum, 2012; Nindl et al., 2018). Special
27
operations forces across the military implemented various programs to improve physical
performance to increase resilience (Park et al., 2017). Strength and conditioning, nutrition, and
sports medicine are each taken into consideration to advance training, assist with recovery,
prevent long-term impact from injuries and, importantly, improve resilience (POTFF Staff,
2021).
Grit, as defined by Angela Duckworth, is finishing what you began and not allowing
setbacks to discourage you: “the passionate pursuit of long-term goals” (Duckworth et al., 2007,
p. 1087; Ledford et al., 2021, p. 4; Meichenbaum, 2012). The partner to grit in military training
is hardiness, which is defined as a daily cognitive persistence, openness to challenge, and how
one thinks about what is in their control (Sinclair & Britt, 2013). These two elements are thought
to contribute to individuals becoming more resilient or having positive processes and outcomes
in the face of difficult situations (Bartone et al., 2009; Ledford et al., 2021; Segovia et al., 2012).
For the SOF community, the combination of these three elements is important to train or ensure
the potential operator possesses known protective factors for those who perform in environments
with high and reoccurring stressors (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Ledford et al., 2021; Loftus et al.,
2020).
To promote mental and spiritual health, many SOF commands have embedded trained
clinicians (Cornum et al., 2011). Yet, as a result of stigmas associated with mental and spiritual
providers, physical health concerns, and risky behaviors, SOF personnel are less likely to report
problems in these areas (Cooper et al., 2020). Social aspects are divided into three categories:
family, unit, and community (Meredith et al., 2011). By promoting emotional ties,
communication, support, closeness, nurturing, adaptability, positive command climate,
28
teamwork, cohesion, belongingness, connectedness, and collective efficacy, the military has an
opportunity to promote resilience (Litz, 2007; Meredith et al., 2011).
The USSOCOMM provides resilience resources for an individual (physical,
psychological, and cognitive), as well as social and cultural resilience resources for managing
PTSD. The focus is to find support, meaning, purpose, and hope; reduce or eliminate current
hardships and stressors; and derive positive feelings from a various range of activities (Litz,
2007). Risk for PTSD mental and functional health problems are not only compounded by the
complexity of an individual’s cultural, economic, and social environments and also that some
individuals might not get the care they need or remain impaired after treatment (Kessler et al.,
1995; Litz, 2007; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019; Starr, 2019). These studies indicate that there
remains a need for pragmatic education and training to reduce the effects of traumatic exposure
with creative solutions to maintain the advantage for Navy SEAL operators (Agaibi & Wilson,
2005).
Trauma-resilience strategy, to provide treatment when necessary, must shift to a
proactive paradigm and not be based on the presence of pathology (Skeffington et al., 2013). The
lack of evidence-based, research-informed programs leads to superficial levels of understanding.
These broadly alluded to outcomes regarding PTSD and suicide hinder effective solutions
(Skeffington et al., 2013). Prevention education in the field of PTSD is relatively new and needs
larger sample sizes, baseline measures, measurement of traumatic exposure, and pathology of
PTSD and suicide (Skeffington et al., 2013). Evidence-based research and data provide an
opportunity not only for active-duty Navy SEAL operators but also for the military as a whole.
29
Trauma-Resilience Challenges for Navy SEALs
Navy SEAL operators face extenuating circumstances regarding trauma that are
compounded. There is an accelerated operational tempo of SOF forces combined with repetitive
combat deployments for extended periods and repeated exposure to trauma, sometimes followed
by a delayed onset of the emotional impact (Price et al., 2013). A brief respite before picking up
an intensive training regimen to prepare for deployment again is considered standard for
operators (LaCroix et al., 2021). Another layer of complexity and challenge in addressing trauma
resilience, for both definitions and solutions, is that researchers and military leaders are still on
the early side of presenting a cohesive perspective. Instead, the interplay of each challenge factor
provided an evolution of trial, error, and success, exposing the need for additional mitigation
efforts. Researchers and military leaders want to produce solutions, but factors such as the
academic infancy of resilience and a cloistered, silent community produce a gap in the research
on the SOF community (Dretsch et al., 2020; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019).
By 2007 the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
had engaged numerous task forces and commissions to promote psychological resilience in the
military (Meredith et al., 2011). The objective was to review the problems service members
encountered regarding PTSD and depression to identify viable solutions and protective factors
(Blackburn & Owens, 2015; Meredith et al., 2011). Protective factors are those elements that
make individuals resilient, but also there is the need to discern how understanding the protective
factors in one situation can be a risk factor in another (Masten, 2014). Some protective factors of
resilience that are currently in the military’s resilience training can, at times, actually be risk
factors. The Stockdale Paradox is the understanding that optimists are the bane of existence to
30
one under stress (Collins, 2001). An example of this is when optimists’ predictions do not come
to fruition; the optimist’s spirit is depleted (Southwick & Charney, 2018).
Traumatic experiences are subjective to the individual, meaning that the person who has
the experience must deem the experience to be traumatic to potentially be traumatized (e.g.,
mental disorder) by the event they experience (Bonanno, 2021). This research divulges that
events are “potentially traumatic,” resulting in the understanding that trauma is not a one-size-
fits-all (Bonanno, 2021, p. 14). Since the events are deemed potentially traumatic, then the
potential is also there for the event to not be traumatic (Bonanno, 2021). The significance of this
assertion is in recognizing that what the individual makes of an experience can be influenced
through education and training in the military’s combat and training programs (Southwick &
Charney, 2018). This opens the door to promoting resilience objectives emphasizing prevention
as opposed to intervention as a reactive treatment. Also, a combat environment is classified as a
traumatic environment.
Trauma exposure for SEAL operators can lead to conditioning that is consistent with
pathological anxiety, fear, and trauma-related symptoms (Zoellner et al., 2020). Predatory
imminence theory (Fanselow & Lester, 1988; Perusini & Fanselow, 2015; Zoellner et al., 2020)
examines the brain and body as it begins to coordinate defensive responses to perceived or actual
threats with anxiety, fear, and even panic. Three timeframes of trauma have the potential to
contribute to an increase of or resistance to traumatic conditioning: pre-trauma, peritraumatic,
and posttraumatic (Zoellner et al., 2020). At the core of PTSD development, maintenance, and
acceleration dwells fear. Adding to the construction is that fear-based responses are critical to
understanding and developing survival skills from reflexes or reactions to adaptive responses
(Zoellner et al., 2020).
31
When addressing trauma resilience for Navy SEAL operators, it is invaluable to
comprehend that outcomes relating to combat exposure often have a delayed onset that could
slowly worsen over time (Armenta et al., 2018; Bonanno, 2021; Litz, 2007). Characteristics to be
aware of are susceptibility toward suicide and tendencies toward risky behaviors, often already
connected to individuals that select high-risk by nature, as exemplified by high-risk careers
within military occupations such as Navy SEAL operators (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019).
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Delayed Onset
Research on prior service members has shown that combat exposure was not associated
with PTSD after 1–6 months; however, after 2 years, there was a relationship between combat
exposure and PTSD (Litz, 2007; Southwick et al., 1995). This outcome solidifies that combat
PTSD is linked to chronic PTSD symptoms. Longitudinal studies have shown that men who have
reported combat as their worst trauma are more likely to have lifetime PTSD (Prigerson et al.,
2001). Symptoms of PTSD fall into one or more of these categories: Intrusive thoughts, avoiding
reminders, negative thoughts and feelings, and arousal and reactive symptoms (Stewart &
Trujillo, 2020).
Operator Syndrome
Navy SEAL operators are rarely representative of the general population of the United
States, and they are not even representative of the general population of the U.S. military.
Instead, they are a highly self-selecting group of military service members who endure intense
training, high attrition rates, and mission requirements that separate them into their own
category. As a result of their selection process, training, occupational education, and experience,
these service members also develop a unique set of symptoms (Frueh et al., 2020). The list of
symptoms that plague SOF members is extensive:
32
Traumatic brain injury, endocrine dysfunction, sleep disturbance, obstructive sleep apnea,
chronic joint/back pain, orthopedic problems, headaches, depression, substance abuse,
suicide, PTSD, anger, stress reactivity, marital/family/community dysfunction, sexual
health and intimacy, memory issues, concentration and cognitive impairments, and
diminished vestibular functions, and vision problems. (Stewart & Trujillo, 2020, p. 8)
Every SOF member that committed suicide in 2014 had sought treatment for traumatic
brain injury (Shanker & Oppel, 2014). The lack of specialized research within the SEAL
community destroys lives, families, and communities (Stewart & Trujillo, 2020).
Peritraumatic
Combat-related peritraumatic stress reactions are different stress-associated behaviors,
manifesting as emotional, cognitive, and physiological symptoms that present during and
immediately following a traumatic event (Agorastos et al., 2013). Examples of peritraumatic
factors include fear of dying, fear of losing emotional control, tachycardia, sweating, shaking,
dizziness, dissociative symptoms, reduction of awareness, depersonalization, derealization,
emotional numbness, dissociative amnesia, out-of-body experiences, emotional numbness, and
altered time perception (Agorastos et al., 2013; Thompson-Hollands et al., 2017). Peritraumatic
dissociation that leads to negative thoughts about self can lead to PTSD and is the only
maladaptive posttraumatic condition to display this relationship between negative thoughts about
the self, PTSD and peritraumatic distress (Thompson-Hollands et al., 2017). Education and
training regarding these symptoms can mitigate the risk and promote a faster recovery if
peritraumatic stress reactions occur in combat environments (Castro & Hoge, 2005; Hoge et al.,
2004).
33
Moral Injury
Shay (1994) presented a compelling case of the insidious aspect of moral injury that
haunts many individual combatants who, as individuals, see themselves as perpetrators either for
acting or failing to act, as they did in war, and therefore carry the moral taint of guilt or shame.
Shay contended there is another moral aspect that combatants may incur when individuals see
themselves as victims. The description of the victim includes betrayal or abandonment by the
action or inaction of people in command, leaders both political or military, or people they
trusted. Shay’s description correlates directly with the definition of moral injury: perpetrating,
bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and
expectations (Litz et al., 2009; Wisco et al., 2017). Evoking the aspect of moral injury that these
veterans feel (shame, guilt, and betrayal) can aid in comprehension of the powerful bond
between service members in combat together, and how combat trauma can produce various
injuries beyond the physical (Grossman & Christensen, 2004; Shay, 1994). Litz (2007)
establishes that PTSD diagnosis fails to capture the consequential conditions that impact combat
veterans.
Shay (1994) captured a portion of consequential conditions, “we can never fathom the
soldier’s grief if we do not know the human attachment which battle nourishes and then
amputates” (p. 39). The layers and interwoven nature between SEAL operators’ mental health
and combat exposure, in particular as it manifests in relation to trauma and resilience, is that each
component is a moving target, and the arsenal to secure each varies. Examining the multiple
indicators at various points from the beginning of a career for baselines, during the career, and
post-career would be invaluable to researchers and future SOF members to assess a clear path for
education and training over time (Frueh et al., 2020; Wisco et al., 2017). Moral injury and
34
Operator Syndrome are not currently recognized as mental health issues; however, there is a
pressing need for study and illumination of both to seriously mitigate and reduce the harm of
unsealed combat trauma.
Approaches to Measurement of Trauma-Resilience for Navy SEAL Operators
Psychological trauma or PTSD, like resilience, can be difficult to define and measure.
Currently, there are over 600,000 various combinations that can be diagnosed as PTSD
(Bonanno, 2021). As well, according to the 2011 RAND report on resilience in the U.S. military,
there are 122 definitions of “resilience” (Meredith et al., 2011). This multitude of definitions and
scales of measurement presents a specific challenge to, and a necessity for, accurately defining
and measuring trauma resilience, especially when applied to such a unique and hard-to-reach
population like Navy SEAL operators.
Measuring trauma resilience for Navy SEAL operators has historically been conducted
by POTFF through USSOCOM’s Needs Assessment survey, also called Wave Assessments
(Dretsch et al., 2020), in line with POTFF’s mission statement to sustain “readiness, longevity,
and performance through integrated and holistic human performance programs” (POTFF Staff,
2021, p. 2). These appraisals were a critical tool for helping military leaders better understand the
needs and well-being of military members and their families under their command (USSOCOM,
2017). Conducted annually from 2012 until 2017, there have been five iterations of this survey,
and this holistic approach has included various validated scales, such as Insomnia Severity Index
and the Friendship Scale (Johnson & Baker, 2019).
Several POTFF programs use the holistic approach, working to build resilience for the
entire SOF (Johnson & Baker, 2019). Yet the question arises of building resilience to what?
Relatively new, the Predictive 6-Factor Resilience Scale (PR-6) utilizes resilience literature to
35
develop a questionnaire, basing the questions on neurobiological models connecting resilience to
specific areas of the brain (Cox, 2020; Rossouw & Rossouw, 2016). This type of measurement
for the SEAL operator has the potential to address preventative targeted programs to build
resilience to trauma. In turn, what is the relationship of these resilience programs to PTSD and its
measurement? The PTSD Checklist (PCL-5) used to measure PTSD is a self-reporting survey
assessing the presence and severity of PTSD through a 20-item questionnaire about problems
people sometimes have in response to a very stressful experience (Weathers et al., 2013). The
PCL-5 can be used to quantify and monitor PTSD symptoms over time and corresponds with the
DSM-5 criteria for PTSD (Johnson & Baker, 2019).
The Brief Resilience Scale (BRS), a self-report measure used in each Wave assessment,
consists of six items measuring resilience as the ability to bounce back after an adverse event.
POTFF assessed that this scale performed best psychometrically when compared to other scales.
According to Windle et al. (2011), the BRS, the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC),
and Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA) received the highest ratings in a methodological review of
resilience measurement scales. However, how each scale measured resilience varied slightly. The
BRS aims to measure resilience as an outcome and the ability of an individual to bounce back.
While the CD-RISC takes the perspective that resilience is a personal competence of 25 items to
establish reference values for resilience that reflects an adult individual’s ability to cope with
stress (Connor & Davidson, 2003). The RSA evaluates intrapersonal and interpersonal protective
factors that could assist adaptation (Windle et al., 2011). Despite these three assessment
protocols’ effectiveness in the general population, the best way to measure resilience for SOF
soldiers and sailors who operate in high-stress environments remains unclear (Ledford et al.,
2021).
36
Little is known about the healthcare needs of SEAL operators (Frueh et al., 2020).
According to Frueh et al. (2020), SOF operators face a variety of medical issues ranging from
emotional and social issues that are not properly captured through psychometric tools diagnosing
depression or PTSD. A unique combination of medical, psychological, and behavioral needs
described as Operator Syndrome has been identified for this population. Mature SEAL operators
face significant health and quality of life challenges from chronic stress and career physical
demands. The Operator Syndrome Scale is a 17-item scale that examines difficulties that some
people who serve in SOF experience (Frueh et al., 2020). This study also found little evidence of
PTSD in its prototypical form. None of the operators in this study attributed fear or avoidance
reactions related to their combat experience, though they experienced many traumatic events
(Frueh et al., 2020). Most of the operators instead communicated a sense of enjoyment from their
combat deployments.
The management and expression of anger were recognized as a common problem, along
with using alcohol as a common practice to cope with pain, depression, loss, and sleep issues
(Frueh et al., 2020). Operator Syndrome (Frueh et al., 2020) also found three common existential
issues found in SOF operators: a mindset that discounts the future, loss/grief/survivors’
guilt/meaning of killing, and fear of developing “invisible wounds.” These invisible wounds
come from a collective pattern that is more pronounced in SOF operators than in conventional
forces (Litz, 2007; Litz et al., 2009). Operators deal with prolonged chronic stress inherent in a
SOF career (Frueh et al., 2020). A SOF career can wear down the mind and body, manifesting in
a wide range of impairments: substance abuse, depression and suicide, PTSD, anger, worry,
rumination, and stress reactivity (Frueh et al., 2020).
37
These maladaptive behaviors as a response to traumatic events add to the complexity of
measuring trauma resilience for SEAL operators. Thus far, the varied scales for measuring
resilience, including the top three cited in Windle et al.’s study (2011), have focused on factors
and resources for the general population. For example, in CD-RISC, the measurements have
generally focused on protective factors or resources from personal traits along with coping styles
(Connor & Davidson, 2003). Another challenge for measuring trauma resilience is that, for
some, the absence of PTSD in an individual is considered a feature of resilience. Yet, we know
that PTSD for civilians is different from military veterans, and PTSD is different for veterans
with combat exposure versus those without (Dretsch et al., 2020). Navy SEALs are known for
hardiness and resilience and, though SEAL operators are proven resilient and hardy in combat,
the NSW community is still suffering from operators committing suicide, dealing with PTSD,
and a complexity of other health issues (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019).
The study of resilience is currently trending toward a growing focus on health promotion
and well-being while shifting focus away from pathology, risk factors, and problem orientation
(Connor & Davidson, 2003). The assumption is that as resilience increases in the adult civilian
population, it is believed that the suicide risk will correspondingly decrease, but the military has
yet to see substantive positive results from this approach over the past 10-plus years of various
well-being and health programs (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). For SOF personnel, a focus on
pathology, risk factors, moral injury, and negative experiences, scales/measurements is a more
compelling direction to effectively examine the unique phenomenology of trauma resilience.
And this is essential (Litz et al., 2009; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019; Vermetten & Jetly, 2018).
Conceptual Framework
38
Clark and Estes’s (2008) needs analysis framework will be adapted for this innovation
study to examine the current gap in performance for Navy SEAL operators as it relates to a
trauma-resilience plan. It is vital for Navy SEAL operators to research the prevention aspects of
a trauma-resilience plan for a variety of reasons. As a result of their combat role, Navy SEALs
work in known traumatic environments. Subsequently, a trauma-resilience plan can provide clear
objectives and goals to propel the organization forward with readiness, longevity, and
performance in mission accomplishment (Clark & Estes, 2008; POTFF Staff, 2021). Within the
SEAL Teams, as a result of exponential variables as they relate to the behavior, environment,
and individual operators, the organization must develop an adaptability mindset and be open to a
variety of options regarding the dynamic, convoluted skill set of trauma-resilience (Benight &
Bandura, 2004). Consequently, SEAL operators’ and the NSW’s outcomes will be successful if
the organization’s mission and performance goals align (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Designing a trauma-resilience plan for Navy SEAL operators requires an examination of
clear objectives and structure for reducing mental disability, structure and objectives that will
result in an evolution of performance and longevity for said operators. Without this plan, SEAL
operators and the organizations that support them will be exposed to wasteful spending,
ambiguous objectives, and suboptimal resilience as it impacts their mental health (Clark & Estes,
2008). A thorough inquiry and examination will focus on the gaps in KMO processes to identify
the need for a trauma-resilience plan for Navy SEAL operators (Clark & Estes, 2008; Malloy,
2011).
39
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivation and Organizational Influences on the Problem of
Practice
Upon initial consideration, the U.S. Navy seems the least likely branch of the military to
produce commandos that rank at the top of the world’s SOFs (Milligan, 2021). Yet the canon of
literature on unconventional warfare agrees that the U.S. Navy SEALs are, worldwide, the elite
of the elite. Despite, or perhaps because of, the heights these warriors have scaled, this group of
highly skilled professionals, the U.S. Navy SEALs, are not immune to the wounds of combat
exposure. It is important to recognize the distinct skills required of this specific group of
professionals and not allow blame to be shifted to the operator when critiquing mental health
needs (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). The methods, principles, and procedures of KMO gap
analysis will be applied by considering existing literature about best practices necessary to create
a trauma-resilience plan for the U.S. Navy SEAL operator to mitigate the effects of trauma from
combat.
Knowledge and Skills
In 2019 it was noted that approximately 8–17% of combat veterans were diagnosed with
PTSD and that SOF suicide rates in 2018 were triple the number of deaths by suicide occurring
in 2017 (Frueh et al., 2020; Richardson et al., 2010; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). To counter
this trend, it is imperative that Navy SEAL operators and NSW, as organizational stakeholders,
advance their knowledge of best practices in psychoeducation for trauma resilience specific to
combat through factual, conceptual, procedural, and metacognitive knowledge in anticipation of
future challenges (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Clark & Estes, 2008). The goal of having
inactive SEAL operators participate in the production of a trauma-resilience plan for active-duty
Navy SEALs relies on the belief that NSW and SEAL operators themselves can best determine
40
how to achieve their performance goals with clear communication and by the dissemination of
critical information (Clark & Estes, 2008; Malloy, 2011). Clark and Estes (2008) discussed that
enhancing knowledge and skills need to happen when the stakeholders anticipate that future
challenges will require novel problem solving.
Factual Knowledge Influences
Factual knowledge refers to knowing the definitions and facts about specific content,
essentially, the known information (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). Also, factual knowledge
entails remembering small bits of isolated details. This type of knowledge is for specific
contexts, foundational information, and particular details relating to the area of study (Anderson
& Krathwohl, 2001). Assessing factual knowledge is needed for SEAL operators to effectively
support NSW’s development of resilience objectives with research-based definitions, planning,
and measuring strategies.
Navy SEAL Operators Know Facts About Trauma-Resilience Strategies. SEAL
operators must comprehend clear facts about trauma, resilience, and trauma resilience as it
pertains to combat and its related education. Said facts and definitions are based on literature and
military culture to clarify mission outcome and understanding and production of trauma-
resilience strategies (Bates et al., 2010; Birur et al., 2017; Castro & Hoge, 2005; Litz, 2007;
Southwick et al., 1995). In a 2011 report by the RAND Corporation, more than 120 definitions of
resilience were taken into account, and the report noted that the first step needed for building
programs is a carefully composed definition as it applies to the military (Meredith et al., 2011).
By defining resilience appropriately, senior military leaders and policymakers would not only
reduce confusion on program objectives but also provide the clarity that would serve as a means
41
to produce measurable impacts (APA, 2013; Cox, 2020; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Meredith et
al., 2011; Rossouw & Rossouw, 2016).
Navy SEAL Operators Know What the Elements Are to Implement for a Trauma-
Resilience Plan. The operators must know the action plan and essential elements of putting the
plan into practice for trauma resilience. Knowing the difference between proactive, intervention,
and reactive strategies will provide clear direction for planning programs for developing stronger
psychological resilience for and from education as it relates to processing trauma sourced in the
arena of combat (Bartlett & Steber, 2019; Nindl et al., 2018; Price et al., 2013). This is important
for the operator’s knowledge to understand if and when symptoms arise. The operators must
have knowledge of specific elements to ensure readiness, mission accomplishment, and
monitoring of whether SOF members are fit for combat (Stewart & Trujillo, 2020).
Conceptual Knowledge Influences
Conceptual knowledge focuses more on general concepts. This form of knowledge
requires a more complex structuring of one’s knowledge (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). For
educators, the distinction between factual and conceptual knowledge is understood when
students can take what they have learned to apply it in new situations and everyday life
(Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). Conceptual forms of knowledge are classifications, principles,
generalizations, theories, models, and/or structures that apply to a particular subject specialty
(Clark & Estes, 2008). Case in point, if SEAL operators do not understand the repercussions of
not having a trauma-resilience plan, they cannot effectively implement the preventative
principles.
Navy SEAL Operators Are Able to Classify Trauma-Resilience Principles. Navy
SEAL operators organize the knowledge into applicable components in preparation for
42
utilization within potentially traumatic combat environments once they clearly understand the
relationships and aspects of trauma, resilience, combat, and the consequential mental health
concerns (Blackburn & Owens, 2015; Bonanno, 200, 2021; Bonanno et al., 2007; Frueh et al.,
2020; Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 2013; Green et al., 2010; Masten, 2014; Meredith et al., 2011;
Segovia et al., 2012; Southwick et al., 1995. Knowing the difference between proactive
exposure, intervention, and reactive measures taken, both cumulatively and over time, will shape
how SEAL operators carry through strategies from education to conceptual application for
trauma-resilience plans (Cornum et al., 2011; Forneris et al., 2013; Sinclair & Britt, 2013; Vyas
et al., 2016). Current resilience training for SEAL operators focuses on resilience processes to
make it through potentially traumatic combat situations and not the resilience outcomes which
may happen months or years later and would occur after a perceived traumatic experience that is
known in their specific occupational environment (Bonanno, 2021; Segovia et al., 2012).
Understanding comorbidities is also essential for developing appropriate trauma-resilience
program plans of action (Agorastos et al., 2013; Frueh et al., 2020; Johnson & Baker, 2019;
Richardson et al., 2010).
Navy SEAL Operators Can Structure Strategies for a Trauma-Resilience Plan. For
culturally relevant psychoeducation, SEAL operators must conceptually grasp the core tenets of
trauma-resilience, cultural competence, and training of protective factors (Benight & Bandura,
2004; Byman & Merritt, 2018; Meredith et al., 2011; Nindl et al., 2018; Park et al., 2017). Navy
SEAL operators need to know how to educate, train, and apply the new knowledge with the
practice of the skills required in the face of traumatic environments to have more resilient
outcomes for performance evolution (Bartone et al., 2009; Cornum et al., 2011; Schiraldi, 2017;
Sinclair & Britt, 2013; Thompson-Hollands et al., 2017). Navy SEAL operators need to know
43
structure in the form of preventative or forward-looking resilience-specific programs for trauma
resilience (Cox, 2020; Rossouw & Rossouw, 2016).
Navy SEAL Operators Can Categorize Protocols for Implementing a Trauma-
Resilience Plan. Operators know specific details and elements for implementing and
accomplishing their performance goals. Navy SEAL operators must fully embrace conceptual
knowledge that produces and applies trauma-resilience strategies circulating through individual,
family, unit, and community (LaCroix et al., 2021; Meredith et al., 2011). To categorize the
relationships between those four components, the operators need to focus specifically on
strategies that correlate their emotions, environment, and behaviors (Armenta et al., 2018;
Bandura, 1989; Bandura et al., 1982; Benight & Bandura, 2004; Prigerson et al., 2001). Each
operator is able to incorporate the best practices in training and education relevant to the
sequence, spacing, and stability that produce illustrations of conceptual knowledge attainment
(Bonanno, 2021; Frueh et al., 2020; Sinclair & Britt, 2013; Weathers et al., 2013).
Implementation is important because the performance outcomes for the operator will impact their
mental health in both the short and long-term (LaCroix et al., 2021; Stewart & Trujillo, 2020).
Metacognitive Knowledge
Metacognitive knowledge is a form of knowing about one’s own learning and the ability
to control, monitor, and regulate your own cognitive processing (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001).
Cognitive processing is divided into six orders of thinking skills ranging from low to high:
remember, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and create (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). The
cognitive process categories show that knowledge is not only based on the facts, but one is able
to retain and comprehend the learning (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). The greatest
understanding of knowledge is obtained when a student can utilize what they have learned in
44
their lives (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). Applying metacognitive knowledge allows the
stakeholders of focus to examine circumstantial factors relating to trauma resilience.
Comprehensive mastery of what physically and mentally is occurring in traumatic environments
will be achieved through metacognitive knowledge, thus improving performance for operators.
Mastery of metacognitive knowledge is strategic and reflective (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001).
This particular knowledge is exhibited in problem solving and cognitive tasks and includes
contextual and conditional understanding (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001).
Navy SEAL Operators Plan Their Approach and Monitor Progress on Trauma-
Resilience. The operators must be able to plan their approach to trauma resilience by keeping a
continuous record of its progress and quality. The SEAL operators need to develop preventative
metacognitive practices concerning their own biases, beliefs, and values regarding stigmas,
behaviors, vision, support, and cohesion (Castro & Hoge, 2005; Cornum et al., 2011; Fanselow
& Lester, 1988; Hoge et al., 2004; Hoge et al., 2007; Meichenbaum, 2012; Meredith et al., 2011;
Perusini & Fanselow, 2015; Zoellner et al., 2020). Self-awareness and evaluation regarding
mindsets, mental agility, strength of character, and connections will produce the best practices
for quality alignment and continuous progress for highly impactful leaders and operators to
become trauma-resilient (Bonanno, 2021; Cornum et al., 2011; LaCroix et al., 2021;
Meichenbaum, 2012; Meredith et al., 2011; Segovia et al., 2012).
Navy SEAL Operators Can Reflect on Protocols for Implementing a Trauma-
Resilience Plan. The final knowledge influence of metacognitive needs challenges the SEAL
operators’ ability to contemplate ways in which this education will be used. Navy SEAL
operators will need this regular education to ensure a stable foundation for their trauma
resilience. However, the strategies may not be necessitated right away and will depend on their
45
perception and exposure to combat trauma (Bonanno, 2021; Collins, 2001). Navy SEAL
operators, as part of the complexity of the organizational maze of military structure, have the
responsibility of implementing performance evolution plans that evaluate to identify strengths
and weaknesses for areas of improvement (Castro & Hoge, 2005; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018;
Meredith et al., 2011). Resilience programs are not new to the military. Efforts for
implementation need to consist of evaluating current programs to develop areas of targeted
education, essentially answering “resilient to what” for specific goal accomplishment and
analysis (Hoge et al., 2007; Meredith et al., 2011). According to Masten (2014), an analysis of
strategies and measures will identify the strengths and weaknesses of current resilience programs
with two techniques of person-focused and variable-focused studies. Person-focused studies
examine individuals as single cases where similarities and differences are compared and
aggregated where groups of individuals with like conditions are compared (Masten, 2014).
Variable-focused studies examine empirical efforts based on variations of characteristics,
relationships, and environments of individuals (Masten, 2014). As a result of improvements,
statistical tools can be utilized with more patterns and even combinations of person and variable
studies to examine more data on resilience for strengths and weaknesses (Masten, 2014).
Table 2 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.
46
Table 2
Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences on Stakeholder ’s Ability to Achieve the
Performance Goal
Assumed knowledge influences Research literature
Factual (terms, facts, concepts)
Stakeholders know facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
APA, 2013; Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001;
Bates et al., 2010; Bartlett & Steber, 2019;
Birur et al., 2017; Bonanno, 2021; Castro &
Hoge, 2005; Clark & Estes, 2008; Cornum et
al., 2011; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Frueh et
al., 2020; LaCroix et al., 2021; Litz, 2007;
Malloy, 2011; Mastroiann et al., 2008;
Meredith et al., 2011; Nindl et al., 2018; Price
et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2010; Rocklein-
Kemplin et al., 2019; Shrestha et al., 2018;
Southwick et al., 1995
Stakeholders know what are elements to
implement for a trauma-resilience plan.
Bartlett & Steber, 2019; Cox, 2020; Nindl et al.,
2018; Rossouw & Rossouw, 2016; Stewart &
Trujillo, 2020
Conceptual (categories, models,
principles, relationships)
Stakeholders are able to classify trauma-
resilience principles.
Agorastos et al., 2013; Anderson & Krathwohl,
2001; Blackburn & Owens, 2015; Bonanno,
2004, 2021; Bonanno et al., 2007; Clark &
Estes, 2008; Cornum et al., 2011; Forneris et
al., 2013; Frueh et al., 2020; Galatzer-Levy &
Bryant, 2013; Green et al., 2010; Johnson &
Baker, 2019; Masten, 2014; Meredith et al.,
2011; Richardson et al., 2010; Segovia et al.,
2012; Sinclair & Britt, 2012; Southwick et al.,
2014; Vyas et al., 2016
Stakeholders can structure strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan.
Bartone et al., 2009; Benight & Bandura, 2004;
Byman & Merritt, 2018; Cornum et al., 2011;
Meredith et al., 2011; Nindl et al., 2018; Park
et al., 2017; Schiraldi, 2017; Sinclair & Britt,
2013; Thompson-Hollands et al., 2017
Stakeholders can categorize protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan.
Armenta et al., 2018; Bandura, 1989, 2003;
Bandura et al., 1982; Benight & Bonanno,
2021; Frueh et al., 2020; LaCroix et al., 2021;
Meredith et al., 2011; Sinclair & Britt, 2013;
Stewart & Trujillo, 2020; Weathers et al., 2013
47
Assumed knowledge influences Research literature
Metacognitive (reflect, monitor, improve
on knowledge in new ways)
Stakeholders plan their approach and
monitor progress on trauma resilience.
Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Bonanno, 2021;
Cornum et al., 2011; LaCroix et al., 2021;
Meredith et al., 2011; Meichenbaum, 2012;
Segovia et al., 2012
Stakeholders can reflect on protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan.
Bonanno, 2021; Castro & Hoge, 2005; Forbes &
Fikretoglu, 2018; Collins, 2001; Hoge et al.,
2007; Masten, 2014; Meredith et al., 2011
Motivation
Value will be added for Navy SEAL operators by receiving motivational support that
focuses on closing the KMO gap, which, in turn, increases performance, adding exponential
value to the force, and reduces the cost of health care needs (Clark & Estes, 2008; Vyas et al.,
2016). Motivation is the product of combining the above steps with respect to one’s own utility
value, self-efficacy, emotions, and attributions in regard to moving the organization toward
achieving its goal (Clark & Estes, 2008). Future motivational goals for organizational change
require removing the focus from past negative events and countering with a culture of realistic
beliefs and expectations and encouraging trauma-resilient practices (Clark & Estes, 2008;
Collins, 2001; Litz, 2007). Three sides of motivation examination require understanding active
choice, persistence, and mental effort (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011).
Active choice is when someone makes the choice to or not to implement a solution or
goal (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011; Schunk et al., 2009). Persistence is when the solution or
goal is no longer pursued when as a result of other temptations or distractions that are less
important than the other more pressing goal (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Mental effort
addresses solving a new problem that requires investing in novel approaches, unanticipated
48
mistakes, and under/overconfidence awareness (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). As
knowledge directs the operator in their personal experience and the how-to of performance,
motivation steps, in turn, inform the operators in sustaining forward progression and dictate how
much effort to expend (Clark & Estes, 2008; Cornum et al., 2011). Producing self-regulated
learners who have acquired experience and can apply their knowledge in real-world situations is
the educational objective (Dembo & Seli, 2000; Rueda, 2011; Rueda & Dembo, 2006)
Utility Value
The long-term value benefit of trauma-resilience education for SEAL operators is in their
ability to manifest career longevity and optimal behavioral health. This ability evokes the best
engagement and performance for the operators’ motivation, both mentally and physically (Clark
& Estes, 2008). The belief in the utilization of trauma-resilience education will be what gets the
operators moving toward their goal and keeps them on the correct path (Clark & Estes, 2008).
The operator’s having scientific understanding and being inspired to utilize their knowledge
practically will improve the outcomes for performance (Pintrich, 2003). The active choice of the
operators to apply learning to develop critical behaviors is impacted by their understanding of the
benefits and how to apply the new knowledge (Rueda, 2011; Schunk et al., 2009). The longevity
of behavioral alterations will depend on operators’ persistence. Persistence depends on direct
commitment over time to the knowledge obtained despite obstacles (Mayer, 2011; Rueda, 2011;
Schunk et al., 2009). It is important to note that when students have a great belief in their
abilities, their efforts are increased. These mental efforts are required to obtain new knowledge
(Mayer, 2011; Pintrich, 2003).
The utility value influence examined here was that Navy SEAL operators find it useful
for themselves to utilize key factors in trauma resilience. SEALs do not choose comfort or lose
49
interest in their pursuit of ongoing and evolving goals (Price et al., 2013; Shanker & Oppel,
2014; Sinclair & Britt, 2013). However, they are able to recognize the importance of career
longevity through prevention education, reducing susceptibility to mental and physical health
injuries sustained in combat/training (Cooper et al., 2020; Green et al., 2010; Grossman &
Christensen, 2004; Nindl et al., 2018; Segovia et al., 2012; Shay, 1994; Shrestha et al., 2018;
Weathers et al., 2013; Windle et al., 2011; Wisco et al., 2017). The personal benefits of operating
as a Navy SEAL are apparent in the requirements for completing the transformative training,
tasks, missions, and continuing education (Castro & Hoge, 2005; Couch, 2001; LaCroix et al.,
2021; Luttrell, 2007; Milligan, 2021; Price et al., 2013).
Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is one’s judgments of abilities to arrange and follow through with the steps
that are indispensable to attain specific levels of performance (Bandura, 1997). The greater the
self-efficacy of operators, the more likely they are to persist with the task related to trauma
resilience. Realistic expectations for operators will highlight relevant belief in their capacity and
reduce unrealistic expectations for performance attainment (Benight & Bandura, 2004). The
level of confidence is directly related to self-efficacy, which also impacts the stakeholder’s
capabilities and engagements regarding specific goals (Bandura, 1997). The gap analysis will
focus attention on present levels of performance and desired education, thus providing insightful
requests for trauma-resilience plans.
Navy SEAL Operators Believe in Their Ability to Identify Key Factors in a
Trauma-Resilience Plan. Navy SEAL operators believe in their ability to apply best practices to
mitigate the trauma of combat with curriculum, instructions, and participation in ongoing
education. Enhancing operators’ self-efficacy is crucial to refining and improving performance
50
through appropriate training solutions as a result of personal insights from experience (Bartone et
al., 2009; Castro & Hoge, 2005). To accomplish full trust, an effective trauma-resilience plan
will require a specific SOF curriculum, time, material, financial support, and trained specialists
(Bilmes, 2021; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Forneris et al., 2013; Vyas et al., 2016). The belief
that stems from this trust will improve efforts, persistence activity, and positive self-efficacy
resulting in greater learning (Bandura, 1997; Pekrun et al., 2002).
Navy SEAL Operators Believe in Their Ability to Implement Strategies of a
Trauma-Resilience Plan. The operators are able to overcome setbacks with a repertoire of
behavioral tendencies. These tendencies include maintaining elite performance, openness,
passion, perseverance, and physical/mental consistency (Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; Duckworth et
al., 2007; Ledford et al., 2021; Loftus et al., 2020; Maddi et al., 2017; Meredith et al., 2011).
Operators are self-assured in their own ability to apply effective aspects of education,
experiences, culture, protective behaviors, and even risk as motivation to improve performance
and belief in self and unit (Cooper et al., 2020; Price et al., 2013). The belief of the operators will
be important to each aspect of motivation. Self-efficacy is important during a mission that
becomes difficult (Rueda, 2011). The operators will develop a greater belief in their abilities and
raise expectancy outcomes, resulting in individuals working harder (Rueda, 2011; Schunk &
Pajares, 2005)
Emotions
Emotional affect is a complex influence that is abundant and continually shifting based
on operators’ needs, ever-changing environments, and belief in the explication of protective
factors and risk factors, as well as relating to trauma resilience. Constructive emotions, such as
meaning and gratification, support work commitment as opposed to anger and depression, which
51
focuses an operator’s attention on past negative events instead of future goals (Clark & Estes,
2008; Lord & Kanfer, 2002). Increasing the emotional well-being of the SEAL operator impacts
job satisfaction, job performance, decision making, relationships, and psychological responses,
each shaping the operator’s trauma resilience (Clark & Estes, 2008; Lord & Kanfer, 2002).
Navy SEAL Operators Feel Good About Identifying Key Factors in Trauma-
Resilience. SEAL operators are able to exhibit their grasp of a vast array of constructive qualities
and expertise, not only in the art of tactics but also in the human terrain. This navigation is
essential on a daily basis for mission training, execution, and understanding combat and
requirements (Collins, 2001; Larsen & Wade, 2008; Lukey & Tepe, 2008; Skeffington et al.,
2013). Additionally, operators are able to feel good about role modeling and leadership to work
toward improving trauma-resilience outcomes (Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Litz et al., 2009;
Vermetten & Jetly, 2018). Navy SEAL operators feel good about their ability to enhance the
essential understanding of strategies for more effective, more efficient, and easier-to-evaluate
performance regarding trauma resilience, provoking ongoing motivation and engagement (Clark
& Estes, 2008; Nindl et al., 2018; Southwick & Charney, 2018).
Implementing Strategies of a Trauma-Resilience Plan Makes Navy SEAL Operators
Feel Good. Navy SEAL operators are able to foster a good feeling, psychological strength and
health toward trauma-resilience strategies rather than a negative orientation, mental limitations,
and mental illness (Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000). Operators obtain implementing trauma-resilient
strategies with feeling good through military support and overall cohesion. Navy SEALs produce
effective practices of critical behaviors for planning, education, training, and reflection (Johnson
& Baker, 2019; LaCroix et al., 2021; Litz, 2007; Meredith et al., 2011; Vermetten & Jetly, 2018).
Table 3 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.
52
Table 3
Summary of Assumed Motivation Influences on Stakeholder ’s Ability to Achieve the Performance
Goal
Assumed motivation influences Research literature
Value
Stakeholders find it useful for themselves
to utilize key factors in trauma-resilience.
Castro & Hoge, 2005; Clark & Estes, 2008;
Cooper et al., 2020; Cornum et al., 2011;
Couch, 2001; Green et al., 2010; Grossman &
Christensen, 2004; LaCroix et al., 2021;
Luttrell, 2007; Mayer, 2011; Milligan, 2021;
Pintrich, 2013; Price et al., 2013; Shanker &
Oppel, 2014; Rueda, 2011; Rueda & Dembo,
2006; Shay, 1994; Shrestha et al., 2018;
Sinclair & Britt, 2013; Windle et al., 2011;
Wisco et al., 2017
Self-efficacy
Stakeholders believe in their ability to
identify key factors in a trauma-resilience
plan.
Bandura, 1997; Bartone et al., 2009; Benight &
Bandura, 2004; Biles, 2021; Castro & Hoge,
2005; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018; Pekrun et
al., 2002; Vyas et al., 2016
Stakeholders believe in their ability to
implement strategies of a trauma-
resilience plan.
Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; Cooper et al., 2020;
Duckworth et al., 2019; Ledford et al., 2021;
Loftus et al., 2020; Maddi et al., 2017;
Meredith et al., 2011; Price et al., 2013;
Rueda, 2011; Schunk & Pajares, 2005
Emotions
Stakeholders feel good about identifying
key factors in trauma resilience.
Clark & Estes, 2008; Collins, 2001: Forbes &
Fikretoglu, 2018; Larsen & Wade, 2008;
Lukey & Tepe, 2008; Nindl et al., 2018;
Skeffington et al., 2009; Southwick &
Charney, 2018; Vermetten & Jetly, 2018
Implementing strategies for a trauma-
resilience plan makes stakeholders feel
good.
Johnson & Baker, 2019; LaCroix et al., 2021;
Litz, 2007; Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000;
Meredith et al., 2011; Vermetten & Jetly,
2018
53
Organization
Navy SEAL operators plan a culturally relevant psychoeducation curriculum that
includes cultural models, cultural settings, policy/procedures, and resources, such that these
organizational elements influence their performance and educational progress toward achieving
the goal of PTSD prevention (Clark & Estes, 2008). Organizational support is imperative for the
needs of operators by allocating time, money, and educational specialists to produce efficient and
effective trauma-resilience strategies that are needed for the environmental demands of combat
(Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; Clark & Estes, 2008). The organizational culture must be taken into
account when assessing the potential for success with the desired goals as a result of the ensuing
process filters, resources, and policies of how people interact with regard to the desired outcome
(Clark & Estes, 2008).
Cultural Models
Much of the cultural model for the SEAL Teams is engrained in the operators’ initial
training and selection programs (Couch, 2001). Despite the team mentality for operators, the
organization is still arranged as an assembly of individuals with their own personal motivations,
aspirations, and intentions with respect to professional aspirations (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Cultural models are the unseen characteristics that penetrate individuals, teams, departments,
groups, and the organization as a continuous structure (Clark & Estes, 2008). These paradigms
strengthen the emotional intensity and shared historical learning experiences (Schein & Schein,
2017). Historically, cultural models develop gradually over time, passing along information from
experience that is shared and unique (Shore, 1996). Experiences shaping the cultural model are
often invisible but can be witnessed in responses to adaptive challenges and changing conditions
(Shore, 1996).
54
The influence related to cultural models examined in this study was that Navy SEAL
operators need trust to facilitate trauma resilience. Organizations are comprised of groups of
individual employees, each with their own motivations, aspirations, and objectives regarding
what they aim to accomplish as part of the organization (Skeffington et al., 2013). Consequently,
operators need to trust the organization within which they operate (LaCroix et al., 2021; Park et
al., 2017). Three characteristics that impact the stakeholders’ culture are high control vs.
creativity; regulations vs. choice; predictability vs. uncertainty (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Clark
& Estes, 2008). By way of the ethos, training, and historical roots of Navy SEAL operators, their
performance is intimately linked to their culture (Couch, 2001; Halberstadt, 1993; Luttrell, 2007;
McRaven, 2017; Milligan, 2021; O’Dell, 2000; Schemmer, 2012; Taylor, 1997; Whitney, 1971).
Policies and Procedures
Policies and procedures inform individuals on how to accomplish goals by providing
regulations, standards, guidelines, constraints, solutions, laws, conduct, and plans (Clark &
Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). The military is an organization that utilizes extensive regulations,
expectations, rules, policies, procedures, and rigid structures in an effort to promote consistency,
stimulate positive production from recruits, and develop trust within units (Dretsch et al., 2020;
Kessler et al., 1995; LaCroix et al., 2021; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019; Shrestha et al., 2018;
Starr, 2019). Every organization has policies and procedures; however, it is imperative that the
policies and procedures do not have detrimental effects on performance goals (Schein & Schein,
2017).
The influence examined was that procedures are in place to identify key factors to
implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW policies. Navy SEAL
operators identify key factors for implementing strategies with trauma-resilience education
55
through cooperative actions that are in place for reviewing effectiveness, feedback, availability,
competency, credibility, barriers, staffing, material review, support, and concrete goals with a
learning culture (Dretsch et al., 2020; Forneris et al., 2013; Hoge et al., 2007; Hoge et al., 2004;
LaCroix et al., 2021; Litz, 2007; Schein & Schein, 2017; Vyas et al., 2016). It is paramount to
the success of trauma-resilience planning to include individual, family, unity, and community to
prevent psychopathology among the service members (Bandura et al., 1982; Meredith et al.,
2011; Seligman et al., 1988; Vyas et al., 2016). Navy SEAL operators work organizationally
within NSW, which operates within USSOCOM. The POTFF, as an arm of USSOCOM,
instigates, regulates, and correlates procedures and dictums that affect and effect policies relating
to trauma resilience (Johnson & Baker, 2019; POTFF Staff, 2021).
Resources
Educational specialists, along with materials, financials, and learning tools, are essential
to accomplish tasks for the success of performance goals. Resources for operators’ education will
need to be available during initial training, continuing education, and reinforcement aids for
maintaining the promotion of trauma-resilience strategies (Clark & Estes, 2008). Examining the
cost-benefit of having a trauma-resilience program will benefit NSW and, to a greater extent,
USSOCOM as well as the Veterans Administration, by comparing the expense to the overall
program benefits (Bilmes, 2021; Clark & Estes, 2008; Vyas et al., 2016).
The Resources Money Is Allocated for Trauma-Resilience Education for Navy
SEAL Operators. Navy SEAL operators are seen as a capital investment for the military as a
whole and not a consumable resource (Schein & Schein, 2017). Since its inception, POTFF has
stated that “humans are more important than hardware”; their funding in 2019 was $500 million
over 5 years (Johnson & Baker, 2019; POTFF Staff, 2021). The cost to produce one senior
56
SEAL operator can be upward of seven digits. To ensure the return on this investment, the best
options are to support operator mental and physical longevity (POTFF Staff, 2021). Financial
support will help promote proper research; provide equipment, supplies, and environmental
enhancements to assist learning; and develop trauma-resilience resources, thus limiting
inconsistencies and improving validity (Park et al., 2017; POTFF Staff, 2021; Rocklein-Kemplin
et al., 2019; Shrestha et al., 2018).
Educational Specialists Needed for in and Outside of Classroom Support. Navy
SEAL operators understand that educational specialists will take learned knowledge and
transform the wisdom into practical application through instruction, consulting, and coaching the
organization members, thus providing support beyond the classroom (Luna, 2020; Schein &
Schein, 2017). Educational specialists also provide opportunities for constant and direct
communication between stakeholders by creating trust and helping stakeholders adjust their
performance to accommodate unexpected events (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Table 4 shows the stakeholder’s influences and the related literature.
57
Table 4
Summary of Assumed Organization Influences on Stakeholder ’s Ability to Achieve the
Performance Goal
Assumed organization influences Research literature
Cultural models
stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma
resilience.
Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; Clark & Estes,
2008; Couch, 2001; Halberstadt,
1993; LaCroix et al., 2021; Luttrell,
2007; McRaven, 2017; Milligan,
2021; O’Dell, 2000; Park et al., 2017;
Schein & Schein, 2017; Schemmer,
2012; Shore, 1996; Skeffington et al.,
2013; Taylor, 1997; Whitney, 1971
Policies and procedures
procedures that are in place to identify key factors
to implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience
plan aligned with NSW policies.
Bandura et al., 1982; Clark & Estes,
2008; Dretsch et al., 2020; Forneris et
al., 2013; Hog et al., 2006; Hoge et
al., 2004; Johnson & Baker, 2019;
Kessler et al., 1995; LaCroix et al.,
2021; Litz, 2007; Meredith et al.,
2011; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019;
Rueda, 2011; Schein & Schein, 2017;
Shrestha et al., 2018; Starr, 2019;
Vyas et al., 2016
Resources (time; finances; people; technology)
money is allocated for trauma-resilience education
for Stakeholders.
Bilmes, 2021; Clark & Estes, 2008;
Forbes & Fikretogul, 2018; Forneris
et al., 2013; Johnson & Baker, 2019;
Park et al., 2017; POTFF Staff, 2021;
Schein & Schein, 2017; Rocklein-
Kemplin et al., 2019; Vyas et al.,
2016
Educational specialists needed for in- and outside-
of-classroom support.
Clark & Estes, 2008; Luna, 2020;
Schein & Schein, 2017
Summary
The concept of resilience for service members is grounded in being a solution to the
invisible wounds (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008) veterans face (Meredith et al., 2011). Resilience
58
education currently for service members is developed around health, wellness, and positive
psychology with a holistic approach. However, a gap in education is still evident in
USSOCOM’s request and veteran mental health. The research examples regarding trauma,
resilience, combat, modern warfare, PTSD and comorbidities, Operator Syndrome, moral injury,
and suicide ideation illuminate the expectations and essential needs for closing this gap. The
specificity of the plan needs to clearly convey who the training is for, what the training will
accomplish, why there is a need for the training, and how to measure the success or ongoing
needs of the program. In reviewing the following:
• characteristics of Navy SEAL operators
• evolution of trauma-resilience as it relates to the operators
• research of resilience as it relates to trauma
• the best practices of trauma-resilience
• existing strategies for solving trauma-resilience
• trauma-resilience challenges for Navy SEALs
• approaches to measurements of trauma resilience for operators
Securing the innovation goal that is specific to the stakeholder’s needs for a trauma-
resilience plan depends on variables from the behavior, environment, and individual operators. It
became apparent, when integrated with the conceptual framework from Clark and Estes (2008),
that the influences and explanation of KMO methodology present modifications which, without
its direction, may repeat previous failings with a revised but equally ineffective program.
Moving forward, the performance gap examination with the methodological framework
contained in the next chapter provides a well-grounded structure for assessment in the problem-
solving process.
59
Chapter Three: Methods
The purpose of this project was to conduct a needs analysis in the areas of knowledge and
skill, motivation, and organizational resources necessary to reach the organizational performance
goal. The analysis began by generating a list of possible needs and moved to examine these
systematically to focus on actual or validated needs. While a complete needs analysis would
focus on all stakeholders, for practical purposes, the stakeholder to be focused on in this analysis
is Navy SEAL operators. Two questions guided this gap analysis:
1. What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational performance needs
for U.S. Navy SEAL operators to produce a trauma-resilience plan?
2. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions to
those needs?
Conceptual and Methodological Framework
This dissertation is an innovation knowledge, motivation, organization (KMO) gap
analysis study (Figure 1). What makes this dissertation innovative is the introduction of a
specific organizational goal to enhance performance by implementing a trauma-resilience plan
for SEAL operators; currently, the analysis reveals that the performance gap is 100% (Figure 2).
Organizations not following a systematic problem-solving approach might make incomplete or
untenable decisions and risk losing time, money and, in this case, lives (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Clark and Estes’s (2008) framework, or the KMO gap analysis, is a research-based structure that
evaluates organizational performance and goals. The gap analysis investigates the space between
current, preferred, or desired, performance and goals through the filter of KMO barriers while
focusing on the stakeholders for achieving organizational goals. What makes this model
60
important and powerful is the specific focus on a particular organizational need for the desired
change necessary for improved organizational performance. The KMO framework pursues
achieving organizational goals by aligning individual performance goals and explicating the
space between the stakeholders’ current and desired performance. It is then organized into three
sections (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Clark & Estes, 2008). In the knowledge section, the
areas are
• factual: basic facts, information, and terminology
• conceptual: categories, principles, structure, or theory
• procedural: skills/procedures with the task (techniques, methods, steps)
• metacognitive: ability to reflect and adjust skills and knowledge
In the motivation section, the areas are
• utility values: learning the content is valuable/useful for future goals
• self-efficacy: performance enhanced with positive expectations
• emotions: positive emotions to enhance performance
In the organization section, the areas are
• cultural models: values, beliefs, and attitudes that are generally invisible
• cultural settings: visible and concrete manifestation of cultural models
• policies and procedures: the established way of taking action
• resources: money, material, staff, and additional assets for effectiveness
61
Figure 1
Theoretical Framework
Figure 2
Conceptual Framework
62
Overview of Design
A brief roadmap of Chapter Three begins with a review of the purpose and framework
and then delineates participating stakeholders and participant criteria for the interviews, surveys,
and document analysis with the rationale for using several sources of data. Integrated as well is
the methodological approach for data collection and analyses addressing credibility,
trustworthiness, validity, and reliability. The chapter closes with ethics, the role of the
investigator, and the study’s limitations and delimitation.
The methodological approach is a convergent mixed methods design, meaning both
quantitative and qualitative data were used, and data from both were simultaneously collected
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The methodological approach of mixing qualitative and
quantitative data allowed more insight into this performance gap. All instruments are aligned
with a priori KMO influence tables, found in Chapter Two. Data collection happened through a
survey, interviews, and document analysis explicating KMO influences: identifying,
implementing, and following impacts for a trauma-resilience plan. The KMO tables act as a filter
for the data, so the results from each instrument can be overlapped for triangulation, creating
coherent recommended solutions, per Clark and Estes’s gap analysis methodology (Clark &
Estes, 2008; Creswell & Creswell, 2018). This design was chosen to ensure a comprehensive
understanding of the performance gap by concurrently collecting data, then analyzing the data
separately, and, ultimately, comparing the findings to confirm or disconfirm each other (Creswell
& Creswell, 2018). Table 5 presents the data sources.
63
Table 5
Data Sources
Research questions Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
RQ1: What are the knowledge and skills,
motivation, and organizational
performance needs for U.S. Navy SEAL
operators to produce a trauma-resilience
plan?
Survey Interview Document analysis
RQ2: What are the recommended
knowledge, motivation, and
organizational solutions to those needs?
Survey Interview Document analysis
Participating Stakeholders
The Navy SEAL operator is the stakeholder of focus. Inactive Navy SEAL operators,
specifically members who have separated from service a year and under, are the types of
participants recruited for data collection. These participants are also a mix of officers and
enlisted personnel with varied career experience. Collecting data within a year aligns with
previous surveys from USSOCOM through the POTFF. The POTFF Wave assessment was an
annual probe of operators concerning commanders’ understanding of the needs and wellness
status (USSOCOM, 2014). This population is an appropriate target population for this research
addressing the matter of PTSD as it regards Navy SEAL operators because of their vocational
environmental exposure to trauma and expectation of resilience. Neither USSOCOM/POTFF nor
NSW have a needs assessment for adequately examining trauma-resilience needs. To date,
treatment has been largely reactive, singular, and post-event. These inactive Navy SEAL
operators provided valuable data about resilience processes and outcomes throughout their
64
careers and beyond to improve preventative plans for PTSD and USSOCOM’s 2020-2030
request for improved resiliency training.
Survey Sampling Criteria and Rationale
Criterion 1. The survey respondents were inactive Navy SEALs. Inactive means inactive
service members who served as Navy SEALs. Collecting data from this sample informed the
knowledge, skills, motivation, and organizational influences related to the needs and solutions
for a trauma-resilience plan specific to the stakeholder of focus.
Criterion 2. Respondents were required to be Navy SEALs who had been separated from
the Navy within a year or less. Collecting data within a year aligns with previous surveys from
POTFF’s annual testing of operators concerning trauma and resilience.
Survey Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
Survey sampling design is a multistage process due to lack of availability and constraints
composing the stakeholder of focus (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The survey sampling
recruitment strategy was to collaborate with non-profit organizations that specifically support the
NSW community to recruit potential respondents. According to the Navy SEAL Foundation
(2020), approximately 150 active-duty Navy SEALs separate from service each year. I sought
total population participation for the survey. Through coordinating with these nonprofits, these
inactive Navy SEALs, who live in various geographic locations worldwide, can be reached. The
survey is cross-sectional (data collected at one point in time) and a purposive sample (aligned
with the research question) because of barriers to access into this special community (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). The survey was a one-time, self-administered, internet-based survey in which
data collection was concurrently happening with the interviews and document analysis. This
process adheres to a convergent design or a single-phase approach for collecting quantitative and
65
qualitative data (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The purpose of the survey was to answer questions
about stakeholders and to empirically evaluate the KMO barriers of a trauma-resilience plan
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Interview Sampling Criteria and Rationale
Criterion 1. The interviewees were the same population as the survey respondents.
Collecting data from this sample informed the knowledge, skills, motivation, and organizational
influences related to the needs and solutions for a trauma-resilience plan specific to the
stakeholder of focus.
Criterion 2. Again, the characteristics of the survey respondents were required of the
interviewees. Collecting data within a year aligns with previous surveys from POTFF’s annual
testing of operators concerning trauma and resilience.
Criterion 3. A purposeful or nonprobability sampling selection of 12 interviewees from
enlisted and officer ranks. This population is an appropriate target population for this research
topic in addressing the matter of PTSD and resilience as it regards Navy SEAL operators.
Criterion 4. Inactive Navy SEAL enlisted and officers with varied time in service (some
with less than 20 years and others with more) to address the research aim. Varied time in service
allowed multiple perspectives to be included in data collection.
Interview and/or Focus Group Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
The interview sampling strategy is to collaborate with non-profit organizations that
specifically support the NSW community with a focus on transitioning from military to civilian
life. Through coordinating with these nonprofits, the purposeful recruitment of 12 inactive Navy
SEALs comprised the interviewees (Symon & Cassell, 2012). These participants have varied
experiences from both the enlisted and officer ranks of the Navy SEAL Teams. Collecting data
66
from this sample informed a deeper understanding through open questions for an in-depth
perspective about influences related to the needs and solutions for a trauma-resilience plan
specific to the stakeholder of focus. The interview data collection happened simultaneously with
the survey and document analysis (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The purpose of the interview
was to answer questions about stakeholders and empirically evaluate the KMO barriers of a
trauma-resilience plan (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Document Analysis and Rationale
Criterion 1. Documents provided by POTFF records are the first portion of the document
analysis. Collecting this data informed the knowledge, skills, motivation, and organizational
influences related to the needs and solutions for a trauma-resilience plan specific to the
stakeholder of focus.
Criterion 2. Public military documents specific to NSW/POTFF and civilian resilience
programs were obtained for comparative analysis. A best practice and needs assessment of these
public documents provided additional perspectives and varied data.
Document Analysis Strategy and Rationale
The sampling strategy for collecting the documents began with contacting POTFF.
Meetings with POTFF leadership to explain the purpose of this research and an agreement to
keep leadership informed as to the use of the documents provided access to private unclassified
military research about trauma and resilience for SOFs, specifically the stakeholder of focus. The
value of the documents was appreciated for the decades of research accessed for this dissertation.
The added credibility of these documents is also necessitated for completing the triangulation of
this study. This research, along with public records relevant to trauma, resilience, and military
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programs, comprise the materials used for this document analysis. The document analysis is the
third source of data needed for triangulating evidence from the interviews and surveys, reducing
potential bias and adding validity to the study (Bowen, 2009; Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Collecting data from the document analysis informed the knowledge, skills, motivation, and
organizational influences related to the needs and solutions for a trauma-resilience plan specific
to the stakeholder of focus (Clark & Estes, 2008). The document analysis happened
simultaneously with the survey and interviews. This process adheres to a convergent design
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Data Collection and Instrumentation
The methodological approach of a mixed-method convergent design, or the use of
qualitative and quantitative research to concurrently collect data, analyzed separately to then
compare results, was utilized to best understand the psychological traits of this gap analysis
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Mixed methods permit the triangulation of multiple sources of
data, which reduces bias, informs various aspects about these phenomena, and creates a more
complex understanding of the phenomena (Maxwell, 2013). Triangulation superimposes findings
from each data source, providing divergent perspectives and a greater depth of understanding
than a single method (Maxwell, 2013). The triangulation of data from surveys, interviews, and
documents as a mixed-methods approach incorporates open-ended and closed-ended questions,
statistical and text analyses, and both predetermined and emerging methods for data collection.
This methodological process converges the surveys, interviews, and document analysis data to
provide a singular comprehensive analysis, per Clark and Estes’s gap analysis model (Clark &
Estes, 2008; Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The data from this innovative needs analysis informed
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the KMO performance needs for the stakeholders of focus, producing a trauma-resilience plan.
Results from this study increase the effectiveness of NSW and its organizational mission.
Surveys
The survey was administered and conducted online through non-profit organizations that
support NSW via an already established email list. The introductory email had a link to the
survey along with appropriate information about the purpose, overview, and consent. Included in
the introductory email was also a note about sensitive or threatening questions that may elicit
emotional or psychological disturbance (Robinson & Leonard, 2019). The location of data
collection was the site used for the survey (Qualtrics), and the computer used for this research
was password-protected.
The survey design utilized the KMO gap analysis to examine the relationships of
influences to critical behaviors. This method ensures a comprehensive understanding of
performance gaps from the stakeholder of focus, the Navy SEAL operator. An estimated time of
15 minutes allowed the stakeholders to complete the 17 KMO survey questions and the 14
demographic questions. The purpose of the survey was to collect data about stakeholders and to
empirically evaluate the KMO barriers related to the needs and solutions for a trauma-resilience
plan (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The KMO methodology establishes reliability through the
development of specific procedures and instruments, which were peer-reviewed, to measure
distinct parts of performance directly connected to the research question. This process also
supported the validity of trauma resilience by measuring exactly and only what is meant to be
measured because the instrument is coded and aligned with the KMO tables through Chapter
Two (Clark & Estes, 2008).
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Interviews
Interview data came from 12 inactive Navy SEAL operators who were purposefully
selected. Multiple interviews with each participant were planned to ensure adequate engagement
in data collection, but one-time informal interviews were conducted (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
The interview protocol was a semi-structured approach to address the research question through
the KMO framework. Once initiated, this open approach prompts a more free-flowing,
exploratory exchange stimulating a general understanding and range of perspectives on a topic
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007, p. 104). The types of interview questions were open-ended with
prompt options. This semi-structured interview has questions directly related to the framework,
supporting the literature annotated in Chapter Two and allowing the participant to define trauma-
resilience as they see it (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). This ensured that data collection was rich and
aligned with the research questions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). To help support trustworthy
data collection, the questions were peer-reviewed prior to the interview to maintain qualitative
reliability (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Gibbs, 2007).
The interview questions, which were aligned to the KMO influences, varied to stimulate
responses about experience, behavior, affect, values, feelings, knowledge, motivation, and
organization. The questions were also designed to avoid multiple, leading, and yes/no questions
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Interviews took between 30–40 minutes to complete and were
conducted using the Zoom platform. The interviews were compared to other data through
triangulation, adding validity to justify data themes (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The KMO
methodology establishes the development of specific procedures and comprehensive instruments
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designed systematically to measure exactly what is intended to be measured and directly
connected to the research questions (Clark & Estes, 2008; Johnson & Christensen, 2014).
Documents and Artifacts
Organizational documents and archived data pertaining to the military on the research on
trauma, resilience, and programs were collected. These resources were collected through
available public access along with private, unclassified internal documents through POTFF. The
use of these documents corroborated findings and reduced potential bias (Bowen, 2009; Johnson
& Christensen, 2014). Permission was given to use POTFF Wave assessments (which the
POTFF provided to me) and a Research Facilitation Laboratory analytic support document about
POTFF programs. Analysis of these documents was completed through the KMO framework
using a qualitative, inductive approach. The approach delivers an understanding that “the
intervention must have specifically targeted active ingredients in order to work” concerning the
trauma-resilience needs of Navy SEAL operators (Clark & Estes, 2008, p. 54).
Data Analysis
Data analysis for the surveys, interviews, and documents was organized in accordance
with KMO influences: identify, implement, and follow impacts for a trauma-resilience plan.
These influences were yielded from the literature review. The approach to analyzing the
quantitative data was through Qualtrics, the internet site designed to collect and analyze survey
data. Interviews were transcribed and coded to the KMO influences. Finally, documents
triangulated comparisons of data from the survey and interviews to overlap the research from
these sources, which then informed coherent themes (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Maxwell,
2013).
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Credibility and Trustworthiness
The convergent mixed methodological approach brings together interviews and document
analysis data to provide a comprehensive analysis of qualitative components, per Clark and
Estes’s gap analysis model (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The KMO methodology establishes
specific procedures and instruments for document analysis and interview protocols to measure
distinct parts of the performance gap directly connected to the research question. This process
also identifies and ascertains exactly what is meant to be measured (Clark & Estes, 2008). Three
specific strategies that are included in this study to ensure credibility (connection between
research and reality) and trustworthiness (careful design of the study) of findings are
triangulation (crystallize), peer-reviewed, and adequate engagement in data collection (Creswell
& Creswell, 2018; Symon & Cassell, 2012).
The interviews relied on my interpretation of the data, making my position as a retired
Navy SEAL and researcher important to this hard-to-reach population (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). Reflexivity and researcher bias were diminished through peer review, institutional review
board (IRB), advisors, and training aids. I took steps to become more reflexive aware by
reflecting on motivation, assumptions, and emotional connection to the research, along with
journaling to stay mindful of the process and practice, for accountability, of primary knowledge
(Symon & Cassell, 2012). A strategy to stay unbiased is employed by using an inductive
approach while remembering to stay open and collecting data specific to each participant’s
knowledge and motivation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Keeping in mind that various ideas,
subjects, and themes were assessed after all interviews were completed allows for maximum
variation or a greater range of findings (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
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Validity and Reliability
According to Salkind (2014), “the road to establishing the reliability of a test is not a
smooth one” (p. 120). In maintaining the rigor required for establishing a valid (measures what is
intended or truthfulness of results) and reliable (consistent over time with an accurate
representation of population) survey, the collection tool adhered to the KMO framework and
relevant literature that was corroborated by the literature review (Golafshani, 2003). The
sampling strategy used a nonprobability sample (or purposive sample) based on participant
availability. The total population participation of survey respondents was approximately 150
inactive Navy SEALs, and 94 inactive SEALs took the survey. To maximize confidence in the
process and provide sufficient response rates, the surveys were anonymous, thus encouraging
candid responses to capture as much information from the stakeholders of focus (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018).
The primary method to ensure and maintain this study’s credibility and trustworthiness
was triangulation. The type of triangulation used was multiple methods, using quantitative and
qualitative means. Another type of triangulation used was multiple sources of data: research data,
collection surveys, interviews, and documents. The multiple sources came from interview data
from various stakeholders with various perspectives. Triangulation, along with other strategies,
was included in data collection, peer review, rich descriptions, and adequate engagement
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). This methodological approach converges the surveys, interviews,
and document analysis data to provide a singular comprehensive analysis in accordance with
Clark and Estes’s gap analysis (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The KMO methodology establishes
reliability through the development of specific procedures and instruments to measure distinct
parts of performance directly connected to the research question aligned to its a priori influence.
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This process also supports the validity by measuring exactly, and only, what is meant to be
measured (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Ethics
The intent of this social science research was to work with human subjects while
adhering to USC’s policies and procedures throughout the dissertation process. Upon proposal
approval, I submitted an application for IRB approval prior to subject recruitment and data
collection. I gained informed consent from all participants, making sure they understood the
research purpose, their role in it, and the potential risks (Samkian, 2019). The subjects of focus
were inactive U.S. Navy SEAL operators, and the participants had complete confidentiality in
this research. There was no compensation or incentives for participation in this study. All
participants were organizationally separated from me, so issues of power dynamics or coercion
were not a factor. The current U.S. Navy SEALs of focus are recently retired or separated
operators (inactive). This allowed a single IRB approval as opposed to active-duty SEALs,
which would have required an additional IRB through the U.S. Naval Academy plus O-6 (high-
level officer rank) approval. This research serves the interests of not only myself but, more
importantly, the organizational and individual needs of those who work in a high-risk and
volatile environment. The specific environment of interest is that of U.S. Navy SEAL operators.
Operators participate in war/combat, which is also categorized as a traumatic event (Birur et al.,
2017). This research aligns with the interests of USSOCOM along with NSW mission statements
that support performance initiatives. The benefits of this study support U.S. Navy SEAL
operators and organizational performance goals. No harm has come from this study.
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Role of Investigator
This dissertation is a mixed methods approach blending the philosophical worldviews or
ontologies of a postpositivist and constructivist methodological approach. Quantitative research
is a positive worldview. This position holds that knowledge is based on observation and
measurement of objective reality, assessing influences to reduce any ideas that comprise
hypotheses and research questions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Qualitative research is a
constructivist worldview believing that experiences are subjective for individuals. Research
relies on the participant’s perspectives and meanings, which are varied and multiple. This
approach guides the researcher through complexity or initiates a theory, as opposed to a narrow
view (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). As a researcher, I realize that my background and lived
experience shape my interpretation of the world around me. My personal philosophical
worldview is that of a constructivist. Trauma-resilience research is typically through quantitative
surveys for trauma or resilience, such as the PTSD checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5), BRS, and
Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC; LaCroix et al., 2021). Through a constructivist
lens, a reductionist method elucidates how stakeholders construct meaning, engage based on
their history, and generate connection socially or through community (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). These are critical behaviors for developing a trauma-resilience plan for a specific
stakeholder.
My intent is to expand the current conversation and offer other perspectives that could
potentially reduce harm to military members. The experience of spending most of my adult life
in the SEAL Teams and 15 years in active combat or training for combat has influenced my
worldview. My positionality (world view), social identity (race, sexual orientation, religion,
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class, ability, gender identity, sex, and ethnicity), and privilege position (seen through the lens of
the intersecting axes of privilege, domination, and oppression) place me socially in the Western
world, along with being identified as a 100% permanently disabled veteran. Having multiple
combat deployments and hearing stories from colleagues, along with my own time at the Naval
Academy, has brought me to this understanding that a trauma-resilience plan is a necessary
ethical prevention of current mental health needs (Glesne, 2011). These past events, especially
my Naval Academy tour, where my struggle with PTSD, traumatic brain injury, moral injury,
relational issues, and substance abuse became a real challenge, have shaped my current problem
of practice. Seeing the harm of living a life in constant preparation for combat is my lived
experience. Essentially, formed in the combat environment, which is always volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous. Consequent behavior and how those experiences are interpreted within
oneself contribute to my drive to create a trauma-resilience plan (Benight & Bandura, 2004;
Tuck & Yang, 2014).
Biases stemming from lived experiences of the primary investigator have to be guarded
against. Attribution and confirmation bias were the two most influential biases for this
investigator to be cognizant of and avoid. The community participating in the survey and
interview component of the research are members of the investigator’s prior career field.
Therefore, the investigator must be vigilant and resist comparing the actions of the interviewees
and interviewer, or attribution bias (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Based on this investigator being a
part of the SEAL Teams’ culture and history through his own past experiences and beliefs as an
operator, vigilance toward confirmation bias has to be avoided as well in seeking to ensure that
all information is taken into account (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
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I am inspired to help fellow military members with their mental health through
preventive planning and education. The lack of preparation (e.g., psychoeducation) I witnessed
in the SEAL Teams and at the Naval Academy, I believe, is a moral disservice to men and
women in the military. The statistics for PTSD are higher for women, and as the military
becomes more diversified and inclusive, women moving into combat roles are potentially two
times more susceptible to PTSD as they deploy overseas (MacGregor et al., 2017). I have
witnessed victim shaming, while the organization provided no knowledge or skills for preparing
individuals for known hardships faced while in service to the organization. The psychological
battles my teammates and I have been through are my primary driving force for this research. In
the interests of securing national defense, there has often been an organizational dismissal of the
collateral damage that occurs in the process, even though there could possibly be a way of
preserving the national defense without the degree of psychological harm currently affecting
many soldiers and sailors. This will remain so until there is a successful plan for trauma
resilience; this is an organizational barrier.
Limitations and Delimitations
I chose Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis to shape this innovation study because it is
a performance framework that includes recommendations for closing the performance gap.
Anticipated limitations in this study are restrictions only to the degree of the quality and quantity
of participation anticipated by potential respondents. Experienced or witnessed organizational
trauma and resilience can influence survey responses. The subject can be sensitive or threatening
to the respondent. The respondent’s perspective about potentially intrusive or invasive questions
required personal information concerning self-perceived shortcomings, personal habits,
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emotional or psychological disturbance, and death or dying, which could have affected
willingness to participate in this survey (Robinson & Leonard, 2019). In terms of the quantity
component, an estimation from nonprofits designed specifically to support Navy SEALs
determined that about 150 Navy SEALs separate from the military each year (Navy SEAL
Foundation Annual Report, 2020). This number varies year-to-year as the Navy actively works
to retain these special operators who are costly to train and equip. After separation, adding to the
difficulty in access and availability of this population, these inactive operators move to various
locations across the country.
These delimitations make this study unique and potentially less generalizable to other
organizations. Possible delimitations, or the boundaries of this study, start with the stakeholder of
focus. The dissertation’s focus on the SEAL operator makes it manageable while working with
broader issues of trauma and resilience. Another boundary described in the selection was the
inactive Navy SEALs who had separated from service a year or under as the research
participants. Definitions of resilience and a focused specificity of trauma experienced during
combat were designed to be aligned with NSW and USSOCOM and could be considered another
boundary.
Summary
The KMO methodology is a framework designed to identify essential needs for a trauma-
resilience plan as it applies to the stakeholder of focus (Clark & Estes, 2008). The SEAL Teams
are a hard-to-reach population, and, even though they are supported through various
organizational resilience programs, Navy SEAL operators still struggle with mental health
issues, specifically PTSD.
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Chapter Three delineates the research methodology for obtaining the innovation goal of
producing a trauma-resilience plan for Navy SEAL operators. The theoretical framework from
Clark and Estes (2008) examines the gap between current goals and desired goals. The space
between those goals is examined through the KMO framework. To close this gap, the convergent
mixed-methods design involved simultaneous quantitative and qualitative data collection.
Research participants were inactive Navy SEAL operators who had been separated from the
Navy for 1 year and under. Data collection was derived from a survey, interviews, and document
analysis. These three sources triangulate the data to ensure a comprehensive analysis of this
performance gap (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The conclusion of Chapter Three elaborates on
the analysis and stakeholder while bonding ethical considerations, the role of the investigator,
and forecasting possible limitations and delimitations.
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Chapter Four: Results and Findings
This chapter presents the results and findings aligned with the research question. The
purpose of this project was to conduct a needs analysis in the areas of knowledge and skill,
motivation, and organizational resources necessary to reach the organizational performance goal.
The introduction of a specific organizational goal to enhance performance by implementing a
trauma-resilience plan for SEAL operators currently reveals that the performance gap is 100%.
No organizations have a needs assessment for adequately examining trauma-resilience needs. To
improve USSOCOM’s resiliency training and preventative plans for PTSD, inactive Navy SEAL
operators have provided valuable data about resilience processes and outcomes throughout their
careers and beyond.
The assumed needs from Chapter Three were delineated and categorized under the areas
of knowledge and skill, motivation, and organizational resources, to answer the research
questions. While a complete needs analysis would focus on all stakeholders, for practical
purposes, the stakeholders focused on in this analysis are Navy SEAL operators. The results will
be organized by the categories of assumed KMO needs. Assertions are supported by numerical
results and qualitative findings. The chapter concludes with a summary of validated needs or
assets that will be used for recommendations. Two questions guided this gap analysis and data
collection:
1. What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational performance needs
for U.S. Navy SEAL operators to produce a trauma-resilience plan?
2. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions to
those needs?
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Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected to leverage triangulation in
validating the assumed needs. Collection happened through surveys, interviews, and document
analysis explicating KMO influences to identify, implement, and follow the impacts for a
trauma-resilience plan. The methodological approach was a convergent mixed methods design,
meaning data were simultaneously collected (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
The rationale for this framework and methodology was to take a holistic look into
performance regarding resilience, specifically trauma-resilience for NSW. Organizations do not
follow a systematic problem-solving approach which might make an incomplete decision and
risk losing time and money (Clark & Estes, 2008). The 16 influences established in Chapter Two
were each confirmed as needs regarding a trauma-resilience plan for Navy SEAL operators.
Participating Stakeholders
The Navy SEAL operator is the stakeholder of focus. Inactive Navy SEAL operators,
specifically members who separated from service less than a year before this study, were the
specific participants recruited for data collection. Estimates project that approximately 150 Navy
SEALs separated from the Navy within a year. Ninety-four inactive SEALs’ responses were
gathered. This is an innovation study; therefore, 100% participation was achieved.
All of the interviewees also contributed to the survey. The survey respondents
represented a wide range of years of experience, as seen in Figures 3–9, from both SEAL
Officers (27%), SEAL Warrant Officers (2%), and SEAL Enlisted (73%), with 72% of
participants being married with children. Most respondents (47%) had spent 15 years or more in
the SEAL Teams as a SEAL operator with NSW. The total number of combat deployments for
all respondents was 377 altogether. Of the respondents (32%) had 0–3 deployments, 4–6
deployments (31%), 7–9 deployments (19%), and 10 or more deployments (18%). Additionally,
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46% of the demographic group earned a bachelor’s degree, and 33% held a master’s. Lastly,
53% of the respondents had not heard of the POTFF.
Figure 3
Responses to Demographics Years of Military Service
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Figure 4
Responses to Demographics Years Assigned to Naval Special Warfare
Figure 5
Responses to Demographics Level of Rank Obtained
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Figure 6
Responses to Demographics Number of Deployments Over Your Career
Figure 7
Responses to Demographics Highest Level of Education Completed
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Figure 8
Responses to Demographics Family Status
Figure 9
Responses to Demographics Having Heard of POTFF
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Determination of Assets and Needs
To assess the KMO gap necessary for Navy SEAL operators to develop a trauma-
resilience plan, survey, interview, and organizational documents were analyzed to assess assets
or needs. The KMO framework was used to systematically validate or not validate assumed
assets that were generated and discussed in Chapter Three. A 31-question survey was given to 94
inactive Navy SEALs for this study. The interviews consisted of 12 inactive SEAL operators
randomly selected from volunteers elicited from the survey. The interviews consisted of 23
questions, with probing questions asked when appropriate. Interviews reached saturation at the
eighth interview, but 12 were conducted for validity and reliability. Finally, a document analysis
was conducted. The measure of validity for the assumed assets was performed through data
triangulation. Data triangulation built justification of themes, also adding validity to the study
findings. Triangulation happened once all data were collected, sorted, and analyzed separately,
and then data were compared to the other findings validating the influence as an asset or need.
Criteria for determining an influence as an asset or need was based on the cut score.
During triangulation, a cut score was used to determine whether the data validated the
influence to be an asset or need. Considering the size of the survey population (150 members),
64% or 94 members participated in the survey, with this being an innovation study with a gap of
100%. With the high participation, a cut score of 70% was established. The weight of interviews
was set at one third, with the survey weighing one third, and documents set at one third. The
criteria were used to measure validity using the cut score:
Validated asset: at least 70% congruence for the presumed influence.
Validated need: below 70% congruence for the presumed influence.
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Results and Findings for Knowledge Needs
The knowledge category of KMO is divided into four areas: factual, procedural,
conceptual, and metacognitive. Chapter Two’s literature review highlighted seven influences
under the knowledge category with 2 x factual, 3 x conceptual, and 2 x metacognitive. The data
were used to validate that particular influence as an asset or need. This study had physical fitness
(71% and 86%) twice validated as an asset, along with the Human Performance program (72%)
and teamwork (73%). However, when that influence was analyzed through triangulation, that
influence became a need. The data shows the seven knowledge influences are all validated needs.
Factual Knowledge: Influence 1
The first factual knowledge influence was that stakeholders know facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
Survey Results Question 1
Based on the survey results, 41% of respondents had the same definition of resilience as
NSW (Figure 10).
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Figure 10
Responses to Item: “What Is the Best Definition of Resilience? (Choose Only One) ”
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Survey Results Question 2
Based on the survey results, 13% selected the correct definition for trauma based on the
definition also used by NSW as stated in the DSM5 (Figure 11).
Figure 11
Responses to Item: “What Is the Best Definition of Trauma? (Choose Only One) ”
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Interview Findings Question 1
When asked to state their knowledge about resilience, few interviewees included the
holistic definition used by POTFF (Table 6). The closest definition was from R10, “Resilience is
the ability to bounce back from stress that could cause emotional, physical, and spiritual trauma.”
The majority of respondents stated resilience as an act to move forward or through adversity,
stress, or trauma. R9, for example, answered, “[resilience] means persevering through adversity
or R2, “resilience is the capacity to move forward.”
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Table 6
Interview Question 1 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q1: (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about resilience?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Ability to bounce back. Bounce back
R2 Capacity to move forward. Move forward
R3 Expectations mentally/emotionally/physically—make
it through hardship.
Make it through
R4 Similar to perseverance.
R5 Being able to rebound back to whatever level you
were at before.
Rebound
R6 Being able to rebound. Rebound
R7 Continue to perform/grow, vice spiraling head down. Grow
R8 Commitment to something focused, find solutions,
working through stress/anxiety that comes with that.
Working through
R9 Preserving through adversity. Through adversity
R10 Ability to bounce back from stress that could cause
emotional, physical, and spiritual trauma.
Bounce back
R11 Ability to adapt, overcome, or live with certain things. Adapt
R12 Ability to go through a trauma or series of and stay
healthy mentally and physically.
Go through
Interview Findings Question 2
When asked to state their knowledge about trauma, the interviewees’ answers varied
(Table 7). The most cohesion found in responses was that trauma varied from individual to
individual. R4, for example, “[trauma] affects everyone differently and looks different.” Other
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interviewees gave similar responses. R5 said, “[Trauma] differs from individual to individual,”
and R11, “[trauma] can vary.” R10 stated,
You have a massive PTSD problem. I do not believe that war caused our PTSD. I believe
it is the final bricks in our backpack for our PTSD. Everybody told me you have PTSD
because you killed people. Or people died around you as you were exposed to trauma. I
always struggled with that because that never bothered me. I took lives because I wanted
to kill them, and when people died around me, I cried for a while, and then I said they
lived a fucking great life. I believe PTSD exists from our childhood or our affirmative
years of growing. Simple fact, when you were supposed to be hugged and kissed when
you fell down and skinned your knee, and you weren’t, that can cause psychological and
emotional trauma.
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Table 7
Interview Question 2 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q2: (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Lasting negative effects. Negative effects
R2 Subjective—they couldn’t handle it. Subjective
R3 Know very little.
R4 Affects everyone differently and looks different, plus
suffering and doesn’t realize it.
Affects differently
R5 Differs from individual to individual, and context to
context.
Differs
R6 Changes you, personality and physiology. Changes you
R7 Witnesses or choices stick with you, can’t let go. Stick with you
R8 Dark moments, depression, traumatic brain injury,
sleep, suicide.
Dark moments
R9 Seen something that didn’t sit well Didn’t sit well
R10 Caused by childhood and war. War
R11 Can vary, much from injury. Varied
R12 Affect brain, body chemistry, and live in the past. Affects
Interview Results Question 3
When asked about knowledge regarding current organizational resilience programs,
respondent answers varied (Table 8). The most common answers mentioned POTFF, National
Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE), or command pre/post-deployment retreats. R1 spoke
about “Care Coalition, POTFF, NICoE clinic, and then there’s kind of variations of all of those
things.” R5 elaborated,
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The Warrior Toughness thing, which I thought was useful for the Navy, but they kind of
turned that into what I was worried about, PowerPoint type of training, but you know that
is typical military. The type of training we want to create for toughness isn’t scalable to
300,000 people.
R7 had a less common answer but addressed additional programs supported by POTFF, stating,
“The one I’m most familiar with would be the retreats, … and they’ll bring in speakers. …
Whether it’s sleep hygiene, … human performance, … mental health. … And then, obviously,
you have your chaplains and your psychs.” Other respondents had answers similar to R6’s,
simply stating, “not very much” or “like none.”
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Table 8
Interview Question 3 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q3: (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about current NSW resilience programs?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 POTFF, NICoE, navy SEAL foundation (NSF),
care coalition
POTFF/NICoE/NSF
R2 Nothing Nothing
R3 The honor foundation (THF), POTFF, NSF,
command retreats
POTFF/NSF
R4 Human performance programs (HPP) HPP
R5 POTFF, tactical athlete, performance coach, big
navy programs
POTFF
R6 Nothing Nothing
R7 command retreats, speakers, sleep hygiene, HPP,
chaplains, command psychologists
HPP/retreats
R8 NICoE, command psychologists NICoE
R9 Nothing Nothing
R10 Nothing Nothing
R11 NSF, Homebase, C4 foundation, command retreats,
speakers, decompression stops
NSF/retreats
R12 Command retreats, NICoE NICoE/retreats
Interview Results Question 4
When asked to state their knowledge about developing resilience, few interviewees could
give a confident answer (Table 9). R1 referenced past SEAL selection programs:
For me, resiliency was developed basically in the two major selection and training
courses that we had: BUD/S [Basic underwater demolition/SEAL training] and Green
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Team. And part of it was that you have to show up already with an amount, and so it
weeds out the people who don’t have that.
R4 stated, “I know it’s something that can be trained like anything else … exposing
yourself to stressful situations and recovering from them. … I don’t know the science behind it.”
While R10 stated, “In order to become mentally tough, you have to do tough things, over and
over again until it becomes normal.”
Table 9
Interview Question 4 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q4: (Knowledge, factual) what facts do you know about developing resilience?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Basic underwater demolition/ school (BUD/S),
green team, you show up with it or go away.
BUD/S
R2 Scale up the stress and exposure to stress Stress
R3 Nothing Nothing
R4 Can be trained through exposure Training
R5 Support networks for individuals Support network
R6 Nothing Nothing
R7 Friends, community, leadership Community
R8 Growth mindset, accept failure Growth mindset
R9 BUD/S, platoon training BUD/S
R10 Toughness, do hard things over and over Toughness
R11 Face hardship and overcome it Face hardship
R12 Preparation, understand what you are getting into Preparation
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Document Analysis
No definition of resilience is able to be assessed with any of the documents from the
organization. The only definition of resilience that is attributed to POTFF is found in a Military
Psychology publication (LaCroix et al., 2021). Resilience is measured with the BRS in surveys
from the organization to assess the ability to bounce back from stress. Organizational documents
do not prove a definition or a measurement of trauma.
Summary
The interviews, the surveys, and the document analysis demonstrate misalignment with
the organization’s definition, lack of knowledge concerning resilience, psychological trauma,
and a clear understanding of resilience education. The surveys identified definitions were 38.5%
for both resilience and trauma; 0% of interviewees were able it have full definitions of resilience
and trauma, and 0% were able to identify current programs; document analysis of four
organization documents had no clear and measurable definition of resilience or trauma, that
corresponded with definitions identified from the literature. 38.5% of the required 70% is 31.5%
below the required threshold. Without a clear definition of resilience, measurement is difficult to
achieve. Further, without basic knowledge about programs or resilience education, findings
confirm this influence as a validated need.
Factual Knowledge Influence 2
The second factual knowledge influence was that Stakeholders know what are elements
to implement for a trauma-resilience plan.
Survey Results
Based on the survey results, physical fitness at 71% is the top strategy for resilience to
trauma (Figure 12). The remaining four domain priorities for NSW and POTFF survey results
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were below the cut score. The next four strategies stakeholders responded to for improving
resilience were family support at 59%, positive thinking at 46%, positive coping with emotional
difficulty at 34%, and community belongingness at 34%.
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Figure 12
Responses to Item: “The Following Strategies Improve Resilience to Trauma in Your Opinion
(Choose Up to Five) ”
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Interview Results Question 5
When asked about strategies for reducing psychological trauma, the most common
answer from respondents was to speak about the traumatic event or events (Table 10). Another
common answer was not having an answer to this question. R3 said, “I will have to get back to
you on that one,” and R5 stated, “[Know] nothing.” R7 stated, “You’ve gotta work whether it’s
talking through it with, you know, close friends or psych, a shrink or something like that.”
Table 10
Interview Question 5 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q5: (Knowledge, factual) what facts do you know about reducing psychological trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Don’t know Don’t know
R2 Reframing Reframing
R3 Nothing Nothing
R4 Not a lot, talk about it Talk
R5 Nothing Nothing
R6 Need to let guys rest and recover Rest
R7 Talk to friends or psychologist Talk
R8 Medication, sleep, talking, support network Talk
R9 Don’t know Don’t know
R10 Counseling, time in nature, talking Talk
R11 Talking, psychologist Talk
R12 Preparation Preparation
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Document Analysis
Service members who had higher PTSD, depression and potential alcohol abuse, and
significantly lower resilience, social connectedness, and average hours of sleep stated that the
stigma and access to the resilience programs provided by POTFF as barriers to seeking strategies
for improvement. As a result of stigma and access, POTFF documents display a need for
knowledge regarding strategies to improve resilience. However, the most used and most
promoted program, HPP, physical fitness training, was utilized by those that took the
organization survey at least three times a week.
Summary
Few interviewees were able to speak to one specific strategy to implement to reduce
psychological trauma after harm has already occurred. The survey results put physical fitness at
71% as the top strategy for SEAL operators to implement for resilience to trauma. The document
analysis also confirmed that the HP program was well promoted and utilized, validating this
strategy as an asset. The remaining four POTFF domain priorities for NSW were below the 70%
cut score. The document analysis demonstrates a barrier to implementing a trauma-resilience
plan, again, once harm has already occurred.
About the factual knowledge influence of stakeholders knowing what the elements to
implement for a trauma-resilience plan are, the surveys identified physical fitness as an
organizational strategy that remains an asset at 71%, while family support was at 59%, positive
thinking was at 46%, positive coping with emotional difficulties was at 34%, and community
belongingness was at 34%, showing the additional four elements are needs. Forty-two percent of
the interviewees identified talking as a strategy. Analysis of the organization’s documents shows
that 25% of the top 4 needs or original POTFF pillars are being met by the organization.
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Identified strategies from the survey, interview, and document analysis show 44% of the required
70%, which is 26% below the threshold. This influence is determined to be a need.
Conceptual Knowledge Influence 1
The first conceptual knowledge influence was that stakeholders are able to classify
trauma-resilience principles.
Survey Results
The survey results showed the top five trauma-resilience principles stakeholders are able
to classify according to what they learned in the teams as physical fitness at 86%, teamwork at
73%, cohesion at 48%, realism at 43%, and behavioral control at 42% (Figure 13).
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Figure 13
Responses to Item: “What Kinds of Resilience to Trauma Fundamentals Did You Learn While in
the Teams? (Select All That Apply) ”
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Interview Results Question 6
When asked about aspects of resilience to trauma that can be trained, respondent answers
varied (Table 11). For example, R6 stated, “Understanding you’re participating in an event that
every male throughout the history of humans has done, which is participating in some kind of
violence where the stakes are life and death.” R8 stated, “You have to have a growth mindset,
meaning accepting that failure is going to be part of your growing process and recovery is
important.” R12 described, “Overall awareness of the realities of combat, not some hyped-up
version of a fucking Hollywood movie. What really happens, and talk about loss, and talk about
dealing with stress and the sleep issues and the anxiety issues.”
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Table 11
Interview Question 6 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q6: (Knowledge, conceptual) what aspects of resilience to trauma do you think can be trained
for active-duty operators?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Support groups Support groups
R2 Reframing, emotional knowledge Emotional knowledge
R3 Self-awareness Self-awareness
R4 Bridge gap between training and combat Bridge gap
R5 Mindfulness, emotional regulation, tactical pause Emotional regulation
R6 Understanding war is part of human history Understanding
R7 Warrior culture, fireside talks, lower facade Talks
R8 Invest in personal development, mentorship,
growth mindset, and recovery
Mentorship/growth
mindset/recovery
R9 Decrease surprise, incremental exposure Exposure
R10 Downtime or administrative leave, counseling Downtime
R11 Being open, compartmentalize Being open
R12 Check your ego, talks about reality of the job Talks about reality of the
job
Document Analysis
The POTFF shared two assessments from 2014 and 2017 examining the usage of their
initiatives in their four key principles. Human Performance programs went from being used 69%
to 72%. Behavioral health care was used by 21% in 2014 and 24% in 2017. Chaplain/spiritual
counseling programs participation went from 12% to 1% to 13% in 2017. Social performance
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program participation also went up 1% over the 2-year organizational survey gap from 17% to
18%.
Summary
Interviewees had various answers to principles for a trauma-resilience plan, while the
survey shows that stakeholders rely on physical fitness (86%) and teamwork (73%) as the top
principles. According to the document analysis, the HP program was the highest utilized (72%).
The 2-year gap between the organizational surveys conducted by POTFF for the special warfare
communities showed 54% of those taking the organization’s survey had not heard of POTFF or
the embedded experts (e.g., NSW psychologist, NSW chaplains, POTFF staff).
The survey data concerning the conceptual knowledge influence that stakeholders are
able to classify trauma-resilience principles identified physical fitness at 86%, teamwork at 73%,
cohesion at 48%, realism at 43%, and behavioral control at 42%. Connecting coded interview
language with the surveys and organization documents, 59% of interviewees were able to class
one principle of trauma-resilience; document analysis of the organization documents showed in
2017, the four programs were being utilized at 32%. Physical fitness and teamwork are identified
as resilient strategies and are identified as assets from the survey. In total, 45% of the required
70% are able to classify principles, which is 25% below the required threshold. This influence is
determined to be a need.
Conceptual Knowledge Influence 2
The second conceptual knowledge influence was that stakeholders can structure strategies
for a trauma-resilience plan.
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Survey Results
Survey results showed that stakeholders’ structures for the top five strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan were mentoring at 86%, recognition at 66%, leadership modeling at 55%,
purpose learning at 53%, and coaching support at 47% (Figure 14).
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Figure 14
Responses to Item: “What Are Important Strategies to Improve Resilience to Trauma? (Select All
That Apply) ”
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Interview Results Question 7
When interviewees were asked about educating others and what they would share with
teammates about resilience to trauma, answers varied. The common themes were emotional
intelligence, talking about trauma, or mentors. R2 said, “I’d probably teach myself to become
emotionally intelligent, which you have to develop.” R4 had a combination of those two
responses with, “It’s ok to talk about it, don’t think you have to be a robot, and if you have
emotions, there’s nothing wrong with that.” R6 stated:
I would always teach people to have empathy and understand other human being’s
perspective. There is very few people you can talk to that don’t have an angle. I would
teach them to go to therapy and get some ground truth. What has happened to you, what’s
going on in your environment, and try to make sense of it. Because the scales of work are
so fucked up, it’s like you are dealing with shit that would absolutely just destroy other
people’s minds on a daily basis.
Having mentors with experience was a common theme throughout the interviews (Table
12). R7 stated, “The willingness to share and the mentorship aspect too. You know, guys need
leaders who they can see this kind of behavior from and model it.” Also have a space to display
or show in one’s actions regarding resilient behaviors was addressed with R8’s suggestion:
If someone trained me in meditation, that would have been an absolute game changer.
Because it just covers so much. We have the pods and stuff, but I wish we had a temple
or something that we could go to during lunch. Like 15 minutes, kick off your shoes, sit
in the egg chair or whatever. Guys know it’s healthy, they want to do it, but guys rarely
do it.
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Table 12
Interview Question 7 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q7: (Knowledge, conceptual) If you were educating others, what would you share with them
for resilience to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Mental process, this is what you signed up for Mental process
R2 Emotional intelligence, know how to ask for help Emotional
intelligence, ask
for help
R3 Myriad of foundations to support you Foundations
R4 You have emotions, ok to talk, resilience is built over
time
Emotions, talk
R5 Support networks, know who cares about you Support networks
R6 Empathy, a therapist is ok (this job would crush most
people), mentor
Empathy, mentor
R7 Mentor, talk about mistakes, recognize issues Mentor
R8 Can happen to anyone, no shame, meditation, be open
don’t bottle it up
No shame
R9 Contingency plan, think through the process Contingency plan
R10 Speak early and often, deal with it how you see fit,
and mentorship
Speak early,
mentorship
R11 Talk about it, stay ahead of it, it’s okay Talk
R12 You will have issues (sleep, mood, alcohol, stress),
learn what happens to your body
You will have
issues
Document Analysis
When comparing the data of the organizational surveys, POTFF does note that an
increase in participation in HPP and social connectedness would yield greater resilience results.
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However, in the documents acquired from NSW and POTFF, there was no documentation of the
operating Navy SEALs being asked about their needs for strategies regarding trauma or
resilience.
Summary
Survey and interview results both confirmed that mentoring and emotional intelligence
education would be beneficial strategies to structure into a trauma-resilience plan. The
organizational documents did not demonstrate stakeholders were sought out for responses to
assist in findings for trauma-resilience strategies. The data concerning conceptual knowledge
influence, stakeholders can structure strategies for a trauma-resilience plan; the surveys
identified the current organization strategy of community-wide education at 33%; 50% of
interviewees; document analysis of the organization documents has 0% of operators questioned.
28% of the required 70% is 42% below the required threshold. This influence is determined to be
a need.
Conceptual Knowledge Influence 3
The third conceptual knowledge influence was that Stakeholders can categorize protocols
for implementing a trauma-resilience plan.
Survey Results
Survey results showed stakeholders think that the top five important categories of
resilience to trauma are sleep hygiene education at 81%, brain-healthy nutrition education at
61%, regular exercise education at 56%, calm thinking education at 47%, and emotional
education at 34% (Figure 15).
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Figure 15
Responses to Item: “What Do You Think Are the Top five Important Categories of Resilience to
Trauma? (Choose Up to Five) ”
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Interview Results Question 8
When asked about examples of areas of life where you see resilience and trauma having
an impact, the majority of respondents referenced two categories: internal issues or behavioral
issues (Table 13). R1 expanded,
I think emotional numbing is still something you have to work through. When I got over
there [combat zone], you wouldn’t want to freeze up when something traumatic
happened. Keep going working through it, but then you come back, and you are trying to
be a family person, and like that, it’s not just a switch on or off or at least it hasn’t been.
So, I think it changed my personality to block things, to build walls, and keep things out.
But now, on the backside of your career, those walls are still up.
R8 spoke directly about the trauma by stating:
The trauma, I never realized how bad it was. It’s just so subconscious, and the drinking
and that getting successively worse. And just the slow shift from being normal to taking
more of a negative perspective on life because of how your professional experiences
begin to affect how you think outside of work, and they just infect everything else.
R11 spoke about behavior regarding relationships, “Oh man! Home life. That dimmer switch,
being able to turn it on and off, is something that I struggle with. And that really comes into play
with outlying relationships.” R12 stated, “But sleep, irritability, attention- yeah, those are the big
ones.”
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Table 13
Interview Question 8 summary and Keyword Rationale
Q8: (Knowledge, conceptual) what areas of your life do you see resilience and trauma having
an impact?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Emotional numbing, building walls, and keeping
things out
Emotionally
numbing
R2 Every day- grief inside a box and shutting down Grief
R3 Family and faith Family/faith
R4 Personal relationships Relationships
R5 Big life choices, family, and having a “why” Family
R6 Be glad of exposure Glad
R7 Everything- marriage, being a father, and
professional life
Everything
R8 Drinking, negative life perspective, and lack of self-
awareness
Drinking/negative
life perspective
R9 Tired (physically and of being around it) Tired
R10 All areas All areas
R11 Homelife (struggle to turn it on/off), family, and
friends
Family/friends
R12 Sleep, irritability, attention, along with focus Sleep/focus
Document Analysis
The NSW, through the POTFF, has five categories of resilience for implementing a
resilience plan. The plan does not mention education regarding exposure to known
organizational traumas. The categories are physical domain or HPP, psychological domain with
embedded specialist, the spiritual domain, social and family domain, and the cognitive domain.
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Summary
Each of the pillars addressed by POTFF is an asset, as noted by the surveys and
interviews. According to the organizational documents, 54% of those in the community had not
heard of the POTFF programs. The surveys, also taken by all of the interviewees, showed that
53% of respondents had not heard of POTFF. The absence of knowledge regarding the POTFF
program demonstrates a need for stakeholders to possess the ability to categorize protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan. Due to multiple concerns internally and behaviorally,
stakeholders are unable to categorize protocols for a trauma-resilience plan by the required 70%.
The survey, interviews, and organization documents show at least a 16% gap to the 70% cut
score, demonstrating this influence is a need.
Metacognitive Knowledge Influence 1
The first metacognitive influence was that stakeholders plan their approach and monitor
progress on trauma resilience.
Survey Results
Survey results showed that stakeholders monitor resilience to trauma by quality of life
progression (66%), know the desired end objective (59%), plan ahead (51%), monitor progress
47%, and track goals (36%). Figure 16 displays the results.
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Figure 16
Responses to Item: “In What Ways Have You Monitored Your Resilience to Trauma? (Choose
All That Apply) ”
Interview Findings Question 9
When asked about getting ready to face extraordinary stress and if anything was done
beforehand to prepare psychologically, visualization was almost a unanimous response (Table
14). Visualization also included potential negative events. According to R7, he would “visualize
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all the different ways it could go and try and prepare for you know best case/worst case
scenarios.” R8 had a similar response:
Thinking through the actual event and then planning ‘what ifs’ and then thinking through
in detail, going down the rabbit hole of what could possibly happen with each of those
‘what ifs’ and being as prepared as I can. I’m gonna see potential team issues and other
issues. It helps me have less of a lag time and making a decision, and acting when
necessary.
R9 also mentioned faith in prayer along with visualization, “I pray that I have the strength
to persevere. I try to visualize the situation. If things go off the rails, then there’s less to
consciously think about. We usually went into the mission with every contingency plan, and
there was very little surprise or shock.”
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Table 14
Interview Question 9 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q9: (Knowledge, metacognitive) reflecting on times when you are getting ready to face
extraordinary stress, did you do anything beforehand to prepare psychologically?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Mentally thinking through (visualization) scenarios to
limit surprise from trauma and better prepare you to
move forward sooner and prayer
Visualization, prayer
R2 Visualization, arousal control, goal setting, and self-
talk
Visualization
R3 Momentary mediation, self-talk, visualization (see
both pos/neg outcomes) focus on desired outcome
Visualization
R4 Visualization- success, potential stressors, different
outcomes, what could go wrong and mitigate it
Visualization
R5 Emotionally distance from family Emotionally distance
R6 Prayer, fear of failing mission Prayer
R7 Visualization- best/worst case scenarios, imagine self,
team, mission various responses what can be done,
better outcomes to be prepared
Visualization
R8 Study target to visualize “what ifs”- what could I face
to be better prepared to have answers for all
contingencies for less lag time
Visualization
R9 Pray and visualization- memorize operation in case of
contingencies, less to think about- stay positive to
help stay calm
Visualization, pray
R10 Follow personal routine, breathe work, slow
everything down
Routine
R11 Mentally rehearse/visualization of contingencies-
seeing it keeps the mind calm for mission success,
increase performance and likelihood of success
Visualization
R12 Visualization of different scenarios (death of self and
teammates) or contingencies to feel better prepared
of “what could” to work it out then move on- gives
confidence
Visualization
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Interview Findings Question 10
When asked about doing anything during the extraordinary stress situation to help
themselves psychologically, the majority of respondents spoke to a focus and calm demeanor
(Table 15). R3 stated, “Honestly, just a heightened sense of awareness to then perform the way
you need to perform.” R6 stated something similar: “I knew being in the moment was really
important because if you’re not in the moment, distracted, and you could potentially get hurt.”
According to R9, “I tried to just enjoy the moment, just be present.” R11 spoke to “calming
myself, calming those around me, taking a tactical or pregnant pause, what’s going on, analyze
the situation.”
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Table 15
Interview Question 10 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q10: (Knowledge, metacognitive) did you do anything during the extraordinary stress
situation to help you psychologically?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Focused Focused
R2 Arousal control Arousal control
R3 Slow everything down and focus then perform Focus
R4 Focus- never losing sight of what or where you want
to go
Focus
R5 Emotional regulation Emotional
regulation
R6 Being in the moment, limit distractions Being in the
moment
R7 Nothing Nothing
R8 Maintain focus, calm on the surface and mind is
processing everything quickly
Focus
R9 Enjoy the moment and present Enjoy the moment
R10 Breath and slow down Breath
R11 Pause, breathing, calming self Breathing
R12 Just focus on the job at hand Focus
Interview Findings Question 11
When asked about doing anything after the extraordinary stress situation to help
themselves psychologically, respondents spoke about the use of alcohol or talking about events
(Table 16). R1 said, “I just had substances that I think was a way of shutting things off.” R9 also
spoke about the use of alcohol:
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Usually just trying to drink. Some chit-chat, you know, talking with the bros. I put pieces
together, and by putting those pieces together, you know that helps. I have little bits of
psychological trauma from not understanding the whole picture.
R12 also had a combination of the two, “I mean most times, the debrief, talking about everything
that happened. Later, we would take time, maybe drink, smoke a cigar, just try laughing. Joke a
little bit.”
Table 16
Interview Question 11 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q11: (Knowledge, metacognitive) did you do anything after the extraordinary stress situation
to help you psychologically?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Drink, pills, or nothing Drink
R2 Nothing Nothing
R3 Sleep Sleep
R4 Hot wash/debrief Debrief
R5 Workout or use support network (family/friends) Workout/network
R6 Drink, relax, bed Drink
R7 Nothing Nothing
R8 Journal and talk about mistakes or opportunities
to be better
Talk
R9 Drink, talk, and try to put pieces together Drink/talk
R10 Joke around Joke
R11 Drink Drink
R12 Debrief, talk, laugh, and drink Debrief/laugh/drink
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Document Analysis
The last time the organization’s surveys from POTFF were conducted was in 2017. This
knowledge was not shared with the participants or published data. Adequate branding is the
culprit to operators exploring and using the initiatives, showing the stakeholders do not have an
approach, nor do they monitor their progress within the provided organizational programs.
Summary
Considering the majority of respondents spoke to visualization of negative and positive
potential scenarios, a calm focus, along with alcohol and talking about potentially traumatic
events, demonstrates alignment among stakeholders. However, the respondents did these acts
intuitively, with no education from the organization. Intuitive acts from the operators identified
in the interviews show 0% of the conceptual knowledge of categorizing protocols from the
organization. Along with the low survey scores and need for knowledge sharing at 52%, which
are all needed for stakeholders to plan their approach and monitor progress for a trauma-
resilience plan, identifies 17% of the required 70%, 53% below the required threshold. This
influence is determined to be a need.
Metacognitive Knowledge Influence 2
The second metacognitive influence was that stakeholders can reflect on protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan.
Survey Results
Of the 94 respondents to the survey, 60 contributed to this open-ended survey question
(Table 17). The top four reoccurring responses were trauma education (14), combat experienced
mentors (13), fireside chats/open talking (12), and prevention training (8).
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Table 17
Responses to Item: “Suppose You Were Asked to Apply Protocols for Implementing a Trauma-
Resilience Plan, After the Fact, What Would Be Some of Your Reflections? (Open-Ended) ”
Response themes Respondents
Stress with brain/hormone health 3,10
Prevention training 3,23,25,27,28,34,37, 46
Talking 4,7, 16,20, 22,29,34,35,41, 48, 53,60
Reduce stigmas 4,5,22,33
Time/breaks 3, 5, 48
Combat experienced mentors (trained) 5, 12, 13, 15, 20, 23, 25, 35, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53
Distraction as coping 6
Meditation 8,9,10,33
Breathing education 8,16,33
Visualization 8
Regular exercise 8,33,41
Sleep hygiene 8,33
Yoga 9,10,16,33
Professional therapies 9, 19, 48, 49, 51, 53
Psychedelic therapies 9,10, 51
Suppression & coping education 11,35, 49, 50, 57
Leadership mentoring 12, 13
Trauma education (assessment) 2, 14, 23, 24, 25, 38, 39, 44, 46, 48, 52, 54, 56, 60
Families included 22,29, 50
Faith 41, 50
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Interview Findings Question 12
When asked about the foundation for practicing resilience to trauma, respondents’
answers varied (Table 18). Some of the foundations mentioned were training, faith, community,
friends, family, and team. R1 reflected on past training, “There’s automatically a mental hardship
that goes with it [being a SEAL] or a mental strengthening that accompanies that. Also, having
faith and community. Those things are also part of a foundation.” R3 stated, “The amount and
frequency of training. I think it’s good that we do a lot of training and travel. Different types of
experiences and the amount of stress that we go through, I think, is of the utmost importance.”
R5 stated, “My wife, kids, and I have my neighborhood. Pretty close to a lot of my neighbors. I
got some friends like inside the teams. That was really what I kind of relied on.” R9 spoke to his
faith:
Just my faith in God. … And legit training like BUD/S. That team aspect is important.
When the team supports the guys, I mean because we are sending people to war, and no
matter how trained you are, people still, war isn’t perfect. I haven’t seen some of the
more heinous things, but I have seen some things, and when the team surrounded the
individuals who went through it with support, they went through it easier.
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Table 18
Interview Question 12 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q12: (Knowledge, metacognitive) reflecting on your career, what would you say is the
foundation for practicing resilience to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Not getting comfortable, physical and mental
hardship, faith and community
Hardship, faith,
community
R2 Mental toughness Toughness
R3 Heavy amount of training Training
R4 Planning what success looks like Planning
R5 Support networks (family/friends/team) Network
R6 Purpose and belief in what you are doing Purpose
R7 Positive forward outlook Positive forward
outlook
R8 Desire to grow- growth mindset Growth mindset
R9 Faith in God, training, purpose, belief Faith, purpose
R10 Finding control in chaos by moving to the macro to
micro
Control in chaos
R11 Education and acceptance of success and failure Acceptance
R12 Training hard skills and drinking Training
Interview Findings Question 13
When asked about foundations for practicing resilience to trauma that are worth sharing
with other operators, most repeated something similar to the previous question (Table 19). Along
the topics were belief, community, and conversations with others. R5 shared, “Build up your
network. Having those people who are there to support you. Those top 10 people you’re gonna
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call when that bad shit happens.” R9 spoke to purpose: “When guys have a purpose, an intrinsic
purpose that’s deep within them, they seem to be more resilient.” R11 had a more holistic
answer:
All of them because not everything works for everybody. Talk to behavior health, talk to
others, use Alpha Stem, breathing exercises, as goofy as that is like some Tai chi shit. I
haven’t felt that good and relaxed and just happy, and I couldn’t remember how long.
Doing stuff on your own, meditation or visualization or whatever.
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Table 19
Interview Question 13 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q13: (Knowledge, metacognitive) what foundations for practicing resilience to trauma are
worth sharing with other operators?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Social groups outside of the SEAL Team and
spiritual beliefs
Social/spiritual
R2 Humility and emotional regulation Emotional regulation
R3 Mindfulness and visualization Mindfulness/
visualization
R4 It’s okay to ask for help and not be where you want. It’s okay to ask for
help
R5 Build networks- have your top 10 people Network
R6 Sleep, positive thoughts, high quality people, and
belief in what you are doing
Belief
R7 Community culture—not alone, be there for others,
and try to intervene.
Community
R8 Belief in self—do your best and meditation. Belief/meditation
R9 Deep sense of purpose Purpose
R10 Routine and systematic process Routine
R11 All the things—talk to friends and a therapist. Talk
R12 Having real conversations—supports preparation of
what you will go through and keep your ego in
check.
Real conversations
Interview Findings Question 14
When asked to reflect on other operators and what techniques are worth sharing, answers
continued to vary (Table 20). Some topics spoken about were mental toughness, faith,
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meditation, preparation, routine, or medical intervention. A theme of no ego did emerge. R1 said,
“The guys who I’ve admired the most in the teams are the guys who didn’t have an ego.” R4
spoke to techniques regarding the importance of learning from mistakes:
Developing a team where failure is not feared or chastised is critical. There is a big
stigma where failure is frowned upon, and obviously, certain failures you can’t have, but
I always learned more when I messed things up, and you have a mentor there or a team to
explain to you or show you corrections. I think that that is really where the resilience can
come from because if you fail a thing, and you constantly get hammered, that just breads
more fear of failure.
R7 echoed a similar response,
When they have the openness to share their stories and how it affected them. Guys have
to be open and honest and take away the bravado.” R6 stated, “I think the best one is
don’t take it personally. They looked at it like a job, and they didn’t take it personally.
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Table 20
Interview Question 14 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q14: (Knowledge, metacognitive) reflecting on other operators, what techniques do you think
are worth sharing?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 No ego, self-regulated, thought and emotional
management
No ego/self-regulation
R2 Mental toughness Toughness
R3 Their faith Faith
R4 Meditation/visualization, a team that does not fear
failure, and have a mentor
Visualization
R5 Use medical interventions. Medical interventions
R6 Not to take things personal Not to take things
personally
R7 Openness to share stories, no bravado or façade Stories/no bravado
R8 Passion and preparation Passion/preparation
R9 No ego, exposing scenarios in training to minimize
surprise
No ego
R10 Routine and mindset Routine/mindset
R11 Hearing the stories of others for perspective Stories
R12 Sit and talk about it. Talk
Document Analysis
Organizational surveys demonstrate positive advancements in the development of
resilience with the programs utilized by the population that knew about the offerings. Of the
negative coping measures that do not support protocols for implementing resilience to trauma,
results from organizational documents provided showed the following from their past surveys:
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social connectedness was down 18%, hours of sleep were down to 6.01%, dependence on
alcohol was up to 2.4%, acknowledging a high problem was 10.7%, acknowledging a potential
problem. High PTSD rates were at 12.3%.
Summary
Data collection for this influence does direct attention to practices and techniques with
training, meditation, preparation, routine, community, friends, family, and team, along with the
topics of belief, community, faith, or medical intervention (Table 21). The data demonstrate that
there is a metacognitive knowledge gap of 100% since 0% of the required 70% of the
stakeholders can reflect on protocols as a result of there not being a trauma-resilience plan to
implement. This influence is confirmed as a validated need.
Table 21
Knowledge Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data
Assumed knowledge influence Asset or
need
Factual
Stakeholders know facts about trauma-resilience strategies. Need
Stakeholders know what are elements to implement for a trauma-resilience plan. Need
Conceptual
Stakeholders are able to classify trauma-resilience principles. Need
Stakeholders can structure strategies for a trauma-resilience plan. Need
Stakeholders can categorize protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience plan. Need
Metacognitive
Stakeholders plan their approach and monitor progress on trauma resilience. Need
Stakeholders can reflect on protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience plan. Need
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Results and Findings for Motivation Needs
The motivation category of KMO is further divided into three areas: extrinsic value, self-
efficacy, and emotions. Chapter Two’s literature review highlighted five influences under the
motivation category with 1 x extrinsic value, 2 x self-efficacy, and 2 x emotions. The data were
used to validate that particular influence as an asset or need. This study had regular fitness (90%)
validated as an asset, along with sleep hygiene (84%). However, when that influence was
analyzed through triangulation, that influence became a need. The data shows the five motivation
influences are all validated needs.
Extrinsic Value Influence
The extrinsic value influence was that Stakeholders find it useful for themselves to utilize
key factors in trauma resilience.
Survey Results
Based on the survey results, stakeholders find regular exercise at 90%, sleep hygiene at
84%, brain-healthy nutrition at 56%, calm thinking at 54%, and tactical breathing at 38% the top
useful skills to apply resilience to trauma (Figure 17).
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Figure 17
Responses to Item: “As an Operator, I Find It Useful for Me to Apply Resilience to Trauma
Skills by (Choose All That Apply) ”
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Interview Findings Question 15
When asked about what they have done throughout their career to reduce the impacts of
trauma they may have experienced, answers varied. Some answers included sleep loss,
suppression, negative thoughts, time with friends, medication, and working out (Table 22). One
common theme was the use of alcohol. R2 stated, “Probably nothing. I just knew something was
fucking wrong. Just tried to turn my brain off, like I wanna get hammered.” R3 stated something
similar: “All the negative things that come with suppression, like drinking.” R10 spoke to a
culmination of issues built up:
I had a period where everything that could go wrong went wrong. The amount of mental,
physical, emotional, and spiritual damage that occurred- I understood why people killed
themselves. It was close to suicide by drinking or complete bodily shutdown.”
R11 elaborated on negative and positive ways he addressed the impacts of trauma:
Fucking drink. No, I mean until the last couple of years. I was pretty good with that.
Successful things, I did a decent amount of acupuncture, the old Chinese, a lot of body
and mind stuff with that and for me addressing all those together was huge. So, I get that
taken care of. Because I will put down my guard and shield a little bit to be like, oh, it’s
the body within, as you know. Starting with something you are comfortable with focusing
on the physical that can evolve to something like self-reflection and some acceptance.
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Table 22
Interview Question 15 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q15: (Motivation, extrinsic value) what have you done throughout your career to reduce the
impacts of trauma you may have experienced?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Sleep loss, drink Sleep loss, drink
R2 Nothing, handled things poorly, drinking Drinking
R3 Suppression, drinking, and all the bad things Suppression, drinking
R4 Having a core group of friends Friends
R5 Workout, therapy, mindfulness Workout, therapy,
mindfulness
R6 Stopped drinking and started to manage the
physical (sleep, hormones, physical activity)
Drinking, physical
management
R7 NICoE, family Family
R8 Meditation, medication, vitamins, and
supplements
Meditation, medication
R9 Nothing Nothing
R10 Self-pity and drank Self-pity, drank
R11 Drink, acupuncture, and spiritual side Drink
R12 Time with the guys Time with guys
Document Analysis
Special warfare community members were surveyed as to if they were aware of the
resources and if they had found them beneficial from the organization. The data from the
organization states that from 2014 to 2017, the stakeholders found the POTFF provided
resources beneficial (39% to 35%).
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Summary
The theme of prioritizing sleep and exercise echoed through the data. Additionally,
themes of negative coping practices, specifically alcohol and low numbers, regarding the use of
available resources, were apparent. Findings show collection concerning extrinsic value
motivation influence that stakeholders find it useful for themselves to utilize key factors in
trauma-resilience. The surveys identified 40% of key factors are utilized. Among interviewees,
42% of key factors are utilized. Document analysis of the organization documents shows that
35% of key factors are utilized. Thirty-nine percent of the required 70% is 31% below the
required threshold. These findings suggest that stakeholders lack the education for useful key
factors to be utilized for a trauma-resilience plan. This influence is determined to be a need.
Self-Efficacy Influence 1
The self-efficacy influence was that stakeholders believe in their ability to identify key
factors in a trauma-resilience plan.
Survey Results
Respondents’ belief in their ability to identify key factors in a trauma-resilience plan was
at 62% on average (Figure 18).
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Figure 18
Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Believe in Your Ability to Identify Key Factors in a
Trauma-Resilience Plan? (Percentage Rating) ”
Interview Findings Question 16
When asked about ever experiencing any effects from a potentially traumatic experience,
answers varied (Table 23). Some of the responses included nightmares, anger, family issues,
depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and emotional suppression. A common theme, not only in
this question but in almost all the interviews, was statements about the loss of teammates and the
grief that follows. R8 spoke to the effects of trauma being noticed later in life: “I started dealing
with certain effects years later, especially when it came to losing friends. When I was able to
reflect, I started to actually feel more of an effect from those losses.” R12 stated, “The first guy
that I was really good friends with that died, I was a fucking hot mess. He killed himself, and
like, it’s just fucking crushing me. Now we’re just fucking drinking.” R2 spoke directly about his
grief:
Just like processing grief. My wife described it because she has a degree in social work.
She described it as a box; imagine you are a box. There’s a button in that box to remind
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you of that grief, and when that grief is fresh, it’s a ball that takes up a majority of the
inside of the box, and it’s constantly hitting that button.
Table 23
Interview Question 16 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q16: (Motivation, self-efficacy) did you ever experience any effects from a potentially
traumatic experience?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Emotional numbing Numbing
R2 Yes- weak Yes
R3 Negative direction of energy Negative
R4 Anger and family issues Anger, family issues
R5 Yes- emotional issues, anger, disappointment,
and cynicism
Anger
R6 Suicidal tendencies, exhausted and burnt-out, no
sleep
Suicide tendencies,
exhausted
R7 Depression, anxiety, shaken hard Depression, shaken hard
R8 Thought and emotional suppression,
compartmentalize, grief, and stress
Suppression, stress, grief
R9 Grief and suppression Grief, suppression
R10 Grief and guilt Grief, guilt
R11 Hyper alert Hyper alert
R12 Nightmares, drinking, and grief Nightmares, drinking, grief
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Document Analysis
Of the documents obtained, there was no evidence of stakeholders’ confidence in their
ability to identify factors of a trauma-resilience plan. As mentioned, the documents provided do
address combat stress, but nothing relating to trauma or trauma resilience.
Summary
Respondents’ answers demonstrated low confidence in their ability to utilize key factors
in trauma resilience. Factors from interview respondents included nightmares, anger, family
issues, depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, grief, and emotional suppression. The document
analysis also lacked key factors. The self-efficacy motivation influence of stakeholders’ belief in
their ability to identify key factors in a trauma-resilience plan. Surveys identified 62% belief in
their ability. All 12 interviewees identified negative coping techniques, demonstrating 0% belief
in their ability. Document analysis of the organization documents yielded 0%. Twenty-one
percent of the required 70% is 49% below the required threshold. This influence is determined to
be a need.
Self-Efficacy Influence 2
Stakeholders believe in their ability to implement strategies of a trauma-resilience plan.
Survey Results
Respondents’ belief in their ability to implement strategies of a trauma-resilience plan
was at 65% on average (Figure 19).
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Figure 19
Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Believe in Your Ability to Implement Strategies of
a Trauma-Resilience Plan? (Percentage Rating) ”
Interview Findings Question 17
When asked what happens to their level of confidence as an operator after a potentially
traumatic event, most of the answers had a negative response (Table 24). A traumatic event
means something did not go as expected, which led to operators questioning themselves. The
level of confidence correlated with the outcome of expectations. R3 stated, “I suppose it’s
situation dependent, so depending on the outcome of the offense and your reaction.” R4 stated, “I
would say that it varied. Let’s say I screwed something up. That’d be a bad arrival for
confidence.” R10 had a similar response, “It could be swayed based on outcomes. I think mine
will remain the same, if not go down a little.”
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Table 24
Interview Question 17 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q17: (Motivation, self-efficacy) after a potentially traumatic event what happens to your level
of confidence as an operator?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Boosted- training got it done. Boosted
R2 Plummeted- in both self and of others Plummeted
R3 Depends on outcome Depends on outcomes
R4 Outcome dependent- successful or hammered Outcome dependent
R5 Decreased Decreased
R6 Either a “ball of mess” or good Either a mess or good
R7 Fucked up- a major impact Impacted
R8 Shaken Shaken
R9 Dips Dips
R10 Outcomes based- might go down a little Outcomes based
R11 Gets messed with Affected
R12 Outcome dependent Outcomes dependent
Document Analysis
Of the documents obtained, there was no evidence of stakeholders’ confidence in their
ability to implement strategies of a trauma-resilience plan. As mentioned, the documents
provided do address combat stress, but nothing relating to trauma or trauma resilience.
Summary
The surveys conducted through the POTFF program accounted for only 17% of the total
Special Operations Community. Of that 17%, 11% stemmed from the NSW community,
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including support personnel. Low survey numbers, along with operator confidence affected by
traumatic events or expectations not being met, resulted in operators questioning themselves and
bringing confidence down. Regarding the concerning self-efficacy motivation influence of
stakeholders believing in their ability to implement strategies of a trauma-resilience plan, the
surveys identified 65%, 25% of interviewees believed the belief is outcome dependent, and
document analysis of the organization documents 0%. Thirty percent of the required 70% is 40%
below the required threshold. This influence is determined to be a need.
Emotions Influence 1
The first emotions influence was that stakeholders feel good about identifying key factors
in trauma resilience.
Survey Results
Respondents felt good about identifying, within themselves, key factors in trauma
resilience at 65% on average (Figure 20).
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Figure 20
Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Feel Good About Identifying Within Yourself Key
Factors in Trauma-Resilience?” (Percentage Rating) ”
Interview Findings Question 18
When asked to describe how they feel when implementing positive resilient behaviors to
trauma, the majority of answers were positive (Table 25). R1 simply stated, “I feel more secure. I
don’t feel like a house of cards. I thought it was a house of bricks.” R4 had a simple answer: “I
think it creates a calmness.” R8 elaborated, “It’s reassuring to know that. Initially, when I started
meditating, was reassuring to know that I can start sensing some recovery. And that I could
affect the mental state and perspective that I was having.”
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Table 25
Interview Question 18 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q18: (Motivation, emotions) can you describe to me how you feel when implementing
positive resilient behaviors to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 More secure Secure
R2 Shame Shame
R3 Pride Pride
R4 Calmness Calmness
R5 It is working It is working
R6 Didn’t do it, so don’t know Don’t know
R7 Roller coaster Roller coaster
R8 Reassuring Reassuring
R9 Okay Okay
R10 Good Good
R11 Confident Confident
R12 Confident and prepared Confident/prepared
Document Analysis
Organizational instruments cannot take into account the universe of factors impacting
personnel and must consider limitations in organizational survey length, response options, and
inclusiveness. As a result, the documents analyzed are a mix of operators and support, along with
limiting survey tools that do not include stakeholders’ emotions.
Summary
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Interviewees were consistent in feeling good when they eventually implemented positive
resilient behaviors at 66%. The issue is the identification and implementation of those positive
resilient behaviors, which was demonstrated by the low scoring on the survey along with
ambiguity in the documents at 65%. Although stakeholders feel good when positive action is
taken, identifying positive resilient behavior is still low at 44% overall of the required 70%, 26%
below the required threshold, validating this influence as a need.
Emotions Influence 2
The second emotions influence was that implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience
plan makes stakeholders feel good.
Survey Results
Stakeholders responding to the survey feel good about implementing strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan at 68% on average (Figure 21).
Figure 21
Responses to Item: “To What Degree Do You Feel Good About Implementing Strategies That
Help You Become Resilient to Trauma? (Percentage Rating) ”
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Interview Findings Question 19
When asked about examples of when they felt good about improving their resilience to
trauma, the majority of answers varied with positivity (Table 26). R5 stated, “The physical
aspect is important. Taking care of your body helps take care of your mind, but it’s feeling good.
That mental aspect of mindfulness of accepting those emotions and processing them, instead of
trying to push them down.” R8 stated, “through self-reflection and being thankful, just feeling
gratitude, being able to truly be compassionate to myself. Essentially, treating myself with a kind
of kindness and nurturing.” R10 stated, “I congratulate myself, so positive self-talk.”
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Table 26
Interview Question 19 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q19: (Motivation, emotions) can you speak to examples of when you felt good about
improving your resilience to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Step in the right direction specifically for family Family
R2 Interactions with family Family
R3 Right path with family Family
R4 Increased skill as an operator Increased skill
R5 Physical fitness and accepting those emotions Fitness/ accepting
R6 Never felt that way Never felt that way
R7 Better sleep and parent, also less drinking and more
sleep
Better
R8 Gratitude, compassion and kindness toward self Gratitude, compassion
R9 Acceptance and compassion Acceptance
R10 Positive self-talk Positive
R11 Confident Confident
R12 Comfortable with outcomes and ability Comfortable
Document Analysis
Organizational instruments cannot take into account the universe of factors impacting
personnel and must consider limitations in survey length, response options, and inclusiveness. As
a result, the documents analyzed are a mix of operators and support, along with limiting survey
tools that do not include stakeholders’ emotions.
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Summary
Interviewees were consistent in feeling good when they eventually implemented positive
resilient behaviors at 75% (Table 27). The issue is the identification and implementation of those
positive resilient behaviors, which was demonstrated by the low score on the survey, 68%, along
with ambiguity in the documents, 0%. Stakeholders feel good when positive action is taken.
Implementing positive resilient behavior is still low at 48%, 22% below the 70% cut score,
validating this influence as a need.
Table 27
Motivation Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data
Assumed motivation influence Asset or need
Extrinsic value
Stakeholders find it useful for themselves to utilize key factors in trauma
resilience.
Need
Self-efficacy
Stakeholders believe in their ability to identify key factors in a trauma-
resilience plan.
Need
Stakeholders believe in their ability to implement strategies of a trauma-
resilience plan.
Need
Emotions
Stakeholders feel good about identifying key factors in trauma resilience. Need
Implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan makes stakeholders
feel good.
Need
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Results and Findings for Organization Needs
The organizational category of KMO is further divided into three areas: cultural models,
policies and procedures, and resources. Chapter Two’s literature review highlighted four
influences under the organization category with 1 x cultural models, 1 x policies and procedures,
and 2 x resources. The data were used to validate that particular influence as an asset or need.
The data shows the four organizational influences are all validated needs.
Cultural Models Influence
The cultural models influence was that stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma
resilience.
Survey Results
That stakeholders trust in the organization for education in resilience to trauma was
strongly agreed and agreed at 32%, 21% undecided, and 46% disagreed and strongly disagreed
(Figure 22).
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Figure 22
Responses to Item: “I Trust in NSW for My Education in Resilience to Trauma (Likert 5-Point
Scale) ”
Interview Findings Question 20
When asked how the Team’s culture affects their approach to resilience to trauma,
answers typically fell into two categories (Table 28). R4 sums it up, “The overall culture of the
teams probably either makes or breaks you.” R1 echoed that response:
The culture is kind of a slippery slope. It’s like a double-edged sword. If you mirror the
right epitome of a tough operator and everything looks fine on the outside, like it’s
completely under control, but it’s not sustainable, and it’s gonna come crashing down.
R12, along with others, thought the team’s culture was not supportive:
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I think the culture is counterproductive to dealing with trauma. You go through a
traumatic event, we’re gonna go fucking have drinks, and we might tell some stories, but
we’re not really fucking dealing with it. We’re just numbing ourselves to the fucking
pain.
R2 stated, “If something’s wrong, you just get thrown into the bin with the other broken toys.”
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Table 28
Interview Question 20 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q20: (Organization, cultural models) how would you say the Team’s culture affects your
approach to your resilience to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Double-edged sword, men don’t show emotions,
culture of suppression, can process devastating
things but comes with giving something up
Suppression
R2 Teams have no time—go in the bin with broken
toys.
Teams have no time.
R3 Leader dependent Leader dependent
R4 Makes or breaks you Makes or breaks you.
R5 Perception is reality. This affects if you ask for help
or not. BUD/S teaches to put pain on the back
burner—keep going with the mission, but the
baggage is going to catch up.
Put pain on the back
burner.
R6 Can be negative: hide it till you fall off the deep end,
then you are a leper.
Negative
R7 There has been some improvement, and still
learning.
Still learning
R8 Depends on you—a toxic environment can make
things difficult or create opportunities.
Depends on you.
R9 Some teams are good, and others are not. Some teams are good.
R10 Train how you fight—this is what I did wrong, and
this is what I am going to do better.
Train how you fight.
R11 It is not okay to be fucked up in the teams. It’s not okay.
R12 Culture is counterproductive to deal with trauma.
Drink and numbing is the culture.
Culture is
counterproductive.
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Document Analysis
In a statement published by the POTFF, “many [stakeholders] refuse to ask for help or
show the least bit of vulnerability.” The same document states that this leaves the “members to
bear the burden of hiding their personal issues to avoid social stigma associated with their
problem.” The attempt of the organization in this document is to improve the trust of the
stakeholders or reduce the stigma of seeking out the organization for educational resources.
Summary
The gaps rooted in the cultural models are apparent in the survey, interview, and
document analysis. Each of the analyses was able to identify stigmas, lack of support, and
counterproductive measures as ways that trust in the organization is lacking. Cultural models
organization influence of stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma-resilience shows; the
surveys identified 32% agreed; 50% of interviewees agreed; document analysis of the
organization documents 0% provided showed trust. Twenty-seven of the required 70% is 43%
below the required threshold. It is apparent in the organization’s own recognition of the gap that
this influence is validated as a need.
Policies and Procedures Influence
The policies and procedures influence was that procedures that are in place to identify
key factors to implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW policies.
Survey Results
Respondents strongly agreed and agreed at 19% that the organization provides them with
clear procedures toward resilience to trauma, and they were 31% undecided, and 50% disagreed
and strongly disagreed (Figure 23).
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Figure 23
Responses to Item: “NSW Consistently Provides Me With Clear Procedures Toward Resilience
to Trauma (Likert 5-Point Scale) ”
Interview Findings Question 21
When asked to speak to strategies NSW promotes to be resilient to trauma, answers
varied (Table 29). Most of the respondents’ answers could be organized into three categories:
training they had been through, NSW resources, or did not know. R4 highlighted training, “I
think the Whole Man approach session that we went through in the BUD/S Pipeline is one of the
best things NSW does.” R11 spoke to NSW resources, “I’m tracking financial support, marriage
counseling or psychs. Also, the retreats and foundations like Navy SEAL Foundation, SEAL
Future foundation is just fucking amazing.” R9 stated, “I have never seen a program to be
153
resilient to trauma that I know of.” Also, R6, “I don’t think they do, and I’m not saying they’re
not doing it. I just don’t know any.”
Table 29
Interview Question 21 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q21: (Organization, policies and procedures) Please speak to strategies NSW promotes to be
resilient to trauma?
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 POTFF, mind gyms, and decompression stops POTFF
R2 BUD/S BUD/S
R3 POTFF, NSF, command retreats, and positive
communication about mental health
BUD/S, NSF
R4 BUD/S (whole man concept) BUD/S
R5 Keep going mentality, mental coaches, and
psychologists
Psychologists
R6 Nothing Nothing
R7 Mindfulness and wellness Mindfulness/wellness
R8 Nothing besides command psychologists Psychologists
R9 Nothing to trauma Nothing
R10 Don’t know Don’t know
R11 Marriage and financial counseling, NSF, SEAL
Future Foundation, along with retreats and
phycologists
Psychologists, NSF
R12 Don’t know Don’t know
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Document Analysis
Organizationally, POTFF and NSW utilize Facebook pages, websites, spouse calls, all
hands calls, service members hearing about POTFF at quarters, and articles to spread the word
about the programs. Despite these efforts, there are no clear procedures toward resilience to
trauma, and only 23% find the POTFF programs very beneficial or beneficial.
Summary
Procedures in place from the organization identifying key factors to implement strategies
for a trauma-resilience plan do not align with NSW policies in any of the three analysis methods
utilized. The interview provided the most insight as to the range of identification, from initial
BUD/S training to the use of non-profit foundation resources. The data concerning policies and
procedures of organizational influence, procedures that are in place to identify key factors to
implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW policies. The surveys
identified that 19% agreed. Of interviewees, 33% agreed. In document analysis, 23% agreed.
Twenty-five percent of the required 70% is 45% below the required threshold. This influence is
validated to be a need.
Resources Influence 1
The first resources influence was that money is allocated for trauma-resilience education
for stakeholders.
Survey Results
Respondents were 13% yes that money is allocated for trauma-resilience education and
46% no, and 41% not sure (Figure 24).
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Figure 24
Responses to Item: “NSW Provides Me Sufficient Money in My Budget to Provide Education
That Addresses Resilience to Trauma (Yes, No, or Not Sure) ”
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Interview Findings Question 22
Answers varied when asked to describe any organizational programs that provide
resilience education specific to trauma (Table 30). Some common responses were foundations,
command psychologists, or did not know. The most common answer was NICoE. R1 stated,
“Probably NICoE. Basically, the skills that NICoE taught.” R7 stated, “NICoE, but that’s outside
of NSW and exclusive. Then I know the stuff we talked about POTFF and the retreats and the
education they have there. And then, the pre-deployment plus post-deployment retreats, which
are pretty lame, mostly worthless.” R8 stated, “NICoE, I think for us. That’s the only one I am
familiar with.”
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Table 30
Interview Question 22 Summary and Key Word Rational
Q22: (Organization, resources) Please describe any organizational programs that provide
resilience education specific to trauma.
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 NICoE, veterans’ affairs (VA), yoga NICoE/VA/yoga
R2 None None
R3 VA, non-profit foundations, Care Coalition VA/foundations
R4 HPP, yoga, chaplains Yoga/chaplains
R5 Chaplains, psychologists Chaplains
R6 Don’t know Don’t know
R7 NICoE, POTFF retreats NICoE/POTFF
R8 NICoE NICoE
R9 Don’t know Don’t know
R10 Don’t know Don’t know
R11 NICoE and non-profit foundations NICoE/foundations
R12 Don’t know Don’t know
Document Analysis
In 2017, the military pursued filling a 2018 contract. The USSOCOM had been awarded
a budget of $500 million dollars for 5 years. The contract or performance work statement
outlines the desired needs the contract awardee will need to fulfill. The statement does not
allocate money for trauma-resilience education.
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Summary
The surveys demonstrated that the stakeholders were unsure of resources that stemmed
from the organization, with 13% saying that money is available for education. The interviewees
were able to identify some of the programs where money is allocated for educational progress at
50%. However, the stakeholders were not able to identify that the money was from the
organization, or they stated that the resources were exclusive resources. As a government
agency, the resources are public knowledge shown in the document analysis. Money is allocated;
however, the stakeholders do not know that the organization has the money. Fifty-four percent of
the 70% cut score is verified, with a difference of 16%. This influence is determined to be a
need.
Resources Influence 2
The second resources influence was that educational specialists needed for in- and
outside-of-classroom support.
Survey Results
Respondents at 15% yes, 44% no, and 41% not sure that the organization provides
enough money for educators for resilience to trauma (Figure 25).
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Figure 25
Responses to Item: “The Organization Provides Enough Money to Provide Me With Educators
for Resilience to Trauma (Yes, No, or Not Sure) ”
Interview Findings Question 23
When asked to speak about any ongoing organizational support that is provided for
resilience to trauma education, some spoke to command psychologists or foundations (Table 31).
The most common answer from respondents was that they did not know. R2 simply stated,
“Zero, none, nothing.” R4 stated, “I can’t think of any. Yeah, you know, so it doesn’t mean it
doesn’t exist. But I don’t know any.” R12 stated, “I don’t know that I can name any, but I think
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there are nonprofits that are around for resilience. Based for guys after they get out, or families,
but off the top of my head, I can’t think of any.”
Table 31
Interview Question 23 Summary and Keyword Rationale
Q23. (Organization, resources) Please speak to any ongoing organizational support that is
provided for resilience to trauma education.
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Command psychologist, navy drug and alcohol
program (DAPA)
Psychologists/ DAPA
R2 Nothing Nothing
R3 Nothing Nothing
R4 Don’t know Don’t know
R5 Nothing Nothing
R6 Don’t know Don’t know
R7 POTFF, psychologists, and chaplains POTFF, psychologists,
chaplains
R8 Psychologists Psychologists
R9 Foundations Foundations
R10 Don’t know Don’t know
R11 NICoE, foundations NICoE, foundations
R12 Don’t know and foundations Don’t know, foundations
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Document Analysis
The public works statement from USSOCOMM discusses, in the purpose and objectives,
service needs relating to the physical and behavioral capacity of resilience. However, none of the
programs or requested specialists required involve trauma. There were requests for
psychoeducational programs with broad wellness categories.
Summary
Surveys provided 15% responses to yes, and interview results were that 33% stated there
were education specialists providing resilience to trauma education(Table 32). Additionally, the
document analysis showed that none of the specialists provided education specific to trauma.
Sixteen percent of the required 70% is 54% below the required threshold. This influence is
determined to be a need.
Table 32
Organizational Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data
Assumed organizational influence Asset or need
Cultural models
Stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma resilience. Need
Policies and procedures
Procedures that are in place to identify key factors to implementing
strategies for a trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW policies.
Need
Resources
Money is allocated for trauma-resilience education for stakeholders. Need
Educational specialists needed for in- and outside-of-classroom support. Need
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Additional Findings
The KMO gap analysis is a comprehensive, research-based framework to evaluate
organizational performance and goals by scrutinizing the space between current and preferred, or
desired, performance. This framework uses a priori (pre-established) coding versus open coding
for data analysis. The a priori coding for this research was established in Chapter Two. However,
during the interviews, one theme from each respondent started to become a source of trauma not
seen in the literature or the document analysis: performance.
Traditional posttraumatic stress is rooted in fear associated, typically, with the
environment (APA, 2013). Moral injury, although not a mental health diagnosis, has supporting
literature and is assumed by some researchers to be a substantial issue among military veterans,
especially those who have experienced combat (Litz, 2007). Moral injury is rooted in morality,
specific behavior that is done or not done. Some of the symptoms of PTSD and moral injury are
anxiety, guilt, shame, and betrayal (APA, 2013; Litz, 2007). Open coding the 12 interviewees,
with the additional finding of performance trauma as a primary code, revealed that 12 operators
spoke to potential trauma rooted in performance. Only one of the 12 interviews spoke to a past
trauma rooted in morality, and zero interviewees had a fear of anything from the environment.
The performance trauma was either from something they did that had a negative outcome, a
sense of betrayal from leadership rooted in performance and not morality, or fearing an inability
to perform from an event that never occurred.
Events that had negative outcomes in performance could have been perceived in various
ways., as seen in the examples interviewees provided. R7, in referencing a parachute accident
that had negative outcomes and his perception of additional possible consequences, stated, “The
jump [name] died on. … I just wonder if, like, you know, if I just held that [parachute formation]
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a little bit stronger, would that little bit had made a difference?” This traumatic event had
multiple possible outcomes, yet R7’s interpretation of the experience made him question himself:
“What could I have done to have done that better? It’s really, you know, going to affect me or
gonna eat at me forever. I don’t hold a huge amount of guilt, but there is something.”
A sense of betrayal from leadership that stems from performance, and not rooted in
morality, was identified during R10’s interview. The recognition of the betrayal of leadership
was a result of his performance as a leader. Respondent-10 recalled, “I thought I had led them to
their deaths… a lot of trauma took me. It still bothers me today. I always have guilt of what I
could have done, but I never have guilt about whatever happened to me.” In a later interview,
R10 commented further on trauma that was rooted in performance, recalling,
All the guys who you think have your back, in 1 day, you find out they don’t. People look
at me with guilt and dishonor. That was probably the most painful thing because I went
from hero to zero overnight!
Performance is also a trauma factor recognized in events that did not actually take place
yet still plagued operators. During the interviews, R12 described nightmares concerning doubts
about the ability to meet tactical expectations. “I still have them several times a week. I still
wake up like fucking screaming, or yelling, or saying something. Even though, in my brain, in
my dreams, I don’t feel like I’m reliving traumatic events.” As the interview continued, R12
recognized, “Almost all of them are things that didn’t even fucking happen. I’m searching for
some piece of gear. I don’t know where I put my rifle, radio, or whatever. Everybody is waiting
on me, and I’m all fucked up.”
In summary, there are various facets regarding performance trauma: negative outcome
performance trauma, betrayal in leadership performance trauma, and fictitious performance
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trauma (Table 33). These have not been identified in previous literature and are important to
understand for the development of trauma-resilience psychoeducation. A special forces
operator’s psychological trauma could have an additional genesis in performance and not the
traditional fear of environment or moral injury. This information can potentially better support
mental health providers for the treatment and care of high-performance operators and a
community that lost many to suicide and other family and social costs that come with PTSD.
Table 33
Additional Performance Findings Determined by the Interview Data
Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
R1 Nightmares related to performance (anxiety,
control, gear, preparation). Shame around
not performing well. More afraid of
weakness than death.
Performance, nightmares,
shame, anxiety, death
R2 Had an internal performance deficit and
shame for asking for help. Felt betrayed for
being thrown in a bin with other broken
toys.
Performance, shame, betrayed
R3 Fell short in performance with a performance
focus at a level of life and death.
Performance, death
R4 Failure is frowned upon. Stressful training
with performance mistakes that “dig into
you.”
Performance, failure
R5 Felt betrayed by the teams’ for failing to
support him. Had performance expectations
of the “brothers” and leaders that were not
met.
Performance, betrayed
R6 More fear of failing the mission than death.
Everybody eventually breaks and we judge
guys harder who quit.
Failing, death
R7 Continue to perform or spiral. What could I
have done better? The level of performance
Perform
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Respondent Summary Keyword rationale
and trauma is wafer thin. If my performance
is slightly off, a teammate could get shot.
R8 I can’t make mistakes, it ruins guys. You are
going to screw up and make mistakes. Learn
to deal with failure. Once they don’t start
performing well, guys just spiral.
Performing, failure
R9 Mistake or not, get the proper support and it is
part of the game- some catches made, and
big catches missed.
Mistake
R10 Guilt from what I could have done. Guys
turned their back on me and felt betrayed.
Guilt, betrayal
R11 Over work, stress, and perfectionism plus
feelings of guilt for letting people down with
continued performance leads to diminishing
returns.
Performance, guilt
R12 Nightmares regarding tactical expectations
and performance ability.
Performance, nightmares
Conclusion
The data were used to validate each particular influence as an asset or need through
triangulation. This study had physical fitness (71% and 86%) twice validated as an asset along
with the HPP (72%) and teamwork (73%) along with regular fitness (90%) validated as an asset,
including sleep hygiene (84%). However, when that influence was analyzed through
triangulation, that influence became a need. The data shows that all 16 KMO influences are
validated needs. A primary concern from the results of the document analysis is that the
documents are not isolated to Navy SEAL operators. In total, 35% of personnel were exposed to
combat. The document analysis did note that support personnel (9%) and operators (26%) were
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exposed to combat. Additionally, 39% were on the spectrum of having PTSD. The rates of PTSD
were ranked low (19.5%), moderate (7.2%), and high (12.3%),
Lack of knowledge concerning resilience and psychological trauma and a clear
understanding of resilience education is found with all 16 influences. Starting without a clear
definition of resilience results in measurements being difficult to achieve. Few interviewees were
able to speak to one strategy to implement to reduce psychological trauma after harm has already
occurred. Survey and interview results both confirmed that mentoring and emotional intelligence
education would be beneficial strategies to structure into a trauma-resilience plan.
According to the organizational documents, 54% of those in the community had not
heard of the POTFF programs, including interviewees. Also, 53% of survey respondents had not
heard of POTFF. The absence of knowledge regarding the POTFF program demonstrates a need
for stakeholders to possess the ability to categorize protocols for implementing a trauma-
resilience plan. Furthermore, due to multiple psychological and behavioral concerns from
stakeholders, they are unable to categorize protocols for a trauma-resilience plan.
A few instances of alignment among stakeholders happened intuitively, with no
education, such as visualization of negative and positive potential scenarios and a calm focus.
The issues of alcohol and talking about potentially traumatic events demonstrate that there
remain prevalent community-wide barriers. The top practices and techniques the participants
repeatedly mentioned in interviews and surveys as still needing more in-depth educational
training are meditation, preparation, routine, community, friends, family, and team, along with
the topics of belief, community, faith, or medical intervention. The theme of prioritizing sleep
and exercise also came back through the data. Additionally, themes regarding negative coping
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practices, specifically alcohol and low numbers with the use of available resources, demonstrate
ongoing NSW community issues.
Operator confidence, affected by traumatic events or expectations not being met, led
operators to question themselves and bring their confidence down. Interviewees were consistent
in feeling good when they eventually implemented positive resilient behaviors. However, the
issue resides in the identification and implementation of positive resilient behaviors. Each of the
analyses identified stigmas, lack of support, and counterproductive measures as ways that trust in
the organization is lacking. Stakeholders were not able to identify that the money was from the
organization, or they stated that the resources were exclusive resources, along with no education
specialists to provide resilience to trauma education. Inactive Navy SEAL operators were able to
confirm the 16 influences were each validated needs, as seen in Table 34, regarding a trauma-
resilience plan.
Table 34
Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Assets or Needs as Determined by the Data
Assumed knowledge influence Asset or need
Factual
Stakeholders know facts about trauma-resilience strategies. Need
Stakeholders know what are elements to implement for a trauma-resilience
plan.
Need
Conceptual
Stakeholders are able to classify trauma-resilience principles. Need
Stakeholders can structure strategies for a trauma-resilience plan. Need
Stakeholders can categorize protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience
plan.
Need
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Assumed knowledge influence Asset or need
Metacognitive
Stakeholders plan their approach and monitor progress on trauma resilience. Need
Stakeholders can reflect on protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience
plan.
Need
Assumed motivation influence Asset or need
Extrinsic value
Stakeholders find it useful for themselves to utilize key factors in trauma
resilience.
Need
Self-efficacy
Stakeholders believe in their ability to identify key factors in a trauma-
resilience plan.
Need
Stakeholders believe in their ability to implement strategies of a trauma-
resilience plan.
Need
Emotions
Stakeholders feel good about identifying key factors in trauma resilience. Need
Implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan makes stakeholders feel
good.
Need
Assumed organizational influence Asset or need
Cultural models
Stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma resilience. Need
Policies and procedures
Procedures that are in place to identify key factors to implementing strategies
for a trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW policies.
Need
Resources
Money is allocated for trauma-resilience education for Stakeholders. Need
Educational specialists needed for in- and outside-of-classroom support. Need
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An additional finding of trauma to performance has not been found in previous literature
and is important to understand for the development of a trauma-resilience plan for Navy SEAL
operators. A psychological trauma rooted in performance and not the traditional fear of
environment or moral injury is a significant distinction.
Chapter Four identified the needs for a trauma-resilience plan, while Chapter Five will
present recommendations for each influence based on empirical research for those needs’
solutions.
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations
The SEAL Teams, like any unit within a larger organization, must constantly evaluate
training programs to demonstrate and justify their effectiveness and value to the organization.
Such accountability is omnipresent in all organizations and social systems (Frink et al., 2008)
and, if properly applied, can be a powerful tool for change, especially when combined with the
new Kirkpatrick model for change.
The Navy SEALs, or SEAL Teams, as the life force of NSW, are responsible for a
variety of special military operations in all global environments. The USSOCOM, which
includes NSW Command, has the objective of ensuring the physical, psychological, spiritual,
cognitive, and social resilience of personnel serving within the SOF community. Oversight of
these USSOCOM objectives is carried out through the POTFF program as specified in its
mission statement: “[our mission] is to optimize and sustain SOFs mission readiness, longevity,
and performance through integrated and holistic HPPs designed to strengthen the Force and
Family” (POTFF Staff, 2021, paras. 2).
Organizational Performance Goal
By May of 2023, 100% of NSW operators exiting the military within one year of service
will participate in research for PTSD prevention to assess the need for a resilience plan to
improve human performance. The assessment, which examined the space between current
organizational performance and desired results, exposed a need for a PTSD prevention plan in
relation to USSOCOM’s solution request for a proposal that improves human performance
resilience capabilities. Without this needs analysis, U.S. Navy SEAL operators’ longevity and
mental and physical performance are vulnerable. Importantly, USSOCOM risks jeopardizing its
unmatched military advantage in securing mission objectives.
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Description of Stakeholder Groups
In researching the viability of a PTSD prevention plan focusing on resilience as a
cornerstone for the military, there are three stakeholder groups at the epicenter of power.
Operators are required to perform at optimal levels of performance, regardless of risk to
themselves, to accomplish the organizational goals of the NSW and USSOCOM. The Navy
SEAL operator is the stakeholder of focus. Currently, there are roughly 2,500 active-duty SEAL
operators, which make up less than 1% of all Navy personnel. The second stakeholder is NSW
because it is responsible for ensuring that SEAL operators are unmatched against their
adversaries at any time and under all conditions in alignment with USSOCOM’s mission
directive to eliminate threats to the nation. Ensuring that frontline SOF operators can achieve and
implement no-fail missions require the highest levels of human performance overseen by the
third stakeholder: USSOCOM.
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study
While all three stakeholders contribute to the overall organizational goal of improving
human performance with regard to resilience, it is imperative to identify the Navy SEAL
operators as the stakeholder of focus. The Navy SEAL operators are integral to carrying out the
organization’s mission of defending the nation, and, importantly, they are frontline and engage
most immediately with warfare trauma. The USSOCOM deems the people as their most precious
asset. The ultimate risk to its organizational vulnerability is whether its assets are inappropriately
prepared and inadequately supported resources. Navy SEAL operators, benefitting from the
evolution of resilience plans, decrease the organizational risk and are better positioned to fulfill
their overall responsibility to win the war. By identifying the organizational goal of improved
resilience and recognizing the operators’ role in the organizational structure, a needs analysis is
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necessary to assess how to design and apply a resilience program. The USSOCOM, NSW, and
the operators are all involved in this process. Operators will engage in semi-annual and annual
evaluations; program participation; officer and senior enlisted observational feedback; and self-
reporting surveys. The stakeholder of focus, by the nature of their work, is most impacted by
warfare.
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this project was to conduct a needs analysis in the areas of knowledge and
skill, motivation, and organizational resources necessary to reach the organizational performance
goal. The stakeholders of focus were Navy SEAL operators. Two questions guided this research:
1. What are the knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational performance needs
for U.S. Navy SEAL operators to produce a trauma-resilience plan?
2. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions to
those needs?
Overview
Chapter Four presented this innovation study’s data and findings. This study identified
and assessed assumed needs for 100% performance enhancement by implementing a trauma-
resilience plan for Navy SEAL operators. The systematic problem-solving approach provides
appropriate unmitigated structure and justifiable decisions as a means to save time, money, and
for this specific organization, lives (Clark & Estes, 2008). The KMO framework is able to
untangle the space between current and desired performance, identifying issues organized by
KMO skills. These KMO skills are then investigated to diagnose what is necessary to close the
performance gap. The strategic planning process is outlined with the objectives at the forefront
of the framework that is the new world Kirkpatrick model.
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The contents of Chapter Five provide relevant recommendations built into a synthesized
trauma-resilient plan for the organization. The design nature of the frameworks for the study and
plan employed, KMO gap analysis and the new world Kirkpatrick model allows for solutions
that address multiple needs for taking on the strategic planning process. Navy SEAL operators’
participation in the planning process and the recommended solutions will expedite the
performance gap’ closure.
The military has attempted and continues to attempt improving resilience. The request
from the organization to improve resilience has to be expanded on to address trauma resilience
for SEAL operators. The stakeholders of focus exceed normal ranges of KMO support typically
examined in research. Still, the gap in KMO examined is 100%. The research indicates that 10 of
the 16 needs are validated as priorities for recommendation that will have the highest impact on
achieving the stakeholder goal.
Recommendations for Practice to Address KMO Influences
The data from this study validated the organizational factual, conceptual, and
metacognitive knowledge influence gaps to address the problem of practice. Table 35 represents
the complete list of assumed knowledge influence, whether the influence is validated as an asset
or need, and if the influence is a priority. Table 35 also references the theoretical principles in
support of recommendations and details the context-specific recommendations to training and
education estimated to make an impact on this problem of practice. These knowledge influences
are validated as needs through data analysis from surveys, interviews, and organizational
documents as foundational to achieving the stakeholders’ goal. The number of survey
respondents and the interview conversations directly reflect my relationship with the
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organization. The framework presented by Anderson and Krathwohl (2001), which is a revision
of the original Bloom’s taxonomy, provides the structure for the assessment.
Table 35
Summary of Knowledge Influences and Recommendations
Assumed
knowledge
influence
Asset
or need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
Stakeholders
know facts
about trauma-
resilience
strategies. (F)
Need Yes Information processing
focuses on the operator’s
role of attention in
performance through
analysis of cognition and
learning processes
(McCrudden et al.,
2010).
Provide operators with
fact sheets of
definitions regarding
trauma, resilience, and
trauma-resilience.
Stakeholders
know what are
elements to
implement for a
trauma-
resilience plan.
(F)
Need Yes Information processing; to
develop mastery,
operators must acquire
component skills,
practice integrating the
skills, and know when to
apply the skills they
have learned through
organizing elements of
feedback specific to
performance tasks and
how the elements fit for
implementation
(McCrudden et al.,
2010).
Provide operators fact
sheet of trauma-
resilient strategies for
elements to
implement a trauma-
resilience plan.
Stakeholders are
able to classify
trauma-
resilience
principles. (C)
Need No None Not a priority.
Stakeholders can
structure
Need No None Not a priority.
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Assumed
knowledge
influence
Asset
or need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
strategies for a
trauma-
resilience plan.
(C)
Stakeholders can
categorize
protocols for
implementing a
trauma-
resilience plan.
(C)
Need Yes Cognitive load theory,
managing intrinsic load
by segmenting complex
material into simpler
parts and training,
among other strategies,
enabling learning to be
enhanced (Kirschner et
al., 2009).
Provide operators
segmented trauma-
resilience protocols
for categorizing that
fits within an
organized plan.
Stakeholders plan
their approach
and monitor
progress on
trauma
resilience. (M)
Need No None Not a priority.
Stakeholders can
reflect on
protocols for
implementing a
trauma-
resilience plan.
(M)
Need Yes Social cognitive theory
focuses on dynamic
interactions of operators’
influences on self,
behaviors, and
environments, with their
belief in reflecting on
implementing learnings,
tasks, and performance
objectives (Denler et al.,
2013).
Provide training where
peer modeling and
task-specific feedback
in learning of
complex behavioral
sequences or problem
solving routines are
strategically planned
and monitored with
learner progress
checks to adjust
learning protocols
with particular
attention to protocols
for implementing a
trauma-resilience
plan.
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Knowledge Recommendations
Given this study’s focus on the development of psychoeducation prevention learning
strategies, there is a higher volume of recommendations aligned to the knowledge influences.
Recommendation for knowledge enhancements is grounded in Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap
analysis framework. Even with directives from NSW and POTFF aiming to educate and
strengthen SEAL operators’ resilience, the primary knowledge concern is the lack of a succinct
understanding of key factors regarding trauma and resilience implementation. It is imperative to
provide training and education regarding the validated influences with four possible solutions of
utilizing information, job aids, training, or education, to help narrow the trauma-resilience gap.
The solutions will depend on relevant transferable skills for operators to improve prevention
around PTSD, resilience, and performance.
Increase the Operators ’ Factual Knowledge Recognizing Trauma-Resilience Strategies
The results and findings from this study indicate that knowledge strategies for resilience
are lacking in 59%; factual knowledge strategies for trauma are lacking in 87% of operators.
Information processing focuses on the operator’s role of attention in performance through
analysis of cognition and learning processes (McCrudden et al., 2010). With continued practice,
the operators will promote an ability to do things without occupying the mind and using less
working memory or automaticity (McCrudden et al., 2010). The frequent practice spread out
over time will be more effective than one long session (McCrudden et al., 2010). The
recommendation is to provide operators with fact sheets of definitions regarding trauma,
resilience, and trauma resilience.
It is important for organizations and educational leaders to be clear about the knowledge
being imparted to learners to have a successful learning experience (Anderson & Krathwohl,
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2001; Rueda, 2011). Meredith et al. (2011) acknowledged the lack of consensus on a single
definition of resilience. In the past, data collection conflated traumatic and stressful events and
treated them interchangeably even though traumatic experiences occur as a result of a terrible
event versus stress which is a personal reaction to an abnormal event (APA, 2013). Operators
will need to receive clear definitions from the organization prior to strategic planning to address
the knowledge gap (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Critiquing the Operators ’ Factual Knowledge to Know What Are Elements to Implement for
Trauma-Resilience Plan
The data from this study indicate that operators lack factual knowledge about elements to
implement for a trauma-resilience plan. Only one element, physical fitness, was identified by
both the organization and the operators as a strategy to implement. The theory recommended as a
solution for this factual knowledge gap is information processing. Another principle under
information processing is a construct of mastery development that states operators must acquire
component skills, practice integrating the skills, and know when to apply the skills they have
learned through organizing elements of feedback specific to performance tasks and how the
elements fit for implementation (McCrudden et al., 2010; Rueda, 2011). Provide operators fact
sheet of trauma-resilient strategies for elements to implement a trauma-resilience plan.
Differentiating the parts of an undiminished trauma-resilience plan will require the
organization to provide solid job-related education that covers general concepts and analytical
knowledge to address unexpected events (Clark & Estes, 2008). Separating the components of a
trauma-resilience plan and determining how the parts relate to one another in relation to overall
trauma-resilient objectives will shield operators from PTSD, which is the essence of learned
trauma-resilience education (Birur et al., 2017; LaCroix et al., 2021). Evidence-based resilience
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factors are supported by literature and fit the known organizational traumas that operators face.
These have the potential to promote resilience for the individual, family, unit, and community
(Meredith et al., 2011).
Classifying Protocols for Operators to Implement a Trauma-Resilience Plan
The results from the surveys and interviews reveal that protocols for implementing
trauma-resilience plans need to match the organization’s teachings. Efforts to enable learning
through managing the intrinsic load by segmenting complex material into simpler parts and pre-
training, among other strategies, is a principle under Cognitive Load Theory (Kirschner et al.,
2009). Applying this principle will allow information regarding trauma resilience to be presented
in manageable parts for the learners and help remove extraneous material from complex training
(Kirschner et al., 2009; Mayer, 2011). This form of meaningful learning will allow the operators
to develop the cognitive processes needed for problem solving to achieve their goal (Anderson &
Krathwohl, 2001). Therefore, the recommendation is to provide operators with segmented
trauma-resilience protocols for categorizing that fit within an organized plan (Clark & Estes,
2008).
Schiraldi (2017) states that resilience can be trained to maintain and improve peak mental
and physical fitness throughout life. In training resilience, operators will improve their ability to
recognize non-resilient behaviors and quickly apply new skills for improvement (Castro & Hoge,
2005; Clark & Estes, 2008; Meredith et al., 2011; Schiraldi, 2017). In classifying resilient
behavior to trauma, operators will promote learning and transfer protective factors with feedback
providing valuable performance information (Bartlett & Steber, 2019; Neenan, 2018; Rueda,
2011). Closing the gap with direct instruction, modeling, and feedback training opportunities
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facilitates a deeper conceptual knowledge for operators by classifying protocols they have
learned when facing new situations.
Planning Protocols for Operators to Implement a Trauma-Resilience Plan
The range of reflections observed during data collection revealed that operators need to
be included in the planning for a trauma-resilience plan. The evidence shows the difference
between what the operators would implement versus what is being implemented by the
organization. Social cognitive theory focuses on dynamic interactions of operators’ influences on
self, behaviors, and environments, with their confidence in reflecting on implementing learnings,
tasks, and performance objectives (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Denler et al., 2013; Rueda, 2011).
This theory would suggest that developing a plan that provides opportunities for learners to
check their progress and adjust learning strategies will foster greater learner control of behavior
and cognition (Denler et al., 2013; Rueda, 2011). Provide training where peer modeling and task-
specific feedback in learning of complex behavioral sequences or problem-solving routines are
strategically planned and monitored with learner progress checks to adjust learning protocols as
needed in relation to protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience plan.
Clark and Estes (2008) discern that knowing when and why something is being done is
metacognitive knowledge. This key aspect of proactive risk mitigation strategic behaviors in
problem solving will allow operators to consider the content and conditions for planning trauma-
resilience implementation (Castro & Hoge, 2005; Clark & Estes, 2008; Schein & Schein, 2017).
Training that focuses on proactive strategies where planning includes leadership and operators
will be credible, familiar, and have functional value to close the metacognitive knowledge gap.
Proactive training measures are more likely to be adopted if the operators have been involved in
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the planning process along with unit leadership that is confident and motivated (Birur et al.,
2017; Meredith et al., 2011; Schein & Schein, 2017).
Motivation Recommendations
In the context of U.S. Navy SEAL trauma-resilience education planning,
recommendations for addressing operators’ motivation issues exist in the ability to influence
behaviors with goals, the content of curriculum, and pedagogy. Clark and Estes (2008) stated
that motivation has three indexes that impact motivational influences: active choice, persistence,
and mental effort. Rueda (2011) recognized that motivation involves the processes of initiating,
sustaining, and ensuring the quality of a goal-oriented activity. Motivations, which drive the
energy and direction of your behaviors, are anchored in the internal process: your goals, beliefs,
perceptions, and expectations (Dembo & Seli, 2000).
Further, motivations that produce encouraged and lasting goal-directed actions are a
process of influences, both internal (cognitive and affective) and external (social, cultural,
community, unit, etc.) (Rueda, 2011; Schunk et al., 2009). Data analysis for this study confirms
motivation influences, as defined by Rueda (2011) and Schunk et al. (2009), align with the
theories of extrinsic value, self-efficacy, and emotions. Table 36 focuses on theoretical principles
that provide context-specific recommendations for the motivation influences deemed vital. All
five influences identified in the research have been validated within the findings to have an
impact on motivation. The research also suggests that self-efficacy and emotion strategies in a
trauma-resilience plan will transfer to the operators utilizing the plan. Therefore, three of the
influences are considered priorities.
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Table 36
Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations
Assumed
motivation
influence
Asset
or need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
Stakeholders find
it useful for
themselves to
utilize key
factors in trauma
resilience.
(Extrinsic value)
Need Yes Expectancy value
theory, motivating
operators’ interest
through opportunities
for choice and control
can expand motivation
(Eccles, 2009).
Provide material and
activities relevant and
useful to the operators,
connecting their
interests, with
foundations in real-
world duties.
Stakeholders
believe in their
ability to identify
key factors in a
trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-
efficacy)
Need No Not a priority.
Stakeholders
believe in their
ability to
implement
strategies of a
trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-
efficacy)
Need Yes Self-efficacy, learning
and motivation are
enhanced when
learners have positive
expectancies for
success in
implementing
strategies (Pajares,
2006).
Provide instructional
support built in early
on with multiple
opportunities for
practice and gradually
taper off to encourage
leadership modeling
with useful feedback
and application in
operators’ lives.
Stakeholders feel
good about
identifying key
factors in trauma
resilience.
(Emotions)
Need No Not a priority.
Implementing
strategies for a
trauma-resilience
plan makes
stakeholders feel
Need Yes Positive emotional
environments support
motivation (Clark &
Estes, 2008).
Provide a positive
emotional
environment
connected to positive
emotional models of
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Assumed
motivation
influence
Asset
or need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
good.
(Emotions)
command-wide
recognized and
respected operators.
Operators Find It Useful for Themselves to Utilize Key Factors in Trauma-Resilience
The results and findings direct attention to regular exercise and sleep hygiene as assets.
Negative coping practices and low usage of available resources are highlighted as needs to be
addressed. Expectancy Value theory contends that motivating operators’ interest through
opportunities for choice and control can expand motivation (Eccles, 2009). Eccles (2009) also
pointed out that rationales that include a discussion of the importance, utility, and value of work
or learning can help the operators develop positive inclinations. The recommendation is to
provide material and activities relevant and useful to the operators, connecting their interests,
with foundations in real-world duties.
Providing training that incorporates feedback to facilitate growth opportunities for the
operators and leadership would improve operators feeling supported. Teaching materials and
relevant operator activities need to be useful to the stakeholders. Connecting their interests with
real-world duties will require their input and stimulate utilization (Pintrich, 2003). It is found that
operators with no internal or external connection to training opportunities will avoid the training
or not commit to utilization (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Rueda, 2011; Schunk et al., 2009). The
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operators can have all of the training in the world, but if they do not value utilizing the strategies
learned, their motivation will stifle usage (Eccles, 2009; Forbes & Fikretoglu, 2018).
Operators Believe in Their Ability to Implement Strategies of a Trauma-Resilience Plan
Data from the study clearly demonstrates that operators, when self-reflecting on how
much they feel good when able to implement trauma-resilient behaviors, rate their confidence at
about 65%. Pajares (2006) identifies that learning and motivation are bolstered when learners
have positive views of success in implementing strategies. High self-efficacy can influence
motivation. Highly effective learners develop the skill to believe in themselves and their abilities
to implement strategies for trauma resilience, reducing the motivation gap in self-efficacy
(Pajares, 2006). Ultimately, the theories included in designing a trauma-resilience plan improve
positive resilient behaviors and promote strategies enhancing operators’ motivations. In
assessing the motivation gap, positive feedback was recognized in implementing strategies for
trauma resilience. For ongoing momentum to continue improving self-efficacy, operators should
be able to recognize success in their abilities. Experience in such positive emotional
environments results in continued improved behaviors. The recommendation is to provide
instructional support built in early on with multiple opportunities for practice and gradually taper
off to encourage leadership modeling with useful feedback and application in operators’ lives.
Self-efficacy beliefs are influenced by a growing understanding the importance of
trauma-resilience and the environment’s receptiveness to the involvement of behaviors necessary
to achieve those tasks (Bandura, 1997). Efforts to improve self-efficacy behaviors provide
instructional support built early on for operators with multiple opportunities for practice (Pajares,
2006). As many of their traumatic experiences are not addressed until they have opportunities to
reflect, the practice will be important for operators and encourage leadership modeling with
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useful application in their lives. (Pintrich, 2003; Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). Having high
self-efficacy levels in achieving the tasks and modeling behaviors contribute to accomplishing
the goals.
Fostering Positive Emotional Environments for Operators to Implement a Trauma-Resilience
Plan
Results from the survey and interview data analysis displayed the most promise for
operators feeling good when they implemented strategies for trauma resilience. Clark and Estes
(2008) recognized that positive emotional environments support motivation. Recognition that
emotions and motivation correlate with one another directs learners to the possibilities and
relevance of the benefits that advance upon execution (Clark & Estes, 2008). Trauma-resilience
efforts are novel and will require a great deal of thought. Incorporating the operator’s
collaboration efforts with social responsibilities will promote implementation and stimulate
community-wide program validation (Clark & Estes, 2008; Meredith et al., 2011; Rueda, 2011).
Provide a positive emotional environment connected to positive emotional models for command-
wide recognized and respected operators.
Efforts must be made to provide command-wide, respected, and recognized operator
models. During training and in real-world application, showing positive impacts as a result of
planning, monitoring, and application of learned success skills increases the performance of
trauma-resilience strategies (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Disregarding the performance
of others and promoting learning as much as possible for the purpose of self-improvement will
promote operators’ performance directed toward mastering implementing trauma-resilience
strategies (Dembo & Seli, 2000). Positive emotions around operators’ success will promote
operators implementing trauma-resilient strategies.
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Organization Recommendations
The data from this study verified organizational influences referenced from the literature
review as needs. One assumed organizational influence was validated as a need but not a
priority, as organizational documents showed that money is allocated to trauma resilience even
though the stakeholders may not know about the funds. Table 37 directs attention to the cultural
models, policies and procedures, and resources that could potentially be adjusted through
context-specific recommendations to effect organizational change within the problem of practice.
Gallimore and Goldenberg (2001) identify cultural models as ever-evolving and potentially
changing viable responses depending on shared ways of perceiving, thinking, and storing those
viable responses to challenges. Depending on efficient and effective organizational work
processes and resources, prevention of desired performance innovation goals can still be
inadequate even if peak knowledge and motivation are present (Clark & Estes, 2008). Identifying
and fixing process barriers is one portion of organizational performance improvement (Clark &
Estes, 2008). Additionally, if the organization’s policies fail to support procedures, the results
have the potential to cause chaos and inefficiency (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Strategies
for addressing three organizational solutions that have been validated as needs are illustrated in
Table 37, with change principles grounded in literature review and research findings.
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Table 37
Summary of Organization Influences and Recommendations
Assumed
organization
influence
Asset or
need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
Stakeholders need
trust to facilitate
trauma resilience.
(Cultural models)
Need Yes Commitment to full
and open task-
relevant
communication and
information is central
to organizational
well-being allowing
everyone to assume
that telling the truth
as best they can is
positive and desirable
(Schein & Schein,
2017).
Provide open forums
for discussion on
issues with emphasis
on the importance of
the teams and
missions reinforced
to promote honest
dialogue with
operators who have
the ability to
facilitate successful
resilience to trauma.
Procedures that are
in place to identify
key factors to
implementing
strategies for a
trauma-resilience
plan aligned with
NSW policies.
(Policies and
procedures)
Need Yes Effective organizations
ensure that
organizational
policies and
procedures that
manage the work of
the organization are
aligned with
organizational goals
and values (Clark &
Estes, 2008).
Provide specific
trauma-resilience
implementation
procedures aligned to
NSW policies to
reach objectives and
improve
performance.
Money is allocated
for trauma-
resilience training
for stakeholders.
(Resources)
Need No Not a priority.
Educational
specialists needed
for in- and
outside-of-
classroom support.
(Resources)
Need Yes Effective change
efforts ensure that
operators have the
resources and
education specialists
that are needed for
organizational
Fund opportunities for
stakeholders to work
in teams to establish
the priorities of a
trauma-resilience
plan to ensure the
most important
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Assumed
organization
influence
Asset or
need
Priority
yes or no
Principle and citation Context-specific
recommendation
priorities supporting
the job (Clark &
Estes, 2008).
objectives are a
priority.
Foster a Sense of Trust for Operators
Findings from the data indicate that, for operators, trust is needed to make a trauma-
resilience plan possible. According to surveys and interviews, the actions and the words of the
organization do not align. The organization states that “humans are more important than
hardware,” yet operators indicated they do not trust the organization to provide adequate
education in resilience to trauma (POTFF Staff, 2021, paras. 1). Commitment to full and open
task-relevant communication and information is central to organizational well-being allowing
everyone to assume that telling the truth as best they can is positive and desirable (Schein &
Schein, 2017). Clark and Estes (2008) identified trust as a factor increasing the spread of
commitment to change goals on all levels. Communication is compromised when trust fails as a
result of empty words from leadership when they separate legitimate responses from historical
events, threaten cohesion, and present unclear organizational direction (Cameron & Quinn,
2011).
To foster effective change via trust, the organization must actively support the operators
with a critical focus on pre-teachings, interpretation, meaning, and implementation of the
trauma-resilience plan (Schein & Schein, 2017). Consistent and candid communication, with
clear descriptions for performance improvements toward trauma-resilience, is imperative for
building trust and producing positive experiences. The recommendation is to provide open
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forums for discussion on issues with emphasis on the importance of the teams and missions
reinforced to promote honest dialogue with operators who can facilitate successful resilience to
trauma.
The cultural model of the SEAL Teams can be relearned to promote positive change by a
group as they fulfill the need to solve this problem of practice. Organizationally, open forums for
discussion would be provided and reinforced by promoting honest dialogue with operators on the
importance of the objectives, missions, and vision. In turn, cultivating a culture of participation
with all operators in achieving the organizations’ encouraged feedback (Cameron & Quinn,
2011; Clark & Estes, 2008). A successful trauma-resilience program will rely on strong
leadership that is able to be clear on program development and guidance for operators and their
families to make suggestions to effectuate change (Meredith et al., 2011; Rueda, 2011).
Identifying Alignment Between Policies, Procedures, and Operators
In alignment with NSW, the operators need to have procedures in place to identify key
factors in implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan. Findings were direct, with one
interviewee stating, “I have never seen a program to be resilient to trauma.” Effective
organizations ensure organizational policies and procedures that manage the institution's work
are aligned with the teams’ goals and values (Clark & Estes, 2008). Organizational policies and
procedures can influence whether performance objectives for operators, units, and the
organization are met (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). This premise identifies that the SEAL
operators’ goals and values must align with NSW’s policies and procedures regarding trauma
resilience. Organizational policies and procedures will need to target solutions that address the
specifics of trauma that impede improved resilience (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Efforts
to ensure alignment require a transparent examination of policies, procedures, and feedback to
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reduce interference with full solution development of the problem of practice. The
recommendation is to provide specific trauma-resilience implementation procedures aligned to
NSW policies to reach objectives and improve performance.
As a means to reach objectives and improve performance, improvement strategies will
provide tailored organizational structures specific to trauma resilience. Organizational processes
or policies that may prevent goal achievement must be checked for validation to close this
particular performance gap feedback from operators (Clark & Estes, 2008). It is apparent that the
operators and leadership in the SEAL Teams have built up patterns of responses to the
challenges with PTSD. Templates addressing this important core issue have changed slowly and
invisibly over time, making the patterns automated and not aligned with policy or procedures for
the performance goal gap reduction (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Providing Education Support for Operators
Findings from the surveys, interviews, and document analyses reveal there are no
education specialists provided for trauma-resilience education or planning. Effective change
efforts ensure that operators have the resources and education specialists needed for
organizational priorities supporting the job (Clark & Estes, 2008). Active problem-solving leads
to learning, and a learning culture must have the most appropriate ways for humans to behave in
relation to their environment by being proactive solvers (Schein & Schein, 2017). Proactive
effective change efforts have the best chances for success with education specialists from the
organization. Evidence also shows that, when facing great complexity, a leader’s vulnerability
with others generates solutions more likely to be adopted when the members of the organization
have been a part of the learning process (Schein & Schein, 2017). Providing education specialists
will set an appropriate example that active problem-solving leads to learning solutions for the
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problem of practice (Schein & Schein, 2017). The recommendation is to fund opportunities for
stakeholders to work in teams to establish the priorities of a trauma-resilience plan to ensure the
most important objectives are a priority.
Built-in opportunities for SEAL Teams to establish, from inception, the priorities of a
trauma-resilience plan ensure that the most important objectives are prioritized (Clark & Estes,
2008). Education specialists are needed as a result of educational directions for trauma resilience,
creating more specific objectives (Airasian, 1994; Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Sosniak, 1994).
Evidence to reduce the organizational resource gap centers on effective change efforts needing
education specialists as a means to have proactive action for trauma resilience.
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan
The Kirkpatrick model for training evaluation was used to explore an evolving and
complex problem of military veterans and active-duty personnel affecting their general quality of
life as well as physical and mental health; the stakeholder of focus are operators in the U.S. Navy
SEAL Teams. Like any high-performing unit iin a larger organization, SEAL Teams must
constantly evaluate training programs to demonstrate and justify their effectiveness and value to
the organization. Such accountability is ubiquitous to all organizations and social systems (Frink
et al., 2008) and, if properly applied, can be a powerful tool for change, especially when
combined with the new world Kirkpatrick model for change.
Implementation and Evaluation Framework
Not all training is designed or delivered well, potentially making poorly designed or
badly delivered training less helpful (Clark & Estes, 2008). The new world Kirkpatrick model for
training evaluation is an updated version of its original 1950s design to modernize the original
four levels. This model is based on the idea that well-designed programs are designed before
191
implementation. The Kirkpatrick model is a four-level program beginning with the last level
(Level 4) first and working backward to Level 1. This end-at-the-beginning approach keeps
training focused and outcomes focused on job performance post-training (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016). The Kirkpatrick model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016) introduces return
on expectations to maximize training value and show a chain of evidence communicating the
value of the training program to the organization and key stakeholders.
Level 4 focuses on the results, which come from the targeted outcomes by using leading
indicators. Leading indicators bridge the gap between the individual and the organization. Level
4 results are not individual, team, or department results but the results desired by the greater
organizational needs. The clarity of these organizational results comes from a combination of the
mission and purpose. Level 3 is behavior focused. Specifically, the degree to which participants
apply what they have learned during training when they are back on the job and their behavior
correlates with organizational desired outcomes. The new world Kirkpatrick model focuses on
critical behaviors, which are specific behavioral traits leading to desired results. Included in
behavior and Level 3 are required drivers. These required drivers are comprised of four parts:
monitor, reinforce, encourage, and reward. Level 2 is learning and focused on learning
components (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). According to Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick
(2016), learning is measured by the individual’s ability to acquire the learning components and
these learning components are also framed as statements:
• I know it (knowledge).
• I can do it right now (skill).
• I believe this will be worthwhile to do on the job (attitude).
• I think I can do it on the job (confidence).
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• I will do it on the job (commitment).
The model concludes with Level 1 as the final level. Level 1 is the participants’ reaction
to the training, classified by the individual’s engagement and favorability/satisfaction and with
the training’s relevance to their jobs. These four levels are designed around the ultimate indicator
of value, which is the return on expectations. This return clarifies expectations, value, and
success from stakeholders and allows more effective and efficient use of training and resources.
Organizational Purpose, Need and Expectations
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is among the top health issues facing returning war
veterans (McNally & Frueh, 2013), yet, despite efforts, attempts by researchers have failed to
develop preventive interventions to reduce the prevalence of PTSD. Forneris et al. (2013) stated
that evidence-based programs to treat PTSD are lacking. It was not until 2016 that the first
empirical study demonstrating reduced rates of PTSD and related depression and lowered
healthcare costs was published (Vyas et al., 2016). Effective programs rely on accurate data
collection, particularly pre-trauma research, which occurs before a potential traumatic event, also
commonly referred to as prevention (Richardson et al., 2010; Skeffington et al., 2013; Vyas et
al., 2016).
The problem with the lack of evidence-based pre-trauma prevention is important to
address because there is inadequate evidence to support any prevention education. The paucity of
empirical research is the primary problem in establishing an effective PTSD prevention
curriculum. These consequences include both high medical costs (approximately $3 billion
annually for veteran mental health services) and social costs ranging from mental and physical
health problems, marital and family instability, lost income/joblessness, drug addiction, crime,
individual and family emotional and physical suffering and the risk of suicide (Forneris et al.,
193
2013; Vyas et al., 2016). Although these statistics are for military veterans, active-duty military
members, especially Navy SEAL operators, suffer from these same health and quality of life
issues, which have the potential to negatively affect operational performance.
Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators
Table 38 presents the degree to which targeted outcomes occur as a result of the
organizational training, as attributed in the Kirkpatrick model’s Level 4 results and leading
indicators in the form of outcomes, metrics, and methods for both external and internal results to
be used for evaluation. The strategic planning of trauma resilience can assist operators in long-
lasting internal modifications based on authentic data from surveys, interviews, and document
analysis. The organization as a whole will externally display the anticipated resilience outcomes.
Once the internal outcomes are being achieved, the external outcomes beneficial to the greater
organizational needs should be realized.
Table 38
Outcomes, Metrics, and Methods for External and Internal Outcomes
Outcome Metrics Methods
External outcomes
Increase shared best
practices From SEAL
operators to support
prevention education
Number of best practices shared
by SEAL operator
Based off survey result
positive/negative POTFF will
share findings promoting
prevention curriculum
Reduction of healthcare
cost for mental health
Veterans Affairs budget Analysis of Veterans Affairs
Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder cost assessment
Positive community Number of complaints or
praises
Annual audit of community
feedback
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Outcome Metrics Methods
External outcomes
Increased SEAL operator
and family community
usage of POTFF
programs
Number of classes given by
POTFF
POTFF reports number of
classes and quantity of
attendees
Survey review evaluated Number of survey reviews
evaluated
Annual assessment of programs
and outcomes with past data
comparison
Ongoing program
utilization
Percentage of force and family
program utilization
Annual comparison of feedback
and quantity of attendees
Recruitment
advancements
Number of recruitment
advancements
Review SOF personnel
quantities
Internal outcomes
Reduce susceptibility to
psychological injury
Reports on the number of
adverse psychological events.
Connor-Davidson Resilience
Scale PCL-5
Retention Reenlistment numbers Examine reenlistment numbers
at 4, 8, 10, 12,16 and 20-year
marks.
Family preservation Assistance services utilized by
family, partner, and/or
caregivers.
SOF community divorces
Calculate annual divorces
reported to Defense
Enrollment Eligibility
Reporting System
Reduce PTSD Number of self-reporting Have regular time allotted for
mentor or education specialist
Level 3: Critical Behavior
The stakeholder of focus is the Navy SEAL operator. The first critical behavior is that
operators must show consistent implementation of trauma-resilience education to demonstrate
competency and facilitate familiarization. The second critical behavior for operators is to
conduct assessments of their social interactions to promote interest and value in family, friends,
195
and self. The third critical behavior is that the SEAL operators will demonstrate trauma-
resilience capabilities. Level 3’s data collection informs the feedback loop to promote progress
through assessment and monitoring, so adjustments can be made in a timely manner to improve
operator performance. The specific metrics, methods, and timing for each of these outcome
behaviors appear in Table 39.
Table 39
Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for Evaluation for Operators
Critical behavior Metrics Methods Timing
Consistent
implementation of
trauma-resilience
education
Number of completed
trauma-resilience
course certificates
Education specialist
and mentors will
maintain course
certificate database
Monthly
Conduct personal
assessments of
social interactions
Number of completed
personal assessments
Education specialist
will conduct
assessments regarding
frequency of social
relationships
Quarterly
Correctly
demonstrates
Trauma-resilience
capabilities
Number of trauma-
resilience capabilities
performed
Education specialists
will monitor
performance progress
that is stored along
with certificates in the
database.
Quarterly
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Required Drivers
Table 40 shows the recommended drivers for reinforcing, encouraging, and supporting
critical behaviors of SEAL operators. To influence the achievement of the desired outcomes,
operators will need education specialists with the knowledge and skills to develop the critical
behaviors described in Table 39 as part of their training. As such, education specialists for
developing learners’ critical behaviors will be influenced based on educational program,
pedagogical, and assessment choices. Many of the knowledge-based recommendations align with
the category of reinforcing, as training and education solutions are incorporated in classrooms,
training environments, and on-the-job training familiar to operators. Motivational
recommendations fall primarily into the encouraging category, as classroom practices support
students in initiating and sustaining trauma-resilient behaviors. Periodically motivation solutions
involve an incentive, which places those drivers in the rewarding category. This area is familiar
to military members as operators are recognized for their successes. Lastly, monitoring is
frequently an organizational-level solution. The foundation for accountability measures,
especially in the military, is reliant on data-driven decision making from already established
routine evaluations. Table 40 identifies and categorizes the required drivers identified in this
study, outlines the time interval for enacting each strategy, and provides alignment identification
to the supported critical behaviors.
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Table 40
Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors of Navy SEAL Operators
Methods Timing Critical behaviors supported
1, 2, 3 etc.
Reinforcing (K-related)
Provide operators with fact sheets of
definitions regarding trauma,
resilience, and trauma resilience.
As needed 1,3
Job aid posted in workspaces to
promote critical behaviors
As needed 1,2,3
Provide operators fact sheet of
trauma-resilient strategies for
elements to implement a trauma
resilience plan.
As needed 1,2,3
Provide operators active learning
opportunities that utilize
knowledge through real-world
examples, direct instruction, and
discussions with feedback in
relation to categorizing protocols
for implementing a trauma-
resilience plan.
As needed 1,2,3
Provide training where peer
modeling and task-specific
feedback in learning of complex
behavioral sequences or problem-
solving routines are strategically
planned and monitored with
learner progress checks to adjust
learning protocols as needed in
relation to protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience
plan.
As needed 1,2,3
Encouraging (M related)
Provide material and activities
relevant and useful to the
operators, connecting their
As needed 1,2,3
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Methods Timing Critical behaviors supported
1, 2, 3 etc.
interests, with foundations in real-
world duties.
Coaching made available Weekly 1,2,3
Family support As needed 1,2,3
Provide instructional support built in
early on with multiple
opportunities for practice and
gradually taper off to encourage
leadership modeling with useful
feedback and application in
operators’ lives.
As needed 1,2,3
Rewarding (M-related)
Incentives for self-reporting Quarterly 1,2,3
Public performance
acknowledgement
Biannually 1,2,3
Family programs Biannually 1,2,3
Provide a positive emotional
environment connected to positive
emotional models of command-
wide recognized and respected
operators
As needed 1,2,3
Monitoring (O-related)
Provide open forums for discussion
on issues with emphasis on the
importance of the teams and
missions reinforced to promote
honest dialogue with operators
who have the ability to facilitate
successful resilience to trauma.
Weekly 1,2,3
Provide specific trauma-resilience
implementation procedures aligned
to NSW policies to reach
objectives and improve
performance.
Quarterly 1,2,3
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Methods Timing Critical behaviors supported
1, 2, 3 etc.
Fund opportunities for stakeholders
to work in teams to establish the
priorities of a trauma-resilience
plan to ensure the most important
objectives are a priority.
Quarterly 1,2,3
Organizational Support
The critical behaviors addressed in Table 39 and the identified required drivers elaborated
on in Table 40 are dependent on the implementation of recommendations at the organizational
level. Working with military organizations provides a unique set of advantages to hold the
various commands accountable. The critical behaviors and required drivers request specifically
from the USSOCOM. Focusing the request on SEAL operators to be successful will rely heavily
on leadership modeling, constant avenues of communication, and education specialists.
Formally, policies and procedures will be developed based on feedback from evaluation and
assessment conducted since the large budget for the program is part of military spending.
Informally, each command will need to be supported through POTFF with options to have
additional resources to support stakeholders’ critical behavior objectives and organizational
objectives.
Level 2: Learning
To support required drivers and the desired operator critical behaviors, a learning
program has been developed that specifically targets Level 3.
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Learning Goals
Following completion of the trauma-resilience program, the Navy SEAL operators will
be able to
• Select complete definition for trauma, resilience, and trauma-resilient with 100%
accuracy (D).
• generate weekly logs of implementing elements of trauma resilience (P)
• classify the protocols categorized for implementation of a trauma-resilience plan (D)
• analyze protocols for implementing a trauma-resilience plan (D)
• utilize for themselves key factors in trauma resilience (P)
• believe in their ability to implement strategies for a trauma-resilience plan
(Confidence)
• attain a good feeling when implementing strategies for a trauma-resilience plan
(Commitment)
• trust in the organization to facilitate trauma resilience (Attitude)
• value alignment with NSW policies and procedures that are in place to identify key
factors to implement strategies for a trauma-resilience plan (Value)
• value education specialists needed for in and outside of the classroom support
(Attitude)
Program
The learning goals listed in the section above will be achieved with formal in-person
training and mentoring programs. The programs will be embedded with already existing training
to demonstrate and practice learning. Learning will be parsed into sections of individual-level
trauma-resilient behaviors, family-level trauma-resilient behaviors, and community-level trauma-
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resilient behaviors. The resilience domains are mental (cognitive and psychological), physical,
social, and spiritual. The trauma-resilience domains address the processes of how one utilizes the
resilience domains to make it through the potentially traumatic experience and navigate the
outcomes. The sequelae for trauma resilience are known to have delayed onset. This becomes a
common concern for veterans and lifetime learners in general, making trauma-resilience
education more important for long-term growth.
For individual-level trauma-resilient behaviors, the operators will each learn skills that
are shown to promote resilience, such as positive coping strategies, positive affect, positive
thinking, realism, and behavioral control. Tools to evaluate mental and emotional threats will be
part of the learning and impact self-observation, self-reporting, self-direction, reflection skills,
reframing narratives, and elevating self-efficacy. Job aids in the form of observation techniques
through education specialists will be used to support each of the operators through their training
for assessment.
Focus group discussions will be utilized for unit-level trauma-resilient behaviors. The
focus groups will address strengths, concerns, and how to address the threats together and
individually while in the group. The focus groups will also use role-play, simulation, and
teaching back prior lessons to reinforce the learning goals. The focus groups will employ
discussions to varied reactions, thought patterns, and increased operator support. The students
will also utilize mentorship from past operators. Briefings on case studies will address
expectations around stressors, natural human reactions, training responses, and psychological
techniques for handling the threats. These case studies will not examine mission tactics but,
instead, scrutinize psychological impacts and sociocultural and sociohistorical learnings. Prior
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undertakings can be a powerful tool in preparing future responses, promoting unit cohesion and
teamwork, and creating a positive command climate.
Families of some operators are extremely supportive, and in other cases, family members
undermine trauma-resilient behaviors. As a result of the shared stress between families and
operators, programs will need to also enhance trauma resilience for families. Enhancement
factors include emotional ties; communication; support; closeness; nurturing; adaptability.
Community-level trauma-resilient behaviors are another important component in operator
learning. Trauma-resilient behaviors are promoted through social interaction and a sense of
belonging, community cohesion, connectedness, and collective efficacy.
Based on performance improvements produced as a result of positive trauma-resilient
processing and outcomes, these programs will motivate operators. The operators will be
encouraged by the display of improved well-being, fewer injuries, sharper performance under
stress, more effective emotional responses, and personal control.
Evaluation of the Components of Learning
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) stated that to determine the effectiveness of the
program, checks for acquired declarative knowledge, procedural skills, attitude, confidence, and
commitment, must be structured throughout instruction. Each component demonstrates varying
degrees of learning acquired. Declarative knowledge is the degree to which the operators know
specific information, whereas a skill is the degree to which the operators know how to perform
that skill (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) also identify
attitude as the belief that implementing what is learned will be worthwhile, as the learning is
carried over to the job. Confidence and commitment are additions to close the learning and
behavior gap observed when knowledge and skills are acquired but fall short of performing
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appropriately on the job (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Table 41 lists the evaluation methods
and timing for evaluation components of learning from the program, which will determine if the
program is effective in closing the KMO performance gaps after implementation.
Table 41
Evaluation of the Components of Learning for the Program
Methods or activities Timing
Declarative knowledge “I know it.”
Knowledge checks using multiple choice Early and often ensuring foundational
knowledge facts and concepts are fully
grasped
Open-ended responses assessed through
scenario with groups or individual
During the in-person programs
Knowledge checks through “pair, think,
share” and other individual/group activities
Periodically throughout in-person instruction
and documented with observation notes
Knowledge checks through essay Before, during, and periodically throughout
the programs
Procedural skills “I can do it right now.”
Demonstrate performance each week during
the training course
During the in-person programs
Demonstrate sustained performance During the in-person programs and through
assessment from education specialists and
mentors
Proficiency survey, comparing and
contrasting before and after training
responses
At the end of programs
Teach back During the in-person programs
Attitude “I believe this is worthwhile.”
Instructor feedback on attendee’s actions,
participation, and assertions of the training
During the in-person programs
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Methods or activities Timing
Focus group discussion of training value During the in-person programs
Post-training questionnaires Post-training and incrementally during the
next year
Confidence “I think I can do it on the job.”
Role-playing During the in-person programs
Simulation During the in-person programs
Performance test During the in-person programs
Commitment “I will do it on the job.”
Presentation of lesson implementation During final in-person programs
Action planning During the in-person programs and as needed
post-training
Level 1: Reaction
Level 1 of the new world Kirkpatrick model will explore the SEAL operator’s
engagement, sense of training relevance, and trainee satisfaction with the program, as seen in
Table 42. It is important that operators know the program’s goals so they can see the relevance of
the information (Knowles, 1980). Operators will have greater motivation to implement strategies
learned in the program when they know it reinforces NSW values and effectiveness.
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Table 42
Components to Measure Reactions to the Program
Methods or tools Timing
Engagement
Instructor observation Ongoing during the program
Attendance During the program
Course survey Two weeks post-program
Program completion Ongoing during the program
Relevance
Dedicated observer Ongoing during the program
Course survey Two weeks post-program
Participant pulse-check with survey and
discussion from instructors
Post-program, post-training block and post-
combat deployments
Trainee satisfaction
Course survey Two weeks post-program
Participant pulse-check with survey and
discussion from instructors
Post-training block and post-program
Evaluation Tool: Immediately Following the Program Implementation
Over the course of the embedded training program, data will be collected (Appendix H)
before, during, and after at designated intervals from the participants, education specialists,
additional training cadres, and mentors. The data will denote participant responses and
engagement, course satisfaction, and evaluate learning goals relevant to jobs. Additionally, data
from the education specialist and additional training cadres will focus on the training content,
adjust the course direction as needed, and ensure direct feedback.
206
In accordance with the training evaluation Level 1, the results will be collected during the
training program. The education specialist will conduct designated pulse checks by surveying
and discussing with participants: relevance/satisfaction of the training content to their job and the
organization, plus delivery to include the learning environment. Level 2, learning, will be
examined to see if the participants attained the desired knowledge, skill, attitude, confidence, and
commitment from their participation in the activities assigned in each training block.
Evaluation Tool: Delayed for a Period After the Program Implementation
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) recognized that a debilitating misconception occurs
when education specialists hold fast to addressing one level at a time. When in actuality, power
is generated in the connection of the four Levels. The blended evaluation approach (Appendix I),
developed by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016), will be administered by leadership at 35- and
90-days post-training-program completion. In this approach, more than one level at a time can be
evaluated (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The evaluation will contain two parts of surveys
and open-ended questions to measure effectiveness:
• Level 1, learning environment, engagement, relevance, satisfaction, and content
relating to job and organization.
• Level 2, applying their training (knowledge and skill) with confidence, commitment,
and attitude.
• Level 3, critical behaviors of the participants by applying what they learned in the
training and applying the training on a day-to-day basis on the job, as evaluated by
participants and education specialists.
207
• Level 4, internal outcomes of the participants resulted in reduced susceptibility to
psychological injury, rise in retention, reduced PTSD, and increased family
preservation.
Data Analysis and Reporting
The program’s success (Figure 26) is attributed to the detailed planning, leadership
training, consistent program feedback, and analytics (Appendix J). Operators who participated in
the program came into each training session valuing the training and applying the lessons
continually to make the appropriate behavioral changes to improve their performance. The NSW
has elicited help to improve resilience. Research along with data and findings shows that
specificity to trauma resilience for SEAL operators needed to be elevated. Trauma-resilience
training to improve mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual performance, ultimately improving
the quality of life for the operators (Level 4). There has been a 100% increase in enhancing
psychological trauma-resilience education. Not only will U.S. Navy SEAL operators succeed
with their trauma-resilience goal, but they also have the potential opportunity to develop greater
credibility with the NSW leadership, improve community relationships, and set new standards
for USSOCOM units.
208
Figure 26
Hypothetical Data Report Out: Percentage of Total Operators That Have Produced a Trauma-
Resilience Plan
Summary
Only with a positive partnership between training and stakeholders, a clear identification
of return on expectations, and value created upfront can the stakeholders effectively counter the
challenge of trauma resilience. Analysis and course corrections, having a chain of evidence
conveying value while starting with the end as the beginning to keep goal attainment in focus, is
imperative. Yet, to maximize current and future program results, the data should be analyzed,
changed if necessary, and continued to inform the training as it runs its course (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016). Do not wait until program completion to collect data and then delay even
more to analyze the data to see what ongoing training has already been reported (Kirkpatrick &
209
Kirkpatrick, 2016). The mental health crisis that veterans face is not uncommon, and prevention
education strategies continue to fall short. Ongoing systemic steps in training evaluation and not
altering objectives will increase program success by providing the tools to maximize outcomes
of all future mission-critical enterprises (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The training plan
developed by and for U.S. SEAL operators will revolutionize the warfighter’s performance by
focusing on behavioral changes that will increase operators’ trauma-resilience outcomes and
reduce PTSD symptoms that are revealed at work and home for ongoing operator evolution and
longevity. Ultimately, the other special operations commands from the Army, Marine Corps, and
Air Force could also benefit from the training program.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach
Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis served as this study’s primary framework to
discuss issues in the following dimensions: knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational
support. This three-dimensional gap analysis approach provides an in-depth examination. The
literature review displays the methods for organizing complex issues within the organization and
directing attention necessary for best practices and clarity of objectives. Chapter Three details
the systematic problem-solving examination of the performance gap with the methodological
framework. The problem-solving examination conducted in Chapter Three also explicates the
design of the survey instruments, interview protocol, and document analysis data collection.
Results and findings from the data are assessed in Chapter Four. The culmination of the
investigation is concluded in Chapter Five with research-aligned recommended solutions. The
new world Kirkpatrick model introduced in Chapter Five provides a second methodological
framework that converts recommended solutions into a plan for implementing and evaluating a
trauma-resilience program.
210
The strengths of utilizing Clark and Estes’s (2008) KMO gap analysis technique in this
innovation study were most apparent with research alignment and gap validation. The best
practices ascertained during knowledge and skills assessment as well as motivational
considerations, drive the program design addressing the problem of practice. The variations in
organizational performance are discussed as part of the KMO analysis and are integral to
understanding and identifying what is needed for Navy SEAL operators as a team-based
organization. Bottom-line-up-front is a consistently applied military format for summarizing the
key elements of an objective. The new world Kirkpatrick model aligns well with this format.
This facilitates the design of a program addressing knowledge and motivation priority needs for
the SEAL operator. The military as a whole is often looked at as one organization, but it has
many personalities. Trauma resilience for the SEAL Teams may greatly vary from other SOF
and conventional forces. Importantly, with mental health costs constantly rising, it is a
worthwhile endeavor for each branch of the U.S. Armed Services and not only the SEAL teams
to invest time and money in gap analysis and training evaluation.
Two strengths in a performance gap framework aid in the recognition of additional gaps
in trauma-resilience research and organizational needs. First, in developing a trauma-resilience
plan aimed at PTSD prevention, it became apparent, during the knowledge and motivation
literature review and findings, that performance trauma is a major contributor to Navy SEAL
operator’s mental well-being. The theme of performance trauma was more common in the
results and findings for SEALs rather than the classic PTSD themes of fear or moral injury
identified in the literature. Secondly, the specificity of producing a plan focused on trauma and
resilience is linked as a result of my experience. It is imperative, however, that identifying
specific organizational goals for trauma resilience starts with answering the question of “resilient
211
to what?” Posing this interrogative was also a strength of the gap analysis. Explicitly, this
research addresses trauma resilience, whereas other organizations analyzing the gap in their
resilience needs would benefit in identifying the target to which their organization wants to be
specifically resilient.
Limitations and Delimitations
Clark and Estes’s (2008) gap analysis to shape this innovation study was chosen as a
result of it being a performance framework that also includes recommendations for closing the
performance gap. The framework utilizes a mixed-methods approach containing surveys and
interviews, along with document analysis for data collection. Flaws, problems, limitations, and
delimitations from the study are identified below.
Limitations in this study include restrictions to the degree of the quality and quantity of
respondent participation. Two responses from an open-ended question in the survey stated, “I am
not smart enough to understand this question” and “I have no clue what that means.” The survey
responses help identify that the question’s wording could possibly have been too academic.
Experienced or witnessed organizational trauma and resilience have the ability to influence the
survey responses of inactive operators. The subject can be sensitive or threatening to the
respondent. The respondent’s perspective about potentially intrusive or invasive questions
requires personal information concerning self-perceived shortcomings, personal habits,
emotional or psychological disturbance, and death or dying, which may affect a willingness to
participate in this survey (Robinson & Leonard, 2019). In terms of the quantity component,
estimations from nonprofits that are designed specifically to support Navy SEALs have
determined that about 150 Navy SEALs separate from the military each year (Navy SEAL
Foundation, 2020). This number varies year-to-year as the Navy actively works to retain these
212
special operators who are costly to train and equip. After separation from the Navy, adding to the
difficulty in access and availability of this population, these inactive operators moved to various
locations across the country. The research from the literature review shows that only one study
identified contains both quantitative and qualitative data from a single participant that was a
Special Forces Army National Guard member (Rocklein-Kemplin et al., 2019). Emphasizing the
limitations of this study, no published literature containing mixed-methods research has been
conducted with Navy SEAL operators. These limitations make this study unique and potentially
less generalizable to other organizations.
Possible delimitations, or the boundaries of this study, start with the stakeholder of focus.
I narrowed the dissertation’s focus on the SEAL operator, making it manageable while working
with broader issues of trauma and resilience. Another boundary is the selection of inactive Navy
SEALs that have separated from service for under a year as the research participants. Definitions
of resilience and a focused specificity of trauma experienced during combat were designed to
align with NSW and USSOCOM and could be considered an additional boundary.
Future Research
The aim of this study was to explore a complete performance needs analysis for U.S.
Navy SEAL operators to produce a trauma-resilience plan along with solution recommendations
addressing the identified needs. The study focus was selected from the researcher’s connection
with the stakeholder community and the organization’s request for resilience improvement. The
research identifies prevention benefits of having specific resilience psychoeducation. Two major
additional findings were identified by the researcher during the course of the study and are
identified for future research. The identification of resilience training courses and future research
would also benefit in specificity as to what exactly the resilience programs are making the
213
trainees able to make it through and the desired outcomes. Additional research that would
provide comparable data should also explore conducting performance needs analysis for other
specified units that have known trauma exposure along with tailored solutions. Attempts by the
researcher to identify this exact pathology resulting from performance trauma failed, displaying
the finding to be a ‘wicked’ problem and in desperate need of future research (Rittle & Webber,
1973). Future performance research for the special operations community regarding
psychological trauma that could have a genesis in performance and not the traditional fear of
environment or moral injury is necessary. Planning out mentorship programs for inactive Navy
SEAL operators also needs to be researched to provide formal guidance to ensure appropriate
needs are being addressed. Pre- and post-data should also be made available, providing efforts
for ongoing and evolving prevention programs continue as research is minimal.
Conclusion
Clark and Estes (2008) stated that the key to finding effective solutions to organizational
performance dysfunction is to “think of a performance problem as an illness within the
organization” (p. 5). This insight applies well to the problem of producing a trauma-resilience
plan for U.S. Navy SEAL operators. Not unlike the realm of medicine, where one component of
finding solutions to a medical illness is to utilize preventive measures, the matter of improving
organizational performance as regards military PTSD would similarly benefit from a
preventative approach. The NSW knows the negative mental health outcomes for SEAL
operators as a result of the nature of their work, and still, proper preparation is not happening.
Specific organizational goals to enhance performance and implement a trauma-resilience plan
for SEAL operators have been introduced in this dissertation, making this an innovation study.
214
By way of the KMO gap analysis, this study’s transformative exploration identifies valid
influences for addressing the problem of practice. The study applies the research-based structure
to provide viable solutions to close the space between current performance and desired
performance. Additionally, the study presents a prevention program implementing the new world
Kirkpatrick model with the objective of developing and implementing the closing of the gap.
Ongoing program evaluation is also a means for the organization to have the ability to make
program adjustments that align with needs. Rigorous triangulation regarding the resilience of
SOF operators, particularly U.S. Navy SEALs, with a magnifying focus on trauma, is the
foundation of this study. The findings validate a need for a plan that makes resilience specific to
the needs of the stakeholder.
In A Humble Shrine, William Shakespeare wrote, “Your monument shall be my gentle
verse; Which eyes not yet created shall o’er-read; And tongues to be your being shall rehearse;
When all the breathers of this world are dead” (Sonnet lxxi, Grossman & Christensen, 2004, p.
xi). This dissertation was built in honor of the stakeholder of focus (Navy SEAL operators), the
parent organization (NSW), and the primary organization (USSOCOM), which are a deeply
loved community for me. Over the years, the drive for this unique undertaking and educational
endeavor has been entirely for the Navy SEAL operators who are extensively impacted by this
problem of practice and now plausible solutions. The levels of impact are even greater than
anticipated. The educational revelations obtained each came with painful jolts. Taking into
account the experience, education, and personal connection to this body of literature, it is vitally
important that the research on these pages be applied as intended: proactive measures to save
lives, livelihoods, minds, communities, and families of the brotherhood.
215
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Appendix A: Pre-interview Recruiting Communications
The following email will be sent to [Inactive Navy SEALs].
Pre-interview: Initial Email to Request Study Participation
Dear Teammates,
My name is Daniel Luna. I am a doctorate student at the University of Southern
California and a retired Navy SEAL. I am conducting research on trauma resilience. My goal as
a student practitioner is to provide insight to our field as to how we might be able to collaborate
to overcome some of the challenges we are facing. Ultimately it is my hope that this information
will benefit current and future operators. I assure you that information acquired will remain
anonymous.
I have received IRB approval and am in the stage of my dissertation where I am gathering
data. I am conducting interviews with inactive SEAL operators who have been separated from
service for one year or less. All participants will be completely confidential. While I know how
busy you are, it would mean the world to me if you would consider giving me 30 to 40 minutes
of your time. I will share the findings of the study with you. It would be my hope that some of
these findings could be of professional value to you.
I would like to schedule 30 to 40 minutes via Zoom with you in the next week at a time
and date that is most convenient to you. Please feel free to reply to this email with some dates
and times that work best. I have also included a link to Calendly in case it is easier for you to use
this method to schedule a couple of hours of your time to be interviewed: [insert link]. Thank
you very much for your time and consideration.
Best regards,
Daniel Luna
Doctoral Candidate, Rossier School of Education, The University of Southern California
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Pre-interview: Email to Confirm Participation in Study
Following the scheduling of a participant, the email below will be sent to confirm
interview appointments.
Dear Teammate,
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my research study concerning the
topic of trauma resilience. You should have received a Zoom link when you registered for an
interview. In case you do not have it, your Zoom link is: [insert link]. As a reminder, your
identity will be known only to me, and I am conducting this study for my doctoral dissertation at
the University of Southern California. I am attaching a pdf file to this email regarding the formal
notice of participant rights and the protocol surrounding how the information you provide will be
used and protected. Please reach out to me if you have any questions about this.
Thank you so very much for taking time out of your schedule to assist me with this
research, and I look forward to our conversation on [insert date and time].
Best regards,
Daniel Luna
Doctoral Candidate, Rossier School of Education, The University of Southern California
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Appendix B: Information Sheet for Exempt Research
University of Southern California
Rossier School of Education
3470 Trousdale Pkwy Ste 1100, Los Angeles, CA 90089
INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXEMPT RESEARCH
STUDY TITLE: Trauma-Resilience Plan
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Daniel Luna, Doctoral Candidate
FACULTY ADVISOR: Dr. Adrian J. Donato
You are invited to participate in a research study. Your participation is voluntary. This document
explains information about this study. You should ask questions about anything that is unclear to
you.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to examine a trauma resilience plan for U.S. Navy SEALs. I hope to
learn the knowledge, motivation, and organizational barriers to trauma resilience for Navy SEAL
operators. You are invited as a participant because of your specific role within your organization,
which fits the defined research population of the study.
PARTICIPANT INVOLVEMENT
You are asked to participate in a Zoom meeting to be interviewed about the research topic. The
interview is expected to last no more than one to two hours. All interaction for you is
confidential and anonymous. You will not be named or alluded to in a manner that would
provide identification.
While it is the desire of the researcher to record the conversation for subsequent confidential and
anonymous transcription so that your responses can be accurately analyzed, such recording is
purely voluntary on your part and is not a condition for participation. The researcher will take
notes as an alternative during the interview as needed.
There is no ‘prework’ necessary for the interview, and it will be held at a time that is to your
convenience and with respect to your schedule and responsibilities.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The members of the research team and the University of Southern California Institutional
Review Board (IRB) may access the data. The IRB reviews and monitors research studies to
protect the rights and welfare of research subjects.
When the findings of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no identifiable
information will be used.
236
Audio recordings, if made, will not have any direct reference to the full name or organization of
the participant and will be used solely for the purpose of analyzing the transcript for relevant
content. The recordings will remain in the sole possession of the research team and will be
destroyed not later than one year from completion and final approval of the study. The study is
expected to be fully completed by May 2023. For this study, the Research Team is the researcher
and the Chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee.
Audio recordings, if made, will not be started until the preliminary and identifying remarks of
the participant, and their organization, are concluded. The researcher will refer to the participant
by an arbitrary identification to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. As a part of the research
study, the recordings will be transcribed by a bonded academic paper transcription company. If a
participant desires, a copy of that transcript will be provided for review, editing, or declination of
participation.
INVESTIGATOR CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Daniel Luna, email: dpluna@usc.edu,
and cell: 619-823-9463, or Dr. Adrian J. Donato: adonato@usc.edu
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the
University of Southern California Institutional Review Board at (323) 442-0114 or email
irb@usc.edu.
USC IRB Information Sheet Template Version Date: 01/30/2021
237
Appendix C: KMO Survey Crosswalk
Assumed influence Survey item
Knowledge
Stakeholders know facts about trauma-
resilience strategies. (K-F)
What is the best definition of resilience?
(Choose only one; K-F)
List terms, multiple choice
What is the best definition of trauma?
(Choose only one; K-F)
List Terms, Multiple choice
Stakeholders know what the elements are to
implement for a trauma-resilience plan. (K-
F)
The following strategies improve resilience
to trauma in my opinion. (Choose up to
five; K-F)
Stakeholders are able to classify trauma
resilience principles. (K-C)
What kinds of resilience to trauma
fundamentals did you learn while in the
teams? (Select all that apply; K-C)
Stakeholders can structure strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan. (K-C)
What are important strategies to improve
resilience to trauma? (Select all that apply;
K-C)
Stakeholders can categorize protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan. (K-
C)
What do you think are the top five important
categories of resilience to trauma? (Choose
up to five; K-C)
Stakeholders plan their approach and monitor
progress on trauma resilience. (K-M)
In what ways have you monitored your
resilience to trauma? (Choose all that apply;
K-M)
Stakeholders can reflect on protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan. (K-
M)
Suppose you were asked to apply protocols
for implementing a trauma-resilience plan,
after the fact, what would be some of your
reflections? (Open-ended; K-M)
Motivation
Stakeholders find it useful for themselves to
utilize key factors in trauma resilience.
(Extrinsic value)
As an operator, I find it useful for me to
apply resilience to trauma skills by.
(Choose all that apply; extrinsic value)
Stakeholders believe in their ability to
identify key factors in a trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-efficacy)
To what degree do you believe in your ability
to identify key factors in a trauma-resilience
plan? (Percentage rating; self-efficacy)
Stakeholders believe in their ability to
implement strategies of a trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-efficacy)
To what degree do you believe in your ability
to implement strategies of a trauma-
resilience plan? (Percentage rating; self-
efficacy)
238
Assumed influence Survey item
Stakeholders feel good about identifying key
factors in trauma resilience. (Emotions)
To what degree do you feel good about
identifying within yourself key factors in
trauma resilience? (Percentage rating;
emotions)
Implementing strategies for a trauma-
resilience plan makes stakeholders feel
good. (Emotions)
To what degree do you feel good about
implementing strategies that help you
become resilient to trauma? (Percentage
rating; emotions)
Organization
Stakeholders need trust to facilitate trauma
resilience. (Cultural models)
I trust in NSW for my education in resilience
to trauma. (Likert 5-point scale; cultural
models)
Procedures that are in place to identify key
factors to implementing strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW
policies.
(Policies and procedures)
NSW consistently provides me with clear
procedures toward resilience to trauma.
(Likert 5-point scale; policies and
procedures)
Money is allocated for trauma-resilience
education for stakeholders. (Resources)
NSW provides me sufficient money in my
budget to provide education that addresses
resilience to trauma. (Yes, no, or not sure;
resources)
Educational specialists needed for in- and
outside-of-classroom support. (Resources)
The organization provides enough money to
provide me with educators for resilience to
trauma. (Yes, no, or not sure; resources)
239
Appendix D: KMO Survey Protocol
The following questions will be asked of all survey respondents.
Knowledge
1. (Knowledge, factual) What is the best definition of resilience? (Choose only one) List
terms, multiple choice.
• The activity of rebounding or springing back.
• The personal qualities that enable one to thrive in the face of adversity.
• The ability to adapt to a new or challenging situation.
• The dynamic process wherein individuals display positive adaptation despite
experiences of significant adversity or trauma.
• The ability to withstand, recover, grow, and adapt under changing
circumstances.
• The process and outcome of successfully adapting to difficult or challenging
life experiences, especially through mental, emotional, and behavioral
flexibility and adjustment to external and internal demands.
2. (Knowledge, factual) What is the best definition of trauma? (Choose only one) List
terms, multiple choice.
• exposure to actual or threatened death or serious injury
• exposure to war, either as a combatant or civilian, threatened or actual
physical assault, threatened or actual sexual violence, being kidnapped, being
taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war,
natural or human disasters, or severe motor vehicle accidents
• exposure to a deeply distressing or disturbing experience
240
3. (Knowledge, factual) The following strategies improve resilience to trauma, in your
opinion? (Choose up to five)
• positive coping with emotional difficulties
• positive affect or optimistic outlook
• positive thinking
• realism
• behavioral control
• physical fitness
• altruism or selfless acts
• emotional family ties
• family communication
• family support
• family closeness
• family nurturing
• family adaptability
• positive command climate
• teamwork
• cohesion
• community belongingness
• community cohesion
• community connectedness
• collective efficacy
• suppression
241
• mental quickness (cognitive agility)
• behavioral health control
4. (Knowledge, conceptual) What kinds of resilience to trauma fundamentals did you
learn while in the teams? (Select all that apply)
• positive coping with emotional difficulties
• positive affect or optimistic outlook
• positive thinking
• realism
• behavioral control
• physical fitness
• altruism or selfless acts
• emotional family ties
• family communication
• family support
• family closeness
• family nurturing
• family adaptability
• positive command climate
• teamwork
• cohesion
• community belongingness
• community cohesion
• community connectedness
242
• collective efficacy
• suppression
• mental quickness (cognitive agility)
• behavioral health control
5. (Knowledge, conceptual) What are important strategies to improve resilience to
trauma? (Select all that apply)
• mentoring
• coaching support
• recognition
• follow-up education
• checklist
• on-the-job training
• self-directed learning
• refreshers
• job aids
• reminders
• leadership modeling
• community-wide education
6. (Knowledge, conceptual) What do you think are the top five important categories of
resilience to trauma?
• regular exercise education
• sleep hygiene education
• brain-healthy nutrition education
243
• performance related to substance education (smoking, vaping, alcohol,
caffeine, etc.)
• tactical breathing education
• muscle relaxation education
• calm thinking education
• heart coherence education
• reflection education (killing reflection, integrity education, tactical memory
defusing or thought field therapy)
• dream management educations
• emotional education
• body response education (hormones, stress symptoms, brain response, etc.)
• war zone integrity education
• warrior identity education
• awareness and memory education
• readiness through prevention
7. (Knowledge, metacognitive) In what ways have you monitored your resilience to
trauma? (Choose all that apply)
• breaking down the goals
• tracking goals
• monitor progress
• reward system
• adjusting goal progression
• plan ahead
244
• journaling progress
• know the desired end objective
8. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Suppose you were asked to apply protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan, after the fact, what would be some of your
reflections? (Open-ended)
Motivation
1. (Motivation, extrinsic value) As an operator, I find it useful for me to apply resilience
to trauma skills by. (Choose all that apply)
• regular exercise
• sleep hygiene
• brain-healthy nutrition
• performance substances
• smoking
• vaping
• caffeine
• alcohol education
• tactical breathing
• muscle relaxation
• calm thinking
• heart coherence
• reflection skills
• dream management
• emotional regulation
245
• body response techniques
• war zone integrity
• warrior identity established goals
• awareness and memory skills
• readiness through prevention efforts
2. (Motivation – self-efficacy) To what degree do you believe in your ability to identify
key factors in a trauma-resilience plan? (Percentage rating)
0%---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
3. (Motivation, self-efficacy) To what degree do you believe in your ability to
implement strategies of a trauma-resilience plan? (Percentage rating)
0%---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
4. (Motivation – emotions) To what degree do you feel good about identifying within
yourself key factors in trauma resilience? (Percentage rating)
0%---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
5. (Motivation – emotions) To what degree do you feel good about implementing
strategies that help you become resilient to trauma? (Percentage rating)
0%---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100%
Organization
1. (Organization, cultural models) I trust in NSW for my education in resilience to
trauma. (Likert 5-point scale)
——|————————|—————————|————————|———————|——
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
246
2. (Organization, policies, processes, & procedures) NSW consistently provides me with
clear procedures toward resilience to trauma. (Likers 5-point scale)
——|————————|—————————|————————|———————|——
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
3. (Organization – resources) NSW provides me sufficient money in my budget to
provide education that addresses resilience to trauma.
• yes
• no
• not sure
4. (Organization – resources) The organization provides enough money to provide me
with educators for resilience to trauma.
• yes
• no
• not sure
247
Appendix E: KMO Interview Crosswalk
Assumed influence Interview item
Knowledge
Stakeholders know facts about trauma-
resilience strategies. (K-F)
What do you know about resilience? (K-F)
What do you know about trauma? (K-F)
What do you know about current NSW
resilience programs? (K-F)
What facts do you know about reducing
psychological trauma? (K-F)
Stakeholders know what are elements to
implement for a trauma-resilience plan.
(K-F)
What strategies do you know about
developing resilience? (K-F)
Stakeholders are able to classify trauma-
resilience principles. (K-C)
What aspects of resilience to trauma do you
think can be trained for active-duty
operators? (K-C)
Stakeholders can structure strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan. (K-C)
If you were educating others, what would
you share with them for resilience to
trauma? (K-C)
Stakeholders can categorize protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan. (K-
C)
Would you please give examples of areas
of your life where you see resilience and
trauma having an impact? (K-C)
Stakeholders plan their approach and monitor
progress on trauma resilience. (K-M)
Reflecting on times when you are getting
ready to face extraordinary stress, did
you do anything beforehand to prepare
psychologically? (K-M)
Reflecting on times when you are getting
ready to face extraordinary stress, did
you do anything during the extraordinary
stress situation to help you
psychologically? (K-M)
Reflecting on times when you are getting
ready to face extraordinary stress, did
you do anything after the extraordinary
stress situation to help you
psychologically? (K-M)
Stakeholders can reflect on protocols for
implementing a trauma-resilience plan. (K-
M)
Reflecting on your career, what would you
say is the foundation for practicing
resilience to trauma? (K-M)
248
Assumed influence Interview item
What foundations for practicing resilience
to trauma are worth sharing with other
operators? (K-M)
Reflecting on other operators, what
techniques do you think are worth
sharing? (K-M)
Motivation
Stakeholders find it useful for themselves to
utilize key factors in trauma resilience.
(Extrinsic value)
What have you done throughout your
career to reduce impacts of trauma you
may have experienced? (Extrinsic value)
Stakeholders are confident in their ability to
identify key factors in a trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-efficacy)
Did you ever experience any effects from a
potentially traumatic experience? (Self-
efficacy)
Stakeholders believe in their ability to
implement strategies of a trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-efficacy)
After a potentially traumatic event what
happens to your level of confidence as an
operator? (Self-efficacy)
Stakeholders feel good about identifying key
factors in trauma resilience. (Emotions)
Can you describe to me how you feel when
implementing positive resilient behaviors
to trauma? (Emotions)
Implementing strategies for a trauma-
resilience plan makes stakeholders feel
good. (Emotions)
Can you speak to examples of when you
felt good about improving your resilience
to trauma? (Emotions)
Organization
Stakeholders need to trust to facilitate trauma
resilience. (Cultural models)
How would you say the Team’s culture
affects your approach to your resilience
to trauma? (Cultural models)
Procedures that are in place to identify key
factors to implementing strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan aligned with NSW
policies. (Policies and procedures)
Please speak to strategies NSW promotes to
be resilient to trauma. (Policies and
Procedures)
Money is allocated for trauma-resilience
education for stakeholders. (Resources)
Please describe any organizational
programs that provided resilience
education specific to trauma. (Resources)
Educational specialists needed for in- and
outside-of-classroom support. (Resources)
Please speak to any ongoing organizational
support that is provided for resilience to
trauma education. (Resources)
249
Appendix F: KMO Interview Protocol
The following questions will be asked of all interviewees.
Knowledge
1. (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about resilience?
2. (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about trauma?
3. (Knowledge, factual) What do you know about current NSW resilience programs?
4. (Knowledge, factual) What facts do you know about developing resilience?
5. (Knowledge, factual) What facts do you know about reducing psychological trauma?
6. (Knowledge, conceptual) What aspects of resilience to trauma do you think can be
trained for active-duty operators?
7. (Knowledge, conceptual) If you were educating others, what would you share with
them for resilience to trauma?
8. (Knowledge, conceptual) What areas of your life do you see resilience and trauma
having an impact?
9. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Reflecting on times when you are getting ready to face
extraordinary stress, did you do anything beforehand to prepare psychologically?
10. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Did you do anything during the extraordinary stress
situation to help you psychologically?
11. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Did you do anything after the extraordinary stress
situation to help you psychologically?
12. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Reflecting on your career, what would you say is the
foundation for practicing resilience to trauma?
250
13. (Knowledge, metacognitive) What foundations for practicing resilience to trauma are
worth sharing with other operators?
14. (Knowledge, metacognitive) Reflecting on other operators, what techniques do you
think are worth sharing?
Motivation
1. (Motivation, extrinsic value) What have you done throughout your career to reduce
impacts of trauma you may have experienced?
2. (Motivation, self-efficacy) Did you ever experience any effects from a potentially
traumatic experience?
3. (Motivation, self-efficacy) After a potentially traumatic event, what happens to your
level of confidence as an operator?
4. (Motivation, emotions) Can you describe to me how you feel when implementing
positive resilient behaviors to trauma?
5. (Motivation, emotions) Can you speak to examples of when you felt good about
improving your resilience to trauma?
Organization
1. (Organization, cultural models) How would you say the Team’s culture affects your
approach to your resilience to trauma?
2. (Organization, policies & procedures) Please speak to strategies NSW promotes to be
resilient to trauma.
3. (Organization, resources) Please describe any organizational programs that provided
resilience education specific to trauma.
251
4. (Organization, resources) Please speak to any ongoing organizational support that is
provided for resilience to trauma education.
In closing, are there any questions I did not ask that you think I should have?
Is there anything more you would like to add?
I will now turn off the recorder and address final steps in the process.
Post-Interview
Your responses will remain confidential and anonymous. I will be analyzing the
information you and the other interviewees have provided. The findings of the study, in addition
to being crucial to my dissertation, will be shared via a brief summary video to the supporting
foundations by June 2023. If you would like, I will also share the video with you at that time.
If you have any questions in the future, please feel free to reach out through the same
contact information.
Thank you for your time and honesty.
252
Appendix G: KMO Document Analysis Protocol,
Assumed influences Selected documents Purpose of analysis
Knowledge
Stakeholders know
facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
(K-F)
Preservation of the Force and
Family Wave II needs
assessment (2014).
Purpose is to assess what facts
about trauma-resilient strategies
are being examined.
Stakeholders know
facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
(K-F)
Preservation of the Force and
Family Wave V needs
assessment and program
evaluation (2017).
Purpose is to assess what facts
about trauma-resilient strategies
are being examined.
Stakeholders know
facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
(K-F)
RAND Corp report: Promoting
Psychological Resilience in the
U.S. Military online document
2011
Purpose is to assess what facts
about trauma-resilient strategies
are being examined.
Stakeholders know
facts about trauma-
resilience strategies.
(K-F)
Resilience research and training
in the U.S. and Canadian
Armed Forces, Online
Document 2015
Purpose is to assess what facts
about trauma-resilient strategies
are being examined.
Stakeholders know
what are elements
to implement for a
trauma-resilience
plan. (K-F)
Evidence for E-OSC constructs Purpose is to assess what facts
about trauma-resilient strategies
are being examined.
Stakeholders are able
to classify trauma-
resilience
principles. (K-C)
Performance work statement
(2017), online document
Purpose is to assess how trauma-
resilience principles are
classified for stakeholders.
Stakeholders can
structure strategies
for a trauma-
resilience plan. (K-
C)
USSOCOM Science and
Technology—Preparing for the
future 2020–2030 Special
Operations Forces Small Unit
Dominance (SOF SUD)
Purpose is to assess how trauma-
resilience strategies are
structured for stakeholders.
253
Assumed influences Selected documents Purpose of analysis
Stakeholders can
categorize protocols
for implementing a
trauma-resilience
plan. (K-C)
Scoping document: POTFF
Command Surveillance
Analytic Support (2015)
Purpose is to assess how
implementing trauma-resilience
protocols is categorized for
stakeholders.
Stakeholders plan
their approach and
monitor progress on
trauma resilience.
(K-M)
POTFF: Modeling the
Relationship between POTFF
Program Use and Personnel
Readiness Final Report (2015)
Purpose is to assess how trauma-
resilience progress is planned and
monitored for stakeholders.
Stakeholders can
reflect on protocols
for implementing a
trauma-resilience
plan. (K-M)
Executive Summary for the
USSOCOM Analytic Support
for Responses to the House
Appropriations Committee
(HAC) (2015)
Purpose is to reflect on trauma-
resilience protocols for
stakeholders.
Motivation
Stakeholders find it
useful for
themselves to
utilize key factors in
trauma resilience.
(Extrinsic value)
Trident Points, 2021 NSW
Suicide Prevention
Purpose is to assess key factors
utilized in trauma resilience for
stakeholders.
Stakeholders believe
in their ability to
identify key factors
in a trauma-
resilience plan.
(Self-efficacy)
Asking for Help: POTFF Looks
to Remove Stigma, Online
Document
Purpose is to assess belief in
identifying trauma-resilience key
factors for stakeholders.
Stakeholders believe
in their ability to
implement
strategies of a
trauma-resilience
plan. (Self-efficacy)
Preservation of the Force and
Family Wave V Needs
Assessment & Program
Evaluation
Purpose is to assess belief in
ability to implement strategies
for a trauma-resilience plan.
Stakeholders feel
good about
identifying key
USSOCOM Science and
Technology – Preparing for the
future 2020-2030 Special
Purpose is to assess feelings about
identifying key factors in trauma
resilience for stakeholders.
254
Assumed influences Selected documents Purpose of analysis
factors in trauma
resilience.
(Emotions)
Operations Forces Small Unit
Dominance (SOF SUD)
Implementing
strategies for a
trauma-resilience
plan makes
stakeholders feel
good. (Emotions)
About USSOCOM Preservation
of the Force and Family
Purpose is to assess feelings about
implementing strategies in
trauma resilience for
stakeholders.
Implementing
strategies for a
trauma-resilience
plan makes
stakeholders feel
good. (Emotions)
Performance Work Statement Purpose is to assess feelings about
implementing strategies for a
trauma-resilience plan.
Organization
Stakeholders need
trust to facilitate
trauma resilience.
(Cultural Models)
Asking for Help: POTFF Looks
to Remove Stigma
Purpose is to assess trust in
facilitating trauma resilience.
Procedures that are in
place to identify key
factors to
implementing
strategies for a
trauma-resilience
plan aligned with
NSW policies.
(Policies and
Procedures)
Performance Work Statement Purpose is to assess the procedures
that are in place to identify key
factors to implement strategies
for trauma resilience aligned with
NSW policies.
Money is allocated
for trauma-
resilience education
for Stakeholders.
(Resources)
PR Newswire. KBRwyle to
improve U.S. Special Ops
Resilience and Health through
$500M Contract, Online
Document 2018
Purpose is to assess the resources
for trauma-resilience education.
Educational
specialists needed
for in- and outside-
of-classroom
PR Newswire. KBRwyle to
improve U.S. Special Ops
Resilience and Health through
Purpose is to assess the resources
for educational specialists in and
outside the classroom to support
255
Assumed influences Selected documents Purpose of analysis
support.
(Resources)
$500M Contract, Online
Document 2018
trauma resilience for
stakeholders.
256
Appendix H: Sample Survey Items Measuring Kirkpatrick Levels 1 and Level 2 Immediate
Evaluation Instrument
Post-course reaction Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
–4 –2 0 +2 +4
Me
This course held my interest.
I was constantly learning in this
course.
I enjoyed the ability to contribute to
my resilience to trauma
performance.
I enjoyed having organizational
support for my career development.
Materials/environment
The course materials (hand-outs, job
aids, etc.) were up to date.
The style of the course material
helped my learning experience.
There was a good mix of materials
(e.g., presentations, discussion,
exercises, role play).
The group size was right for the
course.
Facilities were appropriate for the
course.
Relevance
The course is relevant to my
responsibilities.
This course allowed me to relate my
existing knowledge to the new skills.
Effectiveness/job-related content
I practiced learning through scenario
applications to gain feedback during
the course.
I discussed the subject matter during
the course.
I will be able to apply this learning to
my role.
I believe I will see a positive impact if
I consistently apply what I have
learned.
The next questions request that you consider how you would have responded before and after
participating in performance trauma-resilience training.
257
Before the course Post-course learning review After the course
–4 –2 0 +2 +4 –4 –2 0 +2 +4
Clearly able to articulate
trauma-resilience
performance
Understanding the difficulty
associated with being able to
explain the benefits to all
concerned when trauma-
resilience performance is
undertaken correctly
Ability to describe your
trauma-resilience
performance
Practical understanding of how
trauma resilience can
enhance performance if
recognized and accepted
Ability to transfer trauma-
resilient skills into strategic
performance goals
258
Appendix I: Sample Blended Instrument for 35 and 90 Days Post-Training
Post-course reaction Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
–4 –2 0 +2 +4
As a result of my training, I have
produced a trauma-resilience plan.
As a result of my training, I am ____%
along in producing my trauma-
resilience plan.
0 50 100
-------------------------------------------------------------
After the course, I am able to spend
adequate time with enhancing trauma-
resilience performance.
I have adequate resources to
successfully apply learning from
training.
I have successfully applied the
knowledge/skills learned from the
course to my job.
Rate your level of agreement with this statement: Each item listed below is significant to
contribute to successfully applying trauma-resilience performance techniques.
The program itself
Post-program education specialist help
Trauma-resilience performance practice
Peer support
Referring back to the program materials
Job aids provided by the instructor
Performance incentives
How are you currently using what you learned during the trauma-resilience performance
training?
If you are not using the skills you learned during training, what are the reasons?
What would increase on-the-job application? Please describe.
259
260
Appendix J: Sample Data Analysis Charts
Figure J1
Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Changes
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Before Training After Training
Knowledge Motivation Organization
261
Figure J2
Trauma-Resilience Training Implementation
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2015 2017 2023
PTSD Resilience Trauma-Resilience to PTSD
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
The following case study utilized a performance gap closure protocol to support the development of recommendations intended for increasing the organizational performance goal of improving resilience for special operations forces. A review of the literature revealed essential resilient practices specific to PTSD and identified influences that pertain to the stakeholders and the performance goal. Perspectives and experiences of 94 inactive SEAL operators were gathered via survey. Additionally, 12 inactive SEAL operators participated in interviews, and POTFF documents were reviewed to complete data collection. The data were used to validate each particular influence as an asset or need through triangulation. The study identified knowledge (factual, conceptual, and metacognitive), motivation (extrinsic value, self-efficacy, and emotion), and organization needs (culture models, policies and procedures, and resources) for a trauma-resilience plan as it applies to Navy SEAL operators. Research findings revealed a clear understanding of resilience education with all 16 influences and a lack of knowledge concerning resilience and psychological trauma. The findings also identified the need for future research pertaining to performance trauma through the experiences of other NSW and SOF members, along with the development of specific implementation and evaluation plans. The lack of specialized research within the SEAL community is destroying lives, families, and communities (Stewart & Trujillo, 2020). The findings suggest the importance of a trauma-resilience plan specific to stakeholder needs and offer strategies for developing trauma-resilience education as a proactive measure for those that work in an environment classified as psychologically traumatic. Rigorous triangulation regarding the resilience of SOF operators, particularly U.S. Navy SEALs, with a magnifying focus on trauma, is the foundation of this study. The findings validate a need for a plan that makes resilience specific to the needs of the stakeholder. Targeted goals for a trauma-resilience plan must address the hard conversations that come from combat to include guilt, shame, betrayal, fear, and grief to ultimately improve performance. Addressing trauma factors with a resilience practice will improve operators' performance which ultimately reduces the gap for this problem.
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Luna, Daniel Paul
(author)
Core Title
U.S. Navy SEALs resilience needs assessment: an innovation study
School
Rossier School of Education
Degree
Doctor of Education
Degree Program
Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)
Degree Conferral Date
2023-05
Publication Date
04/13/2023
Defense Date
03/03/2023
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
KMO gap analysis,Navy SEALs,New World Kirkpatrick Model,OAI-PMH Harvest,Performance,posttraumatic stress disorder,resilience,special operations
Format
theses
(aat)
Language
English
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Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Donato, Adrian (
committee chair
), Foulk, Susanne (
committee member
), Robles, Darline (
committee member
)
Creator Email
dan@team3lx.com,dpluna@usc.edu
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UC113013497
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University of Southern California Digital Library
Repository Location
USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA
Repository Email
cisadmin@lib.usc.edu
Tags
KMO gap analysis
Navy SEALs
New World Kirkpatrick Model
resilience
special operations