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The IO contestation project: a multi-method approach towards understanding the ways states contest international organizations.

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The IO contestation project: a multi-method approach towards understanding the ways states contest international organizations.

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Content THE IO CONTESTATION PROJECT:
A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH TOWARDS
UNDERSTANDING THE WAYS STATES CONTEST
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
by
Anne Marieke van Wijk
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulllment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
December 2022
Copyright 2022 Anne Marieke van Wijk
To My Family:
Hans, Janneke
Joost, Sophie, Kim, Robert
& Michael
ii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I extend my gratitude to my dissertation committee for their support,
encouragement, and mentoring the past ve years: Wayne Sandholtz, Patrick James, and
Hannah Garry. I thank Wayne Sandholtz for always being the most kind and supportive
advisor, for giving meticulous feedback on my work, and oering a safe space when needed.
I also thank Patrick James for the continued support, the many research opportunities, and
always encouraging me to reach my full potential { even before I joined the program. Finally,
I thank Hannah Garry for the continued support throughout the dissertation process and
for connecting me to important stakeholders whom I was able to interview for this project.
Without my committee, this project would not have been what it is today.
I also want to thank my broader academic community at USC for their feedback and
support. It was truly the most collaborative and supportive environment I could have ever
wished for. Specically, Brett Carter, thank you for your feedback on numerous fellowship
applications and mentoring throughout. James Lo thank you for being so patient and helpful
with teaching quantitative methods to a qualitative scholar. Jonathan Markowitz, I am
grateful for your help with the project's research design, measurement ans scope. Brian
Rathbun, thank you for the always lively chats, for exposing me to political psychology, and
giving extensive feedback on my survey design and chapter. I greatly appreciate all you
have done for me and my research. I also want to thank Veri Chavarin, who has been a
rock throughout the whole program and helped me navigate all the international student
challenges.
The past three years, I have had the pleasure of working as a research assistant to the
\Power Projection, Deterrence Strategies, and Escalation Dynamics in an Era of Challenging
Near Peers, Rogue States, and Terrorist and Insurgent Organization" research group, also
known as the Near Crisis Project. Being a part of this research community has been a huge
inspiration to my own project and has been a tremendous learning experience. Primarily, I
want to thank Patrick James for giving me the opportunity to be part of this project and
always valuing my input. I also want to thank Steven Lobell, Kyle Beardsley, Victor Asal,
Scott Silverstone, Norrin Ripsman, Shikshya Adhikari, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Suzanne
Weedon for creating a vibrant and uplifting research environment. It was a huge pleasure
and honor to work with you on this project.
This project has also beneted from the nancial support from the Department of Po-
litical Science and International Relations, USC Center for International Studies, the E.J.
Brandenburg Memorial Fund, the USC Bartling Research Fund, and the USC Graduate
iii
School Summer Grant. I want to thank all for their continued support, which made research
assistance, eld work, survey research, and conference presentations possible. I also thank
Delerai Sadeghitari, Megan Bennett, and Kaitlyn King for their excellent research assistance
the past three years.
While research can be solitary, I have never felt alone. I am indebted to my amazing circle
of POIR friends and colleagues whom I have worked with side-by-side and have seen every
aspect of my journey. I am so lucky to have done this with you! First and foremost, Stefanie
Neumeier and Joey Saraceno { thank you for your lifelong friendship. We were basically
joined at the hip from the rst day in math camp and have seen each other through this
roller coaster. I could not have imagined doing this without you two. Also a huge thank
you to the 2017 cohort for your friendship and support: Ayana Best, Daniela Maag, Edward
Gonzalez, Jarred Cuellar, Kyle Reed, Na Young Lee and Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi. Although
we have spread out all over the globe, I hope we can continue our yearly get-togethers. I also
want to thank my extended POIR community: Therese Anders, Evgeniia Badawy, Laura
Breen, Victoria Chonn Ching, Claire Crawford, Taylor Dalton, Nola Haynes, Gaea Morales,
Maria D. Perez, Jennifer Rogl a, and Kelebogile Zvobgo. Thank you for being my community
lled with academic excellence, good times, and support.
In addition, I would not have been able to start this project without the guidance and en-
couragement from my Utrecht community in the years leading up to this PhD. The Utrecht
University History of International Relations Department has helped me grow into the scholar
I am today. I want to thank Mathieu Segers, Laurien Crump, Jaap Verheul, Beatrice de
Graaf, Lorena de Vita, Lauren Gould, Remco Raben, and Jacco Pekelder for all the con-
versations, mentorship and support throughout the years and encouraging me to start this
journey. I also could not have done it without Iris Clever, my academic partner in crime.
Thank you for being a fantastic friend and condant in both Utrecht and LA. You have been
my trailblazer in many ways and I am very grateful for all your guidance and support.
I also want to thank all my friends and family in the Netherlands, who have visited Los
Angeles often and have always supported the decision to move to the US for the program.
Your excitement and willingness to take an 11-hour
ight and come see us here has truly
meant the world. In specic, I want to thank Leon, Nita, Sascha, Robin, and Lauren { thank
you for being such an amazing extended family.
Last but certainly not least, I want to thank my family { to whom I dedicate this
dissertation. My parents, Hans and Janneke, for always encouraging me to reach for the
stars and giving me the freedom to pursue my dreams. Without your unconditional support,
love and trust, this PhD would not have been possible. To my siblings, Joost and Sophie
and my bonus siblings Kim and Robert, who made me feel like home was never far away.
Thank you for all your gezelligheid and frequent trips to LA { I am forever grateful for all
the memories we made together. Then to Michael, words cannot express how thankful I am
that we got experience this adventure together. It was truly a dream to do this with you
and I look forward to the many more adventures to come.
Los Angeles, August 2022
iv
Table of Contents
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Chapter 1: Perspectives on International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The International Order and its Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 The (ir)Rational Design of Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Dissertation Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter 2: Contesting International Organizations: Understanding Treaty Design as
a Parameter for Member State Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Denitions, Measurement, and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 The Institutional Design of IOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1.1 Measuring Institutional Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1.2 Indexing Institutional Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 The Contestation Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.2.1 Measuring the Contestation Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 A Theory of IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 The IO Contestation Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 The Origins of IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.1 IO Design impacts state behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.2 The Individual Drivers of IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2.1 Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2.2 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.2.3 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 IO Contestation in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
v
Chapter 3: Tipping Towards Termination: Understanding the African State
Withdrawals from the ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Permissive Conditions & Tipping Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Research Design & Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 The Permissive Conditions of Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.1 The ICC's Institutional Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.2 African Parties' Grievances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Tipping Points to Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.1 Trauma Informed Foreign Policy Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5.2 Lack of Alternatives to Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.3 Fearful Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter 4: Mobilizing the Middle Ground: measuring the eect of Dutch political
cues on perceptions of the European Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Theory & Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.1 Cues and Euroscepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.2 Cues and Agreeableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.1 Exposure to cues increases support for the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.2 Exposure to debate mobilizes the Middle Ground . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.2.1 The Middle Ground and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.4.2.2 Mobilizing the Middle Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Chapter 5: The Future of International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.1 Perspectives on IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2 Perspectives on IO Endurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A { IO Contestation Project Codebook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B { Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
C { Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Compound Index Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Summary of IO Contestation Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Summary of Expectations for building EU support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2 Summary Statistics Full Survey Experiment Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1 Speeches made by African parties to the ICC 2006-2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.2 Summary Statistics Full LISS Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3 Summary Statistics Middle Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Dissertation Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Institutional Design Features (IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Variable Index Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 The Contestation Toolkit (DV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 IO Contestation Dataset (1995-2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Design Score IV & DV Correlation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Hierarchy & IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Flexibility & IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Authority & IO Contestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 ICC ASP twenty most used words by African parties, 2006-2020. . . . . . . . 69
3.2 ICC ASP Speeches mentioning withdrawal by African parties, 2006-2020. . . 70
3.3 Average Sentiment development ASP speeches by African parties, 2006-2020. 71
3.4 Critics and Challengers Sentiment development in ICC ASP speeches,
2006-2020. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 % of Respondents who think the Netherlands should remain member of the
EU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2 Modeling Post-treatment support for Dutch EU Membership . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 % of respondents who \..." per personality type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 % of Middle Ground respondents who say the EU is (very) important. . . . . 110
4.5 Modeling Middle Ground Post-treatment Importance of the EU . . . . . . . 111
5.1 Modeling Middle-Ground Post-treatment Importance of the EU . . . . . . . 161
viii
Abbreviations
AMU Arab Mahgreb Union
APEC Asia Pacic Economic Council
ArticC Artic Council
ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
AU African Union
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
ICC ASP International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties
ICC WGA International Criminal Court Working Group on Amendments
ILO International Labor Organization
IO International Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE Organization Security Council Europe
P5 United Nations Security Council Permanent Members (5)
RCT Rational Choice Theory
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
IWC International Whaling Committee
OAS Organization of American States
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
WTO World Trade Organization
WWII World War II
ix
Abstract
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of how and why states contest interna-
tional organizations (IOs) by oering novel concepts, data, and measurements to interrogate
the broad range of state behaviors towards IOs between 1995-2020. Theories of international
cooperation have extensively studied why states cooperate { but why do they stop? The con-
cept of `IO contestation' captures the multitude of ways in which states contest international
organizations. I posit that the design of the IO founding document sets the parameters for
IO contestation, meaning that the extent to which organizations are (in)
exible, authori-
tative and/or hierarchical impacts how states behave towards them when they experience
a grievance. However, while the institutional design sets the permissive conditions for con-
testation, individual preference and choice determine the specic choices and actions states
make within these parameters. I investigate this premise using a mixed methods approach,
combining quantitative data analysis, text analysis, interviews, primary source research, and
a survey experiment to oer dierent perspectives on the causes en mechanisms of IO con-
testation. Analysis shows that IO contestation is indeed a complex and multifaceted process
where structure and agency interact. This study oers a ne-grained understanding of how
and why states challenge international organizations, and oers a fresh perspective on how
to counter this perceived unraveling of the international order { and if this is indeed what
we are witnessing.
x
Chapter 1
Perspectives on International Cooperation
In the Fall of 2016, right after the United Kingdom had voted to leave the European Union,
I was writing my graduate school applications. The Brexit was top of mind for me, as well
as for the rest of Europe. The referendum to leave sent shock waves through Europe, it was
both unfathomable and unprecedented. On one end of the spectrum, people spoke about
the complexity of untangling the UK from Europe and what it meant for the remaining
members. On the other end of the spectrum, people argued that the international order as
we had known it was about to implode, we would witness a mass-exodus from the EU, and
we should be rethinking international cooperation completely. Populist and other illiberal
movements gained momentum and thrived on this discourse, arguing that states would be
better o alone.
It struck me then { and now { that we have extensive knowledge about why states coop-
erate, but not so much about why they stop. The major International Relations paradigms
have contributed to understanding what is necessary for cooperation to ensue, how states
can most eectively cooperate, and the challenges they face once cooperation is established.
However, we know very little about how cooperation breaks down, when states renege on
1
their commitments, and what happens when states are discontent. These seemed important
questions that were only answered speculatively. This sparked my intellectual journey that
lead to the dissertation before you.
Broadly, my dissertation aims to better understand how and why international coopera-
tion breaks down { and consequently if we are witnessing the collapse of the post-World War
II international order. These are big questions that require comprehensive answers. I do not
claim to have found a denitive answer and reject the notion that we could even come to
an objective understanding of how these phenomena and mechanisms work. However, this
dissertation oers perspectives on the current challenges we see facing the international order
{ and these will hopefully open the door to further conversation, exploration, and research.
I approach these questions through an eclectic analytic lens, meaning that I draw from
various paradigms and combine quantitative and qualitative methods. This mixed methods
approach is an attempt to prevent my epistemology from becoming an ontological blinder.
In the words of Almond and Genco (1977), the world is a complicated place because human
beings are involved. As a result, we should not strive to capture the world and interaction
in one singular explanation { but aim for pluralism in attitudes and approaches that oer
pieces of the puzzle we are trying to solve. In turn, each piece of the puzzle can be judged
on its methodological merit.
I therefore also rely on dierent IR frameworks: the (rational) design of institutions,
political psychology, and the domestic constraints on foreign policy making. In light of the
broad question posed in this dissertation, using only one conceptual lens or favoring one
over others, would be too limiting. Allowing multiple perspectives to come together opens
doors to better understanding both contingency and multi-causality. Thus, this dissertation
2
strives to be transparent about its ontological and epistemological foundations, to be humble
about we can and cannot know, and to be pluralist in its search for answers.
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of how and why states contest
international organizations (IOs) by oering novel concepts, data, and measurements to in-
terrogate the broad range of state behaviors towards IOs. The overarching theory set forth
here is that the design of the IO charters sets the parameters for state behavior towards
them, meaning that the extent to which organizations are (in)
exible, authoritative and/or
hierarchical impacts how states behave towards them when they experience a grievance.
The institutional design sets the parameters for behavior. Yet, within these parameters, in-
dividual preference and choice determine specic choices and actions states (or their leaders)
undertake. The next section rst discusses the current state of the eld and will then outline
how the three papers work together to answer my research questions.
1.1 The International Order and its Organizations
Dening the international order is understanding the parts that make the whole. While
scholars highlight dierent elements of the international order, there seems to be a general
consensus around its main components. In its most broad sense, it is the system of interlock-
ing international organizations and rules that structure international interactions. Born out
of the atrocities of World War II with the general aim to never let history repeat itself, the
(liberal) international order facilitated unprecedented levels of cooperation on security, eco-
nomic, and humanitarian issues between Western states (Lake et al., 2021). The interlocking
organizations and rules structure relationships between generally capitalist, democratic and
3
industrialized states and its workings have been instrumental for the conduct of international
aairs between them.
Yet, solely focusing on the `Western' and `liberal' part of the international order would
be too limiting in scope. International cooperation is a global phenomenon. The study
of institutional regionalism has exposed the processes of formal institution building on a
regional level (Langenhove, 2016; Katzenstein, 2019; Solingen, 1998; Nye, 1968; Haas, 1964).
Especially after the Cold War, regionalism has witnessed a deepening and broadening of
cooperation beyond trade { also between less liberal states (B orzel and Risse, 2016). Regional
organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
have gained in delegation, authority and competencies in areas such as trade, human rights,
migration, and the environment. A narrow focus on solely Western and liberal organizations
would thus only cover a subset of all international cooperation and contestation.
There are a couple of key characteristics to this international order. The international
order as we know it today mainly started out facilitating economic relationships and trade
between states, hoping that a more inter-connected world would prevent future con
ict
from breaking out. This extended cooperation between states was based on shared economic
growth through the liberalization of international trade and capital. The economic liberalism
constructed through the Bretton Woods agreements has laid the groundwork for the so-
called \embedded liberalism", propelling international trading relations between states that
maintaining domestic stability and welfare (Ruggie, 1982; Mitrany, 1976; Haas, 1964).
In the shadow of the Cold War and tensions between East and West spreading across
the globe, security cooperation also played an important role in the developing modern
4
international order. The members of the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) decided that an attack on one would mean an attack on all. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, share peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, and further disarmament at a time when states were sharing and
stockpiling (Gavin, 2012; Trachtenberg, 1991; Stein, 1990). Also on a more regional level
(such as the Western Union, the ANZUS treaty, and SEATO) states collaborated on to ensure
national security through international cooperation. Thus, building military alliances was
also a key marker of the growing international order (Tavares, 2010; Ball, 2021; Crump,
2015).
Similarly, the development of an international human rights regime through international
courts played an important role in the development of the liberal international order (Alter,
2014). When promoting democracy and human rights became part of the global agenda,
dening the rights that warranted international protection became an important part of its
development.
1
Research has shown that as a result, commitment to human rights treaties
has increased and that human rights practices have generally improved (Fariss, 2014; Cole,
2015, 2012; Sikkink, 2017).
So, how does it all hang together? As Lake et al. (2021, 228) state, \orders connote
patterned or structured relationships among units." In its functional form, international
organizations are important facilitators of those structures by bringing states together on
shared issues of interest and facilitating repeat interactions among them (Keohane, 1984).
Through international organizations, states cooperate and coordinate to pursue shared goals,
1
However, Sikkink (2017) convincingly argues that the idea of human rights did not come from the Global
North and was not imposed on the Global South. On the contrary, the contributions of the Global South
are often forgotten in scholarship about the development of the human rights regime (58).
5
often ones that require international collaboration (Stein, 1982). In addition, IOs are also
both product of shared understandings between states, creating a community around shared
norms, goals and values (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 1999; Barnett and Finnemore,
2004), as well as places where rules and norms are contested, expanded, and re-conceptualized
(Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009).
The approach oered in this dissertation should be applicable to all intergovernmental
International Organizations (IOs). These are dened as formalized cooperative platforms
that operate on the basis of a founding treaty. They are regional or global intergovernmen-
tal organizations with three or more members and are supported by permanent secretariats
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Archer, 1983). This minimalist denition allows for a broad
spectrum in terms of the organizations' mission, function and structure. For instance, organi-
zations can focus on security, environment, economics, human rights, health, etc.. Likewise,
they can have law-making, monitoring, service, bargaining, and/or dispute settlement func-
tions. They are also structurally diverse: some IOs have a general assembly, parliament,
or executive councils. They can dier in meeting frequency, some meet monthly, yearly or
every ve years. In short: the denition covers a wide range of IOs.
1.2 The (ir)Rational Design of Institutions
We know that international organizations make up the pillars of the international order. This
leads to the question, what are these pillars made of? Can we see dierences in how they
are built and what does this mean for the cooperation between states they facilitate? At the
foundation of these IOs lies a treaty that outlines the formal form, the rules, regulations,
6
and responsibilities of the organization, which the members have to sign and ratify. Rational
choice theory (RCT) focuses on how these bargains are made between states, while historical
institutionalism investigates how the preferences for these bargains where shaped. Both
perspectives play a crucial role in understanding what the pillars of cooperation are made
of.
The RCT research agenda argues that states design international organizations in a
strategic and forward looking manner in pursuit of their shared goals (Koremenos et al.,
2001b). In an eort to induce equilibrium behavior, states agree to a certain bargain to
solve a certain problem and lock in future interactions. The rationalist understanding of IOs
connects the various cooperation problems states face to specic institutional design features
that make cooperation possible regardless of those problems (Koremenos, 2016). While
doing so, states trade-o between dierent levels of obligation, precision, and delegation
(Abbott et al., 2000). This understanding of institutions as a rational solution to cooperation
problems led to a host of dierent expectations, for example regarding the
exibility and
longevity of IOs (Koremenos, 2005) and how they can solve domestic problems (Moravcsik,
2000).
In response to structural realists, RCT scholars have shown that institutions can help
states cooperate under anarchy (Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1982). However, others have also
made the point that these power dynamics still exist and that institutions can be used to
reinstate or reinforce those dynamics. In this line of thought, states still advance their own
(narrow) interests, versus pursuing joint interests (Fearon, 1998; Morrow, 1994; Martin and
Simmons, 1998). For instance, Gruber (2000) argues that powerful states can force weaker
7
states to comply, because of the substantial losses they would incur by remaining in the non-
cooperative setting. Their lack of `go-at-it-alone power' prevents them from withdrawing
and enables the hegemons to benet. Thus, diverse preferences and capabilities also matter
for the design of international organizations.
In this project, the rational design of international organizations sets the parameters
for how members contest them in the future. More specically, the `design' of international
organizations is the independent variable and we interrogate how these procedural provisions
(i.e. the design) impact state behavior towards these IOs (DV). Especially when states are
faced with a grievance, these design choices made at inception create the realm of possibility
for what types of acts of contestation are possible. Thus, states lock into an organization
when they sign and ratify the treaty.
However, the preferences for these bargains are neither exogenous nor static. One major
shortcoming of the institutional RCT research is its inability to recognize the impact of
people, politics and processes in shaping these institutions and decisions in the rst place.
Where do these preferences come from, what is the foundation of the initial interaction, and
how have the actors been shaped? These bargains do not fall out of thin air, but are formed
by history and context. Similarly, preferences, actors and the world also change { and these
processes do not always have to be `rational' in the RCT denition. The assumption that
these elements are exogenous at and beyond creation is necessary for rationalist scholarship,
but has not gone unchallenged.
Historical institutionalist approaches emphasize the importance of past interactions and
the importance of history, timing, and sequencing. They talk about the process of insti-
tutionalization, rather than assuming actors and preferences to be exogenous. Haas (1964)
8
most famously discussed the process of institutionalization and how { after creation { in-
ternational organizations will naturally further expand cooperation between states, the so-
called `spillover eect'. More recently, Sandholtz and Stiles (2009) show that the norms on
which institutions are founded are not static once agreed upon at creation, they continuously
adapt to changing problems and needs. Similarly, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) made the
argument that IOs could also behave in ways that are unanticipated by its creators by ex-
panding its original mission, adapting to changing circumstances, developing new rules and
procedures, and/or even display pathological behavior.
Thus, the institutionalists argue that institutional development tends to be path de-
pendent, meaning that pre-existing conditions in
uence what is possible at institutional
inception and also subsequently in
uence the development thereafter. For example, Iken-
berry (2018) argues that the United States was able to lock in its power after World War
II due to the so-called `stickiness' of institutions, but the world is no longer the same place.
Segers (2020) highlights how the (often chaotic) process of European integration was one of
coincidence, emotion, and intrigue. For the Netherlands specically, it was a process that
often happened `to them'. Steehouder (2022) argues that the `blueprints of Europe' can be
traced back to the early 1920s, long before the Schuman Plan, and were built on a desire
for stability after tumultuous interwar years. Hence, in order to understand preferences, we
must understand the mechanisms that lead to these preferences { and how they may change.
This dissertation is based on the notion that each of these perspectives holds a piece of
the puzzle and complements where the other falls short. More specically for this project,
it helps to think through how international organizations may be able to combat both the
internal and external pressures they are facing, where these pressures stem from, and how to
9
deal with them going forward. The next section outlines how this dissertation will go about
addressing this.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
Figure 1.1 illustrates the linkages between the three papers that form the core of this dis-
sertation project. While the chapters dier in the methods and substantive topic, they all
speak to the question how and why states contest international organizations { hence the
connective triangle in the middle. As mentioned above, I value oering multiple perspectives
and methods in order to do justice to such a complex question. Each piece of the puzzle
reveals a dierent aspect of IO contestation, through a dierent lens.
Chapter 2:
IO Design
Chapter 4:
Domestic Audience
Chapter 3:
Policy Makers
IO
Contestation
Internal challenges
to IOs
External challenges
to IOs
Challengers' symbiotic
relationship
Figure 1.1: Dissertation Structure
10
Chapter 2 is based on my original `IO Contestation' dataset, which records acts of con-
testation towards IOs between 1995-2020. The aim of this chapter is to illuminate how IO
design sets the parameters for state behavior when they are faced with a grievance. It argues
that the level of hierarchy,
exibility and authority codied in the founding document of the
IO in
uences whether states decide to waver, challenge or terminate towards it. It both out-
lines and codes the design of sixteen organizations, as well as over 100 acts of contestation
by 57 states. The analysis then shows which design choices makes certain types of behavior
more likely.
2
The connection between chapter 2 and chapter 3 is the shared focus on the internal chal-
lenges IOs face. In this light, chapter 3 zooms in on how policy makers specically interact
with the IO parameters and design and focuses on the mechanisms of IO contestation. Using
the International Criminal Court and the more recent challenges by its African members as
a case study, it looks at the process of withdrawal, withdrawal reversal, and amendment
by various African members. It utilizes text analysis and semi-structured interviews with
involved policy makers to reveal that the discrepancy between how certain provisions { such
as the amendment clause { are intended to function, versus how they are utilized in practice.
The connection between chapter 2 and chapter 4 lies in the shared focus on the external
challenges IOs face. Chapter 4 shifts focus to the domestic audiences and their (lack of)
support for international organizations. We know that state leaders have to listen and cater
to their domestic audience to be re-elected. Thus, domestic discontent with IOs could inform
policy choices and behavior. Chapter 4 interrogates a potential avenue to build support for
IOs under domestic audiences. Based on data from my survey experiment regarding Dutch
2
Data in this chapter remains preliminary and the relations shown are indicative of broader patterns.
11
support for the European Union, my ndings suggest that access or exposure to debate
builds support among the `middle-ground' { those people who are not particularly engaged
in politics and/or very knowledgeable about IOs.
The connection between chapter 3 and chapter 4 lies in the relationship between the
challengers: domestic discontent can fuel and in
uence state contestation more broadly,
but also policy makers can in
uence the audience's perception of international cooperation.
Policymakers that are out of touch with their constituents may be one of the rst sources
of discontent and can ignite populist movements. We know that populism and populist
politicians can be severely detrimental for the international order, but we see that also less
extreme negative perceptions of IOs can hollow out meaningful cooperation. Chapter 3 and
4 suggest how this cycle could be broken on both the policy makers' and audience's side.
12
Chapter 2
Contesting International Organizations:
Understanding Treaty Design as a Parameter for
Member State Contestation
2.1 Introduction
On June 23rd, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union after a 52%
to 48% referendum vote. The UK withdrawing from the European Union sent shock waves
throughout the international community, eectively making it the prime example of the un-
raveling world order. The Brexit is still fresh in our memory, but international organizations
have been under re for a longer period of time. Especially since the end of the Cold War,
their purpose and impact has become less self-evident, states question if giving up part of
their sovereignty is worth the cost of membership, and states more often act outside of these
cooperative platforms. International organizations (IOs) are increasingly being contested
from within by their own members.
13
This paper unpacks the varieties of `IO contestation' strategies and aims to understand
why states pursue certain strategies vis- a-vis IOs when they are faced with a grievance. The
dependent variable in this chapter is state behavior towards IOs. Membership termination
{ like the Brexit { is the most extreme form of IO contestation, but there are many steps
on the escalation ladder leading up to withdrawal. This paper is interested in all forms
of contestation to better understand the variation in strategies and when they are utilized.
This chapter identies three behavioral typologies: 1) wavering (states using their voice to
criticize or threaten), 2) challenging (states taking action to address their grievances through
non-compliance or amendment), and 3) termination (states ending their membership).
I argue that we can better understand why states choose certain IO contestation strate-
gies by looking at how the organization is designed. The institutional design of IOs is the
independent variable for this chapter. These so-called institutional design features dictate
the terms and conditions of membership, and outline the states' room for maneuver under
the treaty. For instance, some treaties allow for states to suggest amendments, temporarily
escape from the organization, or renegotiate every couple of years. Other institutional de-
sign features determine whether or not the organization has monitoring provisions, dispute
resolution mechanisms, or punishment clauses. These design features are my independent
variable, as they make certain types of state behavior more or less likely. As a whole, these
set the parameters for IO contestation.
In order to illuminate these relations between institutional design and IO contestation,
I introduce my novel `IO Contestation dataset', which captures dierent types of acts of
IO contestation between 1995-2020. The data consists of approximately 100 actions, taken
by 57 dierent states, against sixteen international organizations. I code the action as
14
either wavering, challenging or terminating, as well as the institutional design features per
organization, and include various control variables. The analysis of this data will reveal the
relationship between IO design and the behaviors.
Thus, this paper's main contribution is two-fold: interrogating the steps on the contesta-
tion escalation ladder, and simultaneously understanding the impact of institutional design
choices. This paper denes, measures and analyzes these concepts in depth. We see that
institutional design determines the parameters for behavior. In order to show this, I will
lay out the expectations based on the theory, introduce the IO Contestation Dataset and
then test the hypotheses. While the ndings remain tentative, they do illustrate how design
and contestation interact and where future research could dig deeper. The discussion will
elaborate on the implications of the ndings, and discuss remaining questions and future
avenues for research.
2.2 Denitions, Measurement, and Scope
This paper aims to show that the design of these international organizations, impacts how
states behave towards them when faced with a grievance. This section denes, measures,
and outlines the scope of the independent and dependent variables used in this chapter.
2.2.1 The Institutional Design of IOs
Creating new international organizations is an elaborate and complex process that can take
years to negotiate. Every clause, word, inclusion and exclusion is negotiated between the
prospective state parties. Diplomats and state leaders decide on the aim, mission, and scope
15
of the organization: what is it trying to accomplish, what are the annual goals, what is
the road map towards those goals? State representatives also have to determine how the
organization functions on a day-to-day basis, for instance: who gets to vote, what do the
meetings look like, who chairs the meetings, what does compliance look like, and will the
terms of the agreement be reviewed on a regular basis? These latter types of decisions are
of interest here. This section lays out these institutional design features and how they are
measured.
International organizations are dened as regional or global intergovernmental formal
organizations created by governments that operate on a treaty agreement, also called the
founding document. They have three or more member states and are supported by a per-
manent secretariat (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Archer, 1983). This minimalist denition
allows for a broad spectrum in terms of the organizations' mission, function and structure.
For instance, they can focus on security, environment, economics, human rights, health,
etc.. Likewise, they can have law-making, monitoring, service, bargaining, and/or dispute
settlement functions. They are also structurally diverse: some IOs have a general assembly,
parliament, or executive councils. They can dier in meeting frequency, some meet monthly,
yearly or every ve years. In short: the denition covers a wide range of IOs.
The institutional design features are the provisions that have been included in the found-
ing document to manage state membership and the formal procedures. The basic premise
is that these organizations and are designed rationally by their members (Stein, 1982; Mor-
row, 1994; Fearon, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001a; Koremenos, 2005). The importance of
functional form has been underscored by Barbara Koremenos (2016), who argues that states
design international agreements to deal with underlying cooperation problems. For instance,
16
when states face cooperation problems such as `uncertainty about the state of the world'
or `distribution problems', states accommodate them by incorporating so-called
exibility
mechanisms. These could be, for instance, duration provisions, escape clauses, withdraw
clauses, imprecision and reservations to guard against these cooperation problems. I extend
this argument by saying that these design decisions also matter for how states interact with
organizations going forward.
I cluster the institutional design features under the umbrella of 1) hierarchy, 2)
exibility,
and 3) authority. Previous research has extensively discussed the presence of hierarchy in the
international system more broadly (Beardsley et al., 2020; Lake, 2011; Keohane, 1984), but
this paper argues that is also matters how this is codied within international organizations.
Certain clauses in the founding document induce an ordering among the members within the
organization. As a result of these clauses, some states may be more or less powerful within
the organization. For instance, wee see that some members of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) hold veto power and are therefore more powerful than the others.
The design features clustered under
exibility regard the extent to which states are able
to change their commitment or update their preferences as members. Having formal pro-
cedural avenues through which member states could for instance change their commitment
or temporarily escape its jurisdiction. This allows states to reap the benets of cooperation
under the organization, but does not lock them in when the circumstances or preferences
change (Koremenos, 2005; Helfer, 2005, 2013). For instance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) has a 5-yearly review conference where states come together to update the
terms of the agreement.
17
The design features that are clustered under authority consider to what extent states
delegate power to the organization and decision making process (Hooghe and Marks, 2015;
Lake, 2010; Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Under this umbrella of authority,
we specically look at the IOs power to enforce the treaty, sustain credible commitments, and
bind its members to the decisions (Koremenos, 2007; Pollack, 1997). Thus, to what extent
states have handed over a part of their sovereignty to the organization and is thereby able to
exercise power over its members and/or can act on its own. For instance, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors member's nuclear material inventory and inspects
nuclear facilities. Figure 2.1 summarizes the categories.
Hierarchy Flexibility Authority
IO Founding Document
- V oting distribution
- Veto rights
- Chair appointment
- Administrative
appointments
- Amend
- Renegotiate
- Escape
- Reservation
- Duration
- Terminate
- Monitoring
- Dispute resolution
- Punishment
Figure 2.1: Institutional Design Features (IV)
2.2.1.1 Measuring Institutional Design
These institutional design features are operationalized and measured based on the organi-
zations' founding documents, also often called a treaty, statute, or charter. These treaties
18
outline the workings of the organization through clauses that detail the voting rights, amend-
ment process, dispute resolution mechanism, punishment, division of administrative posi-
tions, etc.. In the data, these are coded as dichotomous variable where possible: the treaty
either does or does not contain a certain clause.
1
Hierarchy is measured by seeing whether or not the treaties include clauses that dis-
tribute power within the organization. These are re
ected in clauses that outline the voting
procedures and the assignment/rotation of administrative posts. Especially the absence or
presence of veto rights { either for all or some members { can create a hierarchy in the
organization where some have the ability to block but others do not (Hooghe and Marks,
2015). Similarly when voting rights are based on historic relations or nancial contributions
(Winter, 1996; Snyder et al., 2005). Administrative functions - such as President, Chair,
or Host - give actors institutional authority through which they can set the agenda, create
issues, and enforce rules (Avant et al., 2010). The term, election, assignment and/or rotation
of these functions is a means of power distribution in the IO.
Flexibility is measured by looking at whether or not states have been able to add in
reservations and/or if treaties have included an amendment, renegotiation, escape and/or
termination clause (Helfer, 2005, 2013). Amendment clauses give states the option to amend
the treaty through a set process. Renegotiation clauses give states the option to open up
and renegotiate the treaty at a set moment in time (sometimes at predetermined moments).
Escape clauses give states the option to temporarily be exempt from the requirements under
IO membership and avoid liability for noncompliance due to an exogenous shock (Pelc, 2009).
States can add in reservations at the start of the treaty to tailor the terms to their preferences
1
Codebook for the IO Contestation Dataset is in Appendix A.
19
and domestic constraints. Duration clauses dictate when (and if) there are moments for
renegotiation, such as regular review conferences. Termination clauses give states the option
to withdraw from the organization all together (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas, 2019; Meyer,
2010). Thus,
exibility gives the states the opportunity to keep their seat at the table and
challenge the IO from within, but also give states the option to renounce their seat at the
table and excuse them from their obligations.
Authority is measured by determining the level of power the organizations have over the
members and the types of enforcement mechanisms they can leverage. In other words, the
amount of sovereignty the states handed over to the IO. The delegation of sovereignty to the
IO grants the IO the authority to execute (limited) tasks (Lake, 2007). Here, authority is
measured though their ability to monitor compliance (ranging from self-reporting to external
monitoring bodies), the type dispute resolution mechanisms available to the states (ranging
from diplomatic negotiation, mediation, or adjudication/arbitration), and the IO's ability
to punish states when they violate the terms of the agreement (Betz and Koremenos, 2016;
Crooke, 2016; Farrall, 2016). Thus, authority measures to what extent states behavior
is bound to the treaty, under scrutiny of international law, or if they have any room for
maneuver.
2.2.1.2 Indexing Institutional Design
We have now dened the three institutional design features of international organizations:
hierarchy,
exibility and authority, and outlined how they are measured through the founding
documents. The next step is to create an index score based on these features that will be
used in analysis. The creation of a composite measure has two main benets for analysis: on
20
the one hand, it can capture a more complex concept with various indicators. For instance,
it is not just voting distribution that determines the level of hierarchy, but also the veto
right and distribution of administrative functions. Therefore, several items taken together
will give a more well-rounded indication of the specic variable. On the other hand, the
IO index score also provides a range of variation between IOs, which is useful for more
comprehensive analysis. Thus, in line with the best practices described in Babbie (2016), an
index score allows me to summarize several indicators in a single score while also maintaining
their specicity.
I create two scores: the variable index score (Figure 2.2) and the compound index score
(Table 2.1). The variable index score accumulates the scores (1 or 0) assigned to each
individual attribute of the three main categories (see Figure 2.1 for reference). By creating
an index score, I choose to weigh all variables equally in relation to each other. In practice
this means that, for example, monitoring, punishment and dispute resolution capabilities
each equally contribute to an IO being authoritative.
Thus, the variable index score measures the level of hierarchy,
exibility and authority
in each international organization separately. Figure 2.2 shows how each international or-
ganization in the dataset scores per institutional design variable. For instance, we see that
the Organization of American States (OAS) scores low on hierarchy, but higher on
exibility
and authority. These index scores will be used as part of the analysis in Hypothesis 3-5.
21
Inflexible Flexible
ICC
ASEAN
IOM
NA T O
AU
IAEA
IWC
OAS
GCC
SAARC APEC
ArticC
EU
ILO
IMF
OSCE
Non-authoritative Authoritative
ICC
ASEAN
IOM
NA T O
AU
IAEA
IWC
OAS
GCC
SAARC
APEC ArticC
EU ILO
IMF
OSCE
Egalitarian Hierarchical
ICC ASEAN
IOM
NA T O
AU
IAEA
IWC
OAS
GCC
SAARC
APEC ArticC
EU
ILO
IMF
OSCE
Figure 2.2: Variable Index Score
22
For each IO, I then also tally these variable scores to create compound institutional design
index. The compound index score allows the analysis to take into account how these three
variables may impact IO contestation together. It is thus a combination of the three variable
index scores, scaled from zero to one. For interpretive purposes, I divide the the scores into
either the `high' or `low' category (split equally down the middle). Table 2.1 shows where
each organization falls in the compound score category.
A low compound index score means that the institutional design choices made for the
international organization are { on average { more lenient and undemanding for the member
states. It means that the IO is fairly egalitarian, has sound
exibility mechanisms, and lower
authority over its members. While some of these scores may be a little higher, on average,
states retain their room for maneuver and the ability to act on their own. On the opposite
side, a high compound index score means that the institutional design choices for the IO are
potentially more constricting and rigid for its members. They may have a larger impact on
the members' sovereignty and constrain their ability to act unilaterally in the international
arena. These scores do not qualify the organization dierently, a low or high score serve
dierent purposes (as you can see in the categorization). We will return to these measures
for the analysis.
Score International Organization
Low APEC, ArticC, ASEAN, GCC, ICC, IOM, OAS, SAARC
High AU, EU, IAEA, ILO, IMF, IWC, OSCE, NATO
Table 2.1: Compound Index Score
23
2.2.2 The Contestation Toolkit
We now turn to the dependent variable: the acts of IO contestation. State grievances are the
catalyst for IO contestation, but grievances can originate from many dierent places (B orzel
and Z urn, 2021; Lake et al., 2021). We know from previous research that the duties and
obligations states face under these treaties are subject to interpretation and application, and
can therefore become a source of dispute due to tensions and inconsistencies (Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet, 2004, 242). Similarly, we know that organizations can take on a `life of their
own' once it is operational and may stray from its original aim and mission or become too
independent from the states (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Alternatively, leaders change,
the state of the world changes, and state preferences can change { which could all cause
issues. Thus, grievances are to be expected { some even argue these are ushering in the
end of the liberal world order (Ikenberry, 2018; Kagan, 2017). This paper engages with this
scholarship by examining how institutions impact behavior.
I dene the `contestation toolkit' as the range of strategies IO member states can under-
take when they are faced with a grievance. It consists of three broad behavioral typologies:
1) Wavering, 2) Challenging, and 3) Terminating. These three categories include more spe-
cic types of behavior that we can observe in the real world. More specically, these are the
types of behaviors that are reported on in the media or written about by scholars. I rst
describe the three categories and then turn to their measurement.
The rst category captures states wavering in their commitment to the IO. While these
members may have been supportive and loyal to the IO, they use their voice to question or
accuse the IO publicly. Important to note here is that the behaviors falling under `wavering'
24
only include acts where states use their voice to contest the IO, they either delegitimize or
threaten. They take a public stance against the IO or critique its decisions or threaten to
take action against it. This may cause reputational damage to the IO, or mobilize others to
also join in on the delegitimization. For instance, African members of the ICC have accused
it of being a neo-colonial tool for western states.
Secondly, states can also actively challenge the IO. When acts of contestation are classied
as `challenging', this means that states do not only use their voice to criticize the organization,
but also act on it. Also here, it is important to underscore that these actions are taken in light
of perceived grievances. When they challenge, states can either call for formal changes of the
founding document through renegotiation or amendment or decide to no longer comply. For
instance, states can suggest amendments to the founding document or reduce their formal
commitment (for instance in terms of nancial or military commitment). For instance,
the United States has lowered its NATO contribution because the other members were not
pulling their weight.
The third category is to terminate membership, which is the most extreme form of
challenging behaviors. When states withdraw from international organizations, they formally
sever all ties with the IO and no longer hold any obligations under the statute (Helfer, 2005).
While the other acts of protest allow states to keep their seat at the table and change it from
within, they resign this option through formal withdrawal. Withdrawal or exit clauses can
be included in the founding documents, but states always have the right to withdraw based
on the Vienna Convention on the Laws of International Treaties (1969). For instance, North
Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
25
2.2.2.1 Measuring the Contestation Toolkit
As mentioned above, these acts of IO contestation can be empirically observed. Wavering is
identied when states use their voice and publicly delegitimize or threaten the organization.
Most of these acts are found in public (domestic or international) speeches where leaders
accuse or denounce the organization with the goal of challenging its authority or integrity.
For instance, Moroccan King Mohammed VI in 2017 criticized the Arab Mahgreb Union
(AMU) for failing to promote economic and social progress in North Africa.
2
In addition,
threatening to take action (like reducing formal commitments or noncompliance), but not
actually going through with it, can also be used as a wavering tactic to draw attention or
gain leverage. For instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been threatening
to close NATO bases if NATO would not take Ankara's security concerns seriously.
3
Challenging happens when states actually act on their grievances beyond criticizing it
and take deliberate action. States can decide to go through the process of altering the treaty,
using the amendment or renegotiation process. These are formal procedures often outlined
in treaty. For instance, Kenya has gone through the amendment process in the International
Criminal Court to address one of their grievances. They can also decide to no longer comply
with the treaty and violate its terms of the agreement (Cogan, 2006). This is a willful and
intentional violation of the treaty, which can be done either through a specic action, such as
raising taris, that go against the treaty, or through inaction, such as not arresting a fugitive
on your territory. South Africa did not arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, which
they were obligated to do under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
4
2
Morrocco News, `King Mohammed VI Has Pronounced Maghreb Union Dead, Long Live Africa', 2017
3
Bloomberg, `Turkey Isn't Leaving NATO, But It May Be Breaking With the West', 2019
4
AP News, `South Africa says it was not obliged to arrest al-Bashir', 2017
26
Deligitimization Threatening
Non-
compliance
Altering Withdrawal
Wavering Challenging
Figure 2.3: The Contestation Toolkit (DV)
Termination takes place when states formally withdraw from the organization and re-
quires no permission from the other members { like Britain's decision to leave the European
Union. In some cases, withdrawals do not go into eect immediately, but states need to
sit out a wait period before the withdrawal is ocial. States can also decide to withdraw
only from certain parts of an organization. This termination category will be folded into the
challenging category discussed above. This is necessary because of the rarity of IO member-
ship termination. For data exploration purposes, this section focuses on either wavering or
challenging { including the terminations in the challenge category. Thus, the dierence in
the dependent variable is whether states go beyond using their voice and take active action
against the IO (challenging) or only use their voice to express their discontent or threaten
the IO (wavering).
2.3 A Theory of IO Contestation
The above sections have laid out the key denitions, concepts and operationalization of the
variables. The overarching theoretical expectation is that how organizations are designed
matters for how states interact with them. In other words: the hierarchy,
exibility, and
authority codied in the IO's founding document impacts whether members decide to waver
27
or challenge when they are faced with a grievance. More specically, I expect to see rela-
tionships between high/low hierarchy,
exibility, and authority and whether states decide to
waver or challenge. This section lays out the expectations for this IO Contestation Theory.
The overarching theoretical expectation of \how organizations are designed matters for
how states interact with them", can be tested using the compound index design score (recall
Table 2.1). More specically, I expect to see a higher likelihood of challenging behaviors
when the design score is low { meaning that states would be more likely to take action
against an IO when they have more opportunity to do so (H1a). In this case, states would
challenge IOs that have
exibility mechanisms to go through. In addition, because they are
more egalitarian, they would have the opportunity to be successful because they have more
say and opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the chances of them being punished are small
because the IO has lower levels of authority and they have handed over little sovereignty.
In addition, I also expect to still see a positive relation with wavering behaviors as well {
although less pronounced compared to challenging { because this may be a rst step states
take before challenging (H1b). In short, I hypothesize:
H1a: When international organizations are non-authoritative, egalitarian and
exible, states
will more likely challenge
H1b: When international organizations are non-authoritative, egalitarian and
exible, states
can also waver, but this positive relation is less pronounced than challenging
With regards to organizations that are on the high end of the spectrum, meaning that
the organization is authoritative, hierarchical and in
exible, I expect states to be more
28
likely to waver. Remember that here,
exibility options are low and power imbalances are
high, in combination with a organization that has the ability to act on its own due to
the sovereignty transfer. In this instance, I expect a negative relationship with challenging
behaviors: states have more to lose and could seriously be harmed when they would challenge
(H2a). Therefore, when states have an issue with the IO, they would be more likely to waver
and bring the attention to their grievance in an less harmful way (H2b). Wavering in the face
of an authoritative, in
exible and hierarchical organization could open up the conversation
in a safe way and allow states to nd allies in a shared issue. Therefore:
H2a: When international organizations are authoritative, hierarchical, and in
exible, states
will less likely challenge
H2b: When international organizations are authoritative, hierarchical, and in
exible, states
will more likely waver
I then look more closely at which design decisions drive which types of state behaviors: the
impact of high/low 1) hierarchy, 2)
exibility and 3) authority in the organization. The rst
set of expectations regards the impact of hierarchy in the international organization. Recall
that when hierarchy is high, there can be veto players, unequal voting rights or appointed
administrative positions { power asymmetries are codied in the founding document. When
the organizations are relatively egalitarian, voting is distributed equally and all members
have equal opportunity to be in a leadership position { all members are equal members in
terms of power within the organization.
29
I expect that high hierarchy drives wavering behaviors (H3a), because challenging the
organization would be ineective due to the power asymmetries and could potentially lead
to punishment. For instance, amendments could be blocked or states could be punished for
non-complying. Thus, publicly voicing their discontent and delegitimizing the IO on the
international stage is an eort to harm its credibility and reputation to initiate change, or
perhaps nd allies who share similar grievances. Similarly, threatening certain actions may
be the most ecient way to draw attention to the issue and create some sort of leverage for
the state without actually following through.
The corollary (H3b) of this hypothesis is that a more egalitarian organization would
likely see more challenging behavior from its members. This is also intuitive: using the
formal processes to initiate change or address a grievance would be more eective because of
the ability to build coalitions without being blocked by powerful members. Similarly, there
is less opportunity to be punished for the actions because there are formally no states with
more power in the IO. Therefore:
Hierarchy:
H3a: When there are large power asymmetries among the members (high hierarchy), states
are more likely to waver
H3b: When the organization is relatively egalitarian (low hierarchy), states are more likely
to challenge
The second set of expectations regards the presence/absence of
exibility mechanisms in
the formal agreement. Recall that
exible organizations have plenty of formal opportunities
30
to either renegotiate, temporarily escape, amend, or end the cooperation. I expect that
when organizations lack these types of mechanisms (low
exibility), states are more likely to
waver (H4a). They use this alternative method to express their grievances and call for change,
without immediately escalating to non-compliance. When organizations are
exible, states
would be more likely to challenge the organization by utilizing those
exibility mechanisms
(H4b). This would give states the opportunity to go through the formal
exibility procedures
in order to address their grievance, or non-comply when these eort fail.
Flexibility:
H4a: When organizations included formal
exibility mechanisms (high
exibility), states are
more likely to challenge
H4b: When organizations have little formal
exibility mechanisms (low
exibility), states are
more likely to waver
The third set of expectations regards the level of authority instilled in an organization,
namely: do they have the ability to punish, settle disputes, and/or monitor the agreement.
When organizations have the power to do so (high authority), states have deferred a non-
negligible amount of sovereignty to the organization. Organizations have the ability to
attach consequences to the actions { especially when members do not comply. In light of
the potential costs attached to challenging, I expect high authoritative organizations to see
more wavering behavior (H5a) and low authoritative organizations to see more challenging
behaviors (H5b). In the latter case, states are not deterred because the organizations holds
little power over them and/or has little ability to enforce.
31
Authority:
H5a: When international organizations are authoritative (high authority), states are more
likely to waver
H5b: When international organizations are not authoritative (low authority), states are more
likely to challenge
In summary:
Institutional design Behavior
H1a Low design score More likely to see challenging
H1b Low design score Likely to see wavering, but monologue
Seeing political debate between dissenting actors
will increase the support for the EU more than
seeing a monologue.
Middle ground expectations:
H4 Positive eect of debate
There will be a positive eect from seeing debate
on middle ground individuals.
H5 Positive eect of debate on less informed
The eect of seeing debate will be strongest for
those middle ground individuals who are less
informed about the European Union.
Table 4.1: Summary of Expectations for building EU support
4.3 Research Design
In this study, I test whether exposure to cues about the European Union leads to increased
support. I performed this test by elding an original cue-taking survey experiment using
real and highly salient Dutch cue-givers. The independent variable is exposure to either the
`debate' or `monologue' treatment (or receiving no treatment at all in the control group).
The survey instrument is a video embedded in a survey about the European Union, which
measures the dependent variable: EU support.
Case selection: During the 2021 Parliamentary Elections, the European Union (EU) was
noticeably absent from debates, speeches, and media. This was striking, since the EU is an
important partner for the Netherlands when it comes to addressing issues such as climate
change, migration, the Euro, security, and COVID-19 recovery. It was so noticeably absent,
that a group of Europe-watchers started a Twitter account called the `EU Elephant' (3500
followers) which called out the lack of attention to Europe in the elections and playfully
99
count the (few) EU-mentions during debates.
3
Additionally, the political climate in the
Netherlands is relatively stable, since the right-centrist government under Prime Minister
Mark Rutte has been in power for over 10 years. The EU has become a rather contentious
topic, for which support is not spread uniform across or within the dominant political parties.
Thus, the Netherlands makes an excellent candidate for this survey experiment.
The Scenario: Survey experiments account for endogeneity and omitted variable bias
problems, thereby ensuring sound internal validity. However, because of the less realis-
tic assumptions about the real-world information environment, internal validity is at the
expense of external validity (Druckman, 2004). To combat this problem, the real world
environment is replicated by using highly salient politicians in a real-world parliamentary
setting to mimic those circumstances best (Brutger et al., 2020). The treatment scenario was
non-hypothetical, involved real world actors, and was presented with some basic contextual
information.
4
By employing video clips of real debates, this allowed me to eciently expose
them to cues using dierent formats of deliberation (Collins, 2021), be condent of signicant
eects in a smaller-N survey (Shen et al., 2015), and speak to the real-world implications of
my ndings (Randolph et al., 2021).
The Treatment: Participants were presented with a 2-minute video clip of a Dutch Par-
liament debate about the European Union, in particular the topic of the European Recovery
plan of June 19, 2020.
5
The European Recovery plan is an eort to help the EU tackle the
COVID-19 crisis, to which the Dutch contribution was being discussed in Parliament that
3
NRC, \Den Haag moet niet doen alsof er geen EU is", 21 March 2021.
4
In Dutch: \The European Union is an political and economic international organization between 27
countries of which the Netherlands is also a member" and \You will now see fragment of a Dutch Parlia-
mentary debate about EU collaboration on COVID-19. The topic of this debate was how the Netherlands
would contribute to a nancial recovery fund to help EU states with the costs of the COVID-19 crisis."
5
Link to debate, last accessed September 4, 2022.
100
day. Survey participants were either assigned to the [monologue] treatment, [debate] treat-
ment, or in the control group. The monologue treatment shows a fragment Dutch Prime
Minister Mark Rutte introducing the topic and outlining the Plan. The debate treatment
shows a fragment from the same parliamentary debate, but showing two minutes of back-and-
forth between Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Freedom Party leader Geert Wilders about
the Plan. The control group did not see any video fragments.
6
One potential limitation
of the treatment is that people may feel strongly about European collaboration to combat
COVID, not the European Union per se.
The Survey: These fragments were embedded in an original survey titled \Political pref-
erences and a video." The survey was elded to 1294 individuals in January 2022 through
the LISS (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) panel administered by Cen-
tERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). The LISS panel is a representative sample
of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based on a
true probability sample of Dutch households drawn from the population register (Scherpen-
zeel and Das, 2010). Post-treatment, the respondents were given another set of questions
regarding their opinion on the European Union.
Table 4.2 shows the sample summary statistics per treatment group. I removed the
incomplete responses and/or the participants that had spent less than 45 seconds on the
treatment page. The cut-o at 45 seconds ensures that the respondents who were assigned to
the debate treatment had actually seen both speakers discuss. Eliminating these respondents
reduced the sample from 1294 to 997 participants.
6
While respondents could have possibly been exposed to this debate before, the chances of this impacting
the study are slim: there is a 1,5 year hiatus between the debate and the survey and the debate was not
aired on television but can only be viewed online.
101
Control group Debate Monologue
N = 997 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD Test
Agreeableness score 377 30.35 2.87 325 30.17 2.62 295 30.27 2.59 F= 0:378
Female 377 0.51 0.50 325 0.52 0.50 295 0.48 0.50 F= 0:369
Non-Dutch descent 368 0.21 0.41 318 0.13 0.33 290 0.18 0.38 F= 3:973

Low income 376 0.48 0.50 325 0.48 0.50 295 0.43 0.50 F= 0:921
Age under 40 377 0.24 0.43 325 0.18 0.38 295 0.20 0.40 F= 2:386

Graduated highschool 377 0.66 0.48 325 0.66 0.47 294 0.64 0.48 F= 0:229
Voted populist in 2020 377 0.11 0.31 325 0.12 0.33 295 0.15 0.35 F= 1:072
EU knowledge (self-reported) 377 0.39 0.26 325 0.37 0.27 295 0.39 0.27 F= 0:5
Watchtime in seconds 0 { { 325 173.28 233.41 295 161.56 92.34 F= 0:652
Statistical signicance markers: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Full Survey Experiment Sample
Measuring Agreeableness: An important aspect of this study is being able to accurately
identify and measure the `middle ground'. As mentioned above, I use the Big Five per-
sonality framework to do so. The Big Five framework widely used and researched in the
eld of Psychology and is approaching consensus as a general taxonomy of personality traits
(Goldberg, 1999). It is designed to better understand the relationship between certain per-
sonality type and certain (political) behaviors (DeYoung et al., 2007; Costa and McCrae,
1989). The ve domains (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and
Emotional Stability) contain most personality characteristics and are assumed to be rep-
resentative of all personality traits (O'Connor, 2002). The Agreeableness personality trait
captures individual predispositions to social harmony.
The Agreeableness personality trait measures social relations and general (or lack of)
concern for social harmony. The trait ranges on a scale from being highly Agreeable (being
empathetic, trustworthy, and altruistic) to being disagreeable (being egocentric, selsh and
aggressive). It has been shown that low agreeableness is related to support for populist
parties (Bakker et al., 2021b, 2016) and is negatively associated with interest in politics
102
(Gerber et al., 2011). Thus, the individuals occupying the middle ground are neither high
nor low agreeable, but sit in the middle of the two extremes and are generally more neutral
towards politics.
For this study, I construct the personalty type score using the Big Five personality traits
survey administered in July 2021 (Wave 13) by CentERdata. Personality traits were assessed
by the 50 questions from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999).
The wording for the measures and scoring are constructed according to industry standards
outlined on the IPIP website. Responses (5-point, from \Strongly Agree" to \Strongly
Disagree") are summed to provide scores on the big ve personality traits: Extraversion,
Emotionality/Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Intellect/Openness. The
mean and standard deviation are calculated to determine high, low, or middle ground re-
spondents based on the Agreeableness score: scores within one-half SD of the mean are
considered average (here: the `middle ground') and scores outside one-half SD of the mean
are considered low or high. This data was then merged with the survey respondents on
respondent id number.
Recent research has shown that there may be reciprocal causal in
uences between self-
reported personality traits and political preferences (Bakker et al., 2021a). The results are
small and spurious, but we must still be mindful of the possibility that the cause and eect
is not unidirectional. In order to attenuate possible endogeneity, the respondents were not
asked about their personality and political preferences about the EU in the same survey.
The personality type survey was administered in July 2021 as part of a routine wave study,
the political preferences survey was elded in January 2022.
103
Focusing on the middle ground has a number of key benets. First, every person has a
personality score based on the Big Five framework. Moving away from operationalizing the
political middle ground based on political preferences or voting behavior means that the ex-
periment is less sensitive to country-specic politics, can be generalized outside of the Dutch
context, and can easily be replicated in other countries. Secondly, the majority of citizens
belongs to the middle ground: 46% of the survey respondents fall into the middle ground
personality group (versus 30% high agreeable and 24% low agreeable). Yet, as indicated
earlier, this group is vastly under-theorized and studied. This is striking, because the litera-
ture suggests that we can gain most from from this group in terms of a) understanding mass
political behaviors, and b) bringing about real-world signicant change in their behavior
because of their more impressionable nature.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Exposure to cues increases support for the EU
We start o with the question if exposure to political cues about international organiza-
tions increases the support for them among domestic audiences irrespective of personality
type. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage or respondents per treatment and control group who
strongly feel that the Netherlands should remain a member of the European Union.
7
I use
whether or not the Netherlands should remain as dependent variable because membership
7
To the statement \The Netherlands should remain a member of the EU", the respondents answered with
a 7 or higher on a scale of 0-10.
104
is the strongest indicator of support for the European Union, therefore a hard case for the
hypothesis.
45.1%
55.4%
48.1%
Control group
Monologue
Debate
0 20 40 60
N=997 / January 2022
Figure 4.1: % of Respondents who think the Netherlands should remain member of the EU.
Figure 4.1 shows evidence supporting H1: we see that a higher percentage of respondents
who received the debate treatment indicate that the Netherlands should remain, versus
those who receive the monologue treatment (55.4% vs 48.1%, respectively). Strikingly, there
is only a 3% dierence between the group who received the monologue treatment versus
those who received no treatment at all. Yet, there is a 10% dierence in the number of
respondents who indicated the Netherlands should remain between the debate and control
group. These results indicate that, generally speaking, exposure to cues about the European
Union causes an increase in the extent to which individuals think the Netherlands should
remain a member. More exposure to cues about the EU in general builds domestic support
and debate specically.
These results hold when we include additional control variables such as age, voting be-
havior, income, origin, and gender. Supporting hypothesis 2 and 3, gure 4.2 shows that
105
individuals who were assigned to the debate treatment were more likely to state that the
Netherlands should remain a member of the European Union. This result is signicant at the
99% condence level and holds when controlling for voting behavior in the 2021 elections.
We also see an eect in the monologue treatment (signicant at p < 0.1 / 90%), which also
supports the nding that cues in general can have a positive eect on support for the EU.
The strong negative eect of populist voting behavior on whether the Netherlands should
stay a member of the EU is unsurprising and validates the external validity of the survey
experiment and the data.
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Women
Non−Dutch origin
Low income
Voted VVD (2021)
Voted populist (2021)
Age under 40
Monologue
Debate
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1

Plot represents estimates from an OLS regression model with "NL must remain" as the DV.
Estimates in which the bar does not cross the vertical line are p < 0.01 (99%)
Figure 4.2: Modeling Post-treatment support for Dutch EU Membership
Thus, we see that receiving cues about the European Union has a positive eect on
how important individuals nd the organization. The biggest eect on support for Dutch
membership comes from seeing debates. These results indicate that the total absence of
cues - whether monologues or debates - about the European Union could be detrimental to
domestic support for the European Union.
106
4.4.2 Exposure to debate mobilizes the Middle Ground
We have now established that exposure to political cues increases support among domestic
audiences in general. However, this paper is more specically interested in mobilizing the
`middle ground', those individuals who do not fall on either extremes of the Agreeableness
scale and are generally neutral or aloof towards organizations. Focusing on the middle
ground approximately halves the sample size compared to the full sample (from 997 to 460
respondents). The summary statistics for this group are in Appendix C.
4.4.2.1 The Middle Ground and Politics
Recall that we know from previous research that political messages resonate with voters
if the rhetoric is congruent with their personality (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). More
specically, we know that the low Agreeableness personality trait score is congruent with the
anti-establishment component of populist rhetoric (Bakker et al., 2021b). On the opposite
side, the high agreeable personality trait is associated with being put-o by strong rhetoric
and anti-establishment messages (Weinschenk and Panagopoulos, 2014). In addition, Gerber
et al. (2011) nd that Agreeableness is negatively associated with interest in politics. In
short, low agreeable people are unlikely to change their mind, while high agreeable people
have a general disinterest in politics. The middle ground tends to be more open minded,
trusting, and are accepting of con
ict. For this group, the debate cues will have the engage
them most because it brings to the fore more nuanced and qualied opposition and critique.
We see these dierences between the middle ground, the high, and low agreeable people
also appear in the data collected from the survey respondents. In gure 4.3, row a) and b)
107
show the percentage of respondents who think negatively about the EU in general and/or
those who do not take the EU party standpoint into consideration when voting for the Dutch
parliament.
8
Also here, we see that a larger percentage of the low and high agreeable groups
think negatively about the EU, versus the middle ground. Similarly, a larger percentage of
the high and low agreeable groups do not take the EU into account when voting, versus the
middle ground.
d) Have little trust in politicians
c) Have little trust in European Parliament
b) Say EU not important in parliament vote
a) Think negatively about the EU
0 10 20 30 40
% of Respondents
High Low Middle Ground
Figure 4.3: % of respondents who \..." per personality type.
Similarly, row c) and d) in gure 4.3 show the percentages of the middle ground, high and
low agreeable respondents who state that they have slim to no trust in either the European
Parliament or Dutch politicians in general.
9
We see that respondents who are considered low
agreeable have less trust in these institutions compared to the middle ground. Comparing
the groups, 31% of the middle ground has little trust in the European Parliament, compared
8
Data drawn from pre-treatment survey questions. Both items are measured as scoring between 0-4 on a
0-10 point scale.
9
Data drawn from the CenTEr Data LISS Politics and Values (Wave 13). Little/no trust is measured as
a 0-4 score on a 0-10 point scale.
108
to 38.5% of the low agreeable and 38% of the high agreeable respondents. Similarly, about
a quarter of the middle ground has little trust in politicians in general, versus almost 30%
of the high and low agreeable group. Thus, gure 4.3 indicates that personality type also
matches onto trust and interest in politics: the middle ground is generally more moderate
and trusting towards politics and politicians.
4.4.2.2 Mobilizing the Middle Ground
We have established that personality type is re
ected in the level of political trust and
perceived importance of organizations. This paper hypothesized that exposure to debate
mobilizes the middle ground because it resonates with their personality type. In comparison
to the two extremes, they tend to be more cooperative, open minded, trusting, and accepting
of con
ict (Mondak, 2010, chapter 5) I also hypothesized that the eects of exposure to
debate cues should be especially strong for people with less knowledge about the EU, because
of the compound eect of their reliance on cues due to lack of knowledge, trusting of the
politics, and open to seeing con
ict and nuance. In order to test these expectations, I use the
level of EU importance as the dependent variable because this should the rst step towards
building support among less engaged individuals.
10
Figure 4.4 shows the post-treatment dierences for both the full middle ground sample
(4.4a) as well as the subset of respondents who (self) reported low knowledge of the EU
(4.4b). Looking at 4.4a, we see some support for H4: the full middle ground plot tells us
that that 52.7% of respondents who did not see any video fragment nd the EU `important'
or `very important', versus 67.5% of the respondents who received the debate treatment
10
Respondents nd the EU important when they rate it at least a 6 or higher on a scale of 0-10 on the
statement: \The EU is an important international organization".
109
and 63.3% of the respondents in the monologue treatment. On the one hand, these results
verify the earlier nding that any cue about the EU seems to increase support. However, the
dierence between the two treatments in the middle ground subset is not very informative
and the eects may not be very dierent.
62.2%
67.5%
48.2%
63.3%
56.0%
52.7%
b) Little EU Knowledge Middle Ground
a) Full Middle Ground
0 20 40 60

Control group Monologue Debate
Figure 4.4: % of Middle Ground respondents who say the EU is (very) important.
However, gure 4.4b nds support for H5: we see that exposure to debate builds signi-
cantly more support among middle ground individuals who consider themselves to have little
knowledge of the EU.
11
About 60% of the middle ground respondents report they do not
nd themselves very knowledgeable about the European Union. Dis-aggregation by these
respondents in gure 4.4b shows stronger eects of the debate treatment. In case of the mid-
dle ground respondents who consider themselves to have little to no knowledge about the
EU, 62.2% who saw the debate treatment stated the EU is (very) important, versus 48.2% of
the respondents who saw the monologue treatment. Also striking is that the control group
11
Respondents gave themselves a 4 or lower on a scale of 0-10 when asked \On a scale from 0-10, how
would you rate your knowledge about the European Union?"
110
outperforms the monologue treatment: showing nothing at all may even be better than see-
ing a monologue. The dierence between treatment groups shows that how information is
conveyed matters to the less knowledgeable middle ground audience.
When additional control variables are integrated in a regression model, we see similar
results reappear: Figure 4.5 shows that middle ground individuals who were assigned to the
debate treatment were more likely to express that they nd the European Union important,
an estimation that is statistically signicant at the 95% condence level.
12
The same holds
true for the middle ground individuals who are assigned the monologue treatment, although
the eect size is lower in magnitude.
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Women
Non−Dutch origin
Low income
Voted populist in 2020
Age under 40
Monologue
Debate
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1

● ● Low Knowledge Middle Ground (N=205) Middle Ground (N=460)
Plot represents estimates from an OLS regression model with "EU importance" as the DV.
Estimates in which the bar does not cross the vertical line are p < 0.05 (95%)
Figure 4.5: Modeling Middle Ground Post-treatment Importance of the EU
Most strikingly, gure 4.5 shows that middle ground individuals with little knowledge
of the EU see a positive eect from the debate treatment, versus a negative eect from the
12
As per industry standards, controls for the other four personality traits are also included. These are not
reported here for clarity, but can be found in Appendix C.
111
monologue treatment. Although te results lose their statistical signicance due to the small
N, we do see support for H5 in the hypothesized direction { but the negative eect of seeing
a monologue on the less informed middle ground goes beyond the hypothesized expectations.
Finding that exposure to monologue actually decreases the support for the European Union
under the low knowledgeable middle ground is intuitive: the monologues tend to be more
monotone and dicult to follow { which could present barriers for understanding for those
who have little general knowledge of or interest in the EU. This suggests that exposing those
middle ground with little knowledge of the EU to monologues about the European Union,
could potentially harm support.
In sum, we see that the middle ground can indeed be mobilized through political debate
cues. These results are especially strong for those who have little knowledge of the EU.
This makes sense, we expected to see the compound eect of being able to rely on elite
cues due to lack of knowledge about the topic, especially those coming from Parliament, in
combination with the middle ground Agreeableness personality type, which is not turned o
by con
ict or disagreement and is more open-minded. Together, this leads to the strongest
eect of debate on support for the European Union. The negative eect of monologue cues
on the less informed middle ground is also intuitive in this regard, but points towards the
importance of better understanding who is on the receiving end of the cue.
4.5 Implications
National parliaments provide a crucial link between the European Union and the domestic
public. This paper shows that seeing parliamentary debate builds support for the European
112
Union among audiences in general, but especially among the individuals who make up the
middle ground. Parliament discussions allow citizens to peek into the kitchen of political
decision-making, they make citizens more informed about the implications and trade-os of
policy decisions. In case of the European Union, they are also an important communicative
vessel, bringing `Brussels' closer to home and helping combat the perceived democratic decit
(Auel and Raunio, 2014; Rauh, 2015).
Despite the importance of parliamentary debates, they remain under-utilized in public
discourse and media. A direct implication of this research would be to show more on national
television, beyond soundbites and snippets { but parliamentary debates are hardly television
blockbusters. On the upside, we know peers can also be powerful cue-givers (Kertzer and
Zeitzo, 2017; Rathbun et al., 2016). Future research could investigate if those cues from
peers have a similar (or even greater) eect on the domestic audience and the middle ground,
including those who are less informed about the EU. In a similar vein, this research suggests
that other information vessels such as podcasts could have a similar eect on support -
especially when they feature debate between participants.
Scholars have pointed towards the threat posed to the international order by populist
movements (Lake et al., 2021). This research shifts the focus away from the extremes,
but towards the often overlooked `middle ground'. Instead of understanding who opposes
international organizations, among who could we build support for IOs most successfully?
This paper opens up avenues for further research operationalizing the middle ground using
the Big Five personality traits. This project has shown that appealing to the middle ground
{ those on neither high or low sides of the Agreeableness spectrum { can have a signicant
impact on support for the European Union. They are signicantly more likely to say that
113
they nd the EU important after seeing either of the two cues (debate or monologue). The
middle ground can thus successfully be cued. Based on their personality type, the middle
ground is considered to be more neutral and even apathetic towards politics in general { but
when the EU is brought to their attention, they do care.
The results also show that it is especially important to engage people who do not know
much about the EU. Here, providing them with information in general will not obtain the
same eect. The results show that the low knowledge middle ground is likely to turn away
from the EU when they are shown the monologue: they need to be actively engaged in order
to build support. Political debate forces politicians to be more succinct, witty, and to the
point. It forces to verbalize the trade-os and why the choices are important. This is a clear
signal that debates are more engaging and tend to build support among those who are dicult
to reach. This could be an additional reason to support not only showing parliamentary
debate, but also showing debate through other cue-givers like podcasts, documentaries, and
other cultural platforms.
This study scratches the surface of implications for just how important political cues and
debate can be for support for international organizations. I expect that some of the eects
may even be greater in magnitude than presented here. Firstly, respondents were presented
with a two minute video clip, which is a very light amount of exposure. I would expect those
eects to be stronger when participants would receive multiple doses. Secondly, I also expect
that these eects could be carried through dierent types of cue-givers. This study relies
on politicians, who are often the immediate source for political cues. Since cues from peers
may even be stronger, I would also expect these results to hold from more diverse cue-givers
such as pundits, journalists, or other ocials. Thirdly, this study generalizes outside of the
114
Netherlands due to the global reach of personality types. The study could also be replicated
in dierent countries and regarding dierent organizations. Hence, an obvious extension
would be to replicate this study with a dierent organization, in a dierent country, using
dierent types of cues.
This paper tested one of the many ways in which support for international organizations
among domestic citizens can start to be (re)built. This paper has shown that exposing citi-
zens to parliamentary debate can be a fruitful way of starting this process. The international
order suers a plethora of other issues that contribute to decreasing support, to which this
paper oers not direct solutions. However, we now know that exposing people to information
can help { and especially when this is done through debate.
115
Chapter 5
The Future of International Cooperation
This dissertation set out to investigate the multitude of ways states contest international
organizations. I argue that the institutional design of international organizations sets the
parameters for state behavior, but that individuals { leaders, diplomats and the domestic
public { decide on the course of action within those parameters. To make this point, this
dissertation has laid out novel concepts, theory, measurements, qualitative and quantitative
data. Throughout the chapters, we have seen that IO contestation is a complex and mul-
tifaceted process where structure and agency interact. This concluding section outlines the
main argument, brie
y summarizes the three empirical papers and puts them in conversa-
tion with each other. I will then also re
ect on what these ndings entail in practice, the
development of the international order, and how it could endure future challenges. I then
also touch on avenues for future research and questions that lie outside the scope of this
project.
116
5.1 Perspectives on IO Contestation
International organizations are key to international cooperation. They facilitate regular in-
teraction between states on topics and issues that transcend borders and require multilateral
coordination and collaboration. Especially after World War II, these international organiza-
tions have been key to building global prosperity and fostering peace. Since then, both new
organizations have been erected and the existing IOs expanded in scope and depth. While
the rise of international cooperation through organizations has undoubtedly helped shaped
the post-WWII world order, this has not gone without any push-back.
This project has zoomed in on the era after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the bi-polar
world order came to an end and leaders started to re-conceptualize what the international
order would and should look like. This lead to friction between member states and organiza-
tions. IOs needed to rethink their role and purpose in this new global context, while states
also started to reconsider their priorities and preferences. As the state of the world changed,
so did the nature of international collaboration (Zelikow and Rice, 2019; Ikenberry, 2018).
While this project was originally inspired by state withdrawal from international orga-
nizations, my research process made it apparent that there is a more wide range of ways
in which states voice their discontent. I have divided those three types of behavior into
three categories: wavering, challenging, and terminating. While these actions can be used
by states on a stand alone basis, they can also be used in tandem or in succession. These
are the actions we observe empirically: we see states delegitimizing organizations, not com-
ply with the rules and regulations, or fully terminate their membership. Sometimes they
only threaten to take action, while other times they actually follow through. Termination
117
of membership is in this context still relatively rare, states often rst utilize the other tools
to voice their discontent. This dissertation set out to better understand what drives this
variation.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the world is a complicated place because human
beings are involved (Almond and Genco, 1977). The challenge was to capture the wide
range of behaviors, by a multitude of actors, against a plethora of international organizations
under one explanatory umbrella. The rational choice theory (RTC) research agenda argues
that all these IOs are based on a deliberate process where underlying cooperation problems
drive what the ultimately look like. I extend this premise by arguing that these designs, in
turn, set the parameters that make certain behaviors more or less likely. Thus, structure
and agency interact.
Chapter 2: Contesting International Organizations has outlined the dierent ways in
which states have contested international organizations and has attempted to measure the
eect of IO design on state behavior. This quantitative chapter has underscored the overar-
ching premise of this dissertation: how IOs are designed indeed impacts how states behave
towards them. Organizations that are highly authoritative, in
exible and hierarchical are
more likely to see wavering behaviors such as delegitimization and threats, while organi-
zations that are un-authoritative,
exible and egalitarian are more likely to see challenges,
such as non-compliance, amendment and termination. It also suggested ways forward for
international cooperation and organizations, to which I will return later.
While the design of international organizations determines the range of behaviors avail-
able, this only exposes a piece of the puzzle. It gives us a broad understanding of the cause
and eect of certain clauses on IO contestation, but does not reveal who would be more
118
likely to take this path. Namely, while all states are bound by the same treaty or statute
and some states even share similar grievances towards an IO { we still witness variation in
behavior within the parameters of the organization. Not all these members act in the same
manner: some may only delegitimize, while others may withdraw completely. Quantitative
analysis alone cannot explain this within group variation.
This dissertation therefore also digs into the micro-level drivers of IO contestation at an
individual level to better understand what type of leaders would be more inclined to take
certain actions. This perspective focuses on the mechanisms, versus trying to determine
cause and eect between two variables. Here, I was interested in understanding the why
questions: why do states/leaders pursue certain contestation strategies? To what extent is
this a function of history, psychology and/or emotion? How do they go about executing
these strategies and what is their endgame doing so?
Chapter 3: Tipping Towards Termination explores the case of the International Criminal
Court in depth, where multiple member states have delegitimized, challenged and terminated
in response to similar issues they were having with the Court. I nd that collective historical
trauma, lack of alternative methods to address grievances, and fearful nature of the leader
help better understand the tipping points towards withdrawal. This case shows that the
amendment clause in the Rome Statute may not oer the necessary levels of
exibility to
the members, but also the importance of specic types of leaders that drive the decision.
While understanding leaders' drivers for IO contestation are imperative, a micro-level
understanding does not stop at state leaders or diplomats. Especially in liberal democra-
cies, leaders respond and are sensitive to their domestic audience's preferences. The rise of
general discontent with international organizations { and the populist movement in specic
119
{ has translated to leaders being more critical of these organizations. This is a symbiotic
relationship: leaders are inclined to blame failures on international forces bigger than them,
making their voters more critical, who in turn demand action or restraint towards those
organizations. Thus, international organizations are not only contested top down, but also
bottom up.
Chapter 4: Mobilizing the Middle Ground explores how we could (re)build support for
international organizations among domestic audiences. Through a survey experiment zoom-
ing in on the case of the Netherlands and the European Union, this chapter shows that more
exposure to debate helps build support among the people that are generally less interested
in politics { the so-called `middle ground'. The suggested mechanisms is that exposure to
debate helps individuals better understand the more complex considerations and trade-os,
as well as benets, of international cooperation. Debate engages these people and makes
them more supportive of international cooperation. In turn, more domestic support for in-
ternational organizations could make leaders more inclined to also be more supportive and
contest them less.
This completes the triangle we started with in the introduction. The starting point for
this dissertation was IO institutional design, but we have seen that the quantitative, rational
approach cannot answer all the questions. We have seen that IOs face both internal and
external challenges, which puts pressure on international cooperation and the longevity of
the institutions. This can be especially harmful as the two types of challengers tend to move
symbiotically. The question that now remains is: how do we move forward?
120
5.2 Perspectives on IO Endurance
The demand for international cooperation and international organizations may be bigger
than ever due to increasing transnational issues, deepening economic interdependence, tech-
nological change, and novel types of threats. Hence, it is unlikely that we will see a full
collapse of international cooperation and IOs as we know them today, even though we seem
to witness dierent forms of contestation towards them. Yet, this growing discontent among
members and domestic audiences needs to be addressed. How could we rebuild the legiti-
macy, ecacy, and relevance of IOs to make them robust for the future?
In essence, many institutions were built on an understanding of the world order that may
no longer hold true today. The unipolar moment is ending (or has ended), security concerns
have shifted, democracy is increasingly challenged or backsliding, and we are witnessing
growing economic uncertainty. In addition, more states have been entering the global stage
as in
uential players, bringing in a more diverse set of problems and preferences. Existing
and future IOs should be mindful of these changing circumstances and construct the tools
to deal with other shifts in the future.
While this may be the biggest hurdle to overcome, it may be worth to consider how
existing IOs can be updated to re
ect the current state of the world. The new geopolitical
realities call for the integration of dierent partners and more equal partnership. This
means that when it comes to codied power imbalances between members (hierarchy), lack
of enforcement (authority), and little ability to alter the agreement (
exibility), IOs should
take the initiative to reform those elements that produce gridlock and discontent. As we have
seen in chapter 2, a more egalitarian,
exible and authoritative organization will receive the
121
least harmful acts of contestation. Doing so would also benet the organization by making
sure that it can combat the challenges of the future.
For instance, one of the most prominent examples of a post-war legacy organization that
would benet from reform is the United Nations. The UN is very hierarchical, in
exible
and authoritative organization. Between the ve great power permanent members with veto
power (P5), the fteen non-permanent members, and the General Assembly { its design is
a direct re
ection of the post-WWII global power distribution. While members do have the
option to amend the UN Charter, the threshold is high: amendments need to have the full
support of the P5 and two-thirds majority in the UNGA. While most members favor some
sort of reform, these reforms would be sub-optimal to the status quo for those who have the
power to veto { making the chances of substantial UN reform in the future slim. Similar
arguments could be made for the WTO and NATO.
As a result of these legacy organizations lagging on reform, we are witnessing a prolif-
eration of international organizations and agreements that bypass them. This shows that
the necessity of international problem-solving has not diminished { and I'd argue that it has
even increased with the rise of new transnational threats and issues coming from the cyber,
environmental, and human rights realm. In the absence of reform, states can contest the
organization { as studied in this dissertation { or bypass it completely.
Seeking and building alternative arrangements has increasingly become more popular,
as states work together on more conned issues and opportunities, or come together with
their regional partners or private actors. Both the disaggregation of large issues into more
actionable chunks, as well as the more local focus in smaller coalitions, have proven to be
successful endeavors. However, as these arrangements become formally institutionalized,
122
they must be mindful not to make the same mistakes and produce organizations that re
ect
the current state of the world { versus a more adaptable, authoritative and egalitarian option.
In this light, organizations of the future must make an explicit eort to prevent orga-
nizations from being too rigid, hierarchical, and/or non-authoritative. For instance, having
mechanisms and procedures to amend the treaty through a feasible amendment process or a
regularly scheduled review conference would be essential to making sure that the organization
remains adaptive to future changes and challenges. This would necessitate that all members
are on an equal footing, making (both formal and informal) power dynamics obsolete. Giving
all members equal power would guarantee buy-in from the members. Similarly, even if the
issue area is small, making sure that the organization has the ability to follow-through and
enforce would guarantee commitment from its members to reach the goals it sets out.
There are many examples of more recent organizations with a more narrow scope, playing
into issues that are pressing and current. For instance, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established in 1997, is a more narrow organization focusing
on a specic subset of weapons of mass destruction. The OPCW is able to settle disputes,
monitor stockpile compliance, and enforce national implementation. In addition, member
states are equal partners under the treaty and have the ability to amend the treaty and
review on an annual basis.
1
Hence, the organization is more narrow scope, has authority
on the subject matter, includes
exibility mechanisms for the members, and is egalitarian.
These ingredients should be eective to maintain a strong international platform that is
robust for the future.
1
OPCW Convention, accessed June 8, 2022.
123
Meanwhile, IO endurance is also a function of the extent in which it receives support
from leaders and domestic audiences. The notion that the IO is unfair or disproportionately
disadvantages certain states can be a strong motivator for contestation and termination.
Providing alternative courses of action and tools to make sure these grievances are heard
may help to keep those states on board. In case of the ICC, we have seen that the negative
tone had been building over the course of many years. While it is impossible to prevent
states from withdrawing to avoid prosecution (in case of Burundi and the Philippines), South
Africa, Kenya and the Gambia have stayed due to the existing mechanisms. Expanding and
incorporating
exibility mechanisms may provide a way for leaders to { even in light of their
grievances { remain supportive of the IO and its mission.
Similarly, the support of domestic audiences can make or break international cooper-
ation. The populist assault and the retreat to nationalism is in this sense a vital threat
to IOs. Maintaining domestic support for international organizations requires leaders and
politicians to keep international cooperation at the top of the agenda and refrain from nega-
tive portrayals. We have seen that especially the voters who easily become disengaged from
politics are more interested when they see politicians debate. The debate reveals the more
complex considerations, trade-os, preferences and impact of the IO to voters. Since leaders
act on their constituents' preferences, a supportive voter base should have a positive impact
on leadership support as well.
In short, international cooperation will remain as new (and old) international challenges
continue to rise. However, the post-WWII organizations may diminish in signicance and
relevance if they are not able to more accurately re
ect the current day geopolitical realities
and national preferences. These organizations may then be able to address outstanding
124
grievances and build public support. Nevertheless, the proliferation of smaller and more
narrow organizations could provide a more nimble and focused approach to solving more
immediate issues. This complementary framework, however, should be mindful to not repeat
the same mistakes. Organizations must oer space for states to address their grievances in
a constructive and productive manner without harming the organization.
5.3 Future Research
This project lays the foundation for a broad research agenda on IO contestation. I see
three main avenues for future research pertaining to: 1) expanding the data, 2) contestation
escalation and tipping points, and 3) acts of IO support. I will brie
y touch on each of these
extensions here.
The most obvious continuation of this research would be to continue building the IO
contestation data, nding new cases, and coding dierent types of contestation. While the
data collected over the past three years has proven to be very insightful in illuminating the
relationship between IO design and contestation, there are a couple of areas in which it could
grow. First, using media publications in more languages would help get a better a better
global coverage of the data. Second, the search for cases could also expand in time frame, also
collecting data between 1945 - 1995 to get a better perspective on historical development.
Third, certain acts of contestation are under reported in the media, such as amendments.
Finding these acts would require also diversifying the primary sources away from media,
dedicating specic attention to IO reports, voting records, and/or meeting minutes to nd
these instances. Fourth, while searching for more cases, it may even be possible to move
125
beyond the three typologies (wavering, challenging and termination) and keep the data more
granular at action-level. In short, expanding the data would give an even more ne-grained
perspective on cause and eect and could illuminate more areas of inquiry.
Expanding the data would also give way to more mechanisms research. This dissertation
has focused on challenging and termination by members of the International Criminal Court.
Other case-studies could look at organizations with dierent institutional design features
to understand the mechanisms of IO contestation in dierent contexts. We could think of
comparing dierent acts of contestation within one IO, or similar acts of contestation against
dierent IOs. In any case, selecting case studies on certain characteristics would give way to
a structured comparison between a certain set of cases (Gerring, 2007). Similarly, this could
also be done for more historical cases as the data set expands temporally. For instance, a
NATO chapter could start with the 1966 French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military
command and end at French President Macron calling NATO brain-dead in 2019. By making
the Alliance the focal point of this case study, it could trace the Alliance's adaptability to
(not only the French) state assaults over time.
Expanding both the data and the case studies would lend itself to better understand the
escalation dynamics of IO contestation. Once the data set is large, machine learning methods
such as a random forest model, could show which design variables (or combination thereof)
would be more likely to lead to either wavering, challenging or withdrawal. We could also
investigate which acts of contestation are more likely to take place in conjunction or in a
sequence of events, especially if more dierent types of acts of contestation are collected.
126
Through qualitative case studies, we could then investigate the motives and reasoning be-
hind certain actions, and get a more diversied insight regarding the tipping points on the
escalation ladder.
The focus on formal international organizations with at least three members and a per-
manent secretariat was necessary to dene the scope and limits of this project. Future work
could also extend to include dierent types of cooperative platforms, such as bilateral treaties
and informal working groups. This would also need to include an extension of the concepts
and measurements for the institutional design features { although the typologies may look
the same. Especially in light of the more ad-hoc and narrow nature of newer international
cooperation endeavors, the future of international cooperation may look dierent from what
is studied here. It may also include dierent prot and non-prot actors in combination with
state actors, which could give way to a host of dierent contestations.
Finally, the
ip-side of this research agenda would be to study IO support. This research
would look at when IOs were `getting it right', under which conditions were IOs supported
and successful, when did we see little contestation? This project could look at the dierent
constellations of institutional design features, but it could also look at specic moments in
time when states were coming together to re-conceptualize and shape the future of an IO.
Tracing IOs through time it could look at the characteristics of successful capacity building
work groups, regular review conferences, or fruitful amendment processes. Alternatively, it
could also study the role of certain leaders or visionaries leading the way. Regardless of
the form or shape this project would take, IO support could capture the characteristics of
international cooperative success stories and theorize about what makes IOs more robust
and successful.
127
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Appendix A: IO Contestation Project Codebook
Introduction
This codebook provides the guide to coding the variables for the quantitative data set to
the IO Contestation Project. The dataset is event-level data consisting of IO-Member State
observations, which codes the variables that are related to the IO in question and the con-
testing member state in the period the act of contestation took place. This means that there
can be multiple observations for the same IO and member state, but dealing with dierent
instances of contestation. Besides coding the general charactaristics of the IO, the variables
relate to the theoretical categories of institutional design (hierarchy,
exibility, authority)
and the contestation toolkit (wavering, challenging and terminating).
Variables
Coder Variables
1 version
version of the dataset.
2 date updated
last date this row was updated (notation: year/month).
3 name
initials of person who coded the case.
The Contestation Toolkit
Acts of IO contestation are dened as any actions that states undertake vis- a-vis the organi-
zation they are a member of in light of a perceived wrongdoing by the IO. Please note that
there is aspect of perception in the denition, which means that any act of IO contestation
coded is in response to the notion that the state is subjected to some form of wrongdoing
by the IO.
138
State variables
4. cname
The state that contested the IO, drawn from COW Country Codes for state name
spelling. See COW Codebook in Dropbox.
5. stateabb
Abbreviation of state name, drawn from COW Country Codes for state name spelling.
See COW Codebook in Dropbox.
6. ccode
Standard numerical country ID of state, drawn from COW Country Codes for state
code. See COW Codebook in Dropbox.
7. year
Year in which the act of contestation takes place.
8. cname year
Name and year of state and action (ex: \Afghanistan 1999")
9. state region
In which region is the state located?
(1) Europe
(2) Asia
(3) Middle East
(4) Africa
(5) Latin America
(6) North America
(7) Oceania
10. amembers
number of founding member states at the time of the action specied in COW Inter-
governmental Organizations (v3). See the IOvars le in Dropbox.
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State control Variables
11. state iomem
This is a count of the number of IOs the state is a member of in the year of the action:
drawn from COW Intergovernmental Organizations Stateunit (v3). See `State Level
Variables - Membership Count' sheet in Dropbox.
12. state atop
State's number of military alliances at the time of the action: drawn from The QoG
Basic Time-Series Data (Variable: 4.3.2. atop numbers). See `State Level Variables -
All' sheet in Dropbox.
13. state reg1
Dichotomous regime measure (democracy/non-democracy), The QoG Basic Time-
Series Data (Variable: 4.40.4 ht regtype1) See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in
Dropbox.
14. state reg2
Multi-class regime type measure, drawn from The QoG Basic Time-Series Data (Vari-
able: 4.40.4 ht regtype1) See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
15. state regdur
Consecutive years of current regime type, drawn from The QoG Basic Time-Series
Data (Variable: 4.56.1 p durable). See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
16. state demlev
The freedom status of a state: see The QoG Basic Time-Series Data (Variable: 4.26.6
fh ipolity2). See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
17. state polity
Revised Combined Polity Score (Polity IV), drawn from The QoG Basic Time-Series
Data (Variable: 4.56.2 p polity2). See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
18. state gdpc10
WDI GDP Per Capita (2010), see: The QoG Basic Time-Series Data (Variable: wdi -
gdpcapcon2010). See `State Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
19. state tradegdp
The sum of import and export of goods and services measured as a share of GDP,
140
drawn from: The QoG Basic Time-Series Data. (Variable: wdi trade). See `State
Level Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
20. state tradeabs
The sum of import and export of a country measured in millions of current US dollars,
drawn from: The QoG Basic Time-Series Data (Variable: gle trade). See `State Level
Variables - All' sheet in Dropbox.
Act of Contestation
21. nature
Describe the nature of the grievance in one sentence.
22. basis
What is the primary basis of the grievance?
(1) Economic
(2) Legal
(3) Security
(4) IO leadership
(5) Other memberstate
(6) Procedural
(7) IO's political position
23. act
Did the IO waver, challenge or terminate?
(1) Waver: the state delegitimized the IO verbally in public, for example through a
speech or proclamation.
(2) Challenge: the state is taking action against the IO, for example by not complying
with, amending or renegotiating the treaty.
(3) Terminate: the state ends the relationship with the IO by formally terminating
its membership.
24. sdate
Indicate the start date of the action. If dicult to pin on one day, indicate the year and
month. This variable appears on the record as follows: year, month, (day) (20050610).
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25. edate
Indicate the end date of the action. If dicult to pin on one day, indicate the year and
month. This variable appears on the record as follows: year, month, (day) (20050610).
The following section codes the three typologies of acts of contestation: wavering, challenging
or terminating. Here, you only code category that is relevant to your action.
• Wavering: When states waver, they use their voice to publicly question and/or criticize
certain aspects of the IO. For instance, states could publicly delegitimatize the IO by
challenging, accusing or denouncing the organization in an attempt to undermine its
authority or integrity, or states can threaten to alter the status of their commitment
by threatening to close military bases.
• Challenging: When states challenge, they do not only use their voice to criticize the
organization, but also act on it. It is important to underscore that these actions are
taking as a result of or response to their perceived grievances, it is an act of protest.
When they challenge, states can either call for formal changes of the founding document
through renegotiation or amendment, or decide to no longer comply.
• Terminating: When states withdraw, they formally sever all ties with the IO and no
longer hold any obligations under the statute. They can do this either through the
formal process or unilaterally.
Wavering
26. delegit
In this action, did the state delegitimize the IO? * If the answer is no, skip ahead to
the section 2.3.3. Challenging and leave the rest blank.
(0) No
(1) Yes
27. delegit stage
For this action, did it delegitimize on the international stage in front of the member
states (i.e. in the General Assembly, Annual meeting, etc.) or on the national stage
(parliament, national speech, newspaper interview)?
(0) International
(1) National
28. delegit topic
For this action, which part of the IO did the state aim to delegitimize?
142
(1) Mission (general aim of the IO)
(2) Procedures (decision-making process, voting, agenda setting)
(3) Decisions (regarding aid, missions, budget, etc.)
(4) Members
29. commit
Did the state threaten to reduce its formal commitment (troops, budget, resources)?
(0) No
(1) Yes
30. commit spec
If the state threatened to reduce its formal commitment, was it specic about the
details of the reduction (time, place, units)?
(0) No
(1) Yes
31. commit item
If the state threatened to reduce its formal commitment, what were they threatening
to reduce?
(1) Financial contribution
(2) Military contribution
(3) Personnel contribution
(4) Other
(5) Multiple
(6) Membership
Challenging
32. challenge
In this action, did the state challenge the IO? * If the answer is no, skip ahead to the
section 2.3.4. Terminating and leave the rest blank.
(0) No
(1) Yes
143
33. amend
Did the state attempt to formally amend the founding document using the amendment
procedure by either initiating it or completing it?
(0) No
(1) Yes
34. amend proc
If the state initiated an amendment to the founding document, was the state able to
complete the process?
(0) No
(1) Yes
35. amend out
If the state initiated an amendment to the founding document, was it successful?
(0) No, the document was not amended or the process was not completed.
(1) Yes, the document was amended.
36. noncomply
Did the state intentionally violate the terms of the agreement by no longer complying
with (one of) its provisions in response to their perceived grievance with the IO?
(0) No
(1) Yes
37. noncomply act
If the state intentionally violated the terms of the agreement through non-compliance,
did it do so actively (non-compliance through an action) or passively (non-compliance
through inaction)?
(0) Active
(1) Passive
38. noncomply reduc
If the state willingly violated the terms of the agreement by actively reducing its
commitment, did it fully or partially reduce its commitment?
(0) Fully
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(1) Partially
39. noncomply block
Did the state block the IOs (decision-making) procedures, for example by not showing
up to vote or refusing to compromise?
(0) No
(1) Yes
Terminating
40. terminate
In this action, did the state terminate its membership? *If no, skip the subsequent
terminating variables and leave them blank.
(0) No
(1) Yes
41. terminate mem
Did the state withdraw unilateral (by itself) or multilateral (with other states)?
(0) Unilateral
(1) Multilateral
42. terminate proc
Did the state go through the formal withdrawal procedure as set out in the IOs founding
document?
(0) No
(1) Yes
43. terminate other
Have other states withdrawn before this state?
(0) No
(1) Yes
145
44. terminate mon
If so, how many months ago was the most recent withdrawal?
45. terminate cother
If so, how many other states have withdrawn before? If none, leave blank.
46. terminate rejoin
Did the state rejoin the IO at some point after withdrawing?
(0) No
(1) Yes
47. terminate rejoincount
If the state did rejoin after withdrawing, for how many months was the state not a
member?
Institutional Design Variables
This section codes the characteristics of the international organization that is being contested
by one of its member states.
General
48. orgname
full name of the IO as specied in COW Intergovernmental Organizations (v3). See
the COW Codebook le in Dropbox.
49. ioname
IO acronym as specied in COW Intergovernmental Organizations (v3). See the COW
Codebook le in Dropbox.
50. ionum
IGO id number as specied in COW Intergovernmental Organizations (v3). See the
COW Codebook le in Dropbox.
51. ioyear
year the IO was founded as specied in COW Intergovernmental Organizations (v3).
See the IOvars le in Dropbox.
146
52. fmembers
number of founding member states specied in COW Intergovernmental Organizations
(v3). See the IOvars le in Dropbox.
53. issue
What is the primary issue area of the IO:
(1) security
(2) economics
(3) human rights
(4) health
(5) environment
(6) justice
54. sissue
What is the secondary issue area of the IO (leave blank if none):
(1) security
(2) economics
(3) human rights
(4) health
(5) environment
(6) justice
55. region
What is the regional/global span of the IO? (Based on UN Geoscheme)
(1) Europe
(2) Asia
(3) Australia & New Zealand, Micronesia, Polynesia Melanesia
(4) Africa
(5) Caribbean, South, and Central America
(6) North America
(7) Global
56. regime
Looking at the regime types of the IO's members, regime type is either:
147
(0) Mixed (multiple regime types in the same IO)
(1) Uniform (only democracies or only autocracies)
57. usa
Is the United States a member of this IO?
(0) No
(1) Yes
58. china
Is China a member of this IO?
(0) No
(1) Yes
59. russia
Is Russia/USSR a member of this IO?
(0) No
(1) Yes
60. obligation
2
Based on the founding document of the IO, what characterizes the level of member
state obligation best?
(0) Low level of obligation (i.e. non-legal rules, guidelines, norms)
(1) High level of obligation(i.e. law, obligation, binding rules)
61. precision
3
Based on the founding document of the IO, what characterizes the level of precision
best?
(0) Low level of precision (i.e. dicult to determine compliance or rules only apply
to certain situations)
(1) High level of precision (i.e. little room for interpretation, the requirements and
obligations are clearly laid out)
2
Drawn from Abbott, and Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal, `The Concept of Legalization',
International Organization, Vol. 54, p. 401, 2000.
3
Drawn from Abbott, and Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal, `The Concept of Legalization',
International Organization, Vol. 54, p. 401, 2000.
148
Hierarchy
This section codes the presence of hierarchy in the organization in terms of voting procedures
and the assignment of administrative functions in the IO.
62. hier vr
Are the voting rights within the IO distributed equally (for example: one member, one
vote, or do states that contribute more get more say)?
(0) No
(1) Yes
63. hier vrbase
If you selected no above, on what principles are voting rights established? If yes is
selected above, leave blank.
(1) Historic relations
(2) Financial contribution
(3) Geographic size
(4) Material contribution (oil, materials, forces, experts, etc.)
(4) Other
64. hier veto
Are there members with veto power in the IO?
(0) No
(1) Yes
65. hier vp
In principle, how are decisions made in the plenary sessions, such as the General
Assembly? For example, an IO can aim for consensus decision making, but when
consensus cannot be reached they implement a two-thirds majority. This case would
be coded (1).
(1) Based on unanimity/consensus
(2) Based on majority voting
(3) Supra-majority (qualied majority)
(4) Dual: rst based on consensus and resort to majority voting when this is not
possible.
(5) None specied
149
(6) Depends per topic
66. hier afnum
How many administrative positions for state representatives are there within the or-
ganization?
67. hier afdur
How many years maximum can one person/state hold the highest position in the IO?
For example, how many years is the president's term (incl. possible second term/re-
election).
68. hier af
How does the IO determine who fullls the highest administrative function in the IO?
(0) Position rotates among the members
(1) Position is appointed by members
69. hier afd
How are the other administrative functions divided?
(0) Functions rotate among the members
(1) Functions are appointed by members
Flexibility
This section codes the level of
exibility within the organization in terms of the ability to
amend, escape, withdraw, employ reservations or duration provisions.
70.
amend
Does the IO have amendment clauses in the founding document?
(0) No
(1) Yes
71.
vd vp
Based on what voting rule are amendments to the Statute accepted?
(1) Based on unanimity/consensus
(2) Based on majority voting
(3) Supra-majority (qualied majority)
150
(4) Dual: rst based on consensus and resort to majority voting when this is not
possible.
(5) None specied
72.
escape
Does the IO have an escape clause in the founding document? (An escape clause allows
a state to temporarily be exempt from the rules under the IO because of extraordinary
circumstances, for instance a tsunami)
(0) No
(1) Yes
73.
escapeu
Does the state have to obtain permission to escape before doing so?
(0) No
(1) Yes
74.
exit
Does the IO have an withdrawal clause in the founding document? (The withdrawal
clause allows states to permanently withdraw from the IO)
(0) No
(1) Yes
75.
exitu
How long do states have to wait in order for the withdrawal to become eective?
Answer in number of months.
76.
duration
Does the founding document specify if the agreement will be indenite, i.e. does the
document specify if states will renegotiate (after a certain amount of time) or review
its purpose?
(0) No
(1) Yes
77.
renegotiation
Does the founding document specify any other mechanisms for renegotiation? (For
instance, IOs can have a review conference every 5 year)
151
(0) No
(1) Yes
78.
reservation
Are there any reservations noted in the founding document? (Reservations are often
found at the beginning of the document and specify which states are exempt from
certain clauses)
(0) No
(1) Yes
79.
reservationc
How many states have entered reservations? Count the number of states that have
entered reservations in the founding document.
80.
reservations
Which state entered the most reservations? Use the COW country code to indicate
which state, see COW Country Codes for number (document also in the Dropbox).
Authority
This section codes the level of authority in an organization in terms of autonomy, dispute
resolution mechanisms, enforcement and monitoring provisions.
81. auth monitoring
Does the founding document include treaty monitoring provisions? (Monitoring pro-
visions specify how the agreement will be monitored, i.e. how they will check if a state
is complying with the rules)
(0) No
(1) Yes
82. auth monprov
If so, are these monitoring provisions self-monitoring (i.e. sending in reports), or is the
treaty monitored by an external/third party?
(1) Self-monitoring
(2) External monitoring
(3) Both
152
83. auth disputeres
Does the founding document include dispute resolution mechanisms? (Dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms lay out how disputes between/with states are resolved)
(0) No
(1) Yes
84. auth dispmech
If the IO include dispute resolution mechanisms, does the founding document include
informal (non-binding) or formal (binding) dispute resolution mechanisms?
(1) Informal (for example: recommendations, mediation, discussion)
(2) Formal (for example: settlement by International Court of Justice)
(3) Both
85. auth disputebody
If the IO involves formal external dispute resolution mechanisms, does the Statute
specify which body will settle the dispute?
(0) No
(1) Yes (such as the ICJ, ICC, or an internal body)
86. auth sanctionprov
Does the IOs founding document include punishment provisions in case member states
violate the agreement?
(0) No
(1) Yes
87. auth sanctionmech
If the IO does allow for punishment provisions, does an internal body (created by
the same Statute), or external body (an already existing intergovernmental entity),
conduct the punishment?
(0) Internal
(1) External
88. auth sanctionbody
If the sanction is executed by an external body, which one is this? Note the acronym
of the institution.
153
Research Guide
Thank you for your interest in the IO Contestation Project! This research guide lays out
the practical guidelines for the IO contestation research. If you are working on the project,
please read these instructions carefully.
For this exercise, researchers will produce four documents:
(1) Primary and secondary research document;
(2) Coding sheet;
(3) Logbook;
(4) Summary.
The process is as follows:
Step 1: Case Assignment
The aim is to have one researcher work on the same IO when possible. The team leader will
assign the researchers to an International Organization and decade, for instance: NATO in
the 1960s. The benet of working on one IO is that the IO variables only have to be coded
once, unless the founding document is updated.
Step 2: Secondary Source Research
The goal of secondary research is to get a better understanding of the organization you
are assigned and the developments it has gone through. To that end, the researcher will
start with more broadly oriented preliminary research into the organization and the decade
specically. Using the USC library, the researchers will rst look up general histories of
the assigned IO. For our example here this could be Timothy Sayle's Enduring Alliance: A
History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (2019).
Look through the publication to see if any cases of contestation are noted: does the
publication mention any cases where states have expressed their discontent, grievance or any
other problem with the IO? Are there any mentions for your decade specically? The goal
here is to catch any big and notable acts of contestation: temporarily withdrawing, threat-
ening withdraw, withholding resources such as funds or troops, or wanting to renegotiate?
Those notable types of IO contestation are usually mentioned in these general histories.
Then, the researcher writes up the ndings in the primary and secondary research le.
Make note of the acts of contestation you found in the publication for your decade, and if
you found any acts of contestation outside of your decade, please put these as well for future
reference. Thus, you can indicate acts of contestation from dierent states on in dierent
years, focusing on your assigned decade and IO.
For our example here, this could look something like this: \The book mentions that
French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew from NATO's integrated military command
in 1966." (147) In addition, \after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the US
criticized its European NATO partners for not contributing to the NATO defense posture,
154
and refused to show up to meetings." (164) These are two examples of states contesting the
IO.
Step 3: Primary Source Research
Now that you have a general understanding of your IO and the acts of contestation it has
faced, it is time to zoom in more closely on your decade. Using LexisNexis and/or ProQuest
through the University library, you are going to look at newspaper articles (the primary
sources) that involve your IO per year to look for acts of contestation. Attached below are
more specic instructions for optimizing your searches with LexisNexis and ProQuest. You
can approach this step in two (complementary) ways:
(1) If you have identied one or more instances of contestation through your secondary
source research, you can start with looking for those actions in the primary source material.
Here, the IO and the state have already been determined by your secondary source research.
From there, look closely in the news articles to determine if other states are involved or if it
mentions other cases of contestation by other states. This way you can snowball from there.
(2) If no main instance of contestation came out of your secondary source research or you
are done with the step above you start with researching the rst year of the decade and move
through the sources based on keywords that pertain to your IO and see if any instances of
contestation come up. Remember here that the state in question has not been specied yet,
any member state can be an actor.
When you are using either method for nding primary sources, it is paramount that you
save the news articles in the research le. When you nd a source that mentions an act of
contestation pertaining to your IO, copy-paste the text into the primary research document
and highlight the relevant parts. This will ensure that we can always go back to the source
if needed.
Step 4: Coding the variables
The nal step is then to code the variables laid out above. Remember that each state-act
is one row (observation) that you code for the variables (columns) above. Try to be as
precise is possible, nding all information necessary to answer the questions and ll out the
form. If you are uncertain or have any other questions, highlight the cell yellow and make a
comment in the logbook (see template). That way we can keep track of all coding decisions
and potential issues.
There are three coding categories: 1) Coder Variables, 2) Institutional Design Variables
and 3) The Contestation Toolkit.
(1) Coder Variables: start with these and ll out these variables every time you update
the coding sheet.
(2) Institutional Design Features: using the `Yearbook of International Organizations'
database and the founding document (also called the statue) of the IO, you ll out the
basic characteristics of the IO. If the statute does not go through any major changes,
most of these variables you will only have to code once per decade.
155
(3) The Contestation Toolkit: you code these variables based on the research you have
done using LexisNexis and ProQuest. These variables will change per actor and year,
but you only have to code one of the three categories in the toolkit: states can only
waver, challenge or terminate.
Step 4: Write the summary
The nal step is to write a short summary about the case in narrative form. The template
has a couple of questions that need to be covered, such as who are the actors, what is the
date, the issue and act. This can just be a short, one-paragraph, description of the case.
Step 5: Discussing our ndings
We will meet once every two weeks to discuss our ndings, any coding issues we may run
into, and questions about the codebook. Your experience and ndings are imperative for
improving the project as we go!
LexisNexis and ProQuest
Using LexisNexis
Go to the USC Library website: https://libraries.usc.edu and click on LexisNexis Academic
in the corner left. Accessing it through the USC website makes sure you can use the full
program, not just the public version. You now go into LexisNexis to search for news articles
on the acts of contestation.
1. Go to \Advanced Search"
2. Select \News" as content type
3. You can play around with the search terms a little bit, but a good rst start would be
the country names and topic, for instance: Ecuador and Peru and border.
4. Now we are going to adjust the date. Scroll down to `Date' and choose `date is in
between'. Here, you can set it to the year/decade that you are researching.
5. Click \Search"
6. On the top right, you can organize the articles by date: choose \sort by date (oldest-
newest)".
7. If the search is still to general or gives you too many results, you can add another
search term. Go back to `Advanced Search' (top left) to not lose you other search
information.
8. Add `and withdraw' (for instance), search again and order the results oldest to newest.
9. This gives you still a lot of search results, but these are at least useful ones. You can
use any other term that might seem relevant to you based on what you have read in
the secondary research. If you still get to many hits to go through them all, see some
of the key search terms below as examples for network searches.
156
TIP 1: You can use the asterisk (*) wildcard character to search for variations of a word,
making your search shorter and simpler. Use the asterisk at the end of a root word to nd
the root word plus all the words made by adding letters to the end of it. Look at the details
of the case and the codebook for more variations you can think of.
TIP 2: Read through the `Search Connectors Reference Card' (in dropbox) to learn how to
use search connectors besides `and', such as `near', `atleast' and `or' to make your searches
more focused.
Using ProQuest
ProQuest works very similar to LexisNexis. Go to the USC Library website: https://
libraries.usc.edu - Research - Databases - click on ProQuest in the right column. Ac-
cessing it through the USC website makes sure you can use the full program, not just the
public version.
1. Go to Advanced Search
2. Set the IO (and potentially the state)
3. Choose Specic Date Range and set the date
4. Select source type: newspapers
5. Hit Search
6. Sort by `oldest rst'
7. You can add search terms if this search gives you too much or too little results.
8. When you nd an article that you will use for the coding and want to save, go to `save'
in the right column and choose the RTF format so you can copy-paste it into your own
document.
TIP 1: At the bottom of the page after you search, ProQuest gives you some suggestions for
search terms. Make sure you apply the date range again, otherwise it shows you all results
for that search.
TIP 2: in ProQuest you can also work with connectors and the asterisk wildcard.
157
Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3
Interviews
Please note that my interviewees are protected by my IRB protocol. The interviewees are
speaking from their ocial capacity, hence only their ocial title is shared.
• Ambassador of South Africa to the Netherlands and their Legal Advisor at the South
African Embassy in the The Hague (25 June 2019)
• Legal Advisor to the Burundi Embassy to the Netherlands in the Hague (25 June 2019)
• Director Division of External Operations at the International Criminal Court (26 June
2019)
• Legal Ocer at the International Criminal Court (26 June 2019)
• Permanent Representative to the OPCW and ICC at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Aairs (27 June 2019)
• Acting Chef de Cabinet & Head of Presidency Legal and Enforcement Unit (4 July
2019)
• Dutch Ambassador to Burundi 2015-2017 (23 July 2019)
ICC Ocial Documents
• The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome, 1998/2002)
• Selected Basic Documents Related to the International Criminal Court (publication
by the ICC Secretariat, 2018)
• ICC State Parties' speeches to the Assembly of State Parties 2006-2020 (link)
• \Understanding the International Criminal Court" (publication by the the ICC)
• Kenya: Proposal of Amendments, Reference: C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10,
(2013)
• ICC Reports of the Working Group on Amendments (2014-2016) (link)
• Proposals of amendments to the Rome Statute submitted by States Parties (link)
158
ICC ASP Member Speeches
Year Total Speeches collected
2006 7
Congo, Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Uganda
2007 8
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda
2008 8
AU, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Uganda
2009 5 Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda
2010 12
AU, Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritsius,
Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania
2011 10
Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
2012 8
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Uganda
2013 9
AU, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria,
South Africa, Tanzania
2014 14
AU, Congo, Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
2015 7 AU, Botswana, Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda
2016 10
Congo, Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
2017 9
Congo, Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria,
South Africa, Uganda
2018 9
Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Tunisia
2019 10
AU, Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia
2020 7
Gambia Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Tanzania
Table 5.1: Speeches made by African parties to the ICC 2006-2020
159
Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 4
Variable N Mean Min Max
Female 9832 0.51 0 1
Non-Dutch descent 7050 0.197 0 1
Low Income 9766 0.571 0 1
Age under 40 9832 0.4 0 1
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics Full LISS Panel
Control group Debate Monologue
N = 460 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD Test
Agreeableness score 167 30.05 0.77 154 30.06 0.84 139 29.99 0.78 F= 0:354
Female 167 0.56 0.50 154 0.55 0.50 139 0.49 0.50 F= 0:772
Non-Dutch descent 164 0.20 0.40 152 0.12 0.33 137 0.22 0.42 F= 2:41

Low Income 166 0.48 0.50 154 0.49 0.50 139 0.43 0.50 F= 0:497
Age under 40 167 0.21 0.41 154 0.15 0.36 139 0.18 0.39 F= 0:981
Graduated high school 167 0.66 0.47 154 0.65 0.48 139 0.66 0.47 F= 0:046
Voted populist in 2020 167 0.12 0.33 154 0.16 0.36 139 0.14 0.35 F= 0:452
EU knowledge (self-reported) 167 0.38 0.26 154 0.37 0.27 139 0.40 0.27 F= 0:633
Watchtime in seconds 0 { { 154 197.30 330.77 139 153.75 56.49 F= 2:347
Statistical signicance markers: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics Middle Ground
160
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Women
Non−Dutch origin
Low income
Voted populist (2021)
Completed highschool
Extraversion (Big−V)
Intellect/Imagination (Big−V)
Emotional Stability (Big−V)
Conscientiousness (Big−V)
Age under 40
Monologue
Debate
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1

● ● Low Knowledge Middle Ground (N=205) Middle Ground (N=460)
Plot represents estimates from an OLS regression model with "EU importance" as the DV.
Estimates in which the bar does not cross the vertical line are p < 0.05 (95%)
Figure 5.1: Modeling Middle-Ground Post-treatment Importance of the EU
161

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of how and why states contest international organizations (IOs) by offering novel concepts, data, and measurements to interrogate the broad range of state behaviors towards IOs between 1995-2020. Theories of international cooperation have extensively studied why states cooperate -- but why do they stop? The concept of 'IO contestation' captures the multitude of ways in which states contest international organizations. I posit that the design of the IO founding document sets the parameters for IO contestation, meaning that the extent to which organizations are (in)flexible, authoritative and/or hierarchical impacts how states behave towards them when they experience a grievance. However, while the institutional design sets the permissive conditions for contestation, individual preference and choice determine the specific choices and actions states make within these parameters. I investigate this premise using a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative data analysis, text analysis, interviews, primary source research, and a survey experiment to offer different perspectives on the causes en mechanisms of IO contestation. Analysis shows that IO contestation is indeed a complex and multifaceted process where structure and agency interact. This study offers a fine-grained understanding of how and why states challenge international organizations, and offers a fresh perspective on how to counter this perceived unraveling of the international order -- and if this is indeed what we are witnessing.

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Information, public opinion, and international relations

Asset Metadata

Creator van Wijk, Anne Marieke (author)

Core Title The IO contestation project: a multi-method approach towards understanding the ways states contest international organizations.

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science and International Relations

Degree Conferral Date 2022-12

Publication Date 09/19/2022

Defense Date 09/01/2022

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag contestation,international organizations,leadership,Membership,mixed methods,OAI-PMH Harvest,states

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Sandholtz, Wayne A. (committee chair), Garry, Hannah (committee member), James, Patrick (committee member)

Creator Email anne.vanwijk@hotmail.com,avanwijk@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC112002236

Unique identifier UC112002236

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Document Type Dissertation

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Rights van Wijk, Anne Marieke

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Source 20220919-usctheses-batch-982 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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