University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The Islamic debate on juristic in/fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa wa al-taṣwīb) and the construction of competing orthodoxies, 10th-11th centuries C.E.

(USC Thesis Other)

The Islamic debate on juristic in/fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa wa al-taṣwīb) and the construction of competing orthodoxies, 10th-11th centuries C.E.

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content THE ISLAMIC DEBATE ON JURISTIC IN/FALLIBILITY (AL-TAKHṬIʾA WA AL-
TAṢWĪB) AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMPETING ORTHODOXIES, 10
TH
-11
TH

CENTURIES C.E.
by
Hadi Qazwini
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(RELIGION)
December 2022
Copyright 2022 Hadi Qazwini

ii
Acknowledgments
al-ḥamdu li-Llāh alladhī hadānā li-hādhā wa mā kunnā li-nahtadiya lawlā an hadānā Allāh (Q.
7:43).
I would like to thank my dissertation committee members: Professors Sherman Jackson,
David Albertson, Arjun Nair, and Alexandre Roberts for their guidance throughout the various
stages of my dissertation research and writing process. Their scholarly insights and critical
feedback have made this study much stronger than it would have otherwise been. I would like to
especially thank my advisor Professor Sherman Jackson for his sagacious mentorship, generous
friendship, and unwavering support over the course of my doctoral career. In addition to my
dissertation committee, this study greatly benefitted from the wisdom and support of several
friends and “honorary” committee members. In particular, I want to express profound gratitude to
Professor Jessica Marglin, who kindly read through various parts of my work and offered helpful
suggestions.
I also want to recognize the various contributions of Professors Asifa Quraishi-Landes,
Hossein Modarressi, Aron Zysow, Robert Gleave, Mohammad Fadel, Ovamir Anjum, Hassan
Ansari, Aun Hasan Ali, Ahab Bdaiwi, Rodrigo Adem, and Jawad Qureshi. My conversations with
them greatly assisted me in formulating and revising ideas. I offer special respect and gratitude to
my mentors from the Islamic seminary (ḥawza): my maternal grandfather Āyatullāh Dr. Sayyid
Fāḍil al-Mīlānī (London, UK), Āyatullāh Sayyid Munīr al-Khabbāz (Qumm, Iran), and Āyatullāh
Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ḥāʾirī (Karbala, Iraq), all of whom were very generous with their time
and pressing insights. My numerous discussions with my paternal uncle and close friend Sayyid
Hossein al-Qazwini (Karbala, Iraq) greatly assisted me in formulating my ideas more deeply. My

iii
dialogues with fellow USC colleague and friend Omar Qureshi were helpful in clarifying difficult
concepts; he was also very kind with sharing his books and other resources with me.
This dissertation would not be complete without the support of and conversations with the
USC School of Religion faculty, graduate students, and staff, especially those who participated in
the graduate student seminars over the course of the last two years and provided their insightful
feedback and pressing questions. I am grateful to them all.
My receipt of the USC Graduate School Russell Endowed Fellowship in 2018-2019 greatly
assisted me in the early stages of research and writing. I would also like to thank numerous
colleagues who engaged in conversation and reflection with my work at various conferences and
venues (e.g., the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion and the American
Oriental Society, the 2018 Sharia and the Secular conference at UC Santa Barbara, the 2019 Shiʿi
legal theory summer school at the IAS in Princeton, the 2022 conference of the International
Society of Islamic Legal Studies in London) and members of several social media groups and
others who kindly shared resources with me.
Last, but certainly not least, I’d like to thank my many friends around the world for their
enthusiastic encouragement, my extended family (from both the al-Milani and al-Qazwini sides)
for their warm support, my beloved parents and siblings for their unwavering generosity and
devotional prayers, and my wife Kowsar (“Umm Ali”) and children Ali, Zayneb, and Ghadeer,
whose immense patience, unconditional love, and daily encouragement provided me with the
necessary motivation to complete this project.
Rabbi awziʿnī an ashkura niʿmataka allatī anʿamta ʿalayya wa ʿalā wālidayya wa an aʿmala
ṣāliḥ
an
tarḍāhu wa aṣliḥ-lī fī dhurriyyātī innī tubtu ilayka wa innī min al-muslimīn (Q. 46:15).

iv
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………………...ii
Notes on Dates, Transliterations, Citations, and Abbreviations ………………………………….vi
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………..vii
Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………1
1.1 The Question ……………………………………………………………………………1
1.2 The Significance of This Study…………………………………………………………4
1.3 Previous Scholarship…………………………………………………………………..10
1.4 Methodology …………………………………………………………………………..15
1.4.1 Orthodoxy …………………………………………………………………………...18
1.5 Chapter Outlines ………………………………………………………………………24
Chapter 2: Historical Background ……………………………………………………………….27
2.1 Early Muslim Controversies …………………………………………………………..28
2.2 Earliest Expressions of the Debate ……………………………………………………39
2.2.1 ʿUbayd Allāh al-ʿAnbarī …………………………………………………………….48
2.2.2 Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm, Ibn ʿUlayya, and Bishr al-Marīsī …………………………….54
2.2.3 Perceptions and Receptions of the Early In/Fallibility Positions……………………57
2.2.3.1 Extreme Fallibility ……………………………………………………………...58
2.2.3.2 Extreme Infallibility …………………………………………………………….59
2.3 The Rise of Legal Theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) ………………………………………………61
Chapter 3: Juristic Infallibility (al-taṣwīb) and the Infallibilists (al-muṣawwiba) ………………64
3.1 What is Juristic Infallibility?…………………………………………………………..65
3.2 The Intellectual Sensibilities of the Infallibilists ……………………………………...71
3.3 The Practical Problems of Juristic In/Fallibility ………………………………………74
3.3.1 Problems with Juristic Fallibility …………………………………………………75
3.3.2 Problems with Infallibility ………………………………………………………..80
3.4 Muʿtazilism and Juristic Infallibility ………………………………………………….82
3.6.1 Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār…………………………………………………………...84
3.5 Ashʿarism and Juristic Infallibility …………………………………………………..100
3.5.1 Al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī ………………………………………………….102
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion …………………………………………………..110
Chapter 4: Juristic Fallibility (al-takhiṭʾa) and the Fallibilists (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa) ………………...112
4.1 What is Juristic Fallibility? …………………………………………………………..114
4.2 The Intellectual Sensibilities of the Fallibilists………………………………………119
4.3 The Practical Problems of Juristic In/Fallibility ……………………………………..122
4.3.1 Problems with Juristic Infallibility………………………………………………122
4.3.2 Problems with Juristic Fallibility ………………………………………………..126
4.4 Sunnī Traditionalism and Juristic Fallibility…………………………………………128
4.4.1 Al-Qāḍī Abu Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ………………………………………………….130

v
4.5 Imāmī Shīʿism and Juristic Fallibility………………………………………………..139
4.5.1 Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Mufīd, Abū al-Qāsim al-Murtaḍā, and Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī …141
4.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion …………………………………………………..164
Chapter 5: Collective Memories and Mythmaking……………………………………………..166
5.1 Theoretical Framework: Mnemohistory, Collective Memories, and Mythmaking ….167
5.2 Competing Collective Memories of the Past ………………………………………...169
5.2.1 The Infallibilists …………………………………………………………………170
5.2.2 The Fallibilists …………………………………………………………………..171
5.3 Dogmatic Commitments Sustaining Competing Memories …………………………174
5.3.1 The Inerrancy of the Community (ʿiṣmat al-umma) …………………………….174
5.3.2 The Probity of the Companions (ʿadālat al-ṣaḥāba) ……………………………180
5.3.3 The Inerrancy of the Imāms (ʿiṣmat al-aʾimma)………………………………...185
5.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion …………………………………………………..199
Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..202
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………………211

vi
Notes on Dates, Transliterations, Citations, and Abbreviations
Dates appear with the Hijrī followed by the Gregorian years (i.e., AH/CE). When the exact
month and day of the Hijrī date are unknown, only the earlier of the corresponding Gregorian years
will be included (i.e., simply 260/873, not 260/873-4).
The transliteration of Arabic and Persian terms follows the IJMES (International Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies) transliteration guide.
Arabic and Persian names of people, groups, and places are not Latinized or anglicized
(e.g., Ibn Rushd, not Averroes; Shīʿī, not Shiite; Baghdād, not Baghdad). Exceptions to this general
rule are the English plural form of groups, which include an s at the end rather than the Arabic
plural form (e.g., the Muʿtazilīs, not Muʿtazila).
English translations of the Qurʾān generally follow The Study Quran, ed. Seyyed Hossein
Nasr et al., with minor variations in some cases. English translations of ḥadīths and Arabic and
Persian texts are my own, unless otherwise noted. Citations of the Qurʾān contain Q. followed by
the sūra (chapter) number followed by the āya (verse) number (i.e., Q. 5:55).
Citations follow Chicago Style and are complete the first time they appear in the footnotes
and subsequently abbreviated, with full references in the bibliography. Sometimes citations appear
at the end of paragraphs rather than at the end of every sentence when citing large sections of
material, to decrease the number of repeated citations that appear on the page.
The following references are abbreviated throughout the dissertation:
EI2: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition
EI3: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition

vii
Abstract
This dissertation is a study of a long-standing debate in Islamic thought over the doctrines
of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa) and infallibility (al-taṣwīb). Beginning with developments in Iraq
in the middle of the second/eighth century and continuing to the fifth/eleventh century, this
dissertation traces how Muslim thinkers grappled with an apparently simple yet far-reaching
question: when disagreement of opinion arises among the legal experts (mujtahids) over a
particular question, are all of them correct (muṣīb)? Those who answered this question in the
affirmative, that is, those who considered all legal experts to be correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb)
despite their differences, would become known as “the infallibilists” (al-muṣawwiba). Their
opponents, who would become known as “the fallibilists” (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa), maintained that there
could only be one correct answer for any question (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid), and thus, in cases of
disagreement there could only be one correct legal expert; the rest were all wrong. The proponents
of juristic fallibility and infallibility proposed several variations of these doctrines.
Despite this question’s persistence in manuals of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), the
debate over whether every mujtahid was correct was not simply an academic or intellectual
exercise. Through an analysis of various genres of premodern Islamic literature, this study traces
the development of the debate and describe the various doctrinal positions it produced, focusing
on the works of legal theory produced in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries by major
theologian-jurists representing Muʿtazilism, Ashʿarism, Sunnī Traditionalism, and Imāmī Shīʿism.
This study shows how, despite being legally oriented, that is, concerned with the “assessment of
legal reasoning” (ḥukm al-ijtihād) and therefore largely discussed in works of legal theory, this
debate reveals several intellectual and sociopolitical concerns that go beyond the scope of law
proper. Among these intellectual concerns, the debate’s participants theorized about whether God

viii
had determined a single answer for every religious question and the nature of religious “truths”
(ontologically) and how they are determined (epistemologically). More importantly, this study
argues that participants were concerned with sociopolitical problems, including the nature and
scope of post-Prophetic authority and activity, the methods by which Muslims would manage the
unity of their group identities while simultaneously accounting for diversity of beliefs and
practices, and defining the content and parameters of what scholars deemed to be correct or
acceptable belief and practice, and, by extension, membership in or exclusion from competing
constructions of Islamic “orthodoxies.” These competing orthodoxies were fueled by several
dogmatic commitments undergirding competing collective memory constructions and
“mythmaking,” especially in relation to the earliest Muslim community and its leadership. Taking
the debate on juristic in/fallibility as a case study, this dissertation invites scholars to consider the
ways in which Muslim theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries attempted to negotiate
intra-Muslim disagreements and to variously justify or resist the existing diversity of legal and
other religious views on the ground by projecting their ideas onto the earliest Muslims.

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Question
Muslims have disagreed with one another for fourteen centuries. This historical reality has
led some to suggest that “Islam” has been pluralistic from its inception.
1
Early in the history of
Islam, some of these intra-Muslim disagreements (ikhtilāf) led to the formation of competing
schools of thought. These groups often denied their opponents’ religious legitimacy. This historical
fact was expressed succinctly by the famous eponym of the Ashʿarī school of Islamic theology,
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936): “The people disagreed in many matters after their Prophet.
[Due to their differences,] they considered one another to have gone astray and disowned one
another. Thus, they became distinct groups and disparate parties.”
2
In the formative and classical
periods of Islam,
3
Muslim scholars were increasingly concerned with managing their diverse
disagreements, that is, to variously validate, justify, control, and/or deny them.
One of the ways in which premodern Muslim scholars attempted to manage their
differences was through a long-standing debate on the doctrines of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa)
and infallibility (al-taṣwīb).
4
Early Muslim thinkers, especially legal theorists (al-uṣūliyyūn),

1
For a resourceful attempt at conceptualizing the academic study of “Islam” in a manner that is cognizant of the
plentitude of its adherents’ expressions over history, see Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being
Islamic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). While I disagree with some of Ahmed’s points for reasons that
I will discuss below in my section on “orthodoxy” (section 1.4.1), his work sheds light on some important
methodological questions and remains a massive resource of primary and secondary sources on the subject. Also to
be noted as a recent excellent intervention on studying “Islam” is A. Kevin Reinhart, Lived Islam: Colloquial Religion
in a Cosmopolitan Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
2
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Beirut: Klaus Schwarz
Verlag, 1426/2005), 1-2.
3
By “formative period,” I mean roughly the first to fourth/seventh to tenth centuries, when various religious
differences were still largely being debated and institutional parameters were still being developed. By “classical
period,” I mean the period following the fourth/tenth century, when the various Islamic schools of thought had
crystallized into what may be termed, following Professor Sherman Jackson, as the “classical synthesis.” Muslims
would largely remain in conversation with these interpretive schools until the advent of Modernity.
4
By “doctrine,” I simply mean a principle of religious belief held and taught by its proponents. See Lexico, s.v.
“doctrine,” accessed January 24, 2021, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/doctrine. Aron Zysow has referred to al-
takhṭiʾa as “fallibilism” and al-taṣwīb as “infallibilism.” See Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction
to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013). My use of the terms “fallibility” and

2
grappled with an apparently simple yet far-reaching question: when legal experts (mujtahids) differ
in their conclusions on a question, are all of them correct (muṣīb)? “The infallibilists” (al-
muṣawwiba) and “the fallibilists” (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa), as the two groups would come to be known,
answered this question differently. The infallibilists considered every legal expert to be infallible,
and thus, would proclaim: every legal expert is correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb).
5
This is because,
they argued, the expert is simply charged with engaging in diligent legal reasoning (ijtihād) and
acting upon the basis of his results; once he does so, he has fulfilled his responsibility and is thus
“correct.” Therefore, when the conclusions of two or more legal experts on a question conflict,
they are all “correct”; there is no question of “error” when diligent legal reasoning is employed
(thus, the “infallibility”). On the other side, the fallibilists maintained that there can only be one
correct answer for any question (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid). Thus, when disagreement arises between legal
experts, only one of them is correct; the rest are wrong (mukhṭiʾ). This is because, they maintained,
the act of legal reasoning is essentially a search – not an obligation or an end in and of itself – and
every search requires a target; one may either acquire that target or miss it (qad yuṣīb wa qad
yukhṭiʾ). In this dissertation, I offer a history of this long-standing debate. In the process, I provide
detailed descriptions of the doctrines that it produced and the arguments of its participants.

“infallibility” largely follows their definitions in standard English dictionaries. Fallibility is defined as “the tendency
to make mistakes or be wrong.” See Lexico, s.v. “fallibility,” accessed January 24, 2021,
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/fallibility. Infallibility is defined as “the inability to be wrong.” See Lexico, s.v.
“infallibility,” accessed January 24, 2021, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/infallibility. My addition of the
adjective “juristic” qualifies these standard definitions to show that, in the context of Islamic legal discourse, fallibility
and infallibility refer to doctrines that address the assessment of the juristic or legal reasoning (ijtihād) of an expert
(mujtahid). In other words, they assess whether the conflicting processes and/or conclusions of legal reasoning can or
cannot be considered as always correct. They should not be confused with the possibility of human error generally or
as it relates to the doctrine of divine protection from error or impeccability (al-ʿiṣma), which is a separate (but related)
issue, and to which we will return to below.
5
To reiterate, “infallible” here should not be confused with “inerrant” (maʿṣūm), which is a separate but related
doctrine. In the post-Islamic period, inerrancy was conceived of to be restricted to the Prophet Muḥammad (in
Sunnism) and the Imāms (in Shīʿism) and functioned to “authenticate” their divine missions. All agreed, in theory,
that beside these individuals, everyone else – individually – was fallible, that is, prone to error. We will return to the
relationship between juristic in/fallibility and inerrancy in the upcoming chapters.

3
On its surface, the argument over the “correctness” (taṣwīb) of only one or every legal
expert may simply appear to be another hairsplitting controversy among countless more in the
history of Islam. However, if not for anything else, the fact that elements of this debate appear in
several premodern genres of Islamic literature, such as heresiographical works, theological tracts,
and legal manuals, and that it continued to be intensely deliberated by Muslim thinkers for over a
millennium (including into the contemporary period), should at least provoke us to ask why? Why
did Muslim scholars expend so much intellectual effort and ink on this question? What were they
attempting to achieve? What was at stake? These are very important questions to ask. As A. Kevin
Reinhart has noted in his insightful study of Muslim moral thought,
the “why” of these arguments among sincere and piously motivated scholars seems usually
to escape most monographs and articles. Islamicists seem often to forget that most topics
debated were “things to think with,” or camera obscurae by means of which a delicate or
a sensitive matter could be regarded indirectly...religious controversies must be understood
in this way if they are to be understood at all, and it should be clear that a study of a
controversy must ask what was truly being asked before it can be understood. What is
needed is a work of interpretation.
6

The main objective of this dissertation, then, is to describe not only “the what” behind the debate
on the doctrines of juristic fallibility and infallibility, but also to explain “the why.”
My study will reveal that this debate was much more than an academic exercise in Islamic
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). To be sure, Muslim scholars considered the question of the correctness
of only one or all legal experts to be a problem of legal theory, especially as it relates to addressing
“the assessment of legal reasoning” (ḥukm al-ijtihād). As such, a host of intellectual (i.e.,
philosophical and theological) concerns undergirded the debate, such as what we may refer to as
the “ontological” existence and nature of religious “truths” (e.g., has God determined a (single)
“answer” (ḥukm) for every question?) and the “epistemological” standards by which these “truths”

6
A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1995), 3-4.

4
are determined (e.g., the distinction between unequivocal and suppositional evidence, with the
former leading to “knowledge” (ʿilm) or certainty (qaṭʿ) and the latter to a preponderance of
probability (ghalabat al-ẓann)). However, I contend that this debate and the doctrines that it
produced were heavily fueled by several sociopolitical (i.e., practical) concerns and served as ex
post facto justifications for or reactions to the existence of both present and earlier diversity and
conflict on the ground. Through their participation in this debate, Muslim scholars engaged with
fundamental questions related to religious authority and scholarly activity in the post-Prophetic
period. They took it upon themselves to negotiate both the content and parameters of what they
deemed to be correct or justifiable belief and practice, that is, “orthodoxy,” and, by extension,
membership in or exclusion from constructions of competing Islamic orthodoxies. Crucially, I
argue that the formations of competing orthodoxies were facilitated through scholarly engagement
in “mythmaking” and the recollection of competing collective memories of the earliest Muslim
community and its leadership.
1.2 The Significance of This Study
This study explores several important questions in the fields of Islamic Studies specifically
and Religious Studies generally.
In Islamic Studies, it makes two major interventions. First, it underscores the difference
between historical or sociological diversity and theoretical or ideational pluralism in the study of
Islam and Muslims. By historical or sociological diversity, I mean the historical fact of the
existence of diverse views. By theoretical or ideational pluralism, I mean the theory of the
accommodation or validity of a plurality of views. There is no doubt that, as a historical reality,
“Islam” has never been monolithic. However, this diversity as a historical or sociological reality
in Islam has often been confused or collapsed with pluralism in Islam as a theoretical or ideational

5
construct. In other words, some scholars have taken the historical fact of a plurality of voices on
the ground over the course of the history of Islam to be the basis for their arguments that Islam is
inherently or naturally pluralistic.
7
This view is not entirely wrong. However, it does not tell us
the full story. On the other hand, other scholars have not given enough attention to studying the
“accommodationist” power of legal pluralism as a theoretical construct, especially as it arose in
Islamic law and legal theory discourses.
8
To remedy these problems, this dissertation argues and
demonstrates how both the proponents of legal monism (juristic fallibility; “single-truth”) and the
proponents of legal pluralism (juristic infallibility; “all-correct”) were engaged in theoretical
constructions as reactions to or justifications of the plurality of legal voices and communities on
the ground, respectively.
Second, this study highlights differing ways in which particular Islamic schools of thought
relate to and diverge from one another. In doing so, some of the enduring distinctive features of
these schools and the relationships between them that have been promoted in scholarship are
blurred. As this dissertation will show, despite their commonality on some points of theology (for
example, the emphasis on divine justice, al-ʿadl
9
), Muʿtazilī and Imāmī Shīʿī legal theorists stood
on opposite ends of the debate in question, with Muʿtazilī thinkers adopting juristic infallibility
and Imāmī thinkers adopting juristic fallibility. On the other hand, despite their sharp divide on

7
For example, Bernard Weiss suggests that “the spirit of Islamic law” includes “a number of salient features of Muslim
juristic thought:…a frank acknowledgment of the uncertainty and fallibility of all individual human endeavor to
capture the divine intent and a consequent acceptance of probabilism as the foundation of valid interpretation; a
tolerance of legal diversity and a willingness to disseminate juristic authority among multiple schools.” See Bernard
G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2006), xii-xiii.
8
For example, Shahab Ahmed overlooks both the accommodationist and orthodoxizing power of the doctrine of
juristic infallibility when he states: “While one can have pluralist orthodoxies–such as Islamic law, which accepts a
delimited range of differing, or even contradictory, positions on the same legal question to be equally valid and true–
the meaningfulness of the term “orthodoxy” is diminished as attitudes toward the truth become less restrictive and
prescriptive.” See Ahmed, What is Islam?, 273-274.
9
For an interesting recent study on the relationship between Shīʿism and Muʿtazilism, see Hussein A. Abdulsater,
Shiʿi Doctrine, Muʿtazili Theology: al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and Imami Discourse (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2017).

6
many questions of theology (for example, the focus on divine justice versus divine power or
rational versus revelatory good and evil
10
), Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī thinkers most often agreed on
adopting juristic infallibility. Finally, despite the sharp sectarian divide between the two groups,
this dissertation shows how some Traditionalist Sunnī and Imāmī Shīʿī scholars alike adopted
juristic fallibility, while other Sunnī and Zaydī Shīʿī scholars, for example, agreed on adopting
juristic infallibility. In highlighting differing ways in which these schools of thought relate to each
other, I am also arguing for the necessity of greater comparative explorations in Islamic studies.
Beyond these two major interventions, this study provides a comparative look at how legal
theorists in the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries imagined the scope of Prophetic and post-
Prophetic religious and legal authority. They debated whether the Prophet was permitted to (and
actually engaged in) legal reasoning (ijtihād), whether others beside the Prophet were permitted to
(and actually engaged in) legal reasoning during the Prophet’s lifetime and after his death, and the
question of the Prophet’s and others’ (both individual and communal) (in)errancy. Furthermore,
this study invites us to investigate how the scholars of the early period of Islam who participated
in this debate framed a particular matter to be a principle or subsidiary question (uṣūl or furūʿ) and
how these beliefs may have shifted over time. For even when there was large-scale agreement on
adopting juristic infallibility, for example, scholars often disagreed on whether specific doctrinal
questions were a matter of uṣūl or furūʿ, and therefore, whether in these specific questions all or
only one party was correct.

10
For studies that have focused on these differences, see, for example, George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in
Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and the Problem of
Black Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

7
This dissertation also sheds light on important questions in the field of Religious Studies.
Notwithstanding the myriad problems associated with the category “religion,”
11
by way of
example, we can briefly examine three related questions here. First, “religion” is often assumed to
be exclusively (or primarily) concerned with the “sacred” and excluding the “mundane” (or
“practical”). The French father of sociology, Émile Durkheim (d. 1917), insisted that the division
of the world into two separate and radically opposite domains–one “sacred” and the other
“profane”–was a distinctive feature of all religious beliefs.
12
Thus, Durkheim famously defined
religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things
set apart and forbidden.”
13
Religion, according to Durkheim and many of his successors, had
nothing to do with the “profane” or the “mundane.”
14
More recently, the persistence of this idea
can be seen in works on “lived religion,” which often call for finding “religion” in the everyday
“mundane.”
15
As this dissertation will show, the debate over the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility
reveals that, despite the (sometimes heavy) theoretical (and theological) discourses underlying
them, these doctrines were strongly based on practical and sociopolitical concerns. Scholars were
engaging in the practical act of managing (justifying or resisting) a plurality of (often conflicting)
views on the ground and, in doing so, identifying their own (as well as others’) religious authority.

11
There is no shortage of critical scholarship on the problems associated with “religion.” For a good and recent
overview of the topic, see Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2015).
12
Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995),
34-39.
13
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 44.
14
Despite their differences with Durkheim in emphasis, Rudolf Otto (d. 1937) and Mircea Eliade (d. 1986), for
example, also distinguished the sacred from the profane and held religion’s core to be exclusively concerned with the
former. See Daniel L. Pals, Nine Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 232-237.
15
See, for example, Nancy T. Ammerman, “Finding Religion in Everyday Life,” Sociology of Religion 75, no. 2
(2014): 189-207.

8
Thus, “theology” (studying or engaging in “God-talk”) and “anthropology” (studying “human
behavior”) meet.
16

Second, “religion” is often assumed to be concerned exclusively (or primarily) with
ultimate or absolute “truth.” Thus, for example, in contrasting “religion” and “history” in the
second of his famous “Theses on Method,” Bruce Lincoln states, “Religion, I submit, is that
discourse whose defining characteristic is its desire to speak of things eternal and transcendent
with an authority equally transcendent and eternal. History, in the sharpest possible contrast, is
that discourse which speaks of things temporal and terrestrial in a human and fallible voice, while
staking its claim to authority on rigorous critical practice.”
17
Following Lincoln, Brian Smith is
more forceful in his claim that “religious discourse represents itself as “objectively true”.”
18
Smith
proceeds to explain how this is the case: “Religions become religions (or “religious traditions”)
when they create or collect an authoritative body of truth supposedly based on [the] three
transcendent principles (superhuman in origin or “authorship,” and transcendent of historical and
cultural conditioning and contingency).”
19
Notwithstanding what may be argued as highly
ideologically-charged pronouncements by Lincoln and Smith on what “religion” is (as well as
“culture” and “history”),
20
the debate on juristic in/fallibility shows more nuanced approaches to
the question of “truth” and correctness. The debate’s starting point is sometimes framed with an
epistemological distinction between “absolute truth” (as in when there is apodictic (qatʿī) evidence
for it) and “no single determined truth” (when there is merely probable (ẓannī) evidence). In fact,

16
Scholarship sometimes distinguishes between the two types of study, as in Russell McCutcheon’s definition of
theology: “this term designates the academic discussion and study of God or the gods...It is to be distinguished from
an anthropological approach to the study of religion in which human behaviors, not the actions of the gods, are the
object of study.” See Russell T. McCutcheon, Studying Religion: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2014), 113.
17
Bruce Lincoln, “Theses on Method,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 17, no. 1 (2005): 8.
18
Brian K. Smith, “Authority, Power, and the Definition of “Religion”,” Historical Reflections 25, no. 3 (1999): 415.
19
Smith, “Authority,” 417.
20
For a scathing critique of Bruce Lincoln’s “theses on method,” see Tim Fitzgerald, “Bruce Lincoln’s “Theses on
Method”: Antitheses,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 18, no. 4 (2006): 392-423.

9
the legal theorists, especially the infallibilists, were adamant on focusing their discussions not on
the results of the jurists’ legal reasonings (and therefore, whether they were “right” or “wrong”),
but on the process of legal reasoning. So, too, the fallibilists promoted the idea that one may be
wrong in relation to acquiring that supposed “absolute truth.” Thus, we may speak of a “two-
tiered” approach to “truth.”
21

Finally, “religion” is assumed to be concerned primarily with the creation and
implementation of strict and/or singular “orthodoxy.” Most recently, Shahab Ahmed has
interpreted Talal Asad’s definition of Islam as a “discursive tradition” to mean that “it is
prescriptive: Islam is oriented towards the prescription of correctness.”
22
This view is also evident
in the writings of some contemporary philosophers. For example, speaking of the ways in which
“religions implement themselves in the actual world,” Simon Blackburn contends that “religions
are also ways of turning up the volume. A dissenter is not a voice to be accommodated, a fellow
enquirer in a serious attempt to allay doubt, with whom we may come to be one-minded about
things, but someone to be shunned or extirpated. Anathema sit: let it be damned.”
23
In contrast to
this depiction of “religion” or “Islam,” by taking the debate on juristic in/fallibility as a case study,
this dissertation shows the possibility of the construction of an “accommodationist” or “expansive”
orthodoxy (which, I argue, is exactly what juristic infallibility (al-taṣwīb) is intended to promote),
and, in fact, the possibility of competing orthodoxies. To speak of competing orthodoxies is to
avoid the problem of singling out (normatively) one school as “orthodox” at the exclusion of
others, whether within or across Sunnī and Shīʿī lines – a problem that many scholars of Islam
have perpetuated. As categories or units of study and analysis, “Sunnism” and “Shīʿism” are

21
For the similar idea of “two truths” in Indian Buddhism, see Frederick J. Streng, “The Buddhist Doctrine of Two
Truths as Religious Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, no. 3 (1971): 262-271.
22
Ahmed, What is Islam?, 272.
23
Simon Blackburn, On Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 120.

10
indebted to one another: there is no Sunnism without Shīʿism and no Shīʿism without Sunnism.
To study them apart does a disservice to both. To speak of competing orthodoxies is also to
interrogate and revisit problematic assumptions such as the idea of a monolithic Sunnism or
Shīʿism (e.g., even in the case of the evaluation of the status of the Companions, which is assumed
to be a monolithic Sunnī matter, there was great difference and debate; even in the case of the
Imāmate, which is assumed to be a monolithic Shīʿī matter, there was debate and consequences
between, for e.g., Zaydī and Twelver conceptions as the case of this debate shows).
1.3 Previous Scholarship
This dissertation is not the only or first study of the juristic in/fallibility debate. The debate
and its doctrines have received substantial attention in European and non-European language
scholarship, especially studies focused on Islamic legal theory and law. These examinations have
mostly focused on the debate’s significance in legal philosophy and epistemology with respect to
issues of legal evidence, (in)determinacy, objectivity, and pluralism. There has been much less
focus, however, on the socio-political concerns of the debate’s participants, especially as they
relate to post-Prophetic authority, religious boundary-drawing, and orthodoxy-making. It is here
that I offer my contribution to the study of the debate and its doctrines. It is useful to, however,
briefly survey the intellectual landscape and efforts of previous scholarship to take note of its
useful contributions and critically assess its weaknesses. This survey begins with non-European
and confessional Muslim scholarship before moving on to European language scholarship.
The debate on juristic in/fallibility continues in contemporary Muslim discourses. Scholars
producing modern manuals of legal theory, like their premodern counterparts, maintain dedicated
discussions on the debate in which they describe the positions and arguments of its various

11
participants and almost always include the authors’ normative preferences.
24
Beyond legal theory
manuals proper, Muslim scholars have produced a few studies dedicated to exploring the debate.
It appears that the most thorough work is a two-volume monograph in Arabic by Yaḥyā al-Ẓalmī.
25

The author of this work has presented a detailed survey and description of the positions taken up
by the major Sunnī legal schools in relation to the debate. However, despite this study’s excellent
wealth of details and sources, al-Ẓalmī does not introduce any novel contributions beyond
describing in detail the major positions, their impact on questions of legal theory, and offering his
own doctrinal preference in the debate. Other independent works have been written with the
objective of engaging in polemics. For example, in concluding his article entitled “al-Tawfīq wa
al-Sadād fī Masʾalat al-Taṣwīb wa al-Takhṭiʾa fī al-Ijtihād,” the Kuwaiti Ministry of Endowments
and Islamic Affairs preacher Fayṣal b. ʿAwaḍ al-ʿInizzī writes, “I say to the student of Islamic law:
You will not master law until you settle legal theory, and you will not settle legal theory until you
purify belief from the corruptions of the Muʿtazilīs, the Ashʿarīs, and the Māturīdīs based on the
method of the Sunnīs (ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʿa).”
26
Finally, more academically-inclined Muslim
scholarship has produced valuable insights on the debate’s history, such as Mutaz al-Khatib’s
excellent article entitled “Maqālat Taṣwīb al-Mujtahidīn: Ishām fī Tārīkh al-Afkār”.
27
As its title
suggests, this article explores the historical origins and development of the juristic infallibility

24
Many modern works have been rearranged, but nonetheless largely explore the same topics as their premodern
predecessors. For examples of the debate as it appears in major modern Sunnī works, see Muḥammad Abū Zahra,
Uṣūl al-fiqh (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 388; Wahba al-Zuḥaylī, Uṣūl al-fiqh al-Islāmī (Damascus: Dār al-
Fikr, 1406/1986), 1091-1109; Muṣṭafā Aḥmad al-Zarqā, al-Madkhal al-fiqhī al-ʿāmm (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam,
1418/1998), 1:153-155, 269-276. For some major Shīʿī works, see Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī, Farāʾid al-uṣūl (Qumm:
Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1428/2007), 1:105-124, esp. 110-121; Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Durūs fī ʿilm al-uṣūl
(Beirut: Dār al-Muntaẓar, 1405/1985), 3:15-16, 27; Muḥammad Surūr al-Bahsūdī, Miṣbāḥ al-uṣūl (Qumm: Muʾassasat
Iḥyāʾ Āthār al-Imām al-Khūʾī, 1422/2001), 2:533-535.
25
Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ẓalmī, al-Taṣwīb wa al-takhṭiʾa wa atharu-humā fī masāʾil uṣūl al-fiqh wa manhaj al-
madrasa al-ʿaqliyya al-ḥadītha (Riyadh: Dār al-Tadmuriyya, 1435/2014). The author of this work has cited a few
related studies, which, despite various attempts, I was unable to access.
26
Fayṣal b. ʿAwaḍ al-ʿInizzī, “al-Tawfīq wa al-sadād fī masʾalat al-taṣwīb wa al-takhṭiʾa fī al-ijtihād,” al-Waʿī al-
Islāmī 22 (1432/2011): 59.
27
Mutaz al-Khatib, “Maqālat taṣwīb al-mujtahidīn: ishām fī tārīkh al-afkār,” al-Tafāhum 32 (1432/2011): 38-71.

12
doctrine. Furthermore, al-Khatib provides an excellent analysis of the impact of this doctrine on
the development of Sunnī legal theory. We will have an opportunity to engage with al-Khatib’s
work in the following chapters.
Several decades of interest in Islamic thought have yielded many European language
studies on this debate. Joseph Schacht may have been one of the first western scholars to bring
aspects of the debate to light. In his encyclopedia entry on the term khaṭaʾ (error), Schacht briefly
discusses the term in the context of legal theory discourses on the possibility of a mujtahid’s error.
Schacht notes that “in the orthodox community, the opinion has prevailed that the mud ̲ j
̲ tahid can
err and in cases of difference of opinion only one can be right at a time, and a tradition is even
cited on this point; the Muʿtazilīs asserted that every mud ̲ j
̲ tahid is right, and even celebrated
orthodox teachers held this view, e.g. Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-S ̲ h ̲ aybānī, Ibn
Surayd ̲ j
̲ , al-Muzanī, al-As ̲ h ̲ ʿarī and his school, al-Bāḳillānī, al-G ̲ h ̲ azālī; Abū Ḥanīfa adopts a
middle view.”
28
In concluding his entry, Schacht maintains that “all this holds only of
the mud ̲ j
̲ tahids of the Sunnīs; those of the “Twelver” S ̲ h ̲ īʿīs are infallible.”
29
Notwithstanding
Schacht’s problematic labeling of the “orthodox community” and “orthodox teachers,” I argue that
both doctrines were raised to the level of “orthodoxy,” that is, proponents of both juristic fallibility
and infallibility considered the question of the correctness of the legal expert to be a fundamental
legal tenet (aṣl), and, therefore, a matter over which there was a single correct answer (and thus,
we speak of “competing orthodoxies” here). More problematic, I think, is Schacht’s assertion that
the debate is relevant to the mujtahids of the Sunnīs and that their Twelver Shīʿī counterparts are
infallible. As we shall see below, the Twelver Shīʿī adoption of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa) was
predicated on their rejection of the infallibility of the jurists (i.e., their conclusions) and restriction

28
Joseph Schacht, “Khaṭaʾ,” EI2.
29
Schacht, “Khaṭaʾ.”

13
of inerrancy (ʿiṣma) to the Prophets and Imāms; in fact, it was the Sunnī proponents of juristic
infallibility (al-taṣwīb) who promoted the idea of the infallibility of the legal expert and the
unassailability of his legal conclusions. Of course, in Schacht’s defense, he may have meant that
the Imāms of Twelver Shīʿism are infallible; if this is the case, Twelver Shīʿī scholars rejected the
idea that the Imāms (and Prophets) were mujtahids, precisely due to their belief in the Prophets’
and Imāms’ absolute inerrancy and rejection of the doctrine of juristic infallibility (i.e., the
infallibility of the legal expert). In other words, in the Twelver Shīʿī conception, ijtihād and
inerrancy (ʿiṣma)/infallibility (taṣwīb) are mutually exclusive: if one is infallible, one cannot be a
mujtahid, and if one is a mujtahid, one cannot be infallible.
The most comprehensive treatment of the debate and its doctrines to date belongs to Aron
Zysow. In his seminal 1984 dissertation on the typology of Islamic legal theory, published in 2013
with some minor revisions, Zysow explored several aspects of the debate in his chapter on legal
reasoning (ijtihād).
30
Zysow focuses on epistemology, turning attention to the role of probability
in legal reasoning as an important foundation for its assessment. He states,
The sphere of ijtihād is that part of the law where differences are most obvious, the realm
of probability rather than certainty. These differences are the sociological starting point for
the doctrine of ijtihād, which has to assess their legitimacy. For the majority of jurists,
these differences are legitimate. But on one view, this legitimacy is by default. The one
correct teaching cannot be identified with certainty. Legitimacy is a consequence of the
mere probability that is attainable. The opposing view bestows an absolute legitimacy on
the rival teachings. There is no one correct doctrine. All are equally correct. For this
doctrine of ijtihād, probability is not a stage on the journey to truth but the very goal of this
journey.
31

In Zysow’s treatment of the debate, he explores several important points, including the
problem over the conflict or balance of evidence (taʿāruḍ, taʿādul, takāfuʾ al-adilla),
32
the

30
See Zysow, The Economy, 259-278.
31
Zysow, The Economy, 260.
32
See Zysow, The Economy, 263-264.

14
distinction between the jurist’s process and product of ijtihād,
33
and the theological underpinnings
and implications of the doctrines of infallibility and fallibility.
34
Zysow has also examined the
doctrine of juristic infallibility in his 2002 chapter “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal
Theory.”
35
In both of these treatments, Zysow has done a remarkable job detailing the debate and
its theological and legal underpinnings. However, he has stopped short of providing reasons as to
why the proponents adopted one doctrine over the other.
36
It is my objective in this dissertation to,
in a sense, pick up where Zysow left off and explore this question further.
Since Aron Zysow’s treatment, several further studies have explored the debate in the
context of larger legal theory and theology discourses. These studies include (in roughly
chronological order), but are not limited to, works by Normal Calder,
37
Éric Chaumont,
38
Khaled
Abou El Fadl,
39
Mohammad Kamali,
40
Wael Hallaq,
41
Bernard Weiss,
42
Josef van Ess,
43
Asifa

33
See Zysow, The Economy, 265-266.
34
See Zysow, The Economy, 266-277.
35
Aron Zysow, “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal Theory,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed.
Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 235-265, esp. 239-247.
36
To be sure, Robert Gleave has pointed out that Aron Zysow may have considered the “pragmatic” reasons for the
adoption of infallibility and that Gleave “[does] not think Zysow is necessarily entertaining a social cause for the
persistence or demise of an uṣūl doctrine, but his comments on how infallibilism may have helped in the political
unification of the Zaydīs, or on its rejection by various reformer movements (p. 275), reveal an interesting set of
contexts in which certain doctrines might thrive, whilst others might perish,” Robert Gleave, foreword to Zysow, The
Economy, xvii.
37
Norman Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative: The Emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī Theory of Ijtihād,” Studia Islamica, 70
(1989): 57-78.
38
Éric Chaumont, “Tout chercheur qualifié dit-il juste? (Hal kull mujtahid muṣîb) La question controversée du
fondement de la légitimité de la controverse en Islam,” in La controverse religieuse et ses forms, ed. Alain Le Boulluec
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1995), 11-27; idem, “Ijtihâd et Histoire en islam sunnite selon quelques juristes et
théologiens,” in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice, ed. Robert Gleave and Eugenia Kermeli (London: I.B. Tauris,
2001), 7-23.
39
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women (Oxford: Oneworld
Publications, 2001), chp. 5.
40
Mohammad H. Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 486-
489.
41
Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 117-121; idem, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 78-83.
42
Weiss, The Spirit, 117-122.
43
Josef van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2006), 20-21, 126, 174; idem, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra: A History
of Religious Thought in Early Islam, trans. Gwendolin Goldbloom (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 2:177-188.

15
Quraishi,
44
Anver Emon,
45
Ahmed El Shamsy,
46
Ahmed Ibrahim,
47
Sohaira Siddiqui,
48
Seyyed
Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad,
49
and Mohammad Fadel.
50
Despite some minor inaccuracies and
some of their brevities and oversimplifications, these studies have explored various aspects of the
debate and its doctrines and have laid important foundations for further research. However, most
of these studies have focused on the Sunnī intellectual traditions, leaving the Shīʿī traditions to be
underexplored. Most have also not provided a detailed descriptive account of the debate and its
proponents’ intellectual arguments, limiting themselves to broad generalizations. Finally, and most
importantly, the socio-political concerns of the debate’s participants have largely remained
understudied. This dissertation seeks to address with greater depth and nuance some of these areas
of study.
1.4 Methodology
As a study in Islamic intellectual history, this dissertation examines the doctrines of juristic
fallibility and infallibility and situates their development in their historical and sociopolitical
contexts.
51
My understanding of and approach to intellectual history thus follows the thought of

44
Asifa Quraishi, “On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American
Constitutional Law,” Michigan State Law Review 339 (2009): 339-360.
45
Anver M. Emon, “To Most Likely Know the Law: Objectivity, Authority, and Interpretation in Islamic Law,”
Hebraic Political Studies, 4, no. 4 (2009): 415-440; idem, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmīs and Others
in the Empire of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 201-206; idem, “Ijtihād,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Islamic Law, ed. Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed (Oxford University Press, 2018), 189-196.
46
Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 80-84.
47
Ahmed F. Ibrahim, Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2015), 49-60.
48
Sohaira Z. M. Siddiqui, Law and Politics under the Abbasids: An Intellectual Portrait of al-Juwayni (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 206-207, fn. 74, 227-231.
49
Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad, “The Reception of Factuality (taṣwīb) Theories of Ijtihād in Modern Uṣūlī
Shīʿī Thought,” in Visions of Sharīʿa: Contemporary Discussions in Shīʿī Legal Theory, ed. Ali-Reza Bhojani et. al.
(Leiden: Brill, 2019), 10-25.
50
Mohammad Fadel, “After Revelation, Where Does Reason Lead?,” Renovatio (2020), accessed February 6, 2020,
https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/after-revelation-where-does-reason-lead.
51
Recent scholarship has explored some of the methodological challenges associated with intellectual history and
especially its development out of and relation to the history of ideas. See, for example, Darrin M. McMahon and
Samuel Moyn, eds., Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014);
Alexander Bevilacqua and Frederic Clark, Thinking in the Past Tense: Eight Conversations (Chicago: The University

16
the influential political historian Quentin Skinner, who has proposed that, “if we are to write the
history of ideas in a properly historical style, we need to situate the texts we study within such
intellectual contexts and frameworks of discourse as enable us to recognize what their authors were
doing in writing them…to grasp their concepts, to follow their distinctions, to recover their beliefs
and, as far as possible, to see things their way.”
52
Focusing on recovering the thought of the
theorists whose works I study here allows us to identify and express more clearly their concerns.
In particular, I utilize two methodological approaches to explore my topic. First, in line
with my objective of providing an accurate description of the debate, the doctrines that it produced,
and the intellectual and practical concerns of its participants (the “what”), my exploration will
largely be textual, that is, it will draw upon a close reading and critical assessment of the contents
of several genres of premodern Islamic literature. My focus, however, is on works of legal theory
because these formed the primary intellectual battleground for the debate. More specifically, I
focus on legal theory works that have been classified in Islamic literature as produced “according
to the method of the rationalist theologians” (ʿalā ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn). These works are said
to be focused on legal theory and are largely deductive (i.e., they begin with general principles and
draw legal conclusions from them). They are classified as such to distinguish them from those
legal theory works produced “according to the method of the legists” (ʿalā ṭarīqat al-fuqahāʾ).
These are said to be largely inductive (i.e., they begin with specific legal data and draw general
conclusions from it).
53
Focusing on the “deductive” legal theory works in our exploration of this
debate allows us to see the tension between maintaining theoretical consistency on the one hand

of Chicago Press, 2019). For a concise argument for the importance of Islamic intellectual history, see Khaled El-
Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and
the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2-3.
52
Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1:vii.
53
For further on this distinction, see Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddima, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad al-Darwīsh (Damascus:
Dār al-Balkhī, 1425/2004), 2:201-202.

17
and practical sociopolitical concerns on the other, and further to highlight the need to justify ex
post facto either the correctness of all or only one legal expert.
I limit my study to tracing the debate as it developed between the second to fifth/eighth to
eleventh centuries. It is during this period that the initial controversy emerges, is negotiated and
renegotiated, and largely (albeit not entirely) settled between its participants in the sense that it
produced crystallized doctrinal positions. It is toward roughly the early and middle part of this
period that the various schools of theology and law had crystallized, and thus, the need for coming
to terms with intra-Muslim difference was realized. As we shall see in the upcoming chapters, this
period was characterized by social upheaval and political transitions, thus making the environment
ripe for the formation of competing orthodoxies. Furthermore, I express the views of only a few
major Muslim theologian-jurists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries who participated in
this controversy, especially those who would be counted as the major representatives of the
Muʿtazilī, Ashʿarī, Sunnī Traditionalist, and Imāmī Shīʿī schools of thought.
54

My second methodological objective is to explain how this debate and its doctrines
functioned in early Muslim scholarly constructions of competing orthodoxies and, further, how
the formations of these orthodoxies were facilitated by scholarly “mythmaking” and the use of
competing collective memories of the earliest Muslim community (the “why”).
55
Taking a
functionalist approach, I focus on explaining what the data does, rather than what it is said to be.
56

54
Intellectual history has sometimes been accused of promoting elitism and neglecting social or cultural history. I
justify my approach of focusing on the works of major representatives of the schools of thought here by repeating Roy
Mottahedeh’s astute observation from over four decades ago: “Ulemalogy is a noble science–at least we have to think
so, because it is almost all the Islamic social history we will ever have for this period.” Roy Mottahedeh, “Reviewed
Work: The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History by R. W. Bulliet,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 95, no. 3 (1975): 495.
55
I elaborate on the concept of “competing orthodoxies” below in section 1.4.1 and on the concept of “mythmaking”
in chapter 5.
56
For a concise summary of functional approaches to the study of religion, see McCutcheon, Studying Religion, 31-
39.

18
In the words of Russell T. McCutcheon, “Because the functionalist approach focuses on the use to
which something is put, it shifts attention to defining something in light of an observable group of
people, their needs, their actions, and their practical interests.”
57
This approach, I suggest,
contributes to a viable framework for scholarly analysis provided that the scholar who employs it
refrains from presenting a reductive definition of religion as a whole and instead focuses on
explaining specific processes in religious thought and/or action. The resourcefulness of the
functionalist approach becomes apparent when the scholar employs evidence directly from the
sources under consideration for her analysis. In this way, the scholar maintains the “integrity” of
the religious data she describes while moving beyond purely descriptive work. In our case, this
requires going beyond an analysis of the chapters on legal reasoning (ijtihād) in manuals of legal
theory and exploring other chapters and other genres of literature, including works of Qurʾānic
interpretation (tafsīr), ḥadīth, theology, heresiography, and polemics.
I anticipate at least one important challenge related to my method. This is my reliance on
the category of “orthodoxy”: is it appropriate to include in the study of Islam a concept that has
historically been associated with Christianity?
1.4.1 Orthodoxy
There has been extensive debate regarding the utility of the term or concept of orthodox(y)
in the academic study of Islam. A useful starting point is M. Brett Wilson’s study, where he
examines the trajectory of the term in Islamic Studies scholarship.
58
According to Wilson, the
persistent use of this term
speaks to the enduring power of Christian and Jewish concepts in Islamic Studies and to a
preference for translating Islam in familiar terms. Despite current skepticism in Religious
Studies about a universal definition of religion, the enduring currency of orthodoxy in

57
McCutcheon, Studying Religion, 42.
58
M. Brett Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature: The Concept of “Orthodoxy” in the Study of Islam,” Comparative
Islamic Studies 3, no. 2 (2007): 169-194.

19
Islamic Studies and the superimposition of Western religious categories in other contexts
suggest that the processes of globalization may render religion and its attendant
vocabulary, orthodox(y) included, more pertinent and “natural” than ever before in diverse
religious, geographical, and linguistic contexts.
59

Wilson proceeds to note that orthodox(y) has been used in a variety of ways to describe a range of
different groups, and, as such, “[b]ased on uneven criteria, theological, legal, political, and
factional definitions of orthodox(y) result in a conceptual morass with no clear referent.”
60
After
surveying several prominent works on Islamic Studies that have critically dealt with the concept
of orthodoxy, including those produced by Marshall Hodgson, Ignaz Goldziher, W. Montgomery
Watt, Wilfred C. Smith, Sherman A. Jackson, Alexander Knysh, Omid Safi, Talal Asad, and
others, Wilson proposes that Islamicists avoid employing the term to limit the amount of confusion
caused by its use: “Eschewing the term may not only clear the path to more lucid communication
(at the very least to let us argue over different terms), it will also mark a positive step in distancing
the academic study of Islam from the language of heresiography.”
61

It appears that Wilson is concerned primarily with three related problems: (1) the use of
non-referential language; (2) theological, legal, political, and factional definitions; and (3) and the
superimposition of foreign (i.e., Western, Christian, Jewish) categories on Islamic thought and
practice. However, a more nuanced reflection on these apparent problems may reveal that they can
be solved relatively easily.
With respect to Wilson’s first concern, that is, the use of non-referential language, it may
be argued that the very nature of language makes it susceptible to producing some level of
confusion. Wilson appears to understand this himself, noting that eschewing the use of

59
Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature,” 170.
60
Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature,” 171-172.
61
Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature,” 187.

20
“orthodoxy” from Islamic Studies will pave the way for “us to argue over different terms.”
62
The
solution to this problem is not to abandon the use of potentially questionable terms, since this may
result in scholarly paralysis, but rather to specify their meanings. Scholars can avoid scholarly
paralysis by presenting what Robert Baird has referred to as “stipulative definitions,” that is, by
self-consciously stipulating that a certain word means a certain thing for the purposes of
establishing useful ways of thinking about the subject.
63
Below, I provide a stipulative definition
of orthodoxy as it relates to my discussions in this dissertation.
Wilson’s second concern is more or less valid. The scholar ought to avoid biased statements
or to take normative positions such as signifying that one religious group is more authentic than
another. That is to say, a scholar should not designate or label a particular group “orthodox” and
another “heterodox.” However, the mere fact that the term “orthodoxy” may imply “unorthodoxy”
or “heterodoxy” does not necessarily indicate that the scholar employing it is making a normative
claim. In other words, one may describe a particular process or debate as directed toward
establishing orthodoxy without necessarily taking sides or suggesting that a particular group
participating in the process or debate is “orthodox” or “heterodox.”
Finally, with respect to Wilson’s third concern, it is true that the term orthodox(y) is not of
“Islamicate provenance” and that “Orthodox Islam” (unlike “Orthodox Judaism” and “Orthodox
Christianity”) has not attained the status of a proper title in either academic or popular
vocabularies.
64
However, the simple fact that a term may not have originated with a particular
religious tradition under observation does not necessarily signal that the concept or mechanism

62
Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature,” 187.
63
Thomas A. Tweed, “Marking Religion’s Boundaries: Constitutive Terms, Orienting Tropes, and Exegetical
Fussiness,” History of Religions 44, no. 3 (2005): 257. For an interesting case study with the use of a stipulative
definition of religion, see John Nemec, “Toward a Volitional Definition of Religion,” Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 88, no. 3 (2020): 664-692.
64
Wilson, “The Failure of Nomenclature,” 171.

21
indicated by the term is foreign or inapplicable to that particular religious tradition.
65
In other
words, we may strip the particularity of “orthodoxy’s” relation to Christianity or Judaism while
simultaneously maintaining that it is, as a procedure or mechanism, still applicable to Islam.
66

Therefore, to maintain conceptual clarity, in the context of this dissertation I mean by
orthodoxy the internally defined boundaries of adherence to a religious doctrine or action that is
considered by its proponents to be correct or authorized through formal or informal means.
Stipulating such a definition of orthodoxy has the benefit of both flexibly applying it to the efforts
of various contending groups without taking sides (i.e., avoid labeling particular groups as
orthodox or heterodox) and not superimposing inapplicable concepts (i.e., orthodoxy through the
existence of formal authority such as Christian churches and councils, etc.). In other words, my
stipulative definition and use of orthodoxy is descriptive, not normative. It simply describes a
social process of erecting and maintaining boundaries.
Before moving on, I anticipate additional problems with my inclusion of the term
orthodoxy in this study. First, it may be argued that the groups I draw upon in this dissertation did
not use the terms orthodoxy, heterodoxy, or heresy to identify themselves or others, so why do I
employ these terms? I would suggest two answers to this challenge. The first is that a term need
not necessarily be present for one to recognize the process or tactic that it indicates. As Karen King
has remarked in her excellent study on Gnosticism, polemicists often engaged in various strategies
to brand their opponents as heretics without actually naming them heretics, including by simply
claiming that their beliefs and practices were deficient and/or by distinguishing the righteous from

65
Indeed, one ought to ask whether the labels “Orthodox Judaism” and “Orthodox Christianity” have not also been
constructed to serve certain ends. In the words of Karen King, for these and other over-determined categories, “the
interesting issue is not that they are artificial constructs but rather how they are constructed and to what ends.” See
Karen King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.
66
It would also be interesting to seriously consider the historical constructions of “orthodoxy” in Jewish and Christian
thought and whether modern scholarship has taken for granted that these are also historical and conceptual
constructions (and thus, to argue that they are not “inherent” to their respective traditions).

22
the unrighteous, the enlightened from the blind, the pure from the defiled, and so on.
67
As we shall
see, these and other similar tactics were and continue to be employed by Muslim polemicists,
theologians, and jurists. In the words of Devin Stewart, “Any religion must regulate the exclusion
of deviant elements from the community in some way, and there is ample evidence that this
function has been exercised continually throughout Islamic history.”
68
The second answer to this
challenge is that the participants in the controversy over juristic fallibility and infallibility often
explicitly referred to themselves with such titles as “the proponents of truth” (ahl al-ḥaqq) or “the
saved group” (al-firqa al-nājiya) and to their opponents with such labels as “the proponents of
falsehood” (ahl al-ḍalāl) or “the proponents of unsanctioned innovations” (ahl al-bidaʿ). These
and similar categorizations are explicit designations of orthodoxy and heterodoxy/heresy.
A second challenge relates to the scope of orthodoxy. It may be argued that orthodoxy is
concerned exclusively with the prescription of a single truth. In the words of Shahab Ahmed,
““Orthodoxy” connotes, most intrinsically, the prescription and restriction of truth.”
69
For Ahmed,
this is the only meaningful expression of orthodoxy: “While one can have pluralist orthodoxies–
such as Islamic law, which accepts a delimited range of differing, or even contradictory, positions
on the same legal question to be equally valid and true–the meaningfulness of the term “orthodoxy”
is diminished as attitudes towards the truth become less restrictive and prescriptive. Simply, the
more pluralistic the attitude to truth, the less the term “orthodoxy” can help us in understanding
that attitude to truth.”
70
In fact, this restrictive understanding of the scope of orthodoxy seems to
undergird Ahmed’s critique of Talal Asad. Ahmed writes, “it is clear that, for him [Asad],

67
King, What is Gnosticism?, 30.
68
Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System (Salt Lake City:
The University of Utah Press, 1998), 45.
69
Ahmed, What is Islam?, 273. See also idem, Before Orthodoxy: The Satanic Verses in Early Islam (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2017), 3-4.
70
Ahmed, What is Islam?, 273-274.

23
orthodoxy is any truth-claim that Muslims in a given time and place institute, regulate and require
through a process of exercise of power as being authoritatively correct–and thus as not welcoming
or accommodative of contradictory claims, which are duly condemned, excluded, undermined and
replaced.”
71
Thus, for Ahmed, orthodoxy can only do one thing and that is to restrict truth, if it is
to be “meaningful.” However, this understanding of orthodoxy may reflect more Ahmed’s own
assumptions about the term than anything about the term itself. Who is to say that orthodoxy must
mean the restriction of (a single) truth and the rejection of accommodation?
It is one of my main contentions in this dissertation that the debate on juristic fallibility and
infallibility reveals that, first, one may have competing orthodoxies, and second, that one may
produce an accommodationist orthodoxy that is entirely meaningful. In fact, an accommodationist
orthodoxy is exactly what the doctrine of juristic infallibility entails: “all experts are correct”! It is
an orthodoxy in that it operates under particular boundaries (i.e., an “expert,” not just anyone); it
is accommodationist in that it is inclusive of various and even conflicting results. I would even
argue further that the opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility is also, in some ways,
accommodationist. Despite the doctrine’s emphasis on the pursuit of a single truth, if all experts
cannot simultaneously be correct, this opens the door for the constant negotiation and re-
negotiation of the truth! It is perhaps here, that is, in relation to the concept of “truth,” that the
confusion is revealed. Does Ahmed’s (and more broadly, our modern understanding of “truth”)
correspond with premodern notions of “truth”?
The final challenge to my inclusion of the term orthodoxy is related to the above problem
of scope, with the difference that in this case it considers orthodoxy to be linked exclusively to
formal authority. Without formal authority, the argument goes, there can be no meaningful

71
Ahmed, What is Islam?, 273.

24
expression of orthodoxy. However, this argument does not hold for two reasons: First, one may
have orthodoxy without formal authority. As Professor Sherman Jackson has argued in his
introduction to al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) Fayṣal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa, “all
that is needed to establish and sustain any orthodoxy is authority, full stop, which may be formal
or informal. That is to say, through the use of informal authority–which is based on reputation as
opposed to formal investiture–religious communities can establish and sustain orthodoxy even in
the absence of a formal ecclesiastical hierarchy.”
72
Second, the insistence on the idea that Islam
lacks formal authority is itself not reflective of the history of Islam. Not only does it fail to take
into consideration various notions of formal authority in Shīʿism (e.g., the Imāmate, the concept
of juristic authority post-ghayba, etc.), but it also fails to consider the influence of various political
establishments in Islamic history upon the constructions of orthodoxy. After all, these were formal
political institutions, and, despite the largely informal nature and structure of the scholarly classes,
the formal institutions nevertheless had their impact through patronage and other means.
1.5 Chapter Outlines
Following this introduction, this dissertation consists of five additional chapters. The
following is a brief overview and summary of each chapter.
In Chapter 2, “Historical Background,” I present an overview of the earlier historical
background for the eventual emergence and elaboration of the doctrines of juristic fallibility and
infallibility as they appear in fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh century legal theory discourses. Some of
the themes that I elaborate on in this chapter are controversy and conflict, the rise of various
theological and legal groups (along with labels), and the rise of formal disciplines of Islamic
thought (especially legal theory). This chapter also includes an elucidation of the “origins” of the

72
Sherman A. Jackson, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Fayṣal al-
Tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30.

25
debate in second-third/ninth-tenth century Muslim discourses in Iraq, focusing on developments
and figures in Baṣra and Baghdād.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn my attention to a close reading of several legal theory works
produced by major Muslim thinkers of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries to provide a
detailed description of the doctrines and the debates surrounding them.
In Chapter 3, “Juristic Infallibility (al-taṣwīb) and the Infallibilists (al-muṣawwiba)” I
provide a description of some of the major juristic infallibility doctrines and an exploration of
some of the most salient intellectual and practical concerns of the infallibilists. This is followed by
a detailed elucidation of juristic infallibility in the writings of the Baṣran Muʿtazilī theologian-
jurist al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and the Ashʿarī theologian-jurist al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-
Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013).
In Chapter 4, “Juristic Fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa) and the Fallibilists (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa),” I discuss
juristic fallibility. Here, I begin with an exploration of some of the major concerns of the fallibilists,
both Sunnī and Shīʿī. I examine the works of the Sunnī Traditionalist al-Qāḍī Abu Yaʿlā b. al-
Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066) and the Imāmī Shīʿī theorists al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) and al-
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067).
In Chapter 5, “Collective Memory, Mythmaking, and the Construction of Competing
Orthodoxies,” I provide an analysis of the why of this debate. Going beyond the discussions on
juristic in/fallibility in legal theory works, I focus on the sociopolitical concerns of the debate’s
participants, highlighting their constructions of competing orthodoxies though mythmaking and
the collective memories of the earliest Muslim community, especially focusing on the construction
of post-prophetic authority. In this chapter, I argue that the debate over juristic in/fallibility was
heavily fueled by practical concerns for either justifying (through juristic infallibility) or resisting

26
(through juristic fallibility) the existence of a plurality of views on the ground. Theorists on both
sides of the debate promoted competing memories of the earliest Muslims and their relations and
interactions with one another. The competing memories were sustained by several doctrinal
commitments, including questions of individual verses communal inerrancy.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I include a summary of my research results and its limitations and
suggest some areas for further exploration.

27
Chapter 2: Historical Background
It will become evident in this dissertation that the debate over juristic in/fallibility was a
way for early Muslim thinkers to explore, limit, and/or justify their various differences in belief
and practice. Chapters 3 and 4 provide, respectively, detailed descriptions of the juristic
infallibility and fallibility doctrines espoused by major Muslim theologian-jurists representing the
various schools of thought operating in the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries. In this chapter, I
present an overview of the historical background of the first to third/seventh to ninth centuries,
that is, the developments preceding the eventual emergence and elaboration of the doctrines of
juristic fallibility and infallibility as they appear in fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh century legal theory
discourses. As we will see later in this chapter, the debate was relevant to every major facet of
Muslim doctrinal disagreement. To better understand how this was the case, in this chapter, I
elaborate on the themes of early controversy and conflict, the rise of various and competing
theological and legal groups (along with labels to identify and distinguish themselves from their
opponents), and the rise of formal disciplines of Islamic thought (especially legal theory, uṣūl al-
fiqh). I also include a discussion of the “origins” of the debate especially in second and third/eighth
and ninth century Baṣra and Baghdād and the individuals involved in the emergence of the
“extreme” iterations of the early controversy.
73
Specific developments related to the individual
legal theorists and groups whose works will be the focus of the detailed description of the debate
and its doctrines will be discussed in the relevant sections of the subsequent chapters.

73
By “origins,” I mean the earliest instances of the debate as they appear in Muslim sources. For studies on how this
same problem was addressed in the Jewish tradition, see, for example, Richard Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven:
Legal Pluralism in the Talmud (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2010); Christine Hayes, What’s Divine about
Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), esp. 169-245. For an interesting recent
study of the involvement of non-Muslims in the life of the early Islamic empire, see, for example, Lev E. Weitz,
Between Christ and Caliph: Law, Marriage, and Christian Community in Early Islam (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

28
2.1 Early Muslim Controversies
The earliest period of Islam was fraught with controversy and conflict. The early conflicts
were due to both internal and external factors. Internal factors related to intra-Muslim communal
and doctrinal formation: does the nascent Muslim community choose its leaders, and if so, how
and on what basis? How should Muslims understand the Prophet’s legacy? How do Muslims come
up with new rules for cases with no answer in scripture? External factors related to the expansion
of Muslims into neighboring regions and the interactions of peoples of various sensibilities and
backgrounds: how do Muslims defend their beliefs against external critique? What is the role of
“reason” in Islamic theological thought? How should rituals and other practices be conducted in
new regions? The internal and external factors, of course, frequently overlapped. The earliest
controversies were also numerous. Some of the most pressing conflicts, which would end up
producing differing doctrinal positions and schools of thought over the course of the first-
third/seventh-ninth centuries, related to the succession to the Prophet and leadership of the nascent
Muslim community, the definition and scope of belief (īmān) and the status of the sinning/erring
Muslim, the question of human free will and divine determinism (qadar), the nature of the divine
attributes and their relation to the divine essence, and the problem of legal theory and practice.
74

Before examining in more depth some of the early conflicts, it is suitable to briefly pause here and
ask: how ought scholarship interpret these conflicts?

74
For more in-depth studies of the various early conflicts and their historical contexts and developments, see, for
example, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. One
The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to
Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); W. Montgomery Watt,
The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998); Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies,
3
rd
edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Alexander Knysh, Islam in Historical Perspective, 2
nd

edition (New York: Routledge, 2017); Josef van Ess, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Century of the
Hijra: A History of Religious Thought in Early Islam, translated by John O’Kane (vol. 1) and Gwendolin Goldbloom
(vols. 2-4) (Leiden: Brill, 2017-2019).

29
Some scholarly attempts to classify the early Muslim conflicts into neat and clearly distinct
conceptual categories (i.e., “political,” “religious,” “theological,” etc.) have their share of
problems, the least of which is conceptual confusion.
75
To lessen the confusion, it is important to
note, first, that our modern conceptual categories and the structural differentiation frameworks
they represent do not necessarily reflect the realities of early Islamic history or society.
76
For
example, like the category of “religion,” “politics,” too, has a conceptual history.
77
These (largely
modern) categories often carry with them conceptual baggage (for example, that “religious” and
“political”/“secular” are mutually exclusive categories or entirely differentiated social domains
78
)
that do not necessarily and always accurately map onto early Islam. Despite the apparent “secular”
or socio-political variety of the early conflicts, they were often couched in “religious” terminology,
that is, with reference to God, revelation, the Prophet, scripture, the hereafter, and so on.
79
For
example, in the very first “political” conflict over who would lead the Muslims after Muḥammad,
the sources note that Abū Bakr (r. 11-13/632-634), who would end up being selected as the first
caliph, argued against the Medinese Anṣār that the Prophet had explicitly restricted leadership of

75
For example, speaking of the scope of activities of Muslim thinkers and groups in his survey of early Islamic
thought, W. Montgomery Watt states, “This involvement was both religious and political, but may for convenience
be called simply ‘political’ provided it is remembered that politics is not a compartmentalized segment of the life of
the community...Until about the tenth century all the Islamic sects are religio-political. Even when arguments appear
to be hair-splitting theological subtleties, such as whether the Qurʾān is the created or uncreated Speech of God, there
are political implications” (italics mine). W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended
Survey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), 30.
76
For more on this point, see, for example, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), esp. 27-54; idem, Formations of the
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). Greg Anderson has recently
explored the problems associated with modern attempts at studying the premodern period by taking ancient Greece as
a case study. See Greg Anderson, The Realness of Things Past: Ancient Greece and Ontological History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2018). For an interesting recent study on the religious-secular divide in Islam, see Rushain
Abbasi, “Did Premodern Muslims Distinguish the Religious and the Secular? The Dīn-Dunyā Binary in Medieval
Islamic Thought,” Journal of Islamic Studies 31, no. 2 (2020): 185-225.
77
See Giovanni Sartori, “What is ‘Politics’?,” Political Theory 1, no. 1 (1973): 5-26.
78
As evidenced by the large number of works that continue to be produced with “religion and politics” in their titles.
According to Giovanni Sartori, “With Machiavelli (1469-1527), politics established itself as being different from
morality and religion.” Sartori, “What is ‘Politics’?,” 11.
79
Knysh, Historical Perspective, 53.

30
the Muslims to the Quraysh tribe (al-aʾimma min Quraysh). In this example, Abū Bakr appealed
to the Prophetic tradition to make his case. The second point to note is that the major early
controversies were often interrelated. For example, the question of the leadership of the Muslims
and the “status” of the erring/sinning Muslim were largely implicated in the cases of the events
surrounding the assassination of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (r. 24-36/644-656) and its aftermath, and the
conflict between ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (r. 36-41/656-661) and Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān (r. 41-60/661-
680) and those who opposed them both (i.e., the Khārijīs).
80
Similarly, the conflicts over the nature
of the divine attributes related to the questions of human free will and divine determinism, and
attempts to understand the presence of “evil” in the world.
81
Nonetheless, despite the problems
associated with neat conceptual classifications, it is important to situate the early conflicts, and the
ways in which they would later be understood, in their historical and socio-political contexts.
Doing so allows us to comprehend the stakes more clearly, especially as they relate to the juristic
in/fallibility debate. With these points in mind, we may proceed to examine more closely some of
the early controversies and their various contexts.
The early seventh century rise of Islam in Arabia and its rapid spread into and control over
neighboring regions within a few short decades brought about major civilizational changes.
82

These changes began during the Prophet’s lifetime with respect to his and his followers’ relations
with the powerful Quraysh tribe and the other communities in and around the Arabian Peninsula.
This intensified in the decades after Muḥammad’s death during the early caliphate with the
struggle over the Prophet’s succession, the “apostasy” (ridda) wars, several civil wars (fitan, sing.

80
On this relationship, see, for example, Watt, The Formative Period, 9-37.
81
On the relationship between these issues and the doctrines they produced, see, for example, Jackson, Black Suffering.
82
For more on some of these changes, see Lapidus, A History, 26-64.

31
fitna), and numerous rebellions.
83
These conflicts continued during the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid
periods. The early Arab Muslim conquests and expansion of the Islamic empire also paved the
way for the migration and movement of peoples across a vast geographic space. The early Muslims
created new cities and settled in a variety of milieus, mingling with an array of groups and peoples.
This led to the exchange of cultural, intellectual, and religious ideas and sensibilities. Not only
were the early Muslims diverse in their backgrounds and sensibilities, but the postconquest
settlements added to this early diversity. Diversity was both an opportunity and a challenge: people
of various backgrounds were attracted to the new Islamic civilization, but it also caused severe
fragmentation and conflict.
During the early formative period of Islam, some of the controversies were resolved
through armed conflict. This was the case, for example, with the ridda (“apostasy”) wars, the civil
wars, and various rebellions. Other conflicts were resolved through debate and discussed in
scholarly circles by various early Muslims in conversation with other Muslims and adherents of
other religious traditions. This was especially true in the major cities of the early Islamic empire
in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and the east. The earliest scholarly circles were often
“interdisciplinary,” that is, various topics and issues were discussed, and scholarship was not yet
specialized into clear-cut disciplines.
The development of scholarly circles and teaching occurred alongside the rise of specific
theological, legal, and sectarian groups and schools of thought. The competition and eventual
emergence of various groups was closely correlated to the use of labels to define one’s own group
as well as others: “the people of truth” (ahl al-ḥaqq), “the people of the direction of prayer” (ahl

83
Scott Lucas has provided an excellent summary of the several major and mostly violent intra-Muslim conflicts that
occurred between 11-40/632-661. See Scott C. Lucas, Constructive Critics, Ḥadīth Literature, and the Articulation of
Sunnī Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 226-237.

32
al-qibla), or “the believer” (muʾmin) vs. “astray” (ḍāll), “miscreant” (fāsiq), “unbeliever” (kāfir),
etc. In some ways, the use of these labels was an extension of the earliest controversies over the
meaning of belief and the status of the sinning/erring Muslim.
The case of Iraq as a significant place of armed conflict and scholarly disputation is
especially relevant here. Focusing on Iraq does not mean that developments in other geographic
locations were not important. Indeed, scholarship has explored significant developments in various
geographic locations. However, because Iraq quickly became the site of some of the earliest
conflicts and home to the capital of the Islamic empire for quite a while, the developments there
were certainly consequential for the trajectory of the developing Islamic religion. Iraq had been
under the control of the Sāsānian empire (224-651) before its complete conquest by the Muslim
armies in 638 after having seized the empire’s capital Ctesiphon during the caliphal reign of ʿUmar
b. al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 13-23/634-644).
84
The conquest of Iraq meant a great deal for the Arab Muslim
conquerors and the emerging empire. It gave them access to enormous fortune due to its regional
significance, its developed agricultural system, and its trade routes connecting the Mediterranean
and Far East. However, this new-found fortune came with a price and was accompanied by great
conflict and controversy.
Importantly, for the purposes of this dissertation, the developments that would take place
and be debated in Baṣra and then in Baghdād are especially relevant to the discussion on the debate
over juristic in/fallibility, as will be seen in the following section of this chapter. Thus, a short
survey of some of the developments in Baṣra followed by those in Baghdād is in order.

84
For a good overview of especially the political and social history of Iraq, see Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, A Brief
History of Iraq (New York: Checkmark Books, 2009). See also Michael G. Morony, Iraq After the Muslim Conquest
(Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2005).

33
Baṣra was founded as a garrison town in the second Islamic decade (between 635-638 CE)
before developing into a major intellectual center and trade port. Soon after its founding, over the
course of the first/seventh and second/eighth centuries, Baṣra would become a place of intense
armed conflict and religious controversy.
85

Early on, Baṣra was the site of the infamous and bloody Battle of the Camel in 36/656 led
by, on the one hand, the Prophet’s widow ʿĀʾisha bt. Abī Bakr (d. 58/678), accompanied by the
Companions Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh (d. 36/656) and al-Zubayr b. ʿAwwām (d. 36/656) (both of
whom were killed in the battle), and, on the other hand, the Prophet’s cousin, son-in-law, and
caliph ʿAlī. Many of those who participated in the battle were from Baṣra.
86
Participation in and
reactions to this conflict in Baṣra varied. Some would support ʿĀʾisha and her companions (and
come to be known as the ʿUthmānīs, those loyal to ʿUthmān
87
); others expressed loyalty to ʿAlī,
and others still attempted to maintain neutrality.
88
We are told that major figures such al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣrī (d. 110/728), after moving to the city from Medina at the age of 15 in about 37/657, attempted
to maintain neutrality with respect to this conflict.
89
This conflict would lead to the emergence of
two related attitudes, wuqūf and irjāʾ.
90
Irjāʾ, or “postponement,” referred most basically to the
postponement of judgment (i.e., approval or disapproval) with respect to those who were involved
in the early conflicts between the Muslims. Wuqūf, or “suspension,” was the preferred expression
of those with a similar attitude in Baṣra.
91
These two attitudes, while apparently “political,” would
soon have serious theological and religious implications, spurring intense debate.

85
For a detailed discussion of the various controversies and conflicts of early Baṣra, see Charles Pellat, “Le milieu
baṣrien et la formation de Ǧāḥiẓ,” PhD diss. (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1953); idem, “al-Baṣra,” EI2.
86
For more on this battle and those who participated in it, see Laura Veccia Vaglieri, “al-Djamal,” EI2.
87
For more, see Patricia Crone, “ʿUthmāniyya,” EI2.
88
Pellat, “Le milieu baṣrien,” 185-186.
89
Watt, The Formative Period, 77.
90
Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 21-24.
91
Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 23.

34
Despite its occurrence far from Baṣra in Ṣiffīn, close to al-Raqqa in present-day Syria,
many from Baṣra would participate in the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 37/657 between Muʿāwiya and ʿAlī.
92

Some Baṣrans would maintain loyalty to ʿAlī, while a considerable number of Baṣrans supported
Muʿāwiya and others would end up as Khārijīs, opposing both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya, and whom ʿAlī
would fight in the Battle of Nahrawān in 38/658. In addition to these conflicts, Baṣra would also
be home to some later uprisings, such as that of Ibn al-Ashʿath in 81/701.
Following the earlier armed conflicts and uprisings associated with the city, the latter part
of the first/seventh and first half of the second/eighth centuries saw the rise of various theological
schools of thought and the increased production of theological and other polemical tracts across
the Islamic empire.
93
Several competing theological movements emerged in Baṣra in this early
period. In the words of W. Montgomery Watt, “It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance
of the theological discussions in Baṣra in the period from 690 to 730 [70-110 AH]. It was here that
the foundations of all later theology were laid.”
94
Questions about free will and determinism, the
divine attributes, and the “status” of the sinner were hotly debated. Figures such as al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣrī and Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ (d. 131/748-9) would be recognized as leading contributors to early
theological debates in Baṣra. The city was also the first home to Muʿtazilism, one of the earliest
rationalist theological movements in Islam, with the intellectual efforts of Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ, ʿAmr b.
ʿUbayd (d. ca. 144/761), Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 226/840), Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 220-
230/835-845), and many other Baṣrans.

92
For more on this battle, see Michael Lecker, “Ṣiffīn,” EI2.
93
For more on the works produced by various early theologians, see al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid
(London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1430/2009), 1:555-693.
94
Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 12.

35
Baṣra would also be the home to various early approaches to and developments in legal
thought and practice.
95
Beyond theology and law, Baṣra experienced many other religious and
intellectual developments.
96
The various developments of the first/seventh and second/eighth
centuries undoubtedly affected religious life in Baṣra and led to the formation of schisms and
factions. As we shall see in the next section, the dizzying diversity of thought and practice in Baṣra
would not go unnoticed, and some, such as ʿUbayd Allāh al-ʿAnbarī (d. 168/785), would attempt
to justify this diversity on theoretical grounds.
97

Baṣra’s religious, cultural, and intellectual diversity in the late first/seventh and early
second/eighth centuries would soon be overshadowed by its new and rapidly growing northern
neighbor Baghdād, “the Round City” or “the City of Peace” (madīnat al-salām).
98
Immediately
after its founding as the new ʿAbbāsid capital in the middle of the second/eighth century by the
second ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 136-158/754-775), Baghdād would attract a large number of
diverse scholars from various parts of the Muslim empire, including Kūfa and Baṣra (some of
whom were invited directly by the caliphs themselves).
99
Baghdād soon grew in its international
population, drawing people of diverse backgrounds, languages, cultures, and creeds. It is estimated

95
For an interesting study on the early role of Baṣra in Islamic law, see Christopher Melchert, “Basra and Kufa as the
Earliest Centers of Islamic Legal Controversy,” in Islamic Cultures, Islamic Contexts: Essays in Honor of Patricia
Crone, ed. Behnam Sadeghi et. al. (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 173-194. For more on the jurists of Baṣra and their activities,
see Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:141-189.
96
For examples of some interesting studies focused on Baṣra, see Mustafa Shah, “Exploring the Genesis of Early
Arabic Linguistic Thought: Qur’anic Readers and Grammarians of the Basran Tradition (Part II),” Journal of Qur’anic
Studies 5, no. 2 (2003): 1-47; Christopher Melchert, “Baṣran Origins of Classical Sufism,” Der Islam 82, no. 2 (2005):
221-240; Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:1-486; Adam Gaiser, “Ballaghanā ʿan an-Nabī: Early Basran and
Omani Ibāḍī Understandings of Sunna and Siyar, Āthār and Nasab,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 83, no. 3 (2020): 437-448.
97
On al-ʿAnbarī, see sections 2.2 and 2.2.1 below.
98
Much of the following information about the early historical developments in Baghdād has been extracted from
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, vol. 3; Abd al-Aziz Duri, “Baghdād,” EI2; Fattah and Caso, A Brief History of
Iraq. For some primary sources on early (pre-Mongol invasion) Baghdād, see al-Yaʿqūbī, al-Buldān, ed. Muḥammad
Amīn Dhannāwī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1422/2002), 11-52; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, ed.
Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1425/2004); Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-buldān
(Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1995), 1:456-467.
99
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 3:31.

36
that by the fourth/tenth century, the population of Baghdād had reached approximately a million
and half.
100
Despite the periods of strife over the course of its early history, including the fraternal
conflict between al-Amīn (r. 193-198/809-813) and al-Maʾmūn (r. 198-218/813-833), the
lawlessness and destruction of the vagabonds (ʿayyārūn), and the sectarian (e.g., Sunnī-Shīʿī,
Ḥanbalī-Shāfiʿī) violence, Baghdād would remain a leading hub of intellectual, commercial, and
cultural activity in the Muslim world for several centuries.
As far as its intellectual activities and the spread of religious education (which included the
“sciences,” such as alchemy, astronomy, medicine, etc.) were concerned, Baghdād was the center
of several important developments. These were, first, the translation of Greek, Syriac, Persian, and
Sanskrit texts to Arabic.
101
This is said to have occurred inside and outside the famous ʿAbbāsid
palace library Bayt al-Ḥikma (“the House of Wisdom”), which was one of dozens of libraries in
Baghdād.
102
Second, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, public officials, and other elites built and endowed
several mosques and colleges (madrasas), where religious learning took place primarily.
103

Finally, there was a general scholarly culture of promoting the publication of works and discussion
circles in other public and private places. In short, there was no shortage of opportunities for
learning, scholarship, and debate in Baghdād. This intellectual environment spurred the systematic
expression of various Islamic disciplines and the crystallization of schools of thought. We will
soon return to some of these developments, especially the rise of formal legal theory.

100
Abd al-Aziz Duri, “Baghdād,” EI2.
101
For more on the translations of texts and the role of other religious communities in these translations, see Sidney
H. Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the Land of Islam (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008), especially chapter 5.
102
Fattah and Caso, A Brief History of Iraq, 89. For more on this institution, see Dimitri Gutas and Kevin van Bladel,
“Bayt al-Ḥikma,” EI3, where the authors also present a counterargument to the claim about Bayt al-Ḥikma’s role in
the translation of texts.
103
The most comprehensive work to date on the religious colleges and curriculums of the fourth/tenth and
fifth/eleventh century Baghdād is George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Higher Learning in Islam and
the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).

37
As the above has shown, the early years of intellectual development in Islam produced
dizzying diversity in both substance and method. This was especially the case in the metropolises
such as Baghdād. Josef van Ess has suggested that the large-scale movement of scholars to
Baghdād, or what he calls “the brain drain,” led to two major results. First, the older cities became
“impoverished and provincialized,” so that by the beginning of the third/ninth century Baṣra’s and
Kūfa’s days were over. Second,
with the scholars leaving their individual environments behind, local differences were
levelled... The melting pot of the capital created orthodoxy. Of course there was now not
one opinion only; on the contrary, if anything, the competition was increasing. But this was
not the old opposition between ‘sects’ by means of which people distinguished themselves,
but a difference of methods: muḥaddithūn and mutakallimūn were beginning to jostle for
the caliphs’ favour. As the plurality which evolved in Baghdad encouraged an internal
search for shared norms, for orthodoxy, so it confronted the Muslims externally with the
question of what would be the best way to present Islam. For some decades, kalām was
more successful than hadith; it appeared more useful and outward looking in that it was
more rational. This explains the success of the Muʿtazila.
104

As we shall see later in this chapter, the influence of rational theology (kalām) would extend into
other emerging disciplines, such as legal theory.
Here, and for the purposes of this dissertation, we must keep in mind two important
intellectual developments in the second-third/eighth-ninth centuries that would bear directly on the
emerging debate over the doctrines of infallibility and fallibility. The first was the conflict between
proponents of two methods of scriptural interpretation, often referred to as “rationalism” and
“traditionalism.” The seeds of the debate over juristic fallibility and infallibility first emerge
around the second/eighth century in the midst of a conflict between proponents of two general
interpretive approaches, often referred to by the sources as ahl (or aṣḥāb) al-ḥadīth and ahl (or
aṣḥāb) al-raʾy (sometimes ahl (or aṣḥāb) al-kalām).
105
Some contemporary scholars of Islam have

104
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 3:32.
105
It seems that the label ahl (or aṣḥāb) al-raʾy is more appropriate for discussions pertaining to law, whereas ahl (or
aṣḥāb) al-kalām is more appropriate to theology. Nevertheless, it must be noted that these labels do not necessarily

38
labeled these two approaches as “traditionalism” and the “rationalism,” respectively.
106
Following
Umar Abd-Allah, I refer to those who adopted the former approach as “the proponents of tradition”
and to those who adopted the latter approach as “the proponents of considered opinion.”
107
While
the methodological distinctions between these two propensities have sometimes been exaggerated
by some scholars,
108
the overall tendencies represented by this division did in fact exist.
109

Essentially, the division between considered opinion and tradition represented competing attitudes
toward the interpretation of the Qurʾān, the assessment of individual Prophetic and post-Prophetic
reports, the ways by which conflicting reports were assessed, and so on. In other words, it
represented diverse approaches to reading and interpreting scripture. As we shall see below, the
early “extreme” infallibility and fallibility positions emerged out of the “rationalistic” discourses
of second/eighth century Baṣra, followed by their reception in later legal theory discourses,
especially in Baghdād.

point to clearly delineated groups, and individual scholars who supposedly belonged to these groups varied in their
reliance on and use of traditions, speculation, and considered opinion. As Umar Abd-Allah has noted, “It must be
emphasized that the dichotomy between the proponents of considered opinion and the proponents of tradition remains
a pivotal polarity distinguishing jurists from each other in the early period of Islamic law. But it was essentially an
interpretive propensity and frame of mind, which manifested itself at the level of individual jurists...we must exercise
caution not to speak of groups of people as we speak of the individuals who make up those groups.” See Umar F.
Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina: Islamic Legal Reasoning in the Formative Period (Leiden: Brill,
2013), 10-11. Furthermore, as I will show through this study, religious and intellectual developments during this early
period cut across the supposedly strict disciplinary boundaries of law and theology, which were still in the process of
crystallization.
106
For example, Wael Hallaq has noted that “the intellectual and legal history of Islam between 150 and 350 H (c.
770 and 960 AD) represents a dynamic competition among several forces that crystallized in the opposing movements
of traditionalism and rationalism.” See Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 57.
107
See Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina. I prefer the term “considered opinion” as I think it more accurately
captures the concept of raʾy, especially as not being synonymous with arbitrary opinion.
108
For example, according to Christopher Melchert, in the second/eighth century, the principal division between the
jurisprudents was between aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth and aṣḥāb al-raʾy, that is, “between proponents of entirely Scriptural
authority in theology and law and more or less rationalistic jurisprudents.” Later, he states, “From the later eighth
century to the beginning of the tenth, there raged fierce controversy between those who would found their
jurisprudence exclusively on hadith, aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth or traditionalists, and those who reserved a leading place for
common sense, aṣḥāb al-raʾy” (emphasis in italics mine). See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni
Schools of Law, 9
th
-10
th
Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1.
109
For more on the raʾy-ḥadīth division, see Melchert, The Formation; Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina; Joseph
Schacht, “Ahl al-Ḥadīth,” EI2; Peter C. Henningan, “Ahl al-raʾy,” EI3.

39
The second important development was the distinction made by scholars between the two
conceptual categories of “primary” (uṣūl) and “secondary” (furūʿ) principles. Ahmet Temel has
extensively explored aspects of the development of the concept of uṣūl in his dissertation, which
focuses especially on the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries.
110
Depending on the context, the
term uṣūl meant different things and was used in various ways by scholars. However, as we shall
see below, the distinction itself between uṣūl and furūʿ would be an essential feature in the debate
over juristic in/fallibility. We now turn to the exploring the emergence of the debate and its earliest
expressions in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries.
2.2 Earliest Expressions of the Debate
I will not attempt here to present a clean timeline for the emergence of the doctrines of
juristic fallibility and infallibility nor to say which came first and which was a reaction to the other.
Instead of engaging in a reductive game of “chicken or egg,” it may be reasonable to argue that
the seeds of both doctrines emerged side-by-side. However, a scholarly exploration must begin
somewhere, so I will turn to a discussion of what appears to be the earliest expression of what
would later become a full-fledged doctrine of juristic infallibility, albeit in modified form.
A study of some of the earliest sources reveals that the origins of what would become the
juristic infallibility maxim, that is, that “every expert is correct” (kullu mujtahid muṣīb), appear in
second/eighth century Baṣra with the city’s judge (qāḍī) and public preacher (khaṭīb) ʿUbayd Allāh
b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥuṣayn b. Abī al-Ḥurr al-ʿAnbarī (d. 168/785).
111
Josef van Ess has claimed that

110
Ahmet Temel, “The Missing Link in the History of Islamic Legal Theory: The Development of Uṣūl al-Fiqh
between al-Shāfiʿī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ during the 3
rd
/9
th
and Early 4
th
/10
th
Centuries” (Ph.D. diss., University of California
Santa Barbara, 2014).
111
The sources exhibit variations in his name as well as his grandfather’s name. While correctly noting that some
sources have mistakenly written his first name as ʿAbd Allāh instead of ʿUbayd Allāh, Josef van Ess has incorrectly
written ʿUbayd Allāh’s grandfather’s name as al-Ḥusayn instead of al-Ḥuṣayn, apparently following its first
appearance in Wakīʿ’s Akhbār al-quḍāt. See Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:179. Wakīʿ, however, repeatedly
writes al-Ḥuṣayn later when discussing al-ʿAnbarī’s father and grandfather. See Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, ed. ʿAbd al-

40
al-ʿAnbarī formulated the infallibility maxim itself and that he employed it to justify the validity
of contradictory religious views related to a range of beliefs and practices.
112

It appears that the earliest source to attribute a nascent version of the maxim to al-ʿAnbarī
is Taʾwīl Mukhtalaf al-Ḥadīth, one of the most important works of the proponent of tradition of
the third/ninth century, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muslim al-Dīnawarī, famously known as Ibn Qutayba (d.
276/889).
113

Before turning to an examination of Ibn Qutayba’s work, it is important to note here Ibn
Qutayba’s polemical role in the defense of proto-Sunnī traditionism, especially after the
“inquisition” (miḥna) of the early third/ninth century involving the doctrine of the “created
Qurʾān” (khalq al-Qurʾān). As we shall see clearly, Ibn Qutayba was not shy about making his
opposition to al-ʿAnbarī and others known. This fact, of course, does not automatically invalidate
Ibn Qutayba’s work as an important source, but it is important to note here the difficulty associated
with establishing al-ʿAnbarī’s views based on the reports of his intellectual adversary, a problem
related to understanding the views of many individuals and groups.

ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 1366/1947), 2:88-123. More sources on al-
ʿAnbarī’s life and career appear below.
112
Van Ess, The Flowering, 20, 174; idem, Theology and Society, 2:185. It should be noted that Ibn Qutayba, who is
the first to relate al-ʿAnbarī’s alleged statements, nowhere relates the specific phrase kull mujtahid muṣīb (“every
mujtahid is correct”). However, he does relate similar statements, such as man qāla bi-hādhā fa-huwa muṣīb
(“whoever says this is correct”), kullun muṣīb (“all are correct”), man qāla...fa-qad aṣāb (“whoever says...is correct”),
bi-ayyi dhālika akhadha al-faqīh fa-huwa muṣīb (“whichever of these [positions] that the legist adopts, he is correct”),
and kāna muṣīb (“he is correct”). See Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl mukhtalaf al-ḥadīth, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Aṣfar
(Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1419/1999), 95-96. As we shall see below, later Muslim scholars expressly attributed
the maxim to al-ʿAnbarī.
113
For more on Ibn Qutayba’s life and works, see Gérard Lecomte, “Ibn Ḳutayba,” EI2. The author of this entry as
well as others have rendered the title of Ibn Qutayba’s work as Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥadīth (mukhtalif with a kasra).
While this rendering is not necessarily incorrect, I think the more appropriate rendering is Taʾwīl mukhtalaf al-ḥadīth
(mukhtalaf with a fatḥa); mukhtalaf al-ḥadīth in the title would mean “reports that are the object of
disagreement/conflict” (i.e., verb form viii passive participle, muftaʿal), rather than “reports causing
disagreement/conflict” (i.e., verb form viii active participle, muftaʿil). This rendering would be more in line with Ibn
Qutayba’s method of interpreting these reports, which he spends considerable effort doing in this work, rather than
dismissing or falsifying them. Other titles that have been suggested are: Ikhtilāf taʾwīl al-ḥadīth, Mukhtalaf (or
Mukhtalif) al-ḥadīth, Ikhtilāf al-ḥadīth, Kitāb al-munāqaḍa, and al-Radd ʿalā man qāl bi-tanāquḍ al-ḥadīth. See the
editor’s introduction, Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 29.

41
Ibn Qutayba was arguably one of the most influential proponents of tradition in the central
Muslim lands succeeding Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855).
114
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328)
celebrated Ibn Qutayba as the “orator of the Sunna” (khaṭīb al-sunna), while others severely
criticized him.
115
Gérard Lecomte observes that with the change in state ideology adopted by the
ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861) following the inquisition (miḥna) set in place
and enforced by his predecessors, Ibn Qutayba received considerable attention from government
officials and scholars. He became increasingly close to the ʿAbbāsid vizier ʿUbayd Allāh b. Yaḥyā
b. Khāqān (d. 263/877) and was appointed as judge of Dīnawar in about 236/851. He remained in
that post until around 256/870, after which he devoted himself to teaching in Baghdād until his
death two decades later. According to Lecomte, it is clear that at some point Ibn Qutayba
put his literary talents at the service of the enterprise of the restoration of Sunnism which
was undertaken by al-Mutawakkil and his chief helpers. This meant that a number of his
works were intended to expound a politico-religious doctrine which we might expect would
take its place in the ideological line of the Sunna then coming into being, and particularly
that represented by Ibn Ḥanbal and Isḥāḳ b. Rāhawayh...[Ibn Qutayba’s works combine]
to make him an eminent representative, if not the exclusive spokesman, of the ahl al-Sunna
wa ʾl-Djamāʿa, who in fact from this period were the party of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty after
it abandoned the Muʿtazilī ideology.
116

Ibn Qutayba’s efforts were expressed, first and foremost, through a vehement criticism of
the methods and doctrines of those whom he and his fellow proponents of tradition accused of
harboring unorthodox ideologies, most notably, the rationalist theologians (ahl al-kalām) and the
proponents of considered opinion (ahl al-raʾy). It may be safe to assume that Ibn Qutayba’s use of
the label “proponents of rationalist theology” (and/or, later in the work, “the proponents of

114
Most of the following information about Ibn Qutayba’s life and times is taken from Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-
Aṣfar’s introduction to Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl and Gérard Lecomte’s entry in EI2. See Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 22-37;
Gérard Lecomte “Ibn Ḳutayba,” EI2.
115
For a detailed survey of scholarly opinions on Ibn Qutayba, see ʿAlī al-ʿAliyyānī, ʿAqīdat al-imām Ibn Qutayba
(al-Ṭāʾif: Maktabat al-Ṣiddīq, 1412/1991), 104-125 (Ibn Taymiyya’s view at 107-108).
116
Gérard Lecomte, “Ibn Ḳutayba,” EI2.

42
reflection,” ahl al-naẓar) refers primarily (though not exclusively) to the Muʿtazilīs at this point
in Islamic history.
117
This is because Ibn Qutayba, being born in Kūfa in 213/828 and having
resided in Baghdād, may have either directly experienced or at least was very familiar with the
ʿAbbāsid inquisition from 218/833 to 234/848 involving the Muʿtazilī doctrine of the created
Qurʾān, and the subsequent general Muslim religious and intellectual tide turning against the
Muʿtazilīs. In fact, this is very likely, as some scholars such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)
and his student Shams al-Dīn al-Dāwūdī (d. 945/1538) have asserted that Ibn Qutayba is the author
of a work entitled al-Radd ʿalā al-qāʾil bi-khalq al-Qurʾān.
118
If we are to believe that Ibn Qutayba
authored this work, this would lend additional evidence to his influential role in the post-inquisition
defense of proto-Sunnī traditionalism.
As a work that was in some ways a reaction to the intellectual and religious trends of the
earlier period, Ibn Qutayba’s professed goal in his Taʾwīl is to come to the defense of the
proponents of tradition and to refute the contestations of their opponents, whom he explicitly
identifies as the proponents of rationalist theology and the proponents of considered opinion.
119

Ibn Qutayba notes in the introduction to his Taʾwīl that an anonymous friend had alerted him to
the fact that the proponents of rationalist theology scorned the proponents of tradition for
conveying invented and conflicting reports and for relying on these reports for their religious
views. This, they contend, had led to the rise of many competing groups with contradicting beliefs,
each backing up their beliefs with traditions.
120
Ibn Qutayba seems to confirm this phenomenon.
He surveys several groups, showing how each relies on purported traditions as evidence for their

117
Ibn Qutayba makes only a couple of explicit references to the Muʿtazilīs in this work. See Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl,
115, 200. For the relationship between the label ahl al-naẓar and the Muʿtazilīs, see Ed., “Ahl al-Naẓar,” EI2.
118
See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Bughyat al-wuʿāt fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawiyyīn wa al-nuḥāt, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhim
(Ṣaydā, al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya), 2:64; Shams al-Dīn al-Dāwūdī, Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya), 1:251.
119
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 47, 61.
120
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 47.

43
views while explicitly contradicting one another.
121
After listing these groups and their professed
views, he presents several accusations leveled against the proponents of tradition by their
opponents.
122
He laments that his fellow proponents of tradition have failed to step up to the
critique and have, in some ways, allowed such criticisms (and, possibly even the contradictory
views of the competing groups) to flourish.
123

The section of Ibn Qutayba’s work that is relevant to our discussion on the debate centers
on his censuring the aforementioned al-ʿAnbarī. Ibn Qutayba criticizes al-ʿAnbarī for justifying
various religious controversies of the time and those of the earlier Muslims by claiming that the
competing parties were all correct:
We then turn to ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan who had held a judgeship in Baṣra, who assumed
a position – based on his detestable persuasions (qabīḥ madhāhibihi) and the severity of
his contradictory statements (shiddat tanāquḍ qawlihi) – which is greater in contradiction
than that [of our opinions] which they have criticized.
This is because he used to say: The Qurʾān lends itself to disagreement (inna al-Qurʾān
yadullu ʿalā al-ikhtilāf). [Thus, he claimed that] belief in free will is sound (al-qawl bi al-
qadar ṣaḥīḥ) and has a basis in the Book and belief in determinism is sound (al-qawl bi al-
ijbār ṣaḥīḥ) and has a basis in the Book, and whoever says this is correct (wa man qāla bi-
hādhā fa-huwa muṣīb), because a single verse may lend itself to two points of view and
accommodate two contradictory meanings.
[ʿUbayd Allāh] was asked one day about the proponents of free will (ahl al-qadar) and the
proponents of determinism (ahl al-ijbār) and he said: They are all correct (kullun muṣīb);
this is a group that glorified God and that is a group that exalted God.
[ʿUbayd Allāh] said: And it is so with labels (al-asmāʾ): Everyone who calls an adulterer
a believer (muʾmin) is correct (huwa muṣīb); whoever calls him an infidel (kāfir) is correct;
whoever says he is a malefactor (fāsiq), neither a believer nor an infidel, he is correct;
whoever says he is a hypocrite (munāfiq), neither a believer nor an infidel, he is correct;
whoever says he is an infidel and not a polytheist (mushrik),
124
he is correct; whoever says
he is an infidel, polytheist, he is correct; this is because the Qurʾān indicates all of these
meanings (li-anna al-Qurʾān qad dalla ʿalā kull hādhihi al-maʿānī).
[ʿUbayd Allāh] said: And it is so with the various customs (al-sunan), such as the belief in
[the permissibility of casting] lots (al-qurʿa) and its converse [i.e. impermissibility], the

121
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 47-53.
122
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 53-59.
123
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 59-60.
124
I use the term “polytheist” due to a lack of a concise term in English to refer to “the one who associates (another
being with God in worship),” which is the definition of mushrik.

44
belief in [the permissibility of] labor (al-siʿāya) and its converse [i.e. impermissibility],
125

[the belief in the permissibility of] killing the believer for [killing] an infidel, and [the belief
that] a believer may not be killed for [killing] an infidel; if the legist (al-faqīh) holds any
of these [opinions], he is correct (fa-huwa muṣīb).
[ʿUbayd Allāh] said: And whoever holds that the killer is in hellfire, he is correct; whoever
holds that he is in paradise, he is correct; whoever withholds [judgment] on him (waqafa
fīhi) and postpones [judgment on] his case (arjaʾa amrahu),
126
he is correct, if he intends
by this belief that God has obligated it upon him and that he does not have knowledge of
the unseen.
[ʿUbayd Allāh] held, concerning ʿAlī’s fighting Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr and their fighting him,
that all of this was [performed] in obedience to God, most glorified.
You can see the [amount of] contradiction and defect in this opinion; [ʿUbayd Allāh] is a
man from among the proponents of rational theology and analogy (ahl al-kalām wa al-
qiyās) and a proponent of reflection (ahl al-naẓar).
127

According to Ibn Qutayba’s account, al-ʿAnbarī held seven positions:
(1) “The Qurʾān lends itself to disagreement” (inna al-Qurʾān yadullu ʿalā al-ikhtilāf).
(2) The belief in both free will (al-qadar) and determinism (al-ijbār) are sound (ṣaḥīḥ) and have
bases in the Qurʾān “because a single verse may lend itself to two points of view and accommodate
two contradictory meanings” (li-anna al-āya al-wāḥida rubbamā dallat ʿalā wajhayn mukhtalifayn
wa iḥtamalat maʿnayayn mutaḍādayn).
(3) The proponents of free will and determinism are all correct because both sides glorify/exalt
God.
(4) All of the various categorizations/labels of a sinner are correct, again, “because the Qurʾān
indicates all of these meanings” (li-anna al-Qurʾān qad dalla ʿalā kull hādhihi al-maʿānī).
(5) The jurist is correct if he holds any conflicting legal views.

125
al-siʿāya literally means laboring or undertaking any action. In positive law, and in the sense that it is employed
by Ibn Qutayba, it refers particularly to the laboring of a slave for the purpose of complete manumission conditioned
on the slave’s giving money to the owner. See Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, al-Mawsūʿa al-fiqhiyya
al-Kuwaytiyya (Egypt: Dār al-Ṣafwa, 1404-1427/1983-2006), 25:5-7. I’d like to thank my colleague Omar Qureshi
for clarifying this point to me.
126
This statement refers to the practice of irjāʾ or withholding judgment on the status of a person’s belief and its
relation to her/his otherworldly fate. See Wilferd Madelung, “Murdjiʾa,” EI2.
127
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 95-96.

45
(6) Conflicting assessments/judgments of a sinner’s otherworldly status are correct. This includes
suspending (waqf) or postponing judgment (irjāʾ), “if he intends by this belief that God has
obligated it upon him and that he does not have knowledge of the unseen” (idh kāna innamā yurīdu
bi-qawlihī inna Allāha taʿālā taʿabbadahu bi-dhālik wa laysa ʿalayhi ʿilm al-maghīb).
(7) All parties in the early conflicts between the Companions were correct, because “all of that was
[performed] in obedience to God” (inna dhālika kulluhu ṭāʿatan li-Llāh).
Al-ʿAnbarī thus raises several major concerns: the Qurʾān as a basis for differing or
contradictory views (1, 2, 4); differences in theological persuasions, especially regarding free will
and determinism (2, 3); the objectives/intentions behind those who are in conflict (3, 7); and God’s
specific command to withhold/postpone judgment (6). Thus, according to Ibn Qutayba’s report,
al-ʿAnbarī justified contradictory beliefs, statements, and practices, considering them all to be
correct. Ibn Qutayba is clearly unhappy with this reasoning. However, his censure of al-ʿAnbarī is
not unique. Rather, it appears third in a series of criticisms leveled against the proponents of
rationalist theology and the proponents of considered opinion. Specifically, Ibn Qutayba relates
al-ʿAnbarī’s alleged views in the section of his work dedicated to the views of the rationalist
theologians. Before al-ʿAnbarī, Ibn Qutayba denounces and refutes the doctrines of two well-
known early Muʿtazilīs: Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 220-230/835-845) and Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf
(d. 226/840).
128
Ibn Qutayba’s mentioning al-ʿAnbarī alongside well-known Muʿtazilīs such as al-
Naẓẓām and al-ʿAllāf may suggest that he viewed al-ʿAnbarī as a proto-Muʿtazilī. At any rate, Ibn
Qutayba explicitly labels al-ʿAnbarī a rationalist theologian: “And he [al-ʿAnbarī] is a man from
among the proponents of rationalist theology and analogy and a proponent of reflection” (wa huwa
rajul min ahl al-kalām wa al-qiyās wa ahl al-naẓar).
129

128
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 66-95.
129
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 96.

46
From Ibn Qutayba’s perspective, al-ʿAnbarī is a prime example of all that is wrong with
his adversaries: They accuse the proponents of tradition of relating conflicting reports and holding
contradictory beliefs, yet they all disagree vehemently with one another on religious matters
despite justifying their beliefs with the same tools: analogy and rational investigation.
130
Ibn
Qutayba is especially disturbed by the rationalist theologians’ attempts to justify conflicting
fundamental tenets (uṣūl).
131
He makes this clear: “Had their disagreements been with respect to
secondary matters (al-furūʿ) and customs (al-sunan), we would have possibly excused them...but
they disagreed concerning [God’s] unicity (al-tawḥīd), God’s attributes and power, the reward of
the people of paradise, the punishment of the people of hellfire, the torment of the Intermediate
Realm (al-barzakh),
132
[the existence of] the Tablet (al-lawḥ),
133
and everything else that no
prophet can know except through revelation from God.”
134
These fundamental tenets (uṣūl), Ibn
Qutayba insists, cannot be interpreted through analogies or rational reflection, for the simple
reason that such reflections will differ from one person to another.
135
As we shall see below, later
scholars would insist that in matters of uṣūl, conflicting beliefs could not possibly be justified as
being all together correct or true.
Ibn Qutayba contrasts the conflicting beliefs of his opponents to the unified beliefs of his
fellow proponents of tradition:
If we want to turn away from the proponents of tradition toward the proponents of
rationalist theology, we shall have turned away from conjunction to dispersion, from order
to disunity, from geniality to estrangement, and from agreement to disagreement. This is
because the proponents of tradition unanimously agree that what God wills occurs and what

130
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 62.
131
This would be the most serious accusation leveled at al-ʿAnbarī by later generations of scholars, as we shall see
shortly.
132
See Christian Lange, “Barzakh,” EI3.
133
See Arent J. Wensinck and Clifford E. Bosworth, “Lawḥ,” EI2.
134
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 63. Ibn Qutayba defends the reports that distinguish between the rewards of the erring and
correct legal experts, further supporting his role as an earlier proponent of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa). See Ibn
Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 221-223.
135
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 63.

47
God does not will does not occur, that He is the creator of good and of evil, that the Qurʾān
is the uncreated word of God, that God will be seen on the Day of Resurrection, that the
two shaykhs [Abū Bakr and ʿUmar] are given precedence [over other Companions], and in
belief in the torment of the grave. They do not disagree on any of these principles and
oppose, detest, accuse of innovation, and dissociate from those who oppose them on these
points.
136

Interestingly, Ibn Qutayba adds to this list of theological or creedal doctrines a “political”
position: preferring the first and second caliphs Abū Bakr and ʿUmar over other Companions. This
suggests that, at least from Ibn Qutayba and his peers’ perspective, the early conflicts related to
succession to the Prophet between the Companions may have, at this point, been considered a
matter of principle (uṣūl) and creed, rather than a secondary point (furūʿ). The fact that Ibn Qutayba
includes the justification for both sides of the conflict between ʿAlī and Ṭalḥa/al-Zubayr as one of
the “detestable” positions promoted by al-ʿAnbarī gives greater credibility to this point. As we
shall see clearly later, Muslim scholars would debate the extent to which the various conflicts
between the Companions of the early period would fit into the in/fallibility debate. In fact, I
maintain that competing collective memories of the relations and interactions between the early
Companions was a primary driving force in the later debate over juristic in/fallibility, as we shall
see in Chapter 5.
Be that as it may, following Ibn Qutayba’s lead, al-ʿAnbarī would gain notoriety as being
the instigator and primary representative of promoting “extreme” scholarly infallibility, that is, of
extending infallibility to justify the validity of differences in fundamental theological doctrines
and principles (al-uṣūl) over and above secondary and legal matters (al-furūʿ). Before we see how
this is the case, we turn to an exploration of al-ʿAnbarī himself.

136
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 64.

48
2.2.1 ʿUbayd Allāh al-ʿAnbarī
ʿUbayd Allāh al-ʿAnbarī has received substantial attention in both primary and secondary
sources.
137
He was born between 100/718 and 106/724 into the well-known and powerful Tamīm
tribe in Baṣra.
138
In 156 or 157/773, the second ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 136-158/754-775)
appointed al-ʿAnbarī as judge of the city and its preacher (which, at the time, practically entailed
governorship). Following al-Manṣūr’s death, al-ʿAnbarī appeared at court in the newly established
ʿAbbāsid capital Baghdād as the envoy of his city at al-Mahdī’s (r. 158-169/775-785) accession to
the throne in 158/775. His relationship with al-Mahdī proved to be tense over the course of the
next several years, resulting in al-ʿAnbarī’s removal from both posts in 159/776, reappointment as
judge in 160/777, and final removal from judgeship in 166/783. He died shortly thereafter in
168/785.
139
However, it was not so much his political career and judgeship that would be the focus
of later attention as much as his scholarly reputation. As we shall see, like his early critic Ibn
Qutayba, al-ʿAnbarī would be both praised and condemned by later scholars.

137
Some notable secondary studies on al-ʿAnbarī’s life and career are: Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and
Politics Under the Early ʿAbbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunnī Elite (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 85-91; Mathieu
Tillier, “al-ʿAnbarī, ʿUbaydallāh b. al-Ḥasan,” EI3; idem, “Un traité politique du II
e
/VIII
e
siècle. L’épître de ʿUbayd
Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī au calife al-Mahdī,” Annales islamologiques 40 (2006): 139-170; idem, “Judicial
Authority and Qāḍīs’ Autonomy under the ʿAbbāsids,” al-Masāq 26, no. 2 (2014): 119-131; Josef van Ess, Theology
and Society, 2:179-188; idem, “La liberté du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIII
e
siècle” in Kleine Schriften by Josef
van Ess, ed. Hinrich Biesterfeldt (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 2:1005-1016 (originally published as Josef van Ess, “La liberté
du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIII
e
siècle (II
e
siècle de l’Hégire),” in La notion de liberté au Moyen Age. Islam,
Byzance, Occident, ed. George Makdisi et. al. (Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles Lettres”, 1985), 25-35). For
primary sources on al-ʿAnbarī’s biography, see, for e.g., Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir
ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1410/1990), 7:209; Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, ed. Akram
al-ʿAmrī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1397/1976), 428, 432, 434, 439, 440, 441; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-ʿIlal wa maʿrifat
al-rijāl, ed. Waṣī Allāh b. Muḥammad ʿAbbās (Riyadh: Dār al-Khānī, 1422/2001), 2:312; Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt,
2:88-123; al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, 12:7-11; Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl, ed.
Bashshār Maʿrūf (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1400/1980), 19:23-28; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-islām wa
wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa al-aʿlām, ed. Bashshār Maʿrūf (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003), 4:449; Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāya wa al-nihāya, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (Dār Hijr, 1424/2003), 13:538; Ibn Ḥajar al-
ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb (India: Maṭbaʿat Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmiyya, 1326 AH), 7:7-8.
138
Charles Pellat describes the Tamīmīs as the “true founders” of Baṣra and its intellectual, religious, and political
elite who gave the city its “Sunnī character.” See Pellat, “Le milieu baṣrien, 23-24.
139
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:179-182.

49
We have already noted that Ibn Qutayba accused al-ʿAnbarī of validating contradictory
beliefs and practices, labeling him a rationalist theologian and a proponent of reflection and
analogy. This raises the questions: Was al-ʿAnbarī actually a rationalist theologian? If so, what
was his theological persuasion? Was he a proto-Muʿtazilī or something else? Was he a proponent
of considered opinion? What was his legal persuasion?
140

Al-ʿAnbarī is not mentioned in any of the major Muʿtazilī biographical works.
141
In fact,
there does not seem to be any substantial evidence indicating that al-ʿAnbarī was a rationalist
theologian (mutakallim), despite the obvious relevancy of his purported validation of conflicting
theological beliefs, especially the thorny questions of free will and determinism. However, Wakīʿ
(d. 306/918), author of the well-known biographical work Akhbār al-Quḍāt, relates a short
exchange between al-ʿAnbarī and the famous Arabic philologist al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī
(d. 175/791)
142
that may have some theological value. In the report, al-ʿAnbarī states that he met
al-Khalīl, and the latter requested him to identify himself. Al-ʿAnbarī identified himself as a
member of al-bāṭiniyya and immediately proceeded to inform al-Khalīl that people had disagreed
on speech (al-kalām): some state that human speech is created (kalām al-nās makhlūq) while
others maintain that it is not created. Al-Khalīl then interrogates al-ʿAnbarī on whether he supports
“the truth” and al-ʿAnbarī affirms that he does. Al-Khalīl proceeds to ask al-ʿAnbarī what the
“lightest” (akhaff) sound in speech is, to which al-ʿAnbarī replies bā, since it is enunciated simply
by moving one’s lips without using one’s tongue. Al-Khalīl agrees and asks al-ʿAnbarī what the

140
Most of what follows on al-ʿAnbarī relies heavily on the excellent study by Mutaz al-Khatib, “Maqālat taṣwīb al-
mujtahidīn,” 38-71.
141
Major Muʿtazilī biographical works include: Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, and al-Ḥākim al-
Jushamī, Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li-l-Nashr, 1393/1974);
Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer (Beirut: Dār al-Muntaẓar,
1409/1988).
142
160/776 or 170/786 are given as alternative death dates. For more on al-Khalīl, see Rudolf Sellheim, “al-Khalīl b.
Aḥmad,” EI2; Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:253-258.

50
“heaviest” (athqal) sound is, to which al-ʿAnbarī replies hā, since it stems from one’s interior
(jawf). Al-Khalīl agrees and inquires whether it is possible to enunciate the bā from the place of
the hā or vice versa, to which al-ʿAnbarī replies in the negative. Finally, al-Khalīl states,
“Therefore, let it be known that human speech is the creation of God” (fa-ʿlam anna kalām al-nās
khalq Allāh).
143

This report raises a few concerns. First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the term
al-bāṭiniyya or why al-ʿAnbarī would identify himself with this term. Mutaz al-Khatib has opined
that the term may possibly be a corruption of al-Murjiʾa.
144
While it is an interesting possibility,
this is a problematic assertion, since, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that al-
ʿAnbarī held the basic position of withholding judgment with respect to the conflicts between the
Companions (recall in Ibn Qutayba’s report al-ʿAnbarī does not withhold judgment, but approves
of all sides’ involvement in the conflicts and considers them all to be correct), it is not clear that
this basic position alone would qualify him to be labeled a Murjiʾ. As both Wilferd Madelung and
W. Montgomery Watt have shown, the label Murjiʾa was polyvalent and shifted in its connotations
in the early period.
145
It is more probable that the term al-bāṭiniyya in Wakīʿ’s report is rendered
correctly and perhaps refers to those who were inclined to engage in the interpretation of language
rather than restricting themselves to its apparent or literal meaning; this may be a more suitable
label for one to introduce oneself with to a philologist rather than as a member of a religio-political
group. Furthermore, this explanation would be suitable to al-ʿAnbarī’s alleged statements related
by Ibn Qutayba that the Qurʾān is open to multiple and various interpretations. The second concern

143
Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:111-112. For a similar yet slightly differently worded report (albeit without any
discussion about the creation of speech), see Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ: irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb,
ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1414/1993), 3:265-266.
144
Al-Khatib, “Maqālat taṣwīb al-mujtahidīn,” 44.
145
See Wilferd Madelung, “Murdjiʾa,” EI2; Watt, The Formative Period, chp. 5; idem, Islamic Philosophy and
Theology, 21-24.

51
in this report relates to the substance of the theological discussion between the two figures. It is
well-known that one of the foremost theological controversies of the early period of Islam
concerned the status of God’s speech (kalām Allāh): whether it was created. This controversy and
the Muʿtazilī adoption of the doctrine of the “createdness” of the Qurʾān led to the ʿAbbāsid
inquisition. However, it is not known that there was another major controversy over the status of
human speech, as this report seems to suggest. Of course, it may be argued that the debate over
God’s speech or the Qurʾān was just another side of the broader problem of God’s relation to and
creation of human action and speech. In this way, it is quite possible (and, in fact, likely) that
people debated the status of human speech. At any rate, this report appears to be the only instance
of a theological topic that al-ʿAnbarī explicitly raised. Even then, a single report may not be enough
evidence to label al-ʿAnbarī a “rationalist theologian” or to identify his particular theological
persuasion.
Despite not appearing in the biographical works of the theologians, al-ʿAnbarī features in
the biographical dictionaries of the traditionists (al-muḥaddithūn) and those of the legists (al-
fuqahāʾ).
146
The sources praise him for his positive law (fiqh). For instance, Wakīʿ states, “We did
not refer to ʿUbayd Allāh’s positive law because it is grand, and this is not the place to mention it.
Rather, we only mentioned his reports and what we have received from his judicial matters.”
147

Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), in his famous biographical work Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya, states
that when Zakariyyā b. Yaḥyā al-Sājī (d. 307/919) composed a work on positive law and
disagreements (al-fiqh wa al-khilāfiyyāt) simply entitled Uṣūl al-Fiqh, he included the legal

146
See, for example, al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī, Maʿrifat ʿulūm al-ḥadīth, ed. Muʿaẓẓam Ḥusayn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1397/1977), 248; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, al-Muʿīn fī ṭabaqāt al-muḥaddithīn, ed. Hammām ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm Saʿīd (Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 1404/1983), 61; al-Nasāʾī, Tasmiyat fuqahāʾ al-amṣār, ed. Maḥmūd Ibrāhim
Zāyid (Aleppo: Dār al-Waʿī, 1369/1949), 129; Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahā, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut:
Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970), 91.
147
Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:118.

52
opinions of al-ʿAnbarī alongside other major figures such as al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), Mālik b. Anas
(d. 179/796), Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), Ibn Abī Laylā (d. 148/765), Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), Zufar
b. al-Hudhayl (d. 158/775), Ibn Shabrama (d. 144/761), Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d.
ca. 237/851), Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), Rabīʿa b. Farrūkh (d. 136/753), Ibn Abī al-Zinād (d.
174/790), Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd (d. 143/760), Abū ʿUbayd (d. 224/838), and Abū Thawr (d. 246/860).
148

Despite al-ʿAnbarī’s inclusion as a legist, there seems to be little documentation of his legal
opinions, and thus, his exact legal persuasion is difficult to pinpoint. The Shāfiʿī traditionist and
legist Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) claims that al-ʿAnbarī’s law was largely Kūfan.
149
Al-Masʿūdī (d.
345/956) counted him as a Baṣran in law.
150
Furthermore, despite being considered a traditionist
(muḥaddith), there is no substantial evidence to show that he transmitted more than a few reports.
According to Wakīʿ, “ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan possesses stature and honor, and holds grand
positive law that has been transmitted, despite the very little number of traditions that he has
reported and ḥadīth that he has attributed [to their sources].”
151
Wakīʿ also relates that al-ʿAnbarī
once made a mistake when relating a tradition, whereby he was corrected by another figure; he
then submissively retracted his statement.
152
The above references therefore make it difficult to
categorize al-ʿAnbarī definitively. Based on the above information, that is, the small number of al-
ʿAnbarī’s transmitted reports and his alleged (Kūfan or Baṣran) ʿIrāqī legal persuasion, Mutaz al-
Khatib has suggested that al-ʿAnbarī was among the proponents of considered opinion.
153
This
assertion is problematic for the following reasons. First, the small number of traditions that al-

148
Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī (Hijr li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa al-
Nashr, 1413/1992), 3:300.
149
Ibn Ḥibbān, Mashāhīr ʿulamāʾ al-amṣār wa aʿlām fuqahāʾ al-aqṭār, ed. Marzūq ʿAlī Ibrāhīm (Mansoura: Dār al-
Wafāʾ, 1411/1991), 251.
150
ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Masʿūdī, al-Tanbīh wa al-ishrāf, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Ismāʿīl al-Ṣāwī (Cairo: Dār al-Ṣāwī,
1357/1938), 308.
151
Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:88.
152
Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:90.
153
Al-Khatib, “Maqālat taṣwīb al-mujtahidīn,” 47.

53
ʿAnbarī is purported to have related does not necessarily imply that he was a proponent of
considered opinion. It could be that he transmitted a greater number of traditions, but that we are
unaware of their existence, in the same manner that we are unaware of most of his legal views,
despite his purportedly large body of legal opinions. Second, and more importantly, this assertion
seems to be based on the exaggerated and sharp geographic dichotomy between the proponents of
considered opinion and the proponents of tradition. This view labels the ʿIrāqīs as proponents of
considered opinion and the Ḥijāzīs as proponents of tradition. It also considers the activities and
approaches of these two groups to be mutually exclusive: one may rely on considered opinion or
tradition. The reality is that, more often than not, individual scholars adopted elements of both
approaches. As a case in point, Mālik b. Anas, often labeled a primary representative of the
proponents of tradition, does not always base his legal opinions on traditions, despite relating them
(for example in his famous work al-Muwaṭṭaʾ). According to Umar Wymann-Landgraf, the
Medinese legal tradition, which Mālik arguably stands as the major representative of, “was rooted
in a distinctively consistent and systematic pattern of juristic reasoning in which rationalistic
considered opinion (raʾy) played a crucial role.”
154
On the other hand, the ʿIrāqīs, despite being
labeled proponents of considered opinion par excellence, often employed traditions in their
polemics with Mālik and others, for example, in al-Shaybānī’s work al-Ḥujja ʿalā Ahl al-
Madīna.
155
The case is clearer with the aforementioned ʿIrāqī Ibn Qutayba and his representation
of the proponents of tradition.
Be that as it may, as mentioned previously, later Muslim scholars would both praise and
condemn al-ʿAnbarī. On the one hand, he was lauded as a trustworthy scholar and exceptional

154
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 8.
155
Also see Ibn Khaldūn’s explanation on the reasons for why scholars may have employed traditions. Ibn Khaldūn,
al-Muqaddima, 2:182-183.

54
legist.
156
On the other hand, several scholars severely criticized him.
157
His critics accused him of
holding problematic legal and creedal views.
158

His major crime, though, would be his alleged validation of conflicting theological beliefs
and primary principles, that is, the uṣūl. Later scholars would disagree on interpreting exactly how
inclusive al-ʿAnbarī’s validation was: Was it specific to the theological and creedal disagreements
among the Muslims or did it also include non-Muslim beliefs? Before we delve into the later
perceptions and receptions of al-ʿAnbarī’s statements, we should consider the early emergence of
the opposing doctrine of fallibility.
2.2.2 Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm, Ibn ʿUlayya, and Bishr al-Marīsī
As we will see in the next section, al-ʿAnbarī would come to be known to represent the
early “extreme” infallibility position, that is, the position that considers all experts to be correct in
the principles (uṣūl) like the secondary cases (furūʿ). On the other hand, the second/eighth and
third/ninth centuries would witness the emergence of an opposing doctrine with Abū Bakr ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān b. Kaysān (known as al-Aṣamm) (d. 200/816 or 201/817), along with his two pupils’

156
See, for example, Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 7:209; Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thuqāt, ed. Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-
ʿUthmāniyya (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1393/1973), 7:143; Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Suʾālāt
Abī ʿUbayd al-Ājurī fī al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Qāsim (Medina: ʿImādat al-Baḥth al-ʿIlmī bi-l-Jāmiʿa
al-Islāmiyya, 1403/1983), 368.
157
See, for example, Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Mīzān al-iʿtidāl, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī (Beirut: Dār al-
Maʿrifa, 1382/1963), 3:5; Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb, 7:8.
158
According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), al-ʿAnbarī saw no legal problem with singing (al-ghināʾ) and
was vilified (maṭʿūn fīh). See Ibn Qayyim, Ighāthat al-lahfān min maṣāyid al-Shayṭān, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-
Faqqī (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, n.d.), 1:230. Elsewhere, Ibn Qayyim takes al-ʿAnbarī to task for an apparently
improper legal view that he held, namely, that if a husband is unable to fulfill his financial responsibilities to his wife,
he must be imprisoned until he can provide once again. Astonished at this opinion, Ibn Qayyim exclaims, “I do not
suppose anyone who possesses a trace of knowledge would say this!” See Ibn Qayyim, Zād al-maʿād fī hadī khayr al-
ʿibād (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1415/1994), 5:461. Al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) states, “Among [al-ʿAnbarī’s]
strange [opinions] was that he permitted imitation in creedal and rational [matters], opposing in this view all of the
scholars.” See al-Nawawī, Tahdhīb al-asmāʾ wa al-lughāt, ed. Sharikat al-ʿUlamāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
n.d.), 1:311. See also al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh wa al-mutafaqqih, ed. ʿĀdil al-Gharāzī (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn
al-Jawzī, 1421/2000), 2:128; Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū (Damascus:
Dār al-Fikr, 1403/1983), 401; idem, al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003), 125; Abū
al-Ḥasan al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, ed. ʿAbd al-Razzāq ʿAfīfī (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, n.d.), 4:223.

55
Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl b. Miqsam al-Asadī (known as Ibn ʿUlayya) (d. 218/833) and Abū
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Bishr b. Ghiyāth b. Abī Karīma al-ʿAdawī (known as al-Marīsī) (d. 219/833).
These three figures would come to be known as earlier representatives of the opposite “extreme”
of absolute fallibility (that considers only one truth to exist – and thus only one expert to be correct
– in the furūʿ as in the uṣūl). What made this position “extreme,” as will be made clear below, is
that it considered the single truth to possess unequivocal evidence for it, and therefore, held the
erring expert to be culpable and his erroneous judgment could be overruled. Before we see how
this is the case, we’ll briefly explore the biographies of these three individuals.
Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm was a prominent theologian, exegete, and jurist.
159
He was born in
Baṣra and lived there for most of his life. He created his own study circle in Baṣra and is reported
to have had a large following. He was also a prolific author.
160
As a well-known exegete, his views
feature prominently in many later commentaries of the Qurʾān, such as Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s
(d. 333/944) Taʾwīlāt Ahl al-Sunna.
161
Theologically, he is said to have held principles that were
identical to those of the Muʿtazilīs and Qadarīs of his time, such as his upholding the free will and
responsibility of every individual, his rejection of the doctrines of the predestinarians/determinists,
and even his authoring an independent work on the createdness of the Qurʾān. However, he was
not counted as a mainstream Muʿtazilī due to, for example, his rejection of the doctrine of the
“intermediate rank” and his expressly critical views of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in favor of Muʿāwiya b.
Abī Sufyān.
162
He was also held in high esteem as a jurist.
163
Josef van Ess argues that al-Aṣamm

159
The following information on al-Aṣamm’s life and views is taken from Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:450-
473; Gregor M. Schwarb, “al-Aṣamm,” EI3. Some primary sources appear below.
160
For a list of his works, see al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 1:594-595.
161
See Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt ahl al-sunna (Tafsīr al-Māturīdī), ed. Majdī Bāslūm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1426/2005).
162
See al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 1:594. ʿAbd al-Jabbār counted al-Aṣamm as part of the sixth generation of Muʿtazilīs
alongside Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf. See al-Balkhī et al., Faḍl al-iʿtizāl, 267-268. For his alleged favoring of Muʿāwiya
over ʿAlī, see Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, 56-57.
163
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:473.

56
held “an absolute criterion of truth that was rational insight,” that “he did not distinguish between
theology and jurisprudence,” and that he intended to “objectify the law.”
164
Despite being counted,
along with al-ʿAnbarī and others, as a member of the Baṣran legal tradition,
165
al-Aṣamm rejected
al-ʿAnbarī’s infallibility doctrine. It is unclear whether al-Aṣamm was reacting to al-ʿAnbarī,
although this is certainly possible as he was a fellow Baṣran who very likely knew (of) his city’s
judge and public preacher, but he is said to have proposed a radically opposing fallibility/single-
truth doctrine. Al-Aṣamm’s two prominent students, Ibn ʿUlayya and Bishr al-Marīsī, would
uphold his fallibility doctrine.
Ibn ʿUlayya’s family was originally from Kūfa but had settled in Baṣra and then spread to
Baghdād as well, where Ibn ʿUlayya himself grew up with his father.
166
His father Ismāʿīl (also
known as Ibn ʿUlayya in the sources) would come to be known as a respectable traditionist. Under
the influence of his teacher al-Aṣamm, Ibn ʿUlayya moved away from the circle of traditionists
and more into systematic theology and law. Like his teacher, whose teachings he helped spread
outside of Baṣra, Ibn ʿUlayya was accused of being a Jahmī and a proponent of the doctrine of the
created Qurʾān. Ibn ʿUlayya left Baghdād in 198/813. He appears in polemics with later Shāfiʿīs
and Mālikīs and is said to have engaged in several disputes with al-Shāfiʿī himself.
Bishr al-Marīsī came from Upper Egypt and was a client of the family of Zayd b. al-
Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph’s brother.
167
He would eventually end up in Baghdād, where he also
died. It has been reported that al-Shāfiʿī resided with al-Marīsī and his mother during his stay in

164
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:470, 472.
165
See al-Masʿūdī, al-Tanbīh, 308.
166
The following information on Ibn ʿUlayya is mostly taken from Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 2:473-477.
See also al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, 6:20-22; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Lisān al-mīzān, ed. Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-
Niẓāmiyya (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī, 1390/1971), 1:24-25.
167
Most of the following on Bishr al-Marīsī taken from Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 3:189-203; Bernard
Carra de Vaux et al, “Bishr b. Ghiyāth b. Abī Karīma Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marīsī,” EI2. See al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist,
1:609, n2.

57
Baghdād. Like his teacher al-Aṣamm and his contemporary Ibn ʿUlayya, al-Marīsī was also labeled
a Jahmī (and a Muʿtazilī) for his belief in the created Qurʾān.
168
In addition to studying with al-
Aṣamm, al-Marīsī is said to have been a Ḥanafī in law, studying under Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798).
In keeping with al-Aṣamm’s idea of the existence of a single proof for every fact, al-Marīsī would
reject some of the legal tools, such as “preference” (istiḥsān), that were practiced by the likes of
his own teacher Abū Yūsuf. Ibn Qutayba referred to al-Marīsī as “a leader of opinion” (raʾs fī al-
raʾy).
169
The proponents of tradition vehemently disliked him. He is said to have been persecuted
for his views, even being tried publicly in a mosque in Baghdād before a large audience by Qutayba
b. Ziyād, the judge who was appointed by Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī (r. 201-203/817-819) during the
latter’s short-lived anti-caliphate. According to van Ess, al-Marīsī adopted his teacher’s rationalist
theory that everything can be proven clearly and that every error is a transgression.
170

Al-Aṣamm and his two pupils (sometimes al-Marīsī alone) were often grouped together as
the representatives par excellence of the extreme single-truth/fallibility doctrine. It appears that the
earliest extant source to attribute the doctrine to them was the Ḥanafī exegete and legal theorist
Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981) in his al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl.
171

2.2.3 Perceptions and Receptions of the Early In/Fallibility Positions
Both early positions would largely be criticized and rejected by later scholars, being
counted as too extreme and untenable.

168
Several refutations were written expressly directed at Bishr al-Marīsī for his belief in, among other things, the
created Qurʾān, such as by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Yaḥyā al-Kinānī (d. between 219/833 and 240/854), ʿUthmān b. Saʿīd al-
Dārimī (d. ca. 280/894), and others.
169
Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 134.
170
Josef van Ess, Theology and Society, 3:189.
171
See Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl, ed. ʿAjīl Jāsim al-Nashmī (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-
Islāmiyya, 1414/1994), 4:295, 300.

58
2.2.3.1 Extreme Fallibility
Legal theorists of the fourth/tenth century onward would largely reject (or reinterpret) the
extreme fallibility position, although, as we shall see in Chapter 4, this position would still hold
sway with some later scholars. Many of the legal theorists of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh
centuries agreed on the basic elements of the doctrine held by al-Aṣamm and his two students. It
was understood that they believed that there was a single truth for every question, that the single
truth possessed single evidence, that the expert was obligated to acquire that single truth, and that
it was consequently possible for the expert to acquire or miss that single truth. The legal theorists
differed, however, on whether the trio considered the erring expert to be culpable or excused and
whether the erring experts’ legal rulings/judgments ought to be overturned.
According to al-Jaṣṣāṣ and, later, Abū Yaʿlā, al-Aṣamm, Ibn ʿUlayya, and al-Marīsī held
that God had determined specific evidence (dalīl) for the ruling of a novel case (ḥukm al-ḥāditha),
that the novel case contains a single original case (aṣl wāḥid) along with a single ratio legis (ʿilla
wāḥida) to be analogized from, and that the one analogizing is mandated to acquire it (kullifa al-
qāʾisūn iṣābat dhālik); the one who errs it has erred God’s ruling, except that he is rewarded for
his ijtihād and excused for his error. Additionally, al-Jaṣṣāṣ notes that Ibn ʿUlayya further held
that the mujtahid knows certainly that he has acquired/hit upon God’s ruling specifically through
his ijtihād.
172
Others, such as ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Abū
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, and al-Juwaynī understood al-Aṣamm and his two students to have gone further
and proclaimed that not only is the erring expert not excused nor rewarded for his error, but his

172
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 4:295. See also Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ, al-ʿUdda fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Mubārakī
(n.p., 1414/1993), 5:1548.

59
erroneous ruling can be overturned.
173
Other scholars, such as Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, were more
severely critical and referred to this position as “al-Marīsī’s delusion” (hayadhān al-Marīsī).
174

2.2.3.2 Extreme Infallibility
Virtually all later scholars rejected the validity of al-ʿAnbarī’s doctrine of absolute
infallibility.
175
There was broad agreement that it was not logically possible (or correct) to extend
infallibility to justify differences in the principles (uṣūl). However, scholars differed in their
interpretations of what al-ʿAnbarī intended by his position. They understood four possibilities.
First, some interpreted al-ʿAnbarī’s position to mean that all experts (mujtahids), Muslim
or not, are correct.
176
According to this view, al-ʿAnbarī maintained belief in a multiplicity of truth
in uṣūl matters and thus validated even non-Muslim beliefs as true/correct. Second, some explained
his position as not belief in the multiplicity of truth, but rather as excusing both Muslim and non-
Muslim experts (mujtahids) from fault.
177
Third, al-ʿAnbarī is thought of as believing in the

173
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa al-ʿadl, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā
Ḥilmī (Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li al-Taʾlīf wa al-Tarjama, n.d.), 17:370; Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad fī
uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Khalīl al-Mays (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1403/1982), 2:371; Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda fī
uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Anṣārī al-Qummī (Qumm: Sitāre, 1417/1996), 2:725; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 506;
idem, al-Lumaʿ, 304-305; Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Nibālī and Bashīr al-
ʿAmrī (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1417/1996), 3:336-338.
174
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām ʿAbd al-Shāfī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1413/1993), 356.
175
Some later legal theorists claimed that the Baṣran Muʿtazilī litterateur ʿAmr b. Baḥr al-Kinānī, popularly known as
al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), also held al-ʿAnbarī’s (or a similar) position. See, for example, al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 348; al-
Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. Ṭāhā Jābir al-ʿAlwānī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1418/1997), 6:29. There
was disagreement on which of the two held the more expansive version of the doctrine. For contrasting attributions,
see, for example, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Bukhārī, Kashf al-asrār sharḥ uṣūl al-Bazdawī (Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmī, n.d.), 4:17;
al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 4:178. In some sources, al-Jāḥiẓ is replaced with Dāwūd b. ʿAlī al-Ẓāhirī (d. 270/884). See, for
example, al-Nawawī, al-Minhāj sharḥ ṣaḥīḥ Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj, (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1392/1972),
12:14; Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīt fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Cairo: Dār al-Kutubī, 1414/1994), 8:279, 308.
176
See al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr, 8:277; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:335; ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, Mīzān al-uṣūl fī natāʾij
al-ʿuqūl, ed. Muḥammad Zakī ʿAbd al-Barr (Doha: Maṭābiʿ al-Dawḥa al-Ḥadītha, 1404/1984), 755; Ibn Qudāma al-
Maqdisī, Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa jannat al-munāẓir fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Muʾassasat al-Rayyān, 1423/2002), 2:352.
177
See al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, 6:29; Shahāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl fī ikhtiṣār al-maḥṣūl fī al-uṣūl, ed.
Maktab al-Buḥūth wa al-Dirāsāt (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1424/2004), 344; Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī, al-Taḥṣīl min al-
maḥṣūl, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ʿAlī Abū Zunayd (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1408/1988), 2:289; Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī,
al-Ibhāj fī sharḥ al-minhāj (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1416/1995), 3:257; al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr, 8:276-277; al-
Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 4:178.

60
multiplicity of truth (like the first position here), but only with respect to conflicting Muslim
beliefs: all conflicting Muslim beliefs were correct.
178
In this case, non-Muslim beliefs would be
excluded from validation. Finally, some suggested that al-ʿAnbarī did not intend the multiplicity
of truth with respect to conflicting Muslim beliefs, but that he simply excused Muslims from fault
in their theological and creedal differences.
179

These various interpretations of al-ʿAnbarī’s position would inform reactions to it, which
fall under three general categories: criticism and rebuttal, reinterpretation, and rehabilitation. Many
related al-ʿAnbarī’s doctrine with the intention of showing its error and condemning it.
180
In some
cases, al-ʿAnbarī was accused of being a disbeliever for holding it.
181
Some offered re-
interpretations of al-ʿAnbarī’s statements. For example, al-Juwaynī relates two reports from al-
ʿAnbarī and argues that “in the more popular of the two reports, [al-ʿAnbarī] said: I consider every
mujtahid within the religion [of Islam] to be correct. As for the unbelievers, they cannot be
considered correct. And some of those who reported from al-ʿAnbarī went to extremes and
declared correct all mujtahids, except those who hold steady to innovations and who eschew
ijtihād.”
182
As we saw above, others interpreted al-ʿAnbarī’s position to signify the absence of
fault, not the agreement of belief.
183
Finally, some suggested that al-ʿAnbarī reverted from his
position.
184

178
See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 4:375; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:335; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:540-541; Abū al-Khaṭṭāb al-
Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Mufīd Muḥammad and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (Mecca: Markaz al-Baḥth al-
ʿIlmī wa Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1406/1985), 4:307; Ibn ʿAqīl, al-Wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1420/1990), 5:351; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:398.
179
See al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 350; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:398; Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, ed.
Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Muʿāṣir, 1419/1998), 559; Ibn Burhān, al-Wuṣūl ilā al-uṣūl, ed. ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd ʿAlī Abu Zunayd (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1404/1984), 2:338.
180
See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 4:376; al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 4:178; Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat al-nāẓir, 2:350-352.
181
See al-Shāṭibī, al-Iʿtiṣām, ed. Salīm al-Hilālī (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1412/1992), 1:195.
182
Al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:335. See also Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:540; Ibn ʿAqīl, al-Wāḍiḥ, 5:351.
183
See al-Qarāfī, Sharḥ tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl, 344; Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, Salāsil al-dhahab, ed. Muḥammad al-Shanqīṭī
(1423/2002), 442; al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, 6:29.
184
See, for example, Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb, 7:7-8.

61
Al-ʿAnbarī’s nascent form of infallibility was expansive and validated conflicting matters
of belief (such as al-qadar and al-ijbār), labels (such as al-muʾmin, al-kāfir, or al-munāfiq),
customs/matters of practice (al-masāʾil al-fiqhiyya al-ʿamaliyya), and the Companions’ fighting
one another. As the above discussion has shown, al-ʿAnbarī’s absolute doctrine of infallibility was
largely rejected as untenable by later scholars. It was unacceptable because it was taken to include
justifying disagreements over the principles (uṣūl) of faith, in which it was widely believed that
there could only be a single truth. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, al-ʿAnbarī’s
doctrine found support in relation to matters of law and practice. In order to be acceptable as a full-
fledged juristic doctrine, it required some adjustments. Legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) provided the
space for the necessary debates and adjustments.
2.3 The Rise of Legal Theory (uṣūl al-fiqh)
As mentioned above, the founding of Baghdād in the second/eighth century had a major
impact on the development of Islamic education and scholarship. In Baghdād, the problems facing
the ʿAbbāsid caliphate following its rise did not necessarily destroy the intellectual movement
there. The developments with Būyid arrival and control of Baghdād in the fourth-fifth/tenth-
eleventh centuries (from 344/945 to 447/1055) favored an open and “tolerant” environment for
scholarly production, including the promotion of Shīʿī thought and practice. This was followed by
the promotion of Sunnism with Seljuk rule from 447/1055 onward. On the other hand, this
environment also may have solidified group boundaries. As scholars of various backgrounds and
persuasions assembled from various parts of the Islamic empire into the ʿAbbāsid capital, scholarly
discourses and debates became more frequent. This movement led to the eventual crystallization
of various schools of thought with their differing views on theological, legal, and other matters.
The crystallization of these competing schools and movements required the justification and

62
systematization of the doctrines and positions held by the various groups and their scholarly elite.
This systematization process spurned large-scale production of works of systematic theology, law,
philosophy, heresiography, and other disciplines. It was in this environment of competition, that
is, with an eye on polemical encounters, that some of the earliest systematic works of legal theory
were composed.
Legal theory or jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) would eventually become a prominent vehicle
by which theorists could debate and justify their various doctrinal positions. This was because
legal theory provided a convenient cover as “legal topics” were less risky to discuss than
“theological topics.” However, legal theory included a host of theological, doctrinal, and creedal
assumptions. In his foreword to Aron Zysow’s work, Robert Gleave has noted that “uṣūl al-fiqh
(even in its so-called “legal” expressions) was intensely theological. Uṣūl was, at times, “theology-
in-use,” and this led to theological compromise as it encountered the law.”
185
Furthermore,
theological topics had legal consequences. This was due to the strong relationship between the two
disciplines and their shared methodology, that is, the justification and systematization of doctrine.
The rise of legal theory was in many ways equivalent to the rise in theology, especially kalām, its
more systematic expression. Whereas theology represents the systematization of matters of belief
and creed based on their sources, legal theory represents a systematic attempt to define the sources
of the law and their authoritativeness. When discussing the epistemological distinctions of legal
theory, Wael Hallaq notes, “These distinctions were not unconnected with those made in
theological enquiries (ʿilm al-kalām), since law was seen as derivative of the mother science,
theology. It was the function of the latter to prove the existence of God, His attributes, prophecy,
revelation and all fundamentals of religion, whereas law presupposed these theological

185
Robert Gleave, “Foreword,” The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory
(Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013), xiv.

63
conclusions and indeed built on them.”
186
Many of the earliest legal theorists were theologians,
and many of the early theologians were legal theorists. It was a mark of pride for the scholars of
the late formative and early classical periods to be masters of several disciplines.
It is worth noting that Islamic legal theory began in the second/eighth century in
rudimentary form and reached its final stage with the advent of the fourth/tenth century, with
extensive works produced in the fifth/eleventh century.
187
It was during this early period that
scholars were increasingly concerned with the systematic exploration of epistemology (certainty
and probability), formalism and materialism, and analogy and anti-analogy. They were also
concerned with juristic authority, as the elucidation of the debate over the in/fallibility doctrines
will show. According to Aron Zysow, “Legal theory and theology were both born out of the early
fragmentation of the Muslim community that forced Muslims to identify and defend essential
elements of their belief and practice...Subsequently, developed theology, above all in the form of
Muʿtazilism, managed to penetrate to the very heart of legal theory...Ashʿarism and Māturīdism,
too, in their turn exercised a notable, though lesser, influence on legal theory.”
188

As mentioned, some of the earliest and most prominent legal theorists were also theologians.
At the nexus of theology and law stood the debate over the doctrines of juristic fallibility and
infallibility. The next two chapters will focus on a description of the arguments made by
proponents of the in/fallibility doctrines. We first turn our attention to the proponents of juristic
infallibility.

186
Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 37-38.
187
Hallaq, Islamic Legal Theories, 2, 36.
188
Zysow, The Economy, 4.

64
Chapter 3: Juristic Infallibility (al-taṣwīb) and the Infallibilists (al-muṣawwiba)
We saw in the previous chapter (section 2.2.3) that virtually all Muslim thinkers after al-
ʿAnbarī rejected the validity of what we may term “absolute” or “maximal” infallibility, that is,
considering differing experts to be correct in all cases, including with respect to theological or
creedal questions or with respect to the religion’s fundamental tenets (uṣūl). The theorists largely
agreed that by their very nature the theological or fundamental tenets could not accommodate
justified disagreement.
189
Simply put, these matters could only admit a single correct answer that
the one who was attempting to determine could either hit or miss. Stated differently, with respect
to these cases, virtually all the theorists were fallibilists (mukhaṭṭiʾa). This was because these cases
were presumed to possess unequivocal evidence. However, despite the widespread rejection of
absolute infallibility, some theorists justified other types of religious disagreements by promoting
the doctrine of juristic infallibility (al-taṣwīb), which held that in some cases – namely, legal
questions not holding unequivocal evidence – all legal experts were correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb)
despite their differing and even conflicting views.
In this chapter, I explore the juristic infallibility doctrine and the arguments of some of its
major Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī proponents of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. My focus
on Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theologian-jurists is deliberate. We saw in the previous chapter that these
and other theologians would be counted among the first Muslim legal theorists proper. Studying
their ideas gives us insights into the dynamic at play in the earlier development of the discipline
of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and the intersections of theological and legal discourse. More
importantly, I argue that these Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theologian-jurists were guided by specific
intellectual sensibilities that, when contrasted with their theologian-juristic opponents who

189
See, for example, al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:375-376.

65
adopted juristic fallibility, reveal a strong commitment to rationalistic theological presuppositions
animating their conceptions of the law. This point will be further elaborated on below.
I begin this chapter by examining the basics of juristic infallibility, including the possible
meanings of “truth(s)” (al-ḥaqq, al-ḥuqūq), “correctness” (al-ṣawāb), and “error” (al-khaṭaʾ) in
this context, as well as the major subdivisions of the doctrine. I follow this with an exploration of
some of the main intellectual and practical concerns of the infallibilists: what were they concerned
with, what did they argue, and how did they go about making their cases for the doctrine of juristic
infallibility? Following this overview of the shared concerns of the infallibilists, I focus on a
comparative and critical examination of the writings of two leading fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh
century infallibilists: the Baṣran Muʿtazilī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and the Ashʿarī
al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013). Our exploration of their ideas will be supplemented
with the writings of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) and Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d.
478/1085), who carried on the intellectual legacies of ʿAbd al-Jabbār and al-Bāqillānī,
respectively.
3.1 What is Juristic Infallibility?
The Arabic term al-taṣwīb the I have translated to English as “infallibility” is related to the
word “correctness” or “rightness” (al-ṣawāb) and comes from the root ṣ-w-b. The famed medieval
Arabic lexicographer Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311) defined al-ṣawāb simply as “the opposite of error”
(ḍidd al-khaṭaʾ).
190
One who is right in his activity or statement is thus “correct” (muṣīb).
According to Ibn Manẓūr, it is also possible to say that one who intends what is right (arād al-
ṣawāb) is also correct.
191
Prior to Ibn Manẓūr, the literary scholar al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. early

190
Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1414/1993), 1:535. For more on Ibn Manẓūr, see Johann W. Fück,
“Ibn Manẓūr,” EI2.
191
Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1:535.

66
5
th
/11
th
century) maintained that the term al-ṣawāb may appear in two ways.
192
The first is with
respect to a thing itself when it is inherently good or praiseworthy (bi-ʿtibār al-shayʾ fī
nafsihi...idhā kāna fī nafsihi maḥmud), such as when one says “it is right to pursue justice” (taḥarrī
al-ʿadl ṣawāb).
193
The second way that the term al-ṣawāb appears is with respect to a person who
acquires what s/he intends (bi-ʿtibār al-qāṣid idhā adraka al-maqṣūd bi-ḥasab mā yaqṣiduhu), so
that it is said “s/he acquired such-and-such” (aṣāba kadhā).
194
With respect to this second way,
i.e., one’s intent, al-Iṣfahānī asserts that there are several levels or types of correctness: the most
complete and praiseworthy type results from both intending and performing a good act.
195
A
second type entails intending to perform a good act but actually performing another act after
presuming through one’s due diligence that the pursued act was correct (li-taqdīrihi baʿda
ijtihādihi annahu ṣawāb); this type of correctness, he notes, is what in intended by the statement
“every expert is correct” (kullu mujtahid muṣīb) and the Prophetic report about double rewards for
the judge who engages in legal reasoning and who “acquires” or “hits the mark” (aṣāb) and single
reward for the one who “misses” the mark (akhṭaʾ).
196
The third type is to intend a right act but to
accidentally err, such as when a hunter intends to strike an animal but instead strikes another
person; in this case, one’s error is excused due to intending what was right.
197
Finally, if one
intends to commit a reprehensible act but actually performs another act, it can be said that “s/he

192
For al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s biography and more likely death date, see Everett K. Rowson, “al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī,”
EI2.
193
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qurʾān, ed. Ṣafwān ʿAdnān al-Dāwūdī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam,
1412/1991), 494.
194
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 494.
195
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 494.
196
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 494-495.
197
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 495.

67
was wrong in her intention but acquired the object of her/his proximate aim” (akhṭaʾa fī qaṣdihi
wa aṣāb alladhī qaṣadahu).
198

It is clear that for al-Iṣfahānī and Ibn Manẓūr the meaning of the term correctness (al-
ṣawāb) can differ based on the intention of the actor and is not restricted to characterizing her/his
actual activity. Do their definitions reflect the technical use of the term in legal theory discourses?
In the context of legal theory discourses, the technical term al-taṣwīb refers to the doctrine
that holds that a legal expert (mujtahid) is always “correct” (muṣīb) with respect to his act of legal
reasoning (ijtihād) and/or its result, the legal ruling (ḥukm). I refer to this doctrine in English as
“juristic infallibility,” for it concerns the juristic activity of the legal expert. Juristic infallibility is
often discussed in the context of disagreement (ikhtilāf): when two or more legal experts disagree
over a particular question, are all of them equally correct or is only one of them correct and the
rest are wrong?
199
A more detailed treatment of this doctrine appears below.
For now, it is important to recall that the epistemological distinction made by early Muslim
scholars between certainty (al-qaṭʿ) and probability (al-ẓann) when categorizing and determining
the content of religious questions was a significant development in relation to the emerging debate
over the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility. Following the distinction between “unequivocal” and
“probable” cases, the starting point of almost all infallibilists is that probable cases (al-masāʾil al-
ẓanniyya), alternatively referred to as “ijtihādic cases” (al-masāʾil al-ijtihādiyya), do not possess

198
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 495. This statement is not entirely clear. If one intends a reprehensible act but carries out
an opposite non-reprehensible act, how can it be said that s/he acquired the object of her/his intention?
199
Of course, both possibilities could obtain, depending on the meaning of “correct,” as we have seen.

68
predetermined or single divine rules (ḥukm wāḥid).
200
Sometimes the theorists referred to the
predetermined or single divine rule as a “truth” (ḥaqq, pl. ḥuqūq).
201

This starting point of negating a single correct answer in probable cases sets the framework
for the doctrine of juristic infallibility, which considers all legal experts to be correct despite their
differing and even conflicting legal conclusions. Yet, juristic infallibility was not a single doctrine;
it could encompass several positions. A study of the legal theory works of the fifth/eleventh century
and beyond reveals that the doctrine of juristic infallibility as expressed using the terms taṣwīb,
muṣīb, iṣāba, and the overall use of the maxim “every legal expert is correct” (kullu mujtahid
muṣīb) was understood by the authors of these works to refer to three main positions.
The first position may be referred to as “free choice infallibility.” The proponents of this
position hold that anyone who seeks a legal rule in probable cases is not obligated to engage in
prior diligent legal reasoning (ijtihād) to determine the rule but may simply choose any possible
rule that appears probable to him.
202
This position proceeds from the assumption that, in the
absence of certainty-producing evidence for a rule, all that one is left with is probable evidence,
and all probable evidence “weighs” the same, so to speak. Therefore, any time one selects a
probable rule then one is considered “correct.” Some theorists have labeled the proponents of free

200
See, for example, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s definitions of ijtihādic and non-ijtihādic questions
in al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:396-398. Some infallibilists such as al-Juwaynī rejected the possibility of the nonexistence
of a divinely determined ruling, even in ijtihādic cases. According to al-Juwaynī, when unequivocal evidence for a
rule did not exist, God’s ruling for the individual legal expert (mujtahid) was to act in accordance with his legal
reasoning (ijtihād). See Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Dīb (Doha,
1399/1978), 2:1323-1326.
201
It is important to note here a word about the use of “truth” with respect to the infallibilists. They were not relativists
in the sense of denying the existence of absolute truths. However, some of them argued that the concept of “truth”
(ḥaqq) or a single divinely predetermined rule only pertained (truly) to cases that were based on unequivocal evidence.
See, for example, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:355. Thus, when these theorists sometimes employed the term “truth”
or “truths” (ḥuqūq) in the context of the law, this ought to be understood metaphorically or as a reference to the
possibility of the existence of differing legal responsibilities of individual persons and thus multiple “truths.” In other
words, the individual’s responsibility to engage in diligent legal reasoning and act in accordance with its results would
be his “truth.”
202
See al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1324; al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 561; al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr, 8:290; Āl Taymiyya, al-
Musawwada fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 502.

69
choice infallibility as “extreme infallibilists” (ghulāt al-muṣawwiba).
203
Free choice infallibility
did not hold sway with the vast majority of infallibilists. After all, as we shall see below, the
question of the correctness of one or all legal experts was essentially an evaluation of the act of
the legal expert (mujtahid), which was the activity of legal reasoning (ijtihād). In other words, for
most theorists, it made no sense to deny the obligation to engage in legal reasoning but still speak
of juristic infallibility and the correctness of all experts.
The second position is what I call “standard juristic infallibility.” This position is perhaps
what most infallibilists intended by their use of the phrase “every legal expert is correct” (kullu
mujtahid muṣīb). Standard juristic infallibility refers to the idea that “correctness” resides with the
preponderance of what a legal expert deems to be the most probable (ghālib al-ẓann) legal rule
after engaging in diligent legal reasoning. For the proponents of juristic infallibility, as we noted
above, probable questions exclude the existence of single correct answers. The proponents of
standard juristic infallibility maintain that probable cases admit the possibility of multiple rules
(sometimes referred to metaphorically as “truths”), and every legal expert who exerts utmost effort
to determine a rule that is most probable to him is “correct” (muṣīb). In other words, what gives
rise to a “correct” ruling is the legal expert’s sense of probability (ẓann al-mujtahid) after engaging
in diligent legal reasoning, and, in the sphere of probable cases, the most one may expect to acquire
is what is most probable (ghalabat al-ẓann).
204
The proponents of standard juristic infallibility are
sometimes referred to as “the moderate” infallibilists (al-muqtaṣidūn) in relation to the first group
discussed above. This is because this group calls for the necessity of engaging in legal reasoning,

203
See al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 561. This “extreme infallibilists” label should not be confused with my “extreme
infallibility” description in the previous chapter, which I have also referred to as “absolute infallibility” in the
beginning of this chapter, and which extends the idea of the correctness of all experts to include the fundamental tenets
(uṣūl).
204
See al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 348; Shahāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Nafāʾis al-uṣūl fī sharḥ al-maḥṣūl, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad
ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Maktabat Nizar Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1416/1995), 9:3876; idem, Sharḥ tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl, 438; al-Bukhārī,
Kashf al-asrār, 4:18; al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1319-1320.

70
despite sharing with the first group that probable cases do not possess predetermined divine
rules.
205
Alternatively, they have also been referred to as “the pure” infallibilists (al-khullaṣ), for
they have “purified” their position from the idea of verisimilitude (al-ashbah), which appears to
be a middle juristic in/fallibility position but was understood to fall under the scope of juristic
infallibility.
206

The third juristic infallibility position is based on what Aron Zysow refers to as
“verisimilitude” (al-ashbah).
207
We have noted that the infallibilists generally held that single
determined rules were absent in the sphere of probable cases. Yet, some theorists pushed back
against this claim by arguing that the legal expert (mujtahid) was a seeker (ṭālib), and every seeker
must pursue a particular object (maṭlūb), otherwise one’s act of seeking would be meaningless.
Based on this notion, some infallibilists amended their doctrine by introducing the idea of
verisimilitude, or the positing of a presumed single “truth” as an object of the expert’s inquiry and
reasoning efforts. The idea of verisimilitude was quite controversial, spawning severe
misunderstanding and criticism from various theorists. For now, it suffices to note that, most
basically, verisimilitude is the positing of a target for the purpose of validating the procedure of
legal reasoning. In other words, it builds on the assumption that had God determined a ruling in a
probable case, it would have been this one.
208
And, if there really was no ruling, there would be
nothing for the legal expert (mujtahid) to seek, no object for his legal reasoning (ijtihād).
Juristic infallibility was understood to be the preferred doctrine of virtually all Muʿtazilī
and most Ashʿarī theologian-jurists.
209
Until the fifth/eleventh century, some of the most

205
See al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1319; al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 453.
206
See al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, 6:348; Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Hindī, Nihāyat al-wuṣūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl, ed. Ṣāliḥ b. Sulaymān al-
Yūsuf and Saʿd b. Sālim al-Suwayḥ (Mecca: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya, 1416/1996), 8:3847.
207
See Zysow, The Economy, 267.
208
See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 4:296-298; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:371; al-Samarqandī, Mīzān al-uṣūl, 754.
209
See, for example, al-Samarqandī, Mīzān al-uṣūl, 754; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1549-1550; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira,
498; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:340-341; al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 453; al-Bukhārī, Kashf al-asrār, 4:18.

71
prominent Muʿtazilī infallibilists included Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 226/840), Abū ʿAlī al-
Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915) and his son Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933), Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980),
Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044).
210
Some
of the most prominent Ashʿarī infallibilists of this period were Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d.
324/935), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), and Abū
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).
211

Following this brief introduction to the doctrine of juristic infallibility and its various
manifestations, we shall explore some of the intellectual sensibilities that were guiding the
theorists’ adoption of juristic infallibility and their rejection of the opposing juristic fallibility
doctrine.
3.2 The Intellectual Sensibilities of the Infallibilists
The infallibilists constructed a theoretical framework for accommodating legal pluralism,
that is, justified legal differences. For the infallibilists, legal diversity was legitimate by default.
212

From their perspective, the earliest Muslims, especially the leading Companions, operated under
this assumption.
213
But it was their shared intellectual sensibilities that animated their adoption of
juristic infallibility and its resulting legal pluralism. Specifically, I identify two broad intellectual
sensibilities: rationalism and sectarianism.
First, the infallibilist theologian-jurists may be characterized as holding rationalist
intellectual sensibilities that they carried over from their rationalist theology into the sphere of the

210
See, for example, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī, Kitāb al-maqālāt wa maʿahu ʿuyūn al-masāʾil wa al-jawābāt, ed.
Ḥusayn Khānṣū et al. (Istanbul: Kuramer, 1439/2018), 502; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:277; Abū Ṭālib al-Hārūnī,
al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm Jadbān (n.p., 1434/2013), 4:163; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:370-371.
211
See, for example, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād (al-ṣaghīr), ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1418/1998) (henceforth al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd), 2:107, 355, 3:376-377; al-
Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:340-341; al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 453; idem, al-Mustaṣfā, 352.
212
See Zysow, The Economy, 260.
213
For more on this point, see Chapter 5.

72
law. Compared to their fallibilist counterparts, the infallibilists maintained a more significant
categorical distinction between fundamental tenets (uṣūl) and derivative matters (furūʿ) and
therefore between questions of certitude and probability. These categories were held by the
infallibilists to function in markedly different ways in both theory and substance. Reflection or
reasoning (naẓar) was presumed to be the vehicle by which one recognized one’s religious
responsibilities. Reflection using apodictic rational or scriptural evidence led one to the
fundamental tenets, which represented absolute truths. In turn, the fundamental tenets, by their
very nature, were accompanied by serious human obligations and resultant consequences vis-à-vis
the absolute truths that they represented. For example, these theorists considered the question of
the existence of God to be a fundamental tenet. That God existed was an absolute truth that was
established with certitude through rational methods. Humans, in turn, were expected to acquire
knowledge of the existence of God. The theorists understood successful fulfillment of this
obligation to entail that one had “knowledge” (ʿilm) of God’s existence and translated to one’s
inclusion in the sphere of “belief” (along with legal consequences on the ground, for e.g., the
validity of marriage to another “believer”) and otherworldly reward. On the other hand, the
rejection of the absolute truth of God’s existence entailed one’s being in a state of “ignorance”
(jahl), error (khaṭaʾ), culpability (ithm), exclusion from the sphere of “belief” (along with legal
consequences on the ground, for e.g., the invalidity of marriage to a “believer”), and possible (or
certain) otherworldly punishment. On the other hand, for the infallibilists, the absence of apodictic
methods meant that one was no longer working with fundamental tenets, and thus, excluded
absolute truth and its categories of “knowledge” versus “ignorance,” “belief” versus “disbelief,”
and especially “error” and “culpability.” For the rationalist theologian-jurists, there was a clear

73
division of labor between the two categories of the uṣūl and the furūʿ, and one simply could not
mix up the two frameworks.
The rationalist theologian-jurists, I argue, carried over this hard rationalist distinction from
their conception of theology into their conception of the law. Thus, and we shall see this more
clearly below, their equating “error” necessarily with “culpability” and its consequent social labels
(e.g., miscreance, fisq, or disbelief, kufr) informed their reading of tradition. It is for this reason
primarily, I maintain, that the infallibilists who I have identified as rationalist theologian-jurists
insisted on dismissing or reinterpreting metaphorically (taʾwīl) a large body of traditions that
expressed the earliest Muslims’ – especially the leading Companions – having admitted to their
own and others’ presumed errors in the law.
The second intellectual sensibility guiding the infallibilists was their sectarianism.
214
The
Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī infallibilists of the period under study, that is, up to the fifth/eleventh
century, operated under the broad banner of Sunnism.
215
This means two things. First, the Muʿtazilī
and the Ashʿarī infallibilists adopted, in theory and substance, one of the leading Sunnī legal
schools of the time (often the Ḥanafī and the Shāfiʿī schools and less so the Mālikī school. That
Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as theological movements faced intense backlash from other Muslim
groups, including the Traditionalist theologians, the Ḥanbalī jurists, and the Shīʿīs, did not stop
these theologian-jurists from claiming to uphold the legal doctrines and views of the Sunnī legal
schools. The second point is that, as a matter of principle, the Muʿtazilī and the Ashʿarī infallibilists

214
By the use of the term “sectarianism,” I do not intend its modern derogatory connotation that involves “extreme”
or perhaps “violent” attachment to a party or group. Instead, I simply intend to point to what one may argue is a normal
feature of religious (and any other social) groups, and that is their tendency to identify themselves and others with
particular boundary markers. In our case, the boundary markers should be understood as beliefs and practices that
distinguished between various sects within the broad banner of Islam.
215
Of course, in contrast to Ashʿarism which was eventually admitted into Sunnism (ahl al-sunna wa al-jamāʿa),
Muʿtazilism, especially post-ʿAbd al-Jabbār, was excluded from Sunnism. However, during this earlier period, both
Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism seemed to have operated within the broader scope of Sunnism, especially if we take the
latter to be a marker in contradistinction to other sectarian trends, notably Shīʿism.

74
maintained belief in the excellence of all or most of the Companions who represented the earliest
community of Muslims. Again, to take the case of the reports of the Companions’ alleged errors
as an example, the infallibilists insisted on reinterpreting or dismissing them all together.
Taken together, the rationalism and sectarianism of the Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theologian-
jurists played a fundamental role in their promotion of juristic infallibility, for as we shall see in
Chapter 4, for instance, the Sunnī proponents of the opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility did not
equate error with culpability, nor did they find it necessary to reinterpret or dismiss the large body
of reports that discussed the Companions’ errors and disagreements. In Chapter 5, we will revisit
the question of the competing memories of the early Muslim past, the status and interactions of
the Companions, and this question’s relation to the in/fallibility debate. There, we shall see more
clearly this firmly sectarian aspect of the debate.
Following this outline of the intellectual sensibilities of the infallibilists, let us consider
some of their practical concerns with the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility. It is worth noting that
there was much overlap between what I have referred to as the “intellectual” and the “practical”
concerns of the theorists, and that, essentially, the theorization of and debate over juristic
in/fallibility was a response to the “practical” problems associated with managing a proliferation
of beliefs and legal practices. However, the infallibilists were concerned with specific practical
problems, to which we will turn our attention now.
3.3 The Practical Problems of Juristic In/Fallibility
In the course of their lengthy debates, the infallibilists recognized a host of practical
problems associated with both juristic fallibility and infallibility. We’ll begin with their concerns
over juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa).

75
3.3.1 Problems with Juristic Fallibility
From the perspective of the infallibilists, there were practical problems associated with the
opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility that made it highly problematic and unfeasible as a legal
doctrine. Most prominently, the infallibilists appear to have been concerned with the socio-
political problems that juristic fallibility seemed to promote: (1) the possibility of accusations of
culpability (taʾthīm or tafsīq) and perhaps even disbelief (takfir), (2) the prohibition of offering
and following legal opinions (fatwās), and (3) the overturning of judicial rulings. We’ll take up
each problem in turn.
3.3.1.1 Accusations of culpability
The first and perhaps most serious problem with juristic fallibility from the perspective of
the infallibilists was the risk of holding the erring legal experts to be culpable for their perceived
mistakes and thus labeling them as sinner, malefactors, or disbelievers. This was often considered
to be the “extremist” tendency of juristic fallibility.
216
The infallibilists were concerned with the
possibility of accusations of culpability because, from their perspective, juristic fallibility
represented an insistence on a “single truth” (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid) for every question along with the
existence of its unequivocal evidence and the possibility of missing it (khaṭaʾ), which, in turn,
necessitated sin (ithm) and/or malefaction (fisq) if not outright disbelief (kufr).
217
From the
perspective of the infallibilists, single truths or correct answers and fallibility had to be restricted
to fundamental theological and legal tenets for which there was certainty-producing evidence. In
those cases, if one were to mistake the single truth, one would certainly be held religiously
accountable; and the one who erred could be labeled a malefactor or even a disbeliever, depending

216
See al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1320, 1328-1329.
217
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-366, 368-373; al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:210-213; al-
Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:385-386, 389; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:363-375; idem, al-Burhān, 2:1326, 1328-1329.

76
on the particular question at hand. By contrast, from the perspective of the infallibilists, the only
way to be safe from the possibility of accusations of culpability in the law was to deny the validity
of single predetermined truths or correct answers in probable cases (i.e., juristic fallibility). No
“single truth” meant no “error,” and thus no culpability.
218

Of course, the insistence on upholding juristic infallibility did not necessarily entail the
disappearance or inapplicability of culpability. Despite maintaining that all experts were “correct,”
the infallibilists themselves recognized that juristic infallibility had to be bounded. It did not make
sense to allow unbounded interpretations and consider them all equally correct. It is for this reason
that some infallibilists maintained that if a scholarly consensus existed on the validity of two views
for a particular question, introducing a third would be impermissible, the implication being that
the introduction of a third view here would amount to an act of religious disobedience and
culpability.
219
Consensus, in other words, drew the horizontal boundaries of juristic infallibility.
3.3.1.2 Prohibition of offering legal opinions
A second problem with juristic fallibility was the possibility of prohibiting legal experts
from offering legal rulings or opinions. The infallibilists argued that an insistence on the existence
of a single correct answer for every question and opening the door to the possibility of the legal
expert’s error meant that the mistaken legal expert had opposed unequivocal evidence, and, as a
result, he would have to be prohibited from offering that incorrect legal ruling or opinion.
220
Not
only would the erroneous jurist be prohibited from offering legal opinions, but laypersons would
be prohibited from asking him legal questions or following his legal views, for they were presumed

218
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:391-393. Abū al-Ḥusayn also maintains that it is not necessary that every proven
error entails malefaction (fisq), without providing an explanation. See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:389.
219
For example, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:363.
220
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 3:386, 389.

77
to be incorrect.
221
From the perspective of the infallibilists, the prohibition of offering legal
opinions and its related prohibition of asking legal questions were direct consequences of
maintaining the validity of the doctrine of juristic fallibility.
Some infallibilists insisted that even on the basic assumptions of the fallibilists about the
existence of unequivocal evidence entailing the possibility of error on the part of the jurist, the
resulting prohibition of offering legal views and prohibition of imitating a jurist would not hold.
For instance, Abū al-Ḥusayn provides the example of using the Qurʾān as evidence for legal
questions, such as the case of the order of acts in ritual ablution, where both proponents of the
obligation to observe the particular order of ablution and its opponents infer their arguments from
the same Qurʾānic verse (Q. 5:6); one group holds the fāʾ in the verse (i.e., fa-ghsilū) to entail the
obligation of successive order of acts, while the other group holds the wāw in the verse (i.e., wa-
msaḥū) to imply the opposite.
222
Abū al-Ḥusayn contends that, despite the presumption that
employing a Qurʾānic verse for a legal ruling produces certitude (ṭarīqat al-ʿilm), yet neither side
of this legal disagreement has considered the other sinful for proposing a conflicting view, and the
offering of legal opinions based on both views have been permitted.
223
As for the question of the
layperson seeking legal guidance from the erring jurist and the latter’s offering legal opinions, Abū
al-Ḥusayn argues that it is perfectly reasonable for the layperson’s benefit to be in imitating the
jurist, despite the latter’s presumed error, whether in the legal process or its results.
224
In other
words, he denies the correlation between the legal expert’s presumed error and the prohibition of
the layperson imitating that legal expert’s mistaken view. Furthermore, he argues, the legal expert
ought not to be denied offering a legal opinion: not only is there no precedent for doing so, for

221
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 3:386, 389-390.
222
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:389.
223
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:389.
224
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:389.

78
even the proponents of juristic fallibility have not prohibited their opponents from offering legal
opinions, but additionally if one legal expert prohibits the layperson from asking his opponent, his
opponent will also prohibit the layperson from asking his opponent; and because there is no
principled basis for the layperson choosing one over the other, the layperson would therefore not
be allowed to ask anyone.
225
In fact, Abū al-Ḥusayn claims, the leading Companions permitted
one another to offer legal opinions and rulings, and they did not prohibit the layperson from
following the legal opinions of others.
226
However, from the perspective of the infallibilists,
adopting juristic infallibility resolved this problem because there would be no ground to prohibit
the offering of legal rulings and its related prohibition of the layperson imitating the jurist. If all
legal experts were considered correct despite their different views, it would be meaningless to
prohibit them from offering their legal opinions and/or prohibiting others from imitating their legal
views.
3.3.1.3 Overturning rulings
A third problem with juristic fallibility from the perspective of the infallibilists was the
possibility of overturning judgments and rulings that were perceived to be wrong.
227
If one
considers a judge or jurist wrong in their legal ruling on a particular question, then who is to say
that another expert would not simply overturn that judge’s ruling? Furthermore, if one permits the
possibility of a judge being wrong in his rulings, then this would entail the problem of appointment
as well: the appointer may not appoint a judge one who will produce what are in the appointer’s
view erroneous rulings and if he does so he will have permitted the judge to rule erroneously.
228

225
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:389-390.
226
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:390.
227
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370-371; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:386, 389-391.
228
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:386, 390.

79
Denying the validity of juristic fallibility and instead adopting juristic infallibility meant avoiding
this problem all together.
Some theorists denied the relation between the possibility of the judge ruling incorrectly
and the idea that the appointee had necessarily permitted the judge to rule incorrectly.
229
For
instance, Abū al-Ḥusayn maintains that, first, a leader’s appointing a jurist whose views differ
from his own does not necessitate permission for the appointee to rule or judge erroneously, for it
is presumed that the leader appointed the expert in the first place to judge according to the truth.
Second, Abū al-Ḥusayn contends that it is also not necessary that the appointee will judge in
opposition to the view of the leader, because it is incumbent upon the judge and the expert jurist
to constantly renew their legal reasoning (ijtihād), especially when they are unable to immediate
recall their legal reasonings, and the one who continually revises his legal reasoning will certainly
come up on the correct answers. Finally, Abū al-Ḥusayn insists that if the expert judges in
opposition to the leader’s views, it is not incumbent that the leader overrules the expert’s judgment.
This is because, in the same way that it is reasonable for the benefit of a layperson to be to follow
the guidance of an erring jurist, it is also possible that the benefit here would be in not overturning
the ruling or judgment in that the benefit lies in the contending parties’ adhering to the standing
ruling.
230

To sum up, the infallibilists were concerned with several practical socio-political problems
that they presumed were a direct consequence of holding juristic fallibility. From the perspective
of the infallibilists, denying the validity of juristic fallibility and instead promoting the correctness
of all experts meant avoiding these problems.

229
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:390.
230
Al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:390-391.

80
3.3.2 Problems with Infallibility
On the other hand, the infallibilists were aware of practical problems associated with their
own doctrine of juristic infallibility. The most serious was resolving conflict between two legal
experts when the case concerned both of them.
3.3.2.1 Conflict between two experts
Perhaps the most prominent problem of juristic infallibility related to the actual
accommodation of legal diversity on the ground in cases of conflict. It was one thing to resolve
conflicting views when they related to individual persons by arguing that each is independently
correct. But what happens when there was conflict between two views and those who hold or
follow them? A prominent example of this problem was the case of the conflict over divorce
between a legal expert husband and a legal expert wife who adopted differing legal schools.
231
The
example is as follows.
Classical Muslim jurists largely agreed that a valid divorce required an actual
pronouncement of the termination of the marriage, such as the husband pronouncing to his wife:
“you are divorced.” This much was agreed upon. But what if the husband pronounced his wife
divorced in a fit of rage? Would this still be a valid divorce pronouncement, or would it be invalid
because the husband said it while he was angry? Jurists representing the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī legal
schools differed on this question. The Shāfiʿīs held that uttering the divorce pronouncement while
angry made the divorce invalid, and thus, the man and woman in the example were still technically
married. The Ḥanafīs argued that the divorce pronouncement was valid, irrespective of whether it
was uttered in a state of anger. So far, the case isn’t very controversial: depending on which school
the couple followed, they would know whether their divorce was valid. However, what if both the

231
See al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:346-350; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:376-377.

81
husband and the wife were legal experts and the husband was a Shāfiʿī, and the wife was a Ḥanafī?
In this case, if the angry Shāfiʿī husband pronounced his Ḥanafī wife divorced, we’d have a big
problem. From the perspective of the Shāfiʿī husband, they would still be married (and thus, for
example, it would be permissible for them to be intimate). But from the perspective of the Ḥanafī
wife, they would now be divorced (and thus, it would be impermissible for them to be intimate).
In this case, who’s legal view was correct? The fallibilists would use this example to argue that
considering the differing experts to be simultaneously correct entailed logical contradiction – and
quite possibly, marital frustration!
The infallibilists recognized that this was a serious problem. After all, they insisted, as we
shall see again later in this and the following chapter, that juristic infallibility should not be
mistakenly considered as a justification for contradictory legal responsibilities with respect to a
single person at a single time. In this example, however, the infallibilists would have to admit that
their doctrine was promoting contradictory responsibilities for both the husband and the wife with
respect to the validity of their marriage.
To solve this problem related to their doctrine, the infallibilists insisted on the inevitability
of conflict and its unavoidability in some cases. For example, in the example of angry divorce
between a mujtahid husband and wife, the question posed to the fallibilists (especially those who
promoted probable juristic fallibility) was: who among the two is then uniquely correct, the
husband or the wife? The proposed solution to the inevitability of conflict from the perspective of
the infallibilists was to resort to the judgment of a judge.
232
In other words, the case would have to
be taken up a judge, and whatever ruling the judge pronounced would have to be upheld by both
parties in the conflict.

232
See al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:346-350; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:376-377.

82
Now that we have explored some of the major practical problems that were associated with
both doctrines and their solutions from the perspective of the infallibilists, we turn to a more
detailed and comparative exploration of the ideas of the Muʿtazilī and the Ashʿarī infallibilists,
represented by ʿAbd al-Jabbār and al-Bāqillānī, respectively.
3.4 Muʿtazilism and Juristic Infallibility
This section explores the theory of juristic infallibility among major Muʿtazilīs, focusing
mainly on the legal theory work of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and supplements this with the work of
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, who are perhaps the two most important representatives of the final and
scholastic phase of the earlier development of Muʿtazilism.
233
Using these works, we can
reconstruct the views of earlier prominent Muʿtazilī theologian-jurists. While it is not my objective
to provide an early history of Muʿtazilism or a comprehensive account of the doctrines of the
Muʿtazilīs, it is important to note the far-reaching influence of the Muʿtazilīs not only on the
development of Muslim theology, but on the development of legal theory as well.
234
Some of the
earliest and most influential legal theorists were Muʿtazilīs, and it may be argued that the earlier
attempt to rationalize and systematize theology was inseparable from the earlier attempt to do the
same with legal methodology.
There was a tension between maintaining theoretical consistency and making sense of the
diversity of the law on the ground, especially as the legal schools were still in the process of

233
On this phase of the development of Muʿtazilism, see Sabine Schmidtke, “The Muʿtazilite Movement (III): The
Scholastic Phase,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 160-180.
234
For studies on the early history of the Mu’tazilīs, see Sarah Stroumsa, “The Beginnings of the Muʿtazila
Reconsidered,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 13 (1990): 265-293; Racha El Omari, “The Muʿtazilite
Movement (I): The Origins of the Muʿtazila,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 130-141; David Bennett, “The Muʿtazilite Movement (II): The Early
Muʿtazilites,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), 142-158; Josef van Ess, Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra: A History of
Religious Thought in Early Islam, trans. Gwendolin Goldbloom (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 2:268-389.

83
crystallizing. Many Muʿtazilīs, primarily in their roles as theologians, were not as staunch in their
legal persuasions as they were in their theological commitments. Thus, many were either Ḥanafīs
or Shāfiʿīs. One reason may be due to their adoption of juristic infallibility, that is, considering the
differing opinions of the various legal schools to be correct. An example of this legal flexibility is
the difference between Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980), who had adopted Ḥanafī law, and
who is said to have discouraged his student ʿAbd al-Jabbār from adopting Ḥanafī law and
encouraged him instead to adopt Shāfiʿī law; Abū ʿAbd Allāh is reported to have said to ʿAbd al-
Jabbār: “[law] is a discipline wherein every expert is correct; I am [already counted] among the
Ḥanafīs so you should be among the followers of al-Shāfiʿī.”
235
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s student Abū al-
Ḥusayn, in turn, was a Ḥanafī in law. It may be argued that the large-scale Muʿtazilī adoption of
juristic infallibility was strongly based on the Muʿtazilī attempt to locate itself within the wider
Sunnī legal and communal orthodoxy of the time despite its theological ostracization. Finally,
scholarship has discussed the differences between Baghdādī and Baṣran Muʿtazilism (as well as
the “older” and “newer” phases of Muʿtazilism).
236
For the purposes of this dissertation, it may be
argued that the differences between the two schools or phases did not translate into differences in
the adoption of juristic infallibility.
237
For the purposes of this dissertation, or focus will primarily
be on the theoretical framework of ʿAbd al-Jabbār.

235
See al-Balkhī et al., Faḍl al-iʿtizāl, 367; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, 112.
236
Some major Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs included Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir al-Hilālī, Abū Mūsā Ṣabīḥ al-Murdār, Jaʿfar b.
Ḥarb, Jaʿfar b. Mubashshir, ʿAbd Allāh al-Iskāfī, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, and Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī. Some
major Baṣran Muʿtazilīs included Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ, ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd, ʿUthmān al-Ṭawīl, Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Abū
Bakr al-Aṣamm, Muʿammar b. ʿAbbād, al-Naẓẓām, al-Shaḥḥām, al-Jāḥiẓ, Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, Abū
ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. For more on aspects of the Baghdādī-Baṣran
divide and the main representatives of each, see Racha El Omari, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d.
319/931) (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 1-5; Daniel Gimaret, “Muʿtazila,” EI2; Rashīd al-Khayyūn, Muʿtazilat al-Baṣra wa
Baghdād (London: Dār al-Ḥikma, 1997).
237
Major representatives of the Baghdādī school of Muʿtazilism, like their Baṣran counterparts, also adopted juristic
infallibility. See, for example, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, ed. Henrik Samuel Nyberg (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār
al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1344/1925), 160-161; al-Balkhī, Kitāb al-maqālāt, 380.

84
3.6.1 Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār
ʿImād al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī was a leading
theologian and the foremost representative of the Bahshamī branch (named after its leader Abū
Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī) of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs during his time.
238
As noted above, in law, ʿAbd al-
Jabbar would be counted as a Shāfiʿī. He was born between 320/932 to 325/937 in Asadābādh,
southwest of Hamadhān in Iran. During his youth, ʿAbd al-Jabbār traveled to various cities in Iran
and Iraq, where he studied theology, law, and heard ḥadīth. During his twenties in about 346/957
when he was in Baṣra, he began studying with the famous Muʿtazilī theologian Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm
b. ʿAyyāsh, who in turn was one of Abū Hāshim’s leading students. There is some dispute as to
whether this represented on his part a conversion from Ashʿarism to Bahshamī Muʿtazilism.
239

ʿAbd al-Jabbār then traveled to Baghdād, where he studied with Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d.
369/980), whom ʿAbd al-Jabbār would succeed as the leading representative of the Bahshamī
Muʿtazilīs. In 360/970 ʿAbd al-Jabbār began dictating a comprehensive work on Muʿtazilī
doctrine, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa al-ʿadl, while he was in Rāmhurmuz. Then in 367/977,
before al-Mughnī was complete, he became the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Rayy, at the
invitation of the resident Būyid vizier, al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995), who favored
Muʿtazilism.
240
After the death of al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād, the Būyid ruler in Rayy Fakhr al-Dawla (d.

238
Most of the following biographical information is taken from Margaretha T. Heemskerk, “ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad
al-Hamadhānī,” EI3; al-Balkhī et al., Faḍl al-iʿtizāl, 365-371; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, 112-113.
239
The Muʿtazilī biographical sources claim that ʿAbd al-Jabbār converted after having learned “the truth.” See al-
Balkhī et al., Faḍl al-iʿtizāl, 336; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, 112. While ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s alleged
conversion cannot certainly be ruled out, there does not appear to be any corroborating evidence that suggests that
ʿAbd al-Jabbār was an Ashʿarī at first, especially since he was still quite young when this conversion is held to have
taken place; although it was certainly possible that ʿAbd al-Jabbār had at least began studying (proto-?)Ashʿarī
theology. It is likely that an alleged conversion would be used as a useful trope in polemics, especially to counter the
report of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s conversion from or renunciation of Muʿtazilism.
240
For more on al-Ṣāḥib’s life, intellectual legacy, and role as patron of scholarship see Erez Naaman, Literature and
the Islamic Court: Cultural Life under al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād (New York: Routledge, 2016); Wilferd Madelung and
Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād, Promoter of Rational Theology: Two Muʿtazilī kalām texts from the
Cairo Geniza (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

85
387/997) dismissed ʿAbd al-Jabbār and confiscated his possessions as well as those of the deceased
vizier and other notable figures. After his dismissal, ʿAbd al-Jabbār continued to teach and write
until his death in Rayy at about the age of ninety in 415/1024.
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s scholarly output was very large. He is said to have written or dictated
more than seventy works in the various Islamic disciplines. In addition to his reputation as a
leading theologian, ʿAbd al-Jabbār was a major legal theoretician, recognized for his skills and
works not just by his Muʿtazilī colleagues but others as well.
241
He authored several legal theory
works, such as al-ʿUmad, Sharḥ al-ʿUmad, and al-Nihāya.
242
Also to be included in this genre is
al-Sharʿiyyāt, which is published as the seventeenth volume of his theological magnum opus al-
Mughnī.
243
This volume is ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s only surviving legal theory work. His discussion of
juristic in/fallibility in al-Sharʿiyyāt is divided into five main topics: (1) the distinction between
convictions and actions, (2) juristic infallibility as a legal tenet, (3) the epistemological conditions
for the validity of juristic infallibility, (4) the proofs for juristic infallibility, and (5) the idea of
verisimilitude (al-ashbah). We will take up each of these topics in turn.
3.6.1.1 Convictions versus Actions
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s theory of juristic infallibility begins with what appears to be a distinction
between convictions (al-iʿtiqād) and actions (al-afʿāl).
244
According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, logically
speaking, opposing convictions admit single truth only, whereas the rulings of opposing actions

241
See, for example, al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr, 1:5; Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddima, 2:201.
242
For a brief discussion about the relative chronology of the composition of these three works, see Hassan Ansari
and Sabine Schmidtke, Studies in Medieval Islamic Intellectual Traditions (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2017), 69-70,
n. 20-22.
243
There are currently two printed editions of al-Mughnī. All references in this dissertation are from the earlier edition:
al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa al-ʿadl, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī
(Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li al-Taʾlīf wa al-Tarjama, n.d.).
244
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:355-357. At first blush, this distinction seems to be different from al-Bāqillānī’s
upcoming distinction between unequivocal or apodictic beliefs and actions on the one hand and probable beliefs and
actions on the other hand. However, as we shall see below, ʿAbd al-Jabbār distinction turns out to be closer to al-
Bāqillānī’s than its first impression.

86
may accommodate differences.
245
He explains that the inability for opposing convictions to admit
more than a single truth is because “conviction” entails “absolute knowledge” (ʿilm) and the
methods that produce absolute knowledge are unchanging and universally applicable.
246
In other
words, by their very nature, it is inconceivable for two conflicting convictions to simultaneously
be true; at least one of them must be false and based on ignorance, rather than true knowledge.
And because falsity and ignorance cannot be true, it cannot be justified as correct.
On the other hand, ʿAbd al-Jabbār maintains that with actions, it is logically possible for
the obligations to act to differ between individuals depending on varying circumstances, and, as
such, it is also logically possible for differing experts in these cases to be simultaneously correct.
247

For instance, one who is in residence may be obligated to observe prayer fully, whereas one’s
neighbor who is traveling is permitted to shorten his daily prayers; in both cases, despite the
differing actions of the two with respect to the same act, they would both be correct because their
circumstances varied. Similarly, if two legal experts are obligated to engage in legal reasoning to
determine the rule for a particular question, and each arrives at a differing rule based on his
individual reasoning, both can simultaneously be considered correct.
Ultimately, however, it appears that ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s primary distinction is between
certitude and probability, not between convictions and actions. This becomes clearer in the context
of his discussion about the debate over juristic in/fallibility with respect to revelatory or scriptural
matters (al-sharʿiyyāt).
248
According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the standard of judgment for whether or
not a single truth on a scriptural matter exists is the type of evidence: absolute knowledge (ʿilm)
and with it certitude-producing evidence entails a predetermined single truth (and the error of the

245
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:355.
246
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:355.
247
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:356.
248
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:362-363.

87
opponent), whereas probability-producing evidence entails the permissibility of engaging in legal
reasoning and the correctness of all legal experts (mujtahids).
249
In other words, when unequivocal
scriptural evidence for a particular question existed, that question contained a single true answer.
But in the absence of unequivocal scriptural evidence, the most that one could expect was to have
access to probable evidence; therefore, one was expected to engage in diligent legal reasoning and
to act upon probable conclusions. And everyone who fulfilled this responsibility would be correct,
irrespective of their conclusions and whether they agreed. ʿAbd al-Jabbār insists that this was the
way that the leading Companions operated: some questions they considered to admit a single truth
only and objected to their opponents over their perceived errors, and on other questions they
considered one another correct and promoted their disagreements.
250

We may thus sum up ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s initial distinction as follows: questions for which
there is unequivocal or certitude-producing rational or scriptural evidence admit single correct
answers. In case of disagreements between experts on these questions, only one can be correct,
and the others must be wrong. In these cases, error entails culpability. These cases, we shall see,
are characterized as fundamental tenets (uṣūl). On the other hand, the absence of unequivocal
evidence puts one in the sphere of probability. When this is the case, the expert is expected to
engage in diligent reasoning and come to a probable conclusion. When this occurs, the legal expert
is considered correct, irrespective whether the legal expert’s conclusion conflicts with another’s
legal conclusion. The absence of unequivocal evidence means that one is working in the sphere of
secondary matters (furūʿ).

249
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:362.
250
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:372-373.

88
3.6.1.2 Juristic Infallibility as a Tenet
Throughout this dissertation, I have identified juristic fallibility and infallibility as
“doctrines.” For clarity, in the Introduction, I simply defined “doctrine” as “a principle of religious
belief held and taught by its proponents.”
251
However, a more accurate classification of juristic
in/fallibility is “fundamental tenet” (aṣl). This term is more accurate for it gets to the heart of the
debate over juristic in/fallibility. I mean by this that the proponents of both juristic fallibility and
infallibility insisted that the question of whether only one or all experts were correct is itself one
that admits only a single correct answer, and therefore, both juristic fallibility and infallibility
cannot simultaneously be correct as answers to the question of whether all or only one legal expert
is correct. ʿAbd al-Jabbār makes this case early on in his discussion of the debate, insisting that
this question has certitude-producing evidence for it in favor of juristic infallibility.
252
Thus, for
ʿAbd al-Jabbār (and other infallibilists, as we shall see below), the proponents of juristic fallibility
who maintain that all questions contain single correct answers are wrong on this matter.
Alternatively, the only correct answer to the question of whether all or only one legal expert is
correct is that they must all be considered correct, i.e., juristic infallibility.
Because the question concerned a fundamental legal tenet, this meant that, in theory, it
must have certitude-producing evidence for it. ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues this much, insisting that the
Companions certainly operated based on this presumption: that the Companions unanimously
agreed not to censure or object to one another’s views despite their many legal disagreements
meant that they were certain of the validity of juristic infallibility.
253
ʿAbd al-Jabbār insists that
knowledge of the Companions’ certitude on this matter is enough to establish juristic infallibility

251
See note 4 of the Introduction.
252
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.
253
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.

89
as a tenet, for the Companions must have heard something from the Prophet that produced certainty
for them, and this must be the case even if what they heard has not been transmitted through reports
over the generations.
254
In fact, he argues, the Companions’ collective agreement is a stronger form
of evidence than what any report may provide.
255
We will revisit ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s proofs for the
validity of juristic infallibility below. But before that, let us briefly explore ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s
epistemological conditions for the validity of juristic infallibility.
3.6.1.3 The Epistemological Conditions for the Validity of Juristic Infallibility
The infallibilists maintained that every legal expert was correct in cases of disagreements.
However, the validity of juristic infallibility was not without its conditions. ʿAbd al-Jabbār relates
four conditions with which differing legal experts (mujtahids) can be mutually recognized as
correct.
256
These are the epistemological conditions that must be met for the validity of juristic
infallibility.
First, ʿAbd al-Jabbār insists that the question over which there is disagreement among the
legal experts must relate to the responsibility to act (taklīf al-fiʿl wa al-tark), not to convictions.
257

We saw above that ʿAbd al-Jabbār excluded convictions from admitting more than single true or
correct answers. As examples of convictions that do not admit more than single truths, ʿAbd al-
Jabbār cites divine unicity (al-tawḥīd) or divine justice (al-ʿadl) and their related beliefs.
258
These,
we will recall, were the two fundamental theological topics over which the Muʿtazilīs and other

254
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.
255
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.
256
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357-361. The first part of this section (as well as the last part of the previous
section) was replicated and misplaced in an earlier section of the chapter on analogy. It appears that the original
manuscript copyist misplaced the single manuscript page (consisting of pages 196a and 196b in the manuscript or
pages 356-358 in the Dār al-Miṣriyya edition) where it did not belong (that is, it should have been here in the chapter
on legal reasoning but was erroneously placed in the chapter on analogy). The publisher of the Dār al-Miṣriyya edition
reproduced this error when publishing the work. Unfortunately, so did the second publisher of this work (Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya).
257
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357.
258
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357.

90
Muslim theologians disagreed; the Muʿtazilīs would come to be known as “the proponents of
divine unicity and justice” (ahl al-tawḥīd wa al-ʿadl). But what about the case of those theorists
who did not distinguish between the fundamental tenets (uṣūl) and secondary matters (furūʿ) with
respect to admitting justified differences? Did ʿUbayd Allāh al-ʿAnbarī not hold that differences
were justified even with respect to the fundamental tenets? ʿAbd al-Jabbār dismisses al-ʿAnbarī’s
idea, arguing that al-ʿAnbarī incorrectly presumed that the proponents of particular convictions do
not possess certitude-producing evidence for them, and that Muslims ought to adhere to the
apparent meanings of the Qurʾān (ẓawāhir al-qurʾān).
259
ʿAbd al-Jabbār insists that the fact is that
these and other related convictions are based on absolute knowledge (ʿilm) and rational evidence
(adillat al-ʿaql).
260
Therefore, they can only admit single correct answers.
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s second condition for the validity of juristic infallibility is that the practical
rule over which there is disagreement must be based on a preponderance of probability (tābiʿ li-
ghālib al-ẓann).
261
That is to say, it excludes rulings based on absolute knowledge (ʿilm), whether
it’s necessary (ḍarūrī) or acquired (muktasab) forms. This is because absolute knowledge, in both
of its forms, cannot differ from one person to another.
262
With the preponderance of probability,
on the other hand, it is possible for the responsibility of one person to differ from that of another,
and thus, for there to be valid differences.
Third, and related to the second condition, ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that certitude must be
unattainable (al-tawaṣṣul ilā al-ʿilm wa al-yaqīn mutaʿadhdhir).
263
He insists that reason (al-ʿaql)

259
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:358.
260
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:358.
261
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357.
262
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357.
263
The full Arabic phrase that appears in this edition is: wa min ḥaqqihi an yakūn al-tawaṣṣul ilā al-ʿilm wa al-yaqīn
mutaʿaddiy
an
. This last word is incorrectly rendered as mutaʿaddiy
an
(surpassed) and ought to be mutaʿadhdhir
an

(unattainable). Not only does mutaʿaddiy
an
not make sense in this context, but my reading is confirmed by the author
when he explains this condition by stating: “we have said that knowledge should neither actually or possibly agree or
disagree with the probability that the ruling attaches to. This is because reason dictates that probability has no ruling

91
necessitates that probability is not an acceptable criterion for action except when attaining certitude
is not possible.
264
It is for this reason that it is impermissible to act upon solitary reports when
prolific reports or other methods of absolute knowledge and certitude exist.
265
Here, there is an
epistemological hierarchy with which rulings are related: absolute knowledge (or certitude),
probability, and doubt; and a ruling is not vindicated on one level unless the level above it is
unattainable.
266

ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s fourth and final condition for the validity of juristic infallibility is that the
probability that is linked to the practical ruling must be based on a sound indicant (tābiʿ li-amāra
ṣaḥīḥa).
267
This is because, according to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, with the condition of an indicant there is
no ruling, neither rationally nor scripturally (li-anna maʿa qayd al-amāra lā ḥukm la-nā fī al-ʿaql
wa lā fī al-sharʿ). It is for this reason, he states, that God cannot obligate humans with a scriptural
ruling (fī al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya) based on the preponderance of probability except if there is a
specific indicant for it (amāra manṣūba).
268

To sum up, ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that four related epistemological conditions must be met
for the validity of considering differing legal experts correct (i.e., juristic infallibility): the
disagreement must be over an action, excluding convictions; the action must be based on a
preponderance of probability; that certitude must be unattainable; and that the preponderance of
probability must be based on the existence of s sound indicant (amāra).

expect when knowledge is unattainable” (innahu lā budda fī al-ẓann alladhī yataʿallaq al-ḥukm bihi an lā yakūn al-
ʿilm bi-wifāqihi aw khilāfihi ḥāṣil
an
wa lā mumkin
an
li-anna al-ʿaql yaqtaḍī anna al-ẓann lā ḥukm lahu illā ʿinda
taʿadhdhur al-ʿilm). See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:359.
264
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:359.
265
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:359.
266
What is meant by “unattainable” here is not necessarily a logical unattainability but even a practical one, such as,
for example, a restricted time to act. The unattainability also relates to human actions, not God’s actions, because God
can always instill absolute knowledge in humans. See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:360.
267
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:357.
268
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:359.

92
3.6.1.4 Proofs for Juristic Infallibility
ʿAbd al-Jabbār presents five proofs for the validity of juristic infallibility.
269
Four of these
proofs are “historical” and one is “theological.” Based on these proofs, ʿAbd al-Jabbār denies the
validity of several variations of the opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility.
The historical proofs are based on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s perception of the actions of the early
Muslim community, especially the Companions. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the Companions
themselves agreed that they were all correct despite their differences of opinions on various legal
questions.
270
This is based on several observations. First, the Companions did not object to one
another despite disagreeing with one another’s views.
271
But what about all the reports that indicate
that some of the Companions sometimes scolded and objected to one another’s views? ʿAbd al-
Jabbār insists that these reports are all solitary (āḥād) and do not stand up to what he regards as
the certain knowledge of the Companions’ honoring one another.
272
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s second
reason for the Companions’ agreement on the validity of juristic infallibility is his argument that
the Companions understood that they were operating within a probable (i.e., an ijtihādic)
framework; they employed their considered opinions (raʾy) and converted from one opinion to
another without recourse to considerations of correctness or error.
273
Again, ʿAbd al-Jabbār notes,
had the matter been about single truth and correctness and error, the Companions would have
objected to and overruled what they perceived to have been erroneous views and judgments; but
this did not happen.
274
Thirdly, ʿAbd al-Jabbār contends that the Companions appointed those who
opposed their views as judges and permitted them to rule in opposition to their own views; in fact,

269
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-375.
270
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.
271
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364.
272
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:365.
273
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:365.
274
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:365-366.

93
they actively referred people to them and this encouragement could would have had no place if
their disagreements entailed single truth matters.
275
The fourth and final historical reason according
to ʿAbd al-Jabbār is that the Companions generally avoided labeling one another as malefactors.
This avoidance entails their recognition that their differences did not pertain to single truth matters,
for if this was the case, opposition to single truth entails error and therefore considerations of sin
and malefaction.
276

The “historical” proofs are very important in this debate, as is evident in the discourse of
both the infallibilists and the fallibilists. It is my contention that these arguments served as the
foundation for the validity of the juristic in/fallibility doctrines. We will see how this is the case in
greater detail in Chapter 5.
The theological proof that ʿAbd al-Jabbār presents for the validity of juristic infallibility
pertains to the necessity for the existence of certainty-producing evidence for a particular single
truth question. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, a single truth question entails the existence of
evidence (dalīl) for it, for it is impermissible to be mandated by God with something that does not
possess evidence for it.
277
ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues further that the existence of evidence entails the
existence of ways to know the existence, otherwise the inability to know the existence of evidence
is like the nonexistence of evidence; it should be clear for the one who is correct as well as the one
who is wrong to know how and/or why, otherwise, their inability to know would entail an
“unbearable responsibility” (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq).
278
For ʿAbd al-Jabbār, all of this is to say that
none of these conditions apply to probable (i.e., ijtihādic) cases, and therefore, the nonexistence

275
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366.
276
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366.
277
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366.
278
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366-367.

94
of evidence, or apodictic proof, in these cases entails the nonexistence of a single truth, and
therefore differing views can be considered all together correct.
279

ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s theological proof above is based on his understanding that there can be
no religious responsibility (taklīf) without the existence of and access to clear evidence for it. If
religious responsibility depends on the availability of clear evidence, then the existence of clear
evidence entails the possibility of error, that is, with respect to one’s responsibility vis-à-vis that
evidence. This error, in turn, entails culpability, which can either be labeled as miscreance or even
disbelief. The nonexistence of evidence excludes all these possibilities.
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s insistence on the idea that the evidence’s existence or lack thereof
determines whether a question holds a single correct answer leads him to reject the validity of
several possible juristic fallibility positions.
One position that he rejects is what I referred to in the previous chapter as “extreme
fallibility.” This is the position that holds that a single true answer exists for every question, that
it possesses clear evidence (dalīl) for it, that whoever misses it has erred and is culpable, and
therefore the ruling of the mistaken judge ought to be overturned. We will recall from the previous
chapter that this was the position attributed to al-Aṣamm, al-Marīsī, and Ibn ʿUlayya. ʿAbd al-
Jabbār argues against this position.
280
It appears here that ʿAbd al-Jabbār acknowledges the limits
of clear evidence and thus the limits of objectivity. In other words, from the perspective of ʿAbd
al-Jabbār, one cannot maintain that clear and accessible evidence exists for every question, for this
is simply not the case. He argues that juristic fallibility is based incorrectly on the rejection of the
validity of legal reasoning (ijtihād).
281
He also insists that extreme juristic fallibility opposes the

279
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:367.
280
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:369-370.
281
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370.

95
preceding consensus of the Companions and Successors.
282
In other words, he maintains that there
was an absolute agreement by the Companions and Successors on the validity of juristic
infallibility; any other doctrine, therefore, contradicts this earlier consensus. ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s main
concern with the extreme fallibility position appears to be its logical conclusion: it entails
considering the Companions to have been deviant with respect to legal cases; this, he notes, is
contrary to established consensus.
283
ʿAbd al-Jabbār further distinguishes between overturning a
ruling and considering the ruling wrong: it is possible for a judge to engage in diligent legal
reasoning but still have his ruling overturned.
284
ʿAbd al-Jabbār draws on the custom of the ancient
and older legists to insist that it is known that those figures did not prohibit their opponents from
ruling in opposition to themselves nor did they nullify their rulings, despite being capable of doing
so.
285

A second juristic fallibility position that ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects is “excused juristic
fallibility.” There were two variants of this doctrine. One was based on the idea of being excused
for error due to the vagueness of the evidence. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, it is wrong to hold
that there always exists evidence (dalīl) and one may miss it and be wrong, but that, due to the
evidence’s vagueness, the one who is wrong is excused.
286
This view that ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects
appears to have been the going Sunnī juristic fallibility position, especially with most of the
jurists.
287
We ought to remember from our earlier discussion that ʿAbd al-Jabbār does not

282
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370.
283
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370.
284
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370.
285
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370. ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s point here may reveal an interesting point about the social
psychology of this position – that is, that the earliest Muslims were operating in a realm of freedom to act and away
from fear. Contrast this with the insistence by some of the Shīʿī theorists that at least some of the earliest Muslims
operated in a sphere of fear and possible dissimulation, taqiyya. See, for instance, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa ilā
uṣūl al-sharīʿa, ed. Abū al-Qāsim Gorjī (Tehran: Dāneshgāhe Tehran, 1967), 2:292-293.
286
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:368.
287
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:368.

96
distinguish between clear and vague evidence in that in both cases, the existence of evidence entails
the error of the one who misses it; and that all responsible agents (mukallafs) must have an equally
accessible way of clearly knowing their correctness from their error, otherwise anytime they are
not capable of knowing this, there can be no valid religious responsibility (taklīf) for them.
288
One
may say here that ʿAbd al-Jabbār is proposing an idea of “strong objectivity of evidence” versus a
“weak objectivity of evidence.” His strong objectivity of evidence insists on the necessity of the
existence of evidence (in single truth cases) but also on the necessity of the clarity of that evidence.
Therefore, since the existence of evidence (dalīl) entails the possibility of error, and error entails
culpability, one cannot be excused for error.
289
According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the responsible agent
(mukallaf) is commanded with what is correct and against was is wrong, and every error that is
confirmed to be commanded against is prohibited and thus detestable; thus, error must entail
culpability, which entails miscreance or even disbelief (and thus cannot be excused).
290
So far, one
may say that for ʿAbd al-Jabbār the theological underpinnings of the invalidity of “excused error”
is tied to his belief in “rational good and detestability” (al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ al-ʿaqlī), and, along
with it, “divine promise and threat” (al-waʿd wa al-waʿīd). In other words, a divine command or
prohibition necessitates the goodness or detestability of the action tied to it and thus cannot produce
an opposite consequence (i.e., reward for detestability and punishment for goodness). Finally,
ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects the example of the direction of prayer (qibla) as a justification for the
excused fallibility position. He notes that one ought not raise the example of the one who misses
the correct direction of prayer (or similar cases) as proof for the possibility of excused error in

288
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:368.
289
We may additionally suppose here that ʿAbd al-Jabbār was concerned that “excused error” could (erroneously) be
used as an excuse with respect to theological cases and the fundamental tenets. In other words, if one presumes that it
is possible to excuse error in the law and secondary cases by claiming that the evidence was vague, what stops one
from claiming the same with respect to the fundamental tenets over which disagreements arose?
290
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:368-369.

97
legal reasoning (ijtihād), because the obligation of the one who is incapable of seeing the correct
direction of the prayer is to face the direction that he preponderantly presumes to be the closest
approximation of the direction of prayer – anytime he does that diligently, he will have fulfilled
his obligation, even if he “misses” the actual direction.
291

The second variant of the excused juristic fallibility doctrine that ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects
was based on the idea of being excused for error due to one’s intending the truth. He insists that
the consequence of this position entails excusing “the Khārijīs and other deviant groups” because
one may suppose that they intended the truth and did not intentionally miss it; but if one considers
the Khārijīs as deviant and erroneous (as he presumes his interlocutors as holding), then one cannot
excuse them based on their alleged intentions.
292

The other juristic fallibility doctrine that ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects is what I refer to as
“probable juristic fallibility.” According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, one cannot propose a single truth
position that holds the indeterminacy of evidence (i.e., that cannot distinguish between true vs.
fake evidence) and thus the indeterminacy of who (exactly) is right and who is wrong.
293
He
explains that such a position contradicts the basis of religious obligation (taklīf): God cannot
mandate an obligation with evidence except that God has given the responsible agent (mukallaf) a
way of distinguishing between right and wrong.
294
In other words, evidence cannot be
indeterminate. ʿAbd al-Jabbār maintains that to insist on the possibility of the indeterminacy of
evidence entails the inability to distinguish truth from falsehood, the possibility of suggesting
indeterminacy in fundamental tenets (uṣūl), and/or an unobservable responsibility (taklīf mā lā

291
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:369.
292
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370-371.
293
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:371.
294
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:371.

98
yuṭāq).
295
All of these, of course, are problematic from his perspective. According to ʿAbd al-
Jabbār, even if one suggests that the truth is vaguely out there (i.e., one of two views, but
indeterminate which one specifically), this still entails the possibility of considering “the four”
(Sunnī jurists or caliphs?) to have erred and deviated even if they are unspecified; and this
contradicts consensus.
296
ʿAbd al-Jabbār states that it is for this reason (the possibility of
considering deviant) that some have all together avoided accusations of disbelief (takfir) and held
that anyone who holds a reasonable interpretation (mutaʾawwil) of religion ought not be considered
a disbeliever nor deviant, permitting reasonable interpretation in the fundamental tenets (uṣūl) in
the same manner as secondary cases (furūʿ).
297
This is likely a reference to al-ʿAnbarī, who, as we
noted earlier, was perceived to have proposed an idea of absolute infallibility, including in the
sphere of religious tenets.
Finally, the last position that ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects is the one that holds that two differing
legal experts can both be correct in the act of legal reasoning (ijtihād), but only one is correct in
its legal conclusion (al-mujtahad fīhi) and the error of the other is forgiven. ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejects
the distinction in correctness between the act and the result. He insists that it is invalid for an act
of legal reasoning to be correct but that its conclusion is wrong; this is because the legal conclusion,
which is an act, follows the ijtihād; and the two must be aligned.
298
In other words, if the act of
legal reasoning is considered correct, so must its conclusion; and if the act of legal reasoning is
considered wrong, so must its conclusion.

295
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:371-372.
296
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:372.
297
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:372.
298
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:373.

99
The final aspect of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s discussion over juristic in/fallibility that we will briefly
explore here is the idea of verisimilitude (al-ashbah), which we were introduced to earlier in the
chapter.
3.6.1.5 Verisimilitude (al-ashbah)
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, like other theorists, contends that the discussion over verisimilitude (al-
ashbah) applies only to the doctrine of juristic infallibility.
299
He notes that some of the
infallibilists hold that the validity of the obligation to engage in legal reasoning (ijtihād)
necessitates the existence of a requested thing (maṭlūb); that a search requires that which is sought
and that cannot be probability; that the requested thing is not an actual object but a posited divine
ruling; that one who misses it still has fulfilled his obligation; and that this is like the case of the
choices of expiation: one may choose any one of them and possibly choose the better or more (or
less) suitable option despite still having fulfilled his obligation.
300

The idea of verisimilitude appears to have been a way for some of the infallibilists to come
to terms with the Prophet’s report on the rewards of the correct and mistaken judge, as well as the
objective of engaging in legal reasoning.
301
They attempted to understand how it was possible for
a judge to be wrong but still rewarded, so they proposed the idea of the possibility of several
choices but the positing of a more suitable (verisimilar) choice; and the one who acquires the more
suitable choice is rewarded more, while the one who misses it is rewarded less, but that they both
had fulfilled their responsibilities of engaging in legal reasoning and searching for the more
suitable choice. The argument is that the term “he misses” (akhṭaʾa) here would not carry the
implications of culpability, but rather simply mean that the legal expert “did not acquire the

299
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:376.
300
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:376.
301
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:376-379.

100
verisimilar option,” which he was not required to acquire in the first place, but simply to search
for.
ʿAbd al-Jabbār suggests that this verisimilitude position is sensible only if it entails that the
responsibility of the legal agent (mukallaf) is to reflect using correct indicants and arrive at a state
of preponderant probability, after which the ruling follows, and that no other explanation would
be sensible. He also appears to reject the validity of positing the existence of a divine ruling, that
is, attributing the verisimilar object to God.
302
In other words, for ʿAbd al-Jabbār, it made no sense
to propose any other understanding of the responsibility of the legal expert in probable cases.
Simply, the legal expert was expected to engage in diligent legal reasoning using the evidence at
hand and acting upon his sense of preponderant probability. To put it differently, there was no
point in positing or imagining any other requirement.
3.5 Ashʿarism and Juristic Infallibility
It is not my objective to present a comprehensive history of Ashʿarism or an account of the
school’s doctrines.
303
This section will present a brief overview of some of the earlier intellectual
developments leading up to emergence of the debate over juristic in/fallibility of Abū Bakr al-
Bāqillānī, who, along with Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, were perhaps the foremost “earlier” (al-
mutaqaddimūn) representatives of the classical period of Ashʿarism.
304
Using their legal theory
works, we can reconstruct the views of earlier and other Ashʿarīs. Like their early Muʿtazilī
theologian predecessors, many early Ashʿarī theologians were also skilled legal theorists. I have

302
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:379.
303
For an account of the theological contributions of some of the school’s most important representatives before al-
Ghazālī, see Jan Thiele, “Between Cordoba and Nīsābūr: The Emergence and Consolidation of Ashʿarism (Fourth-
Fifth/Tenth-Eleventh Century),” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 225-241. W. Montgomery Watt has provided a very brief overview of the Ashʿarīs: W.
Montgomery Watt, “Ashʿariyya,” EI2.
304
My use of the phrase “classical Ashʿarism” follows the work of Richard M. Frank. See, for example, his republished
works in Richard M. Frank, Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites, ed. Dimitri Gutas (New York: Routledge,
2016).

101
referred to these thinkers as theologian-jurists to note their extensive work in both theology and
legal theory. Like their Muʿtazilī counterparts, Ashʿarī theologian-jurists adopted various Sunnī
legal schools, mostly the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī schools. In the case of the two theologian-jurists
mentioned above, al-Bāqillānī was a Mālikī and al-Juwaynī was a Shāfiʿī.
Ashʿarism’s origins begin with the school’s eponym and founder, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī
(d. 324/935).
305
He was born around 260/874 in Baṣra, where he began his education. Baṣra at the
time of al-Ashʿarī was a leading center of religious teaching and especially rationalistic theology.
Al-Ashʿarī studied theology with the acclaimed Muʿtazilī theologian Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d.
303/915), before he is said to have renounced Muʿtazilism at around the age of 40 at the turn of
the third/ninth century and adopted the major tenets of the Sunnī Traditionalists. He defended them
through rational theological methods, thereby attracting many disciples. He would go on to live
and teach in Baṣra before moving to Baghdād and living there for the rest of his life. Al-Ashʿarī
and his early disciples of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries faced attack not only from
the Muʿtazilīs, but also the Sunnī Traditionalists, the Māturīdīs and the Shīʿīs. Despite this, Ashʿarī
doctrines and theology would continue to influence the Arabic-speaking Sunnī world.
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī appears to have written a few works on legal theory topics, such
as a book entitled al-Ijtihād fī al-Aḥkām (Legal Reasoning in Rulings).
306
Most legal theorists
relate that al-Ashʿarī adopted juristic infallibility.
307
Most of al-Ashʿarī’s followers also adopted

305
The following biographical information is taken from W. Montgomery Watt, “al-Ashʿarī, Abu ʾl-Ḥasan,” EI2. For
more, see the introductions to al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt; idem, al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna, ed. Fawqiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd
(Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār, 1397/1976).
306
For a list of al-Ashʿarī’s works, see Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabyīn kidhb al-muftarī fī-mā nusib ilā al-Ashʿarī (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1404/1983), 128-136 (a few titles that appear to discuss legal theory at 133). For more on al-Ashʿarī’s
legal theory, see Muḥammad Kamāl Imām, “al-Manhajiyya al-uṣūliyya ʿinda al-imām Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī: ʿarḍ
wa taḥlīl,” al-Tajdīd 14, 28 (1431/2010): 77-100; Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Maysāwī and Bilāl Barakāt Salhab, “Ārāʾ Abī
al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī fī masāʾil uṣūl al-fiqh wa atharuhā fī ikhtiyārātihi al-kalāmiyya,” Majallat al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-
Muʿāṣir 25, 98 (1440/2019): 11-44.
307
See, for example, al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Nibālī and Bashīr al-ʿAmrī (Beirut: Dār
al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1417/1996), 3:340-341; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1549-1550; al-Shīrāzī, al-Lumaʿ, 305; al-

102
juristic infallibility,
308
including major thinkers of the fourth to sixth/tenth to twelfth centuries,
such as al-Bāqillāni, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and others.
309

Other Ashʿarīs of this period adopted the opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility, as we shall see in
the next chapter.
The most important earlier Ashʿarī theologian-jurist to discuss the problem of juristic
in/fallibility is al-Bāqillānī, to whom we will turn to now to explore his discussion of the debate.
3.5.1 Al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī
Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī (sometimes “Ibn al-Bāqillānī”) was among
the leading theologian-jurists of his time.
310
He was born in Baṣra sometime in the earliest part of
the fourth/tenth century, where he appears to have begun his education. He moved to Baghdād,
where he continued his studies and taught until his death there in 403/1013. He is counted among
the leading representatives of the Ashʿarī school. He was a Mālikī in law, having studied under the
leading Mālikī scholar of Baghdād, Abū Bakr al-Abharī (d. 375/985), before himself holding that
position. He was appointed as judge and employed on a diplomatic mission to the Byzantine court
by the Būyid ruler ʿAḍud al-Dawla (d. 372/983). He was a skilled dialectician and his biographers
depict him debating cunningly with his adversaries.
311
Al-Bāqillānī, in a manner appropriate to

Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd, 4:313-314; al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl, 561. Some authors have suggested that al-Ashʿarī held
both the infallibility and fallibility doctrines. See, for example, Ibn ʿAqīl, al-Wāḍiḥ, 5:358; al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām, 4:184;
al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr, 8:282. Al-Ashʿarī’s other extant works indicate that he adopted juristic infallibility, especially
as it relates to justifying the earliest Muslim civil wars. See, for example, al-Ashʿarī, al-Ibāna, 260.
308
See al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 498; al-Samarqandī, Mīzān al-uṣūl, 754; Āl Taymiyya, al-Musawwada, 506; ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm b. al-Ḥasan al-Isnawī, Nihāyat al-sūl sharḥ minhāj al-wuṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1420/1999),
399.
309
For al-Bāqillāni and al-Juwaynī, see below. For al-Ghazālī, see al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, 352 onward. For al-Rāzī,
see al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, 6:29 onward.
310
Most of the following on al-Bāqillānī’s biography is extracted from: al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, 2:455-458; al-
Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik wa taqrīb al-masālik, ed. Saʿīd Aḥmad Aʿrāb (al-Muḥammadiyya, Morocco: Maṭbaʿat
Faḍḍālla, 1981-1983), 7:44-70; Richard J. McCarthy, “al-Bāḳillānī,” EI2; Yusuf Ibish, “Life and Works of al-
Bāqillānī,” Islamic Studies 4, 3 (1965), 225-236.
311
For some of his reported debates, see, for example, al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 7:50-68. His reportedly
successful debates with his contemporary Imāmī theologian al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (“Ibn al-Muʿallim”) are especially
interesting, for, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Shīʿī sources paint an entirely different picture of al-Bāqillānī

103
someone of his stature, was also a prolific author; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149), relating from his
teacher Abū ʿAlī al-Ṣadafī (d. 514/1120) and in addition to his own knowledge, attributed to al-
Bāqillānī some fifty titles on various topics.
312
In addition to his repute as a leading theologian, al-
Bāqillānī was also an astute legal theorist.
313
The sources name several of his legal theory works.
It appears that his only surviving work in this genre is al-Taqrīb wa al-Irshād. Al-Bāqillānī
composed three works of varying lengths (“short,” “medium,” and “long”) with the title al-Taqrīb
wa al-irshād. The long and medium-sized versions appear to be lost. The shortest version (al-
ṣaghīr, which is hardly short!) contains two partially published editions. The first is a 1418/1998
three-volume edition by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd.
314
Abū Zunayd’s edition contains al-
Bāqillānī’s discussions on the introductory elements of legal theory, commands, prohibitions, and
other linguistic aspects of the discipline. The second edition is a 1436/2015 single volume that
represents, according to its editor Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Duwaysh, the final volume of
the work.
315
This volume contains a partial discussion on analogy, imitation (taqlid), and aspects
of legal reasoning.
Al-Bāqillānī’s theory of juristic infallibility is most clearly spelled out in the extant parts
of his al-Taqrīb. His discussion centers on five topics: (1) the distinction between unequivocal and

helplessly being defeated in debate by al-Mufīd. In a severely competitive and sometimes contentious environment
such as that of Baghdād in the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries, reports of various scholars masterfully defeating
the major representatives of their opponents’ schools clearly served polemical purposes.
312
Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 7:69-70.
313
David Vishanoff has studied al-Bāqillānī’s legal hermeneutics (i.e., his linguistic interpretations) in David R.
Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (New
Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011), 152-189. See also Firās ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Aḥmad al-Shāyib, “al-Ārāʾ al-
uṣūliyya li-Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī fī al-muqaddimāt al-uṣūliyya wa dalālāt al-alfāḍ wa
ʿawāriḍuhā: dirāsa muqārana,” MA thesis, Jāmiʿat Āl al-Bayt, Jordan, 1421/2000; Nawāl al-Ṭāhir al-Amīn,
“Ikhtiyārāt al-imām al-Bāqillānī fī al-istithnāʾ wa al-qiyās min khilāl kitābihi al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād,” MA thesis,
Jāmiʿat Umm Darmān al-Islāmiyya, Sudan, 1433/2012.
314
Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād (al-ṣaghīr), ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd (Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1418/1998) (henceforth al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd).
315
Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād, ed. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Duwaysh (Kuwait: Wizārat
al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1436/2015) (henceforth al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh).

104
probable questions, (2) universally- versus subjectively applicable rulings, (3) juristic infallibility
as a legal doctrine or tenet, (4) the responsibility of the legal expert (mujtahid), and (5) the meaning
and implications of “error” (khaṭaʾ). We will examine al-Bāqillānī’s discussion of each of these
topics in turn.
3.5.1.1 Unequivocal vs. Probable Questions
Al-Bāqillānī’s theory of juristic infallibility begins with a distinction between questions for
which there is unequivocal evidence and those that lack unequivocal evidence.
316
The first type,
or what can be termed “unequivocal matters” (al-masāʾil al-qāṭiʿa), include both tenets (uṣūl al-
dīn) and actions for which there is apodictic rational or revelatory evidence.
317
Al-Bāqillānī
includes several examples of unequivocal matters. Among the tenets are belief in God’s unicity
(al-tawḥīd), belief in prophethood (al-nubuwwa), affirming God’s attributes (ṣifāt Allāh), denying
the creation of God’s speech (khalq kalāmih), and belief in God’s power over the actions of His
creation (qudratuhu ʿalā afʿāl ʿibādih).
318
Among the actions, these are the obligation to fast
during the month of Ramaḍān, to observe the daily prayers, and to pay alms.
319
These and other
similar beliefs and actions all belong to the sphere of unequivocal matters, for they possess
apodictic and certainty-producing evidence. The second type, or “ijtihādic matters” (al-masāʾil al-
ijtihādiyya), are questions that do not possess unequivocal evidence. Rather, these questions are
based on preponderant probability (ghalabat al-ẓann) and considered opinion (al-raʾy).
320

Al-Bāqillānī maintains that the difference between the two types of questions is that
unequivocal matters do not admit justified difference in views nor the permissibility of choice

316
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 2:355; al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26-28, 278-292.
317
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26.
318
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26.
319
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26.
320
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 27.

105
between differing views, neither with respect to a single person nor two or more people.
321
In other
words, when it comes to unequivocal matters, a single person may not justifiably hold two
conflicting views with respect to a single question: one may not, for example, believe that God’s
speech is created and uncreated, or that it is obligatory and not obligatory to observe the daily
prayers. Additionally, two people who hold two conflicting views – such that one believes that
God’s speech is created and a second believes that God’s speech in uncreated, or that one holds
that observing prayers is obligatory while the other holds that it is not – cannot simultaneously be
correct. Unequivocal matters possess singularly true answers to them and, according to al-
Bāqillānī, there is scholarly agreement that there could be no justified disagreement over them.
322

In contrast to unequivocal matters, ijtihādic matters are the space for disagreement.
According to al-Bāqillānī, ijtihādic matters not only permit disagreement among scholars, but also
accommodate justified disagreement and the correctness of all experts (mujtahids), or, possibly,
their excused error.
323
But al-Bāqillānī notes that, unlike the scholarly agreement on the
impermissibility of justified disagreement with respect to unequivocal matters, there is some
disagreement between scholars whether it may be permissible for a single person to hold two
conflicting views in ijtihādic matters: the majority of the theologians and jurists considered it
impermissible for a single scholar to hold two conflicting views, whereas some permitted this; this
latter group included al-Shāfiʿī and some of his followers.
324
From the perspective of al-Bāqillānī,

321
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26.
322
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 26. Of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, al-ʿAnbarī had built a
reputation for having been a clear proponent of the justification of conflicting views in cases that were categorized as
the fundamental tenets of religion (uṣūl al-dīn). While al-Bāqillānī notes that al-ʿAnbarī considered “correct” anyone
whose diligent reasoning led him to a view, he also notes that scholars disagreed about what exactly al-ʿAnbarī meant
by all being “correct.” He notes that he will explain this further in another section of his work, but, unfortunately, that
section of his work is missing. See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 2:185.
323
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 2:355. We shall see below that al-Bāqillānī is critical of and considers to
be a contradiction what I am calling the Sunnī probable juristic fallibility doctrine. See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-
Duwaysh, 30-31.
324
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 28.

106
al-Shāfiʿī was certainly an infallibilist: there was no way that al-Shāfiʿī held the truth to be singular
in ijtihādic matters for the fact is that he claimed that one may hold two views with respect to a
single question.
325
In al-Bāqillānī’s view, one may not simultaneously hold that the truth is single
and the permissibility of holding two conflicting views on a question. If one holds that latter view,
then one must be an infallibilist. However, al-Bāqillānī himself insists that neither the infallibilists
nor the fallibilists ought to hold that it is permissible for one person to hold two conflicting views
at one time with respect to oneself or another: one cannot believe that an action is both permissible
and prohibited with respect to a single person in a single case.
326
In fact, this idea would be
promoted by some fallibilists in order to insist on the logical impossibility of holding juristic
infallibility.
327
It is perhaps for this reason that al-Bāqillānī insists that juristic infallibility should
not be understood to affirm the validity of conflicting rulings with respect to the same person at
the same time.
328
From his perspective, the real difference between the infallibilists and the
fallibilists here is that the infallibilists may allow choice between various views (takhyīr), whereas
the fallibilists may not.
329
The infallibilists allow both the mujtahid and the muqallid to freely
choose from a range of various equally valid results.
330

3.5.1.2 Universally- vs. Subjectively Applicable Rulings
One of the major results of al-Bāqillānī’s distinction between unequivocal and ijtihādic
matters is that the former are universal in their applicability, whereas the latter’s applicability may
be subjective.
331
Al-Bāqillānī argues that it may be possible that a ruling is true and correct with

325
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 55-68, esp. 67-68.
326
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 29.
327
For more on this, see Chapter 4.
328
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 29, 41, 49.
329
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 29-30.
330
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 52-57.
331
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 1:299-301, 3:213.

107
respect to one person, but not true and correct with respect to another. An example of this is the
difference in the obligations of prayer and fasting for one who is traveling to a place versus one
who resides there.
332
The traveler shortens his daily prayer and does not fast during the month of
Ramaḍān, whereas the resident prays fully and fasts. In fact, the subjectivity of the ruling even
applies to a single person, for example, depending on whether the person is traveling or not. Thus,
an action may have a mandatory, permissible, or prohibited ruling, depending on various
conditions. Another example is with labeling an act as “discouraged” (makrūh). Al-Bāqillānī states
that in the absence of unequivocal evidence for permissibility or impermissibility and the case
based on reasoning and probability, when there is disagreement over the permissibility and
impermissibility of an act, one may not label the act as universally discouraged, but as discouraged
with respect to the one who considers the act impermissible. This is especially the case based on
juristic infallibility in legal matters (furūʿ al-dīn), and that the “truth” resides in all views (anna
al-ḥaqq fī jamīʿ al-aqāwīl).
333

The significance of the possibility of a ruling’s subjectivity perhaps sets the stage for the
possibility of differing experts to be correct: if the ruling can differ from one person to another,
then similarly, the ruling or obligation of one mujtahid can differ from that of another. We’ll return
to the differing obligations of the mujtahids shortly.
3.5.1.3 Juristic Infallibility: An Unequivocal Question
An important outcome of the distinction between unequivocal and ijtihādic matters is that
the debate over juristic in/fallibility itself then must be characterized: is the question of the
correctness of one or all legal experts an unequivocal or ijtihādic matter? This is partly why I refer
to juristic fallibility and fallibility as doctrines and as producing competing orthodoxies. Al-

332
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:213.
333
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 1:299-301.

108
Bāqillānī, like his fellow infallibilists, strongly insists that juristic fallibility is wrong.
334

Additionally, he argues for the contradiction of what he saw to be the prevalent juristic fallibility
doctrine of the day, which promoted the idea of the existence of a single truth in ijtihādic matters
and the possibility of the expert’s error while also holding that the expert was still obligated to act
upon his legal reasoning. From the perspective of al-Bāqillānī, to hold these two views entailed
contradiction: how can one who is prohibited from adopting and acting upon an erroneous ruling
still be commanded to act according to the erroneous results of his ijtihād? For al-Bāqillānī, this
entails the absurd belief that God has commanded one to act upon that which God has prohibited
acting upon.
335
In this way, al-Bāqillānī and his fellow infallibilists (as well as the Shīʿī fallibilists,
as we shall see in the next chapter) were alert to the tension of holding the “excused error” position,
or what I call Sunnī probable juristic fallibility, which we will introduce in more detail in the next
chapter. This tension lay in the conflict over the nature of the legal expert’s obligation in ijtihādic
matters, which makes up the next part of al-Bāqillānī’s theory that we will discuss.
3.5.1.4 The Mujtahid’s Responsibility
As noted earlier in the chapter, the theoretical framework of the juristic infallibility doctrine
begins with the idea of religious obligation (al-taklīf). Specifically, the responsibility here focused
on that of the legal expert, the mujtahid. What was the mujtahid’s responsibility? According to al-
Bāqillānī, the mujtahid is simply mandated to act based on his considered belief, irrespective of
whether that belief hits or misses (reality).
336
He notes that this is like the example of the direction
of prayer, when one is obligated to pray toward the direction that he assumes to be the direction of

334
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:428.
335
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 29-31.
336
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:425-427; al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 292.

109
prayer, irrespective whether his probability/assumption corresponds to (the actual) direction or
not.
337

The example of the direction of prayer was a favorite and highly controversial example in
this debate. It appears that the infallibilists used it to argue that in the absence of unequivocal
evidence, the obligation of the mujtahid is to act upon his individual legal reasoning, in the same
way that in the absence of the actual direction of prayer, the obligation is to pray toward what one
approximates as the direction of prayer. In both cases, once one does so, one fulfills one’s
obligation (i.e., the obligation is specifically related to acting upon one’s probability, not anything
beyond that, including acquiring the actual direction/reality).
3.5.1.5 The Meaning and Place of “Error” (khaṭaʾ)
According to al-Bāqillānī, the Companions’ “errors” ought to be understood as faulty
ijtihād because proper ijtihād entails correctness with no room for error.
338
In other words, because
the emphasis is on the process of ijtihād and the activity of the mujtahid, the only way one may
assume the existence of “error” is with respect to faulty ijtihād. It is not that the person engaging
in ijtihād is infallible, but that he may engage in a faulty process of legal reasoning, and for this
reason alone be considered having erred. One may not attempt to argue that “error” refers to
missing either the “truth” or verisimilitude (al-ashbah). Missing the truth or verisimilitude is
invalid or inconceivable.
339
But even with the possibility of faulty reasoning, the mujtahid’s “error”
(faulty reasoning) should not be assumed to entail damnation.
340
This also applies to non-
Companion mujtahids, for all mujtahids are the same.
341

337
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:426.
338
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:210-212; Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 174, 189.
339
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 174, 189.
340
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:210-212.
341
Al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:213.

110
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that the doctrine of juristic infallibility as
espoused by the Muʿtazilī and the Ashʿarī theologian-jurists was highly dependent on their
rationalistic intellectual sensibilities. I have identified these theorists as holding rationalist
presuppositions that they carried into the law from theology.
If Ashʿarism as an intellectual movement developed as a reaction to Muʿtazilism with the
ideas and methods of the school’s putative founder Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, then it possible that,
from a diachronic perspective, juristic infallibility was first promoted by the Muʿtazilī theologian-
jurists then adopted by most of their Ashʿarī counterparts. But it is also true if we consider the
development of legal theory in the context of the development of the “rational” disciplines, i.e., as
a systematic rationalization of the law and its sources. In this sense, it is quite plausible that many
Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī legal theorists would share a doctrine in regard to both method and
substance. The legal theorists from both groups shared a concern for systematic rationalization of
theological and legal thought. They also shared an approach to the rational methodology of
reflection (al-naẓar) and reinterpretation of the texts (al-taʾwīl) and the epistemological distinction
between uṣūl and furūʿ and their methods. These shared concerns sometimes led to shared
doctrines. In legal theory, they shared an adoption of juristic infallibility.
From the perspective of some of the infallibilists, however, the debate over juristic
in/fallibility was purely intellectual. Al-Juwaynī presents an interesting analysis of the debate over
juristic in/fallibility, arguing that it is really a debate over expression (fī al-ḥaqīqa yaʾūl al-khilāf
ilā lafẓ) with no practical consequences on the ground. This is because, he insists, everyone agrees
on the legal expert’s (mujtahid) obligation to act according to his preponderant supposition and no
Muslim permits considering the erring mujtahid as culpable (lā yastajīz muslim taʾthīm

111
mujtahid).
342
In making this argument, al-Juwaynī is excluding from this alleged agreement those
who would not agree that the legal expert’s obligation was to act according to his preponderant
supposition and/or those who permitted considering the erring legal expert as culpable. This is his
construction of orthodoxy. Certainly, this orthodoxy excluded at least some of the fallibilists,
whose doctrine of juristic fallibility we will turn to next.

342
Al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1326.

112
Chapter 4: Juristic Fallibility (al-takhiṭʾa) and the Fallibilists (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa)
In the previous chapter, we saw that juristic infallibility (al-taṣwīb) was the favored
doctrine of virtually all the Muʿtazilī and most of the Ashʿarī legal theorists up to the fourth/tenth
and fifth/eleventh centuries. The starting point for juristic infallibility for these theorists was that
the absence of unequivocal evidence for a particular question made it “an ijtihādic question.” This
absence of unequivocal evidence meant that God had not determined a single correct answer for
that question. In these cases, the responsibility of the legal expert was to exert his utmost effort in
legal reasoning and to act upon the results of his most probable conclusion. When the legal experts
did this, they were all equally correct, including when their legal conclusions differed with one
another. The insistence on the correctness of the differing legal experts meant the absence of error
in diligent juristic reasoning and its results.
In this chapter, I explore the opposing doctrine of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa), which
holds that a single correct answer exists (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid) for every question regardless of the
epistemological value of its evidence, and that a legal expert may hit or miss (yukhṭiʾ wa yuṣīb)
that single answer. It followed from this that when legal experts differed on a question, only one
was correct (muṣīb) and the others were wrong (mukhṭiʾ).
We shall see below that juristic fallibility was the favored doctrine of many Sunnī
theologian-jurists, including the Traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth) and the traditionally-inclined
Ashʿarīs (as opposed to their rationally-inclined counterparts who we encountered in the previous

113
chapter).
343
Juristic fallibility was also adopted unanimously by the Imāmī Shīʿīs.
344
My study in
this chapter describes and synthesizes the ideas of the proponents of juristic fallibility among Sunnī
and Shīʿī theologian-jurists of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. When compared
together, we find that the doctrine of juristic fallibility as expounded upon by thinkers belonging
to the two groups was theorized in some similar ways but ended up producing different results. In
Chapter 5, I will show how the crystallization of sectarian and doctrinal identities during the period
under study undergirded these differing results.
My presentation in this chapter begins with an overview of juristic fallibility and its two
major subdivisions. I follow this with an exploration of some of the main intellectual and practical
concerns of the fallibilists, as well as some of the practical problems associated with juristic
infallibility and fallibility from the perspective of the fallibilists. This is followed by a more
detailed critical and comparative study of the discussions of major proponents of juristic fallibility
representing Sunnism and Shīʿism, focusing on the ideas of the Sunnī Traditionalist al-Qāḍī Abu
Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066) and the Imāmī Shīʿīs al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) and al-
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067).

343
For more on my distinction between the “rationally-inclined” theorists and their “traditionally-inclined”
counterparts, see section 4.2 below. Juristic fallibility was also the favored doctrine of the Ẓāhirīs and the Central
Asian Ḥanafīs (later the Māturīdīs), whose ideas fall outside the scope of this dissertation. For the Ẓāhirī position, see
Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda,
1928), 5:64-86. For the Central Asian Ḥanafīs/Māturīdīs, see Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī,
ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī (Hyderabad: Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1414/1993), 1:127, 296, 2:14, 90-
91, 129-131, 141-142, 212; al-Samarqandī, Mīzān al-uṣūl, 753-762; al-Bukhārī, Kashf al-asrār, 4:16-32; Saʿd al-Dīn
al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390), Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid al-nasafiyya (Karachi: Maktabat al-Madīna, 1433/2012), 360-364.
344
We will see in Chapter 5 that the concept of the inerrancy or divine protection from error (ʿiṣma) of the Imām is
what distinguished the Zaydī, Ismāʿīlī, and Imāmī Shīʿīs with respect to their adoption of juristic in/fallibility; those
who upheld the necessity of the Imāms’ inerrancy promoted juristic fallibility whereas those who did not uphold the
Imāms’ inerrancy promoted juristic infallibility. A detailed exploration of the ideas of the Zaydī and the Ismāʿīlī legal
theorists of the period under study fall outside the scope of this dissertation. For juristic infallibility in the thought of
the Zaydīs, see al-Hārūnī (d. 424/1032), al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 4:159-234. For juristic fallibility in the thought of the
Ismāʿīlīs, see al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory
(Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib), ed. and trans. Devin Stewart (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 303-317;
idem, Daʿāʾim al-islām, ed. Āṣif b. ʿAlī Aṣghar Fayḍī (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1383/1963), 2:528-529, 531.

114
4.1 What is Juristic Fallibility?
The Arabic term al-takhṭiʾa that I have translated to “juristic fallibility” in English relates
to the word “error” (al-khaṭaʾ) and its root is kh-ṭ-ʿ.
345
Linguistically, according to Ibn Manẓūr, al-
khaṭaʾ is defined as “the opposite of correctness” (ḍidd al-ṣawāb).
346
One thus may speak or act
mistakenly (akhṭaʾa or takaṭṭaʾa), such as when one diverts from a path (akhṭaʾa al-ṭarīq) or when
a hunter misses his target (akhṭaʾa al-rāmī al-gharaḍ). In this case, one would be considered
erroneous or mistaken (mukhṭiʾ); one may also label others as mistaken (khaṭṭaʾa [fulān]).
347
It
appears that for Ibn Manẓūr the error that is associated with the word khaṭaʾ is irrespective of
intention. However, the variation of the word that is used to describe this error changes depending
on whether the error is intended or not. Thus, al-khaṭaʾ is used when the error is unintentional and
is therefore without culpability, such as the Qurʾānic examples: “There is no blame upon you for
being mistaken therein, but only for that which your hearts intend” (laysa ʿalaykum junāḥ
un
fī-mā
akhṭaʾtum bi-hi wa lākin mā taʿammadat qulūbukum) (Q. 33:5) and “It is not for a believer to slay
a believer, unless it be in error. Whosoever has slain a believer in error…” (wa mā kāna li-muʾmin
in

an yaqtula muʾmin
an
illā khaṭaʾ
an
wa man qatala muʾmin
an
khaṭaʾ
an
) (Q. 4:92).
348
When the error
is intentional, the more suitable word is al-khiṭʾ, and thus relates to sin or culpability, such as the
Qurʾānic example: “Surely their slaying is a great sin” (inna qatlahum kāna khiṭʾ
an
kabīr
an
) (Q.
17:31).
349

According to al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-khaṭaʾ means “going off course” (al-ʿudūl ʿan al-
jiha).
350
This, he suggests, can happen in three ways. The first is when one intends and performs

345
Aron Zysow has translated the term to “fallibilism.” See Zysow, The Economy, 264 and passim.
346
Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1:65.
347
See Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1:65.
348
See Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1:65-66.
349
See Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, 1:66-67.
350
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 287.

115
what ought not to be intended or what is unpraiseworthy (an turīd ghayr mā taḥsun irādatuhu fa-
tafʿalahu); this is “absolute error” (al-khaṭaʾ al-tāmm), which entails accountability.
351
The second
way is when one intends what is praiseworthy but performs its opposite (an yurīd al-insān mā
yaḥsun fiʿluh wa lākin yaqaʿ minhu khilāf mā yurīd); this, al-Iṣfahānī notes, is what is intended by
the Prophetic statement: “whoever engages in diligent reasoning but errs is rewarded once” (man
ijtahada wa akhṭaʾa fa-lahu ajr).
352
Here, one is free from culpability for this unintended error.
Finally, one may intend what ought not to be intended but perform its opposite; al-Iṣfahānī
contends that in this case, one is wrong (mukhṭiʾ) in his intention but right (muṣīb) in his action
and therefore dispraised with respect to his intention but not praised with respect to his action.
353

For these two lexicographers, in addition to one’s action, one’s intention plays a role in whether
the correct term used is khaṭaʾ or khiṭʾ. The use of khaṭaʾ is reserved for unintended errors in
actions coupled with praiseworthy intentions and thus excludes liability (e.g., a physician intending
to cure a patient but actually harming them), whereas khiṭʾ is used for intended errors in actions
coupled with unpraiseworthy intentions and thus includes culpability (e.g., a physician intending
and actually harming a patient).
In the context of legal theory discourses, the technical term al-takhṭiʾa refers to the doctrine
that holds that a legal expert may “hit or miss” (al-mujtahid qad yuṣīb wa qad yukhṭiʾ) with respect
to his legal reasoning (ijtihād) and/or legal conclusion (ḥukm).
354
Therefore, the appropriate

351
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 287.
352
Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 287. For the report, see, for instance, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir
(Egypt: Maktabat al-Ḥalabī, 1358/1940), 494; idem, Kitāb al-Umm, ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (al-Manṣūra:
Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1422/2001), 7:317; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Musnad, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ (Muʾassasat al-Risāla,
1421/2001), 29:351; al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, ed. Muḥammad Zuhayr b. Nāṣir al-Nāṣir (Dār Ṭawq al-Najāt,
1422/2001), 9:108 (kitāb al-iʿtiṣām bi-l-kitāb wa-l-sunna, bāb ajr al-ḥākim idhā ijtahad fa-aṣāb aw akhṭaʾ).
353
See al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, 287.
354
See, for example, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:499, 502; al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 497-498; al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, 1:210; al-
Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:394-395; al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1541; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh,
2:118.

116
English term for al-takhṭiʾa is “juristic fallibility,” because the possibility of error here is in the
context of legal reasoning, that is, the act of the jurist or legal expert (mujtahid). I also add the
qualifier “juristic” here to distinguish this concept from human fallibility more generally, which
both the fallibilists and the infallibilists understood to be natural, that is, that everyone except those
(as individuals and groups) who were deemed to be divinely protected from error (maʿṣūm) were
prone to making mistakes. However, we will see in Chapter 5 that the idea of individual and
communal human in/errancy more generally was related to, and in fact undergirded, the debate
over juristic in/fallibility.
The earlier proponents of juristic fallibility who later came to be known as “the fallibilists”
(al-mukhaṭṭiʾa) did not necessarily employ the term al-takhṭiʾa to refer to their position, nor did
their opponents.
355
During the period under study, the theorists frequently used the phrase “the true
(or correct) position is one” (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid) or “one is correct” (al-muṣīb wāḥid) to refer to this
doctrine.
356
Unlike their infallibilist opponents,
357
the fallibilists maintain that there is an
objectively correct answer for every legal question,
358
and therefore, there can only be one correct
legal expert (mujtahid) in cases of disagreement. With respect to the existence of a single correct
answer for every question, it made no difference to the fallibilists whether the question at hand
was apodictic (qaṭʿī) or probable (ẓannī), nor of primary (uṣūl) or secondary (furūʿ) classification.

355
The only exception to this that I found among the theorists whose works I examine in this dissertation is al-Sharīf
al-Murtaḍā. See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:251.
356
For the use of al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid, see, for example, al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. al-Duwaysh, 29; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-
Mughnī, 17:362; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:371; Abū al-Fatḥ al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, ed. al-Shaykh ʿAbd Allah
Niʿma (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwaʾ, 1405/1985), 2:214; al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:725 Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1541; al-Baghdādī,
al-Faqīh, 2:118. For the use of al-muṣīb wāḥid, see al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:337; idem, al-Burhān, 2:1316.
357
In his later works, al-Juwaynī appears to reject the idea that ijtihādic cases do not contain objective answers. In al-
Burhān, he states: “A divine rule exists for every case” (lā takhlū wāqiʿa ʿan ḥukm Allāh). See al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān,
2:1324-1325.
358
Joseph Lowry has referred to this idea as “metaphysical realism.” See Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory:
The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 245-247.

117
These epistemological or categorical distinctions were not necessarily rejected.
359
For the
fallibilists, these distinctions functioned as a means of distinguishing between certain and probable
correctness and excused versus unexcused error.
360
It is for this reason that two main juristic
fallibility positions developed.
We may refer to one position as “probable juristic fallibility.” This position holds that there
is a single true or correct answer for every legal question, that it contains evidence for it, and that
the legal expert is mandated to acquire it. Thus, in cases of disagreement only one legal expert can
be correct, and others are wrong – but only probably. In other words, the assessment of both the
correctness of the correct legal expert and the error of the mistaken expert(s) (as well as those who
imitate them) is only probable, not certain. The probability of correctness and error was due to the
probable or vague nature of the evidence at hand. It is for this reason also that the error of the legal
expert is excused. In fact, not only is the legal expert’s error excused, but it is rewarded once for
the fact that the expert engaged in diligent legal reasoning (and twice if one was additionally
correct in the legal conclusion). It followed from all this that, although one presumed the
correctness of one’s own view and the error of one’s opponent’s view, it was also possible that
one may be wrong and one’s opponent may be right.
The second position may be called “certain juristic fallibility.” Like probable juristic
fallibility, certain juristic fallibility also holds that a single true or correct answer exists, that it
contains evidence for it, and that the legal expert is expected to acquire it. The difference between
the proponents of certain juristic fallibility and the proponents of probable juristic fallibility is that
the proponents of certain juristic fallibility consider the evidence for the single truth to always be

359
Later fallibilists such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) questioned the validity of the going distinction between uṣūl
and furūʿ, considering it to be “a recent classification” (tasmiyya muḥdatha). See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā,
ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad (Medina: Mujammaʿ al-Malik Fahad, 1416/1995), 6:36.
360
See, for example, Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542-1547.

118
certain or unequivocal, not probable. As such, in contrast to the proponents of probable juristic
fallibility, the proponents of certain juristic fallibility held that their own correctness and the error
of their opponents was certain. For proponents of certain juristic fallibility, there was disagreement
over whether error entailed culpability. For some, error did not entail culpability due to the
presumption that the mistaken legal expert intended the truth; thus, the mistaken legal expert would
be rewarded once for engaging in diligent legal reasoning. For others, error entailed culpability
and could not automatically be excused. This position, however, was rejected by most theorists as
“extreme,” as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3.
Juristic fallibility in its various configurations was adopted by leading theologian-jurists
belonging to various schools within and across Sunnism and Shīʿism in the period under study,
including the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064);
361
the Traditionalists Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066),
362

Abū al-Khaṭṭāb al-Kalwadhānī (d. 510/1116),
363
and Abū al-Wafāʾ Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119);
364
the
Ashʿarīs Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015),
365
Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 418/1027),
366
al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī (d. 463/1071),
367
and Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083);
368
the Ismāʿīlī Shīʿī al-Qāḍī
Nuʿmān (d. 363/974);
369
and the Imāmī Shīʿīs al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022),
370
al-Sharīf al-
Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044),
371
al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067).
372

361
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:64-86.
362
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1540-1593.
363
See al-Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd, 4:310.
364
See Ibn ʿAqīl, al-Wāḍiḥ, 5:356-391.
365
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1549-1550. Al-Juwaynī considered Ibn Fūrak to be a proponent of juristic infallibility.
See al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:340-341.
366
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1549-1550.
367
See al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:114-127.
368
See al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 496-509; idem, al-Lumaʿ, 303-307; idem, Sharḥ al-lumaʿ, 1043-1072.
369
See al-Nuʿmān, Disagreements, 303-317; idem, Daʿāʾim al-islām, 2:528-529, 531.
370
See al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:210-214; al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:723-726.
371
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247, 251, 272-273, 278-297, 310-312; al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:723-726.
372
See al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:723-726.

119
Following this brief overview, let us turn our attention to an exploration of the intellectual
sensibilities of the fallibilists that prompted them to uphold juristic fallibility and to deny the
validity of juristic infallibility.
4.2 The Intellectual Sensibilities of the Fallibilists
For the fallibilists, legal diversity was not justified by default. We may say in general that
the fallibilists held an aversion to what they presumed to be the inherent legal pluralism and
disagreement (ikhtilāf) that was promoted by their infallibilist opponents. To push back against the
validity of legal disagreement, the fallibilists insisted that a single correct ruling existed for every
possible question. We may refer to this idea as “legal monism” in contrast to the “legal pluralism”
of the infallibilists. The legal monism of the fallibilists was based on its proponents’ two
sensibilities: traditionalism (including a maximal understanding of religion) and sectarianism.
The fallibilists were primarily traditionalist in their intellectual sensibilities. By
traditionalist, I mean two things here. First, compared to the rationalist theologian-jurists who we
encountered in Chapter 3, the traditionalist theologian-jurists were more inclined to seriously
consider at face value various scriptural proofs for their doctrine and against that of their
opponents.
Chief among these scriptural proofs was the Qurʾān’s story of the differing judgments
rendered by David and Solomon (Q. 21:78-79). The fallibilists held that the Qurʾānic statement
“We made Solomon to understand it” (fa-fahamnāhā Sulaymān) meant that Solomon was correct
in his judgment (aṣāb fī al-ḥukm) and David was not (lam yuṣib).
373
More prominently than the

373
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1550-1551. Of course, one could argue that the statement immediately following “We
made Solomon to understand it” is “and unto both We gave judgment and knowledge” and indicates that both were
correct in this case. The counter argument is that this statement means that both were granted judgement and
knowledge generally (fī al-jumla), not specifically in this case; the proof for this interpretation, the argument goes, is
the specification included in the statement “We made Solomon to understand it.” See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1553.

120
above Qurʾānic reference, the fallibilists took seriously and interpreted at face value the various
reports indicating that the earliest generation of Muslims, especially the leading Companions,
admitted to their own errors and considered others to be mistaken in many instances. For instance,
after ruling on a case, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb is reported to have said: “By God, ʿUmar does not know
whether he has acquired the truth or missed it” (wa-Allāh mā yadrī ʿUmar aṣāb al-ḥaqq am
akhṭaʾ).
374
In another example, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb is reported to have summoned a pregnant
woman who, as a result, got scared and miscarried. When ʿUmar sought counsel from other
Companions about his responsibility, they told him that he was not liable, but when ʿAlī b. Abī
Ṭālib was asked, he informed ʿUmar that if the rest of the Companions offered their assessment
based on their due diligence, they had erred, and if they offered their view to appease him, then
they had cheated him. ʿAlī then proclaimed that ʿUmar was liable for the miscarried infant’s blood
money and ʿUmar accepted his ruling.
375
Above all, perhaps the most important scriptural proof
was the famous Prophetic statement that we encountered earlier: “The judge who reasons and is
correct is rewarded twice, and the judge who reasons and errs is rewarded once” (idhā ijtahada al-
ḥākim fa-aṣāb fa-lahu ajrān wa idha ijtahada wa akhṭaʾ fa-lahu ajr).
The fallibilists took these and other scriptural examples seriously, arguing that despite the
aforementioned reports technically being solitary in their transmissions (akhbār āḥād),
nonetheless, they have been widely accepted as valid, so they are like prolific reports (mutawātir)
in their standing and cannot be dismissed or ignored.
376
According to the fallibilists, the scriptural
reports clearly promoted the doctrine of juristic fallibility.

374
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1543.
375
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1556.
376
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1554.

121
Second, that the fallibilists were primarily traditionalist in their sensibilities means that
they were disinclined to permit rational theological presuppositions to define their legal theory.
For example, they did not consider “error” in the law to necessitate culpability or sin, in contrast
to the rationally inclined Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī infallibilists, whom we encountered in the previous
chapter. It may be argued that those theorists denied the validity of juristic fallibility based on their
equating legal error with culpability, in the same way that error would entail culpability with
respect to theological matters or fundamental religious tenets. The fallibilists did not allow this
rational theological presupposition to influence their doctrine of legal theory. They maintained that
one may be mistaken in the law and not only be excused, but also rewarded. The reward in the
case of the mistaken legal expert, the fallibilists maintained, was not for being wrong but for
engaging in diligent reasoning.
377
Not only did Q. 21:78-79 imply that David was not culpable for
his error, but it was presumed that he was rewarded for engaging in diligent reasoning;
additionally, the Prophetic report about the rewards of the correct and mistaken judge confirmed
this point.
378

The fallibilists’ traditionalism also informed their “maximal” understanding of religion,
including the law. In contrast to the infallibilists who comfortably suggested that the absence of
apodictic evidence for a question entailed the absence of a single determined correct answer for it,
the fallibilists did not like the idea that there could not be a divinely determined correct answer for
every question. They understood the uṣūl and furūʿ to function in the same way, that is, that in
both spheres there was no “gap” in divine determinations. For the fallibilists, the defining factor
between the uṣūl and the furūʿ was clarity versus ambiguity: the uṣūl were presumed to have clear-
cut proof whereas the furūʿ contained ambiguous or probable proof. It followed from this that

377
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:71.
378
See al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:118.

122
one’s error in the furūʿ could be excused or forgiven. All of this is to say that the fallibilists
presumed not only that the religious law was all-encompassing, but that it contained evidence for
every aspect of it. Proof for everything meant the possibility of hitting or missing that proof.
The second sensibility that I have identified is sectarianism, to which we will return to
again in Chapter 5 but is worth noting briefly here.
For the Imāmī Shīʿī fallibilists, the sectarian intellectual sensibility guiding them was the
dogma of the infallibility (ʿiṣma) of the Imāms. The belief in the infallibility of the Imāms among
the Imāmī Shīʿīs necessitated their adoption of juristic fallibility, for this belief is what
differentiated between the divinely protected guide (i.e., the Prophet or Imām) and others. In other
words, protection from error was reserved for the divine guide (i.e., the Prophet or Imām) and thus
everyone beside him was susceptible to error. It followed from this that if the Imām was protected
from error (and thus always correct) and others beside him were not protected from error, then any
opposition to the Imām automatically entailed error; it could not be justified as “correct.”
Following this brief discussion of some of the intellectual sensibilities guiding the
fallibilists, let us turn to the practical problems associated with both doctrines from the perspective
of the fallibilists.
4.3 The Practical Problems of Juristic In/Fallibility
The fallibilists were concerned with several practical and sociopolitical problems related
to both juristic infallibility and juristic fallibility. We’ll start with the problems associated with the
opposing doctrine of juristic infallibility.
4.3.1 Problems with Juristic Infallibility
From the perspective of the fallibilists, adopting juristic infallibility necessitated several
practical or sociopolitical problems. Some of these problems were that the doctrine promoted

123
censured disagreements, it promoted contradictory legal rules, and it defeated the purpose of
scholarly debate. We’ll take up each of these problems in turn.
4.3.1.1 Promoting censured disagreements
From the perspective of the fallibilists, juristic infallibility promoted censured
disagreements (ikhtilāf) and division (tafarruq).
379
They drew on several Qurʾānic verses that
condemned disagreement and division. For instance, in Q. 3:105, the Qurʾān states: “And be not
like those who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them. And it is they
who shall have a great punishment.”
380
In addition to the Qurʾān, the fallibilists employed the
Tradition to make their case, arguing that the Prophet prohibited disagreements.
381
On the other
hand, they rejected the idea that disagreement was a form of divine mercy (al-ikhtilāf raḥma),
arguing that if disagreement is a form of divine mercy, this entails that agreement is a form of
divine wrath – and this simply cannot be.
382
The argument that disagreement was a form of divine
mercy may have been based on Q. 11:118-119, which reads: “And had your Lord willed, He would
have made humankind one community. But they cease not to differ, save those upon whom your
Lord has Mercy – and for this He created them.” The argument is that the statement “for this He
created them” (li-dhālika khalaqahum) means that God created those who disagree as an
expression of divine mercy and thus God permitted disagreement.
383
According to Ibn Ḥazm, this
interpretation must be rejected for two reasons. First, he argues that the verse clearly indicates that
God excluded “those upon whom your Lord has Mercy” (man raḥima rabbuk) from “those who
cease not to differ”; it thus makes no sense to argue that God created those who disagree to express

379
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:65-67.
380
See also Q. 2:176, 2:213, 3:103, 4:82, 6:153, 6:159, 8:46, and 42:13.
381
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:66-67.
382
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:64.
383
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:69.

124
divine mercy, for then God would have excluded those whom He graced from themselves (la-s-
tathnā al-marḥūmīn min anfusihim wa la-akhrajahum min jumlati anfusihim).
384
In other words,
the correct reading of the verse is that those whom God has graced do not disagree. Ibn Ḥazm’s
second reason for rejecting the interpretation is that the verse is simply describing a fact: the a
group of existent beings (mawjūdūn) with the particular trait (ḥāla) of disagreement.
385
His
interpretation of the Qurʾānic verses under question, Ibn Ḥazm contends, conforms to that of some
earlier pious ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ).
386
Prior to Ibn Ḥazm, al-Mufīd proposed a similar
interpretation of the verses under question when discussing the prohibition of disagreement.
387

For the fallibilists, censured disagreements arose because of the use of subjective methods
and proofs that juristic infallibility promoted. The main culprit was the use of probability or
supposition (ẓann). They argued that the sources of the law (ṭarīq al-aḥkām) were restricted to the
Qurʾān and the Tradition and excluded supposition, which they held to be purely subjective. The
fallibilists did not deny the possibility of disagreements arising on the ground, but they insisted on
exclusive recourse to the scriptural sources to resolve any possible disagreements.
388
Their proof
for this was the Qurʾānic statement (Q. 4:59): “And if you differ among yourselves concerning
any matter, refer it to God and the Messenger.” For the fallibilists, rejecting juristic infallibility
meant avoiding involvement in censured disagreements.
4.3.1.2 Promoting contradictory legal rules
The fallibilists perceived juristic infallibility as promoting the existence of contradictory
legal rules.
389
For this reason, they maintained that juristic infallibility was logically untenable and

384
Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:69.
385
Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:69.
386
Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:69-70.
387
See al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:214.
388
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:68-69, 84; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1560; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 503.
389
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1573.

125
argued against the doctrine by process of elimination.
390
For instance, they held that in cases of
contradictory disagreements, such as one expert ruling for the permissibility of an action or its
validity and another expert ruling for that action’s prohibition or invalidity, there could only be
three logical possibilities: either both experts were correct, both were wrong, or one was correct
and the other was wrong. The fallibilists maintained that it was impossible for both experts to be
wrong, for this would entail that the Muslims had collectively agreed on an error (ijmāʿ al-umma
ʿalā al-khaṭaʾ).
391
Similarly, they argued that it was impossible for both to be correct due to the
law of noncontradiction: a single act cannot simultaneously be permissible and impermissible or
valid and invalid. To see how this was the case, it is instructive to take the example of the validity
of a woman’s marriage based on whether the marriage’s validity was conditioned on her guardian’s
permission. If one view holds that the marriage is valid without the guardian’s permission and
another holds that it is valid only with the permission, then assuming that both views were correct
meant that a particular woman’s marriage was simultaneously valid and invalid, and this is
inconceivable. Thus, if both experts could not be wrong and both could not be right, by process of
elimination, only one can be correct and the other must be wrong. From the perspective of the
fallibilists, adopting juristic fallibility avoided the problem of the existence of contradictory legal
rules.
392

390
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1558-1559; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:118-121; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 502.
391
We will explore in greater detail the dogma of communal inerrancy (ʿiṣmat al-umma) and its relation to the juristic
in/fallibility debate in Chapter 5.
392
We saw in Chapter 3 that the infallibilists vehemently denied that their doctrine promoted contradictory legal rules,
that is, with respect to a single person in a single case. For more on the problem of contradiction from the perspective
of proponents of both doctrines, see al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:376-378; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:344-346; Ibn Ḥazm,
al-Iḥkām, 5:85; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1559-1560, 1573.

126
4.3.1.3 No point in debate
From the perspective of the fallibilists, juristic infallibility stifled scholarly debate
(munāẓara) and discourse (mubāḥatha).
393
They argued that if each of the differing legal experts
presumes that his opponent is correct (muṣīb), their dispute with one another becomes meaningless.
For their part, the fallibilists maintained that the point of scholarly debate was to fulfill the
obligation to engage in reflection and inference; the point further was to refute the arguments and
views that one presumed to be incorrect and to show the correctness of one’s own views. They
insisted that the mere fact that scholars of every era debate and challenge one another’s views
implies that they cannot all be considered correct despite their differences.
The infallibilists denied that juristic infallibility stifled debate.
394
From their perspective,
the point behind scholarly debate was to sharpen one’s ability to engage in diligent legal reasoning
or to renew one’s legal reasoning so that one arrived at another preponderantly probable conclusion
(ghalabat ẓann). The fallibilists argued back that it was useless to shift from a view or task that
one previously assumed to correct and to switch from one probable view to another probable view;
doing so, they held, would promote irrational disputes and conflict.
395

4.3.2 Problems with Juristic Fallibility
From the perspective of the fallibilists, there were practical problems related to various
configurations of their own doctrine. Perhaps the most serious was the question of the certainty or
probability of correctness and error.

393
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1563; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:121; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:383-384; al-Juwaynī,
al-Talkhīṣ, 3:354; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 501, 508-509; al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:210-214.
394
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:383-384; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:354.
395
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1563; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:121; al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:211-213.

127
4.3.2.1 Certainty or probability of correctness and error
It may be argued that insisting on the existence of a single true or correct answer along
with its evidence implied that the legal expert could be certain of his own correctness and the error
of his opponent.
396
This, in turn, opened the door to several other problems: considering the
mistaken legal experts culpable before God, prohibiting them from acting upon the mistaken
results of their legal reasoning, overturning their incorrect rulings, and prohibiting non-experts
from adopting their mistaken legal views. Additionally, and more generally, it opened the door to
rejecting the orthodoxy of established legal schools. Essentially, insisting on a single correct ruling
was presumed to conflate the furūʿ and the uṣūl, holding the mistaken legal expert in the furūʿ to
be the same as the mistaken expert in the uṣūl. In other words, it would be as though the mistaken
legal expert had contradicted unequivocal evidence from the Qurʾān, Prophetic Tradition, or
scholarly consensus, or held a nonorthodox theological belief or fundamental tenet.
397

We saw in the previous chapter that these concerns represented a major problem with
juristic fallibility from the perspective of the infallibilists.
398
However, many fallibilists also shared
these concerns. The solution by the proponents of probable juristic fallibility was to insist on the
probability of correctness and error. This proposed solution would avoid the aforementioned
problems. It would also allow for a more nuanced approached to diversity among the Sunnī legal
schools by suggesting that although the presumption was that one was correct and one’s opponent
was wrong, this was a probable assessment, not a certain one. On the other hand, the proponents
of certain juristic fallibility (as well as the infallibilists) could argue against the proponents of
probable juristic fallibility that their doctrine opened the door to other problems, such as lingering

396
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1568-1569.
397
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1568-1569.
398
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366.

128
uncertainty in some cases. A clear example of this was the case of the validity of a woman’s
marriage that we encountered earlier: despite holding that only one of the two views was correct,
since the proponents of probable juristic fallibility hold that the correct view is not specified, in
this case, they would have no choice but to decide concretely which of the two views was right
and which was wrong.
399

Following this overview of the intellectual and practical concerns of the fallibilists, we now
turn our attention to a more detailed exposition and comparative discussion of the views of
prominent fallibilists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries representing Sunnī Traditionalism
and Imāmī Shīʿism. We will take up each in turn.
4.4 Sunnī Traditionalism and Juristic Fallibility
It is not my objective to provide a full account of the development and ideas of Sunnī
Traditionalism here. However, in a general sense as an intellectual movement, in both its theology
and law, Sunnī Traditionalism represents a contrast to the theology and law that was operating
under the so-called banners of rationalistic theology (kalām) and considered legal opinion (raʾy).
Like other intellectual movements of the early period of Islam, Traditionalism (or “proto-
Traditionalism”) was multifaceted and included individuals who held various sectarian,
theological, and legal views.
400
It may be argued that the main thrust of Traditionalism was to take
seriously the scriptural dictates of the Qurʾān and the Prophetic Tradition (Sunna) as well as the
consensus of the scholarly community and to prefer these sources over others.

399
See further al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:346-348; al-Juwaynī, al-Burhān, 2:1320-1322.
400
See, for example, Hossein Modarressi, “Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shīʿī Jurisprudence: A Preliminary
Survey,” Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 141-158; William A. Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in
Interpretation,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23, 3 (1993): 495-522; Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic
Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 1-31; Jackson, Black
Suffering, 127-156.

129
From the third/ninth century, Sunnī Traditionalism developed primarily under the
influence of the traditionist (muḥaddith) and jurist (faqīh) Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), who
would come to be recognized as the movement’s patron saint following the “inquisition” (miḥna)
concerning the doctrine of the created Qurʾān.
401
In its legal thinking, Sunnī Traditionalism was
closely – though not exclusively – aligned with the Ḥanbalī legal school, named after Ibn
Ḥanbal.
402
Unlike the other eponyms of the Sunnī legal schools and other leading thinkers over
whom there was disagreement about which of the two doctrines they held, that is, who were
credited at times with promoting juristic fallibility and at other times with promoting juristic
infallibility,
403
Ibn Ḥanbal’s disciples credited him with adopting juristic fallibility.
404
This
assessment was based on Ibn Ḥanbal’s transmitted views. For instance, Ibn Ḥanbal held that, “If
conflicting reports are related from the Prophet and one person adopts one of the two reports and
another adopts the other conflicting report, then the truth with God is with one of them; and it is
incumbent upon one to reason diligently and to avoid considering one’s opponent erroneous” (idhā
ikhtalafat al-riwāya ʿan al-nabī fa-akhadha rajul bi-aḥad al-ḥadīthayn wa akhadha ākhar bi-
ḥadīth ākhar ḍiddah fa-l-ḥaqq ʿinda Allāh fī wāḥid wa ʿalā al-rajul an yajtahid wa lā yaqūl ʿan
mukhālifihi annahu mukhṭiʾ).
405
Following this, Ibn Ḥanbal added: “and it is incumbent upon one

401
Jackson, Black Suffering, 127-128.
402
Traditionalism as I have identified it here also largely aligned with the Ẓāhirī legal school and less so with the
Shāfiʿī legal school. The traditionalism of these schools can most clearly be seen in the discussions of, for instance,
Ibn Ḥazm, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, and Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī. See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:64-86; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh,
2:114-127; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 496-509; idem, al-Lumaʿ, 303-307; idem, Sharḥ al-lumaʿ, 1043-1072. One may
argue that what held these theorists together in their adoption of juristic fallibility was not their shared legal or
theological schools (Ibn Ḥazm was a Ẓāhirī, al-Baghdādī started off as a Ḥanbalī then adopted the Shāfiʿī legal school
and the Ashʿarī theological school, and al-Shīrāzī was also a Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī), but their shared traditionalism.
403
See, for example, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370-373, 377, 379; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:370-371; al-Juwaynī,
al-Talkhīṣ, 3:339-340, 378-379; idem, al-Burhān, 2:1319.
404
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542-1543; idem, al-Masāʾil al-uṣūliyya min kitāb al-riwāyatayn wa al-wajhayn, ed.
ʿAbd al-Karīm Muḥammad al-Lāḥim (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1405/1985), 75-77; al-Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd,
4:310; Ibn ʿAqīl, al-Wāḍiḥ, 5:356; Āl Taymiyya, al-Musawwada, 503; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Jāmiʿ li-ʿulūm al-imām
Aḥmad, ed. Khālid al-Ribāṭ (al-Fayyūm: Dār al-Falāḥ, 1430/2009), 5:138-139.
405
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542; idem, al-Masāʾil al-uṣūliyya, 75; al-Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd, 4:310-311.

130
to diligently reason, and he will not know whether he has hit or miss the truth” (wa ʿalā al-rajul
an yajtahid wa lā yadrī aṣāb al-ḥaqq am akhṭaʾ).
406
Taken together, these statements were
understood by some of Ibn Ḥanbal’s disciples to mean that he promoted probable juristic fallibility,
that is, that the truth was single in cases of disagreement but that one could not certainly know
which of the conflicting views was right and which was wrong due to the evidence’s ambiguity.
407

Others suggested that Ibn Ḥanbal may have promoted certain juristic fallibility in some cases and
therefore supported overturning mistaken rulings.
408

Now, we focus attention on the thought of one of the major proponents of Traditionalism
from the period under study, Abū Yaʿlā Ibn al-Farrāʾ, to examine in more detail his theory of
juristic fallibility.
4.4.1 Al-Qāḍī Abu Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Farrāʾ, famously known as al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā or Ibn al-
Farrāʾ, was one of the leading scholars of the Ḥanbalī school in Baghdād; his renown would stretch
far beyond Baghdād and he would be known among the Ḥanbalīs simply as “the judge” (al-qāḍī)
for at least three centuries after his death.
409
He was born in 380/990 into prominence; his father
al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (d. 390/1000) held the office of notary and was offered the chief
justiceship by the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Muṭīʿ (r. 334-363/946-974), which he is said to have rejected.
Despite his father being a Ḥanafī, Abū Yaʿlā learned and adopted the Ḥanbalī legal rite. He would
go on to lead the Ḥanbalī school during the reigns of al-Qādir (r. 381-422/991-1031) and al-Qāʾim

406
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542-1543; idem, al-Masāʾil al-uṣūliyya, 75-76; al-Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd, 4:310-311.
407
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542-1543.
408
See al-Kalwadhānī, al-Tamhīd, 4:313.
409
The following biographical information has been taken from Henri Laoust, “Ibn al-Farrāʾ,” EI2; Ibn Abī Yaʿlā,
Ṭabaqāt al-Hanābila, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqqī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa), 2:193-230; al-Khaṭīb, Tārīkh, 2:252;
Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tārīkh al-mulūk wa ʾl-umam, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā and Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-
Qādir ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1412/1992), 16:98-99.

131
(r. 422-467/1031-1075), which coincided also with the declining phase of Būyid rule over Iraq.
After Ibn al-Ḥamīd’s death in 403/1012, Abū Yaʿlā succeeded him and began to teach ḥadīth and
law, where he would hold weekly classes in the famous al-Manṣūr mosque. In 432-3/1040-1, Abū
Yaʿlā was present in the large gathering where the Qādirī creed was read in the caliph’s palace,
followed by his presence in the meeting a few years later in which the official creedal doctrine of
the caliphate was defined. In 447/1055, Abū Yaʿlā became the judge of the section of the caliph’s
palace known as the Ḥarīm, after which his mandate included Ḥarrān and Ḥulwān. Approximately
a decade later de died in Baghdād in 458/1066. Abū Yaʿlā wrote treatises in theology, legal theory,
and law with over 50 titles attributed to him.
410
Among his most famous works are his treatise in
administrative law entitled al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya, which was similar to (in addition to bearing
the same title as) the work of his Shāfiʿī contemporary al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058). Both Abū Yaʿlā
and al-Māwardī were part of the entourage of the caliphal vizier ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn (Ibn al-Muslima,
r. 437-450/1045-1058). Among his other works, in theology, Abū Yaʿlā wrote al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl
al-Dīn, and in legal theory he wrote al-ʿUdda fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh.
His discussion in al-ʿUdda centers on the following topics: (1) a single truth with God, (2)
the existence of evidence for every question, (3) the responsibilities of the legal expert, (4)
correctness and error, (5) reward and culpability, and (6) probable correctness and error. We will
take up each of these themes in turn.
4.4.1.1 A Single Truth with God
We have already noted that virtually all theorists – including the proponents of juristic
infallibility – rejected what I have termed absolute infallibility, that is, the justification of the
correctness of conflicting fundamental religious tenets (uṣūl). The theorists held that it was

410
For a list of works attributed to him, see the editor’s introduction in Abū Yaʿlā, al-Masāʾil al-uṣūliyya, 19-21.

132
logically impossible for contradictory truth claims related to the fundamental tenets to be
simultaneously correct. These tenets were presumed to be supported by apodictic rational and/or
scriptural evidence. This entailed two related conclusions. First, their apodictic nature meant that
they were universally applicable. In other words, the tenets applied to everyone, regardless of their
individual circumstances. Second, both “reason” and scripture could not promote contradictory
tenets. Taken together, this meant that in cases where there was difference over a particular
question, the differing answers could not all be considered simultaneously correct; there could only
be a single correct answer and the rest were wrong. By contrast, Abū Yaʿlā considers the
correctness of conflicting legal rules (aḥkām al-furūʿ) to be logically possible, but insists that there
still exists a single truth with God in these cases and therefore there can only be one correct answer
among the differing legal experts.
411
The logical possibility of justified conflicting legal rules was
due to the nature of legal rules as opposed to fundamental tenets: it was presumed to be of divine
provenance to permit subjectivity in the law so that individual legal responsibilities could differ
depending on one’s particular circumstances, such as, for instance, the permissibility of eating
during the daylight hours of the month of Ramaḍān for a menstruating woman and its prohibition
for a woman who was not menstruating.
412
This possibility of difference in legal responsibility
meant that it was possible for the responsibility of various legal experts to differ. However, the
logical possibility of the correctness of conflicting legal rules was not enough for Abū Yaʿlā to
permit the actual correctness of conflicting legal rules. This is because Abū Yaʿlā and his fellow
fallibilists considered the religious law to be comprehensive. This meant that it was presumed that
every human action could be categorized under one of the five legal categories: obligatory,
encouraged, neutral, discouraged, or prohibited. However, and perhaps more importantly, it meant

411
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1540-1541.
412
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1541.

133
that legal rules were tied to God’s determination as evident exclusively in the dictates of the Qurʾān
and Prophetic Tradition.
413
In other words, the fallibilists assumed that rulings had to be
determined by God alone and that it was not the legal expert who made any legal determinations.
414

Additionally, if God determined every rule, there could be no contradictory divine determinations.
Therefore, contradictory legal rules could not be justified as all together correct.
4.4.1.2 The Existence of Evidence for Every Question
The existence of a single truth or correct answer for every question entailed the existence
of evidence for it. The existence of evidence for every legal rule served two purposes. The first is
that it grounded the legal rule: there could be no legal rule without evidence for it. And although
it was supposed that legal rules could be subjective if their evidence was specific (e.g., when one
who is traveling is permitted to shorten one’s daily prayers but must complete the daily prayers
during residence), by default, the evidence for legal rules was presumed by the fallibilists to be
general or universal (ʿāmm). According to Abū Yaʿlā, if proofs for legal rules are universal, their
applicability cannot be specific (al-adilla idhā kānat ʿāmma lam yajuz an yakūn madlūlihā
khāṣṣān).
415
Abū Yaʿlā draws on a strange but relevant example of the validity of marriage to make
his point: if a Ḥanbalī man proposes marriage to a woman after obtaining the permission of her
guardian after a Ḥanafī man had proposed marriage to her without the permission of her guardian,
the Ḥanbalī man will consider the Ḥanafī man’s marriage proposal to have been invalid and his
own to be valid (based on the Ḥanbalī view that requires acquiring the permission of the woman’s
guardian’s as a condition for the validity of the marriage), whereas the Ḥanafī man will consider
his own marriage proposal to have been valid and the Ḥanbalī man’s to be invalid (based on the

413
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1560.
414
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1555.
415
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1559-1560.

134
Ḥanafī view of the non-requirement of attaining the guardian’s permission and thus the validity of
his own marriage – and its precedence). Abū Yaʿlā argues that had it been the case that all experts
were correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb), the woman’s marriage in this example would have to be
considered valid with respect to both men, and this validity is unanimously rejected.
416
Abū Yaʿlā
presents this example to show that the evidence for the validity of the marriage with respect to
acquiring to permission of the woman’s guardian is universal and applies to all men equally; and
anytime this is the case it is impermissible for all to be equally correct, for assuming so would
entail that the universal proofs themselves are contradictory.
But what is one were to presume that in the example above and other similar cases, the
absence of unequivocal evidence for the legal rule meant that its indicant (amāra) was the legal
expert’s subjective sense of probability (ẓann al-mujtahid), and thus, the legal rule was not
universal but rather specific to each legal expert? Abū Yaʿlā cautions against this assumption. He
insists that the indicant cannot be the expert’s subjective probability, for the method or way to
legal rules (ṭarīq al-aḥkām) is restricted to the Qurʾān and Prophetic Tradition and excludes
probability (ẓann).
417

The second purpose for the existence of evidence for every rule is that it served as a target
for the act of the legal expert. This was based on the fallibilists’ notion of the responsibility of the
legal expert.
4.4.1.3 The Responsibilities of the Legal Expert
Abū Yaʿlā considers the responsibility of the legal expert to be two-fold: to pursue evidence
for the single correct answer and to acquire the answer.
418
In contrast to the infallibilists who

416
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1558-1559.
417
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1560.
418
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1541.

135
argued that the responsibility of the legal expert in ijtihādic cases was to engage in diligent
reasoning and act upon the highly probable result of that reasoning, the fallibilists maintained that
the responsibility of the legal expert was not simply to engage in diligent reasoning but to acquire
the correct answer.
Abū Yaʿlā suggests that one’s responsibility is either to engage in reasoning to seek a ruling
or that one’s responsibility is to engage in reasoning itself. He insists that it is impossible to
consider one’s responsibility to engage in reasoning itself, for reasoning is not expected for itself,
but for another, and one is not expected to engage in reasoning for the objective of becoming an
expert (mujtahid); it is for this reason that the responsibility to engage in reasoning is to seek the
determined ruling (ḥukm maṭlūb).
419

Abū Yaʿlā asserts that it ought to be assumed that a sought-after thing in fact exists when
one is responsible for finding it, for it makes no sense to seek something that will possibly exist or
not exist after one seeks it; the example of this is one’s responsibility to seek a camel that has
escaped after assuming the camel’s actual existence. Abū Yaʿla thus insists that cannot be that the
obligation of reasoning is to arrive at a preponderance of supposition, for this occurs after the act
of seeking.
420

Thus, the fallibilists insisted on the existence of a target as an objective for the legal expert
to pursue. If there was no target, there was no point to the legal reasoning of the expert.
4.4.1.4 Between Correctness and Error
The legal expert can thus be correct or err (bayn al-iṣāba wa al-khaṭaʾ).
421
It is for this
reason that those who held this doctrine were known as the fallibilists (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa).

419
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1564.
420
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1564-1565.
421
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1551, 1554.

136
Abū Yaʿlā employs several scriptural and “historical” proofs to explain the possibility of
error in legal reasoning and judgements. Among the most important was the Prophetic report: “The
judge who reasons and is correct is rewarded twice and the judge who reasons and is mistaken is
rewarded once” (idhā ijtahada al-ḥākim fa-aṣāb fa-lahu ajrān wa idha ijtahada wa akhṭaʾ fa-lahu
ajr).
422
In contrast to the infallibilists, the fallibilists took this report seriously and understood it at
face value. For this reason, Abū Yaʿlā argues that this report was clear evidence for the possibility
of error, because the Prophet clearly said that the judge can be mistaken. Even though it was a
solitary report, it was presumed to have been widely accepted and acted upon.
423

The main historical evidence that Abū Yaʿlā and the fallibilists put forward was the actions
of the earliest Muslims, the Companions. According to Abū Yaʿlā, there was a consensus among
the Companions that one may hit or miss the single correct answer for legal questions. The main
argument here is that the Companions clearly disagreed on various matters, considered one another
to have erred, and even censured one another. Had all experts been correct, the argument goes, the
Companions would not have considered one another to have erred; rather, they would have
affirmed one another’s correctness.
424

Abū Yaʿlā presents several instances of leading Companions considering one another to
have erred in legal cases. Three examples will suffice here. The first is the case of ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb when he summoned a pregnant woman who got scared and miscarried as a result. When
ʿUmar sought counsel from the Companions about his responsibility, they told him that he was
innocent, but when ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib was asked, he informed ʿUmar that if the rest of the
Companions offered their ruling based on their due diligence and reasoning, they had erred, and if

422
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1554.
423
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1554.
424
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1556.

137
they offered their view to appease him, then they had cheated him. ʿAlī then proclaimed that ʿUmar
was liable for the miscarried infant’s blood money and ʿUmar accepted his ruling. Abū Yaʿlā
argues that in this example, ʿAlī clearly identified the Companions as having erred despite their
being experts (mujtahids). Second, in a case on which he ruled, ʿUmar said, “I do not know whether
I was correct or erred (lā adrī aṣabt am akhṭaʾt), but I did not turn away from the truth.” This
example shows that ʿUmar admitted to the possibility of his own error. Third, Ibn ʿAbbās said,
“Whoever wishes, I shall debate him (bāhaltuhu): that the remainder [of inheritance] does not
return [to the family] (anna al-farāʾiḍ lā tuʿawwal).” Abū Yaʿlā includes all these examples to
show that the Companions sometimes considered one another to be incorrect and censured one
another for their perceived errors in legal judgements.
425

4.4.1.5 Reward and Culpability
If the possibility of error existed, then does this error not entail culpability? Abū Yaʿlā
asserts that the reason why some of the Companions may not have more frequently considered one
another as having erred is that s/he who errs in these cases is excused and in fact rewarded for
her/his intention to acquire the truth, and this has been stipulated by revelation (al-sharʿ).
Furthermore, Abū Yaʿlā insists that the Companions did not more often censure (yankur) one
another for two reasons: (1) revelation prohibited this because it is assumed that these views did
not possess unequivocal evidence but rather were based on a preponderance of supposition (ghālib
al-ẓann); and (2) censuring (al-inkār) may lead to discord (fitna), corruption (fasād), and conflict
(ikhtilāf).
426

On the other hand, most of the Sunnī fallibilists maintained that the one who was correct
was rewarded twice: once for hitting the single ruling with God and a second time for engaging in

425
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1556-1557.
426
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567-1568.

138
diligent legal reasoning. However, the one who missed the single ruling with God was rewarded
once for engaging in diligent legal reasoning and his error (missing the ruling with God) would be
forgiven or excused. This assessment was largely based on the famous Prophetic report about the
correct and erring judge, which we saw above.
But how was it possible that, even though one was considered mistaken with respect to
both one’s legal reasoning (ijtihād) and legal ruling (ḥukm), he would still be rewarded? Abū
Yaʿlā’s answer to this is that the legal expert is considered correct with respect to the extent to
which he acted in his legal reasoning but wrong with respect to what he did not perform
additionally, so that he is rewarded for what he did and excused for what he did not do.
427
But if
this is the case, one may argue that such an interpretation would discourage the legal expert from
expending his utmost effort to acquire the correct legal ruling, for there would still be reward for
engaging in some legal reasoning, even if it did not end up leading to the correct answer. In other
words, one is incited to abandon (diligent) reasoning (fa-qad ughriya idhan bi-l-tark), for one
knows that there is no harm in doing so. Abu Yaʿla argues that the expert in this case is not incited
to refrain from diligent reasoning because ultimately s/he in unaware of the extent to which s/he
must engage in reasoning before being forgiven the rest; this is only something that God is aware
of.
428

4.4.1.6 Probable Correctness and Error
We noted above that the fallibilists maintained that there was evidence for every ruling.
The evidence for the legal ruling could be either unequivocal or probable. The distinction between
types of evidence and the assumption that one was working with probable evidence in the sphere
of legal rulings meant that correctness and error could only be determined in a probable manner.

427
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1555.
428
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1555.

139
For Abū Yaʿlā, the determination of the correctness and error of one’s own legal conclusion
as well as that of one’s opponent was only probable.
429
Abū Yaʿlā insists that probable juristic
fallibility was the doctrine of Ibn Ḥanbal based on the latter’s transmitted views.
430
Going back to
the Prophetic report granting the mistaken judge a single reward meant for Abū Yaʿlā that the
“error” referred to in this report had to be interpreted as meaning missing a probable ruling,
because if it was taken to mean missing an explicit text or unanimous consensus, the error had to
entail culpability.
431

The probability of correctness and error was also presumed to be one of the reasons why
some of the Companions may have appointed judges whose views were at odds with those of their
appointers’. For instance, Abū Bakr appointed Zayd b. Thābit, ʿUmar appointed Ubayy b. Kaʿb
and Shurayḥ, and ʿAlī appointed Shurayḥ and Ibn ʿAbbās; in all of these cases, the appointers
disagreed with the appointees over various legal questions.
432
Abū Yaʿlā contends that, despite
their legal disagreements, the appointer is not certain of the appointee’s error, but considers it
possible that he himself has erred and that his appointee is correct, and it is for this reason that he
appointed him in the first place.
433

4.5 Imāmī Shīʿism and Juristic Fallibility
The development of Imāmī Shīʿism in its formative period has received substantial
attention by scholars in recent decades as attested to by the production of many monographs,
articles, encyclopedia entries, and edited volumes examining its various intellectual
manifestations.
434
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to comprehensively explore the

429
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567-1568.
430
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1542-1543.
431
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1554.
432
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567.
433
Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1568.
434
The following is a non-exhaustive selection of monographs published in the last four decades examining the early
development of Imāmī Shīʿism: Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdī in Twelver

140
trajectory of the early intellectual development of Imāmī Shīʿism. However, we may categorize
the formative development of Imāmī Shīʿism in two major phases. The first phase corresponds to
the period in which the Imāms lived and taught. This period roughly corresponds to the first three
centuries after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, that is, from 11/632 to 329/940. During this
time, what would later become Imāmī or Twelver Shīʿism developed and spread based on the
teachings of the twelve Imāms through their major disciples, especially in the Ḥijāz, Iraq, and Iran.
This was especially the case with the fifth Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114/732) and his son the
sixth Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765). The first phase concludes with the beginning of the major
occultation (al-ghayba al-kubrā) of the twelfth Imām Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan, who the Imāmīs
believed to have been born in 255/869 and entered two successive periods of “hiding,” the first
(“minor,” ṣughrā) from 260-329/874-940 and the second (“major,” kubrā) from 329/940 and
lasting indefinitely. The second phase of the intellectual development of Imāmī Shīʿism begins
with the major occultation. It was in this period that the systematization and elaboration of Imāmī
theology and law occurred through the efforts of many traditionists, theologians, and jurists.
It is important to note the political circumstances of these two phases. In the first phase,
the period of the living Imāms, Shīʿism as a political and religious movement was largely
marginalized by the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid ruling elite. However, the weaking of the central

Shīʿism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); Hossein Modarressi, An Introduction to Shīʿī Law: A
Bibliographical Study (London: Ithaca Press, 1984); Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: The History and
Doctrines of Twelver Shiʿism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Hossein Modarressi, Crisis and
Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shīʿite Islam (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1993); Madelung, The Succession;
Andrew Newman, The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism (London: Routledge, 2000); Heinz Halm, Shiʿism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Liyakat Takim, The Heirs of the Prophet (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2006); Maria Dakake, The Charismatic Community (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007);
Najam Haider, The Origins of the Shīʿa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Andrew Newman, Twelver
Shiism: Unity and Diversity in the Life of Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Najam Haider,
Shīʿism: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Hossein Modarressi, Text and
Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022);
Edmund Hayes, Agents of the Hidden Imām (New Yor: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

141
ʿAbbāsid state especially in the fourth/tenth century opened the way for more pro-Shīʿī groups to
hold power across the Muslim lands. Some scholars have identified the mid-fourth/tenth to mid-
fifth/eleventh centuries as “the Shīʿī century.” It was during this time that Shīʿism flourished in
terms of its political influence and intellectual development. The period under study in this
dissertation corresponds to this period of intellectual flourishing.
With respect to the development of legal theory, in the period under study, the three leading
Imāmī Shīʿī legal theorists were al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d.
436/1044), and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067). These thinkers were considered leaders of the
Imāmī Shīʿī community in the post-occultation period, especially in Iraq. However, in contrast to
many of the Sunnī theorists of the period whose legal theory works included more comprehensive
discussions of the juristic in/fallibility debate, the discussion in Imāmī thought was sparser. It is
for this reason that this section of the chapter will draw on the collective ideas of these three
thinkers. Doing so will provide us with a more complete picture of the concerns of Imāmī theorists
of the time as they relate to the debate over juristic in/fallibility.
4.5.1 Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Mufīd, Abū al-Qāsim al-Murtaḍā, and Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī
Before turning to an exploration of their ideas, let us briefly introduce the three Imāmī
thinkers. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nuʿmān, known famously as al-Shaykh
al-Mufīd or Ibn al-Muʿallim (“the son of the teacher”), was one of the most prominent earlier
intellectual representatives of the Imāmīs during the period of the occultation of the twelfth
Imām.
435
He was born in 336/948 near the town of ʿUkbarā north of Baghdād. Al-Mufīd came to

435
The following biographical information is extracted from al-Najāshī, Rijāl al-Najāshī, ed. Mūsā al-Shubayrī al-
Zanjānī (Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1418/1997), 399-403; al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist kutub al-Shīʿa wa uṣūlihim, ed.
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī (Qumm: Sitāre, 1420/1999), 444-446; Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh
al-Mufīd (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1978); Tamima Bayhom-Daou, Shaykh Mufid (Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2005); Wilferd Madelung, “al-Mufīd,” EI2.

142
Baghdād when he was a young boy and, by the age of 10 or 11, began to hear ḥadīth and initiated
his studies there with major scholars of the time. Already in 377/987 when al-Mufīd was about 40
years old, he was described as a leading Imāmī authority of Baghdād, but his authority would be
widely recognized outside Baghdād. Some of his most prominent contemporaries were the
Muʿtazilī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī, both of whom he engaged in debates with.
Al-Mufīd’s relations with the ʿAbbāsid and Būyid political authorities were generally good.
However, he lived through a tumultuous time in which Baghdād experienced several Sunnī and
Shīʿī riots; on account of these riots, he was banished from Baghdād three separate times before
being permitted to return. He was a prolific author who composed over 200 works spanning a wide
range of Islamic disciplines, including legal theory. Al-Mufīd’s only surviving legal theory work,
al-Tadhkira bi-Uṣūl al-Fiqh, has been preserved in summary by his student Abū al-Fatḥ al-
Karājikī (d. 449/1057).
436
Al-Mufīd died in Baghdād in 413/1022 and his body was laid to rest
next to one of his teachers Ibn Qūluwayh al-Qummī (d. 368/978 or 369/979)
437
adjacent to the
tombs of the seventh and ninth Imāms, Mūsā b. Jaʿfar al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799) and Muḥammad b.
ʿAlī al-Jawād (d. 220/835). Most of the major Imāmī authorities of the following generation were
al-Mufīd’s students. Al-Mufīd’s two most notable disciples were al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and al-
Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.
Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī, better known as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā or ʿAlam
al-Hudā (“the chief of the right path”), was al-Mufīd’s outstanding student and the leading
representative of the Imāmīs after al-Mufīd’s death.
438
He was born in Baghdād in 355/967 to a

436
Al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:15-30. This treatise has been published independently as well. See
437
For more on Ibn Qūluwayh, see Hadi Qazwini, “Ibn Qūluwayh,” EI3 (forthcoming); idem, “Heir of the Prophets:
Veneration of Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī and the Socio-Religious Positioning of Twelver Shiism,” Islamic Studies 60, 3 (2021):
273-275.
438
The following biographical information is extracted from al-Najāshī, Rijāl, 270-271; al-Ṭūsī, Rijāl al-Ṭūsī, ed.
Jawād al-Qayyūmī al-Iṣfahānī (Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, n.d.), 434; al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, 288-290; Carl
Brockelmann, “al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā,” EI2; Abdulsater, Shiʿi Doctrine, Muʿtazili Theology.

143
notable and wealthy ʿAlid family who traced its lineage to the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima
and her husband ʿAlī. Al-Murtaḍā was involved in politics, holding excellent relations with the
ruling and political elites of his time. Following the deaths of his father Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥusayn b.
Mūsā (d. 400/1009) and his younger brother Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn (“al-Sharīf
al-Raḍī”) (d. 406/1016), al-Murtaḍā assumed the position of the syndic (naqīb) of the Ṭālibids.
But al-Murtaḍā’s was recognized more prominently for his scholarship: he studied with various
scholars of his time and taught widely. He is listed as the author of roughly 150 works of varying
form and length, including in Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr), theology, literature, law, and legal theory.
For instance, the titles of some of his most famous and published works include: al-Shāfī fī al-
Imāma, a refutation of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s discussion of leadership (al-imāma) in the latter’s al-
Mughnī; al-Amālī, a collection of his meetings concerning miscellaneous topics; al-Dhakhīra fī
ʿilm al-kalām, his most comprehensive work on theology; al-Intiṣār, a comprehensive work on
Imāmī law; and al-Dharīʿa ilā Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa, his major legal theory work which was based on
his lectures and other shorter treatises, and which he completed in 430/1039. He died in Baghdād
in 436/1044. Like al-Mufīd before him, al-Murtaḍā left many disciples to carry on the intellectual
legacy of the Imāmīs. Chief among these was al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.
Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan, better known as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī or Shaykh al-Ṭāʾifa
(“the chief of the Shīʿī party”), was a superior disciple of both al-Mufīd and al-Murtaḍā and
assumed the leadership of the Imāmīs after al-Murtaḍā’s death.
439
Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī was born in
Ṭūs, Khurāsān, in 385/995. He began his primary education and scholarly career in Nīshāpūr in a
multicultural environment, studying Shīʿī doctrine and law as well as being exposed to other

439
The following biographical information is extracted from Najāshī, Rijāl, 403; al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, 447-451;
Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, “al-Ṭūsī,” EI2; Charles J. Adams, “The Role of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī in the Evolution of
a Formal Science of Jurisprudence Among the Shīʿah,” Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1971): 173-180; Mahmud Ramyar,
“Shaykh Ṭūsī: The Life and Works of a Shī‘ite Leader,” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1977).

144
schools of theology and law. In 408/1017, at the age of 23, al-Ṭūsī moved to Baghdād, which was
then under the control of the Būyids. The Būyids were sympathetic to the Shīʿīs, perhaps being
Shīʿīs themselves, and as such, their patronage presented Shīʿī scholars with an unprecedented
degree of freedom to write and express their views without fear of persecution. While in Baghdād,
al-Ṭūsī took full advantage of the intellectual prosperity of the city, studying with several Sunnī
and Shīʿī scholars. With the death of al-Murtaḍā, al-Ṭūsī, aged about 50, assumed leadership of
the Imāmī community as well as an appointment in kalām, teaching both Sunnī and Shīʿī students.
In 448/1056, the main center of Imāmī scholarship in Iraq moved from Baghdād to al-Najaf, when
al-Ṭūsī settled there after being subjected to sectarian persecution with the arrival and rise of the
Seljuks to power. Al-Ṭūsī’s own home as well as various Shīʿī libraries were attacked, resulting in
the destruction and loss of thousands of texts. In al-Najaf, al-Ṭūsī continued to teach and produce
various works until his death in 460/1067. He was buried in his home, located north of the tomb
of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, and a mosque was subsequently built over his grave in accordance with his
will. Like his teachers, al-Ṭūsī produced dozens of works on a wide range of topics and disciplines.
Most notably, he is credited with composing two of the four canonical Imāmī ḥadīth texts: Tahdhīb
al-Aḥkām and al-Istibṣār fī-mā Ikhtalafa min al-Akhbār. His major legal theory work is al-ʿUdda
fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. He produced this work before al-Murtaḍā produced al-Dharīʿa.
440

Following this brief introduction to our three Imāmī theorists, we may now turn to an
exploration of their legal thought as it relates to the debate over juristic in/fallibility. Beginning
with al-Mufīd, the discussion over juristic in/fallibility in absent in what is extant from his al-

440
Al-Murtaḍā was al-Ṭūsī’s teacher, but al-Ṭūsī composed al-ʿUdda before al-Murtaḍā composed al-Dharīʿa. It
appears that al-ʿUdda was based on al-Murtaḍā’s lectures, for al-Ṭūsī refers to his teacher’s views often and some
parts of al-ʿUdda are identical to al-Dharīʿa. For more on the relationship between the two texts, see, for example,
Muḥammad Bāqir Malikiyān, “Rābiṭey-e Dharīʿa-e Sayyid-e Murtaḍā bā ʿUdda-e Shaykh-e Ṭūsī,” Nashri-ye kitāb-e
Shīʿa 9-10 (1393 SH/2014): 435-444.

145
Tadhkira. However, his views pertaining to the in/fallibility debate have survived in accounts by
his prominent students, most notably in al-Murtaḍā’s al-Fuṣūl al-Mukhtāra and al-Karājikī’s Kanz
al-Fawāʾid, both of which relate relevant polemical disputations that al-Mufīd participated in.
According to al-Murtaḍā in al-Fuṣūl, al-Mufīd participated in a scholarly gathering where
he discussed the invalidity of employing analogy (qiyās) for legal rulings. An anonymous
Muʿtazilī scholar objected to al-Mufīd, and he replied.
441
Following this, the Ashʿarī scholar Abū
Bakr al-Bāqillānī stepped in, spurring a brief debate between the two.
442
It is worth quoting the
entirety of the debate between al-Mufīd and al-Bāqillānī here. Al-Murtaḍā relates:
Al-Bāqillānī said: …My view, which is also the view of this man (pointing to the Muʿtazilī
scholar), is to hold to the prevalence of probability (al-qawl bi-ghalabat al-ẓann) in these
matters. That is, I act upon and consider to be a mark and sign whatever I strongly suppose.
But if someone else strongly supposes another thing and he acts upon it, he is correct and
will not have erred. And every legal expert is correct (wa kullu mujtahid muṣīb). What do
you have to say about this?
I [al-Mufid] said: This is weaker than everything that was argued before it. If God has not
determined evidence for this meaning nor a sign (idhā lam yakun li-Llāh taʿālā dalīl ʿalā
al-maʿnā wa lā al-sima), but rather has, according to you, obligated you to act upon the
prevalence of your supposition, God must therefore have determined a cause (sabab) for
the prevalence of supposition, otherwise you would not suppose it and its prevalence would
not have any basis. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we accept the validity of
the prevalence of supposition in the religious law (al-sharīʿa). What, then, is the evidence
for it to prevail, as you have alleged? What is the effective cause (sabab mūjib) for it? I
request this evidence from you in the same way that I requested this man to show his
evidence for the sign and scriptural reason (bi-jihat al-istikhrāj li-l-sima wa al-ʿilla al-
samʿiyya). If you show us, you will be justified. But if you do not, your argument is invalid.
Al-Bāqillānī said: The causes (asbāb) of the prevalence of supposition are well known.
[Examples of this are] when a man strongly supposes that if he takes this path he will be
safe but if he takes another he will perish, or if he engages in this business he will profit
but if he engages in another he will lose, or if he intends to travel to a village and the sky
is cloudy it will rain but if it is clear he will be safe [from rain], or if he consumes this
medication he will benefit but if he consumes another he will be harmed, and other similar
things. Whoever opposes me in the causes for the prevalence of supposition holds an
abhorrent view.

441
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Fuṣūl al-mukhtāra min al-ʿuyūn wa al-masāʾil, ed. ʿAlī Mīr Sharīfī (Beirut: Dār al-Mufīd,
1413/1993), 82-84.
442
Aron Zysow has related a small portion of this debate between al-Mufīd and al-Bāqillānī and states that al-
Bāqillānī’s “entirely subjective” concept of probability was the basis of his “radical infallibilism.” See Zysow, The
Economy, 261.

146
I [al-Mufid] said to him: What you have said has nothing to do with the religious law and
its rulings (lā nisba baynahu wa bayn al-sharīʿa wa aḥkāmihā). All the examples that you
have presented are based on people’s having customs (ʿāda) and being aware of those
customs, and therefore having a strong supposition based on their customs; and all agree
on this with slight differences due to varying customs. However, the religious law has no
custom (ʿāda) or indicant (amāra) in that sense because the religious texts (al-nuṣūṣ) have
contradicted some of the laws that had been agreed upon [by people] and upheld others
that they had opposed; and there is no place for reason to either affirm or lift its rulings (li-
anna al-nuṣūṣ qad jāʾat fī-hā bi-ikhtilāf al-mutaffaq fī ṣūratihī wa ẓāhir maʿnāhu wa ittifāq
al-mukhtalif fī al-ḥukm wa laysa li-l-ʿuqūl fī rafʿ ḥukm minhā wa ījābuhu majāl). If the
religious law does not contain custom, then the prevalence of supposition in it is invalid.
Do you not see that one who does not have previous experience with business nor knows
about the experiences of others in it cannot strongly suppose profit or loss in business.
[Similarly], one who does not know the roadways and has no prior experience nor has
heard about others’ experiences will not strongly suppose safety in taking one road and not
another. Furthermore, if we assume that there exists someone who has no prior experience
with rain nor has heard anything about it, it is incorrect for him to strongly suppose the
falling of rain when it is cloudy and not when the sky is clear. If the case is as we have
explained and we agree that there exists no custom for people in relation to religious law,
then what you have claimed regarding the prevalence of supposition is invalid. You are in
the same position as the first man in having no basis for your argument.
Al-Bāqillānī said: Your argument opposes all the jurists and falsifies their claims of
prevalent supposition. It is abhorrent to debate with whoever falsifies all the jurists.
I [al-Mufid] said to him: Not all the jurists have adopted your view in depending on the
prevalence of supposition in discerning legal meanings and reasons (al-maʿānī wa al-ʿilal).
Rather, most of them claim that they arrive at this through inference and reflection (bi-l-
istidlāl wa al-naẓar). Therefore, our discussion is not a refutation of the generality (al-
jamāʿa) [of the jurists], but you and your group specifically. We debate with you for this
very purpose, even if you dislike it…
And he did not reply.
443

In another incident, al-Karājikī relates that al-Mufīd participated in a gathering where
Sunnī scholars (mutafaqqihat al-ʿāmma) were present.
444
The discussion centered on the questions

443
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Fuṣūl al-mukhtāra, 84-86.
444
See al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:210. Al-Karājikī states that it has been related that this discussion took place in
a gathering hosted by Abū al-Fatḥ ʿUbayd Allāh b. Fāris before his taking on the wizāra. See al-Karājikī, Kanz al-
fawāʾid, 2:214. The editor of Kanz al-fawāʾid notes that the name of the host has been related by ʿAbd al-Jabbār in
his Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwāt as Abū al-Fatḥ b. Firās. There, ʿAbd al-Jabbār describes the host as “among “the
partisans” (shiyaʿ) and one of the leading Imāmīs…who resided in the eastern part of Baghdād in the Yaḥyā market
and died close to that location. The shiyaʿ referred to him in their reports and their poets would read their poetry to
him as well, such as Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Waṣīf al-Jallāʾ, who was known as al-Nāshiʾ.” See ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad
al-Hamadhānī, Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwāt, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān (Beirut: Dār al-ʿArabiyya, n.d.), 557-558.

147
of disagreement (ikhtilāf), legal reasoning (ijtihād), and juristic in/fallibility. This encounter is also
worth quoting in its entirety. Al-Karājikī relates:
Al-Mufīd said to them: Your principle (aṣlukum) [i.e., juristic infallibility in legal
reasoning] that you depend on for validating disagreements (taswīgh al-ikhtilāf) prohibits
you from engaging in debate and research, and your engaging in debate contradicts your
principles in legal reasoning (al-ijtihād) and the validity of disagreement. Therefore, you
ought to either adhere to the results of your principles and thus avoid debate amongst
yourselves and remain quiet or choose to debate but abandon adopting legal reasoning and
your positions on the validity of disagreement. You must do either of these if you
understand the ways of inference (ṭarīq al-istidlāl).
One of those in attendance objected to al-Mufīd: Why and how do you make this claim?
Al-Mufīd answered: Do you not hold that God has permitted his creation to disagree in
religious rulings (al-aḥkām) to grant them flexibility and lift difficulty from them as a form
of grace toward them, and that had God mandated their agreement in religious rulings and
prohibited disagreements, this would restrict them? [Do you not] justify this view with
what you have related from the Prophet that ‘my community’s disagreement is [a form of]
grace,’ interpreting this statement based on your view of the validity of disagreements?
The man replied: Yes, and what of this?
Al-Mufid stated: Tell me about the purpose of debate (al-munāẓara). Is it not to seek
agreement (al-muwāfaqa) and call the opponent to one’s position based on clear
arguments?
The man replied: No, the purpose of debate is only to affirm the probativity (iqāmat al-
ḥujja) of one’s view and to clarify its strength (al-ibāna ʿan rujḥān al-maqāla).
Al-Mufīd replied: So, what then is the purpose of affirming the probativity of one’s view
and clarifying its strength? What causes one to do so? Is it to push the opponent away from
the strong view with clear evidence, or to call him to it with convincing grace? If you hold
the first view, you hold a view that no reasonable person will agree with you on, and there
is nothing more that can be said to you. If, however, you hold that the one who clarifies his
view with evidence is calling his opponent to [accepting] that view and to the unequivocal
truth, this is the same view that we hold. [That is, we hold] the purpose of debate to be to
come to an agreement and to lift disagreements and conflicts. If this is the case, then it
makes no sense to suggest that disagreement is a form of God’s grace in providing
flexibility for his creation. Therefore, based on your principle regarding disagreement,
debate and research would be impermissible. If, on the other hand, one encourages debate,
then the principle of legal reasoning becomes invalid.
Another man objected: The purpose of debate is not to reach agreement, but to uphold the
obligation (farḍ)
445
of legal reasoning (al-ijtihād).
Al-Mufīd replied: This is the same argument as your companion’s in its meaning, and both
of you are incorrect. This is because, when assuming the obligation (farḍ) of legal
reasoning, one must presuppose an objective (gharaḍ); the act of reflection must contain
an object of reflection (maʿqūl). If the objective of fulfilling the obligation of legal

445
The text reads gharaḍ (objective), but this is an error on part of the copyist or publisher. It ought to be farḍ
(obligation); this is supported by the context of the discussion in addition to the use of farḍ in the next sentence in al-
Mufīd’s reply.

148
reasoning is to make clear the place of the stronger view, this is a rational call to agreement
and coming together on a view through evidence. But if the objective is to create ambiguity,
this is impossible, because the one who reflects diligently attempts to present his case in a
way that convinces his opponent. Thus, if the objective of the act of reflection and the
intention of the one who reflects is to support his view and push back its opponent,
beautifying his view and making ugly that of his opponent, and we necessarily know that
he does not do this to push away from his view but rather to bring [his opponent] closer to
it and call to it, our ultimate position is thus confirmed…”
Al-Mufīd then turned to the gathering’s host (ṣāḥib al-majlis) and said to him: Even if they
get away with the contradiction that we related – and they will never get away with God –
they will not get away with contradicting the commands of God with their alleged view of
the goodness of disagreement and its permissibility in religious rulings. God said: ‘Do not
be like the ones who divided and disagreed after the clear signs came to them; those have
a major punishment’ [Q. 3:105]. Thus, God prohibited [disagreement] in a general and an
apparent way and cautioned and threatened against it; this contradicts the permissibility of
disagreement. God said: ‘Hold on to the rope of God all together and do not be divided’
[Q. 3:103]. So, God prohibited division and commanded all to come together; this
invalidates the view of the permissibility of disagreement. God said: ‘But they cease not to
differ, save those upon whom your Lord has mercy’ [Q. 11:118-119]. God excluded the
ones who are graced from among the ones who differ, thus showing that those who differ
have gone out of God’s mercy. This is due to the specification of mercy for those who do
not disagree (li-ikhtiṣāṣ man kharaja ʿan ṣifatihim bi-l-raḥma). If this was not the case, it
would make no sense to exclude the ones who are graced from among those who differ,
and this is clear to whoever reflects on it.
The host of the gathering said: I see that all of this is directed to those who hold that all
legal experts are correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb). What do you say about the one who holds
that the truth is with one (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid) and does not permit disagreement?
Al-Mufīd replied: Despite being correct in holding juristic fallibility, he will have
contradicted himself if he holds that the one who misses the truth is pardoned or not held
accountable for his error, if he depends in this view on the idea that the mistaken one would
face hardship and constraint if he is held accountable. In this way, he would have joined
the first two [scholars] in contradiction, and thus would have to abstain from research and
discussion. Above all, those who hold that all legal experts acquire the truth present a
greater degree of contradiction and incoherence, such as when one considers his opponent
to have missed the ruling (al-ḥukm) but witnesses that his act through which he missed the
ruling is nonetheless correct. Thus, he holds that his opponent is both correct and incorrect
in his correctness, admitting to him that he is correct and rewarded for opposing his own
view. The inherent abhorrence of this view is clear. And success if from God.
446

These alleged incidents show the prevalent Imāmī attitudes – represented by al-Mufīd –
toward analogy, probability, and both juristic infallibility and excused or probable juristic
fallibility. In the first incident, al-Mufīd rejects the validity of depending on probability in the law,

446
Al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:210-214.

149
especially as it relates to the activity of the legal expert. Al-Mufīd, like other proponents of juristic
fallibility, rejected the idea that the responsibility of the expert was simply to engage in diligent
reasoning and to act based upon its prevalently probable results. Rather, the fallibilists understood
the act of legal reasoning as a means to an end: finding the correct legal ruling. In the second
incident, al-Mufīd rejects both juristic infallibility and excused or probable juristic fallibility as
untenable. For al-Mufīd, not only was juristic infallibility wrong because it defeated the purpose
of scholarly debate, which was to convince one’s opponents that they were wrong, but he also
rejects the idea put forth by the proponents of probable or excused juristic fallibility, that is, that a
legal expert can be mistaken but his mistake is always forgiven.
Following this brief elucidation of al-Mufīd’s ideas, we now turn to his two disciples, al-
Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī, for a more detailed exposition of their concerns related to the juristic
in/fallibility debate.
The discussions of al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī center on the following topics: (1) materialism
and certitude in the law, (2) the meaning of raʾy and its historical usage, (3) the comprehensiveness
of the law and its attached benefits, (4) the existence of objective revelatory evidence for legal
rules, (5) the varying consequences of error in the law, and (6) holding the truth exclusively. We
will examine each of these topics in turn.
4.5.1.1 Materialism and Certitude in the Law
We may begin with the idea of materialism. Aron Zysow has argued that in formative
period two competing legal systems existed: formalism and materialism. Zysow defines the
formalist legal system as holding that “the bulk of the prophetic traditions, though not necessarily
the most important ones, are of no more than probable authenticity. The interpretation of the
Qurʾān and of the traditions brings to light further points of uncertainty. Finally, analogy

150
introduces a growing body of legal rules that have no more than probable validity…Nonetheless,
the hope remains that the uncertainty within which ijtihād flourishes may ultimately be resolved
by consensus, which stamps one of the competing solutions as correct. In some theological circles,
a more immediate resolution to the problem of uncertainty was sought in the infallibilist version
of ijtihād.”
447
Zysow attributes the formalist legal system to most Sunnī legal theorists, with the
noted exception of the Ẓāhirīs.
448
Given the historical dominance of Sunnī legal theory, he
maintains that one may speak of the formalist system as “normal.”
449
On the other hand, Zysow
notes that the materialist legal system “does not allow for traditions that are not of certain
authenticity. The interpretation of the legal texts is conducted according to principles that do not
admit the uncertainty of the normal systems. Analogy and any other inferences that do not yield
absolutely certain results are proscribed. Because these sources of uncertainty are eliminated, there
is no need for consensus. Infallibilism can take no root here.”
450
Based on Zysow’s typology of
legal systems, we may argue that the Imāmī legal theorists of the period under study subscribed to
the materialist legal system. They maintained that the law had to be based on certitude, rejecting
all methods that yielded probability, including legal analogy.
451
For the earlier Imāmī theorists,
only the Qurʾān, the Tradition (including the verified and prolific statements of the Prophet and
Imāms), and the unanimous agreement of the Muslims were valid sources for inferring legal
rules.
452
Their insistence on materialism and certitude is the reason for their denial of the validity
of legal analogy, which they considered to be the primary method that was employed by their
opponents to promote probability in the law. However, this materialist thrust was not based on any

447
Zysow, 279.
448
Zysow, 279.
449
Zysow, 279.
450
Zysow, 279.
451
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:221.
452
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:292-293.

151
rational principle but rooted in Imāmī traditionalism. Rationally, there was nothing necessarily
wrong with the use of legal analogy as a tool in the law.
453
Rather, it was the numerous reports
transmitted from the Imāms where they censured the use of analogy that led the Imāmīs to reject
its validity.
454
One example of a strong censure of analogy will suffice here. The famous Imāmī
traditionist, Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941), relates a report in al-Kāfī in which the
sixth Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq states: “The proponents of analogy seek knowledge [of the law] through
their use of analogy, but their use of analogy does nothing but distance them further away from
the truth; and God’s religion cannot be acquired through the use of analogy” (inna aṣḥāb al-
maqāʾīs ṭalabū al-ʿilm bi-l-maqāʾīs fa-lam tazidhum al-maqāʾīs min al-ḥaqq illā buʿd
an
wa inna
dīn Allāh lā yuṣāb bi-l-maqāʾīs).
455

In addition to their own sources and views, the Imāmī legal theorists drew on the views of
non-Imāmīs to support their rejection of analogy. Al-Murtaḍā undermines the claim that the
Companions agreed on the validity of analogy by listing as proof several reports whereby the
Companions’ rejected and condemned of the use of analogy and considered opinion. These reports,
al-Murtaḍā insists, are related “from [our] opponents among the proponents of tradition (aṣḥāb al-
ḥadīth)” as well as his fellow Imāmīs and include the views of ʿAlī, ʿUmar, Abū Bakr, Ibn Masʿūd,
Ibn ʿAbbās, and other prominent Companions.
456

With respect to juristic in/fallibility, the Imāmīs considered the adoption of probable
methods in the law, especially analogy and solitary or non-prolific reports, as one of the primary
reasons why the infallibilists proposed their doctrine. Al-Ṭūsī notes that the basis for the debate

453
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:181.
454
For a few examples of reports where the Imāms censured the use of analogy, see al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, ed. ʿAlī Akbar
al-Ghaffārī (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1388/1969), 1:56-58.
455
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 1:56.
456
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:258-261.

152
over whether all jurists are correct is “holding [the validity of] analogy (qiyas) and acting upon
non-prolific reports (akhbār al-āḥād). This is because scholars agree that the truth corresponds to
that which is [certainly] known through prolific reports (tawātur) and the apparent meanings of
the Qurʾān (ẓawāhir al-qurʾān). But the proponents of these two methods [analogy and non-
prolific reports] have diverged with respect to this question. And we have shown the invalidity of
acting on analogy and on non-prolific reports that have been related exclusively by our [non-
Imāmī] opponents.”
457

The rejection of probable methods in the law meant the rejection of what were considered
by the Imāmīs subjective methods in the law. This rejection, however, did not entail a
corresponding rejection of the existence of subjective legal rules, i.e., rules that differed depending
on particular circumstances, a point to which we will return below.
But what about the historical disagreements among the Companions? Were these not based
on the fact that the Companions were working with probable evidence and methods such as raʾy?
4.5.1.2 The Meaning of raʾy and Its Historical Usage
Al-Murtaḍā argues against the validity of depending on probability as it relates to legal
reasoning by going beyond simply rejecting the validity of employing analogy. He attempts to
subvert the whole discourse on the use of raʾy. Recall that the infallibilists argued that the
Companions disagreed among themselves, presuming that these disagreements were due to their
use of considered opinion (raʾy) or other probable methods. For them, it was because of the
Companions’ disagreements among themselves that these questions were considered ijtihādic in
the first place, or that they were ijtihādic and therefore disagreement arose over them and all were
considered correct. It is also for this reason that the infallibilists denied the possibility of the

457
Al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:726.

153
existence of “error” with respect to ijtihādic cases and the disagreements that arise in them.
Similarly, the Sunnī fallibilists made a similar distinction between unequivocal and probable cases,
arguing that error in the latter is excused or forgiven because one was working squarely in the
realm of probability and employing raʾy. Al-Murtaḍā attempts to upend this whole framework by
arguing that his opponents’ understanding and use of the term raʾy is wrong, for raʾy is not
restricted to views held based on probability, but includes views based on concrete evidence.
Al-Murtaḍā contends that raʾy, when employed generally, entails views that are arrived at
through a type of inference (istidlāl) and opens the door for debate between the Muslims.
458
For
instance, he insists that raʾy is not specific to the use of analogy; rather, it includes reference to
apparent indications (al-ẓawāhir).
459
According to al-Murtaḍā, the use of the term does, of course,
exclude things that are necessarily known through logical impositions such as the abhorrence of
injustice or the obligation to express equity, or certainly known matters such as the Prophet’s
calling his followers to five daily prayers and fasting in a specific month, or any other things known
through concrete evidence that all of the Muslims agree on such as upholding prayer and fasting,
or knowledge of the prophethood of the Prophet and the truth of his calling.
460
However, al-
Murtaḍā presents several examples of how the term raʾy is frequently used to describe the belief
in doctrines that are arrived at through concrete evidence and thus necessitate certitude (al-adilla
al-mūjiba li-l-ʿilm): “so-and-so holds divine justice” (fulān yarā al-ʿadl), “so-and-so holds divine
determinism” (fulān yarā al-qadar), “so-and-so holds the withholding of judgment” (fulān yarā
al-irjāʾ), “so-and-so holds that the miscreants from the Muslims will certainly be punished” (fulān
yarā al-qaṭʿ ʿalā ʿadhāb fussāq ahl al-ṣalāt), and so on.
461
He continues to note that scholars have

458
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:267-268.
459
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268.
460
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:269-270.
461
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268.

154
used the term to indicate views that are not held based on analogy or legal reasoning, such as when
they state that “Abū Ḥanīfa considered ablution using fermented date water (nabīdh) to be
permissible” (Abū Ḥanīfa yarā al-wuḍūʾ bi-l-nabīdh); that this is his “raʾy” and “madhhab,”
despite it not being based on analogy or legal reasoning.
462
Furthermore, he argues, they have used
this term to note the holding of views based on reports, such as in the case of the statement:
“Judging based on witness testimony and oaths is the view of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī” (inna al-qaḍāʾ
bi-l-shāhid wa-l-yamīn raʾy Mālik wa al-Shāfiʿī).
463
Finally, al-Murtaḍā notes, it is also said that
“the units (al-aqrāʾ) of the [woman’s] waiting period (al-ʿidda) on the view (raʾy) of Abū Ḥanīfa
refers to [her] menstrual period (al-ḥayḍ) and on the view (raʾy) of al-Shāfiʿī and others refers to
her post-menstrual period (al-aṭhār),” despite all of them basing these positions on inference and
not on analogy.
464
Al-Murtaḍā argues that all of this is to say that if the meaning of raʾy is simply
one’s view or belief (al-madhhab wa-l-iʿtiqād), as he holds it to be, the Companions’ affixing their
views to raʾy (i.e., when they say “this is my raʾy”) does not necessarily entail their use of analogy
(as his opponents have argued).
465
This, he concludes, is especially so when one considers that the
Companions did not make it explicit that their raʾy originated in analogy and not any other
method.
466
Thus, if they did not make it explicit, and it is possible that their views were based on
other methods, there is no evidence here for the proponents of analogy to make their claim that the
Companions employed the term raʾy exclusively or even primarily to refer to using analogy (qiyās)
or legal reasoning (ijtihād).
467

462
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268.
463
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268.
464
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268.
465
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:268-269.
466
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:269.
467
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:269.

155
In engaging in this linguistic debate about the meaning and historical usage of the term
raʾy, al-Murtaḍā denies the claim that the Companions’ disagreements were based strictly on
probable issues or opinions.
4.5.1.3 All-Encompassing Law and Attached Benefits
Juristic fallibility in Imāmī thought strongly depended on the idea that the law was
comprehensive. Like other legal theorists, the Imāmīs insisted that the law was all-encompassing.
This means that legal rules encompassed every facet of human action. They have asserted that the
scriptural evidence for this principle is prolific. Two examples may suffice here. In one instance,
al-Kulaynī relates a report on the authority of the fifth Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir in which he
said: “God has not left anything that the community needs except that He has revealed it in His
Book and clarified it to His Messenger...” (inna Allāh tabārak wa taʿālā lam yadaʿ shayʾ yaḥtāj
ilayhi al-umma illā anzalahu fī kitābihi wa bayyanahu li-rasūlihi ṣalla Allāhu ʿalayhi wa ālihi wa
sallam...).
468
In another report, the sixth Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq said: “There is nothing except that
it contains a reference to it in the Book and the Tradition” (mā min shayʾ illā fīhi kitāb aw sunna).
469

In Imāmī theological and legal discourse, the Tradition additionally included the verified
statements of the Imāms who lived successively for two and a half centuries after the death of the
Prophet,
470
thus greatly expanding the concept and its usability. If the law was comprehensive, this
meant that there could be no sphere in which God had not determined a legal rule. This idea would
stand in stark contrast to the idea put forth by the infallibilists especially that it was possible for
legal rules to be nonexistent if there was no evidence for their existence. We saw this concern over

468
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 1:59.
469
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 1:59.
470
See, for instance, al-Mufīd’s statement in al-Karājikī, Kanz al-fawāʾid, 2:15: “The sources for legal rules are three
things: God’s book, the tradition of his Prophet, and the statements of the Imāms after him” (iʿlam anna uṣūl aḥkām
al-sharīʿa thalāthat ashyāʾ kitāb Allāh subḥānahu wa sunnat nabiyyihi ṣalā Allāh ʿalayhi wa ālihi wa sallam wa
aqwāl al-aʾimma al-ṭāhirīn min baʿdihi ṣalawāt Allāh ʿalayhim wa salāmuhu).

156
the comprehensive law earlier with the Sunnī fallibilists, and will return to this point again in the
next section.
In addition to being comprehensive, Imāmī theorists maintain that legal rules contain a
theological aim, which for the responsible agent (mukallaf) is to acquire divinely prescribed
benefits (maṣāliḥ) or avoid divinely prescribed harms (mafāsid). In the words of al-Murtaḍā,
“obligation with legal rules follows benefits” (al-ʿibāda bi-l-sharʿiyyāt tābiʿa li-l-maṣāliḥ).
471

Furthermore, al-Murtaḍā maintains that these benefits can only be known through revelation (al-
samʿ).
472
From the perspective of the Imāmīs, the scriptural evidence for the idea that legal rules
serve this theological aim was clear. In one example, the Prophet is reported to have said during
his farewell pilgrimage: “O people! There is nothing that brings you closer to paradise and further
away from hellfire except that I have commanded you [to perform it], and there is nothing that
brings you closer to the hellfire and further away from paradise except that I have prohibited you
[from performing it]” (ayyuha al-nās mā min shayʾ yuqarribakum min al-janna wa yubāʿidakum
min al-nār illā wa qad amartukum bihi wa mā min shayʾ yuqarribakum min al-nār wa
yubāʿidakum min al-janna illā wa qad nahaytukum ʿanhu).
473
For the Imāmīs, this and other
similar reports indicate that all legal rules are based on divinely-established harms and benefits
that may be acquired or avoided by humans.
For the Imāmīs, an important corollary to the principle of legal rules following benefits and
harms was that legal rules could be subjective, that is, the benefits and harms could differ
depending on varying circumstances, and so too would the responsibilities differ.
474
As noted
earlier, Imāmī theorists were mainly concerned with denying the validity of subjective methods in

471
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:94. See also al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:508, 724, 731.
472
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:95.
473
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 2:74.
474
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:94-95; al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:724.

157
the law, not subjective rules. In their thought, it was not the division between the uṣūl and the furūʿ
(and that the former contained unequivocal evidence and the latter contained probable evidence)
that was instructive here, but the distinction between rational (ʿaqliyyāt) and revelatory
(sharʿiyyāt) cases. According to al-Murtaḍā, the circumstances of individuals (and thus their
responsibilities) do not vary with respect to rational cases, for instance the prohibition of
committing an act of injustice due to its abhorrence (qubḥ al-ẓulm) or the obligation to reflect
theologically (al-naẓar fī maʿrifat Allāh).
475
Rational obligations were presumed to apply to all
responsible agents equally, that is, it was prohibited for all people to act unjustly and mandatory
for all people to reflect theologically. This is because the general dictates of “reason” were assumed
to not differ from one person to another. On the other hand, al-Murtaḍā argues that differences in
responsibilities could appear in revelatory cases.
476
In revelatory cases, it was under the purview
of revelation to distinguish between cases and responsibilities, such as the varying legal obligations
of the rich and the poor with respect to alms, or the resident and the traveler with respect to
completing or shortening the daily prayers.
477
Revelation could determine subjective rules with
varying circumstances and applications. However, and importantly, the possibility of subjective
rules existing in revelatory cases, the existence of evidence for these rules had to be objective and
equally accessible to everyone.
4.5.1.4 Objective Revelatory Evidence for Legal Rules
That the law was all-encompassing and served a theological aim meant two things. First,
legal rules always contained revelatory evidence for them. Second, the evidence had to be objective
and accessible to all, even if the rulings themselves were subjective and applied specifically.

475
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:95.
476
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:95.
477
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:95-96.

158
According to al-Murtaḍā, legal rules must possess evidence for them (al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya lā
budda ʿalayhā min dalīl), and that this evidence cannot originate with one’s subjective choice (wa
lā yarjiʿ ilā ikhtiyār al-fāʿīl).
478
Given that the law is all-encompassing and that legal rules attach
to benefits and harms, al-Murtaḍā maintains that in religious matters (al-sharʿ) it is necessary for
there to be objective evidence that distinguishes between goodness (al-ṣālāḥ) and faultiness (al-
fasād); and because people are fallible, the evidence for legal rules cannot originate with their
subjective choice, which may be defective and cannot guarantee avoiding fault.
479
In other words,
if the only way to recognize divinely-prescribed benefits and harms is through revelation,
480
the
revelatory evidence has to be accessible to everyone equally. Stated differently, if revelation alone
determines the benefits and harms that are attached to legal rules, it is only revelation that can
reveal these benefits and harms by providing equally accessible evidence through the dictates of
the Qurʾān and Tradition.
It ought to be clear that an important consequence of maintaining the existence of objective
evidence for every legal rule is that the responsibility of the legal expert is to discover existing
legal rules, not to produce them.
481
To see more clearly the Imāmī idea of the responsibility of the
legal expert in uncovering legal rules, let us turn to the example of engaging in ijtihād in order to
find the direction of prayer when it was not apparent. As we have seen, this example was a favored
one in discussions concerning the responsibility of the legal expert and especially with respect to
the debate over juristic in/fallibility. Al-Murtaḍā refutes the idea that it is obligatory to seek the
ruling for novel legal cases by employing legal reasoning or analogy when an explicit text does

478
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:181-182.
479
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:182.
480
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:95
481
We saw a similar concern with the Sunnī fallibilists above. See, for instance, Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1541, 1559-
1560, 1564.

159
not exist in the same way that it is obligatory to seek the direction of the Kaʿba for prayer when it
cannot readily be ascertained. He argues that, if anything, this example hints at the possibility of
the obligation of engaging in legal reasoning with respect to legal cases, not its actual confirmation
(ithbāt).
482
Al-Murtaḍā clarifies that the one who depends on this argument is in fact engaging in
analogy himself by analogizing the obligation of engaging in legal reasoning in novel cases to the
obligation of seeking the direction of prayer; the discussion, however, is about confirming the
permissibility of employing analogy in the law in the first place.
483
Additionally, he argues, a legal
rule already exists in this case – one is mandated to pray facing a specific direction (al-mukallaf
qad ulzima an yuṣallī ilā jihat
in
mā) – and the obligation to seek the direction of prayer through
legal reasoning (ijtihād) is so that one is able to fulfill one’s obligation to pray, not for any other
reason.
484
In other words, the act of legal reasoning in this example is not to affirm or produce a
new legal ruling (ithbāt al-ḥukm al-sharʿī), but rather to clarify the existing ambiguous ruling (i.e.,
to face the direction of prayer) that already possesses concrete evidence for it.
485

The existence of objective evidence for all legal rules also meant that the legal expert could
be correct or wrong when attempting to discover them. Imāmī theorists were careful to insist that
there could be no actual contradiction or error between the revelatory evidence itself.
486
Al-
Murtaḍā argues that if there can be no error or contradiction in the revelatory sources, it is possible
for the one who infers when employing them to err by way of incorrect inference, such as delaying
what ought to be prioritized or vice versa (yuʾakhkhir muqaddaman or yuqaddim muʾakhkharan),
or by specifying what ought to be generalized or vice versa (yakhuṣṣ ʿāmman or yaʿum khāṣṣan),

482
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:310-311.
483
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:311.
484
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:311-312.
485
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:312.
486
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:272-273.

160
or by employing a text that has been abrogated, and other errors, so that the error is from the
individual. Otherwise, he maintains, the scriptural texts do not contain inherent errors or
contradictions, but rather it is the one who infers from them who may “miss or hit” (qad yukhṭiʾ
wa yuṣīb).
487

However, what did it mean for a legal expert to be wrong? Was the mistaken legal expert
culpable before God? And what was the responsibility of others toward the mistaken legal expert?
4.5.1.5 The Varying Consequences of Error in the Law
We saw in the previous and present chapter that the problem of culpability due to insisting
on the possibility of the legal expert’s error was a major concern of the infallibilists and some of
the fallibilists. Error in the law, it could be argued, entailed culpability, just like error with respect
to the fundamental tenets entailed culpability. More pressingly, culpability also possibly entailed
other more serious practical consequences, such as the obligation to censure, condemn,
excommunicate, or even take up arms against the one who was wrong. For the infallibilists, the
solution to these problems was the adoption of juristic infallibility and doing away with the
possibility of error in the law all together. If there was no “error” in the first place, there was no
culpability or other more serious consequences. From the perspective of the proponents of
probable juristic fallibility, the solution was twofold: to promote the probable correctness and
incorrectness of legal experts and thus avoid saying who was incorrect with certainty, and to insist
that error in the law was excused due to the assumption that one was working with probable
evidence. If the error was automatically excused, there was no culpability or more serious
consequences to it. The Imāmī theorists proposed a different solution to these problems. Al-
Murtaḍā’s discussion of the matter is instructive.

487
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:273.

161
Al-Murtaḍā argues that not all errors carry the same consequences. He explains that there
are two types of error: those that entail the obligation for others to excommunicate (al-barāʾa, qaṭʿ
al-wilāya) and condemn (al-laʿn) – even perhaps to engage in armed combat (ḥaml al-silāḥ) – and
those that do not; that two actions are considered wrong (khaṭaʾ), he argues, does not necessitate
similar consequences.
488
To show how this is the case, al-Murtaḍā presents the example of the
distinction between “minor” (al-ṣaghīra) and “major” (al-kabīra) sins: both share abhorrence
(qubḥ) but are not similar in their consequences or the status of their committers; likewise,
committing fornication (al-zinā) and disbelief (al-kufr) are both abhorrent, but they do not share
similar consequences.
489
If it is thus possible for two things to be similar in their abhorrence but
different in their results or consequences, al-Murtaḍā argues, it is possible that the truth is with one
view and that the other views are wrong, but that the error is not equal with respect to its
consequences and the obligation to condemn, excommunicate, or fight against.
490
Al-Murtaḍā adds
that one may not only differentiate the consequences of varying abhorrent acts, but also between
individuals who engage in the same action, so that the same act does not carry the same
consequences or severity for everyone.
491
He draws on his opponents views: for instance, his
opponents claim that Moses’s act of killing (related in Q. 28:15) was a minor sin, but this does not
entail that they hold every act of killing to be minor, nor that they necessarily consider the severity
of an act of killing perpetrated by others to also hold in the case of Moses.
492

To make more explicit his case about distinguishing between the consequences and
severity of errors, al-Murtaḍā presents several polemical examples. He asks his opponents:

488
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:286-287.
489
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:287.
490
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:287.
491
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:296.
492
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:296-297.

162
Before the appointment of Abū Bakr as caliph, did the Companions not initially disagree
when the Anṣār [the Medinese Helpers] proclaimed: “A leader from us and a leader from
you” (minnā amīr wa minkum amīr)? If the opponents admit to this disagreement – and
they must – we will ask them: Did the ones who made this claim err for contradicting the
report that has been attributed to the Prophet where he said, “The leaders are from Quraysh”
(al-aʾimma min Quraysh)? It is incumbent for them to admit to [the Anṣārs’] error. We will
then ask them: Do you consider the Anṣār to be deviant miscreants (fussāq ḍullāl) who
were deserving of being cursed, excommunicated, or fought against? If they reply in the
affirmative, they will have held a position that is worse than that with which they vilify
those who they accuse of “rejection” (rafḍ) [i.e., the Shīʿīs]. If, instead, they hold that the
Anṣār did not insist on their claim and reverted to the truth, and are therefore undeserving
of being considered miscreants and of excommunication, we will say to them: Our
discussion is about their actions before hearing the Prophetic report and submitting to it;
based on what you have said, they ought to have been considered miscreants at that moment
of error and thus deserving of excommunication and cursing – but no one has claimed this
about this Anṣār. Additionally, some of the Anṣār insisted on their view even after hearing
the report, so they ought to be considered (on your view) in all the ways mentioned. If they
reply that the Anṣār did not engage in an act of miscreance with their claim, despite the
truth being with the opposite view, and thus they were undeserving of condemnation, we
will say to them: if this is the case, why do you not hold that the truth is with one view and
the rest of the Companions erred, but that this error is not deserving of all of the
consequences that were mentioned? We will ask them, further, in this manner, about all of
the Companions’ disagreements in which the truth is with one, such as their disagreements
over whether or not the one who refused to observe the alms (māniʿ al-zakāt) deserved
death and other cases…They will be asked about ʿUmar’s judgment of stoning in the case
of the pregnant woman who admitted to engaging in adultery whereby ʿAlī said to him: “if
you have a case against her, you have no case against that which is in her womb.” We will
ask them: do you consider ʿUmar’s judgment in this case to be the truth? If they reply in
the affirmative, they will have erred and contradicted the view of the entire Muslim
community, because everyone has agreed that it is impermissible to stone her while she is
pregnant. Furthermore, ʿUmar himself admitted to his error of judgment when he stated:
“had it not been for ʿAlī, ʿUmar would have perished.” We will then ask them: Do you then
consider ʿUmar’s error as deserving of cursing and condemnation? They will have no
choice but to reject this. Thus, we will say to them: the same goes for the case of the legal
experts (al-mujtahidīn).
493

Al-Murtaḍā insists that it is invalid to hold that adopting juristic fallibility necessitates the
condemnation of those who err. This view of error necessitating condemnation or censure, he
argues, is the view of his opponents, not his, and it is incorrect to hold someone to account for a
position that they do not hold.
494

493
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:287-290.
494
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:291-292.

163
4.5.1.6 Holding the Truth Exclusively
We have noted that both the infallibilists and the fallibilists consider the question of the
correctness of all or only one legal expert to fall under the category of the fundamental legal tenets
(uṣūl), and therefore both juristic fallibility and juristic infallibility could not be valid on principle.
In other words, the fallibilists denied the validity of juristic infallibility with certitude and the
infallibilists denied the validity of juristic fallibility with certitude. For both groups, their own
doctrines represented orthodoxy, and therefore, we may speak of the debate over the two doctrines
as a case of the construction of competing orthodoxies. It follows from this that the proponents of
each doctrine held that their opponents were absolutely wrong on this question, and therefore, on
principle, also culpable for their error, for this error related to a fundamental legal tenet (aṣl).
However, some theorists were more explicit with the exclusivity of their doctrine. This was
certainly the case with the Imāmī theorists. According to al-Ṭūsī: “My view, which is the view of
all of our theologian masters, both ancient and contemporary, and which has been adopted by al-
Murtaḍā and Abū ʿAbd Allāh [al-Mufīd] is that the truth is single and holds evidence for it, and
whoever contradicts it is an erring malefactor (mukhṭiʾ fāsiq).”
495
In other words, al-Ṭūsī claims
that the Imāmīs are in agreement in holding certain juristic fallibility as opposed to probable juristic
fallibility. However, what makes this doctrine so exclusive is that the Imāmī theorists insisted that
the truth was restricted to “the true group” (al-ṭāʾifa al-muḥiqqa), i.e., the Imāmīs.
496
Stated
differently, any legal view that did not conform to the prevalent Imāmī view was by default
incorrect. In theory, in proposing this doctrine, the Imāmīs did not have to worry about
accommodating legal diversity in the same way that their Sunnī fallibilist counterparts did, as we
saw above.

495
Al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:725-726.
496
See al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿUdda, 2:726.

164
4.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
A main conclusion of this chapter is that juristic fallibility among the Sunnī theorists was
strongly based on their traditionalist sensibilities. We saw this clearly with Abū Yaʿlā above. But
this also holds true in the case of other Sunnī legal theorists who adopted juristic fallibility, such
as Ibn Ḥazm, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, and Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī. What held these theorists together
in their adoption of juristic fallibility was not their shared legal or theological schools (Ibn Ḥazm
was a Ẓāhirī, al-Baghdādī started off as a Ḥanbalī then adopted the Shāfiʿī legal school and the
Ashʿarī theological school, and al-Shīrāzī was also a Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī), but their shared
traditionalism. These theorists took the scriptural proofs for juristic fallibility seriously and
interpreted them on their face value. Thus, they understood the Qurʾānic verse pertaining to the
differing judgements of David and Solomon to indicate that the former was wrong, and the latter
was right. They also interpreted the famous Prophetic report about the rewards of the correct and
mistaken judges to mean that it was possible for one to be wrong in their legal reasonings and
rulings. Finally, they were not willing to dismiss or reinterpret the large number of reports that
expressed the disagreements of the Companions and their considering themselves and others
mistaken in some cases.
With the Imāmī Shīʿī theorists, we saw a similar approach to traditionalism that may have
informed their insistence on juristic fallibility. This was aided by their materialism, to use Aron
Zysow’s terminology, and their insistence on certitude in the law. However, in the case of the
Imāmī theorists, it may be argued that their traditionalism and materialism was also informed by
the more foundational theological or socio-political dogma of the inerrancy of the Imām. We will
see how this is the case much more clearly in the next chapter. We will also see how other related

165
dogmas, especially that of the inerrancy of the community and the probity of the Companions
undergirded Sunnī ideas related to the debate over juristic in/fallibility.

166
Chapter 5: Collective Memories and Mythmaking
The previous two chapters provided detailed descriptions of the juristic in/fallibility
doctrines with the objective of understanding what the legal theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-
eleventh centuries were debating and how they made their cases. This chapter explores the function
of the juristic in/fallibility debate. I assert that the juristic in/fallibility debate served as a way for
scholars to theoretically justify or resist intra-Muslim diversity and to construct competing
orthodoxies. By “competing orthodoxies,” I mean competing authoritative frameworks for the
determination of correct or justified belief and practice and the consequent delineation of group
identities.
The main question that we will explore in this chapter is the following: what factors might
explain the theorists’ adoption of particular versions of juristic in/fallibility? I argue that the
theorists’ adoption of juristic in/fallibility was largely based on rivaling collective memories of the
early Muslim past, especially the (inter)actions of Muḥammad’s leading Companions. My
argument in this chapter draws on the idea of “mnemohistory,” a term coined by Jan Assmann,
which shifts attention from studying the historicity of historical events to studying how and why
earlier events were sustained and remembered by later thinkers.
497
I assert that the rivaling
collective memories of the early Muslim past were sustained by ideological commitments that
crystallized in the second-third/eighth-ninth centuries. These include the dogmas of (1) the Muslim
community’s inerrancy (ʿiṣmat al-umma), (2) the probity of Muḥammad’s Companions (ʿadālat
al-ṣaḥāba) (in Sunnism), and (3) the inerrancy of the Imāms (ʿiṣmat al-aʾimma) (in Shīʿism).
These dogmas, I maintain, represent the enduring sectarian myths that ultimately animated the
various constructions of competing orthodoxies.

497
See Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998), 9-15.

167
5.1 Theoretical Framework: Mnemohistory, Collective Memories, and Mythmaking
It ought to be clear from the previous two chapters that the infallibilists and the fallibilists
employed various scriptural, rational, and historical arguments to make the case for their respective
doctrines.
498
However, despite the existence of scriptural and rational assertions, it may be strongly
argued that the foundational arguments of the proponents of both doctrines in the fourth-
fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries rested on perceived historical precedent, that is, competing collective
memories of the (inter)actions of the earliest generation of Muslims. In other words, the
justifications of the legal theorists engaged in the debate over juristic in/fallibility were largely
historicized. Frequently looking to the past, the infallibilists and the fallibilists recognized that the
Prophet’s Companions differed in their views on various questions. However, they interpreted the
Companions’ disagreements as signifying different things. How did both groups interpret these
disagreements?
For the infallibilists, the fact of the Companions’ disagreements meant that disagreement
was not only inevitable, but that it was entirely justified and perhaps even encouraged. The
infallibilists interpreted the historical disagreements of the Companions as having been mutually
encouraged and free of hostility; they viewed them as having considered one another correct
(muṣīb). According to the infallibilists, there was no other possible way to interpret the reports of
their disagreements, for the leading Companions were certainly known to have honored one
another. Therefore, because the Companions considered one another correct despite their
differences, this also meant that all legal experts were correct despite their differences.
On the other hand, the fallibilists interpreted the Companions’ expressions of disagreement
not as signifying their considering one another to have been correct, but as evidence that they

498
Sometimes, proponents of both doctrines drew on the same proofs, such as Q. 21:78-79 and the Prophetic tradition
on the rewards of the correct and erring judge. See, for example, al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:380-381, 384-385.

168
considered one another to have missed the single truth in some cases. For the fallibilists, the reports
about the Companions admitting to their own errors and considering one another to have been
mistaken were too many and too clear to dismiss. However, the fallibilists disagreed over the
consequences of the Companions’ errors. The Sunnī fallibilists contended that the Companions
who erred were excused for their errors; this is because they all intended what was right. Similarly,
they argued, legal experts cannot all be considered correct, but those who err are excused and
rewarded for their diligence. The Imāmī Shīʿī fallibilists, on the other hand, were not as forgiving
with respect to the errors of the Companions, especially those who were perceived to have been at
odds with the inerrant Imāms. The Imāmī emphasis on single-truth and fallibility with respect to
the Companions translated to juristic fallibility: there can only be one truth among the differing
legal experts and their errors are not always excused.
This basic outline of the “historical” arguments of the proponents of juristic infallibility
and fallibility may raise questions about historicity: if the participants in the juristic in/fallibility
debate relied heavily on the activity of the Companions to make their cases for their respective
doctrines, what does this tell us about the actual era of the early Muslims? How “historical” are
the arguments by the proponents of both doctrines? It is true that, from a strictly historiographical
point of view, it might be tempting to dismiss their arguments as all together false or as
methodologically useless. However, to dismiss these arguments for historiographical concerns
would entail missing an important point about their function. I argue that the “historical” arguments
of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh century legal theorists represent a case of “mnemohistory” and
should be studied as such. Describing the mnemohistorical approach to historical events, Jan
Assmann states, “Rather than asking, “What really happened?” the mnemohistorical approach asks
how it was remembered; it examines why, by whom, for whose sake, and in which forms this past

169
became meaningful.”
499
In other words, focusing on and how and for what purposes the past is
constructed or remembered reveals what is at stake for those who engage in this constructing and
remembrance. Thus, my analysis in this chapter is mnemohistorical: I contend that the thinkers
engaged in the debate over juristic in/fallibility were constructing competing orthodoxies through
rivaling collective memories animated by dogmatic commitments in relation to post-Prophetic
authority, especially with respect to the status of the Companions and their interrelations. To more
fully appreciate how this was the case, we will pursue two lines of inquiry in this chapter: First,
how did our theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries remember the Muslim past,
especially the (inter)actions of the earliest Muslims? In other words, what were their socially
conditioned competing collective memories of the past?
500
Second, what were the dogmatic
commitments animating these interpretations? In other words, what were the myths – the
significant and enduring stories – that sustained the rivaling memories of the past?
501

5.2 Competing Collective Memories of the Past
The legal theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries drew heavily on historical
arguments to make the case for their respective juristic in/fallibility doctrines. What did they
remember about the early Muslim past, why, and how did they interpret it? The infallibilists and
the fallibilists remembered the interactions of the early Muslims quite differently.

499
Jan Assmann, The Invention of Religion: Faith and Covenant in the Book of Exodus, trans. Robert Savage
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 34.
500
For more on “collective memory,” see Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
501
My use of the term “myth” here is devoid of any normative judgments concerning these dogmatic commitments.
In other words, my use of “myth” does not connote “fake” (or “real,” for that matter). For more on “myth” and
“mythmaking,” see Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1999); Russell T. McCutcheon, “Myth,” in Guide to the Study of Religion, ed. Willi Braun and
Russell T. McCutcheon (New York: Continuum, 2000), 190-208.

170
5.2.1 The Infallibilists
The infallibilists promoted the following memories of the Companions and early Muslim
past:
(1) The Companions disagreed with one another, but they did not reject or object to one another’s
opposing views.
502

(2) The Companions did not nullify one another’s rulings, nor did they prohibit their opponents
from ruling in opposition to their own views.
503

(3) The Companions actively encouraged differences of opinion amongst themselves.
504

(4) The expert Companions never claimed certainty in their varying views.
505

(5) The Companions did not actually admit to their own “errors” or denounce one another in the
sphere of probable questions. The reports that appear to suggest so must be discounted as
solitary or must be reinterpreted.
506

(6) The Companions were capable of “error,” but their “error” ought to be interpreted as engaging
in faulty legal reasoning (i.e., a faulty process). Even then, this “error” does not entail
culpability.
507

(7) The Companions and Successors engaged in debate to exercise their legal reasoning skills, not
to convert or correct one another.
508

These memories of the interactions of the Prophet’s earliest followers express a sense of
calm disagreement. They paint a picture of an early Muslim community that was virtually free
from any hostility, especially in intellectual matters. The leading Companions recognized one

502
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-365; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:385-386; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:366-367.
503
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:370-371.
504
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:366.
505
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:365-366; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:363-365, 388-389.
506
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:382-383; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:371-375.
507
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:210-212; al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:382-383.
508
See al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:354-355.

171
another’s expertise, respectfully differed and, in fact, intentionally encouraged a culture of
tolerance and disagreement. The legitimacy of disagreements was by default.
509
The infallibilists
who viewed the past in such a way were projecting a sophisticatedly elaborated legal theory
framework back to the earliest generation of Muslims: the Companions were fully aware that they
were all largely working with probable or vague evidence, so they did not consider one another to
have actually “erred,” despite their conflicting legal views.
510
Thus, any texts that suggest that they
were critical of one another’s views or that they censured one another for their perceived errors
must either be dismissed or reinterpreted from face value.
511

5.2.2 The Fallibilists
The Sunnī fallibilists promoted the following memories of the Companions and early
Muslim past:
(1) The Companions disagreed with one another, considered (themselves and) others to have been
mistaken, objected to one another, and sometimes censured one another.
512

(2) The Companions’ errors were excused or forgiven because they intended the truth.
513

(3) The Companions did not more often object to and censure one another because revelation
prohibited this, because the disagreements of the Companions were devoid of unequivocal
evidence, or because greater censuring may have caused social discord and corruption.
514

(4) The Companions appointed judges who opposed their own views, but the reason they did this
was because they assumed that it was either possible that the two would end up agreeing when

509
Zysow, The Economy, 260.
510
See, for example, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-366.
511
See, for example, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:365; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:367-375.
512
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:64-65, 85-86; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1556-1558; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:121-125;
al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 500-501; al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247-251.
513
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:121-122.
514
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567-1568; al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 505.

172
the time of a ruling came or because, despite their disagreements, the appointer was not certain
of the appointee’s error.
515

The Sunnī fallibilists remembered the past differently from their infallibilist counterparts.
In contrast to the infallibilists, they remembered the early Muslims as having disagreed and held
themselves and others to have been mistaken in their views at times. Some of the leading
Companions even censured others for their errors.
516
The early Muslim past was not as calm for
the Sunnī fallibilists as it was for their infallibilist counterparts. For the Sunnī fallibilists, one could
not simply discount the many reports that indicated this. But in some ways, the fallibilists
remembered the past quite similarly to the infallibilists. Certainly, some of the Companions
admitted to their own errors and censured others for their errors, but ultimately, their errors were
excused. The Companions all knew this because they understood that they were working with
vague evidence as well. They understood that their task was to diligently look for evidence for
their views and that, if they happened to miss the mark, they would still be excused and would
extend that excuse to their counterparts, because they all intended and sought the truth. The
legitimacy of disagreement, according to the Sunnī fallibilists, was a consequence of the mere
probability that is attainable.
517
Like the infallibilists, the Sunnī fallibilists projected an elaborate
legal theory framework back to the earliest Muslims: The Companions recognized that they were
employing probable tools and thus working with probable results. And while they understood that
everyone was pursuing the truth, they also understood that, despite their best efforts, sometimes
they would not acquire that truth. For this diligent effort, however, they would still be rewarded.

515
See Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1568.
516
See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 5:64-65, 85-86; Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1556-1558; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:121-125;
al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabṣira, 500-501; al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247-251.
517
Zysow, The Economy, 260. On this point, see, for example, Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 5:1567-1568.

173
With respect to the debate over juristic in/fallibility, the Imāmī fallibilists promoted the
following memories of the Companions and early Muslim past:
(1) The Companions admitted to their own errors and considered one another to have made
mistakes. They also denounced one another.
518

(2) The Companions did not employ analogy (qiyās) or considered opinion (raʾy). In fact, they
condemned their use.
519

(3) Not all errors entail the same consequences, and therefore not all the Companions’ errors are
treated in the same way.
520

(4) Some Companions may have withheld their objections to others due to precaution, fear, or
being in a state of weakness.
521

(5) The Companions appointed as judges those who opposed their own views with the expectation
that the appointees rule according to the sources of the law.
522

(6) The Companions may not have overturned the rulings of one another because they
distinguished between affirming the correctness of a ruling and the obligation to abstain from
overturning a ruling. Furthermore, there are reports of Companions overturning the rulings of
one another.
523

In some ways, the Imāmī fallibilists remembered the early Muslim past similarly to the
Sunnī fallibilists. They recalled that the leading Companions sometimes made mistakes, that they
acknowledged their own and others’ mistakes, and that sometimes they censured one another. On
the other hand, the Imāmī fallibilists remembered the past very differently from both their Sunnī

518
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247-251, 272-273, 278-283.
519
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:193, 252-253, 258-261.
520
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:291-292.
521
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:292.
522
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:292-293.
523
See al-Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:294-295.

174
fallibilist and infallibilist counterparts. For one, the Companions did not employ probabilistic legal
tools such as analogy; nor did they accept the validity of considered opinions. In fact, according
to the Imāmīs, the Companions vehemently condemned the use of these probabilistic tools. From
the perspective of the Imāmīs, the early Muslim period was not as tolerant as some of their Sunnī
counterparts liked to depict it. Rather, some of the Companions operated in an environment of
precaution and fear; this is why some of them may not have more frequently raised objections to
incorrect views. The Imāmī fallibilists, however, also projected an elaborate legal theory
framework back to the early Muslim past: the Companions were keenly aware to distinguish
between what it meant to affirm the correctness of conflicting or erroneous views and what it meant
to abstain from objecting to these views. The Companions also realized that not all errors carried
the same consequences, and, thus, distinguished between objecting to an incorrect view and
denouncing it or its holder.
5.3 Dogmatic Commitments Sustaining Competing Memories
I contend that the above rivaling collective memories and interpretations of the interactions
of the earliest Muslims were sustained by competing dogmatic commitments. I have identified
three. These are: (1) the inerrancy of the Muslim community, (2) the probity of the Companions
(Sunnism), and (3) the inerrancy of the Imāms (Imāmī Shīʿism). This section will explore the
development and significance of these commitments. It ought to be noted that these competing
dogmas represent differing solutions to the early Muslim “political” problems and rivaling ways
of extending Prophetic authority into the post-Prophetic period.
5.3.1 The Inerrancy of the Community (ʿiṣmat al-umma)
As we saw above, in making their cases, the legal theorists often argued that the
Companions, scholars, or all Muslims agreed on a particular doctrine or course of action. For

175
example, the infallibilists asserted that all legal experts (mujtahids) were correct, based on the
Companions’ agreement not to object to one another’s differing views and/or their agreement not
to overturn one another’s rulings.
524
For instance, in refuting the assertions of the fallibilists, al-
Juwaynī explains that if the legal experts had actually been mandated to acquire the alleged single
truth with certainty, the Companions and their Successors would not have neglected this
obligation; for, if they did, this would entail their collective agreement to oppose the truth, and this
cannot be, for the Muslim community does not agree on misguidance (lā tajtamiʿ al-umma ʿalā
al-ḍalāla).
525
Abū al-Ḥusayn presents a similar argument regarding the Companions’ agreement
that they were all correct despite their differences, noting that the infallibilists have maintained
that if some of the Companions were wrong, considering them correct would have been deceitful;
and the Community cannot agree upon deceit (al-umma lā tajtamiʿu ʿalā al-kidhb).
526

These and similar examples reveal a commitment to the dogma of communal inerrancy
(ʿiṣmat al-umma). The Muslim community – as a collective entity – was believed to have been
incapable of all together agreeing on a mistake. The community was divinely protected from error.
The idea of communal inerrancy was certainly being debated in the early third/ninth
century, and possibly even in the late second/eighth century.
527
The discussion and reports
surrounding it (both for and against) are strongly represented in this period. For example, Ibn Abī
Shayba (d. 235/849) includes reports in his Muṣannaf affirming that the Muslim community
(ummat Muḥammad) could never agree on error: when Abū Masʿūd al-Anṣārī (d. before 60/680)

524
See ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-366; al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:364, 371; al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, 2:117; al-
Murtaḍā, al-Dharīʿa, 2:247.
525
Al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:364.
526
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:385.
527
Al-Shāfiʿī’s reference to consensus (ijmāʿ) captures the idea of the scholarly community’s infallibility in
transmitting the teachings of the Prophet: “...or the consensus of the Muslim scholars who cannot agree on opposing
[the Prophet’s] tradition” (...aw ijmāʿ ʿulamāʾ al-muslimīn alladhīna lā yumkin an yujmiʿū ʿalā khilāf sunnat
in
lahu).
See al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 315.

176
left Kūfa on his way to perform the pilgrimage, he was asked to offer advice to his listeners, and
he proclaimed, “Adhere to the [majority] group, for God will not permit Muḥammad’s community
to agree upon misguidance” (ʿalaykum bi-l-jamāʿa fa-inna Allāh lam yakun li-yajmaʿ ummat
Muḥammad ʿalā ḍalāla).
528
The Sunnī traditionalist Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) and the Baghdādī
Muʿtazilī Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ (d. ca. 300/913) maintained that it was not possible for the
entire Muslim community – as a community – to agree on error. They argued that the evidence for
this view was the Prophet’s famous report: “My community will not agree on error (khaṭaʾ) (or
ḍalāla, misguidance).”
529
In addition to the concept of “the community” (al-umma), there was an
insistence on maintaining one’s loyalty to “the group” (al-jamāʿa); several reports were relayed
that strongly discouraged even the slightest deviation from “the group.”
530
Besides the Prophetic
report, according to al-Khayyāṭ, the community was infallible because “[it] is authoritative in what
it relates from the Prophet” (li-annahā ḥujja fī-mā yunqal ʿanhu).
531
In other words, the community
is conceived as the carrier of Muḥammad’s authority and legacy. Some would go on to suggest
that, even though the Prophetic report in question was solitary (and, thus, its transmission was
uncertain), it was prolifically known among the Muslims and accepted by the earliest Muslims and
scholars, and no one objected to its transmitters (wa hādhā al-khabar wa in kāna min akhbār al-

528
Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, ed. Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1409/1989), 7:508. See also al-
Fasawī, al-Maʿrifa wa al-tārīkh, ed. Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿAmrī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1301/1981), 3:244-245; al-
Ṭabarānī, al-Muʿjam al-kabīr, ed. Ḥamdī b. ʿAbd al-Majīd (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1415/1994), 17:239.
529
This report had several variations. One version read, “My community will never agree on misguidance, so if you
witness disagreement, adhere to the majority (inna ummatī lan tajtamiʿ ʿalā ḍalāla fa-idhā raʾaytum al-ikhtilāf fa-
ʿalaykum bi-l-sawād al-aʿẓam); another read, “My community does not agree on error” (inna ummatī lā tajtamiʿ ʿalā
khaṭaʾ); another read, “My community does not agree on misguidance” (lā tajtamiʿ ummatī ʿalā ḍalāl). See, for
example, Ibn Māja al-Qazwīnī, Sunan Ibn Māja, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ (Dār al-Risāla al-ʿĀlamiyya, 1430/2009),
5:96 (ḥadīth 3950); Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 69.
530
See Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Sharḥ mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī, ed. ʿIṣmat Allāh Muḥammad (Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya,
1431/2010), 8:21.
531
See al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, 94-95.

177
ʿāḥād fa-innahu qad istafāḍa fi-l-umma wa talaqqāhu al-salaf wa ahl al-ʿilm bi-l-qabūl wa tark
al-nakīr ʿan rāwīhi).
532

The dogma of communal inerrancy appears to have originated with an earlier idea of the
charismatic nature of the whole community in general.
533
After all, the Qurʾān had pronounced
that the Muslims were “a middle (or “best”) community” [Q. 2:143] and “the best community
brought forth to humankind” [Q. 3:110]. It was thought that if the entire community agreed on an
erroneous belief or course of action, it would – as a righteous community – cease to exist.
534
This
earlier idea was then modified to an idea of perpetual Muslim exceptionalism or infallibility
through some of the community.
535
Writing in the fourth/tenth century, al-Jaṣṣāṣ interprets the
Prophetic report to mean that a portion of the community will perpetually be infallible (ifādatuhu
anna ṭāʾifat
an
lā tazāl mutamassikat
an
bi-l-ḥaqq ilā waqt ḥudūth ashrāṭ al-sāʿa wa zawāl al-
taklīf).
536

On the other hand, despite its prominence, some rejected this belief. In their view, the
Muslims were not exceptional. Al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) notes that “some have invalidated [the legal
doctrine of] consensus, holding the possibility of the Muslims agreeing on error and misguidance
with respect to their analogies and deductions (min jihat al-qiyās wa-l-istikhrāj), in the same way
that this was possible with other communities.”
537
The Muʿtazilī theologian Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām

532
See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Sharḥ mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī, 8:21.
533
On the idea of the charismatic community, see the words of W. Montgomery Watt when explaining the recurrence
of the idea of consensus in Muslim thought: “The best explanation of this recurrence of consensus seems to be that it
arises out of an intense belief in the community, a belief that the community is in some way supernatural, is a divinely
instituted and divinely ordered community, in brief, that it is a ‘charismatic community’. The saying of Muhammad,
‘My community will never agree on an error’, is often regarded in the West as having been invented in order to justify
the principle of consensus; but the present train of thought suggests another way of looking at it. Perhaps it is an
expression of this belief in the charismatic community, asserting that its charisma involves infallibility.” See W.
Montgomery Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society (London: Routledge, 1961), 204.
534
Ahmad Hasan, “Ijmāʿ in the Early Schools,” Islamic Studies 6, no. 2 (1967): 124.
535
See Hasan, “Ijmāʿ,” 124.
536
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 3:273.
537
Al-Balkhī, Maqālāt, 489.

178
(d. 220-230/835-845) is said to have held that it was possible for the Muslims to collectively agree
on error.
538

Historically speaking, it may be said that the idea of communal inerrancy arose in response
to the earliest “political” conflicts among the Muslims. Half a century ago, Ahmad Hasan argued
that the concept of the infallibility of the community arose with the early fragmentation of the
Muslims in the decades following the Prophet’s death, specifically due to the problem of
arbitration (al-taḥkīm) between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya at the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 37/657. Discussing
the famous Prophetic report on communal inerrancy, Hasan maintained that it “represents the
reaction of orthodoxy to the stand of the Khawārij and the Shīʿah.”
539

Hasan’s assessment might not be entirely accurate. It is true that the Khārijīs maintained
that the entire community had erred.
540
On their view, Muʿāwiya and his army had erred because
they initiated an armed rebellion against ʿAlī, the rightful caliph. As rebels, according to the
Qurʾānic imperative, it was thus mandatory upon the Muslims to fight Muʿāwiya and his troops.
Those who initially avoided battle were also culpable because they did not fulfill their obligation
to fight against injustice. However, when ʿAlī and his followers agreed to arbitration, they, too,
went astray, because they also avoided fulfilling their obligation to continue fighting injustice.
Therefore, according to the early Khārijīs, the entire community had erred by the time of
arbitration. However, Hasan’s assessment does not seem to be very accurate with respect to the
Shīʿīs. This is because the Shīʿīs accepted the idea that the entire community cannot agree on error,
even if that meant that most of it can.
541
In fact, Hasan himself acknowledges that that the Shīʿīs

538
See Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 65; al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, 94-95.
539
Ahmad Hasan, “The Concept of Infallibility in Islam,” Islamic Studies 11, no. 1 (1972): 2-3. It should be noted that
Hasan’s use of the term “orthodoxy” here appears anachronistic.
540
On the doctrines of the Khārijīs, see, for example, ps.-al-Nāshiʾ al-Akbar, Masāʾil al-imāma, ed. Josef van Ess
(Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1971), 18-19, 68-70; al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 86-131; Watt, The Formative Period, 9-37.
541
On the Shīʿī view that most of the Prophet’s Companions erred by abandoning ʿAlī, see al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 16;
al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, 3; al-Balkhī, Maqālāt, 85.

179
“did not declare the entire community in error, because it consisted of ʿAlī and his followers.”
542

As we shall see later, the Shīʿī conception of the legal doctrine of consensus (ijmāʿ) differed from
the Sunnī conception in that the Shīʿīs held consensus to be authoritative because it entailed the
inclusion of the infallible Imām within the sphere of that consensus (because had the matter over
which there was a consensus been wrong, the Imām would have had to interfere and correct the
error). The difference, therefore, between what would become the Sunnī and Shīʿī conceptions of
the dogma of the infallibility of the community were in degree, not kind (even though, as we saw
above with al-Jaṣṣāṣ, his idea of the infallibility of the community meant the infallibility of some
of the community).
543

Myths of communal inerrancy had become widely promoted and accepted by the time our
legal theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries were extensively debating the doctrines
of juristic in/fallibility. As such, theorists from both sides of the juristic in/fallibility debate could
employ it to further promote their rivaling memories of the early Muslims and their perceived
interactions. If the case could be made that the Companions, who represented the Muslim
community par excellence, had collectively agreed on a course of action, and the community of
Muslims was inerrant, there was nothing more to debate. In other words, if the infallibilists could
make the case that the Companions agreed to consider one another correct despite their differences,
and their fallibilist counterparts could make the case that the Companions agreed not to consider
one another correct despite their differences, and both groups drew on the myth of communal
inerrancy to support these claims, then the debate with their adversaries would stop there. For the

542
Hasan, “Infallibility in Islam,” 3.
543
The earlier doctrine of the infallibility of the community was related to (the basis of?) the legal doctrine of
consensus (ijmāʿ) later. For ijmāʿ, many proofs offered, including several Qurʾānic verses, for example, Q. 4:115,
2:143, and 3:110; in the last verse, for example, it was argued that the Qurʾān’s statement that the Muslims being “the
best of nations” entailed the Muslim community’s inability to agree on error. See, for example, al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Sharḥ
mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī, 8:19-20.

180
infallibilists, disagreement in the law both among the earliest Muslims and later thinkers was
justified and all were correct, and the evidence for this was the community’s infallible agreement.
For the fallibilists – at least those among them who adopted probable or excused juristic fallibility
– identifying exactly who was correct and who was wrong in cases of disagreement did not matter,
for the errors of some did not necessarily translate into culpability, and the evidence for this was
the community’s infallible agreement.
5.3.2 The Probity of the Companions (ʿadālat al-ṣaḥāba)
The second dogma animating the collective memories of the early Muslim past was the
probity of Muḥammad’s Companions (ʿadālat al-ṣaḥāba) as a group and by virtue of their place
qua Companions. The early Muslims differed in their approaches to the stature of Muḥammad’s
Companions (al-ṣaḥāba).
544
In contrast to other groups who accepted the righteousness of only
some or perhaps many of the Companions, the Sunnīs insisted on the probity of all of the
Companions, qua Companions. This meant that, as a collectivity, the Sunnīs held that all
Companions had to be honored and their actions had to be interpreted in the best light.
545
The
probity of the Companions and its related principle of charitable interpretation came to be standard
Sunnī doctrine as early as the third/ninth century.
546
In the words of Gautier Juynboll, “The
Companions, as a class of people, were collectively placed on a higher level than that of any other,
later generation, and whoever casts, or tries to cast, the slightest blemish on the reputation of a
single Companion runs the risk of being ostracized.”
547

544
For an excellent study on the differing views of Muslim thinkers and groups on the Companions, see Etan Kohlberg,
In Praise of the Few: Studies in Shiʿi Thought and History, ed. Amin Ehteshami (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 7-159.
545
See Kohlberg, Praise, 7-34; Lucas, Critics, 255-282. See also Ḥasan b. Farḥān al-Mālikī, Kitāb al-Ṣuḥba wa al-
ṣaḥāba, accessed June 1, 2022, https://almaliky.org/subject.php?id=1728
546
Kohlberg, Praise, 24.
547
Gautier H. A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 191.

181
In the course of their arguments for juristic in/fallibility, the Sunnī and Baṣran Muʿtazilī
legal theorists insisted that the Companions had to be honored. This is because it was held that
God had favored and raised them above any denigration.
548
Honoring the Companions meant that,
whenever and to the extent possible, one ought to interpret their (inter)actions in a favorable light
and based on the principle of charity. In the words of Nebil Husayn, “an ideological commitment
to belief in the righteousness of all Companions led many scholars to either reject or charitably
interpret texts that seemed to present any Companions in a negative light.”
549
There was absolutely
no doubt in the minds of these thinkers that the Companions honored one another, and honoring
the Companions was seen as an extension of the Companions’ honoring one another. Thus, any
doctrine or report that appeared to express otherwise had to be reinterpreted. For example,
anticipating an objection to his position with reports that express the Companions’ disapproval of
one another such as, for example, the report that suggests that Ibn ʿAbbās denounced Zayd b.
Thābit for his erroneous views, ʿAbd al-Jabbār reinterprets these reports. He argues that such
reports must be reinterpreted, for there is no doubt that the Companions honored one another.
550

Sometimes honoring the Companions meant interpreting their legal hermeneutics charitably.
551

This principle of charitable interpretation would sometimes also be extended to the generations
after the Companions.
552

The legal theorists would also extend the principle of charitable interpretation to more
serious disagreements and conflicts. Many of these theorists either entirely avoided discussions of
the earliest intra-Companion violent conflicts or justified the actions of those who participated in

548
Al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:371.
549
Nebil Husayn, Opposing the Imām: The Legacy of the Nawāṣib in Islamic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2021), 178.
550
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:364-365, 370-371; See also al-Juwaynī, al-Talkhīṣ, 3:367, 371; Al-Baṣrī, al-
Muʿtamad, 2:385-386.
551
See al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 2:385-386.
552
See al-Bāqillānī, al-Taqrīb, ed. Abū Zunayd, 3:213.

182
them, either by suggesting that those who survived the violent conflicts repented or that they were
experts who were simply engaging in legal reasoning (ijtihād), and “all legal experts are correct”
(kullu mujtahid muṣīb). According to Etan Kohlberg, the first person who applied the concept of
ijtihād to the Companions was the traditionalist Sunnī theologian al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī al-Karābīsī (d.
248/862).
553
This idea was then promoted by al-Ashʿarī a century later and adopted by most Sunnī
and Baṣran Muʿtazilī thinkers. In his al-Ibāna, al-Ashʿarī describes the leading participants in the
earliest Muslim civil wars in the following terms: “As for what occurred between ʿAlī [on the one
hand] and al-Zubayr and ʿĀʾisha [on the other hand], it was based on interpretation (taʾwīl) and
reasoning (ijtihād). ʿAlī was the leader (imām), and all of them were experts (ahl al-ijtihād). The
Prophet declared for them paradise and martyrdom. This means that they were all correct in their
reasonings. The same goes for the case of ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya, indicating interpretation (taʾwīl)
and reasoning (ijtihād). All the Companions are trustworthy and cannot be suspected with respect
to their faith. The Prophet praised them all and mandated us to revere, honor, and support them;
and to repudiate anyone who belittles any one of them.”
554

The process of the elevation of the status of the Companions required first a definition of
“a Companion.” The Companions’ roles in the transmission of the Prophet’s teachings ensured
their prominence in Sunnism, but the evaluation of the Prophet’s teachings through their
transmission thus required a precise definition of a “Companion.”
555
There was, of course, great
disagreement about who a “Companion” was. Some held that, to be considered a Companion, one
ought to fulfill certain conditions, such as staying with the Prophet, fighting alongside him in

553
Kohlberg, Praise, 14-15.
554
Al-Ashʿarī, al-Ibāna, 260. For similar interpretations of the early violent conflicts between the Muslims and their
relation to juristic in/fallibility, see Abū Yaʿlā, al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn, esp. 231-232; Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-
Ishāra ilā madhhab ahl al-ḥaqq, ed. Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid (Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1420/1999), 184-
189.
555
See Kohlberg, Praise, 20-21.

183
battle, or transmitting reports from him. Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845) relates from Muḥammad b. ʿUmar
al-Wāqidī (d. 207/822) that the Medinese Successor (tābiʿī) Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib (d. 94/715)
considered a Companion to be “one who resided with the Messenger of God for a year or two or
fought alongside him in one or two battles.”
556
Al-Wāqidī himself saw this definition as too
restrictive, arguing that it excluded individuals such as Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī who became
Muslim only a few months before the Prophet’s death but nonetheless played important roles: Jarīr
was sent by the Prophet to destroy al-Khalaṣa, an Arab place of worship between Mecca and
Yemen.
557
He also witnessed the Farewell Pilgrimage alongside the Prophet, and narrated reports
from the Prophet.
558
In this light, following “the people of knowledge” (ahl al-ʿilm), al-Wāqidī
insisted that a Companion was “anyone who saw the Prophet after reaching the age of maturity
and who submitted to and understood the religion and was pleased with it...even if it was for just
an hour of the day” (kullu man raʾā Rasūl Allāh wa qad adraka al-ḥilm fa-aslama wa ʿaqila amr
al-dīn wa raḍiyahu fa-huwa ʿindanā mimman ṣaḥiba al-Nabī wa law sāʿa min al-nahār).
559
Other
definitions were much broader and inclusive. According to al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), a Companion
is “a Muslim who accompanied the Prophet or saw him” (wa man ṣaḥiba al-nabī aw raʾāhu min
al-muslimīn fa-huwa min aṣḥābihi).
560
Not only did the thinkers propose various definitions of
who a Companion was, but there was also disagreement about the relative stature of the
Companions: some were more favored than others.
561

Regardless of the varying scope of the definition of a Companion and their varying statures,
it followed that the Companions had to be honored absolutely. Despite their varying statures, al-

556
Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt (mutammim al-ṣaḥāba), ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAbd Allāh al-Salūmī (al-Ṭāʾif: Maktabat al-
Ṣiddīq, 1416/1996), 818.
557
See Toufic Fahd, “Dhu ʾl-Khalaṣa,” EI2.
558
Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt (mutammim al-ṣaḥāba), 819.
559
Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt (mutammim al-ṣaḥāba), 819.
560
Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 5:2 (kitāb aṣḥāb al-nabī).
561
See Kohlberg, Praise, 17-20, 35-46.

184
Wāqidī held that “all of the Companions of the Messenger of God were leaders who should be
emulated” (wa kull Aṣḥāb Rasūl Allāh kānū aʾimmat
an
yuqtadā bi-him).
562
Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855)
insists: “If anyone speaks ill of any of the Companions of the Messenger of God, or detests him
for something he has done, or mentions his evil deeds, then he is an innovator, [outside] the
community until he asks for (God’s) mercy on all (the Companions) and until his heart is sound
towards them all.”
563
Similarly, authors like al-Bukhārī and Muslim were including in their
collections of reports numerous traditions about the virtues (faḍāʾil) of individual Companions and
of them as a whole. However, as Scott Lucas has noted, “Ibn Ḥanbal’s “Sunnī solution” to the
perpetual problem of the intra-ṣaḥāba warfare is significantly closer to the classical doctrine of the
“collective probity of the Companions” than the approaches put forth in the books of his
contemporaries al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Ibn Abī Shayba, and Ibn Saʿd, and the vastness of his
enterprise certainly laid the groundwork for his pupil Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī to articulate explicitly
this uniquely Sunnī belief,”
564
i.e., of the collective probity of the Companions.
According to Etan Kohlberg, “[t]he role of the Companions as transmitters of
Muhammad’s words explains more than any other single factor the prominence which they
acquired in Sunni Islam.”
565
However, honoring all the Companions was not specific to the
traditionists. The Sunnī Ṣūfīs and theologians of the second-fifth/eighth-eleventh centuries also
upheld the probity and honor of the Companions. It was the view of the ascetics al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī
and al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) and the Ashʿarī theologians Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and
Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī. Eventually, it also was adopted by the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs al-Qāḍī ʿAbd

562
Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 2:287.
563
W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Creeds: A Selection (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 30. See the
original report by Muḥammad b. ʿAwf in Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, 1:311.
564
Lucas, Critics, 282.
565
Kohlberg, Praise, 20-21.

185
al-Jabbār and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. As Kohlberg has noted, “[t]he belief that all the
Companions were good Muslims is so deep-rooted in Sunni Islam that few were willing to
challenge it.”
566

Thus, the doctrine of the probity of the Companions began with the broadening of the term
“Companion” to include almost all of those who saw and followed Muḥammad. Following this,
there was an insistence on the collective probity of the Companions, which meant that they had to
be honored and could not be doubted or disrespected. The dogma of the probity of all the
Companions served as the Traditionalist Sunnī, Ashʿarī, and Baṣran Muʿtazilī myth that animated
the way in which the early Muslim past was remembered. For this reason, the infallibilists among
them could promote the idea that the Companions never denounced one another or even considered
one another to have been mistaken, and on this basis, to deny the validity of the texts that suggested
so. On the other hand, the fallibilists among them could accept the validity of the texts that
suggested that the Companions made mistakes and objected to one another, but promote the idea
that all their errors were justified, excused, or forgiven.
5.3.3 The Inerrancy of the Imāms (ʿiṣmat al-aʾimma)
The dogma of the inerrancy, or more accurately, the divine protection from error or sin of
the Imāms sustained the Imāmī Shīʿī recollection of early Islamic history. Substantive debates
surrounding the definition and scope of the Imāms’ inerrancy arose in the first half of the
second/eighth century.
567
Already by the end of the first/seventh century, competing Shīʿī factions
had emerged, differing not only over the identities of the Imāms, but also over their characteristics
and roles.
568

566
Kohlberg, Praise, 15.
567
Wilferd Madelung and Émile Tyan, “ʿiṣma,” EI2.
568
See Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 4-5.

186
The different Shīʿī groups disagreed not only on the identities of the Imāms and their roles,
but also on the definition and scope of the Imāms’ inerrancy.
569
In fact, the discussion of the
Imāms’ inerrancy was directly related to the differing conceptions of the Imāms’ role(s). The
Zaydīs did not hold to the inerrancy of the Imāms (except the first three). For the Zaydīs,
interpretive authority resided collectively in all the descendants of ʿAlī’s sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn.
This is because the Zaydīs understood the primarily role of the Imām to be to possess political
acumen and military competence. By contrast, the Imāmīs (Twelvers) and the Ismāʿīlīs affirmed
the inerrancy of all the Imāms, despite their disagreements on the identities of the Imāms. This is
because the Ismāʿīlīs and the Imāmīs understood the Imām’s primarily role to be to provide the
correct interpretation of revelation. For the Imāmīs and Ismāʿīlīs, the inerrancy of the Imāms was
due to their role as the divinely chosen guides of the Muslims. This meant that they had to be
immaculate in their knowledge of the religion (and perhaps more) and in their behaviors.
Our attention will be focused on the Imāmī conception of the inerrancy of the Imāms. How
did it develop? The Imāmīs saw this idea as an extension of the inerrancy of the Prophet. As such,
opposition to the Imāms was impermissible in the same way that opposition to the Prophet was
impermissible. For their part, the early second/eighth-century Shīʿīs were mostly promoting the
theological and legal positions of the Imāms Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114/733) and his son Jaʿfar
al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765).
570
While these two figures were generally venerated by the Muslims for
their scholarship and place as heads of the House of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt), some Shīʿīs
considered the knowledge of these two Imāms to be “qualitatively different from that of other
learned men for it was the knowledge of the House of the Prophet, which derived ultimately from

569
For a useful comparative chart on the Zaydī, Ismāʿīlī, and Imāmī conceptions of qualifications and scope of the
Imāmate, see Haider, Shīʿī Islām, 46-47.
570
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 4.

187
the Prophet himself. It was, therefore, unquestionable truth and indisputable authority, representing
in effect a part of the revelation that the Prophet had received from God.”
571
These followers of
the Imāms understood them to be protected from error and sin.
Wilferd Madelung notes that the Imāmī theologian Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795), a
close disciple of the Imāms Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799), was among the first
to promote the idea of the Imām’s immunity from error.
572
Hossein Modarressi states that
Hishām’s theory “was a major contribution to further accommodate the shift” in the Shīʿī
conception of the Imām’s primary role from the political to the religious.
573

By the late third/ninth century, the various doctrines of the Imāms’ inerrancy were well
known outside Shīʿī circles. Writing shortly after 269/882,
574
al-Khayyāṭ (ca. 220-300/835-913)
acknowledges that the Imāmīs believed in the inerrancy of the Imām, noting that the reason why
the Imāmīs would agree to the dogma of communal inerrancy is because the inerrant Imām is
included in the community.
575
Al-Ashʿarī understood Hishām b. al-Ḥakam’s view to be that it was
rationally possible for the Prophet(s) to err but not for the Imāms; this is because the Prophets’
errors could be corrected with revelation whereas the Imāms did not receive revelation.
576
This

571
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 9.
572
Madelung and Tyan, “ʿiṣma,” EI2. On Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, see Wilferd Madelung, “Hishām b. al-Ḥakam,” EI2;
David Bennett, “Hishām b. al-Ḥakam,” EI3; Mehmet Ali Buyukkara, “Hisham b. al-Ḥakam,” The Biographical
Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Oliver Leaman (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 149-150; Josef van Ess,
Theology and Society, 1:410-448.
573
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 9.
574
Josef van Ess states that al-Khayyāṭ’s Kitāb al-intiṣār is the oldest completely preserved Muʿtazilī work available.
See Josef van Ess, “Khaiyāṭ,” in Kleine Schriften by Josef van Ess, ed. Hinrich Biesterfeldt (Leiden: Brill, 2018),
2:1335.
575
Al-Khayyāṭ, al-Intiṣār, 94-95.
576
Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 48. See also ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 20.1:14. Al-Shahristānī relates that this was the view
of Hishām b. Sālim al-Jawālīqī (d. after 183/799), who was a contemporary of his namesake Hishām b. al-Ḥakam.
See al-Shahristānī, al-Milal wa al-niḥal (Muʾassasat al-Ḥalabī), 1:185. On Hishām b. Sālim, see Mehmet Ali
Buyukkara, “al-Jawaliqi, Hisham b. Salim,” The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Oliver Leaman
(London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 258-259.

188
view, al-Ashʿarī continues, was opposed by another view of the Shīʿīs, who held that the Prophets
and the Imāms were equally inerrant because they are all “God’s proofs” (ḥujaj Allāh).
577

Al-Ashʿarī’s remarks point to disagreement among the Imāmīs regarding the definition and
scope of the concept of the inerrancy of the divine guide. We may categorize these two conceptions
of inerrancy as “minimalist” and “maximalist.” These two sensibilities continued to operate a
century after Hishām b. al-Ḥakam in the late third/ninth century.
The Imāmīs disagreed among themselves about the scope of the Prophets’ and Imāms’
inerrancy. We find a development from a more minimalist to a more maximalist understanding of
the inerrancy of the Prophets and Imāms. The minimalist conception was likely influenced by the
reports about the Prophet’s inattentiveness (sahw). The maximalist understanding included
immunity from not only sin, but various types of mistakes, including forgetting and
inattentiveness. Both conceptions still considered the Imām to be exactly like the Prophet in terms
of his objective and mission to guide humanity.
Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1032) in Awāʾil al-maqālāt asserts that the Imāms who
represent the Prophets in their responsibilities are protected from error like the Prophets; it is
impermissible for them to perform a minor sin (ṣaghīra) except what is permitted with respect to
the Prophets; it is impermissible for them to neglect (sahw) anything related to religion or forget
any rulings. This, al-Mufīd insists, is the view of the vast majority of Imāmīs, except a small
number who have mistakenly held on to the apparent indications of reports that ought to be
reinterpreted.
578
Al-Mufīd was referring to the likes of the Imāmī traditionalists al-Shaykh al-
Ṣadūq (d. 381/991), Ibn al-Walīd al-Qummī (d. 343/954), and al-Shaykh al-Kulaynī (d.

577
Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 48-49.
578
Al-Mufīd, Awāʾil al-maqālāt, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī (al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd,
1413/1993), 65, 39-40.

189
329/941).
579
These and other figures held a less comprehensive or “minimalist” conception of
ʿiṣma, following Hishām b. al-Ḥakam.
In al-Kāfī, al-Kulaynī relates several reports indicating that the Prophet inattentively (sahā)
ended the four-unit noon prayer (al-ẓuhr) after the second unit.
580
In one of the reports, Mūsā al-
Kāẓim explains that through this example God wanted to teach the people how to correct their
inattentive mistakes in prayer (innamā arāda Allāh ʿazza wa jalla an yufaqqihahum).
581
In another
report, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq maintains that it was God who made the Prophet forget as a form of mercy
for his community (inna Allāh huwa alladhī ansāhu raḥmat
an
li-l-umma), so that one who
inadvertently makes a mistake in prayer is not rebuked by others, but is able to correct his mistake
in the manner taught by the Prophet.
582
Interestingly, in these reports, while it is said that God
instigated the Prophet’s inattentiveness, it was the Prophet’s followers who alerted him to his
mistake. In the last report, after his followers alert him, the Prophet asks Dhū ʾl-Yadayn (also
referred to as Dhū ʾl-Shimālayn
583
) whether he truly made a mistake and the latter verifies this.
584

As a book of traditions, in al-Kāfī al-Kulaynī does not offer his assessment on these reports and
their implications. However, their inclusion in this important collection might give us a hint where
al-Kulaynī himself stood on the matter. Later Imāmī authors would reject these reports on account

579
Al-Mufīd wrote a refutation of al-Ṣadūq. See al-Mufīd, Risāla fī ʿadam sahw al-Nabī, ed. Mahdī Najaf (al-
Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1413/1993).
580
See al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 3:201-202.
581
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 3:202.
582
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 3:202.
583
In this text, Dhū ʾl-Yadayn and Dhū ʾl-Shimālayn are considered to be the same person. There is debate about
whether the two laqabs refer to the same person or two different people. See al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (Beirut: Dār
al-Turāth, 1387/1968), 11:676; al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ (Qumm: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, 1414/1994),
3:274-276.
584
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 3:202. This event was also used as an example in legal theory debates on tacit consensus. See
Zysow, The Economy, 127.

190
of their insistence that the Prophet could not possibly have forgotten or been inattentive to his
obligations.
585

Elsewhere in al-Kāfī, al-Kulaynī includes reports that maintain the Prophets’ and Imāms’
immunity from sin: ʿAlī b. Riʾāb asked Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq about whether the verse “Whatsoever
misfortune befalls you is because of that which your hands had earned” [Q. 42:30] applies to ʿAlī
b. Abī Ṭālib and his family despite their being “the purified, immune family” (ahlu bayti ṭaḥārat
in

maʿṣūmūn). Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq replies that the Prophet used to seek forgiveness from God every day
without ever committing a sin, and that God chooses to test the virtuous (awliyāʾ) without them
ever committing sin in order to reward them.
586
In a more explicitly worded report, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq
states, “we are an immune group” (qawm maʿṣūmūn).
587

Looking at al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq’s al-Iʿtiqādāt, he notes that the Imāms are protected from
error and fault (anna-hum maʿṣūmūn min al-khaṭaʾ wa al-zalal).
588
Elsewhere, al-Ṣadūq insists
that the Prophets, Messengers, Imāms, and Angels are protected (maʿṣūmūn) and purified
(muṭahharūn) from every impurity (danas); that they perform no major or minor sin, ‘they do not
disobey God in what He commands of them and do what they are commanded’ [Q. 66:6] – and
that whoever rejects their protection in regards to their matters is ignorant of them. Furthermore,
he claims that the Imāmī belief is that all these figures are characterized by perfection (al-kamāl)
and completeness (al-tamām) and knowledge from the beginning to the end of their affairs (umūri-
him) – and that they are not characterized with respect to any of their states (aḥwāli-him) with
deficiency, disobedience, or ignorance.
589

585
See, for example, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ, 3:274-275.
586
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 2:247.
587
Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 1:161.
588
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Iʿtiqādāt (Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Imām al-Hādī, 1435/2014), 293.
589
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Iʿtiqādāt, 304-306. See also al-Ṣadūq, al-Amālī, ed. Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī,
1430/2009), 454: “All of the Prophets, Messengers, and Imāms are greater than the Angels; they are protected and

191
Despite al-Ṣadūq’s insistence in this work on what appears to be the absolute protection
from error of these figures, he relates a report in his al-Faqīh that suggests that the Prophet
Muḥammad was subject to inattentiveness (sahw). Al-Ṣadūq relates a report on the authority of
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, who states that God made the Prophet sleep through the time of the dawn prayer
until the sun rose (anna Allāh anāma rasūlahu ʿan ṣalāt al-fajr ḥattā ṭalaʿat al-shams). The report
states that the Prophet then woke up and observed the missed prayer; however, God then made the
Prophet inattentively end the prayer early in the second unit (of a four-unit prayer) (wa ashāhu fī
ṣalātihi fa-sallama fī rakʿatayn). The report includes what appears to be an explanation for this
obviously strange event: God did this to the Prophet as a mercy toward his followers, so that if any
of them inadvertently sleeps through the prayer time or inattentively makes a mistake during
prayer, s/he will not be rebuked by others since this happened to the Prophet also.
590
Al-Ṣadūq is
critical of the “cursed extremists and delegators” (al-ghulāt wa al-mufawwiḍa) for rejecting the
possibility of the Prophet’s inattentiveness; their reasoning is that the possibility of the Prophet’s
inattentiveness in his prayer would necessitate the possibility of his inattentiveness with respect to
his prophetic mission (al-tablīgh) because both are obligatory upon him (li-anna al-ṣalāt ʿalayhi
farīḍa ka-mā anna al-tablīgh ʿalayhi farīḍa).
591
Al-Ṣadūq rejects this reasoning and insists on the
fact that the Prophet did experience inattentiveness as the report indicates. His explanation is that
the Prophet’s unintentional inattentiveness in the examples of sleeping through the time of prayer
and correcting his mistaken prayer was through divine intervention: God made him sleep and make
a mistake so that, first, people would recognize that he was a human being and not take him as a
god or object of worship, and second, so that people could learn how to correct their prayers when

purified from every impurity (danas) and defilement (rijs), and they have no interest (lā yahummūna) in minor or
major sins, nor do they commit them.”
590
Al-Ṣadūq, Man lā yaḥḍuruh al-faqīh, ed. Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī, 1406/1986), 1:249.
591
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Faqīh, 1:249.

192
they made mistakes themselves. Al-Ṣadūq further maintains that, whereas the Prophet’s
inattentiveness was done by God, the inattentiveness of others is from Satan; Satan, however, has
no control over the Prophets and Imāms.
592
Al-Ṣadūq’s teacher Ibn al-Walīd al-Qummī considered
“the first level of extremism to be the rejection of the Prophet’s inattentiveness” (awwalu daraja
fī al-ghuluww nafiy al-sahw ʿan al-nabī) and that if one intends on rejecting the validity of reports
that speak of the Prophet’s inattentiveness, then one ought to reject all reports and consequently
nullify religion entirely.
593
Al-Ṣadūq was so adamant about affirming the Prophet’s inattentiveness
that he promised to write a separate book on the subject “with the hope of [acquiring divine]
rewards and refuting those who object it.”
594

The matter was not over with al-Ṣadūq. One of his major disciples, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd,
who we encountered earlier, wrote a refutation not only of this particular doctrine but of his
teacher’s creed, aptly titling it Taṣḥīḥ al-Iʿtiqād. It appears that this work was also a commentary
and an explanation of al-Ṣadūq’s creed, not simply a refutation of it. In other words, al-Mufīd does
not reject all of his teacher’s statements. In Taṣḥīḥ al-Iʿtiqād, al-Mufīd defines ʿiṣma as a divinely
graced protection for “God’s proofs” (i.e., the Prophets and Imāms) from performing sins and
blunders with respect to God’s religion.
595
He stresses that the Prophets and the Imāms who
succeed the Prophets are all protected from committing major and minor sins “during their
incumbencies” (fī ḥāl nubuwwatihim wa imāmatihim). Furthermore, he notes, while reason
dictates that it is possible for them to neglect performing recommended acts (mandūb) without
intentional negligence or disobedience (ʿalā ghayr al-taʿammud li-l-taqṣīr wa al-ʿiṣyān), it also

592
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Faqīh, 1:249-250.
593
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Faqīh, 1:250.
594
Al-Ṣadūq, al-Faqīh, 1:250.
595
Al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ al-Iʿtiqādāt, ed. Ḥusayn Dargāhī (al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd,
1413/1993), 128.

193
dictates that it is impossible for them to neglect performing obligatory tasks. Despite this, al-Mufīd
insists, the Prophet Muḥammad and the Imāms succeeding him did not neglect even recommended
acts both before and during their incumbencies.
596
While he is not explicit here, al-Mufīd is clearly
refuting the idea that there can be any valid scriptural evidence to suggest that the Prophet or any
of the Imāms made mistakes, as his teacher al-Ṣadūq would hold in relation to the Prophet. As al-
Mufīd noted elsewhere, any scriptural evidence that appears to suggest that the Prophets or Imāms
erred (including being inattentive and forgetting) ought to be reinterpreted or discarded.
597
Again,
while not explicitly criticizing al-Ṣadūq himself, al-Mufīd here states that if the statement
attributed to Ibn al-Walīd about “the first level of extremism being the denial of the Prophet’s and
Imāms’ inattentiveness (sahw)” is true, then Ibn al-Walīd ought to be labeled “negligent”
(muqaṣṣir)
598
with respect to the roles of the Prophets and Imāms.
599
For al-Mufīd, “extremism”
(ghuluww)
600
is restricted to the claim that the Imāms were Prophets or divine and “delegation”
(tafwīḍ)
601
is restricted to the claim that God delegated the creation of the world to the Imāms;

596
Al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ, 129.
597
See al-Mufīd, Awāʾil al-maqālāt, 65. Imāmī thinkers insisted on interpreting scriptural evidence such as, for
example, the Qurʾānic verses in the beginning of Q. 80 (“He frowned and turned away, because the blind man came
to see him”), as not referring to the Prophet Muḥammad, but rather to another figure. Among other things, they argued
that the Prophet’s inerrancy and his exemplary moral character as attested to by the Qurʾān itself precluded interpreting
the Prophet as the one addressed in Q. 80. For more, see, for example, al-Ṭūsī, al-Tibyān, ed. Aḥmad Ḥabīb Qaṣīr al-
ʿĀmilī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 10:268-269.
598
The term that I have translated to “negligence” here is taqṣīr. In Shīʿī literature, taqṣīr refers to the tendency to
“short-change” or express delinquency in relation to the status of the Prophets and/or Imāms. It is a pejorative label
that Shīʿīs would use to describe those who they believed to have held less devotion to the Prophets and/or Imāms
than necessary. For more on the use of taqṣīr, see Modarressi, Crisis, 36-42.
599
Al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ, 135.
600
“Extremism” (ghuluww) refers to the tendency to attribute divine or extravagant extra-human status to the Prophets
and/or Imāms. Like taqṣīr, it is a label that Shīʿīs label other Shīʿīs with when they sense that they have exaggerated
what they consider to be the appropriate status and role of the Prophets and/or Imāms. Shīʿī sources contain many
examples of the Imāms’ censure of the “extremists” (ghulāt). For example, Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq is reported to have
said: “Beware that the ghulāt do not corrupt your youth, for they are the most evil of God’s creation. They belittle the
magnificence of God, and they attribute divinity to the servants of God.” See al-Ṭūsī, al-Amālī, ed. Muʾassasat al-
Biʿtha (Qumm: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1414/1994), 650. For more on the ghulāt and their beliefs, see Modarressi, Crisis, 19-
49.
601
“Delegation” (tafwīḍ) refers to the idea that God has delegated to the Prophet and/or Imāms supernatural
responsibilities, such as, for instance, the sustenance of the world and the right to legislate. For more on the mufawwiḍa
and their beliefs, see Modarressi, Crisis, 21-29.

194
rejecting the possibility of their inattentiveness (sahw) is not “extremism” (ghuluww) nor
“delegation” (tafwīḍ).
602

According to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), who wrote a book titled Tanzīh al-
Anbiyāʾ, “The Imāmī Shīʿīs hold that it is impermissible for the Prophets and Imāms to commit
minor or major acts of disobedience or sin both before and after their missions.”
603
His argument
for the inerrancy of the Prophets is that they occupy the role of divine guides and spokesmen who
perform miracles, the function of which is to validate their claim to being chosen by God to deliver
His message.
604
Therefore, their inerrancy is a logical necessity that guarantees that they are not
deceiving the people with respect to their claims of prophethood, for if it was possible for them to
deceive despite their ability to perform miracles, for instance, this would entail that God has
permitted them to act deceivingly on His behalf.
605
Additionally, al-Murtaḍā argues, the Prophets’
inerrancy must expand beyond their roles as divine spokesmen to include all aspects of their lives,
for they are expected to be imitated and followed; and permitting their errors in any aspect of their
lives defeats this purpose.
606
In other words, the inerrancy of the Prophets must be absolute in
order to guarantee peace of mind with the people that whatever the Prophet says or does is true
and correct. With respect to the inerrancy of the Imāms, al-Murtaḍā makes a similar case, arguing
that the role of the Imām with respect to guiding the people and preserving the authenticity of
God’s message is the same as that of the Prophets, and, thus, they too must be absolutely
inerrant.
607

602
See al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ, 131-136.
603
Al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh al-Anbiyāʾ, ed. Fāṭima Qāḍī Shiʿār (Tehran: al-Madrasa al-ʿUlyā lil-Shahīd al-Muṭahharī,
1422/2002), 15.
604
See al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 18.
605
See al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 18.
606
See al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 18-19.
607
See al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 24-25.

195
Based on the doctrine of the inerrancy of the Imāms, it followed logically that everyone
beside the Imāms (and the Prophets) was fallible, individually and as groups, including the rest of
the Companions. Therefore, in contrast to their Ashʿarī and Traditionalist Sunnī (and even
Muʿtazilī) counterparts, the Imāmīs did not have to charitably interpret the disagreements of the
Companions when one of the Imāms was involved because those who opposed the Imām were
automatically wrong. Thus, they could easily label those who opposed ʿAlī as rebels and not simply
as experts (mujtahids). The Imāmīs did, however, have to charitably interpret the apparently
questionable actions of the Imāms. However, it appears that instead of employing the concept of
personal reasoning (ijtihād) in these interpretations, they employed the concept of “dissimulation”
(taqiyya) and other similar explanations. This is because the earlier Shīʿīs rejected the validity of
ijtihād.
608
To take an example of how the Imāmīs charitably interpreted the actions of the Imāms,
we turn to al-Murtaḍā’s discussion of why ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib did not openly contend the actions of
the leading Companions who the Shīʿīs consider to have usurped his right to lead the Muslims at
the Saqīfa event, for if it was truly his God-given mandate to lead, he should have asserted this
right and secured it.
609
Al-Murtaḍā insists that ʿAlī, as a divinely designated Imām, was absolutely
inerrant and therefore his actions must be interpreted in a way that preserves this principle.
610

However, al-Murtaḍā argues that what led ʿAlī to abstain from contending the actions of his
opponents and ultimately from securing his right to lead was his recognition that doing so would
not only cause great danger to him and his family and supporters, but also lead to many people
abandoning the religion.
611
Stated differently, the idea is that the political situation after the death

608
For the Shīʿī rejection of ijtihād, see al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, 53.
609
See al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 208-209.
610
Al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 209-210.
611
Al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 210.

196
of the Prophet was so grave for the Prophet’s immediate family and for the Muslims that ʿAlī chose
to maintain the status quo and to avoid the possibility of further harm.
By the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries, Imāmī Shiʿi scholars were increasingly
labeling those who engaged in armed conflict against ʿAlī in the three battles that took place during
his reign as “rebels” (bughāt). For example, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s section in his al-Iqtiṣād is titled:
“the rules concerning those who rebelled against ʿAlī” (aḥkām al-bughāt ʿalā Amīr al-
Muʾminīn).
612
By labeling them as rebels, those who opposed and fought ʿAlī would be stripped
of any justification for doing so. The justification for opposition to ʿAlī for those who wished to
defend it, of course, was that it was ijtihād.
In al-Intiṣār, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā censures “the ignorant ḥashwiyya”
613
for excusing the
rebels and including them among the “people of ijtihād.” This, he argues, “is among the views that
are far away from correctness. It is necessarily known that the earliest community unanimously
agreed upon the condemnation and excommunication of those who rebelled against Amīr al-
Muʾminīn and, and that no one justified their actions.”
614
The reason why they were unjustified is
because ʿAlī was unlike the rest of the Companions. He was an Imām who was inerrant. In his
Tanzīh al-Anbiyāʾ, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā stresses this point. He states, “If it is confirmed that Amīr
al-Muʾminīn [ʿAlī] is an Imām, then it ought to be confirmed rationally that he is inerrant. Thus,
one must interpret all his actions in a positive light and reject any abhorrent description of them.”
615

Simply put, ʿAlī could do no wrong. In case of conflict, only his actions could be justified.
Everyone who opposed him had erred. The lengthy chapter title beginning al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s

612
Al-Ṭūsī, al-Iqtiṣād, ed. Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Mūsawī (Qumm: Dalīl Mā, 1430/2009), 448.
613
The term ḥashwiyya or ahl al-ḥashw was a denigratory label used by Muslims of various sensibilities to refer to
the traditionists who “stuffed” (ḥashw) their arguments with unreliable reports and traditions. For more, see Jon
Hoover, “Ḥashwiyya,” EI3.
614
Al-Murtaḍā, al-Intiṣār (Najaf: Manshūrāt al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1391/1971), 233.
615
Al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 210.

197
discussion on the imāma and inerrancy of ʿAlī in his work al-Jamal sums it up well: “The
correctness of Amīr al-Muʾminīn [The Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī] in all of his battles and
his truth in all of his statements and actions...and the invalidity of his opponents and enemies.”
616

Furthermore, opposition to ʿAlī was equated with opposition to the Prophet. According to
al-Murtaḍā in his Jumal al-ʿilm wa-l-ʿamal (Statements on Knowledge and Action), “Those who
rebelled and fought against Amīr al-Muʾminīn [ʿAlī] committed a major sin; it is as though they
fought against the Prophet. This is because the Prophet said: ‘O ʿAlī, those who fight you fight me
and those who make peace with you make peace with me’ (yā ʿAlī ḥarbuka ḥarbī wa silmuka
silmī).
617
However, the status of those who fought against ʿAlī differs with respect to war booty
and captivity despite their commonality in sin. This is the same as the difference in status between
the apostate (al-murtad) and combatant (al-ḥarbī) versus the protected disbelievers (al-muʿāhad
and al-dhimmī) despite their commonality in disbelief (al-kufr).”
618

Al-Murtaḍā had to justify how it was possible for those who fought against ʿAlī to be like
those who fought against the Prophet but not be accountable in the same way. So, he engages in
some legal acrobatics and offers the example of the difference in status of the disbelievers. And
we see that not only were those who opposed ʿAlī not justified and had erred, but their error was
major, and they were culpable for it. From the perspective of the Imāmīs, this major error entailed
culpability; it simply could not be excused.
I argue that this consistent critical attitude toward those who opposed ʿAlī colored Imāmī
attitudes toward disagreement and ijtihād in general. In fact, this attitude was so strong that even

616
Al-Mufīd, al-Jamal (Najaf: Manshūrāt al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1403/1983), 30-31.
617
This report appears in numerous Imāmī works. See, for example, al-Ṣadūq, al-Amālī, 79; idem, Faḍāʾil al-Shīʿa
(Tehran: Intishārat ʿĀbidī, n.d.), 15.
618
Al-Murtaḍā, Sharḥ jumal al-ʿilm wa al-ʿamal, ed. Yaʿqūb al-Jaʿfarī al-Marāghī (Tehran: Dār al-Uswa, 1419/1999),
235.

198
later with the Imāmī appropriation of the concept of ijtihād with al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī’s (d.
676/1277) intervention,
619
Imāmī scholars continued to insist on adopting juristic fallibility (al-
takhṭiʾa) and opposing juristic infallibility (al-taṣwīb).
620
This insistence, I argue, is explained by
their commitment to the doctrine of the imāma and especially the Imām’s inerrancy.
Of course, not all Shīʿīs upheld the Imām’s inerrancy in the same way that the Imāmīs did.
For the Imāmīs and Ismāʿīlīs, the Imām had to be inerrant in order to preserve his role as the correct
interpreter of the religion. On the other hand, the Zaydīs held that interpretive authority rested
collectively with the descendants of ʿAlī’s two sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn. For this reason, unlike the
Imāmīs and Ismāʿīlīs who insisted on the Imāms’ inerrancy, the Zaydīs rejected this belief.
621

These disagreements between the various Shīʿī groups translated into and corresponded with
disagreements later over juristic in/fallibility: those who upheld the inerrancy of the Imāms
adopted juristic fallibility, and those who rejected the inerrancy of the Imāms adopted juristic
infallibility.
The Imāmī Shīʿī insistence on the inerrancy of the Imām appears to stem from a skepticism
of the human condition: humans, left without an infallible guide, are not guaranteed do well on
their own, even in collectivities. There must always be someone to guide and correct the behavior
of humans. It is rooted in the idea of the extension of Prophethood: in the same way that God sends
Prophets and Messengers to guide humanity, God also sends Imāms to continue that guidance. But
it is also historically conditioned: the Shīʿīs were well aware of what happens when leadership
falls in the wrong hands, as the early history of Islam after the Prophet clearly showed. This sense

619
See al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Maʿārij al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Raḍawī (Qumm: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt,
1403/1983), 179-180.
620
See al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Maʿārij al-uṣūl, 181.
621
For more on the various Shīʿī approaches to the belief in the imāma and the status of the Imāms, see, for example,
Haider, Shīʿī Islam, 31-49.

199
of skepticism can be gleaned from the evidence given by Imāmī theologians for the doctrine of the
Imāms’ immunity from sin and error. For instance, among the justifications that al-Mufīd provides
for the Imāms’ infallibility, he insists that the only way for people to be able to trust the leader is
for the leader to be immune from all types of error, including simple acts of inadvertence or
inattentiveness; even a simple wrong act, even at the beginning of the leader’s life, would destroy
society’s trust in him.
622

The Imāmī Shīʿī dogma of the absolutely inerrant Imām operated like the Sunnī dogma of
the probity of the Companions. It was a convenient tool to be employed in the uniquely Shīʿī
memory of the Muslim past and the insistence that correctness was restricted to the inerrant Imāms
and their followers.
5.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has focused on explaining the function of the juristic in/fallibility debate by
exploring the underlying dogmas that animated the proponents of juristic in/fallibility in their
adoption of their respective doctrines. I have identified three major dogmas: the collective
inerrancy of the Muslims, the probity of the Companions, and the inerrancy of the Imāms. I have
attempted to show that our Sunnī (Traditionalist and Ashʿarī), Muʿtazilī, and Imāmī Shīʿī theorists
of the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries were both contending with and contributing to
emerging sectarian identities in conjunction with other sensibilities: theological, legal, and
intellectual. A major facet of the sectarian identities of the time related to the interpretation of the
early Muslim past. One of the major questions that had direct bearing on the debate over juristic
in/fallibility was how to interpret the earlier conflicts between the Companions considering the
crystallization of these multi-faceted identities.

622
Al-Mufīd, al-Nukat al-iʿtiqādiyya, ed. Riḍā al-Mukhtārī (al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd,
1413/1993), 37, 39-40. See also al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 18-22.

200
We may say that the Muʿtazilīs attempted to locate themselves within the wider Sunnī legal
and communal orthodoxy of the time despite their theological exclusion from Sunnism. They did
this by appealing to shared legal discourse of legal analogy (qiyās) and the adoption of Sunnī law,
for example, but also to sectarian discourse by insisting on honoring the Companions. The
Ashʿarīs, like their Muʿtazilī theologian-jurist counterparts, were contending with the existence of
multiple Sunnī legal schools and a strong pushback against their rationalism by other Sunnī groups,
most notably the Traditionalists. Therefore, the Muʿtazilī and the Ashʿarī infallibilists insisted on
interpreting the disagreements of the earliest Muslims, especially the leading Companions, as an
agreement on their part that disagreement was valid and that all of them were correct despite their
disagreements. The two dogmas animating this interpretation were the collective inerrancy of the
Muslims and the probity of the Companions.
On the other hand, the Ashʿarī and the Traditionalist Sunnī fallibilists were also contending
with the existence of multiple Sunnī legal schools. For their part, they insisted that the Companions
disagreed and sometimes erred (and considered one another to have erred), but that their errors
were excused or forgiven. They extended this interpretation to include not only minor legal
disagreements, but also major and violent conflicts between the Companions. Once again, the two
dogmas animating this interpretation were the collective inerrancy of the Muslims and the probity
of the Companions.
Finally, the Imāmī Shīʿīs were contending with not only the various theological and legal
groups on the ground, but their minority sectarian status vis-à-vis Sunnism. The Imāmī fallibilists
agreed with the Sunnī fallibilists and recognized that the Companions disagreed among themselves
and erred. For the Imāmīs, however, the errors of the Companions were not automatically excused
or forgiven, especially in cases of major conflict. According to the Imāmīs, the exception to this

201
existence of error among the Companions was the case of the Imāms, who they considered to have
been absolutely inerrant. The Imāms’ absolute inerrancy meant that any opposition to the Imāms,
including to their legal views, was unjustified. Therefore, the dogma animating Imāmī juristic
fallibility was the inerrancy of the Imām.

202
Chapter 6: Conclusion
This dissertation has focused on exploring Muslim scholarly disagreement (ikhtilāf) by
taking as a case study the long-standing debate in Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) over juristic
in/fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa wa al-taṣwīb). Beginning with developments in the formative period of
Islam (i.e., the first/seventh and second/eighth centuries) and continuing through to the early
classical period (i.e., the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries), this study has traced how
Muslim theorists of differing intellectual sensibilities and affiliations variously justified and/or
denied the validity of intra-Muslim religious disagreements. It should be evident from this study
that the broader debate over scholarly disagreement related to every major facet of Muslim thought
and practice. Muslim scholars of the formative period debated whether it was theoretically possible
to justify disagreements that pertained to individual theological questions (e.g., whether the Qurʾān
was created or not), sociopolitical doctrines (e.g., whether a Muslim sinner was a “believer” or
not), and legal practices (e.g., whether permission of a guardian was required for the validity of a
marriage contract or not). During this period, however, what we may call “theological,” “political,”
and “legal” thought was entangled, and various intellectual movements and trends were still
largely in flux. However, these trends would eventually crystallize over the course of the
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries into full-fledged schools of thought accompanied by the
systematization of religious thought and the rise of various intellectual disciples such as theology
and legal theory. With these developments, and with the ultimate rise of law as the “ideal religious
science,”
623
the debate over scholarly disagreements took on new shape. Thinkers of the
fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, now operating largely as theologian cum jurists, refined
their theories of disagreement, resulting in the systematization of the doctrines of juristic fallibility

623
See Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges, xiii.

203
and infallibility. At this point, manuals of Islamic legal theory began to deal with the question of
disagreement systematically and more elaborately: when legal experts (mujtahids) disagreed on a
question, were they all correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb) or was only one correct (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid)
and others wrong? With the systematic exploration of this question, juristic fallibility and
infallibility attained the status of fundamental legal doctrines (uṣūl) and served as primary means
for establishing orthodoxy. Through this debate and its doctrines, Muslim scholars took it upon
themselves to negotiate both the content and parameters of what they deemed to be correct (or
justifiable) belief and practice, that is, “orthodoxy,” and, by extension, membership in or exclusion
from constructions of competing Islamic orthodoxies.
One of the main arguments of this study is that the doctrines of juristic fallibility and
infallibility as espoused by the theologian-jurists of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries
ought to be considered as ex post facto justifications or denials of the actual diversity of legal and
other religious views on the ground. This assessment is based on recent scholarship that has
convincingly shown that the development of disciplines such as legal theory served as a way to
validate rather than determine legal content.
624
In other words, the elaborate theories of juristic
in/fallibility proposed by thinkers of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries sought to validate
or question the validity of existing religious views that had largely crystallized by the time that
these theorists were systematically debating these theories. The main thrust of this intellectual
endeavor occurred through the projection of a sophisticated system of theological and legal inquiry
onto the earliest Muslim community, most notably, the Prophet’s leading Companions.
To be sure, the early classical theologian-jurists whose works and theories we explored in
this study drew on a host of scriptural and rational arguments to make their cases and to argue

624
See Sherman A. Jackson, “Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” in Studies in
Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 177-201.

204
against their opponents. We saw prominent examples of these arguments in Chapters 3 and 4.
However, the striking feature of the theorists’ discussions rested on their “historical” arguments:
these theorists maintained that the Companions recognized all the systematic intricacies of a fully
developed legal theory and thus operated as sophisticated theologian-jurists themselves. The
theorists of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries constructed competing collective
memories to argue that the Companions fully understood the doctrines that the theorists themselves
were elaborately proposing and debating. Thus, most basically, the infallibilists maintained that
the Companions disagreed among themselves on many questions, but that the Companions
understood that their disagreements were based on diligent legal reasoning (ijtihād), and therefore,
they agreed among themselves that they were all correct despite their disagreements. On the other
hand, the fallibilists insisted that the Companions disagreed and objected to one another’s views,
and therefore the Companions understood that their disagreements among themselves meant that
they were not all equally correct. In other words, the infallibilists identified the Companions as
infallibilists, and the fallibilists identified the Companions as fallibilists.
That the theorists of the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries largely historicized the
doctrines of juristic in/fallibility reveals an important methodological point in the academic study
of Islamic intellectual history. The competing ways with which the theorists under study recalled
and interpreted the early Muslim past draws our attention to exploring their use of tradition (ḥadīth)
and historiography in conflicting constructions of the past. Until quite recently, Islamic studies
scholarship largely focused on questions of historicity when exploring Muslim historical narratives
and the use of ḥadīth specifically to support these narratives. However, more recently, scholars
have turned away from specific questions of historicity and have focused their attention instead to
understanding the values of the individuals and groups that have produced these conflicting

205
historical narratives. In doing so, they have relieved themselves and others from the (arguably
impossible) burden of “objectively” determining exactly which narrative is “true” and which is
“false.” When this burden is lifted, opportunities for alternative analyses emerge. This is especially
true in the context of studying historical debates and their functions. In the words of Abbas
Barzegar, “Historical narration, that is, any speech act that lays claim towards the recollection [of]
past events, contains a moralizing impulse and produces a legitimating function, because it posits
one interpretation over and against another. Even in its singularity, a solitary historical account is
always part of a debate.”
625
Historical narratives are often employed in the construction,
maintenance, and revision of group identity. As Nebil Husayn notes, “The ethos of a community
is built on mythmaking and storytelling.”
626
In this study, I have proposed, following Jan Assmann,
that engagement with the concept of “mnemohistory” may provide a valuable way of exploring
the theorists’ use of ḥadīth and historiography in promoting their conflicting memories and myths
of the early Muslim past. It is important to maintain that “myth” should not necessarily denote
something false. Rather, it is a natural collective human method of articulating and transmitting
the values that groups deem to be important and representative of their communal identity.
Therefore, the theorists’ historization of the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility ought to be
understood in mimetic terms: through their conflicting uses and interpretations of traditions and
historiographies, proponents of both doctrines sought to construct specific collective memories
that, in their view, formed an unbroken link between their own collective religious identities and
those of the earliest Muslim past. The infallibilists sought to establish a theory of inherent
justification of legal disagreements and to project this justification as originating in the sensibilities

625
Abbas Barzegar, “Remembering Community: Historical Narrative in the Formation of Sunni Islam” (Ph.D. diss.,
Emory University, 2010), 25.
626
Husayn, Opposing the Imām, 13.

206
and actions of the earliest Muslims. Similarly, the fallibilists sought to establish a theory that
denied the inherent justification of legal disagreements and to project this theory onto the earliest
Muslim past.
Beyond this main argument, and to summarize the findings of this study and its scholarly
interventions, we may point to three factors characteristic of the debate over juristic in/fallibility
in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. The first of these is the interplay of theology and
law, both broadly understood. We may recall that modern scholarship has studied the debate over
juristic in/fallibility extensively, often focusing on this debate in the context of law proper and the
activities of the legal expert or jurist. This focus is certainly warranted, as the question of whether
all legal experts were correct despite their differences was essentially an assessment of the activity
of the jurist, his legal reasoning (ḥukm al-ijtihād). However, focusing on this question strictly as
one of the activity of the legal expert poses two conceptual problems. The first is that such a focus
may dislodge the debate from the sphere of religious discourse with theological undercurrents. The
second problem is that it risks positing a confusing (and sometimes inaccurate) distinction between
the study of theology and the study of human behavior.
627
To avoid these two problems, my study
has focused on exploring the juristic in/fallibility debate in legal theory works produced by
theologian-jurists (ʿalā ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn). We will recall from the Introduction that these
works were assumed to operate in a deductive manner: they begin with general principles or
theories and draw legal conclusions from them. This manner of discourse was highly systematic
as the exploration of the works of the theorists in this study has shown. However, despite the
appearance of the debate over juristic in/fallibility in manuals of legal theory proper, and

627
See Russell McCutcheon’s definition of theology as opposed to other areas of academic inquiry: “this term
designates the academic discussion and study of God or the gods...It is to be distinguished from an anthropological
approach to the study of religion in which human behaviors, not the actions of the gods, are the object of study.” See
McCutcheon, Studying Religion, 113.

207
specifically in chapters on legal reasoning (ijtihād), this debate stood at the heart of the intersection
of theology and law. The debate over juristic in/fallibility is interesting for many reasons, one of
which is the extent to which theological concerns fueled the discourses of its participants. One of
the clearest theological concerns pertained to the religious obligation of the legal expert: was the
legal expert obligated to discover answers for every question regardless of the epistemological
status of evidence available, or was he obligated to simply engage in diligent legal reasoning and
act upon the result(s) of this reasoning when it was presumed that unequivocal evidence was not
accessible? Driving this question was the more fundamental theological question of the extent to
which God had or had not determined answers for human questions. From the perspective of the
fallibilists, God had determined a single answer for every possible question, whereas for the
infallibilists it was possible that God had not determined a single answer for every question. The
debate over juristic in/fallibility may thus be characterized as a theological-legal debate, and the
theological concerns of its participants ought to be highlighted. But going beyond theological
discourse, this debate also shows the extent to which its participants held sociopolitical and
practical concerns, and we were introduced to many such concerns especially in Chapters 3 and 4.
Thus, rather than proceeding from an inherent distinction between the study of theology and the
study of human behavior, we find that the two scholarly concerns meet in the study of the juristic
in/fallibility debate.
The second factor operating in this debate, related to the first in some ways, is the rationalist
or traditionalist tendencies of the theorists whose works and ideas we examined. I have labeled the
theorists in this study as “theologian-jurists” to highlight not only the intersection of theology and
law, but also to note the intellectual sensibilities of these theorists that undergirded their
conceptions of theological and legal discourses. But it is important to note that the rationalist and

208
traditionalist tendencies of these theorists operated on a spectrum rather than being diametrically
opposed to one another as is often presumed in scholarship. We will recall that, for instance,
Ashʿarī theologian-jurists disagreed among themselves over the adoption of juristic in/fallibility.
Ashʿarism has been identified as a “rationalist” school of theology. However, as this study has
shown, when it comes to the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility, we may argue that various degrees
of rationalism and traditionalism existed. Thus, those Ashʿarī theologian-jurists who adopted
juristic infallibility (e.g., al-Bāqillānī) stood closer to the rationalist end of the spectrum, whereas
their fellow Ashʿarī proponents of juristic fallibility (e.g., al-Shīrāzī) stood closer to the
traditionalist end of the spectrum. All of this is to say that a more nuanced approach to these
varying intellectual sensibilities reveals clearer insights into the concerns and interpretive
approaches of these theorists.
Finally, and importantly, the sectarian attitudes and affiliations of the theorists, which
included “political” and “religious” dimensions, played a major role as well in their various
proposed configurations of the doctrines of juristic in/fallibility. We saw in Chapters 3, 4, and 5
that sectarian sensibilities guided the proponents of both doctrines. However, as noted earlier in
this study and contrary to popular presumptions, “sectarianism” ought not to necessarily denote a
negative tendency. In a sense, all group identity construction projects involve a measure of
“sectarianism” when in-group and out-group social operations are at play. Social identities involve
a strong measure of boundary-drawing and highlighting distinctions between the in-group and
relevant out-groups.
628
This study presented a comparative exploration across and within early
Sunnism and Shīʿism to highlight the fact that proponents of both juristic fallibility and infallibility

628
See Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity Theory,” in Understanding Peace and Conflict through Social Identity
Theory, ed. Shelley McKeown, Reeshma Haji, and Neil Ferguson (Switzerland: Springer International, 2016), 6. For
an example of the use of social identity theory to explain the construction of Twelver (Imāmī) Shīʿī identity, see
Qazwini, “Heir of the Prophets,” 267-286.

209
were concerned with preserving their respective ideological commitments to the individual and
collective statuses of the Companions and the Imāms. The infallibilists and fallibilists operating
under the broad banner of Sunnism held a commitment to preserving the honorable status of the
Companions (ʿadālat al-ṣaḥāba), especially the most notable among them. For the Sunnī theorists,
this commitment entailed dismissing or charitably interpreting reports that raised the issue of the
Companions’ “errors,” individually and collectively. It also meant that the Companions’
participation in more serious conflicts between them (e.g., the civil wars) could either be justified
because everyone involved was presumed to have been operating with their best intentions, or
avoiding the question of identifying who was right and who was wrong in these conflicts. On the
other hand, the Imāmī theorists were committed to upholding the inerrancy (ʿiṣma) of the Imāms
only and the fallibility of everyone beside them, including the leading Companions. This Imāmī
commitment was directly tied to the theorists’ adoption of juristic fallibility. From their
perspective, any minor or major opposition to the inerrant Imām was labeled as error regardless of
the intentions or positions of their opponents.
In large part, Islamic studies scholarship continues to display a siloed approach, often
focusing on the study of Sunnism or Shīʿism, but rarely both. It may be argued from a
methodological and conceptual perspective that such an approach betrays the Islamic intellectual
tradition, for, certainly in the formative and early classical periods of Islam, what would ultimately
become “Sunnism” and “Shīʿism” (and the various movements within these two categories)
developed in relation to one another, even if partially. As I hope to have shown in this study, a
more comparative exploration of Islamic intellectual history may yield insights that are often
missed when a comparative approach is not employed. However, this study has its own share of
limitations. The inclusion of several earlier schools and their representatives, including Zaydī and

210
Ismāʿīlī Shīʿism, Central Asian/Māturīdī Sunnism, and greater representation of the theologians
and legal schools and trends already discussed above, as well as a broader chronological scope,
would certainly yield many more interesting intellectual insights in the development of not only
the debate over juristic in/fallibility, but the Islamic intellectual tradition more broadly.

211
Bibliography
Abbasi, Rushain. “Did Premodern Muslims Distinguish the Religious and Secular? The Dīn–
Dunyā Binary in Medieval Islamic Thought.” Journal of Islamic Studies 31, no. 2 (2020):
185–225.

Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, Umar F. Mālik and Medina: Islamic Legal Reasoning in the
Formative Period. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Abdulsater, Hussein Ali. Shiʿi Doctrine, Muʿtazili Theology: Al-Sharif Al-Murtaḍā and Imami
Discourse. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women. Oxford:
Oneworld, 2001.

Abrahamov, Binyamin. Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998.

Abū Zahra, Muḥammad. Uṣūl al-fiqh. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, n.d.

Adams, Charles J. “The Role of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī in the Evolution of a Formal Science of
Jurisprudence among the Shīʿah.” Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1971): 173–80.

Ahmed, Shahab. Before Orthodoxy: The Satanic Verses in Early Islam. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2017.

———. What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2016.

Āl Taymiyya. al-Musawwada fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, n.d.

Al-ʿAliyyānī, ʿAlī. ʿAqīdat al-imām Ibn Qutayba. al-Ṭāʾif: Maktabat al-Ṣiddīq, 1991.

Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf. Tadhkirat al-fuqahāʾ. Qumm: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt,
1994.

212
Al-ʿInizzī, Fayṣal b. ʿAwaḍ. “al-Tawfīq wa al-sadād fī masʾalat al-taṣwīb wa al-takhṭiʾa fī al-
ijtihād.” al-Waʿī al-Islāmī 22 (2011): 8–60.

Al-Āmidī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Abī ʿAlī. al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Edited by ʿAbd al-Razzāq
ʿAfīfī. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, n.d.

Al-Amīn, Nawāl al-Ṭāhir. “Ikhtiyārāt al-imām al-Bāqillānī fī al-istithnāʾ wa al-qiyās min khilāl
kitābihi al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād.” MA thesis Jāmiʿat Umm Darmān al-Islāmiyya Sudan,
2012.

Al-Anṣārī, Murtaḍā. Farāʾid al-uṣūl. Qumm: Majmaʿ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2007.

Al-Ashʿarī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl. al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna. Edited by Fawqiyya
Ḥusayn Maḥmūd. Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār, 1976.

———. Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn. Edited by Hellmut Ritter. Beirut: Klaus
Schwarz Verlag, 2005.

Al-Bahsūdī, Muḥammad Surūr. Miṣbāḥ al-uṣūl. Qumm: Muʾassasat Iḥyāʾ Āthār al-Imām al-
Khūʾī, 2001.

Al-Balkhī, Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad. Kitāb al-maqālāt wa maʿahu ʿuyūn al-masāʾil
wa al-jawābāt. Edited by Ḥusayn Khānṣū, Rājiḥ Kurdī, and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Kurdī.
Istanbul: Kuramer, 2018.

Al-Balkhī, Abū al-Qāsim, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, and al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī. Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa
ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila. Edited by Fuʾād Sayyid. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li-l-Nashr,
1974.

Al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib. al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād. Edited by Muḥammad
b. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Duwaysh. Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya,
2015.

———. al-Taqrīb wa al-irshād (al-ṣaghīr). Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd.
Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1998.

213
Al-Baṣrī, Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Khalīl al-
Mays. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1982.

Al-Bukhārī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Aḥmad. Kashf al-asrār sharḥ uṣūl al-Bazdawī. Dār al-
Kutub al-Islāmī, n.d.

Al-Bukhārī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. Edited by Muḥammad
Zuhayr b. Nāṣir al-Nāṣir. Dār Ṭawq al-Najāt, 2001.

Al-Dāwūdī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. Ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, n.d.

Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Mīzān al-iʿtidāl. Edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad
al-Bajāwī. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1963.

———. al-Muʿīn fī ṭabaqāt al-muḥaddithīn. Edited by Hammām ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Saʿīd. Amman:
Dār al-Furqān, 1983.

———. Tārīkh al-Islām wa wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa al-aʿlām. Edited by Bashshār Maʿrūf.
Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003.

Al-Fasawī, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb b. Sufyān. al-Maʿrifa wa al-tārīkh. Edited by Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-
ʿAmrī. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981.

Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. al-Mankhūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl. Edited by
Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Muʿāṣir, 1998.

———. al-Mustaṣfā. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām ʿAbd al-Shāfī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993.

Al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. Maʿrifat ʿulūm al-ḥadīth. Edited by
Muʿaẓẓam Ḥusayn. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1977.

Al-Hamadhānī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad. al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa al-
ʿadl. Edited by Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī. Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li al-Taʾlīf wa al-
Tarjama, n.d.

214
———. Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwāt. Edited by ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān. Beirut: Dār al-
ʿArabiyya, n.d.

Al-Ḥamawī, Yāqūt b. ʿAbd Allāh. Muʿjam al-buldān. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1995.

———. Muʿjam al-udabāʾ. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993.

Al-Hārūnī, Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by ʿAbd al-Karīm
Jadbān, 2013.

Al-Hindī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm. Nihāyat al-wuṣūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl. Edited by Ṣāliḥ b.
Sulaymān al-Yūsuf and Saʿd b. Sālim al-Suwayḥ. Mecca: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya, 1996.

Al-Isnawī, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. al-Ḥasan. Nihāyat al-sūl sharḥ Minhāj al-wuṣūl.
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999.

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl. Edited by ʿAjīl Jāsim al-Nashmī.
Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1994.

———. Sharḥ mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī. Edited by ʿIṣmat Allāh Muḥammad. Dār al-Bashāʾir al-
Islāmiyya, 2010.

Al-Juwaynī, Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbd Allāh. al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by
ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Dīb. Doha, 1978.

———. al-Talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by ʿAbd Allāh al-Nibālī and Bashīr al-ʿAmrī. Beirut:
Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1996.

Al-Kalwadhānī, Abū al-Khaṭṭāb Mahfūẓ b. Aḥmad. al-Tamhīd fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Mufīd
Muḥammad and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. Mecca: Markaz al-Baḥth al-ʿIlmī wa Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth
al-Islāmī, 1985.

Al-Karājikī, Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. Kanz al-fawāʾid. Edited by ʿAbd Allah Niʿma.
Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwaʾ, 1985.

215
Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. al-Faqīh wa al-mutafaqqih. Edited by ʿĀdil al-Gharāzī.
Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2000.

———. Tārīkh Baghdād. Edited by Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 2004.

Al-Khatib, Mutaz. “Maqālat taṣwīb al-mujtahidīn: ishām fī tārīkh al-afkār.” Al-Tafāhum 32
(2011): 38–71.

Al-Khayyāṭ, Abū al-Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Muḥammad. Kitāb al-intiṣār. Edited by Henrik
Samuel Nyberg. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1925.

Al-Khayyūn, Rashīd. Muʿtazilat al-Baṣra wa Baghdād. London: Dār al-Ḥikma, 1997.

Al-Kulaynī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb. al-Kāfī. Edited by ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghaffārī.
Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1969.

Al-Mālikī, Ḥasan b. Farḥān. Kitāb al-ṣuḥba wa al-ṣaḥāba. Accessed June 1, 2022.
https://almaliky.org/subject.php?id=1728.

Al-Mizzī, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl. Edited by
Bashshār Maʿrūf. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1980.

Al-Masʿūdī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Tanbīh wa al-ishrāf. Edited by ʿAbd Allāh
Ismāʿīl al-Ṣāwī. Cairo: Dār al-Ṣāwī, 1938.

Al-Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. Taʾwīlāt ahl al-sunna = Tafsīr al-
Māturīdī). Edited by Majdī Bāslūm. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2005.

Al-Mufīd, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. al-Jamal. Najaf: Manshūrāt al-Maṭbaʿa
al-Ḥaydariyya, 1983.

———. al-Nukat al-iʿtiqādiyya. Edited by Riḍā al-Mukhtārī. al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat
al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1993.

216
———. Awāʾil al-maqālāt. Edited by Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī. al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-Alfiyyat al-
Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1993.

———. Risāla fī ʿadam sahw al-Nabī. Edited by Mahdī Najaf. al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-
Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1993.

———. Taṣḥīḥ iʿtiqādāt al-Imāmiyya. Edited by Ḥusayn Dargāhī. al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī li-
Alfiyyat al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1993.

Al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, Abū al-Qāsim Jaʿfar b. al-Ḥasan. Maʿārij al-uṣūl. Edited by Muḥammad
Ḥusayn al-Raḍawī. Qumm: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, 1983.

Al-Murtaḍā, Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Dharīʿa ilā uṣūl al-sharīʿa. Edited by Abū al-
Qāsim Gorjī. Tehran: Dāneshgāhe Tehran, 1967.

———. al-Fuṣūl al-mukhtāra min al-ʿuyūn wa al-masāʾil. Edited by ʿAlī Mīr Sharīfī. Beirut:
Dār al-Mufīd, 1993.

———. al-Intiṣār. Najaf: Manshūrāt al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1971.

———. Sharḥ jumal al-ʿilm wa al-ʿamal. Edited by Yaʿqūb al-Jaʿfarī al-Marāghī. Tehran: Dār
al-Uswa, 1999.

———. Tanzīh al-Anbiyāʾ. Edited by Fāṭima Qāḍī Shiʿār. Tehran: al-Madrasa al-ʿUlyā lil-
Shahīd al-Muṭahharī, 2002.

Al-Nadīm, Muḥammad b. Isḥāq. al-Fihrist. Edited by Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid. London: Muʾassasat
al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-Islāmī, 2009.

Al-Najāshī, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. Rijāl al-Najāshī. Edited by Mūsā al-Shubayrī al-
Zanjānī. Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1997.

Al-Nasāʾī, Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad b. Shuʿayb. Tasmiyat fuqahāʾ al-amṣār. Edited by
Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid. Aleppo: Dār al-Waʿī, 1949.

217
Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā b. Sharaf. al-Minhāj sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj. Beirut:
Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1972.

———. Tahdhīb al-asmāʾ wa al-lughāt. Edited by Sharikat al-ʿUlamāʾ. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, n.d.

Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ. Tartīb al-madārik wa taqrīb al-masālik. Edited by Saʿīd Aḥmad Aʿrāb. al-
Muḥammadiyya: Maṭbaʿat Faḍḍālla, 1981.

Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān. Daʿāʾim al-Islām. Edited by Āṣif b. ʿAlī Aṣghar Fayḍī. Cairo: Dār al-
Maʿārif, 1963.

———. Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory (Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-
madhāhib). Edited and translated by Devin J. Stewart. New York: New York University
Press, 2015.

Al-Qarāfī, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Idrīs. Nafāʾis al-uṣūl fī sharḥ al-Maḥṣūl. Edited by ʿĀdil
Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd. Maktabat Nizar Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1995.

———. Sharḥ tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl fī ikhtiṣār al-Maḥṣūl fī al-uṣūl. Edited by Maktab al-Buḥūth wa al-
Dirāsāt. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2004.

Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b Muḥammad. al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qurʾān.
Edited by Ṣafwān ʿAdnān al-Dāwūdī. Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1991.

Al-Rāzī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿUmar. al-Maḥṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl. Edited by Ṭāhā
Jābir al-ʿAlwānī. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1997.

Al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir. Durūs fī ʿilm al-uṣūl. Beirut: Dār al-Muntaẓar, 1985.

Al-Ṣadūq, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Bābawayh. al-Amālī. Edited by Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī.
Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī, 2009.

———. al-Iʿtiqādāt. Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Imām al-Hādī, 2014.

———. Faḍāʾil al-Shīʿa. Tehran: Intishārat ʿĀbidī, n.d.

218

———. Man lā yaḥḍuruh al-faqīh. Edited by Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī,
1985.

Al-Samarqandī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Mīzān al-uṣūl fī natāʾij al-ʿuqūl. Edited by
Muḥammad Zakī ʿAbd al-Barr. Doha: Maṭābiʿ al-Dawḥa al-Ḥadītha, 1984.

Al-Sarakhsī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī. Edited by Abū al-Wafā al-
Afghānī. Hyderabad: Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1993.

Al-Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Idrīs. al-Risāla. Edited by Aḥmad Muḥammad
Shākir. Egypt: Maktabat al-Ḥalabī, 1940.

———. Kitāb al-umm. Edited by Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. al-Manṣūra: Dār al-Wafāʾ,
2001.

Al-Shahristānī, Abū al-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm. al-Milal wa al-niḥal. Muʾassasat al-
Ḥalabī, n.d.

Al-Shāṭibī, Ibrāhim b. Mūsā. al-Iʿtiṣām. Edited by Salīm al-Hilālī. Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn ʿAffān,
1992.

Al-Shāyib, Firās ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Aḥmad. “al-Ārāʾ al-uṣūliyya li-Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. al-
Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī fī al-muqaddimāt al-uṣūliyya wa dalālāt al-alfāḍ wa ʿawāriḍuhā:
dirāsa muqārana.” MA thesis, Jāmiʿat Āl al-Bayt Jordan, 2000.

Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī. al-Ishāra ilā madhhab ahl al-ḥaqq. Edited by Muḥammad
al-Sayyid al-Julaynid. Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1999.

———. al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2003.

———. al-Tabṣira fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥasan Hītū. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr,
1983.

———. Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahā. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970.

219
Al-Sijistānī, Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān b. al-Ashʿath. Suʾālāt Abī ʿUbayd al-Ājurī fī al-jarḥ wa al-
taʿdīl. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAlī Qāsim. Medina: ʿImādat al-Baḥth al-ʿIlmī bi-l-Jāmiʿa
al-Islāmiyya, 1983.

Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr. Bughyat al-wuʿāt fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawiyyīn
wa al-nuḥāt. Edited by Muḥammad Ibrāhim. Ṣaydā: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, n.d.

Al-Ṭabarānī, Abū al-Qāsim Sulaymān b. Aḥmad. al-Muʿjam al-kabīr. Edited by Ḥamdī b. ʿAbd
al-Majīd. Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1994.

Al-Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr. Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī. Beirut: Dār al-Turāth, 1968.

Al-Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar. Sharḥ al-ʿaqāʾid al-nasafiyya. Karachi: Maktabat
al-Madīna, 2012.

Al-Ṭūsī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan. al-ʿUdda fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Muḥammad
Riḍā al-Anṣārī al-Qummī. Qumm: Sitāre, 1996.

———. al-Amālī. Edited by Muʾassasat al-Biʿtha. Qumm: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1994.

———. al-Iqtiṣād fī-mā yajib ʿalā al-ʿibād. Edited by Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Mūsawī. Qumm:
Dalīl Mā, 2009.

———. al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān. Edited by Aḥmad Ḥabīb Qaṣīr al-ʿĀmilī. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ
al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.

———. Fihrist kutub al-Shīʿa wa uṣūlihim. Edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī. Qumm:
Sitāre, 1999.

———. Rijāl al-Ṭūsī. Edited by Jawād al-Qayyūmī al-Iṣfahānī. Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-
Islāmī, n.d.

Al-Urmawī, Maḥmūd b. Abī Bakr. al-Taḥṣīl min al-maḥṣūl. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ʿAlī Abū
Zunayd. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1998.

220
Al-Yaʿqūbī, Aḥmad b. Isḥāq. al-Buldān. Edited by Muḥammad Amīn Dhannāwī. Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002.

Al-Ẓalmī, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Taṣwīb wa al-takhṭiʾa wa atharu-humā fī masāʾil uṣūl al-fiqh
wa manhaj al-madrasa al-ʿaqliyya al-ḥadītha. Riyadh: Dār al-Tadmuriyya, 2014.

Al-Zarkashī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh. al-Baḥr al-muḥīt fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Cairo:
Dār al-Kutubī, 1994.

———. Salāsil al-dhahab. Edited by Muḥammad al-Shanqīṭī. Medina, 2002.

Al-Zarqā, Muṣṭafā Aḥmad. al-Madkhal al-fiqhī al-ʿāmm. Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1998.

Al-Zuḥaylī, Wahba. Uṣūl al-fiqh al-Islāmī. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1986.

Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad Ali. “al-Ṭūsī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Ammerman, Nancy T. “Finding Religion in Everyday Life.” Sociology of Religion 75, no. 2
(2014): 189–207.

Anderson, Greg. The Realness of Things Past: Ancient Greece and Ontological History. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Ansari, Hassan, and Sabine Schmidtke. Studies in Medieval Islamic Intellectual Traditions.
Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2017.

Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003.

———. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Assmann, Jan. Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998.

221
———. The Invention of Religion: Faith and Covenant in the Book of Exodus. Translated by
Robert Savage. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Barzegar, Abbas. “Remembering Community: Historical Narrative in the Formation of Sunni
Islam.” PhD diss. Emory University, 2010.

Bayhom-Daou, Tamima. Shaykh Mufid. New York: Oneworld Publications, 2005.

Bennett, David. “The Muʿtazilite Movement (II): The Early Muʿtazilites.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Islamic Theology, edited by Sabine Schmidtke, 142–58. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016.

———. “Hishām b. al-Ḥakam.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

Bevilacqua, Alexander, and Frederic Clark. Thinking in the Past Tense: Eight Conversations.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019.

Blackburn, Simon. On Truth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Brockelmann, Carl. “al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Buyukkara, Mehmet Ali. “al-Jawaliqi, Hisham b. Salim.” In The Biographical Encyclopedia of
Islamic Philosophy, edited by Oliver Leaman, 258–59. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

———. “Hisham b. al-Ḥakam.” In The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, edited
by Oliver Leaman, 149–50. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

Calder, Norman. “Doubt and Prerogative: The Emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī Theory of
Ijtihād.” Studia Islamica 70 (1989): 57–78.

Carra de Vaux, Bernard. “Bishr b. Ghiyāth b. Abī Karīma Abū ʿAbd Al-Raḥmān Al-Marīsī.”
In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Chaumont, Éric. “Ijtihâd et Histoire en islam sunnite selon quelques juristes et théologiens.”
In Islamic Law: Theory and Practice, edited by Robert Gleave and Eugenia Kermeli, 7–
23. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001.

222
———. “Tout chercheur qualifié dit-il juste? (Hal kull mujtahid muṣîb) La question
controversée du fondement de la légitimité de la controverse en Islam.” In La controverse
religieuse et ses formes, edited by Alain Le Boulluec, 11–27. Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1995.

Crone, Patricia. “ʿUthmāniyya.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Dakake, Maria Massi. The Charismatic Community: Shiʿite Identity in Early Islam. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2007.

Duri, Abd al-Aziz. “Baghdād.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by Karen E. Fields. New
York: The Free Press, 1995.

Ed. “Ahl al-Naẓar.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

El Omari, Racha. The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī/al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931). Leiden: Brill,
2016.

———. “The Muʿtazilite Movement (I): The Origins of the Muʿtazila.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Islamic Theology, edited by Sabine Schmidtke, 130–41. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016.

El Shamsy, Ahmed. The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

El-Rouayheb, Khaled. Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly
Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017.

Emon, Anver M. “Ijtihād.” In The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, edited by Anver M. Emon
and Rumee Ahmed, 189–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

———. Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmīs and Others in the Empire of Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

223
———. “To Most Likely Know the Law: Objectivity, Authority, and Interpretation in Islamic
Law.” Hebraic Political Studies 4, no. 4 (2009): 415–40.

Fadel, Mohammad. “After Revelation, Where Does Reason Lead?” Renovatio, 2020. Accessed
February 6, 2020. https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/after-revelation-where-does-
reason-lead.

Fahd, Toufic. “Dhu ʾl-Khalaṣa.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Fattah, Hala, and Frank Caso. A Brief History of Iraq. New York: Checkmark Books, 2009.

Fitzgerald, Tim. “Bruce Lincoln’s ‘Theses on Method’: Antitheses.” Method & Theory in the
Study of Religion 18, no. 4 (2006): 392–423.

Frank, Richard M. Classical Islamic Theology: The Ashʿarites. Edited by Dimitri Gutas. New
York: Routledge, 2016.

Fück, Johann W. “Ibn Manẓūr.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Gaiser, Adam. “Ballaghanā ʿan An-Nabī: Early Basran and Omani Ibāḍī Understandings
of Sunna and Siyar, Āthār and Nasab.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 83, no. 3 (2020): 437–48.

Gimaret, Daniel. “Muʿtazila.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Graham, William A. “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation.” The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 23, no. 3 (1993): 495–522.

Griffith, Sidney Harrison. The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in
the World of Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Gutas, Dimitri, and Kevin van Bladel. “Bayt al-Ḥikma.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third
Edition.

Haider, Najam Iftikhar. Shīʿī Islam: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2014.

224
———. The Origins of the Shīʻa: Identity, Ritual, and Sacred Space in Eighth-Century Kūfa.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Edited and translated by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Hallaq, Wael B. A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

———. Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009.

Halm, Heinz. Shiʿism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Hasan, Ahmad. “Ijmāʿ in the Early Schools.” Islamic Studies 6, no. 2 (1967): 121–39.

———. “The Concept of Infallibility in Islam.” Islamic Studies 11, no. 1 (1972): 1–11.

Hayes, Christine Elizabeth. What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2017.

Hayes, Edmund. Agents of the Hidden Imam: Forging Twelver Shi‘ism, 850-950 CE. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Heemskerk, Margaretha T. “Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam,
Third Edition.

Henningan, Peter C. “Ahl al-raʾy.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

Hidary, Richard. Dispute for the Sake of Heaven: Legal Pluralism in the Talmud. Providence:
Brown Judaic Studies, 2010.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization,
Vol. One The Classical Age of Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

225
Hogg, Michael A. “Social Identity Theory.” In Understanding Peace and Conflict through
Social Identity Theory, edited by Shelley McKeown, Reeshma Haji, and Neil Ferguson,
3–17. Switzerland: Springer International, 2016.

Hoover, Jon. “Ḥashwiyya.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

Hourani, George F. Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.

Husayn, Nebil. Opposing the Imām: The Legacy of the Nawāṣib in Islamic Literature. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Ibish, Yusuf. “Life and Works of al-Bāqillānī.” Islamic Studies 4, no. 3 (1965): 225–36.

Ibn ʿAqīl, Abū al-Wafāʾ ʿAlī. al-Wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī. Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1990.

Ibn ʿAsākir, Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan. Tabyīn kidhb al-muftarī fī-mā nusib ilā al-Ashʿarī.
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1983.

Ibn Abī Shayba, Abū Bakr ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad. Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shayba. Edited by
Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1989.

Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila. Edited by
Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqqī. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.

Ibn al-Farrāʾ, Abū Yaʿlā Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn. al-ʿUdda fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Edited by Aḥmad b.
ʿAlī al-Mubārakī. Riyadh, 1993.

———. al-Masāʾil al-uṣūliyya min kitāb al-riwāyatayn wa al-wajhayn. Edited by ʿAbd al-Karīm
Muḥammad al-Lāḥim. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1985.

Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū al-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī. al-Muntaẓam fī tārīkh al-mulūk wa ʾl-umam.
Edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā and Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā. Beirut: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1992.

226
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā. Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila. Edited by Susanna Diwald-Wilzer.
Beirut: Dār al-Muntaẓar, 1988.

Ibn Burhān, Abū al-Fatḥ Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. al-Wuṣūl ilā al-uṣūl. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ʿAlī Abu
Zunayd. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1984.

Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. Lisān al-mīzān. Edited by Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-
Niẓāmiyya. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī, 1971.

———. Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb. India: Maṭbaʿat Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmiyya, 1908.

Ibn Ḥanbal, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad. al-ʿIlal wa maʿrifat al-rijāl. Edited by Waṣī Allāh b.
Muḥammad ʿAbbās. Riyadh: Dār al-Khānī, 2001.

———. al-Jāmiʿ li-ʿulūm al-imām Aḥmad. Edited by Khālid al-Ribāṭ. al-Fayyūm: Dār al-Falāḥ,
2009.

———. Musnad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. Edited by Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ. Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2001.

Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad. al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām. Edited by Aḥmad
Muḥammad Shākir. Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1928.

Ibn Ḥibbān, Muḥammad. al-Thuqāt. Edited by Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya. Hyderabad:
Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1973.

———. Mashāhīr ʿulamāʾ al-amṣār wa aʿlām fuqahāʾ al-aqṭār. Edited by Marzūq ʿAlī Ibrāhīm.
Mansoura: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 1991.

Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar. al-Bidāya wa al-nihāya. Edited by ʿAbd Allāh b.
ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī. Dār Hijr, 2003.

Ibn Khaldūn, Abd al-Raḥmān. al-Muqaddima. Edited by ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad al-Darwīsh.
Damascus: Dār al-Balkhī, 2004.

Ibn Khayyāṭ, Abū ʿAmr Khalīfa. Tārīkh Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ. Edited by Akram Ḍiyāʾ al-ʿAmrī.
Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1976.

227
Ibn Māja al-Qazwīnī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Yazīd. Sunan Ibn Māja. Edited by Shuʿayb
al-Arnaʾūṭ. Dār al-Risāla al-ʿĀlamiyya, 2009.

Ibn Manẓūr, Abū al-Faḍl Muḥammad. Lisān al-ʿArab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1993.

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr. Ighāthat al-lahfān min maṣāyid al-Shayṭān.
Edited by Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqqī. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, n.d.

———. Zād al-maʿād fī hadī khayr al-ʿibād. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1994.

Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad. Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa jannat al-
munāẓir fī uṣūl al-fiqh. Muʾassasat al-Rayyān, 2002.

Ibn Qutayba al-Dīnawarī, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muslim. Taʾwīl mukhtalaf al-ḥadīth. Edited by
Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Aṣfar. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1999.

Ibn Saʿd, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad. al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-
Qādir ʿAṭā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1990.

———. al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā (mutammim al-ṣaḥāba). Edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAbd Allāh al-
Salūmī. al-Ṭāʾif: Maktabat al-Ṣiddīq, 1996.

Ibn Taymiyya, Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm. Majmūʿ al-fatāwā. Edited by ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b. Muḥammad. Medina: Mujammaʿ al-Malik Fahad, 1995.

Ibrahim, Ahmed Fekry. Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2015.

Imām, Muḥammad Kamāl. “al-Manhajiyya al-uṣūliyya ʿinda al-imām Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī:
ʿarḍ wa taḥlīl.” al-Tajdīd 14, no. 28 (2010): 77–100.

Jackson, Sherman A. “Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Uṣūl al-Fiqh.”
In Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard G. Weiss, 177–201. Leiden: Brill,
2002.

———. Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

228
———. On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Fayṣal
al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Juynboll, Gautier H. A. Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Provenance, and Authorship
of Early Ḥadīth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Cambridge: The Islamic
Texts Society, 2003.

King, Karen L. What Is Gnosticism? Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2003.

Knysh, Alexander D. Islam in Historical Perspective. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2017.

Kohlberg, Etan. In Praise of the Few: Studies in Shiʿi Thought and History. Edited by Amin
Ehteshami. Leiden: Brill, 2020.

Lange, Christian. “Barzakh.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

Laoust, Henri. “Ibn al-Farrāʾ.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Lapidus, Ira M. A History of Islamic Societies. 3rd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015.

Lecker, Michael. “Ṣiffīn.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Lecomte, Gérard. “Ibn Ḳutayba.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Lincoln, Bruce. Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1999.

———. “Theses on Method.” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 17, no. 1 (2005): 8–10.

Lowry, Joseph E. Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī.
Leiden: Brill, 2007.

229
Lucas, Scott C. Constructive Critics, Ḥadīth Literature, and the Articulation of Sunnī Islam: The
Legacy of the Generation of Ibn Sa῾d, Ibn Ma῾īn, and Ibn Ḥanbal. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Madelung, Wilferd. “al-Mufīd.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. “Hishām b. al-Ḥakam.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. “Murdjiʾa.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.

Madelung, Wilferd, and Sabine Schmidtke, eds. Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād, Promoter of Rational
Theology: Two Muʿtazilī Kalām Texts from the Cairo Geniza. Leiden: Brill, 2017.

Madelung, Wilferd, and Émile Tyan. “iṣma.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Makdisi, George. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.

Malikiyān, Muḥammad Bāqir. “Rābiṭey-e Dharīʿa-e Sayyid-e Murtaḍā bā ʿUdda-e Shaykh-e
Ṭūsī.” Nashri-ye Kitāb-e Shīʿa 9-10 (2014): 435–44.

Maysāwī, Muḥammad Ṭāhir, and Bilāl Barakāt Salhab. “Ārāʾ Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī fī masāʾil
uṣūl al-fiqh wa atharuhā fī ikhtiyārātihi al-kalāmiyya.” Majallat al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-
Muʿāṣir 25, no. 98 (2019): 11–44.

McCarthy, Richard J. “al-Bāḳillānī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

McCutcheon, Russell T. “Myth.” In Guide to the Study of Religion, edited by Willi Braun and
Russell T. McCutcheon, 190–208. New York: Continuum, 2000.

———. Study Religion: An Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2014.

McDermott, Martin J. The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022). Beirut: Dar el-
Machreq, 1978.

230
McMahon, Darrin M., and Samuel Moyn, eds. Rethinking Modern European Intellectual
History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Melchert, Christopher. “Basra and Kufa as the Earliest Centers of Islamic Legal Controversy.”
In Islamic Cultures, Islamic Contexts: Essays in Honor of Patricia Crone, edited by
Behnam Sadeghi, Asad Q. Ahmed, Adam Silverstein, and Robert G. Hoyland, 173–94.
Leiden: Brill, 2015.

———. “Baṣran Origins of Classical Sufism.” Der Islam 82, no. 2 (2005): 221–40.

———. The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E. Leiden: Brill,
1997.

Modarressi, Hossein. An Introduction to Shīʿī Law: A Bibliographical Study. London: Ithaca
Press, 1984.

———. Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shīʿite Islam. Princeton: Darwin
Press, 1993.

———. “Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shīʿī Jurisprudence: A Preliminary Survey.” Studia
Islamica 59 (1984): 141–58.

———. Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022.

Mohaghegh Damad, Seyyed Mostafa. “The Reception of Factuality (taṣwīb) Theories of Ijtihād
in Modern Uṣūlī Shīʿī Thought.” In Visions of Sharīʿa: Contemporary Discussions in
Shī ͑ī Legal Theory, edited by Ali-Reza Bhojani, Laurens de Rooij, and Michael
Bohlander, 10–25. Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʿism.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

Morony, Michael G. Iraq after the Muslim Conquest. Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2005.

231
Mottahedeh, Roy. “Reviewed Work: The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic
Social History by R. W. Bulliet.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 95, no. 3
(1975): 491–95.

Naaman, Erez. Literature and the Islamic Court: Cultural Life under al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād. New
York: Routledge, 2016.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Caner K. Dagli, Maria M. Dakake, Joseph E. B. Lumbard, and
Mohammed Rustom, eds. The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary. New
York: HarperOne, 2017.

Nemec, John. “Toward a Volitional Definition of Religion.” Journal of the American Academy
of Religion 88, no. 3 (2020): 664–92.

Newman, Andrew J. The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism: Ḥadīth as Discourse between
Qum and Baghdad. London: Routledge, 2000.

———. Twelver Shiism: Unity and Diversity in the Life of Islam. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2013.

Nongbri, Brent. Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2015.

Pals, Daniel L. Nine Theories of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Pellat, Charles. “al-Baṣra.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. “Le milieu baṣrien et la formation de Ǧāḥiẓ.” PhD diss., 1953.

Ps.-al-Nāshiʾ al-Akbar. Masāʾil al-imāma. Edited by Josef van Ess. Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1971.

Qazwini, Hadi. “Heir of the Prophets: Veneration of Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī and the Socio-Religious
Positioning of Twelver Shiism.” Islamic Studies 60, no. 3 (2021): 267–86.

———. “Ibn Qūluwayh.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

232
Quraishi, Asifa. “On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand
American Constitutional Law.” Michigan State Law Review 339 (2009): 339–60.

Ramyar, Mahmud. “Shaykh Ṭūsī: The Life and Works of a Shī‘ite Leader.” PhD diss. University
of Edinburgh, 1977.

Reinhart, A. Kevin. Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1995.

———. Lived Islam: Colloquial Religion in a Cosmopolitan Tradition. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2020.

Rowson, Everett K. “al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.
Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdī in Twelver Shīʿism. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1981.

Sartori, Giovanni. “What is ‘Politics’?,” Political Theory 1, no. 1 (1973): 5–26.

Schacht, Joseph. “Ahl al-Ḥadīth.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. “Khaṭaʾ.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Schmidtke, Sabine. “The Muʿtazilite Movement (III): The Scholastic Phase.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Islamic Theology, edited by Sabine Schmidtke, 160–80. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016.

Schwarb, Gregor M. “al-Aṣamm.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.

Sellheim, Rudolf. “al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Shah, Mustafa. “Exploring the Genesis of Early Arabic Linguistic Thought: Qur’anic Readers
and Grammarians of the Basran Tradition (Part II).” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 5, no. 2
(2003): 1–47.

Siddiqui, Sohaira Z. M. Law and Politics under the Abbasids: An Intellectual Portrait of al-
Juwayni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

233
Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Smith, Brian K. “Authority, Power, and the Definition of ‘Religion.’” Historical Reflections 25,
no. 3 (1999): 413–22.

Stewart, Devin J. Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System.
Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1998.

Streng, Frederick J. “The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths as Religious Philosophy.” Journal of
Indian Philosophy 1, no. 3 (1971): 262–71.

Stroumsa, Sarah. “The Beginnings of the Muʿtazila Reconsidered.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic
and Islam 13 (1990): 265–93.

Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Taqī al-Dīn. Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā. Edited by
Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī. Hijr li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa al-Nashr, 1992.

Takim, Liyakat. Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shiʿite Islam.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.

Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Kāfī. al-Ibhāj fī sharḥ al-minhāj. Beirut: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1995.

Temel, Ahmet. “The Missing Link in the History of Islamic Legal Theory: The Development of
Uṣūl al-Fiqh between al-Shāfiʿī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ during the 3rd/9th and Early 4th/10th
Centuries.” PhD diss., University of California Santa Barbara, 2014.

Thiele, Jan. “Between Cordoba and Nīsābūr: The Emergence and Consolidation of Ashʿarism
(Fourth-Fifth/Tenth-Eleventh Century).” In The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology,
edited by Sabine Schmidtke, 225–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Tillier, Mathieu. “al-ʿAnbarī, ʿUbaydallāh b. al-Ḥasan.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third
Edition.

———. “Judicial Authority and Qāḍīs’ Autonomy under the ʿAbbāsids.” Al-Masāq 26, no. 2
(2014): 119–31.

234
———. “Un traité politique du II
e
/VIII
e
siècle. L’épître de ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī
au calife al-Mahdī.” Annales Islamologiques 40 (2006): 139–70.

Tweed, Thomas A. “Marking Religion’s Boundaries: Constitutive Terms, Orienting Tropes, and
Exegetical Fussiness.” History of Religions 44, no. 3 (2005): 252–76.

Vaglieri, Laura Veccia. “al-Djamal.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

van Ess, Josef. “Khaiyāṭ.” In Kleine Schriften by Josef van Ess, edited by Hinrich Biesterfeldt.
Leiden: Brill, 2018.

———. “La liberté du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIII
e
siècle.” In Kleine Schriften by Josef
van Ess, edited by Hinrich Biesterfeldt. Leiden: Brill, 2018.

———. The Flowering of Muslim Theology. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2006.

———. Theology and Society in the Second and Third Centuries of the Hijra: A History of
Religious Thought in Early Islam. Translated by John O’Kane and Gwendolin
Goldbloom. Leiden: Brill, 2017.

Vishanoff, David R. The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists
Imagined a Revealed Law. New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011.

Wakīʿ, Muḥammad b. Khalaf. Akhbār al-quḍāt. Edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī.
Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 1947.

Watt, W. Montgomery. “al-Ashʿarī, Abu ʾl-Ḥasan.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. “Ashʿariyya.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

———. Islam and the Integration of Society. London: Routledge, 1961.

———. Islamic Creeds: A Selection. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994.

235
———. Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1985.

———. The Formative Period of Islamic Thought. Oxford: Oneworld, 1998.

Weiss, Bernard G. The Spirit of Islamic Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006.

Weitz, Lev E. Between Christ and Caliph: Law, Marriage, and Christian Community in Early
Islam. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018.

Wensinck, Arent J., and Clifford E. Bosworth. “Lawḥ.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second
Edition.

Wilson, M. Brett. “The Failure of Nomenclature: The Concept of ‘Orthodoxy’ in the Study of
Islam.” Comparative Islamic Studies 3, no. 2 (2007): 169–94.

Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya. al-Mawsūʿa al-fiqhiyya al-Kuwaytiyya. Egypt: Dār
al-Ṣafwa, 1983.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. Religion and Politics under the Early ʿAbbāsids: The Emergence of
the Proto-Sunnī Elite. Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Zysow, Aron. “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal Theory.” In Studies in Islamic
Legal Theory, edited by Bernard G. Weiss, 235–65. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

———. The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory.
Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation is a study of a long-standing debate in Islamic thought over the doctrines of juristic fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa) and infallibility (al-taṣwīb). Beginning with developments in Iraq in the middle of the second/eighth century and continuing to the fifth/eleventh century, this dissertation traces how Muslim thinkers grappled with an apparently simple yet far-reaching question: when disagreement of opinion arises among the legal experts (mujtahids) over a particular question, are all of them correct (muṣīb)? Those who answered this question in the affirmative, that is, those who considered all legal experts to be correct (kullu mujtahid muṣīb) despite their differences, would become known as “the infallibilists” (al-muṣawwiba). Their opponents, who would become known as “the fallibilists” (al-mukhaṭṭiʾa), maintained that there could only be one correct answer for any question (al-ḥaqq fī wāḥid), and thus, in cases of disagreement there could only be one correct legal expert; the rest were all wrong. The proponents of juristic fallibility and infallibility proposed several variations of these doctrines.
Despite this question’s persistence in manuals of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), the debate over whether every mujtahid was correct was not simply an academic or intellectual exercise. Through an analysis of various genres of premodern Islamic literature, this study traces the development of the debate and describe the various doctrinal positions it produced, focusing on the works of legal theory produced in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries by major theologian-jurists representing Muʿtazilism, Ashʿarism, Sunnī Traditionalism, and Imāmī Shīʿism. This study shows how, despite being legally oriented, that is, concerned with the “assessment of legal reasoning” (ḥukm al-ijtihād) and therefore largely discussed in works of legal theory, this debate reveals several intellectual and sociopolitical concerns that go beyond the scope of law proper. Among these intellectual concerns, the debate’s participants theorized about whether God had determined a single answer for every religious question and the nature of religious “truths” (ontologically) and how they are determined (epistemologically). More importantly, this study argues that participants were concerned with sociopolitical problems, including the nature and scope of post-Prophetic authority and activity, the methods by which Muslims would manage the unity of their group identities while simultaneously accounting for diversity of beliefs and practices, and defining the content and parameters of what scholars deemed to be correct or acceptable belief and practice, and, by extension, membership in or exclusion from competing constructions of Islamic “orthodoxies.” These competing orthodoxies were fueled by several dogmatic commitments undergirding competing collective memory constructions and “mythmaking,” especially in relation to the earliest Muslim community and its leadership. Taking the debate on juristic in/fallibility as a case study, this dissertation invites scholars to consider the ways in which Muslim theorists of the fourth-fifth/tenth-eleventh centuries attempted to negotiate intra-Muslim disagreements and to variously justify or resist the existing diversity of legal and other religious views on the ground by projecting their ideas onto the earliest Muslims.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

The Chinovnik and the Rond-de-cuir: bureaucratic modernity in nineteenth-century Russian and French literature

PDF

Deviants and dope: psychoactive drugs, the construction of sexual pathology, and gay culture in the United States, 1922-2000

PDF

Networks of space and identity: origin narratives and manifestations of the Itsukushima deity

PDF

A poke in the gnosis — reimagining documentary: a phenomenological analysis of the reappropriation of meaning and the politics of disruption

PDF

The popularizing and politicizing of queer media images in Taiwan: 1997 to the present

PDF

Surviving the pipeline: the truth behind the numbers in south LA’s juvenile criminal justice system

Asset Metadata

Creator Qazwini, Hadi (author)

Core Title The Islamic debate on juristic in/fallibility (al-takhṭiʾa wa al-taṣwīb) and the construction of competing orthodoxies, 10th-11th centuries C.E.

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Religion

Degree Conferral Date 2022-12

Publication Date 09/08/2022

Defense Date 08/23/2022

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Ashʿarism,Imāmī,Islam,Islamic intellectual history,Islamic law,Islamic legal theory,Islamic Studies,Islamic theology,kullu mujtahid muṣīb,Muʿtazilism,Myth,OAI-PMH Harvest,orthodoxy,Religion,Religious studies,Shīʿism,Sunnism,takhṭiʾa,taṣwīb,traditionalism,Twelver

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Jackson, Sherman (committee chair), Albertson, David (committee member), Nair, Arjun (committee member), Roberts, Alexandre (committee member)

Creator Email hadi.alqazwini@gmail.com,hadi.qazwini@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC111833794

Unique identifier UC111833794

Legacy Identifier etd-QazwiniHad-11183

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Qazwini, Hadi

Type texts

Source 20220908-usctheses-batch-978 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the author, as the original true and official version of the work, but does not grant the reader permission to use the work if the desired use is covered by copyright. It is the author, as rights holder, who must provide use permission if such use is covered by copyright. The original signature page accompanying the original submission of the work to the USC Libraries is retained by the USC Libraries and a copy of it may be obtained by authorized requesters contacting the repository e-mail address given.

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu