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Gender inequity and leadership in the large state militia: an innovation study
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Gender inequity and leadership in the large state militia: an innovation study
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Content
Running head: INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 1
GENDER INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA:
AN INNOVATION STUDY
By
Edwin M. Rodriguez
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
May 2020
Copyright 2020 Edwin M. Rodriguez
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 2
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to four women who shaped my development as a man, my mother
Sylvia Rodriguez, grandmothers Elida Amaya, Rafaela Rodriguez, and my enigmatic daughter
Jozlin Rodriguez.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Like all worthwhile things in life, the completion of this dissertation could not have been
possible without the advice and support of mentors. The three years of travel, deployments, field
training exercises, stress and weight gain have been a blur in the iterative process. I admit, there
were times where I wanted to take a break. However, my dearest friends reminded me to take the
path that demanded the most of me. In particular, I acknowledge Anthony, Carlos, Christine,
Erin, Ernie, Lorena, Nick, Richard, and Yadriana for their kindness and generous support in
helping me see this through. My source of inspiration are Jozlin and Kevin, there is no such thing
as spare time, only lifetime.
I thank my committee Chair, Dr. Darline Robles. I am indebted to you for your patience
and encouragement to this project. I owe my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Kenneth
Yates (the Jedi), Dr. Monique Datta, Dr. Adrian Donato, Dr. Sourena Haj Mohamadi, Dr. Mark
Pearson, Dr. Derisa Grant, and Dr. Eric Canny for their intellectual generosity in mentoring and
advising me. In addition, this study could not have occurred without the input from a group of
courageous female officer candidates who shared their candid experiences. I am also thankful to
Leslie Greenfield, an inspirational leader who shattered the myth with the status quo and helped
me understand how exceptional women persist against covert barriers. Finally, Dr. Guadalupe
Montano, I am humbled by your generous advice in overseeing this dissertation, thank you.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication 2
Acknowledgements 3
Table of Contents 4
List of Tables 7
List of Figures 8
Abstract 9
Chapter One: Introduction 10
Organizational Context and Mission 10
Organizational Performance Status/Need 11
Related Literature 12
Importance of Organizational Innovation 13
Organizational Performance Goal 14
Description of Stakeholder Groups 14
Stakeholder Groups’ Performance Goals 16
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study 16
Purpose of the Project and Questions 17
General Concept and Methodological Framework 17
Definitions 18
Organization of the Study 19
Chapter: Two: Literature Review 20
Innovatively Looking at Gender Inequity 21
Transformational Change 22
Transformational Leadership 23
Leader-Member Exchange Theory 23
The Contemporary Operating Environment 25
Setting the Foundation for Women in Combat Forces 27
Global Trends with Gender Equity in the Military 28
Having the Right Skills and Developmental Experiences 30
Women and the Leadership Labyrinth 33
Improving the Collective Intelligence and Democratic Reasoning in the Military 35
Collective Wisdom and the Argument for Diversity 36
Collective Intelligence 37
Shared Consciousness 38
What Women Contribute to Collective Intelligence in the Military 40
Conceptual Framework: Interaction of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization 42
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivational, and Organizational Influencers 43
Conceptual Framework for the Study 61
Conclusion 63
Chapter Three: Methods 64
Participating Stakeholders 64
Interview and Focus Group Sampling Criteria and Rationale 66
Interview and Focus Group Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale 66
Sampling Strategy and Timeline 67
Qualitative Data Collection and Instrumentation 67
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 5
Interviews and Focus Groups 68
Artifacts 70
Data Analysis 70
Phase I: Open Coding 71
Phase II: Analytical Coding 72
Phase III: Patterns and Themes 72
Phase IV: Claims, Assertions and Findings 73
Qualitative Analysis Process 73
Credibility and Trustworthiness 74
Validity and Reliability 74
Ethics 75
Limitations and Delimitations 76
Summary 76
Chapter Four: Results and Findings 77
Participating Stakeholders 77
Data Validation 79
Results and Findings for Knowledge Influences 81
Confirmed Knowledge Gaps 81
Results and Findings for Motivation Influences 87
Attribution Theory 87
Self-Efficacy 89
Goal Orientation Theory 90
Results and Findings for Organizational Influence 92
Cultural Models 92
Cultural Settings 93
Synthesis 98
Summary of Validated Influences 98
Chapter Five: Recommendations to Address KMO Influences 100
Organizational Context and Mission 101
Organizational Performance Goal 101
Description of Stakeholder Groups 101
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study 101
Purpose of the Project and Questions 102
Introduction and Overview 102
Declarative Knowledge Solutions 104
Motivational Recommendations 108
Motivation Solutions 109
Organization Recommendations 112
Cultural Solutions 113
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan 118
Implementation and Evaluation Framework 118
Organizational Purpose, Need, and Expectations 118
Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators 119
Level 3: Behavior 120
Level 2: Learning 124
Level 1: Reaction 127
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 6
Data Analysis and Reporting 130
Chapter Summary 132
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach 133
Limitations and Delimitations 134
Future Research 134
Conclusion 135
References 137
Appendix A: Research Protocols 147
Appendix B: Focus Group Script 152
Appendix C: Immediate Evaluation Instrument Level 1 153
Appendix D: Immediate Evaluation Instrument Level 2 154
Appendix E: Delayed/Blended Instrument Level 3 and 4 155
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Organizational Mission, Global Goal and Stakeholder Performance Goals 16
Table 2: Knowledge Influences, Types, and Assessments for Knowledge Gap Analysis 48
Table 3: Motivational Influences and Assessment for Motivation Gap Analysis 55
Table 4: Organizational Influencer Worksheet 60
Table 5: Profile of Participants 65
Table 6: Background of Sampling Strategy, Size, and Timeline 67
Table 7: Qualitative Analysis Process 73
Table 8: Interview and Focus Group Participants 78
Table 9: Correlation of Assumed KMO Influences to Themes Found in the Data 80
Table 10: Confirmed Assets and Needs KMO Influences 99
Table 11: Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences and Recommendations 103
Table 12: Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations 108
Table 13: Summary of Organizational Culture Influences and Recommendations 113
Table 14: Results and Leading Indicators for Desired Outcomes 119
Table 15: Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for New Evaluations 121
Table 16: Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors 123
Table 17: Evaluation Method and Components of the Learning Program 127
Table 18: Components to Measure Reactions to the Program 128
Table 19: Possible Key Performance Indicators for Internal Reporting and Accountability 130
Table 20: Assumed KMO Influences 147
Table 21: Focus Group Conceptual Knowledge Understanding 152
Table 22: Level 2 Workshop Likert Scale 154
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 8
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: KMO conceptual framework study of female officer candidates. 62
Figure 2: Combat force decision. 131
Figure 3: Leading indicator alignment. 131
Figure 4: Training outcomes matrix. 132
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 9
ABSTRACT
This study combined the Clark and Estes’ (2008) knowledge, motivation, and organization
(KMO) gap analysis framework, related body of knowledge literature, and the Kirkpatrick and
Kirkpatrick’s (2016) four levels of evaluation to understand why female officer candidates
choose certain career management fields (CMF). The purpose of this study was to determine
which KMO influences shape female officer candidate decisions to not pursue combat force
assignments. This study collected qualitative data from interviews, a focus group, and artifacts
from a deliberate population in order to categorize the information into themes, claims, and
assertions that answered three research questions. The study’s findings indicate that female
officer candidates need to increase their conceptual and procedural knowledge understanding in
order to progress through key development assignments that lead to increased responsibility. The
study contends that female candidates do not lack motivation but are discouraged from leading in
male-dominated roles. The study also found that the State Military Academy (SMA) needs
contemporary processes to resolve systematic gender issues. The implications for not addressing
the problem include the status quo, continued key leader shortages, and reduced organizational
readiness. In conclusion, this study is designed to benefit officers by helping them understand
how organizational barriers discourage talented female officers from filling key leadership
assignments because of covert biases and gender stereotypes. The U.S. Army finds itself at a
crossroad that impacts its future. This study adds to the body of knowledge which can enhance
the future of the U.S. military.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 10
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) sought advice on ways to integrate women
into previously closed combat forces (SECDEF, 2015). Two factors contributed to the initiative:
an ill-defined description of what the frontline meant and poor retention of talented officers
(Haring, 2013). As a result of opening combat forces to women in 2016, the Large State Militia
(LSM, a pseudonym) was legally and fiscally obligated to replicate what the Army did. This
study explored innovative alternatives that may reduce gender inequities, improve unit readiness,
and enhance opportunities for female leaders in the LSM.
Leadership is a privilege bestowed on individuals who reflect the beliefs, values, and
norms of an organization (Lim, Haddad, & Daugherty, 2013; Northouse, 2016). At the LSM,
leaders are assigned to positions of authority based on expertise, knowledge, and potential for
increased responsibility. Leaders are stewards of the profession, accountable to the institution
and heralded for their moral conduct. They inspire culture through shared consciousness, vision
and trust (King, 2017; Northouse, 2016). In addition, leaders deliver urgent organizational
change through concrete, clear, and current goals (Clark & Estes, 2008). Moreover, leaders
leverage change factors to improve the organization. Those change factors include shared
consciousness, empowerment, strategic communication, and engaged leadership.
Organizational Context and Mission
The SMA is located in California and serves as the LSM commissioning program for
entry-level military officers. The SMA was established in 1950 to meet the officer shortage
needs for the Korean War. The mission of the SMA is to train and assess candidates through an
18-month training program to commission federally recognized officers (Iskra, 2007; SMA,
2018). At the macro level, the program is divided into three time- sequenced phases with a three
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 11
cadre to 30 candidate-ratio, during a four-day per month timeframe. Candidates unable to meet
standards may start over or request to be removed from the program.
At the micro-level, the three phases are broken down into three months, 12 months and a
final e month period. Phase I is three months long and assesses candidate physical ability and
mental schema for continuation in the program (Iskra, 2007; SMA, 2018). Phase II is 12 months
long and replicates an infantry rifle company structure in order to assess leadership capacity,
conceptual knowledge, and motivational resiliency during practical exercises (SMA, 2018).
Phase III is three months long and ends with a tactical field exercise that assess core leadership
traits and values. Officer candidates who pass all three phases are provided an opportunity to
select their preferred career path before graduating in August. Thereafter, the new officers are
processed into a CMF that leads combat forces, combat support (CS) and combat service support
(CSS) organizations (Iskra, 2007; SMA, 2018). To clarify, combat forces perform the critical
function of fighting the nation’s wars. In comparison, CS and CSS sustain combat forces with
commodities from decentralized rear echelon areas, often hundreds of miles away. The intent of
this study was to reduce the gender inequity gap for future female officers. Studies claim that
80% of all general officers are males with combat force experience and a population who does
not reflect the institutional demographics (Dougherty, 2014; Haring, 2013).
Organizational Performance Status/Need
To meet the SECDEF’s vision, leaders sought a female integration strategy without
considering a systematic KMO analysis (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). A systematic
performance gap analysis focused on KMO influences could have produced viable options for
achieving desired outcomes (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). This innovative and purposive
study integrated a KMO conceptual framework, a methodological approach, and the KMO
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 12
influences that may reduce the gender inequity gap in the LSM. Clark and Estes (2008) defined
KMOs as the three influences that align with one another to drive and achieve organizational
change. In support, Rueda (2011) asserted that KMO influences can resolve most organization
performance problems by processing them through a problem-solving method like those found in
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) four levels of evaluation or Kotter’s (1995) eight factors for
leading change. It is important to understand that environmental factors are constantly in flux
and tend to influence the behaviors, values, and norms of a culture (Clark & Estes, 2008; Kezar,
2001). In addition, Lewis (2011) posited that cultures cannot benefit from change unless the
majority of stakeholders possess buy-in and cooperate in a coordinated effort.
Related Literature
The related literature in this study applies to the SECDEF’s vision to enhance gender
equity in previously closed occupations (Cohen, 2013; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2015). Clark
and Estes (2008) and Tellis (2013) contend that problems tend to emerge if organizational goals,
policies or procedures conflict with the internal culture. As such, the related literature proposes
three factors which influence gender inequity. These factors include; (a) senior leaders failing to
establish a sense of urgency, (b) failing to create an empowered coalition to hold resisters
accountable, and (c) failing to implement a plan that changed behaviors (Kotter, 1995; Tuckman,
2006). These critical factors demonstrate a failure to consider the social-political needs of the
Army. Tellis (2013) posited that, when policies are not supported by effective processes, the
cause is typically the internal culture itself. Senior leaders who assessed the mandate as a threat
to institutional norms and silently undermined the initiative with their personal views (Lewis,
2011; Szayna et al., 2016). This is codified by Lewis (2011) and Rueda (2011), who suggested
that any new effort must include trust, reliability and credibility for norms and values.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 13
Recent literature highlights numerous benefits for integrating women into combat forces.
Haring (2013) contended that team performance can be optimized through the integration of
“social sensitivity” traits that are commonly found in women (p. 28). Likewise, King (2013)
shared that what matters in combat is competence and performance. Finally, empirical evidence
demonstrates this premise to be true because of the successful use of cultural support teams
(CSTs) and female engagement teams (FETs) during the conflicts throughout Afghanistan and
Iraq (Erwin, 2012; Fraley, 2011; Tracy, 2016; U.S. Army, 2014b). Thus, the related literature
proposed establishing protocols that help to successfully integrate women into combat forces
(Escobar, 2013; Randazzo-Matsel, Schulte, & Yopp, 2012; Szayna et al., 2016).
Importance of Organizational Innovation
Three factors support the effort to reduce the gender inequity gap. First, senior leaders do
not reflect the LSM demographics (Haring, 2013). This problem limits the military from using the
full breadth of its capabilities to decisively mitigate future threats (Dougherty, 2014; Erwin, 2012).
Second, the LSM has not successfully integrated females into combat forces, potentially due to
poor understanding of cultural norms or KMO influences (Clark & Estes, 2008). In addition,
studies indicate that only 6.73% of female officers serve as general officers, yet 91% of females
participate in CS and CSS roles (Asch, Miller, & Malchiodi, 2012; Haring, 2013). A third factor
for reducing the gender inequity gap is in selecting the best-qualified leaders who possess the skills
to advise decision-makers on how to address future cultural dilemmas (Balestrieri, 2017; Votel,
J.L., Cleveland, C.T., Connett, C.T., & Irwin, W., 2016). Thus, Gender affects daily life and can
be leveraged to influence and benefit collective networks (Erwin, 2012). The DCAF - Geneva
Centre for Security Sector Governance (2016) implied that the military stands to benefit from the
inclusion of women in combat forces. The potential outcomes for not addressing this problem
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 14
include an inability to reduce the gender inequity gap, an inability to mitigate future threats, and
missing an opportunity to shape the future with the best thinkers (DCAF - Geneva Centre for
Security Sector Governance, 2016; Escobar, 2013; Korpela, 2016). This strategic problem affects
multinational partnerships and our national security (Erwin, 2012). The military has to evolve and
set conditions that enable a more flexible and adaptive approach to national security problems
(Votel et al., 2016). Korpela (2016) noted that the problem is so important that senior officers from
the U.S. Special Operations Command are actively collaborating with the Norwegian military to
determine how they can replicate female operator results within U. S. Special Forces.
Organizational Performance Goal
By June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100%
of officer candidates on the CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader
shortages. The performance goal was established after determining critical leader shortages in
combat forces. The SMA is the best option for filling key leader vacancies while narrowing the
gender inequity gap. It is in the SMA’s best interest to achieve the SECDEF’s intent to integrate
female officers in combat forces (SECDEF, 2015). If the SMA fails to achieve the goal, the LSM
can expect continued combat force leader shortages and continued gender inequity (Dougherty,
2014;). The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, of all military general officers, only 6.73%
of them are females (Asch et al., 2012; Haring, 2013). Studies contend that, of 350,000 field-
grade officers, the promotion rates for males were disproportionately higher due to preference for
officers with combat force backgrounds (Baldwin, 1996; Dougherty, 2014).
Description of Stakeholder Groups
For this study, the first stakeholder group includes SMA female officer candidates who
serve as the deliberate sample population. Their views, experiences, and perceptions contribute
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 15
to how they see their world (Lewis, 2011; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Studies suggest that the
cause for gender inequity is a need for knowledge, cultural barriers, and poor of engagement
from senior leaders who do not understand how gender can enhance group performance (Lewis,
2011; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). As such, the first step is accepting that
senior leaders failed to prepare women for new opportunities. Additional reasons include (a)
poor performance goals, (b) failure to understand changing political conditions, and (c) a missed
opportunity to assess assumed KMO influences through the gap analysis model (Clark & Estes,
2008; Rueda, 2011). This study aimed to ensure that, by August 2019, 100% of SMA female
officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their knowledge of SMA standards to
undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat forces.
The second stakeholder group includes SMA cadre who perform essential candidate
assessments. SMA cadre actively assist candidates who require the motivation and cognitive
skills to achieve organizational goals. Much of what the SMA cadre does is what Hogan (2010)
refers to as the backstage functions to an individual’s front-stage performance. As such, part of
the cognitive learning process entails performing and playing a role (Hogan, 2010). The second
stakeholder goal entails that, by December 2019, all SMA cadre demonstrate, with 100%
accuracy, their skill in teaching and assessing officer candidates according to SMA standards.
The third stakeholder group consists of senior military leaders who possess the authority,
resources, and urgency for change (Lewis, 2011). As such, senior leaders are responsible for
organizational readiness, mentorship, and the development of officers. The goal for the third
stakeholder group entails developing integration advocacy strategies, enabling opportunities and
fostering gender equity in combat forces. These expectations can be assessed monthly and
reviewed quarterly for alignment with mandates and desired outcomes.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 16
Stakeholder Groups’ Performance Goals
Table 1
Organizational Mission, Global Goal and Stakeholder Performance Goals
Organizational Mission
The State Military Academy’s (SMA) mission is to train, assess and commission candidates to
serve as commissioned officers in the LSM.
Organizational Performance Goal
By June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100% of officer
candidates on the combat force CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader
shortages.
Stakeholder 1 Goal
Female Officer Candidates
Stakeholder 2 Goal
Cadre
Stakeholder 3 Goal
Senior Leaders
By August 2019, 100% of SMA
female officer candidates
demonstrate, with 100% accuracy,
their knowledge of SMA standards
to undergo pre-assessment training
to qualify for service in combat
forces.
By December 2019, all
SMA cadre demonstrate,
with 100% accuracy, their
skill in teaching and
assessing officer candidates
according to SMA standards.
By July 2020, senior leaders will
begin deliberate monitoring of data
inputs through classified unit status
reports.
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study
Although the collective efforts of all stakeholders contributes to this problem of practice,
female candidates were selected for the following reasons: (a) the LSM struggles to integrate
women into combat forces because leaders do not understand KMO influences, (b) senior leaders
do not reflect institutional demographics, and (c) females are underrepresented at senior levels
(Asch et al., 2012; Haring, 2013). The process for selecting the stakeholder goal was determined
by Army’s modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE; Federation of American
Scientists, 1999). As such, it is important to note that the LSM mirrors the Army’s structure in
MTOE design. The level of achievement for the study was made by analyzing SMA graduation
rates. The measures used to track progress are cumulative and reflect previous SMA trends. The
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 17
20% to 30% female candidate rate must be reached in order to fill key leader shortages, improve
readiness, and empower females to compete for senior leadership assignments.
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this innovative study was to conduct a needs analysis of KMO resources
necessary to reach 100% understanding with female officer candidates to pursue combat force
assignments. The study integrates the Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis model with KMO
influences in order to develop options that may reduce the gender inequity dilemma in the LSM.
The deliberate stakeholder group of female officer candidates was selected because of their
gender experiences. For practical reasons, three research questions drove the study:
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
General Concept and Methodological Framework
This study uses the Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis methodology, related literature,
and the Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) four levels of evaluation to determine why female
officer candidates choose not to pursue combat force assignments. This study combines data,
related literature and assumed KMO influences into an analytical framework to understand the
reasons for the gender inequity gap (Clark & Estes, 2008; Creswell, 2014; Weiss, 1994). The
methodological process establishes protocols to determine if female candidates can (a) describe
how knowledge and motivation relate to key developmental assignments, (b) illustrate how key
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 18
assignments lead to promotions, and (c) answer open-ended questions that shed light on factors
that may exacerbate the problem (Creswell, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Weiss, 1994).
Definitions
The following definitions apply to relevant terms used throughout the dissertation.
Career management field (CMF): Officer development designation for entry into
special programs and long-range planning of career goals (U.S. Army, 2014a).
Combat readiness: Synonymous with collective readiness (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
Combat service support (CSS): The essential capabilities, functions, and activities to
sustain operating forces at all levels of war (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
Combat forces: An Army unit capable of defeating threats (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
Combat support (CS): Direct assistance to combat units (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).
Critical behaviors: the few and specific actions that, if performed correctly, will have
the largest effect on desired results (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
General officer: The senior commissioned rank in the U.S. military (U.S. Army, 2012b).
Knowledge influence: The automated, unconscious facts, concepts, processes and
principles from educational experiences (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Knowledge, motivation, and organization (KMO): The three internal systems aligned
to influence environmental factors for organizational change (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Large state militia (LSM): A fictional organization with more than 15,000 soldiers.
Leading indicators: Individual, team and organizational outcomes contributing to the
success of desired results (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
Modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE): An authorization document
prescribing personnel and equipment of a unit (Federation of American Scientists, 1999).
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 19
Motivational influence: The spark and effort expended on tasks (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Officer candidate: An individual with a bachelor’s degree and minimum military
experience who seeks to serve as a U. S. military officer (SMA, 2018).
Operational level: A level where major operations are planned, executed, and sustained
to accomplish strategic goals (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
Required drivers: Support processes and systems that reinforce, encourage and reward
critical behaviors while monitoring through accountability (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
State military academy (officer candidate school): An Army commissioning program
that augments other federal commissioning programs (SMA, 2018).
Strategic level: A level where a nation determines national security goals and deploys
the resources to achieve them (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
Tactical level: A level where activities are planned and executed by tactical units to
accomplish military objectives (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
Organization of the Study
This study contains five chapters. Chapter One describes the problem of practice, goals,
stakeholders, the purpose of the research questions, methodological framework, and definitions.
Chapter Two provides context from related literature reviews. The literature review provides an
understanding of the body of knowledge, potential for future research, and an overview of the
theories that align to the KMO conceptual framework. Chapter Three describes the methodology
for analyzing the data collected, research protocols, processes, and data instrumentation. Chapter
Four includes coding data, themes, claims, assertions and results. Chapter Five provides several
KMO gap recommendations, a stakeholder implementation plan, an evaluation process, overall
research limitations, and conclusions.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 20
CHAPTER: TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter Two provides a review of the literature on the gender inequity phenomenon in
the LSM. Chapter Two synthesizes the related literature to specifically answer three research
question and identify the core KMO influencers affecting gender inequity. In doing so, this study
sought to understand how KMO influences contribute to reducing gender inequity in the LSM.
this purposive study sought to answer three research questions:
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
Historically, the military strives to promote diversity within its culture. However,
evidence shows that male officers with combat force expertise typically occupy the top tiers in
leadership (Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014). Studies in military leadership contend that in a random
population of 318,415 officers, 80.3% were males (Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014; Poblete, 2017;
U.S. DOD, 2016). When comparing female ascension rates, evidence shows a decline as women
ascend through the ranks: 18% are Majors, 14% are Lieutenant Colonels, 13% are Colonels, and
less than 8% are generals (Poblete, 2017; U.S. DOD, 2016). This literature applies to the vision
of integrating women into combat forces and applying innovative perspectives that focuses on
(a) innovatively looking at gender inequity, (b) setting the foundation for women in combat
forces, and (c) improving the collective intelligence and democratic reasoning of the military.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 21
Innovatively Looking at Gender Inequity
The state of social dynamics, culture, and political pressures typically spark the fire for
change in norms, values, and beliefs (Cohen, 2013). In 2015, the chief of staff (CoS) of the Army
detailed his intent before the U. S. Senate to reducing gender inequity by innovatively pursuing
drivers that achieved results (Spivack, 2016; Tellis, 2013). However, voices of dissent persisted.
Lewis (2011) argued that political pressure can present change effort challenges if stakeholders
are set in their ways. Studies indicate that initiatives fail because of three reasons: (a) women
lack knowledge, (b) the process faced cultural opposition, and (c) senior leaders failed to plan for
an innovative and comprehensive gap analysis plan that fosters shared consciousness and cultural
buy-in (Lewis, 2011; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Rueda, 2011; Szayna et al., 2016; Tellis,
2013). Studies also suggest that some male leaders covertly undermine and devalue the potential
for women to succeed in male-dominated professions (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007;
Lewis, 2011; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). Those opposed to change
asked, “is the juice worth the squeeze” (Szayna et al., 2016, p. 149). Tellis (2013) noted that the
inability to change is typically due to internal culture. As such, the dynamics in military culture
have to be assessed before pursuing a policy change (Erwin, 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). Senior
leaders are the catalysts for developing innovative strategies that achieve results while changing
negative behavior (Haring, 2013; Lewis, 2011).
The negative behavior associated with gender inequity lead to long-term side effects. As
Erwin (2012) argued, such behavior damages readiness by forcing talented women to take their
skills to other professions. The military loses talented women because it fails to act on the gender
inequity gap and is unable to meet compatible incentives provided in other professions. Based on
trends, studies imply that women fall further behind the power-curve when compared to their
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 22
male peers (Poblete, 2017; U.S. DOD, 2016). As such, the only viable option for females is to
move. The military needs to reassess the processes that impact organizational culture and how
the status quo may impact the future (Egnell, 2013). Based on this premise, women require more
time and practice to obtain knowledge, experience, and confidence to succeed in male-dominated
leadership roles (Escobar, 2013; Pajares, 2006; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al.,
2016). The problem of practice is a compelling reason for leaders to challenge the status quo by
engaging resisters and applying transformational strategies that reduce inequities gap. Particular
emphasis is required on the SMA knowledge and training curriculum. The current SMA process
requires additional time to improve confidence and knowledge (Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012).
Korpela (2016) added merit to this claim and sheds light on Norway’s Jegertroppen: the
all-female special forces unit. Jegertroppen females routinely outperformed officer assessment
programs, increased unit cohesion, and bridged the cultural gap in combat units where women
play a critical role. As with the Jegertroppen, the future cannot be seen through risk-averse eyes,
a transformational strategy relies on tangible human qualities and truths that bring to bear desired
goals (Egnell, 2013; Korpela, 2016). The decisive point rests on the shoulders of motivated
women who are willing to undergo the challenges for increased responsibility (Randazzo-Matsel
et al., 2012). The military retains a storied past in transforming for the betterment of the whole.
Transformational Change
Transformational change requires senior leader commitment, engagement, energy, and
enthusiasm to inspire people to act in unfamiliar and unwelcome ways (Denning, 2011). It forces
leaders to step out of their comfort zones to set conditions for long-term organization outcomes
(Yough & Anderman, 2006). As Denning (2011) and McChrystal (2011) pointed out, one learns
more from failures, calamities, and mistakes than from success. As such, senior leaders may
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 23
narrow the gender inequity gap while enhancing leadership efficacy (Northouse, 2016; Yough &
Anderman, 2006). As such, transformational change retains a high likelihood to help narrow the
gap. Senior leaders have to tap into the aspirations of the culture to achieve goals.
Transformational Leadership
Transformational leadership is a process where leaders cooperate to bring about change
through motivational group variables (Northouse, 2016). In the case of gender inequity, Williams
(2017) suggested that transformational leadership consistently fosters success for women in key
leadership positions. In contrast, Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) and Szayna et al. (2016)
contended that leaders in male-dominated professions fail to understand how women can lead.
Personal prejudices preclude them from envisioning gender integration and females leading
combat troops into harms’ way. Thus, transformational leadership requires leaders to understand
how conflict efficacy enhances organizational outcomes through gender equity (Alper, Tjosvold,
& Law, 2000, Bandura, 1997). Northouse (2016) argued that women can secure leadership roles
in male-dominated professions by networking and receiving senior leader mentorship. However,
this process requires leaders to assume risk with unknown officers. To build on the unknown,
Northouse (2016) offers the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory to bridge the gap.
Leader-Member Exchange Theory
LMX theory is consistent with the LSM culture because of leader-member norms and
beliefs (Dougherty, 2014; Fix & Sias, 2006). As such, LMX theory fosters personal relationships
that develop opportunities through value convergence, insider-making, non- routine problem
solving, and coaching (Fix & Sias, 2006; Northouse, 2016). Value convergence is the sharing of
leader-member values and perceptions to develop trust and transparent loyalty. Insider-making is
the expectation of making common grounds between leaders and members. Non-routine problem
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 24
solving includes brainstorming and deliberately sharing complex problems that produce viable
solutions between leaders and members. Finally, coaching is about providing career advice to
trusted members. These interactions take time to establish, build credibility, rapport, and shared
understanding in order to avoid mistrust (Northouse, 2016). As such, LMX theory is more about
getting the right people on the team in order improve the performance of the organization. LMX
benefits include lower turnover rates, enhanced leader support, better performance evaluations,
faster promotions, and preferred assignments. LMX builds trust, credibility, and strong bonds
between key leaders and members.
LMX also has the potential to discredit trust. The process is known as low LMX. Low
LMX can ruin careers if members fail to meet leader expectations. As such, some members can
expect power games, performance monitoring, face-threatening, and power games (Fix & Sias,
2006). Power games include interactions that elicit control and compliance. Performance
monitoring occurs when leaders gather information about a member’s performance in order to
micromanage tasks. Finally, face-threatening is a leader’s way of criticizing a member’s results.
Although rare, leaders may reduce LMX dyadic relationships when they notice members lacking
effort. In those rare instances, leaders may covertly place barriers to undermine member motives,
expose self-interests or assess loyalty (Denning, 2011; Fix & Sias, 2006). Furthermore, the
culture itself may undermine efforts by strongly clinging to habitual certainties that explain their
world (Lewis, 2011). As such, LMX fosters a dyadic relationship between leaders and members
wherein they commit efforts to improve the organization (Fix & Sias, 2006; Northouse, 2016).
LMX philosophy. LMX is the only theory that creates a dyadic relationship between
leaders and members (Dougherty, 2014; Fix & Sias, 2006; Northouse, 2016). The dyadic effect
is a natural process through which leaders expect members to increase their efforts in exchange
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 25
for career advice. In addition, the dyadic relationship establishes the member’s assumption for
the leader to provide mentorship, coaching, and development to enhance career opportunities
(Dougherty, 2014; Fix & Sias, 2006; Northouse, 2016). Philosophical LMX factors include trust,
high standards, prudent risk, growing from failures, and a relentless work ethic (Bolman & Deal,
1994). The common understanding with the LMX philosophy is that leadership is complicated, it
is not easy, sometimes you get knocked down and it helps to have leaders who vouch for failures
(McChrystal, 2011). Based on LMX philosophy, female officers face a disadvantage because
women are not commonly found in combat forces. Thus, it is vital for senior leaders to display
their commitment to motivated women who endeavor to compete for combat force assignments.
The Contemporary Operating Environment
Whether it is evolution or an environmental necessity to change, the military adapts well
to the contemporary operating environment. The advancement of technology, the geopolitical
climate, and defense spending all contribute to the evolutionary process (Clark, 2016). The
contemporary operating environment exposes threats and opportunities that the military needs to
explore in order to defend national interests. Competing external variables like terrorism, peace
support operations, nation-building, and hybrid threats cause the military to change and evolve
(Clark, 2016; Votel et al., 2016). The 9/11 attacks caused a paradigm shift with how the military
conducts combat operations, from kinetic to asymmetric, and everything in between (Fraley,
2011; McChrystal, 2011). In the span of 18 years, servicewomen have been indispensable in the
way the military conducts combat operations (Haring, 2013; King, 2013). Of vital importance is
how women performed when attached, rather than assigned, to combat and special operation
forces (SOF). Being attached meant that commanders could circumvent legal parameters and
leverage female capabilities in unique ways (Fraley, 2011). Some of the non-traditional roles that
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 26
women filled were in CSTs and FETs (Erwin, 2012; Fraley, 2011; Tracy, 2016; U.S. Army,
2014b). Fraley (2011) asserted that the female persuasion of rural tribal matriarchs led to the
degradation of insurgency attacks in previously contested areas. As such, CSTs and FETs
targeted social and economic programs, built rapport, trust and fostered consciousness among the
female populations (Fraley, 2011; Tracy, 2016). Based on these roles and outcomes, military
women received praise, valor awards and even sacrificed themselves to disprove the myth that
women do not belong in combat forces (King, (2013). Although their efforts had a significant
impact on cultures and combat operations, most of their follow-on opportunities became limited.
An internal organizational variable which continues to negatively affect women in the
military is the promotion system. To compete against male officers at promotion boards, females
require the same opportunities as males (Fraley, 2011). For example, a male officer, because of
his gender, has opportunities for more diverse and challenging assignments than a female officer
(Fraley, 2011). As such, promotion boards typically look for progressive indicators and unique
experiences for selection and ascension to higher rank. More often than not, promotion boards
acknowledge that a lack of opportunity does not equate to a need in ability. This factor indicates
a fundamental flaw in the current promotion process that requires reconciliation by senior leaders
because it affects future senior leadership of the military (Fraley, 2011).
Generational implications. The current CoS of the Army commissioned as an officer in
the early 1980s, during the Cold War (Clark, 2016). His perceptions, values, beliefs, and norms
of over more than 35 years of service have shaped how he sees the world. He has seen the speed
of technological advancements, the complexity of military operations, and the reality of hybrid
threats (McChrystal, 2011; Snider, 2015). In comparison, the CoS that leads the Army in the
2030s is likely to undergo the same socialization but have profoundly different views (Clark,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 27
2016). The CoS of the 2030s is currently a Major who has deployed numerous times to the
Middle-East and participated in exercises across Europe and Asia (Snider, 2015). As such, there
is nothing to predict what the LSM of the 2030s will look like but integrating women into
combat forces provides a high probability for improving the LSM and Army.
Setting the Foundation for Women in Combat Forces
To increase gender equity, senior leaders have to commit themselves as organizational
change agents, strive for innovative strategies, and resolve root causes in institutional processes
(DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016; Thornberry, 2013). Perkins
(2018) argued that leaders in positions for reform, are the ones least interested in change and
know less of how to do so. As such, Egnell (2013) shared the military has been short-sighted in
innovating gender perspectives that reflects the nature of modern warfare. The last 50 years have
produced unequaled technological advancements (Egnell, 2013). However, progress has been
slow in gender equity. Korpela (2016) and Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) argued that gender
equity can be improved if organizational leaders established a systematic orientation process for
all stakeholders, a physical preparation program for female candidates, and a before-during-after
assessment. Randazzo-Matsel et al.’s (2012) study with police special weapons and tactics
(SWAT), fire-fighting, and forest-fire smoke-jumpers showed that female candidates could
achieve a 96% match-rate to that of their male peers. The results are similar to Korpela’s (2016)
Jegertroppen study, where military women improved in collective intelligence, team cohesion,
and physical performance as well as reduced gender bias and sexual tension. Randazzo-Matsel et
al. (2012) also found that the women who failed did so because they were physically unprepared,
faced negative attitudes or were exposed to psychological barriers. These results raise questions
for senior leader oversight. Leaders have to do more, they have to be more receptive and open to
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 28
innovative ideas, commit themselves to breaking down barriers, and providing opportunities for
women to succeed (Erwin, 2012; Haring, 2013; Lim et al., 2013; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012).
Global Trends with Gender Equity in the Military
The geopolitical landscape of conflict and threats to national security have changed the
way we see warfare. Historically and culturally, men have performed the fighting in wars, but a
study funded by the DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (2016) implies that
women play a more vital role in shaping the outcomes of family, tribe, culture, and generations
that participate in wars. Fraley (2011) and Tracy (2016) confirmed this hypothesis with the roles
that CSTs and FETs played in Iraq and Afghanistan. The interactions by CSTs and FETs with
women and children were a pivotal point for collecting intelligence on high valued terrorists, a
capability that special operations personnel could not bridge (Tracy, 2016). Furthermore, Votel
et al. (2016) argued that we need different approaches for combating future adversaries within
the conflict continuum. These views make integrating women into combat forces all the more
desirable. In October 2000, the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1325
(UNSCR 1235) which integrated women into military operations (DCAF - Geneva Centre for
Security Sector Governance, 2016). As a result, the integration into tactical, operational, and
strategic levels enhanced shared understanding for long-term goals. The passing of UNSCR 1325
enabled leaders to understand the gravity of the situation and the vital role women play in multi-
cultural locales (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016; King, 2017).
The purpose of integrating women into tactical levels was not borne out of physical
necessity but out of cognitive reasoning to help shape the physical and informational domains
(DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016). As such, the decision was based
on key leader shortages and gender perspectives in performance among men and women.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 29
Contrary to commonly held beliefs, gender and sex are different. Gender is a cultural construct
that can be developed and modified whereas sex is a biological phenomenon that serves a
reproductive purpose (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016). Studies
suggest that integrating gender perspective education into the culture promotes understanding
and justice for narrowing the gender inequity gap (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector
Governance, 2016; Landemore, 2012). However, results cannot be achieved without the
committed support from leaders (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016;
Denning, 2011; Haring, 2013; Stainback & Kwon, 2012). Adopting policies like the UNSCR
1325 stand to benefit democratic reasoning, collective intelligence, and understanding in the
military hierarchy (Haring, 2013; Landemore, 2012).
Tactical level. At the tactical level, gender perspectives are significantly more important
because of daily interactions with the general public in foreign countries. A simple greeting from
a female Soldier to a young boy, girl, or woman can have a profound effect on the outcome of a
mission. The interaction could change their world and generations that follow. McRaven (2014)
claimed that women performed exceptionally well and saved the lives of many team members in
combat and SOF organizations. Ultimately, what is at stake is the important role that females
perform at the tactical level. The tactical level is the optimal venue for improving mastery
functions, procedures, build leadership capacity, and enhancing knowledge. As such, building
experience and knowledge at the tactical level contributes to decision making credibility at the
operational and strategic levels (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
Operational level. The operational level is where political agendas are transformed into
operational plans through interpersonal relationships, situational awareness of the environment,
and establishing shared consciousness with senior leaders and mentors (DCAF - Geneva Centre
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 30
for Security Sector Governance, 2016; King, 2017). The operational level is where strong leaders
display critical thinking. Likewise, it is at the operational level where the largest impact on
officer careers takes place. Studies report that, on average, 20% of women serve at the tactical
level, 14% at the operational level and 6% at the strategic level (Baldwin, 1996; Escobar, 2013).
Thus, it is at the operational level where the greatest attrition takes place. This systematic trend is
affected by poor senior leader engagement and commitment to reform (Perkins, 2018). As such,
most females opt-out of the military to pursue options in other sectors (Baldwin, 1996; DCAF -
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016). Escobar (2013) argued that, if the Army
was serious about gender equity, there would be 30% more female generals at the strategic level.
Strategic level. At the strategic level, leadership influences policy change and causes
resistance to established cultural norms (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance,
2016). Northouse (2016) shared that leaders need to follow-up on strategic processes that affect
the future of the organization. Female leaders who reach the strategic level do so because of
previous success in demanding roles, robust experience, and advanced education (Dougherty,
2014). The strategic level is where female leaders can best serve as change agents and staunch
advocates to fairness by breaking down barriers, disrupting gender inequities, and holding
resisters accountable (Stainback & Kwon, 2012; Thornberry, 2013). To change the culture,
leaders have to challenge the status quo by advocating for gender-neutral opportunities during
organizational settings. In addition, senior leaders have the authority to implement policies that
corrects cultural behavior (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
Having the Right Skills and Developmental Experiences
Environmental factors and leadership possess the potential to influence cultural behavior
policies. For example, over 400,000 women were permitted to serve on active duty during World
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 31
War II. In another example, more women volunteered for military service with the passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment of 1972 (Iskra, 2007). Had it not been for such policy changes, there
would be fewer women serving or ascending through the ranks. While it is true that women have
made strides, it does not mean that gender barriers were eradicated (Northouse, 2016; Randazzo-
Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). To compensate for covert barriers, women resort to
subtle methods that transcend stereotypes. Struggles include altering appearance and behavior,
reducing assertiveness by “fitting in” and participating in male topics like sports and politics
(Iskra, 2007). These decisions are the status quo in male-dominated professions (Evans, 2014).
Military career structure. The military continues to evolve while women remain
anomalies at the strategic levels of leadership. The Army demographics indicate that 14% are
officers and 86% are enlisted. A detailed analysis of the trends shows that only 6% of the officers
are female (Dougherty, 2014). The evidence indicates that the current career path has unequal
footing, is inadequate, and shows a preference for combat force experience. Likewise, Escobar
(2013) argued that, although some female officers do obtain the rank of general, 80% of general
officers do so because of their combat force backgrounds. The trends suggest that the 20% who
do not possess combat force backgrounds tend to be male officers with CS or CSS experience. In
addition, studies demonstrate that the warfighters obtain preferential treatment, professional
development, and privileges that female officers struggle to achieve (Haring, 2013; Iskra, 2007).
Escobar (2013) implied that the Army is content in promoting less qualified men over women
because of outdated policies. In support, Dougherty (2014) shared that, although the military has
received praise for allowing women to serve as officers, trends show women are more likely to
occupy top-tier leadership roles in non-military sectors. These comparisons suggest conflicting
views for female leaders. As such, most females fulfill their service obligation and take their
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 32
talents to other professions (Erwin, 2012; Northouse, 2016). For those who decide to stay past
their service obligation, involuntary attrition reduces their rates at the tactical level by 30%, 53%
for those at 20 years of service, and by 82% at the operational and strategic levels (Iskra, 2007).
Iskra (2007) and Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) argued that time cannot be squandered in
establishing the groundwork that leads to coveted assignments. The essential factor begins with
selecting the CMF path that affords the best opportunities for professional military education and
key development assignments. In addition, studies report that effort, persistence, and collective
efficacy help overcome adversities in the future (Bandura, 2000; Iskra, 2007; Northouse, 2016;
Randazzo- Matsel et al., 2012). One opportunity often overlooked by officers includes sponsors
who can champion their cause (Northouse, 2016). Most military officers have exceptional
performance records. However, knowing an influential mentor may serve as the deciding factor
for female officers’ career advancement (Dougherty, 2014; Iskra, 2007).
Lessons learned from women in executive positions. Mastering political networks and
establishing credible mentors are two of the most important factors for success. As such, these
associations are much more readily available in private industry than in the military (Dougherty,
2014; Iskra, 2007; Northouse, 2016). Williams (2017) argued that women have less productive
careers because their professional development is less important to men. Studies of successful
women provide a correlation between mentorship and individuals who devote their time, energy,
and collective efficacy into mastering functions that achieve results (Bandura, 1997; Iskra, 2007;
Yough & Anderman, 2006). Experts agree that what matters is perception, self-efficacy, task
mastery, and emotional intelligence (Fix & Sias, 2006; Northouse, 2016; Poblete, 2017).
Perceptions. Studies in military performance and promotions among officers infer that
their success is determined by performance evaluations (Dougherty, 2014; Iskra, 2007; Poblete,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 33
2017). However, some talented officers struggle for coveted assignments because the focus is on
promoting officers with a combat force background instead of performance (Haring, 2013).
Military culture celebrates warfighting, and most leaders selected for key roles are found within
combat forces (Dougherty, 2014; Haring, 2013). Rising through the ranks is a daunting task for
non-combat force officers. Iskra (2007) found that the military requires a four-to-one ratio
between combat force and support officers, the practice becomes an advantage for combat force
officers who seldom have to compete for coveted roles against CS or CSS officers. As such, the
cultural norm also exposes a bias against females. Studies indicate that female officers struggle
with senior-level assignments because they unwillingly choose CS and CSS CMF paths that limit
their potential (Dougherty, 2014; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016).
Women and the Leadership Labyrinth
Northouse (2016) defined the leadership labyrinth as a cultural norm that covertly limits
women from progressing to positions of authority. The leadership labyrinth is very similar to the
glass ceiling concept, a social norm that prevents women from progressing to executive-level
positions (Evans, 2014). Both the leadership labyrinth and glass ceiling are used synonymously
in this study. Research shows female leaders are underrepresented in leadership assignments
because of the career labyrinth phenomenon (Evans, 2014; Northouse, 2016). Studies noted that
there is no evidence to prove that women lack the education or motivation to achieve coveted
assignments (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Dougherty, 2014; Northouse, 2016). When comparing
education and gender, studies claim that women are awarded 55% of all bachelor’s degrees and
over 56% of all advanced degrees (Hindlian et al., 2018; Northouse, 2016). Based on the results,
there is no reason for a lack of female talent at senior leadership levels. In addition, studies also
remind us that, regardless of education, women face far more covert bias, cultural barriers and
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 34
stereotypes than men (Doll, 2007; Evans, 2014; Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014; Northouse, 2016).
Furthermore, this is a norm within Fortune 500 companies where only 4% of women occupy the
chief executive officer positions (Northouse, 2016). This section described some of the common
barriers that women have to contend with in male-dominated professions. It is critical for women
to plan ahead and side-step the pitfalls as they progress through the ranks (Northouse, 2016).
Leadership differences between men and women. The leadership labyrinth retains a
number of interpersonal limitations against women. One of the myths is that women do not
possess the work experience, training or education for senior-level positions (Northouse, 2016;
Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012). Covert biases and gender discrimination continue to discourage
female motivation and their willingness to pursue senior-level assignments (Randazzo-Matsel et
al., 2012; Serrato, 2013; Szayna et al., 2016). Northouse (2016) argued that women face double-
standards; they are expected to portray themselves as confident, femininely approachable, and
confident. In contrast, male leaders are not subjected to the same sexist views (Serrato, 2013).
Studies contend that females are no less effective or committed to leadership roles than males
(Doll, 2007; Haring, 2013; Northouse, 2016). Doll (2007) implies that women far exceed men in
participatory, transformational, and democratic leadership styles that add cultural value. These
styles reflect the social norms that global organizations strive to emulate. Understanding gender
differences and the covert biases of the leadership labyrinth is the first step in addressing the
injustice and unfairness towards women and human capital (Northouse, 2016; Serrato, 2013).
Human capital investment. Studies in human capital investment imply that women are
just as capable as men of displaying competence, performance, and proficiency in leading teams
(Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; King, 2013; Northouse, 2016; Spivack, 2016). However, contrasting
voices argued that women are predisposed to working less because they prefer to start families or
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 35
take on domestic roles (Northouse, 2016). Studies do not support the argument that women want
to work less or start families; rather, the data indicated that women selectively compete because
they are less likely to negotiate for coveted assignments or self-promotion (Dougherty, 2014;
Evans, 2014; King, 2013; Northouse, 2016; Williams, 2017). Human capital requires a shared
purpose, diversity, education, and leaders who can affect change (Northouse, 2016).
Improving the Collective Intelligence and Democratic Reasoning in the Military
After Vietnam, the all-volunteer force contributed a significant amount of diversity to the
military. However, the military has been slow in developing strategies to bridge the systemic
gender inequity gap (King, 2013). According to Eckel and Grossman (2013) and King (2017),
diversity retains many dimensions that can be used to improve shared consciousness and the
collective efforts of organizations. Improving gender inequity requires women to take on risks,
who seek experience, and can push the status quo for change (Bolman & Deal, 1994). Cohen
(2013) noted that women pursue male-dominated professions for the same reasons as males:
compensation, authority, and status to influence organization goals.
Haring (2013), Landemore (2012), and Prieto (2009) argued that collective intelligence
and democratic reasoning improves when women and diverging perspectives are used to solve
complex problems. Likewise, Stainback and Kwon (2012) posited that senior leaders can serve
as catalysts and change agents against gender inequity, prejudice, and covert bias. It is in the best
interest of the LSM to reform the equity of the organization in order to reflect the demographics
of the institutions, much like what the Norwegians did with their Jegertroppen (Korpela, 2016;
Lim et al., 2013; Prieto, 2009; SECDEF, 2015). Lim et al. (2013) and Nkomo and Al Ariss
(2014) explained that senior leaders possess the obligation to disrupt the status quo, develop
innovative options and clear paths that enhance gender equity through coaching and mentorship.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 36
Collective Wisdom and the Argument for Diversity
The idiom that two heads are better than one retains credibility in the military, most
notably during the rapid decision making and uncertainty of combat operations. The democratic
reasoning and cognitive influence of the many outweigh the opinions of the few when lives are at
stake (Landemore, 2012). As such, female leader integration is expected to improve a team’s
cohesion, proficiency, competence, and performance by resolving cultural problems through the
unique acquisition and perspectives in collective intelligence and democratic reasoning (Haring,
2013; Landemore, 2012; Prieto, 2009). For clarity, collective intelligence and democratic
reasoning are phenomena that benefit the well-being of the organizations. Such collective self-
efficacy outweigh individual views and contribute to cognitive inclusion (Landemore, 2012).
Cognitive inclusion. Based on environmental factors, cognitive inclusion includes
fostering the integration of diversity. Cognitive inclusion occurs as soon as more than one person
views, perceives and interprets the world differently, thus generating new ways to view complex
problems (Landemore, 2012). In addition, Eckel and Grossman (2013) and Haring (2013)
asserted that cognitive inclusion retains dimensions that can be used to improve the collective
efforts of teams. Furthermore, having a small fraction of cognitive inclusion in a population
retains the potential to sway false perceptions among the larger group (Landemore, 2012). The
researcher explains the phenomenon in the following example:
During a jury deliberation, a consensus leads us to believe that the majority is right.
However, all it takes is for one juror to ask the other 11 to explain why they believe a
certain point or have a specific perspective. The explanation from that one lone juror
retains the potential to question the logic and reasoning among all the other jurors, thus
causing a change in views that may lead to a mistrial.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 37
Landemore (2012) illustrated the fallacy of the majority rule among Type-A personality
males in combat forces. Combat forces are doctrinally trained to think and plan the same way
(U.S. Army, 2012a, 2012b). This is where the cognitive diversity in women stands to make the
most contribution to combat forces (Haring, 2013). As such, Landemore (2012) argued that
cultures differ globally, that no two share the same worldviews and that cognitive inclusion is the
key to collective intelligence and combat lethality. Fraley (2011) proves this point with the claim
that females are able to sway perceptions and expectations among diverging cultural matriarchs.
Thus, their collective intelligence adds relevance and value to long-term organizational goals.
Collective Intelligence
The phenomenon of collective intelligence involves the cognitive capacity of group
members to reason for viable solutions and includes inferring and perceiving second- and third-
order outcomes for achieving organizational goals (Doll, 2007; Erwin, 2012; Haring, 2013).
According to Landemore (2012), what matters most in collective intelligence is the number of
people in the group willing to support the fairness, justice, consent and shared values of decision
making. In essence, collective intelligence reduces friction and focuses on building cognitive
group capacity over any one individual’s opinion (Northouse, 2016). The 2013 mandate to
integrate women into combat forces opened the door for enhanced tactical operations where
collective intelligence is leveraged to shape and influence the perceptions of social groups and
cultural networks throughout the world (Erwin, 2012).
Teleological sequence. Kezar (2001) proposed that organizations can change by being
adaptive and purposeful by incorporating teleological theory. Historically, the military adapts to
environmental factors and has repeatedly validated teleological theory. Teleological theories are
sequenced change models that require strategic planning, organizational development and an
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 38
innovative approach to learning organizational norms (Kezar, 2001; Northouse, 2016). As such,
teleological sequence leads to cultural change when leaders see the urgency to adapt, it is long-
term, it is deliberate, can be nonlinear, and can also be dynamic (Kezar, 2001; Lewis, 2001).
Korpela (2016) describes how the teleological sequence model was leveraged through multi-year
strategy that the Norwegian military undertook to develop their Jegertroppen program, the all-
female SOFs. In 2013, both Norway and the U. S. military pursued a vision to integrate women
into combat forces. The results are strikingly different. For the U. S. Army, gender integration
demands a comprehensive approach and leader engagement for shared consciousness whereas
the Norwegian approach did not (Egnell, 2013; Kezar, 2001; King, 2017; Korpela, 2016; Szayna
et al., 2016). As a result, the 2013 mandate cannot succeed without a strategy that incorporates
diverging views, concepts through shared consciousness (Erwin, 2012; Haring, 2013).
Shared Consciousness
The importance of culture cannot be overstated when social injustices, inequities, and
biases occur in organizations. It is essential for change agents to understand how culture shapes
the norms beliefs and values of its members. Simply stated, culture is the accumulated shared
learning of a group as it integrates and solves adaptation problems (Schein, 2017). These factors
apply to the SECDEF’s decision to integrate women into combat forces (Szayna et al., 2016;
SECDEF, 2015). The SMA and LSM retain the potential to modify cultural variables through a
collectivist methodology that develops democratic reasoning and shared consciousness (King,
2017; Landermore, 2012). Within shared consciousness, the variables become significantly more
important because they empower members to align their independent beliefs and values to those
of the organizational leader (King, 2017; U.S. Army, 2012b). Thus, shared consciousness needs
knowledgeable, creativity, and empowered members who leverage transformative worldviews
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 39
for change (Creswell, 2014; King, 2017). It is crucial for senior leaders to understand member
empowerment because the speed, complexity, and interdependence of environmental factors can
overwhelm any exceptional member (King, 2017; McChrystal, 2011). Shared consciousness
empowers members to take decisive actions that align to a leader’s vision, intent, and goals.
Empowerment. Empowering leaders to take decisive action in meeting a commander’s
intent produces what is known as empowerment, an interdependence between both members
(King, 2017; McChrystal, 2011). Empowerment involves is a new level of interdependence that
requires intense and professional exchange (King, 2017). An example of the methodology is
illustrated with the use of the Powell Doctrine, where leaders have to incorporate simultaneous
and overwhelming efforts in order to achieve desired outcomes (King, 2017; Schneider, Brief, &
Guzzo, 1996). In doing so, leaders liberate and empower members to adapt and improvise their
independence while maintaining a strong interdependence to environment conditions and
organizational goals (King, 2017). Empowerment allows members to make vital decisions
through prudent risk, creativity, and innovative judgments. This mutually oriented intentionality
can also be used to bring about gender equity in the LSM. However, the desired outcome is
predicated on senior leader engagement and commitment.
Commitment. Senior leader commitment and empowerment allows members to assume
prudent risk and make informed decisions that benefit the organization (King, 2017). In addition,
commitment encourages leaders to improvise strategies that foster goal achievement (Clark &
Estes, 2008). This premise argues that senior leader commitment shapes the gender inequity
phenomenon (Doll, 2007; Dougherty, 2014; Northouse, 2016; Szayna et al., 2016). Necessity,
commitment, and empowerment are part of the collective consciousness for a group’s ability to
change (King, 2017). Necessity requires leaders to focus on prudent risk with a relentless drive
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 40
for achieving goals. Empowerment demands leaders to have confidence and trust in their people
(King, 2017; U.S. Army, 2012b). Gender equity cannot exist without senior leaders who can
decisively shape the future by integrating talented females and collective intelligence (Alper et
al., 2000; Dougherty, 2014; Haring, 2013; Williams, 2017).
What Women Contribute to Collective Intelligence in the Military
The 2013 mandate faced resentment and cultural barriers at multiple organizational levels
(Szayna et al., 2016). Over 10 years of combat experience and data illustrate that the integration
of women into combat forces enhances organizational performance and the group’s collective
intelligence (Haring, 2013; King, 2013; McRaven, 2014). Bowman (2019) indicates that the
Army continues to enhance organizational performance and currently lists over 400 infantry
females and 28 female Ranger Course graduates. These numbers are a fraction of the available
leaders able to enhance the performance and collective intelligence of numerous organizations.
Haring (2013) shared a Carnegie Mellon and Massachusetts Institute of Technology study
validating the collective intelligence of diverse groups on simple to complex tasks over non-
diverse groups when women are included (Haring, 2013). This study implied that combat forces
stand to benefit in collective intelligence and performance when females are integrated within
the ranks (Haring, 2013; King, 2013; Northouse, 2016). However, covert biases persist against
women who pursue such opportunities (King, 2013; Szayna et al., 2016).
Integration. For the past 18 years, female soldiers have fought and died alongside their
male peers in some of the most austere areas of the world (Erwin, 2012). The on-going global
war on terror and uncertainty of sovereign state actors contributes to why the LSM and Army
need to expedite the full integration of women into combat forces (Egnell, 2013; Haring, 2013).
The Army finds itself at a crossroad where leaders have to engage and demonstrate an urgent
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 41
need to mitigate future threats by using all available option and the gender-focused perspectives
that women bring to the fight (Haring, 2013). A clear indication of the way forward is illustrated
in how the military used CSTs and FETs in Afghanistan and Iraq (Fraley, 2011; Tracy, 2016;
U.S. Army, 2014b). These efforts demonstrate a high demand for talented women in combat.
In 2009, both the Sovereign Force Marine Corps (a pseudonym) and the Army leveraged
female service members for counter-insurgency operations as part of CSTs and FETs (Erwin,
2012). The idea to attach specially selected and trained women to combat and SOF equated to
unprecedented successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Erwin, 2012; McChrystal, 2011). The
exploration contributed to enhanced military cooperation and multicultural understanding
(Erwin, 2012; Tracy, 2016). The techniques enabled women to change cultural behavior, acquire
knowledge and foster shared consciousness with decision-makers and influential matriarchs on
the field (Tracy, 2016). Erwin’s (2012) FET study suggests that shared consciousness and
cohesion contribute to (a) cultural norm understanding, (b) informing the populace, (c) exploiting
the informational and cognitive domains, and (d) influencing the views of future generations.
Cohesion. Unit cohesion and the integration of women have been a topic of debate for
decades (King, 2013; Serrato, 2013; Szayna et al., 2016). In 1991, a U.S. Navy Top Gun cadre
member claimed that integrating women into combat jets would degrade unit cohesion (Haring,
2013). The claim set the tone for cultural stereotypes, where women are perceived as less
capable than men. Women and time disproved the assertion, and cohesion took on a differing
interpretation. Social cohesion is the extent to which people like each other enough to form
bonds (Haring, 2013; Serrato, 2013). In comparison, task cohesion is the shared understanding
for accomplishing an organizational goal that outweighs social or unit cohesion (Haring, 2013).
A year after the instructor’s claim, the U.S. Navy dealt with an incident that caused a paradigm
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 42
shift in cultural norms. The Tailhook scandal alleged a sexual assault of female service members
by over 100 naval aviators (Haring, 2013). Senior leaders promptly engaged the problem with a
comprehensive strategy that changed the perception and discipline of the culture. As a result, the
U.S. Navy has consistently had over 65 female pilots flying combat jest without compromise to
unit cohesion or combat readiness (Haring, 2013). In addition, studies suggest that integrating
women into male-dominated groups can prevent destructive social group norms (Ayman &
Korabik, 2010; Erwin, 2012; Haring, 2013). In addition, for the past 30 years, Israel, Norway,
and Canada shared that integrating women into combat forces enhanced organizational readiness,
improved performance and had no long-term side effects to the force (Haring, 2013; DCAF -
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
This section concludes the problem of practice literature review. Tables 2, 3 and 4 depict
the assumed KMO influences. The next section identifies stakeholder goals and gender inequity
influences that are integrated into the Clark and Estes (2008) gap analysis model.
Conceptual Framework: Interaction of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization
The purpose of the KMO conceptual framework is to show how the interaction between
influencers and other associated factors contribute to this innovative study. The Clark and Estes
(2008) framework connects stakeholder goals, the problem of practice literature and KMO
influences that contribute to achieving the organizational goal. The framework includes an
epistemological construct that integrates a sequence of methodological steps and the problem of
practice literature to address the gender inequity phenomenon (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). In
addition, the framework provides opportunities for building on the previous body of knowledge
(Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The framework highlights the cultural barriers that
contribute to the problem of practice (Ayman & Korabik, 2010; Mayer, 2011).
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 43
Stakeholder Knowledge, Motivational, and Organizational Influencers
This literature review explains how the knowledge, motivation, and organizational
dimensions influence stakeholder goals when aligned to the three research questions: (1) What
are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors that influence
a 100% understanding of combat force career paths? (2) What are the knowledge, motivation,
and organizational needs for female officer candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
(3) What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for reducing
the gender inequity gap in the LSM? The primary stakeholder goal seeks that, by August 2019,
100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their knowledge of
SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat forces. The
second stakeholder goal expects that, by December 2019, all SMA cadre demonstrate, with
100% accuracy, their skill in teaching and assessing officer candidates according to SMA
standards. The third stakeholder goal intends that, by July 2020, senior leaders will begin
deliberate monitoring of data inputs through classified unit status reports.
Knowledge and skills. Many organizations adopt strategies that go beyond their original
plans to reflect established beliefs, commitments, and stakeholder values (Clark & Estes, 2008).
The LSM is such organizations. However, as Haring (2013) asserted that when compared to nine
other professions, the military is the worst for women (Haring, 2013). Escobar (2013) also
claimed that, out of 11 professions where women are underrepresented, the worst profession is
the military. Asch et al. (2012) and Haring (2013) also posited that, of all general officers, 80%
are males with combat force experience and only 6.73% are females without such backgrounds.
These rates do not reflect the fact that over 91% of women participate in military operations
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 44
(Dougherty, 2014). Other factors contributing to the problem include a need for cultural barriers,
gender perspectives, and poor confidence (Escobar, 2013; Szayna et al., 2016).
Szayna et al. (2016) shared that cultural barriers persist even after adopting new policies.
Escobar (2013) and Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) demonstrated that women in male-dominated
professions need more time to develop constructive processes, equal schema, and expertise to
assimilate as leaders. Studies imply that 70% to 90% of what we know about learning is done
automatically, unconsciously, and is often based on how we learn in team-centered processes
(Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Clark & Estes, 2008; Mayer, 2011). Most knowledge and skills start
off as conceptual and conscious but then morphs into automated expertise that is used to solve
complex problems (Clark & Estes, 2008; Northouse, 2016). It is essential to examine how these
dimensions affect the military’s ability to adapt to complex environments. As such, two of the
SMA’s core tasks include building leadership capacity through a knowledge and skills-approach
methodology and assessing officer candidates on conceptual skills. In addition, Northouse (2016)
explained skills approach focuses on developing individual leader competencies, whereas
conceptual skills knowledge focuses on working with ideas and concepts within multi-echelons
organizational levels. Furthermore, Northouse (2016) divided skills approach into two models:
(a) three-skills-based model and (b) skills-based model for organizational leadership.
The three-skills model variables are technical skills, human skills, and conceptual skills.
The technical skills variable focuses on knowledge towards proficiency in a specific activity or
work (Northouse, 2016). For example, officer technical skills include briefing superior officers
with throughout recommendations, conducting critical analysis to complex problems and writing
organizational policy. The human skills include working with subordinates, superiors, peers, and
stakeholders to achieve mutual goals (Northouse, 2016). The practice is essential for building
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 45
leadership capacity and establishing organizational trust. In essence, members rely on each other
to perform their duties with competence and integrity while sharing organizational values (U.S.
Army, 2012b). The conceptual skill variable includes working with concepts, frameworks, and
models. Northouse (2016) claimed that conceptual skills are essential for creating an effective
vision and strategic plan at the mid and senior levels of the organization. Studies suggest that
organizational leadership can be developed through a skills-based approach that incorporates
knowledge and skills that contribute to growth (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Northouse, 2016).
The skills-based model for organizational leadership proposed that people are capable of
learning from experiences and can enhance their ability to enter into coveted roles (Northouse,
2016). In addition, technical and conceptual skills are the foundation for building and developing
leadership capacity at the lower levels of the authority hierarchy. As such, the SMA’s intent for
developing long-term leadership capacity at the lower level of the organization enables female
officer candidates to obtain the requisite knowledge to succeed as combat force leaders.
Knowledge influences. It is vital to bridge knowledge influences to drivers and leading
indicators that shape behaviors and ultimately lead to desired outcomes (Clark & Estes, 2008;
Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). This study anticipates that, by June 2020, the SMA will
implement a systematic process to educate and train officer candidates on the combat force CMF
paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader shortages. In order to achieve the
organizational performance goal, two drivers are used to bridge the knowledge dimension gap,
procedural and conceptual knowledge (Clark & Estes, 2008; Krathwohl, 2002; Rueda, 2011).
Procedural knowledge describes how to do something through a deliberate step by step
process (Rueda, 2011). Procedural knowledge can be illustrated through the steps performed by a
pilot before flying an aircraft: checking the tires, testing the navigation system, and reviewing the
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 46
flight plan. In an SMA context, procedural knowledge determines the commissioning and officer
candidate. If they are unable to perform procedural functions, they will likely be unable to lead
Soldiers through established procedures, processes, and protocols due to their inability to learn
(Mayer, 2011). In contrast, conceptual knowledge connects parts of a framework to make the
sum of the parts work through concepts and models (Krathwohl, 2002). As such, the SMA cadre
assess candidates on their ability to operationalize models and concepts into realistic plans.
Understanding combat forces. Based on procedural and conceptual knowledge, female
officer candidates need to understand how combat force assignments contribute to opportunities,
promotions, and increased responsibility. They need to understand the context and complexity of
the problem (Rueda, 2011). In support, Aguinis and Kraiger (2009) asserted the importance of
maximizing training by documenting the event with mentor and evaluator feedback. This process
builds confidence and trust with female officer candidates who hold long-term service ambitions.
The key to making this a reality is based on the premise that females are interested in combat
forces. As Serrato (2013) argued, women have to develop confidence and independence after
displaying competence and performance during training.
A female candidate’s confidence correlates to her ability to understand procedural and
conceptual knowledge and how the two drivers shape future goals. The SMA training empowers
candidates to master individual and collective goals. As such, female officer candidates need to
understand that mastering individual goals is critical for individual development and building
capacity for future opportunities. In contrast, individual performance goals lead officers to
compare and compete against each other (Yough & Anderman, 2006). Female officer candidates
need to prioritize mastery goals over performance goals because mastery goals directly correlate
to subsequent assignments (Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Rueda, 201; Szayna et al., 2016). As
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 47
such, mastering knowledge enhances the opportunity for key development assignments through
influential military leaders (Dougherty, 2014; Fix & Sias, 2006; Iskra, 2007; Northouse, 2016).
Understanding leadership proficiency. To build leadership proficiency, female officer
candidates need more time and practice to improve procedural knowledge during tactical events.
The events enable candidates to demonstrate competence and proficiency by (a) lead by example
according to established cultural norms, (b) maximizing resources in the environment, and (c)
inspire team-focused decisions through regulatory norms (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Clark &
Estes, 2008; U.S. Army, 2012b). Proficiency is assessed by SMA cadre who place a premium on
an officer candidate’s ability to make effective, timely, and informed decisions. Thus, female
candidates have to display confidence and proficiency during tactical events (Randazzo-Matsel
et al., 2012). It is vital for female candidates to master conceptual and procedural knowledge
because they contribute to decisions to pursue future goals. The SMA uses knowledge as a
conditioning program to modify behavior and reinforce desired leadership principles.
Egnell (2013) and Haring (2013) posited that, in the past 18 years, military females have
consistently kept pace by demonstrating proficiency and competence equal to that of male peers.
In addition, studies contend that women are just as capable as men in competence, proficiency,
performance, and skill (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector
Governance, 2016; Egnell, 2013; Haring, 2013; Northouse, 2016; Spivack, 2016). Thus, when
procedural and conceptual knowledge are merged, evidence implies that females can obtain the
confidence to succeed in male-dominated professions (Northouse, 2016; Randazzo-Matsel et al.,
2012; Tuckman, 2006). As such, this study proposes that, by August 2019, 100% of SMA female
officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their knowledge of SMA standards to
undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat forces. In order to achieve the
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 48
performance goal, this study estimates that by June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic
process to educate and train officer candidates on the combat force CMF paths that achieve a
20% to 30% increase for critical leader shortages. Table 2 displays the procedural and conceptual
knowledge influences aligned to stakeholder and organizational goals.
Table 2
Knowledge Influences, Types, and Assessments for Knowledge Gap Analysis
Organizational Mission
The mission of SMA is to train and commission prospective candidates for service as federally
recognized commissioned officers in the LSM.
Organizational Global Goal
By June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100% of officer
candidates on the combat force CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader
shortages.
Stakeholder Goal
By August 2019, 100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their
knowledge of SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat
forces.
Knowledge Influence Knowledge Type Knowledge Influence Assessment
- Female officer candidates
need procedural knowledge
because they rank
themselves at the lower end
in tactical proficiency
- Female officer candidates
need more time to practice
in order to improve
procedural knowledge
Procedural
Interview: Female officer candidates display
leadership proficiency during tactical events.
- Tell me how leading an SMA platoon differs
from a rifle platoon?
- Do you believe you have the procedural
knowledge to lead a rifle platoon? Is it
different? How so?
Focus group: Female candidates explain what
key development assignments mean.
- Female officer candidates
do not understand what key
development assignments
mean or how they correlate
to career progression
- Female officer candidates
do not understand the three
CMFs or how they correlate
to future opportunities
Conceptual
Interview: The SMA curriculum includes leadership
concepts, as a female officer candidate can you
tell me which are more important for career
progression?
Focus group: Female candidates describe their
understanding of combat forces, combat support,
combat service support and how they relate to
their goals.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 49
Motivation. This section seeks to answer the three questions related to motivational
performance goals: (1) What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and
organizational factors that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths? (2)
What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer candidates to
choose combat specialty assignments? (3) What are the recommended knowledge, motivation,
and organizational solutions for reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM? Army Doctrine
Publication 6-22 (U.S. Army., 2012b), Northouse (2016), and Rueda (2011) defined motivation
as an internal process for solving complex problems by leveraging dominance and intensive
persistence. In addition, Bandura (2000) and Rueda (2011) shared that culture influences how
motivation is viewed and developed in an effort to pursue collective goals. As such, motivation
is an amalgamation of active choice, collective efficacy, persistence, and mental effort (Bandura,
1997; Clark & Estes, 2008; Eccles, 2006; Pajares, 2006; U.S. Army, 2012b). Motivation is an
essential factor for change because it is a cultural catalyst for members to overcome challenges
(Rueda, 2011). This literature review explores three theories with the high probability to achieve
motivational change; attribution, self-efficacy, and goal orientation.
Attribution theory. Attribution theory is a method that examines beliefs, why certain
things happen and how those beliefs affect future outcomes (Anderman & Anderman, 2006).
This section illustrates how female officer candidates attribute success to their individual efforts.
Attribution theory is a motivational construct that enables SMA cadre to determine if officer
candidates possess the cognitive capacity, confidence and mental effort to achieve results.
Attribution theory is used to enhance learning and performance by focusing on individual ability.
Studies support the argument that people are more likely to succeed in challenging situations if
they integrate knowledge, and motivation in organizational settings (Clark & Estes, 2008;
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 50
Eccles, 2006). Anderman and Anderman (2006) infer that female officer candidates are more
likely to attribute negative outcomes to internal and stable causes while attributing success to
unstable and external factors. For example, what female candidates may perceive as success may
be due to good teaching or luck; whereas, failure in a given task may be perceived as not being
good enough with a required skill. Of note is the realization that attribution theory yields mixed
results in the mental cognition of differing generations and genders (Anderman & Anderman,
2006). Based on this understanding, the SMA cadre leverage attribution with officer candidates
during assessed events. As such, they receive input and encouragement on individual and
collective actions while attributing success to personal efforts. Anderman and Anderman (2006)
claimed that attribution theory is similar to Weiner’s model of attribution.
Weiner model of attribution. Weiner’s model of attribution consists of facets that form
beliefs with how environmental factors shape a person’s perception of future events (Anderman
& Anderman, 2006; Northouse, 2016). Weiner’s theory supports the premise that female officer
candidates attribute success to their own efforts by categorizing attribution into three dimensions:
locus, stability, and controllability (Anderman & Anderman, 2006; Rueda, 2011). Locus consists
of internal and external perceptions of events. For example, if a candidate performs a task to
standard, the candidate is likely to infer the outcome is internal and attributed to personal effort.
In contrast, if the candidate fails to achieve a task, he or she can infer the result is due to either
internal or external factors. As such, failure can be attributed to personal effort (internal) or to
poor instruction (external). What the theory seeks to validate is whether someone attributes a
result to either internal or external factors. The second dimension to Weiner’s theory is stability
and is similar to locus when assigning fault to self (stable) or others (unstable). If a candidate
fails to qualify on a range with their assigned weapon, the result is perceived as stable due to the
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 51
candidate’s inability to achieve the standard. In rare circumstances, some candidates simply
cannot shoot, regardless of the number of attempts made. Furthermore, if a candidate fails to
qualify due to high winds, the result can be attributed as unstable because of external factors.
When linked to success, stable causes lead to positive future outcomes and when linked to
failure, leads to less effort (Anderman & Anderman, 2006; Rueda, 2011). Finally, controllability
perceives the cause of events as either under the control or not under the control of a person. This
premise aligns with the motivational view that candidates attribute success to their own efforts. If
the failure is self-induced, the cause may be inferred as controllable because something could
have been done to change the result. In contrast, if the failure was due to environmental factors,
then the cause may be seen as uncontrollable. Thus, attribution theory suggests that officers who
value knowledge, effort, and self-efficacy are more likely to succeed because they are confident
and informed about achieving collective results (Anderman & Anderman, 2006; Pintrich, 2003).
Self-efficacy theory. Self-efficacy are beliefs in one’s own capabilities to organize and
execute plans that achieve results (Bandura, 1997). In doing so, such individuals tend to believe
that they can be more productive if they exert more effort. Self-efficacy requires individuals to
build experience in order to improve behavior and individual performance. Self-efficacy also
links learning, progress, and rewards through immediate feedback for simple tasks and a delayed
response for more complex tasks (Pintrich, 2003). Bandura (1997) and Mayer (2011) suggested
that self-efficacy can enhance learning behavior through vicarious reinforcement or punishment.
Thus, self-efficacy provides multiple opportunities to practice goal achievement (Pajares, 2006).
Self-efficacy theory makes it clear that people are capable of learning and performing
what is taught (Pajares, 2006). Self-efficacy also implies that learning and training can be useful
in the future (Pintrich, 2003). Additionally, self-efficacy can enhance learning through effective
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 52
observational learning, where tasks are clearly organized and rehearsed, then implemented
overtly in group settings that reinforce behavior (Mayer, 2011). As such, self-efficacy beliefs
profoundly affect a person’s motivation to pursue other challenging opportunities, they also
affect their decisions and actions. In addition, the beliefs are critical for pursuing concrete and
challenging opportunities that result with success (Pajares, 2006). An example is illustrated with
female naval officers who pursued jet-fighter assignments in the early 1990s (Haring, 2013).
Their active choice, mental effort, and persistence were important for changing behaviors, and
improving unit cohesion. Such beliefs also reinforce an individual’s resiliency after experiencing
setbacks, calamities, undue stress and the way they think of themselves (Bandura, 1997).
Self-efficacy has enabled female military leaders to achieve great successes in the past 30
years. However, more could have been achieved earlier if the gender views, misperceptions, and
barriers had been removed earlier. As Egnell (2013), Haring (2013), and King (2013) suggested
that proficiency, competence, and professionalism are only the result of the opportunities made
available to women in the past 18 years. Pajares (2006) and Egnell (2013) assert that men and
women are just as capable of learning what is taught and performing required tasks that benefit
individual and collective needs. As such, the SMA retains models that align to self-efficacy and
reinforce task completion and assessments (Tuckman, 2006). At the SMA, self-efficacy enables
candidates the opportunity to build confidence by achieving goals. Through self-efficacy, female
candidates should be confident in performing combat force roles that lead to more opportunities.
Goal orientation theory. Goal orientation theory helps explain reasons for engaging in
achievement behaviors (Pintrich, 2003; Rueda, 2011). Goal orientation seeks to create mastery
orientation by enhancing learning through motivation and performance. This section explains
how motivation and goal orientation enhance learning and leadership capacity. Studies imply
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 53
that group members are more motivated to achieve goals when leaders encourage prudent risk
(Anderman & Anderman, 2006; Yough & Anderman, 2006). Based on organizational culture
norms, the SMA uses goal orientation, motivational mastery, and performance variables to
validate leadership capacity and collective goal achievement (Pintrich, 2003; Rueda, 2011).
Mastery-oriented people seek to master tasks and improve personal knowledge to achieve
results (Yough & Anderman, 2006). Moreover, mastery-oriented people are more concerned
with self-improvement and comparing their success to previous experiences (Rueda, 2011;
Yough & Anderman, 2006). Thus, the mastery-oriented model creates the expectation that by
August 2019, 100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their
knowledge of SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat
forces. The assumed motivational influence in goal orientation theory and mastery orientation
proposes that female candidates possess a mastery approach to performance. To clarify mastery
orientation, it is divided into mastery- approach and mastery-avoid. Mastery approach is a valued
trait because it fosters learning, builds capacity and sustains motivation. In contrast, mastery-
avoid creates a false impression that it is acceptable to use minimal effort for goals. Fortunately,
mastery-avoid can be mitigated by promoting mastery traits (Yough & Anderman, 2006).
Performance-oriented officers display their skills and abilities by comparing themselves
to others in the profession (Yough & Anderman, 2006). Such individuals seek self-development
to demonstrate their superior competence to outperform peers within evaluation-type settings
(Pintrich, 2003). This process is based on the fact that the Army systematically rewards top
performance-oriented officers because they achieve results (U.S. Army, 2014a). As such,
displaying confidence, competence and outperforming peers may seem like a sure way in
securing senior-level assignments. However, personalities may conflict within performance-
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 54
oriented officers, as they are often seen as difficult to work with, self-centered, and egotistical
with their individual goals (Pintrich, 2003). Such personality gaps diminish trust and confidence
within organizational cultures. As an organization, the SMA requires officer candidates to
demonstrate institutional leadership traits that align to cultural beliefs, norms, and values. In
doing so, candidates build confidence, knowledge and trust that can be used to maximize their
leadership capacity. As such, the SMA serves as a test venue for candidates to improve their
leadership traits without fear of making mistakes in a real-world leadership role. Female officer
candidates are encouraged to perform at their optimum level in order to enhance their collective
capacity, learn from mistakes, develop their shared purpose and achieve performance goals.
Like mastery, Yough and Anderman (2006) divide performance goals into performance-
approach and performance-avoid. Performance-approach is a sought-after trait as it provides an
opportunity to outperform peers. Performance-approach is also a motivational construct that
enables the SMA cadre to categorize top performers from average performers. In contrast,
performance-avoid focuses on motivational learning that allows candidates to learn from their
mistakes (Yough & Anderman, 2006). Still, performance-avoid carries a negative connotation
that minimal effort is sufficient for pursuing organizational goals. This undesirable trait typically
causes leaders to establish low LMX interaction, constrained relations and little to no mentorship
for under-performing members (Fix & Sias, 2006). When the friction becomes unsalvageable, it
can lead members to remove themselves from interaction with leaders. Female officer candidates
who understand and can internalize the dynamics of these concepts stand to benefit from LMX
opportunities in combat force progression. Furthermore, leaders need to ensure that the cultural
needs of the organization take precedence over personal views. Table 3 illustrates how the
attribution theory, self-efficacy and goal orientation integrate into the KMO framework.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 55
Table 3
Motivational Influences and Assessment for Motivation Gap Analysis
Organizational Mission
The mission of SMA is to train and commission prospective candidates for service as federally
recognized commissioned officers in the LSM.
Organizational Global Goal
By June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100% of officer
candidates on the combat force CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader
shortages.
Stakeholder Goal
By August 2019, 100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their
knowledge of SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat
forces.
Assumed Motivation Influence Motivational Influence Assessment
Attribution Theory - Female officer
candidates attribute success and
failure to their own efforts
Self-Efficacy Theory - Female officer
candidates need to feel confident in
obtaining combat force assignments.
Interview: What are some of the causes of success or failure
in the SMA?
- When you achieve success, is it based on your own efforts or
the efforts of others?
- Some say that it is a great time for women to maximize their
full leadership potential by serving in combat forces.
- What are your thoughts on women wanting to do so?
Interview prompt: Explain your competence in tactical
leadership scenarios (Note female candidate articulate active
choice, persistence, and mental effort)
- Does your leadership capacity motivate you to pursue other
challenges?
Goal Orientation Theory - Female
officer candidates have a mastery
approach to performance
Interview prompt: How does mastering tasks contribute to
future success?
- Suppose you decide to serve as a leader in combat forces, how
successful do you see yourself against your peers?
- How do you see yourself outperforming combat force
peers as a non-combat force officer?
Organization: General theory. Schein (2017) and Rueda (2011) defined culture as a
group’s approach of accumulated shared learning as it solves external and internal adaptation
problems and, when validated, is taught to new members in how to think, feel, and behave.
Likewise, Clark and Estes (2008) noted that culture is implicit with attitudes, behavior, and
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 56
patterns created by members. This study explored interwoven culture strategies, mental schemas,
models and settings that illustrate how members think the world works (Clark & Estes, 2008;
Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001). This study also used a qualitative theoretical lens to assess how
culture enhances change processes when they are integrated into a life-cycle, teleological or
cultural model. This study provided various models that can be used to fully integrate female
leaders into combat forces, reduce the gender inequity gap, and improve unit readiness.
Cultural model: Life-cycle. Life-cycle models focus on the dynamics of people within
the organizational change process (Kezar, 2001). A peculiarity of life-cycle models is that they
may be perceived as developmental or evolutionary, where members undergo a natural process
to improve (Kezar, 2001). However, life-cycle models imply that all stakeholders play a central
role in developing training programs that encourage, reinforce, reward, and monitor progress for
desired outcomes (Kezar, 2001; Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Life-cycle posits that change
does not occur because people see it as a want or a need; it occurs because it is a natural and
regulative adaptive progression that cannot be stopped or altered (Kezar, 2001). Furthermore,
Rueda (2011) asserted that cultural models can be used to characterize organizations, resolve
problems, and evaluate results. As such, the life-cycle model is similar to King’s (2017) shared
consciousness model, where members use initiative, judgment and critical analysis for decisions.
The life-cycle model can also be used as a practical learning process for female officer
candidates. This is where candidates can collaborate to build trust, leadership capacity, analyze
organizational needs, define desired outcomes and determine their own progress through shared
consciousness (King, 2017; DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016). The
understanding with the life-cycle model is that change is responsive to external factors in the
environment and often requires the alteration of values and beliefs (Kezar, 2001; Schein, 2017).
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 57
The alteration of beliefs and norms is a common trend at the SMA. However, the settings
elicit alterations to conforming institutional values. Examples of such alterations include the
values undertaken by CSTs, FETs and Jegertroppen females. Two of the priorities within the
life-cycle model include focusing efforts on people and training (Kezar, 2001). These priorities
are integrated into the 18-month-long SMA process where candidates align their beliefs and
values to institutional demands while systematically reducing misaligned attitudes that do not
conform to expectations. In addition, the life-cycle model provides an opportunity to obtain
emotional intelligence, high growth, competence, goal mastery, and goal performance (Kezar,
2001). Another viable model that may reduce gender inequity is the teleological culture mode.
Teleological culture model. The teleological culture model is typically used to offset the
effects of discrimination against a gender, age, or race of people (Northouse, 2016). When this
friction point emerges, the teleological model calls for change in order to accommodate the
needs of those specific members (Kezar, 2001). The model can create positive outcomes because
it is purposeful and elicits stakeholder cooperation in order to bring about inclusion and desired
outcomes. Keeping the end in mind, the teleological model is an evolutionary process of intense
collaboration and shared mental schema for breaking down discriminatory barriers and achieving
goals (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001; Kezar, 2001). Unlike the life-cycle and LMX models, the
teleological model identifies leaders as the focal point for implementing scientifically-based
solutions to systemic problems (Kezar, 2001). Associated benefits for the teleological model
include (a) analyzing a need for change, (b) driving a vision for change, and (c) empowering for
change. The teleological model is used by the LSM to resolve complex tactical and operational
level issues. However, for gender equity, the LSM and Army continue to face challenges because
the problem has not been properly framed to the KMO gap analysis framework.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 58
Teleological leadership. Teleological leadership is a subset of the teleological culture
model and is used to describe the dichotomies within organizations. These include strategic
planning, organizational development, and adaptive learning (Kezar, 2001). Clark and Estes
(2008) argued that leadership is fundamental to organizational change. Working towards a pre-
determined end, the rational with teleological leadership is that it looks at culture as fluid and
moldable to environmental factors. As such, this study uses the teleological model and focuses
on the belief that leaders shape culture through vision, measured progress, and goal attainment
(Burke, 2017; Clark & Estes, 2008). Studies suggest that the reason for gender inequity is in the
differing leadership styles between males and females (Burke, 2017; Northouse, 2016). This
gender stereotype undermines the credibility of human capital to resolve systemic problems. As
such, studies and teleological leadership contend that women can lead even while they continue
to face bias, discrimination and cultural barriers (Hindlian et al., 2018; Northouse, 2016).
Leader specific factors. Successful leaders leverage climate and cultural lenses to learn,
decipher and influence organizational change (Northouse, 2016; Rueda, 2011; Schein, 2017;
Schneider et al., 1996). As such, change cannot take place without senior leader engagement in
the improvement process (Burke, 2017; Clark & Estes, 2008). To achieve desired change,
leaders have to develop cultural settings that produce assessment tools and integrate evaluations
to the desired outcomes. For example, the four levels of training evaluation in the Kirkpatrick
and Kirkpatrick’ (2016) model provides a comprehensive process for achieving desired results.
The use of decisive strategies can help create new cultures where members focus on collective
efforts for total organizational change (Clark & Estes, 2008; Schneider et al., 1996). Studies posit
that barriers can be averted when leaders leverage teleological culture models and policies that
align to institutional behavioral norms (Kezar, 2001; Schneider et al., 1996)
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 59
Leadership in culture settings. Cultural settings are experiences where two or more
people come together at a central point to accomplish a common goal (Gallimore & Goldenberg,
2001; Rueda, 2011). As a result, cultural settings are optimal venues for senior leaders to impose
new structures, share new policy guidance, reinforce systems and enhance processes that become
part of the culture (Schein, 2017). As such, cultural settings can improve gender equity if senior
leaders untangle barriers that improve the organization (Ayman & Korabik, 2010; Gallimore &
Goldenberg, 2001). Likewise, Szayna et al. (2016) argued that female officerrs continue to face
discriminatory barriers because cultural settings fail to support their fair treatment. Furthermore,
evidence implies that some leaders use their positions to undermine opportunities and potential
for women to succeed in male dominated professions (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007;
Lewis, 2011; Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). Case
in point, General Barrow stated, “women can’t do it… and there is no military need to put
women into combat” (Letendre, 2014, p. 1). Such claims play a significant factor on culture.
Leader stereotypes. The LSM is organization funded by tax dollars and is not subject to
change as a matter of survival. It also relies on cultural settings that do not reflect its cultural
demographics (Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014). As such, there is an assumption that work, learning,
and leadership takes place under stereotypical gender constructs (DCAF – Geneva Centre for
Security Sector Governance, 2016). These stereotypes create a false reality where gender bias is
dismissed as non-problematic (Serrato, 2013). Such stereotypes can have a detrimental mental
health impact on the well-being in women (Szayna et al., 2016). Table 4 displays the assumed
cultural influences which propose that, by June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic
process to educate and train 100% of officer candidates on the combat force CMF paths that
achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader shortages.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 60
Table 4
Organizational Influencer Worksheet
Organizational Mission
The mission of SMA is to train and commission prospective candidates for service as federally
recognized commissioned officers in the LSM.
Organizational Global Goal
By June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100% of officer
candidates on the combat force CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader
shortages.
Stakeholder Goal
By August 2019, 100% of SMA Officer Candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their
knowledge of SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat
forces.
Assumed Organizational Influences Organizational Influence Assessment
Cultural Model Influence 1:
- Female officer candidates need to perceive
that the organization supports a culture of
cohesion among both male and female officer
candidates.
- The culture needs an innovative framework to
embrace risk and focus on integrating women
into combat forces.
Interview questions: Based on your SMA
experience, do you think the training empowers
female candidates to build leadership capacity?
- If so, can you describe the process?
- If not, what factors do you think devalue it?
- What is your opinion on how well leaders
communicate their vision for breaking down
gender barriers?
Cultural Model Influence 2:
- Female officer candidates need SMA
processes in implementing a curriculum that
align with combat force training.
- The culture needs prudent risk and shared
purpose.
Interview questions: How do the dynamics of
leadership trust enhance or impede goals?
- Do you think leaders are trustworthy?
- Do you have trust in the SMA process?
- What are the reasons for female officer candidates
to not choose combat forces?
Cultural Setting Influence 1:
- Leaders have to develop strategies that create
new cultures and growth.
- Female candidates need to perceive that
organizational settings support female
integration into combat forces.
Interview questions: Do you think the settings are
effective for leader growth? Explain.
- Do you think there is gender bias with female
evaluations? Why or why not?
Cultural Setting Influence 2:
- Female officer candidates need to believe that
senior leaders have a vested interest in their
future opportunities.
Interview questions: Do you know anyone who
worked with females in combat operations?
- What are your views on women serving in
combat forces?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 61
Conceptual Framework for the Study
The conceptual framework illustrates the transformative relationship between literature
review, stakeholders, and the KMO influences in the Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis model
(Maxwell, 2013). The KMO framework includes an epistemological approach for conducting the
study where empirical and theoretical literature defines the gender inequity gap (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Thus, the KMO framework places the study into a theoretical context that builds
on the body of knowledge (Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). To align the framework to
the problem of practice, it is vital to understand two worldviews affect the issue (Mayer, 2011).
The two worldviews are the social constructivist and transformative. The social constructivist
view defines how individuals seek to make sense of their world (Creswell, 2014). In the SMA, it
involves formal and informal mentoring, coaching and teaching from cadre. However, the results
differ for female candidates because their worldview lacks gender perspective education. As is
often the trend, the lack of gender perspectives in organizations shows that the organization is
limited in collective intelligence (DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2016).
In comparison, the transformative view establishes a foundation for helping marginalized groups
through political agendas that confront social inequities (Creswell, 2014). This study used the
KMO gap analysis model and program theory to determine how and why inequities exist (Burke,
2017; Creswell, 2014). These two worldviews exist in tandem to know if stakeholders know how
to achieve results (Clark & Estes, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates the KMO influence integration and
how they can bridge the gender inequity gap. In addition, the related literature codifies the bond
between the KMO influences and stakeholder goals. The desired result is that by August 2019,
100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with 100% accuracy, their knowledge of
SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat forces.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 62
Figure 1. KMO conceptual framework of female officer candidates.
The conceptual framework illustrates the interaction between KMO factors that influence
gender inequity in the LSM. In Figure 1, the large green circle depicts the cultural models and
settings. The cultural models leverage behavioral drivers for consensus, while settings rely on
shared consciousness and institutional processes to show how the world works (Burke, 2017;
Organization: LSM
Cultural Models: Behavioral drivers (artifacts,
espoused beliefs/values, assumptions); consensus.
Cultural Settings: Mentorship; strategic decision making;
shared vision; institutional processes.
Global Goal
Achieve a 20-30% graduation rate for female
candidates to qualify and serve in combat
specialty organizations.
Knowledge
Declarative/Conceptual: Skills
approach; three skills model.
Declarative/Procedural: Human
capital model, cognitive inclusion
model.
Motivation
Attribution Theory: Candidates
attribute success to own efforts.
Self-efficacy theory: Candidates are
confident in pursuing combat forces.
Goal Orientation Theory: Candidates
pursue challenging leadership
assignments to hone their skills,
regardless of mistakes made
Female Officer Candidate Decisions
Female officer candidate: leadership
mastery skills; current, concrete and
clear goals; evaluation feedback
Legend:
Organization
Global Goal
Stakeholder Influence
Simultaneous Use
Interaction leads to
Goal
By August 2019, 100% of SMA
Officer Candidates will
demonstrate, with 100%
accuracy, their knowledge of
SMA standards in order to
undergo pre-assessment training
to qualify for service
in combat units.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 63
Schein, 2017). The global goal (purple circle) establishes an expectation that, by June 2020, the
SMA will implement a systematic process to educate and train 100% of officer candidates on the
combat force CMF paths that achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader shortages. Within
the global goal, the KMO frameworks displays the knowledge and motivation influences (red
circles) that 0pinfluence gender inequity. Procedural knowledge includes human capital and
competency models; while conceptual knowledge leverages the skills approach and three-skills
model (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Northouse, 2016). The motivational influences are shaped by
experience in attribution, self-efficacy, and goal orientation theories (Rueda, 2011). Attribution
theory attributes success to personal effort, self-efficacy are beliefs that influence the pursuit of
goals, and goal orientation focuses achieving mastery in order to pursue future goals (Anderman
& Anderman, 2006; Bandura, 1997; Lazowski & Hulleman, 2016. Thus, the interaction between
knowledge and motivation influences (red arrow) creates the high probability for achieving goals
(orange box). Figure 8 illustrates how KMO influences shape female decisions (blue circle).
Conclusion
Chapter Two illustrated the theories, models, and concepts that relate to gender inequity.
This innovative study sought to understand why female candidates choose not to pursue combat
force assignments that enhance promotions, career opportunities, and increased responsibility.
The study also explored interactions between KMO influences and their effect on organizational
change strategies and mental schemas (Clark & Estes, 2008; Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001).
The literature in Chapter Two is interpreted to make sense of the cultural barriers that support
gender inequity. Furthermore, the conceptual framework extracts the results of KMO interactions
and confirms the needs and assets of stakeholders. Chapter Three depicts interview, focus group,
and artifact methodology to determine why female officer candidates decline combat CMFs.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 64
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Chapter Three begins with a review of stakeholders from Chapter One. Chapter Two
included a literature review with the explanations of conceptual and methodological frameworks.
Chapter Three identifies the sampling criteria, data collection, analysis, instrumentation, and
ends with exploring ethics, limitations, and delimitations. The study answers three questions:
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
Participating Stakeholders
The stakeholders described in Chapter One are transposed into a theoretical process used
in Chapter Three. The stakeholders are six SMA female officer candidates whose demographics
enhance the understanding of why they decline to pursue combat force assignments. Table 5
displays the demographics of the deliberate population participants. Each participant was
assigned an alias to retain anonymity throughout the study. The aliases begin alphabetically with
the letter A and end with the letter F. In addition, the one year of service does not suggest a lack
of military experience. Rather, the one year implies that some participants have at least one year
of experience. Thus, all participants retain a minimum requirement to participate in the study.
Table 5 also displays the selected CMF career path for each participant, all of which fall in line
with the status quo of pursuing careers in CS and CSS.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 65
Table 5
Profile of Participants
Participant Previous Rank Age Degree Total Service Years Career Path
Alice Staff Sergeant 39 MA 19 Intelligence
Beatrice Private 29 BA 1 Human Resources
Catherine Private 40 MBA 3 Human Resources
Diana Sergeant 31 JD 6 Ordnance
Erica Private 25 BS 1 Signal
Francesca Private 24 BS 1 Intelligence
Approval and access to the deliberate population were coordinated two levels above the
SMA. Both the regimental and battalion commanders recognized the importance of the study and
approved the tentative timeline. Additional coordination was made to ensure that the deliberate
population was available for the interviews. The following actions took place: (a) met with the
participants in a classroom setting without distractions, (b) used a voice recorder for interactions,
(c) provided a consent form for permission to voice record interactions, (d) obtained six of seven
consent forms for face-to-face and open-ended interviews, one focus group discussion, and
artifact analysis of regulatory SMA guidance and policies, and (e) used instrumentation to collect
information-rich data while maintaining the anonymity of participants (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007).
Of note is that only one candidate refrained from participating in the study. Her decision
was honored without further discussion. During the recorded interviews, research-based open-
ended questions were asked in conjunction with field notes and explaining terminology to
participants. Establishing trust and remaining impartial were vital to the collaborative process.
This purposive study coupled a criterion-based selection process to a deliberate sample
population to answer three research questions (Johnson & Christensen, 2014; Maxwell, 2013;
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 66
Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The face-to-face interviews and focus group discussion were designed
to elicit participant responses (Creswell, 2014; Krueger & Casey, 2009; Patton, 2002; Weiss,
1994). The study’s results are directed to multiple stakeholders who sway power, authority, and
urgency for change (Lewis, 2011). The results from this study may benefit future officers in the
following ways: (a) the study identified several innovative ideas to help bridge knowledge gaps,
(b) the shared interactions shed light into cultural barriers that discourage women’s motivation
and (c) the study can assist future officers in maneuvering through the leadership labyrinth by
avoiding gender pitfalls. Finally, the study can assist senior leaders in understanding how
engagement can shape positive outcomes for the future of talented women (Haring, 2013).
Interview and Focus Group Sampling Criteria and Rationale
Criterion 1. Possess a minimum of six months of military experience to explain cultural
norms. The participants are likely to share their prior service experience with combat forces.
Criterion 2. Possess at least an accredited baccalaureate degree as a basis for additional
cognitive learning and developing solutions to complex leadership problems.
Criterion 3. Possess the motivation to serve indefinitely in the LSM. The criteria set the
baseline for pursuing individual long-term goals, key developmental assignments for promotions
and obtaining positions of increased responsibility.
Interview and Focus Group Sampling (Recruitment) Strategy and Rationale
The population for this deliberate study consisted of six female officer candidates. The
interview sampling criteria required participants to have; (a) at least six months of military
experience, (2) a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, and (3) the motivation to serve in the LSM
indefinitely. This study invited female candidates to participate in a voluntary, anonymous and
collaborative manner in order to explore the future of female leadership in the LSM (Patton,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 67
2002; Weiss, 1994). To align the conceptual framework to the problem of practice, standard
interview protocols from Patton (2002) and Weiss (1994) were integrated into the study. The
study combined participants, the conceptual framework and research questions. The goal was to
collect rich data from participants and how they see their world (Clark & Estes, 2008; Krueger &
Casey, 2009). Artifact analysis was focused on reviewing regulatory guidance and standards.
Sampling Strategy and Timeline
Data collection and instrumentation combined semi-structured and phenomenological
interviews, a focus group, and artifact analysis to increase the validity and credibility of the study
(Bowen, 2009; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 2002; Weiss, 1994). As such, the researcher
collected responses to open-ended questions that linked understanding to participant experiences
and perceptions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The face-to-face interviews helped obtain rich data
about gender inequity. Table 6 depicts the background of sampling strategy, size, and timeline.
Table 6
Background of Sampling Strategy, Size, and Timeline
Sampling
Strategy
Number in
Stakeholder
Number of participants from
Stakeholder group
Start and End Date for
Data Collection
Interviews Purposeful 7 6 24JUL19
Focus Group Deliberate 7 6 24JUN19
Artifacts Availability 7 6 19JUL19
Qualitative Data Collection and Instrumentation
The qualitative data collection methodology used in this study protects the rights of
participants (Patton, 2002). Before data collection, the University of Southern California (USC)
Institutional Review Board (IRB) assessed if participants were at risk for pressure, bias or open
to social, physical or economic harm (Glesne, 2011; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Based on the results,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 68
the IRB granted exempt status to the researcher and a subject matter expert (SME), the first
female combat force leader in the LSM. As such, data was collected in two phases. Phase I began
in January 2019 with briefings to senior leaders. From there, coordination was made with SMA
cadre to minimize distraction to the curriculum. Based on schedules, the optimal time for data
collection was on Sunday mornings. Phase I ended on June 23, 2019. Phase II began on June 24,
2019, with arrival at the SMA. The researcher arrived early to review protocols and procedures
for the study with the CITI and IRB approved SME. Upon arrival, six female officer candidates
were seated for introductions. An explanation of the study was made prior to signing the consent
agreements. As such, trust, credibility, and transparency were paramount for a mutual exchange
of ideas to take place (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). A significant amount of data and information
was collected during the interviews and focus group session. Phase II ended with artifact analysis
review on July 19, 2019. Leveraging triangulation with interviews, focus group, artifact analysis
and feedback from the SME added to this study’s credibility, trustworthiness, and validity. Refer
to Appendix A for interview protocol. After instrumenting interviews, the data was uploaded to
REV.com for transcription. Thereafter, transcripts were analyzed, and coded for themes and
claims through the use of an approved instrumentation tool. All the recordings and transcripts
remain secure in one memory card. The data is intended for destruction in June 2026.
Interviews and Focus Groups
Interview protocol. Before beginning the study, the researcher needed to build rapport,
establish trust, answer questions and explain the purpose of the study to stakeholders (Patton,
2002; Weiss, 1994). An informed consent agreement was provided to participants in order to
emphasize the importance of confidentiality and privacy (Creswell, 2014; Glesne, 2011; Patton,
2002; Weiss, 1994). The interviews included semi-structured and open-ended questions that
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 69
elicited participant experiences and perceptions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 2002). This
formal process created a free-flow of information and dialogue while seeking to answer the three
research questions. The questions used in the study were aligned to KMO influences and include
hypothetical, opinion, feeling, and devil’s advocate type questions (Patton, 2002). Moreover, the
questions focused on factors that influenced perceptions in how well the SMA prepared officers
to lead in combat forces. As such, the questions were designed to elicit cognitive input from
individuals with cultural norm experiences. It is the input, feedback, and candid sharing of
information which enables the refinement of this study.
Interview procedures. The timing for interviews was scheduled for June 2019. The
researcher’s coordination with the SMA and a CITI- IRB certified SME were vital for reducing
bias during data collection. All interactions with participants occurred in person in order to cross-
validate and triangulate data (Patton, 1987; Maxwell, 2013). As such, triangulation helped reduce
bias and enhance credibility (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Interviews were recorded on a voice
recorder for verbatim remarks and comments. As such, the interviews were scheduled to last
between 30 and 45 minutes, however, due to the enthusiasm from participants, they varied from
33 to 72 minutes. As noted, one female officer candidate opted-out from the study. Her decision
was respected and accommodated, al interactions stopped and she was escorted from the venue.
The focus group took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Refer to Appendix B for the
focus group plan. The purpose of the focus groups was to encourage dialogue with less-vocal
participants (Krueger & Casey, 2009; Patton, 2002). It was critical to actively listen to candidates
while being aware of their body language and maintaining a reciprocal dialogue (Glesne, 2011;
Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 2002; Weiss, 1994). During the focus group, female candidates
were less vocal about sharing their views. The discovery deserves additional future study.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 70
Interview and focus group data were transcribed for accuracy through a web-based
transcription service and stored on a secured memory card. Upon culmination of data collection,
and as a form of gratitude, the researcher compensated participants with gift cards for their time
and feedback (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Finally, the SMA cohort’s recreation fund received
nominal compensation for their participation in the study. As such, the researcher intends to
provide a copy of the final dissertation to participants upon publishing.
Artifacts
The researcher reviewed artifacts that depict SMA standard operating procedures, an
officer candidate guide, a field leadership evaluation form, self-assessment forms, leadership
evaluation cards, other assessment guidance. The data collected from artifacts was thematically
and rigorously analyzed to extract phenomenological themes that support a relationship with the
KMO conceptual framework (Bowen, 2009; Clark & Estes, 2008). Some of the benefits for
artifact analysis are (a) efficiency, b) availability, (c) cost-effectiveness, and (d) stability (Bowen,
2009; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Requesting available artifacts that tied to the motivation and
organization influences increased the efficiency for data collection while reducing time loss
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Finally, the stability of the artifacts added
credibility to the study because the products could not be altered (Bowen, 2009; Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). As such, the analysis of artifacts generated new questions and provided additional
evidence for training that impinges to gender equity (Bowen, 2009, Clark & Estes, 2008).
Thereafter, the data was scrutinized, coded, and cataloged into credible findings (Bowen, 2009).
Data Analysis
The data analysis and validation process for this study leveraged three control measures.
First, the researcher underwent CITI and IRB certification in order to develop ethical standards,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 71
trust and credibility for the study. Second, the researcher leveraged a CITI and IRB certified
female SME to sit-in during the study. Finally, the data collection includes interviews, a focus
group and artifact analysis. From there, the researcher explained the purpose of the study and the
protocols in the informed consent agreement. Participants read and signed the consent agreement
prior to any interactions. Following data collection, information was transcribed via rev.com and
coded in a four- phase analytical process that included (a) open coding, (b) analytical coding, (c)
theme selection, and (d) claim development (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). During Phase I, data was
nested with empirical and a priori codes that aligned to the framework. Standardization was vital
for comparing and contrasting data to conceptual framework. During Phase II data was reviewed
and aggregated into analytical codes. Real-time codes became categories and themes that could
be used to validate claims and assertions (Glesne, 2011). As such, qualitative coding led to
grouping and labeling of information that made sense (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). In Phase III, the
patterns and themes were identified and nested to the KMO framework and research questions
(Maxwell, 2013). Phase IV extracted the themes and patterns and converted them into claims and
assertions. Phase IV culminated by transforming the claims and assertion to results and findings.
Phase I: Open Coding
Phase I began by reading the data multiple times, spot-checking, and doing logic-checks
to clean and make sense of them (Harding, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2014). Open coding included reviewing transcripts and artifacts while making notes to
determine empirical and a priori code commonalities that nest with the KMO framework
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). After each review, notes were made to capture reflections, and
assumptions (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). To account for typicality, a codebook was created in
order to reduce researcher bias and positionality. As such, the codebook enabled the researcher to
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 72
achieve transparent and credible results. In addition, a personal experience analytic tool was
leveraged to identify and aggregate data that answered the research questions (Corbin & Strauss,
2008). Phase I ended by validating how KMO influences shaped decision making.
Phase II: Analytical Coding
Phase II began by aggregating empirical and a priori codes into analytical codes that
represent common categories and specific data (Harding, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Key
phrases and shared views showed how KMO influences are categorized into the following:
● Procedural Knowledge - Human capital model, cognitive inclusion model.
● Conceptual Knowledge - Skills approach; three-skills model.
● Motivation - Attribution Theory: Female candidates attribute success and failure to their
own efforts.
• Motivation - Self-Efficacy: Female officer candidates need confidence in obtaining
combat force roles.
• Motivation - Goal Orientation Theory: Female officer candidates have a mastery
approach to performance.
● Organizational Culture Setting - Mentorship; strategic decision making; shared vision.
● Organizational Culture Model - Consensus (beliefs, values); behavioral complexity.
Phase III: Patterns and Themes
Phase III involved identifying patterns and themes aligned with the research questions
and the conceptual framework. Repetitive phrases, terms, and common views became patterns
and themes that added meaning to claims, assertions, and findings (Glesne, 2011; Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Phase III aggregated data into the NVIVO platform for standardized transcription.
Aside from transcribing, the codebook continued to add relevance throughout data analysis.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 73
Phase IV: Claims, Assertions and Findings
The process for moving from coding to results included developing details that led to
assertions through introductory commentary, framing data to support claims, quoting verbatim
responses, and closing with retrospective framing. Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) analytic tool of
personal experience and positionality helped in shaping initial claims and assertions.
Qualitative Analysis Process
This study used a qualitative analysis processes to sequence data in order to establish
transparency, rigor, validity, and credibility (Harding, 2013; Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002). The
qualitative analysis process enabled the researcher to organize the data into sections and time in
order to prevent delays. Table 7 displays the timeline used to complete the qualitative analysis.
Table 7
Qualitative Analysis Process
Data Source Iterative Phase I-IV Timeline Notes/Resources Questions
6 interviews Transcribe, clean, make
sense. Use NVivo and a
priori codes, color code;
OCs; spot eye-ball, peer
reviews
3 weeks:
31JUL19 via
www.rev.com
- Data collection
ends June 2019
- Ensure audio, field
notes and OCs match
transcripts. (Bogdan &
Biklen, 2007)
- QUAL INQ videos.
- NVIVO/REV
- Instrumentation tool
For Self: Allow
participants to
see questions?
For Chair:
Defense date?
10OCT19
1 focus group Use open codes; a
priori/empirical, then
to analytical codes for
patterns, themes and
claims
2 weeks:
31JUL19
- Schedule
focus group
interviews
(Harding, 2013;
Merriam & Tisdell,
2016)
- LMS Coding videos
- NVIVO software
- Instrumentation tool
For Self: tie in
collective view
to KMO CF.
For Chair:
Editor?
Timeline?
Artifacts Photocopy data; seek
peer input for review
and explain evaluations
15AUG19
Reviews and
assessments
(Merriam & Tisdell,
2016; Miles, Huberman
& Saldaña, 2014)
Review data
applicable to 6
OC
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 74
Credibility and Trustworthiness
Creswell (2014) and Merriam and Tisdell (2016) argued that believability is based on the
coherence and trustworthiness of the researcher. The researcher’s experience, positionality, and
methodological competence shape credibility from its conceptualization to final results (Bowen,
2009; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). As such, the researcher has 29 years of experience in the field
and does not know any of the participants. Furthermore, the researcher served as the sole data
collector in order to develop clear study protocols (Creswell, 2014). This section focuses on how
participants make sense of their world through trust, objectivity, triangulation, and peer reviews.
Triangulation played a critical role in validating the accuracy of interviews, focus group
and artifact analysis (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Krueger & Casey, 2009; Maxwell, 2013; Merriam
& Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 1987). Triangulation also helped reduce bias and chance associations
while enhancing credibility and validity through protocols (Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). Furthermore, aligning triangulation to the conceptual framework shows how participants
demonstrated conceptual and procedural mastery for achieving goals (Rueda, 2011; Yough &
Anderman, 2006). In comparison, peer reviews codified participant feedback and confirmed the
accuracy of the outcome (Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The final method was
reflexivity, and it was used as an important self-reflection on assumptions, worldviews, and
positionality to prevent bias (Bowen, 2009; Maxwell, 2013). Reflexivity has the potential to
change the study because any stakeholder or non-participant can throw off the findings.
Validity and Reliability
Validity includes more than a general review of data and information; it also consists of
strategies and quantitative components that support qualitative studies. Quantitative components
strive for predetermined and structured results to convince readers that procedures were followed
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 75
faithfully (Bowen, 2009; Creswell, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Thus, quantitative processes
seek statistical and mathematical content to replicate a similar outcome (Salkind, 2016). As such,
the need for valid content can discredit results if the researcher modified instruments that made
replication impossible (Creswell, 2014). To prevent such a result, the researcher used content
validity, psychometric tests, and peer reviews for instrument reliability (Salkind, 2016).
This study incorporated semi-structured interview questions, a focus group, and artifact
analysis. To ethically avoid bias, the researcher used cadre, an SME, and the doctoral committee
to scrutinize for data consistency in figures, and tables (Bowen, 2009; Creswell, 2014). Although
this study uses triangulation, the researcher used an editor to translate the data into qualitative
tables and figures. Furthermore, the researcher categorized and clustered the data into tables that
compared and contrasted responses among participants (Bowen, 2009; Creswell, 2014; Salkind,
2016). As such, the validity of this study is ultimately limited by its reliability (Salkind, 2016).
Ethics
The ethical responsibility for this study included a complete shut-down if there was a
perceived breach to privacy, deception, disrespect or harm to participants (Glesne, 2011; Rubin
& Rubin, 2012). Access to participants was a privilege. This study integrated a criteria-based
process to answer research questions that focused on the disparity in gender leadership (Asch et
al., 2012; Johnson & Christensen, 2014). In addition, this study uses pseudonyms to help protect
the anonymity of participants (Johnson & Christensen, 2014; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Moreover,
this study required the researcher to (a) remain neutral, (b) allow participants to withdrawal, and
(c) ensure organizations benefit from the study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Maxwell (2013) contended that ethical concerns serve a purpose and are a necessity in
qualitative studies. The researcher acknowledged that there was no unethical relationship with
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 76
participants (Patton, 2002). The researcher is a military officer with no interest in coercing or
pressuring participants. To reduce risk, the researcher used civilian clothing and clarified the role
as a graduate student. Although the researcher is a military officer, the research instrument status
provides an exemption from participating within the study. The researcher created a reflective
memorandum to note information that may hold future influence. The data collected was
transcribed onto a memory card to remain secure until destruction in June 2026. Finally, the
researcher avoided sharing data with third parties in order to protect participants Biklen, 2007).
Limitations and Delimitations
Some of the unanticipated limitations in this study included challenges that went beyond
the scope of control for the researcher. One such challenge was in forming adequate research
questions that elicited responses aligned to the behavioral needs in the KMO framework (refer to
Appendices A and B for interview, focus group and artifact analysis). Although it is essential to
understand and scrutinize data, it became apparent that triangulation was going to be critical for
validating the credibility and trustworthiness of the study. Forming the questions and aligning
them to the framework was a challenge and time-consuming process (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Summary
Chapter Three provided information on the methodology of this purposive study. This
study enabled participants to share their experiences for not wanting to pursue combat force
assignments. As such, Chapter Three included stakeholders, cultural settings, and artifact
collection for instrumentation. Chapter Three also included factors and variables that enhance
credibility and reliability. Finally, Chapter Three included control measures that protected the
privacy of participants. Moving forward, Chapter Four displays the results and findings.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 77
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The purpose of this study was to understand how cultural barriers influence female
officer candidates, particularly how such barriers discourage their decisions to pursue combat
force assignments. The literature review in Chapter Two explained what we know about gender
inequity. Chapter Three identified the sampling criteria, data collection, instrumentation, and
ended with exploring ethics and limitation. This chapter also provides the qualitative results and
findings that emerged from analyzing the assumed KMO influences. Chapter Five includes the
recommendations from Chapter Four findings. Three research questions guided this study:
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
The data collected were organized by KMO influences and delineated into clusters of
aligned attitudes and key phrases to help create themes and claims. This chapter provides the
categorized results of assumed KMO influences. Numerous qualitative responses were collected
from interviews, focus group, and artifact analysis. The rationale for triangulating all the data
contributes to the credibility, validity and trustworthiness of the study.
Participating Stakeholders
The primary stakeholder group for this study consisted of six SMA female officer
candidates. This diverse stakeholder group began the 18-month commissioning program in
January 2018. With the exception of one candidate, six participated in the study (see Appendix A
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 78
and B for interview and focus group protocols). To protect the identity of participants, the
following pseudonyms were used: Alice, Beatrice, Catherine, Diana, Erika, and Francesca. In
terms of age, the group varied: 50% are at least 31; 16% are 26 to 30, and 34% are 25 years of
age or younger. Their education also varied: two have a BS, one a BA, one an MA, one an MBA,
and one a JD. Their prior military experience also varies from six months as a private to 20 years
as a Staff Sergeant. Thus, 50% of the participants had more than three years of experience. For
CMF career paths, their decisions illustrate the status quo: two are pursuing human resources,
two selected military intelligence, one chose communications, and one went with in ordnance.
Finally, the demographic breakdown is unique in itself, 66% of female candidates are daughters
of immigrants. Table 8 displays additional participant demographics. For the purpose of clarity,
prior-service designation includes the 10-week basic course and at least one year with the SMA
(SMA, 2018). In addition, these soldiers possess the civilian education and experience to respond
to gender-related questions. Moreover, it is the SMA’s mission to train and assess the candidates
for federal service.
Table 8
Interview and Focus Group Participants
Participant Previous Rank Degree Total Service Years
Alice Staff Sergeant MA 19
Beatrice Private BA 1
Catherine Private MBA 3
Diana Sergeant JD 6
Erica Private BS 1
Francesca Private BS 1
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 79
Data Validation
The purpose for interviews was to find categorical commonalities from participant views
and how they perceive their world. As such, interviews were triangulated with a focus group,
artifact analysis, and feedback from the SMA cadre, a female SME, peer reviews and advice
from the doctoral committee. The SME’s feedback as the first female combat force officer in the
LSM contributed to the validity of the study. These procedures assist in validating the neutrality
of the study’s data collection process. Interview saturation was reached when participants could
no longer produce new information (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The intent for the focus group
was to allow less-vocal participants the opportunity to share their views in a group setting.
Merriam and Tisdell (2016) explained that artifact data is not much different from
interview data. As such, reporting artifact results follow a similar process to that of interviews.
The artifacts analyzed include an officer candidate (OC) guide, a leadership evaluation report,
a candidate self-assessment, a leadership evaluation in-brief card, and a field leadership form.
The OC guide provides regulatory guidance on tasks and functions required to complete the
commissioning program. The leadership evaluation report validates the attribution for desired
leadership norms. The self-assessment report was used to reflect on learning from challenges
encountered during the assessment period. Self-reflection focused on a situation, the assigned
task, actions taken and results from the experience. The leadership evaluation in-brief was used
to clarify expectations prior to assuming a leadership role. Finally, the field leadership form was
used to assess tactical proficiency during a stressful scenario. Table 9 displays the correlation
between assumed KMO influences and themes found in the data.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 80
Table 9
Correlation of Assumed KMO Influences to Themes Found in the Data
Assumed Influences KMO Designation Correlating Theme(s) in the Data
Knowledge.
- Female officer candidates need
procedural knowledge because they
rank themselves at the lower end in
tactical proficiency
- Female officer candidates need
more time to practice in order to
improve procedural knowledge
Procedural
- 50% of female officer candidates need
procedural knowledge because they
rank themselves at the lower end in
tactical proficiency
- 100% of females need more time to
practice in order to improve procedural
knowledge
Knowledge.
- Female officer candidates do not
understand what key development
assignments mean or how they
correlate to career progression
- Female officer candidates do not
understand the three CMFs or how
they correlate to future opportunities
Conceptual
- 0% of female candidates understand the
three career tracks or how they relate to
future opportunities
- 0% of female candidates understand
what key development assignments
mean or how they correlate to career
progression
Motivation.
- Female officer candidates attribute
success and failure to their own
efforts
Motivation.
- Female candidates need to be
confident that they can secure
combat force assignments
Attribution Theory
Self-Efficacy
- 100% of female candidates believe that
success is due to personal effort, 83%
assert group effort, yet 0% pursue
combat forces
- 44% of female candidates believe they
can compete against men
Motivation.
- Female officer candidates have a
mastery approach to performance
Goal Orientation
Theory
- 66% of female candidates said there’s a
combat force knowledge gap; education,
experienced SME
Cultural Models.
- Female candidates need to
perceive that the organization
supports a culture of cohesion
among both male and female
officer candidates
- Female officer candidates need
SMA processes in implementing a
curriculum that align with combat
force training
Cultural Model
- Countering cultural barriers that reduce
interest and discourage effort for gender
integration into combat forces
- 66% of female officer candidates state
there are systemic covert biases in
promoting unit cohesion for women in
combat forces
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 81
Table 9, continued
Assumed Influences KMO Designation Correlating Theme(s) in the Data
Cultural Settings.
- Female candidates need to
perceive that organizational
settings support female
integration into combat forces
- Female officer candidates need
to believe that senior leaders
have a vested interest in their
future opportunities
Cultural Setting
- 50% of female candidates say that the
current settings do not foster integration
into combat forces or senior levels
- 83% of female officer candidates state
they have not witnessed senior leader
vision or strategies for breaking down
gender barriers
Results and Findings for Knowledge Influences
The results and findings in this chapter were developed by using Clark and Estes’ (2008)
analytical framework. Through data analysis and evaluation protocols, the framework exposed
KMO influencers that contribute to the gender inequity gap. The results indicate that the gender
gap is attributable to a need in knowledge, discouraged motivation, and cultural models and
settings that fail to achieve goals. This study takes the results from Chapter Four and turns them
into innovative strategies and evaluation criteria that may reduce the gender inequity gap.
Confirmed Knowledge Gaps
The criteria used to validate the knowledge influence gaps focused on themes found in
participant responses. Clark and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis framework was used to highlight the
procedural and conceptual knowledge for gender integration into combat forces. Two of the
themes that emerged were a need in how to go about pursuing combat force roles and a need for
knowledge in what combat forces do. In terms of credibility and triangulation for validating
knowledge gaps, artifact analysis provided operating procedures, performance, and evaluation
tools that contribute to learning and confidence building. The following sections highlight the
prominent knowledge themes found in the data from the six female officer candidates.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 82
Procedural knowledge: Female officer candidates need procedural knowledge
because they rank themselves at the lower end in tactical proficiency. It was evident that
50% of participants need tactical proficiency. The initial assumption with why females do not
pursue combat force assignments was that there was no interest in the CMF. However, the results
show that the problem has more to do with a need in knowledge, gender perspectives, and poor
information flow. Particularly focus is needed to enhance tactical knowledge and expertise
through the application of practical exercises in the curriculum. For example, Diana shared, “I
think it’s harder for me to learn tactics, I’ve just noticed through different subjects. That’s
probably my hardest or most challenging.” Diana’s comments resonate with other participants
who do not possess combat force expertise Although it is rare for officer candidates to not
possess combat experience, this need contributes to the decision in not pursuing combat force
assignments. As Diana stated,
Compared to everybody else? I’m on the lower end. I could still accomplish what I need
to do tactically, but it’s not something that I excel at. I’m not sure if it’s that. I’m not
interested in it or invested in it, but I just, it doesn’t click to me as easily as others.
Likewise, Erika faced a similar view with the need in procedural knowledge, education,
and tactical proficiency. She shared, “I still am very nervous about phase III and I don’t know
everything about all things, work tactics, and stuff.”
Procedural knowledge is essential for female candidates to master as it is aligned to
future promotions, opportunities, and increased responsibility in the LSM. Regardless of the
CMF path selected, mastering tactical proficiency helps build leadership capacity and enhances
experience while conducting critical leadership procedures (Rueda, 2011; Yough & Anderman,
2006). As previously noted, 50% of the female participants need tactical proficiency, the other
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 83
50% are more confident. Francesca shared her experience and stated, “in terms of understanding
tactical military experience, I had zero. As time progressed, it definitely increased. I’m way more
confident than I was. I’m progressively more confident in my tactics.”
Standardized procedures are essential for building leadership capacity. As such, the
SMA uses a fundamental artifact to outline leadership expectations: the OC guide. The OC guide
explains the tasks, conditions, and standards for mastering procedural tasks. When officer
candidates fail to master such tasks, they are afforded remediation. Remediation is additional
time and training to build confidence and experience. As such, the OC guide provides a process
for tactical proficiency evaluations with the use of a field leadership assessment form. The form
is used to validate tactical leadership proficiency. Thus, based on these two artifacts, there is a
high probability that the SMA is currently experiencing a knowledge gap causing 50% of female
candidates to rank themselves low in tactical proficiency, confidence, and expertise.
Female officer candidates need more time to practice in order to improve
procedural knowledge. When asked about comparisons and differences in leading a rifle
platoon and an OCS platoon, none of the participants could explain the procedures or knowledge
in how to do so. This finding was relevant and evident that just two months prior to graduation.
The participants were unprepared to excel during phase III of the commissioning program. For
clarity, all candidates are required to undergo platoon level leadership training and assessments
prior to culminating the program. The curriculum is structured to replicate an infantry platoon
conducting tactical level operations. As such, the comparisons mirror each other, the troop
leading procedures are the same, the principles are the same, and yet none of the participants
could articulate how they relate or differ. Beatrice was clear about her knowledge and said, “I’m
not sure about a rifle platoon.” Likewise, Catherine stated, “I have not been in that situation. I
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 84
imagine like being any other officer.” Moreover, Alice shared, “I’m honestly not sure we have
the experience in that yet.” A quick artifact assessment determined that candidates are required
to lead a platoon, according to the OC guide and the field leadership assessment form. This
discovery was made at the end of June, prior to the commissioning validation set for August. The
risk to this gap exposes the possibility of female candidates not being prepared to pass the
commissioning validation events during phase III, hence, leading a platoon in a tactical scenario.
Studies imply that 70% to 90% of what we know about learning is done unconsciously
and is often based on how we learn in group settings (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Clark & Estes,
2008; Mayer, 2011). The inability to master tactical proficiency like leading a platoon correlates
to a high likelihood of no interest of leading soldiers in combat forces. Alice explained how the
SMA cadre went about preparing the candidates to lead a platoon,
I don’t really have a lot of experience in that. Knowing what it would be like to lead a
rifle platoon, going out there and doing our STX lanes. We get basic knowledge, at the
end of the day, when we go to get assessed, they know we only know the basics.
Escobar (2013) and Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) pointed out that females working in
male- dominated professions require additional time and training to develop constructive skills,
equal schema, and experience to meet organizational expectations. As such, Catherine summed it
best when she said, “we have to put in a lot more time and effort to meet that standard, meet that
level.” Procedural knowledge and tactical proficiency cannot be validated with the wave of the
hand. Time and repetitive training are required to build proficiency and leadership capacity.
Conceptual knowledge: Female officer candidates do not understand the three CMF
paths or how they correlate to future opportunities. Based on the results and findings, none of
the participants could distinguish the difference between combat force, CS and CSS (U.S. Army,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 85
2014a; SMA, 2018). These are the CMF paths that can cement careers that lead to senior-level
roles if the candidates are inclined to pursue the opportunities. During the focus group setting,
Alice confirmed the need for conceptual knowledge by stating, “I’m not really familiar myself.
I’m not familiar with exactly how they all interact or support each other. I’m not, I’d have to look
at a chart.” Based on the feedback, female candidates are encouraged to pursue CMF paths that
align with the status quo: military intelligence, logistics, and human resources. By pursuing the
status quo, female candidates unknowingly limit their potential by not pursuing key development
assignments that lead to promotions. They unwittingly take the easy way out because they do not
possess the knowledge or expertise to take on the demanding roles that place them in the same
circle as 80% of general officers who came up through the combat force CMF (Haring, 2013).
Krathwohl (2002) contended that conceptual knowledge connects information from the
current setting to leading indicators and long-term vision. As such, a review of the organizational
artifacts demonstrates that the leadership evaluation report is clearly aligned to assess cultural
values and competency concepts. The result suggests that female candidates should know how to
conceptualize career progression. The conceptual knowledge need demonstrates that the SMA is
lacking preparation of future officers. In addition, it is evident that the SMA does not possess
assessment feedback to reduce the knowledge gaps.
Female officer candidates do not understand what key development assignments
mean or how they correlate to career progression. Based on conceptual knowledge interview
findings, none of the participants could elaborate on which concepts are important for CMF career
progression. However, 66% of female candidates indicated that “encouraging others and team-
building” relate to career progression. This finding implies a need for conceptual knowledge with
managing CMF career progression. At this stage, candidates do not understand how their careers
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 86
are developed or how they can go about maximizing their progression through key development
assignments in conceptual means or continue with the status quo. Alice answered,
They’re all important, but, for myself, I’m going to use an example of self-discipline.
Knowing when I need to go exercise, knowing when not to have that piece of cake. I relate
that to physical fitness, in the sense of having self-discipline, like making better choices.
Later on, Alice explained, “sometimes you have to fake it.” The need for knowledge and
CMF career progression was echoed across participants. Beatrice guesses that the concepts that
contribute to career progression include “being familiar with the AR 6-22 where it talks about
leader core competencies and stuff. Like leads, develops, and character presence, things like that.”
Beatrice’s guess shows that female officer candidates possess the awareness in what is required to
perform as a leader in combat forces. Catherine also added,
As a female candidate, I think command presence is one of the most important and also, at
the same time, challenging. We have to put in a lot more time and effort to meet that
standard. I have a high-pitched voice that works against me. It’s not easy for me.
During the focus group session, another conceptual question about key development
assignments was asked and only Alice attempted a deductive guess by stating, “they’re specific in
a way that it’s an additional assignment but it gives you the experience to develop yourself in
specific areas, so you become a better overall leader in that sense.” Alice was the only participant
who attempted to correlate how key development assignments pertain to career progression. Of
particular concern with this knowledge gap among 83% of the participants is that it also supports
CMF paths towards the status quo. Failing to understand how key development assignments
influence career development ought to be a cause for concern for officer candidates.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 87
Results and Findings for Motivation Influences
The conceptual framework aligns motivational influences with the key stakeholder group.
The motivational results and findings revealed the cause for female candidates not pursuing
combat forces may be due to biased cultural influencers. As such, the need pursue combat force
assignments correlates directly to learning and organizational culture factors. The influencers
discourage female candidates from thinking about pursuing combat forces. As a result, these
decisions lead to reduced gender integration trends. The following sections highlight the focal
motivational data themes that align with attribution and goal orientation theories. This
motivational influence section focuses on competence and mastering tasks that lead to goals.
Attribution Theory
Female officer candidates attribute success and failure to their own efforts. It is clear
that all participants attribute success to their own personal efforts. Furthermore, 83% of all
participants agree that group effort contributes to collective success. Based on these findings, it is
reasonable to expect one or two participants to choose combat forces. However, the results show
otherwise, none of the participants pursued combat forces. The result is an assumed motivational
influence gap that is divided two-fold: one is cultural bias and the other is an assumption among
females who believe that they cannot compete against combat force males. Beatrice highlights
the growth in attribution but also shares that in the end, it was a “mental-effort” which enabled
her to break through and realize that she is just as capable as any male. Beatrice explained,
When I started, I had a lot of self-doubt because you’re constantly being put in these
situations that aren’t normal, especially me coming out of college. Having gotten through
all of that has given me more confidence. Mentally, I think I broke through the idea that I
can’t do it, it gives me confidence in other things that I want to do.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 88
The assumed motivation influence behind attribution theory is that success is determined
by personal effort, active choice, and perseverance (Bandura, 1997; Clark & Estes, 2008). As
such, attribution theory focuses on the belief that there are reasons as to why certain things
happen. Those beliefs are determining factors in how choices are made in the future (Anderman
& Anderman, 2006). Erika highlights a cultural bias she experienced with a recruiter. The bias
was enough to convince her that her idea was not logical or sound. Erika clarified,
When I first joined, it was shocking to my recruiter about going combat arms. And then
along the lines, I met my significant other and now I’m like, okay, I want to have a
family and work. I love action, adrenaline, and I already have that with my civilian job. I
don’t think I’d be able to balance family and life.
Anderman and Anderman (2006) and Pintrich (2003) posited that cognitive learning and
motivation can enhance future goal achievement. Francesca’s positive outlook on organizational
learning sheds light on the relevance to the theory when she stated, “In general, I feel like you
can master anything. Like any task that’s given, it can help. It just depends on you.” As such, the
SMA enhances learning by focusing on tactical exercises that improve individual performance
through collective efforts. This process helps candidates understand why certain things happen,
how those beliefs shape their potential, and how success is attributed to personal efforts. Thus,
the attributed effort for mastering tasks can be used to achieve future goals. Alice explained, “my
body reacted differently, made me realize that I could do more and that I have the capacity to be
a great leader as I get more and more mentorship and experience.” Francesca’s perception of
pursuing other opportunities was evident when she said, “definitely, I want to pursue more
challenges.” Catherine provided a similar view with attribution when she stated, “definitely, your
own effort because they are starting points, nobody can do for you...you have to do it yourself.”
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 89
A review of the OC guide illustrates policies and relief standards. The policies outline
expectations that members have to abide by. Policies touch on fraternization, appearance,
preparation, and contraband. The standards focus more on punitive actions if candidates fail to
meet course standards. Another artifact that adds credibility to attribution is the leadership
evaluation report which focuses on character, presence, and intellect. These artifacts contribute to
cultural learning and possessing the proper motivation to achieve individual and collective goals.
Self-Efficacy
Female officer candidates need confidence in obtaining combat force roles. As noted
in the findings, all female candidates attribute success to personal effort. However, only 44%
of participants feel confident in competing against their male peers in combat forces. Thus, 56%
of participants lack confidence to compete against males. Although self-efficacy is a motivational
construct, the influence also ties back to knowledge where female officer candidates need more
practice to improve procedural knowledge (Pajares, 2006). As such, the need for confidence may
be attributable to cultural stereotypes, covert bias, and negative attitudes that influence women’s
views. As an example, Francesca explained,
I think that if I were to go, I feel like there is a negative stigma in the military for women
joining combat arms… I don’t think I would be able to progress on the same level as my
male counterparts, only because I think that the military has been very male-dominated.
I’m not going combat arms but I wanted to in a sense.
In comparison, Alice explained how women not only compete with men but are actually
better at multitasking, delegating, supervising, and leading when under pressure,
I feel personally that I would do well just because I’ve experienced a lot of stress in my
life and I know how to multitask. I feel like sometimes females bring that, you know,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 90
being able to delegate and track what’s going on. I’m not saying that males can’t do that.
Sometimes males tend to get distracted.
In contrast, Francesca mentioned that although she is confident in her leadership ability,
she was discouraged about combat forces because she lacked experience and would struggle in
the beginning. Francesca said, “I’ve heard some males in combat arms say that women don’t
belong, I don’t believe them. I wouldn’t mind shifting over once I build my experience a little.”
Bandura (1997) suggests that individuals can attain self-determination in differing
environment if they are able to master vicarious, verbal, and interpretative learning. A cursory
review of artifacts shows that the SMA takes pride in living the virtues of the Army values. As
such, the Army values are displayed both on the leadership evaluation report and on the officer
candidate guide. The Army values are an inherent part of an officer’s core traits. Although the
LSM takes pride in living the Army values, studies imply that some male leaders devalue the
potential for female leaders to succeed (DiTomaso et al., 2007; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012;
Szayna et al., 2016). Thus, the dynamics of military culture have to be reviewed before making a
viable recommendation (Erwin, 2012; Szayna et al., 2016). Senior leaders are critical catalysts
and change agents for reducing bias and negative behavior (Haring, 2013; Lewis, 2011).
Goal Orientation Theory
Female officer candidates have a mastery approach to performance. It was evident
that 83% of participants support the decision to integrate women into combat forces. However,
66% of participants need knowledge, education, and experience for women to serve in combat
forces. This finding demonstrates a need for gender perspectives and on how to go about
obtaining accurate and relevant information for pursuing combat force assignments. Francesca
explained, “I think women should always support other women but I don’t think our military
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 91
should have a gender attached to it at all.” The finding is a common theme found with goal
orientation theory, which aligns well with achievement behavior (Rueda, 2011). As such, goal
orientation seeks to establish mastery orientation by enhancing learning through motivation and
performance (Lazowski & Hulleman, 2016). For Diana, her challenge was more in line with
learning. She stated, “I think it’s harder for me to learn tactics, I’ve just noticed through different
subjects.” Alice provided a similar view with goal orientation when she remarked, “there’s a lot
of doubt because of the way women are brought up.” Beatrice sought information on combat
forces but did not have the processes to follow through: “I did try to look up stuff, and it’s so
hard to find information, and you also don’t know where to look. So, I think the biggest thing is
just not even knowing where to look. I’m pretty good at research.”
Beatrice’s attempt to find combat force information demonstrates an interest in learning
from mistakes and reflects, in general, the mastery orientation by female officer candidates.
However, the SMA currently has a need for knowledge, processes, and expertise bridging the
gaps. Goal orientation theory encourages individuals to adopt mastery goals and learning
(Lazowski & Hulleman, 2016). Catherine shared details on learning from a female perspective,
If we have women who are already in combat arms, talk to them, they have experience.
That will probably help and give a better picture than having to talk to somebody who
has been an infantry special force and is a male. Personally, I want a female perspective.
A review of artifacts reveals the SMA is well resourced to validate goal orientation,
particularly mastery of key tasks. Key tasks are listed in the OC guide, the leadership evaluation
report which focuses on key leader attributes and the self-assessment report which highlights
strengths and improvement. Lastly, the SMA is not resourced to answer the female officer
candidate questions that pertain to combat force processes.
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Results and Findings for Organizational Influence
Within the framework, organizational culture influences emerged as knowledge and
motivation themes and categories. As seen in the data below, decisions for not pursuing combat
forces are based on barriers. Such barriers are commonly found within cultural models and
cultural settings. Cultural models are conceptual beliefs that help members understand how to go
about solving complex issues (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001; Rueda, 2011). In comparison,
cultural settings are visible locations that enable individuals the opportunity to solve issues. The
following sections include cultural categories and themes from the six female officer candidates.
Cultural Models
Female candidates need to perceive that the organization supports a culture of
cohesion among both male and female candidates. When asked about lower unit cohesion and
reduced readiness due to women in male-dominated professions, 66% of female candidates
believe that the stereotypical answer is a poor excuse. Diana said, “anything new is going to be a
disruptor, stop using women as an excuse for unit readiness. I think given time it’ll be fine. But,
right now, with the transition, it’s pretty rough still.” Alice explained a similar view: “I think it
comes down to attitude. I think that if there’s resistance, they contradict themselves.” These
opposing views towards stereotypes demonstrate that female candidates continue to face barriers.
Beatrice went more in-depth with the details of her experience and added,
I think it goes back to the way men interact with each other when a female is there and
continuing to interact the way that they normally do. There’s a different mentality there
and I think they sometimes don’t know how to conduct themselves.
The organizational model responses contend that 66% of participants believe there are
covert views and gender stereotypes that limit their opportunities. The finding indicates that the
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 93
cultural model requires senior leader engagement and a policy change in order to hold resisters
accountable. The cultural model requires prudent risk in changing the culture by implementing a
strategy that builds on shared consciousness and ensuring that desired outcomes are supported
with clear and leading indicators for long-term goals. As such, Francesca shared this point of
view by asserting, “I feel like if anything it would build it more because women think differently
than men in a lot of aspects. So, I feel like it would encourage more unit cohesion than reduce
it.” Her perceptions fall in line with what has occurred in the military for the past 28 years:
female service members contributed to combat and special operations across the globe without
reducing readiness on unit cohesion.
A review of artifacts infers that the organization needs a clear cultural model that
supports shared mental schema. The artifacts highlight traits, characteristics, and values for
doing the right thing. However, there are no regulatory protocols or policies that codify shared
consciousness in how to think about gender. Covert biases persist because resisters have no fear
of consequences with non-engaged leaders. Furthermore, the need for gender perspectives
contributes to the persistence of covert biases within the LSM’s organizational culture.
Cultural Settings
Female officer candidates need SMA processes in implementing a curriculum that
align with combat force training. The findings report that 50% of participants believe that the
SMA needs processes that provide institutional knowledge in how female officer candidates can
go about pursuing indoctrination into combat forces before graduating from the SMA. The
current cultural model fails to address this relevant question. For example, in describing the
SMA experience and pursuing a combat force path, Beatrice noted,
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I think it could be better in terms of getting into a combat arms field. I feel like we don’t
really know anyone and it would be helpful if we had people who were in. Those few
women who went into the field, come talk to us. I don’t think that necessarily we can’t do
it, but we’re probably discouraged because of the comments we hear.
The SMA provides a dynamic environment for educating, learning, training but misses on
opportunities that add value to collective outcomes of the LSM. Erika provided a view that has
not been exploited, “it is helpful when we have a female cadre as opposed to just males. I feel
like a female officer is more of a mentor to females and men just don’t know how to push us.”
This finding was echoed in an informal conversation with a female cadre member and support
staff at the SMA. The information provides a great opportunity that can enhance and help build a
network of support for female officer candidates who are motivated to break down barriers. In
addition, Beatrice mentioned a similar sentiment about the status quo and how the SMA misses
opportunities, “we need some kind of course, not just sexual harassment, or about cultural
sensitivity.” This remark lends support for correcting stereotypes and gender assumptions
through gender perspective education. Likewise, Francesca shared a similar view,
I don’t think it’s really harped on that you should go one branch or another. I feel like if it
was taught more, like women should go this route because of this and not try to
influence them, just educating them. I’m honestly more focused on like infantry in itself.
These themes shed light on the SMA’s low level of creativity with meeting real-world
demands, specifically, how to improve gender integration into combat forces, filling critical
leader shortages, and improving the readiness of organizations with qualified leaders. In
addition, these themes highlight the status quo with how the military functions. The innovative
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 95
approach would be to assess what worked and what required updating. Beatrice adds additional
insight into the current lack of resources at the SMA:
I think it’s the lack of resources, lack of information, lack of not having any precedents or
knowing about anyone who’s done it before. It’s discouraging because female leaders are
looked at differently and scrutinized far more significantly than a male leader.
A review of document analysis provides conflicting details to the cultural standards and
expectations of female officer candidates. The candidates are focused on achieving individual
and collective goals. However, the SMA curriculum fails to provide insight, knowledge, and
gender education with what to expect after graduating from the SMA. This organizational model
discourages candidates from pursuing opportunities that could enhance numerous organizations
within the LSM. As such, female candidates need processes that align to combat forces training.
Female officer candidates need to perceive that the organizational setting supports
female integration into combat forces. The assumed influence suggests that the current
organizational setting do not foster integration into combat forces. The results report that 50% of
participants possess this perception. It is evident that the reason for this organizational gap has
more to do with the shared consciousness of the organization in open settings. In addition, the
results imply that senior leaders have a vested interest to create new cultures and growth for the
organization. As such, female candidates acknowledge that gender integration opportunities have
to be seized rather than waiting for persuasion. Alice explained,
My outlook on that has changed over the years. I’ve seen females given opportunities.
I’ve seen how females have wanted to be in those positions. I’ve had to push myself. I’ve
had to prove myself both, you know, knowledge-wise and physically.
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The results suggest that there is a shared consciousness gap in the LSM cultural settings.
The organization needs a culture that supports the integration of females into combat forces. As
such, leaders possess the authority and urgency to affect change (Lewis, 2011). Furthermore, the
decision to support the initiative cannot be seen with risk-averse eyes. This is an institutional
paradigm shift in which the military is expected to adapt to in order to perform effectively in the
future. Female service members have made significant contributions to the military for the past
75 years and as such, the integration initiative should not be discounted due to personal opinions,
covert biases or gender stereotypes from senior leaders (Szayna et al., 2016).
Beatrice does not know of any women who have served in combat but is astutely aware
of the gender integration mandate and expectations of the Army officers. As such, she said,
I do know one person and he doesn’t particularly like this person. He is constantly
putting her down and it makes me feel like, that’s how a lot of males behave with women
or talk about them. I think it’s just ignorance. Women have to learn to work with that.
In her short time in the military, Francesca explained her experiences about women
serving in combat or knowing someone who served with them in such a capacity. Francesca’s
experiences are new patterns since the SECDEF opened combat roles to women. She stated,
I think war itself is very chaotic, and I think that the military is trying to put structure to
it. I think that women are definitely a part of it and they shouldn’t be disliked for joining.
I guess for me, it doesn’t really make sense to exclude women from combat arms.
A review of artifacts shows that senior leaders rarely share their philosophical views or
professional opinions about gender inequity in open settings. Thus, missed opportunities for
resolving cultural dilemmas that may expose cultural misbehaviors. The results suggest that open
settings are the optimal venue for resolving misaligned issues that reduce unit cohesion.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 97
Female officer candidates need to believe that senior leaders have a vested interest
in their future opportunities. Current efforts to enhance gender integration in combat forces
within the LSM have reached a plateau. The findings contend that 83% of participants have not
witnessed senior leaders share their philosophical or professional opinions for breaking down
gender barriers. A review of artifacts implies that, although senior leaders do publish policies to
improve organizations, most are outdated or reflect the philosophical views of previous leaders.
Furthermore, it is rare for senior leaders to expound on their views for change and expectations
in open settings. Beatrice shared her views in how senior leaders fail to break down barriers,
I think there’s a lot of room for improvement. I don’t feel like we’ve really touched on
that much at all. I definitely would’ve liked to have seen it because I didn’t feel like it
was existing. Not that they don’t want it to be or that they weren’t trying.
Erika shared a similar view, “I think they’re trying but I think it’s going to take time. I
think we’re still far away from reducing gender barriers.” Cultural change experiences differ
with the urgency of individual leader. An example of a forward-thinking leader who challenged
the status quo was witnessed by Alice. Up to this point in her career, Alice had only witnessed
negative attitudes. Her opinions changed after seeing a senior leader address the problem behind
closed doors. Alice said, “I sat in closed-door discussions where a one-star general said that he
wanted to get the word out and increase the media attention where they’re breaking that barrier.”
Alice’s observation is rare in the sense that the act took place behind closed doors. Her 20
years of service also suggests that the observation was unique. In contrast, Francesca’s military
experience provides an alternate view. Francesca asserted, “in this environment, I really don’t
feel like I’ve ever felt like gender has been an issue.” As with the previous organizational setting,
a review of artifacts reveals no clear indication for reducing the gender inequity gap in open
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 98
settings. The results of this study imply that senior leaders selectively pursue politically
influenced talking points in order to avoid risk to their careers.
Synthesis
The findings for procedural and conceptual knowledge indicate that 50% female officer
candidates rank themselves at the lower end of tactical proficiency. The results imply that female
candidates need more time to practice in order to improve on both knowledge dimensions. The
results also contend that female candidates do not know how the CMF and key development
assignments correlate to future opportunities. In terms of motivation, the study contends that
female candidates attribute their success and failure to their own efforts. As such, only 44% of
female candidates have the confidence to compete against their male peers for coveted roles.
Furthermore, the study suggests that although 66% of female candidates face covert bias, they
display a mastery approach for learning and growing from their experiences. For cultural models
and settings, the study shows that female candidates need to perceive that the culture supports an
environment for cohesion among both genders. As such, female candidates need to perceive that
the organizational setting supports female integration into combat forces. Finally, female officer
candidates need to believe that senior leaders have a vested interest in their future opportunities.
Summary of Validated Influences
The results and findings that emerged from the data proposes that the confirmed KMO
influences require a need for gender perspective education, procedural proficiency, and senior
leader engagement in open settings. The sentiment among stakeholders suggest that more can be
done to reduce the gender inequity gap. Listed in Table 10 are the confirmed assets or needs for
KMO influences. Chapter Five highlights validated influences, proposed recommendations, and
an assessed implementation that support the integration of women into combat forces.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 99
Table 10
Confirmed Assets and Needs KMO Influences
KMO Influences Priority Asset/Need
Confirmed Knowledge Influence
50% of female officer candidates need procedural knowledge because they
rank themselves at the lower end in tactical proficiency
100% of female officer candidates need more time to practice in order to
improve procedural knowledge
Y
Y
Need
Need
100% of female officer candidates do not understand what key
development assignments mean or how they correlate to career progression
100% of female officer candidates do not understand the three CMFs or
how they correlate to future opportunities
Y
Y
Need
Need
Confirmed Motivation Influence
83% of female officer candidates attribute success and failure to their own
efforts (AT)
Y Asset
56% of female officer candidates need confidence in obtaining combat
force roles (SET)
Y Need
66% of female officer candidates have a mastery approach to performance
and need knowledge and experience for combat force service (GOT)
Y Asset
Confirmed Organizational Influence
66% of female officer candidates need to perceive that the organization
supports a culture of cohesion among both male and female candidates
50% of female officer candidates need SMA processes in implementing a
curriculum that align with combat force training
Y
Y
Need
Need
50% of female officer candidates need to perceive that organizational
settings supports female integration into combat forces
83% of female officer candidates need to believe that senior leaders have a
vested interest in their future opportunities
Y
Y
Need
Need
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 100
CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS KMO INFLUENCES
Chapter Four provided the data analysis findings from the interactions with six female
officer candidates. Additional information was made available from informal discussions with a
female cadre member and candid feedback from an SME sitting-in during data collection. The
findings and results from Chapter Four were categorized from KMO themes that answered three
research questions. Although there were challenges with qualitative assessments, the findings
confirmed how KMO influences affect stakeholder goals and cultural change. Thus, Chapter
Five proposes an innovative and integrated implementation plan for change.
This innovative strategy seeks to validate how the proposed intervention process affects
the gender inequity phenomenon. This implementation process also influences the urgency for
change. Chapter Five aligns KMO recommendations to help improve female integration into
combat forces, reduce the gender inequity gap, and increase readiness in the LSM. In addition,
this chapter proposes an implementation plan that integrates resources, SMEs, and assessments
to address the need for knowledge at the SMA. The plan calls for a stakeholder workshop that
assesses reaction, learning, behavior change, and goal achievement (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016; Tuckman, 2006). Once initiated, the implementation plan becomes the new curriculum for
gender education and combat force knowledge in the SMA. The implementation plan identifies
initiatives, leading indicators, and drivers that measure the progress for achieving desired results.
As such, the plan incorporates the use of the New World Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick
& Kirkpatrick, 2016). The focus of the model is on developing protocols in reverse order by (a)
identifying the desired outcomes (Level 4), (b) creating drivers and leading indicators to change
behaviors (Level 3), (c) fostering learning (Level 2), and (d) assessing participant reactions
(Level 1). Finally, Chapter Five concludes with opportunities for additional research.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 101
Organizational Context and Mission
As noted in Chapter One, the SMA is located in the state of California and serves as the
LSM commissioning program for entry-level military officers. The program is divided into three
phases; (a) phase I is three months long and assesses physical and mental abilities, (b) phase II is
12 months long and assesses leadership capacity, knowledge and motivation, (c) phase is III
months long and culminates with a tactical field exercise on that validates procedural and
conceptual knowledge. Candidates who pass move onto the selection process for CMF paths.
Organizational Performance Goal
As described throughout the study, by June 2020, the SMA will implement a systematic
process to educate and train 100% of officer candidates on the combat force CMF paths that
achieve a 20% to 30% increase for critical leader shortages. Failure to address the confirmed
KMO influence gaps will result in continued gender inequity and the status quo in stereotypes.
Description of Stakeholder Groups
The primary stakeholder group included six SMA female officer candidates. Their
experiences and perceptions contribute to how they see their world (Lewis, 2011; Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). The second stakeholder group includes the SMA cadre who asses candidates. The
third stakeholder group are senior leaders who retain the authority and resources for change.
Goal of the Stakeholder Group for the Study
For this deliberate study, the primary stakeholder group are six female officer candidates.
As such, the goal of the stakeholder group is to increase the interest and number of females for
combat force assignments in order to fill key leader shortages. It essential that by August 2019,
100% of SMA female officer candidates demonstrate, with a 100% accuracy, their knowledge of
SMA standards to undergo pre-assessment training to qualify for service in combat forces.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 102
Purpose of the Project and Questions
The purpose of this innovative study was to conduct a needs’ analysis of KMO resources
required to achieve a 100% understanding to pursue combat force assignments. The research
questions were designed to elicit the perspectives and experiences from female officer candidates
who can shed light on the phenomenon. As such, their perspectives and experiences can expose
the triggers that motivate other female officer candidates to choose combat force assignments.
The intent for this study is to develop options that reduce the LSM’s gender inequity gap.
Introduction and Overview
This chapter aligns KMO influences, research questions, conceptual framework, and data
analysis results to produce viable recommendations. By the end of this program, female officer
candidates will possess the knowledge to understand how combat forces, key development roles,
and CMF paths enhance careers. The 100% increase in knowledge seeks to empower female
candidates to make informed decisions that can improve gender equity in the LSM. As such, the
current curriculum does not provide a return on expectations for collective goals (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016). This study sought to determine how KMO influences shape the decisions for
not pursuing combat forces. The recommendations align with three research questions:
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 103
This section highlights the assumed knowledge influences that have a high probability for
reducing the need in knowledge for leadership proficiency and the inability to understand how
key assignments contribute to future opportunities. Clark and Estes (2008) places such needs into
a theoretical context and shared that educating people enhances their capacity for generating new
ideas and knowledge for solving complex problems. Hence, female officer candidates seeking
leadership mastery in order to prepare for key assignments in male-dominated roles. Leveraging
the framework and recommendations improves the probability for reducing the inequity gap
through complexity in learning, learner, and environment (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
Table 11 depicts the assumed knowledge influences and recommendations for the study.
Table 11
Summary of Assumed Knowledge Influences and Recommendations
Assumed Knowledge Influence Need/
Asset
Priority
Principle and Citation Context-Specific
Recommendation
Procedural Knowledge.
- Female officer candidates need
need procedural knowledge
because they rank themselves at
the lower end in tactical
proficiency. (P)
- Female officer candidates need
more time to practice in order
to improve procedural
knowledge. (P)
Conceptual Knowledge.
- Female officer candidates do
not understand what key
development assignments
mean or how they correlate
to career progression (D)
- Female officer candidates
do not understand the three
CMFs or how they correlate
to future opportunities. (D)
Need
Need
Y
Y
Procedural knowledge
improves when
declarative knowledge
includes cognitive load
and human capital skills
(Aguinis & Kraiger,
2009; Northouse, 2016).
Conceptual knowledge
improves when
declarative knowledge
includes skills approach
and three-skills model
(Aguinis & Kraiger,
2009; Northouse, 2016).
Provide job aids that
illustrate leadership
principles and troop
leading procedures
that improve
leadership capacity
for success in combat
force assignments.
Provide career path
information for
growth, self-
development, and
mentorship for key
developmental
assignments.
* Indicates knowledge type for assumed influence: (D)eclarative; (P)rocedural
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 104
Declarative Knowledge Solutions
The assumed declarative knowledge influences identified in Chapter Two and analyzed
in Chapter Four focuses on the need for knowledge and leadership awareness found within
combat forces. The assumed knowledge influences were codified on the claims that female
candidates need procedural knowledge, tactical proficiency, and more time to assimilate into
combat forces. These factors contribute to effectively leading in a male-dominated profession.
Female officer candidates need procedural knowledge because they rank themselves
at the lower end in tactical proficiency. The findings contend that 50% of participants need
declarative knowledge and tactical proficiency. This finding is likely due to a need in knowledge
and training processes. A recommendation rooted in cognitive load and human capital theory has
the potential for improving tactical proficiency and declarative procedural knowledge (Clark &
Estes, 2008). Stakeholder goals can be achieved by managing how tasks are learned and applied
(Pajares, 2006; Schraw & McCrudden, 2006). The recommendation requires job aids that
illustrate leadership principles and troop leading procedures that enhance learning.
Studies indicate that much of what we know about learning is done unconsciously and
based on how we learn (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Mayer, 2011). Most skills and knowledge
begin as conceptual and conscious but then morphs into automated expertise used to solve
complex problems (Clark & Estes, 2008; Northouse, 2016). Studies show that women have no
shortage of human capital, as 57% of bachelor’s and over 61% of advanced degrees are obtained
by them (Escobar, 2013; Hindlian et al., 2018; Northouse, 2016). Based on evidence, women
only need time to hone equal schema and constructive processes to lead in male-dominated
professions (Escobar, 2013; Pajares, 2006; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Schraw & McCrudden,
2006). Clark and Estes (2008) and Rueda (2011) argue that the gap analysis model provides a
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 105
high probability for enhancing procedural knowledge and meeting desired goals. People need
opportunities to use mental effort to develop a deeper understanding of knowledge (Aguinis &
Kraiger, 2009; Pajares, 2006). As such, the proposed implementation plan would educate and
prepare female candidates for future opportunities in combat forces by enhancing proficiency.
Female officer candidates need more time to practice and in order to improve
procedural knowledge. Results and findings indicated that no participants could articulate the
procedures or knowledge to compare and contrast the differences in leading an SMA or rifle
platoon. Doctrinally, the procedures mirror each other. Hence, there is little to no difference in
leading either platoon. However, the findings assert that female candidates have not received
sufficient time to practice tactical proficiency with a platoon. The finding is a critical point in the
study because in order to graduate from the SMA, candidates need to display proficiency and
confidence when leading a platoon during tactical scenarios. As such, a recommendation rooted
in organized learning and self-efficacy retains the potential to improve tactical proficiency and
confidence (Pajares, 2006; Schraw & McCrudden, 2006). The solution requires greater lead time
for training in order to build self-efficacy. The increased time combines tactics, education, job
aids, practical exercises, leadership principles, and troop leading procedures to improve equal
mental schema (Escobar, 2013; Randazzo-Matsel et al., 2012; Szayna et al., 2016).
Studies report 70% to 90% of what we know about learning is based on repetitive steps in
group settings (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Clark & Estes, 2008; Mayer, 2011). The additional
time to practice allows candidates to build experience in how to lead a platoon while enhancing
their confidence to take on additional positions of responsibility. This process cannot be achieved
with the wave of the hand. Time and repetitive training are required to build proficiency and
leadership capacity. Without implementing this viable strategy, female officer candidates will
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 106
likely continue to pursue non-combat force career paths that fall in line with the status quo. Their
need in tacit knowledge and proficiency are factors for not choosing combat forces assignments.
Females officer candidates do not understand the three CMF paths or how they
correlate to future opportunities. Data analysis suggests that all participants have a need for
CMF knowledge in how to obtain opportunities within combat forces. A recommendation founded
on skills approach and three-skills model possesses the probability for reducing the declarative
conceptual knowledge gap. There are overwhelming benefits with understanding the conceptual
knowledge that lead to professional growth and key development assignments within CMF
(Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Northouse, 2016; U.S. Army, 2014a). According to Baldwin (1996)
and Dougherty (2004), CMF paths retain the potential to enhance career progression because of
the processes and protocols that have systematically benefitted only one demographic gender. The
recommendation calls for job aids to display the three CMF fields and how to navigate them by
obtaining additional broadening opportunities that increase confidence, proficiency and mastery in
a given field. An innovative option to consider for reducing this gap is to leverage SMEs who
have successfully transitioned through the rigors in male-dominated professions. SMEs can serve
as guest speakers to shed light on the topic of females in combat forces.
Rueda (2011) shared that, if people don’t know what they are supposed to know, there is
a strong likelihood that the desired goal is not understood. Mayer (2011) also contended that
specific knowledge should be designed for specific learners in specific situations. As such,
people have to demonstrate how their understanding of conceptual knowledge relates to the basic
elements of a larger structure that enable them to function together (Krathwohl, 2002). Hence,
female officer candidates need to understand how conceptual knowledge correlates to career
progression along the CMF paths. The CMF paths are designed to meet the vacancy needs of the
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 107
Army, however, preference is provided to prior service officers. Thus, officer candidates have
the option to select the path that maximizes their full potential to ascend through the ranks.
Female officer candidates do not understand what key development assignments
mean or how they correlate to career progression. The findings from this study proposes that
all participants need to understand how key development assignments correlate to future career
progression. As such, unknowingly pursuing non-combat force assignments automatically places
officers at a career disadvantage because they enter a path where only 20% of officers reach the
general officer levels (Haring, 2013). A recommendation rooted with cognitive inclusion retains
the likelihood to improve the need for conceptual knowledge. Cognitive inclusion fosters the
integration of diversity, democratic reasoning and interpreting the world differently. Thus, using
new lenses to view complex problems (Landemore, 2012). By doing so, officer candidates can
distinguish the correlation for how key development assignments lead to career progression. In
addition, cognitive inclusion has dimensions that can be used to improve the collective efforts of
teams. This is an important variable to consider because key development assignments focus on
deliberately delivering on collective efforts. In addition, the SMA is the ideal venue for SMEs to
bridge the need for knowledge. The recommendation requires the SMA to provide SME and
senior leader engagements with candidates in order to enhance shared understanding.
Female officer candidates also need to understand how their uninformed decisions affect
their future potential as senior leaders. Although one female candidate alluded to regulatory
references for core competencies, the need in key development assignment knowledge also limits
their potential. The results in this study imply that 83% of participants intend to pursue career
paths that align to the status quo: military intelligence, logistics, and administration. As such, the
MTOE limits the total allocation of positions listed within the status quo. There is no upward
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 108
mobility with the status quo. Conceptual knowledge is critical for visualizing and understanding
how key development assignments correlate to better career opportunities.
Motivational Recommendations
The data analysis presented in Chapter Four determined three motivational influences
that retain a high probability for stakeholder goal achievement. The three influences include
attribution, self-efficacy, and goal orientation theories. Goals are drivers that people pursue to
accomplish, self-efficacy is a belief that you can achieve goals and attributions are motivational
factors that lead to achieving goal (Rueda, 2011). The three theories are inclusive for display
traits that align with active choice, persistence, and mental effort (Bandura, 1997; Clark & Estes,
2008; Rueda, 2011). Table 12 displays the recommended motivational influences.
Table 12
Summary of Motivation Influences and Recommendations
Assumed Motivation
Influence
Asset/
Need
Priority Principle and Citation Context-Specific
Recommendation
Female officer candidates
attribute success and
failure to their own efforts
(AT)
Asset Y Learning/motivation
is enhanced when people
attribute success or failure
to effort vs ability
(Anderman & Anderman,
2006).
Provide female officer
candidates attributional
retraining to identify reasons
for success or failure on
tactical task and rank
attributions for success or
failure.
Female officer candidates
need confidence in
obtaining combat force
roles (SET)
Female officer candidates
have a mastery approach to
performance (GOT)
Need
Asset
Y
Y
Self-efficacy can influence
motivation; feedback and
modeling increases self-
efficacy (Pajares, 2006).
Self-efficacy improves
confidence (Bandura, 1997).
Focusing on mastery to
improve self, skills, learning,
and progress promotes
positive motivation (Yough
& Anderman, 2006).
Provide female officer
candidates more time and
practice in order to increase
confidence.
Provide female candidates
examples of leaders who
made mistakes but persist to
increased responsibility.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 109
Motivation Solutions
Clark and Estes (2008) asserted that motivation is the spark that gets people going and
informing how much effort to expend on tasks of value. In addition, Mayer (2011) posited that
motivation is dependent on initiative and consistent behavior for goal achievement. It is vital to
understand how knowledge shapes learning and motivation. As such, motivation is defined as the
amalgamation active choice, mental effort, and persistence (Bandura, 1997; Clark & Estes, 2008;
Eccles, 2006; Pajares, 2006). Active choice is a decision to pursue goals. Mental effort is the
process of learning and applying reason to solve complex problems (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Persistence is a deliberate decision in overcoming challenges. This section focuses on how
attribution, self-efficacy and goal orientation theories enhance combat force interest.
Female officer candidates attribute success and failure to their own efforts. The
interview and focus group results determined that all participants believe that success is a direct
outcome of personal effort. Although 83% believe that group effort is key, none selected combat
force as a CMF path. This finding suggests that decisions are influenced by external factors. A
recommendation rooted in attribution theory has been selected to bridge the motivation gap.
Anderman and Anderman (2006) and Pintrich (2003) found motivation and learning can enhance
and improve future goals when people attribute their success to effort. In addition, the finding
recommends providing feedback and time to reflect on learning in order to motivate female
candidates to improve individual efforts. Furthermore, empowering females with choice and
control facilitates the opportunity for professional growth through goal attribution. As such,
recommendations require attributional retraining and reflection for goal achievement.
Beliefs are important for individuals to understand how their ability to do something
contributes to the likelihood of pursuing future goals (Clark & Estes, 2008). Individuals who
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 110
believe they have personal control of their own learning are more likely to achieve challenging
goals than those who do not have control (Pintrich, 2003). As such, female officer candidates
need to attribute their success to personal effort. The importance of effort stresses learning, self-
control, and choice (Rueda, 2011). Thus, attributing success to effort has a positive motivational
outcome, whereas attributing failure to a lack of effort has a negative connotation and outcome
(Anderman & Anderman, 2006). Rueda (2011) argued that attribution can be divided into three
dimensions; locus, stability, and controllability. Locus are internal and external manifestations to
events. If a person performs a task to standard, the person may infer the outcome as internal and
attributed to personal effort. In contrast, if a person fails to achieve a task, they can infer the
outcome as internal (effort) or external (poor instruction). The second dimension is stability and
assigns fault to self (stable) or to others (unstable). If one fails at a task, the result may be viewed
as stable because of the inability to perform the task. If one fails at a task due to factors beyond
one’s control, the result is viewed as unstable. When stability is linked to success, it can lead to
positive results and when linked to failure, may lead to poor outcomes (Anderman & Anderman,
2006). From a theoretical perspective, we can infer that female candidates who value knowledge
and effort are more likely to succeed in combat forces because they likely to attribute success to
past experiences where they practiced and rehearsed functions. Those past experiences afford
reflection to locus, stability and controllability for future endeavors. Thus, it is vital for female
officer candidates to attribute success and failure to their own efforts.
Female officer candidates need confidence in obtaining combat force roles. The results
indicate that participants attribute success to personal effort. However, only 44% possesses the
confidence to compete against male peers. Thus, 56% lack confidence for combat force roles. The
need for confidence may be attributable to cultural stereotypes, covert bias, and negative attitudes
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 111
that influence their cultural perceptions. A recommendation rooted in self-efficacy theory retains
the high probability to reduce the motivation gap. Self-efficacy examines beliefs, why certain
things happen and how those beliefs affect future outcomes (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 2006). In
addition, self-efficacy also links learning, progress, and rewards through immediate feedback for
simple tasks and a delayed response for more complex tasks (Pintrich, 2003). As such, it is vital
for female candidates to understand that their choices have the potential to bring about positive
results, especially when they assume prudent risks for desired goals. Mentors need to be candid
about their professional experiences when inspiring others to pursue challenging opportunities.
Such candor adds value and credibility for dedicating personal effort to collective goals.
Goal achievement can increase when people attribute their success to personal effort
(Pintrich, 2003). The findings in this study suggests that positive feedback, additional time, and
personal engagement can reduce the stigma associated with covert biases in male-dominated
professions. In addition, the motivation is likely to have a direct result on peripheral career sectors,
such as increased rates of women pursuing more male-dominated occupations. Furthermore, the
results could inspire other women to master male-dominated jobs and outperform them in
proficiency and competence. Moreover, continuing to pursue this indicator for gender equity and
female integration reflects the core beliefs in the Army. Attributing success to personal effort is
instrumental for developing self-efficacy, mastering tasks, and enhancing the confidence to
compete against other talented counterparts, regardless of gender.
Female officer candidates have a mastery approach to performance. A review of data
determined that although 83% of females favor women in combat forces, 66% need mastery
skills for key development assignments that lead to increased levels of responsibility. Thus, a
need for mastery approach to performance. A recommendation rooted on goal orientation theory
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 112
retains the potential to bridge the motivation gap. Focusing on mastery orientation to improve
self, skill, and learning enhances performance (Yough & Anderman, 2006). The findings from
this study implied that female officer candidates need to focus discourse on mastery, learning,
and understanding (Pintrich, 2003). This recommendation requires the SMA to provide female
candidates the requisite education and knowledge to learn and grow from mistakes.
This section describes how goal orientation theories help female candidates enhance goal
mastery and key developmental assignments in order to build confidence while improving their
knowledge. Goal orientation theory encourages people to adopt mastery goals with a learning
process (Lazowski & Hulleman, 2016). Studies suggest that task mastery-oriented officers are
interested in self-comparison and improvement rather than peer comparison (Rueda, 2011;
Yough & Anderman, 2006). Based on this claim, such officers are more likely to achieve goals if
leaders encourage prudent risk (Anderman & Anderman, 2006; Yough & Anderman, 2006). In
addition, Pintrich (2003) and Rueda (2011) contended that using task, reward, and assessment
methods to promote mastery is better than norm-referencing processes. As such, adjusting task-
time for under-performing members allows them to progress at their own pace (Yough &
Anderman (2006). In doing so, candidates obtain the confidence for combat force assignments.
Organization Recommendations
This section provides interview and focus group data on the organizational influences that
contribute to gender inequity. Schein (2017) asserted that the only important thing leaders can do
is manage culture. Moreover, Gallimore and Goldenberg (2001) posited that culture falls within
two categories; models and settings. Cultural models are shared mental schema in organizations
and individuals, whereas settings are where people come together to resolve complex problems
(Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001; Rueda, 2011). Both models and settings can be viewed as
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 113
organizational influences that contribute to not pursuing combat forces (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Table 13 displays organizational influences with a high probability of success.
Table 13
Summary of Organizational Culture Influences and Recommendations
Assumed Organizational
Influence
Asset/
Need
Priority Principle and Citation Context-Specific
Recommendation
- Female officer candidates
need to perceive that the
organization supports a
culture of cohesion among
both male and female officer
candidates (Cultural Model)
- Female officer candidates
need SMA processes in
implementing a curriculum
that align with combat force
training
Need
Need
Y
Y
The teleological culture
model is a linear and
evolutionary process of
shared mental schema,
and communication for
breaking barriers
(Gallimore & Goldenberg,
2001; Kezar, 2001).
Learning organizations
engage in generative
learning, involves looking
through novel lenses to
create new ideas (Senge,
1990).
Provide stakeholders
assessment tools that
highlight a need for
leadership philosophy
and policies that
advocate education,
inclusion, and talent
management.
Create a workshop to
provide stakeholders
the knowledge and
expertise to align
policies to leader
vision and new model.
- Female officer candidates
need to perceive that
organizational settings
support female integration
into combat forces (cultural
setting)
- Female officer candidates
need to believe that senior
leaders have a vested
interest in their future
opportunities
Need
Need
Y
Y
Cultural settings may
reduce inequities by
untangling barriers and
improving collective
intelligence (Ayman &
Korabik, 2010; Gallimore
& Goldenberg, 2001).
In learning cultures,
members understand
that they have “two jobs
– the present job and
improving that job”
(Schneider, 1996).
Senior leaders focus
on leadership capacity
in open settings and
expound female needs:
trust, professional
development, support,
and growth.
Senior leaders openly
promote creativity and
shared consciousness
for a framework that
creates opportunities
for female leaders.
Cultural Solutions
According to Clark and Estes (2008), culture is a multidimensional construct where
conscious and subconscious phenomena unfold. The SMA is a military culture that focuses on
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 114
training and developing candidates to serve as commissioned officers. However, like most male-
dominated professions, the culture retains barriers that limit the full potential of female soldiers.
Such barriers are attributed to either cultural models or cultural settings. Cultural models are
invisible and exist within organizations, societies, and individuals who use them to resolve
cultural situations (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001; Rueda, 2011). Cultural settings differ from
models because they are visible and serve as a venue for solving problem (Rueda, 2011).
Female officer candidates need to perceive that the organization supports a culture of
cohesion among both male and female candidates. The interview findings indicate that 66% of
participants do not believe in the fallacy that females do not belong in combat forces. In addition,
all participants claim that they have experienced gender biases and stereotypes while they’ve been
in the military. The experiences do not conform to expected cultural beliefs, norms, or values. A
strategy rooted in the teleological culture model retains the likelihood of reducing this cultural
cohesion gap. This suggests that gender perspective education is important for eliminating
stereotypes about female leaders. The teleological model empowers senior leaders to engage with
other stakeholders in order to drive a vision in cultural norms and beliefs. In addition, studies
show that cultural barriers can be averted when teleological and cultural change is enforced with
policies that condemn misbehaviors (Kezar, 2001; Schneider et al., 1996).
Attitude is an important factor in breaking down barriers, condemning poor behavior, and
holding resisters accountable for their biased views and poor decisions. As Diana explained,
“anything new is going to disrupt.” Gender perspectives and training also plays an instrumental
factor in shaping the beliefs of the organizational culture. As previously noted, the SMA cultural
model requires senior leader engagement and a policy change that clarifies what is at stake by
holding resisters accountable to cultural norms. Senior leaders have to be engaged proactive in
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 115
order to avoid another Tailhook scandal (Haring, 2013). Cultural models cannot continue to persist
as the status quo. Not when there are senior leaders in positions of authority who can shape and
reform the culture for the common good (Perkins, 2018). A paradigm shift in gender perspective
education can foster the desired outcome with minimal side effects. The military retains regulatory
protocol, standards, and policies for doing ethical, moral and legal conduct. However, only senior
leader engagement can foster shared consciousness in how to think about organizational culture.
Female officer candidates need SMA processes in implementing a curriculum that
align with combat force training. The findings indicate that 50% of participants need SMA
processes that provide institutional knowledge in order for female officer candidates to learn how
to go about pursuing indoctrination into combat forces prior to commissioning. A strategy rooted
in learning organization model has the high probability to bridge the culture gap. This suggests
that learning organizations are adaptive and generative in the way they respond to changing
environments (Senge, 1990). Thus, leaders in learning organizations are responsible for building
cultures where people continually expand their talents to shape the future of the organization,
learning organizations have strong cross-communication, collaboration, and shared mental
schema to enhance learning by breaking down cultural barriers (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001.
As such, the learning organization model provides stakeholders assessment tools that promote
alignment of regulatory guidance to leader vision the promotion of talent.
The learning organization model places engaged leaders as the center of gravity for
developing instruction, education, and development for shared consciousness through new
processes and policies (Kezar, 2001; King, 2017). Teaching and educating stakeholders on how
to think about gender is the first step to improving key leader shortages and unit readiness. Thus,
providing a flowchart for going into combat forces or inviting experienced female combat force
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 116
leaders as lecturers establishes credibility and trust among stakeholders. This principle is time-
based and allows female officer candidates sufficient time to decide on their future CMF paths.
Furthermore, affording female combat force leaders an opportunity to mentor, educate and
develop female officer candidates has a high probability to produce positive outcomes (Williams,
2017). These examples in ways to think, teach and change cultural behaviors (Kotter, 1995). As
such, engaged senior leaders need to embrace change while encouraging resisters to support the
new accountable strategy (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). This requires intense collaboration,
shared mental schema, and strategic communication as leading indicators to training (Gallimore
& Goldenberg, 2001; Kezar, 2001; King, 2017). Thus, it is vital for the SMA to establish a
curriculum that aligns to the learning organization model and combat force training.
Female officer candidates need to perceive that the organizational setting supports
female integration into combat forces. The results show that 50% of participants believe that
the current settings do not foster the integration of women into combat forces or onto senior
leader levels. This finding is important because 66% of the participants stated they have been
discouraged by negative attitudes about women in combat forces, particularly the fallacy that
women reduce unit readiness and team cohesion. Furthermore, the findings suggest that senior
leaders do not understand how to implement decisive strategies that foster new and efficient
cultures. A cultural setting principle rooted in cultural setting among engaged leaders retains the
high probability to untangle barriers and improve organization (Ayman & Korabik, 2010;
Gallimore & Goldberg, 20101). In addition, SMEs and leaders may enhance understanding
through transparent involvement and mentoring of new officers. As such, mentoring enhances
interaction and improves the core function for reducing cultural barriers (Ayman & Korabik,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 117
2010; Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001). This recommendation advises leaders to advocate for
professional development, inclusion, trust, and growth in social settings (Balestrieri, 2017).
Senior leaders possess the authority, resources and urgency to affect organizational
change (Lewis, 2011). Based on this cultural norm, senior leaders are collectively the stewards of
the profession who must provide clear, current, and concrete guidance for achieving goals
through engagement and shared consciousness (Clark & Estes, 2008; King, 2017). In addition,
the use of decisive strategies can help create new cultures where members value the collective
efforts of all members. The virtues of leader commitment, engagement, and integrity contribute
to organizational change and inhibit undesirable behaviors (Northouse, 2016). By doing so,
female officer candidates will likely perceive the organizational settings as supportive to the
integration of females into combat forces and career progression based on talents and merits.
Female officer candidates need to believe that senior leaders have a vested interest
in their future opportunities. The findings from interviews, focus group, and artifact analysis
suggest that gender integration in combat forces may have reached a plateau. This assertion is
based on the 83% result of participants who stated that they have not witnessed senior leaders
share their vision or strategies for breaking down cultural gender barriers. A cultural setting
principle rooted in learning organizations retains the potential to cause a paradigm shift with the
desired outcome because of the platform used to transmit the message. This recommendation
advises senior leaders to promote creativity, involvement and contribution (Schneider, 1996).
The recommendation also advocates for trust, professional development, inclusion, growth, and
cooperation in social settings that maximize opportunities for future female officers.
Studies show that senior leaders who have not actively pursued gender integration or
tackled the challenge in breaking down gender barriers may not have done so because of deep-
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 118
seated resentment against women (Nkomo & Al Ariss, 2014; Szayna et al., 2016). This study
found that, although there are select senior leaders who advocate for gender integration, their
efforts were conducted in small forums or behind closed doors. In doing so, senior leaders may
not understand how their lack of transparent engagement influences organizational culture. Their
level of engagement also influences the breakdown of barriers and discourage female officer
candidates from attempting to pursue combat force assignments (Ayman & Korabik, 2010).
Integrated Implementation and Evaluation Plan
Implementation and Evaluation Framework
This implementation and evaluation plan is based on the principles expounded within
Kirkpatrick’s New World Model (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The model recommends that
evaluation plans begin with the desired outcome in mind and working backwards in a concerted
effort of leading indicators. Leading indicators are aligned and linked between the current state
and the desired outcome. As such, Level 4 results are the amalgamation of targeted outcomes
that occur from new training, support, and accountability from senior leaders (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2016). In addition, leading indicators leverage time and critical behaviors as control
measures to prevent undesirable effects. Working backward provides clarity for (a) developing
solutions to behavioral assessments, (b) identifying indicators that codify learning, and (c) noting
member satisfaction with the new strategies. The operational approach for this implementation
and evaluation plan connects the current state to the desired outcome through leading indicators.
Organizational Purpose, Need, and Expectations
The purpose of the SMA is to help female officer candidates understand the needs for
combat force assignment by educating them with essential knowledge that retains the high
probability for success. The improvement plan is dependent on leader engagement and creating
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 119
settings that support the initiative. This study examined the KMO culture barriers that persuade
female officer candidate to not choose combat force assignments. As such, the expectation is that
female candidates will choose combat force assignments as a result of the new curriculum, SME
input, and new tactical practical exercises. Finally, the recommendation focuses on aligning to
leading indicators that lead to critical behaviors that produce desired outcomes.
Level 4: Results and Leading Indicators
Table 14 illustrates the proposed Level 4 results and leading indicators for desired
outcomes. These internal and external internal SMA metrics and methods (leading indicators) are
based on gender perspective education, procedural and conceptual knowledge, new processes.
Thus, if the internal outcomes are achieved through the proposed implementation plan, then
external outcomes retain the high probability for achievement as well.
Table 14
Results and Leading Indicators for Desired Outcomes
Outcome Metric Method
External Outcomes
1. Increased total number of
external pool of potential
candidates
Monitor the number of potential
female candidates with interest and
minimum SMA requirements
(unsolicited referrals)
Solicit monthly organizational data
from Recruiting Battalion of
interested females with minimum
educational requirements to pursue
combat force assignment
2. Used social media and press
release of potential female
candidates who contract for
combat force assignment
Provide potential college
female athlete incentives
and leadership development
(new member)
Leverage RRB in collaboration
with university Reserve Officer
Training Corps for the
recruitment of female athletes
3. Highlighted LSM efforts and
compliance for achieving the
federal mandate through
partnership programs
Provide press commentary through
public affairs channels in how the
LSM is bridging the gender
inequity gap (external perception,
commentary)
Schedule senior leader
conferences with municipal,
county and state officials to
enhance partnership in gender
equity
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 120
Table 14, continued
Internal Outcomes
1. Increased number of female
officers pursuing combat force
assignment
Number of educated cadre and
female candidates at the SMA
with SME Q&A
Solicit semi-annual data from SMA
cadre on female officer candidates
interested in combat force roles
2. Improved gender equity by
providing opportunities to
female leaders who can achieve
desired outcomes
2a. Number of female officer
candidates qualified to serve
as combat force leaders
2a. Senior leaders conduct semi-
annual pre-command course shared
consciousness briefs with company,
battalion and brigade Commanders
2b. Number of qualified
females who can fill combat
force vacancies (internal
initiative)
2b. Analyze data on senior leader’s
support for females interested in
transferring into combat forces
3. Increased female candidate
confidence and satisfaction in
the SMA process
3a. Increased percentage of
female officer candidates
engaging in SMA processes.
3a. Compare data from beginning
and senior SMA classes - female
interest and non-interest in combat
force assignments
3b. Positive/negative feedback
from SMA candidates
(internal engagement)
3b. Set time for data collection in
focus groups or 1:1 discussion with
female officer candidates
Level 3: Behavior
Critical behaviors. The primary stakeholder group for Level 3 behaviors includes all
female candidates and their ability to transfer knowledge. Critical behaviors and requirements
also extend to cadre and leaders who possess the authority, power, and urgency for facilitating
change (Lewis, 2011). Level 3 behaviors are substantially more important and challenging to
resolve because they can either achieve or fail to achieve the desired Level 4 outcomes. Thus,
special emphasis is required for validating Level 3 behaviors because the process is synchronized
within time in order to maximize unit of effort on resources to stakeholder availability.
To achieve desirable Level 3 outcomes, female candidates need to understand integration.
This can be achieved by focusing on drivers that deliver results. Drivers include having candid
Q&A discussions with SMEs from combat force CMF fields. The SMEs can discuss preparation,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 121
training, their roles before, during and after training (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). As such,
SMEs and senior leaders have to share how they went about achieving success, which jobs
enhance careers, and which one demanded more time and effort. The third critical behavior is the
shared consciousness to specific and measurable efforts during the workshop. The measurable
efforts include vision, guidance, and monitoring for leading indicators. This critical behavior
focuses on stakeholders who can affect change and resolve complex problems. Moreover, the
critical behavioral factors and timing is listed in Table 15.
Table 15
Critical Behaviors, Metrics, Methods, and Timing for New Evaluations
Critical Behavior Metric(s) Method(s) Timing
1. Female officer
candidates integrate
into combat forces
Frequency in number
of times female officer
candidates ask for
advice
1a. Officer candidates
ask cadre and mentors
questions and monitor
application approval
processes.
1a. Begins on the 12th
month of the 18-month
long process. Monitor
monthly, ask pertinent
questions to shape
desired outcomes.
1b. Cadre and mentors
spot check process to
fix issues quickly
1b. Cadre/mentor reviews
monthly after the initial
12-month period ends.
2. Female officer
candidates accept
candid insight
provided through
combat force expertise
Median results for;
interest in professional
development, higher
responsibility and
enhanced promotion
opportunities
Stakeholders make time
for documented SMA
Q&A sessions. Focus on
encouraging and
supporting candidates
through candid input
Begins on the 12th
month of the 18-month
long process. Monitor
monthly, ask pertinent
questions to shape
desired outcomes
3. Candidates bridge
shared consciousness
and align to specific,
observable and
measurable efforts
(vision and leading
indicators) among
stakeholders
Officer evaluations
reflect “developed or
achieved” rates for the
total number of female
officer candidates
pursuing service in
combat force
assignments
Senior leaders review,
monitor, and update
policies, procedures and
evaluations that align
with the DOD gender
equity mandate.
During 3rd quarter of
the fiscal year. Monitor
monthly, ask pertinent
questions to shape
desired outcomes
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 122
Required drivers. Female officer candidates need the support of combat force SMEs,
cadre and senior leader mentors to reinforce, encourage and reward the learning they internalized
from the workshop. Reinforcement can be demonstrated through job aids, self-directed learning
and executive modeling (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Reinforcement can be achieved by
providing job aides that illustrate key development assignments and troop leading procedures. In
addition, cadre, mentors and senior leaders have a vested interest in providing candidates clear,
current and concrete goals for success (Clark & Estes, 2008). Encouragement can be leveraged
as a driver through coaching, mentoring and candid feedback. SMEs and leaders can share non-
attributional insight to the experiences which enabled enhanced effectiveness and resiliency. In
terms of rewards, recognition can be made when candidates master tasks that align to collective
goals. The process is focused on tactical proficiency and assessments that support mastery
approach efforts over performance-avoid goals. Finally, accountability requires the credible
monitoring of assessments and feedback for leading indicator goals (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
2016). This can be achieved by focusing on policies, inclusion, promoting talent, commitment in
open settings and quarterly assessments that achieve results. Table 16 includes the drivers for
critical behavior.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 123
Table 16
Required Drivers to Support Critical Behaviors
Method Timing Critical Behaviors
Supported 1, 2, 3
Reinforcing
Provide job aids that illustrate leadership principles and troop
leading procedures to improve leadership capacity for success
in combat force assignments.
Quarterly
during final
12 months
1, 2
Provide career path information for growth, self-development,
and mentorship for key developmental assignments.
Semi-Annual 1, 2, 3
Encouraging
Provide female officer candidates attributional retraining to
identify reasons for success or failure on procedural tasks.
Monthly 1, 2
Provide female officer candidates examples of leaders who
made mistakes on development assignment but persist to
increased responsibility.
Monthly 1, 2, 3
Rewarding
Performance recognition for task and academic mastery;
expose 1st-year candidates to senior phase incentives
Semi-Annual 1, 2, 3
Evaluations reflect “developed or achieved” for number of
female officers pursuing combat force assignments
Quarterly 1, 2
Monitoring
Provide cadre and senior leaders assessment tools that highlight
a need for leadership philosophies and policies that advocate
education and adherence to inclusion, integration and the
promotion of talent
Quarterly 3
Advise senior leaders to advocate for leadership capacity in
social settings to expound on what female soldiers seek: trust,
professional development, support, interaction, growth, and
cooperation.
Semi-Annual 3
Conduct quarterly meetings to communicate the vision,
mission, and goals for gender equity accomplishments.
Quarterly 3
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 124
Organizational support. This study proposes three strategies to help reduce the gender
inequity gap: (a) cadre, SME, and senior leaders developing and enforcing policies that facilitate
gender education in combat forces, (b) senior leaders conducting yearly gender equity reviews,
and (c) senior leaders conducting quarterly assessments that determine alignment to their goals.
In doing so, results can improve unit readiness, bridge the gender inequity gap, and fill key
leader shortages. Furthermore, these strategies can be aligned to hold resisters accountable.
Level 2: Learning
Learning goals. After culminating with the recommended implementation training plan
that educates officer candidates on combat force assignments, candidates will be able to:
1. Attribute achievement for greater responsibility to own efforts instead of matters beyond
their control. (Attribution)
2. Differentiate the short and long-term benefits associated with the human skills required to
work with subordinates, superiors, peers, and stakeholders to achieve goals. (D)
3. Summarize with confidence, the motivational factors required to lead combat force
troops. (Confidence)
4. Understand the difference between combat, CS, and CSS forces and how they relate. (D)
5. Align organizational culture to desired outcomes. (Cultural Setting)
6. Value the responsibilities and opportunities provided in combat forces. (Value)
7. Articulate how pursuing challenging assignments contribute to improving skills. (GO)
8. Effectively use self-regulation skills to overcome leadership challenges (P)
Program. The learning goals listed in the previous section can be achieved through an
innovative program that maximizes learning based on the Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016)
levels of training evaluation. Korpela (2016) and Randazzo-Matsel et al. (2012) suggested that
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 125
gender equity can improve if leaders establish a systematic orientation process that includes
physical preparation and a before-during-after leading indicator assessment for achieving results.
The program blends KMO influencers through an instructor-led formative and summative
workshop that assesses the skills, knowledge, attitudes, and commitment of participants. For
application purposes, the program is divided into three phases and completed in seven hours.
The first phase of the program is orientation. This phase begins with a pre-test to
determine the attitude and what the audience knows or believes they know about gender
perspectives in the military. Phase I exposes participants to specific combat force job aids and
references that highlight the CMF process for different occupations. A second job aid highlights
the differing career management fields and how those paths lead to promotions, increased
opportunities, and senior-level assignments. A third job aid illustrates a timeline of how key
development assignments and professional military education lead to increased levels of
responsibility. Phase I ends within two hours and includes a pre-test review.
Phase II begins by focusing on what the candidates and cadre learned from phase I and
determining if they possess the confidence for more training. Phase II includes a team-centered
process to improve knowledge and confidence. As such, the instructor explains and provides
exercises for overcoming four physical barriers by relying on the physical abilities in genders.
Two of the exercises simulate interactions where cultural matriarchy sways influence for
solutions. After the exercises, participants undergo an after-action review to improve policies,
processes, and resources that can help reduce the inequity gap. Moreover, the review adds value
to misperceived notions and stereotypes. The interaction, learning, and development in shared
consciousness through team-focused scenarios is vital for the formative process to work. Phase II
ends with a check on learning and candid feedback from the two hours of training.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 126
Phase III is the before-during-after training evaluation process. It begins by reviewing
successes and failures in phase I and II and how those outcomes influence policies and senior
leader guidance. It also includes asking real-world questions about how mentorship, trust, and
commitment shapes culture. Phase III is a critical point where open dialogue from mentors can
foster creative opportunities. Phase III also serves as a platform for addressing covert bias and
stereotypes. The feedback from such discussions is consolidated, synthesized and framed as
recommendations to senior leaders to consider for improving gender equity in open settings with
other leaders and formats. Phase III ends at seven hours of gender-centric training.
Evaluation of the components of learning. Demonstrating knowledge is a requisite for
solving complex problems and creating opportunities for marginalized members (Krathwohl,
2002). Likewise, Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) contended that learning is the degree to
which participants acquire the intended knowledge, skills, attitude, and confidence from training.
Thus, it is vital to assess learning for both knowledge. It is also essential for participants to feel
confident in learning, committing and transferring the knowledge and skills through a formative
program. In doing so, the training evaluation process codifies the learning that took place. Table
17 displays the required evaluation methods and components for the learning program.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 127
Table 17
Evaluation Method and Components of the Learning Program
Method Timing
Declarative Knowledge “I know it.”
Knowledge checks using check on learning during
delivery; thumbs up, down, or in between responses
Periodically during training
Knowledge checks before, during and after group
Activities
Diagnostic exam before workshop,
practical exercises during training, and
post-training check on learning
Procedural Skills “I can do it right now.”
Individual proficiency (procedural knowledge)
application of skills
Before workshop
Demonstration of job aids during group settings During workshop
Candid quality feedback from peers and trainer After-action review; post-workshop
Attitude “I believe this is worthwhile.”
Instructor’s observation of participant comments and
actions demonstrating value and benefit for the training
During workshop
Retrospective and reflective discussion on the
value of the lesson and training
After workshop; open-ended questions
Confidence “I think I can do it on the job.”
Discussions following practical exercise and feedback During workshop
Retrospective pre and post-test assessment discussion Post-workshop; open-ended questions
Commitment “I will do it on the job.”
Candid discussion on commitment following training After workshop
Post-test assessment discussion After workshop
Level 1: Reaction
Level 1 is the phase to confirm the quality of the training program by keeping things
simple and asking questions that monitor for reporting purposes (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 128
2016). Level 1 reaction is the summative and formative part of training where instructors play a
critical role in assessing the pace, pulse, and comfort of the learning environment through
observations and interactions. This phase determines how participants react to the engagement,
relevance, and satisfaction of the training. Level 1 reactions is designed to achieve desired
learning outcomes. Table 18 depicts the components to Measure Reactions to the Program.
Table 18
Components to Measure Reactions to the Program
Method Timing
Engagement
Workshop practical exercises Hourly
Participant interaction During workshop
Observations by instructor Before, during, and after the workshop
Relevance
Azimuth/pulse check with participants During workshop
Check on learning through experiences During workshop
Member Satisfaction
Azimuth check with participants After workshop
Course evaluation Two days after workshop
Evaluation Tools
Immediately following the implementation program. Before the workshop, the
instructor develops blended evaluation questions that nest and align psychological measurement
principles to the course content. Doing so ensures relevance to Level 1 reactions and trends that
may arise (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). The purpose of synchronizing and integrating the
psychological measurement principles is to enhance the usefulness and credibility in learner-
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 129
centered focus instead of critiquing how the workshop was administered. It is vital to format
questions in a way that puts the focus on participant learning and quality feedback to Level 1
training. Thereafter, the instructor introduces a pre-test to determine what the participants already
know about the topics. The workshop includes diagnostic and post-workshop tests to measure
proficiency, knowledge recall, and applying knowledge (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016).
For Level 1, immediately after the workshop, the instructor conducts a check on learning
to determine the relevance of content. Refer to Appendix C for the check on learning evaluation
plan and check on learning. The instrument for Level 1 and Level 2 open-response questions are
eight questions. The eight questions assist to determine participant reactions, their internalized
knowledge, and the potential for behavior change (Tuckman, 2006). If vagueness or confusion
arises, participants are allowed to ask questions for clarification. Moreover, the instructor
conducts Level 2 assessments by asking participants to complete a four-point Likert Scale survey
on workshop satisfaction. Refer to Appendix D for the immediate evaluation plan for Level 2.
Level 1 and 2 assessments are vital for improving understanding and training value in this study.
Delayed for a period after the program implementation. Approximately four weeks
after the implementation of the training program, and again at 12 weeks thereafter, the instructor
conducts a virtual online webinar to measure participant perspectives, satisfaction, and relevance
of Level 1 training. The webinar is coordinated through a webinar platform with learner-centered
questions. Participants will be asked to reflect and expound on their attitude, commitment, and
confidence during Level 2 learning. The webinar concludes with an inquiry about how well their
behavior-change strategies affected their organizations, met expectations, and if not, why not.
Refer to Appendix E for the delayed and blended evaluation plan. The amalgamation of blended,
formative, and summative questions adds credibility, and reliability to this study.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 130
Data Analysis and Reporting
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) contended that, when working with data, it is vital to
base the analysis on whether confidence, attitude, and results meet organizational expectations.
The authors also suggest bringing in training graduates, SMEs, or the “Bright Lights” to share
the barriers encountered. This section couples Level 4 training outcomes to Level 3 critical
behaviors. As such, Level 3 behaviors are depicted in Tables 15 and 16. Table 19 displays key
performance indicator measurements used to codify the probability for achieving Level 4 results.
Thus, key performance indicators drive the metrics, frequency, and graphics in dashboards.
Table 19
Possible Key Performance Indicators for Internal Reporting and Accountability
Key Performance Indicator Metric Frequency Dashboard Display
Increased total number of
external pool of potential
candidates
Number of potential female
candidates with interest and
minimum SMA requirements
Quarterly Bar Chart (satisfaction rate);
Matrix
Media and press release of
females contracting for
combat forces
Incentives and leadership
development
Quarterly Table (social media
exposure); Matrix
Participants understand
combat force integration
requirements
Median time for processing
applications through approval
protocols
Monthly Bar Graph (total integrated);
Matrix
Participants understand the
responsibilities and
opportunities provided in
combat forces
Median results for females
changing into combat force
fields
Monthly Pie Graph (collective
understanding of
institutional knowledge);
Matrix
Vision, guidance and leading
indicators are aligned and
measurable to Level 4 results
Assessments reflect
“achieved or developed”
metrics for the total number
of females pursuing combat
force roles
Monthly Bar Graph (current and
benchmark requirements);
Matrix
A dashboard is a pragmatic way to display and communicate key performance indicator
accountability to stakeholders. A dashboard includes a return on expectations through training
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 131
outcomes that focus on critical behavior, required driver performance levels, and leading
indicators where the bulk reflects Levels 3 and 4 (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2016). Examples of
dashboards are represented in Figures 2, 3, and 4 below. Figure 2 displays the decisions female
candidates take to pursue combat force CMF paths. Figure 3 displays the alignment of leading
indicators to the desired outcomes in achieving a 20% to 30% female integration rate. Figure 4
delineates training outputs and outcomes to the stakeholder’s return on expectation timeline.
Figure 2. Combat force decision.
Figure 3. Leading indicator alignment.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 132
Frequency Sample Target Prior % ROE %
Level 4 – Results
External female candidate increase Quarterly 2-4 per yr .5 100%
Integration into combat forces Semi-Annual 3 of 10 .5 80%
Federal mandate compliance Quarterly 30% 1% 75%
Level 3 Behavior
Attributional retraining Monthly 100% 60% 85%
Recognition for mastery Monthly 100% 60% 100%
Leader social settings advocacy Quarterly 100% 10% 45%
Level 2 – Learning
CF, CS, and CSS alignment Semi-Annual 100% 5% 100%
Level 1 – Reaction
Participant interaction Hourly 100% 50% 100%
Figure 4. Training outcomes matrix.
Chapter Summary
The Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s New World Model (2016) was used as the framework
for implementing a training plan that achieves stakeholder goals. Prior to developing the plan,
research was conducted to identify stakeholder gaps. During the interview process, information
revealed a performance gap between all KMO influences. Based on the results, a formative and
summative learning recommendation was made to educate and train candidates through a seven-
hour long workshop that focuses on improving understanding, skill, and confidence with cultural
behavior. The workshop also targets SMA cadre and senior leaders as a training audience. The
opportunity to collaborate also fosters a shared consciousness for improving the organizational
culture. Educating stakeholders is expected to reduce the gender inequity gap, improve readiness,
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 133
and fill key leader shortages. The Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) New World Model is a
practical approach for shaping future programs, how they are designed, applied, and evaluated.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach
There were various strengths and two weaknesses in using the Clark and Estes (2008) gap
analysis framework and the Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016) New World Model for this study.
The use of Clark and Estes’ (2008) framework enabled this study to identify and use influences
that affect gender equity. In doing so, the framework assisted in establishing a realistic goal for
increased graduation rates by integrating and analyzing assumed KMO influences. In addition,
the conceptualization and instrumentation of data helped drive the qualitative methodology that
ultimately produced data-rich responses from female officer candidate experiences. Furthermore,
leveraging the four levels of training evaluation from the Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2016)
model enabled this study to produce leading indicators and tools for the future development of
senior leaders, cadre, and officer candidates. The implementation plan is a practical process that
can achieve results by focusing on reactions to learning, behavior change, and cultural goals.
For the two weaknesses, the first weakness unfolded with the proposed recommendation,
as external and non-considered factors that may influence the outcome of the study. Although the
recommendations are anchored to research data results and findings, there is an inclination to
believe that more could have been done for the study if it had been conducted as an improvement
model study. The second weakness emerged as a result of the complexity for integrating the
influences into the gap analysis framework. It became apparent that the more interest there was
in a particular influence, the more findings that emerged for it. Thus, it became increasingly
complex to determine which influence were more of a priority for the research questions.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 134
Limitations and Delimitations
Three limitations affected this study: the timing of data collection, coding the data, and
the inability to witness the intended goal achieved. Data collection was supposed to occur during
March but was rescheduled to June and July due to unexpected delays with dissertation reviews.
More time could have been devoted to interviews and focus groups with differing stakeholders.
Also, coding, correlating, and making sense of the data caused unexpected delays. The lack in
digital familiarity forced the researcher to abandon the instrumentation tool for an analog tool
that made sense. As such, the new tool had the elements for producing assertions and claims that
answered the research questions. As a result, there is a high probability to replicate this study.
The final limitation is with not being able to see the results come to fruition. The potential of
having female combat force leaders and SMEs contribute to this body of knowledge is certain to
raise the interest from many stakeholders who can serve as engaged change agents.
Future Research
Numerous studies have delved into inequities in male-dominated professions but none
where an institution abruptly opens a purely-male specialty CMF to all female leaders. Although
this study focused on female officer candidates, future studies could compare U.S. Army policy
to that of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. In doing so, the proposal
would require approval from senior government officials who seek to enhance multinational
cooperation and interoperability strategies that combat the lethality of future adversaries (Votel
et al., 2016). In addition, comparing perspectives and experiences from various multinational
military cultures could assist in bridging the gender inequity gap in the U.S. military at a faster
pace. Moreover, future research could also include a larger sample population of gender-neutral
participants who can share their perceptions for such a study.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 135
Future studies could replicate this study and take it to the next step in the evolutionary
process by leveraging the data from Chapter Four for other innovative recommendations. Future
research could also determine which females pursued combat force opportunities and then left
the military for personal reasons or if they were disillusioned by integration process. The results
and findings from the study could be of value for organizational leaders who seek to incentivize,
mentor, or groom candidates for future senior leadership assignments. Furthermore, one seldom
studied group that can benefit from this research are females wanting to join SOF CMFs.
Although the KMO influences provided sufficient data for the development of proposed
recommendations, other theoretical models can be leveraged for developing alternative gender
equity solutions. Some may be as a matter of national survival: Israel, South Korea, et al. Clark
and Estes’ (2008) gap analysis framework and Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick’s (2016) New World
model are just two concepts that can improve the performance and well-being of organizational
cultures. Finally, the results from these theoretical constructs can shed light into the factors that
influence shared consciousness and how senior leaders drive change through prudent risk.
Conclusion
This study indicated the prevalence of KMO gaps. The 2013 mandate to integrate female
leaders into previously closed combat specialties was an attempt to replicate the demographics of
the society at large. However, gender stereotypes, discriminatory attitudes, and covert biases
persist in the culture. The lack of female leaders at the general officer level implies that women
lack educational and leadership acumen to lead in such positions. Such views are a juxtaposition
in the contemporary world where democratic reasoning, collective intelligence, and multinational
cooperation shapes how leaders resolve complex problems. Studies posit that there is no shortage
of qualified women who can lead in today’s world (Escobar, 2013; Hindlian et al., 2018)
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 136
The efforts to address the military’s gender inequity gap raised larger concerns with
combat force readiness. Although combat operations have slowed in the Middle East, more show
of force deployments are scheduled for Europe and the Pacific. These deployments use combat
forces as the center of gravity for influencing national interests. It is the combat force which sets
the tone in diplomatic relations, maintains regional stability, and counter-postures against global
competitors. In addition, combat forces require proficient officers who can lead. As this study
suggests, this is a crucial time for leveraging knowledge to promote talented officers who retain
the skills and motivation to lead. Senior leaders can operationalize expectations by developing
innovative implementation programs that account for resisters while enhancing the shared
consciousness of the culture. As explained through related literature and qualitative data, the
organization should foster a climate where the best and brightest officer ascend to coveted
positions of trust and responsibility. Senior leaders have to be willing to accept risks and follow
through on being a leader, doing the right thing and breaking-down cultural barriers.
According to the findings, the misalignment of cultural norms, beliefs, and values is due
to a need in knowledge and how gender contributes to organizational performance. As such, this
implementation plan retains a highly probability for enhancing the development of combat force
officers through knowledge and training. Although organizational models, settings, and factors
play a role, it is the need in knowledge which leads to gender inequity gap. Gender perspectives,
CMF knowledge, and professional development have not been introduced in a manner that
attracts interest from females. This implementation plan is aligned to leading indicators and
critical behaviors for change. The results suggest that it will take time for females to establish an
equal level of trust, confidence, and leadership to that of males. This study calls for senior leader
engagement and shared consciousness in how KMO influencers affect organizational culture.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 137
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INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 147
APPENDIX A
Research Protocols
Research Questions
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
Table 20
Assumed KMO Influences
Knowledge Influence Knowledge Type Knowledge Influence Assessment
- Female officer candidates need
procedural knowledge because they
rank themselves at the lower end in
tactical proficiency
- Female officer candidates need more
time to practice in order to improve
procedural knowledge
Procedural
Interview: Tell me how leading an SMA
platoon differs from leading a rifle
platoon?
- Do you believe you have the procedural
knowledge to lead a rifle platoon? Is it
different? How so?
Focus group: Female candidates explain
what key development assignments mean
- Female officer candidates do not
understand the three CMFs or how
they correlate to future opportunities
- Female officer candidates do not
understand what key development
assignments mean of how they
correlate to career progression
Conceptual
Interview: The SMA curriculum includes
leadership concepts, as a female officer
candidate can you tell me which are more
important for career progression?
Focus group: Female candidates describe
their understanding of combat forces,
combat support, combat service support
and how they relate to their goals.
Motivation Influence Motivation Influence Assessment
Attribution Theory: Female officer Interview: What are some of the causes of success or failure
candidates attribute success and failure in the SMA?
to their own efforts.
- When you achieve success, is it based in your effort or the
efforts of others?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 148
Table 20, continued
Self-Efficacy Theory - Female
candidates need to be confident that
they can secure combat force
assignments
- Some say that it’s a great time for women to maximize
their full leadership potential by serving in combat forces.
- What are your thoughts on women wanting to do so?
Interview prompt: Explain your competence in tactical
leadership scenarios (Note female candidate articulate active
choice, persistence, and mental effort)
- Does your leadership capacity motivate you to pursue
other challenges?
Goal Orientation Theory: Female
officer candidates have a mastery
approach to performance
Interview prompt: How does mastering tasks contribute to
future success?
- Suppose you decide to serve as a leader in combat forces,
how successful do you see yourself against your peers?
- How do you see yourself outperforming combat force
peers as a non-combat force officer?
Organizational Influence Organizational Influence Assessment
Cultural Model Influence 1.
- The culture needs values that break
down gender barriers.
- The culture needs an innovative
framework to embrace risk and focus
on integrating women into combat
forces.
Interview questions: Based on your SMA experience, do
you think the SMA training empowers female candidates to
build leadership capacity?
- If so, can you describe the process?
- If not, what factors do you think devalue it? What is your
opinion on how well leaders communicate their vision for
overcoming existing gender discrimination barriers?
Cultural Model Influence 2.
- The culture needs visionary and
committed leaders to drive accountable
change.
- The culture has to improve shared
consciousness.
Interview questions: How do the dynamics of leadership
trust promote or impede goals?
- Do you think leaders are trustworthy?
- Do you have trust in the SMA process?
- What are the reasons for female officer candidates to not
choose combat forces?
Cultural Setting Influence 1.
- Leaders have to develop strategies that
create new cultures and growth.
Interview questions: Do you think the settings are effective
for leader growth? Explain.
- Do you think there is gender bias with female evaluations?
Why or why not?
Cultural Setting Influence 2.
- The organization needs female change
agents with experience in experimental
and special operation forces.
Interview questions: Do you know anyone who worked
with females in combat operations?
- What are your views on women serving in combat forces?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 149
Interview Protocol Script
Good morning ladies, my name is Edwin Rodriguez and I am a graduate student at the
University of Southern California (USC) and I am conducting a gender study. I want to thank
you for taking the time to listen and potentially participate in this study. The purpose of this
study is to understand the key factors that influence your decisions in not pursuing combat force
roles. There is no pressure or legal agreement for you to contribute to this study. You are under
no obligation to answer any questions if you do not feel comfortable.
The informed consent agreement is a formal request permitting me to record interactions
in order to maintain the integrity of the study through rigorous interpretation and feedback. The
agreement highlights that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. The open-ended
questions and discussion in the study are confidential. As such, your identity remains anonymous
and protected throughout the study. Your privacy is of utmost importance, hence the use of
pseudonyms for your names. Again, there is no pressure to participate, this is voluntary. Ok, now
that we’ve established professional and ethical protocols, I’ll explain how the process works. By
agreeing, you permit me to ask you questions about your perceptions on gender inequity. Finally,
the data collection of demographics are part of this study, please answer the following questions:
● What was your previous rank before being accepted into the SMA?
● How many months of military experience did you have before joining the SMA?
● What ethnic group do you identify with?
Again, I want to express my sincerest appreciation for taking the time to share your views
about your time in the military. Now, let’s get started with the interview and discuss your views,
experiences and perception on gender inequity.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 150
The following questions pertain to your knowledge, experiences, and views on gender.
1. (O) Based on your SMA experience, do you think the training empowers female candidates to
build leadership capacity?
a. If so, can you describe the process?
b. If not, what factors do you think devalue it? (Patton: Opinion).
2. (M) Explain your competence in tactical leadership scenarios (Seek active choice, persistence
and mental effort, regardless of failure).
a. How does mastering tasks in SMA contribute to your future success in the LSM?
b. Does your leadership capacity motivate you to pursue other challenges?
c. How does leadership capacity make you feel? (Patton: Feeling).
3. (K) Explain your leadership proficiency for SMA tactical events.
a. Do you see yourself at the top, center or lower end of the class?
4. (K) The SMA curriculum includes leadership concepts, as a female officer candidate can you
tell me which are more important for career progression?
5. (O) Do you know anyone who worked with females in combat operations?
a. What are your views on women serving in combat forces?
Let’s now talk about your experiences with cultural norms.
6. (M) What are some of the causes of success or failure in the SMA?
a. When you achieve success, is it based on your efforts or the efforts of others?
7. (M) Some say that it’s a great time for women to maximize their full leadership potential by
serving in combat forces. What are your thoughts on women wanting to do so? (Advocating).
a. What would you include to improve support for the effort?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 151
8. (K) Can you share with me how leading an SMA platoon compares or differs in leading a rifle
platoon? (Hypothetical).
a. Do you believe that there is a difference in procedural knowledge? If so, how?
9. (O) Some people would say that integrating women into combat forces reduces unit cohesion.
(Devil’s Advocate).
a. What are your beliefs about women serving in combat forces?
Finally, let’s talk about organizational goals and leadership. The Army has three career tracks
to pursue; combat force, combat support and combat service support. Based on these tracks,
80% of all generals come from the combat force. That said let’s proceed with the questions.
10. (M) Suppose you decide to serve as a combat force leader, how successful do you see
yourself when compared to male peers? (Hypothetical).
a. As a combat support or combat service support officer, how do you see yourself
outperforming combat force leaders for promotions?
11. (O) How does leadership trust promote or impede your views on goals? (Patton: Opinion).
a. Do you think leaders are trustworthy?
b. Do you have trust in the SMA process?
c. Is trust a factor in female officer candidates not choosing combat forces assignments?
12. (O) What is your opinion on how well leaders communicate their vision for overcoming
existing gender barriers?
13. (O) Do you think the settings are effective for leader growth? Explain.
a. Do you believe cadre display gender bias in female evaluations? Why or why not?
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 152
APPENDIX B
Focus Group Script
Research Questions
1. What are the female officer candidate knowledge, motivation, and organizational factors
that influence a 100% understanding of combat force career paths?
2. What are the knowledge, motivation, and organizational needs for female officer
candidates to choose combat specialty assignments?
3. What are the recommended knowledge, motivation, and organizational solutions for
reducing the gender inequity gap in the LSM?
Table 21
Focus Group Conceptual Knowledge Understanding
Focus Group Questions Alice Beatrice Catherine Diana Erika Francesca
Can anyone explain what key
development assignments are?
X X
Describe your understanding of
Combat Forces, CS, CSS and
how they relate to your LSM
career goals?
X
Focus Group Protocol Script
Good afternoon again ladies, we appreciate you taking the time to meet with me as a
group. This is an opportunity for all of you to openly share opinions and views that affect your
future success as commissioned officers. The purpose for this focus group is to establish a
collaborative exchange of ideas and opinions that impact future leadership assignments. Again,
there is no obligation for you to answer any questions if you do not feel comfortable or if you are
concerned about how your remarks may be interpreted. Everything is confidential and protected.
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 153
APPENDIX C
Immediate Evaluation Instrument Level 1
Open Response
1. In terms of gender biases, what covert behaviors concern you most? (L2: Declarative)
2. Describe your advocacy plan for improving gender perspective education and
opportunities for female leaders. (Commitment)
3. Based on what you learned today, how do you plan to mentor and advise females who
wish to pursue combat force assignments? (L2: Procedural)
4. Explain what you can do to hold cultural resisters accountable. (L2: Attitude)
5. Do you believe female leaders are just as capable as male leaders? (L2: Motivation)
6. Are you prepared to advocate for female opportunities in combat forces? (Confident)
7. Overall, did the workshop training maintain your interest? (L1: Engagement)
8. Can you see the relevance in gender perspective education for subordinate leaders?
(L1: Relevance)
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 154
APPENDIX D
Immediate Evaluation Instrument Level 2
Table 22
Level 2 Workshop Likert Scale
Directions: Thank you for attending today’s gender
equity workshop. We appreciate your candid feedback
in answering the following nine items. This feedback
is anonymous.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Agree Strongly
Agree
1. The workshop content was relevant and easy to
follow (L1)
2. The activities helped me understand the concepts
that influence cultural barriers (L1)
3. My learning was enhanced by the knowledge of the
instructor (L2)
4. I was engaged throughout group activities (L1)
5. I obtained new knowledge of relevance for my
position (L2)
6. I understand how gender inequity impacts
organizational culture (L3)
7. I feel prepared for implementing behavioral change
in my organization (L3)
8. I participated in valued group activities (L2)
9. I am committed to improving gender equity (L4)
INEQUITY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE STATE MILITIA 155
APPENDIX E
Delayed/Blended Instrument Level 3 and 4
Open-ended questions (4 and 12 weeks after)
Directions: Thank you for answering the following open-ended questions. You may also
contribute feedback to improve the workshop. This is an anonymous form.
1. Explain how participating in the workshop contributes to reducing gender inequity and
enabling female leaders to serve in combat forces. (L4)
2. I successfully applied what I learned during the workshop. (L3)
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
3. If you selected Strongly Disagree or Disagree for #2, please indicate the reason(s). (L3)
a. What I learned is not relevant.
b. I do not feel confident in applying what I learned in the workshop.
c. Other (please explain):
4. If you are not using the skills learned during the workshop, what are the reasons? (L3)
5. How do combat forces improve from the inclusion of female leaders? (L4)
6. Describe three behavioral changes that occurred after applying what you learned? (L3)
7. Reflecting on the workshop, what improvements could be made? (L1)
8. What part of the workshop was most relevant for behavioral change? (L3)
9. I see a positive impact as a result of applying what I learned. (Results/Leading Indicators)
a. Increased engagement and satisfaction among cadre and SMA candidates
b. Increase in female officer candidates deciding to pursue combat arms career paths
c. Provide one or more examples of positive outcomes from workshop application (L4)
10. Please share any suggestions you have for improving this training:
Abstract (if available)
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Rodriguez, Edwin Miguel
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Gender inequity and leadership in the large state militia: an innovation study
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