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Critical factors in evaluating compliance to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: developing a methodology for compliance evaluation

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Critical factors in evaluating compliance to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: developing a methodology for compliance evaluation

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Critical Factors in Evaluating Compliance to United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540: Developing a Methodology for Compliance Evaluation

By
John M. Holmes

A Dissertation Presented to the
Faculty of the USC Sol Price School of Public Policy
University of Southern California

In Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Policy, Planning, and Development

May 2020

ii

Table of Contents

List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. v
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................. 1
Research Problem, Questions, Purpose, and Contribution to Practice........................................ 4
Initial Assumptions and Hypothesis ............................................................................................ 7
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 11
Key Research............................................................................................................................. 14
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 16
Literature Review.......................................................................................................................... 18
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 18
Origin, History, and Requirements ........................................................................................... 20
Principals of Regulatory Compliance and Compliance Theory ................................................ 23
Challenges, Areas of Improvement, or Factors that Influence Compliance ............................. 26
Previous Compliance Analyses, Assessments, Methodologies, or Tools ................................. 28
Gaps Underscoring the Need for an Analysis and Implication to Practice ............................... 42
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 43
Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 44
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 44
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Approach and Data Collection .................................................................................................. 45
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 47
Identification of Compliance Factors ........................................................................................ 50
Analysis of Compliance Factors ............................................................................................... 51
Model Development .................................................................................................................. 52
Weighting of Attributes and Categories .................................................................................... 56
Calculating Category Scores and Developing the Total ........................................................... 60
Initial Validation and Revision ................................................................................................. 62
Expert Validation and Final Revision ....................................................................................... 63
Justification of Methodologies .................................................................................................. 64
Research Limitations ................................................................................................................. 66
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 69
Identification, Analysis and Model Development ........................................................................ 71
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 71
Identification and Analysis of Compliance Factors .................................................................. 71
Instrument Factors and Keyword(s) ...................................................................................... 76
Implementation Factors and Keywords ................................................................................. 77
Enforcement Factors and Keywords ...................................................................................... 81
Model Development and Weighting ......................................................................................... 83
Instrument Attributes ............................................................................................................. 89
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Implementation Attributes ..................................................................................................... 92
Enforcement Attributes ........................................................................................................ 100
Initial Validation and Revision ............................................................................................... 108
Expert Review and Validation ................................................................................................ 119
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 126
Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion .................................................................................. 129
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 129
Implications ............................................................................................................................. 133
Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 134
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 136
References ................................................................................................................................... 139
Appendix A: Text of UNSCR 1373 ............................................................................................ 160
Appendix B: Text of UNSCR 1540 ............................................................................................ 165
Vita Auctoris ............................................................................................................................... 171

v

List of Tables

Table 1: Factors Identified by Stiles and Thane ………………………………………….….31
Table 2: Factors Identified by Stinnett, Early, Horne and Karreth ………….………...……..34
Table 3: Factors Identified by Conroy ………………………………………………….……38
Table 4: Factors Identified by Hess ……………………………………………………….....40
Table 5: Keyword(s)-in-Context Analysis …………………………………………………...49
Table 6: Objectives and Attributes in Evaluating UNSCR 1540 Compliance ……….……....54
Table 7: Converting Raw Score to Value Score ………………………………..………….....56
Table 8: Converting Value Score to Weighted Value Score ………….………….…………..58
Table 9: Sample Smart Model Table …………………………………………...………….....61
Table 10: UNSCR 1540 Compliance Factors …………………………………….…………..74
Table 11: UNSCR 1540 Compliance Factors with Attributes …………………...…………...86
Table 12: Attributes and Hypotheses ………………………………………………………..103
Table 13: Sample Model with Raw Scores ……………………………………….………....106
Table 14: Sample Model with Value Scores (0-100 Scale) ……………...………………….107
Table 15: Weighted Value Scores: Instrument Category ……………………………………108
Table 16: Weighted Category Score ………………………………………………………....108
Table 17: Quantitative Analyses Correlations …………………………………..…………...111
Table 18: Revised Model …………………………………………………….………………116
Table 19: Revised Model After Panel Review …………………………………...…………..123
Table 20: Scores for Compliance with UNSCR 1540………………………………………...126

vi

Executive Summary

On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1540 (UNSCR 1540) that dealt with the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The resolution, which is binding for member states, outlines the obligations of states
under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. The resolution requires countries to develop and enforce
legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery,
with a focus on the spread to nonstate actors.
Based on self-reporting and other analysis, compliance with UNSCR 1540 to date has
been challenging. Data included in the UNSCR 1540 Committee 2016 report (United Nations
Official Document, 2016) indicates that approximately 35 countries, or only 18% of the U.N.
member states, has implemented 70% of the Resolution’s requirements.
The complexity of the task, the limitations in capabilities and resources, and the lack of
political will of countries to meet their international obligations raises concerns regarding the
level of compliance with UNSCR 1540. This study uses a mixed-method phenomenological
quantitative methodology to identify the factors impacting compliance, use these factors to
develop a compliance evaluation tool, and test this tool on a sampling of countries to determine
its validity.
A number of researchers have examined factors that impact compliance with
nonproliferation instruments. In a 2007 article in World Affairs, Matthew Fuhrmann examined
some of the factors that impact compliance, writing, “Compliance with UNSCR 1540 will likely
vary significantly from country to country.” In a May 2019 Ph.D. thesis, Amanda Hess
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conducted a quantitative analysis of some of the factors identified in previous literature to
examine the correlation between these factors and UNSCR 1540 compliance.
This study examines scholarly articles and previous analyses to develop a comprehensive
list of the factors that are critical in evaluating a country’s level of compliance with UNSCR
1540. Once identified, an analysis of these factors was conducted, and a tool was developed
using the SMART/SWING technique (Mustajoki, Hämäläinen, & Salo, 2005) to evaluate a
country’s level of compliance. This tool was then vetted by a panel of experts and successfully
tested on an initial sample of 13 countries. Testing revealed that the model reflects the real-life
situation in the countries examined. When compared with the existing Peddling Peril Index (PPI)
(Albright, Burkhard, & Stricker, 2019), the gap between the scores in both models was less than
2.5%.
The model can be used to provide insight into countries that require implementation
assistance, guidance in determining the need for and type of incentives, and background data in
the development of mitigation measures. It provides an analysis of the key factors affecting
compliance with UNSCR 1540, as well as a tool to determine the level of compliance with the
Resolution. The tool can be used to assist agencies and organizations in their efforts to enhance
international compliance, and it can be adapted for use in evaluating other national and
international nonproliferation programs.
This study is particularly relevant given the current emphasis on deterring the
proliferation of WMD, their components, and their means of delivery. Current assessments rely
principally on an evaluation of existing physical security standards and reflect the situation at the
time of the exam. They do not assess foundational factors that address long-term sustainability of
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security programs, such as the political will, capability of personnel, compliance costs, and the
country’s regulatory system. The tool developed in this study could allow these factors to be
taken into consideration prior to the assessment.
A systematic and comprehensive evaluation of compliance factors is necessary to
effectively evaluate the proliferation risk. This thesis identifies these factors and provides a
methodology to evaluate a country’s level of compliance, compliance challenges, potential for
future compliance, and an indication of the level of risk of a proliferation incident. It will allow
countries to make more effective decisions regarding the mitigation of the proliferation of WMD
and their means of delivery.

1

Introduction

Background
The security and resilience of global infrastructure is an ever-present international
priority. The threat landscape is constantly changing, and the asymmetrical challenge presented
by nonstate actors has taxed government resources and tested their capabilities. International
requirements have expanded, and in some cases, countries have signed international conventions
or committed to implement international instruments, even though they may lack the capability
to implement the programs, the capacity to enforce their requirements, or the political will to do
either (Salisbury, Stewart, & Viski, 2018).
Of particular concern is the issue of nonproliferation (Dunn, 2006; Pomper & Crail,
2007; Bale & Ackerman, 2009; Gahlaut, 2017). United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1540 (United Nations Official Document, 2004A), adopted in April 2004 under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (United Nations Official Document, 1945), is one of the
principal international instruments that deals with nonproliferation. Although not defined in the
Resolution, the U.S. Department of Defense defines nonproliferation as “actions to prevent the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by dissuading or impeding access to, or
distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise” (Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).
UNSCR 1540 was developed as a response to the increasing threat from nonstate actors
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Segell, 2004). The Resolution was
developed to “try to address the inadequacies of existing measures and the particular challenge of
controlling WMD proliferation by non-state actors” (Van Ham & Bosch, 2007).
2

UNSCR 1540 was the first comprehensive international instrument to criminalize
terrorism and require signatory countries to implement a number of national measures to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These measures include: not
supporting nonstate actors in their efforts to acquire and use these weapons; adopting national
laws to prohibit nonstate actors from manufacturing, transporting, or using these weapons; and
establishing domestic controls to account for and protect nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons.
The Resolution also requires countries to develop and maintain border controls and
implement law enforcement controls to detect, deter, and combat illicit trafficking. It requires
member states to develop and maintain export and trans-shipment controls, including ensuring
that they have in place laws and regulations to prevent the financing of these activities. It also
requires that these countries have in place penalties for violations of these requirements.
In terms of international agreements, UNSCR 1540 is relatively new and in many
countries is still being implemented (United Nations Official Document, 2016). The principal
means of determining progress in UNSCR 1540 implementation is the self-reporting
requirements identified in Paragraph 4 of the Resolution (Rehman & Qazi, 2019). According to
the Resolution, the first report was required no later than six months after its adoption on April
28, 2004. Data collected by the UNSCR 1540 Committee for its 2016 report indicated that 23 of
the 191 member countries had not submitted a required progress report (United Nations Official
Document, 2016).
To aid in reporting, the UNSCR 1540 Committee developed a matrix in 2005 that was
revised in 2013. The initial matrix was broken into 330 measures (332 when revised) that should
3

be taken to ensure compliance. Information from country reports indicates that although progress
is being made, UNSCR 1540 implementation is far from finished. As the 1540 Committee
website indicates:
In 2011, out of a possible maximum number of 330 measures under paragraphs 2 and 3
of the resolution, 124 States had individually 150 or fewer measures and 68 States had
more than 150 measures. In 2016, the figures were 110 and 83 States respectively out of a
maximum possible of 332 measures. The average number of measures per State for the
data fields concerned rose to 159 in 2016 from 134 in 2011 and from 93 in 2008. (United
Nations Official Document, 2016).
Fulfilling the obligations of the Resolution on a global scale is a daunting task given the
number of countries involved, as well as the fact that countries around the world have differing
priorities regarding nonproliferation (Whitaker, 2010). Unfortunately, globalization has
introduced border security challenges worldwide by expanding the global supply chain to the
point where a weakness or insecurity in an individual node (i.e., port or border) presents the
potential for weapons or their components to gain access to any other country (Flynn, Holmes, &
Burke, 2017).
A principal challenge is how can a country evaluate the security of its trading partners or
determine the probability that a trading partner may allow a weapon, one of its components, or a
means of delivery into the supply chain, allowing these illicit materials to end up in the receiving
country? At present, there is no systematic and accurate way to evaluate the level of compliance
of a partner nation (Shirazyan, 2019). This lack of evaluation presents a significant gap in any
effort to determine the effectiveness of UNSCR 1540. This study identifies the key compliance
4

factors in UNSCR 1540 and employs them to present a methodology to systematically evaluate
the level of compliance, thereby allowing countries to make better decisions regarding the level
of risk trading partners pose and the mitigation measures that may be implemented.
Research Problem, Questions, Purpose, and Contribution to Practice
This study addresses the inconsistency of UNSCR 1540 implementation and the current
inability to determine compliance. To address this problem, this study answers three questions:
1. Which factors are critical in evaluating UNSCR 1540 compliance?
2. Is it possible to use these factors to develop a methodology to evaluate compliance?
3. Can this methodology be successfully tested on a sample of countries?
This study identifies the factors that are critical in evaluating compliance, and it analyzes
and applies them to develop a methodology that results in the development of a “Compliance
Evaluation Tool” that can be used to systematically assess compliance levels. In addition, this
study tests the methodology on 10 countries and validates it using a panel of experts.
The problem of evaluating compliance is made more difficult due to the fact that the term
“compliance” is not defined in the Resolution. The lack of definition reflects one of the
challenges of UNSCR 1540 implementation, that is, the Resolution’s use of generic or ill-defined
terms (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018).
“Compliance” is typically defined in absolute terms. The Cambridge English Dictionary
defines compliance as adherence to a rule or order, implying that to be in compliance,
implementation of every aspect of the rule, or in this case, the Resolution, must be met. With
5

complex instruments such as UNSCR 1540, which uses terms such as “appropriate” and
“effective,” it appears that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the goal of implementation
and adherence with each of the 332 individual measures (United Nations Official Document,
2004A).
This study employs a more pragmatic definition of compliance that is in keeping with the
views of some of the experts that have taken a more risk-based approach to implementation
(Crail, 2006). The definition used here speaks to compliance as a goal and not a binary state (Lin,
2016). This definition accommodates some of the terminology used in the Resolution and also
takes into consideration the UNSCR 1540 Committee’s call for “full implementation” by 2021
(United Nations Official Document, 2014).
Perhaps most importantly, the definition used for this work acknowledges the efforts that
have taken place to date and recognizes that a “one size fits all” approach does not take into
consideration the inherent differences between the countries, their concerns, or their capabilities
(Scheinman, 2008). As a November 2014 report indicates:
States should not all have to implement UNSCR 1540 in the same way for full
implementation to be achieved. States that do not manufacture or hold WMD-relevant
material, for example, will require less stringent laws, regulations and enforcement
processes than states possessing nuclear/biological/chemical programmes or NBC related
export industries (International Security Department Meeting Summary, 2014).
For the purpose of this study, “compliance” is defined as “substantially” meeting the
requirements of UNSCR 1540 through the development and implementation of programs that
address the requirements in the Resolution. In this case, “substantial” is defined as compliance
6

with the essential requirements of the Resolution to satisfy its purpose or objective. With this, a
minimum score of 70% in the evaluation methodology developed in this study is considered
“substantial” compliance.
This study fills a particularly urgent gap, given the current emphasis on securing borders
and enhancing the security of the global supply chain to deter the proliferation of WMD or their
components. The study and its results are intended to help U.S. and international agencies and
organizations in assisting countries in securing their borders and enhancing international
compliance. More specifically, the results of this study provide:
 Insight into which countries may need assistance in implementation
 Assistance in determining the need for and type of incentive programs
 Assistance in the decision to enhance or eliminate sanctions
 A template that can be used to evaluate regulatory programs
 Assistance in the development of mitigation measures
The methodology provides the capability to conduct a more systematic evaluation of
compliance to the UNSCR 1540 program. If, for example, a country is noted for corruption, has
no legal basis for prosecution, or possesses only limited resources for implementation and
enforcement, these factors should be taken into consideration in any security evaluation or
capability assessment. The UNSCR 1540 evaluation methodology presented here can be used to
provide perspective and identify the landscape that must be considered when conducting the
assessment.
7

The UNSCR 1540 program is required to be reviewed annually, with a comprehensive
review required every five years. The last comprehensive review was conducted in 2016, and the
Report of the Security Council Committee indicated, “While, overall, progress has been made
with the implementation of Resolution 1540, there remains more to be done to accomplish the
objective of full implementation of the resolution.” (United Nations Official Document. 2016)
The next comprehensive review will be required in 2021. Given the seriousness of the
proliferation problem, there is a need not only to identify countries that have compliance
challenges but also to identify the factors that create these challenges. Identifying countries with
compliance challenges allows partner countries to make better decisions regarding the scrutiny of
the goods they receive and the appropriate measures to mitigate the increased risk caused by
UNSCR 1540 implementation challenges. By this, countries can more efficiently allocate limited
resources, the end result being more effective security.
The Compliance Evaluation Tool developed in this study permits countries to conduct a
self-evaluation to determine areas where improvement is needed and allows organizations and
countries to focus their resources on the areas where assistance provides the most benefit.
Additionally, the tool can be adjusted to assist in determining the effectiveness of other existing
international, nonproliferation programs, guide the development and implementation of new
nonproliferation programs, or to impose, enhance, reduce, or eliminate international sanctions.
Initial Assumptions and Hypothesis
Three assumptions underpin the basis for this scholarly work. The first is that a nation’s
level of compliance efficiency can be systematically evaluated. There is a great deal of research
8

regarding compliance with UNSCR 1540 and other nonproliferation instruments, as well as a
commensurate amount of discussion on the factors that impact compliance.
In addition, at least four quantitative assessments have been conducted that identify
factors that researchers believe impact compliance (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett, Early, Heinz,
& Karreth, 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). These studies have identified compliance factors,
attributes, and measures and analyzed this information to try to determine how these factors
impact compliance.
Although all of these efforts have had value in identifying compliance factors, they have
either been narrow in their analyses or have identified attributes that are based on measures that
may not be true indicators of the factors identified. In addition, since no system exists to audit or
accurately determine UNSCR 1540 compliance (Cupitt, 2012; Shirazyan, 2016), the existing
studies typically use information provided by the countries in their reports to the UNSCR 1540
Committee (United Nations 1540 Committee website: National Reports, 2019) as an indicator of
compliance.
To date, a comprehensive analysis of all factors believed to impact UNSCR 1540
compliance has not been conducted, nor has a validated methodology been developed to
systematically evaluate compliance. This study has developed such a methodology.
The second key assumption is that the factors impacting UNSCR 1540 compliance (as
well as other nonproliferation instruments) apply relatively equally in every country. Although
existing research regarding UNSCR 1540 compliance assumes that the principal factors
impacting compliance apply equally to all governments, prior to this study, this assumption was
not discussed or validated.
9

The third key assumption is that compliance evaluations are relatively consistent between
countries; that is, the individual factors impacting compliance will have the same relative impact
in, for example, Senegal as they do in Germany. Existing literature has assumed that the factors
impacting compliance apply equally, meaning implementation failures in one country have a
similar impact as implementation failures in another, or lack of enforcement in one country has
the same impact as in another. Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, as well as additional
research throughout the course of this study, this assumption appears to be valid.
The hypothesis at the outset of this study was that there are a number of factors that must
be considered to evaluate a country’s level of compliance with UNSCR 1540 and other
nonproliferation instruments, which must be considered in a compliance evaluation. In this
study, the factors impacting compliance have been placed into three broad categories identified
as the “Instrument,” its “Implementation,” and its “Enforcement.” The factors were categorized
as such to represent the natural progression of a regulatory instrument (i.e., development to
implementation to enforcement).
Factors that impact compliance associated with Instrument include those that arise or
occur as a result of the development of UNSCR 1540 itself. This includes development concerns
such as whether the rule is clearly written, and process concerns, such as a country’s perception
of the legitimacy of the Resolution. Another example of an evaluation factor involving the
Instrument that impacts compliance are political concerns. These include such issues as Security
Council Politics (i.e., whether countries were hesitant to implement the resolution due to U.N.
politics) or their lack of representation in the development process.
10

“Implementation” factors involve the application and execution of UNSCR 1540. These
include national issues such as government structure or national security interests. There are also
economic factors that impact Implementation. An example of an economic factor is the
cost/benefit concern regarding implementing UNSCR 1540 (i.e., is the cost of implementation
commensurate with the tangible or intangible benefits received). Countries trying to build transit
or transshipment programs, for example, may believe that implementation will have a financial
impact on business. If they believe that this impact will be negative, they may postpone
implementation or reduce enforcement, and compliance is likely to suffer as a result.
“Enforcement” factors are those that occur as a result of, or were influenced by, efforts to
enforce the Resolution. The Enforcement category includes a number of factors such as a lack of
enforcement due to lack of financial or technical capabilities, or simply that a country has not
had the time to implement the requirements, develop the government institutions, or change the
culture (Crail, 2006; Nayan, 2018).
These categories were identified to be consistent with the requirements in UNSCR 1540,
which requires countries to “adopt and enforce” or “develop and maintain” controls. The
categories also reflect the natural progression of the regulatory process—review and analysis of
the “instrument,” ensuring national “implementation,” and “enforcement” of the requirements.
As the OCED Handbook indicates, “Whilst adoption and communication of a law sets the
framework for achieving a policy objective, effective implementation, compliance and
enforcement are essential for actually meeting the objective” (OCED, 2010).
11

In this case, compliance falls under the purview of the implementing states. The purpose
of this study is to develop a means of evaluating a country’s compliance to assess and mitigate
nonproliferation risks and assist countries in fulfilling their obligations under the Resolution.
Methodology
This study employs a sequential mixed-method phenomenological-quantitative
methodology (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie; Chowdhury, 2015;
Anguera, Villaseñor, Losada, Sanchez-Algarra, & Onwuegbuzie, 2018). It is the methodology
best suited to identifying and analyzing the factors that impact UNSCR 1540 compliance,
organizing these factors into a model, and transitioning to the identification of attributes or
metrics for each of the factors. The initial phenomenological approach was appropriate because
the goal was not to develop theory but to identify concepts to build and support the compliance
methodology.
The transition from a phenomenological methodology (Thani, 2012; Tomkins & Eatough,
2013) to a quantitative methodology (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007) was necessary to
identify attributes and operationalize the factors. This was accomplished by identifying data that
could be used as metrics for the attributes (Keeney & Gregory, 2005). Every effort was made to
identify direct data where possible, although in some cases constructed data were necessary. In
cases where this was not possible, proxy data were identified.
The data were analyzed via three methods. “Constant comparison analysis” was used to
code and organize the data, “keyword(s) analysis” was used to identify the keyword(s) or phrases
that identified compliance factors, and “classical content analysis” was used to identify the
frequency of these key phrases. This analysis was critical in assigning weight to the factors.
12

Once the attributes and measure were identified, SMART method with swing weighting (von
Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986; Mustajoki et al., 2005)
Although the research was informed by semi-structured interviews conducted as part of a
previous MacArthur Grant study (Flynn, Holmes, & Burke, 2017), the data analyzed was limited
to literature collected. The data were collected in a range of areas, including: the origin, history,
and requirements of UNSCR 1540; the principals of regulatory compliance and compliance
theory; challenges, areas of improvement, or factors that influence compliance; and previous
UNSCR 1540 compliance analyses, assessments, methodologies, or tools.
Data were coded and priorities were established for the coded data (Chowdhury, 2015).
In the areas of “factors that influence compliance” and “previous compliance analyses,” more
credibility was given to recent data. This was because data from 2014 or later (i.e., after the 10-
year anniversary of the Resolution’s adoption) reflects more experience with the Resolution
(Research Papers Comprehensive Review, 2016: Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). In
addition, data provided by officials involved in UNSCR 1540 implementation, or experts
involved in its development, was given greater consideration than data from non-practitioners.
As expected, data disagreement occurred. Compliance factors identified as statistically
significant in one quantitative analysis were not identified as such in another (Stiles & Thane,
2006; Stinnett, Early, Horne, & Karreth, 2011; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). In addition, in the
qualitative analyses, there was disagreement over the importance of the compliance factors.
Advocates of the “managerial” school of compliance believe that compliance is more a
factor of ability than choice (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998). Advocates of the “enforcement”
school of compliance believe that compliance is a cost/benefit calculation, or choice, that
13

depends on such factors as economic interests and external pressures (Downs, Rocke, &
Barsoom, 1996; Fuhrmann, 2007).
Advocates of the managerial school argue that technical and bureaucratic capabilities are
the key factors that impact compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1998; Scheinman, 2008). Since a
phenomenological methodology is used in this study, both views were taken into consideration
and the data inconsistencies and differing perspectives were reflected in the simple multivariate
rating technique (SMART) that used swing weighting for the attributes and categories (von
Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986; Eisenführ, Weber, & Langer, 2010).
The project was greatly informed by a 2017 MacArthur Grant Project, “A New
International Framework for Bolstering Global Supply System Security and Resilience” (Flynn
et al., 2017). The project was initiated in an effort to encourage the maritime industry to become
more involved in preventing nonproliferation to support global supply chain security (Widl,
2012). A key consideration of the project was how the maritime industry can assist governments
in compliance with the UNSCR 1540 requirements.
The project was based on the theory that large multinational shipping and terminal
operating companies could assist countries in implementing border control and export and trans-
shipment enforcement requirements. The project included conducting semi-structured interviews
with government, nongovernment, and maritime industry personnel in the United States, Europe,
and Asia. One of the focuses of these interviews was determining the factors that impact or
encourage compliance with UNSCR 1540.
The MacArthur Grant project raised a number of questions regarding compliance and the
factors that motivate individuals, companies, or governments to comply with international
14

instruments (Koh, 1997; Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998). In applying these questions to
subsequent work with governments on UNSCR 1540, the apparent lack of compliance by many
countries was recognized (Cupitt, 2012; United Nations Official Document, 2016), and it became
clear that additional research in the area of the factors that influence government compliance
with the Resolution had significant value.
An examination of existing analyses identified that a comprehensive analysis of
compliance factors would have substantial value (Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019) and
that the development of a simple evaluation tool would assist governments and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in assessing compliance and/or identification of areas where assistance
should be provided. Further investigation revealed that no such tool existed.
Key Research
In a May 2014 article in Arms Control Today, Igor Khripunov described UNSCR 1540 as
a “work in progress,” writing that the Resolution’s primary accomplishment has been “to create a
universal, legally binding standard out of a patchwork of diverse and potentially conflicting
international commitments.” Like many international agreements, UNSCR 1540 instructs
countries on what to do to prevent nonproliferation, but it does not tell them how these things
should be done. As a result, the complexity of developing a national regulatory program, the
required equipment, training, and the overall investment of time and effort can make compliance
with the Resolution extremely challenging
For this study, compliance to UNSCR 1540 was explored in five specific areas. These
are: the history of the Resolution’s requirements; the principals of regulatory compliance and
compliance theory; challenges impacting compliance; compliance analyses, assessments,
15

methodologies, or tools; and gaps that underscore the need for a comprehensive analysis of
factors that determine compliance.
A great deal of literature has been written regarding motivation for compliance with
international instruments, perhaps the most well-known of which is Louis Henkin’s book, How
Nations Behave (1979). Additionally, there is a great deal of literature available on international
regulatory principals and compliance theory (Chayes & Chayes 1993, 1998; Chayes, Chayes, &
Mitchell, 1998; Ford, 2005; Nance & Cottrell, 2014).
While some of the relevant literature is dated (particularly on compliance and regulatory
theory), the information on the legal and implementation challenges of UNSCR 1540 is more
current. Keeping in mind that the Resolution was adopted in 2004 and that many countries had to
take time to analyze its impact, particular attention is given to information developed after the
Resolution’s adoption (Kassenova, 2011; Bunn, 2016; Drahos, 2017).
There is no shortage of analyses of UNSCR 1540. Legal scholars such as Alverez (2002,
2003), Abe (2007) and Shirazyan (2019) have discussed its origins and impact. Finlay (2012), as
well as Rehman and Qazi (2019), have discussed the challenges of the Resolution’s
implementation, and previous compliance analyses have been conducted as early as 2006 by
Stiles and Thayne (2006) and more recently by Hess (2019).
As a starting point in the research, the advice of Richard Cupitt, a U.S. 1540 expert and
the former U.S. Representative on the UNSCR 1540 Committee, was particularly relevant. In the
forward to the book, Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs: Measuring the Success of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 (Salisbury et al., 2018), Cupitt indicated that the best way to
16

understand the Resolution is to review the documents on the UNSCR 1540 website, reports by
governments and other organizations, issues of the 1540 Compass, and other scholarly articles.
In addition, three longer analyses were recommended: Towards the 2016 Comprehensive
Review Former Experts Assess UNSC Resolution 1540 (Kasprzyk, Shadung, & Stott, 2015);
Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (Scheinman, 2008); and
Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (Bosch & Van
Ham, 2008). These works provided a road map for the research. A comprehensive analysis of
these and other works studied is provided in Chapter 2.
Conclusion
Compliance with UNSCR 1540 is the key element in the deterrence and detection of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The nuclear
and biological weapons programs of Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea have been built on the
compliance failures of U.N. member states that have not fulfilled their obligations under these
and other requirements.
As David Albright indicates, “The reality of the last thirty years is that states that have sought
to join the ‘nuclear club’ have done so almost exclusively through illicit trade” (2010). He also
indicates that governments tend to overlook this situation, which would support the
“Enforcement” theorists who indicate that political will is a factor in noncompliance (Bosch &
Van Ham, 2007).
Understanding the factors that impact compliance while also employing a tool that can
systematically and consistently evaluate a country’s level of compliance provides the possibility
of identifying nations with compliance challenges, allowing partner nations to put programs in
17

place that can mitigate the risks that these shortfalls create. It also allows for the identification of
areas where international capacity-building programs can be the most effective.
Mitigating compliance shortfalls is critically important. History has proven that it is difficult
to prevent a determined and persistent individual or group from conducting violence with a
WMD. This is evident in reviewing the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo Subway
(Olson, 1999), or the 2001 anthrax attacks in Washington, DC (Winett & Lawrence, 2005). This
difficult task becomes almost impossible absent a global effort to detect and deter WMD, the
related materials, and the means of delivery. UNSCR 1540 and other international
nonproliferation instruments are the foundation of this global effort.
A better understanding of compliance with these instruments, along with the ability to
systematically evaluate, compare, and address the compliance challenges of countries, allows
nations to identify areas where additional efforts are needed and assist in the development of
measures and incentive programs that address these challenges.

18

Literature Review

Introduction
Considering the literature and scholarship pertinent to this study, factors that influence
compliance to UNSCR 1540 were explored in five specific areas: the history of the Resolution’s
requirements; the principals of regulatory compliance and compliance theory; challenges
impacting compliance; compliance analyses, assessments, methodologies, or tools; and gaps that
underscore the need for a comprehensive analysis of factors that determine compliance.
While some of the relevant literature is dated, particularly on compliance and regulatory
theory (Fromm, 1983; Downs et al., 1996; Dons & Jones, 2002), information on the legal and
implementation challenges of UNSCR 1540 is more current. Keeping in mind that the Resolution
was adopted in 2004 and that many countries had to take time to analyze its potential impact,
particular attention is given to information developed after the Resolution’s adoption
(Kassenova, 2011; Khripunov, 2014; Kasprzyk et al., 2015; Bunn, 2016; Shinwari, 2016;
Drahos, 2017; Salisbury et al., 2018).
There is no shortage of analyses of UNSCR 1540. Legal scholars such as Alverez (2002)
and Shirazyan (2019) have discussed its origins and impact. Finlay (2012), as well as Rehman
and Qazi (2019), have discussed the challenges of the Resolution’s implementation. Previous
compliance analyses have been conducted by Stiles and Thane (2006), Stinnett, Early, Horne,
and Karreth (2011), Conroy (2017), and more recently, Hess (2019).
Burkhard and Stricker (2019) developed the Peddling Peril Index (PPI) in an effort to
gauge national compliance with the Strategic Trade Controls, required by Paragraph 3(d) of the
19

Resolution (Beck & Gahlaut, 2003; Jones, 2006). Additionally, a great deal of literature has been
written regarding international politics and motivations for compliance. This includes works
from Coplin and Kegley (1975), as well as Louis Henkin’s, How Nations Behave (1979).
There is general agreement that UNSCR 1540 has had a significantly positive impact
(Cupitt, 2012; Khripunov, 2014; Kasprzyk et al., 2015) and that the existing methods of
determining compliance are insufficient (Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). Factors
impacting compliance are discussed in Conroy’s analysis (2017) of compliance vis-à-vis the rule
of law, as well as Whitaker’s (2010) discussion of the compliance factors, such as lack of
capacity, which are more prevalent in developing countries or “weak states.”
Unfortunately, these scholarly efforts are largely focused on specific aspects or areas of
compliance, and to this point, a comprehensive list of factors impacting compliance with
UNSCR 1540 has not been compiled or analyzed, nor has a predictive model been developed. In
particular, there is a need for more analysis on factors related to enforcement, such as whether
the appropriate laws and regulations are in place, or whether the government is structured in a
manner to be able to enforce the requirements (Dutch Ministry of Justice, Law Enforcement
Expertise Centre, 2004; Bunn, 2007).
Presently, the principal gauge of the effectiveness of UNSCR 1540 has been the national
implementation reports submitted to the 1540 Committee by governments, in accordance with
Paragraph 4 of the Resolution. To date, more than 176 states have submitted these reports, which
are organized in matrices that can be found on the Committee website. Although the reports are
certainly helpful in providing an indication of how countries are managing implementation of
20

UNSCR 1540, they do not provide an effective evaluation of compliance (Cupitt, 2011;
Salisbury et al., 2018).
In a 2019 paper based on more than 50 interviews with “key stakeholders involved in the
design and implementation of 1540,” Shirazyan (2019) states:
To demonstrate the impact of the 1540 regime, the 1540 Committee essentially relies on
two measures: 1) the overall number of domestic implementation reports, and 2) the
number of specific measures that states reported taking to meet their 1540 commitments,
organized in the 1540 matrices. Both of these measures are insufficient to determine the
success of 1540.
Shirazyan goes on to indicate that based on an interview with a U.N. official, she sees no
indicators that can provide an assessment of how each country implements its 1540-related
measures in practice. This represents a significant gap with respect to evaluating compliance
with UNSCR 1540 and its effectiveness in implementation, which supports the goals of this
study. While there is currently no scholar, source, or tool that can identify all of the indicators for
implementation and compliance assessment, there is a body of literature with important insights
and direction as it relates to this academic effort.
Origin, History, and Requirements
Understanding the origin, history, and requirements of the Resolution provides the
necessary background for understanding the regulation and its complexities, as well as the
concerns and challenges in its development. This is important because the development of
Resolution 1540 may itself have created challenges that hamper its implementation.
21

Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United Nations Security Council
typically used a consensual approach in adopting resolutions. After the 9/11 attacks, a more
legislative approach was taken (Talmon, 2005). UNSCR 1373 was the first of two resolutions
that reflected this approach (United Nations Official Document, 2001). Adopted on September
28, 2001, this resolution required states to take additional measures to prevent and suppress the
financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. It was the first time since 1945 that the
Security Council invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which
gives the Security Council the authority to determine threats to peace and decide the measures
taken to ensure international peace and security (United Nations: Shaping Our Future Together,
2019).
Where UNSCR 1373 was rapidly developed and largely in response to the 9/11 attacks
(Oosthuizen & Wilmshurst, 2004), UNSCR 1540 was a more comprehensive instrument dealing
with nonproliferation. UNSCR 1540 is focused on nonstate actors, and it requires states to take
measures to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials, their
components, and their means of delivery. It also requires states to adopt domestic controls,
ensure protection and accountability of materials, and have in place export control measures
(United Nations Official Document, 2004).
A number of states were critical of this new role of the Security Council, in which the 15
Council Members forced all member states to adopt laws (Oosthuizen & Wilmshurst, 2004;
Talmon, 2005; Meier, 2008). Legal scholars commented that the United Nations had confused
the scope of its enforcement powers under Chapter VII with its lawmaking powers under Article
26 (Joyner, 2007; Shefloe, 2008). The shift in posture was largely a result of the efforts of the
22

United States (Van Ham & Bosch, 2007). In his September 23, 2003, address to the United
Nations General Assembly, U.S. President George W. Bush challenged the United Nations:
Today, I ask the UN Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution. This
resolution should call on all members of the UN to criminalize the proliferation of
weapons—weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict export controls consistent with
international standards, and to secure any and all sensitive materials within their own
borders.
This transition from a body that exercised limited or no oversight over the conventions it
codified to mandatory requirements on reporting and oversight was welcomed by some countries
and questioned by others. This action represented a new type of global governance impacting the
security of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials (Alger, 2008; Harnisch, 2014).
In a debate over the Resolution that took place in an open session of the Security Council
on April 22, 2004, some non-Security Council countries questioned how the Council could pass
a resolution that impacted their national law (United Nations Official Document, 2004B). In
addition, developing countries and those without nuclear materials expressed concern about the
cost of implementing the requirements. Still other nations were concerned about the United
Nations’ new role and its capacity to force sovereign governments to change or enact national
legislation (United Nations Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, 2004).
Some countries were overwhelmed with the complexity of the Resolution and others by
the potential cost of implementation. The result was political push-back and in some cases
delayed acceptance and implementation of UNSCR 1540. As such, some of the factors that
impact compliance (e.g., process concerns about perceived lack of legitimacy of the Resolution
23

and political concerns regarding Security Council politics) arose as a result of the Resolution’s
passage (Van Ham & Bosch, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018).
Principals of Regulatory Compliance and Compliance Theory
Of particular importance to this study is literature concerning regulatory theory and
compliance strategies, notably those with an emphasis on international instruments. This
literature provides important perspective on treaty implementation and compliance, as well as the
ways in which treaties can be most effective (May, 2004; Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012)
Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen (Drahos, 2017) provide a general discussion of 14
typical compliance motives, divided into two dimensions identified as “spontaneous” and
“enforced.” These factors can be viewed as a baseline for regulatory compliance. Spontaneous
factors include:
 Social and economic costs and benefits (i.e., time and money to comply versus
noncompliance)
 Degree of acceptance (i.e., legitimacy or agreement with the objectives and principals)
 Respect for the law (i.e., the general belief in abiding by the law)
 Existence of nonofficial influence (i.e., ability of outside groups to motivate compliance)
 Business model (i.e., whether compliance is relevant to the organization’s goals)
 Knowledge of the rules (i.e., whether the target group is aware of its obligations)
 Capacity to comply (i.e., whether the target group has the resources to comply)

24

Meanwhile, enforced compliance factors include:
 Respect for the regulator (the target group’s respect for the organization)
 Risk that violations will be reported (i.e., whether nonconformities will be reported)
 Risk of inspection (i.e., the probability of being inspected by the regulator)
 Risk of detection (i.e., the risk of nonconformities being detected)
 Risk of sanction (i.e., risk of sanctions or penalties after detection)
 Severity of sanction (i.e., the amount or severity of the sanction)
Each of the characteristics identified by Parker and Nielsen are addressed and discussed
in other literature (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018). Based on the broad
scholarly agreement on the importance of these factors, the “14 Question” model developed by
Parker and Nielsen provides an excellent starting point for an analysis of factors in determining
compliance.
This model is similar to a tool developed in 1994 by the Dutch Ministry of Justice that is
used for monitoring compliance with legislation (Dutch Ministry of Justice, Law Enforcement
Expertise Centre, 2004). The Ministry’s “Table of Eleven” has similar dimensions to the “14
Question” table, even to the point of dividing it into “spontaneous” and “enforced” compliance
factors. In the “Table of Eleven,” the compliance factors for spontaneous dimensions include:
 Knowledge of rules (i.e., stated as the familiarity and clarity of legislation)
 Costs and benefits (i.e., the tangible advantage/disadvantage of compliance or
noncompliance)
 Extent of acceptance (i.e., the degree to which the policy is accepted by the group)
25

 Respect for authority (i.e., the extent to which the target group respects government
authority)
 Nonofficial control (i.e., the risk of sanctions other than from authorities)
Also, in the “Table of Eleven,” compliance factors for enforcement dimensions include:
 Risk of being reported (i.e., the risk of a violation being reported to the government by an
entity other than the authorities)
 Risk of inspection (i.e., the risk of an inspection by the authorities)
 Risk of detection (i.e., the risk of a violation being detected)
 Selectivity (i.e., the risk of a violation being detected from the selection for inspection)
 Risk of sanction (i.e., the risk of a sanction being imposed)
 Severity of sanction (i.e., the severity and nature of the sanction)
Clearly, the “14 Question” and “Table of 11” are remarkably similar tools. In fact, the
tool developed by Parker and Nielsen and published in the Regulatory Theory: Foundations and
Applications (Drahos, 2017) was based on the table developed in 1994 by Dr. Dick Ruimschotel
for and in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Justice (Drahos, 2017; Dutch Ministry of
Justice, Law Enforcement Expertise Centre, 2004). Many of the factors in both tools are
applicable to UNSCR 1540 compliance and have been mentioned in numerous analyses of 1540
implementation. As a result, either tool is a good place to start in any analysis of the factors that
can be used to evaluate compliance with UNSCR 1540.
Additional insight can be found in reviewing policy documents. In a 2005 discussion of
the European Union’s compliance strategies, Tanja Borzel and Rachel Cichowski write:
26

By combining rationalist and sociological approaches, a typology of four different
compliance mechanisms or strategies can be drawn up: sanctioning (negative incentives),
capacity building (positive incentives), persuasion (learning), and legal internalization
(litigation). They differ according to the source of non‐compliant behavior (voluntary v.
involuntary) and the logic of influencing (non‐)compliant behavior (rationalist v.
constructivist).
Discussions regarding compliance in the European Union are particularly relevant to the
situation in the United Nations (Kienzle, 2013; EU Institute for Security Studies, 2012; European
Union report, 2016). Like the United Nations, the European Union does not possess the
enforcement powers of the member states. The European Union is described as the “guardian of
the treaties” with the function “to ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied” (Borzel & Cichowski, 2005).
A review of regulatory theory and compliance strategy provides an excellent foundation
for the identification and analysis of the factors that impact compliance. The factors can be used
to validate the compliance factors identified in the data.
Challenges, Areas of Improvement, or Factors that Influence Compliance
There is a wealth of scholarship and writing on the challenges of implementation, areas
for improvement, and factors influencing compliance. Almost every source regarding UNSCR
1540 contains information that can be used to develop the list of factors impacting UNSCR 1540
compliance and keyword(s) that can be used to identify attributes.
Perhaps the most relevant work on UNSCR 1540 is the recently published work,
Preventing Proliferation of WMDs: Measuring the Success of UN Security Council Resolution
27

1540 (Salisbury et al., 2018). It is an excellent update to the information in Bosch and Van
Ham’s 2007 work, Global Non-Proliferation and Counter Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR,
which was written shortly after adoption of the UNSCR 1540. The 2018 work provides insight
into trends and challenges based on more than 10 years of implementation of the Resolution.
There is a great deal of literature available describing the Resolution itself. This includes:
the documentation of the UNSCR 1540 Committee; relevant reports by governments and
international and regional organizations; and articles and information in the 1540 Compass,
which is a journal of views and ideas for effective implementation of UNSCR 1540. An excellent
example of this is the edition that marked the 10-year anniversary of the Resolution (1540
Compass, 2014).
For longer works, the monograph “Towards the 2016 Comprehensive Review former
experts assess UNSC Resolution 1540” is an excellent resource (Kasprzyk et al., 2015). In
addition, an excellent regional perspective regarding 1540 compliance is provided in
Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (Scheinman, 2008).
Post-April 2014 literature reflecting insights and conclusions from a fuller
implementation of UNSCR 1540 include studies from Salisbury (2018), Shirazyan (2019), and
Rehman and Qazi (2019). The latter discusses the evolving nature of UNSCR 1540 challenges,
and like many other documents, it underscores the inadequacy of depending on country reports
to gauge compliance.
Rehman and Qazi list as a principal challenge the current inability to determine a nation’s
degree of compliance with the Resolution (2019). They indicate that threats have evolved and
identify factors that continue to impact implementation, including lack of capabilities and
28

resources. Like the work of Crail (2006), this analysis also calls for a risk-based approach to
implementation to adequately address evolving threats, with a particular emphasis on providing
assistance to resource-challenged regions, such as Central Asia (Persbo & Woodward, 2005;
Rehman and Qazi, 2019).
Relevant literature also includes writing from Beth Elise Whitaker on some of the
political challenges that impact compliance with UNSCR 1540 among African states. She writes:
From among many factors considered important in the study of compliance, four seem
particularly relevant to the international counter-terrorism regime: the perception of a
terrorist threat; the availability of funding; the nature of domestic political institutions;
and the relative influence of domestic constituencies. (2008)
The factors Whitaker identifies are consistent with those mentioned in other works. Igor
Khripunov, for example, concludes that these same four factors impact compliance (2014). In
addition, he also identifies inadequate expertise as a factor that impacts compliance.
The scholars noted are among the leading sources on UNSCR 1540, although there are
additional papers and other materials that have been reviewed in depth and that underpin the
scholarship in this study. These sources are important in the analysis and development of a
comprehensive list of factors impacting UNSCR 1540 implementation.
Previous Compliance Analyses, Assessments, Methodologies, or Tools
Compliance has been described as a puzzle that requires all pieces to be effective
(Salisbury et al., 2018). A principal objective of this study is to identify all the pieces of the 1540
puzzle. To that end, it is important to consider literature concerning efforts that have taken place
29

to date to solve compliance puzzles, such as tools that have been used to determine the level of
compliance with nonproliferation instruments.
Although there are a number of documents put forward as UNSCR 1540 compliance
analyses or assessments, most of these are broad in scope and focused on the history of the
Resolution, its effectiveness, areas of improvement, and factors impacting compliance. However,
there are four quantitative analyses and two tools that are pertinent to this study. Although they
are not in agreement on the compliance factors that are relevant, nor is the data necessarily in
agreement, they do provide valuable insight in the development of the evaluation tool.
The first of these is an analysis conducted by Stiles and Thane (2006). This is a statistical
model designed to be used to evaluate UNSCR 1540’s predecessor, UNSCR 1373 (United
Nations Official Document, 2001). UNSCR 1373 was the first binding effort against terrorism,
effectively “criminalizing” terrorism. UNSCR 1373 was a broad measure rapidly developed
largely in response to the events on September 11, 2001. UNSCR 1373 laid the groundwork for
UNSCR 1540.
The tool developed by Stiles and Thane (2006) made use of publicly available data as
proxy measures for the dependent and independent variables to analyze factors that may impact
compliance. UNSCR 1373 is different from UNSCR 1540 in that it does not require the level of
national regulatory requirements, nor does it contain the transit, trans-shipment, and export
control requirements in UNSCR 1540 that are extremely resource centric (United Nations
Official Document, 2001; United Nations Official Document, 2004A).
In their work, Stiles and Thane identified three behavioral theories that could be used to
determine treaty compliance factors.
30

1. Foreign policy orientation – Nations act in their own interest and tend to
continue to do what they have done in the past (Krasner, 1999).
2. Vulnerability to external pressure – Nations make efforts to insulate themselves
from external pressures and reduce their vulnerability to international
inducements (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998).
3. Level of democratization – More democratic nations tend to follow the rule of
law and support international legal requirements (Raustalia, 2000).
Stiles and Thane identified a number of factors to measure compliance in the areas
impacted by the theories. These factors, along with proxy measures identified for each, became
the variables in the scholars’ equation. Foreign policy orientation factors include: past
antiterrorism treaty ratification, membership in regional organizations, the level of U.S. relations
(measured by shared alliances), and the past number of terrorist attacks.
With regard to vulnerability to external pressure, Stiles and Thane identified as factors
the amount of government spending, exports to the United States, and the development
assistance received. For the level of democratization, the scholars identified adherence to the rule
of law as the principal factor. A complete listing of the factors is identified in Table 1.

31

Table 1
Factors Identified by Stiles and Thane
Theory Factor
Foreign Policy Orientation and Interests Past treaty ratification
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
Membership
Location in Africa
Location in Europe
Shared alliances with the US
Us Bases in country
Member of the Coalition of the Willing
Member of NATO
Number of past terrorist attacks
State Power and Vulnerability to External
Pressure
Development assistance received
Exports to the US
National public expenditures
Government Effectiveness
Level of Democratization and Internal Legalism Democracy (Rule of Law)

Stiles and Thane's study is significant in that it delivered a statistical analysis of some of
the factors that can be used to provide insight into 1540 compliance. Of the factors analyzed, five
emerged as statistically significant, each of which has been identified in other literature. All of
the factors identified are foreign policy factors from the table above. They include: the number of
treaties previously ratified (i.e., past behavior) (Raustiala, 2000); membership in the
Organization of Islamic Countries (i.e., political will or commitment) (Scheinman, 2008;
Ogilvie-White, 2008); the number of previous terrorist attacks (i.e., perceived threat) (Whitaker,
2010), and association with a regional group (Chayes & Chayes, 1998; Salisbury et al., 2019).
In 2011, Stinnett, Early, Horne, and Karreth conducted an analysis that looked at the
factors or attributes they believed influenced UNSCR 1540 compliance. This was the first
quantitative analysis specifically focused on UNSCR 1540 compliance. Similar to the analysis
conducted by Stiles and Thane (2006), it used publicly available data to attempt to identify a
32

correlation between the factors identified and UNSCR 1540 compliance. The factors were
broken down according to two differing perspectives on compliance, one based on enforcement
and the other based on state capacity or capability.
As outlined in the article by Stinnett et al., scholars advocating the “enforcement” theory
of compliance argue that compliance is a choice that depends on security ties, economic
interests, and external pressures (Downs et al., 1996; Fuhrmann, 2007). Advocates of the
“managerial” theory of compliance argue that technical and bureaucratic capabilities are the key
factors that impact compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998; Scheinman, 2008). The article
identified factors in both categories.
Like many scholars (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018), Stinnett et al. were
concerned that most assessments of UNSCR 1540 compliance were based principally on treaty
participation and self-reporting and not on “actual behavior” (2011). As a result, their study
partially based its analysis of a country’s compliance on the factors that reflect their capability to
enforce the Resolution.
These factors were compiled into a composite index, which was called “The
Nonproliferation Index Score.” The index was broken down into three categories (“legal basis,
state institutions, and implementation”) designed to provide an indication of whether a country
has the requisite laws, regulations, agencies, processes, and training in place to meet their
commitments under UNSCR 1540. The categories and factors include:
Nonproliferation Compliance Score Variables
Category Component Variables
Legal Basis
33

Export control licensing laws
Export control enforcement laws
Control lists (existence and specificity)
Government-industry outreach laws
Institutions
Export control expertise
Licensing institutions
Customs and border-security adjustment
Government-industry institutions
Implementation
Export control licensing practices
Use of control lists in licensing and enforcement
Customs and border-security activities
Export control follow-up
Government-industry outreach activities
A five-point scale was used to evaluate each category (0-4), where “0” indicates the
absence of meaningful laws and “4” equals the gold standard. The results in each category were
then converted to a percentage and each category was converted into a 100-point scale. The
average of the three scales was the final point total, or “Nonproliferation Index Score” (Stinnett,
Early, Horne, & Karreth, 2011). These scores were identified for 30 of the 82 “key” states
identified by Crail (2006) and provide a number of insights into early implementation of UNSCR
1540.
34

To further analyze the “enforcement” versus “capability” argument, a statistical analysis
of four additional “indicators” or factors was conducted. The enforcement approach asserts that
compliance is largely dependent on whether compliance is in a country’s national interest
(Downs et al., 1996). Proponents of the managerial approach assert that states do not comply
because they lack the ability to comply (Chayes & Chayes, 1998; Scheinman, 2008). In the
analysis, Stinnett et al. used the factors of “export dependence” and “security ties with the U.S.”
to represent the national interest or enforcement argument, and they used “economic capacity”
and “bureaucratic capacity” to represent the managerial or “capability” argument. Table 2
provides a summary.
Table 2
Factors Identified by Stinnett, Early, Horne, and Karreth
Argument Hypotheses Indicator (Factor) Measure
Enforcement:
National Interest
Compliance is
determined by
national interests
Export dependence Ratio of exports to
GDP
Enforcement:
National Interest
Compliance is
determined by
security interests
Security ties to United
States
Alliance ties and
alliance similarity
with the United
States
Managerial: Capacity
/ Capability
Compliance is
determined by state
capacity
Economic capacity GDP per capita
Managerial: Capacity
/ Capability
Compliance is
determined by state
capacity
Bureaucratic capacity Quality of
governing
institutions

The results of this analysis showed little support for the enforcement approach. There was
no statistically significant correlation between either export dependence or security ties to the
United States and compliance with UNSCR 1540 compliance. With respect to the managerial
approach, the analysis showed strong statistical correlation between capacity and compliance,
35

indicating that a key determinant of UNSCR 1540 compliance is a state’s technical and
economic ability to implement policy changes. The analysis by Stinnett et al. found that “states’
activities in preventing the proliferation of dual-use materials appear to be strongly related to
their bureaucratic and economic capabilities,” and “state capacity is the factor most closely
linked to the institutionalization and implementation of export controls” (2006).
The third tool pertinent to this study is the NTI Nuclear Security Index for Theft and
Sabotage. This index was developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative staff to construct a
framework for assurance, accountability, and action (NTI, 2018A; NTI, 2018B). To develop the
index, a panel of experts was assembled to assist the NTI staff in identifying and weighing key
factors that collectively indicate a level of compliance. This resulted in the development of three
separate tables. The first assesses nuclear security in countries that have one kilogram or more of
weapons-usable nuclear materials. The second table assesses the nuclear security conditions in
countries that have less than one kilogram of weapons-usable materials or none at all. The third
table assesses nuclear security in those countries (including Taiwan) with nuclear facilities,
where sabotage could lead to a significant radiological release with serious off-site health
consequences (NTI, 2018A; NTI, 2018B).
For example, the first table, which assesses security in the 22 countries with one kilogram
or more of weapons-usable material, consists of five categories, each with a set of underlying
indicators. These indicators include:
1. Quantities and sites – Quantities of nuclear materials; sites and transportation; and
materials production and elimination trends.
36

2. Security and control measures – On-site physical protection; control and accounting
procedures; insider threat prevention; physical security during transport; response
capabilities; and cybersecurity.
3. Global norms – International legal commitments; voluntary commitments; and
international assurances.
4. Domestic commitments and capacity – UNSCR 1540 implementation; domestic
nuclear materials security legislation; safeguards adherence and compliance; and
independent regulatory agency.
5. Risk environment – Political stability; effective governance; pervasiveness of
corruption; and group(s) interested in illicitly acquiring materials (NTI, 2018A;
NTI,2018B)
Up to 100 points are awarded for each of the five categories, the total score is an average
of the category scores, and countries are ranked according to their total scores. As an example,
Australia and Switzerland had the highest theft ranking scores (most favorable security
conditions) of those countries with one kilogram or more of weapons-grade materials. Both
countries scored 94 points out of a possible 100. Although the tables do speak to all aspects of
UNSCR 1540 compliance, their relevance to this study is principally as a means to identify
possible compliance factors, as well as to provide an example of a process by which categories
and indicators can be identified and weighted to build a tool to determine compliance.
The fourth tool relevant to this study is the Peddling Peril Index (PPI), developed by
Albright, Burkhard, and Stricker (2019) and the Institute for Science and International Security.
37

Last updated in May 2019, the PPI is designed to measure the effectiveness of a country’s
strategic trade controls required under section 3(d) of Resolution 1540.
The 2019 PPI identifies five major “super criteria” and uses 150 weighted “sub-criteria”
to develop a possible score of 1,300. The super criteria include: an international commitment to
preventing strategic commodity trafficking; existing legislation to regulate and guide oversight
of trade in strategic commodities while criminalizing and preventing strategic commodity
trafficking; the ability to monitor and detect strategic trade; the ability to prevent proliferation
financing; and the adequacy of enforcement against strategic commodity trafficking.
As an example, the super criteria of “international commitment to prevent strategic
commodity trafficking” measures membership to treaties, conventions, and regimes. There are 22
sub-criteria or indicators, 9 of which are rated as high impact (15 points each), 10 of which are
rated as medium impact (10 points each), and 3 of which are rated low impact (5 points each). The
maximum score that a country could receive in this category is 250 points.
The value of analyzing this tool is twofold. An examination of the tool may assist in
identifying factors or indicators that can be used to evaluate compliance with UNSCR 1540, and
a study of the development of the index can provide valuable insight into the process of
developing a tool for evaluation. For example, both the Nuclear Security Index for Theft and
Sabotage and the PPI use weighted scores determined by a panel of experts. This raises
questions: should qualitative indices be weighted, and if so, what is the best way for this
weighting to be conducted?
38

A fifth relevant tool is found in Sean Conroy’s 2017 dissertation. Like Stiles and Thayne
(2006) and Stinnett et al. (2011), Conroy uses a combined qualitative and quantitative approach
to identify factors and determine the relationship between these factors (independent variables)
and UNSCR 1540 compliance (dependent variable). Like the previous studies, Conroy identified
factors or independent variables based on theories of compliance, and once these were identified,
he assigned proxy measures for the statistical analysis. Table 3 outlines his hypotheses, factors,
and measures.
Table 3
Factors Identified by Conroy
Hypotheses Indicator (Factor) Measure
Stronger law and order
correlates to increased
compliance
Strength of law and order
within a country as a function
demand for cash transactions
Demand for cash transactions
from International Monetary
Fund Statistics
Higher confidence in contract
enforcement and property
rights correlates to increased
compliance
Confidence in contract
enforcement
Measure of contract
confidence from World Bank
data
Higher corruption correlates
to decreased compliance
Perception of corruption in a
country
Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index
A more competitive political
system is correlated with
increased compliance
Competitiveness of the
political system
Political system
competitiveness from Polity
IV Index
Increased compliance in a
region is correlated with
increased compliance for
individual countries
Regional compliance Regional compliance from the
NTI Index data
Increased compliance in a
region is correlated with
increased compliance for
individual countries
Regional compliance Regional compliance from the
UNSCR 1540 data

The factors Conroy focused on in his thesis are rule of law, political competition, and
regional compliance, which are quite different from the factors identified by Stiles and Thane
39

(2006), or Stinnett et al. (2011). Conroy’s analysis was consistent with Stiles and Thane’s study
in that a high correlation was found between the region of the country and compliance with
UNSCR 1540. Unlike Stiles and Thane, Conroy found a strong correlation between the rule of
law (Transparency International, 2016) and compliance.
In 2019, A. C. Hess (2019) completed a dissertation that included a review of existing
UNSCR 1540 literature and the previous quantitative analyses conducted by Stiles and Thane
and Stinnett et al. In her work, Hess examined compliance factors using a framework found in
treaty compliance literature. Similar to the approach taken by Stinnett et al., the compliance
factors in this literature fell under either “managerial” or “enforcement” theories of compliance.
Like Stiles and Thane, Hess found a correlation between regional location and
compliance. Like Stinnett et. al., Hess found strong support for “managerial” theory factors in
her analysis. Both analyses identified gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and other
managerial factors as indicators of compliance. In addition, Hess also found strong correlations
between membership in nonproliferation treaty regime participations and previous treaty
ratifications and compliance with UNSCR 1540. A listing of factors identified by Hess can be
found in Table 4.

40

Table 4
Factors identified by Hess
Factor Measurement Hypothesis

Economic capacity

GDP per capita
Higher economic capacity is correlated with
increased implementation of 1540
obligations

Bureaucratic
capacity

Quality of a state’s
governing institutions

Higher bureaucratic capacity is correlated
with increased implementation

Decision-making
process
(complexity)

Institutional constraints on
decision-making powers
of the chief executive

Fewer constraints is correlated with
increased implementation

State in conflict

Conflict in the prior year

A state in conflict is correlated with lower
implementation

Foreign aid

Total foreign aid received

Higher receipt of foreign aid will be
correlated with increased implementation

NGO activity

Number of NGOs

Higher number of NGOs is correlated with
increased implementation

Economic
interests
(trade)

High-tech export
dependence

A state that relies more on high-tech exports
is correlated with lower implementation

Security interests

Alliance ties with the
United States

Alliance ties to the United States is
correlated with increased implementation

Vulnerability to
terrorism

Number of terrorist
attacks

A higher number of terrorist attacks is
correlated with increased implementation

Foreign policy

UNGA voting similarity
with the U.S.

Similarity of foreign policy interests is
correlated with increased implementation

Regime type

Regime type

A democratic regime type is correlated with
increased implementation

NAM membership

NAM membership status
NAM membership is correlated with lower
implementation

As indicated previously, the managerial theory emphasizes the importance of capability,
capacity, and temporal considerations in countries meeting their international obligations
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998). Key questions regarding managerial theory include whether the
41

state has the financial or technical ability to implement the requirements, are they prepared to do
so, and how long will it take to make the necessary structural and cultural changes to do so?
Enforcement theory, on the other hand, focuses on a cost-benefit calculation that includes
a state’s consideration of reputation, outside pressure, identity, and national interest (Downs et
al., 1996; Kassenova, 2011). The key questions for enforcement theory include whether it is in
the state’s best interest to comply and is the benefit from compliance greater than the economic,
political, or social cost of the effort to comply?
In countries without WMD programs that either manufacture WMD components or are
substantial transportation hubs, an additional question needs to be asked: what impact will
compliance have on business? That is, will compliance enhance or detract from business, and/or
will it affect stature as a transshipment hub?
It should be noted that the results of these quantitative analyses depend largely on the
data identified to measure the variables in the equation. Conroy, for example, uses the NTI
Nuclear Security Index for Theft and Sabotage as a proxy for UNSCR 1540 compliance, while
Stiles and Thane use a constructed attribute (a self-developed index of treaties signed and reports
submitted) as their measure of UNSCR 1373 compliance. In these analyses, the case can be
made that the measures used may not be the most valid and that neither measure is an
appropriate indicator of nonproliferation treaty compliance. In both of these studies, natural
attributes could not be identified, and the attributes used may not be considered either
“unambiguous,” “comprehensive,” or “direct” (Keeney & Gregory, 2005).
There is substantial value in examining existing assessments and models to identify
factors that should be considered and methodologies that can be adopted in an effective
42

evaluation of UNSCR 1540 compliance. Although existing tools certainly have value, none of
these tools provide an analysis of all factors impacting UNSCR 1540, nor do they yield a
comprehensive assessment of compliance. What is clear is that despite efforts to date, more
needs to be done.
Gaps Underscoring the Need for an Analysis and Implication to Practice
In reviewing the literature, it appears no scholar has yet identified all of the pieces of the
compliance puzzle. Although efforts have been made by the UNSCR 1540 Committee and others
to effectively determine each nation’s level of compliance, these efforts have either been based
on publicly available information or documents submitted by the countries. There is clearly a gap
between the tools available for measuring compliance and the accuracy and trustworthiness of
the outcome. Shirazyan (2019) indicates that country reporting is an inadequate metric for
measuring 1540 compliance, writing:
This is because the quality of the reports and the effectiveness of the reported
implementation efforts are not subject to evaluation. More generally, the 1540 Committee
does not critically assess countries’ compliance or systematically identify areas of
concern, let alone set priorities or target resources to address vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by non-state actors to traffic WMD materials.
Andrea Viski would seem to agree. In Chapter 3 of Preventing the Proliferation of
WMDs, she remarks on the inherent complexity in implementing the Resolution, which is due to
a number of factors, including its broad scope and its lack of clarity regarding what states need to
do to meet the requirements (Salisbury et al., 2018). Viski also remarks that there is no clear
measure to gauge how well states are implementing their obligations. She goes on to say that
43

these issues need to be addressed if full implementation of the resolution is to be achieved by
2021, as called for by the president of the Security Council in his address marking the tenth
anniversary of the passage of UNSCR 1540.
The challenges identified by these scholars provides an opportunity to enhance the
practice of public policy through the review, analysis, and compilation of the factors and
assessment methodologies that can lead to a comprehensive list for assisting in the effective
evaluation of UNSCR 1540 compliance.
Conclusion
Literature on the history and implementation of UNSCR 1540 (Simpson, 2004; Weiner,
Braun, May, & Speed, 2007; Robinson, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018), as well as the principals of
regulatory compliance, compliance theory, and compliance with international agreements
(Richardson & Kegley, 1980; Fromm, 1983, Moon, 1985; Tallberg, 2002; Guzman, 2002; Tyler
& Jackson, 2014) provide important background for this study. Literature on the challenges
impacting compliance, as well as compliance analyses, assessments, and methodologies (Stiles &
Thayne, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2011; Khripunov, 2014; Kasprzyk et al., 2015; Hess, 2019) is
employed in this study to develop the model for evaluating UNSCR 1540 compliance.
With this literature as prologue, this study is positioned to support and inform the 1540
Committee, which must review its tasking prior to its potential renewal in 2021. Any tool that
could be used to evaluate performance, identify areas where assistance is needed, and provide
this assistance where the risk is greatest would greatly help in the management of UNSCR 1540
implementation, while at the same time encouraging accountability. With that end in mind,
considered next is the methodology by which such a tool is created and presented in this study.
44

Methodology

Introduction
Presented here is the methodological approach used in this study, the justification for that
approach, and the methods used in collecting and analyzing the data. Also described is the
justification for the selection of the subject and the identification of data sources, along with the
reasoning used to identify which of these sources is the most appropriate (Onwuegbuzie, Leech,
and Collins, 2012). Key limitations of the methodology and data analysis are articulated, as are
the means by which these limitations were mitigated during research and analysis.
The research problem for this study is two-fold: implementation of UNSCR 1540 is
inconsistent, and there is currently no way to accurately determine compliance with the
Resolution. Existing literature indicates that UNSCR 1540 implementation has been inconsistent
for a number of reasons and owing to a variety of factors (Salisbury et al., 2018). Shortly after
the Resolution was adopted, Van Ham and Bosch (2007) discussed a number of factors that
impact the Resolution’s implementation, some of which are inherent in the way the instrument
was passed.
One of these factors is the perception of the Resolution’s legitimacy. A number of nations
initially questioned whether it was appropriate for the Security Council to act as a “World
Legislature,” which could require countries to change its sovereign laws (Talmon, 2005). In
addition, it was noted that there is a lack of clarity of the Resolution, which contains general,
ambiguous, and undefined terms like “appropriate” and “effective.” Unfortunately, little
guidance has been provided by the UNSCR 1540 Committee regarding how these terms should
be defined (Rehman & Qazi, 2019).
45

Another concern is that nations may lack the capacity or capability to implement the
Resolution (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998; Kassenova, 2011). It has also been discussed that
there is currently no way to accurately determine compliance. As Shirazyan indicates in a paper
based on interviews with more than 50 UNSCR 1540 experts, “There are no set implementation
indicators that would let the Committee assess how vigorously each country implements its 1540
related measures in practice” (2019).
These are some of the factors that impact UNSCR 1540 compliance. Others that have
been discussed include a country’s political will (Nayan, 2018), priorities (Crail, 2006), and
reputational concerns (Whitaker, 2010).
Approach and Data Collection
This research adopted a pragmatic approach suited to integrate the quantitative and
qualitative strategies employed in the study. This approach was the best available to provide real-
world answers to the research questions and develop an evaluation methodology that reflects the
experiences in UNSCR 1540 development and implementation (Feilzer, 2010). The study was
greatly informed by a 2017 MacArthur Grant Project, “A New International Framework for
Bolstering Global Supply System Security and Resilience” (Flynn et al., 2017). The project was
initiated in an effort to encourage the maritime industry to become more involved in preventing
nonproliferation through protection of the global supply chain. A key consideration was how the
maritime industry could assist governments in their compliance with the UNSCR 1540
requirements and what factors were critical in motivating compliance.
The MacArthur Grant project was based on the notion that large, multinational shipping
and terminal operating companies working in numerous countries could assist those countries in
46

implementing the UNSCR 1540 border control and export and trans-shipment enforcement
requirements. In an effort to determine the factors that impact or encourage compliance, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with government, nongovernment, and maritime industry
personnel in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This work led to a more in-depth investigation
into the factors impacting UNSCR 1540 compliance, which is focus of this study (Flynn et al.,
2017).
Initially, this study focused on determining factors that could be used to evaluate UNSCR
1540 compliance, as well as compiling these factors into a simple evaluation tool. As research
progressed, the study expanded to include a more detailed analysis of the factors, including
developing and testing an evaluation tool. This required a change in methodology.
The research began with a purely qualitative phenomenological model designed to
capture perceptions of UNSCR 1540 developers and implementers regarding factors influencing
compliance (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005). However, with the addition
of model development, factor weighting, testing, and evaluation, the methodology was
broadened into a sequential mixed-method approach (Rao & Woolcock, 2003; Knox, 2015;
Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015; McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015) that used a quantitative analysis to
weigh the factors and develop the model (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). The methodology
underpinning this work led to the following sequential steps:
1. Identification of compliance factors
2. Analysis of the factors
3. Model development (i.e., operationalizing the factors)
47

4. Weighting of the factors
5. Initial validation and revision
6. Expert validation and final revision
Data Analysis
Data were collected from existing literature and analyzed using multiple qualitative data
analysis methodologies. These were “constant comparison analysis,” also called “coding” (Ryan
& Bernard, 2003), “keyword(s) in context analysis,” and “classical content analysis” (Creswell
& Creswell, 2017). Using three different data analysis models provided a triangulation of
methods. As Leech and Onwuegbuzie write, “Using multiple qualitative data analyses allows the
researcher to utilize the strengths of each qualitative data analysis tool involved in order to
understand better the phenomenon” (2007).
Given the breadth of the research, the data were divided into five categories:
1. The origin, history, and requirements of UNSCR 1540;
2. Principals of regulatory compliance and compliance theory;
3. Challenges, areas of improvement, or factors that influence compliance;
4. Previous compliance analyses, assessments, methodologies, or tools; and
5. Gaps that underscore the need for a comprehensive analysis of factors that
determine compliance.
48

The categorization of the literature was essential. It greatly assisted in the coding (i.e.,
constant comparison analysis) by identifying and eliminating categories of data that did not
require additional analysis. To develop the evaluation methodology and build the model, a great
deal of data had to be coded and prepared for the application of the two other data analysis tools,
“keyword(s) in context analysis” and “classical content analysis” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007).
For this study, the coding was done manually to deal with numerous documents that had been
scanned but could not be searched electronically.
The coding was conducted principally to identify compliance factors that would be
included in the evaluation methodology, focusing on three of the categories listed above:
“principals of regulatory compliance and compliance theory;” “challenges, areas of
improvement, or factors that influence compliance;” and “previous compliance analyses,
assessments, methodologies or tools.” Each document was reviewed multiple times to ensure that
the coding was accurate (Chowdhury, 2014).
Initially, each of the three categories was coded into general areas. For example, the
“challenges, areas of improvement, or factors that influence compliance” category was coded
into the areas of “compliance challenges,” “compliance improvement,” and “compliance
factors.” The areas identified were sub-coded to assist in the development of the compliance
evaluation model. The development of sub-codes, such as “lack of expertise” or “lack of
legitimacy,” was extremely helpful in the analysis of the data as sub-coding eliminated
unnecessary effort by providing a focus for the “keyword(s) in context analysis” and the
“classical content analysis” that was conducted later in the research.
49

A review of the data in the “principals of regulatory compliance and compliance theory”
category, and in particular the coded data for “compliance models,” provided the foundational
information by which to begin model development. A keyword(s) in context analysis was then
conducted in the categories of “challenges, areas of improvement, or factors that influence
compliance,” and “previous compliance analyses, assessments, methodologies, or tools.” The
keyword(s) used for this analysis were selected for their correspondence with factors identified
in the data as impacting compliance with UNSCR 1540. They included words such as expertise,
capacity, capability, legitimacy, priority, and political. Table 5 provides an example of two
keyword(s) in context. The interpretations in the table reflect the perceptions and observations of
some of the experts that have been involved in 1540 development, implementation, or analysis.
Table 5
Keyword(s)-in-Context Analysis
Keyword(s)-in-context Interpretation
“Even if a state supports the aim of
preventing WMD Proliferation to non-state
actors, it must still be able to muster a certain
degree of technical and legal expertise, as
well as financial and human resources to
establish the specific mechanisms outlined in
the Resolution” (Crail, 2006)
States lack expertise
“From its very inception, Resolution 1540
lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many U.N.
member states. The 1540 regime faced
potential disempowerment, as it was created
through a process and authority deemed not
rightful by many states…” (Shirazyan, 2019)
Concerns regarding legitimacy

The keyword(s) in context analysis was used to add factors to the baseline compliance
factors developed as a result of the regulatory theory data review. The elimination of some of the
factors and the weighting of the remaining factors was influenced by another data analysis
50

method, the “classical content analysis” model. This type of analysis is similar to the constant
comparison analysis but instead of revealing underlying themes, it provides a count of how many
times these themes arise (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). It employs the same type of words or
phrases identified in the sub-codes, or those used in the keyword(s) in context analysis, and
determines how often they appear in the data.
After the coding was completed and the baseline factors were identified, the keyword(s)
in context analysis was used to validate factors for the model. Once these factors were validated,
the classical content analysis offered justification for the weighting of the factors and revision of
the model.
Identification of Compliance Factors
The identification of compliance factors began with a review of literature on regulatory
compliance and theory. The initial factors considered were those identified by Parker and
Nielsen (Drahos, 2017), which were derived from a model developed by the Dutch Ministry of
Justice (Dutch Ministry of Justice, Law Enforcement Expertise Centre, 2004). The model is
supported by regulatory compliance theory and used by European governments to develop and
evaluate regulations. It is used in this research as a baseline upon which to build.
The initial listing was expanded with the inclusion of factors identified by UNSCR 1540
experts and practitioners, including representatives of governments, governmental organizations,
NGOs, and private industry. These additional factors were identified through review of relevant
data and literature, including: the origin and history of UNSCR 1540; challenges, concerns, or
factors that influence compliance; and previous analyses and assessments of nonproliferation
agreements.
51

The factors were validated through the review of four previous quantitative analyses, one
of which concerned compliance with UNSCR 1373 (Stiles & Thane, 2006), and the other three
concerned the compliance with UNSCR 1540 (Stinnett et al., 2011; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019).
Attention was also given to two existing tools, the NTI Nuclear Security Index, published in
2018, and the PPI, published in 2019 (Albright et al., 2019)
Analysis of Compliance Factors
With compliance factors identified, ensuing analysis attempted to determine which
factors appeared most frequently and whether any could be further supported or invalidated by
existing literature. The result of the analysis was a revised list of compliance factors divided into
three categories representing the natural progression of a regulatory instrument from
development to enforcement. These categories are:
 Instrument – Factors that occurred as a result of the development of the Resolution,
such as “legitimacy” (i.e., the impact on compliance due to concerns about the
legality of the Resolution or the methods used to adopt it) (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007).
 Implementation – Factors that occurred or were influenced by efforts to implement
the Resolution, including “reputation” (i.e., a country’s concerns about the impact
noncompliance will have on their national reputation (Kassenova, 2011).
 Enforcement – Factors that occurred or were influenced by efforts to enforce the
requirements, including a lack of enforcement due to their lack of capability (i.e.,
their lack of economic, technical, or administrative resources) (Crail, 2006; Nayan,
2018).
52

Model Development
The revised list of factors informed the model development. A matrix was created, and
the factors were placed in the three aforementioned categories (instrument, implementation, and
enforcement). Attributes were identified for each factor, and raw scores for each attribute and a
Simple Multi Attribute Rating Technique (SMART) was used to convert the attributes. The
attributes were converted to a 100-point scale, and the attributes and categories were weighted
based on their importance and impact (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).
A critical task in the development of the model was converting the factors impacting
compliance into objectives and identifying the attributes for each objective. The identification of
attributes or measures is an essential step in developing the methodology to evaluate the impact
of the factors on a country’s compliance with UNSCR 1540 (Edwards, Miles, & von Winterfeldt,
2007). For the purpose of this study, each of the compliance factors is linked to an objective, and
each objective is associated with an attribute. An example is listed in Table 6.
In some cases, the factors identified as impacting compliance were easy to convert to
objectives and to identify “good” attributes (Keeney & Gregory, 2005), while in other cases it
proved extremely challenging. “Good” attributes, according to Keeney and Gregory (2005), are
unambiguous, comprehensive, direct, operational, and understandable. An example of a case
where this was easy is the factor of “previous nonproliferation treaty adoption.” In this instance,
the factor converts to the objective “identify the number of treaties approved,” with the attribute
being the “percentage of nonproliferation treaties approved.” With this, the attribute or measure
is directly associated with the objective.
53

A more difficult case is with respect to factors such as “reputational concerns.” In these
cases, although it is not difficult to convert the factor to objectives, it is much more difficult to
identify a “good” attribute that is directly associated with the objective. This is also true in the
case of “lack of capability.” In that instance, the conversion to the objective “identify the
capability to implement the resolution” was not difficult. What was difficult was identification of
attributes that have the desired properties of “good” attributes (Keeney, 2005).
Table 6 offers an example of three issues or concerns that UNSCR 1540 experts believe
are factors that influence the evaluation of compliance with the Resolution. In the example, the
final column lists the type of attribute. There are three types of attributes. These are natural,
constructed, and proxy.
Natural attributes typically have a common understanding (i.e., the percentage of treaties
approved). Proxy attributes usually involve a scale that is in general use. It is important to note
that proxy measures do not directly measure the objective. In this work, the identified attribute
“gross domestic product” is a proxy attribute. Constructed attributes are typically developed
from existing data to measure an objective. The World Bank Logistics Performance Index is an
example of a constructed attribute (World Bank Database: Aggregated LPI 2012-2018, 2019).

54

Table 6
Objectives and Attributes in Evaluating UNSCR 1540 Compliance
Compliance
Factor
Objective Attribute Measure Type
Implementation
Issues
Determine if a
country has
made efforts to
implement
UNSCR 1540
reports
submitted
Number of
UNSCR 1540
reports
submitted to the
committee
Natural
National Issues Determine
whether a
country can
effectively
implement the
resolution
GDP per capita Logarithm of
GDP per capita
Proxy
Capability Issues Determine if the
country has the
capability to
enforce the
resolution
World Bank
Governance
Indicators
-2.5 to +2.5
indicator of
government
effectiveness
Constructed

It is more efficient to be able to identify natural attributes for each objective. Natural
attributes have a far greater probability of having all of the properties for “good” attributes.
Additionally, if natural attributes cannot be identified, constructed attributes can be used.
Unfortunately, it was difficult to identify natural attributes or develop constructed attributes for
some of the compliance factors and their objectives, and in a number of cases, proxy attributes
had to be used.
Proxy attributes are the last choice because they do not directly measure the objectives
and may not be a strong indicator of whether the objective is achieved. The type of attributes
used is critical because it speaks to the model’s validity and whether the research truly measures
that which it was intended to measure and the research results are accurate (Gass, 1983).
55

Once the factors, attributes, and measures were identified and tabulated, an appropriate
methodology was needed to convert and evaluate the data. SMART was used to convert the raw
data in the “raw scores” table into a standard format in preparation for the use of swing
weighting to determine the scores (von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986; Eisenfur, Weber, &
Langer, 2010). The SMART process has been used extensively for evaluating multiattribute
models, including recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense in evaluating facilities for
closure and the National Academy of Medicines for evaluating vaccines (Knobler, Bok, &
Gellin, 2016).
In this process, each measure was converted from a raw score to a 100-point scale to
provide a common scale for each of the measures. An example of this application is as follows;
 In the Instrument category, one of the factors is “rule implementation concerns,” meaning
whether a country’s concern about clarity and complexity impacts implementation
efforts.
 The attribute identified to measure this is “1540 Reports Completed,” based on the
UNSCR Committee website.
 The measure is the number of reports submitted to the UNSCR Committee, with the
greatest number of reports submitted by any country being five.
Using the SMART methodology, “0” reports represents the lowest score and “5”
represents the highest. As such, on a scale from 0% to 100%, each report submitted equals 20
percentage points, with a country submitting 5 reports scoring 100% in the category. This
conversion process is repeated for each of the attributes and measures, converting all of the raw
56

scores to a 100-point scale. These values were represented in the value scores (see Table 7).
Using the example above, the raw score for a country that submitted three reports out of five is
60% on the 100% scale, or 60 for entry into Table 7.
Table 7
Converting Raw Score to Value Score
Raw Score Range Value Score
3 1-5 3/5 or 60

Weighting of Attributes and Categories
With the model created and the scores converted to a common 100-point scale, there was
a need to prioritize the individual factors and categories. The previous qualitative and
quantitative analyses and two indices support factor weighting. Analyses conducted by Stiles and
Thane (2006), Stinnett et al. (2011), Conroy (2017), and Hess (2019) all indicate that the factors
influencing UNSCR 1540 compliance are not of equal significance.
The two most well-known tools for evaluating nonproliferation compliance use weighting
as a means to add validity to their models. These are the NTI Nuclear Security Index of Theft
and Sabotage (NTI, 2018) and the PPI (Albright et al., 2019). An example from the NTI Index is
that it provides a greater weight for the category of “security and control measures” than it does
for the category of “risk environment.”
In the 2019/2020 PPI, the “super criteria” are not weighed equally. As the discussion of
the PPI methodology indicates:
57

The Ability to Prevent Proliferation Financing and Adequacy of Enforcement super
criteria are weighted the most; Legislation and Ability to Monitor and Detect Strategic
Trade are given half the impact of those; and International Commitment is given a quarter
of the impact of Ability to Prevent Proliferation Financing and Enforcement (PPI, p. 5).
Additionally, the “sub-criteria” in the PPI have different weighting as well. The “sub-
criteria,” or factors under the “super criteria,” are weighted based on their perceived impact, with
high impact criteria weighted as 15 points, medium impact criteria weighted at 10 points, and
low impact criteria weighted at 5 points.
Thus there is general agreement that factors are of differing levels of importance in
ensuring compliance. To compensate for these differences, a weighting system was employed in
this model in accordance with the SMART process. This involved an analysis of the attributes in
each category and assigning each measure a weight, where each weight in the category must add
up to 1.0. An example is that the six individual 100-point measures in the Instrument category
each had to be assigned a value. Using the example above, the measure “number of reports
submitted to the UNSCR 1540 Committee” for the attribute “1540 reports completed” could
have a weight in category of 0.25, with the other attributes collectively adding up to 0.75, for a
category total of 1.0.
The weights were derived based on a number of factors. These include the number of
times the particular attribute was mentioned, past analyses that indicates statistically significant
correlations, the type of metric identified, and whether it is a reliable measure of attribute. Based
on these and other factors, the attributes were ranked using a “ratio estimation procedure (von
Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1996). In this procedure, 100 points were assigned across the attributes
58

in a manner that reflected their relative importance, with 10 points out of 100 being a multiplier
of 0.1, 20 points being a multiplier of 0.2, and so forth.
The multiplication of the “value scores” by the weight of each measure results in the
weighted value scores. An example is taking the raw score from the example above (3 of 5
possible reports equaling 60%) and multiplying it by the attribute weight of 25/100 (or 0.25) to
develop a “weighted value score” of 15. This “ratio estimation score” procedure is also applied
to the cumulative scores, shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Converting Value Score to Weighted Value Score
Value Score Weight Weighted Value Score
60 0.25 60 x 0.25, or 15

The three categories in the model are also weighted differently. Instrument comprises
10% of the weighting, Implementation comprises 40%, and Enforcement comprises 50%. This
weighting was developed using the same “ratio estimating procedure” (von Winterfeldt &
Edwards, 1996) after a review of the data.
This weighting was based on an analysis of the categories and their impact. The
Instrument category, for example, was weighted very low based on the determination that factors
such as “lack of legitimacy” and “lack of clarity” are less relevant than they were when the
Resolution was adopted (Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). In the 15 years since UNSCR
1540 has been in force, countries have accepted the Resolution, the 1540 Committee has
provided guidance regarding implementation, and the United Nations has made efforts to assist
59

states in developing programs (UN Document S/2016/1038, 2016). It is because of this that the
Instrument category was assigned a value of 10 out of a 100, or 0.10.
The literature also indicated that Implementation and Enforcement issues remained a
principal concern. Presently, 179 of the 193 U.N. member states have taken measures to
implement the Resolution (UNSCR 1540 Committee website), but implementation by some
member states remains a challenge. “Lack of national priority” (Kassenova, 2011) and “lack of
political will” (Khripunov, 2016) are factors impacting implementation, particularly in
developing countries or those that do not have nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
programs (Nyan, 2018). As a result, these issues are cited more often, and this category is
assigned a value of 40 out of 100, or 0.40.
Enforcement is also a noted concern in recent literature. As a number of authors have
indicated, there is no means available for the 1540 Committee to evaluate how well states are
doing in implementing the Resolution (Cupitt, 2012), let alone determine the level of
enforcement by individual states. Information indicates that there are gaps in the 1540 program
in general and enforcement in particular. Shirazyan writes that despite the alleged success of the
1540 regime, there were a number of attempts by nonstate actors to buy, steal, or otherwise
traffic in WMD materials, citing a number of instances, including a case where “a North
Ossetian smuggler bypassed radiation detectors at the Russian-Georgian border and attempted to
sell 100 grams of Highly Enriched Uranium” (2019).
With respect to Enforcement, the factors “lack of capacity” and “lack of government
structure” have been identified as concerns. States lack the funding to buy necessary equipment,
the training to conduct operations, and the workforce to properly conduct the border management
60

required by the Resolution (Fuhrmann, 2007). In addition, states may have other priorities or
may lack the government organizations or interagency coordination to enforce the requirements
in the Resolution (Nayan, 2018). Since the Instrument or its Implementation are of little value
without Enforcement, this factor is weighted at a level commensurate with both categories,
which is 50 out of 100, or 0.50.
Calculating Category Scores and Developing the Total
Once the “weighted value scores” for each factor are calculated, they are totaled to
calculate the “category scores” for each country. These scores are then multiplied by the
category weighting to develop the “weighted category score.” The weighted category scores for
Instrument, Implementation and Enforcement are then totaled for each country to develop the
total score.
As an example, if a country’s weighted scores for the Instrument category add up to 55
and the value assigned to the category is 10 out of 100 (or 0.10), the weighted category score is
5.5. If the weighted scores for the Implementation category is 43 and the value assigned to the
category is 40 out of 100 (or 0.40), the weighted category score is 17.2. If the weighted scores
for the Enforcement category is 68 and the value assigned to the category is 50 out of 100 (or
0.50), the weighted category score is 34. Adding these scores together results in a total score of
56.7 out of 100 possible points, or 56.7%. A sample is provided in Table 9.

61

Table 9
Sample Smart Model Table

Raw Data (in red)
Attributes Measures Country "A"
Category A Weight (sum to 100% across the three categories) 0.10
Worst Best
Weights
Raw Weights
Attribute 1 0 to 5 measure 3 0 5 0.6 0.6
Attribute 2 0 to 1 measure 0 0 1 0.4 0.4
Sum
100%
100%
Category B Weight 0.40
Worst Best
Weights
Raw Weights
Attribute 3 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 0.33 -2.5 2.5 0.30 0.3
Attribute 4 0 to 5 measure 4 0 5 0.40 0.4
Attribute 5 0 to 5 measure 5 0 5 0.30 0.3
Sum
100%
100%
Category C Weight 0.50
Worst Best
Weights
Raw Weights
Attribute 6 0 to 5 measure 2.4 0 5 0.3 0.3
Attribute 7 -140 to 350 measure 280 -140 350 0.4 0.4
Attribute 8 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 0.71 -2.5 2.5 0.3 0.3
Sum
100%
100%
Value Scores (from 0 to 100)
Attributes Measures Country "A"
Category A Weight (sum to 100% across the three categories) = 0.1
Worst to Best measure
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 1
0 to 5 measure 60 0 5 0.6
Attribute 2
0 to 1 measure 0 0 1 0.4
100%
Category B Weight (sum to 100% across the three categories) = 0.4
Worst to Best measure
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 3 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 56.6 -2.5 2.5 0.3
Attribute 4 0 to 5 measure 80 0 5 0.4
Attribute 5 0 to 5 measure 100 0 5 0.3
100%
Category C Weight (sum to 100% across the three categories) = 0.5
'Worst to Best measure
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 6 0 to 5 measure 48 0 5 0.3
Attribute 7 -140 to 350 measure 86 -140 350 0.4
Attribute 8 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 64 -2.5 2.5 0.3
100%
Weighted Value Scores
Attributes Measures Country A
Category A Scores Weight (sum to 100% across the three categories) = 0.1 0.00
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 1 0 to 5 measure
36 0 5 0.6
Attribute 2 0 to 1 measure
0 0 1 0.4
Weighted Score for Category A 36 100%
Category B Scores Weight 0.00
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 3 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 16.98 -2.5 2.5 0.3
Attribute 4 0 to 5 measure 32.00 0 5 0.4
Attribute 5 0 to 5 measure 30.00 0 5 0.3
Weighted Score for Category B 78.98 100%
Category C Scores Weight 0.00
Worst Best
Weights
Attribute 6 0 to 5 measure 14 0 5 0.3
Attribute 7 -140 to 350 measure 34 -140 350 0.4
Attribute 8 -2.5 to 2.5 measure 19 -2.5 2.5 0.3
Weighted Score for Category C
68
100%
Weighted Score Table Weighted Value (Weighted Value X Cat. Weight) Country "A" Weights Raw Weights
Category "A" Score (36 X 0.1) 3.600 0.10 0.10
Category "B" Score (79.98 X 0.4) 31.592 0.40 0.40
Category "C" Score (68 X 0.5) 33.973 0.50 0.50
Total Score 69.165 100% 100%
Category "B"
Category "C"
Category "A"
62

Initial Validation and Revision
To enhance validity, the completed model was validated against three parameters:
1. Face validity – Whether the initial impression of the model’s realism was reflective of the
real-world situation, as well as whether the model was credible.
2. Attribute validity or sensitivity – Whether the model’s attributes changed similarly to
their assumed counterparts in the real world.
3. Hypotheses validity – Whether the higher-level relationships correspond to the
relationships in the real world (Gass, 1983).
The model was tested on a representative sampling of 10 countries intentionally selected
to include nations in each United Nations region. The model included countries with known
compliance issues that were a result of some of the factors identified in the literature. The
country sample included: Ghana and Morocco in the Africa Region; Honduras and Panama in the
Latin America and Caribbean Region; Kazakhstan and the Philippines in the East Asia Pacific
Region; Georgia and Russia in the Eastern European Region; and Greece and Spain in the
Western European Region.
The results of the testing were then reviewed to determine if the model accurately
evaluated the known level of compliance for the given countries, whether the attributes in the
model were sufficient predictors of the factors identified, whether new attributes needed to be
identified, and whether factors needed to be eliminated from the table. In some cases, the factors
in the table were repetitive measurements. In others, the attributes identified did not provide a
63

valid measure of what the objective was intended to measure (Keeney & Gregory, 2005). The
model was then adjusted based on this testing.
During the initial validation process, two additional countries were assessed. One was the
United States, which is recognized as a leader in nonproliferation activities and an active
member of all of the nonproliferation regimes. The United States is known to have a strong
program and has aggressively implemented UNSCR 1540. The second country that was
evaluated is Kenya, which has had recent challenges in the area of nonproliferation activities and
has been making efforts to enhance their level of compliance. Kenya is not known to have a
strong program and has had some difficulty with UNSCR 1540 implementation. These countries
were evaluated to determine if their scores accurately reflect the situation in the country
Expert Validation and Final Revision
Final validation involved model testing by three experts who are familiar with UNSCR
1540 and who are aware of the level of compliance in the 10 test countries. The first expert is Dr.
Stephen Flynn, the founding director of the Global Resilience Institute and professor of political
science at Northeastern University in Boston, MA. He is a supply chain security expert and one
of the co-principal investigators of the MacArthur Grant Report cited in this study.
The second expert is Dr. Charles Massey, a former Sandia National Laboratory Official
who is currently a Nuclear Security Officer at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in Vienna, Austria. At the IAEA, Dr. Massey is responsible for providing technical support for
the advancement and application of science and technology to improve the effectiveness,
efficiency, and sustainability of systems and operations used to detect and interdict illicitly
trafficked nuclear materials and other contraband.
64

The third expert is Mr. Neil Watts, a former South African Naval Officer and Panel of
Experts Committee member on the UNSCR 1718 (DPRK Sanctions) Committee. His areas of
expertise include WMD nonproliferation, WMD border security, export controls, materials
security, and foreign policy.
Model testing for final validation was performed for a number of reasons: to provide an
analysis and obtain agreement with the factors identified; to conduct an assessment of whether
factors need to be added or removed; and to achieve a determination of whether the model
accurately reflects the real-world situation. In addition, validation was conducted to better
understand the model’s utility, which depends on usefulness and usability.
A model is useful if it can deliver the objectives for which it was established, and it is
useable if it is understandable, the data are readily accessible, and it is available to the users. If a
model is useful and usable, it is more likely to be employed (Emshoff & Sisson, 1970). The
model validation yielded a number of comments from experts that informed necessary
adjustments. The resulting final model is that which is presented in this study.
Justification of Methodologies
This research was conducted using a sequential phenomenological/quantitative mixed-
method approach (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). In this methodology, phenomenological
research was conducted using “constant comparison analysis” as a means to identify factors that
impact UNSCR 1540 compliance. These factors were then organized and weighted using
keyword(s) in context and classical content analysis to build the compliance evaluation model.
Once the model was constructed, quantitative data were identified and used to develop
metrics for the factors in the model. The model was then validated by the researcher (Keeney &
65

Gregory, 2005) for a sampling of countries with known compliance issues. Based on this
validation process, the model was adjusted, and expert review and testing was conducted.
Following that, adjustments were made to construct the final model.
Although the phenomenological approach is typically used to “explicate the meaning,
structure, and essence of lived experiences of a person, or group of people around a specific
phenomenon” (Simmons, 2000), it is increasingly applied to organizational and management
research (Gill, 2014; Anosike, Ehrich, & Ahmed, 2012). This “organizational phenomenology”
has the same focus as other phenomenological research except the data collected reflect the
views of compliance held by an organization or group of organizations. In this study,
observations were gathered from data provided by government officials and UNSCR 1540
experts.
The “organizational phenomenological approach” provided the best methodology to
address the first component of the research problem; that is, UNSCR 1540 implementation is
inconsistent. This methodology is appropriate when the intent is not to derive a theory but to
search for the “meaning, structure, or essence of a phenomenon” (Reiter, Stewart, & Bruce,
2011).
This methodology is the best suited to help answer the research question, what factors are
critical in evaluating UNSCR 1540 compliance? As Wilding and Whiteford write,
“phenomenology, in the research context, is a method of inquiry that offers a way of
systematically studying and learning about a phenomenon, which are typically difficult to
observe and measure” (2005).
66

A phenomenological approach provided a pragmatic way to study the phenomenon of
UNSCR 1540 compliance and to identify the factors that impact it (Cresswell & Cresswell,
2017). It also provided a sound foundation to explore whether there is a way to accurately
determine compliance and to answer this study’s additional research questions: Is it possible to
develop a methodology to systematically evaluate UNSCR 1540 compliance and can this model
provide proof in principal?
Although phenomenology was the driver in identifying the factors for the compliance
evaluation model, it was not an appropriate methodology to develop the compliance evaluation
model and operationalize the factors that impact compliance. Doing so required a quantitative
methodology. Each factor required a metric for measurement. Some of the factors, such as
“nonproliferation treaty compliance” could be measured as a direct measure of “percent of
nonproliferation treaties signed.” Other factors, such as “corruption” are best measured through a
metric derived from a developed index, such as the World Bank: Worldwide Governance
Indicators Dataset (2019). For other factors, proxy measures were identified.
There was little value in identifying key factors that impact UNSCR 1540 compliance
without organizing them into a table. Once this table was developed, the only way of creating a
usable tool was to identify metrics to operationalize the factors. This required a transition in
research methodologies and mixed-method research was the only way that this could be
accomplished.
Research Limitations
There are three primary limitations in this analysis and study. The first is that the factors
identified in the data that informed the evaluation methodology may not represent all factors that
67

influence compliance. Some of the factors may not be mentioned because of an oversight in the
data or a hesitancy to do so. Indeed, some country representatives and personnel involved in the
implementation of the Resolution may not want to discuss enforcement issues or are otherwise
prohibited from doing so.
This limitation was mitigated in two ways. Establishing a baseline of factors using the
information provided in the “14 Questions method” (Drahos, 1955) yielded a broad spectrum of
factors influencing compliance. The second mitigating step was the review and validation
process built into the research. The evaluation table went through a two-part validation process.
The initial validation involved a comparison of data for a sampling of countries with known
compliance issues. After review and adjustment, the compliance evaluation tool was validated a
second time by a panel of UNSCR 1540 experts. The evaluation tool was adjusted a second time
based on comments from the panel.
The second limitation in this research is that the “classic content analysis” method was
used to inform factor weighting in the compliance evaluation table. The number of times words
and phrases appear may be more a function of interest or writing style rather than an indication
of importance or value. Similar to the first limitation, words or phrases may also be missing in
the data because the topics may not be as relevant or because they are topics that government
officials do not discuss.
This limitation was mitigated in two ways. The data were gathered from a broad range of
sources with varying interests and perspectives (e.g., legal scholars, political scientists, and
operational analysts). Many of the literature sources of the data have no concerns or limitations
68

on what they can discuss. The second mitigating step was the validation process described above.
If the factor weighting was imbalanced, it was identified during this process.
The third limitation involves concerns over the “objectives” and “attributes” for the
factors that impact compliance. For the factors, it was not difficult to identify objectives. It was
however, difficult to identify “natural” attributes, or to develop “constructed” attributes that were
“good;” that is, “unambiguous, comprehensive, direct, operational and understandable” (Keeney
& Gregory, 2005). This was due to the fact that in some cases, it was challenging to find
effective measures for attributes such as a country’s “lack of political will.” For other factors, it
was challenging to identify or construct appropriate proxy attributes.
This was particularly true in the Enforcement category. It was challenging to identify
good attributes for compliance factors such as “lack of capability.” There is no dataset that
directly measures a country’s financial, technical, or administrative capabilities, and it is
challenging to identify data that can be used to construct a metric. As a result, a number of proxy
attributes had to be used, and it was difficult to identify proxy measures that did not negatively
impact the validity of the model (Gass, 1983).
There were two ways this limitation was mitigated. The first was soliciting guidance from
individuals (such as Dr. Detlof von Winterfeldt) who have literature cited in this study. They
have substantial expertise in the area of identification and development of attributes and have
provided assistance as advisors for this scholarship. They have provided insight regarding the
development of objectives and attributes that would provide valid metrics for the factors.
The second mitigation method was the validation process discussed above. For a model
such as the one developed in this study, validation must be an overriding concern. This process
69

provides a way to determine whether the model is reflective of the real-world system being
modeled (Golafshani, 2003). Validation of the model was critical in mitigating shortcomings.
Recognizing the importance of this process, two separate validations were conducted.
Conclusion
This study uses a sequential phenomenological/quantitative mixed-method approach,
which is the most appropriate to: identify and analyze the factors that impact UNSCR 1540
compliance; organize the factors into a model; and transition to the identification of attributes or
metrics for each of the factors (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Sandelowski, Voils, & Barroso,
2006, 2012; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007).
This model was selected because it was best suited to address the research problem and
the research questions identified. The initial phenomenological approach was appropriate
because the goal was to analyze how countries view compliance, along with the views of
practitioners and scholars. The transition to a quantitative methodology was necessary to identify
attributes and build the model (Chowdhury, 2015).
The data were analyzed using three methods. Constant comparison analysis was used to
code and organize the data, keyword(s) analysis was used to identify the keyword(s) or phrases,
and classical content analysis was used to identify the frequency of these key phrases. This
analysis was critical in identifying and weighting the factors. The three methods were the best to
address the research questions and provide data analysis triangulation (Leech & Onwuegbuzie,
2007).
In developing the model, priority was given to data that was developed after the 10-year
anniversary of adoption of the Resolution, as it was believed that more experience with the
70

Resolution would yield more credible data. In addition, data provided from government officials
involved in UNSCR 1540 implementation or those experts involved in its development were
given greater consideration than data from non-practitioners (Cupitt, 2014; Stewart & Nayan,
2014; Gahlaut, 2017; Salisbury et al., 2018).
In terms of the limitations, the largest challenge was identifying “good” attributes
(Keeney & Gregory, 2005) for each of the compliance factors. Although it is impossible to
identify direct attributes in every case, dual validation was used to enhance the reliability of the
model and ensure its credibility (Gass, 1983).
71

Identification, Analysis and Model Development

Introduction
This section provides a discussion of this study’s process for data gathering, analysis, and
model development. The process included coding the data using themes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003;
Chowdhury, 2014), classical content analysis, and keyword(s) in context analysis (Leech &
Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Cresswell & Cresswell, 2017) to identify factors that scholars believe have
an impact on compliance. Once identified, an analysis of the factors was conducted based on
keyword(s) in context counts and existing quantitative analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett,
Early, Heinz, & Karreth 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019).
Following this analysis, a basic model was developed and the factors were weighted
using the simple multi attribute rating technique (SMART) (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986).
Once the initial model was completed, it was tested with an initial validation process involving
10 countries, two in each of the United Nations identified regions. This was done to determine if
the model reflected the real-life situation (Gass, 1983). To better determine model validity,
testing was conducted on two additional countries. Once this initial validation was conducted,
the model was sent to three experts for validation. Based on feedback, further adjustments were
made before the model was finalized.
Identification and Analysis of Compliance Factors
During the initial review, 116 documents were coded into the following themes:
principals of regulatory compliance and compliance theory; challenges impacting compliance;
compliance analyses, assessments, methodologies, or tools; and gaps that underscore the need for
a comprehensive analysis of factors that determine compliance. A classical content analysis and
72

keyword(s) in context analysis was conducted on the 50 documents that fit into the categories of
compliance theory, compliance challenges, and compliance assessments.
The previous quantitative analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2007; Conroy,
2017; Hess, 2019), the NTI Index (2018) and the PPI (Albright et al., 2019) were not considered
in the keyword(s) in context analysis because these analyses either used existing data or were
based on a review of existing compliance factors. The result of the keyword(s) in context
analysis was a listing of 10 general compliance factors and 29 keywords or phrases that were
either consistent with compliance theory or used repeatedly in the 50 documents. In total, the 29
keyword(s) in context were used 551 times in the documents.
Table 10 provides an outline of the categories, factors, keywords, or phrases identified in
the data. The table also indicates whether the keywords were cited in “general documents,”
meaning the documents that may not specifically refer to UNSCR 1540 but instead compliance
with international instruments more generally. The other three categories – Times Cited Pre-
2009, Times Cited 2009-2014, and Times Cited Post 2014 – all refer to documents pertaining
specifically to UNSCR 1540. The last column provides a cumulative number of citations in all of
these categories.
This breakdown was conducted to provide some granularity in the analysis and to inform
the weighting process. A factor cited in a general document may have some application to
UNSCR 1540 compliance, but it may not necessarily reflect the unique situation of UNSCR
1540, which was contentious in its adoption by the U.N. Security Council and represented a new
way of doing business by the council (Talmon, 2005; Bosch & Van Ham, 2007).
73

For UNSCR 1540-specific documents, a keyword(s) citation timeline was provided. This
allowed weighting considerations to be adjusted based on experience gained in the
implementation of the Resolution, as well as what Chayes and Chayes refer to as its “temporal”
impact (1993, 1998); that is, the time needed for countries to decide to comply or develop the
ability or structure to do so. As an example, the impact of concerns over the Resolution’s
legitimacy were not initially known and questions arose concerning how long it would take for
countries to accept the Resolution. Over time, it became obvious that most countries, even those
that had initially questioned the validity of the Resolution, had accepted it (Cupitt, 2012;
Salisbury et al., 2018). As a result, initial concerns about the legitimacy of the Resolution
became markedly less important as time progressed.

74

Table 10
UNSCR 1540 Compliance Factors
Category Factor Keyword(s) Times
Cited
in
Gener-
al
Docum
-ents
Times
Cited
Pre-
2009
Times
Cited
2009-
2014
Times
Cited
Post-
2014
Cites
Instrument
Process
concerns
Legitimacy 3 23 8 29 63
Security
Council
politics
1 1
Transparency
of process
1 1
Effectiveness
of rule
1 1
66
Content
issues
Clarity,
complexity
5 16 4 14 39
39
Category
Total
105
Implementation
Political
concerns
Government
structure
1 1 2 4
Rule of law 1 2 2 4 9
Domestic
interest groups
1 9 3 12
National
priorities
1 33 11 6 51
National
security
interests
1 1
Previous treaty
ratification
4 4
Perception of
threat
2 2 3 7
Political will 1 19 4 15 39
127
Economic
concerns
Cost/benefit 1 7 8
75

Internal
forces
Reputation 3 2 8 13
Relationship
with other
countries
1 3 4
17
External
forces
External
pressure
1 12 7 20
Incentives 2 2 1 2 7
U.S.
relationship
1 1
Aid
dependence
1 1 2
30
Regional
forces
Regional
location
26 6 7 39
Regional
coordination
5 4 9
48
Category
Total
230
Enforcement
Capability
issues
Capacity
(financial,
technical, or
administrative)
2 74 44 54 174
Temporal
issues
Change culture 1 1 12 1 15
Structural
issues
Government
structure
4 4
Time to
implement
5 5
Lack of
consequences
2 7 5 14
Ability to
monitor
3 3
Level of
corruption
1 1
27
Category
Total
216

Total 10 29 551

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Table 10 is divided into the categories of Instrument, Implementation, and Enforcement.
These categories reflect the natural flow of the compliance process and the questions and
concerns that arise. Each of these categories was associated with factors identified as impacting
compliance, as well as associated keyword(s).
Instrument Factors and Keyword(s)
The questions and concerns in the Instrument category reflect both the enforcement
school of thought, positing that compliance is motivated by what is in a country’s best interest,
and the managerial school of thought, viewing compliance as a function of a country’s capability
to comply (Alverez, 2002). The first question associated with the Instrument and its passage is
simply, “Is this requirement applicable, and if so, how can it be implemented?” This question
speaks to politics, process, and the clarity of the rule itself (Oosthuizen, 2004).
Two factors were initially associated with the Instrument category. These were “process”
and “content,” referring to the process of developing the Resolution and the content of the
Resolution itself. The keyword(s) associated with “process” were: legitimacy, Security Council
politics, transparency of process, and effectiveness of the rule. These keyword(s) concerned how
the Resolution was developed and whether the process was appropriate and fair, particularly to
those countries that were not on the Security Council, were not members of an established
alliance, and which have no chemical, biological, or nuclear programs. These keyword(s) were
mentioned 66 time in a variety of articles.
The most mentioned keyword(s) was “legitimacy,” referring to the process by which the
Resolution was adopted (Talmon, 2005). Associated with this are the keyword(s) “transparency
of process,” which refers to concerns voiced about the adopting the requirements as a Security
77

Council Resolution, and “effectiveness of rule,” which refers to whether a rule adopted in a
questionable manner can be effective (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007).
The keywords associated with the content of the regulations were “clarity” and
“complexity,” referring to how the compliance process is impacted by the generic nature of the
Resolution, how easy is it to understand, and how easy it is to determine its requirements. The
keywords “clarity” and “complexity” were mentioned 39 times in the literature. This points to
one of the difficulties impacting compliance, in as much as the Resolution instructs countries on
what to implement but not how to do so. As scholars like Scheinman (2008) and Whitaker
(2008) note, this is particularly problematic for developing countries.
Implementation Factors and Keywords
The second category and step in the compliance process is Implementation. The
implementation process reflects a cost/benefit decision that involves internal and external
pressures, as well as a decision about the value of compliance (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Hobbs
& Young, 2015). The questions and concerns in this category principally reflect the enforcement
theory of compliance (Fuhrmann, 2007), and the primary question asked with respect to this
category is, “What are the tangible or intangible benefits of implementation, and what are the
pressures motivating this implementation?”
In this category, “political concerns” refers to factors such as the country’s political will,
its national interests, and its perception of threat. Associated keywords include: government
structure, rule of law, domestic interest groups, national priorities, national security interests,
previous treaty ratification, perception of threat, and political will.
78

“Government structure” speaks to how the government is organized to effectively
implement the Resolution, while “rule of law” refers to how the government adheres to legal
codes and processes the law. “Domestic interest groups” are those within the country that
influence the Resolution implementation, including political parties and business groups.
“National priorities” and “national security interests” can be associated with “political
will” in that they determine the level with which the country will accept, implement, and enforce
the Resolution. “Previous treaty ratification,” meanwhile, speaks to the level at which the
country has embraced previous treaties or participated in nonproliferation regimes (Chayes &
Chayes, 1998).
“Perception of threat” refers to the country’s perception of the nonproliferation threat. To
some countries, this threat is realer than others. The factor of “political issues” on the whole
speaks to whether nonproliferation is a priority, and if so, how the government is prepared to
address it.
Collectively, keywords associated with the “political concerns” category were mentioned
127 times in the literature, with “national priorities” and “political will” being mentioned 51 and
39 times, respectively. These keywords were individually mentioned more than three times as
much as others in this factor, and they can be logically associated. If Resolution compliance is
not made a national priority, it is unlikely that there will be the political will to implement it.
A number of scholars indicted that developing countries and/or those without chemical,
biological, or nuclear programs may not make UNSCR 1540 compliance a priority (Crail, 2006).
Others indicate that this is particularly the case in developing countries where there are many
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other pressing problems that impact the country’s political will to comply (Scheinman, 2006;
Whitaker, 2010; Nyan, 2018).
What is particularly challenging is that many of these factors are dynamic. Political will
and national priorities change, and countries make decisions to implement or enforce the
Resolution based on a number of internal and external factors. An excellent example of this is
provided in a paper discussing 1540 implementation and enforcement in China (Lieggi. 2010),
where over time it became advantageous to transition from a “proliferator” to a “model citizen.”
Continuing in the Implementation category, the “economic concerns” factor refers to the
economic benefits of compliance. The keywords associated with this factor are “cost/benefit,”
which was mentioned eight times in the literature. Scholars who ascribe to the enforcement
theory of compliance (Fuhrman, 2007) believe that compliance is a cost/benefit decision (i.e., the
benefit of compliance is greater than the cost of complying). This benefit could come in tangible
economic terms, such as compliance being favorable to trade (Raustiala, 2000), but some
scholars also note intangible benefits, such as increased international standing (Cupitt, Grillot, &
Murayama, 2001).
There are three “forces” impacting Implementation: internal, external, and regional.
“Internal forces” refers to a country’s concerns about how other countries view it and the impact
of these perceptions. A keyword search for this factor revealed 17 instances where the keywords
“reputation” (13) or “relationship with other countries” (4) were identified. Classic enforcement
theorists such as Raustiala (2000), as well as more recent scholars (Cupitt et al., 2001) believe
that a country’s level of compliance is often a result of its concern over its reputation, and to a
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certain extent, how compliance or noncompliance impacts its standing with other countries,
particularly its neighbors.
“External forces,” meanwhile, refers to the pressure applied through things like
requirements by allies and/or trading partners to reach a level of compliance as a condition for
implementing an agreement or for inclusion in a group or meeting. It also includes incentives
provided for compliance and disincentives for noncompliance. A classic incentive is the
provision of funding, training, or equipment, while an example of a disincentive is exclusion
from a key meeting or trade agreement until certain things are done or a specific level of
compliance is achieved. Additionally, some scholars argue that countries implement UNSCR
1540 because they want to maintain or strengthen their relationship with the United States, which
was a champion of UNSCR 1540 (Fuhrmann, 2007).
Another scholarly view is that countries that receive foreign aid are expected to be more
compliant, particularly if this aid is in the area of export control assistance or nonproliferation aid
(Cupitt et al., 2001). The keywords for external forces were external pressure, incentives, U.S.
relationship, and aid dependence. These keywords were mentioned 30 times in the literature.
Since 2009, scholars have indicated that regional assistance and the efforts of regional
organizations have a significant impact on compliance (Steyn, 2005; Ogilvie-White, 2008; Stott
& Broodryk, 2014; Kasprzyk, 2016; Hess & Marcus, 2019), and the UNSCR 1540 committee
has also recognized the value of regional assistance. Its 2016 report (United Nations Official
Document, 2016) indicates that “institutions and arrangements, in particular those possessing
nonproliferation expertise, continues to contribute to the effective implementation of Resolution
1540.” For these regional forces, two keywords were identified: “regional location” and
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“regional coordination.” These keywords were mentioned 48 times in the literature, with location
mentioned 39 times and coordination mentioned 9 times.
Enforcement Factors and Keywords
The third step in the compliance process is Enforcement. The questions and concerns in
this category principally reflect the managerial theory of compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993,
1998). The core question is, “Does the country have the capability and structure to enforce the
Resolution, and if not, how long will it take to develop this structure?”
This category includes three factors scholars have cited as impacting enforcement:
“capability issues,” “temporal issues,” and “structural issues.” Of these, “capability” is most
often mentioned in the literature (174 times). Capability concerns represent the essence of
managerial theory; that is, that countries would comply but they lack the technical,
administrative, or financial capability to do so (Fuhrmann, 2007).
“Temporal issues” acknowledge that countries need time to implement new programs,
and for those countries that do not already have similar programs in place, more time for
implementation may be required (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998). For example, when Resolution
1540 was adopted in 2004, Germany was a member of several nonproliferation regimes and
already had compliance programs in place. Thus, it took limited additional effort to implement
the Resolution. For countries that were not regime members, however, and who had no
nonproliferation programs, time to implementation became a much greater challenge.
The keywords associated with the temporal issues factor is “culture,” which is mentioned
15 times in the literature. In many cases, the adoption of a new program requires a cultural
change in a country’s institutions. One example is the time it takes to effect culture change in a
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customs organization, shifting it from a revenue-gathering organization to an enforcement
organization. Also consider the time it may take for a siloed government to share the information
necessary to enforce nonproliferation laws.
The last factor in Enforcement is “structural issues.” This speaks to a country’s ability to
implement, monitor, enforce, and prosecute the laws and regulations required by the Resolution
(Crail, 2006; Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Ogilvie-White, 2008). Although some structural issues
impacting compliance have a time factor attached, these issues typically concern whether a
country has the government structure in place to implement and enforce the Resolution.
Keywords for this factor include: government structure, time to implement, lack of
consequences, ability to monitor, and level of corruption.
“Government structure” concerns whether a country has the structure in place to oversee,
enforce, and prosecute the laws and regulations required by the Resolution, and “time to
implement” refers to the length of time required to make these structural changes. “Lack of
consequences” is a concern discussed in regulatory theory. Most simply, it is difficult to ensure
compliance if there are no penalties for noncompliance (Dutch Ministry of Justice, Law
Enforcement Expertise Centre, 2004; Drahos, 2017). Last, “level of corruption” refers to the
impact of corruption on a government and Resolution enforcement. Overall, keywords associated
with the structural issues were mentioned 27 times in the literature, with “lack of consequences”
mentioned most often (Cupitt, 2012; Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019).
Looking across all factors and keywords in Table 10, by far the factor most often
identified as impacting compliance was “capacity” (174). This was followed by “political” (127),
“legitimacy” (66), “regional” (48), and “structural” (39). Of the two most identified as impacting
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compliance, “capacity” falls squarely within managerial theory and “political” within
enforcement theory. This supports Louis Henkin’s assertion that states are motivated by a
number of reasons (1979).
Model Development and Weighting
The first step in model development was identifying attributes for the factors and
keywords. Table 11 provides an initial listing of attributes for each of the compliance factors and
keywords. Attributes were identified for a number of reasons:
- They were used in past quantitative analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2007;
Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019).
- They were used in other tools, such as the NTI Index (2018) and the PPI (Albright et al.,
2019).
- They were direct measures of factors identified in qualitative analyses, such as
membership in past treaties (Craft, 1996).
For some keywords, there are established indicators that directly measures a compliance factor,
such as the World Bank’s measure of the “rule of law” (Conroy, 2017). In other cases, however,
it was not possible to identify attributes that directly measure the implementation concerns the
keywords identified. For example, considering the keywords “national priorities,” there is no
data or developed metric that measures whether UNSCR 1540 is a national priority. In these
instances, a proxy measure was employed for this study.
There are a total of 27 attributes identified in the table, which represents an adjustment of
the arrangement of the keywords from Table 10. The first adjustment to the table was that the
factor of “political concerns” was separated from the “process concerns” factor. This was done
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based on background information that described the political nature of the Resolution’s passage
(Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018) and which was discussed by the United
Nations in an open session held in 2004 (United Nations Official Document, 2004). Given this,
as well as the fact that political issues were factors identified in quantitative analyses (Stiles &
Thayne, 2006; Hess, 2019), it was determined that these factors should be provided more
prominence in the table.
The second adjustment from Table 10 is that the keywords “U.S. relationship” were
moved from the implementation factor of “external forces” to the new “political concerns” factor
under Instrument. This was justified because the United States aggressively drove the passage of
both UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1540, and pro- or anti-U.S. sentiment was likely to influence a
country’s concerns regarding their acceptance of the instrument (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007).
The third adjustment to the table was combining the Implementation keywords “external
pressure,” “incentives,” and “aid dependence” into a single phrase—“external pressure, aid
dependence, and other incentives.” This was done for two reasons. First, aid is an incentive, and
incentives are a form of external pressure. Second, there is no data available that identifies all of
the UNSCR 1540 specific aid or other incentives provided by one country to another.
The fourth adjustment was moving the enforcement keywords “time to implement” to the
“temporal issues” factor, and under “structural issues,” the keywords “ability to monitor” were
combined with the keywords “government structure.” This was done because “time to
implement” is a temporal concern and a better fit under the “temporal issues” factor. “Ability to
monitor,” meanwhile, is largely a function of government organization and personnel training.
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The last table adjustment was the removal of the keywords “lack of consequences” from
the “structural issues” factor in the Enforcement category. “Lack of consequences” was
identified as a factor that impacts compliance in the “Table of Eleven” developed by the Dutch
Ministry of Justice, Law Enforcement Expertise Centre (2004) and again by Salisbury in Chapter
5 of his book (Salisbury et al., 2018). The keywords “lack of consequences” were removed from
the table not only because of its difficulty to measure, but also because the Security Council
developed UNSCR 1540 with neither the intention nor the tools to force compliance (Joyner,
2007; Heupel, 2008; Kienzle, 2019).

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Table 11
UNSCR 1540 Compliance Factors with Attributes
Category

Factor Keywords Cites Attributes
Instrument
Content
concerns
Clarity,
complexity
39 1540 Reports completed based on
2016 UNSCR Committee website

Process
concerns
Legitimacy 63 Assistance offer to UNSCR 1540
Committee as of 10/31/2019,
according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website

Transparency
of process
1 Assistance request to UNSCR 1540
Committee as of 10/31/2019,
according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website

Effectiveness
of rule
1 Action Plan submitted as of
10/31/2019, according to the UNSCR
1540 Committee website

65
Political
concerns
Security
Council
politics
1 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
country membership as of
10/31/2019, according to the
Worlddata.info database

U.S.
relationship
1 Membership in the Organization of
Islamic States

2
Category
Total
106
Implementation
Political
issues
Government
structure
4 World Bank Governance Indicator:
Regulatory Quality 2018

Rule of law 9 World Bank Governance Indicator:
Rule of Law 2018

Domestic
interest
groups
12 World Bank Governance Indicator:
Government effectiveness 2018
87

National
priorities
51 Membership in the five primary
multilateral export control regimes:
the Australia Group
(AG), Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG),
the Zangger Committee, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

National
security
interests
1 Alliance with United States based on
data from the Correlates of War
Project
Previous
treaty
ratification
4 NPT Treaty membership (Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological
Weapons Convention, and Chemical
Weapons Convention

Perception of
threat
7 Number of chemical, biological, and
nuclear incidents from 2013 to 2018,
based on the START database

Political will 39 Percentage of 1540 items reported as
complete, according to the 2016
UNSCR 1540 report

127
Economic
issues
Cost/benefit 8 Proliferation salient industries, as
identified in Hess’ updated analysis
of Peter Crail’s 2006 table

Internal
forces
Reputation
and
relationships
with other
countries
17 United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime Container Control Program
presence in country, whether the
country has requested and funded a
UNODC CCP in the country
according to the Container Control
Program website
Number of NGO’s in country as
determined by UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
Database
External
forces
External
pressure, aid
dependence,
and other
incentives
29 Foreign aid as a percentage of gross
national income from World Bank
database 2018 data
88

Regional
issues
Regional
location
39 Regional location

Land Water Contiguity from the
Correlates of War Direct Contiguity
Database (v3.2) and PPI index

Regional
coordination
9 Membership in a Regional
Organization

48
Category
Total
229
Enforcement
Capability
issues
Capacity
(financial,
technical, or
administrative
174 GDP per capita from 2017 World
Bank data

Population based on World Bank
2018 data

Temporal
issues
Time to
implement
5 National Legislation is in place from
PPI

Change
culture
15 World Customs efficiency from
World Bank, Aggregated LPI 2012-
2018

20
Structural
issues
Government
structure and
ability to
monitor and
enforce
7 Adequacy of enforcement from the
2018 PPI scores
Level of
corruption
1 World Bank Governance Indicator:
Control of corruption

8
Category
Total
202
Total 537

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Instrument Attributes
Three factors and six keywords were included in the Instrument category. The factors
were content concerns, process concerns, and political concerns. The keyword(s) are: clarity and
complexity, legitimacy, transparency of process, effectiveness of rule, Security Council politics,
and U.S. relationship.
The attribute associated with “clarity and complexity” is the number of UNSCR 1540
reports completed, as reported on the UNSCR 1540 Committee website by October 31, 2019
(United Nations 1540 Committee website: National Reports, 2019). “Reports completed” was
identified as an attribute based on the hypothesis that a country that makes the effort to complete
reports has a clear understanding of the Resolution and its expectations and has made a choice to
comply (Stewart, 2018). Although the reports may vary in complexity, the belief is that the more
reports a country completes, the greater the degree of compliance (Hess, 2019).
The “legitimacy” attribute is an offer of implementation assistance through the United
Nations, as indicated on the UNSCR 1540 website as of October 31, 2019 (United Nations 1540
Committee website: Offers of Assistance, 2019). This attribute was selected based on the
hypothesis that a country that offers assistance to other countries views the Resolution as
legitimate. In this case, it is assumed that an offer of assistance reflects a greater level of
compliance by the country offering the assistance.
The attribute associated with the keywords “transparency of process” is the submission of
a request for assistance to the UNSCR 1540 Committee, as reflected on the website as of
October 31, 2019 (United Nations 1540 Committee website: Requests for Assistance, 2019).
This attribute was selected based on the hypothesis that a country that has requested assistance,
particularly a developing country, is confident with the Resolution’s development and
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implementation process. In this instance, a request for assistance is associated with a desire to
implement and enforce the Resolution, which may indicate a greater level of compliance.
Importantly, some countries do not need assistance, particularly those that have previously
implemented other nonproliferation regimes. As such, countries with high levels of compliance
may not receive points in this category. This anomaly is taken into consideration in the weighting
process.
For the keywords “effectiveness of rule,” the attribute identified is whether a country
submitted an action plan to the UNSCR 1540 Committee, as reflected on the website as of
October 31, 2019 (United Nations 1540 Committee website: National Implementation Action
Plans, 2019). This attribute was selected based on the hypothesis that a country that has
submitted a plan views the Resolution as an effective tool and seeks to reassure the committee
that there is an implementation plan. The submission of a plan requires a great deal of work
involving coordination and cooperation among numerous government agencies. This process
often involves several days of cross-government meetings followed by weeks of follow-up. It is
a useful indicator of the extent to which the government intends to implement the Resolution and
can serve as a useful measure of their commitment (Du Preez & Dye, 2008). Thus, the
submission of an Action Plan is taken as an indicator of increased compliance.
For the keywords “Security Council politics,” the attribute identified is Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) membership as of October 31, 2019 (Worldata.info Member States Non-
Aligned Movement, 2019). The membership currently includes 120 countries and 27 observing
states that are typically smaller nations that are not members of a major alliance and lack
representation on the Security Council. Many NAM members provided comments during the
Security Council Session on April 22, 2004, just prior to the passage of UNSCR 1540.
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During the meeting, nations offered comments regarding the legitimacy of the action and
the politics surrounding the Resolution’s development and passage (United Nations Official
Document. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 2, U.N. DOC. S/PV.4950, 2004). Many
NAM members were initially opposed to UNSCR 1540 (Crail, 2006; Ogilvie-White, 2008). As
such, the hypotheses for this attribute is that NAM members have concerns about the Resolution,
and being a NAM member is an indicator of decreased compliance. NAM membership is also
one of the attributes identified by Hess in her quantitative analysis (2019).
The final keywords in the Instrument category are “U.S. relationship.” Early qualitative
studies indicated that because countries sought favor with the United States, in part because of
the numerous U.S.-sponsored capacity-building programs, countries with ties to the United
States or that participated in these programs would be more likely to implement the Resolution’s
requirements (Cupitt, 1994; Fuhrmann, 2007).
Previous quantitative analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2011; Hess, 2019)
provided a mixed indication that a relationship with the United States may be an indicator in
determining compliance. A quantitative analysis by Stiles and Thane (2006) found a correlation
between being a member of the Organization of Islamic Countries and decreased compliance
with UNSCR 1540’s predecessor, UNSCR 1373. Stinnett et al. found no correlation between a
U.S.-relationship and UNSCR 1540 compliance (2011), and Hess’ analysis identified a
correlation between alliance ties with the United States and increased implementation.
After reviewing these analyses, and recognizing the disagreement between the Stinnett et
al. (2011) and Hess (2019) analyses, the attribute of OIC Membership as of October 31, 2019,
was selected as an indicator of “U.S. relationship” (OIC website: Membership, 2019). This is
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based on the ambivalence of the OIC member countries concerning the western model of
combatting terrorism (Stiles & Thane, 2006), and in particular, the anti-U.S. sentiment of many
of these countries (Akbarzadeh & Connor, 2005). The resulting hypotheses is that this anti-
western sentiment has prevented many countries from embracing UNSCR 1540 and that OIC
membership is an indicator of decreased compliance.
Implementation Attributes
Five factors and 13 keywords were included in the Implementation category. The factors
include: political issues, economic issues, internal forces, external forces, and regional issues.
The keywords are: government structure; rule of law; domestic interest groups; national
priorities; national security interests; previous treaty ratification; perception of threat; political
will; cost/benefit; and reputation and relationships with other countries.
For the keywords “government structure,” the attribute identified is regulatory quality for
2018, as detailed in the World Bank database. This was selected as an indicator of compliance
because the structure of the government as it applies to passing laws and implementing
regulations is critical to implementing UNSCR 1540 (World Bank: Worldwide Governance
Indicators Dataset, 2019). Scholars have argued that the bureaucratic capacity of a country is a
key factor in compliance. In their quantitative analysis, Stinnett et al. identified a correlation
between the bureaucratic capability of a country and its implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2011).
Thus, in this case, the hypotheses is that a higher score in regulatory quality is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Scholars argue that countries that are strong adherents to the rule of law are more likely
to implement instruments such as UNSCR 1540 (Simmons, 2009). This was the central assertion
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in a thesis by Conroy (2017), whose quantitative analysis identified a correlation between
countries that have a higher respect for the rule of law and UNSCR 1540 compliance. In this
model’s attribute, “rule of law” is measured using the World Bank database (World Bank:
Worldwide Governance Indicators Dataset, 2019). The hypotheses is that a higher score in the
governance indicator for “rule of law” is an indicator of increased compliance.
For the keywords “domestic interest groups,” the identified attribute is another World
Bank Governance Indicator, “Government Effectiveness” (World Bank: Worldwide Governance
Indicators Dataset, 2019). The notion is that an effective government is aligned in its policies,
including those involving the implementation of UNSCR 1540, and that this alignment includes
domestic interest groups (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998; Crail, 2006; Bosch & Van Ham, 2007;
Ogilvie-White 2008). This concept of government effectiveness was an attribute studied in two
of the quantitative analyses (Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). For this model, “domestic interest
groups” are measured via “government effectiveness,” based on the hypothesis that a higher
score in government effectiveness is an indicator of increased compliance.
Considering “national priorities,” a number of scholars (particularly those who study
smaller or developing countries) have indicated that UNSCR 1540 implementation may simply
not be a priority for some countries (Scheinman, 2008; Whitaker, 2010; Nayan, 2018). For the
purpose of this model, the associated attribute keywords are a country’s membership in the five
principal multilateral export control regimes, as of October 31, 2019. These are the Australia
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger
Committee, and the Wassenaar Agreement.
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If a country is a member of one of these regimes, they are more likely to have in place
much of the structures needed to implement UNSCR 1540 (Gahlaut, 2017). In addition, if a
country is a member of multiple regimes, they have a significant interest in nonproliferation.
Two of the previous quantitative analyses include regime membership as an attribute (Stiles &
Thane, 2006; Hess, 2019). For this study, the hypothesis is that a higher number of memberships
in existing nonproliferation regimes is an indicator of increased compliance.
Scholars have argued that countries are motivated by their national security interests, and
in particular, by their concern that they will not obtain support from major countries, notably the
United States (Fuhrmann, 2007; Cupitt, 2014). Previous analysis indicates that alliance ties with
the United States may be a factor influencing compliance with UNSCR 1540 (Cupitt et al.,
2001). In this study, the attribute identified is a country’s number of alliances with the United
States, as of October 31, 2019, and as indicated by the Correlates of War Project, version 4.1.
This was an attribute identified in two previous quantitative analyses (Stinnett, 2011; Hess,
2019). The hypothesis is that a greater number of alliances with the United States is an indicator
of increased compliance with UNSCR 1540.
Looking to “previous treaty ratification,” the attribute keywords are the number of
memberships a country holds in the three previous nonproliferation treaties (i.e., the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons
Convention). Several scholars have indicated that a country’s past actions are excellent
indicators of what they will do in the future (Henkin, 1973; Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998). Past
history of implementing international instruments has also been identified as an indicator of
compliance in two of the previous quantitative assessments. Stiles and Thane (2006) conducted
an analysis of previous terrorist treaties signed, and Hess (2019) examined the ratification of the
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three previous nonproliferation treaties in her analysis. The resulting hypothesis for this study is
that a higher number of treaty ratifications is associated with increased compliance with UNSCR
1540.
Analyses have indicated that countries that have experienced past terrorist attacks may be
more likely to implement UNSCR 1540 (Cupitt et al., 2001; Du Preez & Dye, 2008). Countries
that have experienced terrorism may be more likely to see a valid threat in proliferation. The
attribute associated with the “perception of threat” is the number of chemical, biological, or
nuclear incidents from 2013 to 2018, based on the START database managed by the University
of Maryland (START Global Terrorism Database, 2019).
This database records terrorist incidents worldwide. In her analysis, Hess (2019)
examines the relationship between previous attacks and UNSCR 1540 compliance, although the
metric she uses is the total number of attacks, not just those involving chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear materials or their means of delivery (as is the case in this model). The
hypothesis associated with this attribute is that a greater number of these incidents will be an
indicator of increased compliance.
As noted, some countries may lack the political will to implement the Resolution’s
requirements (Biersteker, 2007; International Security Department Meeting Summary, 2014;
Salisbury, 2018). For this study, the attribute identified as an indicator of “political will” is the
percentage of the items identified as complete on the country’s UNSCR 1540 Committee-
approved matrix, as of October 31, 2019 (United Nations 1540 Committee website: Committee
Approved Matrices, 2019). Although the matrix is self-reported, the UNSCR 1540 Committee
does validate the reports and approves the matrices before they are placed on the Committee
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website. In this instance, it is asserted that a country’s will to implement the requirements of the
Resolution is reflected by the number of items listed as complete.
The effort to provide legal citations and comments on a complex matrix with more than
300 individual entries provides an indication of a country’s political will, similar to their
completion of a National Action Plan discussed (Du Preez & Dye, 2008). As a result, the
hypothesis for this attribute is that a higher percentage of items completed on the UNSCR 1540
Committee-approved matrix is an indicator of increased compliance.
Enforcement theorists argue that at its core, compliance is a cost/benefit decision. Despite
political will, requirements may not be implemented because of a conclusion that the benefit of
implementation is not worth the cost (Stewart, 2018). In an effort to identify an attribute that
reflects the current cost/benefit decision process, this study draws from a table first developed by
Peter Crail (2006) and later updated by Ashley Hess, detailing countries with “proliferation
salient industries.”
The table (Hess, 2019) identifies proliferation salient industries in a country. It includes
facilities that manufacture or use chemical, biological, or nuclear materials and/or weapons. The
table also includes countries that have emerged as transit/transport states (i.e., countries that are
involved in shipping goods from one country to another or are an intermediary in the shipping of
goods from one country to another). The final table category includes states that are major
transport or transit locations for materials and components.
This study asserts that if a country receives economic benefits from these industries, or
from the transit or transport of related materials, then internal and external (industry) pressure
should encourage them to comply. As such, the hypothesis associated with this attribute is that
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benefit from proliferation salient industries, or serving as a material transit or transport hub, is an
indicator of a country’s increased compliance. 
Continuing in the Implementation category, the keywords “reputation and relationships
with other countries” raises two attributes. The first is the presence in the country of a U.N.
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Container Control Program (CCP), and the second is the
number of NGOs present in the country.
A number of scholars have discussed that a country’s concern about its reputation can be
a factor in encouraging compliance (Whitaker, 2010; Kassenova, 2011). If a country is
concerned about its reputation and is having difficulty implementing the UNSCR 1540
guidelines, an appropriate way to show that they want to move toward compliance is to request
the assistance of the UNODC in developing a CCP in their country. A CCP Unit could assist
their government in their implementation and enforcement efforts, as well as provide an
indication that the country is serious about implementing the Resolution. The hypothesis
associated with this attribute is that the presence of a CCP Unit in the country is an indicator of
increased compliance.
The second attribute is the number of NGOs in the country, as found in the UNODC-
NGO Database (2019). Scholars indicate that a country concerned about its reputation would be
supportive of assistance from NGOs of any type and that NGOs can assist a country in
implementing 1540 requirements. (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Raustiala, 1997).
An alternative theory is that if a country has a large number of NGOs in-country, they
have other concerns that take priority over Resolution implementation. Hess’ research bears this
out. Her quantitative analysis identified a slight negative correlation between the number of
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NGOs in a country and UNSCR 1540 implementation. As such, the hypothesis with respect to
this attribute is that a higher number of NGOs in-country is an indicator of decreased compliance
Considering the keywords “external pressure, aid dependence, and other incentives,”
scholars indicate that a country is influenced by external pressure, whether it is in the form of
incentives for compliance or disincentives for noncompliance (Cupitt et al., 2001). An alternative
theory is that countries that receive the most aid may be the least able to implement Resolution
requirements.
In their 2006 quantitative analysis, Stiles and Thane found no correlation between U.S.
grants and compliance with international instruments. In her quantitative analysis, Hess (2019)
found evidence that the alternative theory was true and that countries that receive more aid are
less able to implement UNSCR 1540 requirements. For this model, the attribute identified is
foreign aid as a percentage of gross national income (World Bank Database: Net ODA received
[% of GNI], 2019). The hypothesis is that with foreign aid as a percentage of gross national
income, a greater volume of aid is an indicator of a country’s decreased compliance.
Concerning the keywords “regional location,” scholars have identified that countries in
certain regions tend to have higher compliance rates than those in other regions. This was
recognized by Stiles and Thane (2006) in their assessment and by the 1540 Committee in its
2016 report, which provided an assessment of compliance rates based on documents submitted
by the countries (United Nations Official Document, 2016). For keywords “regional location,”
the attribute is in which of the five UN regions the country is located (i.e., Africa, Latin America
and the Caribbean, Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, or Western Europe, U.S., Canada and others).
99

The hypothesis for the attribute is that compliance is region dependent, and the region where a
country is located is an indicator of its level of compliance.
Scholars have also indicated that regional organizations can assist countries in their
implementation efforts, particularly those that have a dedicated regional coordinator (Stein,
2005; Ogilvie-White, 2008; Whitaker, 2010; Stott & Broodryk, 2014; Khripunov, 2014; Nayan,
2018). These organizations can assist countries in developing National Action Plans and
coordinating regional efforts.
An additional attribute associated with “regional location” is “land water contiguity”
(Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Database version 3.2, 2018). This attribute involves a
country’s desire and need to emulate the security of its neighbors (Gilardi, 2012). If a country
borders another that has effectively implemented UNSCR 1540 and has aggressive trade policies
and border controls in place, there is significant pressure to emulate the controls of the
neighboring country. The hypothesis is that a state whose neighbors have implemented UNSCR
1540 is an indicator of increased compliance.
For the keywords “existence of a regional coordinator,” the attribute identified is
“membership in a regional organization.” The hypothesis associated with this attribute is that
membership in a regional organization is an indicator of increased compliance. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to determine if a region has a dedicated coordinator. The best information available is
found in the NTI Resource Collection (NTI UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection: Regional and
National Information, 2019).
100

Enforcement Attributes
The last category, Enforcement, presents three factors, five keywords and six attributes.
The factors are capability issues, temporal issues, and structural issues. The keywords are
capacity (financial, administrative, or technical), time to implement, change culture, government
structure and ability to monitor and enforce, and level of corruption.
There are two attributes associated with capacity, the first of which is “GDP per capita,”
based on World Bank data. Scholars have indicated that lack of capacity is one of the principal
reasons for noncompliance (Bosch & Van Ham, 2007; Salisbury et al., 2018). Concerns about
capacity are the basis of the managerial theory, which indicates that “compliance problems often
do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a
calculation of interests” (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). GDP per capita was selected based on past
quantitative analyses that also used GDP as a metric (Stinnett et al., 2011; Hess, 2019). The
hypothesis for this attribute is that a higher GDP per capita is an indicator of increased
compliance.
The second attribute associated with capacity is population size, based on 2018 World
Bank data. Population is an indicator of increased human capital and enhanced capability. It is a
metric used by Stiles and Thane (2006) and Hess (2019) in their quantitative analyses. The
attribute identified for population is total population for 2018, with the hypothesis being that a
higher population is an indicator of increased compliance.
Considering the Enforcement category, “time to implement” is identified as the temporal
aspect by Chayes and Chayes (1993) in their discussion of the managerial theory of compliance.
As they indicate, governments may want to comply with the Resolution but may not have the
101

capability to do so. In moving toward compliance, there is a necessary time for law and
regulations to be implemented and organizational changes to be affected.
The associated attribute is whether national legislation is in place in the country, as
indicated by the National Legislation score on the 2019/2020 PPI (Albright et al., 2019).
Measures of government capabilities such as these were used in three of the previous quantitative
analyses (Stinnett et al., 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). It is believed that the ability and
readiness of a country to pass legislation is an indication of their ability to comply, and the
hypothesis is that a higher score in National Legislation on the PPI is an indicator of increased
compliance.
Similar to the temporal issues associated with passing legislation and implementing
regulations, there are often cultural challenges involved in regulation enforcement. It takes time
to change government culture to enable it to share the information necessary to enforce export
control regulations. The keywords “cultural change” can be associated with the managerial
theory of compliance (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1998), and the temporal challenges identified can
be mitigated by an efficient customs organization. The attribute identified for these keywords is
the World Customs Efficiency Indicator, and the hypothesis is that a higher score in customs
efficiency is an indicator of increased compliance.
Managerial theory supports the assertion that some countries do not have the structure in
place or the capability to implement and enforce UNSCR 1540 requirements (Kassenova, 2011;
Cupitt, 2012; Nayan, 2018). Considering “government structure and ability to monitor and
enforce,” the attribute identified is “adequacy of enforcement,” as measured in the 2019/2020
PPI, which is one of the few tools that assesses enforcement capabilities (Albright et al., 2019).
102

The hypothesis for this attribute is that a higher score in “adequacy of enforcement” is an
indicator of increased compliance.
The final keywords are “level of corruption.” Corruption impacts enforcement, as
evidenced in a Kings College Center for Science and Security Studies paper assessing UNSCR
1540 implementation after 10 years (Stewart & Nayan, 2014). There are number of corruption
indexes available. Conroy used the Transparency International “Corruptions Perception Index for
2016” for his research, and in his analysis, he indicated that the results were consistent with the
World Bank Governance Indicator, Control of Corruption Index, used in this model (World
Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators Dataset, 2019). The hypothesis with respect to this
attribute is that a higher score in controlling corruption is an indicator of increased compliance.
The keywords, attributes, and hypotheses for each of the three categories are listed in
Table 12 and are the basis of this study’s model.

103

Table 12
Attributes and Hypotheses
Keywords

Attributes Hypotheses
Instrument
Clarity,
complexity
1540 Reports completed based on 2016
UNSCR Committee website
A higher number of reports
completed is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Legitimacy Assistance offer to UNSCR 1540
Committee as of 10/31/2019, according to
the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
An offer of assistance is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Transparency of
process
Assistance request to UNSCR 1540
Committee as of 10/31/2019, according to
the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
A request for assistance is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Effectiveness of
rule
Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019,
according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website
Submission of an action plan is
an indicator of increased
compliance.
Security Council
politics
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019, according
to the Worlddata.info database
Membership in the NAM is an
indicator of decreased
compliance.
U.S. relationship OIC membership in the Organization of
Islamic States
Membership in the OIC is an
indicator of decreased
compliance.
Implementation
Government
structure
World Bank Governance Indicator:
Regulatory Quality 2018
A higher score in regulatory
quality is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Rule of law World Bank Governance Indicator: Rule
of Law, 2018
A higher score in rule of law is
an indicator of increased
compliance.
Domestic
interest groups
World Bank Governance Indicator:
Government Effectiveness, 2018
A higher score in government
effectiveness is an indicator of
increased compliance.
National
priorities
Membership in the five primary
multilateral export control regimes: the
Australia Group (AG), Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the
Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement (WA)
A higher number of
memberships in the principal
multilateral export control
regimes is an indicator of
increased compliance.
National security
Interests
Alliance with the United States based on
data from the Correlates of War Project
A greater number of alliances
with the United States is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
104

Previous treaty
ratification
NPT Treaty membership (Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological
Weapons Convention, and Chemical
Weapons Convention)
A higher number of
memberships is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Perception of
threat
Number of chemical, biological, and
nuclear incidents from 2013 to 2018,
based on the START database
A greater number of incidents is
an indicator of increased
compliance.
Political will Percentage of 1540 items reported as
complete according to the country’s
UNSCR 1540 Committee-approved
matrix, as of 10/31/2019
A higher percentage of items
reported as complete is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Cost/benefit Proliferation salient industries as
identified in Hess’ (2019) updated
analysis of Peter Crail’s 2006 table
A country that has a greater
number of proliferation salient
industries or is a major
transit/transshipment country is
an indicator of compliance.
Reputation and
relationships
with other
countries
Whether the country has requested and
funded a UNODC CCP in the country
according to the Container Control
Program website, as of 10/31/2019
CCP Unit presence in a country
is an indicator of increased
compliance.
Number of NGOs in-country in 2018, as
determined by UNODC NGO Database
A higher number of NGOs is an
indicator of decreased
compliance.
External
Pressure, aid
dependence, and
other incentives
Foreign aid as a percentage of gross
national income from the World Bank
database, 2018
A greater amount of foreign aid
as a percentage of national
income is an indicator of
decreased compliance.
Regional
location
Regional location The region in which a country is
located is an indicator of
compliance.
Land Water Contiguity from the
Correlates of War Direct Contiguity
Database (v3.2) and PPI index
A state whose neighbor(s) have
implemented UNSCR 1540
requirements is an indicator of
compliance.
Existence of
regional
coordinator
Membership in a regional organization, as
of 10/31/2019

Membership in a regional
organization is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Enforcement
Capacity
(financial,
administrative,
or technical)
GDP per capita from 2017 World Bank
data

A higher GDP per capita is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
105

Population based on World Bank 2018
data
A higher population is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Time to
implement
National legislation is in place from
2019/2020 PPI
A higher score in national
legislation on the PPI is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Change culture World Customs efficiency from World
Bank, Aggregated LPI 2012-2018
A higher score in customs
efficiency is an indicator of
increased compliance.
Government
structure and
ability to
monitor and
enforce
Adequacy of enforcement from the
2019/2020 PPI
A higher score in the adequacy
of enforcement in the PPI is an
indicator of increased
compliance.
Level of
corruption
World Bank Governance Indicator:
Control of Corruption
A higher score in controlling
corruption is an indicator of
increased compliance.

Once the attributes were identified, they were included in the model and raw scores were
calculated. Table 13 provides a sample of the model format and the raw scores for two of the
initial 10 countries: Georgia and Greece. The table only includes some of the attributes identified
in Table 12, along with the raw measures for the attributes included. The last two columns on the
table are the “worst” and “best” scores. These numbers are required to convert the scores to a
100-point or 100% scale, as required to facilitate the SMART process (von Winterfeldt &
Edwards, 1986).
106

Table 13
Sample Model with Raw Scores

Table 14 shows the same data converted to a 100-point or 100% scale. This was done to develop
the “value scores,” which provide a common reference for the items in preparation for the
SMART weighting of the attributes and categories.

Attributes Measures Georgia Greece
Raw Data (in red)
Instrument Scores
Worst Best
1540 Reports completed based on 2016 UNSCR
Committee Website
Number of reports submitted to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, with addendums counting as part of original
report.
3 1 0 5
National Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
Submission of a plan is indicated by a “1” in the box 0 0 0 1
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019 according to the
Worlddata.info database
Non-NAM countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 1 1 0 1
Implementation Scores
Worst Best
World Bank Governance Indicator: Government
effectiveness 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
government effectiveness.
0.61 0.34 -2.5 2.5
Membership in the five primary multilateral export
control regimes: the Australia Group
Number of regime memberships is indicated in the box 0 5 0 5
Percentage of 1540 items reported as complete
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee approved
matrix
Percentage of items completed is indicated in the box. 74% 72% 0% 100%
Enforcement Scores
Worst Best
GDP per capita in thousands of USD from 2017
World Bank data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates GDP per capita in thousands of
dollars.
3.6 4.3 2 5
National Export Control Legislation is in place from
PPI
Number in box indicates as follows: 1 point for PPI
“Red” country, 2 points for PPI “Orange Country”, 3
points for PPI “Yellow” country, 4 points for PPI “Light
Green” Country, and 5 points for a PPI “Dark Green”
Country.
5 5 0 5
World Customs efficiency from World Bank,
Aggregated LPI 2012-2018
Number in box indicates Customs efficiency with 5
being the most efficient
2.4 3.2 0 5
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Table 14
Sample Model with Value Scores (0-100 Scale)

Once the value scores were calculated, weighting could be conducted for the attributes and
categories using the SMART methodology. In this case, the initial weighting was conducted
using swing weighting to rank the attributes from best to worst (von Winterfeldt & Edwards,
1986), assigning a value to each attribute, and assigning five points to the least important
attribute. The swing weighting was conducted within each category, and the three categories
were weighted in the same manner (Mustajoki et al., 2005). Table 15 provides an example of the
ranking and weighted value scores in the Instrument category.
In Table 15, each score is assigned a priority, which was initially used to determine a
weight. The individual scores were converted to a 100-point scale, and each individual score in a
category was multiplied by the attribute weight to obtain the weighted value score. This
Attributes Measures Georgia Greece
Instrument Scores
Worst Best
1540 Reports completed based on 2016 UNSCR
Committee Website
Number of reports submitted to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, with addendums counting as part of original
report.
60 20 0 5
National Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
Submission of a plan is indicated by a “1” in the box 0 0 0 1
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019 according to the
Worlddata.info database
Non-NAM countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 100 100 0 1
Implementation Scores
Worst Best
World Bank Governance Indicator: Government
effectiveness 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
government effectiveness.
62.2 56.8 -2.5 2.5
Membership in the five primary multilateral export
control regimes: the Australia Group
Number of regime memberships is indicated in the box 0 100 0 5
Percentage of 1540 items reported as complete
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee approved
matrix
Percentage of items completed is indicated in the box. 74 72 0% 100%
Enforcement Scores
Worst Best
GDP per capita in thousands of USD from 2017
World Bank data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates GDP per capita in thousands of
dollars.
53 77 2 5
National Export Control Legislation is in place from
PPI
Number in box indicates as follows: 1 point for PPI
“Red” country, 2 points for PPI “Orange Country”, 3
points for PPI “Yellow” country, 4 points for PPI “Light
Green” Country, and 5 points for a PPI “Dark Green”
Country.
100 100 0 5
World Customs efficiency from World Bank,
Aggregated LPI 2012-2018
Number in box indicates Customs efficiency with 5
being the most efficient
48 64 0 5
108

methodology requires the weights in each category to add up to 1.0 and the weights of the
categories to also add up to 1.0. For example, the attribute “1540 Reports” in the table was
multiplied by the attribute weight of 0.25 to get the weighted value score of 15. The category
score was then multiplied by the category weight to obtain the weighted category score listed in
Table 16, which in this case is 5.5.
Table 15
Weighted Value Scores: Instrument Category

Table 16
Weighted Category Score

Initial Validation and Revision
Initial validation revision was conducted based on a number of factors, including:
development of the 10 initial country scores; a reexamination of the scholarly literature and
keyword(s) counts; and a review of the previous quantitative analyses. Ten initial scores were
developed to determine if the model reflected the real-world situation. The countries scored were
Weighted Value Scores WEIGHTED SCORES
Attributes Measures Georgia Greece
Instrument Scores
Weight (need to sum to 100% across the three
categories
0.10
Worst Best Rank Weights
1540 Reports completed based on 2016 UNSCR
Committee Website
Number of reports submitted to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, with addendums counting as part of original
report.
15 5 0 5 2 0.25
National Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
Submission of a plan is indicated by a “1” in the box 0 0 0 1 4 0.15
Assistance request to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the Committee website
Submission of a request for assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 0 0 1 5 0.05
Assistance offer to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website
Submission of an offer of assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 5 0 1 6 0.05
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019 according to the
Worlddata.info database
Non-NAM countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 20 20 0 1 1 0.3
OIC Membership in the Organization of Islamic
States
Non-OIC countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 20 20 0 1 3 0.2
Weighted Score for Instrument 55 50 100%
Weighted Score Table
Georgia Greece Weights Raw Weights
Instrument Score 5.500 5.000 0.10 0.10
Implementation Score 17.306 27.796 0.40 0.40
Enforcement Score 34.044 31.726 0.50 0.50
Total Score 56.850 64.522 100% 100%
Implementation
Enforcement
Instrument
109

of different sizes and capabilities in each of the five U.N. regions. The results were compared to
information in existing analyses, with an emphasis on those conducted after the 10-year
anniversary of the Resolution’s adoption (Stewart & Nayan, 2014; Nayan, 2019; Salisbury et al.,
2018; Shirazyan, 2019).
Particular attention was given to analyses of developing countries to ensure that the
scoring in the model reflected challenges outlined in the literature (Scheinman, 2008; Whitaker,
2010; Kassenova, 2011; Nayan, 2019). To ensure its validity with more developed countries, the
model was run on two additional “known” countries, Russia and the United States. As a result, a
total of 12 countries were analyzed to validate the model.
Existing literature was also reviewed to provide a better understanding of the context of
the keywords and to conduct a comparison of the keyword counts with the attribute weights in
the model. Based on a review of the literature, it became clear that enforcement theory and
managerial theory factors were mentioned numerous times. Of the two most popular factors
believed to impact compliance, “political issues” fits squarely in the enforcement theory school
of thought (Tallberg, 2002), which posits that compliance is a choice, and “capability issues” is
consistent with the managerial school advocates (Chayes & Chayes, 2003), who see compliance
as a factor of capability or capacity.
Additionally, there are in some cases disagreement between the theories outlined in the
qualitative analysis and the data in the quantitative analyses. An example is found in the area of
how foreign aid impacts compliance. Some scholars (Cupitt et al., 2001) have indicated that
countries that receive a greater amount of foreign aid should be expected to have implemented
110

more of their UNSCR 1540 requirements. This theory is not supported by the data developed in
the quantitative analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Hess, 2019).
This is also the case (though to a much lesser extent) with respect to the attribute of
NGOs in-country. Scholars have theorized that NGOs can assist a country in its compliance
efforts (Raustiala, 1997). In her analysis, however, Hess found no such correlation. In fact, her
analysis found that the number of NGOs is slightly correlated with decreased compliance.
Table 17 was generated from the four quantitative analyses discussed earlier (Stiles &
Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). This table is included as another
tool to provide triangulation of data and validation of the weighting of the attributes and
categories in the SMART methodology (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).
The table indicates if there is a correlation between the attribute and compliance. A “N”
in the box means that the data used indicates no correlation between the attribute and
compliance. A “Y” in the box means the data supports a correlation. The number of “+” or “-”
in the box indicates whether the correlation is positive or negative, as well as the strength of the
correlation. One “+” or “-” indicates a weak correlation, two indicate moderate correlation, and
three indicate strong correlation.
An example of how this table can be helpful involves the attribute “membership in the
five primary multilateral export control regimes,” which is assigned the highest weighting in the
Implementation category. A review of Table 17 indicates that according to Hess’ analysis
(2019), this factor has a high positive correlation to UNSCR 1540 compliance. As such, the high
rating based on the qualitative analysis is validated by data from the quantitative analysis.
111

Table 17
Quantitative Analyses Correlations
Stiles &
Thane, 2006
Sig Stinnett, Early,
Horne &
Karreth, 2011
Sig Conroy, 2017 Sig Hess, 2019 Sig
Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes
Average
number of
terrorist
attacks
Y+ Ratio of exports
to GDP
N World
Governance
Indicator: Rule
of law
Y+ GDP per
capita
Y+
Number of
U.N.-
designated
terrorist
conventions
signed
Y++ Alliance
similarity to the
United States
N Contract
Intensive Money
Y Quality of
governing
institutions

GOVSPEND:
Central
government
spending
N Defense pact
with United
States
N Corruption
Perception
Index
Y- Constraints on
decision
making
N
EXPUS:
Exports to the
United States
N Bureaucratic
capacity
(Combines
political
stability,
regulatory
quality, rule of
law, and control
of corruption)
Y+ Competitiveness
of participation
from Polity IV
N Conflict in
prior year
N
Aid as a
percentage of
GDP
N GDP per capita Y+ Regional
compliance
Y++ Total aid
receipt
Y--
Correlates of
war data
N NTI Compliance Y++ Number of
NGOs per
country
Y-
Rule of law N UNSCR 1540
compliance
Y++ High-tech
exports
N
Member of
the
Organization
of Islamic
Conference
Y-- Alliances with
the United
States
Y+
AFRICA:
Location in
Africa
Y- Number of
terrorist
attacks
N
112

EUROPE:
Location in
Europe
Y++ Voting
similarity to
the United
States
N
Regime type N
NAM
membership
Y-
UNGA voting
participation
N
Number of
reports
Y+
Proliferation
salient
materials/facil
-ities
Y+
Population Y+
Regime
memberships
Y+++
Treaty
memberships
Y++
Land/water
contiguity
Y+

A number of adjustments impacting category and attribute weight were made to the
model, based on the initial validation process. These adjustments were made based on a review
of the scores and an examination of the data from the quantitative analyses.
An example of how Table 18 provides data triangulation involves the attribute,
“membership in the five primary multilateral export control regimes,” which is assigned the
highest weighting in the Implementation category. A review of the Table 17 indicates that
according to Hess’ analysis (2019), this factor has a high positive correlation to UNSCR 1540
compliance. As such, the high rating based on the qualitative analysis is validated by data from
the quantitative analysis.
113

The Instrument category was reduced from 0.2 to 0.1 because the two attributes that
accounted for half the value of the category (i.e., “membership in the Non-Aligned Movement”
and “OIC membership”) have become far less important in the period since the Resolution was
adopted (Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). The category weight was also adjusted because
as time progresses, the Resolution becomes more accepted, and the initial political factors
become less important. In the Instrument category, no adjustments were made to the weights of
the attributes.
Under Implementation, the category was not adjusted during the initial review process
(i.e., from 0.4); however, several attributes were. The weight of the attribute “nonproliferation
treaty membership” was reduced from 0.1 to 0 for two reasons. First, most states had ratified the
three primary treaties, and each of the 12 countries tested in the model received the same score.
As such, little discrimination existed in the data, and there was no impact on the model. This may
be different with a larger subset of data. Second, a higher correlation existed for the attribute
“regime membership,” which better measured the past history of compliance (Henkin, 1979).
The second change in the Implementation category was reducing the weight of the
attribute “number of chemical, biological, and nuclear incidents” from 0.05 to 0. This is based on
concerns about the reliability of the data, as well as the fact that almost no chemical or biological
incidents were in the database. Scholars believe that past attacks reinforce the perception of a
terrorist threat (Du Preez & Dye, 2008), and as such, countries that have experienced attacks
should be more encouraged to implement UNSCR 1540 requirements.
Stiles and Thane (2006) indicate that there is a relationship between compliance and
previous terrorist attacks, but in her 2019 analysis using the same START Global Terrorism
114

Database, Hess found no relationship between past attacks and compliance. A more practical
concern is the lack of a consistent global definition of terrorism. What is more, in many
countries, terrorist incidents are not seen as such and a terrorist threat perception does not exist,
particularly for chemical, biological, and nuclear incidents many countries perceive as first-
world problems.
The final change in this category is the reduction of the attribute “membership in a
regional organization.” This attribute was reduced from 0.05 to 0. Scholars recognize that region
is a factor in determining compliance (Whitaker, 2010; Nayan, 2019) and that this is supported
by data gathered by the UNSCR 1540 Committee (United Nations Official Document, 2016).
There is also evidence that dedicated regional coordinators can be effective (Hess & Marcus,
2018). Unfortunately, there is little data available that can reveal if a dedicated coordinator exists
or if, in some cases, a point of contact is in fact a dedicated resource. As a result, the weight of
this attribute was reduced to 0 based on the unavailability and unreliability of data. It was also
decided that the impact of regional location was covered by the attribute “regional location,”
which was weighted 0.1.
The Enforcement category was adjusted from 0.4 to 0.5. This was done because
Implementation and Enforcement should be of equal value, and the category identified as
Instrument can be looked at as a subset of Implementation. If the category weight for Instrument
is 0.1 and the weight for Implementation is 0.4, for Enforcement to have equal value, it needs to
be weighted 0.5.
Considering Enforcement attributes, “GDP per capita” and “population” raw data were
converted to logarithms prior to the development of the final model to better accommodate the
115

wide spread in numbers, along with the outliers. India and China had more than a billion more
people than the next populous country, the United States. There were no changes to the attribute
weights in the category as a result of the initial review. The adjustments to the model are
reflected in Table 19.

116

Table 18
Revised Model

Weighted Value Scores WEIGHTED SCORES
Attributes Measures Georgia Ghana Greece Honduras Kazakhstan Morocco Panama Philippines Kenya Russia US Spain
Instrument Scores
Weight (need to sum to 100% across the three
categories
0.10
Worst Best Weights
1540 Reports completed based on 2016 UNSCR
Committee Website
Number of reports submitted to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, with addendums counting as part of original
report.
15 10 5 15 10 5 10 20 10 15 25 15 0 5 0.25
National Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
Submission of a plan is indicated by a “1” in the box 0 15 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 15 15 0 1 0.15
Assistance request to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the Committee website
Submission of a request for assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0.05
Assistance offer to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website
Submission of an offer of assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 1 0.05
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019 according to the
Worlddata.info database
Non-NAM countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 20 20 20 20 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 1 0.3
OIC Membership in the Organization of Islamic
States
Non-OIC countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 20 20 20 20 0 0 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 1 0.2
Weighted Score for Instrument 55 65 50 55 10 5 65 60 55 60 85 75 100%
117

Implementation Scores Weight 0.40
Worst Best Weights
World Bank Governance Indicator: Regulatory
Quality 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest
regulatory quality.
3.62 2.42 2.8 2.03 2.64 2.26 2.9 2.55 2.27 1.96 4.08 2.55 -2.5 2.5 0.05
World Bank Governance Indicator: Rule of Law
2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
governance.
2.83 2.57 2.65 1.48 2.07 2.36 2.35 2.12 2.09 1.4 3.95 3.93 -2.5 2.5 0.05
World Bank Governance Indicator: Government
effectiveness 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
government effectiveness.
3.11 2.29 2.84 1.88 2.52 2.29 2.48 2.55 2.09 2.44 4.08 3.50 -2.5 2.5 0.05
Membership in the five primary multilateral export
control regimes: the Australia Group
Number of regime memberships is indicated in the box 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 25.00 20.00 0 5 0.25
Alliance with U.S. based on data from the Correlates
of War Project
Number of alliances with the U.S. are indicated in the
box.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0 5 0.15
NPT Treaty membership (3 total Nuclear Weapons
Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, &
Chemical Weapons Convention
Number of NPT Treaties ratified is indicated in the box. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 3 0
Number of chemical, biological and nuclear
incidents from 2013 to 2018 based on the START
database
Number of incidents is indicated in the box. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 5 0
Percentage of 1540 items reported as complete
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee approved
matrix
Percentage of items completed is indicated in the box. 7.40 4.10 7.20 3.50 5.70 2.70 4.10 4.20 3.30 8.50 9.60 8.40 0% 100% 0.1
Proliferation salient industries as identified in Hess’
updated analysis of Peter Crail’s 2006 table.
Number in the box indicates the number of the following:
if a country is a source for nuclear weapons or
associated materials, if a country is a source for
biological weapons or associated materials, if a country
is a source for chemical weapons or associated
materials, if a country is a transit/transshipment point, if
a country is a major transit/transshipment point.
3.00 2.00 4.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 0 5 0.05
United nations Office of Drugs and Crime Container
Control Program (CCP) presence in country –
whether the country has requested and funded a
UNODC CCP in the country according to the
Container Control Program 2018 Annual Report.
The presence of a CCP unit in the country is indicated by
a “1”.
5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 0.05
Number of NGO’s in country as determined by UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Database
Number of UN registered NGO’s in country is indicated
in the box.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 500 0 0
Foreign aid as a percentage of gross National
Income (GNI) from 2017 World Bank database
The number in the box indicates the amount of foreign
aid as a percentage of GNI.
10.31 11.72 15.00 11.90 14.94 12.36 14.90 14.94 10.26 15.00 15.00 15.00 10 0 0.15
Regional location
The numbers in the box indicate the region, i.e. Africa
(1), Latin America and the Caribbean (2), Asia Pacific
(3), Eastern Europe (4), or Western Europe, U.S. and
Canada (5)
8.00 2.00 10.00 4.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 2.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 0 5 0.1
Membership in a Regional Organization
A “1” indicates a country’s participation in a Regional
Organizations that has a designated UNSCR 1540
coordinator
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 0
Land Water Contiguity from the Correlates of War
Direct Contiguity Database (v3.2) and Tier Ranking
from the PPI index
Number in the box indicates as follows: 1 point for
contiguity with one PPI tier 2 country, 2 points for
contiguity with one PPI tier 1 country, 3 points for
contiguity with two or more tier two countries, 4 points
for contiguity with two or more tier 1 or 2 countries, and
5 points for contiguity with more than one PPI tier 1
countries.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 5 0
Weighted Score for Implementations 43.27 32.10 69.49 29.79 45.87 31.97 46.73 46.36 29.01 56.30 76.71 74.38 100%
118

Enforcement Scores Weight 0.50
Worst Best Weights
GDP per capita in thousands of USD from 2017
World Bank data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates GDP per capita in thousands of
dollars.
8 7 12 7 10 8 11 8 6 14 13 2 5 0.15
Population in millions based on World Bank 2018
data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates population in millions 4 6 5 5 6 6 4 7 6 1 8 6 4 10 0.1
National Export Control Legislation is in place from
PPI
Number in box indicates as follows: 1 point for PPI
“Red” country, 2 points for PPI “Orange Country”, 3
points for PPI “Yellow” country, 4 points for PPI “Light
Green” Country, and 5 points for a PPI “Dark Green”
Country.
10 6 10 2 10 6 4 10 2 10 10 10 0 5 0.1
World Customs efficiency from World Bank,
Aggregated LPI 2012-2018
Number in box indicates Customs efficiency with 5
being the most efficient
7 8 10 8 8 8 10 9 8 8 12 11 0 5 0.15
Adequacy of enforcement from the 2018 PPI
Enforcement Scores
Number in box indicates PPI Enforcement score 26 16 18 16 22 19 21 15 17 6 29 28 -140 350 0.3
World Bank Governance Indicator: Control of
corruption
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
corruption control.
13 10 10 8 8 9 8 8 7 7 15 12 -2.5 2.5 0.2
Weighted Score for Enforcement 68 52 63 45 64 55 58 56 46 32 88 80 100%
Weighted Score Table
Georgia Ghana Greece Honduras Kazakhstan Morocco Panama Philippines Kenya Russia US Spain Weights Raw Weights
Instrument Score 5.500 6.500 5.000 5.500 1.000 0.500 6.500 6.000 5.500 6.000 8.500 7.500 0.10 0.10
Implementation Score 17.306 12.838 27.796 11.914 18.348 12.788 18.690 18.544 11.604 22.520 30.684 29.752 0.40 0.40
Enforcement Score 34.044 25.809 31.726 22.742 31.909 27.489 29.130 27.976 23.185 15.825 43.750 40.059 0.50 0.50
Total Score 56.850 45.147 64.522 40.156 51.257 40.777 54.320 52.520 40.289 44.345 82.934 77.311 100% 100%
Implementation
Enforcement
Instrument
119

Expert Review and Validation
Following initial validation, the model was shared with three experts for final validation:
Dr. Steven Flynn from Northeastern University, Dr. Charles Massey at the IAEA, and Mr. Neil
Watts, who until recently was a United Nations employee and one of the principal investigators
for the UNSCR 1718 Committee. As described in Chapter 3 of this study, these individuals were
selected based on their knowledge of UNSCR 1540 and their operational experience.
All have spent a significant part of their careers overseas working in countries impacted
by UNSCR 1540. Each of these individuals found the tool to be valuable and believed it to be
reflective of the situation in the countries in the model. They provided a number of questions and
comments, as well as suggestions for improving the model.
All of the experts indicated that the model was a valuable evaluation tool, and that it was
valid in that it accurately reflected the UNSCR 1540 landscape in the countries tested in the
model. Dr. Massey spent a great deal of time analyzing the model and provided the most through
and extensive comments.
To better gauge the reliability of the model, Dr. Massey asked if a country with which
they were familiar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), could be run through the model. The
results of the modeling indicated that the UAE scored a 57.3%, which puts it in a relative
position behind Greece and ahead of Georgia in the scoring. To further check the model’s
reliability, this score was benchmarked against another much more complicated instrument, the
PPI (Albright et al., 2019).
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In this index, the UAE scored 783 out of a possible 1300 points, or 60.2%, very close to
the 57.3% in this model. To provide a benchmark, the score of the United States was compared
from both models. In the PPI, the United States scored 1019 out of 1300 possible points, or
78.3%. The U.S. score in this model was a bit higher at 82.9%. This triangulation of data
provided evidence that the model was valid.
One of the comments from Dr. Massey was that in the Instrument category, a country that
was both a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country and a member of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) would seem to be unduly penalized in the model. This is an
appropriate comment. Stiles and Thane (2006) found a negative correlation between OIC
membership and compliance, 53 of the 57 current OIC members are also NAM members. In her
analysis, Hess (2019) found a negative correlation as well.
As such, using both NAM membership and OIC membership places too much weight on
attributes that are largely duplicative. As a result, the final model has been adjusted to weight
OIC membership at 0, effectively removing it from the model. The rest of the category weighting
was readjusted accordingly.
Dr. Massey also expressed concerns about attributes based on self-reporting, which is
consistent with the comments of a number of scholars (Viski, 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). This is
also valid, although it was explained that the attributes based on self-reports (i.e., “1540 reports
completed” and “percentage of 1540 items reported as complete”) were validated by the UNSCR
1540 Committee. In addition, the attribute “1540 reports completed” was found to have a
correlation to implementation in the previous quantitative analyses (Hess, 2019).
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Dr. Massey also questioned the value of foreign aid as a predictor of compliance, based
on his experience in the field. Although he recognizes that some scholars have made the case that
a country that receives aid (Cupitt et al., 2001) would be more likely to comply, his observation
was consistent with Hess’ quantitative analysis (2019), indicating that just the opposite is true;
that is, there is a negative correlation between foreign aid and increased compliance.
Dr. Massey also commented on the general nature of the data, particularly with respect to
regional location. He was concerned about the general scoring for all countries in a region (i.e.,
“regional location”), which assigns scores based on location. His experience indicated that there
may be varying levels of compliance within a region. This is also a valid comment, and it is
recognized that it is difficult to capture the difference of every country in a general model such
as this. While no single attribute describes a country in question, it is believed that the
combination of all the attributes can provide a general picture, recognizing that outliers may
exist.
Dr. Massey offered comments concerned possible inclusions in later versions of the
model. He suggested that the business climate in a country may be an indicator of compliance.
He said that increased investment may be an indicator of political stability and regulatory
compliance and that data (e.g., foreign investment) may be an indicator of compliance. The
thesis in this case is that a higher amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
may be an indicator of increased compliance.
Dr. Massey also indicated that income inequality may be an indicator to examine in the
model, based on the theory that countries with high income inequality may be less likely to
implement UNSCR 1540 requirements. There is a great deal of scholarly work on income
122

inequality and its impact on political and economic factors (Muller, 1988), and there could be a
correlation that can be exploited for future iterations of the model.
Overall, the only model revision made based on Dr. Massey’s comments was the
reduction of the value of being an OIC Member and the reweighting of the other factors in the
category to compensate. The reweighting of the category did not have a significant impact. Upon
rescoring using the revised model based on Dr. Massey’s comments, the score for the country
that he asked to be run in the model (UAE, a NAM and IOC country) increased slightly to
58.8%, while the U.S. score dropped to 79.9%.
This rise in scores indicates that NAM and OIC countries were not given a double
penalty and that countries that were not NAM and IOC were not provided an advantage. In
addition, the revised scores were closer to those aligned with those in the PPI after the
adjustment. Table 19 presents the revised model.
123

Table 19
Revised Model After Panel Review

Attributes Measures Georgia Ghana Greece Honduras Kazakhstan Morocco Panama Philippines Kenya Russia UAE US Spain
Instrument Scores
Weight (need to sum to 100% across the three
categories
0.10
Worst Best Weights
1540 Reports completed based on 2016 UNSCR
Committee Website
Number of reports submitted to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, with addendums counting as part of original
report.
18 12 6 18 12 6 12 24 12 18 12 30 18 0 5 0.3
National Action Plan submitted as of 10/31/2019
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee website
Submission of a plan is indicated by a “1” in the box 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 20 0 1 0.2
Assistance request to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the Committee website
Submission of a request for assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1
Assistance offer to UNSCR 1540 Committee as of
10/31/2019 according to the UNSCR 1540
Committee website
Submission of an offer of assistance is indicated by a
“1” in the box
0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 1 0.05
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country
membership as of 10/31/2019 according to the
Worlddata.info database
Non-NAM countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.35
OIC Membership in the Organization of Islamic
States
Non-OIC countries are indicated by a “1” in the box. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Weighted Score for Instrument 18 32 11 18 12 6 32 24 22 23 12 55 43 100%
124

Implementation Scores Weight 0.40
Worst Best Weights
World Bank Governance Indicator: Regulatory
Quality 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest
regulatory quality.
3.62 2.42 2.8 2.03 2.64 2.26 2.9 2.55 2.27 1.96 3.43 4.08 2.55 -2.5 2.5 0.05
World Bank Governance Indicator: Rule of Law
2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
governance.
2.83 2.57 2.65 1.48 2.07 2.36 2.35 2.12 2.09 1.4 3.31 3.95 3.93 -2.5 2.5 0.05
World Bank Governance Indicator: Government
effectiveness 2018
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
government effectiveness.
3.11 2.29 2.84 1.88 2.52 2.29 2.48 2.55 2.09 2.44 3.93 4.08 3.50 -2.5 2.5 0.05
Membership in the five primary multilateral export
control regimes: the Australia Group
Number of regime memberships is indicated in the box 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.00 0.00 20.00 16.00 0 5 0.2
Alliance with U.S. based on data from the Correlates
of War Project
Number of alliances with the U.S. are indicated in the
box.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0 5 0.15
NPT Treaty membership (3 total Nuclear Weapons
Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, &
Chemical Weapons Convention
Number of NPT Treaties ratified is indicated in the box. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 3 0
Number of chemical, biological and nuclear
incidents from 2013 to 2018 based on the START
database
Number of incidents is indicated in the box. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 5 0
Percentage of 1540 items reported as complete
according to the UNSCR 1540 Committee approved
matrix
Percentage of items completed is indicated in the box. 7.40 4.10 7.20 3.50 5.70 2.70 4.10 4.20 3.30 8.50 6.70 9.60 8.40 0% 100% 0.1
Proliferation salient industries as identified in Hess’
updated analysis of Peter Crail’s 2006 table.
Number in the box indicates the number of the following:
if a country is a source for nuclear weapons or
associated materials, if a country is a source for
biological weapons or associated materials, if a country
is a source for chemical weapons or associated
materials, if a country is a transit/transshipment point, if
a country is a major transit/transshipment point.
3.00 2.00 4.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 0 5 0.05
United nations Office of Drugs and Crime Container
Control Program (CCP) presence in country –
whether the country has requested and funded a
UNODC CCP in the country according to the
Container Control Program 2018 Annual Report.
The presence of a CCP unit in the country is indicated by
a “1”.
5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 0.05
Number of NGO’s in country as determined by UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Database
Number of UN registered NGO’s in country is indicated
in the box.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 500 0 0
Foreign aid as a percentage of gross National
Income (GNI) from 2017 World Bank database
The number in the box indicates the amount of foreign
aid as a percentage of GNI.
10.31 11.72 15.00 11.90 14.94 12.36 14.90 14.94 10.26 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 10 0 0.15
Regional location
The numbers in the box indicate the region, i.e. Africa
(1), Latin America and the Caribbean (2), Asia Pacific
(3), Eastern Europe (4), or Western Europe, U.S. and
Canada (5)
8.00 2.00 10.00 4.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 2.00 8.00 6.00 10.00 10.00 0 5 0.1
Membership in a Regional Organization
A “1” indicates a country’s participation in a Regional
Organizations that has a designated UNSCR 1540
coordinator
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 0
Land Water Contiguity from the Correlates of War
Direct Contiguity Database (v3.2) and Tier Ranking
from the PPI index
Number in the box indicates as follows: 1 point for
contiguity with one PPI tier 2 country, 2 points for
contiguity with one PPI tier 1 country, 3 points for
contiguity with two or more tier two countries, 4 points
for contiguity with two or more tier 1 or 2 countries, and
5 points for contiguity with more than one PPI tier 1
countries.
5.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 5.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 0 5 0.05
Weighted Score for Implementations 48.27 32.10 68.49 30.79 49.87 32.97 49.73 46.36 32.01 58.30 45.37 76.71 75.38 100%
125

Enforcement Scores Weight 0.50
Worst Best Weights
GDP per capita in thousands of USD from 2017
World Bank data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates GDP per capita in thousands of
dollars.
8 7 12 7 10 8 11 8 6 13 14 13 2 5 0.15
Population in millions based on World Bank 2018
data expressed as a logarithm
Number in box indicates population in millions 4 6 5 5 6 6 4 7 6 1 5 8 6 4 10 0.1
National Export Control Legislation is in place from
PPI
Number in box indicates as follows: 1 point for PPI
“Red” country, 2 points for PPI “Orange Country”, 3
points for PPI “Yellow” country, 4 points for PPI “Light
Green” Country, and 5 points for a PPI “Dark Green”
Country.
10 6 10 2 10 6 4 10 2 10 10 10 10 0 5 0.1
World Customs efficiency from World Bank,
Aggregated LPI 2012-2018
Number in box indicates Customs efficiency with 5
being the most efficient
7 8 10 8 8 8 10 9 8 8 12 12 11 0 5 0.15
Adequacy of enforcement from the 2018 PPI
Enforcement Scores
Number in box indicates PPI Enforcement score 26 16 18 16 22 19 21 15 17 6 24 29 28 -140 350 0.3
World Bank Governance Indicator: Control of
corruption
A -2.5 to 2.5 indicator where 2.5 is the highest level of
corruption control.
13 10 10 8 8 9 8 8 7 7 15 15 12 -2.5 2.5 0.2
Weighted Score for Enforcement 68 52 63 45 64 55 58 56 46 32 79 88 80 100%
Weighted Score Table
Georgia Ghana Greece Honduras Kazakhstan Morocco Panama Philippines Kenya Russia UAE US Spain Weights Raw Weights
Instrument Score 1.800 3.200 1.100 1.800 1.200 0.600 3.200 2.400 2.200 2.300 1.200 5.500 4.300 0.10 0.10
Implementation Score 19.306 12.838 27.396 12.314 19.948 13.188 19.890 18.544 12.804 23.320 18.148 30.684 30.152 0.40 0.40
Enforcement Score 34.044 25.809 31.726 22.742 31.909 27.489 29.130 27.976 23.185 15.825 39.422 43.750 40.059 0.50 0.50
Total Score 55.150 41.847 60.222 36.856 53.057 41.277 52.220 48.920 38.189 41.445 58.770 79.934 74.511 100% 100%
Implementation
Enforcement
Instrument
126

Table 20
Scores for Compliance with UNSCR 1540

Conclusion
This chapter presented the identification and analysis of the compliance factors. This was based
on data coding using themes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Chowdhury, 2014), classical content
analysis, and keyword in context analysis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Cresswell & Cresswell,
2017) to identify factors that scholars believe have an impact on compliance. More than 100 data
sources were reviewed during this process. As a result, 29 keywords or phrases were identified
that were either consistent with compliance theory or used repeatedly in the 50 documents
considered. In total, the 29 keywords in context were used 551 times in the documents. The
keywords were organized into three categories and 10 factors to develop the table.
The first step in model development was identifying attributes for the factors and
keywords. Attributes were identified for a number of reasons, including: use in past quantitative
0.000
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
90.000
Instrument Score Implementation Score Enforcement Score
127

analyses (Stiles & Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019); use in tools
such as the PPI (Albright et al., 2019); or they were measures of factors identified in qualitative
analyses, such as membership in past treaties (Grillot, Wolfe, & Beck, 1998).
Once the attributes were selected, measures were identified for each. Raw scores were
recorded for each of the attributes, and a SMART process with swing weighting (von
Winterfeldt, & Edwards, 1986) was used to convert the raw scores to a 100-point scale, weight
the attributes in each category to add up to 1.0, and weight each of the categories to add up to 1.0
The initial weighting was conducted using swing weighting to rank the attributes from
best to worst (von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) and assign a value to each attribute (Mustajoki
et al., 2005). These weights were validated based on a number of factors that included
development of the 10 initial country scores, a reexamination of the scholarly literature and
keyword(s) counts, and a review of previous quantitative analyses.
The model initially analyzed 10 countries representing each of the five United Nations
regions. To ensure validity, the model was run on two additional “known” countries, Russia and
the United States. As a result of this process, the attribute and category weights were adjusted.
Once these adjustments were made, the model was shared with experts for validation. A number
of expert comments were offered, including the need to consider more business-related factors
and to develop attributes and measures for these factors for possible inclusion in the model.
As a result of a comment regarding the overlap of two of the factors, the weighting of the
model was adjusted slightly to eliminate this overlap. An additional country (United Arab
Emirates) was evaluated based on a request from the experts, and a comparison was conducted
128

based on the adjusted weighting to ensure that the overlap was mitigated and that countries that
were both NAM and IOC members were not penalized.

129

Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion
Discussion
This study explores UNSCR 1540 implementation and the difficulties of determining
compliance. To address this problem, the study answers three questions:
1. Which factors are critical in evaluating UNSCR 1540 compliance?
2. Is it possible to use these factors to develop a methodology to evaluate
compliance?
3. Can this methodology be successfully tested on a sample of countries?
In pursuit of these answers, the study employs a sequential mixed-method
phenomenological-quantitative methodology (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015). The initial
phenomenological approach was used to identify compliance factors. The quantitative
methodology was used to determine the attributes, operationalize the factors, and build and
test the model.
The data were analyzed using three methods. “Constant comparison analysis” (Ryan
& Bernard, 2003) was used to code and organize the data and identify compliance factors.
“Keyword analysis” (Creswell & Creswell, 2017) was used to identify the keyword(s) in
each of the compliance factors. “Classical content analysis” was used to determine the
frequency of these phrases (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). Once this process was complete,
attributes and measures were identified, and a SMART methodology with swing weighting
(von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) was used to build a model to evaluate compliance.

130

While “compliance” is not defined in UNSCR 1540, it is typically defined in absolute
terms, implying that to be in compliance, implementation of every aspect of the rule or
resolution must be met. For complex instruments such as UNSCR 1540, complying with
every aspect is extremely difficult, as supported by the 2016 Committee Report (United
Nations Official Document, 2016) indicates that no country is in full compliance with the
Resolution.
This study employs a pragmatic definition of compliance that is in keeping with the
views of some of the experts that have advocated a more risk-based approach to UNSCR
1540 implementation (Crail, 2006). The definition used in this study speaks to compliance as
a goal and not a binary state (Lin, 2016). For this study, compliance is defined as
“substantially” meeting the requirements of UNSCR 1540. In this instance, substantially is
defined as compliance with the requirements of the Resolution, as represented by a minimum
score of 70% in the evaluation model.
Returning to this study’s three research questions, the results affirm that factors
critical in evaluating UNSCR 1540 compliance can be determined. This study is the most
comprehensive analysis to date regarding compliance factors. It not only examined previous
qualitative and quantitative analyses regarding UNSCR 1373 and UNSCR 1540 compliance,
but it also validated these factors using experts known for their expertise working with many
of the countries involved.
This additional level of data triangulation was of critical importance in validating findings. In
the course of examining compliance factors, it became clear that in some cases, theory and
practice were not aligned. One such case involves the impact of “external factors” on
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compliance. Scholars have advanced the theory that countries that receive a greater amount
of assistance in the form of resources and money should have higher compliance rates
(Cupitt, et al., 2001). Yet, some quantitative analyses (Hess, 2019) disagree with this theory.
In her study, Hess found just the opposite to be true. Her analysis indicates that there
is a negative correlation between aid and compliance (i.e., the more aid a country receives,
the less compliance they achieve). Expert validation agrees with Hess. One of the panel of
experts that reviewed the study and who works in nonproliferation programs in developing
countries commented that there appears to be no correlation between increased aid and
enhanced compliance.
Although this finding may appear counterintuitive, it can be explained through a
review of the data. In the case of foreign aid, for example, aid data is not separated by type,
and the countries that receive it are typically countries that do not have chemical, biological,
or nuclear programs and that have more pressing problems than UNSCR 1540
implementation.
Not every possible factor could be evaluated in the study. Although the data review
was comprehensive, there are many factors that motivate governments and impact
compliance (Henkin, 1979). The study examines those factors most frequently cited but
recognizes that others may exist. Nevertheless, the factors identified were sufficient for
model development.
The second research question—whether the factors identified could be used to
develop a methodology to evaluate compliance—can also be answered in the affirmative. A
model was developed with data obtained from a variety of sources to provide a level of data
triangulation. A SMART method with swing weighting was used in its development (von
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Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986), and the model was initially tested on 10 countries, two in
each of the five United Nations regions.
A review of the model was conducted based on a secondary review of the qualitative
data and a comparison of this data with the four existing quantitative analyses (Stiles &
Thane, 2006; Stinnett et al., 2007; Conroy, 2017; Hess, 2019). From this, the model
weighting was adjusted and two additional “known” countries (Russia and the United States)
were tested to ensure that the model accurately reflected the situation in the countries.
The testing indicates that the phenomenological-quantitative methodology (Mayoh &
Onwuegbuzie, 2015) using keyword analysis to identify the compliance factors (Creswell &
Creswell, 2017), as well as the SMART/SWING technique (Mustajoki et al., 2005) can be
used as an effective means to evaluate UNSCR 1540 compliance.
Finally, to the question, can the methodology be successfully tested on a sample of
countries, the answer is yes. After the initial review, testing, and adjustment, the model was
reviewed by a panel of experts who indicated that it was a valid tool that had use in the
evaluation of UNSCR 1540 compliance. During this process, the panel of experts requested
that the model be tested on an additional country, the UAE. The UAE scored 57.3% in the
initial testing of the model. To further check the model’s reliability, this score was
benchmarked against another much more complicated instrument, the PPI (Albright et al.,
2019).
On the PPI, the UAE scored 783 out of a possible 1300 points, or 60.2%, very close
to the 57.3% in the model presented in this study. To provide a further benchmark, the U.S.
score from both models was compared. In the PPI, the United States scored 1019 out of 1300
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possible points, or 78.3%, somewhat higher than the 82.9% found through the model
presented here.
Based on comments from the panel regarding an overlap in two of the attributes, the
model weighting in the Instrument category was adjusted slightly. Using the revised model,
the score for the UAE increased to 58.8%, while the U.S. score dropped to 79.9%. After the
adjustments, the gap between the PPI and the model created in this study closed slightly and
the difference between the scores in both models were less than 2.5% for the two countries.
Although a larger sample would be helpful in analyzing the last iteration of the
model, and some valid suggestions were provided by the panel of experts regarding
additional attributes and measures that could be examined, the results indicate that the model
accurately represents the real-world situation. As the panel of experts indicated, the
methodology developed could be used as a tool to evaluate UNSCR 1540 compliance.
Implications
This study fills a particularly urgent gap, given the current emphasis on securing
borders and enhancing the security of the global supply chain to deter the proliferation of
WMD or their components. The study has value for government and other organizations that
assist countries in advancing the international nonproliferation agenda. More specifically,
this study assists in identifying which countries need implementation assistance, what type of
assistance is needed, and where the need for assistance is greatest. It also allows countries to
conduct a more systematic evaluation of compliance and provide a tool for benchmarking
national progress.
The Compliance Evaluation Tool developed here allows countries to conduct self-
evaluations to determine areas where improvements are needed, and it helps organizations
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and countries focus their resources on areas where assistance provides the most benefit.
Additionally, the tool can be adjusted to assist in determining the effectiveness of other
international programs, guide the development of new programs, or impose, enhance, reduce,
or eliminate sanctions.
Perhaps most importantly, the tool is easy to use with readily available data. It takes
less than 30 minutes to use the model to evaluate a country, and most of this time is taken in
the review of the UNSCR 1540 Committee-approved matrix submitted by the country. There
is widespread application for governments, NGOs, and businesses for a quick, easy-to-use
tool that provides an indication of a country’s nonproliferation compliance.
Recommendations
There are a number of recommendations that can be made as a result of this study and
the input from the expert panel. The first is that to properly determine validity, the model
needs to be tested on a larger number of counties. The testing of the 10 original countries
(later expanded to 13) provided the model’s proof of concept, but to better ensure its
effectiveness, a larger number of countries needs to be modeled.
The second recommendation is that the factors, attributes, and measures need to be
reevaluated. This study found that in the changing global landscape, some traditional theories
were not valid in determining the best predictors of compliance. An example provided earlier
is with the issue of foreign assistance. A similar factor involves NGOs. Scholars believed that
countries that have a strong domestic NGO presence may be more likely to implement their
international obligations (Weiss & Jacobson, 2000). A recent quantitative analysis (Hess,
2019) indicated that this is not the case.
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The panel of experts also provided a recommendation that attributes such as income
inequality, foreign direct investment, insurability, or ease of doing business in a country
should be examined as they may provide indications of compliance. The panel noted that
UNSCR 1540 has a significant impact on international trade and that a correlation may exist
between the business climate in a country and Resolution compliance. Enforcement theorists,
such as Fuhrmann (2007), argue that compliance is a cost/benefit problem. These decisions
also drive international trade. Since trade is important to both government and industry, and
industry seeks to work in countries with stable governments, economies, and trade policies,
the panel indicated that business friendliness may have a correlation to increased compliance.
None of the identified attributes specifically dealt with industry cooperation or
industry data. Section 8(C) of UNSCR 1540 mandates that governments should “work with
and inform” industry regarding their UNSCR 1540 efforts (United Nations Official
Document, 2004). Some of the more recent articles have touted the importance of engaging
civil society (Finlay, 2012) and industry (Kraig, 2011) in nonproliferation.
It is also important to consider what Chayes and Chayes (1993, 1998) identify as the
“temporal” aspects of compliance. For those countries that do not possess chemical,
biological, or nuclear materials, or that are not regime members, the implementation of
UNSCR 1540 and other nonproliferation requirements represents a significant task these
countries are not prepared for and will take time to complete.
Additionally, once implementation has been completed, there are likely to be cultural
changes impacting enforcement. These changes will involve conducting the training and
making the cultural transition from an administrative to enforcement mindset. This takes time
and can only be accelerated with the assistance of governmental and nongovernmental
partners.
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Finally, Peter Crail (2006) and many others (Shirazyan, 2019) have recommended
that the United Nations support a risk-based approach to implementation. In this, countries
would be asked to focus on the aspects of UNSCR 1540 that have the greatest impact. A
country where this approach would be particularly relevant is the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas, which has no chemical, biological, or nuclear programs and does not manufacture
components of WMD.
The Bahamas is, however, a major trade and transshipment country. As such, a risk-
based approach would lead the country to focus on Section 3(D) of the Resolution, which
requires the development and maintenance of national export and transshipment controls
over nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.
Conclusion
Compliance with UNSCR 1540 is the key element in the deterrence and detection of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The
programs of many countries have been built on the compliance failures of others. The fact
that a country does not have WMD programs does not make it less important for that country
to comply with the Resolution. Indeed, these countries may serve as a transit or
transshipment point for these materials.
Employing a tool that can systematically and consistently evaluate compliance
provides a means to identify nations with compliance challenges, allowing partner nations to
implement programs that can mitigate risks from these compliance shortfalls. An evaluation
tool can also help identify areas where international capacity-building programs can be most
effective.
To be sure, no tool is a substitute for an oversight and assessment program. As a
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number of scholars have indicated, there is currently no valid assessment of UNSCR 1540
compliance (Salisbury et al., 2018; Shirazyan, 2019). When asked what standards the 1540
Committee used to evaluate how well the Resolution was being implemented and how much
the Committee would press states to comply, Richard Cupitt indicated that the answers to
those questions are “none” and “very little” (2012).
An on-the-ground assessment of UNSCR 1540 compliance should be a prerequisite
for a country providing assistance, training, equipment, or funding to a host country. In
addition, an assessment of UNSCR 1540 compliance should be a condition of trade or
transportation agreements and existing assessments, such as those conducted for the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).
Requiring assessments and a minimum level of compliance as a condition of
agreement to a treaty, trade, or other international agreement has been an effective measure
used by the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. These agencies
have leveraged a country’s desire for an agreement as a means to enhance compliance with
international instruments. UNSCR 1540 should be one of these instruments.
This being said, it is important to remember that an evaluation tool or an on-the-
ground-assessment only provides an indication of compliance at a particular time. Factors
change as capabilities improve and others are impacted by changing economic and political
conditions. As a result, assessments and evaluations should be routinely conducted and tools
such as this should be updated to reflect these changes.
Clearly, more needs to be done to assess compliance with UNSCR 1540. In addition,
based on the assessments conducted by the UNSCR 1540 Committee, a great deal more
needs to be done to enhance compliance. As data from the 2016 Committee report indicates,
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based on reports submitted by the member nations, 17 out of the 193 U.N. member nations
had not submitted a compliance matrix, and the average score based on this self-assessment
was 48.2% (159 out of 330 items completed).
This reveals that a large percentage of countries do not meet this study’s definition of
“substantial compliance,” which as noted earlier in this a score of 70%. The data in the
UNSCR 1540 Committee 2016 report indicates that approximately 35 countries (18%) of the
U.N. member states were in substantial compliance with UNSCR 1540. Comparing this to
the data from the model developed in this project, the average score on the tool for the 13
countries evaluated was 52.5%, and only two countries (the United States and Spain) were in
substantial compliance.
Thus, the model developed in this project is a valid tool for measuring UNSCR 1540
compliance. What is more, the factors impacting compliance can be identified, these factors
can be used to develop a methodology to evaluate compliance, and this methodology can be
successfully tested on a sample of countries.
139

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160

Appendix A: Text of UNSCR 1373

United Nations
S/RES/1373 (2001)
Security Council Distr.: General
28 September 2001
Resolution 1373 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385
th
meeting on 28 September 2001

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12
September 2001,
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took
place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and
expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by
the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of
terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts,
including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant
international conventions relating to terrorism,
161

Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking
additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means,
the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of
October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its
resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nation
1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry
out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate
in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf
of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons
and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from
making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related
162

services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit
or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist
acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or
persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members
of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by
provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts,
or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using
their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought
to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support
of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession
necessary for the proceedings;
163

(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through
measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers
and travel documents
3. Calls upon all States to:
(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information,
especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified
travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications
technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and
cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist
acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements,
to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions
1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and
international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee
status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or
participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
164

(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the
perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political
motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of
alleged terrorists;
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and
transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms- trafficking,
and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly
materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on
national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting
terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a
Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to
monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise,
and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of
adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the
Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;
7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30
days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation
with the Secretary-General;
8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full
implementation of this resolution in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
165

Appendix B: Text of UNSCR 1540
United Nations S/RES/1540 (2004)
Security Council Distr.: General
28 April 2004
Resolution 1540 (2004)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004

The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their
means of delivery, * constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the
Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January
1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in
relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all
weapons of mass destruction,
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve
peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting
the maintenance of regional and global stability,
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to
international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as
provided for in the United Nations Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States
parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,
166

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:
Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.
Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in
conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral
treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the
design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their
means of delivery.
Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which
contribute to non-proliferation,
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and
technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used
as a cover for proliferation,
Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State
actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and
maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267
and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,
Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, * which adds a
new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to
international peace and security,
167

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national,
subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global
response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,
Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under
treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at
preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have
taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive
materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery,
Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and
agreements to which they are party,
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,
Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area
of non-proliferation,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-
State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
168

manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well
as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an
accomplice, assist or finance them;
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, o r biological weapons
and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related
materials and to this end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such
items in production, use, storage or transport;
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through
international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in
accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and
trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to
control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds
and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and
transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user
controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for
violations of such export control laws and regulations;
4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure,
for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council,
169

consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other
expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation
of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than
six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they
have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted
so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic
Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national
control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest
opportunity the development of such lists;
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions
of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer
assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal
and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling
the above provisions;
8. Calls upon all States:
(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary,
strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
170

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure
compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non- proliferation treaties;
(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular
within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in
the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for
peaceful purposes;
(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public
regarding their obligations under such laws;
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non- proliferation so as
to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons,
and their means of delivery;
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative
action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means
of delivery, and related materials;
11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and,
at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

171

Vita Auctoris

John M. Holmes is an Independent Marine Consultant and port and maritime specialist
with 40 years of experience in positions that include Chief Operating Officer, Fortune 500
executive, and senior level Coast Guard Officer (Captain). Most recently, Capt. Holmes was the
co-principal investigator on a MacArthur Foundation Grant project regarding bolstering counter-
proliferation efforts in the global supply system. In addition, for the past 13 years, he has been a
National Security Advisor for General Dynamics Information Technology, assisting the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in conducting international training and capacity building
efforts in the area of the deterrence and detection of weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to his consulting career, Capt. Holmes served as Deputy Executive Director for the
Port of Los Angeles, where he was responsible for managing the day-to-day operations at the
nation’s largest port. Before joining the port, Capt. Holmes was Chief Operating Officer of the
Marsec Group, a consulting firm specializing in port, border, and supply chain security. Prior to
the Marsec Group, Capt. Holmes was a Vice President at Science Applications International
Corporation, where he implemented technological solutions to homeland security challenges.
Capt. Holmes retired from the U.S. Coast Guard in 2003 following 27 years of service.
His posts included Captain of the Port for the Los Angeles-Long Beach Port Complex. Capt.
Holmes was at the helm on September 11, 2001, and has been credited with actions that led to
the creation of number of national initiatives regarding port and maritime security. During his
military career, Capt. Holmes served as Deputy Chief of the Office of Congressional Affairs, as a
member of the Country Team at the U.S. Embassy in Singapore, and as Committee Chairman at
the International Maritime Organization in London.
172

Capt. Holmes was a member of the Marine Board of the Transportation Research Board
of the National Academy of Sciences from 2008 to 2016. He was also a member of the National
Academies Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (2010), the Committee on
Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (2013), the India–U.S.
Workshop on Science and technology for Countering Terrorism (2014), and most recently, a
Planning Committee member and facilitator for the Joint U.S.-Japan International CBRN
Resilience Exercise that took place in Tokyo in October 2017.
Capt. Holmes holds bachelor’s degrees in English and education from Boston College in
Boston, MA, and a master’s degree in business administration from Washington University in St.
Louis, MO.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This study examines scholarly articles and previous analyses to develop a comprehensive list of the factors that are critical in evaluating a country’s level of compliance with UNSCR 1540. Once identified, an analysis of these factors was conducted, and a tool was developed using the SMART/SWING technique to evaluate a country’s level of compliance. This tool was then vetted by a panel of experts and successfully tested on an initial sample of 13 countries. Testing revealed that the model reflects the real-life situation in the countries examined. The model can be used to provide insight into countries that require implementation assistance, guidance in determining the need for and type of incentives, and background data in the development of mitigation measures. It provides an analysis of the key factors affecting compliance with UNSCR 1540, as well as a tool to determine the level of compliance with the Resolution. The tool can be used to assist agencies and organizations in their efforts to enhance international compliance, and it can be adapted for use in evaluating other national and international nonproliferation programs.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Holmes, John Merrill (author)

Core Title Critical factors in evaluating compliance to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: developing a methodology for compliance evaluation

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 02/25/2020

Defense Date 02/12/2020

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag compliance evaluation,compliance factors,compliance methodology,OAI-PMH Harvest,United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,UNSCR 1373,UNSCR 1540

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Southers, Erroll (committee chair), Natoli, Deborah (committee member), von Winterfeldt, Detlof (committee member)

Creator Email jholmes1149@cox.net,jmholmes@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-272557

Unique identifier UC11675413

Identifier etd-HolmesJohn-8206.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-272557 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-HolmesJohn-8206.pdf

Dmrecord 272557

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Holmes, John Merrill

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA