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Environmental policy reforms in a global and regional world: mimetic, diffusive, and coercive policy adoptions in France and Korea
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Environmental policy reforms in a global and regional world: mimetic, diffusive, and coercive policy adoptions in France and Korea
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Content
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REFORMS IN A GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
WORLD: MIMETIC, DIFFUSIVE, AND COERCIVE POLICY ADOPTIONS
IN FRANCE AND KOREA
by
Sun-Young Kwak
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)
December 2010
Copyright 2010 Sun-Young Kwak
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are many people without whom I could not have written this dissertation.
First and foremost, my deepest appreciation goes to Professor Jefferey M. Sellers, my
chair and mentor, for his respectable erudition, insightful comments, and invaluable
support at every stage of my doctoral studies. I am also grateful for Professor Alison
Dundes Renteln for her thoughtful guidance, warm encouragement, and constructive
comments on my work. I am thankful for Professor Lisa Schweitzer, who, as an outside
committee member, offered a distinct perspective and helpful comments on my
dissertation. Furthermore, I deeply appreciate the excellent support for my research that
came from other faculty and staff members in the Department of Political Science. I also
acknowledge the research support of Phi Beta Kappa Scholarship Award for International
Student and Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics for Summer Graduate Student Award.
I am also grateful to Professor Mary Caputi, Professor Barry H. Steiner, and
Professor Ron Schmidt at California State University, Long Beach for their interests in the
progress of my research. Not only did they encourage me to pursue my doctoral studies
but they also have shown constant support for my research. During my graduate years at
USC, I was fortunate to meet colleagues with whom to share my research interests and
academic life, including Yong-Wook Lee, Yoo-Il Bae, Jeany Choi, Kyu-Nahm Jun,
Archana Agarwal, and Dan Hosang.
During my dissertation research, many professional researchers, government
officials, and representatives of environmental organizations helped me produce the
empirical contents of this study. In particular, I appreciate Professor Hoi-Sung Chung,
former president of Korea Environment Institute, Professor Jun-Woo Park, Jae-Kon Shim,
iii
former Director of Resource Recycling Division, and Goh Kun, former Mayor of Seoul
and Prime Minister of Korea, for their extensive comments on the initial recycling policy
developments. I am also thankful for Mi-Hwa Kim, Director of Korea Zero Waste
Movement Network, Professor Jaehyun Oh, Chairman of the Korean Institute of
Resources Recycling, and other anonymous representatives of environmental
organizations in Korea. In France, I received valuable comments from Alain Geldron,
Head of Extended Producer Responsibility & Recycling Department, and Marc Cheverry,
Head of Advanced Waste Management Department of the French Environment and
Energy Management Agency (ADEME). I also deeply appreciate the concrete and
extensive comments from a number of environmental organizations and their
representatives in France, including Gerard Ide, Director of ProRecyclage, Pascal Gislais,
Director of Eco-Emballage, Igor Billimoff, Director of the FEDEREC (Fédération de la
Récupération, du Recyclage et de la Valorization), Fabrice Pairot de Fontenay, Director of
Alliance Carton Nature, Bruno Weinzaepfel, Vice-president of the AFITE (Association
Française des Ingénieurs et Techniciens de l'Environnement), and Richard Eynard-Machet,
Vice-President of FRAPNA (Fédération Rhône-Alpes de Protection de la Nature).
Finally, I could not have made it through this process without the support of my
family. My parents have been the most ardent supporters of my studies. My sister and
brother have always been cheery companions in my academic years. In particular, my
father-in-law, Noh-Seok Park, and my brother, Jung-Hwan, helped me with my field
research in many ways. But mostly, I cannot express enough thanks to my husband,
Sang-Il, and my son, Justin Junho, for their warm support and patience. I dedicate this
dissertation to them.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
LIST OF TABLES vii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
ABSTRACT x
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
1.1. What Brings About the Policy Reforms and How? 9
1.2. Theoretical Frameworks: Effect of Global, Regional, and National 11
Factors on Recycling Policy Adoption Processes in France and Korea
1.2.1. Policy Adoption and Transfer Research 11
1.2.2. Globalization and Policy Convergence 14
1.2.3. Regionalization as Effective Mechanisms of Policy Adoption 16
1.2.4. New Institutionalism and National Policy Legacy 18
1.2.5. Public Attitudes and Reform Prospects 21
1.2.6. Transnational Advocacy Networks and Policy Diffusion 22
1.3. Methodology 24
1.4. Overview of the Dissertation 26
CHAPTER 2. ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES, MOVEMENTS AND 33
INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE AND KOREA
2.1. Traditional Environmental Philosophies and Modern Perspectives in 36
France and Korea
2.1.1. Environmental Philosophies and their Legacies on Policy 36
Perspectives in Korea
2.1.2. Environmental Philosophies and their Legacies on Policy 41
Perspectives in France
2.2. Democratization and Environmental Movements 49
2.2.1. Democratization and Environmental Movements in Korea 50
2.2.2. Democratization and Environmental Movements in France 54
2.3. Development of Environmental Institutions and Regulations in France and 59
Korea
2.3.1. Developments of Environmental Institutions in France and Korea 61
2.3.1.1. Organization of the Ministry of Ecology, France 67
2.3.1.2. Organization of the Ministry of Environment, Korea 70
2.3.2. Developments of Legislative and Regulative Frameworks 72
CHAPTER 3. RECYCLING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN 77
FRANCE AND KOREA
3.1. Global Environmentalism: Policy Convergence or Divergent Adoptions? 84
3.2. Regionalization: National and Regional Policy Imperatives 91
3.2.1. France in Regionalized Europe and Korea among East Asian
Countries 91
3.2.2. Effect of Neighboring Countries 96
3.3. National Policy Legacies on the Scope of Environmental Policy Reforms 98
v
3.3.1. Recycling and Waste Management Reforms in France 100
3.3.1.1. National Policy Legacy: negotiation-oriented, gradual policy 100
reforms
3.3.1.2. Coercive and Diffusive Policy Processes within the EU 103
3.3.1.3. Policy Entrepreneurs for the Reforms: Environmental 109
Organizations, Corporate Associations, and Leadership as
Major Actors
3.3.2. Recycling and Waste Management Reforms in Korea 115
3.3.2.1 National Policy Legacy: Swift and Transformative Regulatory 115
Changes by Centralized Environmental Policy Process in the
Decentralized Governance
3.3.2.2. Policy Makers’ Initiative for National and Local Regulatory 117
Reforms: “mimetic innovations” of Jonryangje
3.3.2.3. Civic Environmental Activism for Further Reforms 129
3.4. Political Culture and Public Support for Environmental Reforms 135
3.4.1. Growing Environmentalism and National Policy Structure on Public 137
Support for the Reforms
3.4.2. Political culture 141
3.4.2.1. Anti-dirigism and Localism in France 142
3.4.2.2. Collectivism and Civic Activism in Korea 146
3.5. Conclusion: Global, Regional and National Effects on the Reform Processes 152
CHAPTER 4. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCACY 162
NETWORKS (TEANs) as ENABLING POLICY NETWORKS
AND AVENUES OF POLICY DIFFUSION
4.1. Types of Environmental Organizations Within and Across Borders: their 166
Professionalization and Transnationalization
4.2. Policy Transfer Mechanisms of Emulation, Diffusion, and Coercion 177
4.3. TEANs as an Avenue of Policy Diffusions 183
4.4. TEANs as Enabling Networks 187
4.4.1. TEANs in France and their Low-Profile Enabling Strategies 191
4.4.2. TEANs in Korea and their High-Profile Enabling Strategies 195
4.4.3. Converging Strategies of the TEANs? 198
4.5. Conclusion: Contextual Understanding of Regionalization on the TEANs 201
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 205
5.1. Theoretical Implications 207
5.1.1. Divergent receptiveness toward Global Environmentalism and 207
International Environmental Institutions in France and Korea
5.1.2. Regionalization as a Contextual Analytic Category with Multifaceted 213
Policy Adoption Implications
5.1.3. National Policy Legacies and Threshold Effects for Multilevel policy 216
processes
5.1.4. Public Attitudes, Political Culture and National Policy Frameworks 222
5.1.5. Transnational Environmental Organizations as Enabling Policy 225
Networks and Avenues of Policy Diffusion
5.2. Methodological Implications 233
5.3. Policy Implications 236
5.3.1. 3Rs Policies and National Policy Developments 236
5.3.2. Multi-level Network Governance as Effective Reform Dynamics 241
vi
5.4. Concluding remarks 243
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247
APPENDICES 257
Appendix A: Environmental Organizations’ View on the Three Most 257
Important Factors in Recycling Policy Reform Processes
Appendix B: Development of the EPR System in Korea 258
Appendix C: Environmental Organizations Survey Questionnaires 260
Appendix D: Environmental Organizations in France 264
Appendix E: Environmental Organizations in Korea 265
Appendix F: Industrial Waste Generation in France and Korea (2007) 266
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: Institutional History of the Ministry of Ecology, France 67
Table 2-2: Institutional History of the Ministry of Environment, Korea 70
Table 2-3: Major Environmental Laws and Regulations on Recycling and 75
Waste Management Policies
Table 3-1: Environmental Data Comparison of France and Korea 79
Table 3-2: Major Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Waste 105
Management and Recycling in France
Table 3-3: Major Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Waste 123
Management and Recycling in Korea
Table 3-4: Comparative Outcome of Hypotheses on the Effect of External 157
and Internal Factors on Environmental Reform Processes
Table 3-5: Municipal and Household Waste Generation (kg/capita) and 159
Recycling Rates (paper/cardboard, glass)
Table 3-6: Surveys on Public Attitudes toward Environmental Issues 160
Table 4-1: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental 171
Organizations in France
Table 4-2: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental 171
Organizations in Korea
Table 4-3: Internationalization and Regionalization of the TEANs 176
Table 4-4: Conceptual Frameworks for Policy Adoption and Convergence 180
Mechanisms
Table 4-5: Hypotheses and Outcomes on the TEANs’ Effect on the Policy 204
Reforms
Table 5-1: 3Rs Principles of Resource Recycling 238
Table B-1: Development of the EPR System in Korea 258
Table D-1: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental 264
Organizations in France
viii
Table D-2: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental 265
Organizations in Korea
Table F-1: Waste Generation in France and Korea (2007) 266
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1. Organization Chart of the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, 63
Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning (Ministère de
l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la
Mer), France
Figure 2-2. Organization Chart of the ADEME, under the Ministry of 64
Ecology, France
Figure 2-3. Organization Chart of the Ministry of Environment, Korea 65
Figure 3-1. SGI Comparision Chart on Environmental Performance 79
Figure 4-1. Transnationalization of Environmental Organizations in France 174
(by year established)
Figure 4-2. Transnationalization of Environmental Organizations in Korea 174
(by year established)
Table A-1: Environmental Organizations’ Assessment of the Three Most 257
Important Factors in Recycling Policy Reform Processes
x
ABSTRACT
Why is a set of environmental reforms promoted in some political settings but not
in others? We have noticed the effect of global and regional institutions on national
policy reform prospects, especially since the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP)’s Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992. Globalization
theories generally assume that international institutions are conducive to crossnational
policy convergence. Theories of regionalization posit that the highly integrative
European Union (EU)’s environmental policy frameworks have resulted in progressive
policy reforms in EU member countries. Furthermore, as institutionally and
socioeconomically more mature systems, established democracies and advanced
economies are often considered more likely to accept untraditional claims for
postmaterialistic, environmental values as policy options. In reality, however, not all of
the advanced economies in Europe have comprehensively improved their environmental
policies, despite strict EU policy directives. Meanwhile, without coercive regional policy
imperatives, transitional democracies often exhibit farther reaching environmental policy
implementations than established democracies. For example, Korea’s extensive
mandatory household separate waste collection systems and resource recycling policies
present a research puzzle; what are the major sources and critical policy adoption
mechanisms for its reforms?
This research seeks to understand the causal mechanisms of divergent
environmental policy developments in established democracies within the EU and
transitional democracies outside of the EU. In particular, I investigate the interlocking
effect of global institutions, regionalization, national policy legacies, political culture, and
xi
transnational environmental advocacy networks (TEANs) on recycling policy reform
processes in France and Korea since the 1990s. This research is based on both qualitative
and quantitative analyses; process tracing methods and discourse analysis of interviews
with key policymakers, professional experts, and environmental activists were used to
capture major policy reform dynamics in the two countries. Based on my Environmental
Organizations (EO) survey of 23 environmental groups in each country, the dissertation
presents original data sets to document the development of and variation in TEANs in
established and transitional democracies.
This dissertation’s comparative analysis highlights the contextual effect of
globalization and regionalization on the environmental policy reform processes of
established and transitional democracies. Different from conventional assumptions, the
transitional democracy and its mimetic policy learning efforts have been more receptive
to global and crossregional policy transfer mechanisms than have the established
democracy. In Korea, policymakers and the TEANs have been actively engaged in both
crossnational and “crossregional” policy emulation and diffusion processes.
Counterintuitively, EU regional policy imperatives have both enabled and constrained
policy learning efforts in France; policymakers and TEANs tend to work mostly with
their European partners through higher level of information exchanges within the EU and
their geographical/cultural similarities. At the same time, however, they have been
conditioned by bounded rationality and cultural constraints in ways that they work less
with non-European TEANs. Furthermore, the transnationalization of the French
environmental organizations turns out to be lower than that of Korea. The French
TEANs’ transnationalization has decreased since the mid-1990s, whereas their regional
xii
networks have been strengthened more than Korean TEANs’. In both established and
transitional democracies, TEANs have evolved into critical actors with diverse access
points to the multilevel governance in a global world, through resourceful, “enabling”
strategies based on professionalized expertise and transnational networks.
These cases also demonstrate that it was more consciously driven mimetic reform
initiatives of policymakers and TEANs in the transitional democracy that enabled both
crossnational and crossregional policy adoptions. Thus, within the framework of policy
transfer research, I highlight mimetic emulation as an analytically distinctive conceptual
category, along with diffusive and coercive mechanisms.
Both the predicted and unexpected findings of the comparative research
illuminate the significance of regional and national settings in which policymakers and
TEANs work for policy reform. The divergent scope and distinct mechanisms of
environmental reform in the established and transitional democracies should be
understood through the extent to which policymakers and TEANs have exploited the
interlocking and constitutive effects of national policy legacies and political culture on
policymaking processes in a global and regional world.
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A diverse range of environmental challenges, such as climate change, air
pollution, and water resources depletion, has become a major worldwide concern. Deeply
intertwined environmental problems affecting essential aspects of everyday life across
countries have called for viable policy change at the national and international level.
Environmental policy entrepreneurs, both committed government officials and
transnational activists, have worked to trigger national policy changes across the globe,
often through supranational institutions such as the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Environment Directorate, and the World Bank. The effect of supranational
institutions on national policy reform prospects has been highly praised, especially since
the UNEP’s Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992. The European
Union (EU) has also worked as an exemplary regional institution that promotes
progressive environmental policy frameworks for its member countries.
At the national level, more industrialized democracies have been expected to lead
the policy changes. Past research on environmental reform indicates that established
democracy and advanced industrial status in a country often precipitate more progressive
environmentalism and extensive environmental policy developments (Grossman &
Krueger 1991; Seldon & Song 1994; Lijphart 1999).
1
As institutionally and
socioeconomically more mature systems, established democracies and advanced
economies are considered more likely to accept the untraditional claims for
postmaterialistic, environmental values as policy options.
1
More nuanced analysis on the relationship between economic development and environmental regulations has grown
as well, including Sellers (2004), and Brabdolini and Smeeding (2007).
3
In reality, however, not all of the more advanced economies in Europe have
expansively improved their environmental policies, even under the strict EU policy
directives. Meanwhile, transitional democracies, like Korea, have shown unexpectedly
progressive environmental policy implementations, such as mandatory household
separate waste collection systems and resource recycling policies.
The 2009 Sustainable Governance Indicator (SGI)
2
reports that Korea’s recycling
systems for households and industry have been unprecedentedly far-reaching and strict,
even compared to Germany, Sweden, or Japan, which are famous for their systemic waste
management system. According to SGI reports, municipal waste generation per capita in
Korea has been kept very low compared to other countries since the mid 1990s; 390
annual kilograms of waste generation per capita in Korea meant that it ranked as the
seventh country in sustainable waste management. Poland and Czech Republic ranked
first and second well-performing countries, respectively, and Mexico ranked the fourth.
Japan stays as the ninth, France as the 17
th
(with 540 annual kilograms of waste
generation per capita), Germany as the 21st, and the United States as the 29th.
3
Without pressure from regional institutions like the EU, and as a traditionally
developmentalist, newly industrialized country, Korea’s extensive recycling reforms
present an ironic research puzzle. How can we explain the more extensive recycling and
waste management policy reforms in the transitional democracy as compared to those of
established democracies? What are the main institutional, political and cultural causal
factors that have led to the far-reaching environmental reforms? Furthermore, while
2
The SGI, published by Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2009, presents comparative analysis for the OECD countries’ capacity
to deal with a range of social and political challenges.
3
“Waste Management”, SGI. http://www.sgi-network.org/index.php?page=indicator_quant&indicator=S16_6
4
many countries have recently exhibited increasingly similar recycling reform policies,
what are the critical, transnational and national sources for the policy transfer
mechanisms in the different political and regional settings?
My research aims to investigate a) the major causal factors of environmental
reforms in increasingly multilevel governance and b) the critical policy adoption
mechanisms that have resulted in divergent environmental policy developments in
established democracies within the EU and transitional democracies outside of the EU.
To understand major, multilevel sources of the divergent waste management and
recycling policy reforms, this research will illuminate the interlocking effect of global,
regional, transnational, and national factors on policy processes, as their relative impact
has shaped the dissimilar scopes and degrees of the reforms. In particular, I will explore
the ways in which global intergovernmental organizations, regional institutions,
transnational environmental advocacy networks (TEANs hereafter), national policy
legacies, and public support have promoted or constrained the reform efforts in
established and transitional democracies. In so doing, this research pays special attention
to the extent to which TEANs and their nongovernmental, informal politics have
unprecedentedly facilitated crossnational policy transfer and adoption processes through
increasingly multilayered environmental governance. In addition, the comparative
analysis will highlight their transnational linkages through which foreign policy ideas
have been effectively transmitted into national policy frameworks.
At the same time, my dissertation will analyze critical causal mechanisms of the
policy adoption processes. Theoretical frameworks of policy transfer research
distinguish three major policy transfer mechanisms—coercive, diffusive, and emulative
5
processes. In general, policy transfer mechanisms illuminate the coercive influence of
supranational institutions, the diffusive effect of transnational policy networks, and the
emulative upshot of rational policy learning across countries. The different mechanisms
further reveal not only the role of diverse institutions and networks of actors in the
distinctive policy reform processes but also their respective effect on the scope of policy
changes. For example, whereas the coercive and harmonious effects of supranational
institutions provide structural conditions for national policy reform, the noncoercive,
emulative, and diffusive policy learning efforts of policymakers and TEANs often shape
innovative reform prospects. Therefore, I will examine the ways in which policy
adoption mechanisms could be exploited or hampered in established and transitional
democracies within their national, regional, and global settings.
By looking at these two analytic dimensions, therefore, I seek to bridge the
analytic distance between policy transfer research and comparative multilevel analysis.
Policy transfer research has hardly attended to the significant influence of regional
integration on national policy reforms from a comparative perspective. While mainly
focusing on policy adoption mechanisms and processes within the same federal system,
within the same region, or within the globalized setting, past research has not fully
probed the effects of regional institutions on crossnational, multilevel governance.
4
Even
some of the most scrupulous comparative analyses on crossnational environmental policy
reforms have not addressed the effects of regional institutions on the policy reform
prospects. Moreover, they have not thoroughly observed the increasingly significant,
4
Even for crossregional studies, analytic focus has only taken into consideration the effect of the EU on environmental
policy reforms of its member countries, not its effect on nonmember countries. Moreover, it is hard to find a
comparative analysis of the environmental policy reforms of European and Asian countries, such as France and Korea.
6
transnational channels and networks of nongovernmental actors as causal impetuses of
environmental policy adoption.
Therefore, in order to link process-oriented policy transfer research and multilevel
comparative approaches, this study seeks to capture global, regional, and national sources
of environmental reform, especially the growing effect of TEANs and regional
institutions on national policy reform processes of countries in different geographical
regions. Largely composed of nongovernmental, private actors, as well as governmental
officials, TEANs have emerged as critical actors that permeate into diverse levels of
environmental governance. Beyond the national level, TEANs have considerably
changed the horizons of policy transfer across countries and regions, while actively
interacting with global and regional institutions, national policymakers, and the general
public. Also, as EU directives have imparted more definitive environmental policy
frameworks in its member countries, a regional comparison is necessary for a more
detailed understanding of the supranational institution on national policy changes. In this
crossregional research, therefore, I will highlight the extent to which TEANs and EU
policy directives have shaped the policy reforms of established democracies of the EU
vis-à-vis those of transitional democracies outside of the EU.
My cases are France and Korea. France and Korea share a range of common
institutional structures and political dynamics in policy processes, including: traditionally
highly centralized policymaking; dominant technocratic bureaucracy in policy processes;
and a strong legacy of state-led developmentalist policies. The similar institutional
reforms of decentralization and economic liberalizations in the European and East Asian
countries since the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, render the case analysis even more
7
comparable. Moreover, that this comparative research examines France as an
established democracy and Korea as a transitional democracy in different geographical
continents allows me to explicate the effect of political and regional settings on
environmental policy processes. Because it has been major drafter of the EU, France
presents a representative case that demonstrates the effect of regional institutions on
national policy processes more than peripheral countries of the EU. Thus, this
comparative research into European and Asian cases will articulate the implications of
regional integration on the reform prospects in France vis-à-vis those in a non-European
country. Given the general assumptions about the impact of strict EU environmental
policy frameworks on its member countries’ progressive national policy reforms, how
can we explain the more extensive environmental reforms taking place in non-European,
transitional democracies? Has the EU been conducive to strengthening the transnational
linkages of environmental organizations and policy entrepreneurs across regional
countries, as is generally assumed? In this research, “region” will be used to refer to
supranational geographical boundaries, such as European or Asian terrains.
5
As will be articulated in Chapter Three, I focus on waste management and
recycling reform to explicate an environmental policy area in which a number of
transitional democracies, including the Czech Republic and Mexico, have actually been
more progressive than established democracies. In addition, waste management and
recycling is a policy arena in which the effect of the attitude and support of the public, as
a major participant in and implementer of policy at the municipal level, can be
investigated.
5
Supranational “region” is differentiated from “province,” which denotes domestic regions in this research.
8
To solve the research puzzle on causal mechanisms and policy adoption processes
of environmental reforms in France and Korea, the empirical work of this dissertation is
divided into three parts. The first part is descriptive, portraying the historical and
institutional development of environmental policy frameworks and environmentalism in
France and Korea as the underlying institutional and cultural conditions for reform
prospects. The second part of this research takes up the causal question about policy
reform mechanisms, examining the institutional and political dynamics in which the
reforms have taken place. Thus, I will examine the interplay among global organizations,
regional institutions, national policymakers, the public, and environmental organizations
in order to elaborate the disparate dynamics of the reform processes. The last part of this
dissertation focuses on the effect of TEANs on policy diffusion and reform processes in
European and Asian countries.
The introduction proceeds as follows. First, I enumerate the theoretical, empirical,
and thematic contributions of this dissertation. Second, I locate my analysis within the
theoretical frameworks of policy transfer research, globalization, regionalization, new
institutionalism, political culture, and transnational advocacy networks. In so doing, I
preview the theoretical arguments that lead to my hypotheses, which will be tested in the
following chapters. Third, I explain the methodologies used to investigate the causal
mechanisms and policy adoption processes of the recycling reforms. Fourth, and lastly, I
briefly outline the structure and major arguments of this dissertation.
9
1.1. What Brings About the Policy Reforms and How?
International relations and comparative politics literature have noted the
increasingly influential role of global and regional institutions in national policy changes,
along with the central role of the governments. At the same time, the unprecedented
effect of TEANs on national policies has been recognized by the literature. Different
from traditional intergovernmental policy networks, TEANs are composed of
nongovernmental organizations, activists, corporate groups, and committed government
officials that have sought to influence national policy frameworks at multiple levels of
governance with more diversified, resourceful strategies. Nonetheless, their critical role
in policy adoptions has not been fully attended to from a comparative perspective, which
analyzes their interlocking effect with global and regional institutions of countries in
geographically different regions. Furthermore, the implication of TEANs under different
regional institutions on diverse, coercive, diffusive, and mimetic policy adoption
processes has not been fully studied.
Therefore, my dissertation seeks to investigate the extent to which the reform-
minded policymakers and TEANs have interacted with global and regional institutions
and their citizens to enable or constrain national environmental policy reforms. Notably,
this research does not join the either/or, state-civil society or state-supranational
institution debates on their relative political importance in policymaking. Rather, this
study will be devoted to examine their interlocking effect on different forms of coercive,
diffusive, and mimetic policy transfer processes, especially in the areas of waste
management and recycling.
10
Theoretically, I develop a set of 15 propositions that specify external, domestic,
and transnational mechanisms through which the reforms have been promoted; to what
extent have globalization, regionalization, transnational environmental advocacy
networks, national policy legacy, and public attitudes shaped and reshaped recycling
policy reforms in France and Korea? In Chapter Three, for example, I show how the EU
has constituted the “coercive” policy adoption mechanisms in its impact on national
policymaking in France; how reform-minded policymakers pursued “mimetic” policy
adoption for highly controversial, far-reaching recycling reforms in Korea; and the ways
in which TEANs have promoted “diffusive” policy adoptions in both countries,
especially since the late 1990s. An interdisciplinary analysis of the causal mechanisms
for reforms and policy adoption processes will broaden the scope of comparative politics
and policy transfer research.
Empirically, I use both quantitative and qualitative methods (the combination of
surveys and in-depth interviews) in order to capture the crucial role of global, regional,
transnational, and national environmental groups and institutions in forging government
policy orientations. Based on process tracing and discourse analysis, the causal
mechanisms of policy reforms will be illuminated in the chain of policy adoption
processes. The Environmental Organization (EO) survey, drawing on responses from 23
national and transnational environmental organizations in France and Korea, further
elucidates the professional and transnational resources of environmental organizations
inducing progressive reform.
Thematically, my comparative case analysis tests the extent to which national
governments have interacted with the increasingly influential nontraditional TEANs on
11
policy reform within common global and different regional settings. Thus, a major
contribution of the research will be found in its new exploratory comparative analysis of
the environmental policy reform processes in different geographic regions. Furthermore,
the research’s attention to the role of TEANs will enrich the premises of previous policy
transfer research, incorporating transnational and even nongovernmental dynamics of
policy innovation beyond the usual major focus on national reform initiatives.
1.2. Theoretical Frameworks: Effect of Global, Regional, and National Factors on
Recycling Policy Adoption Processes in France and Korea
This dissertation research builds on different theories of policy transfer research,
comparative politics, and international relations. The theoretical analysis is motivated by
policy transfer research that focuses on policy adoption processes, and yet moves further
to explain the multilevel, interlocking influences of global, regional, and national
institutions and actors on the policy reforms. In order to investigate the multidimensional
causal mechanisms for divergent environmental policy adoption processes, therefore, this
research develops 15 testable hypotheses, drawing on five midranged theoretical
frameworks, including globalization, regionalization, new institutionalism, political
culture, and transnational advocacy networks.
1.2.1. Policy Adoption and Transfer Research
Broadly understood as the socially mediated spread of certain practices and
innovations, policy adoption and transfer have been defined as the processes and
channels through which political actors adopt new policy goals, ideas, practices, and
12
administrative arrangements to different political settings.
6
Previous research on policy
transfer and adoption has enhanced our understanding of the sources and implications of
well-functioning policy innovations that are often taken from preceding models of other
institutions (Hall 1989; Bennett 1991; Dimaggio & Powell 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh
1996, 2000; Rogers 1998; Stone 2004; Elkins & Simmons 2005; Busch, Jorgens & Tews
2005; Way 2005; Dolowitz 2006).
In general, the theories explain both voluntary and coercive policy transfer and
adoption mechanisms. A more dominant, sociological approach to policy diffusion pays
greater attention to cultural norms and sociopolitical networks, which increase the
chances of transmitting or emulating novel policy norms (Dimaggio & Powell 1991;
Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Rogers 1998; Elkins & Simmons 2005). For example,
voluntary policy adoption tends to be stimulated by cultural similarity, geographical
proximity, and the central or prominent position of an institution or an actor that easily
communicates with the others. Meanwhile, institutional approach to policy transfer
addresses political dynamics in which the autonomy of nation-states meets pressure from
international regimes or professional, elite networks (Hall 1989; Bennett 1991; Dolowitz
& Marsh 1996, 2000; Stone 2004; Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005; Way 2005; Dolowitz
2006).
Meanwhile, in explaining noncoercive policy transfer mechanisms, past research
has been inclined to focus on either “diffusive” or “emulative” processes; or, studies of
policy “diffusion” tend to treat “emulation” dynamics as part of diffusive policy transfer
6
The definitions most often cited include: “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain
channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 1995); a phenomena in which “prior adoption of a
trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 1991).;
“uncoordinated interdependence among states” (Elkins & Simmons 2005).
13
processes (Bush & Jorgens 2005; Elkins & Simmons 2005). As will be examined further
in Chapter Four, however, the two voluntary adoption mechanisms are conceptually
distinctive, independent analytical categories for investigating diverse causal mechanisms
of policy adoption. Indeed, diffusive mechanisms involve more “interdependent and yet
uncoordinated” processes in which voluntary (uncoordinated) adoption efforts occur
through explicit communicative (interdependent) connections between policy exporters
and importers. On the other hand, emulative mimesis takes place due to the “more
conscious learning” effort of the adopters, even without direct connections to the policy
origin (Dimaggio & Powell 1991; Bennett 1991). Nonetheless, even when “policy
diffusion” is conceptualized as an overarching framework to cover both emulative and
diffusive mechanisms (Elkins & Simmons 2005), the conceptualization relies heavily on
“bounded rationality” as the primary motive for the adoption efforts, and thus does not
differentiate it from more consciously vigorous and rational lesson-drawing efforts (Rose
1993; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).
Therefore, my research emphasizes the equally distinctive conceptual values of
diffusion and emulation. The conceptual distinction is especially important in explicating
divergent policy adoption mechanisms within mimetic, emulative efforts, which search
for a policy model even from geographically and culturally dissimilar regions. To
examine the major impetuses for divergent processes of policy adoption, innovation, and
reform in diverse political settings, my analysis emphasizes the discernable
characteristics of diffusive and mimetic policy transfer mechanisms.
14
1.2.2. Globalization and Policy Convergence
Theories of globalization posit increasingly convergent, crossnational policy
adoptions. Increasingly frequent interactions among different political economies have
fostered a shared recognition of common socioeconomic problems. Thus,
intergovernmental efforts have been organized to promote global policy frameworks.
Diverse communication linkages among decision makers also have yielded greater
resemblances in economic policies and social service sectors across countries (Held &
McGrew, 1999; Rogers 1998; Huber & Stephens 2001; Imig & Tarrow 2001).
According to international regime theory, the domestic implementation of strikingly
parallel policies is the outcome of international agreements, both legal and “soft-law”
harmonization (Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005; Slaughter 2004).
Therefore, global institutions have bred more homogeneous national policies in
diverse political institutions, through both coercive and diffusive policy transfer
mechanisms. Their collective norms and measures have been exerted through diffusion,
persuasion, leverage, payoffs, and coercion (Hall 1989; Rogers 1998; Elkins & Simmons
2005; Dolowitz 2006; Hochstertler & Keck 2007).
Also in environmental policy arena, increasing concerns about aggravating global
environmental problems have fostered common crossnational policy frameworks. Even
without binding obligations, the 1992 UN declarations and resolutions on sustainable
environmental strategy have led to voluntary government compliances. Diverse
measures to induce meaningful environmental protection are promoted through
international institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Environment Directorate
15
(OECDED), and the World Bank (Bush, Jorgens & Tews 2005). For example, The
World Bank’s Operational Directive 4.02 from 1992 formally required a National
Environmental Action Plan as a condition for receiving World Bank loans, and
effectuated the mandatory measure for borrower countries. Many central and eastern
European countries, including Albania (1993), Moldova (1995), Macedonia (1997), and
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2003), adopted the conditionality (Bush, Jorgens & Tews 2005,
156). Thus, the effect of international environmental organizations on national
policymaking and performance has been widely explicated (Bernauer 1995; Martin &
Simmons 1998; Caldwell 1990; Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992; Hass, Keohane & Levy 1993;
Checkel 2005; Ward 2006). Past research also assumes that international institutions
have an intervening effect in fostering transnational linkages among environmental
organizations (Hoschstetler & Keck, 2007).
Nonetheless, despite common interests among countries in improving their
environmental problems, researchers have observed that policy implementations at
national levels still differ considerably across countries. For example, whereas the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change stimulated the formation of national CO2
reduction targets, the international spread of energy tax policies
7
has been sluggish.
Therefore, this research will test whether international environmental institutions
have induced convergent, high level of recycling reform discourses and initiatives in
France (H1.1.1) and Korea (H1.1.2). Furthermore, I will examine whether the
supranational intervening effect of TEANs has taken place in France (H1.2.1) and Korea
7
Energy taxes are market-based environmental policy instruments that tax energy consumption or production to reduce
COs emissions from the use of fossil fuel in energy production and thereby mitigate climate change. In 2003, a
European minimum energy tax was adopted (Directive 2003/96/EC), but “its level remains far below the initial
ambitions of the European Commissions and existing tax rates in the more progressive EU member states” (Bush,
Jorgens & Tews 2005, 165).
16
(H1.2.2), broadening the likelihood of global policy diffusion in the national policy
paradigms.
1.2.3. Regionalization as Effective Mechanisms of Policy Adoption
Theories of regionalization dissect the structural conditions that globalization
theorists assume; regional, rather than global, institutions create high levels of policy
transfer across member countries. Due to geographically and culturally similar milieus,
regional contexts create deep-seated differences in policy ideas and regulatory practices
in crossregional spheres (Lutz 1987; Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005; Sagan & Halkier
2005; Paraskevopoulos, Getimis & Rees eds. 2006; Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007).
Regional institutions gain political legitimacy in their integrative policies in more and
more diverse policy sectors (i.e., “spillover” effect) and in functionally specialized,
independent intergovernmental policymaking (i.e., “spill-around” effect) (Hass 1968;
Schmitter 1970, 2002). Thus, regional institutions function as structural determinants for
higher levels of policy diffusion (Lutz 1987).
In particular, highly integrated European regionalization and EU directives have
had a strong impact on environmental policy diffusion dynamics in member countries, in
such areas as eco-labels, energy taxes, and legal provisions on free access to
environmental information (EC Directive 90/313/EEC) (Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005;
Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007).
8
The European Environmental Agency (EEA)’s policies
8
The highly integrated regional policy networks of the EU have engendered a distinctive form of extensive regional
market integration and a collaborative mechanism to devise more effective environmental policies in regional countries
(Bomberg 1998; Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999; Bush, Jorgens & Tews 2005). For example, Bush, Jorgens, & Tews
illustrate significant regional policy diffusion cases between geographically linked countries, including the 1992 Fifth
Environmental Action Program on strategic environmental planning, the European Flower eco-labels, higher level of
EU member countries’ adoption of energy taxes, and EC Directive 90/313/EEC on free access to environmental
17
and the EU Parliament’s directives concerning environments (e.g., waste management
and recycling Directives 75/422) present comprehensive environmental measures. The
EEA has facilitated diverse environmental policy networks and tried to spread best
practices through European Environmental Information and Observation Network
(EIONET). Furthermore, recent studies assert that the EU has played a leadership role in
global environmental governance, especially a leading role in pushing for the
establishment, ratification, and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Vogler & Stephan 2007; Schreurs
& Tiberghien 2007).
In contrast, policymaking in Korea has not been subject to any significant
regional policy imperatives. Without pressure from binding regional institutions such as
the EU, environmental policies in Korea have been only intermittently attended to by
regional institutions such as the UN North-East Asian Subregional Programme for
Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC), the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), UNEP Regional Resource Center for
Asia and Pacific, Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC),
and Annual Meeting of Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-East
information (FAI). They articulate that legal provisions on FAI in Scandinavian countries (Sweden in 1949, Finland in
1951, Norway and Denmark in 1970) can be attributed to deep historical and cultural connections among the countries.
The FAI provisions facilitated democratic environmental policy processes through the normative idea of transparency
and accountability in public policymaking. Moreover, some of the central and eastern European countries were
motivated to adopt the FAI provisions by the prospect of EU membership though they have little capacity to provide
the information and have weak domestic NGOs (Bush, Jorgens & Tews 2005, 163-164). EU countries have also
adopted Directive 2003/96/EC for European minimum energy tax, which has promoted more reformist governments in
the region. Recent European Union studies note that national policymaking is compliant to different degrees to the
pressure of external forces for adaptation and change (Cowles, Caporaso, Riss, & Riss-Kappen 2001; Bache & Fliders
2005). However, the studies largely assume that the EEA has been a critical apparatus through which governmental
and nongovernmental efforts cooperate with one another to promote environmental strategies.
18
Asia (SOM) since the early 1990s.
9
Though they have not engendered any binding
decisions of significant importance, the regional institutions have served to facilitate
crossnational information exchange on broad policy frameworks and best examples.
Therefore, looking at recent environmental reform processes in the two regional
cases will help us understand whether regional influences have made significant
differences in policy reform and adoption in France and Korea. In particular, the EEA’s
highly integrated policy networks and the advanced industrial status of Europe are likely
to bring about more responsive environmental policy reforms in France. With this
reasoning, I hypothesize that regional influences create divergent policy processes in
European and Asian regions; as such, the “coercive” effects of regionalization on
environmental policy reform are likely to be higher in France than in Korea due to the
integrated European policy directives and their policy networks (H2.1). It is also testable
whether the EU’s policy directives make a significant impact on the scope of reforms in
France and thus entail higher levels of recycling reforms in France than in Korea (H2.2).
1.2.4. New Institutionalism and National Policy Legacy
Why is a set of reforms supported and advanced in some political territories but
not in others? To answer this question, new institutionalism maintains that it is important
to comprehend specific institutional and sociopolitical contexts in which diverse actors
are more enabled to promote particular policy changes. According to this approach, a
distinctive combination of national geographical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural
9
ASEAN Plus Three Economic Forum makes regional, intergovernmental efforts for economic programs that often
entail environmental agendas.
19
factors produces disparate patterns of policy processes across countries (Steinmo, Thelen,
& Longstreth 1992; Lichbach & Zuckerman 1997; Katznelson 1997; John & Cole 2000;
Levy 1999; Hall & Soskice 2001; Jouve & Lefèvre 2002; Sellers 1998, 2002ab, 2005;
Dolowitz, 2006; Tiberghien 2007; Mahoney & Thelen 2010).
In particular, policy adoption prospects tend to be significantly constrained by
past policy practices (Hall 1989; Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Thelen & Steinmo 1992;
Skocpol 1985; Evans 1997; Vogel 2001). A state’s approach to remedying
socioeconomic problems often occurs in the shadow of existing administrative and policy
instruments. Earlier policy decisions often reinforce newer policy adaptation to go in a
particular direction through “positive feedback loops” (Skocpol 1985). Thus, policy
legacies furnish decisive frameworks in which conceivable policy alternatives are drawn
from “a restricted array of plausible scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed
and how the future ought to look” (Cruz 2000, 277).” As a result, certain historical paths
and socioeconomic infrastructures shape national capacities and political contexts
(Sellers 1998), which thus influence particular policy strategies and reform programs.
Moreover, policymakers are more likely to pursue incremental changes from past
policy practice, thus rooting policy development in “historical continuity” punctuated
only by “critical junctures” from the past (Lichbach & Zuckerman 1997).
10
“Cognitive
10
National histories and institutional structures, however, are not the sole precursor for distinctive policy processes.
Types of policy sectors further entail differing scopes of policy innovations and diffusions. Along with the
transnational advocacy literatures, social movement theorists assert that particular policy sectors precipitate more
intensive and effective network activism (Aminzade, 2001; Imig & Tarrow, 2001; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001;
Tarrow, 1998). Policies regarding environmental protection and economic development, for example, gain different
societal interests or constituencies in their support for legislative changes. Internal decision making procedures and
implementation capacities differ across sectoral institutions, which make particular policy reforms more feasible than
others. Even within the same national institutional settings, therefore, degrees of reform vary depending on the policy
types. Active reformers also differ across policy sectors, partly because the pubic and policymakers often attend to
policy changes related to their own interests. Hence, cross-sectoral variations in policy processes will be worth
examining, given the different policy network formations across diverse reform agendas.
20
disequilibrium” also explains disruptive motive of past “self-sustaining system of shared
beliefs” on the legitimacy of past institutions (Aoki, 2001). Only when networks of
political entrepreneurs successfully legitimize alternative, innovative plans do distinctive
combinations of national reform package start to be institutionalized (Weir & Skocpol
1985, 125). Thus, major impetuses for policy adoptions should be understood in terms of
contextually different political settings, including interactive linkages among particular
domestic institutions, networks of policy entrepreneurs, public support, and international
environmental institutions.
Drawing upon new institutionalism, therefore, I will examine whether
policymaking legacies have shaped their environmental reform processes; I hypothesize
that a negotiation-oriented policymaking legacy in France within the multilevel
governance—nonconfrontational policymakings of the MEC, acute local heterogeneity,
and antidirigistic attitudes of the public—is likely to prevail in the environmental reform
processes, resulting in incremental and gradual reforms (H3.1.1). In contrast, national
leadership and bureaucrat-centered policymaking legacies in Korea are considered to
shape swift and extensive environmental reform processes (H3.1.2).
Furthermore, France has a record of long-standing corporate environmentalism
(Keeler 1985; Levy & Egan 1998; Lyon & Maxwell 2004; Szarka 2005; Avdagic &
Crouch 2006), with corporate groups and their transnational associations understood as
having significant agency in successfully legitimizing reform prospects in the country
(H3.2.1). Since civic-oriented groups have been increasingly active in Korea since the
mid-1990s, I will also test whether civic environmental groups have been highly capable
of constructively supporting the recycling reforms (H3.2.2).
21
1.2.5. Public Attitudes and Reform Prospects
Political culture, shaped by state structures, political dynamics, and historical
contexts, affects “public shared meaning” and the scope of their political action (Skocpol
1985; Evans 1985; Weir & Skocpol 1985; Putnam 1993). Culturalists particularly
emphasize that distinctive cultural norms and ideas may facilitate or impede public
participation in policy processes, which may lead to effective or unsuccessful policy
adoption (Almond & Verba 1963; Tilly 1995; Inglehart 1988, 1997; Ross in Lichbach
and Zuckerman 1997). What makes policy reform socially legitimate and workable is not
only policy entrepreneurs’ ability to justify the normative validity of reform agenda but
also public support for the policy norms and implementations (Tiberghien 2007, 23). It is
especially the case when reform costs borne by on citizens are easily discernable, as is in
the case of mandatory recycling systems (e.g., paying extra cost for standardized fee-
based waste bags for separate waste collection system and disposable cups/food
containers). Thus, a strong participatory political culture should be an increasingly
important determinant of effective environmental policy processes. Public support of and
attitudes about reform result in different outcomes of national receptiveness toward
reform agendas (Imig & Tarrow 2001).
In the democratized environmental governance of France and Korea—based on
administrative decentralization, localization/local autonomy and established civil
society—public willingness to support particular policy has proven to be key factor in
effective policy innovation and implementation. Therefore, in order to understand the
civic factors that facilitate or limit the scope of the policy implementation, one must
examine the extent to which a country’s political culture affects the level of public
22
participation in the reforms (H4.1). With this reasoning, this study will test if anti-
dirigism and localism in France has bred a low level of public participation in reform,
especially in the policy implementation processes (H4.2.1). Meanwhile, based on past
research, I will investigate whether traditional political culture centering on collectivism
and nationalism in Korea have led to higher level of public participation in the reforms in
Korea (H4.2.2).
1.2.6. Transnational Advocacy Networks and Policy Diffusion
Theories of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) often illustrate informal yet
highly mobilized crossnational linkages of policy learning and adoption. In particular,
the theories highlight the “norm-entrepreneurial” role of advocacy alliances at multiple
levels of governance beyond domestic policy processes (Keck & Sikkink 1998;
Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Rogers 1998; Imig & Tarrow 2001; Orenstein, Bloom &
Lindstrom 2008; Hochstetler & Keck 2008). These theories articulate that networks of
advocates mediate the scope of national and transnational policy options, which most
literature on policy diffusion and convergence has not fully reflected. Through the
networks, even countries with dissimilar institutional structures are interconnected at
multiple levels and influenced by unprecedented crossnational linkages. The
“boomerang effect,” for example, delineates how advocacy coalitions seek to align
themselves with foreign governments and international organizations to compel changes
in national policies (Keck & Sikkink 1998).
The networks are often composed of governmental and nongovernmental
channels, including reform-minded policymakers, professional experts, firms, civic
23
organizations, and ordinary citizens. Their devoted alliances, coming from diverse
regions and professions, make the most of available resources to publicize and legitimize
their agenda through the media, the Internet, conferences, and different levels of IGOs
and NGOs. While inciting policy rhetoric and building public consensus across countries,
these networks often serve to inform governments of workable reform programs. For
example, nonconventional norms, like environmental concerns and welfare and human
rights, have gained considerable international attention through issue networks that have
often held agendas in contradiction to traditional government policies, such as industrial
development (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Thus, transnational
networks act as crucial nodes that not only impart successful policy examples but also
urge the institutionalization of nontraditional policies across different regions of the
world..
After the 1989 Bagel Convention in Switzerland and the 1992 Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro, governments have been advised to develop a wide range of regulatory
policies that promote user charges, higher taxes on waste disposal, and awareness-raising
campaigns at national level. To further encourage international agreements as important
national policy agendas, TEANs have promoted a range of lobbies and campaigns for
waste prevention and recycling reforms. TEANs, like the Zero Waste Movement, have
been one of the most vigorous forces, criticizing incineration and urging substantial
changes to waste management policies. Environmental organizations, including the
Cooperative Research Network (CRN) and the Global Alliance for Incinerator
Alternatives (GAIA), have also encouraged governments to adopt more systemic
24
environmental programs, presenting successful cases from Toronto, Halifax (Canada),
Colchester (U.K.), and others.
Therefore, my research seeks to understand the extent to which TEANs have
facilitated recycling policy adoptions and reforms in the comparative contexts of France
and Korea. Have they induced convergent policy reform processes in geographically
different regions of the world? First, drawing on the theories reviewed supra (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler and Keck 2007), I ask whether global institutions and EU
environmental directives have fostered a higher level of transnationalization among
environmental organizations in France than in Korea (H5.1). Also, I will test whether the
higher level of TEANs in France is likely to induce a commensurately higher level of
policy diffusion in France than in Korea (H5.2). Similarly, I question whether TEANs
have been a major avenue for policy diffusions in both countries (Bennett 1991; Dolowitz
and Marsh 2000; Bush and Jorgens 2005), having gained multiple access points to policy
processes at both transnational and national levels (H5.3). Drawing on professional and
resourceful networks in increasingly multilayered environmental governance, I will also
examine the ways in which the TEANs act as enabling networks with low-profile,
consensual strategies, than contentious, high-profile strategies (Imig & Tarrow 2001;
Hochstetler & Keck 2007) (H5.4).
1. 3. Methodology
The comparative analysis of the recycling reform processes is primarily based on
process-tracing case studies and survey analysis. Process-tracing is a method to analyze
“a case into a sequence of events and showing how those events are plausibly linked” in
25
terms of actors’ intent, intervening variables, and their interaction within the contextual
circumstances (Goldstone 2006, 47; Mahoney 2006, 363-365). Thus, to explain the
underlying sources for divergent reform and policy adoption processes in France and
Korea, process-tracing is used as an indispensible method to identify a chain of events
and to analyze the causal mechanisms.
A process-tracing method is complemented by discourse analysis of interviews
and documents, including interviews with policymakers and environmental organizations,
government reports of reform processes, policy reports presented by governmental
research institutes and environmental organizations, and the media reports.
11
Therefore,
critical events that reinforce or reshape the policy agendas and frameworks will be
uncovered to explicate the causal mechanisms.
As part of an intensive empirical investigation into complex causal mechanisms,
the cases are analyzed to detect both more well-known historical patterns and
unanticipated deviant causal factors for reform processes (George & Bennett 2004, 75-77,
214; Ragin 2000, 120-123). Thus, as a heuristic case study that examines outlier cases,
process-tracing serves to capture alternative causal paths to policy adoptions; in many
cases, these paths have not as yet been identified. Accordingly, the case studies will
contribute to testing hypotheses built on the theories reviewed supra and to developing
11
For example, for the French case, the government positions for the reforms have been traced based on its policy
publication, “2009 Assises Nationale des Déchets (AND),” 2008 Un Plan Ambitieux et Partenarial, Doté de Moyens
Importants, and numerous records published by the ADEME, as well as interviews with Director Alain Geldron, the
Head of Extended Producer Responsibility & Recycling Department in the ADEME and with Marc Cheverry, Head of
Advanced Waste Management Department, ADEME. Interviews with major environmental groups, such as SEPANSO,
FEDEREC, and Eco-Emballages, also helped me classify critical events and contexts to analyze the causal mechanisms.
For the Korean case, interviews were conducted with the very initiator for the mandatory waste management reforms,
Jae-Kon Shim, the Director of Resource Recycling Division (RRD) of the Ministry of Environment (MEN), Goh Kun,
former Prime Minister and Mayor of Seoul, important staff of the research team, including Professor Jun-Woo Park,
Professor Hoi-Seung Chung of Korea Environment Institute, and other policymakers, Deok-Soo Dong, current Director
of the RRD. Prominent environmental organizations for the reforms were also interviewed, including Korea Zero
Waste Movement Network (KZWMN) and Korea Institute For Sustainable Society.
26
the theories through analytical refinement and elaboration (George & Bennett 2004, 214;
Rueschemeyer 2003, 332-333).
Notably, process-tracing evidence may permit only provisional conclusions, due
to possibly unavailable data and evidence related to the causal mechanisms (George &
Bennett 2004, 218-224). Nonetheless, as an important analytic step to developing
contingent generalizations, process-tracing will be a critical method to detecting the
underlying sources for the reform processes.
The other major method used in this research is the Environmental Organizations
(EO) survey analysis. Based on the 1998 Global Environmental Survey conducted by the
Center for the Study of Democracy at University of California, Irvine (UCI), 28
questionnaires on environmental organizations’ activities and their networking have been
constructed. Among 35 environmental organizations selected for the structured survey,
23 environmental groups in each country, France and Korea, responded to the mail, email,
and faxed survey questionnaires. As a significant means of measuring their different
patterns of activities and networking based on the 28 structured questionnaires (Appendix
C), the quantitative approach assesses the effect of globalization, regionalization, and
government policy initiatives on TEANs’ activities. Follow-up interviews with major
environmental organizations as well as key policymakers will be used to confirm or
reconsider the findings.
1.4. Overview of the Dissertation
Chapter Two begins with an in-depth overview of distinctive environmentalisms
and environmental movements within democratization phases in France and Korea.
Along with the second half of Chapter Two, which traces the development of the
27
Ministry of Environment and environmental regulatory frameworks, an historical
overview serves to illuminate the underlying philosophical, political, and institutional
foundations for waste management and recycling reforms that have taken place since the
early 1990s in these countries.
Chapters Three and Four are empirical analyses of the causal mechanisms of
policy reform processes in the countries. Chapter Three will examine the extent to which
globalization, regionalization, national policy legacies, and public attitudes have shaped
and reshaped divergent policy reform processes in France and Korea. As reviewed supra,
11 hypotheses were formulated and tested to investigate the external and domestic effects
on policy reform mechanisms.
Using process tracing, discourse analysis and OECD data, the comparative case
studies demonstrate that coercive mechanisms in France and mimetic innovations in
Korea were the main reform dynamics in the 1990s. EU policy frameworks and
centralized policymakings were the major impetus for reforms in France and Korea,
respectively. Since the 2000s, however, diffusive policy adoption mechanisms have been
highly precipitated by the TEANs in both countries, forging increasingly similar
recycling policy frameworks. For example, the French focus on packing recycling and
Korea’s mandatory waste separation system, with deposit scheme, showed quite
contrasting policy developments in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the industry-targeted
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system has been the central policy tenet in both
countries for packaging standards, End-of-Life Vehicles, and Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (WEEE).
28
In analyzing the distinctive policy reform processes, the cases indicate that the
effect of global and regional institutions has been dissimilar in France and Korea.
Different from conventional assumptions, global effects on crossnational policy
convergence does not hold true. Counterintuitively, global effects have been much
higher in Korea both in legitimizing the national recycling policy reforms and in fostering
the transnational linkage of environmental advocacy groups. Furthermore, although EU
directives have a significantly coercive effect on French environmental policymaking,
they has not necessarily created a higher level of recycling reforms in France vis-à-vis
Korea or highly convergent policy reforms across its member countries. Without such
regional policy imperatives or explicit crossnational policy networks, the policymakers in
Korea have eagerly looked at foreign policy models beyond their Asian regional
boundaries (and from European models), setting up unprecedentedly strict and extensive
waste management and recycling system since the early 1990s.
The second half of Chapter Three is devoted to examining domestic institutional
and political effects on the reform processes. In France, a negotiation-oriented policy
legacy—based on the nonconfrontational policymaking of the Ministry of Ecology
(MEC), acute localism, and antidirigism—has prevailed in recycling policy processes,
resulting in incremental and gradual reforms. In contrast, interviews with reform
initiators reveal that swift and extensive reforms in Korea have been primarily derived
from a bureaucrat- and national leadership-centered policymaking legacy.
At the same time, as in other policy sectors, corporate activism in France and
civic activism in Korea have been based upon major nongovernmental forces for
environmental policy processes. Corporate TEANs have been the critical nongovernment
29
agency facilitating the EPR-based recycling systems and green industry in the European
country. In Korea, civic-oriented groups have been highly effective in supporting the
mandatory municipal waste management system, especially during policy evaluation and
implementation stages. Even for corporate-targeted EPR reforms, pressure from the civic
organizations was critical in shaping public opinion with regard to corporate
responsibilities, compelling the largely pro-growth firms and businesses in Korea to agree
with the regulatory terms.
The last section of Chapter Three highlights the significance of national policy
structures that cultivate political culture as a major means of the policy implementations.
In increasingly multilevel environmental governance, public support is critical, especially
as major implementers of municipal recycling and waste management reforms. However,
as will be reviewed in Chapter Two, established and transitional democracies exhibit
similar public attitudes toward reform policies in diverse survey data, including the
World Value Survey, thus indicating that public environmentalism has not been major
basis of public support for the reforms. Instead, traditional political culture centered on
collectivism and nationalism has led to higher level of public participation in the
mandatory reforms in Korea. The reformist policymakers directly point to the crucial
importance of the political culture, explaining that they deliberately sought to exploit
collectivist culture as a policy instruments for “mandatory” separate waste collection
system at the municipal levels. Two public officials from the French Environment and
Energy Management Agency (ADEME) accentuate precisely the opposite notion: They
have intended not to disturb the political culture of localism and antidirigism in France,
and thus pursued “voluntary” mechanisms of recycling regulations.
30
Chapter Four then tests the effect of TEANs on the policy reform processes,
through the EO survey analysis of 23 environmental groups of France and those of Korea,
as well as through follow-up interviews with major organizations. Through four
additional hypotheses (added to the ones in Chapter Three), the analysis shows both
expected and unanticipated outcomes. Counterintuitively, despite highly integrative EU
policy frameworks in France, the transnationalization of TEANs turns out to be higher in
Korea than in France. More importantly, regional policy imperatives have both enabled
and constrained TEANs in their policy learning efforts; whereas French TEANs tend to
work with their European partners, they have been conditioned by the bounded rationality
and cultural constraints in ways that they work less with non-European TEANs. The
TEANs’ activities are more about policy diffusions within the EU, linking Brussels and
localities or the EU member countries. In Korea, however, emulative efforts of TEANs
have more actively contributed to both crossnational and “crossregional” policy
diffusions.
Meanwhile, more professionalized TEANs in France have exploited low-profile
strategies to affect the industry-oriented, EPR-based recycling reforms. High levels of
corporate environmentalism and definitive EU directives also have not necessitated high-
profile, media-intensive strategies. In contrast, the more civic-oriented types of TEANs
in Korea often utilize high-profile enabling strategies in order to effectuate the mandatory
municipal separate waste collection system, to raise public environmental consciousness,
and to fend off the largely pro-growth corporate interests against the recycling reforms.
Chapter Five concludes with a discussion of the main findings. The comparative
analysis highlights the contextual effect of globalization and regionalization on the
31
environmental policy reform processes of established and transitional democracies.
Different from conventional assumptions, the transitional democracy and its mimetic
policy learning efforts have been more receptive to the global and crossregional policy
transfer mechanisms than has the established democracy. Thus, within the framework of
policy transfer research, I highlight mimetic emulation as an analytically distinctive
conceptual category, along with diffusive and coercive mechanisms. Even without
geographical or cultural familiarity with the policy models, more consciously driven
mimetic emulation has been a significant basis of policymakers’ and TEAN’s initiatives
for extensive reform in Korea. Thus, they have been actively engaged in both
crossnational and “crossregional” policy emulation and diffusion processes.
Counterintuitively, however, EU regional policy imperatives have both enabled
and constrained policy learning efforts of France; whereas policymakers and TEANs tend
to work more with their European partners based on higher level of information
exchanges within the EU and their geographical/cultural similarities, they have been
conditioned by the bounded rationality and cultural constraints in ways that they work
less with non-European TEANs. Furthermore, transnationalization of the French
environmental organizations turns out to be lower than that in Korea. The French
TEANs’ transnationalization has decreased since the mid-1990s whereas their
regionalization has been strengthened than that of Korea.
Finally, I assess the mutually constituting nature of political culture and
institutional/regulatory structures. As generally argued, political culture shapes the
political capacities and attitudes of the public and policymakers, which affect the scope of
national policy reforms. Conversely, it is important to note that New Institutionalists
32
stress state activities and policy frameworks, which in turn cultivate political culture that
may serve for further reforms.
33
CHAPTER 2. ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES, MOVEMENTS, AND
INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE AND KOREA
This chapter will investigate the development of the environmental philosophies,
environmental movements, and institutional/regulatory frameworks of environmental
policies in France and Korea that have formed the historical, philosophical, and
institutional background for their divergent recycling and waste management policy
reform efforts.
Legitimate bases for environmental policy reform have often been drawn from a
range of traditional ecological mindsets and modern environmental philosophies
regarding the nature-human relationship.
12
Public attitudes toward the environment and
their cultural construction of its meaning have also been significant sources of
policymaking. Beyond their philosophical and cultural effects, institutional
infrastructures serve as an important basis for the national history of environmental
policy development. In particular, policymakers often utilize political power and the
administrative discretion of the Ministry of Environment within the government as a
critical policy instrument for reform. Institutional and political structures also shape
environmental regulatory frameworks, which in turn constitute the future scope of
progressive policy implementation.
12
With regard to nature-human relationships, a human-centered philosophy highlights that nature is valuable because
of its instrumental value for humans. The anthropological view contends that humans need to extend their moral
responsibility to protect the rights of the natural environment due to its value-use and utility for humans.
Preservationist claims for a human stewardship of nature are often based on religious or cultural rights to be engaged in
the natural environment (Johnston 1997, Gillespie 1997); the rights of future generations to inherit a fair share of a
healthy natural world (Weiss 1989; Baxter 2005; Ksentini 1994); and the aesthetic and recreational value of the natural
environment. In contrast, bio-centric and eco-centric theorists voice criticism of the human-centered assumptions.
They assert the intrinsic value of non-human life-forms and even inanimate entities in nature. The “integrity, stability
and beauty of a biotic community” and every natural being has intrinsic value in and of itself and should be protected
from any destruction (Leopold in Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott 2002, Singer in Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott 2002,
Stone 1974). While more compromising approaches to environmental and cultural rights have been suggested
(Gillespie 1997, Renteln 2004), we observe distinctively dominant perspectives on nature-human relationship in
different societies.
34
France and Korea have distinctively different legacies of thought regarding the
environment, as well as different philosophical foundations on which their policy reform
has been legitimized and promoted. Thinkers in France have espoused multiple mutable,
and reciprocal relationships between nature and humans, generating more diversity-
oriented, multilevel policymaking processes with regard to the environment.
Enlightenment and modernity legitimized anthropocentric domination and the
exploitation of the nature, which was long thought to be infinite in its resources.
However, skeptical humanism in French thought raised a critique of human rationality
and the human ability to utilize nature objectively. A philosophical emphasis on
contestation (fundamental questioning) has called for a de-centered, critical assessment
of diverse ecological concerns in various contexts, which has led to gradual, consensus-
centered policy processes in France. In essence, French environmentalism is depicted as
a “humanistic ecology” that underscores a cautious but active human effort to protect the
environment. The tradition has been the basis of high tech-oriented environmental
management and corporate activism for the green industry.
In Korea, a longstanding tradition of eco-centric thinking, including Taejonggyo,
animism, shamanism, Shinto, Fungsu, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, has been
the philosophical foundation for extensive environmental policy initiatives and reform.
Moreover, the critical role of communal leadership in traditional ecological rituals has
been the cultural basis of public expectations of an active role by the government in
environmental management. At the same time, drawn form the old teachings on human-
nature organism and conservationist moderation for spiritual emancipation, policymakers
35
and activists have exploited the concept of communal responsibility for nature protection
in order to engage the public in a range of environmental efforts.
Along with historical, philosophical, and cultural developments, political,
institutional, and regulatory structures have shaped the prospect of environmental policy
reform. In both countries, severe environmental problems and industrial accidents began
to occur after periods of intense industrialization and modernization. Since the 1960s,
environmental movements were accompanied by democratization movements, opening
up diverse channels of public participation in the policymaking process. In France, the
predominance of a postwar progrowth position and divided environmental movements
resulted in high tech-oriented, state-led effective environmental management. The
circumstances also yielded the development of a largely growth-centered, relatively
strong Ministry of Ecology. The strong political power and intertwined interministerial
function of the Ministry of Ecology enabled more cooperative, noncontentious— and yet
gradual—policy reform. For example, with a vice-ministerial position and a structurally
cooperative arrangement with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Infrastructure, the
Ministry of Ecology gained the more independent political capacity to work on a diverse
range of socioeconomic and environmental agendas, including energy, technology,
spatial planning, and sustainable development.
Korea’s relatively short history of industrialization and democracy engendered a
broad spectrum of equally strong, progrowth and ecocentric environmental movements. It
also resulted in state-centered approaches to environmental problem solving and the
relatively weak institutional development of the Ministry of Environment within the
government. The development of the Ministry of Environment under the vice-minister in
36
Korea has resulted in a relatively newer and weaker department than the French
counterpart in terms of its political power within the government and as compared to
other ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Construction.
Thus, the Ministry has had difficulty in its reform efforts, facing grave opposition from
other progrowth ministries.
At the same time, as opposed to the integrated law system of the Ministry of
Ecology (MEC) in France, the multiple, separate legal system of the Ministry of
Environment (MEN) has enabled more radical, swift regulatory policy changes in Korea.
The multiple legal system has led to complicated, often contradictory and over-regulating
policies around industrial and municipal recycling. Nonetheless, reformers have made
the most of the flexible and easily enforceable character of the regulatory frameworks as
significant policy instruments for vigorous recycling and waste management programs in
Korea.
2.1.Traditional Environmental Philosophies and Modern Perspectives in France and
Korea
2.1.1. Environmental Philosophies and their Legacies on Policy Perspectives in
Korea
Traditional environmental philosophies in Korea demonstrate (a) strongly eco-
centric views on the nature-human relationship, (b) the crucial role of communal or
religious leadership in managing major environmental issues, and (c) communal and
individual responsibilities for protecting the nature. In their religious and cultural
traditions, humans show admiration for their natural environment and express the desire
37
to harmoniously coexist with nature. The deification of nature is highlighted in the major
tenets of ancient religious beliefs, such as Taejonggyo, animism, shamanism, Shinto,
Fungsu, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. As Korea’s oldest religion, dated to the
24
th
Century B.C., Taejonggyo explains that the great ancestor and king (Dangun) of the
Korean tribe is the human-like son of the heaven/sky (Whanung) and his wife, Ungnyeo.
Ungnyeo was a human who was transformed from a bear, as a reward for her perseverant
aspiration to be a human. Often cited as the historical basis of national identity and unity,
Taejonggyo represents the people’s respect for mother nature.
In line with the Taejonggyo’s historical emphasis on the sanctity of nature,
animism, shamanism, Shinto, and Fungsu also reveal their ancient belief that humans
should live according to natural forces (Chung & Byun 2008, 79-80; Kim, 1997, 64-66).
Animism is an ancient indigenous belief that everything in nature, including nonlife
forms like rocks, water, and forest, has intrinsic divinity and is interconnected with
ecological organisms. The spiritual effect of animism on people’s everyday lives was
significant especially during the pre-modern period, with the birth of the tribe. Big rocks,
wells, and old trees were represented as sacred symbols of the community and often
worshiped for their divine value. Just as people revered their ancestors, they prayed to
natural creatures for their wishes and wellness. It was believed that without worship and
respect for the nature, people would be punished by heaven by getting a poor harvest, or
becoming ill or impoverished. Conversely, they would benefit from nature if they
properly preserved their natural surroundings. Shinto, another major traditional belief, is
also based on the notion that the earth is the god of humans, as its literal meaning reveals
(“shin” represents God, and “to” refers to earth). Furthermore, Fungsu still dominates
38
Korean architecture and geomancy with the belief that humans and their natural
surroundings and topography are essentially intertwined in that the natural environment
shapes human health and human fate.
In addition to their ecocentric worldviews, Koreans have ancient traditions that
highlight the close relationship between nature and communal leadership, as well as
crucial role of communal or religious leadership in managing major environmental issues.
As is often found in other cultures, shamanism depicts the ancient belief that humans,
both communal leadership and the public, must heed nature’s edicts. Traditionally, a
political leader often served as a religious ruler (Shaman) capable of hearing nature’s
voice. That leader’s major task included bringing security and prosperity to the
community (or natural means for good harvest, such as rain, water, sunlight, etc.) through
his or her legitimate authorities, which was to be approved by heaven (Hogart, 1999; Yu
& Guisso, 1988; Cho, 2003; McBride, 2007). Thus, the critical role of shamans and
political leaders was in mediating between nature and community, and political
leadership was expected to deal actively with the environmental concerns of the
community. During Dangun’s kingdom of Gojoseon (2333 B.C. until 103 B.C.) and
Three Kingdoms period of Korea (from 57 B.C until 688 A.D.), the kings wore “Tree of
Life” crowns that symbolized the power of divine trees in the kingdom (Kim 2001; Yu &
Guisso 2003, 31).
In addition to these ancient faiths, the Asian religious beliefs of Taoism,
Confucianism, and Buddhism have laid the spiritual foundation of nature-centered
ecological perspectives in Korea. More importantly, they posit a human responsibility to
protect nature and to live in accordance with natural laws for spiritual emancipation,
39
without material avarice (Kim 2001; Chung & Byun 2008). Taoism prioritizes the rule of
nature first, which in turn guides ethics (Do), heaven, earth, and humans, in that order.
For Taoism and Confucianism, nature and humans should be regarded as inseparable, and
all life forms are created from nature and then return to nature (Chung & Byun, 2008, 76-
79; Kim, 1997, 64-67). Buddhism also emphasizes the falsity and meaninglessness of the
human exploitation of nature and of other humans (Ibid., 78). As religious teachings
stress the concepts of human-nature organisms and of conservative moderation for
spiritual emancipation, they have offered an important basis for justifying and inciting
communal efforts in nature protection.
However, during the modernization phase beginning in the late 19
th
century,
some western religions, such as Catholicism and Christianity, began to discredit these
ancient religions as having superstitious characteristics. Moreover, since the 1970s their
nature-centered environmental thinking was considered unproductive in the eyes of
Korea’s full-fledged industrialization enthusiasm.
Nevertheless, the “Industrial Deepening policy” and its focus on heavy industry in
the 1970s began to pose grave environmental problems such as air pollution, as it was
aggressively promoted for both post-Korean war national security and economic
development prerogatives (Petitoire 1997, 93). In the 1980s, high-tech export industries
were led by the state and corporate groups, and were based on semiconductors,
computers, aerospace, and telecommunication devices. Corporate capitalism, based on
the high-tech industry and IT developments, was predominant. And yet corporate
capitalism resulted in severe heavy-metal contamination of soil and water, as well as
impacting human health in the form of industrial accidents.
40
Since the late 1980s, the traditional environmental ethos has been revived and has
become influential. Strong eco-centric views, along with modern anthropocentric
approaches to the environment, have been a firm basis for far-reaching government
initiatives since the 1990s and for public support of aggressive environmental regulation.
Critical reflection upon indiscriminate pro-growth outlooks and the anthropocentric use
of nature also emerged as a response to severe pollution problems. Along with the effect
of major international environmental reports, including the 1992 Earth Summit,
traditionally eco-centric worldviews have been the underlying basis for major
environmental policy initiatives by the government as well as by environmental groups in
the areas of waste management, water quality management, and forestation movements.
As reform-minded government officials and activists have promoted extensive
environmental policy development, conservationist initiatives have gained public support,
despite the predominance of corporate, developmentalist interests, and the weak
institutional position of the Ministry of Environment vis-à-vis other ministries. Initial
opposition from socioenvironmentalist concerns for the extra financial burdens on the
lower classes were also overcome through various incentive programs and long-term
prospective benefits.
In addition, a traditional emphasis on communal/religious leadership in ecological
rituals/management has resurfaced in many of the often abrupt and radical state-led
environmental management initiative reform cases. As will be shown in detail in Chapter
3 and 4, not only do technocrat administrators conceive of themselves as designers of
national environmental plans, but environmental organizations also think that the
41
government should lead policy reform so that they are effectively regulated and
implemented at the national level.
13
Furthermore, as traditional ethics underscore the concept of the human-nature
organism and conservative moderation for spiritual emancipation, extensive
environmental reform has mobilized public efforts for various conservation programs and
reform campaigns. As traditional ecological ethics underscore concepts of the human-
nature organism and conservative moderation for spiritual emancipation, policymakers
and activists have easily justified the need for a communal effort to protect nature from
the individual pursuit of economic benefits at the expense of the natural environment.
The effect of the ecological perspectives was significant up until the preindustrialization
period and still often appears in customary practices, social discourses, literature, public
environmental attitudes, and policy perspectives.
2.1.2. Environmental Philosophies and their Legacies on Policy Perspectives in
France
Ecological perspectives in France have underlined (a) the multiple implications of
reciprocal human-nature relationships, (b) new rationality drawn from skeptical
humanism and its decentered, critical assessment of diverse ecological concerns in
different contexts, and (c) confidence in the meticulous application of advanced
technologies in environmental management.
13
As the Appendix A shows, the EO survey demonstrates that environmental organizations in Korea express their
higher expectation and assessment of the role of the government in environmental reforms. Korean organizations say
that government policy decision, public support and participation, and public campaigns through the media are the
factors most conducive to reform. In France, environmental groups posit that government policy decisions,
environmental organizations, and cooperation between domestic and foreign environmental organizations have been
the most important basis for reform.
42
Ecological perspectives have been largely grounded in the multiple implications
of reciprocal human-nature relationships (Bess, 1995, 2003; Whiteside, 2002; Lascoumes
1994). For French ecologists, nature and humanity are “mutually defining,” thus
believing that ecological perspectives of their relationship should not be fixed but rather
continuously re-constituted and re-framed in shifting, historical, epistemological, social,
and political-ethical contexts. Thus, nature-human relationships or the relationships
between “the primal and the artificial […] are better understood as polar opposites on a
broad spectrum, shading off into one another in countless gradations and hybrids—
felicitous intertwinings that enrich the world through their interaction” (Bess 1995, 861).
In the ancient period, human beings were considered relatively weak in the face of
the savage and mystical rhythms of the natural world (Bess 1995, 859). Old Celtic
literature often illustrates that Gauls revered nature, especially water and oak with
mistletoe, the natural power of which was believed to rejuvenate human energy. At the
same time, however, humans were regarded as separate from nature or from the nymphs
of nature, which are incomprehensible, magical, or sometimes deceived by humans.
Celtic tradition is marked by a belief in mystical, majestic, friendly, superstitious, and
even punishing natural characters, as in other European cultures, including Greco-Roman,
German, slave, Baltic, and Scandinavian traditions (Delort & Walter 2001, 55).
However, many philosophies privileged human logic (la pensee logique) over the
natural environment (Ibid., 58-61). French “Cartesianism” began to serve as the
prominent basis for cultural development, with its belief that rationality guides advances
in theology and natural sciences. Judio-Christian religious tradition in France distanced
humans from nature, promoting a belief that humans are guided by God rather than by
43
nature (Ibid., 19, 64-70). Around the 12
th
century, confidence in human progress and
rationality was solidified, and medieval thought identified humans as the center and
master of the material world, utilizing nature for their purposes under the eyes of God
(Ibid. 64).
The Gallic belief in a positive human role in the intertwined human-nature
relationship originated primarily in the traditional Gallic regard for nature as
“humanized” or as a “relatively tamer entity,” at least since the Middle Ages (Bess 1995,
859; 2003, 134; Delort & Walter, 2001, 64). Different from other European or Asian
perspectives of nature as wild and untouched, nature in France has been conceived of as
more of an entity “open to human penetration and influence,” existing for human survival,
aesthetic satisfaction, and mutual enrichment (Bess 1995).
Therefore, nature, as an historical and cultural space, has been shaped and
reshaped by human hands through the ideas of French “Cartesianism,” with rationality
guiding the development of theology, natural sciences, and municipal architecture. This
traditional emphasis on human control over nature is demonstrated in meticulously
arrayed trees/flora and the geometrically sculpted and domesticated greenery of French
gardens, including the Versailles under the Ancient Regime (Whiteside, 2002, 1, 12; Bess,
2003, 64, 133; 1995, 862). Compared to other open spaces in Europe, where nature has
been consciously preserved, French parks were built for people to enjoy the aesthetic and
elegant beauty of nature (Forestier, 1997, 49-50). Social gardens were seen as
demonstrating political and economic power and aristocratic status through embellished,
fortified structures based on mathematical and scientific calculations (Ibid.).
44
Since the late 17
th
century in France, the Enlightenment and its emphasis on
modernity promoted anthropocentric worldviews of civilization and scientific control
over nature. Descartes avowed that humans make themselves “as masters and possessors
of nature,” by subjecting material environment first to rational analysis and then to
technological control (Whiteside 2003, 1). Also influenced by Bacon and Kant, human
mastery of nature was justified by modernity’s faith in progress in science, medicine,
industry, and political institutions. The homocentric exploitation of biodiversity was
exemplified in the development of the life sciences under Louis XIII, when countless
medical plants were imported from around the world to study in the Jardin des Plantes in
Paris (renamed as Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle in the 19
th
century) (Bess, 2003,
64). Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s theory of acclimatation (acclimation) and its popularity
among French aristocratic and business circles serves as another example of
anthropocentric zoology; without considering the possible ecological disruptions to
France and foreign sites, researchers imported and catalogued an immense variety of
animal specimens of foreign origins for human welfare and entertainment (e.g., South
American alpacas into the plains of southern France, kangaroos into the Pyrenees, etc.)
(Ibid., 65-66).
14
During the late 18
th
century, urban planning in Paris was dominated by a chemical
technocracy, members of whom held prominent public offices such as ministers of
education (Halmin, 706-707). While a reevaluation of the aesthetic and intergenerational
value of nature slowly emerged since the creation of Fontainebleau in the 19
th
century,
French emphasis on nature was still anthropocentric in assessing the useful value of
14
Under the auspices of Napoleon, Saint-Hilaire became the first president of the Société Impériale Zoologique
d’Acclimatation in 1854, which was later renamed as Société Nationale de Protection de la Nature.
45
nature, based on human needs (Bess 2003, 67-71; Whiteside, 2002, 14). After the
Second World War, up until the 1970s, a national rush for state-led economic
development and independent security was at its peak, and a preoccupation with
economic growth and the technological development of natural protection were
intensified in France.
At the same time, criticism of these anthropocentric attitudes was also noticeable.
From the 1950s on, Roger Heim’s Destruction et Protection de la Nature, Jean Dorst’s
Avant que Nature Meure (Before Nature Dies), and Jacques-Yves Cousteau’s The Silent
World warned that a disrupted ecological equilibrium would be one of the dehumanizing
effects of advanced technologies and industrialization. Even since the 16
th
century,
Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau,
15
and Voltaire were major figures who revealed their
wariness of the unity of human rationality, the knowability of the external world, and
man’s superiority over nature. Rather, they argued, human reason is often blurred by
subjectivity, irrationality and the myth of the human psyche (Morin & Kern 1993,
Whiteside 1998; Biro 2005). Science is not necessarily conditioned by the objectivity of
science itself, but is often used by politics, military strategy, social dogma, and the
mythology of humans. Scientific development, in fact, inflated the human illusion of
having the capacity to invigorate life and ethical progress.
Skeptical humanism in French ecological philosophies highlights the irreducible
diversity of ecological values and the historically/culturally constructed meanings of
nature-human relationships (Whiteside, 2002, 3, 75-78). Nature should be seen not as an
intending subject with intrinsic value or due respect, but as value-laden, “multi-form and
15
Even during the Enlightenment, Rousseau warned that egoistic human nature and the misguided use of science and
progress lead to human moral detriment, reviving pastoral romanticism.
46
as inextricably confounded with humanity’s projects and self-understandings” (Ibid.).
Therefore, systemic theory in France, originated from the 1965 Objectif 72 (later “Group
of Ten”), maintains that the very concept of nature should be understood as based on a
reciprocity between nature and humans, not on the passivity of nature available for
human appropriation and manipulation (Serres 1990, 64).
16
Human-nature relationships
are “reciprocally problematizing” within specific historical and cultural contexts, and
there is no clear-cut distinction between “civilized” human reason and “savage” nature
(Whiteside, 2002, 75-78). Departing from other biocentric views, systemic theorists
argue that the “intrinsic” value of nature is a human construction, attributed by an
anthropocentric epistemology and by social institutions (Ferry 1995; Whiteside 1998).
Thus, ecological projects are essentially humanistic and regulatory (Faivret, Missika and
Wolton, 1980, 59). According to Whiteside, these skeptical questions about human
rationality have brought about “non-centered” ecological arguments on “divided natures,”
which acknowledge a range of conceptual possibilities on the relationship between
human communities and their environments (Whiteside, 2002, 12-14; Bess, 2000, 9).
Lascoume’s critique of eco-pouvoir (Eco-Power) further articulates the major
characteristics of French environmental policymaking: the technological/scientific
management of the environment by the “uncontested mastery” of experts and technocrats,
as well as by consensus-oriented policy frameworks (1994, 27-31). On the one hand,
Lascoume calls for a new humanistic, Habermasian discursive “trans-coding” of diverse
16
For systemic theorists, the biocentric approach is limited because it is hard to know the value of nature and justify
different moral consideration in cases where humans and nonhumans conflict over the same interests in cultural
practices or self-realization claims. Hence, the more dynamic theory of systemic ecologism in France disapproves of
the nature-human distinction and assumes a reciprocal influence, equilibrium, and partnership between humans and
nature.
47
environmental interests as a “counter-power” to resist the homogenizing consequences of
bureaucratic bio-power (Ibid., 289). At the same time, he calls for democratic
participation in various hybrid forums, ecological hearings, and national committees. For
Lascoume, the public, activists, and dissident experts/scientists should locate a wide
range of environmental interests and meanings in “the environment” through their own
socioeconomic contexts and political concerns (Ibid., 9-14, 287).
A new rationality drawn from skeptical humanism emphasizes a decentered,
critical assessment of diverse ecological concerns in different contexts, entailing gradual
policy changes to encompass critical perspectives as well as more predominant positions.
Bess (2003) describes the incremental changes in French environmental policies as “a
gradual half-revolution, a tectonic shift, far-reaching in some of its implications, yet
surprisingly marginal and limited in other key domains” (2003, 14-15; 1995, 832).
Therefore, a “Cartesian” legacy of new humanism in contemporary French
environmentalism has fostered confidence in the meticulous application of advanced
technologies to environmental management. In particular, corporate interests in the green
industry have been highly developed as a way of balancing the environment and
economic and technological development. French “ecological humanism” accentuates a
positive view of the human capacity to mitigate undesired, human effects on nature
through the technological management of ecological problems (Whiteside 1998; Bess
2003). Amalgamated with France’s skeptical humanist heritage, Gallic
environmentalism, since the late 1960s, has carefully utilized technological innovation
for sound ecological management undertaken in a gradual manner (Bess, 1995, 834, 850-
854; Whiteside, 2002, 229-257). One of the most famous environmentalists, Jacques
48
Cousteau maintained that, “the technology that we use to abuse the planet is the same
technology that can help us to heal it” (Ibid, 853).
17
Drawing on sustainable development approaches than deep ecologists’ view on
zero-growth cycle of production and consumption, French greens have advocated a
critical but serious consideration of high-tech solutions (Bess 2003, 240; Whiteside 1998;
Prendiville 1994, 91).
18
For example, France has aggressively pursued nuclear power
development as a requisite for economic development and postwar national security.
The distinctive combination of philosophical, socioeconomic, and political
environmentalism in France has been termed a “light-green society” (Bess 2003).
According to Bess, the vibrant green movement, along with a popular faith in high-tech
progress and economic growth, penetrates virtually every aspect of society, “although
modestly, cautiously, and somewhat tentatively, without upsetting the existing state of
things too much” (2003, 240-241; 2000, 16). As will be reviewed in Chapter 3, these
ecological views are clearly linked to distinctive environmental policymaking in France,
including: diversity-oriented multilevel governance on environmental management and
policy processes; gradual policy changes to encompass critical positions as well as more
17
Different from the deep-ecologist emphasis on the preservation of natural wilderness, Gallic pastoralism traditionally
favors more tamed and humanized nature and often offers an image in which people work with their Minitel computers
at a distance without consuming gas to commute and travel to the countryside for leisure by train á grande-vitesse
(high-speed electric trains) rather than by gas-guzzling airplanes (Ibid, 852, 862; Bess 2000, 16).
18
Many systemic theorists criticize one of the thinkers, Joel de Rosnay for his belief in scientific and technocratic
rationality to remedy ecological problems (e.g., energy-intensive technologies and fertilizers) (Whilteside 1998). And
yet they propose exploring multidisciplinary knowledge (human science as well as natural science) of the dialectical
relations of nature and culture to seek “conscious control of knowledge by knowledge” and “control of control” (Ibid.).
Thus, while systemic theorists caution against the danger of a human-centered philosophy to the intrinsic value of
nature, it is important to note that they still hope human faculty will resolve environmental problems and foster our
sense of an environmental ethics. Systemic theory in France has been influential, as one of the theorists, Michel Serres
was appointed to the Council for Rights of Future Generations, and Edgar Morin was elected president of the Scientific
Council for the National Consultation on High Schools.
49
predominant positions; and the development of corporate interests in green industry as a
way of balancing economic growth and the environment.
2.2. Democratization and Environmental Movements
Democratization has been a critical social, political, and institutional basis on
which diverse environmental movements and national environmental institutions have
been established. Past research maintains that democracy and more decentralized
institutions are linked to greater official efforts in ensuring environmental protection, and
that authoritarian regimes tend to treat environmental issues as marginal to their
policymaking (Hochstertler & Keck 2007). Democratization creates multiple channels of
public participation in policy processes, which in turn incite voluntary public demand and
support for environmentally progressive policies and regulations. In order to understand
the sociopolitical and historical backgrounds that have shaped disparate environmental
policy developments in France and Korea, therefore, this section will investigate the
linkages among democratization, environmental movements, and the development of
environmental institutions in these countries.
In Korea, both late democratization and industrialization engendered (a) a broad
spectrum of active environmentalisms ranging from post-Fordist greens and progrowth
environmentalist movements, (b) relatively weak institutional development of the
Ministry of Environment, and (c) state-centered approaches to environmental problem-
solving. In France, postwar aspirations for intense industrialization and modernization
coincided with dynamic democratization and environmental movements. As a result,
since the 1960s, environmental movements have fostered (a) decentered and yet new
50
humanistic, high-tech oriented environmental management, (b) strong institutional
development of the Ministry of Ecology drawn from interministerial cooperation, and c)
state-centered environmental policy management as a more effective apparatus for
promoting technology-oriented environmental management and economic development.
2.2.1. Democratization and Environmental Movements in Korea
Despite democratization in the late 1980s and late industrialization in the 1960s,
environmental movements have only really been active in Korea since the 1990s.
Environmental NGOs comprised almost more than half of 24,000 registered NGOs as of
2004, and have generated various strands of environmentalism, ranging from post-Fordist
“Greens,” “Political Greens,” sustainable environmentalists, and progrowth “postmodern
managers” (Cho 2004, 139; Peritore 1997, 95-110).
19
The environmental movement in Korea has its origins in worker protests that
demanded compensation for industrial accidents and irresponsible corporate practices
during the first phase of the environmental movement (1966-1980) (Jeong 2002; Cho
2004; Chung and Byun 2008, 545-565). For example, antismoke movements took place
against a coal-burning power plant in Busan Metropolitan city in 1966, and antipollution
movements occurred in Onsan and Ulsan Industrial Complexes in the late 1970s (Jeong
2002, 49; Cho 2004, 147). Since the 1970s, environmental movements have been
19
Until the 1990s, environmental organizations seemed to have been largely polarized into more eco-centric post-
Fordist greens and political greens on the one hand, and progrowth sustainable developers and postmodern managers
on the other (Peritore 1997, 110). Whereas the eco-centric environmentalists stood for transformative structural
changes to political institutions, the economy, and value systems in order to restore the natural environment and green
economy, sustainable developers and postmodern managers believed in the government’s capacity to address
environmental problems through technological and regulatory devices. However, as diverse groups started to
participate in policymaking through increasingly democratized policy processes and international channels for
environmental alliances since the 1990s, the division between progrowth and post-Fordist environmentalisms has
largely dwindled.
51
spurred by an intense democratization movement. As heavy urbanization and
industrialization caused industrial disasters, pollution, water shortage, public nuisance,
and excessive consumer wastes since the 1970s, environmental movements have urged
the authoritarian government to respond to these aggravating environmental issues.
While the authoritarian government sought to oppress the first phase of the
environmental movement, the second phase of the movement (1980-1987) benefited
significantly from democratization movements. Supported by the ideological Left,
environmental organizations staffed by scientific experts were established
20
but achieved
sketchy outcomes (Chung and Byun 2008). Although they could not affect
environmental policymaking in any significant way, environmental organizations
undertook mass mobilization and petitioning, inducing governmental response to the
Yeochun pollution case and inciting an official governmental research group on Onsan
and Ulsan Industrial Complexes, which eventually made residential relocations possible.
In 1983, they also succeeded in protesting the construction of Jinro Factory around
Youngsan Lake to preserve the water reservoir.
The first presidential general election in the history of Korea, in 1987, signaled a
burgeoning democracy and a third wave of environmental movements (1987-1992),. This
election further promoted freedom of the press and organizational participation in
political processes. Through high-profile strategies, environmental groups utilized
domestic and international media to affect government policy processes. Institutional
arrangements of policy monitoring and public-private environmental research teams also
fostered preventative environmental movements against pollution and in support of
20
Korea Pollution Research Institute was created in 1982, Anti-Pollution Movement Association in 1984, and Anti-
Pollution Civic Movement Association in 1986.
52
expert-oriented environmental research aimed at protecting residential and industrial sites.
Thus, environmental groups and mobilized citizens successfully launched a range of
environmental agendas from anti-nuclear movements, like the Anmyun Island Movement,
to green producer education, such as Hansalim.
Since 1992, accelerated by civilian democratic governments, institutional
decentralization, and the Rio Conference on sustainable development, environmental
organizations started to form local, national, and transnational networks of activities to
promote more politicized, national, and global campaigns. Local Agenda 21 facilitated
public debate around conservation programs through cooperative partnerships among
local and corporate multistakeholders (Cho 2004, 150). Accordingly, environmentalism
became more popular in the emerging civil society as people began to see its issues as an
integral part of everyday life. Major environmental NGOs, including the Korea
Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), Green Korea United, and Citizen’s
Movement for Environmental Justice were established since the early 1990s. Many
religious organizations began to participate in environmental activities through education
programs, policy monitoring, and public campaigns for eco-friendly life styles. Since the
early 1990s, a growing number of organizations has been engaged in a diverse range of
environmental concerns, from local issues like water reservoir preservation to a national
agenda for global warming. Thus, the division between progrowth environmentalism and
socioenvironmentalism has blurred and reoriented toward issue-specific activities.
Proenvironmental stances were publicly advocated in political discourse by
national leadership, especially since the first civilian President, Kim Young-Sam (1993-
1998), as the government sought to legitimize new policy agendas based on global
53
environmental institutions. Liberalization also helped weaken the linkages between the
state and corporate groups, signaling that the government would not ignore corporate
irresponsibility in environmental matters as it had before.
In 1994, the MEN in Korea gained the ministerial authority to establish and
implement independent policies. Before then, the Environment Administration,
established in 1990, was under the Ministry of Health and Society. The MEN gained a
broad range of independent administrative powers, although its short institutional history
means that MEN has often faced progrowth pressure from other ministries, such as the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the
Ministry of Construction and Transportation, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy
(Kim, 1995, 88-95; Interview with Director Shim).
Since the early 1990s, environmental movements have been characterized by
upsurging activism of nongovernmental and professional organizations. As
democratization opened diverse institutional and political channels, NGOs and research
institutes became important actors in the environmental policymaking process.
Furthermore, different from the antistatist activity of earlier movements, new
environmental efforts have sought state-centered approaches to solving environmental
problems. Public expectation of and support for the intervening role of government has
been regarded as “mobilization of voluntarism in civil society in stark contrast to the
mobilization of authority of the government”
21
(Cho, 2004, 143,160).
21
State mobilization of conservationist environmentalism had its history during military regimes from 1945 to 1987.
During three waves of Five-Year Economic Plans, set forth by President Chung-Hee Park (in office 1963-1978), the
government often invoked nationalism to promote the public mobilization of industrial labors and resource
conservation policies. Through central economic planning, the Saemaeul Movement (new village movement, 1973-
1998) was used as a sociopolitical venue to educate the public for community activities, such as modern education,
sanitary waste disposal, resource conservation, and the construction of modern housing for energy conservation.
54
Not only did environmental organizations and activists assume the efficacy of
state-led policies in solving national problems, but also the government sought to engage
environmental activists in policy processes in order to gain policy legitimacy. For
example, the MEN asked the Korea Institute for Sustainable Society to conduct
comprehensive environmental research on metropolitan landfill sites in 1992; YMCA on
the application of polluter pays principle in 1993; Civic Institute for Environment Studies
under the KFEM on public nature conservation policies in 1993; and Sseushihyup on the
civic evaluation of the volume-based waste fee system, Jongryangje pilot program in
1994. In 2000, Youngho Kim, Chief of the Ministry of Commerce, successfully
proposed Korea NGO’s Energy Network to promote energy and resource conservation
efforts (Interview with Korea NGO’s Energy Network).
2.2.2. Democratization and Environmental Movements in France
French environmental movements, rooted in the sprit of contestaton (fundamental
questioning) and skeptical humanism, have led to both eco-centric and progrowth
environmental policy development. On the one hand, as a means to achieve national
prosperity and independence, modernization, industrialization, mass consumerism, and
the ideology of technological progress have had a strong influence on diverse sectors of
the society until the 1960s and even into the 1980s. As a late industrializer compared to
Through the environmental campaigns, the citizens were required to clean roads and pick up rubbish. Children were
supposed to bring at least three kilograms of paper waste for recycling to public institutions or schools every month.
While President Park’s regime is regarded as having been highly authoritarian in oppressing individual freedoms and
freedom of press (e.g., the provision of 1971 Yusin Constitution for his third reelection), the Saemaeul movement is
regarded as an opportunity for the public to be educated in how to participate in collective efforts to improve its
economic and environmental conditions.
55
other European countries, France had a system of technocratic, central command in
public planning, despite its long history of democratization.
22
On the other hand, around May ’68, “more polyvalent,” organized grassroots
dissent, far from the clear-cut, left-right dissent of the 1950s and 1960s, arose with an
antistatist and anticonsumerist character (Bess 2000, 9-10). Green movements advocated
decentralized, nonhierarchical politics, and neo-ruralist eco-centric environmentalism.
Eminent scientists and well-known academics started to participate in environmental
mobilization, including the protest against Marée Noire (black tide) in Torrey Canyon in
1967; France’s first nationwide campaign on behalf of a national site, Vanoise 1969; and
antinuclear demonstrations
23
in the 1970s against the abruptly quadrupled size of
France’s nuclear power program in 1974 due to the oil crisis. Protests against a high-
speed train project, TGV south-east (1969-1977), also illustrated public claims for the
right to environment and EIR (Environmental Impact Review) forms of prior consultation
in environmental policy decisions (Fillieule 2003, 30). Policy failures and a public
distrust of dirigistic government institutions generated more active, organized, and
mobilized activism. Following the 1970s, Larzac tradition, more localized, grassroots
environmental campaigns started a dynamic ecology movement. The strong statist model
22
In France, public demands for the right to freedom and environment originate from the early revolutionary period in
the late 18
th
century (Tilly 2003). Popular mobilization for diverse social programs and cross-class alliances (e.g., the
peasant-bourgeois alliance in 1789-1973) have been the grounds for “democracy-promoting mechanisms,” through a
series of democratization and dedemocratization of regimes between 1650 and 2000 (Tilly 2003, 105, 131). As a result
of the long history of democratization efforts, institutional and political changes could be seen in the forms of popular
political participation, elections, and legislative assemblies (as standard government device), absorption or destruction
of existing patron-client networks, and the formation of cross-class political coalitions (Tilly 131). Since De Gaulle
was elected by universal suffrage in 1962, more diversified contentious movements have contributed to the
democratization processes.
23
Antinuclear movements have been exemplary in the environmental movement in France. In the 1950s, intense the
opposition of civic groups and political action committees against nuclear power programs arose. In the 1970s, large,
dramatic antinuclear protests and demonstrations were predominant (e.g., 1971 protests in Bugey, 1977 protests in
Superphenix). In 2007, ‘Sortir du nucleaire’ protests were in Renne, Lyon, Toulouse, Lille, and Strasbourg.
56
of the policymaking process and concertation has been challenged by visible citizen
activism and antistatism (Alland 1994). Anticonsumerism has called for more
community-centered attitudes, which conceive of urban utilities as communal properties
rather than as “self-acting systems” (Schott 2004, 525). Successful German
environmental programs, such as systemic waste recycling schemes, also provoked public
reflection upon community-centered environmental programs (Ibid.).
The Ministry of Ecology (MEC) was established in 1971— somewhat earlier than
other countries in the Europe— and the steadily rising popularity and influence of green
political parties was captured in the 1981 presidential election (Buller 2004; Bess 1995,
842). Growing environmental regulations and eco-journalism have also occurred since
the 1980s. In 1986, the French Federation of Nature Protection Societies (FFSPN) was
established as the most influential lobbying group and a focal point for regional, national
and transnational environmental action (Bess 1995, 837). Democratization and
institutional decentralization opened diverse channels of public participation in policy
processes. Activists, experts, and the public also started to have numerous regulatory
bodies, commissions, and consultative national councils attend to and address
environmental policy decisions (Bess, 2000, 12).
Nevertheless, as most environmental issues are drawn from either “catastrophic
long-term threats projected into an unknown future, decades or even centuries away, or
more precise and modest threats in the present, such as oil spills or disappearing species,”
they could not gain broad public support (Bess 2000, 14). As reviewed in the previous
section, the humanized conception of nature has proved resilient, and eco-centric
environmentalism was unpopular in the traditionally agricultural society. For example, in
57
1988, public opinion scored the lowest in the EC amongst concerns for environmental
protection. Furthermore, green parties were split between Lalonde’s Génération
Ecologies and Waechter’s Les Verts in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, compared to
those of other European countries, environmental movements in France, including the
New Social Movements in the 1960s, have been portrayed as relative weak, spontaneous,
and ephemeral (Appleton 2005, 61; Tarrow 1994).
Urban-rural cleavage has been longstanding with regard to eco-centric and
anthropocentric policies toward the nature (Haegel 2005, 23; Delort & Walter 2001, 107-
108). Strong agricultural corporatism has been deliberately promoted as the major
national economic policy since the country’s postwar modernization efforts, and an
anthropocentric exploitation of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and nutrients have been
prevalent in the agricultural sector (Montpetit 2003, 54-55). Although anti-GMO
movements have been especially pitched in France, along with antiglobalization and
antineoliberalism movements (Whiteside 2003), the political influence of the agro-
environmental sector has been durable in its effort to protect the economic viability of
farming (Montpetit 2003). The strong influence of Chasse, Peche, Nature et Tradition
(CPNT) in anti-hunting bills further exemplifies their resistance to eco-centric
environmental legal measures.
As a result, recent environmental movements have been characterized as “light
green” rather than truly eco-centric (Bess 1995; 2003). The green movement has
embraced a strong popular faith in high-tech innovation and economic growth as an
58
integral part of the green revolution. Green consumerism
24
and the corporate green
industry have been regarded as the most viable response to various environmental
challenges. Traditional philosophical and cultural emphases on contestation and
skeptical humanism have led to a new humanistic vision, with which cautious application
of high technologies is actively used to promote sustainable development. Even in the
1960s and 1970s era of radical social movements, “trepidation about France’s entry into
“technological modernity” only rarely resulted in an outright rejection of scientific and
technological innovation” (Bess 2003, 836). Therefore, environmental movements in
France have been more of an incremental “half-revolution,” that is “far-reaching in some
of its implications, yet surprisingly marginal and limited in other key domains” (Bess
2000, 15).
As a middle-sized nation, France has undertaken an expanded role in terms of
state intervention into environment policy processes, as is visible in environmental
policymaking, as well as in other policy arenas in France. Only strong national
leadership has been thought to be able to administer the technological management of the
environment and to promote an internationally competitive economy, such as in the
dynamic, high-tech Grand Programme for TGV, Minitel computer network, Concorde,
etc. (Bess 2003, 850-851, 855-856).
The expansion of the MEC clearly illustrates the increasing role of the
government in ecological management; the MEC has grown into the Ministry of
Territorial Management and Environment in 1997, and then into the Ministry of Ecology,
Energy, Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning in 2009. As institutional
24
For example, hybrid cars, eco-labeled packaging products, and organic produce markets (e.g., Naturalia, La Vie
Claire, etc.) have been in high demand by environmentally conscious consumers.
59
restructuring gave the MEC its vice-ministerial position, it intended to accomplish the
dual goal of environmental protection and development. Institutional expansion also
aimed to manage technology-oriented sustainable development based on diversified
organizational and human resources and to prevent the sort of interministerial conflict
that often occurs in other countries without the amalgamated institution.
2.3. Development of Environmental Institutions and Regulations in France and
Korea
Since the 1970s, the institutional and political bases of environmental
policymaking and reform, the Ministry of Ecology (MEC) in France and the Ministry of
Environment (MEN) in Korea, have continuously developed. In their current institutional
forms, MEC’s broad interministerial arrangement with a vice-prime ministerial position
and Korea’s smaller, environment-specific structure under a vice-prime minister have
already demonstrated their relative significance vis-à-vis other ministries in their
respective political systems. In France, the empowered position of the MEC has enabled
it to work with other ministries cooperatively and noncontentiously on environmental
policymaking. In contrast, the MEN has often faced grave opposition from other
progrowth ministries as it promotes environmental policy reform.
Furthermore, the two types of environmental juridical frameworks—an integrated
scheme in France, as opposed to separate, multiple law system in Korea—explain the
divergent implications of their reform prospects (Koh, 2008). The integrated system in
France has been the basis for gradual reform that reconciles the divergent interests of
interministerial, proenvironmental, and progrowth stances. In Korea, reformers added
60
regulatory codes to the separate, multiple legal system, in which separate delegations
regulate polluting targets and polluting sources. While the multiple law system in Korea
has enabled radical and swift regulatory changes in recycling reform, it has also made
possible the abrupt relief of some of Korea’s earlier progressive reform measures.
2.3.1. Development of Environmental Institutions in France and Korea
The institutional structures of the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable
Development and Spatial Planning, in charge of green technology and climate negotiation
(Ministère de l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la Mer, en charge
des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le Climat, Ministry of Ecology (MEC)
hereafter) in France and the MEN in Korea have been largely reorganized in the late
2000s. The MEC was remodeled in June 2009, empowered from the previous Ministry
of Transportation, Ecology and Energy that was created in 2007. As the new title of the
Ministry encompass broader policy objects, restructuring has aimed at more harmonious
and comprehensive development of environmental policy, including the preservation of
biodiversity and natural habitats; Climate Kyoto Protocol application; and environmental
control of industries, national, and local territorial planning, infrastructures, and
transportation.
In August 2008 in Korea, the new administration restructured the MEN to reduce
the number of functionally similar departments and bureaus in order to more effectively
implement environmental policies. As a result, the previous two departments and five
bureaus were turned into two departments and three bureaus, including the Planning &
Coordination Department, Environmental Policy Department, Water Environment
61
Management Bureau, Nature Conservation Bureau, and the Resource Recirculation
Bureau.
25
At the same time, the Korea Meteorological Administration was transferred to
an affiliate of the MEN from the Ministry of Science and Technology in order to develop
green industry and national research strategies to address climate change.
The institutional structures of the MEC in France and the MEN in Korea, however,
have bred significantly divergent ramifications in the scope of their environmental
policymaking and implementation procedures in general, and of recycling and waste
management policies in particular. As shown in Figure 2-1, the MEC became up-graded
to a vice-prime ministerial position, with more independent administrative power in its
environmental planning, based on broader jurisdictions over construction, transportation,
and regional infrastructures. Furthermore, as the MEC supervises Agence de
l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie (the Agency for Environment and Energy
Management, ADEME hereafter) jointly with the Ministry of the Higher Education and
Research (Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche), it has garnered
more prominent administrative and political capacities for policymaking and
implementation. Environmental public campaigns and research projects were promoted
in cooperation with the Ministry of Education at both national and local levels.
The institutional structure also shows that recycling and waste management
policies are not a priority for the MEC. Rather, the policies are jointly managed by
different ministries under the General Commission of Sustainable Development (Figure
2-1). Also, as Figure 2-2 shows, the policies are administered by five lower service
departments with technical expertise under the ADEME: Service Filières Responsabilité
25
During 1994 and 2008, the Ministry of Environment included five Bureaus of Air Conservation, Nature Conservation,
Water Quality, Waterworks and Resource Recirculation.
62
Elargie des Producteurs et Recyclage; Service Eco-conception et Consommation
Durable; Service Prevention et Gestion des Déchets; and Service Planification et
Observation de Dechets under Direction Consommation Durable et Déchets in ADEME.
Figure 2-1: Organization Chart of the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Spatial Planning (Ministère
de l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la Mer), France
Ministre d’Etat
Deleguee
interministerielle au
developpement durable
Secretaire general a la
mer
Deleguee
interministerielle a la
securite routiere
Inspection generale des
affaires maritimes
Censeil general de
l’environment et du
developpement durable
Secretaire d’Etat charge
des transports
Secretaire d’Etat charge
du logement et de
l’urbanisme
Secretaire d’Etat aupres
du ministre d’Etat
Secretaire d’Etat chargee
de l’ecologie
Commissariat general au
developpement durable
Direction generale de la
prevention des risques
Direction generale de
l‘amenagement, du logement
et de la nature
Direction generale de
l’energie et du climat
Direction generale des
infrastructures, des
transports et de la mer
Secretariat general
Haut fonctionnaire de
defense et de securite
Direction generale de
l’aviation civile
Delegation a la securite et la
circulation routieres
Direction des infrastructures
de transport
Direction des services de
transports
Direction des affaires
maritimes
Service de l’administration
generale et de la strategie
Direction du transport aerien
Secretriat general
Direction des services de la
navigation aerienne
Direction de la securite de
l’aviation civile
Sous-direction de l’action
interministerielle
Sous-direction de l’education
routiere
Sous-direction des actions
transversales et des
ressources
Departement de la
communication et de
l’information
Departement du controle
automatise
Mission d’audit de securite
des infrastructures
Observatoire national
interministeriel de securite
routiere
Direction des affaires
europeennes et
internationales
Direction des affaires
juridiques
Direction de la
communication
Direction des ressources
humaines
Service du pilotage et de
l’evolution des services
Service des politiques
supports et des systemes
d’information
Service des affaires
financieres
Service de defense, de
securite et d’intelligence
economique
Direction de la recherche et
de l’innovation
Service de l’observation et
des statistiques
Service de l’economie, de
l’evaluation et de l’integration
du developpement durable
Delegation au
developpement durable
Direction de l’habitat, de
l’urbanisme et des paysages
Direction de l’eau et de la
biodiversite
Direction de l’energie
Service climat et efficacite
energetique
Service des risques
technologiques
Service de la prevention des
nuisances et de la qualite de
l’environment
Service des risques naturels
et hydrauliques
Administration Centrale
Directions regionales de
l’industrie, de la recherche et
de l’environment: La Reunion
– Antilles/Guyane
Directions regionales des
affaires maritimes
Directions
Interdepartementales des
routes
Services de navigation Direction redionale de
l’equipement d’lle-de-France
Directions regionales de
l’environment: La Reunion –
Guadeloupe – Martinique -
Guyane
Direction regionale de
l’environment
Direction regionale de
l’industrie, de la recherche et
de l’environment
Centres d’etudes techniques
de l’equipement
Services territoriaux
Directions regionales de
l’environment, de l’amenagement et
du logement
Directions
departementales de
l’equipement, et de
l’agriculture
Directions
departementales de
l’equipement: La Reunion
– Guadeloupe –
Martinique - Guyane
Directions
departementales de
l’equipement
Direction de l’urbanisme,
du logement et de
l’equipement
Directions
departementales des
territoirs des ou directions
departementales des
territiores et de la mer
Directions
departementales de la
cohesion sociale et de la
protection des populations
Directions
departementales de la
cohesion sociale
Directions
departementales de la
protection des populations
Directions
departementales de
l’equipement: Mayotte –
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
Services des affaires
maritimes: Mayotte –
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon
Sources : The Ministry of Ecology. http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Organigramme-du-ministere,14141.htm
63
Figure 2-2: Organization Chart of the ADEME, under the Ministry of Ecology, France
President
Directeur General Delegue
Direction executive
Action territoriale
Direction executive
Programmes
Direction executive
Strategie, Recherche,
International
Secretariat General
Direction de
l’Action
Internationale
Direction
Recherche et
Prospective
Direction
Productions et
Energies
Durables
Direction Villes
et Territoires
Durables
Direction
Consommation
Durable et
Dechets
Direction
de l’Action
Resionale
Nord et
Est
Direction
de l’Action
Regional
Ouest
Direction
de l’Action
Regionale
Sud et
Outre-Mer
Service
Synthese
et Gestion
Regionale
Direction
Communication
et Formation
Direction des
Affaires
Financieres
Direction
Informatique
et Logistique
Direction des
Ressources
Hummaines
Service
Affaires
Juridiques
Service
Programmes et
Partenariats
Internationaux
Service
Coordination
Geographique
Internationale
Represenation
aupres des
Instances
Entropeennes
(Bruxelles)
Service
Recherche et
Technologies
Avancees
Service
Economie et
Prospective
Service Eco-
conception et
Consommation
Durable
Service
Prevention et
Gestion des
Dechets
Service
Planification et
Observation de
Dechets
Service Filieres
Responsabilite
Elargie des
Producteurs et
Recyclage
Service
Transports et
Mobilite
Service
Batiment
Service
Evaluation de la
Qualite de l’Air
Service Friches
Urbaines et
Sites Pollues
Service
Organisations
Urbaines
Service
Reseaux et
Energies
Renouvelables
Service
Bioressources
Service
Agriculture et
Forets
Service
Entreprises et
Eco-
technologies
Service
Animation
Territoriale
Service
Communication
Professionnelle
et Technique
Service
Formation
Externe
Service
Communication
Institutionnelle
et Information
des Publics
Service
Developpement
des Ressources
Humaines
Service Gestion
du Personnel
Service
Performance
et Controle
de Gestion
Service
Systemes
d’Information
Service
Budget
Finances
Service
Infrastructure
Informatiques
Service
Moyens
Generaux
Cabinet
Direction de
l’Inspection
Generale
Agence
Comptable
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Direction
Regionale
Service Climate
Sources: ADEME. http://www2.ademe.fr/servlet/KBaseShow?sort=-1&cid=96&m=3&catid=13089
64
Figure 2-3: Organization Chart of the Ministry of Environment, Korea
Policy Assistant to Minister
Environmental Policy
Department
Resource Recirculation
Bureau
Water Environment
Management Bureau
Nature Conservation
Bureau
Vice Minister
Office of Spokesperson Policy Public Team
General Service Division
Office of Inspector
Audit & Inspection office
Environmental Inspection & Investigation Team
Minister
Planning & Coordination
Department
Planning & Budget Office
Creation & Innovation Office
Legal Affair & Regulations Reform Office
Environmental Data & Information Office
Emergency Planning Office
International Cooperation Office
International Affairs Division
Global Environment Division
Green Environment Policy Office
Policy Coordination Division
Green Technology & Industry Division
Green Cooperation Division
Office of Environmental Health
Environmental Health Policy Division
Chemicals Management Division
Indoor Air and Noise Management Division
Climate & Air Quality Management Office
Climate & Air Quality Management Division
Climate Change Cooperation Division
Air pollution Control Division
Water Environment Policy Division
Watershed & Total Load Management
Division
Aquatic Ecosystem Conservation Division
Water Supply & Sewerage Policy Office
Water Supply & Sewerage Policy Division
Sewerage Division
Soil & Groundwater Management Division
Water Industry Promotion Division
Nature Policy Division
Nature Resources Division
Environmental assessment Policy Division
Environment Impact Assessment Division
Resource Recirculation Policy Division
Waste Resources Management Division
Resource Recycling Division
Waste to Energy Team
National Ecological
Institute Planning Office
Planning Team
Research Team
Environmental Transportation Division
National Institute of
Biological Resources
Regional Environmental
Office
River Basin
Environmental Office
Metropolitan Air Quality
Management Office
National Environmental
Dispute Resolution
Commission
Korea Environmental
Industry & Technology
Institute
National Institute of
Environmental
Research
National Institute of
Environmental Human
Resources
Development
National Ecological
Institute Planning Office
Korean Environment & Resources
Corporation
Environmental Management Corporation Korea National Park Service Sudokwon Landfill Site Management
Corporation
Sources: the Ministry of Environment, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=abo_org_chart
65
66
Meanwhile, in Korea, institutional restructuring has not created as many
independent privileges for the MEN,in terms of its policymaking and implementation
capacity vis-à-vis other ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and
Energy, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, and the Ministry of Finance and
Economy. Because the ministerial position of the MEN started in 1994, very recent
compared to other ministries, its policy agendas have been often ignored by
developmental interests and have met with controversial responses from other ministries.
As will be noted later, waste management policy reform has faced fierce opposition from
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy and the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation, due to overlapping jurisdiction issues and the ambiguous administrative
responsibilities that were entailed through the reforms. Nonetheless, Figure 2-3 shows
that a distinctively designated policy emphasis on resource recycling is already
conspicuous in the institutional structure of Korea; the Ministry includes “Resource
Recirculation Bureau” as one of the five departments/bureaus. In contrast, none of the
eight secretariat/directions in France clearly states a policy emphasis on recycling in its
institution.
Although the practical effects of the recent restructuring of the MEC and the
MEN remain to be seen, the “policy instruments” for the MEN seem to be relatively
limited compared to those of its French counterpart (Weir & Skocpol in Evans ed. 1985,
118). Considering the weaker institutional power of the MEN (compared to the MEC),
Korea’s more far-reaching recycling and waste management reform is surprising. While
the underlying impetuses of these divergent reforms will be examined in detail in Chapter
67
3, this section will review the distinctive developments of the MEC and the MEN, as the
institutional and political bases for reform processes.
2.3.1.1. Organization of the Ministry of Ecology, France
The Ministry of Ecology (Ministère de la Protection de la nature et de
l'Environnement) was established in 1973. Before then, environmental problems were
addressed by diverse ministries, such as the Ministry of Construction, of Public Works
and Transportation, of Industry and of Internal Affairs. In the early 1970s, however, the
Ministry was called the “Impossible Ministry” due to its highly centralized but weak
administrative capacities, with few direct regulatory powers of its own (Buller 2004, 88).
The Ministry functioned as an internal ministerial pressure group existing in order to
prompt and coordinate interministerial actions based on its strong scientific and technical
support for environmental agendas.
Table 2-1: Institutional History of the Ministry of Ecology, France
Year Title of the Ministry
1971 Ministère de la Protection de la Nature et de l’Environnement
1973 Ministère de l’Environnement
1974 Ministère des Affaires Culturelles et de l’Environnement
1976 Ministère de la Culture et de l’Environnement
1976 Ministère de la Qualité et Vie
1977 Ministère de la Qualité et Vie et de l’Environnement
1978 Ministère et de l’Environnement et du Cadre de Vie
(Fusion with the Ministry of Infrastructure)
1981 Ministère de l’Environnement
1997 Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement
2002 Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement durable
2007 Ministère des Transports, de l'Écologie et de l'Énergie
2009 Ministère de l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la
Mer, en charge des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le Climat
Sources : History of Ministerial Development (The Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development
and Spatial Planning http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Sous-la-presidence-de-Francois.html);
Buller 2004, 89.
68
As shown in Table 2-1, the frequently changing title of the institution literally
reveals the Ministry’s empowerment vis-à-vis other ministries. In 1976, the Ministry of
Quality of Life (Ministère de la Qualité et vie) absorbed water pollution control and
management from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Agriculture, which was treated as
the most important urban policy agenda. The adoption of the Nature Protection Act in
1976 provided the Ministry with a unified legislative framework for its nature protection
policy.
As the environment has became a key issue area in the European Union since the
1980s, the Ministry has gained additional political legitimacy vis-à-vis other ministries,
industrial interests, and civil society. Institutional restructuring has increased legitimacy;
the “Minister” of the Environment was empowered significantly in changing from
Minister to “Delegated Minister” to Secretary of State. Furthermore, since 1991, the
Ministry has been run by a “full Minister,” the highest rank under prime minister (Buller
2004, 88-91). The 1990 Plan Nationale Pour l’Environnment also became the legislative
basis of the empowered Ministry.
In 1998, the Ministry’s administrative authority was enhanced as it absorbed the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Territory and became the Ministère de l'Aménagement du
Territoire et de l'Environnement, with expanded jurisdictions.
26
The Ministry
reassembled distinctive administrative functions for infrastructure and transportation,
ecology, and energy in 2007, and added supervisory roles with regard to technology and
construction in 2009. As shown in Table 2-1, the Ministry became a comprehensive
administrative entity with vice-ministerial power; the central administration work around
26
History of Ministerial Development (The Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Spatial
Planning http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Sous-la-presidence-de-Francois.html).
69
General Secretariat, General Commission, five general directions and one branch office.
The central administration also works with Regional Services Directions (les directions
régionales de l'environnement, de l’aménagement et du logement [DREAL]) and
Territorial Departments at the Local Levels (les directions départementales des territoires
([DDT]).
27
Furthermore, the ADEME was created to adapt to the growing environmental
interests of the EU and to diverse actors implicated in the EU policy processes.
28
Under
the joint supervision of the Ministry of Ecology and of Higher Education and Research,
the ADEME has been the MEC’s administrative and political substructure, serving to
coordinate and facilitate environmental policy implementation. Mostly composed of
technocrats (almost half of them, 356 of 820 employees are engineers), the agency has led
educational programs and public campaigns to raise public environmental consciousness,
as well as to promote green industrial and commercial development. As a mediating
institution that connects the MEC, provincial, and local governments, the ADEME works
through its three central departments (in Angers, Paris, and Valbonne), 26 provincial
branches, three representative offices in France’s overseas territories, and one
representative office in Brussels. In particular, as shown in Figure 2-3, Direction
Consommation Durable et Déchets, under Direction Exécutive Programmes in ADEME,
is directly in charge of recycling and waste management policies.
27
Organization of the Ministry (The Ministry of Ecology http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/-Organisation-
.html)
28
The first form of the ADEME was created in 1974.
70
2.3.1.2. Organization of the Ministry of Environment, Korea
In December 1994 the Ministry of Environment in Korea gained ministerial
authority to establish and implement its own policies. Before that time, the
environmental policy agenda was often regarded as negligible vis-à-vis other growth
policies regulated through other ministries, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The government’s
environmental institutions originated in the 1960s, but underwent a long period of
subservience to other ministries. The Pollution Section of Ministry of Health and Society
was established in 1967, then was expanded to the Pollution Division, in charge of
environmental administration, in 1973. After several reforms and an expansion of its
environmental authority, the Environment Administration was launched as an affiliate of
the Ministry of Health and Society, in 1980. In January 1990, the Environment
Administration was promoted to the Ministry of Environment under the Office of Prime
Minister in order to integrate and coordinate environmental issues more efficiently.
Table 2-2: Institutional History of the Ministry of Environment, Korea
Year Title of the Ministry
1967 The Pollution Section of Ministry of Health and Society
1973 Pollution Division
1980 Environment Administration, affiliate of the Ministry of Health and Society
1990 the Ministry of Environment, in the Office of Prime Minister
1994 the Ministry of Environment (with ministerial position)
Sources: History of the Ministry of Environment (The Ministry of Environment, Korea
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=abo_his_history
As shown in Table 2-2, the MEN was given its ministerial position in 1994. At
the same time, although the government launched its institutional restructuring based on a
“small government” principle, the MEN was the only institution that gained an extended,
71
independent policymaking capacity with its new ministerial structure (Yu and Kim 2003,
141). Moreover, many environmental functions were transferred from other ministries,
including the Water Supply and Sewage Treatment Bureau (from the Ministry of
Construction), the Potable Water Management Division (from the Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs), and the Water Quality Inspection Department (from the National Health
Institute).
29
However, the MEN’s institutional power is relatively weak compared to its
French counterpart, which has a vice-ministerial position under the prime minister. In
Korea, the central administration is based on two departments and three bureaus, under
vice-minister, working with provincial Environmental Management Offices. The
provincial offices were reorganized as four offices: each Watershed Environmental Office
is responsible for one of the four major rivers in the country and for the three Regional
Environmental Management Offices (in Wonju, Daegu, and Jeonju).
In particular, the Waste Management & Recycling Bureau was renamed as the
“Resource Recirculation Bureau” to demonstrate the significance of resource recycling
and recirculation policies in the ministry. The fact that recycling and waste management
are clearly divided and directly administered by one of the five bureaus also shows the
significant policy priority within the MEN, which is very different from the French case,
where the policies are broadly directed by the MEC (Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-3).
29
History of the Ministry of Environment (The Ministry of Environment, Korea
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=abo_his_history)
72
Subsidiary government institutions, such as the National Institute of
Environmental Research (NIER)
30
and the Korea Environment & Resources Corporation
(ENVICO)
31
have also assisted in policymaking and reform processes, working with
government affiliated research institutions such as Korea Environment Institute (KEI).
32
Other government affiliated institutions directly relevant to recycling policies include the
Korea Waste Association and Korea Environmental Consulting Association, established
in 2008 and 2006, respectively.
2.3.2. Developments of Legislative and Regulative Frameworks
Since the establishment of the MEC, major legal frameworks have been created in
France. The Nature Law of 1976 was oriented more toward safeguarding artistic
monuments than natural sites. Furthermore, Law 76-629 mandated an environmental
impact study prior to construction projects, the first such requirement in Europe. The
National Plan for the Environment in 1990 was enacted to create the DIREN (provincial
environmental directorates), and increased the MEC’s budget and restructured its
agencies for increased efficiency. The Barnier Law of 1995 enacted four basic
progressive environmental foundations, including the precautionary principle, the
principle of preventive action, the polluter-pays principle, and the principle of
30
The National Environmental Institute was originally created in 1978 under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
and empowered as the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) in 1987 under the Ministry of
Environment.
31
ENVICO, established in 1980, has played a leading role in recycling agricultural wastes and in successfully
establishing the separate discharge system. In July 1, 2004, KORECO was reborn into ENVICO (Korea Environment
& Resources Corporation), a specialized organization conducting resource-recycling policies. Major policies include
EPR (Extended Producer Responsibility), electronic waste manifest management, waste charge systems, and systems of
waste reduction at work to build effective resource recycling system.
32
Korea Environment Institute (KEI), as the leading environmental policy research and evaluation institution, was
created in1993 and renamed from Korea Environmental Technological Development Agency 1997.
73
participation for the citizens (Bess 2003, 197-209; Buller 2004). In addition, the
European Union’s Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) helped the government abide by the strict
environmental frameworks of the EU. For example, in 1999 the government was charged
with negligence of natural habitats protection in regional planning in Marais Poitevin. In
2005, under President Chirac, the Charter for the Environment was added to the
Constitution.
In Korea, the Environmental Pollution Prevention Act-Law 1436 in 1963 aimed to
ameliorate pollution problems and is regarded as the first environmental law in its history
(Koh 2008; Ministry of Environment, 2010, History of Environmental Law).
33
In 1977,
the Environment Conservation Act started to function as a more active and
comprehensive legal basis for preventing and remedying pollution through the principle
of environmental impact review, industrial waste disposal standards, and regulation of
pollutants. In 1980, Article 35 of the Constitution ensured the people’s right to a healthy
and pleasant environment and addressed their responsibility to protect the natural
environment. The Waste Control Act (1986) and Natural Park Act (1980) were also
enacted to manage landfill problems and the preservation of the natural environment. In
addition to the Framework Act on Environmental Policy of 1990, the Rule on Presidential
Commission on Sustainable Development in 2000 created the Committee on Sustainable
Development directly under the President, in order to address national and global
environmental issues.
33
MEN, History of Environmental Law,
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=law_law_his_history; MEN, Amendments on
Environmental Law, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=law_law_his_amendment
74
Beginning in 1990, the Framework Act on Environmental Policy began to serve
as the foundation for the multiple legal system in order to address impending, aggravated
environmental problems in a timely manner. Nonetheless, the multiple, separate law
system has also entailed a high level of overlap in regulatory rules, which confuses both
policymakers, as well as industry members, businesses, and citizens; contradictory rules
between different regulations in terms of pollutant targets and sources; excessive direct
regulations on behalf of regulators who often discourage industrial growth; and frequent
over-delegation on highly technical interpretations (Koh, 2008). While it allowed for
more radical and swift regulatory and policy changes in environmental management in
Korea, without a unified/integrated structure, the legal framework also has shown its
limitations in comprehensively administering interconnected and continuous patterns of
pollution problems.
These different environmental juridical frameworks explain the divergent
implications for reform prospects in France and Korea (Koh, 2008). The integrated
system in France has been the basis for gradual reform that reconciles the divergent
interests of interministerial, proenvironmental, and progrowth stances. In Korea, the
multiple law system has allowed regulators to address imminent problems aggressively,
to promote radical and swift regulatory changes by adding separate codes to the multiple
legal system, and also to relieve some of its earlier progressive reform measures.
As will be reviewed in Chapter 3 in detail, reformers have vigorously promoted
regulations on recycling and waste management since the early 1990s in Korea,
particularly with regard to municipal, commercial, industrial, and waste treatment and
recycling (the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources [1992]) and
75
the EPR system (the Act on the Promotion of Construction Waste Recycling [2003]). In
France, recycling and waste management reform has been based on both national and EU
regulations on packaging standards, (Law no 92-646 [1992] and Law no 95-101 [1995]
that concern disposal of waste and classified facilities, relating to 1975 EU Directive
75/442/EEC); Lalonde Decree (1992-377) relating to packaging recycling based on a
deposit system [1993]); End-of-Life Vehicles (based on the EU Directive 2000/53/EC);
and WEEE management (WEEE legislation [2005] based on the EU Directives
2002/95/EC and 2008/98/EC).
Table 2-3: Major Environmental Laws and Regulations on Recycling and Waste
Management Policies
France Korea
Law n° 61-842 against atmospheric pollutants
(1961)
Environmental Pollution Prevention Act
(1963)
Public Nuisance Act (1963)
Nature Protection Law (1976)
Environmental Conservation Act (1977)
Article 35 of the Constitution, Right to the
Environment
Environmental Pollution
Prevention Corporation Act
(May 1, 1983)
Waste Control Act (1986)
National Plan for the Environment (1990)
Law no.91-1381 (1991) on the waste treatment of
radioactive materials
Law no 92-646 (1992) and Law no 95-101 (1995)
concerning disposal of waste and classified
facilities, relating to 1975 EU Directive
75/442/EEC
Lalonde Decree (1992-377) relating to
packaging recycling based on deposit system
(1993)
the Barnier Law (1995)
Decree n° 95-540 (1995) on the treatment of
radioactive materials (also, Law n°2006-739
(2006))
Framework Act on Environmental Policy
(1990)
Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources (1992)
Act on the Control of Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1992)
Korea Environment & Resources Corporation Act
(1993)
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (1993)
Promotion of Installation of Waste Disposal
Facilities and Assistance, etc. to Adjacent Areas
Act (1995)
76
Table 2-3: Continued
European Union’s Treay of Amsterdam (1997)
Tax on polluting activities (TGAP, 1999), which
was doubled in 2002.
Sudokwon Landfill Site Management Corporation
Act (2000)
Presidential Commission on Sustainable
Development (2000)
On End-of-Life Vehicles (based on EC
Directive 2000/53/EC)
Title 4 on Waste, Book V on Prevention of
Pollution, Risk and Nuisance (Partie legislative,
2003), as part of Le Code L’Environnement
34
Act on the Promotion of Construction Waste
Recycling (2003)
Prevention of Waste Production, in National Plan
2004-02-11 for combating climate change
Good practice Guide for Construction and Public
Works Inert Waste Storage Facilities, The Ministry
of Ecology (2004)—sentenced by the EU Court of
Justice for not having compiled with deadlines for
transposition of directive 1999/31
Charter for the Environment to the
Constitution (2005)
WEEE legislation (2005)
based on Finance Law no 2005-1720 (Article 87)
and Article L. 541-10-1 in the French
Environmental Code; Order no. 2005-829 (2005)
transposing EU Directives 2002/95/EC and
2002/96/EC relating to the limitation of hazardous
substances, and the disposal of WEEE.
Law on Waste Framework directive 2006/12/EC,
directive 2004/12/EC concerning domestic
packaging and directive 1999/31/EC on landfilling
Act on the Management and Use of Livestock
Manure (jointly enacted) (2006)
Framework on Sustainable Development
(2007)
WEEE legislation based on Article 3 and 4 of the
EU Parliament and Council Directive 2008/98/EC
for prevention of waste and resource recirculation
Law no.2009-584 on the transportation of
pollutants
Decree no.2010-197 on waste management
Act on Resource Recycling of Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and
Automobiles (jointly enacted, 2008) (Law
8725/10390)
Sources: The Ministry of Ecology, France; The Ministry of Environment, Korea; Chalmin and Gaillochet
2009.
34
In July 2003, the Parliament established the environmental act, in which the right of environment was reorganized
and codified for Legislative and Regulatory Parts (Parties législative et réglementaire). Major four principles of the
code include precautionary principle, preventive principle, principle of participation and Polluter-Pays-Principle.
77
CHAPTER 3. RECYCLING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN
FRANCE AND KOREA
Past research on environmental reform posits that the advanced industrial status of
established democracies often precipitates more progressive environmentalism and
extensive environmental policy development than occurs in transitional democracies
(Grossman & Krueger 1993; Seldon & Song 1994; Lijphart 1999). As institutionally and
socioeconomically mature systems, established democracies and advanced economies are
more likely to accept nontraditional claims for postmaterialistic, environmental values as
viable policy options.
To test the propositions, this chapter will focus on a comparative analysis of
recycling and waste management reform in France and Korea. As reviewed in Chapters 1
and 2, the countries share a range of common institutional structures and political
dynamics in the policy processes, including highly centralized policymaking; dominant
technocratic bureaucracy in policy processes; a strong legacy of developmentalist policy;
and institutional reforms of decentralization and economic liberalization since the 1980s
and the 1990s, respectively.
Moreover, that this comparative research examines France as an established
democracy and Korea as a transitional democracy in different geographical continents
allows me to explicate the effect of political and regional settings on environmental
policy processes. Because it has been major drafter of the EU, France presents a
representative case that demonstrates the effect of regional institutions on national policy
processes more than peripheral countries of the EU. Thus, this comparative research into
78
European and Asian cases will articulate the implications of regional integration on the
reform prospects in France vis-à-vis those in a non-European country.
In particular, I focus on waste management and recycling reform to explicate an
environmental policy area in which a number of transitional democracies, including the
Czech Republic and Mexico, have actually been more progressive than established
democracies. In addition, waste management and recycling is a policy arena in which the
effect of the attitude and support of the public, as a major participant in and implementer
of policy at the municipal level, can be investigated.
In terms of economic development, the GDP per capita of France is much higher
than that of Korea, by 1.2 times in 2008 (33,090 dollars in France and 27,658 in Korea in
2008) (See Table 3-1). The gap was much wider when recycling and waste management
were initiated in the early 1990s— by more than two times (24,327 dollars in France and
11,398 in Korea in 1990, [in 2005 US dollars]). Furthermore, the democratization of
France has been more established than that of Korea. Thus, it is presumable that more
comprehensive environmental policy development could be observed in France than in
Korea. Strict EU environmental policy directives and the more established status of the
Ministry of Ecology in France than Korea also seem to signify that the regional and
institutional conditions are conducive to a higher level of environmental policy
development in France.
Table 3-1: Environmental Data Comparison of France and Korea
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008
GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars)
FR 24,327 25,222 28,344 29,629 33,090
KR 11,398 15,782 18,755 22,783 27,658
Public R&D Budgets for Control and Care of the Environment
(as % of Total R&D budget appropriations)
FR 1.7 - 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.7
KR 3.8 - 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.5
Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure (% of GDP)
FR 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
KR 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Revenues from environmentally related taxes (% of GDP)
FR 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1
KR 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.8
Population density (inhabitants per km2. total area: France: 551.5km2; Korea: 99.3 km2)
FR 102.8 104.9 107.1 110.6
KR 431.9 454.3 473.6 485.0
Sources: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2006/2007; 2008; International Comparisons of GDP
per capita and per Employed Person: 17 countries, 1960-2008, Division of International Labor
Comparisons, July 2009.
Figure 3-1: SGI Comparison Chart on Environmental Performance
Source: Performance Comparison Chart of the Sustainable Governance Indicators, OECD 2009
79
80
The Performance Comparison Chart of Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI)
35
(Figure3-1) illustrates that environmental performance in many sectors are higher in
France than in Korea. The SGI analysts assess that, “the overall state of the environment
in France is good”, while “environmental policies in Korea have to date been insufficient
to protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and the quality of the
environment” (SGI, 2009, France Report 18; South Korea Report 23). France
demonstrates more thorough environmental policy management in general, its control
over energy intensity, energy mix, and CO
2
emissions.
Nonetheless, the indicators exhibit that the waste management and recycling
policy of Korea has been far more intensive than that of France, and that water
management has been slightly better in Korea than in France (with 550 annual cubic
meters of water use in Korea, compared to 560 in France, in 2005).
36
The SGI report
says that water and waste management in Korea has shown, “considerable progress […]
albeit from a very low initial level” (Ibid., 24). The report assesses mandatory separate
waste collection and recycling systems for households and industry in Korea as
unprecedentedly far-reaching and strict, even compared to Germany, Sweden, or Japan,
which are famous for their systemic waste management systems. According to SGI
reports, since the mid-1990s municipal waste generation per capita in Korea has been
kept very low compared to other countries; 390 annual kilograms of waste generation per
capita in Korea meant that it ranked as the seventh best managed country in terms of its
35
The figure was produced through a template chart program, Performance Comparison Chart, which is available in the
Sustainable Governance Indicators 2009 webpage,
http://www.sginetwork.org/index.php?page=indicator_quant&indicator=S16_6
36
As will be reviewed in a later section of this chapter, Jae-Kon Shim, the former Director of Resource Recycling
Bureau and Water Management Bureau, was the critical political entrepreneur who initiated far-reaching reforms in
waste management and water management in the 1990s and the early 2000s in Korea.
81
waste and recycling policy. France is 17th, with 540 annual kilograms of waste
generation per capita.
37
Whereas France’s better performance in most environmental arenas can be
assumed based on the aforementioned reasons, Korea’s extraordinary performance in
waste management and recycling policy necessitates an assessment of the domestic and
international sources for these unanticipated policy outcomes. For a country with a short
history of democratization, civil society, and environmental policy development, what
factors could possibly lead to the more extensive development of waste management and
recycling policies? In addition, different from the conventional assumptions on the
relationship between GDP and environmental policy development, Table 3-1 shows that
environmental expenditures and national environmental R&D support have been higher
in Korea than in France.
In part, more urgent environmental problems in Korea may have compelled the
government to promote rapid and extensive policy reform. As shown in Table 3-1,
excessive urbanization in Seoul’s metropolitan area, and higher population density in
Korea than in France may have urged instant government policy responses. However, it
is also worth explicating the factors for the unexpected waste management and recycling
policy reform processes because Korea has not made significant policy developments in
other environmental areas, such as energy intensity or CO2 emissions, as compared to
France. What would make waste management and recycling reform more successful than
other environmental reforms in Korea? How could the interactive mechanisms of
37
While it has been argued that less developing countries or low-income classes are more likely to generate less waste,
the argument is not applicable here since the waste generation in 1990 shows much higher level in Korea (with 710
kg/per capita) than in France (450kg/per capita), even when the GDP of Korea was less than half of that of France (see
more in Table 3-5 in this chapter).
82
different policy entrepreneurs, institutional structures, and cultural factors in France and
Korea drive the differing reforms?
Therefore, this chapter investigates key causal factors that have resulted in
divergent waste management and recycling policy reform processes in France and Korea.
In the increasingly multilevel environmental governance, policy reform prospects are
largely affected by the interlocking effects of both international (global and regional) and
national (institutional, sociopolitical, and cultural) factors. Therefore, hypotheses will be
tested as to how the reform dynamics have been conditioned by multilevel factors—
globalization, regionalization, national policy legacies, and policy entrepreneurs, and
public attitudes on the waste management and recycling policy reform. In this chapter, I
test 11 hypotheses to examine the effect of external and domestic variables on recycling
reform within four major theoretical frameworks of globalization, regionalization, new
institutionalism, and political culture (Table 3-4).
First, as significant normative and legitimate sources for the reform processes, the
effects of global environmental institutions and intergovernmental policy networks, such
as the UNEP and OECD, are assumed to induce more convergent and higher levels of
policy reform discourse and initiatives in France (H1.1.1) and Korea (H1.1.2). In
addition, I assess the intervening effect of international institutions in fostering
transnational linkages among environmental organizations, which in turn broaden the
likelihood of adopting diffusive global policy norms into national policy paradigms in
France (H.2.2.1) and Korea (H2.2.2).
In addition to the increasing influence of globalization, regionalization is expected
to create divergent policy processes in European and Asian regions; the effects of
83
regionalization on environmental policy reform are likely to be higher in France than in
Korea, due to integrated European policy frameworks and their policy directives (H2.1).
At the same time, the effects of regionalization are likely to engender divergent scopes of
policy reforms in the different continents; the EU’s policy frameworks are likely to make
a significant impact on the scope of reform in France and thus to entail higher levels of
recycling reforms in France than in Korea (H2.2).
Within domestic political structures, new institutionalism assumes that national
policy legacies shape the scope and intensity of policy reform. Thus, a negotiation-
oriented policymaking legacy in France within multilevel governance—
nonconfrontational policymaking by the MEC, acute local heterogeneity, and the
antidirigistic attitudes of the public—is likely to prevail in the environmental reform
process, resulting in incremental and gradual reform (H3.1.1). In Korea, the leadership
and a bureaucrat-centered policymaking legacy is likely to shape swift and extensive
environmental reform processes (H3.1.2).
At the same time, the role of nongovernmental organizations in policymaking
processes has been increasingly critical in adopting a diffusive policy agenda. Therefore,
in line with past research on prominent corporate environmentalism in France, corporate
groups and their transnational associations are likely to have been a significant agency in
the recycling and waste management policy process (H3.2.1). As civic-oriented groups
have grown as important policy-pushers in Korea since the mid-1990s, it is expected that
civic environmental groups have been highly active in the reform process, along with the
government-led policymaking dynamics (H3.2.2).
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In increasingly multilevel governance at both global and national levels, the
public has been an unprecedentedly important player in policy formulation, evaluation,
and implementation processes. Due to the growing environmentalism of the public,
therefore, it is also assumed that the public is highly engaged in recycling and waste
management efforts both in France and Korea since the 1990s (H4.1). However, it is
important to note that state structures and activities of states form political culture, which
in turn affect the political capacities and attitudes of the public. Hence, political culture
against dirigistic policy and long-standing localism in France is likely to have bred a low
level of public participation in the reform, especially in the policy implementation
process (H4.2.1). Meanwhile, I will test if traditional political culture, centering on
collectivism and nationalism, has led to a higher level of public participation in reform in
Korea than in France (H4.2.2).
The hypotheses will be examined based on process-tracing methods in order to
explain the extent to which the global, regional, national, and civic factors have enabled
or limited the scope of the environmental policy adoption and reform in France and
Korea. In so doing, I will assess their intertwined and respective effects for the different
phases of the policy reform processes—agenda setting, policy formulation,
implementation, evaluation, and modification processes since the early 1990s.
3.1. Global Environmentalism: Policy Convergence or Divergent Adoptions?
Theories of globalization posit that international institutions foster policymakers’
shared recognition of common socioeconomic problems through broadened
communication and research channels across countries. According to the theories, based
85
on both legal and “soft-law” harmonization of diverse intergovernmental institutions,
nation-states have shown more convergent patterns of policy adoption (Slaughter 2004).
Thus, past research widely examined the effectiveness of institutional organizations on
national policymaking (Bernauer 1995; Martin & Simmons 1998; Caldwell 1990; Hurrell
& Kingsbury 1992; Hass, Keohane & Levy 1993; Checkel 2005; Ward 2006). For
example, they found that international institutions, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Environment Directorate (OECDED), and the Basel Convention, have been
major loci, fostering worldwide environmental awareness. The UN conference for
Environment and Development (UNCED) and its Agenda 21 also enabled both
governmental and nongovernmental actors to formulate their sustainable development
strategies at the local level. In particular, the 1992 UN Earth Summit and the Basel
Convention provided a regulatory basis for recycling and waste management policies,
especially with regard to toxic waste treatment and the illegal trade of hazardous waste to
developing countries.
However, whereas we have observed an increasing resemblance of environmental
policies and regulations among geographically distant countries, environmental
regulations are not as convergent as the theories posit. We even find very divergent
environmental policies even between neighboring countries, like France and Germany,
for example. Thus, the extent to which globalization theories can explain the effect of
institutional institutions on policy transfer and diffusion is questionable. Drawing on
globalization theories and policy transfer research (Rogers 1998; Stone 2004; Elkins &
Simmons 2005; Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005; Way 2005; Dolowitz 2006), Hypothesis 1
86
tests whether global environmental institutions and intergovernmental policy networks
have induced more high level of convergent environmental reform discourses and
initiatives in France (H1.1.1) and Korea (H1.1.2).
The effects of international environmental institutions on reform processes have
considerably differed in France and Korea. In France, along with the regional influence
of the EU, international institutions have defined the broad contours of recycling and
waste management reform. However, the effects of international institutions on their
agenda-setting and policy formulation stages have not been central, in that the Ministry of
Ecology’s (MEC) waste management and recycling policies mostly rely on EU
regulatory frameworks on EPR systems, such as packaging standards, End-of-Life
Vehicle recycling, and WEEE regulations. Global policy norms have been primarily
filtered through the regional policy frameworks of the EU. Director Cheverry and
Director Geldron (ADEME) also attribute most development of national recycling polices
to regional influence, saying that the effect of international institutions has been moderate
(Interviews with Director Cheverry and Director Geldron, ADEME). As the EU sets a
broad framework of recycling targets, national policy strategies have aimed to meet the
targets within the EU policy framework of sustainable development. Therefore, H1.1.1 is
partially supported, as the waste prevention and recycling policies in France have been
legitimized and promoted primarily through coercive EU directives and the regional
policy frameworks, as well as through the international policy principle of the 3R
strategies.
In contrast, policy agendas and proposals from global institutions have been taken
very seriously by Korean agenda-setting and policy formulation stages since the early
87
1990s. In particular, in order to deal with national landfill saturation problems, policy
entrepreneurs took advantage of the prestige of international guidelines as their policy
instruments to promote radical and swift waste management and recycling reform.
Although the reformers and the Resource Recycling Division (RRD) in the MEN had
already started to design their reform projects drawing on German models, the RRD used
the international principle of waste prevention and recycling (against landfills and toxic
trades) to gain support from the Minister of Environment and President Kim Young Sam
(Interview with Director Shim). Accordingly, they overcame grave opposition from other
pro-growth ministries, corporate groups and businesses, and the public. Therefore,
H1.1.2 is highly supported; the diffusive effect of global environmental policy norms was
significant in the agenda setting and policy formulation process in Korea.
During policy implementation and evaluation processes, the effects of
international institutions on reforms in Korea were also critical. During the mid-to late-
1990s, mandatory separate waste collection (based on volume-based waste bag charging
system) received mixed responses for its policy outcome. The government,
environmental activists, and the public regarded the soaring recycling rates and waste
prevention to be unprecedentedly fruitful. However, the inconvenience to the public and
industry of separating different recyclable materials bred criticism of the reforms.
Opponents also claimed that waste treating facilities lacked appropriate recycling
infrastructures, and that the infrastructures should be constructed first for the recycling
policies to be successful (Monthly Waste Century 21, 2001, 1-5). Nonetheless, 2005
OECD Environmental Performance Review and its praise of policy efficacy enabled the
RRD to surmount most criticism. Policy evaluation of international institutions was the
88
RRD’s major tool for reinforcing and updating recycling and waste management policies,
which gave a sense of national prestige to the administrators, local governments, and the
public as a whole. In France, however, international discourses have not made a
substantial difference in the policy adoption process. While President Chirac made the
Charter to the Environment part of French Constitution in 2005 based on the UN
Millennium Development Goals, interviews with key recycling policymakers and with 12
environmental organizations credit EU directives as their primary policy references.
In addition to the direct effect of global environmentalism on national policy
adoptions, Hoschstetler and Keck (2007) maintain that international institutions have an
intervening effect on fostering transnational linkages among environmental organizations.
Thus, I test if the role of global or regional institutions has been significant in building
transnational linkages among environmental organizations, which in turn facilitate
diffusive policy adoptions in France (H1.2.1) and in Korea (H1.2.2). The intervening
effect of international institutions on cultivating transnational environmental networks
has been conspicuous both in Korea than in France. In Korea, most environmental
organizations have been established since the early 1990s, largely stimulated by the 1992
Earth Summit (Appendix E). Furthermore, environmental organizations, and
professional and technical expertise, have been increasingly influential on national and
local policymaking processes since the early 2000s, empowered by the international
recycling policy norms and the organizations’ transnational linkages with foreign groups.
As will be reviewed in Chapter 4, the transnationalization of environmental organizations
has been built up since the mid 1990s in Korea (Figure 4-2). For example, based on its
transnational alliance, GAIA, Korea Zero Waste Movement Network (KZWMN) has
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been a principal contributor that successfully proposed EPR system (adopted in 2003),
packaging standards (adopted in 2008), and the WEEE regulations (adopted in 2008) to
the government. Thus, H.1.2.2 is highly supported; drawing on international policy
norms and discourses, environmental organizations have been actively engaged in
“diffusive” policy adoptions in Korea.
In France, environmental organizations have strengthened their transnational ties
with foreign organizations, as European directives, along with global environmental
policy norms, have framed national policies. Nonetheless, as explained in further detail
in the next section and in Chapter 4 (Table 4-3), environmental organizations in France
have mostly worked with organizations in neighboring countries. Although their
transnational networks have been highly globalized during the 1970s and the 1980s, the
organizations’ transnationalization has decreased since the mid-1990s (Table 4-1). More
directly influenced by the EU policy frameworks than by global institutions, TEANs in
France often hold regional conferences and network with European groups to discuss
their policy agendas and strategies. For example, Eco-Emballages, a major nonprofit
private recycling company in France, works with the PROEurope Congress on waste
management and recycling. Alliance Carton Nature (ACN) in France mostly works with
Alliance for the Beverage Cartons and the Environment (ACE) in Britain, ACE in
Belgium, and Fachverband Kartonverpackungen für flüssige Nahrungsmittel (FKN) in
Germany, in order to advocate the use of paper packaging for renewable resources
recycling.
In addition, although many environmental organizations began in the early 1990s,
most environmental organizations and their national federations had been established in
90
the 1970s and worked long before the Basel Conference; more than one third of
environmental organizations (11 out of 28 organizations surveyed in this study) were
founded in the 1970s and 1980s, with some degrees of transnational linkage within or
beyond the EU. Even some TEANs were formed before the 1972 Stockholm conference.
Furthermore, it is important to note that major EU Directives on waste management and
recycling (75/442/EEC and 90/313/EEC) had been formulated well before the 1989 Basel
Conferences. Most importantly, environmental organizations themselves attribute their
reform agendas to EU directives not solely drawn from international environmental
discourses. Instead, they credit the reforms to regional provisions on recycling and waste
management within the EU and to national interests in enacting the regional plans.
Therefore, H1.2.1 is partially supported in that transnational networks of environmental
organizations have been increasingly regionalized rather than globalized.
Both as a direct and intervening effect on convergent policy diffusion,
international institutions and their environmental policy norms have had more significant
influence in Korea than in France. In order to fully understand the transnational
dimension of policy diffusion in France, it will be important to consider the effect of EU
policy frameworks and transnational environmental networks (TENs) on the recycling
reform process. As the TENs will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, in the next sections,
I will examine the regional and national effects on the reform processes.
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3.2. Regionalization: National and Regional Policy Imperatives
3.2.1. France in Regionalized Europe and Korea among East Asian countries
Theories of regionalization posit that regional contexts create deep-seated
differences in policy ideas and regulatory practices in crossregional spheres (Lutz 1987;
Busch, Jorgens & Tews 2005; Sagan, & Halkier. 2005; Paraskevopoulos, Getimis, &
Rees, eds. 2006; Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007). Regional institutions function as
structural determinants for high levels of policy diffusion (Lutz 1987). Indeed, EU
directives have had a strong impact on environmental policy diffusion dynamics in
member countries, in such areas as eco-labels, energy taxes, and legal provisions on free
access to environmental information (EC Directive 90/313/EEC) (Busch, Jorgens &
Tews 2005; Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007). Thus, I hypothesize that regional influences
are expected to create divergent policy processes in European and Asian regions; as such,
the coercive effects of regionalization on environmental policy reform are likely to be
higher in France than in Korea, due to the integrated European policy frameworks and
their policy networks (H2.1). It is also testable whether the EU’s policy directives make
a significant impact on the scope of reforms in France, and thus entail higher levels of
recycling reform in France than in Korea (H2.2).
H2.1 is highly supported, in that the environmental policy process in France is led
by “direct coercive transfer” through EU policy directives (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1999,
348; 2000, 10-11). From the agenda setting and legislative policy formulation process,
recycling and waste management policies have been made largely through the direct
coercive transfer mechanism of the EU to member states. France is required to follow the
Law on Waste Framework (based on directive 2006/12/EC; directive 75/442/EEC), Law
92
on End-of-Life Vehicles (based on directive 2000/53/EC), and WEEE Legislation (based
on directive 2008/98/EC) on major domestic policy structures for recycling, waste
prevention, and resource recirculation.
As a central member of the EU, France has been active in its effort to affect the
Environmental Council and European Parliament during the policy processes in general.
With sovereignty, the state crafts its own concrete policy implementation programs to
meet the EU requirements at the national and local level. In addition to government
efforts, environmental organizations and corporations have been increasingly engaged in
policy debates in Brussels through their participation in commissions and lobbying.
Nonetheless, as the ADEME acknowledges, EU directives have been the chief
rules around which member countries construct their own recycling and waste
management programs within the 18-month grace period after the EU’s enactment of the
policies. If not, the member countries are sentenced by the EU Court. For example, in
December 2004, France was sentenced by the European Court of Justice for not having
complied with deadlines for transposition of the Directive 1999/31, which requires only
inert waste to be placed in class 3 landfill sites, and was required to sort the waste before
landfilling (Chalmn & Gaillochet 2009). Also, recent DEEE (WEEE) legislation has
been decidedly instigated by the EU framework on Article 3 and 4 of the EU Parliament
and Council Directive 2008/98/EC. Accordingly, the producers of EEE (Electrical and
Electronic Equipment) and B&A (Batteries and Accumulators) should register for the
ADEME’s management program based on the EPR recycling system. Although the
government can be self-regulating on policy implementation strategies to meet the EU
93
policy objectives, the policy processes, including policy evaluation and modification, are
largely guided by the coercive policy transfer mechanisms.
Meanwhile, policymaking in Korea has not been subject to any significant
regional policy imperatives. Without pressure from binding regional institutions such as
the EU, environmental policies in Korea have been intermittently consulted by regional
institutions such as the UN North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental
Cooperation (NEASPEC), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and Pacific,
and the Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC) since the
early 1990s.
38
While the NEAC facilitates information exchange rather than decision
making, the Annual Meeting of Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-
East Asia (SOM) functions as the governing body of NEASPEC for consensual decisions
and efforts to address environmental challenges in the subregion. However, the regional
institutions have not engendered any binding decisions of significant importance but have
served to facilitate crossnational discussion on broad policy frameworks and best
examples. Moreover, interviews with the government officials, public researchers, and
environmental organizations that work for recycling and waste management reform
reveal that the effects of regional institutions on policies were virtually ineffectual for the
agenda-setting, policy enactment and implementation processes in Korea.
Rather, regional effects have been considered important in strengthening the
legitimacy of the existing policy when the Ministry of Environment uses external
38
ASEAN Plus Three Economic Forum engages in regional, intergovernmental efforts for economic programs that
often entails environmental agendas.
94
evaluations of domestic policies to reinforce the MEN’s policy stance. Professor Kim,
Jun-Woo (Economics, Sangmung University) and Dr. Kim, Kwang-Im (Senior Research
Fellow, Korea Environmental Institute) highlight that policy evaluations of global and
regional institutions are often used to justify the substantive value of existing public
policies. In addition to the international OECD Performance Reviews, regional
assessments have been advantageous to environmental policy entrepreneurs for fortifying
their policy basis for systemic recycling and waste management in Korea and to keep
policies from being called off by opposing interests such as business. For example, the
RRD could have gained further support for its policies from the media, the public, and
other government divisions when the 9
th
meeting of SOM in 2004 stated, “the Republic
of Korea had developed its national waste management programme which was being
implemented very successfully resulting in drastic reduction of waste” (ECNEA, 4).
In addition, the comparative cases reveal that the EU environmental directives
have not functioned as all-encompassing policy frameworks for a range of environmental
issues. Based on regional directives, France’s efforts have involved pursuing diverse
environmental reforms and have exhibited notable progress in diverse environmental
policy arenas such as energy intensity, energy mix, and CO2 emissions, as shown by SGI
indicators in 2009. France, however, does not show significant progress in its recycling
and waste management policies, compared to its other environmental policy management
categories (Figure 3-1). Different from general assumptions about the effects of the EU
and its integrating policy guidelines on more extensive environmental policies in member
countries (Liefferink and Jordan 2004; Leveque 1996; Paraskevopoulos 2006), the cases
highlight that the regional directives do not necessarily lead to more progressive
95
environmental policies in member countries vis-à-vis countries outside the EU. The
cases also show that EU directives do not necessarily ensure more progressive
environmental policy frameworks than other regional or national initiatives outside the
EU. For example, Japan also has shown progressive recycling policies as the proponent
of the 3R strategies since the late 1990s, and ranked as the 9
th
in waste management and
recycling (SGI, 2009)
Furthermore, as officials from the ADEME articulate, regional directives may
limit the scope of innovative recycling policy reform in its member countries.
Preoccupied with regional policy priorities, these countries may not be able to invest their
substantive policy instruments in order to promote additional, newer national agendas.
EU policy frameworks are already seen as very progressive in terms of their policy
priorities of environmental protection over economic development, the latter of which the
government has been devoted to as a national imperative. Without the extraordinary
sociopolitical resources proposed by environmental organizations or reformist
policymakers, the newly empowered institutional resources of the MEC are not capable
of dealing with nonurgent environmental issues that have not been addressed in the EU
policy framework. Unless a critical national agenda raises unparalleled policy
incompatibility with the regional directives (e.g., French interests in agro-environment
vis-à-vis ecological protection within the EU countries), the MEC has been busy devising
effective national strategies to meet EU directives. Therefore, the analysis shows that
regional directives do not necessarily broaden the scope of policy adoption and
innovation prospects. The regionalization effects on environmental policy processes
96
should be examined through multilevel analysis that involves other international and
domestic factors, which will adequately explain the divergent degrees of policy reform.
3.2.2. Effect of neighboring countries
Beyond the official institutional level of regionalization, however, it is important
to note that policymakers and environmental organizations often turn to neighboring
countries to seek alternative policy options.
In France, although policy objectives in terms of recycling rate targets have often
been drawn from the practices of nearby countries, as well as from EU directives, policy
examples in neighboring countries have not been emulated. For example, even when the
German model of recycling and waste management policies was considered exemplary
during the policy formulation phase in France in the early 1990s, French waste collection
programs were designed mainly based on EPR rather than on systemic separate waste
collection. Eco-emballage, as the leading nonprofit private recycling organization in
most localities, points out that policy debates centered around formulating a “French”
model of effectuating recycling rates in a practical sense, rather than constructing the
most extensive recycling program (Interview with Director Glaisis). Policymakers and
environmental commissioners did not think that their geographical and cultural
characteristics could directly import and accept the German model. In France, it has been
also important to ensure the policy legacy that local authorities retain their independent
authority to decide how they will reach the recycling targets (either through direct
management or through delegation of the public service to private recycling companies).
Meanwhile, environmental organizations often work through their direct networks
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with affiliated organizations in the neighboring countries to influence national and EU
environmental policy and legislation. For example, Eco-Emballages exploits the
PROEurope Congress on waste management and recycling in order to influence
European policy frameworks from French, national, and local perspectives. Alliance
Carton Nature (ACN) in France works with Alliance for the Beverage Cartons and the
Environment (ACE) in Britain, ACE in Belgium, and Fachverband Kartonverpackungen
für flüssige Nahrungsmittel (FKN) in Germany, to advocate the use of paper packaging
for renewable resources recycling.
In Korea, policies in neighboring countries have been used not only to reinforce
reform but also withdraw its own far-reaching scope of the existing policies. For
example, the 3R initiative (reduce, reuse, recycle) promoted by Japan since the late 1990s
was adopted by Korea in 2000 and by the G8 Meeting in 2004 as part of the G8 Action
Plan. Even though strict separate waste collection and recycling reform had been already
promoted since 1994 in Korea and showed higher recycling and waste reduction rates in
Korea than in Japan, the 3R catchphrase was taken as a useful slogan to facilitate public
participation in the programs. However, when announcing the release of restrictions on
the use of paper shopping bags and disposable cups at restaurants in June 30, 2008 (based
on the modification of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving
and Recycling of Resources), the Ministry of Environment and its Resource Circulation
Bureau reasoned that the current restriction on the use of disposable food containers and
beverage cups posed a grave inconvenience to the public, and that this type of
inconvenient policy could not be found in any other countries in the region, including
Japan, the image of which was raised as the most environment-friendly regime in East
98
Asia. The policy release was criticized because it was, in fact, backed by business
interests, and was seen as regretful for reversing the policy after years of successful
policy implementation during which people became quite accustomed to reusable
shopping bags, reusable beverage cups, or disposable cups with a deposit system.
However, the ME relieved public criticism through reference to the regional recycling
policy practices of neighboring countries. Although the regional effect was hardly found
during earlier phases of agenda setting and policy formulation, it has been a useful policy
instrument for the government to justify its policy directions during policy evaluation and
modification phases since the early 2000s.
Thus, regionalization, as a structural determinant for policy diffusion (Lutz 1987),
should be deemed a more contextual analytic category that may engender dissimilar
degrees of policy diffusion within a region, depending on other national, institutional or
political cultural factors. Section 3.3 will examine the effect national policy legacies have
had on the scope of environmental policy reform in France and Korea.
3.3. National Policy Legacies on the Scope of Environmental Policy Reforms
Recycling and waste management reform since the 1990s in France and Korea
depict how differences in institutional structures, major reformist actors, and
environmental policy priorities result in very divergent policy processes. Seemingly, the
newly strengthened ministerial power of the French Ministry of Ecology (MEC) and
coercive EU environmental directives are likely to have brought about more extensive
reform in France than in Korea. In the established multilevel governance structures that
began in the 1970s, many environmental organizations have gained more diversified
99
policy channels for reforms, which are conducive to high levels of environmental reform.
Conversely, the weak ministerial authority of the Ministry of Environment (MEN), a lack
of coercive regional imperatives, and a short history of environmental organizations
established since the 1990s in Korea appear to have set limitations for viable
environmental reform.
Nonetheless, despite the above assumptions and the relatively centralized policy
planning structures commonly found in France and Korea, unexpectedly differing policy
developments in the countries have been observed. Differences in national policy
legacies, types of major policy entrepreneurs, and the immediacy of an environmental
agenda in their policy priorities have resulted in incremental waste management and
recycling reform in France and extensive, swift reform in Korea since the early 1990s.
In France, major causes for its gradual, incremental policy reform dynamic are
found in (a) negotiation-oriented policymaking legacies thst focus on compromising
heterogeneous local and sectoral interests, (b) the coercive adoption of EU policy
directives that target industrial practices based on EPR systems and the diffusive adoption
of policy strategies that are taken through multilevel governance, and (c) corporate
environmental activism in the reforms.
A contrasting policy dynamic of aggressive, mimetic innovation has been found
in Korea, which brought about extensive and swift reform measures. These were made
possible due to (a) swift and radical policymaking legacies that are often deliberately
utilized by government officials and national leadership, (b) the policymakers’ strong
initiatives for mimetic policy reform to address impending environmental problems and
100
to promote far-reaching waste minimization and recycling schemes at the national level,
and (c) civic environmental activism during the course of the reforms.
3.3.1. Recycling and Waste Management Reforms in France
3.3.1.1. National Policy Legacy: negotiation-oriented, gradual policy reforms
Policymaking in France has been generally assumed to be top-down in nature,
based on central planning and elite coordination (Suleiman 1979; Katzenstein 1978; Hall
1986; Schmidt 2002; Yu 2006)
39
. Even when socioeconomic actors are able to
participate in policymaking, state intervention and planning has been “inspired by the
vision of an économie concertée, that developed a corporatist network to intensify the
participation of private interests in the making of public policy” (Keeler, 1985, 230-231,
244-245).
However, whereas centralized policymaking comprises a resilient part of the path-
dependent characteristics, policy dynamics have changed to a significant degree since the
institutional decentralization and economic liberalization in the 1980s (Culpepper in Hall
and Soskice 2001; Hancké in Hall & Soskice 2001; Cole, Le Gales & Levy 2005; Levy
2005; Tiberghien 2007). Movement toward more decentralized, multilayered
environmental governance has reinforced a negotiation-oriented, gradual policymaking
legacy in France. A more consensual approach to policy processes has been derived from
four major characteristics of institutional structures and political culture, including the
recent development of the Ministry of Ecology and its more autonomous environmental
39
Schmidt (2002) highlights a “state-enhanced model” in France, and Tiberghien (2007) finds “a top-down process
driven by political entrepreneurs with a large degree of bureaucratic delegation and some windows of high political
autonomy.”
101
policymaking within the government; public apathy toward dirigiste policies; an
institutional and cultural emphasis on local autonomy in France; and EU policy
frameworks that entail coercive and diffusive policy processes.
With a short history of environmental legislative frameworks and relatively mild
activism on the part of environmental organizations in France, the Ministry of Ecology
has been also known as nonconfrontational vis-à-vis other ministries or interest groups
(Montpetit, 2003, 54-55). Compared to other ministerial tasks, environmental
policymaking is relatively new in France, introduced with the emergence of EU policies
in the 1970s. The structural newness of the Ministry with respect to other ministerial
powers or the grand corps of the state has also led to negotiation-oriented environmental
policymaking, vis-à-vis diverse industries, and heterogeneous local environmental
interests and their policy networks. Thus, national environmental policymaking mostly
resulted from the Ministry’s avoidance of “normative, authoritarian and unilateral forms
of [national] intervention” in the “strongly territorial flavors” of local environmental
interests of the middle-sized country (Buller, 2004, 94). As was reviewed in Chapter 2,
the MEC was restructured in 2009 to empower its environmental and other territorial
development policies (such as construction and transportation). However, environmental
policymaking still represents a policy arena in which diverse policy agendas have been
discussed in multilevel governance to create coherent and negotiation-based regulatory
changes.
The central unitary state model has been further contested by long-standing local
autonomy, the antidirigism of the public, and the multilayered policy structures of the EU.
Reinforced by institutional decentralization in the 1980s, historically strong localism has
102
been persistent in France (Muller 1992; Buller 2004; Bess 2003). Public distrust of
dirigiste state policy also led to questioning of the efficacy of national top-down
regulatory policies (Levy 1999; Appleton 2005; Buller 2004). As will be reviewed in
further detail in the following section, localism and antidirigism in France have invoked
civic activism to be engaged in the multilevel—local, national, and regional/supranational
levels of—policy processes.
In addition, since the institutional decentralization and European regionalization
that opened multiple channels to the local and supranational policy processes,
increasingly diverse public and private actors have been involved in agenda setting,
legislation, and implementation processes (Marks & McAdam 1996; Knill 1998; Wallace,
Wallace & Pollark 2000; Smith 2005; Avdagic & Crouch 2006). As EU directives have
formed a coercive policy framework for national regulatory policies, they also have
encouraged multiparty policy debates both at national and the regional levels. Diverse
actors, including NGOs, big firms and their associations, sectoral producer associations,
and environmental and consumers’ organizations, have promoted their interests directly
through collective-bargaining structures within the EU and indirectly through lobbying to
the EU commissions. Within EU structures, collective bargaining has sought to negotiate
for voluntary agreements among the diverse actors (Avdagic & Crouch 2006).
Thus, the distinctive institutional and political developments in France
(institutional development and nonconfrontational policymaking by the MEC, long-
standing acute local heterogeneity, antidirigistic public attitudes, and the decentralized,
multilayered policy structures of the EU) has strengthened negotiation-oriented policy
legacies in general and consensus-oriented environmental policy makings in particular,
103
which in turn engender modest and gradual changes in policy redirections (Muller 1992;
Larrue & Chabason 1998; Buller 2004; Smith in Cloe, Le Gales and Levy eds. 2005;
Palier 2005; Tiberghien 2007). As the policy process has been affected by multilayered
governing structures—regional, national, provincial, local, and communal input into the
policy process of the EU— the government has focused on avoiding political clashes and
congregating diverse policy objectives through negotiations. Thus, policymaking in
France has been rooted in reconciliation and mediation processes between the state,
various localities, sectoral industries, related ministries, and other countries’ policy
preferences within the EU (Buller 2004, 84-95).
Drawing on theories of decentralized, multilevel policymaking in France,
therefore, I hypothesize that the negotiation-oriented policy legacy is likely to prevail in
the recycling and waste management reform processes since the 1990s, resulting in
incremental and gradual reform (Hypothesis 3.1.1).
3.3.1.2. Coercive and Diffusive Policy Processes within the EU
Within the European-national nexus, negotiation-oriented policymaking occurs
through both coercive and diffusive mechanisms.
The “direct coercive transfer” of EU directives broadly contours national
environmental policy targets and strategies. Once Brussels announces its policy
framework, the national government has to follow the directives and transpose them into
national law within two to three years, depending on their grace periods (which is usually
18 months for environmental policies). Thus, national law on waste treatment and
recycling was established in 1975, based on the EU Directives. The law was aimed at
104
preventing and reducing waste generation and its toxicity on the environment; regulating
waste transportation; enacting the legible use of waste through recycling; and honoring
the public’s right to environmental information.
The central recycling policy has been based on EPR system for Packaging
Standards (No.1992-377), End-of-Life Vehicles recycling (Directive 2000/53), and
WEEE regulations (Directive 2008/98/EC that revised Directive 2006/12/EC). Package
standards (No. 1992-377 from the law no.75-633) based on a deposit system were
enacted in April 1992 and implemented in January 1993 to locate responsibility for
producers/importers to collect package wastes from household. It also extended its codes
for landfill regulation and landfill tax to allow only final residuals to be buried. Marked
with a green dot (Point Vert), about 60% of household packages have been recollected
for recycling as of 2009, and the MEC targets a 75% of collection rate by 2012 (ADEME
2009).
40
The government enacted a law on End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) in August 1, 2003,
to adopt EC Directives 2000/53. The law is based on the EPR system, the responsibility
of manufacturers and distributers/importers for the disassemblance and recycling
treatment of ELV vehicles. While recovery and recycling rates of vehicles in France
have not met their targets of 85% and 80% set by the EU, respectively, they are very
close to them, with 81.5% and 79.8% in 2006 (Eurostat, Recycling and Recovery Rates
for End-Of-Life Vehicles, in 2006). Considering that most countries in Europe have not
yet extensively implemented the ELV system, the French application of the recycling
system is regarded as a remarkable advancement in its environmental policies. The EU
40
4ème Recontres Parlementaires sur les Déchets: L’économie verte comme Moteur de la Relance, ADEME, 2009
105
has also imposed a regulatory requirement for WEEE regulations, which will be in effect
in 2010.
Table 3-2: Major Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Waste Management and
Recycling in France
Legal/Regulatory Measures European Framework Content
Décret n° 92-377 April 1992
(derived from n° 75-633, July 1975)
Directive 75/442/EEC Packaging recycling
Décret n° 2003-727
Directive 2000/53 End-of-Life Vehicles recycling
Loi n° 2005-1319
October 2005
Directive 1999/31/CE
Communal rights to
Environment (against illegal
waste transportation)
Décret n° 2005-829
July 2005
Directive 2008/98/EC that
revised Directive 2006/12/EC
WEEE recycling
Nonetheless, recycling and waste management reforms have been multilevel,
gradual, and negotiative processes, as well. EU directives have set the major principle of
recycling and waste management reform within the European rule for “polluter pays
system” and “waste hierarchy”
41
that sets recycling “targets” at the national and local
level. However, they do not standardize policy strategies at the national and local level.
National regulatory systems decide on concrete measures to pursue regional policy
frameworks and to guide the local means of policy implementation. Then, local
governments determine the commune’s autonomous policy strategies, which must meet
the national policy frameworks and recycling target rates. For example, in 2008,
according to Un Plan Ambitieux et Partenarial, Doté de Moyens Importants announced
by the MEC, new government plans aim for a 7% reduction of waste generation in five
years; 35% of recycling rate by 2012, and 45% by 2015; and a 15% decrease in
41
The waste hierarchy refers to the 3Rs, “Reduce, Reuse and Recycle” classifications. The hierarchy classify waste
management strategies in order of importance—prevention, minimization, reuse, recycling, energy recovery and
disposal. Recently, a 4
th
R has been proposed to influence the “source reduction” of industrial production.
106
incineration or landfill by 2012. Even the EU’s support for national Green Public
Procurement is based on “voluntary” measures, along with other mandatory regulatory
frameworks within the rules of EU Internal Market.
42
At the national-local level, the MEC has chosen EPR system as the most viable
policy framework in the country for dealing with public antidirigism and strong localism.
The recycling framework regulates industrial and corporate practices rather than
promoting nation-wide, mandatory public participation in a separate waste collection
system. Furthermore, to implement the EPR system, the MEC chose a “shared cost
mechanism” in order to ensure local political autonomy and the practical, cost-efficient
applicability of reorganized recycling systems in the early 1990s across different
localities. Under the shared mechanism system, manufacturers and distributers are in
charge of collecting the targeted products either through the local government or through
nonprofit private recycling companies. Local governments, in turn, choose either to
provide the collecting service directly to meet national targets or to delegate the service to
private recycling companies. As a result, the legacy of heterogeneous local autonomy
and their policy preferences has been reinforced in the policy mechanism, allowing local
authorities to decide on concrete strategies.
In most localities, nonprofit private companies, such as Eco-Emballage (for
packaging waste), ADELPHE (for packaging waste), Eco-système (for WEEE), and
Recylum (for used lightening products), have been in charge of the service of meeting
national recycling targets. In fact, the shared cost mechanism itself reveals that the
42
“Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable
Industry Policy Action Plan”, Brussels, COM (2008) 397/3, p.7
107
recycling system in France is more of a compromising model that also distributes
economic burdens for recycling treatment between local governments and producers.
Local governments are responsible for collecting waste (mostly through the private
companies), and producers are responsible for the rest of recycling treatment costs
(except waste collection).
Furthermore, the French waste treatment model has been pursed explicitly based
on “multi-channel approach” in the context of various territories. The “Minutes of the 9
th
Assises Nationale des Déchets (AND)” in September 2007 portrayed the
intergovernmental efforts to garner disparate policy interests in drafting recycling targets
and further reformist measures. Major government officials from the EU Commission,
the MEC, the provincial regional council, and the French mayors associations
participated in the meeting and highlighted their different policy perspectives. The
meeting was lead by diverse local, national, and European actors, including Jean-Louis
Borloo, the Minister of Ecology; Stéphane Cassereau, General Secretary of the AND;
Timo Makela, Director of Sustainable Development and Integration of the European
Comission; Jacques Auxiette, President of the Pays de la Loire Regional Council;
Jacques Pelissard, President of the French Mayors Association; Nathalie Kosciusko-
Morizet, French Secretary of State for Ecology (AND 2007, 28).
Negotiation-oriented, gradual recycling policymaking processes have also been
noticeable in numerous national meetings for a range of governmental and
nongovernmental actors. On a regular basis, the ADEME seeks advice from diverse
108
actors concerning recycling policies and organizes the Commission d’Accord
43
3-6 times
a year, composed of about 40 representatives from local authorities, associations of
consumers and environmental protection, packers, retailers, waste management
companies, and recycling companies (Interview with Director Geldron and Derector
Cheverry of the ADEME and Director Glaisis, Eco-Emballage). In order to encourage
civic participation in its voluntary household recycling programs, the ADEME promoted
an awareness-raising campaign, “Quick, let’s reduce our waste--it’s overflowing!” in
2005, as part of a National Strategy for Sustainable Development, which started in 2003.
An ambitious project involving the public and firms, the campaign urged the use of
individual composting, “10% less waste operation” for small- and medium-sized business,
and the local recruitment of 100 “waste prevention project leaders” (ADEME, September
2005). In order to recruit socioeconomic expertise and to acquire information on
different stakeholders and their strategies on environmental issues, the ADEME also set
up “Prospective and Socioeconomic Studies” in 2007-2010. In essence, strong localism
and their heterogeneous policy preferences have been well acknowledged by
policymakers and their actual policy projects for firms/industries and localities (Interview
with Director Cheverry from the ADEME, Director Glaisis of the Eco-Emballage, and
President Marandon of the FEDEREC).
Moreover, the structure of Le Grenelle itself demonstrates a
negotiation/mediation-oriented environmental policymaking principle in France, which
43
Non-profit organizations participate in the planning phases of the policy arena through various eco-forums and
Commission d’Accord. The Commission aims to review policy proposals regarding activities, strategies and target
rates for recycling. ADEME and four other Ministries of Ecology, of Economy, Finance and Industry, of Agriculture,
and of Education arbitrate the review and incorporate the agendas to their policy frameworks. The Ministry of Ecology
and of Industry leads the review, with 80% and 5% of voting rights in the process. While the reviewed proposals do
not have legislative effect themselves, they are often integrated to policy planning.
109
gathers consensual proposals from each socioeconomic and political group, including
ministries, local governments, industries, labor unions, professional associations, and
NGOs. The Projet de Loi Grenelle 2 Article 78-I-1A clearly states that one of the major
obligations of the Grenelle 2010 is to “reinforce local communes’ consensus on recycling
and waste management agendas” (Le Grenelle Environnement, Synthèse des Mesures,
Novembre 2009, p. 19). Led by the ADEME, Pollutec has been also a significant
national and European conference on recycling, waste management, energy renewal, and
sustainable development, and involves public officials, diverse industrial sectors, research
experts, journalists, and the public in multidimensional policy debates and proposals.
Thus, Hypothesis 3.1.1 is supported; negotiation-oriented, multilevel policy
making has led to gradual changes in recycling and waste management policies,
circumventing the kind of conflicts among different interests that can be generated by
abrupt reform. Reform has been rooted in more gradual, selective adoption of policy
mechanisms and regulatory measures, which are proposed by diverse actors’ policy
preferences at the national, local, and supranational level.
3.3.1.3. Policy Entrepreneurs for the Reforms: Environmental Organizations,
Corporate Associations, and Leadership as Major Actors
Nongovernmental organizations have been largely recognized as increasingly
significant policy entrepreneurs in environmental reform (McCormick 1995; Hochstetler
& Keck 2007; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Biermann, Frank, Siebenhüner, Bernd & Schreyögg,
Anna eds. 2009). In multilevel, negotiation-oriented environmental governance,
recycling and waste management reform since the early 1990s in France has been led by
110
not only political officials but also by environmental organizations. Staffed with
professional experts and engineers, environmental organizations have acted as prominent
advocates for the reforms, as they propose more practical policy strategies suited to
specific sectors and localities. In France, nonprofit private corporations and their
interfirm alliances have often sought to promote national and crossnational regulatory
environmental policies (Keeler 1985; Levy & Egan 1998; Lyon & Maxwell 2004; Szarka
2005; Avdagic & crouch 2006). In line with past research on prominent corporate
environmentalism in France, therefore, I hypothesize that corporate groups and their
transnational associations have had significant agency in recycling and waste
management policy processes (Hypothesis 3.2.1).
The hypothesis turned out to be highly supported; in France, corporate
environmental groups have been distinctively active in the reform processes, as policy
principles in France mainly target industrial practices based on EPR system. Within the
EU, national recycling regulations have, until recently, focused on EPR system for End-
of-Life Vehicles and Packaging Standards. Since 2010, the EU and the national
government announced that regulations on the WEEE be in effect as the third major
recycling policy.
44
Thus, often by building alliances with reformist government officials
and environmental organizations, corporate associations have sought to promote their
policy agendas in recycling policy processes in general and green industry in particular—
such as by defining and regulating recyclable materials for trades.
44
Interviews with the ADEME officials and environmental organizations, including Eco-Emballages, ADELPHE, and
Eco-système, clearly reveal that their recycling and waste management adopted EPR system rather than public
mobilization for separate waste collection system because of the localism and public distrust of dirigiste programs. In
addition, inasmuch as producers and distributors are major perpetrators of waste generation (in terms of weights of
wastes in municipal wastes), policy focus has been made on regulating packaging standards of the industries than
imposing mandatory schemes on the public.
111
As the contours of national environmental policies are firmly set forth by coercive
EU Directives, environmental groups actively seek to exploit their business opportunities
in accordance with the regulatory policies. First, new recycling regulations have offered
additional trade and domestic markets to explore. Green industry has drawn broader
corporate interests, as the value of raw materials have considerably increased (Chalmin &
Gailochet 2009, 129), and as growing eco-consumerism creates new, profitable markets.
In addition, to push their interests for further reforms, nonprofit environmental
corporations and their national and transnational associations have functioned as novel,
focal points through which recycling R&D, technical agenda, and recycling logistics
could be consulted. For example, ProRecyclage and AFITE provide industrial
manufacturers with concrete information and tactical consulting to meet the WEEE
regulations.
Therefore, corporate environmental enterprises in France play an “indirect
coercive transfer” role in stimulating regulatory reform (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). The
actors have been critically productive forces in French reform, whereas firms and
industries are typically known for their antienvironmental stances in most countries. In
addition to their role in policy diffusion, firms and businesses have targeted not in order
to loosen environmental regulations but so as to promote effective regulatory frameworks
for environmentally sustainable industry guide. As past research posits that private
sectors may support a higher level of transnational enactment of regulations over
regulatory liberalization (Hall & Biersteker 2002; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Vogel
1997, 2006), the environmental enterprises, manufacturers, and nonprofit corporations
112
demonstrate their active engagement in shaping articulate, regulatory frameworks at both
EU and national levels.
At the supranational level as well, rather than passively limited by national and
regional regulatory policies, environmental firms and nonprofit corporate associations
have actively sought to affect EU commissions and politicians to foster favorable
conditions for their green industry activities. For example, the FEDEREC (French
Federation of Recovery and Recycling) and Bureau of International Recycling (BIR)
lobby for EU Commissions to define the term “secondary material” for textile trades.
Without explicit, comprehensive regulations on recyclable materials, the industry has had
difficulty manufacturing and trading recycled materials. For instance, the concept of
“secondary textile material” has to be clearly defined by transnational law in order to
export the secondary material from France to developing countries like China. Without
the regulatory concept, conflicting crossnational standards on recycled materials could
prevent the trade from prospering or even existing (Interview with vice-president
Billimoff, FEDEREC). Hence, corporate alliances have urged the government and the
EU to enact a definitive regulation of the term in order to utilize increasing textile
recycling rates in France and to broaden the trade markets. Also, the Alliance Carton
Nature (ACN), as a member of European federation of Alliance for Beverage Cartons and
the Environment (ACE), is pushing for regulation of packaging materials made of carton
in place of plastics (Interview with Fabrice Pairot de Fontenay, Executive Director of
ACN). As a member of the European Manufacturers of Expanded Polystyrene (EUMPS)
and the International EPS Alliance (INEPSA), the Polystyrene Expanse (PSE) works for
both national and European regulation of biodegradable plastics (Interview with Clement
113
Spiteri, Charge de Missions of PSE). Eco-Emballages, a leading nonprofit private
recycling company in France, regularly participates in the PRO Europe Congress in order
to gain updated crossnational information and to influence policy debates from a local
French perspective (Interview with Pascal Gislais, Director of Eco-Emballage). Many
other organizations have attended the PRO Europe Congress in order to promote their
interests in European policymaking, as the Congress is led by members of European
Parliament, European Commissioner to the Environment, and Presidency of the EU
Council.
In addition to the increasing weight of socioeconomic and local actors in reform,
recycling efforts are still largely shaped by an “activist [French] state in comparative
perspective” (Hancké in Hall and Soskice 2001, 334). “The eclipse of dirigiste model has
not been synonymous with the eclipse of the French state, and rather than simply or
solely retreating, the French state evolved” (Levy 2005, 172). Planning,
sectoral/industrial policies and ambitious grand projets have been largely abandoned
since the 1980s, but state spending in socioeconomic policies has, in fact, increased to
address socioeconomic problems, such as welfare and labor-market measures (Ibid, 171-
172). After all, decentralized government institutional structures have been an important
condition for the multilevel policy processes at the national level, which have allowed
civic and corporate participation in reform and has provided subsidies to environmental
groups. For example, since 2003, ADEME’s programme, “Etat Examplaire (State Sets
the Example)” has been a central authority in leading various environmental projects in
different localities, including supervising best practice monitoring and resource centers,
training government officials, and developing policy strategies for local governments.
114
Furthermore, while the agenda has not been highly popular among politicians,
Jacque Pelissard, the president of the French Mayors Association (L’Association des
Maires de France [AMF]) and a member of the Parliament representing Jireh Department,
has been known as a prominent political actor, who has promoted waste management
reform for about 15 years. As shown in the “Assises Nationale des Déchets (AND)” in
2009, Pelissard contributed to the development of practical urban recycling mechanisms
by mediating local interests with the central policymakings, especially working for the
creation of Eco-Folio (eco-body), which has been endorsed by the AMF and local
finances committees. Moreover, in response to growing corporate interests and duties in
the EPR systems, ADEME recently launched a campaign, “Ca marche, ça rapporte, ça
profite à tous!” Involving corporate enterprises, consulting chambers, and research
bureaus, the campaign aims to reduce corporate waste by 14% and to increase recycling
by 24% with a two-year scheme beginning in 2010, as it encourages enterprises to
improve their production processes.
Government activism in recycling reform manifested in a broader framework for
environmental policy developments, as well. For example, Le Grenelle Environnement
(2007, 2010), initiated by President Sarkozy, has been considered one of the most
important national channels through which diverse governmental and nongovernmental
actors review environmental organizations’ policy proposals. The National Council for
Sustainable Development (CNDD), established by President Chirac in 2003, presents a
similar example. More importantly, the addition of a Charter to Environment to the
Constitution in 2005, by President Chirac signified the role of political leadership in
115
elevating an environmental agenda as a policy priority, which significantly empowered
civic and professional environmental groups in the policymaking process.
Without facing any urgent landfill saturation problem that calls for an immediate,
transformative reform, the government has mostly conceived of its recycling agenda as
part of “sustainable development” within EU policy frameworks on national legislative
obligations.
45
Thus, although environmental agendas in general have received increasing
policy attention in France, as in other countries, waste management and the recycling
agenda have been regarded as secondary environmental issues, after climate change
issues and ecological protection (Interview with Marc Cheverry, Head of Advanced
Waste Management Department, ADEME).
3.3.2. Recycling and Waste Management Reforms in Korea
3.3.2.1. National Policy Legacy: Swift and Transformative Regulatory Changes by
Centralized Environmental Policy Process in the Decentralized Governance
In the course of post-Korean War industrialization and democratization processes,
“radical and swift” policymaking has been often been exploited by national leadership
and key policymakers (Lim & Jang 2006; Woo 1991; Kwon 2009). In order to induce
effective policy implementation and personal records of political achievement, national
leadership and bureaucrats have tried to make notable policy reforms for national
socioeconomic and political development. For example, through highly centralized
45
In that respect, a competing argument may claim that non-urgency of the policy agenda has been the condition for
the gradual changes. Nonetheless, the claim looses its validity as long as climate change or ecological protection has
not been regarded as more imminent or urgent environmental issues than recycling in France. Rather, as articulated in
the previous section, institutional and political effects of the national policy legacies explain the underlying policy
dynamics for the gradual reforms.
116
government structures, military dictatorships led rapid industrialization up until the late
1980s, making the country one of the Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries).
Even after the democratization and decentralization of political systems that took
place in the early 1990s, leadership- and bureaucrat-centered policymaking in Korea has
typically shaped swift and extensive reform processes. As was reviewed in Chapter 2,
the multiple law system allows rapid changes in regulatory laws and swift
updates/revisions of regulations, which generates numerous redundant regulatory codes
and yet expeditious policy reform (Koh 2008). “Swift health reform change” (Woo 1991;
Kwon 2009) and “swift neo-liberal transformation” (after the Asian economic crisis in
the late 1970s) (Lim & Jang 2006) exemplify the dominant policy legacy of the extensive
and expeditious reform dynamic in Korea. In addition, the informal policy influence of
the central government on local governments remains an important practice of the newly
decentralized governance.
Therefore, I hypothesize that the legacy of leadership- and bureaucrat-centered
policymaking in Korea is likely to have shaped swift and extensive recycling and waste
management reform processes (H 3.1.2). In fact, environmental policy in general never
gained any political attention as a major national policy agenda. As reviewed in Chapter
2, the feeblest institution in the government in the 1990s was the Ministry of
Environment (MEN), whose agendas were often overshadowed by other ministerial plans.
As will be explicated in the next section, however, public officials’ strong policy
initiatives and national leadership’s support have made the unprecedentedly extensive
recycling reforms possible in the environmental policy history of Korea.
117
3.3.2.2. Policymakers’ Initiative for National and Local Regulatory Reforms:
“mimetic innovations” of Jonryangje
Policy reforms for aggressive recycling and waste management have been marked
as the most representative and successful example of environmental policy development
in Korea. These reforms have been praised as a “transformative change” in Korea after
the country joined the OECD (OECD, March 1996). In January 1995, the national
mandatory separate waste collection system, volume-based charged bag schemes
Jonryangje, was launched. Different rates are applicable to industrial sectors and
commercial/residential areas, wastes are strictly divided into diverse recyclable, non-
recyclable, biodegradable categories and are collected for appropriate treatments.
46
In the
late 1990s, Korea started banning commercial use of shopping bags
47
and disposable
items, including disposable cups and food containers by law; Enforcement Decree of the
46
According to Jongryangje, generation of waste of non-recyclable materials is charged based on volume; recyclable
waste will not be charged as long as it is discharged properly to designated collection containers. Recyclable materials
include different types of macromolecule materials including clothes, tires, plastic and vinyl
46
, ceramic materials
including glass, metal resources including electronics and vehicles, and biodegradable materials including paper, wood
and food waste. Separate collection of food waste significantly contributed to waste reduction and sanitary treatment
systems. Separate collection rate of food waste has increased since the late 1990s; from 21.8 % in 1998 to 34 % in 1999,
45 % in 2000, and 96 % in 2005 and 2006 (Recycling Report, 2009). Since food waste is used for livestock feed,
garden compost, or production of energy through fermentation, it led to considerable reduction in incineration and
landfill. Also, it has had a positive effect on reversing global warming because incinerating wet waste causes much
harmful secondary pollution, increasing release of dioxin during the combustion process. The fact that there is much
more use of soups in Korean food compared to other countries made policy makers enforce more rigid separation of
food waste.
47
The Ministry of Environment in Korea implemented it from August 9, 1999 onwards based on the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources to charge for use of each
plastic shopping bag about $ 0.02~.05 (20-50 won), and each paper bag about $ 0.05~.10 (100won). Although the law
has been modified to waive the charge for use of “paper” bags since June 30, 2008, it is important to note that the
government implemented the Act to change public attitudes toward energy conservation and to reduce wastes through
mandatory recycling. Furthermore, on April 28, 2009, Ministry of Environment announced that six nationwide large
retailers, including H-Mart, Lotte Mart, Home Plus, GS Mart, and Mega Mart, and Hanaro Mart, would use standard
garbage envelopes/bags in place of disposable plastic shopping bags. Consumers are expected to use the standard
envelope as garbage bags in their homes for the collection system. The standard bags are available as pay envelopes,
just as the previous plastic shopping bags; the use of standard garbage envelopes will be expanded to small stores and
convenience stores in 2010. The Ministry says the new measure aims to reduce the use of plastic bags by half within a
year, creating 9.6 billion won economic benefit and reducing 7,100 t of CO
2
emissions a year. It is estimated that about
191 million plastic shopping bags (3,820 t) were manufactured in 2007. The Ministry also emphasizes that consumers
will save their money for the standard envelope, which they had to buy for the purpose of mandatory separate waste
collection for each household.
118
Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources was promulgated. Further
enactment of strict regulations ensued, including the Enforcement Decree of the Waste
Control Act and Promotion of Installation of Waste Disposal Facilities and Assistance,
etc. to Adjacent Areas Act. Since the early 1990s, a score of environmental legislations
(18 new acts) and bills have been adopted and environment related expenditure has been
well over 2 % of GDP.
Their reform regulations brought about fruitful results, considerably reducing the
amount of municipal and industrial waste. For example, the total amount of municipal
waste generated declined by about 4 million tons per year between 1994 to 1999, from
21.213 million tons in 1994 to 16.649 million tons in 1999. The amount of landfill and
incinerated waste decreased by about 5.840 million tons per year between 1994 and 1999,
from 17.955 million tons in 1994 to 10.301 million tons in 1999. In 2006, the total
amount of municipal waste was about the same as in the late 1990s (1.782 million tons),
and the amount of landfill and incinerated waste decreased 2.4 times between 1994 and
2006 (7.64 million tons in 2006).
The critical basis for the reforms can be found in the policy making system in
which bureaucrats and national leadership hold high level of discretionary administrative
powers to initiate and promote reform agendas (Lim and Jang, 2006; Woo, 1991; Kwon,
2009). At the initial stages of reforms, the most important pioneers were government
officials, including the Director of Resource Recycling Bureau (RRD) in the MEN,
Environmental ministers, and the President. As policy makers who could draft and direct
their own initiatives, officials in the MEN (then Environmental Administration, without
ministerial status until 1994) actively sought to devise policy schemes to address serious
119
national landfill saturation problems since 1990 onwards. Until then, the environmental
issue had largely been ignored by pro-growth interests of other ministries.
For the MEN, the most urgent environmental problem in metropolitan areas was
to prevent unsanitary waste disposal that produced malodor and additional build-ups of
landfills around the cities. Previous landfills were already close to saturation and yet it
was not easy to find new locations to absorb growing quantities of wastes in the
excessively urbanized Seoul. Nor was it easy to negotiate with local governments or the
citizens for a landfill or an alternative incinerator construction, due to “Not In My Back
Yard” claims of residents and environmental organizations. Protests against existing or
planned incinerators were already quite shrill. Most of all, landfill waste disposal could
not but face its limits due to the intensifying metropolitanization in the small country.
From the perspectives of the MEN, an alternative system for waste minimization and
prevention was desperately needed.
When Director Jae-Kon Shim was appointed to the Resource Recycling Division
(RRD) of the MEN in 1993, he set up a research team to devise an innovatively
progressive waste prevention system workable in the national setting. This research team
formulated Jonryangje, similar to the well-known German waste separation system
(Mülltrennung) along with “Green Dot” (Der Grüner Punkt) Duales System.
48
For a more
aggressive waste reduction program, a stricter volume-based waste bag charging system
was designed, which could induce substantial changes in public attitude toward waste
48
Der Grüner Punkt program allows manufacturers to use the green dot on packaging of their consumer products so
the consumers can return the packaging for recycling or reuse. Manufacturers who use the green dot contribute to
recycling or disposal of their packaging material through paying a license fee to Duales System Deutschland GmbH
(DSD) that collects consumer products with the green logo. The Duales system was introduced in 1991 as part of
packaging law (Verpackungsverordnung) in Germany, and the Green Dot scheme has been adopted by 23 other
European countries under the “Packing and Packaging Waste Directive-94/62/EC.”
120
prevention principles through economic incentives. For example, different from the
relatively voluminous waste bins used in German residential areas, the Jonryangje waste
bags range from 5 liter to a hundred kilograms, differentiating charging rates by 5 liters
for residential areas.
49
As one of the main staff of the research team, Professor Jun-Woo
Park of the Economics Department, Sangmyung University, recalls that the RRD planned
the incentive system to trigger public engagement in the unfamiliar waste reduction
efforts and achieve notable outcomes within a short period of time to address landfill
saturation and anti-incinerator movement issues.
Without an explicit link to policies adopted or advocated by foreign governments
or supranational institutions, these reforms can be described as a mimetic emulative
process (Dimaggio & Powell, 1991; Bennett, 1991). Devoid of any direct institutional or
political linkages with foreign policy models, the reforms were promoted by active
adoption of reformist ideas and practices from many countries such as Germany, Sweden
and Japan. The reforms, however, have been developed into a more ingenious system
than its original form. The policy formulation processes were led by inventive
experimentations with the strictly mandatory system, changes in laws and practices and
swift updates/revisions of regulations. In the early 1990s, the mimetic policy innovations
were driven by the critical role played by policy pioneers, public-private partnership
between the government and environmental organizations, and highly effective central
government policy decisions at lower levels.
49
The prices of waste bags or types of waste separation slightly differ depending on the character of the locality. For
agricultural areas where use of Jonryangje bags remained about 30 % due to unsystematic collection practices, ‘village
unit Jonryangje’ has been applied to charge for the total volume of waste from a village as a unit.
121
Due to the radical scope of the reforms and the MEN’s weak institutional power
within the government, however, the reform proposals met grave opposition from other
ministries, business and industry, civic and environmental organizations, and the public at
the early stage in 1994. The new ministerial power of the MEN was still weak compared
to other ministries,
50
and functional standing of the MEN was highly interdependent with
dispersed and diversified tasks of other ministries, including the Ministry of Construction
and Transportation
51
and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Thus, the process of
environmental policy making often lacked consistency and coherence, facing frequent
tensions with different government branches because of jurisdiction and responsibility
issues. The recycling reform encountered grave opposition from other ministries,
especially the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
52
While the MHA promoted growth-
oriented environmental policies that focused on pollution control and management, the
MEN’s initiatives, such as ban on use of disposable items in service sectors and
restaurant businesses, were considered ultra progressive and unnecessarily preventative
strategies which could hamper industrial and business development. Furthermore, the
MHA was concerned about the lack of financial resources for the new program and
possible criticisms from local governments with regard to additional administrative tasks
they were expected to undertake.
50
As was reviewed in Chapter 2, the Ministry was newly established in 1994, from its administrative position of the
Environment Administration since 1990.
51
The Ministry of Construction and Transportation was in charge of water resources management, land management
and transportation until December 1994 when water resources management was transferred to the Ministry of
Environment.
52
The name of the Ministry of Home Affairs changed to the Ministry of Public Administration and Security in 2008.
122
As in most environmental policy cases, firms and businesses have been the
strongest opponents to recycling reforms in Korea. Directly affected by the changing
system, previous waste collection companies and related businesses, such as trucking
groups, instigated numerous protests. Previously, they relied on long-term contracts with
the government and fixed collection rates that secured their stable revenues. Now their
contracts had to be renewed through competitive bids by each local government, and the
new collection system implied greater responsibility for previous managements because
of the waste tracking provisions that effectively ruled out illegal dumping and treatment.
Hospitality industry, including hotels and restaurants, also showed fierce dissatisfaction
with the recycling policy. As the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of
Resources (Article 10) started to regulate disposable items, the industry expressed its
discomfort in reducing the use of disposable cups, food containers, shopping bags and
laminated flyers, etc. In 2001, the law began to require use of reusable and recyclable
items in place of disposable or unrecyclable products for waste reduction and prevention
purposes. The policy against disposable items also faced firm opposition from their
manufacturers. Director Shim recalls numerous episodes in which he had to face
lobbying and even threats from the manufacturers (interview with Director Shim, June 19,
2009). Large firms that relied on plastic (petrochemical) disposable items sought to have
the law changed through lobbying. Until the public started embracing green
consumerism after years of experience of the mandatory separate waste collection in the
1990s, a number of firms and manufacturing industries sought to reverse the regulation
rather than taking advantage of the policy to develop green products and enhance their
eco-friendly images.
123
Table 3-3: Major Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Waste Management and
Recycling in Korea
Legal/Regulatory Measures Content
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the
Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources 1992
Jonryangje
mandatory waste separation of the
recyclable, unrecyclable and
composting materials (e.g. food
waste)
Korea Environment and Resources Corporation Act
(revised 2003 into EPR system)
Deposit/Allotment system
Revision/announcement of the Article 10 of the Act on
the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources, 2000
Ban on disposable items
Revision/announcement of the Article 16 and Article 18 of
The Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving
and Recycling of Resources, 2000
Additional list of recyclable items to
Jongryangje, including batteries
Act on Resource Recycling of EEE and Vehicles, 2007
WEEE recycling
Act on Promoting the Recycling of Construction Waste 2003
Construction waste recycling
Packaging and Labeling Recommendation System
Packaging recycling
Revision/announcement of the Article 10 the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of
Saving and Recycling of Resources
Release of the ban on disposable
items
Law on Electronic Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery,
February 2008
End-of-Life Vehicles recycling
While recognizing the importance of systematic waste separation and recycling
programs, the public initially did not support the policy because of the inconveniences it
caused in daily lives.
53
While environmental organizations had been the most cordial
partners of the Resource Recycling Division during the recycling reforms, they were
significant obstacles to the reforms at the initial policy formation stage. Director Shim
53
However, the RRD’s economic incentive system could easily surmount public hesitance about the new policy. The
RRD actively publicized government expenditure on waste treatment and strict volume-based charging system. Critics
first expressed skepticism on the economic incentive system and said that the modest price difference in the waste bag
sizes would not change public willingness to reduce waste. Nonetheless, it was vividly broadcast that people in many
localities were dumping their waste even at the midnight on December 31, 1994, right before the law took effect on the
first day of 1995. People started to be realize that their recycling and waste reduction could save immense waste
treatment expenditure; the MEN disseminated public commercials on the wasteful treatment expenditure. Continuous
campaigns from the government and civic environmental organizations contributed to change public perceptions of the
new recycling system and their role in improving of the environment (Interviews with Director Shim and with
Professor Jun Woo Park).
124
recalls that most civic environmental organizations contested his plan for Jonryangje
based on social equity issue. They argued that Jonryangje would put more economic
burden on lower classes who may need to pay more waste disposal fees than they used to;
lower classes, who dump their waste in public waste collection areas, cannot afford
Jonryangje bags, and this would increase illegal dumping. Professional environmental
organizations added another dimension to criticism of the initiatives, calling for
regulations stricter than the initial deposit system and the Jonryangje plan, which did not
include separate collection of toxic waste arising from consumer products such as
batteries, pesticides and fluorescent lights.
It was the policy legacy of national leadership-centered policy making that helped
the RRD overcome inter-ministerial opposition within the government, corporate dissent,
and public apathy toward the programs. Director Shim was well aware of the critical role
of the national leadership in implementation of the new national programs. He sought to
arrange a meeting with President Kim for a ten minute power point presentation on
ramifications of the recycling plans (interview with Director Shim). Since environmental
policy making does not usually involve the President, he had to lobby one of his former
coworkers, then a Special Advisor, to schedule a short meeting with the President. He
recalls that the informal meeting with the President was the critical occasion to gain
crucial support for the policy agenda. Once the President became a supportive ally for
the initiatives, the Presidential Order
54
changed the direction of recycling policy making
in the early 1990s. Opposition from other ministerial offices was overcome through the
Minister of Environment, who was also convinced by Director Shim and the RRD’s
54
Presidential order is managed as special agenda to precede other policy plans, requiring seasonal report of the policy
development status (Yoo and Kim, 2003).
125
comprehensive plans. Opposition from business firms and manufacturing industries
could be finally surmounted as the central government endorsed and enacted the
recycling schemes as the Decree in 1993.
As part of waste management reforms, construction of the Seoul World Cup
Stadium and World Cup Ecological Park also exemplifies the role of the central
government in environmental governance. Goh Kun, former mayor of Seoul (1988-1990,
1998-2002) and prime minister of South Korea (1997-1998, 2003-2004), pursued
stabilization of Nanjido, the saturated, unsanitary landfill site in Seoul and creation of an
alternate sanitary landfill site in Kimpo, Incheon. There was opposition from diverse
sectors: construction companies wanted to use the landfill site for residential and
commercial buildings for profits without comprehensive stabilization; illegal residents
who used to live around the landfill claimed their right to sell recyclable waste from the
landfill; and diverse communities in Seoul lobbied for building of the Stadium in their
respective areas, instead of Nanjido, which could be described as “Please In My Front
Yard (PIMFY).” Despite corporate lobbying with other ministers and policymakers, the
prime minister assigned the old open landfill site for a new public recreational and
ecological area and secured financial provisions in 1998 (interview with Goh Kun, June
22, 2009). Then, as mayor of Seoul, he could lead construction of the stadium and
environmental restoration around the old landfill area. The Nanjido story demonstrates
how a high-level government official’s commitment to ecologically conducive
development could re-steer environmental restoration plans in Korea.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3.1.2. is supported. In line with past research that
highlights swift, transformative changes in the legal and regulatory policy regime in
126
Korea, the environmental policy pioneers pursued rapid and extensive policy innovation,
through mimetic adoption and centralized policy planning. The bureaucrat’s initiatives
and the President’s policy orientation were decisive in the radical and expeditious
recycling policy reforms in the 1990s.
55
As the RRD gained acceptance within the government in 1993, it started to
promote local applications of the national program, launched in January 1, 1995, after
successfully implementing a pilot program in many localities in Seoul from April 1994 to
December 1994.
56
Initially, the legal basis of Jongryangje policy was not drawn from
national regulation of local governments; it was promoted as national administrative
guidelines and standing rules (rather than a law) for local governments, including Waste
Charge Jonryangje Enforcement Guidelines. The Waste Management Law Article 13,
Code 4 states that Minister of Environment is able to “advise” local governments to
charge fees for waste disposal depending on volume. Thus, within the decentralized
structures, local governments could refuse to follow the administrative advice.
Nonetheless, the fact that Jonryangje was adopted by most of the local governments in
55
Nevertheless, in 2008, the ban on use of disposable cups at restaurants and lunch containers was removed from the
law. The Ministry of Environment announced that effective recycling of disposable items should be managed through
EPR system rather than the previous regulatory system. In fact, most of environmental research institutions and civic
organizations see the relief in the regulation as a result of corporate lobbying to the new government rather than policy
updates. Most environmental organizations, including Waste 21 and Citizens Institute for Environmental Studies,
stated that the changes in the regulation go against the foremost principle of the previous environmental policy, which
stresses genuine waste prevention rather than large-scale waste management. They maintain that regulatory
amendment rather than cancellation of the regulation is necessary to increase recycling rates of disposable items. For
example, the revised Article 10 of the Law could mandate that disposable food containers made of unrecyclable
materials be replaced with recyclable materials. They also point out that considering the recycling policy
implementation has changed public attitudes and lifestyles for more than 10 years, simple liberalization in the use of
disposable items will make people confused and disillusioned with government policy direction. Moreover, researchers
say that recycling disposable food containers based on the EPR will be unworkable due to the largely unrecyclable,
petrochemical laminating materials (Civic Society Report, May 26, 2008). Jae-Kon Shim, the former Director of
Resource Recycling Division also views this change as reversal of the principal part of recycling reforms (Interview).
He adds that petrochemicals manufacturers have continuously lobbied for this policy liberalization, and that the
regulatory change reflects the effect of major business interests in environmental policy making in Korea.
56
It was reported that waste generation was reduced by 38 % for three months, and that recycling rate increased by
90 % for the period (Chosun Daily, December 27, 1994)
127
1994 during the pilot program implementation demonstrated not only the legitimacy of
the policy but also the actual administrative power of the central government on the local
bodies.
57
The RRD aggressively encouraged local governments to adopt the central
initiatives by issuing local ordinances, through financial and administrative support for
the pilot programs and informal publication of weekly progress reports on local
governments’ Jonryangje adoption status. Concerned about their respective images vis-
à-vis other cities and their relationships with the central government, local governments
could not but issue the ordinances. Then, based on the Waste Management Law, Article
12, local governments had to enact or revise an ordinance (based on Article 13) to
promote Jonryangje. The entrepreneurial role played by the RRD as a central authority
was critical in bringing about local enactments of the national initiatives “without delay”
(Shim 2002, 16-19).
Furthermore, the waste recycling reform process in the 1990s highlights policy
dynamics in which the government could maximize its administrative capacity by
actively seeking and forging partnerships with civic organizations. In response to the
initial criticisms from civic environmental organizations, the RRD suggested the MEN
that civic organizations be entrusted the task to carry out and evaluate Jonryangje pilot
programs in 1994. The MEN endorsed economic incentives and subsidies for the
organizations, as the first government financial support for civic organizations in the
administrative history of Korea. The goal of engaging civic organizations in the policy
57
In practice, environmental policy making in Korea has been highly centralized in terms of central-local governments
relationships. After the Central Command and Monitoring Division started to regulate overall environmental policies
since 1984, central decisions prevail and override general functions of lower level governments. In 1986 local
environmental agencies were established as a special branch of central government, and they started to share
discharge/emission facilities management with the central government (Chung, 2008). As the Environmental
Administration was promoted to the Ministry of Environment in 1994, authority of central planning and management
has been further reinforced.
128
process was not only to cooperate with the organizations, but also to enhance legitimacy
of the reform policy. The government stated that objective evaluation by civilian
perspectives would increase efficacy of the policy, and would facilitate expansion of the
pilot program to the national level (Report 504-9259, Waste Management Division, the
Ministry of Environment; Interview with Director Shim).
The evaluation committee consisted of civic organizations, with professional
expertise and national networks capable of implementing extensive local programs. The
major task of the committee was to monitor progress of the pilot program: examine
participation of residents and local government officials; publicize positive ramifications
of the policy; analyze problematic aspects of the program; and propose alternatives for
further improvement. The civilian evaluation committee, composed of eight civic
organizations and their 564,000 members, carried out their assessments of the Jonryangje
policy pilot program. The committee included National Council of the Young Men’s
Christian Association (YMCA), Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), and
six other organizations who were members of the Citizens Committee to Resolve the
Garbage Problem, SSeuSiHyup
58
, including Citizens’ Coalition For Economic Justice,
National Council of Homemakers Classes, Federation for Environmental Movement,
Green Korea United, Environment and Pollution Research Group, and One Spirit One
Body (Catholic) Organization.
As civic-oriented groups have been increasingly active in Korea since the mid-
1990s, it is assumed that civic environmental groups have been highly active in recycling
and waste management reform processes (H3.2.2). Indeed, the government reform
58
In the late 1990s, SSeuShHyup was composed of 264 environmental organizations with technical staff.
129
initiative gained constructive support from civic organizations as well as the public. The
organizations’ assessment of the pilot program was a crucial resource to stir up public
awareness of the landfill saturation problem and necessity of recycling reform. Their
reports diagnosed inadequacies of the existing waste treatment system and emphasized
the urgent need for systematic waste separation and innovative recycling (Shim 2002, 7-
9). Extensively published in major daily newspapers, journals and academic articles, the
organizations’ reports, independent publications and campaigns served as important
resources for effective policy implementation during early phases of the reforms in the
1990s.
3.3.2.3. Civic Environmental Activism for Further Reforms on the EPR system
If the first stages recycling and waste management reforms were led by RRD’s
mimetic policy adoptions and initiatives in the 1990s. In the second phase since the late
1990s they were pushed further by environmental organizations and their policy diffusion
efforts. Since the late 1990s, drawing on transnational networks, foreign examples,
OECD, and EU guidelines, the organizations’ scientific and professional expertise
induced significant updates in the policy frameworks. The organizations’ public
campaigns were potent in appealing for public support, highlighting immediate and long-
term effects of the reforms. For example, these organizations reinforced government
policy slogans such as “Half Waste, Double Recycling” and “Do Not Waste Wastes”, in
order to create awareness about the need for waste minimization and prevention for
sustainable development. Catchphrases in the language of “My Shopping Bag” and “My
Mug Cup” have spread lifestyles that make use of reusable personal items a matter of
130
habit. Along with the campaigns, SSeuSihyup urged the RRD to enforce the charging
system for disposable items to reduce waste from plastic shopping bags and disposable
food containers, which ultimately brought about enactment of Article 10 of the Act on the
Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources. Their movement against disposable
items was targeted at the Seoul World Cup Stadium, which symbolized the significant
green policy practices supported by the public in the early 2000s.
Through publicizing the efficacy of the reform, environmental organizations
worked as a medium that linked different ministries of the government, as well as the
government and the public. Strong support from environmental organizations for reforms
helped the RRD toughen its policy stance and to press forward with the plans, despite
opposition from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Economy, and
Ministry of Construction and Transportation.
Also, environmental organizations have supported the MEN in promoting
regulatory policies among corporate groups, firms and businesses. Unlike the French
case, pro-growth corporate interests have prevailed in Korea, and their opposition to
reforms has been steady and firm. Their anti-regulatory position is exemplified in vehicle
manufacturers’ opposition to the EPR policy agenda on End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV). In
response to their opposition, environmental organizations such as the Korean Institute of
Resources Recycling (KIRR) helped promote the ELV policy, which requires
manufacturers’ to bear the responsibility for recycling at least as a part of the recycling
process.
59
59
Intense opposition from the vehicle industry against EPR and regulation of vehicle recovery is a tough area of the
recycling reform process. Although a series of discussions on the regulation have ensued (as in the Law on Electronic
Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery (February 2008)), vehicle manufacturers have had considerable leeway in
131
Furthermore, transnational networks of environmental organizations have been a
significant basis to justify recycling reform and to update information on policy strategies.
Most of organizations work with their transnational partners; the KFEM, as member of
Friends of the Earth and Green Peace, networks with organizations in different countries
to import and export environmental information on a range of issues, such as movement
against asbestos. Also, KZWMN (formerly SSeuSihyup) networked with Global Alliance
for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA) in order to join worldwide movements for waste
minimization and recycling and effectively contribute to raising of public responsiveness
to recycling policy reforms. The Alliance’s concept of “zero waste” was introduced to
the MEN and the society by KZWMN. The organization’s GAIA network in Asia, Waste
avoiding their responsibility under the EPR system. Initially, the 2005 bill introduced by the Ministry of Environment
outlined manufacturers’ full responsibility for vehicle recovery. However, the bill faced fierce opposition from the
manufacturers, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, and
the Ministry of Finance and Economy (Recycling Report, 2009). The controversy was about recycling charge that
should be imposed on the manufacturers (Oh, 2008). The bill for vehicle recovery was prepared by Ilho Park, Director
of Resource Recycling Division based, on the EPR and Integrated Product Policy (IPP) system of the EU, which was
also supported by environmental organizations and research institutions. The bill targeted to effectively manage
recyclable materials from end-of-life vehicles and to meet the EU’s ELV regulation on recycling rates for trade. While
diverse branches of the government and manufacturers acknowledged the need to meet the EU’s regulatory standards,
they disagreed as to who should be responsible for recycling charge and funding its management. As the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and Energy accounts for electronics and vehicle production, and the Ministry of Finance and
Economy for economic growth, their interests largely went along with the manufacturers who focused more on sales
revenues than vehicle recovery. Although the Ministry of Construction and Transportation was in charge of vehicle
waste disposal, they did not support the new plan proposed by the Ministry of Environment. In December 2005 a task
force composed of related ministries, businesses and experts concluded that the bill should be collectively prepared by
the three related ministries. Although there were two other congressional legislative agenda that supported the EPR
system based on manufacturer’s full responsibility, a tri-ministerial agenda was accepted by the congressional standing
committee and submitted to plenary session in April 2007. The tri-ministerial agenda was passed in the session, and
yet the essential part of the bill was far from the EPR system of the EU; although it regulates recycling rates and criteria
for toxic materials, it is limited in regulating manufacturers’ responsibility for vehicle recycling. Instead of clarifying
manufacturers’ full responsibility of recycling charge, the law states that vehicle disposal should be completed by
cooperative effort of end-of-life vehicle industry, recycling industry and other related businesses when the value of a
disposed vehicle is higher than disposal treatment of the vehicle. Vehicle manufacturer/importer should be responsible
when the value of a disposed vehicle is lower than the cost of disposal treatment of the vehicle (Recycling Report,
2009). In essence, the policy process illustrates that the substance of the Law on Electronic Products and End-of-Life
Vehicle Recovery is very deviant of the key tenet of the EPR system that aimed to include manufacturers as major
participants of recycling policy. Professor Jaehyun Oh, chairman of the Korean Institute of Resources Recycling
(KIRR) commented on the government’s and vehicle industry’s slow response to the issue: “the political and economic
power of the major chaebol and their vehicle manufacturers in Korea are so strong that they can exert leverage on the
policy process. Although various research institutes have recommended exemplary regulatory models from Japan and
the EU, regulation on vehicle recovery and recycling could not be implemented yet (Interview with Professor Jaehyun
Oh, May, 2009)” (See also Appendix B).
132
Not Asia (WNA), played a critical role by urging enactment of policy on toxic waste
treatment and illegal e-waste trade. As the 2004 WNA meeting denounced toxic e-waste
dumping, especially in developing countries in Asia, domestic organizations, led by the
KZWMN, Ecojustice, and the KFEM, managed to have the EPR policy amended to
regulate domestic electronic companies. These organizations’ efforts for expanding the
list of types of recyclable waste led to an extension of the EPR system in 2006, when 11
recyclable items were added to the initial EPR framework.
More than anything else, it was the KZWMN that proposed the RRD adopt the
EPR system, in place of the previous Deposit System enacted in 1992. After a series of
research analyses and official reviews, RRD embraced their advice and revised Articles
16 and 18 of the act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources to promote
an industry responsibility-based EPR system. After reviewing legal and practical
implementation of EPR since 1998,
60
the EPR policy framework was established in 2003,
based on voluntary agreements with firms and manufacturers that were worked out in
2001.
61
Their current dialogue includes proper recycling of PCs, regulations on End-of-
Life Vehicles recycling, and Mechanical-Biological Waste Treatment (MBT) system.
62
60
Since the RRD launched research analysis of the promotion of EPR system in 1997, its partnership with
environmental organizations and civic professional research groups reified in two public hearings (the first hearing was
held on March 26, 1998, and the second on May 28, 1998). EPR Reform Commission on treatment costs and EPR
Policy Forum were also convened by the public-private partnership in 1998 and 1999, respectively.
61
The voluntary agreements illustrate a political dynamic in which environmental organizations and the government
tried to engage electronic companies in recycling reform, in exchange for informing them of changing environmental
policy in advance and offering financial incentives. Based on the agreement, the firms developed recycling centers for
electronics waste in each province through Associations Electronics Environment and other 41 collaborating recycling
enterprises (Recycling Report, 2009).
62
As a supplementary scheme to Jongryangje, Korea Zero Waste Movement Network proposed adoption of the MBT
system since 2006. At the KZWN Workshop on November 9, 2006, Chong Shik Shin, Director of Municipal Waste
Department participated to discuss the necessity of MBT system amidst changing waste treatment policies in advanced
countries. Drawing on successful European examples of Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Britain and Italy, the
environmental network could persuade the government to start a pilot program for automatic waste separation system
133
As Appendix B shows, adoption and enactment of the EPR illustrates highly interactive
public-private partnerships in policy making. Civic environmental organizations
mobilized around the KZWMN have been major architects of the EPR system, along with
the RRD under the MEN.
Supported by Chosun Daily and the Ministry of Environment, Green Mileage
Campaign is one of the recent public programs that support EPR system. As a way of
changing lifestyles to prevent waste and save energy, KZWMN launched the 30-80
Green Mileage Campaign to influence manufacturer’s packaging standards and to prevent
unnecessarily extravagant, bundled or unrecyclable packaging. Involving major chain
stores and 18 companies that produce health, cosmetic, liquor and razor products, the
campaign aimed to reduce packaging waste by 30% in 2008, compared to the previous
year, and 80 % reduction by 2012. If consumers buy refill items or products that support
Green Mileage Campaign, they will be rewarded by complimentary reusable shopping
bags or discounts on the products. Moreover, KZWMN provides education on waste
reduction and monitoring of packaging practices to those who wish to participate in the
campaign. The campaign intends to decrease production expenses for manufacturers,
reduce product costs for consumers, preclude unnecessary wastes, reduce CO
2
generation,
and prevent global warming.
63
In the long term, it also aims to reduce conflicts between
local areas on issues of incinerators and landfill sites.
since 2007. Current pilot programs to test MBT system show increasing effect of environmental organizations in
inducing more progressive recycling policies in Korea, based on “diffusion” of foreign policy examples.
63
The KZWMN expects that the campaign will reduce approximately 6,200 tons of unnecessary packaging waste every
year starting 2006, and this will save about 84 billion Won of packaging cost and 80 % reduction in packaging waste
until 2012. If it succeeds, waste reduction will contribute to landfill management and reduction of 12,000 tons of CO
2
generation by 2012 (Interview with KZWMN).
134
Therefore, Hypothesis 3.2.2 is supported. Civic-oriented environmental groups
have been the most active non-governmental actors in the reform process, as the reforms
have been largely based on mandatory public participation in recycling systems. Even
for corporate-targeted EPR reforms, pressures from increasingly professionalized civic
organizations have been highly effective in inducing a sense of corporate responsibility
for the reforms.
In essence, divergent (environmental) policy developments and processes
occurred during the early phases of reforms (the 1990s) in France and Korea. In France,
gradual, negotiation-oriented reform processes were followed to establish the EPR-based
recycling system, due to its consensus-oriented policy making legacy, traditionally strong
heterogeneous localism, public apathy toward dirigiste policies, and corporate
environmentalism. In contrast, the more extensive and swift Jongryangje reforms could
be launched in the 1990s in Korea because of its swift and radical policy making legacy,
centralized policy practices, the lack of corporate environmentalism, and highly active
civic environmental organizations. Furthermore, the effects of EU directives resulted in
coercive adoption of the ERP policy in France, and absence of such regional policy
imperatives resulted in adoption of the mimetic Jongryangje reforms in Korea.
Nonetheless, in the 2000s, recycling reforms in the two countries have shown
increasingly similar policy emphasis on the EPR-based system. In France, both coercive
and diffusive reform processes occurred as EU directives on national regulatory
frameworks were actively supported by policy reform efforts of environmental and
nonprofit organizations. In Korea, environmental organizations promoted diffusive
135
adoption of the EPR system, leading to replacement of the previous Deposit/Allotment
systems (enacted in 1992) by EPR systems in 2003 for stricter enforcement of industrial
and manufacturers’ recycling responsibilities. Moreover, policy processes in both
countries exhibit increasingly multilevel mechanisms that involve active participation of
environmental organizations. For both diffusive policy adoptions and effective
implementation of the policies, environmental organizations have significantly
contributed to enhancement of environmental consciousness of the public and the
industries and to engage them in the reform processes.
3.4. Political Culture and Public Support for Environmental Reforms
Environmental policy making processes at global, transnational, national and
local levels have broadened the multilevel governance realm even for the public. The
public in France and Korea has gained a range of political capacities to affect the reform
processes, through their decentralized local governments, the Internet and the ME
websites, the media, overseas travel, and growing interactions with diverse domestic and
transnational environmental organizations. Theories of democratization and
globalization particularly highlight the broadened prospects of public participation in
progressive environmental policy reforms (Lester, 1995; Jörgens, 2004; Lim & Tang,
2002, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Hoschstetler & Keck, 2007). In recycling and waste
management policy processes, reform measures have required almost all people to
participate in recycling and waste collection in some way or the other, and yet the
comparative cases show that public attitudes and participation in reforms have differed in
France and Korea. Thus, in order to understand the divergence in policy implementation
136
processes, this section examines the extent to which the public has supported or
constrained recycling reforms. In addition, the bases on which public attitudes toward
the reforms have been shaped are investigated. While past research has noted
increasingly progressive environmental attitudes in democratic and globalized societies,
they have not adequately addressed institutional and cultural sources of public
participation in reforms. In this analysis, I consider growing environmentalism in general
and the distinctive political cultures in France and Korea as significant factors shaping
public attitudes toward recycling and waste management policy reforms.
While the ubiquitously growing global environmentalism does not hold for the
differing levels of public support for the reforms, my analysis highlights the importance
of political culture and national policy frameworks that shape the scope of public
engagement in and support for environmental programs and reforms. Compared to anti-
dirigism and localism in France, the collectivist political culture in Korea is considered a
crucial cultural effect on effective policy implementations since the 1990s. This was
deliberately exploited by policymakers to promote the reforms. At the same time, this
comparative analysis points to important ramifications of mandatory policy frameworks,
not only for efficient policy implementation but also for cultivating public attitudes
toward environment and the reforms.
3.4.1 Growing Environmentalism and National Policy Structure on Public Support
for the Reforms
Efficacy of policy reforms can be observed from the level of public support for or
active participation in policy implementation and evaluation processes. As the public is
the major actor who carry out municipal recycling programs, public participation is
137
important to understand the comparative dynamics of practical policy implementation
processes. In general, a high level of public support for environmental policies’
implementation is expected to be drawn because of the growing environmental activism
(Lester, 1995; Norris, 1997; Barkan, 2004; Jörgens, 2004). An OECD report (Household
Waste Prevention and Recycling: a cross-country empirical analysis, 2009) has
highlighted that individuals’ environmental attitudes have a strong and positive effect on
both recycling patterns and intensity across countries (Ferrara, 2009). People have
become very concerned about climate change in France (72.3%) and Korea (59.4%), and
they have made efforts to reduce the effects of the environmental impact (96.3% in
France and 97.3% in Korea), including recycling (75.6% in France and 89.7% in Korea)
and reducing waste (69.1% in France and 70.5% in Korea).
Therefore, due to the growing environmentalism at both global and national levels,
it is assumed that the people are highly engaged in recycling and waste management
efforts in both France and Korea since the 1990s. Especially since the mid 1990s when
concrete national recycling and waste management programs, such as EPR and
Jongrangje, were enacted, the people are showing higher levels of environmental
consciousness and are actively participating in the programs as a way to support the
reforms (Hypothesis 4.1).
Increasingly conscious of their major role in implementation processes, people
have shown higher levels of engagement in reforms than before since the early 1990s in
both France and Korea. The 2008 OECD Environmental Data Compendium provides a
basis for comparative examination of public participation in France and Korea in
recycling and waste management systems (Table 3-5). The data show in both France and
138
Korea, significantly increasing recycling rates and decreasing or stabilizing household
waste generation. In particular, Table 3-5 show that municipal waste generation in Korea
significantly decreased since the early 1990s, from 710 kg per capita in 1990, to 390 in
1995, and to 380 in 2005. In France, however, municipal waste generation has in fact
grown from 450 kg per capita in 1990, to 480 in 1995, and to 540 in 2005. Recycling
rates for paper and glass also Korea has shown better performance than France; glass
recycling rate in Korea has improved from 44 % in 1993 to 72 % in 2004, while France
showed modest progress in the same period, from 46 % in 1993 to 58 % in 2004.
Nonetheless, comparative analysis of diverse environmental surveys and OECD
environmental statistics suggests a more obscure relationship between the two countries
in terms of their respective environmentalism and the different patterns of public support
for reform programs. As shown in Table 3-6, public support for protecting environment
vis-à-vis achieving economic growth is higher in France than in Korea (Question 13)
although public confidence in environment protection movement is higher in Korea than
in France (Question 12) (World Value Surveys 2005/6). As environmental activism and
public attitudes toward environment protection in Korea are not found to be significantly
higher than France across the survey questions, growing environmental activism alone
could have hardly led to a higher level of public support for recycling and waste
management reforms in Korea than in France.
Rather, without a clear connection with the growing environmentalism in the two
countries, policy outcomes in terms of recycling and waste reduction rates in France and
Korea underline critical effects of national policy frameworks, which shape public
participation in policy implementations. The 2008 OECD Environmental Data
139
Compendium clearly shows the inverse trends in waste “reduction” vis-à-vis recycling in
France. While recycling rates have increased in France from 1990 to 2005, municipal and
household waste generation has steadily increased during the same period. In contrast,
both recycling rates and waste reduction rates have increased conspicuously since 1990 in
Korea.
More importantly, the plummeting municipal waste generation per capita in
Korea between 1990 and 1995, from 710 to 390 kgs per capita, illustrates the significant
effect of the mandatory unit bag-based waste management policy. Municipal waste
generation in Korea decreased from 710 to 380 kgs per capita between 1990 and 2005,
and household waste generation decreased from 340 to 320 kgs between 1995 and 2005.
In France, however, municipal waste per capita increased from 450 to 540 kgs, and
household waste generation remained at about the same level (350 kgs) between 1990
and 2005.
The divergent outcomes of waste management systems demonstrate the critical
importance of national policy frameworks in shaping of public engagement in
environmental policies’ implementations. The mandatory programs in Korea could make
a substantial difference in organizing public participation. Whether based on economic
incentive or environmental concerns of the public, reform policies could work as a
structural basis for them to contribute to environmental efforts. In “Household Behavior
and Environmental Policy: Waste Generation”, Kwang-Im Kim, Senior Research Fellow
in Korean Environmental Institute, emphasizes the importance of “volume-based fee” as
the major variable that results in policy success (OECD, 2009).
140
Increase in waste recycling rates has been much more notable in Korea than in
France. Between 1991 and 2004, recycling rates for paper and cardboard increased from
43 % to 69 %, and the rates for glass rose from 45 to 72 % in Korea. For the same period,
recycling rates for paper and cardboard changed from 34 to 54 %, and from 41 to 58 %
for glass in France (Table 3-5). The changing rates were significant around the
regulatory implementation in Korea, involving 5-10 % increase, while they remain about
the same (0-2 % increase) in France between 1994 and 1995.
Considering waste management and recycling in France have been based on
voluntary participation of the public, the data underscore the crucial ramifications of the
different regulatory frameworks in eliciting public support for reforms. A representative
statistical analysis of OECD data further supports the causal mechanism for the
divergence in patterns and concludes that “individuals for whom mandatory recycling is a
consideration in their recycling decisions tend to recycle more (Ferrara OECD, 2009).”
In Table 3-6, the TNS survey also exhibits the characteristics of national regulatory
structures/frameworks as an important condition for public participation; people in Korea
showed a higher rate of public willingness “to pay extra for waste collection to recycle”
(52%), than in France (41%) in 2008.
Thus, not only the parallel growth but also divergent developments in public
engagement in reform programs point to the significance of distinctive administrative
structures, which shape the scope and capacity of public environmental action (Skocpol,
1985; Buller, 2004). The next section, therefore, examines the extent to which political
culture, cultivated by national political and policy structures, affects public support for
reforms.
141
3.4.2. Political culture
Political culture, shaped by state structures and historical contexts, affects “public
shared meaning” and the scope of political action (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980;
Skocpol, 1985; Evans, 1985; Weir & Skocpol, 1985; Putnam, 1993; Ross, 1997). Public
support drawn from a strong participatory political culture is an increasingly important
determinant of effective policy implementation. In the democratized environmental
policy processes in France and Korea, based on administrative decentralization,
localization/local autonomy and civic activism, public willingness to support a particular
policy became the key factor for policy innovation and effective implementation.
Therefore, in order to understand domestic factors that facilitate or limit the scope
of policy implementation, this section discusses the extent to which the respective
political cultures of the two countries affected the level of public participation in
recycling and waste management reforms. It is assumed that anti-dirigism and localism
in France has bred lower level of public participation in reforms, especially in policy
implementation processes (H4.2.1). Meanwhile, a traditional political culture centered on
collectivism and nationalism is likely to have led to a higher level of public participation
in reforms in Korea (H4.2.2).
3.4.2.1. Anti-dirigism and Localism in France
In France, political culture has been largely described based on “public distrust of
dirigiste state policy” (Levy, 1999, 2005). Public participation has been low and
uncommon in policy processes in general, and broad apathy toward dirigiste policy
making has been characterized as the underlying pattern of public attitudes in France
142
(Levy, 1999, Appleton, 2005; Buller, 2004). Since policy making in France is generally
based on centralized technocratic, state-corporatist mechanisms in its relationship with
communes and the people, “it is all as if the central objective is first and foremost to
make the procedures work and only accessorily to improve environmental quality for the
wider public” (Buller, 2004, 93). In relation to the strong state authority, public anti-
dirigism has been visible, and social or environmental movements in France have
traditionally been portrayed as relatively weak, spontaneous and ephemeral (Appleton,
2005; Tarrow, 1994; Bess 2003).
At the same time, strong localism stands out as another major aspect of the
political culture that contests the central unitary state model, along with political
decentralization, subsidiarity and regional autonomy (Muller, 1992). In the policy arena,
as reviewed supra, the concept of an environmental policy itself has been relatively new
in France, introduced with the emergence of EU policies in the 1970s. Without a long-
standing environmental legislation or ministerial body, national environmental policy
making has been highly attentive to “strongly territorial flavors” of local environmental
interests (Ibid., 94). Therefore, instead of authoritarian or unilateral national intervention
in local policy programs, more heterogeneous negotiation-oriented environmental policy
making has been pursued to mediate between diverse interests of the state, various
localities, and sectoral industries (Buller, 2004). Institutional structure of environmental
governance also mirrors local autonomy, in that communes are not subjected to
standardized pressure from the ADEME in terms of their recycling and waste reduction
strategies; they are subject to only broad regulatory frameworks. Intertwined with anti-
dirigism, strong localism has been noticeable as anti-Europeanism or anti-globalism has
143
grown due to the public’s distaste for the supranational regulatory approach that often
ignores the traditional French approach to provincial territorial management of ecological
issues.
Furthermore, interviews with major environmental organizations and government
officials from ADEME indicate public distaste for nationally mobilized programs in
France and the national cultural and geographic context in which the people do not need
to concern with thorough recycling or waste management efforts.
Bruno Weinzaepfel, president of AFITE, Richard Maillet, President of FEDEREC
Sud-Ouest, and Pascal Gislais, Director of Eco-Emballage highlight levels of public
concern that almost bordered on indifference with “systematic” recycling in the 1980s
and the gradually increasing consciousness of EPR policy efficacy since the 1990s. The
ADEME and Eco-Emballage promoted national public campaigns and education
programs to increase public consciousness, including “Eco-Citoyen” (eco-citizen). The
rates of household package recycling have grown to 65 % since the year 2005.
At the same time, however, experts underline the national cultural context in
which recycling and waste management system could not be promoted based on
“mandatory” frameworks at the national level; people would not just like to be forced by
their government. In line with previous research on public attitudes toward national
mobilization (Levy, 1999, 2005; Appleton, 2005; Buller, 2004), environmental
organizations articulate the French preoccupation with “voluntary” and “local” ecological
issues more than broader regional or national environmental agenda. President Maillet of
FEDREC Sud-Ouest uses the analogy that people tend to only look at matters around
their feet on the ground rather than their sky when thinking about environmental issues.
144
In part, as reviewed in Chapter 2, people prefer technological management of recycling
system to systematic public participation in waste collection systems; technocratic
experts of the government have been required to devise more efficient, mechanical waste
separation systems that do not require mandatory public participation. The packaging
industry should produce recyclable items that do not need waste separation by the public
(Interview with Director Gislais, Eco-Emballage). Therefore, having been well aware of
the anti-dirigistic sentiment, the ADEME and environmental organizations have worked
to promote “voluntary” public involvement in waste separation and the EPR-based
recycling system. Mr. Gislais also explains, in as much as the public and interest groups
have shown their strong concerns for management of their local ecology, politicians have
not been attracted to systematic recycling or waste management agenda to gain political
support from their constituencies, especially at higher levels of government. For them,
environmental problems should be addressed in relation to geographically/locally specific
spatial planning, not in terms of undifferentiated scientific or normative criteria often
used by the EU regulatory approach.
Marc Cheverry, Head of Advanced Waste Management Department in the
ADEME, underlines the geographic and territorial specificity that results in particular
attitudes toward waste management agenda. The very perception that territorial space for
landfill still exists in the mid- country France is (more than other countries in Europe),
has led the government and the people not to be highly concerned with strict application
of waste reduction programs. He contrasts this example with the German case where
geographical constraints could not allow landfill any more in the 1970s and compelled
national development of extensive separate waste collection and recycling systems.
145
Moreover, although France’s close neighbor, Flanders (in Belgium) has shown incredibly
effective waste management with 60 percent recycling rates in 2007 (compared to 31 %
in France), with a total ban on landfill method, French policy makers believe the public
would not buy the concept and call for locally autonomous schemes that will effectively
fit heterogeneous local milieus in the sizable country.
Alain Geldron, Head of Extended Producer Responsibility & Recycling
Department in the ADEME, also notes that the recent economic downturn posed another
obstacle to public support for environmental issues. However, he points to growing
public environmental concerns and actions by the public, including increasing use of
bicycles, changing patterns of consumerism, and slowly but growing voluntary waste
reduction efforts on part of the public. In addition, Le Grenelle de L’Environnement
worked as a political nexus through which the ADEME could reach diverse
socioeconomic sectors and the public to increase environmental consciousness in the
society.
Therefore, the historical anti-dirigism, localism, and geographically contextual
effects of the political culture in France explicate modest public participation in the
reform process, supporting Hypothesis 3.4.1. Policy makers have been very slow in
adoption of systematic mandatory recycling and waste prevention policies from other
political settings, including agenda-setting, policy formation and policy evaluation
processes. At the same time, the political culture has made policy makers refrain from
adopting effective foreign models or expanding the scope of voluntary and EPR-based
reforms to mandatory waste separation mechanisms.
146
3.4.2.2. Collectivism and Civic Activism in Korea
Recent literature on environmental movements in Korea describes the increasing
role of civic activism in both supporting and constraining government environmental
planning (Kim and Cho, 2009; Jeong, 2002; Lim and Tang, 2003). In the democratized
policy process, the public often expresses willingness not to support government projects
that do not meet their normative and economic interests. While past research focused on
environmental movements, I investigate the mechanisms through which reform programs
could gain high level of public engagement. I argue that along with growing civic
activism, collectivism and nationalism are accountable for the high level of public
endorsement of the reforms since the mid 1990s.
Traditional values of collectivism and nationalism still shape public attitudes
toward government policy making and implementations (Yoo, 1979; Kim, 1998;
Helgesen, 1995; Shin & Park, 2002). Not only the neo-Confucius influence on the culture
but also public experience of national mobilization programs under the post-Korean War
authoritarian regimes have reinforced the traditional themes of political culture vis-à-vis
growing civic activism. The public tend to care about community matters and value a
collective sense of community (Helgesen, 1995; Shin & Park, 2002).. They are also
likely to follow government initiatives and centrally planned programs, largely based on
nationalism. However, it is important to note that the public has not indiscriminately
shown collectivist engagement in public policies. Major environmental protest cases,
including Dong River Dam, Saemangeum Reclamation Project, and Four River Project,
show that the people fiercely resisted government initiatives when central planning could
not rationalize economic benefits of environmental destruction.
147
Thus, environmentalism matters within the context of political culture. Once the
reform agenda attained policy legitimacy in terms of environmental protection and
conservation, implementation and feedback processes could gain significant public
support for the programs, leading to sparkling of their collectivist characteristics. Waste
management and recycling reforms exemplify policy adoption dynamics in which central
initiatives convinced the public of policy efficacy and gained their support effectively by
appealing to their collectivist and nationalist attitudes toward government programs.
Initially, public responses to major reform measures were highly negative. They
supported neither the idea that they may need to pay more based on the bag-based unit
pricing system (for household solid waste and non-recyclables, except recyclables and
food waste), nor the requirement that they actually have to put more efforts to separate
different types of waste properly.
As the RRD presented fruitful outcomes of the 1993 pilot programs, however,
initial aversion to reforms was turned into a high level of public participation in the
national programs. Interviews with Jae-Kon Shim, former Director of RRD and most
environmental organizations emphasize critical importance of Korean political culture,
collectivism and nationalism, as the real precursor that ultimately effectuated the national
initiative for policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Although people were
cynical and unsupportive during the agenda-setting period between 1992 and 1993,
general characteristics of the collectivist public attitude boosted consistent contribution of
the people to the programs. For example, especially in the mostly dense, high-rise
residential areas in metropolis, informal neighborhood monitoring has worked as an
effective check for civic responsibility. If one dumps trash in an unidentified bag, instead
148
of the designated volume-based unit waste bag, the person will be caught and fined by
neighborhood organizations (Bansanghuoi or Bunyuhuoi) or security guards as they
investigate contents of trash bags, using such indicators as a discarded envelope with
name and address.
Environmentalism matters not only in the sense of normative concerns but also in
terms of a remedy to the landfill saturation problems born out of geographical conditions.
As opposed to the French condition, waste management reform was an urgent policy
agenda in Korea because of landfill saturation and lack of alternate sites. The issue
received ministerial attention, as evident from the former Prime Minister Goh Kun’s
effort to set up a new sanitary landfill site in Kimpo and convert the saturated open
landfill, Nanjido, into Seoul World Cup Ecological Park. Director Shim, the initiator of
the reforms, attributes part of the reasons for strong public support to increasing public
consciousness of environmental issues in general and the value of waste prevention in
particular. In addition to the widespread notion of environmental degradation, the
concept of waste saturation in the small country could cause changes in public attitudes
toward their environment and government initiatives. Related environmental issues such
as land contamination, water quality, air pollution, and climate change have further
heightened public awareness. Experts assess that people now seem to be accustomed to
their everyday recycling practices. The former president of Korea Institute of Policy
Evaluations and vice president of Korea Environmental Policy and Administration
Society, Professor Hoi Sung Chung, believes significant changes have taken place in
public consciousness of environmental problems.
64
Deok-Soo Dong, current director of
64
Interview with Dr. Hoi Sung Chung (May 28, 2009).
149
RRD also notes that increasing public awareness of diverse environmental problems
affects their everyday recycling practices and often results in proactive inquires for
prompt government response to local issues.
65
More importantly, however, the early reform dynamics show that the government
actively sought to inspire public environmentalism and collectivism by making use of the
political culture as a crucial reform implementation strategy. Major means to cultivate
collectivist environmentalism and gain public support included a) more definitive
regulatory policies at the local level; b) public campaigns through major media and the
Internet; and c) partnerships with civic environmental organizations. While
decentralization of government and growing jurisdictions of local governments appear to
signal decreasing influence of the traditionally centralized administration processes,
decentralization in fact served to promote the national policy implementation more
effectively. As opposed to the French counterpart that reinforced localism in
geographically different regions, Korean local institutions often functioned as more
concrete sources of information that enabled people to easily assess the policy process. It
has become more straightforward for people to interact with policy makers to deliver
their concerns through local government offices and websites. For the government,
spreading policy agenda and regulatory measures has been more effective at local level,
as public participation became more active through local neighborhood commissions and
public hearings.
The government and environmental organizations often launched environmental
education and related campaigns through the media (including major prime news reports),
65
Interview with Deok-Soo Dong, director of RRD (June 19, 2009).
150
the Internet, schools and organizations, neighborhood meetings and forums. Interviews
with policy makers, researchers, and environmental organizations highlight that major
media are often used to effectively carry environmental issues to the public and to change
their attitudes in the geographically small country. Mihwa Kim, director of the Korea
Zero Waste Movement Network (formerly SSeuSihyup) and Kyung Wha Kim, Director
of Korea Institute for Sustainable Society, emphasize this tendency, “high level of public
acceptance of media campaigns has been one of major forces that resulted in vigorous
policy implementations for separate waste collection, recycling, and energy-saving
practices.”
66
Along with the media effects, the Internet has been a critical means for people to
get environmental information on a diverse range of issues from central and local
governments, civic organizations and the media. In particular, the Internet allowed the
public to become more active in contacting local and national governments. For example,
civil petitions or queries can be submitted through the Ministry of Environment websites
or recycling divisions of local governments.
67
Their role has not been limited to merely
following government directives for separate waste collection; it also included active
learning of the ways to change their lifestyles, monitoring community efforts, and making
suggestions for more practical application of programs through diverse neighborhood
commissions and environmental organizations.
66
Interview with Mihwa Kim, director of the Korea Zero Waste Movement Network (former SSeuSihyup) (June 8,
2009).
67
For government-citizen interaction through website of the Ministry of Environment,
http://eng.me.go.kr/docs/qna/qna.html?cat=630
To disseminate information on recycling practices, the Ministry of Environment formed a separate website,
“Environment in Our Life” through http://lifewaste.me.go.kr/.
151
As a result, a public opinion poll on separate waste collection system in 2000
showed that the public had been active in different implementation stages of the reforms.
95.4 % of women in Seoul were interested in the separate collection system. 44.2 % of
the respondents said they were highly interested in the system, and 51.2 were somewhat
interested.
68
In municipal programs, for example, it was surprising to witness high level
of public participation in food waste collection
69
although it requires frequent separation
and removal of the waste to community food waste bins (due to the composting character
of the waste). In 2006, separate collection rate of food waste was 96 % while it was a
mere 21.8 % in 2002.
70
The economic incentives system also explains the differences in public
involvement in policy implementation. From the start, the research team devised the
volume/unit-based waste bag as an incentive system to apply the polluter-pays principle.
Until the mid 1990s, reward programs were used to check illegal dumping (Shim, 2002).
However, economic incentives to use less Jongryangje bags created minimal financial
benefits for users. More importantly, the TNS surveys on public attitudes display higher
levels of public willingness to pay extra for waste collected for recycling in Korea (52%)
68
Public Opinion Poll on Household Separate Waste Collection, October 26-27, 2000, City of Seoul.
69
Earthworm pottery for food waste disposal also depicts government-NGO partnership in recycling reforms. Proposed
by Hun-Guen Choi, director of National Institute of Environmental Research, under the ME, with his colleague, Hae-
Chul Lee, Charge of the Environmental Protection Department, in Goyang City, the earthworm decomposition system
and multilevel flower pottery is designed to keep earthworm as the medium of organic decomposition. The designs
were awarded a special prize by the National Science Museum in September 1999 and a High Prize in 2000. Their
independent research attracted attention of numerous environmental organizations that work for waste minimization
and prevention. Organizations and institutions, including Eco-Buddha, One-Buddhism, YMCA, KFEM, SSeuSihyup,
and Gyeseong Girl’s High School, have worked together with Mr. Choi and Mr. Lee to spread the use of the multilevel
flower pottery. The multilevel flower-earthworm pottery has been also well reported through environmental journals,
such as Organic Resources Society under ENVICO, Monthly Environment 21, Envinews, as well as leading daily
newspapers. In as much as strict separate collection of food waste has been enforced in Korea, the multilevel flower-
earthworm pottery has been welcomed by people as an organic practice to decompose food waste in a natural way.
70
2009 Recycling Reports, Korea Resource Recycling Institutes, 486.
152
than in France (41%) (Table 3-6, Q6). Therefore, cultural differences account for a larger
part of the difference in level of public support for reform programs between Korea and
France. Also, in temporal contexts within the country, the explicit regulatory structures
and institutional measures for “mandatory” policies seem to have cultivated a political
culture that values waste prevention and reduction efforts over time. Just as political
culture shapes public attitudes toward government environmental initiatives, public
participation in reform programs for about fifteen years seems to have formed an
important part of public attitudes toward environmental issues.
3.5. Conclusion: Global, Regional and National Effects on the Reform Processes
Both expected and unanticipated findings could be drawn from the comparative
case analysis. The effect of national policy legacies and political culture turned out to be
highly resilient in both France and Korea. The ramification of globalization and
regionalization, however, calls for a more contextual understanding of the reform
processes within the different political and geographical settings.
The comparative analysis reinforces the significance of national policy legacies
and political culture in shaping the prospects of environmental policy reform. In France,
consensus-oriented policy processes—drawn from the nonconfrontational policymaking
of the MEC, acute local heterogeneity, and antidirigism—have brought about gradual and
moderate recycling reform. In Korea, based on national leadership’s and bureaucrat’s
administrative discretion and a collectivist political culture, swift and radical
policymaking legacies prevail over recycling policy reform dynamics. Accordingly,
despite the less industrialized economy and weak institutional power of the Ministry of
153
Environment, unprecedentedly extensive Jongrayngje, a mandatory separate waste
collection and recycling system, was promoted in the early 1990s in the Asian country.
The analysis also exhibits the critical importance of national policy
entrepreneurship in enabling more far-reaching recycling reforms. In the countries where
centralized policymaking has been pervasive, reformist policymakers and their policy
networks initiated the policy reorientations. In Korea, consciously vigorous, “mimetic”
policy adoption was pursued by Director Shim and his research team in Resource
Recycling Division (RRD) under the Ministry of Environment (MEN), based on their
ingenious administrative policy instruments. Even without direct connections to foreign
policy origins, the RRD formulated a comprehensive waste management and recycling
system to ameliorate landfill saturation problems. As the reformist policymakers and the
RRD gained presidential and ministerial support, centralized policy legacies were reified
as swift, radical, and extensive waste management and recycling reform. Thus, despite a
weak ministerial position, the MEN overcame grave opposition from progrowth
ministries and business/corporations. Moreover, as the first government subsidies for
civic environmental organizations in the administrative history, RRD’s new public
funding for the recycling pilot program effectively embraced local governments,
environmental organizations, and the public as their allies. In addition, civic
organizations and their public campaigns have been a crucial basis for inspiring public
environmental consciousness and support for reform. Not only during the policy
formulation phase but also during policy implementation, reformers deliberately
exploited the collectivist political culture and the growing number of civic environmental
154
organizations as significant resources for mandatory waste separation and recycling
systems.
In France, policymakers have been inclined to make the most of their consensus-
oriented, gradual policy making legacy; although antidirigism and long-standing localism
have had a constraining effect on systemic recycling reform, the Ministry of Ecology
(MEC) has exploited strong corporate environmentalism to establish industry-targeted,
EPR-based recycling systems. Along with voluntary mechanisms for a municipal
recycling system, the EPR policies have been highly efficient in France, especially in
packing standard regulations.
As a “regulatory state” (Pollack and Ruhlman 2009), “agenda-setter”
(Christoffersen 2009), and “policy pusher” (Bennett 1991) for its member countries, EU
directives have been the most significant precursor to coercive and diffusive policy
adoption processes in France. By lobbying to commissions and to sectorally specialized
policymaking structures in the EU, environmental organizations, corporate environmental
enterprises, and the government directly and indirectly affected the policy framework of
the EU. As EU directives set the “direct coercive transfer” mechanism for environmental
policy adoption, France has been committed to transposing regional policy principles into
national laws and regulations.
In contrast, without such regional policy obligations, and yet facing imminent
landfill saturation problems, reform-minded officials and environmental
institutes/organizations were the pivotal architects of mimetic policy adoption and
innovation in Korea. Thus, the effect of regionalization should be understood within the
national political context; the more integrative and progressive EU environmental
155
directives have not always been conducive to extensive environmental reform at the
national level. Even without the regional imperatives— and yet drawn from the German
Green Dot system— mimetic policy adoption efforts in Korea contributed to
crossregional policy transfer.
Counterintuitively, the direct and intervening effects of global environmental
institutions were much higher in Korea than in France (Tables 3-4 and 3-5). In Korea,
environmental organizations with professional expertise and transnational networks have
been fostered by global institutions, such as the 1987 Basel Conference and 1992 Earth
Summit. Korean organizations were mostly formed around the 1992 Rio conference, and
diffusive global environmental policy norms, like the 3R recycling principles, which
were translated into national regulatory frameworks. Global environmental institutions
and their policy norms were also actively exploited by policymakers in defending and
promoting extensive regulations at the national and local level. In particular, OECD
Environmental Performance Reviews were used as a critical policy instrument for the
reformers to persuade antireformist, progrowth government officials, corporate groups
and the public.
In France, the global effect was an important basis for regional and national
policy debates, and yet it was slightly less visible than in Korea; major EU directives for
recycling reform started to be formulated even before the global policy debates became
high-pitched. Also, major environmental organizations in France were established before
the global conferences or the 1972 Stockholm conference. Recycling policies in France
have been legitimized and promoted primarily through coercive EU directives and
regional policy frameworks. Even global policy principles of the 3R strategies were
156
reframed and reconstituted within EU policy directives, which were then transposed into
the national regulatory frameworks.
In the increasingly multilayered governance, environmental organizations and
their transnational networks have been indispensible and constructive forces for reform.
Surprisingly, while antienvironmentalist interests of business and corporations are
pervasive across countries, corporate environmental associations in France have been
highly influential in pressuring EU commissions and the national government to enact
stricter, EPR-based regulatory reforms. Thus, not only effective as a channel for policy
diffusion, environmental organizations have facilitated the “indirect coercive transfer” of
regulatory reform.
Table 3-4: Comparative Outcome of Hypotheses on the Effect of External and Internal Factors on Environmental Reforms
157
Country
Hypotheses
France Korea
H1.1:
Global environmental institutions and
intergovernmental policy networks, such as the
UNEP, are expected to induce convergent, high
level reform discourses and initiatives in both
established and transitional democracies in
France (H1-1-1) and Korea (H1-1-2).
Partially Supported: Waste prevention and
recycling policies in France have been legitimized
and promoted primarily through coercive EU
directives and regional policy frameworks.
Supported: Global environmental institutions and
their policy norms (e.g., OECD Environmental
Performance Reviews) have been important policy
instruments for reform-minded policy
entrepreneurs in Korea.
H1.2.
The effect of international institutions has been
a significant intervening variable in fostering
transnational linkages of environmental
organizations, which in turn broaden the
likelihood of adopting foreign policy norms in
national policy paradigms in France (H1.2.1)
and Korea (H1.2.2).
Partially supported:
In France, environmental organizations have
strengthened their transnational ties mostly with
organizations in neighboring countries.
Nonetheless, French organizations have
developed international linkages with foreign
groups even in a world of nation states, since the
late 19
th
century, long before the Basel
Conference or the 1975 Stockholm Conference.
Supported:
In Korea, most environmental organizations have
been formed in the early 1990s, stimulated by the
1992 Earth Summit. Drawing on international
policy norms and discourses, environmental
organizations have led diffusive policy adoptions
at the national level, including the EPR system.
H2.1:
Regional influences are expected to create
divergent policy processes in European and
Asian regions; the coercive effects of
regionalization on environmental policy reforms
are likely to be higher in France than in Korea,
due to highly integrated European policy
frameworks and their policy directives.
H2.2:
The effect of regionalization is likely to induce a
divergent scope of policy reform in the
European and Asian regions; the integrative EU
policy framework is conducive to higher levels of
diverse environmental reform in the established
democracy than in the transitional democracy.
Supported: The environmental policy process in
France is led by the “direct coercive transfer”
through EU policy directives, and regulatory
changes have been based on EU frameworks.
Unsupported:
EU environmental directives have not functioned
as all-encompassing environmental policy
frameworks. Based on the regional directives,
France has exhibited notable progress in many
environmental policy arenas, such as energy mix
and CO2 emissions, as is shown in the SGI
indicators in 2009. France, however, does not
show significant progress in its recycling and
waste management policies, compared to its other
environmental policy developments.
Supported: policymaking in Korea has not been
subject to any regional policy imperatives.
Regional institutions have not engendered any
binding decisions but have facilitated
crossnational discussion of broader policy
frameworks and best practice examples.
Unsupported:
Even without regional policy imperatives, the
transitional democracy has achieved more
comprehensive waste management and recycling
reforms than its European counterpart.
Table 3-4: Continued
H3.1:
National policy legacies shape the scope and
intensity of policy reform.
H3.1.1:
Conditioned by longstanding
local heterogeneity, and the antidirigistic attitudes
of the public, the negotiation-oriented
policymaking legacy in France is likely to prevail in
the environmental reform processes, resulting in
incremental and gradual reform (H3.1.1).
H3.1.2:
The leadership- and bureaucrat-centered, swift
and radical policymaking legacy in Korea is likely
to lead the environmental reform processes.
Supported:
Policymakers have pursued gradual and
incremental reforms in recycling and waste
management, through the MEC’s traditionally
nonconfrontational policymaking.
Supported:
Policy entrepreneurs in Korea pursued rapid and
extensive recycling policy reforms through
centralized policy planning structures and mimetic
policy learning efforts.
H3.2:
Drawing on the past research on the increasingly
significant role of nongovernmental organizations
in policymaking processes (Stone 2004, Riss-
Kappen 1995), environmental organizations are
assumed to play critical roles in adopting the
reform policies.
H3.2.1:
In line with past research on prominent corporate
environmentalism in France (Keeler 1985; Levy
and Egan 1998; Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Szarka
2005; Avdagic and crouch 2006), corporate
groups and their transnational associations are
expected to have significant agency in the
recycling and waste management policy
processes.
H3.2.2:
As civic-oriented groups have been increasingly
active in Korea since the mid-1990s, civic
environmental groups are expected to be highly
active in the recycling reform process.
Supported:
National and transnational corporate
environmental networks have been critical non-
governmental agencies in the reform processes,
as recycling and waste management reform has
targeted industrial practices based on EPR
systems.
Supported:
Civic-oriented environmental groups have been
the most active nongovernmental actors in the
reform processes, as reforms are largely based on
mandatory public participation in the recycling
systems. Even for corporate-targeted EPR
reforms, the organizations’ pressures have been
effective in inducing corporate responsibility for
the reforms.
158
Table 3-4: Continued
H4.1:
Due to the growing environmentalism at both
the global and national level, it is assumed that
the public is highly engaged in recycling and
waste management efforts both in France and
Korea beginning in the1990s.
Unsupported
Not only parallel increases but also divergent developments of public engagement in reform programs
have been found: Public support for reform is higher in Korean than in France. As public
environmentalism and attitudes toward environmental protection in Korea are not significantly higher
than those in France across the survey questionnaires, it is hardly true that growing environmentalism
alone has led to a higher level of public support for the recycling and waste management reforms in
Korea than in France.
H4.2.1:
State structures and activities of states form
political culture, which in turn affect the political
capacities and attitudes of the public. Hence, it
is assumed that political culture against dirigistic
policy, as well as localism in France has bred a
lower level of public participation in reform,
especially in the policy implementation
processes.
H4.2.2:
Traditional political culture, centered on
collectivism and nationalism, leads to a higher
level of public participation in recycling and
waste reduction programs in Korea than in
France.
Supported:
Historical anti-dirigism, localism, and
geographically contextual effects of the political
culture in France have led to a modest level of
public participation in the reform processes.
Supported:
A traditional political culture centered around
collectivism and nationalism has led to higher
level of public participation in mandatory reforms
in Korea. Earlier reform dynamics show that the
policymakers actively sought to inspire public
environmentalism and collectivism by
incorporating the political culture into crucial
reform strategies.
Table 3-5: Municipal and House Household Waste Generation (kg/capita) and Recycling Rates (paper/cardboard, glass)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
FR 450 480 510 540 Municipal waste
KR 710
390 360 380
FR 350 340 350 350 Household waste
KR -
340 310 320
FR 34 34 34 36 36 39 42 41 43 46 47 49 51 53 54 55 Recycling
rates_paper
KR 44
43 44 46 51 53 55 57 58 59 60 62 64 66 69
FR 41 44 46 48 50 50 52 55 55 55 55 55 58 58 62 Recycling
rates_glass KR 46 45 43 44 46 57 60 68 66 66 67 69 74 70 72
Sources: OECD Environmental Data Compendium 2006-2008
159
Table 3-6: Surveys on Public Attitudes Toward Environmental Issues
160
Survey Q Questionnaire
France Korea
1
Condition of Natural Environment in the World excellent/very good
good
1
7
4
11
2
Condition of Natural Environment in Own Country excellent/very good
good
2
25
7
22
3
Environmental Problem Most Concerned with Air pollution
Water pollution
Toxic waste
Nuclear waste
Deforestation
Overdevelopment
Something else
None
26
19
12
10
18
13
1
1
41
20
8
5
9
16
1
0
4
Have Changed Behavior to Benefit Environment a great deal
a good amount
7
30
3
16
5 Aware of the term, ‘Carbon Footprint’ 21 12
6 Willing to pay extra for waste collection to recycle 41 52
7 Willing to pay extra for environmentally friendly products 48 81
8
Do governments downplay environmental issues? 15% Completely agree
18% Pretty much agree
6% Pretty much disagree
6% Completely disagree
15
18
6
6
14
31
3
1
TNS
9
Do the media downplay environmental issues? Completely agree
Pretty much agree
Pretty much disagree
Completely disagree
7
10
11
11
4
19
8
6
Synovate 10
Feelings regarding the effects of climate change Concerned
Neither concerned nor unconcerned
Somewhat concerned
Not at all concerned
Not at all concerned in fact quite pleased
about the climate change
Not at all concerned because it is a natural
cycle of events
Do not believe that the climate is changing
Don’t know
72.3
16.8
4.1
2.2
2.8
6.8
-
-
59.4
20.8
7.2
5.6
0.8
0.6
0.2
4.6
161
Table 3-6: Continued
11
Have you personally done any of the following to
reduce the effects of climate change in the past year?
Any(net)
Bought green products
Bought or plan to buy smaller car
Bought energy-efficient devices
Improved home insulation
Informed self about climate change
Joined a lobby group
Encouraged friends or colleagues to reduce
the effects of climate change
Re-cycled waste
Reduced use of packaging and bags
Reduced water consumption
Saved power
Changed travel activities
Off-set carbon consuming activities
Had green tariffs on bills
None of these
96.3
36.3
10.5
49.9
26.5
17.3
2.6
19
75.6
69.1
60.9
78.9
4.2
10.1
-
3.7
97.3
51.7
20.1
55.4
21.7
72.1
3
27.9
89.7
70.5
65.2
72.3
43.5
19.1
-
2.7
12
Confidence in environmental protection movement 2.31
2.25
Higher
13
Protecting environment v. economic growth 1.50
Higher
1.76
World
Value
Survey
14
Membership in environmental organizations .21
Higher
.10
TNS: TNS Kantar Group Company Research Survey interviewed 13,128 respondents across 17 countries in 2008, analyzing green attitudes, perceptions and
behaviors.
Synovate: Synovate Global Omnibus survey on climate change interviewed 14,220 respondents across 21 countries in 2007. The first question included 458
respondents in France and 500 in Korea; second question included 427 respondents in France and 437 in Korea.
World Value Surveys: the year of survey for France is 2006; Korea 2005. For the three questionnaires, 986 respondents in France and 1199 in Korea
answered for the first question (1 a great deal; 2 quite a lot; 3 not very much; 4 not at all); 999 in France and 1196 in Korea for the second question (0 not a
member; 1 inactive member; 2 active member); and 963 in France and 1197 in Korea for the third question (1 strongly agree; 2 agree; 3 disagree; 4 strongly
disagree).
162
CHAPTER 4. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCACY
NETWORKS (TEANs) AS ENABLING POLICY NETWORKS AND AVENUES
OF POLICY DIFFUSION
Transnational environmental advocacy networks (TEANs) are increasingly
regarded as important actors in policy processes, as they gain a range of political
opportunities in multilevel governance, and are thus able to reshape the scope of national
policy reform. Comprising one of the important causal forces that drive policy
convergence across countries, TEANs are considered pivotal actors in policy diffusion
dynamics that link supranational-regional-national-domestic policy processes. In policy
transfer research, regional or international institutions have been considered the main
forces bringing about crossnational policy adoption through their “harmonization” or
“imposition/penetration/coercion” effects on policy convergence. Meanwhile, TEANs
are considered an increasingly important agent for diffusing policy norms and ideas that
may or may not be adopted by national policymakers (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Busch &
Jorgens 2005; Stone 2004).
Past policy transfer literature, however, illuminates either global or domestic
dynamics for policy adoptions, with less focus on TEANs (Bennett 1991). While
highlighting the ever more important role of TEANs in policy transfer and diffusion,
recent literature still largely focuses on explanatory analysis at the global level, without
considering regional contexts (Busch & Jorgens 2005; Stone 2004; Hoberg 2001;
Holzinger & Knill 2005). Even Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) meticulous framework of
policy transfer only briefly mentions the role of transnational NGOs as “indirect coercive
163
mechanisms.” Also, the literature largely centers on the crossnational diffusion of
socioeconomic policies such as financial liberalization or welfare reform.
Thus, missing from policy transfer research is a more comprehensive comparative
analysis of the TEANs’ effect on the scope of national policy adoptions in increasingly
interlocking, multilevel—international, regional, transnational, and national—governance.
Inasmuch as countries have shown dissimilar scopes of environmental policy adoption,
even under common global or regional institutions, the active intervention of TEANs in
policy reform should explain the rest of transnational dimension of policy processes that
result in divergences across countries. Therefore, this comparative research aims to
investigate the role of TEANs in recycling policy reform in France and Korea, as TEANs
act as policy entrepreneurs in dissimilar domestic-regional-international nexuses.
In the context of major research questions set forth in Chapter 1, therefore, this
chapter seeks to examine the relationship between TEANs and the various levels of
domestic, regional, and international actors and institutions, and their impact on recycling
reform processes since the 1990s in the countries of study. While the significant role of
TEANs in “diffusive” policy adoption is assumed in general, this chapter will examine
the concrete ways in which the intertwining effects of the TEANs, supranational
institutions, policymakers, and the public have enabled or circumscribed national policy
adoptions. To what extent have TEANs strengthened their transnational ties to affect
policy diffusion in France and Korea? Within divergent regional and national milieus,
how do the institutional structures enable or constrain the TEAN’s conscious efforts to
promote progressive environmental reform? To what extent have the activities of the
TEANs differed in their “enabling” strategies to motivate the reforms of the regionally
164
different European and Asian countries? These questions will serve the basis of an
analytic approach to explicating the increasingly significant yet divergent roles of TEANs
in the recycling reform dynamics of France and Korea.
Theoretically, hypothesizing the role of TEANs in motivating and diffusing
policy adoption is important to specifying the actors’ effects on policy processes in the
comparative settings. Past research on policy adoption mechanisms has generally
focused on either diffusion (Elkins & Simmons 2005; Bush & Jorgens 2005; Weyland
2006) or emulation (Bennett 1991; Dimaggio & Powell 1991) in explaining policy
convergence. I suggest that the concepts of “interdependent and yet uncoordinated”
diffusion and more “conscious learning” of emulation are analytically distinctive,
independent categories for investigating the causal dynamics of policy reform and
adoption. Along with coercive mechanisms, emulation and diffusion should be used as
equal conceptual frameworks that explain voluntary policy adoption, rather than as
analytically different levels of concepts. If emulation is categorized as part of
diffusion— or ignored from major policy transfer mechanisms, as is now— conscious
efforts to adopt policy norms and practices even “without direct contacts” among actors
may not be explained. Even when it is analyzed as an overarching concept to describe
both adaptation and learning (Elkins & Simmons 2005), “diffusion” has not elucidated
the consciously vigorous and rational search for a policy model from geographically and
culturally dissimilar regions (Ibid., 42-45). In global era in which indirect
communication and information acquisition are prevalent, researchers must distinguish
emulative policy adoptions, as well as diffusions; whereas diffusive patterns of policy
adoption are more easily noticeable, mimetic emulation illuminates distinctive public
165
policy innovations in an unexpected place. Moreover, emulative adoptions can explain
effective and successful policy transfer cases drawn from more aggressive lesson-
drawing efforts that learning based on bounded rationality cannot (Rose 1993; Dolowitz
& Marsh 2000; Lopes & Durfee 1999).
Pragmatically, the similar and differing strategies of TEANs in France and Korea
elucidate their roles in advancing diverse environmental policies in the geographically
different countries. High-profile, enabling networks have been increasingly effective
strategies engaged by TEANs to promote reform in both established and transitional
democracies. At the same time, in France, traditionally “low-profile” strategies used by
enabling networks have been developed due to more professionalized types of TEANs, in
the form of long-standing environmental “epistemic communities,” predominant
corporate environmentalism, industry-oriented recycling reforms, definitive EU
directives on the reform prospects, and negotiation-oriented gradual policy reform
legacies. Korean TEANs exhibit very different tactics. The often high-profile strategies
should be explicated based on diverse domestic and external factors, including: the more
civic-oriented types of environmental organizations; far-reaching mandatory recycling
schemes based on public participation as well as industries’; extensive and swift policy
reform legacies; and the lack of supranational imperatives with regard to the policy arena.
Thematically, this chapter highlights the increasingly professionalized and
transnationalized character of environmental organizations in the established and
transitional democracies. In analyzing the greater transnationalization of Korean
organizations’ than French groups, I emphasize the significance of the TEANs’ conscious
pursuit of policy learning/emulation in policy adoptions. Even without regional policy
166
imperatives that are conducive to policy diffusion, the TEANs have enacted emulative
efforts in Korea that have allowed them to serve as avenues of crossnational and
crossregional policy diffusion. Furthermore, highly integrated regional structures may
have a counter-intuitive effect on the organizations’ transnational policy learning; though
they may prompt policy diffusion among the member countries, the coercive policy
transfer mechanisms of the EU may also limit emulative efforts for policy learning from
non-EU countries because of cognitive/cultural constraints and bounded rationality.
Conversely, the absence of regional cooperative or coercive frameworks may in fact
provoke the organizations to undertake a more aggressive pursuit of transnational
networks and policy learning beyond their regional boundaries. Without the TEAN’s
conscious learning efforts, broad transnational channels do not readily signify a higher
level of policy diffusion and adoption across the countries.
4.1. Types of Environmental Organizations Within and Across borders: their
Professionalization and Transnationalization
The professionalization of environmental organizations has enhanced the
credibility and legitimacy of their advocated policy agendas, which are often new or
unfamiliar to the public and policymakers in different fields. Equipped with professional
staff and experts, these organizations have undertaken a broad range of efforts, including
activities in public education, issue campaigns, lobbying, and publishing reports or policy
proposals for the government and international governmental organizations (IGOs).
Different from small-scale, local volunteer organizations that mostly work for public
campaigns and rely on blocking strategies through an “ecology of protests,” professional
167
organizations have been able to enact an “ecology of results”— activities that enable
substantial accomplishments (Hoschstetler & Keck 2007, 101). Specialized expertise
also allows the organizations to focus on technical research and the development of
alternative policy content and instruments, which can be practically applicable to
domestic settings.
The professionalization of environmental organizations has strengthened the effect
of civil environmental organizations and corporate groups on state decision making
processes. Nonprofit private corporations and their interfirm cooperation often seek to
promote national and crossnational environmental regulatory regimes (Wilson 1982;
Keeler 1985; Levy & Egan 1998; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Lipschetz & Fogel 2002; Lyon
& Maxwell 2004; Szarka 2000). As expert groups and “representative” private
associations, environmental corporations have dealt with public authorities on various
“normatively progressive social agendas,” such as ecolabeling certification and
sustainable forestry standards (Hall & Biersteker 2002, 14; Lipschetz & Fogel 2002).
Hence, it has been posited that organizational professionalization is conducive to policy
diffusion or isomorphism. Legitimate norms drawn from professional expertise are
highly promulgated and thus effectively diffusing among professional associations and
networks (Dimaggio & Powell 1991, 71; Hoschstetler & Keck 2007). The professional
networks are in turn highly likely to be consulted by policymakers through government
committees and public forums.
At the same time, the transnationalization of organizations reinforces
accountability for and the legitimacy of their activities, as the crossnational advocacy of
policy preferences symbolizes more generally acceptable norms in different sociopolitical
168
settings. Drawing upon a “norm-entrepreneurial” role of advocacy alliance, professional
organizations with transnational networks have increasingly gained a firmer basis for
their specialized policy norms, which appeal to broader international audiences (Haas
1992; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Hoschstetler & Keck 2007).
The dense networks of these organizations have also been recognized as indicative of
actors’ structural position to frame and direct action, as an important source of
“diffusion” (Fligstein 1991, 335). The effect of transnational network linkages on
“policy convergence” has been widely recognized by policy transfer research, social
movement studies, transnational advocacy network theories, and constructivist theories in
international relations (Bennett 1991; Hall 1993; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Stone
2004; Bush & Jorgens 2005; Radaelli 2000; Hoberg 2001; Evans & Davies 1999;
Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1998; Rogers 1998; Imig & Tarrow 2001; Robinson
2001; Saunier 2002).
Thus, transnational advocacy network theories highlight the unprecedented
crossnational linkage of advocacy coalitions at multiple levels, which have compelled
changes in national policy for countries even with dissimilar institutional structures
(Keck & Sikkink 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). These networks act as crucial
nodes that impart successful policy examples and urge the institutionalization of non-
traditional, newer policy frameworks across different global regions. Therefore, higher
levels of organizational transnationalization denote a broader scope of policy learning
and information exchange with other groups in different countries. It is expected that the
transnational networks will consequently contribute to effective consensus building,
agenda framing, and reform prospects in targeted countries.
169
The first set of hypotheses to be tested in this section is based on theoretical and
historical accounts of transnational networks of professional environmental organizations.
The researcher both assumes that globalization and regionalization foster transnational
linkages among environmental organizations, and expects the transnationalization of
environmental organizations to be higher in France (due to the more integrative effect of
European regionalization) than in Korea (H5.1). Furthermore, the higher level of
transnationally networked environmental organizations in France than in Korea is likely
to induce a higher level of policy diffusion in France than in Korea (H5.2). Empirical
findings around H5.2 have important implications for the study of policy transfer and of
state-society/group relations research. Outcomes will clarify the extent to which TEANs
have strengthened or limited national political capacities to address domestic
environmental issues, to adopt alternative policy models, and to institutionalize
progressive reforms.
In an attempt to examine characteristics, activities, and networks of environmental
organizations that work on recycling and waste management reform as their major or
partial tasks, I designed a set of Environmental Organizations (EO) Survey questionnaires
based on the 1998 Global Environmental Survey conducted by the Center for the Study
of Democracy at University of California, Irvine (UCI) (Appendix C). The structured
survey was sent to 35 organizations in France and Korea in 2008-2009; 23 environmental
organizations, nonprofit environmental corporations and research institutes in each
country returned their responses. Fifteen from France and 12 from Korea participated in
follow-up interviews in December 2009 and June 2009, respectively.
170
Levels of professionalization were considered based on the organizations’ self-
identification or on having a 2/3 portion of professional experts in environmental arenas
or related fields. Most environmental organizations in both countries showed some level
of professionalization as they have increasingly developed their specialized activities by
recruiting environmental experts and scientists. Even when they focus on civic-oriented
activities such as grassroots campaigns or neighborhood activities, most organizations
have either an outside advisory committee or professional membership. Thus, levels of
professionalization were divided into lower, medium, and higher degrees. Some of the
highly professionalized organizations conduct civic-oriented activities along with their
professional tasks.
Transnationalization was assessed based on the Survey Questionnaires 22-n
(Appendices C and D). The question asks whether the organizations use contact with
international environmental groups or groups from another nation to exchange
information, coordinate activities, or attend transnational/international meetings. Levels
of transnationalization were measured as higher, medium, and lower for organizations
that describe their contact as “very often” or “often,” “sometimes,” and “rarely,”
respectively.
171
Table 4-1: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental
Organizations in France
Higher
7
(30.4%)
1
(4.3%)
6
(26%)
Medium
11
(47.8%)
1
(4.3%)
10 (43.5%)
Lower
5
(21.7%)
1
(4.3%)
1
(4.3%)
3 (13%)
Transnationalization
1
(4.3%)
3
(13.0%)
19 (82.6%)
Lower
Medium
Higher
Professionalization
Table 4-2: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental
Organizations in Korea
Higher
13
(56.5%)
2
(8.7%)
11 (47.8%)
Medium
4
(17.4%)
2
(8.7%)
2
(8.7%)
Lower
6
(26.1%)
3 (13.0%)
1
(4.3%)
2
(8.7%)
Transnationalization
3
(13.0%)
5
(21.7%)
15 (65.2%)
Lower
Medium
Higher
Professionalization
As shown in Table 4-1, the professionalization of environmental organizations is
higher in France than in Korea. However, as opposed to H5-1, their transnationalization
172
turned out to be higher in Korea than in France. In France, most environmental
organizations have grown into more institutionalized groups with professional staffs and
national offices/headquarters. About one-seventh of environmental organizations has
worked primarily as a nonprofit research institute that analyzes resource recycling
mechanisms and supports the technical needs of governmental and industrial efforts for
recycling reform (Appendix D). For example, ProRecyclage, AFITE, ATEE, and
FEDEREC are largely composed of scientists and technical experts and provide
industries with policy information on WEEE regulations through their organized websites,
forums, and direct consulting. Also notable is that corporate environmental organizations
and their associations have been highly active in France. French corporations have
actively sought their interests in green industries as the recycling policies are based on
EPR systems that prioritize industrial duty (Keeler 1985; Lyon & Maxwell 2004; Szarka
2000; McCauley 2008).
Meanwhile, along with their increasingly professionalized characters, most
environmental organizations in Korea are still preoccupied with civic-oriented activities,
including public campaigns, education programs, and neighborhood meetings. The
professionalization of organizations in Korea has manifested as university professors,
scientists, environmental experts, former government officials, and former news reporters
playing specialized roles in promoting far-reaching recycling reforms. For example, Jae-
Hyun Oh in the Korean Institute of Resource Recycling (KIRR), as an engineer and as a
professor at the Yeonsei University, has sought to provoke both public and private
awareness of the indispensability of vehicle recycling based on the EPR, which requires
industrial responsibilities beyond the present emphasis on civic conscientiousness. As a
173
TEAN, KIRR holds a biannual East Asian Resource Recycling Symposium, with Asian
organizations seeking to enact vehicle recycling laws in their own countries. Former
prime minister Goh Kun’s recruitment into the Climate Change Center also signifies the
environmental group’s effort to enhance its organizational capacities to affect national
policy processes. As the mayor of Seoul and prime minister, Mr. Goh has shown
environmental concern in his past policies, such as by converting the saturated landfill,
Nanjido, to Seoul World Cup Park. The professionalization of environmental
organizations has been also encouraged through government support in the form of
various subsidies, starting with the Jongryangje pilot programs and other reform-related
project funding.
71
At the same time, even for the most highly professionalized groups in Korea, with
many members who are scientific experts and professionals, civic-oriented public
campaigns are still considered an important part of their action strategies to promote
policy norms and to pressure the government. For example, the Korea Zero Waste
Movement Network (KZWMN or Korea Zero Waste 21) emphasizes its preoccupation
with public campaigns; in order to legitimize its progressive agenda and to publicize
changes in the recycling policies to the public, KZWMN often exploits major national
news media.
72
The civic-oriented character has also been strengthened because some
environmental organizations have been staffed by former civic activists who worked for
71
Many environmental organizations claim that they have not received any more financial support from the
government since 2008 that they had since 1994 for the reforms and that they largely rely on donations and
membership fees of the public. Changes in the financial resources of the organizations imply both the significance of
national policy frameworks on fostering environmental activism and the organizations’ strategies (see more on resource
mobilization theory that posits a broad range of strategies for organizations with sufficient levels of labor, capital, and
network resources, as opposed to more confrontational strategies for organizations with poor resources (Eyerman and
Jamison 1991; Dalton et al. 2003; Imig and Tarrow 2001; McCauley 2008).
72
For example, KZWMN campaigned for consumer’s choice on the eco-label products and package
standards through Hangook Daily during summer 2009.
socioenvironmentalist campaigns in the 1980s and were trained abroad for environmental
or scientific professional expertise in foreign institutions. Moreover, as was reviewed in
Chapter 3, corporate environmentalism has been relatively underdeveloped in Korea,
where business interests have been largely formed around progrowth industrial interests
rather than through newer opportunities in the green industry.
The EO Survey analysis reveals that the transnationalization of environmental
groups is more conspicuous in Korea than in France. This finding turns the H5-1 upside
down and calls for an alternative explanation, one that will offer a more nuanced
contextual interpretation of the effects of globalization and regionalization on fostering
the transnational networks of environmental organizations.
Figure 4-1: Transnationalization of Environmental Organizations in France, by year
established
Figure 4-2: Transnationalization of Environmental Organizations in Korea, by year
established
174
175
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show that patterns of TEAN transnationalization have
differed significantly since the 1990s in the two countries. In Korea (Figure 4-2), most
environmental organizations started to establish themselves in the early 1990s and have
intensified their transnational networks. TEANs established more recently— since
1998— display high levels of transnationalization.
In France some environmental organizations were established as early as the
1940s (Figure 4-1). What is surprising about the French organizations’
transnationalization, however, is that their high level of network activity was sustained
from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s, and yet has exhibited decreasing tendencies
since the mid-1990s. It is ironic to see this decrease in a global era, as French
organizations have developed international linkages with foreign groups even in a world
of nation states, even in the 1850s, and from the 1940s to the early 1990s. As indicated
in Figure 4-1, the mean values illustrate a high level of transnationalization for French
TEANs established around the mean year of 1974. Their transnational activism
subsequently decreased, and a moderate level of transnationalization is shown for TEANs
established around 1980. Counterintuitively, in France, TEANs established more
recently— around 1994—reveal a much lower level of transnational activism.
The primary cause of this ironic contrast is the increasingly strong effect of
European integration, which compels member countries to enforce the national
transposition of regional environmental policy. Policymakers and environmental
organizations have been preoccupied with devising national policy frameworks that can
best implement the European directives in their national milieu, with less interest in
global policy debates outside the European region. As TEANs have become more
176
concerned with the direct effects of EU policy frameworks on their national policies, the
organizations’ transnational activities have dwindled somewhat. This indeed supports the
findings of Hypothesis 1-2 in Chapter 3. The creation of environmental organizations
and their transnational linkages in Korea have been highly affected by global institutions,
and yet the international effects on the French case have been less clear (Table 3-1).
More specifically, the French organizations’ strong “regional” linkages are much
more noticeable with the EU’s “direct coercive policy transfer” effect. This finding also
corresponds to the growing regionalization of environmental policymaking in the
European Union; since the late 1980s, EU environmental policies have been set forth
within the policy frameworks of the Delors I package in 1989, the Delors II package in
1992, and Agenda 2000 in 1997 (Wallace 2009; Pollack & Ruhlman 2009; Christoffersen
2009). Since the 1985 Single European Act, the EU has exerted a strong influence on
national environmental policies as a “regulatory state” with a steadily increasing acquis
of EU regulations and directives (Pollack & Ruhlman 2009, 44, 59, 61, 65), as well as a
critical regional agenda-setter (Christoffersen 2009, 85).
Table 4-3: Internationalization and Regionalization of the TEANs
Low
international/
regional
contact
Mostly with groups
in neighboring
countries
Contacts with groups
in neighboring
countries and groups
outside region
Mostly with
groups outside of
the region
Regionalization
only
Globalization and
regionalization
Globalization
only
France 1 16 3 2
Korea 4 10 8 2
The differing patterns of transnationalization in France and Korea are made
conspicuous in Table 4-3 as well. One of the EO Survey questionnaires (Q10) asked
environmental organizations to describe most of their contacts outside of their nation.
177
Globalized networks in Korea are more common than those in France, whereas TEAN
“regionalization” is higher in France than that in Korea. Organizations in France
demonstrate their networking patterns mostly within “regional” boundaries (with six
more organizations in France frequently contacting groups in neighboring countries than
those in Korea). Meanwhile, environmental organizations in Korea affirm that they seek
their network activities with groups in neighboring countries and groups outside of Asia.
4.2. Policy Transfer Mechanisms of Emulation, Diffusion, and Coercion.
Past research has generally assumed that globalization and regionalization foster
transnational linkages among environmental organizations (H5.1) and play an effective
role in policy diffusion (H5.2). Nevertheless, the comparative survey depicted the two-
sided effects of regionalization on the scope of environmental groups’ transnational
networks, as well as on the organizations’ effect on policy diffusion processes. TEANs in
France have been both enabled and constrained in their role in policy diffusion within the
EU; European regionalization enables TEANs to exploit a more direct, higher level of
contact for policy learning and diffusion within the region. At the same time, however,
EU directives limit TEAN’s roles in policy learning and diffusion among European and
non-EU countries.
First, TEANs were constrained by regional imperatives that mainly address
European issues. Due to its “bounded rationality,” with less information about policy
options that can be found beyond the EU policy frameworks, France has become more
concerned with regional issues and less motivated for non-European policy emulation
(Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Elkins & Simmons 2005). Furthermore, its policy learning
178
efforts have been constrained by cognitive and cultural policy routines, which influence
the TEANs to focus on national policy precedents for problem solving and not to search
for alternatives beyond the EU frameworks (Ripley in Neack, Hey & Haney eds. 1995;
Elkins & Simmons 2005). Interviews with French organizations and officials from the
ADEME elaborate more on their strategic and cultural attentiveness to domestic and
European issues than on their global environmental agendas. Also, EO survey responses
exhibit the TEANs’ higher concern with national issues than with international issues and
display more confidence in regional than international cooperation for solving
environmental problems in France.
73
Their cognitive and cultural limitations are also
conditioned by heterogeneous local policy interests that have been further strengthened
by institutional decentralization and the anti-dirigistic sentiment of the public. As a result,
national policy guidelines tend to develop their policy framework primarily to deal with
national and local agendas, within the context of coercive EU directives, rather than
within global policy debates.
Without definitive regional policy directives like the EU’s, however, TEANs in
Korea exhibit a higher level of policy learning from boundaries beyond their Asian
region. TEANs in Korea demonstrate higher levels of transnationalization than French
organizations, in that they are more actively engaged in communication with global
environmental institutions than their counterparts in France (Figures 4-1 and 4-2). The
EO Survey (9-e and f) also support these findings; TEANs in Korea have been more
73
Fifteen out of 21 organizations responded that they are more concerned with local and national issues than with
international issues. Five of them said they are equally concerned with national and international issues, and only one
organization said that it is more concerned with international issues. Also, 11 out of 17 organizations responded that
they are more in contact with groups in neighboring countries than with groups outside the region. Three of them said
that they are contacting groups in neighboring countries and groups outside the region. Moreover, whereas 19 out of
20 organizations showed that regional cooperation is effective in solving environmental problems within the region, 13
of them replied that international cooperation is effective in solving national environmental problems.
179
involved in seeking advice and technical information from outside than in transmitting
them, whereas those in France have been slightly more active in giving advice or
technical information to foreign groups/agencies than in receiving them.
74
Also, a
slightly larger number of organizations in Korea exhibit their activism for learning from
foreign groups and agencies than those in France.
Interestingly, however, organizations in Korea do not attribute their expanded
network resources for policy learning to “direct” information exchanges with
transnational networks. Although they exploit both direct and indirect contacts with their
transnational networks, TEANs highlight that they often find substantive information on
exemplary policies and regulative practices through “indirect” contacts and research, as
well as through direct information exchanges. In in-depth interviews, they explained that
they found reasons for these often unidirectional, indirect forms of policy learning from
conscious lesson-drawing and emulation efforts. Different from policy “diffusion,” in
which information exchanges and policy learning occur largely through “bounded
rationality” based on cultural, geographical, or cognitive proximity/familiarity (Bush and
Jorgens 2005; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Weyland 2006), emulative learning is more
rooted in highly conscious lesson-drawing efforts.
The distinction between diffusion and conscious effort of emulation entails
considerable critical implications for the analysis of policy transfer research. It is largely
assumed that policy diffusion is more likely to occur when structural conditions are
favorable for diffusive mechanisms, such as regional institutions like the EU, global
74
For Questionnaires 9-e and 9-f, for the TEANs in France, 11 organizations say that they have been “often” or
“sometimes” active in giving advice or technical information from foreign groups/agencies, than receiving them
“often” or “sometimes” (10 organizations), 14 organizations in Korea say have been more “often” or “sometimes”
concerned with getting advice and technical information from the outside than with transmitting them “often” or
“sometimes” (11 organizations).
180
institutions like the UNEP, or geographical and cultural familiarities among neighboring
countries (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Bush and Jorgens 2005; Elkins and Simmons 2005;
Weyland 2006). Conversely, without conditions that are conducive to learning based on
bounded rationality, diffusive policy learning is less likely to take place.
However, the findings reveal that the transnational organizations’ network density
with a larger number of foreign advocates may not be necessarily correlated with their
level of influence on policy learning. Meaningful policy learning among TEANs is
drawn more from “conscious” emulation processes than from diffusive structure of dense
transnational networks of the organizations. Even in the absence of direct connections to
external organizations or foreign governments, mimetic emulation is more likely to bring
about momentous learning processes for extensive environmental reform. Equally, even
within more institutionally, geographically, or culturally bound settings, policy adoption
would not take place without conscious adoption efforts on the part of the reformers.
Table 4-4: Conceptual Frameworks for Policy Adoption and Convergence Mechanisms
Literature Policy Adoption and Convergence Mechanisms
Bennett (1991)
emulation, elite networking, harmonization (based on international
agreements), penetration (by supranational/federal politico-economic
conditionality on national/local institutions)
Dimaggio and Powell
(1991)
mimetic process, coercive isomorphism, normative pressures
Dolowitz and Marsh
(1996)
voluntary transfer, indirect coercive transfer, direct coercive transfer
Dolowitz and Marsh
(2000)
Lesson-drawing(perfect rationality), lesson drawing (bounded rationality),
international pressures, conditionality, obligations,
direct imposition
Bush and Jorgens
(2005)
cooperative harmonization, coercive imposition, interdependent but
uncoordinated diffusion
Elkins and Simmons
(2005)
diffusion as adaptation to altered conditions (cultural norms; support groups;
and competition) and diffusion via learning (information cascades; learning
and availability; and learning and reference groups)
75
75
Elkins and Simmons provide one of the most thorough reviews of diffusion theories and explain “adaptation” and
“learning” as the main types of diffusion. Their “adaptation” includes its sub-categories of cultural norms (reputational
legitimacy), support groups (credibility and practical benefits from a networks of similar policy practices), and
competition (over resources). The “learning” mechanisms encompass information cascades (dependence on early
181
As shown in the Table 4-4, however, previous research often does not distinguish
emulation from diffusion or focuses only one of the mechanisms. Bennett (1991)
pinpoints the conceptual difference between emulation and diffusion:
[E]mulation and diffusion is not a synonym for diffusion: ‘any pattern of successive
adoption of a policy innovation’. In other words, emulation should not be inferred
from the successive adoption of similar policies by different sates in the absence of
any empirical evidence of conscious copying, lesson-drawing or adaptation
(Bennett 1991, 220. emphasis original).
Bennett (1991) deliberately excludes diffusion from his fourfold framework of
convergence processes of emulation, elite networking, harmonization, and penetration,
treating diffusion as more of a static outcome of policy convergence, and emulation as a
procedural motivation for the convergence. However, although “diffusion” can denote
both outcome and process of policy convergence, recent research has persuasively argued
that diffusion refers to “processes” characterized by “interdependent, but uncoordinated
decision making” (Busch & Jorgens 2005; Elkins & Simmons 2005). The processes are
interdependent due to mutual communicative mechanisms between the policy origin and
reformers, and uncoordinated because of noncoercive mechanisms. Thus, diffusion has
been recognized as one of the key processes of “interdependent and yet uncoordinated”
policy convergence, and emulation has been articulated as more “conscious” lesson
drawing than diffusion.
Therefore, my comparative analysis of TEANs suggests that the significant
differences between diffusion and emulation may be highlighted as distinctive analytical
categories for the study of policy convergence and adoption mechanisms. For, only
adopter’s choices), learning and availability (familiarity and most available policy models), and learning and reference
groups (imitation of policy models from geographically and culturally similar countries).
182
emulation can explain the conscious and innovative lesson-drawing policy adoption
efforts of TEANs, even without direct or “interdependent” contact with others, the latter
of which has been purported to be the main characteristic of diffusion.
76
Emulation is
also different from most diffusion processes that highlight bounded rationality as a major
learning mechanism.
In addition, in so far as both emulation and diffusion explain more voluntary
policy adoption processes, they should also be discerned from coercion. Thus, the
conceptual categories of conscious learning of emulation, interdependent and yet
uncoordinated diffusion, and coercion should be differentiated in order to capture major
types of policy adoption processes.
The comparative analysis demonstrates that meaningful policy adoption took
place when the TEANs and policymakers were highly motivated to consciously learn
foreign policy examples through mimetic, emulative mechanisms, even without direct
connection with foreign policy networks. Thus, it is important to differentiate mimetic
emulation from other policy adoption mechanisms in order to adequately understand
various policy reform processes that are taking place within unparallel, international,
regional, and national settings.
76
This is also applicable to the analysis of the Korean emulation of German recycling policy; without direct
intergovernmental contacts (at least in the initial stages), Director Shim tried to adopt the German Duales System to
more innovative forms in Korea, which he learned about before he became the director of the Resource Recycling
Division, ME, Korea. Interdependent contacts started only after director Shim launched his research team to
investigate the German model in detail, and thus the process can be characterized as emulative learning rather than
diffusion. An example can be also brought up to emphasize the analytically distinctive concepts of diffusion and
emulation; although neighboring countries seem to have structural conditions under which diffusion may easily take
place, recycling reforms in France have been very different from those in Germany in terms of the policy scopes,
contents, and instruments. Although France has been aware of the reputational system of recycling and waste
management in Germany, it asserts that the German model was not considered transferrable or “emulative” to the
French context (Interviews with Mr. Geldron, ADEME and Mr. Gislais, Eco-Emballages. Also see similar case on
France in Busch and Jorgens 2005, 877).
183
Meanwhile, Hypothesis 4.1, on the level of organizational transnationalization in
France vis-à-vis Korea, and the Hypothesis 4.2, on the effect of transnationalization on
levels of policy diffusion, are hardly supported in these cases. Just as Bennett notes that
studying the relationship between “state” autonomy and policy learning is a researchable
hypothesis (1991, 233), investigating TEANs’ effects on policy diffusion seems to be a
sensible research question. The findings illuminate the extent to which conscious
learning by the TEANs has enabled the diffusive and emulative mechanisms of policy
transfer and reform in France and Korea. The findings also highlight that the structural
condition of the organizations’ transnationalization may have counterintuitive effect on
their policy learning; coercive policy transfer mechanisms of the EU, as “policy
pusher[s]” (Bennett 1991, 228), prompt policy diffusion among the member countries
and yet constrain their emulative efforts for policy learning from non-EU countries.
Conversely, the absence of regional cooperative or coercive frameworks may provoke
organizations’ more aggressive pursuit of transnational networking and policy learning
beyond their regional boundaries. In addition, without conscious emulation efforts, broad
transnational channels do not automatically mean high levels of policy diffusion or policy
learning among TEANs.
4-3. TEANs as an Avenue of Policy Diffusion
The previous section highlights the multilevel, contextual significance in which
the conscious effort of TEANs works as a precondition for policy learning. This section
will examine the TEANs’ pivotal role in policy reform processes as an effective avenue
for policy learning and diffusion vis-à-vis other state actors. As theories of transnational
184
networks and environmental movements posit, “multiple access points to policy
processes” have served as a more significant organizational asset and strengthened
political capacity of the TEANs in different countries than ever before. In the “composite
polity” of Europe and in globalized multilevel network governance in Asia (Imig &
Tarrow 2001), TEANs have exploited diverse avenues to influence policy making
through their professional expertise and network strategies. Hochstetler and Keck’s
(2007) emphasis on “the centrality of networks in constructing political capacity”
highlights that the TEANs willfully seek to build their networks in order to utilize major
access points to policy processes (19). As such, a more nuanced question is raised as to
what extent the TEANs have been empowered in the policy reform process. Therefore, I
hypothesize that, having gained multiple access points to policy processes at transnational
and national levels, TEANs have been a major avenue for policy diffusion in both France
and Korea (H5.3).
In these countries, TEANs show that they have developed increasingly
professionalized, resourceful networks, and have “become an integral part of the process
of setting agendas … through their ability to spread ideas and information on an
international level”
77
(Dolowitz & Marsh 2000, 11). Interviews with key government
officials in the MEN of Korea reinforce that TEANs self-identify as significant sources of
policy diffusion, especially based on their transnational networking strategies. Director
Dong, in RRD, acknowledges the growing voice of TEANs in agenda setting, policy
formulation, and policy revision processes in Korea. In addition to the MEN’s
77
It should be noted that although Dolowitz and Marsh prefer the term “policy transfer” to “diffusion,” they indicate
that NGOs are an important agent to “spread” or diffuse policy norms across countries. With regard to the role of
NGOs, they assume both coercive and voluntary roles of their policy transfer. However, they do not differentiate the
effects of IGOs and NGOs in significant ways, and do not use the term, “diffusion” as a way of explaining the effect of
NGOs in policy transfer.
185
International Cooperation Office, RRD often consults with the NGOs to discuss foreign
policy models and practices in both formal and informal meetings. Director Cheverry, in
the Waste Management division, and Director Geldron, in the Recycling Division,
confirm a similar tendency in the policy process in France. NGOs, especially those with
larger domestic and transnational associations, are often invited to government
committees and informal meetings, as they are capable of presenting concrete policy
cases and more practical or workable policy strategies in the French context.
78
TEANs in France also demonstrate their function as an avenue of policy diffusion
between Brussels and localities as well as across countries. McCauley (2008) has noted
this aspect of their activities in his analysis of NATURA 2000. The European scheme of
N2000 required environmental groups to design and undertake their ecological programs
at local/regional levels, and to directly report the outcomes to Brussels. In so doing, the
environmental groups focused on exchanging practical policy strategies and regulatory
codes across localities and regions in order to design their local programs. They also
looked up the practices of neighboring countries in order to better devise their ecological
management plans. Thus, the organizations could strengthen political capacity through
the domestic/local political opportunity structures and through direct communications
with Brussels (8). In recycling and waste management reform, the Féderation de la
Récupération du Recyclage et de la Valorisation des Déchet (FEDEREC) and its
international network, Bureau of International Recycling (BIR), present examples of
organizations that have been a major means of policy communication between Brussels
and domestic recycling firms on regulatory information regarding textile recycling and
78
One of the example is the refinement of local waste sorting facilities based on the TEANs’ proposals.
186
trades. The French case confirms that nonprofit recycling organizations have worked as
an avenue of policy diffusions in the Brussel-Paris-local nexuses of policy process.
More importantly, TEANs in Korea have played an unexpected role as avenues of
EU policy diffusion. Because TEANS in Korea often use the more progressive recycling
directives of the EU as their reference points for domestic policy reforms, the effect of
European regionalization has been glimpsed in the policy processes of the Asian country.
For example, although Korea already had a “deposit system” as its industry-targeting
recycling regulation since 1992, TEANs mobilized around the KZWMN could
successfully induce the policy modifications with a new framework of EPR adoptions in
2003. Drawing on the European system, the EPR system further mandated business and
industrial duties as the new major skeleton of the policies. The discursive change in the
regulatory policies clearly illuminates the TEANs’ role in expanding the effect of EU
policy directives on the non-EU country.
Thus, as is generally posited, Hypothesis 5.3 is supported in that TEANs in both
countries have instigated a range of reform initiatives as they act as effective avenues of
crossnational policy diffusion (Bennett 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Risse-
Kappen 1995; Orenstein & Lindstrom 2008; Imig & Tarrow 2001; Stone 2004). At the
same time, the comparative analysis adds more significance to the role of TEANs; they
operate as avenues not only of crossnational but also of crossregional policy diffusion.
187
4.4. TEANs as Enabling Networks
Well-known images of transnational advocacy networks involve media-intensive
high-profile “blocking” strategies that promote undertaking confrontational campaigns
and placing issue-oriented political pressure on national or supranational regulatory
projects. TEANs are also often conceived in order to employ contentious tactics to
pressure governments to adopt progressive environmental agendas. Anti-nuclear
movements, Campaign against Climate Change, and anti-Belo Monte dam protests in
Brazil are just a few examples. These assumptions are reflected in studies that have
posited causal links between blocking networks and high-profile, media-intensive
strategies, as opposed to ones between enabling networks and low-profile maneuvers
(Hochstetler & Keck 2007, 19-20; Keck 2002; Keck & Sikkink 1998). As environmental
reforms have not traditionally been popular policy agendas, the organizations have often
used more high-profile, contentious strategies as an effective means of gaining broader
public attention and halting growth-centered projects (Keck 2002; Hochstetler & Keck
2007).
Meanwhile, resource mobilization, political opportunity theory, and social
movements theory note that groups with a range of strategic resources and a larger
window of political opportunities tend to involve more consensual activities (Imig &
Tarrow 2001; Marks & McAdam 1996, 1999; McCauley 2008, Rucht 2000). They also
posit that, “poorer resourced environmental groups are more likely to perform more
confrontational activities” (Dalton et al. 2003, 756). In their historical research, Imig,
Tarrow, and Rucht have maintained that environmental movements in Europe have
become less contentious, using more low-profile lobbying than protests since the 1980s,
188
especially after the mid-1990s (Imig & Tarrow 2001, 46; Rucht 2001, 135).
79
Environmental organizations increasingly utilize low-profile enabling networks that focus
on consensual regulatory policy reform. Imig and Tarrow also show that in non-EU
countries, contentious politics in general have remained at the same level during the
period of 1984-1997 (less contentious than their EU counterparts in 1984 and about three
times more contentious than those in 1997). Would these comparative analyses indicate
that TEANs in non-EU countries use more high-profile strategies as blocking networks
than TEANs in the European countries?
Different from generalized assumptions, the recent environmental movement
literature describes increasingly consensual strategies and institutional participation as
major tactics of environmental organizations in Korea, along with their still contentious,
blocking activities against developmentalist plans (Kim & Moon 2003; Kim & Cho 2009;
Jeong 2002). On the development of environmental organizations as substantial players
in national policy making in France, most analyses underline their engagement in both
enabling and blocking organizational strategies. In particular, analyses reveal the
idiosyncratic, fragmented characteristics of French government-interest group
relationships that no longer fit into corporatist, statist, or pluralist perspectives. Having
been relatively marginalized vis-à-vis other socioeconomic interest groups (e.g.,
agricultural corporatism) in the history of policy making processes in France,
environmental organizations have sought to expand their scope of influence in
79
In addition to increasingly rich resources on environmental organizations and their political opportunities, Rucht
finds the reasons for more cooperative network activities from relatively minor impact of environmental regulations in
general on people’s lives, which are not “obtrusive, direct and personally consequential enough” to wage
confrontations (139). Also, the EPR systems have been considered not entailing a direct, major effect on the public,
compared to other environmental agendas including anti-GMOs or antinuclear protest issues.
189
government policy circles through a series of inclusive (e.g., lobbying, institutional
participation in committees and councils) and exclusive strategies (e.g., protests, mass
mobilizations) as a means of achieving multiple objectives (McCauley 2008, 7).
The mere fact that the TEANs have developed both enabling and blocking
strategies, however, does not explain the ways in which they have interacted with
international and regional institutions, their governments, and the public, in order to
effectuate recycling policy reform in the different domestic settings. To fully understand
how TEANs have been empowered or constrained in reform processes within
international, regional, and national milieus, I examine the operational strategies they are
motivated to use in order to heighten policy diffusion and adoption prospects in their
countries. Because TEANs have attained a broad range of mobilization resources and
have expanded political opportunity structures in increasingly multilayered and
networked environmental governance in both countries, it is worth testing whether since
the recycling reform initiatives in the 1990s, TEANs in France and Korea have acted
more as enabling networks with low-profile, consensual strategies, than as blocking
networks with high-profile, contentious strategies (H5.4).
As increasingly professionalized groups in both France and Korea, TEANs have
enacted strategies that have engaged a range of institutional and strategic activities in
order to advance their agendas toward environmental policy processes. Their activities to
influence policy on environment and conservation issues include participating in diverse
government commissions and advisory committees, having formal and informal meetings
with government officials both at national and local levels, attending public forums,
consulting corporations, promoting educational programs, raising public campaigns,
190
launching demonstrations, protests and direct actions, resorting to legal and juridical
recourses to solve cases, utilizing domestic and international media, and coordinating
conferences with foreign organizations. According to the EO Survey (Questionnaire 22)
and follow-up interviews, TEANs in both countries say that they have become a formal
and informal part of recycling and waste management policymaking routines through
lobbying, institutional participation, and bargaining. Thus, they have increasingly
worked as enabling networks in both countries— although the TEANs are still involved
in blocking strategies through demonstrations and protests.
While they share more cooperative enabling network characteristics that facilitate
progressive regulatory policy reforms than they used to, TEANs in France and Korea
have exhibited divergent developments in their major proreform strategies since the
1990s. As will be set forth infra, the different developments of TEANs’ enabling
networks in France and Korea need to be analyzed more contextually to illuminate the
relationships between professional/civic types of TEANs, the scope of the reforms
conditioned by national and regional/international institutions, and domestic political
structures and cultures where TEANs operate.
In France, a more steady, low-profile development of the enabling networks can
be explained by diverse domestic and external factors including: the more
professionalized type of TEANs as long-standing environmental “epistemic
communities” (Hass 1992); predominant corporate environmentalism (Lyon & Maxwell
2004; Keeler 1985; Szarka 2000); industry-oriented recycling reforms; definitive EU
directives on the reform prospects; and negotiation-oriented incremental policy reform
legacies.
191
In Korea, however, the often high-profile, enabling, and yet also contentious,
strategies of TEANs can be explicated based on the more civic-oriented types of
environmental organizations (and their socioenvironmentalism in the early 1990s Korea),
far-reaching mandatory recycling schemes based on public participation as well as
industries’ extensive and swift policy reform legacies, and the lack of supranational
policy guidelines with regard to the policy arena.
4.4.1. TEANs in France and their low-profile enabling strategies
TEANs in France, mostly as continuously developed, highly professionalized
organizations, have demonstrated mostly enabling networks that seek to advance
regulatory policy reform at both national and European levels. In the recycling and waste
management arenas, for example, Georges Cingal, Secretary General of SEPANSO, who
also serves as a member of the executive board of the France-Nature-Environnement and
as a vice president of the executive board of European Environmental Bureau, has
strengthened the organizations’ influence on reform dynamics through their lobbying
strategies at the local (Southwestern part of France), national, and European levels. The
professionalized environmental organizations and their networks have clearly exhibited
more institutionalized and inclusive enabling strategies to act as “insiders” in the
policymaking processes.
Furthermore, my survey data and in-depth interviews with government officials
from the ADEME, environmental organizations, and nonprofit environmental corporate
groups revealed that the longstanding professional expertise of the organizations since the
1970s—or even before— (see Figure 4-3) has been actively sought by the government
192
for formulating various regulatory schemes. For example, since the early 1990s, France-
Nature-Environnement and Mouvement National de Lutte pour l’Environnement
(MNLE) have continuously communicated with the ADEME, especially Département
Gestion Optimisée des Déchets and Département Organisation des Filières et Recyclage,
to discuss and devise workable local recycling plans. As policymakers and
environmental organizations agreed upon more industry-oriented compromising
framework
80
for packaging standards and recycling since April 1992 (effected since
January 1993) based on No. 1992-377, the policy frameworks have left public
participation in the programs essentially voluntary at the local levels. Other professional
organizations and nonprofit recycling enterprises like Eco-Emballages and ADELPHE
have also engaged civic environmental organizations in order to maximize the
effectiveness of voluntary recycling programs, including Asseco CFDT, Confederation
de la Consommation, du Logement et du Cadre de Vie (CLCV), Indecosa CGT,
Confederaton Syndicale des Familles (CSF), Organisation Generale des Consommateurs
(Orgeco), Reseau Ecole et Nature, Union Nationale des Associations Familiales (UNAF).
In addition to the highly professional characteristics of TEANs, corporate
environmentalism in France has provided a firm basis for more consensual policy
processes than Korea. In contrast to the the largely progrowth business and firm interests
in Korea, which are against reforms, corporate groups in France have been major
participants in the reforms, finding novel opportunities to promote environmental and
market interests. The FEDEREC, the nonprofit federation of recycling industries, and its
80
The compromising model distributes economic burdens for recycling treatments between local governments and
producers. Local governments are responsible for collecting package wastes (through Eco-Emballage), and producers
are responsible for the rest of recycling treatment costs, except waste collection.
193
international association, BIR, are one example. For instance, they have sought to enact
stricter, detailed regulations on the textile recycling sector so that corporations can obtain
clear, exhaustive rules for manufacturing and trade relations without latent restrictions on
their activities. The TEANs’ collaborative relationship with the government have been
based on both statist and neocorporatist policymaking and have worked as constructive
sources for the industry-centered recycling reform, including the EPR system on End-of-
Life Vehicles, packaging standards, and WEEE (Lyon & Maxwell 2004; Keeler 1985;
Szarka 2000). For example, the ADEME-professional associations partnerships
encompass Eco-Business Export Plan (PEXE) that aims to promote French green
industry in international markets. Also, they are in collaboration with various
organizations, including France’s Professional Association of Car Manufacturers, to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and recycling; International ADEME Club to support
environmental enterprises; and Pollutec Exposition, through which the ADEME and
environmental groups exchange their policy perspectives.
Moreover, since the 1970s EU policy imperatives have been chiefly directed at
corporate practices through EPR-based recycling policy frameworks, with prospective
schemes of regulatory legislation and gradual steps of recycling targets. Thus, without
significant protests for or against recycling reforms, professional environmental
organizations, enterprises, and their transnational associations have sought to develop
long-term plans to advance their new marketing interests, R&D, and technical consulting
in green industry within EU frameworks. In fact, partly because the scope of national
recycling reforms have been promoted within EU frameworks, reform agendas have not
been highly debated among either politicians or constituencies in France; the
194
organizations even say that there was were virtually no politicians or policymakers
dedicated to recycling agenda in France, except Jacque Pelissard, the president of the
French Mayors Association (L’Association des Maires de France [AMF]) and a member
of the Parliament representing Jireh Department (Interview with Mr. Glaisis, Eco-
Emballages).
81
ADEME officials also concede that recycling has been a secondary
environmental agenda to their preoccupation with climate change issues. As a result,
drawing on the EU directives, TEANs in France have been active participants in drafting
national regulatory reforms for practical EPR and packaging standards since the early
1990s.
Consensus-oriented, negotiation-centered policymaking in France (Muller 1992;
Buller 2004; Smith in Cole, Le Gales, and Levy, eds. 2005; Tiberghien 2007; Larrue and
Chabason 1998; Palier 2005) have characterized TEANs’ organizational strategies as
well. Interviews with TEANs highlight their intentional efforts to embrace the
heterogeneous interests of different localities and socioeconomic interest groups in their
activities, as well as to avoid political conflicts with the policy directives of their national
and EU authorities. For example, Mr. Glaisis, director of Eco-Emballages, and Mr.
Weinzaepfiel, president of AFITE, emphasize that TEANs in France have not insisted on
sweeping, mandatory recycling schemes for the public, even when they could observe the
successful implementation of more far-reaching recycling policies in their neighboring
country of Germany. Rather, their policy debates have focused on moderating diverse
public and private interests and developing practicable and economically efficient
81
Jacque Pelissard has been known as the most prominent political actor to promote waste management reforms for
about 15 years. As shown in the “Assises Nationale des Déchets (AND),” Pelissard contributed to mediating local
interests with central policymaking, especially for the creation of Eco-Folio, an eco-body that has been endorsed by the
AMF and local finances committee.
195
recycling systems suitable to the French environment. For example, they do not see a
nation-wide mandatory separate waste collection system as necessarily cost-effective, as
it requires the establishment of a whole new standardized management system. In essence,
in line with past research on European environmental networks (Marks and McAdam
1996, 1999; Rucht 2000), TEANs in France have shown more consensual, “low-profile”
enabling strategies of lobbying, bargaining, and negotiations to advance regulatory
recycling policies during most reform phases.
4.4.2. TEANs in Korea and their high-profile enabling strategies
Because most environmental organizations started their activities based on strong
civic-oriented environmental philosophies and socioenvironmentalism, their
organizational strategies have shown somewhat conflicted relationships to MEN in their
early blocking strategies against far-reaching mandatory recycling reform initiatives since
1992.
82
Initial responses by environmental organizations to Jongryangje were mixed;
while many organizations were aware of the need for systemic policy reform to address
landfill saturation and unsanitary waste treatments, they were also concerned about
socioeconomic burdens on the lower class and small businesses. Hence, in the early
1990s, high-profile, contentious strategies were often used against reforms that enacted
extensive scopes and swift changes requiring mandatory public participation in each
municipality. Environmental organizations thus called for modified schemes that would
focus on industrial responsibilities.
82
In Korea, most environmental organizations were established around the 1992 Earth Summit. Although the
organizations have been rapidly professionalized in the 1990s through their recruitment of environmental experts and
transnational networks, the leaders and key staff of the emerging environmental organizations were often from other
grassroots organizations or were activists for democratization movements in the 1970s and 1980s.
196
At the same time, however, organizations have primarily demonstrated enabling
strategies as their major activities during most of the reform phases since the mid-1990s.
Initial opposition from civic environmental organizations, which were concerned about
social equity issues, were reconciled within a year as they became involved in multiple
access points to the governance. Once the MEN actively sought for institutional
participation in the pilot programs in 1994, TEAN policy interests were significantly
redirected to ameliorate landfill saturation problems in major cities. Sponsored by
government subsidies for the implementation activities, TEAN projects and activities
began to be funded by the government from the mid-1990s. It was the first governmental
attempt to engage civic environmental organizations through subsidies/funding in the
administrative history of Korea, which opened new political opportunities for the
organizations to participate in more consensual, enabling networks (Interview with
Director Shim, RRD, MEN).
The public-private partnership became the most important basis of mandatory recycling
reform in Korea; since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of TEANs have emerged as
major agents to expand the regulatory frameworks that were originally initiated by the
government. They also have participated in diverse institutional ways in government
committees, public forums, and more routine lobbying activities. In a UN ESCAP
Virtual Conference report, “Close Relationship between MOE and NGOs in Korea,”
partnership among various actors—governments, NGOs, academia, private groups—was
given best practice rating, especially based on the formation of the “Environmental
Preservation Committee” (Yoo, 2003). The Committee works as a multilevel decision
making body with representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the
197
Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the
Ministry of Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation,
environmental organizations, and other NGOs. Equipped with far more cooperative and
even innovatively enabling strategies for the reforms than before, the organizations have
evolved into more professionalized transnational organizations since the mid-1990s.
83
For
example, since 1997, working in a transnational alliance with Global Alliance for
Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), KZWMN has succeeded in pressuring the ME to adopt
the concept of “zero waste” against incineration and to use the norms in the regulatory
frameworks and policy discourses on packing standards.
The organizations’ enabling strategies to implement policy programs at the local
and national levels, however, were very different from the assumptions that correlate
high-profile strategies and blocking networks, and those that associate low-profile
strategies and enabling networks. In order to gain support from the public as well as
from diverse socioeconomic groups and industries for comprehensive recycling
regulations, TEANs in Korea have exploited both high-profile and low-profile strategies.
Interviews and the EO Survey with TEANs reveal that civic-environmental
networks rely more on media-intensive, high-profile strategies. In Korea, most of
TEANs have grown as civic-oriented professional environmental organizations and
research institutes. Because the extensive scope of policy reform requires mandatory
public participation to become major implementers, TEANs have used high-profile
strategies to launch public campaigns and education programs around separate waste
83
The comparative environmental organizations survey reviewed in Chapter 4.1. (Tables 4-1 and 4-2) shows that more
professional research institutions or corporate environmental associations compose TEANs in France, and that more
civic environmental organizations and research institutes constitute those in Korea.
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collection, waste reduction, and recycling systems. Working with municipal
governments, TEANs have also often offered local practical guidelines about regulatory
policies to the general public.
Furthermore, in order to surmount opposition from diverse ministerial and
socioeconomic interests and to publicize policy legitimacy, TEANs in Korea have
preferred more media-intensive strategies (over low-profile techniques) than their
counterparts in France,. Without any supranational imperatives, the far-reaching reform
initiatives created intense opposition from manufacturers/corporations and former service
contractors who aimed to repeal the reform measures. Absent of mature corporate
environmentalism, firms and businesses acted more for the profit-oriented status-quo and
against the costly reform projects. Professor Jae-Hyun Oh, president of KIRR, recalls
that corporate lobbies have been so unyielding that legislative efforts to enact End-of-Life
Vehicles recycling were repeatedly halted.
4.3.3. Converging Strategies of the TEANs?
Beyond simple generalizations about causal links between high-profile, media-
intensive strategies and blocking networks (as opposed to links between low-profile and
enabling networks) (Hochstetler and Keck 2007, 19-20; Keck 2002; Keck and Sikkink
1998), analysis calls for theoretical specification that explains TEAN strategies more
contextually. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.4 was refuted, and the analysis presents an
alternative postulation: The comparative cases demonstrate that the enabling TEANs
have, in fact, exploited both high-profile and low-profile techniques. TEANs have used
the techniques depending on more professional or civic types of TEANs, target audiences
199
that are most affected by the reforms, reform prospects conditioned by national and
regional/international institutions, and domestic political structures and cultures in which
TEANs operate.
In comparative reform processes, TEANs stand out as active protagonists who
seek to forge and enlarge their political capacities to institute and reconstitute
environmental regulatory reform. They have done much more than passively diffuse
transnational environmental policy norms formulated by intergovernmental policy
networks or regional institutions (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 33). Their strategies in France
and Korea have significantly differed, as the TEANs in the two countries have sought to
use more effective tactics within the dissimilar domestic, regional, and international
milieus.
Understanding TEANs’ emphasis on divergent strategies highlights the
institutional constraints they have confronted, and the strategic alternatives that they have
used to empower themselves in the policy processes. The French TEANs’ largely low-
profile strategies mirror both their industry-centered recycling approaches as well as the
relative lack of civic responsibility in recycling regulation. While the reforms mostly
underscore industrial responsibilities and the “voluntary” participation of the public in the
separate waste collection, Eco-Emballage, Recylum, Eco-Systeme have been the major
nonprofit environmental organizations promoting public campaigns and education
programs at school, engaging the public in order to achieve higher rates of packing,
lightbulb, and WEEE recycling, respectively. However, even for the civic-oriented
organizations, TEANs say that they do not use major national media very much to draw
public attention than their Korean counterparts. Partly due to the burden of commercial
200
costs and relative public disinterest in extensive, systematically managed programs, Eco-
Emballage and Eco-systeme say they have instead used public advertisement through
subways/metro and local bulletin boards. The EO Survey confirms this tendency, as
TEANs in France demonstrate much less effort to mobilize public opinion than their
counterparts in Korea (Q 22-d)
84
.
85
Theoretically, the cases articulate the persistent effect of national politics on
TEAN strategies for reform. However, the French case shows a potential policy model
for more extensive EPR reforms in Korea as their corporate environmentalism and
nonprofit corporate environmental groups have been highly developed as a basis for the
industry-oriented EPR reforms. Inasmuch as the EPR system targets changes in
corporate norms and practices, TEANs may need to adopt strategies that elicit high
publicity that first resonates with the public, which would in turn place legitimate
pressure on business (in line with TEANs’ boomerang effect at international levels). Or,
TEANs may need to devote themselves to cultivating corporate environmentalism to
induce changes in the long-term, as have many environmental organizations for climate
change issues, like Climate Change Center, which focuses on leadership programs for
high-level government officials and business leaderships.
84
Twenty-one organizations in Korea say that they try to mobilize public opinions often or sometimes, and eleven in
France say that they do.
85
Nonetheless, TEANs in France show a higher level of confidence in public attitudes towards recycling than the
Korean TEANs do for the public in Korea (Q 17).
85
This difference suggests that French TEANs can heighten their
organizational efficiency for higher rates of recycling and waste reduction if they can increase their activities to
promote more high-profile, civic-oriented campaigns and education programs.
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4.4. Conclusion: Contextual Understanding of Regionalization on the TEANs
As generally assumed, TEANs have been a major avenue of policy diffusion in
both France and Korea. Having gained multiple access points to policy processes in
increasingly multilevel environmental governance, TEANs have actively promoted
crossnational learning of effective recycling policies.
In France, TEANs tend to use “low-profile” enabling strategies to pursue
recycling regulatory reforms. This approach is due to their steadily developed
professional organizational character, their well-established corporate environmentalism,
consensus-oriented environmental policymaking legacy, and definitive EU directives that
target industry-oriented recycling. As the coercive EU directives mainly target EPR-
based recycling reforms, national reform policies have not met significant corporate
opposition. Rather, well-established, professional corporate environmental organizations
have been critical actors, that promoting further regulatory reforms, as they have sought
new market opportunities in the green-industry. Thus, low-profile strategies are often
used through lobbying, bargaining, and institutional participation in committees and
councils.
Korean TEANs, however, often employ “high-profile” enabling strategies. As
recycling reform in Korea has been largely based on mandatory public participation, the
traditionally more civic-oriented environmental organizations have actively utilized
national media, public campaigns, and education programs to enact reform. High-profile
strategies have also contributed to counteracting the largely anti-environmental
business/corporate interests and progrowth ministerial opposition to the reforms.
202
Nonetheless, TEAN strategies have been more diversified since the 2000s; as
French TEANs have increasingly engaged in public campaigns, they have also used high-
profile strategies in to mobilize public environmental support for the voluntary recycling
systems. Although national media have not often been used, due to the localized
recycling frameworks, diverse education programs and public campaigns have been
promoted. In Korea, since TEANs have been invited to diverse government forums and
committees in the late 1990s, they have developed a range of informal, low-profile
strategies to influence policy decisions.
Contrary to the hypotheses, however, the transnationalization of environmental
organizations has been higher in Korea than in France (Figures 4-1 and 4-2). Since the
mid-1990s, French organizations have demonstrated a decrease in the transnationalization
of their networking activities, whereas Korea has shown the inverse trend. Moreover,
TEANs in France exhibit a higher level of regionalization in their network activities.
This unexpected tendency calls for a contextual understanding of regionalization;
within the definitive EU directives and policy frameworks, TEANs have been
preoccupied with regional policy imperatives rather than global policy norms. Thus, they
have been constrained by bounded rationality and cultural policy routines, which have led
them to focus on national and regional issues. Thus, regionalization has both facilitated
the TEANs’ policy diffusion efforts within the EU, and yet constrained their emulative
policy learning from non-EU countries. In contrast, without such regional imperatives,
TEANs in Korea have shown higher levels of crossregional learning. Their emulative
initiatives have contributed to the EPR adoption in Korea since the early 2000s. These
203
counter-intuitive findings highlight the contextual effects of regionalization on TEAN
activities and the prospects of policy transfer in the European and Asian settings.
Table 4-5: Hypotheses and Outcomes on TEANs Effect on Policy Reforms
H5-1: As globalization and regionalization
have been assumed to foster transnational
linkages among environmental
organizations, their transnationalization is
expected to be higher in France because of
the effect of higher regionalization in Europe
than in East Asia.
Unsupported:
TEANS’ transnationalization in France has
decreased since the mid 1990s.
Unsupported: Transnationalization turned out
to be higher in Korea than in France.
H5-2: Situated in a highly integrated
European regionization, TEANs in France
are likely to be experiencing more intense
crossnational policy transfers than those in
Korea.
Unsupported:
TEANs in France have been both enabled and
constrained in their ability to impact policy
diffusion. Constrained by bounded rationality
and cultural limitation, TEANs in France have
been highly active in policy diffusion processes
within the EU rather than in cross-regional
policy transfer activities.
Unsupported:
Without regional policy imperatives or direct
policy networks with foreign environmental
institutions, TEANs in Korea have been
actively engaged in crossnational and cross-
regional policy learning, beyond the East Asian
region. TEANs may be more engaged in policy
diffusion efforts beyond their region.
H5-3: Having gained multiple access points
to policy processes at transnational and
national levels, the TEANs have been a
major avenue for policy diffusions in both
France and Korea.
Supported: TEANs in France demonstrate
their function as an avenue of policy diffusion
between Brussels and localities, as well as
across countries.
Supported: TEANs in Korea operate as
effective avenues of crossnational and cross-
regional policy diffusions.
Unsupported: The comparative cases demonstrates that the enabling TEANs in fact have
exploited both high-profile and low-profile techniques depending on whether they were
professional or civic types of TEANs, target audiences that are most affected by the reforms, and
domestic political structures and cultures where the TEANs operate.
H5-4:
Based on growing organizational resources
and transnational networks since the 1990s,
the TEANs in both established and
transitional democracies act more as
enabling networks with low-profile,
consensual strategies.
In France, steady development of low-profile
strategies of the TEANs have been shaped by
professionalized types of TEANs, industry-
oriented recycling reforms, predominant
corporate environmentalism, negotiation-
oriented incremental policy reform legacies,
and definitive EU directives on reforms.
In Korea, the often high-profile, enabling and
yet contentious TEANs’ strategies should be
explicated based on the civic-oriented types of
environmental organizations, far-reaching
mandatory recycling schemes based on public
participation, swift policy reform legacies, and
the absence of supranational policy guidelines.
204
205
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
This dissertation conducted a comparative multilevel analysis of recycling and
waste management policy reform processes in France and Korea, in their global and
regional contexts. According to past research, growing effect of global institutions,
regional integrations, and the transnationalization of advocacy networks has expanded the
scope of crossnational policy transfer. They also posit the policy transfer has led to
highly convergent national environmental policy reforms in different countries.
Nonetheless, such research has not focused on the interlocking ramifications of
institutional and political sources, which can result in considerably disparate policy
reform processes across countries, especially in geographically different regions.
Therefore, this research attempts to go beyond the analytic boundaries of past
research to explain the extent to which the combining effects of supranational and
transnational factors engender divergent environmental policy dynamics in France and
Korea. In particular, the case analysis was crossregional, namely in European and East
Asian contexts. This crossregional comparative analysis allowed me to reconsider some
general assumptions about the definitive effects of EU environmental policy directives on
more progressive national reform prospects. The implications of domestic factors were
also tested, including national policy legacies, the development of environmental
institutions, growing professionalization and transnationalization of environmental
organizations, and political culture, all of which have shaped the divergent scope of
recycling reform in the established and transitional democracies.
At the outset of this study, three general empirical questions were derived from
policy transfer research and comparative politics literature: (a) What are the critical
206
impetuses that have initiated and promoted the recycling policy adoption and reform?; (b)
How do globalization and regionalization affect the scope of divergent forms and avenues
of policy adoption and reform in geographically different countries?; (c) Drawing on
theories of state-society relationships and transnational advocacy networks, to what
extent have transnational environmental advocacy networks (TEANs) empowered or
limited the national capacity for reform to address environmental problems effectively?
Conversely, to what extent have TEANs incorporated civic interests and their preferences
into policy processes and instantiated their efficacy in more democratic, global civil
societies? The three sets of questions were posed to examine the interlocking,
institutional, and political sources for policy changes in an increasingly globalized and
regionalized world, in which national policy legacies, political culture, and public
attitudes still compose salient aspects of public policymaking within sovereign
jurisdictions.
The research questions were derived from a pragmatic puzzle; namely that the
2009 OECD Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) reports more extensive recycling
and waste management reform in Korea than in France. This study provoked questions
as to how these disparate policy outcomes have come about despite the more
industrialized and democratized status of France and the EU’s stricter environmental
regulatory directives for national policy. As reviewed in Chapter One, the historically
comparable institutional and policymaking structures of France and Korea also prompted
this comparative analysis of distinct policy adoption mechanisms. Whereas past research
generally assumes that external factors—globalization, regionalization, and TEANs—
heighten the prospect of more convergent policy adoptions across countries, in fact
207
divergent scopes of national policy reforms necessitates an explanation of the distinctive,
external and internal effect on policy processes. More extensive reform in transitional
democracies than in established democracies further provokes the analytic inquiry.
To address these questions, this research sought to analyze the multilevel contexts
in which supranational, transnational, national, and subnational factors affect the
disparate reform paths in France and Korea. To what extent have globalization,
regionalization, transnational advocacy networks, national policy legacies, and public
attitudes engendered the divergent policy adoptions and reforms in the countries? As
reviewed in Chapters Three and Four (and shown in Tables 3-4 and 4-1), 15 hypotheses
were formulated and tested to disentangle the research questions, and to specify the
comparative contexts in which the different forms and avenues of policy adoption and
reform have taken place.
Furthermore, this research aimed to bridge the analytic gap between policy
transfer research and comparative analysis. A more sociological approach to policy
transfer research focuses on network-oriented policy adoption processes and yet often
neglects to undertake the multilevel comparative analysis. Meanwhile, comparative
approaches have not fully engaged in a crossregional analysis that examines the effect of
transnational linkage on policy adoption processes in the different geographical
(European and East Asian) contexts. Thus, based on both policy transfer research and
comparative politics, my dissertation investigates the interlocking effects of multilevel
institutions and networks of actors in recycling and waste management policy reform in
France and Korea.
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5.1.Theoretical Implications
5.1.1. Divergent Receptiveness toward Global Environmentalism and International
Environmental Institutions in France and Korea
As this analysis started by probing the links between globalization and national
environmental policy reform processes, counterintuitive findings have been articulated in
the process-tracing analysis of policy adoption and reform in France and Korea. Contrary
to the hypothesis on the effect of globalization on more convergent policy reforms in the
respective countries (H1-1), the effects of global environmental institutions on national
policymaking have significantly differed between established and transitional
democracies. As was reviewed in Chapter One, past research posits that global
environmentalism and international institutions induce more convergent, more advanced
levels of reform discourses and initiatives. It is also presumable that reform processes in
France were more likely to be affected by globalization than those in Korea, due to EU
directives that incorporate global institutional policy norms, as well as to more
established transnational environmental networks. Contradicting conventional
assumptions, however, international environmental institutions have played a much more
critical role in policy formulation and evaluation processes in Korea than in France.
Since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, the
1987 Basel Convention, and the 1992 Rio conference, the ramifications of global
environmentalism for waste management and recycling reforms has been two-fold: global
institutions have had a direct impact on national policy reform discourses and initiatives
(H1.1) and an intervening effect on fostering transnational linkages between
environmental organizations that subsequently translate diffusive global policy norms
209
into national policy paradigms (H1.2). Indeed, increasingly globalized environmental
norms and principles have been a significant source of changing policy dynamics in
France and Korea. However, the two-pronged globalization effects have been much
more prominent in Korea than in France.
The explicit impact of international institutions, including the UNEP and the
OECD Environmental Directorate, has been paramount for policy formulation and
evaluation processes in Korea since the early 1990s. During policy formulation phases in
the early 1990s, policy entrepreneurs took advantage of the prestige of international
policy statements as their own policy instruments to convince diverse echelons of
environmental governance. Reformers have actively sought to engage global policy
discourses and strategies to gain political legitimacy from national leadership, opponents
from other ministries, industries, as well as the general public. In policy implementation
and evaluation phases from the late 1990s on, the term “global” concerns toward waste
problems were often used to justify and expand the reforms. For example, the 2005
OECD Environmental Performance Review and its praise of the “remarkable” efficacy of
recycling and waste management reforms reinforced the reformers’ positions and their
progressive policies.
In France, however, global policy norms have been primarily filtered through the
regional policy frameworks of the EU. The regional policy directives have worked as an
effective mechanism for integrating global environmental concerns such as illegal
transboundary toxic waste trades. Recent policy developments for WEEE management
in France also refer to regional frameworks of the EU Directives 2002/95/EC and
2008/98/EC on the recycling target rates, rather than to global policy norms. Due to the
210
definitive EU framework, global environmental discourses have been rarely used to
devise national recycling and waste management strategies and regulatory measures.
Global environmentalism and international agreements have been more broadly
employed for their policy emphasis on a “sustainable city,” rather than for a more
specified, recycling and waste management agenda. Furthermore, interviews with
government officials from the ADEME reveal that global environmental conferences
since the late 1980s have motivated policymakers more on climate change issues, leaving
waste prevention and recycling a secondary environmental agenda in France (Interview
with Director Geldron and Director Cheverry in ADEME).
As Hypothesis 1.1 on the effect of globalization on national policy processes is
only partially supported for the French case and highly supported for the Korean case, the
outcomes raise an alternative proposition: Global environmentalism and policy proposals
set forth by intergovernmental institutions and policy networks meet differing
receptiveness across countries. More notably, global environmental agendas can be more
aggressively integrated into policymaking in transitional democracies, which are, in fact,
less known for environmental protection or industrial advancement. Conversely, it is
inferred that established democracies that are well known for postmaterialistic policy and
advanced industrial status do not primarily rely on global environmental policy norms;
rather, their environmental policy priorities may be selectively decided to address their
regional and national policy imperatives.
The second part of the globalization hypotheses also demonstrates that the effects
of globalization are more pervasive in Korea than in France. In their intervening effect on
cultivating transnational environmental networks, global environmental norms turned out
211
to be a more significant factor in the policy processes of Korea than of France, which in
turn broaden the likelihood of adopting “diffusive” global policy norms in to national
policy paradigms (Hoschstetler & Keck 2007).
In Korea, most environmental organizations were established in the early 1990s,
right around the 1992 Earth Summit. Furthermore, the policy leverage of environmental
organizations on national and local policymaking processes has grown since the late
1990s, and has been highly empowered by transnational linkages with foreign
organizations as well as their professional/technical expertise. For example, Korea Zero
Waste Movement Network (KZWMN) has been the principal promoter of the adoption of
the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) (in 2003), packaging standards (in 2008),
and the WEEE regulations (in 2008 and revised in 2010) in Korea.
Unlike the Korean case, the French case shows that the hypothesis on the
intervening effect of globalization on fostering transnational environmental linkages
gains only partial support. It has been true that most environmental organizations have
built their transnational networks since the Earth Summit and strengthened their
transnational and regional ties. TEANs have also worked to circulate the international
policy norms of the 3R strategies within the EU policy debates and urged their
government to adopt the stricter recycling and waste management regulations. However,
explaining the effect of the transnational networks on diffusive policy adoptions in
France mainly through global environmental institutions is insufficient. Many active
TEANs in France started to work long before the Earth Summit, and the major EU
directives for waste management frameworks, such as the Directives 75/442/EEC, were
created in even before the 1987 Basel conference. More than one third of environmental
212
organizations (11 out of 28 organizations surveyed or contacted in this study) were
founded since the 1970s and 1980s, with some degrees of transnational linkages within or
beyond the EU. Even some of the major TEANs, like Société Nationale de Protection de
la Nature and France Nature Environment, were formed before the 1972 Stockholm
conference. Most importantly, TEANs and policymakers of the ADEME in France
themselves attribute the source of their policy reforms to EU directives that are not solely
drawn from international environmental discourses. Instead, they credit as the primary
motives of reform to regional provisions on recycling and waste management within the
EU and to national interest in enacting the regional plans.
Hence, although many significant recycling and waste management policies have
been adopted since the early 1990s, such as la Stratégie Européenne de Déveoppement
Durable (SEDD) (1995), regulations on packing standards (1992), End-of-Life Vehicles
(2003), and WEEE (2008), globalization cannot exclusively explicate the growing
transnational linkages of environmental organizations and their diffusive role in policy
transfer mechanisms. Rather, the case analysis undertaken here points to an alternative
explanation of the links between globalization and growing transnational linkages of
environmental organizations, and their impact on more diffusive policy adoptions across
countries. Through both formal and informal lobbies and policy networks with
government officials and Commission members in Paris and Brussels, environmental
organizations and their transnational associations have been increasingly active in
influencing regional policy in its agenda setting and policy formulation stages. In future
research, it will be worth testing the effect of TEANs in crafting, accumulating, and
reinforcing the legitimacy of the environmental policy norms, which are first suggested
213
by professionals or local organizations, and then translated into international institutions
and intergovernmental policy networks. Thus, further research should illuminate not
only governing from above but also “governing from below” (Sellers 2002) and “changes
from below” (Böwel & Sedelmeier 2006) in order to explicate the real origins of
diffusive policy norms and strategies. In practice, reform dynamics show that
environmental policy norms and ideas have often been devised by local and national
environmental organizations and then diffused to other countries and diverse regions of
the globe.
5.1.2. Regionalization as a Contextual Analytic Category with Multi-faceted Policy
Adoption Implications
In an attempt to explain the effect of regionalization on recycling policy processes
in France and Korea, hypotheses were tested to see if regional policy frameworks made a
significant impact on divergent policy processes across European and Asian regions; the
“coercive” effect of regionalization on environmental policy reform was expected to be
higher in France than in Korea due to the integrated European policy frameworks and
their policy directives (H2.1). This study also examined if the EU’s integrative policy
directives made a more significant impact on the scope of reforms in France than in
Korea, thus entailing divergent policy adoption prospects across the regions (H2.2). The
hypothesis also implicitly tested if regional institutions created convergent, higher levels
of recycling reforms within the regions.
The more distinct implication of regionalization is found in its institutional effect
of triggering “direct coercive” policy adoption mechanisms for EU member countries,
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supporting Hypothesis 2.1. The EU has brought about more intensified recycling reform
directives on the EPR system in France, including regulations on end-of-life Vehicles and
WEEE especially since the mid-2000s. The directives have set mandatory policy
objectives for its member countries to adopt. As a result, both legislative and regulatory
changes in France have been pursued based on the EU frameworks. In Korea, however,
recycling policymakings has not been subject to any regional policy imperatives or to
binding decisions. Rather, regional frameworks, like Northeast Asian Conference on
Environmental Cooperation (NEAC), largely function as crossnational,
intergovernmental discursive tools that facilitate information exchanges on best practices
or model strategies.
Nevertheless, the analysis presents outcomes contrary to the conventional
assumption that regionalization and its integrating policy guidelines are conducive to
higher levels of environmental reform. Contradicting general assumptions about the
effect of the EU regionalization on the more extensive environmental policies in its
member countries (Liefferink and Jordan 2004; Leveque 1996; Paraskevopoulos 2006),
the cases highlight that regional directives do not necessarily cause more progressive
environmental policies in its member countries. In fact, EU environmental directives
have not functioned as all-encompassing policy frameworks for a range of environmental
issues. Based on regional directives, France has pursued diverse environmental reforms
and exhibited notable progress in its diverse environmental policy arenas such as energy
intensity, energy mix, water usage, and CO2 emissions, as shown in the 2009 SGI (Figure
3-1). France, however, has not shown significant progress in its recycling and waste
management policies when compared to its other environmental policy categories or to
215
those of Korea. The cases also show that the EU directives do not necessarily ensure
more progressive environmental policy frameworks than other regional or national
initiatives outside of the EU.
More importantly, the integrative regional policy frameworks both enable and
constrain the policy learning efforts of EU member countries. Policymakers and TEANs
in the established democracy often work with their European partners within the regional
policy framework. However, French TEANs and Director Geldron and Director
Cheverry from the ADEME enunciate that regional directives often limit the scope of
innovative recycling policy reform in European countries. One the one hand, the
government has been constrained by bounded rationality (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000;
Elkins & Simmons 2005), with high level of information exchanges within the EU and
less information on policy options that can be found beyond the EU policy frameworks.
On the other hand, their cultural policy routines have made both policymakers and
TEANs more preoccupied with domestic and European issues than with a global
environmental agenda (Ripley in Neack, Hey & Haney eds. 1995; Elkins & Simmons
2005). Thus, the government has become more concerned with the regional issues and
less motivated toward non-European policy emulation.
While the relationship between the environmental policy priorities of the EU and
the policy performance of its member countries is a subject beyond the scope of this
dissertation, the comparative case analysis demonstrates that the effect of regional
directives on national policymaking is not an institutional antidote to environmental
issues faced by member countries. Just as globalization and international institutions
have not caused convergent types and processes of institutional or environmental reforms
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across countries, regionalization should be seen through an analytical lens that reflects
the dissimilarities among national policymaking across the regions. Since degrees of
regionalization differ across the continents, coercive policy adoptions have been
noticeable only in the European case. At the same time, however, although the EU
policies have been considered environmentally progressive in general, they have not
entailed more comprehensive recycling reforms across the board in France than in Korea.
Also, the extent to which coercive regional directives affect the scope of national
recycling reforms has been divergent across regional countries within the EU. Although
within-regional analysis is not the main subject of this dissertation, a brief overview of
recycling policies in European countries reveals dissimilar levels of reform. For example,
Belgium has adopted more far-reaching recycling reforms, with a total ban on landfill in
the Flanders, than France. The gap in the French and Belgian policy frameworks
suggests that regionalization’s effect on environmental policy process should be
examined through multilevel analysis that involves other international and domestic
dynamics within the European region. Thus, alternative postulations about the effect of
regionalization need to be extracted in order to adequately explain the divergent degrees
of national policy adoption and the substantive development of diverse policy strategies
within the region as well as across regions. Moreover, regionalization should be
explained as a contextual variable, which interacts with multifaceted institutional and
political factors in national policy processes.
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5.1.3. National Policy Legacies and Threshold Effects for Multi-level policy
processes
While supranational factors do not explain the whole picture of causal
mechanisms, an institutionalist emphasis on policy legacies elucidates the underlying
dynamics of divergent recycling reform in France and Korea, especially during the early
reform phases in the 1990s. More convergent dimensions of their reform processes since
2000s can be also illuminated by institutionalists’ explication of “incremental changes”
based on national “policy legacies” and “critical juncture” (Thelen & Mahoney 2010;
Scokpol 1985; Evans 1985).
French reform processes epitomize the significance of path-dependence and
policy legacy on national policy reform prospects; recycling and waste management
reform has been primarily shaped by negotiation-oriented policy legacies, heterogeneous
localism, public antidirigism, and active corporate environmentalism (Muller 1992;
Buller 2004; Smith in Cole, Le Gales & Levy eds. 2005; Tiberghien 2007; Larrue &
Chabason 1998; Palier 2005). Thus, recycling reforms in France have taken more
incremental, gradual, and reconciliatory form since the early 1990s.
Although the government has been largely conditioned by the coercive effect of
EU policy principles in transposing the EPR-based EU directives into national laws and
regulations, even the “direct coercive transfer” of the EU policy directives takes place
gradually with about a two-year grace period for policy implementation. The coercive
policies of the EU can also be considered negotiation-based to some extent since national
governments, environmental organizations, and corporations have directly and indirectly
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affected the contents and strategies of regional policy frameworks through both informal
lobbies and formal representations in Brussels.
Consensus-oriented policy legacy and long-standing localism are also noticeable
in French municipal waste management and recycling framework. National laws on
“shared cost mechanism” aim to allow local sovereignty either to be responsible for its
management to meet national targets or to delegate the public service to private sectors,
such as Eco-Emballage and ADELPHE since 1993, based on the EU directives
90/313/EEC.
An additional distinctive feature of recycling reform in France is found in
conspicuous corporate activism as in other policy arenas. As a major EU recycling policy
principle has been based on industry-targeted EPR systems, corporate groups and
nonprofit enterprises have been engaged in policy processes to a significant degree. Also
partly because the traditional environmental philosophy in France is grounded in
“humanistic” ecology (Bess 2003), as was reviewed in Chapter Two, high-tech
intervention in environmental policy perspectives and management has been espoused in
the society. Accordingly, environmental corporate groups and associations often
participate in shaping major contours of regulatory reform at both the EU and national
levels.
During the early phase of the recycling reforms in the 1990s, technocrats were the
major actors who dominated the reform processes in both countries. However, the scope
of their reform initiatives was considerably divergent, largely due to their environmental
policy priorities, policy legacies, and supranational policy imperatives. Without visible
policy failure with regard to waste management and landfill capacities, recycling and
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waste management reforms in France have been based on the multilayered, negotiation-
oriented policy structures. Policy options were also conditioned by heterogeneous
territorial/local management policy flavors, which were further strengthened by
institutional decentralization and the antidirigistic attitudes of the public. Hence, in my
interviews with policymakers, the ADEME officials state that they have excluded the
nation-wide systemic implementation of mandatory separate waste collection from viable
reform options. Instead, the recycling agenda has been discussed as part of broader,
sustainable development policies, as framed in the EU directives. The policymakers
point to their emphasis on recycling and waste management, which is relatively newly
introduced than many other countries and their strong preoccupation with other
environmental agendas, such as climate change, anti-GMOs, and ecological protections.
In contrast, without such regional policy obligations and yet faced with imminent
landfill saturation problems, reform-minded policy entrepreneurs started to pursue far-
reaching recycling reforms in Korea in the early 1990s. The early reform phase is
characterized by “radical and swift” policymaking legacies in Korea (Lim & Jang 2006;
Woo 1991; Kwon 2009). Also in line with these policymaking legacies— in which
proreform technocratic bureaucrats act as exclusively critical agents— Director Shim, his
Resource Recycling Division (RRD) under the Ministry of Environment (MEN), and its
research team were the pivotal architects for aggressive nation-wide recycling reform
initiatives in the 1990s.
Jongryangje, a mandatory volume-based waste bag fee system, exemplifies
“mimetic” policy innovation processes in transitional democracies. As reviewed supra in
Chapter Three, the RRD set up Jongryangje and the deposit/allotment systems, partially
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motivated by the Green Dot Duales System in Germany, without any explicit, direct
policy networking with foreign governments or supranational institutions. Once it
mimetically adopted strict waste reduction principles, the RRD devised and promoted an
ingeniously extensive recycling and waste management system that is much stricter than
the original form found in the European countries.
The reform initiatives, however, were first regarded as unprecedentedly bold and
futile policy proposals; the institutionally new, weak ministerial power of the MEN and
environmental policies in general instantly invoked grave oppositions from progrowth
business/industries and other ministries, such as the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation and the Ministry of Commerce and Finance. Nonetheless, once policy
entrepreneurs gained presidential support for their agenda, an institutionalist emphasis on
policy legacies started to hold true again in their environmental policy arena; just as
before, the role of national leadership and bureaucrats was indispensible to swift and
extensive policy changes in Korea.
The bureaucrats’ strategic engagement of civic environmental organizations
further shows that government policy entrepreneurs could creatively exploit their
institutional structures by creating the first government subsidies to civic organizations in
the administrative history of Korea. Through institutional strategies, the RRD could
easily overcome the initially confrontational orientation of civic groups and productively
integrate them into the MEN’s proreform efforts. The swift and extensive reforms were
also possibly based on the public’s collectivist support, gained through a range of public
campaigns of national media and education programs.
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The comparatively distinctive reform developments in France and Korea in the
1990s can be well explained by Mahoney and Thelen’s “framework for explaining modes
of institutional change” based on national policy structures (2010, 15). The two different
developments of mimetic innovation in Korea and the coercive and yet gradual reforms
in France mostly fit to “displacement” change caused by “insurrectionaries” and by
“layering” pursued by “subversives,” respectively (Ibid., 14-31). Conditioned by their
policy legacies, the reform processes largely describe their path-dependent policymakings.
Meanwhile, more convergent aspects of diffusive policy adoptions in the 2000s
than the past in France and Korea necessitate an analytic re-focus from path-dependence
and policy legacies to institutional sources of change. Whereas the initial recycling
reforms in the 1990s in Korea were marked with “radical and swift” path-dependence, as
in their “swift neo-liberal transformation” (Lim and Jang 2006) and “swift health policy
change” (Woo 1991; Kwon 2009), their EPR policy adoptions since the early 2000s have
exhibited increasingly multilevel policy dynamics similar to those in France. Different
from the centralized policymaking that was exclusively led by government officials, the
adoption of the EPR in 2003 was initiated and precipitated by TEANs. Environmental
policy processes in Korea became open to TEANs once the RRD incorporated civic
environmental organizations through the public-private partnership of the Jongryangje
reform since the early 1990s. Indeed, the “adoption of one set of institutions establishes
conditions that make the adoption of others more or less likely” (Hall 2010, 213). Once
reformers in the government started to utilize public-private partnerships in the 1990s, the
policy alliances have changed the institutional context in the 2000s. Environmental
policy agenda started to be highly affected by the diffusive policy discourses and
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initiatives of nongovernmental actors for further, even stricter environmental regulatory
reforms.
At the same time, however, the changes in the policy processes are “incremental”
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4) in that policymakers and national leadership remain the
most crucial determinant for reforms. For example, although the ban on disposable food
containers and beverage cups was enacted since 2000 in Korea— much earlier than any
other country in the world and in Europe— the decade-long regulation was swiftly
lightened by a new administrative initiative in 2008. Therefore, as Mahoney and Thelen
advise, an historical-institutionalist emphasis on policy legacies and threshold effects
(Pierson in Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003) should be complemented by an a study of
institutional changes and institutional continuity. The comparative analysis also calls for
an alternative postulation that illuminates the extent to which policy legacies have been
reconstituted by increasingly influential nongovernment actors and their domestic and
transnational networks in the reform processes. As will be reviewed in the following
section, 5.1.5, the comparative cases reveal that since the early 2000s TEANs have
become a critical agent, replacing previously centralized policy processes with more
diffusive, multilevel policymaking dynamics.
5.1.4. Public Attitudes, Political Culture and National Policy Frameworks
Environmental policymaking processes at global, transnational, national, and
local levels have broadened multilevel governance realms for the public as well. The
public has aquired a range of capacities through which to affect the reform process: local
governments, the Internet and ME websites, the media, overseas travels, and growing
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interactions with diverse domestic and transnational environmental organizations.
Theories of democratization and globalization particularly highlight the broadened
prospects of public participation in progressive environmental policy reform (Lim &
Tang 2002, 2007; Hoschstetler & Keck 2007).
Meanwhile, divergent public participation in reform in France and Korea cannot
be explained solely by growing environmentalism in more democratized and globalized
societies. My analysis highlights the significance of political culture and national policy
frameworks that shape the scope of public engagement in environmental programs and
their support for reform.
As similar levels of public environmental awareness are displayed in both
countries across different survey responses, including the World Value Surveys,
environmentalism alone does not seem to account for a major part of the disparate public
support for policies (Table 3-6). Similar public attitudes toward environmental protection
in both countries and yet divergent levels of public support for the recycling reform can
be explained by political culture and national policy frameworks, which shape public
attitudes toward policy implementation.
Political culture, shaped by state structures and historical/geopolitical contexts,
affects “public shared meaning” and its scope of political action (Almond & Verba 1963,
1980; Skocpol 1985; Putnam 1993; Ross 1997). Antidirigism (Appleton 2005, Buller
2004; Levy 1999, 2005) and localism in France (Muller 1992) have formed a context
preventing the pursuit of mandatory public participation in national recycling reforms.
Policymakers in the ADEME clearly acknowledge political culture as a factor that has
prevented them from even imagining nation-wide mandatory programs as a possible
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policy option. Instead, key ADEME officials and TEANs point out that, due to the
political culture, they have been attentive to more industry-centered EPR systems as their
primary policy frameworks; for example, they have focused on the regulatory reforms for
the End of Life Vehicles and WEEE.
In contrast, traditional collectivism and nationalism in Korea (Yoo 1979; Kim
1998; Helgesen 1995; Shin & Park 2002) have constituted a crucial basis of government
reform initiatives. The MEN explains that it actively sought to exploit collectivist culture
as major policy implementation strategy; to overcome initial public opposition to the
plans (for minimal but extra economic burden on the public) and to gain broader support
for its policy legitimacy, MEN has tried to foster “national collective” interests in the
environmental projects (Interview with Director Shim). Therefore, the government
invested a lot for a) public campaigns through the major media, the Internet, schools, and
neighborhood organizations, b) straightforward regulatory guidelines at the local level,
and c) its partnerships with civic environmental organizations.
The case also indicates the significance of national policy structures that shape the
scope of public engagement in environmental programs and awareness of policy
legitimacy. Despite the public’s similar environmental attitudes in both countries, with
regard to recycling and waste management policies, the Korean public shows a higher
level of support for reform than does the French public (Table 3-5). After more than a
decade of the reform policy implementation, people in Korea show a higher level of
support for reforms than people in France, and the former is more “willing to pay extra
for waste collection to recycle” than the latter (52% and 41% respectively in 2008, Table
3-5). Rather than being merely mobilized by mandatory government projects, the public
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has revealed its voluntary intention to further support reform. An OECD statistical
analysis supports these patterns, concluding that, “individuals for whom mandatory
recycling is a consideration in the recycling decisions tend to recycle more” (Ferrara
2009). This analysis demonstrates that public attitudes toward recycling reform could be
cultivated by state policy frameworks and thus function as effective policy instruments
for that reform. Therefore, public environmental attitudes should be understood both as
an independent and a dependant variable affected by national policy frameworks, rather
than only as a precursor to policy reform prospects.
5.1.5. Transnational Environmental Organizations as enabling policy networks and
avenues of policy diffusion
As theories of transnational networks and environmental movements posit, the
most significant organizational asset and political capacity of environmental
organizations is their “multiple access points to policy processes” at the global, regional,
and national levels. In “composite polity” in Europe and, increasingly, in globalized
multilevel network governance in Asia (Imig & Tarrow 2001), TEANs have exploited
their multiple access points to influence policymaking, with their professional expertise
and broader, transnational network strategies (Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Keck & Sikkink
1998; Finnenmore & Sinkkink 1998). Especially since the 2000s, TEAN activities have
been more independent from the integrative, “spillover” or “spillaround” effects of
supranational institutions (Hass 1968; Schmitter 1970) or state-centered
intergovernmental policy networks (Dash & Dash 2008; Hirst 2001). TEANs and their
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member advocates have been actively seeking to forge and enlarge their political
capacities to reorient environmental regulatory reform based on their policy preferences.
Recycling reform processes illuminate that TEANs have become an increasingly
formal and informal part of the policymaking routines, through lobbying, institutional
participation, and bargaining in both established and transitional democracies. Chapter
Four articulates two distinctive roles of TEANs in increasingly multilayered and
networked environmental governance: enabling policy networks and serving as effective
avenues of policy diffusion in recycling reform in France and Korea.
TEANs in France and Korea show increasingly cooperative, “enabling” network
characteristics (Keck 2002; Hochstetler & Keck 2007) that facilitate progressive
regulatory policy reforms. At the same time, however, they have exhibited divergent
developments in their major proreform strategies since the 1990s. TEANs in France have
demonstrated more steadily developed, professionalized networks seeking to influence
both regional and national policies. Their largely “low-profile” strategies are drawn from
negotiation-oriented incremental policy reform legacies, predominant corporate
environmentalism (Lyon & Maxwell 2004; Keeler 1985; Szarka 2000), definitive EU
directives, and more professionalized types of TEANs as long-standing environmental
“epistemic communities” (Hass 1992). EU policy imperatives have been chiefly directed
at corporate practices through EPR-based recycling policy frameworks since the 1970s,
and the policy directives cannot be opposed by national governments or by TEANs.
Therefore, professional and corporate environmental organizations and their transnational
associations have actively exploited the EU frameworks to develop long-term
opportunities for new marketing interests, R&D, and technical consulting in the green
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industry. In addition, nonconfrontational, consensus-oriented MEC’s policymaking has
also made TEANs’ high-profile strategies unnecessary (Montpetit 2003).
In Korea, however, TEANs often utilize high-profile strategies to promote civic-
oriented mandatory recycling policy implementations, which have been continuously
revised by national, swift and extensive policymaking. TEANs also use high-profile
strategies to publicize the antireform stances of business and corporations and thus to
pressure them to change their policy positions. National initiatives— without any
supranational imperatives— have made business and corporations act more for the
progrowth status-quo and against the reform projects. Furthermore, extensive and rapid
regulatory reform in Korea has created more confrontational responses from
manufacturers/corporations, progrowth ministries of the government, and former service
contractors. Civic organizations that work for environmental justice issues have also
criticized the reform initiatives for bringing extra socioeconomic burdens to the general
public. Nonetheless, TEANs have grown far more cooperative, even serving as
innovators and enabling agents for reform since the mid-1990s, as they gained multiple
access points to governance. The most crucial policy instruments of the government-led
radical reforms in the 1990s were the RRD’s deliberate incorporation of civic forces into
the reform processes. By swiftly changing regulatory codes that would allow the
government to subsidize and consult the civic organizations, the administrative strategy
could foster the organizations’ political capacities in the policy processe. Since the mid-
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1990s, organizations have evolved into more professionalized, transnational
organizations.
86
In Korea, however, TEANs often utilize high-profile strategies to promote civic-
oriented mandatory recycling policy implementations, which have been continuously
revised by national, swift and extensive policymaking. TEANs also use high-profile
strategies to publicize the antireform stances of business and corporations and thus to
pressure them to change their policy positions. National initiatives— without any
supranational imperatives— have made business and corporations act more for the
progrowth status-quo and against the reform projects. Furthermore, extensive and rapid
regulatory reform in Korea has created more confrontational responses from
manufacturers/corporations, progrowth ministries of the government, and former service
contractors. Civic organizations that work for environmental justice issues have also
criticized the reform initiatives for bringing extra socioeconomic burdens to the general
public. Nonetheless, TEANs have grown far more cooperative, even serving as
innovators and enabling agents for reform since the mid-1990s, as they gained multiple
access points to governance. The most crucial policy instruments of the government-led
radical reforms in the 1990s were the RRD’s deliberate incorporation of civic forces into
the reform processes. By swiftly changing regulatory codes that would allow the
government to subsidize and consult the civic organizations, the administrative strategy
could foster the organizations’ political capacities in the policy processe. Since the mid-
86
The comparative environmental organizations survey reviewed in Chapter 4 shows that more professional research
institutions or corporate environmental associations compose TEANs in France, and that more civic environmental
organizations and research institutes constitute those in Korea.
229
1990s, organizations have evolved into more professionalized, transnational
organizations.
87
In both France and Korea, TEANs have also developed their increasingly
professionalized and resourceful enabling networks as “indirect coercive transfer” agents
of policy diffusion (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). As more professionalized groups, TEAN
have engaged strategies that involve a broad range of activities for policy diffusion, such
as institutional participation in diverse government commissions, public forums, lobbying,
corporate consulting, educational programs, public campaigns, informal meetings with
government officials, and expanded networking with foreign organizations.
At the same time, the TEANs in both countries have instigated various reform
initiatives as effective avenues of crossnational policy diffusion (Bennett 1991; Dolowitz
& Marsh 1996, 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995; Orenstein & Lindstrom 2008; Imig & Tarrow
2001; Stone 2004). Counterintuitively, even corporate TEANs have promoted regulatory
recycling reform in France and EU countries through their commission activities and
lobbies in Brussels. For example, the Féderation de la Récupération du Recyclage et de
la Valorisation des Déchet (FEDEREC) and Bureau of International Recycling (BIR)
have sought to enact a stricter regulation of “secondary materials” for textile recycling in
order to make trade markets more transparent, stable, and thus investable. In Korea,
reinforcing the government-led mandatory recycling systems, the KZWMN successfully
induced the policy modifications of old, inefficient deposit systems for the EPR
87
The comparative environmental organizations survey reviewed in Chapter 4 shows that more professional research
institutions or corporate environmental associations compose TEANs in France, and that more civic environmental
organizations and research institutes constitute those in Korea.
230
adoptions from the EU, further mandating business and industrial duties as the major
skeleton of the policies.
Meanwhile, the comparative analysis necessitates theoretical specification to
explain TEANs’ strategies more contextually with regard to a) the relationship between
the enabling characteristics of the TEANs and their high-profile issuization strategies,
and b) the effect of regionalization and globalization on the diffusive boundaries of
policy transfers. The cases demonstrate different development of TEAN’s enabling
networks, their professional/civic organizational types, and their major strategies in the
respective countries. Thus, further analysis should explicate the relationship among the
types of TEANs, the scope of reforms that decide those who are most affected by the
reform prospects, and the domestic political structures and cultures where TEANs operate.
Interviews and surveys with TEANs reveal that civic-environmental networks rely more
on media intensive strategies for public campaigns and education programs than highly
professional networks, to increase public participation in separate waste collections,
waste reduction, and recycling. In Korea, TEANs are mostly civic-oriented
environmental organizations and research institutes, and its reform policies have targeted
a high level of public participation in mandatory recycling schemes. Thus, Korean
TEANs have exploited much higher-profile strategies than their counterparts in France in
order to effectively publicize the legitimacy and practical guidelines of regulatory
policies.
In France, however, the reforms mostly underscore industrial responsibilities and
the “voluntary” participation of the public. Therefore, TEANs often use low-profile
strategies and participate in professional conferences and forums. Meanwhile, as
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nonprofit environmental organizations, Eco-Emballage, Recylum, Eco-Systeme, are
major groups promoting public campaigns and education programs at school to engage
the public in civic recycling programs in packaging, used electronic light-tubes, and
WEEE recycling rates. Compared to corporate environmental groups, civic-oriented
organizations have engaged in a higher level of public campaigns to raise environmental
awareness of the voluntary local recycling programs, although compared to their Korean
counterparts, they still show low usages of major national media in order to draw public
attention.
For professional and research-based environmental networks in both countries,
however, low profile strategies, including lobbying, consulting, and institutional
participation (e.g., government commissions) are much preferred to public campaigns or
protests. Accordingly, TEANs in France mostly show low-profile, less-contentious
strategies as they are predominantly professionalized research associations or corporate
environmental federations that lobby for industry-related EPR regulations. In Korea,
KIRR and its Asian networks exemplify the relationship between low-profile strategies
and research-oriented, professional types of environmental organizations. As a research
institute working for industry-targeted EPR systems, the KIRR works mostly with
reform-minded officials and parliament members, participating in institutional
commissions, and promoting legislative changes in the End-of-Life Vehicles recycling
reform agenda.
The effect of regionalization and globalization on the diffusive boundaries of
policy adoption is best understood within nuanced contexts. In general, past research
assumes that globalization and regionalization precipitate more direct contacts and
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greater mobilization of advocacy groups. Also, the research posits that European
regionalization enable TEANs to exploit more direct, higher level contacts for policy
learning within the region. My comparative cases reveal that the EU regional integration
may limit diffusive boundaries of crossnational policy adoptions, especially from non-EU
countries. Constrained by bounded rationality and cultural limitation within the highly
integrated region, the TEANs in France have shown their highly regionalized networks.
As reviewed in Chapter Four, the Environmental Organizations (EO) survey
analysis reveals that the transnationalization of European TEANs has significantly
decreased since the mid-1990s. In fact, their transnationalization was higher in a world
of nation-states-- during the late 19
th
century until the early 1990s (Figure 4-1).
Ironically, however, European policy imperatives have constrained the voluntary “cross-
regional” policy learning efforts of policymakers and TEANs from the established
democracies. The TEANs have been conditioned by both cognitive/cultural containment
that focuses on national and local issues and by bounded rationality, which highlights
institutional, geographical, and cultural proximity as a structural condition for policy
learning. Thus, TEANs in France tend to network more within the EU regional
boundaries, and are less interested in looking beyond the regional periphery. They also
tend to employ more direct contact with their transnational advocate members within the
region than the Korean TEANs do within and beyond the Asian region.
On the other hand, TEANs in Korea demonstrate that they are engaged in higher
levels of communications with international environmental institutions than their
counterparts in France. Without definitive regional policy directives like the EU’s,
TEANs in Korea exhibit higher level of conscious, emulative policy learning from
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broader boundaries beyond their region. Interestingly, however, the organizations in
Korea do not attribute active policy adoption to “direct” information exchanges with their
transnational networks. Although they exploit both direct and indirect contact with their
transnational networks, TEANs highlight that they also find substantive information on
viable policy regulations and practices through “indirect” contact and research than
through direct information exchanges. They attribute the often one-sided, indirect forms
of policy learning to rational lesson-drawing policy transfer mechanisms and emulative
motivations. TEANs add that direct transaction costs are still unaffordable for many
civic organizations. The TEANs’ concern for the transaction costs points to the
increasing significance of the Internet as a critical political means for policy diffusion and
adoption mechanisms. It also suggests an alternative postulation— that the network
density of TEANs with foreign advocates does not necessarily correlate to their level of
influence on policy adoptions. It rather implies that more conscious, emulative, and
mimetic forms of policy learning, even without direct connections with foreign
organizations, may bring about more extensive environmental policy diffusion in
transitional democracies.
5.2. Methodological Implication
The comparative analysis of the recycling reform processes is based on both
qualitative process-tracing methods and quantitative survey analysis of major
environmental organizations in France and Korea. In an attempt to identify plausible
causal variables that explain the divergent reform and policy adoption processes, I
employed process-tracing as a major research method. As part of an intensive empirical
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investigation of complex causal mechanisms, the cases could serve to detect both more
well-known historical patterns and “previously unnoticed causal factors” for the reform
processes (George & Bennett 2004, 214; Ragin 2000, 120-123).
A major strength of process-tracing is found in its capacity to test theories and to
further develop theories (George & Bennett, 2004, 217; Rueschemeyer 2003, 315, 332-
333). As such, the comparative analysis suggests a more nuanced understanding of
regional, national, and transnational factors, presenting alternative postulations for
analyzing policy adoption processes. As reviewed supra, many of the hypotheses drawn
from the previous theories were supported by the findings, strengthening the implication
of existing assumptions.
However, the findings also reinforce that a critical merit of process-tracing is its
capacity to “identify variables that were otherwise left out” in the previous analysis
(George & Bennett, 2004, 215). As reviewed in Chapters Three and Four, and previous
sections of this chapter, many unpredicted outcomes were revealed in the findings on the
effect of globalization, regionalization, national policy legacies, political culture, and
transnational environmental networks on the policy reform process. The French case
uncovered not only the enabling but also the constraining effect of regionalism on
emulative and diffusive policy adoption. Ironically, in Korea, the effect of European
policy frameworks was significant when TEANs justified the adoption of more
progressive recycling regulations of the EU into Korea. That globalization had a greater
impact on progressive policy reform in Korea than in France was also telling; despite the
weak institutional power of the Ministry of Environment and the less industrialized and
less democratized status of Korea, the reformers managed to beat progrowth opposition
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and accelerate vigorous policy reforms based on the legitimacy of international policy
guidance and evaluation. Therefore, the counterfactual outcomes of this study could help
refine and develop existing theoretical frameworks on policy adoption and transfer
research, especially as EU policy frameworks should be a variable that affect the policies
of the non-European, transitional democracy. In addition, the triangulation of interviews
with policymakers, TEANs, and their policy discourses validated the reformers’ claims
about policy mechanisms.
Furthermore, the comparative analysis shed light on the deviant case of Korea,
with its surprisingly extensive, mandatory recycling and waste management reform since
the early 1990s. Just as process-tracing helps to “identify different causal paths that lead
to a similar outcome in different cases” (George & Bennett, 2004, 215), the deviant case
of Korea was contrasted with the French case in order to examine its extraordinary,
divergent reform processes during the early phase in the 1990s, which led to more
convergent, EPR-based policy adoptions beginning in the early 2000s.
In particular, the more consciously emulative, mimetic policy adoption efforts of
policy entrepreneurs—the Director of RRD in the MEN and environmental
organizations—in Korea should be identified as the “threshold” factor of distinctive
reform dynamics (Pierson in Mahoney & Rueschemyer, 2003). The RRD in the 1990s
surpassed the old practice that the MEN’s reform initiatives had been largely
marginalized within the government. However, the RRD was able to do so within the
policy legacy, as presidential support for its initiatives was the critical policy instrument
for reform. Nonetheless, in the 2000s, the TEANs broke the long-standing practice of
state-led policymaking, as its diffusive efforts led new EPR-centered reform through
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more multilevel governance. The reform processes illustrate the dynamic changes to
causal mechanisms through the “critical event” of EPR adoption in the transitional
democracy. Despite the similar policy outcomes of the EPR-centered recycling
framework, the Korean case illustrates a causal mechanism greatly different from of that
of France, which has been led by both the coercive EU directives and the active, diffusive
role of corporate environmental groups in the reforms since the early reform phases of the
1990s.
In order to confirm the findings for the “contingent generalization” of middle-
ranged comparative theory (George & Bennett 2004, 216), more comparable cases should
be tested to strengthen the validity of causal mechanisms. If more crossregional and
within-regional cases can be examined, the causal inferences between the aforementioned
variables and the divergent policy reform processes will be further reinforced. For
example, more illustrative conclusions could be derived from a comparative analysis of
the more stringent recycling reform in Belgium and Germany in the European region and
the less strict reforms in Japan and Taiwan in the Asian region. Such study would
supplement the French and Korean case analysis undertaken here. In a similar vein, the
lessons of TEANs’ increasing influence on reform would be further strengthened if a
more diverse set of environmental organizations in different countries were included in
the survey analysis.
237
5.3. Policy Implication
5.3.1. 3Rs Policy Frameworks and National Policy Developments
Major recycling policy developments in France and Korea illustrate multilevel
policy processes, in which national policy initiatives are integrated into global and
regional policy frameworks, in turn reconstituting national policy principles in various
ways. The divergent developments of 3R policies in France and Korea suggest potential,
crossnational policy learning between the countries from their distinctive policy
frameworks.
As was briefly reviewed in Chapter Three, the 3R (Reduction, Reuse, and
Recycle) initiative was first proposed by Japan as a shared, “global zero-waste societies”
policy framework in 2004 at the G8 Sea Island Summit (OECD 2008; Ministry of the
Environment, Japan 2008). The 3R resource recycling principles have been widely
discussed at various intergovernmental and nongovernmental conferences since the early
2000s, and the Kobe 3R Action Plan was adopted as the main objective of the G8
Environment Minister Meeting in 2008.
Nonetheless, even some advanced industrial countries have not extensively
promoted the 3R global policy framework at the national level. Although many countries
have adopted a “recycle” policy based on the EPR system as the major strategy, most
have not set up comprehensive regulatory frameworks for “reduction” and “reuse”
principles. Until recently, the policy emphasis in most countries has been exclusively on
recycle-oriented approaches, which still entails considerable limitations on waste
“prevention.” Although “recycle” strategies based on the EPR may decrease landfill and
incineration rates, they do not address the fundamentally wasteful use of resources and
238
problems incurred in final treatments that require further energy consumption and air
contamination.
88
To achieve more effective management of wastes and resources,
reformers posit that more preventive, “reduction”-based approaches accompany current,
recycle-oriented policies.
Table 5-1: 3Rs Principles of Resource Recycling
3Rs Major objective FR KR
Restriction on the use of disposable
products
(e.g. disposable food containers, shopping
bags, disposable razors, etc.)
No Yes
Mandatory separate waste collection,
Including food waste
No Yes
Regulation of packaging standards
(e.g. on excessive, double packaging)
Yes
(based on
Manufacturers’
voluntary participations)
Yes
Reduction
Polluter pays fee
(e.g. on plastic products, disposable diapers,
etc.)
Yes Yes
Deposit system for reusable packages Yes Yes Reuse
Re-usage of packages
(e.g. refillable products)
Yes Yes
EPR system on recyclable materials
(e.g. End-of-Life Vehicles, WEEE)
Yes
Yes
Assistance for recycling facilities Yes Yes
Recycle
promotion of
recycling industry
Yes Yes
As major objectives of “reduction” and “reuse” exhibit in Table 5-1,
implementing these principles requires both governmental and civic willingness to
change environmental worldviews as well as lifestyles. The 2008 OECD-UNEP
88
In a normative sense, waste minimization/prevention and recycling appear to be an environmental policy arena where
governmental, industrial, and public efforts can bring about the most effective consequences on all sides. Conservation
of packaging materials, for example, can bring about not only reduction of waste generation but also conservation of
other resources such as water and energy that are used to produce unnecessarily excessive packaging. Exacerbated by
consumerism, commercialization and mass production, overly extravagant materials and packages have created
excessive waste. Consequently, waste treatment has generated immediate health-related maladies from landfill
saturation and incineration, which result in the contamination of soil, water, and air. In addition to the direct effects of
waste treatments, landfill and incineration involve secondary effects in socioeconomic and political tension that arises
around the construction of landfill sites, the disturbance of ecosystems, and greenhouse gas emissions from incineration.
Hence, although largely ignored in many countries, waste minimization and prevention can be part of the most critical
policy principles to halt and reverse these multifaceted environmental problems.
239
Conference on Resource Efficiency highlighted approaches to a more progressive policy
principle and environmentally sound worldview, calling for an embracement of
resourcification-centered policy norms, in place of the efficient disposal/treatment-
centered approach toward wastes. For policymakers, citizens, and manufacturing or
service industries, 3R emphasizes waste prevention as the primary policy objective;
resources should be optimally used and conserved as much as possible to prevent waste
in the first place. If generated, wastes should be considered “secondary” resources to be
reused and recycled with minimum energy use for the process.
Major recycling policy gaps between France and Korea can also found in the
regulatory application of 3R policy. The French focus on “recycle” and the Korean focus
on the 3Rs have resulted in noticeable disparity in waste generation and recycling rates,
as reviewed in Table 3-1 and Figure 3-1 of Chapter Three. Whereas Korea has promoted
“reduction” and “reuse” as well as “recycle” since the late 1990s, the French policy has
centered on “recycle” until the late 2000s. Notably, the established democracy has
updated its regulatory frameworks, recently incorporating the “reduction” principle
through the EU Directive 2008/98/EC, including packaging standards and manufacturers’
voluntary participation (Table 5-1).
The distinctive policy developments of France and Korea regarding the 3R
principles reveal potential ground for crossnational policy learning. On the one hand,
substantial waste reduction in Korea has an instructive point; a far-reaching 3R policy
framework is necessary for significantly reducing waste generation at the municipal level
and for preventing the secondary effects of landfills or incinerations. For example, policy
frameworks in Korea have been efficient in promoting waste reduction, integrating
240
various incentive systems for the public to change daily habits and reduce its use of
disposable or nonrecyclable/nonbiodegradable products. It is true that regulatory
frameworks have been criticized for presenting inconveniences and for reflecting radical
or idealistic tenets. Impracticable management issues have also surfaced: Municipal
waste collection and disposal costs have not been fully paid by the volume-based waste
pricing system, and illegal dumping is still present (OECD 2009, 229). However, it is
important to note that some countries, like Belgium, Sweden, Germany, and Korea have
already worked on the far-reaching programs and have achieved results in waste
reduction and prevention.
Notably, France has demonstrated some promising efforts to more effectively
regulate industrial and manufacturing practices, and thus reduce and recycle waste.
Drawing on EU directives and corporate environmentalism, EPR-based recycling policies
have been extensively enforced to prevent and reduce sizable and hazardous wastes,
compared to Korea (Appendix F).
89
In Korea, although corporations have increasingly
shown their interest in “clean development mechanism” since the mid-2000s, its
reluctance to accept more comprehensive EPR systems for End-of-Life Vehicles
exemplifies the immense hurdle in recycling reform. The 2009 OECD Performance
Review also points out that technological and market developments in the green industry
in Korea have been lethargic (Ibid.). While business interests often work as a potential
threat to environmental regulations, French corporate environmentalism presents an
exemplary case in which corporations have become a major part of the TEANs working
89
The 2009 OECD Performance Review assesses, “the generation of industrial and hazardous waste was not decoupled
from economic growth during 1997-2003. […] The most important factor in the growth of industrial waste has been the
rise in construction and demolition waste, a consequence of the extensive renovation and replacement of large
apartment buildings built 30 or more years ago.” (OECD 2009, 226).
241
for progressive reform in Paris and Brussels. As French “recycle” strategies effectively
exploit and cultivate corporate activism in the green industry, the policy frameworks
illustrate a synergistic approach with which both industrial/market interests and
environmental managements can be pursued.
5.3.2. Multi-level Network Governance as Effective Reform Dynamics
Environmental policy processes in France and Korea are exhibiting increasingly
multilevel network governances (Imig & Tarrow 2001, 12). Whereas state-led recycling
reforms were conspicuous in both countries in the 1990s, recent reforms have been
largely shaped by formal and informal networks of diverse nongovernmental actors as
well as policymakers. In particular, the role of nongovernmental organizations in
crossnational policy diffusion has been a crucial source of recent recycling reform,
including the WEEE regulations. As the most active nongovernmental actors, corporate
environmental groups in France and civic environmental organizations in Korea manifest
their distinct contributions to the divergent recycling policy reforms. From a policy
perspective, their crucial role in reforms points to possible ways in which not only policy
ideas but also policy instruments or administrative techniques can be transferred between
the countries in order to encourage nongovernmental activism for more effective reforms
(Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 349-350).
The European case demonstrates more multilayered governance, in which neither
the EU nor national/local policy preferences exclusively lead the policy processes.
Rather, their interlocking effects on policy agenda setting and implementation processes
have become increasingly significant. That is, European policy imperatives cannot be
242
considered a mere additive layer that coerces regional environmental norms and
strategies on national policies. Instead, Brussels has been the policymaking nexus, in
which global norms, regional policy principles, national objectives, local preferences, and
corporate environmental interests have been communicated and crafted into regional
directives, which in turn reshape national policy frameworks. In particular, as was
reviewed supra, although civic environmental organizations have been relatively weak on
recycling reforms in France, corporate environmental groups have been highly active,
resulting in a matured green industry and a well-organized EPR system.
90
Recycling reform in Korea since the early 1990s illustrates changing policy
processes toward multilevel governance as well. Whereas earlier policy processes
highlighted the critical role of policymakers in leading national regulatory reforms and
strategies, recent policymaking exhibits the growing significance of TEANs in diffusing
diverse policy options, which are often drawn from foreign examples. Furthermore, as
was analyzed supra in Chapter Four, TEANs’ diffusive activities highlight that the effect
of EU directives on Korean recycling reforms is more immediate and significant than has
generally been assumed. As TEANs have sought to import European policy practices,
such as the EPR for End-of-Life Vehicles and WEEE, they have created not just
crossnational but also crossregional policy diffusion dynamics. Although corporate
environmentalism has been nearly absent in Korea, the civic-oriented environmental
organizations have provoked industry-targeted recycling policy strategies since the early
2000s.
90
The 2009 OECD Performance Review also assesses that French environmental reforms have been successful in
creating “environmental jobs” (OECD 2009, 120).
243
Despite their parallel, multilevel environmental governance, France and Korea
exhibit divergent developments of nongovernmental environmental organizations.
Corporate environmental groups and civic environmental organizations have been highly
active in promoting industry-centered and civic-oriented recycling reform in France and
Korea, respectively. The divergent activism also reveals possible ways that policy
instruments can be cultivated at the national level and then transferred across countries.
For example, MEN in Korea strategically employed civic organizations in the
government-led mandatory recycling reforms in the 1990s. Even though the civic
environmental organizations were not firmly established, state initiatives and policy
structure fostered their development through diverse reform programs. If the Korean
government can nurture corporate environmentalism for further reform, industry-targeted
EPR reform will be much more consequential than its current forms. Conversely, the
ADEME will be able to make voluntary recycling schemes more effective at the local
level in France if it can actively engage civic environmental organizations and public
campaigns. As Szarka (2000) points out, policy instruments should be also reformed to
prevent waste management efforts from functioning in an “ad hoc and uneven
fashion”(184).
5.4. Concluding remarks
This comparative case analysis highlights the extent to which divergent recycling
reforms have derived from the interlocking effects of global, regional, national, civic, and
transnational actors and institutions. Reform processes in France and Korea exhibit both
more conventional and unexpected causal mechanisms of reform. As assumed, the effect
244
of policy legacy and political culture in both countries has been highly significant in the
environmental policy reform processes at the national level: consensus-oriented
policymaking, corporate environmentalism, long-standing localism, and antidirigism in
France have led to gradual recycling reforms since the 1990s; in contrast, the legacy of
state-led policymaking, progrowth industry, and civic collectivism in Korea has made
swift, more extensive recycling and waste management reform possible since the early
1990s. The scope of the reforms has been largely shaped by national political,
institutional and policy structures, which in turn cultivate the conscious will of reformers
as well as public support for the reforms.
Counterintuitively, however, policy entrepreneurs in France and Korea have
integrated the effect of global and regional institutions into the national reform dynamics
in very different ways. Whereas reformers in the transitional democracy have been
highly receptive to the policy frameworks of the UNEP and the policy evaluations of the
OECD, those in the established democracy have been predominantly led by the coercive
effects of EU directives.
More importantly, regional effects turned out to be both constructive and
constraining in the policy adoption mechanism; whereas the EU policy framework
facilitated the diffusive adoption of policy norms and strategies within the region, it also
constrained the European reformers’ “crossregional” policy adoption efforts from non-
European countries. Due to both cognitive/cultural limitations and bounded rationality,
policymakers and TEANs in Europe have shown higher levels of regionalization in their
scope of action compared to those in the East Asian country. Ironically, the regional
integration also led to a decrease in French TEANs’ level of transnationalization since the
245
mid-1990s, whereas Korean TEANs have shown steadily increasing transnationalization
in their activities and networking.
The comparative analysis highlights the contextual effect of globalization and
regionalization on the environmental policy reform processes of established and
transitional democracies. Different from conventional assumptions, the transitional
democracy and its mimetic policy learning efforts have been more receptive to the global
and crossregional policy transfer mechanisms than has the established democracy.
These cases demonstrate that it was more consciously driven mimetic reform
initiatives of policymakers and TEANs in the transitional democracy that enabled both
crossnational and crossregional policy adoptions. Thus, within the framework of policy
transfer research, I highlight mimetic emulation as an analytically distinctive conceptual
category, along with diffusive and coercive mechanisms. The policy entrepreneurs have
broadened the scope of their policy options through mimetic adoption mechanism, even
without explicit, direct policy networks. As a result, the transitional democracy has been
able to bring about more extensive recycling reform than the established democracy, even
without the comparable regional imperatives of the EU. At the same time, the cases point
to the growing effect of TEANs on diffusive, EPR-based recycling policy adoption in
both countries. TEANs have evolved into critical actors with more access points to the
multilevel governance in a global world, through resourceful, “enabling” strategies based
on professionalized expertise and transnational networks.
Both the predicted and unexpected findings of the comparative research
illuminate the significance of regional and national settings in which policymakers and
TEANs work for policy reform. The divergent scope and distinct mechanisms of
246
environmental reform in the established and transitional democracies should be
understood through the extent to which policymakers and TEANs have exploited the
interlocking and constitutive effects of national policy legacies and political culture on
policymaking processes in a global and regional world.
247
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three m ost im portant factors in recycling policy reform p rocess
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
govt policy decision
environmental
institutions/organizations
environmental research
and academic expertise
public support and
participation
intergovernmental policy
exchange across borders
cooperation between
domestic and foreign
environmental
organizations
public campaigns
through the media
other
FR
KR
257
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Significant Factors in Recycling Policy Reform Processes
Figure A-1: Environmental Organizations’ Assessment of the Three Most Important Factors in Recycling Policy Reform
Processes
258
Appendix B: Development of the EPR System in Korea
Table B-1: Development of the EPR System in Korea
Date Reform Process Public-Private
Partnership
1996-1997 Policy proposals and media reports on EPR by SSeuSihyup yes
7/4/1997-
7/3/1999
Launching research analysis of Comprehensive Scheme on
Waste Recycling System (as an extension of 1992 Deposit
System)
yes
(ENVICO under the
ME)
3/26/1998 1
st
Public Hearing yes
5/28/1998 2
nd
Public Hearing yes
May 1999-
Dec. 1999
Launching research analysis of voluntary recycling scheme yes
5/26/1999 1
st
Policy Forum yes
9/10/1999 2
nd
Policy Forum yes
4/11/2000 Establishment of EPR adoption plan RRD only
April 2000 Revision of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources.
RRD only
June 2000 Reform Commission on regulation and integration of glass bottle
deposit system
yes
6/20/2000-
7/1/2000
Discussion on enactment of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources.
related
Departments under
the ME and Local
Governments
7/24/2000-
8/14/2000
Preliminary announcement of Enforcement of the Article 16 of
the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving
and Recycling of Resources
The ME
9/7/2000 Presentation on EPR to producers and recycling companies yes
9/28/2000 Review and Resolution by Regulation/Reform Commission yes
10/12/2000 Public hearing by Congressional Environmental Forum yes
11/21/2000 Submission to the Congress The ME, Congress
12/27/2001 Congressional Resolution on the enactment of EPR The ME, Congress
2/4/2002 Revision and Notice of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources
The ME
April-June
2002
Discussion between related ME Departments on regulation/laws
on the Article 16
The ME
July-
September
2002
Preliminary Announcement of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources
The ME
12/18/2002 Revision/announcement of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources
The ME
12/30/2002 Revision/announcement of the Article 16 of the
Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Re
cycling of Resources
The ME
11/30/2004 Revision/announcement of the Article 16 and Article 18 of the
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and
Recycling of Resources
The ME
12/10/2004 Revision/announcement of the Article 16 and Article 18 of the
Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Re
cycling of Resources
The ME
12/22/2005 Public hearing on the Resource Recycling Law on Electronic
Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
yes
12/30/2005 Preliminary announcement of the
Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Re
cycling of Resources
The ME
259
Table B-1: Continued
5/30/2006 Congressional agenda on the Law on the Promotion of Recycling
of Electronic Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
Congressional
agenda (by Doo Un
Chung)
June/2006 Original draft of common legislative agenda on Electronic
Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
The ME, the
MCIE* , and the
MFE
**
7/26/2006 The 1
st
Congressional Environmental Forum on End-of-Life
Vehicle
by Congressman,
Hwa Gap Han
September/
2006
Draft of common legislative agenda on Electronic Products and
End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
The ME, the MCIE ,
and the MFE
10/26/2006 The 2
nd
Congressional Environmental Forum on End-of-Life
Vehicle
by Congressman,
Hwa Gap Han
12/14/2006 Congressional agenda on the Law on the Eco-friendly Recycling
of Electronic Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
Congressional
agenda (by Hwa
Gap Han)
12/27/2006 Tri-ministerial common legislative agenda on Electronic Products
and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
The ME, the MCIE ,
and the MFE
2/28/2007 The 3rd environmental labor commission (265
th
Congress)
on alternative agenda (redrafted by the Senate Subcommittee on
Review) to congressional agendas (by Doo Un Chung and by
Hwa Gap Han) and Tri-ministerial common legislative agenda on
Electronic Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery
Congress
4/27/2007 Announcement of the Resource Recycling Law on Electronic
Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery, Tri-ministerial
agenda passed by the congressional standing committee and
submitted to plenary session
The ME, the MCIE ,
and the MFE
February/
2008
Law on Electronic Products and End-of-Life Vehicle Recovery The ME, the MCIE ,
and the MFE
Sources: “Explanation on the EPR system” by the Environmental Management, the Ministry of
Environment; Interviews with Mihwa Kim, director of the Korea Zero Waste Movement Network (former
SSeuSihyup); Interviews with Professor Jaehyun Oh, the chairman of the Korean Institute of Resources
Recycling (KIRR)
* The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
** The Ministry of Finance and Economy
260
Appendix C: Environmental Organizations Survey Questionnaires
2008 Global Environmental Survey
Thank you for your time in helping with this study. Your responses will enable the research to
study environmental groups’ activities and network that have promoted significant changes in
global environmental policy reforms. Confidentiality will be assured if preferred.
Please fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate answer for each question.
0. Does your group prefer confidentiality? Yes ________ Not necessary __________
1. In what year was the group founded? _____________________
2. About how many members does your group have at the present time?______________
3. About how many people work in the office of the organization?
Full time __________ Part time ____________ Volunteers ______________
4. What is your annual operating budget? (in your currency)
Overall ______________
5. Over the past 2-3 years has the group’s income (circle the answer)
a. increased _____ b. decreased_____ c. kept pace with inflation_____
6. Here is a list of environmental issues that may be affecting the world as a whole. Could you
indicate how important this issue is to the activities and political concerns of your group (circle the
answer):
Highest priority Very important Important Not a priority
Water pollution 1 2 3 4
Protecting natural areas 1 2 3 4
Protecting local wildlife 1 2 3 4
Global warming 1 2 3 4
Loss of ozone 1 2 3 4
Global biodiversity 1 2 3 4
Waste management 1 2 3 4
Recycling (household) 1 2 3 4
Recycling (firms) 1 2 3 4
Other: (please specify)
_________________________
1 2 3 4
7. To what extent is your group primarily concerned with national environmental issues versus
issues of an international or global nature? Please select the most appropriate description
based on the following categories (circle the most accurate answer).
1 2 3 4 5
Primarily
concerned
with national
issues
More
concerned with
national issues
Equally
concerned with
national/international
issues
More
concerned with
international
issues
Primarily
concerned with
international
issues
8. Within your nation, to what extent is your group primarily concerned with local/regional
environmental issues versus national environmental issues? Please select the most
appropriate description based on the following categories (circle the most accurate answer).
1 2 3 4 5
Primarily
concerned with
local/regional
issues
More
concerned with
local/regional
issues
Equally
concerned with
local/national
issues
More
concerned with
national issues
Primarily
concerned with
national issues
261
9. How active has your group been in international environmental activities (circle the answer)?
Often Sometimes Rarely Never
a. Met with environmental groups from other
nations to exchange information
1 2 3 4
b. Met with environmental groups from other
nations to coordinate activities
1 2 3 4
c. Attended international environmental
conferences or meetings
1 2 3 4
d. Dealt with international environmental agencies
such as the UN or regional agencies
1 2 3 4
e. received advice or technical information from
groups/agencies outside of your nation
1 2 3 4
f. given advice or technical information to
groups/agencies outside of your nation
1 2 3 4
g. Had visits from representatives of
groups/agencies outside of your nation
1 2 3 4
10. How would you describe most of your contacts with environmental groups outside of your
nation (circle the most appropriate answer):
1 2 3 4
No international
contact
Mostly with groups in
neighboring nations
Contact with groups
in neighboring nations
& groups outside
region
Mostly with groups
outside of our
region
11. On average, how useful is such international cooperation in solving (circle the most
appropriate answer)
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
The environmental problems of your
nation
1 2 3 4
International or global environmental
problems
1 2 3 4
12. To your knowledge, please circle the specific areas in which international cooperation has
been more effective:
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
Water pollution 1 2 3 4
Protecting natural areas 1 2 3 4
Protecting local wildlife 1 2 3 4
Global warming 1 2 3 4
Loss of ozone 1 2 3 4
Global biodiversity 1 2 3 4
Waste management
including recycling
1 2 3 4
Polluter Pays Systems
(in packaging standards)
Cleaning up landfill
Other: (please specify)
___________________________
1 2 3 4
13. On average, do you think the cooperation among environmental groups within the geographic
regions such as European or Asia-Pacific has been useful in solving the environmental problems
within the regions?
Yes ______________ No______________
262
14. To what extent do you think the effect of international organizations or EU has been important
in solving environmental problems and reforming the policies of your nation?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
Solving the environmental
problems of your nation
1 2 3 4
Reforming environmental policies
of your nation
1 2 3 4
15. To what extent do you think the effect of other governments besides the international
organizations or EU has been important in solving environmental problems and reforming the
policies of your nation?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
Solving the environmental
problems of your nation
1 2 3 4
Reforming environmental policies
of your nation
1 2 3 4
16. To what extent do you think participation of local civic organizations besides
environmental groups (e.g. Council of European Municipalities and Region (France), Human Rights
Center (UK), Action Canada For Population and Development (Canada), etc.) has been important
in solving and reforming environmental problems of your nation?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
Solving the environmental
problems of your nation
1 2 3 4
Reforming environmental policies
of your nation
1 2 3 4
17. To what extent do you think the public attitudes support recycling in your country?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
1 2 3 4
18. To what extent do you think people in other countries in your region (e.g. Europe, Asia-Pacific,
North America, etc.) support recycling reforms?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
1 2 3 4
19. To what extent do you think the public attitudes in countries beyond your region support recycling
reforms?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
1 2 3 4
20. How important has learning about policies in other neighboring countries been as part of the
motivation for environmental reform in your country?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
1 2 3 4
21. How important has public opinion/acceptability been as part of the motivation for environmental
reform in your country?
Very Somewhat Not very much Not at all
1 2 3 4
263
22. In more general terms, this list includes various means that different groups might use to influence
policy on environmental and conservation issues. For each one, would you indicate how frequently your
organization uses each method: often, sometimes, rarely, or never? (please circle appropriate answer)
Very oftenOften Sometimes rarely
A. participation in the work of government
commissions and advisory committees
1 2 3 4
B. formal meetings with civil servants/ministers 1 2 3 4
C. Informal contacts with civil
servants/ministers
1 2 3 4
D. Efforts to mobilize public opinion 1 2 3 4
E. Working with other environmental groups in
your nation
1 2 3 4
F. contacts with members of parliament and
parliamentary committees
1 2 3 4
G. Contacts with officials of political parties 1 2 3 4
H. Contacts with local government authorities 1 2 3 4
I. Demonstrations, protests, direct actions 1 2 3 4
J. Legal recourse to the courts or other judicial
bodies
1 2 3 4
K. Contacts with people in the domestic media 1 2 3 4
L. Contacts with people in the international
media
1 2 3 4
M. contacts with other social groups, such as
unions or economic groups
1 2 3 4
N. contacts with international environmental
groups or groups from another nation
1 2 3 4
23. In terms of the political orientation of environmental groups, some groups believe that the
environment can be protected effectively only if societies fundamentally change the way their
economies work. Other groups believe that it is possible to protect the environment without
fundamentally altering the economic system. Where would you place the philosophy of your group
in this debate? (Mark the box closest to your position)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Can protect environment
only if economic system
is fundamentally
changed
Can protect environment
without changing economic
system
24. In what year did you join this group? ____________
25. What position do you hold? _________________________
26. How long have you held your present position? _____________________________
27. Would you like to receive the primary report of finding: Yes ______ No_______
28. Which of the following do you think the most important factors in recycling policy reform process in
France? Please rank them in order you think important. (1: most important, 2: second important,
…etc.)
1. government policy decision________
2. proposals from environmental institutions/organizations________
3. contribution of environmental research and academic institutions_______
4. active participation and support from the public_______
5. policy exchange/communication between French government and the governments in different
countries________
6. information exchange between domestic environmental institutions/organizations and
foreign/international environmental institutions/organizations______
7. public campaigns through the media_______
264
Appendix D: Environmental Organizations in France
Table D-1: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental
Organizations in France
Year
established
Organizations/Associations Transnationalization Professionalization
1850s 1854 Anonymous 1 M H
1940s 1945 Federation de la
Recuperation du Recyclage
et de la Valorisation des
dechet
H H
1948 Bureau of International
Recycling
H H
1960s 1968 France Nature
Environnement
H H
1970s 1972 FRAPNA (federatrion
francaise des societes de
protection de la nature)
M H
1973 Anonymous 2 H H
1975 Sepanso H H
1978 ATEE (l'association
francaise des ingenieurs et
techniciens de
l'environnement)
M H
1979 AFITE (association francaise
des ingenieurs et
techniciens de
l'environnement)
H H
1980s 1981 MNLE (movement national
de lutte pour
l'environnement)
L H
1984 CLER (Comite de Liaison
Energies Renouvelables)
H H
1990s 1990 Alliance Carton Nature M H
1992 Anonymous 3 M H
1993 Eco-Emballage H H
1995 Cercle Nationale du
Recyclage
L H
1995 Comite21 L H
2000s 2000 ProRecyclage M H
2000 Dechetcom.com L M
2001 2nEnvironnement L H
2004 Journal l'Environnement M H
2005 Eco-systèmes M H
2005 Anonymous 6 M H
2005 Anonymous 5 M H
2005 Anonymous 4 H H
265
Table D-2: Transnationalization and Professionalization of Environmental
Organizations in Korea
Year
established
Organizations/Associations Transnationalization Professionalization
1980s 1989 anonymous3 L M
1990s 1991 Green Korea United M H
1992 KIRR H H
1992 anonymous4 M H
1993 Anonymous 1 L L
1993 Anonymous 2 H H
1993 anonymous 11 H H
1993 anonymous14 H H
1995 anonymous 5 L L
1995 anonymous 8 M H
1996 anonymous 9 L L
1996 anonymous 10 H H
1997 Korea Zero Waste 21
(KZWMN)
H H
1997 anonymous 13 M H
1998 anonymous 7 L H
1998 Forest For Life H H
2000s 2000 KFEM GS H H
Enet (Energy Net) M H
anonymous 6 H H
Environment Action
Association (EAA)
H H
2003 Green Fund H H
anonymous 12 L H
2008 Climate Change Center
anonymous
H H
266
Appendix F: Waste Generation in France and Korea (2007)
Table F-1: Waste Generation in France and Korea (2007)
FR KR
Landfilling 36% 29%
Incineration
33%
(Energy Recovery Incineration)
15%
Recycling & composting 31% 56%
Manufacturing industry
non-hazardous waste production
(in kg/inhabitant/year)
296 792
Sources: Chalmin and Gaillochet, 2009.pp. 129, 357.
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Why is a set of environmental reforms promoted in some political settings but not in others? We have noticed the effect of global and regional institutions on national policy reform prospects, especially since the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)’s Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992. Globalization theories generally assume that international institutions are conducive to crossnational policy convergence. Theories of regionalization posit that the highly integrative European Union (EU)’s environmental policy frameworks have resulted in progressive policy reforms in EU member countries. Furthermore, as institutionally and socioeconomically more mature systems, established democracies and advanced economies are often considered more likely to accept untraditional claims for postmaterialistic, environmental values as policy options. In reality, however, not all of the advanced economies in Europe have comprehensively improved their environmental policies, despite strict EU policy directives. Meanwhile, without coercive regional policy imperatives, transitional democracies often exhibit farther reaching environmental policy implementations than established democracies. For example, Korea’s extensive mandatory household separate waste collection systems and resource recycling policies present a research puzzle
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Creator
Kwak, Sun-Young
(author)
Core Title
Environmental policy reforms in a global and regional world: mimetic, diffusive, and coercive policy adoptions in France and Korea
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Politics
Publication Date
09/27/2011
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
environmental policy,Globalization,new institutionalism,OAI-PMH Harvest,policy reform,policy transfer and diffusion,political culture,regionalization,transnational environmental advocacy network
Place Name
France
(countries),
Korea
(countries)
Language
English
Contributor
Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Sellers, Jefferey M. (
committee chair
), Renteln, Alison Dundes (
committee member
), Schweitzer, Lisa (
committee member
)
Creator Email
skwak@usc.edu,sunkwak@gmail.com
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3483
Unique identifier
UC167097
Identifier
etd-Kwak-3755 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-425321 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3483 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
etd-Kwak-3755.pdf
Dmrecord
425321
Document Type
Dissertation
Rights
Kwak, Sun-Young
Type
texts
Source
University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
(collection)
Repository Name
Libraries, University of Southern California
Repository Location
Los Angeles, California
Repository Email
cisadmin@lib.usc.edu
Tags
environmental policy
new institutionalism
policy reform
policy transfer and diffusion
political culture
regionalization
transnational environmental advocacy network