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Scaling up charter management organizations: understanding how policies, people and places influence growth

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SCALING UP CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS:
UNDERSTANDING HOW POLICIES, PEOPLE AND PLACES INFLUENCE
GROWTH

by

Michelle B. Nayfack

___________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(EDUCATION)

December 2010

Copyright 2010 Michelle B. Nayfack
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Completing this dissertation has been a long journey that has taught me as
much about myself as it has about urban education. Above all else, I have learned
that no goal can be accomplished in isolation. In my case, an army of friends, family
and colleagues has guided me towards the completion of my doctoral work. Penny,
I’d especially like to thank you for your constant enthusiasm and wisdom, which
extended well beyond charter management organizations. Your unwavering support
of all of my life choices has made reaching this goal so much more meaningful for
me. Also, I am forever grateful to my CEG family and my dissertation committee
members—Amanda, Patricia, Jo, Gib, Cait, Cassandra and Janice--for their endless
insights and encouragement. My conversations with all of you helped shape the
trajectory of this research in so many important ways.
To my family and friends, who often had no idea what I was doing with
myself, thank you for talking me through the “dark periods.” Also, an especially
heartfelt thank you to Felisa, Bob, Mom, Dad and Ericka who lovingly cared for
Isaac and gave me the peace of mind to be able to concentrate on my writing. To
Isaac—all goals are attainable with hard work and perseverance; let this be your first
example. But most importantly, to my wonderful husband Aaron, without you none
of this would have been possible. You were my rock and continue to be my biggest
fan. I am so lucky.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………....ii
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………… ..iv
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………... ...v
Abstract………………………………………………………………………… ...vi
Chapter One: The Evolution of Charter Schooling………………………... ...1
Chapter Two: A Review of Literature on Organizational Change……….. ...20
and Small Firm Growth
Chapter Three: Research Design……………………………………………...45
Chapter Four: Findings—Understanding Growth in CMOs……………… ...72
Chapter Five: Revisiting the Exploratory Model & Implications for…… ...119
Policy and Practice
References……………………………………………………………………. ...143
Appendices
Appendix A: Introductory Interview Protocol………………………….. ...155
Appendix B: In-Depth Interview Protocol………………………………...154
Appendix C: Code List…………………………………………………. ...160
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1. Externally-driven theories of organizational development:…… ...31
an overview
Table 3.1. CMO sampling criteria template………………………………. ...51
Table 3.2. Selected demographic information: study population…………....54
Table 3.3. Participant information…………………………………………...63
Table 3.4. Selective code list: first iteration coding………………………. ...67
Table 3.5. Second iteration code list for CMO scale-up study: coding……...68
by theme
Table 4.1. Growth strategies………………………………………………....74
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Exploratory model for CMO growth…………………………... ..44
Figure 3.1. CMO school locations…………………………………………....56
Figure 3.2. CMO age………………………………………………………. ...57
Figure 3.3. Number of campuses [grouped] 2008-2009……………………...58
Figure 3.4. CMO student enrollment………………………………………....59
Figure 3.5. Students served vs. number of school campuses……………… ...60
Figure 5.1. Revised model for CMO growth………………………………...120
vi
ABSTRACT
In recent years charter schooling has become a mainstream reform strategy
supported by a wide array of political and education-related stakeholders. More
recently nonprofit networks of charter schools labeled Charter Management
Organizations (CMOs) have emerged as a way to increase the impact of the charter
movement and combat the organizational challenges faced by stand-alone charter
schools. Despite the fact that CMOs are rapidly growing, both in number and in
size, little is known about how these organizations approach growth.
This study utilized a qualitative research design that incorporated a national
sample of 25 CMOs to investigate how CMOs approached growth. The goal of this
study was to identify the array of factors influencing the growth process and to better
understand how CMOs responded to these influences.
Analysis revealed that a number of environmental, organizational and socio-
cultural factors were influencing CMO growth. Based on organizational needs, local
and state policy contexts, and the availability of resources, CMOs developed new
growth targets, or they revisited existing ones. These targets, in turn, influenced
internal growth planning styles that were either premeditated or more evolving.

1
CHAPTER ONE
THE EVOLUTION OF CHARTER SCHOOLING
In 1994, two Teach For America alumni decided to capitalize on a new idea
in public education—charter schools—by opening up a middle school for urban
students in Houston, Texas. Their objective seemed simple—find a way to better
educate underperforming students so that they were prepared to succeed in high
school and college ("About KIPP," 2009). However, a long history of poor test
scores, high drop-out rates and limited access to post-secondary education has
proven that educating urban students is not necessarily a straightforward task (e.g.
Henig et al., 1999; Tyack, 1974).
In this particular case, the school’s two founders are claiming victory. Their
innovative school model, anchored by a core set of operating procedures called the
five pillars, produced impressive results in Houston (“Knowledge is Power
Program,” 2010)
1
. With success came visibility; and with visibility came financial
support. Now, 15 years later, the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) has
expanded nationwide and become familiar to many urban communities. Currently,
the KIPP Foundation manages 82 public schools in 19 states and enrolls 20,000
students ("About KIPP," 2009). But, how did KIPP transform from a single school
that educated 400 students into a network that educates 20,000 students?

1
Not all scholars feel that KIPP’s program has been a success. A study by SRI international released
in 2006 found that while KIPP students did perform above average on state assessments, a large
proportion of students who enrolled in KIPP schools as 5
th
graders were not completing 8
th
grade in
KIPP schools.
2
The answer to this question is layered and complex but it is rooted in a basic
understanding of charter schooling. More specifically, it is dependent upon
foundational questions like how charter schools emerged; where they have struggled
and where they have succeeded; and why charter management organizations (CMOs)
like KIPP have gained popularity.
Educational Reform and the Emergence of Charter Schooling
A Push Towards Standardization
Ever since the controversial report A Nation at Risk was released in 1983 the
education community has been preoccupied with “fixing” America’s public school
system. That report highlighted the poor performance of the country’s public school
students and issued warnings about America’s impending inability to compete
internationally. While some scholars have criticized the report for being alarmist
(Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Tyack & Cuban, 1995), most have acknowledged that it
served as a necessary catalyst for rethinking how schools and districts were governed
(Bell, 1993; Guthrie & Springer, 2004). Since then, other national academic
markers, for example the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
support the argument that public school students are failing to meet acceptable
standards of performance in math and language arts. The National Center for
Educational Statistics (NCES) most recently found no improvement in language arts
or math scores for 17 year-old students taking the NAEP assessment between 1977
and 2004. Equally problematic were the 2008 NAEP test results which highlighted
the long-standing academic divide between subgroups of students—affluent versus
3
poor, white versus minority, and English-language learners versus native English
speakers (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). While the reason for these
academic divides continues to be a source of scholarly debate, the fact that these
divides exist is not (Lee & Bowen, 2006; Rothstein, 2004).
Urban schools that have traditionally served predominantly poor, minority
students were especially vulnerable to terminally low student achievement, poor
quality teachers and high rates of principal turnover (Henig et al., 1999). In
response, the 1980s and 1990s were dominated by educational reforms that tried to
solve these problems. From a programmatic standpoint, educators focused on
piloting externally developed reform models and then “scaling-up” successful
models across multiple schools or school districts. But these types of reform
initiatives, for example small learning communities (Cotton, 2001) and Success for
All (Slavin et al., 2006), were often met with strong resistance from teachers that did
not like the hierarchical nature associated with implementing these types of
initiatives (Hargreaves & Goodson, 2006; Hargreaves, 1994; Huberman, 1992).
Additionally, studies found that externally developing reform models and expecting
them to “work” in any school context ignored the unique challenges that schools and
school districts faced (Datnow, Hubbard & Mehan, 2002; Hargreaves & Goodson,
2006).
During this time period educational leaders also focused reform efforts on
changing how schools were being governed. One seminal study, the RAND change
agent study (1974-1978) emphasized the importance that local factors played in
4
successful school reform. This work was followed by other research that began to
clarify the role of teachers and school-based leaders in successful educational change
(e.g. Crowson, 1987; Datnow & Castellano, 2000; Leithwood & Jantzi, 1990). As a
result, many districts opted for a higher degree of site-based management in an effort
to give principals more decision-making power. Site-based management (SBM) was
seen as a way to keep decision-making focused on the needs of specific communities
and student populations. It also served as a way to empower teachers and involve
community groups more effectively (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003).
Concurrent with school-level reform efforts like SBM and externally
developed initiatives was a policy-oriented approach to school reform that focused
on defining and standardizing what students should know and be able to do
(McLaughlin & Shepard, 1995). Many states began adopting uniform “standards”
that outlined grade-specific skills to be mastered and included statewide assessments
to test for these skills on an annual basis (Elmore, Abelmann & Fuhrman, 1996).
While the push towards standardization appealed to those who felt that too much
teacher autonomy over curriculum was leading to poor outcomes for students,
especially urban students who often ended up with the least experienced teachers,
others felt standardization limited teachers’ abilities to develop lessons tailored to the
specific needs of their students (McTighe & Brown, 2005; Tomlinson, 2000).
When The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, renamed the No Child
Left Behind Act (NCLB), was reauthorized in 2001, standardization was coupled
with an increased emphasis on accountability. Through this act, all states were
5
required to develop “scientifically-based” standards for each grade level and subject
area that could be aligned directly to state assessments. Yearly progress was charted
and district funding was linked to improved student performance across all
subgroups of students (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). For the first time, school
districts were being held accountable for the academic success of all of their
students; a condition that many early supporters of NCLB felt would successfully
close existing achievement gaps. While the motivation behind NCLB is admirable—
namely that educational reform should be rooted in evidence-based practices and
targeted towards all subgroups of students—the policy has been criticized for setting
unattainable performance measures, being inconsistently implemented and enforced,
and being under-funded (Armor, 2006; Mathis, 2005; Paige, 2008). Additionally,
many critics feel that NCLB is limiting the educational experiences open to students
because so many schools are now overly focused on improving test scores in
mathematics and language arts in order to hold on to state and federal grants. This
belief is reflected in the Obama administration’s proposed revision of the law; it
focuses more on a well-rounded curriculum (Klein, 2010).
Origins of the Charter Movement
The charter movement developed as a response to issues of school-level
autonomy, standardization and accountability raised by the reform efforts discussed
above. Seen as an alternative to the uniformity of comprehensive school reform and
the one-size-fits all mentality of standards-based reform, charter school champions
argued that parents deserved more choices when it came to their children’s
6
education. Charter schools, they said, would have the flexibility of site-based
management without the bureaucracy of district regulations. They’d still be
accountable to state performance criteria, but they’d have the autonomy to meet
those criteria using new and innovative pedagogy or governance structures that could
be tailored to local community needs and allow teachers to become more involved in
the schooling process (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003; Bulkley & Wohlstetter, 2004;
Lubienski, 2002; Nathan, 1996; Shanker, 1988).
However, it should be noted, that the theory of action behind charter
schooling involved more than just the opportunity to develop autonomous,
innovative schools. The movement was also rooted in what is now commonly
referred to as the market-based model of schooling (Chubb & Moe, 1998). Each
school’s charter would serve as a contract with its stakeholders (parents, students,
school authorizers, governing board). Stakeholder satisfaction would guarantee the
school’s success in the “competitive” market of public education. Failure to satisfy
the demands of these stakeholders would result in the loss of students (Bulkley &
Fisler, 2003; Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel & Rothstein, 2005; Chubb & Moe, 1990;
Finn, Manno & Bierlein, 1996) and eventually cause school closures.
2
Those
advocating for the market-based approach believed that increased competition

2
Research on charter school closures does not support this theory. According to the Center on
Education Reform (2008), approximately 8% of all charter schools have closed nationwide. Most
charter schools close because of financial mismanagement and not because of customer (specifically
parent) dissatisfaction or low student achievement (Rotherham, 2005; Wohlstetter, Nayfack & Mora-
Flores, 2008; Zimmer et al., 2003). Additionally, authorizers are now being acknowledged as the
linchpin in accountability with responsibility for making decisions regarding charter school success
and failure (Hess, 2001; Rotherham, 2005).
7
among charter schools and traditional schools would improve both models of
schooling because it would force traditional schools to improve in order to meet the
higher quality of schooling set by neighboring charter schools (Chubb, 1990).
Politicians, educators and researchers who were more critical of the charter
movement saw charter schooling as an attempt to dismantle the current public
system of education. These opponents viewed charter schools as a first step towards
school vouchers (public dollars used to send children to private schools) and
subsequently the complete privatization of schooling in America (Wells et al., 1999).
They also claimed that charter school performance has been mixed, at best, and that
many charter schools were not being monitored closely. Furthermore, critics
charged charters with skimming the best students from traditional public schools and
re-segregating communities that traditional school districts worked so hard to
diversify (Arcia, 2010; Dee, 2004; Estes, 2003; Lacireno-Paquet, 2006).
Despite all of the critiques, charter schools have become a fixture on the
education reform landscape (Smith, 2009). Since Minnesota opened the first charter
school in 1992, thirty-eight other states, along with Washington, D.C., have passed
their own charter laws. Today, only Washington, Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, Vermont, Maine and West
Virginia lack charter laws (although West Virginia is in the process of passing
legislation) (Center on Education Reform, 2010). According to the National
Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 1.5 million students are now being educated in
4900 public charter schools nationwide, or roughly 3% of the nation’s school age
8
children (Number of public charter schools and students: 2009-2010, 2009). The
majority of these students are attending “stand-alone” charter schools—single school
sites started from scratch by educators, parents or community members. However, a
growing number of students are attending schools affiliated with charter
management organizations (CMOs)—non-profit charter school organizations that
oversee a network of charter schools that all share a common mission or instructional
design.
3

The Emergence of CMOs
When charter schools were first developing no one conceived of them
becoming large organizations educating thousands of students. However, the first
decade of charter school research highlights many challenges that stand-alone charter
school operators must overcome to achieve success. CMOs, and their for-profit
counterparts educational management organizations (EMOs) have gained popularity
in part because they are a solution to these challenges faced by stand-alone charter
schools.
Starting a charter school from scratch presents a number of organizational
challenges. Not only are educators and administrators responsible for developing an
educational program that will effectively educate students, but they must tackle all of
the tasks associated with starting a new business venture. Among the challenges
identified by researchers are: 1) securing a facility suitable for classroom instruction

3
For an in-depth definition of CMO as it was used in this study please reference p. 49 in chapter 3.
9
(Hill, 2006; Loveless & Jasin, 1998); 2) raising enough financial capital to
supplement funding received by the state (Loveless & Jasin, 1998); 3) recruiting and
training competent school teachers and leaders (Gross & Pochop, 2007; Miron &
Nelson, 2002; Robelen, 2008; Zimmer et al., 2003); 4) learning to work effectively
with their board of directors (Carpenter, 2006; Hill & Lake, 2006); 5) establishing
and refining administrative processes and procedures (Loveless & Jasin, 1998); 6)
establishing a nurturing and supportive school culture; and 7) sustaining the school’s
mission and vision over time (Deal & Hentschke, 2004; Wexler & Huerta, 2000).
For many charter school founders, even those with administrative experience in
traditional school districts, these tasks are being carried out for the first time and
require an extremely high degree of determination, creativity and perseverance.
Stand-alone charters also deal with a number of influential environmental
pressures that can become barriers to success. At the most macro level, all charter
schools are constrained by state and federal school choice policy (Lubienski, 2002).
Since charter laws vary, sometimes drastically, by state, some stand-alone charters
are forced to contend with much more prescriptive rules and regulations than others
(Center for Education Reform, 2008; Wong & Shen, 2008). Also, state charter laws
can differ on how many charters are allowed statewide; how frequently they require
charters to come up for renewal; which types of authorizing bodies can approve
charters; how much stand-alone funding will be allotted to new schools; whether
they will receive help with facilities or supplementary services; or what types of
people must sit on a school’s governing board (Center on Educational Governance,
10
2007; Wong & Shen, 2008). Kirst (2006) also points out that charter school politics
are highly contextualized. Support for charters depends on demographic information
like the race and or socioeconomic status of the local community.
At the local level, Loveless and Jasin (1998) found that charters opening in
small towns faced especially strong opposition because “enrollment in cities
represented a smaller proportion of total students, the fiscal impact was more
manageable for urban districts” (p. 23). Urban charter schools are not immune to
community politics either. These schools often face strong opposition from powerful
local school boards (many of whom serve as charter authorizers) and highly
influential teachers’ unions (which have traditionally been opposed to charter
schooling). This has been evident in Los Angeles, California where the current
mayor is highly supportive of charters, but the Los Angeles Unified School District
and the local teacher’s union are far less enthusiastic (Maxwell, 2007). Numerous
studies on charter school leaders have documented that many school founders and
leaders greatly underestimate the time and energy they must spend fostering
community support for their school and “networking” with local politicians to create
positive relationships (Deal & Hentschke, 2004; Gross & Pochop, 2007).
Stand-alone charters may choose to tackle the above problems on their own,
or they may decide to develop into CMOs in order to more efficiently address these
challenges. CMOs are being labeled both a solution to the challenges discussed
above, as well as a strategy for catalyzing the systemic impact that most school
choice advocates expect out of the charter movement (“Charter Management
11
Organizations,” 2006; “Quantity Counts,” 2007). To date, millions of private
philanthropic dollars have been invested into the 30-50 CMOs currently operating
nationwide.
4
This money is targeted mostly at CMOs trying to replicate their school
models in new communities at a rapid pace.
In theory, CMOs should be able to mitigate some of the burdens suffered by
stand-alone charters. The CMO home office, for example, can develop expertise in
tasks such as payroll, academic reporting to meet state requirements, recruiting,
facilities management, and professional development. Taking ownership of these
tasks frees site-based CMO school leaders from managing such responsibilities and
allows them to concentrate more on curriculum and instruction. Also, CMOs are
being viewed as a partial solution to the problems surrounding financing and
financial capital mentioned earlier. Many charter advocates feel that CMOs will be
able to enjoy economies of scale, or at least hire administrative staff devoted to
fundraising (“Charter Management Organizations,” 2006; “Quantity Counts,” 2007).
A number of projects have tried to develop a deeper understanding of what
the CMO landscape looks like nationally. Of course, because considerable debate
exists over the definition of a CMO, the findings from these studies are not entirely
transferrable. However, descriptive statistics outlining the structure of CMOs are
similar.

4
This approximation is based upon two prior studies, one by NewSchools Venture Fund, and the
other by the Center on Reinventing Public Education, University of Washington. See the reference list
at the end of this study for complete citations. Because there is still some debate over the definition of
a CMO, no exact universal count of CMOs is possible.
12
A recent report from the National Resource Center on Finance and
Governance (2009) found that the first CMO was founded in 1997 but that the
number of CMOs being established peeked in 2003. This report also highlighted a
shift in the way CMOs develop. Early adopters of this model of governance tended
to start as stand-alone schools and then gradually transform into CMOs. Newer
CMOs actually started out as multi-site organizations. This report located CMOs in
26 of the 40 states with active charter laws and found that the majority of CMOs
have 3-10 school sites. Another study released by Gary Miron and Jessica Urschel
(2009) found that non-profit EMOs (their equivalent to CMOs) operated in 25 states.
It also reported that 46% of these were “large”—operating 10 or more schools—and
36% were “medium-sized”—operating between four and nine schools. Both reports
found continued growth within CMOs over time. Finally, the most recent public
charter school dashboard issued by the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools
(2009) found that 12% of charter schools were being managed by CMOs during the
2008-2009 school year. This represented a 0.5% increase over 2007-2008.
CMOs and the Growth Process
The three reports discussed above offer a good foundation from which to
begin to build a deeper understanding of CMO growth. Namely, how did all of these
organizations reach their current sizes and scales? Were certain factors influential in
how these organizations were scaling up? What was the motivation for growth?
Some preliminary studies have tried to identify issues related to CMO growth but
13
these reports relied on weak study design and unsophisticated data analysis
techniques.
One study, “Quantity Counts,” released by the National Charter School
Research Project in 2007, began to investigate CMOs. In “Quantity Counts” (2007)
researchers interviewed 10 CEOs of both CMOs and for-profit Educational
Management Organizations to try to identify common challenges faced by these
organizations during scale-up. Not surprisingly, common challenges included:
managing the political climate; developing realistic growth plans; lack of
management capacity; and uneven design implementation. More recently, Education
Sector (2009) released a report focused on scaling up successful stand-alone charter
schools. Again, findings focused on facilities, funding sources and leadership
capacity as major challenges to scale-up. However, the data sources that this report
relied on were not made explicit and the findings were presented in an anecdotal,
overly generalized manner. Yet, both studies still identified challenges, especially
those that were environmental, which were also shared by stand-alone charters.
Consequently, more research is necessary before CMOs can be unequivocally
labeled as a viable solution to the challenges faced by stand-alone charters.
A set of case studies released by NewSchools Venture Fund, a venture
philanthropy focusing specifically on CMOs, also discussed how its grantees
(CMOs) were addressing problems associated with growth. Although data collected
for these case studies were sparse, they were useful for confirming those challenges
faced by CMOs that were already emphasized in the prior two reports. Among the
14
topics highlighted were: Teacher recruitment, teacher credentialing, unionizing CMO
teachers, governance board management and fundraising, community outreach, and
opening new school sites. Again, this list makes clear that CMOs face similar types
of challenges to stand-alone charters, but these challenges simply take on a new
dimension when applied to CMOs.
Lastly, another article that looked at CMO growth specifically considered
CMOs that employ either a franchising or corporate ownership model of growth
(Bennett, 2008). While Bennett’s work was biased in support of applying the
franchise model to charters as the only viable option for growing CMOs to scale
quickly and efficiently--it was still one of the few articles that dealt with the topic of
CMO scale-up. The article contrasted KIPP and Big Picture, two CMOs that
adopted the franchise model of expansion, against more traditional hierarchical
model CMOs like Lighthouse Academies and Achievement First. Bennett argued
that corporate-style growth allowed better quality control. Among Bennett’s other
points were how difficult it was to recruit competent leaders to keep up with the fast
pace of expansion in franchise-model CMOs. As with stand-alone charters, building
and sustaining leadership capacity seemed to be a constant challenge.
Bennett (2008) also identified a number of environmental factors affecting
CMO scale-up. These included a school’s distance from the CMO home office,
differing charter laws by state, different political environments, and different theories
of action for running schools (p.32). Ultimately, Bennett identified four best-
practices for CMOs wishing to scale using the franchise model: 1) Carefully select
15
and train franchisees; 2) experienced franchisors provide specific instructions for
launching the business; 3) successful franchisors perfect their prototypes before
replicating them; and 4) the most successful franchise systems grow carefully, within
one geographic area at a time. However, these recommendations were not based on
any discussion of empirical research findings.
While the above reports do not speak to the “effectiveness” of CMOs from a
student achievement perspective, it is important to note that preliminary research is
also underway to understand whether CMOs are effectively educating students
(Cech, 2008). Very early evidence shows that CMOs seem more capable of
educating urban, at-risk students than do stand-alone charter schools (EdSource,
2008). If this proves true, CMOs will undoubtedly continue along their path of rapid
growth.
Purpose Statement
Since 2000, the number of CMOs operating in the U.S. has more than tripled
(Miron & Urschel, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). The majority of these CMOs have
organizational growth as a primary objective. The federal government continues to
encourage charter schooling, charter advocacy groups are ardently fighting for more
lenient charter laws, state legislatures are constantly raising or eliminating the cap on
new charters, and private philanthropists continue to support the expansion of CMOs
(Center on Education Reform, 2006; Education Commission of the States, 2008,
Klein, 2010; Scott, 2009). These conditions make a convincing argument for the
16
continued popularity of charter schooling as a model for systemic educational
reform.
Accomplishing responsible growth that has the support of a broad range of
charter school stakeholders is a lofty goal. Reaching it requires that CMOs and
educational researchers engage deeply with issues related to the growth process.
Of course, CMOs are not the first organizations trying to manage growth.
Whether non-profit or for-profit, private or public, all organizations must eventually
confront the risks and benefits associated with expansion. In public education,
traditional school districts have certainly dealt with issues related to overcrowding
and increasing student enrolment. However, these organizational activities are
planned for and monitored by district offices that are well established and have most
likely experienced similar periods of growth in the past.
Charter Management Organizations (CMOs), non-profit organizations
managing multiple charter school sites, also confront organizational growth on a
regular basis. Unlike traditional districts, they do not have the benefit of past
experience because many have only been in existence for 5-10 years (Center on
Educational Governance, 2008). CMOs do not have established infrastructures, nor
do they have a guaranteed supply of students to enroll. Prior research on stand-alone
charter schools has identified a number of challenges that impede operations (e.g.
Hill, 2006; Loveless & Jasin, 1998; Zimmer et al., 2003) and CMOs have been
touted as both a solution to these challenges and a catalyst for systemic reform via
school choice.
17
Like all “new” trends in education reform, much more must be understood
about CMOs than their ability to meet legislated measures of student achievement.
The structures and governance processes of these potentially new organizational
forms must also be systematically studied so that existing CMOs and future CMOs
can develop thoughtful approaches to growth and so policymakers, practitioners and
researchers can understand what growth looks like for this particular sector.
To date, charter school research that focuses on CMOs as a unique, separate
sector of charter schooling is limited (Education Sector, 2009; “Quantity Counts,”
2007; Miron & Urschel, 2009). Existing work does attempt to describe these
organizations; some studies even focus on the growth process. However, most of
these studies are anecdotal and not theoretically grounded. In light of this gap in
research and theory on CMOs, this dissertation investigated how CMOs approach
growth. More specifically, it identified the environmental, socio-cultural, and
organizational factors that influenced CMO growth and then looked at whether these
factors changed the way CMOs approach growth planning and management.
The following research questions guided this dissertation:
• RQ1: How do charter management organizations approach growth?
o What are the environmental, organizational or socio-cultural
factors that influence growth decisions?
o Are certain factors more influential than others? If so, how do
these influences impact organizational behaviors like planning and
management?
18
• RQ2: What are the implications for policy and future research?
To answer these questions, this research study examined qualitative data
collected from a national sample of CMOs. The findings were situated within a
model developed from existing organizational theories on change and development,
as well as the empirical and theoretical research on charter schools reviewed above.
Significance of the Study
This study aims to develop a new theory about CMO growth that will
contribute to existing research on charter school governance, as well as guide policy-
makers struggling to manage the rapid expansion of charter schooling. To reiterate,
empirical, theoretically grounded research on CMOs is extremely limited. Theories
of action that guide the charter movement do not include parameters for the growth
of charter management organizations. From a policy perspective, charter school
authorizers and legislators lack guidance when trying to decide how to manage the
growth of CMOs. When charter policy was first developed, CMOs were an
unimagined model of charter school governance. Now that they are becoming more
prevalent, research that offers guidelines to policymakers will help these legislators
adapt existing charter law to meet the needs of the current system.
In the chapters that follow, the literature and research methods that guided
this dissertation will be discussed in detail. Chapter 2 provides a review of the
literature on organizations that is relevant to CMO growth. It culminates with an
explanation of the exploratory model that guided the data collection and analysis.
Chapter 3 details the study’s research design; it explains how the study is structured
19
and justifies these decisions. It also reviews the data sources, the data collection
methods, and the data analysis plan. Chapters 4 presents the study findings and
Chapter 5 analyzes the data using the exploratory model outlined in Chapter 2 of the
dissertation. Chapter 5 also concludes with a discussion of the study’s implications
for theory, policy and practice.
20
CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
AND SMALL FIRM GROWTH
As introduced in the previous chapter, the study of CMO growth is uncharted
territory. To date, charter school researchers have not established any theoretical
base from which to research processes of scale-up. CMOs are quasi-public
organizations in that they educate public school children free of charge and are
prohibited from establishing admissions criteria. However, they more closely
approximate the function of private-sector organizations because they are non-profit
entities governed by external boards of directors. Without a roadmap, one must
approach the development of a theoretical model with caution. Borrowing from
existing theories is helpful for building a hypothesis about how CMOs approach
growth and what factors may impact these plans, but to a large extent a “grounded”
theory which emerges inductively will best explain the growth process within CMOs
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
Acknowledging the limitations of applying private sector theories to CMOs
does not negate their usefulness as a starting point for discussion. A long history of
organizational theory, derived from private sector research, has tried to explain how
organizations change, and organizational growth is certainly a change process at its
core (Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi, 2005). This study of CMO growth,
therefore, relies on theories of firm growth (specifically those related to small firm
growth) to identify the set of organizational demands and management criteria that
21
may influence scale-up. The firm growth literature acknowledges that firms do not
exist in a vacuum; that change in organizations is also mediated by various
environmental factors interacting with organizational demands. Therefore, theories
that address the role of the environment in organizational change are also considered.
The ultimate goal was to develop a model for CMO growth that gave agency to
CMOs and their founders/CEOs, but also acknowledged environmental influences
and how they promote or constrain growth efforts. While this chapter relied
primarily on theories borrowed from the private sector, relevant literature from the
field of education (especially studies focused on charter schools) that incorporated
appropriate organizational theories as a foundation for research and analysis was also
included.
Theories of Firm Growth
Theories of firm growth are rooted in Edith Penrose’s (1959) foundational
work, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Here, Penrose argued that successful
growth was a function of both entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities. The first,
entrepreneurial skills, allowed firms creativity and flexibility to adapt to new
opportunities. The second, managerial capabilities could be recruited or built up
over time to support growth. Penrose’s assumption that growth was dependent upon
the balance of entrepreneurial and managerial knowledge acquisition and application
has become widely accepted amongst researchers studying firm growth (Macpherson
& Holt, 2007). Although some have questioned whether Penrose’s theory can be
applied to new small businesses when her assumptions relied on firm behavior at
22
large, well-established businesses (Garnsey, 1998), there is no question that most
current research on growth still relies on Penrose’s basic assumptions (Barringer &
Greening, 1998; Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi, 2005; Hay & Kamshad, 1994;
Macpherson & Holt, 2007; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).
Building upon Penrose’s work, a number of scholars have tried to explain the
process of growth (or any other process of change) in firms as a “staged” process
where organizations moved through distinct phases that forced shifts in
organizational structure or function (Greiner, 1972; Minkoff & Powell, 2006; Van de
Ven & Poole, 1995). These stages required organizations to build capacity and
resources in advance of growth and then successfully mobilize resources to achieve
growth. Frequently, stages of growth were mediated by the size and age of the firm
and as such, research on the growth of firms has a long history of being associated
with these two variables (Das, 1995; Delmar, Davidsson & Gartner, 2003; Greiner,
1972, Greve, 2008). However, much of this work on firm growth relied on data sets
from industries that were well-established and studied organizations that were very
large (Garnsey, 1998).
CMOs do not fit this mold. As previously discussed, the charter movement
has only been in existence since the early 1990s and CMOs did not really become a
popular model of charter school governance until 2000 (Smith et al., 2009).
Consequently, the subset of firm growth research that focuses specifically on small
firm growth is more relevant to the study of growth in CMOs. This research does
not discredit the staged, life-cycle approach to firm growth; it simply acknowledges
23
the importance of other influencing factors such as the entrepreneurial nature of
small firms (Macpherson & Holt, 2007) and focuses on firms in the early stages of
their development.
Existing research on small firm growth is focused on identifying the factors
that inhibit and constraint growth, as well as explaining how small firms plan for and
manage organizational growth. This dissertation is also focused on understanding
those factors that promote or inhibit growth in CMOs, thus this research is a useful
launching off point.
Generally, research on small firm growth emphasizes internal organizational
characteristics as most critical to planning for and managing growth. Multiple
studies focus on individual founder/manager characteristics as being highly
influential. Hay and Kamshad (1994) found that CEOs emphasized growth as an
organizational objective more so than firms’ founders. They also found that small
firm growth was limited by the management team’s ability to recruit qualified staff
and adapt to changing roles as their organizations grew. Davidsson, Achtenhagen
and Naldi’s (2005) review of research on small firm growth supported these findings.
Their synthesis found that the motivation, education, management experience and
functional skills of small firm founders influenced the growth process. Wiklund and
Shepherd (2003) also found that organizational capacity, human capital and financial
capital were all influential to small firm growth. They argued that these resources
interacted with a founder’s growth aspirations to predict actual growth. When
24
resources and aspirations were both high, growth occurred, but if a firm possessed
one without the other, then growth was limited (p. 1937).
Research focused on understanding entrepreneurs also lends itself to this
discussion of CMO growth. Davidsson (1989) explained that small-business
owners’ motivation to grow was rooted in the economic incentives but it was
tempered by a fear of loss of control or reduced employee well-being. With his
colleagues, Davidsson continued to focus on small-firm growth, especially as it
pertained to the behavior of the manager/owner. In a more recent study of small
business managers’ attitudes toward growth (Wiklund, Daviddson & Delmar, 2003),
perceived benefits like increased income and increased independence in relation to
customers, suppliers and lenders were associated with a more positive attitude
toward growth. For CMO founders and CEOs, individual attitudes towards growth,
such as those identified above, may very well be determining how each organization
approaches growth.
Another key component was a small firm’s ability to create a resource-rich
network in each new market. Here, networking referred to the process of building
relationships with key suppliers, partners or individuals that could support firm
growth. This conception of networking is consistent with the existing literature base
on social networks. Here, a network is defined as a set of actors connected by a set
of ties, where an actor can be a person or an organization (Borgattie & Foster, 2003).
A rich body of research has examined the benefits of building network ties to
25
improve an actor’s ability to acquire resources for themselves or their organizations
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003).
Bruce Barringer and Daniel Greening (along with their colleagues) spent time
conducting case studies in small firms that chose growth strategies that relied on
geographic expansion. They defined geographic expansion separately from
franchising techniques in that small businesses had “expanded from a single location
to several locations while retaining essentially the same ownership structure” (1998,
p.469). This research found that in addition to recruiting and training new staff,
networking (or building network ties) proved a key constraint for small businesses.
Often, entering new geographic areas required building relationships with potential
funders or others producing resources critical to the firm’s operations. Also,
networking proved necessary when the firm needed to establish legitimacy with its
new customer base. Ultimately, Barringer and Greening’s work on geographic
expansion argued that the key to successful small firm growth was sufficient
planning to mitigate barriers like human capital issues and financial capacity issues
(Barringer & Greening 1998; Greening, Barringer & Macy, 1996).
Finally, Macpherson and Holt (2007) built upon the work of Hay and
Kamshad (1994) in identifying three interrelated factors important to small firm
growth: human capital, organizational capital (finance, structure, systems), and
network capital. From a human capital perspective, they argued that the skill sets of
the management team and the founder’s organizational “blueprint” influenced the
firm’s overall approach to growth. These employee-specific characteristics were
26
mediated by firm-level components such as the financial stability of the firm and the
current structures and systems being used prior to growth. A firm’s ability to grow
depended on its capacity to adapt skill sets and systems to changing organizational
demands. Finally, like Barringer and Greening (1998), Macpherson and Holt (2007)
saw networking as key to small firm growth. They explained that the competencies
of a firm’s management team attracted the attention of different network contacts;
this helped build professional and personal identity and it widened access to
resources (Ramachandran & Ramnarayan, 1993). Furthermore, they found that
different types of networks became more or less relevant as small firms grew. For
example, networks might shift from mostly social to more professional or
institutional as the firm required more resources to operate (Macpherson & Holt,
2007). Again, these findings were consistent with those from the networking
literature (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).
The above findings prove valuable in developing an exploratory model for
CMO growth. As the research questions in Chapter 1 make clear, one objective of
this study was to identify the environmental and organizational factors that
influenced CMO growth. Since most CMOs are still small, young nonprofit
organizations compared to both traditional school districts and larger private sector
companies; and since most also began as single sites and chose to expand to new
geographic markets, it is reasonable to assume that they could behave similarly to the
small firms studied above. Consequently, issues of human capital, financial capital
and networking are likely to influence growth, as are the individual competencies of
27
CMO founders and CEOs. However, the research on small firm growth does have
its limitations. Firstly, this body of research assumes certain motives for growth that
do not entirely align with the mission/goals of most CMOs. For example, when
asked about their motives for geographic expansion small firm managers listed
overcoming liabilities of smallness, economies of scale, and wealth creation as
primary concerns (Greening, Barringer & Macy, 1996). These views were consistent
with other economic theories of firm growth built from research on large
corporations. These studies also listed issues of market share, profitability, and
economies of scale as key motivators for firm growth. While existing research shows
that CMOs do grow in order to capitalize on economies of scale (“Quantity Counts,”
2007), like many non-profit service organizations, CMOs are highly mission-driven
(Moore, 2000). Rather than focusing on enhancing personal wealth or shareholder
wealth, CMOs aim to achieve a social mission (Moore, 2000). Consequently, a
model for CMO growth that includes internal organizational influences must
certainly incorporate the CMO mission along with the more economically focused
goals.
The empirical and theoretical work on small firm growth is also limited by
some methodological concerns. First, in none of the research reviewed do the
authors delineate what a “small firm” looks like. How many employees does it
have? What type of structure? What level of revenue or production? There seems to
be agreement over the fact that small firms are “start-ups” and thus have an
entrepreneurial nature (Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi, 2005, Macpherson & Holt,
28
2007) but some empirical work eliminated firms with 25 or fewer employees
(Fombrun & Wally, 1989) while other studies included all firms with 150 employees
or less (Hay & Kamshad, 1994). Some empirical work saw size as a function of
revenue and not level of human capacity (Fombrun & Wally, 1989), while other
research took small firm size as a given and didn’t define the boundaries of a small
firm at all (Barringer & Greening, 1998; Macpherson & Holt, 2007). Hay and
Kamshad (1994) acknowledged that there was no hard and fast definition of firm
size, but the variability across research studies could have an impact on the
transferability of the findings to different contexts. With respect to CMOs, the
majority of organizations in this study qualified as “small firms” if one applies the
150 employees or less criteria. Therefore, the findings discussed above should prove
relevant.
Of course, the applicability of the small firm growth literature is also
tempered by its emphasis on different outcome measures. CMOs are growing in size
(both number of school sites and number of students served), and this growth does
increase revenues by bringing in more federal and state funding that comes attached
to each new student the CMO enrolls. However, unlike for-profit firms, growth is
not measured by increased productivity or product sales (a common marker of
growth in the private sector). As was discussed earlier, an over-arching mission that
may or may not include increasing “market share” within specific communities
guides CMO growth.
29
Though research on small firm growth emphasizes internal factors such as
founder knowledge, human capital and organizational capital (Macpherson & Holt,
2007), scholars agree that the environment also influences the growth of firms
(Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi, 2005; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). An
extensive body of research on organizational change supports this claim (e.g.
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Next, such theories are reviewed and their relevance to the study of CMO growth is
discussed.
Externally-Driven Theories of Organizational Development
Minkoff and Powell (2006) wrote, “[w]hile mission serves as organizational
purpose or compass, nonprofits are also buffeted by environmental contingencies and
challenged by external mandates” (p.592). Therefore, even though CMOs may have
control over certain decisions about growth (e.g. mission, pace) the scale-up process
is a constant interaction between internal organizational processes and external
circumstances. This begs the question: How can one explain this interaction?
In their foundational work on resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) have explained, that “[w]hat happens in an organization is not only a
function of the organization, its structure, its leadership, its procedures, or its goals.
What happens is also a consequence of the environment and the particular
contingencies and constraints from that environment” (p.3). This belief, that
organizational development is strongly influenced (or constrained) by environmental
forces like government policies, available resources, or the existence of similar
30
organizations is the cornerstone of externally-driven theories of organizational
development (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). Since the 1970s three theories have dominated the discussion of
environmentally-driven organizational adaptation. These theories all acknowledge
the significant role that environmental factors play in organizational development.
However, they differ in the degree of emphasis they place on environmental
determinism, strategic choice, and the connection between external constraints and
internal dynamics (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The first thoery, organizational
ecology, is discussed only briefly because this theory allows for almost no
organizational autonomy in responding to the external environment. Rather,
organizational ecologists argue that the environment selects successful organizations
while less successful firms die out (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). This perspective
does not lend itself to the study of CMO growth because, historically, charter schools
have not closed in large numbers due to drastically changing environments (Smith,
2009). However the second and third theories, institutionalism and resource
dependence theory, are discussed in detail because both theories allow for individual
organizations to react to the environments within which they are situated. Table 2.1
summarizes key components of all three theoretical perspectives, and a detailed
discussion of each theory as it pertains to CMO growth follows.
31
Table 2.1. Externally-driven theories of organizational development: an overview

Theory
Foundational
Literature Major Premise Limitations
Application to CMO
Growth
Organizational
Ecology
Hannan &
Freeman, 1977
Organizational
success/failure is a
function of selection
based upon an
organization's ability
to thrive within a
current environment.
Focus is on
predicting diversity
within populations of
organizations.
Organizations are
not adaptable. If
environments
change too
drastically, they will
be selected out by
other organizations
more suited for
success.
Variability in CMO
structure and
governance as a
function of growth.
Are some "forms" of
CMOs growing faster
than others because
they are better suited
to their
environments?
Resource
Dependence
Theory
Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978
Organizations are
depedent upon the
ability to acquire and
maintain resources
from their
environment.
Effective
organizations are
those that can adapt
to changing
conditions of
resource dependency
in order to maintain
high-levels of
production.
Organizational
decisions are viewed
as entirely driven by
the acquisition and
maintanance of
resources. In
mission-driven
organizations
resource dependence
may not be the sole
motivator for
organizational
decision-making.
CMO strategies for
growth as a function
of resource
dependancies like
limited private/public
funding, facilities,
recruitment of
students/staff.
Institutional
Theory
DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983;
Meyer &
Rowan, 1977
Organizational
structures and
practices are
primarily a function
of the established
norms, social rules
and expectations
already operating
within a larger
environmental field.
Isomorphic pressures
limit diversity across
organizational fields.
Organizational
behavior is "loosly
coupled" with
institutionalized
rules and regulations
therefore changing
environments may
cause organizational
adaptation that is
largely symbolic.
CMO growth, in form
and function, is
constrained by
existing
institutionalized
norms of schooling--
both those that are
legislated and those
that are legitimated
by other social actors.
32
Organizational Ecology
As opposed to other theories of organizational development, organizational
ecology (also called population ecology) views organizational change as a process of
selection. Variability across populations of organizations, as well as their ultimate
success or failure, is a function of how well suited they are to their current and future
environments (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). More specifically, organizational ecology
focuses on understanding “how social conditions affect the rates at which new
organizations and new organizational forms arise, the rates at which organizational
forms change, and the rates at which organizations die out” (Hannan & Freeman,
1989, p.7).
In thinking about CMOs, organizational ecologists would argue that the most
successful CMOs would be those operating in markets that are extremely stable over
time. This is because these organizations can establish structures and processes that
effectively respond to current social, political and economic conditions and they can
feel secure in the fact that these constraints will remain constant over time. Problems
arise when environments change because organizational ecologists feel that
individual organizations are not adept at adapting to such changes. Rather, they
believe that new organizational forms, better suited to deal with such environmental
changes, emerge to replace older, less effective ones (Hannen & Freeman, 1989).
Since CMOs are expanding to new markets almost by definition, and very few have
been selected out, it is reasonable to argue that organizational ecology has more
applicability when applied to the private sector.
33
However, CMOs certainly have different growth targets and the pace of
growth within these organizations is variable. Identifying the types of environmental
conditions that “select” high-growth CMOs over more static CMOs is useful to an
overall understanding of CMO growth. Additionally, understanding the degree to
which CMO growth creates variability of organizational forms is a productive
enterprise. Hannan and Freeman (1989) emphasize the importance of organizational
diversity saying, “[a] system with greater organizational diversity has a higher
probability of having in hand some form that does a reasonably satisfactory job of
dealing with the changed environmental conditions” (p.8).
Furthermore, this study focuses on understanding a process—growth—across
a population. Organizational ecologists are not concerned with the study of
processes. Rather, their focus is on outcomes like success or failure. Since CMOs
are still such a new model of charter school governance, this view of organizational
development is not extremely productive.
Resource Dependence Theory
In contrast to organizational ecology, resource dependence theory allows for
organizations to change their activities in response to environmental factors. More
specifically, resource dependence theorists argue that “a good deal of organizational
behavior, the actions taken by organizations, can be understood only by knowing
something about the organization’s environment and the problems it creates for
obtaining resources” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p.3).
34
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), who originally developed this theory, outlined
three central themes. First, as has already been mentioned, that the environment of
organizations is of central importance for understanding the decisions that get made
within them. Second, that although an organization’s environment constrains its
activities, the organization still has autonomy to address these constraints and pursue
its own interests. Lastly, the construct of power plays an important role in
determining the interdependence of organizations within the same environment.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) have argued that although their work on resource
dependence theory is widely cited, the body of empirical literature that tests its
assumptions is fairly limited. Therefore, it is not surprising that this theory has not
been directly applied to public education or charter schools more specifically.
Most relevant to this study of CMO growth is the theory’s ability to predict
organizational decisions based upon the availability of resources coupled with
organizations’ dependence on these resources. High degrees of interdependence,
where one organization is completely dependent on a number of other organizations,
ultimately give these actors power over the focal organization (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). For example, CMOs are dependent on one primary resource for survival—
students. The number of students they enroll at each school site directly translates
into larger or smaller funding streams. Therefore, resource dependency theory
would predict that CMOs that are growing quickly are able to effectively recruit
students and keep them enrolled long term, thereby ensuring the ability for future
growth. However, CMOs that are less capable of acquiring students become
35
dependent on other environmental interest groups, like private foundations, to secure
funding for their operations. Ultimately, this dependence gives foundations, or
student groups, or any other “supplier”, power in influencing the decisions of a
particular CMO (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This hypothesis is supported by
Froelich’s (1999) work on revenue stream diversification in the nonprofit sector.
She found that funders of nonprofit organizations (specifically foundations and
individual donors) were able to impact organizational goals and other decisions,
because nonprofits were so dependent upon the resources these funders provided
(Froelich, 1999). Publically available financial records indicate that the majority of
CMOs are regularly receiving donations from foundations to support the start-up of
new school sites and the development of central office functions
5
. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that funders may also influence decisions about CMO growth.
Besides private foundations and students (and their parents), other interest
groups that are most likely providing resources to CMOs include local school
districts, city permitting offices, local community groups, and city officials.
Depending on a CMO’s dependence on these suppliers, each may hold significant
influence over organizational decisions about growth. Additionally, resource
dependence theory allows for “an organization, through political mechanisms, [to
attempt] to create for itself an environment that is better for its interests” (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003, 189). However, this option is seen as a last resort once organizations

5
CMO annual reports were collected and analyzed along with other relevant organizational
documents. An in-depth analysis of these documents is included with the rest of the study findings
presented in Chapter 4.
36
are unsuccessful at negotiating stable resource relationships with other organizations
in their environment.
Research focused on the private sector finds that organizational board
appointments as well as strategic alliances/partnerships are key levers for stabilizing
resource interdependencies (Kono, 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Since CMOs
are nonprofit organizations operating within environments that have the potential to
be quite unstable, it is realistic to hypothesize that they will react to this instability by
scaling up in ways that minimize the risks associated with resource interdependence
as well. This could also mean forming long-term alliances, for example with
foundations to counteract the fluctuating nature of public funding. It could also
mean developing strong community relations to safeguard against declining student
enrollment. Or, as has been well documented amongst stand-alone charter schools,
CMOs may continue to create formal partnerships with other organizations as a way
to build strategic alliances that could rebalance power between CMOs and resource
suppliers (Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006; Wohlstetter, Smith & Malloy, 2005). While
the strategies are yet to be determined, the notion that environmental factors are
impacting CMO growth from a resource dependence perspective seems probable.
As important as resource acquisition is to the effectiveness of an
organization, critics of resource dependence theory argue that it overlooks many
other important environmental effects, for example geography (Kono, Palmer,
Friedland & Zafonte, 1998), and that it does not leave space for organizational
decisions that are not driven by resource dependence, for example mission-driven
37
decisions (Moore, 2000). The final externally driven theory reviewed here,
institutional theory, also diverges from resource dependence theory in that it places
more emphasis on the norms, rules and regulations that exist in an environment—
these constructs are the foundation for organizational structure and processes.
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory (sometimes also referred to as neoinstitutionalism) also
helps explain the role of the environment in shaping organizational development.
This theory assumes that organizational development is the result of the reproduction
and reinforcement of existing structures and processes; the result of a variety of
institutional pressures influencing a specific organizational field, for example public
education (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).
Institutional theory, more so than resource dependence theory, rejects the
assumption that individual organizations are making rational choices about how to
deal with environmental constraints, and asserts that organizations actually adapt to
resemble existing institutions within their organizational fields primarily out of a
desire for legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991). This desire for
legitimacy was alluded to in the small firm growth literature (Greening & Barringer,
2998) but it was framed as a firm-level behavior, rather than a process that is
externally controlled. Traditionally, this adaptation, called isomorphism, has been
attributed to coercive, mimetic and normative environmental pressures (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). Coercive forces come primarily in the form of legislative directives,
while normative pressures are the universally accepted practices and beliefs of
38
professional associations and peer-groups within the organizational field. Mimetic
isomorphism, potentially the most relevant to a discussion of CMO scale-up, predicts
organizational behavior during times of uncertainty. When faced with uncertainty
about structure and process, organizations look to peer organizations with high levels
of legitimacy for answers. Most often, these less legitimate organizations will adopt
structures and practices that have already been deemed legitimate by others in their
field, so as to increase their own levels of legitimacy (Burch, 2007; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991).
Unlike population ecology and resource dependency theory, institutional
theory has a long history within the field of education and has already been applied
to research on charter schools more specifically (Huerta, 2009; Lubienski, 2004;
Rowan 2006). Next, institutional research on school choice that is relevant to the
study of CMO growth is reviewed.
Institutionalism and School Choice
Institutional theory has been widely applied to public education. What
started with Weick’s (1976) work on loose coupling in educational organizations has
grown into an extensive body of research and theory that has used ideas about
institutional environments and institutional actors to better understand phenomena
like the structure of schools and districts (Carolan, 2008; Rowan & Miskel, 1999);
how educational organizations learn (Hanson, 2001); how new education policy
impacts school districts (Burch, 2007; Firestone, Fitz & Broadfoot, 1999; Fusarelli,
2002); how global institutions impact national and state education systems
39
(LeTendre, Baker, Akiba, Goesling & Wiseman, 2001); and how educators react to
their institutional environments (or lack there of) at the micro-level (Bidwell, 2001;
Coburn, 2001; Talbert & McLaughlin, 1994).
In thinking specifically about charter schools, a number of researchers have
applied institutional theory to explain the degree to which charter schools have
developed innovative educational practices. The theory of action driving the charter
movement includes the assumption that charter schools would be opportunities for
innovation; places to break free from the status quo (i.e. institutionalized norms) and
experiment with new and different models of schooling. Recently Rowan (2006)
singled out the school choice movement as an example of organizations within a
strong institutional environment (public education) trying to operate in new and
innovative ways, despite the impact that this may have on their legitimacy within
their sector. However, others studying charter schools were quick to argue that
charter schools struggle to preserve a new and innovative technical core of schooling
amidst strong isomorphic pressure to conform to existing, legitimated models of
schooling (Huerta, 2009). Research on the convergence of organizational behavior
in charter schools (Henig, Holyoke, Brown & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005), as well as
research that finds similarities in instructional and curricular models across charters
(Lubienski, 2004) supports an institutional view of charter school development. In
these cases, charters seemed unable to deviate from normative models of schooling.
Institutional theory explains this lack of variance in two ways. First, charters may be
constrained by normative or coercive institutional forces (e.g. state charter law or
40
opinionated parents and community organizations). Second, charters may be
constrained by mimetic institutional forces that limit choice in exchange for
organizational legitimacy. Charters that are structured too differently may simply be
unable to recruit students or garner enough community support to survive.
Luis Huerta (2009) built upon research on innovation (or lack there of) in
charter schools in his work on scaling-up these organizations. Here, Huerta argued
that charter school development is greatly influenced by existing, legitimate
conceptions of schooling:
Although charter schools are granted autonomy from many
regulations that govern traditional public schools, they are not
evolving within a decentralized policy vacuum that insulates them
from the forces of the wider institutional environment. Rather,
charter schools are still subject to normative definitions of effective
schooling advanced by the institutional environment. (p. 415)

Huerta goes on to argue that as charter schools grow, they must constantly
balance their internal objectives with “bureaucratic demands linked to
institutional conformity” (p.416).
Huerta’s (2009) work focused predominantly on the structures and processes
of charter schools. Bulkley’s (1999) study—the first to analyze charter related
phenomenon through an institutional lens—examined charter school authorizing
bodies. She conducted case studies of charter school authorizers in Arizona and
Michigan in an attempt to better understand the structure and function of these
organizations. What Bulkley found was that the political and legislative
environments within which charter authorizers were situated shaped both the
41
structure of their organizations and their methods of oversight and technical support.
In Arizona, a Republican, neoliberal state legislature passed a very unrestrictive
charter law. This translated into a charter authorizing organization that was less
bureaucratic and less focused on oversight of individual schools. In Michigan, the
opposite proved true. There, authorizing organizations were much more bureaucratic
and spent more time concentrating on developing and streamlining processes for
charter school oversight. Bulkley attributed these different outcomes to coercive
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). She also emphasized that authorizers in
Arizona and Michigan were not receiving equal resources. “With funding for only a
small staff for each board in Arizona, these boards are simply unable to develop the
type of professionalized, structured organization found [in Michigan]” (p.692).
Again, since funding for authorizers was controlled by state legislators, these
governing bodies served as a coercive force for organizational development.
The existing body of research that studied the charter movement through an
institutional lens offers valuable insights for thinking about CMO scale-up. First
CMOs, like authorizers, are confined to a large degree by the charter laws of their
states. Therefore, CMOs operating in different states (or in multiple states) will have
different coercive pressures impacting their scale-up decisions. Differing laws
governing per-pupil funding, charter authorization and renewal, charter school
oversight and accountability, and facilities space will likely impact the strategies that
CMOs adopt when growing to scale. Also, as Bulkley (1999) mentioned, state-level
politics will also likely affect CMO scale-up because “charter-friendly” politicians
42
and community groups can often help charters navigate the messy bureaucracy of
state departments of education and/or city government and local school districts.
Such help will surely impact timelines for growth and locations for new school sites
at minimum.
Drawing from Huerta’s (2009) work on scaling up charter schools, it is also
reasonable to hypothesize that CMO growth processes will be constrained by
existing institutional norms of public education. As they grow, CMOs must partner
with local community groups, local school districts, parents, city officials and state
and federal policy-makers in order to enter new communities, secure additional
charters and facility space, and establish credibility. Oftentimes, successfully
navigating these partnerships could depend upon adopting structures and processes
for growth that are already viewed as legitimate or effective either within the public
school arena or within the nonprofit sector.
Conclusion
Understanding issues of growth in CMOs relies on developing a model to
explain how CMOs, as quasi-pubilc organizations, develop over time. Historically,
organizational theorists have argued that change is predominantly either externally or
internally driven. Here, it is argued that CMO development is dependent upon
successfully adapting to both sets of constraints. Therefore, Chapter 2 reviewed
relevant theories focused on explaining small firm growth from an organizational
perspective. While CMOs, as nonprofits with strong social missions, are not
perfectly aligned with these small businesses, the individual and organizational
43
factors that researchers in this field identified as key influences on growth and the
growth planning process seem likely to transfer to CMOs that are scaling-up. So, as
CMOs grow, the growth aspirations of their founders and CEOs, the organization’s
financial capital, its human capital, and its existing relationships with key resource
suppliers will all influence growth plans and the pace at which they are realized.
Additionally, CMOs’ abilities to mobilize the necessary resources for growth will be
mediated by the environments within which they operate (or plan to be operating).
Whether growth decisions are driven primarily by resource interdependencies or by
isomorphic pressures is yet to be seen. Figure 2.1 illustrates the tension between
organizational autonomy and environmental determinism that exists for CMOs as
they grow. It was developed using the above literature, as well as the research on
stand-alone charter schools presented in Chapter 1.
In Figure 2.1, socio-cultural factors such as community demographics and
city politics are also included as influencers CMO growth. These factors were
aggregated with the other environmental factors influencing organizational change
by the theories just reviewed. This model chooses to separate them out for emphasis,
but does not assume that parents, students or community groups, for example, would
influence CMO growth in a manner not explained by the three externally-driven
change theories discussed above.
44
Figure 2.1. Exploratory model for CMO growth

Chapters 1 and 2 have focused on the importance of this study and on
building an exploratory model to apply to the study of CMO growth. In the next
chapter decisions about research design are justified, the study’s methodology and
data sources are explained, and data analysis techniques are outlined.
45
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN
Overview and Study Rationale
The purpose of this research was to gain an in-depth understanding of how
CMOs approach growth. More specifically, the study identified the factors that
influenced organizational growth as well as how CMOs planned for growth given
their unique organizational and environmental contexts. As was discussed in the first
two chapters of this dissertation, the research on CMO growth is fairly limited so no
accepted method of study exists. Likewise, neither the existing empirical research
on small firm growth nor the research on stand-alone charter schools established a
clear methodological approach that could guide a study on CMO growth.
Given these conditions Strauss and Corbin (1990) encourage the use of
qualitative research in situations where one is trying to “uncover and understand
what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known” (p. 19). They
also advocate for qualitative methods as a way to “give the intricate details of
phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative methods” (p. 19). When it
comes to studying a phenomenon like CMO growth, both justifications for a
qualitative approach are valid.
A Qualitative Approach to CMO Growth
The literature review in Chapter 2 emphasized how environmental, socio-
cultural and organizational factors could influence organizations. However,
researchers have not systematically examined how context affects the process of
46
scale-up within CMOs, nor have they recognized that CMOs operating in different
environments may need to approach scale-up differently. Consequently, the present
study of CMO scale-up placed an emphasis on understanding how these multiple
contexts affected decisions about organizational growth. While one could approach
the study of CMO scale-up from a quantitative perspective, Denzin and Lincoln
(2000) explain that “quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of
causal relationships between variables, not processes” (p.8). Alternatively,
qualitative research places a strong emphasis on developing a relative understanding
of a complex case or phenomena; it values interpretation of multiple realities and
seeks to explore, not just explain, patterns and relationships among organizational
stakeholders and their environments (Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Given
the emphasis on holistic interpretation, as well as the suitability to areas of study that
are just emerging (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), a qualitative approach proved the most
appropriate for conducting a formal inquiry into the process of CMO growth. It
allowed for a rich, nuanced investigation that could both confirm existing theories on
organizational change and create new theory that was CMO specific.
This study chose not to conform rigidly to traditional qualitative research
designs like case study or ethnography because they proved difficult to apply to a
study of CMO growth. This was because most CMOs are still small organizations
and the process of planning for growth often impacts only a small cross-section of
the organization’s high-level administrative teams. While school-level
administrators and teachers felt the impact of organizational growth via changes in
47
accessibility and resources, CMO leaders confirmed that they were rarely involved in
the actual development of growth strategies. Therefore, spending long periods of
time in the field gathering data from a large cross-section of organizational
stakeholders at a few CMOs would most likely add little value beyond a few key
CMO informants.
Furthermore, few researchers have systematically or empirically examined
scale-up in CMOs. Consequently, studying this process in a small sample of
organizations offers less insight for the long term. Because of this, the present study
stayed within the spirit of the case study tradition by adopting Stake’s (1995)
conceptualization of case study as a starting point for an investigation of CMO
growth. Stake views case study as an interactive methodology where meaning is
constructed through interactions between study participants and researchers.
Consequently, the research team focused on data collection methods that
incorporated multiple sources of data, but also placed a heavy emphasis on in-depth
interviews with key CMO leaders.
The research design that follows was guided by these research questions,
which were first introduced in Chapter 1:
• RQ1: How do charter management organizations approach growth?
o What are the environmental, organizational or socio-cultural
factors that influence growth decisions?
48
o Are certain factors more influential than others? If so, how do
these influences impact organizational behaviors like planning and
management?
• RQ2: What are the implications for policy and future research?

Study Methods
Purposeful Selection
This research drew on data gathered as part of a larger national study on
CMO scale-up.
6
The research team’s objective was to include as many CMOs as
possible in this study because the majority of empirical research on CMOs has used
small study samples that prevent the transferability of findings across the field as a
whole. The team’s primary objective was to identify all CMOs in operation during
the 2008-2009 academic year that met the project’s selection criteria. To identify
CMOs for the study, the research team used a criterion-based sampling approach that
focused on current organizational characteristics as well as plans for future growth
(Creswell, 1998). The research team’s sampling criteria centered around its
definition of a CMO.

6
The larger study is being funded by the U.S. Department of Education. Dr. Priscilla Wohlstetter
served as the principal investigator on the project. Besides myself, the research team also included
one post-doctoral fellow and another doctoral student. However, as the project manager, I was
intimately involved with the conceptualization of the overall project and subsequent research design.
I also led the development of the data collection instruments, conducted the majority of the in-depth
interviews, and managed the overall data collection process. Moving forward, the “research team”
will be credited with any work conducted collaboratively. If the research team is not specifically
mentioned and no other scholars are cited, one can assume that I was solely responsible for the
information and analysis being presented.
49
This definition of a CMO was crafted after careful consideration of existing
definitions of CMOs, as well as existing definitions for other types of educational
management organizations. Other charter school researchers reviewed preliminary
drafts of the definition and the final CMO definition for this project reflects these
researchers’ suggestions.
The final definition categorized CMOs as nonprofit organizations that
managed a network of charter schools to differentiate them from for-profit education
management organizations. The CMOs in the study shared three additional
characteristics. First, each CMO had a common identifiable mission or instructional
design across its schools. Second, every CMO had a home office or management
team that provided significant ongoing administrative support to its schools. Third,
each CMO needed to exclusively manage schools and not also be responsible for
overseeing additional community programs (Farrell et al. 2009). As an example,
this third criterion eliminated CMOs that were affiliated with umbrella organizations
that also operated counseling or medical programs in their communities.
For the purpose of this study, the team also chose not to include virtual
charter school networks or CMOs that catered to home-schooling.
7
This choice
reflected the core belief that operating virtual charter networks and non-site-based
networks was fundamentally different than operating site-based charter

7
The research team recognized that this CMO definition was not one that was universally accepted.
Many organizations that operate schools consider themselves CMOs but were not selected for this
study. The choices made here reflect an overarching desire to limit variability across CMOs enough to
uncover common themes about growth.
50
organizations. For example, the way that site-based CMOs needed to plan for site
acquisition or recruitment would be quite different in a virtual CMO situation.
Focusing only on site-based CMOs limited the variability of data and produced
findings that were more transferable.
Because this study focused specifically on CMO growth, the universe of
CMOs that fit the research team’s definition was further limited by two criteria that
ensured each CMO in the final sample had experience with growth and with
planning for future organizational scale-up. These criteria included: a) Each CMO
managed at least 3 campuses/school sites during the 2008-2009 academic year; b)
each CMO had plans for continued growth by 2010.
In order to identify CMOs for the study, the research team conducted an
exhaustive search using: internet resources (google scholar, ERIC, JSTOR etc.),
existing study samples from past research (“Charter Management Organizations,”
2006; NewSchools Venture Fund, 2008; “Quantity counts,” 2007), presentations at
charter school conferences (for example, National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools, California Charter Schools Association), popular press articles that focused
on charter schools (daily newspapers, magazines, trade publications), and
networking with charter school and CMO employees. After a preliminary list of
51
CMOs was compiled, the team solicited feedback from fellow researchers who were
conducting concurrent research on CMOs
8
.
The final list of CMOs, which reflected existing knowledge of the entire
population of CMOs, was then vetted using the sampling criteria listed above. This
process was facilitated with the template below (Table 3.1).
Two examples of CMOs evaluated using the sampling criteria are included.
CMO A is one that would have been included in the final list of prospective CMOs,
while CMO B was not included (They did not have future plans for growth and were
not a non-profit). CMOs needed to satisfy all sampling criteria to be included in the
study.

Table 3.1. CMO sampling criteria template

CMO Name A B
At least 3 schools in network X X
Common school design/mission X X
Plans for future growth X
Only manages charter schools X X
Home office that oversees all schools in network X
CMO is classroom based X X
Non-profit Status X

8
Researchers included worked at respected institutions including the Center for Research on
Education Outcomes (CREDO), Mathematica, and the Center for Reinventing Public Education
(CRPE).
52
The preliminary research using the above criteria identified 40 CMOs for
study. For these 40 organizations, the team developed an introductory interview
protocol that was used to conduct 10-15 minute interviews with the executive
director (or equivalent) of each CMO. CMO Executive Directors became the
targeted informants for introductory interviews because past research had identified
them as key players in the scale-up process (NewSchools Venture Fund, 2008;
"Quantity counts," 2007).
The introductory interview protocol included the following items:
Demographic information on the CMO, Sampling criteria to be confirmed by the
executive director; and current and future growth targets (Appendix A). It also
incorporated research that the team had gathered from the Internet on each
prospective CMO. For example, one question asked how many school sites the
CMO planned on opening by 2010. If a preliminary answer to this question was
uncovered through the team’s internet research, it was included on the protocol for
that CMO and then confirmed/amended during the introductory interview.
Introductory interviews served three purposes. First, as already mentioned,
they allowed the team to confirm their preliminary research and verify that each
CMO met the selection criteria. Second, they established contact with potential study
participants and allowed research team members to introduce the study and
communicate its objectives. Third, the research team used these interviews to secure
each CMO’s participation and used snowball sampling (Creswell, 1998) techniques
to identify subsequent CMO home office staffers to interview.
53
As previously mentioned, introductory interviews were attempted with the 40
CMOs identified through preliminary research. Out of these 40 organizations, 7
CMOs were eliminated because they failed to respond to initial phone calls and
subsequent attempts by phone and email to contact them. These seven CMOs were
overwhelmingly small, young organizations. All of the older, more established
CMOs agreed to participate in this project. Additionally, three CMOs were
eliminated because they declined participation; and five were eliminated because
they did not meet the selection criteria. Most often, CMOs that did not meet the
selection criteria were eliminated because they did not have plans for continued
growth, or because their home offices managed other programs/organizations beyond
charter schools. Ultimately, 25 CMOs participated in the study. This group of
CMOs reflected the research team’s desire to include the entire universe of CMOs in
operation during the 2008-2009 academic year that were also dealing with
organizational growth. Table 3.2 lists the final study sample along with some key
demographics information.
54
Table 3.2. Selected demographic information: study population

CMO
Year CMO
Founded
Began as a CMO
vs. Stand- Alone
charter (SA)
Achievement First 2003 SA
Algiers Charter School Assoc. 2005 CMO
Alliance for College-Ready 2003 CMO
Arthur Academy/Mastery Learning 2002 CMO
Aspire Public Schools 1998 CMO
Cesar Chavez Public Charter Schools for
Public Policy
2003 SA
Envision Schools 2002 CMO
Friendship Public Charter Schools 1997 CMO
Great Hearts Academies 2004 SA
Green Dot Public Schools 1999 CMO
High Tech High 1999 CMO
IDEA public Schools 2000 CMO
Imagine Schools 2003 CMO
Inner City Education Foundation (ICEF) 1994 SA
King/Chavez Public Schools 2004 SA
KIPP 1994 SA
Lighthouse Academies 2003 CMO
Mastery Charter Schools 2001 CMO
New City Public Schools 2000 SA
Noble Network of Charter Schools 2005 SA
Partnerships to Uplift Communities (PUC) 2004 SA
Perspectives Charter Schools 1997 CMO
Propel Schools 2003 CMO
Uncommon Schools 2005 SA
Yes College Preparatory Public Schools 1995 SA
55
Characteristics of CMO Sample
As the above table makes clear, the sample was comprised of a wide variety
of organizations—both new and more mature and those that began as single-site
stand-alone schools as well as those that originated as networks of schools.
Next, the study population is described in terms of geographic scope, CMO
age and CMO size. These attributes are discussed in detail because the literature
review presented in Chapter 2 predicted that they would influence the scope and pace
of CMO Growth.
Geographic scope. The study included CMOs from 26 of the 41 states with
charter school laws. More than half of the CMOs studied have developed within a
city or region of one state; only three CMOs opened schools nationwide (three or
more states). CMOs served a wide range of locales, from urban areas in
Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Chicago and
Houston to suburban and rural areas in states including Oregon, Arkansas and
Georgia (Smith, Farrell, Wohlstetter, & Nayfack, 2009). California had more CMO
operators than any other state. Also, the majority of CMOs are operating in urban
settings as opposed to rural. Figure 3.1 extends the discussion of geographic scope
by separating sample based upon regional, multi-state and national criteria.
56
Figure 3.1. CMO school locations

As shown in Figure 3.1, the majority of the CMOs in this study were
operating in one local area in one state. However, eight of the 25 CMOs operated in
multiple communities within the same state. Less prevalent were CMOs operating
across state lines.
Age. The first CMOs began surfacing in the late 1990s (Smith, et al., 2009).
Two-thirds of the CMOs in the study were established between six and ten years ago,
with only six CMOs in operation for more than 10 years (Aspire, Friendship, ICEF,
KIPP, Perspectives, YES Prep). Figure 3.2 shows the age range for CMOs in the
study.
57
Figure 3.2. CMO age

Of the CMOs that were established between 1999 and 2003, the majority
(n=7) were founded in 2003. These include Achievement First, the Alliance for
College-Ready Public Schools, Imagine Schools and Lighthouse Academies. Only
six CMOs were founded between 2004-2009.
Size. An in-depth discussion of CMO size as it relates to growth is included
in Chapter 4. However, an overview of the size of the CMOs in this study (as
determined by number of campuses per CMO and total student enrollment) is
included below. Figure 3.3 shows the number of CMOs operating 3-10 campus, 11-
30 campuses and 30 or more campuses during the 2008-2009 school year.
58
Figure 3.3. Number of campuses [grouped] 2008-2009

As this figure makes clear, the majority of CMOs in the study were operating
3-10 school campuses. Interestingly, large charter school networks that operated
many individual schools were not always the CMOs that were educating the largest
number of students. To get a better idea of the number of students being educated by
CMOs in the study sample, Figure 3.4 shows the diversity in the size of CMOs based
on the number of students they enrolled.
59
Figure 3.4. CMO student enrollment

In total, CMOs in this study were educating approximately 115,000 students.
This represented approximately 8% of all students in charter schools for the 2008-
2009 year.
9
Imagine Public Schools, which operated 75 schools, was serving the
largest number of students (35,000). New City Public Schools, which operated three
campuses, was serving the fewest students (565). Again, the number of campuses
within a CMO network did not always predict the number of students the CMO
served. For example, Arthur Academy operated six campuses during the 2008-2009

9
Total number of students being educated in charter schools during the 2008-2009 year was estimated
at 1,439,749 by the National Alliance of Public Charter Schools. Information on enrollment can be
accessed at http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page/overview/year/2009.
60
school year but only educated 900 students. In comparison, Friendship Public
Charter Schools operated 5 campuses but served 4000 students.

Figure 3.5. Students served vs. number of school campuses

While the majority of CMOs had a positive relationship between the number of
campuses they managed and the number of students they served, figure 3.5 shows
that this was not always the case.
Data Collection
In addition to data gathered from the Internet and introductory phone
interviews with CMO executive directors, study data was also collected during in-
depth phone interviews and via internal CMO documents. While the goal was to
61
collect data from multiple data sources, Merriam (1998) explains that data sources
are rarely used equally. Instead, one or two methods of data collection predominate
while the other(s) play a supporting role in gaining in-depth understanding of the
case. For the current study, the primary data sources were the in-depth interviews
with 2-3 home office administrators at each CMO. Internal CMO documents
(organizational charts, business plans, financial reports etc.), CMO specific
newspaper and magazine articles, and internet-based organizational data were also
collected to support interviews. The following sections detail how all study data
were collected and stored. Data collection procedures are followed by a discussion
of data analysis and the measures taken to ensure that the analyses were reliable.
Interviews
Existing research on CMOs confirms that CMO executive directors are
highly involved in strategic planning for their organizations (NewSchools Venture
Fund, 2008; "Quantity counts," 2007). Therefore, these individuals were the primary
points of contact within each CMO. As previously mentioned, data collection began
with internet-based research and introductory interviews with CMO executive
directors. The introductory interviews confirmed organizational characteristics
gleaned from internet-based research, and also enabled researchers to schedule in-
depth interviews with CMO leaders. All finalized introductory interview protocols
were stored electronically by CMO name after the organization’s characteristics had
been updated.
62
During introductory interviews snowball sampling techniques (Creswell,
1998) helped to identify additional CMO home office staff to participate in extended
in-depth interviews. CMO executive directors were asked who else in the
organization had responsibility for developing growth plans. Executive directors
recommended one or two members of their management teams; these people were
then contacted about participating in the study. In-depth interviews were also
scheduled at this time.
The research team conducted semi-structured interviews from August 2008
through February 2009 with a total of 51 CMO leaders. The interviews lasted 60-90
minutes and were conducted by telephone; all were recorded and transcribed for
future analysis. Interview transcripts were reviewed for accuracy and discrepancies
were clarified with the interviewee. All interview transcripts were stored by CMO
name as electronic files and in hard-copy form in locked files.
The content of the interviews followed protocols that were developed to
capture critical elements of the scale-up process. The research team chose to use a
semi-structured approach, rather than structured or unstructured because it allowed
interviewees to describe the phenomenon under investigation in their own words
(Stake, 1995) but, at the same time, maintained consistency across interviews
(Bogden & Biklen, 2003).
The protocol addressed six key components of CMO scale-up: a) the history
of the CMO, b) funding streams, c) strategic planning for growth, d) contextual
factors that influence the planning and implementation process, e) implementation of
63
growth plans, and e) reflections on the success of scale-up efforts. These six
components emerged from an extensive review of the existing literature on
organizational growth in the fields of business and education (see Chapter 2).
An early draft of the interview protocol was piloted with two CMOs.
Refinements were made to the protocol based on feedback from the pilot. The final
protocol is included as Appendix B.
As Table 3.3 makes clear, all of the study participants were CMO executives.

Table 3.3. Participant information

Job Title within CMO Number of Interviews
Executive Director* 24
Chief Financial Officer or Business Manager 5
Chief Development Officer 2
Chief Academic Officer 3
Chief Operating Officer 8
Other^ 9
Total 51
*Includes Chief Executive Officers, Founders and Superintendents
^Includes positions related to new school development, network growth and strategic
planning

In most cases, the ED and one other administrator were interviewed at each
CMO. However, some CMOs (3) were small enough that the ED was the only
person actively involved with organizational growth and so only one person was
interviewed. At the other extreme, three CMOs had more than four employees who
64
were actively involved in growth. In total 51 in-depth interviews were conducted
with CMO leaders/executives.
Kezar’s (2002) approach towards transformational elite interviews guided the
interview process. Kezar emphasizes that a power dynamic frequently exists between
the elite interviewee and the researcher that makes it challenging for the researcher to
gain a detailed understanding of the phenomenon under study. Kezar suggests a
different approach that frames interviews as opportunities for transformation and
reflection by the person being interviewed. She argues that the elite interview should
be designed as a beneficial experience for both the parties. In CMOs, where growth
is often rapid and leaves little time for reflection, Kezar’s framework was a valuable
tool. The research team worked to build trust and familiarity with interviewees; the
protocol included questions to encourage reflection and consciousness-raising.
Document Collection
In addition to the interviews—introductory and in-depth—the research team
collected CMO documents referred to during the interviews. Documents included
organizational charts and budgets, materials related to strategic planning, public
documents (newspaper articles, videos, websites etc.), and intra-organizational
communications. CMO documents were useful for identifying dates and timelines
for organizational activity. They also served as rich descriptions of what people who
produced the documents thought about their organization and how the CMO was
evolving (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003 (b)). Further, as Yin (2003) argues, the archival
documents provided a stable source of data that was organic as opposed to being
65
created from interactions between study participants and the researcher. Such
documents had the potential to provide authentic insights into the culture of each
CMO as well as the political and economic environments within which the
organization was situated.
Furthermore, Since the CMOs studied spanned the entire country, the
research team could not easily attend planning and/or strategy meetings where
leaders discussed organizational growth. The intra-organizational documents and
strategic plans helped the team better understand these activities and the contexts
within which they were situated (Stake, 1995).
In the next section data analysis procedures are explained. The section also
describes how procedures for analyzing and synthesizing the data are used to
maximize trustworthiness and minimize researcher bias.
Data Analysis
Vincent Anfara, Kathleen Brown and Terri Mangione (2002) emphasize the
importance of transparency when it comes to data analysis in qualitative research.
They argue that, “how researchers account for and disclose their approach to all
aspects of the research process are key to evaluating their work substantively and
methodologically” (p.28). Internal reliability, or trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba,
1985), can only be established when coding methods and triangulation methods
clearly connect raw study data to theme development and final conclusions. The
discussion of data analysis procedures that follows explicitly outlines coding
methods, theme development and sactivities related to the triangulation of data.
66
The data analysis process adopts Boyatzis’ (1998) framework for thematic
analysis and code development. This framework identifies three distinct stages of
qualitative data analysis:
1. Deciding on sampling and design issues (already discussed)
2. Developing themes and codes
3. Validating and using the codes
During stage two, developing themes and codes, two iterations of analysis were
completed. The first was a preliminary coding of all of the raw data. The second, a
more macro analysis was aimed at consolidating and synthesizing the first set of
codes. Details about both iterations are presented below.
Developing Themes and Codes
Boyatzis (1998) identifies three methods for developing thematic codes:
theory driven, prior data or research driven, and inductive or data driven. In this
study, codes used during the first iteration of coding were developed using all three
methods. Table 3.4 includes selected codes, listed by theme, that were used in the
first iteration of data analysis.
10
It also sorts these codes by method developed.
Codes labeled TD are theory- driven, codes labeled RD are research-driven and
codes labeled DD are data-driven. Theory-driven and research-driven codes were
those that correlated most directly with the interview protocol because the protocol
was developed to reflect theories and research on organizational growth.

10
This selected list is meant to serve as an example of the specificity of codes used to sort data during
the first iteration of coding. For the complete code list that includes all codes used during this first
phase refer to Appendix C
67
In addition, some codes were developed using inductive, data-driven
methods. To develop these codes, a subset of data was selected and new ideas were
identified within it. These ideas were then compared across other subsamples to
determine their prevalence. Once an idea was determined to be consistent across
multiple subsets of the data, individual codes were created to capture it. Then, these
codes were applied to the raw data (interview transcripts and all collected
documents) along with the codes developed using the other two methods.

Table 3.4. Selective code list: first iteration coding

BACKGROUND
BG.CEOasfounder (DD)
BG.CMOHistory (TD)
BG.CMOtargetcommunity (RD)
BG.CMOtargetstudents (DD)
BG.new.school.grade.configuration
(RD)
BG.new.school.location (DD)

GROWTH PLANS
Plans.absence (DD)
Plans.advice.consultants (DD)
Plans.collaborationwithotherCMOs (DD)
Plans.goals.financial.stable (DD)
Plans.goals.market.share (DD)
Plans.rationale (DD)
Plans.strategy (RD/DD)
INFLUENCES ON CMO GROWTH
Influence.advocacy(DD)
Influence.facilities (RD)
Influence.fed.NCLB (TD)
Influence.funders (TD)
Influence.gov.board (TD)
Influence.leadershipcapacity (RD)
Influence.local.charter.competition
(DD)
Influence.local.citypolitics (DD)
Influence.recruiting (TD)
Influence.state.chartercaps (DD)
Influence.state.charterprocess (DD)
68
A code book, which detailed the types of information labeled with each code,
was created prior to the analysis process and updated during analysis as themes
emerged (see Validating and Using Codes, below, p. 69). A second iteration of
coding aimed at consolidating and synthesizing the codes used during the first
iteration. The primary goal was to develop connections between codes and identify
more macro-level themes. A software program, Atlas.Ti version 6.1, facilitated the
process of theme generation for this second iteration.
11
This program aided theory-
building by sorting and manipulating the data that had been analyzed using the first
list of codes (Weitzman, 2000). It allowed the researcher to identify patterns related
to frequency of codes and the types of codes being grouped together regularly. The
final list of themes developed during the second iteration of data analysis was
already included in Table 3.4, but higher-order codes developed to group lower-level
codes from the first iteration are also included in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5. Second iteration code list for CMO scale-up study: coding by theme

Theme #1: Influences on
CMO growth
Influence.Environmental
Influence.Sociocultural
Influence.Organizational
Theme #2: Growth Plans
Strategy.Opportunistic
Strategy.Evolving
Strategy.Premeditated
Plans.CMOgoals
Theme #3: CMO
Background
BG.Leadership
BG.History
BG.Demographics

11
More information on this software program can be accessed at www.researchware.com
69
Validating and Using Codes
All of the codes used to analyze the CMO data were validated in the
following manner. First, codes were tested for inter-rater reliability to establish
“consistency of judgments” among different reviewers (Boyatzis, 1998). Using data
from the pilot study, members of the research team coded the same subsample of
data and discussed any discrepancies in coding that emerged. Then, new subsamples
of data were coded to ensure that all codes were being accurately and consistently
applied. Any changes to the original code list were discussed and agreed upon by
the team. Examples of data that fit new codes also were analyzed bye the group.
The code book facilitated this process (Boyatzis, 1998). For each code listed in
Appendix C, the code book, contained an entry similar to the one below:
Label: Plans.strategy.opportunistic
Definition: Interviewee describes an overall strategy that is more
opportunistic responding to the charter or local environment.
Indicators: An opportunity we couldn’t pass up
Examples: A funding opportunity came about to fund new schools; a
partner donated a facility, “we wait for an opportunity for a facility, then we
jump on it.”
Exclusions: comments about different types of planning strategy. For
example, strategy that is very premeditated.

As previously mentioned, the code list included as Appendix C reflected the
first iteration of data analysis. Themes that surfaced through the second iteration of
analysis (discussed above) were not validated in the same way as the initial code list
because the author of this dissertation (not the entire research team) completed this
work. However, themes identified during the second iteration of analysis were
vetted with the other members of the team—all of whom had deep levels of
70
familiarity with the data. Themes that the majority of the team considered weak
were reevaluated for bias and authenticity (Creswell, 1998) before they were
adopted.
Ultimately, the goal was to iteratively code all qualitative data using codes
(and later themes) drawn from the literature review, exploratory model, and codes
induced from the interview data and documents that were collected.
Triangulation of Data
In addition to validating individual codes and themes, this study used
Creswell’s (1998) standards for verifying the content and accuracy of qualitative
research as its guide—what Lincoln and Guba (1985) call trustworthiness and
authenticity (as described in Creswell, 1998). Creswell’s framework emphasizes
positionality (honesty about the position of the author), community and the accurate
representation of one’s study participants. In order to ensure the trustworthiness and
authenticity of the present study, multiple sources of data were triangulated to check
for consistency (documents, web-based data, and interview data).
Anfara, Brown and Mangione (2002) chastise qualitative researchers for
offering little detail or transparency when it comes to the triangulation of data.
Following their suggestion, all of the findings presented in chapter 4 of this
dissertation were linked to multiple sources of data that have been documented by
theme, CMO and data type.
71
Conclusion
In this chapter, a qualitative approach to the study of CMO growth was
outlined. In addition, study participants were defined, data sources were identified
and data analysis procedures were discussed in detail. While past research on CMOs
attempted to shed light on the growth process, the majority of the research is
anecdotal or focused solely on a few major challenges to growth. The current study,
which investigates the process of scale-up in CMOs, adds valuable empirical
knowledge based on a large sample that includes a variety of contexts. In the next
chapter, findings from the study, organized around the research questions, are
presented.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS—UNDERSTANDING GROWTH IN CMOS
The purpose of this chapter is to build an understanding of how CMOs
approach growth. Emerging from the data were two categories of findings. First,
findings revealed two distinct growth-planning styles—premeditated and evolving—
and these styles were punctuated with varying degrees of opportunism. Second, data
analysis found that a number of environmental, organizational and socio-cultural
factors were influencing growth in CMOs. All data were considered across the
entire sample of CMOs, but also considered as they pertained more or less to similar
subgroups of CMOs (e.g. disaggregated by size or age). To this end, environmental,
socio-cultural and organizational influences on CMO growth, as well as specific
planning styles, were ultimately categorized as being universally relevant, or more
critical in CMOs of a particular size or maturity level.
RQ1: How do charter management organizations approach growth?
Growth Planning Styles
Twenty out of twenty-five
12
CMOs in the sample adopted one of two
planning styles--premeditated or evolving—then incorporated varying amounts of
opportunism. These planning styles emerged from the data, but proved consistent

12
Findings were reported using the CMO as the unit of analysis, not the individual study participant.
Therefore, all numbers presented represent the aggregate incidences mentioned by subject participants
at individual CMOs unless otherwise specified. Consequently, if multiple participants from the same
organization mentioned similar influences on growth, these comments were aggregated and used as
evidence for the strength and validity of the finding but not reported separately. Findings that were
not triangulated across multiple interviewees were cross-referenced with other data sources to ensure
their validity before they were reported here.
73
with existing strategies discussed in the strategic planning literature (Boyne &
Walker, 2004; Chakravarthy & White, 2002; Miles & Snow, 1978). Here,
premeditated growth was characterized as planning and management activities that
were thought through in advance of growth, clearly delineated, and also incorporated
a long-range vision based upon defined growth objectives. The CMOs that adopted
premeditated growth strategies stood in contrast with evolving CMOs. These
organizations let growth plans develop more organically. While decisions were not
made in a haphazard, irresponsible manner, they were also rarely predetermined. In
addition to behaving in a more premeditated or evolving manner, many CMOs
incorporated some degree of opportunism into their growth planning and
management. Opportunistic growth, in its most pure form, was conceptualized as
growth based entirely on the availability of resources (e.g. facilities, school leaders,
money, community support) that were deemed most critical for scale-up. While
three CMOs in the sample were primarily approaching growth from this vantage
point, the majority incorporated some degree of opportunism into either an evolving
or premeditated growth style
13
.
CMOs were categorized as premeditated, evolving or opportunistic if the
majority of the data collected on the organization clearly supported one growth style
over the others. If the majority of the evidence on CMO growth planning

13
Growth was conceptualized as a style, rather than a strategy, because the author felt that style
incorporated an over-arching approach but allowed for variation within these basic confines.
Therefore, CMOs that approached growth in a premeditated manner could have sometimes capitalized
on unexpected opportunities, but they did so in a premeditated way.
74
emphasized one specific style but also included examples of opportunistic growth (as
was previously discussed), then they were categorized as premeditated or evolving
but with a higher degree of opportunism than those approaching growth in a manner
more consistent with one planning style in its most pure form. Table 4 .1 shows the
breakdown of CMOs by growth style.

Table 4.1. Growth strategies

Growth Strategy Number of CMOs
Premeditated 6
Premeditated + Opportunistic 3
Evolving 6
Evolving + Opportunistic 2
Opportunistic 3
Strategy Unclear 5
Total 25

As this table shows, no particular growth style dominated the study sample. Further,
five CMOs had data that supported both growth styles equally.
In the sections that follow, each type of CMO growth style will be discussed
in detail. Then, an analysis of the specific environmental, organizational and socio-
cultural factors influencing growth will be presented.
Premeditated Growth
Nine out of 25 CMOs adopted planning styles consistent with premeditated
growth. Leaders from these organizations were most often focused on creating high
75
quality networks of schools that would force change in local traditional districts
through a strategy focused on constantly increasing the numbers of students that their
organizations served. At the time of data collection these CMOs spanned all ages
and sizes
14
from small to large and from new to mature (CMOs founded between
1998-2000 were “mature,” CMOs founded between 2001-2003 were “emerging,”
and CMOs founded after 2004 were “new”
15
). What connected them was the
existence of extremely deliberate, long-range growth plans and organizational
leaders who supported an approach to growth that was cohesive and targeted. Often,
premeditated approaches were clearly defined in publicly available business plans.
In fact, six of these nine CMOs received support from private donors to engage in
formal planning sessions with professional consultants. For example, one CMO’s
business plan incorporated a detailed needs analysis based on projected shortages in

14
CMOs were categorized by size based upon two criteria—number of schools in operation and total
student enrollment. This choice was made because in some instances CMOs with larger numbers of
schools were educating fewer students than those with fewer numbers of schools. This could have
had an impact on environmental influences such as funding formulas or facilities policy. Large
CMOs were those operating over 30 campuses or enrolling over 4000 students. Mid-sized CMOs
were those operating 11-30 campuses or enrolling 2000-4000 students. Small CMOs were those
operating 3-10 campuses or enrolling less than 2000 students.

15
CMOs that began as single-site schools were categorized based on the year that they became
networks, not on when the flagship campus opened. While the process of running a single school site
likely influenced future decisions about growth, many of the factors reported here would not have
been relevant to single-site schools and only gained relevance once these schools took on the
challenge of geographic expansion. Consequently, CMOs categorized as new may have been
operating as a single school prior to 2004, but only became a CMO network after this cut-off date.
The majority of CMOs in the study (72%) were operating 3-10 campuses. Larger CMOs were far less
common. The prevalence of smaller scale CMOs is not surprising, given the fact that the majority of
the CMOs in the study sample were founded in 2003 or later. Growth is a complicated and time-
consuming endeavor that requires dedicated planning and support. Only one large CMO (currently
operating 75 schools) had been founded after 2003 and merging a number of existing, smaller CMOs
created it. The majority of CMOs in the sample chose to scale-up much more slowly and this is
reflected in their current sizes.
76
a number of traditional school districts targeted for future CMO-affiliated campuses.
For this organization, there was nothing haphazard about growth; nothing was left to
chance. The CEO of this organization explained that the CMO’s premeditated
approach to growth dated back to well before the CMO had been established:
[A current board member] was involved with district and community-wide
reform efforts and just felt that she wasn’t satisfied with the impact or results
of her efforts. She actually commissioned WestEd to do a nationwide study
on what was working…the result of that study was a recommendation to
create a scaleable, replicable model that would be of sufficient size to have an
impact on the [traditional] district.

All of the planning documents and growth activities that followed supported this
overarching objective. While specific short-term growth targets (such as number of
schools opening in a given year) have at times been adapted in response to specific
environmental and organizational factors, the organization’s premeditated style has
remained consistent.
Another premeditated CMO founder showed similar purpose. “We want to
create a change, not just in the communities we serve, but create a change in public
education across California. We believe that we will do that when we are at a
significant size and consistent quality across all of our schools such that we cannot
be written off.” Here, as with the previous CMO leader, the founder communicated
a clear goal that was dependent upon growth. His organization’s business plan goes
on to document exactly how many campuses are needed to create the change he
alluded to and then lays out a timeline for reaching this target. Interestingly, changes
within the organization or within its environment rarely derailed growth in
77
premeditated CMOs. The pace of growth or manner in which it was accomplished
could change, but the ultimate objective did not.
Even the most experienced managers encounter unexpected opportunities that
are not included in their organization’s growth plans. Three organizations from these
nine premeditated CMOs relied heavily on such opportunities to drive growth.
These organizations still had clear missions and pre-established growth targets,
however they allowed themselves more latitude in meeting these targets. For
example, one CMO in Washington, D.C. chose new school locations almost
exclusively based upon the availability of facilities in low-income neighborhoods.
Yet, the overall approach to growth was still quite premeditated in that specific
neighborhoods were predetermined and a long-term growth objective was clearly
defined. What varied was the exact communities where expansion occurred and the
number of campuses opened each year.
This approach sits in contrast to another, less opportunistic, premeditated
CMO that refused to deviate from its own agenda. “Again, I want to underscore that
neither the community, the district, nor the state is leading our stance and plans…we
have the expansion plans because [we feel the work] needs to be done.”
Ultimately, premeditated CMOs were growing in a manner that was driven
by data and the CMOs’ missions. Decisions about new schools or new communities
took into account market research and aligned with organizational objectives. As
one leader explained, “We actually have a pretty rigorous decision matrix now. One
is having foundation partners in the local area, people who can provide us growth
78
and start up capital. The second one is having at least moderate district relations.
The third one is looking at the student demographics because our mission is to serve
primarily low socio-economic status students. Additionally, we need to make sure
that there’s either already a charter presence there, or our presence is not going to tip
the scales, in terms of critical mass.” As this comment shows, CMOs adopting a
premeditated style of growth left very little to chance. Those that did rely on
opportunism did so within a clear framework. Consequently, they were not willing
to accept every opportunity as it was made available; only those that aligned with
existing growth objectives were considered.
Evolving Growth
CMOs that adopted an evolving growth style focused far less on developing
prescriptive systems and processes to manage growth because these organizations
viewed growth targets as more fluid and open to discussion. Like the premeditated
CMOs, the nine CMOs identified as evolving were focused on managing high
quality schools. However more systemic goals, such as changing local districts,
were not as prevalent. Consequently, growth targets became far more incremental
and decisions about growth were constantly evolving. One CMO leader explains,
“[Our CMO] has completely grown from within. So if somebody comes up through
the organization and they’re effective, and they’re soulful, and have a vision, we, as
an organization, would back that vision. For example, we’ve had somebody that said
I want to run a community center because my school and what we’ve got going on
needs a community center to really tie this together, and so I want to grow in that
79
direction. [We support this because] our growth is driven by supporting the visions
of our leaders, paired with the needs of the community.”
This approach to growth was quite different from that of premeditated
CMOs. There was no mention of decision matrices or pre-existing growth targets.
Instead, the evolving needs of the organization or the changing needs of the
communities it served motivated decisions about growth. This was evident at one
Los Angeles CMO where growth was a direct response to community need; no
predetermined growth target existed. “We have an organic approach to our growth,”
explained this organization’s CEO, “what we really are trying to do is respond to
community needs.” Another administrator at this CMO expanded by saying, “Our
primary function is to serve the community. We think we’re good enough that we
can handle opening a new school and still manage to have quality…what we don’t
want to happen is that we multiply and lose quality because that’s not serving the
community.”
Both evolving and premeditated CMOs listed high quality schooling as
paramount, not surprisingly. Yet, those CMOs focusing on premeditated growth
seemed to place less emphasis on the connection between growth and quality.
Evolving CMOs, on the other hand, were more aware of the risks that growth posed
to quality. This resulted in an approach to scale-up that was slower-paced and less
steadfast. As another evolving CMO leader explained, “We’d like to say we have a
launch model [for new campuses] but the reality is we don’t. We’ve tried a lot of
different things and part of why is because there are a lot of external parameters
80
around school launches.” Still another explained that business plans in his CMO
were constantly being written and then shredded because of constantly changing
conversations about growth and what it would look like over time. “Planning is for
pessimists,” he said.
While this comment was extreme, it captures the ideals of many of these
evolving CMOs. Namely, that developing long-term growth plans presumed levels
of insight about environmental and organizational factors that these organizations did
not feel comfortable projecting.
Again, evolving CMOs did incorporate varying levels of opportunism into
their growth decisions. Those evolving CMOs most influenced by opportunities
tended to also be focused on capitalizing on available facilities or the momentum
created by parents and community groups.
Opportunistic Growth
Only two CMOs from the sample approached growth with a purely
opportunistic style. However, they are worth mentioning because of their unique
characteristics. One organization was the largest in the sample. It grew to its current
size by capitalizing on opportunities to buy existing for-profit educational
management organizations and “re-brand” those schools to become part of their
nonprofit network. The CEO/founder from this CMO had no background in
education and therefore approached his organization much like someone from the
private sector. Quality was mentioned as important, but consistent quality across the
CMO was not a prerequisite for future growth. This CMO was also one of only 3
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national CMOs and opportunism played a large part in their nationwide strategy for
growth. The CEO explained, “We’ve really tried to have a culture where everybody
is looking for opportunities to serve more students…we are looking for opportunities
to serve as many families as we can and provide a quality option.”
The other CMO operating with an opportunistic style of growth is located in
post-Katrina New Orleans. The CMO was founded during the early months of
recovery and rebuilding was one of the only options for students still living in the
city. Consequently, most decisions about growth (past and present) were dictated by
opportunities made available by different city governing bodies. At the time of data
collection it was too soon to tell whether long-term growth would become more
premeditated or evolving.
Opportunism guided all 25 CMOs on some level. As the next section will
show, CMOs were often constrained by environmental, organizational and socio-
cultural factors during scale-up. Adapting to these constraints necessitated
capitalizing on opportunities when they arose even if doing so was risky.
No Clear Growth Style
For five CMOs, one clear growth style did not emerge. Instead, these
organizations made choices that were sometimes premeditated and other times
evolving or opportunistic. An explanation for this mixed approach to growth was
not readily apparent. Neither CMO age nor size served as predictive variables since
these five CMOs spanned all ages and sizes. However, all five organizations did
seem to adopt an evolving planning style in infancy and move more towards a
82
premeditated style as they aged. This approach makes sense given that all five of
these organizations began as stand-alone charter schools and were most likely not
thinking about growth in a very premeditated way until they had opened multiple
campuses. Interestingly, only four out of the nine evolving CMOs started as stand-
alone charters. Consequently, this variable is not a precondition for adherence to an
evolving growth style.
Another explanation for these CMOs’ unclear planning styles could be
economic. During 2008-2009 when data was being collected for this study the
country was in the midst of one of the most drastic economic downturns in decades.
CMOs that may have previously been committed to a specific style of growth
planning could very well have felt a newfound pressure to conform to suppliers’
requests or to capitalize on opportunities even if they did not completely align with
their mission or goals. Also, two of the five CMOs with unclear planning styles
turned to outside consultants for long-term planning advice; this decision partially
explained a shift in planning style.
Summary
The majority of the CMOs in the study approached growth using either a
premeditated or an evolving style. Also, CMOs capitalized on opportunities to
further growth objectives to a greater or lesser degree. However, the majority chose
opportunities that fell within the boundaries of their overarching objectives and did
not make decisions about growth based solely on taking every opportunity that came
83
their way. Neither CMO age nor size served as predictive variables for planning
style.
Factors Influencing Growth
The first half of this chapter was devoted to building an understanding of how
CMOs approach growth from a planning perspective. It found that CMOs adopted
either a premeditated style or an evolving style, and that opportunism factored into
these growth styles to a greater or lesser degree depending on the CMO. However,
no particular planning style directly influenced decision-making. Rather, CMO
leaders seemed to adopt one style over another based upon the importance that was
placed on certain external or internal factors. Building on these findings, the
remainder of this chapter focuses on identifying those environmental, organizational
and socio-cultural factors that influenced CMO scale up. In Chapter 5 the
relationship (or lack there of) between these factors, CMO planning styles and
overall organizational objectives is examined as it pertains to the exploratory model,
presented in Chapter 2.
Environmental Factors
Policy Environments
Institutional theory and resource dependence theory (reviewed in Chapter 2)
predicted that a number of environmental factors would impact CMO growth. These
included the federal, state and local policies acting upon CMOs, as well as a number
of CMO stakeholders (for example funders, students and parents) to which CMOs
were accountable. Ultimately, these two theoretical lenses aptly predicted those
84
environmental factors most relevant for CMOs dealing with scale-up. CMOs’ policy
environments, as well as a number of resource dependencies (funders, community
relationships, traditional school districts) influenced their growth trajectories.
Federal policy environment. Since the majority of CMOs are accountable
primarily to state charter laws it is not surprising that federal policy proved the least
influential in decisions about growth. Given that all 25 CMOs were committed to
starting and managing high quality schools, one might assume that federal academic
standards, for example the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) guidelines in NCLB,
would influence the pace of growth. Namely, CMOs would choose not to grow if all
of their schools were not meeting or exceeding AYP targets. However, only two out
of 25 CMOs identified a connection between meeting federally legislated
performance measures and decisions to adjust the pace of growth. The majority of
the CMOs echoed the sentiments of this executive director who explained:
We’re not making AYP and one of our schools is in its first year in corrective
action. Conceivably at some point that could be a constraint [to growth], but
in DC no one who takes kids after the fifth grade is really making AYP so
we’re not that concerned about it. Federal policies are neither encouraging
nor discouraging us.

Instead, CMOs tended to measure success by internal markers established
around their individual organizational missions. These measures included college
access and completion, financial sustainability, and proven impact on traditional
school districts. One CMO leader explains:
I think our larger vision and goal is to improve education here in Los
Angeles…we would be perfectly happy if Los Angeles Unified School
District saw the wonderful things we’re doing and how every single one of
85
our schools is significantly outperforming the school down the street; we
would love it if they learned very quickly from that and essentially were able
to set up such a wonderful system where they could drive us out of business
because they meet or exceed our results.

Although federal academic measures did not influence CMO growth, other
aspects of NCLB did come up during interviews with CMO leaders. Most prevalent
was frustration over the “highly qualified teacher” mandates found in NCLB. These
dictate that all teachers must be highly qualified (possess or be in the process of
acquiring valid teaching credentials) if a school or district receives Title I funding.
While this seems reasonable to many educators, CMO leaders explained that such
restrictions often limited their organizations’ abilities to grow. In fact, of the 10
CMOs that described federal policies as influencing their organizational growth, six
talked about how needing to hire highly qualified teachers constrained their
organization. “The whole idea of highly qualified teachers affects our ability to staff
up,” one leader said, “I would say that that’s something in the No Child Left Behind
that comes immediately to mind.” Another CMO chief academic officer described
his frustration with the mandate, “Just to give you a flavor, you have a Ph.D. in
biology but you don’t have a teaching credential in California...California would
assume that you are not highly qualified to teach seventh grade life science. We
could get into why, but it’s just so stupid.”
Lastly, 6 out of 10 CMOs also brought up the ability to receive federal
charter school program start up grants as a factor they consider when making
decisions about growth. This particular federal policy was closely linked to
86
differences in state charter school laws. For example, some CMOs were unable to
receive start up grants for new campuses because their state charter laws required
them to operate under a single charter that was being continually amended as the
organization grew. So, even though they were incurring the costs of opening up new
schools, they were not viewed as “start ups” according to federal guidelines. For
others, state laws required them to have different charters for each new school site.
This allowed CMOs to apply for multiple start up grants, but there was never a
guarantee that the money would be allocated for every new campus. All six CMOs
explained that deficits created by gaps in federal start up funding were not immediate
reasons to slow or halt growth. They were, however, setbacks that could ultimately
change CMO growth plans if funds could not be acquired elsewhere.
State policy environment. State policy environments proved a strong
influence on CMO growth. Most influential were elements of individual state
charter school laws such as the existence of charter caps; the number of charters
required per CMO along with the number of governing boards; whether authorizing
districts were mandated to share facility space; equity in per-pupil funding; and
whether there were multiple paths to chartering for CMOs. Also, states that
legislated enrollment guidelines that prohibited k-12 CMOs from creating feeder
patterns for their students proved to be an influence on growth decisions, especially
as they related to new school configurations.
13 out of 25 CMOs that participated in the study spoke about the influence
that state charter laws had on their growth trajectory. More specifically, CMOs
87
categorized charter laws as being “strong” or “weak” depending upon a number of
elements including the existence of charter caps, the number of paths available to
procure charters (i.e. number of authorizers or ability to appeal applications that are
denied), and the inclusion of guidelines for shared facility space with neighboring
traditional school districts.
16
Strong laws enabled CMO growth, both within and
across state lines, while weak laws constrained growth. For example, one CMO
currently operating only in Arizona was reluctant to grow across state lines because
leaders had become accustomed to the flexibility that Arizona’s charter laws
allowed. “The state has really left the charter law to be very permissive in Arizona,”
says one chief executive officer, “many of us have multi-state aspirations within the
organization, but we’ll have to look at how that would work. We could go to
Flagstaff and to Tucson here in Arizona. I think that going to another state like New
Mexico, or Michigan that has really charter friendly legislation that would allow us
to do what we do without too much bureaucracy. That’s the tough thing about going
multi-state is that Arizona has very freeing charter school legislation--we don’t have
to hire certified teachers, for example. So when we think about going to another
state, it becomes more complicated.” A different, multi-state CMO leader echoed
these sentiments when asked about how his organization decided upon which states
it would operate within:

16
The notion of strong versus weak charter school legislature was first proposed by the Center on
Education Reform; they continue to rank charter school laws on a continuum from strong to weak on
a yearly basis. The most recent rankings can be accessed at
http://www.edreform.com/About_CER/Charter_School_Laws_Across_the_States/index.cfm.
88
So we did a survey of the 41 states with charter school statutes, we looked for
states in which there was a clear path to chartering, a clear path to re-
authorizing, and states that were still under-served. We came up with a list
and went and interviewed authorizers, looked at the political climate, and
looked at the neediest communities and then began to apply for charters.

As the above comment makes clear, charter laws are only one influence on CMO
growth plans. Other influences, like community needs, will be discussed in detail
when socio-cultural and organizational influences are addressed.
Not surprisingly, the availability of facility space was also a key component
for continued growth. From a state policy perspective, 8 CMOs specifically
mentioned state mandated facilities support as influential to the growth process. As
one CMO leader explained, “ we have some funding problems in Arizona that
negatively impact our ability to grow and to have nice facilities…we don’t get any
facility funding and that has a huge impact. I mean it’s hard to run legitimate prep
schools out of a strip mall, and that’s what we do.” A consequence of such
disparities in facility funding was that all of these CMOs spent considerable time and
resources trying to change state charter laws to allow for equitable funding for
facilities as compared with local traditional school districts. Recently, those CMOs
operating in California were successful in advocating for and passing Proposition 39,
which required traditional school districts to share unused facilities with charter
schools. California-based CMOs highlighted the financial benefits that this victory
provided, but also acknowledged the challenges that have resulted as a by-product.
They mentioned the human and financial capital that was invested in bringing about
89
the legislation, as well as the continued effort it took to maintain positive working
relationships with local district superintendents and principals.
Facilities issues were tied in with larger policy issues associated with per-
pupil funding for charter schools. Nine CMOs specifically highlighted how changes
in funding formulas influenced growth. For one multi-state CMO, differences in
per-pupil funding between states was slowing growth in states that offered less
money per child. This frustrated CMO leaders because they felt like they were
choosing financial sustainability over the needs of the students in the communities
they were serving. However, leaders acknowledged that long-term they could not
rely on private donations to run schools so public dollars needed to be factored into
decisions about growth. “So the reality of Connecticut’s charter law is that we still
need to raise $2000-$3000 per student per year, which is why we’re working on the
advocacy work, because that’s not a long-term sustainable thing.” The recent
economic downturn only complicated this issue for high-growth CMOs. One leader
said, “we wanted to open up three schools next fall but the economy has thrown us a
big curve ball.” Similarly, three other CMOs mentioned decreasing ability to borrow
money and fear over the potential cuts to per-pupil funding due to the struggling
economy. Finally, CMOs concerned with state policy-related funding issues
included those who were less concerned with the total amount of funding and more
with restrictions on how the money could be allocated. “Our largest challenge on the
financing side,” explained a California-based CMO CEO, “ is having enough
unrestricted money around to be used for the purposes that are needed.”
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To some extent, state policy influences on growth were also mediated by
CMO size, age and geographic spread. In Chapter 3, it was reported that 20 out of
25 CMOs in the sample were operating in only one state, and that 12 of these
organizations were operating in only one region within the state. For these CMOs,
who mostly did not have immediate plans to expand into different states, the aspects
of state charter policy that were most salient for continued growth included the
existence of charter caps and the ability to appeal unfavorable decisions made by
local school districts serving as charter school authorizers. This was because their
main concern was how easy it was for their CMO to acquire additional charters. One
California-based CMO leader explained:
Well, two things enable our growth. For California there is no cap on the
number of charters, and I know that’s not true of all states. And
secondly…we have appeal rights, so if we are denied [a charter] at our local
school district, we can appeal to our counties, and then if your county denies
you, then you can go to the state, and I know that’s not a possibility in other
states. If you get denied at the local level, you’re done.

Along with this CMO, eight other organizations spoke about authorizers and charter
caps as barriers to growth. Alternatively, the five CMOs operating across multiple
states had the added layer of growing into geographies that would allow them to
operate schools in a unified, efficient manner. Many seemed to have learned this
lesson the hard way. They began operating in multiple states for reasons other than
friendly state charter policies and were now struggling with how to manage
conflicting state regulations as they grew. One multi-state CMO operating in both
Connecticut and New York struggled because “in Connecticut we have a relatively
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weak charter law that pays us 70-cents on the dollar with no facilities allotment and
Special Education’s a mess.” This leader goes on to explain that in addition to the
financial constraints, certain charter laws will not allow the CMO to create direct
feeder patterns from its elementary schools into its middle and high schools while
other state laws do not prohibit such behavior. This has created a management
challenge and has required the CMO to get extremely creative in certain states where
one charter must often govern the entire k-12 network even if there are multiple
school sites included in the network. Another multi-state CMO CEO actually pulled
his organization out of states where he felt the policies were not conducive to
running CMOs. “Most states don’t even have charter laws that are worth [the
investment],” he explained, “There are only 14 or 15 states that are worthwhile.”
When state policy influences were disaggregated by the age of the CMO the
data revealed that the influence of funding formulas and authorizer policies seemed
to be more influential for new CMOs but charter caps, enrollment guidelines, and
facilities guidelines were equally relevant factors considered during scale-up
regardless of CMO age. This finding highlights the importance of the state policy
environment with respect to CMO growth.
Disaggregating by the size of the CMO also produced some meaningful
findings. First, when judging CMO size by number of schools in operation, the
growth of small CMOs were overwhelmingly impacted by facilities policies,
enrollment policies and policies related to appeal processes and multiple authorizers.
However, other state policy issues (e.g. strength of charter laws and funding
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formulas) were equally influential regardless of CMO size. Interestingly, if size was
viewed as total student enrollment, rather than number of schools, the types of
CMOs most influenced by state policies during growth changed. Now, the strength
of charter laws influenced growth much more frequently in mid-size and large
CMOs, whereas enrollment issues become less of an influencing factor for small
CMOs.
In summary, state policy strongly influenced growth in CMOs. Most relevant
were factors that determine the strength of the charter laws themselves. These
included the existence of charter caps, appeal processes for denied charter
applications, and equitable funding criteria. Also important were legislative
provisions that allocated facilities to CMOs, the existence of multiple charter
authorizers, and the ability to shape enrollment patterns across one’s network of
schools. In general, strong charter laws supported CMO growth while weak laws
constrained growth. This was true for both single-state and multi-state CMOs. The
size and age of CMOs also mediated state policy influences, although not as
drastically as one might expect.
Local policy environment. The manner in which local policy influenced
CMO growth turned out to be more complex than policy influences at the state and
federal levels. As has already been discussed, federal and state policy contexts
limited the choices CMOs had regarding growth. Charter caps, for example, created
upper boundaries on growth for CMOs.
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Local policies, on the other hand, were viewed as far less limiting. CMOs
rarely mentioned specific local policies as negatively impacting scale-up. Instead,
they emphasized the importance of relationship building with local community
groups, school boards and city politicians so that policy roadblocks, for example
zoning laws for facility space or the provision of special education services, could be
overcome.
Resource Dependencies
Relationships with key resource suppliers proved critical for CMOs trying to
grow. Within their larger environments, CMOs needed to negotiate relationships
with community groups, politicians, funders, and parents; and their success in doing
so contributed to the acquisition of resources that were necessary for growth.
Consequently, these four local suppliers held real power when it came to influencing
CMO growth.
Community groups. Community groups such as faith-based organizations,
non-profit service providers or community revitalization groups proved influential to
CMO growth. In this case CMO leaders were not necessarily dependent on
acquiring the products or services that these groups were providing. Instead, they
were focused on tapping into the political and social capital
17
that these groups
enjoyed within the communities that CMOs were targeting for growth. For 12

17
Political and social capitals refer to the value that political and social contacts (or networks) can
have on the productivity of individuals, groups or organizations. Social capital was popularized by
Pierre Bordieu’s (1972) work, Outline of a Theory of Practice. Other non-traditional notions of
capital, like political capital, are an outgrowth of his work.
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CMOs in the study establishing meaningful relationships with local community
groups provided the legitimacy that these organizations needed in order to succeed at
other critical tasks like student recruitment. One chief operating officer in San Diego
explained, “We understand that admissions are something that are not seasonal. We
are out there constantly…at community-based organizations; we go into churches;
we develop key relationships with mavens in the communities to help us get things
done.” Here, community groups and community leaders supplied the local expertise
and “know-how” that many CMOs growing across state lines or county lines
desperately needed in order to navigate different geographies.
Interestingly, the majority of the 12 CMOs were mature organizations. Only
three new CMOs (2004-2008) identified community groups as being influential to
growth. While not all of the mature CMOs in the sample were categorized as large
(number of school sites), there was far more diversity in size than with new CMOs
(almost all were small organizations). Therefore, the emphasis on community
relationships in mature CMOs may be correlated with these organizations’ increased
experience entering new geographies.
CMOs operating in areas where charter competition existed (either for charter
acquisition or limited supplies of students and staff) found their need to develop
strong meaningful relationships with community groups all the more critical to
successfully achieving their growth objectives. As one CMO leader put it, “When
you talk to the [authorizers] about what’s going to happen, you know, you can see it.
If they continue to add new players it’s going to get competitive; and when it starts
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getting competitive you don’t want to be the little guy.” CMO leaders who built
strong relationships with local communities asserted that these “resources” could be
leveraged to circumvent roadblocks associated with scale up.
Politicians. Building relationships with city politicians provided similar
benefits for growing CMOs. Fourteen organizations identified local politicians and
city officials as impacting the growth process. In this case, CMO age had little
impact on the likelihood that such relationships would be influential. However,
CMO size did seem to play a role. When CMO size was measured by student
enrollment, the influence of political relationships was evenly felt by small, mid-size
and large CMOs. However, once size was conceived as number of school sites, the
influence of political relationships became concentrated in small CMOs (3-10
schools). Part of the explanation may relate to the hypothesis that opening new
school sites (versus expanding enrollment at existing sites) requires a more
sophisticated ability to navigate city governments. Small CMOs that did not yet
have the capacity to devote high levels of human capital to such tasks may have been
more dependent on their relationships with politicians and city officials than larger
CMOs.
Why local politicians influenced some CMOs more than others may be
difficult to explain, but the manner in which they were influenced was clearly
documented. For example, one California CMO leader said, “We work first with our
city councilmember, just establishing relationships with her, working with her staff
and going to their events. Then, when [we] do need something like a parking permit
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or whatever, they’re real happy to connect us with who we need to talk to at the city
level.” Another leader echoed these sentiments when explaining why growing into
different cities and states is so difficult:
It’s just dramatically harder to grow in different places because you have to
have so many different relationships and understand so many different
political climates to do it well. So for the Los Angeles players, they’ve got to
know Los Angeles politics, they’ve got to know their local communities and
neighborhoods…so just understanding and navigating and knowing the
nuances of all the politics and relationships and things that need to happen
when problems come up, it’s harder to do.

Understanding resource interdependencies in CMOs, as with other
organizations, is ultimately a function of power relationships (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). As with community groups, politicians in local communities had the power
to constrain or enhance CMO growth. Providing essential social and political capital
to CMOs helped them navigate new, complex communities more effectively than
their competitors. Withholding such capital crippled CMOs because it required them
to expend many more human and financial resources to accomplish growth-related
tasks. Consequently, CMOs have entered into a resource dependent relationship
with local environmental resource suppliers like community groups and city
government.
In addition to these groups, the study found that resource interdependencies
also existed between CMOs and private funders (e.g. foundations or individual
donors), as well as between CMOs and the parents that they served. Also, but to a
lesser degree (8 out of 25 CMOs) relationships with traditional school districts
impacted CMO growth.
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Funders. With 21 out of 25 CMOs identifying private funders as key
influences on organizational growth, it is clear that these “suppliers” have
considerable power over the development of CMOs. Again, CMO age did not
appear to be correlated with stronger or weaker funder influence. What did influence
the likelihood of funders playing a role in CMO growth was CMO size. Not
surprisingly, smaller CMOs (on both measures) were more likely to identify funders
as influential to growth. Most likely, these organizations were more dependent on
their funders than are their larger counterparts because they could not yet capitalize
on economies of scale and other such benefits those larger organizations enjoy.
However, since the majority of CMOs discussed the role of private funders, specific
organizational characteristics were not a strong determining factor.
The majority of the CMO leaders interviewed described private funders as
both a blessing and a curse. For most, aggressive growth objectives and constantly
shrinking public funds made their organizations reliant on raising large sums of
money to fund start-up of new campuses as well as the home office costs associated
with growth (new personnel etc.) Often, private grants/donations came with as set of
stipulations and expectations about growth. Sometimes, these conditions were seen
as quite positive. For example, twelve CMOs received strategic planning guidance
and management advice from their funders as a condition for further financial
support. “To be positive,” said one CEO, “[our funders] have pressured us to lean
out when necessary and to think about having a model that eventually does self-
sustain under public revenues.” Another CMO leader also focused on the positive
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influence that private funders had on his organization. “They [the funder] have
forced some strategic thought simply because they’re not going to get involved with
any schools in the future who haven’t developed their plans based on a strategic
assessment of where they are and where they want to be and how they’re going to
get from here to there.” Also, many funders joined CMO boards or facilitated
relationship building with key individuals. Such opportunities often led to more
donations.
However, CMOs’ dependence on private funders also created many
situations where CMO leaders felt pressured to adopt growth strategies or objectives
that they were unhappy about because they felt reliant on their donated funds for
survival:
I think that there’s been a tremendous pressure from the philanthropic
community to open more schools, and in some ways I think that they may
have over sold their message to a lot of us. They got a lot of us feeling like
we really needed to open more schools. Then if you have one school and they
say that’s nothing, you have to have four schools, so you have four schools,
and they say, well, that’s nothing, you have to have eight schools, you have
eight schools and you start to say, wait a minute, if we have 400 schools
they’re going to say, how come you don’t…and literally we’ve been
admonished, how come you don’t have a million students in your
organization?

CMOs recognized the potential for conflicting interests when it came to accepting
private grants for organizational growth, but felt that entering into relationships with
these organizations was critical to their success. Consequently, funders did
ultimately influence the pace of growth as well as the way CMOs’ planned for and
managed the growth process.
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Parents. In thinking about critical resource dependencies associated with
CMO growth, none seems more imperative than that between CMOs and the parents
they serve. After all, successful CMOs must recruit students and keep them enrolled
long term. Their abilities to accomplish this task depend largely on the relationships
they develop with their students’ parents and their potential students’ parents. Yet,
only 11 out of 25 CMOs highlighted parents as influencing the growth process.
Those that did tended to be small to mid-sized sized organizations spread across all
age ranges.
The CMOs that did identify parents as an important resource seemed to
understand that their approval could have an impact on future organizational growth.
“You know parents are our biggest critics and our biggest fans,” one CMO leader
said, “if they love what’s going on, they’re going to tell everybody they know and if
they hate what’s going on they’re also going to tell everybody they know. So it’s
been really good for us to make really strong relationships with parents.” A number
of the CMOs relied on parents to spread the reputation of the school to future
targeted communities. Additionally, parent interest often dictated where CMOs
ended up opening new schools and even what grade levels these schools served. One
CEO captured the power of parents well when she described the role they’d played
in her CMO’s growth trajectory. “A group of parents formed to try to pressure us to
open another school—parents who didn’t get into the current school. Several of
them decided to keep their kids back and not send them to a kindergarten because
they wanted them to go to our school. So we ended up putting that off for a year or
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two but eventually found a growth opportunity.” Similarly, another CEO explained,
“We have grown directly in response to what parents have asked us to do so that’s
why we have grown to eight schools.”
Other CMOs did not mention that parents strongly influenced growth. These
organizations frequently commented that growth was internally driven by
organizational objectives. Comments like, “we open in and around the worst
schools, period,” don’t overtly reference the role of parents in the growth process.
Yet, as the primary consumers of educational services, parents likely influenced
growth in every CMO in the study (Wohlstetter, Wenning & Briggs, 1995).
Traditional School Districts. Lastly, 8 CMOs said that traditional school
districts influenced growth. Of those CMOs, most described a resource dependent
relationship where their CMOs were dependent upon traditional districts for services
(e.g. special education or busing), authorization of charters, or facilities space. One
leader explained, “Special education is a bit of a nightmare because the district still
makes all of the special ed. decisions. So because of that, if the district is reasonable
then you’re okay, if they’re not then you’re really stuck.” Here, the power dynamic
is clearly defined. Another CMO leader reinforced the importance of establishing
positive relationships with local districts:
Part of our problem right now is contentious relationships in districts make it
very difficult to recruit teachers, recruit students and find facilities. Districts
have the ability to kind of choke off the entire lifeline of the organization. So
if you come in with a very contentious relationship you’re not going to
succeed or you’re going to have to devote so much organizational resources
to it that one school may succeed but you’re going to sink the rest of your
organization.
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These examples reinforce the dependent relationship that exists between CMOs and
local school districts. Also noteworthy was the fact that five of the eight CMOs that
reported local district influence were mature CMOs, all of whom are large in size.
Consequently, the findings suggest that relationships with traditional districts
become more complicated as CMOs age and grow. Smaller, younger CMOs may
not yet identify such relationships as influential for scale-up, but they will most
likely change their viewpoint once their organizations begin to threaten the
enrollment of the local districts within which they reside.
Summary
A number of environmental factors influenced growth in CMOs. Federal and
state policies often constrained these organizations by restricting their ability to grow
free from legislative regulations, as many private sector firms are able to do. Local
policies did not appear to influence CMO growth as directly. However, resource
dependent relationships at the local level did influence CMO growth. Establishing
balanced, positive relationships with politicians, community groups, parents and
local school districts was fundamental for efficiently navigating local rules and
requirements associated with opening new school sites as well as for establishing
legitimacy in new communities.
Socio-cultural Influences
In addition to the above environmental influences, a number of socio-cultural
factors influenced CMO scale up. These influences included the student and
community demographics of neighborhoods; specific market characteristics such as
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the number of charter schools or CMOs currently in operation; and the perception of
community need for CMOs’ services.
Overwhelmingly, these socio-cultural factors impacted growth decisions
pertaining to new school locations and new school grade configurations whereas
environmental and organizational factors influenced growth objectives, planning
styles and the pace of growth overall.
Student/Community Demographics
Student and community demographics include the racial/ethnic
characteristics of current or targeted communities as well as the socioeconomic
status of families in these neighborhoods. The majority of CMOs (16 out of 25) felt
that these demographics influenced organizational growth. Larger CMOs (11
schools and over; 2000 students and over) identified student and community
demographics as an influence more so than smaller organizations. Age was less of a
mediating factor as over 50% of new, emerging and mature CMOs highlighted
demographics as influential to growth.
CMOs that reported being influenced by student and community
demographics spoke most frequently about the fact that these criteria were closely
linked to their organizational missions. In other words, CMOs’ objectives were not
only to run high quality schools, but also to run high quality schools for poor and
minority students. Consequently, growth was dependent upon the accessibility of
communities that met CMOs’ specific demographic criteria. “We wanted to be in
Washington, D.C. but also in low income neighborhoods,” said one CMO executive.
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Another explained, “We have two branches to our mission and one is to serve a more
traditionally underserved economically disadvantaged student population. So, we’ve
chosen to open two schools in the city’s central core.” Identifying appropriate
communities for growth depended upon student and community demographics, but
actually opening new schools within identified communities involved navigating
through a number of other environmental and organizational influences on growth
(e.g. relationship building, facilities, recruitment).
Market Share
At the heart of charter schooling is the market theory that drives it (Chubb &
Moe, 1988). Consequently, a number of market characteristics that were related to,
yet different from, student and community demographics appeared influential to
CMO growth. These hinged upon the potential for increased market share; a growth
outcome that was associated with the performance of competitors (charter and
traditional), the demand for services, and the pool of potential students. Seventeen
CMOs identified these market characteristics as influential factors; size and age did
not impact the likelihood of these findings.
Market share, or the potential for CMOs to enroll increasing numbers of
students, influenced growth. Communities where local school districts were
experiencing declining enrollment were not seen as ideal opportunities for CMO
growth. One CMO CEO explained, “It’s going into communities where we see that
the demographic trending is the right way…so there are more students than there
were five years ago. We don’t want to move into a community that’s already seeing
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a decline in population.” Another CMO’s business plan delineated target
communities as being places where traditional schools were “severely overcrowded
and resource-poor.” In addition to identifying communities with the potential for
stable or increasing enrollment, CMOs also linked decisions about growth to
perceived lack of choice in target communities. A CMO leader at one emerging
organization said, “Our strategy is to operate high performing schools in
communities where families lack access to choices.” Another CMO leader expanded
on this strategy by saying, “Some regions of the city already have a critical mass of
existing CMOs so there’s no reason for us to go in there to give parents choice.”
The performance of existing traditional district schools and charter schools
also played a role in determining whether increased market share was a possibility.
CMOs targeted new communities where traditional districts were unsuccessfully
educating students. However, if stand-alone charters or other CMOs would become
competitors then growth in such communities was less attractive.
Lastly, CMOs that identified market characteristics as influential to growth
emphasized the importance of demand for their services by either parents or other
community groups. One California CMO leader whose organization originally only
opened high schools mentioned that the decision to open middle schools was driven
by parents demanding better middle schools for their children. Another CMO
actually attempted to unionize interested parents in order to prove to authorizers and
local school districts that there was high demand for more choice within their
targeted communities. Ultimately, CMOs that were constantly finding themselves
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with long waiting lists perceived demand for their services to be high and assumed
that families would enroll in new schools if they were established.
Summary
The first portion of this chapter reported environmental factors and this
second portion focused on identifying socio-cultural factors that were influencing
growth in CMOs. Student and community demographics, as well as factors
associated with increasing market share were all associated with organizational
growth. Unlike some of the environmental influences, socio-cultural influences were
not mediated by CMO size or maturity.
The reported findings confirm prior research that acknowledged the role of
environmental factors on organizational change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). However, research on small firm growth also emphasized
organization-level factors as critical to geographic expansion (Macpherson & Holt,
2007). Next, organization-level factors that influence CMO growth are identified
and discussed.
Organizational Influences
The literature on small firm growth that was reviewed in Chapter 2
emphasized that internal organizational characteristics such as CEO/Founder goals,
and the ability to secure and develop adequate human, organizational and network
capital were critical during the growth process (Hay & Kamshad, 1994; Macpherson
& Holt, 2007). This study confirmed these findings and also extended them by
identifying additional organizational influences that were CMO specific. These
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included the influence of organizational mission as well as the ability to acquire
adequate facilities for new and existing school sites.
CEO/Founder Goals
Research on small firm growth emphasized the influence that a founder or
CEO can have on an organization’s development (Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi,
2005; Hay & Kamshad, 1994). Of the 23 CMO founders/CEOs that were
interviewed, 17 confirmed that their own strategies and objectives significantly
influenced scale-up within their organizations. Sometimes, these founders and CEOs
were the drivers of growth; they established their organizations with scale-up as a
primary objective. As one California founder put it, “From the very beginning the
plan was to create a network that would do good work at scale for at-risk kids.” This
CMO, which was founded in 1998, now operates 21 schools. Another CMO founder
felt similarly, “From the beginning we said this is always about more than 250 kids.
What is the way we can have maximum impact?” Other times, founders/CEOs
approached growth with far more reservations.
I’m not sure how big a CMO should be. I think there ought to be a limit but I
don’t know what the limit is. But, [as you grow] I think you’re at great risk
of becoming what you disdain and some of that is just going to be natural
because bureaucracy grows as organizations grow. There’s a big question in
my mind about the charter movement and how the CMOs need to structure
within that. Our model is one school, multiple campuses and I’m not sure we
can do 25 or 30. I don’t think we would be able to run them the same way
and have the same personal touch.

Regardless of a founder/CEO’s approach to growth, findings support that
growth decisions were very much driven by these CMO leaders. Oftentimes this
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meant that the founder/CEO spent a considerable amount of time working with his or
her board of directors so that these stakeholders would support growth plans. One
CMO founder explained that it took him two years to convince his board that his
plan for growth was the best approach for his CMO. Ultimately, his board did
support his plans. Another founder spoke about how he stayed very active on his
board even after he turned day-to-day management of his CMO over to a new CEO
because he wanted to make sure that he could continue to drive the organization’s
growth trajectory.
Given the power that CEOs and high-level executives have over the
trajectory of their organizations, it would also be reasonable to assume that the past
leadership experiences of CEOs/Founders might influence the growth planning styles
that their organizations adopt. For example, a CEO with a business-oriented
background might chose a more premeditated growth style for his/her CMO that
drew from strategic planning practices that are characteristic of the private sector.
Interestingly, such relationships could not be established within this sample. First,
only four out of the 25 CEO/Founders interviewed came from the business sector.
The majority had education-related backgrounds either in leading traditional public
schools or working for traditional school districts. If one examines the backgrounds
of the individuals that each CEO hired to support them (for example COOs, CFOs
and Chief Academic Officers), 15 did report transitioning from the private sector.
Again, if these 15 employees were all concentrated across CMOs with the same
growth planning styles, then prior experience might be an important indicator for
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growth planning. However, such a trend was not apparent in this data set.
Consequently, these findings support the theory that it is the specific ideologies of
CMO founders and CEOs that help determine decisions about growth rather than
their previous work experiences.
CMO Mission and Goals
Since CMO founders and CEOs often play integral roles in developing their
organizations’ missions and goals, it is not surprising that most also felt that their
organization’s mission influenced growth. However, interviews with the other CMO
leaders who participated in the study as well as CMO documents such as business
plans also confirmed this sentiment. Data revealed that 20 out of 25 CMOs believed
CMO mission and goals were a driving factor when it came to scale-up. In fact,
organizational mission statements often explicitly listed growth as integral to
organizational success. One CMO’s mission statement read:
The mission of [our CMO] is to open and operate a network of excellent
small high-performing 9-12 and 6-8 public schools in historically
underachieving, low income, overcrowded communities in Los Angeles that
will significantly outperform other public schools in preparing students to
enter and succeed in college.

Another example of a growth-oriented mission statement was:
By taking the bold step of transforming its single school into a network of
small schools, [our CMO] intends to: 1) ensure that significantly more
Washington, D.C. students have access to a high-quality education that
prepares them for success in college and life, 2) develop an ever-growing
force of young leaders who have the skills and knowledge to create positive
change in their communities and the world around them, and 3) provide a
model of replication and school network design for other successful schools
to follow.
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In situations where CMO missions were explicitly growth-oriented, the organizations
themselves were exceptionally focused on the process of scale up.
Along with CMO mission, organizational goals also influenced growth.
Primarily, CMOs were focused on three goals that were not mutually exclusive: 1)
creating high quality schools; 2) bringing about change in local school districts
(which often translated into increasing their market share); and 3) becoming
financially self-sufficient. All three goals dove-tailed with a larger, implicit goal of
successfully educating students; sometimes college readiness was included under this
objective. Some CMOs felt that high quality schools were impossible to run if their
organizations grew too large while others felt that size and quality were not
necessarily correlated. Also, CMOs that focused on college readiness mentioned that
this goal drove decisions to expand their organizations into new grade levels.
Preparing middle school students for college, for example, became difficult when
these students were thrust back into failing traditional high schools.
Finally, CMOs perceived the goal of transforming local school districts as
closely linked to growth. Two CMOs in the sample acknowledged that changing
traditional public schools did not necessarily require large-scale expansion of their
own networks of schools. One explained, “What we think we have the ability to
impact in the educational world is our educational model for secondary schools and
so any growth or anything that we do is to try to amplify that. But, we’re not trying
to tip the system so we are pretty conservative around [growth].” However, the other
10 CMOs who mentioned transformation as a major goal did link success to growth
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saying things such as, “We want to create a change, not just in the communities that
we serve, but create a change in public education across California. We believe that
we will do that when we are at a significant size and consistent quality across all of
our schools such that we can’t be written off.”
Human Capital
Moving away from mission and goal oriented influences on growth, CMOs
also identified human capital related influences. Human capital issues influenced
CMOs in two ways. First, CMO growth was impacted by an organization’s ability to
recruit and retain qualified teachers, leaders and home office staff. Second, CMO
growth was affected by current employees’ abilities and skill sets.
When it came to issues of recruitment CMO leaders expressed a number of
factors that influenced organizational growth. One CMO CEO summarized by
saying, “The greatest levers for growth for us will be… our ability to retain our
managing directors, our ability to find, develop and retain outstanding teachers and
school leaders, and then lastly, our ability to find, develop and retain outstanding
folks in the home office.” This dual focus on recruiting qualified staff and making
sure that existing staff were able to do the job that was required of them was
emphasized in the conversations about scale-up in 13 CMOs from the study sample.
Teacher recruitment also influenced growth significantly. Without effective
teachers that could successfully implement their instructional models, for example,
CMOs were incapable of expanding. One leader explained, “The single biggest
challenge we have today is the same challenge that we had when we had 200
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students, and that is making sure that every single one of our classroom students is in
the presence of an excellent instructor.” Complicating teacher recruitment for some
CMOs in the study was competition for teachers in areas where multiple charters
were in operation. While leaders didn’t seem to be worried about student
recruitment in densely chartered geographies, they did worry about their ability to
“beat out” other CMOs and stand-alone charters when it came to hiring the best
teacher candidates. Three New York metropolitan area CMOs purposely joined
forces to try to overcome the fact that “there is no question that we are competing for
the same great teachers.” These organizations decided to create their own teacher
certification program so that they could develop teachers that were suited to their
unique school environments and preferred teaching styles. While this won’t entirely
erase the competition for teachers, it does establish collegiality and respect and
should ultimately lessen the influence of teacher recruitment on growth in these
CMOs.
Recruiting exceptional school leaders also influenced CMOs trying to scale-
up. One CMO leader explained, “Our mantra for growth is ‘as fast as we can, as
slow as we must’ and the number one variable is do we have a great school leader?
You know, we might start another school in Connecticut; there’s one candidate that
we have, if she says she wants to do it then we’ll start the school. If she says she
doesn’t want to do it then we’ll hold off a year or two. At some point, it comes down
to that.” The majority of the 13 CMOs that felt influenced by leadership recruitment
issues focused on purposeful leadership development strategies that emphasized
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“growing one’s own” school leaders. CMOs expressed that the most important
quality in potential school leaders was a deep understanding and commitment to the
CMOs culture and core values. Consequently, they did not feel comfortable hiring
school leaders from outside the organization. “At [this CMO] we feel that the leader
is the critical piece to our growth. We’ve never opened a school without previously
identifying the leader so we’ve been grooming people specifically for that [their new
high school].”
While recruiting qualified teachers, leaders and home office staff influenced
growth, so did the existing skill sets of current employees. In 15 CMOs, leaders
talked about how training current staff in new, critical management skills or having
the “manpower” to designate certain existing staff to focus on building
organizational capacity influenced future growth. One CMO leader explained:
We had grown one school to seven schools and were adding three more
schools, bringing it to ten this year and we had outgrown the capacity of eight
people to manage the organization with quality, and as we’ve gotten larger it
became crystal clear that in order to support consistency with quality of
instruction and the implementation of the model, we had to build our
capacity, our bandwidth to support schools.

Another addressed this same issue saying, “It just really comes down to a manpower
issue. We would love to have somebody fulltime that just looks for facilities in the
state….we just don’t have the time on our current staff to do it.” These findings
were consistent with Macpherson and Holt (2007) who found that the skill sets of the
management team influenced the firm’s overall approach to growth.
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Recruitment and existing human capital influenced CMO growth in
organizations of all ages and sizes. Not surprisingly, mid-sized and large CMOs
identified human capital issues more frequently than smaller CMOs because as
CMOs grow in size, they also have a larger demand for new staff. CMO age,
however, did not appear to impact whether CMOs were influenced by human capital-
related factors. Organizations of all ages identified these factors as important
considerations during scale up.
Network Capital
Related to, but different from, human capital is network capital. Network
capital, which can also be referred to as the strength of a CMO’s social network,
referred to the capacity to access needed resources by building network ties with
appropriate social, professional and institutional actors (Borgatti & Foster, 2003;
Macpherson & Holt, 2007; Ramachandran & Ramnarayan, 1993). For CMOs,
network capital influenced growth in two key ways. Of primary importance was the
governing board’s role in creating network ties. Sixteen CMOs addressed the role
that their governing boards played in organizational growth; often the board’s ability
to connect CMO leaders with key community members, potential funders and local
politicans proved tantamount for CMOs with aggressive growth targets. “We are
making plans now to restructure the board,” explained one small CMO executive,
“we need to get some people off the board and bring people on who know what’s
expected of them in terms of supporting the school with their time and their money
and their expertise in governing non-profit organizations.” Interestingly, the
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influence of governing boards on CMO growth was one of the few factors that
appeared to be impacted by the age of the organization. Of the 16 CMOs that
identified their governing boards as influential, all were either new or emerging
organizations. Furthermore, all nine “new” CMOs in the sample identified
governing boards as influential to organizational growth. This pattern could be
explained by the fact that educators with limited management experience founded
many “new” CMOs. Consequently, they relied on board members to build important
relationships and guide them through difficult business decisions.
CMO leaders explained that choosing high profile board members included a
number of trade offs. One CEO said, “I think one of the big challenges with our
board of directors is they’re all such important people…our board members are so
powerful, and they are so needed elsewhere, that it is extraordinarily difficult to get
them together.” Since CMO boards often needed to approve major decisions about
growth, selecting high profile board members proved to have both negative and
positive influences on scale up.
CMO governing boards influenced the network capital of CMOs, but so did
top level management. Findings revealed that CEOs and founders that did have the
ability to bridge a variety of social networks or to create new network ties by
themselves gave their organizations an advantage with respect to growth. This
networking capital is different than the relationship building that proved an important
environmental influence and was discussed earlier in this chapter. There, CMO
growth was affected by the organization’s ability to build strong relationships with
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key suppliers to acquire the resources necessary for growth but this relationship
building was not person specific. Here, the influence is internal and focused on
skills that top-level managers bring to the organization. As an executive from one
large California CMO asserted, “A big reason why we’re the biggest and serve the
most is because of [our founder]. I think you’re going to see a lot of people either
slowing growth or not growing, not because they can’t handle the numbers, but
because they bump up against the relationship issues.” Here, successful growth was
influenced by the founder’s own ability to build critical relationships with all
different people—funders, CMO staff members and board members, and local
community members, as well as the existing relationships and connections that
senior staff members brought with them.
Organizational Capital
Macpherson and Holt (2007) defined organizational capital as the finances,
structure and systems within the organization and argued that the ability to adapt
these organizational attributes as a firm grew would influence the success of a firm’s
scale-up efforts. Only 11 out of 25 CMOs identified organizational capital as
influential to scale up. Again, these 11 were spread fairly evenly across new,
emerging and mature CMOs and also tended to be smaller in size (based on number
of schools and students enrolled). Since most CMOs start off as small,
entrepreneurial organizations with very minimal centralized staff, systems or
structures, it makes sense that smaller CMOs would feel more impacted by
organizational challenges than larger organizations that already had to develop more
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sophisticated, efficient systems and structures to support an increasing number of
staff and students. This was reflected in interviews with larger CMOs. For example,
one CEO explained that her organization had recently invested in a new student
information system that would be able to support large-scale growth moving
forward. Another large CMO CEO described how his organization had a period of
slower growth while they were restructuring the management model to accommodate
regional oversight.
Other CMOs found fiscal capacity to be a key constraint on growth.
Oftentimes, this meant that CMOs did not have the money necessary to grow at their
ideal rate, either because they could not raise enough from private sources or because
they had not accurately projected the costs associated with their growth plans.
Ultimately, CMOs were influenced by organizational capacity issues but not in as
widespread a manner as was expected by existing research on small firm growth.
Facilities
The final organizational factor that influenced CMO growth was a CMO’s
ability to locate, finance and renovate facilities for each new school campus. This
factor proved to be one of the strongest influences on CMO growth. In fact, 22 out
of 25 CMOs discussed this factor in depth. As one CMO leader explained, “We had
an original business plan that called for growth quicker than we were able to do it.
We rewrote the growth projections about a year and a half ago and have yet to make
good on those because of facilities issues.” Another CMO leader highlighted how
available facilities were really a main driver for growth. “If you want to grow in a
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disciplined way, the number of possible buildings that fit the criteria for a school—
they’re big enough, they’re in a specific city or neighborhood etc.—leave you a
pretty small number of places that work. So, if you find a place that works, then you
have to finance it, or have a partner that will buy on your behalf…so it’s finding it
and then figuring out a way to pay for it.”
Each of the 22 CMOs dealing with facilities challenges had a similar story to
tell. On some level, all organizational growth was linked to the availability of
facilities. In order to overcome the constraint that facilities placed on CMO growth,
CMO leaders relied on developing relationships with funders, community groups and
city officials, as has already been discussed.
Conclusion
The purpose of the chapter was to build an understanding of how CMOs
approach growth. The chapter examined growth from a planning perspective—
identifying two prominent growth planning styles—and it also focused on the
contexts within which CMOs grew by identifying the environmental, socio-cultural
and organizational factors that were influencing scale-up. Findings revealed that
federal and state policies were significant influences, as were a number of local
resource suppliers including politicians, private funders and community groups.
Additionally, CMO growth was influenced by socio-cultural factors including the
student/community demographics of target neighborhoods and market characteristics
like enrollment potential and customer demand. Also influential were organizational
factors like CMO mission, founder/CEO goals, the availability of facilities, and an
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organization’s ability to recruit, retain and train home office staff, school leaders and
teachers.
The next chapter highlights how the study’s findings relate to and inform the
exploratory model, originally presented in Chapter 2, and how these findings also
build upon past research. More specifically, it examines the relationship (or lack
there of) between planning styles and influencing factors like organizational mission
and state charter laws. Chapter 5 also addresses research question two by offering
policy implications and suggestions for improved practice. It concludes with a
discussion on areas for future research suggested by this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REVISITING THE EXPLORATORY MODEL
& IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
A Revised Model for CMO Growth
The study’s exploratory model, presented in Chapter 2, built a sequential,
rational connection between the factors that influenced CMO growth, the growth
process itself and CMO growth targets and objectives. The model relied on three
organizational theories (small firm growth, institutional theory and resource
dependence theory), as well as research on charter school governance, to predict the
factors that would be most influential to CMOs trying to expand their school
networks. This led to the hypothesis that certain environmental, organizational and
socio-cultural influences, whatever they ended up being, would influence growth
planning and management, which in turn would influence CMO growth targets and
organizational goals.
Revisiting this model in light of the study findings presented in Chapter 4
produces some useful insights, especially with respect to the relationship between
constraints on growth, CMO growth planning and organizational objectives. In
actuality, the relationship between the various influencing factors and CMO growth
targets was far more synergistic than that presented in the original model. Also,
decisions about CMO growth planning and management proved to be the outgrowth
of organizational goals and growth targets, rather than directly dependent upon the
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environmental, organizational and socio-cultural factors that were promoting or
constraining CMO scale up.

Figure 5.1. Revised model for CMO growth

By comparing the above model to that included in Chapter 2 as Figure 2.1
(see p. 44), it is clear that the relationships between influencing factors, growth
targets and growth planning are far more complex than the original model assumed.
As opposed to a strictly linear process, CMO scale-up was more dependent upon the
policies, people and places that interacted with these organizations at both the local
and the organizational levels. Furthermore, the growth planning styles adopted by
CMOs (premeditated vs. evolving) were not directly the result of key constraints (as
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originally hypothesized). Instead they grew more from the growth targets and
organizational objectives guiding CMOs.
In the next section the revised model is discussed in more detail and specifics
about how the findings align with, deviate from, or expand upon existing theories
about charter schools and organizational change are examined.
Establishing Legitimacy Through Network Growth
Predictions about two sets of influencing factors—environmental and socio-
cultural—rested on two main streams of organizational theory. The first,
institutional theory, focused on organizational change as a quest for legitimacy
within an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991). Establishing
legitimacy was often the result of isomorphic pressures taking coercive, normative
and mimetic forms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Unlike past research on institutionalism and charter schooling, this study did
not focus on the convergence of CMO curriculum and instructional practices with
traditional schools or other CMOs (Huerta, 2009), nor did it attempt to assess the
innovative nature of the growth process (Lubienski, 2004). Instead, the goal was to
determine whether isomorphic pressures and the quest for legitimacy were impacting
the growth process.
Evidence of isomorphism across the sample did surface, but its origins were
unexpected. As Chapter 4 revealed, state charter policies influenced decisions about
growth in CMOs. Past research using institutional theory would predict that these
policies would serve as coercive isomorphic pressures limiting organizational change
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(Bolman & Deal, 2003; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell
& DiMaggio, 1991). The existence of similarly strong or weak charter laws (both
within and across states) did impact CMO growth targets and organizational
objectives. For example, the decision to adopt single state or multi-state growth
targets was partially a consequence of state charter laws. However, findings did not
show evidence of similar growth trajectories across CMOs in like policy contexts, as
coercive isomorphism would predict.
CMOs showed more evidence of isomorphic tendencies when it came to
establishing legitimacy within their educational fields
18
. For example, CMO leaders
often spoke about how organizational growth targets reflected a desire to become an
“undeniable force” within their existing communities and/or across entire states. To
accomplish this goal CMOs needed to establish themselves as legitimate educational
organizations. To CMOs, growth often contributed to such legitimacy. They
expressed that prospective supporters (like community groups, parents or politicians)
saw growth as a measure of permanency and success. Since CMOs needed the
support and connections that these supporters possessed, it was critical for them to
attain legitimacy by whatever measures these individuals valued. Furthermore,
CMO leaders felt that large-scale growth bred legitimacy with respect to traditional
school districts, state-level administrators and authorizers. Comments like, “Once

18
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) define an educational field as “a set of organizations that constitute a
recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (p.148).
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we’re educating 10 percent of the district’s students the community won’t be able to
ignore us,” validated this viewpoint.
Consequently, many of the other environmental factors discussed in Chapter
4 served as mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures in this quest for legitimacy.
For example, funders were identified as having a significant influence on CMO
growth. In Chapter 4 funders were discussed in the context of resource dependency;
their role as resource suppliers for CMOs is undeniable. However, funders also
drove normative isomorphism in that CMOs turned to these “legitimate”
organizations when faced with uncertainty about how to structure their organizations
for growth. In turn, these funders guided CMOs through the early stages of
growth—giving advice about pace, structure and process. Sometimes advice came in
the form of funders recommending private consultants, other times information was
transferred through informal conversations. These relationships resulted in a
common language for growth that was evidenced across the sample, as well as a
level of similarity when it came to justifying growth plans, home office staff, and
organizational goals. This convergence of thought could be seen in CMO
organizational charts and annual reports.
Funders were more than just legitimate organizations that CMOs turned to for
advice. They were also resource suppliers that CMOs often depended on during
growth. Consequently, funders sometimes served a coercive role as well if they
required organizations to adhere to what they perceived as legitimate growth
planning practices in order to acquire or maintain financial support. As Chapter 4
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highlighted, some CMO leaders felt that the formal process of strategic planning that
their funders required was extremely beneficial. Others candidly explained that such
activities were primarily symbolic and that the documents that these planning
sessions produced were rarely the focus of future conversations.
In their discussion of the symbolic frame, Bolman and Deal (2003)
acknowledged the second mentality as common in organizations that were trying to
establish legitimacy, explaining that one of the primary benefits of isomorphism was
to improve an organization’s image rather than its products and services (p.273).
Referring back to the revised model (Figure 5.1), CMOs that engaged in planning
activities to appear more legitimate but did not necessarily value the process or
products that resulted still felt the influence of these isomorphic pressures. However,
for these CMOs, growth targets and organizational objectives were more directly the
result of organizational and/or socio-cultural factors and not environmental ones.
In summary, analysis showed evidence of mimetic and normative
isomorphism over coercive. Such findings were surprising in light of findings that
showed a clear influence of state and local policies on CMO growth targets and
objectives. Ultimately, it was the desire to be perceived as legitimate by funders,
traditional school districts and other suppliers (like parents or community groups)
that drove mimetic and normative growth. CMOs turned to legitimate organizations
within their educational field (e.g. other, larger CMOs, or private consultants) for
advice on the growth process. Some of the growth planning behaviors that resulted
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from these conversations were authentically influencing CMO growth, while others
were more symbolic decisions aimed at establishing legitimacy.
Resource Suppliers as Power Brokers
This study’s original exploratory model also included resource suppliers as
key environmental influences on CMO growth. This hypothesis was grounded in
resource dependence theory, which asserts that imbalances of power between
organizations and their key resource suppliers will impact organizational decision-
making (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The review of literature on resource dependence
theory and charter schools predicted a number of suppliers that could influence CMO
growth. These included private funders, parents, local school districts, local
community groups and city officials (Deal & Hentschke, 2004; Loveless & Jasin,
1998). All of these suppliers have resources that CMOs need in order to scale-up.
Consequently, they have the potential to impact CMOs depending upon how critical
the CMO perceives each supplier to be to meet organizational goals.
One critique of resource dependence theory is that little empirical research
has tested its assumptions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This study contributes to the
empirical base by confirming a major tenet—that resource dependence gives power
to suppliers thereby allowing them to influence the trajectory of an organization. In
this case, findings confirmed that community groups, politicians, funders and parents
all possessed resources that CMOs deemed integral for growth. Sometimes, those
resources came in the form of relationships, other times they were more concrete.
Funders provided financial capital for everything from facilities to building
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organizational capacity. Parents controlled the largest revenue stream of all—a
CMO’s new and existing students. Each supplier, therefore, was a power broker
who had more or less influence based upon the needs and desires of the CMOs
themselves. In line with Froelich’s (1999) study of nonprofits, this study also
confirmed that private funders harbored significant power and influence when it
came to CMO growth.
Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) offered three key strategies for altering
organizational interdependence—in this case CMOs dependence on funders, parents
and other suppliers in order to achieve growth. First, an organization could attempt
to manage its interdependence by extending its own control into vital areas currently
controlled by these other suppliers. Second, an organization could try to increase its
own dominance so that those with whom it exchanged became relatively more
dependent on it. Finally, the organization could, “reduce the dominance of other
organizations or individuals by decreasing its reliance on single critical exchanges”
(p. 113).
Findings suggested that CMOs did develop strategies to restore balance and
become less dependent on suppliers. These strategies fell most in line with the
second and third ones offered by Pfeffer and Salancik. In terms of their reliance on
parent support, CMOs were dependent on parents because the funding tied to student
enrollment made up the majority of their operating budgets. However, CMO leaders
discussed that if one community of parents was not supportive of the CMO, the
organization simply looked for another community that would get behind its mission
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or it worked harder to build support. Also, in line with strategy two (described
above) most CMOs aimed to create higher quality schools than those currently
existing in the communities that they were serving (or targeting for growth). The
strategy, then, was to create situations where parents became more dependent on the
CMOs as a source of superior schooling for their children, rather than the other way
around. Where parents did maintain power as resource suppliers was in existing
schools. CMO leaders discussed the importance of keeping existing parents happy
(i.e. not sacrificing quality for quantity) so that they could maintain steady
enrollment at all of their school sites from year to year. This task, not surprisingly,
proved far more difficult than recruiting parents/students for new schools.
Additionally, a number of CMO leaders talked about supporting multiple
political candidates and joining as many community groups as possible. This
allowed the organizations to limit the power of any single resource supplier—the
third strategy suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003). Leaders from one CMO, for
example, were candid about finding ways to financially support all of the candidates
running for election within their school communities. This allowed them to build up
positive relationships with as many constituent groups as possible.
Lastly, a number of CMOs were candid about seeking advice (and even
alliances) from neighboring CMOs. For example, a group of New York
Metropolitan Area CMOs were working together to address shared facilities issues
with the New York City school district. These were the same organizations that
were also working together to establish their own teacher- credentialing program.
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Doing so could be interpreted as a way to lessen their dependency on other resource
suppliers like intermediary human capital suppliers such as Teach for America or
traditional university credentialing programs. Relationships, like that described
above, ultimately gave CMOs more bargaining power with resource suppliers (for
example local school districts or school boards) who they identified as influencing
their decisions about growth.
Resource suppliers influenced CMO growth targets and objectives, especially
when it came to the pace of growth. An inability to acquire resources (like school
leaders or facilities) caused CMOs to adapt existing plans; these changes were, at
times, aligned with conditions set forth by private funders who held considerable
power as resource suppliers. CMOs did attempt to lessen their dependence on these
suppliers by building relationships that would increase competition or by focusing on
improving their own “product” to tip the power dynamic with certain suppliers. As
the revised exploratory model suggests, their success at accomplishing the above
goals determined the extent that resource suppliers influenced growth targets and
organizational objectives.
Ultimately, CMO growth targets and objectives were still only partially
influenced by environmental conditions like dependence on resource suppliers or a
desire for legitimacy. Study findings also supported the role of internal factors like
CMO mission or organizational capacity. The next section focuses on the
relationship between internal and external constraints on growth.
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Balancing External and Organizational Constraints on CMO Growth
Research on small firm growth served as the foundation for the inclusion of
specific organizational factors hypothesized to influence CMO growth. These
studies, more empirical than theoretical, identified factors such as human and
network capital as being key to successful small firm growth. The findings
presented in Chapter 4 confirmed that many of the same organization-level factors
relevant to private-sector firms also influenced the growth of CMOs. As has been
already discussed, CEO/Founder goals combined with human, network and
organizational capital to influence the trajectory of these quasi-public organizations.
This study builds upon the research on small firm growth in a number of
ways. Unlike existing research, it expands findings beyond the private sector,
confirming that nonprofit organizations face similar constraints on growth.
However, it contributes an important new finding—that organizational mission, not
just CEO goals, acts as a strong influence on growth. This finding is consistent with
theory from the nonprofit sector (Moore, 2000), but had yet to be included in the
small firm growth literature directly.
Also, as was raised in Chapter 2, individual CEO/Founder attitudes towards
growth were included as a predictor for actual CMO growth (Daviddson, 1989;
Wiklund, Daviddson & Delmar, 2003). Findings confirmed that CMO leaders
viewed growth as a means for financial independence and that this perception did
serve as a driver for growth. However, far more relevant than individual
CEO/Founder beliefs and attitudes was each CMO’s organizational mission. The
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desire to grow, or not, appeared to be connected to a broader, social imperative to
improve the educational experiences of as many students as possible. Then, other
growth-related functions such as pace and scope were determined by the existence
and interplay of contextual factors already identified and discussed in Chapter 4.
Finally, existing theory on small firm growth spends little time on the role of
external forces, especially those that are not economically rooted. This study
confirms that small firm growth is significantly influenced by both internal and
external factors. In fact, it is the constant rebalancing of these factors that ultimately
influences growth targets and objectives. Consequently, the pace of growth in
CMOs, as well as overall growth targets, were largely a function of the internal or
external constraints that were currently dictating decision-making. More
importantly, dominant constraints were not static; they were constantly changing.
For instance, CMOs that were struggling to find facilities or raise new capital for
renovations needed to slow growth to accommodate these constraints. Likewise,
CMOs that wanted to grow in cities or states that proved hostile to their expansion
efforts needed to adapt growth plans regardless of the desires of a CEO or its board
of directors. To reiterate, as CMOs grew, leaders described the balance between
internal and external influences as constantly readjusting. Consequently, CMOs
often revisited growth plans to accommodate each new balance of power. While not
confirmed, it is hypothesized that the entrepreneurial nature of many CMO leaders is
what allowed such regular recalibration to take place. Most leaders interviewed for
this study did not express a need for concrete, long-term planning. As was
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previously discussed, the majority commented that if such plans did exist, they were
almost certain to change quite drastically depending upon the unknown trajectory of
the CMO. The presence of the plans was more a source of legitimacy within the
larger educational field and less a function of necessity from the perspective of CMO
leaders.
To summarize, this study confirmed empirical findings on small firm growth
that identified a number of internal, organization-level factors as being critical to
geographic expansion (Barringer & Greening, 1998; Hay & Kamshad, 1994;
Macpherson & Holt, 2007). These findings were consistent with existing work on
CMO growth, which identified organizational factors like management capacity,
recruitment, and fundraising as barriers to growth (NewSchools Venture Fund, 2008;
“Quantity Counts,” 2007). The study also confirmed that the relationship between
these internal factors and a variety of external factors was interactive and constantly
changing. To date, only one other article on CMO growth acknowledged that
environmental factors like state policies and political environments affected scale up
(Bennet, 2008).
Where Do Premeditated and Evolving Planning Styles Fit?
None of the existing research on CMOs, or CMO growth specifically, has
examined how these organizations actually plan for growth. As has been previously
mentioned, some studies do highlight the challenges associated with growth
(Bennett, 2008; Education Sector, 2009; NewSchools Venture Fund, 2008; “Quantity
Counts,” 2007). It was originally hypothesized that these challenges, along with the
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other factors found to influence CMO growth, would directly impact the CMO
growth planning process (see Figure 2.1, p. 44). However, the lack of direct
empirical evidence on CMO growth planning created a metaphorical black box when
it came to understanding both how CMOs plan for growth, as well as how growth
planning styles are related to organizational goals and the various contextual factors
that impacted growth.
Thus far, discussion has focused on explaining how the factors that influence
growth lead to changes in CMO growth targets and organizational goals. However a
complete analysis of the CMO growth process must also include a discussion about
how the two growth planning styles—premeditated and evolving—identified in
Chapter 4 fit within the revised exploratory model presented here.
In actuality, findings supported a new relationship where contextual factors
primarily influenced CMO growth targets and organizational goals, not growth
planning styles. In turn, these CMO targets partially determined the approach that
CMOs adopted with respect to scale up. However, the relationship between growth
targets and objectives and growth planning was reflexive; each was related to the
other to some degree. The one exception to this relationship was the role of a key
resource supplier, private funders, on growth planning. In this case, funders often
used their power and influence to encourage CMOs to adopt specific growth
planning processes. These processes tended towards the premeditated style. As was
previously mentioned, CMOs that felt pressured to develop long-range “strategic
growth plans” that felt incongruous with their goals and mission often set these
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documents aside or recognized them as necessary to establish legitimacy but not
extremely useful as a living, breathing road map for growth.
In general, CMOs with organizational goals that emphasized responsiveness
to the community overwhelmingly adopted evolving planning styles rather than
premeditated ones. In these organizations, growth was not an assumed process.
Rather, it was mission-driven and plans for future school sites were constantly
evolving based upon the needs of the communities currently being served by the
CMO. A variety of environmental, socio-cultural and organizational factors did
influence decisions about growth—namely the pace at which growth occurred and
the communities targeted for new school sites—but these factors did not directly
influence planning styles. Conversely, organizations adopting premeditated planning
styles appeared to do so because their growth targets and overarching goals were
ambitious enough that they necessitated a considerable amount of planning and
foresight. Again, factors like funders, state policy or organizational capacity shaped
these growth targets and goals. In turn, CMOs adopted a premeditated approach to
growth as a way to help facilitate reaching these goals. The nature of this
relationship was consistent with existing theory on strategic planning in public and
non-profit organizations. Bryson (1988) has explained that setting goals and then
developing strategies to meet those goals often defined the strategic planning
process. For CMOs, this “strategy development” was predominantly premeditated or
evolving.
134
Summary
To summarize, data analysis necessitated a revised exploratory model of
CMO growth. Findings revealed that the relationships between context, growth
targets and growth planning were not as sequential as originally predicted. It turns
out that environmental and organizational factors directly influenced growth targets
and organizational goals more so than CMO planning styles. However, given that
these goals and targets did then have an influence on how CMOs planned for growth,
one can argue that context still indirectly influenced planning. Additionally, the
relationships between the influencing factors and the growth targets were not static;
they were constantly changing and readjusting.
Moving beyond the revised exploratory model, this study also contributed to
theory on institutionalism and resource dependence. Analysis revealed that CMO
growth was partially driven by a desire for legitimacy within the larger educational
field (resource suppliers, existing CMOs, traditional districts); and this desire led to
varying degrees of mimetic and normative isomorphism. Furthermore, the primary
assumptions set forth by resource dependence theory were confirmed through this
work on CMO scale up. Critical suppliers, like private funders or prospective
parents, did function as power brokers who were able to influence CMO growth
targets and planning behaviors. Alternatively, CMOs did try to rebalance these
resource interdependencies in order to have more freedom to grow on their own
terms.
135
Implications for Policy and Practice
This study is relevant to a number of constituents—policymakers, CMO
leaders and philanthropists. This next section addresses research question 2; it
details the ways in which this study can advance policy and practice for this wide
array of constituents.
RQ2: What are the implications for policy and future research?
A Need for CMO-Specific Charter Policy
To date almost no state charter laws recognize CMOs as a unique governance
model. Consequently, CMOs are forced to scale up within the confines of policy
geared predominantly towards stand-alone charter schools. Whether specific state
policymakers and educators believe in the value of CMOs or not, their continued
presence in the school choice community is certain (Klein, 2009; Nayfack, Smith &
Wohlstetter, 2009; Scott, 2009). Therefore, revising policy to allow successful
CMOs to grow as efficiently as possible makes sense. One state, California, is
leading the way. Here, policymakers have designated statewide benefit charters and
have already granted them to three CMOs.
19
These unique charters allow CMOs with
documented success to open up to 10 new school sites statewide with minimal
paperwork or authorizer intervention. Such legislation allows successful CMOs to

19
Three CMOs in California have been awarded this charter: Aspire Public Schools, High Tech High
and Magnolia Schools. The first two organizations were included in this study. For more information
on California’s Statewide Benefit Charter please refer to
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/ds/cdscodesbc.asp.
136
scale-up using fewer resources—both at the state level and also at the organizational
level.
In addition to policy amendments focused on charter acquisition, CMO
leaders interviewed for this study acknowledged a number of other policy changes
that would promote more efficient growth. These included guaranteeing multiple
paths to authorizing, limiting the number of charters (and by association governing
boards) that each CMO was required to carry, reconsidering restrictions on
preferential enrollment across k-12 CMOs, and aiding the process of facilities-
sharing between charters and traditional schools. A number of states with strong
charter laws have already begun to address some of these issues. For instance,
Minnesota and Arizona both allow multiple authorizers and do not limit the number
of charters allowed to open across the state. The Obama administration has
accelerated policy changes by connecting federal education dollars to policy
requirements like charter caps. This has caused a number of states, including New
York, which did have limits on new charters to amend their existing legislation
(Martinez, 2010).
It is important to note that amending charter laws to recognize and support
CMOs should not be seen as a carte blanche for unlimited growth. Many researchers
and charter school critics have cautioned against large-scale CMO growth because
they see it as a recreation of bureaucracy that strays from the original innovative
spirit of charter schools, or simply as an unsustainable model of school reform
(Huerta, 2009; Toch, 2009). Also, until more extensive research on how the CMO
137
model improves academic achievement is conducted, unbridled growth would be
irresponsible. However, amending charter laws to keep current with existing
research and practice on CMO growth would create the opportunity for important
discussions about responsible CMO growth, as well as appropriate methods of
oversight and accountability.
Increased Transparency Around CMO Growth Practices
Often, the challenges and pitfalls associated with organizational growth
remain the subject of high-level meetings between board members, executives and
major investors. Such practices do little to promote realistic or responsible growth
across entire sectors. Especially in communities where a single, successful charter
school has changed the trajectory of a small number of students, it is tempting to
assume that such success could be translated to many more communities and
families. However, findings from this study reveal a number of constraints on
growth that may not be apparent to these leaders.
To date, CMOs who have scaled up significantly have done little to share
their experiences—both good and bad—with stand-alone charters just beginning to
consider growth. Improving transparency and communication across the charter
sector would benefit those leaders who are thinking about growth by allowing them
to anticipate challenges and set realistic growth targets and timelines. Additionally,
increasing transparency across existing CMOs would also promote the replication of
effective growth practices. Certain investors, for example NewSchools Venture
Fund, have begun to promote shared practice by bringing together CMO leaders and
138
key educational stakeholders on a regular basis to share experiences and knowledge.
However, more opportunities that are instigated by the CMOs themselves would
prove beneficial.
Translating Study Findings into Practice
This chapter has already highlighted how study findings impact charter
policies, as well as how they highlight a lack of transparency across CMOs. The
findings also translate directly into suggested practices for CMO executives tackling
organizational growth. Firstly, they reinforce what many educational researchers
who have studied scale up in traditional school systems already know. Namely, that
growing from one context into many requires a deep understanding of the people,
places and politics of each new community and that successful growth hinges on
having the human capital to research each potential school community and build
relationships that are authentic and lasting. New school locations should not be
chosen haphazardly or purely opportunistically; they should be selected because of
their fit with the existing organization. Second, that growth need not be highly
premeditated to be successful. Rather, growth planning styles should reflect an
organization’s mission and goals as well as the management styles of its key
administrators. Third, CMO leaders must think critically how to balance quality
schools with the desire to scale up. The pace of growth should be determined by
measures of quality and not but environmental influences like changing policies or
resource suppliers like private donors or foundations.
139
Summary
Study findings uncovered a number of implications for policy and practice.
Most important were the need to augment charter school policy with CMO specific
issues, as well as the importance of increased transparency when it came to CMO
growth processes. Also, findings supported specific changes in practice, especially
those related to choosing new school locations or how quickly to scale up.
Concentrating on these two areas of policy and practice will lay the foundation for
responsible and efficient CMO growth.
Areas for Future Research
Although study findings clarify many aspects of CMO growth, a number of
questions remain unanswered. Moving forward, research on small firm growth
would benefit from an expanded viewpoint that includes nonprofit organizations as
well as quasi-public organizations like charter schools. Also, this research should
acknowledge the interactive nature of external and internal constraints instead of
focusing, as it currently does, mostly on the role of internal factors. With respect to
charter schools, until this study only one existing piece on CMO growth discussed
the role of environmental factors like state laws or political environments (Bennett,
2008). More empirical work will only improve knowledge about how small firms,
and CMOs specifically, approach growth.
On a macro level, research on CMO growth is interrelated with other research
questions about CMOs that remain unanswered. Potentially the most important to
the overall success of CMOs is research that looks at whether CMOs are a useful
140
strategy for systemic education reform. Questions that address how to measure
responsible growth, or how to determine the optimal size for CMO networks would
provide critical knowledge to policymakers and potential CMO supporters. Is there
an equilibrium point for CMOs that balances out productivity and student
performance outcomes? If so, how would one measure this?
Additionally, studies that address the viability of large-scale growth from a
number of vantage points (fiscal capacity, human capital etc.) are critical to the long-
term success of CMOs. These studies could address a number of key questions that
have been raised in other contexts. First, current examples of large-scale geographic
expansion by CMOs (i.e. KIPP, Aspire) have relied on regional offices as a solution
to growing managerial demands. If this trend persists as other CMOs scale-up, will
the growth process in these organizations become cyclical at some point and create a
feedback loop between growth planning and those factors influencing growth
targets?
Furthermore, no research on CMOs has addressed how these organizations
are actually going about “replication.” Existing research in education emphasizes
the complex role that context plays when transferring reform models from one
school to another. Datnow, Hubbard and Mehan (2002) explained that most often
reforms become co-constructed, where local educators and reform developers jointly
construct change and where local variation is inevitable. Is there evidence of co-
construction across school sites within CMOs? If so, is this variability welcomed, or
are CMOs insisting on direct replication?
141
In the same vein, CMO growth has been predominantly conceptualized as a
systems-level phenomenon. Research has focused on understanding the activities of
home office administrators, board members and a variety of key stakeholders like
philanthropists and charter school authorizers. However, the process of scale up is
very much alive at the local level where teachers, school leaders and students most
directly feel the ramifications of growth decisions. To date, their experiences have
been largely ignored. Research that investigates how CMO growth plays out in new
and existing network schools is an important next step in understanding how CMOs
are evolving. More specifically, studies that focus on the degree of direct replication
from site to site (as was just discussed) or on how school-site autonomy is impacted
by network growth would begin to clarify some of the questions currently circulating
regarding whether CMOs are recreating the perils and pitfalls of their traditional
district counterparts.
Conclusion
Ideally, the present study has allowed for a more complex understanding of
CMO growth; one that situates “success stories” like KIPP’s in the realities of
organizational growth and education reform. By building a model for CMO growth
that acknowledges how context can impact organizational goals and planning styles;
and by thinking about motivations for growth in a new way, the present study also
extends existing theory on firm growth and organizational change. As charter
management organizations continue to grow in number and in size, the findings from
142
this study can serve as a guide for policymakers and educators alike, as well as serve
as the foundation for future research.
143
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Zimmer, R., Buddin, R., Chau, D., Gill, B., Guarino, C., Hamilton, L., et al. (2003).
Charter school operations and performance: Evidence from California. Santa
Monica: RAND.
153
APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTORY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
CMO Scale-Up Study
Protocol: Introductory Interview
Interviewer: ______________________ Date:____________
Interviewee: _____________________ Job Title:_____________________
Introduction:

The Center on Educational Governance at the University of Southern California is
studying the scale-up of Charter Management Organizations. The goal of this
conversation is to confirm some basic information about [insert CMO], to schedule a
more in-depth call with you in the near future, and to identify one or two other
people who are very involved in scale-up.

I want to assure you that your comments will be strictly confidential. We will not
identify you, or the CMO, by name.

This interview should last about 10-15 minutes. Do you have any questions before
we begin?

CMO Demographics
1. I’m going to run through some background information about [insert CMO].
Please let me know whether this information is accurate and complete:
a. History of the CMO
i. Your CMO was established in [year]
ii. Was this the same year that your first school opened to
students?
iii. Your CMO currently serves [total number of] students.
iv. We’ve read [on your website etc.] that your CMO’s mission
statement is [XX]. Is this still the most accurate description of
the CMO’s mission and vision? If it has changed, why has it
changed?
b. Definition of CMO
i. Does [insert CMO] provide exclusively site-based educational
services, or can students take classes online or through some
form of home-schooling?
154
ii. Do you have an organizational chart or other document that
details your home office management structure?
1. If so, can you provide us with a copy of that
document?
iii. We’ve read [on your website etc.] that your CMO has a
common school design for all of your charter schools. The
description is [XX]. Is this still the most accurate description
of your CMO’s common school design? If it has changed, why
has it changed?
c. About the CMO Schools (2007-2008 school year)
(Reminder: simply confirm previously gathered info with interviewee)
i. Your CMO currently manages [# of campuses]
ii. These campuses serve students in grades [insert grades served]
iii. Your CMO serves students in the following communities:
[insert cities/states]
iv. Your CMO plans to open up [# of campuses] by 2010

2. Our study of CMO scale-up focuses on six core areas:
a. The history of the CMO
b. Funding streams
c. Planning for scale-up (deciding where/when/how many schools; staff
skill sets needed)
d. Factors that motivate/influence scale-up
e. Implementation of growth plans
f. Measuring successful scale-up
Given these focus areas, who would be best to interview within your
organization? (Note: If they say that they can speak to all 6 areas, stress that we
a) want multiple perspectives and b) want to take up as little of their time as
possible, so we’d really like to split the interview between two people)
i. In what ways do you feel these people have been relevant to
[insert CMO ] scale-up work?

Reminder: Documents that will be sent to CEG? Fax? Mail? Email?

Thank you for your time!
155
APPENDIX B
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
CMO Scale-Up Study
Interview Protocol: CMO Leaders
Interviewer:______________________ Date:_____________
Interviewee: _____________________ CMO:____________
Job Title:_____________________ phone: _________________
Start Time:____________ End Time: _____________
Introduction:
[Introduce yourself and your affiliation]. The Center on Educational Governance at
the University of Southern California and the DC-based non-profit The Finance
Project are studying CMO scale-up as part of a U.S. Department of Education-
funded study.

During this conversation, we are hoping to learn more about [insert CMO] and your
experiences with scaling up. Specifically, I’d like to speak with you about how your
organization approaches the process of scale-up, and what factors influence your
decisions. The study’s ultimate goal is to create a useful guide for others in the CMO
community considering scale-up – we want developing CMOs to learn from the
experiences of those who have gone through the scale up process.

I want to assure you that your comments will be strictly confidential. We will not
identify you, or your organization, by name. I would like to tape record this
interview in order to have an accurate record of our conversation. Would that be
okay?

The interview should take approximately 60 minutes. Do you have any questions
before we begin?

I. Background: CMO Leader
1. How long have you been in your position? What is your prior experience and
training?

156
2. To what extent are you involved in decisions about scale-up in the CMO? Has
your involvement changed over time? If so,how?

3. When important choices about scale-up arise, who do you turn to for advice or
guidance? Why?
[Probes: colleagues within CMO, colleagues in other CMOs, friends, scholars]

II. Background: Charter Management Organization
Before we ask you specific questions about the CMO’s scale-up practices, we would
like to start by asking you some background questions about [insert CMO].
1. To get a sense of the CMO, your schools and the communities you serve,
we’d like to know more about the history of [insert CMO ].
a. Talk a little bit about some of the other (in addition to yourself) key
founding staff members for [the CMO]. How were they key to the
organization’s development and growth?
b. What are [insert CMO] targeted communities/student
populations/schools and why?
-How do you decide where to open new schools?
-How do you decide what grade configurations the new
schools will have?
c. What role do community partnerships play in your organization’s
growth and development?
III. Scale-Up Plans
Let’s shift gears a bit and talk about how the CMO plans for scale-up.
1. Let’s talk about the strategic planning process at [insert CMO]
a. Who’s involved and in what manner?
b. How do growth strategies emerge?
c. Is there a timeline of planning events (board meetings, retreats etc.)?
d. How often are growth plans revisited?

2. Thinking about your long-range plans to grow, is [insert CMO] “on-track” to
meet these long range targets? Why or why not?

3. Do you think there is an optimal number of charter school sites for [insert
CMO] If so, what is that number and why was it selected?
157
IV. Scale-Up Funding
Next, I’d like to talk a bit about how the CMO funds scale-up and on-going
operations.

1. What funding streams provide resources for your scale-up efforts?
[Probes: federal/state/local, foundations, corporations, private funders,
community contributions; Public vs. Private]
a. Have your funding streams changed since [insert CMO] inception?

2. Are any of these funding sources specifically targeted at building capacity in
the home/central office as compared to the operation of existing schools?

V. Environmental/Organizational Influencers
You’ve already discussed some basic elements of your CMO’s scale-up plan. Now,
we’re interested in learning more about the environmental and organizational factors
that affect the development of the scale-up plan. In other words, let’s discuss the
“why” of scale-up.

1. How do federal policies influence your organization’s scale-up decisions?
[Probes: NCLB, categorical funding]

2. How do state policies influence your organization’s scale-up decisions?
[Probes: number of charters required, start-up grants, per-pupil funding,
facilities funding]

3. How do local communities influence your organization’s scale-up?
[Probes: availability of a facility, local school boards, city policies,
socioeconomic status of community etc.]

4. If the CMO has external partners (e.g. museums, universities) or
philanthropic funders, how do they influence scale-up?

5. Does the distance from the central office influence expansion efforts?
6. How do other structures or processes within [insert CMO] facilitate scale-
up? [Probes: curricular choices, student information systems, fiscal capacity,
leadership capacity]

7. Are decisions about scale-up at [insert CMO ] influenced by any other people
or processes that I have not asked you about?

158
VI. Implementation of Scale-Up Decisions
We’ve just discussed factors that influence decisions about scale-up. Now, we’re
interested in learning more about how scale-up decisions are implemented – the
people and tasks involved with the scale-up process.

1. How do you garner community support for your scale-up efforts?
2. Is there a timeline of tasks when opening a new school?
[Probes: finding a site, applying for additional charters, securing funding,
hiring staff, recruiting students, purchasing materials and supplies, setting up
the school’s governing board]

3. Which aspects of scale-up [e.g. acquiring facilities, hiring staff] need to
remain flexible and which must be absolute?

4. Talk a little about the types of tasks that the home office does in terms of
getting a new school up and running, compared with the tasks done by the
school’s principal.
[Probe: freeing principal up to focus on instructional leadership]

5. How does [insert CMO] prepare leaders to head new schools?
6. Do you feel there is a “critical mass” after which opening new schools
becomes easier? [Probes: economies of scale, political savvy/connections
built with authorizers, skills-development of key staff]
a. If so, what is that critical mass?
b. If so, what factors contribute to the process becoming easier?

VII. Reflections
The last set of questions focus on lessons you’ve drawn from the scale-up process.
1. If a developing CMO can afford to hire additional staff to help with growth,
what types of positions should they prioritize?
[Probes: COO, Director of Facilities, CFO etc.]
a. What skill sets are crucial? [Probes: HR, Development, business and
management skills, political saavy]

2. What are some “lessons learned” for others who may be interested in scaling-
up or expanding their school networks?

3. What measures do you use to gauge the success of your scale-up efforts?
159
VIII. Document Collection
Does [insert CMO] have documents that address the planning, process and
implementation of scale-up? If so, may we have copies? [Make sure to get
email/phone numbers for anyone mentioned as the person to get these from]
[Probes: strategic plan, business plan, organization chart]
160
APPENDIX C
CODE LIST
Descriptive Codes:
#federal
#local
#state
&negative
&neutral
&positive

Background Codes:
BG-CEOasfounder
BG-CMOHistory
BG-CMOstructure
BG-CMOtargetcommunity
BG-CMOtargetstudents
BG-founderrole
BG-Growthtargets
BG-InstructionalModel
BG-misc
BG-Mission
BG-new.school.grade.configuration
BG-new.school.location
BG-Originalgoal.multiplesites
BG-Originalgoal.singlesite
BG-partnerships
BG-prior.experience.ed
BG-prior.experience.other
BG-priorexperience.bus
BG-Sizeofhomeoffice
BG-years.at.job

Influence Codes:
Influence-advocacy
Influence-authorizers
Influence-charter.competition
Influence-chartercaps
Influence-charterprocess
Influence-citypolitics
Influence-community
Influence-Economicenvironment
161
Influence-facilities
Influence-funders
Influence-fundingformulas
Influence-gov.board
Influence-insideCMO
Influence-leadershipcapacity
Influence-localdistrict
Influence-location.of.schools
Influence-misc
Influence-NCLB
Influence-parents
Influence-partners
Influence-policy.teachercredentialing
Influence-policyenvironment
Influence-recruiting
Influence-relationshipbuilding
Influence-statelegislators

Growth Plans Codes:
Plans-absence
Plans-advice.board
Plans-advice.consultants
Plans-advice.friends
Plans-advice.funders
Plans-advice.other
Plans-advice.other.CMO
Plans-advice.scholars
Plans-advice.within.CMO
Plans-behind.schedule
Plans-collaborationwithotherCMOs
Plans-futureobjectives
Plans-goals.changelocaldistrict
Plans-goals.changepolicy
Plans-goals.collegesuccess
Plans-goals.financial.stable
Plans-goals.highqualityschools
Plans-goals.market.share
Plans-goals.other
Plans-how.involved
Plans-how.often
Plans-misc
Plans-ontrack
Plans-optiminal.schools
162
Plans-rationale
Plans-revision
Plans-strategy.evolving
Plans-strategy.opportunistic
Plans-strategy.premeditated
Plans-strategy.reactive
Plans-strategymisc
Plans-where
Plans-who.involved
Plans-why.involved

Abstract (if available)

Abstract In recent years charter schooling has become a mainstream reform strategy supported by a wide array of political and education-related stakeholders. More recently nonprofit networks of charter schools labeled Charter Management Organizations (CMOs) have emerged as a way to increase the impact of the charter movement and combat the organizational challenges faced by stand-alone charter schools. Despite the fact that CMOs are rapidly growing, both in number and in size, little is known about how these organizations approach growth.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Nayfack, Michelle Braun (author)

Core Title Scaling up charter management organizations: understanding how policies, people and places influence growth

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education

Publication Date 08/26/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag charter schools,institutional theory,OAI-PMH Harvest,organizational growth,resource dependence theory,school choice

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Wohlstetter, Priscilla (committee chair), Datnow, Amanda (committee member), Hentschke, Guilbert C. (committee member), Riley, Patricia (committee member)

Creator Email mnayfack@air.org,mnayfack@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3411

Unique identifier UC198461

Identifier etd-Nayfack-3843 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-388911 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3411 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Nayfack-3843.pdf

Dmrecord 388911

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Nayfack, Michelle Braun

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu