Assessing the effectiveness of transnational activism: an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns

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Content ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-WHALING AND ANTI-SEALING CAMPAIGNS by Gloria Yolanda Guevara _______________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE) December 2008 Copyright 2008 Gloria Yolanda Guevara ii Table of Contents Abstract iii Chapter 1:Introduction: Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational 1 Activism: An Analysis of the Anti-Whaling and Anti-Sealing Campaigns The Significance of Transnational NGOs in Domestic 4 and International Policymaking Theoretical Framework 34 Chapter 2: Origins and Early History of the Anti-Whaling Movement 44 Conclusion 106 Chapter 3: The Anti-Whaling Campaign into the 1980s and Beyond 110 Transnational Activism after the Moratorium: 118 The IWC, The Revised Management Scheme (RMS) and the Clash of Preservationist/ Conservationists Perspectives The Campaign to Stop the Moratorium RMS 124 Save the San Ignacio Lagoon (aka “Mitsubishi Campaign”) 130 The Sakhalin Campaign 140 The Southern Ocean Sanctuary Campaign: Japan and 151 “Operation Migaloo” Current Challenges for Anti-Whaling NGOs 157 Conclusion 159 Chapter 4: The Origins and Early History of the Anti-Sealing Campaign 170 Conclusion 210 Chapter 5: Canada Reopens the Hunt –The Anti-Sealing Campaign (1995-2008) 214 Conclusion 231 Conclusion 235 Bibliography 247 iii Abstract This analysis assesses the impact of transnational campaigns at the state and international levels and charts the development of transnational activism focused on furthering the protection of animal rights (preservation) and species protection (conservation) through an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns. The study explores the responses (specific campaigns) of preservation and conservation by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to policies and practices of corporate and societal actors and international and national institutions. It contributes to the literature that explores the factors and forces that influence transnational action aimed at addressing environmental problems and evaluates under what circumstances transnational actors are effective. The unit of analysis is the specific campaign organized by environmental NGOs. In addition, the origins of the campaigns, their strategies, the factors that influence transnational activism, and the impact that transnational activism has on furthering the goals of the campaigns are examined. The case studies demonstrate that group characteristics, domestic and global factors provide the reasons for transnational activism and influence the shape and scope of transnational activity. The case studies also suggest that the campaigns have at times been effective in raising awareness of the issues, in increasing the public and policymakers’ agenda, as well as in influencing the behavior of targets actors and modifying international regimes. Factors that influenced the effectiveness of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns included the extent to iv which the ideologies of the transnational NGOs were congruent with the dominant cultural and economic interests of its target actors (e.g., consumers, states, corporations, international regimes). Other factors included the use of such political strategies as moral and material leverage, as well as the ability of transnational NGOs to utilize international processes in modifying international regimes. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction. Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational Activism: An Analysis of the Anti-Whaling and Anti-Sealing Campaigns The growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their relationship to domestic and international policymaking and the growing understanding of the need for global problem solving suggest the importance of studying transnational NGOs. NGOs (non-governmental organizations) are groups made up of people who come together who share interests, ideologies, cultural affinities and so forth, outside the formal organizations of the state. NGOs are political organizations that arise and operate outside the formal structures of the state, are devoted to addressing public issues, and include groups such as religious bodies, professional organizations and trade unions. Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs that work across state lines) attempt to influence the way in which states and international organizations such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) address political, socio- economic and environmental issues. While transnational NGOs are not necessarily a new phenomenon, their numbers and the strategies employed have been affected by the new resources available to groups in an age of information and technology. 1 There is an 1 (Wapner, 2002:6). NGOs can serve many functions. They can provide a means of communication and promote issues of common interest. They can fill the vacuum left by ineffective or non-existent government programs or extend the reach of resource poor nations and national governments. They can also serve as an independent voice and promote public participation, through their opposition to governmental programs or by placing pressure on governments or international organizations (DeGarmo, 1995:26). In terms of international politics, NGOs usually refer to groups that form on a voluntary basis with the goal of addressing an international issue, interest or cause. [Weiss and Gordenker (1996:19) cited in Wapner (2002:2)]. NGOs that operate across borders and play a role in influencing international politics are often referred to as INGOs (international NGOs) or transnational NGOs. 2 increase in transnational NGO activity, and the numbers of NGOs are increasing. 2 The issue this raises is the extent to which nongovernmental organizations effectively organize across borders in their effort to address the problems that arise from an increasing interdependent, globalizing world. This analysis attempts to identify the impact of transnational campaigns at the state and international levels. It charts the development of transnational activism focused on furthering the protection of animal rights (preservation) and species protection (conservation) through an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns. It will examine the ideological orientations; the nature of the transnational relationships; the links between international and national institutions, their strategies, and whether these actors are able to influence policy and public perception. In addition, this analysis addresses the problems and challenges transnational actors face in their campaigns. The questions addressed by this analysis are: how does transnational activism help these groups achieve their objectives? What factors explain the reasons for transnational activism? Under what conditions are campaigns effective in influencing target actors and achieving their goals? The purpose of the project is to explore the responses (specific campaigns) of preservation and conservation groups to policies and practices of corporate and societal 2 See CONGO (Coalition of Non Governmental Organizations) web site; the numbers of NGOs registered have increased dramatically in the past twenty years. As DeGarmo (2005) points out, “the incredible growth of NGOs around the world and their increasing involvement in international negotiations has expanded the study of NGOs to include their increasing influence in the international environmental realm (26-27). Ahmad and Potter (2006:211) estimate that there are tens of thousands of NGOs working on environmental issues and that as of August 10, 2006, according to the World Directory of Environmental Organizations Online, there were 517 international environmental NGOs. 3 actors and international and national institutions. This analysis contributes to the literature that explores the factors and forces that influence transnational action aimed at addressing environmental problems and under what circumstances transnational actors are effective. The unit of analysis is the specific campaign organized by environmental NGOs. A major assumption of this analysis is that the increase in environmental transnational activism is a result of NGOs realizing the potential of establishing transnational relationships, and the ability to do so is a result of the resources available in the age of global information (which influences their ability to reach their objectives). 3 An additional assumption is that states still play a role in transnational activism and this impacts the nature of the relationships established across borders. The role the state plays can be positive or negative depending upon the nature of the relationship between groups and their government. Clearly the state and its relationship to civil society actors influence the ability of these groups to operate (within the current process of globalization) and impact their successes/failures. Thus the domestic environment that such groups are operating in is in fact an important starting point for identifying the potential for transnational activism. At the same time, a state’s relationship to the international arena can also influence the direction of NGO activity. 3 See Keck and Sikkink (1998:130-131). The authors argue that since the 1980s, environmental advocacy networks have been taking advantage of the cheaper and faster means of communication, and cheaper air travel to further their cause; “that would have been unthinkable even a decade before.” 4 A final assumption of this analysis is that environmental NGOs contribute to raising domestic and international awareness of environmental issues and influence the way states and the international system respond to environmental issues. In sum, the focus of this analysis is on nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to address environmental issues through specific transnational campaigns. The next section of this analysis presents an overview of the literature addressing transnational activism and puts forth the theoretical framework to be applied to the two case studies. The Significance of Transnational NGOs in Domestic and International Policymaking Early on, scholars such as Nye and Keohane (1971) emphasized the increasing role of transnational organizations in influencing social, economic and political processes. These organizations included economic nongovernmental organizations such as multinational corporations as well as public interest groups. While the observations made by Nye and Keohane hold true, the difficulty lies in the different approaches found in the studies of transnational activity and in assessing its impact on domestic and international issues. This is especially true in the context of studying non-economic transnational activism related to furthering social and political issues. Identifying the nature of transnational activism is a burgeoning topic in such academic areas as international relations, comparative politics and sociology. Scholars attempt to identify the organizational characteristics of transnational activism as well as the impact of the nongovernmental organizational activity at the local, national and 5 international levels. There is extensive scholarship addressing how national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seek to further campaigns internationally, or across borders, in the areas of labor rights, human rights, women’s rights and environmental issues. A review of the literature in the area of transnational activism demonstrates the multifaceted and multidimensional character of this activity. The literature also distinguishes between many terms that are used interchangeably and this creates the possibility for conceptual fuzziness; several scholars are critical of the lack of precision in the terminology employed in the literature. 4 In this study, the literature of interest is specifically in the area of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and can be divided into: (1) The scholarship that identifies the factors that influence nongovernmental organizations to act transnationally. In other words, what are the causal mechanisms for transnational action? How do we explain the impetus or reasons for transnational action? What conditions facilitate transnational activism? (2) The literature that addresses the processes that link transnational actors to one another, to states and to international institutions. What strategies do they employ? (What do they do?) (3) The literature that measures the impact or effectiveness of transnational campaigns politically and civically, domestically and internationally. For example: What are their 4 Mac Sheoin (2007:106). 6 goals? When are they effective? What are the challenges, problems and obstacles that transnational actors face in their campaigns? Explaining Factors in Transnational Activism: Domestic and International Influences Explanations for transnational activism focus on group characteristics, domestic factors, and global forces. Domestic forces include political opportunities available to groups on the domestic level. With respect to global forces, increased economic integration and the retreat of the state in the international arena may provide an impetus for transnational action: increased contact as a result of global forces also facilitates transnational activity. State and international level factors may also be complementary: for example, where the national structure may create obstacles, the existence of international norms and structures may provide an impetus for action. Tarrow (2005) identifies six processes that connect domestic actors to the international arena; in other words, these processes bring NGOs out of their domestic arenas and into transnational space. The processes include: (1) global framing; the mobilization of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts; (2) internalization; a response to foreign or international pressures within domestic politics; (3)diffusion; the transfer of claims or forms of contention from one site to the other; (4) scale shift; the coordination of collective action at a different level than where it began (this suggests the spread of contention beyond its typically localized origins); (5) externalization; the vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors and (6) transnational coalition formation; the horizontal formation of common networks 7 among actors from different countries with similar claims. The first two processes have international potential but occur on purely domestic grounds; the second two processes establish connections between the domestic and the international and finally, the last two processes have the greatest potential to create transnational social movements. Group Characteristics Group characteristics also influence transnational action, and the literature demonstrates that the major issues include: 1) the extent to which a group’s ideology challenges or coincides with the existing or dominant paradigm; 2) the ideological congruity between participating NGOs; and 3) the resources available to groups. Some groups work easily within established government channels and their goals easily lend themselves to working with these institutions. Research indicates that if a group’s ideological orientation does not pose a major challenge to the existing social paradigm, then the group is less likely to face opposition from dominant economic groups. Those NGOs whose notions represent a challenge to the existing dominant paradigm may be more likely to engage in transnational activism because they may need to look beyond their borders for allies that support their principles. 5 The significance of ideological congruity in facilitating transnational action is also examined in the literature. Rohschneider and Dalton (2002) observe that sufficient consideration must be given to the inequalities of action and ideology that exist within transnational networks and the implication of these inequalities: 5 Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002:516). 8 This is not a network of equals, with identical norms and goals as often is implied by the global civil society literature. The resource flows follow the same North/South patterns of many other first/third world interactions. Moreover, the resource suppliers (Western ENGOs) often have distinct ideological and political goals that are not always shared by the NGOs in the developing world. Environmental groups from OECD nations are more likely than groups from developing nations to espouse a challenging ecologist orientation. 6 Thus differences between groups can impact the ability of groups to effectively organize in a given campaign if ideological congruity does not exist between nongovernmental actors. 7 However, Fox (2002, 2005) argues that shared targets (not necessarily shared ideologies) are necessary for transnational actors to work together. An additional factor presented in the literature includes the resources available to groups which function as an impetus for and facilitate action. Economic and social resources are critical to the emergence and strength of transnational action. 8 Groups that have more resources and access to cutting edge technologies are better equipped to participate transnationally. Internal Characteristics of the State and Domestic Forces Some studies question the validity of placing too much emphasis on the international context in explaining transnational activism. Many emphasize the idea that transnational activity is the extension of domestic politics to another arena, and that 6 Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002:530). 7 Keck and Sikkink (1998); Fox (2000,2002); Roschneider and Dalton (2002); Oneill (2004). 8 (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Fox 2000, Roschneider and Dalton, 2002; Tarrow 2005; Smith and Wiest 2007). 9 international action is not a substitute for domestic action but rather a continuation of the domestic movement activity to another level. 9 For example, Tarrow (2005) argues that students of domestic movements long ago determined that transnational collective action cannot be traced directly to grievances or social cleavages, even vast ones like those connected to globalization. According to Tarrow (2005), acting collectively requires activists to marshal resources, become aware of and seize opportunities, frame their demands in ways that enable them to join with others, and identify common targets. 10 He goes on to suggest that if a barrier exists in domestic politics then these barriers are even greater at the international level; globalization, he concludes, “is not sufficient to explain when people will engage in contentious collective action and when they will not.” 11 Instead, Tarrow asserts that domestic politics is the framework in which most people live and where the changes in transnational activism will ultimately be felt and that is the starting point in the analysis for understanding the impetus and nature of transnational activity. Thus national level processes and ideologies will dominate much of the discourse and strategic thinking of activists, who continue to organize around domestically defined goals. 12 9 See Roschneider and Dalton (2005); Tarrow (2005); Smith and Wiest (2007). 10 Tarrow, (2005:6). 11 Ibid. 12 Smith and Wiest (2005:622). 10 Thus scholars argue that the domestic arena is the starting point for identifying the specific characteristics of transnational activism. 13 For example, Fox (2002) observes that in the case of bi-national relations that “most Mexico-U.S. civil society relationships involve networking and occasional bi-national coalition campaigns between social and civic organizations that remain fundamentally local and national in orientation.” 14 Research that emphasizes the domestic arena also indicates that the significance of the political process at the national level should not be overlooked; the state can not only shape the strength of the movement within borders but also influence movements that establish transnational linkages. 15 The focus on domestic forces emphasizes the idea that a state’s internal characteristics present political opportunities available to groups and facilitates transnational participation. 16 The literature suggests that it is the nature of political opportunities available to groups/individuals that create the potential for transforming mobilization into action. 17 If activists believe that transnational networking will further 13 Wapner (2002), Tarrow (2005), Eschle, Keck and Sikkink (1998), Fox (2000, 2002). 14 Fox (2002:343). Fox also points out that the “impact of cross-border ties has often been overestimated and that the involvement of international actors in the national arena, per se, does not demonstrate that they therefore significantly influence that arena. For example, there is a widespread tendency to assume that the international concern of the Zapatista rebellion translated into significant international civil society impact on the course of events in Chiapas. An alternative hypothesis is quite plausible, however. International civil society actors may have been, in practice, marginal to what has been a primarily nationally determined political process.” (343). 15 Wapner 1996, 2000); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Fox (2000, 2002), Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002); Tarrow (2005) Smith and Wiest (2007). 16 Smith and Weist, (2007). 17 Keck and Sikkink (1998); Tarrow (2005); Heijden (2006). 11 their missions and campaigns, there exists the potential for the creation of networks. 18 Specifically, networks are the cross-border relationships that exist between NGOs, the media, sympathetic government officials (on the international and national levels) and charitable foundations that are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services.” 19 In regards to the state’s internal characteristics, some studies indicate that the extent to which the political system is “open” or “closed” to domestic actors explains the impetus for action in its corresponding networks. Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest that oftentimes transnational cooperation between developed and developing nations result from groups in developing nations being blocked by domestic institutions (states) and thus they turn to transnational networks to pursue their policy goals and further their political resources with the help of external allies. This is what the authors refer to as the “boomerang” hypothesis: Transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge around those issues where channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the ‘boomerang’ pattern of influence characteristic of these networks… Where channels of participation are blocked the international arena may be the only means that domestic activist have to gain attention to their issues. Boomerang strategies are most common in campaigns where the target is a state’s domestic policies or behavior; where a campaign seeks broad procedural change involving dispersed actors, strategies are more diffuse. 20 18 Keck and Sikkink (1998). 19 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999:18). 20 Keck and Sikkink, (1998:12). 12 Thus participation in the international arena often occurs after domestic political and judicial arenas fail to address their claims, “the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur; domestic NGOs bypass their state directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from the outside.” 21 According to Keck and Sikkink (1998) international allies can further amplify the demands made by domestic actors. Smith and Wiest (2005) also note that state repression influences participation in transnational associations since they can serve to counter the intentions of repressive states. 22 Thus the relationship between the state and civil society can either diminish or enhance the ability for local NGOs to engage in cross- border networking. An additional factor includes the nature of the national voluntary sector; “where there are opportunities for citizens to freely engage in a variety of voluntary associations, there is a greater propensity towards involvement in diverse social movement organizations.” 23 Roschneider and Dalton (2005) question how often the “boomerang” model actually occurs in the context of transnational action. In their study, they test Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang” hypothesis: The results tend to undercut the claimed boomerang effect…some green groups in less democratic nationals certainly turn to international allies when they are blocked by domestic political forces; but when other groups confront this same 21 Ibid. 22 Smith and Wiest (2005:625). 23 Smith and Wiest (2005:626). 13 situation they apparently renew their efforts to deal with these challenges within the national systems. 24 The authors point out that they have no doubt that the boomerang pattern might occur in some instances but the pattern does not generally explain the patterns of international environmental action. They conclude that democratic conditions and participation in international agreements are generally unrelated to international action. Groups that are most active in dealing with national governments through conventional channels are also more likely to engage in each form of international activity, and that a primary explanation of international activism is to a considerable degree based on the same characteristics that predict domestic activism by groups. Interestingly, some scholars argue that if the political system is extremely receptive to domestic actors/NGOs, this can explain the lack of networking among groups. This scenario is apparent in the political system shared by Scandinavian countries, which tend to co-opt new social movements reflecting a “state-friendly” society where NGOs can cooperate closely with the state without losing their credibility, and where citizens have high levels of trust in government institutions. Bortne and Grendstad’s (2001) study stresses that the “state-friendliness” of Norwegian society makes it difficult for a movement or an organisation to grow. Norwegian climate change activism has been shaped by a state accepting the legitimacy of the movement and its activities which has limited the growth of the movement. 24 Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002:528). 14 Other studies suggest that in addition to the degree of openness of the political system the nature of the issue can influence participation. Specifically, Lewis (2002) indicates that states having a higher probability of being selected for conservation projects were those that were both politically open and had a higher level of NGO activity. She hypothesized that this might not be the case for issues related to human rights, where more closed repressive systems would attract human rights activism. Tarrow stresses the idea that the domestic arena is where the “new transnational activism” takes place; that is, activism in the context of internationalism which presents new opportunities. He notes, Not all activism that is relevant to transnational politics takes place in the international arena. Relevant processes are found within domestic politics, in transitions from the domestic to the international level, and between states and within and around international institutions… internationalism is the institutional and informational framework within which transnational activism—some of it aimed at globalization but much of it is independent of that process—takes shape. In the triangular relations among states, non-state actors and international organizations, regimes and institutions, we find resistance to globalization and activism of claimants who have little or nothing to do with globalization. Internationalism provides a framework within which transnational activists respond to threats and seize opportunities that empower their activism. 25 In explaining transnational action, new transnational activism is as multifaceted as the internationalism within which it has emerged. “Although globalization and global neoliberalism are frames around which many activists mobilize, the protests and organizations are not the product of a global imaginary but of domestically rooted 25 Ibid. (10, 19). 15 activists.” 26 These activists make claims that are both domestic and international in nature. Scholars are increasingly discovering that national political and regulatory styles remain very resistant to external pressures for change that derive from international agreements. Smith and Wiest (2007) argue that the internal characteristics of the state not only shape transnational action but also influence the implementation of international policy. Clearly, just because an international agreement has been secured does not ensure that fundamental changes in national styles of regulation and policy making will result. For example, recent controversies over the role of the WTO—particularly over how its policies relate to trade in hormone-treated meat and genetically modified foods- indicate that international negotiators are discovering the limits of how much global negotiations can override national differences in regulatory cultures and practices. From this perspective, it is logical to assume that activists lobby governments domestically and at international conferences and other forums to further their interests. NGOs understand the importance of the state in reaching their objectives; “NGOs thus focus their energies on enlisting states in their campaigns.” 27 26 Tarrow (2005:207). 27 Wapner (2002:7). 16 The International Context Smith and Wiest (2005) observe that the global political context both expands and complicates the strategic choices available to those advocating political and social change. The impetus for transnational action is presented as a result of global processes and some scholars argue that transnational activity suggests new forms of resistance. 28 For example, the reinforcement of trade liberalization institutions as governing bodies and the growing inability of nation-states to exercise their power over domestic, social and environmental legislation have been important in explaining social action. 29 As a result of increased economic integration, the legalization and enforcement of rules of trade agreements by international organizations (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] or the European Union [EU]) impact domestic politics and the state’s ability to react to growing socio-economic and environmental problems that are the result of globalization. 30 Many individuals, groups and nations construe the influence of such international institutions as the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a significant threat to both state sovereignty 28 Buttel and Gould (2005) argue that one of the most distinctive aspects of late-twentieth century is the emergence of a global-scale social movement, the anti-globalization movement. 29 See Chase-Dunn (2006). 30 Florini (2006). 17 and the general welfare of the individuals affected by such agreements. 31 As Lipschutz, (1996) suggests, social and organizational externalities are generated by globalization and under regulated market activities and as a result, states are shedding their responsibilities to citizens. Thus as a result of global processes/forces, the state is often construed as non- responsive to their global socioeconomic and environmental concerns. It is the inability of the state to respond to socio-economic concerns in the face of globalization that explains the impetus for transnational action. Globalization is also presented as the force that facilitates action through the creation of what is referred to as “global social spaces,” 32 which create opportunities for action. 33 Several studies demonstrate the idea that transnational activism is facilitated by a state’s ties to the international system. Smith and Weist (2005, 2007) note that while ties to the global economy do not necessarily impact participation; a country’s links to international institutions enhance the opportunities for transnational action. 34 31 Scholars who emphasize this approach argue that initially, however, social movements responding to global forces kept a primarily national focus, and their internationalist dimensions have not been readily obvious This is because much of their focus has been on taking back the national identity and state sovereignty affected by such regional trade agreements as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See Andre C. Drainville.2004. “Social Movements in the Americas: Regionalism from Below?” in Mace and Belanger, et. al. The Americas in Transition. 32 See Sassen (2001) Axford (2001). 33 Batliwala and Brown (2006:4). See also Zhouri (2007) . The author explains how the Amazon became a “transnational space” in recent history. He suggests that democratization of Brazilian society, and the increase in social urban and rural movements, the development of new international relations following the end of the cold war which is reflected in the articulation of environmentalism of on a global scale, and the “internationalization” (framing) of environmental issues. The latter, is a result of the policies of the first global actors involved with the Amazon (the IMF, World Bank, and MNCs), which helped form international public opinion and an increasing awareness of the environmental desecration of the region in the late 1980s. 34 Smith and Weist, ( 2007, 2005); Tarrow, (2005); Vand der Hedijden, (2006). 18 This type of NGO participation is reflective of what Van der Heijden (2006) identifies as the “international political opportunity structure” in explaining factors that create opportunities for transnational action arguing that due to the processes of globalization, the level of political decision making to some degree has moved away from the national to the international level. Building on the literature that addresses domestic political opportunities (like domestic politics, international political opportunities are influenced by whether the international system is open or closed), the author attempts to apply such principles to the international arena suggesting that the international political opportunity structure reflects a composite of a number of international governmental organizations like the UN, the EU , the World Bank and the IMF, establishing a number of formal treaties, international regimes and systems of global governance and that the international opportunity structure may be different for different transnational movements. For example, the WTO is of major importance to the environmental movements because of environmental trade restrictions, however, it might be less important for movements such as the human and gay rights movements. 35 Another example of how an increasingly interconnected world facilitates action is in the development of transportation, communication and information technology. 36 Internet technology plays a critical role in facilitating transnational action in both exchanging information and organizing action which increases the reach of participation. 35 Van der Heijden (2006:32). 36 Keck and Sikkink (1998). 19 For example, the Horizons Network uses the internet to promote cases of sustainable practices which can then be implemented on a local level. Additionally, conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. For example, the World Social Forum (a transnational forum) creates an international environment for networking among transnational NGOs. This presents the possibilities for greater participation at the regional and local levels. Thus conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. 37 Goals and Strategies of Transnational NGOs The Goals of NGOs The goals of transnational NGOs include: 1) issue creation and agenda setting (e.g., media coverage of issue, consideration of issue by domestic and/or international institutions); 2) changing norms (changing the way people think about the such issues about the environment, human rights, women’s rights; serving a public education function) 38 ; (3) modifying behavior of specific target actors such as states or corporations (e.g., whether a corporation ceases certain actions or performs certain functions as a 37 Keck and Sikkink (1998:) 38 The primary difference between a norm and law is the consequence of violating them: if you break a law you risk criminal or civil punishment; if you break a norm you risk social sanctions, such as being shunned or ostracized (Sikkink, 2002). 20 result of transnational NGO campaigns) 39 ; 4) changing domestic or international regime (e.g., new laws, treaties, etc.). 40 While issue creation, agenda setting and changing cultural norms are strategic goals in that they can be steps in achievement of basic goals, modifying the behavior of states or changing international or domestic law are long term goals for transnational actors. In regards to issue creation and agenda setting, transnational NGOs draw attention to all kinds of transnational issues (women’s rights, indigenous rights, human rights, environmental threats, etc). 41 This task includes interpreting scientific data and drawing attention to existing and potential problems/threats--NGOs act as conduits for ideas and political pressures. Issue creation places domestic and international pressure on states to respond. 42 NGOs lobby and pressure governments to act on specific issues. In a sense they can be viewed as pressure groups. By influencing state behavior through the establishment of cultural norms transnational action can at times negatively impact certain groups within society. Sikkink (2002) demonstrates that transnational actors mobilize on the behalf of norms and of enforcement of certain measures such as women’s rights, but she argues that there are 39 The impact of transnational NGOs can be both domestic and international in nature--influencing both domestic and international law. Clearly the goals of NGOs include changing the behavior of “target actors” in an effort to influence states to respond to the demands of their campaigns. Transnational networks have also been successful in changing the behavior of multilateral lending organizations such as the World Bank, in an effort to make development projects less successful. 40 Wapner (1996). 41 See Raustiala (1997); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Fox (2000, 2002), Florini (2000), DeGarmo (2001); Jeong (2001); Wapner (1996, 2002); Tarrow (2005); Ahmad and Potter (2006). 42 Wapner (2002:7). 21 limits to what changes transnational actors can accomplish; not all issues lend themselves equally or easily to the social construction of new rules; “powerful states block the construction of new legal rules contrary to their perceived interests.” 43 In a similar vein, a theme presented in the literature includes the debate surrounding the value of producing international law and treaties that appear to have no teeth and whether transnational actors influence the development of international law. Specifically Price (2003) asks, “what is the point, for example, of human rights treaties that have little or no provision for enforcement and that clearly have not eliminated human rights violations in regimes around the world?” 44 A counter argument found in the literature includes the idea that treaties create the foundation for new norms over time that may become stronger; the argument against them is that they encourage an understanding among states that international law does not have to be taken seriously. The effect of the tactic of initially creating weak framework treaties to serve as the basis for more stringent norms is difficult to measure, however the position that such treaties do not have any impact is unwarranted. Several case studies reflect the idea that transnational actors play a role in influencing the creation of weak international norms as well as in building upon them. 45 Clark (2001) examines Amnesty international’s efforts to achieve greater political and legal objectives by building on smaller goals such as UN resolutions. These resolutions provided openings for more specific norms based on 43 Sikkink (2002:39). 44 Price (2003:584). 45 Keck and Sikkink (1998); Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002); Wapner (2002); Price (2003). 22 similar principles. 46 Price (2003) suggests that while such accounts of norm building are suggestive, it cannot be known unless scholars systematically compare successes with failures along these dimensions. 47 NGOs frequently play direct and indirect roles in the monitoring and verification of regimes, by investigating violations and enforcing penalties? Data indicate that the compliance with international environmental agreements is inconsistent. States often fail to report relevant activity or live up to agreed-upon activity. NGOs can not only monitor the behavior of states participation in international regimes, they also monitor states during negotiations. 48 Strategies There are a variety of strategies that nongovernmental actors employ to carry out their goals. Strategies can target the state or international levels; public opinion, public institutions or the opinions of leaders. The literature suggests that transnational NGOs (and their corresponding networks/coalitions, etc) use persuasion, socialization and pressure to achieve their goals. Oftentimes, the media is used as an important weapon in a campaign. According to Wapner (1996, 2002) environmental NGOs influence the way the international system addresses transnational issues through specific strategies that include lobbying states, manipulating economic structures, and influencing the 46 See also Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999); Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002). 47 Price (2003:586). 48 Ibid. 23 socialization process by targeting social proprieties in their campaigns to address specific concerns. Using a somewhat different framework, Keck and Sikkink (1998) define the strategies (or the types of politics they employ to further their goals) as: (1) information politics (strategies that inform or explain specific issues to the public or policymakers); (2) symbolic politics (strategies that create visual images and references relating to the specific issue); (3) leverage politics (strategies that pressure policymakers or corporations through such tactics as boycotts); and (4) accountability politics (strategies that make corporations or governments accountable for their actions, a type of “shaming and blaming”). 49 Through the various strategies transnational actors seek to change not just the interests, identities and practices of actors but also the environments within which those actors operate. 50 Within these differing strategies lies the idea that through the construction of frames NGOs, networks and coalitions are able to bring issues to the public’s agenda in innovative ways by seeking “hospitable venues”. 51 Framing refers to the way social movement actors present their arguments in a manner that may resonate with those outside the movement. Frames are …’schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences with their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. 52 49 Keck and Sikkink (1998:16). 50 Price (2003:583). 51 Oneill (2004). 52 Snow (1986:464). 24 The effectiveness of NGO campaigns may be affected by issue characteristics and actor characteristics. 53 Issue characteristics include the ability of issues put forth for advocacy to arouse strong feelings, involve ideas about right and wrong and allow activists to recruit volunteers. Thus how issues are framed in campaigns can influence its effectiveness. Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggests that issues leading to effective campaigns involve vulnerable individuals that have been wrongfully harmed (and there exists a clear causal chain assigning responsibility); or when issues involve legal equality of opportunity. Issues that cross over into other issues also influence the likelihood of success. According to Tarrow (2005) if activists want their message to resonate with the target actors they must relate their campaigns to the “common sense” of their target publics; “activists are both consumers of existing cultural materials and producers of new ones.” 54 Both information politics and symbolic politics are employed in the construction of frames. Information politics involves the ability to quickly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the greatest influence. Transnational actors and their campaigns serve as an alternate source of information—they provide information that otherwise might not be available, from sources that might not otherwise 53 Keck and Sikkink (1998), Wapner (2002). 54 Tarrow (2005:61). 25 be heard, and they make this information understandable and useful to activists and the public who may be geographically and /or socially distant. 55 The nature of the information used by activists can include scientific data and testimonies (personal stories, etc.), and the information is simplified so it is easily digestible and understandable to the public. Additionally, the non-state actors will often frame issues simply, in terms of right and wrong. They strive to uncover and investigate problems; they will alert the press and policymakers. To get attention they must be timely and dramatic; “sometimes these multiple goals of information politics conflict, but both credibility and drama seem to be essential components of a strategy aimed at persuading publics and policymakers to change their minds.” 56 Using information to frame issues also involves the use of language by “renaming issues” which allows the groups to draw attention to their concerns. Keck and Sikkink (1998) also point out that the lack of certainty and credible data is seen as the most frequently cited dimension of environmental issues. To resolve this problem, NGOs have reframed the issues in their campaigns, drawing attention to populations (all species) that are adversely affected by the issue. 57 This allows campaigns to have greater impact; since networks that are able to identify victims as being physically harmed allows advocates to 55 Keck and Sikkink (1998:16-18). 56 Keck and Sikkink (1998:19). 57 The global warming issue serves as a case in point. Although there is conflicting data on the degree to which global warming is occurring, environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) have framed the issue in the context of how it impacts species (such as polar bears) and humans (indigenous populations affected by deforestation). By doing so, they have called for action independent of the scientific data. Keck and Sikkink (1998:20). 26 portray the issue in terms of right and wrong: the claim about harm is a distinctive feature of advocacy networks. Specifically, issues that most easily lend themselves to such portrayals involve displacement of traditional peoples or destruction of their livelihoods, making for powerful appeals, and not surprisingly some of the best-known transnational networks have arisen to oppose deforestation and /or large dams and their impact on indigenous populations. 58 The ability of NGOs and their corresponding alliances to use testimonial information along with technical and statistical information furthers their campaigns and mobilizes support. This two-level approach to information (linking testimony with data) is being used more and more in international campaigns. 59 According to Keck and Sikkink (1998) information is the basis for network formation, since NGOs depend on their access to information to help make them legitimate actors; “contact with like- minded groups at home and abroad provides access to information necessary to their work, broadens their legitimacy, and helps to mobilize information around particular policy targets.” 60 Additionally, creating links with local groups allows actors to send and monitor information all over the world. Local groups also depend on international contacts to help them disseminate information and aid them in their work. 58 Ibid. (132-133). Keck and Sikkink (1998:141) also observe that what brought even more attention to this international campaign was the murder of Chico Mendes; who was killed by mercenaries hired by irate landowner. This development had enormous symbolic impact, even making the front page of The New York Times. At this point in the campaign, the issue was framed in the context of deforestation in the Amazon as including “a complex set of relationships in which the roles of the rubber tapper, cattle rancher and the justice system, Brazilian government programs, multilateral development banks and North American and European taxpayers, all became apparent.” 59 Keck and Sikkink (1998:20). 60 Keck and Sikkink (1998:22). See also Wapner (1996, 2005). 27 Finally, the media plays an essential role in the dissemination of information. The press is critical for nongovernmental actors to try to reach a broader audience. Groups attempt to creatively package information in a timely and dramatic fashion, in order to receive widespread media attention to a specific issue. 61 The second strategy discussed in the literature is symbolic politics. Symbolic politics suggests the ability to frame issues in the context of powerful symbolic events, “symbolic interpretation is part of the process of persuasion by which networks create awareness and expand their constituencies.” 62 Symbolic politics serves to stir the emotions of a given population and is often used in the context of tapping into ones feelings about abuse, injustice, solidarity, patriotism, etc. An example of symbolic politics includes Al Gore’s receipt of both an Oscar and the Nobel Peace Prize for his work/documentary, An Inconvenient Truth (2005). These two symbolic events have furthered public awareness of the issue of global warming as a result widespread media attention. Various environmental groups have used these developments to influence public opinion and target actors in regards to keeping the issue of global warming on the public and policymaker’s agenda. The third strategy is leverage politics. Leverage politics reflect the idea that in order to bring about effective policy change (political effectiveness) transnational actors need to use pressure to persuade more powerful actors such as governments, international 61 Keck and Sikkink (1998); Wapner (2002); Tarrow (2005). 62 Keck and Sikkink (1998:22). See also Wapner (1996, 2002); Price (2003); Epstein (2005). 28 financial institutions or transnational corporations (target actors). 63 The leverage can be either material (money) or moral (mobilization of shame), both of which attempt to leverage more powerful actors to initiate policy change. As Price (2003) notes, “activists themselves can wield substantial financial power through such tactics as boycotts”. 64 Thus leverage politics can impact the behavior of states or corporations (or both) by changing the behavior of consumers through material leverage. Target group or states must be vulnerable to the different strategies for the campaigns to be effective. Specifically, “vulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail.” Countries that are most vulnerable to transnational pressure are those that aspire to belong to a “normative community of nations.” Moral leverage is useful where states are actively trying to raise their status in the international system. 65 Finally, when a government or international institution takes a position on an issue and publicly commits itself to that issue, transnational actors can use those positions and their command of information to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This strategy is what is referred to as accountability politics. Specifically, the legal system or litigation is one way in which accountability politics is practiced. Keck and Sikkink (1998) note that this is somewhat limited in that such legal mechanisms do not exist is every country and it varies even among democracies. In the United States the 63 Keck and Sikkink (1998:23). 64 Price (2003:582). 65 Keck and Sikkink (29). See also Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) and Tarrow (2005). 29 centrality of the courts “creates a venue for the representation of diffuse interest that is not available in most European democracies. It also explains the large number of U.S. advocacy organizations that specialize in litigation.” 66 Wapner (1996) defines “the politics of accountability” in a somewhat different context than Keck and Sikkink (1998). He defines accountability politics as a strategy employed to change public perception of an issue and to expose the gap between the rhetoric and the practices of governments, corporations and ordinary citizens and to demand explanations for it. The intention of accountability politics is to point out hypocrisy and to use this to goad people’s consciences and thus joggle their conceptions of everyday circumstances. Governments, corporations and individuals make promises, enter into agreements and tout viewpoints that support fair business practices and advocate protection (e.g. fair wages, safety of workers). These are codified in laws, advertisements, international accords, and so forth. 67 The politics of accountability pushes people, governments and corporations to live up to their pronouncements. In an effort to guide corporations toward more sound and equitable practices NGOs will employ a strategy of corporate accountability which consists of establishing voluntary codes of conduct that corporations agree to abide by. In the past years, companies such as Levi-Strauss, Reebok, J.C. Penney and Wal-Mart have agreed to eliminate prison and child labor in their operations throughout the world. 66 Keck and Sikkink (25). 67 Wapner (1996:55). Wapner discusses “accountability politics” in the context of it representing a strategy which engages the economic dimension world collective life. 30 The Effectiveness of Transnational Activism As indicated above, studies of transnational activism and its impact on domestic and international policy yields somewhat mixed results in explaining the efficacy of groups achieving their goals through transnational action. The transnational interaction of nongovernmental organizations presents the possibility of what some scholars argue is a “world civic politics” in that NGOs affect the behavior of larger collectivities throughout the world, by manipulating governing structures of global civil society. As defined by Wapner (1996), transnational environmental groups work globally, locally and at the state level, to “change widespread behavior through enlisting mechanisms within global civil society rather than the governing instrumentalities of states. In this manner they engage in world civic politics.” 68 Others argue that this view is too simplistic and is an overgeneralization. 69 This section of the literature review discusses the effectiveness of transnational campaigns and identifies the problems and challenges transnational actors face in their campaigns. Regardless of the strategy, the literature suggests that transnational activism tends to have an uneven influence on domestic and international policy. Oftentimes the nature of the issue and how the issue is framed dictates the level of effectiveness of a campaign. 68 Wapner (1996:40). 69 Keck and Sikkink (1998); Roschneider and Dalton (2002); Smith and Wiest (2005); Tarrow (2005). 31 The Impact of Transnational Activism The effectiveness of a campaign depends on numerous factors. An effective campaign may be evaluated in two ways: (1) in the ability of nongovernmental organizations to effectively organize across state lines (this includes bridging the gaps between groups from developed and developing countries); and (2) the ability of the campaigns to influence target actors as well as domestic and international policy. In regard to the first dimension, the factors that facilitate transnational activism also influence its effectiveness. Fox (2002) notes that successful collaboration among broad- based organizations that have kept partnerships are those that “think locally to act bi- nationally”. The linkages that transnational and domestic actors create make possible the search for common ground, or what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as the “common advocacy position”; reflecting the notion that NGOs in many parts of the world can agree upon and collaborate around specific issues. Differences between developed countries and less developed countries can have an impact on the effectiveness of transnational campaigns. Conflicting ideologies and goals can create political tensions between groups in different countries and affect the patterns of successful international cooperation. One critique is that Western environmental NGOs are elitist and somewhat removed from the realities of the developing world. As a result, Oneill (2004) suggests that Western NGOs are now “reframing” environmental issue in terms of global justice, sustainability and human rights. 32 Fox (2000, 2002) also identifies how differing viewpoints reflected in the bi- national campaigns in regards to Mexican-U.S. relations has yielded mixed results; “binational networking and advocacy have been marked by very significant differences within as well as between national movements.” 70 The first difference is reflected in how each respective movement views the solutions/problems. For example, non-state actors in Mexico see the solution to their environmental issues in terms of economic development, whereas groups in the U.S. see the problems of environmental degradation as a result of economic development. In addressing the second dimension of effectiveness (i.e., ability of campaigns to influence policy) Jonathan Fox (2000, 2002) suggests that three main questions must be answered in assessing the impact of transnational activism: (1) Was there some clear change that might be attributed to nongovernmental actors? (2) How important are the actors in explaining the change? (3) Within the broader set of civil society actors, how important were transnational actors? Fox identifies transnational advocacy as having had a significant impact on official policy discourse in Mexico. Other scholars argue that even issue characteristics that arouse strong feelings are not always effective in influencing change. Moral discourses associated with issue characteristics put forth in a campaign can challenge the validity of existing norms. 71 There are several examples of groups that have been wrongfully harmed and yet transnational campaigns have not been able to influence policy to address these 70 Fox (2002:324). 71 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999:13). 33 concerns. 72 Some examples of unsuccessful campaigns include human rights campaigns, specifically those addressing genital mutilation, women’s rights campaigns and campaigns addressing the rights of homosexuals. Tarrow (2005) notes that not all transnational actors are free to frame their campaigns as they wish, since they compete at a structural disadvantage with ruling elites and the media. 73 Thus a significant challenge for transnational actors is in how the issue is framed and the ability of groups to effectively propose frames that are new and challenging but still resonate with existing cultural understanding. The ability to propose frames that fit in with existing cultural understandings involves what Tarrow (2005) refers to as a “delicate balancing act”. He notes that it is particularly problematic where activist attempt to import symbols and forms of action from abroad that don’t mesh with their target audience. 74 As the above suggests, a significant obstacle faced by transnational actors is whether their campaign challenges a cultural tradition or practice of the “target groups” or the economic livelihoods of individuals are impacted as a result of the campaigns. For example, several campaigns addressing human rights issues and women’s issues have not been successful due to cultural and ideological factors that have affected the ability of “target groups” to respond to the demands of the campaigns. Thompson (1999) points out that a major problem of campaigns for women’s rights in many parts of the world is that the efforts by transnational actors are routinely depicted as tools of Western imperialism. 72 Poletta (1999). 73 Tarrow (2005:62). 74 Tarrow (2005:61). 34 If the media represent the views of the target groups or states this can also impede the effectiveness of the campaigns. 75 Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework will attempt to address the questions posed in this study: What factors explain transnational activism in campaigns specific to whaling and sealing? How does transnationalism enable groups to further their objectives? What factors influence the effectiveness of transnational campaign? This framework draws from the three elements explaining the nature of transnational activism and its impact: group characteristics, domestic factors (internal forces and characteristics of the state), and globalization. Domestic and international forces interact in determining the ability of transnational actors to bring about change. The extent to which these factors contribute to the effectiveness of the campaigns will be examined in addition to the problems and challenges transnational actors face which influence outcomes/and or the effectiveness of the campaigns. Factors in Transnational Activism Group Characteristics The campaigns examined in this analysis generally involve several different advocacy groups. With respect to group characteristics, and its impact on transnational action, the major issues include: (1) whether or not (or the extent to which) the ideology 75 Tarrow (2005: 61-63). 35 of the group or groups and the corresponding campaign challenge the existing or dominant paradigm or culture within a respective state or nation; (2) the resources available to the groups; and (3) the specific ideology of the participating groups. Indeed transnational action is facilitated by the nature of the relationship between NGOs and the ability to achieve a “common ground”, or “common advocacy position”; reflecting the notion that domestic and transnational NGOs in many parts of the world can agree upon and collaborate around specific issues. 76 Domestic Factors The differences in domestic contexts in which transnational actors participate also influence the direction and nature of transnational activity. The domestic context can enable or constrain transnational activity. 77 Domestic factors include the nature of the political opportunity structure (whether the political system is open or closed) and the nature of the issue addressed. 78 Under the political opportunity structure, there exist three possibilities: (1) the system is open and responsive; (2) the system is closed and unresponsive; or (3) the system is open but unresponsive. If the system is open, it provides channels facilitating both domestic and international activity. But if it is open and responsive, transnational activism may be less necessary. If it is closed, or open but unresponsive, this provides the potential incentive for transnational activism (boomerang 76 Keck and Sikkink, (1998); Roschneider and Dalton, (2002). 77 Keck and Sikkink, (1998); Sikkink, (2002); Krasner, (2002); Smith and Weist, (2005, 2007); Tarrow (2005); Krasner, (2002). 78 Risse-Kappan, (1995); Keck and Sikkink, (1998); Tarrow, (2005); Roschneider and Dalton, (2002), 36 effect) however an unresponsive state does not guarantee that transnational activism will take place. The more centralized the political system the fewer access points NGOs have in permeating the target state. 79 With respect to the nature of the issue, or issue characteristics, what is relevant is the extent to which the issue challenges the state or specific interests in society. For example, a state (or societal elites) might be more willing to cooperate with a campaign for forest conservation than one focused on the human rights, if the state has a history of repression. Additionally, the nature of issue (whether the issue or problem “spills over” into other countries) also may help to explain transnational activism or even make it necessary. The extent to which the issue is tied up with cultural practices or economic interests influence the nature of transnational activism, since the cultural and economic positions of different countries/groups impacted by a specific campaign can play a significant role in influencing outcomes. Globalization/Global Forces Intergovernmental organizations, regimes, etc. constitute part of the global framework within which various kinds of transnational activity takes place. The more highly institutionalized the international environment of the issue area, the more likely transnational actors are to overcome hurdles posed by state-dominated domestic 79 Krasner, (2002); Smith and Weist, (2005, 2007). 37 structures. 80 Transnational activism is facilitated by the increasing flows of information and communication that are a result of global processes. 81 The existence of international organizations and regimes provide many transnational actors with “international political opportunities” for participation and opportunities for interaction with target actors. 82 Globalization creates opportunities by creating global social spaces including international regimes and the expansion of technological resources. The processes of internationalism that connect states to the global economy provide groups with opportunities for participation through the emergence of “social spaces” (conferences, technologies, international regimes) that strengthen the ability of non-governmental actors to act transnationally. The extent to which the state is integrated into the international arena may also influence the nature of transnational activity and the outcome of campaigns. 83 Goals Specifically, transnational advocacy groups – as advocacy groups in general – aim to accomplish goals that are both strategic and general. Goals vary, but may include one or more of the following strategic goals: issue creation (i.e., raising consciousness about a given issue), and agenda setting (i.e., ensuring that a given issue is taken up by 80 (Risse-Kappan (1995); Smith and Weist, (2007). 81 Wapner (1996), Keck and Sikkik, (1998). 82 Van der Heijden, (2006); Keck and Sikkink, (1998); Raustalia, (1997), Risse-Kappan, (1999), Tarrow (2005). 83 Smith and Weist, (2007). 38 domestic and/or international policy makers). Strategic goals such as issue creation, agenda setting and influencing norms and customs (changing the way target actors think and mobilizing them to action) can be viewed as a means to advance the overall general goal. General goals include influencing the behavior of states, affecting domestic or international policy, and modifying existing regimes. This includes the ability to modify the norms and behavior of target actors whether these actors are specific populations, corporations, governments, international institutions, or international regimes, or, as is often the case, some combination of these. 84 The specific outcomes are reflected in the passage of legislation, the successful litigation of cases, or changes in the behavior of states or other target actors. Effectiveness of Campaigns (Factors that can facilitate/impede effectiveness) Effectiveness can be seen in terms of the ability of NGOs to organize across state lines and the ability of transnational actors to influence target actors and domestic and international policy. A measure of effectiveness in organizing across state lines is reflected in the ability to establish a common advocacy position to overcome differences between groups in different countries. The characteristics of advocacy group(s), particularly to the extent that these are from different countries and whether or not there exists basic agreement/ differences with respect to goals (e.g., preservationist, conservationist, etc.) and strategies (direct action, etc.) contribute to the ability to build a “common advocacy position”. Evaluating whether or not a campaign is effective is also 84 Wapner, (1996, 2002); Keck and Sikkink, (1998); Risse-Kappan (1999). 39 dependent upon the achievement of strategic and basic goals that transnational actors sought to achieve/accomplish through the campaign. The effectiveness of a campaign is influenced by both issue characteristics and actor characteristics and by those factors that facilitate action (globalization, domestic context, group characteristics, etc.). Effectiveness can be measured in terms of degrees. For example, on the simplest level, the ability to garner public attention and discourse on an issue, or the ability to mobilize public support are all indicators of effectiveness. Influencing cultural norms (changing the way people think), or establishing international norms through international agreements are also an indicators of an effective campaign. When campaigns influence the behavior of states, or modify existing regimes these factors indicate that the campaigns have attained a greater degree of effectiveness. The extent to which the changes (or successes) that occurred domestically or internationally are a result of the efforts of transnational actors and their corresponding campaigns will be examined. Types of Strategies The various strategies used by transnational actors in their campaigns can impact the effectiveness of campaigns. Effective strategies enable transnational actors to gain access to the political system or officials through “consciousness raising” activities as well as function to legitimize the claims made by transnational actors. 85 Additionally, the 85 Risse-Kappan, (1995, 1999). 40 ability of transnational actors to adjust or alter strategies in light of domestic and international circumstances may also increase the effectiveness of the campaigns. Indeed, the ability to build international or domestic consensus or support for an issue is often dependent upon the ability of transnational actors to adjust their initiatives to domestic structures and context of “target states”. Activists must take into account the impact of proposed policy changes on groups impacted by such changes. 86 The different political strategies used by transnational actors to increase issue awareness and ultimate influence policy include: information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics, and leverage politics. 87 Indeed, a campaign can employ several strategies simultaneously. The tactics employed can be conventional or unconventional (e.g., circulating petitions vs. lying in the middle of a busy intersection to stop traffic as in the case of anti-war protestors) or a combination of both. Specifically, information politics functions to enable transnational actors to generate information, aids in issue creation and thus works to influence either the public’s or policymaker’s agenda (or both). Examples of information politics include the use of the media to generate information, and the use of testimony by scientific experts. Symbolic politics is also a type of information politics and functions to arouse the emotions of its recipients. For example by staging dramatic events and drawing attention to the cause of the campaign, symbolic politics enables transnational actors to garner 86 Sikkink, (2002); Risse-Kappan, (1999). 87 Keck and Sikkink, (1998). 41 support for an issue. Leverage politics works to force unwilling actors to alter their behavior through such tactics as boycotts or through litigation, participating through domestic or international legal channels. Leverage politics can be used to “bully” or “bribe” target actors into altering their behavior. 88 Finally, accountability politics serves to force target actors to account for behavior that contradicts claims or written/verbal agreements made regarding a specific issue. 89 Factors that inhibit or impede the effectiveness of the campaigns (i.e., the problems and challenges faced by transnational actors) may include the nature of the strategies employed (if issues are not “framed” correctly this can impact the effectiveness of the strategies and the campaign), the ability of transnational actors to adjust or change strategies dependent upon international and domestic circumstances, the impact of the campaign on specific groups and the group’s ideology. For example, the ability of transnational actors to take into account domestic cultural and economic considerations is significant. Whether there are ideological differences or similarities between the groups and the “target” actors (states, specific populations or corporations) influences the effectiveness of a campaign. For example, if a specific campaign threatens the economic livelihoods of individuals (local fishermen) or challenges the cultural practices of indigenous cultures or larger societal behavior those factors can impede the campaign’s progress. 88 (Risse-Kappan, (1995); DeSombre, (2000, 2002). 89 Wapner, (1996, 2002), Keck and Sikkink, (1998). 42 Methodology/Methodological concerns This analysis examines transnational activism through two case studies of environmental campaigns, those focused on whaling and the anti-sealing campaign directed at halting the Canadian seal hunt. These campaigns reflect those actors whose main agendas include animal rights/welfare, species protection and conservation. Primary and secondary sources will be employed in this analysis. Sources include: interviews with activists and officials different environmental NGOs (domestic and transnational), print ads, websites, documents, public opinion polls and analysis of existing statistics. Additionally, this analysis will examine recent legislative decisions on the state level and international developments in terms of treatises and the modification treatises related to whaling and sealing. General Research Questions: How does transnational activism reflected in the specific campaigns allow groups to further their objectives/accomplish their goals? What factors explain the reasons for transnational activism? When are they effective? Specific Questions applied to each case include: (1) What are the origins of the NGOs/campaigns? How have domestic and international factors and group characteristics facilitated transnational action? (2) What problems do the campaigns seek to address? What are their goals? (3) What are the problems and challenges faced by transnational activists? How do they cope with/resolve these problems? Do they succeed in achieving a common 43 advocacy position with respect to goals and strategies? Do they have a common ideology? (4) Who are the target groups (e.g., states, corporations, international institutions)? What are the economic interests of target groups? Is the ideology of the groups involved in the campaign congruent with that of target groups? (5) What strategies do transnational activists use (information, symbolic, leverage, or accountability politics)? How do they frame the issue? Do their strategies change over time, and if so why? What is the relationship between strategies used and successful campaigns? (6) How effective were the campaigns in achieving their goals? The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The second and third chapters address the campaigns that surround the whaling issue. This includes the anti-whaling campaign and the campaigns that seek to protect and preserve the habitat of the species. The fourth and fifth chapters of this analysis examine the role of transnational actors in the Canadian seal hunt or anti-sealing campaign. Chapters four and five are followed by the conclusion which includes a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two cases studies, identifying the nature of transnational activism and the role that transnational activism played in furthering the goals of the campaigns and examining those factors that contributed to the campaign’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness. 44 Chapter 2: Origins and Early History of the Anti-Whaling Movement It is perhaps the unspoken intention of anti-whalers that, one day, the IWC and other bodies will be regarded as institutions that normalized the symbolic understanding of the whale as victim, or even friend, and as immune from direct physical attack by man…the implication that whale meat is murder is not just a propaganda tactic on the part of the more forceful NGOs , it is predicated on the twin assumptions that whales are special and that past folly will be repeated if whalers are not strictly controlled—eradicated , in the case of commercial whalers—by anti-whaling forces. 90 From the perspective of whale eaters, the as-yet-unanswered question is why are whales so special? If whale meat looks and tastes like beef and whale blubber resembles pork fat, and if eating cows and pigs are not immoral acts outraging an international majority, then why castigate the Faroese for eating pilot whales and the Japanese for their sashimi? 91 Environmental transnational and domestic NGOs work to make people more environmentally conscious, changing the way people in developed and developing countries think about the environment and attempt to show the connection between their actions and its impact on the environment. 92 In many ways NGOs have been successful in changing public attitudes and establishing cultural norms. This is especially true in the 90 Stoett (2002:161-162). 91 Komatsu and Misaki (2003) quoted in Shoemaker (2005). 92 The term environmentalism can reflect a myriad of dimensions; and the issues that environmental groups put forth are just as diverse. Wapner (1996) explains that environmentalism can be viewed as a sensibility 45 case of the anti-whaling movement. 93 Whales are often perceived by the general public in several countries as sentient, thinking creatures that are “entitled” to life; some argue that the practice of whaling is morally reprehensible. However, in other countries whaling is part of a cultural practice. Whales are viewed as a sustainable resource that should be preserved for human exploitation. The anti-whaling case study is significant because it can be seen as one of the first transnational campaigns that established the “whale” as one of the first species in need of environmental protection. It can be argued that it became the first international symbol of endangered species protection. that values nature and believes that the quality of life on earth depends upon the well-being of the plants water, air, etc. As Torrance and Torrance (2006) suggest, environmental issues vary substantially and the problems can stem from the local (drinking water contamination), trans-boundary (air pollution) or truly global (ozone depletion). Environmental issues may be simply bi-national issues or involve issues that impact fifty states, or cross borders. Additionally, the issues can involve those that include the use of common resources (fisheries) or private (land), renewable (timber) and nonrenewable (oil). The issues can also include those of species protection or preservation (whaling agreements), conservation (debt for nature swaps), sustainability or development. The issues also can be seen as those specific to developed countries (acid rain) or those that primarily affect developing countries (tropical deforestation). Environmental issues are sometimes presented in ethical terms (harmful to nature, species or humans) or presented as problems that suggest market failures or negative economic externalities. There exists great variations in regard to the meaning and issues surrounding environmentalism, so much so that this gives rise to “different constellations of interests, and means that a unified environmental perspective and an accompanying environmental movement are unlikely to arise.”(2006:108-109). As Rootes (1999) observes, the different circumstances surrounding the liberal, developed democracies and the developing countries suggests that environmental concerns and discourses are unlikely to be applicable universally nor accepted universally across the board. In a similar vein, the literature also suggests that a developing country’s environmental concern is more likely to be rooted in the local, related to issues like sustainability and development, whereas in the more developed countries the focus may be on issues like conservation. Many conflicts arise between the two (developed and developing countries) over such issues as solving existing environmental problems, funding the implementation of obligations, and the importance of certain environmental issues. Thus the meaning of the term environmentalism varies depending upon the political culture and perspective of the actors involved. 93 D’Amato and Chopra (1991:33). D’Amato and Chopra suggest that the transition to protective measures undertaken for the survival and longevity of whales as a species is psychological, even though manifested in legal instruments. They argue that the progression of the view of whaling has gone from self-interest to altruism, and that the progression is better conceptualized as a broadening of international cultural consciousness. 46 How did the social construction of the whale evolve from the image of “Moby Dick” (the dangerous whale threatening Captain Ahab) to that of “Free Willy” (the captured and abused whale needing the public’s help and protection)? 94 This change in consciousness in many parts of the world raises the following questions: To what extent was the anti-whaling movement and transnational action responsible for this change in consciousness? How did transnational activism help the anti-whaling movement achieve its goals? What factors explain the reasons for transnational activism on this issue? What impact did the anti-whaling NGOs have on international rules and domestic legislation to protect whales? The anti-whaling issue lends itself to transnational action given that whales are migratory mammals (cetaceans) that do not distinguish between state boundaries. The ability to protect or conserve whale stocks proves difficult because the reach of domestic and international policy is either confined to state (coastal) boundaries or is dependent upon the consensus of participating states through international agreements/conventions (international waters). Additional problems arise in that there is an inconsistency in the application of domestic and international policies and their efficacy in protecting whales in the absence of strong enforcement measures. Transnational actors have both focused their campaigns at the state level and have crossed state lines to influence the policy of other states. On the international level transnational actors work though international processes to further their objectives. 94 For the record, “Free Willy” A Giant Orca, is actually a dolphin. 47 There is not just one anti-whaling campaign but rather several campaigns that address the issue of protecting whales and/or (there are several coalitions that have formed) in response to specific problems regarding whales. The anti-whaling campaigns include, among others: (1) campaigns to end all commercial whaling; this includes campaigns that focus on domestic and international policy as well those that literally attempt to stop whaling through direct action tactics; (2) campaigns to create sanctuaries or “buffer zones” ; (3) campaigns to stop development projects that endanger whales natural habitat. New campaigns undertaken by transnational actors are continually emerging as a result of increasing globalization and economic integration, since such integration presents new threats to whale populations. Activism specific to the whaling issue can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase (1965-1974) reflects the early roots of the movement, and is characterized by early legislative successes and increasing international participation by environmental and animal welfare NGOs (e.g., 1972 Stockholm Conference). The second phase (1975- 1979) reflects a concerted effort on the part of transnational activism to influence the domestic legislation of major whaling states (Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Japan) through direct action tactics, information, leverage and accountability politics and coalition building. This phase is characterized by increasing public awareness of the whaling issue as a result of the campaigns. The years 1980-1989 represents the third stage of the anti-whaling movement. By 1980 transnational actors were beginning to push towards an international ban on commercial whaling. By using the international processes established transnational actors 48 were able to achieve their goal of a moratorium in 1982. This stage of the campaign is characterized by coordinated efforts by transnational actors on the state and international levels. The final phase (1990s-present) is characterized by transnational actors renewing the anti-whaling campaign in response to increasing international pressure to end the moratorium. During this period many of the campaigns are focused on addressing the additional challenges to the protection of whales that result from increasing economic integration. This includes protecting whales from open ocean development projects, driftnets, waterways and increasing traffic in international waters that threaten migrating whale populations. The analysis of the anti-whaling movement and its relationship to transnational action is divided into two chapters. This chapter identifies the significant actors that shape the nature of the anti-whaling movement, distinguishing between the different ideological perspectives reflected in the movement. The next section examines the history of whaling, followed by discussion of the development of early efforts to regulate whaling (1880-1960). This is followed by a discussion of the origin of the environmental movement and its impact on the early anti-whaling campaign of the second stage (1960s- 1974). This period reflects the initial influence of the movement on domestic policy and the beginning of transnational action specific to whaling. The fourth section addresses the increasing activism (1975-1979) on the state level and the push towards an international moratorium on commercial whaling. This push is a direct result of the early successes and failures of the movement. As a result of the failures of the IWC to monitor 49 whaling states and enforce its guidelines, transnational actors came to the realization that the composition of the IWC itself must be changed. Next, chapter 3 examines the third stage (1980-1989) and explores the dynamics as to how transnational NGOs were effective in convincing the IWC to establish a 1982 moratorium (to take effect in 1986) on commercial whaling. The final section (1990- present) of chapter 3 focuses on the more recent efforts of the anti-whaling movement to maintain the IWC’s moratorium and identifies the current campaigns of transnational actors. The current stage of activism is characterized by a growing number of coalitions working to protect whales and their habitat from increasing economic integration as a result of a growing global economy. Whaling regulations are influenced by events and by agreements negotiated among activists, scientists and states that are also concerned with a broader range of environmental issues and there are two sets of regulations: those specifically oriented to whaling and broader environmental rules and laws that affect whaling and cross over into other issues. Negotiation and debate over the whaling issue has been driven by a critical question: That is, are whales a renewable resource (conservation) or do whales merit special protection (preservation)? In other words, is limited commercial whaling permissible or is it inhumane to hunt whales? This question lies at the heart of the whaling debate. It is in this context that the tension between the interests that argue that whaling and conservation can coexist, and those that seek to preserve all whales find themselves. 50 Key Actors in the Whaling Debate In identifying the actors involved in the whaling issue there are three general sets of interests: (1) the pro-whaling interests (or those proponents of whaling for cultural, commercial, or scientific purposes) including states such as Japan and Norway, and some indigenous groups; (2) the scientists; and (3) the anti-whaling interests which include states such as the United Kingdom and the United States in addition to the environmental and animal rights NGOs/groups. 95 Although the primary focus of this analysis is on transnational NGOs and their impact on domestic and international whaling policies, all interests must be addressed to get a full picture of the different influences on the whaling issue. For the most part, a state’s commitment to protecting whales is dependent upon its interest to advocate such a position. For the most part states and their position on whaling can be divided into the following categories: (1) states with strong commercial whaling interests; (2) states subject to cross-pressures from environmentalists on one side and small-scale whalers (commercial, subsistence or both); and (3) states open to strong environmentalist influence for lack of competing lobbies. The use of unilateral economic sanctions by the U.S. against other governments on whaling issues at various points in time has made it so central to outcomes that both whaling and anti-whaling interests have sought to influence its policy. Pro-Whaling Interests: States, Industries and Indigenous Groups The transnational NGOs and states that reflect pro-whaling interests have both commercial and cultural reasons for supporting whaling. In the early years of the 95 Andersen and Skodvin (2007); Friedheim (2001); DeSombre (2000); Stoett (1997). 51 International Whaling Commission (1940s-1960s), the first international regulatory body created in 1946, the whaling states and whaling industry dominated the discourse and policy. The purpose of the IWC was to conserve whale stocks for future use, keeping an ample supply of whales for the industry. The whaling industry views whaling policy as a matter of resources management; stressing the immediate economic return form whaling. For the most part, during this period whaling industry managers relied on their own governments for representation and their political ties to key government officials to influence domestic and international policy. However beginning in the 1970s Japanese, Icelanders and Norwegians began to hire American lobbyists to influence the U.S. government. As the numbers of various whale species continued to decline so did the influence of the whaling industry. Today only a few states (Japan, Iceland, and Norway) are involved in commercial whaling and these have pro-whaling interests that they are seeking to protect. Other states, such as the United States, oppose commercial whaling but argue that subsistence whaling for indigenous groups should be protected. Japan invokes scientific and cultural arguments to defend its pro-whaling position. Since the early 1990s, the pro-whaling interest groups have reemerged as observers at IWC meetings and new pro-whaling organizations participate as transnational NGOs. These coalitions or alliances reflect the pro-whaling interests of states and indigenous groups frustrated with the IWC. The pro-whaling activists have functioned as an important counter-veiling force on the whaling issue (especially at IWC 52 meetings). They identify themselves as economic conservationists that view whaling as an economic activity that can be undertaken in a sustainable manner. Indigenous groups such as the Eskimos (Inuit) in Alaska or the Makah tribe in Washington State support subsistence whaling (on a not-for-profit basis). Indigenous groups have been vocal proponents of subsistence whaling based on cultural practices. For example, in 1979, the Alaskan Inuit won a “subsistence” exemption from the IWC on bowhead whaling by arguing that whaling is not just nutritionally necessary for their survival but also essential for the survival of the Inuit culture. The issue of imposing what are construed to be “Western values” upon the practices of indigenous cultures is a significant issue in the anti-whaling campaign. It can be argued that the preservation of whales constitutes a type of cultural imperialism poses a significant problem for the anti-whaling advocates. Cultural anthropologists have coined such perspectives as “latent Orientalism”; which reflects the imposition of normative practices and ideals based on the Western domination of “others”. According to this perspective, the campaign to end the commercial slaughter of whales reflects the biocentric perspective of “latent orientalism.” They argue that in the discourse of “putting nature first,” the anti-whaling interests are advocating a challenge to the anthropocentrism by pursuing a model which leads to the extension and preservation of endangered spaces and species but is in fact a type of cultural imperialism. 96 96 Kitossa (2000:23-27). 53 The Scientists Scientists (cetologists) have always been more transnationally oriented than industry managers because of the long tradition of science as a global activity. The scientific community has become more and more important in environmental governance in four ways: (1) science and scientists have helped to mobilize debate and action by governments on environmental problems; (2) in many environmental areas scientific expertise is necessary to assist policymakers in the elaboration of scientific agreements; (3) once the policies are in place, the reassessment of environmental standards and targets is usually proceeds on the best available scientific data requiring further research to determine the level of commitments by governments; (4) scientific research and scientists have the potential to encourage compliance with international agreements. 97 Scientists within governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental scientific organizations have influenced the development of domestic and international policy and disseminated information about environmental issues. The establishment of global environmental problems as political issues has given new weight to scientific knowledge; and global environmental concerns are closely intertwined with the development of global science: there is an inherent connection between science and activism. One of the first global environmental campaigns that demonstrated this 97 Elliot (1998:12). 54 relationship is the anti-whaling campaign, which reflected the efforts of transnational NGOs and scientists in its early stages. 98 At the first IWC meeting in 1949, the Science, Technical, Financial and Administration Committees were established. While the number of committees on scientific issues has vastly expanded, a Scientific Committee is at the center of the basic organization structure. As a result scientists have a formally institutionalized channel of influence at the international level. 99 However the history of whaling management by the IWC is not an example of a strong and cohesive epistemic community influence over policy. Some critics question the autonomy of scientists from the influence of state and non-state actors in that they have established relationships with both environmental NGOs and national governments. Some argue that Scientific Committee members were, and are today, servants of the commission and at different points in the IWC’s history have reflected the interests of the dominant national positions of whaling states. 100 Because of the misuse of science by various interests, the “objectivity” of the scientific community is continually questioned and the processes for determining quotas etc. becomes politicized since each side (pro-whaling and anti-whaling) uses science to further its own interests. For the most part the epistemic community has not been a united front at IWC meetings and throughout its history has suffered some internal conflicts. 98 Epstein (2005:47). 99 Black, Richard. BBC News Online. 5/29/07. 100 Aron (2001:117). 55 As indicated above, all forces (both pro and con) are dependent upon the scientific community to further their objectives. Both sides use science when convenient to further their positions. Groups and governments that are organized around a “moral” solution to whaling pay little attention to observations showing no harm and only focus their attention on observations showing harm. 101 For example, those arguing against whaling on moral grounds stress scientific studies that suggest that whaling causes intense suffering and there is no such thing as “humane whaling.” Proponents of this view also ignore data that suggests that certain whale populations have sufficiently recovered and thus should no longer be considered endangered (e.g., minke whales) which would allow for a resumption of whaling. At the same time, the scientific community’s recommendations and recommendations by the IWC are at times ignored altogether by states in the IWC. For example, in the 1977 the US ignored warnings from scientists (as well as pressure from domestic and transnational NGOs) that the bowhead whale was critically endangered. The US was not willing to enforce the Endangered Species Act (1972) or the IWC’s ban on whaling of these species due to domestic pressure by Alaskan Eskimos (Inuit) that argued that they should be permitted to continue to hunt the bowhead since whaling was part of their cultural practices. Ultimately, for political reasons, the Alaskan Eskimos 101 Friedheim (2001:205). As Epstein (2005) notes, a key factor in explaining the success of the movement was the marriage between science and activism in that activists used science to convince states of the need for policies to stall environmental destruction. Additionally the findings of scientists are put forth once they are taken up in the environmental campaigns. Transnational actors not only used science as a political weapon but have also contributed to shaping the science in the making in terms of both its method and content. The organizations most central to the whaling debate discuss the issue in scientific terms but inherently believe that whales should not be seen as a resource to be exploited and should not be killed at all. 56 were allowed to continue to hunt bowheads even though this practice could lead to the species extinction. The decision went against the scientific data supporting the need for the ban. One of the reasons for a lack of consensus among the participants in the IWC is the distrust between the scientists and representatives of NGOs and governments that have ignored their advice. This reflects the divide between the pro-whaling and anti- whaling perspectives. This tension makes negotiations based on scientific data on whaling difficult to achieve. There are also other independent scientific international governmental organizations that are influential in the regulation of whaling. For example, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) is an independent scientific organization with memberships that include governments, government agencies and conservation organizations. Expertise on whales has been developed by the IUCN through its Committee on Marine Mammals and its Working Group on Management of Whales. The IUCN also works with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). While the IWC is not directly involved in the IUCN Red List process, which includes collecting data and listing endangered species, some members of the IWC’s Scientific Committee participate directly or indirectly in providing advice. The Anti-Whaling Interests: States, Environmental and Animal rights NGOs 57 States play important roles in supporting (or thwarting) environmental activism domestically and internationally. Clearly the relationship between states and environmental NGOs domestically, and the relationship between the state and the international system influences the nature of transnational action. The environmental NGOs specific to the whaling issue have forged relationships with several states, and in some ways the movement has been successful as a result of these relationships. 102 States that traditionally support a ban on commercial whaling, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand and Austria and Italy, as well as most other states within the European Union (EU), function as an anti- whaling coalition. Most European states are opposed to whaling, though in varying degrees. In most European states public opinion is very influential. There are strong animal rights lobbies and the Green parties which play an important role in Germany, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Sweden maintaining an anti-whaling position. These states are essentially against whaling, irrespective of what scientists say. The United States has generally maintained an anti-whaling position although it supports whaling by indigenous groups and its position has on occasion shifted under different administrations. Other significant anti-whaling states include several Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia). 103 Many of these states were 102 Andresen and Skodvin (2007:129). 103 As of 2006 a group of Latin American countries created the Latin American Conservation Society. Working with international and domestic environmental NGOs on various conservation issues, these countries are taking an anti-whaling position. 58 previously either pro-whaling (Brazil) or took no position at all. Mexico was an early proponent of protecting whales having signed the Geneva Convention in 1931, which sought to address dwindling whale populations. 104 Several of these states promote the whale-watching industry, which is an important economic resource. This coalition of “like minded states” within the IWC can usually command a core vote and can usually pick up enough swing votes to control IWC decisions, even three-quarters majority decisions. NGOs and Ideological Orientations Environmental NGOs are nongovernmental organizations that seek to further an environmental agenda; they are dedicated to protecting air quality, land and water use throughout the world and the continued existence of non-human species. Environmental NGOs can be global, regional, national or local. Additionally, many domestic environmental NGOs can at times have transnational relevance, depending on the issue area; domestic organizations can have a strong influence on international environmental affairs. 105 Transnational activism around whaling reflects both environmental and animal rights concerns. The positions on whaling can be categorized in the following manner: 1) the “sustainable use” conservationist (indigenous groups); 2) environmental 104 See Dedina, Saving the Grey Whale (2000). 105 An example of this in the literature includes the Brazilian Rubber Tappers, whose leader, Chico Mendez was killed while attempting to defend the rights of the rubber tappers and protect the rain forests, his death created a transnational network of groups from the international community ranging from indigenous rights to environmental groups seeking justice for his death and addressing the destruction of the rain forests. 59 conservationists (protecting and conserving all species, stressing biodiversity); 3) preservationist (preserving/protecting species and 4) animal welfare/animal rights. The conservation movement is a political and social movement that seeks to protect natural resources including plant and animal species as well as their habitat expressly for the continued sustainable use by humans. The early conservation movement included fisheries and wildlife management, water, soil conservation and sustainable forestry. Conservationists are concerned with the management of resources for continued use. The contemporary conservation movement has broadened from the early movement’s emphasis on the sustainable yield of natural resources and preservation of wilderness areas to include the preservation of biodiversity. Conservation groups tend to pragmatic in their approach to policy change and tend to work within the existing domestic and international government channels. Some of the best known groups include the World Wildlife Federation (WWF), the Sierra Club, Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS) and Earth Island. Several of these groups include sustainability in their campaigns and work very closely with local populations in order to strike a balance between local communities and conservation. 106 Preservationists differ from conservationists in that preservationists argue that non-human species should be preserved from human exploitation. Specific to whaling, preservationists do not agree that sustainable whaling is possible or should be supported. 106 Wapner (1996:79). Wapner also discusses a recent development within the conservation movement (e.g., WWF), which includes the idea that it is not enough to save a species from extinction without saving the habitat as well. Thus conservation groups have come to realize that a species entire ecosystem must be maintained for a species to survive. 60 While the ideologies emanating from these positions are distinct, at times they do overlap. For example, some groups within the anti-whaling campaign stresses the concept of animal rights, in that these non human species deserve the same respect for life as human beings. This idea is further developed by Jasper and Nelkin (1992), who point out that the contemporary animal rights movement also incorporated the critique of exploitive attitudes towards nature developed by the environmental movement. Within the environmental movement, the concept of moral standing has become central to environmental and protectionist ethics. Those with moral standing gain a certain moral status—and their interests must be taken into consideration—and this moral status carries ethical obligations. Moral agents (those who are capable of acting either morally or immorally) must respect those who have moral standing. Western ethics asserts that human beings have moral standing however it is common practice not to apply moral standing to animals. In this regard animal rights advocates extend moral standing to non- human species. 107 All whale species must be protected. Stoett (2005) suggests that the heart of the ethical debate over whaling remains the conservationist/ preservationist split. Groups such as Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (led by Paul Watson a founding member of Greenpeace), the Animal Welfare Institute, the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) espouse a preservationist position. 108 107 Kemmerer (2006:17-19). 108 WSPA and IFAW are also animal welfare organizations. 61 The preservationist position coincides with the concept of animal rights (which is sometimes connected to the concept of “animal liberation”) which reflects the idea that the basic interests of non-human animals parallel those of the basic interests of human beings. 109 Animal rights activists argue that animals should not be viewed as property rather they should be regarded as members of the moral community and assigns moral rights to non-human species. Some animal rights activists argue that any human being or institution that profits from animals by using them for food, entertainment, cosmetics, clothing, animal testing, or for any other reason, infringes upon the animal’s rights. 110 Finally, within the philosophy of animal welfare there exists a variety of approaches in regards to an animal’s moral status. For example, Peter Singer (1970, 1990) argues that animals have a moral right to be free from pain and suffering. The pain and suffering of animals can be justified only if it serves the greater good of society and animals by minimizing the suffering of both species. This position calls for a highly restricted use of animals and is the most popular view within the animal rights movement. Organizations such as the HSUS and ASPCA reflect this view. Singer uses the concept of “speciesism” to define as the belief that nonhuman animals exist to sustain 109 Animal welfare/animal rights is a major political issue only in countries that are affluent, where food supply is adequate, and where political groups actively campaign on ethical and moral issues concerning animals. Western European countries lead the rest of the world in this regard, with the emergence of Green parties forcing the issue onto their political agendas. Great Britain, for example, was the pioneer in guaranteeing rights for farm animals, while Germany and Switzerland have taken the lead in adopting protective legislation that has real enforcement power. See Libby (1993:60). 110 See Angus Taylor (2003) Animals and Ethics. Scholars such as William Ryder (1972) and Peter Singer (1975) are seen as some of the early founders of the contemporary animal rights movement. The concept of animal rights can be distinguished from that of animal welfare. The animal rights movement emerged within the more traditional animal welfare movement in the 1970s, getting its inspiration from the successes of the civil rights, feminist, ethnic and other movements. 62 and support human life, which he sees along with famine, poverty, war, racism, sexism, unemployment and environmental destruction as major problems facing the world. Singer asserts that nonhuman animals or species have the same rights as humans to be free from pain and suffering and that they have a moral right to live free of domination by humans. This includes the right to be protected from slaughter and confinement for human food production. According to Singer, on a moral plane, the only real difference between human and nonhuman animals is their species. He points out that the oppression of nonhuman beings by humans in providing food, clothing, and entertainment is enormous compared with the suffering by humans inflicted upon one another. 111 While conservation groups that stress species protection such as the Sierra Club, Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) frame their environmental efforts differently than animal rights groups such as People for the Ethical 111 A more radical view is put forth by Tom Regan (1983), who argues that animals have an absolute right to be free from pain and suffering regardless of the benefits to society, (such as animal experimentation to find a cure for AIDS or cancer). He rejects Singer’s limited use proposition, saying that because animals are vulnerable to human control, humans have a moral responsibility to protect animals from pain and suffering. For many animal rights advocates, the commitment to the principles of vegetarianism and animal rights is part of an individual, even communal, spiritual ethic (Mika 2006:916). Several animal rights campaigns are dedicated to promoting a vegan lifestyle. “Of all the movements that are associated with the animal rights movement, vegetarianism has, perhaps, the most natural connection. Those who take animal rights seriously are likely to correspondingly see that breeding and raising animals to slaughter and eat is the ultimate violation of rights.” More aggressive groups such as PETA and the Animal Liberation Front espouse this view. 63 Treatment of Animals (PETA), Campaign Whale, MadMermaids, Animal Welfare Institute, Sea Shepherd Society, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) 112 or the more extreme groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Defenders of the Earth (DEA), their interests are not mutually exclusive. Some groups have elements of both concerns, depending on the issue. For example, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherds, which can be seen as conservation groups on some levels, also stress the issue of animal rights, as reflected in the anti-whaling campaign. Conversely, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) or the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA), both animal welfare organizations also focus their energy on preservation issues. Sometimes it is difficult to typecast NGOs into a specific ideological category. For example, WhaleWatch, a coalition within the umbrella organization the World Society for the Protection of Animals identifies itself as a “coalition of over 140 non-governmental organizations in over 55 countries worldwide, united by a common belief that whaling should be banned because it is inherently cruel.” Additionally, its mission statement/goals include maintaining the International Whaling Commission (IWC) ban on commercial whaling and to show the world that the whaling debate is not just about numbers and conservation, but also about animal suffering; arguing that the way whales are hunted is inhumane. 113 Thus their philosophy has elements of the ideas related to animal rights, preservation and conservationism. The 112 The SPCA founded in Britain in 1824, was the first animal welfare organization in the world. 113 See htttp://www.whalewatch.org. 64 conception of whales and whaling has undergone various changes and these changes are reflected in domestic and international policies. The conceptions of how whaling is viewed include free resource, conservation and preservation; and there is an inherent tension between the conservation and preservation positions. Some scholars suggest that the final stage in this progression is entitlement. 114 Unlike preservation in which individuals are exercising their rights to save animals, in the entitlement stage, animals are entitled to rights as living beings. What is significant about transnational environmental NGOs (both preservationist and conservationist) is their ability to operate effectively. They have strong national followings in most of the Western industrialized states, growing affiliates in developing countries and new opportunities for organizing as a result of globalization and changing geopolitical circumstances such as the limited political openings in Russia and Eastern Europe (as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union). They also have strong and effective transnational links, some of which such as those between Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund are formalized, while others such as the cooperation at intergovernmental conferences are established when needed. The staff members of the United Nations Economic Program (UNEP), the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) utilize organization facilities to network and encourage collaboration. Individual members and foundations have been able to provide money and people to maintain a high 114 D’Amato and Chopra (1991). 65 level of publicity, lobbying activity and “direct action” undertaken by individuals or NGOs to supplement or substitute for government enforcement. 115 Early Regulation of Whaling and Transnational Actors (1880s-1960s) Modern whaling techniques were spurred in the 19th century by the increase in demand for whale oil, and by 1848 whaling entered the industrial age with the invention of the exploding harpoon. This harpoon enabled whalers to hunt the fast swimming blue, fin, sei and Bryde’s whales which could not be caught by previous whaling methods. As a result, blue and fin whales in the northern Atlantic were hunted and stocks diminished quickly. In addition, the use of steam powered ships and modern equipment enabled whalers to voyage further from shore and hunt whales from all the world’s oceans including the Antarctic regions. In the 20th century whaling was spurred by a demand for whale meat. Bilateral agreements between the US and Russia (1893) to regulate sealing reflect some of the early international attempts to address the issue of diminishing natural resources and in 1911 the U.S., U.K., Russia, Canada and Japan signed the first international treaty for wildlife conservation. The North Pacific Sealing Convention treaty outlawed sealing in open waters of the Bearing Sea (off the coast of Alaska’s Pribilof Islands). National attempts to address the issue of diminishing natural resources date to the late 19 th century. Several environmental organizations were established in the United States and Europe. In 1892, John Muir founded the Sierra Club and in 1905 the National Audubon Society was established in the U.S. Both organizations expressed the 115 Peterson (1992:154-155). 66 hope that the spirit of nature might save the materialistically obsessed from the narrow priorities of the industrial age. The Lacey Act (1911) sought to protect birds traded nationally with the U.S. The increasing awareness of the need to regulate and provide for the continuation of natural resources on the national level coincided with the growth and development of the international conservation movement establishing early norms that reflected the significance of conservation. In the United States, for example, conservationism existed as a branch of the general Progressive movement. During the Progressive Era (1900- 1915) environmental issues became matters of intense national concern and environmental issues were brought to the attention of policymakers by such groups as the Sierra Club. For example, in 1903 President Roosevelt visited the Yosemite Valley accompanied by John Muir and was convinced by Muir to establish Yosemite National Park in 1905. The Roosevelt’s administration had established 13 national parks by 1913 and created the National Park Service (1916) to oversee its administration. 116 Some of the first conservationists were scientists who wanted to use their knowledge to address the waste of natural resources for the use of future generations. Also known as utilitarians, they did not aim to save natural beauty or charismatic animals; rather their concern was with ensuring the long-term health of the U.S. economy. Another branch of the movement was preservationism, led by people such as John Muir. While conservationists were elite scientists with government connections, preservationists were biologist and other concerned citizens who were concerned with the 116 Kline (1997). 67 legal protection of areas and species. Oftentimes the two forces would come together to further political issues as seen in the efforts of Theodore Roosevelt, who not only had close ties to utilitarians but also appreciated the efforts of preservationists. The establishment of the Grand Canyon as a national park was an example of Roosevelt’s effort to bring the two forces together. Clearly one problem was that natural resources are common property—a resource used by many but owned by no one until killed, captured or extracted. These users have no economic incentive to show concern in what they are extracting; rather their main motive is profit. The significance of early agreements and domestic legislation was that it served to establish support for protection of the environment and influenced the creation of international norms. The need for the conservation of whale stocks became evident in the 1920s following the introduction of factory ships, which could function as processing plants independent of land-based stations, in 1925. The result was a massive growth in the whaling industry: the global kill of whales nearly doubled from approximately 23,000 in 1924 to 43,000 in 1930 and by the early 1930s whale stocks had diminished significantly. 117 During the period between World War I and World War II there were many attempts to regulate whaling internationally. For example in 1924 and 1927 there were two failed attempts by the League of Nations to regulate whaling. 118 By 1931 international cooperation specific to whaling began with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). The ICRW sought out 117 See Stoett (1997:53) and www.greenpeace.org/whales/history/htm. 118 The Whale Coalition (1979: 27-29). 68 to address the problem of increasing extraction of natural resources and the corresponding decreasing whale populations. Some of the whaling nations during this period were the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Australia, South Africa, Panama, New Zealand, Japan and Russia (the ICRW was not ratified until 1946). Since the ICRW international efforts to regulate whaling have been channeled through the International Whaling Commission (1946) to manage whale stocks effectively. Membership of the IWC was open to any country in the world that formally adhered to the 1946 Convention. Thus the IWC was created by voluntary agreement among the member nations to function as the sole governing body with authority to act under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and to implement its economic and environmental goals. Each member country was represented by a Commissioner, who was assisted by experts and advisers. The Chair and Vice-Chair were elected by the Commissioners and usually served for three years. The convention established three committees for the IWC: Scientific, Technical and Financial, and Administration. The Scientific Committee was instructed by the original Rules of Procedure to keep under review the statistical, biological and other technical information and to make recommendations. The function of the Scientific Committee was to report on and analyze research results achieved from scientific studies conducted within individual states, but it did not carry out research itself. These committees were to meet and make recommendations to the IWC as a whole. The IWC started out as a “whaling club,” completely dominated by the short-term interests of the whaling industry. Its purpose was to provide for the proper conservation 69 of whale stocks, and ensure that whale populations were not depleted as a source. Its function was to ensure the orderly development of the whaling industry by striking a balance between conservation and utilization. 119 The structural design of the IWC rested on the assumption that states in their long-term self-interest would adopt cooperative policies suggested by expert scientific management of a common resource. At this point in the IWC’s development, the influence of transnational actors on the regime was limited to industry interests. For the first two decades of the IWC (1940s- 1960s) its regulatory function was limited and the era of whaling was characterized by the continued commercial depletion of whale stocks. Additionally, conservation efforts were not very effective due to the lack of commitment to conserving stocks by the whaling interests. This “free resource” mentality of the whaling states continued into the 1960s. There were major difficulties confronting the IWC. First was its lack of enforcement power for new rules that were established; member states often failed to comply. The IWC did not have the capability to monitor states to ensure that they were in compliance with IWC rules. Additionally, the IWC was unable to control the use of “pirate vessels”---ships that would whale under the flags of countries that were not part of the IWC and thus not subject to international regulation. For example, the whaling practices of Aristotle Onasiss (aka “the Greek Tycoon”) were in constant violation of IWC rules. To get around these rules, Onasiss’ Olympic Whaling Company would whale under the flag of such Central American countries as Panama or Honduras in order to go 119 Andresen and Skodvin (2007:124). 70 unnoticed. The company itself was actually incorporated in Uruguay. Since none of these states at the time were members of the IWC they were not subject to IWC regulations. 120 Another practice by member states that undermined the ability of the organization to effectively regulate whaling was when member states opted out of specific commitments. For example, at the IWC annual meeting in 1956 the Soviet Union approved a lowering of the whaling quota for that year, however when seven other member states objected to lowering quotas the Soviet Union claimed that it would not abide by the lower quota unless the other states supported it as well. In the late 1950s there were two significant developments that demonstrated changing international perceptions and early international norms specific to whaling; these were changes that were occurring outside of the IWC (the impetus for such conventions stemmed from concerns of the scientific community). The first was the Geneva Conference (1958) and the adoption of a resolution entitled the “Humane Killing of Marine Life” which directly dealt with whales. 121 Additionally, the Antarctic Treaty (1959) had an important impact upon the perception of whaling. The Antarctic Treaty was designed both to ensure that this region would be used for peaceful purposes and to promote cooperation in the scientific community. Out of this treaty grew a major conservation effort with the adoption of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. This Convention proved significant for the protection of marine mammals because 120 DeSombre (2002). 121 Specifically, the resolution stated: “The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Requests States to prescribe by all means available to them, those methods for the capture and killing of marine life, especially of whales and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible.” 71 it identified the dangers to the fragile ecosystem of Antarctica and the need to preserve it. This had major implications for the protection of Antarctic whales. 122 A final issue that compromised the IWC’s regulation and conservation efforts was the lack of support given for the recommendations of Scientific Committee. In 1953 the IWC was warned by scientists that blue whale populations were decreasing rapidly, yet no action was taken until 1965. 123 In 1960 the IWC commissioned independent scientists to report on the condition of the southern hemisphere baleen whale stocks and in 1963 scientists reported that action was necessary to preserve the existing whale stocks, but no action was taken by the IWC. The lack of response of the IWC to diminishing whale populations was based on organizational character of the IWC in that it was dominated by whaling interests who continually questioned the validity of any scientific findings suggesting the need to for extreme conservation efforts. The U.S. Environmental Movement, the Institutional Context and the Origins of the Anti- Whaling Movement (1965-1974) Beginning in the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, endangered species protection became the hallmark of environmental policies in Western industrialized democracies, marking the advent of activism specific to protecting whales. As a result of the larger environmental movements, the passage of domestic legislation, and state recognition of the need to address environmental issues on an international level, international organizations such as the U.N. responded to environmental concerns with the passage of 122 See D’Amato and Chopra (1991:36-37). 123 The Whaling Coaltion (1979:93). 72 resolutions and conventions. Transnational activism was facilitated by group characteristics, domestic and global factors and anti-whaling campaigns were effective in generating issue attention and agenda setting and influencing the behavior of target actors (states) as seen in the passage of domestic legislation specific to whaling. The 1960s were a decade of social turbulence in the United States, especially for younger generations who questioned traditional American views and supported such issues as the civil rights movement, feminism, alternative lifestyles and the anti-Vietnam War movement. These activists rallied against the evils they perceived in American life including materialism and the uncontrolled exploitation of the environment. During this period several new and existing environmental NGOs emerged and/or became much more visible and active in American politics. Groups such as the Sierra Club (1893), the Animal Welfare Institute (1951) and World Wildlife Fund (1961) took an aggressive stand on many environmental issues attempting to publicize diverse issues such as forest conservation and the protection of marine mammals. The whaling issue became prominent when scientists discovered that the blue whale, (the largest creature that has ever lived on earth) was in danger of extinction, which sparked a concern about the future of the species. Wildlife, environmental, animal welfare and conservation groups such as the Animal Welfare Institute (1951) began to lobby heavily in the U.S. to stop commercial whaling. In addition to lobbying Congress, their strategies included public awareness campaigns, and staging protests. The political opportunities available to the anti-whaling movement included an open and receptive political system that enabled domestic and 73 transnational activists to influence U.S. policy. Their activism was instrumental in the passage of several U.S. environmental protections specific to marine mammals such as the Endangered Species Preservation Act (1966). As a result of public and group pressure, Congress continued to extend the list of species that could be endangered under the ESA and banned their export in 1969. Given that there were not extreme economic costs associated with protecting marine mammals (the U.S. did not have a strong whaling interest) the protection of marine mammals was an easy way for policymakers to score political points without upsetting any economic interests. The observation of the first Earth Day (founded by Senator Gaylord Nelson on April 22, 1970) was a grass-roots level movement and reflected the public recognition of the need to address environmental issues; millions of people convened in towns, cities, campuses around the country to raise public awareness about various environmental issues such as clean air, water, endangered species of plants and animals and the overall declining health of the planet. That same year, the U.S. government identified the need to monitor marine resources and oceans and thus created the federal agency NOAA: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 74 Administration (Under the Department of Commerce). 124 As Senator Hollings (D-SC) put it, the creation of NOAA was necessary, “the oceans are too important for the United States to afford anything but the highest level of attention.” 125 The NOAA functioned as the primary source of data and information concerning problems of the ocean and atmosphere. As a result of increasing political support from policy makers, increasing public awareness and active public mobilization on environmental issues, the anti-whaling activists were in command of powerful political resources. Their leverage included the ability to influence public opinion and the media which led to continued Congressional support on this issue. One of the leading early anti-whaling activists in the U.S. was Christine Stevens, who launched the original “Save-the-Whales” campaign in the 1960's. The Animal Welfare Institute employed information and symbolic politics in publicizing the plight of the whales in hundreds of newspaper, magazine, radio and TV ads across the U.S. Anti-whaling activists found celebrity spokespeople to help publicize the campaign 124 Under NOAA there are five major branches concerned with ocean services, weather services, fisheries, satellites and data, and research and many cross links connecting these branches. All five branches make observations of the natural environment and contribute to the NOAA data bank, are involved in carrying out research or in using results of research, and are responsible for services to the public. The agency is primarily made up of scientists that monitor the health of the oceans and manage ocean fisheries. NOAA observations, research and services are essential to the US’ understanding of the environment, and it also functions as the agency that enforces/oversees the implementation of the IWC rulings. NOAA’s responsibilities have been outlined in hundreds of pieces of legislation, and by Executive Orders, or interagency agreements. Other responsibilities result from international agreements and treaties (such as IWC); while others have come out of rational solutions to critical problems with no clear legal standing. At times NOAA’s administrative appointments have been based on scientific and professional criteria. At other times, they have been political appointments to further the agenda of a specific administration. This has impacted its autonomy and its ability to plan and carry out programs effectively. In the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan NOAA became an independent agency and its budget was drastically cut. See Fleagel, Robert, G (1986). “NOAA’s Role and the National Interest,” Science, Technology and human Values, Vol. 11, No. 2. (pp. 51-62). 125 Science News (March 14, 1970) “The Deep Six for NOAA” (p. 267). 75 and raise awareness on the issue. The changing conception of the whale from Moby Dick to Free Willy began to take form in the early 1970s. Specifically the extent to which the Captain Ahab and Moby Dick story reversed itself was illustrated when the star of the 1956 John Huston film Moby Dick spoke out against whaling on national television. Gregory Peck, who played Captain Ahab in the film, made his position on whaling evident in a 1971 televised public service announcement sponsored by the Animal Welfare Institute: A hundred years ago during whaling’s romantic heyday, a three-year expedition netted an average of thirty-seven whales. Today a modern Japanese or Russian whaling fleet can eliminate thirty-seven whales a day with brutal military precision. There are cheap, plentiful substitutes for all whale products. Unfortunately, there are no substitutes for whales. 126 International celebrities such as Mikhail Baryshnikov (a Russian ballet dancer who defected to the United States) worked actively on the “Save the Whales” campaign for the Animal Welfare Institute in the early 1970s. This had symbolic significance since Russia was still actively whaling at this time. Such factors laid the foundation for the internationalization of American whaling policies. Additional hearings before Congress in 1971 concerning species protection reflected the active participation of animal welfare and environmental organizations. Among them were the Sierra Club, American Cetacean Society, Friends of the Earth 127 , the Animal Welfare Institute, Animal Rescue League, Environmental Defense Fund, the 126 Peck, quoted in Day (1987:13). 127 Friends of the Earth (FOE) took their name from the John Muir quotation, “The earth can do all right without friends, but men, if they are to survive must learn to be friends of the earth.” 76 Humane Society of the United States and the Connecticut Cetacean Society. These organizations testified before Congress and argued for the need to protect marine resources. The 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act not only reflected active participation of environmental groups but also ended any potential U.S. whaling and more importantly helped to turn the U.S. against whaling internationally. All whales (even those not endangered) were to be protected under the MMPA. 128 At the time the movement had the support of the U.S. public, Congress and the Nixon Administration. Additionally, in 1972 Congress passed the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuary Act which established the National Marine Sanctuary Program. Outside the US, Canada banned commercial whaling and the European Community (EU) banned the importation of whale products in 1972. All of these developments were viewed by activists as important steps toward restricting the whale market. They also furthered to raise international attention to the issue of whaling. The success of domestic NGOs in influencing government policy began to have an effect on the international scene. Environmental and animal welfare groups such as Sierra Club, Animal Welfare Institute, Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, and Friends of the Earth were able to point to numerous U.S. laws supporting their cause at the first international environmental summit, the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment (known as the Stockholm Conference). The Conference was a watershed event in terms of environmental global governance, reflecting a broad change 128 Epstein (2006:45). Early on the United States played an active role in influencing the international regulation of whaling. Epstein notes that the early species protection by the United States position became the norm that shaped international environmental cooperation through the 1970s. 77 in the nature of diplomacy in world politics. Essentially the conference provided a forum through which the international community could address its global environmental concerns. The origins of the Conference can be traced to several domestic and international factors. The timing was ripe for an international conference--with growing environmental movements and legislation in western industrialized states, the publication of such works as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962, which documented the effects of chemical pesticides on the environment), all led to increasing international awareness and concern towards environmental issues. Additionally, environmental disasters such as the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill off the coast of Great Britain contributed to a growing international perception that such environmental problems would require a global response. The international community did respond and in 1968, the UN issued a resolution calling for an international conference addressing global environmental concerns and the changing relationship between humankind and the environment. Thus the Stockholm Conference was prompted by concerns in industrialized states over transnational pollution from industry and its products. Specifically, the conference was proposed by Swedish social scientist and television personality Svante Oden. An advisor to the Swedish government, he played a significant role in convincing the Swedish public and politicians that its lakes and rivers were becoming acidic as a result of sulfur from smokestack industries in other countries. In response, the Swedish government 78 persuaded of the need for international cooperation to address these issues proposed the conference. 129 The Stockholm Conference was an example of an international political opportunity structure, its influence on NGO activity was significant and it served as an important factor in explaining transnational activity. In addition to the extensive media coverage that the conference received, the conference served as an impetus to the spread of environmentalists’ ideas and organizations from the Western industrialized states to other parts of the world. It was also significant in that it facilitated transnational action through the establishment of global spaces for the participation of environmental NGOs. Stockholm ignited the creation of institutions around which transnational environmental actors would mobilize. 130 NGOs played a major role not only during the preparatory process, but also throughout out the conference. Specific to transnational participation the official participants were representatives of 114 states, with members of the UN secretariat and staff of other intergovernmental agencies, and representatives from 255 transnational and domestic NGOs. In addition, NGOs had specific input into the adoption of a declaration of principles concerning the global environment, and an Action Plan which generated 109 activities to be undertaken by governments and international agencies was also put in place. 129 Bernstein (2001:33-34). 130 Keck and Sikkink (1997:125). The Stockholm Conference pioneered new forms of public participation in a United Nations conference, establishing links between the formal process and the informal parallel NGO process. 79 The 1972 Conference not only served as forum for transnational activity. It also represented the first step internationally to go beyond conserving whale stocks, calling for a needed ban on commercial whaling, as seen in the passage of a resolution calling for a temporary (10 year) moratorium on commercial whaling. Essentially Stockholm demonstrated that the IWC had been ineffective its management of “natural capital”. NGOs that lobbied in the U.S. to ban whaling also lobbied heavily for the resolution at Stockholm. This resolution reflected the first step in establishing the protection of whales as an international norm. Thus the major international consideration of whaling control occurred outside of the IWC. As a result of the Conference the United Nations established its Environmental Program (UNEP), an environmental intergovernmental organization. Its main purpose was to coordinate environmental activities among states as well as prod the UN and governments into more sound environmental management. The UNEP Governing Council also played a role in pressing member states to ratify the 1973 Convention on Illegal Trades of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) whose mandate was to ensure through international cooperation that the international trade in wild 80 species did not threaten their long-term survival. CITES functioned as an additional source of international regulation of whaling. 131 Another important development in the United States that impacted inter-state relations and whaling policies within those states was the Pelly Amendment (1973) to the 1954 Fishermen’s Protective Act. This amendment allowed fishery product imports to be prohibited from states that were not abiding by international fishery agreements (including whaling). This amendment encouraged international fish and wildlife conservation and authorized the president to certify any state whose actions diminished the effectiveness of international environmental agreements as being in noncompliance with the act. Those states that violated such agreements were threatened by the possibility of having their fishing rights in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone cut or eliminated, and could be subject to unilateral trade sanctions. 132 This amendment 131 CITES banned international commercial trade in whale meat of endangered species and conferred a protected status on the world's whales. The relationship between CITES and the IWC is significant because CITES essentially functions as a mechanism to “red flag” endangered species. Whale species that are listed under CITES as endangered must be identified by the IWC as essentially off limits to whaling nations. Additionally, transnational NGOs play an essential role in the enforcement of CITES. Specifically, in the early seventies the WWF not only contributed to the establishment of CITES, but also in order to boost the effectiveness of CITES, the WWF and IUCN created TRAFFIC in 1976, a body whose function is to monitor trade in wildlife and wildlife products. 132 For the most part the Pelly Amendment has served as a deterrent, even though actual punishments given out have actually been slaps on the wrist. 81 provided the U.S. government with an important tool to potentially modify the behavior of whaling states. 133 By 1974 the IWC began to take a stricter conservationist position, in part as a result of Stockholm Conference. International pressure by anti-whaling states and transnational actors for a moratorium continued. Two weeks after Stockholm, the U.S. proposed a ban on commercial whaling at the IWC meeting. While the IWC rejected the moratorium (in part to the efforts of Japan—which had opposed the moratorium at the UN Conference—and the USSR which had boycotted the UN Conference because East Germany had been denied full participation) the IWC showed a willingness to impose more severe restrictions on whaling states and began to give greater weight to the input of the scientific community. The IWC introduced the New Management Procedure (NMP) in 1974 which focused on reducing whale capture to levels deemed consistent with ensuring the survival of stocks in light of improved scientific knowledge. Unlike the previous two decades, which reflected a “free resource” mentality to self-regulation, the IWC began to address the problem of diminishing whale stocks. However, the IWC was still predominately influenced by whaling interests. Although the cetologists (scientists) had increasing influence, they tended to stress conservation identifying the need to maintain whale populations at levels to ensure reproduction over the long term. In contrast, commercial whaling interests gave greater weight to the 133 Activists also believed that additional ground was gained through the passage of the Marine Sanctuaries Act (1972). The Act allowed Congress (under pressure by anti-whaling activists) to establish several marine sanctuaries during the 1970s and 1990s. Some of the sanctuaries established include: the National Marine Sanctuary (North Carolina, 1975); the Key Largo Marine Sanctuary (Florida, 1977); the Channel Islands Marine Sanctuary (California, 1980); the Hawaiian Islands Marine Humpback Sanctuary (Hawaii, 1992). 82 immediate economic return from whaling. 134 This dynamic contributed to the New Management Procedure’s failure. The NMP proved difficult to enforce, since imposing quotas on whaling states translated to their diminishing economic returns. In practice the whaling states understood that there was no real threat of penalty for violating the NMP since there was no way to ensure that states were abiding by the IWCs policies or to monitor the amount of whales being hunted (the system relied on self reporting). At this juncture, the anti-whaling movement began to step up its campaign by expanding its strategies to include the use of information politics and direct action tactics to increase awareness of the whaling issue. This included documenting details of the hunt, influencing the policies of whaling states and monitoring the behavior of whaling states (collecting data) that were in violation of the IWC’s NMP. Stepping up the Transnational Anti-Whaling Campaign In the mid-1970s environmental organizations, including those with a conservationist and preservationist orientation (primarily in the U.S. and U.K.) took up the plight of the whale as an important symbol of environmentalism. Some of these groups were broader environmental organizations such as the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace that added the issue of whaling to its agenda and used it as symbol to further other environmental causes; making whales the “flagship” of the environmental movement. 135 Organizations such as the American Cetacean Society (1967) specifically 134 Peterson (1992:148). 135 Epstein (2005). 83 focused on protecting whales and other cetaceans. 136 The anti-whaling campaign’s target actors were corporations, national and international policymakers and the general public. The tactics of anti-whaling NGOs such as Greenpeace or the American Cetacean society varied although all of them focused on raising public awareness of the whaling issue. Some groups focused on anti-whaling campaigns at the state level by specifically targeting whaling states (Japan, USSR, Australia, and New Zealand). Other groups such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund worked within the international processes to accomplish their goals and worked with states through international organizations. For example, the “Seas Must Live” campaign was a joint effort by the transnational NGO World Wildlife Fund and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to stimulate governments worldwide into taking action on a number of marine conservation issues (of which whaling was a central issue) before certain whale species became extinct. The launch of WWF´s marine campaign "The Seas Must Live" in 1975 enabled the organization to set up sanctuaries for whales, dolphins and seals, and to protect marine turtle nesting sites. The strategies employed against whaling states during this period were influenced by the political opportunity structures within the respective states. This factor also determined whether transnational actors 136 Interestingly, ACS was founded by Bemi DeBus and Clark Cameron who were exploring the notion of eradicating world hunger by "farming" whales, however they discovered that the whales were endangered. They looked for an appropriate conservation group to collaborate with, but found nothing. ACS was launched on November 3, 1967. Its members included yacht owners, scientists, educators and school children. At that time, it was the only whale conservation group in existence and the first to take groups on whale watching trips. 84 pursued strategic goals (issue attention, agenda setting, and monitoring existing regimes) or long-term goals such as influencing domestic or international policy. Group characteristics were significant in explaining transnational environmental action on both the state and international level in that overall, the anti-whaling campaigns reflected a “common advocacy position.” In spite of splits within certain groups over the nature of direct action tactics (e.g., Greenpeace and Sea Shepherds Society 137 ) anti- whaling NGOs shared the common goal of increasing public awareness and eventually ending commercial whaling. The fact that transnational NGOs concerned with whaling were frustrated by the lack of commitment by member states in following the new management procedure also served as an impetus for action. Additionally science played a more significant role in the campaigns--now that science was given greater credibility in influencing whaling policy on the state and international levels, the anti-whaling campaigns began to use science and scientists to support their position for a moratorium. As transnational activists began to step up their attack on pro-whaling states, the strategies of the campaigns varied according to the political opportunity structures in the respective states. Given that the states of Japan and Russia were not open to domestic environmental NGOs, transnational and domestic actors employed other strategies external to the state and attempted to apply pressure (leverage) from other states and the international arena in order to accomplish their goals. This is evident in NGOs such as the Animal Welfare Institute and Friends of the Earth pressuring the U.S. government to 137 Paul Watson left Greenpeace in 1977 and founded the Sea Shepherds Conservation Society. Their parting of ways had to do with the tactics of the group. It appears the split was not amicable, and Watson refers to Greenpeace as the “Avon ladies of the environmental movement.” 85 enforce the Pelly Amendment (1973) against Japanese and Russian whalers as well as applying material leverage to the markets of whaling states. For example, in 1974, the Animal Welfare Institute initiated a boycott against Japan and was later joined by such groups as Friends of the Earth, Fund for Animals, Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federation. The boycott centered on Japan since the U.S. was a leading importer of its consumer goods. While the boycott strategy raised public awareness regarding the issue (issue attention) of whaling the strategy was not successful in changing the behavior of the target actors (Japan). 138 Transnational actors also attempted to influence Japan to stop commercial whaling through letter writing campaigns and circulating petitions. The president of the Datsun Motor Division (now Nissan Motors) reported that he received thousands of letters protesting Japan’s whaling policies. The Japanese government was so concerned over the public outcry denouncing its whaling practices that it hired an American public relations firm to defend the Japanese position. The Japanese position reflected a disagreement as to the declining populations of whale stocks as well as economic interests specific to whaling. Transnational and domestic NGOs through their various state level campaigns sought to change the image of whales to one of living, thinking creatures that possessed a level of intelligence, whose voices they believed needed to be heard. The campaigns’ goals were to stop commercial whaling within whaling states, and they used information and symbolic politics in the process. Transnational actors sought to change cultural 138 See Mandel (1980). 86 norms and attitudes towards whales and attempted to “endear certain animals to people so as to inspire people not to want to consume them—as clothing, food and so forth—but to value their preservation in the wild.” 139 They used photographs, films and audio recordings in their campaigns in their effort to portray whales as a special species deserving not only protection but a voice. The American Cetacean Society used vocalizations known as whale “songs” which functioned as a type of testimonial or story told from the whale’s perspective. School children within whaling and non-whaling states (U.S., U.K. Australia and New Zealand) became inundated with symbolic images of “Willie the Whale” a giant inflatable whale that traveled around several countries educating children about the dangers faced by whale populations (“Willie the Whale” also made appearances at IWC meetings). The Connecticut Cetacean Society (CCS) adopted the sperm whale as its state animal, and in 1975 built “Connie” a forty foot concrete whale that sat outside the Children’s Museum in Hartford. This tactic placed whaling at the center of the local policymaker’s agenda for it was difficult for any state representative not to support the official state animal; especially when it was being hunted by the enemy of the U.S.—the “Russians.” In 1975 some anti-whaling activists began confronting factory ships through direct action tactics to further publicize the issue. These tactics were primarily used against states with limited political opportunity structures. Direct action tactics involved direct confrontation with whaling vessels, filming of the whale hunt and their confrontation with whalers. They also collected and documented evidence of states 139 Wapner (1997). 87 violating international whaling agreements or domestic laws. These strategies proved to have a significant impact within domestic and international spheres providing information to the general public, state governments, and international organizations such as the IWC. They worked to further craft the image of the whale (or frame the issue) as a special creature and a helpless victim in need of protection. The Greenpeace Foundation (founded in 1970 in Vancouver, British Columbia) was the first NGO to employ direct action tactics. The Greenpeace Foundation originated from two groups – the Quakers, primarily war resisters from the United States who had moved to Canada, and the British Columbian members of the Sierra Club. The Sixties-era Sierra Clubbers represented the “Green” and the Quakers represented the “Peace.” It was funded by private contributors and used ocean voyages to challenge whaling states such as Russia by shadowing its whaling ships in an effort to prevent the whales from being hunted. It monitored the whaling ships and collected data on the number of whales hunted. Greenpeace referred to the tactic of confronting and monitoring whaling ships as “bearing witness”. By “bearing witness” activists engaged in direct, nonviolent action that included climbing aboard Russian whaling ships to stop the whalers. By putting themselves physically between whales and ships, Greenpeace believed that this symbolized their level of commitment to the cause. The philosophical stance of “bearing witness” reflected the religious attitude that an atrocity, or injustice, can be challenged by witnessing the crime and reporting to others. Documenting legal and illegal whaling practices through videotapes of whaling vessels harpooning whales (the films were then released to the media in various countries) dramatized the brutality of the whaling 88 industry, raise public awareness in whaling and non-whaling states and demonstrated to the international community that current whaling regulations were not sufficiently constraining the member states. The first confrontation between Russian whalers and Greenpeace was on June 27, 1975. Although the group was not successful in saving the whale from the whalers they had equipped one of their smaller boats with a cameraman, who almost by accident successfully captured the most critical moment of the encounter on film. The incident was subsequently broadcast in the U.S. on Walter Cronkite’s CBS TV News and on almost every major television station in the western world. As a result of Greenpeace’s efforts, for the first time the “Save the Whale” movement was front page news. Robert Hunter, a Greenpeace activist described how the group sought to dislodge the traditional symbols associated with whaling (i.e. brave men battling vicious and numerous monsters of the deep), by documenting a different image: Soon, images would be going out into hundreds of millions of minds around the world, a completely new set of basic images about whaling. Instead of small boats and giant whales, giant boats and small whales; instead of courage killing whales, courage saving whales; David had become Goliath, Goliath was now David; if the mythology of Moby Dick and Captain Ahab had dominated human consciousness about Leviathan for over a century, a whole new age was in the making. 140 Hunter understood the symbolic importance of dramatic images in popular media (symbolic politics). This idea is echoed by former Greenpeace activist Paul Watson, who noted: “When you do an action it goes through the camera and into the minds of people. 140 Day (1987:12). 89 The things that were previously out of sight and out of mind now became commonplace. Therefore you use the media as a weapon.” 141 Aside from collecting dramatic visual images by “bearing witness”, transnational actors monitored and reported the illegal actions of such whaling states as Japan, Norway and Russia. According to IWC regulations, whaling states must have at least one observer on board to document the number of whales taken; it established a self-monitoring system. Understanding that most whaling states did not accurately report their catches to the IWC, transnational actors began to collect data on whaling nations that were violating quotas. On several occasions Russian and Japanese whaling ships were found to have taken undersized whales or to have gone over the IWC quotas. Once the data was collected it was made public. This tactic was meant to publicly embarrass whaling states and urge policymakers to take action. For example, in the U.S, President Gerald Ford threatened to use the Pelly Act (1973) against Russia and Japan when information provided by transnational actors showed that the states violated the IWC quotas by over 3,000 whales each. 142 Such tactics reflect attempts by anti-whaling NGOs to apply political pressure (leverage) from the outside to influence target actors. The threats by the U.S. had only symbolic importance; Japan and Russia were not sanctioned by the IWC or the U.S. They were able to legally exceed quotas without appearing to challenge the IWC’s authority by claiming to misunderstand rulings, hunting unclassified species (such as orcas) and issuing unilateral scientific permits for whaling. 141 Paul Watson quoted in Wapner (1996:54). 142 Day (1987:30). 90 Whaling states would also work with “pirate vessels” or set up ghost corporations in an attempt to cover up their violations. The “pirates” (which included the whaling ship the Sierra whose crew was made up of Norwegians, Japanese, Indian, African and Portuguese sailors) were not only violating the fishing and whaling regulations of several countries but were also whaling throughout the South Atlantic—an area that was established as “off-limits” to hunting by the IWC in the early 1970s. The actions by the pirates functioned to further undermine international attempts to protect endangered whale populations. Transnational actors adjusted their tactics accordingly. Through monitoring these actions, transnational NGOs such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Society were able to expose illegal whaling practices by “pirate whalers” who attempted to circumvent IWC quotas. Data collected by anti-whaling activists demonstrated that whalers were killing critically endangered species such as the humpback, right and blue whales and even killed undersized whales, nursing mothers and calves. In 1975 transnational groups such as Greenpeace, the People’s Trust for Endangered Species and the International Society for the Protection of Animals made the information on the Sierra pirates and their illegal catches public and reports were sent to all IWC Commissioners. The story also broke in the world press with considerable response by the international community. The story gained even more momentum when the pirate vessels were tracked to being registered with a Norwegian bank Forrentingsbanken, although the pirate vessel was also connected to the Sierra Fishing 91 Company of South Africa. 143 In reality Greenpeace exposed the actual owner of the Sierra (25% by a Norwegian company and 75% was owned by a Japanese company the Taiyo Fishing Company). 144 More controversy surrounded the Sierra emerged when the sale of the illegal whale meat that was tracked to the Taiyo Fishing Company was made public by the anti- whaling advocates (specifically Paul Watson of Greenpeace). Japan faced additional embarrassment when the names and photos of Japanese crew members were released to the press. Photos were also released of whale meat falsely labeled “Fresh Frozen Whale Meat. Product of Spain” being taken by the Sierra and loaded on to Japanese cargo ships in the Canary Islands. States implicated as a result of the investigation included Japan, Norway, and South Africa. As a result of the scandal South Africa banned whaling, and the government pursued criminal charges against the pirates. The problem of pirate vessels continued beyond the Sierra: in 1978 a Japanese pirate ship the Tonna (a sister ship of the Sierra) registered with a fake Panamanian company was caught slaughtering whales off the coast of Chile in the Southern Ocean 143 When the director of the Sierra Fishing Company was interviewed by a South African Reporter, and asked about its practices, the response was far from apologetic; stating that the company did not have any obligation to be bound by IWC rules, which the company considered a wishy-washy organization. According to the company director Andrew Behr, there was no reason not to hunt whales endangered or not. After all, he noted, people come first and the company was providing jobs for people. “What difference did it make? He asked. Everyone knows that whales are finished anyway.” See Day (1987:23- 26). This didn’t fare well with the IWC, the last thing they wanted declared was that the whale species was doomed for extinction. 144 Watson, “The Greenpeace Chronicles” (September 1979). http://www.seashepherd.org/editorials 92 which at that time was off limits per the IWC. 145 That same year Greenpeace was able to expand its anti-whaling efforts and purchase another ship, The Rainbow Warrior, with the help of the World Wildlife Fund and the rock group the Beatles. 146 Greenpeace continued its direct action tactics of “bearing witness” confronting whaling ships and specifically had several confrontations with Icelandic whalers in the late 1970s. 147 The actions of the Sierra exposed the weakness of the New Management Procedure, demonstrating how member states contradicted the policies of the IWC and highlighting the inability of IWC to properly monitor whaling states and conserve whale populations. Environmental groups registered violations in an attempt to get them on public record with the IWC. Despite the increasing evidence collected by transnational NGOs, and the increasing international attention, the IWC still did not act upon any of the violations of its members. Transnational actors continued to pressure the IWC through protests and testimonials at IWC meetings. For example, Sir Peter Scott (World Wildlife Fund) addressed the IWC commissioners in 1978 arguing that the New Management Procedure and the quota system were not working; whale populations continued to decline. His concern was that at the current rate that whaling was taking 145 Day (1987:40). Interestingly, this ship was later sunk by a whale, and the criminal actions were fully exposed when the remaining crew members were rescued off the coast of the Canary Islands. 146 A year earlier in 1977 the key founders of Greenpeace parted ways, and Paul Watson created the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. Their main dispute was over how direct their direct tactics should be (Watson took a more aggressive position). 147 In 1978 Sea Shepherd went so far as to ram and cripple the Sierra. In 1980 the Sierra was mysteriously sunk when it was stationed in port in Lisbon. Port authorities assumed that it was Paul Watson and Sea Shepherd, however at the time Watson was in Canada being tried for interfering with the Canadian Seal Harp Campaign. 93 place, it would continue unabated until all whale stocks were commercially extinct; this would serve as the ultimate indictment of the IWC and its policy. 148 Anti-whaling advocates continued to pressure the U.S. government to enforce the Pelly Amendment and use it as leverage against the whaling states violating IWC rules but were unsuccessful in influencing U.S. actions. Although the Carter Administration was publically against whaling as were most members of Congress, the US commissioner to the IWC was not supportive of the anti-whaling movement. A reason for the lack of support by the U.S. IWC commissioner, Dick Frank was revealed when Frank was subsequently hired by the Japanese whaling commissioner as a lobbyist and advisor for the whaling industry. The lack of response by the U.S. government and the IWC served as an impetus for action to end commercial whaling. Another explanation for the U.S. government’s lack of response to the anti- whaling advocates can be traced to the development of the issue of subsistence whaling by indigenous groups which began to emerge around 1977. The U.S. government found itself in a difficult position during this period when the Alaskan Eskimos (Inuit) requested an increase in quotas for a critically endangered species of whale. Anti- whaling activists and indigenous groups such as the Alaskan Eskimos had influence over different agencies/branches of the U.S. government. For example, NOAA, which had the overall responsibility for US whaling policy, worked with the assistance of an interagency group consisting of members from the State, Commerce, and Interior Departments. As interest in whaling issues rose through the 1970s, the interagency group 148 Scott (1977). 94 expanded to include members of Congress and selected private citizens. Both the anti- whaling advocates and the Eskimos had representation in this group and were connected to the U.S. delegations to the IWC meetings. While anti-whaling interests had stronger influence in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Eskimos and Pacific Coast fishers had stronger influence on other key congressional committees such as the House and Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 149 The Alaskan Eskimos had hunted one of the most endangered species of whale, the bowhead. The populations of these whales remained steady (between 3,000 and 4,000) until the 1970s when the Eskimos began increasing their take of whale stocks and the numbers of bowheads fell to 2,000. This alarmed environmental groups who pressured the government to apply the Endangered Species Act in an effort to protect the remaining populations. However the ESA did not apply to subsistence hunters/cultural practices. On the international level, the IWC voted 15-0 for a total ban on bowhead whaling. At the annual meeting in Canbera Australia, the IWC adopted a moratorium on the killing of bowhead whales in the North Pacific by native Alaskans and other aboriginal people. Its action was prompted by the reports of rapidly decreasing numbers of bowheads. The commission’s scientific committee urged the moratorium. The Eskimos reacted angrily and were suspicious that conservationist conspired to have the exemption removed as part of a campaign to prohibit all whaling. 150 149 Peterson (1992:173-174). 150 Walsh (August, 26, 1977). 95 Whaling nations began to use the precarious position between the U.S. and Alaskan Eskimos in regards to the hunting bowheads as political leverage against U.S. conservation efforts and began a bargaining process literally offering to trade bowheads for sperm whales. Specifically, Japan was interested in getting support from the US to increase its quota of sperm whales. Under the U.S. commissioner to the IWC, Dick Frank, deals with the Japanese government were made behind closed doors. For example, in 1977 at a special meeting held in Tokyo, in exchange for the bowheads, the U.S. commissioner agreed to an increase in sperm whale quotas to go from 763 to 6,444. 151 From that time on, the U.S. was not in a position to argue for a moratorium given that it was arguing against protecting one of the most endangered species of whales. In response to the U.S. position, 67 conservation groups signed a letter to President Carter asking that the US not compromise its principles and not to allow anymore secret meetings at the IWC. In contrast to the lack of success in dealing with states like Japan and the U.S. during this period, states like New Zealand and Australia were more responsive to domestic and transnational interests, thus facilitating the ability of domestic and transnational NGOs to pursue their goals. Groups such Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Humane Society of the United States, Sea Shepherds Conservation Society, the IFAW, World Wildlife Federation (WWF), Project Jonah formed The Whaling Coalition and were effective in influencing the policies of these target states which had open, 151 Day (1987:38). 96 responsive political systems and limited economic interest in whaling. Domestic and transnational activists worked within states and across state lines to influence the whaling policies of these states. In New Zealand 152 key transnational actors included Project Jonah (formed in Australia in 1972 to oppose commercial whaling; the New Zealand chapter opened in 1974) and Greenpeace. These NGOs organized community forums and form-letter writing campaigns aimed at the government. Project Jonah, in particular focused on support from children. Form letters were frequently from school children who sent “save the whales” letters to officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The campaign also included rallying public support to persuade the government to return to the IWC 153 ; by 1976 New Zealand had returned to the IWC. Anti-whaling advocates argued that the success of their campaign in New Zealand was primarily due to the fact that the policy position reflected the views held widely in the community. In spite of its small size, Project Jonah along with other transnational and domestic actors successfully incorporated smaller communities into the campaign. According to Project Jonah, communities play a significant role in bringing about environmental change acting as an avenue for community contact with government. This link mechanism worked well in specialized areas, such as whale conservation, where the public's views might otherwise go unnoticed. Their strategy involved establishing 152 Across the broad spectrum of views held within the IWC, New Zealand stands firmly in the preservationist camp. It opposes commercial whaling on principle and is working hard to protect whales worldwide. 153 According to Cawthorn (1999), compared to other whaling states New Zealand was a relatively small player. The state joined the IWC in 1949 with the hope that its participation in the IWC might facilitate increased economic activity. New Zealand withdrew from the Commission in 1968 despite fears from other nations that this move might precipitate further defections from the IWC. 97 dialogues with the community and government and then solutions were discussed. Through letter writing campaigns, circulating petitions and working with local government officials the group played a significant role in the development of the 1978 Marine Mammal Protection Act, which protected all cetaceans and pinnipeds within the waters under New Zealand's jurisdiction. Building on the success in New Zealand, anti-whaling advocates turned their attention to Australia. The Australian case is significant because its position on whaling represented one of the most complete turnabouts in conservationist history. By the end of the decade Australia went from being a pro-whaling state to becoming a fervent anti- whaling state. It was one of the first states to outlaw whaling for ethical and scientific reasons. Domestic NGOs in Australia had actively focused public attention on whaling since the mid-1960s. The campaign became more effective with the formation of the Whale Coalition in 1977 which included such domestic NGOs as Project Jonah and the Australian Conservation Foundation and transnational NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Animal Protection Institute, Oregonians Cooperating to Protect Whales, The Whale Center, and Greenpeace. In addition to the coalition members other transnational and domestic organizations actively campaigned in Australia as well, among them being the Alaska Center for the Environment, Albany conservation Society, American Cetacean Society, Animal Liberation, Animal Welfare Institute, Australian Mammal Society, Connecticut Cetacean Society, International Society for the Protection of Animals, National Audubon Society, Whale Protection Fund and the World Wildlife Fund. 98 As in New Zealand, the anti-whaling coalition pursued a policy of public education and political lobbying to end whaling in Australia, and emphasized the benefits that whales bring to society which included tourism and entertainment, as well as the broader aesthetic and cultural value of whales. The coalition argued that these values should be taken into consideration in whaling management. Transnational and domestic actors were effective in their use of broad non-confrontational tactics to influence public opinion. As a result of domestic political pressure and international censure, Australian whaling became less popular among the public and government officials--by the summer of 1977 more than 70% of the Australian public was against whaling. 154 During 1977-78 over 37,000 letters were sent to the Prime Minister calling for an end to whaling in Australia (14,000 were from Australia and the remainder were from overseas). Additionally, activists circulated over 78 petitions presented to Parliament calling for an end to whaling and for the closure of the Cheynes Beach Whaling Company. The Australian Conservation Foundation also administered a similar petition to the IWC and to the states of Japan and the former USSR. 155 The coalition also used direct action tactics-- zodiacs (boats) used by the Whale and Dolphin Coalition followed the Cheynes Beach Whaling Company into the waters off the Australian coast to interfere with their whaling activities. The direct action tactics provided another venue for the coalition to bring the whaling issue to the public’s attention. 154 See Day (1987) and The Whale Coalition (1979). 155 The Whale Coalition (1979:183-194). 99 As in the New Zealand case, Project Jonah focused on public education and worked closely with school children on the issue. One of the leading anti-whaling advocates was 11 year-old Phoebe Fraser, the daughter of the Prime Minister Malcolm Frasier. Throughout her father’s political campaign she wore a “Save the Whales” badge. During the campaign she told representatives that her father was coming under pressure from home to stop the killing of whales. 156 As a result of the media attention, and pressure by coalition members, the newly elected Prime Minister Frasier publicly announced that he was going to authorize an independent inquiry into Australian whaling policy. The central question confronting the inquiry was whether the whale is a species of wildlife that should be absolutely protected or whether it may be properly exploited as a renewable natural resource. Ultimately, the Australian government supported the preservationist position, arguing that this reflected the views of the state and its civil society. As Sir Sidney Frost, a jurist and Chairman of the Inquiry noted: It is not only opinion polls that show a significant support for an end to whaling. Project Jonah points to the very strong support from children and their teachers on this issue, an emotive issue as it may be for young people. There are also a strong number of conservation organizations all of them with the support of very large numbers of members, arguing that whales should be protected. They include Project Jonah, the Australian Conservation Foundation, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace. The same view is taken by the Governments of New South Wales and South Australia…It was submitted by Project Jonah that on the basis of demonstrated public attitudes and opinions, the killing of whales is wrong in the eyes of the Australian community. The submission then went on to suggest that the continuation of whaling by Australia would outrage a significant proportion of the population. The latter view is one which the Inquiry agrees. 157 156 Day (1987). 157 The Whale Coalition (1979:193). 100 The outcome of the inquiry included the following: 1) a permanent ban on whaling in Australia within the 200-mile limit of its waters; 2) a ban on the import of all whale products and goods; 3) an Australian policy of working for a worldwide ban on commercial whaling. 158 The effectiveness of this coalition was due to both domestic and international timing. Given the increasing international attention to the whaling issue as a result of the direct action, the passage of domestic legislation in the early 1970s with the MMPA in the U.S., the Stockholm Conference, CITES, the success in New Zealand, and the support of the scientists (at this time several studies stressed the need for strict conservation efforts), the coalition was able to convince the Australian government to ban commercial whaling by 1979. Domestic and transnational NGOs were effective as a result of the international developments during the 1970s that established the global environmental norm of protecting whales. Domestically, there were several reasons why the coalition was effective in influencing its target actors. First, domestic and transnational activity was facilitated through the political opportunity structure--transnational and domestic actors had access to the state. The state allowed for active participation and input from all interests. Second, the interests of the activists did not challenge the dominant paradigm in Australia, nor did it severely threaten a thriving commercial industry-- at the time there 158 The Whaling Question published by the Whale Coalition (1979) provides a full report of the Australian Inquiry by Sir Sidney Frost. 101 was only one whaling company actively whaling in Australia. These same domestic conditions hold true in the case of New Zealand as well. In many ways the year 1979 was an important turning point in the development of the anti-whaling movement and developments at the IWC enabled anti-whaling actors to achieve both strategic and long-term goals. First, the IWC established the Indian Ocean Sanctuary. 159 The establishment of the Indian Ocean Sanctuary was a result of the efforts of a coalition of states (Seychelles and France) and non-state actors such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, Animal Welfare Institute and the International Society for the Protection of Animals. Second, whale quotas (or allowable catches) were significantly reduced at the 1979 IWC meeting—from 23,520 to 15, 650 tons. This decrease in the quota allowed by the IWC was a direct result of the ability of transnational actors (both preservationists and conservationists) to infiltrate the central committee of the IWC—the Scientific Committee. The reorganization of the Scientific Committee in 1977 allowed advisers from UNEP, FAO, and the IUCN to be added to the nationally appointed members and the meetings of the Scientific Committee were now open to scientists and observers from NGOs. Although the changes were intended to increase the weight of independent scientific advice, it transformed the Scientific Committee in other ways as well—not only increasing its transparency but also giving anti-whaling actors direct access to the committee. 159 Sanctuaries are a sub-issue of the regulatory nature of the IWC—these are designated areas the IWC has made “off-limits” to whalers although scientific and subsistence whaling can still legally continue in these waters. The sanctuaries act as buffers and offer extended protection to whales, this is especially relevant in the context of a potential reversal of the moratorium on commercial whaling. 102 Transnational NGOs took advantage of this restructuring and began to fund their own research projects. Specifically at the 1979 IWC meeting, the People’s Trust for Endangered Species presented their own scientific studies on whale populations to the Scientific Committee. When these studies were compared with the data of the Scientific Committee’s scientists there were discrepancies. For the most part, the data collected by the Committee was either extremely suspect or missing. During this time some of the scientists on the Committee were employed by the whaling interests, essentially questioning the credibility IWC’s Scientific Committee and its findings on whale populations. For the most part, accurate reports on whale populations did not exist or were continually biased in favor of the whaling interests. The degree of scientific uncertainty was so widespread and the problems associated with the New Management Procedure were so unsolvable that even members of the Scientific Committee noted that the only way to assure stocks were not overexploited was through a moratorium. The third successful development in 1979 was that the dialogue for placing a commercial ban on pelagic whaling began and it would soon become the central issue debated at the next two IWC meetings. An additional development in the United States that would eventually help further the anti-whaling movement’s influence at the IWC was the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 by the US Senate in 1979. The amendment was in response to the unwillingness of the Carter Administration to use the Pelly Amendment to sanction Japan, ultimately giving the U.S. government more leverage against whaling states. The 1979 Packwood-Magnuson 103 Amendment allowed the United States to exclude or suspend fishing privileges within a 200 mile limit in U.S. waters for nations acting contrary to IWC guidelines. Senator Bob Packwood the co-sponsor of pointed out that any nation that violated the IWC’s regulations (regardless of the nation’s membership within the IWC) would be sanctioned; and that the sanctions were not dependent on the whim of an administration, but required by US law. This amendment gave the US the potential to bully states to change their whaling practices or their vote at the IWC meetings in support of a ban on commercial whaling. 160 Towards the end of the 1970’s some important international developments provided the states with the potential to protect and or conserve whale populations and further established the international norm of protecting whales. Specifically, the UN Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) was significant in that it established a state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Under this treaty states can maintain, conserve and protect their marine resources. The UN Law of the Sea Convention granted coastal states ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources.’ Specifically, Article 65, which deals with "Marine Mammals," provides that states shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case 160 Friedheim (2001:208). For the most parts the Magnusun-Packwood Amendment has been used for political reasons, as seen in the willingness of the United States under the Reagan Administration to invoke the amendment against the Soviet Union in 1983, yet unwillingness to use it against Japan after it began catching sperm whales in 1984 which was in violation of the IWC ban. Japan and the U.S. government negotiated an agreement that by 1987 it would stop hunting sperm whales (which were endangered) and by 1988 it would stop commercial hunting altogether. Conservation and animal welfare groups subsequently filed a suit to overturn the agreement between the U.S. and Japan and to force the U.S. government to enforce the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. 104 of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management and study. Additionally, Article 65 stipulates: “States must abide by the regulations of the IWC whether or not they are Parties to the Whaling Convention, except where they adopt stricter measures for the conservation of whales.” 161 UNCLOS created the potential for states to invoke their right of the EEZ against states that are whaling in their waters. There exists a clear relationship between the UNCLOS and the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and its influence on international law in that the UNCLOS recognizes that the IWC is the "appropriate international organization" for cetacean conservation under the treaty. 162 1979 was also the year that the U.S., the U.K, France, Germany and several developing countries signed on to the Convention on Migratory Species (Bonn Convention) which assigned a protective status to migratory species including whales. CMS or Bonn Convention aimed to conserve terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species and their habitats on a global scale. The Bonn Convention functions as an intergovernmental treaty under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 163 Its passage reflected further international support for the norm of protecting migratory species such as whales. 161 Stoett (1997:68). 162 Several scholars suggest that the influence of the IWC is in fact diminishing and question its enforcement capabilities in maintaining the moratorium on commercial whaling. See Friedheim (2001) and Stoett (1997). 163 CMS is another international convention concerned with the conservation and management of biological diverity. Like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the Convention on Migratory Species is concerned with the conservation and management of biological biodiversity. These 105 Conclusion The anti-whaling case is significant because it was one of the first transnational campaigns and established the “whale” as a species in need of protection. By its nature, the whaling issue is transnational. The anti-whaling movement and its various organizations came out of the environmental movement of late 1960s in addition to concerns regarding whale populations put forth by the scientific community. Early international conferences such as the Stockholm Conference in 1972 reflected international concerns about the environment and provided the “global spaces” that facilitated transnational action. Successes and failures of domestic and transnational anti- whaling campaigns appear to influence action. For example, early legislative successes in such western states as the U.S. with the passage of the Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA) provided an impetus for action. The failures associated with the lack of response of whaling states receiving pressure from transnational groups, and the inability of the IWC to enforce its regulations also influenced transnational action. Domestic and transnational actors were able to accomplish their goals on several levels and this was facilitated by transnational action on the issue. This was due in part to treaties are specific in their field of application. Each of these conventions serves a particular purpose and, in terms of their stated aims, they are largely complementary to one another. CITES, for example, is concerned with aspects of international trade in wildlife, and attempts to mitigate threats arising from excessive international commerce in live animals and products derived from them. Yet it has no direct jurisdiction over the harvesting of wildlife within a country. CMS, on the other hand, is expressly intended to address problems of domestic consumption of endangered wildlife and works to foster international co- operation to achieve conservation objectives. Both of these conventions attempt to deal with all aspects of the problem at hand and are mutually dependent. Specifically, CMS or the Bonn Convention is the only global intergovernmental treaty, concerned exclusively with the conservation of migratory species and the habitats on which they depend. It provides a forum through which Governments around the world can communicate directly with one another on issues pertaining to the conservation of migratory animals. (www.cms.int) 106 group characteristics and the existence of a common advocacy position found within the whaling movement. Preservationist and conservationists shared the common goals of making the public and policymakers aware of the issue of whaling and anti-whaling NGOs were effective in increasing public awareness of the whaling issue through direct action tactics and public awareness/educational programs. By “bearing witness” and framing the issue in the context of innocent victims in need of protection, domestic and transnational NGOs were able to draw public sympathy for the plight of the whale. Direct action tactics also exposed the weaknesses of the IWC’s New Management Procedure in their data collection and monitoring of whaling states and tracking pirate vessels such as the Sierra that were found to have connections to IWC member states including Japan and Norway. These tactics represented a form of symbolic politics aimed at raising public consciousness and changing perceptions regarding whales and whaling as well as accountability politics, exposing the failure of states to adhere to international norms The effectiveness of anti-whaling campaigns at the state level in such states as Australia and New Zealand was also due to transnational action. These cases also demonstrate that political opportunities available to domestic and transnational groups not only facilitated action but also influence the ability of anti-whaling actors to accomplish their goals of issue attention, agenda setting and influencing the behavior of states (target actors). Anti-whaling campaigns were not always effective in achieving the goal of influencing target actors in their attempts to modifying state behavior or international 107 regimes. Specifically, the lack of commitment by the U.S. government to support anti- whaling efforts in the mid-late 1970s, its support of the continued hunting of the critically endangered species of whale (bowhead) by indigenous groups and its unwillingness to use the Pelly Amendment against whaling states violating international and domestic law did influence the ability of the movement to alter the behavior of such whaling states as Japan. It highlights how even powerful states such as the U.S. are still constrained by domestic influences (indigenous groups) and transnational relations (trade with Japan). The boycotts initiated against Japan also proved to be ineffective in influencing the whaling policies of Japan (in part due to Japan’s denial of scientific data indicating that whale populations were at risk) and while material leverage (boycotts) raised international public attention, domestic and transnational activists were constrained by the political, cultural and economic interests of states. The ratification of various international treaties such as the Antarctic Treaty (1958), the Stockholm Conference (1972) and the Bonn Convention (1979) all further established the cultural norm of protecting marine resources. The 10 year moratorium proposed at the Stockholm Conference would prove to be an important indicator of the nature of policy that would come out of the 1980s. Frustration with the IWCs inability to control whaling states such as Japan and the Soviet Union led transnational actors to adopt new diplomatic strategies inside and outside of the IWC. Ultimately, transnational NGOs came to the realization that in order to win their “Whale War” the focus must be on high-jacking the institutional processes of the IWC. 108 109 Chapter 3: The Anti-Whaling Campaign into the 1980s and Beyond Domestic and transnational environmental NGOs were effective in influencing domestic and international public opinion with respect to whales during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the agreements, conferences and domestic legislation of this period demonstrated that individual states and increasingly a “community of states” acknowledged the need for a more effective method for protecting whales. The international conventions identified early on that measures were necessary to conserve whale populations, as seen in the 1972 Stockholm Conference which had called for an international moratorium, although the International Whaling Commission (IWC) did not support this recommendation. Scientists in the IWC continued to stress a more limited position on conservation in their recommendations, which led to the passage of the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) by the IWC. During the late 1970s and early 1980s environmental and animal rights groups lobbied heavily to convince the IWC member states to change their positions. By 1980 there was an influx of new actors on the scene (anti-whaling interests including both states and NGOs) that changed the composition of the IWC and its policies. 164 This chapter examines how transnational activists were able to effectively influence the passage of a moratorium by organizing across state lines and utilizing international 164 There was a significant increase in the number of environmental NGOs on the international scene; their membership and their resources increased as well. For example, Greenpeace (Canadian) began in 1970 with only a handful of activists, by 1980 it had over 1 million members and a by 2003 it had a budget of over 100 million dollars, and had internationalized with satellite offices throughout the world. The original group began its first transnational environmental campaign in 1971 when the U.S. announced a plan to detonate a nuclear test bomb Amchitka Island, off the coast of Alaska. 110 processes provided by the IWC. It also examines the campaigns to protect whales since the moratorium of 1982. These campaigns include the campaign to maintain the IWC moratorium and block the passage of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS), as well as campaigns to protect the habitat of whales, among them the Mitsubishi Campaign, the Sakahlin Island Campaign and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary Campaign. In all cases group characteristics, domestic and global factors explain the reasons for transnational activism. In addition, transnational activism has played a significant role in contributing to the effectiveness of the various campaigns. Transnational Activism, the IWC and the Whaling Moratorium In the early 1980s transnational NGOs begin to further utilize international processes and increase their presence and participation at IWC meetings in their efforts to convince member states to approve a moratorium on whaling. Transnational action was a central in influencing the outcomes of IWC meetings. NGOs had been present at IWC meetings since 1965 when the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) sent observers, and subsequently NGOs such as the Animal Welfare Institute, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace began attending IWC meetings as well. NGO attendance at IWC meetings increased from just a few in 1972 to fifty-seven by 1980. Greenpeace, attending only since 1978, soon turned out to be the most important, influential and aggressive anti- whaling NGO and would play a significant role in the negotiation processes at the IWC meetings. 165 For example, at the meetings, Greenpeace provided photographic evidence 165 Andresen and Skodvin (2007:127). 111 of whaling states such as South Korea violating its IWC quotas and regulations. Greenpeace also exposed an on-going Japanese-South Korean-Taiwanese underground cartel that illegally imported Taiwanese whale meat from Korea into Japan presenting evidence that South Korea had mislabeled whale meat as being Bryde’s whales when what was hunted were endangered whales such as the fin and right whales. In addition to providing testimonials and evidence at IWC meetings, anti-whaling activists worked through the international process created by the IWC. Recognizing the strategic opportunity provided by the convention’s structure, and working within the rules of the IWC, transnational activists concentrated on bringing in a sufficient number of new anti-whaling states to join the organization, which could ultimately influence the passage of a moratorium. This was an easy way to manipulate votes since membership in the IWC was open to all states regardless of a state’s whaling activity. NGOs not only drafted instruments of accession for new states they also paid the membership fees for these states and represented them at meetings. They even “bribed” them by offering foreign aid to join or take certain positions. Specifically, Greenpeace added six new anti- whaling members from 1978-1982 and paid their annual dues, drafted the states’ membership documents, briefed states on their positions, and appointed the states’ commissioner to represent them, at an annual cost of more than $150,000. 166 Several NGOs also formed branches in the IWC member states to convince local populations to 166 DeSombre (2001:187). There are several stories documenting the influence of NGOs over these states. For example, the IWC secretary recalls how an unnamed member state signed over a check from an NGO to pay its dues; or when a representative from a recently joined non-whaling state showed up late for a meeting and had to ask directions to the NGO section in order to get his briefing book from the organization that had prepared it for him. 112 pressure their own governments to turn against whaling. Two such states that eventually changed their positions were Argentina and Uruguay. Working within the state continued to be an effective strategy for anti-whaling activists. 167 Another important factor that explains the effectiveness of transnational actors to initiate change in the IWC’s position on whaling was that transnational NGOs received support from the United States on this issue, given that the U.S. had significant influence over other states. Unlike the previous decade, when US support for an international moratorium waned under IWC commissioner Frank, the US began pushing an anti- whaling platform to further its leverage over such states as Japan and the Soviet Union. U.S. legislation such as the Magnusson-Packwood and Pelly Amendments could be used in several ways to further the interests of the U.S. (and the interests of the anti-whaling movement). They could be used to bring anti-whaling states that were not members of the IWC into the agreement and to bring about changes in the whaling policies of nations within the agreement. During this period, the United States threatened Japan, Iceland and Norway with economic sanctions if they did not change their policies in accordance with the U.S. position. 168 The threat of unilateral economic sanctions under these amendments was a significant factor that influenced the decline of the number of whaling states in the 1980s. As a result of the politics surrounding the Cold War (democratic capitalism vs. communism) it was in the interest of the U.S. to maintain an anti-whaling position 167 DeSombre (2002:138). 168 Andresen and Skodvin (2007:137). 113 internationally since the Soviet Union was a pro-whaling state. This influenced the ability of transnational actors to wage an effective campaign. In their efforts to pass the moratorium, NGOs focused on setting the tone and agenda for the 1982 IWC meeting, and employed several strategies to increase international awareness of the whaling issue. For example, one week before the Conference Greenpeace mounted a media campaign and received international press coverage of their efforts to stop a whaling ship in Siberia. Crew members of the Rainbow Warrior were detained by a Soviet whaling ship after the group attempted to distribute anti-whaling leaflets to crew members of the ship. While on board, Greenpeace filmed the ship’s processing plant before being released by the Soviets. This event provided a type of political theatre, and given the climate of the Cold War (East vs. West) it received world-wide attention by the media. The following week, at the IWC meeting Greenpeace showed the footage, which included the processing of whale meat into animal food which was in direct violation of IWC regulations. 169 Other events such as rallies and demonstrations took place before and during the IWC meetings. For example, two days before the 1982 IWC conference in Brighton (U.K.) the Friends of the earth launched the “Last Whale Rally” in London, which was attended by over 20,000 people. According to the FOE organizer, it was the largest animal rights rally ever held. The timing was right for NGOs to push for a moratorium and at the 1982 IWC meeting the anti-whaling activist got what they wanted—a ban on commercial whaling (which would go into effect beginning in the 1985-1986 season). NGO efforts 169 The AP. July 21, 1983. 114 domestically and internationally were effective at several levels. Through documentation, testimonials and direct action tactics NGOs effectively pushed the issue on the agenda of the public and policymakers. Transnational activists also highlighted the inability of the IWC to prevent significant reductions in the stocks of major whale species or to monitor whaling states. Although other factors such as the declining economic interest of states to continue commercial whaling (whether this decision was voluntary or involuntary, i.e., the “bribing” and “bullying” of IWC members/target actors) and U.S. support on this issue influenced the passage of the 1982 moratorium, transnational NGOs successfully exerted considerable influence on the framing on the whaling issue, as well as shaping the negotiation outcome. A critical feature of the multilateral negotiations regarding the moratorium was its dependence upon the formation of winning coalitions to influence outcomes. These coalitions consisted of “like-minded states” and NGOs. Countries that were most vulnerable to NGO pressures were those that aspired to belong to a “normative community of states,” 170 and anti-whaling NGOs were able to effectively use moral leverage to garner support for the moratorium. 171 The effectiveness of the campaign to end commercial whaling can be attributed to transnational environmental activists followed by an attentive audience in the post-material generation of industrialized 170 Keck and Sikkink (1998). 171 Epstein (2006:58) concludes that the moratorium on commercial whaling was obtained on the political rather than the scientific battleground and that in elevating the whale as the international symbol for endangered species anti-whaling NGOs were able to influence cetologists’ practices in accordance with the whale’s new political significance: “This shift in the way the whale was perceived would alter the way in which it was studied.” 115 states. 172 The whaling issue provided these states with the opportunity to respond to the growing concern of industrialized societies regarding the global environmental crisis. The campaign by transnational NGOs to influence IWC members to pass an international moratorium on whaling influenced the development of the cultural norm of preserving whales. This norm was established internationally once the moratorium passed. Transnational NGOs were also able to raise awareness of the whaling issue and ultimately create an alliance between those who opposed whaling on moral grounds (preservationists) and those who opposed it in order to replenish whale stocks for the future (conservationists), which was sufficient to support a moratorium on commercial whaling (at least in the short term). The problem for the future was that it was a weak alliance and ultimately a temporary coalition that would prove difficult to maintain and not ideologically cohesive enough to keep the moratorium in place. 173 The concept of a moratorium doesn’t entitle whales to the right to life, because a moratorium implies temporal limitations among whaling activities. While preservationists would prefer a 172 Epstein (2006:46). 173 That a moratorium can end, with a resumption of whaling, is explicit in the “global commons” recommendation of the World Conservation Strategy an organization commissioned by the United Nations Environmental Program. The World Conservation Strategy (WCS) was commissioned in 1980, and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) provided the financial support for its preparation and contributed to the evolution of its basic themes and structure. This document presents the aim of the WCS. It explains the contribution of living resource conservation to human survival and to sustainable development, identifies the priority conservation issues and the main requirements for dealing with them and proposes ways for effectively achieving the Strategy’s goals. The recommendation of the WCS called for a moratorium to be extended to all commercial whaling until the consequences of removing large populations of whales can be predicted. 116 total moratorium based on the concept of “entitlement” to life, the prevailing conservationist perspective was based on the continuation of living resource conservation to human survival and sustainable development. Epstein notes that “the IWC became the new green club, where states could cast themselves as taking the green turn called for by their populations…doing something about the whales had been successfully framed by the anti-whaling campaign as preserving them from the whalers.” 174 For many states the protection of whales was an easy issue to support given that they had limited economic costs in supporting the whaling issue. Transnational Activism after the Moratorium 175 : The IWC, The Revised Management Scheme (RMS) and the Clash of Preservationist/Conservationists Perspectives The preservationist position that the IWC had taken has come under strain since in the late 1980s as conservationists argued that various species were sufficiently populous to allow limited hunts. The sharp controversy between those interests that wish to resume some whaling and those opposed to it has led the pro-whaling interests to question the legitimacy of the IWC's decisions. Annual IWC meetings during the early 1990s have focused on crafting an acceptable revision to the moratorium to provide the basis for the 174 Epstein (2006:47). 175 After the passage of the moratorium transnational NGOs continued their campaigns against whaling states. For example, transnational actors such as Greenpeace continued to coordinate activities to influence states and their positions on whaling. It threatened to enforce a boycott of Norwegian fish products and the US government threatened Norway with economic sanctions. In 1986 Norway decided to stop commercial whaling. Additionally, in 1988 Greenpeace mounted a campaign in the US, UK and Germany to convince individuals and institutions not to buy Icelandic fish. They reported failure in the UK but success in the US and Germany. Iceland facing similar pressures to Norway, (it is estimated that Iceland’s loss of revenue during this time as a result of the boycott was approximately 30 million dollars) and stopped its scientific whaling in 1989. 117 resumption of limited commercial whaling, as well as to review the status of whale populations that some nations sought to resume harvesting commercially. This development has heated the debate at IWC meetings and within the movement in general. The ideological division among environmental NGOs and states has been exemplified by the adoption of what is known as the Revised Management Scheme (RMS). The RMS would allow for limited commercial whaling of whale species whose populations were no longer threatened allowing for “sustainable” whaling of these species. The differing positions regarding the RMS reflect the division between the conservationists and preservationist perspectives. Some environmental organizations such as the World Conservation Society, the Group to Preserve Whale Dietary Culture and Friends of Whales along with the pro-whaling states such as Japan, Norway and Iceland, argue that adopting the RMS would ensure that pro-whaling states would stay within the IWC guidelines for sustainable “catches” (i.e. the number of catches allotted to each state). Pro-Whaling Interests and the RMS As noted above, an important aspect influencing the passage of the moratorium was the scientific uncertainty surrounding the status of key whale stocks. A condition of the moratorium was that a comprehensive scientific assessment of potentially exploitable whale stocks was to be carried out in the future. Since the early 1990s, the Scientific Committee’s recommendations have favored the implementation of the Revised Management Scheme and the resumption of commercial whaling of certain species. Pro- whaling states have launched large-scale scientific programs (following the guidelines put forth by the RMS) with some states having returned to whaling. The aim was to 118 provide scientific evidence that sustainable commercial whaling was possible since their data indicated that some species had recovered. In Norway, for example, scientists working for the Norwegian government presented strong scientific evidence to support its decision to resume commercial whaling in 1993. Similarly in Japan, the government was committed to resume whaling based on its own team of scientists that suggested that whale populations had recovered and could be hunted in a sustainable manner. 176 Pro-whaling interests have also formed alliances to influence whaling policy, and serve as an important counterveiling force to the preservationists within the IWC. These alliances include: the World Conservation Trust 177 , the High North Alliance 178 and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAAMCO). 179 The time and energy 176 Ishii and Ayako (2007) suggest that the IWC has been one of the few negotiation arenas where Japan is at the center of world attention, since it is the only major whaling nation that must negotiate with the anti- whaling nations to lift the 1982 moratorium before resuming commercial whaling. Japan’s whaling diplomacy has thus attracted the attention of not only the IWC participants but also numerous scholars who are struggling to explain the underlying reasons for Japan’s behavior in the IWC and its rejection of the anti-whaling norm (55). The existing literature presupposes that Japan is seriously trying to resume commercial whaling, and the authors attempt to explain Japan’s diplomacy in regards to this issue arguing that the domestic political structure of Japan has insulated Japanese whaling policy (56). 177 The World Conservation Trust is an NGO committed to sustainable use of marine and terrestrial resources. Its mission is to promote the sovereign right of states in their conservation efforts and to develop a better understanding and tolerance of different cultures and their relationship to nature. See www.IWMC.org. 178 The organization was established in response to the campaigns calling for a total ban on all commercial whaling and sealing. HNA's task is to provide alternative information to these campaigns. The organization's objective is to protect the rights of whalers, sealers and fishermen to harvest renewable resources in accordance with the principle of sustainable management. HNA also works towards consolidating the knowledge and skills necessary for the ecologically sound management of marine mammal resources. See www.highnorth.no. 179 The moratorium on commercial whaling led Iceland to withdraw in protest from IWC, as it had threatened to do if the moratorium was extended. Both Japan and Norway also threatened to leave the organization. In April 1992, the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) was established by the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and Norway under the Agreement on Cooperation in Research, 119 whaling states have put into garnering votes, protecting their industries, and trying to overturn the moratorium has mirrored the energy the anti-whaling states have put into protecting the moratorium. 180 The pro-whaling coalitions have been adamant about maintaining their sovereign right to whale. In the case of Japan they also invoke cultural arguments suggesting that “eco-terrorists” (environmental groups) infringe upon their cultural right to whale. The 1992 IWC meeting was particularly contentious as anti-whaling interests took the first steps to end the 6-year moratorium and potentially permit a limited resumption of commercial whaling on biologically healthy whale populations. This proposal was defeated as a result of the positions of anti-whaling states (U.S., France, Australia, the U.K. and New Zealand) in addition to the lobbying by anti-whaling NGOs. The next year, Philip Hammond, the Chairman of the IWC Scientific Committee resigned in protest over the inability of the IWC to adopt the RMS. 181 In 1994 IWC commissioners adopted the RMS, but noted that for the RMS to be implemented and the moratorium on commercial whaling lifted, an inspection and observation scheme had to be put in place to ensure that agreed catch limits were not exceeded. Several states that had supported the moratorium changed their positions and supported the adoption of the RMS, accepting the argument that it would ensure that the world’s whales were properly “conserved”. These states include: Denmark, Sweden, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic. The document clearly responded to what the drafters regarded as inappropriate whale protectionist tendencies of the IWC. 180 DeSombre (2001:193). 181 Stoett (1997). 120 Switzerland, Netherlands and the United States. Pro-whaling states such as Japan, Norway and Iceland have been accused by anti-whaling activists of bribing states to change their vote in support of the RMS. They claim that Japan bribed and brought a number of non-whaling states into the agreement by offering financial assistance. For example, Japan had targeted Seychelles, a leading advocate of whale conservation (originally brought in by anti-whaling NGOs) and offered to finance a fishing vessel for the Seychelles to do research and training, but threatened to withhold the grant ($40 million) if the country did not withdraw its support for the moratorium. 182 Essentially pro-whaling states have employed the same tactics used against them in the 1980s by the anti-whaling NGOs in order to influence IWC policy. Indigenous groups have also looked to the IWC for recognition and support for their cultural practices of whaling. The Makah tribe (Washington State) serves as a case in point. Historically, the Makah were granted the legal right to kill whales in the 1855 treaty of Neah bay, in which the tribe ceded the majority of their land at Cape Flattery to the U.S. government. Their fishing, sealing and whaling rights were explicitly provided for in the treaty. The tribe had ceased their ceremonial whale hunts in the 1920s however, when gray whale populations were to near extinction. With the recovery of the gray whale populations, the Makah sought to practice whaling once again. The tribe argued that their culture had disintegrated since the cessation of whaling and that the last two generations have not known the tradition and pride that came with ceremonial hunting. 182 DeSombre (2001:188). 121 The tribe also argued that they have nutritionally suffered from not having a seafood and sea mammal meat diet. Restoring the tradition of whale hunting, they claimed would result in the restoration of their culture. 183 Presenting their argument to the IWC the Makah tribe requested that they be able to resume traditional whaling. In 1995 the IWC granted the tribe permission to return to its cultural practice of subsistence whaling. 184 In addition, in 2007 the IWC granted a five-year extension for the Native populations in Alaska (the Aleut, Inuit), Russia (Chukchi, Inuit), Greenland (Inuit) and indigenous peoples in the Caribbean islands of St. Vincent and Grenadines (Bequian). 185 The IWC has continued to place more weight on the scientific community’s recommendations; even decisions regarding indigenous rights to whale regulation have been left to the scientists. For example, at the 2007 IWC convention in Alaska, the Inuit (Greenland) requested an increase in minke whales quota from 175 to 200, along with two bowhead whales and ten humpback whales. The IWC did not support the proposal 183 See Enger and Smith (1999). 184 The Makah people are also monitored by domestic agencies. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Makah tribal council, and the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission all put forth a management plan that explicitly defines quotas, hunting techniques, area restrictions and monitoring the enforcement of regulations. Additionally, the National Marine Fisheries Service has played an active part in defining sustainable populations of whales and other marine animals. The Makah are subject to strict regulation and are under careful surveillance of their whaling practice. In 2007 the Makah Tribal Council publicly apologized for the illegal shooting of a resident gray whale by five of their tribal members. The killing was in violation of US law, IWC regulations and the laws of the Makah nation. 185 The IWC has also granted subsistence quotas to Russian Inuit and Chukchi, Greenlandic Inuit and Caribbean Bequian whalers (Barsh, 2001:167). Critics charge that Japan and Norway are behind the funding for these groups to continue their whaling efforts For example, environmentalist allege that the Makah have received funding from Japan and Norway to support their campaign for whaling. Both of these countries host commercial whaling industries and allowing the tribe to resume hunting, environmentalist argue, sets an important precedent for the Japanese and Norwegians to argue for “cultural” subsistence whaling. 122 because scientists advising the IWC were not sure that the populations had recovered sufficiently to support the increase. As one delegate to the IWC suggested, “we can only support a quota that is scientifically based.” 186 The Campaign to Stop the Moratorium RMS This Revised Management Scheme represented a new chapter and challenge for the anti-whaling movement. Although the 1982 moratorium was never supposed to be permanent, this is not how the preservationist-minded NGOs within the anti-whaling movement viewed it. The efforts of the anti-whaling movement now involved not only the goal of maintaining the moratorium on all commercial whaling and stopping the implementation of the RMS; but also finding non-lethal/humane methods of “scientific whaling” since the IWC allows whaling for “scientific” purposes. Because the preservationists (states and NGOs) could no longer defend a moratorium on purely scientific grounds, they have turned to ethical arguments. Such ethical arguments make up the “ideological glue” that hold anti-whaling states and non state actors together in their preservationist positions. 187 However, sometimes the “ideological glue” is construed as a type of western imperialism. Pro-whaling interests including states and indigenous groups argue that the anti-whaling forces are attempting to impose their values at the expense of the whaling interests’ cultural autonomy. 186 “Aboriginal Whale Quotas Renewed” May 30, 2007. Reuters. http://www.alertnet.org/ thenews/ newsdesk/N29355755.htm 187 Friedheim (2001:12). The author argues that these actors reflect the views provided by “deep ecologists” who strive to “cultivate a deep consciousness and awareness of organic unity of the holistic nature of the ecological webs in which every individual is enmeshed”. This falls in line with environmental NGOs committed to preserving whales since they consider it an ethical imperative to preserve all animals. 123 Anti-whaling NGOs have been directing their campaigns towards maintaining the continuity of the position of the IWC (maintaining the moratorium by challenging the implementation of the RMS) and they have been effective in stopping the implementation of the RMS. Once again, transnational environmental NGOs have been focusing their efforts on issue creation and agenda setting at the state and international levels. Transnational action has played a critical role in the campaigns to stop the RMS. Through such strategies as information, symbolic, accountability and leverage politics the anti-whaling campaigns have attempted to maintain the moratorium by framing the debate around the implementation of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS). The activists understand that the decision to implement the RMS rests entirely on the shoulders of the scientists on the Scientific Committee, and thus have used their own “scientific experts” to support the legitimacy of their position. They have also tied the issue of protecting whale populations to the larger issues of global warming, pollution and other factors that affect the whale’s habitat. For example, Greenpeace has urged the government representatives at the IWC to change their focus away from the exploitation and toward the strict conservation of whales, emphasizing the significance of addressing the health of the ecosystem. Their campaign to protect the oceans focuses on the idea that the ocean habitat of whales has already been badly degraded by toxic pollution, global climate change, over-fishing, ozone depletion, and even noise pollution and warn that if the IWC goes forward with plans to resume whaling, the increases in catches, 124 added to the existing environmental threats, could potentially lead to a point of no return for the survival of some whale populations. 188 Environmental NGOs have been effective in maintaining the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling; a position that may have an increasingly weaker scientific foundation. The main source of this level of influence seems to have been political capital, and the continued use of established tactics including the ability to mobilize the public and the media in support of its position through the use of well established coalitions. Globalization has facilitated transnational action on this issue with the development of electronic global social spaces. The information disseminated in the campaign has been done electronically--the internet has become a significant tool for anti-whaling groups to generate information, leverage and accountability. The anti- whaling movement was one of the first protest movements to take advantage of the emerging cyberspace as its venue for expression. 189 Additionally, the internet facilitates action by allowing for the co-ordination and formation of coalitions. Coalitions such as Global Whale Alliance and WhaleWatch have positioned themselves favorably via the pro-whaling forces. The strategies employed by these coalitions include building on the shared values and norms concerning the symbolic nature of the whale (a thinking, sentient, intelligent creature) to persuasion to “shaming and blaming” (accountability politics) to more coercive means (direct tactics). Additionally, the transnational actors have provided governments with the scientific data they would need to render a decision 188 www.greenpeace.org. 189 Epstein (2005). 125 concerning the RMS and thus have functioned to educate government officials, ultimately hoping to influence their decisions. 190 The anti-whaling coalition, the Global Whale Alliance was established in 2001 by the European anti-whaling NGO, Campaign Whale specifically in response to the RMS. The coalition which includes over 150 NGOs from the U.S., U.K. Bahamas, Canada, Portugal, Finland, Mexico, among others as well as governments, scientists and members of the public opposed to the RMS asserts that the “commercial slaughter of whales has no place a modern, compassionate world…the RMS will reopen and legitimize a cruel industry; the killing of whales for profit and pushing the world back to the dark ages of mass whale slaughter.” The Global Whale Alliance argues that there are a growing number of ethical, political, legal, environmental and scientific arguments that support the view that the commercial hunting of whales cannot be justified in the 21st century. It claims that commercial whaling poses an unnecessary and unacceptable risk both to the health and recovery of surviving whale populations and the people who consume whale products, and supports the continuation and strengthening of the commercial whaling moratorium, as well as research necessary to quantify and address both the serious environmental threats to whales and the health risks to people that eat whale products. It ties the whale to the larger ecosystem asserting that because the ecosystem has been compromised as a result of increasing ocean pollution, the whale meat that is sold to consumers is not safe to consume. 190 Interview with a WSPA member 1/30/08. 126 The alliance’s tactics include lobbying states who are considering supporting the RMS as well as boycotting seafood from pro-whaling nations that support the RMS. In November of 2007, the coalition along with twenty-five nations delivered a signed protest to Iceland, expressing the collective opposition to whaling and urged the Icelandic government to reconsider its position on whaling. 191 The transnational coalition WhaleWatch, 192 also formed in response to the RMS, has worked with local and national organizations in member states to organize local rallies, provide information to the public regarding the whaling issue (including the RMS) and has actively participated at IWC meetings. WhaleWatch was formed by the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WPSA) in 1981 through a merger of The World Federation for the Protection of Animals, and the International Society for the Protection of Animals (ISPA). WhaleWatch functions as a network/coalition that works with both domestic groups within the US (Whalesneedus.org) and other countries; its main headquarters are in London while regional offices coordinate activities. For example, Caribbean and Latin American NGOs work with the Costa Rica office; EU NGOs work with international headquarters (UK). 193 191 www.Globalwhalealliance.org. 192 See www.wspa-international.org/history. 193 Note that the rules governing the accreditation and admission of NGOs to IWC meetings were amended at the 59th Annual Meeting in Anchorage in 2007. These changes eliminated the requirement for NGOs to maintain international offices, relaxed the restrictions on total attendees from each NGO and adjusted the fee structure for equitability. The new rules allow for the potential of increased participation by transnational NGOs. The Commission agreed to review the effectiveness of the new rules after a 2-year operating trial (i.e. at IWC/62).] See www.IWC.org. 127 An example of how the anti-whaling issue has been framed by both coalitions includes focusing on the brutality of the whale hunt and the emphasis on the suffering of whales hunted. This concern has been echoed by states and their representatives. For example, at the 2006 IWC meeting the United Kingdom Commissioner Richard Cowan stated the UK’s strong concern for the cruelty of whaling; he cited the 700 emails that he had received from a concerned British public during the meeting. The US also expressed the need make the hunt more humane and to reduce the suffering (the amount of time it takes a whale to die) of whales during scientific and commercial whaling. Such examples suggest that the anti-whaling campaigns have been effective in influencing the agendas/policy positions of states, it may also suggest that the cultural norm of “humane” treatment of animals hunted has been established in many states. Anti-whaling activists continue to argue that emphasizing the cruelty of whaling holds the key to stopping the pro-whaling bloc from lifting the moratorium and that the scientific evidence they have gathered confirms that there is no humane way to kill a whale at sea and, and therefore, all commercial and so-called scientific whaling should cease on cruelty grounds alone. Another coalition opposed to the RMS is the Latin American Cooperative Strategy for the Conservation of Cetaceans, which is made up of domestic Latin American NGOs and states and has collaborated with such transnational NGOs as World Society for the Protection of Animals and the World Wildlife Fund. They have focused their campaigns on both regional and global levels to address their whaling concerns. For example, the coalition has urged the IWC to stop “scientific whaling” (aimed at Japan) and maintain the moratorium. They have also urged the IWC to promote commercial, 128 non-lethal uses of whales through well-managed whale-watching programs, to strengthen its conservation agenda and to create whale sanctuaries in the South Atlantic and Southern Pacific Oceans. 194 The campaigns formed in response to the RMS convey how even groups that appear to be ideologically dissimilar (e.g. animal welfare/ preservation/conservation) do in fact share commonalities when it comes to their efforts. As indicated earlier, these coalitions consist of NGOs that can be labeled “preservationist,” “conservationists,” or as being interested in “animal rights” or “animal welfare” in their ideological orientation. The campaigns to maintain the moratorium suggests that transnational collaboration continues to be the organizing principle of the anti-whaling movement. The fact that the moratorium is still in place ten years after the RMS was first introduced indicates that the anti-whaling interests have been effective in achieving their goals for the time being. The current challenge faced by all interests of the whaling issue is that both sides claim that their data reflects the accurate count of specific whale populations. The pro-whaling interests claim that populations have recovered sufficiently to resume commercial whaling and anti-whaling interest argue that the data show that the science on the exact numbers of the whale populations is inconclusive, and the ability to take an accurate count of whale populations is difficult. Thus the outcome of the RMS (which reflects the conservationist/sustainable use approach) appears uncertain since that there is a lack of consensus on the part of the “epistemic community”; unless of course one 194 www.wdcs.org. 129 subscribes to the preservationist position in which case the discussion of a return to commercial whaling becomes a moot point. Save the San Ignacio Lagoon (aka “Mitsubishi Campaign”) As a result of increasing economic integration transnational activists have focused on a number of environmental issues that specifically affect the habitat of whales. A proposed joint venture in 1994 between the Mexican government and the Mitsubishi Corporation to develop a saltworks project serves as a case in point. The campaign to oppose this project, the Mitsubishi Saltworks campaign involved the Coalition to Save Laguna San Ignacio which was made up of several Mexican environmental groups, such as ProNatura and a coalition of Mexcio’s writers and artists, Grupo de Cien (the group of 100) 195 ; as well as transnational NGOs such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) and Wildcoast. Altogether over 50 domestic and transnational NGOs from the U.S. and Mexico worked on this campaign. The cooperation between transnational and domestic NGOs evolved through three distinct stages. The first stage reflected establishing communication and trust between the U.S. and Mexican environmental groups. The second stage was providing financial support to Mexican environmental groups by such NGOs as the Natural Resources Defense Fund and the International Fund for Animal Welfare. The third stage was the coordination and maturation of the 195 Spalding (2002) notes that the Grupo de Cien, a group made up of Mexican artists and writers (the elite of Mexican Society) was influential in some media circles within Mexico which aided the effectiveness of disseminating information of the campaign. 130 campaign, which led to the formal Coalition to Save Laguna San Ignacio and to the success of defeating of the implementation and development of the Mitsubishi Saltworks project. The goals of the campaign were to stop a development project, establish a sanctuary/whale nursery and halt development in the surrounding areas. The strategies employed combined the used of information, accountability and leverage politics to influence its target actors (the Mitsubishi Corporation and the Mexican state). This case study demonstrates how factors such as globalization, state-society relations and group characteristics all influenced transnational activism in this campaign. The campaign’s effectiveness can be attributed to successful transnational collaboration, with the coalition having a “common advocacy position” and clear issue/actor characteristics. Because both mainstream and radical environmental organizations were able to launch such an extensive campaign against Mitsubishi, the political costs to the U.S. and Mexican governments as well as Mitsubishi were raised significantly. 196 For the United States, the political costs were enormous given the controversy in the United States surrounding the passage of NAFTA, The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994). Negative publicity from this development project had the potential to create a public relations nightmare for the U.S. government given the concern by domestic environmental groups within the U.S. on the lack of environmental protections put forth in the agreement. 196 Fox (2002:368). 131 The saltworks development project threatened the breeding grounds/nursery of the Pacific Gray whales in the San Ignacio Lagoon in Baja California Sur. The lagoon is also the habitat for 221 species of birds, green sea turtles, bottlenose dolphins and osprey. The site had already been declared a biosphere reserve (the Vizcaino Biosphere) by the Mexican government in 1988 and a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1993. The San Ignacio Lagoon had also been declared a Pacific Gray whale sanctuary in 1976. 197 The proposed project would create a 116 square-mile industrial landscape of evaporation ponds, a million-ton salt stockpile, fuel and water tanks, a 1.25 mile long pier with a shipping dock and conveyer belts running from crystallization ponds to the pier’s end, workshops, headquarter buildings and the facilities necessary to support 200 employees while on site. The new plant involved digging out an area twice the size of Washington D.C. to create a system of salt evaporation ponds. Seventeen pumps operating 24 hours a day would draw 6,600 gallons of saltwater per second from the lagoon into the evaporation ponds. The project would introduce tankers, giant diesel turbines, and heavy industrial activity to this area. Environmental NGOs were concerned that the project would have adverse effects on the ecosystem and might disrupt the whales’ migration patterns and behavior. These whales migrate from Mexico to the U.S. to the Bering Strait. Several other plant and animal species also could have directly or indirectly been harmed by the proposed habitat alteration during construction and subsequent operation of the project. 197 See Dedina (2000) Saving the Grey Whale and Spalding 2002. 132 Environmental groups within Mexico learned of the proposed development project from two Ph.D. students who were doing field research in Baja California. A copy of the proposed development plans were leaked to the Grupo de los Cien who then leaked it to the Mexican media. In 1995, el Grupo de los Cien, asked U.S. NGOS (like the NRDC and the IFAW) for help with its efforts to stop the salt factory. Specifically the NRDC was asked to help with legal and administrative action. Realizing that the project was beyond the NRDC’s capabilities, the IFAW was asked to help collaborate on the issue. Additionally, that same year an Ensenada-based environmental group, Pro Esteros, (which is dedicated to the preservation and conservation of coastal estuaries, bays and wetlands located in Baja California) was brought into the newly developing coalition. 198 A challenge for Mexican and U.S. NGOs was that at first Pro Esteros was suspicious and reluctant to join in with U.S. groups. It was concerned that U.S. based conservation groups were imperialistic interlopers that were carrying a protectionist agenda for competing industries. Much of this suspicion was a result of the efforts of transnational actors regarding the dolphin/tuna controversy where many Mexican fishermen were adversely affected by the efforts of transnational groups to require “dolphin safe” tuna. They were even more suspicious of the Grupo de Cien and its lack of science credentials along with what they considered its propensity towards showboating. 198 Spalding (2002). 133 The NRDC was able to overcome Pro Esteros concerns given that it had build important relationships in the early 1990s during the NAFTA negotiations in its effort to influence the environmental side agreements with other Mexican environmental groups but more significantly, it had established a close relationship with Alberto Szekely, one of Mexico’s most prominent and well-respect public interest environmental attorneys. 199 The relationship established between the NRDC and the group Pro Esteros was one of the most critical components of the campaign in enabling the NRDC to establish partnerships with local and regional environmental groups in Baja California. Pro Esteros successfully organized all of Baja California’s environmental groups into a coalition, which became known as Pro Peninsula to share information on the project. 200 Pro Peninsula consisted of local fishermen, whale watching businesses, and regional environmental groups. The financial and networking support of the NRDC and the IFAW provided the Pro Peninsula the political and economic support it needed to speak out against the project. The creation of Pro Peninsula also created a solid base of local and regional NGOs in Mexico that could continue the campaign to focus on gray whale conservation. Together, Pro Peninsula, domestic NGOs and U.S. environmental NGOs formed the Coalition to Save San Ignacio. Working with local fishing communities in the San Ignacio Lagoon, the coalition argued that the saltworks plant would severely threaten 199 Dedina (2000). 200 See www. Propeninsula.org. 134 local fisheries by polluting the surrounding waters. These claims were supported by a scientific study funded by the WWF that found that the saltworks project would have a devastating effect on the region’s fragile ecosystem. 201 In 1998 the coalition was also able to persuade the U.N. World Heritage Committee to review Mitsubishi's plans; the committee voted in defense of the whale nursery. And a group of world-renowned scientists, including nine Nobel laureates, signed on to the campaign, urging Mitsubishi to scrap the saltworks project. The campaign consisted of emails, newspaper ads and more than 1,000,000 letters of protest (from the United States and Mexico) to Mitsubishi opposing the plant. 202 For example, in 1995 the coalition placed an ad in the New York Times criticizing the saltworks project. Within a month Mitsubishi responded with its own ad in the New York Times in defense of the project. In 1997, the coalition invited celebrities, scientists, and media to the San Ignacio Lagoon ecotourism camp during whale watching season, which prompted significant worldwide media coverage and international expression of concern. In addition, in 1999 the NRDC and the International Fund for Animal Welfare increased consumer pressure on Mitsubishi by waging a nationwide boycott: the MITSUBISHI. DON'T BUY IT! Campaign. In addition to individuals' pledges to forgo purchasing Mitsubishi products, more than 40 cities and counties in California -- the company's biggest U.S. market -- passed resolutions opposing the company's actions and threatened 201 www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/whalevictory.asp. 202 Interview with NRDC lead attorney on Mitsubishi case, 4/17/08. See also Shea, Michael (May 20, 2000). “Beating Mitsubishi,” Business.Net. http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m2519/is_/ai_64910379 135 to cancel Mitsubishi contracts. Mitsubishi had never before withdrawn an industrial project under environmental pressure, but the worldwide protest campaign had become a public relations disaster. On March 2, 2000, Mitsubishi and the Mexican government abandoned their plan for the saltworks. In the Mitsubishi campaign information, leverage and accountability politics played a key role in the strategies of the campaign, reflected in the bi-national pressure by the various environmental groups that obliged project proponents to meet unusually rigorous environmental assessment standards. 203 The Coalition to Save San Ignacio Lagoon has continued to work to pressure the Mexican government to make the lagoon a permanent sanctuary. 204 In 2005, the coalition began a media campaign that included fund raising efforts to purchase the development rights (a land conservation easement) to the surrounding one million acres, with the goal of keeping the area off-limits to future development projects (such as high-rise hotels and resort marinas with ocean bond ships). These lands are controlled by private property owners as well as local ejidos (a total of six ejidos). In 2008, the NRDC, the IFAW, Pro Natura, Wildcoast and the International Community Foundation and other coalition members raised $1.7 million dollars in their effort to purchase the development rights of 140,000 acres. This was negotiated with Ejido Echeverria Alvarez. This easement restricts development activities on lands the ejido controls. The deal marks the first time 203 Fox (2000:363). 204 Transnational NGOs are also working to help the communities in the San Ignacio Lagoon. For instance, the IFAW and the NRDC established a $100,000 fund to assist the communities around Baja’s Laguna San Ignacio, and in 2002 Earth Island Institute, the NRDC and the IFAW backed low-interest loans to local fishermen to convert their panga fishing boats from two-stroke to four-stroke engines, thus reducing emissions and decreasing noise. 136 a private land trust in Mexico has been negotiated for an ejido’s entire territory. This legally binding agreement has been put forth by environmental groups as a model for conservation as well as a way to preserve cultural and traditional identity. 205 The goal of the coalition is to bring the other five ejidos in the region into the program as well continue to preserve the UNESCO World Heritage Site. One difficulty faced by the coalition is that some of the other ejidos are hesitant to join the project. Many landowners and ejidos would rather sell the land to developers (who pay more money) than to participate in the easement project. Richard Kly, president of the International Community Foundation (ICF) which maintains the alliance’s trust fund notes, “The seduction of a quick buck is enormous especially in these poor areas; what we are trying to do is take a proactive approach and give the ejidos an income stream, which allows them to achieve community goals and control their own future…while at the same time protecting the whale’s habitat.” 206 The coalition was effective in influencing the Mexican government to support their efforts. In March 2007 the Mexican government announced that it would donate 109,000 acres of federal lands surrounding the lagoon for conservation. The coalition has continued its fund-raising efforts through its campaign trying to raise a total of 8.6 million dollars to purchase an additional 750,000 acres in an effort to secure the whale 205 Christian Science Monitor, December 5, 2005. The deal signed October 25, 2005 between the US and Mexican based environmental groups and the 43 members of the local ejido stipulates that fishermen and whale-watching guides will protect the 120,000 acres they own along the shores of the lagoon. In exchange for payments of $25,000 a year from a group of conservationists, the ejido also will limit industrial and tourist projects in favor of low-impact developments. 206 Christian Science Monitor, December 5, 2005. 137 sanctuary. 207 To raise funds, the campaign has been framed in the context of creating a “gray whale nursery” where mother whales can safely give birth and provide protection to their off-spring in the lagoon which protects mother and calf. In the lagoon, calves (safe from Killer Orcas) can “hone their swimming skills” for their journey back to Alaska. In this case study, the impetus for transnational action was the threat to a biosphere reserve and whale sanctuary resulting from increasing economic integration and globalization. The Mitsubishi campaign demonstrated that if environmental NGOs are able to gather media-worthy attention (focusing on whales) they can be effective in influencing or blocking new, high-profile, high risk policy decisions. The Mitsubishi (San Ignacio Lagoon) campaign involved a coalition with clear tangible, shared goals. 208 The domestic and transnational NGOs that made up this coalition were able to overcome early suspicions and work together to launch an effective campaign. Thus group characteristics were significant in explaining the ability of transnational and domestic actors to accomplish their goals. The Mexican and U.S. environmental groups were able to overcome cultural differences because they saw the value in thinking locally to act transnationally. 209 The initial campaign served as an example an effective transnational collaboration, which led to halting the saltworks development project. Additionally, the 207 Interview with NRDC lead attorney on Mitsubishi case, 4/17/08. See also www.nrdc.org/media/ pressreleases/whalevictory.asp. 208 Fox (2000). 209 Fox (2000). 138 political opportunities available to transnational activity facilitated action. The Mexican political system was open and responsive to the domestic and transnational efforts. Although activists took the campaign outside of Mexico by placing ads in US newspapers and focused their boycotts of Mitsubishi products in US markets this strategy was not a result of a closed system in Mexico but simply expanded its target audience. Focusing the campaign outside of Mexico (California) added to the campaign’s effectiveness and help to garner binational support for the campaign. 210 The Sakhalin Campaign Like the Mitsubishi/San Ignacio Lagoon campaign, the Sakhalin campaign raises the issue of sustainable development and raises questions regarding the role of states, development agencies, multinational companies, and international lending institutions in financing potentially environmentally hazardous projects that have a negative impact on species and human beings. The Sakhalin campaign is another example of transnational collaboration that emerged in response to development projects that are a result of increasing economic integration. As in the Mitsubishi case study, the case raises the question regarding what the international environmental standards are and should be regarding development projects. 211 The Sakhalin campaign also highlights the 210 In this case study of groups on both sides of the border, the NGOs learned through participation. The success of the continued alignment of the coalition was clearly depicted in an ad taken out (after the initial saltworks campaign was halted) in the New York Times (July 27, 2001). The ad read: “A Message to President Vicente Fox: THANK YOU for your continued commitment to protect the ‘World’s Aquarium.’” 211 See also Mike Bradshaw (2007). “The Greening of Global Project Financing: the Case of the Sakhalin II Oil and Gas Project,” Canadian Geographer. 51, 3 (pp. 255-279). Bradshaw suggest the case study conveys how environmental NGOs hold the oil and gas companies to account. 139 significance of issue and actor characteristics and transnational action in aiding NGOs to wage effective campaigns. In addition it demonstrates the efficacy of transnational collaboration between domestic NGOs and government agencies in Russia (such as Rosprirodnadzor, Russia’s state-controlled environmental protection agency) and transnational NGOs in the U.K. and the U.S. In the case of the Sakhalin campaign environmental and other domestic and transnational NGOs argued that the development project threatened the habitat/breeding grounds of grey whales and other species as well as the livelihoods of local communities many of which consist of indigenous populations. In response to the project, domestic and transnational NGOs coordinated their efforts to halt the development of the project. The first phase of the project included construction to prepare for extraction of oil and natural gas. Beginning in 1994, Royal Dutch/Shell and Exxon-Mobil as well as other international energy companies developed massive oil and natural gas extraction projects on and offshore of the Sakhalin Island, Russia. 212 The Sakhalin offshore oil and gas development was the largest foreign investment in any enterprise in the Russian Far East. 213 The second phase of the Sakhalin project (Sakhalin II) focused on the development/construction of two oil pipelines off the coast of Sakhalin Island. 212 For this project Shell, together with Mitsui and Mitsubishi, established the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company LTD at Bermudy Island. In 1998 Shell embarked on the construction of the second phase of the Sakhalin project, with financial support coming from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Japanese and US Export Credit Agencies. Environmental groups argue that not only was the environmental impact study on the project flawed, Sakhalin Energy refused to respect Russian legislation and release environmental information. Since the construction of the platform there have been reports of a reduction in saffron cod fishing that is especially important for the island's indigenous communities. See www.Sakhalinenvironmentalwatch.com 213 See Sakhalin.html. 140 According to environmentalists, the planned construction of the pipelines and their operation potentially threatened a critically endangered species of gray whales. 214 The project’s main sponsor during the first phase of the project (referred to as Sakhalin I), Energy Investment Company (SEIC), was a consortium of several transnational corporations: Marathon (USA, 37.5%); Mitsu (Japan, 25%); Shell (Netherlands, 25%) and Mitsubishi (Japan, 12.5%). In 1997 it signed contracts with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM). The main investors included Shell (55%), Mitsubishi (20%) and Mitsui (25%). Royal Dutch/ Shell also pursued the financial backing of private banks like Credit Suisse, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and First Boston. Additionally, in December of 2006 Shell and its Japanese partners agreed to sell Gazprom (the Russian state-controlled energy firm) a controlling share of the 22 billion dollar project. 215 Environmental NGOs against the project stressed that the proposed oil and gas project was an environmental disaster waiting to happen. Critics of the project claimed that construction thus far (phase I) had already impacted salmon populations, as well as fishermen and indigenous communities that depend on the natural resources of the region. They argued that the second phase of the Sakhalin project which called for the construction of an undersea pipeline to be trenched through the feeding habitat of the 214 Bradshaw (2007). 215 See www.panda.org. 141 critically endangered pacific gray whale, would have a devastating impact on these mammals due to the constant noise from a platform bordering the whales’ feeding area, the platform dredging, and the dumping of drilling wastes into the sea. Sakhalin would have been the world’s largest liquefied natural gas plant and would have potentially dumped over 1 million cubic meters of waste into the Gulf of Anvia. 216 An additional concern was that the second phase of Sakhalin included plans for an 800-kilometer on- shore pipeline trenched across hundreds of wild salmon-bearing streams, which would potentially threaten the livelihoods of local fishermen. In addition, the pipeline for Sakhalin project would be constructed directly over an ancient cemetery of the indigenous Nivkh people. Finally domestic and transnational actors were concerned that since Sakhalin Island was an area that is prone to high seismic activity, experiencing numerous earthquakes the safety of the project was called into question. 217 According to the NGOs the second phase of the development project was never fully assessed for its environmental impact, and thus the coalition members demanded that Shell and the project sponsors (SEIC) properly assessed the project’s impact. They also demanded that the problems that resulted from the existing development be properly identified and addressed before the public and private banks provided funding, and argued that if the project developers did not properly address these concerns then the project should be abandoned altogether. Additionally, the NGOs claimed that the project violated several international and domestic laws, arguing that it was in breach of the 216 www.panda.org. 217 www.pacificenvironment.org/russia/sakhalin_protest.htm. 142 Equator Principles (which set sustainability criteria for project finance deals by private banks). They also stressed that the project violated the U.K.’s foreign policy and Russian environmental law. The coalition members of the campaign initially pressured Shell, Exxon-Mobil and other oil companies to either apply the best international social and environmental standards to their Sakhalin projects or halt them altogether. The strategies employed by the transnational actors included information, accountability and leverage politics. In January of 2003 the Russian Far Eastern coalition of environmental organizations, referred to as the ‘Living Sea’ coalition, launched an Internet campaign that addressed the environmental devastation that was a result of past construction on the projects and specifically framed the issue in the context of “saving the gray whale”. Living Sea’s Internet site called on Russian citizens to send letters to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Natural Resources Ministry and Sakhalin Governor Igor Farkhutdinov “to introduce some important changes to the oil and gas projects that will not considerably affect the implementation of the project, but will give the gray whales a chance to survive.” 218 That same year, the ‘Living Sea’ coalition joined forces with transnational NGOs and helped the coalition pressure the governments (e.g., U.S. U.K., 218 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. “Environmentalist Launch Gray Whale Campaign on Internet,” The Sakhalin Independent. February 13-17, 2003 #43. Ecojuris, the Moscow-based public interest environmental law firm, believes that the Russian government and international financial institutions have acted illegally by approving an inadequate Environmental Impact Statement for Sakhalin-II. In a letter to Viktor Ivanovich 143 Russia, Japan, etc.) and the multinational corporations involved in the project. The new coalition, the Sakhalin Environmental Watch sought to address the environmental damage that had already occurred on the island as a result of the stage I of the project and the construction from the preliminary stages the second stage of Sakhalin. In addition the coalition argued the need to halt any further construction until the environmental impact of the project could be fully measured and addressed. 219 The NGOs working on the campaign include several transnational NGOs such as the WWF (UK, Germany), Greenpeace (Russia), Friends of the Earth (Europe, Japan, France), Rainforest Action Network, CEE Bankwatch Network 220 , and domestic NGOs based in Russia such as the Sakhalin Environmental Watch and Ecojuris. Finally, the broad-based coalition also Danilov-Danilyan. Chair of the State Committee for the Protection of the Environment. Ecojuris President Dr. Vera Mischenko writes that the project's approval cannot be considered lawful. 219 In 1998 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Export Credit Guarantee Department (EBRD) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan the (JEXIM) required that Sakhalin II adopt a Habitat Conservation Plan for the Western Pacific Gray whale under the project’s first phase of development. However according to WWF, Shell produced for the lenders a legally and scientifically insufficient plan approved by the lenders 2001. Shell and the other sponsors withheld the plan from the public until March 2002. After 25 independent NGOs were asked to review the plan they found that it lacked scientific credibility. See www.wwf.org. A number of deficiencies were found in the Sakhalin II project when the San Francisco-based Pacific Environment and Resources Center (PERC) and other environmental groups organized an independent analysis of the Environmental Impact Assessment. For example, the companies are refusing to use best available technology. The plan was to dump the polluting wastes into the ocean, although this practice is currently forbidden by Russian law and studies have shown that such dumping has a negative impact on biological marine resources. 220 CEE Bankwatch Network is a transnational NGO whose mission is to prevent the environmentally and socially harmful impacts of international development finance and to promote alternative solutions and public participation. It currently has members in 12 countries across central and eastern Europe. The aim of the network is to monitor the activities of the international financial institutions which operate in the region and to propose alternatives to their project and projects in the region. See www.bankwatch .org. 144 included NGOs that addressed the rights of indigenous groups such as the Channel Foundation 221 and the Pacific Environment. 222 In addition to Shell and Exxon-Mobil, NGOs also targeted the financial investors of the project stressing the illegality of the project and the liability the institutions would incur as a result of the environmental damage that had already occurred during the initial construction of the project and the potential environmental damage that would likely be incurred in the future. Specifically, the Russian environment agency Rosprirodnadzor calculated the current damage to forestry resources as a result of the construction on the island at 50 million. 223 The coalition members documented (through photographs and video) damage from the initial construction of the project and released them to the media and posted them on the different websites of the coalition groups. In addition to their internet campaign, the coalition participated in demonstrations, letter writing campaigns and litigation. The NGOs were able to effectively influence the behavior of the target actors. This included those financing the project and states. For example, in 2004, Russian NGOs filed a lawsuit against the Russian government to halt any construction or industrial development in the defined gray whale habitat area, naming 221 The Channel Foundation is a small, private foundation based in Seattle, Washington, USA that promotes leadership in women's human rights around the globe. Channel's mission is to fund and create opportunities for groups working in many regions of the world to ensure that women's human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled. See www.channelfoundation.org. 222 The Pacific Environment is a transnational NGO that seeks to promote grassroots activism, work to strengthen communities and reform international policies. They confront tax-payer funded banks that back oil, gas, mining and timber extraction and the companies that profit from these often environmentally- destructive projects. See www.pacificenvirornemnt.org. 223 Sakhalinenviornementalwatch.org. As the head of Rosprirodnadzor , Oleg Mitvol states: "We'll defend Russia's environment, and we'll defend it openly." See “Moscow’s Green Giant,” Business Week (Nov. 15 th , 2006). 145 Sakhalin Energy Investment Company as a third party defendant. The Russian environmental coalition Sakhalin Environmental Watch and Rosprirodnadzor (Russia’s environmental agency) argued that Russian law clearly prohibits harm to the habitat of Red Book (endangered) species. Additionally, as a result of the project studies had shown that there had been a massive die-off of herring and decline of cod population. In 2005 demonstrators from Greenpeace and other NGOs protested in front of Credit Suisse Bank (US headquarters) demanding that it invest in environmentally friendly sources of energy rather than the Sakhalin II project which was environmentally dangerous. Holding banners reading “Credit Suisse: Oil is Over,” “Stop Investing in Sakhalin Oil,” “Produce Chocolate in the Alps Rather Then Oil on Sakhalin,” and “Dead Whales—Swiss Guarantee,” Greenpeace and other NGOs began to call further public attention to the issue. Greenpeace also handed the head of Credit Suisse a letter demanding that it stop funding the Sakhalin project. The letter included information on safe and renewable energy sources, along with a list of Russian companies that produced equipment for renewable energy. 224 Similar demonstrations took place outside of the headquarters of Shell in the UK. Many of the groups called attention to the company’s slogan, “Shell: Profits and Principles,” emphasizing that in the case of Shell it was all about “profits.” 225 Additionally local residents of Sakhalin and NGOs repeatedly blocked construction sites in an attempt to halt construction. 226 Limited success was achieved 224 www.Greenpeace.org/russia/en/press/releases/credit-suissse-bank. 225 www.panda.org. 226 www.Greenpeace.org/russia/en/press/releases/credit-suissse-bank. 146 when in 2005 the Dutch Bank ABN Amro annual meeting, [then] chief executive officer Rijkman Groenink committed not to finance Sakhalin II until it was brought into compliance with the Equator Principles. In 2007 the environmental campaign groups and NGOs began pressuring the chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). RBS had recently acquired the Dutch Bank ABN Amro that had initially made the loan for the Sakhalin project. Before RBS bought ABN Amro, the Dutch bank was already under pressure from environmental groups over its decision to provide the loan. Thus when RBS bought ABN Amro, it acquired the bank’s assets and liabilities, which were both financial and reputational, and this included the responsibility to address the financing of Sakhalin. RBS was shocked to learn that the bank had circumvented the principles by financing Sakhalin through one of the project sponsors. Consequently, RBS now had to follow through on ABN’s promise to bring the financing in compliance with the Equator Principles. In August of 2007 the WWF UK and the environmental social justice organization, the Corner House filed lawsuits in the UK against the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), the government department responsible for facilitating British business abroad. The suit claimed that the British government undermined the ‘UK’s ethical foreign policy’ through its operations and support of a project that were seriously damaging the environment. The lawsuit was filed as a result of ECGD’s commitment to fund $1 billion dollars in contracts for Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (SEIC). 227 227 www.panda.org 147 The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation was also targeted by the coalition in October of 2007 calling attention to the lack of environmental and social standards of the Sakhalin II Project. 228 The letter carefully outlined the following: (1) the irreparable impacts to Aniva Bay; (2) the inadequate baseline information regarding the environmental impact of the initial construction of the project, this includes the impact on the fisheries industry, species, gray whales, etc; (3) the danger of gas pipelines in seismic areas; (4) inadequate monitoring and response to potential leaks of the pipeline (5) the lack of oil spill prevention measures; (6) inaccurate and deceptive information on the part of Sakhalin Energy and other investors; (7) the lack of public acceptance or consent regarding the project. This final point included the refusal by Sakhalin Energy to relocate indigenous communities and other people who were negatively impacted by the construction of the project and their unwillingness to compensate them for their losses. The letter stressed that the project did not meet the common approaches to social and environmental standards agreed to by the Export Credit Agencies and the Japan Bank for International development, and thus would irreparably harm the reputation of the bank. Additionally it noted that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development withdrew funding for the project in 2007. The letter was signed by over 40 domestic and transnational NGOs. That same year, environmental organizations met with high-level officials in JEXIM Bank and other US agencies amidst widespread rumors within the 228 Letter to Koji Tanamai, CEO, Japan Bank for International Cooperation. October 11, 2007. See www.Sakhalin Environmentalwatch.org. NGOs that signed the letter were: BankTrack, the Berne Declaration, Campagna per la Riforma della Banda Mondiale, CCE Bankwatch Network, Friends of the Earth Europe, Japan and France, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Corner House, Platform, Proyecto Gato, Rainforest Action Network, Urgewald, WWF UK, WWF Germany. 148 government that JEXIM Bank and possibly ECGD would cause the Sakhalin II application to be withdrawn as a way to avoid having to officially decline financing due in great part to environmental non-compliance. The ability of the coalition to influence the withholding of JEXIM and ECGD financing for Sakhalin II greatly increased the political, financial and reputational risks of other banks that had committed financing to the project including the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. Also, the withholding of financing sent a strong message to oil companies seeking approval and financing for highly risky projects in the Arctic region. On March 3, 2008 Sakhalin Energy announced it was planning on withdrawing the financing for the project. According to the company this was due to “serious concerns over possible delays” in financing. The company did not mention that for five years it had been unable to secure billions of dollars in public and private financing due in large part to the company’s failure to demonstrate compliance with banks’ environmental policies. Thus the coalition was effective in halting the project. The likelihood of further development without the proper environmental assessment seems unlikely. The fact that the campaign’s target actors (MNCs, international financial institutions, state agencies) altered their behavior/withdrew their support for the project as a result of the efforts of transnational actors and demonstrates the effectiveness of this campaign. This case further demonstrates the way in which transnational NGOs work across state lines to further their objectives. The effectiveness of the campaign can be attributed to group characteristics in that coalition actors had shared common goals were effectively able to 149 organize across borders and influence outcomes. In addition, the issue characteristics were effective in showing harm not just to whales but to other species and the surrounding indigenous communities that depended on the resources of the region. Given the technological resources available to coalition members as a result of increasing globalization, and the political opportunities available to the different actors in the respective states, transnational actors were able to effectively use information and accountability politics in their campaign strategies. The Southern Ocean Sanctuary Campaign: Japan and Operation “Migaloo” Several states have established non-whaling sanctuaries outside of the IWC, among them Mexico, which has several gray whale sanctuaries, including the San Ignacio Lagoon, and Canada, which has the Pacific Rim National Park and the Robson Bight Ecological reserve. The most recent sanctuary to be established by the IWC is the Antarctic sanctuary (Southern Ocean). This action has created tension between pro and anti-whaling interests in that two IWC members, Japan and Russia protested and failed to attend the follow-up meeting pertaining to the sanctuary in mid-October of 1994. This conference called for the cooperation among members whose waters are adjacent to the sanctuary, including Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa. Japan continues to whale in the sanctuary, a source of conflict between the Japanese government, anti-whaling states and domestic and transnational NGOs. 229 The Southern Ocean is significant because Japan’s largest catch is taken within the Southern ocean 229 AAP General News Wire. Sydney: 12/21/07. 150 Sanctuary and is marketed commercially in Japan. Protecting these waters is now a major campaign undertaken by anti-whaling interests. The protection of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary provides another example of the diversity of challenges faced by transnational and domestic actors working on the anti- whaling campaign. The Southern Ocean Sanctuary was established by the IWC in 1994 and anti-whaling NGOs both domestic and transnational have focused their energies on protecting the whales found in the waters off the coast of Australia, particularly “Migaloo,” an albino humpback whale that migrates into the Southern Ocean Sanctuary and has become an important national symbol to the Australian people. 230 “Operation Migaloo” has been targeted towards the Japanese government its whaling ships undertaking “scientific” research in the Southern Ocean. 231 At the 2007 IWC meeting in Anchorage Alaska, Japan threatened to hunt Migaloo down along with 50 other humpback whales if the groups did not agree to its demands for increases in their “scientific” quotas of minke whales. Such threats have generated a great deal of animosity between the Australian and Japanese governments. As of December 2007, pressure from the anti-whaling NGOs and the Australian government ( the Rudd government which has been vocal about its anti-whaling position) was able to convince 230 Interview with Sea Shepherd member 2/7/08. 231 Japan continues to whale under the guise of scientific research even though its findings are not required for management purposes. Japan argues that the way in which it is able to support its “scientific” whaling activities is to sell the whale meat commercially to offset the research costs. “Salty Shepherds,” The Economist, 1/24/08. http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566770. See also “Whale Controversy Brewing in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,” Sydney Indymedia. 12/17/07. http://www.indybay.org/ newsitems/2007/12/17/18467442.php 151 the Japanese government to drop its plans to kill 50 humpback whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. NGOs (such as the Humane Society of the United States, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Greenpeace, IFAW, and Australian NGOs) and states (such as Australia, New Zealand, and several Latin American and European states) view the actions by the Japanese government as being in violation of international and domestic law. Additionally, environmental groups have argued that scientific research on whales can be undertaken without killing them. Activists claim that the whaling by Japan in the Southern Ocean sanctuary has been a commercial endeavor being done under the auspices of “scientific” research. The Japanese Institute of Cetacean Research claims that the amount of scientific data gathered by Japan's research program (JARPAII) is extensive and that Japan's whale research programs are conducted in accordance with the IWC’s rules on scientific whaling. The Institute of Cetacean Research say their research does not involve illegal whaling. Japan’s continued presence in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary has been met with protest (and confrontation) from such environmental NGOs as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Conservation Society along with the governments of Australian and New Zealand. In June and December of 2007, for example, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Conservation society attempted to stop the “scientific” whaling by Japan. 232 The Sea 232 The Japanese government considers Watson and Sea Shepherd’s Society “an environmental terrorist organization”, and of being “circus performers” and “dangerous vegans." The philosophy espoused by Sea Shepherd Society is that you cannot depend on governments, institutions or international organizations to stop whaling, only small groups can make an impact. Their goal is not just to protest whaling but to stop the killing of whales. They have been successful in shutting down the whaling processing ships. According 152 Shepherd Conservation Society mission to stop the Japanese Whalers entering into the waters of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary continue to use direct action tactics. 233 On a ship christened “The Steve Irwin” (after the well-known Australian environmental activist, who was killed last year by a stingray while filming a documentary) the crew has undertaken what Watson refers to as “non-violent” resistance. Through the internet Paul Watson’s voyage can be viewed on U-Tube; corresponding news reports regarding the campaign are also linked into the site. Both Greenpeace and Sea Shephards take full advantage of the explosion of the digital superhighway in their campaigns. In May of 2007 an independent panel of Australian international law experts concluded that Japan’s rapidly expanding ‘scientific’ whaling program breached UNCLOS (the UN Law of the Sea Treaty), the Antarctic Treaty System, CITES (Convention on the Illegal Trade of Endangered Species) and the guidelines set out for scientific whaling by IWC, and the panel found that Japan’s whaling program was therefore illegal. Australia announced that it would send a surveillance aircraft and ship to gather evidence for a possible international court challenge to halt the slaughter. 234 In January of 2008 a federal court in Australia issued an injunction against Japanese to Watson, the group acts in the interests of the whales; “we have never killed, injured or harmed a living being or a living organism…but we will skink a ship. If we sink a ship we make sure that anybody who might be on can get off.” He adds, “the Japanese are the environmental terrorists, not us.” “Sea Shepherd Seeking Australia’s help” AAP Newswire 2/12/06. Lecture presented on YouTube June 2007. 233 While Watson was pursuing the Japanese whaling vessels in the Southern Ocean’s Sanctuary both the Australian and New Zealand governments refused to give the vessels protection, announcing that it would not service any Japanese ships that have anything to do with whaling. Peter Heller, National Geographic Adventure (1/1/08). 234 “Humpback back-down by Japan not enough: Australia,” AAP Newswire. 12/27/2007. 153 whaling vessels arguing that the whaling in the Southern Ocean sanctuary is in violation of domestic and international law. 235 As of January, 2008 a network of domestic and international environmental NGOs have joined a global grassroots campaign to boycott Japanese products in the U.S., the U.K. Australia, and New Zealand, in an effort to pressure Japan to stop whaling. Anti-whaling activists from Australia, including the Byron Whale Action Group and Surfers for Cetaceans hand-delivered letters to the Japanese consulate informing the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of the boycott of such Japanese companies as Sony, Mitsubishi Motors and Japan Airline Corp. This global grassroots campaign has been coordinated over the Internet websites such as MySpace and You Tube. Similarly, Greenpeace has challenged Canon Inc. to take a stand against whaling given that Canon sponsors programs dedicated to wildlife and endangered species protection and uses these programs as part of its advertising campaigns. As one Greenpeace activist noted: “Canon sells cameras by using the pictures of endangered species, including whales…Greenpeace is amazed that Canon wouldn’t condemn the killing of threatened species for fake research.” 236 Additional efforts include a letter writing campaign and public awareness campaign by the WhaleWatch coalition, has set out to inform the public about the parent seafood company’s whaling practices. The coalition has also demanded that Gorton’s (a North American subsidiary of Nippon Suisan, one of Japan’s three 235 In addition to the Southern Ocean sanctuary, in 2000 the Australian government established the Australian Whale Sanctuary, which protects all whales and dolphins in Australian waters. 1/15/08. www.abcnews.net. 236 1/28/08. See www.JapanToday.com.. 4/2/2002. www.guardian.co.uk/international/story. 154 largest seafood companies) stop its associations with whaling activities. 237 An additional letter was sent to Gorton’s by Greenpeace Japan suggesting that whaling not only negatively impact’s Japan’s relationship with Australia but also may thwart Japan’s attempt at its bid for the 2016 Olympics. 238 Interestingly, there has been a recent controversy within the World Wildlife Fund and the whaling issue. WWF’s Japanese branch came out in favor of limited commercial whaling, a decision which outraged WWF International (based in Switzerland) and environmental NGOs around the globe. This raises an interesting question as to how much autonomy Japanese NGOs (whether domestic or international) have in regards to speaking out against the government’s position on whaling as well as their autonomy in regards to the WWF international. 239 The campaign to protect the Southern Ocean Sanctuary serves as another example of the significance of transnational actors in their continued efforts to influence the 237 According to HSUS (a member of the WhaleWatch coalition) Gorton responded to the boycott with a letter expressing its opposition to whaling, saying that it has “gotten out of the whaling business.” However, the NGO claims that it is still associated with whaling. 238 “Whaling to Hurt Japanese Economy: Greenpeace,” World/Asia Pacific, 1/22/08. 239 Several other transnational organizations have chapters in Japan. These include Greenpeace Japan and Friends of the Earth. For the most part domestic NGOs in Japan that oppose whaling are difficult to find. In Japan, until now, the NGOs have not been as active as their western NGOs due to social systems and other factors that limited participation in them. Even the Wild Bird Society of Japan, which is said to be the country's largest environmental NGO, only has about 55,000 members. None of the Japanese NGOs are comparable to the U.S. and European groups in terms of their large membership of several hundred thousand and funding, as well as their political opportunity structures, their influence and their influence and power. In spite of this, Japan has been seeing an increase in the numbers of the NGOs and expansion of their activities today, as the issues inherent in the existing social and economic structures are coming to the fore. The question remains as to how NGOs will be treated by the Japanese government and whether they will have more influence in society, more similar to their western counterparts. See http://www.japanfs.org/en/public/ngo03.html and Keiko Hirata (2002), Civil Society in Japan. 155 behavior of states, keep the whaling issue on the public’s agenda and ultimately stop commercial whaling. Through the use of international and domestic law, the relationships they have formed with states that have similar interests, and their ability to organize campaigns through the use of the internet these actors continue to effectively organize across borders. At the same time it also demonstrates some of the difficulties of cross-border activism and the long-term effectiveness of the campaigns to stop commercial whaling is still unknown. Current Challenges for Anti-Whaling NGOs Anti-whaling NGOs continue to monitor and respond to challenges that continue to threaten whales. This includes responding to issues related to increased economic integration and increasing domestic and international pressure to support the RMS. For example, in the U.S. anti-whaling NGOs are challenging the Bush Administration’s stalling of the implementation of the proposed regulations that would revise ship traffic lanes on the Eastern Seaboard. A number of right whales (which are critically endangered, with less than 300 in existence today) have been injured/killed as a result of ship strikes off the coasts of Cape Cod, Georgia and Florida. The regulations were approved by the International Maritime Organization and based on recommendations of the IWC, NOAA, the Coast Guard and several environmental/animal welfare groups such as WWF and HSUS. The recommendations were to reduce speeds in these areas and move ship traffic lanes to avoid contact with the migrating right whales. Environmental NGOs have also been at odds with the Bush Administration in its support for the RMS--a position that could feasibly change with the upcoming 2008 156 presidential election. The Bush administration has alienated many environmental groups with the administrations unwillingness to enforce existing environmental legislation. Anti-whaling NGOs have continued to pressure the United States to change its position on the RMS. Additionally, while the Bush Administration supports the RMS, it has been supportive of not allowing the commercial whaling of endangered species. For example, Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez (The Secretary of Commerce overseas the federal agency NOAA) publicly denounced Iceland’s decision to resume commercial whaling of fin and minke whales, which have been certified as endangered under the ESA and there is a global commercial ban on minke and fin whales per the IWC. In 2004, Iceland was certified under the Pelly Amendment as a country that is undermining the effectiveness of whaling convention and the IWC through its “scientific” whaling. The certification remains active today. 240 At the June 2008 IWC meeting in Chile, there was still no resolution on whether the moratorium would be lifted. In addition at the 2008 meeting, anti-whaling advocates were not successful in convincing the IWC to establish a South Atlantic Sanctuary in spite of broad support among Latin American states including Chile. 241 However, a small success was gained by transnational NGOs in that Greenland was denied an extension of its existing quota having requested that it be allocated an additional 10 humpback whales for subsistence hunting. Transnational actors such as WPSA testified before the IWC and 240 See www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2006. 241 Sutor, Julie. June 27, 2008. “Whale Meeting in Chile Yields as Many Questions as Answers,” The Santiago Times. 157 revealed that 25% of whales killed by Greenland - which they are permitted to hunt only for aboriginal subsistence purposes – were sold commercially, resulting in significant profit and exploding the myth that their whaling quotas are purely subsistence based. . Conclusion The case study of the anti-whaling movement and of the campaigns presented in chapters two and three demonstrate the importance of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations in influencing the processes associated with the formation of domestic and international policy with respect to whaling (these processes include issue attention, agenda setting, changing the behavior of target actors and modifying existing policy on the state and international levels). The whaling issue “spills” over into other countries or regions in that the protection of whales is a transnational issue---whales are migratory mammals that know no state boundaries. Transnational action played a significant role in helping anti-whaling NGOs wage effective campaigns on the state and international levels, and while not all transnational campaigns were effective, transnational NGOs had an important role in further establishing the international norm of protecting whales (both domestic and international factors explain the reasons for transnational action in that they provided groups with opportunities for action and functioned as an impetus for action). Initially, the crisis of diminishing whale populations (with some whales near extinction) functioned as an impetus for action. Early legislative success in the U.S. and early international conventions during the 1960s and 1970s provided an additional 158 impetus for action and created “global spaces” which facilitated the participation of environmental NGOs. Specifically, the UN Convention of the Human Environment or the Stockholm Conference in1972 created a favorable international climate for those pursing anti-whaling regulation. The ability of actors to utilize the international processes within the IWC provided domestic and transnational NGOs with another arena for participation and their presence and voices at IWC meetings became more and more significant. The ability of transnational and domestic NGOs to build networks and coalitions has been a major source of strength and influence of campaigns to limit whaling or to eliminate it altogether. At least since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, NGOs have created networks among themselves to exchange information, share and expand offices across state lines and coordinate strategies. These coalitions generally espouse a “common advocacy position” (although there have been some exceptions); they speak and act with a coordinated voice and focus on the same target actors (states, corporations, intergovernmental organizations etc). 242 242 Group characteristics are also significant in explaining the ability of the transnational actors to organize effectively, despite tensions among them. As discussed earlier, while there is still tension between two of the most well-known environmental groups Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd, the split between Paul Watson and Greenpeace had to do with tactics. Greenpeace refuses to ram ships or sink whaling ships, while Watson argues that as long as human beings aren’t harmed those actions are justified in the “Whaling War”. Currently, in the case of Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd, it appears that Greenpeace has completely disassociated itself from Sea Shepherd and refuses to work with the group on the campaign to stop Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. Paul Watson, the founder of Sea Shepherd complains how Greenpeace refuses to aid them in tracking down the Japanese whaling ships, arguing that Greenpeace has faster, boats and is better equipped to keep up with the Japanese whalers yet refuses to give them their coordinates. 159 As noted above many environmental and animal rights groups are split on the issue of subsistence whaling. Groups such as Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the World Society for the Protection of Animals that tend to stress animal welfare and animal rights (preservation) are critical of subsistence whaling because they argue that the whaling practices of these groups include the use of non-traditional hunting techniques (rifles, speedboats, etc) and thus are not practicing the traditional methods of whaling. Other groups such as Greenpeace, Human Society of the United States, Friends of the Earth and World Wildlife Fund 243 tend to support the right of indigenous groups to practice their tradition of subsistence non commercial whaling as long as it provides some benefit to conservation. The tension between the preservation/conservation approaches does not exist in campaigns to establish additional safe havens or buffer zones for whales through sanctuaries, to protect endangered species, or to halt development projects that are a result of increasing globalization. For the most part the campaigns waged against whaling states and those targeted at the IWC demonstrate a great deal of cohesion between the groups; even between groups that advocate a strong conservationist or strong preservationist position. This demonstrates that a lack of ideological cohesion does not always prevent environmental and animal rights/animal welfare groups from coming together. This is 243 For example, WWF states that its organization only “promotes the consumptive use of wild species only when such use provides some benefit to conservation, which is highly unlikely n the case of commercial whaling. WWF does not therefore support commercial whaling, and will continue advocating that if any whaling takes place it must be conducted under international control.” See www.ngo.grida.no/wwfap/whalewatching/wwf. 160 clearly the case in the concerted effort of the anti-whaling advocates to get the IWC to place an international moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982. The Mitsubishi and Sakhalin campaigns also demonstrate the ability to create a “common advocacy position” within the coalitions among various transnational and domestic groups. In Mexico, for example, different groups (fishermen, environmental advocates, artists, etc) with different interests from different countries were able to overcome their suspicions and work together against the development of the Mitsubishi saltworks project. Today, the greatest source of tension for NGOs is in the increasing power of global economic interests (multinational corporations) and the ability of multinational corporations to influence states and intergovernmental organizations in regard to the environment. This is the challenge that anti-whaling and environmental NGOs are confronting in the more recent campaigns. Aside from the crisis of diminishing whale populations, the failure of the IWC to address the issue of pirate whaling by various states during the 1970s provided an additional impetus for action. Indeed, the IWC’s inability to enforce whaling regulations or influence the behavior of member states resulted in transnational activists using direct action tactics in an effort to raise public awareness and influence norms. In addition, as a result of increasing economic integration/globalization the Mitsubishi and Sakhalin campaigns formed in response to the environmental problems that arose from specific development projects that threatened the habitat of whales. In all of the campaigns in this analysis the globalization of resources and technology played a critical role in facilitating action and in aiding transnational actors in 161 disseminating information. Early on the use of video cameras enabled transnational actors to allow the public to “bear witness” to whaling. Today, the anti-whaling interests actively participate in the global spaces that are a result of increasing technological interconnectedness (globalization), such as the internet, including My Space and U-Tube which facilitate transnational action by creating a venue for dialogue in cyberspace; and through blogs (most environmental NGOs have blog sites) permitting the anti-whaling interests to further generate information about the issue. 244 The use of the internet and email to inform the public about boycotts, to circulate petitions, to contact their congressperson or senator, to sign a universal declaration of animal rights via the U.N., to report violations by states or corporations, or to keep the public informed about recent developments of the issue has provided an effective resource for domestic and transnational NGOs Transnational actors accomplish their goals at various levels. The goals of transnational NGOs in the whaling issue included agenda setting (raising consciousness), changing cultural norms (changing the way people think), as well as influencing the behavior of target actors including states, corporations, etc., and modifying international regimes. In an effort to accomplish these objectives, transnational NGOs have employed various tactics and strategies in their campaigns including direct action tactics, information politics, leverage politics, symbolic politics, and accountability politics. The 244 For example, the powerful images of the ocean voyages (Sea Shepherd’s and Greenpeace) of the anti- whaling fleet as they sail off to stop the whaling vessels are available with a click of a mouse. Although it may be difficult to measure its impact, it is a visual spectacle and functions effectively in further supporting existing norms regarding whales. What is apparent is that the use of the global space known as the internet facilitates participation in the international arena. 162 use of information politics, symbolic politics, and leverage politics through the use of direct action tactics as well as other tactics have been effective in raising consciousness of the whaling issue and placing it on the public and policymakers agenda. Transnational campaigns also appear to influence cultural norms. On an international level there is the suggestion that international conventions addressing species protection of marine mammals (such as the Stockholm Conference, CITES and the Bonn Convention) and transnational anti-whaling campaigns have been successful in establishing the protection of the whale as an international symbol of environmentalism. In all of the campaigns discussed, the domestic arena impacted the ability of domestic and transnational actors to further their objectives and provided these groups with opportunities for action. As the various campaigns indicate, the political opportunities available to transnational and domestic actors in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, and to some extent, Russia allowed the NGOs to further their objectives. However the political opportunities available to transnational actors were also dependent upon political and economic circumstances within the state. In the U.S., the ability of groups to accomplish their goals continued to be dependent upon the support of the presidential administrations at the time. New Zealand’s and Australia’s shift in its position on whaling in the late 1970s as a result of transnational and domestic actors and their consistency on this position reflected the cooperation between domestic and international NGOs in the anti-whaling campaigns. This has also enabled NGOs to draw on their support for the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. The government has worked with domestic and transnational NGOs in 163 opposition to Japan’s “scientific” whaling practices in the Southern Ocean. The relationship between the anti-whaling NGOs and the Australian government has further influenced the ability of transnational actors to organize and campaign against whaling states such as Japan. NGOs in the various campaigns frequently played direct and indirect roles in the monitoring and verification of environmental regimes, by investigating and reporting violations. During the 1970s and 1980s transnational actors would monitor and report the illegal capture of whales and expose the underreporting of the whales killed by whaling states such as the former Soviet Union. The anti-whaling coalition WhaleWatch monitors the compliance of states within the IWC by reporting violations of participating states and WhaleWatch carefully monitors the trafficking of illegal whale meat and work closely with CITES to ensure the enforcement of and compliance with the IWC rules. This is another way anti-whaling NGOs attempt to prevent the killing and trafficking of endangered whale species. In another example, several transnational actors have worked with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in researching and monitoring the illegal transport of endangered species. “Traffic” (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce) is a joint venture between NGOs (such as the Nature Conservancy and the WWF) and the IUCN, with offices and long standing 164 relationships with state ports around the world. This allows “Traffic” to monitor violations of CITES and report them to the IUCN. 245 One of the most significant accomplishments of the anti-whaling movement was the ability to infiltrate the IWC where NGOs played a significant role in the passage of the whaling moratorium. Several factors explain why the transnational anti-whaling NGOs were effective in the campaign to end commercial whaling. First, they were able to build upon the early success of the anti-whaling campaigns in the U.S.in the late 1960s and early 1970s and later in states like Australia and New Zealand that banned commercial whaling and became vocal opponents espousing a strong anti-whaling position. Second, transnational actors such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd were effective in increasing the international awareness of the whaling issue and exposing the weaknesses of the IWC through direct action tactics. Third, the scientific community was uncertain as to the status of key whale stocks, which enabled the anti-whaling NGOs to insist that whaling be ended in the absence of firm data. Fourth, NGO participation at IWC meetings increased dramatically and they were able to present their own scientific findings in support for a moratorium at IWC meetings. Finally, transnational NGOs made a concerted effort to focus their attention on the IWC and use the processes available to influence the composition of IWC members. NGOs were able to raise the membership of non-whaling states in the agreement above the three-quarter mark, the number required to change the schedule and create a temporary moratorium on whaling. This change in membership was also the result of the change in the US position, and its 245 See Traffic Bulletin; Sands (1990); Raustiala (1997:729); Wapner (2002). 165 willingness to use the Pelly and Packwood-Magnusson Amendments against whaling states to influence their vote on the moratorium. In the short run, the goal of the transnational advocates was to get the IWC to pass the moratorium. It is questionable whether the IWC alone would have passed the moratorium or whether the Mexican government would have halted the Mitsubishi saltworks project, or whether the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company would have halted the development of the second phase of the Sakhalin project, without the influence of NGOs. As suggested by Keck and Sikkink (1998) this may be attributed in part to their “framing of the issue”. As they note, successful campaigns often involve issues involving harm to vulnerable victim, which arouse strong feelings and ideas about right and wrong. The fact that the notion of the “whale as victim” has been permanently imprinted on the minds of both the public and policymaker in several countries demonstrates the effectiveness of the campaigns in drawing attention to the issue and influencing norms. With respect to the nature of the whaling issue, what is apparent is that the success of the campaigns was dependent upon whether they did or did not challenge the dominant or existing paradigm within the state or internationally. Because states like the United States and Australia (unlike Japan and the USSR) did not have an economic interest in whaling, it was much easier for anti-whaling NGOs to further their agendas. . Campaigns also tend to be more effective if they cross-over into other issue areas. The Mitsubishi and Sakhalin campaigns not only addressed the impact of the development projects on whales but also the project’s impact on the lives of people in the surrounding areas. Transnational actors like Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, Friends 166 of the Earth and others have continued focusing their campaigns on issues that address the health of the earths’ oceans and its implication for the continued existence of cetaceans and the livelihoods of people around the world. Transnational NGOs have been traditionally ineffective in influencing the behavior of states such as Japan, Norway, Iceland and Russia under the Soviet Union. In the case of Japan and Russia (in the early part of the anti-whaling movement) this was due to the lack of political opportunities available to the actors within the states as well as the cultural factors that influence state behavior. Norway and Iceland however present a different problem for transnational and domestic actors pushing an anti-whaling agenda in these states. While Iceland and Norway have open political systems, NGOs have not dramatically influenced public opinion or state behavior specific to whaling. 246 For example, in October of 2007 Iceland announced that it was going to begin commercial whaling again, and Norway has been consistent in its support of whaling. Thus the effectiveness of the transnational campaigns in influencing the behavior of states has been mixed. As noted above they have been more successful in countries such as the U.S., Australia and New Zealand than in Japan. The early domestic and international anti-whaling campaigns lay the foundation or groundwork, which the more recent campaigns build upon. A great deal has been learned by domestic and transnational actors and the movement has made significant gains on this issue including the social construction of the whale in many states as an 246 Bailey (2007) describes the anti-whaling movement as being in a state of “arrested development” and specifically in regards to Norway refers to anti-whaling as a “failed cultural norm.” 167 international symbol of environmental politics. The focus of many environmental, animal rights and animal welfare NGOs is now on maintaining the moratorium and there exists a tension between those actors that argue for the continued ban (primarily NGOs and states in which whaling is not a major issue) and those that argue that the ban has achieved its goal of restoring whale stocks and now should be discontinued (notably the whaling industry, states in which whaling has commercial or cultural importance, and some members of the scientific community). A long-term goal of anti-whaling advocates is to change the mission of the IWC; making it an international organization that focuses on the preservation of whales and the conservation of its habitat. However, with the rise of counterveiling interests that advocate sustainable use at IWC meetings, the ability of anti-whaling interests (which include transnational NGOs, some states, and some within the scientific community) to uphold the moratorium may prove difficult in the future. 168 Chapter 4: Origins and Early History of the Anti-Sealing Campaign 247 Millions of people living in the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe now hold as an article of faith that the preservation of seals in Canadian waters, and hence the cessation of Canadian seal hunting, is a moral test of the relationship between human beings and the other animals on this planet. A perception of this test as critical has been built by decades of strident argument, invective and protest. 248 Forty years ago a bitter controversy broke out between Canadian sealers and animal-welfare groups over the hunting of baby harp seals. The harp seal pup, with its fluffy white coat and black pleading eyes, became the darling of the anti- sealing movement and a symbol of all that was wrong with human exploitation of nature. … [Today the Canadian government claims success]. Success on every front? Not quite, for quotas can't address the most fundamental question: Should seals be killed at all? And so the battle still rages between those who view sealing as a legitimate use of a renewable resource and those who believe seals, along with whales and dolphins, should be above exploitation. 249 The harp seal question is entirely emotional. We have to be logical. We have to aim our activity first to the endangered species. Those who are moved by the plight of the harp seal could also be moved by the plight of the pig—the way they are slaughtered is horrible. 250 For many North Americans and Europeans, the Canadian seal controversy comprises everything they know about seals, animal rights and environmentalism. The baby harp seal, in many ways can be considered the “poster child” of the environmental movement. Transnational and domestic environmental NGOs have played a central role in framing the issue through the personification of the baby harp seal as an innocent 247 Seals included in this campaign include the harp, ringed and hooded seals. The most well known is the harp seal. 248 Wendt (1991:35). 249 Warne (March 2004). 250 Jaques Cousteau quoted in Wenzel (1991:48). 169 helpless victim subject to the clubbing of greedy hunters. However such a simplistic definition of the issue discounts the brutal nature of the industry for both seals and sealers. Canadian author Farley Mowat described the sealing industry as “organized exploitation of men and seals.” Because the livelihoods of sealers and the lives of seals are at risk, it is understandable why this continues to be an emotionally charged issue, although from the sealers’ perspective, the efforts of the anti-sealing movement had triggered the eventual collapse of the seal trade by 1987. The Canadian seal hunt, also known as the Atlantic seal hunt, is the largest marine mammal hunt in the world. Thus Canada has been and continues to be the central focus of the campaign against sealing. Canada is the only industrialized nation carrying out widespread commercial sealing activities. In Canada the commercial seal hunt season extends from November to March, however most sealing activity occurs in March in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and during the first week of April off the coast of Newfoundland. This peak period is what is referred to as the “Canadian seal hunt”. The primary targets are harp seals and hooded (ringed) seals 251 . Each year the Canadian government sets quotas for sealing. In 2003, for example the three-year harp seal quota granted by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was 975,000. A total of 317, 672 harp seals were 251 The adult harp seal averages about 300 pounds and about 51/2 feet long. It is pre-eminently an ice seal, spending much of its life on or close to the broken floes of the drifting pack. An agile swimmer, it can dive to at least 600 feet and swim long passages under water or ice, remaining submerged for as long as half an hour. The harp nation is composed of three distinct parts. One lives in the White and Barents Seas to the north of Europe, the second in the Greenland Sea east of the island, and the third and largest inhabits the northwest Atlantic. This third group spends summers in the north (within 400 miles of the North Pole) but whelps off the northeast coast of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. During the cycle of one annual migration harp seals must travel 5,000 miles or more (see Mowat, 1984:345-346). 170 landed during 2005 and over the past three years nearly a million were harvested. 252 Additionally, in 2007 the Canadian government authorized 270,000 harp seals to be killed in the commercial hunt. An additional 10,000 were allocated during this period for hunting by Aboriginal peoples (Inuit). The Canadian government and anti-sealing NGOs monitor the seal hunt every season. In 2006 the St. Lawrence portion of the hunt was shut down by the government (upon the insistence of transnational and domestic NGOs) because sealers had exceeded the quota by 1,000 animals. Environmental NGOs and Canadian officials continue to come into conflict over the actual number of seals taken---anti-sealing interests argue that quotas are consistently exceeded and that the hunting techniques are inhumane. 253 Canadian officials put forth the opposite argument, arguing that it is humane and the seals don’t suffer under the current hunting methods. The seal war from the onset has been a moral conflict between domestic and transnational NGOs on the one hand and the Canadian government, which activists argue tends to represent the interests of sealers, on the other. The sealing issue has remained a matter of severe political confrontation within Canada and outside its borders. 254 The case study of the anti-sealing movement, specifically the Canadian harp seal campaign, illustrates how domestic and transnational actors have been effective on various levels through transnational action. Like the anti-whaling movement 252 Linzey (2006). 253 There are also those seals that are “struck and lost”; that is they are injured or killed but not taken and thus are not counted as part of the “catch.” 254 See Lee (1990). 171 transnational actors employed multiple forms of action to accomplish their goals. The case study also demonstrates how factors such as group characteristics, state-society relations and globalization serve as both an impetus for and facilitate transnational action and transnational links between domestic and European NGOs were established early in the campaign; from the onset of the campaign the issue was transnationalized. As in the anti-whaling movement, a major impetus for and facilitator of transnational action was the use of domestic and international media sources to bring public to the issue. Additionally, in this case study Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang hypothesis” applies in that the Canadian government has been and continues to be relatively unresponsive to domestic pressure within the state in regards to its sealing policy. Anti-sealing activists argue that the government also does not properly enforce its restrictions on sealing quotas. It is through participation outside of Canada and the pressure from transnational actors working within other states that the Canadian government was forced to respond to the demands of domestic and transnational groups. In 1987 the seal hunt was shut down by the Canadian government. However, in1995, the Canadian government reopened the hunt, which marked the beginning of the second phase of the seal hunt campaign. The chapter addressing the Canadian harp seal campaign begins with a brief discussion of the significant actors (states, NGOs, indigenous groups) related to the issue. The history of sealing and the origins of the campaign are also discussed. The anti- sealing campaign, like the anti-whaling campaign has been influential in shaping the social construction of the seal and its plight in dealing with the human species. Framed 172 in the context of a “war against seals” the campaign’s origins can be traced back to the 1950s, and was influenced by the environmental movement of the 1960s in western states. The campaign was also influenced by the tactics/strategies employed by the anti- whaling campaign, especially in the context of strategies (direct action) and social construction of seals as the epitome of mammals in need of protection from human greed and environmental destruction. The campaign has gone through various stages in regards to strategies employed; and like the anti-whaling campaign it has reflected an ideological mix of conservationist and preservationist perspectives. However, from the onset of the campaign the issue of animal welfare/animal rights existed in that the brutality of the hunt remained the central focus of the movement. The harp seals’ declining numbers and the nature of the hunt were brought to the public’s attention simultaneously. Since harp seals were hunted on the ice, and rarely fled from their captors, the way in which the seals were slaughtered was easy to document. It was the concern over the declining numbers of harp seals in the 1950s that gave the campaign its legitimacy and leverage. Animal rights became the dominate position in the late 1970s after the Canadian government reluctantly agreed to conserving the number of seals and humane killing methods. While the government agreed to more “humane” killing tactics, transnational and domestic actors argued that the suffering of the seals being hunted remained consistent. The hunt was suspended in 1987, which can be partially attributed to the campaign efforts of transnational and domestic actors. When the Canadian government reinstated the seal hunt in 1995, animal rights/welfare became the center focus of many of the campaigns. Additionally, 173 the issue of conservation has returned to the campaign as scientists have recognized the impact of global warming on the ice sheets, which serve as whelping grounds for the seals. This development has allowed the movement to broaden its base (include more broad-based environmental NGOs) and use science to substantiate its claims that sealing should end given that seal populations are declining as a result of global warming. From the onset of the initial campaign, transnational action became a central component in furthering the goals of the anti-sealing NGOs and it continues to play a central role in the second stage of the campaign. As in the anti-whaling case study, the goals of the anti-sealing campaign include issue attention and agenda setting, creating cultural norms and modifying the behavior of states. In addition, working within international processes has also allowed anti-sealing NGOs to influence international policy specific to seals. The discussion of the anti-sealing campaign is presented in two chapters: the first discusses the origins of the initial campaign and its emphasis on conservation and humane killing practices as well as the shift in strategy (European boycotts) and emphasis on animal rights that began in the late 1970s. The chapter concludes with the identification of those factors that led to success and enabled NGOs to influence the Canadian government to suspend the hunt indefinitely in 1987. The second chapter discusses phase two of the campaign which began in 1995, when the Canadian government decided to reopen the hunt and transnational and domestic NGOs responded through their corresponding campaigns. In this second stage, the forces of increasing globalization play a significant role in the politics of the seal hunt and in the impact on 174 the species as a whole. The second part (chapter) concludes with a discussion of the factors explaining transnational action as well as the implications for successful transnational activity. Significant Actors Sealing Interests The actors that support sealing include the states of Canada, Greenland, Norway, Russia and China (specifically, Canada’s biggest markets are Norway, Russia and China). Canada, Greenland, Norway and Russia all allow commercial hunting. Canada’s hunt is the largest among the states and thus has been the target of anti-sealing interests. Economic NGOs include the Canadian Fur Institute, the Magdalen Island Sealing Association and the Canadian Sealing Association. Norwegian groups include the Karlsen Company. Domestic and transnational economic NGOs and their lobbyists play a significant role in influencing the Canadian government’s support for the seal hunt. The importance of sealing to Canada’s local fisherman is also an important consideration in understanding the Canadian position and the state’s inability to address the both the concerns of the sealing and anti-sealing interests. In addition, the relationship between the local politician and its constituents (fishermen) plays has played a critical role in the ability of the government to end sealing. Many local sealers argue that sealing is not only an important way for them to supplement their incomes but also a tradition that has been passed down from generation to generation that should be preserved. Local and national 175 politicians from these regions of Canada who do not support sealing interest find their political futures at risk. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is the leading federal government department responsible for developing and implementing policies and programs to support of Canada’s economic, ecological and scientific interests in oceans and inland waters. This includes the responsibility for the conservation and sustainable use of Canada’s fisheries resources while continuing to provide safe, effective and economically sound marine services that are responsive to the needs of Canadians in a global economy. Because the DFO establishes the sealing policies and makes recommendations to the Canadian parliament it has the power to influence the future of seal hunting in Canada. Additionally, Canada has passed specific legislation pertaining to marine mammals. The Marine Mammal Regulations under the Canadian Fisheries Act specifically requires the humane killing of seals. This includes such guidelines as not hunting seals less than three weeks of age, forbidding skinning seals while still alive and guidelines as to the proper ways to strike a seal to ensure minimal pain is felt by the mammal. Additionally, indigenous groups such as the Inuit (Greenland, Canada) partake in sealing based on their cultural and traditional practices and commercial use. Specifically, the ringed seal and the harp seals have been their main staple for food and are used for clothing, boots, fuel and lamp oil. When the hunt was suspended in 1987, the Inuit community was severely impacted since the market and demand for pelts fell significantly. With the reopening of the hunt in 1995 the Inuit were able to resume their small-scale commercial sealing. More recently however, both local fishermen and Inuit 176 communities have been hit hard by the increasing costs of fuel and the decreasing value of seal pelts on the international market. 255 Scientific Community The scientific community plays a central role in influencing regulation, public information and transnational advocacy on the sealing issue. In the early stages of the movement the scientific community significantly influenced the development of the anti- sealing movement. Attention to the declining numbers of seal populations was a result of scientists documenting the phenomena. Scientific evidence has also been used to justify the reopening of the seal hunt in 1993 when commercial fishermen began pressuring the Canadian government to reopen the hunt due to declining cod populations. The Canadian government has maintained that the collapse of the cod stocks were the direct result of the increasing harp seal population; thus to save the cod industry (and their political careers), Canadian officials argued that seal populations had to be reduced. 256 However, anti-sealing advocates assert that the science used to calculate seal populations and to determine the “humane” killing of seals by the Canadian government is flawed and they 255 During the most recent 2008 seal hunt, several local hunters did not go on the ice because of the increasing costs of fuel. Additionally, this year the value of seal pelts decreased from $107.00 in 2004 to $31.00 in 2008. For several hunters it was not worth the trip. See Mclean “Swilers on the Sidelines: Heavy Ice, High Fuel Costs, Low Pelt Prices Keeping Sealers Home,” The Telegram (4/11/08). 256 Some marine biologists estimate that each year an adult harp seal devours more than a ton of fish— mostly capelin, sand lance, and arctic cod—and invertebrates such as crabs, shrimp, and krill. Harp seals are thought to account for more than 80 percent of the estimated four million tons of fish and zooplankton consumed by all seal species in the northwest Atlantic. As far as the fishermen are concerned, that equates to a lot of seafood not being caught. Control the harp seal population, say fishermen, and you level the playing field. See Warne (2004) “Wolves of the sea to fishermen and cause célèbre for anti-fur activists, the irresistible animals are raising tempers again,” National Geographic Online. www.ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0403/feature3/fulltext.html.. 177 maintain that there is no scientific justification to kill harp seals. They also argue that the scientific data indicating that the declining cod populations are a result of the seals is inaccurate. The declining cod populations are rather a result of such factors over-fishing and global warming. Critics also postulate that killing harp seals will not allow cod populations to recover and in fact, they maintain that marine biologists suggest that reducing seal populations may do more harm to the ecosystem. Scientists working in the Canadian government play a critical role in formulating the policy of quotas to ensure that a long-term sustainable harvest is maintained. In the Canadian Department of Fisheries (DFO) scientists work to produce models of the harp seal population, based on such factors as how many seals are born each year, how many die, and how many are in each age group. The model assists the government in setting one supremely important number: the TAC, or total allowable catch. For the Canadian government, a fair TAC is one that maximizes the sealers' returns without compromising the harp seal stock. Sealers consider it to be too low and conservationists too high. 257 Veterinarians are also employed by both sides to document the humane/inhumane methods of killing harp seals. Those vets working on behalf of the Canadian government maintain the killing practices are humane, while those representing the anti-sealing advocates continue to present data that suggests that under current practices the seals are still suffering. 257 The idea is to use the TAC—broken down into quotas for each sealing area—to control the population. At the moment the department considers harp seals to be abundant, so it has set a relatively generous TAC—975,000 for the three years from 2003 to 2005. Hunters can take up to 350,000 seals during any two of those years, but the total for the three years cannot exceed 975,000. For environmental NGOs the quotas are too high, and for preservationists there should be no quota since the hunt should be ended. 178 Some scientific NGOs such as the Seal Conservation Society work to protect and conserve seal populations through the collection of scientific data and work closely with transnational environmental NGOs on the conservation of seals working to identify current threats to seal populations and help to rehabilitate seals. Currently, the scientific community plays a central role documenting the declining ice sheets that serve as nurseries for the harp seals. As in the whaling issue, some scientists suggest that global warming poses a threat to seal populations. 258 States and Anti-Sealing NGOs The states and NGOs that make up the anti-sealing interests appear to be more ideologically cohesive in their attitudes towards sealing and can be considered “hardliners” in regards to the sealing issue. The states that have been anti-sealing advocates do not have prominent sealing industries. Thus taking an anti-sealing position is not difficult for such states as the U.K., the U.S., France, Germany and Australia. The anti-sealing interest for the most part are not concerned with just conserving seal populations rather, states are advocating a total ban on sealing for moral reasons. Maintaining a “hard line” against sealing does not present a high cost for them. Most industrialized nations such as Australia and the U.S. that have large seal populations have 258 For example, over the past several years scientists have documented thinning ice sheets which they attribute to global warming. This has a direct impact on the survival of young pups; when the ice is thin pups drown, or the stress associated with the changing environmental conditions causes mothers to abandon their pups or give birth early which decreases a pup’s chances of survival. A final concern put forth by scientists and marine biologists (working for the DFO and NGOs) is the continual declining weight of the mothers. Scientists are unsure as to why this happening. 179 made an effort to protect the seals indigenous to their areas. The exceptions are Russia and Canada, as noted above, the latter is the central focus of the anti-sealing campaign. Transnational Activists and Ideological Orientations There are no specific NGOs that address only the sealing issue rather it is one of various issues on the agenda of environmental and animal rights/animal welfare NGOs. NGOs, like any group seeking to maintain public support, have found a “moral cause” in this issue and several NGOs have embraced the harp seal issue as part of their platform. The transnational and domestic NGOs that make up the anti-sealing interests are diverse and consist of groups that address a wide range of animal rights/welfare and environmental issues. They include groups such as Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, the Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), the Federation Against Abuse for Animals (Germany), Human Society of the United States (HSUS), the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Canadian Green Party (Animal Alliance) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). Additionally, several coalitions that exist include HarpSeals.Org, and the Boycott Canada Coalition. All of the NGOs listed participate in at least one of these coalitions. Harpseals.Org consists of over 100 NGOs. In addressing the ideologies of the anti-sealing NGOs, what is apparent is that the dominant ideology reflects that of a preservation, animal welfare/animal rights 180 perspective over that of conservation of the species. 259 As discussed earlier, for ecologists and conservationists, sustainable environments require a balance among various species and the focus is on the maintenance of the ecological communities which is made up of plants and animals. What happens to the individual animal is not important. They accept that out of necessities of nature and even necessities of individuals (subsistence hunting) that some individual animals will not survive. In contrast animal rights advocates feel the pain of the particular animals and at times they even reject a species orientation as “environmental fascism” that violates the rights of individual animals for the greater collective good. 260 On this issue, there exists an even greater intolerance for subsistence hunting of seals. For example, a group such as the IFAW that supports subsistence whaling for indigenous groups does not support subsistence sealing. The critique by environmental/animal rights NGOs has been that these indigenous populations are not using traditional tactics for hunting seals; rather they are using snowmobiles and rifles. The practical argument, apart from the moral position of the animal rights movement, is that modern hunting technology and economic practices have so altered northern life that Inuit harvesting is neither essential nor linked to cultural tradition. In essence, Inuit adaptation has given way to modern technological and economic practices. 261 259 Brian Davies notes, “These animals are symbolic, and if they can’t be saved it is probably not ever going to be possible to save any substantial population of wild creatures. The world will gradually be filled with the filth and one day, empty of all but man, this planet will become the loneliest place in the universe. Perhaps in saving the seals, man may save himself” (Davies, 1969:208). 260 Jasper and Nelkin (1992:43). 261 Wendt (1991:36). 181 Additionally, anti-sealing advocates argue that the idea of subsistence sealing is supposed to translate into sealing for non-commercial reasons, while groups such as the Inuit are also killing for profit which contradicts what should be considered “traditional” subsistence sealing. As Stephen Best of the International Wildlife Coalition suggests, “all people are essentially the same…Inuit kill for the same reasons as Newfoundlanders, as South Africans, as Scottish fishermen, to make money.” 262 Critics of the anti-sealing interests argue that their views translate into a type of “biocentric imperialism” in that such groups place environmental justice over social justice and that imperialism and whiteness permit biocentrists to promote cultural genocide as a rationale for environmental protection. According to this perspective, in their efforts to promote environmental protection, the environmentalists construct present day Aboriginals and EuroCanadians as equal threats to the environment. 263 According to Kitossa (2000), the biocentric eradication of Aboriginal difference began when the anti- sealing campaign attacked the Inuit seal hunters. Two primary factors facilitated this process. First it was incomprehensible to white biocentrists that indigenous peoples could kill the animals they loved and respected. Equal to this is western cognitive dissonance: biocentrists imagine animals as sentiment beings whose right to existence is equal to that of humans, a concept not disputed by the Aboriginals. Therefore, in asserting that animals 262 Wenzel (1991:167). In contrast to anti-sealing activists, both Kitossa (2000) and Wenzel (1991) the normative that argument in the battle to save nature, Aboriginal people are getting lost in the cross-fire, and that if we are seriously going to “put nature first” this must be done by also putting Aboriginal peoples and rights first. 263 Kitossa (2000:23). See also Wenzel (1991). 182 have a superior right to existence, biocentrists equate Aboriginal hunting in moral and material terms with commercial hunting; “the inevitable conclusion is that Aboriginal nations are, like us, part of a universal culture of speciesism.” 264 According to Jasper and Nelkin (1992) addressing the relationship between environmentalists and animal rights/welfare activists, the environmental movement (which the early sealing campaign was a critical part) left behind several essential legacies that were useful to the animal rights activists. Jasper and Nelkin (1992) note that the animal rights activists adopted the environmental critique of instrumentalism even though they differed in their attitudes towards animals. According to the authors, several of the environmental groups of the early 1970s provided examples of radicalism that influenced animal activists to transcend the limits of the welfarist tradition of animal protection; “if the humane societies appeal to the hearts of animal lovers, environmental arguments appealed to their minds, to their desire for an ideological rationale.” 265 As Paul Watson (who is both an advocate of animal rights and conservationist), states “The seal slaughter has no place in civilized society and no place in the 21 st century. It is a hold-over from the days of mass wildlife plunder and the decimation of seal populations has grossly altered the entire marine ecosystems of the Northwest Atlantic region.” 266 264 Kitossa (2000:29-30). 265 Jasper and Nelkin (1992:73). 266 http://www.seashepherd.org/editorials. 183 Early History of Sealing Archeological evidence indicates that Indigenous populations in North America (Canada, U.S.) have been hunting seals for at least 4,000 years. There is also evidence that seals were hunted in northwest Europe and the Baltic Sea more than 10,000 years ago. The first commercial hunting of seals began around 1515, and sealing became more prevalent in the late 1700s when seal herds in the southern hemisphere began to be hunted by whalers. Seals were hunted for their coats, for seal oil and for their meat, the first being the most significant source of income for sealing interests. The peak of the sealing industry was around 1821. Commercial sealing of harp was practiced not only on the east and west coasts of Canada but also in the White and Baltic Seas, the North Pacific, and the sub-Antarctic islands which were exploited by British, American and other European hunters. 267 As a result of the European commercial harvesting of sealing without effective regulation, numerous seal populations were brought to near extinction. Specific to Canada, in Newfoundland the seal hunt became an annually recorded event in 1723 and by the late 1800s sealing became the second most important industry (cod fishing was first). Data show that by 1830 that most seal stocks had been seriously depleted. Specifically, between the years 1828-1870 over 12 million seals were hunted. The hunt was facilitated with the use of steam boats and by 1914 a new vessel, the “ice breaker” was invented which further aided the sealers to enter remote areas surrounded by ice, breaking up the ice and ultimately increased the number of seals killed. 267 Busch (1985). 184 The economies in New Foundland and the Magdalen Islands were built around the sealing industry although seal products were subject to violent fluctuations in the market. For example, in the 1960s, seal pelts went from $2.00 a pelt to $12.00 a pelt as seal populations continued to diminish. Unfortunately, this motivated the sealers to take as many seals as they could given the high yield of return. Generations in these parts of Canada were socialized to become sealers and because there were few economic opportunities for individuals in these areas sealing was central to their economy, even though it is extremely hazardous for sealers to go out on the ice in sub-zero temperatures. International conservation efforts related to sealing date back to the early 20 th century with North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty of 1911. 268 This treaty included the countries of Russia, the U.S., and Canada. As a result of the severe drop in seal populations (less than 150,000 were in existence in 1909 as opposed to over 2.5 million in 1867) the treaty eliminated the pelagic hunt of the North Pacific Fur Seals in order to allow populations to recover. Unlike the Pacific Fur Seal situation where British and Canadian hunters competed with Americans, Russians and aboriginal users, the Atlantic harp seal industry was Canadian-dominated almost from the beginning. By the late 1940s international demand for seal oil declined, and thus the focus of the hunt now turned on the pelts from newborn pups, or “white coats.” The industry was dominated by the Norwegians, 268 The North Pacific Fur Treaty of 1911 banned sealing in the North Pacific (open sea) and gave governments the power to control sealing on lands that they owned. In addition, the four countries agreed to share the gains from permitted kills, partly in the form of skins and partly in the form of money. The United States agreed to pay Japan and Britain each US$200,000 and to supply them with a share of the annual harvest. The other three countries also agreed to share their harvests with each other. U.S. interest in controlling this territory (it had purchased Alaska from Russian in 1847) influenced its interest in pursuing this agreement. See Cairncross (2004). 185 specifically the Karlsen Company incorporated in Canada. Through incorporation the company was able to secure access to federal and provincial subsidies and to whale and seal without restraint inside Canadian territorial waters. 269 Additionally, because the whelping and moulting patches normally formed in international waters the fleet was not subject to national restraints or supervision. The Norwegian sealers also hunted seals migrating northward as far west as Greenland. These seals normally would have returned south to whelp the following spring. 270 The Role of the Scientific Community and the Origins of the Seal Hunt Campaign (1950- 1976) World-wide sealing activity (1750-1950s) seriously diminished seal populations. Additionally, concern over the tactics used in sealing dates back to as early as 1920, when a series of articles published in National Geographic criticized the Canadian seal hunt. Other editorials appeared in 1928 in the Canadian Fisherman calling for a moratorium of sealing. For the most part these media stories were virtually ignored by the Canadian government and the international community. However by the 1940s science began to play a significant role in influencing policies related to marine resources. As in the case of the establishment of the IWC in 1948, science was used to further support the dominant industries’ economic interests in terms of identifying the amount of resources 269 Until 1949 Newfoundland was an independent state. Once it became a province of Canada the government was responsible for the seal hunt at the Front, as well as in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 270 Mowat (1984:367). 186 that could be utilized to maintain a “sustainable” industry. For example, in 1950, the International Convention on the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was established. The purpose and function of the IGO was to provide scientific management of fisheries in the North West Atlantic Ocean. At the same time some members of the scientific community can be credited with increasing public awareness of the sealing issue. Public concern over the cruelty of the hunt began in the 1950s when reports by independent observers (scientists) of the techniques and methods of sealing began to surface. The reports indicated that hunt was not only ecologically dangerous to the survival of the species but inherently cruel. Specifically, in the depictions of sealing, two images of the hunt served to conjure up a distinctly negative picture for outsiders. One was the use of clubs and spiked poles as killing tools. The other was the image of the newborn pup being clubbed and skinned while still alive. 271 These reports stimulated the first calls for reform of the sealing methods and scale of the hunt. Such images of sealing would continue to be used by transnational actors throughout the course of the anti-sealing campaign in an effort to increase public awareness on the sealing issue. The Canadian government responded to the reports by establishing an observer system. Specifically, the new policy included sending observers to the seal hunt to collect additional data on seal populations and to observe the techniques used during the hunt. 271 In the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the ice was said to have a red tinge after the seal hunt every March, where hundreds of thousands of seals are killed for their pelts. The seals most sought after by the sealers are the babies, who for the first three weeks of life have furry white coats that yield greater profits. However, currently, “white coats” cannot be hunted. Baby seals cannot be taken before they are three weeks of age. 187 The first scientific observers sent to the ice were Dr. Hay Lillie and Dr. Joseph Cunningham who documented the declining numbers of harp seals and filmed the 1955 hunt. Upon their return they began a series of lectures to humane organizations throughout North America. Their public criticism of the hunt seeded the beginning of a new awareness of the issue. However their film did not reach a mass audience. 272 At this point in time, there were no quotas established by the Canadian government and sealing was completely unregulated. Further international attention of the issue of over-sealing was generated by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 273 While the scientific reports and early treaties acknowledged the need to protect marine life including diminishing seal populations, they did little to address the need for conservation specific to the Canadian seals. By the early 1960s additional data was collected and presented concerning the diminishing seal populations in Canada. For example, in 1960, a report released by the Canadian Department of Fisheries disclosed that surveys taken in 1950, 1951 and 1960 indicated that populations of seal pups had declined from 729,000 (1950) to 232,000 (1960). Adult seal populations went from 3 million (1950) to 1.25 million (1960). Thus in a ten year period, as a result of over-sealing the seal populations diminished by over 50%. In response to the 1960 report, conservationist Harold Horwood published “Tragedy on the Whelping Ice” for Canadian Audubon. In his article he criticized the 272 Watson (2002). 273 Twelve states signed on to the Treaty and it was ratified by 1961. The purpose of the treaty was to establish a natural reserve that would be dedicated to furthering scientific investigation. The Treaty also sought to demilitarize the Antarctica and establish a territory free from nuclear testing and radioactive waste. See B.B. Roberts (1977). 188 waste associated with the hunt and the lack of quotas, noting, “if you hunt moose in Canada, you are allowed to kill only one animal and must bring all meat out of the woods. But you may kill an unlimited number of seals and leave all the meat on the ice.” While the scientific community within the Canadian government continued to support the idea of conservation, arguing that seal populations were endangered, the Canadian government continued to encourage sealing and was slow to respond to the recommendations of the scientists. Early conservation efforts by the scientific community, which included publicizing scientific findings and making recommendations to the Canadian government to address the diminishing populations remained unsuccessful. This can be attributed to the powerful influence of the sealing lobby on the state. For example, the Canadian government continued to give tax incentives given to sealing companies. Thus sealing in Canada continued to remain completely unregulated. The 1961 kill, for example, took almost every seal pup born that season. Additionally, during this period the market for pelts continued to expand and technological advances in processing/tanning pelts increased production. Technological advances aided modern sealers--they used helicopters, radar, wireless radios, airplanes, refrigeration and weather forecasting to hunt seals. Interestingly the most significant event that served as an impetus for the emergence of the anti-sealing movement and gave international attention to this issue was for the most part accidental—a film documenting the virtues of Canadian hunting and fishing. A Montreal-based company working on behalf of Quebec’s tourism department was contracted to produce a series of television tourism films with its main focus on the 189 Canadian outdoors (hunting moose, geese, ducks, elk, etc.). A film crew member, a Magdalen Islander, suggested the inclusion of the seal hunt that occurred every spring. The film crew--expecting to film seals in their natural habitat and the age-old struggle between man and nature (brave hunters fighting the seals, resembling Old Quebec in the pioneering days)—took footage of the 1964 hunt and included it in the television series. The film entitled “Les Phoques de la Banquise” (The Seals of the Ice Floes) shocked its Canadian and US audiences in that it was graphic and bloody. The film was eventually circulated throughout Europe as well. The sight of passive baby seals being clubbed, kicked and spiked in the head in front of distressed mothers caused outrage and controversy throughout the industrialized world attracting attention to the issue by environmentalist and animal welfarists. 274 That same year Canadian journalist Peter Lust published the article, “Murder Island” in the Montreal Star addressing the brutality of the hunt, and the article was subsequently reprinted throughout Europe. After the article was published in a German newspaper Hamburger Morgenpost, the German government and German animal welfare NGOs publicly condemned the hunt. 275 Transnational links between domestic and European NGOs were established early in the campaign, as a result of the wide circulation of the Artek film and the increasing 274 Lust (1967), Mowat (1984), Jasper and Nelkin (1992), Watkins (2005). Brian Davies, the founder of the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) reflects on how overzealous the sealing industry appeared at that time. In his view it appeared that their only motivation was profit even if that meant killing the last seal pup. He notes how those who profited from the suffering of seals didn’t give it a second thought, as he describes a seal about to be slaughtered: “Their hind flippers were like two hands crossed in prayer, and again the five fingernails. I can well imagine why biologists consider sea mammals the most advanced form of nonhuman life.” (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992:72). 275 Lust (1967). 190 interest on the issue by European NGOs. Domestic NGOs in Canada worked closely with European animal welfare NGOs. Domestic NGOs such as the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies and the Canadian Audubon Society began organizing campaigns on the sealing issue in the mid-1960s. Given the increasing international media attention to the issue, it provided groups with the political opportunity for action. The most significant transnational organization to play a role in the early movement was the animal welfare organization the Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). Local chapters of the SPCA existed throughout Canada. American and European chapters of the animal welfare organization included the Hamburg SPCA, SPCA Switzerland, and the New York chapter. In Europe other organizations that participated in the campaign included the Animal Protection League of Zurich, Inter-Canton Animal Help, the Federation for Animals, Bern and the Federation Against the Abuse of Animals (Gesellschaftgegen Missbrauch der Tiere), which played a significant role in the early stages of the campaign after the release of the Artek film in 1964. In many ways, transnational and domestic NGOs followed the lead of scientists, journalists and other international figures and the media that initially brought attention to the issue. Environmental and animal welfare NGOs echoed the concerns of the scientific community and emphasized the need for conservation due to over-sealing. The limited response by the Canadian government to the diminishing seal populations along with the increasing media attention served as an impetus for action. Early efforts by anti-sealing activists had both a domestic and European focus. Coverage of the hunt was especially important in Europe, since it contained the biggest 191 market for seal skins. 276 The campaign to “save the seals” in the north Atlantic focused on the inhumanity of the hunt and called for more humane practices. Anti-sealing NGOs focused on bringing the issue to the attention of the public. To accomplish this goal, the sealing issue was framed in a moral context of “right and wrong” and the hunt was portrayed the greatest mass slaughter ever inflicted upon any wild mammal species. Indeed, the anti-sealing interests used the media as a “weapon” in every way possible. Technological advances (a more portable movie camera) allowed anti-sealing NGOs to document the hunt and increase international public awareness and political discourse on the issue through pictures. The use of information politics also included public forums, such as a televised discussion of the sealing issue on West German television, letters to the editors of local and Canadian newspapers, public appeals to the Canadian prime minister to end the hunt and the circulation petitions. In 1965, over 50,000 letters were delivered to the Canadian embassy in Bonn, Germany. While the Canadian government denied the validity of the film, claiming the hunt as portrayed in the Artek film was “staged” it did attempt to respond to the international and domestic criticism given to the issue. The Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson publicly responded and assured the public that future hunts would be carried out with “efficiency and humanity”. Legislation such as the Sealing Act of 1965 (which was passed with support of the sealing industry) established specific hunting regulations such as requiring that sealers be licensed, prohibiting sealers from skinning live seals and setting quota kills for sealing by ships or airplanes in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. It did not 276 For example, Germany purchased 78% of the harp sealskins. 192 however, address other killing methods such as clubbing, goring and kicking, nor did it restrict the numbers of seals killed by local landsmen. Subsequently, in response to the increasing international attention brought to the issue and pressure by animal welfare groups, in 1965, the Canadian government agreed to allow observers from humane societies to accompany government officials on the ice to monitor the hunt. However, it was mostly a symbolic gesture by the government given that government officials had limited enforcement capabilities; the government allocated 17 men to cover over 100 square miles and 700 sealers. 277 In 1966, observers were allowed on the ice. Specifically, Brian Davies from the SPCA New Brunswick chapter went along to observe the 1966 hunt and his observations confirmed the validity of the depictions of the slaughter in the Artek film. That same year, as a result of increasing public pressure, the Canadian government agreed to meet with local chapters of humane societies and the sealing industry to discuss the sealing issue. The meeting proved unsuccessful; the government continued to support the sealing interests. At this point in the campaign, however the Canadian government attempted to limit transparency of the hunt given the amount of negative publicity it was receiving. Essentially, the government was initiating its own campaign of damage control. After the 1966 hunt, as a result of continued negative international and domestic media attention the hunt received, the Canadian government refused to allow any more observers from humane societies on the ice. This did not stop anti-sealing groups from observing the hunt; groups such as the 277 Mowat (1984). 193 SPCA were receiving funding from domestic and international sources and were able to rent helicopters, ships and other equipment to observe the hunt on their own. Information politics played continued to play a crucial role in the anti-sealing campaign and efforts to keep the public informed on the issue were effective. For example, in 1968 Britain’s largest paper, The Daily Mirror featured an expose and extensive coverage of the seal hunt. The front page of the Mirror featured a photo of a baby seal being clubbed to death with the headline reading “The Price of a Sealskin Coat.” Additional public attention was generated by the publication of the book Savage Luxury (1970) by Brian Davies of the SPCA, which was circulated throughout Canada and Europe. The book was significant in that it was Davies’ account of his efforts to initiate a “save the seals” fund/campaign through the SPCA, as well as his first-hand account of his observation of the hunts of 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969. The book also documented his account of the continued harassment and interrogation he faced by the Canadian government as a result of his anti-sealing efforts. Davies later received a full expose’ by the paper the Paris-Match which ran a series of articles on Davies and the seal hunt. 278 The continued coverage of the seal hunt by the by the European press and efforts by anti-sealing activists further enabled the anti-sealing advocates to set the agendas of the public and policymakers Canada and Europe. The increasing coverage also impacted the domestic actors participating in the campaign. Specifically, because the campaign had become so controversial and heated the Canadian chapters of the SPCA decided to withdraw from the anti-sealing campaign 278 Jasper and Nelkin (1992:75-76). 194 in order to focus on other animal welfare issues. The concern by the SPCA was that their support of the campaign was too radical and the issue was too divisive for its members and contributors. As a result, in 1969 Davies created the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). Its first campaign was focused on the sealing issue, continuing what he started with the SPCA. During this period domestic and transnational environmental actors had made significant progress in raising awareness of environmental issues and influencing the passage of environmental legislation throughout industrialized states. The U.S. legislation gave the anti-sealing campaigns further legitimacy. For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1968) was passed and by 1972 the U.S. had implemented a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine products. Later that year it passed the Endangered Species Act. Internationally, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972) 279 identified the need to enact conservation measures for Antarctica seals and the Stockholm Conference in 1972 also acknowledged the need to conserve marine mammals. The Canadian government, however, had taken a more conservative approach. While emphasizing humane killing of seals and issuing quotas by 1971, the government still did not support a complete ban on sealing due to external and internal constraints. 279 The treaty addressed the general concern about the vulnerability of Antarctic seals to commercial exploitation and the need for effective conservation measure and thus required an international treaty to ensure the effective conservation of a valuable living resource in the marine environment. The opening words of the Convention states, “Recognizing the general concern about the vulnerability of Antarctic seals to commercial exploitation and the consequent need for effective conservation measures.” This treaty grew out of the Antarctic Treaty (1959). States that signed on include: the U.K, the U.S., Canada, Russia, Japan, Chile, Poland, New Zealand, Norway, Italy, Belgium, Brazil and Argentina. 195 The Canadian government’s inability to respond to the demands placed on the state by anti-sealing advocates had to do with the political costs associated with severely restricting or banning the seal hunt. Elected officials within the Canadian government (from such areas as Newfoundland) were split on the sealing issue since placing a ban on sealing would not have been supported by certain constituencies that relied on the additional income they received from sealing. The external constraints had to do with the power and influence of the multinational sealing industry on the Canadian state and the jobs the sealing industry provided for local sealers. In an effort to respond to the concerns about dwindling seal population, in January of 1971 a group of independent scientists sitting on a newly established House Advisory Committee on Seals and Sealing (COSS) recommended to the Canadian Parliament that the entire seal hunt be phased out no later than 1974 and recommended that both harp and hood seal populations be given at least six years to recover. 280 The Canadian government responded by suggesting that it could not take unilateral action, since the sealing issue was really a matter of international concern and thus left the issue to the ICNAF. The ICNAF which had not taken action in the past to conserve seal populations (although pressured to do so by anti-sealing NGOs) established quotas in the Harp and Hood Seal Protocol which would establish an overall quota for Atlantic seals. The quota would be determined on the basis of scientific data and used for scientific management of seal 280 COSS was created by Canadian Minister of the Environment, Jack Davies in 1971 in an attempt to gather accurate data on the impact of sealing on seal populations. COSS recommendations did not coincide with the political realities facing Canada at the time—banning sealing was not an option. 196 populations. The quota established in 1971 was 200,000 harp seals for ships and 45,000 for landsmen. By the end of the 1971 season, only 231,000 seals were taken—since that was all they could get given the diminishing populations. By 1972, the ICNAF placed a further reduction on the quota and lowered it to 150,000; however that year sealers were only able to land 136,000. While seal populations continued to diminish, white coat prices continued to rise, and this increased the incentive for sealers to yield higher catches. Anti-sealing NGOs continued to pressure the ICNAF to lower the quotas. In 1976, as a result of intensive lobbying at the state and international levels by anti-sealing advocates, and the mounting scientific evidence (such as the publication of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. study which suggested that there were no more than 800,000 seals at a year old and older) ICNAF lowered the quota to 127,000. 281 The domestic and transnational NGOs had successfully placed the issue of conservation on the public’s and policymaker’s agenda within Canada and across state lines. Although the government attempted to limit the state’s responsibility for regulating the hunt, it was unable to deflect increasing international criticism and public outrage when it placed the responsibility of regulating sealing in the hands of the ICNAF. While the government supported the quotas set forth by the ICNAF, as a result of domestic and international pressure, additional legislation was passed in Canada that attempted to impose stricter regulations on sealing. This included strict stop and start dates, licensing procedures and on-site supervision. The government also agreed to ban the use of the gaff 281 Mowat (1984:380). 197 as a killing tool and established guidelines for the bats used to club seals which now would have to be 24-30 inches in length. For some environmental/conservation NGOs, the conservation issue had been adequately addressed by the ICNAF and the Canadian government. For others, such as the more conservative wing of the animal welfare NGOs the issue was too tumultuous and too extreme. In 1976, for example, groups such as the Canadian Audubon Society and the World Wildlife Federation withdrew from the campaign when the ecological viability of the seals seemed assured. 282 However other animal welfare NGOs argued that the ICNAF existed to further the interest of the Canadian and Norwegian governments and their respective sealing industries. Animal welfare/conservation NGOs such as the SPCA (U.S, Europe), Greenpeace 283 , Fund for Animals and the IFAW claimed that the domestic legislation and the ICNAF quotas had not gone far enough. It did not change the nature of the hunt (cruelty of the killing practice) nor did it adequately address the diminishing seal populations. At this point in the campaign the ideology of the movement also included an emphasis on animal rights (preservationist). Stepping Up the Campaign: Shift in focus and target actors (1975-1987) The growing support by the scientific community, the distribution of the Artek film, and the coverage by international media which was a result of the efforts of domestic and transnational actors played a role in raising awareness of sealing issue. In 282 Wendt (1991). 283 In 1975 Greenpeace officially entered the campaign at the insistence of Paul Watson. 198 the initial stages of the harp seal campaign, during the 1950s and 1960s, domestic and transnational NGOs had worked to set the agenda of the public and states and pressured the Canadian government to address the concern of the diminishing seal populations and the techniques used in sealing. The first stage of the initial campaign was effective in getting the Canadian government to respond to the concerns over conservation, influencing the state (its target actor) to place the issue on its agenda. The response (though limited) of the Canadian government included establishing observer systems, setting kill quotas, licensing, and restricting the techniques used in sealing. Other external factors such as the negative international attention that the Canadian government was receiving by the European press (e.g., Paris Match) concerning the hunt and the work of anti-sealing NGOs in Europe (such as the IFAW) in addition to the increasing international awareness of the issues facing marine mammals explain how the international context was such that the Canadian government had limited options—it had to respond. However, the efficacy of the implementation and enforcement of these new policies were questionable. After 1976, the influence of the anti-sealing activists on the Canadian state was limited, since the state was constrained by the (domestic and international) sealing industry and the economic interests of the local fishermen that relied on the supplemental income they received from sealing. The Canadian government’s position was that it had responded to the concerns of the anti-sealing interest. In response to the Canadian position, and as a result of the fact that some conservationists NGOs had left the issue, the anti-sealing campaign began to shift its strategy and the emphasis of the campaign 199 was less on conservation and more on preservation. Activists framed the campaign in the context of animal suffering and cruelty (animal rights). The shift in focus can be attributed to the realization of some anti-sealing activists that they had exhausted any hope of gaining any additional ground influencing the Canadian government to ban sealing due to the influence of the industry and the interests of the local sealers whose economic livelihoods would be displaced by such a ban. Along with the shift in ideology there also was a shift in protest strategy of the campaign, which included the expansion of target groups. Initially, the campaign had focused on the Canadian government and its support of the sealing industry. Now transnational NGOs were targeting the governments of the United States and Europe and the consumers within those states. Additionally, at this juncture the anti-sealing NGOs began working began working with such European based NGOs like Britain’s Animal Welfare Trust, and the Comite d’Action. 284 The shared goals of conservation and humane killing practices of the early campaign shifted to the goal of ending sealing in Canada although it did not include sealing by indigenous populations such as the Inuit. Tactics in the campaign included information and symbolic politics such as direct mailings which were meant to shock and horrify the recipient. NGOs such as Greenpeace sent out mass mailings in Europe, the U.S. and Canada. The mailings not only allowed the group to raise money for the cause but impacted public perception about the plight of the innocent seal pups (symbolic politics). Specifically, the mailings included three pictures: one, of a newborn (white coat) baby harp seal. The pup’s coal black eyes starred 284 Wendt (1991:49). 200 innocently into those of the viewer. The animal appeared pure white and behind it was the image of pristine and glittering ice. The second photo depicted a terrified pup that faced a roughly clothed man looming over the “innocent victim.” In his hands was a spiked club posed to strike. In the next picture, the background was filled with pools of blood that stretched across the ice. Although the front cover of the pamphlet warned its recipient that the “contents may be disturbing” no one could have prepared for the horrendous images that they were about to see. 285 The ability to call attention and inform the public about the plight of the harp seal (and the moral leverage applied) had much to do with the way the issue was presented-- personifying the cute, cuddly baby harp seals as innocent victims that were subject to brutal clubbing and skinning in front of the distraught mother seals. The photographs of the baby seals along with video documentation were powerful visual images that resonated with the public. The groups were successfully able to tap into the viewer’s emotions. Additionally through newspaper advertisements that condemned the seal hunt and direct mailings of pre- printed postcards, the public was encouraged to express their revulsion with the seal hunt by contacting the Canadian government representatives in their respective countries, the environmental departments of their own countries and their own government representatives. The shift in focus of the campaign was reflected in the new protest strategy which was marked by an escalation in campaign rhetoric and direct action tactics. The impetus for continued action of the campaign was clearly ideological in that the “immorality” and 285 Coish (1979); Wright(1984); Wendt (1991). 201 cruelty of the hunt drove groups to action, which also served to facilitate action in that the “advocacy position” remained constant throughout the campaign. The campaign continued to use moral leverage against the Canadian government and other states. The campaign also shifted its focus adopting the direct action tactics, which had been commonly used by anti-whaling advocates to increase public awareness. For example, in 1975 transnational and domestic NGOs such as Greenpeace and IFAW began to send observers down to the ice (as in the previous decade) to monitor and document the hunt each spring in an effort to further publicize and disrupt the hunt. The difference between the observers sent in the previous decade and those that were now being sent to the ice was that now direct action tactics were employed. Anti-sealing advocates were not just passive observers they actively sought to disrupt the hunt. The new protest strategy also included a forum outside Canada. Foreign political and cinema celebrities were invited to the ice to view the hunt. For example, Brigette Bardot drew wide attention during a visit to the Gulf in 1977 and US Congressmen from California and Florida accepted Greenpeace’s invitation to observe the hunt. Additional direct action tactics included the spraying of the pelts of baby seal with green and red dye. Although harmless to the pups, once the pelts were sprayed with the dye it made the pelts worthless to the sealers. To counter the visits to the ice in 1976, the Canadian government began to step up enforcement of the Seal Protection Act (which was initially passed in 1971) making it a violation of federal law for any unlicensed individual or aircraft to come within a half a mile of a harp or hooded seal during whelping season. Ironically, the sealers were 202 allowed near the seals so they could hunt, but government scientists, anti-sealing advocates, the press and independent scientists and investigators were forbidden on the ice. Anti-sealing advocates argued that the Seal Protection Act was not designed to protect the seals, rather it was intended to protect the sealers, the sealing industry and the government of Canada by preventing the truth of what was happening on the ice from reaching the general public. 286 In 1977 the Act was amended making it illegal for anyone to interfere in any way with a seal hunter. The Act also vested the Department of Fisheries (DOF) officers with the authority equivalent to that of a peace officer enabling them to arrest any protestors disrupting the sealing activities. The Canadian government also reversed its position regarding its sovereign right to regulate the hunt (having deferred its authority to the ICNAF in 1975, claiming it had no control over the sealing taking place in international waters). In 1977 with the ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), the Canadian government now proclaimed limited sovereignty over the surrounding seas to an offshore distance of 200 miles. This brought the entire western Atlantic ice-seal population and the seal hunt under the jurisdiction of Canada and thus made it subject to Canadian law once again. The DOF also proclaimed that its authority was to “manage” marine resources and harvest them in a humane fashion. The policies were based on “sound conservation principles” which they claimed would ensure the survival of the stocks, and which took into account the relationship among species as competitors, predators and prey. The government had put forth the idea that “an argument can be advanced from the fishing 286 See Mowat (1984), Watson (2002). 203 industry to reduce the population of harp seals to a low level in order to ensure the supply of fish such as cod.” 287 From the perspective of the anti-sealing interests, this covert policy deliberately employed the sealing industry as an instrument by which the Canadian government could maintain its populations of fish. The government argued that by lowering seal populations they would be able to address the diminishing cod, herring and salmon levels, since the seals were to blame. Thus it justified the seal hunt in an effort to protect the fishing industries in Canada. As a result, in 1977, the DOF raised the quota from the ICNAF’s 127,000 to 177,000. This decision was made against the recommendation of Parliament’s COSS committee, which maintained that 140,000 was the maximum that the harp seal population could endure. In 1978, it was raised to 180,000. In addition to raising the quotas, the Canadian government continued to subsidize the sealing industry with the construction of additional sealing vessels and provided government technical support in ice-forecasting and reporting and aerial reconnaissance that pinpointed the location of whelping patches. The government also employed the Canadian Coast Guard and Fishery vessels to protect the sealers against anti-sealing advocates. Such actions functioned as an impetus to action for the anti- sealing campaign. The second phase of the movement exposed the increasing hostility of the Canadian government towards the anti-sealing advocates as a result of their direct action tactics as well as its inability to adjust to the campaign’s shift in tactics. Although the campaign was unsuccessful in modifying the Canadian position on sealing it continued 287 See Mowat (1984), Watson (2002). 204 transnational advocacy that moved the sealing issue outside its borders and ultimately beyond the control of the Canadian government. The anti-sealing campaign focused on issue attention and agenda setting in Europe and pushing the issue onto the agenda of the EC and other European states. This was evident when the anti-sealing actors centralized the debate in Europe, and now transnational NGOs such as Greenpeace and the IFAW were able to control the discourse on the issue and concentrate their rhetoric outside of Canada. The actions by the Canadian government fit Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang hypothesis” suggesting that groups take campaigns outside the domestic arena as a result of states being non-responsive to internal pressure. 288 Additionally, anti- sealing actors effectively kept the drama surrounding the issue in the press through the use of direct action tactics. The press continued to cover newsworthy stories of such groups as Greenpeace, the IFAW and the newly formed Sea Shepherd Conservation Society who spray painted seals with vegetable dye so that they could not be hunted, and were repeatedly harassed, jailed, fined and even assaulted by the government in an effort to keep the protesters off the ice. The battles between the anti-sealing protestors and the Canadian government in the “seal wars” were consistently covered in the international media. At this juncture, the government sought to keep any groups, scientists, domestic or international media from observing the hunt. It also attempted to shut down domestic discourse on the issue within its borders. However, the anti-sealing NGOs kept the 288 The attitude of the Canadian government is clearly outlined in a quote from the minister in charge of sealing in 1984, he states: “Let’s not forget who we are dealing with, we are dealing with blackmailers, with liars, with fanatics, so obviously no rational argument can convince fanatics, people that I would call fascists.” (Globe and Mail, 1984). 205 rhetoric of the campaign alive in Europe and shifted the discourse from “conserving” seals to conceptualizing sealing as an “immoral” act. The campaign used moral leverage to influence European policymakers. “Science” was also used selectively in the campaign. Now that Canada had employed some conservation measures, and put forth the idea of “sustainable harvesting” of seals, it was able to support its position with scientists/marine biologists’ population models that suggested the seal herds had recovered. The government backed up its humane killing practices with the support of veterinarians that declared clubbing was the most effective and humane means of killing young seals. To counter these arguments Greenpeace and the IFAW offered photographs of blood-stained seal pups suggesting that the brutality of the hunt was still an issue and hired veterinarians to support the accusation that the seals were being skinned alive. Anti-sealing advocates also challenged the government’s assertion that seal populations had recovered. The groups cited the findings of the government’s own research scientists and a 1979 U.S. Marine Mammals Commission report that concluded that the ICNAF/NAFO scientists had consistently overestimating the harp seal pup population by as much as a third. 289 The effectiveness of the strategy of information and symbolic politics employed through the personification of baby seals was evident in increased public awareness within and outside of Canada. In addition to the moral leverage, the campaign used economic leverage as well. This strategy proved to be the most effective in aiding the anti-whaling NGOs to attain their goal of influencing the behavior of states and influence 289 Mowat (1984). 206 its policy. The boycott initiated in Europe against Canadian seal products sought to dissuade consumers from purchasing fur coats made out of the harp seal pelts. Consumers proved to be receptive to changing their buying habits. The visual images brought to American and European audiences by the anti-sealing campaign influenced attitudes towards sealing and its practices. It was especially effective in dissuading consumers who purchased seal coats. As a result, the demand for seal pelts in the European market was reduced considerably, which made the seal trade essentially unprofitable. 290 The boycott initiated by the domestic and transnational NGOs throughout Canada and Europe also went beyond seal pelts—it included all fish products imported to Europe from Canada. Transnational actors lobbied major supermarket chains across Europe and the U.S. and staged protests. The campaign effectively convinced consumers not to shop at markets that sold Canadian seafood and store owners not to buy Canadian seafood to be sold in their markets. In addition to the boycott, domestic and transnational actors established a powerful lobby directed at persuading the ten-nation European Economic Community to prohibit the import of white coats. Although the Canadian government took the matter lightly, by the early 1980s the lobby made significant headway and by 1981 the Canadian government came to the realization that the lobby posed a threat to the future of the seal industry. Specifically, the IFAW had established public relation campaigns in Belgium, Germany, and the U.K. and testified before the parliament of the European Community. The lobby was led by IFAW’s Brian Davies, who argued that not only was the hunt cruel 290 Wapner (2002:12). 207 and ecologically dangerous, but that the Canadian people had not been told the truth about the realities of the hunt which was clouded by the government’s pro-sealing propaganda. Davies also emphasized that the gross value of the seal hunt in Canada was the economic equivalent to two McDonald’s restaurants. A major success for the anti-sealing NGOs came when the community of European states (EU) banned all imports of seal products from baby seals (whitecoats) with the passage of the 1983 European Seal Import Ban. The ban caused the collapse of the market for seal pelts in Europe. The number of pelts imported went from 200,000 to 20,000 between 1981 and 1984. In1987, as a direct result of the external economic and political pressure placed on the Canadian government by the anti-sealing movement, the Canadian government officially suspended sealing operations by commercial vessels on the Atlantic Coast, and called off the 1988 hunt in an attempt to undermine the continued negative publicity and the economic realities of the boycott. 291 The Canadian seal hunt still continued but on a smaller scale in that it was carried out by local landsmen and indigenous groups. The collapse of the harp seal fur trade in Canada had an especially devastating effect on the Inuit communities participating in the fur trade since it cut off its market. For the local landsmen, the impact was felt, however local sealers also relied on fishing and other activities for income. 292 For the anti-sealing advocates the 291 Although the Canadian government suspended the hunt, the sealing industry firmly stated its plans to resume seal hunting in the future. 292 Wenzel (1991). 208 suspension of the commercial seal hunt was a major success, and would have been impossible without the transnational activism which was central to the campaign. Conclusion Prior to the development of anti-sealing movement, the initial concerns regarding the sealing issue focused on the conservation of seals. The need for conservation began to gain attention in the 1920s and continued into the 1940s and 1950s as a result of concerns raised by the scientific community about diminishing seal populations. The Artek film (1964) which reflected the realities of the seal hunt provided the impetus for action by domestic and transnational environmental groups. Environmental groups took up the issue in the mid-1960s, which coincided with the growth of the environmental movement in industrialized states. The issue became transnationalized from the start of the campaign with domestic NGOs in Canada establishing links with European animal welfare organizations and domestic and international media stories covering the story in Europe and the U.S. Group characteristics, domestic and global factors influenced advocacy on this issue. In regards to groups characteristics the first and second stages of the campaigns maintained a “common advocacy position.” The first stage was guided by conservationism. The second stage’s focus was grounded in a preservationist perspective and those groups who did not identify with the preservationist position withdrew from the campaign when the ideological focus shifted from conservation to animal welfare/rights. Domestic factors also influenced action and while political opportunities within Canada 209 existed, there was limited access to the Canadian government after the first phase of the campaign. This was due to the conflicting interests surrounding the sealing issue. The sealing industry was an important source of employment for the local fishermen and the influence of international economic interests constrained the options available to the state. Politicians from such prominent sealing areas as the Magdalen Islands or Newfoundland faced a political liability if they supported anti-sealing efforts. At the same time, global factors, including the increasing internationalization of media sources and the development in technology facilitated action by anti-sealing groups on the issue. International conventions such as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972) and the Stockholm Conference 1972 not only increased public awareness of environmental issues but also the international acknowledgement of the need to conserve seal populations. The primary goals of the early campaign (1960s-1975) were issue attention and agenda setting and to modify the position of the Canadian government. The campaign effectively employed such tactics as information, symbolic and accountability politics. The domestic and transnational NGOs such as the Canadian Audubon Society, the SPCA, Greenpeace and the IFAW maintained domestic and international issue attention on the seal hunt. The campaign also effectively pressured and “shamed and blamed” (accountability politics) the Canadian government to take action. The Canadian government responded to the concerns of the public and the criticism it was receiving from the international community (from such states as the U.S., France, the U.K, and Germany) with such conservation efforts as the Seal Protection Act of 1971 and the 210 establishment of quotas in the early 1970s. For many anti-sealing advocates, however, the response by the Canada was not sufficient. Having exhausted its ability to influence the Canadian state beyond the measures it had taken, the anti-sealing NGO shifted their focus and strategy. This shift reflected a new phase of the anti-sealing movement (1975- 1987), which now focused on preservation of the species and targeted the European and the U.S. public. While staying with the traditional strategies of information, symbolic and accountability politics the second phase of the campaign also employed economic leverage (boycott) on both the sealing interests and the fishing industry. In addition such tactics as spraying baby seals with red and green vegetable dye, direct action tactics also enabled the anti-sealing actors to maintain public interest in the sealing issue by staging such dramatic events on the ice. The use of material leverage against both Canadian seal products and Canadian seafood in Europe was an effective strategy in aiding transnational actors in modifying the position of the Canadian state. The “boomerang hypothesis” explains the nature of transnational action on the sealing issue. Given that the Canadian government did not respond to the demands put forth in the second phase of the anti-sealing campaign the anti-sealing NGOs looked beyond the borders of Canada to influence its policy. The second phase ended with the Canadian government suspending its commercial sealing operations. Thus the anti-sealing campaign was effective in attaining its primary goal of stopping the commercial seal hunt in Canada. The next chapter (chapter 5) examines the current stage of the campaign (1995-2008) which began when Canada reopened the seal hunt. This phase has been 211 characterized by the continuation of transnational activism in the campaign’s efforts to accomplish their goal permanently ending the Canadian seal hunt. 212 Chapter 5: Canada Reopens the Hunt –The Anti-Sealing Campaign (1995-2008) International awareness of the need to protect marine resources is reflected in such international conventions as the Fur Seal Treaty (1911), the Antarctic Convention (1959) and the Convention for the Conservation of Seals (1972). In Canada, the awareness of the need to protect seals from overexploitation began in the 1920s and continued into the 1940s and 1950s as a result of concerns raised by the scientific community of diminishing seal populations. By 1964 with the release of the Artek film the international and domestic media took the issue of seal conservation and the brutality of the hunt and placed it on the public agenda. It also created a political opportunity for action by domestic and transnational environmental groups to take on the sealing issue in Canada. The early campaign was transnational from the start and its strategic goals included drawing attention to the issue and agenda setting as well as the long term goal of modifying the position of the Canadian state to address the diminishing seal populations along with the tactics used in the hunt by the sealers. The second phase of the early campaign used information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability politics, including direct action tactics, to keep the issue on the agenda of the public and policymakers and to decrease the demand for seal products outside of Canada. Placing pressure on the sealing industry and influencing its target actors (the European consumers of seal products) proved to be an effective strategy in achieving the goals of shutting down the seal hunt. In 1983 the EU banned all imports of all products from “white coats” (baby 213 seals) and in 1987 due to the collapse of the market for seal products the Canadian government suspended the seal hunt. After almost ten years of a moratorium on commercial sealing, however, the Canadian government reopened the commercial seal hunt in 1995. Local fishermen suffering from severe economic hardship as a result of the collapse of the cod stocks in the northern and southern Gulf of St. Lawrence in the mid 1990s began pressuring the Canadian government to respond to the crisis. The Canadian government argued that seal populations had recovered sufficiently and this had placed the fishing industry at risk, since the government placed the blame for the declining cod populations on the seals. Thus in an effort to sustain the cod populations and appease the fishermen the government re-opened the seal hunt in 1995. It also allowed for the highest kill quota levels in the history of the hunt due to the increases in seal populations and improvements in markets for seal products. Specifically with increasing globalization, Asia replaced Europe to become the major destination for exports of seal oil, skins and penises (seal penises are thought to be an aphrodisiac). The government also agreed to subsidize the industry, supplying sealers with government subsidized ships and other government resources and technology to aid them in the hunt. Critics (anti-sealing advocates) contend that the reopening of the seal hunt in Canada was a deliberate effort by the Canadian government to divert attention away from the possibility that the collapse of the cod populations was a result of poor fisheries management by the Canadian government. The problem of overfishing due to lack of regulation by the Canadian government in the Atlantic (along with other parts of the 214 world) has significantly impacted the fishing industries. They alleged that Canadian government understood that the probability that the cod populations would recover was not high, and thus in an effort to avoid any responsibility for the problem it proposed an alternative explanation for the collapse—the seals. Transnational and domestic anti-sealing NGOs argue that the policy of returning to the hunt to save the cod populations not only doesn’t properly address the problem but also makes it worse, and they use scientific evidence to support these claims. Their data suggest that when seals eat in herds, they return massive amounts of nutrients in the form of fecal material, which feeds the plankton, which feed the fish, which in turn feed the seals. The removal of this nutrient base would pose a serious threat to the health of plankton and fish populations. 293 According to Greenpeace, the collapse of the cod populations was the most conspicuous example of poor fishery management practices under Canadian jurisdiction and has often been cited as a case example of such failures. Additionally, the transnational NGOs contends that there were other factors such as those related to global warming that can also explain the collapse of the populations. Interestingly, the cod stocks failed to recover after the ban on sealing was lifted, which led to the total closure of cod fisheries in southern and northern Newfoundland in 2003. 294 The Canadian government had to provide the local fishermen with alternative economic resources, and 293 Watson (2002:192). 294 See “The Canadian Seal Hunt: No Management and No Plan” (2005). www.Greenpeace.org. See also Miano, “Declining Fish Populations leads to Unhealthy Ecosystems,” Johns Hopkins Newsletter 3/31/2005. http://media.www.jhunewsletter.com/media/storage/paper932/news/2005/03/31/Science/Declining.Fish.Po pulations.Lead.To.Unhealthy.Ecosystems-2243633.shtml 215 thus the sealing industry was brought back as a way to offset the economic impact of the declining cod populations. The reopening of the hunt was discrete and without any official public disclosure. To offset the negative image of hunting baby seals or “whitecoats,” and to circumvent the European seal product ban, the government redefined the term “whitecoat” to narrowly mean harp seal pups of about 13 days of age or less. It then banned the taking of whitecoats. Thus, it not only circumvented the European seal product ban, which allowed seal product exports to increase significantly, but it also gained a valuable edge by being able to assert that sealers were no longer slaughtering “baby seals.” 295 The seal hunt in Canada was reopened due to cultural, political and economic factors. Culturally, many Atlantic Canadians identified with the landsmen being able to practice the centuries-old sealing tradition, which had been passed down from generation to generation. Politically, federal, provincial and municipal politicians promoted the seal hunt as a means of getting elected, and re-elected. 296 In Canada, a politician who publically questioned the hunt or who failed to endorse the practice would have little chance of election. Economically, local fishermen augmented their incomes by slaughtering seals; selling pelts, oil and meat; or servicing the sealing industry. This chapter examines the campaigns developed by transnational and domestic NGOs in their efforts to modify the position of the Canadian government and end the seal 295 Seals two weeks and older whose fur is beginning to molt are referred to as “beaters.” 296 Politicians in the Provinces have consistently supported the local sealers and the seal hunt. For example in April of 2008 an MP from the Labrador Province went on the ice with the sealers to show support of the cultural practice. See Russell, “Labrador MP to Participate in Opening of Seal Hunt,” Canadian Press (4/11/08). 216 hunt in Canada. Like the earlier campaigns the strategic goals of issue attention and agenda setting are a significant component of the campaigns. The goals of changing the behavior of target actors and modifying their behavior along with the changing international policy (specifically the EU) remain central to the long term objectives of the anti-sealing campaigns. Similarly, the “boomerang hypothesis” again explains the reasons for transnational action on this issue. The difference between the initial campaign that led to a moratorium on sealing in 1987 and the current campaign is the nature of technological resources available to environmental and animal rights/animal welfare NGOs which has further facilitated action, along with the bridging of conservationist/ preservationists perspectives in that both types of NGOs share the common objective of ending the seal hunt and addressing larger forces (globalization, global warming and the overexploitation of resources by humankind) that are negatively effecting the ecosystems in which they live. The Campaign The reopening of the Canadian seal hunt in 1995 functioned as an impetus for action by transnational and domestic anti-sealing NGOs in Canada. According to Chris DeRose, the founder of the animal welfare organization Last Chance for Animals (LCA), the harp seal campaign was revived when LCA followed up on a rumor in 1995 that the Canadian government began sealing once again, even though various transnational and domestic anti-sealing NGOs had been assured by Canadian officials during this period 217 that there was still a moratorium on commercial sealing throughout the country. 297 DeRose then contacted Brian Davies of the IFAW and informed Davies about the resumption of the hunt. Davies, who verified the validity of the rumor, restarted the anti- sealing campaign and sought to reopen the channels that had been established during the first phase of the campaign. With the increasing numbers of environmental and animal welfare/animal rights NGOs that had formed since the late 1980s, and the increasingly transnational nature of these NGOs, the numbers of domestic and transnational actors that participated in the anti-movement during the 1990s increased and the NGOs were better organized, had increased funding and were more seasoned/experienced in domestic and transnational activism. As in the earlier campaign, transnational activism has been instrumental in helping anti-sealing NGOs accomplish their goals. Some of the same transnational environmental and animal welfare/rights NGOs that participated in the early campaign also worked on the second phase such as Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and the IFAW. Additional transnational actors include: Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WPSA), Respect for Animals (UK), the International Wildlife Coalition, and the Sealing Conservation Society. Domestic animal welfare groups within Canada participating in the current anti-sealing campaign include: Animal Alliance of Canada, Global Action Network, Atlantic Canada Anti-Sealing Coalition, Campaigns Against Cruelty to Animals (CATCA) and the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies (CFHS). In 297 Interview with Chris DeRose (LCA founder) 2/20/08. 218 response to the Canadian governments unwillingness to respond to various environmental and animal welfare issues, in 1994 the Animal Alliance of Canada formed its first green party, the Environmental Voters (EV). Their strategy includes running candidates who will agree to support and implement good environmental and animal welfare policies. Although candidates the run rarely win elections, they publicly support or endorse candidates from the other parties who will support their environmental platform. 298 The goal of the campaign is not just to reinstate the moratorium but to persuade the Canadian government to phase out the commercial seal hunt once and for all. The strategies employed within Canada include the establishment of the Green Party and direct action tactics, which allow these groups to keep public attention on the issue. The campaign was met with resistance by both the Canadian government and the local sealers. For example, in 1999, Newfoundland Fisheries Minister John Efford publicly announced that Canada had a significant “seal problem” and advocated total extermination of the species. Such responses by the Canadian government have served as a further impetus for action. On several occasions activists have been jailed, beaten, fined and threaten by both DFO officials and landsmen. 299 The Canadian government began to 298 Interview with Liz White (5/4/08), Seal Hunt Campaign Coordinator, Animal Alliance. 299 In 1995, after the Canadian government announced the resumption of the seal hunt, Sea Shepherd returned to the Gulf of St. Lawrence to conduct further research for an alternative non-lethal sealing industry. The Sealing Association on the Magdalen Islands was angered that Sea Shepherd was attempting to interfere with the hunt. On March 16, a mob of three hundred sealers took-over the hotel where Captain Watson, Lisa Distefano, actor Martin Sheen, other volunteers, and media representatives were staying. Sealers broke down the door to Watson's hotel room and assaulted him. Reporters were attacked and journalists' cameras were smashed. Police took Watson against his will from the hotel to the airport - while the car was driving away a brick was thrown at the window hitting Watson in the head. A Quebec tactical police team was flown to the Magdalens to escort the media and Sea Shepherd crew out of the province. 219 step up the rhetoric, initiating a public relations campaign defending the hunt as a means of preserving the livelihood of the fishermen and initiating the slogan, “save a cod, kill a seal”. The DFO also used the scientific community to justify the hunt citing studies that blamed the decline of cod populations on the seals and using reports from government veterinarians declaring that the hunt was “humane.” As in the earlier campaign the political opportunities available to the anti-sealing activists were limited and anti-sealing NGOs have been unable to influence the agenda of policymakers, nor modify the position of the Canadian government. Again, the anti-sealing advocates have worked outside the state in an effort to accomplish their goals. Globalization has played a significant role in aiding the transnational and domestic NGOs in establishing networks across state lines. Anti-sealing advocates have spread the campaign globally, arguing that many Canadians, as well as an increasing numbers of citizens and their elected representatives from the U.S., Mexico, Australia, Taiwan and Europe want an end to the seal hunt. As in the anti-whaling campaigns, the ant-sealing campaigns have formed coalitions such as Harpseals.org (2003) and Boycott Canadian Seafood Coalition (2002). Ideologically, both coalitions reflect a “common advocacy position” in their support of the total abolition of the seal hunt. Harpseals.org has approximately one hundred domestic and transnational NGOs working on the anti- sealing campaigns. The CBS coalition has over 70 domestic and transnational NGOs working on its campaign. Its website provides interested participants with information The Quebec police refused to press charges against the sealers. Canada's return to sealing was publicized worldwide (See Tervit, “A Human Avalance,” The Toronto Sun, March 17, 1995). 220 regarding protest strategies, literature, petitions and letters that can be circulated, information on the restaurants participating in the boycott and other resources. Harpseals.org’s coalition also indicates a high level of organization. It consists of three general categories: primary opposition groups, secondary opposition groups and tertiary groups. Those groups involved in the “primary groups” have the Canadian seal hunt as a primary campaign. These groups include the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, the IFAW, Friends of Animals, HSUS, the WSPA, Animal Alliance (EV), CATCA, PETA, Greenpeace, Animal Naturalis International, and the Global Action Network. The primary groups work on promoting the boycott within their respective states and across state lines, promoting educational programs, obtaining celebrity endorsements, organizing protests, spreading information via websites, circulating petitions, lobbying governments, and channeling support to other countries to promote new anti-sealing campaigns. For example, Global Action Network works to channel support from Spanish-speaking activists based in Latin America. While the “primary” groups are either organizations that are exclusively focused on the seal hunt or have major seal hunt campaigns, the “secondary” groups have supportive campaigns. The tertiary groups provide links and information via websites/mailings on the sealing issue. All three categories consist of domestic and transnational NGOs. 300 Domestic and transnational actors believe that the only way to permanently shut down the hunt is to destroy the economic incentive for the hunt—close off the economic 300 See www.harpseals.org/oppositon/unified.html for a complete list of NGOs participating in the coalition. 221 channels (demand) through political pressure on significant trading partners of Canada. To underscore this point, Stephen Best (BCS, EV) explains that “the authority for deciding the seal hunt policy in Canada is vested solely in federal Members of Parliament (MP). MPs from all political parties have been taught by the sealing community that there is a political benefit to be had by supporting sealing and taught by anti-seal hunt advocates that no political cost is to be paid.” According to Best, the political benefit of the sealing industry amounts to – and is limited to – eight or nine federal seats: seven in Newfoundland and one, possibly two, in Quebec “If a political cost of similar or greater size can be exacted by the anti-seal hunt community, then politicians will recognize the benefit to negotiating an end to the seal hunt.” In 2004 Canadian Seafood Boycott activists met with Canadian Members of Parliament and officials at the DFO in Canada. The purpose of the meeting was to inform the sealing interests that a boycott of Canadian seafood would be implemented unless they called for a permanent end to the seal hunt. The activists were attempting to negotiate an end to the seal hunt before the consumer boycott took place. The head of the Canadian Seafood Industry and the DFO officials informed the anti-sealing advocates that they were not interested in negotiating with them and the seal hunt would continue. On March 29, 2005 the boycott was initiated. Transnational actors understand that the United States and Canada are each other’s most important trading partners, thus the most appropriate target for a consumer boycott with the political objective of ending the Canadian seal hunt included initiating a 222 boycott of Canadian seafood in 2005. 301 The primary target for the seafood boycott continues to be the United States and European markets. Recent legislation has been passed in the U.S. that makes it much easier for consumers to identify the origins of the seafood they purchase. A provision of the U.S. 2002 Farm Bill requires Country of Origin Labeling (COOL). As a result of the recent legislation transnational actors expect that as they continue to raise public awareness about the issue that consumers will avoid Canadian seafood (fish and shellfish). The anti-sealing campaign and the corresponding strategies have been organized with the political and economic factors in mind. “The truth is,” says Stephen Best, “Canadian politicians and all Canada’s political parties benefit from promoting the seal hunt, because—no matter how cruel, environmentally destructive, or costly to taxpayers—doing so wins votes in parts of Atlantic Canada and Quebec. Fishermen make a profit from hunting seals – they wouldn’t go out on the ice if they didn’t. Take away the votes and profits and the commercial seal hunt dies.” The strategies/tactics involved in the second phase of the anti-sealing campaign have included similar methods employed in the initial stages of the campaign. The major components of the strategy include lobbying the European parliament and the individual European states as well as a boycott of Canadian seafood and with the goal of influencing the passage of a total ban in the EU of all imports of seal products. 302 Since the boycott was initiated in 2005, the Canadian 301 See Stephen Best (2002) “Ending the Canadian Seal Hunt: A Political Strategy for Ending the Canadian Harp and Hooded Seal Hunts”, prepared for Animal Alliance of Canada and Environment Voters, September 2002. 302 The initial EU ban passed in 1983 had only prohibited the importation of “whitecoats.” 223 fishing industry experienced a 465 million dollar decline in the export of snow crabs. That same year, Greenland agreed to ban the import of all seal pelts as a result of HSUS (a member of the BCS coalition) efforts to convince the government that the hunt was inhumane. 303 Direct action tactics continue to be employed by such groups as Sea Shepherd’s Society, who used various vessels to not just observe but attempt to interrupt the sealing season. Additionally, other groups such as HSUS and IFAW send observers to film and document the hunt in an effort to gather evidence to support their central claim that the seal hunt is still brutal and inhumane, and to gather evidence demonstrating that sealers consistently exceed the total allowable catches (TAC) for the seasons. This evidence is used to influence policy makers on the state and international levels. Every spring, footage of the seal hunt is made available on the websites of transnational NGOs such as Greenpeace, HSUS, IFAW and Sea Shepherds Conservation society. Footage of the hunt and other media worthy events are also available on U-Tube. Specifically, for the last seven years, Newfoundlander Rebecca Aldworth, the current regional manager of the Humane Society of the United States, has gone out on the ice to view the hunt first hand. 304 There she has documented dozens of acts of cruelty. These include pups being 303 According to CBC news the Environmental Minister of Greenland ordered its state-owned tannery Great Greenland to stop importing seal pelts from Canada because of its opposition to the Newfoundland hunt. The concern of Greenland’s Inuit is that it is a severe blow to indigenous hunters and that the ban would impact an already fragile industry. “Seal Pelt Ban Concerns Nunavut Minister,” 1/16/2006. CBC. http:// www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2006/01/16/akesuk-sealing-16012006.html 304 In March of 2007, Aldworth and representatives from HSUS and Humane Society International were arrested for documenting the commercial seal hunt in the Gultf of St. Lawrence. Their cases are still pending. The pending charges did not stop Aldsworth from documenting the hunt in March of 2008. 224 bled or skinned alive, seals being impaled while still alive and dragged for long distances, seals convulsing while being skinned, live seals being kicked and stomped by sealers, seal being killed with illegal weapons, and injured seals being stockpiled near the fishing vessels, left to suffer and eventually die. Aldworth’s eyewitness accounts have been confirmed by an international team of veterinarians who observed the seal hunt in 2002- 2003 and examined the corpses of skinned seals. They estimate that as many as 42% of the seal pups had skull fractures insufficient to have caused death. As in the earlier campaign, NGOs have been able to attract media attention and raise public awareness of the issue through the support of celebrities such as Martin Sheen, Sir Paul McCarthy, Pamela Anderson, and the CEO of Paul Mitchell. These celebrities and well-known personalities go to the ice with transnational actors to observe the hunt. Such tactics enable the groups to keep the sealing issue alive in the media. Other activists such as Paul Watson, founder of Sea Shephard’s continue to go on the ice to document the hunt and continue to get into trouble with the Canadian government. Watson’s vessel the Farley Mowat was seized by the Canadian government in 2008 for alleged Canadian Fisheries Act violations. 305 Technological advances and resources such as the internet have aided anti-sealing NGOs in furthering their goals of public information and placing public pressure (leverage) on the Canadian government. Coalitions and groups take advantage of the accessibility of emails, video, and general information. Circulating petitions and letter 305 Morris, H. “Minister Defends Armed Seizure of of Protest Ship,” Morris, H. National Post News, 4/13/2008. http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=442322%20 225 writing campaigns to the Canadian government are done with a great deal of efficacy on the internet. Resources available to NGOs are impressive, including the use of high tech equipment, ships, and helicopters. Additionally, several of the groups such as IFAW, Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd’s have had significant increases in both membership and money from donations. Anti-sealing activists have also utilized domestic channels within Canada to pressure members of Parliament in Ottawa to end the hunt. Domestic groups such as Animal Alliance and the Global Action Network along with the transnational groups Greenpeace, HSUS, IFAW, and others have also focused their efforts on educating the public about the inherent cruelty in the hunt, the conservation myths perpetuated by the sealing industry, and the economic realities of Canada's seal slaughter. The anti-sealing advocates claim that Canadian tax dollars should not be spent on subsidizing a hunt that is inhumane and is not profitable. Additionally, protests against the hunt have been staged throughout Canada and in the U.S., throughout Europe and even in Latin America. Anti-sealing activists have mobilized the public within these regions to write letters of protest to the Canadian government, and provided submissions to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Eminent Panel on Seal Management. In an attempt to take the economic realities of the local sealers into account, anti- sealing advocates such as Sea Shepherd’s and the IFAW have also concentrated their efforts on introducing alternative techniques/methods of obtaining seal fur to the sealers which would prove to be non-lethal to the seals, ultimately replacing the club with a brush. Specifically, Paul Watson of Sea Shepherds Conservation Society attempted to 226 introduce the method of brushing the pups to extract the fur. He had also managed to secure the commitment of a European retailer who was interested in processing the “humane” seal fur for use in coats and sweaters. Proposals for creating a tourism industry around the harp seal populations, having visitors on the ice during the whelping season have also been put forth. These efforts were attempts by anti-sealing NGOs to neutralize/ incorporate its opponents. However, both suggestions have been not been supported by both sealers and government officials. With respect to the EU, transnational groups such as the HSUS and the IFAW have participated in the domestic and international policy process as seen in their continued efforts to lobby and testify before state governments (using moral leverage) within Europe and before the EU parliament as well. On several levels the campaign has been effective. The goal of issue attention and agenda setting by educating the public through the anti-sealing demonstrations, circulating petitions and soliciting letters of protest have kept public attention on the issue. Anti-sealing NGOs have also been effective in modifying the behavior of states like Belgium, the U.K, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Croatia, Denmark, Holland and Mexico. These states have either agreed to ban all imports of all seal products or have done so already. Currently transnational NGOs such as Sea Shepherds, the IFAW and HSUS are presenting sealing footage/evidence to the European Parliament in an effort to get the EU to ban the importation of all seal products. The evidence presented is to show that contrary to the Canadian government’s claim, the hunt continues to be inhumane. In July of 2008, the EU took into consideration a ban on all seal products on the basis that the hunt is 227 inhumane. The ban would apply not only to seal pelts but all goods derived from seals, including meat, vitamins and other products. To counter the claims made by the anti-sealing NGOs and the scientific evidence they have presented to the EU, in April of 2008 Canada sent a delegation to Europe on behalf of the sealing interests. The delegation included Inuit leaders, fishermen from Newfoundland and Quebec, and several other regional officials in an effort to convince the EU not to ban seal products, claiming that the hunt was as humane as any other form of hunting and that it was not only a part of the Inuit lifestyle and cultural tradition, but also the indigenous communities depend on the hunt for meat and for their economic livelihood. EU officials assured Canada that the ban would not affect the traditional Inuit hunt. 306 The Canadian government has also looked to international regimes for assistance. For example, in August 2007 Canada sought formal consultations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process to address Belgium’s ban on the importation and marketing of seal products, arguing that the Belgian ban is a violation of Belgium’s international trade obligations under the WTO. The anti-sealing actors have also used international regimes to settle disputes related to the Canadian seal hunt. In August of 2007, several domestic and transnational NGOs including the Conservacion De Mamiferos Marinos (Marine Mammal Conservation), the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiente (Mexican Center for Environmental Law) and the Humane Society International have urged the NAFTA 306 www.EUobserver.com (4/15/08). 228 Environmental Commission to investigate Canada’s failure to effectively enforce its Marine Mammal Regulation, its humane regulation of the annual harp seal hunt through which the DOF is required to enforce humane regulation is governing the methods used in killing the seals. (This obviously includes not skinning seals while they are still alive). The submissions filed by these groups with the NAFTA Environmental Commission cited evidence in the form of veterinary reports and videos taken during the seal hunt of 2007, demonstrating that the main provisions of the regulations are often ignored by hunters and are not enforced by DOF officials. 307 In the United States the government continues to take an anti-sealing position. Recently as a result of the pressure on Congress by animal welfare groups, the House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the annual Canadian seal hunt and urging the Canadian government to end it. House Resolution 427 was passed on July 30, 2007. The Senate introduced a similar Resolution 118 which has been referred the Committee on Foreign Relations and as of July, 2008 is still in committee. 308 307 Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation states that members of the public including NGOs are allowed to make submissions to the Secretariat of the Commission. If the secretariat finds that the claims have merit the submission is forwarded to the government for a response. Once an investigation is completed a Factual Record is made available to the public. While this mechanism does not have much enforcement capability it is another way transnational and domestic actors are able to publicly embarrass the Canadian government. 308 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hr110-427. 229 Conclusion Anti-sealing campaigns with a transnational focus have been and continue to be central to furthering the objectives of anti-sealing movement. Domestic and transnational groups have made progress in influencing public attitudes towards sealing through their campaigns in such states as the U.S., Australia, the U.K., Germany, Belgium, Greenland, states within Latin America and even to some extent Russia. 309 This underscores the importance of transnational and domestic groups working together to accomplish their goals whether the focus is on influencing the behavior of states. However, the main focus of the anti-sealing campaign has been Canada. From the advent of the anti-sealing campaign the issue has been framed as a “seal war” and has been a constant battle between transnational and domestic NGOs campaigning to end sealing and the government of Canada continuing to support sealing interests. The ideological orientations of several of the environmental NGOs participating in the campaign emphasized the importance of species protection. These environmental groups effectively allied themselves with animal rights/animal welfare groups in the mid- 1970s; ultimately finding a “common advocacy position”. Both camps emphasized the brutality and cruelty of the hunt in the campaigns. The two movements often pursued the same goals for different reasons. While animal protectionist concerned themselves with those animals that humans exploit, environmentalists 309 Specifically, in 2000 the Russian parliament agreed to ban sealing in Russia by a 273 votes to 1. But the legislation was subsequently vetoed by President Vladimir Putin. “Archangel Bloody Seal Pup Cull Halted,” TimesOnline. (3/13/2008). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article3542189.ece 230 concentrated on animals in the wild whose populations needed to be conserved. During the first phase of the movement, domestic animal welfare and environmental NGOs withdrew from the campaign after the Canadian state made some attempts at conservation. The “common advocacy position” of ending the hunt in the second part (1975-1987) of the early movement and after Canada reopened the hunt suggests that group characteristics continue to be a significant factor in facilitating action. The ideology of the anti-sealing NGOs clashed with that the economic and cultural interests of the state, especially the period between 1975-1987 and when the hunt was reopened in 1995. This influenced the direction of the campaign and the shape and scope of the campaign, moving it outside of Canada and thus transnationalizing the issue. Specifically the lack of response to domestic actors by the Canadian government forced NGOs to look outside of the domestic arena for support and they engaged in transnational activity to initiate change. Global factors (e.g., the international sealing trade and expanding global markets and current issues related to global warming) provided an impetus for action and also facilitated action by aiding NGOs in establishing networks and coalitions. The impact of globalization on NGO activity created opportunities for transnational action through “global spaces” and through the expansion of technological resources. Because transnational NGOs continue to participate in the “global spaces” this too, has influenced the permanence of transnational activism related to this issue. The role of international media is also significant in understanding how the anti-sealing movement was able to 231 effectively raise public awareness and create international attention on the issue; keeping the sealing issue alive through media sources. The goals put forth by the anti-sealing movement have consistently focused on issue attention and agenda setting and in modifying the behavior of target actors (states, consumers) in an effort to influence sealing policy in Canada. In addition in the second part of the early campaign (1975-1987) and in the campaign that begun in 1995 transnational actors sought to utilize international processes and the influence policy by lobbying the EU to ban the import of all products produced from “white coats”. After 1995 they continued to cross state lines to modify the behavior of other states (e.g. Belgium, the U.K, France) by lobbying these states to ban the import of all seal products. The campaigns in both the early and later stages (1960’s-1987) and the second campaign (1995-2008) have been effective in influencing the behavior of target states outside of Canada and appear to have made some progress in their recent attempts to promote a complete ban on all seal products in the EU (the decision is still pending). Unintended consequences of the anti-sealing campaign have been the deterioration of seal markets for indigenous groups. After Canada suspended the commercial seal hunt in 1987 as a result of the boycott, indigenous groups such as the Inuit were hit hard economically since the markets for pelts collapsed. These groups have made a concerted effort to organize and ally themselves with the sealing interests in Canada and have expressed their concerns regarding the potential EU boycott. Their situation is compounded by the deteriorating state of the global economy and the high cost of fuel (this is also affecting the local sealers). Indigenous groups have received 232 little sympathy from anti-sealing NGOs, who while not against subsistence sealing, do not support the Inuit in their efforts to kill seals using modern methods and then selling the pelts to the international market. The future of sealing appears questionable, however, neither the Canadian government nor the anti-sealing NGOs appear to be willing to back down from their positions. In the end, market forces may determine the future for both the direction of the anti-sealing movement and for Canada in that a declining economy and a collapsed fishing industry in the North Atlantic may pressure the government to increase the total allowable catches of seals to offset the economic hardship faced by the local sealers and indigenous groups. On the other hand, if anti-sealing NGOs are successful in their attempts to influence the action of the EU to ban seal products and if their boycott of Canadian seafood is also effective, the Canadian government may have no choice but to suspend the seal hunt once again as it did in 1987. 233 Conclusion The case studies of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns offer insight into how transnational actors have successfully organized around shared values and have influenced domestic and international politics through transnational action. The case studies also affirm the significance of a new global political and social space, located beyond the state, which is traditionally held as the locus of politics. Whaling and sealing politics are now played out on a global scale and transnational action is facilitated as a result. The analysis of transnational activism at the state and local levels identifies those factors that served as an impetus for action and/or facilitated transnational action, examines the goals and strategies of transnational campaigns, and explores the extent of effectiveness of these campaigns and factors in their success or failure. This study builds upon the literature within the fields of international relations, comparative politics and sociology to identify the nature of transnational activism among anti-whaling and anti-sealing NGOs and to assess the impact that transnational NGOs have on environmental politics on the international and national levels. A goal of this analysis is to identify the significance of environmental transnational campaigns in explaining domestic and international policy responses to the issues of whaling and sealing. It addresses following questions: how have transnational activism and the corresponding campaigns aided environmental NGOs in accomplishing their goals? What factors (group characteristics, domestic conditions, globalization) explain the reasons for transnational activism? What were the goals of transnational campaigns? 234 What problems and challenges did transnational NGOs face in their campaigns? Under what circumstances were the campaigns effective? Both campaigns required transnational activism although for different reasons. In the anti-whaling case study transnational activism resulted from the transboundary nature of the issue, as well as the existence of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which regulated whaling activities. In the anti-sealing case study the issue became transnationalized as a result of the circulation of the Artek film and other European media sources that publicized the brutality of the seal hunt and as a result of the resistance of the target state (Canada). It also reflects the fact that the Canadian seal hunt is the largest marine mammal hunt in the world. While the anti-whaling issue incorporates several different campaigns with various targets including states, corporations, and international regimes such as the IWC, the anti-sealing campaign has been primarily focused on changing the policies of the Canadian government. Origins of Transnational Activism in the Anti-Whaling and Anti-Sealing Campaigns The international arena served as both an impetus for and facilitator of transnational action. Transnational activism was facilitated by the context of globalization, including the spread of environmental norms and concerns which were legitimized as a result of the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the establishment of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the ratification of such treaties as the Convention for International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES); and the existence of such international organizations such as the International Whaling Commission that 235 environmental actors in turn were able to influence. The early international agreements such as the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty (1911), the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946), the Antarctic Treaty (1959) the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Stockholm Conference (1972), CITES (1973) and the Bonn Convention (1979) were signs that the international community identified the need to protect species including marine mammals and gave transnational actors’ issues legitimacy since much of the justification for their action is embedded in international law. They also gave transnational NGOs international political opportunities as seen in the Stockholm Conference (1972) which can be considered one of the first “global spaces” for participation by NGOs; ultimately creating international opportunities for networking between groups. In both the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns, the impetus for action in the 1990s was also due to international developments. In the case of the anti-whaling campaign, the impetus for action was a result of the possibility of the ending the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling. In the case of the Mitsubishi and Sakhalin campaigns the international development projects that threatened the habitat of whales created the impetus for action. The further internationalization of the seal trade as a result of increasing economic integration of the global economy was a factor that led to the reopening of the Canadian seal hunt in 1995 (along with the economic crisis faced by local sealers), which in turn influenced the emergence of the second phase of the anti- sealing campaign. Issues related to global warming have also created an impetus for further action for both campaigns. For example, melting ice sheets that have been linked 236 to global warming have negatively impacted the seal’s whelping grounds. The international arena will continue to function as both an impetus for and facilitator of transnational action as new challenges emerge that threaten the habitats and environments of marine mammals (and all species) as a result of increasing interconnectedness between states and between peoples around the world. This also suggests that more and more issues will cross-over affecting other groups within states and issues will spill over into other states, which suggests an increase in the likelihood of transnational responses in the future. Characteristics of the domestic arena could facilitate or obstruct NGO activism. In the anti-whaling case, because of the opportunities presented as a result of an open political system, environmental and animal welfare groups were able to take advantage of established channels of political participation in countries such as Australia and New Zealand. In the case of the anti-sealing movement specific to Canada, however, the lack of response by the Canadian state (after the mid-1970s) to the anti-sealing NGOs created an impetus for transnational action, and worked to move the anti-sealing actors across state lines. Moving their activities outside the Canadian state and working with European groups aided the transnational actors in furthering their objectives. In the anti-sealing case study Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang hypothesis” works well to explain the nature of transnational action. By going around local and state indifference towards the legitimacy of the claims by the anti-sealing actors, these groups went across state lines to influence the Canadian state’s policy towards the seal hunt. The transnational actors continue to do this today, as seen in their lobbying of the European Parliament to boycott 237 the import of all Canadian seal products. In a similar vein, the inability of anti-whaling activists to influence the Japanese and Russian governments also suggested an external route taken by transnational actors to influence the behavior of these two whaling states The resistance of these three states to transnational pressures however, indicate that states continue to exercise sovereignty even in the age of globalization, although they continue to be targeted by transnational NGOs. Goals and Strategies The goals of these campaigns included issue attention and agenda setting (strategic goals), and the long term goals of modifying the position of target actors (states, corporations, consumers) and/or modifying existing regimes (IWC, EU). The case studies demonstrate that transnational NGOs will employ a variety of strategies when necessary to accomplish their goals, among them information politics and symbolic politics, including direct action tactics. These strategies were effective in raising awareness of the whaling and sealing issues and influencing the agendas of the public and policymakers (domestic and international). Other strategies included applying moral and economic leverage (e.g., boycotts) to the campaign’s target actors and the use of accountability politics in monitoring existing policies and regimes. More specifically, the political strategies employed by the anti-whaling and anti- sealing activists indicate that different tactics, conventional and unconventional, were necessary dependent on the nature of the political system and the international context. Clearly the role of direct tactics, which can be identified as a type of unconventional 238 “information” and “symbolic” politics played a critical role in getting the media to pay attention to the issue. Direct action tactics had the effect of turning the classic struggle between man and nature on its head, portraying the whale or seal as victim and highlighting the willingness of human beings to destroy nature in the interest of profit. These tactics used the issue characteristics of the whale and seal transforming them into symbols of environmentalism. While direct action tactics may not have directly changed policy, they sparked debate regarding the legitimacy of whaling and sealing for both the public and policymakers. Direct action tactics contributed to issue creation and agenda setting (global and local) allowing transnational actors to monitor international policies as well as gather and present evidence and research to national governments and international organizations. Direct action tactics allowed transnational actors to not only inform the public and policymakers but also to use moral leverage against sealing and whaling states. This is especially relevant in the anti-sealing campaign where the clubbing of baby seals raised moral and ethical concerns and anti-sealing advocates successfully used moral leverage against the Canadian government by holding this practice up to international scrutiny. The role of multi-media sources aided transnational actors in “bearing witness” to the brutality of the whale and seal hunts--especially in the era of digital media and the internet which has played a critical role in dissemination of information and the circulation of petitions by the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns. 239 Effectiveness of Campaigns In examining the effectiveness of transnational actors in achieving their overall goals of protecting and conserving diminishing whale and seal populations it is apparent that on many levels they were effective in bringing attention to the issue, setting the agenda, influencing the behavior of target actors and modifying existing regimes. Transnational actors were able to mobilize public support around the anti-whaling/anti- sealing issues and influence national and international policy. Factors contributing to the effectiveness of mobilizing the support of the pubic and policymakers included issue characteristics and the creative use of a variety of strategies in framing the whaling and sealing issues in terms of innocent victims. In addition, in some cases anti-whaling activists were able to take advantage of the fact that the whaling issue crossed over into other issues (e.g. development projects affecting the livelihoods of local communities, fishermen, or indigenous populations) to form alliances with other groups, as seen in the Sakhalin and Mitsubishi campaigns, which contributed to their effectiveness. The effectiveness of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns is also due to group characteristics and particularly the ability of domestic and transnational NGOs to achieve a “common advocacy position”, based on a commitment to protect marine mammals. Although some groups identify themselves as “conservationists” (concerned with the preservation of species) and others identify themselves as “preservationists” (concerned with animal rights), for the most part, the lines between the two are somewhat blurred. Many groups that focus on both the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns identify themselves as “conservationists” (e.g., Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd, and World 240 Wildlife Fund) but have taken a preservationist stand on commercial whaling. There are also animal welfare groups such as World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) that see themselves as “preservationist” but are not against subsistence whaling. While differences between groups have emerged throughout the various stages of the campaigns in regards to strategies or issues (as seen in the split between Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Conservation Society over the nature of direct action, or in the positions taken on subsistence whaling), for the most part the case studies demonstrate an ideological cohesion between groups on the anti-whaling campaigns and even more so for groups working on the anti-sealing campaign. In both case studies there was a shift between conservationists and preservationist perspectives. Early campaigns were conservationists in their aim and sought to address diminishing whale and seal populations. The environmental movements that spread across western industrialized states in the late 1960’s and early 1970s increased awareness of environmental issues on the part of the public. Domestic legislation such as the 1968 Endangered Species Act and the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act assigned a protective status to whales and seals in the U.S. and legislation such as the Packwood- Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Act (1979) also signaled to the international community the U.S. government’s commitment to protecting marine mammals. The effect of concerned scientists and transnational actors brought domestic and international media attention to the whaling and sealing issues emphasizing the need for conservation of these species and contributed to moving the issue onto the public’s and policymakers agenda both domestically and internationally. 241 The preservationist perspective which focused not only on preserving the species but also animal rights, gained ground in the late 1970s in both campaigns. As a result of pressures by the anti-whaling NGOs the IWC established the 1983 moratorium on commercial whaling. Anti-sealing campaigns led to the European ban of “white coats” which in turn led to the eventual suspension of sealing by the Canadian government. Preservationist-oriented campaigns picked up again for both campaigns in the early 1990s, with the end of the Canadian moratorium on sealing in 1995 and the Revised Management Scheme (RMS), introduced to the International Whaling Commission in the early 1990s (which would have allowed for the resumption of commercial whaling). The “common advocacy position” between the various environmental NGOs has been strengthened in the era of globalization as a result of increasing threats to the habitats of marine mammals including global climate change and the growth in the number of economic development projects as seen in the Mitsubishi and Sakhalin campaigns. This “common advocacy position” is apparent in the transnational coalitions that have emerged consisting of environmental, animal rights and animal welfare NGOs, and in anti-whaling and anti-sealing coalitions as Global Whale Alliance, WhaleWatch, the Coalition to Save San Ignacio Lagoon, the Sakhalin Coalition, Boycott Canada, and HarpSeals.org. Another factor enabling transnational NGOs to influence the behavior of target actors (states, corporations, consumers) was the congruence of the campaign’s goals with the dominant interests of the states/target actors, or the absence of strong countervailing economic interests or cultural concerns. The anti-whaling campaigns targeting Japan, the 242 USSR, and Norway were not as effective given the presence of groups favoring whaling for economic and/or cultural reasons. In the case of the anti-sealing campaign, NGOs and the Canadian state were able to agree on some principles of conservation in the early campaign, however by the mid-1970s when the campaign shifted its focused on the preservation of seals, this shift conflicted with Canada’s position on sealing. The conflict of interest between the states and transnational NGOs were cultural (indigenous groups and subsistence hunting, e.g. Inuit whaling in U.S. and sealing communities in Canada) and economic (e.g. Japanese economic interest in whaling, economic interest of local sealers in Canada). In the anti-whaling campaigns, transnational and domestic NGOs were more effective in states that did not have strong whaling industries (e.g., the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand) and where there was not a strong cultural tradition of whaling. Material leverage (boycotts) was effective in some cases, as seen in the boycotts initiated in the first anti-sealing campaign, which essentially impacted the market for seal products in Europe. As a result of the boycott in Europe and the political leverage applied to the European states, anti-sealing NGOs were able to change of behavior of consumers and ultimately change the behavior of the Canadian state when the seal hunt was suspended in 1987. In the second stage of the anti-sealing campaign (1995- ) anti- sealing NGOs have not only applied material leverage (boycotts of Canadian seafood in Europe and the U.S.) but also political leverage in lobbying individual states and the EU to ban seal products altogether. In the case of the anti-whaling activists the boycott of fish products from such whaling states as Norway and Japan has not been as effective in 243 changing the behavior of these states. The boycott of Icelandic fish in the mid-1980s was somewhat effective in changing the behavior of the state but this was for a limited period of time. The ability of transnational actors to infiltrate the IWC is an example of how transnational actors were able to influence international policy formation and ultimately achieve their goal of establishing an international moratorium on commercial whaling. These changes included the admission of NGOs in the institutional processes of the IWC and the change in the composition of the Scientific Committee, which allowed for independent scientists and those linked to the NGOs to participate and present their own research. Though the tactics employed by NGOs were somewhat unorthodox (bribing states to become members and pressuring the U.S. to bully members to support the moratorium) they were able to take advantage of the fact that the timing for a moratorium was ripe—uncertainty within the scientific community regarding the actual numbers of whale populations along with other factors that gave the anti-whaling interests enough of a majority to influence the passage of the moratorium. The fact that as of June 2008 (the IWC Conference in Santiago, Chile) the anti-whaling NGOs have continued to maintain the moratorium and stop the implementation of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) suggests that they continue to be effective in influencing international policy. The anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns demonstrate that transnational activism played a critical role in aiding NGOs to further their goals. Without transnational activism the mobilization of international public support would have been impossible. In the anti-sealing campaign, for example, given the resistance of the 244 Canadian government, anti-sealing NGOs turned to transnational action in their efforts to influence European states and the EU. Additionally, without transnational advocacy the ability to effectively challenge international bodies such as the IWC and to establish international norms (e.g. by attending international conferences and promoting international legal frameworks) would not have been possible. Finally, without transnational advocacy the NGOs would not have been able to share resources and information (scientific studies, tactics, etc.) or successfully network. Transnational action influences the formation of networks and coalitions that work within states and across state lines to mobilize support on their issues, thus enabling them to increase the effectiveness of their campaigns. The anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns have succeeding in bringing the respective issues to the attention of the public and of domestic and transnational policy making bodies. They have influenced cultural norms, raising consciousness and modifying the way people in many countries think about whales and seals and whaling and sealing. Despite several setbacks, they have also been effective in influencing state policies, corporate behavior, and international regimes. Given their significance, the study of transnational campaigns will continue to be relevant to understanding the ways in which environmental NGOS respond to an increasingly globalized world. 245 Bibliography Ahmad, Shamima and Potter, David 2006. NGOs in International Politics. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Allen, Jeremiah. 1979. “The Anti-Sealing as an Industry,” Journal of Political Economy, 87, 2 (pp. 423-428). 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Gagged: the politics of reproduction and U.S. foreign aid, 1961-2009

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Creator Guevara, Gloria Yolanda (author)

Core Title Assessing the effectiveness of transnational activism: an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publication Date 11/14/2008

Defense Date 07/15/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anti-sealing movement,anti-whaling movement,environmental movements,OAI-PMH Harvest,strategies transnational nongovernmental organizations,transnational activism,transnational campaigns,transnational environmental nongovernmental organizations

Place Name islands: Sakhalin Island (geographic subject), lakes: San Ignacio Lagoon (geographic subject), reserves: Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary (geographic subject)

Language English

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Advisor Hamilton, Nora (committee chair), Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee member), Stanford, Craig (committee member)

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