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Institutional contestation, network legitimacy and organizational heterogeneity: interactions between government and environmental nonprofits in South Korea
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Institutional contestation, network legitimacy and organizational heterogeneity: interactions between government and environmental nonprofits in South Korea
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Content
INSTITUTIONAL CONTESTATION, NETWORK LEGITIMACY AND
ORGANIZATIONAL HETEROGENEITY:
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL NONPROFITS IN SOUTH KOREA
by
Chang Bum Ju
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION)
August 2008
Copyright 2008 Chang Bum Ju
ii
Dedication
To my father Kum-Su Ju
and my mother Ae-Ja Park
Table of Contents
Dedication ii
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Abstract x
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
1.1 The Research Question 1
1.2 Interactions between Government and Environmental
Nonprofits in Korea 3
1.2.1 The emergence of environmental nonprofits 3
1.2.2 The role of government funding in the rise of
of environmental nonprofits 4
1.2.3 Increasing influence of environmental nonprofits in
government policies 5
1.2.4 Political contestation over the role of NGOs 6
1.3 Distribution of Government Funding and Nonprofit Political
Advocacy
1.3.1 Distribution of government funding
1.3.2 Nonprofit political advocacy
6
7
8
1.3.3 Puzzles from interviews and gaps in literature
1.4 Theoretical Perspectives: Historical Institutionalism, Institutional
Theory in Organization Studies and Network Theory
10
11
1.4.1 Historical institutionalism 11
1.4.2 New institutionalism in organization studies and
network theory 13
1.4.2.1 Legitimacy within communities: Legitimacy
conferral from above and from below 15
1.4.2.2 Legitimacy within populations: Lateral conferral of
legitimacy 16
1.4.2.3 Effects of the differentials of network legitimacy on
institutional pressures 16
1.4.2.4 Legitimacy differentials and resource acquisition 17
1.4.3 Three studies on nonprofits in Korea: Why two lenses of
institutionalism, not one?
18
iii
1.5 Dissertation Overview 19
Chapter 2: Government Funding, Political Contestation and the
Evolution of Environmental NGOs in Korea 21
2.1 Introduction 21
2.2 Historical and Comparative Perspectives of Environmental
NGOs and the Role of Government Funding in Korea 22
2.2.1 The historical perspective of the emergence of
environmental NGOs 22
2.2.2. Historical and comparative perspectives of
government funding of environmental NGOs 25
2.3 Two Theories of the Evolution of the Nonprofit Sector:
The Social Origin Theory and the Power-Distributional Account 29
2.3.1 Social origin theory of the nonprofit sector 30
2.3.1.1 Critiques of the social origin theoretical account of
the evolution of the nonprofit sector 30
2.3.2 The power-distributional account of the evolution of
the nonprofit sector 32
2.3.2.1 The recent ascendance of nonprofits in the U.S. and
the U.K. 33
2.3.2.2 Limitations of the power-distributional account of
the evolution of the nonprofit sector 34
2.4 Theories of the Evolution of the NGO Sector:
Critical Junctures and Path Dependence 36
2.4.1 The framework of critical junctures 38
2.4.2 The framework of path dependence 40
2.4.3 Institutions, objects of political contestation 43
2.5 The Emergence and Institutionalization of Environmental
NGOs in Korea 45
2.5.1 Antecedent conditions 46
2.5.1.1 The 1960s and 1970s: Absence of
environmental organizations 47
2.5.1.2 1980-1987: Nascent environmental organizations 47
2.5.2 The first critical juncture triggered by
the 1987 democratic breakthrough 49
2.5.2.1 1988-1992: Democratic transition 50
2.5.2.2 1993-1997: The advent of democratic consolidation 52
2.5.3 The second critical juncture triggered by
the 1997 economic crisis 55
iv
2.5.3.1 The NGO Support Law 57
2.5.3.2. Establishment of the greatest number of
new environmental NGOs 59
2.5.3.3 Political drivers of government support of NGOs 60
2.5.3.3.1 Restructuring chaebols 60
2.5.3.3.2 Restructuring the political landscape 61
2.5.3.3.3 The role of NGOs in President
Kim Dae Jung’s reform politics 63
2.5.3.4 Attacks on government funding of NGOs 64
2.5.3.5 Different positions within environmental NGOs 66
2.5.3.5.1 The identity dilemma 66
2.5.3.5.2 Transparency of funding decisions 68
2.6. Summary and Implications of the Evolution of
Environmental NGOs in Korea 69
2.7 Conclusions 74
Chapter 3: How Network Ties Become a Factor in Government
Funding of Nonprofits 77
3.1 Introduction 77
3.2 Theoretical Framework 81
3.2.1 Institutional theory and network analysis 81
3.2.2 Legitimacy differentials and resource acquisition 84
3.2.3 Government and legitimacy 84
3.2.4 Legitimacy, a multi-dimensional concept 86
3.2.5 Interorganizational ties as network portfolios 89
3.3 Major Hypotheses 93
3.3.1 Network centrality, legitimacy, and rationales of
government funding for nonprofits 93
3.3.2 Organizational characteristics related to government
funding 95
3.4 Methods 97
3.4.1 Research setting and data collection 97
3.4.2 Categorizing environmental NGOs 99
3.4.2.1 Core-periphery method and CONCOR 101
3.4.2.2 Dividing into core and periphery 102
3.4.3 Variables 104
3.4.3.1 Dependent variable 104
3.4.3.2 Independent variables 105
v
3.4.3.3 Control variables 108
3.5 Analyses and Results 109
3.5.1 The mean difference 109
3.5.1.1 Three subgroups in the board networks:
Their relations and characteristics 111
3.5.1.2 Characteristics of block members 114
3.5.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 116
3.5.3 Regression diagnostics 117
3.5.4 OLS regression results 120
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 124
Chapter 4: Legitimacy-Seeking Breeds Practice Variations: Differential
Effects of Network Legitimacy on Nonprofit Political
Advocacy 129
4.1 Background 129
4.1.1 Practical background 129
4.1.2 Theoretical Background 131
4.1.3 Theoretical development in organizational institutionalism 132
4.1.3.1 From homogeneity to heterogeneity 134
4.1.3.1.1 Structuration and dialectics 134
4.1.3.1.2 Institutional logic and embeddedness 135
4.1.3.1.3 An alternative proposal 136
4.2 Major Concepts: The Institutional Logic of Network Legitimacy 137
4.2.1 Institutional logic of legitimacy 137
4.2.2 Legitimacy-conferral 139
4.2.3 Network logic of legitimacy:
Variance in network legitimacy 141
4.2.4 Three levels of organizational legitimacy and
network centrality 143
4.2.5 Social cohesion 144
4.3 Legitimacy and Environmental Nonprofits 146
4.4 Major Hypotheses 148
4.4.1 Legitimacy, network centrality and social cohesion 148
4.4.2 Organizational characteristics related to political advocacy 150
4.5 Methods 153
4.5.1 Research setting and data collection 153
vi
4.5.2 Reliability of centrality measures 155
4.5.3 Dependent variable: Nonprofit political advocacy 158
4.5.4 Independent variables 160
4.5.5 Control variables 165
4.6 Analyses and Results 166
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 166
4.6.2 Regression diagnostics 168
4.6.3 OLS regression results 170
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions 174
Chapter 5: Conclusions 178
5.1 Dissertation Summary 178
5.2 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 180
5.3 Theoretical observations 181
References 183
Appendix A. Qualitative Interviews 210
Appendix B. Survey Questionnaire 213
vii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Share (%) of Government Funding of Environmental
Nonprofit Revenues Among Selected Countries
29
Table 3.1 Comparison of the Three Levels of Networks 90
Table 3.2 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Bureaucratization 108
Table 3.3 t-tests on Log-Transformed Mean Amount of Government
Funds Distributed Between the Core and Periphery According
to the Core-periphery Method
110
Table 3.4 ANOVA on Log-Transformed Mean Amount of Government
Funds Distributed Between Three Subgroups According to
CONCOR
111
Table 3.5 Results of CONCOR Algorithm on Interlocked Board
Networks (Three-Block Models and Image Matrix)
112
Table 3.6 Pearson Correlation Between Board Network Subgroups and
Organizational Characteristics
115
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 117
Table 3.8 OLS Regression on Log-Transformed Amount of
Government Funds in 2006
122
Table 4.1 Correlations Among Centrality Measures 157
Table 4.2 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Centrality 158
Table 4.3 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Nonprofit
Political Activity
160
Table 4.4 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Bureaucratization 165
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 167
Table 4.6 OLS Regression on Nonprofit Political Activity in 2006 172
viii
List of Figures
Figure 2.1 Founding of New Environmental NGOs in Korea 24
Figure 2.2 Founding of New Environmental NGOs in Seoul 26
Figure 2.3 Sources of Revenues of Seoul-based Environmental NGOs in
2006
27
Figure 2.4 Share (%) of Government Funding of Revenues of
Seoul-based Environmental NGOs in 2006
28
Figure 3.1 Network Plots – Technical Advice 91
Figure 3.2 Network Plots – Managerial (Resource Sharing and Joint
Activities)
92
Figure 3.3 Network Plots – Interlocked Boards 92
Figure 3.4 Image Martrix of Seoul-based Environmental Nonprofit
Organizations
112
Figure 3.5 Histogram of Standardized Residuals 118
Figure 3.6 Normal Probability Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals 119
Figure 4.1 Histogram of Standardized Residuals 168
Figure 4.2 Normal Probability Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals 169
ix
Abstract
This dissertation examines interactions between government and
environmental nonprofits in South Korea. As a research of historical analysis, I
examine the evolution of environmental organizations in Korea from the early
1980s. As quantitative research, I investigate environmental organizations active in
metropolitan Seoul from 2006 to 2007. The three major questions for my research
are: Are there paths to institutionalizing nonprofits in Korea which differ from
those of western countries? What are the factors critical to active nonprofit political
advocacy? Does government channel its funds to certain types of environmental
nonprofit organizations?
To analyze these questions, I employ a multi-method approach consisting of
qualitative interviews with executive directors of 74 environmental nonprofit
organizations and an investigation of multiple sources of data on financial,
operational and network aspects of those organizations, followed by a historical
analysis of the institutional evolution of environmental nonprofits in Korea. Two
pieces of study in this dissertation employ network analysis and the other piece of
study employs a framework of historical institutionalism.
Chapter 2 highlights government funding and political contestation as
important drivers of the evolution of nonprofits. Theoretically this study contributes
to the understanding of institutional development by showing that there can be
institutional continuities during critical junctures and there can be ongoing
institutional changes during path-dependent periods.
x
xi
Chapter 3 demonstrates that nonprofits with peer legitimacy are more likely
to attract funds from government agencies than those with efficiency legitimacy.
This study is meant to compare different rationales of government-funded nonprofit
provision of public services and to provide new approaches to measuring those
rationales.
Chapter 4 examines factors critical to active nonprofit political advocacy.
This study fills a gap in existing discussion of organizational legitimacy by offering
laterally conferred organizational legitimacy. I submit that the notion of
organizational connectedness as it is construed in institutional theory contains
within it possibilities for understanding heterogeneity of organizational practices in
response to institutional pressures.
This study combines institutional theory and network theory that are not
normally used together in order to frame network legitimacy, and shows the effects
of network legitimacy on organizational practices and resource acquisition. It is
hoped that this study may enrich the theoretical frameworks used to study
interactions between government and nonprofits.
1
Chapter 1:
Introduction
1.1 The Research Question
People who take institutions seriously invoke them to explain coordination,
compliance, and persistence of collective endeavors. To rational choice theorists,
institutions coordinate actors engaged in bilateral or multilateral actions to realize gains
from cooperation (Ostrom 1999; Williamson 1975). Organizational sociologists invoke
institutions to explain how organizations conform to legitimate organizational structures
and practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Comparative-
historical authors bring up institutions to highlight their path dependent developments
often triggered by critical junctures (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000a).
All of these perspectives have been recently criticized largely for their
overemphasis on coordination, compliance, and persistence, resulting in de-emphasis of
conflicts, difference, and change (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002; Schneiberg 2005;
Thelen 2004). In response to this criticism, some authors have turned to agency-centered
theoretical approaches (Callon 1998; Peters, Pierre, and King 2005). But others have
sought to shore up institutional theory by “tap[ping] the full power or potential of
institutional [perspectives]” (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002:45). These institutional
scholars have sought to explain how institutions themselves change over time, and how
2
institutions become the sources and drivers of change and difference. The wind of change
is currently felt in all branches of institutionalism (see Schneiberg 2005; Djelic and
Quack 2003b). The present study will address institutional change in the context of
comparative-historical studies and organizational difference in the context of
organizational studies.
In this dissertation, I analyze nonprofit organizations in South Korea (hereafter
Korea) that are engaged in activities to serve and promote environmental causes. The
overall motivating question for the research is: how do the political advocacy activities
and resource requisition of environmental nonprofit organizations vary? This question
implies three more specific questions: Are there paths to institutionalizing environmental
nonprofits in Korea which differ from those of western countries? What antecedents lead
to active political advocacy activities of environmental nonprofit organizations? Does the
government channel its funds to certain types of environmental nonprofit organizations?
To analyze these questions, I employ a multi-method approach consisting of
qualitative interviews with executive directors of 74 environmental nonprofit
organizations and an investigation of multiple sources of data on financial, operational
and network aspects of those organizations, followed by a historical analysis of the
institutional evolution of environmental nonprofits in Korea. The 74 organizations
represent nearly the entire organizational population in metropolitan Seoul in 2007, to
minimize selection bias in sampling. Chapter 2 of the study employs a framework of
historical institutionalism, which provides improvements over theoretical frameworks of
3
the existing nonprofit studies. Chapters 3 and 4 of the study employ network analysis,
which offers analytical leverage to examine previously overlooked aspects of interactions
between public and nonprofit organizations.
In what follows, I set the context for the study by explaining the emergence of
Korean environmental nonprofits, the role of government funding in the rise of
environmental nonprofits, and the influence of the environmental nonprofits on
government policies. Subsequently, it is discussed why this study includes analyses of
three empirical questions regarding institutional paths of nonprofits, the distribution of
government funding of nonprofit organizations, and nonprofit political advocacy.
Thereafter theoretical perspectives are discussed.
1.2 Interactions between Government and Environmental Nonprofits in Korea
Korean environmental nonprofits emerged in the middle of the 1980s when Korea
began a transition to democracy. They grew rapidly in the late 1990s when Korean
government started funding them. During that period environmental nonprofits increased
their stake in government policies. However, the roles of nonprofits in Korea have
continued to evolve through political negotiation and contestation.
1.2.1 The emergence of environmental nonprofits
Two socioeconomic shocks contributed to the emergence of environmental
nonprofits in Korea. One was the democratic breakthrough in 1987 and the other was the
economic crisis in 1997. Few environmental nonprofit organizations were established
4
until 1987, as the authoritarian government suppressed people’s political rights and civil
liberty. In 1987, there was a democratic breakthrough, opening up political space for
nonprofits. The establishment of environmental nonprofits began to rise during the
“democratic transition,” and dramatically increased in 1993, when the first civilian
president since 1963 was sworn in. The establishment of new environmental
organizations remained relatively stable during the civilian presidency until 1997, when
an economic crisis shocked the country. The economic meltdown period between 1998
and 2002 saw the greatest rise of new environmental organizations.
1.2.2. The role of government funding in the rise of environmental nonprofits
The rapid rise of new environmental organizations during the economic meltdown
period was mainly due to government funding starting in 1999, when the government
enacted the Law on Support of Nonprofit Civil Organizations. Government funding
accounted for 31% of environmental nonprofit revenues in 2006, followed by business
funding (30%), membership dues (21%), and fees (14%).
1
Government funding
accounted for only 15.3% of environmental nonprofit revenues in 1999 (Lee 1999a). The
average amount of government funding given to each of the Seoul-based 74 organizations
in 2006 was US $ 251,204; the median value was US $ 67,000. The percentage (31%) of
government funding in Korea in 2006 was similar to the 29% average of government
funding of environmental nonprofits in 30 countries across the world.
2
1
The funding data are based on interviews with executive directors of 74 environmental
organizations active in Seoul in 2006 and 2007.
5
1.2.3 Increasing influence of environmental nonprofits in government policies
Prior to the democratic breakthrough in 1987, the influence of environmental
organizations in government policies had been limited. The government harshly
suppressed people’s political rights and “anti-business” actions. Environmental
movements were often parts of larger democratic movement, which were extremely
confrontational in their interactions with the government. These conditions contributed to
limited representation of environmental advocacy in policy processes.
The democratic breakthrough in 1987 generated a political opportunity in which a
new organizational form emerged, that is, environmental nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). These NGOs differed from environmental organizations established during the
previous authoritarian regimes. They were issue-based, adopted apparently
institutionalized approaches to environmental problems such as policy advocacy, and
sought to increase technical expertise.
The economic crisis in 1997 triggered a new political opportunity for
environmental NGOs. Political opposition leader Kim Dae Jung became president in the
turmoil of economic breakdown. He engaged in “reform politics” to overhaul an IMF-
controlled economic system and a region-based political system. President Kim Dae Jung
received limited support from traditionally entrenched social groups, so he mobilized
NGOs to broaden his political and social bases. In so doing, he enacted the Law on
Support of Nonprofit Civil Organizations, which NGOs had demanded in order to gain
2
The funding data of 30 countries are based on reports from the Johns Hopkins
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, the largest and most up-to-date dataset presently
available.
6
financial and institutional support from government. After 1998, when the National
Assembly endorsed a budget account for government funding of NGOs, growth in the
establishment of new environmental NGOs was unprecedented.
Environmental NGOs benefited from the favorable political environment,
expanding their capacity, influence, and legitimacy. They aborted several national
development projects, and even engaged in electoral processes in the early 2000s, ousting
politicians they considered “unfit.”
1.2.4. Political contestation over the role of NGOs
Despite their increasing institutional legitimacy and influence, environmental
NGOs remained the object of ongoing political contestation and negotiation among
competing political coalitions in the 2000s. Conservative sociopolitical groups including
opposition parties and newspapers demanded that the government ban subsidies for
politically active NGOs, including environmental organizations. These conservative
groups opposed NGO electoral activities. Likewise, progressive ruling parties were not
favorable to NGOs when many of the NGOs opposed major government policies.
Government funding often became useful leverage in political contests.
1.3 Distribution of Government Funding and Nonprofit Political Advocacy
In addition to a historical analysis of the evolution of Korean environmental
nonprofits, this study relies on qualitative interviews to identify key research questions,
hypotheses, and variables for quantitative research (see Appendix A). Two themes
7
emerged from the interviews: the distribution of government funding and nonprofit
political advocacy.
1.3.1 Distribution of government funding
Many nonprofit organizations rely on government funding because philanthropy is
not well developed in Korea. However, executive directors I interviewed expressed
conflicting views on government funding and grantee selection.
When asked an open-ended question about government funding, 18 out of 70
executive directors in environmental nonprofits responded favorably.
3
For example, they
said that government funds are “seed money” for new projects and “incubate” new
nonprofit organizations. But 38 of the 70 made reference to something resembling the
negative aspects of government funding. For example, they said that the government “did
not consider that nonprofits work effectively with government funds (interview # 21),”
“did not fund core projects of nonprofits such as research and policy development
(interview # 64),” “instead did fund projects such as campaigns that need little technical
expertise (interview #6),” and thus “partnerships between government and nonprofits
were tenuous (interview #55).” Six executive directors said that they changed the main
nature of their programs to accommodate government preferences. One executive
director said that he changed the mission of his organization in chasing government funds
(interview #5).
3
Out of 74 executive directors I contacted for this research, 4 replied via email and phone.
I excluded these 4 directors from the number of interviewees. It was difficult to conduct
substantive interviews using email and phone.
8
When asked about factors critical to getting funds from government, 12 of the
directors mentioned strong networks with nonprofit activists from influential
organizations. For example, one director implied that people in selection committees
mattered, saying that fund-seeking organizations sought nods from influential nonprofit
activists because they were often in selection committees and knew government officials
well (interview #43). Another director said that good relationships with influential
organizations paid off (interview #50). But out of 70 executive directors interviewed, 10
said that government “selected grantees relatively fairly,” “minimized any favoritism
toward certain organizations,” and “sought to increase diversity in granted organizations
and programs.”
1.3.2 Nonprofit political advocacy
Political advocacy received considerable attention from all of the executive
directors. They indicated that Korean environmental nonprofits had been at the forefront
of nonprofit political advocacy during the past two decades. Given that government funds
were major sources of nonprofit revenues in Korea, many of these directors were
concerned about the viability of political advocacy of environmental nonprofits.
When asked an open-ended question about nonprofit political advocacy, 19 out of
the 70 made reference to something resembling identity dilemma and political tension
facing nonprofits. For example, one executive director noted that he went through a
morally difficult time when his organization opposed government policies while carrying
out government-funded projects (interview #66). One organization split into two
9
organizations in order to carry out the two separate functions of political advocacy and
fundraising. A director from that organization said, “We split our organization because it
did not make sense for an organization both to oppose government policies and to raise
funds from government agencies simultaneously (interview #9).” Some interviewees
noted political tension surrounding government funding. One director said that
conservative newspapers were too harsh toward funded organizations in their reports
(interview #24). One activist noted, “A local government official phoned me to apply for
projects that his agency would start when my organization had found fault with his
agency (interview #53).” Another director mentioned that one of his peer organizations
that had been awarded sizable government grants opted out of an anti-nuclear alliance
among environmental nonprofits (interview #46).
Only 22 of the 70 executive directors did not mention negative effects of
government funding on nonprofit political advocacy. For example, one director noted that
government funding constituted a compensatory measure for sacrifices which civil
organizations had incurred during their efforts to achieve democratization (interview
#57). An activist said that government funds were originally money from taxpayers, so
funded organizations were accountable not to government agencies but to taxpayers
(interview #31).
When asked about factors critical to the enhancement of political advocacy, 14
directors mentioned that environmental organizations cared a great deal about peer
organizations in their fields. One activist said, “Certain organizations set the directions of
10
the entire movement and we have tried not to fall out of their lead (interview #10).” One
director elaborated that organizations arranged certain networks with influential
organizations to see where the wind blows (interview #12). Eleven directors mentioned
that they felt free to engage in political advocacy because of their technical expertise.
One activist noted, “We are doing what public officials are not able to do (interview
#65).” Another activist said, “The municipal government needs us because they need to
get things done well (interview #23).”
1.3.3. Puzzles from interviews and gaps in literature
Qualitative interviews helped identify research questions. One concerned the
patterns of government funding of nonprofit organizations. The directors expressed
conflicting views on the topic. More intriguing was the question of what factors are
critical in government funding patterns. Interviews alone did not give satisfying answers
to this puzzle. It is a question that the literature has rarely addressed.
Likewise, the directors were divided between the negative and positive effects of
government funding on nonprofit political advocacy. The negative effects have received
considerable attention from western scholars (Gronbjerg 1993; Haines 1984; Jenkins and
Eckert 1986; Lipsky and Smith 1989; McAdam 1982; McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson
1991; Wolch 1990). However, empirical research has challenged the assumption of
mitigated political advocacy as a result of government funding (Hartogs and Weber
1978); Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Child and Grønbjerg 2007).
11
It is evident that the effects of government funding on nonprofit advocacy is worth
researching, in particular, the question of what factors motivates nonprofits to engage in
active political advocacy, given the widespread of government funding. Interviews
provided certain clues such as relationships among peer organizations and technical
expertise within organizations. However, much remains to be revealed.
1.4 Theoretical Perspectives: Historical Institutionalism, Institutional Theory in
Organization Studies, and Network Theory
This dissertation consists of three separate yet related studies. Historical
institutionalism is employed to conduct a historical analysis of the evolution of
environment nonprofits in Korea. Institutional theory in organization studies and network
analysis are employed in two quantitative studies: an analysis of the distribution of
government funding of nonprofit organizations and an analysis of factors critical to
nonprofit political advocacy. Institutional theory and network theory are not normally
used together, but they are combined here to provide new insights into the current
understanding of interactions between government and nonprofits.
1.4.1 Historical institutionalism
To historical institutionalists, small events in initial phases can have great and
enduring consequences if they occur at the right moment (Pierson 2000a). When small
events trigger movement toward a particular path out of multiple possible paths, their
moments are considered critical junctures (Pierson 2000b). During the period of
institutional reproduction, which follows critical junctures, increasing return processes
12
are set in motion and positive feedback reinforces a given path. But the chosen path is not
necessarily efficient; it is often suboptimal in comparison to other options (Pierson
2000a, 2000b).
Despite its contributions to institutional genesis and development, historical
institutionalism is not immune to criticism. First, historical institutionalism
overemphasizes that institutional changes are radical and the sources of radical change
are socioeconomic shocks such as economic depressions. Second, the mechanisms of
institutional reproduction, which feature “increasing returns,” “self-reinforcing
sequences,” and “lock-in,” are deterministic (Streeck and Thelen 2005).
To this overemphasis on exogenously-driven radical institutional change (off-path
change) and deterministic reproduction of institutions, recent authors present
endogenously-driven but evolutionary change (on-path change) and contentious features
of institutional development. In these analyses, institutional changes do not always take
the form of “replacements” of old institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Actors within
old institutions can take actions to create “bounded change” within the old paths (Weir
1992). For instance, Thelen (2003) holds that as a result of political contestation, old
institutions are transformed to new purposes (conversion).
Such new approaches to historical institutionalism focus on the role of agency
(purposeful decision making). There are interplays between actors and contextual
structures. Critical junctures are “moments of relative structural indeterminism” such that
actors shape outcomes in a more willful fashion (Mahoney 2001). Similarly,
13
institutions are “the object[s] of political contestation” during path dependence periods
(Thelen 2004:31). The losers in political and policy making processes do not necessarily
disappear. They may adapt to prevailing institutions, a process which is different from
reproducing those institutions (Thelen 2003). The aggrieved losers may challenge the
winners when the right moments come. Even prevailing institutions are not necessarily
reproduced automatically; they need to be cultivated by political actors (Deeg 2005).
1.4.2 New institutionalism in organization studies and network theory
In order to anchor two quantitative studies of this dissertation in a broader
theoretical context, two self-contained, yet previously disconnected theoretical insights
are combined. The first is that organizations seek legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). The second is that
organizations are embedded in interorganizational networks and have different degrees of
network commitment (Granovetter 1985; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).
In institutional theory, legitimacy is critical for organizational survival (Dart 2004).
In a broad sense, legitimacy refers to the extent to which actors exist or act in accordance
with socially acceptable norms and expectations (Suchman 1995). Organizations shape
their structures and practices to demonstrate their compliance with the norms and the
social expectations of key stakeholders in organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983).
Legitimacy operates differently between communities and populations.
Communities and populations represent two separate institutional environments. These
environments have different criteria for legitimacy and they have different legitimacy-
14
conferrers. Legitimacy is determined by stakeholders “whose assessments count” (Scott
1995:60).
The main proposal of network theory is that organizations are embedded in
interorganizational networks. The interorganizational relations of networks provide not
only opportunities to but also constraints on organizations by deepening awareness, trust,
and commitment among organizations within the networks (Larson 1992). Degrees of
embeddedness vary among organizations in a network. Some organizations are more
embedded than others, having more incoming ties or reciprocated ties than others.
Organizations with more ties are regarded as central organizations in a networked
organizational field.
Much organizational literature conceives central organizations as those which
possess higher levels of legitimacy than others (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Mizruchi
1996). Central organizations, more than others, are significantly exposed to and deeply
constrained by the institutional logic of the networks. This institutional logic including
norms and values shape organizational interests and a repertoire of organizational
practices (Friedland and Alford 1991). Network theorists view network ties as channels
through which normative values and expectations are communicated.
1.4.2.1 Legitimacy within communities: Legitimacy conferral from above and from
below
Legitimacy-building of organizations is achieved through a process of
isomorphism in a field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). One method of isomorphism is
achieved through networking with other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
15
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989; Hinings and Greenwood 1988). The connectedness
of an organizational field pushes organizations toward homogenization through coercive,
mimetic, and normative mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Increasing
interactions within an organizational field undergo institutionalization, leading to the
development of mutual awareness of what are legitimate practices in an organizational
field (Friedland and Alford 1991).
However, connectedness with other organizations is not sufficient to create
isomorphism (DiMaggio 1992). Isomorphism may need social reinforcements, which
require pressures of social actors who are doing the “legitimating” (Dacin 1997). There
are several classes of social actors within a given field who confer legitimacy on
organizations. These may include states, trade associations, and professional associations
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), which this study refers to as legitimacy conferrers from
above, and organizations’ constituencies (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001), which this
study refers to as legitimacy conferrers from below. Others even attribute legitimacy
conferrer status to amorphous entities such as wider social expectations (Dacin 1997) and
public opinion (Deephouse 1996; Scott 1998).
1.4.2.2 Legitimacy within populations: Lateral conferral of legitimacy
Within a population, legitimacy-conferrers are peer organizations. I refer to this as
lateral conferral of legitimacy. Organizations seeking peer legitimacy need to
demonstrate their commitment to the institutional logic shared by peer organizations.
16
Organization studies suggest that organizations seek associations with other
organizations in order to increase their legitimacy (Huang and Provan 2006; Mizruchi;
Scott 1995; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994). The networking patterns are unequal
across organizations. Other things being equal, organizations seek legitimate
organizations as networking partners. Organizations which have fewer ties are not
perceived as legitimate. This tendency breeds variations in networking, and variations in
networking may represent variations in legitimacy. I argue that the difference in “network
legitimacy” among peer organizations is a factor critical to difference in organizational
behavior in response to institutional pressures.
1.4.2.3 Effects of the differentials of network legitimacy on institutional pressures
Much attention has been given to how institutional environments have differential
isomorphic effects across organizations or organizational populations, particularly in the
contexts of adoption and of diffusion. Less explored are reactions from organizations to
institutional pressures. If institutional environments exert pressures on organizations,
there should be reactions of organizations against those institutional pressures. Such
reactions may be conformity to institutional pressures, as predicted by organizational
institutionalism, or resistance to institutional pressures (Oliver 1991). Organizational
reactions to institutional pressures thus are not isomorphic; they are differential.
As noted earlier, an important factor critical to differential reactions of
organizations to institutional pressures is legitimacy differentials. In comparison to
peripheral organizations, central organizations are more embedded in a population, and
17
more likely to be committed to the normative logic of the population (Greenwood and
Hinings 1996; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991). For instance, if
environmental nonprofits consider active political activity against government agencies
the dominant normative logic, then legitimate nonprofit organizations are more likely to
agree.
1.4.2.4 Legitimacy differentials and resource acquisition
When organizations seek to secure financial resources from institutional
environments, legitimacy differentials make a difference. In providing financial resources
(funding hereafter), funding institutions take into account the legitimacy of fund-seeking
organizations. Legitimacy is especially important when funding agencies and fund-
seeking organizations are nonmarket organizations, such as public agencies and nonprofit
organizations. Nonmarket organizations are those for which outputs are rarely evaluated
by economic effectiveness, unlike market organizations (Casile and Davis-Blake 2002).
Market organizations are directly controlled by their customers: if customers are not
satisfied with the services of market organizations, then the customers withhold their
money (Scott 1998). Nonmarket organizations are less affected by their customers.
Moreover, the customers of nonmarket organizations are more diverse and ambiguous
than those of market organizations (Downs 1967). This does not mean that nonmarket
organizations are not controlled, but that they are controlled by a different criterion,
which is legitimacy.
Legitimacy of nonprofits can be an important factor in attracting funds from
government agencies. As noted earlier, a criterion of economic effectiveness is not viable
18
for public agencies to employ when they evaluate nonprofit organizations. As an
alternative criterion, funding agencies may take into account institutional aspects of fund-
seeking nonprofit organizations. This criterion may safeguard funding agencies from
criticisms of important stakeholders in a field.
1.4.3 Three studies on nonprofits in Korea: Why two lenses of institutionalism, not
one?
The three studies included in this dissertation employ two perspectives of
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and organizational institutionalism. The first
study about nonprofit institution building uses the framework of historical
institutionalism, while the second study about patterns of government funding of
nonprofit organizations and the third study about nonprofit political advocacy employ the
framework of organizational institutionalism. There are two reasons for employing these
two lenses, not one, of institutionalism.
First, most research employing the theoretical framework of organizational
institutionalism is concerned with (1) organizations and organizational fields as units of
analysis, and (2) the effects of institutional pressures on organizations or organizational
fields. The second and third topics of this study, patterns of government funding of
nonprofit organizations and nonprofit political advocacy, are concerned with interactions
between two organizational populations – public agencies and environmental
nonprofits. These topics are typical of the analysis of organizational institutionalism.
The first research is concerned with the emergence and institutionalization of the
environmental nonprofit sector in Korea between 1987 and 2007. The building processes
19
are parts of major sociopolitical transformations that Korean society experienced
following the democratic breakthrough in 1987 and the economic crisis in 1997. At the
same time, the emergence of environmental nonprofits in Korea is embedded in the
emergence of the entire nonprofit sector. Without understanding the political dynamics
affecting the entire nonprofit sector and the wider society, the emergence of
environmental nonprofits and their institutionalization cannot be explained. Given that
nonprofit building in Korea is more political phenomenon than organizational
phenomenon, this topic may be better addressed through the lens of historical
institutionalism.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
Chapter 2 explores how the environmental nonprofits have emerged and have been
institutionalized in Korea. Government funding plays an important role in the emergence
of nonprofits, and political actors continue to engage in contestations over the roles of
nonprofits in Korea. This study is particularly concerned with political actions of Korean
presidents and their parties during critical junctures and subsequent path dependent
processes. These political contestations continue to change diverse aspects of nonprofit
institutions in Korea, including environmental nonprofits.
Chapter 3 concerns patterns in which government funds are allocated, and factors
critical to funding patterns. The study will consider two competing rationales of
government funding of nonprofits—an efficiency rationale and a non-efficiency rationale
construed as a political rationale.
20
Chapter 4 explores factors critical to active nonprofit political advocacy. Nonprofit
political advocacy refers to nonprofit activities carried out to influence public policies.
Among diverse types of nonprofit political advocacy, this study examines nonprofit
political advocacy intended to criticize and challenge government policies. This study
particularly explores (1) whether are there variations in nonprofit political advocacy?; (2)
is this related to differences in network legitimacy?; and (3) how does government
funding affect nonprofit political advocacy?
Chapter 5 summarizes all three studies. It discusses their limitations and makes
suggestions for further studies.
21
Chapter 2:
Government Funding, Political Contestation and the Evolution of Environmental
NGOs in Korea
2.1 Introduction
Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are relatively recent
phenomena in Korea. The substantial emergence of Korean environmental NGOs can be
traced back to democratic transitions in 1987, which gives them a short history compared
to environmental nonprofit organizations in Western countries. However, the rate of
nonprofit building in the environmental sector in Korea has accelerated since the late
1990s when the Korean government began funding nonprofit organizations. The funding
appears to be associated with the emergence of collaborative governance between public
and nonprofit institutions. However, in the 2000s, government funding of nonprofits in
addition to the role of nonprofits have become the objects of political contestation among
competing political coalitions. Whereas nonprofits in general and environmental NGOs
in particular now have become taken for granted in Korea as they are in Western
countries, Korea has experienced a unique historical path to nonprofit building in the
environmental sector. This study investigates the trajectory of the evolution of
environmental nonprofits in Korea, and the roles of government funding and political
contestation in their evolution.
22
This study departs from two conventional accounts of the evolution of nonprofits:
social origin theory provides one account, and the other account results from a power-
distributional perspective. Social origin theory does not capture the evolving nature of
nonprofit building, and the power-distributional account does not explain how marginal
organizations become important institutions by being mobilized by powerful political
coalitions. For an expanded understanding of the evolution of nonprofits, this study
employs the insights of three distinct yet intertwined concepts of historical
institutionalism: critical junctures, path dependence and political contestation. While they
may seem to provide competing accounts of some aspects of institutional evolution, these
three concepts can make complementary contributions to the understanding of the diverse
dimensions of the institutional evolution of environmental NGOs in Korea.
2.2 Historical and Comparative Perspectives of Environmental NGOs and the Role
of Government Funding in Korea
2.2.1 The historical perspective of the emergence of environmental NGOs
The historical pattern of the founding of environmental NGOs in Korea is unique.
Rather than linear and incremental, the growth in the establishment of new environmental
NGOs had remained stagnant during certain periods until two waves of rapid rises in the
number of new environmental NGOs punctured these periods. Korea’s democratic
breakthrough in 1987 and economic crisis in 1997, defined here as critical junctures,
triggered these waves.
23
Figure 2.1 shows the number of new environmental NGOs established between
1963 and 2005 according to the Encyclopedia of Korean Associations 2006, which
conducted a survey in 2005. The data included only organizations active at the time of the
survey. The survey did not include organizations that were founded and had disbanded
prior to the time of the survey.
As Figure 2.1 shows, few environmental organizations were founded during the 17
years of President Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian administration (1963-1979). Under the
succeeding administration of President Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987), which was no less
authoritarian, the number of environmental organizations increased only slightly. In 1987
there was a democratic breakthrough restoring people’s political rights and civil freedom.
Although this breakthrough did not lead immediately to the establishment of new
environmental NGOs, a few did begin to emerge during the subsequent “democratic
transition” period (1988-1992). Even though President Roh Tae Woo was popularly
elected in 1987, this general-turned-president was still considered a successor to the past
authoritarian regime. During this transitional period, traditional pro-democracy groups,
which were vital to the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, regained their
influence in Korean civil society, marginalizing the newly formed NGOs.
4
The number of new nonprofit organizations rose dramatically in 1993 when
President Kim Young Sam was sworn in as the first civilian president since 1963. He had
been a long-time opposition leader until 1990, when his party merged with the ruling
4
See The Politics of Democratization in Korea: the Role of Civil Society (Kim 2000) to
understand interactions between traditional pro-democracy groups called “people’s
movement groups” (Minjung undong danch’e) and nonprofits or NGOs called “citizen’s
movement groups” (Simin undong danch’e).
24
and counted by the author. (N=429.)
Source: Data compiled in the Encyclopedia of Korean Associations 2006
25
uated the stable increase in the establishment of new organizations.
e number
igure 2.2, which depicts the pattern of the establishment of new
enviro
rea
udget account for funding.
Gove
ctivists in Seoul in 2007 and collected data on their organizations’ revenue sources. The
4 organizations the activists worked in represent almost the entire population of
environmental NGOs active in Seoul at that time. As shown in Figure 2.3, government
party led by President Roh Tae Woo. President Kim joined the ruling bloc in order to
avoid being marginalized in parliamentary politics. Although his career as a democratic
leader was severely damaged after the transition, he was still supported by certain pro-
democracy groups. The number of environmental NGOs established in 1993 was three
times greater than that of the previous year (31 vs. 10). More than 20 organizations were
founded every year during the civilian presidency (1993-1997). The economic crisis in
December 1997 punct
The period of economic meltdown from 1998 to 2002 saw the greatest rise in th
of new organizations. F
nmental NGOs still active in Seoul in 2007, echoes this pattern.
2.2.2. Historical and comparative perspectives of government funding of
environmental NGOs
Government funding of environmental NGOs has increased significantly in Ko
since 1999, one year after the National Assembly endorsed a b
rnment funding existed prior to 1999, but it was sporadic and non-institutionalized.
In some cases, the government heavily patronized pseudo-civil organizations called
kwanbyun danch’e, particularly under authoritarian regimes.
The author conducted in-person interviews with 74 executive-level environmental
a
7
26
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2007. (N=74.)
27
nding (30%), membership dues (21%) and fees (14%). The percentage of
venues from government funding had increased significantly since 1999 when
government funding accounted for only 15.3 percent of the NGOs’ revenues, according
to a survey mailed across the country to which 55 environmental NGOs responded (Lee
1999a).
funding accounted for 31 percent of their organizational revenues in 2006, followed by
business fu
re
tal NGOs shown in Figure 2.4, 93 percent of the organizations received
government funding. Government funding accounted for more than 40 percent of the
revenues for 43 percent of the organizations. The average amount of government funding
given to each of the 74 organizations was US $251,204; the median value was US
$67,000.
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2007.
According to the breakdown of government funding for the 74 Seoul-based
environmen
28
Source: Data compiled by the author in 2007.
nted
0
t
ing to environmental
nonprofits in major industrialized countries (shown in Table 2.1).
The 1999 percentage (15.3%) of Korean environmental NGO revenues accou
for by government funding was far lower than the 29-percent average government
contribution to environmental nonprofit revenues in 30 countries. The funding data of 3
countries are based on reports from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector
Project, the largest and most up-to-date dataset presently available. However, the 2006
percentage (31%) of revenues of Seoul-based environmental NGOs from government
funding is near the 29-percent average in these 30 countries, higher than the 20-percen
average in developing/transitional countries and lower than the 38-percent average in
developed countries. The 2006 government funding share (31%) of the budgets of Seoul-
based environmental NGOs resembles the share of government fund
29
able 2.1 Share (%) of Government Funding of Environmental Nonprofit Revenues
Among Selected Countries
Country Share )
T
(%
Australia 38
France 32
Israel 32
S. Korea (Seoul) 31
Norway 30
Spain 30
Japan 27
United Kingdom 27
Sour ected
2. Data of S. Korea compiled by the author, and the share (%) is based
on Seoul-based environmental NGOs.
ofit Sector: The Social Origin
Theor
tion
l
rture
for explaining the evolution of nonprofit organizations in Korea since the 1980s.
ce: 1. Data from the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project coll
between 1995 and 2000.
2.3 Two Theories of the Evolution of the Nonpr
y and the Power-Distributional Account
Two perspectives are prominent in political-sociological accounts of the evolu
of nonprofit organizations. One perspective is Salamon and Anheier’s (1998) social
origin theory of the nonprofit sector, and the other perspective is a power-distributional
account of institutions (Knight 2001). While the former emphasizes historical-contextua
factors in shaping the nonprofit sector, the latter emphasizes the role of power relations
among political coalitions. This study takes the two perspectives as points of depa
30
f the
lass,
e;
ed
strialization
comb
tiques of the social origin theoretical account of the evolution of the
nonpr
on
e comparative-historical framework found in Esping-Anderson’s (1990) analysis of
2.3.1 Social origin theory of the nonprofit sector
Social origin theory assumes that historical-contextual factors in general and power
relations among social classes in particular heavily influence the character and size o
nonprofit sector in each country. In this account, the nonprofit sector is chosen over
markets and the public sector as the service-providing sector because of the relative
power of social classes, such as the landed elite, urban middle-class, urban working c
rural peasantry, state and colonial powers. Salamon and Anheier (1998) assume that
variations across countries in the character and size of nonprofit sectors are not indefinit
certain uniformities may be found, especially when assessing variations in terms of the
extent of government social welfare spending and the size of the nonprofit sector. For
instance, the United States has a powerful business sector with a preference for limit
state spending on welfare, which gives rise to a sizable nonprofit sector (Smith and
Gronbjerg 2006). By contrast, Japan has limited public welfare spending and limited
nonprofit development resulting from the development of a powerful state apparatus, and
ineffective urban middle and working class movements in the course of indu
ined with extensive corporate welfare (Anheier and Salamon 2006).
2.3.1.1 Cri
ofit sector
Salamon and Anheier’s (1998) social origin theory of the nonprofit sector builds
th
31
ment
of
nonprofit
reeck
id rise of nonprofits in Korea can serve as an example of these
critiques, and thus Salamon and Anheier’s social origin theory of the evolution of
nonprofits is incomplete.
welfare regimes and in Moore’s (1967) analysis of political regimes. Salamon and
Anheier’s arguments also reflect insights from path dependence theory by emphasizing
the importance of historical trajectories in shaping subsequent institutional develop
(Anheier and Salamon 2006). The social origin theory accounts well for the influence
historical contextual factors in the development of the nonprofit sector in different
countries, which enables comparative analysis of nonprofit sectors across countries.
However, the theory does not fully acknowledge important institutional changes that
unfold over time within each regime (e.g., Yutaka 2003) or capture the isomorphic
tendencies of institutional change that unfold across different regimes (e.g., Moore 2001).
Social origin theory does not account for political contestation evolving around
institutions in each country. Influential political actors engage in political negotiation and
confrontation because they have a stake in the form and functions of nonprofit
organizations (Clemens and Cook 1999; Djelic and Quack 2007). Political processes may
affect the evolution of nonprofits incrementally (Anheier and Salamon 2006), but gradual
changes may come with transformative consequences (Djelic and Quack 2003a; St
and Thelen 2005). The rap
32
s
es on
elopment of institutions thus results from the efforts of
social
unting
hich elections
of con
ralded
n
nk
2.3.2 The power-distributional account of the evolution of the nonprofit sector
A power-distributional explanation of institutions claims that power relation
among political actors with different preferences are at the center of institution building
(Knight 1992). In this account, institutions are embedded in asymmetrical power
relations, which allow more powerful actors to impose their institutional preferenc
less powerful actors. The dev
actors to acquire “distributional advantages in the conflict over substantive
benefits” (Knight 2001:38).
The power-distributional account of institution building originated in the study of
social welfare policies in Western countries. According to this account, strong labor
movements mobilize their political power to advance generous welfare policies (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Hicks 1999; Korpi 1989). Thus, centralized labor unions, strong parties
of the left and the weak power of conservative parties contribute to the expansion of
social welfare programs (Pierson 1994). This explanation is useful as well for acco
for “power reversals” during the past two decades (Thelen 2004) during w
servative governments in Western countries have led to the smaller role of
government in social welfare services (Campbell and Pedersen 2001).
According to the power-distributional account, neoliberal public policies he
by the Thatcher cabinet in the United Kingdom and the Reagan administration in the
United States during the 1980s accelerated the salience of the nonprofit sector i
contemporary policy debates. The primary goals of the neoliberal policies were to shri
33
“protector of human
welfa icies,
nonpr
e
emerged as alternative areas for dealing with
social
r
rly
1 percent during the same period. The
numb
government and dismantle the modern welfare state (Kettl 2000; Osborne and
McLaughlin 2002), de-legitimizing the notion of the state as the
re” (Anheier and Salamon 2006:92). As a by-product of neoliberal pol
ofits enhanced their stature in the provision of social welfare services in the United
States and the United Kingdom (Anheier and Salamon 2006).
2.3.2.1 The recent ascendance of nonprofits in the U.S. and the U.K.
The Reagan administration cut back the size of federal budgets, reduced the rates
of individual and corporate taxes, shifted responsibility for social programs to state and
local governments, and promoted greater reliance on the private sector and market-
oriented approaches for social services (Palmer and Sawhill 1984). In the course of thes
changes, the nonprofit and voluntary sectors
service problems formerly taken care of by the state. The Reagan administration
justified its greater reliance on nonprofits as restoring the American spirit of voluntary
service (Salamon and Abramson 1982).
Since the Reagan era, nonprofits have experienced sharp growth in their revenues
from federal contracts. Federal support to nonprofits in the United States increased from
$23 billion to $175 billion between 1974 and 1995 (Marwell 2004). The increase of
government support to nonprofits positively relates to the growth of the nonprofit secto
between 1977 and 1997. The overall revenues of nonprofits increased 144 percent, nea
twice the growth in the nation’s economy of 8
er of 501(c)(3)/(4) nonprofit organizations registered with the Internal Revenue
34
ed
ie
hich
e Blair cabinet, which proposed the
politic
Active nonprofit sectors—de-legitimizing the traditional divide
portance of power changes in explaining the recent prominence of nonprofits in
estern countries. When labor was powerful, nonprofits were not important because the
d
e of government in the delivery of social welfare services,
Service increased 115 percent, while the number of business organizations registered
increased only 76 percent (Salamon 2002).
In the United Kingdom, the Thatcher cabinet sought to dismantle a generation-held
notion of the welfare state and its resulting large bureaucracies. The cabinet embrac
market discipline as a key component of public sector reform, advocating customer
choice in the design and delivery of public services (McLaughlin, Osborne, and Ferl
2002). The notion of New Public Management encapsulated public sector reform, w
transformed into the “reinventing government” movement heralded by the Clinton
administration in the United States (Kettl 1997). Th
s of a “third way,” particularly embraced the greater role of nonprofits in the
United Kingdom.
between “pubic” and “private” in the delivery of social services—were important
components of third way politics (Morison 2000).
2.3.2.2 Limitations of the power-distributional account of the evolution of the
nonprofit sector
The power-distributional account of the evolution of nonprofits emphasizes the
im
W
state delivered social welfare services. When conservative political coalitions weakene
labor and reduced the rol
35
ic
m
ever,
-
ainst
ed to
oalitions. In some cases, even progressive governments sought to undermine nonprofits
s. In sum, power change enabled Korean
onprofits to arise, but their roles were contested even during favorable progressive
however, nonprofits took over the work offloaded from government and emerged as
important institutions.
The power-distributional account underpins arguments by relying on system
variables, including power relations. As a consequence, it does not capture intra-syste
dynamics (Pierson 1994). Even where progressive regimes are in power, important
differences in the size and character of nonprofits exist.
In Korea, to some degree, “power reversals” or regime change explain the
emergence of the nonprofit sector. The Korean nonprofit sector began to arise when
progressive political coalitions began to take political power in the early 1990s. How
the power of labor was not weakened during the ascendance of Korean nonprofits.
Korean progressive government supported labor, but it did not mobilize labor power to
broaden its political and social bases. Rather, the Korean progressive government that
sought industrial peace bounded labor power. Nonprofits emerged as another socio
political group that the Korean progressive government relied on to establish its political
base. Korean nonprofits even engaged in national electoral processes to campaign ag
“unfit” politicians. As they were in the political business, Korean nonprofits continu
remain the objects of political contestation between progressive and conservative
c
when nonprofits did not serve their interests. Governments used funding as a useful
leverage to wield influence over nonprofit
n
36
ctive
evolution of nonprofits.
ugh
l
fication of
histor nal
apture the
lving,
n
role of political contestation and negotiation between political coalitions in these
coalitions, which points to the incomplete account of the power-distributional perspe
regarding the
2.4. Theories of the Evolution of the NGO Sector: Critical Junctures and Path
Dependence
Social origin theory is useful in searching for nonprofit patterns thro
categorizations and comparisons. A power-distributional account provides a usefu
conceptualization of how power relations propel institutional outcomes. However, these
two theoretical accounts settle for generalizing institutional differences via
categorizations and conceptualizations. These accounts lack the identi
ical paths leading to institutional uniqueness and mechanisms that drive institutio
evolution along historical trajectories. In addition, these two theories do not c
importance of intra-system variables, such as political contestation.
Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of social origin theory and a
power-distributional account, this study draws on the literature of historical
institutionalism. While the core arguments of historical institutionalism still are evo
the frameworks provided by critical junctures and path dependence have been integral
ingredients in this literature. While the framework of critical junctures posits radical
changes in institutions, the framework of path dependence posits the deterministic
development of institutions following institutional changes. However, new emphases o
incremental changes in institutions leading to transformative consequences and on the
37
ns play a
relatively long periods of stable institutional evolution, which
respo
king
role
l
sitive feedback,” (Pierson 2000a) or “self-
reinfo
The theoretical frameworks of critical junctures and path dependence are mutually
reinforcing claims. However, because the two frameworks developed in distinct ways, it
incremental changes have led recently to criticisms of these radical and deterministic
explanations. This study combines the three distinct yet intertwined insights of historical
institutionalism: critical junctures, path dependence and political contestation but is
informed by the argument that political contestations between political coalitio
significant role in shaping the institutional paths of environmental NGOs in Korea.
Critical junctures refer to crucial moments of institutional founding and
transformation that occur in differently described ways in various units of analysis. Path
dependence refers to
nd to changing political and socioeconomic conditions in ways constrained by their
initial trajectories.
The theoretical accounts of nonprofit evolution provided by critical junctures and
path dependence have strengths and weaknesses. Two strengths of the concept of critical
junctures are (1) that it incorporates the timing of formative politics and policy ma
into the analysis of institutional processes and (2) that it emphasizes the significant
of agency during crucial moments. Critical junctures, however, are inadequate in
identifying the mechanisms by which initial critical choices are reproduced during
subsequent legacy periods. The notion of path dependence, by contrast, explains wel
such reproduction mechanisms through “po
rcing sequences” (Mahoney 2000). However, path dependence does not fully
explain how or why institutions emerge.
38
is important to keep the discussions informed by each of the two frameworks separate.
This will help minimize the danger of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970).
5
2.4.1 The framework of critical junctures
The framework of “critical junctures” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970)
assumes that major “watersheds” (Collier and Collier 1991) or “turning points” (Abbot
1997) occur in institutional, political and policy development. In their landmark work,
Collier and Collier (1991:29) define a critical juncture as “a period of significant change,
which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of
analysis).” Junctures are “critical” because once set up on a trajectory, institutional
arrangements are difficult to reverse (Pierson 2004). Examples of critical junctures
include periods in which party systems form and realign, agriculture is commercialized
through modernization or labor is incorporated into politics.
6
Comparative-historical
analyses of such periods often concentrate on structural, antecedent conditions of the
polities under consideration that lead to divergent polity developments (Capoccia and
Kelemen 2007).
Comparative-historical analysis has been criticized largely for its neglect of agency
during periods of critical junctures, while its structural accounts still are considered
important. Mahoney (2001:7) argues that “critical junctures are moments of relative
structural indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic
5
Sartori (1970:1034) refers to conceptual stretching as “[indefinitely] broadening the
meaning and thereby the range of application of the conceptualizations at hand …
[resulting in] vague, amorphous conceptualizations.”
6
For classic works dealing with critical junctures in entire polities, see Lipset and
Rokkan (1967), Moore (1967), and Collier and Collier (1991).
39
fashion.” Similarly, Katznelson (2003:283) stresses that, “many constraints on agency are
broken or relaxed and opportunities expand so that purposive action may be especially
consequential.” The agency-centered approach to critical junctures is assumed to be even
better suited to studies of subject matters other than entire polities (Capoccia and
Kelemen 2007). Such subject matter includes organizations, interorganizational
relationships and public policies (Calder and Ye 2004; Gal and Bargal 2002; Hacker
1998; Hogan 2005; Richards and Smith 1997).
Periodization is explicit in the framework of critical junctures (Katznelson 2003).
Three distinct phases are proposed in a temporal sequence: the antecedent conditions, the
critical junctures and the legacies of the critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991).
Complex interactions among the three phases need to be specified to explain the full
range of critical junctures. Crises (or cleavages)—political, socioeconomic or cultural—
emerge out of the antecedent conditions and lead to critical junctures. Often, critical
junctures occur in the wake of immediate responses to crises triggered by external
shocks, such as war and economic depression or endogenous forces (Collier and Collier
1991).
7
Critical junctures are hypothesized to explain, partially or probabilistically, their
legacies.
8
The ways in which the junctures occur shape the institutional processes of
7
“Immediate response” does not necessarily mean that the duration of a critical juncture
is brief. Whereas some scholars tend to consider the duration of critical junctures brief
relative to the duration of subsequent legacy periods (Capoccia 2007; Hogan 2006;
Calder 2004), Collier and Collier (1991) argue that wide variations exist in the duration
of critical junctures.
8
Some scholars suggest that changes during legacy periods may not be a necessary
component of the temporal sequence of critical junctures (Capoccia 2007). The
consequences of critical junctures may involve the restoration of the prior status quo.
40
their legacies for years to come. How such legacies are institutionalized is the central
theme of another theoretical framework of historical institutionalism: path dependence
analysis.
2.4.2 The framework of path dependence
An alternative to the framework of critical junctures but by no means an
incompatible one for understanding institutional processes is path dependence. This
framework—informed by the insights of the economic historians Paul David, Brian
Arthur and Douglass North—assumes that “eventual outcome[s] can be exerted by
temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather
than systematic forces” (David 1985:332). Four self-reinforcing mechanisms are posited
for these economic phenomena to operate: large setup or fixed costs, learning effects,
coordination effects and adaptive expectations (Arthur 1988, 1989, 1994). Large setup or
fixed costs give advantage to continuing investment in a given technology; learning
effects confer advantage to repetitive use of a given technology rather than the pursuit of
alternative technologies; coordination effects benefit existing technology users with
expanded functions of the same technology and further investment in the related
economic infrastructure; and adaptive expectations occur when technology users believe
in the expanded use of the technology, and the self-fulfilling character of this expectation
enhances continued prevalence of the technology. North extends this account of
technological processes to institutional processes by pointing out that it explains not only
competing technologies but also “competition between organizations embodying the
41
competing technologies” (1990:94). He concludes that Arthur’s assumptions therefore
were applicable to institutional analysis.
The concept of path dependence has taken on richer meaning in political science,
sociology and policy studies. For instance, policy decisions made in earlier times
influence policy decisions in later times, which limits policy options available to policy
makers in the present (Katznelson 1997). Multiple factors contribute to this path-
dependent development, including the timing of policy formulation (Fargion 2000) and
organizational inertia to resist change. In his analysis of the welfare state, Pierson
(1994:40) also explains a path-dependent mechanism: policy structures create resources
and incentives that lead to the formation of social groups, and these policies influence the
activities of these social groups and affect social learning among major political actors.
The idea of path dependence is contrasted with rational choice institutionalism,
which assumes that institutions are designed for the benefits they generate. That is,
participants cooperate to design institutions to produce collective goods, and thus
institutions become problem-solving devices that actors use to reap gains from
cooperation and to protect themselves from opportunism (Ostrom 1999; Weingast 2002;
Williamson 1975). The path dependence account of institutions disregards the account of
institutional design. Rather, it emphasizes institutional causality: small events in initial
phases can have great and enduring consequences if they occur at the right moment
(Pierson 2000a). Moments when small events trigger movement toward a particular path
out of multiple possible paths are considered critical junctures (Pierson 2000b). Thus, the
42
chosen path is not necessarily efficient; it is often suboptimal (Pierson 2000a, 2000b).
Thus the neo-classical assumption that the eventual outcomes become efficient as a result
of competition and negative feedback is rejected.
The literature on path dependence seeks to identify mechanisms of reproduction
following critical junctures. Pierson (2000a) proposes the notion of “increasing returns,”
which explains that an institutional alternative, once adopted, delivers increasing benefits
with continued adoption. The costs of switching from an institutional alternative to
another increase over time, and thus it becomes difficult to change the adopted institution
into a more efficient one. However, Mahoney (2000) argues that increasing returns does
not fully specify self-reinforcing mechanisms. He holds that the notion of increasing
returns is a utilitarian explanation that assumes actors choose to reproduce particular
institutions because they perceive that it is in their interest to do so.
9
Mahoney (2000)
adds functional, power and legitimation processes to increasing returns to explain the
“lock-ins” of an adopted institutional path.
Mahoney characterizes critical junctures and path dependence in a more
deterministic fashion. Mahoney (2000) proposes that while selection processes during
critical junctures are marked by contingency, subsequent path-dependent sequences are
marked by deterministic mechanisms.
10
He defines contingency as “the inability of
theory to predict or explain, either deterministically or probabilistically, the occurrence of
a specific outcome” (2000:513). In his study of liberal reform in Latin American
9
Network arguments do not necessarily assume this as well.
10
Thelen particularly emphasizes these points (2003, 2004).
43
countries during the early 20th century, for instance, Mahoney (2001) suggests that
historical contingencies, such as political challenges to liberal leaders, strongly
influenced the decisions of those leaders. However, he proposes that “institutional
reproduction is explained by mechanisms derived from predominant theories” (2000:515).
2.4.3 Institutions, objects of political contestation
The frameworks of critical junctures and path dependence hold that institutions
change discontinuously and that self-reinforcing reproduction follows such change.
Punctuated equilibrium models that sharply distinguish between analyses of institutional
change and analyses of institutional stability heavily influence such patterns (Krasner
1988; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
These frameworks have been openly challenged in recent years (Amable 2003;
Crouch 2005; Crouch and Farrell 2004; Thelen 2003, 2004). For instance, old institutions
that have served their initially intended purposes are not necessarily dismantled at critical
junctures. Rather, they are often “either recalibrated or functionally reconverted” (Thelen
2004:34). The notions of deterministic processes of increasing returns and institutional
“lock-in” are also rejected. Rather, institutional survival involves “political renegotiation
and realignment of coalitional bases on which specific arrangements rest” (Thelen
2004:35). Political negotiation is intended to accommodate new political decision makers
and adjust the institutions to new political and economic imperatives. Political
negotiation drives important, yet often incremental, changes “in the form these
institutions take and in the functions they perform” (Thelen 2004:35). Changes can be
gradual, yet their results can be consequential (Djelic and Quack 2007).
44
The new approach to path dependence seeks to restore the political dynamics
almost lost in deterministic approaches to institutional development (Amable 2003).
Institutions now become “the objects of political contestation” (Thelen 2004). The losers
in political and policy making processes do not necessarily disappear (Schneiberg and
Clemens 2006). They may adapt to prevailing institutions, a process which differs from
reproducing those institutions (Thelen 2003). Even prevailing institutions are not
necessarily reproduced automatically; political actors must cultivate them (Deeg 2005).
Thus, institutional changes do not always take the form of “replacements” of old
institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Actors within old institutions may create
“bounded change” within old paths (Weir 1992). As a result, institutional changes can
occur endogenously within institutions (Deeg 2005) and can be evolutionary in the
absence of external shocks (North 1990; Schwartz 2001). Thelen (2003) holds that, as a
result of political contestation, some old institutions transform into new purposes
(conversion); Schickler (2001) notes that new elements are grafted onto old institutions
(layering); and Hacker (2004) and Zucker (1988) add that institutions can erode through
drift or entropy.
The arguments for political contestation differ from power-distributional accounts,
which assume that institutional changes represent changes in the balance of power among
various political actors (Knight 2001). Political actors that benefit from these institutions
that rest on a particular balance of power have not necessarily designed them. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has become an institution for defending civil rights.
45
However, the constituencies immediately benefiting from the defense of civil rights did
not design the Court. Sometimes institutions empower marginal groups to exercise
leverage well beyond their resources, a resulting consequence their designers did not
intend (Thelen 2003).
An assessment of Korean non-profit organizations helps to clarify this point of
political contestation. Although Korean non-profit organizations often sought to gain
prominence on their own, ordinarily they did not have adequate resources to evolve into
their present status. Rather, the current prominence of non-profit organizations was
significantly driven by political motivations, because they were very useful to existing
political coalitions in broadening their social and political bases. Because of the political
nature of the evolution of Korean nonprofit organizations, their roles in the overall
national society became the object of political contestation.
2.5. The Emergence and Institutionalization of Environmental NGOs in Korea
Critical junctures, path dependence, and political contestation have developed in
distinct ways, as can be seen in the literature of historical institutionalism. While these
three entities seem to compete in some aspects of institutional evolution, they can make
complementary contributions to our understanding of institutional evolution. The
historical evolution of nonprofit organizations in Korea provides a unique opportunity to
how these three entities have complemented each other relative to the development of
institutionalism in the nation.
46
2.5.1 Antecedent conditions
Korea had been one of the poorest agricultural economies in the world until the
1960s when its economy began industrializing in earnest. In two decades, Korea, which
became a model for other developing countries, made one of the most dramatic economic
development achievements in modern history. Korea’s gross national income (GNI)
increased from $2.3 billion to $109.1 billion in U.S. dollars between 1962 and 1986 with
per capita GNI soaring from $87 to $2,699 in U.S. dollars during the same period (KSIS;
WHO). Authoritarian governments, which gave policy priority to the growth of heavy
chemical industries and exports of their products, drove this rapid economic growth.
Government-led economic development, however, came with high costs to the
quality of the environment. The establishment of large industrial complexes brought
devastating contaminants into the rivers, coasts and air across the country. However,
pollution prevention was not high on the policy agenda of the authoritarian Park Chung
Hee administration in the 1960s and 1970s, which was concerned primarily with
maintaining high rates of economic growth. Although the Park administration established
legal and administrative apparatuses to deal with pollution—for example, the Pollution
Prevention Law and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs—legal standards were
loose, and administrative enforcement was lax. Businesses found no compelling reasons
to invest in pollution prevention facilities during that period (Moon 2004).
47
2.5.1.1. The 1960s and 1970s: Absence of environmental organizations
Pollution took its toll on people across the country, but the heaviest toll was on
residents in and around large industrial cities, such as Ulsan and Yeocheon in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some residents who lived near pollutant-generating factories fell victim to
metal element contamination or suffered from agricultural damage. These residents
sometimes called for compensation for the damage incurred by the factories despite the
Park administration’s suppression of any “anti-business” actions. Such collective actions
often were grassroots and not assisted by organized groups from the outside (Lee 2000b).
Professional environmental organizations did not exist in the 1960s and 1970s,
except for a couple of intellectual and student groups (Ku 1994). Acknowledging
pollution was not only politically taboo under the Park administration but also was a
secondary issue on the agenda of “democratic movement organizations,” which were
concerned primarily with political democracy, human rights and labor conditions (Kim
2000b).
2.5.1.2 1980-1987: Nascent environmental organizations
In 1979, the Park Chung Hee administration collapsed as a result of internal power
struggles. A military general, Chun Doo Hwan, came to power through a coup in 1980.
The Chun administration was no less harsh than the Park administration. Despite the
harsh political circumstances, an important environmental organization formed in 1982.
Protestant and Catholic clergymen and dissident intellectuals founded the Korean
Pollution Research Institute (KPRI), signaling the advent of professional environmental
48
organizations in Korea. KPRI had its own staff, offices and other resources to manage its
organization. It effectively politicized environmental issues. One of its achievements in
1985 was politicizing “Onsan illness,” which toxic waste contamination allegedly caused
and that the Japanese identified as a Korean version of “Itai-itai illness” (KPRI 1986;
KFEM).
Beginning in 1983, political circumstances softened somewhat. The Chun
administration released political prisoners, allowed activist students and professors to
return to their colleges, and scaled down its oppression of democratic movements (Hsiao
and Koo 1997). This is referred to as political “liberalization,” allegedly driven by the
Chun administration’s overconfidence about political stability and political motivations
to boost its legitimacy after three years of solid economic growth (Fowler 1999; Kim
2000c). During this period of political liberalization, a number of small environmental
groups, usually organized by college students and dissident intellectuals, emerged. These
groups formed umbrella organizations to strengthen scattered environmental movements.
Notable umbrella organizations included the Anti-Pollution Movement Council (APMC),
the Pollution Opposition Citizen Movement Council (POCMC), the Pollution Eradication
Movement Youth Council (PEMYC) and the Mokpo Green Movement Council (Ku
1994; Lee 1999b).
From 1980 to 1987, the nascent environmental organizations were radical and
militant. Environmental movements were parts of larger democratic movements, mostly
advanced by radical groups, such as labor unionists, organized peasants, the urban poor,
49
dissident politicians, intellectuals and college students. Environmental organizations
during this period defined their activities as “anti-pollution” rather than “environmental
protection” activities to draw a clear line between polluters and the victims of pollution.
In so doing, environmental organizations defined authoritarian governments, big business
and the capitalist system as the primary causes of pollution (Ku 1994).
2.5.2 The first critical juncture triggered by the 1987 democratic breakthrough
In early 1987, police arrested a college student activist, who subsequently was
tortured to death, in Seoul for his involvement in anti-government activities. The
revelation of this tragedy triggered a number of protests across the country. The political
turmoil intensified in the wake of the then-ruling party’s June 10 convention, where party
chairman Roh Tae Woo was chosen as the party’s candidate for the next indirect
presidential election. Opposition parties and pro-democracy groups protested against the
continuation of indirect presidential elections (Ahn 2003; Masao 1993).
The protests went beyond political opposition and student unrest; white collar
workers and urban residents, the main beneficiaries of President Chun’s solid economic
achievements, supported them. As the political turmoil was spread too widely to be
controlled, the ruling party’s presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo declared on June 29
that the party would concede to major demands from the opposition parties and pro-
democracy groups (Ahn 2003). The concession package had eight democratic reforms,
including direct presidential elections, amnesty for the leading dissident Kim Dae Jung,
the freeing of all political prisoners, guaranteed human rights, a free press, local and
50
educational autonomy, freedom for political parties, and a campaign against crime and
corruption. Although the “June 29 Declaration” was considered a blow to the ruling
party, Roh seized the initiatives for the upcoming presidential contestation. He claimed
credit for controlling the political turmoil and thus gained legitimacy as a presidential
candidate (Bedeski 1993). In the end, Roh Tae Woo was elected popularly as president in
1987, and dismantled much of the security apparatus that had repressed people’s
assemblies and demonstrations, freedom of the press, and the autonomy of local
governments and universities. During this critical moment, an authoritarian regime broke
down and a democratic regime emerged, triggering the activation of civil society in
Korea (Lee 1993).
2.5.2.1 1988-1992: Democratic transition
The period of 1988 to 1992 opened an era of NGOs in Korea. The Citizens’
Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was founded in 1989 with the mission of
promoting economic justice. It argued that the government’s preferential treatment of
chaebols, big business conglomerates, primarily deterred economic justice in Korea.
Through its size, commitment to its mission and influence in Korean society, CCEJ
became the model NGO in modern Korean society (Kim 2002).
The environmental sector also saw the rise of vibrant NGOs led by the Korea Anti-
Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA). The organization was founded in 1988 by
merging the Pollution Opposition Citizen Movement Council (POCMC) and the
Pollution Eradication Movement Youth Council (PEMYC), which had been founded
51
during the political liberalization period (KFEM). KAPMA expanded its membership
from activists to general citizens to become the largest environmental NGO
in Korea. NGOs in other sectors, such as the YMCA and the CCEJ, also began
environmental movements in the early 1990s. Of particular importance, the CCEJ
established a suborganization concerning environmental issues in 1992. In 1998, this
suborganization developed into an independent environmental NGO called
Environmental Justice and became one of the three leading environmental NGOs in
Korea (EJ).
During the period of 1988 to 1992, environmental movements went beyond mere
grassroots protests; environmental NGOs organized them. An era of professional
environmental movements thus was ushered in. Environmental NGO approaches to
environmental problems, ranging from reactive to proactive, varied. The NGOs
responded to environmental challenges, such as tap water contamination in Seoul in 1989
and 1990, and the dumping of phenol and other chemical waste into the Nakdong River
in 1991(Ku 1994; Lee 2000b; KFEM).
Simultaneously, some environmental NGOs acted proactively. They publicized
environmental issues unrecognized by the public and framed them as serious
environmental threats. Environmental NGOs used this proactive approach in antinuclear
activities in the early 1990s, when the government sought to select disposal sites for
nuclear waste produced by nuclear power plant operations. The government approached
this nuclear waste issue in a clandestine and bureaucratic way because no residents
52
anywhere wanted nuclear waste in their backyards. Environmental NGOs boosted public
fear of nuclear disasters, such as the Chernobyl incident, and mobilized grassroots
protests in local areas designated for disposal sites, including a site on Anmyondo Island
(Lee 1999b). Going a step further, environmental NGOs undertook environmental
activities alone without the participation of victims, such as in protests against
development in Lake Paldang in the early 1990s (Ku 1994). Environmental NGOs began
to play a role as stand-alone environmental stakeholders.
During the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, environmental
NGOs no longer were simply parts of larger democratic movements but became
independent organizations, focusing exclusively on environmental issues for their own
sake. The organizations became more professionalized, their activities more issue-
oriented and their strategies less militant than in the scattered protests prior to the 1987
democratic breakthrough.
2.5.2.2 1993-1997: The advent of democratic consolidation
In 1993, the election of President Kim Young Sam ushered in an era of democratic
consolidation in Korea. He was the first president from a civilian background in a
generation of presidents from military backgrounds. President Kim carried out wide-
ranging reforms, including legal and financial support of NGOs. For instance, a new law
revised in 1994 stipulated that civil organizations no longer were required to seek prior
approval from regulatory agencies to establish themselves (Kim 2000a). Also, the
national government began to provide financial assistance to NGOs in 1994, although the
53
amount of assistance—amounting to about $1 million U.S. dollars a year—was not
impressive (Lee 2002). The NGOs demanded that the government enact a law requiring
financial and institutional support of NGOs. Government support of NGOs was
considered a compensatory measure for sacrifices that civil organizations incurred during
their efforts to achieve democratization. In 1994, two main political parties, the ruling
Democratic Liberal Party and the opposition Democratic Party, submitted separate bills
to the National Assembly, but the bills did not pass. Both parties failed to agree on
whether or not governments should support financially pseudo-NGOs called kwanbyun
danch’e.
The two parties disagreed over three major pseudo-NGOs: the New Community
Movement, the Society for a Better Tomorrow and the Korea Freedom League (Kim and
Moon 2003; Lee 2004). Past authoritarian governments, which sought to mobilize the
public, organized and patronized these pseudo-NGOs. In so doing, past authoritarian
governments enacted a special law for each of those organizations requiring national and
local governments to support them financially. For instance, President Chun Doo Hwan
originally organized the Society for a Better Tomorrow after he took power through a
coup in 1980; his successor, President Roh Tae Woo, enacted a special law in 1989 to
sponsor the organization.
The environmental sector saw the establishment and expansion of important NGOs
during the democratic consolidation period. In 1993, the Seoul-based KAPMA and eight
local environmental NGOs merged into the Korean Federation for Environmental
54
Movements (KFEM), becoming the most influential pro-environmental force in Korea.
The KFEM, along with the Green Korea organization founded in 1991 and the
Environmental Justice organization founded in 1992, contributed to the rapid expansion
of environmental movements during the 1990s. These major environmental NGOs
evidently discarded past militant tactics in favor of institutionalized ones. They sought to
increase technical, legal and research expertise, and emphasized mass and grassroots
participation (Ku 2003; KFEM).
The establishment of environmental NGOs significantly increased between 1993
and 1997. According to data compiled in the Encyclopedia of Korean Associations 2006,
a total of 123 environmental NGOs were founded during those five years, which accounts
for 29 percent of the 429 environmental NGOs active across the country in 2005. This
number far exceeds the number of environmental organizations founded during the
preceding 30 years (a mere 53 organizations). The founding of environmental NGOs
across the country shows patterns similar to those in Seoul. According to data about
Seoul-based environmental NGOs compiled by the author, 21 of the 73 NGOs that have
engaged in environmental activities in Seoul were founded during the five year period of
1993 to 1997, which accounts for 29 percent of the total number of organizations
founded. Those 21 organizations almost equaled the number of organizations founded
prior to 1993 (20 organizations).
Environmental NGOs significantly increased in number and size but had not yet
gained full institutional legitimacy in the eyes of citizens or the government.
55
2.5.3 The second critical juncture triggered by the 1997 economic crisis
Circumstances stemming from an economic crisis in 1997 helped NGOs gain
institutional legitimacy with citizens and government, and thus helped the organizations
receive substantial government financial and institutional support. In 1997, several big
business conglomerates, including Hanbo, in Korea became insolvent and fell into court
receivership. Foreign investors pulled funds out of Korea, and the exchange rate and
stock market plummeted, leading to a drastic fall in foreign exchange reserves held by
Korean monetary institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave Korea a $57
billion bailout loan that required the Korean government to implement stringent
macroeconomic policies, restructure financial and corporate policies, and carry out
capital and trade liberalization (Kim 2000c). The economic crisis threatened
manufacturing companies with closure or downsizing and tripled the unemployment rate
from around 2 percent in 1997 to approximately 6 percent in the second quarter of 1998.
The number of unemployed was 556,000 in 1997 but jumped to 1,481,000 in the second
quarter of 1998 (Kwon 2001b).
Unfortunately, government expenditures for social programs were minimal when
the economic crisis hit (Kim 2004a). Only about 7 percent of the total government
budget—accounting for less than 2 percent of GNP—was earmarked for social security,
health and human resource development in 1997 (Kwon 2001b).
56
The public administrative infrastructure was developed well for times of
government-driven economic growth but insufficient for responding to the outburst of
unforeseen social disasters. In this situation, NGOs had a unique opportunity to build
institutional legitimacy by collaborating with government in efforts to recover from the
crisis. The government contracted NGOs to provide public work programs designed to
provide temporary income support (Kwon 2001b). NGOs carried out programs to assist
the unemployed in finding jobs and provided after-school programs for children from
low-income families. The visibility of NGO activities was highlighted when they
campaigned to collect gold jewelry from citizens to purchase foreign exchange currency.
In response to the NGOs’ significant contributions to nationwide efforts to recover from
the economic meltdown, President Kim Dae Jung, who was elected in the midst of the
economic turmoil, put “institutional and financial support of NGOs” high on his national
agenda (Lee 2002; Park 2002).
Political reasons were at work in President Kim’s support of NGOs as well. Much
of the NGO leadership had been recruited from former pro-democracy groups. These
groups sided with Kim Dae Jung as he pursued the presidency. They suffered from lack
of financial resources and thus demanded government financial support once Kim was
elected president. While some had supported former president Kim Young Sam, most
pro-democracy groups backed Kim Dae Jung. The election of President Kim Dae Jung
provided them with an opportunity to push their demands.
57
2.5.3.1 The NGO Support Law
Once Kim Dae Jung became president, the NGOs rekindled their efforts to enact a
law providing institutional and financial support for NGOs. As noted earlier, they had
made this effort during the previous administration but failed due to disagreements
between the two main political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic
Party. In 2000, after three years of consultation with NGOs, the Kim administration
enacted the Law on Support of Nonprofit Civil Organizations (hereafter called the NGO
Support Law) designed to promote the institutional security and financial resources of
NGOs. The NGO Support Law enabled NGOs to obtain legal status as incorporated
organizations, collect tax-free donations, use postal services at discounted rates and
receive other administrative benefits. Most importantly, the law provided government
funding to NGOs. The law authorized governments at the national, provincial and local
levels to earmark funds for NGOs (Kim 2004b).
Prior to the enactment of the NGO Support Law, governments had enacted special laws
to channel funds to government-patronized organizations called kwanbyun danch’e, such
as the New Village Movement. The newly enacted NGO Support Law included these
government-patronized organizations (Kim, Cho, and Lee 2004). Nevertheless, the old
special laws pertaining to the kwanbyun danch’e have not been abolished yet. Although
the national government suspended the patronization of those organizations, municipal or
local governments continue to subsidize them through municipal ordinances (Ha 2004a).
58
As noted earlier, the previous Kim Young Sam administration had subsidized
certain pro-democracy organizations. However, the funding was sporadic and limited in
both scope and amount (Kang 2001). In some cases, the government had funded NGOs
without establishing legal arrangements (Jung 2000).
Until the enactment of the NGO Support Law in 2000, NGOs in general were not
able to secure substantial, regular government funds. The NGO Support Law authorized
the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) to administer
grants annually to NGOs on an open and competitive basis. The grants amounted to US
$15 million a year. MOGAHA directly distributed half of the grants to national-level
NGOs and delegated the rest to provincial and local governments to assist local NGOs in
their jurisdictions. In November 1998, prior to the enactment of the new law in 2000, the
National Assembly endorsed a budget account for the grants, and grant-making began in
1999. Thus, two years prior to the enactment of the NGO Support Law, NGOs expected
grants to be established. Grants indeed were distributed one year prior to the law’s
enactment. MOGAHA’s grants still are the most accessible government grants (Choe and
Kim 2005; Kim 1999; Lee 2000a).
In addition to access to MOGAHA grants, NGOs gained access to other
discretionary funds administered by government agencies at various levels. The total
amount of these discretionary funds is known to be much larger than the total amount of
MOGAHA grants. However, the size of the discretionary funds is difficult to compute as
the funds have been distributed without open competition and by too many funding
59
agencies. One report estimated that the national government gave US $90 million to
NGOs in 2002 using discretionary funds (Kim, Cho, and Lee 2004). However, it is
estimated that the amount would be more than double if it included discretionary funding
from provincial/local governments, various government-owned corporations and
government-incorporated organizations (Ha 2004a).
2.5.3.2. Establishment of the greatest number of new environmental NGOs
The new institutional environment greatly increased the number of new
environmental NGOs across the country. According to the Encyclopedia of Korean
Associations 2006, a total of 203 environmental NGOs were founded between 1998 and
2002, which accounted for 47 percent of all 429 environmental NGOs active in 2005. The
emergence of new environmental NGOs almost doubled from 23 in 1997 to 41 in 1998,
when the National Assembly endorsed the budget account for the MOGAHA grants.
Similar increases in the number of NGOs were maintained between 1999 and 2001: 49
new organizations were founded in 1999 when the first MOGAHA grants were made; 51
were founded in 2000 when the NGO Support Law was enacted; and 36 were founded in
2001. The number of new organizations founded between 1998 and 2002 (203
organizations) exceeded the total number of NGOs founded in the preceding 35 years
(176 organizations). This study’s survey of Seoul-based environmental NGOs confirmed
that the number of NGOs founded during the period of 1998 to 2002 was the greatest of
any period. A total of 24 new environmental NGOs—representing 33 percent of the 74
total NGOs that existed in 2006 and pursued environmental causes—were founded.
60
2.5.3.3 Political drivers of government support of NGOs
Although the economic crisis in 1997 contributed to the institutional and financial
support of NGOs provided by the Kim Dae Jung administration, other political drivers
also were at work. After he took office in February 1998, President Kim sought to
overhaul the Korean economy and the country’s political system. The main targets of his
economic reform were business conglomerates called chaebols, and the main target of his
political reform was political regionalism. President Kim needed social forces to support
his reforms. At the forefront of the social forces were NGOs.
2.5.3.3.1 Restructuring chaebols
The Korean economy came almost to the brink of collapse in 1997, and the Kim
Dae Jung administration sought bailout loans totaling US $57 billion from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and foreign governments. The Kim
administration implemented far-reaching economic restructuring under strict programs
and rules agreed upon with the IMF (Feldstein 1998). The economic restructuring
focused on chaebols, which were blamed for imprudent financing of short-term foreign
debt (Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998; Sharma 2004).
For chaebol reforms, the Kim administration sought to enhance corporate
transparency and accountability, resolve cross-debt guarantees among member firms
within a chaebol, improve the country’s financial structure and streamline business
activities. For instance, chaebols were pressured to strengthen the role of the boards of
directors, diminish the influence of controlling shareholders and enhance minority
shareholders’ legal rights.
61
Inevitably, the Kim Dae Jung administration restructured chaebols in the wake of
the economic crisis, but it should be noted that political factors also played a role.
Chaebols long had been under the protection of government prior to the economic crisis.
Government-controlled banks favorably financed chaebols, which were politically
connected to ruling parties (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999; Kwon 2001a). Chaebols
often built up slush funds and donated them to presidential candidates from ruling parties
in expectation of preferential treatment after elections (Kim and Kim 2007). In the course
of this collusion, chaebols and their tycoons leveraged their economic power to influence
industrial policy, taxation, media coverage and court decisions in their favor. Kim Dae
Jung, a long-term opposition leader, was marginalized from the collusion. After taking
power, he attempted to reduce the power of chaebols, and the 1997 economic crisis
provided a unique opportunity to do so (Lim and Jang 2006).
2.5.3.3.2 Restructuring the political landscape
After taking power in 1998, President Kim Dae Jung received weak support from
mainstream society, which the chaebols, conservative newspapers and urban middle class
controlled (Lim and Jang 2006). These groups were attached politically to the former
conservative ruling party, which Kim Dae Jung defeated in the 1997 presidential election.
The former ruling party had a strong regional base in the Kyongsang Province and took
advantage of political regionalism to maintain its political power (Ahn 2003).
Political regionalism originated in the 1960s and 1970s when President Park Chung
Hee favored the Kyongsang Province, where his hometown was located, in industrial
62
policies and recruitment into the political elite. Political regionalism intensified in Korean
politics in the 1980s and in the early 1990s when politicians from the Kyongsang
Province strengthened their grip on Korean politics, which led to consecutive elections of
their presidential favorites. Kim Dae Jung was a victim of this political regionalism
during each of his four presidential attempts. His regional stronghold, the Cholla
Province, was smaller than those of his competitors from ruling parties (Ahn 2003; Ahn,
Kil, and Kim 1988).
Kim Dae Jung succeeded in the 1997 presidential election mainly due to a political
alliance with another opposition party and a political split within the then-ruling party.
The National Congress for New Politics headed by Kim Dae Jung forged a political
alliance with the United Liberal Democrats headed by Kim Jong Pil. Kim Jong Pil was
not secure completely in his regional base in the Chungchong Province; nevertheless he
had enough political clout in the region to tip the scales in favor of Kim Dae Jung.
Meanwhile, the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) split into two parties prior to the
election, which reduced regional support for GNP presidential candidate Lee Hoi Chang.
Other than support from his regional stronghold, the political base of President
Kim Dae Jung largely consisted of pro-democracy groups he had allied with during his
long political struggles. These groups were pivotal in sparking the 1987 democratic
breakthrough. Following the breakthrough, many leading activists of the pro-democracy
groups were recruited into NGO leadership (Kim 2000c; Lee 1999b).
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The NGOs adapted to the new political environment in which a long-term
opposition leader became president for the first time since 1963. The NGOs pursued
issue-oriented, gradual institutional reforms. The vital constituents of the NGOs were
white collar workers, professionals and intellectuals. The advocacy activities of NGOs
focused on reforming the chaebols, citizen engagement in policy processes and
environmental protection (Kim 2000a).
2.5.3.3.3 The roles of NGOs in President Kim Dae Jung’s reform politics
President Kim Dae Jung embraced NGO advocacy activities, which were
instrumental in advancing his reform programs. Two leading NGOs were at the forefront
of restructuring the chaebols, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and
the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). The two NGOs strongly
insisted that the chaebols improve corporate governance and business transparency,
which was consistent with the Kim administration’s economic reform programs (Lim and
Jang 2006). The Kim administration—overcoming severe resistance from business
employers, some opposition lawmakers and bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health and
Welfare—also used health care advocacy organizations to restructure the medical
insurance system in 1999 (Kwon and Reich 2005; Kwon 2003; Wong 2005).
Dramatic cooperation between the Kim administration and the NGOs occurred in
political reform activities. The NGOs formed coalitions, demanding that political parties
not nominate “corrupt” and “incompetent” politicians as congressional candidates, prior
to the congressional election in 2000. Leading organizations in the fair elections
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campaign were the PSPD, the Korea Women’s Associations United, and two major
environmental NGOs—the KFEM and Green Korea. The campaign hit hardest the
politicians in the opposition parties. The opposition party politicians argued that President
Kim and his party had “plotted” with the NGO coalitions to reshape the political
landscape (Kim 2004b). The fair elections campaign was successful overall in ousting
“unfit” politicians: a total of 56 out of 86 “unfit” candidates lost. However, campaign
effects were limited in areas in which political regionalism was rooted deeply.
President Kim’s incorporation and institutionalization of NGOs into his reform
politics were most evident in 1998 when he initiated his “Second Nation Building
Campaign” designed to address important national priorities, such as inter-Korean
cooperation. Two eminent NGO activists headed his campaign, which took the form of a
civil campaign that included the participation of political parties and NGOs. However,
the campaign failed to boost President Kim’s reform programs because the government
exclusively initiated it without the voluntary support of the people (Wein 2000).
2.5.3.4 Attacks on government funding of NGOs
President Rho Moo-hyun succeeded President Kim Dae Jung in 2003. He
maintained his predecessor’s institutional and financial support of NGOs. However,
government support of NGOs was not without setbacks during the Rho administration.
Diverse political and social groups often scrutinized it closely.
First, opposition parties and conservative newspapers pressured the Rho
administration to stop subsidizing NGOs involved in electoral activities. They alleged
65
that these NGOs violated the Election Law prohibiting NGOs from engaging in mass
rallies, campaigning for petitions and releasing opinion poll results (Chosun Ilbo 2004).
Giving in to the persistent demands of these parties, the government agreed to reduce the
annual MOGAHA grants to NGOs from US $15 million to $10 million in 2004 (Choe
2006).
In a second setback, the National Assembly, including the ruling party, also called
for a ban on subsidizing NGOs that opposed government policies. This call emerged in
2006 when some NGOs protested against the negotiation of a free trade agreement with
the United States, and staged violent demonstrations against a plan for the relocation of
the U.S. Army garrison in Yongsan and the 2
nd
Infantry Division in northern Seoul to the
city of Pyongtaek (Segye Ilbo 2006; Hankyoreh 2006, 2007; Yonhap 2007). The National
Assembly sought to legislate these plans and pressured the Rho administration to
withdraw grants from the NGOs involved in violent demonstrations.
In a third setback for NGOs, progressive lawmakers from the ruling party insisted
that the Rho administration stop funding government-patronized organizations called
kwanbyun danch’e by arguing that subsidizing those organizations served as a legacy of
past authoritarian governments. However, the government maintained funding for these
organizations because the organizations had become deeply rooted organized
constituencies (Ha 2004b). Moreover, it became difficult to differentiate between “real
NGOs” and “pseudo-NGOs” as some formerly labeled pseudo-NGOs had attempted to
adapt themselves to the general notion of NGOs.
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2.5.3.5 Different positions within environmental NGOs
During the last two administrations of President Kim Dae Jung and President Rho
Moo-hyun, government funding of NGOs became institutionalized as a policy instrument
facilitating collaborative governance between public organizations and environmental
NGOs. However, two important issues have emerged. The first issue is an identity
dilemma for environmental NGOs resulting from the receipt of government funds while
opposing government environmental policies. The second issue concerns lack of
transparency in government grant-making.
2.5.3.5.1 The identity dilemma
Government funding of NGOs has been supported widely by environmental NGOs
in general, but a divide has existed between major and minor environmental NGOs as to
whether receiving government funds harms their identities as independent institutions.
According to interviews carried out in this study with executive NGO activists in 2006
and 2007, minor environmental NGOs generally have embraced government funding, but
major environmental NGOs, such as the KFEM and Green Korea, had concerns about
possible identity crises, although they argued that receiving government funds did not
moderate their advocacy activities. They claimed that the belief that NGOs that opposed
government policies should not receive money from the government was a social
prejudice. However, conservative opposition parties and newspapers continued to attack
environmental NGOs on moral grounds.
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Since the MOGAHA grants began in 1999, environmental NGOs have protested
against several core national projects, including the establishment of disposal sites for
nuclear waste, the building of dams on the River Dong, the development of highways and
express railroads through mountain environments around Seoul, the building of new
towns on open green space near Seoul, and the location of a large-scale landfill, known as
the Saemangum project, on the southwestern coast through the construction of
underwater walls. In some cases, the government gave in to pressures from
environmental NGOs. Suspended projects include a disposal site for nuclear waste in
Puan County and a dam on the River Dong. In other cases, the government pushed
projects through despite protests from environmental NGOs. These projects include
express railroads, “new towns” and the Saemangum project.
In one case, the government and environmental NGOs had stakes in the
Saemangum project. The Kim Dae Jung administration decided in 2001 to carry out the
Saemangum project that the Roh Tae Woo administration began 14 years ago. This
decision dealt a blow to major environmental NGOs, which strongly opposed it. The
project was estimated to be one of the world’s largest landfill projects, filling in an area
of about 155 square miles—more than half the area of Singapore and more than six times
the size of Manhattan. The project was predicted to have catastrophic effects on the
ecology of the southwestern coast.
In other cases, the Rho Moo-hyun administration pushed the construction of new
towns around Seoul and other development projects across the country. The Rho
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administration’s development-oriented policies also dealt blows to environmental NGOs.
Major environmental NGOs, calling these moments “emergency situations for Korean
environments,” withdrew from consultative and advisory government committees
through concerted protests during the Kim administration in 2001 and during the Rho
administration in 2004. Despite these fierce confrontations, the government has
maintained funding for environmental NGOs.
Executive activists interviewed for this study claimed that opposing government
policies was one thing, and receiving government funding was another. Given their role
in collaborative governance, they considered receiving government funds as legitimate.
One executive activist in the KFEM insisted that refusing to receive grants from the
government amounted to succumbing to the persistent pressure from conservative
political groups and newspapers (i.e., DongA Ilbo 2004; Munhwa Ilbo 2004),
traditionally critical of environmental NGO work.
2.5.3.5.2 Transparency of funding decisions
Another matter of concern over NGO government funding has been the lack of
transparency in grant-making decisions. Individual networks connecting public officials
and NGO activists often have received attention as channels of flow for government
funds (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2006). These networks are called “inmaek” or “yonjul” in
Korean. According to interviews conducted for this study, activists from small and minor
NGOs have been concerned particularly about grant-making transparency as their
networks have been weak in comparison to those of major NGOs.
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Individual networks are maintained in different ways. NGOs may establish
networks with government agencies when their leaders take government positions or join
in government advisory committees at various levels. NGOs also have sought to include
on their own boards of directors other prominent NGO leaders who sometimes have been
included in government funding committees or generally have maintained strong ties
with government officials.
Minor NGOs surveyed for this study tended to attribute funding failures to their
lack of participation in these networks. One executive activist of a minor NGO regretted
that memberships in networks sometimes seemed to be more decisive factors in funding
decisions than the quality of grant proposals and the NGO’s expertise. If so, the
environmental NGO sector in Korea eventually could ratchet down to voluntary
vendorism, which may distort the mission of NGOs and result in the loss of
organizational autonomy that has defined the integrity of the environmental NGO sector.
2.6. Summary and Implications of the Evolution of Environmental NGOs in Korea
There were two critical junctures in the evolution of environmental NGOs in
Korea. One was triggered by the democratic breakthrough in 1987, and the other by the
economic crisis of 1997. Prior to the democratic breakthrough, environmental
organizations were underdeveloped because of harsh governmental suppression of
people’s political rights and civil liberty and “anti-business” actions. During those years,
environmental organizations were small, few in number and not particularly influential.
70
They were often elements of larger democratic movements that remained confrontational
in their relations with government.
The democratic breakthrough that occurred in 1987 produced a political
opportunity from which a new form of organization emerged; specifically, environmental
NGOs. These NGOs differed significantly from previously established environmental
organizations. In particular, they were issue-based, they adopted largely institutionalized
approaches such as policy advocacy, they sought to increase technical expertise, and they
were less confrontational relative to their methods of engagement with the government.
The number of environmental NGOs significantly increased between 1988 and 1997, and
their legitimacy increased as well. However, it is premature to conclude that
environmental NGOs were fully developed during the period of the new democratic
regime.
The economic crisis of 1997 triggered a new and critical juncture for the evolution
of environmental NGOs in Korea. Political opposition leader Kim Dae Jung became
president in the turmoil of economic breakdown and achieved the first transfer of
political power away from the traditional ruling camp to the opposition since 1963. He
applied a process known as “reform politics” to overhaul an IMF-controlled economic
system and a regionalized political system. However, President Kim garnered only
limited support from traditionally entrenched social groups, which caused him to
mobilize NGOs in an effort to broaden his political and social relevancy. In doing so,
Kim enacted the NGO Support Law, an initiative the NGOs had demanded in order to
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gain financial and institutional support from government. When the National Assembly
endorsed a budget that provided government funding of NGOs in 1998, the growth of
new environmental NGOs surged to unprecedented levels, and their legitimacy increased
dramatically.
Viewed from the perspective of path dependence, the decision by Kim Dae Jung’s
administration to fund NGOs, including those with environmentalist mission, produced
path-dependent effects. Government investment in NGOs generated strong commitment
among civil activists and the general public for the nonprofit sector, an effect that can be
considered tantamount to “generating sunk costs.” For example, Kim’s funding policy
provided more resources and incentives than ever before, and greatly facilitated the
formation and expansion of environmental NGOs. This governmental funding created
“spoils” that provided strong motivation for environmental entrepreneurs. Following
parliamentary endorsement of government NGO funding, the establishment of new
environmental NGOs was unprecedented during the next five years. In fact, some
existing organizations changed their mission statements to pursue the sudden availability
of government funds. However, some political groups sought to reverse the newly
enacted government funding policy for NGOs. Interestingly, these reactions came from
both conservative and progressive groups in the early 2000s. Conservative political
groups sought to block governments from funding progressive NGOs particularly
because some of them actively engaged in electoral processes against conservative
politicians. On one hand, the then-ruling administration, although progressive,
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accommodated this political pressure by reducing the size of the national government’s
funding in 2004, but it still maintained its policy to subsidize NGOs. On the other hand,
progressive political groups—arguing that sponsoring conservative NGOs was a legacy
of authoritarian regimes prior to democratization—did not agree that conservative NGOs
should benefit from this funding. Nevertheless, the government funding policy, fending
off political reactions against it, survived with modifications. Once the policy of
providing government funding to NGOs was established in 1998, reversing the
institutional settlement of the policy was difficult.
The Kim Dae Jung administration’s policy improved the legitimacy of
environmental NGOs and the notion of “environment” itself by intensifying ongoing
mechanisms of learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations among
political and social actors. For instance, governors and mayors emphasized “greening”
their provinces and cities, and partnered with environmental NGOs in policymaking
processes. Business groups assumed pro-environmental postures and sponsored
environmental NGOs. As it were, the notion of “environment” became omnipresent. As
environmentalism becomes a legitimate social norm, it becomes difficult for political and
social actors to reverse the value of environmentalism.
However, the perspectives of critical junctures and path dependence do not cover
diverse dimensions surrounding the evolution of Korean environmental NGOs. While
critical junctures punctuated the evolution of environmental NGOs, for instance,
organizational continuity still was seen in the evolution of environmental NGOs.
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Environmental organizations prior to democratization were not replaced literally by
environmental NGOs. Rather, many environmental organizations “either recalibrated or
functionally reconverted” to new purposes (Thelen 2004:231). Environmental
movements prior to democratization were subversive because they were parts of
democratic movements. By contrast, environmental movements following
democratizations served to foster the cause of environment for its own sake. As they went
through different political periods, environmental organizations adapted themselves to
changing political and social opportunity structures. When it was founded prior to
democratization, for instance, the KPRI was an ideologically radical organization.
Following democratization it merged with other NGOs to establish the KAPMA, and
later became the KFEM, which adopted institutionalized approaches to environmental
issues.
The institutional character of environmental NGOs did not survive by standing
still. It remained the object of ongoing political contestation and renegotiation among
competing political coalitions. Since government began NGO funding in 1999,
opposition parties, conservative social groups and newspapers demanded that government
ban subsidies to politically active NGOs including environmentalists. These conservative
groups opposed NGO electoral activities. Likewise, ruling parties attempted to restrict
political activities of NGOs when many of the NGOs opposed major government
policies. Government funding often became useful leverage in political contests.
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Political contestation over NGOs unfolded differently during two critical junctures.
Following the first critical juncture triggered by the democratic breakthrough in 1987,
general-turned-president Roh Tae Woo was trapped in rising labor and social unrest. His
democratic measures meant to restore procedural democracy, but labor unions and other
social groups were dissatisfied and demanded substantive democratic reforms. Under the
unstable political circumstances, the Roh administration was unable to incorporate
important social groups into state power structures. As a consequence, environmental
NGOs remained independent because they had been released from government
suppression.
Following the second critical juncture triggered by the economic crisis in 1997,
President Kim Dae Jung provided environmental NGOs with financial and institutional
support, contributing to their organizational capacity and legitimacy. However, political
drivers were behind his support of NGOs. He attempted to mobilize NGOs to advance his
reform politics. Given that the president’s social bases were limited, NGOs were useful
social forces. Dissident-turned-president Kim Dae Jung institutionalized environmental
NGOs, but ironically, their independence became more vulnerable to government
influence than under general-turned-president Roh Tae Woo.
2.7 Conclusions
This study departs from two perspectives of the evolution of nonprofits: Salamon
and Anheier’s social origin theory and a power-distributional account. Instead, it draws
on insights from historical institutionalism, critical junctures, path dependence and
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political contestation. Social origin theory and a power-distributional account were useful
in cross-national categorizations, which gave rise to theoretical generalizations. While the
former categorizes nonprofit regimes in terms of government social welfare spending and
nonprofit scale, the latter attributes cross-national variations in social provision to
differences in bargaining power among classes. Both theories underpin their arguments
through the reliance on systemic variables, including power relations. However, these
two theories do not capture intra-system dynamics. Even where democratic regimes were
in power, important differences in the size and character of Korean nonprofits were
found. It is difficult to determine the role of nonprofits in society overall when they rely
on government nonprofit spending.
This study maintains that the evolution of Korean nonprofits is linked to historical
origins; and once they were taken following critical moments, paths of evolution have
had enduring effects down the road. However, these path-dependent effects did not
necessarily shape the nature of nonprofits deterministically. Under the path-dependent
effects, political contestation and renegotiation over the roles of nonprofits among
different political coalitions have continued.
Environmental NGOs in Korea recently have seen an important change in political
coalitions. Ending a decade-long progressive regime, conservative opposition leader Lee
Myung-bak took power in 2008. Environmental NGOs—expanding their capacity,
influence and legitimacy—benefited from progressive political coalitions. At the same
time, political tension continued between NGOs and conservative political coalitions,
which challenged the identities of NGOs as political actors.
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At this time, President Lee has a stake in the environment. When he was mayor of
Seoul, Lee restored the Cheonggyecheon stream, an urban waterway which runs through
the heart of Seoul. The stream restoration, contributing to his nomination as presidential
candidate, became one of his most important achievements as mayor. During the 2007
presidential campaign, Lee proposed another ambitious engineering work, the “Grand
Korean Waterway,” which was expected to revitalize the inland economy and slash
transport costs. The 336-mile canal is expected to cut diagonally across the country
between Seoul and Busan, Korea’s two largest cities. However, the Grand Korea
Waterway met intense debate after Lee’s election, and the project has divided public
opinion. Environmental NGOs, arguing that it would cause irreparable damage to the
Korean environment, strongly have opposed the plan.
The ideas of critical junctures and path dependence are useful in understanding the
transformative evolution of nonprofits and the enduring effects of the transformation.
Despite the advantages of these theories, it should be noted that institutions can change
incrementally through political contestation, but the consequences can be transformative.
To understand the future evolution of environmental NGOs in Korea, it is thus
worthwhile to observe the complementary roles of these three perspectives of historical
institutionalism.
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Chapter 3:
How Network Ties Become a Factor in Government Funding of Nonprofits
3.1 Introduction
Governments have become major patrons to environmental nonprofits over the last
decade in South Korea (hereafter Korea) and elsewhere. According to data collected by
the author in 2007 from Seoul-based environmental nongovernmental organizations
(ENGOs), government funding accounted for 31 percent of their revenue—a greater
percentage than any other funding source. Business funding (30%), membership dues
(21%) and fees (14%) followed. This funding pattern resembles patterns in other
countries. On average, 29 percent of environmental nonprofit revenues come from public
sector sources, according to the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project that
has the largest and most current dataset available for 30 countries collected between 1995
and 2000 (Salamon, Sokolowski, and Associates 2004).
Certain rationales account for why governments fund nonprofits to provide public
services instead of the direct provision of public services. One of the most widely cited
rationales is grounded in an economic perspective. The core argument for the economic
rationale is that governments can deliver public services at lower costs by outsourcing
services to non-governmental entities (Ni and Bretschneider 2007; Sclar 2000).
Outsourcing can take the form of privatization or contracting out. Privatization refers to
78
the transfer of ownership of physical assets from public agencies to private organizations,
while contracting out refers to opening services previously provided by public agencies to
competition among nongovernmental entities (Domberger and Jensen 1997). The
presence of competition among nonprofit bidders thus is assumed to facilitate cost
savings and quality improvements (Donahue and Nye Jr. 2002; Van Slyke 2003). To reap
the benefits associated with nonprofit contracting out, however, public agencies must
have the capacity to properly execute contracting processes, monitor contracting
programs and oversee the performance of nonprofit service providers (Donahue and Nye
Jr. 2002; Kettl 1993; Ni and Bretschneider 2007; Van Slyke 2003).
Framing privatization and contracting out in economic terms would be acceptable
if nonprofit service providers were not embedded in interorganizational relations.
Organizations often are embedded in networks of relations from which organizational
reputations arise. Reputation becomes an important factor in driving organizations to
change their behavior, for instance, in generating trustable behavior and discouraging
malfeasance (Granovetter 1985). Given the importance of organizational embeddedness
in organizational behavior, an alternative rationale for government funding for nonprofits
can be proposed.
According to institutional theory of organization studies, an ideal model of
competition and the resulting efficiency are difficult to achieve when organizations are
embedded in interdependent relations. Government agencies and nonprofit organizations
operate in organizational fields in which various institutional actors interact with each
79
other. For instance, lawmakers, citizens, the mass media and peer public/nonprofit
organizations have a stake in the government funding of nonprofits (e.g., Ni and
Bretschneider 2007; Van Slyke 2003). These institutional actors exchange with each
other not only information and resources but also mutual awareness, trust and norms.
Given those circumstances, the efficiency imperative can be discarded in favor of the
imperative of legitimacy-seeking. Legitimacy-seeking refers to the behavioral tendency
of organizations to conform to legitimate institutional norms in certain institutional
environments. If this is the case, the efficiency imperative likely does not constitute the
first priority of government patrons in funding nonprofits. Rather, government patrons
may give first priority to securing organizational legitimacy.
Despite the recognition that government funding decisions may not be made
necessarily on efficiency rationales but possibly on legitimacy-seeking rationales,
difficulties arise in identifying official government rationales for selectively funding
nonprofit organizations. One way of addressing this puzzle is to investigate the patterns
of government funding for nonprofit organizations. Investigating funding patterns can
offer a clue as to why governments channel funds to certain nonprofit organizations and
not to others. Channeling government funds to certain organizations is of vital
importance especially to advocacy organizations, such as environmental nonprofits.
Government funding potentially affects the advocacy activities of these organizations
(Dryzek 1996; Nikolic and Koontz 2007; Smith 2004) because of the commitment of
these organizations to political advocacy—which refers to activities to improve the
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conditions of clients and represent groups that cannot speak for themselves, such as
oceans or watersheds (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Jenkins 2006; Suarez and Hwang
2008)—and the resulting, inherently contentious and conflicting interactions with
government (Smith and Gronbjerg 2006). This study thus means to explore the question
of what rationales drive governments to fund nonprofits.
This study will combine insights from both institutional theory and network
analysis because the former provides the theoretical foundation regarding organizational
legitimacy and the latter provides a methodological foundation. Through institutional
theory, this study develops a multi-dimensional model of organizational legitimacy,
which incorporates not only efficiency but also non-efficiency rationales. The multi-
dimensional model of legitimacy enables us to answer the question of whether or not an
efficiency rationale is decisive in government funding for nonprofits. Thus, this study
addresses the following questions: Which environmental nonprofit organizations receive
government funds? What factors can be identified that may account for funding patterns?
To obtain empirical data, this study investigates the patterns of government funding
for environmental nonprofits in Korea. A survey of 74 environmental nonprofit
organizations in Seoul was conducted in 2007. The survey includes both environmental
organizations that did and did not receive government funding.
This study proceeds as follows: First, a theoretical framework is presented.
Research methods are described, and subsequent sections present the analysis results.
This study concludes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for further research.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
3.2.1 Institutional theory and network analysis
To anchor the research question in a broader theoretical context, this study
combines two self-contained but previously disconnected theoretical insights. The first
insight is that organizations seek legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). The second insight is that organizations are
embedded in interorganizational networks and have different degrees of network
commitment (Granovetter 1985; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).
A unique feature of government funding is that governments are accountable to
citizens and legislators for their use of budgets; therefore, governments may impose
regulations on funding recipients to ensure fiscal accountability (Salamon 1987). More
importantly, the simple fact that nonprofits depend on governments for financial
resources places pressures on recipient organizations even when government funding has
minimal strings attached or regulations. These regulations are construed as regulative or
coercive institutional pressures that governments exert on nonprofit organizations
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995). If applying this argument to government
funding for environmental organizations in Korea, then environmental organizations
would be expected to submit to the explicit or implicit expectations governments have
about the role of nonprofits in policy processes, which may result in mitigated advocacy
activism by nonprofits.
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This study agrees with institutional theory’s proposal that organizational practices
aim to acquire legitimacy, and that governments exert regulative institutional pressures
on nonprofit organizations. However, this study argues that governments disbursing
funds also function under institutional pressures. Most studies informed by institutional
theory construe government agencies as operating independently of the pressures from
other stakeholders in organizational fields, although government agencies also operate
within the complex dynamics of organizational fields. This study thus treats government
agencies as “targets” of institutional pressures as well as “pressure-givers.”
Network theory primarily proposes that organizations are not atomic entities;
organizations are embedded in interorganizational networks. Those networks provide the
structural bases of organizational fields (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005).
Interorganizational networks not only provide opportunities but also constraints on
organizations by deepening awareness, trust and commitment among organizations
(Larson 1992). Degrees of embeddedness, however, vary among organizations in a
network. Organizations with more incoming ties in directional networks or more
reciprocated ties with others in nondirectional networks are regarded as centrally
embedded organizations.
Much of the current organizational literature conceives central organizations as
possessing higher levels of legitimacy (Mizruchi 1996). Organizations with fewer ties are
not perceived as legitimate. The different degrees of embeddedness across organizations
result in different commitments to shared norms and values. Organizations that are more
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embedded are more exposed to and deeply constrained by shared norms and values.
Network ties serve as channels through which the communication of normative values
and expectations occurs, which shape organizational interests and a repertoire of
organizational practices (Friedland and Alford 1991). As Granovetter (1985) asserts,
reputation can be a powerful force for controlling organizational practices in networked
organizational fields.
Other things being equal, organizations seek legitimate organizations as
networking partners (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006; Galaskiewicz 1985b;
Hannan and Freeman 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This
legitimacy-seeking tendency breeds variations in network patterns as “the richer get
richer.” Variations in networking may represent variations in legitimacy. The variation in
“network legitimacy” among organizations is a factor critical to variation in
organizational behaviors in institutional environments.
Although legitimacy often is used synonymously with reputation or status and thus
difficult to disentangle (Washington and Zajac 2005), legitimacy is assumed to be “the
foundation for the emergence of reputation and status” (Sullivan, Haunschild, and Page
2007:56). To enhance prestige or status, for instance, organizations must justify their
claims “on the basis of legitimacy in reference to the institutional realm of shared values
and beliefs” (Zhou 2005:95). Organizational reputation often becomes “an outcome of
the process of legitimation” (Rao 1994:31).
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3.2.2 Legitimacy differentials and resource acquisition
When organizations seek to secure financial resources from institutional
environments, legitimacy differentials make a difference. In providing financial resources
(funding hereafter), funding institutions account for the legitimacy of fund-seeking
organizations. Legitimacy especially is important when funding agencies and fund-
seeking organizations are nonmarket organizations, such as public agencies and nonprofit
organizations. Unlike market organizations, outputs rarely are evaluated by economic
effectiveness in nonmarket organizations (Casile and Davis-Blake 2002). Customers
directly control market organizations: If customers are dissatisfied with the services of
market organizations, then they withhold their money (Scott 1998). Customers have less
of an effect on nonmarket organizations. Moreover, the customers of nonmarket
organizations are more diverse and ambiguous than those of market organizations. As
Downs (1967:25) argues, “[nonmarket organization] outputs are not directly or indirectly
evaluated in any markets external to the organizations by means of voluntary …
transactions.” However, this does not mean that nonmarket organizations are
uncontrolled. Instead, a different criterion—legitimacy—controls nonmarket
organizations.
3.2.3 Government and legitimacy
Like nonprofit organizations, government agencies are embedded in structures of
organizational relations as public policies often are executed in networks of multiple
organizations (Tang and Mazmanian 2007). Interdependent situations lead government
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agencies to become subjects of institutional pressures from lawmakers, the executive
branch, media organizations, peer government agencies, political parties, lobbyists and
citizens. Nonprofit organizations also constitute key stakeholders in government
agencies as they attempt to influence public policies through advocacy activities.
Sometimes, government funders may build support from fund recipients to protect their
organizations against scrutiny from other stakeholders (Saidel 1991; Smith 1996).
In such institutional environments, government agencies must justify allocating
funds to some nonprofit organizations while withholding funds from others (Ruef and
Scott 1998; Stone, Hager, and Griffin 2001). Scholars often argue that the government
rationale for funding nonprofits is efficiency (Van Slyke and Roch 2004). Government
agencies may make allocation decisions by directly evaluating the organizational
expertise, managerial capacity and organizational performance of fund-seekers.
However, the performance of nonprofits is difficult to measure. Their goals often are
symbolic and ambiguous (Brown 2005); the links between means and ends are unclear
(Bigelow and Stone 1995); and diverse stakeholders may differ about desired outcomes
(Herman and Renz 1997). Several recent studies have addressed the challenges of
assessing the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations, but myriad conceptual and
empirical problems still remain (Forbes 1998; Herman and Renz 1999; Sowa, Selden,
and Sandfort 2004). Even when considering the achievements of nonprofits,
performance is not the only factor that determines funding. Chambre and Fatt
(2002:519) note that the “continuation of funding was not only based on performance,
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but also on political factors.” Grønbjerg (1993) also reports that nonprofit organizations
shift their focus to particular aspects of performance to meet the government agencies’
changing interests.
Based on this understanding, this study proposes that legitimacy is a critical factor
in the allocation of government funds to nonprofits. If unable to observe directly the
performance of nonprofit organizations, government agencies may evaluate nonprofit
organizations by observing how key stakeholders perceive them, that is, which
organizations conform more closely to acceptable practices in a given organizational
population. This study refers to this as evaluation by legitimacy perception. Legitimacy-
based evaluation provides normative support to government agencies when key
stakeholders perceive government funding decisions to be appropriate. This criterion may
safeguard funding agencies from criticism regarding biased funding allocations.
3.2.4 Legitimacy, a multi-dimensional concept
Stakeholders “whose assessments count” determine legitimacy (Scott 1995:60). As
institutional environments are composed of multiple stakeholders (Rowley 1997), several
classes of social actors who confer legitimacy on organizations exist within a given field.
These may include states, trade associations and professional associations (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Rao 1994), which are known as
the enforcers of regulative legitimacy (Scott 1995). This study refers to this as
legitimacy-conferral from above. In contrast, the constituencies of organizations also are
considered to be legitimacy conferrers because organizations seek support and
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appreciation from their constituencies (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001; Kissane and
Gingerich 2004; Swindell 2000). This study refers to this as legitimacy-conferral from
below. Some researchers even suggest abstract sources of legitimacy conferral, such as
wider social expectations (Dacin 1997), public opinion (Deephouse 1996; Scott 1998),
and nature and reason (Zhou 2005).
Legitimacy conferrals from above and below find legitimacy-conferring social
actors in vertical institutional relations. In response to a call for a fuller description of
institutional processes in organizational studies (Scott and Meyer 1991), this study
proposes another set of social actors empowered to confer legitimacy on organizations—
peer organizations in the same organizational population. This study refers to this as
lateral legitimacy-conferral.
Organizational relations within a population are important to focal organizations.
Populations are “classes of organizations which are relatively homogenous in terms of
environmental vulnerability” (Hannan and Freeman 1977:934) and are “bounded sets of
organizations with a common form” (Carroll and Hannan 2000:74). Although peer
organizations often compete commensalistically for resources (Hawley 1950), a
population of like organizations can share constitutive beliefs about legitimate norms,
expectations and practices (Ruef 2000; Scott 1995). Organizational relations not only are
transactional but also normative (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).
Organizational relations thus are infused with meanings, values and norms (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Shared values and norms particularly emerge when a population of
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like organizations makes similar demands on the institutional environment. For instance,
peer organizations can cooperate with each other when they seek to improve their own
population’s legitimacy (Aldrich 1999).
Some practices thus are more legitimate than others in reference to shared values
and beliefs. Therefore, to be deemed legitimate by peer organizations, organizations must
demonstrate their commitment to the shared expectations of those peers. Peer recognition
in an industry or profession becomes an important asset for the survival and growth of
organizations (Deeds, Mang, and Frandsen 2004; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).
According to Parsons (1960) and Thompson (1967), organizations have three
levels of management: technical, managerial and institutional. The technical level is
responsible for transforming product/service inputs into outputs. Technical legitimacy is
conferred on organizations which possess qualified staff and use appropriate technology.
The managerial level refers to obtaining and managing resources essential for technical
activity. Managerial legitimacy is conferred on organizations which have sufficient
resources and managerial staff. The institutional level pertains to organizations’
negotiation activities in relation to institutional environments. Boards of directors at the
institutional level work to convince key stakeholders of their organizations’ legitimacy
with respect to the technical and managerial dimensions (Ruef and Scott 1998). Boards of
directors potentially can make political demands on institutional environments as well.
For instance, firms connected through interlocking boards likely express agreement on
corporate political action and legislative matters (Burris 2005; Mizruchi 1996). Thus, this
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study differentiates between three levels of organizational legitimacy: technical,
managerial and institutional legitimacy.
3.2.5 Interorganizational ties as network portfolios
Network ties provide opportunities to develop legitimacy in diverse dimensions.
Organizations often increase legitimacy through associations with other organizations
that already possess a high degree of legitimacy (Galaskiewicz 1985b).
To operationalize the three dimensions of legitimacy (technical, managerial and
institutional), this study investigates technical advice-giving networks, resource
sharing/joint activities networks and interlocking board networks. In short, these
networks are referred to here as technical, managerial and board networks. Previous
network research shows that network relations, whether interorganizational or
intraorganizational, usefully are disaggregated. Different relations represent different
conceptual dimensions of network relations (e.g., Bolland and Wilson 1994; Krackhardt
1992). Many networks can serve as portfolios that organizations use to maximize
network opportunities (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).
Each network relation varies in the degree of the tangibility of exchanged
network resources (Alexander 1996; Huang and Provan 2006). For instance, managerial
networks are more tangible than other networks. This study adds another important
dimension of network resources, that is, political relevance. Examining whether
interorganizational networks are relevant politically is important given that advocacy
organizations, such as environmental and human rights nonprofits, actively engage in
political advocacy.
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As shown in Table 3.1, these three levels of network relations differ in their
characteristics, particularly density and centralization.
Table 3.1 Comparison of the Three Levels of Networks
Link Type Density Centralization
Technical .051 .62
Managerial .074 .65
Board .031 .87
a. Technical, technical advice networks (incoming ties); Managerial,
resource sharing and joint activities networks (reciprocated ties);
Board, board interlocking networks (reciprocated ties).
b. Centralizations scores are Bonacich’s measures of centralization.
At one extreme, managerial networks are denser than the other two networks. As
they exchange tangible resources and rarely address political issues, managerial networks
are conducive to connecting organizations, but a limited number of organizations will
have difficulties controlling them. At the opposite extreme, interlocked board networks
exhibit the highest level of centralization, which means that a limited number of
organizations control this network resource. Given that board interlocking potentially
leads to politically oriented social cohesion among organizations (Burris 2005; Davis
1991; Useem 1984), interlocked board networks among nonprofits may demonstrate
representations of elite theory and class cohesion theory (Domhoff 1967; Useem 1984;
Zeitlin 1974). Participation in “inner circles” has consequences for politically cohesive
activities (Useem 1984). Directors of multiple boards may act as agents of community
elites as a class rather than as agents of particular organizations (Davis 1991). In contrast,
technical networks exhibit low scores in both density and centralization, indicating that
technical advice is not conducive to sharing and rarely has relevant political implications.
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 represent the characteristics of the three levels of networks.
This study employed Netdraw—a graphic layout instrument in UCINET (Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman 2002)—to produce three levels of networks plots. The layouts of
network plots are malleable according to different algorithms. This study relied on a
spring embedder layout algorithm. As its subroutines, this study employed geodesic
distances (the shortest path connecting two actors), node repulsion (preventing actors
from stacking on top of other actors), and equal edge lengths (displaying the same
physical distance for the same geodesic distance). These subroutines exhibit both the
global patterns of the networks and organization positions in the networks (Huang and
Provan 2006)
Figure 3.1 Network Plots – Technical Advice
(Density scores = .051, Centralization scores = .62)
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Figure 3.2 Network Plots – Managerial (Resource Sharing and Joint Activities)
(Density scores = .074, Centralization scores = .65)
Figure 3.3 Network Plots – Interlocked Boards
(Density scores = .031, Centralization scores = .87)
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3.3 Major Hypotheses
3.3.1 Network centrality, legitimacy, and rationales of government funding for
nonprofits
Measures of centrality in each network indicate the degree of legitimacy each
organization possesses. Measures of centrality in technical advice networks, for example,
indicate the degree of technical legitimacy.
The legitimacy of an organization increases as it becomes the object of more ties.
In other words, ties to an actor (incoming ties) matter in directional relations because it is
possible to identify who initiated a tie (Wasserman and Faust 1994). An environmental
nonprofit will be central in its directional networks to the extent that other nonprofits
identify it as a partner. However, only the number of ties matters in nondirectional
(reciprocated) relations because whoever initiates a tie is indistinguishable.
Some researchers assume network centrality to be a measure of power (Brass 1992;
Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Fombrun 1983). However, this assumption is difficult to
generalize because such studies use reputational dependent variables (Cook, Emerson,
and Gillmore 1983; Ibarra 1993). This makes the assumption that network centrality is a
behavioral indicator of the exercise of power questionable. In contrast, Wasserman and
Faust (1994) explicitly define network centrality in directional relations as prestige, and
Bonacich (1972a) defines it as popularity or status. As I note earlier that legitimacy is
assumed to be “the foundation for the emergence of reputation and status” (Sullivan,
Haunschild, and Page 2007:56), it is reasonable to relate network centrality to
organizational legitimacy.
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These three dimensions of legitimacy constitute two competing rationales for
government funding for nonprofits. If the government channels funds to organizations
with high technical and managerial legitimacy, then it is construed that the efficiency
rationale constitutes the first priority in government funding. By contrast, if the
government channels funds to organizations with high institutional legitimacy, then it is
construed that the efficiency rationale does not constitute the first priority. Instead, a non-
efficiency rationale is the critical factor in government funding for nonprofits. This non-
efficiency rationale can be explained in many ways. Although discussed later, this study
proposes that the political feature that interlocking board networks imply mainly drives
government allocations.
The two hypotheses that follow investigate whether an efficiency rationale
constitutes the first priority in government funding for nonprofits.
Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): NGOs centrally located in technical advice-giving networks more
likely receive government funding than peripherally located NGOs.
Hypothesis 3.2 (H3.2): NGOs centrally located in managerial (resource sharing/joint
activities) networks more likely receive government funding than peripherally located
NGOs.
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By contrast, the following hypothesis examines whether a non-efficiency rationale
constitutes the first priority in government funding for nonprofits.
Hypothesis 3.3 (H3.3): NGOs centrally located in interlocking board networks more
likely receive government funding than peripherally located NGOs.
3.3.2 Organizational characteristics related to government funding
In addition to legitimacy, the scholarly literature has considered the effect of
nonprofit organizational characteristics on patterns of government funding (e.g., Stone,
Hager, and Griffin 2001). Based on the existing literature, this study identifies three
organizational characteristics hypothesized to relate to government funding for
nonprofits.
Areas of activity. This study accounts for the areas of activity of each organization. The
notion of an environmental movement was not restricted to the classical idea of
preserving nature and historic monuments. This study expands the concept to incorporate
issues concerning the social environment and urban areas, including industrial pollution,
health hazards, the scarcity of energy resources, transportation problems, toxic waste,
food safety, and the difficulties in defining and securing environmental justice (Diani
1995). As the two areas of activity require different expertise, governments may account
for this factor in funding decisions. As technical expertise constitutes an efficiency
rationale in government funding, the following hypothesis investigates whether an
efficiency rationale constitutes the first priority in government funding for nonprofits.
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Hypothesis 3.4 (H3.4): Areas of activity of environmental organizations significantly
relate to the amount of government funds received by environmental organizations.
Organizational bureaucratization. Organizational bureaucratization may constitute a
factor in determining government funding for nonprofits. Under bureaucratized
organizations, people must act in accordance with rules and written regulations.
According to Adler’s (1996) assessment of bureaucratization, in what he terms as an
enabling bureaucracy, professional staff help members master their tasks better, work
more effectively and commit themselves to organizational missions. In a coercive
bureaucracy, professional staff use their power for ends alien to member goals or views.
Bureaucratization sometimes will and sometimes will not help nonprofits achieve
organizational goals. In this study, I investigate two dimensions of bureaucratization: the
extent to which organizations formally describe and evaluate their staff members’ work
and performance, and the extent to which organizations formally describe and evaluate
services and activities that they provide. These dimensions of bureaucratization may
create rigid and demoralized work environments, but they also may enhance the
achievement of organizational missions. As government funders require recipient
organizations to follow complicated rules and regulations in managing funds and
reporting the use of funds (Gronbjerg 1993; Smith and Lipsky 1993), these dimensions of
bureaucratization can serve as good indicators to funding agencies of managerial capacity
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and organizational accountability. As managerial capacity constitutes an efficiency
rationale for government funding, the following hypothesis investigates whether an
efficiency rationale constitutes the first priority in government funding for nonprofits.
Hypothesis 3.5 (H3.5): Bureaucratization significantly relates to the amount of
government funds received by environmental organizations.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Research setting and data collection
This study combines secondary data about the government funding of
environmental nonprofit organizations with primary survey/interview data. Primary data
were collected through a questionnaire survey of 74 organizations in Seoul, Korea (see
Appendix B), between December 2006 and May 2007, and through face-to-face
interviews conducted by the author with executive-level activists of those organizations
during the same period.
11
A preliminary list of environmental NGOs was created from three sources
available on the internet: the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement directory
of ENGOs, the Korean Ministry of Environment directory of ENGOs and the Korea
NGO Promotion directory of ENGOs. Then, the Web sites of those organizations were
examined to identify other environmental NGOs. I also consulted with NGO activists and
NGO scholars in Seoul to identify NGOs involved in environmental issues. Among
11
Four organizations among the 74 organizations responded to this survey via e-mail.
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organizations listed or identified as environmental NGOs, some either were impossible to
contact or no longer active. I contacted one member of each organization to determine
whether or not the organization was inactive as an environmental NGO. I also consulted
with NGO activists and NGO scholars in Seoul to determine whether or not organizations
that could not be contacted were inactive as ENGOs.
Because this study focuses on voluntary and nonprofit organizations that engage in
environmental activities broadly defined, I excluded organizations from the preliminary
list that primarily were commercial, governmental, recycling, recreation or research
organizations, and those organizations that treat environmental issues as distinctly
peripheral to their mission. When in doubt, I either contacted executive-level directors of
the organizations or consulted with NGO activists and scholars to determine whether or
not organizations should be categorized as environmental NGOs. The final list included
74 environmental NGOs. It is reasonable to conclude that the final ENGOs on the list
represented nearly the entire ENGO population in Seoul in 2007.
The survey asked a range of questions eliciting information about relations with
other environmental NGOs, government funds received in 2005 and 2006 and
organizational characteristics. Information about interorganizational networks was
elicited by asking respondents to identify the ENGOs “regularly,” “substantially” and
“directly” involved in working relationships with them in 2006 from the list of
organizations. “Regularly” was included to discourage respondents from including
organizations with which they had only occasional working relations; “substantially”
was used to discourage the inclusion of organizations with which they had trivial
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relations; and “directly” was included to discourage respondents from including
organizations with which they had only indirect working relations, such as relations that
occur through common membership in an alliance or umbrella organization (Ansell
2003). Explanations of the three terms were provided to respondents during face-to-face
interviews. In the case of the four organizations that took the survey via e-mail, I
contacted the respondents and explained the terms over the phone. Types of
involvement with peer organizations included technical advice-giving, resource
sharing/joint activities and board interlocking. Information about these relations was
coded as a 74-by-74 matrix. While technical advice-giving networks constitute an
asymmetric matrix because network ties are directional, resource sharing/joint activities
and interlocking board networks constitute symmetric matrices because their network
ties are reciprocated.
This study used mean difference methods employing t-tests and ANOVA to
examine whether or not differences existed in the amount of government funds
distributed among the ENGOs. Then, ordinary least squares regression was employed to
investigate what factors associate with government funding outcomes.
3.4.2 Categorizing environmental NGOs
The key methodological issue in studies of funding patterns involves how to
categorize organizations. This study employs two forms of categorization developed in
network analysis: one is a model of a core-periphery structure and the other is a block
modeling procedure, CONCOR (CONvergence of iterated CORrelations). Both ways of
categorizing organizations are incorporated as subroutines in UCINET, a software
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package for network analysis (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Two theoretical
perspectives on subgroup behaviors in network theory—the cohesion perspective and the
structural equivalence perspective—inform both categorization schemes (Burt 1987b).
Each offers a logical explanation of how subgroups in a whole network behave in
relatively homogeneous ways.
According to the cohesion perspective, organizations in a network are divided into
cohesive subgroups. Cohesive subgroups are defined as being maximally connected
internally but minimally connected with other subgroups (Friedkin 1984). The notion of
cohesive subgroups does not mean that all member organizations must be in direct
contact as Luce and Perry (1949) formally define cliques. Borgatti and Freeman
(1999:376) note that a network cannot be subdivided into exclusive cohesive subgroups;
rather, a network consists of organizations that “belong to a subgroup to a greater or
lesser extent.” The most straightforward form of cohesion is direct contact among
organizations (Harkola and Greve 1995). An alternative form of cohesion occurs through
indirect contact via a third party using short contact channels (Friedkin 2004).
The structural equivalence perspective posits that behavioral homogeneity can
occur without direct contact among organizations in a network (Friedkin 2004). The term
structural equivalence refers to positions in a network that have the same structural
characteristics. For instance, two organizations are structurally equivalent to the extent
that they occupy the same position in the social structure; thus, they have identical
patterns of relations with other organizations (Burt 1987a). It is assumed that
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organizational positions in networks predict organizational behavior better than
interactions among organizations (Burt 1982).
3.4.2.1 Core-periphery method and CONCOR
A model of a core-periphery structure described by Borgatti and Everett (1999)
represents an important feature of the cohesion perspective. The core-periphery model
posits that a network consists of the core and the periphery if the network can be
partitioned into two sets of groups. The core group is composed of actors connected with
each other in some maximal sense, while the periphery is composed of actors minimally
connected with each other. The core-periphery model estimates the extent to which each
actor is close to the core using cluster analysis, which results in a parsimonious
description of network patterns (Borgatti and Everett 1999; Borgatti, Everett, and
Freeman 2002). If the data fit a core-periphery model, relations among actors decrease as
an actor moves away from the core. Thus, actors in the core are tied densely to each
other, while actors in the periphery have more ties to core members than to each other
(Everett and Borgatti 2000).
However, a model of a core-periphery structure does not consider the possibility
that several equally important but distinct cores exist. Any cohesive subgroup can be
regarded as the core of a localized region of the entire network (Everett and Borgatti
2000). As such, this study employed a hierarchical clustering technique called CONCOR
to examine the possibility that more than two meaningful, distinct subgroups exist in the
networks.
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CONCOR is an accepted model for structural equivalence analysis. Developed by
Breiger, Boorman and Arabie (1975), CONCOR computes correlations of ties among
actors, compares the similarity of correlations between ties and then successively
partitions the entire network into a number of blocks according to the similarity (Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman 2002; Faust 1988; Harkola and Greve 1995; Shah 2000). This
partitioning continues until a specified number of blocks have been formed. Thus, the
patterns of relationships of the members within the same block are highly correlated
compared to those outside the block (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). As a consequence,
actors in each block are described as structurally equivalent.
3.4.2.2 Dividing into the core and periphery
Using the core-periphery method, I divided the environmental nonprofit
organizations in the sample into two groups by identifying those at the core and those at
the periphery. The two groups were generated against each set of interorganizational
networks: technical networks, managerial networks and board networks. Eventually,
three sets of core groups and three sets of peripheral groups were generated. This study
ran t-tests to examine whether government funding differed between a group at the core
and the periphery in each set of groupings.
In contrast to the core-periphery model, CONCOR does not provide any fixed
number of subgroups. The number of subgroups is a function of the number of partitions.
CONCOR first partitions a set of data into two blocks, each of which subsequently is
partitioned into sub-blocks (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). As no rule determines
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the number of subgroups in CONCOR, additional tests are necessary. This study took
two steps to determine an appropriate number of subgroups.
In the first step, this study compared patterns of correlations within blocks with
those outside of blocks. In accordance with the architecture of CONCOR, structurally
equivalent blocks have maximally correlated relations within themselves and minimally
correlated relations with actors in outside blocks. As expected, as the number of
partitions increases, blocks have fewer and fewer actors, and within-block correlations
increase.
In the second step, the number of partitions was determined to ensure that the
group size of each block was not dissimilar markedly. This study ran an ANOVA to
examine whether government funding differs among subgroups in each network. The
ANOVA method requires the assumptions of the normality of the distribution and the
homogeneity of variance. However, ANOVA is robust with respect to the possible
violation of the assumptions if group size is not dissimilar markedly.
CONCOR was run with one, two and three partitions. When one partition was
executed in the technical networks, the average internal correlation was .376, while the
average external correlation was zero, giving rise to two mutually exclusive blocks
(subgroups). When two partitions were executed, three blocks (subgroups) were created.
Both internal and external average correlations increased—the former to .551 and the
latter to .007. When three partitions were executed, five blocks (subgroups) were created.
In the same pattern, both internal and external correlations increased to .713 and .009,
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respectively. However, the smallest of the five subgroups only had seven members, while
the largest subgroup had 31 members. As the three partitions generated markedly
dissimilar subgroups in terms of the number of members, partitioning of the technical
networks stopped at two. Two partitions generated three subgroups with relatively similar
group sizes of 21, 22 and 31.
When one partition was executed in the managerial networks, the average internal
correlation was .351, and the average external correlation was zero. Four subgroups were
created when two partitions were executed, and both internal and external average
correlations increased to .591 and .006, respectively. However, the smallest of the four
subgroups only had six members, while the largest group had 29 members. As the two
partitions generated four subgroups with markedly dissimilar groups in terms of the
number of members, one partition was adopted for the managerial networks. The two
subgroups generated with one partition had 45 and 29 members each.
A similar pattern occurred in the board networks. The average internal correlation
increased from .601 with one partition to .754 with two partitions, and the average
external correlation also increased from zero to .002 in absolute value. Two partitions
generated three blocks with memberships of 21, 13 and 40.
3.4.3 Variables
3.4.3.1 Dependent variable
Government funding. This variable measures the extent to which government funding
accounted for each organization’s revenues in 2006. The dependent variable was the log-
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transformed amount (in U.S. dollars) of government funds distributed to organizations in
2006.
3.4.3.2 Independent variables
Centrality in organizational networks. This variable measures the extent to which
organizations are central in networks. At their core, measures of centrality, accounting for
the structure of the whole network, describe the position of each actor relative to the
positions of other actors in a network (Freeman 1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Central actors are defined as those tied to a greater number of other actors, while
peripheral actors are tied to relatively few actors. In the case of nondirectional relations,
the degree centrality of an organization is the number of ties that the particular
organization establishes with other adjacent organizations, defined as,
d(ni),
where d(ni) refers to the number of ties to the node (here, the organization) i. The degree
of centrality is a function of the number of actors in a network other than ego,
which is n-1 (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Freeman (1979) attempts to relate degree centrality to theoretical constructs by
proposing that degree centrality signifies the “well-connectedness” of an organization.
The measure of degree centrality seems suited as an indicator of organizational
legitimacy because most of the organizational literature considers the enhancement of
legitimacy as a result of organizational attempts to associate with other organizations.
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Freeman’s degree centrality, however, has a limitation. While it captures the
importance of the number of allies an organization relies on, degree centrality does not
account for the ties and structural positions of its allies. For instance, firms gain
reputation, recognition or legitimacy if they are tied to other firms prominent in the
biotechnology industry (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999) and semiconductor industry
(Stuart 1998). Donative nonprofits connected to prominent organizations gain high
esteem and status as well (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006).
In this sense, Bonacich’s (1972a; 1972b) measure of centrality best captures the
idea of legitimacy that this study uses. Bonacich’s centrality accounts not only for an
organization’s ties to other organizations but also for the centrality of other organizations
in the network. A focal organization’s centrality is weighted by the centrality of the other
organizations to which the organization is connected. As a consequence, an
organization’s centrality is a function not only of its own centrality but also the centrality
of all other organizations to which the organization is tied. Bonacich’s centrality measure
(hereafter, centrality) in each network indicates the degree of legitimacy each
organization possesses in that network.
This study uses Bonacich’s measure of centrality, which is expressed operationally
as:
λSi = Wi1S1 + … + WinSn
As noted by Bonacich (1972a), W is a matrix of ties, λ is an eigenvalue, and S is an
eigenvector. The eigenvalue for each matrix here was 27.7 for the technical networks,
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32.8 for the managerial networks and 19.8 for the board networks. Eigenvector centrality
scores were computed for each of the three matrices. These centrality scores are based on
confirmed network ties to increase the reliability of reported network ties (Marsden
1990). This study employed UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) to calculate
these scores. The square roots of these scores were used to make their distributions more
symmetric.
Areas of activity. This variable measures the extent to which organizations targeted
environmental activities toward the social environment or urban areas in 2005. “Areas of
activity” is an interval variable because it was measured by the percentage of the total
yearly expenses of each NGO spent on environmental activities targeting the social
environment and urban areas in 2005.
Organizational bureaucratization. This variable measures the extent of bureaucratization
of the organization’s work. All items are assessed with seven-point Likert-style scales
with the anchors of 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “to a great extent.” These items were: formal
job descriptions for staff member positions; formal performance evaluations of staff
members; statistical records of programs and services organizations provided; records of
information about the cost of programs, services or activities
organizations provided; records of information about the impact of programs, services or
activities organizations provided; and formal evaluation of programs, services or
activities organizations provided in the past three years.
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The Cronbach's alpha for the bureaucratization items was estimated at .869,
indicating a reasonably high degree of internal consistency. Principal components
analysis was used to determine whether the six items should be combined into a single
factor. Table 3.2 shows that principal components analysis identified a single construct of
bureaucratization. Factor scores were calculated as measures of bureaucratization.
Table 3.2 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Bureaucratization
Bureaucratization Factor loading
1. Formal evaluation .886
2. Cost information .832
3. Impact information .819
4. Evaluation of paid staff members .729
5. Job descriptions .708
6. Statistical records of programs .701
Eigenvalue 3.673
Proportion of variance explained 61.214
N=74.
3.4.3.3 Control variables
This study included control variables, including three indicators of organizational
capacity: membership, full-time equivalent staff and board members. The number of
board members is included as the scope of board members is considered an important
factor in fund raising (Miller-Millesen 2003; Siciliano 1996). The first two variables were
log transformed to make their distributions more normal. This study did not include
organizational budgets as an indicator of organizational capacity because the size of
organizational budgets highly correlates with both the amount of government funding
(.630) and the number of full-time equivalent staff (.487).
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3.5 Analyses and Results
3.5.1 The mean difference
A series of t-tests were employed to examine the differences between the core and
periphery in the amount of government funds allocated, the division of which was based
on Borgatti and Freeman’s (1999) core-periphery method. Government funds are
measured by log-transformed amounts of government funds distributed to each
organization in 2006.
Results from the core-periphery method shown in Table 3.3 indicate that there was
no statistically significant difference with respect to the average amount of government
funds received between the core and the periphery either in the technical networks or in
the managerial networks. These results do not provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2 that
NGOs centrally located in either technical or managerial networks likely receive more
government funds than peripherally located NGOs.
However, there was a statistically significant difference in the board networks (p<
0.05), showing that in 2006 the core organizations in the board networks received more
funds from government agencies than peripheral organizations. This result provides
support for Hypothesis 3 that NGOs centrally located in interlocking board networks
likely receive more government funds than peripherally located NGOs.
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Table 3.3 t-tests on Log-Transformed Mean Amount of Government Funds
Distributed Between the Core and Periphery According to the Core-Periphery
Method
Types of Link Core Periphery t-value
Technical 12.56 (286281.82) [51] 11.94 (153921.76) [23] .90
Managerial 12.49 (266535.74) [58] 12.03 (167593.75) [16] .73
Board 12.70 (327128.89) [51] 11.06 (63347.88) [23] 2.79*
a. Technical, technical advice networks; Managerial, resource sharing and joint
activities networks; Board, board interlocking networks.
b. Absolute amounts ($) are shown in parentheses; the number of organizations are
shown in brackets.
c. N=74.
*p< 0.05.
** p<0.01.
*** p< 0.001.
As shown in Table 3.4, the CONCOR results were consistent with those of the
core-periphery analysis. The results suggest that there was no statistically significant
difference with respect to the average amount of government funds received among the
three subgroups in the technical networks and the two subgroups in the managerial
networks. These results do not provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2. However, there
was a statistically significant difference among the three subgroups in the board networks
(p< 0.05) in the amount of government funding received. A post-hoc test (Turkey HSD
paired comparison) showed that subgroups A and B received more funds from
government agencies than Subgroup C. However, there was no statistically significant
difference between Subgroup A and Subgroup B in the amount of government funds
received. This result provides partial support for Hypothesis 3.
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Table 3.4 ANOVA on Log-Transformed Mean Amount of Government Funds
Distributed Among Three Subgroups According to CONCOR
Subgroups
Types of
Link
A
B
C
F-value
Turkey
HSD paired
comparison
Technical
12.89
(396993.93)
[21]
12.06
(173590.91)
[22]
12.24
(206368.99)
[29]
1.55
Managerial
12.61
299941.61
[45]
12.05
171970.39
[27]
1.28
Board
12.95
(421646.32)
[21]
12.80
(362407.69)
[13]
11.70
(120386.86)
[38]
3.66*
A>C
B>C
a. Technical, technical advice networks; Managerial, resource sharing and joint
activities networks; Board, board interlocking networks.
b. Absolute amounts ($) are shown in parentheses; the number of organizations are
shown in brackets.
c. N=74.
*p< 0.05.
** p<0.01.
*** p< 0.001.
3.5.1.1 Three subgroups in the board networks: Their relations and characteristics.
This study examined the relationships among the three subgroups A, B and C in the
interlocking board networks to determine their network positions and roles. Table 3.5 and
Figure 3.4 show the density table and image matrix, which assists in understanding the
relationships among the three subgroups.
Table 3.5 Result of the CONCOR Algorithm on Interlocked Board Networks
(Three-Block Models and Image Matrix)
Density matrix (average density = .0137)
Nonprofit Block A B C
A .071 .066 0
B .066 .051 0
C 0 0 0
Image matrix (Cutoff value= .0137)
Nonprofit Block A B C
A 1 1 0
B 1 1 0
C 0 0 0
a. N=74.
.071
Block B (N=13)
.066
.066
Block C (N=40)
Block A (N=21)
.051
Figure 3.4 Image Matrix of Seoul-based Environmental Nonprofit
Organizations. (Cutoff for reporting image matrix links: average density of interlocked
board networks=.0137)
The density table shows the densities of ties (the proportion of the actual number of
ties over the maximum possible number of ties) within and across blocks. The image
matrices are binary adjacency matrices with “1” indicating the presence of a bond and
112
113
“0” its absence. The image matrices were derived from the density tables by indicating
the presence of a bond only if the within-block densities were greater than the entire
network density.
The image matrix indicates to some extent a dichotomous core-periphery structure
for the Seoul environmental nonprofits but does not fit exactly with the core-periphery
structure. From a dichotomous core-periphery viewpoint, blocks A and B represent
relatively core groups, while Block C represents the periphery. The average density of the
entire network is .0137. Within-block densities of blocks (subgroups) A and B are .071
and .051, respectively. They are greater than the entire network density (.0137), which
implies that these two subgroups are cohesive internally. By contrast, Block C lacks
internal cohesion as its within-block density is zero, which implies that
interorganizational relations within Subgroup C are sparse. In contrast, blocks A and B
have a between-block density of .066, indicating that relations among organizations in
these two subgroups are dense. However, Block C is isolated from other blocks as
between-block densities are zero. It should be noted that the “zero” is not the absolute
density measure of Block C organizations but rather an artificial measure generated
according to the number of partitions executed. As Block C is split further with additional
partitions, the density measures either within-block or across-blocks likely become
positive.
Yet the image matrix suggests that the network structure of Seoul environmental
nonprofits departs from a dichotomous core-periphery structure. The core of the entire
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network is not composed of one subgroup but rather has two equally meaningful,
important subgroups. Although blocks A and B are regarded as core groups, these two
subgroups differ in networking patterns. Block A exhibits an internal density greater than
its external density, which indicates that Block A organizations are more oriented
internally in terms of networking. Block B, however, appears distinctive. Block B
indicates that its external density is greater than its internal density, which implies that
Block B organizations are more oriented externally. It appears that Block B organizations
are the objects of networking partners from a wider scope of organizations.
3.5.1.2 Characteristics of block members
To create a detailed profile of each block, the zero-order correlations between
block membership and other organizational variables were examined. As shown in Table
3.6, blocks A, B and C exhibit distinctive organizational characteristics.
Block B organizations seem to be hardcore environmental nonprofit organizations.
They are membership-based organizations (.252) and are well supported by staff
members (.265). Governments tend to provide funds to these organizations (.203). As
expected, many major environmental NGOs in Korea are in Block B, which includes
Green Korea, Environmental Justice, Korean Federation of Environmental Movements,
YMCA, Networks for Green Transport, and Female Solidarity for Environment.
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Table 3.6 Pearson Correlation Between Board Network Subgroups and
Organizational Characteristics
Subgroups
Variables A B C
1. Gov’t funding 2006 Ln .199* .203* -.335**
2. Membership Ln -.373** .252* .145
3. Full time staff Ln -.039 .265* -.167
4. Bureaucratization † .081 .169 -.202*
5. Board of directors -.082 .062 .028
6. % Areas of activities
2005
-.019 .169 -.112
† factor scored variables.
*p< 0.05.
** p<0.01.
*** p< 0.001.
Block A organizations differ from Block B organizations in several respects. They
are not membership-based organizations (-.373). Block B organizations exhibit
statistically insignificant correlations with staff support. Like Block B organizations,
however, Block A organizations correlated positively with government funding (.199).
One of the interesting features of Block A is that it has all the prominent network-based
environmental organizations, which include Korea Zero Waste Movement Networks,
Energy Networks, and Networks for Saving Water for Life. These network-based
environmental organizations are not based on individual citizen membership but on
organization membership. These network-based organizations receive a large amount of
government funds and distribute them to other environmental organizations for the
116
purposes of promoting their own environmental causes, such as waste recycling, energy
saving, and conserving rivers and watersheds.
Block C organizations also differ from organizations in blocks A and B in several
respects. These organizations show negative correlations with bureaucratization (-.202).
The correlations between these organizations and both membership and staff support are
statistically insignificant. These organizations correlated negatively with government
funding (.-335). Based on qualitative judgments, Korean environmental movements do
not regard many of these organizations as important organizations.
3.5.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 3.7 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the
variables. A pare-wise correlation matrix was inspected to evaluate multicollinearity,
which can generate large standard errors in the estimated regression coefficients and
possibly insignificant t-ratios. The correlations in this matrix generally were low (less
than .3) with a few exceptions. There were relatively high correlations (more than .5)
among the three measures of centrality: technical, managerial and board centrality. These
three measures of centrality were not entered into the same models; rather, each of the
three measures of centrality was entered into different models.
The correlation matrix indicates that several organizational, operational and
network features of nonprofit organizations correlated moderately with the amount of
government funding: Large government funding tended to pertain to organizations with
large full-time staff, high expenditures on social environment and urban issues, and high
117
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4
1. Gov’t funding 2006 Ln 8.01 15.25 11.179 1.650
2. Membership Ln 0 13.71 6.111 3.145 .158
3. Full time staff Ln 0 4.09 1.528 1.009 .591*** .346**
4. Board of directors 0 100 19.996 14.432 .072 .255* .132
5. % Areas of activities 2005 0 100 49.857 38.898 .201* .165 .257* .150
6. Bureaucratization † -2.242 1.764 .050 .980 .199* .128 .356** -.010
7. Board network centrality †† 0 .77 .145 .197 .455*** -.049 .310** -.034
8. Technical network centrality †† 0 .67 .172 .190 .179 .017 .332** .020
9. Managerial network centrality †† 0 .68 .184 .191 .346** .027 .347** .121
Variable 5 6 7 8 9
6. Bureaucratization † .306**
7. Board network centrality †† .151 .195
8. Technical network centrality †† .189 .029 .506***
9. Managerial network centrality †† .402*** .256* .536*** .656***
† factor scored variables; †† squared rooted variables.
bureaucratization. Organizations with high centrality on managerial and interlocked
board networks tended to correlate positively with the amount of government funding.
3.5.3 Regression diagnostics
Regression diagnostics were conducted as certain assumptions should be met for
regression analysis. As noted earlier, logarithm and square-root transformations were
conducted for certain variables to meet normality assumptions: government funds,
membership and full time equivalent staff members (log-transformed), and centrality
(square-rooted). After executing the transformations, the distributions of these variables
became more symmetric. A histogram of standardized residuals also was inspected
visually to determine whether the residual errors were normally distributed for each set of
independent variables. The histogram generally showed a normal curve, as seen in Figure
3.5.
Regression Standardized Residual
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
.75
.50
.25
0.00
-.25
-.50
-.75
-1.00
- 1.25
- 1.50
-1.75
-2.00
His tog r a m
D ependent Variable: natural log u 0 (pf nd 6)
Frequency
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = .96
Mean = 0.00
N = 70.00
Government Funding in 2006
Figure 3.5 Histogram of Standardized Residuals
As an alternative method, the normal probability plot of the regression’s
standardized residuals was checked visually. The Y axis shows the expected cumulative
118
probabilities of the occurrence of the standardized residuals, and the X axis shows the
observed normal probabilities of occurrence. In the plot, a 45-degree line should appear
to meet the normality assumption. Figure 3.6 generally presents a 45-degree line.
N ormal P-P Plot of R egression Sta
D ependent Variable: natural log (pf
Observed Cum Prob
1.00 .75 .50 .25 0.00
Expected Cum Prob
1.00
.75
.50
.25
0.00
Government Funding in 2006
Figure 3.6 Normal Probability Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals
The Durbin-Watson coefficient d was checked for autocorrelation—the
independence of observations. The value of d ranges from 0 to 4. Values close to 2
indicate no correlation. It is low likelihood that autocorrelation caused a problem in this
study (d=1.570).
119
120
The plots of independent variables against the dependent variable were inspected
visually for outlying observations. There were no significant outliers for all independent
variables. Because of multicollinearity assumptions, Tolerance Statistics, the Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) and Condition Indices were examined (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
1980). The multicollinearity assumption can be violated if the Tolerance is less than .1,
the VIF is greater than 10, or the condition index is greater than 30. An examination of
these indices indicated that multicollinearity was not a major problem in this study.
3.5.4 OLS regression results
The previous simple correlation analysis provides pair-wise relationships between
variables. The correlation analysis does not capture inter-correlations among variables.
Thus, a number of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted not
only to obtain more realistic relationships between the independent variables and the
dependent variable but also to examine the hypotheses.
This study formulated six models to identify the model best fit to the data.
Model 1: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members
Model 2: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members + Areas of activity (t-₁)
121
Model 3: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members + Areas of activity (t-₁) + Bureaucratization
Model 4: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members + Areas of activity (t-₁) + Bureaucratization + Network centrality on
interlocked board networks
Model 5: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members + Areas of activity (t-₁) + Bureaucratization + Network centrality on
technical networks
Model 6: Amount of government funding = Membership + Full-time staff member +
Board members + Areas of activity (t-₁) + Bureaucratization + Network centrality on
managerial networks
Table 3.8 presents the results of the hypotheses testing using ordinary least squares
regression analysis.
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Table 3.8 OLS Regression on Log-Transformed Amount of Government Funds in
2006
Model
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Membership Ln
-.028
(.057)
-.030
(.057)
-.030
(.058)
-.002
(.055)
-.032
(.058)
-.017
(.058)
Full time staff Ln
.995***
(.173)
.975***
(.178)
.988***
(.187)
.826***
(.185)
1.012***
(.201)
.915***
(.193)
Board of directors
.001
(.012)
.000
(.012)
.000
(.012)
.001
(.011)
.000
(.012)
-.002
(.012)
% Areas of activities 2005
.002
(.004)
.003
(.005)
.002
(.004)
.003
(.005)
.001
(.005)
Bureaucratization †
-.047
(.187)
-.086
(.177)
-.056
(.190)
-.068
(.186)
Board network centrality ††
2.538**
(.855)
Technical network centrality ††
-.324
(.951)
Managerial network centrality ††
1.385
(.994)
Constant
9.793
(.414)
9.730
(.432)
9.701
(.450)
9.439
(.434)
9.725
(.458)
9.620
(.450)
N 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared .322
.315
.305 .381 .295 .315
Change in R-squared .003 .001 .079** .001 .019
*p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p< 0.001.
† factor scored variables; †† squared rooted variables.
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Model 1 included control variables. This baseline model explains the variation in
the dependent variable by 32 percent. Model 2 tested areas of activity. Inclusion of this
measure did not improve the fit of the model. The same pattern occurred with
bureaucratization. Model 3 tested the measure of bureaucratization, but the inclusion of
this measure did not improve the fit of the model.
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Model 4 tested the measure of network centrality on interlocked board networks.
This measure significantly improved the fit of the model as the adjusted R squared
measure = .381 and the R square change = .079 at the .01 level. However, the measure of
network centrality on either technical or managerial networks did not improve the fit of
the model, as shown in models 5 and 6. The results of the series of tests are
straightforward. The model that has control variables, areas of activity, bureaucratization
and network centrality on interlocked board networks provided the best fit to the data.
The fourth model was examined to test the hypotheses. The measure of network
centrality in interlocked board networks was positive and significant at the .01 level,
which provides support for Hypothesis 3.3. It is interpreted that a one-unit increase in the
measure of network centrality in board networks will result in a 2.54-percent increase in
the average amount of government funding for nonprofits. However, the measures of
network centrality in either technical or managerial networks were not statistically
significant in accounting for the amount of government funding for nonprofits, which
disprove hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3.4, the measure of areas of activity was statistically
insignificant as well. Likewise, bureaucratization was insignificant, which disproves
Hypothesis 3.5. Among the control variables, however, the number of full-time
equivalent staff positively associates with the amount of government funding. It is
interpreted that a 1-percent increase in the number of full-time equivalent staff will yield
a 0.83-percent increase in the average unit of government funding for nonprofits.
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Overall, the results support the hypothesis that environmental NGOs centrally
located in interlocked board networks receive more government funds than peripherally
located environmental NGOs. However, no funding differences were found between
NGOs at the core and at the periphery in either technical or managerial networks.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
At the beginning of this study, a question was raised about the efficiency rationale
as the driving force behind government funding for nonprofit organizations. Previous
research suggests that governments can deliver public services at lower costs through
privatization or contracting out with nonprofit organizations, which underpins the
efficiency rationale of government funding for nonprofits. Thus, an understanding that
non-efficiency rationales can drive government funding for nonprofits rarely had been
considered.
In this study, an alternative rationale of government funding for nonprofits was
proposed, that is, organizational legitimacy. Although evaluating the effectiveness of
nonprofit organizations is difficult, government agencies must justify why they allocate
funds to some nonprofit organizations but not others. If they cannot observe directly the
effectiveness of nonprofit organizations, government agencies may evaluate them by
observing how key stakeholders perceive these organizations—that is, which
organizations conform more closely to acceptable practices in given organizational fields.
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This study agrees with institutional theory’s proposal that organizations seek
legitimacy, and that governments exert regulative pressures on nonprofit organizations.
However, this study argues that funding government agencies also function under
institutional pressures as they also operate under the complex dynamics within
organizational fields. This study treats government agencies as “targets” of institutional
pressures as well as “pressure-givers.”
The findings of this study advance the understanding of organizational legitimacy
and network centrality. Network centrality can represent organizational legitimacy among
like organizations within the same population because organizational relations among
like organizations are of vital importance to the survival and growth of organizations.
This study refers to this type of legitimacy as peer-conferred legitimacy and argues that
this legitimacy relates to the patterns of government funding for nonprofits. In this study,
three levels of centrality were proposed regarding technical, managerial and interlocked
board networks. These three levels of organizational connectedness underlie different
dimensions of organizational legitimacy, that is, technical, managerial and institutional
legitimacy. The network logic of organizational legitimacy never has been examined in
previous research, and thus this study clarified the limitations of previous research while
providing new insight on dominant understandings in previous research.
This study advances the understanding of how three types of legitimacy relate to
rationales behind government funding for nonprofits. Each of these three dimensions
constitutes different rationales for government funding. Technical and managerial
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legitimacy relate to an efficiency rationale behind government funding for nonprofits,
while institutional legitimacy relates to a non-efficiency rationale. The results of this
study did not support the efficiency rationale that government funding decisions are
based on the expertise and managerial capacity of fund-seeking organizations.
Governments did not fund environmental organizations with higher levels of technical
expertise and managerial capacity more than others. However, the result supports the
argument that a non-efficiency rationale factors into patterns of government funding.
Governments funded environmental organizations with higher levels of institutional
legitimacy more than others.
The implication of these findings construed from the existing research is that
board interlocking potentially leads to politically oriented social cohesion among
organizations. Although mostly found in the for-profit literature, networks of
interlocking directors are conducive to political cohesion (Burris 2005). This view
generally is associated with elite theory and class cohesion theory (Domhoff 1967;
Useem 1984; Zeitlin 1974). Arguably, corporate elites can acquire a broader view of
business community interests through multiple memberships on corporate boards
(Davis 1991). Participation in “inner circles” has consequences for politically cohesive
activities (Useem 1984). Directors of multiple boards may act as agents of business
elites as a class rather than as agents of particular firms (Davis 1991).
Based on findings from for-profit organization studies, networks of interlocked
boards are assumed to facilitate political cohesion among nonprofit organizations. For
127
instance, directors of multiple boards in environmental nonprofits may have a broader
outlook of the environmental sector and may establish an agenda for political advocacy
in interactions with government. If this is the case, it is construed that political factors
constitute the first priority in government funding for nonprofits. Environmental
nonprofits with high institutional legitimacy, possibly playing an important role in
environmental movements in Korea, may exert influence over agenda setting and policy
implementation in the environmental sector. Funding those organizations may serve as a
viable strategy to push government plans through possible opposition from
environmental nonprofits.
Earlier research has discussed associations between board members and funding
outcomes (e.g., Miller-Millesen 2003; Siciliano 1996). Boards of directors serve to
represent the social expectations of important institutional stakeholders, and the
legitimacy-seeking behavior of organizations increases opportunities to gain access to
grants and contracts (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998). Board interlocks, functioning as
boundary-spanners between organizations and influential patrons, decrease the
uncertainty and constraints inherent in scarce resource environments (Galaskiewicz and
Rauschenbach 1988; Middleton 1987; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Furthermore, nonprofit
board members differ in degrees of prestige, and local communities recognize the
differentials in board prestige (Galaskiewicz 1985a).
In addition to network centrality, the findings of this study clarify other factors
critical to government funding for nonprofits. Government funding was not related to
128
areas of activity and bureaucratization. However, the interpretation of the result of
bureaucratization must be bounded because this study only considers two aspects of
bureaucratization: the extent to which organizations formally describe and evaluate their
staff members’ work and performance, and the extent to which organizations formally
describe and evaluate the services and activities they provide. As bureaucratization and
areas of activity can constitute an efficiency rationale behind government funding for
nonprofits, these findings disprove that an efficiency rationale constitutes the first priority
for government funding. However, the number of full-time equivalent staff related to
government funding. The implication of this finding is straightforward. As the overall
organizational budget, the amount of the organizational budget accounted for by
government funding and the number of full-time staff are correlated highly, a greater
number of staff likely associates with a greater amount of government funds.
This study is not without limitations. Although it may contribute to our
understanding of pathways through which governments channel funds to some
nonprofit organizations in Korea, this study did not address directly why government
agencies in Korea favor environmental organizations high in institutional legitimacy.
As another limitation, the findings result from data from environmental NGOs
active in Seoul, Korea. The geopolitical context of this study asks readers to consider the
cultural aspects of the findings. Thus, examining national culture, political situations and
cross-cultural insights further would benefit this study. Future studies can accomplish
these tasks.
129
Chapter 4:
Legitimacy-Seeking Breeds Practice Variations: Differential Effects of Network
Legitimacy on Nonprofit Political Advocacy
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Practical background
What critical factors affect nonprofit political advocacy in criticizing and
challenging government policies given the widespread government funding of
nonprofits? Current public and nonprofit literature does not address this research question
fully as the predominant focus lies either on nonprofit resource dependence on
government or the institutional pressure of government patrons on nonprofits.
Research from resource dependence theory often focuses on whether or not
government funding has “negative’’ effects on nonprofit management or activities.
Conclusions of recent research on the effects divide between negative and null. While
some researchers argue that government funding carries with it the potential for
controlling the goals, management and advocacy activities of nonprofits (Froelich 1999;
Guo 2007; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Wolch 1990), others demonstrate that government
funding does not necessarily have negative effects on nonprofits, especially on their
political advocacy activities (Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Child and
Grønbjerg 2007).
130
Research from institutional theory often arrives at similar conclusions. Institutional
theory mainly proposes that organizations submit to pressures from important
stakeholders to increase their legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995). A
unique feature of government funding is that governments are accountable to citizens and
legislators for their budget allocations; therefore, governments may create regulations to
ensure fiscal accountability (Salamon 1987). More importantly, the simple fact that
nonprofits depend on governments for financial resources places pressures on recipient
organizations even when government funding has minimal strings attached or
regulations. Institutional theorists construe these institutional pressures, explicit or
implicit, as regulatory or coercive institutional pressures that governments exert on
nonprofit organizations. It may be expected, then, that government-funded nonprofits
tend to submit to the explicit or implicit expectations the government has about the role
of nonprofits in policy processes, which possibly results in the mitigated advocacy
activism of nonprofits.
However, not all nonprofit organizations uniformly conform to coercive
institutional pressures. Some government-funded nonprofits, challenging the government,
continue to be dominant political actors. In consequence, the following question arises:
What factors motivate nonprofit organizations, despite receiving government funds, to act
independently of government, and to engage in active political advocacy in criticizing
and challenging government policies?
131
4.1.2 Theoretical background
This study is not limited to addressing that practical question alone. Rather, it
addresses an important theoretical challenge in the field of institutional theory.
Institutional theory pays much attention to the assumptions that organizations seek
legitimacy within organizational fields and that organizational networks are structural
foundations of organizational isomorphism. But less attention has been paid to the
possibility that both legitimacy concerns and organizational networks can contribute to
organizational heterogeneity in response to institutional pressures. Recently, institutional
theory has shifted its theoretical focus from the study of organizational isomorphism
toward the study of organizational heterogeneity (e.g., Lounsbury 2007; Marquis, Glynn,
and Davis 2007). The core question of this new theoretical direction is: What factors,
suppressing counter-forces that compel organizations to act similarly, drive organizations
to act differently?
This study investigates nonprofit political advocacy in the environmental sector in
Seoul, Korea, to address the research question but not without core insights from
institutional theory. Nonprofit political advocacy refers to activities carried out by
nonprofits to improve the conditions of their clients and to represent groups that cannot
speak for themselves, such as oceans or watersheds (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Jenkins
2006; Suarez and Hwang 2008). Among various types of nonprofit political advocacy,
this study particularly focuses on confrontational political advocacy, that is, political
advocacy designed to criticize and challenge government policies. This type of advocacy
132
is important to advocacy nonprofits, such as environmental nonprofits and human rights
nonprofits. In organizational studies, resistance is an important organizational response to
institutional pressures, but it is not explained adequately (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007;
Oliver 1991). This study particularly explores (1) whether variations exist in nonprofit
political advocacy; (2) whether variations relate to differences in network legitimacy; (3)
whether variations relate to differences in network structure; and (4) how government
funding affects nonprofit political advocacy.
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, the theoretical frameworks used to analyze
nonprofit political advocacy are presented. Next, research methods are described. The
subsequent sections present results of the analysis. The paper concludes with discussion
of the results.
4.1.3 Theoretical development in organizational institutionalism
Institutional theory in organizational studies recently has shifted focus from
organizational homogeneity toward organizational heterogeneity (Dacin, Goodstein, and
Scott 2002). An earlier overemphasis on homogeneity may have arisen in reaction to
agency-centered perspectives. Agency-centered perspectives assume that organizations
pursue interests in a rational, atomistic and opportunistic fashion rarely affected by
interorganizational connectedness (DiMaggio 1988; Kraatz 1998), which is a notion
critical to institutional theory.
In institutional theory, organizational connectedness is a structural foundation of
isomorphic processes (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005), and it occurs
133
within the boundaries of an organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Isomorphic processes involve coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms, which shape
organizational structures and practices to resemble one another (DiMaggio and Powell
1983). Institutional environments as higher-order factors constrain organizations, which
are lower-order factors (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). In response to the resulting
institutional pressures, organizations conform to the explicit or implicit expectations of
institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983).
Consequently, organizational choices are limited yet legitimized by the institutional
environment. These choices often are suboptimal for organizational efficiency but may be
optimal for organizational survival (Powell 1991). Interactions between organizations and
institutional environments tend to enhance the homogeneity of organizational fields,
which results in institutionalization (Scott and Meyer 1994).
The assumption of homogeneity creates an impasse for those seeking to explain
differences among organizations in how they respond to institutional pressures, just as
agency-centered perspectives create an impasse for those seeking to explain similarities
among organizations in how they respond to institutional pressures. Whereas agency-
centered perspectives leave organizations free of embeddedness, institutional theory
leaves organizations iron-caged by embeddedness.
Institutional theory’s overemphasis on isomorphism blinds us to heterogeneity,
which prevails in organizational practices. This study seeks to explain how organizational
responses to institutional pressures vary. This study does not abandon the core insights of
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institutional theory, such as the importance of organizational connectedness and
legitimacy-seeking practices, and the notion of organizational fields. Rather, this study
attempts to contribute to additional understanding of these core insights by examining
variations in the extent that nongovernment organizations (NGOs) engaged in political
advocacy against the government in Korea in 2006.
4.1.3.1 From homogeneity to heterogeneity
In institutional analysis, several efforts have accommodated the claim of practice
variations. Oliver (1991) offers a convergence of institutional theory and resource
dependence theory to predict variations in organizational responses to institutional
pressures. Other studies suggest that power and interests are important drivers of practice
variations at the organizational level; although institutional factors, such as ambiguity in
institutional environments (Edelman 1992) and ties to accrediting organizations (Casile
and Davis-Blake 2002), at the same time influence practice variations. However, these
studies are subject to the criticism inherent in the core assumptions of institutional theory
that actors and their interests themselves are constructed institutionally (DiMaggio and
Powell 1991; Friedland and Alford 1991; Seo and Creed 2002).
4.1.3.1.1 Structuration and dialectics
Acknowledging such theoretical criticisms, one line of research employs the
notions of structuration and dialectics to resolve the theoretical impasse regarding the
embedded agency. Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) seek to resolve conflicts between the
old and the new institutionalism by drawing insights from Giddens’ (1984) notion of
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structuration. Barley and Tolbert (1997) also draw on structuration to offer a recursive
model of institutionalization, where institutions not only constrain actions but also serve
as objects of maintenance or modification through action. On the other hand, Seo and
Creed (2002:240) conceptualize “praxis” as critical human agency in a fragmented,
contradictory social world, and argue that the notion of praxis is essential to explaining
the “mediating mechanism that links institutional embeddedness, contradictions, and
change.” Their line of research proposes that the relationships between agencies and
institutions are mutually constitutive.
4.1.3.1.2 Institutional logic and embeddedness
Another stream of research on practice variations among organizations draws
directly on the core insights of institutional theory: institutional logic and embeddedness.
The notion of institutional logic generally refers to broad cultural beliefs and rules, which
structure cognition and guide action in a field (Lounsbury 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury
2007; Thornton 2002). For instance, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) investigate how
national banks’ efforts in the United States to introduce efficiencies as a banking logic
triggered banking professionals’ response to preserve the community logic of banking.
Institutional logic often is associated with period- or location-specific effects. For
example, a shift in logic over time led to different determinants of publishing companies’
governance practices (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Practice variations also are associated
with competing forms of logic, which are rooted in different locations (Lounsbury 2007;
Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007).
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Authors who employ the notion of “embeddedness” largely draw on insights from
network theory. In network theory, organizations are seen to be embedded in
interorganizational networks (Granovetter 1985) either centrally or peripherally
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The conventional wisdom
of the embeddedness literature is that organizations are not embedded equally; thus
organizations at the field’s margins more likely initiate practices that diverge from the
prevailing logic. Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991), for instance, suggest that
fringe players in the U.S. radio broadcasting industry triggered practice variations. New
actors may introduce alternative practices into established institutional contexts as well
(Lounsbury 2001; Zilber 2002). But findings contrary to the conventional wisdom exist
in the embeddedness literature. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) find that organizations
centrally embedded in organizational fields may initiate novel practices because they are
capable of bridging organizational fields. Thus, the notion of embeddedness was
proposed not only as a constraint on variation but also as a foundation for variation
(Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006).
4.1.3.1.3 An alternative proposal
Authors writing in the framework of “embeddedness” have built theoretical
foundations for the structural analysis of practice variations. But the notion of
embeddedness often remains at a conceptual level in investigations, which often employ
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qualitative, small-N case studies. The analyses in these studies have not attempted to
explain practice variations by highlighting interorganizational structures as sources of
heterogeneity as well as homogeneity. I submit that the notion of organizational
connectedness construed in institutional theory contains within it possibilities for
understanding practice heterogeneity. Organizations seek meaningful interdependencies
with others to secure resources and reputation (Kraatz 1998; Nohria and Eccles 1992).
Organizations do so through networking with legitimate organizations. Such legitimacy-
seeking networking breeds variation in organizational connectedness, which gives rise to
different organizational responses to institutional pressures.
4.2 Major Concepts: The Institutional Logic of Network Legitimacy
To anchor the research question in a broader theoretical context, two self-contained
but previously disconnected theoretical insights are combined. The first is that
organizations seek legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977;
Tolbert and Zucker 1983). The second is that organizations are embedded in
interorganizational networks and have different degrees of network commitment
(Granovetter 1985; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).
4.2.1 Institutional logic of legitimacy
In institutional theory, legitimacy is critical for organizational survival (Dart 2004).
In a broad sense, legitimacy refers to the extent to which actors exist or act in accordance
with socially acceptable norms and expectations (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy is built in
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organizational fields, which provide “a common frame of reference” (Bartley 2007:10).
Thus, organizational fields are understood as being infused with meanings, values and
norms (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991). Organizations shape their structures
and practices to demonstrate their compliance with the norms and social expectations of
key stakeholders in organizational fields (Dejean, Gond, and Leca 2004; Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). This perspective departs from technical
perspectives of organizations that view organizations as rational actors (Thompson 1967).
Institutional frameworks constrain technical considerations, if any exist (Powell 1991).
Sometimes, conforming to norms and social expectations may interfere with
effective organizational practices but result in organizational legitimacy (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Friedland and Alford (1991) maintain that
organizations that adopt appropriate forms and practices can perform well because
stakeholders consider them legitimate. Legitimate forms and practices can diffuse
through coercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms, giving rise to isomorphism
throughout organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Although legitimacy often is used synonymously with reputation or status and thus
difficult to disentangle (Washington and Zajac 2005), legitimacy is assumed to be “the
foundation for the emergence of reputation and status” (Sullivan, Haunschild, and Page
2007:56). To enhance prestige or status, for instance, organizations must justify their
claims “on the basis of legitimacy in reference to the institutional realm of shared values
and beliefs” (Zhou 2005:95). Organizational reputation often becomes “an outcome of
the process of legitimation” (Rao 1994:31).
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4.2.2 Legitimacy-conferral
According to institutional theory, legitimacy is achieved through a process of
“isomorphism,” where organizations begin to resemble each other (DiMaggio and Powell
1991). Isomorphism can arise as a result of “connectedness” (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989; Hinings and Greenwood 1988). Increasing
interactions within an organizational field result in institutionalization, which leads to the
development of a mutual awareness of legitimate practices (Friedland and Alford 1991).
However, connectedness with other organizations is not sufficient to create
isomorphism (DiMaggio 1992). Isomorphism may need social reinforcement, which
requires pressures from social actors who are doing the “legitimating” (Dacin 1997). This
is because stakeholders “whose assessments count” determine legitimacy (Scott
1995:60).
As institutional environments are composed of multiple stakeholders (Rowley
1997), several classes of social actors who confer legitimacy on organizations exist
within a given field. These may include states, trade associations and professional
associations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Rao
1994), which are known as the enforcers of regulative legitimacy (Scott 1995). This study
refers to this as legitimacy-conferral from above. In contrast, the constituencies of
organizations also are considered to be legitimacy conferrers because organizations seek
support and appreciation from their constituencies (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001;
Kissane and Gingerich 2004; Swindell 2000). This study refers to this as legitimacy-
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conferral from below. Some researchers even suggest abstract sources of legitimacy
conferral, such as wider social expectations (Dacin 1997), public opinion (Deephouse
1996; Scott 1998), and nature and reason (Zhou 2005).
Legitimacy conferrals from above and below find legitimacy-conferring social
actors in vertical institutional relations. In response to a call for a fuller description of
institutional processes in organizational studies (Scott and Meyer 1991), this study
proposes another set of social actors empowered to confer legitimacy on organizations—
peer organizations in the same organizational population. This study refers to this as
lateral legitimacy-conferral.
Organizational relations within a population are important to focal organizations.
Populations are “classes of organizations which are relatively homogenous in terms of
environmental vulnerability” (Hannan and Freeman 1977:934) and are “bounded sets of
organizations with a common form” (Carroll and Hannan 2000:74). Although peer
organizations often compete commensalistically for resources (Hawley 1950), a
population of like organizations can share constitutive beliefs about legitimate norms,
expectations and practices (Ruef 2000; Scott 1995). Organizational relations not only are
transactional but also normative (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991).
Organizational relations thus are infused with meanings, values and norms (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Shared values and norms particularly emerge when a population of
like organizations makes similar demands on the institutional environment. For instance,
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peer organizations can cooperate with each other when they seek to improve their own
population’s legitimacy (Aldrich 1999).
Some practices thus are more legitimate than others in reference to shared values
and beliefs. Therefore, to be deemed legitimate by peer organizations, organizations must
demonstrate their commitment to the shared expectations of those peers. Peer recognition
in an industry or profession becomes an important asset for the survival and growth of
organizations (Deeds, Mang, and Frandsen 2004; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).
4.2.3 Network logic of legitimacy: Variance in network legitimacy
I agree with institutional theory’s proposal that organizational practices aim to
acquire legitimacy, but with this study, I attempt to investigate possible variations in
legitimacy at the organizational level. Organizational scholars of legitimacy and networks
suggest that organizations seek network ties with other organizations to increase their
legitimacy (Galaskiewicz 1985b; Huang and Provan 2006; Mizruchi 1996; Scott 1995;
Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994). This is because networking with legitimate
organizations helps focal organizations gain credibility or legitimacy (Galaskiewicz,
Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). In addition, legitimacy
facilitates resource flows (Aldrich and Auster 1986; Deeds, Mang, and Frandsen 2004),
and legitimate organizations aid the survival of their partners (Baum and Oliver 1991).
Network ties serve as channels through which the communication of normative
values and expectations occurs, which shape organizational interests and a repertoire of
organizational practices (Friedland and Alford 1991). Thus, interorganizational networks
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not only provide opportunities but also constraints on organizations by deepening
awareness, trust and commitment among organizations (Larson 1992). As Granovetter
(1985) asserts, reputation can be a powerful force for controlling organizational practices
in networked organizational fields.
Networking patterns, however, are unequal across organizations. Organizations
that have more incoming ties in directional networks or share more reciprocated ties with
others in nondirectional networks are regarded as central organizations. Much of the
current organizational literature conceives central organizations as possessing higher
levels of legitimacy (Mizruchi 1996). Organizations with fewer ties are not perceived as
legitimate. The different degrees of embeddedness across organizations result in different
commitments to shared norms and values. Organizations that are more embedded are
more exposed to and deeply constrained by shared norms and values.
Other things being equal, organizations seek legitimate organizations as
networking partners (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006; Galaskiewicz 1985b;
Hannan and Freeman 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This
legitimacy-seeking tendency breeds variations in network patterns as “the richer get
richer.” Variations in networking may represent variations in legitimacy. The variation in
“network legitimacy” among organizations is a factor critical to variation in
organizational behaviors in relation to institutional pressures—in this study, nonprofit
political advocacy in relation to government.
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4.2.4 Three levels of organizational legitimacy and network centrality
According to Parsons (1960) and Thompson (1967), organizations have three
levels of management: technical, managerial and institutional. The technical level is
responsible for transforming product/service inputs into outputs. The managerial level
refers to obtaining and managing resources essential for technical activity. The
institutional level pertains to organizations’ negotiation activities in relation to
institutional environments. Boards of directors at the institutional level work to convince
key stakeholders of their organizations’ legitimacy with respect to the technical and
managerial dimensions (Ruef and Scott 1998). Boards of directors potentially can make
political demands on institutional environments as well. For instance, firms connected
through interlocking boards likely express agreement on corporate political action and
legislative matters (Burris 2005; Mizruchi 1996). Thus, this study differentiates between
three levels of organizational legitimacy: technical, managerial and institutional
legitimacy.
It is expected that technical legitimacy is conferred on environmental nonprofits
that possess qualified staff and technologies perceived as appropriate in the
environmental nonprofit sector. The use of appropriate staff and technologies tends to
increase the possibility of attaining projected goals. It is expected that managerial
legitimacy is conferred on environmental nonprofits with sufficient resources and
managerial staff. In some cases, government matching-fund programs tend to advantage
organizations with sufficient resources—a policy that accounts for managerial
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legitimacy. The institutional legitimacy of environmental nonprofits does not depend
only on the board members’ activities and ability to legitimize the technical and
managerial levels. Rather, it also depends on the board members’ reputations in setting
the agenda for the environmental sector and implementing that agenda against
institutional environments.
To operationalize the three dimensions of legitimacy (technical, managerial and
institutional), this study investigates technical advice-giving networks, resource
sharing/joint activities networks and interlocking board networks. Previous network
research also shows that network relations, whether interorganizational or
intraorganizational, usefully are disaggregated. Different relations represent different
conceptual dimensions of network relations (e.g., Bolland and Wilson 1994; Krackhardt
1992). The legitimacy of an organization increases as it becomes the object of more ties.
In other words, ties to an actor (incoming ties) matter in directional relations because it is
possible to identify who initiated a tie (Wasserman and Faust 1994). An environmental
nonprofit will be central in its directional networks to the extent that other nonprofits
identify it as a partner. However, only the number of ties matters in nondirectional
(reciprocated) relations because whoever initiates a tie is indistinguishable.
4.2.5 Social cohesion
Although the centrality of network ties is essential to this discussion, network
structure also is a factor critical to nonprofit political advocacy. Network theory develops
two insights into the structure of interorganizational relations: the strength of weak ties
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versus the strength of strong ties (Granovetter 1982, 1973). The strength of weak ties
involves the advantages of bridging actors in wider, distant networks. Weak ties may
provide organizations with new information and resources rarely available to closely
related networks (Burt 1982; Granovetter 1973). In contrast, the strength of strong ties
pertains to the advantages of bonding actors in closely related networks. Strong ties
provide organizations with in-depth, intimate interactions as well as routine information
and resources less available to wider networks. The in-depth, intimate interactions
strongly set in motion the structuration of closely related networks, which gives rise to
trust and mutual awareness regarding legitimate norms and practices (Granovetter 1982;
Krackhardt 1992; Uzzi 1996). In this sense, the extent to which networks are cohesive
and dense around focal organizations can play an important role in organizational
behavior—in this study, the organizational responses to institutional pressures.
Network centrality and social cohesion tend to co-occur, which makes
disentangling network centrality effects from social cohesion effects difficult. However,
network centrality and social cohesion conceptually are distinct. Network centrality
describes individual connectivity. In an extreme case, individual connectivity can be high
when actors are embedded in a sparse, third-party web. Thus, the effects of network
centrality and social cohesion can occur simultaneously yet through different
mechanisms.
Like network centrality, social cohesion can motivate organizations to spend
resources and time in representing a nonprofit community that they belong to and that has
clients they serve. Social cohesion here refers to the extent to which the ego’s
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connections are surrounded by others connected to one another (i.e., density of third-
party connections) (Burt 1992; Reagans and McEvily 2003). Given that government
funds are one important financial source of nonprofits, the engagement of nonprofits in
active political advocacy in criticizing and challenging government policies would
endanger the chances of obtaining government funds. However, strong third-party
connections may overcome the calculated self-interest of organizations and facilitate
legitimate practices. The loss of reputation and social sanctioning can be powerful drivers
of organizational behavior (Coleman 1988, 1990; Granovetter 1985). Thus, nonprofit
organizations more likely engage in active political advocacy when embedded in a dense
web of third-party relationships.
4.3 Legitimacy and Environmental Nonprofits
Legitimacy concerns loom large for nonprofits, which operate outside of market
competition. The goals of nonprofits often are symbolic and ambiguous (Brown 2005),
such that links between means and ends are unclear (Bigelow and Stone 1995).
Nonprofits are “particularly open to ideas from the outside world and particularly
concerned with legitimacy” (Alexander 1998:275). As Moore (2001:708) notes,
“although the actual word legitimacy is not used, the nonprofit literature is replete with
issues that are closely related to the concept of legitimacy.” This indicates the influence
of legitimacy in the interorganizational relations of nonprofits.
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The nonprofit literature often assumes that nonprofit advocacy is rooted in
normative legitimacy (Henderson 2002; Price 2003; Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, and Auld
2006; Sell and Prakash 2004) because the primary goal of advocacy organizations is
“making public claims and pursuing related social changes” (Andrews and Edwards
2004:485). Advocacy organizations pursue their goals through interactions with
governments more than interactions with any other entity. Interactions between advocacy
nonprofits and government often are tense, which easily leads to confrontation rather than
harmony and cooperation. Such relations between advocacy nonprofits and government
often are described as an “inherent tension” from civil society perspectives and a
“conflictual relationship” from social movement perspectives (Smith and Gronbjerg
2006). Najam (2000:386) contends that “opposition is as much a defining feature of the
nongovernmental sector as coercion is a defining feature of the state apparatus.” If they
employ less confrontational forms of interaction with government and are more
cooperative, then advocacy nonprofits may risk their very existence as advocacy
organizations (Berry 2005).
Environmental nonprofits exhibit more “expressive, public-oriented mobilizing
activities” than do their social/human service counterparts (Dalton, Recchia, and
Rohrschneider 2003:750; Kempton, Holland, Bunting-Howarth, Hannan, and Payne
2001). Although some, for instance in the United States, are criticized at times for their
mitigated militancy, national environmental organizations still are considered important
vehicles for mobilization and protest (Minkoff 1997). In the case of Korea, environmental
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NGOs have engaged in active, often confrontational political advocacy in interactions
with government, which is the legacy of long-standing democratic movements (Kim
2004c). Thus, active political advocacy gives weight to the legitimacy of environmental
organizations, which they leverage in the battle against government.
4.4 Major Hypotheses
4.4.1 Legitimacy, network centrality and social cohesion
Network centrality. As noted above, a concern for legitimacy is one factor that motivates
nonprofits to engage in active political advocacy in interactions with government.
Networking patterns among organizations represent the structural foundations of
organizational legitimacy. Although explicit links between the degrees of legitimacy and
network centrality rarely are addressed, the organizational literature is replete with
suggestions that network centrality relates to degrees of legitimacy (e.g.,Wasserman and
Galaskiewicz 1994; Scott 1995). Mizruchi (1996:276) notes, for instance, “the existing
literature on board appointments certainly implies…that the quest for legitimacy
underlies the formation of many interlocks.”
Some researchers assume network centrality to be a measure of power (Brass 1992;
Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Fombrun 1983). However, this assumption is difficult to
generalize because such studies use reputational dependent variables (Cook, Emerson,
and Gillmore 1983; Ibarra 1993). This makes the assumption that network centrality is a
behavioral indicator of the exercise of power questionable. In contrast, Wasserman and
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Faust (1994) explicitly define network centrality in directional relations as prestige, and
Bonacich (1972a) defines it as popularity or status. As I note above that legitimacy is
assumed to be “the foundation for the emergence of reputation and status” (Sullivan,
Haunschild, and Page 2007:56), it is reasonable to relate network centrality to
organizational legitimacy.
Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1): Network centrality among peer organizations is associated
positively with nonprofit political advocacy against government.
Social cohesion. Unlike network centrality, the relevance of social cohesion depends on
the contexts under consideration. In the case of nonprofit political advocacy, which is the
subject of this study, social cohesion likely is relevant if politically oriented. Other things
being equal, non-political social cohesion likely will not influence nonprofit
organizations in engaging in political activities. Thus, technical and managerial cohesion
likely will not be relevant. Rather, social cohesion based on networks of interlocked
boards can make a difference. Board interlocking potentially leads to politically oriented
social cohesion among nonprofit organizations. Although mostly found in the for-profit
literature, networks of interlocking directors are conducive to political cohesion (Burris
2005). This view generally is associated with elite theory and class cohesion theory
(Domhoff 1967; Useem 1984; Zeitlin 1974). Arguably, corporate elites acquire a broader
view of business community interests through multiple memberships on corporate boards
(Davis 1991). Participation in “inner circles” has consequences for politically cohesive
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activities (Useem 1984). Directors of multiple boards may act as agents of the business
elites as a class rather than as agents of particular firms (Davis 1991). Based on findings
from for-profit organization studies, networks of interlocked boards are assumed to
facilitate political cohesion among nonprofit organizations. For instance, directors of
multiple boards in environmental nonprofits may have a broader outlook of the
environmental sector and may establish an agenda for political advocacy in interactions
with government. The network density surrounding focal organizations can represent
social cohesion.
Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2): Network density in interlocking board networks is associated
positively with nonprofit political advocacy against government.
4.4.2 Organizational characteristics related to political advocacy
In addition to legitimacy and social cohesion, the scholarly literature has
considered the possibility that the organizational characteristics of nonprofits affect their
political advocacy (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Child and Grønbjerg 2007; Jenkins
2006). Based on the existing literature, this study identifies three organizational
characteristics hypothesized to relate to the nonprofit political advocacy of environmental
organizations.
Government funding. One key organizational characteristic is the extent to which Korean
environmental organizations received any funds in support of their environmental
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activities from municipal, provincial or national governments in 2005. As noted earlier,
government funding has been considered an important factor that influences nonprofit
political advocacy. While some researchers argue that government funds carry the
potential to control nonprofit political advocacy (Lipsky and Smith 1989; Wolch 1990),
others demonstrate that government funding does not necessarily have negative effects on
it (Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Child and Grønbjerg 2007).
Hypothesis 4.3 (H4.3): The amount of government funds received by nonprofit
organizations is associated negatively with nonprofit political advocacy against
government.
Areas of activity. This study accounts for the areas of activity of each organization. The
notion of an environmental movement was not restricted to the classical idea of
preserving nature and historic monuments. This study expands the concept to incorporate
issues concerning the social environment and urban areas, including industrial pollution,
health hazards, scarcity of energy resources, transportation problems, toxic waste, food
safety, and the difficulties in defining and securing environmental justice. As issues
concerning the social environment and urban areas tend to be more contentious than
classical conservation issues, a greater emphasis tends to be placed on explicit political
actions, including confrontational tactics (Diani 1995). Thus, the area of environmental
activity is considered as a factor that influences political advocacy.
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Hypothesis 4.4 (H4.4): The amount of resources spent on social environment and urban
issues is associated positively with nonprofit political advocacy against government.
Organizational bureaucratization. Organizational bureaucratization is another important
factor in determining nonprofit political advocacy. Under bureaucratized organizations,
people must act in accordance with rules and written regulations. Scholarly opinion is
divided about whether or not bureaucratization contributes to political advocacy activity.
Michels’ (1962) contention that social movement organizations become less oppositional
as they become mature and institutionalized (Landriscina 2006) has influenced heavily
the argument that bureaucratization decreases political advocacy activity. Jenkins (1998;
Jenkins and Halcli 1999) contends that professionalized social movements tend to share
the professional and normative values of elite patrons, which results in the lack of
confrontational political activity. In contrast, Harrison (1960) notes that bureaucracy is
necessary to achieve the goals of voluntary associations, although such associations tend
to be anti-authoritarian. Some recent research has supported this perspective (Della Porta
and Diani 1999; Landriscina 2006; Rucht 1999).
Adler’s (1996) assessment of bureaucratization is worth considering for a better
understanding of the impact of bureaucratization on organizations. In what he terms as an
enabling bureaucracy, professional staff help members master their tasks better, work
more effectively and commit themselves to organizational missions. In a coercive
bureaucracy, professional staff use their power for ends alien to member goals or views.
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Bureaucratization sometimes will and sometimes will not help nonprofits maintain the
normative legitimacy to challenge governments and their policies. In this study, I
investigate two dimensions of bureaucratization: the extent to which organizations
formally describe and evaluate their staff members’ work and performance, and the
extent to which organizations formally describe and evaluate services and activities that
they provide. These dimensions of bureaucratization may create rigid and demoralized
work environments, but they also may enhance the achievement of organizational
missions.
Hypothesis 4.5 (H4.5): Bureaucratization significantly relates to nonprofit political
advocacy against government.
4.5 Methods
4.5.1 Research setting and data collection
This study combines secondary data about the government funding of
environmental NGOs (ENGOs) with primary survey/interview data. Primary data were
collected through a questionnaire survey of 74 ENGOs in Seoul, Korea (see Appendix
B), between December 2006 and May 2007, and through face-to-face interviews
conducted by the author with executive-level activists of those ENGOs during the same
period.
12
12
Four organizations among the 74 ENGOs responded to this survey via e-mail.
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A preliminary list of environmental NGOs was created from three sources
available on the internet: the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement directory
of ENGOs, the Korean Ministry of Environment directory of ENGOs and the Korea
NGO Promotion directory of ENGOs. Then, the Web sites of those organizations were
examined to identify other environmental NGOs. I also consulted with NGO activists and
NGO scholars in Seoul to identify NGOs involved in environmental issues. Among
organizations listed or identified as environmental NGOs, some either were impossible to
contact or no longer active. I contacted one member of each organization to determine
whether or not the organization was inactive as an environmental NGO. I also consulted
with NGO activists and NGO scholars in Seoul to determine whether or not organizations
that could not be contacted were inactive as ENGOs.
Because this study focuses on voluntary and nonprofit organizations that engage in
environmental activities broadly defined, I excluded organizations from the preliminary
list that primarily were commercial, governmental, recycling, recreation or research
organizations, and those organizations that treat environmental issues as distinctly
peripheral to their mission. When in doubt, I either contacted executive-level directors of
the organizations or consulted with NGO activists and scholars to determine whether or
not organizations should be categorized as environmental NGOs. The final list included
74 environmental NGOs. It is reasonable to conclude that the final ENGOs on the list
represented nearly the entire ENGO population in Seoul in 2007.
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The survey asked a range of questions eliciting information about relations with
other environmental NGOs, government funds received in 2006 and organizational
characteristics. Information about interorganizational networks was elicited by asking
respondents to identify the ENGOs “regularly,” “substantially” and “directly” involved in
working relationships with them in 2006 from the list of organizations. “Regularly” was
included to discourage respondents from including organizations with which they had
only occasional working relations; “substantially” was used to discourage the inclusion of
organizations with which they had trivial relations; and “directly” was included to
discourage respondents from including organizations with which they had only indirect
working relations, such as relations that occur through common membership in an
alliance or umbrella organization (Ansell 2003). Explanations of the three terms were
provided to respondents during face-to-face interviews. In the case of the four
organizations that took the survey via e-mail, I contacted the respondents and explained
the terms over the phone. Types of involvement with peer organizations included
technical advice-giving, resource sharing/joint activities and board interlocking.
Information about these relations was coded as a 74-by-74 matrix.
4.5.2 Reliability of centrality measures
The network literature refers to “confirmed” or “unconfirmed” ties in assessing the
reliability of centrality measures. Two actors in the survey must report the presence of
network ties between them for non-directional (reciprocated) ties to be “confirmed.” For
instance, if one actor reports the presence of a board interlocking tie or a resource-sharing
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tie with a second actor, the tie only counts when the second actor also reports this tie.
Thus, the matrix of nondirectional ties is symmetric. In contrast, two actors either must
report or acknowledge the presence and direction of ties between them for directional ties
to be “confirmed.” For instance, if one actor reports that it sent technical advice to a
second actor, the second actor must acknowledge that it received the advice from the first
actor. Thus, the matrix of directionality ties is not symmetric.
The network literature on the reliability of unconfirmed network ties is divided.
Some researchers have reported unconfirmed ties (e.g., Bolland and Wilson 1994; Foster-
Fishman, Salem, Allen, and Fahrbach 2001; Friedman, Reynolds, Quan, Stephanie,
Crusto, and Kaufman 2007), suggesting that an overreliance on confirmed ties as network
indicators may underestimate interorganizational relations. Unconfirmed ties may
represent not the absence of network ties but the presence of weak ties (Provan, Veazie,
Staten, and Teufel-Shone 2005). One of the respondents in a pair may not recognize or
perceive ties with the other respondent as prominent (Isett and Provan 2005). The
presence of unconfirmed ties illustrates the basic structure of network relations, although
such ties may be weak. Unconfirmed ties potentially can become strong ties, that is,
confirmed ties depending on how actors nurture and maintain unconfirmed ties (Provan,
Veazie, Staten, and Teufel-Shone 2005). Yet other scholars hold that the reliability of
reported network ties increases only when such ties are confirmed, which results in
conservative estimates of network relations (Calloway, Morrissey, and Paulson 1993;
Knoke and Chermack 2005). These scholars assume that network data depends heavily
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on “fallible humans” and thus potentially is susceptible to cognitive distortions and
purposeful misrepresentations of actual network ties (Kenis and Knoke 2002; Marsden
1990). This study uses confirmed network ties as a more conservative approach.
In addition, in the assessment of the reliability of network centrality, test-retest
methods theoretically are possible because of the assumption that network centrality is
highly reliable and stable over time (Mariolis and Jones 1982). An alternative method
involves developing multiple-item scales so that an “individual item’s idiosyncrasies and
fluctuations cancel each other out” (Ibarra 1993:487). This study develops three items for
centrality (technical, managerial and boards).
This study employs principal components analysis to determine whether the three
centrality measures should be treated separately or combined into a single factor. This
methodological consideration is important because the relatively high correlations among
the three centrality measures shown in Table 4.1 can cause multicollinearity in regression
analyses.
Table 4.1 Correlations Among Centrality Measures
1. 2. 3.
1. Technical × × ×
Centrality 2. Managerial .675*** × ×
3. Board .527*** .547*** ×
a. Technical, technical advice centrality (incoming ties); Managerial, resource sharing and joint
activities centrality (reciprocated ties); Board, board interlocking centrality (reciprocated). All of
them are square root measures of Bonacich’s centrality.
b. N=74.
*p< 0.05
** p<0.01
*** p< 0.001
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Table 4.2 shows that principal components analysis identified a single factor of
centrality. The Cronbach’s alpha estimate was .806 (confirmed), indicating reasonably
high degrees of internal consistency. Although the three centrality measures underlie
different conceptual levels of organizational legitimacy (technical, managerial and
institutional), a single construct of organizational legitimacy was created by combining
the three centrality measures, and factor scores were used as indicators of combined
centrality.
Table 4.2 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Centrality
Centrality measures Factor loading
1. Technical .866
2. Managerial .878
3. Board
Eigenvalue
Proportion of variance of explained
.803
2.166
72.208
N = 74.
4.5.3 Dependent variable: Nonprofit political advocacy
The dependent variable measures the extent to which Korean environmental NGOs
engaged in political advocacy activities in interactions with governments in 2006. These
activities mostly intended to ensure pro-environmental policies, often leading to
confrontation or critical engagement with government. After my qualitative inquiry into
74 environmental NGOs in Korea, I realized that environmental NGOs resort to a
repertoire of political activities to criticize or challenge governments. For that purpose,
they use not only disruptive political activities but also institutionalized political
159
activities. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which each organization
participated in political activities in 2006 to criticize or challenge government policies.
All items are assessed with seven-point Likert-style scales with the anchors of 1 =
“never” and 7 = “to a large extent.” This variable consists of seven items. These items
were: participating in coalitions with other organizations; providing testimony on public
policy issues; providing public education on policy issues; contacting appointed or
elected public officials or members of their staff; conducting demonstrations or boycotts;
issuing policy reports through diverse venues, including mass media; and buying
advertising time or space in commercial media.
The Cronbach's alpha was computed for the seven types of environmental political
advocacy activity to determine internal consistency. The Cronbach's alpha was estimated
at .908, indicating a high degree of internal consistency. Principal components analysis
was employed to determine whether or not the seven political advocacy items should be
combined into a single construct. Table 4.3 shows that principal components analysis
identified a single construct, and factor scores were used as indicators of environmental
nonprofit political advocacy.
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Table 4.3 Results of Principal Components Analysis of Nonprofit
Political Activity
Nonprofit political activity Factor loading
1. Coalition activity .838
2. Public testimony
3. Public education
4. Contact of public officials
5. Demonstrations or boycotts
6. Issue of public reports
7. Media contacts
Eigenvalue
Proportion of variance explained
.860
.821
.812
.869
.830
.544
4.515
64.496
N = 74.
4.5.4 Independent variables
Centrality in organizational networks. This variable measures the extent to which
organizations are central in networks. At their core, measures of centrality, accounting for
the structure of the whole network, describe the position of each actor relative to the
positions of other actors in a network (Freeman 1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Central actors are defined as those tied to a greater number of other actors, while
peripheral actors are tied to relatively few actors.
Network centrality is a multi-dimensional concept. According to Freeman (1979),
three types of centrality exist: degree, closeness and betweenness. Degree centrality
refers to the number of other actors (alters) to which a focal actor (ego) directly is
connected. Closeness centrality is defined as the extent to which a focal actor can reach
all other actors via the shortest (geodesic) path. Betweenness centrality resembles
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closeness centrality in that both measures focus on access to other actors (Rowley 1997).
However, closeness centrality represents the viewpoints of two actors positioned at
terminal points who are either sending or receiving network resources, while betweenness
centrality refers to “actors in the middle,” that is, actors between pairs of other actors
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). By definition, betweenness centrality measures the extent
to which other actors must pass through a focal actor to reach other actors.
Freeman (1979) attempts to relate the three types of centrality (degree,
betweenness and closeness) to theoretical constructs by proposing that degree centrality
signifies the “well-connectedness” of an organization; closeness centrality represents the
ability of an actor to access all other members of a network; and betweenness centrality—
expressed, for example, in the role of network brokers or gatekeepers—captures the
ability of actors to control others.
The measure of degree centrality seems better suited as an indicator of
organizational legitimacy than the other two measures because most of the organizational
literature considers the enhancement of legitimacy as a result of organizational attempts
to associate with other organizations. In contrast, closeness centrality cannot be
calculated unless all actors in a network are connected. A completely connected network
is highly unlikely because certain actors often are isolated from the rest. Betweenness
centrality would be an appropriate measure if social brokerage were considered (Burt
2005; Freeman 1979).
162
Freeman’s degree centrality, however, has a limitation. While it captures the
importance of the number of allies an organization relies on, degree centrality does not
account for the ties and structural positions of its allies. For instance, firms gain
reputation, recognition or legitimacy if they are tied to other firms prominent in the
biotechnology industry (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999) and semiconductor industry
(Stuart 1998). Donative nonprofits connected to prominent organizations gain high
esteem and status as well (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 2006).
In this sense, Bonacich’s (1972a; 1972b) measure of centrality best captures the
idea of legitimacy that this study uses. Bonacich’s centrality accounts not only for an
organization’s ties to other organizations but also for the centrality of other organizations
in the network. A focal organization’s centrality is weighted by the centrality of the other
organizations to which the organization is connected. As a consequence, an
organization’s centrality is a function not only of its own centrality but also the centrality
of all other organizations to which the organization is tied. Bonacich’s centrality measure
(hereafter, centrality) in each network indicates the degree of legitimacy each
organization possesses in that network.
This study uses Bonacich’s measure of centrality, which is expressed operationally
as:
λSi = Wi1S1 + … + WinSn
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As noted by Bonacich (1972a), W is a matrix of ties, λ is an eigenvalue, and S is an
eigenvector. The eigenvalue for each matrix here was 27.7 for the technical networks,
32.8 for the managerial networks and 19.8 for the board networks. Eigenvector centrality
scores were computed for each of the three matrices. This study employed UCINET
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) to calculate these scores. The square roots of these
scores were used to make their distributions more symmetric, and then factor scores were
calculated for the combined Bonacich’s measures of centrality.
Social cohesion. This variable measures the extent to which strong third-party
connections surround organizations. Following Burt (1992), social cohesion is measured
by the aggregate network density of each organization. The basic notion of network
density rests on a triadic relationship, such as the relationships among actors i,
p and j. If ego i’s network partners, p and j, are connected with each other, their
relationship severely constrains ego i. If ego i’s partners, p and j, are not connected with
each other, actors p and j have difficulties constraining ego i’s behavior. This basic logic
is expanded into multiple triadic relationships surrounding an ego. The strength of
network density is expressed as:
PiqPqj
where Piq is the proportional strength of the network connection from actor i to actor q,
and Pqj is the proportional strength of the network connection from actor q to actor j. This
164
variable is “a triadic density measure,” indicating “the presence of strong third-party
connections” surrounding an ego (Reagans and Mcevily 2003: 255). To measure the
overall strength of the network density, the product of PiqPqj is aggregated across all
contacts q. This study employed UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002) to
calculate this variable.
Government funding. This variable measures the extent to which government
funding accounted for each organization’s revenues in 2005.
Areas of activity. This variable measures the extent to which organizations
targeted environmental activities toward the social environment or urban areas in 2006.
Organizational bureaucratization. This variable measures the extent of bureaucratization
of the organization’s work. All items are assessed with seven-point
Likert-style scales with the anchors of 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “to a great extent.” These
items were: formal job descriptions for staff member positions; formal performance
evaluations of staff members; statistical records of programs and services organizations
provided; records of information about the cost of programs, services or activities
organizations provided; records of information about the impact of programs, services or
activities organizations provided; and formal evaluation of programs, services or
activities organizations provided in the past three years.
The Cronbach's alpha for the bureaucratization items was estimated at .869,
indicating a reasonably high degree of internal consistency. Principal components
analysis was used to determine whether the six items should be combined into a single
165
factor. Table 4.4 shows that principal components analysis identified a single construct of
bureaucratization. Factor scores were calculated as measures of bureaucratization.
Table 4.4. Results of Principal Components Analysis of Bureaucratization
Bureaucratization Factor loading
1. Formal evaluation .886
2. Cost information .832
3. Impact information .819
4. Evaluation of paid staff members .729
5. Job descriptions .708
6. Statistical records of programs .701
Eigenvalue 3.673
Proportion of variance explained 61.214
N=74.
4.5.5 Control variables
It should be noted that, according to Michels (1962), organizational age and
capacity are factors that enhance or inhibit the political activity of social movement
organizations. This study included control variables, including three indicators of
organizational age and capacity: organizational budgets, regular memberships and
founding dates. The first two variables were log transformed to make their distributions
more normal. This study did not include the number of professional staff as an indicator
of organizational capacity because the number of professional staff highly correlates with
the size of organizational budgets. While previous research emphasized differences in the
political opportunity structure across different jurisdictions (Nicholson-Crotty 2007), this
study excluded the political opportunity structure because the sample was collected from
one city.
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4.6 Analyses and Results
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the
variables. A pare-wise correlation matrix was inspected to evaluate multicollinearity,
which can generate large standard errors in the estimated regression coefficients and
possibly insignificant t-ratios. The correlation matrix contains an interaction term that is
centered. Centering transformation (subtracting the mean value from each case) helps
reduce multicollinearity without changing estimated relationships among variables
in a regression (Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi 1990). The correlations in this matrix generally
were low (less than .3) and modestly low (less than .4) with a few exceptions. There were
relatively high correlations (more than .5) among the three measures of centrality:
technical, managerial and board centrality. These three measures of centrality were not
entered into the models; instead, these measures were combined into a single measure
that was entered into the models.
The coalition matrix indicates that several organizational, operational and network
features of nonprofit organizations were moderately to highly correlated with nonprofit
political advocacy: High advocacy tended to pertain to organizations with high
bureaucratization and high expenditures on social environment and urban issues.
Organizations with high centrality and high network density on interlocked boards tended
to be active politically in criticizing and challenging government as well. However, the
correlation between government funding and nonprofit political advocacy was not
167
statistically significant. As noted earlier, network centrality modestly correlated with
network density (.475 at the .001 level).
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Min. Max. Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4
1. Political advocacy 2006 -1.163 2.025 -.012 .969
2. Years in activity Ln 0 4.533 2.407 .808 .015
3. Membership Ln 0 13.710 6.052 3.113 .112 0.532***
4. Bureaucratization † -2.242 1.764 -.017 .956 0.312** -.055 .100
5. Budget Ln 8.700 15.761 12.387 1.579 .195 0.268* 0.339** 0.385***
6. % Areas of activities 0 100 47.071 40.149 0.420*** 0.318** .170 0.334**
7. % Gov't funding 2005 0 1000 36.363 28.243 .109 -.051 -0.299** -.066
8. Technical network centrality †† 0 .667 .166 .192 0.381** .106 .039 .053
9. Managerial network centrality
††
0 .681 .181 .192 0.524*** .193 .048 0.311**
10. Board network centrality †† 0 .769 .139 .195 0.323** -.020 -.049 0.216*
11. Combined network
centrality † ‡
-1.001 2.832 .000 1.011 0.484*** .114 .017 0.227*
12. Board network density ‡ -.332 .668 .000 .408 0.430*** -.207* -.188 .184
13. combined network centrality
x board network constraint
-.669 1.539 .193 .306 -.012 .076 .056 -.077
Variable 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6. % Areas of activities 0.360**
7. % Gov't funding 2005 .032 .122
8. Technical network centrality †† 0.321** 0.230* .028
9. Managerial network centrality
††
0.400*** 0.458*** .128 0.675***
10. Board network centrality †† 0.396*** 0.212* 0.257* 0.527*** 0.547***
11. Combined network
centrality † ‡
0.437*** 0.356** .158 0.869*** 0.878*** 0.802***
12. Board network density ‡ .117 .048 .156 0.404*** 0.375** 0.437*** 0.475***
13. combined network centrality
x board network constraint
-.078 -.130 .072 .133 .109 -.045 .081 .058
† factor scored variables; †† squared rooted variables; ‡ centered variables
4.6.2 Regression diagnostics
Regression diagnostics were conducted as certain assumptions should be met for
regression analysis. As noted earlier, logarithm and square-root transformations were
conducted for certain variables to meet normality assumptions: year, membership and
budget (log-transformed), and centrality (square-rooted). After executing the
transformations, the distributions of these variables became more symmetric. A
histogram of standardized residuals also was inspected visually to determine whether the
residual errors were normally distributed for each set of independent variables. The
histogram generally showed a normal curve, as seen in Figure 4.1.
Regression Standardized Residual
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
.75
.50
.25
0.00
-.25
-.50
-.75
-1.00
-1.25
-1.50
-1.75
-2.00
-2.25
-2.50
Histogram: 06 advocacy
Dependent Variable
Frequency
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = .93
Mean = 0.00
N = 70.00
Political Advocacy in 2006
Figure 4.1 Histogram of Standardized Residuals
As an alternative method, the normal probability plot of the regression’s
standardized residuals was checked visually. The Y axis shows the expected cumulative
probabilities of the occurrence of the standardized residuals, and the X axis shows the
168
observed normal probabilities of occurrence. In the plot, a 45-degree line should appear
to meet the normality assumption. Figure 4.2 generally presents a 45-degree line.
The Durbin-Watson coefficient d was checked for autocorrelation—the
independence of observations. The value of d ranges from 0 to 4. Values close to 2
indicate no correlation. It is low likelihood that autocorrelation caused a problem in this
study (d = 2.065).
Normal P-P Plot of Regression
Dependent Variable: advocacy
Observed Cum Prob
1.00 .75 .50 .25 0.00
Expected Cum Prob
1.00
.75
.50
.25
0.00
Political Advocacy in 2006
Figure 4.2 Normal Probability Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals
The plots of independent variables against the dependent variable were inspected
visually for outlying observations. There were no significant outliers for all independent
variables. Curvilinear relationships were tested by putting in squared terms of two
variables, centrality and network density. There were no significant relationships between
squared independent terms and the dependent variable.
169
170
Because of multicollinearity assumptions, Tolerance Statistics, the Variance
Inflation Factors (VIF) and Condition Indices were examined (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
1980). The multicollinearity assumption can be violated if the Tolerance is less than .1,
the VIF is greater than 10, or the condition index is greater than 30. An examination of
these indices indicated that multicollinearity was not a major problem in this study.
4.6.3 OLS regression results
The previous simple correlation analysis provides pair-wise relationships between
variables. The correlation analysis does not capture inter-correlations among variables.
Thus, a number of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted not
only to obtain more realistic relationships between the independent variables and the
dependent variable but also to examine the hypotheses.
This study formulated six models to identify the model best fit to the data.
Model 1: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget
Model 2: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget + Areas of activity
Model 3: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget + Areas of activity + Government funding (t-₁)
171
Model 4: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget + Areas of activity + Government funding (t-₁) + Network
centrality
Model 5: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget + Areas of activity + Government funding (t-₁) + Network
centrality + Network density
Model 6: Nonprofit political advocacy = Years in activity + Membership +
Bureaucratization + Budget + Areas of activity + Government funding (t-₁) + Network
centrality + Network density + Network centrality* Network density
Table 4.6 presents the results of the hypotheses testing using ordinary least squares
regression analysis.
Model 1 included control variables. As expected, this model was statistically
insignificant (the p value for F statistic = .111), and thus organizational characteristics
(organizational age, membership, bureaucratization, and budget size) alone cannot
explain the variation in the dependent variable of nonprofit political advocacy. Model 2
introduced the measure of areas of activity. Inclusion of this measure made this model
statistically significant. As expected, this model explains only 17 percent of the variation
172
in the dependent variable. Government funding was tested in Model 3. Inclusion of the
measure of government funding did not improve the fit of the model.
Table 4.6 OLS Regression on Nonprofit Political Activity in 2006
Model
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Years in activity Ln
-.035
(.170)
-.197
(.167)
-.205
(.168)
-.217
(.153)
-.155
(.149)
-.152
(.151)
Membership Ln
.024
(.044)
.036
(.042)
.050
(.044)
.070
(.041)
.075
(.039)
.076
(.040)
Bureaucratization †
.279*
(.131)
.162
(.128)
.177
(.129)
.166
(.118)
.131
(.115)
.131
(.116)
Budget Ln
.044
(.084)
-.004
(.080)
-.014
(.081)
-.117
(.079)
-.107
(.076)
-.110
(.077)
% Areas of activities
.010**
(.003)
.009**
(.003)
.007*
(.003)
.008**
(.003)
.008*
(.003)
% Gov't funding 2005
.004
(.004)
.003
(.004)
.002
(.004)
.002
(.004)
Network centrality † ‡
.413***
(.112)
.272*
(.122)
.276*
(.125)
Network density ‡
.677*
(.277)
.678*
(.279)
Network centrality
x network density
-.077
(.322)
Constant
-.608
(.983)
-.165
(.932)
-.228
(.935)
1.108
(.928)
.805
(.901)
.839
(.919)
N 70 70 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R-squared .053
.167
.166 .305 .356 .346
Change in R-squared .120** .011 .137*** .056* .001
*p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p< 0.001.
† factor scored variables; †† squared rooted variables; ‡ centered variables.
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
173
The measure of network centrality was tested in Model 4. This measure
significantly improved the fit of the model as the adjusted R squared measure = .305 and
the R square change = .137 at the .001 level. Network density was tested in the fifth
model. The fit of this model improved modestly as the adjusted R squared measure =
.356 and the R square change = .056 at the .05 level. As expected, the two network
measures significantly improved the fit of the model to the data. An interaction term
between network centrality and network density was tested in Model 6 to examine
whether network centrality effects were contingent upon network density effects.
However, the inclusion of the interaction term did not improve the fit of the model. The
results of the series of tests are straightforward. The model that has control variables,
areas of activity, government funding, and network centrality and network density
provided the best fit to the data.
The fifth model was examined in testing the hypotheses. The measure of network
centrality was positive and significant at the .05 level, providing support for Hypothesis
4.1. It is interpreted that a one-unit increase in the measure of combined network
centrality in technical, managerial and board networks will increase the average unit of
nonprofit political advocacy by .272. Providing support for Hypothesis 4.2, the measure
of network density had a significantly positive effect on nonprofit political advocacy at
the .05 level. It is interpreted that a one-unit increase in the measure of network density in
board networks will increase the average unit of nonprofit political advocacy by .677.
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Contrary to Hypothesis 4.3, the measure of government funding had no statistically
significant effect on nonprofit political advocacy. In contrast, the measure of areas of
activity was positive and significant at the .05 level, providing support for Hypothesis
4.4. It is interpreted that a one-unit increase in the measure of nonprofit resources spent
on social environment and urban issues will increase the average unit of nonprofit
political advocacy by .008. Disproving Hypothesis 4.5, however, bureaucratization was
insignificant. Finally, the effects of the three significant independent variables—network
centrality, network density and areas of activity—were compared. These three variables
had similar effect sizes on the dependent variable: The standardized coefficient of
network centrality was .288, network centrality .286, and areas of activity .313.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions
At the beginning of this study, we raised a question about the contribution of
legitimacy-seeking behavior to variation in organizational practices. Previous research
suggests that legitimacy-seeking was an integral part of isomorphism in organizational
practices. Thus, an understanding of legitimacy-seeking as a source of variation in
organizational practices had not been considered. This study focuses on two distinct
features of organizational connectedness: network centrality and network density. The
evidence indicates that both network features facilitate variation in organizational
practices in response to institutional pressures—in this study, nonprofit political
advocacy in criticizing and challenging government. The findings are important because
175
they clarify the limitations of previous understandings and shed new insight on dominant
understandings of institutional theory.
The findings advance the understanding of network centrality and network density.
Network centrality can represent organizational legitimacy among like-organizations
within the same population. This study refers to this type of legitimacy as peer-conferred
legitimacy and emphasizes that this legitimacy facilitates organizational resistance in
response to institutional pressures. However, network density can affect the behavior of
the focal organization as well. The effects of network centrality and network density tend
to co-occur, but these two network features conceptually are distinct. While network
centrality facilitates nonprofit political advocacy through direct connections among
organizations, network density enhances nonprofit political advocacy indirectly through
third-party connections.
This study advances the understanding of three types of network density (technical,
managerial and board) and how they related to nonprofits. While a combined measure of
network centrality was proposed to indicate organizational legitimacy as three centrality
measures are highly correlated, network density measures are not. Each of three types of
network density can have a different implication on nonprofit activities. Technical
density and managerial density were not related to nonprofit political advocacy. Although
the measures of these two density were not reported in this study, technical density (t=.-
608) and managerial density (t=.314) were both insignificant. Only network density of
interlocked board was significant. Given that nonprofit political advocacy is related to
176
institutional pressures placed on nonprofit population as a whole, this finding is
consistent with the notion that the interlocked board provides a foundation for cohesion
in political actions (Useem 1984; Mizruchi 1996). Nonprofit directors who are
simultaneously board members of other nonprofit organizations can develop shared
political values and norms of their field as a whole. The interlocked directors can
function as the political vanguard of a given nonprofit field in interactions with
government.
The findings clarify the factors critical to nonprofit political advocacy. Government
funding was not related to nonprofit political advocacy in the environmental sector. This
finding is consistent with recent empirical evidence based on different nonprofit areas
and sectors (Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Child and Grønbjerg 2007).
Bureaucratization was not related as well. The interpretation of this finding must be
bounded because this study only considers two aspects of bureaucratization: the extent to
which organizations formally describe and evaluate their staff members’ work and
performance, and the extent to which organizations formally describe and evaluate the
services and activities they provide. However, areas of activity were related to nonprofit
political advocacy. This finding is straightforward. As environmental issues concerning
the social environment and urban areas become more contentious (Diani 1995),
organizations engaging in these issues likely are politically active. However, the evidence
that organizational connectedness and subsequently organizational legitimacy facilitate
nonprofit political advocacy never has been found in previous research, and thus this
study contributes to the growing body of nonprofit-sector research.
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This study is not without limitations. Among others, the findings result from data
from environmental NGOs active in Seoul, Korea. The geopolitical context of this study
asks readers to consider the cultural aspects of the findings. Thus, examining national
culture, political situations and cross-cultural insights would benefit this study further.
Future studies can accomplish these tasks.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusions
5.1 Dissertation Summary
This study examined nonprofit organizations concerned with environmental causes
in Korea from 1987 to 2007. It examined the roles of political contestation in the
evolution of nonprofits, the effects of legitimacy-seeking on differential political
advocacy activities of nonprofits, and the effects of lateral network ties on the distribution
of government funding to nonprofit organizations. The three major conclusions of the
study are the following.
Roles of political contestation in the evolution of nonprofits
Chapter two highlighted political contestation as important drivers of the evolution
of nonprofits. Existing literature examining institutional evolution provided different
theoretical frameworks such as critical junctures, path dependence, and political
contestation. Each of these frameworks emphasizes a particular dimension of institutional
evolution. However, political dynamics are lost in frameworks of critical junctures and
path dependence, although the two frameworks are useful.
President Kim Dae Jung sought to broaden his political and social bases in Korea,
and his political motivation contributed to enhancing the legitimacy of nonprofits
including environmental nonprofits. The emerging nonprofit sector became the objects of
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political contestation and negotiation between competing political coalitions, making
nonprofit organizations vulnerable to political influence. On macro levels, it is useful to
periodize the evolution of the nonprofit sector in Korea and to recognize path-dependent
processes within each period of institutional evolution. But it is important to note that
there were continuities during critical changes and ongoing political negotiation over the
roles of nonprofits during path dependent periods.
Patterns of government funding of environmental nonprofit organizations
Chapter three demonstrated that the legitimacy of nonprofit organizations was an
important factor in attracting funds from government agencies. This study examined two
competing rationales of why government agencies fund certain organizations over others:
an efficiency rationale and a non-efficiency rationale that is construed as a political
rationale. An efficiency rationale posits that the first priority of government funding goes
to nonprofit organizations that have technical expertise and managerial capacity, which
fits with widely-recognized government rationales of nonprofit outsourcing. A political
rationale posits that the first priority of government funding goes to nonprofit
organizations with high institutional legitimacy, which are assumed to have agenda
setting influence in a given nonprofit sector. The institutional legitimacy was measured
by Bonacich’s measure of centrality in interlocked board networks. This study concluded
that nonprofits with high institutional legitimacy are more likely to attract funds from
government agencies than so nonprofits with efficiency legitimacy.
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Legitimacy-seeking and variations in nonprofit political advocacy
Chapter four examined what factors contributed to political advocacy activities of
nonprofit organizations in criticizing and challenging government policies. The concept
of organizational legitimacy was operationalized by network centrality in
interorganizational networks. This study demonstrated that organizational legitimacy
conferred by peer organizations made a difference in political advocacy activities.
5.2 Limitations of the Study and Future Research
This study postulated a relationship between the notion of organizational
legitimacy and network centrality. Although I used Bonacich’s measure of centrality as a
indicator of organizational legitimacy, some reviewers may not agree. As network
analysis is still an emerging area, there is no consensus on what theoretical concepts
centrality measures refer to. In this study, I relied on insights from the existing
organization literature to justify this approach, but the approach needs further
investigation.
The data in this study are cross-sectional, so causality cannot be definitively
determined. It was not possible to determine whether organizational legitimacy led to
political advocacy activities in criticizing and challenging government policies, or the
other way around. On the other hand, it was not possible to determine whether
government agencies themselves experienced legitimacy enhancement as a result of
funding organizations with high legitimacy.
181
Environmental nonprofit organizations in Korea exist in unique institutional
environments, and observations about them may not generalize well to other nonprofit
settings. Environmental nonprofit organizations are under stronger pressure to carry out
political advocacy activities in criticizing and challenging government policies than are
other types of nonprofits. Korea may also be said to be more contentious in government-
nonprofit relations than western countries are. The study cannot claim to capture a full
spectrum of government-nonprofit dynamics.
5.3 Theoretical Observations
It is hoped that this study may enrich the theoretical frameworks used to study
interactions between government and nonprofits. The following are salient observations.
Institutions change discontinuously during critical junctures and discontinuous changes
can be followed by path-dependent processes. This understanding of institutional
evolution is informed by the perspective of punctuated equilibrium. However, this
understanding does not capture the full spectrum of institutional change and evolution.
There can be continuities during critical junctures and ongoing changes during path-
dependent periods.
The existing discussion of organizational legitimacy focuses on organizational
legitimacy conferred both from above and from below. Legitimacy conferral from above
includes states, trade associations, and professional associations, while legitimacy
conferral from below includes organizations’ constituencies. This study notes that there is
182
also laterally conferred organizational legitimacy, which is determined by peer
organizations in a given organizational population.
The notion of organizational connectedness as it is construed in institutional theory
contains within it possibilities for understanding heterogeneity in organizational
practices. The data examined in this study demonstrated, contrary to arguments for
homogeneity salient in the current institutional literature, that interorganizational
structures are sources of heterogeneity in organizational practices in response to
institutional pressures.
The data presented here provided new insights into government-funded nonprofit
provision of public services. Scholarly notions describing government-nonprofit
relationships have evolved from nonprofit outsourcing, nonprofit contracting out, and
most recently, collaborative governance. This study compared different rationales for
government-funded nonprofit provision of public services and provided new methods of
operationalizing those rationales.
Most importantly, the data presented here indicate that network centrality
represents measures of organizational legitimacy and that organizational legitimacy has
differential effects on organizational practices and resource acquisition of organizations.
Further investigation of these dynamics would seem to be a promising focus for
continuing research.
183
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Appendix A
Qualitative Interviews
This study relies on qualitative interviews to identify research themes, working
hypotheses, and variables. I conducted 74 formal interviews between December 2006 and
May 2007, each lasting between 50 and 60 minutes. The interviewees were executive
directors of environmental nonprofit organizations active in metropolitan Seoul, Korea.
During the same period, I consulted representatives of the Korean government and
scholars at Korean universities in order to seek diverse views on the subject matter
addressed in the interviews. I interviewed representatives from the Ministry of
Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA), the Ministry of
Environment, and the Seoul Metropolitan Government. I interviewed scholars in public
administration, nonprofits, and environmental policies at Hankuk University of Foreign
Studies, Korea University at the Sejong Campus, Chung-Ang University at the Ansung
Campus, and Seoul National University.
As I collected data from the interviews, I scanned them for themes. In so doing, I
summarized the main line of interview texts, and sorted units of texts with labels. To be
eligible as a theme, labels were needed to be used frequently and needed to capture
dynamics that informants considered important (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Miles and
Huberman 1994; Michel 2007). In sorting, I sought to achieve, first, “local integration” in
which the texts of each category are interpreted to have coherence and meaning, and then,
“inclusive integration” in which the collection of each category is organized into a
coherent story (Weiss 1994).
211
I reiterated between data, themes, and questions. I collected interviewees’
responses and examined my data to formulate research themes, and then conducted
supplementary interviews about issues not covered in the initial interviews. Using theme-
focused analysis, I discovered conflicting views on two themes: the patterns of
government funding of nonprofit organizations and the effects of government funding on
nonprofit political advocacy.
Interview Questions
Specific questions evolved as I collected interviewees’ responses, examined data,
and formulated research questions. Some questions were added. The questions were as
follows:
1. Please summarize what kinds of work or projects your organization carried out with
government funds.
2. How would you describe your experience with government-funded projects? Can you
illustrate your experiences with examples?
3. Can you recall government-funded projects that you considered successful? Why do
you consider them successful?
212
4. Can you recall government-funded projects that you considered unsuccessful? Why do
you consider them unsuccessful?
5. How would you describe factors that were critical to getting funds from the
government? Why do you consider them important?
6. Were there any changes to your organization’s activities after your organization
received funds from the government?
7. How would you describe your organization’s political advocacy activities that
contradict government policy?
8. How would you describe factors critical to political advocacy activities of your
organization? In what way were they important?
213
Appendix B
Survey of Environmental NGOs in Korea
Instructions: This questionnaire is intended for a study of environmental non-
governmental organizations active in Korea. Please answer the following questions to the
best of your knowledge, following the given format. Your responses will be highly
appreciated and treated confidentially.
Part I. Description of Your Organization
1. In what year was your organization founded (approximately)? ______________
2. How many registered members did your organization have in 2006 (approximately)?
____________________
In the past two years, that is, since January of 2005, would you say that the total
number of members has changed?
If the membership has increased or decreased, by what percent? ____________ (%)
3. The number of employees in your organization (in 2006):
Paid full-time employees _______________
Paid part-time employees _______________
Volunteers___________________________
4. The number of employees in your organization (in 2005):
Paid full-time employees _______________
Paid part-time employees _______________
Volunteers___________________________
5. Many organizations work on projects that serve different geographic areas. Please specify what
percentage of your organization’s budget was used in different geographic areas in 2006. (The
percentages should sum to 100%.)
Neighborhoods, communities, towns, local cities……….. ( %)
Provinces, metropolitan cities …………………………. ( %)
National areas (more than or across 2 provinces or metropolitan
cities)............................................................
( %)
International areas……………..…………………… ( %)
Total 100%
214
6. In the past two years, that is, since January of 2005, would you say that the percentage of the budget used
in different geographic areas has changed?
If the number has increased or decreased, by what percent (%)?
Increased Decreased
Neighborhoods… ( % ) ( % )
Provinces, cities… ( % ) ( % )
National… ( % ) ( % )
International… ( % ) ( % )
7. Organizations often engage in many activities to achieve their missions. Please specify what percentage
of your organization’s budget was used for the following activities in 2006. (The percentages should
sum to 100%.)
Research, education …………………………………………. ( %)
Formulating or monitoring policies / laws…………………... ( %)
Lobbying ……………………………………………………. ( %)
Direct actions (e.g., campaigns, rallies, protests, mobilization). ( %)
Public services (providing help to the public)………………. ( %)
Legal actions (e.g., litigation) ………………………………. ( %)
Other (specify) _______________________________ ……... ( %)
Total 100%
8. Organizations may pursue a single issue or multiple issues at the same time. Please specify what
percentage of your organization’s budget was used to address issues concerning the following in 2006.
(The percentages should sum to 100%.)
Biological diversity protection, conserving natural environments (protection of
water, air, coastline, wilderness, undeveloped areas, or endangered
species)………………….
( %)
Protection of historic buildings or monuments ……………………… ( %)
Work against development, industrial pollution, industrialization, urban sprawl,
rural development, military bases, global warming, ozone, yellow sands…
( %)
Work on energy, transport (nuclear safety, alternative fuels, mass transport,
renewable energy…) ………………………………………………..
( %)
Work on toxics and waste (encouraging recycling, eliminating pollutants such as
radioactive waste or pesticides, promoting clean-up)……………….
( %)
Work on food safety and medical safety (for example, imported food safety,
medication overuse, bird influenza…) …………………..…………
( %)
Environmental justice (gaps in environmental benefits between peoples, classes,
regions) ………………………………...
( %)
Other (specify) ________________________________________...... ( %)
Total 100 %
215
9. Organizations may pursue a single issue or multiple issues at the same time. Please specify what
percentage of your organization’s budget was used to address issues concerning the following in 2005.
(The percentages should sum to 100%.)
Biological diversity protection, conserving natural environments (protection of
water, air, coastline, wilderness, undeveloped areas, or endangered
species)………………….
( %)
Protection of historic buildings or monuments ……………………… ( %)
Work against development, industrial pollution, industrialization, urban sprawl,
rural development, military bases, global warming, ozone, yellow sands…
( %)
Work on energy, transport (nuclear safety, alternative fuels, mass transport,
renewable energy…) ………………………………………………..
( %)
Work on toxics and waste (encouraging recycling, eliminating pollutants such as
radioactive waste or pesticides, promoting clean-up)……………….
( %)
Work on food safety and medical safety (for example, imported food safety,
medication overuse, bird influenza…) …………………..…………
( %)
Environmental justice (gaps in environmental benefits between peoples, classes,
regions) ………………………………...
( %)
Other (specify) ________________________________________...... ( %)
Total 100 %
10. What was the approximate total of your organization’s revenues from all sources in 2006?
$ ________________________________
11. What percentage of that total revenue came from each of the following sources. (The percentages
should sum to 100%.)
Government grants and contracts …………………………….. (_____________%)
Individual, corporate and foundation contributions…………. (_____________%)
Fees and charges for services or for sales of products …………... (_____________%)
Membership dues……………………………………………… (_____________%)
Other (specify) ________________________________ ……. (_____________%)
Total 100%
12. In the past two years, that is, since 2005, would you say that the total revenue has changed?
If the number has increased or decreased, by what percent (%)? ____________ (%)
Or, would you specify the total revenue in 2005? ____________________
13. In the past two years, that is, since 2005, would you say that the revenue from government grants and
contracts has changed?
If the number has increased or decreased, by what percent (%)? ____________ (%)
Or, would you specify the total government grants and contracts in 2005? ____________________
14. Which of the following best describes your organization (please mark with an “X”)?
A stand-alone organization ……………………….. (________)
A branch of a multi-site organization …………….. (________)
The headquarters of a multi-site organization ……. (________)
Other (specify) _________________________....... (________)
216
Part II. Involvement with other NGOs
15. Please indicate other environmental NGOs on the following list with which your organization was
regularly, substantially, and directly involved in working relationships in 2006. Please indicate any type
of involvement your organization might have had with these other NGOs. (Please mark all that apply with
an “X.”) Otherwise, please leave the box or row blank.
Received technical advice from
From which organizations did your organization regularly,
substantially, and directly received technical advice, ideas,
information, or expertise because your organization sought their
advice…
Sent technical advice to To which organizations did your organization regularly, substantially,
and directly sent technical advice, ideas, information, or expertise
because they sought your organization’s advice….
Participated in joint activities or
shared resources
Your organization regularly, substantially, and directly engaged in
specific programs, campaigns, events, or protests with…or shared
resources with…
Had members of other
organizations on your boards
Your organization had members of other organizations appointed to the
boards of your organization
(alphabetical order)
Organizations
Received
technical advice
from
Sent technical
advice to
Participated in
joint activities or
shared resources
Had members of
other
organizations on
your boards
Other (specify)
217
Part III. Environmental Advocacy Activities
16. Nonprofit political advocacy refers to activities carried out by nonprofit organizations to improve
conditions of their clients and to represent groups that cannot speak for themselves, such as oceans or
watersheds. Among various kinds of nonprofit political advocacy, organizations may participate in any of
the following advocacy activities in criticizing and challenging government policies. On the seven-point
scale below, circle the number that best indicates the extent to which your organization was involved in the
listed activities in 2006.
Never
↓
To a Large
Extent
↓
a. provided testimony about public policy issues
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
b. participated in government commissions or
committees
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
c. met with public officials (either elected or
appointed) or their staff members
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
d. participated in development or revision of
regulations related to public policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
e. participated in coalitions with other
organizations for the purpose of influencing
public policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
f. organized or participated in a demonstration or
boycott
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. paid dues to an association or belonged to a
coalition that advocated or lobbied on your
behalf
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
h. issued policy reports or recommendations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. provided public education about policy issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. wrote editorials or letters to the editors of
newspapers or magazines
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
k. bought advertising time or space in commercial
media for advocacy purposes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
l. advocated for public policies in some other way
specify:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
In the past two years, that is, since January of 2005, would you say that overall your organization’s
advocacy activities have (please mark with an “X”):
increased _____ decreased _____ stayed about the same _____
If the activities have increased or decreased, by what percent? ____________ (%)
218
Part IV. Organizational Structure
17. Does your organization have a board of directors? Yes ( ) No ( )
If yes, how many people usually serve on the board of directors? ( )
18. Please circle the number that best fits the existence of the following in your organization:
Not
at all
↓
To a very
great extent
↓
a. Formal job descriptions for staff
positions.......................
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
b. Formal performance evaluations of staff
members ...............................
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
c. Statistical records of your programs and
services..................................
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
d. Information about the cost of programs,
services, or activities provided....
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
e. Information about the impact of your programs,
services, or activities.....
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
f. Formal evaluation of your programs, services or
activities have been carried out during the past 3
years...........................................
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19. In the past three years, that is, since January of 2004, has your organization Yes No
merged with another organization?.................................................... (____) (____)
If so, please describe.
( ___________________________________________________________________)
In the past three years, that is, since January of 2004, has your organization
split from another organization?........................................................
Yes
(____)
No
(____)
If so, please describe.
( _____________________________________________________________________)
20. How long have you worked for your organization? Years______
What is your title in your organization? Title________________________
Please provide any other comments about other environmental NGOs that you feel are important but which
were not included in the environmental NGO list that provided with this questionnaire
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Please return your response in the enclosed self-addressed envelope, if possible, by _________2007.
Thank you for your cooperation. I look forward to receiving your response.
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This dissertation examines interactions between government and environmental nonprofits in South Korea. As a research of historical analysis, I examine the evolution of environmental organizations in Korea from the early 1980s. As quantitative research, I investigate environmental organizations active in metropolitan Seoul from 2006 to 2007. The three major questions for my research are: Are there paths to institutionalizing nonprofits in Korea which differ from those of western countries? What are the factors critical to active nonprofit political advocacy? Does government channel its funds to certain types of environmental nonprofit organizations?
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Ju, Chang Bum
(author)
Core Title
Institutional contestation, network legitimacy and organizational heterogeneity: interactions between government and environmental nonprofits in South Korea
School
School of Policy, Planning, and Development
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Public Administration
Publication Date
08/04/2008
Defense Date
05/29/2008
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
environmental nonprofits,government funding,historical institutionalism,Korean NGOs,nonprofit advocacy,OAI-PMH Harvest,organizational legitimacy,organizational networks
Place Name
Seoul
(city or populated place),
South Korea
(countries)
Language
English
Contributor
Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Tang, Shui-Yan (
committee chair
), Adler, Paul S. (
committee member
), Robertson, Peter John (
committee member
)
Creator Email
cju@usc.edu,juchangbum@yahoo.com
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1542
Unique identifier
UC192151
Identifier
etd-Ju-2226 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-108458 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1542 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
etd-Ju-2226.pdf
Dmrecord
108458
Document Type
Dissertation
Rights
Ju, Chang Bum
Type
texts
Source
University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
(collection)
Repository Name
Libraries, University of Southern California
Repository Location
Los Angeles, California
Repository Email
cisadmin@lib.usc.edu
Tags
environmental nonprofits
government funding
historical institutionalism
Korean NGOs
nonprofit advocacy
organizational legitimacy
organizational networks