The resiliency of Arab authoritarianism and the Arab-Israeli conflict: the United States' role in the cases of Egypt and Jordan

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THE RESILIENCY OF ARAB AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN THE CASES OF
EGYPT AND JORDAN

by

Fayez Yousef Hammad

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)

December 2008

Copyright 2008 Fayez Yousef Hammad

ii

Dedication

To my mother and to the memory of my father

iii

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee chair, Professor Nora
Hamilton. Although not a specialist of Middle East politics, her insightful and at times sharp
critiques provided me with tremendous feedback to strengthen my argument and clarify my
thoughts. She demonstrated great patience, both in assisting me with connecting my argument to
the historical details of the topic, and in dealing with my propensity to push deadlines, for which I
am most grateful. My thanks also go to my other committee members: Professor Richard
Dekmejian for his feedback and numerous discussions over coffee of Middle East politics and the
politics of the field, and Professor Tim Biblarz for agreeing to be on my committee and for his
enthusiasm about my topic.
I would like also to express my debt and gratitude to the late Professor David Heer of
Sociology for encouraging me to pursue my graduate education and for instilling in me the values
of honest and disciplined social research. I also owe Professor Howard Gillman an intellectual
debt for exposing me, during his graduate seminar on Law and Public Policy, to alternative and
critical methods outside the mainstream of political science.
I would like to thank my friends Abdalghafar Almahdi and Katja Hawlitschka for their
support and encouragement. My late father, my mother, and my brothers and sisters have always
given me “my space” in completing my degree, and it is thanks to their faith in me that our tacit
understanding has been fulfilled. But it was my wife Laurie who facilitated a loving and
supportive environment, which enabled me to bring the project to completion. During the last
phase of which, her patience over my “absence” and also putting off house projects on hold has
been unparallel, and I am deeply grateful. Last but not least, our cats Layth and Thai’r also
contributed through their wonderful companionship and late night visits.

iv

Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgments iii

Abstract v

Chapter 1: Introduction: The Puzzle of Arab Authoritarianism in 1
Comparative Perspective

Chapter 2: The International Dimension of Democratization and Authoritarianism 29

Chapter 3: The Development of the Special Relation between the 58
US and Israel

Chapter 4: The Forms and Sources of the US-Israeli 102
Special Relationship

Chapter 5: US Relations with Egypt and Jordan 141

Chapter 6: The post-1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Causal Mechanism of 177
Arab Authoritarianism

Chapter 7: The External Costs of Internal Oppression: The United States, 249
Political Islam, and Authoritarian Client Regimes

Chapter 8: Conclusion 300

Bibliography 310

v

Abstract

This study focuses on the external dimension of the resiliency of authoritarianism in
Egypt and Jordan. It proceeds by eschewing the pre-requisite approaches, which argue that lack
of some condition, such as sufficient economic development or cultural and religious
compatibility with democracy, prevents transition to democracy. Instead, the study follows a
contingency approach, at the center of which lies the authoritarian incumbent’s strategic
calculations over the expected domestic costs of toleration and oppression of the opposition. In
filling the gap in the literature and providing a policy-relevant explanation for Arab
authoritarianism, the study contends that the regime also considers the expected external costs.
A close examination of the historical record revels that the US relationships with Jordan
and Egypt are a function of the US-Israeli special relationship, which itself is a function of
Israel’s perceived strategic value to the US, American-Israeli cultural and political affinity, and
the pro-Israel lobby. In the wake of the devastating Arab defeat in the 1967 War and Israel’s
occupation of Arab territories, and due to this “special” relationship, the US has followed an
Israel-centered approach towards the region and supported Israel’s policies, resulting in the non-
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This significantly accounts for the rise of political Islam
and Arab anti-Americanism. These two currents are further reinforced by the fact that both Egypt
and Jordan reached separate peace treaties with Israel, which left the Palestine problem
unresolved.
Against this backdrop, the United States, in essence, strikes a bargain in a two-level game
with the two authoritarian regimes: at level one Jordan and Egypt preserve their peace treaty with
Israel and support US policies in the region; in exchange, the US provides not only generous
financial support but also political support in the form of non-interference in the regimes’ conduct
vi

toward their domestic opposition. Since these currents (i.e. political Islam and anti-Americanism)
and the US-regime dynamics provide the opposition with its raison d’être, the United States is
provided with an additional rationale to support the regimes: to prevent the mostly Islamist
opposition from coming to power. At level two while the US Congress readily ratifies such a
bargain, Arab authoritarian regimes extract ratification through cooptation, manipulation or
oppression. Fully aware of American calculations and objectives, the regimes in Jordan and
Egypt accurately calculate that there is little or no external cost to oppressing their opposition.

1

Chapter One
Introduction: The Puzzle of Arab Authoritarianism in Comparative
Perspective
This dissertation examines the US role in the resiliency of Arab authoritarian regimes.
To be sure, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the US,
particularly under the Clinton administration, assigned a relatively high priority to the promotion
of democracy across different regions in the world. The US rationale seemed to have been two-
fold: the creation of new markets and the establishment of market-hospitable “zones of peace.”
While the former was based on the purported correlation between economic development and
political development argued by modernization theory, the latter was based on the “democratic
peace” thesis, which claims that democracies, for some intrinsic reasons, do not fight one another.
Unlike other regions, however, the Arab world was not the target of democracy
promotion efforts during the 1990’s. Instead, the US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process
seemed to dominate the US agenda and determine US relations with the Arab world, particularly
the Arab East (i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Occupied Territories).
Indeed, the defeat of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud and the election Yitzhak
Rabin of the Labor Party in 1992 led to the Israeli-PLO Oslo Accord breakthrough, presenting the
Clinton administration with an active peace process and a rationale for serious engagement. The
centrality of the peace process to the US foreign policy approach to the region was such that US
support for the regimes in the region became a function, not of regimes’ progress toward
democratization but, rather, their support for the peace process.
Arab Authoritarianism: the Puzzle and the Approach
The stark contrast between the US emphasis on the peace process in the Arab world, on
the one hand, and the focus on democratization elsewhere, on the other, constitutes the precursor
of research puzzle for this study. Specifically, the study poses the questions: why did the US

2

approach the peace process with such a regional emphasis, why did it ignore the question of
democracy when it came to the Arab world, and was there a relationship between the peace
process and support for the status quo of Arab authoritarianism?
It is important to stress at the outset that this dissertation is not about democracy
promotion in the Arab world or elsewhere and it does not pose these questions in relation to
democracy promotion. To be sure, while the question of democracy promotion must always be
understood within the context of the promoter’s motives, its normative aspect for the promoting
country or the targeted country is not the concern of this study. Nor are the true motives behind
the promoter’s effort, nor the chances of success for the transition to or consolidation of
democracy as a result of the external influences. What concerns us here is the observation that
the United States avoided the question of democracy in the Arab world, irrespective of all
considerations found elsewhere. This peculiar position in the post-Cold era underpins the
contention of this work that the United States perceived its strategic and regional interests to be
served best by the existing authoritarian regimes and that those interests would be harmed by the
alternative, which democracy might usher in.
There is virtual unanimity among scholars of Middle East politics and US foreign policy
towards the region as well as among US policy makers that the United States had three main
objectives in the region for much of the second half of the twentieth century: Soviet containment,
securing the flow of oil, and the security of Israel. While the role of US containment policy in the
resilience of authoritarianism is still the subject of academic debate as a later chapter will engage,
for the post-1989, the Cold War cannot be utilized as an explanation, thus ruling out one of the
three pre-1989 objectives. As for oil, it is also ruled out of consideration in this study for three
reasons. First, the end of the Cold War significantly reduced US anxiety over a possible Soviet
takeover of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf region. Indeed, the US had in place contingency
plans, which included the destruction of oil fields, to prevent such Soviet moves and potential

3

resultant blackmail or economic domination.
1
Second, as will be elaborated upon in the next
chapter, willingness to supply oil to the global market has never been a function of the country’s
regime type (e.g. democratic, authoritarian, etc.). Third, the study focuses on Jordan, which has
no oil, and Egypt, which has oil primarily for domestic consumption. In other words, Jordan and
Egypt—as the two case studies—do not figure into US concerns about oil exports.
The absence of containment from and the irrelevance of oil to the equation of US
strategic considerations as applied to this study leave us with the third objective of ensuring the
security of Israel. The primacy of US interest(s) in relation to authoritarian regimes and their
possible alternatives, and the dominance of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the US framework
for the region, suggest another, new proposition: the importance of Israel and of the support for
Israel in the American determination to support authoritarian regimes and impede the emergence
of the threatening alternative. If such a connection is to be established, some additional questions
need to be addressed: what factors explain the role of Israel in a relationship between the US and
third countries like Jordan and Egypt, why does the Israel objective arise to such relevance, and
what are the exact causal mechanisms which determine US policies towards Arab authoritarian
regimes in the context of the Israel objective? As this study argues, based on a close examination
of the historical record, the special nature of the US-Israeli relationship provides an answer to
some of these questions and forms the basis of the study’s puzzle. The main argument is that the
US-Israeli special relationship accounts for American support for the authoritarian regimes in the
countries under study.
It becomes clear, once its historical development is examined, its attributes are
delineated, and its forms and sources traced, that this special relationship manifests itself in the
strong US support for Israel. As will be emphasized later, there is a distinction to be maintained
between support for Israel’s security and Israel’s policies. American support for Israel’s security

1
Shibley Telhami, The Stakes : America and the Middle East : The Consequences of Power and the Choice
for Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 140-2.

4

may not be unique, since the US would support and defend the security and territorial
independence of many friendly member-states of the United Nations. However, what is unique is
that successive US administrations have invoked the US “ironclad” support for the security and
survival of Israel so frequently, not only because of Israel’s ongoing conflict with the Arabs but
also because it is a commitment deeply rooted in the American consciousness and fully integrated
into the conception of the American national interest. As such, US support for the security of
Israel is a given, is viewed as a constant, and thus is of little explanatory value here. By contrast,
support for Israel’s policies is a different matter and is viewed here as a variable. The fact that it
has not, for different reasons, varied, is where much of the explanation lies. In other words, US
support for Israel’s policies assumed a high value (i.e. strong support), and it accounts for the US
Israeli-centered approach towards the region and its support for authoritarian regimes. Therefore,
based on the foregoing formulations, the dissertation advances the prime hypothesis that given
strong US support for Israeli policies (the independent variable), it is more likely that the United
States will support authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt than without such support, thus
accounting for their resiliency (the dependent variable).
To investigate this proposition, the study submits its two sets of relationships—i.e. US-
Israeli and US-Arab (Egypt and Jordan)—to a systematic historical examination, which traces
these relationships to their origins dating back to the first half of the twentieth century. The
following chapters present evidence to reject the null hypothesis that American support for Israel
had no role in the US approach towards the two countries, thus confirming our proposed
hypothesis. In fact, it is demonstrated that, since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, these two sets of
relationships have been so intertwined that no serious and honest examination can escape the
conclusion that the US special relationship with Israel significantly affects its relations with
Egypt and Jordan. As the United States navigates between these intertwined relationships, its
attitudes towards the regimes are formed, in essence, in response to an anti-American Arab
perspective, which has been itself informed by the United States policies affecting the Arab world

5

and the Arab people. With the devastating Arab defeat in the 1967 War and the resulting Israeli
occupation of Arab territories (i.e. the Sinai, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights),
the United States completed its gradual shift in approach towards the region from a Soviet-
centered (most prevalent under Eisenhower) to an Israel-centered one. The new approach, as
chapter six will demonstrate, has been a central factor in the non-resolution of the Palestine
problem, which has in turn been a major element in the rise of political Islam and Arab anti-
Americanism, two key currents among the political opposition in the Arab world. Against the
backdrop of this reality, Washington provides support for the authoritarian regimes in Amman
and Cairo and promises non-interference in the regimes’ domestic affairs. In exchange, the
regimes protect the peace treaties with Israel, support US policies, and act as a bulwark against
the opposition with its declared rejection to US policies. Herein lies what this study calls the US-
Arab authoritarian bargain, leaving the regimes to oppress the opposition at little or no cost and
thus contributing to the resiliency of authoritarianism.
This formulation, in essence, conceptualizes the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict as the causal mechanism for the proposed hypothesis. It is perhaps worth taking a short
detour to look at the issue from a different angle and to point out that the conflict has also played
a domestic role in the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism. Given its profound consequences, the
conflict has been used and misused by various Arab regimes as the rationale for the subordination
of political reforms to the need to mobilization against the enemy, Israel. Arab regimes have
based (at least some of) their legitimacy on the “sacred mission” of supporting Palestine and the
Palestinians against Israel, “demand[ing] that all society rally behind the quest.”
2
In the same
vein, Larry Diamond and Daniel Brumberg put forth the provocative and specific proposition that
the “future of democracy in the Middle East will remain bleak absent a permanent, peaceful, and

2
Larry Jay Diamond and Daniel Brumberg, "Introduction," in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, ed.
Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2003).

6

mutually negotiated two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”
3
The authors argue that
the “conflict has generated a heavy fog over Arab politics. Arab governments have used it
relentlessly to legitimate their role—by stressing the authenticity of their commitment to
something larger than themselves.” Diamond and Brumberg also share the consensus—felt
widely in the Arab world
4
and recognized by most scholars of the region—that the “conflict
siphons off much energy and passion that Arab intellectuals and political activists might
otherwise devote to political failings closer to home.” The resolution of the conflict would also
strip Islamists (radical and moderate) “one of their most powerful rallying cries.”
5

While the dissertation engages and marshals evidence in support of the premise that
Arab-Israeli conflict is central to these propositions, it does not focus on, nor does it move in the
direction of establishing, the effects of the conflict on the Arab domestic environment as
concluded by Diamond, Brumberg and many others. Instead, this dissertation pushes the
argument further in the other direction by examining and assigning agency to the non-resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, if the emerging consensus is that the conflict impedes
the prospects of democracy and enhances authoritarianism, would it not be productive for both
the scholarly and policy debates to investigate the causes of such costly and undesirable—at at
least to the peoples of the region—outcomes? The answer here is an emphatic yes on both
counts, and this study attempts to do so by exploring the external dimension of the conflict, as it
relates to the role of the United States.

3
Ibid., p. xxiii.

4
For an Arab regional view of the negative impact of the conflict on Arab development see the United
Nations Development Programme, "The Arab Human Development Report 2002 : Creating Opportunities
for Future Generations," (New York: United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab
States, 2002). ———, "The Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society,"
(New York: United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2003), ———,
"The Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World," (New York: United
Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2004).

5
Diamond and Brumberg, "Introduction," p. xxiii.

7

As to how the role of an external power would fit into the calculus of an authoritarian
regime, it is useful to begin with the definition of authoritarianism as a regime type. According to
Juan Linz’ classic definition, under authoritarianism the ruling regime is characterized by
“limited pluralism” and the population by “the absence of extensive intensive political
mobilization.” Once the demand is made by at least a segment of the population for more
pluralism and participation, the emerging opposition and the incumbent regime become the two
main actors on the political stage. As will be developed in the next chapter, what determines the
outcome of the regime-opposition struggle is the regime’s calculus of the costs of toleration vs.
the costs of oppression of such opposition. Conceptualized in this way, the question of
authoritarianism is considered by this work within a “contingency” framework or in a “process
oriented” fashion in that it focuses on the strategic and rational choices of the ruling incumbents.
To be sure, the incumbents’ calculus could become highly complex given that it is a function of
the composition of the regime (e.g. hard-liners, soft-liners, reformers, etc…), the composition of
the opposition (e.g. radical vs. moderate, legal vs. illegal, loyal vs. disloyal), and positions on a
range of contentious issues. Scholarly works examining such dynamics have done so solely
within the domestic setting and thus such a focus is not the topic of this study. However, as far as
this writer is aware, there have been no studies which examine, in a sustained manner, the
international context’s effect on the authoritarian regimes in, at least, Egypt in Jordan. At best
the external context has been alluded to in passing, and the American objective of support for
Israel, in particular, has been relegated mostly to “black box” treatment. In a novel contribution,
this work demonstrates the importance of the US role as defined so far (i.e. in the context of the
non-resolution of the conflict and US Israel-centered approach) and as determined by the US
president and his advisors. In this way the study requires the introduction of the regime’s
calculations of the external costs of oppression. As mentioned above, given the US-Arab
authoritarian bargain, the regimes in Amman and Cairo calculate, accurately, that this cost is
minimal.

8

The theoretical framework for this argument is developed in chapter two and the
empirical evidence developed through the study will be applied to this framework in chapter
seven. To begin the process here, we return to the stark contrast mentioned at the beginning of
the chapter, namely: that between US democracy promotion—albeit laxly at times—across
different regions on the one hand, and the exclusion of the Arab world from such an emphasis
while instead focusing on the peace process, on the other. This contrast is both a reflection and a
reinforcement of another contrasting reality: that of numerous democratic transitions across
countries and regions and their absence in the Arab world. This is what sometimes is referred to
as Arab “exceptionalism” in the context of Samuel Huntington’s third wave of democratization.
Accordingly, we begin by setting the question of Arab authoritarianism in general within these
political realities and the scholarly debate, which attempts to address their causes.
Global Democratization “Skipping” the Arab World
Perhaps no other question has occupied the field of comparative politics in the last three
decades more than the question of democratization. The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship
in 1974 marked the beginning of what Samuel Huntington termed the “third wave”
6
of
democratization.
7
As a result, comparativists have begun studying transitions to democracy
outside the North Atlantic core by employing various methodologies and theoretical formulations.
This multiplicity of explanations for democratization and for the larger regime question (i.e.
“choice of procedures that regulate access to state power”
8
) comes under the rubrics of the
“prerequisites” approaches, “contingency” approaches, or some combination. While work in the
subfields of transitology and consolidology proliferated on many countries and across regions —

6
Phillippe Schmitter (1996) refers to this wave as the fourth. He splits Huntington’s first wave (1828-
1926) into two. In his formulation, the second begins with the establishment of democracies in the
aftermath of World War One. Huntington’s classification is utilized here due to its wider usage and
popularity.

7
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

8
Gerardo Munck, "The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies," World Politics 54, no.
1 (2001): p. 123.

9

i.e. on the “positive” cases-- the realities of the Middle East, or more specifically, the Arab
World
9
, dictated the focus on the absence of both authoritarian breakdowns and democratic
transitions, or on the “negative” cases.
Indeed, shortly after the beginning of the third wave with the transition in Portugal, the
military regime in Greece collapsed, leading to the creation of a parliamentary republic and the
abolishment of the monarchy. Soon after, the death of General Francisco Franco in Spain paved
the way, under the new King Juan Carlos, for a peaceful transition to democracy which
culminated in the ratification of a new constitution, instituting a constitutional monarchy and
bringing parliamentary elections. With the demise of southern Europe’s dictatorships, the “wave”
moved to South America, where the return of the military to the barracks facilitated civilian rule
in many countries. Negotiated pacts and/or external pressure led to more transitions, and with the
end of PRI authoritarian dominance in Mexico in 2000, Cuba was left as the only exception to
democratically-elected governments in the entire region of Latin America.
The collapse of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 marked
the arrival of the third wave in Southeast Asia. Soon after, the military withdrawal in South
Korea, the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987, and massive demonstrations in 1992 in
Thailand all led to successful transitions. By the end of the 1990’s, Cambodia, East Timor,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal had all, with varying degrees and success rates,
experienced transitions to democracy. But perhaps no other global events had a greater impact on
the transition to democracy than the collapse of communism in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The speed at which democratic change swept through Eastern Europe affecting
Warsaw Pact members and former Soviet republics was unparalleled.

9
The Arab world, as defined here includes the 19 states: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Although Comoros, Djibouti, and Somalia are also member-states in the Arab
League, they are excluded from this study since there are virtually no Arabs among their populations, and
they are not part of the Arab political system in the views of the Arab states and external players.

10

Benin’s transition to democracy in 1990 through the National Conference signaled that
the democratization trend was not to be missed in sub-Saharan Africa either. The same year the
apartheid regime in South Africa released Nelson Mandela from his long imprisonment, and
thanks to a transition through negotiated settlement, he was elected president in the newly
instituted democracy. In addition to the three established democracies—Gambia, Botswana, and
Mauritius—the end of the Cold War facilitated a transition to democracy in another dozen or so
countries.
10

It is clear that convergence towards democracy has been global and the third wave has
touched all continents. To appreciate the spread of democratic transitions, the Freedom House
provides a combined political rights/civil liberties scale, through an operationalization of
democracy, which could serve as a rough indication: In 1973, the year before the Portuguese
transition, Freedom House classified 43 countries as “free” or 29% of the total independent
countries; and in 2005, the number of “free” countries more than doubled to 89, or 46% of the
total states.
11

The State of Arab Political Regimes
Huntington defines a wave of democratization as “a group of transitions from
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that
significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction in that period of time.”
12
Huntington
identifies some thirty transitions taking place during a 16-year wave period (1974-1990). With
the end of the Cold war and the arrival of the “wave” to more countries and regimes, the
conventional wisdom would not have envisioned the absence of transitions in the Arab world. If

10
See Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa : Regime Transitions
in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York,
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

11
The Freedom House’s scale combines a 10-question, 3-subcategory, 7-point political rights scale with a
15-question, 4-sub-category, 7-point civil liberties scale. The average rating of the 2 scores represents the
country’s level of freedom, where 1 to 2.5 designates “free,” 3 to 5 “partly free,” and 5.5 to 7 “not free.”

12
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, p. 15.

11

we specify a thirty-year period, from 1974 to 2004, which nearly doubles Huntington’s
timeframe, this expanded period is sufficient to determine whether more countries will join, or if
not, to conclude that in fact the third wave has come to an end, as Larry Diamond has asserted.
13

If the third wave has indeed come to an end, its global reach has affected every region of
the world, except one: the Middle East, or more precisely, the Arab world. Moreover, not only
had none of the Arab states made the transition from non-democratic to democratic regime in
Huntington’s dichotomous sense, but none of them had moved away from authoritarianism. To
demonstrate its dismal state, according to the Polity IV Project
14
, the average democracy indicator
for the Arab world was a mere 0.31 for the year 2003 and that of autocracy was 6.5 on 0-10
scales.
15
In fact, while all world regions had displayed a net increase of democracies and a decline
(towards more freedom) in the 7-point combined Freedom House’s scale of freedom, the Arab
world had lost its only democracy (Lebanon, with the start of its civil war in 1975) and exhibited
a decline from a freedom average rating of 5.15 in 1974 to 5.79 in 2004 as illustrated in Table 1.
To elaborate briefly on the two countries under examination, in Jordan King Hussein
ruled and reigned over Jordan from 1953 until his death in 1999. His son Abdullah succeeded
him and followed the same path. The king is the center of political authority and is the final
arbitrator in the country; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister and the 55 members of the
Senate. As will be elaborated upon in the following chapters, King Hussein dismissed the
democratically-elected parliament and imposed martial law in 1957, many of its elements lasting
until 1989 when he introduced limited liberalization and allowed free election, sweeping Islamists

13
Larry Jay Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996).

14
This is a three-university continuous project to for “coding the authority characteristics of states in the
world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis,“
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

15
Lebanon and Iraq are not included for this year as they were treated as cases of foreign “interruption” and
marked as “system missing.” In addition to the democracy and autocracy indicators, the Polity IV Project
also provides the “polity” indicator/variable by subtracting the latter from the former to produce a unified
scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The Arab world scores an
average of -6.19 on this scale.

12

into control of the constitutionally-weak parliament. Fearful of losing his tight grip, the king
presided over the manipulation of election laws and district gerrymandering so as to dilute the
electoral power of the Islamist opposition and the country’s Palestinian majority, producing
rubber-stamp parliaments.
Table 1: Polity IV and Freedom House Measures in the Arab World

Country
Polity IV 2003 Freedom House 2004
Auto-
cracy
Demo-
cracy
Polity=
Dem-Aut
Political
Rights
Civil
Liberties
Average
PR&CL
Algeria 4 1 -3 6 5 5.5
Bahrain 7 0 -7 5 5 5
Egypt 6 0 -6 6 6 6
Iraq 7 5 6
Jordan 4 2 -2 5 5 5
Kuwait 7 0 -7 4 5 4.5
Lebanon 6 5 5.5
Libya 7 0 -7 7 7 7
Mauritania 6 0 -6 6 5 5.5
Morocco 6 0 -6 5 5 5
Palestine 6 6 6
Oman 8 0 -8 6 5 5.5
Qatar 10 0 -10 6 6 6
Saudi Arabia 10 0 -10 7 7 7
Sudan 6 0 -6 7 7 7
Syria 7 0 -7 7 7 7
Tunisia 5 1 -4 6 5 5.5
UAE 8 0 -8 6 6 6
Yemen 3 1 -2 5 5 5
Average 6.5 0.31 -6.19 5.95 5.63 5.79

To elaborate briefly on the two countries under examination, in Jordan King Hussein
ruled and reigned over Jordan from 1953 until his death in 1999. His son Abdullah succeeded
him and followed the same path. The king is the center of political authority and is the final
arbitrator in the country; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister and the 55 members of the
Senate. As will be elaborated upon in the following chapters, King Hussein dismissed the
democratically-elected parliament and imposed martial law in 1957, many of its elements lasting
until 1989 when he introduced limited liberalization and allowed free election, sweeping Islamists
into control of the constitutionally-weak parliament. Fearful of losing his tight grip, the king

13

presided over the manipulation of election laws and district gerrymandering so as to dilute the
electoral power of the Islamist opposition and the country’s Palestinian majority, producing
rubber-stamp parliaments.
As for Egypt, the country has had three presidents since 1954: Nasser until his death in
1970, Sadat until his assassination in 1981, and Mubarak since then. In five elections for the
People’s Assembly between 1984 and 2000, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) has
scored 87%, 78%, 80%, 93%, and 87% majorities. While hoping to present a façade of
“democracy,” the regime ensures such results by the cynical manipulation of election laws and by
conducting the elections under “layers of fraud” and the omnipresence of the security forces, to
block roads, stuff the ballot boxes, bully, beat, and to even to eliminate opponents, as was the
case in the 1995 election when 36 people were killed.
16
Indeed, in these elections, so “brazen was
the manipulation of the vote that the regime rarely bothered to conceal its fraud.”
17
Since
becoming president in 1981, Mubarak has been selected by this parliament and then elected
through a popular referendum for three more terms (1987, 1993, and 1999) with more than 95%
voting “yes.” In the 2005 the presidential election, the regime did allow direct multi-candidate
elections, but it reserved the right to approve other candidates, and Mubarak still won a reported
86.6% of the vote.
As a defining attribute of authoritarianism, authoritarian regimes prevent political
expression to all, or certain group interests (e.g. ethnic, religious, etc…) within the population.
Accordingly, while the regime in Jordan manipulates the rules of the system to weaken the
political expressions of Islamists and Palestinian-Jordanians, the Egyptian regime not only
manipulates in order to exclude all opposition, but also bans, as a matter of law according to
article 76 of the constitution, the political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood as an

16
Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge [England] ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 124-8.

17
Ibid., p. 127.

14

organization or a party. With this definitional interjection, it is useful at this point to address and
clarify the definitions of concepts related to regime types that underpin this analysis, setting the
stage for pursuing the research questions in the study.
Concepts and Definitions
As the selection of concepts informs the direction of the research project, conceptual
clarity is an essential ingredient to carrying out sound research and arriving at plausible
conclusions. This dissertation engages one of the most important questions in political science:
the regime question or the “choice of procedures that regulate access to state power.”
18
The
foregoing discussion placed the state of Arab polities within the comparative framework of
Huntington’s third wave of democratization. As a result, the emphasis on regime type, and
specifically on the resiliency of Arab authoritarian regimes, also underscores the glaring absence
of both transitions to democracy and democratic regimes. While the focus here is only on
authoritarianism, transitology entails a focus on at least three concepts: “transition” and two
regime types. The very conceptualization of “regime” determines the number of types it may
involve as well as the number of transitions or thresholds required to move between any two
regimes. For example, if our objective is the transition from a non-democracy to a democracy,
the Freedom House classification could entail two thresholds between three regime types: not
free, partially free, and free. Other classifications, such as that of Larry Diamond, include three
transitions over four regime types: authoritarian, pseudo-democratic, electoral, and liberal
democracy.
Again, since the purpose of this study is to address the presence of authoritarianism—i.e.
absence of (transition to) democracy—the type of political regimes will be defined and
considered only in a dichotomous (democratic vs. authoritarian)—instead of a continuous or
graded—fashion, entailing one transition. Consequently, the liberalization process (i.e., the
expansion of political space) and its various manifestations in different Arab polities such as

18
Munck, "The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies," p. 123.

15

Brumberg’s “liberalized autocracy”
19
in Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, or Robinson’s “defensive
liberalization”
20
in Jordan, while illuminating, do not begin to resemble the process of
democratization, much less reach the threshold of transition to democracy. Such studies engage
in an exercise of conceptual stretching which produces what Collier and Levitsky have aptly
labeled “democracy with adjectives” (or autocracy with adjectives). More important, they also
begin with the promise of providing an explanation for authoritarianism but end up engaging in
describing one or another attribute of authoritarianism.
It is often the case that authoritarianism, as a nondemocratic regime type, is
conceptualized as a residual category or in reference to attributes of democracy that are absent.
Indeed, one source of the confusion over the stages of democratization is the lack of clear and
consistent definition of democracy itself. To be sure, the concept of democracy has been the
subject of debate since Plato and therefore has multitude of definitions. The most widely utilized
modern definition has been Joseph Schumpeter’s minimal definition of democracy, or what is
known as electoral democracy. In rejecting the “classical doctrine of democracy,” Schumpeter
advances “another theory of democracy,” or the “democratic method” defined as the “institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”
21
Robert Dahl raises the minimum bar of
what constitutes democracy by identifying eight guarantees or requirements in order to achieve
“preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government,”
22
thus rendering democracy the
“ideal” and “polyarchy,” as he calls it, the closest to that ideal. Dahl then arranges these eight
requirements along two theoretical dimensions of democracy: opposition or public contestation

19
Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002).

20
Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," International Journal of Middle East Studies
30, no. 3 (1998).

21
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Third ed. (New York: Haper Colophon
Books, 1950), p. 269.

22
Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1971),
p. 3.

16

and participation. It is noteworthy, as will be addressed in the next chapter, that it is the
authoritarian regime’s calculated costs of tolerating vs. oppressing this opposition as it demands
participation, that determines the possibility of the regime’s breakdown. Once the external costs
of oppression are entered into the regime’s calculations, this conception provides the essence of
the model relied upon for this study.
To return to Dahl’s two dimensions, Diamond delineated a third necessary dimension
from among Dahl’s eight conditions: “civil liberty.”
23
To avoid the “fallacy of electoralism” and
in a further elaboration on Dahl’s conception, Terry Lynn Karl adds a fourth “military-civilian
dimension,” based on experiences from Latin America, and advances a useful “middle-range”
definition of democracy: “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as
citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled
elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and
limited military prerogatives.”
24
Although it lacks the deep historical relevance characteristic of
Latin America, the military-civilian dimension is nonetheless relevant in Egypt and, to a lesser
degree, in Jordan.
The other value in the “regime type” variable under consideration is authoritarianism, the
definition of which may not be as contested once the value of “democracy” has been clearly
defined. Given his classic work, any discussion of authoritarianism must begin with Juan Linz’s
classic definition. In analyzing the authoritarian regime in Spain under Franco, Linz relied on the
concepts and classifications of democracy and totalitarianism to place authoritarian systems
between the two. Based on four “constituent characteristics” or dimensions of regime types
(pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership) he defined authoritarian systems as:

23
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), p. 8.

24
Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23, no. 1
(1990).

17

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and
guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without intensive or extensive political
mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a
small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable
ones.
25

In more recent work, Linz has acknowledged that the three-type classification of regimes
has became less useful given that the number of authoritarian regimes has exceeded the total
number of democratic and totalitarian regimes and given that authoritarianism has proved more
resilient than initially conceptualized.
26
Linz therefore expands his classification of regimes into
five types: democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post- totalitarianism, and sultanism.
27
In
addressing authoritarian regimes, Linz focuses on only two regime dimensions—the limited
degree of political pluralism and the degree of apathy and demobilization. He then created five-
subtype authoritarian regimes: bureaucratic-military; institutionalized or “organic statism;”
mobilizational in post- democratic; mobilizational post-independence; and post-totalitarian.
Linz argues that these “modern” subtypes of authoritarian regimes should be
distinguished from other non-democratic regimes whose basis of legitimacy is “traditional,” e.g.
Morocco and Jordan.
28
Linz’s distinction here is based on his focus on South European and Latin
American cases after the breakdown of their traditional societies. To this extent, this distinction
may be valid. However, it does not follow that regimes that continue to rely on “traditional”
sources of legitimacy should be classified separately solely on this basis, given that their
attributes are clearly authoritarian. Interestingly, once he refers to the works of Middle East

25
Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p.
159.p. This definition is based on Linz’s 1964 work on Spain, which was reproduced in the cited volume.

26
Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),
pp. 38-9.

27
Ibid., pp. 40-54.

28
Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, p. 10.

18

scholars, Linz in a footnote latter in the same work places Morocco with the post-dependence
sub-type of authoritarianism.
29
Following J.C. Hurewitz, our case study Jordan is classified as an
authoritarian regime of modernizing monarchy.
According to Linz’s classification, Egypt is a mobilizational single-party authoritarian
regime. Barbara Geddes devises a typology of personalist, military, and single-party regimes,
and allows for intermediate categories (e.g. personalist-military). She codes the regime of
Egypt’s Mubarak as a single- (or hegemonic) party regime. In short, while authoritarian regimes
may shift within, or share, different subtypes and typologies, the authoritarian regimes in Jordan
and Egypt are unequivocally authoritarian.
Regime transition is the other crucial, if not central, concept in this project, for it
constitutes the threshold of change between regimes and, as a result, must be clearly defined. In
their pioneering Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter, while
acknowledging transitions among all regime types, define democratic transition as “the interval
between …the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and …the
installation of some form of democracy.”
30
However, since such an interval includes a
liberalization process which may stall or be reversed (e.g. the experiences of Egypt under Sadat’s
in the mid-1970s, and Jordan), the benchmark for a transition lies at the end of this volatile period
and is manifested by fair and free “founding elections” with, as Karl points out, an uncertain
outcome and in the context of the creation (voluntarily or otherwise) of space for civil society.
31

According to Przeworski a “crucial moment” in the democratic transition “is the crossing of the
threshold beyond which no one can intervene to reverse the outcomes of the formal political

29
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe, pp. 287-8, footnote 60.

30
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 6.

31
terry Lynn Karl, "From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule ", ed. CDDRL Working Papers (Stanford: Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law,
Standford Institute on International Studies 2005 ), p. 7.

19

process.” He adds the essential condition that “democratization is an act of subjecting all interests
to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty.”
32

Given the difficulty of marking the beginning of this uncertain period, productive
assessment and conceptual understanding are possible only in retrospect, at the conclusion of
transitions. Otherwise, the analyses will either fall into the fallacy of a linear progression of
liberalization towards democracy or, much worse, into the fantasy of predictive knowledge
towards future transitions. However, as many experiences of the third wave have demonstrated,
once countries pass through the transition period with the founding elections, it is far from certain
that they will be successful during the next stage of democracy consolidation or, although the
threshold is now higher, that they will not revert to authoritarianism. Therefore, according to the
above defined concepts of democracy, transitions, and authoritarianism, none of the Arab
countries, is a democracy and none has experienced a democratic transition: they all fall squarely
within the definition and classification of authoritarianism. Furthermore, irrespective of the state
and points of destination of third wave transitions, the crucial distinguishing factor is that Arab
authoritarian regimes (including Jordan and Egypt) never risked the uncertain outcomes
associated with political transitions. It is because of the unwillingness to submit to uncertainty (a
la Przeworski) that the regimes in Jordan and Egypt have refused to consider transitions to
democracy. While it is clear such risks could mean the end of these regimes, what is less
analyzed, and what this dissertation will attempt to address, is how the United States perceives
such risks and uncertainties, and how its strategic interests affect the choices made (and not
made) by the two Arab regimes as they continue to preserve authoritarianism and resist
democracy.

32
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market : Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America, Studies in Rationality and Social Change (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), p. 14.

20

Explanations for Authoritarianism in the Arab World
Before beginning to examine the role of the United States within a framework of the
international dimension of authoritarianism and the resiliency of Arab authoritarian regimes, it is
useful to place this approach in contrast to alternative explanations. This section provides a
critical analysis of some of these purported explanations, which fall under the rubric of the
prerequisite approaches to democratization. Proponents of these approaches-- the role of
culture/religion, the role of civil society, and the role of economic development--have argued that
a deficiency or a shortage in these factors is what accounts for Arab authoritarianism.
The Poverty of Cultural and Religious Explanations
The absence of a transition to democracy in the Arab world was a major reason that
scholars of comparative politics working on democratization marginalized if not completely
omitted discussion of developments in the region from major works.
33
Samuel Huntington, one
of those who addressed this phenomenon, accurately predicted that “[a]mong Islamic countries,
particularly those in the Middle East, the prospects of democratic development seem low.”
Relying on Daniel Pipes, his explanation derived from the conditionality of the developmental
thesis and the region’s cultural “exceptionalism,” as he declared that “Islam…has not been
hospitable to democracy.”
34
Such formulations constitute the major parts of Bernard Lewis’
(Pipes’ mentor) “master narrative.” Propagating this narrative for more than five decades, Lewis
sees the West engaging in its last stages of struggle for dominance over Islam. It is the very
concept of “the clash of civilizations” that Huntington was later to pick up in his influential
Foreign Affairs article (1993) and book-length elaboration, The Clash of Civilizations and the

33
O'Donnell, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives., ———, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, ed.
Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc.,1995). Juan and Alfred Stepan Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996). Larry and Marc Plattner Diamond, The Global Divergence of
Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

34
Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic," Political Sciecne Quarterly 99, no. 2
(1984).

21

Remaking of the Modern World.
35
He assigns primacy to the role of Christianity in western
civilization which contributed the duality of “God and Caesar,” and, therefore, enabled the
emergence of democracy. However, “[i]n Islam, God is Caesar,” and, hence, the prerequisites of
democracy are lacking. In the same vein, Elie Kedourie faulted “Arab/Muslim essentialism” for
the fact that “there is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world—which are the political
traditions of Islam—which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of
constitutional and representative government.”
36

The literature criticizing the cultural hypothesis to explain democracy, authoritarianism,
and other political phenomena is vast. It is important to underscore that all cultural explanations
share the methodological fallacy of tautology. What the proponents of this approach argue is that
people, states, or any phenomenon under study “behave this way because they are this way.”
Orientalists and cultural reductionists presuppose a static nature of the people and sociopolitical
settings in the Arab/Muslim world since the advent of Islam, and portray a region detached from
historical transformations and unaffected by profound dislocations as a result of imperialism,
colonialism, and occupation. Consequently, such a mode of inquiry, as Lisa Anderson argues,
falters in the face of complexity and reflects “an inability to think critically about change,”
37

hence calling into question the soundness of its applicability and underscoring the poverty of its
explanatory power in studying the absence of democracy and the presence of authoritarianism in
the Arab world.

35
———, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.,
1996).

36
Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, D. C.: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 1992).

37
Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," in
Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul
Noble (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 89.

22

Civil Society is not the Issue
While some draw from the cultural hypotheses and argue the inapplicability of the
concept of “civil society” because Arab/Muslim societies “manifest at most a feeble yearning” for
it,
38
a more sympathetic view by scholars such as Augustus Norton, in the influential two
volumes, Civil Society in the Middle East, argues that although the theoretical formulation of
“civil society” is an historically European-developed concept, it is indeed appropriate to apply it
to the Middle East, thanks to its “heuristic value.” Located between the state and the individual,
civil society, in its organizational/associational dimension, according to Norton, is “where a
mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups come
together to provide a buffer between state and citizen.”
39
Acknowledging tolerance and pluralism
or “civility” and the concept of “citizenship” within state-society relations as other dimensions of
civil society, Norton and his contributors identified the presence of many facets of civil society in
the region and celebrated, prematurely as it turned out, the liberalization processes initiated in the
early to mid 1990’s by some regimes such as those in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Yemen.
One problem with the civil society formulation lies in the assumption made, it least
implicitly, by many of the contributors and proponents of this approach, and explicitly by Norton,
that it is “a necessary condition to democracy.”
40
Observing the wave of democratization moving
across different regions with envy, many Middle East specialists, mostly out of well-intentioned
sentiments towards the region and its peoples, exaggerated the potential impact of the top-down
liberalizing orchestrations and mistook the “civil society” manifestation as an early and necessary
stage of the transition to democracy. But what accounts for this “irrational exuberance” may be

38
Ernest Gellner, quoted in Ibid., p. 12.

39
Augustus Richard Norton, "Introduction," in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. Augustus Richard
Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p. 7.

40
Ibid., p. 9.

23

related to some deeper historical and epistemological misdiagnoses as well. Alluding to the role
of external factors, Lisa Anderson argues that the “end of the Cold War had its particular dynamic
in the Middle East and our failure to capture it is a measure of how little we understood its role in
shaping politics in the region in the first place.” Perhaps it is also the discrepancy between this
lack of understanding and the appreciation of the profound impact the end of the Cold War had
on other regions that caused theoretical dislocation. Therefore, it is no “wonder that [Norton’s]
contributors retreated to description …instead of developing the common analytical …framework
that would have permitted, perhaps required, comparison with other times and places in the
world, thereby enabling formulation and testing of explanatory hypotheses.”
41

By the late 1990’s, however, the fact that not only had democracy not arrived but neither
had liberalization had a sobering effect on the “democracy enthusiasts,” as Anderson labeled
them. Consequently, while Norton later still held to the centrality of the “civil society” concept
for “a fuller understanding of how [not why] authoritarianism persists,” he attached its necessary
conditionality to the durability of democracy rather than to the transition to democracy.
42

Although the presence of civil society in the quantitative sense (e.g. the presence NGOs and
external funding for them) is bountiful in the Arab world or as one observer put it, the problem
may be of “too much civil society, too little politics,”
43
powerful ruling elites make sure to keep
the qualitatively meaningful civil society (i.e. that which is capable of challenging the incumbent
regime) in short supply. Thus, a weak civil society is a manifestation, rather than an explanation,
of authoritarianism.

41
Ibid., p. 5.

42
———, "Associational Live: Civil Society in Authoritarian Political Systems," in Area Studies and
Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics, ed. Mark Tessler (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1999), p. 32.

43
Vickie Langohr, "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,"
Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004).

24

The Role of Economic Factors
The prerequisite of certain economic-structural conditions has also been advanced as an
explanation for the presence or absence of democracy. A pioneering proponent of the
developmental or modernization thesis, Seymore Martin Lipset postulated that “the more well-to-
do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy.”
44
Measured in terms of indices of
wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, Lipset found strong a correlation between
economic development and democracy. Yet, along with many other scholars, Lipset himself
moved from seeing a correlation of conditions/requisites in democracies to attributing causation
to certain preconditions/prerequisites in prospective democracies. As Dankwart Rustow argued
in a seminal article, this correlational finding could be useful to the “functional” question of how
a democracy can be sustained, but not to the “genetic” question of how a democracy comes into
existence.
45
Indeed, the empirical evidence from countries such as Bangladesh, India, and other
new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa presents a challenge to the developmental thesis and to
its applicability, particularly to the Arab authoritarian countries that enjoy relatively high levels of
GNP and socio-economic conditions. Furthermore, in a comprehensive study of more than a 40-
year period and of more than one hundred countries coverage, Prezworski and his collaborators
established that economic preconditions are great predictors of the survivability of democracy but
not of transitions.
46

Also using a political economy argument the “rentier” state theory has been advanced to
explain the lack of democracy in the Arab world. Given its heavy dependence on nonproductive,
external revenues from oil production, the state in the region is in less need of domestic extraction

44
Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): p. 75. P. 75

45
Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2, no.
2 (1970).

46
Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub, and Fernardo Limongi, Democracy and
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).

25

and, therefore, is less accountable to the people and their political demands. This non-productive
rent is also collected by non oil-producing countries in the region in the form pipeline transit fees,
foreign aid, and labor remittances (which filter through the private sector). Instead of peoples’
demand of “no taxation without representation,” the threat of rulers becomes, as Giacomo Luciani
put it, “no taxation, no representation.” John Waterbury (while partially advocating the
cultural/religious hypothesis), has challenged the taxation effect of the rentier theory on the
grounds that Middle Eastern countries are not undertaxed and that they collect more tax revenues
than those in Latin America.
47
Even though much of the tax is indirect in the region, the theory
does not explain India’s democracy, for example, where indirect taxes constitute more than 75
percent of its total revenues, or Turkey’s most recent transition to democracy precisely during a
period of declining taxes as a proportion of GNP.
As a result, while Waterbury concluded that “neither historically nor in the twentieth
century is there much evidence that taxation has evoked demands that governments account for
their use of tax monies,”
48
he still called for further empirical investigation into the dynamic
relationship between taxation and political demands. Michael Ross undertook such an
investigation and, in the context of a study addressing whether oil hinders democracy, he asserted
affirmative causality, seeming to minimize the significance of one of his own conclusions that
“tax increases have only short-term effects on democracy: people tend to respond to tax hikes
right away or not at all.”
49
Even when people protest against tax increases, which take the form of
lifting subsidies on basic commodities, as happened in Jordan, for example, the regime introduced
only a managed, or defensive liberalization, as Robinson labeled it.

47
John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the
Middle East," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed.
Ghassan Salame (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994).

48
Ibid., p. 29.

49
Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy," World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): p. 349.

26

Of more salience is the ability to secure the financial means to maintain the domestic
security and intelligence services to suppress potential opposition and discourage political
demands not only by oil-producing countries (which Ross’s statistical analysis supported) but
also by other less wealthy rentier-economy countries in the region. In fact in the mukhabarat
(security services) state of the Arab world the military, with large budgets (as a percentage of the
GNP), is there not only to deter external threats; it has also been utilized to suppress domestic
opposition in Jordan and Egypt among other Arab states. Indeed, it is the hallmark of any
authoritarian regime first to ensure the solvency of its coercive apparatuses in order to defend
itself. The decision to oppress, however, is a function not only of the regime’s financial resources
but also of its perceived domestic and international costs, which are generally low for Arab
countries.
Into the External Environment
The primacy of the international, and predominately political, factors satisfactorily
explains not only the financial well-being of the Arab authoritarian regimes but also the very
economic structure of the states over which they preside. Lisa Anderson utilizes the concept of
“soft-budget constraints” to describe the political economy of the Arab countries. In such an
economy, instead of the typical bottom line considerations of trade, investment, industrialization,
and taxation, it is the non-economic, non-market, politically-derived, mostly internationally-
defined sort of transactions that not only dominate domestically but also link the country with the
world economy. Considerations of “foreign aid, debt relief, even oil prices, are not set by market
mechanisms so much as they are determined by the political needs of actors outside the region.”
Indeed, in reference to the United States and the clash of civilization thesis, Anderson adds that
the “security of Israel has trumped the desire for human rights and democracy on the part of
Huntington's ‘most powerful democratic states’ for decades.”
50
Such a configuration has the

50
Lisa Anderson, "Counterpoint: Arab Democracy; Dismal Prospects," World Policy Journal 18, no. 3
(2001): p. 56.

27

double effect of relieving the authoritarian regime from its accountability to the people and
increasing its capacity to coerce them, on the one hand, and ensuring regime compliance with the
objectives of external actors, particularly the United States, on the other.
Chapter two addresses the role of these external factors within a comparative perspective.
It traces the theoretical roots of the role of external factors in domestic politics and particularly in
fostering/maintaining regime types. In other words, this study examines the international sources
of domestic politics and then advances a theoretical model for incorporating the external
constraints/incentives into the calculations of the authoritarian incumbents. This dissertation
rejects the above-discussed prerequisite-based, structural approaches as unsatisfactory
explanations. Short of a revolution or external intervention, the only perequisite for the peaceful
breakdown of an authoritarian regime lies in the contingency of the incumbent’s willingness to
allow its breakdown.
Outline of Dissertation
Given the puzzle and the approach outlined in the first section of this chapter and using
the theoretical framework developed in chapter two, chapter three explores the historical
evolution of the US-Israeli relationship into a special one across successive administrations.
Chapter four provides empirical evidence of the relationship’s political, economic, and military
forms, demonstrating its special nature. It also explores the three sources of this relationship and
advances a model to understand and assess their importance: political-cultural affinity, the
perception of Israel as a strategic asset, and the pro-Israel lobby. Chapter five traces the history
of Western encounters with the Arab world, particularly with Egypt and Jordan. It then uses this
context as the backdrop to examine US relations with these two Arab countries, particularly
during the eventful 1950’s. Chapter six presents in details what this study identified as the causal
mechanism of the proposed hypothesis: the Arab-Israeli conflict since shortly before the June
1967 Arab-Israeli War. Special emphasis is placed on the emergence of UN Resolution 242 as a
new frame of reference for the conflict, the role and evolution of the PLO, and the role of Israeli

28

settlements. These issues will be addressed in the context of the US role in the non-resolution of
the Arab-Israel conflict. Chapter seven reintroduces the theoretical model developed in chapter
two and evaluates the external costs of oppression, thus explaining an important dimension of the
resiliency of the authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt. The concluding chapter briefly
summarizes the findings of the study, outlines some policy implications, and assesses the
dissertation’s conclusions.

29

Chapter Two
The International Dimension of Democratization and Authoritarianism
The various explanations overviewed in the first chapter for the authoritarian resiliency
and democracy deficit in the Arab World are all domestic-politics driven. The pre-requisite
approaches of culture, economic development, socioeconomic conditions, and civil society all fall
short of providing satisfactory explanations of the state of political affairs and authoritarian
regimes in the Arab world.
With the end of the Cold War and the democratic transitions that swept Eastern Europe,
the international dimension of democratization has risen in importance, even in re-evaluating
perspectives on earlier transitions in Latin America. While it is true that no country has
experienced such transformative changes among the Arab countries, the study of the lack of
democracy in the Arab world with its heavy emphasis on domestic factors seems to lag behind in
appreciating the increasingly important role external factors play. It is rather peculiar for scholars
studying the Arab world to mostly continue to ignore their impact. One reason for such an
omission may be related to what Schmitter referred to as the “deeply rooted paradigm divide”
between the study of comparative politics and international relations. Where the study of
democratization and regime types is the prerogative of the former and the focus on external
factors is that of the latter, the analysis of external factors on democracy promotion has been that
of neither and instead, as Thomas Carothers pointed out, has been mostly left to policy makers.
1

The disconnect becomes acute for area- and country- study specialists who allocate considerable
time to learning the local language, cultivating local sources, having to travel to study their

1
See Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad : The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1999), ———, Critical Mission : Essays on Democracy Promotion
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), Thomas Carothers and Marina
Ottaway, Uncharted Journey : Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, Global Policy Books
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace : Brookings Institution Press, distributor,
2005).

30

independent variable, drawing more into the domestic dynamics of the political setting, and thus
focusing primarily on the domestic developments of liberalization.
External Factors and the Study of Arab Regimes
As political change in the Arab world did not move beyond, in fact retreated from,
liberalization, attempts to construct comparisons with regions in transitions to democracy became
less illuminating and, as a result, a methodological fallacy was set. Since, by definition, much of
the literature on the transition to democracy focuses on factors causing its arrival or success, cases
of non-democratizing countries become understudied. The problem of selection on the dependent
variable in such models inhibits sound testability of the independent variables and undermines
their wider generalization to the excluded cases of “failure.” Furthermore, in the context of the
absence of democratic transitions in the Arab world, when scholars in the region paid attention to
examining the absence of democracy and authoritarianism, they draw heavily on democratization
models biased towards the exclusion of external factors.
The few studies that focused on, or at least addressed, external factors have only done do
in a superficial manner thus failing to probe them fully or had missed a crucial part of the
equation. In a major work
2
, a section addressed the external context in which Gabriel Ben-Dor,
while acknowledging that the protracted nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict has had negative
implications for democracy in the Arab world, argues that it is ultimately domestic factors that
stand in the way of diffusing democracy into the Arab world in the aftermath of the Cold War. In
addition to the role of external rent, Gregory Gause’s chapter identified the role of the prevalence
of regional conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israel conflict in the Arab Mashriq (the Arab East).
Indeed, Arab regimes have utilized the conflict with Israel to justify their authoritarianism by

2
F. Gregory Gause III, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World "
in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and
Paul Noble (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), Rex Brynen, "The Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan
" in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Comparative Experiences ed. Bahgat
Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

31

representing it, in the words of Waterbury, as a “sacred mission”
3
in the national narrative,
claiming that any calls for democratization by oppositional forces will cause disunity,
distractions, and ultimately defeat.
However, this explanation falls short for two reasons. First, while it is true that the
conflict with Israel to some degree was used by Nasser in Egypt in the 1960s and is still being
used by the Assad regime in Syria, it cannot be said of the current regimes in Egypt and Jordan
since they signed peace treaties with Israel in 1978 and 1994, respectively. As such, military
conflict with and public mobilization against Israel are not options these regimes would consider.
However, what could be said is that peace with Israel indeed did not lead to democracy in either
country. While Gause terminates the argument prematurely to weaken the conflict-
authoritarianism link,
4
Laurie Brand took the argument a step further in examining Jordan’s de-
liberalization in the wake of its peace treaty with Israeli. Given the context of the close multi-
dimensional ties between Jordan and Palestine, the regime’s peace treaty and normalization drive
with Israel faced popular opposition because they were carried out against the backdrop of the
continuing conflict and lack of peace with the Palestinians.
5
Secondly and relatedely, although it
has domestic and regional implications, the Arab-Israeli conflict has also a paramount global
connection (to the United States, particularly) and, as a result, for studies to ignore the impact of
this dimension is to render their analyses incomplete and unsatisfactory.
Two recent studies on authoritarianism addressing or touching upon the role of external
factors in the region warrant special attention. Eva Bellin, in a study examining the robustness of
authoritarianism, addressed the role of external players. Correctly rejecting the prerequisite

3
John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the
Middle East," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed.
Ghassan Salame (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p. 33.

4
Gause III, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World ".pp. 302-3.

5
Laurie A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity," Journal of Palestine Studies 24, no. 4
(1995): p. 65.

32

hypotheses (culture, Islam, civil society, and modernization thesis), she argues that the
exceptional nature of the region’s resilient authoritarianism lies in the regimes’ robust coercive
apparatus, which in turn is a function of the regimes' fiscal health, institutionalization of this
coercive apparatus, level of popular mobilization, and international support network. However,
these security apparatuses that ensure low level of mobilization are defining, rather than
explanatory, features of authoritarianism. It is worth mentioning that such a problem seems to be
prevalent in institutionalist approaches which focus on opposition-ruler dynamics; manipulation
by incumbents of parties, parliaments, and civil society; and regime reliance on survival
strategies. While such studies are penetrating in addressing mostly the “how” question, they
hardly engage the “why” question of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) resilient
authoritarianism.
6
Furthermore, these approaches describe authoritarian regimes intending, or
maneuvering to keep power. Perhaps, the simplest, if not ironically the most powerful, answer as
to why authoritarian Arab leaders endure, is because they want to. This dissertation argues that
outside forces enable them to do so.
Of more relevance to this study, Bellin correctly argues that the Middle East was the only
exception to democracy promotion because of America’s “multiple security concerns that
survived the Cold War.”
7
Yet, as these concerns include the long standing reliability of the oil
supply and the relatively recent addition of the “Islamist threat”, to exclude the universally
accepted security of Israel
8
from what Michael Hudson labeled the “holy trinity” of American
interests (in addition to oil and Soviet containment), is to constrict the argument and to diminish

6
Russell E. Lucas, Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan : Domestic Responses to External
Challenges, 1988-2001, Suny Series in Middle Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2005), Ellen Lust-Okar, "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political
Opposition," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004), Vickie Langohr, "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little
Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004).

7
Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): p. 148.

8
Bellin delegates the designation that “[p]reservation of Israel’s security might be a third concern” only to
a footnote.

33

the explanatory power of the model. Contrary to her assertion, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been
not only (mis)used by various Arab regimes as a rationale for suppression and impediment to
democracy emergence; but also, and more importantly, Washington employs as a scale where
Arab regimes stand on the US-defined approach to solving the conflict in order to determine its
relations with virtually all Arab regimes. Specifically, the more supportive Arab regimes are to
the US-sponsored “peace process” the more supportive the United States is to them, warts and all.
This, along with the United States special commitments to Israel’s dominance over all Arab states
during war and peace, will continue to make the Arab-Israeli conflict paramount to our
understanding of Arab authoritarianism.
Appreciating Bellin’s focus on the authoritarian regime’s coercive apparatus, Jason
Brownlee deemphasizes the “exceptional” nature of the exercise of coercion in MENA in
comparison with other regions and emphasizes the importance of external players. He provides
evidence from four personalistic MENA regimes—Syria (1982), Tunisia (1987), Iraq (1991), and
Libya (1993)—to argue that the absence of constraints by and independence from foreign patrons
enabled these regimes to oppress opposition and, consequently, re-stabilize and survive in the
wake of crisis. Alluding to other manifestations of the role of external players that may shed light
on authoritarianism in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Brownlee glosses over the
importance of US foreign policy objectives—including Israel’s role—to explain its resilience. In
fact most studies examining Arab authoritarianism that address the US support for Israel in the
protracted Arab-Israeli conflict
9
do so only briefly or in a gloss-over fashion, and tend to
approach this explanation as a black box phenomenon without further examination. This
dissertation aims to open the black box and unpack the United States objective of its strong

9
Lisa Anderson, "Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft Budgets," Journal of
International Affairs 49, no. 1 (1995), ———, "Counterpoint: Arab Democracy; Dismal Prospects," World
Policy Journal 18, no. 3 (2001). Larry Jay Diamond and Daniel Brumberg, "Introduction," in Islam and
Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), Burhan Ghalioun, "The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism "
Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004).

34

support for Israel to determine their effects on Arab authoritarian regimes. It is essential to
clarify that the variable “US support for Israel” as used throughout this dissertation refers only to
Israeli policies in relations to the Arab-Israeli conflict. US support for Israel’s existence as a state
is constant and assumed as a given. It is the support for polices, not the existence, of Israel that
invokes Arab-Israeli conflict as the causal mechanism into operation.
The Genesis of External-Internal Linkages
Excluding external factors from consideration has not been restricted to the analysis of
democratic transitions and regime change. The entire field of comparative politics has, by and
large, suffered from the same exclusion given the deep divide separating it from the field of
international politics. As this study focuses on the role of the United States in the resiliency of
authoritarianism in the Arab World, it provides a demonstration for both the external-internal and
comparative-international politics linkages. James Rosenau was one of the pioneer scholars to
shed light on what he phrased “linkage politics.” Although he conceptualized linkage as “any
recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one [domestic] system and is reacted to in
another,” his focus—the dependent variable—was still the foreign policy behavior of the nation-
state.
10

As such, Rosenau’s formulation is consistent with Kenneth Waltz’ second image of
international politics. In his classical theoretical analysis, Waltz argues that the causes of war are
found simultaneously in three images (or levels of analysis): the nature of man, the nature of the
state, and the nature of the international system. While human behavior and internal structure of
the state—the first and second images, respectively—describe the forces that determine policy, it
is the third image’s anarchic nature of the international system that formulates the framework

10
James N. Rosenau and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of
International Studies., Linkage Politics; Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems
(New York,: Free Press, 1969).

35

and, therefore, accounts for much of the understanding of international politics.
11
Ultimately, in
such a world where “wars occur because there is northing to prevent them,”
12
states attempt to
balance their power vis-à-vis their adversaries through growth or alliances, thus leading either to
peace if power parity is reached, or to war if imbalance of power distribution prevails. This
“power of balance” perspective which dominates the realist approach in international politics is
obviously not the immediate concern of this dissertation. However, Waltz’ positioning of the
second image as an independent (if not only intervening) variable in the question of causes of war
is instructive, although not before a major conceptual revision.
Peter Gourevitch provides such a revision in his seminal article The Second Image
Reversed. Concluding that the literature addressing international-domestic politics interactions
has tilted heavily to the side of IR specialist, he presents the “comparativist’s perspective” by
arguing that just as domestic structure is seen as a cause of international politics or foreign policy,
it could also be a consequence of them, thus reversing Waltz’ second image.
13
While invasion
and occupation present an extreme manifestation of the impact of external forces on internal
structure, as was the case, for example, with Germany and Japan after WW II, Hungry in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Iraq in 2003, the instrument of “meddling” as the United States
pursued in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, is also important. Ideas and ideology also play a role in
the dynamics of political development such as the conflict of Western democracy with
communism or fascism, and more recently, at least the perception of conflict with Political Islam
or “Islamism.” The international state system and the international economy are two other

11
Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis (New York,: Columbia University
Press, 1959).

12
Ibid., p. 232.

13
Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,"
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): p. 882.

36

important and most utilized aspects of external factors. “Put more simply, political development
is shaped by war and trade.”
14

These various forms of external influences impact and produce a variety of domestic
outcomes. While specific events, specific decisions, and specific policies are all important
elements of such outcomes, Gourevitch argues they are shaped by two other and more enduring
outcomes of regime type and domestic coalition pattern. In other words, any or a combination of
these external factors—foreign meddling, ideas and ideology, the international system and the
international economy—produces or impacts one or more of the outlined domestic outcomes. Of
this complex matrix of influences and outcomes, only the international state system-regime type
link is of most interest to this dissertation. Regime type, by definition, entails the shape of the
institutional structure and the procedures the ruling elite follow in decision making, and it is
defined here in terms of the democracy-authoritarian binary, as outlined in the introductory
chapter. The international system side of the equation is anchored within the balance of power
and anarchic nature of the international environment which, once the second image is reversed,
define and impact these domestic political developments through different mechanisms.
As Gourevitch pointed out and Gabriel Almond later elaborated, it was the late 19
th
-early
20
th
century German historian, Otto Hintze who first fully developed within a comparative
historical perspective a model that privileged the external environment in understanding the
organization of the state. Building on the work of his mentor the Cambridge historian John
Robert Seeley, Hintze studied the impact of both class structure and external ordering of states on
the armed forces, ministerial government, and representative institutions as internal features of
the state.
15
In a frontal attack on many political theorists including Aristotle, Machiavelli and
Marx for their exclusive emphasis on internally-based explanations, Hintze concluded that it is a

14
Ibid.: p. 883.

15
Gabriel A. Almond, "The International-National Connection," British Journal of Political Science 19, no.
2 (1989): pp. 242-3.

37

“one-sided exaggeration and therefore false to consider class conflict the only driving force in
history”
16
and that the “general law holds that the spirit and essence of internal politics is
dependent on the external conditions of the state.”
17
The formulation that “the degree of liberty
will be inversely proportional …to the degree of [external] pressure”
18
constituted what Almond
dubbed the “Seeley-Hintze Law,” out of which came the insight that the geo-strategic location
and standing of a state influence its internal political organization.
A classic example is England, which thanks to the English Channel, was spared the need
for a standing army, and instead relied for security on maritime power which could not be used
domestically thus enabling the development of constitutional political system. By contrast,
Prussia (and other continental European countries) had open frontiers thus requiring standing
armies which could be used not only for security against external threat but also for domestic
repression, which facilitated absolutism. According to Seeley-Hintze’s theories and Perry
Anderson’s notion, the late middle age European monocracies were able to preserve their
absolutism through centralization because of external pressures.
19
As such, where states continue
to buttress their national security and international standing, they inevitably impact their domestic
configuration through at least three mechanisms, as Gourevitch identifies. First, the special
nature of foreign relations is such that the executive is almost always has more power vis-à-vis
other domestic forces. Second, states engage in territorial compensation as a foreign policy
instrument for state building to ultimately advance their interest, although not always

16
Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," p. 897.
17
Almond, "The International-National Connection," p. 245.
18
Ibid.: p. 242.
19
Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: N.L.B., 1974).

38

successfully. For example, France voluntarily gave territory to Prussia in order to counterbalance
Austria which made Prussia “the Frankenstein monster which turned on its benefactor.”
20

Another example of equal consequence but of more relevance is that the State of Israel
came into existence as a result of such nation engineering. During World War I Britain and
France were planning their post-war imperial designs to divide the Arab part of the Ottoman
Empire between them. Britain incorporated the Zionist project into its post-war strategy by
issuing in 1917 the Balfour Declaration which proclaimed “His Majesty’s Government view with
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” That the (mostly
non-Zionist, at least not in the political sense) Jews constituted only 9.7% of the population and
owned 2.04% of the land in Palestine
21
was of little importance to Britain’s promise based on its
national interests, immediate war goals
22
, and its Christian connection to the land of the Old
Testament.
During its Mandate over Palestine, Britain, as promised, “facilitate[d] the achievement”
of a Jewish home by ensuring the inevitability of the establishment of Israel as it ended the
Mandate in May 1948. With the added rationale of guilt over the Holocaust, the new state was
immediately recognized by the West, particularly the United States, which took the mantle from
Britain in the aftermath of WWII in becoming Israel’s sponsor and protector. It is this
relationship, this dissertation will argue, that is at the heart of arguing the US role as an enabler of
Arab authoritarianism.
The third mechanism identified by Gourevitch is the international environment and
devastating episodes of foreign involvement which impose strains and overtax the domestic

20
Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," p. 899.

21
Walid Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest : Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), p. xxvii.

22
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004),
p. 55.

39

political system. Revolutions are often (at least partially) products of such strains as was the case
with the Russia under the impact of WWI, France in the aftermath of its involvement with the
American revultion, and China as a result of the Japanese invasion in WWII. Indeed, as Theda
Skocpol asserted, while class conflict is a necessary condition, “[t]ransnational relations have
contributed to the emergence of all social-revolutionary crises and have invariably help to shape
revolutionary struggles and outcomes.”
23
The United States led a coup overthrowing the elected
government of Musaddiq in Iran in 1953 and installed the Shah who was the benefactor of US
stanch support throughout his repressive and torturous rule. Such an involvement cannot but be
seen as a cause for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In the same vain, carving Israel out of historic
Palestine and the defeat of several Arab states in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war created deep strains in
their domestic political systems. In the aftermath and as a consequence of this devastating defeat
and loss of Palestine, Syria went through several coups, Egypt overthrew its monarchy in 1952
and Iraq in 1958, and the first King of Jordan was assassinated 1951. His grandson, King
Hussein, in the face of rising demand by the leftist opposition (influenced by the nationalism of
Nasser) dissolved the freely elected parliament, sacked his popular prime minister, and declared
martial law in 1957. Politically-induced economic crisis led to the “bread riots” in the south part
of the country in April 1989 which ultimately persuaded the King to lift martial law and offer
limited (and short-lived) political liberalization. The 1957 and 1989 crises in Jordan were
externally driven and, as such, provide examples of “political crises” which is identified by
Almond as another mechanism that links international political factors to domestic political
outcomes.
24

It is important to point out that the international economy constitutes another, and no less
consequential, dimension of external factors affecting domestic political developments. Indeed,

23
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions : A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 19.

24
Almond, "The International-National Connection," pp. 253-4.

40

Gourevitch, Almond, and other scholars reviewing or addressing external-internal linkages pay
equal attention to economic aspects of the external-internal linkages. Analysis of late
industrialization,
25
theories of dependency,
26
imperialism and world systems theory,
27
liberal
development approaches, state-centered Marxism, economic modernization and interdependence
schools have all addressed through their various formulations the external dimension to the
questions of regime and political development. Conceptually and empirically important as it is,
however, the international economic dimension has not been made the focus of this dissertation
for two reasons. First, given the complex mechanisms of each of the political and economic
dimensions in addition to their various forms, the study’s intention in focusing on the political
aspects is to adhere to parsimoniousness; i.e.to remain within the comfort of focusing purely on
political and strategic parameters.
Second and more important, upon examining the external environment, particularly the
role of the United States, it became quickly apparent that economic considerations were
subsumed under strategic political calculations. Consider the all important objective of the West,
and particularly, the United States of securing the flow of oil from the Middle East at reasonable
prices. This objective has been habitually cited as too important for the US to jeopardize for
facilitating transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes in the region. To the extent such

25
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays
(Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), Barrington Moore, Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston,: Beacon
Press, 1966).

26
Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural
Reform," in The Politics of Economic Adjustment : International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and
the State, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), —
——, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Development: A Comparison of Latin America and East
Asia," in Manufacturing Miracles : Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, ed. Gary
Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

27
Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World-System : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Text ed., Studies in Social Discontinuity (New
York: Academic Press, 1976), ———, The Modern World-System, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New
York: Academic Press, 1974).

41

an argument has been made (as opposed to being asserted), it is far from being convincing for
there is no intrinsic obstacle to prevent the US and its allies from buying oil from potential Arab
democratic regimes securely. Nor there is an intrinsic rationale to prevent the democratic regimes
from selling oil to the West. Indeed, the critical issue to the US is accessing oil and not the nature
of the regime, since the global oil market has been hardly a function of regime type. Meanwhile,
Arab oil—even as it constitutes a major percentage of the world reserve in this all too important
commodity to the global economy—is secondary to political considerations. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, Lisa Anderson argues persuasively that “soft-budget constraints,” are also a
function of the political needs of external actors.
28

The “resource curse” hypothesis may shed some light on the ability of authoritarian
regimes to maintain their rule and finance the instruments of repression. However, it does not
capture the impact of external forces on the oil-rich regimes, much less on the non oil-producing
countries in the region. Without oil, poor countries like Jordan and Egypt are simply of no
economic significance to the large economies of the United States and its European allies. To
provide perspective, the 2006 gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income per capita
were $107.4 billion and $1350 respectively, for Egypt; $14.1 billion and $2660 for Jordan; and
$13,201 billion and $44,970 for the United States.
29
When the United States signed its third Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2000 with Jordan—a country with 1/1000
th
the size of its economy—
it was not for economic, but for political reasons relating directly to the Arab-Israeli conflict and
the peace process.
Given the supremacy of political factors within the international dimension, the
discussion will turn now to placing the argument within a comparative perspective influenced by
the above theoretical formulations.

28
Anderson, "Counterpoint: Arab Democracy; Dismal Prospects."

29
World Development Indicators database, World Bank, July and September 2007

42

External Factors in a Comparative Perspective
That studies of Arab political regimes by and large eschew the international dimension is
consistent with that of major works analyzing democratic transitions in other regions. However,
Gourevitch’s trail-blazing work made it possible for more comparative politics scholars to
consider the role of external factors in perhaps the most of quintessential questions in the filed:
democratization and regime change. Inspired by Gourevitch and Almond and based on South
European transitions in the middle of 1970s and the later East European transitions of the early
1990s, Geoffrey Pridham furthered the framework to address this very question.
30
Given its
complexity, Pridham argues for the need to “unscramble” the international dimension by
outlining three categories. First, background or situational factors that define the position of a
country, changes experienced, and challenges and constraints imposed on it economically and
geo-strategically both under authoritarianism and during transition. Second, the identity of
external actors such as international organizations, a regional or superpower state, non-
governmental organizations (national or international), or any combination thereof define the
effect played in the transition process. Third, the forms of external influences which are
consistent with those mentioned by Gourevitch and Almond and include economic, political, or
ideological—direct or indirect, coerced or otherwise.
The degree to which these “inner-directed” linkages (from external to internal) influence
an authoritarian regime in transition, argues Pridham, depends on the response of the domestic
context and its “outer-directed” linkages (from internal to external) which he also “unscrambled”
into three mirror categories. The first includes background variables such as the nature and
dynamics of the transition process and the fate of international commitments under the new
regime. Second, domestic actors and the environment they operate within—the position, attitude,
and inter-reaction of domestic actors towards the political changes, external links, and actors—

30
Geoffrey Pridham et al., Building Democracy? : The International Dimension of Democratisation in
Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

43

constitute important considerations in understanding the external-internal linkages in regime
change.
Third is the larger domestic environment: it refers to the wider societal influence through
the role of public opinion and the media and whether there is fragmentation and disagreements
over foreign policy issues. An example of “inner-directed” linkages is the view of the opposition
and of wider Arab masses of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the existing peace treaties between
Israel and both of Jordan and Egypt. Should the Islamist opposition come to power, there is the
fear—real or imagined—by the regimes and external actors over the fate of these peace treaties
and other US interests in the region. Indeed, given the international dimension, external actors,
particularly the United States rejected Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian parliamentary election.
Comparative politics scholars focusing on the “inner-directed” linkages (to the extent
external factors are considered in the first place) and international relations scholars addressing
those that are “outer-directed,” they have both provided connecting formulations that are too
general and too loose to establish causality between external factors and democratic transition.
One useful approach to establish causality, Pridham argues, is to probe deeper into the process by
focusing on the different types as well as phases of transition from either direction so “we can
trace sets of chain reactions”

within the empirical case.
31
However, earlier works on transitions,
particularly before the end of the Cold War, did not always probe enough into the “inner”
direction. Indeed, the dominant orientation on the question of democratization in the late 1980s is
captured by the editors of the seminal multi-volume project, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
one of the firmest conclusions that emerged …was that transitions from authoritarian rule
and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of
national forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually
marginal role
32

31
Ibid., p. 14.

32
Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule. Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5.

44

As such, O’Donnell and Schmitter asserted that divisions between the soft-liners and
hard-liners within authoritarian regimes were at the heart of the beginning of the transition and,
therefore, it was “fruitless to search for some international factor or context”
33
in order to explain
otherwise. However, the end of the Cold War altered the calculus of the United States, and
accordingly contributed to the transitions to democracy of many authoritarian regimes in sub-
Saharan Africa. Similarly and more prominently, it was the role of such international factors—
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the support of the United States and Western Europe—that
triggered the fourth wave of democratization and transformed East European countries into
democracies so rapidly. It was in large part thanks to these developments and to more democracy
transitions elsewhere that much of the theoretical framework explaining the transitions in Latin
American was due for a major revision. In fact, it was none other than Schmitter who conceded
that it was “time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change” and
warned that failure to do so will “fly in the face” of theoretical formulations (i.e. world-system
analysis) and will contradict increasing empirical evidence.
34

Laurence Whitehead, Transitions’ third collaborator and early skeptic of the
marginalization of the international dimension, pointed out the susceptibility of the local actors
engaged in a transition to external influence (governmental or otherwise) and distinguished—
based on the US v. Europe—between three components of “democracy promotion”: pressuring
authoritarian regimes to democratize; supporting struggling democracies to consolidate; and
deterring undemocratic forces from toppling democratic regimes.
35
In a further critique of the

33
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 18.

34
Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context Upon the Choice of National
Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in The International Dimensions of Democratization :
Europe and the Americas, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.
27.

35
Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization " in Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

45

earlier transition model’s “simplifying assumptions” and in the aftermath of the fourth wave of
democratization, Whitehead developed a framework outlining three international dimensions or
“alternative perspectives” for the conceptualizations of democratization: contagion
(demonstration effects or what Huntington termed “snowballing”) through proximity to other
cases; control (or the promotion of democracy) by some dominant external power; and consent in
the interaction of domestic forces and international dynamics to establish new democratic norms.
Schmitter added his own fourth dimension of conditionality or the imposition of conditions by
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the European Union, with its insistence on standard
democratic behavior for membership.
36

In his model, Whitehead divides democratic transitions throughout history into five
clusters and submits them to each of the perspectives. While contagion, with its restrictive
assumptions, could account for some of the cases, the control perspective acknowledges the
motivations and strategic calculations of the dominant powers thus providing more explanatory
power to democratic transition. The latter perspective is of importance to this dissertation as it is
most productive in explaining the initial stages of transition and how dominant powers enable or
impede its chances of success. Once the transition is complete and as the new democracy enters
its consolidation stage, a shift towards the consent perspective is required as to account for the
resulting complex of democratization in a comprehensive fashion. Specifically, the stability and
durability of the new regime is based on whether consent (by various sociopolitical groupings) is
generated and enhanced once international processes are incorporated.
37
An example of this is
reciprocal acceptance of the National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition—as authentically
Nicaraguan—by the Sandinistas and of the Chamorro government by the latter, thus providing the

36
Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context Upon the Choice of National Institutions and
Policies in Neo-Democracies."

37
Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization : Europe and the Americas,
Expanded ed., Oxford Studies in Democratization (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

46

necessary consent for the democratic transition to take hold. As such, Whitehead’s consent
perspective is essentially Pridham’s “inner-outer” linkages model outlined above.
Although based on the empirical experiences of democratic transitions in Southern
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, there is nothing to prevent applying the theoretical
formulations of such models to cases of transitions that have failed or did not even take place.
Once the external factors presented in these models are seen as variables, they assume not only a
positive value of enabling the democratic transition but also a negative value of impeding
democratization as well as maintaining authoritarianism.
In general, then, the external-internal linkages must be conceptualized in a dynamic
fashion as to explain how and why transitions happen and when they don’t, to show how and why
not. In this vein and building on Pridham’s model, Levitsky and Way provide a framework that
considers the post cold war international environment impact on regime change along the level
(high or low) of two international dimensions: western leverage and linkage to the West.
38
With
geographic proximity as its most influencing factor, linkage to the west is defined as “the density
of ties [i.e. economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transitional civil society] between
a particular country and the U.S., the EU, and western dominated multilateral institutions.”
39

Leverage is defined as “authoritarian government’s vulnerability to external pressure [i.e.
political conditionality, economic sanctions, or military intervention] for democratization,”
40
and
is determined by the size and strength of the regime, the existence of a regional power, and the
presence of competing foreign policy objectives.

38
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," Journal of
Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005), ———, "Linkage Versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension
of Regime Change," Comparative Politics 38, no. 4 (2005).

39
Levitsky and Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," p. 22.

40
Ibid.: p. 21.

47

Linkage is diffuse and subtle with multiple pressure points and, as such, is more
pervasive and persistent than leverage which tends to be blunt and less enduring. Both linkage
and (to a lesser degree) leverage increase the cost of repression and the entire authoritarian
system by the international rejection of and response to government violations, strengthening the
opposition, and reshaping the balance of power in favor of the democratic forces.
Although the Arab world is geographically distant from the West there is the additional
important obstacle which prevents the West, particularly the US, from objecting to authoritarian
regime abuses and from empowering domestic opposition: the presence of political Islamism.
Increasingly since the late seventies, this threat—real or imagined—stands in the way of the
United States policy objectives in the region which, as Levitsky and Way would have it, weaken
the US leverage over the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
However, the authors’ assumption that western leverage automatically entails a push for
democratization is a source of bias and the concept could have been more inclusive had it also
allowed consideration of the western powers’ desire not to push for democratization. A case in
point is the US relations with the authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt. Contrary to having
low leverage, the US does not want to exercise its (formidable) leverages vis-à-vis these two
regimes to push for democratization, given its objectives. Despite this conceptual shortcoming,
introducing the western foreign policy strategic objectives into the equation is of crucial
importance to this study for they supersede other considerations and render other factors and
variables less operative.
Strategic calculations of external actors (particularly those of the US) affect their
preferences over regime type in countries and regions with strategic value. As a result,
democracy promotion must always be examined against the promoters’ motives. Since the
United States emerged out of World War II as a superpower, the role of democracy promotion in
foreign policy has occupied varying degrees of commitment and produced a mixed record of
success. One interpretation of the objective of democracy promotion, exemplified by the works

48

of Larry Diamond (and Marc Plattner)
41
, is that the United States is engaged in a moral mission to
reflect its values abroad, to affirm the universality of freedom, and to create “a community of
states under the law, a global democratic civilization.”
42
Advancing a more radical interpretation,
William Robinson sees only a promotion of “low-intensity democracy” or “polyarchy,” which
replaces the no-longer defensible client regimes, but ultimately still serves the interests of
hegemonic transnational elites and capital within the global economy.
43
Another proclaimed
motive is the declaration that promoting democracy achieves peace. Although its conclusions are
suspect, the “democratic peace” thesis has been argued for the Middle East only as a distraction
as will be discussed later in the chapter.
Another and not less consequential manifestation of the nexus between US strategic
objectives and regime preferences is the agenda of democracy demotion. While demoting
democracy has not been directly specified or elaborated by policy makers and scholars of regime
change, the role of foreign policy and strategic objectives—to the extent external factors are
considered—are always mentioned as potential obstacles to democracy if not also as “deal killer.”
For example, in his contribution, International Aspects of Democratization, to the early work
Transitions, Whitehead concluded that “democracy promotion” is but one US foreign policy goal
among security objectives which “frequently conflict with and may even override liberal
democratic goals in determining foreign policy.”
44
In the face of such strategic considerations,
“democracy promotion” fluctuates between being assigned a lower priority and being used as “an

41
They are the editors of the Journal of Democracy and the directors of the International Forum for
Democratic Studies. The journal and the forum are affiliated with the National Endowment for
Democracy, which was created in 1983 by the Reagan administration to promote democracy.

42
Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy 87, no. summer (1992): p. 46.

43
William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy : Globalization, Us Intervention, and Hegemony, Cambridge
Studies in International Relations 48 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 2-6.

44
Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization ", p. 43.

49

element in the arsenal of American foreign-policy rhetoric,”
45
if only for popular moralistic
reasons. In relation to the Arab world, Eva Bellin, although ignores the very consequential US
support of Israel, acknowledges that United States “multiple security concerns” prevented the
promotion of democracy, as mentioned earlier in the chapter. In addressing possible democracy-
terrorism connections, Gregory Gause argues that given the strength of the Islamist opposition,
“democratization of the Arab world should produce more anti-U.S. foreign policies”
46
and, as a
result, bluntly and approvingly summarizes Washington’s position that “there is no good
alternative [to] authoritarian Arab governments.”
47

Another motive given by policy makers for democracy promotion is that democracy
brings about peace. Indeed, in the attempt to search for a rationale in invading Iraq, President
Bush spoke succinctly, on behalf of the proponents of the war, to assert that the “commitment to
democratic reform is essential to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
48
This “democratic peace”
thesis lies within the strand of internal-external linkages literature which claims that the specific
regime type of democracy is intrinsically conducive to peace and resolving conflicts peacefully.
Indeed, the proposition that democracy is conducive to peace, that therefore democratic states do
not—or at least are less likely to—go to war with each other, and that more democracies mean
fewer wars has been the subject of major debate. The proponents claimed an emerging consensus
in the field of international politics.
49
Encouraged, if not carried away, by the moments when

45
Ibid., p. 39.

46
F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): p. 71.

47
Ibid.: p. 75.

48
Address to the UN General Assembly, September 21, 2004

49
John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace,"
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001), ———, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999), John R. Oneal
and Bruce M. Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations, 1885-1992," World Politics 52, no. 1 (1999), James Lee Ray, Democracy and
International Conflict : An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition, Studies in International

50

some Arab authoritarian regimes flirted with liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
some scholars undertook studies to assess the impact of democratization on the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
50

However, given the absence of consensus on the causal mechanisms and possible
spurious nature of the democratic peace relationship, some scholars argue for the reversal of and
the “sequential” addition to this causal relationship. In other words, it is first the antecedent
peaceful environment or “zones of peace” that is more conducive to democratization and the
subsequent transition, which in turn reduce threats and foster more peaceful behavior.
51
Although
this study contends that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict increases the likelihood of the
breakdown of authoritarian regimes and transition to democracy in the Arab world, it does not
make the argument within the democratic peace-reversed thesis. Instead, the argument is that
what will contribute to bringing about democracy is, not peace per se, but solving the Arab-Israeli
conflict and thus removing it from the strategic equation of the United States in the region and the
political calculations of Arab regimes, as it will be elaborated in a later chapter.
Towards a Model for the study of Arab Authoritarianism
For the purpose of this study, the general and the highest level of abstraction is assumed
to be the strategic objectives of a sole superpower. Once defined, it is important first to analyze
the amenability of the regime in question to the basic parameters of such objectives. With the
exception of the large European powers and Japan (the post-WWII outcome), the United States
by and large has cared less about regime type than whether the regime in question is willing to

Relations (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An
Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace " The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4
(1999).
50
See David Garnham and Mark A. Tessler, Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East, Indiana
Series in Arab and Islamic Studies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).

51
Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Rivalries and the Democratic Peace in the Major Power
Subsystem," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 6 (2001), William R. Thompson, "Democracy and Peace:
Putting the Cart before the Horse?," International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996), William R. Thompson
and Richard Tucker, "A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41,
no. 3 (1997), Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, "The Economic Development-Democratization
Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 (2003).

51

advance and not obstruct the U.S. interests. Once the nature of the regime’s relation to the U.S. is
ascertained, the analysis should next move to the question of the United States preferences over
regime type and change. Such an evaluation determines whether the focus should be on
democracy promotion or democracy demotion if not also authoritarian preservation. In other
words, the often-fashionable question of democracy promotion should be approached deductively
rather than inductively, since the latter may lead to an empirical fallacy by accumulating data and
citing figures over largely inconsequential and externally-funded NGOs and so forth.
Conceptualized as such, the U.S. strategic objectives determine three foreign policy
positions over regime type and democracy promotion. First, if democracy is seen as serving its
best interests, the U.S. will maintain, promote, or even impose democracy as was the case
Germany and Japan after WWII. Second, if its interests are perceived as best served by an
authoritarian regime, the US will maintain authoritarianism, demote democracy and impede its
prospects. Third, if its interests are not impacted by regime type, the U.S. is more likely to
support and promote democracy over authoritarianism, as was the case in sub-Saharan Africa
after the end of the Cold War.
It is the contention of this study that much of the Arab world—and particularly the two
cases under focus, Egypt and Jordan—falls squarely under the second alternative. Specifically,
the overriding U.S. objective of providing unconditional support for Israel impacts the U.S.
regional calculations in such a fashion as to conclude that this objective as well as other related
objectives are best served by authoritarian regimes. As the strongest domestic opposition in
Jordan and Egypt, the Islamists are most likely to assume power under free elections. The United
States views such an outcome unacceptable for it carries the direct risk of undermining its
objectives in the region. Therefore, the U.S. not only ensures that the authoritarian regimes are
sustained and their breakdown (the first stage of transition) is prevented, but of equal importance
also demotes and prevents the emergence of democracy. These two sets of action are carried out
through myriad of direct and indirect mechanisms such as the financial backing, political gestures

52

of support, and military ties to these regimes, the refusal to grant legitimacy to—if not indeed
dehumanizing—Islamist opposition, failure to acknowledge and empower the secularist and
leftist opposition, refusal to condemn violations and abuses by the regime, as well as others, all of
which ensure that the balance of domestic forces always favors authoritarian incumbents. It is
important to stress, however, the US supports authoritarian regimes (Arab or otherwise) simply
because those regimes happen to support the US interests —not because they are intrinsically
inclined to do so. In the Arab setting, for example, if a democratic regime that supports the US
interests (particularly in relation to Israel) is to emerge, there will be little reason for the US not to
support it.
This chapter thus far has shown the underutilization of the international dimension in the
few studies focusing on the Arab regimes, discussed the origins of external-internal linkages in
the fields of international relations and comparative politics, reviewed important comparative
works on the role of external factors on regime change and democratization, and began to
formulate a model to narrow the focus and identify the US strategic objectives as an obstacle to
democracy and as a sustainer to authoritarian Arab regimes. The discussion now turns to the
question of how the specific U.S. objective of supporting the country of Israel leads to lack of
democracy in two other countries: Jordan and Egypt. To proceed, specific and well defined
causal links and mechanisms must be advanced to bring this external factor into the domestic
political setting. With the exception of the external imposition of democracy in the aftermath of
invasion and occupation, it is generally the ruling incumbents who are formally in charge and are
at the center of competing forces and any potential political democratic transition. Given the
nature of authoritarianism and close ties to the United States, the regimes headed by the King in
Jordan and the president in Egypt are the direct target of U.S. policy demands and the expected
facilitators of its objectives. These external demands and objectives enter into the regime’s
perception, strategies, calculations, and decisions over whether to democratize and thus risk
losing power or to maintain the status quo.

53

In his seminal article, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level
Games,
52
Robert Putnam advances a conceptual framework to capture the interaction of domestic
dynamics and international factors simultaneously. Based on empirical evidence from G-7
Summit negotiations, Putnam formulates the concept of “two-level games” where the “chief
negotiator” or “chief of government” must engage and formulate policies based on the constraints
imposed and opportunities presented by the national and international environments. Placed at
the center of both games, the state leader is engaged in negotiations with the leader of the other
state (Level I) and at the same time is involved in discussions with various domestic constituents
(Level II). For this simultaneous interaction to succeed both leaders must not only reach an
agreement at level I but also each leader must ensure the ratification of the agreement at home.
Such contingent ratification, Putnam asserts, constitutes the crucial theoretical link. Conceived as
such, each leader seeks to influence and take into account the positions of their constituents at
home and the position of the other leader as well as the other leader’s domestic actors.
Putnam correctly points out that the purely domestic and the purely international
approaches provide only “partial equilibrium” and criticizes that much of literature on the
domestic-international connections addresses the question in a superimposed and ad-hoc
fashion—“additive approaches,” as one scholar describes it
53
. On the other hand, the “two-level
games” model allows an interactive and simultaneous evaluation of leaders as they preside at the
point of intersection between the domestic setting and the international context, and thus provides
“general equilibrium.”
Putnam’s two-level game metaphor provides a useful framework for the analysis of Arab
authoritarianism. Through overt and covert mechanism as well as direct and indirect interactions

52
Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988).

53
Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Dmostic Theories," in Double-Edged
Diplomacy : International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson,
and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 17.

54

the Arab leader “negotiates” a bargain
54
with the American administration at Level I that gives
the U.S. the support it needs for its policies (at the center of which is support for Israel) in the
region in exchange for U.S. blessing of the leader’s authoritarian regime. At Level II, the
American administration “ratifies” this agreement with ease by an overwhelmingly Israel-
supporting congress, a mostly sympathetic public, and selective (if not also biased) media outlets
thanks to American pro-Israel lobbying efforts and historical reasons, as will be discussed in the
next two chapters. To the extent the U.S. commitment to support these authoritarian regimes—as
per the bargain—is acknowledged or even known by the domestic constituents, it is seen as an
acceptable price.
From the perspective of the Arab regime at Level II, the authoritarian ruler extracts
“ratification” from the domestic forces—particularly the opposition—through repression.
Repression (exercised or threatened) is a function of not only the balance of domestic forces but
also of the external sources. In this vein, in his seminal work, Polyarchy, Robert Dahl advances
the axiom that “the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as expected
costs of toleration decrease…and the expected costs of suppression increase.”
55
Thus, domestic
dynamics are more likely to bring about democratic transition when the internal cost of
suppression is higher than the internal cost of toleration. However, once external factors are
introduced to the domestic balance sheet a la Putnam, the regime must reckon with two additional
considerations: the external cost of suppression and the external cost of toleration. Indeed, when
Dahl’s condition does not hold (i.e. when democratization does not come about because the
domestic cost of suppression is lower than that of toleration), an “open model” of political

54
As used by Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, senior member of NSC, and
Ambassador to Israel, all during the Clinton Administration. Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foreign
Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002).

55
Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1971),
p. 15.

55

change—open to the inclusion of these two external constraints—must be considered since
internal dynamics are not sufficient to bring about or explain regime and political change.
56

Given the “US-Arab authoritarian bargain” struck between the United States and Arab
regimes where authoritarianism is supported and democracy is demoted by the former, the
external cost of suppression declines sharply and could be set at zero. Without condemnation or
economic, political, or military retribution from the outside, the internal cost of suppression is
also lowered. Having the external and internal costs of suppression significantly lowered, the
authoritarian regime is left with two costs to consider: internal and external costs of toleration.
The authoritarian regime is less likely to democratize if both costs are high or the internal cost is
higher than the external cost of toleration. While the forms and levels of costs vary, it is the
subjective judgment of the authoritarian incumbents that is of most importance and must be
considered. Based on perceptions and evolution of the domestic and international factors,
authoritarian rulers decide whether they are willing to pay the ultimate cost of tolerating the
opposition and demands for democratization: loss of power, if not life as well.
As the detailed analysis in chapter seven will demonstrate, what ultimately explains Arab
authoritarianism is the point of general equilibrium resulting from internal-external interactions
and the simultaneous configuration of forces, actors, and dynamics. Specifically, it is the
balancing point between the regime’s desire and capacity to maintain power on the one hand and
the United States goal of protecting its interests in the region, the most prominent of which is its
support for Israel, on the other. This balancing and “general equilibrium” point resides within the
confines of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its consequences which are conceived as the causal
mechanism connecting US support for Israel and Arab authoritarianism. The resulting rise of
political Islam and anti-Americanism reinforces oppression of domestic opposition by the
authoritarian regime and provides the US with the rationale to support these regimes in Jordan

56
Hakan Yilmaz, "External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of
Democratic Change," Democratization 9, no. 2 (2002): p. 76.

56

and Egypt. It is the latter argument that constitutes the main focus and it is the hypothesis of this
dissertation that with the US support to Israel and thus non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
it is more likely for the United States to support the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan.
While it acknowledges the presence of some important structural constraints, this
dissertation presents a “process-oriented” explanation
57
and focuses on the strategic choices of the
ruling elite. As chapter five points out, the ruling regimes in Jordan and Egypt operate within
structural constraints as they are the inheritors of nation-states with elaborate colonial legacies
and vivid historical experiences of outside influences. These constraints not only shed light on the
origin of Arab authoritarian regimes
58
but also support the main theme in this study of the
importance of external factors. Nevertheless, agency is privileged, for it is entirely in the hands
of the authoritarian leader to set his country on the path of democratization and to give up power
in an orderly and peaceful fashion. The importance of this choice becomes more pronounced
when considering the other theoretical alternative, i.e. that the authoritarian ruler is compelled to
democratize and is forced to give up power. Furthermore, while it is relatively easy for external
powers to conspire to prevent a certain leader from assuming power democratically or to
overthrow a democratically elected leader, it is far more difficult to stop an authoritarian leader’s
will to democratize and to prevent him or her from departing office.
As such, the ruling incumbents will be at the center of the various forces and dynamics
both internally and externally. This dissertation demonstrates the argument for and draws out the
path of external influence impacting the resiliency of Arab authoritarian regimes. Whether the
analysis moves from the early US support for Zionism and the creation of Israel; the development
and consolidation of the US-Israeli special relationship; the Eisenhower Doctrine; the all

57
For a useful review of the differences between “structure-oriented” and “process-oriented” approaches
see, Herbert Kitschelt, "Review: Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?,"
The American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992).

58
Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," Political Science
Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991).

57

important 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the US-PLO relationship; the Israeli settlements in the Israeli-
occupied West Bank and Gaza; or to the peace process under the Clinton, the connections of such
analysis will always be logically sequentialled in order to trace their implications for the
authoritarian regime’s calculations and, thus far at least, for the regime’s success at keeping
power.
The case study methodology of “process tracing” will be utilized throughout the study.
First formulated by Alexander George,
59
the “process-tracing method attempts to identify the
intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent
variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”
60
This study raises questions
that entail multiple interaction affects and seeks to provide comprehensive explanations of
multilayered events within a simplified rational choice approach. The process-tracing method—in
its analytical explanation variety—provides a guideline to produce a logical and convincing
argument. To this end, the dissertation will examine histories from secondary sources, archival
documents, participants’ memoirs, and interview transcripts. According to the substance of the
argument made so far and following this methodology, the discussion in the next chapter moves
to reviewing the US-Israeli political, economic and strategic relations.

59
Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison," in Diplomacy : New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy
ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979).

60
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), p. 206.

58

Chapter Three
The Development of the Special Relation between the US and Israel
The introduction of external factors into the regime type question requires tracing them
back to their source. The ability of the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan to maintain
power is explained by these factors, which are defined in terms of the United States’ objectives in
the Middle East. US support for Israel, as a major objective, is operationalized or measured in
terms of the strength and special nature of this support. Therefore, it is important to unpack the
US-Israel special relationship by first tracing its origins to the advent of the Zionist project and
then examining the growing US entanglement with pro-Zionist efforts. The chapter will provide
an overview of the historical development and the evolution of the relationship into a special one
under successive administrations, beginning with that of President Wilson and concluding with
the end of Cold War under President Bush, Sr.
The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in Russia in 1881 brought the reign of the less
tolerant Alexander III, peasant unrest and open hostility against Russian Jews, prompting Jews to
leave Russia. While most left for the United States (91.5 million between 1900 and 1914),
some—especially students—emigrated to Palestine for religious reasons.
1
During the pogroms of
1881-1884, the 20-30 thousand religious Jewish immigrants constituted the first wave of Jewish
immigration to Palestine (or Aliya’ as all Jewish immigration to the land of Israel has been called)
and settled in agricultural communes (later to be known as Kibbutzim).
2
In response to growing
European anti-Semitism, particularly in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair,
3
and within the context of
the development of nationalism in Europe, the First Zionist Congress was organized by the

1
Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine : One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge, UK ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 39.

2
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2004), p.
30.

3
Alfred Dreyfus, a French-Jewish officer, was falsely accused of treason in 1894.

59

Viennese Jew Theodor Herzl
4
and held in Basel, Switzerland in August 1897. Giving birth to
political Zionism, the congress declared the need for the “establishment of a publicly and legally
secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people.”
5
Although other places were briefly
considered, once Palestine was identified as the target because it was the place of the biblical
Jewish kingdom, the Zionists’ goal was to enlist the support of a major power and to secure the
Zionist project international recognition. In 1917, in the context of the First World War, Zionist
leaders succeeded in enlisting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration promising Palestine as a
national homeland for the Jews. This declaration came, despite Britain’s earlier wartime promise
of independence to the Arabs,
6
and in partial contradiction of the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot accord
with the French specifying how these two powers would divide the Arab East between them
assuming an Ottoman defeat.
President Wilson was suspicion of European colonial designs and supported self-
determination for peoples, including those of the former Ottoman Empire. As a result, in the
immediate aftermath of the war, and despite ambivalence by France and Britain, Wilson
dispatched the fact-finding King-Crane Commission to the region to ascertain the wishes of the
Arabs of Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) for their political future. While London
and Paris continued to wrangle over who should be given control of Syria, the commission
carried out its mission and recommended a brief mandate by the United States (if not, then,
Britain, but not France), and then independence, since the inhabitants wanted a united Arab state
of Greater Syria. As for creating a Jewish home in Palestine, the commission, in line with

4
Herzl was a reporter at the Dreyfus’ trial, who became convinced that if Anti-Semitism was rampant in
such an enlightened country as France, Jews could be assimilated only in a home of their own.

5
Text of The Basel Program, 30 August, 1897

6
This promise was made by Britain’s High Commissioner to Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, to the King of
Hijaz and Guardian of the holy cities Mecca and Medina, the Sharif Husayn, in exchange for an Arab
alliance against the Ottoman Turks in WWI in a series of letters (1915-1916) known as the Husayn-
McMahon Correspondence.

60

subsequent fact-finding commissions, found “intense opposition of the Arabs and the Christians”
to it, and recommended that the “extreme Zionist program must be greatly modified.”
7

Although the recommendations would not to be heeded by France or Britain, in deference
to and in order not to complicate the designs of both countries, the United States did not make
them public until after the League of Nations entrusted the mandates to both countries. In 1922,
Syria and Lebanon were placed under a French Mandate, and Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine
under a British Mandate incorporating the Balfour Declaration.
The Balfour Declaration
It is important to note that Secretary of State Robert Lansing had advised Wilson against
endorsing the declaration for the main reason that, since it was not at war with Turkey, the US
“should avoid any appearance of favoring taking territory from that Empire by force.” He had
also argued that it was unwise to favor one faction over the other, particularly the Jews who were
not “a unit in the desire to reestablish their race as an independent people,” and that many
Christians “would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to the absolute control of the
race credited with the death of Christ.”
8
Despite this recommendation against supporting the
Zionist project, President Wilson, in private communication with the British government and
influenced by Zionist associates, endorsed the Balfour Declaration shortly before its release in
November 1917. While there is disagreement among historians over Britain’s exact reasons for
issuing the Declaration, British Zionists, most noticeably Chaim Weizmann (who became Israel’s
first president), played an important role in incorporating the Zionist project into Britain’s war
needs and long-term national interests. On November 2, 1917, following the approval of the
British government of a proposal of Jewish goals, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour sent a letter

7
The King-Crane Commission Report, August 28, 1919

8
Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), p. 15.

61

to the nominal Zionist movement leader, Lionel Walter, the Lord of Rothschild, which became
known as the Balfour Declaration and is worth quoting in its entirety:
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the
following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to,
and approved by, the Cabinet.
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of
this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist
Federation.

Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour

The declaration marked a calamity for Palestine’s Arab majority, particularly after Britain
won the war, but a triumph for the Zionists. Perhaps no other issue captures the core of the Arab-
Zionist struggle and the Palestine problem than the demographic realities—which were accepted
by the Zionists and later Israel—in Palestine around the time Balfour penned his letter. The Arab
Muslim and Christian population, which Balfour saw fit to refer to as only the “non-Jewish
communities,” stood at around 630,000 (91% of the total) according to the last Ottoman census of
1914, and 663,000 (87% of the total: 77% Muslim and 8% Christians) according to the British
census of 1922; by comparison, the Jews numbered no more than 60,000 (8.7%) and around
84,000 (11%), respectively.
9

9
The 1914 figures were listed in the 1922 Census of Palestine and obtained from Janet Abu-Lughod, "The
Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in The Transformation of Palestine; Essays on the Origin and
Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ed. Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod (Evanston Northwestern University
Press, 1971).The 1922 figures were obtained from Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, "A Survey of
Palestine," (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of Palestine Studies 1991), p. 149, Table 7c. The Christian
population, while predominately Arab, includes British officials in Palestine at the time. As Abu-Lughod
argued, there every reason to believe there was a significant undercount of the Muslim rural population.

62

Balfour was later to argue that given it was “rooted in age-long tradition” (i.e. the Bible),
Zionism superseded “the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient
land.” Indeed, Britain, under the new government of Prime Minister Lloyd George and his
foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued the declaration based on the Biblical-based restoration
(of the Jews to Palestine) tradition. As Weizmann acknowledged, the Zionists’ task was easy
thanks to “men like Balfour, Churchill, Lloyd George, [who] were deeply religious and believed
in the Bible.”
10
In fact, Lloyd George who stressed that he “was taught in school far more about
the history of the Jews than about the history of [his] country” had been the attorney hired to
facilitate Zionist movement’s contacts with the British Foreign Office in the previous decade.
11

Additionally, Britain issued the declaration in order to induce American and Russian Jews to
influence their governments to support the war, and to enhance Britain’s post-war power and
protect the Suez Canal under a Jewish Palestine.
12

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, President Wilson’s friend and Supreme
Court appointee (the first American Jewish justice), Louis Brandeis had been converted to
Zionism, and became the leader of the movement in the US. Brandeis was in direct contact with
Weizmann over diplomatic and lobbying efforts and was visited by Lord Balfour to assist in
securing Wilson’s endorsement, which he succeeded in doing first privately in October 1917 and
then publicly in August 1918.
13
It is important to point out that Zionism was initially opposed by
many Jews in the United States and Europe, particularly England. While ultra-Orthodox Jews
objected on the grounds that the Jews’ return to the Promised Land was to be achieved by divine

10
Victoria Clark, Allies for Armageddon : The Rise of Christian Zionism (New Haven [Conn.] ; London:
Yale University Press, 2007), p. 116.

11
Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete : Jews and Arabs under the Mandate, 1st American ed. (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), p. 36.

12
Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London,: Vallentine, 1961).

13
Chaim Weizmann, the leader of British Zionism, asserted that Wilson’s endorsement “was one of the
most important individual factors in breaking the deadlock created by the British Jewish anti-Zionists, and
deciding the British Government to issue its declaration,” quoted in George Lenczowski, The Middle East
in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 84.

63

intervention as opposed to political maneuvering by humans, reformed rabbis opposed it because
of their conviction that Judaism denoted religion and not nationalism, as Zionism advocate. For
their part, Jewish socialists and communists indicted Zionism as “a reactionary bourgeois
movement.”
14

Much of the opposition was based on the fear that nationalist identification with Zionism
would undermine Jewish assimilation. Wealthy American Jews and Jewish members of the
British aristocracy feared loss of influential positions and social status.
15
Additionally, most
American-born Jews were fearful of dual loyalty charges, and the newly arriving immigrants
wanted to integrate and leave ties to the Old World behind them. As a result, both groups had
misgivings about the Zionist project.
16
Within his melting-pot Americanism,
17
Brandeis assured
American Jews and gentiles that there “[wa]s no inconsistency between loyalty to America and
loyalty to Jewry” and every “American who aids in advancing the Jewish settlement in Palestine
…will be a better American for doing so.”
18
Accordingly, he was instrumental in garnering
support for Zionism among American Jews (as the Zionist Organization of America, ZOA,
increased its membership ten-fold to nearly 200,000 members in 1919),
19
and for Congressional
passage of a joint resolution endorsing the Balfour Declaration in September 1922.
Zionism’s Gathering Strength and the United States
Nonetheless, the State Department never adopted the endorsement of the Declaration as
the official policy of the United States. Additionally, during the inter-war years, the US withdrew
into isolationism, and the Zionist movement experienced disarray due to ideological and tactical

14
Ibid., p. 389.

15
Ibid., p. 391.
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace : Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (London: A.
Deutsch, 1989), p. 299.

17
Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis : Justice for the People (New York: Schocken Books : Distributed by
Pantheon Books, 1989).

18
Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, p. 11.

19
Ibid., p. 17.

64

differences. In Palestine, Britain was witnessing the disastrous consequences of its policies and
contradictory promises. In order to pacify Palestinians after the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) and to
enhance its strategic posture vis-à-vis Germany and Italy as war loomed, Britain issued a White
Paper in 1939, promising a Palestinian state in 10 years, and restricting Jewish immigration to,
and Jewish land purchases in, Palestine, thus practically reversing its Balfour promises. The
policy was rejected flatly by the Zionists, but also by the Palestinians, since independence was
deferred. Although the British enforced the restrictions with resoluteness, the Jewish population
(outside of natural increase) in Palestine continued to increase, thanks to legal and illegal
immigration. Willingly or otherwise, Britain essentially oversaw the Jewish Agency’s (the de
facto Jewish government in Palestine) unabated building of Jewish military and economic
infrastructure, which ultimately facilitated the creation of the Jewish state despite the objections
and resistance of Palestine’s indigenous population.
Under more extremist leadership, fueled by the Nazi horrors against European Jews, and
in response to Britain’s war policy of restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine, by the early
1940s American (and world) Zionism became more assertive in insisting upon its program and
enlisting US support for its agenda. Major American and world Zionist organizations met in
1942 and adopted what was called the Biltmore Program, which called for the establishment of a
Jewish state in all of Palestine,
20
the creation of a Jewish military force, and the “unalterable
rejection” of the 1939 White Paper. Accordingly, support for Zionism skyrocketed among
American Jews, was endorsed by 33 state legislatures in 1945, remained solid in the US
Congress, and gained increasing acceptance among the general public. As for President
Roosevelt, although his position(s) were contradictory, he was more sympathetic to Jews than
Arabs based on his biblical beliefs; he was also more knowledgeable about Zionism than about
the Arabs and the history of the region, at least initially.
21

20
Text of Baltimore Program.

65

To illustrate the contradiction, during his 1944 reelection campaign, he personally
endorsed the provision in the Democratic Platform in favor of the “opening of Palestine to
unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and …the establishment there of a free and
democratic Jewish commonwealth.”
22
But he was more concerned about the damage such
support might have on US geostrategic interests in the region in wartime. Given the importance
of Arab support and air base rights in, and oil from, Saudi Arabia to fuel the war efforts,
Roosevelt assured Saudi King `Abdul `Aziz ibn Sa`ud on board the USS Quincy on February 14,
1945 and in a letter on April 5, 1945 (which was released later in the year by Truman) that the
attitude of the American Government toward Palestine was that “no decision [would] be taken
with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and
Jews…[and] that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this
Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.”
23

Furthermore, Roosevelt avoided making public statements about Palestine and Zionism
so as not to complicate the war efforts. He was largely unmoved (at least, into taking specific
actions) by the plight of European Jewry, and unforthcoming regarding allowing Jewish refugees
to immigrate to the US during the war. Given the increased lobbying pressure to support Zionism
publicly and the Zionists’ uproar over his meeting with King `Abdul `Aziz, Roosevelt authorized
one of the Zionist leaders to issue a statement on March 16, 1945 affirming the President’s
support for unrestricted Jewish immigration to, and creating a Jewish state in, Palestine. Adding
to the confusion, Roosevelt sent telegrams affirming his pledge of consultation with the Arabs to
both the governments of Iraq and Syria on April 12, 1945—three hours before his death.
24
In

21
Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), chapter 2.
22
Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), pp. 14-5.

23
Letter of President Roosevelt to the King of Saudi Arabia, FRUS

24
Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, p. 26.

66

short, while leaving an inconsistent legacy to his successor, Roosevelt was consistent in
subordinating his personal outlook and domestic political consideration to strategic imperatives.
Truman’s Policies on the Partition of Palestine and Recognition of Israel
It is important to underscore that prior to 1948 the United States, lacking any colonial
legacy or history of intervention in the region, was the most popular of the western countries in
the Arab World. The US also maintained friendly relations with all Arab League states, none of
which was “even on speaking terms with the Soviet Union.”
25
However, this picture was to begin
to change drastically and, therefore, it is worth detailing the underlying causes and dynamics.
Immediately after assuming the presidency, Truman became closely involved with the
Zionists and the Palestine question. During his first week in office, he was informed by his
secretary of state of Roosevelt’s letters to Arab leaders. Truman also was visited by a major
leader of American Zionism, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who requested the new president’s support
for increased Jewish immigration to Palestine and establishment of a Jewish state.
The Push for 100,000 Jewish Immigrants to Palestine
Based on the recommendation of his personal envoy dispatched to assess the situation of
the displaced persons (DB) camps in Europe at the end of the war and answering the calls of
Zionist supporters, Truman sent a letter to Britain’s new Prime Minister Clement Attlee on
August 31, 1945 requesting the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into
Palestine.
26
This marked the beginning of direct US involvement in Britain’s Palestine policy,
and the British government was furious at what it saw as Truman’s harassment and unwelcomed
pressure, since its Palestine policy was collapsing under the weight of its contradictions. As the
British-Jewish alliance faltered in the aftermath of the White Paper of 1939, Jewish
immigration—much of it now illegal—continued to provoke and threaten Palestinians. A

25
Walid Khalidi, "Revisiting the Unga Partition Resolution," Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 1 (1997):
p. 18.

26
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Garden City,
N.Y.,: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 138-9.

67

sustained terror campaign against the British in Palestine was initiated by underground militant
Jewish organizations such the Irgun and later the more radical Stern Gang, which tried to
establish an alliance with Germany to force Britain out of Palestine.
27
With the Zionists’
perception that the new Labour government in Britain was less accommodating to their agenda, in
October 1945 the largest underground military organization the Haganah and its strike force
Palmach joined with more violent organizations to form the Hebrew Rebellion Movement to
strike against British targets. Moreover, Britain was strapped for resources, its military was
stretched in its other colonies, and therefore, as Foreign Secretary Bevin argued, it was not
prepared to “put another division of British troops in there”
28
to absorb and integrate 100,000
immigrants into Palestine. While Bevin quipped that the Americans were pushing for Jewish
immigration to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York,”
29
Arabs
frequently made the less flippant argument that America was a more appropriate destination,
given its vast size and strong concern for Jewish European refugees.
Britain’s attempt to address the Jewish refugee problem within an international context
and to involve the US in a bilateral fashion led to the creation of the Anglo-American Committee
of Inquiry. On April 20, 1946, the committee announced its findings: the creation of independent
Arab or Jewish state would result in civil conflict; therefore the British Mandate should be
continued “pending the execution of a Trusteeship agreement under the United Nations;”
“100,000 certificates [should] be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews
who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution;” and rescinding land transfer

27
Benny Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, 1st Vintage Books
ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), p. 174.; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, 1st
ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 24.

28
Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles, p. 16.

29
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department, [1st ed. (New York,: Norton,
1969), p. 174.

68

limitations in place since the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940.
30
Without prior consultation
with and to the dismay of the British government, on the same day the report was released
Truman endorsed only its last two provisions, ignoring the rest of the report. While Palestinians
and Arab states flatly rejected the recommendations, the Zionists “pocketed” the achievements
and refrained for the time being from pushing further so as not to antagonize the US president.
As Britain needed US financial assistance and as Truman needed British cooperation, the
two countries agreed to form a higher level committee to assess the implications of the Anglo-
American Committee. The Morrison-Grady Committee proposed a plan to create Jewish and
Arab provincial autonomy in separate districts, to place the country under British trusteeship for
undetermined period, and to admit 100,000 Jewish immigrants—if the entire plan was accepted
by both Arabs and Jews.
31
Submitting the immigration issue to the condition of Arab consent
marked a clear retreat from the recommendation of the previous committee and infuriated
Zionists in Palestine, who intensified their attacks and terror tactics against British targets. While
initially inclined to support the plan so as to prevent further deterioration in Palestine as the
British warned, Truman became the target of intense lobbying efforts by American Zionists and
as a result rejected the Morrison-Grady plan. In the face of these lobbying efforts and against the
background of the upcoming November 1946 congressional elections, Truman made a crucial
announcement that would further infuriate Britain and commit the US to support the realization of
Zionism’s chief objective. Despite strong objections from the Departments of Defense and State
on geostrategic, diplomatic and economic grounds, on October 4, 1946 and coinciding with Yom
Kippur, Truman reiterated the US request to Prime Minister Attlee for the immediate acceptance

30
Text of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Department of Sate Publication 2536, Near Eastern
Series 2, Accessed online through the Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/anglo/angch01.htm

31
Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 182.

69

of 100,000 immigrants, and, for the first time, endorsed the Jewish Agency’s partition plan to
establish a Jewish state in Palestine.
32

The United Nations Plan for the Partition of Palestine
This announcement “destroyed all possibility of Anglo-American cooperation in the
resolution of the Palestine problem (the only hope of a relatively peaceful outcome),”
33
and,
coupled with the intensifying Jewish harassment and attacks, Britain was unable to mediate or
impose a solution. Therefore, in February 1947 it announced its intention to turn the Palestine
problem over to the United Nations and requested calling a special session of the General
Assembly. The UNGA authorized and dispatched the United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) to assess the situation and propose a solution. On August 31, 1947 the
eleven-state committee recommended unanimously the end of British Mandate, and while the
majority (8 to 3, with one abstention) called for partition into a Jewish and an Arab state and the
internationalization of Jerusalem, the minority called for an independent Jewish federal state.
34
As
the General Assembly began debating partition, Truman had already instructed the State
Department to endorse it. Britain, on the other hand, consistent with its determination to
dismantle the colonial structure, declared on September 26 its unwillingness to implement
partition and its intention to end the Mandate on May 15, 1948.
35

Irrespective of its philosophical underpinnings and goals, the Zionist idea’s translation
into a successful program required Jewish migration to Palestine and the establishment of a
Jewish state. During the initial phase of his direct involvement in the conflict, President Truman

32
The day before, Truman sent the statement to Attlee, who cabled the president with an urgent plea to
delay its release but to no avail. Attlee responded sharply that “I have received with great regret your letter
refusing even a few hours grace to the Prime Mister of the country which has the actual responsibility for
the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the probable
results of your action.” Oct 3, 1945 FRUS 1946, pp 604-5.

33
Khalidi, "Revisiting the Unga Partition Resolution," p. 8.

34
Elaborate on the committee formation and the Negev’s inclusion in the Jewish part.

35
See Ritchie Ovendale, "The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1947: The Decision to
Withdraw," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 56, no. 1 (1980).

70

focused almost exclusively on immigration in the context of his oft-repeated humanitarian
concern over the plight of Jewish refugees in Europe. He also strongly advised the Zionist
leadership, with little success, to separate the two objectives: to focus on the immediate
humanitarian question, and to defer discussion of the political question of state creation until it
was feasible.
36
However, as the joint US-British efforts failed, the Palestine question entered its
second phase of international diplomacy in envisioning a Jewish state, which Truman had already
endorsed.
Indeed, endorsement was formalized when the United States voted for the UN General
Assembly Partition Plan of November 29, 1947 to establish a Jewish state, and Arab state, and an
international enclave (corpus separatum) for Jerusalem. UNGA Resolution 181 was adopted by
thirty-three votes in support, thirteen against, and ten abstentions (with two votes to spare), but
not before the voting date was postponed due to filibustering. While the first vote of November
26 counted 25 votes for, 13 against, and 17 abstentions, threats and pressure by Zionists and the
Truman Administration caused Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Liberia, Luxembourg, Paraguay, and the
Philippines to change their votes to secure the two-thirds required majority.
37
A glaring example
was when Harvey Firestone, under threats of Jewish boycott of tire products, threatened Liberia
to terminate production plant expansion there if the country voted against partition.
38

With passage, the partition plan awarded nearly 56% of the land (the best and most
fertile) of Palestine to the Jews, who constituted 31% of the population—thanks to waves of
recent immigration—and who owned only 7% of the land. The Palestinians, for their part, who
owned the rest of the land and formed 69% of the population, were given 44% of the land. It is

36
Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy, chapter 2.

37
Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics " in From Haven to
Conquest : Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948, ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), Walid Khalidi, "Intorduction," in From Haven to Conquest :
Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948, ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington, D.C.: Institute
for Palestine Studies, 1971).

38
Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 189.

71

important to recall that on the eve of the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, Ottoman
Palestine’s Jews, who were driven by religious and cultural—as opposed to political— Zionism,
constituted around 5-7% of the population concentrated as minorities in urban Jerusalem and
Jaffa areas
39
and owned an “infinitesimal”
40
portion of the land (much less than the estimated 2%
as of 1922
41
). As for the “non-Jews,” as the Balfour Declaration saw fit to classify the rest, they
were the descendants of the Canaanites (preceding the Israelites) and scores of foreign invaders
through settlements and intermarriages, the majority of whose forebears became Muslims
between the seventh and tenth centuries, or remained Christians, constituting 80-85% and 10% of
the total population, respectively.
Jewish acceptance and Arab rejection of the partition plan have been the subject of a
great deal of analysis, much of which has celebrated Jewish “compromise” and denounced the
Arab rejectionist intransigency. However, it is precisely these sobering demographic and
geographic realities that must establish the frame of reference to explain the Jewish acceptance of
the gift, and the Palestinian rejection of being dispossessed by a settler colonial movement. Far
from considering these realities, Truman’s reference was grounded in religion, thanks to his
evangelical Christian upbringing, as he viewed the Jewish return to the Holy Land as noble and a
fulfillment of a biblical prophecy which would have superseded any consideration for the Arab
Muslim concerns—had he been less ignorant of them in the first place. President Wilson’s
endorsement of the Balfour Declaration—which Truman understood to bind the United States to
supporting its implementation, Truman’s Zionist and pro-Zionist close advisors, and the
persistent lobbying efforts (annoying and harassing as they were) by Zionist organizations were

39
Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," p. 140.; Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry, "A Survey of Palestine," p. 144.

40
John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation " in The Transformation of Palestine; Essays on the Origin
and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ed. Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod (Evanston Northwestern
University Press, 1971).

41
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, "A Survey of Palestine," p. 244.

72

all consistent with Truman’s outlook. Accordingly, these factors were not only important in
infusing action into Truman’s a priori position but they were also instrumental in moving the
United States in line with the Jewish Agency in Palestine towards the realization of Zionism.
The Creation of Israel and American Recognition
David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency’s executive committee and
subsequently Israel’s first prime minister, concluded as early as 1936 that the only possible way
to address the Palestinian rejection of both Jewish immigration and establishment of a Jewish
state was through military force.
42
Although after the White Paper Ben-Gurion still saw the
British-Zionist conflict as political in nature, he and other Zionist leaders concluded that at some
point a campaign of attacks, assassinations, and harassment against Britain would be required to
end the Mandate and to remove the buffer of British troops in order to clear the path towards a
military showdown with the Arabs. While some late but inconsequential diplomatic maneuvering
was taking place at the UN, inter-communal Jewish-Palestinian fighting broke out immediately
after the partition vote; more significant for the ultimate outcome, in early April the Jewish forces
led by the Haganah and Palmah (by now transformed into a regular army) launched decisive
military offenses against a leaderless (as result of killings and expulsions) and disorganized
Palestinian population. Additionally, the Jewish forces undertook a psychological campaign (e.g.
loud speaker announcements of threats of violence against those who stay) and committed some
massacres
43
with the clear goal—successfully achieved—of terrorizing some of the Palestinian
population into fleeing and expelling others in order to take control of significant amounts of
territory.
On the eve of the end of Mandate, at midnight on 14-15 May 1948, Ben-Gurion
proclaimed the establishment of Israel as a state from Tel Aviv. The following day, troops from
neighboring Arab countries, which lacked any military coordination and were mostly suspicious

42
See Khalidi, "Revisiting the Unga Partition Resolution."

43
Including the most infamous Dier Yasin massacre of April 9, 1948 where at least 250 were murdered.

73

of each other’s territorial ambitions in Palestine, entered the territory to “rescue” Palestine.
Indeed, as Benny Morris, one of Israel’s most noted revisionist historians has accurately argued,
in the Arab camp there “was no political agreement about the goals of the war; there was no unity
of military command, agreed military aims, or operational procedures and timetables.”
44

Additionally, with the possible exception of the Arab Legion of Jordan (whose leadership had
colluded with Zionists), the invading armies were of such decisively inferior quality and numbers
in comparison to the Israeli forces that when truces were reached and armistices signed at the end
the 1948 war, Israel controlled 78 percent (50% more than partition allotted) of historic Palestine
and had created between 770,000 and 785,000 refugees.
45
As for the rest of Palestine, what
became the West Bank and East Jerusalem (control of the Old City being the only objective Israel
did not achieve) were annexed by Jordan, and the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian
military/administrative rule.
In Washington, it was only 11 minutes after Ben-Gurion’s announcement that the
Truman administration was the first to extend de facto recognition to the new state. The
recognition was issued against the strong recommendation of the Pentagon, the State Department
(which Truman held mostly in contempt, referring often to career diplomats as “striped pants
boys”), and the newly established CIA. They all argued that such a decision (as well as the prior
one supporting partition) would lead to war, antagonize the Arabs, cost the US its high prestige in
the region, threaten the oil supply, and open the Arab world to Soviet influence. That Truman
decided to ignore these threats, in favor of partition and recognition significantly undermine the
argument that his decisions were driven by the geostrategic interests of the United States,
46

particularly since the specified threats were to materialize as predicted. Indeed, it was the advice

44
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 219.

45
Janet Abu Lughed Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine."

46
See Clark M. Clifford and Richard C. Holbrooke, Counsel to the President : A Memoir, 1st ed. (New
York: Random House, 1991), pp. 18-25.

74

of the president’s personal advisors in the While House (e.g. Clark Clifford, Eddie Jacobson, and
David Niles) that carried the day over that of his professional advisors (e.g. Undersecretary of
State Robert Lovett, Policy Planning Director George F. Kennan, Defense Secretary James
Forrestal, and Secretary of State George Marshall) and steered Truman to recognize Israel.
The president’s support, however, was not without its limits. Although some American
Zionists requested military aid (the Jewish Agency and Jewish forces were well-armed thanks to
Soviet weapons from Czechoslovakia), Truman ruled out any such to Israel. In fact an
international arms embargo was imposed on both sides and observed by the US (but not other
states, most noticeably Czechoslovakia) during and after the war. Truman also ruled out US
military involvement in the conflict, often repeating that “I have no desire to send 500,000
American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.”
47
Neither was the president without some
anti-Semitic tendencies nor was his patience towards extreme Zionist leaders and tactics without
limits: he barred some of them from entering the White House for a period of time (mostly
because of the belligerence of Abba Hillel Silver) as he bitterly complained that the “persistence
of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political
threats—disturbed and annoyed me.”
48
Nevertheless, despite such annoyances, his commitment to
Zionism, although seemingly ambivalent at times, never wavered when it counted most. Indeed,
“who cares?” was the response of one Zionist commentator
49
to offensive remarks by Truman
released in 2003, for he “will be remembered for his support and recognition of the homeland of
the Jews, the State of Israel,” as an American Jewish leader had accurately explained.
50

47
Truman, Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, p. 133.

48
Ibid., p. 158, Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel to the President : A Memoir.

49
Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post, November 24, 2006

50
Abraham Foxman, Anti-Defamation League (ADL) National Director, July 11, 2003
http://www.adl.org/

75

In summary, thanks to such advisors as Jacobson (who was instrumental in reopening the
While House to Zionists), his Bible-based orientation, the persistent lobbying efforts of pro-
Zionist groups (including from within the White House), and pro-Zionist public opinion and
congressional support (built by these lobbying efforts) all led Truman to pro-Zionist actions and
provided an explanation for them. In addition, Truman’s calculations over the Jewish vote in the
1948 close election cannot be discounted for the “evidence is overwhelmingly…that the president
was deliberately and calculatingly playing politics with this explosive [recognition] issue.”
51
In
the three-way presidential election, Truman received 75% of the Jewish vote, and the election
was close enough such that had Truman received a total of some 29,000 less votes in Ohio,
California, and Illinois—with sizable and heavy voting Jewish populations—he would have lost
the election.
52

It is also during this crucial period (mid 1945-47) that American Jewish lobbying—to be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter—coalesced into an organized and effective form
which would subsequently be called upon again and again to support Israel, to advocate pro-Israel
US policies, and to strengthen US-Israeli ties. Shortly before the UN vote on partition, Truman’s
advisor David Niles was coordinating the massive Zionist lobbying campaign directed at the
White House and State Department, prompting Truman to comment in his memoir that “I do not
think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this
instance.” In turn, by “direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and indirect,
was brought to bear by American officials [at the State Department ] upon the countries”
53
not
supporting partition to change their position and vote in favor.

51
John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, Hoover Institution Studies, 39
(Stanford, Calif.,: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 132.

52
Ibid., p. 134.

53
Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, p. 50.

76

Truman’s endorsement of partition and recognition of Israel marked the climax of his
involvement in the region, helped push the Zionist-Palestinian struggle into an inter-state, Arab-
Israeli conflict, and, most relevantly, inaugurated an era of Arab resentment towards the United
States. Meanwhile, the White House and State Department factions continued to quibble over
post-Israel creation issues such as when the US should grant de jure recognition to Israel (which
came on January 31, 1949), Israeli membership in the UN (admitted on May, 11, 1949), and a
$100 million bank loan to Israel.
54
More importantly, following the British withdrawal from the
region, the United States began to fill the vacuum and attend to the larger considerations of
ensuring stability in the context of the Cold War.
The fear of Soviet penetration into the region was beginning to shape the US orientation,
as demonstrated by the Truman Doctrine, issued in March of 1947 with the objective of
protecting neighboring Turkey and Greece against Soviet threats. As a result, during Truman’s
second term, the US recognized the Arab-Israeli conflict as a cause of instability and thus
attempted—albeit half-heartedly—to find a permanent settlement to the conflict, including the
refugee problem, which frustrated Truman as Israel refused to assume any responsibility.
Additionally, Truman introduced the Tripartite Declaration, issued jointly in May 1950 by the
US, France, and Britain, to establish a balance of power by ensuring parity of arm supplies to the
Arab states and Israel “for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate
self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole.”
55

Soviet Containment and Eisenhower’s Search for Arab-Israeli Impartiality
The Eisenhower administration introduced a drastic change into the US approach towards
Israel and the Arab states and continued with increased intensity to counter Soviet threats. Unlike

54
Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman
to Reagan, Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 40.

55
American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents Volumes I and II, Department of State
Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office,
1957

77

his predecessor, Eisenhower did not have emotional or biblical connections to the Jewish people
or the State of Israel. By all accounts, Eisenhower (and his influential secretary of state, John
Foster Dulles) was pragmatic and “uncomfortable with rhetoric and distrustful of abstracts …
[and] had little appreciation for history.”
56
Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador to the US at the time
and later foreign minister, remarked in his memoir that Zionism “was unlikely to be embraced by
anyone who lacked a historic imagination and at least a modest ounce of romantic eccentricity.”
57

It is no wonder that Eban found Eisenhower “aloof” and lacking in knowledge about Jews within
and outside the Bible. Such a personal outlook or lack of imagination may provide an
explanation for the president’s attitude towards Israel.
Of equal importance, the state of Israel was already an established reality, accepted
institutionally at the State Department, recognized by the great powers and the wider world
community as a member of the United Nations. No existential questions were being debated or
advocated by pro-Zionist forces and lobbies. Accordingly, from the beginning the Eisenhower
administration viewed Israel as another normal state and maintained that its relations with the US
should not be subject to domestic considerations. Through the State Department, he put Israel on
notice that “we would handle our affairs exactly as though we didn’t have a Jew in America. The
welfare and best interests of our own country were to be the sole criteria on which we
operated.”
58
Eisenhower’s overriding objective was containing the Soviet Union, and thus he set
out to enhance the western response to any Soviet threat by expanding on the Truman Doctrine
and deepening US commitment to cooperating countries, particularly in the Arab world.

56
Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy, p. 96.

57
Quoted in Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from
Truman to Reagan, p. 74.

58
Ibid., p. 97.

78

Of course, securing Western access to Middle Eastern oil and denying possible control to
the Soviet Union were also important.
59
Thus, like the previous administration, the new one
recognized the danger of the Arab-Israeli conflict in view of the potential spread of communism
and saw in its comprehensive settlement a remedy to Soviet expansion in the region. What
differentiated the new administration from Truman’s policy of “lopsided” favoritism to Israel,
however, was its view that preventing Soviet influence dictated the need to implement a policy of
“true impartiality” towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and, as Eisenhower instructed his NSC staff,
to be “as tough with the Israelis as with any other nation.”
60
Thus, when in late 1953 Israel began
a project of diverting water from the international waterway of the Jordan River in the north to
the Negev desert in the south through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Eisenhower
administration refused to allow it. The matter was brought to the United Nations by Syria, and
the US demanded that Israel suspend work on the project. When Ben-Gurion refused, Secretary
of State Dulles promptly announced the cutting of all foreign aid to Israel. The Israeli cabinet
agreed to suspend the project on October 25, 1953 and as a result Dulles released the $26 million
grant earmarked for Israel three days later.
61

The US Cold War Calculations in the Region
To enhance its sphere of influence and fill the geostrategic gap between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO),
in 1955 the US supported the British initiative to create the Baghdad Pact. Although the US was
concerned about opposition from nationalist forces in the region and ambivalent about Britain’s
motives (i.e. continued colonial ambitions), both powers had hoped Arab countries would join

59
The US was willing to destroy the oil fields in the region if they were to fall under Soviet control and
had a contingency plan to this effect, see Shibley Telhami, The Stakes : America and the Middle East : The
Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002).

60
Quoted in Douglas Little, American Orientalism : The United States and the Middle East since 1945
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 89.

61
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 90.

79

those of the northern tier (Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan) in this defensive pact. Turkey and Pakistan
signed a mutual cooperation treaty in February 1954; a year later Turkey and Iraq (against strong
public opinion) joined to create the Pact, and a month later Iran and Pakistan, followed by Britain,
also joined. Jordan was courted to join, but domestic opposition, regional pressures (mostly from
Egypt) and military aid and financial incentives (from Saudi Arabia) persuaded the young King
Hussein to reconsider.
62
Iraq was harshly criticized for joining “imperialist alliances” as Egypt’s
President Nasser put it. In and in July 1958, the monarchy was overthrown in a bloody military
coup, and under the new republican regime, Iraq withdrew from the pact in March 1959. This
ended western hopes for any Arab participation and rendering the pact the least successful of anti-
Soviet alliances. The pact became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), moved its
headquarters to Ankara, and was dissolved in 1979 after Iran and Pakistan also withdrew from the
pact.
United States and western attempts to create such alliances in the region underscored
important interconnected realities for the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Israel, not
only was it not welcomed by the West, since no Arab state would join the Jewish state in such an
alliance, but it was also unwilling to join given the US-imposed conditions on the use of military
aid. Such restrictions would have curbed Ben-Gurion’s military “adventurism”
63
and reined in
Israel’s policy of “massive retaliations” against cross-border attacks and refugee infiltrations. At
the same time as Israel resented the supplying of arms to any Arab state, it sought a bilateral
defense alliance with the United State. Truman had ruled out such an arrangement early on. Nor
did the Eisenhower administration contemplate the option and, despite the massive military aid to
Israel and the “special relationship” the two countries came to celebrate under later US
administrations, the two never entered into a formal defense alliance.

62
Laurie A. Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations : The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 87 and 285.

63
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World.

80

As for the Arabs, at least for the republican regimes (Egypt, Syria, and later Iraq) and the
Arab people, the Baghdad Pact and western engineering of alliances were seen as attempts to
thwart the region’s independence hopes-- vestiges of colonial domination and threats to the
aspirations of pan-Arab nationalism. Moreover, the creation of Israel in the midst of the Arab
world, not the fear of communism, was seen as the primary threat. Indeed Dulles discovered
when he visited the region in 1953 that the Arabs were “more fearful of Zionism than of the
communists.”
64
Mindful of these sentiments, Nasser was not willing to accept western military
aid under restrictive conditions. However, Egypt was in desperate need of arms, not only to
replace the outdated and limited armory left by the British, but also to enhance its deterrent
capability against the increasingly punitive Israeli attacks across the border. Following a few
months of tranquility, on February 28, 1955 Israel carried out a military raid led by infantry
Commander Ariel Sharon against the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, killing 37 soldiers,
wounding 31, and causing extensive material damage. The attack was carried out, not only for
Israeli domestic political reasons, but also to expose Egypt’s military impotence, humiliate
Nasser, and to check the perceived threat in the rise of Arab nationalism under his leadership.
65

As it constituted not only a threat but also a nightmare to the Egyptian regime,
66
the
attack marked a major turning point in Nasser’s Egypt. After the attack, instead of a policy of
restraint, Nasser now encouraged and dispatched Egyptian-trained Palestinian fida’iyeen (guerilla
fighters) into Israel. More importantly, as he was unable to obtain arms from the West at the
needed level and under favorable conditions, in September 1955 Nasser announced an agreement
to purchase $200 million worth of advanced weapons from Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union
(the actual seller and provider of the arms, as it was later revealed), imposed no conditions and

64
Naseer Hasan Aruri, Dishonest Broker : The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine (Cambridge, MA: South
End Press, 2003), p. 16.

65
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, pp. 123-9.

66
Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest : A Critical Examination (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 58.

81

extended generous terms (arms in exchange for Egyptian cotton). The arms deal represented the
introduction of Soviet arms, or as Eisenhower put it “the first evidence of serious Communist
penetration,” into the region, thus undermining the western alliance system, increasing Nasser’s
popularity across the Arab World, and contributing to the ensuing arms race with Israel.
The Suez War: Eisenhower’s Demand for Withdrawal
This climate served as a general background to the Suez War of 1956 (to be elaborated
upon in the chapter five) in which Britain, France, and Israel colluded to attack Egypt for
different immediate motives but united by strong opposition to Nasser. As the US was struggling
to respond to new Soviet influence in the region, the Eisenhower administration strongly
condemned the Israeli attack on Gaza, suspended US military and some economic aid to Israel,
and sponsored a General Assembly (as opposed to the Security Council, to avoid British and
French vetoes) resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all invading
troops. France and Britain grudgingly complied, but Israel initially refused to withdraw from the
Sinai Peninsula; later, under mounting pressure, it agreed to do so only in principle and with
preconditions. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Dulles was lamenting bluntly the “terrific control
the Jews ha[d] over the news media … [and that the] Israeli Embassy [wa]s practically dictating
to the Congress through influential Jewish people in the country.”
67

In spite of this climate, in a televised address to the nation on February 20, 1957,
Eisenhower argued that “a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of the
United Nations disapproval [should not] be allowed to impose conditions on its own
withdrawal…[the UN must] exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal
resolutions.”
68
On the same day, Eisenhower sent a private message to PM Ben-Gurion
threatening to cut off all official aid as well as any private assistance from American Jews to

67
Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, p. 99.

68
Eisenhower's Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in the Middle East,
February 20, 1957

82

Israel, and indicating that the US would not oppose expelling Israel from the UN.
69
A week later
Israel accepted the US demands and completed the withdrawal on March 16, 1957.
In his unequivocal demand for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and the
linkage of foreign aid to Israeli compliance in 1956-57, Eisenhower was the last president to deal
with Israel in such an assertive and impartial manner. Additionally, Eisenhower refused the
notion that Israel somehow should have a veto power over US weapons sales to Arab states, as
attempted by Israel over sales of advanced tanks to Saudi Arabia in 1956.
70
It is important to
point out that successive US administrations followed suit in selling weapons to friendly Arab
states and increasingly to Israel thanks to defense industry (or the military industrial complex,
which Eisenhower warned against) lobbying and thanks to the US policy that Israel must always
maintain qualitative military advantage over all of its adversaries combined.
Although the US opposed the Suez campaign and took a firm stance against Israel,
Egypt did not enjoy warm relations with Washington beyond the end of the crisis. Nasser was a
leading figure in the nonaligned movement. He characterized Egypt’s relations with the
superpowers as “positive neutralism,” but he tilted increasingly to the Soviet camp and thus was
viewed as a “Soviet proxy” by the Eisenhower administration. As a result, the Eisenhower
Doctrine—which was announced in early 1957 to offer economic and military aid to any Middle
Eastern country facing aggression from “international communism—” pitted Nasser against the
pro-Western Arab states (e.g. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq until the coup) and opened
a decade-long inter-Arab rivalry, or the “Arab Cold War,” as it was aptly characterized by
Malcolm Kerr.
71
The doctrine and its inter-Arab consequences, which will be discussed in

69
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 181.

70
George George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University
Press, 1990), p. 49.

71
Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3d ed., A
Galaxy Book, Gb 358 (London, New York,: Oxford University Press, 1971).

83

chapter five, (re)launched a trajectory of unprecedented and ever closer US-Israeli ties thus
forging the “special relationship.”
The Beginning of the US-Israeli Special Relationship
As with previous administrations attempting to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the
initial phase of his administration President Kennedy attempted to solve the refugee issue, but
without success. Unlike his predecessor, however, Kennedy differentiated, at least initially,
between nationalism and communism, and thus sought to befriend instead of trying to repress
Arab nationalism by making overtures to Nasser. However, the increasing intensity of inter-Arab
rivalries combined, with strong congressional and Jewish opposition, led Kennedy’s efforts to
falter.
At the same time, Kennedy proceeded to embrace Israel, provide it with economic aid,
commit to the “tradition of friendship,” and celebrate what he was the first to term the “special
relationship” between the United States and the Jewish state.
72
Additionally, although the new
president lacked the biblically-based affinity for Israel, he understood, within the frame of ethnic
politics, the Jews’ connections to Israel and appreciated the strong role of the “Jewish vote” in the
very close 1960 election (as he was willing “to use the Israel issue for electoral purposes.”)
Accordingly, he appointed pro-Israel Myer Feldman as special counsel to the White House with
strong mandate on Jewish and Israel-related issues, and was susceptible to domestic pressures and
lobbying efforts.
73

At the same time, the Kennedy administration was trying to convince Israel to accept the
Johnson Plan,
74
(a US-proposed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem) and dissuade it from

72
Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy, pp. 106-7.

73
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 100.

74
Joel Beinin, "The United States-Israeli Alliance," in Wrestling with Zion : Progressive Jewish-American
Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ed. Tony Kushner and Alisa Solomon (New York: Grove
Press, 2003), p. 42.

84

developing nuclear-arms capabilities in the Dimona nuclear facilities in the Negev desert.
75
When
Israel requested anti-aircraft Hawk missiles in May 1961, the administration, in keeping with the
previous US position, declined initially. However, Israel renewed the request and, thanks to the
persistent lobbying by Israel’s supporters (including Feldman from within the White House)
76
, the
administration approved the arms deal in September 1962 with the hope, but not necessarily the
expectation, that Israel would be enticed to cooperate on the nuclear and refugee issues. In the
event, Israel received the weapons but rejected the Johnson Plan and continued its nuclear
military program. The significance of the weapons acquisition exceeded its military value since
Israel, contrary to its claims that it was militarily inferior vis-à-vis Egypt,
77
already enjoyed
military superiority vis-à-vis its Arab adversaries, according to the US State and Defense
departments. As Israel was relaying on France for weapons thus far, it was the first time the US
sold arms to Israel, thus breaking from previous policy and initiating a new US-Israel military
relationship that has been deepening ever since.
The Buildup of US-Israeli Special Relationship
Distrustful of Nasser and less sympathetic to Egypt’s Arab nationalism, President
Johnson reinforced and furthered Kennedy’s positive sentiments and supportive position towards
Israel. The new president shared Truman’s biblically-informed orientations with respect to the
Jews and Israel, as he noted "the Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories as the
gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into our souls,"
78
and
surrounded himself with numerous Jewish and pro-Israel personal friends and advisors. Despite

75
Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 193.

76
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 107.

77
Shimon Peres, "American Arms for Israel," in Israel in the Middle East : Documents and Readings on
Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, ed. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda
Reinharz (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2008).

78
Johnson’s Address to B’nai B’rith Meeting, Washington, D.C. 1968

85

the assessment that Israel enjoyed military superiority vis-à-vis the US-supplied “moderate” and
the Soviet-supplied “radical” Arab states, there was no doubt that the White House view of the
need to arm Israel to maintain the Israel-Arab balance would win. As a result, during his visit in
June 1964 as the first foreign leader to meet the new president, Israeli Prime Minster Levi Eshkol
was assured by Johnson that Israel would continue to receive more economic aid, enjoy shared
intelligence with the US, and have its requests for more weapons fulfilled. After some
inconsequential bureaucratic wrangling, in early 1965 Israel received more than 200 tanks and in
1966 some 50 Skyhawk bombers, which constituted the first deal for offensive weapons, another
milestone in US-Israel relationship.
79

Israel was receiving this increased support at the time the US was becoming more
embroiled in Vietnam. Given that the Arab-Israeli conflict was in a period of relative quiet, the
Johnson administration viewed it as manageable and accorded it a lower priority. Furthermore,
by this time Israel had become the primary source in shaping the US frame of reference on the
conflict. For example, while Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy attempted to address the refugee
problem—albeit without success—the Johnson administration not only ignored the problem but
also accepted the Israeli position that it was for the Arab states to address.
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War
However, the calm was about to come to an end. First, while the borders between Israel
and Egypt had been quiet since the end of the Suez conflict in 1957, there were some fida’iyeen
attacks and infiltrations into Israel, mostly from Jordan (without the support of the regime) and
from Lebanon with Syrian support, which in 1966 came under a new regime based on the radical
wing of the Ba’ath party. In response to a fida’iyeen attack that killed three Israelis, on
November 13, 1966 Israel raided the village of Al-Sammu’ in the West Bank (under Jordanian

79
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 134.

86

control) killing dozens of people and destroying at least 118 houses.
80
In early 1967, the Israeli
army began cultivating land in the DMZ between itself and Syria in a step designed to provoke a
reaction from Damascus that would produce a rationale to retaliate. On April 7, 1967 Syria
opened fire on an Israeli tractor, and an air battle ensued in which Israel shot down six Syrian
planes, thus starting the countdown to the 1967 War.
81

The reasons and consequences of the war will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.
It is sufficient here to highlight that the combination of Nasser’s fateful miscalculations and
empty pre-war rhetoric, Israel’s desire to defeat Nasser and to expand territorially (particularly
over East Jerusalem, if given the chance), and President Johnson’s “green light” or at least
“yellow light”
82
to Israel to attack all contributed to the outbreak of war. Far from the war’s
being an example of Arab aggression towards a v vulnerable Israel as the US media had portrayed
it (including the propagation that Egypt attacked first), Israel and the US knew that Egypt was
neither prepared nor had the intention of going to war. Indeed, Egypt’s commitment not to fire
the first shot was communicated privately to both the Soviet and Americans sides and also
publicly. In comparison, not only did Israel never take the war option off the table but on May 11
and 12 its military leadership threatened to topple the Syrian regime, triggering a series of actions
and reactions that led to war. On June 5, Israel launched a massive attack against Egypt,
decimating its entire air force on the ground within two hours, followed by an attack on Jordan
and ending with an attack on Syria. When a ceasefire was reached on June 10, Egypt’s Sinai
Desert and Gaza Strip, Syria’s Golan Heights, and Jordan’s West Bank and East Jerusalem had
all fallen under Israeli occupation.

80
Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 138.

81
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 235.

82
William Quandt called it only “yellow light,” see Peace Process,William B. Quandt, Peace Process :
American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2001), p. 23.. But as Joel Beinin correctly pointed out that for Israeli, “as long as it was not a strong
red light, the effect was the same,” Beinin, "The United States-Israeli Alliance," p. 42, footnote 1.

87

Johnson and the War Aftermath
Regardless of whether the color of Washington’s signal to Israel before the attack was
yellow or green, the role of the United States during and after the war was clear. Johnson
maintained close contacts before, during, and after the war with the Israeli government directly
and indirectly—mostly through pro-Israel personal friends and intermediaries. By comparison,
the US had minimal contacts with Egypt and the US-Egyptian relations were tense. . More
important, however, unlike the strong reaction of the Eisenhower administration over the Suez
War of 1956, the Johnson administration never condemned the Israeli attacks, much less demand
an immediate or unconditional withdrawal. Instead, the president linked any Israeli withdrawal to
achieving peace between Israel and its adversaries. Shortly after the war, Johnson blamed Egypt
for the fighting and outlined a five-point plan to resolve the conflict that was incorporated into
UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. Ultimately, it was his pro-Israel
predisposition—which was made easier by strong pro-Israel public opinion and congressional
support—that accounted for Johnson’s stand. With such a predisposition and support, Johnson
did not need to be lobbied by anyone to support Israel thus rendering, as William Quandt argued,
the role of the pro-Israeli lobby insignificant.
83

The resolution in essence affirmed Israel’s borders within the 1949 armistice lines at a
minimum (thus negating any possible Arab claims based on the UN Partition of 1947), required
Israel to withdraw from territories—as opposed to the territories according to the English, but not
the French, version of the resolution—occupied in the recent conflict, and omitted any reference
to Palestine or Palestinians except in the context of finding a “settlement to the refugee
problem.”
84
This marginalization of Palestine, it is worth mentioning, was a reflection of the
condition of the Palestinians following the 1948 war, thanks to the trauma of defeat, their
expulsion, and the absorption of the rest of Palestine by Egypt and Jordan.

83
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 50.

84
UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

88

With no sense of urgency or any US pressure to implement UN 242, Israel’s swift
victory, after pre-war exaggerated fears of and threats by the Arabs to bring about the Jewish
state’s “imminent extermination,” triggered a sense of euphoria
85
not only in Israel but also
among Israel’s supporters abroad, particularly in the United States. In the context of the civil
rights movement and rise of ethnic politics, Israel’s accomplishment gave many American Jews a
collective and renewed sense of Jewishness,
86
and encouraged the assertion of a more American-
Jewish identity closely tied to Israel, not only in the cultural but also in the political sense. The
impact was also felt by the larger American public which, against the backdrop of the US struggle
in Vietnam, viewed victorious Israel as a powerful American ally and perceived it very favorably.
The Johnson administration also saw in Israel’s trouncing of its Soviet-armed adversaries
a shattering of Soviet prestige in the region and a proven example of the superiority of American
weapon systems over those of the Soviet Union. Given the deepening and worsening of its
involvement in Vietnam, the administration welcomed and adopted the Israeli view that Israel
was emerging as a strategic asset to the US. Indeed, the capture by Israel of Soviet-made
weapons and their transmission to the US has been frequently cited as an early example of this
view.
Since France was no longer supplying weapons to Israel after the 1967 War thanks to
Charles de Gaulle’s Arab policy, the US was its natural replacement. Thus when Israeli Prime
Minster Eshkol requested an assortment of arms—including the most advanced US F-4 Phantom
jet fighters— in January 1968, Johnson promised approval but urged postponement until after
exploring the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to maintain an arms
“balance” in the region. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning two factors. First, as pro-Israel

85
Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, Israel in the Middle East : Documents and Readings on Society,
Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, 2nd ed. (Waltham, : Brandeis University Press
2008), p. 219.

86
Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy.

89

lobbying efforts accelerated, not only did “every major [Jewish] organization stress[] the
importance of the jets in its political and educational activities…[but a] variety of non-Jewish
organizations also endorsed the sale, including Americans for Democratic Action, the American
Legion, and the AFL-CIO, [in which] Jewish groups either instigated or encouraged the action.”
87

Second, the State and Defense departments opposed the sale, and attempts were made by some to
condition the sale on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and by others to insist on
Israel’s ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As pro-deal pressure mounted and the
Soviets refused to limit arms before a comprehensive political settlement, Johnson ignored the
advice, rejected the conditions, and officially approved the arms deal on October 9, 1968.
The Nixon Doctrine
Nixon’s illusive “peace at hand” in Vietnam accelerated the previously established
trends. In order to reduce US involvement in Vietnam and within the framework of a global
strategy towards the Soviet Union, Nixon announced what came to be known as the Nixon
Doctrine by which the US would keep its formal security commitments (e.g. SEATO) and
“provide a shield if a nuclear power threats the freedom” of allies or nations of vital interest to the
US.
88
The novel addition, with relevance to the Middle East, was that the US would also provide
economic and military support for threatened allies to defend themselves and would designate a
regional surrogate power to maintain stability and protect US interests. Early in the
administration and in deference to Israeli opposition, Nixon accepted in advance the lack of
implementation of the “even-handed” Roger Plan, which called upon Israel, based on UN
Resolution 242, to withdraw from the occupied territories with only “insubstantial alterations” in
borders in return for Arab recognition of Israel’s sovereignty within the 1949 armistice lines.

87
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 161.

88
Henry Kissinger and Clare Boothe Luce, White House Years, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p.
225.

90

Additionally, the influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was actively
working to undercut the plan of the secretary of state (who saw the conflict outside Cold War
parameters). However, despite private assurances that the Roger Plan was not to be pursued,
pressure from the Israeli government and its American supporters mounted to abandon the plan
altogether and approve Israel’s latest request for arms. Nixon approved the request in March
1970, and as Kissinger planed to push aside and replace Rogers in any meaningful policy making
related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger’s deemphasizing of regional conflicts and his
preference for maintaining the status quo prevented Israel from having to make any concessions.
Furthermore, when Jordan’s monarchy was threatened during the 1970 Civil War by
factions of the PLO, which also had Syria’s backing, King Hussein requested and was promised
by the US that Israel would undertake direct military intervention against Syria (and possibly
Iraq) if Syrian tanks did not withdraw swiftly from northern Jordan. In the aftermath of its
readiness to rescue the pro-West “moderate” regime against the pro-Soviet “radical” forces, Israel
presented itself and was perceived by the US to have emerged as a “strategic partner” and a
regional surrogate (in addition to Iran) for the United States as per the Nixon Doctrine. Indeed, as
Nixon promised he would “never forget Israel’s role” in the Jordan crisis and stressed “that the
United States was fortunate in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East,” Yitzhak Rabin
(Israel’s ambassador to the US, at the time), welcomed the US’s elevated commitment as “the
most far-reaching… on the mutuality of the alliance between the two countries.”
89
Accordingly
and in line with Kissinger’s view that if Israel were to make territorial “concessions” it should do
so from a position of strength, the United States increased military and economic aid and
approved longer-term arms deals to Israel. As a result, the Nixon Doctrine ultimately served as a
mechanism to enhanced Israel’s military strength vis-à-vis its Arab adversaries rather than a
strategy to deter Soviet aggression in the region. The continued US involvement in Vietnam, the

89
Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p.
189.

91

opening to China, SALT talks with the Soviets, the1972 presidential elections and Kissinger’s
preference for the status quo in the region all reinforced a virtual stalemate in the Arab-Israel
conflict until late 1973.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
However, the status quo was becoming increasingly intolerable to President Anwar Sadat
of Egypt, and in order to force greater US involvement in the conflict, Sadat fulfilled a US
condition by expelling Soviet advisors from Egypt in July of 1972. In the absence of any serious
peace initiatives and with the intention of breaking the political impasse, on October 6, 1973,
Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces in the occupied Sinai and Golan
Heights, and were able to regain some of their territories, at least in the initial phase of the war.
Nixon affirmed that the US “had to keep the interests of the Israelis uppermost during thus
conflict,”
90
and, therefore, a few days into the war, he ordered a massive airlift of military
equipment to Israel. As the tide turned in Israel’s favor and Nixon requested $2.2 billion in aid to
Israel, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced an oil embargo on the US (and the Netherlands, for
facilitating arms shipments to Israel) and curtailed oil production. With Israel taking more
territory than it had occupied before the war, a ceasefire was finally called after the adoption of
UN Resolution 338, and after placing all American forces (including nuclear ones) on alert over
the fear of Soviet intervention on behalf of Syria or Egypt and the increased likelihood of a
superpower confrontation.
With the intention of marginalizing Soviet involvement, Kissinger began a post-war
“shuttle diplomacy” in the region and produced a disengagement agreement between Israel and
Egypt in January 1974 and another one between Syria and Israel in May 1974. Israel’s
intransigence in the face of Egypt’s demands for further Israeli withdrawals led Kissinger to
suspend the talks and President Ford to suspend new aid agreements to Israel; Ford also requested

90
Richard M. Nixon, Rn : The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 2 vols. (New York: Warner Books, 1979), p.
477.

92

a reassessment of US policy in the region. Fearing the possibility that the administration might
call for a comprehensive settlement, Israel and its supporters perceived such an approach with
alarm and accused Kissinger of exerting excessive pressure on Israel. With counter pressure
mounting on the administration from pro-Israeli forces, seventy-six senators signed a letter to
remind Ford that the US commitment to Israel’s security was bound “by a policy of continued
military supplies and diplomatic and economic support.”
91
What became known as the “Letter of
76” served as a reminder that it would be “politically counterproductive”
92
to pressure Israel and
led Kissinger to resume unilateral “step-by-step” diplomacy—Israel’s preferred mode of
negotiations. As a result, Kissinger produced the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement (Sinai II) in September 1975 but not before Israel was offered an additional $2 billion
in US aid. In addition, Kissinger promised to drop the idea of a Jordanian-Israeli agreement, and
US committed itself not to talk with the PLO unless it renounced terrorism and recognized
Israel’s right to exist.
93

More important, the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement caused a split between Egypt and
Syria and ultimately paved the way for the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords in September
1978 and Peace Treaty in March 1979 under the auspices of President Jimmy Carter. Although
the United States became heavily involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict under Kissinger’s full
control, his “step-by-step diplomacy” precluded the possibility of reaching a comprehensive
settlement. Indeed, his ultimate objective was to remove Egypt from the Arab-Israeli military
equation, win Sadat to the US side, and reduce, if not completely eliminate, the role of the Soviet
Union in the peace process. Indeed, the ubiquitous phrase “peace process,” which has become

91
Letter to President Ford by 76 Members of the U.S. Senate, 22 May 1975, website of Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA

92
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 165.

93
Ibid., p. 168.

93

the enterprise solely of the United States to the exclusion of other third parties —in line with
Israel’s preference--owes its existence to Kissinger’s post-war diplomacy.
The Arab oil embargo, imposed against the United States (and the Netherlands) as a
result of its unprecedented support for Israel during the 1973 war, merits a brief discussion. As
the undisputed leader of the oil-producing countries and the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia first
demanded full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 (Sinai, the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights) before ending the embargo. With the shift from a “buyer’s
market” to a “seller’s market” and the threat against foreign oil companies in Libya after the
1969 Qaddafi-led revolution, oil prices were poised for an increase above the stable prices of
around $3.-$3.5 for the 15 years prior to the October War. To capitalize on the economic
opportunity offered by the embargo, Iran and Venezuela were in the forefront in pushing oil
prices to four times the previous value in the December 1973 meeting of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, created in 1960). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia softened its
condition to that of ending the embargo at the beginning of Israeli withdrawal, and Arab oil
ministers ended the embargo on members of the European Economic Community a day after the
OPEC meeting.
94
At the United States’ urging and with President Sadat’s encouragement, the
Arab oil embargo against the US was ended in March 1974, after the first Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement agreement was signed.
While the embargo succeeded in disrupting the oil supply and in causing long lines at
gasoline pumps across the United States, it failed to achieve its political objectives. Saudi Arabia
and the other Arab oil-producing countries first revised their positions without securing a US
promise to pressure Israel, and then ended their embargo after the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, an
agreement which virtually moved Egyptian forces only to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and
produced no Israeli pullback from the territories occupied in 1967. In addition, it was reached
independently, not because, of the embargo. The Arab oil-producing counties could not sustain a

94
Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, pp. 133-4.

94

prolonged embargo because of their need for oil revenues and their fear of triggering alternative
energy development. Moreover, not only did the embargo fail to force the United States to
reduce its support for Israel, but rather such support continued to increase unconditionally.
As a result, the Arab oil states never again contemplated the use of oil as a weapon in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. For the United States, the embargo marked the first instance in which its
support for Israel conflicted with securing Arab oil since the discovery of oil in the Arabian
Peninsula and the advent of the Zionist-Arab conflict. With the exception of the embargo
episode, the US’s continued ability to secure oil from the region marks the only error the
diplomatic and military establishments made, when advising presidents against US support for
Zionism, the UN partition plan, and recognition of Israel. It may be recalled that the State and
Defense departments had also predicted that such support would also cause war and long-term
conflict, increase Soviet influence in the region, and create enmity against the United Sates in the
Arab World, all of which came to materialize with detrimental consequences. Only on the
question of continued access to Arab oil were they proven wrong.
The United States has apparently deemed these consequences an acceptable cost, not for
its support for Israel’s existence (which was becoming gradually less of an issue of conflict even
among the Arab states—in reality although not necessarily in rhetoric), but for Israeli policies,
which have been opposed by much of the world. Neither the considerations of economic
trilateralism (as viewed by Japan and Europe) nor the rise of the Third World—which supported
numerous, but mostly inconsequential, pro-Palestinian resolutions at the UN General
Assembly—seemed to have any impact on the trajectory of US-Israeli relations.
The Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords and Peace Treaty
Upon his arrival in the White House, based on formative biblical experiences and
strategic considerations, Carter decided to take an activist approach towards finding a
comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He sought to do so according to UN 242
(with only minor border modifications), and to include the Palestine question, thus sounding an

95

alarm bell in Israel and among its supporters in the United States. Carter understood the political
and humanitarian dimensions of the Palestine problem and was the first president to pronounce in
March 1977 the need for a “Palestinian homeland.”
95
Carter also hesitated in approving all of
Israel’s military requests, vetoed Israel’s sale of jets to Ecuador,
96
and introduced measures to
lessen military cooperation with Israel, all in an attempt to reduce reliance on arms sales as a
foreign policy instrument.
Furthermore, after policy assessments and reappraisals, visits to the region, and
considerable consultations, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s efforts culminated in the Soviet-US
Communiqué of October 1, 1977 which outlined Carter’s outlook within UN Resolution 242,
called for convening a joint superpower-sponsored Geneva Conference, and urged a
comprehensive settlement to the conflict, “including insuring the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people”
97
[Emphasis added]. While the PLO welcomed the joint statement, Israel’s
government under Prime Minister Menachem Begin denounced it.
98
All these developments were
strongly rejected by Israel, and the administration’s attempt to involve the Soviet Union in the
process triggered the eruption of a political firestorm of indignation and pressure to change course
by pro-Israel organizations, the US Congress, and the media.
99
As it was the first time for the US
to refer to Palestinian rights, New York City mayoral candidate Ed Koch captured the mood of

95
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 182.

96
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 330.

97
Text of Joint Communiqué by the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, October 1, 1977 in Samuel Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change " in
The Middle East : Ten Years after Camp David ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1988), p. 447, Appendix B.

98
New York Times, October 2, 1977

99
Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to
Reagan, p. 338.

96

the pro-Israel camp in announcing that “Israel will never, nor should it ever, have to sit down
with the P.L.O. murderers.”
100

As a result, Carter succumbed to Israel’s demands and retreated from the joint
communiqué in a US-Israeli “working paper” worked out by Vance and Dayan, Israel’s right-
wing Likud foreign minister, who essentially threatened Carter that without such a statement
“there will be screaming here [by American Jews] and in Israel.”
101
William Quandt, an NSC
staffer for the Middle East under Nixon and Carter observed that this “whole episode left Carter
exhausted and somewhat cautious, the Israelis both distrustful and aware of their power, and the
Arabs confused and alarmed at the spectacle of the United States’ appearing to retreat under
pressure on the eve of the Geneva conference.”
102

However, Sadat’s dramatic and surprising announcement on November 9, 1977 of his
willingness to go to Israel in search of peace drastically altered the actors’ calculus and rendered
the proposed conference useless. Ten days later Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset (parliament)
in Jerusalem, thus dramatically altering the course of Arab-Israeli conflict. Sadat’s initiative led
to the signing on September 17, 1978 of the Camp David Accords (laying the framework and
principles for withdrawal and peace). On March 26, 1979 the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty,
according to which Egypt ultimately regained complete sovereignty over Sinai and established
full diplomatic relations with Israel, was signed in Washington. Although Sadat (as a self-
appointed representative of the Palestinians) and Carter attempted strenuously to extend the
application of UN 242 to the West Bank and Gaza and incorporate the Palestine question into the
accords, Prime Minister Begin adamantly refused, agreeing to offer Palestinians only a limited
“autonomy” for the people, but not over the land.

100
New York Times, October 4, 1977

101
Quoted in Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p.
190.

102
Ibid.

97

However, the Palestinian autonomy plan, the second part of the Peace Treaty, was dead
on arrival, despite attempts by the administration to resurrect it. While Begin saw the autonomy
plan as end in itself, Carter and Sadat viewed it as a “transitional stage” to be followed by Israeli
withdrawal according to UN 242, although the Palestinians were neither consulted nor accepted
by Israel as negotiating partners. Worse, Jewish settlement in the occupied territories increased,
in contradiction to Begin’s promise to Carter to “freeze” construction. With the fall of the Shah
of Iran in January 1979, the subsequent hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
uphill election campaign, and the strong position of the pro-Israeli lobby, Carter was simply too
weak politically to push further for his goal of achieving a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Although he strongly felt he had been “double-crossed”
103
by Begin on the
settlements issue, Carter granted $3 billion to Israel to construct new military airfields, approved
all of Israel’s outstanding weapon orders (having withheld approval during negotiations), and
institutionalized the near $3 billion in annual military and economic aid.
Despite the Camp David accomplishment of delivering peace to Israel and removing its
most formidable enemy from the battlefront, Carter’s active role in the process was seen by the
American Jewish community as constituting pressure on Israel for which he never was forgiven.
As a result, while obtaining 64% of the Jewish vote in the 1976 election, Carter was the first
democratic presidential candidate since 1920 to obtain less than half (45%) of the Jewish votes in
his failed 1980 reelection bid.
104

103
Samuel Lewis Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change ", p. 223.

104
Another example is the strong vilification and indignation against Carter by pro-Israel forces in the US,
who were never able to pass beyond the title of his 2006 book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. Accusing
Carter of using “canards” in the old European anti-Semantic sense, the Anti-Defamation League’s
Abraham Foxman asserted that one “should never judge a book by its cover, but in the case of former
President Jimmy Carter’s latest work…we should make an exception.” ADL’s website
http://www.adl.org/israel/carter_book_review.asp

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The US-Israeli “Strategic” Relationship
In contrast to Carter’s strong emphasis on placing the Arab-Israeli conflict within its
regional framework, the Reagan administration viewed the conflict (and other regional conflicts)
through the prism of the US-Soviet rivalry and saw Israel as a major partner (along with Saudi
Arabia) in Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s regional “strategic consensus” against Soviet
designs. Reagan celebrated Israel as a loyal democratic US ally in a region of hostile states. He
saw its strategic value to the United States in the Cold War, and two weeks into his
administration, he declared Israeli settlements not illegal but “perhaps unnecessarily
provocative.”
105
Facilitated by an Egypt neutered by the peace treaty and Reagan-Haig’s
supportive understanding, in 1981 Prime Minister Begin sent the Israeli air force to destroy
Iraq’s still unfinished nuclear reactor, reaffirmed the annexation of East Jerusalem, and extended
Israeli law into the occupied Golan Heights (just short of annexation). In June the following year,
thanks to Haig’s solid “green light”
106
he ordered the invasion of Lebanon. In addition to killing
more than 20,000 people and wreaking massive destruction on the country, Begin and his
Defense Minister Sharon achieved their objection of defeating the PLO militarily and driving it
out of Lebanon. They failed, however, to liquidate the Palestinian national movement or to install
a friendly regime in Beirut.
The Reagan administration condemned the attack on Iraq and the annexation moves and,
with the rest of the world, was appalled at the massacre and the extent of death and damage in
Lebanon, thus causing some tension with Begin’s government. However, no one expected these
“disagreements among friends” to last, as the US-Israeli special relationship continued to be
special throughout the Reagan years. The US increased its economic aid to the Jewish state and
signed with Israel the first Free Trade Agreement in April 1985—before the US-Canada free

105
New York Times, February 3, 1981

106
Samuel Lewis, US Ambassador to Israel at the time recalled that it “was a clear, strong amber light.”

99

Trade Agreement of January 1988 and NAFTA of December 1992 were signed. Under Reagan a
series of memoranda of agreements on strategic cooperation were signed providing for joint
military exercises and ventures, opening the US military market to Israeli weapon systems, and
designating Israel as a “major non-NATO” ally with access to the most advanced weapons in the
US arsenal.
As for peacemaking, the Reagan administration was responsible for two initiatives. The
first was the Reagan Plan, announced on September 1, 1982 after the PLO evacuation from
Lebanon. However, this plan, which expanded the Camp David autonomy concept into “some
association with Jordan,” was also dead on arrival, as Begin lectured Reagan that “what some call
the West Bank, Mr. President, is Judea and Samaria …which we liberated with God’s help ...and
will never again be the West Bank” of Jordan. He argued that if that were to happen, “then in no
time, you will have a Soviet base in the heart of the Middle East.”
107
The second came in 1988,
following the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada (popular uprising against Israeli occupation)
and Israel’s brutal response to it, which alarmed the administration and many Jewish and pro-
Israel Americans.
In March 1988 the administration announced the Shultz Initiative, (named after Secretary
of State George Shultz) which called for an international conference to be followed by multi-
stage negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While the Shamir
government rejected most aspects of the initiative, Jordan’s King Hussein rendered it irrelevant in
July as he announced, for political and economic reasons, Jordan’s disengagement from, and
relinquishment of all claims to, the West Bank. The end of the “Jordanian option,” and the
emergence of the Palestinian Hamas (the Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement) with
its rising challenge to the PLO leadership in the occupied territories, led to a shift in US policy.
It will be remembered that Kissinger imposed the conditions of the PLO’s renunciation of

107
From Letter of Begin to Reagan, see Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Pocket Books,
1990), pp. 433-4.

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terrorism and recognition of the State of Israel prior to any US-PLO dialogue. As PLO chairman
Arafat was prepared to meet these conditions at the United Nations, the US denied Arafat a visa
to enter the US to address the UN and, as a result, the UN General Assembly moved and held a
special session in Geneva to listen to Arafat. The language Arafat used was not satisfying to
Shultz, who dictated to Arafat in a humiliating fashion that he needed to utter the “magic words,”
108
leading to limited US-PLO contacts through the US Ambassador in Tunisia on December 14,
1988.
Nevertheless, this action removed an important taboo from the annals of the US approach
towards the Palestinians and gave the administration of president-elect Geroge H.W. Bush a cost-
free diplomatic tool. While economic and military aid to Israel continued unabated, the new
administration widened its contacts with the PLO, although it failed to enlist Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s cooperation on procedural issues, much less his endorsement of
withdrawal or an agreement to stop building settlements. The first year of the Bush
administration witnessed dramatic global shifts as the Berlin wall fell, the Cold War ended, and
the Warsaw Pact disappeared. As a result, the administration paid less attention to the stagnating
Arab-Israeli conflict; indeed, it suspended the dialogue with the PLO on June 20, 1990, in the
aftermath of Arafat’s refusal to condemn a thwarted attack on Israel by a breakaway faction of the
PLO.
Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990 ushered in a new era in
the region with profound implications for regional security, US-Arab relations, and American-
sponsored Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War
brought about democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and facilitated democratization elsewhere,
but not in the Arab world. As was sketched in the previous chapter, the transition from an
authoritarian regime to a democracy is a function of not only internal dynamics but also of

108
Shultz reported that he informed Reagan that in “one place Arafat was saying, ‘unc, unc, unc’ and in
another he was saying, ‘cle, cle, cle,’ but nowhere will he yet bring himself to say, ‘Uncle’” George Pratt
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph : My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner's, 1993).

101

external factors. These are defined in terms of US strategic considerations, particularly its
support for Israel, which not only largely dictates US interaction with Arab actors but also enters
into the calculations of regional regimes regarding liberalization or democratization.
As will be illustrated in chapter six, the peace process during the 1990’s offers a vivid
case study to capture this US-Arab-Israeli dynamic, since the persistence of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict provides Washington with the rationale for propping up authoritarian regimes
actively oppressing domestic opposition, at low external cost.
The discussion thus far has traced the roots and evolution of the US-Zionist/Israeli
relationship through successive administrations. To appreciate why US administrations have
been pro-Israel, the next chapter will provide empirical evidence for the US support to Israel in
the economic and military spheres and provide the sources and rationale for the special
relationship.

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Chapter Four
The Forms and Sources of the US-Israeli Special Relationship

"America and Israel share a special bond. Our relationship is unique among all nations.
Like America, Israel is a strong democracy, a symbol of freedom, and an oasis of liberty,
a home to the oppressed and persecuted.
President Bill Clinton

The survival of Israel is not a political issue, it is a moral imperative. That is my deeply
held belief and it is the belief that is shared by the vast majority of the American
people...a strong secure Israel is not just in Israel's interest. It's in the interest of the
United States and in the interest of the entire free world."
President Jimmy Carter

"My commitment to the security and future of Israel is based upon basic morality as well
as enlightened self-interest. Our role in supporting Israel honors our own heritage."
President Gerald Ford.

"Our society is illuminated by the spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets. America and
Israel have a common love of human freedom, and they have a common faith in a
democratic way of life."
President Lyndon B. Johnson

I had faith in Israel before it was established, I have in it now. I believe it has a glorious
future before it - not just another sovereign nation, but as an embodiment of the great
ideals of our civilization."
President Harry S. Truman

While scholars, policymakers, and concerned partisan organizations differ over the
reasons behind United States support for Israel, what is less in dispute is that it is indeed a special
relationship, perhaps too special as some may argue. The strength of the relationship is
manifested in the important diplomatic, military, and economic arenas. Early Zionist leaders
recognized the necessity of securing a major power endorsement for Zionism, particularly as it
became increasingly clear that the establishment of a Jewish state could not be achieved without
the use of force against and expulsion of Palestine’s indigenous Arab inhabitants. With Britain’s
issuance of the Balfour Declaration and facilitation of formation of the pre-state Jewish

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infrastructure in Palestine, the responsibility was passed to the United States as it emerged as a
superpower to give birth to Israel by supporting partition and granting recognition. Thus the shift
from London to Washington made the latter the hub for diplomatic activities and the unparalleled
source of political support to the State of Israel.
In order to decipher the puzzle of Arab authoritarianism in the context of the US role, the
dissertation has posited the proposition that the US-Israel special relationship is crucial to our
understanding of US relations with the authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt. To
demonstrate the first link (i.e. US-Israeli), the previous chapter provided an historical overview of
the US-Israeli relationship across successive US administrations. This chapter will focus on the
political, economic and military forms of US support to Israel, providing details on the level of
support and various benefits Israel draws form the US and the special programs made available to
Israel. The discussion then moves to an analysis of the rationale and sources of the US-Israeli
special relationship. The role of the pro-Israel lobby will be assessed in the context of the
argument that Israel has been of strategic value to the United States. Dissatisfied with limiting
the debate about this relationship to “the lobby” vs. “strategic value,” the dissertation explores the
cultural roots of the relationship by focusing on the role of the Bible, the Holocaust, popular
culture, and political norms. In this way, American political cultural affinity for Israel emerges as
a third important factor in understanding the special nature of the relationship. The chapter
concludes by presenting a model in which the “lobby,” the perception of strategic value, and
“affinity” all assume distinguishable functional roles and, thus, account for this relationship.
Forms of US Support to Israel
As the discussion in the previous chapter has demonstrated, with the exception of the
Suez War, the United States has given Israel approval (whether through green or amber light, as
long as it is not red) to launch wars and provided political and material support during and after
armed hostilities. As chapter five will further show, the US has largely accommodated Israeli
views on the conflict and accepted its preferences during the “peace process.” At the UN Security

104

Council, in addition to the numerous resolutions that the US prevented from being submitted to a
vote, the US has vetoed 42 resolutions critical of Israeli violations between 1972 and 2006, thus
shielding Israel from international condemnation.
1
In order to avoid the US vetoes and to
measure the pulse of the international community, sponsors over the years have taken Israel’s
violations to the UN General Assembly, where the United States has consistently voted in the
minority (generally with only Israel, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands) against the non-
binding resolutions critical of Israel.
While there are also many adopted resolutions requiring Israel to abide by international
laws, they have been largely unfulfilled or left to Israel’s prerogatives to implement. An example
of the latter is UN Security Council Resolution 425 which called “upon Israel immediately to
cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces
from all Lebanese territory.” Although the resolution was adopted in March of 1978 and
reaffirmed in many subsequent resolutions, the US never pressured Israel to implement it until
Israel, in the face of resistant Lebanese resistance, decided to withdraw its military forces from
Lebanon in May of 2000. Thanks to US unwillingness to pressure Israel (as a recipient of US
massive aid), the all-important UN Resolution 242 of November 1967, which holds the key to
Arab-Israeli peace—and is perhaps the most referenced resolution in UN history—remains
unimplemented with detrimental consequences, including anti-Americanism and Arab
authoritarianism. Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal has been protected by US determination to
keep it off all Middle East-related agendas and repeated derailments of any attempt to submit it to
International Atomic Energy Agency regulations. At the same time, the US uses virtually all
means available to prevent other states in the region from developing or considering pursuing
nuclear programs—whether for peaceful purposes or not.

1
Donald Neff, "An Updated List of Vetoes Cast by the United States to Shield Israel from Criticism by the
U.N. Security Council," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May-June 2005. and Subjects of UN
Security Council Vetoes, http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm

105

Military Aid
In addition to its support for Israel’s remaining the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in
the region, the US has vowed since 1967 to sponsor and solidify Israel’s already qualitative
superiority in conventional weapons over its Arab adversaries. As discussed in the previous
chapter, during what could be called the “arms-free” phase the US was not intent on extending
military support to the new Jewish state, which initially had obtained arms from Czechoslovakia
and then relied mostly on France. The sale of Hawk missiles under Kennedy marked the first
advanced weapons deal
2
and the first milestone in the military relationship. During this second or
“defensive-arms” phase (1962-1967) US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance totaled
$136.4 million. The sale of Phantom airplanes in 1968 after Israel’s swift victory in the 1967
War marked the beginning of the “offensive-arms” era, which lasted until 1978, with a total of
$7.8 billion—or an annual average of $789 million—in military assistance, half of which was in
the form of grants.
3
As Israel became the largest single annual recipient of US aid in 1976,
4
the
annual military aid stood at $1.4 billion-$1.8 billion during the “post-Camp David” phase of
1978-1998.
Based on Prime Minster Netanyahu’s request, the US economic aid decreased by $120
million per year and FMF increased by $60 million annually between 1999 and 2008, when the
figure rose to $2.4 billion million. The Bush administration reached a Memorandum of
Understanding on U.S. Military Assistance with the Israeli government in August 2007 to
increase FMF by $6 billion over the next 10 years for a total of $30 billion.
5
In justifying the

2
The first arms sale to Israel was made actually during the Eisenhower administration in 1958 but it only
involved 100 recoilless rifles. Dore Gold, "The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance: An Israeli Response to
the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault," Jerusalem Issue Brief 5, no. 20 (2006).

3
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" " (USAID).

4
Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," in CRS Report for Congress, ed. Defense Foreign Affairs,
and Trade Division (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2008).

5
Ibid., p. 2.

106

military aid package, the administration reasoned that in addition to the US’s abiding interest in
the security of Israel and concern with the resurgence of Iran, it is “an investment in peace—in
long-term peace…Peace will not be made without Israel being strong in the future”
6
. In addition
to the budgeted figures, Israel has been the beneficiary of joint ventures to develop weapon
systems with the US defense department. Out of the Pentagon budget, for example, Israel has
received $200 million for the Merkava tank and $1.8 billion for the Lavi aircraft before they were
cancelled. The US provided $625 for developing the Israeli Arrow Anti-Missile System, paid in
FY 2008 nearly $100 million to develop the Arrow II system, and has contributed significantly to
literally dozens of such programs worth billions of dollars over the years.
Furthermore, Israel receives grants for anti-terrorism assistance, intelligence operations,
and incidentals. These include matters such as $650 million for the damage from Operation
Desert Storm in 1991 plus free Patriot missiles, a $700 million grant of military equipment
withdrawn from Western Europe, $1.2 billion for the implementation (which never occurred) of
the Wye agreement with the Palestinians in 1998, and $1 billion in military grants after the 2003
invasion of Iraq.
7
The US also makes available to Israel surplus weapons and military equipment
at steeply discounted prices or at no charge and places at Israel’s disposal US military supplies
stored in Israel, as was the case during the 2006 War on Lebanon, which was restocked at $400
million.
8

During the pre-1974 period all US aid to Israel was in the form of loans but extended at
very favorable repayment terms such 30-40 years with a10-year grace period. Beginning with the
$2.2 billion aid in 1974, more than half of U.S military aid was in the form of grants and the rest

6
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Remarks and Press Availability at
Signing Ceremony for Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Military Assistance, August 16, 2007, the
American Embassy Tel Aviv – Press Section

7
Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel."

8
Ibid.

107

was in loans with waived repayments which were, as a practical matter, grants.
9
However, since
FY 1985, all military aid to Israel has been in the form of grants with at least two important
unique features. Since FY 1990, Israel has been allowed to receive its entire foreign aid in a lump
sum within the first month of the fiscal year as opposed to receiving the funds over four quarters,
as is the case with all other recipient countries. This early payment costs the US not only the
interest for borrowing the money in the first place (since the US runs deficits and has to borrow)
but also the interest paid to Israel, as it then invests the fund in US Treasury bonds. The estimates
for such costs were, for example, in 1991 $50-$60 million and $86 million, respectively.
10

Another crucial distinctive aspect is that Israel is the only country allowed to use a
significant portion of its military aid for military spending in Israel. While all other recipients
must make their purchases from US manufacturers through the Department of Defense (DoD),
Israel deals directly with US weapons makers without any DoD oversight and, since 1977, was
allowed to transfer FMF portions (26.3% for 2007)
11
out of the U.S. to use for the development of
its own various weapons systems. The unique combination of US contribution to the joint
military projects and this exceptional transfer arrangement not only underscores the special nature
of the relationship between the two countries, but also significantly bankrolls Israel’s defense
industry thus making Israel a worldwide leading supplier of arms.
Economic Aid
Economic aid to Israel began with the establishment of the state, as the Truman
administration approved a $100 million Export-Import Bank loan in 1949. During the period
1949-1974 the US provided Israel with $1.3 billion in economic assistance, 49% of which was for
food aid. The period between 1975 and 1984 witnessed a sharp increase reaching a yearly

9
With the $2.2 billion aid, Israel preferred the aid in a form of a loan “to avoid having U.S. contingent in
Israel to oversee a grant program.” Ibid., p. 6. This concern became non-issue as US did not impose such
an oversight on Israel anymore.

10
Ibid., p. 10.

11
Ibid., p. 3.

108

average of more than $750 million and, to address Israel’s economic crisis and runaway inflation
(reaching more than 400% in 1984), the US channeled to Israel $3.85 billion in economic aid in
1985-1986, significantly helping to reduce inflation to 20% in 1987.
12
In 1984 the so-called
Cranston Amendment (after Alan Cranston, former senator from California and a staunch
supporter of Israel) was passed. It stated that “the policy and intention” of the United States was
that economic aid “shall not be less than the annual debt payment (interest and payment) from
Israel to the United States government.” The amendment, which was to ensure economic
assistance to Israel during the economic crisis and beyond, was attached to annual appropriation
bills until 1999, when Israel’s economic aid began to be phased out, following annual Economic
Support Fund (ESF) giving of $1.2 billion annually between 1987 and 1998.
In addition to the benefits of early payment arrangements explained above, in 1979
economic aid to Israel became completely unrestricted, no longer linked to specific development
programs (e.g. health, education, etc.) or limited to purchases of US goods and commodities. It
thus became a “largely unconditional direct transfers for budgetary support.”
13
All economic aid
also has been converted to cash grants since FY 1981. It was because of Israel’s thriving
economy and its increasing comparability to economies of Western industrialized nations that the
Israeli government agreed to a 10-year phase out of economic support, ending in 2008, at least in
its budgeted form. But the decrease and elimination of the economic form of aid was more than
offset, partially by an increase in military aid and more significantly by the increased utilization
of loan guarantees and other periodic emergency or “one-shot US contributions”
14

Although the US government provided loan guarantees to Israel to reschedule payments
for older loans in the 1970’s, its request in 1990-91 for $10 billion over five years to finance the

12
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" ".

13
Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p. 1.

14
Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1991

109

absorption of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union was controversial. As Prime
Mister Shamir refused to stop or slow Jewish settlement building in the Occupied Territories, the
Bush administration, after heated public debate and delays in granting the request (until October
1992), imposed a “penalty” of reducing the estimated yearly cost of settlements from the annually
approved amount of $2 billion. As a result, the guarantee loan amounts were reduced by $437
million for FY 1994 and $216 million for FY 1995.
15
President Clinton, however, in fulfilling a
promise made to Prime Minster Rabin, subsequently offset much of the deductions.”
The ineffectiveness of such a “penalty” is also captured by Israel’s perennial option of
requesting more funds to offset the anticipated deductions or the US Congress’ approving more
funding than what Israel requests, as was the case when Prime Mister Sharon requested $8 billion
in loan guarantees for economic recovery and P.L. 108-11 included $9 billion.
16
It is also
captured by the fact that Israel has never used the entire available loan amount, even after the
deduction. For example, the $10 billion loan was reduced to $9.226 billion because of settlement
activities, but Israel drew only $6.6 billion
17
thus rendering the whole “penalty” exercise
irrelevant. Furthermore, contrary to the claim of many pro-Israel supporters, these private bank-
issued, low-rate loans are not without cost to the US Treasury because of the need to appropriate
4.1% of the loan in a reserve account against default.
18

Of more significance, given the historical pattern, Israel is most likely to continue to
receive extra-budgetary, “one-shot” grants, and waivers to offset repayments of loans. Should
Israel default on these loans the US, as the guarantor, must repay the lending banks, and Israel
becomes liable to the US Treasury. Such a scenario would invoke the Cranston Amendment by

15
Shawn Twing, "The Cost of Israel to U.S. Taxpayers: A Comprehensive Guide to U.S. Aid to Israel,"
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 30, 1996, p. 7.

16
Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," p. 11.

1717
Ibid., p. 4.

18
Ibid., p. 11.

110

which the US economic aid must at least cover the amount of loan payments (principle and
interest). In addition to the already mentioned aid programs, Israel also receives annual
assistance from the State Department’s Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) fund, the
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA), and from joint US-Israel cooperation
programs in the scientific, business, educational, and agricultural arenas, among others. In
addition, Israel receives an estimated $1 billion in private donations from the US and another $1
billion through the purchase of Israel Bonds
19
which enjoy special tax benefits under IRS rules.
In sum, while it is very difficult to know the exact amounts Israel has received in total US
aid, it is safe to conclude that they are higher than the amounts enumerated under Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) reporting, which amounts to the total of FMF plus ESF figures (but not
those of Pentagon funding, interest paid, loan guarantees, and other direct and indirect aid). Still,
the total amount of FAA funds Israel received between FY 1949 and FY 2008 is at least $103.7
billion or the equivalent of more than $176 billion in 2008 dollars.
20
To place the figures in
comparative perspective, US military aid constitutes 20% of Israel’s defense budget; total annual
US aid is equivalent to 3% of Israel’s GDP and averages more than $600 per year for each Israeli.
Additionally, it is important to stress that although there were some disagreements between Israel
and the United States, they were mostly tactical in nature (e.g. over timing and symbolic matters),
were seen as “disagreements among friends,” and were never translated into policy.
Rationale and Sources of the Special Relationship
While there is consensus on the special nature of the US-Israeli relationship as
manifested in the various spheres discussed above, its sources are the subject of acrimonious
debate. The historical review provided in the previous chapter suggests three possible

19
Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," in Issue Brief for Congress, ed. Defense Foreign
Affairs, and Trade Division (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress,
2005), summary.

20
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" ".; Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel." 2008

111

explanations for the US-relationship: strategic interests, pro-Israel lobbying efforts, and the views
of the administration and public support within the American political system. Scholars and other
observers writing on the topic have utilized, with different emphases, one or a combination of the
following explanations: Israel’s strategic value to the US or the US’ strategic value to Israel,
effective lobbying efforts, guilt over the Holocaust, the Judeo-Christian tradition, Evangelical
Christians’ influence, the weakness of the Arab lobby, hostility towards Arabs and Muslims, the
role of the media, and the fact that Israel is the region’s only democracy (i.e. shared political
values). There are numerous works that address this question directly or indirectly and, while not
entirely marginalizing the other factors, most have focused on and compared the strength of the
“strategic” and “lobby” factors. While important for any analysis of the sources of the special
relationship, a deconstruction of the two factors demonstrates that it is the perception of Israel’s
strategic value to the US that best aids us in understanding this relationship. However, it is the
contention of this study that such a focus limits the scope of analysis as to miss a third, and
equally important, factor: American cultural and political affinity towards Israel. As it will be
elaborated later in the chapter, “affinity” is a function of such factors as those mentioned above;
i.e. the Bible, the Holocaust, popular culture, and political norms. These elements of “affinity”
have become so deeply engrained in American consciousness and an integral part of the
American sociopolitical system as to warrant their inclusion as elements that define the American
national interest.
The Debate: the Role of the Lobby vs. the Strategic Rationale
For example, Edward Tivnan’s critical study
21
traces the formation and aggressive
evolution of what is simply referred to on Capitol Hill as “the lobby,” from the “Jewish lobby” to
the “pro-Israel lobby.” As a result of numerous interviews with influential members and leaders,
the author argues that with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) at the

21
Edward Tivnan, The Lobby : Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987).

112

forefront and with the financial support of numerous pro-Israel political action committees
(PACs), the lobby won the war
22
and came to dominate the making of US Middle East policy by
the mid 1980’s. Tivnan concludes that this development, coupled with massive US aid to Israel,
is to the detriment of US and Israel’s long term interests; for peace to be achieved in the Middle
East, the US aid to and relationship with Israel must be reexamined and debated. Indeed, viewed
by both opponents and proponents alike as by far Washington’s most powerful lobbying group on
behalf of a foreign country (and domestically second only to the AARP
23
), AIPAC‘s main focus
is to ensure that the US Congress overwhelmingly supports pro-Israel policies, rewarding those
who toe the line and punishing the few who “dare to speak out.” One example of the latter is
former Illinois Republican Congressman Paul Findlay, who lost his seat in 1982 after 22 years as
a result of his “PLO connections” and “anti-Israel views” to the unknown but pro Israel-vetted
Richard Durbin (who became the Democratic Whip in the US Senate in the 110
th
Congress). In
his book They Dare to Speak Out, Findley argued that his own experience was “part of a broader
attempt to silence criticism of Israeli policy” by an Israeli lobby with no qualms over “the
impairment of free speech” to achieve its objectives.
24

In a more scholarly attempt to assess the US-Israeli relationship, Cheryl Rubenberg
25

subscribes to “the thesis that Israel has not served the interests of the United States in the Middle
East” and that such interests have been “seriously jeopardized, even thwarted, as a result of the
U.S.-Israeli partnership.”
26
What accounts for this union, then, she argues, are the misperceptions
and misjudgments of American foreign policy makers and the power of the pro-Israel lobby.

22
The “war” was won after losing the battle over the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981.

23
Washington’s Power 25, Fortune, December 8, 1997

24
Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out : People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby (Westport,
Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1985).
25
Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest : A Critical Examination (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1986).

26
Ibid., pp. 19-20.

113

However, Rubenberg makes a critical error in locating Israel outside US interests, asserting that
“[n]othing in the core values…of American political culture accounts for a definition of the
national interest that includes a commitment to the security and survival of Israel.”
27
Contrary to
her assertion, this commitment has been coherently articulated and embedded into the American
national interest through the utilization of powerful political culture instruments, to be addressed
later. As a result, Rubenberg’s misconception renders the study, although rich in empirical
details, of limited explanatory value.
Steven Spiegel’s The Other Arab-Israeli conflict
28
offers a different perspective, relying
on narrow assumptions and ignoring its own empirical evidence. Addressing the US-Israel
relationship within the larger context of American Middle East policy, Spiegel, in this widely-
cited work, views the Arab-Israeli conflict within “a static framework,” holds the international
system, Congress and interest groups “constant,” and concludes that it is the attitude of the
presidential elite which accounts for policy changes.
29
He rejects the view that “the influence of
the pro-Israeli interest groups…shapes US policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute”
30
despite the
numerous and powerful examples provided throughout the study suggesting otherwise.
31

Another study that is dismissive of the role of pro-Israel lobby is A.F.K. Organski’s The
$ 36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel. True to his book’s title,
the late University of Michigan political scientist argued that it had been a bargain for the US to
provide Israel with “essential” assistance in achieving the strategic goal of curbing Soviet

27
Ibid., p. 11.

28
Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman
to Reagan, Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

29
Ibid., p. 393.

30
Ibid., p. 386.

31
See footnotes 74, 77, and 88 in the previous chapter for such examples.

114

influence in the region.
32
While erroneously arguing that military aid to Israel escalated only
under Nixon in 1970 (as opposed to under Johnson after the 1967 War), Organski further argued
that the pro-Israel lobby (the “politics” in book’s subtitle) had no role prior to 1970 and provided
ex post facto support to Nixon and the Congress’ “independent” view of Israel as a strategic
assert. In addition to dismissing the role of Congress, the media and public opinion, he advocated
excluding the pro-Israel lobby factor from consideration since any evidence about “AIPAC’s
power and performance is entirely anecdotal or downright gossip.”
33
The study’s importance has
been its role in providing pro-Israel advocates with “scholarly proof” of Israel’s strategic value
and as “a tour de force” for “calling off the old and sterile debate over the Israel lobby,” as pro-
Israel and anti-Arab and Muslim polemicist Daniel Pipes puts it.
34

As a further reflection of his superficial understanding of the nature of the US-Israeli
relationship, at the end of his book Organski advances a provocative and relevant (to this
dissertation) hypothesis that “if the USSR ceases to be perceived (and to act) as an expansionist
power by top U.S. foreign policy elites” then US assistance to Israel “would be seriously
reduced.”
35
This Cold War-centered approach, in essence, blindsided Organski into minimizing
the role of Arab-Israeli conflict and its centrality to the pro-Israel lobbying efforts, in securing
congressional and public backing for generous US support for Israel. Moreover, as mentioned in
previous chapters, the United States’ focus on curbing Soviet influence in the region (and
elsewhere) relegated to the margins the question of democracy promotion and prompted the US to
support friendly authoritarian regimes. However, that the fact that USSR did cease to exist in
fact, had no impact on US assistance to Israel, which continued to increase thus disproving

32
A. F. K. Organski, The Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990), p. 202.

33
Ibid., p. 19.

34
Daniel Pipes, "Book Reveiw: The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel,"
Commentary Magazine, January 1991.

35
Organski, The Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, p. 217.

115

Organski’s hypothesis. That he based his erroneous prediction on the study’s conclusion (i.e. it
was Soviet-centered strategic considerations accounting for US support) should perhaps call into
question also the soundness of the latter.
The US-Israel relationship is the direct subject of a recent essay subsequently expanded
into the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy by international relations professors John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard University. Their thesis
states that “the United States provides Israel with extraordinary material and diplomatic support,
the lobby is the principal reason for that support, and this uncritical and unconditional
relationship is not in the American national interest.”
36
The authors’ argument created nothing
short of a firestorm in the United States and beyond. In addition to many critical newspaper and
weekly editorials as well as radio and TV coverage, a swift response also came from such pro-
Israel quarters as New York Congressman Eliot Engel, who called it “anti-Semitic,” Rep. Jerrold
Nadler, who described it as "a hatchet job on Israel and the United States disguised as a policy
paper,"
37
and the Anti-Defamation League, which termed it "a classical conspiratorial anti-
Semitic analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control."
Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard law professor and the “attorney” for the “Israeli case” in
the US
38
, requested and was granted by the Harvard School of Government permission to post his
response next to the original paper on the school’s website. Leading the attack, the thrust of
Dershowitz’s 44-page response, Debunking the Newest – and Oldest – Jewish Conspiracy
39
was

36
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), p. 14.

37
New York Sun, march 27, 2006

38
See Alan Dershowitz’s The Case for Israel, 2003 and The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Can be Resolved, 2005; in response to the former see Norman G. Finkelstein’s Beyond Chutzpah: On the
Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, a book that Dershowitz unsuccessfully attempted to
prevent from being published by writing to Governor Schwarzenegger of California to intercede with UC
Press. The governor refused.

116

to label the authors as anti-Semites. Why? Because their argument “can be found on the websites
of extremists of the hard right, like David Duke”
40
and because they must have known that their
study “would be featured, as it has been, on neo-Nazi and extremist websites, and even by
terrorist organizations, and that it would be used by overt anti-Semites to “validate” their
paranoid claims of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.”
41
Before resting his case, Dershowitz’s
closing argument is a warning that the study “will give an academic imprimatur to crass
bigotry...[and] place all Jews in government and the media under suspicion of disloyalty to
America.”
42
The uproar was due to in part to the authors’ background not as journalists, “sour-
loosing” congressmen, or “biased” Middle East scholars as was the case with the earlier cited
works, but rather as two accomplished scholars at prestigious universities working within
mainstream political science and the realist approach in international relations, who seemed to
have caused sufficient alarm as to trigger the pro-Israel lobby into employing, as the authors
pointed out, the very tactics underscored in The Israel Lobby.
Mearsheimer and Walt define the “Israel lobby” as a “loose coalition of individuals and
organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.”
43
It
includes dozens of political action committees and more than ninety organizations such as
AIPAC, ADL, American Jewish Congress (AJC), Zionist Organization of America (ZOA),
American Jewish Committee, Americans for Safe Israel, Americans Friends of Likud, and the 51-
member umbrella Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, with the
mission of “mobilizing support for Israel” and providing “a link between American Jewry and the

39
Alan Dershowitz, "Debunking the Newest - and Oldest - Jewish Conspiracy: A Reply to the
Mearsheimer-Walt “Working Paper"," Faculty Research Working Papers
Series(2006).http://www.hks.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/dershowitzreply.pdf

40
Ibid.

41
Ibid.

42
Ibid.

43
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 5.

117

U.S. government, and marshalling a coordinated community response.”
44
It also includes:
Christian Zionist organizations such as John Hagee’s Christians United for Israel (CUFI),
National Leadership Conference for Israel, the Unity Coalition for Israel; think tanks such as the
influential Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the National Jewish Institute for
Security Affairs (JINSA), the Middle East Forum; scores of well-placed neoconservative
individuals and think tanks such as the Hudson Institute and American Enterprise Institute;
publications such as Commentary, the Weekly Standard, New York Sun, and the Wall Street
Journal op-ed page, the New Republic, other newspapers with pro-Israel editorials, and a
substantial number of commentators and pundits who “cannot imagine criticizing Israel.”
45

Of all the lobbying organizations, AIPAC is the best known and the most effective group
lobbying on behalf of a foreign government. Its influence has been universally recognized and its
success has been the envy of other ethnic lobbying groups, including Arab, Greek, Armenian,
Cuban, etc. Newt Gingrich, former Republican House Speaker, called it “the most effective
general-interest group…across the entire planet,” while former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin assessed that “the support of the U.S. government...and the support of the American Jewish
community for Israel has an identity card. The name on that card is AIPAC.”
46
Referring to
AIPAC, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid commented, “I can’t think of a policy organization in
the country as well-organized and respected.”
47
The organization’s strategy and tactics to ensure
solid congressional support for Israel are indeed legendary. Although not a political action
committee (PAC), AIPACS’s board of directors are exceptionally generous to the organization
and pro-Israel candidates and causes, and AIPAC’s storied success lies in its function as

44
Conference of Presidents website, http://www.conferenceofpresidents.org/

45
Media critic Erik Alterman, cited in Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,
p. 170.
46
http://www.aipac.org/about_AIPAC/5968_1596.asp

47
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 153.

118

clearinghouse for identifying the Israeli-centered agenda, formulating pro-Israel polices,
“educating” political candidates. Once “approved” AIPAC then introduces those to an extensive
network of Jewish PACs and wealthy donors. A former AIPAC president explains, “AIPAC
meets with every candidate running for Congress. These candidates receive in-depth-briefings to
help them completely understand the complexities of Israel’s predicament…We even ask each
candidate to author a ‘position paper’ on their view of the US-Israel relationship –so it’s clear
where they stand in the subject.”
48

Coupled with a close tracking of congressional voting records, AIPAC ensures the
election and reelection of strong supporters of Israel, preferably like Congressman Richard
Armey, who said “my No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel,” and Tom Delay, who
offered that he was “an Israeli at heart.”
49
AIPAC’s success is also noted in its perceived or real
ability to punish those who may seem hostile to Israel. According to the editor of the Jewish
weekly The Forward there “is this image in Congress that you don’t cross these people [of
AIPAC] or they take you down.”
50
Given the rewards for pro-Israel positions and the potential
costs of hostile positions, staunch pro-Israel supporter Senator Daniel Inouye rationalized that
‘[w]hen it comes to an Israeli issue or Jewish issue, most people just go along. As you say, why
make a fuss?”
51
Indeed, as Aaron Miller, a now-critical Jewish member of Clinton’s “peace
process team” stated, the “U.S. Congress has not had one serving member with an anti-Israeli or
pro-Arab agenda since Paul Findley, who served in congress from 1961 to 1982…in political life
in America today everyone of consequence says they’re a friend of Israel.”
52

48
Ibid., p. 154.

49
Ibid., p. 152.

50
Ibid., p. 159.

51
Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land
: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 93.

52
Ibid., p. 79.

119

Insisting that it is not a cabal, conspiracy, centralized movement, or solely Jewish,
Mearsheimer and Walt advance a well-documented account of the lobby’s two strategies aimed at
maintaining strong US support for Israel. They present the lobby “in action” by examining five
foreign policy case studies during the George W. Bush Administration (i.e. towards the
Palestinians, the Iraq War, Syria, Iran, and the 2006 Lebanon War). The lobby’s first strategy is
“guiding the policy process” by limiting, if not entirely silencing, debate on Capitol Hill, ensuring
the election of pro-Israel presidents, and keeping the administration in line. The other is
“dominating public discourse” through various media outlets and forums, influential think tanks,
attempts to police the academy, the use of “objectionable tactics” (e.g. preventing public
programs critical of Israel), and through the “great silencer,” the charges of anti-Semitism and
“new anti-Semitism” to characterize any criticism of Israeli government policies.
The strength of Mearsheimer-Walt’s study lies in its massive wealth of empirical
evidence and the multitudes of sources consulted to demonstrate the power and influence of the
pro-Israel lobby. As explained further shortly, it is worth pointing out that neither critics on the
right (e.g. Dershowitz, Pipes, etc.) nor the left (e.g. Chomsky, Zunes, etc.) dispute the study’s
evidence. However, the former camp is concerned with the implications of any study that
critically highlights the power of the lobby, fearing this may undermine US support to Israel or,
worse, revive the classic European anti-Semitism which focused on purported “Jewish control.”
The critics’ rejection of the book’s conclusion that the lobby’s agenda is detrimental to US
national interests is a legitimate point of disagreement, but serious discussion of it is hampered by
the unfounded accusations of anti-Semitism against the authors. That the authors’ conclusions
find an audience in anti-Semitic circles and neo-Nazi groups is neither a sufficient nor a
necessary condition for their dismissal as Dershowitz has argued.
On the substance of the argument, both critics on the left and the right agree, in reversal
of the author’s conclusion, that it is Israel that serves US interests, that US support to Israel
constitutes only the rewards, thus rendering the presence and activity of the lobby largely

120

irrelevant. As pointed out earlier, this dissertation posits that in addition to considering the pro-
Israel lobby and the perception of Israel’s strategic value, a consideration of American “affinity”
towards Israel must be included in the analysis of the US-Israel special relationship. The
preceding brief summary is intended to serve as a background for analyzing the role of the pro-
Israel lobby in this relationship, for it is not the objective of the dissertation to engage the claims
and counterclaims of whether the lobby is influential. In this sense, the study, which is not about
the “lobby,” then, assumes the existence of such a lobby based on overwhelming evidence
provided by “members,” and “targets” of the pro-Israel lobby as well as numerous serving and
former government officials.
53

Another crucial observation about the role of American Jews in the pro-Israel lobby
needs to be stated. While the designation “pro-Israel lobby” is more inclusive than the “Jewish
lobby,” and thus more accurate, since the lobby includes many non-Jewish activists and
organizations, it remains that Jews constitute the majority of the lobby’s membership and the
lobby’s work on behalf of Israel is the concern of most if not all American Jews. It has been the
collective voice of the lobby—particularly AIPAC—that the lobby’s mission is to support and
advocate Israel’s policies and positions, irrespective of the party in power in Israel. While some
Jewish organizations have been in existence since the first half of the twentieth century, AIPAC
(and other organizations) secured their dominant role in lobby during the Likud’s years in power
(1977-1992). When Rabin came to power in 1992, AIPAC’s positions had already been so
steeped in Likud policy orientations that Rabin encouraged the creation of the more moderate
Israel Policy Forum group, which supported his peace process and has been advocating, with the
older and liberal Peace Now, a two-state solution and a more “even-handed” US approach to the

53
In addition to the cited Mearsheimer and Walt’s study, see J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power : Inside the
American Jewish Establishment (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996).. Goldberg, who is Jewish and is
the editor of the premier Jewish weekly The Forward, provides also a wealth of empirical evidence of the
lobby’s influence in his study.

121

Arab-Israeli conflict. However, these more accommodating groups do not hold sway in the lobby
as Aaron Miller explains:
Organizations such as Americans for Peace Now and the Israel Policy Forum have long
pushed for a robust American diplomacy and are willing to acquiesce in firm U.S.
policies toward Israel –let’s say on settlements—to achieve Arab-Israeli peace. But these
organizations do not set the tone or the agenda or drive the politics on these issues. More
powerful groups such as AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Conference of
Presidents, whose orientation is more conservative, tough-minded, and at times
defensive, play that role.
54

The majority of American Jews fit into the more liberal and accommodating strand of Jewish
groups and, thus, are not “democratically” represented by the “ruling” hawkish organizations. A
key to a US even-handed approach to the peace process may lie in a pro-Israel lobby responsive
to the majority of American Jews. That this has not been the case yet is also a reflection of this
majority’s unwillingness to assert itself more vocally on this issue, in a manner similar to the
historical role American Jews have played in many progressive and liberal causes in American
politics.
Towards A Model for Understanding of the Special US-Israel Relationship
In addition to the pro-Israel critics who do not engage the Walt-Mersheimer argument,
other pro-Israel critics of The Israel Lobby argue that it is not the lobby, but US strategic interests
that account for “the low cost” US support for Israel which “underpins the pax Americana in the
eastern Mediterranean,”
55
in line with Organski’s argument. To be sure, critical assessments also
come from the left from such scholars and fierce critics of Israeli polices as Noam Chomsky,
Norman Finkelstein, Joseph Massad, and Stephen Zunes, who argue that Israel has been the
“junior partner”
56
and “loyal agent” in fulfilling the US imperial designs in the region that

54
Miller, The Much Too Promised Land : America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 89.
55
Martin Kramer, “The American Interest,” Azure, No. 26 (Fall 2006). See also Dore Gold’s The Basis of
the U.S.-Israeli Alliance: An Israeli Response to Mersheimer-Walt Assault, Jerusalem Issue Brief,
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-20.htm

56
Stephen Zunes, “The Israel Lobby: How Powerful is it Really?” Foreign Policy
in Focus Special Report, May 16, 2006

122

ultimately serve, according to Chomsky, the “strategic-economic interests of concentrations of
domestic power in the tight-corporate linkage.”
57
Given the acrimonious disagreement over the
Palestine Question between these critics on the left and on the right, it is ironic they are in
agreement on the fundamental issue of the source of US-Israeli relationship: both deemphasize
the role of the Israel lobby and privilege US strategic considerations.
In their attempt to correct the Israel lobby-centered thesis for its exoneration of the US
“from all the responsibility and guilt that it deserves,”
58
critics on the left seem to overcompensate
by claiming that Israeli actions, such as the defeat of Nasser in 1967, the attack on the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon were all undertaken at the behest of
the US. This ideologically-driven interpretation not only exceeds the claims of pro-Israel critics
but also is predicated on two erroneous assumptions. The first is that Israel has no interests of its
own, thereby dismissing the possibility that Israel’s regional interests may be at least as powerful
as those of the United States. It is true that Israel has served US interests (and been rewarded for
doing so) by channeling arms and providing militarily advice to, for example, Taiwan, apartheid
South Africa, and rightist dictatorships in Central America. However, as the historical record
demonstrates, Israel’s actions in the Middle East are guided by its own strategic interests, which,
although coinciding (or at least perceived to coincide) with US interests, should not be conflated
with US “green lights” or strong support for those actions.
The second conceptual error of both the critics on the left and the proponents of the Israel
lobby thesis is that they reject the notion of US support for Israel—as an end in itself; i.e. as one
of the US strategic interests in the region. As a result, by definition, they rule out examining the
genesis and development of the US-Israel special relationship within American political culture
which, itself, is an important factor in the construction of the American national interest. Once

57
Noam Chomsky, The Israel Lobby? http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4134

58
Joseph Massad, Blaming the lobby, Al-Ahram Weekly, March 23, 2006

123

conceived as such, the view that either the Israel lobby or strategic interests must account for the
US-Israeli relationship limits the scope of analysis, and the question of whose interest is being
served oversimplifies reality. As noted in the previous chapter, before President Truman
endorsed partition and granted recognition, all Arab states maintained friendly relations with the
US; none was even on speaking terms with the USSR. Truman (influenced by his pro-Zionist
personal and White House advisors and acting on his religious sentiments) made his decisions
against the advice of the diplomatic and military establishments, which feared support for Israel
would open the region to Soviet influence. In the event, it was precisely the conflict with Israel
or, as Dulles discovered early on, the fear of Zionism, rather than love of communism that drove
Egypt to the USSR for arms and not before Nasser’s shock over and impotence in the face of
Israel’s attack on Gaza in February 1955.
The Perception of Israel as a Strategic Asset
The evolution of the military aspect of the US-Israeli relationship as manifested by
successive strategic milestones—such as the post-1967 “offensive arms era,” the military airlift
during the 1973 War, and 1983 US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on strategic
cooperation—were predominately a function of Israel’s military (exaggerated) needs in
confronting its Arab adversaries rather than a response to any Soviet threats. As Israel attempted
to widen US strategic support beyond its Soviet linkage, the first US-Israeli MOU in 1981, which
was suspended (after Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights) and then reactivated in 1983,
serves as a case in point. To underscore its irrelevance to any Soviet threat and instead its direct
link to the Arab-Israeli conflict, before Secretary of Defense Weinberger grudgingly signed this
highly touted agreement emphasizing Israel as a “strategic asset,” he “inserted multiple references
to cooperation against possible Soviet threats…[only] to minimize adverse publicity in the Arab
World.”
59

59
Samuel Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change " in The Middle East : Ten Years
after Camp David ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 235.

124

Consider as well the testimony of Henry Kissinger, the former National Security Advisor,
Secretary of State under presidents Nixon and Ford, and one of the most influential American
officials to understand and to respond to Israel’s strategic requirements in the history of the US-
Israeli relationship. In a private meeting with the leaders of an American Jewish group in June of
1975 the then-Secretary of State offered the assessment that “the strength of Israel is needed for
its own survival but not to prevent the spread of Communism in the Arab world. So it doesn't
necessarily help the U.S. global interests as far as the Middle East is concerned. The survival of
Israel has sentimental importance to the United States” [Emphasis added].
60
It is noteworthy that
while the proclaimed goal for “strengthening” Israel has been for its defense against Arab attacks,
Israel has used its strong military power to attack and impose its will against its neighbors. Even
if one concedes that Israel was of a strategic value to the US during the Cold War, the continued
US military (and other) support to Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union should be sufficient
to bring the debate to an end.
The claim that Israel kept the influence of “radical” and nationalist Arab states in check
for the Unites States is accurate only to the extent they posed a threat to US interests in the
security of Israel itself, not to an independent threat to the US. More accurately, however, as
acknowledged by President Kennedy, who stated that Nasser’s and other nationalisms were not
equal to communism, not only were the nationalist tendencies and internal dynamics of the
surrounding Arab states largely shaped by the Arab-Israeli conflict, these Arab states were
targeted by Israel for its own domestic dynamics and regional calculations. During the 1970
Jordan crisis when the PLO threatened Jordan’s monarchy, the Nixon administration perceived
Syria’s initial intervention as a Soviet threat and enlisted Israel’s military assistance to protect the
king—in what has been cited as the clearest example of Israel’s perceived strategic value.
However, while “the Syrians [we]re pushing the Palestinians,” Kissinger’s report to Nixon that

60
Minutes of the meeting as printed as Special Document: Conversation with Kissinger, JPS, Spring 1981
Number 3,

125

“the Soviets [we]re pushing the Syrians” was not only inaccurate
61
but also instrumental in
cementing Israel’s status as a strategic asset and thus in increasing military aid to it. Indeed,
although its “assistance” to the US was not ultimately needed, Israel’s collaboration and
willingness to intervene also derived from its own interest in preventing any gains by the
Palestinian national movement.
Moreover, as for Israel’s role in securing western access to Middle Eastern oil, the US
has sought, not to enlist, but to prevent Israel’s entanglement with this strategic objective and
Persian Gulf security. Israel’s potential liability as a regional ally, for the protection of oil, was
clearly demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War, when the US exerted considerable pressure to prevent
Israel from retaliating against Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles and joining the international
coalition, which included Arab states. Had Israel retaliated against Iraq, other Arab-collision
members (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria) would have found themselves fighting alongside
Israel against another Arab state. It would have been very difficult for any Arab regime to
survive such an open alliance with Israel, particularly in fighting another Arab state. The US
heavily leaned on Israel not to join so as not to unravel the Iraq War coalition. Another example
was the failure of Reagan’s Arab-Israeli “strategic consensus” which attempted, albeit indirectly,
to link Israel and oil under the umbrella of combating the Soviet threat. Indeed, an overriding US
goal has been to achieve a balance between supporting Israel and securing oil, and with the
exception of the 1973 oil embargo, the US has been largely successful.
Among the strategic services Israel purportedly performed on behalf of the United States,
curbing the Soviet threat, not surprisingly, has stood out as the most-cited one in the period
between 1967 and the end of the Cold war in 1989. Although the US did benefit in some
instances (e.g. receiving from the Israel captured Soviet-made military hardware and sharing
intelligence), the historical evidence has demonstrated Israel’s actual value in serving US

61
George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press,
1990), p. 127.

126

interests, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union, to have been of minimal significance. It is
no wonder that US and Israeli officials “have difficulties coming up with examples of where
strategic cooperation…might be put to the test.”
62
In reality, US-Israeli strategic cooperation (or
more accurately, US military and strategic support for Israel) has been the result, not the cause, of
the special relationship.
However, the perception, not the reality, of Israel’s strategic value vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union served as a convenient and convincing rationale for continued US support for Israel. The
fact that this support was left unaffected by the end of the Cold War underscores the power of
pro-Israel forces in transforming and reengineering perceptions as support for Israel became
“imperative” in the fight against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. In promoting the Iraq
War, Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Defense Secretary and one of the architects of the war,
argued that "it was for bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction,
because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." If nothing else, it has been for such
“bureaucratic reasons” that the elite, the media, and the public justified support for Israel, first
against the Soviet threat and then against Islamic fundamentalism, thanks in part to the clash of
civilization thesis. Additionally, as Israel continues to forge even stronger ties with the United
States and as increasing numbers of Israel’s advocates join US administrations and “become an
integral part of the policymaking apparatus,” US and Israeli interests are increasingly articulated
as closely intertwined.
63
For example, Clinton appointed Martin Indyk, a former official at
AIPAC and later the head of the influential pro-Israel think tank, the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy (WINEP), and Dennis Ross (who left government for WINEP in 2002) were the
unchallenged architects of the peace process during the 1990. As discussed in chapter six, their
pro-Israel views and policy recommendations regarding the Arab-Israel conflict and the peace

62
Karen L. Puschel, Us-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era : An American
Perspective, Jcss Study No. 20 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 157.

63
Kathleen Christison and Bill Christison, "Its Origins and Growth: The Power of the Israel
Lobby,"(2006), http://www.counterpunch.org/christison06162006.html.

127

process were often repackaged and then presented as “American ideas” or “bridging proposals.”
The Bush Jr. administration appointed the staunchly pro-Israel Elliott Abrams (a former Reagan
official convicted for his role in the Iran-Contra affair) as Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs in the National Security Council.
Abrams become the leading influential administration official in the making of US Middle East
policy. Other influential officials in recent years have included strong pro-Israel neoconservatives
John Bolton, Douglas Feith, John Hannah, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser.
64
It is noteworthy that while Clinton’s pro-Israel advisors
promoted the line of Israel’s Labor Party, Bush’s advisors strongly advocated the hard-line
policies of the Likud and other ultra-religious parties. Real or perceived, the resulting US-Israel
strategic relationship and the argument of Israel as a strategic asset (based on evolving and new
threats) become justification for, and a variable in explaining, the special relationship.
The US-Israeli Political and Cultural Affinity
The other important variable lies in shared values, affinity, and, as Kissinger put it,
sentimentality which is a function of all other factors mentioned at the beginning of the previous
section. Strategic interests are the most central aspect of the national interest within the realist
(and neorealist) approach in understanding a state’s foreign policy in an anarchic world with self-
interested states in search of material security. Hence, it is not surprising that Mearsheimer and
Walt not only argue that Israel has not served the national interest of the United States but also
exclude non-material values (e.g. affinity) from the definition of national interest. A recent
international relations approach provides a conceptual accommodation to the (neo)realist
limitation. Constructivism, in essence, as stated by one of its leading formulators, “is about
human consciousness and its role in international life.”
65
While multifaceted and wide in scope of

64
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 153.

65
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics," in Annual Review of Political Science ed. Nelson W.

128

application, it suffices to specify that constructivism is an approach to social analysis which
focuses “on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in
particular the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas.”
66
For our purpose, the focus is
on the notion that these intersubjceive ideas and beliefs play a role (if not the major role) in
constructing the interests and identities of states as they purse their foreign policies.
67

As the discussion in the previous chapter of the development of the relationship between
the US and Zionism/Israel demonstrated, the role of the religious beliefs of successive presidents
and their advisors has been critical in securing US support and in shaping this relationship. Just
like the British before them, most American policymakers have been products of a Christian
tradition replete with connections to the Jews and the Old Testament. That the “Western mind”
has been so amenable and accommodating to the actualization of the Zionist venture and its
support for Israel derives from what historian Walid Khalidi aptly termed the “Bible Syndrome,”
of which the “epicenter is the great dialogue between Christianity and Judaism.”
68
Religious and
sociopolitical conflict within Christendom led to the Reformation which gave rise to
Protestantism with its rediscovery of and heavy emphasis on the Old Testament. Although
Herzl’s political Zionism was not articulated until the late 1890’s, throughout the 19
th
century
Christian Zionism of various Protestant denominations in Europe (mostly England) and the
United States had advocated the restoration of Jews to Palestine. Indeed, it was within this
framework that, for example, President John Adams expressed the sentiment that “I really wish
the Jews again in Judea an independent nation.” Another example was a Methodist leader’s

Polsby (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 2001).p. 392, see also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), ——
—, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995).

66
Ibid, p 392

67
See Shibley Telhami and Michael N. Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002); Telhami and Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East.

68
Walid Khalidi, "Intorduction," in From Haven to Conquest : Readings in Zionism and the Palestine
Problem until 1948, ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971)., p. xxiv.

129

petition to President Harrison in 1891 for the US to convene a congress of European powers to
intercede with the Ottoman Empire to grant Palestine to the Jews. The petition was signed by
more than 400 prominent Americans, including leading newspaper editors and publishers,
religious clergy (Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, and also Roman Catholic) and political
leaders such as future president William McKinley, speaker of the house, Supreme Court chief
justice, and mayors of major cities.
69

Of particular importance was the development of dispensationalism by theologians such
as English Anglican ministers Louis Way and John Nelson Darby and American evangelists
Dwight Moody and William Blackstone. The adherents of dispensationalist theology, which is a
form of premillennialism or the apocalyptic tribulation before the advent of Christ’s 1000 year-
reign, believe that the ingathering of the Jews in Palestine is a precondition for the prophesized
Second Coming of Christ. This theology is the foundation of the political hyper support lent to an
expansionist Israel—especially after 1967 War—by American Christian Zionists and other
Christian Right evangelicals who number in the tens of millions and who are represented by such
figures as Pat Robertson, the late Jerry Falwell, and John Hagee.
70
Despite these Christians’ belief
that Jews will be left with the choice of either conversion or death at Armageddon, most
American Jewish organizations have pragmatically welcomed their support, at a time, as ADL
argued, “when there are serious threats to the Jewish state.”
71
In a similar vein Daniel Pipes has
stated that “other than the Israel Defense Forces, America’s Christian Zionists may be the Jewish
state’s ultimate strategic asset.”
72

69
Walter Russell Mead, "The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back the Jewish State,"
Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (2008).

70
Victoria Clark, Allies for Armageddon : The Rise of Christian Zionism (New Haven [Conn.] ; London:
Yale University Press, 2007).

71
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.

72
Daniel Pipes, Christian Zionism: Israel’s Best Weapons? New York Post, July 15, 2003

130

It was also within this enduring Biblical legacy that Balfour issued his declaration
73

rationalizing that not only the “four great powers are committed to Zionism,” but more important
and blunt that “Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in
present needs, and future hopes, of far profounder import than the desire and prejudices of the
700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land” [Emphasis added].
74
This “profounder import”
assumes an added dimension when juxtaposed to the Puritans’ and their descendants’ plans of
profounder import than the desire of the Native American Indians. Indeed, once the fog of denial
and/or self-induced amnesia is lifted from the American narrative (in contrast to elsewhere,
including Israel) about the essence of the Palestine conflict, the parallels between the American
and Israeli founding experiences are unmistakably clear. Specifically, the forceful
displacement—by annihilation or expulsion—of the natives is not only acknowledged, but also
accepted and celebrated through shared values and norms. The United States’ affiliation with and
affinity towards Israel owes in no small measure to a shared national narrative consisting of
experiencing the “pioneering” spirit, establishing “freedom” and “democracy,” escaping from
religious persecution, and ushering in “civility and modernity.”
It is important to point out that while never approximating the extent of European anti-
Semitism, American society was not immune to holding and exhibiting historically-based anti-
Semitic sentiments against American Jews. In neither case, it is also important to point out, was
there a necessary contradiction between anti-Semitism and endorsing the restoration of the Jews
to Palestine. In the US, one source of this sentiment was the nativist backlash against newer
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe prevalent in the late 19
th
and early 20
th
centuries.
However, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel, anti-Semitism

73
Walid Khalidi, Al-Quds: Min Al-'Uhdah Al-'Umariyah Ila' Kamb Divid Al- Thaniyah (Jerusalem: From
the Covenant of 'Umar Ibn Al-Khattab to Camp David Ii (Washington, D. C. : Institute for Palestine
Studies, 2001), pp. 39-40.; David Fromkin David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace : Creating the
Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (London: A. Deutsch, 1989), p. 298.

74
Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. 16-7.

131

declined sharply and the image of Israelis (and American Jews) began to be woven into the
American cultural narrative (as discussed below). The emergence of the “New Jew,” the
transformation of Jews and Israelis from “outsiders” into “insiders” in American society, and the
cultural “Americanization” of the state of Israel have all been accomplished by powerful popular
culture expressions.
75

The 1958 publication of Leon Uris’s best-selling novel and the 1960 release of the epic
Hollywood film Exodus had perhaps the most influential role in this transformation. The love
story of the pioneering Israeli Jewish fighter Ari Ben Canaan (played by Paul Newman) and an
American Christian nurse embodied virtually every relevant historical-political-cultural theme in
a unifying and celebrated American-Israeli narrative. Exodus, the novel and the film, “became an
enduring cultural touchstone for a generation of Americans and American Jews, because it
echoed many of the themes of the previous decade’s cultural discourse and asserted them as
unchallenged truths.”
76
The epoch was of such influential proportion that the “Israel of most
Americans, including Jews, is still the Exodus version.”
77
The story also managed to demonstrate
the foreignness of this modern narrative to Arabs, who were portrayed as backward, terrorists,
and ex-Nazi collaborators.
78
According to the New York Times review, “the Arabs came off
badly in this book.”
79
The shared narrative and the positive image of Israel were subsequently
reinforced by scores of other, similar thematic films such as The Ten Commandments, The Sword
in the Desert, The Juggler, and The Wall. TV programs such as the showing of “The Israel

75
See Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel : How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2006); Elizabeth Stephens, Us Policy toward Israel : The Role of
Political Culture in Defining The "Special Relationship" (Portland OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006).
Although these two books do not place the argument within a theoretical framework of sources of foreign
policy, they nevertheless provide detailed discussion of the role of culture in the US-Israeli relationship.

76
Mart, Eye on Israel : How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally, p. 169.

77
Tivnan, The Lobby : Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, p. 51.
78
Jack G. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs : How Hollywood Vilifies a People (New York: Olive Branch Press,
2001), pp. 180-91.

79
Tivnan, The Lobby : Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, p. 51.

132

Anniversary Show” as a special on the popular show The Toast of the Town to celebrate, as Ed
Sullivan reflected the national sentiment, “the founding of the young but powerful State of
Israel.”
80
Popular fiction such as Exodus, The Young Lions, and My Glorious Brother, Passage in
the Night, The Enemy Camp, and countless celebratory magazine and newspaper articles, in
Time, Life, and Reader’s Digest have all featured positive and inspiring Jewish characters,
connecting to the wide readership at universal humanistic level. All these popular cultural
events/elements have contributed significantly to the decline of anti-Semitism and the remaking
of the image of American Jews into a confident and successful community. They also provided
American Jews with a foundational and facilitating platform and have prepared the groundwork
among the American public to assert their influence in the political sphere during the following
decade, particularly after the June 1967 War.
At the same time, and even more clearly after 1967, Arab Americans (and all Arabs)
were portrayed negatively as permanent “outsiders” thanks to their vilification in such media
outlets. These parallel processes have shaped the Jew-Israeli/Arab-Palestinian dichotomy into a
pioneer/terrorist, modern/backward, and civilized/uncivilized binary images) not unlike that of
the earlier and no longer acceptable image of cowboy/Indian.
Equally important, Arab Americans have been excluded from the American political
process in what Samhan labeled as a form of “political racism.”
81
For example, as early as 1978,
James Zogby, the then-head of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, was invited to the White
House as a part of an ethnic leadership meeting with Vice-President Walter Mondale. Afterwards,
Zogby was notified that he would not be invited to any further meetings “because they ha[d]
received objections to the inclusion of an ‘Arab.’”
82
In 1999, House Minority Leader Richard

80
Mart, Eye on Israel : How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally, p. 139.
81
Helen Samhan, "Politics and Exclusion: The Arab American Experience," Journal of Palestine Studies
14, no. 2 (1987).

82
James Zogby, Our Twenty Five Years, January 6, 2003, http://www.aaiusa.org/

133

Gephardt nominated Salaam al-Marayati, Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council of Los
Angeles, to the National Commission on Terrorism for “his extensive public service experience
and being involved in interfaith dialogue,”
83
only to withdraw the nomination after Jewish
organizations charged that Al-Marayati supported terrorism against Israel and the US.
Concerns were voiced by the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and
Zionist Organization of America, whose President, Morton Klein, “spearheaded the effort to have
Al-Marayati removed, ”
84
over the objections of some local Jewish leaders in Los Angeles.
Similarly, in the same year, Jewish groups demanded that the State Department fire Joseph
Zogby, the only Arab American in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, from his position as
special assistant to Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, who defended
Zogby’s credentials and moderate views before he finished his one year appointment. While these
and other members of the community criticize the Israeli government’s policies against
Palestinians in the occupied territories, Abraham Foxman, national director of the ADL,
instructed that there “is no room at a U.S. government agency …for individuals who publicly
advocate antagonistic views of Israel and our policy regarding an ally.”
85

In the realm of electoral politics, Arab Americans’ have also had to contend with
deliberate attempts at their exclusion. Responding to or fearing objections by Jewish groups,
campaign contributions by Arab Americans to the 1984 Mondale campaign were returned, and in
1988, the Democratic presidential candidate, Michael Dukakis, rejected the endorsement from
Arab American Democratic Federation. In the 2000 election for the US Senate seat from New
York, Hilary Clinton returned a $50,000 donation from the American Muslim Alliance chapter in

83
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/07/29/terrorism.commission/

84
Ibid

85
Joseph Zogby, Is Criticism of Israel Forbidden? http://www.aaiusa.org/news/staffart070399.htm

134

Massachusetts. Her action was in response to accusations made by her opponent Rick Lazio that
it was “blood money.”
86

Such practices are a reflection of the stark differential in power and influence between the
pro-Israel lobby and the position of Arab Americans. This and the negative images have been
exacerbated by the non-existence or at best the weakness of the so-called Arab lobby, which owes
to the relatively recent immigration of most Arabs, nation of origin-based disagreements within
the community, and lack of resources. It must be made clear here that is erroneous to conflate the
“oil lobby” with an Arab lobby, for the former consists of American oil companies, whose first
and foremost objective is to obtain governmental concessions to enhance their bottom line. Their
rare promotion of pro-Arab positions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict is generally abandoned at
the first objections from the pro-Israel lobby. As former AIPAC Director Morris Amitay noted of
the oil lobby “we very rarely see them lobbying on foreign policy issues …In a sense, we have
the field to ourselves.” Tome Dine, another former AIPAC’s director dismissed Saudi lobbying
efforts “since they hire foreign agents …to do their bidding. Their support is not rooted in
American soil.”
87
It has been the weakness and thus the absence of any significant counter
pressure to challenge the pro-Israel lobby which contributed to the latter’s dominance and
effectiveness.
As outlined in chapter three and earlier in this chapter, it was not until after the 1967 War
that US aid to Israel began to increase markedly and the relationship between the two countries
assumed its special character. However, it was precisely during these two decades (1948-1967),
of relative “low profile” on the US-Israeli strategic and political fronts that the US-Israeli special
relationship on the cultural front was being built, as Israel was being woven into the American
popular cultural narrative. This cultural affinity accounted for the widespread support by

86
The New York Times, November 2, 2000

87
Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 145 and 44.

135

American society and the US government for Israel in the 1967 war and was itself enhanced as
result of the war and its effects.
The Role of the Holocaust
One critical effect of the 1967 war, was the re-entry of the Holocaust into American life
after it had been actively marginalized by the American Jewish leadership as a result of Cold War
considerations. First, the West German-US alliance against the USSR in the Cold War had led to
the exclusion of the Holocaust from public discussions so as not to embarrass an ally in the
context of the more important issue of fighting communism. Second, the American Jews who
were willing to talk about German atrocities were members of the American left and, during the
McCarthy era, were often viewed as “communist-sympathizers.” As such, these Jewish activists
were pressured by leading Jewish leaders and organizations into marginalizing the Holocaust so
as not to associate Jews with pro-communist tendencies. Lastly, persistent—albeit declining—
anti-Semitism had also prevented Jewish organizations and leaders from focusing on and
inserting the Holocaust into American public life. Rejecting the Freudian “return of the repressed
trauma” thesis as an explanation, the historian Peter Novick argues instead that the emergent
“collective memory” and memorialization of the Holocaust were constructed in response to the
cultural, social and political issues of the day.
88

Indeed, During the early 1960’s, the capture and the globally-televised trial of Adolf
Eichmann, the release of the movie Judgment at Nuremberg, and the publication of and reaction
to Hannah Arendt’s book Eichmann in Jerusalem “effectively broke fifteen years of near silence
on the Holocaust in American public discourse.”
89
As mentioned in the previous chapter, while
American Jews had exaggerated fears of Israel’s possible annihilation by the Arabs preceding the
1967 War and during the 1973 War, the swift victory in the former and the relief over the
eventual victory in the latter enhanced their confidence and increased their identity- assertion.

88
Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).

89
Ibid., p. 144.

136

This combination dramatically mobilized the Jewish community into securing a prominent place
for the Holocaust in American society.
90
NBC’s airing of the miniseries Holocaust (which was
watched by 100 million Americans) in April 1978 marked the “most important moment in the
entry of the Holocaust into general American consciousness”
91
[Emphasis added] and prompted
President Carter to announce two weeks later the formation of the President’s Commission on the
Holocaust to create a national memorial. While there may be a stronger argument for building
memorials to the genocide of Native Americans and slavery of African Americans (both
committed by white Americans on American soil), and notwithstanding Jesse Jackson’s leaked
comment that he was “sick and tired of hearing about the Holocaust…The Jews do not have a
monopoly on suffering,”
92
the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum on the National Mall was
dedicated in 1993 by President Clinton.
As the principal “address” of American Jewry, the museum’s focus is the centrality of
Israel (and American Jews) and the Holocaust to each other—a focus that is propagated across
the American cultural landscape through a plethora of Holocaust-centered venues such as media
discourse, other museums, academic institutions, school-mandated programs, and financial
support foundations. However, Novick argues that to assign uniqueness to the Holocaust and
mark “it the benchmark of oppression and atrocity” ultimately trivializes “crimes of lesser
magnitudes,” and promotes evasion by the United States of its “moral and historical
responsibility” towards Native and black Americans.
93
Novick, as a Jew, concludes his seminal
study by warning that it would amount to granting Hitler a “posthumous victory” to “tacitly
endorse his definition of ourselves as despised pariahs by making the Holocaust the emblematic

90
Ibid., see chapter 8.

91
Ibid., p. 209.

92
Quoted in Ibid., p. 330 n 101.
93
Ibid., pp. 14-5.

137

Jewish experience.”
94
In another critique, Norman Finkelstein argues that the “Holocaust” is a
onstruct and an “ideological representation of the Nazi holocaust”
95
(the actual historical event),
and the political utilization of Holocaust-centered efforts by American Jewry constitutes what he
terms, the “Holocaust industry.” He argues that the cynical exploitation of the Nazi holocaust
untimely serves the financial coffers of its promoters (not its victims) and, notwithstanding
Novick’s warning, deflects criticism of Israel and its policies.
96

The Model
The belated entry of the Holocaust into the American consciousness and the resulting
enhancement of US-Israeli cultural affinity were not achieved as a result of some sort of
conspiracy. Rather, it was largely a result of the fact that “the Jews play an important and
influential role in Hollywood, the television industry, and the newspaper, magazine, and book
publishing world.”
97
This “Americanization of the Holocaust” also shifted into higher gear
efforts to conflate and harmonize the interests of the two countries in elite conceptions of the
national interest. It is crucial to highlight the fact that American Jews constitute an influential
and disproportionate segment of the social, cultural, and political elite. With only around 2.2% of
the US population,
98
as the prominent sociologist and political scientists Seymour Martin Lipset
has shown, Jews constitute for example: 45% of leading intellectuals; 30% of professors at major
universities; 21% of high-level civil servants; 40% of partners at leading law firms in New York
and Washington, D.C.; 26% of executives, editors, and reporters at major print and broadcast
media; 58% of producers, directors and writers of major motion pictures; and 23% of Forbes 400

94
Ibid., p. 281.

95
Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry : Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering
(London ; New York: Verso, 2003), p. 3.

96
Ibid., p. 149.
97
Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, p. 207.

98
United States: Jewish Population , American Jewish Year Book, 2007, p. 160

138

richest American list.
99
Furthermore, Congress includes hundreds of Jewish congressional staff
members with 9 Jewish senators and 30 House representatives serving in the 110
th
Congress, and
both Republican and Democratic administrations have appointed included Jewish American
officials to key policy positions, particularly in relations to the Middle East.
While they might be viewed by anti-Semites and other distracters as grounds for
grievance, these Jewish achievements are largely due, as Lipset has argued, to the “extraordinary
scholastic accomplishments” of American Jews in the mostly meritorious American society.
However, the American Jewish success story is not only an example of the success of an ethno-
religious minority within American domestic dynamics. Of more importance and relevance to
this dissertation is the argument that there is nothing to prevent the inclusion or construction of
the preferences of the influential and determined Jewish community into the American national
interest.
100
Since Israel is central to most Jews and its preservation is the raison d'être for many
Jewish organizations, their preferences enter into the construction of the US national interest,
with an Israel-centered agenda structured in such a fashion as to successfully and continuously
tap into the reservoir of the US-Israel cultural narrative. The objective is to center Israeli
perspective into the making of US policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and thanks to the “Bible
Syndrome” and its implications, as Walid Khalidi put it, to reject when it comes to “the the
Palestine problem, any train of thought, however warrantable, that might lead to placing the
Zionists-as-Jews in the dock.”
101

As has been argued thus far and as the epigraphs at the beginning of this chapter
captured, the Bible, the Holocaust, popular culture, and political norms have all acted as

99
See chapter five in Seymour Martin Lipset, American Pluralism and the Jewish Community (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990), ———, American Exceptionalism : A Double-Edged
Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, Jews and the New
American Scene (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
100
Seth Tillman Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 54.

101
Khalidi, "Intorduction," p. xxiv.

139

determinants in explaining the “Americanization” of Israel and its entrance into the American
consciousness. As pointed out above, constructivism allows (if not also privileges) the
incorporation of this political-cultural affinity—as a function of these four determinants—into the
socioeconomic and political elites’ inter-subjective formulation and very definition of what
constitutes the national interest. As a result, the study has proposed that this inter-subjectively-
based affinity, along with the proclamation—not reality—of Israel’s strategic value and the
power of the pro-Israel lobby constitute the three main factors explaining the special US-Israeli
relationship. As demonstrated earlier, Israel during the Cold War was of little practical value to
the US. The US support for Israel after the 1967 war has been first and for most to satisfy Israel’s
military demands in relations to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The proclamation that such support
was for Soviet-centered strategic rationale simply does not stand to historical scrutiny. Nor the
shift to the rationale that Israel was of strategic value in combating radical Islam has been more
convincing. Instead, these rationales had been utilized as convenient justification for more
military support for Israel. Soviet aggression, global terrorism, and radical Islam were simple and
powerful arguments for the media, the public, and congress to rally against. The perception that
Israel stood in the region at the forefront against such threats had been compelling to justify more
support for Israel and to view it as providing strategic value to the United States. According,
notwithstanding the absence of a true strategic value, the perception of Israel as a strategic asset
informs and constitutes an important source in the formation and explanation of the US-Israel
special relationship.
Given the deeply engrained political and cultural American affinity towards Israel and the
US-Israel “strategic alliance” against global menaces, the Israel-centered lobby operates within a
hospitable American society and polity to manage, shape, and emphasize when needed, various
aspects of this perceived strategic and political-cultural arguments in order to ensure that the
special ties continue. Conceptualized as such, it becomes readily clear that the US-Israeli special
relationship not only constructs the security of Israel as an American national interest but also

140

explains the centrality of Israel in the making of US foreign policy in the region. Put differently,
affinity, the perceived strategic value, and the lobby are the sources of this Israel-centered US
policy. These three sources could be thought of as to perform three roughly distinguishable
functional roles: affinity as source for US commitment to preserve Israel’s security in case of a
military threat; “strategic value” as a source of providing extra material and military support to
Israel; the lobby as source of continuing to stress the importance of the first two, and ensuring US
polices are in line, to the extent possible, with those of Israeli governments.
Before concluding the chapter, it is important to clarify a conceptual and empirical issue.
For the purpose of this project and to avoid conceptual and empirical stretching, the domain of
influence under examination is restricted to US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. While
the role of Israel and its lobby in, for example, the Iraq War and the simmering conflict with Iran
(2007-08) over nuclear proliferation is the subject of intense and acrimonious debate, the focus
here is be on the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and its epicenter: the Palestine
problem. In the post-Cold War era and despite Egypt’s and Jordan’s having signed peace treaties
with Israel, US relations with both these countries continue to be viewed by successive
administrations within the Israel prism. Later the dissertation will demonstrate that the
intractability of the Palestine question provides not only the key to this counterintuitive argument
but also an explanation for US support for these two authoritarian regimes. But first, chapter five
will trace the historical development of US relations with Egypt and Jordan and demonstrate the
shift from US Soviet-centered approach to an Israel-centered approach.

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Chapter Five
US Relations with Egypt and Jordan
The previous two chapters demonstrated the special nature of the US-Israeli relationship
by focusing on its historical evolution across successive administrations, its forms (i.e. political,
economic, and military), and its rationale and sources (i.e. perception of strategic value, affinity,
and the pro-Israel lobby). The discussion, in essence, defined and operationalized the
independent variable in the puzzle of Arab authoritarianism (the dependent variable). In the same
fashion pursued in examining the US-Israeli relationship thus far, this chapter submits the US
relations with Egypt and Jordan to a systematic historical examination to delineate the nature of
these relations and determine the dynamics which affected the US approach towards the two
countries. As such, to establish the US role in the resiliency of the regimes in Jordan and Egypt,
this chapter focuses on the origins and evolution of US relations with these two regimes.
However, this relationship has come to be perceived by many Arabs as a part of the
longer history of hostile Western encounters with the Arab world. The contrast between these
conflictual encounters and the support that the Zionist movement received to establish the state of
Israel is key to Arab perceptions of the relationship. To fully explain these Arab perceptions, the
discussion here begins by tracing the origins of Western penetration of the Ottoman Empire.
While the Greeks, Persians, Romans, Crusaders, and others have left their marks over the ages,
the twentieth-century political history of the Arab region cannot be understood outside the
context of the continued European penetration and ultimate collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Accordingly, this chapter provides an historical overview of the British occupation of Egypt and
the creation of Transjordan. Britain dominated the political life of both countries before the
United States assumed its superpower role in the region.
Prior to 1947-1948 the US was mostly free of the “baggage” of Western colonialism.
However, with the Truman administration’s endorsement of the partition of Palestine and

142

recognition of the state of Israel, the United States set out on a course of conflict with the Arab
world, thus linking itself, in the view of the Arab people, with the long history of Western
attempts at domination. Against such a background, the discussion moves to address US relations
with Egypt and Jordan until the June 1967 War, with a focus on the eventful 1950’s. The chapter
focuses on two critical episodes during the Eisenhower Administration: the Israeli-French-British
attack on Egypt in the 1956 Suez War and its aftermath and King Hussein’s termination of
Jordan’s nascent democratic experiment in 1957. The discussion addresses both the domestic and
regional settings and centers around the tension created by the US Cold War-centered Baghdad
Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine on the one hand, and the implications for the Arabs of the loss of
Palestine and the emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the other. Eisenhower’s successor,
Kennedy, viewed Arab nationalism with less alarm. However, under the Johnson administration,
the United States began the shift to an Israel-centered orientation, which became fully entrenched
by the 1967 war.
The chapter concludes with an assessment of the gap during the Eisenhower
administration between Soviet-centered (mis)perceptions on the one hand, and regional
conditions (i.e. the conflict with Israel and the rise of Arab nationalism), on the other. This
assessment will serve as a contrast to the post-1967 US Israeli-centered approach to the region,
which will be the subject of discussion in the next chapter. Under both approaches, the US has
always sought supportive Arab regimes irrespective of the implications of such alliances for the
domestic politics of the Arab countries.
Prelude to American Involvement: The Origins of Western Influence
Following its rise in the late thirteen century, the Ottoman Empire expanded steadily,
reaching the height of its power in the sixteenth century with the control of the Middle East,
North Africa, and Southeastern Europe. From this position of strength and to facilitate and
encourage trade, the Ottoman sultans signed a series of agreements with European powers known
as Capitulations. These agreements (usually attached to treaties) granted economic, religious, and

143

legal privileges and rights to citizens and representatives of foreign powers in the Empire.
Granted first to France, foreign nationals, for example, were given commercial enclaves,
exempted from taxes, allowed to build churches, and were placed under the jurisdiction of the
laws of their home states as opposed to the laws of the Ottoman Empire.
1

Not unlike other empires, the Ottomans began their long decline generally as result of
sweeping historical forces. While the reasons behind the decline and eventual collapse of the
Ottoman Empire are the subject of a long scholarly debate and beyond the scope of this
dissertation, the development of capitalism, the resulting modern world economy, the Protestant
Reformation, and the industrial revolution all unleashed profound dynamics which were largely
beyond the empire’s control or its ability to implement sufficient reform in response.
2
During the
steady decline, European powers began to utilize the capitulations as instruments of asserting
their influence over and increasing their penetration of the Empire. Furthermore, beginning in the
mid 17
th
century the Ottomans were increasingly on the defensive militarily experiencing
successive military defeats, particularly the disastrous war with Russia which ended in 1774. The
Ottomans lost that war and, according to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, ceded parts of the
Crimean Peninsula to Russia, thus giving it access to the Black Sea. It also granted the latter
rights to build a Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul and to represent Orthodox Christians in the
Ottoman Empire.
3

The year 1774, therefore is often used to mark the rise of the Eastern Question, that of
how the European powers should deal with an increasingly weakened Ottoman Empire. Whereas

1
James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East : A History, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2005), p. 48.

2
Ibid., chapter 4, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey / Bernard Lewis, 3rd ed., Studies in
Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

3
Gelvin, The Modern Middle East : A History, pp. 50-51.

144

Ottoman weakness produced ambitious European claimants to the attractive spoils,”
4
at the same
time, European statesmen were wrestling with how the European balance of power would be
affected if the Empire collapsed or retreated. Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798
sharpened the Eastern Question, emboldened the European powers vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire,
and inaugurated profound colonial expeditions.
5
Although short-lived, the French occupation of
Egypt (1798-1801), which was ended thanks to Britain’s alliance with the sultan, introduced new
rules to Ottoman-European encounters: “European plans to conquer interior portions of the
Ottoman Empire, rather than being satisfied with nibbling away at the Eurasian edges, now
became increasingly thinkable” [Emphasis added].
6
Subsequently, France occupied Algeria in
1830, Tunisia in 1881, and declared Morocco a protectorate in 1912; Britain occupied Aden in
1839 and Egypt in 1882, and Italy occupied Libya in 1911. Napoleon’s expedition marked the
beginning of the modern history of the Arab World and the Western intervention in the region has
continued, and with profound consequences.
7

Egypt under British Control
In addition to the British force, a 300-man Albanian contingent under a leader by the
name of Muhammad Ali was attached to the Ottoman army to repel the French invasion of Egypt.
Once the French, British, and most Ottoman troops had left, Muhammad Ali, thanks to his
intelligence and charisma, took advantage of the chaos and void that was left and convinced the
Ottoman sultan to appoint him the viceroy (khediwi) of Egypt in 1805.
8
Muhammad Ali
eliminated his enemies, consolidated his power, introduced agricultural reforms, developed early

4
L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East : Old Rules, Dangerous Game, Princeton
Studies on the near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5
Ibid., p. 30.

6
Ibid., p. 25.

7
Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire : Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle
East, 1st cloth ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), pp. 10-11.

8
Latifa Mohamed Salem, Levantine Experiences, Muhammad Ali (1805-2005), Al-Ahram Weekly, Special
Issue No. 768

145

industrialization, created a bureaucracy, and most important, built a formidable military force.
He subsequently challenged Ottoman authority by sending an army into Greater Syria in 1831
under the command of his son Ibrahim, who then became the governor of the area comprising
present-day Israel, Palestine, Syria, Jordan and much of Lebanon. Moreover, the northern thrust
of the Egyptian regime reached the city of Kütahya, causing Ottoman defeat and threatening the
imperial seat in Istanbul. In the face of their unsuccessful attempt to regain the occupied region
and fearful of Muhammad Ali’s further military ambitions, the Ottomans, with the support of
European powers (particularly Russia)—contending to preserve the balance of power and
extracting further concessions from the Ottomans in the process—forced him to retreat.
Muhammad Ali agreed to withdraw from Syria in 1840 and reduce the size of his army, but not
before compelling the Ottoman sultan to designate Egypt as an autonomous province and grant
him the right to pass his title to his descendants.
9
Thus, Muhammad Ali was not only the founder
of modern Egypt, but also created a dynasty that was to rule Egypt, first as governors until 1914
and then as sultans and kings until the Free Officers revolution overthrew the monarchy in 1952.
Meanwhile, cotton production further integrated Egypt into the world economy and
accounted for an increasing portion of its trade and revenues. The unavailability of American
cotton during the Civil War put a premium on Egyptian cotton in the British and other European
markets, thus dramatically increasing Egypt’s revenues leading to a fuller reliance on this export
commodity. The sudden financial windfall not only facilitated needed expenditures in public
projects and infrastructure, but also encouraged foreign borrowing to finance many nonproductive
projects such as the building of palaces, yachts, and cultural landmarks (e.g. Egyptian Museum,
Opera House, and Geographic Society).
10
However, once Southern cotton again became
available after the end of the American Civil war, Egypt’s boom ended, its cotton revenues
plummeted, and the 1873 international depression made its financial standing more perilous. In

9
Arthur Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts on File, 2008), pp. 69-70.

10
Ibid., pp. 77-78.

146

response, the Khedive Isma`il sold Egypt’s share of the Suez Canal Company (completed in
1869) to Britain for four million pounds and imposed severe austerity measures on Egyptians
while exempting foreigners thanks to the Capitulation agreements
11
.
With debt (mostly foreign) exceeding 90 million British pounds, Egypt declared
bankruptcy in 1876 and was forced to accept French-British financial control over its entire
budget to ensure debt payment to its European creditors.
12
These upheavals and European
interference intensified Egyptian nationalist sentiments and led to the `Urabi Revolution of 1881-
1882. Colonel Ahmad `Urabi led an army mutiny and forced the Khedive Tawfiq to appoint a
pro-reform cabinet, proclaim a new constitution, and hold legislative elections. `Urabi—now as
the head of War Ministry—and the empowered representative assembly stressed Egypt’s interests
and sought to return Egypt’s financial portfolio to Egyptian hands. The new political landscape
alarmed European nationals in Egypt and offered a pretext for Britain to intervene militarily after
riots broke out in Alexandria. The khedive sided with the British while the cabinet declared war
on them. In the end, the British forces defeated the nationalists, occupied Egypt in September
1882, installed a pro-British government, exiled `Urabi and his colleagues, and propped up the
Khedive Tawfiq.
13

The occupation of Egypt with its all-important Suez Canal was one example of British
actions aimed at protecting imperial communication and commercial lines to India. The British
occupation also marked the first western intervention in the Arab region to abort political reforms
and impede democratization. While the British did introduce land reforms and increased
agricultural output, they prevented the growth of local manufacturing, suppressed the spread of
public education, and ignored increasing demands to grant Egypt its independence. With their
occupation lacking international legitimacy, Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt when

11
———, Modern Egypt : The Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 29.

12
Gelvin, The Modern Middle East : A History, pp. 77-8.

13
Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt, chapter 6.

147

World War I broke out in 1914. To the dismay of Egypt’s nationalists, given President Wilson’s
championing of self-determination, the United States recognized the protectorate at the 1919
Paris Peace Conference As a result, unrest intensified across the country and crystallized in the
1919 Revolution under the nationalist leader Sa`ad Zaghlul. The revolution forced Britain to
grant Egypt nominal independence in 1922 while maintaining control over its own interests in
Egypt: defense, other foreign interests and minorities, and the status of the Egyptian sultan (as he
was titled by now.)
14
On the domestic front, parliamentary life thrived, political parities
proliferated, and Zaghlul’s Wafd nationalist party dominated all free elections. After a five-year
suspension, King (after the shift of title from Sultan) Fuad restored the 1923 constitution in 1935,
held elections which the Wafd swept, and formed a multi-party government to negotiate a new
treaty with Britain, which was fearful of the Italian threat coming from neighboring Libya and
Ethiopia. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty still granted Britain a 20-year occupation of the Suez
Canal zone, but it reduced the number of British forces, called for the abolition of the
Capitulations, and supported Egypt’s membership in the League of Nations.
15

However, Egyptians hopes of more political reform under the new, young, and popular
King Farouk were quickly dashed as he and his advisors replaced the elected government with
palace loyalists. Instead of being in opposition to monarchy, by the early 1940’s the Wafd party
joined in conservative alliance with the king as Wafd became more corrupt and attuned to the
interests of the landowning class.
16
Repeated interventions by the Palace and the British caused
splits within the Wafd and let to further proliferation of ineffectual and elite-centered political
parties. As a result, Egyptians were becoming disillusioned with the trappings of parliamentary
institutions and Egyptian nationalism at the same time that the Society of Muslim Brothers

14
———, Modern Egypt : The Formation of a Nation-State, p. 59.

15
IIbid., p. 64.

16
Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State : Politics and Society in the Middle East (London ;
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 107.

148

(established in 1929) and Arab/Muslim nationalism were on the rise. The period also marked the
entry of the Palestine Question into the Egyptian consciousness as Palestinians launched their
revolt (1936-1939) against the British; the Palestinians were desperately resisting the Zionist
project and British occupation, something with which Egyptians were all too familiar.
17
Indeed,
as successive Egyptian governments sought to revise the 1936 Treaty and end Britain’s de facto
occupation—particularly after the end of WWII--Egypt, largely to check Jordan’s territorial
ambitions entered the Palestine war and lost to Israel, thus ultimately leading to the 1952
revolution (Egypt’s third), which overthrew the monarchy, effectively cancelled the 1923
constitution, and ultimately brought the charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser to power,.
The British Creation of Jordan
As earlier nationalists identified with the Ottoman Empire under continuous
encroachment by European powers, both Egyptian (Pharaonic) nationalism and Egypt’s Arab-
Muslim nationalism supported and viewed the Palestinian revolt against the British as a
welcomed departure from an earlier Arab revolt in collusion with the British against the Ottoman
Empire.
18
Prior to the “Great Arab Revolt” proclaimed by the Sharif Husayn of Mecca in June
1916 against the Ottomans, the area known as Transjordan was part of the Ottoman vilayet
(province) of Syria the capital of which was Damascus. Given its desert climate, small
population size, and lack of urban centers, this area was of little significance to the Empire
outside the pilgrimage route to Mecca-- until the second half of the 19
th
century.
To fulfill his territorial ambitions, the Sharif Husayn established an understanding with
the British in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence of July 1915 to January 1916. The eight-
letter correspondence stipulated that in exchange for Husayn’s support for Britain in the war, the
latter would install him at the head of an Arab Kingdom to be carved out of the Ottoman Empire
with boundaries to be determined after the war. The Sharif made ostensible common cause with

17
Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt, chapter 8.

18
Ibid., p. 127.

149

the Arab nationalism being articulated in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo to justify the daring
alliance between himself, as the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites, and a Christian power against
the Ottoman Muslim Empire. However, at virtually the same time, Britain and France were
negotiating a scheme to partition and place the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire under their
own spheres of influence in what was later revealed as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916.
The San Remo conference of April 1920, following the end of WWI and the defeat of the
Ottomans, granted mandatory power to France in Syria and Lebanon, where it held financial and
cultural interests. Britain was granted Palestine—which overlooked the Suez Canal and had been
the target of the 1917 Balfour Declaration (to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine)—and Iraq
with its proximity to Britain’s India and its promise of oil. Transjordan also fell under the British
sphere of influence in the territory intended to be included in the Palestine Mandate.
However, by the time the League of Nations formalized the mandate powers in July
1922, Britain had excluded Transjordan from this territory, and was in the process of working out
a different governance arrangement. Abdullah, the Sharif Husayn’s most ambitious son, moved
from the Hijaz first to the southern Transjordanian town of Ma’an and then to Amman to present
himself to the British for consideration as the ruler of Transjordan, hoping its boundaries would
be enlarged to include Syria. However, during the Cairo Conference of March 1921 Britain’s
Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill squashed all ideas for such expansion, and granted
Abdullah only a six-month probationary British-supervised rule over Transjordan with a monthly
stipend of ₤5,000. In return, Abdullah had to promise “to keep the territory clear of anti-French
anti-Zionist agitation.”
19

This was the foundational moment for the country, and this arrangement both
encapsulated its regional position and defined its relations with major powers. Accordingly,
British officials in London and colonial officers in the region regarded Transjordan as buffer

19
Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan, Cambridge Middle East Library
(Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 53.

150

between Jewish-promised Palestine and disruptive nationalist forces emanating from Syria,
Lebanon, and Palestine. First with the Zionist-Palestinian clash and then with the intractability of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country’s leaders realized that playing such a role earned it its
“moderate” designation by the West and provided the rationale for western support, beginning
with the ₤5,000 stipend. Given its war fatigue, direct involvement in Palestine, and heavy losses
from the revolt in Iraq, Britain deemed its indirect control of Transjordan, via the Hashemite
Abdullah and without any Britain military presence, as sufficiently meeting its interests.
Despite the conclusions by British colonial officials that Abdullah had lacked
administrative skills and committed financial irregularities as well as their persistent reluctance,
in May 1923 they announced that “His Britannic Majesty’s Government will recognize the
existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir
Abdullah,”
20
with an increased annual subsidy of ₤150,000. However, this independence was not
from Britain but in reference to delinking the mantiqa (area or district) of Transjordan from the
British mandate in Palestine, as the imposed 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty formalized
Transjordan’s colonial status.
21
In addition to maintaining control over security (through the well-
trained army, or Arab Legion), foreign relations, and finances, Britain viewed the treaty as a
reward for Abdullah’s suppression of nationalists and foreign Istiqlalists (of the Istiqlal, or
independence, party) and his non-assistance to Syrian revolts against the French. Abdullah
viewed his collaboration with the British as an acceptable price for London’s renewed (albeit
tentative) faith in him, as an enhancement to the country’s status with the reference to imarah
(emirate), and as a reasonable exchange for the continued yearly subsidies, which further
routinized the country’s reliance on external financial assistance.

20
Maan Abu Nowar, The Development of Trans-Jordan, 1929-1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan (Reading Garnet Publsihing Limited 2006), p. 13.

21
Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan, p. 76.

151

While accountable to the Colonial Office through the British resident, the treaty granted
Abdullah domestic powers and introduced the Organic Law or constitution. Since neither
Abdullah nor the British were interested in developing democratic government and institutions,
the promulgated constitution created a 21-member (7 appointed) Legislative Council which
favored loyalists (i.e. tribal bedouins, Circassians, and Christians), lacked the power to propose
legislation, and served at the pleasure of the Amir and his appointed Executive Council.
22

Subsequent demands by a growing opposition, largely urban intellectuals and some tribal leaders
(the latter mostly with concerns over economic marginality), for independence from Britain and
democratic representation went unanswered for the next two decades.
23
Abdullah’s continued
deepening ties with Britain, the fine performance of the Arab Legion during WWII on behalf of
the allies, a British Empire in retreat after the war, and a new Labor government in London all
moved Britain to grant the county its independence in May 1946. Accordingly, the country
became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the amir became a king, the British Resident in
Amman became ambassador, and a new constitution was promulgated which established a
parliament (majlis al-nuwwab) to be selected through direct elections. However, Jordan’s
continued heavy reliance on British subsidies to balance its budget and the latter’s strategic
concerns (i.e. in Palestine) rendered the formal independence largely irrelevant to the basic nature
of Anglo-Jordanian relations.
While British discouragement and earlier French actions in Syria ultimately ended his
hopes to expand northward, a westward glance looked more promising as the storm in Palestine
was gathering. Abdullah’s pre-war collusion with the Zionists in Palestine,
24
the 1947 UN

22
Naseer Hasan Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (The Hague,: Nijhoff, 1972),
p. 77.

23
Rex Brynen, "The Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan " in Political Liberalization and Democratization in
the Arab World: Comparative Experiences ed. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 72.

152

partition of Palestine, and the trilateral (Britain, the Jewish Agency, and Jordan) consensus
against an independent Palestine all facilitated Abdullah’s conquest during the 1948 War of much
of the territory that the partition had designated for an Arab state. Thereafter, he “incorporated”
what has come to be known as the West Bank into a “unity” with the East Bank by April 1950.
As a result, Palestine vanished, Jordan tripled its population (to around 1.2 million), and popular
sovereignty further languished.
British and French imperial designs in Greater Syria—according to the Sykes-Picot
Agreement—not only divided the region into separate Arab states and created a colonial-settler
Jewish state but also disrupted traditional social and economic processes, deprived the Fertile
Crescent of its geographic coherence, and virtually eliminated any prospect of Arab unity.
Britain converted the dynasty in Egypt into a monarchy, invented another one in Jordan, and not
only retreated with both intact but also left a legacy of authoritarianism and suppression of
indigenous demands for self-rule. Additionally, Britain’s policy in Palestine played a major role
in shaping its policy in Egypt and largely defined the rationale for Britain’s creation and
management of Jordan. With Jordan’s conquest of the West Bank and Egypt’s administration of
the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of 1948 war, the loss of Palestine and its consequences came to
dominate the internal affairs of the two (and other) Arab countries, and the creation of Israel
became central in the relations the US, which would now come to replace the British in region,
would have with the Arab world.
Early US-Egyptian Relations
The United States has been involved in the Middle East since the middle of the
eighteenth century, through culture, education, and religion. Mostly out of evangelical impulses,
Americans went to the region as missionaries, archeologists and Biblical scholars, built schools
and hospitals, and opened institutes of higher education such the Syrian Protestant College

24
See Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan : King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition
of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), passim.

153

(renamed the American University of Beirut) in 1863 and the American University of Cairo in
1919. On the political and diplomatic front, however, after some involvement in the immediate
post-World War I period, the United States resumed its isolationism and deferred to Britain and
France over matters related to the region. Contrary to its growing interests in the Arabian
peninsula as a result of oil discoveries in the 1920s, the US viewed Egypt with little interest in the
interwar period as the US ambassador to Cairo observed in 1932 that "as I see it there is not much
going on here of tremendous consequence to my government…It appears to me to be quite a
sideshow."
25

While it fully supported Britain’s actions in Egypt during the war, after the war the
United States oscillated between its sensitivity to Britain’s desire to maintain its control over the
Suez Canal and its concerns over Egypt’s potential tilt to the Soviets given the rising nationalist
calls for complete British withdrawal. In the face of mounting Egyptian protests and strikes,
British forces attacked the police headquarters in Isma`iliyya and killed 50 Egyptians on January
25, 1952. The next day Egyptians from all political parties and walks of life marched into
downtown Cairo and, after an altercation, a rampage ensued in which western landmarks and
buildings symbolizing foreign economic and cultural influence were torched. The infamous
events of that day which came to be called “Black Saturday” captured the depth of Egyptian
resentment toward Western presence and influence and exposed the monarchy’s incompetence
and bankruptcy. Meanwhile, as King Farouk imposed curfews and failed, through four different
governments, to restore order and salvage credibility, some 300 commissioned Egyptian officers
were at the latter stages in the preparation for a plot to overthrow the monarchy. Opposition to
British control, dissatisfaction with the monarchy, humiliation over the 1948 Arab defeat, and the
protracted crisis and violence of 1945-1952 all led the so-called Free Officers to undertake what

25
Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 : Strategy and Diplomacy in the
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 15.

154

was a bloodless coup on July 23, 1952 and force the king into exile.
26
A 13-man executive
committee, the Revolutionary Command Council under the leadership of the veteran General
Muhammad Najib, took over the reins of power.
American diplomats and intelligence officials at the Cairo Embassy were able to ascertain
before and immediately after the coup a coincidence of interest with the new regime in the desire
to check leftist and pro-communist groups. As a result the US declined to intervene on behalf of
the king, accepted the result of the coup, and immediately granted the new regime’s request for
economic and industrial expertise based on Truman’s program for providing assistance to post-
colonial countries to resist communism.
27
However, when Lt. Col. Nasser replaced the popular
Najib after a short power struggle, and then consolidated his power, banned all political parties,
created the Liberation Rally as the only channel for mass politics, and suppressed the Muslim
Brotherhood, the much-needed United States assistance was not as generous as had initially been
hoped. Throughout the protracted Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over Suez, the United States, at
the urging of and in deference to Britain, delayed and conditioned any assistance—particularly
military—to Egypt on the conclusion of an agreement with Britain. Egypt needed to modernize
its military and replace its antiquated armaments left from the old regime.
It is important to point out that, assessing that Egypt would emerge stronger in the
aftermath of such an agreement, Israel’s defense ministry dispatched an espionage ring in July
1954 to Egypt to commit acts of sabotage—with little damage—against American and British
facilities in Cairo while planting Egyptian-indicting evidence. Israel’s objectives in what became
known as the Lavon Affair (after Israel’s defense minister) were to demonstrate Nasser’s inability
and his untrustworthiness in protecting Western interests, to derail the looming Anglo-Egyptian
agreement, and to prevent an Egyptian-American rapprochement over a regional military

26
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir; a Study in Political Dynamics, 1st. ed. ed. (Albany,: State
University of New York Press, 1971), pp. 19-20.

27
Jon B. Alterman, "American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: From Hope to Hostility," Middle East Journal
52, no. 1 (1998): p. 52.

155

alliance.
28
Although the affair failed because a member of the ring was caught red-handed and all
were put on trial, Israel continued its aggressive posture against Egypt (as well as Jordan and
Syria) since it “had become the practice of Israel’s policymakers to find ways of accommodating
the views of the military.”
29

Britain and Egypt finally reached an agreement by which Britain would evacuate all of its
troops from the Canal within 20 months, would still be allowed to use Canal Zone airbases, its
civilian technicians would maintain the bases, and Britain would have the right to occupy the
canal in case of an outside attack (i.e. by the Soviet Union) on members of the Arab League or
Turkey. Although the treaty significantly reduced British influence over the country, opposition
forces protested the rights granted to Britain, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted
to assassinate Nasser, who responded with a campaign to destroy the movement’s base and
infrastructure and by filling prisons with Muslim Brothers, communists, and other dissidents.
What was worse for Nasser was that instead of approving further assistance in the aftermath of
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the United States placed new conditions on it. While approving only
$66.3 million in economic aid for 1955,
30
the Eisenhower administration—with the support of
pro-Israel lobby, Congress and Britain—refused to sell arms to Egypt, citing the western arms
embargo of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration (western powers’ agreement not to sell arms to
combatants of Arab-Israeli conflict). Although Israel was receiving arms from France, the US
conditioned arms sales to Nasser on Egypt’s entrance into a western alliance against the Soviet
Union and on making progress towards solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

28
Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), pp.
111-2.

29
This assessment represented the views of Israel’s Foreign Ministry, particularly its experts on Arab
affairs. Ibid., p. 111.

30
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" " (USAID).

156

Egypt between the Western Baghdad Pact and the Israeli Gaza Raid
In the early 1950’s, the US called for the creation of a western alliance to close the
strategic gap left after the creation of NATO and SEATO. Egypt strongly opposed the effort
from the beginning and when a Turkish-Iraqi treaty was signed on February 24, 1955 as the first
element in the Baghdad Pact, Nasser vehemently protested the inclusion of an Arab country,
which was perceived as a threat to Arab solidarity under Cairo’s leadership. Having recently
succeeded in setting a course for securing British withdrawal from Egypt, Nasser argued that
placing Egypt under renewed western control and conditions in the name of combating the non-
existent threat (to Egypt) of the Soviet Union was not an option. Instead of communism and the
Soviet Union, Egypt’s enemies were Zionism and the State of Israel. The Eisenhower
administration implicitly acknowledged this reality by calling for the resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. However, the objective was to remove the “distraction” over the conflict so
Arabs and Israeli can realize the Soviet threat and join western alliances.
However, this thinking about peacemaking was not supported by events on the ground.
Shortly after the 1948 war the regimes in Egypt (under King Faruq), Syria (under President Husni
Al Zaim) and Jordan (under King Abdullah) all sought peace with Israel with minor border
modifications, but were rebuffed by the Jewish state. Moreover, as the work of Israeli revisionist
historians based on Israeli archives began to convincingly demonstrate, starting in the mid
1980’s, Israel was also engaged in the immediate post-1948 War years in a deliberate policy of
massive retaliation against neighboring Arab states for minor border crossings and some
fida’iyeen (commando) infiltrations. Far from settling the existing conflict, Israel’s goal was to
draw an Arab response which would give Israel the pretext to invade and expand its territory at
Arab expense.
31

An example of this policy was, as mentioned in chapter three, the devastating

31
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World. Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 :
Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993). Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé, Jordan in the Middle East : The Making of a Pivotal State,
1948-1988 (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994), Ilan Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51

157

Israeli raid on February 28, 1955 against the Egyptian police headquarters in Gaza which not only
caused numerous causalities and extensive damage but, more important, exposed Egypt’s
weakness in the face of such attacks. The Eisenhower administration discovered for itself the
difficulty of achieving an Egyptian-Israel peace during this period. It dispatched presidential
envoy Robert Anderson in a secret mission called Operation Gamma. He conducted three rounds
of talks (December 1955-March 1956) but failed to have both sides agree on even procedural
arrangements, let alone solving the conflict.
Thus in the context of repeated Western refusals to sell arms to Egypt, as Nasser stressed
and as “Egyptian historiography consistently”
32
shows, it was the Gaza raid that moved Egypt in
the Soviet direction in search of heavy weaponry. Nasser’s attendance at the inaugural summit of
non-aligned states in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955 and his welcoming as a hero by leaders
such as Indonesia’s Sukarno, India’s Nehru and China’s Chou En-lai caused his popularity to soar
in the Arab World and confirmed his inclination to reach out to the Soviet bloc for arms. On
September 1955 Nasser announced an agreement with Czechoslovakia (later to be revealed that it
was with the Soviet Union) for the purchase of a massive $200 million worth of weapons in
exchange for Egyptian cotton.
33

Aswan Dam and the Suez War
The conclusion of this deal triggered joyous celebration by Nasser’s supporters,
particularly among the Arab masses, and annoyance and contempt among his detractors in Israel,
the West and among the “conservative” Arab regimes, especially in Iraq and Jordan. The

(London ; New York: I.B. Tauris 1992). Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars : The Untold
History of Israeli Intelligence (New York: Viking Penguin, 1991), Benny Morris, 1948 and After : Israel
and the Palestinians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ———, The Birth of the Palestinian
Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd ed., Cambridge Middle East Studies 18 (Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956 : Arab Infiltration, Israeli
Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War.

32
Alterman, "American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: From Hope to Hostility," p. 59.

33
Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt : The Formation of a Nation-State, p. 103.

158

Eisenhower administration, having failed to talk Nasser out of the arms deal, was receptive to
Egypt’s financial needs to build the Aswan High Dam. In addition to his charisma, Nasser
attempted to enhance the new regime’s legitimacy through the implementation of public projects
such as the development of the Nile Corniche and the plan to build a dam to prevent punitive
floods, increase arable lands and crops production, and generate much-needed hydroelectric
power. After a positive feasibility study, the World Bank estimated a cost of over $1.3 billion
and proposed a plan to finance building the dam: during the initial phase the Bank would provide
a loan of $200 million along with grants of $50 million from the US and $14 from Britain, but
with conditions; the two countries would also extend loans to Egypt to finance the project’s
subsequent phases. The conditions included denying Egypt’s request for arms and placing
Egypt’s economy under Western scrutiny thus reminding Egyptians of the 1876 Dual Financial
Control.
34
While the United States endorsed and accepted to finance the project in December
1955, Egypt attempted to obtain better terms by raising the prospect of the Soviet Union as an
alternative financier, thus trying to create superpower competition.
35

As Egypt neither officially responded to the offer nor received a counteroffer, opposition
was building in the US congress (based on fiscal concerns and potential threat to the “cotton
states”) and among pro-Israel supporters. More important, Secretary of State Dulles was
becoming increasingly furious with the Egyptian regime over a set of factors: first over Nasser’s
Soviet arms deal, neutralism, and objection to the Baghdad Pact; then over the failure of the
Anderson mission and Nasser’s recognition of the Peoples Republic of China in May 1956. As a
result, when Egypt accepted the financial package to finance the Aswan Damn unconditionally,
Dulles withdrew the offer on July 19, 1956 in unceremonious fashion. Britain and the World

34
Ibid., pp. 105-6.

35
Jon Alterman argues, based on Egyptian archival sources, that Egypt was too weak to engage the West
and East in a bidding war. Alterman, "American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: From Hope to Hostility," p. 69.
P. 69

159

Bank followed suit and withdrew their offers as well. In fact, because of these policies of
Nasser’s, earlier that spring the United States, in concert with Britain, drafted a covert plan called
“Operation Omega” to isolate and weaken Nasser. The joint operation, according to Britain’s
former ambassador to the US, “envisioned withholding aid to Egypt, giving Iraqis a powerful
transmitter to counter Egyptian propaganda, bolstering the Western position in the Middle East
and Baghdad pact…encouraging France and Canada to send arms to Israel… and to build up
King Saud as an alternative leader to Nasser in the Arab World.”
36

Nasser’s reaction to the humiliating
37
offer withdrawal was swift and dramatic: during a
live and long speech over the radio on July 26, 1956, Nasser issued a coded order to military and
navy agents to occupy the canal facilities and announced during the same speech the
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The announcement galvanized Egyptians and other
Arabs across the region, for the Suez Canal symbolized the West’s long dominance and
exploitation of Egypt. Nasser argued that the revenues from the canal would be used to pay for
the Aswan Dam and the Egypt would compensate stockholders at the market value of their shares
as of the eve of nationalization. Although the headquarters of the company were in Paris, the
canal was Egyptian, and Egypt was within its rights under international law to nationalize it, as
long as international navigation rights were preserved.
38
However, France and Britain strongly
objected to the nationalization. They charged that Egypt lacked the technical expertise to operate
and maintain the canal, and they threatened the use of force.
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles understood Egypt’s action as they separated
the less important issue of the ownership of the Canal Company from the all-important question

36
Quoted in Ibid.: p. 64, n69.

37
The US released the text of its statement to journalists before the meeting between Dulles and the
Egyptian ambassador was concluded and before Egypt was able to respond. This and the rationale given
that Egyptian economy could not support the project infuriated Nasser, who viewed them as calculated
insults.

38
Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt, p. 160.

160

of freedom of navigation. They warned France and Britain against resorting to force and called
for a diplomatic solution. Although more favorable to Egypt than plans proposed before the
crisis, the new proposals such as placing the canal under international administration or creating a
Suez Canal Users Association to collect tolls were rejected by Nasser, for they would have
reversed the nationalization. To increase the pressure on Egypt, in mid-September Western crews
and pilots resigned their jobs and were immediately replaced by Egyptian and other pilots of the
Egyptian-created Suez Canal Authority who performed their duties smoothly, despite the
deliberate increase of French and English ships passing through.
39

Despite continued American warnings, the disappointed France and Britain joined by
Israel began secretly planning for a joint attack against Egypt in hopes of overthrowing Nasser.
In addition to the concerns over losing its share of the canal (44%) which was instrumental to its
imperial reach, Britain witnessed with alarm Nasser’s propaganda attacks on its client Hashemite
monarchies in Jordan and Iraq for their pro-Western orientation. The fact that French nationals
held the majority of shares in the canal, that France was unwilling to lose the last vestige of its
power in Egypt, and that Egypt’s support of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) undermined
its position in Algeria all informed the latter’s decision. As for Israel, it wanted to stop the
fida’iyeen infiltrations, destroy Egypt’s potential before the new weaponry became operational,
40

and perhaps expand territorially, all of which contributed to its decision to join in the attack.
Accordingly, on October 29, 1956 Israel invaded Egypt, swiftly occupying the entire
Gaza Strip and strategic locations in the Sinai Peninsula. According to the script of the plot, the
following day, Britain (invoking the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty) and France issued an
ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to withdraw to 10-mile distance from the canal. As expected,
Egypt swiftly rejected the proposal and Israel accepted it, although Israeli forces were already

39
Ibid., p. 161.

40
———, Modern Egypt : The Formation of a Nation-State, p. 108.

161

outside the stipulated parameter.
41
As a result, the next day Britain and France launched air
attacks on Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal zone and began landing their troops in the
eastern Mediterranean, and by November 5, Israel had occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula. As
Nasser vowed that Egypt would never surrender, the international community assailed the
aggression, and the Soviet Union threatened to bomb Paris, London, and Tel Aviv. Despite his
unease about Nasser and because of his repeated advanced warnings against the use of force,
President Eisenhower harshly condemned the attack and, as was detailed in Chapter Three, forced
Britain, France, and, with more pressure, Israel ultimately to withdraw their forces from Egypt.
Reaping the Benefits of the “Victory”
Israel achieved its war’s operational objectives in defeating the Egyptian army,
terminating the fida’iyeen attacks thanks to the stationing of United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF), and opening the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping. However, Israel failed in the
political aims of overthrowing Nasser and expanding its territory.
42
Although he lost the war
militarily and the Egyptian army lost credibility in the face of Israel’s swift invasion, Nasser won
the war in the political and moral senses.
43
The mere joining of Britain and France (as powers
with long histories of detested colonial penetration) with Egypt’s sworn enemy of Israel in what
became known as the “Tripartite Aggression” immediately placed Egypt and its leader in a very
sympathetic and morally strong position, at least across the Arab World. Indeed, “the humiliating
withdrawal forced upon the invaders by the U.N and the two super-powers amounted to a victory
of the first magnitude,”
44
and symbolized Nasser’s stance simultaneously against imperialism and
Zionism. These diplomatic successes during Nasser’s first three years in power cemented, as

41
George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, Durham : Duke University Press, 1990),
p. 43.

42
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, pp. 183-4.

43
Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir; a Study in Political Dynamics, pp. 46-7.

44
Ibid., p. 47.

162

Dekmejian argued, the “shift in revolutionary action from the domestic to the international stage
[which] was accompanied by a parallel redirection of … Egyptian nationalism into Pan-
Arabism.”
45

Nasserism, or the movement around Nasser’s charismatic leadership, Arab nationalist
agenda, anti-colonial orientation, and rejection of western domination inspired Arabs across the
entire region. Thanks to Nasserism, Arab nationalists in Jordan prevented King Hussein and the
pro-Western government in Syria from joining the Baghdad Pact, Palestinians’ expectation for
the liberation of Palestine rose, a military regime, similar to Nasser’s, overthrew the Iraqi
monarchy, and the Ba’ath party in Syria sought unification with Egypt, thus forming the United
Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. Realizing the futility of confronting Nasser, the
Eisenhower administration relaxed some of the economic and trade restrictions against Egypt.
Thanks to the new policy, Egypt was able to purchase $110 million worth of American wheat and
other product for 1959-1960, in comparison to only $1.6 for the previous two years.
Egypt’s international prestige provided Nasser’s regime with immense political capital on
the domestic front, not to advance democracy, but to underpin the regime’s authoritarian nature.
The new constitution promulgated in June 1956 ended the three-year transitional period, affirmed
the ban on all political parties, and confirmed the one-party political system (the National Union).
The constitution also stressed the government’s obligation to achieve social justice by raising
living standards, and providing old age benefits, social insurance, and public health. Beginning
with land reform and redistribution, the regime embarked on a massive modernization program
with marked benefits to an increasing number of Egyptians. After the war the public sector grew
at the expense of the private sector as the regime began a nationalization drive culminating in the
July Laws of 1961 which regulated industries and nationalized all banks, insurance companies,
airlines, utilities, and manufacturing enterprises. In 1960, Egypt inaugurated its first

45
Ibid., p. 51.

163

comprehensive Five-Year Plan, which centered on import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and
generated 1 million new jobs and annual growth rate of 6%.
46
The expansion of the labor market,
the increased economic opportunities, the introduction of income and land redistribution
measures, and the implementation of the socioeconomic welfare benefits all contributed to the
creation of a relatively content population and led to the incorporation into the regime’s
centralized economic development program and co-optation of many civil society organizations.
Through cooptation and oppression, as was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime
was able not only to marginalize those promoting democracy but also to enhance its authoritarian
hold. As a result of this “compact” the regime enjoyed a few years of relative domestic calm,
until the 1967 war.
Inter-Arab Rivalry and the United States
Already less tense towards the end of the Eisenhower administration, US-Egyptian
relations witnessed significant improvement thanks to President Kennedy’s less ideological
outlook. The new president recognized nationalism as a force of ex-colonial nations rather than
pro-communist ones, accepted neutralism as a legitimate choice of the emerging nation-states,
and offered American support for development as a guarantee against extremism and instability.
As a result, Kennedy understood Arab nationalism, supported Algerian independence, and
appointed the Arabist and former president of American University of Cairo John Badeau as
ambassador to Egypt. Moreover, Kennedy extended a hand of friendship to and initiated a
private letter correspondence with Arab nationalism’s chief advocate, Nasser, and provided Egypt
with agricultural commodities under the PL-480 Food Program.
However, at the same time, Arab nationalism was in retreat and the Arab World was
experiencing its own cold war. Arab unity as the major goal of Arab nationalism suffered a
crippling defeat as a result of not only the United Arab Republic’s (the Egyptian-Syrian union)

46
Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 195-6..

164

failure to entice other Arab states, particularly Iraq, to join, but also Syria’s secession from the
union in September 1961. While there were numerous reasons for the breakup, two key elements
were that Nasser’s socialist decrees upset entrenched interests in Syria and that Egyptian rule was
too domineering and condescending towards the “Syrian province” in the very premature
“union.” With Syria’s secession, Egypt was left with the legacy of a failed Arab unity project, and
its decision to keep the name United Arab Republic seemed to keep that legacy alive. Such
fallout underscored the conflict within the “revolutionary” or “progressive” camp as an aspect of
the Arab Cold war. The main and more colorful aspect was between this camp and the
“conservative” camp, which was replete with accusations of “treason,” counter accusations of
cowardice, and exchanges of personal insults. As a result, instead of unity projects, the region
moved to war plans, and the Arab cold war became a hot one with the outbreak of the Yemen
conflict. Inspired by Egypt’s revolution, army officers headed by General Abdulla al-Sallal in
Yemen carried out a coup d’état against the monarchy in September 1962. The deposed young
king Imam al-Badr (who assumed power a week after his father died) took to the mountains and
organized tribal loyalists to fight the new republican regime which, in the face of a serious threat,
requested Nasser’s military support. Nasser responded positively and was accused by Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and the British in Aden of intending to extend Egyptian hegemony into the
Arabian Peninsula.
As Egypt sent troops to support the republican regime, and Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser
extent, Jordan supported the royalists, the latter two countries and the British strongly objected to
the diplomatic recognition extended to the republican regime on December 19, 1962 by the
Kennedy Administration, which saw the new regime as a part of modernizing and “progressive”
trend in the Arab World. However, the American recognition was based on the expectation of
Egypt’s disengagement from Yemen, which was itself conditional upon the termination of Saudi

165

and Jordanian support to the royalists.
47
Not only did Egypt fail to disengage, thus causing strains
with the US prior to Kennedy’s assassination, but also, thanks to their deep mistrust and mutual
recriminations, Cairo and Riyadh managed further to fuel the Yemen Civil War for five years,
tying down 70,000 of Egypt’s best troops. The Egyptian-American “honeymoon” during the
Kennedy Administration, it is important to recall from chapter three, was never at the expense of
the strong US support to Israel. In fact, US-Egyptian relations were friendly enough for President
Kennedy to send a special envoy to inform Nasser of the US plan to supply Israel with advanced
Hawk missiles.
48
The subsequent Johnson Administration was unsympathetic to Arab
nationalism, hostile to Nasser, and decidedly pro-Israel. It also objected to Egypt’s regional
policies but not necessarily to its Yemen involvement,
49
resented Nasser’s criticism of the
Vietnam War and other US policies, brought to a halt its economic support-- particularly the Food
Program-- to Egypt, and proceeded to offer support to Israel at unprecedented levels, particularly
during and after the 1967 War.
Early US-Jordanian Relations
There was still in the late 1940’s some lingering hope in the United States among pro-
Zionist individuals and groups that Transjordan would be part of Palestine under the British
Mandate and for the purpose of implementing the Balfour Declaration.
50
As a result, although
Britain granted Jordan formal independence in May 1946, the United States did not extend its
recognition until January 31, 1949, on the same day the US granted de jure recognition to the

47
Ibid., p. 81.

48
Ibid., p. 76.

49
US Ambassador Badeau, who resigned shortly after Johnson took office, argued that Johnson adopted the
a “stew-in-your-own-juice” policy of leaving Egypt to remain deeply entangled in the Yemen quagmire “to
suffer the inevitable consequences,” Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East : Regional
and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 190.

50
See New York Times, April 24, 1946 and May 5, 1947 for prevalence of the Palestine-Transjordan
linkage.

166

State of Israel.
51
While still heavily reliant on British financial subsidies, Jordan received
economic assistance under President Truman’s Point Four Program, which offered technical and
scientific aid to developing nations with the ultimate goal of containing the Soviet Union.
During King Talal’s brief rule--the result of mental illness-- a new more liberal
constitution (than that of 1947) was promulgated on January 1, 1952, according to which the
Prime Minister and the cabinet became collectively responsible before the Chamber of Deputies
(Article 51), which was empowered to dismiss the cabinet with a two-thirds (amended in 1954 to
absolute) majority vote of no confidence (Article 53). In line with many constitutions in the Arab
world and elsewhere, Jordan’s 1952 constitution, which remains in effect as of this writing, grants
individual, press, assembly, and other freedoms, but with the infamous caveat “in accordance
with the provisions of the law.”
52
As Talal’s teenage son Hussein assumed the throne in May of
1953, under the new constitution and with the unification of the two banks, parliamentary life
became more active, political parties increased in number and activities, and Palestinian-
dominated opposition began to take shape in the context of the rise of Arab nationalism and
Western attempts to prevent the spread of communism in the region.
The Baghdad Pact and the Rise of Nationalist Opposition
In the context of Western attempts to contain Soviet influence in the region and in an
attempt to remain relevant in the face of post-war imperial decline, Britain (with the US
endorsement) led the effort to promote the Baghdad Pact and enlisted Iraq—as the first Arab
country—to join. In the face of calls by the opposition to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty,
which was not to expire until 1963, Britain offered to do so in 1955 and to provide Jordan with
military assistance on the condition of joining the Baghdad Pact. While initially reluctant to join,
King Hussein sacked the government of Prime Minster Abul-Huda, which opposed the Pact, and

51
New York Times, February 1, 1949

52
The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, January 1, 1952,
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

167

appointed the supportive Said al-Mufti to lead a new government to move Jordan toward joining.
In the aftermath of lobbying visits by the Turkish president and prime minister and, the following
month, by the British chief of imperial staff, who detailed the military and economic benefits of a
potential membership, Hussein was convinced and prepared to sign the Letter of Intent had it not
been for the divided cabinet. In the face of mounting opposition as the government began
deliberation, four Palestinian ministers from the West Bank resigned, thus leading to the
resignation of the prime minster and to the fall of the government after seven months in office.
Determined to proceed, the king appointed Hazza’ al-Majali, a leading figure from a large and
influential southern Transjordanian tribe and a staunch advocate of the pact, to lead a new
government. However, Majali’s cabinet was forced to resign after only five days in office
following demonstrations mostly in West Bank cities but also the East Bank which claimed 15
lives, dozens of injuries, and which led to hundreds of arrests by the Arab Legion, then still
commanded by British General John Glubb (or Glubb Pasha).
53

It is important to recall the context of these demonstrations: growing Arab nationalist
sentiments; deep anti-Western suspicions; Nasser’s opposition to the pact and his tremendous
popularity—particularly after the announcement of the“Czech” arms deal; the deep Arab
conviction that it was Israel, not the Soviet Union, which constituted the mortal threat to Arabs;
and the blistering propaganda out of Cairo’s Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) radio against the
Hashemite “agents of imperialism” in Baghdad and Amman. Accordingly, the king dissolved
parliament and appointed an interim government under Ibrahim Hashem to supervise the new
elections. Nonetheless, the dissolution decision was reversed by the High Court on a technicality,
thus leading to the reinstatement of parliament, the cancelation of the elections, more
demonstrations, and the appointment of Samir al-Rifa`i as the country’s fifth prime minister in
less than nine months.
54
The al-Rifa’i government terminated the drive towards joining the

53
New York Times, December 17, 1955 and December 21,
54
Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965), pp. 125-28.

168

Baghdad Pact and pledged to steer clear of pro-western alliances. In March of 1956 the king
dismissed General Glubb from his command of the Arab Legion along with the British director of
general intelligence, thus allowing the Arabization of the armed forces, a key demand of the
opposition, and ridding the country of an important and shameful vestige of British control.
Enjoying widespread approval as a result of the dismissals, the king dissolved the unpopular
parliament of 1954, called for new elections for October 21, 1956, and signed an agreement with
Egypt and Syria placing the militaries of the three counties under one Unified Command.
55

The Amman Spring and the King’s Objection
The caretaker government of Ibrahim Hashem facilitated an election campaign free of
political controls and interference and open to debate of all important political and social issues.
The elections were held on time and the opposition parties emerged victorious in the freest
elections in the kingdom’s history, elections dominated by calls for radical foreign policy
changes. In the 40-member parliament, the liberal and pro-Arab unity Nationalist Socialist Party,
under the leadership of Suleiman al-Nabulsi, won a plurality with eleven seats, the National Front
(communist) gained 3 seats, the Ba’ath 2 seats, the pro-regime and pro-status-quo Arab
Constitutional Party 4 seats and Al-Umma (the Community) Party 1 seat, the Islamist Muslim
Brethren 4 seats and the Al-Tahrir (Liberation) Party 1 seat. The king charged al-Nabulsi with
forming a new government, for which he drew ministers from the first three parties or the leftist
opposition and independents who won 14 seats and proceeded to fulfill many elements of its
electoral agenda.
56
The new government abrogated the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, ratified an Arab
Solidarity Agreement in which Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia promised to replace the British
subsidies, purged conservative pro-regime loyalists from the army and bureaucracy, broke
diplomatic relations with France over its bloody conduct towards the Algerian revolution,

55
Ibid., p. 133.

56
Ibid., p. 135.

169

championed freedom of the press, including opening a Soviet news agency (Tass) office,
welcomed delegations from the communist countries, and rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine.
57

The leftist-dominated al-Nabulsi government not only represented a new chapter in the political
history of the country but also held itself accountable to parliament and considered itself, not the
king, as the principal decision-maker, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.
But the king had had enough. Hussein first requested that al-Nabulsi curb communist
expressions (newspapers, books, films, etc.) and dismiss the communist and Ba’athist ministers
from the cabinet. He then sent the prime minster an “open letter” which warned against
communist infiltration, stating that unless “these unwarranted principles, beliefs, and views …are
curtailed…they will affect all the glory and prestige for which our nation stands…No gap must be
left to allow the propaganda of communism to ruin our country.” The prime minister not only
refused to comply with the king’s orders or respond to his letter; but in addition, decided to open
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the king dismissed al-Nabulsi’s
government on April 10, 1957 and, in the midst of demonstrations, three premiership changes
within two weeks, and a palace-staged coup (which the opposition was blamed for), the king set
about reestablishing his authority. The government of the old guard loyalist Ibrahim Hashem
declared martial law, established military courts, installed Military Governors, dissolved and
banned all political parties, disbanded trade unions, reinstated censorship, arrested or chased
away opposition deputies, and intensified suppression, particularly in the West Bank.
The King and the Eisenhower Doctrine
King Hussein’s invocation of the communist threat as a rationale for the palace-led coup
against the democratically-elected government was designed to attract the attention of the United
States and to tap into the recently-announced Eisenhower Doctrine. In response to increased
Soviet influence in the wake of the Suez crisis’ discrediting of French and British role in the
region, President Eisenhower announced to the Congress on January 5, 1957 the United States’

57
Ibid., p. 136.

170

determination to assist the nations of the Middle East in developing their economic strength and
to undertake “programs of military assistance and cooperation.” This announcement, known as
the Eisenhower Doctrine, was signed into law on March 9, 1957. It specified that such programs
should “include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt
armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.”
58
While targeting
Egypt as the aggressor, the doctrine perceived the conservative Arab regimes in Jordan, Lebanon,
and Iraq (before the 1958 overthrow of the monarchy) as victims worthy of US protection and
support.
In Jordan, the supposed coup or the Zarqa Affair
59
which triggered the king’s dismissal of
al-Nabulsi’s government and termination of democratic life in Jordan was in fact, as Avi Shlami
argued based on others, an instigation fabricated by the king with “strong American backing.”
60

It is instructive to note that President Eisenhower, writing in his memoirs, perceived the
tumultuous events in Jordan to have begun “when King Hussein made a courageous but
unsuccessful attempt to reform his Cabinet. The trouble was apparently instigated by
Communists. Hussein’s next crisis came…when he removed a pro-Soviet Premier and replaced
him, unfortunately perhaps, with an old-fashioned conservative. Our observers believed the
King’s life to be in danger.”
61
Accordingly, Secretary Dulles assured the king of US support “in
the face of very great difficulty.”
62
Eisenhower authorized his spokesman to declare that the

58
Marvin E. Gettleman and Stuart Schaar, The Middle East and Islamic World Reader (New York: Grove
Press, 2003), pp. 247-8.

59
It entails a purported an army regiment mutiny against the monocracy and the king went face the officers
personally.

60
Avi Shlaim, an Israeli Oxford professor, is the foremost expert on the political life of King Hussein. He
enjoyed generous access to the king over the years until shortly before the king’s death in February 1999.

61
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday, 1963), p. 194.
62
Quoted in Aruri, p. 144

171

“independence and integrity of Jordan is vital,”
63
instructed the US Sixth Fleet to move into the
eastern Mediterranean on the day martial law was declared in Amman, and the US Ambassador in
Amman approved a $10 million grant on April 29, 1957 to recognize the “brave steps taken by
His Majesty King Hussein.”
64
The grant marked the shift in the king’s sources of financial
assistance from Britain to the United States, which proceeded to forward support of nearly $60
million annually between 1958 and 1967.
65
Outside the conventional channels of military and
economic assistance, the CIA, through its station chief in Amman, began in 1957 providing King
Hussein with annual cash payments initially “amounting to millions of dollars.” The payments
were reduced to around $750,000 by the time the Washington Post broke the story, President
Carter ordered the CIA diversified subsidy under the codeword project name “No Beef”
terminated.
66

What was of greatest consequence, however, was that the King’s abrupt termination of
the nascent democratic life in 1957 denied the country the chance to develop accountable
democratic institutions and civic life until free elections were finally held in 1989 and the ban on
political parties was lifted in 1992. The limited nature of the 1989-1993 liberalization
underscored the lesson the King drew from the 1957 experiment: that genuine political pluralism
and democracy constituted a mortal threat to the monarchy. Indeed the assertion in 1957 of
royal primacy and the strong linkage between the fate of the palace and “king’s men”
underpinned the “Hashemite restoration,” under the watchful eye of loyalist troops and an
increasingly zealous mukhabarat (security and intelligence service). The stability of the regime

63
Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961, p. 195

64
Quoted in Aruri, p. 145

65
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" ".

66
Washington Post, February 18, 1978 and Bob Woodward, Shadow : Five Presidents and the Legacy of
Watergate (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 44-52.

172

thereafter has rested, as Robert Satloff accurately describes, on the king’s determination that
“neither government nor army was ever permitted to slide into opposition to the regime.
Similarly, not parliament, democracy, or even some abstract and well-meaning notion of
constitutionalism was ever again permitted to conflict with the royal ‘we.’”
67

The Eisenhower Administration: Between Arab Reality and Anti-Communist
Misperception

The nationalist agenda pursed in Jordan by the opposition and the accomplishments made
by the short-lived al-Nabulsi government were “directly traceable to the influx of Palestinians
into the political system in Jordan.”
68
The loss of Palestine, the Abdullah-Yishuv collusion, and
the forced annexation of the West Bank all presented the king with a Palestinian population
resentful of the country’s conservative and rigid political system and opposed to its pro-Western
direction. While invading Egypt as a part of the “Tripartite Aggression” just as al-Nabulsi
formed his government, Israel was keeping a close eye on developments in Jordan. Israel (and
even some Arab states at one point in time or another) had doubted Jordan’s viability as a state
and floated the plan that in case Jordan disintegrated, Hashemite Iraq when at peace with Israel
would get the East Bank along with the Palestinian refugees and Israel would get the West Bank.
Indeed, President Eisenhower, who had recently forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and
Gaza, was concerned enough to warn Israel “to refrain from any attempt to take advantage of the
situation”
69
of April 1957 in Jordan. Guided by anti-communism considerations and
notwithstanding democracy suppression, the Eisenhower administration was committed to
Jordan’s “independence and viability,” including against Israel’s ambitions. It endorsed the
deployment of British troops to protect the king in the aftermath of the bloody overthrow of the

67
Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein : Jordan in Transition, Studies in Middle Eastern History
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 174.

68
Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965), p. 188.

69
Eisenhower, The White House Years, p. 194.

173

other Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, and affirmed its financial support during King Hussein’s visit
to the While House in March 1959.
The Palestinians and their nationalist allies from the East Bank were encouraged by
Egypt’s anti-Western stances and inspired by Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, both of which derived to a
large extent from the conflict with Israel and the Palestinian cause. As explained above, it was in
large part the humiliating 1948 Arab defeat by Israel that brought the Free Officers to power in
Egypt. Indeed, a major justification for the revolution was to cleanse the country of the
widespread corruption, bribery, and “traitors’ plots” against the army, which ultimately caused
the defeat in the Palestine war.
70
The defeat during the watch of the old regimes not only brought
republican regimes to power in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, but also thrust the army into a prominent
role in society, thus inhibiting democratic tendencies and consolidating the authoritarian hold of
the revolutionaries. Moreover, as the leader of the revolutionary camp, Nasser carried the weight
of Palestine as a “sacred mission” and suffered the brunt of Israeli retaliation as demonstrated
through the February 1955 raid on Gaza. Egypt’s response in securing the “Czech” arms deal and
political victory in the Suez crisis inspired Arabs everywhere and in turn provided a lift to Arab
nationalism and the Palestinian cause.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the larger theme that the Arab World, particularly
Jordan and Egypt, was affected by crucial dynamics corresponding to two diametrically opposed
sets of considerations. On the one hand, it was the conflict with Israel—with all its derivatives—
that continued to force itself on the domestic scene of Jordan and Egypt and to account for
Nasser’s regional and international conduct towards the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower
Doctrine. On the other hand, it was the fear of the communist threat and the strategy of
containment that shaped the views and dictated the behavior of the Eisenhower Administration
towards the very same dynamics in the region. The administration was able to imagine only “a

70
Walid Kazziha, "The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics," in The Arab State, ed. Giacomo Luciani
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 302.

174

pro-Soviet” image of Jordan’s democratically elected and nationalist government. Therefore, it
not only endorsed King Hussein’s dismissal of this government, but also it propped up the regime
militarily and inaugurated a perennial financial subsidy to the monarchy.
Similarly, the administration and in particular Secretary of State Dulles could not imagine
Arab nationalism as separate from communism. Nor would they accept Nasser’s opposition to
the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine as evidence of a deeply seated desire to eliminate
western domination and of a rejection of conservative regimes, whom Nasser held responsible for
the Palestine Nakbah (disaster). Nor did the administration compel Israel, France, and Britain to
withdraw from Egypt out of fondness towards Nasser, or for idealistic reasons such as upholding
international law and deterring aggression per se. Instead, having warned British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden before the attack that the Soviets were “playing hard to gain a dominant position in
the Near East area,”
71
Eisenhower forced an end to the war, sought “above all [to] exclude
Communist influence from making any headway therein,” and considered supplying Egypt with
defensive weapons “in return for an agreement that it w[ould] never accept any Soviet offer.”
72

Conclusion
Despite Dulles’ early discovery that the Arabs were “more fearful of Zionism than of the
communists, the examination of the historical record show that the Eisenhower Administration
approached the region with a determination to subordinate the Arab Israel-centered reality to the
American communism-centered understanding of regional politics. While the Soviet-centered
fixation repelled the tripartite attack on Egypt, the disconnect between (mis)perception and reality
prompted the United States to support King Hussein’s termination of the democratic experiment
in Jordan. However, as Eisenhower’s term neared its end, the United States slightly softened its
attitude towards Egypt, particularly after Dulles’ departure from the State Department. With the
arrival of the Kennedy Administration, the Soviet-centered approach of the Eisenhower

71
Eisenhower, The White House Years, p. 54.

72
Ibid., p. 194.

175

Administration towards the region and, by extension, the Arab-Israeli conflict began assuming a
secondary role. The perception of Israel’s strategic value, the cementing American affinity
towards Israel, and the role of the pro-Israel lobby have all led to weakening if not terminating
what could be labeled as “Soviet-centered phase” in US-Arab relations. While successive
administrations continued with the containment strategy until the Cold War’s end in 1989, the
shift whereby the Arab-Israeli conflict came to assume the primary role—over anti-communism
considerations—in US policy towards the Arab countries began under President Kennedy, and it
was completed with the end of the Johnson administration.
In the early 1960’s both the United States and Egypt agreed to assign a low priority to the
Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict, or to place them in the “icebox,”
73
as it was put
by both sides. The deployment of UNEF on the Egyptian-Israeli border in the aftermath of the
Suez war, Egypt’s military inferiority vis-à-vis Israel, inter-Arab rivalries, and Egypt’s stalemate
in the Yemen War all led Nasser’s regime to de-activate the Arab-Israeli file. During the same
period, while tensions in US-Egyptian relations were on the rise, Israel was deeply involved in
the development of its nuclear arsenal thanks to French sponsorship. Initially, Kennedy was
strongly opposed to this development, but under Johnson, US policy evolved to one of virtual
endorsement. As was demonstrated in chapter three, the contours of the US-Israeli strategic
relationship were taking form with the US supplying advanced defensive weapons under
Kennedy and then advancing offensive arms under Johnson; both of these developments further
enhanced Israel’s conventional superiority over all Arab states. Of equal importance, as
explained in chapter four, the United States’ political-cultural affinity towards Israel—thanks to
the Bible, the Holocaust, political norms, and popular culture—had been developing since 1948
over a period in which US-Israel relations moved from “normalcy” to “specialness” in 1967.

73
Memorandum for Record, Washington, January 3, 1964, Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Accessed online from
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xviii/a.html

176

With such an enhanced military and political position and with unfulfilled territorial
ambitions, Israel found a sympathetic audience in President Johnson and a chance to set a new
and more advantageous territorial frame of reference for its conflict with the Arabs. While
President Eisenhower had succeeded in holding the 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice lines in place in
1957, President Johnson, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, had no qualms regarding
Israeli expansion beyond these lines in 1967. With such support, the United States had entered a
decidedly “Israeli-centered” phase in its policy towards the region and Arab authoritarian
regimes. The next chapter will turn to the June 1967 war and its monumental consequences
which led the US to view the region within an Israel prism and ultimately provided the US with
the rationale to support the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan.

177

Chapter Six
The post-1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict:
The Causal Mechanism of Arab Authoritarianism
It has been the contention of this study that the United States’ strategic interests in the
Middle East have played an important role in the resiliency of the authoritarian regimes in Jordan
and Egypt. Throughout much of the 20
th
century the United States has identified three strategic
objectives in the Middle East: anti-communism, securing oil, and security of Israel. With the end
of the Cold War and the inapplicability of the US’s oil objective to the two cases under
examinations, there remains the objective of supporting Israel. The theoretical framework
presented in chapter two posited the Arab-Israeli conflict as the causal mechanism underlying the
hypothesis that given its strong support for Israeli policies, the United States is more likely to
support the two authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan. Chapter three presented, beginning
with the Wilson administration, the historical development, and with the Johnson administration,
the evolution of the US-Israeli relationship into a special one. Chapter four demonstrated the
special nature of the relationship by providing empirical evidence of its political, economic, and
military forms. It also advanced a model by which the US political-cultural affinity towards
Israel constitutes the foundation of the relationship, and the perception of a supposed Israeli
strategic value serves to enhance the material aspect of the support. The role of the pro-Israel
lobby was presented as that of controlling the time and level of emphasis of the “strategic” and
“affinity” variables to ensure continued strong support for Israel and its policies. In other words,
the two chapters traced the historical process to arrive at the (empirically-supported and fully-
operationalized independent variable of the) US objective of support for Israel.
While the historical record demonstrates that Israel was born into friendly relations with
United States and its interests were aligned with a superpower, the same cannot be said of the two
Arab states under examination. Chapter five demonstrated the deep and long historical European

178

antagonism towards the Arab people and the West’s imperial designs against the Arab world.
Britain first colonized Egypt and created Transjordan as a British protectorate. It left two
authoritarian monarchies in place before it passed the baton to the United States. The United
State, for its part, immediately set a course of conflict with the Arab world with the Truman
administration’s support for the UN plan to partition Palestine and for its recognition of Israel.
The Eisenhower administration marginalized Arab aspirations for political pluralism (e.g. support
for King Hussein’s dismissal of democratically-elected government in 1957) and concerns
regarding the conflict with Israel, privileging instead an approach focusing on countering the
Soviets.
The 1967 June War not only led to a US Israel-centered approach but also inextricably
linked US to Israel on the one hand, and to Egypt and Jordan, on the other. The war was, by far,
the most important event in the second half of the twenty century affecting the Arab world. The
colossal defeat of the Arabs had profound and detrimental consequences: it redefined the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and introduced a new frame of reference for attempts at its resolutions. No
serious analysis of US relations with Egypt, Jordan, or Israel since 1967 can avoid this
monumental event and its derivatives. As mentioned earlier, the dissertation thus far has
demonstrated the US-Israeli special relationship and established the US support for Israel as the
independent variable. It conceptualized the externally-supported authoritarianism and sought to
explain it as the dependent variable. This study has also introduced a causal mechanism as the
intervening variable to explain the hypothesized relationship: post-1967 War Arab-Israeli conflict
until 2000.
Neither during the march to war nor since its end has the United States ever been a
disinterested party to the conflict. Given its explanatory power and profound impact on the
region and beyond, the 1967 war is discussed in detail in this chapter. The presentation first
provides detailed explanation of the background and proximate causes of the war. Next, it
examines the role of the Johnson administration in the war and post-war diplomacy. The all

179

important UN Security Council Resolution 242 (exchanging land for peace) is then discussed and
analyzed from the various parties’ perspectives, particularly that of the United States. Special
emphasis is given to how this critical UN resolution introduced a frame of reference to the
territorial dispute of the Arab-Israel conflict. President Carter’s success in implementing the
resolution on the Egyptian-Israeli front will be examined in the context of other administrations’
unwillingness or failure to push for 242’s implementation on other fronts.
In addition, the US role in two post-war developments which contributed significantly to
the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be examined critically. The first, the US ban
against PLO contacts for nearly twenty years at the same time the PLO was moving towards
political settlement, will be analyzed within the discussion of the rise and evolvement of the
Palestinian national movement since 1967. Second is the US disregard of international law in
relation to Israeli settlement building in the occupied territories, which has diminished the
prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state. Finally, ending with the year 2000, the chapter
will demonstrate how President Clinton’s peace efforts, thanks to the firmly Israel-centered
approached, produced little progress and failed to broker peace agreements between Israel and
each of Syria and the PLO.
The overriding objective of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate that the United States’
strong support for Israeli positions and polices has been central to the non-resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. As will be argued in the next chapter, such an impasse and such support do not
come without cost but with consequences, leading to continued US support for the authoritarian
regimes in Egypt and Jordan.
The Background Causes of the 1967 War
After abandoning the plan to divert water from the Jordan River under pressure from the
Eisenhower Administration in 1953, in 1959 Israel began the National Water Carrier project to
convey water from Lake Tiberias to the Negev. The project was to be completed in June 1964.
Concerns over the resulting immanent reduction of water available to Jordan and Syria served as

180

the catalyst for the First Arab Summit Conference in Cairo on January 13, 1964 in order to
articulate a unified Arab response.
1
Against the backdrop of intense inter-Arab rivalry and in the
spirit of Arab rapprochement particularly among Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the summit
reached three important decisions which were further detailed and confirmed during the Second
Arab Summit Conference in Alexandria in September 1964. First, it was decided to create a
unified Arab command, although a military response against Israel was to be postponed since the
Arab states were not prepared for war. Second, the two summits approved an Arab water
diversion plan of their own for the Jordan River in Syrian and Lebanese territory. In the context
of a tense Syrian-Israeli border since 1949, Syrian work on a diversion project and general
tensions between the two countries led to increased Israeli provocations and attacks against Syria
throughout 1965 and 1966 and culminated in a short military confrontation, after Syrian shooting
at an Israeli tractor caused a tank and air engagement leading to the downing by Israel of six
Syrian MiGs on April 7, 1967.
While the pervasive narrative in Israel and (the United States) has been that Israel was
involved in defensive counterattacks against Arab aggression and terrorist infiltrations, Israeli
revisionist historiography reveals that it was Israeli provocation and massive retaliation which
were responsible for the tense relations and state of war with the Arabs. In confirmation of this
revisionist thesis, Israel’s hawkish defense minister during the June War, Moshe Dayan,
described how this policy worked against Syria in a 1976 interview that was published long after
his death. In it, Dayan acknowledged “[i]n my opinion, more than 80 percent [of the time], but
let’s talk about 80 percent. It was this way: We would send a tractor to plow someplace where it
wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians
would start to shoot. If they did not shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in
the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the

1
Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3d ed., A Galaxy
Book, Gb 358 (London, New York,: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 23.

181

air force also, and that’s how it was.”
2
Given Israel’s punitive attacks, Arab leaders at the Third
Arab Summit, in Casablanca in September 1965, asked Syria to halt the project, and Nasser
warned against continuing it before the Arabs’ military capabilities were enhanced. While
initially reluctant, Syria halted work on the project after Israel bombed the construction site and
downed a Syrian MiG-21 in July 1966. With that and the Johnson Administration’s limited
response of being opposed to “the use of force on the water issue,” Israel won the water war.
3

The third decision of the Arab summits was the creation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) under the auspices of the Arab states. In the context of the Arab cold war,
the Arab states, particularly Nasser’s Egypt, were coming under increasing criticism from the
Syrian Ba’ath regime and the nascent Palestinian revolutionary movement for marginalizing the
Palestinian issue. The Arab League, despite Jordan’s misgivings
4
, finally created the PLO to
deflect criticism, to channel the growing frustration and disillusionment of Palestinians—over the
lack of Arab unity or program to liberate Palestine—into an Arab state-controlled organization,
and to prevent infiltrations and attacks against Israel that might draw the Arab states, particularly
Egypt and Jordan, into confrontation with Israel. The first Palestine National Council (the PLO’s
parliament) was convened in Jerusalem in May 1964 and its decisions were endorsed by the Arab
League at the September 1965 summit. The first PNC created a 15-member Executive
Committee, elected Nasser’s man, the aging Ahmad Al-Shuqayri as its chairman, endorsed the

2
Quoted in Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton,
2000), p. 235.

3
Benny Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, 1st Vintage Books
ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), p. 304.

4
The source of King Hussein’s initial rejection of the creation of the PLO and his long history of
ambivalence towards the organization stemmed from the king’s accurate perception of the threat the PLO
and Palestinians posed against Jordanian rule over the West Bank (1948-1967). Many Palestinians, for
their part, have always viewed the Hashemite monarchy with suspension and mistrust given its collusion
with the Zionist leadership and its role in the prevention of the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1948.
It was against this backdrop that the fida’iyeen saw the king’s prevention of their infiltration to fight Israel
as another chapter of Jordanian-Israeli collusion. The Jordanian regime and the PLO came to a head clash
during the September 1970 Civil War, forcing the Palestinian national movement out of Jordan and
creating Palestinian-Trasjordanian (or West Bank-East Bank) strife that has yet fully to heal.

182

Palestine National Charter which called for the liberation of Palestine and denied Israel’s right to
exist, and formed the Palestine Liberation Army, to be placed under Unified Arab Command and
alongside Arab armies, thus creating a “Palestinian entity.”
5

However, the Fateh movement, which was founded by Yasser Arafat (and other
cofounders) in 1957, along with other smaller organizations, viewed the PLO with suspicion,
sought to assert self-reliance and independence from Arab regimes, and viewed armed struggle as
the only path for the liberation of Palestine.
6
As a result, through its military wing al-‘Asifa (the
Storm), Fateh inaugurated its guerrilla warfare against Israel with a failed attack on Israel’s
National Water Carrier on January 1, 1965.
7
Against vehement Egyptian and Jordanian objections
and tight border control for fear of Israeli retribution, Fateh carried out dozens of attacks in 1956-
1966 mostly through infiltrations from Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. Syria, on the other hand, due
to ideology and inter-Arab rivalry, generally supported and encouraged these attacks while
ensuring they take place, not from Syrian but from Lebanese and Jordanian territory. While
pointing the finger at Syria for an attack that killed three Israelis, Israel launched a devastating
raid on the West Bank village of Al-Sammu’ on November 13, 1966, killing 15 Jordanian
soldiers and 6 villagers, wounding 37 people, dynamiting at least 118 houses, and destroying a
mosque, a police station and a clinic.
8

The raid shocked King Hussein and caused widespread demonstrations across the West
Bank among Palestinians, who not only accused the Jordanian regime of leaving them defenseless
but also, under the leadership of both Fateh and the PLO, demanded military training and arming

5
Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 98.

6
Philip Mattar, Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, Facts on File Library of World History (New York: Facts
on File, 2000), pp. 128-9.

7
Ibid., 129

8
Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, p.
38.and Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace
Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 130.

183

of the population.
9
The King’s imposition of curfews, imprisoning of activists and fida’iyeen,
closing the PLO offices in Jerusalem, and withdrawal of recognition from Shuqayri’s PLO all had
the opposite effect from the intended goal, increasing guerrilla membership and attacks against
Israel and intensifying the Syrian, Egyptian, and PLO propaganda attacks against Jordan.
Jordan’s response was a propaganda war of its own, accusing Nasser of hiding behind the United
Nations Emergency Force, UNEF—stationed in Sinai since 1957—instead of coming to the
rescue of Jordan against Israel’s punitive attacks. These attacks, the inter-Arab rivalry, and the
beginning of the reemergence of the Palestinian national movement not only exposed Jordan’s
weakness in the face of powerful and increasingly empowered adversaries. More important, they
also began to unravel Jordan’s policies of collusion with Zionism-Israel, and its prevention of the
establishment of a Palestinian state, thus pushing the region close toward war.
However, it was “the sputtering Syrian-Israel border”
10
and “Israel’s strategy of
escalation on the Syrian front”
11
that led to the June 1967 War. With the exception of infiltration
and individual attacks committed by Palestinian irregulars, Israel’s borders with Jordan and Egypt
were much quieter than its border with Syria, which had witnessed armed confrontations over the
demilitarized zone, the water issue, and Syria’s support of Palestinian fida’iyyin operations.
These developments caused an internal struggle within the Ba’ath regime that had come to power
in March 1963. They further radicalized Syrian politics and ultimately produced a coup by the
Ba’ath’s radical wing under the de facto head of government General Salah Jadid in February
1966.
12
The new regime supported the Palestine cause and called for a “popular liberation war”
against imperialism, Zionism, and reactionary forces (i.e. Jordan and Saudi Arabia), thus causing

9
Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p.
131.

10
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 304.

11
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 235.

12
Muhammad Muslih, Syria, in Mattar, Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, p. 338.

184

further deterioration in Syria’s relations with Jordan and renewed rapprochement of the former
with Egypt. In the wake of the Israeli attack on Syria on July 14
th
, to avoid a bidding war with
Syria over enmity towards Israel, and to place any Syrian military engagement with Israel under
Egyptian control, Nasser signed a mutual defense treaty with Damascus on November 7, 1966.
However, Israel’s downing of six Syrian MiG-21s and bombing of 17 positions
13
on April 7
th

failed to move Egypt—still mired in the Yemen quagmire and under economic duress—to Syria’s
rescue. Egypt’s inaction exposed Nasser to renewed taunting from Jordan and Saudi Arabia that
he was hiding behind UNEF rather than confronting Israel and that Egypt was shirking its
military responsibilities towards the Arab World. Egypt’s lack of preparedness for war with
Israel was underscored, as Malcolm Kerr accurately analyzed, by Nasser’s placement of “so
many conditions” on Egyptian participation (i.e., Arab unity, spread of socialism, Arab military
strength, and isolating Israel from the US) “that doubts began to rise that he ever intended to
liberate Palestine at all.”
14
However, for Nasser—in spite of Israel’s overwhelming military
advantage—“almost worse than military defeat would be the shame of doing nothing to help
Syria or Jordan.”
15

The Proximate Causes of the 1967 War
It was within this general regional climate and against the backdrop of the Johnson
Administration’s hostility towards Nasser and strong support, including recent provision of
offensive weapons, for Israel that the countdown to war began in the second week of May. On
May 11 and 12 high level Israeli officials made threatening statements against the Syrian regime
which triggered a series of actions and reactions thus leading to war. For example, Israeli Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol announced in a speech on May 11 that in light of increasing border

13
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 304.

14
Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, p. 126.

15
Ibid., p. 98.

185

incidents, “Israel will have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7.”
16
In a more
crucial and blunt threat, the United Press International reported on May 12 that a “high Israeli
source said Israel would take limited military action designed to topple the Damascus army
regime if Syrian terrorists continued sabotage raids inside Israel.”
17
[Emphasis added] While there
is still disagreement whether the “source” was Israel’s Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin or Israel’s
director of military intelligence General Aharon Yariv, the threat caused a state of panic in Syria
and brought Egypt, given the mutual defense treaty, to the forefront of the escalating conflict. On
such statements and pronouncements, Israel’s foreign minister at the time, Abba Eban was later to
comment that “if there had been a little more silence, the sum of human wisdom would probably
have remained intact.”
18

The next day, for reasons that are yet to be authoritatively verified, the Soviet Union
delivered to Egypt what turned out to be an erroneous warning that Israel was concentrating 11-
13 brigades on its border with Syria. However, given Israel’s doctrine of massive retaliation and
conduct on the Syrian front thus far, neither Tel Aviv’s provocative threats nor the Soviet Union’s
warning seemed out of character to Egypt and Syria. Moreover, as Richard Parker noted,
everyone “in Israel seem[ed] to have reached [the] conclusion…that a strike against Syria was
imminent. The question was not whether was Israel was going to strike, but when and how.”
19

With 50,000 of Egypt’s best trained troops still bogged down in Yemen at a high cost to the
economy and neither intending nor planning to go to war, Nasser was nonetheless compelled to
come to Syria’s aid in the event of an Israeli attack in order to save face and demonstrate he was
not “hiding behind the skirts of the UNEF.” Additionally, to dissuade Israel from attacking Syria

16
L. Carl Brown, "Origins of the Crisis," in The Six-Day War : A Retrospective, ed. Richard Bordeaux
Parker (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996).

17
Quoted in Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 304.

18
Quoted in Richard Bordeaux Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Indiana Series in
Arab and Islamic Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 16.

19
Ibid.

186

and to relive pressure on the Syrian front, Egypt began moving some troops into the Sinai and on
May 16 requested that the United Nations to remove its UNEF troops from only the Egyptian-
Israeli land borders. However, UN Secretary General U Thant, in a surprise and a controversial
move, presented Egypt with the choice of either leaving in place or withdrawing the entire UN
force, including troops from the Gaza Strip and along the coast of Gulf of Aqaba. Israel had
refused that week U Thant’s request to move the UN force to the Israeli side of the border, and
Yitzhak Rabin had noted in his memoirs that Nasser’s choice of full withdrawal was to save face
and not to go to war. Still, Israel had been deploying troops since at least May 14, and three days
later began reserve call-ups and full mobilization, and placed “all land, sea, and air units on top
alert.”
20

However, Israel’s military establishment under Chief of Staff Rabin and the hawks inside
and outside the government knew they needed casus belli (e.g. blockading of the Strait of Tiran)
to obtain the approval of the country’s political leadership and to remove any possible US
objections to launching a full-scale war . Nasser was not to disappoint. The UNEF withdrawal
allowed the return of Egyptian forces to Sharm al-Sheikh and, to blunt Arab criticism, prompted
Nasser to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships and strategic cargo on May 22. Egypt’s
position was that the demand of UN withdrawal and closure constituted an exercise of
sovereignty and a restoration of the pre-1956 status quo.
Nasser calculated that, although perceived as escalation, the closure would pull “the last
curtain on the Israeli aggression of 1956,”
21
mark a political victory without war, and increase
Arab morale, all of which materialized but lasted for a mere two weeks. During this brief period
on May 30 King Hussein made a sudden visit to Cairo, signed a joint defense treaty—similar to
that between Egypt and Syria—with Nasser, placing Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian

20
Yitzhak Rabin Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), p. 70.

21
As described by Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad in a memorandum of meeting with UN
Secretary General U Thant in the aftermath of Egypt’s announcement to close the Strait of Tiran.

187

command, and agreeing to allow Syrian, Iraqi, and Saudi troops to enter Jordan in event of war.
While the treaty ended the Cairo-Amman propaganda war and personal insults over the airwaves,
it was too soon to heal the Damascus-Amman rift, the latest episode of which had taken place on
May 21 when Syrian agents detonated a truck bomb at a border town killing 21 Jordanians.
22
The
Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian trilateral defense pact, reached within the vivid Arab Cold war
context, was not a sign of gathering Arab strength, but a façade for Arab disunity, mistrust, and
military weakness. The Egyptian-Iraqi joint defense treaty of June 4 only added to the charade.
As Nasser led the Arab camp in the propaganda war and declaration of lofty goals, Israel was
about to not only call Nasser’s bluff but also point to pre-war rhetoric proof of imminent Arab
aggression.
Ultimately, Nasser miscalculated in thinking Egypt was operating just below the brink,
and that the UN and superpowers would intervene to prevent further escalation. While the Soviet
Union strongly warned Egypt against military confrontation and received, along with the United
States and some European nations, Nasser’s unequivocal assurance that Egypt—contrary to the
advice of the military—would not fire the first shot, the United States’ role vis-à-vis Israel was
ultimately much more supportive. Despite the Eisenhower administration’s willingness to
declare the Gulf of Aqaba an open international waterway and its endorsement of Israel’s right to
use force to keep the strait open,
23
Secretary of State Dulles had acknowledged, after the end of
the Suez crisis in summer of 1957, that Egypt’s claims that the Straits of Tiran were Egyptian had
“a certain amount of plausibility from the standpoint of international law.”
24
Egypt attempted to
push the legal argument by proposing a two-week moratorium on any Egyptian action regarding

22
Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p.
132.

23
Dwight Eisenhower Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday,
1963), p. 190.

24
Quoted in Hisham Sharabi, Prelude to War: The Crisis of May-June 1967 in Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod,
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Evanston, : Northwestern University
Press, 1970).

188

the Straits if Israel agreed to the same as well as to referring the matter to the International Court
of Justice. Unfortunately, Israel rejected both. It is instructive that the US neither objected to the
complete withdrawal of the UNEF nor, for three days, warned Nasser of the consequences of the
Strait closure. Such a warning, as William Quandt argued, might have influenced Nasser’s next
move.
25

The Johnson Administration’s Role in the War
More important, while mindful of the US commitment under Eisenhower, President
Johnson was more mindful of the Vietnam quagmire and the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution and
thus unwilling to embark on unilateral military action —even on behalf of Israel—without
congressional approval. Instead, the State Department under Dean Rusk was ready to pursue a
British proposal to build an international consensus—with as many countries as possible—in
support of a freedom of navigation declaration, to debate the matter at the UN, and then to form a
multinational naval escort—the Red Sea Regatta—to pass through the Straits. Meanwhile the
Israeli cabinet dispatched Foreign Minister Abba Eban to France, England, and the US to consult
and gather support for Israel’s position on the blockade. President Charles de Gaulle and Prime
Minister Harold Wilson urged restraint and advised that the blockade did not warrant going to
war.
However, by the time he arrived in Washington on May 25, 1967 Eban received a cable
from Israel’s Prime Minister Eshkol with new instructions. Israel’s generals were pushing Eshkol
to go to war sooner rather than later, based on a claim of a “decisive change in the disposition of
the Egyptian forces.” Succumbing to their mounting pressure, Eshkol’s message, according to
Rabin, was that “Eban was therefore expressly ordered not to present the blockade of the straits as

25
William B. Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Rev.
ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 27. President Johnson had sent a letter to Nasser
urging him to stress the “avoidance of hostilities and to propose a visit to the Egypt by Vise President
Hubert Humphrey if “we come through these days without hostilities.” The letter was dated May 22 but
was not delivered to Nasser until after he took the decision to close the Strait of Tiran. Text of letter is in
Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, Document 3, p. 225.

189

the main issue in his talk with President Johnson. Instead, he must stress that the Arab world was
preparing for a war of annihilation against us.”
26
Upon informing Secretary Rusk of Israel’s
alarming assessment, Eban was informed that the US “intelligence community had analyzed each
of [the Israeli] charges and concluded that an attack was not pending,”
27
and that, to be sure,
Egypt would be warned directly and through Moscow against the use of force. During the all
important meeting with Eban the following day, Johnson stressed Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara’s (who was present) conclusion that according to three separate intelligence reports
there was no imminent Egyptian attack and the assessment there was unanimity that if Egypt
were to attack, “you will whip the hell out of them.”
28
While pointing out that he lacked the
authority to equate an attack on Israel with an attack on the US as Eban was instructed to request,
Johnson emphasized that the US was committed to free passage through the strait but would act
through the UN first and, with congressional approval, would push for the international naval
force. In his attempt to dissuade Israel from attacking first, Johnson delivered the critical, and
much analyzed phrase—Rusk’s coinage—that “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go
alone.”
29
After Eban left the meeting, Johnson declared to his advisors that “I have failed, they
will go.” Eban, for his part, was later to refer to the cable as “an act of momentous
irresponsibility” for instead of “conveying Israel’s real situation I was being called to present a
demand that had no justification and that would invite rejection.”
30

Although Eban’s report was not viewed with confidence by the military, Eshkol acceded
to Johnson’s request for restraint, which was followed by a letter from Rusk warning that Israel’s

26
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 85.

27
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 32.

28
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point; Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York,: Holt,
1971), p. 293.

29
Ibid.

30
Quoted in Ronald Popp, "Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War," Middle East Journal 60, no. 2
(2006): p. 293.

190

unilateral action would be “irresponsible and catastrophic.” He then secured a cabinet decision to
postpone action for two or three weeks, and sent the director of Mossad (Israel’s intelligence
service) Meir Amit on a secret mission to the US to further probe American positions and
reactions to Israel’s war plans. By the time Amit arrived in Washington, a major shift had
occurred in Johnson’s position from pursuing a diplomatic solution to that of “unleashing” the
Israelis. While it was Rusk’s and McNamara’s view that prevailed in Johnson’s message to
Eban, it was the views of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas—Johnson’s longtime friend and
informal advisor—that carried the day. A staunch supporter of Israel, Fortas had frequent
contacts with Johnson and delivered messages to Israel’s Ambassador to Washington Harman and
the influential minister (at the Israel’s embassy) Ephraim Evron throughout this critical period.
Since the beginning of the crisis, in his role of “informal intermediary,”
31
Fortas’ position had
been that preventing Israel from striking first entailed a US commitment, including the use of
force, to break the blockade on behalf of Israel; otherwise, the US should not object to Israel’s
unilateral actions. It is important to point out that although it was supported by Johnson, the
multinational naval plan met with a lukewarm response from the international community and
outright opposition from the Defense Department on military grounds.
At this time the light in Washington, as William Quandt has argued, was changing from
Rusk’s “red light” into Fortas’ “yellow light.”
32
Another scholar has stressed that Johnson had
dual thinking: on the one hand a cautious approach, and on the other favoring Israeli military
action, which merged more clearly and carried the day.
33
Repeated intelligence reports indicated
that Israel would swiftly (within 5-7 days) defeat its enemies by itself, and military assessments
confirmed that the US military would not be needed to assist Israel. As a result, President

31
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 404 fn. 45.

32
Ibid., p. 34.

33
George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press,
1990), p. 108.

191

Johnson dropped his objections to Israel’s initiation of a war. As a result, after meeting with
McNamara and CIA Director Richard Helms, the Mossad chief was able to report to Prime
Minister Eshkol on June 1 that no one in Washington would be upset if Israel attacked and won
decisively.
34
Fortas, reflecting Johnson’s thinking, expressed gratitude for the Israel’s “restraint”
and declared the end of American diplomacy in communicating to Evron that “Eshkol and Eban
did great service to Israel by giving the U.S. a chance to explore options other than Israeli force.
If they had not done so, it would have been difficult to secure the President’s sympathy.”
35

Additionally Israeli officials were told by Johnson’s formal and informal advisors that the
maritime escort idea, to the extent it was taken seriously by anyone other than Rusk and his
deputy, was not going to be pursued, thus freeing Israel to act unilaterally and freely.
36
Foreign
Minister Eban concluded that all these explicit pronouncements constituted “as near as [sic] a
green light a president could safely give” and communicated to the Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin
that there was no longer “any diplomatic necessity for further military restraint.”
37

While Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister might not have minded US
intervention to break the blockage in the straits, neither the political leadership nor, most
certainly, the military establishment in Israel counted on direct US military intervention.
Notwithstanding Israel’s “partnership” with France and Britain in the 1956 War , one of Israel’s
military doctrines has been the full reliance on its own military—Israeli Defense Force, (IDF)—to
fight its wars. This policy not only had earned Israel the admiration of US administrations and
public opinion over the years, but had also coincided with the US’s overriding objective of
avoiding other military entanglements during the Vietnam War. Indeed, Amit, the director of

34
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 38.

35
Quoted in Ibid., pp. 38-9.

36
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 95. Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict since 1967, p. 35 and p. 406 fn. 57. .

37
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 39.
See also Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 241.

192

Mossad, had repeatedly stressed to American officials that Israel needed nothing from the United
States except “to check any Soviet intervention, provide political support in the UN, and expedite
arms deliveries.”
38
Despite the public US declaration of an arms embargo, declassified
documents would later show that the United Sates continued supplying Israel with arms until the
eve of the war.
39
Although the Soviets shared the American objective of avoiding superpower
confrontation throughout the crisis, Johnson demonstrated his resolve to prevent any Soviet
military involvement on behalf of the Arabs during the war. In response to the Soviet threat after
Israel violated the cease-fire and attacked Syria on the fifth day of the war, Johnson ordered the
Sixth Fleet to hasten its return to the eastern Mediterranean.
Perhaps no other Israeli need surpassed that of ensuring that there would be no repeat of
Eisenhower’s 1957 demand of a full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. As the generals under Rabin
spoiled for war, Eshkol urged restraint, reasoning that “we still need Johnson’s help and support
…in order to protect our gains.”
40
The IDF’s request for US military commitment which it neither
needed nor expected to be granted was, it is reasonable to conclude, only the opening position in
a calculated strategy. Seen as such, Israel’s acceptance of lesser—but sufficient—commitments
(i.e. arms, support at the UN, and checking the Soviets) would constitute a welcome
“compromise” by the administration, which, as a result, experienced a sense of relief and
exhibited an eagerness to offer support. After the meeting (on Friday) in which he rejected
Eban’s request to view any attack on Israel as an attack on the US, it was reported that Johnson
wondered aloud if he might not regret on Monday “not having given Eban more today.”
41

Johnson’s sense of guilt (for not promising direct US involvement) only strengthened his

38
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1st Presidio
Press ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 146.

39
Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 110.

40
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 97.

41
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 34.

193

predisposition to meet Israel’s war needs. As a result, the IDF succeed in obtaining the support it
needed according to its own timeframe and according to its game strategy vis-à-vis President
Johnson.
The Six-Day War
Still, because of the “restraint” not to attack, the Israeli military leadership questioned the
credibility and resolve of the Eshkol cabinet as the country inched towards war. As a result, on
June 1 Eshkol was forced to relinquish his role as defense minister (which he had held
simultaneously with the premiership) to the hawk and 1956 Suez War hero Moshe Dayan, and to
appoint two ministers without portfolio from Menachem Begin’s right wing Gahal party in the
newly formed national unity government. While the military was going over the war plans “time
and time again,” the end of the restraint period ended what Rabin described as the “illusionary
hopes” of political leaders “that war might be averted.”
42
Rabin and the military leadership had
argued—since full mobilization had taken place between May 17 and 19, before Israel had its
casus belli—that “[w]hether or not the Egyptians were bent on leading the situation to war at
present, we were inevitably moving in that direction.”
43
As Nasser continued to send firm and
credible (by American admission) assurances to the US of having no intention to attack Israel,
Egypt informed the State Department on June 3 that Egyptian Vice President Zakariya Muhieddin
would come to Washington on June 7 to discuss ways to defuse the blockade issue,
44
in an
attempt to withdraw from the brink.
45
Fearful of a last minute political effort to difuse the crisis
and mindful of the military clock, Israel viewed the move as unacceptable. Its war cabinet

42
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 93.

43
Ibid., p. 71.

44
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. (Boston, Mass.: Bedford/St. Martins,
2004), p. 276.

45
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir; a Study in Political Dynamics, 1st. ed. ed. (Albany,: State
University of New York Press, 1971), p. 243.

194

recommended on June 3 a decision to go to war, and its full cabinet voted on June 4 to go to war
the next day.
On the morning of June 5, Israel launched two waves of devastating air strikes against
Egypt, destroying all of the country’s forward air bases, runways, and virtually the entire
Egyptian air force on the ground. Although it warned Jordan that morning to stay out of the war,
Israel knew King Hussein had limited options. Lacking knowledge of the extent of the unfolding
calamity in Egypt and with his armed forces under Egypt’s command, Hussein was faced with a
choice of either entering the war or risking a civil war and the loss of his throne.
46
In response,
Hussein entered the war and within two hours Israel destroyed Jordan’s modest air force, more
than half that of Syria, as well as an Iraqi air base. By early afternoon, Israel had destroyed more
than 400 Arab warplanes, its air force had complete control over the region’s skies, and its ground
operations had proceeded with unchallenged air cover and inconsistent ground resistance.
Dumbfounded by the day’s devastation, Nasser first sought to convince Hussein of the
fabrication—made by his deputy commander in chief—that the United States had directly
participated in the attacks on Egypt. Nasser’s public accusation of “American aggression,”
caused a fury and increased Nasser’s popularity—at least initially—in the Arab world, similar to
the reaction to the 1956 “tripartite aggression.” His claims prompted seven Arab countries to
break diplomatic relations with the US and infuriated the Johnson administration.
The next day, Israel continued its push in Sinai and solidified its position in the West
Bank, surrounding the Old City of Jerusalem. To avoid the complete obliteration of their forces,
Jordan and Egypt ordered their armies to retreat on the night of June 6-7, causing complete
disorientation and demoralization. A UN resolution for a cease-fire in place, as Washington
insisted, as opposed to a cease-fire with withdrawal, as Moscow demanded, was passed, but was
rejected by Egypt and ignored by Israel. This prompted Defense Minster Dayan to seize “the

46
See Hussein’s remarks in Benny Morris, Making Israel (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2007), p. 242.

195

historic opportunity” to conquer the Old City—with the Wailing Wall—and take the rest of Arab
East Jerusalem as well as the Gaza Strip. By the time a second cease-fire was to take effect and
before it was accepted by Jordan late on June 7 and by Egypt on June 8, Dayan decided, with the
Arab armies in full retreat, to push forward. As a result the entire West Bank and Sinai, up to the
eastern bank of the Suez Canal, fell under Israeli control. On June 8, Israel staged an attack on
the US intelligence ship U.S.S Liberty, which was in international waters off Sinai, killing 34
sailors, injuring 171, and causing extensive damage. Relieved that it had not been a Soviet attack,
the US government officially accepted the Israeli version that the attack had been an accident
caused by the misidentification of the ship as Egyptian. Israel apologized and paid $13 million in
compensation. However, survivors of the attack and many intelligence and other US officials
(such as CIA Director Helms and Secretary of State Rusk) believed it was deliberate, perhaps to
prevent the US from gathering intelligence on Israel’s war moves.
47

As for Syria, there was the sense in Israel, particularly among expansionist-minded
residents of Israel’s northern settlements, that Syria was about to emerge without any punishment
(in territorial acquisition and ground attack), since there had been no action beyond the first day
of light shelling. With the defeat and acceptance of the cease-fire by Jordan and Egypt, on June
8 Israel’s security cabinet had decided against attacking Syria, which had also accepted the
second cease-fire. As a result Rabin viewed “the war []as effectively over,”
48
or so he thought.
However, on the morning of June 9, in direct opposition to the government’s directive and
sidestepping the chief of staff, Defense Minister Dayan ordered the northern commander—who
had been extremely frustrated by the inaction on that front—to launch an immediate attack
against Syria. Dayan, whose modus operandi had been the “exploitation of opportunity,” was
responding to an intercepted message from Nasser admitting defeat to the Syrian president,

47
Tom Segev, 1967 : Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East, 1st U.S. ed. (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), p. 386.

48
Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, p. 115.

196

conveying his belief that Israel would turn its military attacks to Syria, and urging him to accept a
cease-fire to preserve the Syrian army. The colossal collapse of the political leadership of the two
Arab countries, Dayan argued to the bewildered Eshkol, needed to “be exploited to the full” by
attacking Syria.
49

As Soviet Premier Kosygin sent a hot-line message (his last of some 20 messages related
to the conflict) to President Johnson threatening of Soviet military intervention if Israel continued
the attacks, Israel had already occupied the entire Golan Heights, accepted the cease-fire, and the
June War had come to an end. As for casualties, the war left Egypt with 10,000-15,000 dead,
Israel with 779, Jordan with 762, and Syria with around 500.
50
During and immediately after the
war between 200,000 and 300,000 Palestinians “fled or were driven from the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip” to the East Bank, many of whom were second time refugees. Another 70-80,000
Syrians from the Golan Heights were driven farther into Syria, “probably with Dayan’s
approval.”
51
The one million Palestinians who remained in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
came under Israeli occupation.
Post-War Diplomacy and UN Security Council Resolution 242
The swiftness and extent of the Israeli victory exceeded all expectations, including those
of Israel itself. Within less than a week, Israel had delivered a crushing defeat to three Arab
armies and occupied territories—the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank and Arab East Jerusalem—three times its size according to the 1949 armistice lines. As the
war came to an end, post-war diplomacy centered around the Israeli-US understanding that there
would be no calls for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal as in 1956. As the US senate majority
leader (1955-1960), Johnson had opposed Eisenhower’s demand for such a withdrawal, and there

49
Text of message from Dayan to Eshkol after the launch of attack on Syria in Shlaim, The Iron Wall :
Israel and the Arab World, p. 248.

50
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 304., Abu Odeh,
Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, p. 36.
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, p. 327.

197

was nothing in his subsequent record to suggest he would change his position in the aftermath of
a war where, he believed, Israel had the moral and legal upper hand.
52
In a major address on June
19, 1967 on the recent conflict, Johnson adopted the Israeli position in calling Nasser’s decision
to close the Straits of Tiran the “single act of folly [which] was more responsible for this
explosion than any other.” He further asserted that Arab and Soviet calls for a return to the pre-
June 4 status quo represented “not a prescription for peace, but for renewed conflict.” He
conditioned any Israeli withdrawal on five “fundamental” principles
53
: “recognized rights of
national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage,
limitation of the arms race, and respect of for political independence and territorial integrity.”
54

In response to a developing international consensus, and with no sense of urgency in
deference to Israel and its supporters, the Johnson administration sought to secure a UN
resolution with the president’s five principles, but delegated the effort with “a great deal of
latitude” to US Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg, who was a close friend of Johnson’s and
a staunch supporter of Israel
55
Backed by the US, Israel offered withdrawal only after a
comprehensive peace treaty through direct negations was reached, while the Arabs, with Soviet
support, demanded full withdrawal before the end of belligerency—a position enforced by the
three “Nos” (no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations) adopted at the Arab Summit in
Khartoum, Sudan in August 1967. It is worth taking a short detour to briefly elaborate on the
summit declarations since they have been cited by Israel’s supporters as evidence of Arab

52
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 45.

53
The principles were drafted with help of Jonson’s friends and staunch Israeli supporters Arthur and
Mathilde Krim and Abraham Feinberg, who reported to the president that “Jewish leaders all over the
country…are high in their appreciation,” see Donald Neff, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
November/December 1996, page 96

54
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Public Papers of the Presidents (PPP) of the United States, June 19, 1967, p.
633. Accessed online through the University of Michigan Digital Library (UMDL).

55
Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman
to Reagan, Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 128, 55-6.

198

intransigence. In addition to the three “Nos,” the Arab summit also vowed not to relinquish the
rights of the Palestinian people and promised financial aid to Jordan and Egypt.
Despite the uncompromising language of the Khartoum conference towards Israel —
which was to placate the “radical” camp, especially the PLO and Syria—with the support of the
“moderate” camp Jordan and Egypt declared their preference for a political solution: peace with
Israel in exchange for full withdrawal. Humbled by the defeat, Nasser, in particular, was
instrumental in striking a moderate tone vis-à-vis the West during the summit. He opposed
proposals by hardliners for Arab oil countries to declare oil boycott and suspend diplomatic ties
with the US, and requested from Saudi King Feisal to mediate with the Johnson administration.
56

The Khartoum summit produced an Egyptian-Saudi agreement to end the Yemen conflict,
brought the Arab Cold war to an end, and shifted Arab focus from inter-Arab rivalries back to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Johnson ignored Nasser’s overtures thanks to repeated urgings by Israel’s
supporters to “distance America from the Arab world.”
57

To return to the UN, after several drafts and extended debate a compromise draft
authored by the British ambassador to the UN was finally adopted unanimously as UN
Resolution 242 by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967. It incorporated Johnson’s
five principles and established what has come to be referred to as the “land for peace” principle.
The resolution called for “[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict” and “[t]termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force.” The deliberate ambiguity in the omission of the definite article “the” (or
the word “all”) before “territories,” in the English language version of the resolution, addressed

56
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East : Regional and International Politics, 1955-
1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 232-36.

57
Donald Neff, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December 1996, page 96

199

the demands of Israel and the United States and inaugurated an era of conflicting interpretations
that has yet to end as of this writing. While Israel argued secure boundaries required keeping
significant portions of the territories occupied, the United States quickly established the position
that border modifications should be kept to a minimum and, according to Dean Rusk, rejected
“any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war.”
58
The Arabs, on the
other hand, insisted on full withdrawal, given that the resolution’s preamble emphasized the
fundamental principle of international law of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by
war,” and that the equally binding French language version of the resolution specified des
territories occupées (the territories occupied) in the withdrawal clause. In securing Jordan’s
acceptance of the resolution, Ambassador Goldberg gave King Hussein assurance on behalf of the
United States that it would secure an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank within six months.
59

Although the resolution met Israel’s demand of linking (less than full) withdrawal to peace
agreements, Egypt accepted the resolution, while Israel delayed its acceptance until May 1968
and its formal endorsement until August 1970. The linkage led Syria to reject the resolution out
of hand.
UN 242: New Territorial Frame of Reference and No Implementation
What is of fundamental significance about the UN Security Council Resolution 242 is
that it shifted the territorial frame of reference of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To be sure, many in
the Arab world had decried the existence of Israel and called for the destruction of the “Zionist
entity.” However, as the Arabs mourned the loss of Palestine and continued to cope with the
resulting refugee problem across the region, the Arab states had been increasingly coming to the
realization that Israel was a reality, destroying it was not possible , and that—despite lingering
resentment and vehement objections—some sort of accommodation with Israel might be

58
Quoted in Quandt, Peace Proces : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 410
fn. 89.

59
Yehuda Lukacs, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process, 1st ed., Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict
Resolution (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 99.

200

inevitable. Israel came into existence in 1948 within armistice lines in the aftermath of cease-
fires, not with recognized international borders. It was the UN General Assembly Resolution of
November 1947 that had sanctioned the partition of Palestine, created Israel and, in time,
provided the Arabs with a legally and internationally-sanctioned territorial frame of reference. In
other words, although the Arabs initially rejected the UN partition plan and King Abdullah‘s
annexation of the rest of Palestine undermined the Arab case for a Palestinian state, the Arabs had
come to hope that the UN plan would serve as the adjudicating instrument in their conflict with
Israel.
This hope and such thinking ceased to exist by the end of the June 1967 War. The
adoption of UN Resolution 242—which was based entirely on the “recent conflict—“ created a
new frame of reference, and the resolution’s acceptance by the Arabs certified such a reality.
When Jordan and Egypt accepted the resolution shortly after its adoption, and Syria followed suit
in 1973, these three Arab claimants to the occupied territories formally recognized the state of
Israel, forfeited all rights to any reference to the 1947 partition plan, and accepted the June 4,
1967 lines as the territorial referents for the Arab-Israel conflict. This new reality constituted the
very “gain” Prime Minster Eshkol wanted President Johnson’s help in protecting. Johnson’s five
principles became the basis of UN 242, which then became the embodiment of the international
consensus for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Johnson never pressured
Israel to implement the resolution.
As detailed in chapter three, after the war Johnson proceeded to fulfill Israel’s post-war
orders for weapons and deepen the institutionalization of US-Israeli ties until the end of his
administration. On the peace diplomacy front, while stressing to Israel privately the need for full
withdrawal from Sinai and the Golan and withdrawal with minor modifications from the West
Bank and Gaza, the administration assigned low priority to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Given that
the post-war status quo squarely favored Israel, the US propensity for inaction was further
enhanced by the escalating conflict in Vietnam, particularly after the Tet offensive, Johnson’s

201

decision not seek reelection, and the presidential campaign. As a result, the administration
deferred to the UN, whose secretary general designated the Swedish diplomat Gunner Jarring as a
special representative to promote an agreement and assist in achieving a peaceful settlement.
While Israel viewed Jarring’s mandate to be restricted to securing the agreement of Arabs to
direct negotiations, the Arabs had the high expectation that his mission would produce an Israeli
withdrawal. Shlaim argues that Israel employed a tactic to promote a stalemate, “feeding Jarring
proposals and documents to which he was to obtain Arab reactions.”
60
The objectives were to
give the impression that the mission was useful and to prevent the referral of the issue to the
Security Council. As Eban saw it, “even diplomatic activity that is not leading anywhere …gives
Arab moderates an alibi for avoiding the military option.”
61

The failure of diplomacy to produce an Israeli withdrawal, the (form the Egyptian
perspective) intolerable status quo of Israeli forces on eastern bank of the Suez Canal, the closure
of the canal and the resulting lost of toll revenues, and intermittent border clashes all led Egypt to
intensify its attacks on Israeli forces beginning in March 1969. Furthermore, it is important to
point out that while the Nixon administration, at least initially, attempted to regulate arms
supplies so as to induce Israeli concessions, Israel used the weapons to protect the territorial
status quo and to force the Arabs into making the concessions. Nasser refused to negotiate from
weakness, decided to increase Israel’s cost of maintaining the status quo, and replenished Egypt’s
weaponry from the Soviet Union. The attacks across the Suez Canal—what came to be known as
the War of Attrition—involved massive Israeli retaliations, destroyed much of Egypt’s new
weaponry, and prompted Secretary of State William Rogers to advance a peace plan on
December 10, 1969. The Rogers Plan, which called for Israeli withdrawal with only minor
border modifications and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, was not supported by
National Security Advisor Kissinger and was rejected by Israel outright on December 10. Israel

60
Shlaim, The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World, p. 261.

61
Quoted in Ibid.

202

also responded by launching massive and penetrating attacks into Egyptian territories as far as the
outskirts of Cairo, prompting Nasser’s to make a secret visit to Moscow to request urgent military
help. Accordingly, the Soviet Union sent its most advanced weapon systems and 15,000 Russian
military personnel to Egypt, which was then able to launch stinging counterattacks, checking
Israeli air superiority and its sense of invincibility. Alarmed at the rate of escalation and
concerned over the Soviet military presence, Rogers advanced his second initiative or Rogers
Plan B, calling for a cease-fire, soliciting official endorsement of Resolution 242, and reactivating
the Jarring mission. While Egypt and Jordan accepted the plan immediately, Israel endorsed the
plan only after Nixon’s assurances that the US would not force it to make any concessions on
withdrawal or refugees. As a result, only the cease-fire provision of the Rogers Plan was
implemented, thereby bringing the 18-month War of Attrition to an end on August 8, 1970.
62

The cease-fire brought an end to not only the War of Attrition but also the Rogers Plans
and the Kissinger-Rogers rivalry. Kissinger won Nixon to his side, sidelining Rogers and ending
his attempts at evenhanded Arab-Israeli peace making. Kissinger assumed the dominant role in
shaping US policy towards the region until January 1977, first as the National Security Advisor
and then concurrently as Secretary of State. In agreement with Nixon over taking global strategic
initiatives (i.e. détente and opening to China) and in deference to Israel’s preferences, Kissinger
relegated the Arab-Israel conflict to a low priority. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat found the
resulting stalemate intolerable, appealed to the Nixon administration for diplomatic intervention,
and ultimately expelled the Russian advisors from Egypt to demonstrate his openness to a pro-
Western reorientation.
When all of Sadat’s moves failed, Egypt and Syria launched coordinated and surprise
attacks on Israeli forces in the occupied Sinai and Golan, starting the 1973 War on October 6,
1973. The war of limited military objectives (at least from Sadat’s perspective) secured
Kissinger’s undivided attention. That war ended with UN Resolution 338, calling for a cease-fire

62
Ibid., pp. 289-98. Lukacs, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process, pp. 100-11.

203

and the implementation of UN Resolution 242 “in all of its parts.” As discussed in chapter three,
Kissinger’s post-war shuttle diplomacy produced an Israeli-Syrian and two Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement agreements. Although it was able to turn the tide and win the 1973 war thanks to
the unprecedented US military air lift, Israel realized its vulnerability and grudgingly reached the
strategic conclusion of the need for peaceful accommodation with the largest and most
formidable of its adversaries, Egypt. Following the second disengagement agreement in 1975,
Sadat began moving rapidly towards rapprochement with Washington at the expense of Egypt-
USSR relations. Despite rhetorical proclamations of Arab nationalism and intent to seek a
comprehensive peace with Israel, Sadat in fact turned to an “Egypt-first” policy in order to reach
a unilateral peace with Israel. Additionally, Egypt’s economic woes served as another reason for
Sadat to seek peace with Israel, thus reducing military expenditures and securing American
financial aid. Indeed, in the 1970’s, Egypt had been experiencing economic crisis with high
inflation, IMF-imposed austerity measures (leading to fierce riots which killed at least 150 people
in January 1977)
63
, and exuberant military budgets, reaching 25% of Egypt’s GDP.
Presidential Resolve: Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords
On the US front, Carter arrived at the White House determined to tackle the Arab-Israeli
conflict and was the first president to acknowledge the need for a Palestinian homeland. Based
on UN Resolution 242, he personally engaged in intensive mediation and presided over
acrimonious negotiations between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minster Begin for
13 days in September 1978 at Camp David. With Sadat’s willingness to establish a full peace and
diplomatic ties with Israel and his flexibility on security arrangements, it was President Carter’s
insistence on extracting Begin’s commitments for full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai that produced
the historic Camp David Accords on September 17. Six months later, on March 26, 1979, a full
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on the South Lawn of the White House. The Egyptian-
Israel treaty removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli military equation—a major Israeli objective—

63
Arthur Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts on File, 2008), p. 181.

204

and led to the freezing of its membership in the Arab League for breaking Arab ranks and
abandoning the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Egypt subsequently became fully aligned
with the United States and the second—after Israel—largest recipient of US military and
economic aid. Although it had begun receiving increased economic aid after the disengagement
agreements—an annual average of $809 million in 1975-1978, between the 1979 peace treaty and
2000, Egypt received an annual average of $1.2 billion in military and $975 million in economic
aid.
64

In Carter’s attempt to achieve a comprehensive peace, the Camp David Accords included
provisions for granting a five-year transitional period of autonomy to Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza, after which the final status of the territories was to be determined in the context
of a peace treaty with Jordan. Negotiations over autonomy and the final status were to involve
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and “representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza,” but not
the PLO. However, with Israel’s intention of keeping the territories under Israeli sovereignty
and upon Begin’s insistence, the UN 242 principles, including the withdrawal clause, were
excluded from all references to the status of the West Bank and Gaza, which Begin argued Jordan
had no right to claim. The continued building of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories
was the other major issue Begin was determined to win. During the last day of negotiations at
Camp David, President Carter and Secretary of State Vance were given to understand that Begin
had committed to a settlement freeze for the period of the autonomy negotiations, only to have
Begin state in a letter to Carter after the singing of the accords that the freeze was to be for only
three months. Carter felt “double-crossed” however, his exhaustion in the face of Begin’s refusal
to compromise on the West Bank and Gaza and Sadat’s indifference to matters outside the return
of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty during Camp David talks led to the signing of the accords even
though the Palestine problem remained unresolved. Reaching peace with Israel at the expense of

64
Figures calculated from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" " (USAID).

205

Palestine and other Arab causes led much of the Arab world to level charges of treason against
Sadat, who was assassinated by Islamist militants on October 6, 1981. As the Camp David
Accords and other attempts failed to solve the Palestine problem within the UNSCR 242
framework, two direct consequences of 1967 War—the reemergence of the Palestinian national
movement under the PLO and a resumption of settlement building by the Israelis—shaped the
subsequent evolution of the conflict and warrant further discussion.
The Rise of the PLO and Reemergence of the Palestinian National Movement
The failure of the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) against the Zionist project and the British
Mandate marked the beginning of the demise of the pre-1948 Palestinian national movement. In
comparison to the unity, cohesiveness, and gathering strength of the Zionists in Palestine, the
revolt’s failure led to demoralization, factionalization, and an absence of leadership (due to death
and expulsion) for the Palestinian side. This power imbalance played a key role in the 1948
triumph of Zionism and the establishment of Israel on the one hand, and the destruction of more
than 400 Palestinian villages and towns, the loss of much of Palestine, and the expulsion of more
than 785,000 Palestinians, on the other.
65
Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank and Egypt’s
administration of the Gaza Strip completed the loss and removed Palestine from the map. With
the trauma of defeat and dispersion of al-Nakbah (the catastrophe), Palestinian nationalism, as
Rashid Khalidi noted, entered a period of hiatus or “lost years,” during which “there no longer
appeared to be a center of gravity for the Palestinians.”
66
Another reason for this hiatus was the
subsumption of Palestinian nationalism and other wataniyyat (local nationalisms) into the larger
cause of al-qawmiyah al-Arabiyyha (Arab nationalism), which emphasized the linguistic,
historical, and cultural unity of all Arab countries and people and indicted imperial interventions
for blocking Arab political unity. As the dominant ideology in the first half of the twentieth

65
Walid Khalidi, All That Remains : The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

66
Rashid Khalidi Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity : The Construction of Modern National
Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 179.

206

century, Arab nationalism reached its apex under the Egyptian President Nasser, whose creation
of the PLO in 1964 was a clear example of subsuming a local nationalism, as well as an attempt
to place manifestations of Palestinian nationalism under the control of the Arab League.
The devastating results for the Arabs of the 1967 war—what was referred to by Nasser
first, in a most profound understatement, as al-Naksah (the setback)—marked a defeat of Arab
nationalism and served to reawaken Palestinian identity and nationalism. To be sure, as Brand
has argued, shortly after 1948 the Palestinians in the diaspora unconsciously “began to
reassemble the pieces of their shattered political, economic, and social structures…and to lay the
foundations for a national entity...building on the basis of an identity rooted in a shared dispersal,
statelessness, and frustration of national aspiration.”
67
Although it was owing to these diaspora
efforts that the Arab League created the PLO as a “national entity,” the national liberation
dimension was not part of the mandate. The Arab states and the first three Palestine National
Councils (PNC) of the Arab-controlled PLO stressed that whenever the time came to liberate
Palestine, it would be a task for conventional Arab armies, not independent Palestinian-led
groups.
The wholesale discrediting of the Arab armies in 1967 precipitated the entry of guerilla
groups into the PLO. The organization, which had thus far been linked to Arab regimes, was
transformed into a Palestinian-controlled umbrella organization of diverse groups. Reflecting the
new reality, the fourth PNC of July 1968 called for the “total liberation of Palestine” by
Palestinians through armed struggle and “popular revolution,” and rejected “all forms of
intervention, trusteeship, and subordination” to Arab states. In the July 1968 battle of al-
Karamah (a Jordanian border town), Palestinian fida’iyin, joined by elements of the Jordanian
army, withstood an Israeli attack and caused extensive damage to the invading forces. The much
celebrated battle served to inspire thousands of volunteers to join the guerilla groups. At the fifth

67
Laurie A. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World : Institution Building and the Search for State (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 3-4.

207

PNC of February 1969, these groups constituted more than half the seats of the legislature, and
Yasser Arafat, the head of the dominant faction Fateh, became the leader of the PLO through his
selection as the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. The PNC also declared that the
ultimate political goal consisted of establishing a “free democratic society in Palestine
encompassing all Palestinians, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews.”
68

As the fida’iyyin increased their infiltrations and attacks against Israeli targets, mostly
from Jordanian territory, Israel referred to the guerilla fighters as “Arab terrorists.” Israeli Prime
Minister Golda Meir’s dismissive remark in March 1969 that “[t]here was no such thing as
Palestinians…They do not exist” was a reflection of Zionist determination to erase all remnants
of Palestinian patrimony and connections to historic Palestine, and also a reflection of the hiatus
in development of the Palestinian nationalist movement between 1948 and the late 1960’s.
Israel’s objective of reducing any and all forms of Palestinian resistance to “terrorism” was
greatly enhanced with the appearance of the radical and Marxist-oriented Palestinian faction, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), on the international scene through a series
of airline hijackings in 1969-1970. The decline of the Jordanian regime’s legitimacy and the
surge in the legitimacy of armed guerillas after the 1967 defeat compelled King Hussein to allow
Jordan to be used as a base by the PLO. Gradually, the PLO became a state within a state in
Jordan. The PELP, which called for the overthrow of the monarchy, challenged the regime’s
authority, and hijacked four airplanes into Jordan in early September 1970.
These developments dragged the PLO into conflict with the regime and led the King to
order a crushing assault on the resistance and Palestinian refugee camps in the country in what
came to be known as Black September. The 1970 bloody civil war almost invited Israeli
intervention on behalf of the Hashemite regime and created a Palestinian-Jordanian inter-
communal rift that has yet to fully heal. The PLO was driven out of Jordan in July 1971 into

68
Muhammad Muslih, "Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National
Council," Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 4 (1990): p. 14.

208

Lebanon and Syria. A group named “Black September” was formed in response, with at least the
tacit support of Fateh, to avenge the killing of Palestinians in Jordan and to carry acts of
international terrorism against Israel. The most spectacular one was a terrorist attack during the
1972 Munich Olympic Games in which eleven Israeli athletes (as well as five Palestinian
terrorists, and one German police officer) were killed. In response, Israel launched extensive
strikes against Lebanon and Syria killing between 200 and 300 people (the majority civilian)
69

and unleashed a terror campaign of its own in Europe, sending assassination squads and
sponsoring car and letter bomb attacks against PLO officials and resistance group members
there.
70

In the midst of these setbacks, the difficulty in securing an operational base, the failure of
the international terror strategy, and the relative moderating effect of Fateh vis-à-vis other
factions, the PLO began a shift in 1974 towards endorsing a political settlement with Israel. In a
detailed analysis of the PNC resolutions, Muslih argues that the twelfth PNC in June 1974
marked a turning point in that the PLO took the first step away from its insistence on total
liberation towards coexistence with Israel via the two-state solution. The shift was also prompted
by the sense of opportunity created by the intense American diplomacy in the aftermath of the
1973 war and was enhanced by two important diplomatic developments. The first was the
decision of the Arab League summit in Rabat, Morocco in October 1974 to assert, with King
Hussein’s grudging acquiescence, “the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent
national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.” The other took place at the
United Nations General Assembly, which invited Arafat to address it on November 14, 1974.

69
Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, p.
309.

70
Zvi Zamir, the head of Israel’s Mossad (foreign intelligence organization) at the time acknowledged that
it “was terrorism what we did in those days,” Erik Hooglund, Terrorism, in Mattar, Encyclopedia of the
Palestinians, p. 396.

209

While wearing his gun and holding an olive branch, the PLO chairman pleaded “do not let the
olive branch fall from my hand.” The UNGA endorsed the Rabat declaration, officially
recognized the Palestinian people’s “inalienable right to self-determination,” and granted the PLO
permanent observer status. According to the New York Times, in his speech Arafat “left room for
eventual efforts to work out some sort of coexistence between Israel and the Palestinian state he
seems sure to obtain eventually.”
71

These developments not only were not reciprocated by Israel (with full US support) but
were in effect derailed by Israel and Henry Kissinger. With the shift towards political
coexistence with Israel, the Arab League endorsement, and international recognition, Arafat was
convinced that the “key to Israel is the United States.” However, to secure Israel’s endorsement
of the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, Kissinger, in a secret document,
acceded to the Israeli demand that the US would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it
recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted UN 242 and 338.
72
This pledge “constituted self-
limitation of the United States’ sovereign right to recognize, or negotiate with, any individual or
organization it might wish to deal with…it conveyed the idea of subordinating an important
sector of American’s foreign policy to Israeli guidance.”
73

Although the interdiction of contacts with the PLO became official US policy, and
Kissinger dismissed the possibility of a Palestinian state as “not a subject for serious discourse,”
74

the PLO’s gradual shift towards the two-state solution, although marred with “creative
ambiguity,” as Muslih pointed out, continued in a “stable and steady” fashion.
75
The PLO was

71
New York Time, November 15, 1974

72
William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions : American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 275.

73
Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 152.

74
Quoted in Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State : The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-
1993, p. 321.

210

trying to strike a balance between two camps with extreme positions. The first was the PLO’s
radical flank, which contributed to the liberation movement’s legitimacy, but accused the PLO of
selling out to Israel and the US. The other was Israel and the US, with their demands that the
PLO submit to conditions they knew it could not meet, in order to defer if not completely avoid
withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO could not accept UN 242, for it dealt with
the Palestinians only in the context of finding a “settlement of the refugee problem,” avoiding any
mention of Palestinian political and self-determination rights. Nor, the PLO argued, could it have
recognized Israel’s right to exist (as opposed to Israel’s existence) for such recognition would
have entailed Palestinian endorsement of their own dispersal and expulsion from Palestine.
Without acknowledgment by the United States and Israel of Palestinian identity and the right to
self-determination, for the PLO to have agreed to negotiate under such conditions, as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders later argued, would have mounted to an “act of
generosity that is virtually without historical example.”
76
Still, the PLO’s strategy was to continue
its shift to a diplomatic trajectory and to enhance its international recognition and legitimacy with
the hope of positive acknowledgment from and engagement with the US to reach an
accommodation with Israel.
The PNC, the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, was deliberately cautious on the path
towards political settlement. But the historical record beginning in the mid 1970’s is replete with
pronouncements directed at Washington, by the PLO leadership under Chairman Arafat’s
dominant Fateh, of acceptance of a political settlement with Israel. The PLO had shown its
willingness to give “a de facto recognition to Israel” and its acceptance of the establishment of
“an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza.”
77
However, successive

75
Muslih, "Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council," pp.
17-8.

76
Quoted in Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 188.

211

US administrations failed to respond to such overtures; indeed, even modest attempts at
exploration were aborted unceremoniously. As an example, US UN Ambassador Andrew Young
met briefly in July 1979 with the PLO observer at the UN to explore the possibility of amending
UN 242 to reflect the Palestinians’ relevance to achieving a solution. However, while the
unauthorized encounter involved neither negotiation with nor recognition of the PLO, as per
Kissinger’s ban, its revelation caused an uproar among the pro-Israel camp in the, ultimately
forcing President Carter to dismiss Young from his post.
In the region, as Carter later noted, one of the consequences of removing Egypt from the
Arab-Israeli military equation in the aftermath of the peace treaty was Israel’s full scale invasion
of Lebanon in the summer 1982.
78
With Israel’s and the US’s refusal to acknowledge its overtures
and its resulting unwillingness to abandon the guerilla war option entirely, the PLO, which
developed into a state within a state in Lebanon, became a factor in the Lebanese civil war. Israel
had always responded to PLO raids with massive retaliations and although the PLO had observed
a US-brokered cease-fire in July 1981, the Likud government in Israel witnessed with alarm the
PLO’s growing diplomatic standing and buildup of forces, and began preparation for war pending
a PLO provocation. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon seized the opportunity when there was an
attempt on the life of Israel’s ambassador to London by the Abu Nidal group.
79
With Secretary of

77
An audience to these pronouncements was the senior Republican on the House Middle East
subcommittee Congressman Paul Findley. For other examples See Seth Tillman, The United States in the
Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, chapter 5. For an accurate and authoritative presentation of the
PLO’s thinking and full position, see Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian
State," Foreign Affairs, no. 2 (1978). For a Palestinian perspective on the resolution of the wider Arab-
Israeli conflict, see Sabri Jiryis, "On Political Settlement in the Middle East: The Palestinian Dimension,"
Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 1 (1977), ———, "The Palestinian Position," Journal of Palestine
Studies 6, no. 4 (1977).

78
Jimmy Carter, The Blood of Abraham (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 45.

79
The Abu Nidal faction had broken away from the PLO for its “treason” of pursing peace with Israel, and
had already assassinated a number of PLO officials.

212

State Alexander Haig’s “green light,”
80
Israel invaded Lebanon, caused massive destruction, and
defeated the PLO militarily. The US then brokered the organization’s evacuation out of Lebanon.
The transfer of the PLO leadership to faraway Tunisia and the dispersal of its fighting
force across the Arab world, ended the option of fighting Israel from a base in a neighboring
country and significantly weakened the organization politically. This most recent defeat and
dispersal shifted the center of gravity of Palestinian politics from the PLO outside historic
Palestine to the Palestinians inside the occupied West Bank and Gaza. This outside-inside shift
was also in response to another shift that had begun in the mid 1970s inside the territories from
the socioeconomic-based status notables and traditionalist-centered Palestinian polity to that of
non-notable nationalists and political activism-centered polity and orientation. At least three
factors undermined the notables’ power base and also fostered the politicization of new political
elites. First, within the context of occupation, Israel had prevented the emergence of independent
a Palestinian economy which led young Palestinians to seek employment inside Israel, thus
finding themselves serving the Israeli economy and generating political awareness to reject the
stark occupied/occupier discrepancies. Second, Israel’s continued land confiscation and
increased building of settlements in the occupied territories. Third, the development of university
system and its wide accessibility to Palestinians (especially from lower classes) had increased
their politicization.
81

While there is no need to address the various diplomatic initiatives of the period 1982-
1987, it suffices to state these initiatives were rejected by Israel and the United States either
because they envisioned a future Palestinian state or because they failed to find a formula for
Palestinian representation that they found acceptable. Meanwhile, the PLO continued the steady
move towards accommodation and adopted in the eighteenth PNC of April 1987 a program with

80
Douglas Little, American Orientalism : The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 110 and fn. 10 p. 372.

81
Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State : The Incomplete Revolution, Indiana Series in Arab and
Islamic Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), chapters 2 & 3

213

an implicit recognition of Israel, and a clear acceptance of the two-state solution “on the basis of
UN resolutions relevant to the Palestine question.”
82
However, for the first time in Arab
summitry, the Arab summit held in Amman in November 1987 virtually ignored both the
Palestine problem and Arafat as the Iran-Iraq war took precedence. Against the backdrop of
systematic Israeli and American denial of their rights and, now, Arab marginalization of the
Palestinian cause, the Palestinians inside the territories were becoming very restive. The highly-
politicized and long Israeli-humiliated Palestinians had increasingly resisted the occupation in
various ways but, in the context of the political impasse, a popular and relatively spontaneous
intifada broke out against the Israeli military occupation in December 1987.
The Palestinian popular uprising contributed significantly to three important and related
developments. First, fearful of a potential spillover to the East Bank, King Hussein announced on
July 31, 1988 Jordan’s “administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank.” Also, as a
front-line state on the conflict with Israel, Jordan had been the recipient of generous financial
subsidies from Arab oil producers to support al-sumoud (steadfastness); Jordan had been left out
when the Arab League decided the previous month to channel all future funds directly to
Palestinians through the PLO. Second, the intifada caught the PLO—by now with declining
prestige and weakening political influence—by complete surprise, empowered it to take bold
initiatives, and presented its leadership with an opportunity for renewed relevance. Intending to
fill the political vacuum created by Hussein’s decision and fearful of possible Israeli annexation,
the nineteenth PNC on November 15 accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 “as the basis for
negotiations with Israel.” The PNC also issued the Declaration of Palestinian Independence in
the West Bank and Gaza, which was recognized by many Arab and Muslim countries and the
USSR, but not Israel or the US.
Third, Hussein’s disengagement, the PNC’s acceptance of 242 and concern over Israel’s
brutal response to the intifada created the climate for a major US policy shift. In the aftermath of

82
Muslih, "Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council," p. 23.

214

successful American Jewish-PLO dialogue under Swedish mediation and tedious haggling over
wording, Secretary of State George Shultz finally certified that the PLO had met US conditions
for negotiations with the organization. Although there was pressure from the leadership of the
pro-Israel lobby against recognition of the PLO, the images of Israeli brutality in suppressing the
stone-throwing Palestinian youth of the intifada were too much for the lobby’s public relations
damage control campaign. The intifada challenged the image held by many American Jews (and
the American public) of Israel as David fighting the Arab Goliath, energized many of them (i.e.
American Jews) into calling for recognition of Palestinian rights, and prompted the participation
of some pro-peace individuals in the Swedish initiative.
83
In place since 1975, President Reagan
lifted the ban on US-PLO talks on December 14, 1988, presenting the George H.W. Bush’s
incoming administration with a degree of maneuverability free of cost.
Although the Bush administration suspended talks with the PLO in June 1990,
84
these
rapid developments placed PLO at the center of any negotiated settlement with Israel over the
West Bank and Gaza. It is worth recalling that during its eight years in office the Reagan
administration had advanced two Arab-Israeli peace initiatives—the Reagan Plan in September
1982 and the Shultz Initiative in March 1988—but quickly abandoned them after Israel’s
rejection. The PLO’s long march towards accommodation with Israel had been replete with
direct and overt signals to Washington since 1974, but had never been sufficient for the US to
respond favorably. The US had always deferred to Israel, and Israel had always employed the
“terrorism argument,” which was, to be sure, strengthened at times by PLO actions, particularly
those of its renegade factions in the late 1970s and 1980s. Israel’s objective was to dehumanize

83
Mohamed Rabie, "The U.S.-Plo Dialogue: The Swedish Connection," Journal of Palestine Studies 21,
no. 4 (1992).

84
In the face of Israel’s continued suppression of the Intifada and in an attempt to derail the PLO political
program, the PLO renegade Palestine Liberation Front under Abu al-Abbas carried an intercepted attack on
Israel. After the US vetoed a resolution condemning Israel for mounting causalities in the Occupied
Territories, Arafat refused to meet American specific commands to condemn and punish the attackers. In
response to mounting pressure and demands by pro-Israel forces, the Bush administration broke off the
talks.

215

and deny Palestinians the right of self-determination and to continue its control of the Occupied
Territories. The outbreak of the intifada compelled the Reagan administration to engage, and the
intervention of American Jews had provided it with the needed political cover to do so. However,
the administration took the important, but modest, step of recognizing the PLO only during its
waning days in office, after the November 1988 election, so as not to jeopardize Bush’s chances
of victory.
These developments did not impress the new Prime Minister Shamir of the right-wing
Likud party, who advanced his own plan in May 1989 to grant Palestinians in the territories only
limited autonomy à la Camp David Accords. Shamir vowed to exclude the PLO from any talks,
to continue settlement building, and never to allow a Palestinian state to emerge, asserting “we
shall not give the Arabs one inch of our land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years.” Neither
able to convince nor willing to compel Shamir to accept PLO direct participation, Secretary of
State James Baker scrambled to find Palestinians acceptable to Israel to begin a peace process,
and warned Israel against settlement building, but unsuccessfully. Fearing progress as a result of
Arafat’s flexibility towards Baker’s proposal, Shamir—empowered by the formation of yet
another new government (as a result of conflict with Labor over the peace process)— in June
1990 rejected the very plan he had advanced the previous summer.
As will be discussed later, the US reestablished contacts with and recognized the PLO in
the wake of the Israeli-PLO Oslo Accords (September 1993) and only after Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin, in essence, authorized the US to do so. As the Israel-centered approach replaced the
Soviet-centered approach in the post-1967 war era, the US refusal to recognize or negotiate with
the PLO for nearly twenty years has contributed significantly to the non-resolution of the Arab-
Israel conflict. This, in turn, led Washington to seek Arab regimes supportive of its policies,
empowered the Islamist opposition, and caused Arab anti-Americanism, as will be discussed in
the next chapter.

216

Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories and the US Response
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories pose a threat, not only as daily provocations
and the source of most violence against Palestinians in the territories but also as a threat to
achieving a peaceful resolution to the Palestine problem. The settlement issue has also been
identified as “final status issue” to be negotiated if such a solution is to be found. While the other
issues of borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and water are all important to any final negotiated
agreement, settlements play a critical role, as they embody Zionism’s emphasis on the
implantation of Jews in the land of historic Palestine. Land is at the core of the Palestine
problem, and settlements continue to divide and reduce the amount of land available to
Palestinians. Moreover, as settlements and their supporting regime shape the status of the land,
the focus on them also entails a focus on Jerusalem—as part of the occupied territories centrally
affected by settlement building—borders, and water in the territories.
85
As such the settlements
issue is the core of the Palestine-Israeli conflict and thus warrants further discussion in connection
with the US position on it.
The euphoria that swept Israel in the aftermath of its 1967 victory, argues Benny Morris,
“unleashed currents within Israeli society that militated against yielding occupied territories and
against compromise. Expansionism, fueled by fundamentalist messianism and primal nationalist
creed, took hold of a growing minority, both religious and secular, getting its cue, and eventually
creeping support, from the government itself.”
86
In fact, it was as early as June 11, 1967—the
day following the end of the 1967 War—that Israel began exercising and legislating its
expansionist orientation when it gave three hours’ notice to 650 Palestinians to leave their homes
in the ancient Maghrabi Quarter in the Old City. Bulldozers then demolished the houses to
facilitate paving a plaza in front of the Wailing Wall, thus beginning the process of land

85
As for the refugee issue, while UNGA 194 of December 1949 calls for the “return of refugees to their
homes,” the passage of time is leaving their descendants with no other option than that of collecting
compensation from Israel.

86
Morris, Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, pp. 330-1.

217

confiscation and settlement building in the newly occupied territories. Two weeks later, the
Israeli government approved the expansion of East Jerusalem into other occupied territories and
the annexation of “Greater Jerusalem,” began settling Israeli Jewish citizens in these areas, and
later declared Jerusalem the “eternal” capital of Israel.
Settlements in the Occupied Territories
According to a UN report, the settlements are organized communities established on land
in the occupied territories with “the approval and direct or indirect support of the Israeli
government,” for only Israeli civilian citizens and Jewish people; they are “not open to West
Bank and East Jerusalem Palestinians.”
87
In addition to settlements in East Jerusalem, Israel’s
Labor Party government began a gradual but limited settlement drive—mostly in the nearly
unpopulated Jordan River valley—for “security” reasons. The government also approved, after
initial opposition, establishing the Kiyat Arba settlement near Hebron by Israeli Jews with the
religious motivation of “returning” to Judea and Samaria—the Biblical names for the West Bank.
Although it was never adopted formally by the government, the Allon Plan proposed shortly after
the 1967 war became the de facto policy, according to which nearly thirty percent of the West
Bank—mostly along the border with Jordan—was to be expropriated by Israel as a “security
perimeter” and for settlements, military posts and bases off-limits to Palestinians. By the time the
Labor Party lost power to the right-wing Likud for the first time since the creation of Israel in
May 1977, there were around 50,000 settlers in Arab East Jerusalem and 7,000 in the rest of West
Bank and Gaza living in nearly 45 settlements.
88

Determined to render the occupation irreversible and to prevent Palestinian self-
determination, the Likud government, under the ultranationalist Prime Minister Menachem
Begin, introduced a dramatic shift in the settlement project. Through the ultra religious-

87
The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other Infrastructure in the West
Bank, United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), July 2007, p. 13

88
Geoffrey Aronson, Israeli Settlements in Mattar, Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, p. 201. In addition,
there were 4000 other settles in the Golan and Sinai.

218

nationalist Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) movement, Begin allocated considerable funds
and requested that all relevant governmental agencies facilitate increased settlement activity in
the “Land of Israel” of “Judea and Samaria.” By 1985 or a year following Begin’s departure,
there were 104,000 settlers in East Jerusalem and 46,000 in the West Bank, representing a 108%
and 557% increase, respectively. Continued investments in infrastructure and settlement building
under the national unity governments during the 1980s continued to facilitate settlement, leading
to a population of 135,000 in East Jerusalem, 78,600 in the West Bank, and 3,300 in Gaza as of
1990. Israel’s Labor government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (June 1992-November
1995) focused more on “thickening” existing rather than establishing new settlements so as not to
“disrupt” peace negotiations. By the time of Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, there were
295,800 settlers in the occupied territories.
89
Likud’s Netanyahu, while prime minister, pushed
for the enlargement of existing settlements and the building of new ones, while his Minister of
National Infrastructure Ariel Sharon urged the children of members of Gush Emunim simply “to
grab and settle” on the hilltops.
It is important to emphasize that while the government normally declared such
settlements as ”unauthorized” (according to Israeli law) “outposts” at the beginning, the pattern
has been that most of them become de facto settlements. Through the persistent application of
the principle of creating “facts on the ground,” these settlements, with time, become legalized.
This continued permissiveness toward illegal settlement activity increased the number of settlers
to 372,000 in 2000, an increase of more than 25% from 1995.
90
With no settlers left in Gaza after
Israel redeployed its forces and evacuated its settlers from there in 2005, there were 472,000
settlers in 149 settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem as of 2007. Additionally,
the settlements (which comprised 3.1% of the West Bank in 2005), the extensive networks of

89
All these statistics are taken from the Foundation for Middle East Peace’s bimonthly Report on Israeli
Settlements in the Occupied Territories, http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/statistics.html

90
Ibid

219

roads only for Jews, and the numerous check-points divide the Palestinian territories in such a
way as to prevent contiguity, restrict movement, and promote economic dependence on Israel.
Although they vary in size, many settlements within the large “settlement blocs” constitute full
towns with thousands of residents and elaborate service infrastructures. They were built with the
intention of retention and with the purpose of rendering the occupation irreversible. While
rendering nearly 40% of the West Bank off limits to Palestinians for various purposes,
91
a quick
look at a map of the territories illustrates the accuracy of the “Swiss Cheese” map depiction and
gives credence to Palestinians’ fear of living in emerging South African-like Bantustans.
Settlement and International Law
Israeli settlements in the context of the occupation not only represent the last existing
colonial enterprise in the world but also mark a clear violation of international law. The status of
settlements in the occupied territories falls squarely under Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 49(6) of the convention states
unequivocally that the “Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies.” Numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions affirm the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to, and the illegality of, the
Israeli settlements. For example, it is worth quoting the relevant clause in full in UN SC
Resolution 446 of March 1977, which
Calls once more upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking
any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and
materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since
1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the occupied Arab territories.

91
They consist of: Settlements, Outposts, Land cultivated by Israelis, Military bases, Closed military areas,
Fenced military, buffer zone, Nature reserves, Roads primarily for Israeli use, and The Barrier/closed areas.
The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other Infrastructure in the West Bank,
United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), July 2007, Annex 2

220

UN SC Resolution 465 of March 1980 demands that Israel “dismantle the existing settlements
and in particular …cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of
settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.” In a reflection of
the prevalence of violence committed against the Palestinian population by extremist settlers, UN
SC Resolution 904 of March 1994 “Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to continue to take
and implement measures, including, inter alia, confiscation of arms, with the aim of preventing
illegal acts of violence by Israeli settlers.” In an advisory opinion requested by the General
Assembly regarding the separation wall Israel has been building inside the West Bank, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) found, among other things, that “the wall…and its associated
regime, are contrary to international law” and that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international
law.” The ICJ findings were adopted by the UN GA in Resolution ES-10/15 in August 2004.
92

Settlements and the US Response
Although the Johnson administration never made public statements terming Israeli
settlements as constituting violations of international law, in a confidential airgram of April 1968
Secretary of State Dean Rusk requested of the US Embassy in Tel Aviv that it restate to the
Israeli government “in strongest terms the US position.” Although the US confirmed that the
settlements were contrary to Article 49 of the Geneva Convention and added “serious
complications to the eventual task of drawing up a peace settlement,”
93
Israel never altered its
course, establishing a familiar pattern of US and international demands and Israeli
noncompliance. In line with other pronouncements affirming US policy on both grounds, under
the Nixon administration US Ambassador to the UN George Bush stated in September 1971 that

92
The quoted resolutions were obtained from UN Information System on the Question of Palestine website:
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf

93
Document 136: Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Foreign Relations
1964-1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967-1968,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xx/2667.htm

221

"[w]e regret Israel's failure to acknowledge its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention
as well as its actions which are contrary to the letter and the spirit of this convention."
94
William
Scranton, US envoy to the UN during the Ford administration, affirmed that settlements were
“illegal under the convention.” In negating the “facts on the ground” principle, he stressed that
settlements “cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between
the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East.”
95

With the rapid acceleration of the settlement drive after the arrival to power of Prime
Minister Begin in 1977, the US’s position on the settlements assumed increased importance.
Carter seemed to understand more than any of his predecessors the detrimental impact of
settlements on the prospects for peace. The historical record is replete with statements by Carter
and other administration officials to that effect. Carter failed to link the Palestine problem,
particularly the settlement, issue to the Egyptian-Israel Camp David Accord, and felt “double-
crossed” by Begin’s refusal to abide by the understanding of even a limited settlement freeze that
Carter and Secretary of State Vance thought had been agreed to. While Carter’s vehement
objection to Israeli settlements was instrumental in the adoption by the UN Security Council of
unequivocal resolutions critical of settlements, neither his administration nor the world body was
able to bring a change to Israel’s settlement policy.
With his replay to a question about settlements on February 2, 1981 that “I disagreed
when the previous administration referred to them as illegal—they’re not illegal,”
96
President
Reagan declared a US policy reversal on this important issue.
97
With such a pro-Israeli position

94
Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), p. 154.

95
Yehuda Lukacs and International Center for Peace in the Middle East., Documents on the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, 1967-1983 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1984), p. 69.

96
New York Times, February 3, 1981.

222

having been clearly stated, subsequent administration pronouncements have, for reasons of
diplomatic niceties, ignored or sidestepped the legal argument altogether. Thus with the
declaration that “our objection is not legal but practical,” the displeasure over Israeli settlements
was reduced and restricted to the views that they were “perhaps unnecessarily provocative”
according to Reagan, and “not a constructive move,” as Secretary of State Shultz put it.
98
Worse,
as early as September 1982 Shultz adopted for the US two slippery if not also illegal positions
that were to play a future role and perhaps put a workable and just resolution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict permanently out of reach. Shultz’ statement warrants further exploration but first
a few words about settlement policy under the Bush Sr. administration.
From his days as the UN Ambassador in the early 1970s, President Bush was quite
familiar with and opposed to Israeli settlement. His engaged Secretary of State James Baker
urged Israel, while addressing the powerful pro-Israel AIPAC, to “foreswear annexation. Stop
settlement activity.”
99
To accommodate the flood of Jewish Soviet immigrants in Israel and in
settlements, Prime Minster Shamir made two requests for loan guarantees, and for the first time
since Eisenhower, Bush conditioned approval on Israel’s promise not to use the funds for housing
in the occupied territories.
100
Despite continuing settlement building and because of immense
pressure from Israel’s supporters, the administration could only delay approving the requests.
The second loan guarantee (worth $10 billion) was approved after Shamir left office and with
Labor Prime Minster Rabin’s promise to limit building to “security” as opposed to “political”
settlements, whatever that might have meant. With clear Bush-Shamir tension over settlements, it

97
William Quandt argues that Regan was influenced by Eugene Rostow, a “prominent spokesman for
neoconservative, and pro-Israeli views.” Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 287.

98
The first quoted statement was made by Deputy Secretary of State Dam. All three quotes were taken
from Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: Statements on American Policy toward Settlements by
U.S. Government Officials – 1968-2006, Foundation for Middle East Peace,
http://www.fmep.org/analysis/analysis/israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-territories/

99
Neff, Fallen Pillars : U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945, p. 159.

100
Ibid., pp. 160-1.

223

is telling to note the contrast in response between American Jews and Israeli voters. While the
former resented Bush’s tough stand on settlements and contributed to his defeat in the November
1992 election,
101
the latter took a note of the US position and voted Shamir out of office in
Israel’s June 1992 election, in favor of Labor’s Rabin.
102
Still, while he echoed Reagan in
abandoning international law in declaring settlement as “not illegal,” Baker was more forceful on
the practical implications by arguing that there was no “greater obstacle to peace than settlement
activity.”
103

To return to Shultz’s two-faceted announcements, first, Shultz declared that the “status of
Israeli settlements must be determined in the course of the final status negotiations.” [Emphasis
added] While seemingly straightforward, this view stripped the explosive settlement issue out of
its legal context, delinked it from questions of international law as affirmed by numerous UN
resolutions, and placed its adjudication in the hands of the more powerful party to the
negotiations. Indeed, the response that it was “to be decided by the two parties in the final status
negotiations” became the Clinton administration’s standard position throughout the 1990s peace
process, not only over settlements but also over the other important issues of Jerusalem, borders,
refugees, and water.
Shultz also made the other declaration that “neither will we support efforts to deny Jews
the opportunity to live in the West Bank and Gaza under the duly constituted governmental
authority there, as Arabs live in Israel” [Emphasis added]. Notwithstanding the fact that the issue
was not one of the simple freedom of members of ethno-religious groups to live where they wish,
Shultz’s statement had a profound implication. Shultz was well aware that settlers in the
occupied territories had always fallen under Israeli law and Israel had viewed with anathema any

101
Ibid., p. 161.

102
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 318.

103
Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: Statements on American Policy toward Settlements by
U.S. Government Officials – 1968-2006

224

possibility of Israeli Jews living under some Palestinian regime. Shultz’ intention was to equate
the protected status of Israeli Arab citizens
104
living inside Israel with the illegal presence of
Jewish settlers in the occupied territories. Moreover, once considered within the shifting
demographic realities, this linkage has been gradually assuming a policy dimension in Israel in
relation to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. To illustrate, Israel has been increasingly alarmed by
what it calls the “demographic threat” emanating not only from Palestinians in the occupied
territories but also from Palestinian citizens of Israel who constitute 20% of Israel’s population.
Regarding the former, it is expected by 2009-10 that the total population of Palestinian Arabs in
historic Palestine (i.e. today’s Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza) will exceed the Jewish population
for the first time since shortly after Israel’s establishment.
However, Israel’s ironclad insistence on maintaining a Jewish majority while remaining
democratic precludes both the forceful annexation of the occupied territories and the
establishment of a Jewish-Arab bi-national state in historic Palestine. As for Israel’s other
problem, Likud party leader Netanyahu bluntly stated, “if there is a demographic problem, and
there is, it is with the Israeli Arabs who will remain Israeli citizens.” With no settlers in the
Palestinian territories the day June 1967 war broke out, the settler population increased to nearly
6% of the total West Bank population in 1977 and jumped to 16.7% in 2007.
105
The settler
population is expected to continue its increase, given its annual average growth of 5.5% (mostly
due to new settlers)
106
versus 2.5% for that of West Bank Palestinians. To solve the
“demographic threat” from within, current and former Israeli officials—irrespective of political

104
Although there has been systematic and institutionalized discrimination against Israeli Arabs enough to
render them second-class citizens, nevertheless, they are still citizens of the citizens with rights to vote, de
jure protection of the law, and other rights.

105
Calculated from population figures from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, www.pcbs.gov.ps,
and settlement figures from Foundation for Middle East Peace,
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/comprehensive-settlement-
population-1972-2006

106
This is for the period 2001-2007. From 1990-2000 the growth rate was 9-10% per year,
http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=61&docid=1856&pos=6,

225

party—have, since the second Palestinian Intifada of September 2000, been floating a troubling
proposal: that any Palestinian-Israeli final agreement must include an exchange of populations
and land swap between illegal settlers and illegal settlements in the territories on the one hand,
and law-abiding Palestinian citizens and some Arab villages in Israel, on the other.
107

In sum, despite the clarity of international law and a consensus in the international
community against Israeli settlements in the Palestinian occupied territories, successive US
administrations have been either unable or unwilling to compel Israel to change course. Having
declared a monopoly over the sponsorship of Arab-Israeli peacemaking since the Nixon
administration, the US under Carter had upheld international legality and warned of the
detrimental impact of settlements on the prospects for peace. This position evolved into Clinton’s
abdication that it was “unproductive to debate the legalities of the [settlement] issue” and the
characterization of the settlements as only a “complicating factor.” With neither resolve nor a
credible threat from Washington to cut financial aid, Israel was allowed, with increasingly US
approval, to continue building settlements and to establish detrimental “facts on the ground.” To
the Palestinians and others across the Arab world, the United States is deeply implicated in
Israel’s flouting of international law. That the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan
maintain friendly relations with, and receive the support of, the US against this backdrop is what
underpins the opposition in the Arab world to these regimes and US policies. This has provided
the US with the rationale to provide more support for and to prop up these two regimes.
The Peace Process under the Clinton Administration
The end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War
presented the Bush administration with an opportunity to attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict, as it had promised the Arabs for their participation in “Desert Storm.” After months of
acrimonious diplomacy given Shamir’s intransigence, President Bush and particularly Secretary

107
Jamal Dakwar, "Land, Demography, and Peacemaking under Security Council Resolution 242,"
Journal of Palestine Studies XXXVII, no. 1 (2007): pp. 67-71.

226

of State Baker were widely praised for their success in holding an international conference and
thus restarting the peace process. The Bush-Gorbachev co-chaired Madrid Conference of
October 30, 1991 brought Israel and its neighboring adversaries Jordan, Syrian, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians (as part of the Jordanian delegation), together for the first time, and also included the
UN, Arab League and the weight of Saudi participation. Bilateral and multilateral (over regional
issues) meetings were then held over the next year. Although some views were exchanged and
positions outlined, no breakthrough was expected and the conference is still remembered
primarily for its symbolic accomplishment.
With no political answer to the Palestinian intifada, the election of Rabin brought a sense
of optimism towards peace prospects and increased calls within Israel for PLO recognition, thus
facilitating the Israeli Knesset’s (parliament) removal of the ban on Israeli-PLO contacts in early
1993. Although Palestinian participation in the ongoing Madrid Conference-derived talks was
directed by Arafat from behind the scene, the PLO leadership in Tunis was determined to emerge
from the shadows and reassert its leadership role in negotiations. It is essential to recall that in
the aftermath of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, Arafat had allied the PLO with Iraq, and
misguidedly supported Hussein’s Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. As a result, the PLO lost its
generous financial subsides from the oil-rich Arab counties and its support and influence
diminished in the territories. The PLO was politically weak and, and more importantly, on the
verge of bankruptcy. Israel was, of course, well aware of the PLO’s plight, and Rabin, intending
to capitalize on its weaknesses and unable to suppress the intifada by military means, authorized a
secret channel of talks with high PLO officials in Norway.
To the surprise of all, the talks ultimately produced the Oslo Accords
108
which were
signed on the White House South Lawn on September 13, 1993 during a world-wide televised
ceremony with President Clinton presiding. The accord followed the Camp David approach by
allowing a 5-year transitional period before negotiating over the difficult final-status issues of

108
The official name of the accord is Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

227

Jerusalem, refugees, border, settlements, and security. Given its weakened position, the PLO’s
acceptance of the interim period without a prior agreement on these issues based on “international
legitimacy,” as Arafat frequently put it, constituted a radical departure from PLO’s previous
position and a major compromise. According to the accord, the PLO once again recognized
Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism, and Israel finally “decided to recognize the PLO as
the representative of the Palestinian people.”
109
According to the subsequent Cairo Agreement of
May 1994 (to implement the Oslo Accord), Israel allowed the PLO’s political leadership to move
to Gaza, redeployed (as opposed to withdrawal, thus keeping the occupation intact) its army out
of Gaza and Jericho, and the countdown began for the conclusion of a final settlement agreement
by May 1999.
The Oslo Accords also allowed the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (with
executive and legislative branches) to manage Palestinian civilian affairs while maintaining
overall security, foreign affairs, and border control in the hands of Israel. More damaging to the
Palestinians, Oslo granted Israel a veto power and disagreements were adjudicated, not based on
international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, but according to Israeli interpretation and
law, almost always with US support. After continued negotiations, the breakthrough agreement
led to Oslo II
110
of September 1995, which stipulated further Israeli military redeployments out of
Palestinian cities and other areas. While “security” ruled supreme at the expense of human rights
and economic opportunities for Palestinians and the construction of settlements continued
unabated, the assassination of Rabin two months later and a series of Hamas bombings inside
Israel brought the anti-Oslo Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud to power in May 1996.
Netanyahu began to look for excuses to reverse Oslo, first by slowing redeployments
significantly. He ended the implementation of Oslo agreements altogether in September 1997.

109
Text of letter from Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin to PLO Chairman Arafat

110
Oslo II is officially called the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.

228

In spite of no prospect for reaching a final agreement on time, the election of Prime
Minister Ehud Barak of Labor in May 1999 brought a renewed sense of optimism and facilitated
serious negotiations on both the Syrian and Palestinian tracks. Before discussing the US role in
the Assad-Clinton Geneva summit involving the former and the Camp David II summit of the
later, a brief mention of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty is warranted.
Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations and Peace Treaty
After King Hussein severed administrative ties and relinquished legal claims to the West
Bank to the Palestinians and their representative the PLO, there was only a small strip of
Jordanian land (nearly 140 sq. miles) occupied by Israel.
111
Although Israel had been technically
in a state of war with Jordan, Israeli officials and pre-state Zionist leaders had viewed the
Hashemite dynasty favorably, found satisfactory accommodation with Jordan, and expected to
achieve peace with it once the opportunity arose. Abba Eban, former Israeli foreign minister, was
later to capture in his autobiography Israel’s historical attitude towards the Hashemites accurately
when he wrote, “[t]here was nothing here of the inhumane virulence which marked the attitude of
other Arab nationalists towards Israel’s existence. Even in wars, an unspoken assumption of
ultimate accord hovered over the relations between Israel and Jordan.”
112
King Abdullah’s
collusion and secret meetings with Zionist leaders before the 1948 war were the prelude to at least
forty-two secret meetings between Hussein and high Israeli officials between 1963 and mid
1994.
113
Thus, it was no surprise that the bilateral Israeli-Jordanian track was the most productive
during the post Madrid negotiations. In fact, although the Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda (to
guide their future negotiations) was reached in October 1992, it was signed on September 14,

111
Israel had expanded eastward beyond the international border in the late 1960’s.

112
Abba Solomon Eban, Abba Eban : An Autobiography, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1977), p.
408.

113
Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan : The Lion of King Hussein in War and Peace, British ed. (London: Penguin
Group 2007), pp. 652-3.

229

1993 only after the Palestinians signed the Oslo Accord the previous day. Hussein’s regime
simply could not have dared to sign such an agreement with Israel before the Palestinians did, lest
the King be called a traitor as Sadat had been for signing the Camp David Accord and a separate
peace treaty with Israel.
As peace talks progressed rapidly with Israel, Jordan’s economy was in a shambles due
to loss of Arab and US financial support because of its pro-Iraq tilt in the 1991 Gulf War. With
its foreign debt at nearly $7 billion, Hussein sought relief for the $700 million owed to the US.
Clinton, while fully appreciating Jordan’s needs, argued he needed a powerful argument to
convince the US congress of debt forgiveness. While Rabin promised to lobby Washington on
the king’s behalf, Clinton informed Hussein that a “public meeting with Rabin would give me
that argument.”
114
Hussein was “amazed” by Clinton and reassured by his support and
understanding, which “he had not had…with any president since Dwight Eisenhower.”
115
The
king’s comparison between the two presidents of two eras is instructive. It will be recalled from
the previous chapter that President Eisenhower officially affirmed the US financial commitment
to Jordan in the context of the Cold War. Hussein began receiving US support in April 1957,
after the king dismissed the Arab nationalist, or what Washington called “communist” and “pro-
Soviet,” government. In the aftermath of Hussein’s enthusiastic support for the Eisenhower
Doctrine and in spite of the king’s termination of the democratic experiment in Jordan,
Eisenhower institutionalized US support to Jordan during their White House meeting of March
1959.
A generation later, Clinton was offering generous financial relief and military support on
the condition that Hussein demonstrate to the pro-Israel US Congress pro-Israel sentiment in the
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is also important to recall that the US strategic outlook
towards the region began its shift in the early 1960s and became fully Israel-centered in the wake

114
Ibid., p. 535.

115
Ibid.

230

of the 1967 War. To underscore this reality, for example, while King Hussein was still licking his
wounds after the 1967 defeat, Jordan was able to replenish its arms through purchases from US
after the approval of Israel, whose Prime Minister Eshkol stated “that Johnson had effectively
given him a veto over whether the United States should sell tanks to Jordan.”
116
As long as the
regime in Jordan was supportive of Washington’s regional objectives, the topics of democracy
and political reforms were never raised by the Clinton administration or by any previous
administration. While the strategic concerns have varied from Cold war-centered to Israel-
centered, lack of democracy promotion has been a constant.
In fulfillment of Clinton’s condition, and with Clinton as a witness, in July 1994 at the
White House Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein signed in public the Washington
Declaration ending the state of belligerency between Israel and Jordan. The de facto peace
became a de jure peace with the signing of a comprehensive peace treaty in October 1994 at the
border between the two countries. Unlike the Egyptian-Israeli “cold peace,” the king intended to
have “warm peace” and to accelerate the process of normalization with Israel. Additionally, the
Israeli public had overwhelmingly supported the treaty and admired the king. However, the
Israeli-Jordanian peace was a “king’s peace” or “peace of the palace” rather than of the
populace,
117
since peace failed to bring about the highly touted economic benefits and promised
peace dividend to Jordan. More important, the overwhelming majority of Jordanians (of both
Palestinian and Transjordanian origins) resented the treaty and the king’s intended speed of
normalization given that the Oslo Accords were still far from bringing an end to the Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian territories.
With Jordan and Egypt at Peace with Israel, Why still Authoritarian?
The Palestine problem not only constitutes the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but its
non-resolution provides the answer to the counterintuitive rationale of focusing on Egypt and

116
Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, p. 410 fn. 91.
117
Shlaim, Lion of Jordan : The Lion of King Hussein in War and Peace, chapter 26.

231

Jordan, just as it impedes the prospects of democracy in the Arab world. The two-level argument
of this dissertation is that the strong US support for Israel constitutes a major factor in the non-
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict which in turns contributes to the resiliency of the
authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt. The United States’ support for Israel has been defined
by the Arab-Israeli conflict—almost by definition, since Israel was conceived within and born
into conflict with the Palestinians and other Arabs. The 1967 war and its consequences solidified
the US-Israeli relationship into a special one. It also, in essence, dictated the terms and
parameters of the United States’ relationship with the three Arab states that lost territories to
Israeli occupation: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Specifically, successive US administrations
determined the level of American support to the three authoritarian regimes based on their
approach towards Israel and their endorsement of the American-defined, Israel-centered “peace
process.” Notwithstanding his authoritarianism and while at first objectionable to the Eisenhower
administration for his supposed pro-Soviet orientation, President Nasser of Egypt was particularly
objectionable to the Johnson administration for his declared enmity towards Israel. President
Sadat turned into a celebrity in the US only after the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty were signed, and President Mubarak became a trusted ally for following
Sadat’s line and maintaining peace with Israel, irrespective of the authoritarianism of both.
Thanks to Israel’s affinity for the Hashemite dynasty even during war, King Hussein—who ruled
and reigned—had always been a supported “friend” of the United Sates and it became more so
after he signed the peace treaty with Israel.
However, peace with Israel did not end authoritarianism in either Egypt or Jordan. This
may seem to contradict the argument that peace diminishes authoritarianism, or at least presents
Jordan and Egypt as the study’s “tough cases.” On the contrary, having Jordan and Egypt at
peace with Israel constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the causal mechanism
(i.e. the complete resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on international law and UN
resolutions) to have its effect in removing the US rationale for supporting the two authoritarian

232

regimes. Specifically, the explanation lies in that the humiliating 1967 defeat, strong US support
to Israeli policies, and the non-resolution of the Palestine problem as the core of the conflict all
unleashed or intensified currents in the region which prevented a partial Arab-Israeli peace from
removing the conflict from any of the actors’ calculations. The rise of political Islam, rise of anti-
Americanism and increased terrorism not only reinforced the authoritarian regimes’ oppression of
the domestic opposition but also (as will be discussed in the next chapter) provided the rational
for US support for the regimes in Jordan and Egypt against this opposition. Of equal importance,
that Egypt and Jordan reached separate peace treaties with Israel without the resolution of the
Palestine problem lies at the core of Arab opposition to these treaties and regimes. As such,
maintaining the treaties becomes an important source of the US support for these regimes.
As far as the inter-state dimension of conflict is concerned, it has been frequently
repeated and widely accepted that for the Arabs “there is no war without Egypt and no peace
without Syria.” With Egypt out of the equation formally since 1979, there was no American
mediation between Israel and Syria following the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, until the
1990s peace process under the Clinton administration. Although (the late) President Hafiz al-
Assad’s authoritarian regime is not part of the study, the absence of Israeli-Syrian peace also
prevented the activation of the causal mechanism and Clinton’s role in negotiations on the Syrian-
Israeli track presented a graphic illustration of US support for Israeli positions. With strong
Jewish support in the 1992 election and a pro-Israel orientation, Clinton appointed two staunch
pro-Israel advocates, Martin Indyk and Dennis Ross, to lead the peace process. They became
“the intellectual architects” of the US policy towards the region, particularly the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Indyk had previously worked as a research director at the famed pro-Israel lobbying
group AIPAC, and moved from the directorship of the pro-Israel and very influential think tank
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) to become the head of the Middle East
division at the National Security Council. Ross was to replace Indyk at WINEP but was retained

233

from the Bush administration to become Clinton’s special envoy to the Middle East and
coordinator of the peace process.
Thanks to Ross and Indyk, throughout the peace process, Clinton fully subscribed to the
“ripeness” approach whereby the parties should be left to themselves until the process became
ripe for an agreement. However, leaving the parties to their own devices to reach peace, not only
advantaged the status quo-preferring occupying power, but more importantly, restricted the role
of the United States to that of a facilitator—of Israel’s agenda, as it the discussion below
demonstrates. Thus, the Clinton administration’s pro-Israeli approach and its conduct leading to
and during Clinton-Assad Geneva summit were decisive in the summit’s failure and the
continuation of the conflict, which warrants further elaboration.
The Lead-up to and the Clinton-Assad Geneva Summit
Peace on the Syrian front has been most elusive, yet the issues could not have been
simpler. The basic Syrian demand has always been Israel’s complete withdrawal from the Golan
Heights to the June 4, 1967 line. Assad rejected anything short of full Israeli withdrawal—as per
UN 242’s affirmation of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war—” or some
sort of transitional agreement. In other words, Assad insisted on an Israeli-Egyptian-like
framework and rejected the Oslo model and offered “total peace for total withdrawal.” Once such
a commitment was made by Israel, Assad was open to discussing Israel’s concerns. A major
breakthrough came when Rabin made a commitment for full withdrawal if there was an
agreement on three other issues: security, peaceful relations, and an implementation schedule.
The four-issue potential agreement, all parties agreed, was “like a table with four legs that cannot
stand until all four have been constructed.”
118
Rabin’s commitment was made first to Secretary of
State Warren Christopher as early as August 1993 and later to President Clinton. It came to be

118
Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks : 1991-96 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 63.

234

known as the “Rabin Deposit” which was to be kept in Clinton’s “pocket” until agreement was
made on the other three issues.
However, this optimism and breakthrough failed to produce an agreement as the US
“peace process” team deferred to Israel’s desires and provided an early example of the US
abdication of its once proclaimed “honest broker” role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The team
failed to elicit an Israeli response to the Syrian request for clarification after Rabin’s commitment
for a full year.
119
Yet, the head of the team, Dennis Ross, was ready to blame the Arab side for
the lack of progress, a recurring theme during the 1990s. Ross claimed in the concluding section
of his voluminous account of the peace process that Assad “was only prepared to slowly grind out
an agreement in a negotiation marked more by attrition than give-and-take.”
120
However, it was
Rabin, as Ross himself points out earlier in his book, who after Oslo “made it clear …that the
Israeli public would require more time to absorb the agreement with the PLO [and] Rabin
likewise needed more time before moving ahead in the negotiations with the Syrians.”
121

Although subsequent peace talks resumed in the summer of 1995 and January 1996,
producing the significant agreement on Aims and Principles related to security and post-peace
relations, Peres’ call for early elections and Hamas’ suicide bombings prompted Peres to stop the
Wye Plantation talks, and with the election of Netanyahu in may 1996, any hope for genuine
progress in the peace process came to an end. Barak came to power with a renewed hope for
Arab-Israeli peace, exchanged complimentary messages with Assad, and communicated his
explicit desire to resume talks with the Syrians. These developments paved the way for the
December 1999-January 2000 talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. While Israeli officials

119
Israel wanted to confirm that Rabin meant withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 line and not the 1923
international line

120
Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace : The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 1st pbk. ed.
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), p. 760.

121
Ibid., p. 136.

235

attempted to obfuscate the “Rabin Deposit” at different times, Clinton acknowledged that
“[b]efore he was killed [in November 1995], Yitzhak Rabin had given me a commitment to
withdraw from the Golan to the June 4, 1967 borders.”
122
[Emphasis added] With the “deposit”
in his “pocket” and convinced that an agreement was within reach since it was clear to him that
the parties’ positions “were not that far apart,” Clinton promised Barak before the talks to restrict
the US role to that of a facilitator. Given the importance of reaching peace not only to Clinton’s
legacy but also to the interests of the United States, Clinton was “disappointed” by Israel’s
conduct and by the failed outcome of the talks. As he described in his memoir, Clinton
acknowledged that the
Syrians came to Shepherdstown in a positive and flexible frame of mind, eager to make
an agreement. By contrast, Barak, who had pushed hard for the talks, decided, apparently, on the
basis of polling data, that he needed to slow-walk the process…it quickly became apparent that
Barak still had not authorized anyone on his team to accept June 4, no matter what the Syrians
offered.
123

Consistent with the administration’s shielding of Israel from public blame and given the
knee-jerk propensity to blame the Arab side for lack of progress, Albright’s judgment of
Shepherdstown meeting is most illustrative. Contrary to the assessment of American officials
(including Albright) after the end of the administration, she saw fit to charge immediately after
the talks that the Shepherdstown meetings would not have been a missed opportunity “if Assad
had wanted to make a decision.”
124
While unwilling to exert pressure in response to the “Israeli
rebuff” at Shepherdstown, Clinton was to get a second, and as it turned out last, chance to
“facilitate” between Israel and Syria. For the first time, in February 2000 Barak acknowledged to

122
Bill Clinton, My Life, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), p. 883.

123
IIbid., pp. 886-7.

124
Quoted in Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David : The Untold Story About the Collapse of
the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Nation Books, 2004), p. 127.

236

his cabinet Rabin’s June 4, 1967 commitment,
125
but he refused Secretary of State Albright’s
offer to communicate his new position to Assad, demanding that only Clinton could be trusted
with the task. Clinton invited the ailing Assad to Geneva and assured him that the “deposit is in
my pocket; your requests are met and you will be happy.”
126
Assad understood that Clinton was
ready to forward Rabin’s deposit to him and agreed to meet Clinton in Geneva on March 27,
2000.
Yet just as the Geneva summit began, it came to an abrupt end, thus closing the window
to peace between Israel, Syria and (by derivation) Lebanon. Instead of finally forwarding to
Assad the Rabin Deposit he had held in his pocket for nearly seven years, Clinton was advocating
withdrawal to a “commonly agreed border” in which “Israel will retain sovereignty along Lake
Tiberias and a strip of territory.”
127
Given the experience at Shepherdstown and his mistrust of
Barak and now of Clinton, Assad was not interested in more rounds of the same. Succumbing to
Barak’s desire, according to Clinton’s Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs Robert Malley,
Clinton did not present his own ideas such as, for example, establishing an international peace
park in the strip and placing it under Syria’s nominal sovereignty.
128
The fact that Barak dictated
if and when summits would be held and his demands that prevented proper summit preparation
were clear throughout the accounts of the “peace team” principles. As an example, before the
Geneva summit, Barak vetoed Albright’s visit to Syria to prepare for and assess the likelihood
success of the summit.
Confirming Clinton’s lack of will to present his own initiatives and Barak’s dictates on
strategy and tactics, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote that before Geneva,

125
Haaretz, February 28, 2000

126
According to Assad’s interpreter, Bouthaina Shabban as quoted in Swisher, The Truth About Camp
David : The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, p. 94.

127
Quoted in Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams : The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East,
1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003), p. 141.

128
Robert Malley, "Israel and the Arafat Question," The New York Review of Books, October 7 2004, p. 20.

237

“Barak produced a complete script for the President’s use with Assad. In a manner I thought
patronizing, he said it would be fine for the President to improvise the opening generalities, but
the description of Israel’s needs had to be recited word for word.”
129
In a most revealing moment
during the Camp David summit in July 2000, the US role in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks was
clearly expressed by Clinton himself. Angry at Barak for being unforthcoming, according to
Malley, Clinton fretted “I went to Shepherdstown and was told nothing by you for four days, I
went to Geneva and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding, I will not let it happen here!”
130

It is important to recall that as a one-term president and in keeping with UN Resolution 242,
Carter had recognized Egypt’s right to demand full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai to the June
4, 1967 line and was assured of Sadat’s willingness to address Israel’s security demands and
negotiate modalities of implementation. In exercising the crucial honest broker role, once Carter
convinced Begin of the need for full and complete withdrawal, other pieces fell in place; hence
the successful Camp David Accords and the lasting Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
By comparison, Clinton was unwilling to uphold UN Resolution 242 as the frame of
reference or to press upon Barak that it was time for Israel to fulfill its own commitment (i.e., the
Rabin Deposit) to achieve peace with Syria and Lebanon. Instead, the Clinton administration was
always sensitive to Israeli “domestic considerations” and public opinion. As acknowledged by a
member of the Israeli negotiating team, peace talks failed with Syria because “Barak understood
that the Israelis [were] not yet ready to give up to Syria a presence on the Lake of Galilee.”
131

Thus the US position became—as communicated by Albright to Assad in Geneva—that the
Syrian president should not “throw away the chance to recover 99 percent of the Golan Heights in

129
Madeleine Korbel Albright and William Woodward, Madam Secretary (New York, N.Y.: Miramax
Books, 2003), p. 480.

130
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," New York Review of Books,
August 9 2001.

131
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak as quoted in Swisher, The Truth About Camp David : The Untold Story About
the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process, p. 127.

238

a dispute over a narrow strip of land.”
132
America’s acceptance of Israel’s refusal of UN-
mandated full withdrawal (including from the “narrow strip of land”) prevented the resolution of
the conflict with Syria and Lebanon with detrimental consequences, including the 2006
Hezbollah-Israel war.
133

Camp David II
Throughout the Clinton administration Israel shifted back and forth between the
Palestinian and Syrian tracks and attempted to play them off against each other. Having failed to
reach an agreement with Syria, Israel and the US shifted to the Palestinians in a last-ditch attempt
to reach a deal before the new deadline of September 13, 2000. Although much more complex
than Syrian-Israeli peace making, the role the US played was not much different on the
Palestinian-Israeli track. While Clinton “at no time …allow[ed] himself to get out in front of
Yitzhak Rabin, who led the peace efforts,”
134
Netanyahu’s election in 1996 posed a challenge for
the Clinton administration when the expectation was lowered to only keeping the peace process
alive. For example, in reaching the Hebron Protocol of February 1997 (to redeploy Israeli troops
out of the city of Hebron), the US “peace team” members found themselves running around the
city with measuring tapes to secure 20% of the Old City quarter (with a Palestinian population of
20,000) for 450 settlers as to meet the Likud’s leader demands.
As for Barak and Camp David II, by all indications, Clinton’s warning, “I will not let it
happen here,” amounted to just that. Despite nearly eight years of peace making, not only was
there not enough preparation for Barak’s engineered summit, but it was entered into in bad faith.
Barak reneged on his commitment to Clinton and Arafat to transfer three Jerusalem villages to the
Palestinians, prompting Clinton to complain that it was the first time he had been made out to be

132
Albright and Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 481.

133
The counterfactual that “had an Israeli-Syrian peace been achieved in 2000, the Lebanon War of 2006
would have not taken place” is the subject of a project under work by this writer.

134
William B. Quandt, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incrementalism," Journal of
Palestine Studies 30, no. 2 (2001): p. 26.

239

a “false prophet.”
135
Barak sought to negotiate all “permanent status” issues (i.e. Jerusalem,
settlements, borders, security, refugees, and water) and to achieve a final agreement to end the
conflict and all Palestinian claims. However, Barak expected Arafat to make all the concessions,
calculating, in the words of Albright, that “in the ‘pressure cooker’ environment of a summit,
President Clinton would be able to ‘shake’ Arafat into agreement.”
136
Furthermore, while Barak
refused to inform the US of his “endgame” and the “US lacked a sense of direction coming in,”
137

Clinton called for the summit to which Arafat, full of mistrust of Israel and wary of American
intentions, “had to be dragged.” Arafat accepted the invitation only after Clinton promised not to
blame Arafat and the Palestinians in the case of failure. As such, there was wide awareness
among Palestinians of the “American/Israeli trap” and expectation that Arafat would withstand
the pressure by delivering a “No” on their behalf.
There is no need to recap the various, at times contradictory, accounts of the 14 days at
Camp David. It suffices to stress that a dominant and erroneous narrative emerged immediately
after the summit in the United States and Israel. The “orthodox” narrative stressed Arafat’s
rejection of Barak’s historic and “generous offer,” and the inability of the Palestinian leadership
to reach peace with Israel. Far from being a detailed agreement, the American-backed Israeli
offer consisted of vague proposals. Israel offered to return 91% of the West Bank, called for the
annexation of 9% with a land swap of 1% in return, and the retention of 10% in the Jordan Valley
for 20 years. However, considering Israel’s definition of the West Bank, which does not include
three areas (i.e. East Jerusalem, territorial waters of the Dead Sea and a No Man’s Land), the
“generous offer” would have amounted to the permanent annexation of 14% of the West Bank

135
Malley and Agha

136
Albright and Woodward, Madam Secretary, p. 484.

137
Robert Malley, "American Mistakes and Israeli Misconceptions " in The Camp David Summit--What
Went Wrong? Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the Boldest Attempt Ever to
Resolve the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, ed. Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Brighton Sussex
Academic Press, 2005).

240

and its division into three separate areas, thus ruling out territorial contiguity or the political and
economic coherence of the proposed Palestinian state.
138
Israel offered the Palestinians only
custodianship over the al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, functional autonomy (not sovereignty)
over the core of Arab East Jerusalem and sovereignty over its eastern outlying areas. Although it
was not a central focus at Camp David, the refugee issue only solicited the vague and unbinding
efforts by Israel of finding a “satisfactory solution.”
It is critical to stress that throughout Camp David and the entire peace process, the United
States’ standard of progress and compliance was not the fulfillment of UN Resolution of 242 and
reliance on international law to adjudicate claims and counterclaims in its role as the
indispensible intermediary. Rather, its standard was Israel’s needs, Israel’s generous offers from
Israel’s perspective in comparison with Barak’s and other former prime ministers’ prior positions,
and Barak’s ability to sell an agreement to the Israeli public. As the administration’s “point
person” on the Arab-Israeli peace process, Dennis Ross was the principle architect of articulating
this policy and selling it to Clinton. Indeed, as Norman Finkelstein succinctly deconstructed, the
main innovation of Ross’s narrative was to shift the framework of the peace process from rights
to needs. This novel framework served as: (1) an analytic devise to demonstrate Israeli flexibility
and Palestinian intransigence: and (2) a normative devise for justifying a settlement that negated
Palestinian rights…no Israeli “concession” to the Palestinians required any sacrifice of its rights,
whereas the Palestinians were called upon to sacrifice basic rights for the sake of Israeli needs.
139

With the loss of much of historic Palestine, Palestinians based their right to recover the
remaining parts (i.e. West Bank and Gaza) from UN Resolution 242. Without defined or
recognized borders, Israel derived its international legitimacy and state recognition from UN GA
Resolution 181, which partitioned the country and granted Israel 57% of it. Although Israel

138
Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?," international
Security 28, no. 2 (2003).

139
Norman Finkelstein, "The Camp David Ii Negotiations: How Dennis Ross Proved the Palestinians
Aborted the Peace Process " Journal of Palestine Studies xxxvi, no. 2 (2007): pp. 46 & 48.

241

wound up with 78% of the land in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the partition plan still served as
the only legal instrument for adjudicating the Palestinian-Israeli territorial conflict, until 1967.
As the sole representative of the Palestinian people and legal claimant of the occupied territories,
the PLO accepted UNSCR 242 and such acceptance entailed recognition of Israel. More
important, it also marked a Palestinian historic compromise of settling for the remaining 22% of
Palestine. From this perspective, therefore, the goal of negotiations with Israel was to secure full
Israeli withdrawal, end the occupation, and establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza. Although still blaming Arafat for the failure of the 2000 summit, Danny Yatom, Israel’s
former Mossad chief and a member of Israel’s negotiating team at Camp David II, acknowledged
that “we understand very well the Palestinian argument that they had already made all the
possible concessions when they agreed to the borders of June 4, 1967.”
140

Dennis Ross, and by extension the US, neither understood the Palestinian argument nor
ever acknowledged the Palestinians’ historic compromise. Instead, he devised the shift to
“needs” to accommodate those of Israel inside the remaining 22% of Palestine, within the context
of Israel’s increasing “facts on the ground.” Instead of relying on international law and forcing
the application of UN resolutions, Ross viewed Israel’s “giving up” of territory as a generous act
and conceived of the US role as one in which “‘[s]elling’ became part of our modus
operandi…We would take Israeli ideas or ideas that the Israelis could live with and work over
them—trying to increase their attractiveness to the Arabs while trying to get the Arabs to scale
back their expectations.
141
While Ross talked about “selling” on Israel’s behalf, his deputy,
Aaron Miller, who emerged as a critic of the administration’s handling of the peace process,
described its position, in a sobering assessment, as lawyer-ing: “For far too long, many American

140
Danny Yatom, "Background, Process, and Failure," in The Camp David Summit--What Went Wrong?
Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians Analyze the Failure of the Boldest Attempt Ever to Resolve the
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, ed. Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Brighton Sussex Academic
Press, 2005), p. 39.

141
Ross, The Missing Peace : The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, p. 55.

242

officials involved in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, myself included, have acted as Israel's attorney,
catering and coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace negotiations…What
we ended up doing was advocating Israel's positions before, during and after the summit.
142

Despite his earlier promise to Arafat, after the summit, Clinton launched the “blame
Arafat” campaign, which certainly was a contributing factor to the Al-Aqsa intifada and to the
collapse of the peace camp in Israel. Since the US and Israel expected Arafat to succumb to the
“pressure cooker” and deliver concessions, the American team arrived at the summit without a
careful strategy, a willingness to push Barak, or an alternative plan
143
. Once it was clear that
Arafat was not going to accept whatever Barak was offering, the US team members “literally sat
around the table going, what do we do next?”
144
Miller explained that “we can blame Arafat and
praise Barak all day long, but that doesn’t address our share of the responsibility once we got to
the summit. We didn’t run the summit; the summit ran us.”
145
It is noteworthy that due to
Carter’s deep involvement during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David negotiations, there were no
fewer than twenty-three drafts before an agreement was finalized. By comparison, Clinton and
the US negotiating team at Camp David of 2000, in acceding to Barak’s demands, conducted the
negotiations without a negotiating text: the US was in effect doing Israel’s biding without
concrete details on Barak’s specific positions. According to Miller, Barak “wanted an end of
conflict but couldn’t come up with Israeli concessions to produce it. He wanted to focus on the
big issues but yet was having trouble delivering on commitments he had made to the Palestinians
on the small ones.”
146
As for the US role, Miller offers that, had the US “pushed back when the

142
Washington Post, May 23, 2005.

143
Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land : America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace
(New York: Bantam Books, 2008), pp. 300-9.

144
According to Maria Echaveste, Clinton’s deputy chief of staff, quoted in Ibid., p. 301.

145
Ibid., p. 298.

146
Ibid., p. 291.

243

Israelis went too far, we might have preserved our integrity. But we caved to Israeli
objections.”
147
Even Dennis Ross, who was hard pressed to criticize the Israelis or the US role
during the peace process, admitted that when “Barak says no, […] we back off.”
148
As for
Clinton himself, Miller argues that the “president, to use one of his favorite words, was simply
not prepared to “jam” the Israelis.”
149
Indeed, there may well lie the crux of the US role in the
non-resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict and its consequences.
Conclusion
In a seminal study, historian Rashid Khalidi argues that throughout much of its history
the Palestinian national movement presented a “quixotic narrative,” which portrayed “failure as
triumph and defeat as victory.”
150
Such a strategy obscured the PLO political leadership’s many
costly mistakes and poor decision-making (e.g. in Jordan, Lebanon, etc.). Ironically, both despite
and because of the heavy losses, the persistence of the Palestinian cause against insurmountable
odds served to unite the Palestinians in exile and inside the occupied territories and to preserve
their identity as a people.
151
Egyptian President Nasser’s use of the term al-Nakseh (the setback)
for the 1967 war enjoyed wide currency in the Arab world and served a (failed) purpose: to
obfuscate the gap between Nasser’s empty pre-war rhetoric of impending Israeli defeat and the
actual colossal Arab defeat.
Israel, for its part, was determined to reap the benefits of its swift military victory
and not to squander the territorial gains it had won at the expense of Jordan, Syria and Egypt
without exacting its price. This chapter has demonstrated that Israel requested, and readily
received, an American commitment to achieve its supreme objective of not being forced to

147
Ibid., p. 302.

148
Quoted in Ibid.

149
Ibid.

150
Khalidi, Palestinian Identity : The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, p. 197.

151
Ibid., pp. 196-201.

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withdraw unconditionally. Whether green or amber, what counted for Israel was that President
Johnson did not signal a red light before Israel launched its attacks in 1967. Although there was
nothing in Johnson’s record to suggest otherwise, Israel’s immediate pre-war contacts with
Washington left no doubt about US support for Israel’s post-war objectives. Post-war diplomacy
and the adoption of UNSCR 242 formalized the pre-war Israeli-American understanding. The
resolution called for Israeli withdrawal from the (according to French version) occupied
territories as a result of the June war only on the condition that the Arab claimants to these
territories recognize Israel and its “right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries.” As such, the resolution negated the 1947 UN GA partition plan and introduced a
new UN-sanctioned frame of reference to the territorial map of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While
the 1947 partition plan awarded Israel 57% of historic Palestine, UNSCR 242 shifted the status of
Israel’s share of 78% from de facto to de jure.
The resolution incorporated Johnson’s five pro-Israel principles,
152
secured US support
and consensus from the] international community regarding them, and became the only basis for
the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The endorsement of the resolution by Egypt and
Jordan shortly after the war and by Syria in 1973 affirmed their acceptance of this new frame of
reference. The chapter demonstrated that although the resolution contained its pre-war
objectives, Israel did not accept it formally until 1970, and Johnson never intended to pressure
Israel to comply. Israel thus “pocketed” the Arab endorsement without having to withdraw. It
was the 1973 Arab attack on Israeli forces (in the occupied Egyptian and Syrian territories), that
forced the US to reengage, leading to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and producing Arab-Israeli
disengagement agreements.
Unique since the 1967 war, Carter’s determination to implement UNSCR 242 and to
compel Israeli compliance produced the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords and peace treaty.

152
As one of these five principles, the mention the refugee issue was acceptable by Israel as long as it was
mentioned in generalities and without assigning reasonability on Israel for solving it.

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However, Prime Minister Begin’s intransigence and the immense pressure from the American
pro-Israel lobby, led to the failure of Carter’s attempts to resolve the Palestine problem and end
the building of Israeli settlements. This chapter demonstrated that the US refusal to recognize or
negotiate with the PLO served Israel’s goals both of denying Palestinian rights and of remaining
in the Palestinian territories. In support of Israel’s position and mindful of pro-Israel supporters,
successive US administration were unwilling to respond to the PLO’s steady shift towards
recognition of and political accommodation with Israel. It took the Palestinian intifada and the
resulting American Jewish support to move the lame duck Reagan administration finally to
remove the ban on contacts. However, Israel’s supporters compelled the Bush administration to
re-instate the ban at the first “opportunity” and, despite the Madrid-initiated Israeli-Arab
(including Palestinian) talks, the Clinton administration did not recognize the PLO until after
Rabin authorized it do so in the wake of the Oslo Accords. In deferring to Israel over whether it
should negotiate with the PLO, the United States, in effect, abdicated its responsibilities as a
superpower and as a party with significant interests in the region. Specifically, given Israel’s
dependence on the US for political, economic, and military support, the United States has denied
itself the opportunity to independently pursue diplomatic options that could have resulted in the
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With such an outcome, the rise of political Islam—as the
main vehicle of Arab opposition—and the rise of Arab anti-Americanism could have been
neutralized, and the US would have been left with fewer reasons to support Arab authoritarian
regimes, as will be elaborated in the next chapter.
The discussion of the American role in the peace process during the 1990s underscored
the Clinton administration’s abdication of such responsibilities. Although President Clinton
expended considerable time and energy on the Arab-Israeli peace process, to the point of
mastering arcane details of the conflict, his outlook and approach were predominantly filtered and
shaped by the two staunch pro-Israel architects of administration’s policies, Martin Indyk and
Dennis Ross. It was based on their advocacy that the administration adopted the “ripeness”

246

approach (i.e. wait until the process is ripe to engage), which not only favored Israel but also
partially accounted for the failure of the Camp David summit during the last months of Clinton’s
presidency. Moreover, it was due to Dennis Ross in particular that the Clinton’s entire peace
process of the 1990’s and especially during Camp David focused on the parties’ “needs,”
ignoring Palestinian (and Syrian) rights. Clinton succumbed to a faulty strategy which, in effect,
granted Israel veto power over the process and rendered Clinton a facilitator of Israel’s agenda.
While Clinton blamed Arafat and Assad for the failure to reach agreements with Israel, he
nonetheless, in a rare revelation, insinuated that an Israeli-Syrian agreement might have been
reached had he not allowed himself to be, in his own words, Barak’s “wooden Indian.” It is
important to underscore, however, that not only were such an admission of Israel’s intransigence
and Clinton’s uncharacteristic frustration the exception; they were also insufficient to alter the
decidedly pro-Israel American approach. Indeed, if it were not for the revelations of such critics
and former administration officials as Aaron Miller and Robert Malley, the Arab narrative about
the peace process—that the US acted as “Israel’ attorney,” to use Miller’s description—would
have not been corroborated and would instead have been dismissed as “typical Arab” accusations.
It is useful to draw a comparison between Clinton and Carter over their role in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. While Clinton failed to deliver an Israeli-Syrian agreement during the
Geneva Summit (March 2000) or a Palestinian-Israeli agreement during Camp David (July 2000),
Carter succeeded in delivering the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords (September 1978) and a
peace treaty (March 1979). Both presidents assigned high priority to the resolution of the conflict
and involved themselves personally, and both administrations faced more or less the same
staunch pro-Israel US Congress and influential pro-Israel lobby. What accounted for the
difference in results lies in two related factors. The first is that while Carter sought mediation
within the full implementation of UN resolutions, Clinton, abandoned such internationally-
sanctioned principles and, in essence, subcontracted the entire process to Dennis Ross, who
coordinated the US involvement within an Israeli framework. In other words, contrary to

247

Clinton, Carter maintained the role of the US as “honest broker.” The second is that Carter
exerted pressure on Israel and thus ultimately paid a political price in losing American Jewish
support (and perhaps the 1980 election). On the other hand, whether as a result of having learned
Carter’s “lesson” or as a result of a lack of will, Clinton did not seem to have contemplated
pressuring Rabin or Barak
153
to even compel Israel to fulfill already concluded agreements.
The US role in the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is related to the question of
US support for Israel’s existence vs. support for Israel’s policies. In line with the need to
distinguish between US support for Israel’s existence and US support for Israel’s policies, the
discussion presented in this chapter demonstrates that since at least 1967, Israel’s existence has
never come under serious threat from its Arab adversaries.
154
Indeed, there is a strong argument to
be made that, in the context of the sources of US support as discussed in chapter four, it is in the
national interest of the United States to ensure the existence of the State of Israel. American
commitment to Israel’s security and existence enjoys universal recognition, including in the Arab
Word. However, it is not clear how exactly it is in the national interest of the United States to
side with Israel over, for example, settlements in the West Bank or in its desire to a keep a strip of
Syrian territory along Lake Tiberias. It is the US support for Israel’s illegal and expansionist
policies, not the support for Israel’s existence, which the Arabs find most objectionable. Given
the deeply rooted American commitment to Israel’s security, it is through the character of the
president and the views of his administration that the US level of support for Israel’s policies and
the contours of the US’ own policies are determined. The role of the pro-Israel lobby has been to
contribute to the definitions of these policies and to exact a price when an administration deviates.
Indeed, the US president and administration operate within the conventional wisdom in

153
While Clinton was unhappy over Netanyahu’s utter intransigence and slowing of the Oslo process, the
Israeli prime minister (1996-1999) continued with his agenda in spite of occasional US complaints.

154
To be sure, Israel was badly shaken by the surprise Arab attack in 1973. However, it is important to
recall that Egypt and Syria conducted limited military operations—unsuccessfully—against Israeli forces in
the occupied Arab territories. The objective of the war was political: to force American re-engagement to
break the Arab-Israeli stalemate.

248

Washington that a price will be exacted for applying pressure on Israel. Only if an administration
is willing and somehow able to overcome this restrictive environment, can a more productive US
role for mediating a genuine and lasting Arab-Israeli peace be envisioned. The general US
unwillingness or inability to counter such pressures has exacted a heavy price in the Arab world.
This chapter has traced the historical development of the post 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict
and established the centrality of Israel in the US-Israeli-Arab nexus of relations. The next chapter
continues tracing the line and logical sequencing of the argument to examine the consequences.
The non-resolution of the conflict and the US support of Israel’s policies gave rise to of Political
Islam and anti-Americanism in the Arab world and provided the opposition with much of its
raison d’être, inviting oppression by the Arab authoritarian regimes and providing the US with a
further rationale for supporting these regimes.

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Chapter Seven
The External Costs of Internal Oppression: The United States, Political Islam, and
Authoritarian Client Regimes
It has been the main contention of this study that the question of regime type change (e.g.
from authoritarian to democratic, etc.) is a function, not only of domestic, but also external
factors. This dissertation has focused on the latter, specifically on the role of United States
foreign policy toward the regimes in question. As Thomas Carothers points out “[w]here
democracy appears to fit in well with U.S. security and economic interests, the United States
promotes democracy. Where democracy clashes with other significant interests, it is downplayed
or even ignored.”
1
Since support for authoritarianism is a form of democracy demotion, the study
contends and seeks to demonstrate how and why the US strategic objective of supporting Israel
has affected the resiliency of the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan
To do so, the study has discussed the historical evolution of the American-Israeli
relationship into a special one, illustrated its forms and depth, and provided the rationale for its
predominance in the United States’ decision-making towards the Arab world/Middle East. Since
the end of the Cold War, in addition to oil, the security of Israel has been the other overriding
policy objective for the United States in the region. Our examination of US relations with Egypt
and Jordan over the last forty years has revealed the predominance of the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the centrality of Israel. The 1967 war and its consequences have come to define what is
meant by the “Arab-Israeli conflict,” and the United States’ efforts since the late 1960’s to solve
the conflict have been referred to as the “peace process.” Accordingly, the previous chapter
provided a detailed overview of the causes of the June 1967 War, the immediate post-war
diplomacy and UN Security Council Resolution 242, and the US role in the post-1967 conflict,
particularly in the context of the two important developments of the rise of the PLO and Israel’s

1
Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission : Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 42.

250

settlement building in the Occupied Territories. The chapter demonstrated that the American
Israel-centered approached has been central to the non-resolution of the conflict and a thereby a
key factor contributing to the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism. Indeed, the US approach has
been an obstacle to both Arab-Israeli peace and Arab democracy.
Specifically, the study posits the non-resolution of the conflict as the causal mechanism,
or intervening variable for the hypothesis that US support for Israeli polices has strengthened
authoritarian rule in Egypt and Jordan. The study, in effect, also argues that the breakdown of
authoritarianism is more likely once the Arab-Israel conflict is resolved. The goal of this chapter
is to demonstrate these relationships. As we continue to logically trace the argument and closely
examine relevant historical developments, an important factor for the analysis become apparent:
the rise of political Islam. This crucial current has emerged in the Arab world in response to the
1967 War and the non-resolution of the conflict. Before the radical version of this current
reached the United States in the September 11 attacks, its moderate and radical streams not only
had profound effects in the region but also influenced US’s relations with Arab authoritarian
regimes.
Therefore, methodologically, political Islam is conceived of here as another layer of
analysis between the independent and dependent variables: US support for Israeli policies and
Arab authoritarianism, respectively. Having defined in the previous chapter the non-resolution of
Arab-Israeli conflict as the first intervening variable, its distinct consequent—political Islam—is
introduced in this chapter as the second, sequential intervening variable. In this sequence of
causative relationships, Washington sees, in political Islam, a threatening alternative to its client
authoritarian regimes in Amman and Cairo. Given Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan,
the latter two’s support for US polices, the dominant Islamist nature of the opposition in these
two countries, and this opposition’s strong objections to US polices, the US has been simply
unwilling to risk its Israel-driven objectives by supporting genuine democratization.

251

The chapter will demonstrate these relationships, frame the arguments developed thus far
in the dissertation, and connect the pieces of the puzzle within the theoretical framework of the
international dimension of authoritarianism developed in chapter two. To proceed, given the
importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the thesis, the chapter will first explore the possible
“routes” for its resolution: “Arab,” “Israeli,” and “Washington” routes. Second, by definition, the
discussion will focus on the “Washington route” by recalling the international dimension of Arab
authoritarianism. The analysis will apply the two-level game theoretic (based on Putnam’s two-
level game metaphor) to the role of the United States in Arab authoritarianism. Specifically, the
chapter will analyze the conditions under which the US-Arab authoritarian “bargain” was reached
and how the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan extract “ratification” for this bargain from
their domestic constituencies. According to this “bargain” the US grants material and political
support for regimes in exchange for the regimes’ support for US policies and protecting the peace
treaties with Israel. The second dimension of the model which constitutes the other rationale for
US support to the regimes is the fear of the alternative: Islamists coming to power. Political
Islam, then, is encouraged and empowered by the regime’s forceful extraction of “the
ratification,” and it cements the US’s rationale for the need for its authoritarian “bargain.”
Given the place of political Islam in this formulation, it is important to explore this
current in some detail. Accordingly, the chapter traces the origins of the Islamist revival and the
founding of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt, their birthplace and the most
influential Arab country of the time. It will analyze the origins of modern political Islam in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the centrality of Palestine to Islamists everywhere. The
chapter will also address the Islamist radical turn as well as the moderation and calls for political
integration from the majority mainstream Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian
territories. While such developments are discussed in the context of Islamist-regime relations, the
section will end with an analysis of the US position on political Islam and, more important, of

252

how the US perceives the effect of this current on its relations with Arab regimes, given its Israel-
centered objectives.
In the last part of the chapter, the discussion will return to the theoretical framework
mentioned above to analyze its final link in invoking Robert Dahl’s notions of the internal costs
of oppression and of toleration. The dissertation’s incorporation of the Arab regimes’ external
costs of oppression will be assessed in terms of the US’s role in the non-resolution of the conflict
(as discussed in the previous chapter) and the US’s perception of the threat posed by political
Islam to both the Arab regimes and to its interests in the region. Concluding that Islamists
coming to power is an unacceptable outcome, the US has thrown its support behind the existing
regimes, which receive the unequivocal message that oppressing the opposition is cost free in
terms of their relationship with Washington.
The Possible Routes for the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
To be sure, there are three routes for solving the conflict outside the unlikely event of the
Arab use of force, but only two of them can activate the causal mechanism in such a way as to
contribute to authoritarian breakdown. The first would involve Syria’s and the Palestinians’
accepting agreements that fall short of the full implementation of UNSCR 242. In the Syrian
case, this could mean Israeli withdrawal short of the June 4, 1967 borders—in accord, for
example, with what Israel offered at the failed Clinton-Assad Geneva Summit of March 2000:
withdrawal while retaining a strip of land by Lake Tiberias. However, the Syrian regime may not
be able to justify an agreement which cedes a portion of its territories to Israel. Nor may the
regime be capable of maintaining legitimacy, given that both of Syria’s historical rivals, Egypt
and Jordan, signed peace treaties with Israel in return for full Israeli withdrawal.
On the Palestinian front, such a scenario would entail the more complicated issues of
settlement, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, and water. Arafat could have accepted the Israeli
parameters offered at Camp David in July 2000 and signed a treaty to “end the conflict;” his
successor, President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) could still accept a similar offer willingly,

253

under pressure from the US or other Arab states, when and if Israel makes one. However, such
an offer would not be accepted by the majority of Palestinians, and despite a formal agreement
would likely fail to bring an end to the conflict. The agreement would mark its Palestinian signer
as a traitor to the Palestinian cause and as an agent of American and Israeli interests, providing
Palestinians with the rationale to oppose the agreement and to continue resisting the occupation.
Syrian and, more important, Palestinian opposition, then, would render such agreements
illegitimate, and this “Arab route” would lead to the non-resolution of the conflict. Under these
circumstances, the need would remain both for US support for Israeli polices and for these
authoritarian regimes.
The second route deals with the Israeli side. International law and numerous UN
resolutions place the burden on Israel, as the occupying power, to return occupied land and to
cease violations. Its voluntarily compliance and full implementation of the UNSCR 242 would
indeed be the smoothest path to ending the conflict. It is important to stress that contrary to
potential charges of bias against Israel, what makes this route the one of least resistance is that it
entails Israel’s voluntary compliance with international law. Accordingly, the burden is on Israel
to comply under international law and not on the Arabs to accept any less than Israel’s full
compliance. While Rabin seemed to have understood this crucial principle of “we give, they
take,”
2
he and other Israeli leaders have decided to replace international law with “Israeli needs”
in deciding what Israel gives and what the Arabs take.
Nevertheless, since this study tilts in favor of agency in focusing on the decisions of
leaders, an Israeli Charles de Gaulle- or F W de Klerk-like leader would have to be in a position
to lead Israel to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to a satisfactory resolution—acceptable by the
overwhelming majority of Palestinians and by the international community. It will be recalled
that the French leader, in response to a bloody revolution and despite stubborn French opposition,

2
Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace : The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 1st pbk. ed. (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), p. 55.

254

ended France’s 132-year colonization of Algeria. Similarly, the South African leader in response
to international isolation, freed African National Congress’ (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela from
jail unconditionally, and dismantled the apartheid regime completely, thus facilitating the
adoption of a new constitution and bringing the ANC to power. Although pro-Israel forces and
U.S. administrations have always considered the first route (i.e. Arab acceptance of Israel’s
offers) as the only avenue to achieve peace,
3
the “Israeli route” involves different analysis,
beyond the scope of this study. Still, voluntary and full compliance by Israel would resolve the
Palestine problem and end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This would likely sharply reduce Arab
opposition (much of the source of which is US support for Israeli occupation), thus facilitating the
opening of political space and the weakening of authoritarianism.
The same outcome could be reached, perhaps with more effective impact, through a third
route, or the “Washington route,” which has been the argument and focus of this study. The
study offers a “process-oriented” explanation which, while it considers structure, privileges
agency. Thus within the context and constraints of the role of Congress, public opinion, the
media, and pro-Israel lobbying, the analysis has applied a presidential-leadership perspective
4

which focuses on the president and his closest advisers in studying US policies towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It is the contention here that US support for Israel’s security and existence has
been deeply rooted in the structure of the American sociopolitical system, which is highly
unlikely to produce a presidential administration questioning such a commitment. However, US

3
For example, as Clinton kicked off the “blame Arafat” game after Camp David, the influential New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman often peddled the “analysis” that Arafat was too much of a Willie
Nelson singing old songs rather than Nelson Mandela to accept Barak’s historic offer. To the misfortune of
the Palestinians, they were unable, for many reasons, to build an anti-occupation movement in the US
similar to the anti-apartheid movement. Mandela was not willing to accept any agreement short of
dismantling apartheid. The reason Arafat was unlike the towering Mandela was because Arafat failed to
compel Israel to end what is becoming increasingly apartheid-like occupation. See Thomas Freidman,
Yasser Arafat’s Moment, and Dead Man Walking, New York Times, July 28, 2000 and January 30, 2002,
respectively

4
William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions : American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 28-36.

255

polices regarding the conflict and implementation of UN resolutions are, or at least there are
precedents to argue that they should be, “less fixed” in a pro-Israeli mode.
Far from having appeased the Arabs, for example, Carter’s mediation in Camp David
ensured the implementation of UNSCR 242 and secured a peace treaty for Israel with its most
formidable enemies. Another example is George H.W. Bush’s condition that Shamir freeze
settlement building before approving Israel’s request for loan guarantees. Although the
guarantees were ultimately approved without a settlement freeze, there is wide consensus that
Bush’s “tough” stance tipped the 1992 Israeli election to bring Labor’s pragmatic Rabin to power,
which ultimately led to Oslo and the active peace process in the early 1990s. The irony is that
although the two presidents’ efforts were strenuously resisted by pro-Israel forces on the grounds
that they placed undue pressure on Israel, the outcomes (i.e. peace with Egypt and the Oslo
Accords) were ultimately supported by an overwhelming majority of these very forces. Such
examples support the view that, with a willingness to assume the role of the “honest broker”
based on international law, and to withstand short-sighted pressure, while preserving Israel’s
security and US long-term interests, a determined US administration can mediate a peaceful and
just settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to removing a major source for the
rationale of supporting authoritarian regimes, such an effort would also earn the US increased
respect and decreased animosity among a new opposition. Under this scenario, it is less likely for
this opposition to be threatening to US interests and freer to challenge incumbents who are of less
strategic value to the US.
Two-Level Process: US-Arab Bargain and an Authoritarian-Extracted “Ratification”
While recognizing the “Israeli route” as that of least resistance for the resolution of the
conflict, this study has embarked on investigating the Washington route as the key to the
conflict’s non-resolution and to the resilience of Arab authoritarianism. To advance the argument
through its logical links, it would be useful at this point to recall the theoretical model for the
study of Arab authoritarianism presented in chapter two. Using Putnam’s two-level game

256

analysis as a useful metaphor, we conceptualized Washington’s support for the two authoritarian
regimes in Amman and Cairo as entailing a two-level game or process. At Level I, the US
administration, in essence, negotiates a bargain with the authoritarian leader: In return for the
support of authoritarian regimes for its objectives (primary among which is support for Israel),
the US administration offers these regimes blessing and material support. While domestic
considerations enter into the calculations of the two parties as the agreement is negotiated and
reached at Level I to ensure ratification at home, the two leaders still need its legal or de facto
ratification by their respective “legislative” bodies, constituting Level II of the process. The US
administration obtains ratification from the overwhelmingly pro-Israel congress, which approves
economic and military assistance and joins the administration in extending political support to the
Arab authoritarian regime (which placates or satisfies various parts of the authoritarian regime’s
constituent parts/factions). Lacking any, or at least a genuine, democratic legislative body, the
authoritarian regime imposes the agreement at home as a fait accompli or extracts “ratification”
from the domestic opposition through real or perceived oppression.
The Hussein-Eisenhower agreement in 1957 marked an early example of such a US-Arab
bargain. With US support, the king dismissed the democratically elected government and
dissolved parliament, which were considered by the US as pro-Soviet, and declared his support
for the Eisenhower Doctrine, marking Jordan’s shift to the US as its main western financier and
supporter. In return, the regime received political support and a significant increase in military
and economic aid. While US aid to Jordan averaged $6.3 million annually between 1951 and
1956, it increased nearly nine-fold, or to $53.3 million annually for the period 1957-1967,
reaching one-third of Jordan’s total budget.
5
In the cold war context, the US Congress easily
approved such aid and, in exercising its secret budgetary discretion, the CIA funneled millions of
additional dollars in cash payments to the “Brave Young King.” As the US approach under the

5
The calculations are based on figures, in historical dollars, obtained from U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, (1945 -
2006), "The Greenbook" " (USAID). The report is commonly known as "The Greenbook."

257

Johnson administration to the region was becoming increasingly Israeli-centered, economic
support continued thanks to Hussein’s established pro-Western credentials and accommodating
tendencies towards Israel. The US provided Jordan with military support within two
considerations.
First, weapons would strengthen the monarchy vis-à-vis Nasser’s nationalism and
nationalist domestic opposition. Second, those weapons would be of significantly lesser quantity
and quality than what Israel was receiving, and they would be supplied after, as it were, Israel’s
approval, thus fulfilling the condition of US support for Israel. Indeed, even as Israel was
escalating its punitive attacks as part of the march to war in 1967, Johnson approved the supply of
arms to Jordan after Israeli former Defense Minister Shimon Peres “cited the unspoken
‘agreement’ between Israel and Jordan to dampen border trouble.…[and] made clear that Israel
prize[d] Hussein’s independence of Cairo to which [US] aid to Jordan [wa]s decisive.”
6

Similarly, after the 1967 war Israeli Prime Minster Eshkol reported that Johnson had granted
Israel veto power over the supply of tanks to Jordan.
7
Although Jordan did not participate in the
1973 War, King Hussein requested new arms from the US during a meeting with Kissinger,
arguing that the war exposed “how far behind we were in sophisticated equipment.”
8

While such weapons were expected neither to match those sent to Israel nor be used
against it, Zaid Rifai, the accompanying prime minster and the king’s close advisor, explained to
Kissinger that they were “to show our army that you are taking care of us.”
9
As a result, for the
period 1973-1980, total US aid to Jordan increased to an average of $180 million and its military

6
As reported by National Security Advisor Walt Rostow to President Jonson before the latter’s meeting
with King Hussein in June 1966, quoted in Clea Lutz Bunch, "Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States
During the Johnson Administration " Canadian Journal of History 41, no. 3 (2006): p. 535.

7
William B. Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Rev.
ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 410, fn 91, Quandt, Decade of Decisions :
American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976.

8
Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting between Secretary Kissinger and King Hussein, November 8,
1973, p. 11.

9
Ibid., p. 11.

258

portion to that of $97 million, or 54% of the total, marking a jump from 31% for the preceding
decade. In turn, the new (and old) weapons demonstrated that the regime was taking care of its
army to ensure the latter’s loyalty. With such support, the army and al mukhabarat (security
services) are able to perform their primary role for Jordan’s authoritarian regime: protecting the
regime from domestic opposition and enhancing its coercive capability. It is within this context
that the king extracts ratification for the long US-Jordanian understanding under various US
administrations. However, with agreements reached at Level I, the king hardly submits them to
negotiations at Level II. The exceptional cases are “ratified” by the monarch’s rubber-stamp
parliament. He always maintained complete control of the foreign policy portfolio.
As for Egypt, Washington’s misperception of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism as being
pro-communist prevented any similar US-Egyptian agreements until the mid-1970s. With no
military aid, US aid to Egypt consisted entirely of agricultural products (mostly wheat) and
depended on the US administration’s view of Nasser’s regime. The Eisenhower administration
granted credit terms for wheat when it still hoped to dissuade Egypt from moving in the Soviet
direction (over arms) in 1955-56 and again when it began to realize that Nasser’s nationalism was
perhaps not pro-communist after all in 1959-1960 ($110 million). Kennedy realized this fact and
dramatically increased agricultural sales to Egypt to nearly $350 million for 1962-63. Johnson’s
pro-Israel and anti-Nasser orientation led to a decline and then a virtual halt in aid in the mid to
late 1960’s, a policy that carried over into the first term of Nixon’s administration. However, the
1973 War and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements (particularly the second
in which Egypt ruled out war as a means to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict), led to a major policy
shift, as the US infused significant economic aid into Egypt, more than $800 million per year for
1975-1978.
10

The Camp David Accords and peace treaty fundamentally altered Egypt’s relations not
only with Israel but also with the United States. Because Egypt reached peace with Israel, the

10
All figures in this paragraph are in historical dollars and obtained from “greenbook.”

259

Egyptian-Israeli agreement also constituted, in effect, a US-Egyptian agreement. As a result,
because it helped maintain peace with Israel, US aid to Egypt became an extension of US aid to
Israel. The US-Egyptian bargain at Level I stipulated, in essence, that the Egyptian regime
preserve peace with Israel at any and all domestic costs. In case of Egyptian violation or
abrogation of the peace treaty, according to a US-Israeli Memorandum, the United States “will
take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic
and military.”
11
In exchange for Egypt’s respecting the treaty, the US has provided political
support unequivocally and opened its purse generously to Egypt’s authoritarian regime.
Immediately after the peace treaty was signed in 1979, Egypt received $1.5 billion worth of
military aid—its first installment— while Israel received $4 billion. The annual aid package of
$2.2 billion between 1979 and 2000 became a fixture in the US budget, making Egypt the
second—only to Israel—highest recipient of US foreign aid. From the beginning, this line item
also enjoyed automatic approval or “ratification” by the US Congress. More than half of the aid
was allocated for military purposes and Egypt was obliged to spend it buying weapons from
American defense contractors under the US’s full supervision.
Egypt acquired this weaponry “presumably for defense against Libya, but really to ensure
that the Egyptian military would go on backing Sadat’s government and polices.”
12
Sadat’s
controlled initiative to create a limited multi-party political system brought a reprieve to the
regime but ensured the ruling National Democratic Party’s (NDP) domination of parliament with
84% of the seats after the 1979 election. This reinforced the Sadat’s position after the peace
treaty with Israel,
13
thus securing the ratification of not only the peace treaty with Israel but also,

11
The Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State
of Israel of March 26, 1979 became part of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt,
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/israel_us/adddoc/ius_memorandum_agreement_1979.html

12
Arthur Goldschmidt, Modern Egypt : The Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1988), p. 156.

260

at Level II, the bargain with US. Within the context of the agreements and in response to the
resulting and mounting opposition, in September 1981 Sadat “lashed out against real and
suspected domestic foes,” rounding more than 3000 political activists cross the political
spectrum—mostly Islamists—including hundreds of influential personalities.
14
Against the
backdrop of the oppressive atmosphere and popular uproar, Islamist militants assassinated
President Sadat during a military parade on October 6, 1981. Nevertheless, President Hosni
Mubarak’s rule reaffirmed the durability of Egypt’s separate peace with Israel and its strategic
alliance with the United States. Moreover, Egypt’s political realignment underscored the
detrimental impact of Egypt’s removal from the Arab camp and its impotence, for example, in the
face of Israel’s war on Lebanon and colonization, through settlement building, of the occupied
Palestinian territories. The US support for an authoritarian regime responsible for bringing about
these conditions and maintaining the status quo became a major source of Arab opposition to the
regime and to US policies in the region.
The end of the Cold War has not altered this reality. It has been a consistent theme of
this dissertation that the formation of the US’s Israeli-centered approach long preceded the end of
communism, and thus the Soviet threat has not been, at least since 1967, a satisfactory
explanation for US support of Arab authoritarianism. The end of the Cold War, in fact, buttresses
this thesis and answers its critics. While it is generally accurate that the East-West rivalry
prevented the transition from authoritarianism to democracy across several regions (e.g. Eastern
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa), the Arab world has been a notable exception. Contrary to the
widespread claim—albeit reflexively—that the cold war prevented such transitions in the Arab
World, its end failed to usher in democracy. Put differently, this failure could be explained

13
Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge [England] ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 93.

14
Bahgat Korany, "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt," in Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Arab World: Comparative Experiences, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul
Noble (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 50.

261

through a simple quasi experimental design: The introduction of the suspected antecedent (end of
the Cold War) did not produce the hypothesized outcome (transition from authoritarianism).
Therefore, the antecedent must be rejected as a complete explanation.
In fact, the end of the Cold War not only failed to prompt the US to promote democracy,
but also served as a context to Washington’s renewal of its “authoritarian bargain” with Arab
regimes. Thanks to the Madrid Conference and the arrival of Rabin as a prime minster (after the
loan guarantee controversy), in 1992, President Bush left the incoming Clinton administration at
least a low-profile peace process (and more hospitable climate than the later left for Bush Jr. in
2000). From the beginning, the Clinton administration recognized that peace and normalization
with the Arab world were in Israel’s long-term security interest and thus assigned a top priority to
the peace process. Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued that, from “the outset,
advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process and maintaining security in the Gulf have been among
the highest foreign-policy priorities of our administration.”
15
With the Oslo Accords of
September 1993, Clinton and his Middle East “peace team” became intensely involved with the
Arab-Israeli peace process in such a fashion as to dictate the administration’s approach to the
region and relations with Arab regimes. Martin Indyk, former head of the Near East division at
Clinton’s National Security Council outlined the centrality of the peace process (i.e. Israel) in the
renewal of the US-Arab bargain in the following terms:
Pushing hard for political change might not only disrupt the effort to promote peace but
could also work against vital U.S. interests: stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf and strategically
critical Egypt. [T]he Clinton administration fashioned a bargain with America’s Arab allies
[who] would provide the U.S. military with access to bases and facilities to help contain the
“rogues” and would support Washington’s efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict; in return,
Washington would [leave the] regimes to deal with their internal problems as they saw fit.
16

15
Quoted in Fawaz Gerges Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of
Interests? (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

16
Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): p. 77. It is worth pointing out that
containing the “rouges” is in reference to the policy of “dual containment” against Iran and Iraq which the
Clinton administration had adopted based on a policy study authored by Indyk while serving as the head of
the influential and decidedly pro-Israel think tank Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).

262

Although he stated it in reference to Clinton’s approach during his last year in office,
former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau’s similar
observation that the “only messages that Arab leaders received from the White House were (1)
support a Palestinian-Israeli Agreement that the Palestinian people are visibly rejecting and (2)
pump more oil”
17
is applicable to Clinton’s entire presidency. To be sure, the US has long
recognized the Arab authoritarian regimes’ occasional needs “to take positions at odds with the
United States …to calm popular outrage at home.”
18
In fact, the US, at least as early as the mid-
1960’s, understood the dilemma of the US-friendly Arab leaders when Johnson’s National
Security Advisor acknowledged of King Hussein that “unless he acts the good Arab he endangers
his own throne.”
19
It will be remembered that previous chapters have demonstrated King
Hussein’s historical pro-Western orientation and long desire for rapprochement with Israel. His
support for the peace process and Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel constituted the king’s side of
the bargain. American financial support and Clinton’s laissez-faire approach towards the
domestic policies of the Amman regime represented Washington’s side of the bargain. It will be
recalled that because of Jordan’s July 1988 disengagement from the West Bank and the April
1989 economic riots among the regime’s traditional supporters, Hussein introduced a series of
political reforms, leading to free parliamentary elections in November 1989. The Islamists won a
stunning victory as they operated within expanding political space thanks to the termination of
emergency rule and martial law (many aspects of which in place for decades) and the legalization
of political parties (particularly the Islamic Action Front Party).
The Islamists’ increasing power alarmed and reminded the king of the nationalist
opposition’s growing influence and parliamentary victory in 1956. While the regime quickly

17
Abdel Moneim Said Aly and Robert Pelletreau, "U..S.-Egyptian Relations," Middle East Policy 8, no. 2
(2001): p. 48.

18
Ibid.: p. 49.

19
Robert Komer, Interim National Security Advisor, quoted in Bunch, "Balancing Acts: Jordan and the
United States During the Johnson Administration ": p. 528.

263

dismissed the 1956 nationalist parliament in the context of the US Soviet-centered bargain, the
king decided to cut the Islamists’ influence in a less blunt fashion against the backdrop of the US
Israeli-centered bargain. In the wake of the Oslo breakthrough announcement the king first
considered cancelling the elections slated for November 1993, but then shifted to produce a new
election law designed to reduce the influence of the opposition, particularly the Islamists and to
gerrymander districts as to dramatically increase the representation of the traditional pro-regime
Trans-jordanians at the expense of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. With electoral manipulation
and engineering, regime supporters won in the 1993 elections; they subsequently ratified the 1994
peace treaty with Israel and the implicit authoritarian bargain with the United States at Level II.
In fact, on the same day the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, Clinton addressed the
Jordanian Parliament, promising economic aid while warning against “the forces of terror and
extremism that cloak themselves in the rhetoric of religion and nationalism.”
20
The domestic
“price, however, was the trampling of the political liberalization.”
21
The short lived opening “had
suffered its first major setback on the eve of the Madrid” conference in October 1991 as the
muhabarat’s began harassing those opposing the peace process.
22
While Hussein was utilizing
his oppressive security apparatus to prevent derailing the second separate Arab peace treaty with
Israel, the US had raised no objections to the king’s “ratification” methods. In addition to its
hands-off approach towards what constituted a rapid reversal of the regime’s limited political
liberalization, the US continued its economic and military aid to the Jordan, averaging nearly
$300 million per for 1996-2000 and constituting around 12% of Jordan’s total budget.
23
In this
climate, the regime continued its retreat from the short-lived liberalization with renewed

20
Address by President Clinton to the Jordanian Parliament, Amman, Jordan, October 26, 1994.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_/ai_16932958

21
Laurie A. Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," Journal of
Palestine Studies 28, no. 2 (1999): p. 60.

22
Ibid.: p. 59.

23
The “greenbook” and figures from Jordan’s 2000 budget.

264

restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and with increased violations of human
rights.
The two-level framework has demonstrated thus far the exchanged utilities between the
authoritarian regime and the United States according to the implicit bargain. However, as
mentioned earlier, there is a second and equally consequential dimension to the framework which
centers on the nature and agenda of the domestic opposition to the persistent authoritarian regime:
the fear of the alternative. The US and Arab authoritarian regimes share the genuine fear that, in
free and democratic elections, the opposition will emerge victorious, assume power, and
drastically alter the status quo in cancelling the bargain. To be sure, while both the secularist and
the Islamist oppositions in the Arab world are against US polices, it is the latter that constitutes
the majority of the opposition. The following discussion will focus on political Islam since it is
perceived by the regimes and the US as the most formidable and organized to pose the most
threat. So as not to risk the arrival of Islamists to power and thus the abrogation of the bargain,
the authoritarian regime resorts to oppression if need be and the US sees an added rationale for
supporting this regime, thus cementing the bargain. In other words, the US supports the
authoritarian incumbents not only because the latter support its policies but also because of the
conviction that their successors will not. Given its importance, it is necessary to unpack the
“opposition” and explore its sources.
It will be recalled, building on Dahl’s axiom that the chances of democracy increase the
more the cost of repression exceeds the cost of toleration,
24
that the dissertation has posited that
the authoritarian incumbent’s decision to keep power and not to democratize is a function of both
Dahl’s internal costs and, as the dissertation introduced, the external costs of repression and of
toleration. The introduction of such external costs to the domestic balance sheet and the
incumbent’s calculus, within the focus on the US role, required the historical-empirical

24
Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1971),
p. 15.

265

investigation in the previous chapters. The study demonstrated the special nature of the US-
Israeli relationship, established the centrality of Israel to US-Arab relations, and provided
evidence for the US pro-Israeli approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process.
The non-resolution of the conflict, within this Israeli-centered reality and the US-Arab
authoritarian bargain, has significantly contributed to the rise of political Islam and anti-
Americanism in the region. These trends have both shaped and empowered the opposition. To
be sure, corruption, failed economies, the denial of rights, oppression, and other detrimental and
domestically-driven components of authoritarianism have always produced some form of
opposition in societies across time and space. In addition, in the Arab context, the United States
is deeply implicated in the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism, thus shaping the opposition into
an anti-American posture and “authentic” Islamist identity and agenda. As the discussion turns to
political Islam, the question of how this consequential current in the Arab opposition affect the
regimes’ external costs of repression vs. toleration will be kept in mind and addressed when we
turn back to the theoretical framework afterwards.
The Rise of Political Islam
The third Abrahamic and monotheistic religion, Islam is not unique in having a deep
influence on the political orientations of its adherents. Islam has a long tradition of revival
(tajdid) and reform (islah) dating back to the emergence of the religion in the seventh century.
There is no need to dwell on the distant past to appreciate the Islamist revival of the last few
decades, for it is traceable to the formation of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood (Harakat
el-Ikhwan el-Muslimin) in Egypt in 1928. As the most populous Arab country with long
historical and strategic importance, Egypt has been always at the center of the political and socio-
cultural life in the Arab world. Whether in culture (particularly, in films and music), political
ideologies (e.g. Arab nationalism and socialism), military strength, or socio-religious revivalism,
Egypt had held the dominant role and set the standards for the Arab world. Thanks to the more
than a thousand year old premier al-Azhar university, Egypt’s influence in Islamic scholarship

266

and ideology has been felt throughout the Muslim world. Accordingly, to analyze Islamic
revivalism and political Islam is to focus on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
The Roots of Islamist Revivalism: the Foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood
Influenced by such Muslim reformers as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu and
Rashid Ridha, school teacher and activist Hasan al-Banna formed the Brotherhood in the midst of
Egypt’s struggle against British colonialism and the country’s inability to address its pressing
social, economic, and political ills. As mentioned in chapter five, the Egyptian nationalist
movement as articulated by the `Urabi Revolution of 1881-1882 and the Sa`ad Zaghlul
Revolution of 1919 (which forced Britain to grant Egypt nominal independence) failed to end de
facto British rule, solve Egypt’s problems, or usher in meaningful reforms. Nor was the reformist
movement of Muhammad Abdu any more successful, for it catered to the learned and thus lacked
mass appeal.
25

With an activist orientation and Sufism-influenced Islamic education, al-Banna criticized
secularists for their adoption and glorification of the “principles of the European civilization” and
the earlier Islamic modernists for their production of “Westernized Islam.”
26
He began his
da’wah (preaching and call to Islam) to the masses on the centrality of Islam in all aspects of
human life. Thus the Quran and the Sunnah (the tradition in the actions and sayings of the
Prophet Muhammad) constituted the foundational reference for the religion, and the Sharia
(Islamic law) constituted the map for Muslim life. A-Banna sought, above all, to convince
Muslims to appreciate the essence of Islam for salvation and self-betterment, which would lead to
the reform and awakening of the ‘umma (the community), leading naturally to a Muslim regime.
Its philosophy consisted of the simple proposition that al-islah yabda’ bi el-nafs (reform begins
from within oneself). Denying any political aims, al-Banna insisted that the movement was

25
Charles Butterworth, "Political Islam: The Origins," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
And Social Science, no. 524 (1992): p. 35.

26
John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality?, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), p. 133.

267

concerned only with social causes and religious matter. Thus the inter-war years witnessed the
establishment of schools, clinics, and other social and welfare organizations, and by 1948 the
Brotherhood had 2000 branches and a million followers. As the “triangular confrontation
between the monarch, the British, and …the Wafd party,” prevented the resolution of Egypt’s
woes, Dekmejian argues that the success of al-Banna’s movement owed to its possession of
crucial distinguishing characteristics: an activist ideology, organized structure, charismatic
leadership, mass following, and a pragmatic orientation.
27
For this reason, al-Banna is considered
the foremost Muslim revivalist leader in the Sunni Arab World in the twentieth century. The
Indian Abul ‘Ala Maududi founded the Jamaat-i Islami party (Islamic Society) in 1941, which
came to dominate in the Sunni Indian subcontinent. Albeit with some differences, the groups
have a similar ideological worldview and activist orientation, and constitute the source of
numerous offshoot groups and organizations in the Muslim Sunni world. While Islamic
revivalism in the Shiite Muslim world shares many elements of its Sunni counterpart, particularly
the rejection of colonialism as a crime against Islam and Westernization as a threat to Muslims, it
remains distinct and draws its inspiration from the late Ayatollahs Khomeini of Iran and Baqir al-
Sadr of Iraq.
28

As the largest Islamic movement in the Arab world, the Brotherhood, under its General
Guide al-Banna, became a recognized and formidable political force in Egypt and formed military
wing and a secret apparatus. It established many branches in the Arab world, including in Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen. Although subordinate to the Egyptian center in the
general ideological and theoretical senses, the movement’s branches in other countries exercised
organizational and programmatic independence, operating within the specific context of the
country. With regional reach and national popularity, the Brotherhood reached its apogee in
Egypt during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, in which many Society volunteers participated. Indeed,

27
Richard Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, Second Edition, p. 74-75

28
Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 2.

268

the Society had been involved in Palestine since the Palestinian revolt of 1936-9, and the
Palestine problem had become “the most pressing” issue outside of Egypt for the Society. For the
Brotherhood, “Palestine was the beginning of the identification of the United States with political
imperialism…and the United States ‘joined the ranks of imperialists with the creation of
Israel.’”
29

With the rapid growth of the movement’s strength and influence and use of violence and
assassinations in Egypt, the government moved against it with full force. In response, the
Brotherhood assassinated Egypt’s Prime Minister in December 1948 and, and in response, the
government dissolved the Society and “brought a reign of terror against the society,”
30

culminating in the government’s assassination of al-Banna in February 1949. Although the
Society’s legal status was reinstated a year later under its new General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi,
it was still disoriented because of the departure of its charismatic founder, al-Banna. As
discussed in chapter five, the Brotherhood shared, if not led, the Egyptian consensus that the
palace and the ruling Wafd party were discredited as nationalist forces in the struggle against the
British. As such, while not taking part, the Society welcomed the Free Officers’ overthrow of
monarchy in the 1952 revolution and enjoyed friendly relations with the new regime. However,
the honeymoon was short-lived as Nasser moved to assume full control of the new regime’s
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) after a short power struggle with the officers’ titular
leader General Muhammad Najib and banned all political parties, many of which sided with
deposed leader. The Brotherhood also supported Najib, demanded a referendum on a new
constitution, and led the opposition against the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which they alleged
was treasonous for not ending British control completely. In the aftermath of an assassination

29
Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.
227.

30
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 2nd ed., Contemporary
Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 77.

269

attempt against Nasser, allegedly by the Brotherhood, Nasser dissolved the movement, outlawed
all of its activities, executed several of its leaders, and imprisoned thousands of its members, thus
sending it underground.
Sayyid Qutb: the Roots of Political Islam’s Militant Turn
One of these Brotherhood members sent to prison was activist, prolific writer, and former
advisor to the new regime’s RCC, Sayyid Qutb. As an employee of the Ministry of Education,
Qutb was sent to the United States to study Western educational methods. During his three-year
US stay, the pious Qutb was struck by three observations that were to appall him and profoundly
alter the course of his worldview. Although he admired the scientific and economic progress of
the country, Qutb experienced a culture shock from the racism, anti-Arab and pro-Zionist
sentiments, and sexual permissiveness of American society.
31
Upon his return to Egypt, he
became more religious and an uncompromising critic of the West, joined the Brothers, and
quickly rose through the leadership ranks before being sent to prison in October 1954.
It was during his long imprisonment, where he was subjected to and made witness to
brutal and systematic torture by the regime, that Qutb honed his political-religious ideology,
completed his landmark Quranic commentary (In the Shade of the Quran) , and published his
most influential and far reaching Islamic ideological and revolutionary tract, Ma’alim fi el-Tariq
(Milestones). Qutb’s books were to be translated to many languages, and in particular,
Milestones became must reading for the uninitiated and the instrument of introduction into
Political Islam (violent or otherwise). Qutb launched a frontal attack on communism, capitalism,
individualism, qawmiyyah (Arab nationalism), wataniyyah (local nationalism), and other worldly
systems—including those prevailing in the Arab and Muslim worlds—and placed them along
with their proponents in the camp or society of al-jahiliyya (ignorance, darkness, and unbelief in
reference to the pre-Islamic era). According to his binary classification, Islamic society was not

31
John Esposito Esposito, The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality? , p. 136. John L. Esposito, The Oxford
Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), v. 3, p.
401.

270

only the other recognized system but also the only system acceptable to God. With the al-
jahiliyya society having committed the ultimate sin in challenging God’s most innate
characteristic of supreme sovereignty and rule on earth (al-Hakimiyyaah), Qutb theorized that it
was up to the vanguard (tali’ah) of Muslims to lead through jihad the renaissance (ba’th) from the
al-jahiliyya state to the Islamic community (umma) and to establish God’s reign under Islamic
rule.
32
Qutb’s radicalism lay in his departure from the Brotherhood’s unified ideology (under al-
Banna) by identifying Nasser’s repressive regime (and other Arab authoritarian regimes) as the
main target of the struggle and by advocating a revolutionary (as opposed to evolutionary) course
for Islamic revival, including the use of arms. Rooted in Nasser’s brutal oppression, torture had
begotten radicalism. The new radical position of the younger disaffected generation, in essence,
caused an internal split between the old guard’s evolutionary approach of preaching and social
activism. With rejection by the mainstream of the Brotherhood, “[a]ctivism, originally rooted in
the theory of religious revivalism, evolved in response to repression.”
33

Nasser’s repression of the underground Brotherhood, the regime’s brutal and outright
killing of the movement’s imprisoned members, the Qutb’s resultant militancy, and his
intelligence and powerful literally style all led to Qutb’s emergence during the 1950’s as the
Society’s “major voice… and most influential ideologue.”
34
Although released from jail in May
1964, fifteen months later he was rearrested for terrorism and sedition, and brought to a show trial
with his Milestones book as the main “evidence” presented. Despite intense international
pressure, he was executed in August 1966, thus creating the most storied martyrdom in the
history of modern Islamic revivalism. As was the case in 1954, the Brotherhood was accused of
an assassination attempt on Nasser’s life in 1965, resulting in more oppression through the

32
Sayyid Qutb, Ma’alim Fi El-Tariq (Milestones) (1966), pp. 5-13.

33
Mark Huband, "Egypt: The Community of Muslims," in The Contemporary Middle East : A Westview
Reader, ed. Karl Yambert (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), p. 226.

34
Esposito, The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality? , p. 136.

271

killing, torture, and arrest of thousands of its members, while many others were forced to flee the
country or go underground.
35
In the face of the regime’s brutality, the Brotherhood teetered on
verge of virtual extinction. Ironically, it was in the confines of Nasser’s prisons that the
Brotherhood managed to survive, as its members engaged in debates and bitter interpretational
disagreements over the underspecified practical implications of Qutb’s ideological positions. The
Brotherhood’s bleak fate was further reinforced by the success of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism.
It will be recalled from chapter five that once Nasser defeated his domestic enemies (through co-
optation, marginalization, imprisonment, or liquidation) and consolidated his power, he pursued
and secured externally–driven Arab nationalist credentials. This showdown with the British over
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, the 1955 Czech/Soviet arms deal, the nationalization of the Suez
Canal, the political victory in the aftermath of the Suez War, opposition to the Baghdad Pact and
the Eisenhower Doctrine, anti-Israel stands, the unity with Syria, and his support for nationalist
forces across the Arab world all made Nasser a hero for most Egyptians and for the Arab masses.
During the 1950’s and early 1960’s, the ideology of Arab nationalism was the dominant political
force. The signs of secularism were many and the expressions of public religiosity (e.g. women
wearing hijab, men sporting beard, mix of sexes, etc…) were few. Indeed, “Nasser appeared to
have solved, in a secular context, the pervasive Arab identity crisis by overwhelming all
sectarian, fundamentalist, rightist, liberal, and leftist challenges.”
36

The 1967 War: Resurrection of Political Islam
The above climate lasted until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The swift and colossal Arab
defeat by Israel had profound implications across the Arab world: it discredited Nasser’s Arab
nationalism and socialism, thus causing an identity crisis; it exposed the collective impotency of
the Arab militaries; it delegitimized Arab regimes, prompting the masses to challenge
authoritarian rule and corruption; it exposed class conflict; and it exacerbated cultural crises.

35
Ibid., p. 138.

36
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, p. 26.

272

These resulting conditions, according to Dekmejian, constitute the “attributes” of “a crisis
environment.” In a useful analytical model for the study of the rise of fundamentalism in the
Arab world, Dekmejian argues that the presence of a cross-national societal crisis environment—
with such attributes—causes and determines the intensity of Islamic revivalism.
37
The response
to this resulting multifaceted milieu of crises, disorientation, and dislocation was to be found in a
religious reawaking among the masses and the emergence of political Islam under the Islamists’
slogan “Islam is the solution.” Shortly after the war, Egypt’s most celebrated religious leader and
preacher, Sheikh Sha’rawi, was to declare that we “thank[] God for a traumatizing defeat that
served to awaken the nation from its engagement on the wrong path, by having left religion
aside.”
38
Moreover, the soul-searching following the catastrophic defeat was as deep and
widespread as to call into question nationalist and other “imported” ideologies, Western-
influenced development strategies, and the Western, particularly American, support for Israel not
only by Islamists but also secularists of variety of orientations. There was in the Arab world a
state of collective cognitive dissonance, so to speak, but with the recognition that only an
authentically-based movement could serve as a resolution. While the Islamists readily concluded
that the solution lay in political Islam, the secularist forces either accepted this new direction
grudgingly or as a result of being too discredited or weak to resist the societal shift in the
Islamists’ direction.
That the June 1967 Arab defeat led to such profound changes, especially Islamic
revivalism, is widely agreed upon by scholars of political Islam. With the Arab defeat and the
loss of Jerusalem, including Islam’s third holiest mosque shrine, al-Masjid al-Aqsa, the Muslim
Brotherhood was presented with “a new opportunity”
39
and with “their patiently awaited hour.”
40

37
Ibid., pp. 3-7 and 23-30.

38
Quoted in Bassma Kodmani, "The Dangers of Political Exclusion: Egypt's Islamist Problem," in
Carnegie Papers: Middle East Series (Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2005), pp. 8-9.

273

This “historic turning point”
41
resurrected the Society, in both its evolutionary moderate and
revolutionary radical strands, and ushered it back into the forefront of Egypt’s sociopolitical
landscape. It experienced a relative reprieve from Nasser before his death in 1970, before the
successor regime under Sadat sought an unexpected accommodation with the Society’s by then
prevailing moderate and majority faction. Sadat’s overture was designed to counterbalance the
leftist forces and embark on the de-Nasserification of government and Egyptian polity aimed at
consolidating his own power. Accordingly, Sadat released the Society’s political prisoners, and
while he denied it recognition as a political party or registration as jam’iyyah (social
organization), he permitted the Society to engage in social and charitable activities, preaching,
and publishing. As a result, the Brotherhood continued its recruitment from the middle and lower
middles classes and received generous financial support from members working in the Arab-oil
countries.
42

Notwithstanding the lack of political recognition by the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood
became, in a sense, the “legal opposition.” This earned it accusations of betrayal and having been
co-opted by the government from the minority radical faction, which formed its own various
underground groups—as will be explained shortly—and which could no longer be considered
part of the Brotherhood. As this opposition increasingly asserted its independence in the face of
economic stagnation and the absence of social reforms, its opposition to the Camp David
Accords, the separate peace treaty that left the question of Palestine question unresolved, and
Egypt’s alignment with the United States rendered it intolerable from the point of view of the
regime. Consequently, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, Sadat lashed out at all enemies,

39
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, p. 78.

40
Gilles Kepel, Jihad : The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.
32.

41
Esposito, The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality? , p. 10.

42
Ibid., p. 140.

274

arrested thousands of opposition leaders (the majority of whom were Islamists, including the
Brotherhood’s General Guide, Umar Tilmasani) in September 1981. On October 6, 1981, Sadat
was assassinated, but by the radical Islamic Jihad group, not a member of the Brotherhood.
43

Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Liberation Organization, Takfir w-al Hijra, al-Gammaa al-
Islamiyya, and many other smaller, radical organizations came into existence either soon after
1967 or during the 1970’s. Having survived Nasser’s torture and Sadat’s continued oppression,
the groups’ leaderships emerged with a determination to hold the regime accountable by force.
Turning al-Banna’s formulation upside-down and adopting Qutb’s full ideological program, these
groups pushed their argument to its logical conclusion: total war with the ruling regime and all
“Muslim” regimes not fully implementing Islam. There is no need to delve into the narrow
ideological differences among these groups, their leadership style, or organizational structures; it
is sufficient here to stress that they view jihad (holy war) as a necessary instrument against the
unjust authoritarian ruler as the first step in transforming society from a state of al-jahiliyya to the
perfect Islamic rule and community. While the groups may differ over the timing of such
undertaking, their open challenge and willingness to begin at the top in targeting the regime posed
an immediate, mortal threat to the regime and, in turn, placed them in the direct sight of the
regime’s coercive apparatus. As they declared war on the Mubarak’s “atheist” and “infidel”
regime, the regime declared war on the “bloody terrorists” during the 1980’s and early-mid
1990s, when fringe groups escalated by targeting Western tourists and Egypt’s Coptic Christians.
The result was reciprocal assassinations, violence, and terrorism.
By the early 1990’s, the radical groups had emerged with a sense of boldness and self-
confidence in the aftermath of many of their members’ participation with the victorious
Mujahedin against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. While down-playing the instrumental effect
of the Reagan administration-supplied Stinger Missiles in the Soviet defeat, the Arab (and other)
Mujahedin shared the conviction that they had played an important role in toppling the godless

43
Also known as Tanzim al-Jihad and Egyptian Islamic Jihad

275

communist Soviet superpower. It is noteworthy that it was during the Afghan war that three
influential Arab Mujahedin—as members of what came to be known as the “Arab Afghans,”—
met or reconnected. The Egyptian medical doctor member and future leader of the Islamic Jihad
(later the New Jihad) Ayman al-Zawahiri was implicated in Sadat’s assassination, imprisoned and
tortured before traveling to Afghanistan to join the battle. The Palestinian-Jordanian professor of
religious studies in Jordan, Abdulla Azzam, was too impatient with a stale academic position
under the King Hussein’s restrictive regime to advance the cause of umma (Islamic community)
and too radical for the regime not to be forced out. Azzam left for a teaching position in Saudi
Arabia (where Qutb’s Milestone was a required reading) where he and Professor Mohammad
Qutb (who shared his brother Sayyid’s ideology) taught university student Ussama bin Laden,
Azzam, al-Zawahiri, and bin Laden were to find their separate ways to Afghanistan to join the
battle. The former two (who met in Egypt in the early 1970’s) were members of the Brotherhood
before following Qutb’s radical turn and were to provide bin Laden with his intellectual
foundation and radical ideological underpinnings.
There has been always strong condemnation across the ideological spectrum in the Arab
(and Muslim) world of the US support for Israel. The radical ideology and groups have judged
this alliance as to meet the condition of having to declare jihad, time permitting, on both Israel
and the US. It was thanks to Azzam, who saw the Afghan war as the “experimental battle”
44

towards the liberation of Palestine , that former student bin Laden was steeped in the importance
of Palestine in the struggle against the “Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators.”
45

With the defeat of the Soviets at the hands of the Mujahedin, and with his late mentor’s influence
bin Laden linked his al-Qaida with al-Zawahiri’s New Jihad to form the al-Qaida network and
turn their attention to the other superpower. In his declaration of war on the United States on

44
Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know : An Oral History of Al-Qaeda's Leader (New York: Free
Press, 2006), p. 40.

45
Quoted in Ibid., p. 164.

276

August 23, 1996, bin Laden, under the protective hospitality of the Taliban’s Mullah Omar,
stressed among other things (e.g. rejection to the presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia) that:
I feel still the pain of the loss of Al-Quds [Jerusalem] in my internal organs. That loss is
like a burning fire in my intestines…My Muslim Brothers: the money you pay to buy American
goods will be transformed into bullets and used against out brother in Palestine…My Muslim
Brothers of the World: you brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places [in Mecca
and Medina, Saudi Arabia] are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting
against the enemy—your enemy and their enemy—the Americans and Israelis.
46

Providing extensive inventory of bin Laden’s statements over the years—long before the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Peter Bergen concludes that numerous such statements of bin
Laden’s should put to rest the “canard” in the “conventional wisdom that bin Laden adopted the
Palestinian issue only recently [i.e. after 9/11].”
47
While the difference between the Islamist
revolutionary and evolutionary strands lies in timing and tactics, the liberation of Palestine has
been always an essential question.
To return to Egypt’s Islamists, in a clear rejection of the violent strand, particularly in the
aftermath of Sadat’s assassination, and as an affirmation of their grassroots philosophy, the
mainstream Brotherhood adopted the strategy of working within the existing order and therefore
accepted parliamentary democracy and political pluralism. The Brotherhood took advantage of
the Mubarak regime’s relative political opening in the context of massive economic problems,
and thus registered significant gains in the Islamization of Egyptian society during the 1980’s.
The organization sponsored a full array of social welfare programs, established publishing
houses, founded media outlets, opened Islamic banks and investment houses, and built mosques.
The assertion of Muslim identity reached all socioeconomic strata and manifestations of religious
observance spread everywhere.
48
Since then, in the democratic elections of the professional

46
Quoted in Ibid., pp. 165-6.

47
Ibid., p. 164.

48
Esposito, The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality? , p. 141.

277

unions and syndications, the moderate Muslim Brothers have won board elections in the medical,
lawyers, engineering, and other professional associations.
49

The Brotherhood had penetrated all aspects of Egyptian civil society and the movement’s
peaceful and gradualist social transformation had been institutionalized. It is important to point
out that other, smaller gradualist (and radical) groups have also contributed to the society’s
Islamization, which had affected Egyptians with various degrees. To counter the violent
Islamists, the regime attempted to burnish its own “Islamist credentials” by granting a public
platform to the Brothers and the state’s ‘ulama (religious scholars) and advancing an official
Islamic discourse. Additionally, according to Dekemjian, the large gradualist camp operates
within an “ideological spectrum [that] ranges from liberal and middle-of-the-road- intellectuals to
various conservative shaykhs and politicians,” and could be thought of to consist of modernists-
rationalists and Traditionalists-Pragmatists.
50

During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the moderate mainstream Egyptian Brotherhood had
proven that it was able to garner sizable grassroots support within the existing political system. It
has done so also with an unwavering commitment to political pluralism and peaceful opposition.
The denial by Mubarak’s regime, with the United States’ endorsement, of the opposition’s
legitimate demands accounts for an important source of anti-Americanism in the region. While
presumably apolitical, the brotherhood-sponsored developments and dramatic shifts were taking
place at the same time of and in parallel to the state’s failure to address society’s needs, the
regime’s increased corruption, and Mubarak’s suppression of rights and denial of democratic
reforms. What is of relevance to the United States is that the Egyptian opposition (Islamists or
others) rejects Egypt’s unwavering alliance with the United States and its continued peace treaty

49
Saad Edin Ibrahim, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview," in Political
Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 50.

50
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, p. 179.

278

with belligerent Israel. It is because of such concerns the United States supports Mubarak’s
authoritarian rule; absent such concerns, the United States would have no intrinsic objection to an
Egyptian opposition in conflict with the regime over domestic issues.
While still denied legal party status because of Egypt’s law banning religious-based
parties, the Muslim Brothers, determined to participate in the political process, have nonetheless
entered elections over the years in alliance with other political parties. Their platform for the
1987 elections was typical in calling for, among other things, “non-alignment and avoidance of
any special relationship with the United States; and freezing [i.e. abrogating] of the Camp David
accords.”
51
Despite severe restrictions and obstacles, the Brotherhood has managed to make
respectable showings, although never of sufficient size to challenge Mubarak’s ruling National
Democratic Party (NDP). Through manipulation of election laws and blunt coercive tactics, the
NDP have never received less than 78% (in 1987) of the seats in parliament; purportedly secured
as much as 93% (in 1995).
It is through coercion and electoral manipulation that Mubarak is able to maintain his
authoritarian grip and keep Egypt’s most formidable opposition out of power. While Islamists
dominate the opposition and may differ among themselves or with other opposition groups over
important issues, virtually all opposition is united against Egypt’s pro-US orientation in the light
of its solid support for Israeli policies. Upon his arrival to power in 1981, Mubarak
acknowledged the difference between the Brothers’ peaceful agenda and the radical Islamists’
violent program, and thus placated the former to marginalize and delegitimize the latter.
52

However, with the intensification of the radical Islamists’ terror campaign beginning in the early
1990’s and in order to deny demands by mainstream Islamists for political reform, the regime
ceased distinguishing between the two camps. The regime falsely accused the Brotherhood of
collusion with the radicals and unleashed it security forces against both. Mubarak also accused

51
Korany, "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt," p. 53.

52
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, p. 177.

279

Iran and the Sudan of supporting the radicals in an attempt to play to a receptive audience in
Washington, which designated these two states as “rogues.”
53
Unconvinced of Egypt’s
arguments on both fronts, the Clinton administration briefly hesitated; however, given its
overriding objectives regarding the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the peace process, it
ultimately lent the Mubarak regime its full support.
54

The discussion thus far has focused on Egypt, which has been the birthplace of Islamic
reform movement and radical Islamic extremism. However, as mentioned earlier, the Muslim
Brotherhood established branches in most Arab countries and beyond, and political Islam has
been become conspicuous and played an important role in many of these other Arab/Muslim
countries. Jordan’s Islamist movement and the Palestinian Hamas are most relevant to this study
and thus warrant brief mention.
Political Islam in Jordan
Due to al-Banna’s efforts to spread and increase support for his movement, the Muslim
Brotherhood was established in Jordan in 1945. King Abdulla allowed the organization to
register under the Charity Societies and Clubs Law and permitted its activities under the strict
condition that they would be confined to the spiritual and social spheres. While lacking the
designation of political party, it proceeded to propagate its message of the need to return to
Islamic values through its charitable and social works, and by establishing schools, clinics, and
social and sports clubs.
55
From the beginning the Brotherhood accepted the legitimacy of the
Hashemite monarchy and the two sides long enjoyed an amicable and mutually beneficial
relationship. Thus while Nasser outlawed and oppressed the movement to facilitate the rise of his
pan-Arab nationalism, King Hussein utilized the Jordanian branch to counterbalance the

53
Gerges, America and Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? , p. 175.

54
Ibid., pp. 176-83.

55
Beverly Milton-Edwards, "Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan," in The Oxford encyclopedia of the modern
Islamic world, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 195.

280

nationalist forces threatening the monarchy. Indeed, when the king dismissed the democratically
elected government and declared martial law in 1957, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood was allowed
to continue operating as if it were a political party. All it lacked was the official designation. In
contrast to the Brotherhood, Jordan’s Hizb al-Tahrir (and other smaller groups to emerge later)
advocated the revolutionary philosophy that “change begins from the top.” Not surprisingly, their
rejection of the legitimacy of the monarchy attracted the regime’s wrath.
56

The regime-Brotherhood tacit alliance withstood the immediate impact of the Arab defeat
in 1967 as the movement became more instrumental in its social activism among the most recent
wave of Palestinian refugees. However, the alliance began to witness tension in the mid 1980’s
as it became clear that the king was using the Brotherhood as a pawn in Syrian-Jordanian
relations: when Hussein’s relations with Syria’s Assad were strained, the king would use the
Brotherhood to support the Syrian Brotherhood against the Syrian regime; when they were good
he would blame it for doing so.
57
By the time the Brotherhood had begun, at least implicitly, to
question the monarchy’s legitimacy and the regime had begun its crackdown, the Brotherhood’s
success in Islamizing society were clear. In motion since the 1967 war and in accord with the
regional trend, the slogan that “Islam is the solution” has been the dominate thinking, and
expressions of religiously—of women wearing hijab, men growing beards, and a proliferation of
mosques and Quranic study groups—have emerged across a broad spectrum of Jordanian society.
The outbreak of the Palestinian intifada and the rise of Hamas in the occupied Palestinian
territories only accelerated these trends.

56
See Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism : Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and
State Power in Jordan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).

57
Milton-Edwards, "Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan," p. 196.

281

Political Islam in the Palestinian Territories: the Rise and Role of Hamas
The creation of Hamas was a part of the broader regional Islamization as well as a direct
response to the Israeli occupation. The level of its support among Palestinians has been a
function of Israeli oppression and the status of the “peace process.” As the largest and most
influential Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas’ roots extend back to the influence of Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine during the late 1930s to organize the Palestinian revolt against
Britain and Zionism. Officially founded in 1946, in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the imposition
of Egyptian administrative rule in Gaza, and of the annexation of the West Back by Jordan, the
Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood split into two parts, which then fell under the Muslim
Brotherhood of the respective new ruling countries. Accordingly, the Gaza branch faced the
same fate as did the Brotherhood in Egypt with Nasser’s crackdown, and gradually was
influenced by Qutb’s radical turn, spawning the militant Islamic Jihad. The Islamist movement in
the West Bank, on the other hand, became part of the Jordanian Brotherhood, allied with the
monarchy to counter nationalist and leftist influences. After the Gaza Strip and West Bank fell
under Israeli control in 1967, the two branches remained separate and entered into a period a low-
level social activism. Owing to the rise of the PLO, at this stage Palestinians were more
influenced by the secularist character of the national liberation movement. While societies in the
neighboring Arab states were becoming Islamized in reaction to the Arab regimes’ failures,
Palestinian society, particularly in the West Bank, remained relatively secularized until the mid
1980’s. In other words, the PLO’s secularism led to a lag in Palestinian Islamization.
Meanwhile, however, Brotherhood activism, particularly in socioeconomically destitute
Gaza, was on the rise as manifested in mosque construction, social welfare assistance, and anti-
occupation resistance. As discussed in the previous chapter, the absence of a political settlement
to end the Israeli occupation combined with collective, simmering anger led to the eruption of the
intifada on December 8, 1987. The following day, the Political Bureau of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Gaza met and created the Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas (the reverse of

282

its Arab acronym) under former headmaster, quadriplegic, and Brotherhood leader Sheikh Ahmad
Yasin. While distinguishing itself in its application of the Islamic principle waqf (Islamic trust or
endowment) to Palestine, it is important to stress that both Hamas’ 1988 Charter and the PLO’s
1964 Charter had the same nationalist political objective: the total liberation of Palestine.
Equally important, from the beginning Hamas maintained that its military struggle against Israel
would be confined to historic Palestine; it would not involve Israel’s Western supporters, nor
entangle Arab regimes. Hamas rejected the PLO’s 1988 declaration of independence over only
the West Bank and Gaza, and denounced the 1993 Oslo agreement -- both of which entailed the
PLO’s explicit recognition of Israel -- as sellouts of Palestinian rights. Pointing to Israel’s
continued occupation, Hamas refused to participate in Israeli-authorized Palestinian “national”
elections. It opposed the PLO’s political program, but as a “loyal opposition.” In fact, both sides
had come to the early agreement that they would not resort to violence to settle their differences.
58

Despite Israel’s attempts to stoke inter-communal confrontation, thanks to Arafat and Hamas,
Palestinian unity was maintained.
However, Hamas’s rejection of and detachment from the very process which allowed the
PLO leadership to return to Palestine and provided a sense of optimism to most Palestinians was
not viewed favorably by the Palestinians. Despite the ups and mostly downs of the peace process
in the 1990s, Palestinians still favored Arafat’s largely secularist Fateh and other factions over
Hamas by a wide margin. To illustrate, for the December 1994-April 2000 period, Palestinian
support for Fateh had averaged 42%, for left-wing PLO factions 8.3%, and for Hamas and Islamic
Jihad 15%. In the aftermath of the Islamists’ refusal to participate in the 1996 legislative and
presidential elections, support for them fell to10%. Against the backdrop of Palestinian
hopelessness that framed the collapse of the Camp David summit in July 2000, for the November
2000-November 2003 period, support for Fateh declined to an average of 25% and witnessed

58
Graham Usher, "What Kind of Nations? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories," in Political
Islam : Essays from Middle East Report, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997), p. 351.

283

increases for support for political Islam (i.e. Hamas and Islamic Jihad) to 24% and for
independents to nearly 31%. Sympathy following Arafat’s death after the long siege of his
Ramallah headquarters combined with renewed hopes for a settlement under the new Palestinian
leader and US/Israel-approved Mahmud Abbas, led support for Fateh to increase once again to
35.5% vs. 27.4% for the Islamists (mostly Hamas).
59
However, in what by now should w be
understood to be a predictable pattern, as optimism quickly disappeared owing to the Sharon
governments repeated assassinations of Palestinian leaders, initiation of the “separation” wall,
and other suffocating military and administrative restrictions, not only did support for Hamas
increased: against the backdrop of its steady political and social moderation, Hamas scored a
stunning victory in the 2006 January parliamentary elections, which were universally viewed as
free and fair. In their wake, Hamas formed a new (Hamas-led) Islamist government, the first in
the Arab world.
These statistics provide strong empirical evidence supporting a central argument of this
dissertation: that the non-resolution of the Palestine question leads, in free elections, to a victory
for the Islamists, producing the very result of which the US is most fearful. The US’s fear of the
Islamists derives from the latter’s presumed objections to US Middle East policies, at the heart of
which is support for Israel and its policies. US support for authoritarian Arab regimes is a direct
result of its desire to ensure the endurance of Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt against
the Islamist opposition. While it should be self-evident that Islamists would welcome Israel’s
return of Arab occupied territories as per the treaties, what needs to be stressed is that the
Islamists’ objection lies in reaching peace with Israel while leaving the Palestine question
(including Jerusalem) behind.
Regarding Palestine, Hamas, in a sense, holds the key for Islamists elsewhere and
Palestinians hold a sway over the larger Arab public across the Arab world. The opposition of

59
All these statistics are based on surveys conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies and
the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University, and are taken from Jamil Hilal, "Hamas’s Rise as
Charted in the Polls, 1994-2005," Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (2006).

284

Jordan’s Islamists to that country’s peace treaty with Israel first and foremost stems from the
widespread consensus that the treaty, as was the case with Egypt’s, came at the direct expense of
securing Palestinian rights. The historical record and the turn of events vindicated this
conclusion, as Israel was emboldened by the removal of two adversaries, particularly Egypt, from
the conflict. Moreover, Palestinians have continued to endure a brutal occupation despite the
signing of these peace treaties. Given that the Palestine question is of larger Arab and Muslim
concern, broad consensus exists among both Islamists and secularists, whether in Jordan or
beyond, that the Palestinian struggle needs to be considered in judging the acceptability of any
subsequent treaties. Islamists and others have criticized the PLO’s acceptance of the Oslo accord
for falling into an Israeli “trap” which abdicates Palestinian inalienable rights. However, there is
little evidence that there will be credible attempts, by secularists or other Islamists, to overbid
Hamas in securing Palestinian rights from Israel. Thus the importance of Hamas and other
Palestinian Islamists lies not only in their role in Palestinian politics or their militant response to
Israel but also, and more important, in their ideological connection to Islamic and nationalist
credentials across the Arab and Muslim world.
To be sure, in deference to the US and in support for the US-sponsored peace process
during the 1990’s, pro-western Arab regimes have been critical of Hamas’ violence against Israel.
They have also been concerned about Hamas’s influence in the further radicalization of their own
societies. While in ideological disagreement with Hamas and fearful of its sociopolitical
program, some Palestinian and Arab secularists could only argue publicly that Hamas’ suicide
bombings were counterproductive and harmful to the Palestine cause. However, neither such
criticisms and concerns nor any morally-grounded argument could withstand the images of
Israel’s brutal treatment of Palestinians shown on Arab satellite television. In fact, the regular
guest on a popular Al-Jazeera program, and the Sunni world’s most influential theologian and
moderate Muslim Brother, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been a vocal supporter of the
Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. While strongly condemning the September 11

285

terrorist attacks and bin Laden’s radical Islamism, al-Qaradawi, after the beginning of the second
Palestinian intifada in September 2000, issued a fatwa (religious edict) condoning the groups’
“martyrdom” operations as one of the few instruments in the hands of the Palestinians in their
struggle for liberation against the militarily-powerful Israel.
60
The occupation and settlement
building has begotten violence; and the relationship reversal does not hold. The non-resolution of
the Palestine problem has been the source of the Palestinian-Israeli cycle of violence.
In sum, conversely, a resolution to the conflict based on international legitimacy would
be accepted by most Palestinians, thus diminishing support for or moderating the Islamists. It
would also leave Israel and the United Sates and with less reason to fear the outcome of free
elections, regardless of the winner. As the evidence suggests, if such a plausible development is
possible at the epicenter—i.e. Palestine—of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is even more likely to
hold true in the neighboring Egypt and Jordan. The resolution of the conflict and the “liberation”
of Jerusalem would neutralize Islamists everywhere in one crucial aspect of their opposition to
the US. A peace settlement would also allay US’s concerns over Israel, which would be at peace
with the Palestinians and other Arabs. With the removal of this critical factor from the calculus,
the US would view the outcome of free elections in the Arab world with far less concern for their
impact on US strategic interests. Opposition—Islamist or otherwise—would be neutralized
enough to seek, and “normalized” enough to receive, US (and other external) recognition and
possible support, as this “new” opposition challenges the ruling incumbents for power by
demanding political reforms
The United States and Political Islam
The United States encountered the revolutionary and violent stream of Political Islam
long before the attacks of September 11. The negative images of radical Islam and “Muslim
terrorists” first became common in America beginning with the Iran hostage crisis in November

60
See al-Qaradawi ‘s http://www.qaradawi.net for the scope of depth of his Islamist influence and opinions
on social and political questions.

286

1979. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a month later, President Carter secretly-
authorized (in July 1979) CIA Operation Cyclone to support the “good Muslims” of the “freedom
fighters” (al-Mujahidin) had come into full operation. Much of the operation’s funding and
armaments, coupled with Saudi financial support, were coordinated by the intelligence services of
the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was the most prominent leader of the
Mujahidin and also the head of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. This party was heavily inspired
by Qutb’s radical strand thanks to scores of Afghans who had studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar
University—the Muslim world’s oldest and most prominent institution for religious studies—
where they encountered the Muslim Brothers. That Hikmatyar and other leaders “had been
assassinating and terrorizing other Afghans for years” was of little significance in the United
States’ cold war calculations. Nor did their problematic background prevent establishing a
Mujahidin-US alliance which, as Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, later
acknowledged, “had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap” where the United
States had “the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War.” The Soviet
withdrawal and the subsequent precipitous American disengagement from the country, set the
stage for the failure of the Afghan state and the country’s transformation into a battle ground for
warlords. It was this context that provided fertile soil for the rise of the al-Qaida network and the
planning of the 1998 bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and of the
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
It was Jean Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN under Reagan and early intellectual
leader of neo-conservatism, who popularized the distinction between and support for “right-wing
authoritarianism” on the one hand, and rejection of “left-wing totalitarianism,” on the other,
arguing the former was more amenable to democracy. Notwithstanding the indistinguishable
level of oppression committed by both against their own citizens and the historical falsification of
her democracy thesis on both fronts, the usefulness of Kirkpatrick’s distinction lies in the US’s
long practice of judging regimes (and oppositions to regimes) based on its perceived strategic

287

interests. Long before Reagan argued that the Mujahidin were the “moral equivalents of
America’s founding fathers,” the Johnson administration encouraged Saudi Arabia to create a
Saudi centered-Islamic alliance and even supported Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood during Nasser’s
rule. The favorable US view of Islamist activism at the time, of course, had nothing to do with a
desire to spread Islam or concern about Nasser’s oppression of Islamists. Rather, it was intended
to counter Nasser’s secular nationalist forces and to check his influence in the Arab world. It was
secularist Arab nationalism, not political Islam (mainstream or otherwise), that posed a threat to
the US interests and its conservative allies in the region during the 1950s and 1960s.
61

It has been US strategic interests rather than any intrinsic American hostility towards
Islam that had accounted for its shift more recently to opposing political Islam. This became
more complicated if not also tenuous in the wake of the September 11 attacks and their profound
and far reaching consequences, which lie beyond the scope, of this study. To be sure, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of
civilization” thesis attracted many adherents. Many American pro-Israel supporters and some
conservative commentators, religious leaders, and policy wonks have argued that the United
States should reorient its global posture and polices and be ready to engage based on
Huntington’s premise: that the “clash of civilizations will dominate global politics…On both
sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as clash of civilizations.” Indeed, while
the overwhelming majority of Muslims oppose US policies, it has been the fringe minority of
Qutb’s determined followers who subscribe to this thesis and declare willingness to “fight” the
West.
However, there is little evidence to suggest that the US has adopted such a sweeping
civilization-based approach. Nor has the US articulated a general approach towards political
Islam per se. Over the years and based on its strategic interests, the United States has supported

61
Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution : Fundamentalism in the Arab World, p. 32. Gerges, America and
Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? , p. 40.

288

Islamic regimes guilty of gross human rights violations and extensive reliance on oppressive
security apparatus: in Saudi Arabia; Pakistan, particularly under General Zia ul-Haq; Sudan under
Ja`far al-Numayri; and to some extent, Afghanistan under the Taliban. Indeed, according to the
Clinton administration, the US was “prepared to live with Islamist regimes as long as they [did]
not endanger or [were] hostile to our vital national interests. We [had] no intrinsic interest in
human rights in the Middle East”
62
[Emphasis added]. Conversely, when US interests were not at
stake, it supported democratic transitions in, for example, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. In
contrast, given the conventional wisdom that free elections in the Arab world would usher
Islamists—who oppose US policies—into power, the US has not only been unwilling to risk
supporting democratic transitions but has also actively propped up authoritarian regimes in the
region.
The stark difference between the US approach to political Islam in the cases of
Afghanistan and Iran illustrates the centrality of the role of national interests. Because it was
perceived as being in the US interest to supply both sides of the Iran-Iraq war (to ensure both
countries emerged weakened), a faction within the Reagan administration supplied weapons to
Khomeini’s regime in what became known as the Iran-gate. However, by the time the Iran-Iraq
war, the Soviet-Afghan war, and the Soviet Union had all come to an end, another type of
political Islam was on the ascendant: Israel-centered political Islam. Against the backdrop of the
Lebanese civil war and the historical marginalization of Lebanon’s Shiite majority, the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon was the catalyst for the rise of the Islamic militant Hezbollah in
Lebanon. While Iran provided it with spiritual and material support, Hezbollah emerged as a
strong opponent of Israel and Western interference in Lebanon and utilized violence and
terrorism in hostage taking, bombings, and hijacking. With the continued occupation of southern

62
Gerges, America and Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? , p. 102.

289

Lebanon by Israel, during the 1990s Hezbollah evolved into a major player in Lebanon’s internal
politics and into a formidable resistance movement against Israel.
63

As discussed earlier, the rise of Hamas, as a direct consequence of the Israeli occupation,
has not only given the organization an important role in the internal Palestinian affairs but has
also linked it, at least ideologically, to Islamists in the Arab world and beyond. The Oslo Accords
allowed Fateh and other PLO factions to enter the Palestinian territories and banned them from
any military confrontation with Israel. During the 1990’s peace process the Palestinian Authority
(PA) and PLO’s groups had, by and large, refrained from armed confrontation. On the other
hand, non-PA/PLO Hamas and Islamic Jihad had staged intermittent violent resistance to Israel’s
continued occupation and harsh measures, inviting escalation and more of Israel’s retribution.
Therefore, during the 1990’s it was only the Islamists who engaged Israel militarily from
within historic Palestine. With Hezbollah’s military engagement from southern Lebanon, the two
Islamist groups constituted the only active armed resistance from the Arab world against Israel.
While the al-Qaida’s storm was still gathering its strength, Hamas and Hezbollah became the face
of militant and political Islam to Israel and the United States during much of the 1990’s. From
the perspective of the United States and Israel, there were only two realities: “Arab/Muslim
terrorism” and Israeli “self-defensive reactions.” As mentioned earlier, Egypt’s Mubarak
obliterated all differences between the radical and mainstream camps so as to deny the latter’s
legitimate demands for political pluralism. In Jordan, King Hussein had curtained the strength of
moderate and peaceful Islamists in biased elections so as to extract the needed ratification for the
peace treaty, and thus the regime’s bargain with the US. For its part, the United States,
influenced by Israel’s views, equated the two camps because both were equally, at least
ideologically, hostile to Israeli policies and actions. Indeed as officials in the Clinton
administration acknowledged, the United States was “very much influenced by the Israeli

63
See Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah : A Short History, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007).

290

definition of Islamists. To a large extent, Israel’s view of Islamic fundamentalism shape[d] U.S.
officials’ perception of this phenomenon.”
64

In summary, during the 1990s Israel-focused political Islam emerged as a response to US
support for Israeli policies and the general US Israeli-centered approach. The centrality of Israel
in both action and response informs the US position on the need to support Arab authoritarian
regimes in Egypt and Jordan. Israel’s peace treaties with the two countries deeply influence US
relations with them. While most of the opposition in Egypt and Jordan perceive the peace treaties
as an obstacle in the resolution of the Palestine problem, the US views them as a protection for
Israel and its policies, including maintaining the occupation. A major concern of the United
States is the endangerment of the peace treaties in case, for example, “the regime in Egypt
changed suddenly” or “radical Islamic movements gain control.”
65
In fact, the historian Paul
Kennedy and his corroborators argue that Egypt is sufficiently important for the US objectives
that it is considered a “pivotal state,” defined as “a hot spot that could not only determine the fate
of its region but also affect international stability.”
66
The authors argue that
the government of President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak has provided a bulwark against
perhaps the most significant long-term threat in the region--radical Islamic fundamentalism. The
collapse of the current Egyptian regime might damage American interests more than the Iranian
revolution did. The Arab-Israeli peace process, the key plank of U.S. foreign policy in this region
for the past 20 years, would suffer serious, perhaps irreparable, harm.
67

The US Message to the Regimes in Jordan and Egypt: Oppress Free of Cost
To return to the theoretical framework regarding the international dimension of Arab
authoritarianism and to bring the discussion to a conclusion, it will be recalled that the two-level

64
Quoted Gerges, America and Political Islam : Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? , p. 54.

65
William B. Quandt, Peace Process : American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 418.

66
Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs
75, no. 1 (1996): p. 33.

67
Ibid.: p. 40.

291

game analysis was applied to the study of US-Arab relations in our attempt to understand the US
role in Arab authoritarianism. At Level I of the process, the United States and the Arab
authoritarian regimes strike a mutually beneficial bargain. Given its political and cultural affinity
towards Israel, the United States has identified the security of Israel as a supreme objective. Due
to lobbying efforts by pro-Israel supporters and the virtually universal backing they have enjoyed
in the US Congress, the objective of the US commitment to the security of Israel as a state has
been broadened to include support for Israeli policies in general. In other words, there have been
concerted efforts and, increasingly, a deliberate conflation of the need to maintain Israel’s
security with the need to support Israeli policies. Within this supportive environment, according
to the bargain, the United States receives assurances from the regimes in Jordan and Egypt that
they will maintain their peace treaties with Israel and will support US regional policies. During
the 1990’s, the US-sponsored, Israel-centered peace process ranked at the top of the Clinton
administration’s objectives. In return, the regimes in Egypt and Jordan receive US economic,
military, and political support. Political support is of particular importance, as it also entails, at
least tacitly, support for these regimes’ domestic agenda vis-à-vis the opposition. This support
comes usually in the form of American silence in the face of the oppression and/or exclusion of
opposition from any meaningful participation.
At Level II the two parties to the bargain seek ratification of the bargain from their
respective constituencies. Given the above-mentioned hospitable climate, the US administration
received congressional and public approval of such agreements (according to the bargain) with
ease. For their parts, the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes secured ratification for their respective
peace treaty with Israel from an electorally engineered, largely rubber-stamp parliament. As for
the close alliance between the US and these regimes and their support for US polices,
“ratification” is “obtained” from the opposition by manipulation or outright oppression. Either
way, ratification is always extracted and never legitimately obtained.

292

In tracing the historical developments of US relations with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt
during the last forty years, the Arab-Israeli conflict has emerged as the nexus in understanding
US-Arab-Israel relations. The objective has been the study of the US role in Arab
authoritarianism—the dependent variable. The centrality of Israel to both this trilateral
relationship and to the US approach towards the conflict provided the empirical evidence and
conceptual rationale to posit “strong US support for Israel” (due to US political/cultural-driven
affinity) as the independent variable. The United States has been an important factor in this chain
of causations and has not been an innocent bystander in the conflict. Within the framework of US
involvement in the conflict the conflict’s non-resolution has been conceptualized as the first
intervening variable between the dependent and independent variables.
Similarly, both historical and contemporary evidence has shown that the 1967 War
triggered the rise of political Islam and the role of both the US and a US-supported Israel in the
continuing intractability of the conflict further facilitated its growth as the dominant oppositional
force in the Arab world. In other words, the non-resolution of the conflict (the first intervening
variable) has, essentially, led to the rise of political Islam (the second intervening variable). The
importance of political Islam to our analysis also derives from Washington’s conviction that it
poses a mortal threat to the status quo in the Arab world. The US believes, with good reason, that
free elections will bring Islamists to power in Jordan and Egypt and that as a result the peace
treaties with Israel will unravel, its security will be compromised and US interests will be
damaged. The United States, therefore, considers Islamist regimes as unacceptable alternative to
its client regimes. As a result, preventing the emergence of this alternative constitutes the second
main reason for US support for the authoritarian regimes.
Having brought the argument this far, the analysis still must address how the non-
resolution of the conflict and rise of political Islam affect the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism.
To do so, we return to Robert Dahl’s notions of the expected costs of toleration and suppression
of the opposition. In a seminal study, Dahl focuses on participation and contestation as two

293

“dimensions” of democracy, which exists only as an ideal type. He proposes “polyarchy” as the
“real world” system approximating democracy which is defined as a regime that has “been
substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public
contestation.”
68
Given the demands of the domestic opposition, a hegemonic or an authoritarian
regime—as has been referred to in this study—becomes competitive (i.e. polyarchy or more
democratic) according to Dahl’s axiom: “The more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of
toleration, the greater the chance of a competitive regime.”
69
These costs are all domestically-
driven; i.e. the authoritarian regime assesses them within the context of its relations with the
opposition and its reading of all domestic dynamics. The two factors affecting the outcome, then,
are the internal costs of suppression (or oppression) and the internal costs of toleration. The
regime’s calculus may cover, for example, the socioeconomic order and conditions, ethnic and
religious divisions, the structure and ideologies of the opposition(s), role of the military, the state
of bureaucracy, the structure of other institutions, etc. In its response to the demands of the
opposition, the authoritarian regime’s strategies may include: accommodation, cooptation,
manipulation, deliberate division, or outright oppression. To be sure, any regime transition
ultimately entails, by definition, the transformation of relations between incumbents and the
opposition. However, the domestic costs of oppression and toleration have not been the focus of
this study. As was noted in the introduction of the dissertation, numerous studies on Arab
authoritarianism or aspects of liberalization in the Arab world have focused exclusively on one
domestic aspect or another of the phenomenon.
Instead, the focus of this dissertation has been the international dimension of
authoritarianism. Consequently, while acknowledging the regime’s domestically-driven
calculations, it has been the contention here that the authoritarian ruler also considers external
factors when faced with the opposition’s demands for reform and pluralism, and, therefore, these

68
Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, p. 8.

69
Ibid., p. 15.

294

factors must also be incorporated into the regime’s calculations. In his study, Dahl did consider
the role of “outright foreign domination” for the prospects of polyacrchy (e.g. Germany and
Japan after WW II). However, he glossed over the effect of actions falling short of domination,
stating only that “the actions of foreigners may drastically alter the options available to a regime
without necessarily altering the form of the regime.”
70
This study has argued that the actions of
the United States have altered the options of the regimes in Jordan and Egypt in such a way as
precisely not to alter the form of regimes. Therefore, the regime’s equation includes two
additional factors: the external costs of toleration and the external costs of oppression.
Toleration would involve the regime’s placating the opposition sufficiently so as to
satisfy the latter’s demands. While such an outcome may follow stages of negotiations and
compromises, what concerns us here is the assumption that the opposition will not stop until
democratic transition—following free foundational elections for the real and highest decision
makers in the country—is achieved. In other words, toleration would lead to the dissolution of
the existing authoritarian regime either peacefully or by force. This means that the regimes in
both Jordan and Egypt would lose power to an opposition dominated by Islamists. In Egypt, it
would entail the removal of President Mubarak from office and his regime from control of the
country. In Jordan, the transition could entail the monarch’s abdication of the throne, or more
likely, the monarch’s acceptance of the restricted role of reign—as opposed to rule—in a fashion
similar to that of the monarchy in England or the Netherlands. While the costs of toleration are
abundantly clear, they are ultimately internally-driven in the sense that it is highly unlikely that an
external actor would compel or “punish” an authoritarian ruler for agreeing to relinquish power.
Regime toleration of the opposition and the ruler’s ultimately voluntary (even if pressured)
decision to leave office provide low resistant path towards the dismantlement of authoritarianism.
However, as the authoritarian incumbents maintain control and resist the opposition’s
demands, the costs of oppression become the operative factor in the incumbent’s equation. What

70
Ibid., p. 190.

295

have concerned us in this study are the regime’s external costs of oppression. In other words,
what is important in the cases of Jordan and Egypt are the incumbents’ perceptions of what the
external—i.e. those imposed by the United States—costs would be when the decision is made to
refuse demands and oppress the opposition. The arguments which have been laid out and the
historical evidence marshaled throughout this dissertation demonstrate that such costs have been
very low or non-existent. As the preceding paragraphs have recapped, two themes have emerged
with crucial importance to the United States’ Israel-centered framework concerning the
authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt: the US role in the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the rise of political Islam as the dominant oppositional force in the region. While
Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan inaugurated the mutually-beneficial US-Arab
“bargain,” the consequences of the continuing conflict have provided Washington with the
rationale to maintain it. It is also precisely this bargain which constitutes a bulwark for
Washington against the threat of political Islam.
If, on the other hand, the opposition were amenable to the US Israel-centered regional
objectives, the United States would have significantly less reason to maintain the existing
regimes. Under such a scenario, the regime’s external cost of oppressing the opposition would
likely be high. American threats to cut off support to these regimes and US recognition of the
opposition would constitute significant pressure on the incumbents and thus increase the
prospects for authoritarian breakdown and democratic transitions. However, such an opposition
is nowhere to be found in the Arab world. It is the combination of the absence of such an
opposition and the presence of the Islamist opposition which informs the Washington’s
perception that there is no acceptable alternative to the authoritarian Mubarak and Hashemite led
status quo. The regimes in Amman and Cairo fully understand this, and the clear message they
receive from the US is cost-free oppression of the opposition. It is noteworthy that the absence of
external costs to resilient authoritarian regimes by no means equates with an absence of external

296

effects or impact. Perhaps it has been the fallacy of conflating the two that most studies on Arab
authoritarianism marginalize the role of external factors.
Finally, the American perception is reinforced by yet another dynamic: Arab anti-
Americanism. In essence, anti-Americanism is the “expression of negative attitudes towards the
United States.”
71
In an important study of anti-Americanism, Katzenstein and Keohane argue that
a cognitive structure or schema processes events, narratives, and histories to formulate a world
view, thus informing attitudes. Their focus is on the political aspect of anti-American views,
which are “always contested or at least contestable… and are objects of political struggle.”
72

They contend that attitudes are a function of a continuum of opinion, distrust, and bias. Opinion
is ephemeral and amenable to “reasonable interpretation of available facts” as to lead to dislike
for “what America does.” However, once opinions are entrenched and hardened, they may turn
into enduring distrust and, worse, systematic bias. While distrust and bias require predisposition,
the latter, in particular, assumes fundamental disagreements and involves dislike for “what
America is.”
73

While there is wide consensus that the United States both enjoyed supportive sentiments
after the September 11 attacks and then suffered an upsurge in anti-Americanism around the
globe in the wake of 2003 Iraq war, anti-Americanism in the Arab world has been consistently
and overwhelmingly high in recent years. It will be remembered that this was not always the
case: the United States, as mentioned in chapter three, unlike the European powers, enjoyed
friendly relations with the Arab world until the complexities of the Palestine question transformed
the relationship in the late 1940’s. Political developments since the 1967 war in particular,

71
Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction: The Politics of Anti-Americanisms," in Anti-
Americanisms in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2007), p. 2.

72
———, "Varieties of Anti-Americanisms: A Framework for Analysis," in Anti-Americanisms in World
Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 12.

73
Ibid., pp. 19-24.

297

demonstrated, from the Arab perspective, the detrimental consequences of the United States’
almost unconditional support for Israel. Given the centrality of the Palestine question in the Arab
world, this has been the primary source of anti-Americanism among Arabs. Shibley Telhami, the
leading analyst of Arab public opinion in North America, has commissioned numerous surveys
over the last ten years on Arab public opinion. His conclusions are clear: “No other issue
resonates with the public in the Arab world, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more
deeply than Palestine. No other issue shapes regional perceptions of America more
fundamentally than the issue of Palestine.”
74
According to a frequently quoted poll on Arab
attitudes in several Arab countries, Arabs were overwhelming opposed to the “American
government’s policy towards the Arab nations” and “towards the Palestinians.” For example,
unfavorable attitudes on these two issues were: 86% and 89% in Egypt; 88% and 90% in Saudi
Arabia; 88% and 94% in Kuwait; and 87% and 89% in Lebanon, respectively. Similarly, the
“Palestinian issue" was viewed as "the most" or "a very important" issue facing the Arab world
today.
75

Given the US bias towards Israel on the Palestine issue, anti-Americanism has been
shaped not only by Arabs’ negative opinion but also of Arabs’ distrust of the United States’
intentions. March Lynch, an expert on Arab media and public opinion, confirms that in the Arab
world “[q]uite simply, Israel enters into virtually every political conversation about the United
States”
76
and argues that Arab audiences are so distrustful of the United States over its uncritical
support of Israel that “America rarely gets the benefit of the doubt.”
77
While Arabs’ negative
opinion and distrust of the US are clearly policy-driven, and thus, constitute what is referred to as

74
Shibley Telhami, The Stakes : America and the Middle East : The Consequences of Power and the
Choice for Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), p. 96.

75
Zogby International, The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll, April 11, 2002

76
Marc Lynch, "Anti-Americanism in the Arab World," in Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, ed. Peter
J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 205.

77
Ibid., p. 211.

298

political anti-Americanism, the radical Islamist’s more fundamental bias against the United States
informs radical anti-Americanism. It is true some Islamists who hold the view that the US and
the West are part of al-jahiliyya have fundamental and irreconcilable differences with American
culture and values. However, as discussed earlier, even the most radical of Islamists cite
objections to US regional policies as the core of their grievance against the US.
78
It is because of
their objection to US policies that radical Islamists propagate the message of irreconcilability and
seek new recruits during periods of crisis. In spite of this radical ideology, Lynch found little
support in the Arab world “for the thesis that anti-Americanism is rooted in essentialist cultural
conflicts.” He also found that the “mainstream public remains open to argument,” but changes in
US policy would be required for anti-Americanism to decrease.
79

Lynch identifies Israel, Islamism, and “national political configuration” (i.e. whether a
regime is allied with the US) as the sources of Arab anti-Americanism.
80
Indeed, whether
through the non-resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict, opposition to political Islam, or support for
authoritarian regimes, the United States’ role has been most consequential in all three
fundamental issues, and considerations for Israel have been paramount in the US’s framework
towards the region. Nevertheless, for some time, and particularly since 9/11, pro-Israel
supporters, neoconservatives, and media pundits in the United States have sought to ascribe Arab
anti-Americanism to a purported fundamental irreconcilability of cultural values and norms, Arab
bias (hatred for the US or Israel), or a broader clash of civilizations. Such lines of argument have
influenced American public opinion and the policy-making elite, reinforcing support for
maintaining the authoritarian status quo and labeling calls for altering the policy course as futile.

78
For example, the specific US actions Bin Laden and his ilk have cited include: US troop presence in
Saudi Arabia, US support for Israel, support for Arab authoritarian regimes, US-driven sanctions and then
war on Iraq, etc.

79
Lynch, "Anti-Americanism in the Arab World," pp. 198 and 211.

80
Lynch examines “Arab Media” as source of Arab Anti-Americanism but found no “correlation between
watching Arab satellite television and anti-American attitudes.” Ibid., p. 205.

299

The dissertation has earlier defined two reasons why the US supports Arab authoritarianism: the
regimes’ support for US polices and the fear of Islamists as an alternative. Arab anti-
Americanism in response seems to have provided the United States with a third reason: “because
these people hate us.”

300

Chapter Eight
Conclusions
The resiliency of Arab authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Jordan has been the focus of
this study. To appreciate its findings and contribution, it is useful to consider them against the
backdrop of the relevant scholarly debate. In the context of what Samuel Huntington called the
“third wave” of democratization, which started in 1974 and has continued (with even greater
frequency) since the end of the Cold War a plethora of scholarly studies, policy pronouncements,
and journalistic accounts has appeared addressing one aspect or another of the Arab authoritarian
regimes.
Some scholarly works attempting to explain the phenomenon have used the “pre-
requisite” approaches, arguing that the Arab countries have lacked such necessary precondition(s)
for democracy as: democratic culture, sufficient levels of economic development, proper
socioeconomic conditions, proximity to a “democratic epicenter,” and a strong civil society.
However, as Terry Lynn Karl has argued, “preconditions for democracy may be better conceived
as the outcomes for democracy.”
1
Or, at most, preconditions, to the extent they apply, may be
needed for the consolidation of, rather than the transition to, democracy.
Another strand of structural approaches addresses the role of institutions. The role of
political parties (if they exist), the role of the military, the nature of business-labor relations, the
structure of government bureaucracy, dynastic/familial entrenchment, and the presence/function
of domestic or international civic organizations have all been considered in the attempt to explain
Arab authoritarianism. That none of these factors to date has facilitated the dismantlement of
authoritarian regime should not lead to their automatic disqualification as potentially useful
explanatory factors. In other words, one or a combination of these factors may still play a critical
role in the breakdown of an authoritarian regime, but we will not know which one or which

1
Quoted in Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), pp. 40-1.

301

combination until after the fact. Until then, that the regime was able to maintain power should
guide us to the conclusion that the regime, at least thus far, has managed to successfully utilize
the various instruments at its disposal against such institutional pressures, if they have in fact
been present. But the ability and/or willingness of the regime to employ such instruments
(coercive or otherwise) are attributes of an authoritarian regime. They define, rather than
explain, authoritarianism. Thus, most institutional factors are better equipped to answer the
question of how, rather than why, an authoritarian remains in power.
The regime’s capability to maintain power against the opposition is the focus of the
other major research program on authoritarianism: the “process-oriented,” or contingency,
approach. At the center of this approach lie the strategic choices of the ruling incumbents.
Inherit in it is also the role, or the strategic choices, of the opposition. In other words, the nature
of the regime-opposition relationship and the net balance of the dynamic interactions between the
two shape the final outcome of the struggle. However, the mere examination of such interactions,
while illuminating, may still also address only how the regime succeeds in frustrating the
opposition in its demands for political reform and pluralism, rather than why. Larry Diamond has
argued that the only precondition for the establishment of democracy is the “commitment among
political elites to the legitimacy of democracy and its procedural norms.” Absent such
commitment (in the voluntary sense), the authoritarian regime’s perception of its costs must be at
the center of analysis of why it maintains power. What explains authoritarianism is that the net
costs have not been sufficiently high either to convince or to compel the regime to negotiate itself
out of power. Most studies examining Arab authoritarianism with a focus on such a calculus
have examined the regime’s domestic costs.
It has been the contention of this study that authoritarian regimes also consider the
potential external costs of oppressing their opposition. The study developed a framework for the
international dimension of authoritarianism and set out to examine the external costs of
oppression as perceived/calculated by the authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt.

302

Specifically, the analysis has focused on US relations with these two regimes and concluded that
the American role has been significantly shaped both by its special relationship with Israel and by
the resulting US Israel-centered approach to the region, particularly towards the Arab-Israel
conflict. Within the context of this configuration and the non-resolution of the conflict, the
United States has, in effect, entered into agreements with Arab authoritarian regimes according to
which: the former receives the assurances that the regimes will protect their peace treaties with
Israel and will support US polices; the latter receives US material support and the promise of non-
interference in the regime’s demotic policies, particularly in relation to the opposition.
The study has also found that the rise of political Islam in the aftermath of the June 1967
Arab-Israeli war and the threat it poses to US Israel-centered policies have provided the United
States with a second rationale for its support of the regimes in Jordan and Egypt: to prevent the
alternative—i.e. the opposition of popular Islamists—from coming to power. This broader
political environment has produced a sharp rise in Arab anti-Americanism and thus provided the
US with yet another rationale for propping up the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the United
States seems to have convinced itself that such anti-Americanism is unrelated to its regional
polices, and hence believes that altering its policies will not changed the entrenched realities. This
American commitment to the status quo squarely fits with the regimes’ determination to remain
in power, and in turn, the resulting supportive, external environment significantly contributes to
the stability and resiliency of the regimes in Jordan and Egypt. The regimes of Mubarak and of
the Hashemite monarchy have fully understood the US calculus, concluding accurately—thus far
at least—that there is no cost to oppressing their opposition. With the external cost of oppression
set at zero, the regimes are left with no externally-imposed constraints to manipulate and
oppress—in real or perceived terms—the externally-reviled opposition.
Contributions of the Dissertation
Against this backdrop and given such findings, the dissertation’s contributions lie in three
areas. First, in identifying an important external element (i.e. a US strategic interest) and

303

systematically examining its multifaceted effects on Arab authoritarian regimes, the study has
contributed to the larger debate on the regime question, which entails the “choice of procedures
that regulate access to state power.”
2
In addition, it has done so within the underutilized
framework of the international dimension of democratization and authoritarianism. The regime
question is “one of the most fundamental issues in the study of politics,” and there is an
increasing realization by students of the regime question that the external context is important and
that it has been under-considered. This work not only treats both these themes but does so using
a case study from a region with a poor record of scholarly contribution to comparative politics.
The second area of the dissertation’s contribution lies in the fact that the specific US
policy of its support for Israel has been the focus. While a few studies have addressed the
external dimension of authoritarianism in the Arab world, these studies and numerous others have
glossed over the role that US support for Israel—as one US strategic interest in the region—may
have played in the resiliency of Arab authoritarianism. To be sure, the US objective of
containment during the Cold War was widely understood to have acted as an enforcer of
authoritarianism and an impediment to democracy across different regions, including the Arab
world. The US objective of securing oil has also been explored as an impediment to democracy,
given the fear that political instability or political transition threatened to disrupt the flow of oil.
Notwithstanding the absence of a necessary correlation between regime type and oil flow
in any case, the study has focused on two countries with no oil to consider just as it has focused
on the post-Cold War period (until 2000), ruling out the effect of these two factors and leaving us
with the third remaining US objective of support for Israel. Accordingly, the study has sought to
open the “black box” and unpack this objective. Whether out of lack of intellectual excitement or
out of desire to avoid political controversy, the systematic and historical exploration of the role of
US support for Israel in the question of Arab authoritarianism has been long overlooked.

2
Gerardo L. Munck, "Review: The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies," World
Politics 54, no. 1 (2001): p. 123.

304

Constructing historically-based arguments, unitizing analytical frameworks, and relying on
scholarly western secondary sources, memoires, and archival documents, the dissertation has
engaged this question directly, thus making an original contribution. While it is acknowledged
that the study’s findings may generate disagreement, it is hoped that the sequential and logical
presentation will leave the reader with, at least, the sense that the study entails a reasonable and
plausible argument.
The third contribution of the study is related to its policy implications. In making the
argument, this study has addressed themes of major consequence to the peoples of the region and
beyond: the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise of political Islam, the resiliency of
authoritarianism, the absence of democracy, and anti-Americanism. The first has emerged as the
most consequential and, to a large degree, is a major cause of the others. The conflict’s
intractability has been identified as an intervening variable between the US support for Israel
(independent variable) and Arab authoritarianism (dependent variable). In contrast to the
conflict-authoritarianism relationship, the peace-democracy link has been the subject of policy
debates in the United States at least since the September 11 attacks. This link harks back to the
“democratic peace” thesis that democracy is intrinsically conducive to peace and, thus, that
democracies don’t fight each other. Notwithstanding the theoretical and empirical problematic
surrounding the thesis, the Clinton administration subscribed to it and invoked it in its democracy
promotion initiatives during the 1990’s across different regions, except the Arab world. On the
other hand, the Bush administration was the first to declare that “commitment to democratic
reform is essential to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
3
This work, in essence, has argued the
reverse: that resolving the conflict is essential, or at least, it will increase the chances of
authoritarian breakdown and democratic reform and pluralism. The policy implications of the
argument, thus, warrant a brief elaboration.

3
George Bush’s Address to the UN General Assembly, September 21, 2004

305

Policy Implications and an Agenda for Future Research
Far from marking a policy departure, President Bush’s proclamation came in reaction to
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s plans vis-à-vis Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians territories. In
response to the second Palestinian intifada, in the spring of 2002, Israel launched major military
operations into the West Bank, causing massive destruction in infrastructure and many
causalities. In June 2002, in a speech widely seen as having met all of Sharon’s conditions for
Israel to engage in any peace process, Bush declared, restating Sharon’s main condition, that:
“[p]eace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be
born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror…If
the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel.”
4
Bush
announced formally before the UN the US endorsement of an independent Palestinian state, and
an international Quartet—the US, EU, Russia, and UN—was formed and later issued a
“Roadmap,” outlining a mechanism to implement this vision.
Despite these diplomatic moves, the US-Israel understanding led to the freezing of the
peace process and the intensification of Sharon’s harsh policies: Israeli siege of Palestinian towns,
building of more settlements, erection of the “separation wall,” targeted assassinations of leaders
and activists, and the isolation and then the “house arrest” of Arafat until his death. The second
Intifada, which had begun in September 2000, intensified with more Palestinian militancy and
suicide bombings. Approved by the US and Israel as a “peace partner,” Mahmud Abbas
succeeded Arafat as the PLO Chairman and was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in
January 2005. Although Sharon ordered the unilateral redeployment of Israel troops and
evacuation of settlers out of Gaza in August 2005, a move which some hailed as the end of Israeli
occupation of the narrow coastal strip, his moves were widely interpreted by many others as part
of a plan to further consolidate Israel’s hold over settlements and expanded designs in the West

4
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june02/bush_speech_6-24.html

306

Bank. Arafat’s absence and Abbas’ election neither relieved Palestinians from Israel’s tightening
grip nor led to any movement on the peace process.
Against the backdrop of economic deterioration and political impasse, elections for
Palestinian Legislative Council were slated for January 2006. The holding of this vote was
widely encouraged, including by Israel and the US. Indeed, Bush had declared in his famous
2002 speech that the “Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body.”
However, as this dissertation’s framework would have predicted, the unthinkable—from the point
of view of the Americans and the Israelis—happened: Hamas swept the universally-
acknowledged free elections, gained 56% of the seats in the Council, and two months later
formed an Islamist-led government under the leadership of longtime Hamas leader Ismail
Haniya. The reaction of both Israel and the United States was immediate: the complete rejection
of the election results. Hamas was given an ultimatum to immediately recognize Israel’s right to
exist, renounce violence, and adhere to previous agreements. Once Hamas refused to comply,
Israel tightened its grip on the territories, particularly Gaza (Hamas’ power base), detained Hamas
members, including ministers and parliamentarians and, launched a mini-war on the small
territory in the aftermath of a kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, and further decimating an already
floundering Palestinian economy.
The US, for its part, immediately demanded from the Palestinian Authority (PA) (and
received) the unspent portion of already disbursed funding, cut all of its financial aid to and
contacts with the PA
5
, and convinced European donors to do the same. More important, the US
supported all of Israel’s measures and launched a campaign to develop an Arab consensus to
deprive the PA of all funding as a part of 12-step plan to isolate and destabilize the Hamas
government. The clearly stated US objective has been to create sufficient civilian suffering so as
either to compel Hamas to meet the American/Israeli conditions or to cause the government

5
USAID officials were informed by Washington “not to deal with ‘even a nurse’ with ties to the PA,”
Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy, The Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 2006, p. 102

307

collapse. Moreover, there is sufficient and increasing evidence that the US enlisted the support of
Jordan and Egypt to carry out a covert plan that is “part Iran-contra, part Bay of Pigs…approved
by Bush and implemented by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security
Advisor Elliott Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war.”
6
This “dirty war”
7
culminated in the
Hamas takeover of and the complete isolation of Gaza in the wake of an open Hamas-Fatah
military confrontation, which left 1000 wounded and140 dead, including some who were
summarily executed.
8

The US has shown no hesitancy in attempting to abort the emergence of an Islamist
government perceived to pose a mortal threat to its Israel-centered interests in the region. The
Hamas’ victory encapsulates the major themes raised in this dissertation: the Arab-Israeli conflict,
political Islam, and US support for Israel and for the authoritarian regimes in Jordan and Egypt.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Palestinian elections were held under occupation, the elections
produced an Islamist government both at the epicenter of the Arab-Israeli conflict and next to
Jordan and Egypt. The two regimes were sufficiently worried over a potential Hamas’
“spillover” and both still held to the terms of the US-authoritarian bargain to the extent that they
were willing to partner with United States to sponsor a “dirty war” aimed at ousting a
democratically-elected Islamist government. The US role in the aftermath of Hamas election is
thus another case study, which, accordingly to preliminary evidence, seems to strongly confirm
this study’s findings.
Future work on this Palestinian case should also examine the rapid pragmatic evolution
and political moderation that has taken place among the Hamas leadership, not only since the

6
David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, no. April (2008),
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804.

7
Ibid.

8
The International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," in Middle East Report (Brussels: The International Crisis
Group, 2 August 2007 ), p. 1.

308

election but even in the year preceding the election. Indeed, the leading authority on Hamas
writing in English, Khalid Hroub, provides strong evidence that the positions of the “new Hamas”
not only reveal “strong programmatic and, indeed a state building emphasis, but also considerable
nuance in its positions with regard to resistance and a two-state solution… and progressive de-
emphasis on religion.”
9
The US and Israel have deliberately ignored this transformation.
10

This brings us to a final thought. It has been the dominant narrative in the United States
that Israel’s main challenge lies in the fact it lacks “a peace partner” in a sea of implacable Arabs
and rejectionist Arab states. That, at least in the de jure sense, was certainly the case for the early
post-1948 period. However, this dissertation has provided the evidence to show that since the
1967 war there has been radical transformation in the Arab position in the acknowledgment of
Israel’s existence and acceptance of the full implementation of UN 242 as the basis of ending the
conflict. Given the centrality of Palestine to the themes raised in this dissertation, no one with
significant standing in the Arab or Muslim worlds is in a position to overbid Hamas over
Palestine. As per Nancy Bermeo’s moderation hypothesis (i.e. radical groups will moderate once
in power)
11
, Hamas has embarked on “crash course” on moderation and shown remarkable
capacity for political pragmatism, accepting the two-state solution.
Of equal importance, Crown Price (now King) Abdulla of Saudi Arabia sponsored, and
the Arab League adopted, a dramatic Arab peace plan in 2002, and reaffirmed it in 2007. It calls
for full Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in 1967 according to UN 242, the resolution
of the refugee problem based on UNGA Resolution 194, and the recognition of a sovereign
Palestinian State (with East Jerusalem as its it capital). In return, all Arab countries would enter

9
Khaled Hroub, "A "New Hamas" Through Its New Documents," Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 4
(2006): p. 6.

10
The US attitude towards Hamas has been exactly the same as its earlier attitude towards the PLO: accept
the conditions or else. The only difference however is in the pace of evolvement: “what it took the PLO ten
years to achieve, Hamas has done in a matter of months.”

11
Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions,"
Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997).

309

into a peace agreement and normalize relations with Israel. The Arab-Israeli conflict would thus
be brought to an end.
Against the backdrop of these remarks and the findings of this dissertation, it is worth
recalling a moment of history when Arab-Jewish inter-communal violence was at its peak on the
eve of the establishment of Israel and when it was abundantly clear that the Zionists had the upper
hand. The Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi writes:
On 14 May, 1948, the Chief Secretary of the British administration called a press
conference in his office in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. This was the last day of the
Mandate. After a statement on the achievements of His Majesty’s Government in the country and
the unhappy circumstances of the termination of the Mandate, one of the assembled journalists
asked: “And to whom do you intend to give the keys of your office?” The Chief Secretary,
blushing, and valiantly forcing a smile, replied: “I shall put them under the mat”—a fitting
epitaph to perhaps the shabbiest regime in British colonial history.
12

The 1947 UN partition plan granted Israel 57% of historic Palestine; Israel emerged from
the 1948 war with 78% of the land. The 2002 Arab League plan in effect endorses Israel’s 21%
war gain and it is asking for only the remaining 22%. Sixty years after the establishment and full
consolidation of the Jewish state, with Israel still unmoved by this generous Arab offer of 2002, it
is perhaps time for the United States to re-retrieve the key from under the blooded mat and divide
the house between Palestinians and Israelis. This will free Palestinians and other Arabs to
arrange their own houses as they please. Otherwise, it will continue to be, as it has been, the
shabbiest and most toxic chapter of US regional history.

12
Walid Khalidi, "Intorduction," in From Haven to Conquest : Readings in Zionism and the Palestine
Problem until 1948, ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), p. Ixxxiii.

310

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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This study focuses on the external dimension of the resiliency of authoritarianism in Egypt and Jordan. It proceeds by eschewing the pre-requisite approaches, which argue that lack of some condition, such as sufficient economic development or cultural and religious compatibility with democracy, prevents transition to democracy. Instead, the study follows a contingency approach, at the center of which lies the authoritarian incumbent's strategic calculations over the expected domestic costs of toleration and oppression of the opposition. In filling the gap in the literature and providing a policy-relevant explanation for Arab authoritarianism, the study contends that the regime also considers the expected external costs.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Asset Metadata

Creator Hammad, Fayez Yousef (author)

Core Title The resiliency of Arab authoritarianism and the Arab-Israeli conflict: the United States' role in the cases of Egypt and Jordan

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publication Date 12/11/2009

Defense Date 10/22/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Arab authoritarianism,Arab-Israeli conflict and authoritarianism,external factors and democratization,Middle East peace process and democratization,OAI-PMH Harvest,political Islam and U.S. Middle East policy,U.S. democracy promotion in the Arab world,U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East

Place Name Egypt (countries), Israel (countries), Jordan (countries), Middle East (region), USA (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hamilton, Nora (committee chair), Biblarz, Timothy J. (committee member), Dekmejian, Richard H. (committee member)

Creator Email fayezhammad@yahoo.com,fhammad@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1909

Unique identifier UC194354

Identifier etd-Hammad-2519 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-155624 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1909 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Hammad-2519.pdf

Dmrecord 155624

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Hammad, Fayez Yousef

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu