University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Securitizing the democratic peace: democratic identity and its role in the construction of threat

(USC Thesis Other)

Securitizing the democratic peace: democratic identity and its role in the construction of threat

PDF

Download

Open document

Flip pages

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

SECURITIZING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: DEMOCRATIC IDENTITY AND ITS
ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THREAT

by

Jarrod Hayes

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

August 2009

Copyright 2009 Jarrod Hayes

ii
Dedication

For Janelle, Beverly, and Dorothy: Three extraordinary women.

iii
Acknowledgements

When I was an undergraduate, I nearly always skipped over the acknowledgements
section of whatever text I was reading. As I have progressed in my academic career,
however, I have taken a greater interest in authors’ acknowledgements. Perhaps they
remind me, in my own daily efforts (sometimes struggle) to produce meaningful work,
that those far more advanced in their careers and contributions likewise work with the
support of others.

I offer up my own acknowledgements and thanks. Foremost, I wish to recognize Patrick
James. Pat has been a friend, advisor, and mentor to me for the bulk of my graduate
career. I would not be where I am today—completing my dissertation with a job waiting
in one of the most difficult job markets in years—without Pat’s guidance. There are
places in the dissertation where I thank individuals for points I raise in the body of the
text. To do so with respect to the contributions Pat has made to my thinking on the
dissertation would easily treble my total footnote count. Overstating my debt to Pat as a
mentor and friend is simply impossible.

The other members of my committee—Dan Lynch, Robert English, and Nicholas Cull—
have also been of immense aid in my work on this dissertation. At various times, all have
challenged—and improved—my thinking on the junction of identity and the democratic
peace as well as my use of securitization theory. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dan for his
help as I struggled to select my China cases. Similarly, I owe Rob many thanks for

iv
suggestions on extending the dissertation, and the theoretical framework I develop in it,
into a broader research program. Thanks to Rob, I have plenty of work to do for the next
few years. Also at the University of Southern California, I am indebted to the fantastic
staff who make it their job to aid graduate students and patiently answer what must seem
like an endless stream of emails. In this incredible group of people, Linda Cole, assistant
director of the School of International Relations, stands out. Every time I walked out of
her office, I had a sense that everything would work out.

As a resident of Oxford, UK for the past two years, this dissertation was written in its
entirety a long way from my home institution. Without access to the fantastic library
resources at the University of Oxford, I would have been confronted with a painful
choice: complete the dissertation or live apart from my wife. Fortunately, such a decision
proved unnecessary, thanks entirely to the support and assistance of Gordon Clark.
Gordon not only enabled my library access, he has been a surrogate advisor and has done
much to make an outsider to Oxford feel welcome.

A great many scholars over the past three year have discussed my dissertation with me
with incredible generosity of time and spirit, all to my great benefit. I am grateful to Wes
Widmaier, John M. Owen, Michael C. Williams, Thomas Risse, Erik Gartzke,
Christopher Daase, Harald Müller, Sara Mitchell, Ewan Harrison, Mark Peceny, David
Welch, Emmanuel Adler, Colin Kahl, Michael Doyle, James Lee Ray, and David
Kinsella. The dissertation would not be nearly as good as it is without the ideas and

v
thinking generated in my conversations with them. The willingness of these scholars to
meet and talk with me, sometimes more than once, epitomizes all that is great about
academia.

No less valuable, my family and friends have been an incredible well of emotional
support in what has seemed at times an endless trail. My wife, Janelle, has been a fellow
traveler on the doctoral road, and I cannot imagine anyone else I would rather have by
my side. She has been amazing, by turns comforting, energizing, and inspiring. She has
been a fantastic sounding board, helping me to work through my ideas. My mother,
Beverly, has always been there for me, a shoulder to lean on during the many times I
struggled to reconcile myself to life, academic and otherwise. My grandmother, Dorothy,
who did not live to see me reach this point, never accepted anything but my best effort—
her memory has provided motivation more times than I can count. My stepfather, Walt,
has been a steadying force: whenever I needed help, he was there. My brother, Adam,
has been what I imagine every little brother is, a wonderful friend and always good for
comedic relief. My sister-in-law, Jadine, was a great support as my housemate for the
first few years of my PhD course, very much easing the stress of moving to a new city.
Finally, I owe a great deal to my friends for their camaraderie: Jeff Fields, Yitan Li, Dan
Tauss, Conor Browne, Chris Griffin, Joe Ragole, Ryan Thomas, Scott Schneider, Anders
Munk, and AK Bøcher Ellern. I would particularly like to thank Jason Enia for his
friendship over the past six years.

vi
Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgements iii

List of Figures viii

Abstract ix

Introduction | Securitizing the Democratic Peace 1
Background and approach 1
Significance 3
Structure of the project 9

Chapter 1 | New Evolution of an Old Idea: The Democratic Peace 14
Demonstrating the existence of the democratic peace 16
Causes in the Democratic Peace: structure and norms 20
Critics strike back: counterarguments 29
The Rise of Evolutionary, Constructivist, and Qualitative Approaches 41
Moving Forward: Lacunae and Opportunities 54

Chapter 2 | Theory: Standing on the Shoulders of Giants 57
Systemism and the importance of mechanisms in Social Science 59
The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory 62
Bringing in identity 70
Putting the pieces together: securitizing the democratic peace 76

Chapter 3 | Methodology: Analysis and Cases 98
The qualitative approach and issues in defining democracy 98
Selecting the cases 101
Analyzing the cases 112

Interlude I | Democracy, Securitizations and the Relationship Between the
United States and India 116
Overview and discussion of case merits 116
The Indo-American literature 122
Roadmap and theoretical expectations 126

Chapter 4 | 1971: The Bangladesh War and the U.S. ‘Tilt’ Towards Pakistan 129
Historical overview and literature 129
The case 138
Private versus public construction of the India ‘threat’ 138
Public response 164

vii
Conclusions 169

Chapter 5 | The Nuclear Issue: India, the Bomb, and American Securitization. 171
Historical overview and literature 171
1974 PNE 174
The 1998 nuclear tests 185
Desecuritizing proliferation: 2006 U.S.-India nuclear deal 192
Conclusions 198
Democratic identity and security in Indo-American relations 199

Interlude II | The Non-Democratic ‘Other’: the Sino-American Relationship 202
Overview and discussion of case merits 202
The Sino-American literature 210
Roadmap and theoretical expectations 219

Chapter 6 | 1995-1996: The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the U.S. Response 222
Historical overview and literature 222
General overview of U.S.-Taiwan-China relations 222
The 1995-96 Crisis 228
The case 242
Rhetorical foundations of ‘engagement’ 242
1995-96: engagement versus securitization 246
Public response 273
Conclusions 278

Chapter 7 | 2001: The Hainan Island EP-3 Incident 283
Historical overview and literature 283
The case 291
Bush versus Congress 291
Public response 306
Conclusions 310
Democratic identity and security in Sino-American relations 312

Chapter 8 | Conclusions, Implications, Contributions 314
Theory and data 314
Theoretical contributions 318
Policy significance 324
Moving forward 327

Bibliography 332

viii
List of Figures

Figure 1: Bunge’s example: economy and population 60

Figure 2: Framework proposed by this project 87

ix

Abstract

The democratic peace—the finding that democracies do not use force against each
other—has emerged as one of the most promising research programs in the study of
international relations. The vision the democratic peace offers of a world sustainably and
durably at peace has universal significance. In academe, the democratic peace offers the
prospect of a social ‘law’ as well as a solution to one of the central problématiques in the
study of international relations: the causes and means to prevent war. In the policy
world, the democratic peace offers the possibility of the elimination of a major source of
insecurity and, in the process, a peace dividend unlike any other.

Not surprisingly, given the potential embodied in the democratic peace, scholars have
directed significant energies toward determining if the democratic peace is real, and if so
what causes it. These efforts, however, have been incomplete. The large-N, quantitative
studies attempting model possible causes of the phenomenon dominate the field, but
these models generally do not access the underlying mechanisms of the democratic
peace. As a result, explanations of the phenomenon remain unconvincing. It is into this
gap that the present dissertation steps.

The dissertation presents a theoretical framework novel to the study of the democratic
peace. Drawing on Copenhagen School securitization theory under the metatheoretical
aegis of Mario Bunge’s systemism, the dissertation argues that the democratic identity of
the public plays a critical role in shaping security policy in democracies. In short, shared

x
democratic identity inhibits the ability of political leaders to argue an external democracy
poses an existential threat. This dynamic, if accurate, should produce specific discursive
patterns in the security arguments of political leaders. Testing the approach using case
studies drawn from U.S.-India and U.S.-China relations, the findings support the central
theoretical expectations. These findings, and the argument behind them, fuse several
disparate lines of theorizing into a coherent approach and offer significant and powerful
insight as to why democracies have been remarkably free from war, clarifying the policy
options of decision-makers who seek to take advantage of the democratic peace
phenomenon.

1

Introduction | Securitizing the Democratic Peace

“The ‘democratic peace’ cries for a constructivist explanation.” (Adler, 1997, p. 347)
Background and approach
The democratic peace. Few ideas in International Relations are as appealing as the
suggestion that democracies do not use force against each other.
1
The security dilemma
would be defused. The scourge of war—if not eliminated in a completely democratic
world—would at the very least be dramatically minimized. States and societies would be
able to enjoy an unprecedented ‘peace dividend.’ In short, the democratic peace offers a
vision of the world durably and sustainably at peace. It comes as little surprise that the
democratic peace theory has bled out of academia into the ‘real world.’ In the ideological
vacuum of the post-Cold War world, it has become—at least in rhetoric—a basis for
policymaking in the United States. Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush have both
referred to the democratic peace as a basis or justification for U.S. policy (Bush, 2003;
Clinton, 1994).

In the annals of International Relations, few areas of study compare to the research
program termed Democratic Peace Theory. Jack Levy has argued that in all of
International Relations, the findings of the Democratic Peace represent the field’s closest
approximation of a natural law (Levy, 1988). Fred Chernoff claims that the Democratic
Peace satisfies the rigorous criteria—imported from the natural sciences—for a

1
Here capitalization is used to indicate the study of an issue, while the use of the lower case refers to the
actual phenomenon (i.e. ‘International Relations’ refers to the study of interstate dynamics, while
‘international relations’ refers to the actual advent of interstate dynamics).

2

‘progressive science,’ helping to impart a scientific sheen onto International Relations
(Chernoff, 2004; 2008). Similarly, James Lee Ray argues that the Democratic Peace
satisfies Lakatos’ criteria for a progressive research program (Ray, 2003). Seung-Whan
Choi and Patrick James note that the Democratic Peace represents the scientific ideal:
“incremental progress toward greater knowledge” (Choi & James, 2005a, p. 37). First
speculated by the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant, the democratic peace has
generated an immense body of work since scholars in the 1970’s and early 1980’s
resurrected Kant’s concept of a ‘republican peace.’ For scholars, the democratic peace
represents a long sought for law-like regularity in a social system, a morale boost for
social scientists unsure that the model of the natural sciences can be applied to the social
world.

Yet while we refer to the concept of a democratic peace as a ‘theory,’ scholars are far
from united on what causes the phenomenon.
2
As indicated above, this lack of consensus
does not arise from a dearth of research effort. Scholars have suggested the democratic
peace arises out of democratic political structures, the externalization by democracies of
democratic norms, and the diffusion of democratic norms at the international level to
name just a few causes. Few of these suggested causes, however, prove to be very
compelling (Müller & Wolff, 2004). The apparent fact that the democratic peace
functions only between democracies (as opposed to pacifying relations between
democracies and all types of states) makes it difficult for monadic (single state) causes to
explain a dyadic (two state) phenomenon. Most of the efforts to explain the democratic

2
Or, indeed, that the phenomenon exists at all (Cf. Chapter 1)

3
peace leave aside the domestic level dynamics of security within democracies, creating a
large explanatory hole in the field. As the quote from Emanuel Adler at the outset
suggests, the explanatory efforts in the field are largely build on rationalist foundations,
neglecting many of the insights of constructivism. Finally, most of the causal theorizing
is not specifically mechanistic in focus, and thereby fails to connect convincingly the
phenomenon of the democratic peace to explanations of it. Making these points does not
detract from the scholarship in the field. As Chernoff’s analysis indicates, the
Democratic Peace is a vibrant and progressive research program, and many of the
scholars contributing to the program are doing high quality research. The point here is
simply that there are patterns of research in the Democratic Peace that produce gaps in
explanation, creating room for further work to make a significant contribution to our
collective understanding regarding the underlying mechanisms and causes of the
democratic peace. In particular, the lacunae of the literature leave unanswered a core
puzzle: what is it about democracy that gives rise to the democratic peace? Put another
way, what causes the democratic peace phenomenon?
Significance
The dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways: theoretical and methodological.
Theoretically, it brings a novel and explicitly mechanistic approach—in line with the
strictures of Mario Bunge’s metatheoretical work (systemism) on causation in social
science—to bear on the study of the democratic peace. While a decade old, the
Copenhagen School’s securitization theory has not been applied to the democratic peace.
This dissertation changes that, using securitization theory as a means to access the

4
underlying security mechanism generating the democratic peace. Briefly, securitization
theory argues that security is not a natural state of affairs, but a social construct.
Securitizing actors, typically political leaders, must argue that an actor or issue poses an
existential threat to an object of value to an audience (also called a securitization move)
for that actor or issue to transition from the realm of normal politics to that of security
politics—thus becoming securitized. However, securitization theory alone does not
indicate what it is about democracy that generates the peace dynamic; it is a framework
for understanding the process of security. To securitization theory, the dissertation adds
theorizing on a democratic identity within the public. In a few words, the argument
claims democracy, as an ideology, requires the willing participation of the public. This
ideology and willing public participation generates an imagined democratic community
and an attendant democratic identity, leading to behavioral expectations based on the
operative norms of democracy: rule of law, nonviolent conflict resolution, and
compromise. Because democratic identity is not national or ethnic, the criteria for
recognizing ‘others’ as the ‘self’ transcend the boundaries of nation-states and ethnicities.
This allows the internationalization of expectations of behavior operative in the domestic
context. Here, securitization theory enters the picture. Shared democratic identity makes
it very difficult for political leaders within democracies to successfully argue that another
democracy poses an existential threat—a critical component to the securitization move.

This approach offers several advantages. First, it directs our focus onto the mechanisms
within democracies that may give rise to the democratic peace, facilitating a linkage

5
between the domestic level—where governance type is nested—and the international
level, where we observe the democratic peace. As I note in Chapter 1, the failure of the
literature in general to attend to the forces within democracies that generate the
international democratic peace dynamic leaves the research program vulnerable to
counterarguments of reverse causality. This dissertation begins to contribute to a
coherent causal understanding of the democratic peace.

Second, it links two types of constructivism—speech act constructivism typified by
securitization theory and social identity constructivism typified by Peter Katzenstein’s
edited volume The Culture of National Security—that have been separated into a single
approach. In doing so, this dissertation rectifies weaknesses in both types of
constructivism. With respect to speech act constructivism, bringing in identity helps to
establish a more robust understanding of the ‘facilitating conditions’ that permit, or
block, securitization (Stritzel, 2007). With respect to identity constructivism, linkage
with speech acts provides an avenue for evaluating the role and impact of identity in
international relations, a point where identity constructivism has been criticized
(Moravcsik, 1999).

Third, it fuses democratic norms and structure, also artificially separated in the literature
on the democratic peace, into a single causal explanation. In the Democratic Peace
literature, these two symbiotic elements of democracy have been artificially separated.
The dissertation addresses the problem linking democratic identity—informed by

6

democratic norms—as a formative element of public threat construction to the unique,
structurally driven need of democratic political leaders to garner public support for major
security policies. In doing so, the dissertation provides a more robust and useful
explanatory approach than existing explanations that separate democratic norms and
structure.

Fourth, it resituates the democratic peace back within international security studies more
generally. Rather than framing the phenomenon as an anomaly in international relations,
this approach of this dissertation views it as a security (or lack thereof) regularity that
may shed light on other aspects in international security. In particular, the combination
of identity and securitization suggests a possible pathology of security within
democracies.
3
Moreover, a better understanding on how securitization processes take
place within the interdemocratic context may generate insights, or at least potential
avenues of exploration, on the relationship between identity and securitization in other
types of states. The approach also makes some significant contributions to the literature
on securitization. It marks one of the first efforts to apply securitization theory—a
European framework—within a U.S. context. The dissertation also represents one of the
first efforts to apply securitization in a large scale (i.e. larger than article length),
empirical project. Finally, particularly in the work on determining securitization
acceptance, the dissertation makes important contributions to securitization theory itself.

3
I owe this point to Wes Widmaier.

7

Fifth, because shared democratic identity can only exist between democracies, the
approach proposed by this dissertation it explains the dyadic nature of the democratic
peace—as indicated by the bulk of the large-N quantitative studies. The ability to explain
the dyadic nature is a critical problem in for many of the explanatory efforts in the
literature (Müller & Wolff, 2004). The approach also begins to offer a systematic
explanation of how identity influences the securitization of non-democracies.
4
The
emphasis on the role of the public in shaping securitization also accounts for the use of
covert force by some democracies against others—a phenomenon particularly
problematic for existing explanations of the democratic peace. Under the framework
proposed by this dissertation, we should expect political leaders of democracies who
perceive an external democracy to be a threat to resort to the covert use of force because
they understand the difficulty they face convincing the public of their threat construction.
This dynamic—sans the actual use of force—will play out in the 1971 case study.

Finally, the new approach introduced by this project to the Democratic Peace literature
has the potential to raise new questions in the field. For example, what does
securitization discourse look like—and how does behavior change—as rivalrous dyads
composed of one democracy and one autocracy shift to an all democratic composition?
How does the securitization discourse play out between a firmly established democracy
and a democracy on the fringes of the democratic community? Do the identity dynamics
that we observe within democracies also play out in nondemocracies? The ability to raise

4
In doing so, it follows in the footsteps of John Owen (Owen, 1997). Cf. Chapter 1 for more on Owen’s
contribution to the Democratic Peace.

8

these and other questions marks the approach advocated by this dissertation as a
significant contribution to the field.

The methodological contribution of the dissertation to the literature on the democratic
peace lies in its use of case studies. Large-N, quantitative studies dominate the
Democratic Peace. While such studies have been invaluable in establishing that a
democratic peace phenomenon exists, they are less useful at uncovering the causal forces
behind the phenomenon.
5
The dominance of large-N quantitative methods plays a
significant role in the inability of the Democratic Peace research program to develop
compelling causal explanations. The case studies in this dissertation contribute to the
relatively small but growing pool of case study work in the research program. Not only
does this increase the pool of causal data, it also adds to the universe of cases available
for large-N qualitative studies that draw on the work of many researchers to analyze
causal mechanisms over a range of cases too expansive for a single individual to conduct.

Just as the democratic peace has ramifications outside academia, so too do efforts to
better understand the underlying causes and mechanisms. At the most general level,
without a good understanding of what dynamics underlie the democratic peace, policies
predicated on taking advantage of the phenomenon are built on shaky ground. There is
no way to know how to effectively operationalized an academic finding into a
meaningful policy approach. Any effort to shed additional light on the mechanisms of
the democratic peace should be of immediate benefit for policymakers. More specific to

5
Hence the maxim ‘correlation does not imply causation’ (Barnard, 2006, p. 780)

9
the framework proposed by this dissertation, the possibility that identity plays a role in
constructing the democratic peace has important ramifications. It suggests that efforts to
forcefully spread democracy (e.g. Iraq) may short-circuit the very phenomenon of which
they are attempting to take advantage. This can happen in two ways. First, policy may
reinforce identities that compete with democratic identity (e.g. religious, regional, or
national identities), thus weakening or eliminating the critical causal force behind the
democratic peace. Second, by acting in a manner contradictory to the core norms of
democratic identity, policies that seek to aggressively (i.e. use force) to spread democracy
may weaken the expectations that shared democratic identity will produce predictable
behavior. Conversely, the approach also suggests ways for policymakers to garner
international support for securitization moves against nondemocratic states, emphasizing
the importance of democratic identity in public threat construction. For democracies on
the boundaries of the democratic community, the approach suggests the importance of
clear identification as a democracy to forestall possible military action by other, more
established democracies (i.e. Iran 1953, Chile 1973). It also suggests ways for
policymakers in nondemocracies to understand the securitization dynamic within
democracies, clarifying signals of war and peace that may be lost in translation between
different governance structures.

Structure of the project
This dissertation, like its brethren, proceeds in several sections. Chapter 1 is dedicated to
a critical overview of the (vast) literature on the democratic peace. The purpose here is

10

two-fold. The first is to give the reader a sense of what has been written about the
phenomenon. The second is to argue that there is space for this dissertation to make a
significant contribution in what is already a crowded field.
6
Of critical importance on the
second point is the dominance of quantitative studies in the democratic peace and the
corresponding lack of efforts to address the underlying mechanism.

Chapter 2 outlines the unique (within the scope of the Democratic Peace) theoretical
approach of the dissertation. Under the aegis of Mario Bunge’s metatheoretical approach
(termed systemism) the chapter endeavors to combine the Copenhagen School’s
securitization theory with an argument regarding the presence and nature of democratic
public identity to provide a mechanistic explanation for the democratic peace. In brief,
the argument is that democracy, as an ideology, requires the active participation of the
public. The norms of democracy inform a shared sense of self (a democratic imagined
community), a democratic public identity. This democratic public identity plays an
important role in shaping security policy. According to securitization theory, for an issue
to become a security issue, it must be constructed as such by a securitizing agent, who
makes a security argument (also called a securitization move) to a target audience. This
move has two critical components—1) the claim of an existential threat to 2) an object of
value. The unique normative and structural nature of democracy means that, for major
security issues (i.e. war), political leaders must make their securitization move to the
general public. Here is where the democratic public identity becomes a factor. It makes

6
To preserve the narrative flow of the dissertation, literature specific to the cases will be found within the
chapters dedicated to those cases.

11
the existential threat component aspect of the securitization very implausible (perhaps
impossibly so) with respect to external democracies. Conversely, when the external state
is a non-democracy, that fact makes the existential threat claim more plausible.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of the dissertation. The securitization core of the
theoretical framework calls for a focus on the discourse of securitizing actors as well as
the acceptance by the audience of the securitization move, while the identity component
requires attention be paid to how the securitization move is constructed. The chapter
outlines the dissertation’s methodological response to these demands. Content analysis
of the security discourse of political leaders in both the Executive and Legislative
branches comprises the central empirical focus, while public opinion polling data
provides a measure of public acceptance of securitization (and desecuritization) efforts.
The chapter moves on to discuss the appropriateness of the case dyads—U.S.-India and
U.S. China—including arguments regarding the least likely nature of the Indo-American
dyad and most likely nature of Sino-American relations in the context of the
dissertation’s theoretical approach.

Chapters 4 through 7 are centrally concerned with empirical testing. Relatively brief
‘interlude’ chapters precede each pair of empirical chapters. These interludes provide
general historical background on Indo- and Sino-American relations, discuss the merits of
the subsequent cases in the context of the dissertation, overview the academic literature
on relations between the United States and India and China respectively, and summarize

12

theoretical expectations regarding the data. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Indo-American
relations. Four focal points comprise the test cases. The 1971 ‘near miss’ when the
United States sent the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal to intimidate
India during the Bangladesh War, occupies chapter 4. As one of the few situations where
force is at least intimated between democracies, the case proves instructive on how
democratic leaders in the U.S. who seek to securitize India do so, or if they do not what
constrained their policy. The second set of U.S.-India cases occupy chapter 5 and center
on Indo-American nuclear relations. Cases include India’s 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear
explosion’ (PNE), 1998 avowed nuclear weapon test, and the 2006 U.S.-India nuclear
energy deal.
7
These cases are useful because, while the U.S. may not fear a direct Indian
nuclear strike, nuclear weapons as a general issue is already securitized, forcing political
leaders who wish to justify a desecuritized approach to India’s nuclear program to justify
it.

Chapters 6 and 7 test the dissertation using U.S.-China relations. Two focal points
comprise the test cases. The first, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis (Chapter 6) when
China actively threatened Taiwan during the island’s first democratic presidential
elections—to which the United States eventually responded with the deployment of two
aircraft carrier battle groups. This case offers an opportunity to examine securitization
moves when, as in the 1971 case, the use of force is apparently a very real possibility.
The emergency landing (following a midair collision) on Chinese territory of a U.S.

7
The organization of these four cases into chapters is thematic rather then chronological. The 1971 cases
stands largely alone, while the 1974, 1998, and 2006 nuclear cases comprise a long-running issue between
the U.S. and India.

13
military surveillance plane and subsequent detention of plane and crew by China (the
2001 EP-3 incident) is the subject of Chapter 7. These Sino-American cases, in addition
to providing variation on the independent variable (external regime type—a point
discussed in Chapter 3), also provide an opportunity to explore the thesis of the
dissertation as a pathology of democratic security (as opposed to an approach more
narrowly constrained to the democratic peace). Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the findings
of the dissertation, the theoretical and policy significance of the project, and possible
directions for future research.

14

Chapter 1 | New Evolution of an Old Idea: The Democratic
Peace

First Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace: The Civil Constitution of Every State Should
Be Republican (Kant, 1795/1983, p. 112)

As most International Relations scholars are by now aware, in 1795 the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote an essay outlining the criteria for establishing what he
called a ‘perpetual peace’ (Kant, 1795/1983). According to Kant, the foremost condition
required for perpetual peace is the universal establishment of republican civil governance.
This idea—that democratic governance could result in the reduction or elimination of
war—while potent, got little traction.
1
Most of the governments in Kant’s time, and in
subsequent years, were not democracies. His claim that democracies do not fight
languished until the 1970’s when Babst, Rummel, and Small and Singer ‘rediscovered’
the phenomenon using large-N quantitative analysis (Babst, 1972; Rummel, 1975; Small
& Singer, 1976). Michael Doyle sparked the mainstream research drive on the issue with
his seminal two-part publication outlining the philosophical underpinnings for the
democratic peace (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b). Since then, research on the democratic peace
has exploded to become one of the most active areas of research in International
Relations.

1
In his essay on perpetual peace, Kant drew a distinction between republican government and democracy.
The terms describe two different aspects of governance. Republicanism refers to the division of
governmental power between an executive and legislative branch. Democracy refers to the vestment of
sovereignty in the people as opposed to an individual (autocracy) or elite group (aristocracy). Since the
concept of democracy has come to include Kant’s separation of powers, I will use the term democracy
rather than separate republican and democracy terms to convey the concepts of separation of powers and
vestment of sovereignty.

15

Since the democratic peace is the central theoretical focus of this dissertation, it also
serves as the central focus of this literature review. Arguably, given the wide scope of
the project, equally detailed reviews of the foreign policy, international security, and
constructivist literatures might be appropriate. While some aspects of these literatures
will be a factor in the theory chapter, the space limits of the dissertation require I leave
them aside.

In this critical overview, I argue that, while the idea of a democratic peace has enjoyed an
immense amount of attention, the nature of inquiry has created significant lacunae that
have only recently begun to be addressed. Methodologically, large-N quantitative studies
dominate the field.
2
While these studies have been invaluable in establishing the claim
that the democratic peace phenomenon exists (what I call the ‘statistical democratic
peace’), by their very nature they are able to demonstrate only correlation, not causation.
Not surprisingly, what effort these studies do make towards understanding and explaining
the democratic peace focuses on causes—norms and institutions (Maoz & Russett,
1993)—that can be quantified, either directly or by proxy. Yet the quantitative nature of
the studies does not enable direct access to these causal forces. The mechanism or
mechanisms behind the democratic peace remain shrouded in shadow.

2
Of the over 250 studies, articles, and books I have identified addressing the democratic peace or related
issues (e.g. factors in democratic foreign policymaking) roughly 180 have significant empirical
components. Of these, three quarters of the studies utilize statistical methods. While I do not claim to have
access to or have seen every study on the democratic peace or related issues, my citation database compares
favorably to that established by R.J. Rummel (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BIBLIO.HTML). My
‘sample’ very likely does not include every study on the democratic peace, but the discrepancy is random
rather than systemic. Consequently, the characterization of the field as heavily quantitative should be fairly
accurate.

16
This review takes a three-pronged approach toward the literature depending on its
relevance to the theory, ideas, and methodology presented in this dissertation. A fairly
broad approach will be used to discuss quantitative approaches both for and against the
democratic peace. In the second phase, the proposed mechanisms dominant in the
1990’s—democratic norms and structure—of the democratic peace engender a closer
examination. This section also outlines major counterarguments forwarded against the
democratic peace since they have largely been proposed in the context of the
norms/structure debate. Finally, the more recent—and most closely related to this
project—advent of studies employing constructivist theoretical frameworks with
qualitative methodologies receives the most attention.

Demonstrating the existence of the democratic peace
Beginning with Babst’s initial statistical finding of a correlation between democracy and
peace (Babst, 1972), a central front of the debate over whether the phenomenon exists has
centered on whether the correlation between democracy and peace is indeed real. Early
tests focused on establishing whether the initial findings represented an actual
phenomenon or a statistical artifact. Correspondingly, the issues of primary concern
revolved around fixing the scope of investigation and parameterizing state membership,
democracy, and war (Chan, 1984). The definitions of war and state have largely been
derived from the Correlates or War (COW) project (Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett,

17

1992; Small & Singer, 1982; Weede, 1984).
3
While they are important areas of study,
civil wars, colonial wars, and extrastate (state versus nonstate actors) do not fall within
the scope of the democratic peace research program. Of all the conceptual issues,
defining democracy has probably been the most difficult and contentious (Munck &
Verkuilen, 2002). The consensus definition seems to focus on the importance of electoral
structures and certain basic norms like non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, and
transparency (Dahl, 1971; Schumpeter, 1942). Obviously, characterization of
democracies does not enable large-N statistical analysis of them, and to that end Gurr and
Jaggers’s Polity dataset has served as the principal operationalization of state type, with
other datasets such as that of Freedom House enjoying lower levels of utilization
(Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Rummel, 1983; Weede,
1984). While these issues remain contentious to varying degrees, particularly the concept
of democracy, they occupy far less page space than they did in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Throughout the initial phase of democratic peace research (and beyond), studies of
increasing technical sophistication consistently found evidence of an interdemocratic
peace (Bennett, 2006; Bremer, 1992, 1993; Chan, 1984; Choi & James, 2003; Maoz &
Russett, 1992; Oneal & Ray, 1997; Small & Singer, 1976; Weede, 1992).
4
Indeed, by
1988 the statistical evidence of a democratic peace had strengthened to the point that Jack

3
In establishing their criteria for interstate war, Small and Singer exclude violent confrontations with fewer
than 1,000 total battle fatalities shared among all the participating states. Participation in war is determined
by level of commitment in addition to battle deaths: countries with fewer than 100 fatalities and
contributing fewer that 1,000 personnel engaged in active conflict are not considered party to the conflict
(Small & Singer, 1982, pp. 50, 55).
4
It is interesting to note that Choi and James—James in particular is a noted skeptic of the democratic
peace phenomenon—found democracy to be a statistically significant effect on involvement in militarized
interstate disputes (Choi & James, 2003, p. 806)

18

Levy could make his oft-cited claim that the democratic peace “comes as close as
anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1988).

Despite Levy’s claim, there exists no universal consensus on the existence of a
statistically significant democratic peace and a number of scholars have challenged the
statistical models used to test for the existence of the democratic peace. A common
counterargument points to the difficulty of eliminating the possibility of reverse
causality—peace giving rise to democracy (James, Solberg, & Wolfson, 1999; Midlarsky,
1995; Thompson, 1996).
5
Other efforts focus on identifying flaws in the statistical
approaches that have revealed a democratic peace correlation in order to demonstrate that
the phenomenon is not a pattern in reality but instead a statistical artifact (Farber &
Gowa, 1995; Green, Kim, & Yoon, 2001; Spiro, 1994; Ward, Siverson, & Cao, 2007).
Typically, efforts to demonstrate the spuriousness of the statistical democratic peace
point to other factors that, when accounted for ‘properly,’ eliminate or dramatically
reduce the statistical significance of shared democracy. These factors include geographic
proximity or conflict (Gibler, 2007; James, Park, & Choi, 2006; Kacowicz, 1995; Small
& Singer, 1976; Ward et al., 2007), shared interests (i.e. political similarity) (Farber &
Gowa, 1997; Gartzke, 1998, 2000; Gowa, 1999), decision-making constraints (Morgan &
Campbell, 1991; Morgan & Schwebach, 1992), and shared (capitalist) economic structure
(Gartzke, 2007; Mousseau, 2003). I will discuss in more depth these possible alternative

5
A third option is presented by Reuveny and Li, who find that democracy and conflict affect each other
simultaneously (Reuveny & Li, 2003).

19

explanations a little bit later. The point here is that scholars have challenged statistical
approaches to the democratic peace on their own ground.

Befitting an active research program, proponents of the democratic peace have responded
to these counterarguments with additional large-N studies incorporating ever more
sophisticated models in an effort to conclusively demonstrate the existence of the
phenomenon (Bennett & Stam, 2000; Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001;
Gleditsch, 1995; Goenner, 2004; Kim & Rousseau, 2005; Mousseau & Shi, 1999; Oneal,
Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996; Oneal & Ray, 1997; Oneal & Russett, 1999b, 2001;
Oneal, Russett, & Berbaum, 2003; Reiter, 2001).
6
As I indicated at the outset of this
section, it is beyond the purview of this review to delve into the intricacies of this aspect
of the democratic peace debate. There are two reasons for this. First, these issues are
peripheral to the central theoretical and methodological focus of the dissertation.
Attempting a detailed analysis of the statistical models deployed by the contending
scholarly sides would do little to further the arguments presented in this dissertation.
Second, as should become apparent by the end of this review, the focus on quantitative
tests has imparted onto the study of the democratic peace the general inability of
quantitative studies to access causality in more than a superficial way. While statistical
studies of the democratic peace are important, a more detailed analysis of the quantitative
debates here will not advance the field.

6
Note that Reiter and Mousseau and Shi differ in that they are testing the reverse causality hypothesis
directly (for which they find no support) rather than more traditional dyadic testing. Gelpi and Griesdorf
specifically address and reject the claim that common interests generate a spurious democratic peace
finding.

20

Causes in the Democratic Peace: structure and norms
Starting roughly in the early 1990’s, scholars began to significantly shift their attention to
incorporating causal explanations of the democratic peace.
7
Speculation within the
dyadic democratic peace literature on the causal mechanisms quickly focused on the roles
played by democratic political structure and norms.
8
However, as will become clear, the
success of statistical methods on testing a correlational relationship between democracy
and peace has inhibited the development of a robust causal mechanistic understanding of
the democratic peace.

Rationalist approaches of the democratic peace have largely been centered on
explanations emphasizing the importance of domestic political structure in governing
violence in interdemocratic relations. Political accountability (constraints) is one model

7
The need for such a transition was exemplified by the opening sentence in a 1992 article by Maoz and
Russett: “A near consensus [is] emerging on the proposition that, for whatever reason, democratically
governed states rarely go to war against each other, and are also less likely than one would expect by
chance to engage in conflict short of war against other democracies.” (emphasis mine) (Maoz & Russett,
1992).

8
Some scholars argue that the democratic peace is monadic (Benoit, 1996; Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, &
Huth, 1996; Rummel, 1995). As this review suggests, the vast majority of large-N studies on the matter
conclude that the phenomenon is dyadic. For this reason, the discussion here focuses on dyadic
explanations. For the sake of completeness, I should note that—as in the dyadic case—monadic causal
explanations also display a binary structure. Norms based arguments centers on the externalization of
inherently non-violent nature of libertarian (democratic) domestic norms (Rummel, 1975; Rummel, 1983,
1985; Rummel, 1995) or the externalization of norms of compromise (Dixon, 1993). Rummel even goes so
far as to argue that totalitarian and authoritarian governments are the primary, perhaps only, sources of
violence in the international system (Rummel, 1979, pp. 277-278). The structural argument, notably
advocated by David Rousseau, points to the ability of domestic political opposition to impose political
costs of expensive or failed policies such as war. Given that political leaders want to retain power, they try
to avoid the imposition of political costs of war whenever possible, thus producing a monadic democratic
peace (Rousseau, 2005).

21
scholars point to as a plausible explanation for the democratic peace. The argument
essentially posits that, because political leaders want to retain office, they avoid foreign
policy blunders and pursue high success foreign policies in an effort to diffuse political
opposition and build domestic political capital (Huth & Allee, 2002; Reiter & Tillman,
2002; Rioux, 1998). Some scholars point to the importance of transparency in
democratic political structures and the role this may play in minimizing the
miscommunication or mistakes in signaling that otherwise lead states to miscalculate the
willingness of the opponent to fight over a given issue (Schultz, 1998, 1999). The
transparency argument emphasizes the role—support or resistance—of opposition
political entities within the state to the chosen foreign policy. The ability of opposition
parties to demonstrate support of or opposition to security policy makes it possible for
international opponents to more easily determine the home state’s willingness to wage
war. Thus, democracies avoid war by avoiding misunderstandings.

A related argument points to the importance of audience costs in democratic
policymaking. The audience costs argument claims that democratic political leaders—
owing to a high political cost of failure that makes policy reversals difficult—will only
threaten or use force in crises with a high possibility of a successful outcome. This leads
to enhanced signaling of resolve by democracies, decreasing the possibility of war
(Eyerman & Hart, 1996; Fearon, 1994; Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001). Another possible
structural explanation points to the hindrance on precipitous action imposed by separation
of powers in democratic governance (Maoz & Russett, 1993). This structural drag

22
enables groups and political leaders opposed to the use of violence to get involved in the
policy process, heading off the use of violence completely or delaying its onset enough to
allow negotiations to defuse the conflict(s) of interest. A related argument, more directly
derived from Kant’s arguments regarding the war willingness of the democratic public,
points to the importance of public participation in limiting the initiation of disputes
(Reiter & Tillman, 2002).

Finally, some scholars argue that the democratic peace can be traced to the size of the
winning coalition supporting the government and the ability of political leaders to
distribute goods to their supporters (Bueno De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith,
1999). In war, while autocratic leaders can still provide private goods to (usually) his
selectorate (by holding back resources destined for the war effort), providing public
goods to the much larger selectorate in democracies in the event of loss is far more
difficult. Consequently, democratic leaders are more careful in choosing their battles and
work harder to win those they do choose. Because democracies make for difficult
opponents, they do not target each other.

While structural explanations occupy a central place in efforts to explain the democratic
peace, they suffer from significant problems. Structural explanations alone have a
difficult time explaining the willingness of democracies to participate in UN
peacekeeping missions, a phenomenon that seems related to the democratic peace
(Lebovic, 2004). Structural approaches also struggle with the dyadic nature of the

23

democratic peace. They all explain the democratic peace through an interaction effect.
The influence of democratic political structure always affects the foreign and security
policy of democracies the same way. When democracies deal with each other, these
effects overlap to form the democratic peace. Problematically, as Müller and Wolff point
out, structural explanations are monadic (Müller & Wolff, 2004). Were the rationalist
structural explanations prevalent in the literature accurate, we should expect to find that
democracies are generally less war prone than other types of states. As my broad review
of the statistical findings suggests, the consensus seems to be that the democratic peace is
dyadic without comparable monadic effects.
9

Another significant problem with structural approaches is that they treat the state as
though it is a unitary rational actor (Ray, 1995). Structural approaches assume the
political dynamics that are so critical to their basic underpinnings. Here we see a clear
weakness manifesting out of the field’s roots in quantitative studies. Of those studies that
argue for the structural explanation either by itself or in combination with normative
explanations, approximately 80 out of 115 (70%) are large-N quantitative studies.
Eliminating non-empirical work (review articles, theory or modeling articles) increases
the percentage of large-N studies to over 80 percent. Not surprisingly, few studies go

9
To be fair, the possibility of secondary monadic effects seems to be a point of continuing debate in the
democratic peace literature. Thus, the possibility exists that further large-N analysis in the future will
produce a solid consensus that there are secondary monadic effects. However, if those future studies reflect
the findings of existing studies (MacMillan, 2003), the secondary effects are likely to be small. This
finding would not necessarily support structural explanations, since these explanations do not provide a
basis for understanding how small monadic effects would be magnified into a large dyadic effect. Indeed,
this line of reasoning suggests another weakness in structural explanations: a general lack of effort to
clarify the strength of the monadic effect and how these monadic effects add up to the observed dyadic
effect.

24
inside the state—where large-N quantitative studies would struggle—in an effort to
determine if the dynamics theory presupposes to explain external behavior actually take
place. For example, while the transparency argument claims democratic political
structures reduce miscommunication, there seem to be no studies probing this
mechanism. There are exceptions to this general criticism (Elman, 2000; Rousseau,
2005; Schweller, 1992), but their small numbers only serves to emphasize the neglect of
more qualitative, case-oriented approaches. Moreover, operationalization of variables
often leaves much to be desired in our communal effort to understand the why and how
of the democratic peace (Owen, 1994). For example, Reiter and Tillaman find that public
participation limits the initiation of disputes by democracies (Reiter & Tillman, 2002).
Their proxy for public participation, electoral turnout, requires a significant leap of faith.
It is very possible that election participation serves as a good indicator of the role of the
public in limiting disputes, but election participation may not necessarily arise because
public concerns over foreign policy or security policy. If voters are motivated to vote
primarily for economic reasons, then there is no a priori reason to believe that electoral
turnout should effect security policy. In short, Reiter and Tillman’s statistical approach
does little to shed light on why public electoral participation should have the observed
effect. The point is not to highlight Reiter and Tillman as somehow extraordinary or
remiss in their work; they are not alone in dealing with this problem. Indeed, the linkage
between operationalization and the reality of the target variable is a concern in most, if
not all, large-N studies. The issue here lies less with the problem of operationalization
and more with the unbalanced dominance of large-N studies.

25

A related critique is the penchant of structural explanations to assume rationality in the
foreign policy decision-making process vis-à-vis the domestic costs of policy. The
frameworks proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Fearon depend on this rationality. Yet I
was unable to locate one study that tested this assumption by probing the actual cost-
benefit calculations of democratic political leaders. Along these lines, structural
explanations say nothing about the important dynamic of threat construction within
democracies. Certainly political cost-benefit calculations must significantly depend on
how threats are constructed. The cost-benefit calculations of political leaders when the
external state is perceived to be—or can be constructed as—a threat are certain to differ
dramatically from those situations when the reverse is true. Moreover, the magnitude of
the threat must play a critical role in assessing the political costs of action versus inaction
(and the corresponding selection of policy), yet structural explanations largely leave aside
these considerations—a significant oversight.

The other explanation for the democratic peace prominent throughout literature published
in the 1990s focused on the role of democratic political norms. Efforts to develop this
explanation argued that democracies—characterized by norms of non-violent conflict
resolution, compromise, and rule of law—would externalize these norms into the
international system (Gaubatz, 1996; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Raymond, 1994). By and
large, these explanations focus on policy elites either explicitly (Huth & Allee, 2002;
Owen, 1997) or implicitly by referring to the anthropomorphic ‘state’ (Gaubatz, 1996).

26

There are minor permutations of the concept of democratic norms. Braumoeller argues
for two critical sets of norms. The first traces a general sense of equality within
democracies to liberalism’s emphasis on individual freedoms and the undermining effect
these freedoms have on nonegalitarian social divisions and hierarchies.
10
The second
(more rationalist) set emphasizes norms of cooperation and negotiation—a point shared
by Huth and Allee (Huth & Allee, 2002). This leads democracies to use tit-for-tat
strategies, cooperation begetting cooperation with fellow democracies, but breaking
down when dealing with nondemocracies (Braumoeller, 1997). Danilovic and Clare are
more expansive in their identification of the operative norms, including legal equality and
respect for civil liberties as well as rule of law in a package they call liberal
constitutionalism (Danilovic & Clare, 2007). Dixon and Senese highlight the importance
of ‘democratic norm of bounded competition’ in contrast to the ‘regulated competition’
framing in Maoz and Russett’s authoritative 1993 article (Dixon & Senese, 2002, Maoz,
1993 #34). John Owen argues for a reconceptualization of the operative norms as
‘liberal’ in their basis rather than ‘democratic’ (Owen, 1994, 1997). These key liberal
norms center on the concept of freedom, and include many of the same norms as those
cited by other scholars—equality and regular elections. It also includes fairly novel
norms like self-interest and freedom of speech.
11

10
Interestingly, though his principle focus is the democratic peace, Braumoeller falls back on liberalism as
the principle normative source. In my reading, his appeal to liberalism is not needed. The norms he
outlines are basic to the operation of democracy, and do not necessarily lead to the types of individual
freedoms typically associated with liberalism.

11
Although Maoz and Russett ‘live and let live’ formulation of democratic norms may encompass Owen’s
self interest approach (Maoz & Russett, 1993).

27

Much as is the case with structural explanations, the normative arguments explain the
democratic peace as the product of an interaction effect. While democracies universally
seek to externalize their norms, the nature of the international system restricts their ability
to do so (Maoz & Russett, 1993). Democracies that do attempt to universally externalize
their norms would be quickly weeded out as predatory non-democracies take advantage
of democratic restraint. The anarchy of the international system preferences non-
democratic norms over democratic norms in international interactions. It is only when
democracies deal with each other that the constraints of the international system fall
away, enabling the democracies to externalize their norms without concern that the other
state will punish the democracy for doing so.
12
It is worth noting that John Owen’s
normative argument differs subtly from the mainstream normative explanation. Owen
argues that liberal norms are a two edged sword, serving to identify states—
democracies—that can be trusted as they “seek their citizens’ true interests” and those
states—non-democracies—that seek other, more dangerous, ends (Owen, 1994, 1997).
Owen presents a proto-constructivist identity type of argument, and in many ways
parallels the argument I will make in the following chapter. Accordingly, I engage more
seriously with his work when I develop my theoretical approach.

As with the structural explanations, normative explanations have difficulties explaining
the security policy of democracies. Like structural approaches, most norms models

12
This approach seems to borrow from Axelrod’s work on the evolution cooperation (Axelrod, 1984).
Axelrod’s finding that tit-for-tat cooperation behavior produces the most gains over a large number of trials
both for the individual and for the collective bears a strong resemblance to the normative dynamics
described by Democratic Peace scholars.

28

depend on interaction effect to generate the democratic peace. In this context, the
normative approach has difficulties dealing with aggressive democracies (Bachteler,
1997). This is no small matter. In his assessment of the normative approach to the
democratic peace, Braumoeller identifies two principal hypotheses, one of which
explicitly states that liberals (democrats) will be less willing to use force than illiberals
(Braumoeller, 1997, p. 381).
13
The evidenced willingness of democracies to use force,
possibly as frequently as nondemocracies, poses a problem for norms-based arguments.
14

Also like structural explanations, large-N, quantitative approaches dominate the field,
although that dominance is less pronounced. Of those normative studies with empirical
components, 70 percent utilize statistical approaches.

A broader critique of the efforts to explain the democratic peace through structural and
normative mechanisms lies in the artificial separation of the two. As Kahl points out,
norms and structure are complimentary (Kahl, 1999, p. 99). While some effort has been
made to integrate the two into a coherent holistic explanation (Doyle, 2005; Maoz &
Russett, 1993; Oneal et al., 1996), these efforts have a tentative quality to them. The
underlying theoretical framework does not give us a solid basis for understanding how
the two mechanisms fit together. Another problem lies in the failure of these
explanations to account for how threat is constructed. The democratic peace is at its core
about threat construction. As I have already noted, structural explanations have nothing

13
The second hypothesis points to the importance of perception: “ Individuals who are themselves liberals,
and who believe another country to be democratic, will perceive less conflict with that country than would
otherwise be the case” (Braumoeller, 1997, p. 381)

14
Owen proves to be an exception to this point.

29
to say on this point, marking a significant failure of those approaches. Normative
arguments fare better, but do not go far enough; their underlying assumption that threats
are self-evident, informed by democratic norms, assumes too much. Both explanations,
possibly arising out of their birth nested within large-N studies, are overly deterministic.
Security policy, indeed most state policies, arises out of a complicated dynamic between
elected officials, bureaucracy, divisions of government, political parties, and individuals.
Efforts to explain the democratic peace through a singular cause, to the exclusion of all
others, are bound to be found wanting. Several scholars have to varying degrees
indicated that the contention between structural and normative explanations is a false one
(Owen, 1997; Ray, 1995). Thus, while the critique is not new, it does bear repeating.
Rosato also notes (implicitly) the deterministic nature of structural and normative
explanations and, while Slantchev and his coauthors argue Rosato misreads the
probabilistic nature of democratic peace research, it remains the case that most of the
literature is implicitly rather than explicitly probabilistic (Rosato, 2003; Slantchev,
Alexandrova, & Gartzke, 2005).
Critics strike back: counterarguments
I previously outlined counterarguments levied against the democratic peace, and, having
sketched the normative and structural explanations that have dominated the literature
until recently, now seems a fitting point to delve into the counterarguments a little more
deeply. The counterarguments are concentrated into six principal areas: seeking
exceptions to the democratic peace, geographic distance or lack of geographic conflict,
the importance of shared interests over shared governance, the importance of shared

30

economic systems, linkage between democratization and violence, and the pervasiveness
of decision-making constraints.
15

The effort by critics of the democratic peace to identify cases where democracies have
purportedly fought—the Spanish-American War (Rosato, 2003)—or where democracies
very nearly came to blows, relies on a different logic than the other five
counterarguments. While the other areas accept the statistical finding that democracies
very rarely or never (depending on variable operationalization) go to war against each
other, they seek to explain it away. The effort to find disconfirming examples seeks to
challenge the seemingly deterministic nature of the democratic peace argument as well as
argue against the existing explanations of the democratic peace. One form this approach
has taken has been to point to the use of covert force or pressure by democracies against
other democracies (Forsythe, 1992; James & Mitchell, 1995). Alternatively, some
authors highlight cases where democracies did not go to war, but did not do so for the
reasons that Democratic Peace scholars have posited—for example the Trent affair
between the United States and Great Britain during the U.S. civil war (Layne, 1994).

Unlike most of the literature, efforts to use near misses to demonstrate flaws in the
proposed mechanisms and logic of the democratic peace do rely on case studies. As
such, they offer important insight into the relationship between democracy and war

15
The efforts of critics to demonstrate that the democratic peace is a statistical artifact constitute a seventh
area of contention. However, in line with the structure of this review presented at the outset, I leave my
discussion of this point relegated to the more general discussion of statistical efforts to ‘prove’ the
democratic peace.

31
specifically and security more broadly. There are reasons, however, to believe that these
studies do not pose as significant a problem to the Democratic Peace research agenda as
they purport. Some of these studies, particularly those of Rosato and Layne, set up a
something of a straw man argument of the democratic peace, relying on a deterministic
reading of the explanations and logic of the Democratic Peace. However, Danilovic and
Clare and Slantchev et al. argue against this conception, countering that the democratic
peace is not a deterministic claim (Danilovic & Clare, 2007; Slantchev et al., 2005).
Therefore, while the cases highlighted by Rosato and Layne are informative, they are not
definitive. Owen has outlined a framework, based on perception of shared liberalism,
that also highlights the narrowness of the cases as a problem (Owen, 1994). By focusing
narrowly on the circumstances of the near misses, the efforts of authors like Rosato and
Layne miss the societal milieu of the events, a critical oversight. Cederman’s
evolutionary approach—arguing that the democratic peace is a product of learning—also
accounts for these seeming anomalies, as the cases presented by Rosato and Layne occur
before the turn of the twentieth century (Cederman, 2001a). On the point of covert
operations, these studies can also be addressed without significant damage to the
democratic peace proposition. In particular, the framework I propose in the following
chapter can easily accommodate the threat or use of covert force by one democracy
towards another. Forsythe and James and Mitchell are correct in their assessment that the
structural and normative frameworks predominant at the time of their writing would have
difficulties accounting for interdemocratic covert action. Indeed, Forsythe himself makes
a similar point in his concluding remarks (1992, p. 393).

32

The geography argument holds that the observed democratic peace correlation is in fact a
product of geographic separation (Ward et al., 2007). Small and Singer suggest that the
lack of common borders explains their then anomalous finding of a lack of
interdemocratic conflict (Small & Singer, 1976). A related argument holds that the
democratic peace arises from the presence of stable borders—a lack of territorial
conflict—rather than democracy itself (Gibler, 2007). This lack of territorial conflict
ostensibly arises from the satisfaction of democracies with the territorial status quo
(Kacowicz, 1995). Somewhat ironically, James and his coauthors find the opposite;
territory is an issue between democracies, and when it is democracy matters less than
issue-related variables (issue salience and past issue interactions) (James et al., 2006).

There are several puzzling aspects to the geography counterargument generally. First, the
arguments suggest that territory is the primary, indeed singular, issue that drives conflict.
This is the only way the removal of territory conflicts makes sense as a counterargument
to the democratic peace. Yet as Mitchell and Prins note, territory is but a singular issue,
and not even the most prominent in the post World War II world (Mitchell & Prins,
1999). Mitchell and Prins also find that, contrary to the claims of Gibler and Kacowitz,
democracies do in fact suffer from territorial disputes. Second, it is not clear why
democracies would be status quo regarding territory. Particularly in the case of large,
powerful democracies bordering on weaker, smaller democracies, there is no a priori
reason in the geographic explanations why the larger state should not take advantage of

33
the smaller to achieve territorial gains. Third, the proximity issue has been modeled
repeatedly in other large-N tests of the democratic peace and found not to eliminate the
pacific effect of democracy (Oneal & Russett, 2001). Moreover, as the number of
democracies has seen a dramatic increase in the ‘third wave’ of democratization
(Huntington, 1991), the geographic separation argument seems increasingly obsolete.
Finally, the literature is indeterminate with respect to how democracies deal with
territorial disputes. James and his coauthors indicate that state type plays a secondary
role in territorial disputes, while Mitchell and Prins find just the opposite.

Another primary counterargument against the democratic peace focuses on the
confluence of interests, rather than democratic governance, as the explanation for the
democratic peace. The central claim of the argument is that the unique historical milieu
of the Cold War served to align the interests of anti-communist democracies, eliminating
or dramatically reducing conflicts of interest (Farber & Gowa, 1997; Gowa, 1995, 1999).
Statistical tests based on United Nations voting patterns as a proxy for national interests
seem to support the claim (Gartzke, 1998, 2000), although its should be noted that these
tests are disputed (Oneal & Russett, 1999a). Leaving aside questions about the validity
of U.N. patterns as a proxy for national interests, the interests based claim has several—
not necessarily unique—problems. First, the state is a black box in these explanations, as
is the case in most systemic or realist arguments. The proponents of the interests
argument do not provide any evidence regarding the mechanism underlying interests-
based foreign policy convergence. In effect, they are relying on structural realist theory

34
to do much of the explanatory heavy lifting. However, as Waltz himself indicated,
realism is not a theory of foreign policy (Waltz, 1979). Implicitly relying on structural
realism to ground a foreign policy argument seems problematic. Moreover, interests, as
measured by Farber, Gowa, and Gartzke, are subsequent to the policymaking process. It
is entirely reasonable, as constructivist work argues, that interests may very well
converge as a result of shared identity informed by shared norms (Hopf, 1998; Wendt,
1999). Since norms and structure operate synthetically, this line of argument brings us
back to the importance of democracy. Second, proponents of the interests argument do
not indicate the nature of the interests alignment; shared interests does not necessarily
equate to shared interest in peace. The end objective of interests may be mutually
exclusive, thereby making shared interests a catalyst for conflict, rather than a suppressor.
Third, as was the case with the territorial argument, the interests counterargument has
been countered on statistical grounds. Scott Bennett finds that there is indeed an
autocratic peace, but that the democratic peace is clearly stronger, suggesting that shared
democracy has an effect independent of shared interests (Bennett, 2006). Finally, work
on the evolutionary nature of the democratic peace presents strong evidence that the
democratic peace is along term phenomenon, not just a Cold War artifact (Cederman,
2001a; Mitchell, 2002).

A related, domestic interests type argument focuses on the process of reframing the self-
other distinction inherent to identity arguments to justify policy based on more material-
oriented (e.g. power, territory) interests calculations (Oren, 1995). In this argument, the

35
identities of the home state and the external state are reconfigured into alignment should
cooperation be necessary or into opposition if conflict is called for. The principal
proponent of this argument, Ido Oren, claims that the values that inform the current
definition of democracy arose from the need of America leaders to introduce
psychological distance between the U.S. and its enemies. The primary example of this
type of reconfiguring seems to be U.S.-German relations before the First World War.
Before the war, Germany was construed as the archetype of the politically advanced
nation-state: “modern, constitutional, administrative” (Oren, 1995, p. 153). It was only
with American entry into WWI that the sharp distinction between ‘autocratic’ Germany
and ‘democratic’ America became the central characterization of Germany. The
subsequent shift, particularly in database coding of pre-WWI Germany as illiberal or
undemocratic, arises not from new knowledge about Germany according to Oren, but
from the selective emphasis on what aspects of the state are important in defining it.

While Oren’s case approach supports his argument well, there are problems with the
study. First, as a singular case, it has a difficult time explaining, if the democratic peace
is subjective, how the regularity exists. Oren’s framework, while broadly interests based,
is not easily compatible with the other critiques of the democratic peace, preventing a
potentially coherent tie-in. Oren also makes the problematic assumption that public
images of itself and external states are tentatively held and easily malleable. Oren seems
to see the public as a foreign and security policy tabula rasa. The significant literature
on the role and independent influence of domestic politics in foreign policymaking

36
indicates that the manipulation of identity Oren details is not as easy as he suggests
(Levy, 1988; Morrow, 1991; Putnam, 1988). The enfranchisement of the majority of the
population and the spread of information access—both through education and the
availability of information—also makes the tabula rasa assumption increasingly difficult
to justify. Coverage of foreign elections and democratic debates as well as the
intersubjective agreement on what states are, and are not, democracies, in the media and
society makes it very difficult for political leaders to redefine the self and other in the
way Oren argues. Finally, it is significant that President Wilson recast Imperial German
as an autocracy in contrast to American democracy. While Oren does not address the
domestic political context of Wilson’s securitization move (Kahl, 1999, fn 135), it seems
unlikely that Wilson chose to reframe Germany along the democracy–autocracy axis in
the securitization argument by accident—a reframing that meshes well with the general
thrust of the democratic peace and the argument made in this dissertation.

A third significant counterargument takes an economic approach, arguing that the
democratic peace claim masks the true role of capitalism in pacifying the world. The
‘capitalist peace’ argument depends on three claims. First, that the rise in importance of
intellectual and financial capital makes territorial aggrandizement as an economic policy
more expensive and less effective than utilizing market mechanisms. Second, borrowing
the interests argument, that democracies have enjoyed a convergence of interests in the
post World War II world. Finally, globalized capital markets create opportunities for
communication and avenues of competition that divert states from violence (Gartzke,

37

2007). Findings that the democratic peace may be tempered by level of development
seem to support the capitalist peace claim (Mousseau, 2002, 2003; Mousseau, Hegre, &
Oneal, 2003).

The economic argument has at is heart the assumption that security and war are
principally driven by economic concerns.
16
Otherwise, the increasing efficiency and
efficacy of markets to deliver financial and intellectual capital would not matter for war.
Yet this assumption is problematic. If security concerns are driven, even in part, by
existential concerns (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998), then economic factors alone
cannot explain the absence of war between democracies. Recent concerns over China as
a security threat, despite the capitalization of the Chinese economy, seem to suggest that
capitalism is not enough to diffuse security concerns (BBC News, 2007). While
economic similarities, usually measured in terms of trade interdependence, have long
been part of a broader ‘liberal’ peace research regime (Oneal et al., 2003), most of the
statistical evidence seems to indicate that economic factors alone cannot bear the full
weight of explaining the democratic peace. The logical difficulties of the argument are
compounded, as is the case in much of the literature, by the fact that the mechanisms of
the capitalist peace argument remain underexamined. All the literature I was able to
locate on the matter utilizes a large-N approach; case studies highlighting the role of
economic rationales in the democratic peace do not seem to exist.

16
Interesting work has been done exploring the clustering of national attributes (trade, domestic polity, etc.)
that may play a role in conflict. Rather than use regression analysis, cluster analysis identifies coherent
patterns of attributes that define groupings of states. Rather than emphasizing one-way causality
(trade →peace) cluster analysis highlights the interactive, bidirectional effect of national attributes
(Wolfson, Madjd-Sadjadi, & James, 2004).

38

The democratization and war claim does not directly challenge the democratic peace.
The principal proponents of the approach, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, do not
argue against the proposition that mature, stable democracies do not go to war against
each other. Instead, they identify the democratization process as a potential source of
international instability and war (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2005). Not all
democratic transitions are problematic (the authors cite the Czech Republic and South
Africa among others as examples where violence was minimal or non-existent), only
those where the transition to democracy is partial and where it takes place in the context
of weak government institutions. In these situations, political leaders in the new semi-
democracies have incentives to appeal to ethnic or national identity to gain governing
legitimacy. This appeal, and the requisite ‘othering’ of a nearby group or state, leads the
state into war.
17
Their work is primarily statistical with some small cases studies added
in an effort to demonstrate their proposed mechanism. Not surprisingly, their statistical
analysis has been challenged (Enterline, 1998; Oneal & Russet, 1997; Oneal et al., 2003).
The cases Mansfield and Snyder include are not very helpful in resolving the quantitative
dispute. In neither their 2005 book nor their 2002 article are the cases very substantial,
indicating that the examination of the underlying mechanism is superficial. Moreover,
given that they are implicitly relying, at least in part, on an identity argument, they do not
address whether or how political leaders utilize nationalist or ethic identity in justifying
security claims, or how the public responds to these identity claims. In effect, although

17
Although war is not necessarily an end these political leaders foresee. They may get caught up in a
public groundswell over which they have little control.

39
the argument has constructivist aspects, the authors neglect these in favor of more easily
quantified structural (institutions) arguments.

A final major counterargument specifically targets the constraints structural argument by
arguing that decision-making constraints are not unique to democracies (Morgan &
Schwebach, 1992). Three constraints in particular are argued to be central to decision-
making constraint: leadership selection process, institutionalized political competition,
and the degree of shared decision-making power (Morgan & Campbell, 1991). If these
factors are not equal in their constraint weight—in particular, if the last is stronger than
the other two—it is possible for autocratic states, generally thought to be less constrained
than democracies, to face similar levels of constraints as democracies. Thus, the
democratic peace research program should be retasked to focus on the role decision-
making constraints in security and foreign policy rather than polity. This argument has
more significant problems than the others I have discussed. First, the studies themselves
do not find significant statistical support for the constraint argument. Second, the
constraints model does not actually examine whether constraints have the theorized
impact. Third, the constraints model inherits the difficulty of structural explanations
generally in explaining the dyadic nature of the democratic peace and the willingness of
democracies to resort to war.

Standing apart from much of the literature on the democratic peace, Elman’s edited
volume of comparative case studies deserves particular mention (Elman, 1997b). It is, to

40

date, one of the only coherent efforts to utilize case studies to explore the democratic
peace. Unfortunately for advocates of the democratic peace, it makes for difficult
reading.
18
Skeptical of the claims of the democratic peace, Elman claims that she and her
coauthors are “gate crashers at the democratic peace party” (Elman, 1997a, p. vii). Like
the other counterarguments to the democratic peace, the volume focuses on the normative
and structural explanations of the democratic peace as the principal explanatory
mechanisms. Throughout the nine cases, the monadic approach to the democratic peace
is thoroughly disabused and the dyadic proposition is significantly qualified, although it
should be said that not all the cases focus on dyadic relations, or even democracies. One
section of the book focuses almost exclusively on nondemocratic interactions, for
example Malin examines relations between Iraq and Iran from 1975-1980 (Malin, 1997).
The volume is not all critical, and produces some interesting new information. The most
coherent of this new information is the suggestion that shared democratic governance is
particularly important to the United States in foreign policymaking (Rock, 1997). While
Elman’s conclusions take neorealist theorists to task for outright dismissal of the
democratic peace regime—an irony given Layne’s effort to do just that in the first case
study of the book—she (rightly) points out that the democratic peace program at the time
oversimplified explanatory mechanisms and overreached on the resulting conclusions. In
particular, she notes the failure of democratic peace research to appreciate the complexity

18
Not the least because of Christopher Layne’s claim to have disproven an entire research program with a
single case study—an impossibly high standard for even the natural sciences (King, Keohane, & Verba,
1994; Kuhn, 1962; Layne, 1997, p. 96). Charles Tilly points out that, “Rarely can (much less does) a single
inquiry offer definitive proof or disproof for any particular social-scientific theory of nationalism,
revolution, balance of power, or any other political phenomenon” (Tilly, 2001).

41

of democracy and its neglect of domestic democratic politics (Elman, 1997b, p. 483).
Notable as the text is, it also has significant drawbacks. While Elman criticizes the
democratic peace literature for failing to understand domestic political dynamics, the
volume almost completely neglects that very issue, focusing heavily on decision-
makers.
19
The volume also falls victim to the very complaint it expresses about the
Democratic Peace: it overdraws the argument made in the democratic peace literature,
setting it up as far more deterministic than it actually is.
The Rise of Evolutionary, Constructivist, and Qualitative Approaches
Toward the close of the 1990’s, coincident with the acceptance of social constructivism
as a mainstream approach, scholars began to probe the mechanisms of the democratic
peace more directly.
20
It also marked the rise of innovative new approaches to studying
the democratic peace, notably work by Lars-Eric Cederman and his coauthors
(Cederman, 2001a; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2004), as well new systematic interpretations
of what had largely been seen as a monadic or dyadic phenomenon (Harrison, 2004;
Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell, Gates, & Hegre, 1999). The studies that characterize this
ongoing period of democratic peace scholarship mark a serious effort to fill in the gaps in
our scholarly understanding of the mechanisms and operation of the democratic peace. In
this section, the review more strongly focuses on the work of particular authors. In part,

19
The chapter by Lawrence Freedman on British involvement in the Falklands War proves to be the only
significant exception. Interestingly, Freedman’s methodology closely parallels that used here (focusing on
leadership rhetoric and public response) and his findings that democracy plays an important role in the
justification for war supports the theoretical approach advocated in this dissertation (Freedman, 1997).

20
Although it should be noted that one of, if not the, first efforts to interpret the democratic peace through a
constructivist lens dates to Risse-Kappan’s 1995 effort (Risse-Kappen, 1995b).

42

this arises out of the relatively recent nature of this stage of democratic peace research,
leaving fewer scholars to fill out the literature. A relative lack of unifying themes also
drives the magnified focus of this section. With the exception of social constructivism,
broadly construed, and the importance of perception, the studies typical of recent research
on the democratic peace defy easy categorization. This literature also more directly
related to my own approach, detailed in the next chapter.

Efforts to understand the systemic effect of the democratic peace and democratic norms
in general serves as a useful transition from the theorizing on domestic norms and
structure that dominated the 1990’s to later constructivist, more individual level work.
The systemic argument claims that the growth in the number of democratic states,
coupled with their ability to propagate democratic norms throughout the international
system (some of the most powerful, if not the most powerful, states in the international
system over the past century and a half have been democracies) has produced systemic
effects. In particular, non-democratic states increasingly observe democratic norms
(Mitchell, 2002). Mitchell’s study does not address all norms, only the norms of third
party conflict management, but her findings are dramatic. As the number of democracies
in the international system increases, the acceptance by non-democracies of the
democratic norm of third-party mediation increases dramatically.
21
In effect,
democracies are reconstructing the norms of behavior in the international system. The
systemic approach is also an evolutionary one. As the number of democracies in the

21
Mitchell finds that non-democracies are 16 times more likely to use third party settlement mechanisms
when democracies compose 50% of the system population of states as opposed to when democracies are
completely absent from the system.

43
international system changes, systemic democratic peace effects fluctuate (Mitchell et al.,
1999). Mitchell and her coauthors, and the systemic approach in general, have found
subsequent theoretical support. Harrison argues that the democratic peace research
program should be moved to the systemic level by drawing on the inherent synergies with
the constructivist research program (Harrison, 2004). This moves the democratic peace
away from the separate peace framework and towards a more comprehensive challenge
of the Realist research program and its conception of anarchy. The systemic approach
does not share some of the methodological weaknesses of the other aspects of the
literature. While Mitchell and her coauthors make use of large-N methodology, the
weaknesses of the approach in the systemic context are less troubling. In particular, it is
difficult (but not impossible) to construct case studies examining the dissemination and
integration of democratic norms over long periods. Moreover, given the limited amount
of work done at the systemic level, the use of large-N studies to establish a presence of
the hypothesized dynamic are completely legitimate. As Mitchell herself notes in the
conclusion of her 2002 article, much work remains to be done investigating whether the
systemic normative effect of democracies she finds extends to other democratic norms
(2002, pp. 757-758). That said, system level work does little to further our understanding
of what dynamic internal to states generates the democratic peace.

Lars-Eric Cederman shares Mitchell’s emphasis on studying the democratic peace using
an evolutionary framework (Cederman, 2001a, 2001b; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2004;
Cederman & Rao, 2001). Tracing his argument back to Kant and implicitly building on

44
Thomas Risse’s claim that he democratic peace is a rule resulting from international
learning (Risse-Kappen, 1995b, p. 503), Cederman argues that the democratic peace is at
least in part the result of an international macrohistorical learning process. Cederman
finds that over time the democratic community learns from common experience that
shared democracy promotes peace. Using a combination of novel (to the Democratic
Peace) computer-based evolutionary modeling and large-N statistical analysis, Cederman
demonstrates that disputes (using the MID database for the dependent variable) between
democracies decrease over time. Like other large-N studies, Cederman controls for a
wide range of variables in his empirical testing, including alliances, capabilities, and level
of development (Cederman, 2001a, 2001b). Interestingly, as with Mitchell, Cederman
also finds that non-democracies show a similar, if not as dramatic, dispute learning curve.
As is the case with Mitchell’s work, how this learning process manifests itself inside the
state and affects its security behavior is left aside as Cederman pursues his broader
argument. Cederman points to strategic tagging, alliances, and collective security as
mechanisms for consolidating the democratic peace in a dangerous geostrategic
environment, but undertheorizes how democracies get to the point of alliances or
collective security arrangements or determine that indeed other democracies can be
trusted not to use force (e.g. something is short-circuiting the security dilemma between
democracies).

The more explicitly constructivist research on the democratic peace dates back to at least
1995 and Thomas Risse’s seminal treatment of the democratic peace. In a point that has

45
been echoed since (Müller & Wolff, 2004), Risse finds the normative and structural
explanations unable to satisfactorily explain the security duality of democracies:
interdemocratic relations bear little evidence of the security dilemma while the security
dilemma remains active in relations between democracies and nondemocratic states
(Risse-Kappen, 1995b). Drawing on the newly (at the time) emerging constructivist
literature, Risse argues that democracies use shared identity, informed by democratic
norms, to construct their ‘friends;’ states to which peaceful intentions are attributed.
Likewise, nondemocratic governance structures indicate the ‘other,’ an enemy identity
from which aggressive motives are inferred. Foreshadowing Cederman’s work, Risse
argues that enmity and amity are social constructed, and the behavior of democracies
(peaceful towards each other, aggressive towards nondemocracies) is a rule learned
through a process of interaction whereby the peacefulness or aggressiveness of another
state is inferred from the state’s internal political structures. Constructivist approaches
have largely taken Risse’s argument and applied it individual leaders or
anthropomorphized states.

The constructivist approach to the democratic peace, particularly with its strong emphasis
on the level of the individual policymaker, also builds off Hermann and Kegley’s
influential article linking psychology to the democratic peace (1995). The authors argue
that democratic peace research should explicitly consider leadership perception of the
international system and external states. Of particular relevance are attribution and social
identity theory as well as work on leadership styles and decision-making processes.

46
Hermann and Kegley do not present findings as such (they reanalyze previous studies);
their paper is more concerned with highlighting the potential and importance of political
psychology for the study of what is most certainly a dynamic where decision-makers play
a pivotal role. Although it took some time, the field eventually responded.

Barbara Farnham points to the role of perception in democratic leaders in her study
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Farnham, 2003). In particular, Farnham investigates Roosevelt’s
perception of the threat coming from Nazi Germany. Farnham finds that Roosevelt’s
perception of Hitler’s threat arose not from the type of regime Hitler headed but from
Hitler’s demonstrated disregard for democratic norms. The operative mechanism rests in
the leader’s mind, the psychological processes that result in the conclusion of friend or
foe. Her work suggests that the psychological mechanisms of democratic leaders key on
the observation of norms by foreign leaders rather than on domestic political structure.
This is important, but the mechanism is only partial. What Farnham’s study does not
include—not to her fault—is how the democratic leader converts his or her perception of
threat into state action.

Wesley Widmaier’s study of the US-India near miss helpfully explores the basis of
democratic identity, pointing to the problems that differences in democratic identity can
generate in interdemocratic relations (Widmaier, 2005). He specifically points to the
importance of socio-economic characteristics of democracies as important for explaining
quality of relations; liberal democracies view emphasis on social equality in social

47
democracies as undemocratically constraining individual choice in the name of some
arbitrary ‘public interest’, while social democracies may see the domestic competition of
liberal democracies as an endorsement of unrestrained systemic competition. These
differences in domestic norms inform distinctly different democratic identities, and these
different identities generate significant tensions between democracies. To explore this
dynamic, Widmaier uses the case of the 1971 ‘near-miss between the United State and
India, when the Nixon Administration sent the Enterprise carrier group to the Bay of
Bengal during the Bangladesh war to intimidate India. Widmaier’s mechanistic focus is
remarkably similar to Farnham’s—the role of identity and norms in psychological
process of identification with friends and alienation from enemies at the level of the
decision-maker, in Widmaier’s case study Kissinger and Nixon. Widmaier finds that the
divergence of democratic identity does play a significant role in Nixon’s threat
assessment. Widmaier’s findings clearly reinforce the third of Kahl’s constructivist
empirical propositions: positive identification between democracies depends on
assessments of how the ‘other’ is perceived to be like the ‘self’ (Kahl, 1999, p. 117).
Widmaier’s findings also obviously reinforce the importance of psychological processes
in how political leaders identify threats, but they leave aside how the leader’s assessments
interact with democratic political structure and public democratic identity.

Like Widmaier, Michael Williams explicitly appeals to the role of identity in
understanding the democratic peace (2001). Also like both Widmaier and Farnham,
Williams places significant emphasis on perception, although in his case Williams argues

48
that shared identity, and the perception thereof, arises through political acts. The liberal
self is produced, not given, and relies heavily on recognition by others. At the crux of
this construction is the ability of liberal democracies to recognize each other; liberal
recognition and identity are based on more than the adherence to a particular set of
political principles or shared institutions. Williams argues that it is the common
recognition of inappropriate behavior and the shared struggle against this behavior (the
struggle to maintain the liberal self) that binds democracies together. In effect, liberal
democracies see other liberal democracies as agents similarly engaged in the mutually
recognizable task of creating and perpetuating liberalism. However, unlike Widmaier
and Farnham, Williams is less interested in how the recognition process plays out as he is
in exploring the core nature of liberal identity. How this identity plays out in domestic
and international dynamics is not his chief concern, and the article leaves aside any
significant empirical aspect. While Williams refers to identity construction on the
individual and social level, how that identity construction interacts with policy at the
domestic level falls outside the scope of his article.

While not constructivist, Mark Schafer and Stephen Walker also spotlight the importance
of perception in their study of the operational codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton in the
context of the conflict over Kosovo (2006). Focusing on how leaders’ belief systems
condition interdemocratic and democratic-nondemocratic relations, the authors find that,
at least in the case of Clinton and Blair, leader belief systems correlate remarkably well
with what would be expected under the democratic peace. Clinton and Blair both

49
perceived democracies as peaceful or friendly, while viewing nondemocracies as hostile.
This perception structures their international relations and established positive
expectations of dealings with fellow democracies and conversely negative expectations
when dealing with nondemocracies. The two leaders are not entirely similar in their
belief systems: Blair is less inclined to use rewards and more willing to take a hard line
with recalcitrant states than Clinton. However, this difference is not material to the
dyadic democratic peace approach. Schafer and Walker, through their use of coded data
are able to present a longer-term evaluation of the belief codes, engendering more
confidence in the generalizability of their study. Their research design also meshes well
with the more temporally limited work of Widmaier and Farnham to present a more
complete understanding of the role of decision-maker perception in the democratic peace.

On the state level, Mark Peceny makes important points about the importance of
perception (Peceny, 1997). Explicitly arguing that democratic identity arises out of
intersubjective consensus rather than empirical law, Peceny claims states that outsiders
might classify as democracies may not recognize each other as such. States (collectively)
and their leadership may not, for reason of history or imperfect or misinformation,
recognize an external state as a democracy, or the democratic states may construct their
democratic identity in such a way so as to exclude an external democracy or near
democracy from the democratic fold. In effect, states that are democracies may not see
themselves as part of the liberal international community even as they recognize the
liberal community. In the case of the 1898 Spanish-American War—Peceny’s central

50

empirical focus—Spanish imperialism and retention of a (mostly figurehead) monarchy
served to place it outside the liberal community from the American perspective.
22
Peceny
also gives some attention to how war was justified in the United States and how the
public reacted to these justifications, but this is not his central focus. There are also hints
regarding the role of political structure in shaping U.S. policy, particularly the interaction
between the executive and legislative branches of government, but again this is not
Peceny’s main concern. As with Farnham, Peceny’s work provides valuable insight on
the role of perception in the democratic peace, but his framework does not explicitly
address the mechanisms internal to the state that ultimately drive the phenomenon.

John Owen similarly focuses on the role of perception at the state level and policy elites
(1994; 1997). Owen theorizes that liberal ideology, rather than democracy, is the key to
explaining the democratic peace.
23
The ideas of liberalism center on enlightened self-
interest. Liberal states do not aggress against each other because, governing in the ‘true’
interests of their publics, such aggression would be counterproductive (i.e. costly and
dangerous). Because of this, liberal elites view other liberal states as reasonable,
predictable, and trustworthy. The issue of war only arises in the context of illiberal
states—seen as unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous—and only when
the liberal state must act to enhance self-preservation and wellbeing. As with other work
on perception, Owen indicates that mutual perception of shared liberal nature is critical to

22
It is also interesting to note that this time period corresponds with the last period of (relatively) high
tension between the United States and the United Kingdom—a state which shared some of Spain’s
‘antidemocratic’ traits, particularly imperialism and monarchy.
23
A point of emphasis where he is not alone (Kahl, 1999)

51

the liberal peace, and this perception process is not objective. The perception of shared
liberal nature is not wholly subjective either. Conceptions of what liberal and illiberal
states look like have a degree of stability. Owen suggests a linkage between liberalism
and the ability of domestic institutions to constrain foreign policymakers, but the
interaction between policymakers and the public lies outside the scope of his study.
Instead, he focuses on the interaction between (liberal) foreign policy elites and
(potentially illiberal) policymakers who may seek to lead the state into war. How
policymakers publically construct security issues seems largely beyond the purview of
Owen’s approach.

While Choi and James’ 2005 study is neither constructivist nor qualitative, it does fit the
pattern of the third wave of democratic peace research through the authors’ focus on
possible causal mechanisms (Choi & James, 2005a).
24
Using a foreign policymaking
approach, Choi and James argue for the inclusion of two critical aspects of domestic
political and social structure in models testing the democratic peace: civil-military
relations (the balance of power between civilian and military authorities, including the
level of militarization in society) and openness of political communications (including
media freedom and use of international diplomatic channels). The authors find that the
civilian-military balance does play a significant role, with greater military political power
associated with greater involvement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Their more

24
The study is not entirely quantitative. The authors do strategic use of case studies to flesh out ideas and
explore counterintuitive statistical results. This caveat aside, I suspect the authors would agree that their
study is predominantly quantitative.

52

powerful finding, however, pertains to the effect of media openness; according to their
models, media openness does more to account for the democratic peace than democracy
itself.
25
Choi and James are more explicit about some of these mechanisms than others.
For example, the effect of bureaucratic contestation between (pacific) civilian and
(aggressive) military leadership for control of policy seems fairly straightforward. The
mechanistic effect of media openness, however, is less obvious. According to the
authors, media openness facilitates state transparency (increasing confidence in
negotiations) as well as enhancing government credibility and validity. To this end, the
mechanisms here echo earlier structural explanations, inheriting the weaknesses of those
prior efforts.

While the findings are important, the real strength of Choi and James’ effort lies in their
integration of elements of decision-making within states with international or third image
phenomena. In this case, they link civilian-military relations and media openness, both
typical of democracies, with the democratic peace. In doing so, the authors provide an
interesting way forward for future research efforts. Their work, however, is not without
its weaknesses. In particular, Choi and James are (explicitly) focused on the decision-
maker as the central pivot of the war/peace dynamic. Broader social dynamics, as well as
how these may shape decisions of war and peace, are not an explicit part of their
framework. Consequently, while media openness is their most compelling finding, it is
not at all clear how this variable operates to generate the finding. The explanations the

25
Although media openness is typical of democracies while rare in nondemocracies. Interestingly, they
also find that use of diplomatic channels is inversely related to MID involvement.

53
authors provide, while undoubtedly realistic, do not seem sufficient to explain the pacific
effect. Society is largely left aside in explanation, a point all the more notable because
media is a societal product. These points, as with all the ‘critical’ comments in this
review, are less criticisms than notes regarding the ability of this dissertation to make a
novel and significant contribution.

The following table summarizes the three waves of literature on the democratic peace.

Table 1: Three Waves of Democratic Peace Literature
Wave Central Focus
Primary
Methodology
Key Authors
1
st
(Late 1970’s,
1980’s)
Demonstrating the
existence of a
democratic peace
phenomenon
Quantitative, large-
N statistical
modeling and
analysis
Babst, Bremer,
Chan, Maoz and
Russett, Rummel
Small and Singer
2
nd
(1990’s)
Causal theorizing
centrally focused on
democratic
structures and norms
Mostly quantitative,
large-N statistical
analysis, few case
studies
Bueno de Mesquita,
Elman, Fearon,
Gartzke, Gowa,
Layne, James,
Mousseau, Oneal,
Owen, Ray, Rosato,
Russett
3
rd
(2000 and later)
Using constructivist,
psychological, and
evolutionary
approaches to
deepen explanation
of the democratic
peace
Balanced mix of
case studies and
large-N statistical
analysis
Cederman,
Farnham, Hermann
and Kegley (1995),
Mitchell, Müller
and Wolff, Peceny,
Risse (1995),
Schafer and Walker,
Widmaier, Williams

54

Moving Forward: Lacunae and Opportunities
In the past three decades, the study of the democratic peace has risen from the fringes of
International Relations to become one of its central research programs. Hundreds of
journal articles and more than a few books have addressed the democratic peace in some
way. As I argued in the introduction to this literature review, research on the democratic
peace has structured itself into three main foci: basic empirical demonstration of the
presence of the phenomenon, theorizing and testing of normative and structural
explanations, and evolutionary, constructivist, and qualitative studies. While some
scholars have challenged the democratic peace, often with compelling arguments, other
researchers have provided equally compelling responses. In sum, there seems to be clear
evidence that the democratic peace is a real (i.e. not a statistical ghost) phenomenon.
Yet, despite the volume of work on the matter, today scholarly understanding of the
mechanisms of the democratic peace remains uncertain. In large part, the
overwhelmingly quantitative methodological focus of the literature has imparted to the
field as a whole the inability of large-N studies to access causality. The central
explanations of the field, norms and structure, have also contributed to the general
weakness of mechanistic understanding. As Müller and Wolff lucidly point out, structure
and norms are fundamentally monadic explanations for what appears to be a dyadic
phenomenon (Müller & Wolff, 2004). Additionally, with a few exceptions (Kahl, 1999),
the literature exploring norms and structure as explanations treats them as separate
mechanisms. Scholars have largely neglected the need to unify these explanations into a

55
coherent framework. States do not separate norms and structure in their operation and it
is not clear why theory should either. Moreover, constructivist theory indicates that these
two aspects of society cannot be separated as they reinforce each other. Recent
application of constructivist ideas to the democratic peace along with the deployment of
case based approaches has begun to address some of the surprisingly significant lacunae
in the field. However, gaps in the literature remain.

Constructivist literature focuses on the construction of shared identity—mostly at the
theoretical level (Risse-Kappen, 1995a; Williams, 2001)—or on the interface between
democratic identity— including the norms that inform that identity—and the international
system at the decision-maker junction point. While these are exceedingly important areas
of investigation—work at the individual is critical for understanding the initial stage of
transforming a situation into a security issue—they neglect three important aspects. First
is the role of domestic political structure—we are talking about democracies after all—in
the norms and identity dynamic. As Kahl points out, norms and structure are
complimentary, not competitive, explanations (Kahl, 1999, p. 99). Second, and this is
related to the nature of democratic political structure, is the importance and role of public
social and corporate identity. Constructivism argues that leaders perceive threats based
on their interests, which are in turn informed by their identity. The argument can, and
should, be extended to the public in democracies because their perception of threat is an
important factor in democratic security policy. Third, constructivist approaches overlook
linkages regarding how the democratic leader converts his or her perception of threat into

56
state action, although efforts by Peceny and Owen do indirectly address the issue. These
gaps leave several questions unanswered. How can structure and norms be unified into a
coherent theoretical framework? How do leaders present their threat assessments to the
public? How does the public respond to these threat assessments? Does the public play a
significant role in the democratic security policy process? What role does public identity
play in all this? In the next chapter, after a brief review of pertinent foreign policy and
security literature, I will present a theoretical approach that begins to answer some of
these questions. While this study cannot provide conclusive answers, it can lay the
foundation for an ongoing effort to do so.

57
Chapter 2 | Theory: Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants

The controversy surrounding the democratic peace is no longer about history but about
theory (Dixon & Senese, 2002, p. 547)

The previous chapter highlights the expansive amount of work done on the democratic
peace, structured in three ‘waves;’ an initial emphasis on empirical, largely inductive,
demonstration of a democratic peace phenomenon followed by an explanatory push
centered on structure and norms and a subsequent broadening of explanation to include
insights from constructivist approaches to international relations. Counterarguments
predominantly focused on the second wave when structural and normative arguments
dominated the discussion of the democratic peace. In much of the literature, large-N
analysis forms the central focus the empirical aspect of the research, a trend that has only
begun to change recently. The structure of the Democratic Peace as a research program
has generated some significant lacunae. The prevalence of large-N approaches has
imparted onto the Democratic Peace research program the inability of quantitative studies
to directly access causal mechanisms. Structure and norms have been separated for
analytical purposes, but as Kahl points out, there is no a priori reason to expect that this
separation exists in the ‘real world’ and that such a separation may hamper our collective
effort to understand and explain the democratic peace (Kahl, 1999). Domestic dynamics
have also been largely overlooked, and those efforts that have addressed the domestic

58

side have overwhelmingly relied on rationalist domestic politics approaches.
1
While
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with these works, the critique above and the rise of
constructivism suggest that these efforts may overlook significant causal factors.

The theoretical approach I outline below is an effort to begin to address some of these
weaknesses in a systematic and empirically meaningful way. Utilizing the Copenhagen
School’s securitization theory, the central focus is on how the factors within the state
generate the democratic peace dynamic. The essence of the argument is this: leaders in
democratic states, when dealing with major potential security issues, must justify their
policy to the public in which sovereignty is vested. The large, disparate democratic
public that comprises the audience forces political leaders to appeal to shared systems of
value, norms, and ideas to communicate the presence or lack of threat in a given
circumstance. Because of the unique nature of democracy (as an ideology), democratic
identity plays a critical role in the assessment of threat by the public, and it is to this
identity that political leaders can (powerfully) appeal in efforts to ‘securitize’ or
‘desecuritize’ an external state. This approach draws on several key theoretical works in
an effort to derive an understanding of the democratic peace. It also addresses the space
between individual and systemic level constructivist research on the democratic peace
and draws together structure and norms into a coherent whole.

1
In calling for causal mechanistic theories in social science—and in particular the democratic peace—
Jeffrey Checkel paraphrases President Bill Clinton’s advisor James Carville: “it’s the process stupid”
(Checkel, 2006, p. 363).

59

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I engage in a brief, metatheoretical discussion of
the importance of mechanisms in the social sciences, drawing primarily on the work of
the philosopher Mario Bunge. Second, I provide an overview of the Copenhagen School
as well as the substance and development of securitization theory. Third, I discuss the
role of democratic identity drawing substantially on the work of Benedict Anderson.
Fourth, I synthesize these approaches into a domestically oriented, mechanistic,
constructivist approach to the democratic peace and discuss the applicability and
limitations of the approach.
Systemism and the importance of mechanisms in Social Science
The focus on mechanisms here is inspired by Mario Bunge’s work on philosophy of
social science (Bunge, 1996, 2000, 2004).
2
Bunge argues that the study of the social
sciences is the study of social systems and thus requires a ‘systemist’ approach over
traditional approaches that compartmentalize social studies into holistic or individualistic
boxes. Both holism—typified by structural realism—and individualism—rational choice
theories for example—miss out on critical pieces of the explanatory puzzle located at the
alternative level in the social system.
3
The central focus of the systemist approach human
systems, e.g. the interaction between individuals and society. Explanation should link

2
I am not alone in noting the importance of mechanisms in the social sciences. In recent years a number of
scholars have called for a renewed focus on mechanisms in the social sciences and international relations in
particular. If my analysis in the preceding literature review of the domination of large-N quantitative
studies in the democratic peace holds true for the study of international relations more broadly, these calls
may be an effort to rebalance the field (Checkel, 2006; Tilly, 2001)

3
A system is defined as a “complex object whose parts or components are held together by bonds of some
kind” (Bunge 2004, 188). According to systemist perspective “everything in the universe is, was, or will be
a system or a component of one” (Bunge 2004, 190).

rather than separate the structural and individual levels. Systemism is in part an attempt
by Bunge to restore the importance of mechanisms in understanding and explanation.
4
In
his 2000 paper, Bunge provides the example of the relationship between economic
development and population dynamics (Bunge 2000, 150). It is well known that there is
a relationship between the economic status of a state and its age demographic, as the
following graphic demonstrates:

Figure 1: Bunge’s example: economy and population
Economic
Growth
Population
Stagnation
Macro level
Old Age Security Decline in Fertility
Micro level

From the holist perspective (macro level), the linkage is clear: Economic growth drives
population stagnation. Unfortunately, why this might be remains a mystery. The
underlying motivating dynamic is missing. On the individualist (micro) level, old age
security drives a decline in fertility as parents no longer need numerous children to ensure
their survival as they age. Problematically, what brings about old age security is
exogenous to the linkage between age security and fertility rates. Systemism brings both
levels of explanation together for a more satisfying and meaningful model. Economic

60

4
Bunge defines a mechanism as “a process (or sequence of states, or pathway) in a concrete system, natural
or social” (Bunge 2004, 186).

61
growth facilitates old age security, driving down fertility and resulting in population
stagnation. The causal mechanism depends linking individual level dynamics (micro
level) to structural level phenomena (macro level). It is worth noting here that the use of
the term mechanism does not mean mechanical. Buzan and Little argue that two
approaches typify the study of International Relations: mechanical (i.e. Neorealism and
neoliberal economics) versus social construction (i.e. English School) (Buzan & Little,
2000, pp. 103-107). Mechanical approaches emphasize the role of governing laws for
understanding the behavior of the international system. Social construction approaches
argue for the importance of perception and identity, minimizing the importance of
immutable social laws. The similarity between the terms mechanism and mechanical
suggests that the dissertation observes the same epistemological assumptions as
mechanical International Relations theory. However, the suggestion is a false one. As
will become apparent, I do not argue that the democratic peace arises from a universal
law immutable in space and time. Instead, the use of mechanism here denotes a pathway
through which social action or inaction takes place. The socially constructed nature of
human interactions means that these pathways may change in time or disappear
altogether. For example, the behavior altering action of international norms has produced
shifts in behavior as international norms have changed. Today, imperialism and
colonialism have fallen into disrepute, but the international norms pathway (i.e.
mechanism) remains active, shaping state behavior to accord with a different set of
norms. Furthermore, the term mechanisms as used here is part of a comprehensive
approach—systemism—towards understanding how social processes unfold rather than a

62

commentary on the nature of those processes (i.e. mechanical versus socially
constructed). Some even argue that the concepts of mechanisms and systems can be used
in place of Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ and Lakatosian ‘research programs’ as metrics for
evaluating scientific progress (James, 2004).

Bunge’s systemist approach highlights the problem of mechanisms in the Democratic
Peace. The predominantly quantitative methodological focus lends itself well to
establishing the macro level linkages—that democracy leads to peace—but has difficulty
accessing the micro level linkages or establishing the relationship between the micro and
macro levels. Approaches utilizing case studies begin to address this gap, but much more
work remains to be done.
5
It is to this need that the current study addresses itself.
Systemism provides a path to clarify conceptualizing the relationship between the
variables of democracy and peace by forcing us to look at micro level mechanisms. Part
of the contribution of this project to the literature is the attempt to use a constructivist
framework consistent with the requirements of systemism to explain the democratic
peace.
The Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory
To access possible causal mechanisms motivating the democratic peace phenomenon, the
current study draws heavily on securitization theory initially formulated by the
Copenhagen School of security studies centered on Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. While

5
Notable examples from the previous chapter include the Miriam Fendius Elman edited volume, Barbara
Farnham, John Owen, and Wesley Widmaier.

63

in development since at least 1987 (Jahn, Lemaitre, & Wæver, 1987), three texts
principally comprise the core of the Copenhagen treatise—Identity, Migration, and the
New Security Agenda in Europe; Security: A New Framework for Analysis; and Regions
and Powers: the Structure of International Security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al.,
1998; Wæver, et al., 1993). As described in these texts, three central tenets characterize
the Copenhagen approach to security: multisectorality, regionalism, and securitization.
6

Copenhagen’s sectoral aspect emphasizes the different issue areas—environment,
political, societal, military, and economic—in which security claims are made, marking a
break from traditional conceptions of security concerned largely with military threats.
The regionalism aspect, termed in Regions and Powers as ‘regional security complex
theory’ posits that geographic characteristics play an important role in global security
dynamics and consequently, regions where security issues are interlinked can be
identified for analytical purposes. These two tenants are important aspects of the
Copenhagen School’s coherent approach to security studies, but for reasons that should
become evident, they do not play a role in my effort to apply the Copenhagen School to
the democratic peace. The third core concept, securitization, does however play a central
role in my theoretical approach.
7

6
While all three texts have elements of all three elements, they also neatly match up in terms of central
focus with the three tenants of the Copenhagen School, i.e. Identity associates with sectoral security,
Security: A New Framework with securitization, and Regions and Powers with regionalism.

7
As Aradau notes, while Copenhagen School has been most successful in the broadening of security based
on its sectoral approach, it is securitization that makes the School truly innovative (Aradau, 2004, p. 391)

64

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue in Security: A New Framework for Analysis that a
state of security threat does not exist as an objective ‘fact’ easily recognized by all
concerned.
8
Instead, it arises out of an intersubjective, socially constructed security
process. This process centers on the security speech act, which claims a particular actor
or issue represents an existential threat to something of value (e.g. individual or collective
physical beings, the state, culture, identity). In effect, an issue or actor does not
constitute a threat until someone, whom authors label a securitizing actor, makes a
security claim about that issue or actor.
9
Because the security threat claim centers of the
continued survival of an object of value—the personal survival of large numbers of
individuals in the advent of nuclear war for example—the claim of a security threat is at
its core a claim that the issue at hand cannot be dealt with using ‘normal’ political
processes. Instead, in order to address the existential threat, the security claim seeks to
move the issue into a Schmittian, authoritarian political framework where deliberation is
suspended, power is centralized, and political rights are deemphasized (Aradau, 2004).
10

It is, in effect, an effort to ‘break free’ of the rules that govern normal political behavior.
A successful security claim represents a failure of normal political systems and processes

8
Unless otherwise noted, the discussion here of securitization refers to the second chapter of Security: A
New Framework for Analysis, pages 21-47

9
“Security,” note Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this
practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but
because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24).

10
Schmittian here refers to the work by German political philosopher Carl Schmitt, whose work formed the
philosophical foundation for Nazi control of Germany in the 1930’s. Schmitt’s work focused on the
efficiency of power centralization (dictatorship) and the unification of the state through the identification of
a threatening ‘other’ (Schmitt, 1928, 2007).

65
to address a given issue, and according to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde should be seen in
a negative light (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29).

The security claim, or securitization move, involves three parties: the securitizing actor, a
referent object, and the audience. The securitizing actor forms the impetus of the
securitization move; he or she makes the security claim. To make the claim credibly, the
individual or organization must enjoy a level of social capital—they must occupy
positions of authority within the socio-political context that would give their security
claims enough weight to warrant consideration by the relevant audience. The threat
claim(s) these securitizing actors make are integrally tied to the subject of the threat, what
the authors call the referent object. The referent object cannot be anything for a
securitization move to be successful; it must be an object that enjoys security legitimacy.
That is, the audience perceives the referent object as a thing of value whose long-term
survival needs to be guaranteed. Thus, a corporation in a market economy, while
possibly valuable, does not enjoy a guarantee of long-term survival and as a result makes
for a very unconvincing referent object.

The audience plays a critical role in the security move. While the securitizing actor
initiates the security claim, it is done so in an effort to convince the audience of the
validity of the security threat claim. The audience holds the key to the success of the
security move. If the audience accepts the security argument, then securitization is
successful, and the issue moves out of normal politics into the realm of security. If the

66

audience rejects to security move, the securitization fails, and the issue remains within
normal politics.
11
To this end, securitizing actors need to use language that the audience
can identify with and understand to communicate the threat assessment. While there is
no a priori reason to believe that securitization theory only applies to democracies, it is in
democracies where it potentially most powerful as an explanatory mechanism.
12
The
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 serves as a topical and concrete way to illustrate the
securitization dynamic. Preceding the invasion, President George Bush argued that Iraq
could use its weapons of mass destruction directly against Americans or give them to
terrorists who would deploy them against Americans. Here, the securitizing actor is
George Bush, the referent object is the physical safety of Americans, which was
threatened by Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. The audience, the U.S.
public, agreed with the assessment and accepted the movement of the issue out of normal
politics (i.e. the use of military force).

There are some gaps and tensions in securitization theory as outlined by Buzan, Wæver,
and de Wilde. While the authors indicate security as a process, the formulation around
the speech act suggests securitization arises out of a singular event. Yet few issues in
politics, where securitization is firmly lodged, occur as the result of a single claim or act.

11
Buzan et al. are not clear whether this rejection must be proactive or if it can be passive. I suggest that it
can be both. That is, the audience may actively reject the security claim (perhaps evidenced by a decrease
in the social capital of the securitizing actor) or may passively reject the security move by ignoring it (e.g.
the issue fails to gain ‘traction’ in political parlance).

12
The work on ‘selectorates’ by Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors suggests that leaders of authoritarian
states also court security audiences, albeit much smaller than in democracies (Bueno De Mesquita,
Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 2004).

67

Politics and human interactions are dynamic; they are a process rather than a chain of
singular events.
13
Securitization theory is, in effect, ahistorical. I mean this in two ways.
First, securitization neglects the ongoing effort over a period of time to build a security
case. It is unrealistic to expect that the security move exists in isolation to politics
preceding it and subsequent and well as external events. I provide the following example
to draw out the point. Over a span of months in 2002 and 2003, President George Bush
made a series of securitizing moves with respect to Iraq. The securitization of Iraq (I say
securitization because the audience, the U.S. public, generally accepted the securitization
move) took place over a series of months; evidence was marshaled, security claims were
repeated, and in the repeating reinforced and imbued with credibility. Iraq was
securitized as the result of a security process rather than a singular security act. Second,
securitization provides little theoretical grounding for understanding new issues that arise
in the context of existing or latent securitizations. For example, India’s development of a
nuclear weapon took place in the context of the latent securitization of nuclear
proliferation. How is this new issue influenced by the historical security context within
which it takes place?

This example also highlights two additional points. The first is that securitization theory
provides little ground for understanding gradients of securitization. Nuclear weapons and
their proliferation have clearly been constructed, in the United States, as an existential
threat. There is evidence that the public has accepted the security move with respect to
nuclear weapons, but the policy response and indeed the whole issue area suggest a

13
I owe this point to Michael C. Williams.

68
background or latent securitization. The issue has been securitized, but that securitization
seems to serve more as a facilitator for other actor-specific securitizations rather than
policy impetus in and of itself. Second, Buzan and his coauthors play very limited
attention to the dynamic of desecuritization (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 1998). This is
particularly important in the context of latent securitizations like nuclear weapons. How
do political leaders desecuritize events that take place in the context of a historically
securitized issue area?

Balzacq and Stritzel reformulate securitization theory to emphasize social constructivist
elements minimized in the initial focus of securitization theory on the self-referential
speech act (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007). Both authors modify and extend the
traditional Copenhagen School securitization approach—which emphasizes a so-called
internalist or self-referential perspective focused on the constitutive rules of the speech
act—by advocating for an externalist reformulation more concerned with a social
constructivist or intersubjective focus. Balzacq argues that securitization as outlined by
the Copenhagen School originators does not provide adequate leverage for examining
real world security acts. The focus on a formal structure of the security speech act
suggests a natural law-type, unchanging, permanent practice, which stands in stark
contrast to the generally social constructivist approach of the Copenhagen School. To
remedy this, Balzacq shifts the formulation of securitization from speech act to strategic
practice, emphasizing three aspects: the audience-centered nature of effective
securitization, the context-dependence of securitization, and the importance of power

69

(principally, the differential between securitizer and audience) in the securitization act.
Stritzel emphasizes the importance of the securitization process rather than the speech act
as a singular event and the “broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing
actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power”
(2007, p. 360). In effect, the Copenhagen School neglects the social context within
which the securitization process takes place. Like Balzacq, Stritzel reformulates
securitization into a tripartite analytical framework focusing on the performative force of
the threat claim/texts, the social and discourse context, and the positional power of the
securitizing actors.

Despite these issues, securitization theory provides a powerful analytical tool and insight
on a possible mechanism behind the democratic peace.
14
It points us towards the internal
workings of the state as the source of external security behavior and in particular it
highlights the interaction between political leadership and the public (at least in

14
The applicability of securitization as an analytical tool is by no means accepted in the literature. Some
within the ‘critical’ security community argue that securitization, because it addresses a political process,
reifies and privileges the undemocratic security dynamic through the process of analysis. Combined with
the relative neglect within the theory of the desecuritization process, critics argue that Copenhagen School
securitization actually serves as an advocate for the authoritarian-like, Schmittian security at the expense of
democratic processes and politics (Aradau, 2004). It is obviously beyond the scope of this dissertation to
answer these critiques conclusively. The debate over securitization theory is an important and healthy one.
Rather than engage in this debate, I sidestep it by utilizing securitization as Taurek advocates; as a practical
tool for analyzing security and “tracing incidents of securitization and desecuritization” (2006, p. 55).
Likewise, Alker notes that “for analytical, comparative purposes, one neither needs to articulate a well-
developed normative position nor has to endorse or condemn…the political worthiness of the political
processes one is seeking to analyze”(Alker, 2006). It is in the spirit of these comments that securitization is
used here. I do not dispute that the security move, successful or not, can and often is sociologically
damaging and represents a failure of normal politics to address the issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29), but
these concerns do not impact securitization as an analytical tool, which is the manner I utilize it. Indeed,
using securitization as an analytical tool for uncovering how security issues are constructed and shedding
light on the security process would be the first step towards a meaningful normative or ethical approach
towards security studies more broadly. Moreover, the constructivist approach adopted both by the
Copenhagen School and myself does not reify security claims or threats.

70
democracies) as the heart of the security dynamic. According to securitization, this
interaction should provide significant insight on why democracies do not use force
against each other. This approach is novel to the field of democratic peace studies and
quite rare in U.S. security studies generally. As such, its application here marks a
significant contribution to our understanding of both the democratic peace and security
dynamics in democracies more broadly. Applying securitization to the democratic peace
also explains the limited applicability of the sectoral and regionalism components of the
Copenhagen School. The focus on militarized conflict of the Democratic Peace research
program collapses the Copenhagen sectoral framework down to the more conventional
political/military security sectors. Moreover, because the democratic peace is observed
to be a global phenomenon, the regional security complex aspect of the Copenhagen
School also drops out of the theoretical equation. From the perspective of the research
approach embodied in this dissertation, securitization is the key analytical component of
the Copenhagen School.
Bringing in identity
Efforts by Balzacq and Stritzel to emphasize the importance of external socio-cultural
context for securitization highlight the potential importance of public identity as a key
piece of the democratic peace puzzle. While social constructivists have long
acknowledged the importance of identity for understanding international relations and
security dynamics, the role of identity in the democratic peace is underdeveloped.
Existing social constructivist work on the democratic peace is bifurcated. On one end,
typified by Wesley Widmaier, the literature focuses on the role of identity in threat

71

construction at the level of the individual. On the other, systemic work, exemplified by
that of Sarah McLaughlin Mitchell, emphasizes the importance of systemic norm
dynamics for reconstructing the interests of states. The middle ground is largely left
fallow.
15
Normative explanations that dominate the second wave of democratic research
usually assume that the public adheres to the norms attributed to states and as a
consequence is vulnerable to charges of reductionism (James & Mitchell, 1995).

Since the rise of constructivism (i.e. interests are socially constructed) as a serious
research program in international relations, the importance of identity in the literature has
increased dramatically.
16
The literature is far too expansive to cover in a comprehensive
manner here; this dissertation is centrally focused on contributing to our collective
understanding of the democratic peace. I discuss the literature on identity here to give
backing to my own efforts to theorize democratic identity and the role that may play in
the securitization dynamic. Typically, constructivism operates at the systemic level
(Adler, 1997; Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996b; Onuf, 1989; Risse-Kappen, 1995b;
Wendt, 1992).
17
For example, in his 1998 article on the promise of constructivism, Hopf
refers to the identity of the state when talking about U.S. involvement in Vietnam: “U.S.

15
The irony here is that it is the middle ground, the interaction between policymakers and the public, which
plays a critical role in making democracy democratic.

16
Thomas Risse defines identity as defining and delineating boundaries between the self and the other as
well as prescribing norms of appropriate behavior towards other agents within the self identification (Risse-
Kappen, 1996, p. 367)

17
My point here is not to say that systemic level identity investigations are unimportant. Identity systems
do not operate in isolation. Social identity constructed by states at the international level influences
corporate identity at the sub-state level, and the reverse is also true. I only seek to highlight the relative
neglect of domestic level identity dynamics.

72

military intervention in Vietnam was consistent with a number of U.S. identities: great
power, imperialist, enemy, ally, and so on” (Hopf, 1998, p. 178). Hopf is clearly
discussing state identity within the context of the international system, not the corporate
identity of the public within the state (Cederman & Daase, 2003). Likewise, the literature
on security communities and the role identity plays in their construction focuses on the
systemic level (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Williams, 2001) Within Peter Katzenstein’s
notable edited volume on the culture of national security, there is some variation on the
level of identity analysis, with two chapters focusing at least in part of on the role of
corporate identity in shaping the state behavior of the Soviet Union, Japan, and Germany
(Berger, 1996; Herman, 1996). However, Thomas Risse’s chapter focusing on the role of
republican liberal identity in threat perception and the democratic peace recenters the
analytical focus back at the systemic and individual levels (Risse-Kappen, 1996).
18

Similarly, Rousseau’s exemplary work on the role of identity in threat perception largely
focuses on identity at the systemic level (Rousseau, 2006). Like the other literature on
the role of identity, Rousseau argues shared identity decreases the willingness to use
force by decreasing threat perception (although does not necessarily increase the
willingness to cooperate) (Rousseau, 2006, pp. 58, 69). While he criticizes Wendt for
neglecting internal or domestic factors in state identity formation (a point Rousseau
shares with Cederman and Daase), Rousseau’s central concern remains on system level
or individual level identity. The (admirably systematic) hypotheses derived from

18
Risse argues that international dynamics give rise to state social identities, but his analysis centers on
how individual policymakers (e.g. Eisenhower in the 1956 Suez Crisis) internalize these state identities and
act on them.

73

Rousseau’s framework focus on the formation of identity in the context of the individual,
the state, and the international (Rousseau, 2006, pp. 94-95). While the State level
suggests a role for public identity, Rousseau is not explicit on this point. State identity
relates to identity characteristics arising from within the state, rather than of groups
within the state. Where domestic identity plays a role, it is as a conditioner of system
level identity, rather than as a policy shaping factor it its own right. For example in his
case study of threat perception of China by Japan and the United States, Rousseau
focuses on the perception of elites in those countries. The role of domestic public
identity is left aside.

Indeed, Cederman and Daase’s call for work on corporate identity as recently as 2003
highlights the state dominate nature of identity discourse in International Relations.
19

The literature on nationalism provides some insight on this point. Benedict Anderson’s
groundbreaking study on nationalism powerfully informs the proposal on democratic
identity I present below. Predating much of the work on constructivism, Anderson’s
insight that nationalism as an identity is a social construct that binds the imagined
national community together continues to be an authoritative conception of the concept
(Anderson, 1991). Similarly—and in sympathy with the securitization argument I am
making—Hall argues that the national conception of the self has a powerful effect on

19
Cederman and Daase define the corporate identity of the state as being comprised of “territory, legal
frameworks and other institutions” (Cederman & Daase, 2003, p. 8). Kahl defines state corporate identity
slightly differently: “A state's corporate identity is generated by state formation and political development
processes that are, to varying degrees, prior to or independent from interaction with other states” (Kahl,
1999, p. 105).

74
how the international system constitutes itself and shapes how states interact with each
other (Hall, 1999).

Hopf’s innovative study of the impact of identity on Soviet/Russian foreign policy in
1955 and 1999 parts ways with much of this literature in both its theoretical focus and
methodological approach (2002). Critical of theoretical ‘preloading’ with respect to
identity—i.e. deductively determining what identities are important and then going to the
discourse to find them—Hopf adopts an inductive approach coupled with a “cold, thin
cognitive version of identity,” which relies on habit and practice, rather than role and
norm, as the principle mechanism of reproduction (Hopf, 2002, p. 10). For Hopf, identity
functions as an axis of interpretation, a heuristic for interpreting information and the
world. Using this ‘cold, thin’ approach, Hopf proceeds—analyzing official state
missives, newspapers, magazines, and novels—to develop an inductive understanding of
social identities at play in 1955 Soviet Union and 1999 Russia. These identities in the
public are then found to play a role in shaping the foreign policy of the state. In his
study, Hopf provides one of the few examples of analyzing the role of public identities in
the formation and implementation of foreign policy. There are, however, significant
differences with the approach I will outline, differences I will discuss in greater detail
later.

As noted in the literature review, there have been efforts to apply identity to the
democratic peace. Typically, these efforts occur on the individual level to determine the

75

role of identity in policymaking (e.g. Widmaier) or at the systemic level in an effort to
determine the role of state identity in the democratic peace. There have, however, been
some efforts to explore the influence of corporate public identity in the democratic peace.
Weart argues that democracy, as an ideology, endows democracies with a democratic
identity.
20
He notes “group boundaries are typically set in ways connected with political
circumstances. In particular, democrats…normally define even foreign democrats…as
in-group, ‘people like us,’ at least in terms of what kind of political relations they expect”
(1998, p. 18). The suggestion here seems to be that democracy informs corporate
(public) as well as social (state) identity, but Weart’s research approach leaves the
corporate aspect largely unexplored. Mark Haas also suggests an important role for
ideology, though he does not tie it explicitly to identity. Focusing on policy-makers,
Haas argues that ideology is central to threat perception and that ideological distance
serves as the principle metric for evaluating threat (2005). Contra Weart and the
arguments I will make subsequently, Haas draws no distinctions regarding the content of
ideology in threat perception. The critical aspect of ideology and threat perception is
ideological distance rather than ideological content.

Kahl’s 1999 article on the relationship between constructivism and the democratic peace
also comments on a potential role for corporate identity. In particular, he notes that
“when collective liberal identification exists, significant portions of public and elite
opinion should be strongly liberal, trusting, and pacific toward other states perceived to

20
Democracy is an ideology because it requires the active maintenance and affirmation of a set of beliefs
by the population at large (Weart, 1998, p. 61).

76

be liberal democracies (a corollary being that they should be more distrustful of states
perceived to be illiberal or nondemocratic).
21
The extent and intensity of these opinions
should co- vary with the degree of positive collective identification” (emphasis mine)
(Kahl, 1999, pp. 138-139). Like Owen, and divergent with the approach I have taken
here, Kahl focuses on liberalism rather than democracy.
22

It is clear from the literature that identity plays a role in interest formation and policy
outcomes. With respect to the democratic peace, liberal identity is clearly thought to play
a significant role in the phenomenon. Dynamics of trust arise from shared liberal
identity, generating peaceful dynamics. However, the literature rarely directs attention
towards the role identity for the public. Those that do, notably Kahl, point to liberal
identity. Yet relying on liberal identity risks constraining our understanding of the
democratic peace to the West. Moreover, it is not clear how liberal identity arises from
democratic systems. In short, there is room for more theorizing on the role of identity in
the democratic peace. Drawing on these authors, I argue that the norms that regulate the
basic functioning of democracy inform a corporate democratic identity in the public.
Putting the pieces together: securitizing the democratic peace
Joining securitization theory with a focus on democratic corporate identity has the
potential to illuminate an important causal mechanism behind the democratic peace.
Applying securitization to the democratic peace gives us an avenue for studying the role

21
Kahl claims democratic institutions may serve identity markers that signal shared liberalism (Kahl, 1999,
p. 131).

22
Although in this context, the distinction between the two may be of small significance.

77
of norms and identity in the formation of security policy in democratic states. It seats the
locus of action at the domestic level, where decisions of war and peace are made.
Securitization gives us a structured way for looking at the security process, focusing on
the communicative action of leaders and their audiences. It also ties norms and structure
together in explanation. To securitize successfully, leaders must use the language of
security; they must appeal to certain norms and identities in order to communicate the
idea of a threat and that the object threatened is valuable. The nature of the audience
(general public, small group of oligarchs, military officers) as well as the norms and
identity language the audience responds to are linked to the political structure.
Securitizers in autocracies face a very different audience, requiring a very different
language of securitization, than those in democracies.

Owing to the structural nature of democracy, securitizers in democracies must deal with a
large, varied audience. Transparency in democratic governance and the need to maintain
public support in order to continue in office means that democratic leaders have a
difficult (but not impossible) time launching significant military options outside the
purview of public opinion. Moreover, because military operations are major policy
operations (risk of large-scale war, significant drain on the treasury, sending citizens off
potentially to die), electoral incentives and often governmental authority structures force
securitizers in democracies to obtain at least a plurality, and often a majority, of public
support for security policy. Regardless of democracy size, this audience is very large,

78

with a wide variety of assessments regarding the national interest.
23
In this case,
democratic securitizers are forced to construct the security claim using language that has
both widespread applicability (or appeal) to a diverse audience and taps into existing
threat construction frameworks.
24
Drawing on Anderson’s concept of the state as an
imagined community (Anderson, 1991), I argue that securitizers in democracies face
large audiences in the event of significant military options, forcing them to appeal to
basic ties that bind the imagined (democratic) community together.

I expect that political leaders use the language of democratic identity and norms to signal
possible threats or the lack thereof to their security audience. Consider the domestic
identity of a democracy. The norms that inform democratic ideology are agreed to
include non-violent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise, and transparency
(Dixon, 1994; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Russett, 1993). These norms inform
democratic identity; they, in conjunction with the democratic political structure to which
they are tied, generate a framework for defining the self and the other and expectations of
behavior. They also function as a critical linkage in the imagined community that
recreates democracy every day. Democracies do not primarily maintain internal order

23
Leaders in autocracies face a very different identity and norms environment. Political structure, identity,
and norms are far more personalistic, indicated by small selectorates and hierarchical political structures
(diZerega, 1995). The governing identity(s) and the interests of the state are grounded in the particulars of
the ruling group. Consequently, the language of securitization will appeal to the identity and norms of the
ruling group rather than the national citizenry.

24
The point here is that securitizers rarely, if ever, have the temporal space to construct a threat assessment
framework from the ground up. Instead, they really on existing frameworks that serve as assessment
platforms by which people evaluate who can be trusted, who cannot, and what types of behaviors and
reactions to expect from a given counterparty under particular conditions.

79

using force or fear. Dahl points out that democracy cannot exist if people do not believe
in it. Tocqueville likewise thought beliefs more important for the function of democracy
than laws or Constitutions (Dahl, 1989, p. 178). The basic ordering principles as I have
listed here are not imposed from the top down; they are at least in part generated from the
bottom up. Democracy as a process of ruling (Dahl, 1989, pp. 106-118), generates the
experiences, values, norms, and ideas that inform identity from the ground up through the
everyday activity of living in a democratic state. Indeed, according to Dahl the level of
inclusion of the public into the political process and the ability of the public to contest the
activities of government are the critical indicators of polyarchy (the real-world
implementation of the democracy ideal). In effect, a democracy cannot be a democracy
without the active participation of the public; it is what separates democracies from
authoritarian regimes (Dahl, 1971, pp. 6-8). If a large enough group within the
democracy actively chooses to abide by a different set of norms, e.g. to use physical
violence to achieve political interests, the democracy falls apart. Because of this active
participation in the ideology of democracy (Weart, 1998)—as opposed to passive
reception of more hierarchical social orders
25
—I expect democratic identity to play an
important part in threat perception and construction by the public. Public participation in
the democratic system also contains elements of habit and practice (Hopf, 2002).
Citizens buy into the democratic program every day they habitually practice the societal

25
The distinction here is important. Democracy as a process requires citizens live out democracy in their
everyday lives. This ranges from joining organizations freely to voting to writing political representatives
to pursuing grievances through the judicial system. Alternatively, authoritarian regimes depend on, and
require, far more passivity from the citizenry. This is not to say that all citizens in authoritarian regimes are
passive recipients of the political order. Some actively perpetuate it while others seek to challenge it. In
the latter case, however, it is worth asking that if the entire population were active in this manner, whether
the state would continue to be authoritarian. In any case, these are exceptions rather than the rule.

80
expectations of the democratic system. This habitual aspect should strengthen
democratic identity.

This is not to say that democracies are coercion or manipulation-free utopias. Dahl
reminds us that states of all types employ coercion (1989, pp. 40-42, 244). Coercion is
the primary tool for states in their efforts to maintain social order. The key characteristic
of democracy—a government continuously responsive to the preferences of its citizens
(Dahl, 1971, p. 1)—means however that the social boundaries the democratic states uses
coercion to enforce are ultimately grounded in the citizenry rather than the idiosyncratic
desires of the political leadership. Obviously, the actual practice of democracy (what
Dahl calls polyarchy) differs from the ideal of democracy, and political leaders may
undertake policy initiatives that do not have the support of the public, but a reasonably
free and fair electoral system gives the public the means and opportunity to remove
political leaders who stray too far from the public’s policy preferences.

The issue of manipulation also presents a challenge to my characterization of democracy.
Is it meaningful to talk about a government responsive to the desires of the public if the
government can shape public preferences at will? Manipulation can occur at two levels.
Gramci’s concept of hegemony characterizes the first level. Put bluntly, this level
generally deals with the ‘brainwashing’ of the public regarding the mechanisms of power
and their operation. Dahl calls this minority domination and after extensive treatment
dismisses theories of this macro-level manipulation as lacking evidence (Dahl, 1989, pp.

81

265-279). Particular (temporally limited) policy issues comprise the second (micro) level
of manipulation. Noted democracy theorist Joseph Schumpeter certainly thought poorly
of the ability of democratic publics to resist manipulation. Schumpeter argues that public
opinion is the manufactured product of professional politicians or “exponents of an
economic interest or of idealists of one kind or another” (Schumpeter, 1966, p. 263).
Workable democracy requires the people be saved from themselves through the selection
of political leaders wise enough resist these sales pitches and the public vulnerable to
them (Schumpeter, 1966, p. 269).
26
Oren similarly claims that political leaders can
reconstruct public identity of both the self and the other to suit the demands of
international power dynamics (Oren, 1995). Interestingly, the literature on democracy
largely leaves aside this micro level of manipulation. Characteristic of the literature,
Dahl makes no mention of it in his award-winning and often cited text Democracy and Its
Critics (Dahl, 1989).

Fortunately, the scholarly literature on public opinion does address the possibility of
government manipulation of the public with regard to specific policies and indeed
suggests support for the model proposed in this dissertation. The great public opinion
scholar Walter Lippman states in his seminal work that culture plays a critical role
filtering what the public does, and does not, accept:

For the most part we do not see, then define, we define first then see. In the great
blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already

26
Although it is interesting to note that, by implication, Schumpeter is arguing that democratic
governments themselves do not manipulate the public, only conniving politicians and special interests.

82
defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form
stereotyped for us by our culture (Lippmann, 1922/2004, p. 44)

Zaller in his widely cited 1992 monograph similarly argues that opinion is a marriage of
information and predisposition. The citizenry are not simply passive receivers of the
information flows presented to them; they bring their own interests, values, and
experiences to bear on the information, and these ‘predispositions’ greatly affect their
willingness to accept or resist persuasive influences (Zaller, 1992, p. 22). Indeed,
according to Zaller these predispositions are the “critical intervening variable between
communications people encounter in the mass media…and their statements of political
preferences” (Zaller, 1992, pp. 22-23). In short, people resist arguments inconsistent
with their political predispositions (Zaller, 1992, p. 44). Jacobs and Shapiro similarly
argue that values and fundamental preferences of the citizenry are largely immune to
political efforts to sway the public’s evaluation of specific proposals (Jacobs & Shapiro,
2000, p. xiv). The emphasis on predispositions (Zaller) and values (Jacobs and Shapiro)
in public filtering of political communications matches up well with the contention of this
dissertation that identity plays an important role in public assessments of threat claims.
In a later article, Jacobs concludes that at least in the United States the public does not
look like the puppets Schumpeter described. Instead, the American public appears to be
“energetic and inventive in seeking out new avenues for civic engagement” (Jacobs,
2001, p. 1372).

In order for democratic identity to work, there has to be flexibility in the other delimiters
of identity. This point agrees with Kahl’s claim that certain corporate identities are more

83

universal and inclusive than others. In particular, Kahl argues a liberal corporate identity
may be especially inclusive because liberalism's universal and cosmopolitan tenets
encourage an expansive notion of the national self (Kahl, 1999, p. 119).
27
While Kahl’s
argument points to liberalism, I believe democratic identity as I have defined it can be
similarly characterized. To be successful, democracy must tolerate differences in
religion, cultural practices, economic perspective, gender and race. The criteria for
recognition and respect in a democracy must be fairly open (Williams 2001). Were they
not, the democracy would tear itself apart. A democracy can only operate if the
population willingly opts into the program. If most people chose to identify with their
religion at the expense of their democratic identity, the state would quickly turn into a
theocracy. Democratic governance fundamentally rests on the democratic identity of its
citizenry.

Policies involving aggression and violence—nondemocratic political behavior—are
justified by demonstrating that the target state is beyond reason or trust, that its behavior
could result in violence against the home state (an existential threat). Political leaders
achieve this aim by emphasizing the undemocratic identity and the other’s unwillingness
to reliably operate by democratic norms. The securitized state poses an existential threat

27
Kahl argues this inclusiveness generates positive identification: “The relative inclusiveness of liberal
corporate identity will foster positive identification between liberal democracies. The more exclusive
corporate identities of many illiberal states, including illiberal democracies, make extensive positive
identification with liberal democracies improbable and may foster negative identification” (Kahl, 1999, p.
118). My approach is less ambitious. I simply argue that shared democratic identity prevents the
construction of a fellow democracy as an existential threat.

84

because it is dissimilar from the democratic self, a self defined by the exclusion of
violence from conflict resolution.

The securitization dynamic is not unique to democracies. What is unique to democracies
is the audience.
28
In a democracy, the public plays a critical role in large foreign policy
decisions like war. It is inherent to the nature of democratic governance: leaders are
accountable to the public for their policy decisions. Consequently, the dominant
(democratic) identity of the public and the attendant set of norms provide democratic
leaders with a powerful basis for securitizing an external state. Combining the work on
the individual level with securitization produces a more complete picture of the
mechanisms behind the democratic peace. Democratic norms and identity shape the
security policy of democratic political leaders in two ways. First, leaders have
internalized the democratic norms and identity, shaping their personal perception of
threat. Second, democratic political structures bind leaders to the democratic norms and
identity of the electorate.

This is not to say that relations between democracies are always cordial, or even friendly.
Many times they may not be. Day to day relations between states are built on policies
and interactions that never rise to the level of security and may escape public attention.

28
Henderson argues that citizenship is a distinctive and defining aspect of democracy. As such, Henderson
claims the concept should play a central role in explaining the democratic peace (Henderson, 2006). While
not taking explicit account of citizenship, my approach does account for the concept implicitly both by
redirecting focus to the role of the public in policy formation and implementation (in line with sovereignty
embedded within the citizenship concept) and by focusing on identity informed by an ideology
(democracy) that citizens must accept in order for democratic governance to be successful.

85

At these sub-public levels of policy, a multitude of factors come into play (e.g. personal
and bureaucratic operational codes or standard operating procedures), none of which are
addressed here. Because these policy matters do not rise to the level of security, the
framework proposed here does not speak to them.
29
The mechanism proposed here only
deals with issues, visible to the public, where leaders attempt to securitize or desecuritize
the matter. It is not a comprehensive theory of democratic foreign policy.

Theoretically, the temporal applicability of the framework proposed here is not limited.
While it true that definitions of the ‘citizenry’ have varied with time, and that the
variations may affect the definition of the self, the core precepts of democracy have
remained stable. Additionally, the expansive nature of democracy and the nature of
democratic political structures by definition tie the citizenry to the state in a way not
evidenced in autocratic regimes. As such, democratic identity, as a conditioner of intra
and intersociety relations, is expected to play a primary role. There are a few caveats to
this argument. The approach I have outlined does not indicate that democratic identity is
all powerful; states and groups within them, including the public in general, have
multiple identities (Risse-Kappen, 1995b). Other identities may be more powerful than
the democratic identity of the public. I only argue that democratic identity is expected to
have an important and powerful role to play, not the only or most powerful role. Ethnic
and racial identities may constrict who is considered a citizen within democracies. In
these cases, securitizers within these ethnic/racial democracies may be able to securitize
playing on ethnic/racial identity. Indeed, the junction of ethnic or racial identity with

29
These issues also often escape public attention, further removing them from the approach outlined here.

86
democratic identity may serve as a classification filter, positioning states that do not fit
with the ethnic or racial identity of the self as nondemocracies. It is also possible for
other identities to play a role; the argument here is not exclusive. Alternative identities
may be tied to culture (‘Western’) or economic structure (communist, socialist, liberal).
It is also possible that these identities will take precedence over democratic identity.
However, these situations are likely to be highly limited. For example, during the Cold
War the conflict ostensibly revolved around economic identities: communists versus
capitalists. When it came to security, however, the threat posed by the Soviet Union to
the United States was linked to endangered democracy and liberties, not the right to buy
products at freely determined market prices. However, as in the case of ethnic or racial
identity, economic identity in the Cold War acted as a classification filter. States were
only ‘true’ democracies if they evidenced the political and economic structures of the
self. This conditioning of threat construction is particularly evident at the individual
level, e.g. Wesley Widmaier’s study of the shifting construction of India by U.S. political
leaders. With respect to cultural identity markers, it is difficult to imagine a cultural
identity within democracy relevant to security that does not rest implicitly or explicitly on
democracy. Indeed, one of the principle underpinnings of the ‘Western’ cultural identity
is shared commitment to democracy. It may be that in the past the Western cultural
identity and democratic identity diverged, but it is worth asking whether the Western
cultural identity existed in the sense it does today.
Figure 2: Framework proposed by this project
Democracy Peace
Macro level
Democratic
identity
derived from
political
structure and
norms
Securitization
Micro level

This approach offers a novel contribution to the literature on the democratic peace.
Securitization theory has yet to be utilized in efforts to understand the democratic peace
phenomenon. The use of securitization theory here introduces a much-needed
mechanism into collective efforts to understand the democratic peace. The emphasis on
domestic public identity as an important factor in the securitization dynamics is also
novel in the literature.
30
While not novel in the literature, this study’s effort to explicitly
and empirically explore the relationship between identity and policy formation
contributes to a relatively underexplored sector.

87

30
There is some work on the role of the public in explaining the democratic peace. For example, Reiter
and Stam and Reiter and Tillman both examine the role of public electoral participation in influencing
democratic dispute initiation (Reiter & Stam, 2002; Reiter & Tillman, 2002). In both cases, the authors
find that increased public electoral participation has a significant effect on suppressing democratic dispute
initiation. Unlike the current study, the authors do not focus on the role of identity in security policy
formation, and their large-N approach does not directly access the mechanism through which electoral
participation affects policy. Thus, while these studies are complimentary to mine, there is little overlap.
Similarly, John Owen’s work on liberalism parallels the model proposed here (Owen, 1994, 1997). There
are crucial differences however. Owen focuses on the role of liberal norms in shaping the perceptions of
foreign policy elites whereas this project is centrally concerned with the role of public identity and the
interaction between policy-makers and the public in the securitization process.

88

Securitizing the democratic peace accounts for the general finding of the large-N
literature of a dyadic, but not monadic, democratic peace. The shared democratic
identities of the publics in an interdemocratic dispute limit the ability of leaders to
securitize the other democracy. The approach also satisfies Lipson and Müller and
Wolf’s call for dyadic mechanisms to explain a dyadic, interactive phenomenon (Lipson,
2003; Müller & Wolff, 2004).
31
While the focus here is on the internal dynamic of the
state, this dynamic cannot occur without a counterparty, and the nature of the
counterparty had a direct impact on the internal security dynamic of a democracy. The
approach I have outlined here says nothing about the inherent security behavior of
democracies in isolation. Indeed, such a point in the context of the securitization
approach here makes no sense. Securitization, at least in the military sense, can only
occur in the context of a self-other relationship. By its very nature, securitization theory
forces us to consider a dyadic, dynamic phenomenon with a dyadic, dynamic mechanism.
Similarly, the securitization approach I adopt keeps the focus on the heart of the
democratic peace: the observation that there is a relationship between domestic political
system and international conflict behavior (Huth & Allee, 2002, p. 2).

My approach acts as a bridge between the constructivist approach of the Copenhagen
School and the more identity and norms based approach that typifies most constructivist
research and advocated by Katzenstein and his various coauthors in their definitive 1996
text (Katzenstein, 1996a). As discussed previously, one of the weaknesses of

31
Lipson makes the following point: “The democratic peace is fundamentally an interactive phenomenon.
It is not about why one democracy or another is peaceful. It is about why two democracies seldom fight
each other” (Lipson, 2003, p. 4)

89
securitization theory as articulated by the Copenhagen school is its weak account of
factors like identity that are external to the security speech act but undoubtedly have a
significant impact securitization and its success. Katzenstein and his coauthors focus on
the importance of identity and norms, but provide little insight on the manner in which
these factors influence state behavior aside from the impact at the individual level. The
approach here, with its emphasis on both identity and the means by which it comes into
play joins these two constructivist approaches in a coherent framework.

The theoretical framework above also serves to integrate structure and norms as well as
identity into a single mechanistically oriented explanatory framework. Rather than
privileging either norms or structure as many of the explanations in the second wave of
democratic peace research did, my approach points to both as playing a critical role in the
democratic peace dynamic. Democratic political structure conditions the nature of the
audience and the obligations of the securitizing actor to address the security move to that
audience. Identity and norms condition the content of the securitizing message. All this
is in addition to the co-constitutive linkage constructivism claims between political norms
and structure (Adler, 1997).

The securitization approach I have outlined also serves to reintegrate the democratic
peace back into international security studies more generally. The research program has
come to be seen as something outside ‘normal’ security dynamics. By utilizing
securitization theory, an approach applicable across the broad scope of security studies,

90

this project reintegrates the democratic peace back into our efforts to understand
international security dynamics. Rather than existing outside international security, the
democratic peace can be understood as (in part) the outgrowth of security dynamics
within democracies.
32

The approach outlined here also addresses two critiques leveled against the democratic
peace by James and Mitchell. First, they argue that cultural explanations exemplify
reductionist fallacy: the beliefs of the populace are not necessarily reflected in the state
(James & Mitchell, 1995). The securitization framework provides a linkage between the
public and the state. On major issues in the public eye, securitization gives us a means
for understanding if the linkage between public belief and state action is a fallacy or
reality. The second critique focuses on structural explanations. As James and Mitchell
note, structural explanations assume the democratic public will oppose war. Yet the
history is replete with examples where the public has willingly accepted the costs of war
with non-democracies (James & Mitchell, 1995).
33
The constructivist argument put
forward here, particularly my claim that democratic public identity can facilitate the
securitization undemocratic states even as it impairs the securitization of democratic

32
I say in part because I make no claim that this framework or its predicted dynamic apply all the time to
all situations. Like all complex social phenomena, I suspect that the democratic peace is a product of
equifinality. In the physical sciences, probability plays a central role in explanation, and the same is, or
should be, true in the social sciences. My claim here is that we should expect the interface between
securitization and democratic identity to play a strong role (relatively high probability) in the democratic
peace. There may be times where democratic identity does not play a role because it is eclipsed by other
identities, structural forces, or chance events. My framework would fail, however, if these other identities,
structural forces, or chance events predominantly explained the democratic peace.

33
Incidentally, this is a problem for cultural/normative explanations as well.

91

states speaks directly to their observation. In this, my argument shares similarities that
presented by Owen, although Owen focuses on perception of foreign policy elites and
liberalism while I focus on democratic public corporate identity and the dynamic internal
to the state (Owen, 1994, 1997).

Finally, the framework I have proposed also accounts for the apparent problem of the
covert use of force by democracies against other democracies (Forsythe, 1992; James &
Mitchell, 1995). In these cases, policymakers sought to keep intervention from the public
eye, suggesting they believed that a securitization move would be unsuccessful. A
variety of interests may motivate individuals, and many may have nothing to do with
national interest calculations (e.g. personal political calculations or ideological
particularities). When the structure of democracy allows leeway in the state security
apparatus, exemplified by executive control over classified or secret policy
implementation instruments (e.g. CIA covert operations teams), for the executive to make
security policy measures without the securitization dynamic typical of democracies, we
should expect a limited number of covert uses of force. We should expect the covert use
of force particularly in cases when the leadership of the executive branch has not
internalized the norms of democracy or when, as in the Cold War, an alternative identity
assumes a higher security profile.
34
These situations do not necessarily undermine the
democratic peace because they take place outside the mechanisms that generate

34
Interestingly, in these cases the securitization dynamic in a democracy comes to resemble that of an
autocracy. Particularly in the case of an upper echelon decision-making environment dominated by
political appointees, the language of securitization may reflect the ideological commitments of this
presumably ideologically homogenous group.

92

democratic peace. If the framework I have proposed here does indeed play a significant
role in generating the democratic peace, restricting the ability of executives to
autonomously use force should reduce or eliminate interdemocratic use of force.

A key possible counterargument centers on the Oren’s exposition (1995). Drawing on
the case of U.S. constructions of Germany before and during World War I, Oren argues
that the true nature of the democratic peace phenomenon focuses not on democracies but
instead on states that are “America-like.” U.S. political leaders reconstruct allies and
enemies in line with calculations of interest.
35
American political leaders redefine the
image of the self to remain consistent with the attributes of friends and in contrast to the
attributes of enemies. In the German case, Oren finds that indeed, political leaders in the
United States did successfully recast Germany, previously considered a model of
efficient, progressive governance, as an authoritarian menace. Drawing on Oren, a
Realist rejoinder to my argument would argue that political leaders in democracies
simply alter the construction of the external state to fit with power or material derived
interests.

There is undoubtedly some accuracy to Oren’s argument, particularly when leaders
confront states on the margins of the community of democracies—those that have
recently or are in the process of transitioning to democracy, or states whose democratic
systems harbor enough shortcomings to bring their democratic identities into doubt.

35
Similar concerns regarding the manipulation of norms and identity are expressed by Kowert and Legro
(Kowert & Legro, 1996, p. 492).

93
However, Oren makes the problematic assumption that public images of itself and
external states are tentatively held and easily malleable. Oren seems to see the public as
a foreign and security policy tabula rasa. The significant literature on the role of the
independent influence of domestic politics in foreign policymaking indicates that the
manipulation of identity Oren details is not as easy as he suggests (Levy, 1988; Morrow,
1991; Putnam, 1988). The enfranchisement of the majority of the population and the
spread of information access—both through education and through the availability of
information, also makes the tabula rasa assumption increasingly difficult to justify.
Coverage of foreign elections and democratic debates as well as the intersubjective
agreement on what states are, and are not, democracies, in the media and society makes it
very difficult for political leaders to redefine the self and other in the way Oren argues.
Finally, it is significant that in Oren’s argument, Wilson shifted to characterizing
Germany as an autocracy, suggesting support for the framework proposed here. The
point here is that Wilson could not successfully securitize Germany using antebellum
constructions. In order to justify military action, Wilson did not reconstruct Germany,
but did so in a particular manner: away from democracy and towards autocracy. This
move itself suggests that Oren’s work supports my stipulation that corporate democratic
identity plays an important role in the securitization dynamic.

Another possible critique of the approach outlined here is that it does nothing to address
the statist approach embedded in the democratic peace (Barkawi & Laffey, 1999). This
project explicitly acknowledges its state-oriented approach. The purpose here is to

94
explore the internal dynamic of democratic states, states which have largely been
responsible for their security policies. This does not dismiss the need for work at the
systematic level (Harrison, 2004; Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell et al., 1999) or the need to
consider how global dynamics influence domestic norms and identity. The purpose here
is to explore the mechanism of a critical and underexplored subsystem, not provide a
comprehensive theory—if indeed such a task is even possible. The critiques of some of
these authors, notably Barkawi, regarding the western definition of democracy is well
taken here, resulting in the identity argument informed by minimalist democratic norms.
Barkawi’s concerns regarding the temporal limitation of the definition of democracy are
also well taken, and the cases have been chosen to prevent, as much as possible this
potentially confounding issue. Further work will and should examine the temporal
stability of modern definitions of democracy—a crucial matter for the underlying
dynamic of mutual recognition.

It is also worth pointing out that my model differs significantly from Hopf’s well-
regarded, and in some way definitive, study of identity in the Soviet Union/Russia (Hopf,
2002). In outlining his approach, Hopf specifically rejects what he calls theoretical
preloading: assuming a priori the identities that are important for explaining a given
phenomenon. In his conclusion, Hopf argues that his work “has vindicated the method of
inductively finding identities in the texts rather than a priori stipulating which identities,
say, nation and gender, are likely to matter and going out to find them in the discourses”
(Hopf, 2002, p. 261). It might be possible to adopt Hopf’s approach with respect to one

95
country at one or two particular points in time, as Hopf did. However, the democratic
peace phenomenon has been systematically observed. While I do not argue that all cases
at all points in time where democracies could have gone to war but did not are explained
by any one approach, there is clearly a regularity to explain. That suggests a common
mechanism or mechanisms acting on democracies in similar ways. This a priori limits
the field of possible affective identities. Hence, while Hopf may disagree, there is reason
to believe that a common democratic identity plays a role in the democratic peace, and it
is reasonable to go out and look at the role that identity may have played. Furthermore,
Hopf focuses less on the means by which identity influences policy than on uncovering a
relationship between public identities and policy. His framework suggests—but does not
explicitly discuss—that public identity influences decision-making by influencing the
identity of individual decision-makers. The approach I have outlined here, as with other
theoretical approaches focusing on the role of identity in the individual, compliments
Hopf’s approach by examining the interaction between policymakers and the public as
well as providing an explicit mechanism for how public identity influences policy.

To summarize, the theoretical approach outlined here breaks new ground in the study of
the democratic peace. By drawing on securitization theory—an approach novel to the
democratic peace—to enable a focus on the internal security policy dynamics of
democratic states, this dissertation has the potential to shed new light on the underlying
mechanisms of the democratic peace. Using securitization theory also brings
interdemocratic security dynamics back into the broader discussion of international

96
security. Understanding how democracies have developed what appears to be a zone of
peace in a world of turmoil offers the potential for huge insights into one of the core
research areas of International Relations. The constructivist approach outlined here also
continues efforts to expand our collective understanding of the role identity and norms
play in policy formation and international dynamics.

My approach produces distinct, testable hypotheses:
H1: If the external state is recognizably democratic, then political leaders in the
home democracy will be unable to securitize the external democracy.
H1a: In the context of a securitization move by political leaders with
respect to an external democracy, indications of public threat perception of
external democracies will not increase to the point where a plurality or
majority of the public perceive the external democracy as a threat.

H2: If the external state is a democracy, then political leaders who seek to
securitize the external state will attempt to de-democratize the identity of the
external state in their security argument.

H3: If the external state is a democracy, then political leaders who seek to
desecuritize the external state will emphasize the democratic identity of the
external state in their desecuritization argument.

97
H4: If the external state is a non-democracy, then political leaders who seek to
securitize the external state will emphasize the non-democratic identity of the
external state in their securitization argument.

H5: If the external state is a non-democracy, then political leaders who seek to
desecuritize the external state will emphasize the aspects of the external state that
are democratic or potentially democratic in their desecuritization argument.

A concluding point. In the context of the desire to develop comprehensive covering laws
in International Relations, it may be troubling that the theoretical framework, as I have
outlined it here, does not claim such high ground. However, that the framework outlined
here is only one possible mechanism driving the democratic peace is not necessarily
problematic from an explanation standpoint. Within the scope of a research program or
paradigm, the exploration of a variety of mechanisms can lead to cover law type
explanations once the building block mechanisms are synthesized (Elster, 1998).

98
Chapter 3 | Methodology: Analysis and Cases
The qualitative approach and issues in defining democracy
This study takes a case study approach towards the democratic peace in an effort to
explore the underlying mechanism or mechanisms that generate the observed effect. As I
indicated previously, the literature on the democratic peace is remarkably lacking in
small-n, case oriented investigations, a point I am not alone in making (Müller & Wolff,
2004). I am also not alone in arguing that small-n investigations need to complement
large-N studies. Bruce Russett noted in 1970 that “neither the case study nor the general
kind of systemic analysis I shall call correlational study can alone provide the basis for
reliable and valid generalizations about international politics” (Russett, 1970, pp. 426-
427). Ray similarly concludes, “it is particularly important to exploit the possibilities
inherent in intensive analysis of a small number of cases when the phenomenon of
interest, like international wars and democratic pairs of states, are statistically rare” (Ray,
1995, p. 154). More broadly, Flyvbjerg argues that without case studies, social science is
ineffective (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Methodologically, the case study approach of this study
complements the large-N literature on the democratic peace and begins to address the
well-documented need for small-n studies. Small-n case based approaches are also
particularly well suited for exploring causal mechanisms (George & Bennett, 2005).

Historically, the concept of democracy has been a contentious one in the literature. As
evidenced by the variety of efforts to define the concept, consensus on the issue has been

99

difficult to come by. Early scholarship on the matter emphasized the importance of free
and fair elections as central to the concept (Downs, 1957; Schumpeter, 1942). Related
work focuses on the ability to replace decision-makers and influence policy through
elections (Lipset, 1959). Later scholarship has evolved to include a more expansive list
of characteristics in the definition of democracy. Dahl’s definition of democracy
included eight components spanning both political rights and political freedoms (Bollen,
1991; Dahl, 1971).
1
They include 1) the freedom to join and form organizations, 2)
freedom of expression, 3) right to vote, 4) eligibility of public office, 5) right of political
leaders to compete for support and votes, 6) alternative sources of information, 7) free
and fair elections, and 8) institutions for making policy accountable to the preferences of
the electorate (Dahl, 1971, p. 3). Alternatively, Babst defined democracy in four parts: 1)
government finances controlled by a legislature placed through majority vote, 2)
administration of government controlled by an executive placed through majority vote, 3)
secret ballot and freedom of the press, and 4) independence (Babst, 1972, p. 55). More
expansively, Bollen defines democracy as “the extent to which the political power of the
elites is minimized and that of the nonelites is maximized” (Bollen, 1991, p. 5).

There are some clear trends in these efforts to define democracy: the resting of political
power in the populace, emphasis on political (and by extension legal) rather than physical
(i.e. violent) dispute resolution mechanisms, and relative personal freedom. Democracies

1
Dahl argued in this 1971 text that democracy was an ideal that could not be matched in reality, and
introduced the concept of polyarchy as a vehicle for exploring the real world implementation of democracy.
So, while Dahl actually attaches these criteria to polyarchy, for the sake of simplicity, and since the
distinction is not significant in this context, I maintain the use of the term democracy.

100

are those states that seek to minimize the coercive power of the state in society and
maximize the mechanisms for political and legal dispute resolution. Key here—in Dahl’s
definition as well as the ensuing efforts to define democracy—is the need to look beyond
the institution of voting. Democracy is more than a political activity; it is a set of socio-
political institutions that bind the state and society together in a particular way. As the
definitions make clear, democracy is about both voting and the social and political norms
that enable the process of voting to be meaningful.

Determining the definition of democracy is not a central point of this thesis. Indeed, the
large amount of literature on the issue testifies to the monumental effort such an emphasis
would require.
2
Determining which states are democracies, and which are not, is
however critical from a case selection perspective. To this end, the literature on and
efforts to quantify the concept of democracy provide helpful guidance. Selecting states
that fall within the definitional boundaries of most, if not all, of the major definitions of
democracy as well as states highly rated by democracy databases provides a measure of
validity as to the case selection. In effect, we can be confident that the states in question
are indeed democracies. Additionally, by choosing states that fit most or all of the
various criteria laid out in the literature, we can be fairly certain that the public perceives
the external state as a democracy. Since the theoretical proposals of this dissertation rest
firmly on the public’s recognition of the external state as a fellow democracy, a high

2
See for example Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, 1996; Andrews & Chapman, 1995a, 1995b;
Beetham, 1994; Bollen, 1980; Bollen & Paxton, 2000; Coppedge, 1990, 2000; Inkeles, 1991; May, 1978;
Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; and Tilly, 1995.

101

degree of confidence that the public sees the external state as a democracy is crucial.
Choosing ‘safe’ democracies goes a long way towards establishing that confidence.

Selecting the cases
In the social sciences, data availability is a central concern. In any social science study,
the optimal case selection may not correspond with the data available for analysis. This
study is no different. A study design that addresses most, if not all, methodological
concerns would require travel to at least half a dozen countries to engage in archival
research in at least that many languages.
3
Such a design is simply not possible within the
context of a single study. Indeed, concerns about data availability lead to conclusion that
the case study dynamic needs to be simplified to an examination of the security dynamics
within a single state towards a variety of external states. The United States is the obvious
choice both in terms of language concerns and data availability. There are other reasons
for selecting the United States.
4
Over the past 50 years, it has been one of, if not the
most, internationally engaged democracies in the world. As a consequence, the level of
interaction between the United States and far-flung democracies where cultural
similarities are minimal is much higher than it would be with smaller, more parochially

3
In order for the study to be immune from critiques of generalizability, cases would need to span both
space and time. The space component would ensure that the theory under review is not limited only to a
particular political or cultural geography. In the democratic peace literature, a significant critique is that
studies focus on ‘Western’ states, and that conclusions based on these studies are only applicable to these
states rather than globally. The time component is necessary to address possible critiques that the findings
are temporally limited. A version of this critique can be found in work by Farber and Gowa (Farber &
Gowa, 1997). Combining both aspects of generalizability requires engagement on cases that span temporal
and global dimensions.

4
Some have argued that “[t]oday’s world revolves around Washington DC” (Choi & James, 2005b, p. 2).

102
concerned democracies, particularly those of Europe. This enables the examination of
relationships not significantly shaped by shared history (as would be the case with inter-
European relations) or by shared culture. In effect, the expansiveness of U.S. global
engagement gives us an opportunity to examine a relatively pure democratic relationship.
Moreover, the United States does not have an extensive background as a colonial power
that may shape internal and external perceptions.

There are of course, drawbacks to focusing on the United States, foremost among them
being the possibility that exceptionalism in the U.S. security process or some aspect
thereof reduces or eliminates the generalizability of the results. While problematic, this
issue is not as devastating as it might be for a large-N study. First, case studies are
broadly acknowledged to be difficult to generalize (Brady, Collier, & Seawright, 2004, p.
10). That is why they serve as a complement to, not a replacement of, large-N studies.
Second, the goal here is to explore a possible mechanism. Finding that the mechanism
has empirical support in the U.S. context opens up further research possibilities in other
states. Moreover, the focus on causal-process or mechanistic observations, despite the
small number of cases, in this study is recognized as a valid path to causal inference
(Brady et al., 2004, p. 12). The weaknesses of the methodology here simply create new
possibilities for future research. No study can answer all possible critiques, particularly
in terms of methodology. As such, any research design requires trade-off in terms of
strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis alternative designs (Collier, Seawright, & Munck,

103

2004, p. 48). The best social scientists can do is recognize the strengths and weaknesses
of any given approach.

While the focus is on the democratic peace, the cases do not involve war per se. As the
review of the statistical evidence indicates, there are no, or almost no, cases of
interdemocratic war. Instead, the cases focus on situations where an issue between two
states reached a security level, or where an issue is expected to have reached a security
level if the external state were not democratic. These situations provide insight on the
securitization dynamic and the role of democratic public identity and in the process
begins to address the ‘non-event’ problem confronting democratic peace research.
5
To
this end, Mahoney and Goertz’s Possibility Principle provides valuable
guidance(Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). In selecting negative cases, Mahoney and Goertz
emphasize the importance of selecting those where the outcome of interest is possible—
in my study the outcome of interest is large-scale violence between democracies. Doing
so maximizes inferential leverage while avoiding errors that impair causal inference. For
example, in the case of U.S.-India relations, there have historically been no significant
impediments to the use of force by the U.S. towards India. The United State certainly has
had since World War II the power projection capabilities to use force against India, and
with India’s avowed enemy Pakistan on its northern border, basing would not pose a
significant challenge. Additionally, the capability of the Soviet military—India’s chief

5
One of the principle challenges facing the democratic peace is that there are very limited, if any, cases of
interdemocratic war. It is difficult to explain, in a rigorous theoretical and empirical way, why an event did
not occur without having positive cases to contrast against the negative. This is referred to as the ‘dog that
didn’t bark’ problem (Doyle & Roden, 1993, p. 23; Ray, 1995, p. 41).

104

ally—to intervene in a meaningful way in the event of the use of military force by the
United States was limited. Soviet military capabilities focused on land-based military
options rather over the naval assets necessary to effectively oppose potential U.S.
operations against India. Satisfying the Possibility Principle, the U.S. could have used
force against India.

The Possibility Principle offers some insight on selecting cases, but is far from definitive.
Case selection in both large-N quantitative and small-n qualitative studies has been the
focus of much discussion in International Relations and the social sciences more
broadly.
6
The central points of concern focus on avoiding selection bias and maximizing
inferential leverage. King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV) established the baseline against
which most of the literature has reacted for and against (King et al., 1994). Critics have
argued that the quantitative grounding of KKV leads the authors to make research
prescriptions that are at best only roughly applicable to small-n research and at worst
completely inapplicable (Brady & Collier, 2004; Brady et al., 2004, p. 8; Ragin, 2004).
Moreover, it is questionable how applicable the KKV approach, with its rigid structure
for assessing causal inference, is to constructivist approaches. These problems aside,
even critics acknowledge that KKV make a major contribution to our collective
understanding of qualitative methodology and their book is one of the benchmarks in the
literature on the subject (Brady & Collier, 2004). Accordingly, it will play a significant
role in the subsequent discussion of the methodological approach of the dissertation.

6
The literature is too large to cite at length here. For example, see: Collier & Mahoney, 1996; Collier,
Mahoney, & Seawright, 2004; Ebbinghaus, 2005; Geddes, 1990; George & Bennett, 2005, chapter 4;
Gerring, 2007; King et al., 1994; Munck, 1998; Seawright & Gerring, 2008; and Shively, 2006.

105

The central hub, then, in this study is the United States. It meets all the democracy
criteria of various democracy theorists and his highly ranked by democracy measurement
databases. In an effort to contribute to the limited empirical base of the Democratic
Peace outside the United States and Europe, the principal focus here will be on U.S.
interactions with non-Western states. One of the most promising pairings lies between
the U.S. and India. Both countries are firmly democratic while sharing limited cultural
similarities. Moreover, the relationship represents a difficult one for the theoretical
approach I have adopted. The United States and India have long suffered a difficult
relationship, with relations blowing hot and cold over the span of the Cold War
(Widmaier, 2005). For much of the Cold War India was closely associated with the chief
rival to U.S. global interests, the Soviet Union. The Indian economic philosophy
accordingly was far more socialist than that of the United States. India was and remains
the chief rival to Pakistan, a long-standing, albeit on and off, ally of the U.S. These
characteristics set U.S. and India geopolitical and geostrategic interests in opposition.
From a realist perspective, we should expect that the United States would not be hesitant
to use force against India. The United States fought proxy wars against the Soviet Union
throughout the Cold War, and other than shared democracy there is no reason to expect
that the U.S. would not similarly be willing to engage the Soviets in India. The Indian
military for much of its post independence history has been weak, and certainly do not
seem to be of significant strength to dissuade U.S. military adventurism. India also sits
atop key shipping lanes for Middle East oil. In short, there are a number of reasons why

106

the U.S. might choose to use force against India. Additionally, the India case is unique
among major democracies because it stayed outside the expansive network of U.S.
alliances formed to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

There are four specific cases within the context of the U.S.-India relationship that warrant
detailed investigation regarding the U.S. securitization dynamic: the 1971 Bangladesh
War, the 1974 Indian ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ the 1998 nuclear tests, and the 2006
nuclear technology deal. The 1971 case represents a clear assessment of threat by U.S.
leadership, and the other three involve the only weapon system demonstrated to pose an
existential threat to entire populations: nuclear weapons. These cases represent focal
points and as such are critical for tracing the relationship between the at least partially co-
constitutive elements of securitization and identity (Lupovici, 2009).
7
This research
design also satisfies Lupovici’s call for a multipronged approach to constructivist
research.
8
While I do not make significant use of counterfactuals, the approach outlined
here does utilize both content analysis and process tracing. In this way, my research

7
The use of focal points is particularly critical for this study due to the importance of securitization theory
in the overall project. Because securitization theory focuses on the relationship between securitizers and
their audience, potential security issues must be important to garner the attention of the audience. This is
exceptionally important in democracies, where the audience is large and disparate, and where many daily
issues and situations go unnoticed. Focal points provide a means for identifying situations or issues that
intrude on the public consciousness. The nature of focal points makes the criteria for selecting them
somewhat vague. They are situations or incidents that garner significant public and media attention. What
is significant is difficult to define; they are situations that focus public attention and are likely to receive
more than one or two news articles worth of coverage. These are situations that break into the public
consciousness and as a consequence we should expect them to garner sustained media attention over the
period of the incident or situation in question. Incidents or situations that do not receive such attention may
be important to small sub-groups within the public, but do not rise above the ‘background noise’ of daily
life, and are thus not focal points.

8
Lupovici argues that discourse analysis, process tracing, and counterfactuals should be used together to
strengthen inference in constructivist research (Lupovici, 2009, figure 1).

107

design provides contextual validity, defined as the ability of research to study constitutive
effects, social constructions, and the roles of social agents. The India cases also test an
existing theory of interdemocratic relations. Wesley Widmaier finds that liberal versus
social democratic identity plays a role in shaping interdemocratic relations at the level of
individual policy-makers. The time period covered by the India cases allows for testing
of the model developed here as well as Widmaier’s against social democratic India
(1970’s) and more liberal India (1990’s and later).
9

While analysis of Indo-American security relations comprise a large portion of the
empirical grounding of this dissertation, the U.S.-India relationship alone is not sufficient
to make a compelling case for the theoretical approach I have outlined. In particular, it
would be helpful to have variation on the independent variable to provide for at least the
possibility of variation on the securitization dependent variable. The Sino-American
security relationship fits this need. China is clearly not a democratic state by any
definition, and thus presents a non-democratic ‘other’ in possible security situations. In
keeping with the relatively modern temporal focus of the dissertation, two focal points
stand out as high public awareness potential security situations: the 1995-1996 Taiwan
Straits crisis and the 2001 EP-3 grounding incident.
10
These cases are not as good a fit,
in terms of the Possibility Principle, as the India cases for my theoretical approach. In
particular, the United State and China enjoy strong economic ties and the United States is

9
This parallels the case structure in Hopf’s well-regarded 2002 study on Soviet/Russian identity in 1955
and 1999 (Hopf, 2002).
10
Thanks go to Dan Lynch for pointing these out.

108

home to a large number of Americans of Chinese descent who occupy a cultural presence
in excess of their numbers, factors that are expected to reduce the possibility of conflict.

11
In addition, a strong factor reducing the possibility of militarized conflict is the
military strength of China, particularly its nuclear weapons capability as well as large
military that could impose significant costs on any U.S. military effort.
12
These latter
military issues, however, do not impinge on the possibility of securitization, only on the
selection of force as a policy option, a crucial distinction.

These cases have several advantages. First, they avoid possible multicollinearity effects
(King et al., 1994, pp. 122-124). One of the central foci of the literature critical of
democratic peace research rests on the possible confluence of interests, rather than
democracy, as the key explanatory variable (Farber & Gowa, 1997; Gartzke, 1998, 2000).
These arguments are, in effect, arguments that the democratic peace statistical
observation is a multicollinearity effect causes by confusing democracy for interests as
the operative independent variable. Farber and Gowa use alliances as the indicator of
shared interests while Gartzke uses United Nations voting records as his proxy of choice.
On both counts, the India case provides a meaningful test that avoids these

11
As evidenced by the number of ‘Chinatowns’ in U.S. cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland,
Denver, Chicago, Boston, New York , etc.). The key point here is that there is a significant electoral
demographic that may choose to define itself in terms of ethnic identity rather than democratic identity in
the context of Sino-American relations as well as a large cultural impact that may serve to soften efforts to
define China as part of the outgroup defined along democratic-autocratic lines.

12
A 2003 report by the Council on Foreign Relations on Chinese military modernization supports this
point: “Although U.S. forces would ultimately prevail in a military crisis or conflict, Beijing might be able
to impose serious risks and costs on the U.S. military” (Brown, Prueher, & Segal, 2003). Thomas
Christensen’s 2001 article in International Security makes a similar point (Christensen, 2001).

109

multicollinearity arguments. With respect to alliances, India and the United States have
never been formally, or informally, allied.
13
Likewise, the United States and China have
not been allies since the Second World War.
14
By this measure of interests, the United
States and India do not share common ground. The UN vote measure of interests also
shows a divergence of Indo-American ‘interests.’
15
These are not surprising results. The
history of U.S.-India relations is largely defined by divergent interests (Kux, 1994).
These indicators do however suggest that if we observe democratic peace effects between
India and the United States, we can be confident they are not the result of
multicollinearity effects as put forward in the literature.

The second advantage the cases allow for variation in the dependent variable,
securitization of the external state (King et al., 1994, p. 129).
16
China provides important
variation as a clear nondemocratic state contrasting against democratic India, allowing for
the possibility that the securitization move made by U.S. political leaders will differ in
comparison with securitization, or desecuritization, moves made with respect to India.
The focal points approach for selecting the cases within the country pairings also does not
focus on the securitization outcome, since the primary selection criteria concentrate on

13
The U.S. and India were allied in World War II, but India, as a British colony, did not control its foreign
policy. Accordingly, India’s alliance, through Britain, with the United States was not an alliance between
two states.

14
Then the U.S. was allied with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.
Arguably, China under Communist rule has been an altogether different country.
15
An analysis of Erik Voeten’s United Nations General Assembly voting data shows the United States and
India voted the same way—yes, no, or abstain—23 percent of the time (1005 out of 4444 votes) (Voeten).
If General Assembly voting indicates preferences, U.S. and Indian preferences are dramatically divergent.
My thanks to Janelle Knox-Hayes for providing the analysis.

16
Also known as selecting cases based on the value of the dependent variable (Geddes, 1990).

110

identifying potential security issues or situations that rise to the level of public awareness.
How those potential security matters are securitized or desecuritized—what is effectively
the dependent variable here—remains an open question with respect to case selection. It
should be noted, however, that the predominantly within-case analytical focus of the
dissertation renders concerns regarding variation on the dependent variable less trenchant
than they might otherwise be (Collier, Mahoney et al., 2004, p. 100).
17

Third, the cases avoid problems of selection bias. In addition to not selecting the cases
on the dependent variable, both cases, but India in particular, represent difficult cases for
the framework I have proposed. As I have already indicated, U.S.-India interests have
diverged more often than they have converged over the span of their 60-year relationship.
Moreover, Indo-American economic and cultural ties have not been significant, thus
eliminating possible salves for conflicts of interest. As is the case with variation on the
dependent variable, owing to the mechanistic, within-case analytical focus of the
dissertation the issue of selection bias may be less problematic for this study than for
cross-case, regression, or less mechanistic oriented research (Collier, Mahoney et al.,
2004, p. 96).

17
Collier and his coauthors point out the inferential leverage for small-n studies arises from the in-depth
analysis of causal ideas rather than through variation of the variables. They argue that small-n cases that
attempt to gain leverage through variable variation are in fact deriving their inferential power through in-
depth analysis. In a similar vein, King, Keohane and Verba, despite their large-N methodological starting
point, also find room for no-variance research designs when they are part of a larger research program—as
is the case of this study with respect to the democratic peace (King et al., 1994, pp. 129,147-149).

111

Finally, and this applies particularly to India, the cases fit the criteria established to be
crucial; the facts of the case are central to confirmation of my theory (Eckstein, 1975;
Gerring, 2007). ‘Strong’ crucial case tests are those where the case can be explained
precisely and only by the invariant, deterministic theory in question and no other
(Gerring, 2007, p. 232). As I have discussed the cases, they do not satisfy the definition
of a ‘strong’ critical case, but they certainly fit a weaker definition, what Eckstein and
Gerring call the least-likely case: “A least-likely case is one that, on all dimensions
except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome
and yet does so. It is confirmatory” (Gerring, 2007, p. 232).
18
The case of India satisfies
the ‘Sinatra inference’: if my theory can make it there, it can make it anywhere (Levy,
2002, p. 143). The casework on China is less well positioned to fit these criteria. As I
mentioned previously, there are significant, although not overwhelming, confounding
influences in the Sino-American relationship, including strong economic ties as well as
the large number of Americans of Chinese descent. This is not to say that the China case
cannot provide significant insight, only that it does carry the strength in terms of theory
confirmation that the India cases do.
19

18
The inapplicability of the ‘strong’ crucial case approach to democratic peace research has been
recognized elsewhere and is thus not particular to my framework (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 49, fn 44).

19
It is also worth noting that the mechanism I outline in the previous chapter is far less definitive when it
comes to relations between democracies and non-democracies. Factors other than the lack of shared
democratic governance may come into play in securitization moves. For example, while there is some
discourse on the democratic deficit in the Middle East, the region’s role, particularly that of Saudi Arabia,
as a primary global supplier of oil has a significant impact on the discourse, and on potential securitization.
Thus while the China cases do not carry the same strength for the theory as the India cases, this is not
terribly problematic.

112

Given the mechanistic focus of this dissertation, the cases also satisfy criteria for
Gerring’s variant on the crucial case, the pathway case. The pathway case takes place in
the context of an existing, well established hypothesis—in the case of my research the
claim that interdemocratic relations are peaceful—and serves to explore and clarify
causal mechanisms rather than the overarching hypothesis itself (Gerring, 2007, p. 238).
Here both India and China serve in the pathway case role, serving to clarify and explore
the causal mechanism I have outlined rather than directly addressing the democratic
peace hypothesis. Indeed, the pathway case approach is particularly appropriate with
respect to the Democratic Peace research program. As Gerring defines it, pathway cases
can only exist in situations where cross-case covariational patterns are well studied but
the underlying mechanism(s) linking the principle explanatory and dependent variable
remain underexplored. This could easily serve as the summary conclusion of the
Democratic Peace research program as I described it in the literature review. In short, the
pathway case approach justifies and supports the case approach I have adopted as well as
the mechanistic analytical approach.

Analyzing the cases
Within the cases, the securitization core of the theoretical arguments dictates the
methodology. The empirical focus rests on the claims and arguments made by those with
sufficient political capital, elected political leaders, to make a securitization move.
20
A

20
Chilton, in his excellent monograph on language and politics, argues that politics and speech are
fundamentally linked (not the least because both are uniquely human) and that “politics is very largely the

113

structured analysis is made of the securitization moves, with a particular emphasis on the
role of identity. A careful look at the securitization comments made by U.S. decision-
makers should reveal patterns of identification and the relationship between this
identification and U.S. policy. This means focusing on the public argument, transmitted
by Presidential and Congressional political leaders both directly to the public and through
the media. In the United States, the primary political figure in terms of foreign policy
formation is the President. Consequently, Presidential and Executive branch discourse,
embodied in official texts, press releases, speeches, press conferences, and interviews,
figures centrally in the subsequent analysis. Although Congress does not have a strong
formal role in foreign and security policy, it does serve as a politically important forum
for discussion where counterarguments can be voiced with significant political weight.
Here again, texts of arguments made by Congressional leaders—media reports,
interviews, speeches—play an important role, as does the Congressional Record. Finally,
securitization is successful only if the audience accepts the securitization argument.
While this acceptance is difficult to measure, public opinion polling does offer important
empirical proxy.

While securitization theory suggests the approach I have outlined here, there is support
for it within the constructivist literature generally. Kahl argues that constructivist
analysis requires an interpretive epistemology “that seeks to explore the meanings,
understandings, and interpretations of the relevant actors, the processes involved in

use of language” (Chilton, 2004, p. 14). Thus, accepting that security is the result of a political act, it
makes sense for us to examine the language of security.

114

generating these intersubjective meanings, and the behavioral patterns that result” (Kahl,
1999, p. 132). Of the three methods of interpretation Kahl outlines, my approach uses
two: it analyzes “explicit statements made in public and private sources for what they do
and do not say about the notions of national identity and the degree of affinity between
states” and analyzes the symbolic use of democratic identity (Kahl, 1999, pp. 136-137).
21

Ted Hopf’s work on the role of identity in foreign policy formation in 1955 Soviet Union
and 1999 Russia also takes an approach similar to that I have presented here (Hopf,
2002). While Hopf’s approach is inductive and his sources span a much broader range
than those I use—he included popular novels for example—Hopf focuses on examining
texts for identity discourse in much the same way I am proposing. The approach I adopt
is also similar to Chilton’s informal analysis of Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech
(Chilton, 2004, pp. 111-116). Chilton focuses on legitimizing communication within the
speech, a strong parallel to the implicit effort within the securitization move to legitimate
the removal of an issue from normal politics.

The approach advocated here also addresses one of the central complaints about
constructivist work: that it is impossible, or very difficult, to declare constructivist

21
Kahl’s other approach “involves interrogating the sources for their causal logics. This calls for the
analyst to outline, or ‘map,’ the structure of means-ends relations across the spectrum of representative
sources being interpreted. The more closely these causal logics parallel the means-ends relationships
inherent in a liberal identity and sense of collective liberal identity, the more reasonable it is to infer that
these forms of identification exist” (Kahl, 1999, pp. 136-137). Kahl’s point here roughly parallels Khong’s
effort to uncover the analytical role of analogies in policymaking. Khong argues that if the policy
eventually adopted conforms to the analogies used in discussions regarding the policy, that ‘congruence’
supports the underlying analogical argument (Khong, 1992, p. 66). Similarly, Kahl argues that if the causal
logics in arguments under consideration are ‘congruent’ with the means-ends relationships of liberal
identity (the appropriate means to achieve given ends in a particular situation) then the identity argument
finds support. On symbols: “symbols are socially constructed condensations, or summaries, that evoke
shared beliefs, emotions, or experiences associated with an object” (Ibid).

115
theories and claims empirically invalid (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 670). If democratic public
identity plays a role in securitization, we should expect some effort of political leaders to
appeal to that identity. If it does not, then political leaders should make no such explicit
effort. This is a testable and observable expectation.

No research methodology addresses is immune from critique, and the case selection and
analytical approach I have outlined here is no exception. The cases and analytical
approach I use do have significant strengths from both the vantage point of inferential
leverage (KKV’s quantitatively oriented perspective) as well as understanding the social
processes of the democratic peace (e.g. Ragin’s case study counterargument). The
analytical approach is clear and reproducible with observable and testable expectations.
While the number of cases is small, the fact that this study takes place within the context
of a larger research program where intensive large-N testing has taken place ameliorates
many of the drawbacks of the small-N approach.

116
Interlude I | Democracy, Securitizations and the Relationship
Between the United States and India
Overview and discussion of case merits
Somewhat unconventionally for a case-based study, I pay particular attention to the
relationship between the United States and India. The following two chapters focus on
two significant aspects of the relationship between the world’s largest democracies: 1) the
1971 ‘near miss’ when the Nixon Administration sent an aircraft carrier battle group to
the Bay of Bengal to intimidate India and 2) U.S. policy towards India’s nuclear program.
The emphasis on U.S.-India relations arises from the critical and difficult nature of the
relationship for my framework. The criticality of the relationship arises from the unique
geopolitical status of both states. India is the world’s largest democracy. With over a
billion people and rapid economic development, India typifies the future of democracy:
non-European and in the developing world. India is also one of the few examples of
stable democracy in a developing state. With the sole exception of Indira Gandhi’s state
of emergency from 1975 to 1977, India has enjoyed uninterrupted democracy, an
astounding feat compared with other developing states, particularly Turkey and many of
the democracies in South America, where until relatively recently military interference in
the government was relatively common. The United States is the world’s wealthiest and
most militarily powerful democracy, and by most measures the oldest. If the democratic
peace is to play a meaningful role in structuring the international dynamic, there are no
two more important countries between which for it to operate. India also represents a key
relationship for the United States. India’s current and future economic growth makes it a

117
significant world player, a proto-great power. As a great power itself, the United States
has a keen interest in what India does. Nascent great power status aside, India also sits in
one of the most explosive regions in the world. Not only does South Asia bear witness to
the nuclear powered rivalry between India and Pakistan, it also is a central theater in
global efforts to contain the influence of militant Islamic ideology. The Indo-American
relationship is critical not only to the democratic peace; along with a few other interstate
dyads, it is crucial for world peace.

India’s relationship with the United States also presents a difficult test for the theoretical
framework of this dissertation. The United States and India have significant cultural
differences, particularly when compared to the common cultural background shared
between the United States and Europe. Misunderstandings and cultural barriers have
been a regular aspect of relations between the two states (Kux, 1994). One author has
characterized the relations between the two countries as one of “[m]oral indignation and
mutual incomprehension, even at times a sense of betrayal” (Hathaway, 2002). For
example, President Lyndon Johnson, throughout the Indian droughts of 1965 and 1966,
kept U.S. food aid desperately needed by India to prevent wide scale starvation on a
‘tight tether,’ releasing only enough aid to keep India from the brink of famine. His
motivation, according to a number of staffers and policymakers, was to push India to
focus on desperately needed—and largely neglected—agricultural reforms. The
government, led by the newly in office Indira Gandhi, did not interpret Johnson's policy
in a similar light. Angry and alienated, Gandhi reversed a trend in Indian foreign policy

118
of leaning towards the United States and released several statements, particularly with
respect to Vietnam, that were broadly in agreement with the Soviet position (Ahlberg,
2007; Kux, 1994:243-260; Sathasivam, 2005:78-79). The cultural differences coupled
with India’s geostrategic ‘nonalignment’ may make the Indo-American relationship one
of the most difficult cases for constructivist efforts to explain the democratic peace. That
said, the lack of cultural similarity is useful from a research design perspective: it isolates
the democracy variable. While there are states that perhaps test the democratic ties that
bind put forth in this dissertation more, the U.S-India relationship is a very good test.

Strategically, the U.S.-India case is also a difficult one for my framework. Indeed,
looked at through the framework of realism, the case of Indo-American relations presents
one of the strongest possibilities for war between democracies. India, particularly during
the Cold War, strategically often defined itself contra the West though Indian advocacy
for and participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. Relations between the United States
and India throughout much of the Cold War were strained as India was perceived to be
actively undermining US containment policy (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007). India, seen as a
‘friend’ to the Soviet Union for much of the Cold War, was by extension unfriendly to
the United States, although this perception has varied with time and the political party of
the sitting president (Widmaier, 2005). Pakistan, a long time US ally, has been India’s
archrival since the separation of the two states in 1947. Indian security policy directly
opposes longstanding American security policy and interests. It was the first state outside
the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to openly develop and

119

test a nuclear device—the 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion.’ India also remains firmly
outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the attendant International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards. On both counts, India’s security policy stands in
direct contravention to U.S. policy and efforts directed toward preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. While defenders of India claim the Indian non-
proliferation record surpasses that of other nuclear power states, including the U.S.
(Ollapally & Ramanna, 1995), India’s nuclear work at the very least accelerated the
Pakistani nuclear program, which in the end was highly detrimental to non-proliferation
efforts.
1

Geographically, India sits in a significant strategic position. Valuable shipping lanes,
particularly for oil, cross the Indian Ocean. India is near enough to the Middle East and
large enough, with easy sea access, to pose a significant geostrategic challenge to US
interests should Indian leadership wish to do so. In sum, strategically the U.S.-India
relationship by no means serves as an easy test of the framework proposed in this
dissertation. If anything, given the context of the relationship, the fact that the United
States and India have never come to blows poses a real puzzle.

The focus of this and the following two chapters is on how U.S. leaders have attempted to
construct the U.S.-India security relationship. While the span of India’s existence as a

1
For example, the Pakistani effort to produce a nuclear weapon gave rise to the A.Q. Kahn nuclear
technology proliferation network. The network, which would eventually provide material and knowledge
to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, proved to be one of the most significant challenges to non-proliferation in
recent years (Albright & Hinderstein, 2005).

120
state is only about 60 years, there is too much material for a single chapter to adequately
encompass. Consequently, four key situations, or focal points, where potential security
issues between the United States and India have been critical occupy the central focus of
this and the following chapter. These are the 1971 Bangladesh war, the 1974 peaceful
nuclear explosion (PNE), the 1998 nuclear tests, and the 2005-2006 nuclear technology
deal. These cases represent the most coherent, promising points of investigation in the
U.S.-India relationship. All of them are highly visible incidents, requiring political
leaders in the United States to securitize or desecuritize the issue or situation in public.
Three of these subcases involve nuclear weapons or nuclear policy—a well recognized
security issue both within the Indo-American relationship and in security studies more
generally (Bertsch, Gahlaut, & Srivastava, 1999; Gallucci, 1994; Kux, 2002; Noorani,
1981; Sagan & Waltz, 2003). The fourth, when Richard Nixon sent the Enterprise carrier
group into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Bangladesh War, constitutes the only time
the United States has in any significant way suggested the use of force against India.
Indeed, the events of 1971 constitute one of the so-called near misses of the democratic
peace (Ray, 1995; Widmaier, 2005). These cases present the best opportunity to examine
how security issues with respect to India are securitized and whether the democratic
identity of the American public acts plays a role.

Neoliberal institutional models that focus on institutions and economic interdependence
have surprisingly little to say about the Indo-American relationship. Few authors
reference the impact of economic interdependence, and those that do are generally

121
dismissive (Sagar, 2004; Timberg, 1998). Other than the United Nations, the United
States and India do not share membership in any significant multilateral institutions.
Bilaterally, as discussed above, India has actively sought to keep itself out of the U.S.
sphere of influence, up until recently avoiding significant binding ties to the United States
as much as possible. Economic ties between the United States and India have historically
been, and remain, relatively weak. Popular debates in the United States about
outsourcing aside, U.S.-India trade figures are underwhelming given the size of the two
countries. According to the OECD, U.S. manufacturing imports from India in 1980
totaled just over one billion USD. That placed India at 19 on the list of U.S. import
trading partners, below Australia, Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan. U.S. 1980 exports to India, at
1.6 billion USD, ranked India 20 in terms of export value (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2000). By 2004, the latest date available from the
OECD, U.S. imports from India added up to 16.4 billion USD, placing India at 15 on the
import list, little moved from its position almost a quarter of a century previous. U.S.
exports to India fared even worse, accounting for only 6 billion USD, putting India 23
from the top in terms of export value (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2006b). Total trade with India amounted to less than one percent (.96%)
of total U.S. trade. Given the relatively small trade figures and the relative lack of
growth characterizing the Indo-U.S. trade relationship, economic interdependence does
not seem to be a strong tie to bind the United States and India together.

122
The Indo-American literature
The strained relations between the United States and India are a major theme in the
literature on Indo-American ties. The title of Dennis Kux’s history of Indo-American
relations, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Kux, 1994), largely
summarizes the academic discourse. Authors have asked “Can the U.S. and India be
Real Friends?”, argued that détente between the United States and India “Won’t
Happen,” and explored the nuclear tensions between the two states (Chadda, 1986;
Ollapally & Ramanna, 1995; Singh, 1983). More hopeful works also reflect the
predominant tension theme. Recently authors have claimed that India and America are
“Estranged No More,” that the relationship between the U.S. and India has witnessed a
“Remarkable Turnaround,” and that the Indians and Americans are engaged in a
relationship transforming “Courtship” (Adhikari, 2004; Hathaway, 2002; Kapur &
Ganguly, 2007; Kux, 2002). Within these works, the tendency is to focus on the
determinants of the relationship at the systemic or at the decision-maker level, almost
exclusively from an explicitly or implicitly rationalist perspective. With the exception of
Wesley Widmaier’s case study of the 1971 crisis, constructivist work on U.S.-India
relations seems to be nonexistent.

The literature is remarkably atheoretical in nature. Much of it is descriptive, as to be
expected given the predominantly diplomatic historical approach. However, there are
distinct theoretical undercurrents. At the systemic level, neorealist, rationalist, power
oriented explanations (implicit and explicit) of U.S. foreign policy dominate. A

123
consistent theme in historical treatments of Indo-American relations is the application of
the logic of great power competition to South Asia. The dynamic of power politics
weaves its way throughout Kux’s oft-cited history of U.S.-India relations. More
explicitly, McMahon argues that the strategic lens of the Cold War fundamentally
defined relations between the United States and India. For McMahon, the inapplicability
of this lens explains much of the tension in relations between the two states (McMahon,
1994). Chadda rejects the possibility of a U.S.-India détente because the geopolitical
forces push the United States into the Pakistani camp (Chadda, 1986). Bajeerjee’s
innovative application of dependency theory to explain the U.S. ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan in
1971 ultimately appeals to geopolitics to explain why U.S. policymakers felt the need to
defend the power elite in Pakistan (Banerjee, 1987). The theme continues into the post
Cold War literature. The end of the Cold War has altered the systemic pressures on the
United States and India. For the United States, geopolitics need no longer be seen
through the filter of Soviet containment. Instead, China becomes the principal
geopolitical target. Some authors explain improving U.S.-India relations as an attempt by
the United States to balance against the rise of China (Guihong, 2005; Rajamony, 2002).
Scholars explaining the Indian approach towards the United States also rely on power
politics arguments, arguing that Indian need for support against potential Chinese threats
leads policymakers to the United States (Jha, 1994; Kapur & Ganguly, 2007).

Work on the individual level has tended to focus on the strategically motivated decisions
of political leaders largely operating outside the constraints of the domestic context.

124
Kux’s meticulous history of the relationship between India and the United States focuses
predominantly on the diplomatic exchanges and the role of leaders and key policymakers
in fashioning the relationship (Kux, 1994). Kux’s account also emphasizes the
importance of systemic level geopolitical logic for policymakers. There are exceptions of
course. One of the most notable of these exceptions was Lyndon B. Johnson’s efforts to
encourage Indian agricultural self-sufficiency, which significantly damaged relations
between the two states at a period in time when India was leaning towards the U.S.
Likewise, Strobe Talbott’s diplomatic history of the events surrounding the 1998 nuclear
tests focuses largely on the interpersonal interactions of leaders and the way these
interactions shaped policy. While there is some note of domestic political context—
Talbott mentions the efforts of Senator Jesse Helms to block the passage into law of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—the domestic dynamic does not figure significantly in
Talbott’s narrative (Talbott, 2004).

While the role of domestic politics is not absent in the literature, neither is it of
significance. Some authors note the role of domestic forces, but only tangentially.
Hathaway does discuss the role of domestic forces, but limited his scope to the influence
of the Indian-American community and eventually concludes that domestic concerns are
marginal and that U.S. policy with respect to India will be made on the basis of
(unexamined) national interest (Hathaway, 2002). Similarly, Rubinoff argues that Indian
expatriates in the United States have played a key role in influencing policy and
perception in both U.S. and India (Rubinoff, 2005). Various authors throughout the

125
Gould and Ganguly edited volume make note of domestic pressures on U.S. leaders—
Kissinger and Nixon during 1971 and again in 1974 for example—but the primary focus
is on the interaction between policymakers (Gould & Ganguly, 1992). There is an
important gap in the literature regarding the role of norms and identity in structuring the
U.S.-India relationship. With the sole exception of Widmaier’s work, constructivism has
been absent from the academic discourse on U.S.-India relations. To some degree, this
lacuna is understandable; the U.S.-India relationship appears to be one dominated by
geopolitical strategic concerns. The predominance of systemic pressures makes the U.S.-
India case a difficult one for constructivism. Additionally, the focus on systemic
causation has led to a general neglect of the interaction between decision-makers and the
public and how U.S. policymakers construct to the public the security relationship
between the United States and India. Therefore, not only is this dissertation contributing
to the literature on the democratic peace, these two chapters address a significant gap in
our understandings of the U.S.-India dynamic.

A constructivist approach also provides insight on two puzzles in the Indo-American
relationship. First, why has the United States refrained from using force against a rising
challenger in the system despite sometimes significant conflicts of interest? This puzzle
is particularly acute given the relative weak economic ties between the U.S. and India
that neoliberal institutionalists would point to as generators of cooperation. Second, why
has the Indian nuclear weapons program not been a security issue for the United States?
Indian nuclear weapons development takes place in contravention of international

126
institutions—e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group—in which
the United States has invested deeply and have played a key role in regulating the spread
of nuclear weapons. From a Neorealist theoretical perspective, the development of
nuclear weapons by a rising power and an antagonist to a long-standing U.S. ally in both
the Cold War and the ‘War on Terror’ should be cause for alarm. From a neoliberal
institutional perspective, the international legal frameworks binding the United States
into a non-proliferation agenda should drive U.S. opposition to the Indian nuclear
program. Yet, the United States has remained remarkably unconcerned about India’s
nuclear program for over three decades. A constructivist approach offers the potential to
provide insight on both of these puzzles.
Roadmap and theoretical expectations
The chapters are organized similarly. In each, I begin with an issue overview and a
review of relevant literature. I then move onto the case or cases themselves, analyzing
the security constructions of political leaders in the United States with particular attention
to how shared democratic identity structures the security arguments. In the chapter on
the 1971 Bangladesh War, I end with an empirical and analytical summary. This
summary is also present in the second chapter on U.S. nuclear policy towards India, but is
followed by an effort to situate all the cases within a theoretical reading of Indo-
American relations as exceptions or aspects of the general pattern of relations. The
chapter wraps up tying the cases back to the general theoretical framework presented in
the dissertation as well as the literature on the democratic peace.

127
It bears repeating that the objective of these chapters is not to explain the formation of
U.S. foreign policy with respect to India. Instead, the aim is to examine how U.S.
policymakers attempt to construct their security policy vis-à-vis the American public.
The claim of the thesis is that the democratic identity that binds the imagined community
together acts as a constraint of the foreign policy options available to leaders. At the
psychological level, leaders may construct threats and formulate security policy using
very different rationales than what they present in public. In the case of India, and in the
chapters to follow, the argument leads to the following expectations. When attempting to
securitize a fellow democracy, U.S. policymakers are expected to de-emphasize the
external state’s democratic characteristics and identity while emphasizing any
nondemocratic aspects. When attempting to desecuritize an issue or external state that
had been previously securitized or would normally be expected to be securitized,
policymakers are expected to emphasize the democratic characteristics and identity of the
external state. With respect to the 1971 crisis, when Nixon and Kissinger clearly
implemented a security policy predicated on India as a threat, their public discourse
should reflect efforts to portray India as undemocratic in order to justify their policy
position. Those who opposed the policy are expected to emphasize India’s democratic
characteristics in an effort to undermine the existential threat argument. These dynamics
are expected to play out in 1974 PNE, 1998 nuclear tests, and 2006 nuclear deal cases of
the second chapter as well. As securitization theory indicates, the success of these efforts
can be measured by public support for the policy. If securitization is successful, the

128
public accepts the existential threat argument as well as the identification of the threat
and the policy prescription.

129
Chapter 4 | 1971: The Bangladesh War and the U.S. ‘Tilt’
Towards Pakistan
Historical overview and literature
When India was granted independence by the British in 1948, the former crown jewel of
the British Empire split into two separate states, secular, predominantly Hindu India and
the religiously oriented Muslim state of Pakistan. While India enjoyed territorial
continuity, Pakistan did not. The bulk of the Pakistani state lay to the northwest of India
and was dominated by the Punjabi ethnic group. To the East of India, near Burma
(Myanmar) lay East Pakistan, with an almost completely Bengali population and no
physical connection to West Pakistan. In 1970, the first democratic election in Pakistan’s
history gave a parliamentary majority to the Awami League, an East Pakistan party that
favored autonomy for the east. West Pakistani leaders, who dominated the outgoing
government, were generally unhappy with the election results and a political impasse
became apparent. Negotiations stalled over how much autonomy Bengali East Pakistan
should enjoy. In March 1971 following demonstrations in East Pakistan, the military
moved to reassert control. The President, Yahya Khan, outlawed the Awami League and
ordered the military to arrest Awami leaders and disarm Bengali military personnel. The
crackdown was brutal, with particular attention paid to East Pakistan’s Bengali Hindu
population. The military action in East Pakistan pushed million of refugees into India,
placing significant strains on the state and federal government. Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi denounced the Pakistani action and began covert assistance to Bengali
members of the Pakistani army who had escaped detention. India and East Pakistani

130
political leaders also began a concerted campaign to raise public awareness of the
situation and mobilize public opinion against Pakistan. In the meantime, the Indian
military began to draw up plans for a military response in the winter (Kux, 1994, pp. 289-
292; National Security Council, 1971; Sathasivam, 2005, pp. 9-10, 82; Sisson & Rose,
1990).

The American response was muted. While the Consul General in Dakka urged
condemnation of West Pakistan based on a policy (and national interest) centered around
human rights (Blood, 1971b), they were unaware of Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts,
funneled through Pakistan, to establish formal contact with China. On July 15, 1971
Nixon announced Kissinger’s mission to Beijing and his own forthcoming trip. In sharp
contrast to U.S. efforts in 1962 when Kennedy extended aid to India during the short
Sino-Indian war of that year, Kissinger made it clear that should China move against
India in the context of an Indo-Pakistani war, the United States would do nothing to assist
India. Shortly afterward, on August 9, Indira Gandhi announced the signing of a
friendship treaty between New Delhi and Moscow. Thus the geopolitical stage was set
(Kux, 1994, pp. 292, 294-295).

By November 1971, the situation in East Pakistan reached a tipping point. Bangladeshi
guerrilla fighters were increasing their attacks on Pakistani military forces in East
Pakistan, often with Indian artillery support. In the United States, policy against India
had hardened. By that point, Nixon had chosen to ‘tilt’ U.S. policy in favor of Pakistan,

131

and Kissinger was pushing the foreign policy apparatus hard to implement the ‘tilt’ (Kux,
1994, p. 302). In early December, after attacking Indian airfields, Pakistan declared war
on India. The Indian response was immediate, moving against Pakistani forces in East
Pakistan while mounting sufficient operations in the west to prevent the arrival of
reinforcements. Pakistani and U.S. leaders both thought China would come to Pakistan’s
aid, but both were mistaken. While the Chinese verbally supported Pakistan, no military
support was forthcoming. Within two weeks, the fighting in East Pakistan—soon to be
Bangladesh—was over as 93,000 soldiers surrendered to Indian forces. While few in
government agreed with them, Nixon and Kissinger grew concerned that India would
continue the war effort and attack West Pakistan. Despite assurances from both the
Indian government and the Soviets that such an attack was not in the offing, Nixon
ordered the USS Enterprise carrier group to the Bay of Bengal (Kux, 1994, p. 305). The
move “deeply angered” Indian leaders, set back U.S.-India relations for decades and
strengthened the hand of those within India who wanted to move forward on nuclear
testing (Kux, 1994, p. 307).

For such a critical moment in the shared history between the United States and India—it
was the first time that the United States threatened the use of force against India (Van
Hollen, 1980)—the events of 1971 have been largely neglected in the academic
literature.
1
Of the literature that deals with the events of 1971, a very few authors focus

1
Although this may be an extension of a generalized lack of interest by academics in U.S. foreign policy
towards India (Sathasivam, 2005:vii). In part, the lack of scholarly interest may arise from India’s
relatively slow economic growth in the decades after independence, making the Indian story one more of
unrealized potential than international presence. Another possible explanation is its participation, indeed

132

on the foreign policy aspects from the American perspective. Christopher Van Hollen—a
high level State Department official during the Nixon Administration—in his 1980 article
presents an insightful but largely atheoretical analysis. Arguing that the Nixon-Kissinger
foreign policy system left them critically isolated from Congress, the public, and experts
on the region in the State Department, Van Hollen disputes the worldview that led Nixon
to deploy the Enterprise task group. The isolation of the Nixonian decision-making
system allowed for Nixon’s personal affections (for Yahya) and enmities (against Gandhi
and before her Nehru) to play an outsized role in policy formulation. Van Hollen also
argues that Nixon and Kissinger misapplied geopolitics in the crisis, holding the Soviet
Union responsible for a ‘client’ in India that was not really a Soviet client and failing to
appreciate either the unique features of the region or the impact of millions of refugees on
India’s social, political, and economic stability. Van Hollen disputes Nixon and
Kissinger’s belief that supporting West Pakistan was critical for maintain the Pakistani
channel linking Washington and Beijing (Peking) proving the mettle of U.S. promises to
stand by the Chinese against the Soviets. Pakistan ‘desperately’ wanted to maintain the
goodwill of both the U.S. and China and would have been highly unlikely to relinquish
its role as intermediary. Moreover, even if Pakistan had backed out of the arrangement,
there were other channels, notably through Romania.
2
With respect to maintaining the

spearheading, of the Non-Aligned Movement, effectively removing it from the international dynamic—the
Cold War—that dominated the study on international relations in the United States until the early 1990’s.

2
Romania in addition to Pakistan served as a conduit for Nixon Administration communications with
China. It was only the ‘slight preference’ of Nixon and Kissinger for Pakistan that precluded the use of
Romanian contacts as the primary option (Van Hollen, 1980, pp. 340, 343).

133

credibility of commitments, Van Hollen points out that Kissinger himself indicated that
agreement on issues did not seem to be a prerequisite to a successful China visit.

In Van Hollen’s account, though he is not explicit on this point, U.S. policy during the
Bangladesh crisis can be traced to structural faults in the foreign policy apparatus that
enabled Nixon and Kissinger—operating in secret and isolation—to apply untempered
personal worldviews to the situation.
3
In effect, Nixon and Kissinger, through a
combination of isolation and the misapplication of geopolitics risked war with India—
and possibly the Soviet Union—unnecessarily, damaged their own standing with the
American public, and set back U.S.-India relations for years (Van Hollen, 1980).

Sanjoy Banerjee takes a different approach, although also within a broadly structuralist
perspective. According to Benerjee, the United States acted offensively towards India
and supported the West Pakistani leadership—representing a minority of the country—as
an extension of the geopolitics of the Cold War. The US had to assure other allies—
specifically those that held power within other states that may or may not represent the
majority of the public in the state—that the United States would defend their interests
against Soviet threat. The nature of American alliances with developing world countries

3
This is, however, a point Dan Haendal explicitly makes. Using the 1971 crisis to explore a foreign policy
priority formation theoretical framework, Haendal focuses Nixon and Kissinger as key policy-makers.
Haendal does explore the organizational structure of foreign policymaking in his efforts to understand how
policy priorities were established within the Nixon Administration and finds, much as Van Hollen, that
Nixon and Kissinger were isolated from the bureaucracy and the area specialists therein. Agreeing with
Van Hollen, Haendal argues this isolation, largely engineered by Henry Kissinger’s domination of the
policymaking process and role as gatekeeper to the President, allowed Nixon and Kissinger’s worldviews
to dominate U.S. policy. However, Haendal goes further than Van Hollen and Kux (see below) in arguing
that the low priority status of South Asia in U.S. foreign policy facilitated the imposition of a global
geostrategic framework onto what was essentially a regional issue (Haendel, 1977).

134
was not the same as alliances between developed world democracies. In the developed
world democracies, alliances were between states writ broad. In those cases, the
leadership within a given period was immaterial to the status of that state as an ally of the
United States. The United Kingdom (or West Germany or Japan or the Netherlands)
would remain a U.S. ally regardless of who was Prime Minister and what party they
hailed from. The situation in the developing world, where Pakistan was firmly lodged,
was very different. In the developing world, the alliance was between the U.S. and a
clientalist group of power holders within the developing state. The alliance between the
United States and these clientalist power elites within these developing states was not
grounded in public opinion, shared, identity, or institutional structure. These leaders
could, relatively easily, change their allegiance if they felt the United States was not
credible in its commitment to them.

Wesley Widmaier’s work argues that the 1971 crisis was itself an aspect of a larger
dynamic of interdemocratic identity construction. The Bangladesh crisis provides entre
into the tension generated by difference between ‘social’ and ‘liberal’ democracies. The
divergent characteristics of these two types of democracy can generate suspicion and
conflict, and Widmaier argues that this dynamic played an important role in informing
Nixon and Kissinger’s threat perception. Leaders in liberal democracies, with their
emphasis on individualism and the free function of the market, may view the stress on
equity in social democracies as undemocratic; a constraint on individual freedom for the
sake of some arbitrary public interest. Alternatively, leaders in social democracies may

135
view the emphasis on economic and individual competition in liberal democracies as an
indicator of the willingness of liberal democracies to engage in systemic competition.
Widmaier finds that there is a pattern of amity and enmity between the United States and
India depending on which party holds the White House. When Democrats do, relations
are significantly better then when a Republican sits in the White House. In the case of
the 1971 crisis, Widmaier finds that the liberal-social democracy nexus does indeed play
a powerful role in explaining Nixon and Kissinger’s construction of India as a potential
threat (Widmaier, 2005).

Historical approaches to Indo-U.S. relations do comment on the incident and the possible
sources of what turned out to be a disastrous foreign policy. Kux argues that the key to
the 1971 tilt lay in the psyche of Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon had developed a personal
dislike for India and its leaders dating back to his time as Vice President under
Eisenhower. At the time, Nixon met with Nehru and found him to be unfriendly (Kux,
1994, p. 110). Nixon’s relations with Indira Gandhi—Nehru’s daughter—were no better.
A state visit by Gandhi in October 1971 was a disaster as both leaders sniped at each
other in public and ignored the other in private. Conversely, Pakistani leaders treated
Nixon well and he held a distinct appreciation for the country. For Kux, Nixon’s
personal animus towards India, while certainly enabling, was not foundational to the
formation of the 1971 policy. In agreement with Van Hollen, Kux argues instead that the
policy can be traced to Nixon and Kissinger’s application of a geostrategic framework to
what was a regional matter, an assessment shared by Thornton (Thornton, 1992). They

136

saw the crisis as a way to prove U.S. reliability to the Chinese. At the time Kissinger
argued: “While we are in the process of opening up our dialogue with China, we face a
crisis in South Asia for Pakistan, our traditional ally. China will be looking to see how
we treat that ally…If the United States stands by and sees our ally dismembered what
will the Chinese think about our reliability” (Kux, 1994, p. 306). Since Nixon and
Kissinger dominated the foreign policy decision-making during the Nixon
Administration—not even Secretary of State Rogers knew of the negotiations with
China—it makes sense to look to them at the individual level to determine how the policy
was formulated. However, Nixon and Kissinger did not operate in a vacuum; they had to
justify their policy to the public, and Kux makes no mention of how they did so.
4

There are weaknesses in these works, some of which the approach advocated by this
dissertation, and its application to the 1971 case, addresses. The atheoretical approaches
of Van Hollen and Kux, while informative, do not advance our understanding of foreign
policymaking more generally. In Van Hollen’s case, there are some aspects of the case
that stand in contrast to the argument he presents. In particular, Van Hollen’s contention
that Nixon and Kissinger were isolated from the public, if supported, would significantly
weaken the argument that the public plays an important role in securitization.
Fortunately, there are indications that Nixon and Kissinger were not as isolated as Van
Hollen contends. In the case of the monsoon that killed as many as 500,000 East
Pakistanis in 1970, the importance of the public in foreign policymaking was obvious:

4
Kux’s only domestic observation is that the Pakistan ‘tilt’ policy was unpopular (Kux, 1994:307)

137
Kissinger: I have two problems about the Pakistanis. I called the Pakistan Ambassador.
He is satisfied. I asked about sending a delegation. They are probably not eager to have
a delegation.
Halderman: We don’t care. It’s to avoid the negative. We have to look humanitarian.
…
Halderman: What good can they do with wheat. [sic] We are treating it as a
bureaucratic thing.
Kissinger: That’s not true. We have sent three cables a day.
Halderman: Does anyone in Iowa care about 3 cables a day to the Pakistanis? They
watch thousands of people die and we should be doing something. (United States Office
of the President, 1970b)

In the case of the 1971 crisis, as will hopefully become apparent in the subsequent
analysis, while Nixon and Kissinger were isolated as policymakers, concerns about the
public and Congressional reaction their policies did play a role in constraining the
eventual policy path.

Given the similarities between Van Hollen and Haendal’s work, a similar critique can be
applied to Haendal’s argument. Moreover, as it typical of the literature on the crisis,
Haendal does not examine the relationship between the policymakers and the public. In
the case of Banerjee’s argument, the empirical evidence does not seem to support his
assertions. Nixon and Kissinger did demonstrate some concern about their credibility in
the eyes of the Chinese, but with the exception of a single reference (United States
Department of State, 1971h), concern about other similar allies was absent. Even with
respect to Pakistan, Nixon was driven in large part by the amity he felt for Pakistani
government leaders, Yahya in particular, and not by the fear that opposing their East
Pakistan policy would push Pakistan into Soviet arms. Widmaier’s work enjoys a
significant level of empirical support, but is limited to how Nixon and Kissinger

138

constructed their threat environment. Absent is the critical aspect of policy leader-public
interaction that is unique to democracies.
The case
Private versus public construction of the India ‘threat’
As Widmaier’s work indicates, there is no ambiguity as to the position of Nixon and
Kissinger, as the primary foreign policy formulators, on the events in East Pakistan. Both
supported the military government of Yahya against both the democratically elected
Awami League (and as a consequence East Pakistan more generally, where the Awami
League received 75% of the vote) and democratic India. While other major powers
condemned West Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger pushed a U.S. policy ‘tilting’ towards
Pakistan (United States Department of State, 1971m).
5
Despite the fact that Yahya’s
government was actively and severely repressing East Pakistan, and that India was also a
victim with millions of refugees straining its infrastructure and resources, Nixon and
Kissinger marked India as the principle threat, not Pakistan:

Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger: They’re such bastards.

5
In a CIA briefing on the events and prospects for the future of Pakistan, the analysts noted that, with the
exception of China, “none of the major powers have shown any support for the central [West Pakistan]
government’s efforts in Bengal.” The Soviets in particular had likely concluded that “the odds favor a
separatist solution or at least that Islamabad has little chance of imposing its will on East Bengal in any
lasting and effective way” (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1971). On the tilt, Kissinger
colorfully told the Washington Special Actions Group: “I’ve been catching unshirted hell every half-hour
from the President who says we’re not tough enough. He believes State is pressing us to be tough and I’m
resisting. He really doesn’t believe we’re carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt toward Pakistan, and he
believes that every briefing or statement is going the other way” (United States Department of State,
1971m).

139
Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that. We're going to feed them—a
new kind of wheat. But if they're not going to have a famine the last thing they need is
another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war [unclear].
Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there.
Nixon: The Indians?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Sure. (United States Department of State, 1971k)

Remarkably, the threat assessment made by Nixon and Kissinger, made on May 26, came
at a time India and Pakistan were not aggressing against each other and not long after
India had been deluged by refugees. While there was evidence that India was helping
train Bengali resistance fighters, the level of Indian assistance at that point was limited
(United States Department of State, 1971n). In November of that year, the animosity
towards Indira Gandhi and the general perception of threat by Kissinger and Nixon
hardened:

Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch.
Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. It’s—to
them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she
carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan…You very subtly—I mean, she will not
be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception and
therefore, in despair, she’s got to go to war. (United States Department of State, 1971e)

The threat posed by India in the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger was two-fold. First, India
posed an indirect threat to containment. Indian support for Bangladesh was expected to
enable the rise of an independent state. The poverty and lack of natural resources in
Bangladesh would in turn result in a state ripe for communist ‘infiltration.’ The second
threat was more direct. Nixon in particular saw the ultimate Indian aim as the destruction
of Pakistan, an ally to the United States and a component of containment policy (United

140

States Department of State, 1971j). In November, Kissinger warned Nixon that India in
his option had become a Soviet operative:

Kissinger: Except for Vietnam, I’d give her [Indira Gandhi] 5 minutes of the Tito talk
because it will go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese.
Nixon: Will it?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia. They leak
everything right back to them. (United States Department of State, 1971e)

By December, Kissinger became more explicit in linking India to the Soviets in his
threat assessment:

[W]hat we may be witnessing is a situation where a country equipped and supported by
the Soviets may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a
vassal.” (Gwertzman, 1972)

At one point, Kissinger went so far as to call the crisis “our Rhineland” a reference to
Hitler’s militarization of German Rhineland at the outset of World War II (United States
Department of State, 1971h). This kind of powerful imagery indicates how strongly
Kissinger and Nixon came to see the Indian threat.

As policymakers, Nixon and Kissinger seemed unbound by democratic norms and
identity.
6
They supported efforts by U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland to
transfer State Department officials who brought the events in East Pakistan to
governmental and public attention (United States Department of State, 1971c).
7
Neither

6
This would not surprise anyone a few years later as Nixon’s role in the Watergate scandal, particularly his
efforts during subsequent cover-up, became apparent. Nixon’s efforts to obstruct the investigation into the
Watergate Hotel break-in clearly demonstrate a fundamental disregard by the President towards the rule of
law and normal political process.

7
Including the U.S. Consul General in Dacca Archer Blood, the head of the United States Information
Service in the region as well as the head of US AID for Pakistan Eric Griffel.

141
Nixon or Kissinger seemed to have any qualms about the efforts of President Yahya to
role back democratic reforms—reforms that had been generated due to internal political
pressure (Hughes, 1969; Khan, 1999, pp. 274-275)—and abuse the citizenry in East
Pakistan. Meeting with Pakistani President in late 1970, Nixon commented that he hoped
Pakistan would “keep a strong Presidency as in France,” and did not contest Yahya’s
claim that Pakistan was unfit for parliamentary democracy. Later, after the repression of
East Pakistan had begun in earnest, Nixon and Kissinger showed no concern for the loss
of life in East Pakistan or the damage to the fledgling democracy in Pakistan:

Kissinger: There’s nothing of any great consequence Mr. President. Apparently Yahya
has got control of East Pakistan.
Nixon: Good. There’re sometimes the use of power is…
Kissinger: The use of power against seeming odds pays off. Cause all the experts were
saying that 30,000 people can’t get control of 75 million.
Nixon: Well maybe things have changed. But hell, when you look over the history of
nations 30,000 well-disciplined people can take 75 million any time. Look what the
Spanish did when they came in and took the Incas and all the rest. Look what the British
did when they took India…But anyway I wish him [Yahya] well. (emphasis mine)
(United States Department of State, 1971o)

The violation of human rights on a massive scale—a cable from Dacca dated March 30,
1971 described the situation as “selective genocide” (Blood, 1971a)—, the failure to
respect rule of law, and most certainly the complete lack of nonviolent conflict resolution
seemed irrelevant to Nixon and Kissinger in their evaluation of the situation. In fact, the
non-democratic aspects of Yahya’s behavior, the projection of force to suppress the
democratic will of the East Pakistanis, seemed to be what impressed them the most. As
the evidence mounted of military atrocities in East Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger
remained unmoved. In a Senior Review Group meeting, Kissinger commented after

142
being told that there had been significant casualties at a university that “They [the British]
didn’t dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle” (United States
Department of State, 1971l).

Outside the Nixon-Kissinger decision-making space, Nixon’s construction of India was
radically different. He regularly referred to India’s democratic government. Nixon
emphasized the importance of Indian democracy in a private meeting with Indian Foreign
Minister Dinesh Singh, arguing that if India, as a parliamentary democracy, “does not
make the grade, the example for the rest of the world will be profound” (Saunders,
1969a). Reiterating this point during a visit to India in a meeting with Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi and top U.S. and Indian aids, Nixon went further, arguing that
“[i]t is essential that India succeed” (Saunders, 1969b). Within the Administration,
Nixon also focused on Indian democracy, telling U.S. Ambassador to India Kenneth
Keating—who at the time was pushing Nixon and Kissinger to pull funds from the
Pakistani foreign aid package and transfer them to India to help that country deal with the
massive influx of refugees—that:

I know that country is trying to make it (unclear) basically with some semblance of
democracy—private enterprise, call it whatever you want. And I know that looming over
from the north are the Chinese (unclear). It’s, therefore, very much in our interest to see
that India, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we want
them to do well. (United States Department of State, 1971b).

In August 1971, despite the high level of securitization of India evinced by Kissinger and
Nixon, Nixon refused to securitize India publically. During a news conference, Nixon’s

143
only comments on the East Pakistan crisis were to emphasis the amount of aid donated by
the United States ($70 million) to aid India in dealing with the massive number of
refugees generated by Yahya’s military action. No mention was made of Nixon’s belief
that India sought to dismantle Pakistan or that India posed a direct of indirect threat to
U.S. interests (New York Times, 1971e; Nixon, 1971a).

By the end of September however, Nixon and Kissinger were moving to securitize India
while justifying their failure to securitize Pakistan, albeit within government circles. In a
conversation with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home and British
Ambassador to the U.S. George Baring, Earl of Cromer, Nixon and Kissinger explicitly
pointed to India as the primary reason that the crisis had not been resolved. Kissinger
claimed that India had “totally thwarted it [meeting between Bengali resistance and
Yahya]. They made it impossible for these people to deal with us; they’re forcing them
to check everything with them, they are padding demands, which are totally incapable of
fulfillment” (United States Department of State, 1971g). In a prelude to arguments made
later in public, Kissinger was attempting to justify the U.S. government’s anti-Indian
approach by targeting India as the primary responsible party in the crisis. The
increasingly dire security situation in East Pakistan could and should be laid at the feet of
the Indians. At the same time, Nixon repeatedly defended Pakistani President Yahya,
leader of a government responsible for thousands of deaths and millions of refugees as a
“decent man.”

144
The growing willingness by Nixon and Kissinger to securitize India within the halls of
government in September was not reflected in their public discourse. To the American
public, Nixon and Kissinger maintained a façade of neutrality. In October, in a statement
on relief aid to South Asia, Nixon once again focused on relief efforts rather than security
concerns and specifically mentioned India as a primary recipient of emergency aid
(Nixon, 1971c). In greeting Prime Minister Gandhi during her November 1971 visit to
the United States, Nixon immediately brought attention to India’s democratic system:

Our distinguished guest here today has the unique distinction, through the parliamentary
system of India, that more people have voted for her leadership than for any leader in the
whole history of the world. Madam Prime Minister, we welcome you because you
represent the world’s largest free nation, the world’s largest democracy. We welcome
you also for another reason…India and the United States are bound together by a higher
morality [than treaties], a more profound morality that does not need legal document to
make it live. I speak of the common devotion that the people of India and the people of
the United States have to the cause of freedom, to the cause of representative
government…to the cause of peace. (Nixon, 1971b; Welles, 1971b)

Presaging later arguments by his Administration, Nixon used the language of shared
democracy to mask the pro-Pakistan position of the U.S. government. By appealing to
Indian democracy, Nixon was communicating to his audience, through the press, as well
as to Indira Gandhi, that arguments claiming the United States had chosen Pakistan over
India were false. By highlighting democracy, Nixon was diffusing the pro-Pakistan
critique by demonstrating that he recognized India as a fellow democracy and would
therefore not support the Pakistani military dictatorship at India’s expense. The
democracy rhetoric also served as an effort to mask Nixon failure to address the ongoing
and deepening crisis in East Pakistan, or of the massive burden imposed on India by the

145

resulting refugee outflow—issues certainly at the forefront of India’s concern at the time.
The principle reason Nixon would use the rhetoric of democracy is that he expected it to
resonate with his audience, the American public.
8

By the time the war started in earnest in December 1971, Nixon and Kissinger had deeply
securitized India. Kissinger actively disseminated his belief to other government officials
that India was aggressing against Pakistan, and that the Soviet Union was pulling the
geopolitical strings. Kissinger had also begun to use a heavily security-laden term with
respect to the situation: ‘rape.’ Before the war started, Kissinger was concerned that
Pakistan would ‘get raped’ if the crisis was brought before the UN, to which Secretary of
State Rogers replied “They will if the fighting doesn’t stop” (United States Department of
State, 1971q). Kissinger extended the rape metaphor in a discussion with Secretary of the
Treasury John Connally:

The thing that concerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet
collusion, raping a friend of ours…Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the
Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war. (United States
Department of State, 1971r)

As for restraining India:

No matter what we do, we can't do as much for them [India] as the Soviets have already
done on the thing that interests them [India] which is to rape Pakistan. (United States
Department of State, 1971r)

8
As well as, intriguingly, the domestic audience in India.

146

By the time India and Pakistan engaged in direct military confrontation, Kissinger and
Nixon used the rape metaphor regularly to describe their fears for (West) Pakistan
(United States Department of State, 1971h, 1971i).
9
The rape language conveys the
impression that innocent, vulnerable, Pakistan was in danger of (or being) assaulted by
the aggressive, endangering nexus of the Soviet Union and India. This posed a threat not
only to Pakistan; in the logic of containment, if the Soviet Union, through its Indian
proxy, was successful in destroying Pakistan, it would be emboldened to strike at far
more geopolitically and economically precious territory in the Middle East. On
December 8, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger acted to move U.S. policy outside the realm of
normal politics. In a phone conversation with Pakistan Ambassador to the United States
Raza, Kissinger told him to tell the U.S. State Department that Pakistan wished to invoke
their “mutual security treaty” with the United States (United States Department of State,
1971s).
10

9
Three times in the span of an hour long conversation. While Nixon did not use the word, he clearly
agreed with the assessment.

10
There was in fact no mutual security treaty. According to the State Department: “No mutual security
treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and
unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that
Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military
action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger’s reference to a mutual security treaty
during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United
States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. The
agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action "as may be mutually agreed
upon" to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace
and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution
contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by ‘any
country controlled by international communism’ so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty
obligations and the Constitution of the United States” (United States Department of State Office of the
Historian, 2008). Kissinger would later argue with Secretary of State Rogers over the matter as Rogers
insisted that the Kennedy agreement in no way committed the U.S. to use military force to aid Pakistan
(United States Department of State, 1971p).

147
Nixon and Kissinger, in their effort to justify their securitization of India, attempted to
de-emphasize Indian democratic identity and reframe India as acting or being
undemocratic. In a December discussion planning their public relations strategy, Nixon
strongly emphasized that India was defying the will of the global peoples and ignoring
the will of the United Nations, determined through democratic voting:

The general tone is that in view of India’s refusal to accept the terms of the General
Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 104–10 calling for an
immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of armed forces, the United States has now decided
again to take this grave issue to the Security Council…All right. Add one sentence. “If
India defies,” put it this way, “If India should defy the overwhelming weight, defies,
should continue to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by a
blankety blank vote in the UN General Assembly.” (United States Department of State,
1971f)

By focusing on India’s refusal to heed world opinion and the will of the UN, established
through a democratic voting process, Nixon was seeking to target the core pillar of
American public support for India: shared democratic identity. Nixon also sought to
reframe India’s identity, casting it not as a democracy, but as part of the communist
system that was accepted to pose an existential threat to the United States:

Nixon: Now, “Pakistan has accepted. India has refused. India, supported the Soviet
Union”— [sic]
Kissinger: That was the next question I wanted to put to you.
Nixon: “India, supported by the Soviet Union, has refused”—now we are going.
Kissinger: Supported only by the Soviet Union.
Nixon: Supported only by the Soviet Union. Well, some other Communist countries.
Kissinger: Supported by the Soviet Union.
Nixon: Supported by the Soviet Union. Can we say other Communist countries? Use the
word Communist for a change. And, well that throws in the Chinese and the Romanians.
All right, supported by, at any rate, supported by the Soviet Union. (United States
Department of State, 1971f).

148

By linking India with the Soviet Union, Nixon sought to remove India from the
community of democracies.
Even in early December, the Nixon Administration moved to securitize India in an almost
passive aggressive manner. For example, the Nixon Administration moved quickly to cut
off all military export licenses to India. Only 48 hours separated the Nixon
Administration’s announcement that no new export licenses would be granted to India
and the announcement that all existing licenses would be canceled as well (T. Smith,
1971; Welles, 1971c). This stands in stark contrast to the hesitant manner with which
U.S. military export licenses were handled with respect to Pakistan, a point made by the
Indian ambassador to the United States (Welles, 1971c).
11
From the vantage point of the
public, the speed of Nixon’s decision to cut India’s licenses meant he perceived India as a
primary threat, but the Administration was reluctant to clearly stake the claim. Charles
Bray, the State Department spokesman at the time, indicated that the suspension was due
to “continuing Indian incursions into Pakistan,” implying that India, not Pakistan, bore
responsibility for the crisis. Additionally, unidentified U.S. officials began to suggest
that India was untrustworthy. Responding to Indian reports that Pakistani air forces had
struck at airfields near India’s border with West Pakistan: “It’s hard to believe Indian
reports about those Pakistan air attacks” (Welles, 1971c).
12
The Nixon Administration
was quietly building its case for securitizing India.

11
It is true that licenses to Pakistan were eliminated earlier than they were for India, but the Nixon
Administration did so under strong pressure from Congress and the public, and did not move quickly to
implement the policy, waiting several months after the start of military operations in East Pakistan.

12
In fact, the Indian reports were accurate (Kux, 1994).

149

The Administration’s rhetoric attempting to securitize India became more explicit on
December 4, when a State Department official blamed India for the crisis:

India bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities [between Pakistan and
India]. We believe that since the beginning of the crisis Indian policy, in a systematic
way, has led to the perpetuation of the crisis, a deepening of the crisis, and that India
bears the major responsibility for the broader hostilities that have ensued. (emphasis
mine) (Welles, 1971d)

Secretary of State Rogers made the final connections for the American public, claiming
that the crisis “posed a threat to international peace and security.” The public argument
was set: India posed a threat to U.S. interests because the crisis it had perpetuated and
deepened posed a threat to international security. While the Administration did not
directly address India’s democratic nature despite Nixon’s recognition that democracy lay
at the heart of public support for India, it did highlight undemocratic behavior. The
United States had not even received “minimal” cooperation from India. India had also
refused the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and “refused U.S.
requests to urge the guerrillas not to attack United Nations ships and trucks carrying relief
supplies” (Welles, 1971d).

Less than a week after the Nixon Administration initially announced the cut-off of
military aid to India, the New York Times reported that economic aid would be cut as
well, a move that Nixon had refused to make against Pakistan.
13
In announcing the cut, a
dramatic act against a country as poor as India, the State Department now labeled India

13
Interestingly, the Nixon Administration used the same argument that had been used in calls to cut
economic aid to Pakistan, namely that the continuance of aid would facilitate military operations by
allowing the target state to transfer funds from the civilian to the military budget.

150
the “main aggressor” (Gwertzman, 1971c). Now India was not just to blame for
perpetuating and deepening the crisis; it was actively and openly using force. The Nixon
Administration was slowly moving India up the securitization scale.

Starting on December 14, in line with the planning sessions between Nixon and
Kissinger, the Administration began to recast India’s identity as that of a “client” to the
communist USSR. The New York Times reported ‘senior state department officials’
were ‘puzzled’ by Soviet “willingness to forsake possible dramatic improvements in
relations with the United States,” by continuing to back India (Gwertzman, 1971a). The
implication is that the Soviet Union had deep roots sunk into India and India’s
government; otherwise the Soviets would be willing to reduce tensions with the United
States. What else could explain their apparently irrational behavior? Moreover, the
improvement in relations was described as dramatic; by inference, the Soviet stake in
India must be truly significant to forego such a boon. A day later, the New York Times
reported that the Nixon Administration was considering canceling a summit with Soviet
leaders if they did not pressure India to cease hostiles, further linking India and the Soviet
Union by suggesting that Moscow played a significant role—appropriate to a Soviet
patron-client relationship—in Indian decision-making (Naughton, 1971). In a post-
bellum attempt to justify Nixon’s policy, well known syndicated columnist Joseph
Alsop—citing Henry Kissinger—again attempted to restructure Indian identity in terms
of its association with the Soviet Union and to highlight the threat posed by India.

151

According to Alsop, Kissinger indicated that there was “‘a strong possibility’ that India
would become a ‘vast new Soviet strategic base area’” (Welles, 1972).

The shift in Nixon’s reference to Indian democracy is remarkable. While Nixon and
Kissinger maintained a façade of neutrality, Indian democracy figured heavily in their
rhetoric about India. As the crisis deepened, and particularly in December when the
Nixon Administration was making a concerned effort to securitize India, no reference
was made to Indian democracy at all. In effect, the rhetoric of democracy served to
diffuse arguments by critics that the Nixon Administration had in fact securitized India
and was acting in line with that assessment. A background briefing given by Henry
Kissinger exemplifies this dynamic. In response to strong criticism, particularly from
members of Congress, that the Nixon Administration was “anti-Indian,” the White House
(Kissinger) responded by pointing to Indian democracy:

There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally
inaccurate. India is a great country. It is the most populous free country. It is governed
by democratic procedures. Americans through all administrations in the postwar period
have felt a commitment to the progress and development of India, and the American
people have contributed to this to the extent of $10 billion. Therefore, when we have
differed with India in recent weeks, we do so with great sadness and great
disappointment. (Gwertzman, 1971d; New York Times, 1972).
14

There are two critical points here. The first lies in the accusation that the Administration
was anti-Indian. For such a critique to carry weight, it must reflect the perception by
large portions of the public (since the critique was made for political purposes) that India,

14
At the time the source was identified only as a White House official. Later, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-
AZ) identified the source as Henry Kissinger (Gwertzman, 1971b).

152
despite Administration efforts, was not a threat. Had the Administration succeeded in
securitizing India, the anti-India critique in fact would not be a critique, but a
commendation. Second, when forced to defend itself against claims that it was anti-
India, the Administration attempted to defuse the critique by appealing to what was
perceived to give rise to the strength of the critique. That is, the Administration appealed
to shared democracy—by pointing to Indian democracy—in an effort to confront the anti-
India argument on its ideological grounds. How could an Administration that recognizes
Indian democracy be anti-Indian? The Administration then continued to argue that India
was behaving undemocratically, in this case by claiming that concessions wrung out of
Pakistan President Yahya before the onset of the war were ignored by India. Playing to
public belief about the nature of democratic identity, the Administration claimed to have
“withheld assigning blame [after fighting started in November, but before the onset of
formal war] because it was reluctant to believe that India had come to a naked recourse to
force” (Gwertzman, 1971d).

The Nixon Administration was not alone it its effort to securitize India. Although
support in Congress was weak, some did take up the cause. In the House of
Representatives, Representative Bradford Morse (R-MA) made a clear effort to link India
to the “clear and present danger to international peace” that war between India and
Pakistan would engender. Claiming that the floor of the House was not an appropriate
location to review the details of the crisis of how Pakistan sought to use force to
“reimpose its authority over its rebellious eastern province,” Morse focused on India as

153

the primary agent in a situation that, if it evolved into war, was the “greatest threat to
world peace since World War II” (Representative Morse (R-MA), 1971). Tellingly,
Morse made no reference to Indian democracy or to the victory of the Awami League in
democratic polls that initiated the crisis.
15

After the war, Nixon returned to highlighting Indian democracy in his public statements.
In his 1972 Third Annual Report to Congress on United States Foreign Policy, Nixon
described India as, “[a] great country, a free and democratic nation, in whose future as a
model of progress for the developing world the United States has invested its hopes and
resources” (Nixon, 1972, p. 296). Apparently, after months of refusing to characterize
India as a democracy, Nixon had returned to language symbolic of his frustration with the
public’s unwillingness to perceive aggressive democratic states as threats. Nixon also
attempted to draw the distinction Kissinger attempted earlier by differentiating between
India and Indian action. Nixon again referred to India’s democracy before stating that:

It makes no sense to assume, however, that a country’s democratic political
system…requires our automatic agreement with every aspect of its foreign policy. We
disagreed with specific Indian actions in November and December, and we said so.
(Nixon, 1972, p. 303)

Nixon’s message is clear. As fellow democracies, disagreements between India and the
United States may exist at the level of ‘policy,’ but that these disagreements do not mark
a more fundamental disagreement that would enable the United States to securitize India.

15
The Awami League was the main East Pakistan political party, controlling all but two (167 of 169) of the
East Pakistan seats in the Pakistan National Assembly and dominating the East Pakistan provincial
assembly.

154

The Bangladesh crisis was one such situation where the Nixon Administration simply
disagreed with a few ‘specific Indian actions.’ Nixon’s public position stands in stark
contrast with his private securitization of India. Behind closed doors, Nixon and
Kissinger constructed India as a significant security threat and they attempted to do so,
albeit tentatively, in public. They failed to do so, and reverted to language that would
minimize the negative political consequences of their policy. Nowhere does Nixon,
despite the revelations of the Anderson Papers, discuss the ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan or the
deployment of the Enterprise task group. Public democratic identity, it seems, forced
Nixon to disavow United States policy that he was critical in formulating.

Despite their efforts to securitize India, policymakers in the Nixon Administration
displayed an acute awareness of the difficulties facing any effort to convince the public.
In many cases, the problem of selling Administration policy to the public revolved
around the difficulty in convincing Americans that a fellow democracy could be a threat
to the United States.

There are indications that before the crisis policymakers were aware that public did not
perceive democracies as threats and did perceive nondemocracies as threats (United
States Embassy to Pakistan, 1969).
16
In discussions with Pakistani President Yahya in

16
According to a dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, when Pakistani Admiral Syed Mohammad
Ahsan (then Deputy Martial Law Administrator in Pakistan) paid a visit to Undersecretary of State Elliot
Richardson the “Under secretary said US view of problems sometimes result of reaction, or even over-
reaction, to earlier lessons. Experience with Hitler and Mussolini have left unfavorable image authoritarian
regimes. He believed US understood fact that sometimes military regimes necessary and constructive; but
how to judge when constructive, and having judged, how to communicate judgment, is difficult. Public
and Congressional opinion this subject must be taken into account, e .g ., Reuss Amendment which limits

155

1969 (after the imposition of martial law), Secretary of State Rogers indicated that while
the Administration was sympathetic to the Pakistani position the imposition of martial
law “presented problems for some in the U.S.” (United States Embassy to Iran, 1969).
Later that year during the Nixon visit to India, Kissinger also acknowledged “the strong
feeling of many Americans for India,” linking this feeling with his opinion that
“American liberals had oversold Indian democracy” (Saunders, 1969c). Interestingly, the
problem for Kissinger was the overemphasis on Indian democracy by political opponents
of the Nixon Administration, engendering a favorable perception within the public that
hindered the ability of the Nixon Administration to act, ostensibly, according to U.S.
interests as perceived by the White House. Nixon, in broaching the idea that Pakistan
might serve as an intermediary between the United State and China, mentioned “a
psychosis in this country about India” (United States Office of the President, 1970a).
While Nixon did not explain why such a ‘psychosis’ exists, it seems reasonable to
conclude that India’s democratic identity played a significant role. Similarly, Nixon
complained in November 1971 to the Pakistan Foreign Minister that public opinion was
strongly in favor of India:

I have indeed. Let me say that the President [Yahya] is a good friend to me. He is a
good friend to Kissinger. I—let me be quite candid with you. As I told your former
ambassador, and as the President knows, there’s a huge public relations campaign here.
Many of our friends in the other party, and including, I must say, some of the nuts in our

foreign military sales when sales would have affect of arming military dictators who are denying social
progress to their own people” (United States Embassy to Pakistan, 1969). Richardson seems to indicate
that while U.S. political leaders were willing to deal with, and even encourage, military regimes, the
American public was far less accommodating.

156

own party—soft heads–have jumped on it, have completely bought the Indian line. And
India has a very great propaganda line. And if you read our press, I mean, you get the
whole impression that India’s completely right. (United States Department of State,
1971d)

Again, while Nixon does not indicate why he believes the public strongly favors the India
in the crisis, the fact that Republicans fell in with the consensus seems to indicate that
public support was both broad and deep.
17

In conversation with Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell, Nixon highlighted
the impact of democratic identity on threat perception:

[Y]ou see this is where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they said that
if aggression is engaged in by a democracy it’s all right. But where it’s engaged in by a
dictatorship, it’s wrong…then they say but India is a democratic country, and Pakistan is
a totalitarian country, a dictatorship, and therefore India—we shouldn’t be on the side of
a dictatorship but on the side of the democratic country. (United States Department of
State, 1971a)

In discussions regarding moving an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal, Kissinger
expressed some concern regarding public backlash:

Kissinger: Secondly, we should move the helicopter ship. I’m not so much in favor of
moving the carrier. We’d have to do a helicopter ship and some escorts into the Bay of
Bengal. And claim that they’re for evacuation. Thirdly, on the Jordanian—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Well, it shows we are—not on the Indians but on the Russians—
Nixon: Why the carrier?
Kissinger: Well because I think once the news of that hits there’ll be so many people
screaming we’re [there] for intervention. And then we have to explain what we will
never do.

17
Nixon does mention Indian propaganda, but does not elaborate. On its own, propaganda is an
insufficient explanation; propaganda needs to tie into an ideological base in order to be effective.

157

Nixon: [unclear] we did—you know that we did the whole damn Turkey thing [unclear]
for the purposes of being able to evacuate Americans. You remember?
Kissinger: Yeah, but in—
Nixon: Can’t play this game here. Is that correct?
Kissinger: I would be reluctant—you know you should [unclear—consider?] both
courses. From the Chinese angle I’d like to move the carrier. From the public opinion
angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up
there I—
Nixon: What, why—can’t the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation?
Kissinger: Yeah, but against whom are we going to use the planes? Against whom are
we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in?
Nixon: So what do we move? Move a little helicopter ship in there? What good does
that do? And why do it?
Kissinger: Well it’s a token that something else will come afterward. Gets our presence
established there. (Emphasis mine) (United States Department of State, 1971h).

Clearly, public refusal to securitize India was strong enough to cause Kissinger to harbor
concerns about the possible backlash should the U.S. move to threaten India.

There are indications that within the Nixon Administration, Nixon and Kissinger’s
assessment of the Bangladesh crisis and their policy of siding with a military
authoritarian government against democratic India were not universally accepted.
Columnist Jack Anderson, in discussing how he received internal government documents
on Administration policy during the crisis, highlighted the dissonance confronting some
in the Administration:

During the India-Pakistan war, one of my sources told me we were bungling. Here was a
conflict between a military dictatorship and the world’s second [sic] largest democracy,
and whose side did we—the largest democracy—come out on? The dictatorship.
(Rosenthal, 1972)
18

18
It is odd that Anderson refers to India as the second largest democracy when India’s population in 1971
far outstripped that of the United States, making the United States the world’s second largest democracy.

158
The comment of Anderson’s source suggests that the operative hypothesis of this
dissertation, that democratic identity influences threat perception and construction that in
turn limits the security options of leaders in democracies, has strong explanatory
potential.

Nixon’s efforts to securitize India did not go unchallenged. In Congress, critics of the
Administration pushed back. Senators Kennedy (D-MA) and Muskie (D-MN) disputed
Nixon’s assignment of blame to India and focused on Pakistan as the primary problem
(Gwertzman, 1971d). Kennedy, in rejecting the Administration’s policy and efforts to
characterize India as the aggressor, dated the start of the crisis to Yahya’s crackdown on
the Awami League in March and linked West Pakistani military efforts in the east,
particularly the treatment of minorities, to Nazi Germany. Kennedy argued that Pakistan,
with the “military regime’s brutal repression of democracy,” and “jail[ing] of a political
leader whose only crime was the winning of a free election,” posed the real threat.
Kennedy also desecuritized India, arguing that the refugees generated by Yahya’s policy
threatened the “economic stability and well-being of the world’s largest democracy.”
Kennedy contrasted Nixon’s efforts to open up China to his Administration’s apparent
willingness to “alienate one-sixth of mankind in India—a democratic nation with whom
we have had years of productive relations” (Senator Kennedy (MA), 1971). Kennedy
also drew a parallel between Indian actions in East Pakistan and U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. The linkage between threat and democracy is clear in Kennedy’s statements.
West Pakistan and President Yahya, through their aggression against democracy

159
embodied in the repression in East Pakistan, posed the real threat to world peace and U.S.
interests. Democratic India, victimized in the crisis and patient and reasonable in its
response, posed no threat to the United States and indeed was working in America’s
interests.

Senator George McGovern (D-SD), then a presidential candidate for the Democratic
Party, claimed that India’s action in Bangladesh was justified and that West Pakistan had
provoked the invasion (New York Times, 1971d). Senator Fred Harris (D-OK)
excoriated Nixon’s policy towards the crisis and—drawing on Anthony Lewis’ New
York Times article—argued that, while India could be difficult to deal with at times, it
was still “the largest nation in the world following our notions of political freedom.”
Harris also argued for Congressional investigation of Nixon’s policy toward the crisis,
suggesting that political benefits for the political opposition could be had from Nixon’s
policy (Senator Harris (D-OK), 1971).

Senator Frank Church (D-ID) also pushed back against Nixon’s policy and rhetoric. In
discussing the crisis, Church emphasized that West Pakistan, not India bore the brunt of
the blame for the situation. Not only had West Pakistan imposed massive suffering—
which Church detailed—but it had done so in response to elections. Church quoted one
East Pakistani to exemplify his claim against Pakistan: “We voted for freedom; we were
the majority in the whole country, East and west. We voted for freedom and we were
killed.” Church rejected the Nixon Administration’s labeling of India as an aggressor and

160

argued that India’s position was “consistent with our [U.S.] ideals” and that “there is a
large measure of justice in India’s cause.” Church also cited India as the “only major
democracy on the continent of Asia,” and paralleled India’s involvement in East Pakistan
with American involvement in South Vietnam—making it extremely difficult to argue for
the securitization of India since India reflected the United States both in form—
democracy and values—and function—involvement in another state to facilitate self-
determination (Senator Church (D-ID), 1971).

Representative Cornelius Gallagher (D-NJ) was even more explicit in invoking Indian
democracy to delegitimize Nixon’s approach.
19
Like other legislators, Gallagher argued
that West Pakistan, through its brutal military action in the East, had created the situation
and placed India in an untenable position vis-à-vis the refugees the action generated.
Where Gallagher differed was his explicit appeal to Indian democracy as a critical factor
in U.S.-India relations and a very nearly explicit reference to the importance of
democratic identity in determining policy:

And we must never forget that India is the largest country in the world with a democratic
tradition. Prime Minister Gandhi’s electoral victory gave her nation new hope and new
faith in India’s hard-won traditions of democracy. Would it not then be wise for America
to be very careful in its dealings with India? For the sake of our own oft-expressed
traditions, should we not be disposed to consider India’s position with sympathy and
understanding? (Representative Gallagher (D-NJ), 1971)

19
Gallagher was chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee.

161

The media, particularly the New York Times as a central media vehicle covering the
crisis, also pushed back against the Nixon/Kissinger rhetoric.
20
In an October editorial,
the New York Times argued that India had acted with “remarkable restraint” given the
tremendous economic and physical toll of the refugees fleeing Pakistani military action as
well as the “shocking attack on Indian sensibilities” that accompanied the targeting of
Hindus in the East Pakistan action. In advising Nixon the author specifically identified
India’s “democratic achievements” (Brown, 1971). In a similar vein, a report on
Gandhi’s visit to the United States contrasted her as the “head of the world’s largest
democracy” against Nixon’s “like” of “martial” Pakistani leaders. The reactions of
Indian and American governments were contrasted as well. Gandhi described the
situation in “East Bengal” not as “civil war,” but a “punishment of civilians…it is a
cynical way of getting rid of one’s opponents.” The U.S. approach emphasized
geopolitics, focusing on maintaining a unified Pakistan out of concern that breakup
would “throw President Yahya into the arms of Peking.” The bloodletting in the future
state of Bangladesh “has been viewed here [Washington] more in sorrow than in anger.
There is virtually no moral indignation evident among policymakers.” The wording of
the article suggests that, in their concern for the situation in East Pakistan, Indian leaders
evinced a more democratic values oriented worldview than that of the Nixon
Administration. Indeed, the article reports that one of the chief complaints of the Nixon
Administration is that India talked too much of democracy (Welles, 1971a).

20
Members of Congress regularly cite the New York Times on the crisis, suggesting that it was a primary
media vehicle for coverage. While it is true that the New York Times is seen as a ‘liberal’ newspaper,
political leaders from both parties cited the Times.

162
A letter to the editor published in the New York Times highlighted the democracy versus
authoritarianism aspect of the conflict:

I am sure that in the present civil war in East Pakistan the sympathies of all freedom-
loving peoples of the world lie with the Bengalis in the region...The fact that in the first
free elections held since the country’s formation 23 years ago the Awami League party of
East Pakistan won an absolute majority in the ruling body only adds insult to injury.
(Gajwani, 1971)

The letter writer keys to the issue of democracy and the transgression against the ideal as
the critical source of sympathy for Western audiences as well as a fundamental sin of the
West Pakistan government.

A New York Times editorial emphasized the democratic nature of India while pushing
the Nixon Administration to raise the level of economic aid to India (New York Times,
1971b). Similarly, a later New York Times article emphasized the democratic credentials
of the victims of West Pakistani aggression while arguing that the United States was well
placed to “support democratic and peaceful development in Pakistan.” The editorial
continued, laying the groundwork for a potential securitization discourse with respect to
Pakistan: “Continued blind backing for the military regime in Islamabad can only lead to
disaster for this country’s substantial interests in the Indian subcontinent” (New York
Times, 1971c). The role of democracy in both identifying the victims and determining a
peaceful future for Pakistan is strong within the argument. Additionally, the
characterization of West Pakistan’s government as a military regime in the identification
of threat to U.S. interests supports an interpretation that, at least of the New York Times

163

editorial board, democracy is perceived as non-threatening while nondemocracy is
viewed to be at the core of a possible threat. This framing was present in an editorial
reaction to the shipment of military equipment to Pakistan despite indications from both
the State and Defense Departments that the military aid program had been suspended and
was under review. The United States, by supporting the Pakistani military, was “abetting
an act of repression that is not only morally repugnant but which constitutes a serious
threat to this country’s own long-term interest in peace and democratic development on
the Indian subcontinent” (New York Times, 1971a).

Anthony Lewis’ December 6 editorial repudiated the Nixon approach, castigating the
Administration for blaming India for the crisis and comparing Yahya, with qualifications,
to Adolph Hitler.
21
Democracy played an important role in Lewis’ forceful critique.
Yahya was using force to “wipe out the result of the [1970] election by force” because
the “largest number of seats was won, democratically, by a Bengali party that favored
effective self-government for East Pakistan.” In dismissing the Administration’s efforts
to blame India, Lewis highlighted the fundamental argument of this dissertation, and why
securitization of India was seen to be wrong:

American policy toward the Indian subcontinent is as much of a disaster by standards of
hard-nosed common sense as of compassion. India may be annoying and difficult, but
she does happen to be the largest nation in the world following our notions of political
freedom. (Lewis, 1971)

21
Lewis compared the anonymous State Department official that blamed India to the scheming and
duplicitous antagonist in David Copperfield: “The anonymous state department official who made the
comment matched Uriah Heep in sheer oleaginous cynicism about the facts of the situation and about our
own moral position” (Lewis, 1971).

164

An indication of the power of Lewis’ argument lies in the frequency with which members
of Congress, addressing the crisis and U.S. policy, cited it and requested inclusion in the
Congressional record.

Public response
Direct evidence of public acceptance or rejection of the Nixon/Kissinger securitization
argument is sparse. Part of this scarcity no doubt arises from the timeframe of the early
1970’s, but other factors play a role as well. Nixon and Kissinger, while demonstrating
significant concern about the crisis behind closed doors, were reticent to discuss the
matter in public. The relative secrecy cloaking the Enterprise policy exemplifies the
Nixonian approach. Nixon and Kissinger’s preference for avoiding public discussion on
the matter suggests self-censorship. There were no compelling geostrategic reasons for
secrecy; indeed, challenging a perceived Soviet proxy publicly would be in keeping with
longstanding and future U.S. policy (North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan).
On balance, from Nixon’s point of view, there were good reasons to adopt a more public
approach to the situation. Pakistan was a long standing, if neglected, American ally.
Pakistan was also the primary—although not only—conduit for negotiations with China.
In August, India signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Nixon and
Kissinger’s self-censorship and policy secrecy suggests that they felt, strongly, that they
would be unable to make a compelling case for securitizing India to the public. The
evidence above suggests that indeed this was the case. Consequently, public perception

165

of the situation was low because key policymakers refused to make it an issue of public
debate. A second possible factor was the ongoing war in Vietnam. In the New York
Times, for example, coverage of Vietnam outnumbered coverage of India’s role in the
Bangladesh crisis by a ratio of almost 3 to 1 over the 11 months between March 1, 1971
and February 1, 1972.
22
In the Washington Post, the ratio was even stronger at nearly 7
to 1.
23
Clearly, Vietnam occupied a dominant position in terms of media coverage and as
a result was the central foreign policy concern for the public.

In combination, these factors had the effect of depressing public attention to the
Bangladesh crisis. Consequently, polling on the matter was highly limited.
24
The only
public opinion survey on the crisis occurred after the war had concluded.
25
When
questioned as to which country engendered more sympathy neither India nor Pakistan

22
A search (keyword India AND NOT ad; there seem to be a number of advertisements for an Indian
restaurant and cabernet that the ‘ad’ keyword filters) of the New York Times for the period produced 2035
articles, including news summaries, referencing India—although not necessarily in the context of the crisis,
as India held elections during the period. A similar search for articles on Vietnam (the keyword search is
only for Vietnam—many if not all of the advertisements dealt with the conflict in Vietnam, e.g. a campaign
ad for Democratic Presidential nominee George McGovern highlighting his anti-war position or a
“Principles of Joint Treaty of Peace” full page ad taken out by People’s Peace Treaty) produced 5859
articles, including news summaries, referencing Vietnam. While undoubtedly some of the articles in both
searches are theoretically irrelevant—coverage of Indian sports for example—the point that Vietnam
carried far more media and policy weight in the public’s eyes is still relevant.

23
India coverage was 652 while Vietnam’s coverage was 4542.

24
It is difficult to measure the acceptance by the public of the security construction of India presented by
policymakers. To a certain extent, the focus on policymaker securitization accepts the assumption that, as
politicians, these actors are intimately aware of what policies and justifications they can, or cannot, ‘sell’ to
the public. Public opinion polling should offer some insight on the issue, but as will become clear shortly,
polling data requires at least as much interpretation as political speech and is critically dependent on both
the content and the manner in which questions are asked (Moore, 2004).

25
All public opinion polling questions can be found in the bibliography.

166

fared very well.
26
An overwhelming number of respondents (63%) indicated that they
had no preference between the two countries (Louis Harris and Associates, 1972b).
27

Given the foreign policy context these results are not surprising. The fact that a dominant
majority of the respondents had no preference—perhaps indicative of a basic lack of
opinion—reflects the relatively low media priority of the crisis, the dominance of
Vietnam, and the secrecy of the Nixon Administration. In this context, the small
preference for Pakistan in the poll, while not surprising given the Nixon Administration’s
efforts to securitize India, is not likely indicative of general public reaction. The public
simply did not engage deeply on the issue because they were not asked or forced to do so.
A different question in the same poll as to opinions on Nixon’s handling of the crisis also
indicates a high level of disengagement within the public. On that question, nearly a
quarter of the respondents (24%) were not sure as to their opinion on Nixon’s handling of
the war. Similarly, roughly a quarter of respondents held a poor, only fair, and pretty
good (23%, 25%, 23% respectively) opinion of Nixon’s efforts (Louis Harris and
Associates, 1972a). Since the question and the responses give no indication of whether
the respondents thought Nixon had been too hard on India, the question only serves to
support the claim here that public engagement on the issue was minimal. More
importantly, securitization did not take place.

26
Fourteen percent of the respondents felt sympathetic towards India while 23% felt sympathetic towards
Pakistan.

27
Making of the 63 percent of respondents were those who felt sympathy for neither country (27% of the
overall response), both countries (4% of the overall response), or were not sure (32% of the overall
response).

167

Other polls from the same time offer at best indirect evidence on how the public
perceived India. A majority (65%) of respondents identified Indira Gandhi as a person
whom they respected a great deal (41%) or somewhat (24%). Only 4 percent indicated
they had no respect for her at all (Louis Harris and Associates, 1971).
28
In keeping with
the other polls, a large number of respondents (31%) either had never heard of her or
were unsure. The large percentage of respect accorded Gandhi is particularly striking
given that India had signed its treaty of friendship with the USSR two months prior to the
poll. While respect does not translate into amity or affection, the poll does indicate that
something, possibly India’s shared democracy, helped to keep Gandhi in Americans’
good graces even after a treaty with the Soviets. Another poll, positing a hypothetical
situation of a communist attack against India, also presents indirect but supportive
evidence. A plurality of the respondents (48%) indicated they would send troops (8%) or
material support (40%). A smaller number (38%) indicated they would refuse to get
involved (Gallup Organization, 1971). What is striking about this poll is not the ‘no
involvement’ rate; that would be expected to be sizable in light of the contentiousness
and lack of popularity the war in Vietnam suffered from during its final years. The poll
was, in effect, asking Americans if they would be willing to venture money and/or
manpower for a similar war. Given that context, the high willingness to get involved is
noteworthy. Again, there is no indication as to why a near majority of the respondents
were willing to engage in another war while still fighting an unpopular one, making
conclusions as to the rationales behind public support speculative, but shared democratic

28
It should be noted that the sample was strongly skewed towards women. Out of a 4,000 person sample,
3,000 were women.

168
identity, and the common security construction that attends that identity, may have played
a role.

Another indication that securitization was unsuccessful was the striking silence of the
Nixon Administration with respect to the move of the carrier task group Enterprise to the
Bay of Bengal. The aggressive move was eventually justified through an appeal to the
need to evacuate U.S. citizens from East Pakistan, but the Administration did little to
publically publicize or explain the maneuver (H. Smith, 1971). Indeed, on the December
15, Indian Ambassador to the United States Jha could not cite official U.S. comments on
the Enterprise maneuver, instead referring to “a reliable source” (Naughton, 1971). After
the carrier group movement toward India had been firmly established, the U.S.
government still refused to comment, leaving the explanation of the purpose of the
movement to unidentified sources. These sources claimed that the U.S. purpose was
political and humanitarian, to pressure India and the Soviet Union to prevent further
escalation of the conflict and to evacuate U.S. citizens (Szulc, 1971). Once again, U.S.
policymakers linked India with the Soviet Union. More interesting though is the fact that
the Nixon Administration refused to publicly justify what is clearly a military move.
This may be an indicator that, knowing efforts to securitize India were unsuccessful,
Nixon sought to pressure India without having to mount an embarrassing climb down
after it became apparent that the U.S. public and Congress would not support military
involvement. Had securitization of India been successful, the Administration would
likely have been far more forthcoming regarding the deployment of U.S. military assets.

169
The military purpose of the Enterprise deployment only came to public light after the war
had ended and columnist Jack Anderson, through his syndicated column, revealed
sensitive documents outlining Administration policy and thinking. While Anderson’s
revelations do not contend that the Nixon Administration intended to use force against
India, they do highlight the passive aggressive nature of the Enterprise policy and belie
the public explanations for the carrier group’s movement. The evacuation explanation
was a cover story, a justification rather than rationale. Clearly, by opting for the ‘covert’
use of force, the Nixon Administration felt that its efforts to securitize India had been
unsuccessful (Welles, 1972).
Conclusions
Given the lack of public engagement on the crisis, is it fair to say that the democratic
identity of the public was a factor in the construction of the security issue? I argue that
while the public did not actively engage on the issue, this case does support the general
hypothesis of the dissertation. Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger perceived India as a threat to
United States interests in the region and globally. Indeed, one of the critiques of Nixon’s
policy is that it embedded what should have been a regional affair into the broader
geostrategic security context. If Nixon and Kissinger perceived India as a threat, the
question becomes, why did they act as they did, keeping a low policy profile and
minimizing public exposure? There is evidence that their effort to securitize India was
incurring a significant domestic political cost, particularly in Congress. The ability of
members of Congress to impose political costs on the President as a result of his policy
choices stems from the policy preferences, implicit or explicit, of the public. Policies that

170
run against the preferences of the public engender political costs, those that do not
produce political gains. The fact that the public, as evidenced by the opinion polling, did
not engage strongly on the issue indicates that policy preferences were implicit. Nixon’s
securitization efforts were half-hearted because he and Kissinger believed that ultimately
they would not be successful. They said as much themselves, noting public affection for
India and the willingness of the public to ignore the aggression of other democracies.
Left unsaid, of course, was that the aggression by democratic India was against autocratic
Pakistan. In this case, the expected public reaction, linked to preferences arising out of
democratic identity, stayed the hand of the Nixon Administration. While there are not
indications that Nixon and Kissinger would have actually used force against India, there
is clear evidence that public backlash against their preferred policies restrained Nixon and
Kissinger and that the public’s unwillingness to support those policies is tied to shared
democracy.

171

Chapter 5 | The Nuclear Issue: India, the Bomb, and American
Securitization.
Historical overview and literature
On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first nuclear explosion test at its Pokhran test site.
Code named “Smiling Buddha,” and labeled a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) rather
than a nuclear weapons test.
1
The Indian policy and test took the United States by
surprise (New York Times, 1974f; Reston, 1974). The test was the product of a decision,
made two years previous, by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to manufacture and test a
nuclear device based on existing designs. After the test, India’s nuclear program
remained quiescent until 1998, when India officially tested a nuclear weapon, prompting
a nuclear response from Pakistan (Burns, 1998a). The Clinton Administration imposed
sanctions on both countries, although, at least in the case of India, many of these
sanctions were removed relatively quickly. Following on from intentions declared in
2005 (Bush & Singh, 2005), in March, 2006, President George Bush announced a
controversial agreement to supply India with advanced civilian nuclear technology
(Bumiller & Sengupta, 2006). These three cases, the 1971 PNE, the 1998 nuclear
weapons test, and the 2006 nuclear deal comprise the central empirical focus of this
section.

1
After the test, officials at the site, unable to use a secured hotline, conveyed the success of the test to
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi over an unsecured phone line by reporting that “the Buddha has smiled”
(Talbott, 2004, p. 14). Interestingly, discussions of the event rarely use the code name (Burns, 2007;
Susanna, 2002).

172
How does India’s nuclear program provide a test of theory? In 1974, it was yet another
move by a state Nixon and Kissinger perceived, at least in 1971, to be a threat to U.S.
interests. The PNE demonstrated conclusive dominance of the subcontinent by India
(New York Times, 1974f; Weinraub, 1974a), a state which was also a bound to the Soviet
Union by their joint 1971 Friendship Treaty. Nuclear weapons are also, in the context of
their massive destructive capabilities, easily securitized. Indeed, since the development
of nuclear weapons, the onus has arguably been on political leaders to justify why they
are not a security issue rather than justify their securitization. Public opinion polls
regularly rate the spread of nuclear weapons as a top foreign policy concern. In this
context, India’s development of nuclear weapons provides a good opportunity to explore
a potential security issue that U.S. policymakers did not securitize, and in particular how
U.S. policymakers argued that, while the development of nuclear weapons in other states
were constructed as a threat to the United States (e.g. Iran, North Korea), India’s nuclear
program did not.

Perhaps in part because of the prominence in both academic and public circles of nuclear
weapons and proliferation in general, significant academic attention has been paid to
India’s nuclear program. There is certainly significant levels of policy-oriented work
examining the impact of Indian nuclear policy on global non-proliferation efforts or
prescribing optimal U.S. policy (Carter, 2006; Ganguly & Mistry, 2006; Levy &
Ferguson, 2006; Perkovich, 1998, 2002; Schaffer, 2002). Another set of literature
focuses on explaining Indian nuclear policy choices (Ganguly, 1999; Kinsella & Chima,

173
2001; Marwah, 1977; Mehta, 1998; Sagan, 1996; Walker, 1998). However, more in line
with the literature on the 1971 ‘near miss,’ little of the work in these literatures examines
the why and how of U.S. security policy towards India and its nuclear program.

As was the case with research on the events of 1971, constructivist work on U.S. nuclear
policy towards India is lacking. Strobe Talbott’s 1999 article suggests a constructivist
explanation behind U.S. policy, indicating that President Clinton saw the shared
democracy and entrepreneurial economies as the basis for a natural partnership (Talbott,
1999). However, Talbott does not pursue the approach, instead moving onto a
generalized historical discussion of nonproliferation efforts, arguments against Indian
NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty complaints, speculation on Indian policy
motivations, and examining the geostrategic situation in South Asia. Other than a
relatively brief discussion of U.S. efforts to mediate the Indo-Pakistani relationship,
Talbott leaves aside U.S. policy towards India.

Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna also explore the Indo-American relationship
(Ollapally & Ramanna, 1995). In line with the commentary on the role of these cases in
testing the theory presented in this dissertation, Ollapally and Ramanna note at the outset
that nuclear proliferation serves to impair Indo-American relations. From there, the
authors discuss U.S. India nuclear relations exclusively in terms of the countries’
geopolitical and military strategies and visions and the incompatibility between them. No
attention is paid to how policy is constructed in these two democracies. As is of often the

174
case with efforts to address strategic issues, policy is assumed fully formed. William
Potter’s brief article on the Indo-American nuclear technology agreement does address to
a small degree how the U.S. nuclear policy was formulated—top down policy
proclamation rather than a standard process of bureaucratic policymaking—but does not
explore the issue of policy justification and is largely concerned with the ramifications
for proliferation control (Potter, 2005).
1974 PNE
As discussed above, India’s 1974 PNE was potentially a significant security challenge to
the United States. While India clearly attempted to frame the test in a nonthreatening
manner, terming the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion experiment,” few observers
accepted that framing (Weinraub, 1974a). In fact, a State Department memo issued
immediately after the event noted long-standing U.S. policy that made no distinction
between a peaceful nuclear explosion and a nuclear weapons test (Rush, 1974).

Remarkably, given this context, the Nixon administration made a concerted effort not to
securitize India’s PNE. When the explosion took place, Kissinger’s reaction was muted.
Internal State Department memorandum reference the Department’s “low-key” response
guidance when dealing with the press (Rush, 1974). State Department bureaucrats
prepared a sharp criticism of the PNE, but Kissinger rejected it, stating that “public
scolding would not undo the event, but only add to U.S.-Indian bilateral problems and
reduce the influence Washington might have on India’s future nuclear policy”
(Perkovich, 2002, pp. 183-184). Kissinger instead made a more neutral statement. In a

175
meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed shortly after the PNE, Nixon
emphasized dialogue with India over forceful confrontation despite a litany of security
concerns raised by Ahmed, many of them focused on the cooperation between India and
the USSR (United States Department of State, 1974a). In a separate meeting with
Ahmed, Kissinger made it very clear that while the U.S. could make security guarantees
vis-à-vis the Soviets, no such guarantees could be made with respect to India (United
States Department of State, 1974b). In fact, the most remarkable aspect of the
Nixon/Kissinger approach towards the 1974 PNE was their steadfast refusal to securitize
the issue. In a July memo to then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Nixon
refused to address at any level Pakistani security concerns regarding India (United States
Department of State, 1974c). In September of that year, Secretary of State Kissinger
failed to single out India in an address to the UN on nuclear proliferation (Gwertzman,
1974).

The public construction of the issue reflected the Nixon Administration’s internal
position, in contrast to the events of 1971. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, a
State Department spokesman did attempt to link India’s nuclear blast to a threat to world
stability while other officials suggested that the explosion could ‘disrupt’ Indo-American
relations (Los Angeles Times, 1974; The Washington Post, 1974a). However, as late as
May 22, the New York Times reported the Nixon Administration as silent on the test
(Weinraub, 1974b). In early June, Kissinger argued that India’s nuclear explosion had

176
not changed the balance of power on the Indian subcontinent, ostensibly owing to India’s
limited resources (Gelb, 1974).

The lack of securitization of India’s nuclear efforts is exemplified by the willingness of
the Nixon Administration to rejoin in mid-June a World Bank consortium aid program to
India for the first time since aid was suspended in 1971 (Farnsworth, 1974). The
consortium did not ignore India’s nuclear blast—the Indian representative was asked to
make a statement on the PNE—but clearly the West and the United States in particular
did not view India’s nuclear program as a significant threat.

In July, at an embassy dinner, Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized traditions shared
between the United States and India as a factor in dealing with India’s nuclear explosion:

We have shared many traditions together…we have shared traditions and now we share a
new tradition. This has given rise to doubts in some quarters but I am confident we can
solve it constructively. (McCardle, 1974).

While Kissinger does not refer directly to shared democracy, there can be little doubt that
democracy is one of the primary “shared traditions” to which Kissinger first refers. The
new tradition, nuclear weapons, fits into, and is constrained by, the broader web of shared
traditions—democracy—and these shared traditions enable the constructive resolution of
the problems raised by India’s nuclear test.

177

In a major speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger,
while highlighting the spread of nuclear weapons as a serious threat, claiming that
“nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible whether through design, or miscalculation,
accident, theft, or blackmail,” he refused to single out India by name (Gwertzman, 1974).
Nuclear weapons proliferation was a major theme of the speech, but the possible threat
posed by India was not.

During the first high level meetings between the U.S. and Indian governments since the
nuclear explosion, Kissinger claimed that India had “a special role of leadership in South
Asian and in world affairs,” and that a powerful India would benefit world peace: “there
is no reason to fear a powerful and strong India, and still less reason to prevent it from
being so” (New York Times, 1974c). That these comments came in the wake of
Kissinger’s focus on nuclear weapons proliferation in his UN speech and further
comments while in India highlighting nuclear weapons proliferation as a major threat to
peace exemplifies the effort the Nixon and Ford Administrations were making to
securitize nuclear weapons proliferation while desecuritizing Indian nuclear policy.
2

By September, 1974, the United States agreed to resume shipment of uranium to India in
return for guarantees that the Indian nuclear program would not use plutonium generated
by the use of U.S. fuel for nuclear explosions (The Washington Post, 1974b).

2
During his trip to India, Kissinger claimed that “A world in which an ever increasing number of nations
possess nuclear weapons vastly magnifies the risks of both regional and global conflict” (New York Times,
1974c).

178
In October, less than a year after India’s nuclear explosion, Secretary of State Kissinger
promised new food aid to India and claimed the visit had established “a mature and good
basis for the future relationship between the two countries.” A joint communiqué issued
during the visit emphasized the “broadening” nature of Indo-American relations
(Weinraub, 1974c). Kissinger also, for the first time, accepted and praised India’s non-
alignment policy (Marder, 1974). Securitizing India seemed far outside Kissinger’s
policy options despite proliferation concerns. Notable, however, is the general absence
of democracy rhetoric. With the possible exception of Kissinger’s July embassy dinner,
the shared democratic tradition of the United States and India remained unmentioned.
While official attention to the PNE was quite limited, the absence of democracy rhetoric
is out of line with the expectations generated by the theoretical model of this dissertation,
a point I will return to in the conclusion to this section.

What security reaction there was to the India test overwhelmingly focused on
proliferation generally, not on a potential threat posed by India’s ability to manufacture
nuclear devices (Cowan, 1974; Middleton, 1974; Morgan, 1974; O'Toole, 1974). In his
syndicated column, Marquis Childs argued that the Indian PNE was “shattering,” for the
“long range survival of mankind,” breaking the “fragile barrier,” of the NPT (Childs,
1974). Once again, when India poses a threat, it is not directly to the United States but to
the control of proliferation. Here proliferation—aided by India’s nuclear test—is the
fundamental threat. One news analysis pointedly claimed India’s nuclear development
reframed India’s international image as “less pitiful” without putting India into the

179

category of “menacing” (Simons, 1974). In the U.S. context, the Nixon Administration
and Kissinger in particular were focused on events in the Middle East—specifically
brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights (Gelb, 1974). A
significant reason for Nixon’s focus on the Middle East was his tenuous political position
at home. India’s PNE took place during the heart of the Watergate investigations, and
Nixon would resign from the presidency on August 9, 1974—less than three months after
Smiling Buddha. A breakthrough on the Golan Heights issue, it was hoped, would ease
some of the domestic pressure, or at least cement Nixon’s foreign policy legacy.

The editors of the New York Times did frame the blast in security terms. The editorial
clearly constructed the test in security terms, indicating that, “the military significance of
this nuclear breakthrough will not be lost on India’s neighbors-or others.”
3
The test, in
addition to inhibiting or reversing the “trend towards reconciliation in South Asia,”
marked “a dangerous move away from the world’s essential efforts to render a nuclear
holocaust impossible” (New York Times, 1974d). While the editors did single out India,
they also sought to broaden the burden of blame. The editors argued that India’ nuclear
efforts were a reflection of the failed promises of the U.S. and USSR to destroy their own
nuclear arsenals as promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In effect, the editors, by
using the India test as a rhetorical vehicle, were seeking to securitize global nuclear
policy. The while the editors clearly construct the test in security terms, the threat to the

3
A brief note on sources is in order. As was the case in 1971, the coverage of India’s PNE was vastly
disproportionate. The New York Times was dominant in its coverage at 192 articles on or mentioning the
explosion. The Washington Post and Los Angeles Times had roughly half the coverage of the Times. In
the Wall Street Journal, the explosion barely warranted a mention two days after the fact, and in all was
mentioned only 15 times in the subsequent year of news coverage.

180
United States and its citizens arises from nuclear weapons in general rather than Indian
nuclear weapons specifically. The India test provides a vehicle for the broader argument.

In another editorial, the New York Times argued that India’s nuclear test posed a threat to
the United States and the world, but not that India posed the threat directly. Instead, the
editors argued that by testing and widening the circle of nuclear states, India's nuclear
activities encourage possibly threatening states redouble their own nuclear efforts. The
real threat posed by India’s proliferation is not that India will use nuclear weapons, but
that India’s proliferation challenges the non-proliferation regime that keeps weapons out
of the hands of those that truly do pose a threat:

If nuclear weapons spread further—coming onto the hands of demagogic dictators and
even organizations of terrorists and criminals—dangerous instabilities will replace the
relatively stable nuclear balance that now exists. (New York Times, 1974b)

Implicit within this argument is the idea that Indian democracy differentiates India from
the states that pose a threat to global stability. The editors at the Times are not then
seeking to securitize India—it is not India that poses a threat—but instead they sought to
identify proliferation as the key security issue. Interestingly, the New York Times
editorial staff returned to the theme of shared democracy when they praised efforts by
Ford and Kissinger to reestablish normal relations—pointing out that “Asia’s most
populous democracy,” was an important “symbol of political freedom, maintained in the
face of economic poverty” (New York Times, 1974a).

181
Congressional reaction to the explosion was limited. Senator Edward Kennedy identified
nuclear proliferation as a threat to world peace, but laid the blame on United States
policy:

The real failure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons rests not with India, but with
the United States, with the Soviet Union, with France, with China, and with Britain.
(Senator Kennedy (D-MA), 1974).

Kennedy did not refer to Indian democracy, but he largely left India out of his threat
assessment. Kennedy’s larger purpose seemed to be pushing for a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty rather than detailing concern over the Indian PNE specifically. Along similar
lines, Representative Robert Price (R-TX) also focused on the threat of proliferation
rather than the threat of Indian nuclear weapons, and emphasized strengthened U.S.
support for the IAEA (Representative Price (R-TX), 1974).

More significant discussion of the PNE took place in the context of a debate over a bill
funding international development assistance (IDA). During the debate, Senator Harry F.
Byrd, Jr. (I-VA) complained that U.S. IDA enabled India to develop a nuclear capability
that posed a direct threat to the United States:

What it [IDA bill] does is permit countries like India to use her own resources to develop
a weapon that could plunge this country into chaos and eliminate the world by the
development and use of a nuclear weapon. (Senator Byrd (I-VA), 1974)

In a long response, Senator Humphrey (D-MN) desecuritized the Indian nuclear program
by contrasting it against the military and nuclear programs of the major powers.

182

Humphrey also made an implicit desecuritizing argument by appealing to Indian
democracy:

May I say, before I sit down, that India is still a democracy. China is not. The nations of
Southeast Asia are not. At least they still have elections in India. Of course, India has a
population of 550 million people. It gets into bad habits as it watches the United States,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France.
4
(Senator Humphrey (D-MN), 1974)

The argument is two fold. First, that India as a democracy poses less of a concern than
nondemocratic China and nondemocratic states in Southeast Asia. Second, India’s
behavior, in so far as it is problematic, can be traced directly back to the behavior of the
existing nuclear powers.

Public polling suggests that, as in 1971, the public did not see India as a threat. As is
typical of public opinion polling, no questions exist that directly speak to the focus of this
thesis, but there is some circumstantial evidence. In a 1975 poll, a majority of the
respondents (64%) expressed a desire to strengthen ties (22%) or continue Indo-
American relations as they were (42%). Only 19 percent felt the U.S. should lessen its
commitments to India (Roper Organization, 1975a). The poll, coming about six months
after the PNE and in the midst of efforts by the Ford Administration to improve ties with
India, suggests that the public did not construct India’s nuclear advancement as a threat.
The willingness of Americans to support and improve ties with India is remarkable in
light of expressed concerns over the role of nuclear weapons in the world generally. In
late 1973, nearly 70 percent of poll respondents felt nuclear weapons would be used

4
The bad habits reference here is to India’s nuclear test.

183
should another world war break out (Gallup Organization, 1973). In 1974, clear
majorities, often approaching 70%, felt that nuclear reactor sales and assistance should be
restricted to prominent democracies and established allies including Australia, Israel,
Japan, and West Germany (Louis Harris and Associates, 1974b). In the same poll, 78%
of respondents also expressed concern that “if too many countries get a nuclear
capability, some irresponsible country is bound to set off a bomb that could blow up the
earth in World War III” (Louis Harris and Associates, 1974a). A 1975 poll, emphasizing
the allocation of limited governmental resources, found that 86% of the respondents felt
the U.S. federal government should exert some (28%) or major (58%) effort to limit
nuclear weapons (Roper Organization, 1975b). Given these nuclear concerns, the
willingness of Americans to support Indo-American relations, while not direct evidence
on public perception and construction of India’s possible nuclear threat, does powerfully
suggest that India’s nuclear program, filtered through the lens of shared democracy, was
desecuritized.

While India’s 1974 PNE was commonly accepted to have moved India into the ranks of
the nuclear powers, Indira Gandhi’s government claimed at the time that the test was
purely for peaceful, research purposes and that India would not weaponize its nuclear
technology (Los Angeles Times, 1974). After the 1974 test, India’s nuclear program
receded into the policy shadows. There are indications that India’s political leaders were
surprised by the strength of the international political backlash, particularly from
Canada—one of India’s primary nuclear technology benefactors (Trumbull, 1974). The

184

international reaction pushed India’s nuclear efforts out of the public sphere. While
political leaders kept the nuclear (weapons) option open, nuclear development was secret
and no tests took place. Throughout the remainder of the 1970 and 1980’s, lack of
direction and bureaucratic infighting characterized India’s nuclear program while
political ambiguity and ambivalence surrounded it (Perkovich, 2002). Consequently,
India’s nuclear status, while important, was not a central concern of U.S. policy-makers.
5

In the 1990’s, India began efforts to restart its nuclear weapons program. The Clinton
Administration put significant pressure on the Indian government to prevent a nuclear
test. The victory of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had long
advertised a pro-nuclear weapons policy, in 1998 doomed Clinton Administration efforts
to prevent a nuclear test (Burns, 1998b; Talbott, 2004, pp. 26-27). On May 11, 1998, less
than two months after the BJP took office, India tested its first official nuclear weapon.
That the test took the U.S. government by surprise, including the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of State, testifies both to India’s low-key approach to its
nuclear program since 1974 and to America’s low prioritization of the issue to that point
(Talbott, 2004). These circumstances explain the structure of the case study here. There
is a large gap between the 1974 and 1998 tests because, quite simply, little was
happening.

5
Strobe Talbott perhaps best describes the lack of attention paid to India and its nuclear program: “When
the senior staff meeting ended, I returned to my office and settled behind the desk to read the New York
Times. I skimmed articles on the front page about the latest Arab-Israeli tensions and drug trafficking in
the Caribbean but skipped a feature article about India. That country could hardly have been further from
my mind. In government, it is often said, the urgent drives out the merely important. India—the world's
second most populous country, its largest democracy, and the most powerful country in a region that is
home to nearly a quarter of humanity—seemed permanently stuck in the latter category.” (emphasis mine)
(2004, p. 2)

185

The 1998 nuclear tests
President Bill Clinton’s reaction indicates the strength of the democratic lens for
constructing the security environment. The testing came after years of U.S. pressure on
India designed to avoid just such an event. Clinton was under no illusions regarding the
significance of the tests, saying that the tests, “were unjustified” and that they “clearly
create a dangerous new instability in their region,” as he declared the imposition of
sanctions. However, Clinton also sought to prevent U.S. sanctions policy from being
interpreted as the initial stage of securitization. He claimed he had “long supported
deepening the relations between the United States and India,” and, more importantly from
the perspective of the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation, highlighted
Indian democracy:

It simply is not necessary for a nation that will soon be the world’s most populous
nation—it already has the world’s largest middle class—that has 50 years of vibrant
democracy, a perfectly wonderful country, it is not necessary for them to manifest
national greatness by doing this. It is a terrible mistake.
6
(Clinton, 1999c)

Two points stand out in Clinton’s characterization of the situation. The first is his
recognition of Indian democracy. The second is his claim that the India test represented a
‘mistake’ by India, rather than a malicious, premeditated act. The combination
communicates to the audience that India, as a democracy, would not purposely act in a
threatening manner. Democracy plays a crucial role in desecuritizing India.

6
Interestingly from the point of view of this dissertation, after changing the subject to European integration
Clinton praised an “undivided democratic Europe at peace.”

186
During the same news conference, Clinton also directly addressed the motivation behind
his decision to assess sanctions. In response to a question about Indian nuclear
intentions, Clinton made it clear that sanctions were mandated by law (the Glenn
Amendment), not an assessment of threat by Clinton:

Well, I don’t know about my ability to influence them [India]. I just know what the
United States law requires, and it’s a very stiff sanctions law. It basically says, no more
aid. (emphasis mine) (Clinton, 1999c, p. 745)

The law, according to Clinton, left the executive “no discretion.” As for Indian
intentions, Clinton continued to emphasize non-security explanations for India’s nuclear
policy, claiming India tested nuclear weapons because it had been “underappreciated in
the world as a great power.” Even as Clinton punished India, he took great pains to keep
U.S. policy away from the realm of security, and democracy played a central role in that
effort.

Clinton made similar arguments three days later in a radio address to the U.S. public. In
that address, Clinton explained that, while the U.S. was imposing sanctions, India had
“the world’s largest middle class and 50 years of vibrant democracy to its credit”
(Clinton, 1999b, p. 769). Clinton argued that Indian democracy, among other factors,
was a fundamental reason for the U.S. and India to be “close friends and partners for the
21
st
century.” That same day, in a television interview, Clinton linked Indian democracy
to a desecuritized approach as he discussed how to move beyond the Indian nuclear tests:

187
And we have to go back to the Indians and say ‘Lets find a way to protect your security
and honor the greatness of your democracy without becoming a nuclear power. This is a
bad thing, but let’s minimize this.’” (Clinton, 1999a)

A week after the explosion, Clinton again emphasized India’s democratic credentials:

But, I can tell you that my view is we need, instead of saying we are not going to talk, we
are not going to go here, we are not going to go there, what we really need to think of is
you know Pakistan has been a good ally of ours, India has been arguably the most
successful democracy in history in the last 50 years because they have preserved the
democracy in the face of absolutely overwhelming diversity and difficulty and pressures
internal and external, and they can’t get along over Kashmir and they have some other
tensions, and then their neighbors sometimes turn up the tensions a little bit. We have got
to find a way out of this (emphasis mine). (Office of the Prime Minister, 1998)

The reaction is clearly one of dialogue and understanding rather than concern for
security. Of principal importance in characterizing India is its democratic nature.
Clinton furthers these sentiments a month later when he describes India as:

India is a very great nation, soon to be not only the world's most populous democracy
[ibid], but its most populous country. It is home to the world's largest middle class
already and a remarkable culture that taught the modern world the power of nonviolence.
For 50 years Pakistan has been a vibrant Islamic state, and is today a robust democracy.
It is important for the world to recognize the remarkable contributions both these
countries have made and will continue to make to the community of nations if they can
proceed along the path of peace. (Clinton, 1998)

What is important to note is Clinton’s language and how the potential Indian security
threat is desecuritized. Despite the fact that India had detonated a nuclear weapon in a
region well known for tension and instability, setting off a nuclear response by Pakistan,

188

Clinton’s focus is on highlighting and linking India’s democratic nature with a
desecuritized approach emphasizing dialogue and understanding.
7

Clinton was not alone in his focus on Indian democracy. Immediately after the test,
Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, seeking to redirect the securitization
focus towards China, challenged Clinton’s reaction by highlighting Indian democracy:
“Look how angry he [Clinton] is at a democracy and how tolerant he is of a dictatorship
[China]” (Bennet, 1998). A month after the nuclear tests, Senator Connie Mack (R-FL)
criticized what he perceived as Sino-centric U.S. foreign policy, arguing, “the United
States is helping the largest single-party authoritarian government in the world [China]
suppress the development of the largest democracy in the world [India].” The India-U.S.
relationship should be the focus of U.S. foreign policy according to Mack: “We have a
common bond with the Indian people based on a commitment to democracy, freedom,
and the rule of law.” Mack went on to defend India’s nuclear tests, arguing that India had
broken no international laws and that “India’s 50-year history demonstrates peaceful
intent exercised within a democratic society.” According to Mack, instability in the
region could be traced to Chinese proliferation and U.S. foreign policy that had been
broadly supportive of China. Mack carefully contrasts peaceful, democratic India against
expansive, oppressive, and aggressive China. The real threat for Mack was not an India

7
Exemplifying this desecuritized approach is a letter from Clinton to Congressional leaders that in part
dealt with the India nuclear issue: “Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have worked
unilaterally, and with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United Nations to dissuade India and
Pakistan from taking further steps toward creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join
multilateral arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms race and build confidence by
practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences through dialogue.” (Clinton,
2000:2023)

189
forced to remain outside the NPT and Test Ban treaty by the presence of an aggressive
nuclear-armed state on its border occupying Indian territory with claims on more. The
real threat to the United States for Mack was “internally oppressive and undemocratic”
China (Senator Mack (R-FL), 1998).

Some policymakers did attempt to securitize India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Republican chair
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms claimed India’s nuclear program
constituted “an emerging nuclear threat to the territory of the United States” (Bennet,
1998). In the House of Representatives, Dan Burton (R-IN), quoting newspaper reports
of health effects in villages near the nuclear testing, argued that government indifference
to suffering was an indicator of India’s “real warring intentions.” The area, Burton
argued, could “become the epicenter of a World War-III type nuclear conflict,” ostensibly
involving the United States. The key to India’s intentions for Burton is the apparently
undemocratic behavior of the government, ignoring the harmful effects of policy on the
public. Indeed, the impression Burton gives is that, through testing, the Indian
government willingly imposed such harm in the pursuit of a military luxury
(Representative Burton (R-IN), 1998). Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) responded forcefully
to the India test, calling for the U.S. government to “be prepared to exercise the full range
and depth of sanctions available under law.” Harkin drew a parallel between the India
nuclear test and the surprise Japanese attack on the U.S. navel station at Pearl Harbor in
1941, purposely paraphrasing Roosevelt in calling the day of India’s first tests “a day that
will live in infamy, for the Nation of India.” Harkin also referenced the weaponization of

190

India’s nuclear capabilities twice in an 1800 word speech (Senator Harkin (D-IA), 1998).
The references to Pearl Harbor and weaponization are an effort by Harkin to construct the
Indian nuclear tests as a threat to U.S. security.

History serves as testimony to which argument was successful. The public and
policymakers in general did not accept the efforts to securitize India. Indeed, an
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 offered by
Senators Brownback (R-KS), Feinstein (D-CA), Warner (R-VA), and Levin (D-MI)
roughly a month after the initial nuclear tests exemplifies the lack of securitization.
8
In
the amendment, the senators censured both India and Pakistan for their nuclear weapons
tests but focused on diplomatic approaches to resolving the regional tensions and looked
forward to eventually removing the sanctions. The senators kept the nuclear tests and the
U.S. response to them firmly within the structure of normal politics and away from
security (Senator Brownback (R-KS), 1998). In a further demonstration that
securitization of the India nuclear tests had failed, the U.S. Senate voted in July 1998,
only 3 months after India’s first test, to lift agricultural sanctions on India and Pakistan,
the heaviest of the sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests. In November of that year,
the U.S. eased the ban on access to credit and military training programs. Interestingly,
in October 1999 the United States lifted most of the sanctions imposed in 1998 on India,
but kept them in place for recently autocratic Pakistan. A U.S. spokesman at the time

8
The amendment was titled “a Sense of the Senate on Nuclear Tests in South Asia”

191

indicated that the military coup overthrowing the government of Nawaz Sharif was the
primary reason that sanctions against Pakistan remained in place (BBC News, 1999).

Polling data from after the test indicates that the public accepted the desecuritized
construction of India’s nuclear program. When questioned about the possible threat
posed by India’s nuclear program to world peace, a minority (47%) indicated that India’s
possession nuclear weapons would pose a “serious threat” to world peace. An equal
number indicated Indian nuclear weapons would not pose a serious threat, with 6%
expressing no opinion (Gallup Organization, 1998a). This compares favorably against
the 61% of the respondents that indicated that it was “a bad thing that the atomic bomb
was developed” (Gallup Organization, 1998c). The threat construction of India also
compares favorably against that of non-democratic states, where significant majorities of
the respondents indicated that possession of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to
world peace.
9
In a different survey, an even more significant drop in threat perception
occurred when the survey respondents were questioned about the threat posed to the
United States by India’s nuclear weapons. For that question, only 26% responded that
India’s nuclear weapons posed a “serious threat to the United States,” while 69%
indicated they did not (Cable News Network, USA Today, & Gallup Organization, 1998).
As was the case with the more general question about world peace, non-democracies
registered significantly higher levels of threat perception.

9
Including Iraq (89%), Iran (83%), Pakistan (66%), China (61%) (Gallup Organization, 1998b). By
contrast, for democracies ranging from Brazil to Israel minorities of the respondents indicated that nuclear
weapons possession posed a threat to world peace.

192
Desecuritizing proliferation: 2006 U.S.-India nuclear deal
In 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush announced a deal with India whereby the United
States would supply India with advanced nuclear technology in contravention of
longstanding U.S. policy and accepted nonproliferation practice. Despite significant
differences in political ideology and leadership style, there are striking similarities in the
use of democratic terminology by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. In
February of 2006, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley answered press questions
regarding the Bush Administration’s proposed nuclear deal with India. In his opening
statements, Hadley told reporters that President Bush had set strengthening U.S.-India
ties as a priority of his administration’s foreign policy. India, the President had argued
was,

a country with whom we not only had common interests, but common values—
committed democracy—and that he [Bush] saw India playing a role on a global stage,
and a potential ally and partner for the United States in dealing with global issues…on a
whole range of issues, global in significance, we are now a partner with India. It has
moved beyond just narrow bilateral issues, moved beyond even regional issues to India
and the United States seeing how they can cooperate together on a global range of issues.
(United States Office of the President, 2006)

Clearly, President Bush and his administration felt that the democratic nature of India
was an important characteristic for explaining the U.S. drive to cooperate. That
democracy linked the values and interests of the two states. We know from constructivist
literature that interests are constructed and in this case the President is implying that the
democratic nature (and implicitly identity) of the two governments plays a crucial part in
determining what interests and values are important (Acharya, 2001; Adler, 1997; Hopf,

193

1998; Katzenstein, 1996b; Vaughn, 2000; Wendt, 1999).
10
India wants the same things
as the United States because it is democratic like the United States. Moreover, there is a
heavy emphasis on cooperation and partnership. The implicit message is that the U.S.
trusts India. The concepts of cooperation and partnership both depend heavily on trust.
The target audience knows from their own lives that these concepts require trust. The
message is clear: the United States trusts India and shares India’s interests and values.
What is the basis for this shared trust? Democracy. When it comes to determining
friends and enemies, threats and opportunities, the shared democratic identity certainly is
important. Interestingly, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that autocratic
Pakistan did not warrant the same treatment as India because “Pakistan is not in the same
place as India” (United States Office of the President, 2006).

The message of shared democratic identity is repeated throughout comments made by the
Bush Administration about India. In March 2006 Undersecretary Nicholas Burns
referred to India as “peaceful democratic India” (Burns, 2006). President Bush during a
state visit by Indian Prime Minister Singh emphasized India’s democratic governance:

I'm proud to stand here today with Prime Minister Singh, the leader of one of the world's
great democracies…India and the United States share a commitment to freedom and a
belief that democracy provides the best path to a more hopeful future for all people. We
also believe that the spread of liberty is the best alternative to hatred and violence.
Because of our shared values, the relationship between our two countries has never been
stronger. We're working together to make our nations more secure, deliver a better life to
our citizens and advance the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world.
(emphasis mine) (Bush, 2005)

10
On the role of implication in language, see (Chilton, 2004, pp. 35-39).

194
The language is strongly similar to the language used by Rice and Hadley over six
months later, and it carries the same messages of common identity, trust and cooperation.
In a February 2006 interview, Bush again referenced India as a “great democracy,”
before affirming that U.S.-India cooperation is “reaching new heights” (Bush, 2006). In
April 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher addressing a meeting of Indian
business leaders emphasized cooperation and Indian democracy:

Perhaps most importantly, we believe that one of India’s greatest contributions in the
coming decades can be in its stand for democracy. Many countries around the world are
deciding to act on their democratic aspirations, while some others are wary. We know
that India will stand beside us and the world community in assisting those who choose
freedom. We hope that India will work with others on education, judicial training, free
media, technology, independent elections commissions, rule of law and other foundations
of democratic societies. (Boucher, 2006)

The emphasis on Indian democracy and all that means in terms of cooperation, trust,
shared, interests and values, is a consistent point of emphasis for the Bush administration.
Clearly, either Administration officials truly do see India through the lens of democratic
identity or they are appealing to a populace that does. In either case, security policy—
which includes decisions of war peace—is motivated by democratic identity and the trust
that arises out of a sense that the democratic other is like the self. It is telling that
nowhere does the Bush Administration call for India to observe international law. In fact,
often officials praise India for observing the ‘spirit’ of the NPT by keeping tight control
of nuclear technologies (BBC News, 2006). Even when India clearly does not observe
international law, it is portrayed as doing so. This may be a cognitive distortion of the
Bush Administration because it sees India as a democracy, and part of the democratic

195
identity involves following the law or it may be an attempt to bolster their case for
making the agreement by playing up India’s democratic credentials. Either way, the
argument for shared democratic identity driving pacific relations is augmented. The
fundamental message here is that the relationship between the two countries is predicated
on the trust, values, and interest that arise out their mutual democratic governance.

The emphasis on India’s democratic governance extends into the halls of Congress.
Senators as disparate as Specter (R-PA) and Biden (D-DE) have both made reference to
India’s democratic governance in their comments on the nuclear deal. In late 2006, while
discussing the committee bill authorizing the deal, Senator Joseph Biden commented on
the basis for U.S.-India relations:

It has become cliché to speak of the U.S.-India relationship as a bond between the
world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy—but this cliché is also a
fact. Shared political values are the foundation for our relationship, a firm belief in the
dignity of man and the consent of the governed. (Senator Biden (D-DE), 2006, p.
S11823)

Clearly, for Biden the relationship between the two states is something more than
traditional interstate relations; he describes it as a ‘bond.’ Also clear is the source of the
deep and trusting nature of the relationship: democracy. President Bush echoed these
sentiments two weeks later when he signed the bill Biden was speaking in support of.
India and the U.S., Bush claimed, were “natural partners …united by deeply held values”
(Baker, 2006).

196
Senator Biden’s remarks on the nuclear deal in late 2006 presage those of Senator Arlen
Specter.

In early 2007, Senator Specter, commenting on a recent trip to India, made a realist
balance of power assessment of India’s role as a counterbalance to China in U.S. foreign
policy:

I think it is especially important to see the Nation of India develop with its 1.1 billion
people as a counterbalance, so to speak, to China with 1.3 billion people. We have in
India a democracy, contrasted with the authoritarian government which prevails in China
and, in the long run, the incentives and the productivity of free people in a democracy
should be quite a counterbalance. (Senator Specter (R-PA), 2007, p. S537)

What is remarkable about this quote is Specter’s assessment of threat. China poses a
potential threat to the United States not because it has the largest military in the world or
nuclear weapons. Instead, the possible threat of China is tied to its authoritarian
government. Conversely, India serves as a counterbalance against the Chinese threat
simply because it is a democracy. The implicit argument is that India’s democratic
governance naturally allies it with the democratic United States, and that a democratic
India naturally poses no threat to the U.S. Tellingly, it is after he links threat assessment
(or lack thereof) to Indian democracy that Specter goes on to discuss his change of heart
on the U.S.-India nuclear deal. While Specter claims to have been swayed by India’s
argument that the NPT is discriminatory, it is unlikely that he would have found these
arguments compelling were they coming from nondemocratic states like North Korea or
Iran.

197

A NBC News/ Wall Street Journal poll in March 2006 indicated that public support for
the nuclear deal was split, with opposition to the deal outpacing support by 54% to 41%
(NBC News, Wall Street Journal, & Hart and McInturff Research, 2006). However, there
is no indication within the poll as to why opposition surpassed support. Certainly, polling
indicates that Americans hold a generally favorable view of India. An August 2005 poll
suggests that American’s were open to Bush’s desecuritized construction of India and its
nuclear program. Questioned about the relationship between the U.S. and India, a clear
majority of respondents (62%) indicated that India was either a close ally (20%) or
friendly (42%). Only 3% of respondents indicated India was unfriendly or an enemy
(Harris Interactive, 2005). These numbers were echoed in another Harris poll a year later
(Harris Interactive, 2006). This matches up well with long-term trends in general
perception of India. Clearly, India enjoys a generally favorable perception in the public.
In 2000, 76% of Americans perceived India as an ally (15%) or friendly non-ally (61%)
(Saad, 2000). Differences in question do produce significant variation in the numbers. A
short year after the 2000 poll with no international incidents of note, India’s ‘favorability’
in the eyes of the public stood at only 58% (Moore, 2001). By 2005, 75% of respondents
saw India favorably, possibly reflecting the consequences of the December 2004 tsunami
(Moore, 2005). A year later India’s favorability rating had fallen back to 66%, roughly
consistent with its rating of 69% as of March 2008 (Jones, 2006; Saad, 2008). Despite
the variation in poll ratings, clearly India maintains a broadly favorable position in the
eyes of the public. It consistently ranks among the top ten nations in terms of

198
favorability. As indicated in footnote 24 of Chapter 4, polling does not speak for itself,
and thus it is not clear what factors drive positive public perception of India, but it is
telling that democracies dominate the top of the favorability rankings. If democracy does
play an important role in structuring public threat assessment, India’s high rankings are
consistent what we would expect of public opinion.
Conclusions
In general, the case of U.S. nuclear policy towards India supports the framework
proposed by this dissertation. The very nature of nuclear weapons, notably their massive
destructive power, almost automatically makes them a potential security issue. Polls of
the public regularly register high public concern over the use and proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Thus, nuclear policy makes for fertile security ground. What is remarkable
about the Indo-American relationship is how desecuritized the U.S. approach has been
towards the Indian nuclear program. Indeed, the broader case of U.S.-Indian nuclear
relations can be argued to be a negative security policy case, akin to the negative war
cases that pose a problem for Democratic Peace theory generally. As expected by the
model developed in this dissertation, U.S. political leaders regularly refer to Indian
democracy in their efforts to desecuritize the Indian nuclear program and U.S.
cooperation with that program.

Of the three nuclear policy cases, the 1974 case least fits with the expectations generated
by the model presented by this dissertation. Kissinger, the primary executive branch
foreign policymaker, rarely if ever made reference to the democratic nature of India to

199
justify the desecuritized approach the United States had taken. Indeed, the event, seen as
important by a number of proliferation experts at the time (Dye, 1974; New York Times,
1974e), garnered little official attention. In contrast, the 1998 and 2006 nuclear policy
cases line up well with theoretical expectations. The 1974 case is problematic, but not
insurmountably so. It occurred at a very unique time in U.S. political history as Nixon
confronted possible impeachment over the Watergate scandal. It is reasonable to believe
that the scandal overshadowed all other political developments, including the Indian
PNE, decreasing public attention and thus decreasing the need for the administration to
take an active security position. The Watergate scandal also decreased the amount of
resources available within the administration to deal with foreign policy matters, and
those that were available were focused on Nixon’s efforts to utilize a breakthrough in the
Middle East and warming relations with the Soviet Union to balance against domestic
problems (McCurdy, 1974). Moreover, there is little evidence that the low-key approach
to the Indian PNE needed to be justified in public; the public opinion polling evidence,
while circumstantial, suggests that the public did not see the Indian nuclear program as a
possible threat. Thus, while the 1974 case does not fit neatly within the predictions of the
framework, neither does it pose a significant problem.
Democratic identity and security in Indo-American relations
Taken together, the 1971, 1974, 1998, and 2006 cases strongly suggest that democratic
identity plays an important role in how security policy is constructed. In the 1971, 1998,
and 2006 cases, the appeal of policymakers to Indian democracy strongly correlates with
efforts to desecuritize the relationship. The reverse is also true. When U.S. policymakers

200
sought to securitize India, they avoided mentioning Indian democracy and often sought to
portray India as undemocratic. The 1974 case proves to be a partial exception, with
Indian democratic identity playing a far less substantial role. However, as discussed
previously, the unique domestic political context of Watergate occupied a central focal
point for politicians of all stripes and the public. There is also anecdotal evidence that the
Watergate scandal altered Nixon’s foreign policy priorities, shifting his focus to the
Middle East, where a peace breakthrough held the promise of ameliorating his domestic
political position as well as acting as a positive guarantor of Nixon’s place in history. In
all cases, there is significant evidence that the public did not accept efforts to securitize
India. Thus, regardless of the caveats, the importance of public democratic identity for
security policy construction has been remarkably powerful and consistent over time.

The cases also speak to the literature in significant ways. The 1971 case, finding that
American securitization of India rested in the minds of Nixon and Kissinger but not in the
broader public, lends support to Widmaier’s argument that the vagaries of
interdemocratic relations can be traced to identity dynamics in the leadership (Widmaier,
2005). At the level of the public, however, there is little indication that the economic
identity of a fellow democracy (liberal versus social democratic) plays a significant role
in threat construction. The 1971 case directly counters the argument put forward by Oren
that democratic leaders can, should they desire to, easily manipulate the identity of the
self and the other to justify power-based policy calculations (Oren, 1995). At a personal
level, Nixon and Kissinger clearly constructed, along power political lines, India as a

201
threat to the United States and its interests. Yet, despite the clear assessment of threat,
Nixon and Kissinger were constrained by their belief that they would be unable to
successfully securitize India in public. Underlying this constraint was Nixon and
Kissinger’s belief that the public would refuse to accept a fellow democracy as a threat.
In Oren’s theoretical reality, Nixon would have simply reconstructed the United States or
India in such a way that India would no longer qualify as a democracy, thus removing the
constraints on what was clearly an important and pressing policy preference for Nixon.
These results suggest that Oren’s case can be analyzed in a manner more sympathetic to
the democratic peace.

The 1974 PNE case poses a problem for claims, like that made by Gelpi, that democratic
leaders externalize violence in response to domestic political troubles (Gelpi, 1997).
Despite the fact that Nixon was facing the one of most significant domestic political
challenges to a sitting U.S. president in U.S. history, he, along with Kissinger, took a very
low-key approach to Smiling Buddha. The two virtually ignored the event in public and
implemented a decidedly accommodating policy toward India. Given the existing latent
securitization of nuclear weapons and the weak relations between the United States and
India, the 1974 PNE provided an exemplary opportunity to make a securitization move.
That they did not presents a problem for Gelpi and similarly minded scholars. It also
suggests the power of the shared democracy inhibition on securitization so clearly
highlighted in the 1971 case.

202
Interlude II | The Non-Democratic ‘Other’: the Sino-American
Relationship
Overview and discussion of case merits
The relationship between China and the United States presents an important opportunity
to examine security within democracy when the external state is politically relevant and
non-democratic. Since the Second World War, China has been one of the most
politically relevant non-democratic states in terms of U.S. policy and the international
system in general. Accordingly, it makes an attractive research target (as the mountain of
research on China by U.S. based scholars attests). The following two chapters center on
two important focal points in Sino-American security relations: 1) the 1995-1996 Taiwan
Straits crisis, when the Clinton Administration eventually sent two aircraft carrier battle
groups to the region in response to aggressive Chinese moves toward Taiwan, and 2) the
2001 downing of a United States EP-3 surveillance plane and its subsequent captivity at
the hands of the Chinese.

The U.S.-China relationship presents several opportunities in terms of testing the
theoretical framework I have outlined in this dissertation. First, and most importantly,
including case studies of focal points in U.S.-China security relations allows for the
possible variance on what we can call the dependent variable of my approach—
securitization and the use of identity therein—by varying the independent variable—the
political nature of the external state. There can be little dispute regarding the non-
democratic nature of the Chinese regime. It meets none of the criteria established by

203
Dahl. Elections, with the possible exception of some at the local level (Chen & Zhong,
2008; Li, 2002, 2003; O'Brien & Li, 2000; Shi, 1999), are non-existent, violating the
Downs and Schumpeter criteria. Contravening Bollen’s definition emphasizing
minimization of elite political power, elite circles of the Communist Party clearly contain
most, if not all, of the political power in China. Finally, Babst’s four criteria are
obviously absent. While some scholars argue that China is in the process of
democratizing (Brzezinski, 1998; Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2001; Gilley, 2004; Harding,
1998; Thornton, 2008), China is not now, and has not been in the past, a democracy and
may be in the process of institutionalizing a single party authoritarian state as well as
actively pushing back against democracy as a normative expectation (Lynch, 2007;
Nathan, 2003). Regardless of the measure, China provides a clearly non-democratic
contrast to India’s democracy.

Second, China is a politically relevant state. It is the single largest state, in terms of
population, in the world. China has the world’s largest military in terms of manpower
and, as one of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, has an
internationally recognized nuclear arsenal. Economically, China is a force drawing
global attention. The Chinese economy ranks as one of the largest in the world, and the
growth rate over the last decade has ranged from over eight percent in 2000 to over
eleven percent in 2006 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
2008). Sino-American trade ties are very strong, and China sits at an important
geostrategic location, with several important trade routes between Southeast Asia and the

204
United States running along the Chinese coast. Add to the mix the ongoing trade and
security relationship between Japan and the United States, and it comes as no surprise
that the U.S. is heavily engaged in the region. These factors also mean that potential
security issues between the U.S. and China are likely to achieve a high degree of public
awareness.

Third, in important ways, the U.S.-China case represents an opposite—in terms of
explanatory approaches—to the India case. While U.S.-India security relations present a
difficult—least likely case—U.S.-China relations represent what might be called a ‘most-
likely’ scenario. If my approach has validity, it should easily account for securitization
rhetoric with respect to China. Sino-American relations exist within the context of the
defining ideological and security conflict of the second half of the 20
th
century:
democracy versus communism. This latent securitization of communist political
structures should at least facilitate and at most provide a ready-made template for security
arguments made by policymakers in the United States who seek to securitize a particular
Chinese action. At the opposite end of the securitization scale, political leaders who seek
to desecuritize China would need to address the historical context of communism,
possibly by highlighting democratic structures within China in an attempt to appeal to
domestic democratic identity. An additional factor playing into the importance of
democracy in U.S.-China relations is the democratization of Taiwan. While not
internationally required to recognize Taiwan, there are strong political pressures within
the United States linking the two nations as evidenced by the Taiwan Relations Act of

205

1979.
1
The democratization of Taiwan prevents the U.S.-China relationship from moving
away from the communism-democracy axis with the end of the Cold War.
2
Any conflict
between Taiwan and China immediately recenters in the public eye the autocratic nature
of the Chinese regime because of shared democratic identity with Taiwan.
3
Coupled with
the special relationship between the United States and Taiwan—not to mention large
economic and trade ties approaching $58 billion per year—it would be very difficult for
political leaders to ignore the importance of Chinese autocracy vis-à-vis U.S. democracy,
particularly in situations that involve Taiwan.
4
While there are factors that prevent the
case of U.S.-China relations from being an ‘absolutely likely’ (e.g. the opposite of the
‘strong’ crucial case) that I will discuss below, if U.S.-China relations do not conform to
the expectations generated by my theoretical approach the disjuncture between the theory
and the observations should, at the very least, raise some difficult questions.

An ancillary point to the oppositional nature of the Chinese cases vis-à-vis those of India
concerns the economic and military characteristics of the two states. In many respects,
on these issues China presents a mirror opposite to India. The United States enjoys
strong trade ties with China while Indo-American trade ties are underwhelming. Despite

1
In particular, the Act binds the two countries together from the American standpoint because it carves out
very specific exceptions in U.S. foreign policy for the island that are extended to no other territory.

2
Particularly with the effort of the Chinese leadership to move away from Communist ideology, Sino-
American relations would have otherwise been expected to de-emphasize the Communism-Democracy
ideological conflict.

3
For more on Taiwan’s democracy, see (Chao & Myers, 1998; Copper, 1998; Rigger, 1999; Wachman,
1994)

4
All OECD bilateral trade figures are for manufactured goods only. The OECD bilateral trade database
does not account for trade in services, which according to the World Trade Organization totaled (imports
and exports) over $792 billion in 2007 (World Trade Organization, 2007).

206

similarly sized populations, the Chinese economy, at $3.280 trillion (2007 figures), far
outweighs India’s at $1.171 trillion (World Bank, 2007). China also contrasts India in
terms of military strength. Having detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964, China has
gone onto develop a missile-based nuclear capability while India (consciously) rejected
militarization of its nuclear capacity until 1998. Chinese conventional military
capabilities are also generally assessed to be significantly greater than those of India
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009a, 2009b). Similarly, a contrast exists
in terms of the cultural influence ethnic populations in the United States, with the
influence of the Chinese-American community significantly greater than the Indian-
American community.
5
While these issues may be problematic in terms of isolating the
role of non-democracy external state identity in the securitization dynamic, they do
provide an opportunity to examine securitization under very different conditions than
those presented by the Indo-American security relationship.

There are some mitigating influences that may play a role in U.S.-China security
relations, potentially altering the securitization or desecuritization of a particular issue.
6

Foremost among these possible mitigating influences has already been mentioned: the
Chinese economy and its links to the United States. Annual bilateral trade between the
United States and China tops $245 billion, and while the balance of trade is heavily

5
As indicated by the number of ‘Chinatowns.’ Interestingly, as of 2006 the U.S. Census shows the Indian-
American population at over 2.6 million, only 900,000 fewer that the population of Chinese-Americans
(United States Census Bureau, 2006a).

6
Berger provides a nice review of the expectations for regional security generated by Realism, Liberalism,
and Constructivism (Berger, 2000).

207

weighted in China’s favor, the loss of U.S. exports to China—at $34 billion per year in
2004—in the event of armed conflict would be a significant blow to the U.S. economy
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006a).
7
Chinese-held U.S.
Treasury bonds and securities also have the strong potential to mitigate conflict. As of
August, 2008, the Chinese government owned $541 billion worth of United States
government debt obligations, amounting to almost twenty percent of U.S. foreign debt
and almost four percent of U.S. annual GDP (United States Department of the Treasury,
2008). Should the Chinese leadership choose to stop buying U.S. debt, the U.S. federal
government would quickly face significant financial difficulties. The large Chinese
dollar reserves pose a related risk to the U.S. economy. Should Beijing decide to sell its
dollar holdings, the value of the American currency would crash along with the stability
of the U.S. economic system. While this scenario would impose significant damages on
China as well as the U.S., it is a possibility, and that possibility may act as a drag on the
use of force. However, as I discuss below, it is not clear that an economic inhibitor on
the use of force would similarly act as an inhibitor on securitization.

From liberal-based arguments (Copeland, 1996; Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer, 2001;
Keohane, 1984; Keohane & Nye, 1988; Oneal & Russet, 1997; Oneal et al., 2003;
Papayoanou, 1999), we should expect these economic ties to place a significant damper
on the possible outbreak or armed conflict between China and the United States. There
are a few caveats to mention. First, as mentioned above, the United State and China
suffer a complication not present in most bilateral state relationships—the issue of

7
U.S. imports from China account are significantly more valuable: $210.5 billion.

208

Taiwan. In the economic context, Taiwan also serves as a significant trade partner to the
U.S., accounting for $21.7 billion of U.S. exports (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2006a). While this value does not eclipse the mainland
Chinese value, it could potentially lessen the perceived economic impact of hostilities—
particularly hostilities centered on a China-Taiwan conflict—if the loss of trade to China
suffers a discount arising from expectations of lost trade to Taiwan.
8
A second caveat is
that neoliberal models of state behavior produce expectations of state behavior at the
system level. These models have very little, if anything, to say about the domestic
foreign policy dynamics within states. Securitization does not necessarily lead to the
active use of violence, only the removal of the issue from normal politics. Securitization
is a critical step in the path to use of force, but it is not tantamount to the use of force.
Therefore, systemic level models of state behavior predicated on economic
interdependence may have little to say on the aspect of U.S.-China security relations that
is the central focus of this dissertation.

The military strength of China provides a second possible factor that could effect Sino-
American security relations. The chief points here are China’s possession of an
operative, missile-based, nuclear weapons capability and large conventional military
force. While China’s power projection capabilities are limited (Brown et al., 2003), its
large ground forces and air force would make any military engagement, particularly a

8
The logic here would be that the United States is already losing $21.7 billion in trade due to the loss of
Taiwan as a trading partner, so hostilities with China over Taiwan incur a loss of $12.3 billion (China
imports – Taiwan imports), a rather smaller number than the whole of U.S. exports to China. The critical
factor here is of course that hostilities are grounded in the Taiwan issue. If they are not, as was the case
with the EP-3 incident, then the economic loss to the U.S. would be for the full amount of trade.

209
prolonged one, potentially costly for the United States. While commentators disparage
China’s ability to achieve parity with U.S. military forces, others have pointed out that
parity is not necessary to make U.S. policy-makers think twice about a military
engagement (Christensen, 2001). A number of scholars also argue that the shared
possession of nuclear weapons should prevent the United States and China from
escalating issues to the point of conflict (Asal & Beardsley, 2007; Gaddis, 1986; Geller,
1990; Waltz, 1990).

As is the case with the impact of economic forces on securitization, the influence of
military balance on securitization is far from theoretically clear. That is, military balance
may impede the use of force without impeding securitization. Since securitization does
not necessarily translate to the use of force, a successful securitization move in the
context of a militarily strong external state like China may justify policies ranging from
economic boycott or sanction to increased internal military buildup—what structural
realists would call internal balancing (Brooks, 2003; Waltz, 1979, p. 118). What is clear
is that there is no a priori reason to believe that the military strength of the external state
would necessarily inhibit securitization, but it may redirect the resulting security policy.

A third possible factor that may shape the course of U.S. security relations with China is
the large Chinese-American population in the United States. The census identifies
approximately 3.5 million Americans are either of Chinese descent or are first generation
immigrants from China (United States Census Bureau, 2006b). As evidenced by the

210
number of ‘Chinatowns’ in U.S. cities, the Chinese-American community has a
significant presence in the social fabric of the United States. This strong ethnic
community has the potential to alter the identity discussion with it comes to security
issues that concern China. Ostensibly, because their identity is at least partially grounded
in being Chinese, the Chinese-American community may be less receptive to democratic
identity arguments. This lack of receptivity may require political leaders to present a
more imminent danger-type securitization argument to be successful with this population.
It is an empirical question as to whether the Chinese-American community is as
responsive to democratic identity securitization arguments as other ethnic groups when
the external state is China and therefore no reason a priori to assume that they do not.
However, the possibility exists, and care should be taken to pay appropriate attention to
this in the data.

Many of these issues are empirical in nature, and can only be resolved with investigation.
While the case studies of this dissertation will not prove definitive, they should shed
some light on the role of strategic, economic, and ethnic considerations in securitization.
The Sino-American literature
Unlike Indo-American relations, U.S.-China relations have been the subject of an
immense amount of scholarship. While a discussion of the general Sino-American
literature is important for contextualizing the cases, the volume is such that only a brief

211

overview of the literature is appropriate for this introductory chapter.
9
Given the security
focus of the dissertation, the focus here rests primarily on security relations between the
United States and China and the factors that affect those relations.

Not surprisingly given the ideological divides of the 20
th
century as well as direct and
proxy conflict (Korea and Vietnam) between the United States and China, security is one
of the central themes in the literature on the relationship between the two countries.
Before 1972, strategic security confrontation defined the Sino-American relationship.
The 1950-1953 Korean War institutionalized confrontation between the United States and
China (Christensen, 1996). After the war, U.S. policy in the Pacific consisted primary of
containing China. Two years before Nixon took office, 90% of the public held an
unfavorable opinion of China, and 70% considered China the greatest threat to U.S.
security (Harding, 1992, p. 3). Sino-American relations were born in a security context.
Indeed, for much of the 1970s, Sino-American relations revolved around two issue areas:
resolving differences over Taiwan and defining a mutually acceptable program of
security cooperation (Harding, 1992, pp. 87-88).
10
(In)Security plays a central role in
Harding’s history of Sino-American relations. Chapter titles and section headers warn of
hostility, complications, stalemate, disenchantment and disillusionment (Harding, 1992).

9
It is important to emphasize the goal here is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on
U.S.-China relations, much less the far more expansive comparative literature on China. With respect to
Sino-American relations, replicating the efforts that others have dedicated to spelling out the various
theoretical approaches would be of little utility (Friedberg, 2005; Johnston, 2003).

10
Taiwan plays a predominant role in the security relationship between the United States and China within
the literature. Since the first case—the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis—is centrally about the U.S.-China
relationship as mediated by Taiwan, I leave discussion of the relationship between Taiwan and Sino-
American security relations to the literature overview in that chapter.

212
On the positive side of the security ledger, Sino-American rapprochement was driven by
the need for the United States to pursue strategic security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union
(Mann, 1999). Sino-American mutual interests revolved around security with an
emphasis on reducing the danger of confrontation and conflict and restraining the Soviet
Union. For the U.S., China was also seen as a means to end the war in Vietnam (Mann,
1999, pp. 33-34).

With the normalization of relations in the late 1970’s, economic issues took on increasing
importance in the relationship, an importance reflected in the literature. Economic issues,
however, exist within the broader security context, vying with security to be the primary
shaping force of U.S.-China relations. In Johnston and Ross’s 1999 edited volume on
accommodating the rise of China, over eleven chapters written by multiple authors,
strategic and economic relations comprised the primary (indeed almost exclusive) focus
(Johnston & Ross, 1999). Although he does not explicitly point these two themes out,
Christensen’s analysis of zero and positive sum arguments regarding the rise of China
also reflects the security/economic dichotomy (Christensen, 2006). Explored in the
following chapter, economic interdependence is also the defining element of the U.S.
engagement policy (Johnston, 2003; Lynch, 2002). In discussing the extensive Sino-
American relationship in the early 1990s, Harding focuses almost exclusively on
economic factors: trade, tourism, and military sales (Harding, 1992). Christensen’s
outline of the positive-sum view of U.S.-China engagement emphasizes the importance
of economic engagement and interdependence for the optimistic view of the future of

213
Sino-American relations (Christensen, 2006). The role of economic interdependence
does not lend itself to a singular evaluation. Lampton points out that the growth of
economic interdependence had made fertile ground for nationalist appeals in both China
and the United States, raising the risk of conflict (Lampton, 2001). Christensen’s zero-
sum approach also emphasizes the importance of economic interdependence, but rather
than see it as a positive force, economic interdependence has the potential to undermine
the linkages between the United States and its allies in East Asia as these allies (Japan,
South Korea) and friendly states in the broader region (Philippines, Singapore, Thailand)
increasingly owe their economic stability and success to linkages with China. Thus,
economic interdependence is a double-edged sword depending of the goal of policy. If
the goal is to alleviate the security dilemma (positive sum), regional economic
interdependence provides a compelling answer. However, if the goal is to limit China’s
influence and power (zero sum), interdependence alone is the wrong approach
(Christensen, 2006).

While economics slowly grew to challenge security as the primary motivator of U.S.-
China relations, the end of the Cold War and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis renewed
the importance of security concerns. Kim observes that in the aftermath of the 1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis, the discourse over the rise of China shifted from “‘the rise of China’
chorus in the marketplace” to the “rise of China threat” (Kim, 1998, p. 3). The future of
Sino-American relations in the literature is contentious. Many argue that conflict
between the United States and China is inevitable owing to a lack of a stable balance of

214

power and institutions capable of resolving conflicts (R. Bernstein & R. Munro, 1997; R.
Bernstein & R. H. Munro, 1997; Friedberg, 1993). Christensen’s zero-sum discussion
emphasizes the inevitability of conflict between China and the U.S. given their mutually
exclusive goals of primacy in East Asia—a point supported by Shambaugh’s earlier
assessment of East Asian security (Shambaugh, 1994). Here economic development
poses a problem because it enables a future Chinese military challenge to the United
States. Others agree with the general assessment, but cite different reasons, notably the
divergence on national identity across the Taiwan Strait (Berger, 2000). Taiwanese
independence also plays a critical role in Carpenter’s prediction of conflict between the
U.S. and China (Carpenter, 2005). Opponents to these positions argue that China is a
status quo power unlikely to challenge the United States regionally, much less globally
(Johnston, 2003; Nathan & Ross, 1997; Ross, 1997).
11

Economics and security do not comprise the only themes in the literature on Sino-
American relations. Human rights, for example, plays an important part (Chan, 2002).
However, economics and security—much as in U.S.-China relations itself—are the
dominant discourses. Overall—possibly reflecting the emphasis placed on security—the
literature seems to indicate a consensus that the Sino-American relationship is a fragile
one and vulnerable to significant and dramatic disruption (Harding, 1992). Initial U.S.
engagement with China was founded in the strategic calculus of the Cold War. China, an

11
Johnston’s argument is generally in this latter group, but much of his article centers on a critique of the
concepts of status quo and revisionist in International Relations literature. Interestingly, this position seems
at odds with his earlier findings suggesting that Chinese strategic culture encourages militaristic responses
to international crises (Johnston, 1995).

215
enemy of the Soviet Union, became a ‘friend’ of the United States (Harding, 1992;
Levine, 1998). Denied that grounding with the breakup of the Soviet Union, and
illusions of democratization ruptured by the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square, U.S.
policy became fragmented and inconsistent (Levine, 1998; Mann, 1999). Freeman
describes relations in 1996 as focused on the “adverse consequences of estrangement and
strategic hostility” rather than the benefits of friendship (Freeman, 1996). One-time
Chinese Premier Li Peng has described U.S.-China relations as “highly volatile”
(Freeman, 1996). Lampton argues the relationship between the U.S. and China will be a
mix of contention and cooperation (‘at best’) in perpetuity (Lampton, 2001). Levine
characterizes the relationship as “wracked by contention” over a wide range of issues,
most of which focus on economics (trade) or security (arms transfers, Taiwan).
Misunderstandings and suspicions undermine any effort to improve relations between the
U.S. and China, keeping the relationship unstable. Indeed, the title of Levine’s chapter—
“Sino-American Relations: Practicing Damage Control”—sums up the fraught nature of
relations between the countries (Levine, 1998). The apparent tenuousness of the
relationship is striking, particularly in the context of the accepted importance of Sino-
American ties.

Efforts to account for the role of the American public in the literature on U.S.-China
relations are far more advanced than in the literature on U.S.-India relations. Levine
argues long-term U.S. policy must be grounded in American democratic political culture
(Levine, 1998). Harding also emphasizes the importance of domestic considerations in

216
his history of Sino-American relations, particularly elite opinion and the way in which the
events in Tiananmen effected foreign policy by through the U.S. domestic context
(Harding, 1992). Harding also notes that shifting domestic contexts had an impact on
relations, but these points are less about security per say and more about the role the
‘second image’ in policy. Indeed, at one point Harding clearly dismisses the importance
of the public, noting that negative public opinion of China does not preclude a normal
working relationship between the U.S. and China (Harding, 1992, p. 64). Lampton
disagrees, arguing that domestic audiences play a critical role in Sino-American relations.
As mentioned above, the interaction between global economic forces and domestic
politics gives political leaders incentives to adopt unilateral, nationalistic policies. More
broadly, Lampton claims political leaders in the United States and China face two critical
constituencies, the domestic and the global. For example—discussing the controversy
surrounding the invitation of Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi to a reception held by U.S.
President George H.W. Bush during his visit to China—Lampton notes the conflict
between the personal level importance Bush attached to China and the moral sensibilities
of the American public (Lampton, 2001, pp. 18-20). The Chinese wanted Fang disinvited
while the U.S. domestic media and public saw the situation as a moral test for the new
Administration, bringing domestic forces into conflict with Bush’s own desire to
prioritize U.S.-China relations. An analogous situation confronted the Bush
Administration in the aftermath of the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square. While the
Administration wanted to restore relations, powerful members of Congress—Senator
Jesse Helms for example—sought to distance the U.S. from China. Consequently,

217

‘Tiananmen’ drove “a wedge between the executive and legislative branches on issues
regarding China policy” (Lampton, 2001, p. 21). Mann also claims some importance for
domestic politics, albeit at the upper levels of the policy elite rather than an interaction
between policymakers and the public (Mann, 1999).
12
Occasionally, the public does play
a role, as in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square in 1989, pushing the Administration
towards a policy it would not otherwise choose.
13
Generally, however, Mann’s narrative
portrays the United States side of Sino-American relations as dominated by individual
level decision-making and bureaucratic processes. Congress and the public have only
become involved sporadically and were not generally considered in the foreign
policymaking of Sino-American relations.
14

In his book on Sino-American relations during the Korean war, Christiansen comments
on the importance of domestic political mobilization, arguing for the necessity of
developing a “concept of national political power, defined as the ability of state leaders to
mobilize their nations’ human and material resources behind security policy initiatives”
(Christensen, 1996, p. 11). The ability to mobilize the public is a critical intervening
variable for Christensen. However, there are distinct differences between Christiansen’s

12
He notes, for example, that Nixon was fastidious in preparing the ground for his trip to Beijing in 1972,
cultivating support among Republicans beforehand (Mann, 1999, p. 22).

13
The point that the public’s influence becomes noticeable only in high profile situations suggests support
for the focal points model used in this dissertation. It is these types of situations, where the public engages,
when democratic public identity comes to bear directly on the policy process.

14
Where the public was considered, the image presented by the U.S. government was at odds with the
picture confronting policymakers. In the 1980’s for example, while China remained a possible partner
against the Soviets Reagan Administration officials hid their concerns about China. The public was treated
to “positive images of a friendly, changing China” (Mann, 1999, p. 149).

218
approach and that presented in this dissertation. First, Christensen’s aim is to develop a
framework applicable across polities, while mine focuses on democracies. Second,
Christensen’s factors for domestic mobilization are distinctly non-constructivist: ability
to raise taxes, immediacy of threat, consistency with past responses, and the novelty and
history of policy details within grand strategy (Christensen, 1996, p. 25). These
differences aside, Christensen’s approach and that proposed here would likely
compliment each other in democratic systems, and Christensen’s criticisms of Realist
‘black-boxing’ of domestic factors are equally salient here. Moreover, although
Christensen does not flesh it out, there are what I would call ‘proto-securitization’
indications in his work, particularly his comments on Truman’s use of communist-
democracy ideology to sell foreign policy. Harding and Lampton also note the role of
ideology in Sino-American relations, but like Christensen they do not make the
connections between the public, ideology, identity, and security. These approaches are
more generally foreign policy analysis frameworks that include a wide range of variables
in their efforts to understand the why and how of U.S. policy toward China. In doing so,
Lampton and the other authors leave aside explicit theorizing on how policymakers and
the public interact to effect U.S. security policy in a systematic way.

This dissertation, with its security focus, clearly fits within the general pattern of
scholarship on Sino-American relations. However, it does make some useful
contributions as well. First, the dissertation contributes the relatively scarce

219

constructivist literature on U.S.-China relations.
15
The argument over whether China
poses a threat or not, and over U.S. policy toward China in general, largely assumes a
rationalist basis. Lynch’s critique of the discussion regarding the perceived failure of
engagement draws this point out very well (Lynch, 2002). Lost in the discussion is the
critical distinction that the ‘threat’ posed by China does not exist as an independent state
of affairs obvious to all.
16
It is constructed by political leaders and analysts. The ability
to act on this construction, particularly in the security context, relies on the willingness of
the public to accept the construction. This is the second contribution of the dissertation:
the explicit focus on the relationship between policymakers and the public in the context
of the security policy process. While there is significant attention paid in the literature to
domestic politics (especially as compared to the literature on India), these discussions
largely leave aside the role of the public itself. In discussing the battles over policy at the
upper levels of government—particularly between the Legislative and Executive—
scholars have generally left aside what empowers these debates—the public. This
dissertation addresses that gap.
Roadmap and theoretical expectations
The chapters on the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 2001 EP-3 incident follow the
pattern set by the India cases. In each, I begin with an issue overview and a review of
relevant literature. I then move onto the case itself, analyzing the security constructions
of political leaders in the United States with particular attention to how shared democratic

15
Constructivist approaches are far more common in the China-specific literature (Johnston, 1995; Lynch,
2007).

16
Conversely, the contentiousness of the discussion may highlight this point.

220
identity structures the security arguments. In both chapters, I end with an empirical and
analytical summary. The EP-3 chapter wraps up tying the cases back to the general
theoretical framework presented in the dissertation.

As is the case with the India cases, the central aim of the following chapters is to examine
how U.S. policymakers attempt to construct their security policy vis-à-vis the American
public. The claim of the thesis is that the democratic identity that binds the imagined
community together acts as a constraint of the foreign policy options available to leaders.
At the psychological level, leaders may construct threats and formulate security policy
using very different rationales than what they present in public. In the case of China, and
in the chapters to follow, the argument leads to the following expectations. When
attempting to securitize an external nondemocracy, U.S. policymakers are expected to
emphasize the external state’s nondemocratic characteristics and identity. When
attempting to desecuritize a nondemocratic state, policymakers are expected to emphasize
the democratic characteristics and identity of that state. With respect to the 1995-96 case,
those who sought to construct China as a threat would be expected to highlight the lack of
Chinese democracy, and possibly that autocratic-democratic nature of the cross-strait
conflict. Those who opposed the policy are expected to emphasize China’s democratic
characteristics in an effort to undermine the existential threat argument. These same
dynamics are expected to play out in 2001 case of the second chapter as well. As
securitization theory indicates, the success of these efforts can be measured by public

221
support for the policy. If securitization is successful, the public accepts the existential
threat argument as well as the identification of the threat and the policy prescription.

222

Chapter 6 | 1995-1996: The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the U.S.
Response
Historical overview and literature
General overview of U.S.-Taiwan-China relations
The relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United States dates back to the creation
of the Communist government in China.
1
The United States also has a long history of
emotional, political, and strategic attachment to Taiwan, dating back to Truman’s
insertion of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, effectively ending the major military
phase of the Chinese Civil war and sanctioning the creation of an independent Taiwan
(Ross, 1995).
2
At that time, the U.S.-backed Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chang Kai-shek
had been driven off the mainland by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces and governed only
a few offshore islands, the most significant of which was Taiwan. Truman’s action
established a new status quo, separating Taiwan—the Republic of China (ROC)—from
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland.
3
It also established a tradition of
U.S. military and diplomatic support for the government of Taiwan. In 1954, President

1
It is important to be clear as to the purpose of this overview. The goal here is not to provide a
comprehensive review of U.S.-China relations or the role of Taiwan in those relations. What I seek to do
here is to provide a historical context for the case. To that end, I only provide a brief summary of the
history of Sino-American relations focused on the importance of Taiwan. Far more complete histories are
available—notably by James Mann and Robert Ross—as noted in the preceding chapter. Similarly, the
literature review will be largely constrained to work speaking specifically to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait
Crisis.

2
What Truman was actually reacting to was the spread of Communist influence in East Asia, and the
political problems that presented rather than out of a specific concern for Chang and the KMT (Ross, 1995,
p. 10).

3
For the sake of expediency, the terms ‘China’ and ‘PRC’ will be used interchangeably. Similarly,
‘Taiwan’ and ‘ROC’ will both refer to the functionally independent government on the island of Taiwan.

223
Dwight Eisenhower signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, committing the United States to
the defense of Taiwan. From this point until Nixon’s efforts to normalize relations with
the PRC, the United States maintained a significant military presence on the island. In
1971, Henry Kissinger made an unprecedented visit to China in preparation for a visit
from U.S. President Richard Nixon. Nixon followed up with his own visit in 1972, a visit
that marked the beginning of the process of normalization of relations between the United
States and China.

From the outset, the issue of Taiwan was omnipresent. The Chinese politburo made it
clear that the removal of U.S. forces from Taiwan was a ‘crux issue’ (Ross, 1995, p. 37).
The joint communiqué issued at the end of Nixon’s visit (also known as the Shanghai
Communiqué) clearly outlined the importance of Taiwan as an issue. The Chinese
claimed Taiwan to be the “crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations
between China and the United States,” and demanded the removal of all U.S. military
forces and installations from the island. For their part, the Americans agreed to draw
down U.S. forces on the island with the ultimate goal of complete removal and
acknowledged that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” but reaffirmed U.S. interest in the peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan issue (United States Department of State, 1972).

224

Taiwan continued to be a central issue when the United States and China finally
normalized relations in 1979.
4
The nature of normalization required the issue of U.S.-
Taiwan relations to occupy a central focus in the process. The Chinese government
refused to accept official U.S. relations while America maintained official relations with
Taiwan. In order for the United States to upgrade its relations with China, it would have
to sacrifice its nearly thirty-year-old ties with Taiwan. In what has been called the
‘Second Communiqué,’ the United States under the Carter Administration reaffirmed the
Shanghai Communiqué and once again recognized that Taiwan was part of China (Carter,
1978a). In a domestic press release corresponding to the release of the Communiqué on
December 15, 1978, the Carter Administration went into detail regarding the changes
required by the agreement. Official relations with Taiwan, including the Mutual Defense
Treaty, would be abrogated on January 1, 1979. All remaining military personnel would
be withdrawn within four months. As the Nixon Administration did in the Shanghai
Communiqué, the Carter Administration also emphasized the importance of a peaceful
resolution to the dispute between Taiwan and China, continuing a position that might
allow—but not require—the United States to take action in support of Taiwan should
China exercise military options to force reunification (Carter, 1978b).

4
The long gap between the Shanghai Communiqué and the final normalization of relations was not
planned. Nixon and Kissinger originally intended to normalize relations in Nixon’s second term, a point
made clear by both Mann and Ross. However, as was evident in the case study here on India’s 1974 PNE,
Watergate consumed much of Nixon’s energies, making normalization almost impossible. President Ford
also promised to normalize Sino-American relations, but again had to wait until a possible second term as
he was in a tough primary battle with more conservative elements—namely Ronald Reagan—in the
Republican Party. Interestingly, while domestic politics clearly play a role in policymaking, the role of the
public in policymaking is once again present only by implication.

225
The Second Communiqué and the official establishment of relations with China was not
the final word on U.S.-Taiwan relations. The same year that China and the United States
officially recognized each other, the United States Congress passed Public Law 96-8, the
Taiwan Relations Act (United States Congress, 1979). The Act mandates a U.S.-Taiwan
relationship far more involved than the Second Communiqué suggests. The Act makes
clear that, with the exception of official relations—a role to be filled in large part by the
‘unofficial’ American Institution of Taiwan—the United States would be required to treat
Taiwan as if it were a sovereign foreign country. U.S. laws would apply to Taiwan as
they did any other foreign state and U.S. treaties signed with Taiwan before January 1,
1979 would remain in effect unless legally terminated. While the Act does not commit
the United States to intervening in a military confrontation between China and Taiwan, it
strongly reinforces the need for a peaceful resolution to the situation, going so far as to
pin Sino-American relations on the peaceful evolution of Sino-Taiwanese relations: “the
United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful
means.” Any effort by China to force a reunification with Taiwan (e.g. military force,
economic sanctions, etc.) would be considered by the United States as “a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern.” To this end, the
Act mandates that the United States supply Taiwan with military equipment “of a
defensive character” and requires the President to maintain the capacity to resist any
means of coercion that threatens the security or social and economic systems of Taiwan.
The act also requires the President to inform Congress of any threat to Taiwan and

226
stipulates that Congress as well as the President should determine the appropriate course
of action. This passage is extraordinary because it explicitly removes from the Executive
Branch its traditionally exclusive purview over foreign relations. The passage is also
remarkable because U.S. policy to that point toward China had been made by a select few
policymakers at the top of the foreign relations hierarchy, largely without the input of the
public or Congress (Mann, 1999). Congress clearly sought to reign in the ability of the
President to negotiate away the independence of Taiwan.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan together with Premier Zhao Ziyang issued the third
joint U.S.-China communiqué (Reagan, 1982). Along with the previous two
communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, the ‘Third Communiqué’ provides the
foundation for Sino-American relations. As with the previous two communiqués, the
Third Communiqué once again reiterates that Taiwan is part of China and that the dispute
between Taiwan and China is an internal matter for the Chinese. Unlike the previous two
communiqués, the Third Communiqué takes on the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Acknowledged in the communiqué to be a source of tension between the United States
and China, the issue of U.S. sales of military hardware to Taiwan is the primary subject
in the communiqué. Responding to Chinese pressure (the communiqué states that
“Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue [arms sales to Taiwan] again following
normalization”), the Reagan Administration claimed the United States had no long term
policy for selling arms to Taiwan. Accordingly, the communiqué sets out a long term
U.S. policy, committing the United States to capping qualitative and quantitative arms

227
sales to the levels of ‘recent years’ and to gradually phasing out arms sales to Taiwan
entirely.

As was the case with the Second Communiqué, the Third Communiqué was not the final
word on U.S. sales of weapons to Taiwan. On the domestic front, the Taiwan Relations
Act committed the United States to continued sale of defensive weapons systems to
Taiwan. Internationally, at roughly the same time as the Third Communiqué was being
negotiated, the United States agreed to six ‘assurances’ proposed by Taiwan to govern
U.S.-Taiwan relations (United States Department of State, 1982). In agreeing to the
assurances, the Reagan Administration promised:

1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions
about
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.
5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which
was, that
the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would
not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

Clearly, the issue of Taiwan, and U.S. support of the island and its government, had not
been conclusively resolved. The ambiguity of U.S. commitments to China regarding
Taiwan would continue to be a central focal point for Sino-American tensions. After the
end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the overarching strategic environment that
formed the primary foundation of Sino-American relations (Mann, 1999), the difficulties
between China and the United States over U.S.-Taiwan relations would dramatically

228

increase. Only ten years after the apparent weapons sales limitations of Third
Communiqué were negotiated, the very China-friendly President George H.W. Bush
would lay the groundwork for the 1995-1996 crisis with his decision to sell F-16 fighters
to Taiwan (Friedman, 1992; Ross, 2000). While China’s reaction at the time was
relatively subdued (Mann, 1999, p. 270), the consequences of the removal of the
geostrategic underpinnings of the Sino-American relationship were beginning to become
evident.
The 1995-96 Crisis
I do not intend to provide a comprehensive historical overview of the 1995-96 Taiwan
Strait Crisis (also called the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis). Others have performed this task,
and in much greater length and detail than is possible here (Garver, 1997). However, as
with the preceding overview of Sino-American relations as moderated by Taiwan, a brief
summary of events is helpful. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis is actually two separate
crises conjoined by a common thread: Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwanese
democracy, and China’s fear of Taiwanese independence.
5
The 1995 crisis traces its
roots to an invitation extended by Cornell University to President Lee to give the 1995
commencement address. Lee’s visit would be the first by a Taiwanese leader since
formal diplomatic recognition had switched from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. Lee accepted
the invitation, but the United States government under President Clinton initially
indicated to China that a visa would not be granted to President Lee. Domestic politics

5
The International Crisis Behavior project lists the crisis as beginning on May 22, 1995 when the Clinton
Administration announced a visa for Lee Teng-hui and ending on March 25, 1996 when Chinese military
maneuvers ended after the Taiwanese presidential election [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/].

229

changed the political calculations for the Clinton Administration as both the U.S. House
(396-0) and Senate (97-1) overwhelmingly passed resolutions in May of that year calling
on the Clinton Administration to grant Lee a visa (United States Congress, 1995).
6
The
Clinton Administration relented and issued Lee a visa, and he visited Cornell in June to
deliver his commencement address. Chinese response to the Clinton Administration’s
policy reversal was harsh, warning of future reprisals and placing the responsibility for
“severe damage to Sino-U.S. relations,” on Washington: “If the United States refuses [to
revoke the visa], then the United States will bear the full consequences and pay its price”
(New York Times, 1995a; Tyler, 1995b).

The full Chinese response took shape in July, when the Chinese military fired missiles off
the coast of Taiwan (Faison, 1995). A month later in August, the Chinese military
conducted more intensive exercises combining air and naval missile tests with naval live
fire artillery in an effort to intimidate Taiwan, introduce instability, and ultimately end
Taiwanese President Lee’s career in the lead up to the first democratic presidential
elections on the island due to be held in 1996 (New York Times, 1995b; Tyler, 1995c,
1995e). Foreshadowing efforts the following year, China also sought to influence
Taiwan’s December 2 legislative elections (Tempest, 1995). In November, the Chinese
military once again held military exercises, and specifically stated that the joint land,
naval and air exercises, including amphibious landings were aimed at preventing
Taiwanese moves toward independence (Ross, 2000, p. 102). By the end of the

6
The bill in the House was House Concurrent Resolution 53 and in the Senate was Senate Concurrent
Resolution 9.

230

November exercises, China was probing U.S. military officials as to possible U.S.
reactions to a military crisis over Taiwan (Tyler, 1995a). The U.S. policy response in
1995 was restrained. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher
sent private letters to Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
respectively, and the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz along with several support ships cruised
through the Taiwan Strait in December (Garver, 1997; Mann, 1999).
7

After November 1995, the crisis seemed to abate. China announced no new military
exercises and U.S.-China relations began to thaw (Tyler, 1995a). While Beijing
complained about the Nimitz transit through the Taiwan Strait, relations were strong
enough to permit a long scheduled visit by the U.S. amphibious dock landing ship USS
Fort McHenry to Shanghai (Faison, 1996b; Tyler, 1996c). However, China’s
preoccupation with, and concern over, possible Taiwanese independence and opposition
to Lee Teng-hui did not subside. In January 1996, China issued a clear warning to the
United States that if Lee won the March 1996 presidential elections, China had prepared
military strike plans, including missile strikes, which could be put into action on short
notice. The Chinese warnings also included an implicit threat against the United States.
The press at the time reported that a Chinese official claiming that Beijing was not
concerned with a possible military response by the United States to a Chinese attack on
Taiwan because U.S. leaders “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,”
suggesting that China may use nuclear weapons against the United States (Tyler, 1996a).

7
The transit was a first for any U.S. aircraft carrier since 1979. The transit was low-key however, and was
only reported in the U.S. a month after it occurred and explained by U.S. officials as a bad weather
diversion (Associated Press, 1996b).

231

The apparent lull in the crisis ended on March 5 when Beijing announced a new round of
nuclear capable M-series missile tests in the run-up to the Taiwanese presidential election
on March 23 (Reuters, 1996). Unlike the 1995 tests which took place in the open sea 80-
100 miles from Taiwan, the new tests would target waters much closer to Taiwan,
potentially blockading the principle Taiwanese commercial shipping ports of Keelung in
the north and Kaohsiung in the south (Tyler, 1996b). Five days later, on March 10,
Chinese leaders announced a new round of live fire naval and warplane exercises that
would close a significant portion of the Taiwan Strait and last through the presidential
election (Tyler, 1996d, 1996h). In contrast its response to China’s 1995 war games, the
Clinton Administration reacted by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups (CBG), the
Independence and Nimitz, to the waters near Taiwan (Tyler, 1996f). The deployment
marked the largest U.S. navel force in the region since the end of the Vietnam war
(Pinsker, 2003). By March 13, as the live exercises were underway, Beijing signaled to
the U.S. that Taiwan would not be invaded or attacked (Tyler, 1996e). The day before
Taiwan’s scheduled elections, Beijing’s rhetoric once again became bellicose, with China
warning the United States that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could “bury an
enemy intruder in a sea of fire” and claiming that an invasion of Taiwan could be
mounted with just six hours of preparation (Faison, 1996a). In the end, the Chinese were
unsuccessful in their openly avowed effort to politically weaken President Lee. Lee was
elected with 54% of the vote, better than the 50% he sought as a political mandate.
Combining Lee’s—who favored raising Taiwan’s international profile—vote tally with

232
that of his pro-independence opponent Peng Ming-min indicates that 75% of the voters in
the presidential election voted for a leader at odds with Beijing’s clearly stated and
demonstrated desires (Tyler, 1996g).

The importance of the China’s military buildup and the U.S. response is not easy to
overstate. Andrew Nathan writes that the tests were “one of the most
frightening…military crises in the post-cold war era…[u]ndoubtedly the exercises were a
turning point in the relations between the United States and China” (Nathan, 1999, p. vii).
Ross argues that the events of 1995-96 were the closest China and the United States have
come to crisis in thirty years, and that they were a “critical turning point in post–Cold
War U.S.-China relations” (Ross, 2000). An unnamed Western diplomat at the time of
the crisis presaged both assessments: “I think 30 years from now people are going to look
back at this summer [1995] as a turning point, but I'm afraid it's going to be a turn for the
worse” (Tyler, 1995d).

Not surprisingly, given the magnitude of the crisis and the popularity of Sino-American
relations in the International Relations literature, the events of 1995-96 have received
significant attention. What is surprising is the relative lack of engagement in the
literature on the dynamics internal to the United States. Much of the literature focuses on
the strategic implications of the conflict, or on the causes of the conflict, particularly
those sourced to China or Taiwan.

233
The literature is heavy with strategic analysis. Ross argues that the Taiwan Strait crisis
reflected the interaction between the coercive diplomacy of the Chinese and the
deterrence diplomacy of the United States (Ross, 2000). The Chinese sought to change
the apparently Taiwanese trajectory toward independence and the United States, in
response, sought to reassure Taiwan as well as its allies in the region that Washington
held dear its security guarantees. In Ross’s exploration of the events, the acts on both the
Chinese and American sides can be understood by the strategic demands of the
international system and the efforts to act on these demands by policymakers. In a trend
common to the literature, Ross largely leaves aside the role of domestic politics in setting
and shaping U.S. policy. Where he does mention the role of domestic politics, the
reference is confined to identifying Congress as the weak link in U.S. strategic
policymaking, guilty of using China policy to ‘score political points with the American
public’ (Ross, 2000, p. 117). Why Congress might have been able to use China policy to
score points, and what this means for U.S. policymaking towards China do not appear to
be trenchant issues in Ross’s approach. Leaving the issues aside, however, means Ross is
unable to answer some important questions, and not just about foreign and security
formation broadly speaking. For example, why did U.S. reactions to Chinese military
activities in 1995 differ so dramatically from those in 1996, when the U.S. ‘overreacted’
by sending two CBGs to the region (Scobell, 2000)? Granted, the missiles landed much
closer to Taiwan in 1996, but China also went to much greater pains to assure the U.S.
that no military strike was forthcoming (Scobell, 2000, p. 237; Tyler, 1996e). Answering
these and other similar questions is difficult without a deeper approach to understanding

234
how policymaking interacts with the public to shape foreign and security policy during
high profile events like the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Scobell agrees with Ross’ emphasis on analyzing the crisis at the systemic level and
shares Ross’s assessment of China’s actions as coercive diplomacy (Scobell, 2000).
Hickey’s post-mortem on the crisis reflects a similar emphasis on strategic calculus. He
raises domestic factors only in passing, and only to source blame for the strategic
breakdown to Congress. His recommendations going forward, the central purpose of
Hickey’s paper, emphasize the importance of strategic ambiguity and the need to
eliminate domestic politics—i.e. Congress—from foreign and security policy
calculations. In a similar vein, Pinsker, in his more recent critique of President George
W. Bush’s revisionist approach to strategic ambiguity, interprets the 1996-96 crisis as an
effort by both the U.S. and China to return to a state of strategic ambiguity. Strategic
ambiguity, according to Pinsker, is in effect a conflict avoidance mechanism. As such,
given the costs of conflict that both the United States and China would face, strategic
ambiguity constitutes the most viable strategic option available to both states. The
Taiwan Strait Crisis arose because of doubts on both sides as to whether the counterparty
remained committed to the regime. While not strictly strategic, Friedman’s assignment
of partial blame for the crisis to misperception on the part of the Taiwanese regarding
Chinese commitment to reunification also fits within a broadly strategic interpretation of
the crisis (Friedman, 1997). Nathan’s assessment of the dispute rests centrally on
Chinese concern that Taiwan may be used as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ to threaten

235
the mainland (Nathan, 1996). Accordingly, Chinese policy is orientated toward denying
Taiwanese leaders enough autonomy to make such a scenario impossible. Like Ross,
Nathan makes a tangential reference to American domestic politics, noting that U.S.
public is very concerned about casualties and that if America is forced to resolve its
strategic ambiguity, Beijing’s unpopularity in the U.S. will shape Washington’s response.
Nathan goes into no more detail than this however. Domestic politics, identity,
perception, and other social and political phenomena have little role in Nathan’s
analysis—or indeed most of the strategic approaches.

It may very well be Nathan’s analysis to which Edward Friedman refers when he
complains that, “American security analysts treat states as amoral essences and are little
interested in decisive domestic political forces” (Friedman, 1997, p. 8). In the case of the
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Friedman’s comments are accurate, but only with respect to
the United States. The literature pays considerably more attention to the internal political
and identity dynamics in China and Taiwan than those in the U.S. For example, while
Ross notes that while the realpolitik lessons of the crisis for Taiwan’s leaders are ‘clear,’
Taiwan’s leaders will assess these lessons “in combination with the complex signals sent
to them by the Taiwan electorate” (Ross, 1996, p. 469). The lessons for U.S.
policymakers, by contrast, depend almost exclusively on the frame through which
individuals view China—e.g. those opposed to Communism will harden their attitudes
towards China, while those less dogmatic will be more cautious about offending China,

236
and the military will see Taiwan as part of its security purview and China as a new
opponent for which to plan. U.S. politics, or the views of the public, receive no mention.

There is a notable, and self-conscious, exception to the generalization that American
domestic politics is overlooked in the work on the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Jonathon
Garver’s often-cited 1997 book (Garver, 1997). Garver purposely sets out to explore the
domestic political dynamics that resulted in the confrontation. He notes that Chinese
discontent with U.S. Taiwan policy began in earnest when U.S. President George H.W.
Bush decided, in an election year during an economic recession, to permit the sale of F-
16 fighter jets to Taiwan. The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review
contributed to the momentum leading up to the crisis by giving Beijing the impression
that a policy of China containment had been adopted by the U.S. Garver argues,
however, that Chinese perceptions were flawed. The real source of the review was U.S.
public opinion regarding China and Taiwan and the (somewhat unique) sharing of
policymaking power with respect to the region shared by the Executive and Legislative
branches (i.e. the Taiwan Relations Act). Garver also argues that partisan maneuvering
by leaders in Congress against a President weakened by domestic political failures (health
care reform) was a strong contributing factor to the shift in policy represented by the
Review. Congress had mandated better relations with China, and Clinton’s response was
the Taiwan Policy Review. Clinton was also weak on the issue of China, a weakness that
can be traced to his use of the issue against George H.W. Bush in the 1992 presidential
campaign (Garver, 1997, pp. 35-40). Garver also emphasizes the importance of domestic

237

politics in the decision to grant Lee a visa, arguing the decision can be analyzed “in terms
of the sentiments and calculations of the individual who had the ultimate power of
decision…the institutional interests of organizations making up the U.S. government and
the political relations between those institutions” (Garver, 1997, p. 67). Garver points out
that Clinton had paid a political price when he reversed his position on China’s Most
Favored Nation trading status, so he had political incentives to ignore China on the Lee
visa.
8
Garver also argues that Clinton faced the dilemma of ignoring a request from a
democratic, friendly regime at the behest of an undemocratic, unfriendly regime—a
potential political problem. Clinton was not alone in catering to public sentiment;
Congress did as well (Garver, 1997, pp. 69-71). Surprisingly, while Garver is quite
detailed in terms of the domestic political calculations that went into the policies that led
up to the crisis, in terms of the actual crisis response, his implicit analytical focus shifts to
the individual policymakers involved; he makes only a passing note that domestic politics
played a role in the calculations that went into the response (Garver, 1997, p. 98).

Despite Garver’s focus on the political interplay between the White House and Congress
in his exploration of domestic politics, he does refer to the relationship between the
policymakers and the public as well as identity dynamics within the United States.
Garver notes that “Taiwan, as an expression of U.S. self-identity vested in the use of
national power to spread democracy, is a potent symbol for the U.S.” (Garver, 1997, p.
4). He also regularly references the importance of public opinion in establishing the
political benefits and costs that shaped interbranch politics as well as the incentives faced

8
The issue here refers to Clinton’s effort to link China’s MFN status to human rights.

238
by policymakers. However, Garver does not connect the points. His exploration of
identity dynamics in public is tangential at best to his primary goal of providing a
political history of the crisis, which means many of the connections between the public
and the policymakers, and the role of identity in these connections is either left to
implication or left out entirely. Garver does not have an explicit explanation as to why
political costs and benefits were as he described. Moreover, when events finally
triggered a security response, Garver’s focus eliminates most of the domestic political
action. How the security response was ‘sold’ to the public is missing. These points are
not meant to disparage Garver’s work; he provides an excellent history of the events as
well as trenchant analysis. The point is simply to highlight that even in Garver’s
treatment of the crisis, gaps exist that this dissertation can help to fill.

On the Asian side, domestic political analysis of the crisis largely focuses on Beijing,
possibly because the domestic political dynamics there are much more obscured than they
are in Taiwan. Garver’s work provides the sole exception, which is illuminating in its
predictability. In Taiwan, the identity dynamics mingled with politics in way political
scientists would expect: as the island democratized, political parties affiliated themselves
with particular identity driven perspectives to distinguish themselves and rally voters
(Garver, 1997). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), appealing to a unique
Taiwanese identity, rejected reunification in large part because it claimed Taiwan was
culturally, politically, and historically distinct from the mainland. The New Party, on the
other end of the spectrum, appealed to shared ethnicity as it favored eventual

239

reunification. The KMT attempted to straddle the camps, neither rejecting reunification
(that is, accepting ethnic identity) but expressing doubt in the validity of a single
(exclusive) Chinese ruler (shared political identity). The model is basic identity-driven
electoral politics.

On the Chinese side of the Strait, the arguments are more varied. Willy Lam argues that,
while at the time of his writing the evidence was far from conclusive, factional politics
and power plays in the run up to Deng Xiaoping’s death may have played a significant
role (Lam, 1996). Accordingly, the military response represents the ascendance of the
PLA and allied factions in the policymaking apparatus, and the abrupt cutoff of hostilities
on March 25 may indicate that other, more moderate, factions gained as results of the war
games (two U.S. CBGs in the region, Lee elected with a mandate) were not in line with
expectations. Arguing against Lam and similarly minded analysts who assert Beijing’s
reaction arose from interfactional power plays in anticipation of the imminent passing of
Deng Xiaoping,
9
Ji claims that the Chinese reaction was driven by a need to maintain
leadership consensus on Taiwan (Ji, 1997). According to this consensus, while war with
Taiwan is contra Chinese long-term goals, it is the preferred alternative to Taiwanese
independence. When the leadership perceived U.S. support for Taiwanese independence
in the issuance of a visa to Lee, the consensus required a policy shift. Ji also notes that
the rise of the PLA as a distinctive actor also played a role, shifting the consensus toward
the more hawkish side of the policy spectrum, a point on which Garver agrees. The

9
Interestingly, Ji provides no citations to authors who argue this position. Similarly, writing in 1996,
Andrew Nathan makes a similar claim but provides no citations (Nathan, 1996).

240
military response, while primarily targeted at Taiwan, also had the secondary domestic
political benefit of building the public’s nationalist sentiment. In later work, Scobell
challenges Ji’s contention that the PLA played a significant role in the Chinese response
or was responsible for the hawkish policy tilt (Scobell, 2000). Scobell instead interprets
the Chinese response as an example of coercive diplomacy—a strategic response
calculated based on the international environment—but does agree with Ji that the
civilian and military authorities were operating in consensus.

Within the literature probing the causes of conflict within China and Taiwan, there is a
surprising amount of attention paid to identity and related sociological dynamics.
Friedman traces the cause of the conflict at least in part to identity dynamics in the form
of aggressive Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism played a critical role in framing
how U.S. actions were interpreted, causing Chinese leaders to assume the worst about
possible motivations behind U.S. policies. U.S. efforts to defuse the situation were lost in
the assumption that Washington sought to ‘keep China down’ (Friedman, 1997). While
not specifically concerned with the crisis, Rigger’s exploration of heredity versus culture
as sources of identity, and how these contrasting identities shape positions regarding
Taiwanese independence, provides important insight as to an critical cause of the crisis
(Rigger, 1997). In short, Rigger argues that Chinese identity predicated on heritage or
bloodline (similar to the legal concept of jus sanguinis) strongly encourages a worldview
that perceives Taiwan as an inalienable part of China because the people of Taiwan,
regardless of when their ancestors arrived, are of Chinese decent. This identity also ties

241
ethnic identity to polity; to be Chinese requires governance under the Chinese state.
Ethnic and political identities are fused. Alternatively, identity predicated on culture
(similar to the concept of jus soli) lends itself to an interpretation that Taiwan now exists
as an independent entity. This identity also perceives a distinction between ethnic and
political identity. One may be ethnically Chinese without being politically Chinese.
Conflict between China and Taiwan arises from conflicts in Chinese identity. In support
of this approach, Garver notes that China sought to redefine Taiwanese identity as
Chinese (Garver, 1997, p. 17). Also in 1997, John Copper argues that the conflict arose
as a result of differing perceptions on a range of issues—Taiwan’s history, legal status,
the Taiwan issue, current relations between China and Taiwan, and the global context of
the dispute—on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. For example, while Chinese scholars
pay little attention to Taiwanese ancient and pre-history, Taiwanese researchers have
emphasized these timeframes. This difference in historical scope leads to different
perceptions regarding the importance of more recent Chinese interactions with the island
and its inhabitants; Chinese scholars tend to see them as defining, while their counterparts
in Taiwan see them as peripheral. Copper finds similar types of discrepancies arising
from differences in emphasis, judgment, and scope in the other four issue areas. While
Copper does not explore why these divergences occur, his work suggests mechanisms
operative at the social level, and that these sociological factors have political impacts.

Problematically, the work on Chinese domestic politics and sociological factors exist
largely in isolation. Scholars of Chinese politics largely leave aside considerations of

242
how identity informs worldviews and policy options, and more sociologically oriented
scholars do not connect their findings regarding Chinese identity and social patterns to
policy outcomes. This dissertation does not address this divide, but it is useful to point it
out in terms of furthering the field. In this sense, the securitization approach used by this
dissertation may be fruitful if sufficient materials about the internal workings of the
Chinese government are, or can be made, available. With respect to the United States,
the lacuna with respect to the internal dynamics of policy, particularly the relationship
between policymakers and the public, is significant. In this regard, this dissertation
makes a considerable contribution to our collective understandings of the crisis.

The case
Rhetorical foundations of ‘engagement’
The debate over China and its actions in the Taiwan Strait—somewhat unusually—took
on the contours of the division of power in Washington. The Executive Branch,
embodied in the Clinton Administration, steadfastly sought to keep U.S.-China relations
out of the realm of security. Conversely, Congress—both Houses—pushed hard to make
China’s behavior a security issue. As the overwhelming majorities voting for the
nonbinding resolution pushing Clinton to grant Taiwanese President Lee suggest, the
issue was not a partisan one, although Republicans were far more outspoken in their
effort to securitize China than Democrats.

243
In 1995-96, the Clinton Administration was in a difficult position when it came to dealing
with China. On both the domestic and international scenes, the Administration’s energy
and political capital were depleted or otherwise committed. Domestically, Clinton’s first
Administration had seen significant policy failures—notably health care reform—and
scandal seemed ever present. On the foreign policy front, the Administration was dealing
with a full-fledged crisis in the Balkans with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and
the ensuing bloodshed, with the peace process negotiations coming to a head at the same
time as the crisis broke out in the Taiwan Strait. China had also been an ongoing
problem for the Clinton Administration. While a candidate for the Presidency in 1992,
Bill Clinton criticized President George H.W. Bush strongly for his China policy,
accusing him of ‘coddling’ the regime in Beijing (New York Times, 1992). In his first
year as President, Clinton had sought to tie renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation
(MFN) trading status to improvements in human rights. The policy was largely a failure;
China refused to make even token concessions, forcing Clinton to either deny MFN status
at great economic cost or grant MFN status at great political cost. In the end, Clinton
paid the political cost, making a very public policy reversal (Mann, 1999).

The failure of Clinton’s human rights-MFN linkage, and his Administration’s policy
response, formed the rhetorical and policy foundation of Clinton’s response to the crisis
that would emerge a year later. With the failure of the MFN linkage policy obvious, the
Clinton Administration turned to a policy of ‘engagement’ as the means to pursue U.S.
interests in democratization and human rights in China. On announcing his renewal of

244
China’s MFN status in May 1994, Clinton argued that revoking MFN status would do
less for democracy and human rights in China than his new policy of engagement:

To those who argue that in view of China's human rights abuses we should revoke MFN
status, let me ask you the same question that I have asked myself over and over these last
few weeks as I have studied this issue and consulted people of both parties who have had
experience with China over many decades. Will we do more to advance the cause of
human rights if China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of
political and economic cooperation and contacts? I am persuaded that the best path for
advancing freedom in China is for the United State to intensify and broaden its
engagement with that nation. (emphasis mine) (W. J. Clinton, 1994)

To further cement the relationship between democratization and engagement, Clinton
cited two of the possibly most successful examples where U.S. political and economic
influence had given rise—at least in part—to Asian democracy:

But I believe that over the long run we're more likely to make advances if there's more
contact with the Chinese, not less; if there's more economic growth, not less—we saw
that in Taiwan and Korea—and if we are free to explicitly and aggressively pursue our
human rights agenda, as we would with any other country. (emphasis mine) (W. J.
Clinton, 1994)

In a press conference the same day, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian
and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
(shortly to be Secretary of the Treasury) Robert Rubin reiterated Clinton’s argument
regarding the connection between engagement, democracy and human rights in China.
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argued that the new approach would enable the
Administration to pursue human rights as actively as before:

245
[T]he President wanted to adopt a new approach aimed at the same strategic objectives
and to make a clear decision to delink and has done so…the President's decision is
designed to lay the basis for a long-term, sustainable relationship with China through
which we can pursue both our human rights interests and our security and economic
interests as well. [W]e will be now pursuing a very active human rights policy with
China in the context of that broader relationship. (Lake, 1994)

Future Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin introduced the term engagement, a term
that both described the Clinton policy as well as the explicit expectation that the policy
would result the in improvements in the state of democracy and human rights within
China:

Senior administration people agreed from the beginning the revocation of MFN did not
make sense, that democracy and human rights could be better served by engagement,
integration into the global community of China…the President put enormous emphasis
on what is the best way to accomplish human rights objectives. And it was this
engagement and integration of China to the rest of the world that—was his judgment, was
the best way to accomplish our human rights objectives. (emphasis mine) (Rubin, 1994)

Engagement, however, would not produce the quick results that linkage had sought. It
was by its very nature a long-term approach, a point made by Clinton and reiterated by
the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights:

And, finally, you have to look at the long-term and not just what is happening from week
to week or day to day. And over the long-term, the development of nongovernmental
organizations, a civil society, legal reform, parliamentary exchange we believe can have a
major impact on Chinese society and human rights. (Shattuck, 1994)

These points would occupy a central role in the Administration’s defense of its China
policy. In December 1994, then Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel (Sandy)
Berger repeated the connection between engagement and democratization:

246

That is, that we believe deeply that trade, that engagement does ultimately open societies
and help to open societies, but we also believe that it's not sufficient, that we also need to
vigorously work with countries to strengthen democratic institutions within those
countries on a bilateral and in this case a multilateral basis. (Berger, 1994)

In the crisis, engagement would prove to be an important bulwark for the Clinton
Administration as it sought to ward off Congressional efforts to securitize the events in
the Taiwan Strait.
1995-96: engagement versus securitization
As the historical overview indicated, the immediate origins of the crisis can be traced to
the issuance of a visa to Lee Teng-hui, enabling his visit to Cornell. The Chinese
reaction did not begin in earnest until July, but both sides of the securitization dynamic
that would follow began to lay out their approaches early. In May 1995, Senator Frank
Murkowski (R-AK) highlighted the importance of Taiwanese democracy in their push to
grant Lee a visa: “When we look at the significance of President Lee in the development
of Taiwan—they'll have free elections this year—keeping him out was a situation that
had to end, and I'm glad to see President Clinton move on it” (Greenhouse, 1995). Here
Senator Murkowski suggests that Taiwan’s new democracy provides the critical political
leverage. Never before had the issue of a visa for a Taiwanese president been an issue,
but never before had Taiwan been a democracy (or, more accurately, on the verge of full-
fledged democracy). It was Taiwan’s democracy that made the visa an issue, suggesting
that members of Congress felt that the juxtaposition of Taiwan and democracy would
resonate with the public in a way that Taiwan and authoritarianism had not previously.

247
At the same time, the Clinton Administration sought to downplay the visa, and focused
on the importance of Sino-American relations: “Let me just reiterate something I said
yesterday. Our relations with China are fundamentally important to the United States,
given China's size, its power, its history, and its location in the world. We will continue
to pursue good relations between the United States and China” (Burns, 1995a). Despite
the avowed importance of U.S.-China relations, the Administration was vulnerable. The
importance placed on Taiwanese democracy by members of Congress suggests that
shared democratic identity would resonate with the public. If this were the case, the
Clinton Administration would not have been able, politically, to ignore Taiwan’s
democracy. The Clinton Administration did not, and pushed back against implicit
argument that the Administration favored China over Taiwan:

He's [Lee Teng-hui] someone for whom we have great respect, as you know. We've said
that before. He's done a very fine job in leading Taiwan to a future which we hope will
be based on political and economic reform. We have great respect for him. He will be
treated very well when he comes to the United States. (Burns, 1995b)

Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord went further,
claiming that:

With respect to Taiwan, generally, this Administration, I would argue, has been friendlier
to Taiwan than any previous Administration, strictly within the unofficial context. The
review that we undertook and the changes we made last September, in terms of
upgrading, particularly our commercial and economic ties and other steps we took, was
the most comprehensive review since 1979. Therefore, we have been very friendly
toward Taiwan in an unofficial sense, even as we maintain relations with Beijing and
don't change the basic policy that has been pursued by several Administrations of both
political parties and different ideological viewpoints. (Lord, 1995)

248

The Administration’s efforts to present its Taiwan policy as the ‘friendliest’ toward
Taiwan of any administration suggests that the Clinton White House was concerned that
Congressional emphasis on shared U.S.-Taiwanese democracy would resonate with the
public, and as a consequence damage the political standing of the Administration. While
the arguments here are not securitization moves, the initial language presents important
insights into the role of shared democracy, or lack thereof, would play in the battle over
securitization that would take place over the ensuing year.

Starting in June, the Clinton Administration worked to keep Sino-American relations out
of the realm of security as China announced, and in July executed, plans for missile tests
and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait area. The concept of engagement played a
central role in these efforts to keep U.S.-China relations within normal politics. On June
29, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord, arguing against the claim that the United States
sought to contain—a reference to security policy of the United States during the Cold
War
10
—China explicitly referenced engagement:

That [containment] is emphatically not United States policy. We seek to engage China,
not contain it. Containment would imply that we treat China as an enemy [which would
be] a self-fulfilling prophecy. (emphasis mine) (Sciolino, 1995)

10
It is important to note here that ‘containment’ is as much a policy arising out of a successful
securitization move as the use of armed force. The policy of containment arose out of the claim that the
Soviet Union presented an existential threat to the United States both physically (i.e. might attack the U.S.)
and ideologically/politically (i.e. Soviets were aggressive in expanding the geographic scope of
communism, potentially into the U.S. and its allies). Containment policy also bore the hallmarks of the
suspension of normal politics associated with security: i.e. centralization of power and removal of
policy/issue from normal political decision-making processes. The point here is to emphasize that a
successful securitization move does not necessarily result in the use of force.

249
A little over a week later, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns again called on
engagement to defuse an effort—this time from the press—to securitize China:

Q What would you say to those who say that Vietnam would be an important ally as a
hedge against Chinese expansionism?
MR. BURNS: Oh, I wouldn't put it in those terms. I wouldn't put it in those terms at all
because we have a policy towards China which is grounded in engagement. The
President and the Secretary have talked about that many times. That was a decision made
at the beginning of this Administration—way back in 1993—that that should be the
proper posture for the future of U.S.-China relations. So I would never describe U.S.-
Vietnamese relations in that fashion. (emphasis mine) (Burns, 1995c)

As Chinese military maneuvers in July progressed, the Clinton Administration walked a
very tight line, seeking to dissuade the Chinese from acting militarily against Taiwan
while preventing or defusing securitization moves against China. To this end, the Clinton
Administration moved quickly, coupling abstracted references to peace and stability in
the region with engagement to both express disapproval and counter potential
securitization moves. On July 24, Nicholas Burns presented the peace and stability
position, conscientiously avoiding any framing that suggested Chinese actions were
threatening:

Q: Nick, do you have anything to report upon your exchanges with the Chinese on the
missile exercises now that the exercises have been going on for four days now?
MR. BURNS: We've been in contact with the Chinese Government on the issue of the
missile exercise. We do not believe this test contributes to peace and stability in the area.
It's been the long-standing policy of the United States to seek to promote peace, security,
and stability in the area of the Taiwan Strait. This is in the interest of the United States,
the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan. (emphasis mine) (Burns, 1995d)

250
When a reporter questioned whether the United States or its allies in the region might be
taking steps to counter China’s activities, Burns shut down the issue: “I think I've detailed
how we feel about the test, what we've done about it, and I'd just leave it there.”

Four days later on July 28, Secretary of State Warren Christopher made what was billed
as a major speech on U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. In it, Christopher again
highlighted the engagement policy, reiterated the long-term nature of the policy, and—as
Clinton did a year previous—tied it to democratization:

The second element of our Pacific strategic is our policy of engagement with the other
leading powers of the region, and, as I said, including especially our former cold-war
adversaries. In that connection, of course, few nations are able to play as large a role in
shaping Asia's future as is China. With its vast population, its geographic reach, its rich
history of cultural influence across Asia, its growing military power and its new
economic dynamism, China is just unique. As we shape our policy and as we conduct
our diplomacy with China, we must not allow short-term calculation to divert us from
pursuing our long-term interests. (emphasis mine) (Christopher, 1995)

What is interesting to note here is that Christopher avoids any mention of Chinese
governance in his description of the state and its uniqueness. This is not unique to the
Secretary of State; while the Clinton Administration could not argue that China was a
democracy—public awareness and the relatively recent events in Tiananmen Square
made such a claim largely impossible—not once did Clinton or his surrogates mention
China’s style of governance. The Clinton Administration’s avoidance of the authoritarian
nature of China’s government suggests an awareness that the lack of shared democracy
may be a problem for the public and that problem may work to the advantage of those
who sought to securitize China. Moreover, discussing the current nature of China’s

251
governance would undermine engagement’s message to the audience of China’s long-
term potential for democratization.

Christopher went on to reinforce the oppositional nature of engagement vis-à-vis
securitized policy approaches and ties the approach to democratization:

The policy of engagement reflects the fundamental understanding that our ability to
pursue significant common interests and to manage significant disinterests, would not be
served by any attempt to isolate or contain China. We do not intend to try to do
so…This policy has produced enormous benefits for the United States as well as for
China and Taiwan. It has helped to keep the peace, and it has helped to fuel prosperity on
both sides of the Strait, and it is certainly helping to propel Taiwan's flourishing
democracy. (emphasis mine) (Christopher, 1995)

According to Christopher, peace in the region—the opposite of the existential threat
required for securitization—could only be attributed to engagement, and as a
consequence security policies like containment or isolation would only impair efforts to
return the region to its peaceful state. Moreover, transitioning Sino-American relations
into a security framework would damage the ability of the U.S. to replicate with China
the process that resulted in the democratization of Taiwan.

Throughout August, the Clinton Administration held to its dual line of engagement while
carefully pushing China to suspend military operations. On August 1, Defense
Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon, following on from his State Department
colleagues, denied securitizing China:

252
Q: Can you make any comment on the New York Times article…regarding Beijing
seeing the United States as plotting to thwart the PRC? Can you respond to that
specifically with regard to the military conspiring to undermine China militarily?
BACON: We are not conspiring to undermine China militarily. Quite the opposite. We
believe strongly in the one China policy. We see China as an emerging world power and
a country with which we want to have constructive relations, and we're working hard to
have constructive relations with China. Of course constructive relations require
constructive activity by both partners, and we are working to realize that on both sides of
the relationship. (emphasis mine) (Bacon, 1995a)

Note that once again, the Administration refrained from mentioning what nature of
China’s emerging power. While Bacon does not reference ‘engagement,’ he twice claims
that the U.S. sought to have ‘constructive’ relations with the PRC, a positive term
communicating a normal, working, positive relationship. Two weeks later Bacon—while
denying the U.S. military had contingency plans—was forced to react to further Chinese
military activity:

Q: China began its latest round of military exercises in the China Sea today. Since you
have had more time to find out about the exercises, do you have any new comment on
this, and more specific comment on this latest round of exercises?
BACON: We want to see peace and stability in Asia, and particularly in the Straits of
Taiwan. We believe this is in our interest, in China's interest, and in the interest of the
people of Taiwan. So we're hopeful that China will not be overly provocative in these
exercises. We also believe that it would be helpful to China—and for the cause of
stability in Asia—if China were to resume its security dialogue with us which has been
interrupted recently, and we hope that will happen. (Bacon, 1995b)

Bacon, like his colleagues in other branches of the Executive Branch, sought to downplay
China’s military activity. ‘Peace and stability,’ were in the interests of all the parties
according to Bacon, a positive statement that avoids suggesting that Chinese activities
may present a threat to peace, stability, or U.S. interests. Rather than directly confront
the issue and criticize China, Bacon used positive terminology—‘hopeful’—while

253
suggesting that Chinese activity might be provocative without being threatening. He
concludes with a call for China to return to the normal, indeed democratic sounding,
‘dialogue’ that characterized relations until recently.

Through the end of August, the Clinton Administration had made its position clear. It
sought to avoid securitizing China and used the concept of engagement as a tool for
defusing potential securitization moves, largely on the part of the press who suggested
that the U.S. was seeking to contain China. When the Administration did comment on
China’s behavior, critiques were couched indirectly and in positive terminology. The
Clinton White House sought to keep Sino-American relations clearly in the realm of
normal politics. Starting in September, however, the Administration confronted a more
direct effort to securitize China from Congress. In making a securitization move and
criticizing Administration policy toward China, Representative Peter King (R-NY),
employed an approach directly opposite to that deployed by the Clinton Administration.
King regularly focused on China’s governance type, contrasted Taiwanese democracy
against Chinese authoritarianism, and emphasized both the irrationality of the Chinese
regime as well as its threat. In sending First Lady Hillary Clinton to a United Nations
conference on women’s issues hosted by China, the Clinton Administration was
“providing the veneer of moral respectability,” to an “outlaw regime such as the People's
Republic of China,” which “routinely trample[s] the human rights of all its citizens,”
including the “execut[ion of] 16 political dissidents in preparation for this [women’s]
conference” (Representative Peter T. King (R-NY), 1995). From the outset, King

254
predicated his assessment of China on the political character of the government in
Beijing. However, the women’s conference was not the real problem for King. By
sending the First Lady, Clinton had cast doubt “on the willingness of the United States to
resist mainland China's increasingly aggressive actions against Taiwan.” This was no
small matter for King; after outlining the long relationship between the U.S. and the
important role trade with Taiwan played in the U.S. economy, the Representative turned
to the crux of the matter:

Taiwan's greatest achievement, however, has been its attainment of an open, democratic
society…Taiwan now has a robust political system, with a particularly combative
National Assembly. In March 1996 the President, heretofore elected by the legislature,
will be elected by popular vote. This will mark the first time in the history of China that a
President has been democratically elected. (emphasis mine) (Representative Peter T.
King (R-NY), 1995)

Not only was Taiwan a democracy, like the United States it was a groundbreaking
democracy, the first in all of Chinese history. King went on to characterize the PRC
reaction to this historically momentous occasion:

Unfortunately…Taiwan's economic might and its embrace of democracy have enraged
the PRC which has reacted aggressively…The PRC's response to President Lee's visit has
bordered on the hysterical. (emphasis mine) (Representative Peter T. King (R-NY),
1995)

The Chinese reaction to the Taiwanese embrace—very positive term suggesting peaceful,
positive, and willing conversion—of a style of governance similar to that of the U.S. had
been greeted by the ‘outlaw’ Communist authorities on the mainland with the opposite:
rage and aggression. King’s use of the terms ‘enraged,’ ‘hysterical,’ and ‘aggressive’ ties
into public conception of nondemocracies as irrational and unpredictable; they are willing

255
to use force to resolve political disputes. Having laid the groundwork for constructing
China as a threat based on its nondemocracy, King completed the securitization move by
arguing that the Chinese posed an existential threat not only to Taiwan—a state of value
as a fellow democracy—but directly to U.S. interests:

Clearly the PRC is attempting to use the threat of invasion to intimidate the people of
Taiwan into rejecting President Lee and adopting a docile foreign policy. If the PRC is
successful in carrying out this extortion and subverting the democratic process in
Taiwan, the United States will only be encouraging further PRC aggression in the region
against Japan and the Philippines and we will be severely marginalized as a Pacific
power. In short we will have allowed the PRC to establish Asian hegemony. (emphasis
mine) (Representative Peter T. King (R-NY), 1995)

Failure of the United States to treat China as the threat it was would result in the loss of
Taiwanese democracy as well as aggression against long standing—and democratic—
U.S. allies and the loss of U.S. influence in a large, and critical region of the world.
While King did not argue that China would strike directly at the U.S., the threat to the
United States was no less pressing. King’s assessment of threat—to the United States, to
its allies, and to democracy in general—was tied directly to the authoritarian nature of
China’s regime. While there is a strategic aspect to King’s argument—the loss of U.S.
influence and the rise of PRC hegemony—his securitization move was fundamentally
predicated on the nature of the regimes involved. It was not a strategic argument, and
would not be successful unless it was tapping into a public democratic identity.

256
King’s approach to China would set the pattern for ensuing efforts to securitize China. In
October 1995, Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA) made similar arguments while
urging President Clinton to take a strong stand:

[I]t must be made clear by the President that our support for the freedom and democracy
of Taiwan cannot be compromised and that continued attempts by Beijing to intimidate
Taiwan or to undermine the political stability in Taipei, through the use of missile and
artillery firings off the coast of Taiwan are unacceptable…They [Taiwan] are a strong
democracy committed to the freedoms enjoyed and promoted by the United States and
other democracies throughout the world. (Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA), 1995)

Clearly, shared democracy with Taiwan plays a central role in Gallegly’s assessment of
the situation. Like King, Gallegly contrasts free and democratic Taiwan against the
military response of Beijing. Also like King, Gallegly drew attention to the irrational
nature of the PRC, characterizing the Chinese response as a “temper tantrum” and
“bullying.” While Gallegly does not specifically call for securitizing China, his call for a
‘clear’ stand by Clinton indicates that the Clinton Administration’s relatively gentle
approach was inappropriate and suggests that a more stringent stand is necessary.

In October, the Clinton Administration pushed back against the Congressional
securitization argument. At the end of the month, President Clinton and met with
Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New York. While the meeting was conducting largely
out of the public eye, the Administration sought to defuse Congressional securitization
moves by once again highlighting its policy of engagement and indicating that the New
York meeting would begin a process of dialogue—essentially, that there was no need to
move Sino-American relations into the security realm (McCurry, 1995). More significant

257
was a speech given by Secretary of Defense William Perry, the Administration’s first
major speech on China policy. In keeping with the Administration’s overall
desecuritization strategy, Perry raised the policy of engagement at the outset of the
speech:

These factors [world's most populous country, fourth largest economy in the world, major
military power, nuclear power, permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council]
lead to the inescapable conclusion that China is becoming a major world power. As
China does so, it is inescapable that China's interest will sometimes harmonize and
sometimes conflict with those of the United States. The government of the United States
recognizes this fundamental fact. Our response to it as a policy of comprehensive
engagement with China. (emphasis mine) (Perry, 1995)

Note that once again, there is no mention of China’s government, only a reference to
occasional conflicts of interest between the two countries that engagement is designed to
deal with; no securitization is required. Perry proceeds to reiterate what the
Administration means when it talks about engagement. In contrast to the
characterizations of an irrational China made by members of Congress, engagement was
designed to account for “important common interests and that these interests make
dialogue more rational than confrontation.” Thus, the implicit claim is that those in
Congress who seek confrontation are the irrational actors in the situation, not the
governments of the PRC and the United States. Perry emphasized the critical core of
engagement as an anti-securitization discourse: the long-term promise of democratization
in China:

This dialogue will help us reinforce positive developments in China and encourage China
to become a stabilizing influence in the region and in the world…In the long run, change

258
is coming to China. For example, while Beijing still abuses human rights activists,
market reforms are leading to the rapid development of laws that place increasing
constraints on government and ultimately will empower citizens to defend basic civil
rights. (Perry, 1995)

Indeed, there was already evidence that the promise of democratization was being
realized:

While the ruling Communist Party often practices politics in the old Cold War ways,
there is growing experimentation at the village level with democratic elections. (Perry,
1995)

Engagement was the only way to proceed according to Perry:

The direction of these changes suggests it is more likely than not that long-term change in
China will favor our interest. Seeking to contain and confront China can only slow down
the pace of this change. (Perry, 1995)

Perry’s, and by extension the Administration’s, argument was simple. Confronting or
containing (i.e. securitizing) China would be counterproductive. The policy of
engagement would eventually produce a democracy in China and eliminate whatever
problems—which go unmentioned—the United States and China faced currently. Keep
Sino-American relations within the realm of normal politics, the argument claims, and
shared democracy will become a reality. The desecuritization move depends not on
China currently operating as a democracy, but that it will be in the future.

While the press noted Chinese military maneuvers in November, members of Congress
were largely silent on the issue. The Clinton Administration remained upbeat and

259
consistent in claiming the, “longstanding policy of the United States [is] to seek to
promote peace and security and stability in the area of the Taiwan Straits. This is in the
interest of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and of Taiwan. We hope
that both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China will refrain from any actions which
would increase tensions in the area (Burns, 1995e).

Beginning with the new Congressional session in January 1996, the securitization effort
began again in earnest. Like his predecessors in the effort to securitize China,
Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY) pinned his securitization move on the nature of
China’s governance:

The editorial [to be included in the Congressional Record] alludes to the obvious
differences between Communist China and democratic Taiwan in terms of human rights,
democratic development, and economic performance. The only area left out is foreign
policy orientation. Taiwan is unabashedly pro-Western and pro-United States.
Communist China is unabashedly the opposite. It is a rogue regime, an enemy of
freedom and yes, an enemy of the United States. (emphasis mine) (Representative
Gerald Solomon (R-NY), 1996a)

Solomon uses democratic Taiwan to accentuate the nondemocratic nature of the PRC
regime. Fundamentally, the securitization move—and there can be no doubt this is a
securitization move as Solomon labels China as ‘an enemy’—like those that came before
is predicated on the nondemocratic nature of the government in Beijing. Later that
month, Representative Sherrod Brown (D-OH)—in discussing China’s threat to
democratic Taiwan—implicitly connected China’s autocratic regime to the reported

260

threat that China would use nuclear weapons against the United States (Representative
Sherrod Brown (D-OH), 1996).
11

February 1996 marked an intensification of securitization efforts and a very limited
expansion of the desecuritization effort to Congress. On the first day of the month, a
securitization move by Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA) marked an innovation,
connecting China to significant security threats in the past. Horn started by underlining
the autocratic nature of China by contrasting it against democratic Taiwan:

This free election is the culmination of years of reform in the political process in Taiwan.
It is an obvious contradiction to those who say that Asian cultures cannot and do not
support widespread democratic reforms. That is the view by many of the autocrats of
Asia. Sadly, it is also the view within some Western circles. March 23 will be an
historic date in the advance of freedom during this troubled century. There is no freedom
for the 1.1 billion people of mainland China. There is growing economic freedom. But
the aging Communist oligarchy that rules the People's Republic of China is out of step
with the aspirations of its own dynamic citizenry. (Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA),
1996)

It is to the communist government of the PRC that Horn traces the threat to both Taiwan
and the United States, noting that the “government in Beijing…[has been] threatening the
lives of not only the people of Taiwan, but even the United States. In an appalling turn,
the veiled threat of nuclear destruction has been leveled against Taiwan and the United

11
While not directly related to the Taiwan Crisis, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich contributed to the
collective securitization move a month later in early February when he claimed the United States faced a
future nuclear threat from “China or Iran or Korea or some place like that.” He went on to envisage an
angry China launching a nuclear strike against Los Angeles (Sciolino, 1996). Here Gingrich securitizes
China by tapping into the latent securitization already in place with respect to nuclear weapons. He also
implicitly grounds his assessment of the threat to regime type by grouping China with Iran and North
Korea. The common link between the three and the unnamed ‘someplace like that’ is authoritarian
governance.

261
States.” Horn then connects the current events to the only case when U.S. and Chinese
forces faced each other in war:

Shortly before the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, it was suggested by the
American Secretary of State that the Korean peninsula was outside of direct United States
interests. This played a large part in encouraging the leaders of North Korea that the
United States would not interfere with their plans to reunify Korea by force. The recently
dedicated memorial on the Mall to the thousands of Americans who died to prevent
aggression is proof that they were wrong. (Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA), 1996)

The analogy of the Korean War functions to tie the claimed Chinese threat to concrete
historical events. The possibility of armed conflict between the United States and China
is no mere hypothetical; it has happened and may happen again. China remains
communist and the United States is at risk, by failing to treat China as a security threat, of
allowing history to repeat itself. Using the historical analogy grants legitimacy and
immediacy to Horn’s claim of a China threat. However, the analogy only strengthens his
securitization move; the core of the move rests on the autocratic regime in Beijing. Were
the communists no longer in power, the analogy would fail.

A week later, in arguing for a forceful U.S. response, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) left no
doubt as to the connection between governance type and the threat posed to the United
States:

Mr. President, the best way to avoid force or to avoid giving a dictator and a dictatorship
the appetite that will not be satisfied with conquering one area is to make clear that that
will be resisted by the community of nations. I am not talking about the use of American
troops, but I think American air power clearly ought to be brought to bear if such an
eventuality should take place. (emphasis mine) (Senator Paul Simon (D-Il), 1996)

262

While Simon ostensibly seeks to avoid the use of force, he argues that the only way to
deal with authoritarian regimes—which inherently pose a threat through their
expansionist tendencies—is with a solid security response. If the authoritarian regime
sees the community of nations debating the appropriate response, they will act
aggressively. Simon’s call for a strong response backed by the willingness to use force
implicitly removes the issue from normal political processes and places it into the realm
of security.

With the rising military tensions in the Strait and the increasing pressure from
Congressional securitization moves, the Clinton Administration became more direct in its
refutation of a Chinese threat. On the same day Senator Simon made his securitization
move, Secretary of Defense specifically argued that China did not pose a threat to the
United States:

At this point at least, with the present level of concern but no imminent danger, I don't
believe we will make a statement more definite than that…I am concerned about the
military maneuvering the Chinese are doing to—in not so subtle ways—threaten Taiwan,
to try to influence their election…I'm concerned about the military buildup that's going
on in China today. I do not see this as a threat yet, but I am concerned. (Associated
Press, 1996a)

Later in February, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) mounted a rare Congressional defense of
the Administration’s desecuritized approach to China. Like members of the Clinton
Administration, Nunn focused on engagement and its promise on long-term change:

263
American engagement is essential. We are not likely to significantly affect events over
the short run, but—by engaging in dialog about our mutual interests and our grievances,
by speaking in clear terms in this dialog; by participating in China's development; by
greater military transparency between our countries; by helping to educate China's next
generation of intellectuals, which we are doing by assisting it in alleviating some of its
economic and institutional problems—its evolution is more likely to be in directions
favorable to peace and stability in the Pacific as well as to American interests… Even
were China to embark a process that we would call democratization, the development
would be a lengthy one. (Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), 1996)

The hallmarks of the Clinton Administration’s desecuritized approach are evident here.
Nunn emphasizes the long-term nature of the policy and the promise that China will
eventually evolve in ways domestically that will be favorable to peace and stability in the
region, i.e. in a democratic direction. While Nunn does not go as far as Perry does in his
October speech, the senator also cites evidence of China’s future progress present then:

It [China] has modified its social and cultural control over its people, so that its
authoritarian government, while still harsh, has moved far from the reign of terror of the
cultural revolution days. While far from acceptable by our present standards, by every
conceivable measure, China's treatment of its own people in 1996 is far better than at the
time of President Nixon's opening in 1972 and President Carter's normalization in 1979.
(Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), 1996)

The message here is the same as in Perry’s speech: engagement works. The United
States should keep Sino-American relations within normal politics to guarantee the
peaceful future offered by shared democracy.

As the military exercises intensified in March 1996, the Clinton Administration became
more aggressive in its approach as it denied that China posed a threat. During the 1995
military exercises, the Administration avoided mentioning that fact that China was
conducting military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, usually admonishing China to act in a

264
responsible way or in a manner that would contribute to the peace and stability in the
area. Statements spoke to U.S. interests in peace, but did not express concern at Chinese
actions. The shift in tone by March 5 was evident in comments made by Nicholas Burns:

I think, as we've said before, these missile exercises are designed to intimidate the people
of Taiwan before the Taiwanese elections. We're concerned by this announcement and
by this prospective action. Our Embassy in Beijing today has expressed these concerns
to the Government of the People's Republic of China, and that expression of concern will
be reiterated to the Chinese Embassy here this afternoon by a senior official of the State
Department. Those concerns are well known. Those concerns have not changed. There
have been missile tests in the past which we found to be unproductive and destabilizing.
(Burns, 1996a)

Despite the harsher rhetoric from the Clinton Administration, it still sought to avoid
securitization:

Our judgment is that there is no imminent threat of a Chinese invasion or attack or
military action against Taiwan. We do not believe there is an imminent threat. We've
said that consistently over the last two months, and we stand by that judgment…When
we say there's no imminent threat of a Chinese attack or military action on Taiwan, that
really gets to a political question, a question of political motivation. We don't believe it's
there—the motivation to attack. We believe the motivation is to intimidate. (Burns,
1996a)

An emphasis on engagement also remained at the forefront. Various spokespersons for
the Clinton Administration, including the foremost civilian authority on defense matters
Defense Secretary William Perry would echo Burns’ claim that Chinese actions did not
pose a threat (Perry, 1996). At one point, State Department spokesman Glyn Davies
argued that a Chinese warning to the United States to stay clear of the Taiwan Strait was
not a threat:

265
Q Do you have a response on the Chinese Premier's warning that the U.S. naval forces
should not sail through the Taiwan Straits?
MR. DAVIES: Our reading of this so-called threat is that there was no threat; that if you
read Chinese Premier Li Peng's words carefully—and we have people who are paid to do
that—they in fact have not threatened U.S. forces operating near Taiwan. That's what we
come up with as we look carefully at those statements. (Davies, 1996)

On March 6, the day after Burns’ press conference, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
John Shattuck cited engagement and its long-term scope in waving off an argument that
U.S. policy had not changed China’s human rights record (Shattuck, 1996). The
following day—March 7—while Nicholas Burns warned of consequences should China’s
missile testing go wrong (Tyler, 1996b), he also claimed the U.S. saw no threat in
Chinese behavior. In response to a direct question regarding the possibility of changing
Chinese military behavior through isolation, Burns again turned to engagement:

We are opposed to any policy, and we would not follow a policy of isolating China. We
are engaged in a policy of discussion and activity and, in general, engagement with
China. China is too big a country to be isolated. China plays too important an [sic] role
in the world to be isolated, so therefore we must work with China. (emphasis mine)
(Burns, 1996b)

Even as the U.S. took military steps to address the situation, the Clinton Administration
constructed the moves in a desecuritized frame. As the Independence and Nimitz CBGs
moved into position, Nicholas Burns claimed the largest U.S. naval presence in the region
since Vietnam was there to ‘monitor’ the situation (Burns, 1996c). The ambiguous
response prompted a reporter to push for a more detailed response:

266
Q Since your analysis is that there is no Chinese plan to attack Taiwan—that there's no
military danger to Taiwan—could you kind of explain in greater detail why two aircraft
carriers are being sent to the area?
MR. BURNS: To note the great concern that the United States has over the testing of
missiles in close proximity to Taiwan and the introduction of live-fire exercises. The
general climate that's been created by that, which we think is not conducive to peace or a
constructive discussion of issues. It notes our interest. We are a Pacific power. We are a
Pacific country. We have all sorts of interests in that part of the world, in the western
Pacific. It notes those interests. It's a signal meant to convey the strong interest that we
have in a peaceful outcome to these differences. (Burns, 1996c)

While the United States had sent a massive amount of military hardware to the area near
Taiwan, suggesting the Clinton Administration had securitized China internally, Burns
used language emphasizing the opposite. The CBGs were there to facilitate a climate that
would allow for peace and ‘constructive discussion of issues.’

An exchange at the March 7 highlights the difficulty facing the Administration and its
efforts to keep China from being securitized. At the same time as the crisis, the Helms-
Burton Act was making its way through Congress. The act strengthened U.S. sanctions
against Cuba. Supportive of the measure, a reporter challenged Burns as to the difference
between the countries.

The difference is that China is a very large country with over a billion people in Asia
which is a global power and whose actions have a critical impact on United States
national security interests. We believe that in the case of China, it being a vastly different
country culturally and historically and politically and economically than Cuba, the only
correct policy is to try to work through differences while you engage them on those
differences…Cuba is the only authoritarian country in the entire hemisphere…Cuba has
isolated itself. It's out of touch. It's got policies that made sense perhaps for leftist
revolutionaries in the 1960s—that are completely antiquated. It deserves to be isolated,
and it is effectively isolated…Cuban policies are repressive at home, antiquated in terms
of Cuban foreign policy. They are a major violator of international law. They're close to
our shores. They're out of step with the hemisphere. They deserve to be isolated. They

267
can be isolated, and they will be isolated until the regime changes; until one day when
democracy comes to Cuba. That will be a great day. (emphasis mine) (Burns, 1996b)

Interestingly, Burns used the same type of language toward Cuba that members of
Congress used in their securitization moves with respect to China. Burns focuses on
Cuba’s authoritarian nature as the central reason why the country needed to be isolated,
i.e. securitized. The threat would only be gone when Cuba became a democracy. Cuba
was stagnant and unchanging. With China, by contrast, the United States was engaging
on the difference between the two countries. China was changing, dynamic, moving
forward in the way engagement promised while Cuba was beyond the redemption of
engagement. Certainly, there are strategic elements to the argument here, but the appeal
to democratic identity is powerful. Burns’ effort to draw out distinctions between China
and Cuba, however, highlights the vulnerability of the Administration to securitization
efforts grounded in the democratic identity of the public.

Not surprisingly, the uptick in China’s military behavior in March prompted an increase
in Congressional securitizing moves. March 6, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK) cited
the threat posed to the United States from Chinese nuclear weapons and explicitly raised
the issue of China’s actions in Tiananmen Square in 1989 before arguing that the United
States “cannot idly watch a peaceful, democratic ally—which Taiwan is—be threatened”
(Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), 1996). The next day Senator Paul Simon repeated
his call for a strong U.S. position and raised doubts as to the Administration’s claims that
China would not attack Taiwan:

268

While it is probable that China will not invade Taiwan in the near future, or launch a
missile attack, people struggling for leadership power sometimes do irrational things.
And public officials are risk-takers. No one becomes a United States Senator without
taking risks, and no one moves into leadership in China without taking risks.
The lesson of history is that dictators who seize territory and receive praise for it from
their own controlled media are not likely to have their appetite satisfied with one bite of
land. If China should turn militaristic and seize Taiwan , that would be only the first
acquisition. Mongolia to the north is a likely next target, and as we should have learned
from Hitler, dictators can always find some historic justification for further actions.
12
I personally would favor a strong response with air power by the United States and other
nations, if an attempt were made to invade Taiwan or an appropriate military response if
they launch a missile attack, but the means of responding militarily do not need to be
spelled out. (Senator Paul Simon (D-Il), 1996)

As with his previous call for strong action, Simon underlined the threat posed by
dictators. What is new here is his reference to Hitler, which draws on a historical analogy
where an aggressively expansive dictator far from U.S. shores posed a grave threat to the
United States. The message is clear: China’s distance does not eliminate the threat to the
United States. As before, Simon’s securitization move is directly predicated on the
nature of China’s government.

The major securitization move in Congress came on March 19, when House Concurrent
Resolution 148, entitled “A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress

12
The use of historical analogies—notably Simon’s reference to Hitler and Murkowski’s reference to
Tiananmen Square—are suggestive of work in the foreign policy analysis literature on the role of
analogical reasoning in the decision-making process (Houghton, 2001; Khong, 1992). There is a
significant difference between the use of analogies here and the work on analogical reasoning. That
literature focuses on the cognitive processes whereby policymakers use (and abuse) historical analogies in
their effort to develop, assess, and select policy options. It says almost nothing about the role of analogies
in the interaction between policymakers and the public. Indeed, Khong partitions off the use of analogies
in the justification of policy as part of the ‘skeptics’ argument against analogical reasoning as an individual
level heuristic (Khong, 1992, p. 8). However, Khong’s discussion raises interesting questions regarding the
use of analogies in the public sphere: why are they used in the securitization process and what impact do
they have? The securitization approach used in this dissertation and the presence of analogies in
securitization moves suggests a possible avenue of future inquiry regarding the role of analogy in the
securitization move writ large. However, such a project is beyond the scope of the current dissertation.

269

regarding missile tests and military exercises by the People's Republic of China,” passed
the House of Representative by a vote of 369-14.
13
The bill itself strongly indicated that
China posed a threat to the United States and its interests. According to the bill, China
was guilty of:

intense efforts to intimidate Taiwan have reached a level that threatens to undermine
stability throughout the region… threat[s] to use military force against
Taiwan…[conducting] military maneuvers and tests have included the firing of 6
nuclear-capable missiles [which caused] the interruption of international shipping and
aviation lanes threaten[ing] both Taiwan and the political, military, and commercial
interests of the United States and its allies. (emphasis mine) (Representative Christopher
Cox (R-CA), 1996a)

The litany of offensive actions at least partially ties into existing securitization when it
specifies Chinese missiles as ‘nuclear-capable.’ The response to Chinese aggression was
a clear securitization move:

the United States is committed to the military stability of the Taiwan Straits and United
States military forces should defend Taiwan in the event of invasion, missile attack, or
blockade by the People's Republic of China, [including] maintain[ing] its capacity to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan, consistent with its undertakings
in the Taiwan Relations Act. (Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), 1996a)

While the bill does not specifically highlight the authoritarian nature of the PRC, it does
underline the democratic nature of the ROC:

the United States and Taiwan have enjoyed a longstanding and uninterrupted friendship,
which has only increased in light of the remarkable economic development and political
liberalization in Taiwan in recent years [as] has reached a historic turning point in the

13
The Senate version of the bill passed two days later by an even stronger margin: 97-0.

270
development of Chinese democracy, as on March 23, 1996, it will conduct the first
competitive, free, fair, direct, and popular election of a head of state in over 4,000 years
of recorded Chinese history. (Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), 1996a)

Supporters of the bill also went to great pains to highlight the authoritarian nature of the
regime in Beijing. Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) accused the Administration
of appeasement, an allusion connecting the Chinese government to the totalitarian Nazi
threat of World War II. Gilman argued that the Administration’s “accusations about
isolation, containment, and political transition periods avoid hard questions of how to
deal pragmatically and effectively with a totalitarian government with enormous
resources to cause havoc.” Not only is Gilman identifying the Chinese leadership as
totalitarian (worse than authoritarian) and sourcing instability to that totalitarian nature,
he is challenging the engagement concept and the borrowed democracy on which it
depends. Gilman also drew a parallel between the crisis and the Korean War, repeating
the securitized historical linkage Stephen Horn made in February. Gilman summed up
his assessment of threat, and the central role governance plays in that assessment, neatly:
“Democracies and dictatorships are fundamentally different and will always clash”
(Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), 1996).

Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY) used historical analogy and China’s regime type
in his securitization move:

But, first of all, let me say this: Why should the United States come to the rescue of a
small island country halfway around the world? Let me tell you why: Because we are
proud Americans and we pay our debts. For those that might not be able to remember,
because the people of Taiwan, they came to our rescue. We, the United States of

271
America, standing shoulder to shoulder against the Japanese imperialists that threatened
our freedoms. Do you remember that in World War II? Shoulder to shoulder they stood
with us when we were about to lose that war. Then standing shoulder to shoulder again,
for 40 years, they were an integral link in the chain of defense against the spread of
deadly, atheistic communism, that threatened the freedoms of every single American in
this world. They stood as one of the strongest links in that chain of defense against the
spread of that deadly communism.
So, yes, we have a moral obligation to defend them against that same deadly, atheistic
communism that now threatens their very freedoms, that democracy, that is similar to our
own. (emphasis mine) (Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY), 1996b)

Solomon uses the historical analogy to draw a parallel between the Japanese in World
War II and the Chinese of 1996. Just as the Japanese fifty years prior, the Chinese posed
a direct threat to the United States and its freedoms and democracy. Just as in World War
II and the Cold War—the two supreme and universally recognized security threats to the
U.S. in the latter half of the twentieth century—the United States needed to stand once
again ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the Taiwanese against a common threat. The centrality
of governance type in the threat construction is nearly overwhelming. The ‘imperialist’
Japanese correspond to the ‘deadly, atheistic’ communists of China. In both cases, the
external regime was not democratic, and because of that, it threatened the core of
American identity: democracy.

Gilman and Solomon typified the pattern of securitization. Representative Dana
Rohrabacher, (R-CA) argued that in the face of the “largest and most heinous opponent
and oppressor of people on this planet, the Communist dictatorship in China,” the United
States needed to “reassert to those dictators on the mainland of China that we side with
the democratic people of the world, especially in the Republic of China , and we will not
tolerate their expansionism or their threats or any other activities that threaten their

272
neighbors” (Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), 1996). Enid Waldholtz (R-UT)
claimed that “what is at stake here is not just the viability of democracy in Taiwan , but
the peace and security of the entire Asiatic region and the world” (Representative Enid
Waldholtz (R-UT), 1996). Toby Roth held that the “United States will assist the
democracies of the world in defending against tyranny and oppression” and complained
that the “My only argument with the resolution I am going to vote for is I do not think it
is explicit enough” (Representative Toby Roth (R-WI), 1996). Peter Deutsch (D-FL)
asserted that, in the face of “Beijing's carefully crafted strategy designed to suffocate
democracy in Taiwan…The American people will not tolerate such a grave threat to our
own national security” (Representative Peter Deutsch (D-FL), 1996). George Nethercutt
(R-WA) concluded “It is right for America to defend Taiwan's progress and prevent an
autocratic and militaristic Chinese regime from threatening Taiwan and our Pacific
allies” (Representative George Nethercutt (R-WA), 1996).

Christopher Cox (R-CA), the original sponsor of the legislation, sums up the argument
thus:

It is very, very important that the United States of America make clear to the People's
Republic of China that a war of aggression waged against the democracy on Taiwan will
not be accepted, not by the United States, not by the free world, and that is the world that
Taiwan is joining, because right now, in the days ahead, Taiwan is preparing for the first
ever free, fair, open, and democratic elections of a head of government in nearly 5,000
years of Chinese history.
Communism, which continues to reign in the People's Republic of China, is the
antithesis of democracy…Right now, the People's Republic of China is
threatening freedom in the world because they are threatening this military
invasion…Naked military aggression targeted against a democracy is something

273
that everyone here should understand threatens each of us. (emphasis mine)
(Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), 1996b)

Central to Cox’s construction of the threat, as is the case in the collective Congressional
securitization move, is the autocratic nature of the authorities in Beijing. This
authoritarian nature is the fundamental basis for the threat construction. It is not a
construction based on strategic security or economic security, it is a construction
predicated on a public identity rooted in democracy. That identity gives discursive power
to the shared democracy with Taiwan and the threat posed by Chinese communism.
Without shared democratic identity, military aggression against democracy in Taiwan
would not pose a threat to Americans.
Public response
The March 23 election in Taiwan and the subsequent termination of China’s military
maneuvers effectively ended the crisis. As the preceding data indicates, there was a
concentrated effort by members of Congress to securitize China, and an equally
concerted effort by the Administration to desecuritize China. In both cases, although
more obliquely in Administration discourse, the arguments were grounded in the
governance of China and Taiwan as they related to the United States.

At the outset of the crisis, China was not a central concern for the public. In a June 1995
poll—prior to the start of China’s first military exercises—only 6% of respondents
indicated that China was the most serious foreign policy issue facing the United States
(NBC News & Wall Street Journal, 1995a). In August 1995, despite two months of

274

Chinese military exercises, the public was ambivalent toward China. Roughly equal
numbers saw China as a friend (25%) and an enemy (24%), with a plurality (45%)
indicating China was neither a friend nor enemy of the United States.
14
(Louis Harris &
Associates, 1995a). These results were not a product of general public ignorance of
China or the nature of the regime in Beijing. Another August poll showed that the vast
majority of respondents (82%) place the status of personal freedoms in China at 5 or
lower on a 10 point scale, with almost a quarter of respondents placing China at 1—the
lowest level of personal freedom (Gallup Organization, 1995). At the same time, two-
thirds of Americans felt that the U.S. should not get involved in the internal affairs of
China, even at the cost of ignoring human rights (Times Mirror, 1995a). At the time
(August), Americans also felt Sino-American relations were stable: only 22% indicated
that relations were getting worse. The majority thought that relations were “staying about
the same” (53%) or improving (16%) (Times Mirror, 1995b).

The ambivalence toward China and the relative lack of engagement by the public early in
the crisis is not surprising. In the early months, the security narrative was dominated by
the Clinton Administration, which sought to keep Sino-American relations within normal
politics. The public was disengaged because the Clinton Administration, like a police
officer at the scene of an accident, was waving the public by while announcing that there
was nothing to see. However, there are indications that engagement as a strategic tool

14
For reference, a poll conducted in August showed a large majority of Americans (64%) felt Taiwan was a
close ally (14%) or a friend (50%) of the U.S. Only 5% indicated that Taiwan was an enemy and less than
a quarter felt Taiwan was neither friend nor enemy (Louis Harris & Associates, 1995b). The vast
difference in perception by the public suggests that perceptions of outside actors were filtered at least in
part through democratic public identity.

275

borrowing future Chinese democracy to desecuritize China in the present would be
problematic. Taiwan—a pseudo-state that had held legislative elections since 1980 and
was preparing for its first Presidential election—enjoyed a far more favorable perception
than China (see fn 11). The large pool of respondents who indicated that China was
neither friend nor enemy, particularly compared against Taiwan, also suggests that China
did not enjoy the benefit of public doubt that democratic external actors did.

As the Congressional securitization move began to gather force, public opinion began to
shift. By September, China had moved from the least recognized U.S. foreign policy
issue (out of six options) issue to third, ahead of relations with Russia, North Korea’s
nuclear program, and economic instability in Mexico.
15
Only trade relations with Japan
and the ongoing war in Bosnia outranked China. By the end of the first week in
November, respondents felt China was essentially tied with North Korea in terms of
perceived military threat to long-standing U.S. ally Japan (Gallup Organization, CNN, &
USA Today, 1995).
16
While there is no pre-crisis poll to compare this result to, the
comparison is astounding. In the eyes of Americans, China was perceived to be as
aggressive as North Korea, a state which made no secret of its antagonism toward the
U.S. and against which the U.S. had deployed military force for nearly 50 years. The
response—particularly compared to the disengagement evident in early polls—suggests a
significant shift in threat construction was occurring among the public.

15
The poll in May 6% of respondents indicated that China was the most important issue. In the September
poll, the number was up to 11% (NBC News & Wall Street Journal, 1995b).

16
42% indicated China, 43% indicated North Korea.

276

This shift, however, seemed unstable and public opinion was far from coherent. In
January, during the lull in the crisis, the polls indicated that the public had a marginally
favorable view of China. A slight majority (49%) indicated that they viewed China
favorably while 45% felt negatively toward China (Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA
Today, 1996a).
17
Responses to a February poll regarding U.S. military involvement in
the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan demonstrated strong American unwillingness
to use military force in the region. Only 29% of respondents felt the U.S. should fight in
the event of a Chinese assault on Taiwan (Louis Harris & Associates, 1996c). A similar
number (26%) felt the U.S. should send an aircraft carrier to decrease China's influence
on Taiwan's election (Louis Harris & Associates, 1996a). The use of force, at least in
January and February was not an option for the public.
18
At the same time, however,
there is significant evidence that Americans were broadly sympathetic to Taiwan. In the
February Harris poll, 62% of respondents indicated they thought of Taiwan as a separate
and independent country, and 56% supported a Taiwanese bid for United Nations
membership even if doing so angered China (Louis Harris & Associates, 1996d). Over
two-thirds (69%) felt that Taiwan should reunify with the mainland only if the Taiwanese
wanted to. Only 2% supported Beijing’s contention that Taiwan should be reunited under
any circumstances, and a remarkable 18% said reunification should never occur (Louis

17
The poll was a version of the feeling thermometer. A negative or positive sign on the response indicated
the general feeling toward China while a numerical value (1-5) indicated the strength of the feeling, with
five being the strongest feeling. It is worth noting that while the favorable view of China was slightly
larger than the negative view, the strongly negative responses of -4 and -5 (total: 15%) were stronger than
the strongly positive responses (total: 9%).

18
It should be noted again that securitization does not necessarily mean the use of force. The polling at the
time was, however, exclusively concerned with the possible use of force. Other options were not explored.

277

Harris & Associates, 1996b). In January and February the public seemed of two minds
on the situation in the Taiwan Straits. While unwilling to commit U.S. military forces to
Taiwan’s defense and marginally favorable toward China, Americans were also strongly
supportive of Taiwan’s nation-state aspirations, to the point of being willing to anger
China. The inconsistency suggests that public opinion was unsettled. In the context of
the discursive security battle in Washington and the lack of external cues from the region,
the inconsistency is understandable.

In March, public opinion resumed its trend toward support of the Congressional position.
A poll in the second week of March showed a ten-point swing in U.S. perception of
China toward the negative. Now Americans by an 11-percentage point margin (54% to
43%) viewed China negatively (Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today, 1996b).
19
By
contrast, Taiwan’s favorability remained very high at 64% (Gallup Organization, CNN,
& USA Today, 1996c). A separate poll showed over half (52%) agreed that the United
States had ‘vital interests’ at stake in the confrontation between China and Taiwan (ABC
News & Washington Post, 1996b). The public also reversed its position on sending
CBGs to the region, approving by a margin of 54% to 35% (a nearly 30 point swing from
the February poll) Clinton’s aircraft carrier deployment (ABC News & Washington Post,
1996a). The public also become markedly more willing to deploy U.S. forces to counter
China. While respondents in February overwhelmingly (65%) refused to fight China if it
attacked Taiwan, by March the numbers were nearly even; 43% of respondents favored

19
The extreme responses became increasingly unbalanced toward the negative end as well. The very
positive response (+4 and +5 combined) remained consistent at 8%. However, the very negative response
(-4 and -5) increased to 18%.

278
the use of force to help defend Taiwan to 46% against, another major (~20 point) swing
in opinion (Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today, 1996d). The hardening of U.S.
opinion against China indicate that the Congressional securitization move—grounded in
the democratic identity of the public—had been remarkably successful as external events
lined up with the discourse. While public opinion in favor of the use of force to protect
Taiwan had not reached a majority by the end of the crisis, the success of the
Congressional securitization move—as indicated by the large swings in public opinion—
suggests that had the crisis continued, support for the use of force would have reached a
majority.
Conclusions
The case of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis provides compelling support for the thesis
of this dissertation. The theoretical framework predicts that the democratic identity of the
public plays an important role in constructing threats. In the case of China, the theory
predicts that leaders who seek to securitize (autocratic) China would emphasize the
nondemocratic nature of China’s regime, while those that sought to desecuritize China
would highlight China’s democratic characteristics. In Congress, the primary political
center behind the securitization move with respect to China, China’s authoritarianism was
front and center in the security argument. The claimed threat from China was traced
directly to the authoritarian regime in Beijing. Indeed, many members of Congress
argued that China posed a threat not just to U.S. interests, but to U.S. democracy itself.
The emphasis China’s government, and the contrast against U.S. and Taiwanese
democracy, is overwhelming. Members of Congress acted exactly as the theory predicted

279
they would, and the massive changes in public opinion in March 1996 suggests that the
grounding of the securitization move in democratic identity found resonance in the
public. The successful securitization of China in the public also suggests an explanation
for the deployment of two carrier task groups by the Clinton Administration, a move at
odds with U.S. policy to that point. It seems plausible that the Clinton administration
deployed the carrier groups to head off more drastic action from a Congress empowered
by a successful securitization move.

The role of the ‘engagement’ concept in the Clinton Administration’s effort to keep Sino-
American relations within normal politics also indicates support for the theoretical
approach of the dissertation. It is true, the Clinton Administration did not appeal to
Chinese democracy to defuse securitization moves, but in the context of the 1989
Tiananmen incident and public awareness of the regime in Beijing, such a claim would
not have been credible and thus politically useless. What the engagement concept does,
however, is borrow from the possible future democratization of China in the effort to
defuse Congressional (and media) securitization moves. In effect, the Clinton
Administration argued that securitization—embodied by isolation, containment, or
military response—would sacrifice China’s future democracy. Sino-American relations
should remain in normal politics because China would be a future democracy. In turning
to engagement, the speaker was implicitly calling upon the explicit assumptions
underlying the concept—that China would eventually democratize—to support positions
that opposed securitization. It served as a powerful discursive tool as long as

280
policymakers periodically reminded the audience of those assumptions, which the
Clinton Administration did with two major foreign policy speeches (Christopher in July
1995 and Perry in October 2005) during the crisis.

The case also suggests why the claim of China’s imminent democratization has been so
pervasive. No doubt, some China scholars and scholars of democratic development do
believe that China will shortly adopt a more democratic form of government, but there
are political reasons for supporting the democratization claim. As Mann points out,
China policy has been the preserve of the Executive Branch (Mann, 1999); the public and
Congress have had relatively little input. These Executive Branch actors, particularly the
presidency, have a vested interest in preventing the securitization of China. Yet, the
authoritarian nature of China’s governance means they have precious little leverage to
ward off securitization moves, particularly by members of Congress. To make matters
worse for the President, China is a particular type of authoritarian regime: a Communist
one. While it may be communist in name only, the name triggers automatic reference to
the highly securitized foreign policy of the United States directed toward communist
regimes during the Cold War. The claim of China’s imminent or near future
democratization enables those who seek to desecuritize China or prevent the
securitization of China in a particular context to borrow China’s future democracy to
desecuritize it in the present.

281

Finally, the strong presence of Republican members of Congress on the securitizing side
of the equation suggests an important role for ideology and belief systems in the
assessment of threat at the individual level. China, as one of the last Communist states,
represents the ideological opposite of traditional ‘conservative’ belief systems in the
United States. This ideological opposition may generate an expectation of threat, and
those on the political right in the United States (generally members of the Republican
party) will be more inclined (than if the external state were a right-wing nondemocracy)
to interpret China’s international behavior as threatening or give extra weight to
potentially threatening behavior that supports the belief that left-wing nondemocracies
are a threat. In effect, Republican’s interpret Chinese behavior in a manner that
reinforces their belief that far left ideologies (and the regimes that proclaim them) pose a
threat to the United States. Psychologists refer to this as motivated bias, and this
phenomenon may explain why Republicans are more willing to make a securitization
move with respect to China than (typically more politically left) Democrats (Frijda &
Mesquita, 2000).
20
It is worth noting, however, that while Republican’s dominate the
securitization effort, there is some participation on the part of Democrats, and in
particular Democrats perceived as representing the left in the party. Sherrod Brown (D-
OH) is one such example. Another example is Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who—while not
outspoken during this particular incident—has a long history of hard-line policy
preferences toward China (Salliday, 1998). These observations suggest an interesting
avenue of future research exploring the motivations behind the decision to make a
securitization move on the part of the individual, with a possible emphasis on macro-level

20
Khong notes a similar phenomenon in the psychology literature on Schema Theory (Khong, 1992, p. 37).

282
structures that would lead to predictions regarding who will securitize, and when they
might do so.

283

Chapter 7 | 2001: The Hainan Island EP-3 Incident
Historical overview and literature
The Cold War and the normalization of relations process, coupled with the predominance
of the Executive Branch in managing Sino-American relations (Mann, 1999), restrained
the two countries and allowed potential security incidents to be dealt with quietly.
Consequently, it is only in the post-Cold War period that scholars have an opportunity to
examine how the security process plays out in Sino-American relations. The focal point
methodology of the dissertation calls for high profile incidents to understand how public
identity influences and shapes the securitization process. In the context of Sino-
American relations, only two such focal points exist: the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis—
the subject of the previous chapter—and the 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3
surveillance aircraft and a Chinese J-8II fighter/interceptor.
1
The collision on April 1,
2001, between the top of the J-8II and the bottom of the EP-3 caused serious damage to
both planes. As a result of the collision, the jet powered J-8II crashed into the sea. The
plane was not recovered and the pilot was pronounced dead. The turboprop powered EP-
3 also sustained significant damage, but was able to land, without permission, on the
Chinese island of Hainan (Rosenthal & Sanger, 2001). The crew was held for 11 days
under generally good conditions until the United States issued the ‘two sorries’

1
There are two other possible focal points that are inapplicable from the point of view of this dissertation.
The first is the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 1999. While the incident was highly
publicized, the U.S. was the accidental ‘aggressor’, making the case unsuitable for this dissertation—
although research examining Chinese securitization should find it very useful. A second focal point may be
developing currently. News reports indicate that there have been several confrontations between U.S.
surveillance ships and the Chinese navy in the South China Sea region (Shanker & Mazzetti, 2009). While
the incidents are too recent and low profile to serve as a case here, it may prove to be a fruitful case in the
future.

284
expressing condolences for the loss of the Chinese pilot and apologizing for landing
without permission. The Chinese government released the EP-3 crew on April 11, 2001,
and eventually shipped the dismantled EP-3 back to the United States (CNN, 2001a;
Prueher, 2001; Sanger & Perlez, 2001; Smith, 2001).

Remarkably, given the significance of the EP-3 incident as one of only three major
incidents in Sino-American relations since the normalization of relations, academic work
on the incident is sparse. Despite its small size, the literature displays two clear trends.

First, there is a significant focus on legal and policy lessons. Within the policy-oriented
literature, two foci emerge. One is a clear emphasis on what happened and the policy
related response within the U.S. government (Blair & Bonfili, 2006). The second focus
rests on the dynamics of conflict resolution (i.e. negotiation) between the U.S. and China
with respect to the incident (Tuosheng, 2006; Xinbo, 2007; Yee, 2004). In both cases—
with the exception of Yee’s use of Putnam’s two-level games approach—the literature is
atheoretical; the primary concern is what happened in terms of policy and how can policy
responses be improved so that future engagements of a similar type might be handled
better. To that end, political processes, identity dynamics, and threat constructions—the
central points of concern for this dissertation, are largely unexamined; they lie outside the
authors’ scope of concern. Even Yee’s discussion of the incident and the two-level
dynamics at play mainly focuses at the domestic level on the power dynamics within the
Bush Administration and the Republican party, not on the broader domestic political

285
context or how the situation was constructed. Where these issues do intrude, they do so
as observations on external forces that intrude from time to time onto internal
policymaking behavior. Both Tuosheng and Xinbo note that the incident was grounded
in media coverage and statements by public leaders, but their point is that the media
pushed the matter out of the realm of quiet diplomacy and into the public realm, effecting
the conflict resolution process (rather than focusing on that interplay as a critical
component of security policy).

Similarly, the legalistic aspect of the literature also addresses issues tangential to this
dissertation. Literature in this area concerns itself with the legal arguments made by the
U.S. and China and how those arguments are evaluated vis-à-vis international legal
frameworks (e.g. the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea). Issues of
consistency of practice and freedom of navigation and use are at the forefront (Donnelly,
2004; Valencia & Guoxing, 2002). While the legalist approaches are more expansive
than the policy-centric literature, the results are mixed as to whether they comment on
Sino-American relations generally. Indeed, only one article in either the policy or legalist
approaches plausibly speaks to wider security issues, and it does so in noting that both the
U.S. and China couch their realpolitik sea territory policies in the language of
international law (Donnelly, 2004). However, these legal approaches, like the policy-
centric literature, are tangential to the argument put forward in this dissertation. The
factors shaping policy is not at issue for these authors.

286

Second, there is a remarkable amount of attention (given the small volume of research) to
issues of identity and language as factors effecting how the EP-3 incident transpired.
From the point of view of this dissertation—particularly given its content analysis
methodology and the speech-act grounding of securitization theory—these efforts at
exploring the incident through identity and language analysis are more interesting than
the policy and legally oriented literature. Unlike the policy/legal literature, there is no
easily discernable pattern to the linguistic based research as the articles raise issues
ranging from identity to perception to the role of conceptual metaphors. Given the
conceptual complexity of these arguments as well as their closer relationship to my
research, I am reviewing them with a bit more detail.

With respect to the role of perception, Callamari and Reveron provide an interesting case
study of China’s use of perception management during the incident (Callamari &
Reveron, 2003). Arguing that China utilized perception management techniques to shape
international and U.S. domestic opinion regarding China and the incident, Callamari and
Reveron find that The New York Times shifted its coverage from U.S.-sympathetic to
China-sympathetic in tandem with propaganda efforts put out by the Chinese government
through the Xinhua News Agency. While there are weaknesses in the paper that may be
problematic, the hypothesis put forward by Callamari and Reveron as well as their
findings suggests an interesting twist to the securitization dynamic.
2
In the case of

2
Weaknesses include a simple model of the temporal interaction between the Xinhua News Agency and
The New York Times. Because their model of the timing of stories in Xinhua and The New York Times (2
days) is fairly rudimentary and not tested for significance, it is difficult to determine whether there is
indeed a meaningful effect. Moreover, the authors do not outline or provide evidence of a connection

287

democracies, external states—particularly authoritarian states that can control their media
message effectively—may influence the securitization dynamic because the open nature
of democratic society gives external states discursive pathways to influence the
construction of security. In the case of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, if China
implemented perception management techniques, they appeared to have little or no effect
on the securitization dynamic. Indeed, on the primary issue of Chinese concern—the
sovereignty of Taiwan—U.S. public opinion was firmly against the Chinese message.

Maria Cheng’s approach is more explicitly linguistic: she analyzes the use of ‘if’
statements in charting the trajectory of the incident (Cheng, 2002). As the goal of the
policymakers changed—from ‘finger pointing’ to ‘regret’ to intense negotiations—the
use of ‘if’ phrases, what Cheng calls implicatures, changed as well. It is, however,
unclear from Cheng’s brief article who the audience of these implicatures is and what the
significance changes in them might have. It may be they may be useful as markers of
shifting framing on the part of decision-makers, giving scholars yet another proxy

between The New York Times and the Xinhua News Agency. It is not at all clear how the propaganda
measures undertaken by the Chinese were transmitted to the American media, creating the possibility of a
spurious correlation. For example, the authors cite the characterization of the EP-3 as shifting from simply
a ‘plane’ to a ‘spy-plane’ after the Chinese began using the terminology. While The New York Times may
have gotten the phrasing from the Chinese, it may have changed its terminology for a number of reasons,
including calculations that ‘spy-plane’ sells more copy than ‘plane.’ Moreover, while the headline did not
read ‘spy plane,’ the first New York Times story on the issue did characterize the plane in the body of the
story as a spy plane (Rosenthal & Sanger, 2001). Finally, while the authors do note that some in the Bush
Administration may have been affected by the Chinese persuasion management campaign (e.g. nervousness
about having an unmanned drone shot down over Afghanistan after September 11), they provide no
evidence that the Chinese approach had any effect on the U.S. public. To rephrase, it is not clear from
Callamari and Reveron’s work whether there is a translation between media coverage and public
perception.

288
window into the mind of individuals. Thus, while interesting, Cheng’s approach does not
speak to this project or its central theoretical concern.

Peter Gries and Kaiping Peng offer a theoretically grounded commentary on the affair in
their 2002 article (Gries & Peng, 2002). Arguing against both cultural essentialists—
China’s culture makes it dangerous to the U.S.—and those who dismiss the role of
culture in the incident entirely, Gries and Peng position their comments on a middle
ground. Culture is important, they claim, but not deterministic. For example, drawing of
cross-cultural psychology they point to the divergence in causal thinking as an important
difference. According to the authors, causal thinking in the West is analytic; the primary
focus is on the singular cause of the accident (which plane hit which). Conversely, in the
East causal thinking is holistic; the immediate cause of the plane crash is less important
than the context it takes place in (Bush dropping policy of engagement, increased
surveillance flights) and the consequences (Chinese pilot Wang’s death). This difference
operated in tandem with an important cultural similarity derived from social identity
theory: the willingness of each side to assume the worst with respect to the external
‘outgroup’ state while giving actors associated with the ‘self’ the benefit of the doubt. In
effect, both China and the U.S. were nationalistic, or at the very least had strong
nationalistic tendencies. The authors end with a plea for understanding and self-restraint.
As with the other work on the EP-3 incident, Gries and Peng offer useful insights. Their
emphasis on identity is particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation.
However, their main focus is polemical rather than academic. They are arguing against

289

popular commentators seeking to set policy in the U.S. In this sense, while they do not
make policy prescriptions, Gries and Peng have penned a policy article. They do not
explain why national identities are the crucial identities in the conflict, and they do not
explore how identities are used in the context of the policy response. Thus, while theirs
marks one of the only efforts to explore the role of identity in the incident, Gries and
Peng’s short article leaves much room for further exploration.

Finally, Edward Slingerland and his coauthors use the EP-3 case to explore their
conceptual metaphor approach to International Relations (Slingerland, Blanchard, &
Boyd-Judson, 2007). They argue—contra Gries and Peng—that a fundamental divide in
culture does not explain the incident. Both sides used similar conceptual metaphors to
talk about the incident. The situation arose—the authors claim—in large part due to
misunderstandings of shared metaphorical conceptions. For example, Slingerland and his
coauthors find that three metaphors—war, journey, and economics—dominated the
discursive landscape on both sides of the Pacific.
3
The breakdown in Sino-American
relations within the context of the incident occurred because of failures to communicate
within these metaphorical parameters, not because the two sides were using different
metaphors from the outset. The article presents an interesting approach to IR, and is self-

3
According to the authors, these metaphors suggest different approaches to the incident. The War
metaphor (idea of winning honor and glory on the battlefield) calls for “behavior that respects the adversary
as powerful (not a victim), but suggests that ‘our’ nation’s honorable position, coupled with our strength,
will ensure our security against the enemy” (2007, p. 64). The Journey metaphor (idea of physical journey)
“calls for cooperation between parties rather than the conquering of one’s adversary. If we are on a journey
toward a common destination, communication, and helpfulness are the expected behavior from fellow
travelers” (2007, p. 65). The Economic metaphor (idea of cost-benefit negotiations) calls for negotiations
based on a “rational and unapologetically material” basis (2007, pp. 64, 66).

290

consciously a vehicle for introducing the concepts of the metaphor and somatic markers
to the field of IR. As such, the article and this dissertation speak to two different aspects
of international relations. Slingerland et al are primarily focused on the tools of interstate
communication—how a situation is metaphorically represented.
4
This dissertation, by
contrast, is centrally focused on how domestic public identity shapes the securitization
process. While Slingerland and his coauthors suggest a domestic political role for
metaphors, it is not a subject to which they devote significant attention. It is worth
noting, however, that the prevalence of the war metaphor suggests that the EP-3 incident
should be a useful case in the context of this dissertation. By its very nature, war is a
securitized state of affairs, and the prevalence of the metaphor indicates that a
securitization dynamic was present in the U.S. reaction.

To summarize, there are two trends in the small literature on the EP-3 incident. The first
focuses on the policy and legal procedures and arguments that characterized the incident.
The approaches generally have little to say about the interaction between policymakers
and the public, or how the event was constructed. A second trend, highlighting the role
of identity and language in the incident, speaks more directly to this dissertation. Not
surprisingly, however, given the small volume of research, this literature does not address
the issues at question in this dissertation. In particular, like the policy/legal literature,

4
Slingerland and his coauthors would probably disagree with my use of the term ‘tool’ here. They argue
that metaphors are more than simply linguistic communication mechanisms; they represent deeper
cognitive processes that shape our perceptions of a complex reality. To that end, they would also likely
disagree with my inclusion of their article as part of the linguistic categorization. Since this dissertation
concerns a different focus of analysis that is not—directly at least—in conflict with their work, the
categorization, while rough, serves my purposes here.

291
these approaches have little to say about the relationship between policymakers and the
public, or how the language and identity dynamics they describe play out in the context
of that relationship.
The case
Bush versus Congress
Much like his predecessor, George W. Bush criticized the previous administration over
its China policy as he ran for President of the United States. In the presidential
campaign, Bush effectively abandoned the Clinton Administration’s policy of
engagement with China. Bush saw the country as a ‘competitor’ rather than a ‘partner’
(Bush, 2000). This conception of China was evident as the Administration struggled to
keep the incident from escalating into a crisis. Administration officials recognized the
need to keep the incident from becoming constructed as a national security situation. An
unnamed official immediately after the collision was reported in The New York Times
effectively saying that a securitization move would make the situation worse: “The
question now is do we have access to the crew, when do we get the crew back, and how
do we get the aircraft back. This is going to be a test of everyone's ability to stay cool
and work things out” (Rosenthal & Sanger, 2001). From the outset, the media pushed a
China-as-threat construction in press briefings. In an April 2 press briefing, White House
spokesman Scott McClellan sought to avoid the question:

Q: I said, you're demanding immediate access to the crew.
MR. McCLELLAN: To the crew, and to the aircraft.

292
Q: Or what? What's the other shoe?
MR. McCLELLAN: I'm sorry?
Q: What's the other shoe?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, that's what we're continuing to discuss with Chinese officials.
Q: When do you stop discussing and start acting?
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, again, when we have more information for you, I'll get that to
you. But we continue to press -- because that's our first priority, is the crew, that we have
direct access to them.
…
Q: China is threat to the United States?
Q: Is China a threat to the United States?
Q: It's about the same question, that if they are flying off the shore of San Francisco, do
they do that?
MR. MCCLELLAN: I'd refer you to the Defense Department on that question. I'm not
aware of any— [change of subject] (emphasis mine) (McClellan, 2001)

At a press briefing the next day at the Department of Defense, a similar dynamic played
out. Probing on why the Department of Defense was taking a low-key approach to the
incident, spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley pushed back against the argument that
the U.S. should implement a security response:

Clearly, we believe that there is a diplomatic solution to this incident and not a military
one.
It is our aircrew. They are military people. There is a military aircraft on the ground.
But if you think of a military solution to this, that's not the way ahead, Barbara. The way
ahead is a diplomatic one, and that's why the lead at this point—and I would expect it to
stay—with the State Department. (emphasis mine) (Quigley, 2001a)

At the same time, the Administration did hint that while it was currently understanding of
delays regarding the release of the EP-3 crew, if the situation continued a securitization
move might be possible:

This is an unusual situation in which an American military aircraft had to make an
emergency landing on Chinese soil. Our approach has been to keep this accident from
becoming an international incident. We have allowed the Chinese Government time to

293
do the right thing. But now it is time for our service men and women to return home, and
it is time for the Chinese Government to return our plane.
This accident has the potential of undermining our hopes for a fruitful and productive
relationship between our two countries. To keep that from happening, our service men
and women need to come home. (emphasis mine) (Bush, 2001b)

Here Bush justifies the desecuritization of China’s behavior by pointing to the unusual
nature of the situation. The implication is that there is no standard operating procedure,
and that the Chinese government needs time to determine how to proceed. According to
an unnamed senior administration official, the Administration’s goal was to “issue a
strong statement to the Chinese about what we are looking for, without overreacting”
(Sanger, 2001a). However, the claim that the situation could ‘undermine’ the current
relationship between the two countries suggests that the United States could move Sino-
American relations out of the realm of normal politics. The implication is that the
relationship could become securitized.

Not surprisingly given the security dynamic that developed during the 1995-96 Crisis,
members of Congress began efforts at securitizing the incident, and Sino-American
relations more broadly. On April 3, two days after the collision, an unnamed Republican
congressional aid made an implicit securitization move:

If China wants to behave like a rogue nation, ignoring all the conventions of international
law, this will indicate to us that they seek confrontation over cooperation. If they want to
get members of the U.S. Senate upset over relations with China, this is the way to do it.”
(emphasis mine) (CNN, 2001b)

294

The congressional aid does not explicitly refer to the nature of China’s governance here,
but the ‘rogue nation’ label reminds the audience that China’s government is not
democratic (democracies are not labeled rogue regimes). The ‘confrontation over
cooperation’ comment also suggests that Sino-American ties may become a security
matter.

Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) labeled the situation a ‘crisis situation’ and
traced the source of the problem directly to Chinese governance:

Madam Speaker, just let me say that the new tension created by the holding of 24
American servicemen by the People's Republic of China—a crisis situation that all of us
want to see resolved immediately—only underscores anew how the policies of the Beijing
dictatorship are harsh and unreasonable and how those policies have continued to
worsen and to deteriorate with each and every passing year.
Sadly, universally recognized norms and international laws have no meaningful
application to the dictatorship. The dictatorship in Beijing mocks the rule of law.
(emphasis mine) (Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ), 2001)

While Smith refrains from making an explicit securitization move in his statement, Smith
does suggest that China may be a security threat, particularly in the future. He claims
that Chinese policy is ‘harsh and unreasonable,’ suggesting that were U.S. interests to run
up against those of China, no compromise would be possible. These policies, rather than
improving with time, have worsened according to Smith, suggesting a trajectory that
would make Sino-American conflict inevitable.
5
Not only does Smith tie his (implicit)
threat assessment to Chinese governance—‘dictatorship in Beijing’—he backs it up by

5
This also serves as a broadside against the notion of engagement. Chinese governance and policy has not
improved despite international economic and political integration. Consequently, desecuritization
arguments based on borrowed future democracy would need to account for the lack of progress.

295
underlining Chinese disregard for the rule of law, a core attribute of democracy. The
implication here is not only that China is wholly undemocratic, but also that its parochial
worldview will eventually put it in conflict with the universal, law-law based perspective
of the United States.

Also on April 3, Representative Clifford Sterns (R-FL) continued the pattern of implicit
security moves. At the outset of his comments, Sterns took aim at the claim that
economic engagement with China would result in eventual Chinese democracy:

Mr. Speaker, in the last Congress and many before, many of us have heard predictions
that have been made regarding China. Advocates last year stated that granting permanent
normal trade relations to China would help bring reform to this Communist government,
and establish a real friendship between our nations. (emphasis mine) (Representative
Clifford Sterns (R-FL), 2001)

Instead, Sterns argued, Sino-American relations had gotten worse. China’s human rights
record was as bad or worse as in the past, naturalized Chinese-Americans were being
arrested, and—of ‘larger concern’—China now held the EP-3 and its crew and was
making ‘threatening’ moves toward Navy surveillance ships. He also highlighted
Chinese actions in areas that had already been securitized: nuclear weapons and Iraq.

Other examples showing cracks within our forged relationship with China also bear
noting, such as China's involvement with Pakistan's nuclear bomb program and their
recent questionable involvement in Iraq, to name just a few. (emphasis mine)
(Representative Clifford Sterns (R-FL), 2001)

296

Sterns ends his comments with an ominous call for a reevaluation of U.S. policy toward
China while citing Chinese aggression: “Mr. Speaker, it is clear that our relationship with
China needs to be carefully reevaluated. Since PNTR [Permanent Normal Trade
Relations], we have seen aggressive behavior on their part.” Sterns clearly does not make
an explicit securitization move in his comments. But his outlining of a litany of problems
in Sino-American relations traced back to the ‘Communist government’ of China, Sterns’
association of China with recognized security issues in the form of nuclear weapons and
Iraq, and his call for a reevaluation of U.S. policy comprise an implicit securitization
move. China—owing to its nondemocratic government—poses a threat to the United
States both through direct actions like those taken against U.S. surveillance assets and
indirectly through efforts to weaken nuclear nonproliferation and aid regimes like that in
Iraq.

Also from April 3, there is some evidence suggesting that political leaders tying their
implicit securitization moves to Chinese governance were justified in their linkage.
News organizations carried comments from some of the families of the captive EP-3
crewmembers. While most simply expressed relief at their safe landing and hope for a
quick return,
6
one comment stood out for its assessment as to why the crewmembers
might be at risk. Mark Honeck, apparently responding to a question as to whether he was
worried about his son, responded: “Of course I'm worried that he's in a Communist
country” (Newman, 2001). While the comment is anecdotal and may not represent

6
Apparently on request from the U.S. government to minimize comment for security reasons (Newman,
2001).

297
broader thinking, the fact that Honeck traced his concern to Chinese governance agrees
with the theoretical expectations of this dissertation.

April 4
th
would mark the last day of significant security contestation over the incident.
Congress went into Easter recess the following day, leaving the Bush Administration
largely in control of the policy narrative. As on the previous day, the Administration
walked a fine line between keeping the policy response within normal politics while
suggesting possible securitization. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, in responding
to a question regarding damage to Sino-American relations pointed both to the ‘fruitful
aspects’ of U.S.-China relations while warning of potential problems if the situation was
not resolved:

Q: Ari, have U.S.-Chinese relations been damaged at this point?
MR. FLEISCHER: Keith, the President made it clear yesterday that he hopes that this
accident will not turn into an international incident, and in his meeting with the Deputy
Premier of China, they discussed the fruitful aspects of our relationship with China and
our hopes to grow those aspects. The President said yesterday that if the event that our
servicemen and women are not returned, that it could damage U.S.-China relations. And
that is another reason why it's important for our servicemen and women to be allowed to
come home.
Q: So it could damage U.S.-China relations; it has not so far?
MR. FLEISCHER: Again, what's important is the return of our servicemen and women.
That's where the President's focus is. (emphasis mine) (Fleischer, 2001)

The Administration’s desecuritization tactic remained centered on an appeal to the
utilitarian benefits of the relationship. The terminology ‘fruitful’ suggests that the
incident should remain within normal politics because the U.S. might lose out on
practical benefits derived from the relationship. Not surprisingly, it mirrors Bush’s own

298
emphasis on the ‘fruitful and productive’ relationship between the two countries.
References to Clinton’s policy of engagement are not in evidence, a direct result of
Bush’s campaign effort to criticize the Clinton Administration policy toward China and
redefine the relationship as one between strategic competitors. The Bush Administration
had in effect disowned the borrowed future democracy desecuritization approach of the
Clinton Administration.

The Bush Administration also received some interesting support from Congress.
Representative John Hayworth (R-AZ), while tracing the incident to “the Communist
Chinese regime,” and threatening “numerous [policy options] with serious repercussions
for the Chinese regime in Beijing,” also sought to put a break on his own securitization
move (Representative John Hayworth (R-AZ), 2001). He did so by expressing his
support for the Bush Administration’s diplomatic approach and praising Secretary of
State Colin Powell’s expression of “regret over the loss of life.” Representative Heather
Wilson (R-NM) also demonstrated this discursive desecuritization tool when she claimed
to be “supportive of the President's desire to keep this accident from becoming an
international incident” (Representative Heather Wilson (R-NM), 2001). Similarly,
Representative Jo Ann Davis (R-VA) argued that “politics should stop at the water's
edge. We need to support our President” (Representative Jo Ann Davis (R-VA), 2001).
The message here seems to be that, while these members of Congress had no compelling
counterargument to the securitization discourse their colleagues were putting forward,

299

they could counter these moves by invoking another American norm: Executive branch
purview over U.S. foreign policy.

While the Bush Administration’s position remained consistent from April 3, the
securitization moved on April 4 became more explicit. Representative Brad Sherman (D-
CA) claimed the EP-3 crew—and America—were being held “hostage,” by the Chinese,
suggesting both were under threat (Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA), 2001).
Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) introduced legislation revoking China’s most
favorable trading status, claiming the EP-3 situation was “indicative of the regard in
which the communist regime in China holds our government.
7
The fact is, while we trade
with China, they prepare for war” (emphasis mine) (Yang, 2001). The linkage seems
clear: China’s regime type directly leads to a threat against the United States in the form
of a war. Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) claimed that “[u]ntil our 24 military
personnel are returned, they should be considered as hostages, being held by a hostile
power” (Rohrabacher, 2001). While not explicit about the threat, Rohrabacher uses the
term ‘hostages,’ implying their personal welfare was at risk. More broadly, the concept
of a ‘hostile power’ suggests an immediate threat to the welfare of the United States.
Representative James Traficant (D-OH) was similarly explicit in his appeal to China’s
regime type while making a threat claim:

7
The legislation had 35 cosponsors representing a broad spectrum of political positions, from strong
conservatives like Hunter or Colorado Representative Tom Tancrado (R-CO) to strong liberals like Bernie
Sanders (I-VT) and Sherrod Brown (D-OH) (United States Library of Congress, 2001).

300
China now demands an apology, an apology for spying on a country who has missiles
pointed at us…China is now testing American resolve, piece by piece, incident by
incident. Mr. Speaker, we need to tell it like it is. China is trying to determine what
Congress and Uncle Sam will do when China attacks Taiwan. That is the way it is, folks.
I say the dragon is going too far.
I yield back the fact that an attack on Taiwan is an attack on democracy, and, by God,
that should be considered an attack on the United States of America. (emphasis mine)
(Representative James Traficant (D-OH), 2001)

For Traficant, Chinese action with respect to the EP-3 was indicative of a larger threat to
Taiwan and the United States. Note that Traficant cites both the missiles targeted on the
United States (an immediate existential threat to lives of citizens in the United States) as
well as an attack on Taiwan (a more indirect threat to the U.S. political system) in
constructing his securitization move. While he does not reference China’s governance
directly, the claim that an attack on Taiwan would be an “attack on democracy,” traces
the threat construction indirectly—albeit strongly—back to the nature of China’s
government.

Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA) was less explicit about the threat but more explicit
about the nature of the Chinese regime when he claimed that China owed the United
States an apology:

Mr. Speaker, China's President should apologize to the United States for its aggression in
the accident with one of our airplanes over international waters. This is not the first time
Chinese Air Force fighter pilots have recklessly and aggressively flown by our slower-
moving planes over international waters well outside of China's boundaries to harass our
Air Force planes. They have done this repeatedly and have been warned of the danger.
Unfortunately, this time, the Chinese fighter caused an accident.
This reckless aggression, the forced landing of our disabled plane, and now the holding
of our crew and plane as hostages, and now China's belligerence is outrageous. It
violates international agreements that China has signed; it damages U.S.-China relations.

301
President Bush should stand firm and strong and demand an apology from the dictators in
Beijing, the immediate return of the American crew and plane. China is at fault on this
one. (emphasis mine) (Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA), 2001)

The threat posed by China in Pitts’ statement is one of implication. Pitts relies on
language implying violence when discussing the situation, using terms like ‘aggressive’
and ‘belligerence’ to characterize China and its behavior. He also refers to the EP-3 crew
as ‘hostages,’ a term suggesting that the welfare of the captives is at risk. Pitts points to
the ‘dictators in Beijing’ as the fundamental source of the threat when he claims it is they
who owe the U.S. and apology.

After April 4 and the disbanding of Congress for the Easter recess, the Bush
Administration was left largely in control of the security narrative, and the message
remained the same. On April 5, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer continued to
emphasize the utilitarian reasons to keep the situation desecuritized:

And during the meeting that the President had with Deputy Premier Qian Qichen, what
they focused on in the Oval Office was entirely positive. They talked about the fruitful,
growing relations between the United States and China, the many opportunities our two
nations have, particularly in the area of trade, which are mutually beneficial. That was
the tenor of the meeting. And the President continues to believe that there are many
fruitful opportunities between the United States and China, particularly in the areas of
trade. (Fleischer, 2001)

President Bush was similarly positive, if more vague during an April 5 press conference:

The message to the Chinese is, we should not let this incident destabilize relations. Our
relationship with China is very important. But they need to realize that it's time for our
people to be home. We're working all diplomatic channels to affect our priority. There's

302
discussions going on. And we'll continue to do so. My mission is to bring the people
home.
And as to whether or not we'll have good relations, my intention is to make sure we do
have good relations. But the Chinese have got to act. And I hope they do so quickly.
(Bush, 2001a)

Interestingly, as the incident progressed, Bush began to include some of the engagement
rhetoric that characterized his predecessor’s efforts to keep Sino-American relations
desecuritized. In responding to a question suggesting a trade-off between strategic (i.e.
security) interests and economic interests, Bush essentially argued the trade-off was a
false one, and that promoting U.S. economic interests would eventually produce a
Chinese democracy:

Q: In my region, we have strong economic interests in Asia as an export market. Would
you please comment on the balance that you think should be struck between our strategic
interests and our economic interests in Asia, including China?
THE PRESIDENT: I believe that China ought to be a trading partner of ours. I think it's
in our economic interests to open up the Chinese markets to U.S. products, to U.S.
agricultural products. I not only believe it's in our economic interest, I believe it's in our
interest to promote U.S. values.
And I believe the marketplace promotes values. When people get a taste of freedom in
the marketplace, they tend to demand other freedoms in their societies. And so, I'm an
advocate of China's entering into the WTO and I'm hopeful that the current situation ends
quickly and our people come home.
China is a strategic partner, a strategic competitor. But that doesn't mean we can't find
areas in which we can partner. And the economy's a place where we can partner. And
we've got some differences with China, long-term differences, spreading of weapons of
mass destruction is an issue that we need to work with the Chinese on, as well as other
nations in that part of the world.
Human rights is an issue, but I believe trade will encourage more freedom, particularly
when it comes to individual liberties. The marketplace is -- the marketplace unleashes
the opportunity for people to make choices, and so I continue to push for trade with
China. (emphasis mine) (Bush, 2001a)

It is difficult to understate the significance of Bush’s claims here. While he included his
construction of China as a strategic competitor, he once again fell back on Clinton era

303
‘engagement’ language in his effort to desecuritize China and its relations with the
United States. The question that prompted Bush’s response suggested that the United
States could not pursue its economic interests—the primary rationale for desecuritization
to this point—and security interests simultaneously. Confronted a question that
effectively claimed economic interests were an insufficient rationale for desecuritizing
China, Bush relied on borrowing from China’s future democracy to fill the discursive
gap. Interestingly, the concept of engagement came up again two days later during a
televised interview with the House International Relations Committee Chair Henry Hyde
(R-Il). In response to a claim from co-host Mark Shields that China was a “Stalinist
regime,” Hyde agued for a policy of engagement instead of securitization:

Well, I don't think we should have any illusions about the character of the Chinese
government, but it's out there. It's the largest country in the world in terms of population,
and it's a reality, and we have to deal with it.
Now, we can deal with it, at least attempt to deal with it, by engagement, by flooding the
country with American marketeers and servicemen. That's what most-favored-nation
status is supposed to be about. It's called engagement. I haven't seen an awful lot of
results from that, and how long we should continue that is another question. But I'm not
for heating up another Cold War that could well turn into a hot war. (emphasis mine)
(Hyde, 2001)

After Bush’s March 5 interview, the Administration curtailed commentary on the
situation (Perlez & Sanger, 2001). Bush himself limited his comments to on the issue
until the crew was released 6 days later, indicating only that the U.S. was working
“behind the scenes,” and pursuing a diplomatic solution (Bush, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e).
Administration spokespeople were similarly restrained. White House spokesman Ari

304
Fleischer’s response to a loaded question regarding Chinese motivations emphasized the
complexity of the situation and the importance of a diplomatic response:

Q: That China is testing the strength [original question: “Some reports are saying that
China is testing the waters and the strength of the United States and of this
administration, how long President Bush can go on this, and this is going like 20 years
ago, U.S. diplomats in Iran.”]
MR. FLEISCHER: I think what took place was an accident. And now in the wake of that
accident, both nations are involved in a delicate diplomacy, so that our men and women
can come home. I think that's what's going on in the ground in China. I think it's a
complicated situation on the ground in China. And that's where the matter stands.
(emphasis mine) (Fleischer, 2001)

Department of Defense Spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley responded similarly to a
leading question from a reporter:

Q: And there continues to be a sense here that we need to just modulate what everybody's
saying and let the diplomatic process play out? Because again, I'm struck by the fact that
—I mean, these are 24 of your own—that you're not outraged about this. But everything
that we know officially is very—we're very grateful and we're very happy that
everybody's—What! These are 24 prisoners!
ADM. QUIGLEY: Diplomacy—well, I don't agree with your term.
Q: Twenty-four detainees!
ADM. QUIGLEY: Diplomacy, as the president said yesterday, can be a slow process, but
that is the way ahead. There is not a military solution to this, it is a diplomatic solution.
That process is underway. It will continue until we get to a successful resolution.
(Quigley, 2001b)

The Bush Administration clearly sought to keep the U.S. response, and Sino-American
relations more broadly—desecuritized. When pushed, the Administration emphasized
the importance of diplomacy—a very normal political process—in resolving the
situation.

305
Once the crew was released on April 11, the incident faded from public view. While the
EP-3 remained in Chinese custody for over a month after the crew was released, news
reports on the subject dropped off dramatically. In Congress, with a few exceptions,
business went onto other matters. All but one of these exceptions were statements by
members of Congress praising the merits of the EP-3 crew. On April 24, immediately
after Congress’ return from recess, Representative Dana Rohrbacher (R-CA) made the
most explicit securitization move of the incident, and in doing so derived his threat
construction directly from China’s regime type:

Mr. Speaker, one month ago, the Communist regime that controls the mainland of China
attacked an American surveillance aircraft while it was in international waters. After
being knocked out of the sky, 24 American military personnel, the crew of the
surveillance craft, were held hostage for nearly 2 weeks. The Communist Chinese
blamed us and would not return the crew until the United States was humiliated before
the world…How much more proof do we need that the so-called engagement theory is a
total failure? Our massive investment in China, pushed and promoted by American
billionaires and multinational corporations, has created not a more peaceful, democratic
China, but an aggressive nuclear-armed bully that now threatens the world with its
hostile acts and proliferation. Do the Communist Chinese have to murder American
personnel or attack the United States or our allies with their missiles before those who
blithesomely pontificate about the civilizing benefits of building the Chinese economy will
admit that China for a decade has been going in the opposite direction than predicted by
the so-called ‘free traders.’
We have made a monstrous mistake, and if we do not face reality and change our
fundamental policies, instead of peace, there will be conflict. Instead of democratic
reform, we will see a further retrenchment of a regime that is run by gangsters and thugs,
the world's worst human rights abusers.
Let us go back to basics. The mainland of China is controlled by a rigid, Stalinistic
Communist party.
[…]
Yes, the Communist Chinese are arming themselves to sink American aircraft carriers, to
kill thousands upon thousands of American sailors. Make no mistake about it, China's
military might now threatens America and world peace. If there is a crisis in that part of
the world again, which there will be, we can predict that some day, unlike the last crisis
when American aircraft carriers were able to become a peaceful element to bring
moderation of judgment among the players who were in conflict, instead, American
aircraft carriers will find themselves vulnerable, and an American President will have to

306

face the choice of risking the lives of all of those sailors on those aircraft carriers.
(emphasis mine) (Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), 2001)

Rohrabacher’s statement hardly requires analysis. He repeatedly references the
nondemocratic nature of China’s government, and draws a very direct connection
between that government and his claim of a threat. The argument is not a strategic or
economic one: Rohrabacher does not argue that China’s weapons acquisitions pose a
threat to U.S. trade interests or U.S. allies (aside from an implication at the end regarding
Taiwan). Instead, Rohrabacher makes an identity based securitization move. China is a
threat to the U.S. because of the nature of its government.
Public response
Public opinion polling from the period suggests that the securitization move presented by
members of Congress was not effective. Before the incident, China had already been
securitized in the minds of many Americans. In February 2001, before the collision, 48%
of respondents in a Gallup poll indicated they had a mostly (31%) or very (17%)
unfavorable view of China (Gallup Organization, 2001c). A similar question in same
poll asked respondents to assign a value from -5 (most unfavorable) to +5 (most
favorable) to their opinion of China. The result here was even stronger, with 51%
indicating some level of negative opinion toward China (Gallup Organization, 2001b).
These values correspond almost exactly to a Gallup poll run one year later. In that
February 2002 poll, 49% of respondents indicated they had an mostly (37%) or very
(12%) unfavorable opinion of China (Gallup Organization, 2002).
8

8
It is worth noting that the second poll took place after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

307

During the period of the incident, opinion polling presents a mixed picture. A poll from
April 1-4 shows a large majority of respondents (68%) indicating that China presents an
‘extreme/somewhat threat’ versus 32% responding that China presents ‘Not much of a
threat/no threat at all/not sure’ (The Committee of 100, 2001a). The same poll shows a
spike in unfavorable perception of China’s government to 61% holding a somewhat or
very unfavorable impression (The Committee of 100, 2001b). These poll results suggest
an increase in the number of people constructing China as a threat and may indicate
Congressional securitization moves were successful. However, the polls contrast against
an April 4-5 CBS News poll indicating 49% or respondents felt China was an ally (5%)
or friendly but not an ally (44%) (CBS News, 2001b). To confuse matters further, the
same CBS poll found that 48% of respondents held a ‘neutral’ opinion of China (CBS
News, 2001a). Of those that did hold an opinion, 34% held an unfavorable impression
while 13% held a favorable estimation of China. This result does not seem to square with
the friend/enemy question from the survey; a plurality of respondents felt China was
friendly or an ally, yet a plurality were agnostic toward the country.

An ABC News/Washington Post poll from April 5 shows yet another result, with a
significant majority (57%) judging China as unfriendly (37%) or an enemy (20%) (ABC
News & Washington Post, 2001c). An overwhelming majority (74%) agreed trade
should be restricted if China did not return the crew and plane, suggesting Congressional
securitization moves may have been successful here, since the Bush Administration

308

steadfastly refused to publically consider retaliatory action (ABC News & Washington
Post, 2001b).
9
A large majority (73%) also felt the incident posed a serious (48%) or not
serious (25%) threat to Sino-American relations (ABC News & Washington Post, 2001a).
In an April 6 Gallup poll, 55% of respondents considered the EP-3 crew hostages, also
indicating Congressional securitization rhetoric may have been successful in defining the
situation (Gallup Organization, 2001a).

In the immediate aftermath of the incident (after the crew had been released), polls
seemed to indicate an increase in unfavorable views of China. An April 20-22
Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll showed a large majority (69%) saw China as unfriendly
(44%) or an enemy (25%), a significant increase over similar questions asked during the
first week of the incident (CNN & USA Today, 2001). This matches up well with a
separate NBC News poll from April 21-23 in which 71% percent of respondents
indicated that the perceived China as an adversary (NBC News & Wall Street Journal,
2001). These polls would seem to suggest that Congressional securitization moves were
successful. Again complicating the picture, however, is a CBS News poll showing 44%
of respondents viewing China negatively (34% as unfriendly, 11% as an enemy) while
49% viewed China positively (4% as an ally, 45% as friendly) (CBS News, 2001c). May
polls agree with the Gallup/CNN/USA Today and NBC News polls. A Pew poll showed
an overwhelming majority of respondents (81%) considered the rise of China as a world
power to be a major (51%) or minor (30%) threat to the United States (Pew Research

9
The question did not give the respondents a time horizon for restricting trade, i.e. should trade be
restricted if the crew and plane are not returned in X (days/weeks/months).

309
Center for the People and the Press, 2001b). Somewhat contradictory to the late April
NBC poll, the Pew poll found that while 70% of respondents viewed China in a negative
light, only 19% viewed China as an adversary while 51% felt China was a ‘serious
problem’ (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2001a).

The picture painted by the polling numbers is far from clear. While there are indications
that the Congressional securitization moves had an impact on public construction of the
Chinese threat, these indications are not undisputed. Polls conducted at the same time
asking similar questions produced significantly different results. In part, this hazy picture
can be attributed to the nature of public opinion polling. The nature of the incident may
also account for the lack of clarity. The EP-3 collision and the ensuing negotiations over
the crew release took place over a relatively short period of time, preventing strong
feeling from cementing one way or another. Another factor was the Congressional
recess, cutting off the national platform for members seeking to make securitization
moves. Finally, the Bush Administration did not present a strong desecuritization
narrative. Without the engagement narrative, the Bush Administration was left with calls
for patience and respect for diplomatic processes, hardly compelling discursive tools.
These attributes of the situation may help explain the lack of coherence in the public
opinion polling. As a consequence of this lack of coherence, while there are indications
that the public responded to the securitization move, the indications are far from clear
enough to make strong conclusions one way or the other.

310
Conclusions
Drawing firm conclusions from this case is a much more challenging proposition that it
was in the case of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. There was a significant effort by
some members of Congress to securitize China, and as predicted, these efforts sourced
the core of the threat to the nature of China’s government. The securitization moves
certainly meet with expectation. The desecuritization narrative, however, does not. The
Bush Administration had jettisoned Clinton’s engagement concept as a discursive tool.
Its effort to desecuritize the situation relied on appeals to shared economic interests, calls
for patience, and appeals to the diplomatic process. Bush did in one significant instance
adopt an engagement style argument, linking economic trade today with Chinese
democracy tomorrow, but this did not represent a sustained discursive approach. Public
opinion polling is not clear. While there are indications that Congressional securitization
moves may have been effective, these are not definite. Thus, while the evidence in this
case in general accords with the expectations generated by the theory of this dissertation,
there are not conclusive.

The situational nature of the EP-3 incident explains the difficulty in drawing conclusions.
At eleven days, it took place over a relatively brief period. For over half that period,
Congress was not in session, denying those would securitize China their platform for
doing so. These factors may also contribute to a more subtle security dynamic that
outlasted the incident itself. This security dynamic would not be accounted for by

311

securitization because it would effect policy below the level of public awareness.
10
For
example, at the end of April, President Bush stated clearly that the U.S. had an obligation
to help defend Taiwan and would do “whatever it takes” to fulfill that commitment
(Sanger, 2001b). This represents a significant break from the prior U.S. policy of
‘strategic ambiguity.’ The security dynamic may have also played out in the missile
defense debate in Congress. In May, Representative David Weldon (R-PA) argued that
the United States needed missile defense as a precaution against Chinese or North Korea
threats (Representative David Weldon (R-PA), 2001). Similarly, Representative Neil
Abercrombie (D-HI) linked China with North Korea and Russia in citing possible missile
threats to the United States—and justifying the development of national missile defense
(Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), 2001). Indeed, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-
ND), in arguments against the missile defense system, emphasized that a weakness of the
system was that it would not protect against Chinese or Russian missiles (Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-ND), 2001). Echoing James Traficant’s earlier comment, Representative
Duncan Hunter linked China with North Korea as he specifically cited Chinese missile
targeting as a cause for U.S. insecurity:

For example, China never signed that [Anti-Ballistic Missile] treaty. They are building
ballistic missiles right now and aiming them at American cities and telling us, it is your
obligation not to defend yourselves. North Korea now has recently tested a missile
which, if we extrapolated its flight, would have enough stretch, enough distance to get to
the United States, or at least parts of the United States. (Representative Duncan Hunter
(R-CA), 2001)

10
In effect, there are no new focal points to draw public attention.

312
Without going into further detail regarding the debate over missile defense, the point here
is to highlight the prominence of China as a threat in that discussion. While there is no
direct trace from the EP-3 incident—i.e. no one indicated that Chinese behavior during
the incident justified missile defense—the prominence of China in the discussion less
than a month later suggests that the construction of China as a security threat may have
gotten a boost from events during the first two weeks in April.
Democratic identity and security in Sino-American relations
Taken together, the 1995-96 and 2001 cases strongly suggest that democratic identity
plays an important role in how security policy is constructed. In the both cases, the
emphasis of policymakers on the lack of Chinese democracy strongly correlates with
efforts to securitize the relationship. The nondemocratic nature of China’s governance,
and the threat this posed to democracy, played a predominant role in the securitization
discourse. The reverse is also true, although less so in the 2001 case. When U.S.
policymakers sought to desecuritize China—particularly in the 1995-96 case—they
appealed to the policy of engagement, borrowing from future Chinese democratization to
desecuritize China in the present. The 2001 case proves to be a partial exception, with
the concept of engagement playing a far less predominant role. The Bush presidential
campaign had harshly criticized the outgoing Clinton Administration on its engagement
policy, making an appeal to the concept very difficult. Even so, during the latter stages
of the incident, Bush once again appealed to engagement, suggesting the power of a
desecuritization argument predicated on potential Chinese democracy. In both cases,
there is significant evidence that the public did accept efforts to securitize China,

313
although again this evident is weaker in the 2001 case (very likely owing to the short
duration of the incident). Thus, regardless of the caveats, the role of public democratic
identity in security policy construction has been remarkably powerful.

314
Chapter 8 | Conclusions, Implications, Contributions

“Words matter. Words have consequences.” (Senator Byrd (D-WV), February 13, 2002)
Theory and data
In chapter 2, I outlined the theoretical framework of this dissertation, linking
securitization with democratic public identity to produce a coherent and mechanistic
constructivist account of the democratic peace. In doing so, I derived five hypotheses—
expectations of what the data should show if the proposed theory accurately explained
reality. These hypotheses were:

H1: If the external state is recognizably democratic, then political leaders in the
home democracy will be unable to securitize the external democracy.
H1a: In the context of a securitization move by political leaders with
respect to an external democracy, indications of public threat perception of
external democracies will not increase to the point where a plurality or
majority of the public perceive the external democracy as a threat.
H2: If the external state is a democracy, then political leaders who seek to
securitize the external state will attempt to de-democratize the identity of the
external state in their security argument.
H3: If the external state is a democracy, then political leaders who seek to
desecuritize the external state will emphasize the democratic identity of the
external state in their desecuritization argument.

315

H4: If the external state is a non-democracy, then political leaders who seek to
securitize the external state will emphasize the non-democratic identity of the
external state in their desecuritization argument.
H5: If the external state is a non-democracy, then political leaders who seek to
desecuritize the external state will emphasize the aspects of the external state that
are democratic or potentially democratic in their desecuritization argument.
1

The cases bear these hypotheses out. In 1971, Nixon and Kissinger clearly viewed India
as a threat to U.S. interests both locally in the context of ally Pakistan’s internal troubles
and globally in the context of the struggle against communism, yet India remained
desecuritized, indicating support for H1. As the crisis deepened, Nixon grew
increasingly frosty toward India in public, eliminating references to Indian democracy
that were common in the early days of the crisis before Indian involvement became
significant, suggesting support for H2. However, the Nixon Administration’s
securitization efforts in public did not reflect the private security assessments of Nixon
and Kissinger. In this respect, the 1971 case provides powerful support for the theory
because it comes close to a ‘smoking gun’ case—a situation where securitization (even
war) would have occurred had the external state not been a democracy.
2
Nixon and
Kissinger in their private conversations chafe at the restraints placed on their foreign
policymaking ability by their belief that the public would not support a securitization
move against India because India was a democracy. In the 1971 case, political leaders

1
In subsequent discussion, I shall refer to these hypotheses by their abbreviations (e.g. H1).

2
I owe this point to Thomas Risse.

316
who sought to counter Nixon’s securitization efforts relied heavily on Indian democracy
in their countermove, implying support for H3. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy
repeatedly referred to the contrast between autocracy and democracy in the conflict, a
distinction the Nixon Administration did not make.

These dynamics play out throughout the three Indo-American nuclear cases. In all three
cases (although support from the 1974 case is not as strong as from the 1998 and 2006
cases) political leaders who sought to securitize India and its nuclear program
downplayed Indian democracy, highlighted nondemocratic aspects of the Indian state, or
linked India by implication with nondemocratic states that had been successfully
securitized (i.e. Japan in WWII). Conversely, those who sought to keep relations with
India within the realm of normal politics regularly emphasized India’s status as a fellow
democracy. At no point, however, does public opinion polling suggest that securitization
moves toward India were successful. These trends within the nuclear cases, coupled with
the 1971 case, provide compelling support for H1, H2, and H3. On the basis of these
cases, it seems fair to say that the empirical data supports this dissertation’s theoretical
framework.

The Sino-American cases provide a more difficult test in some ways. While the Indo-
American cases make for a difficult case within the democratic peace context (history of
differing geostrategic aims, etc), the U.S.-China cases test the ability of the framework to
travel beyond the democratic peace and explain general democratic security behavior.

317
Both cases, however, provide significant support for H4 and H5. Support from the 1995-
96 Taiwan Strait Crisis is particularly strong. Political leaders in Congress who sought to
securitize China made China’s lack of democracy a central point in their securitization
moves, in accordance with H4. Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration and allies in
Congress regularly referred to the policy of ‘engagement’ as a desecuritization
countermove, borrowing from future Chinese democratization to desecuritize China—
supporting H5. The public opinion polling data suggests that the securitization moves
were indeed successful—possibly prompting the U.S. deployment of two carrier battle
groups to head off a more drastic response in Congress.

Support from the EP-3 incident, while significant, is not as strong as that provided by the
Taiwan Strait Crisis. Congressional leaders, as in the Taiwan Strait Crisis, did make
Chinese nondemocracy a prominent aspect of their securitization moves. However,
Congress was out of session for much of the crisis, denying a national platform to
policymakers who sought to securitize China. The Bush Administration clearly sought to
keep the situation within the bounds of normal politics, but with a few notable exceptions
did not rely on the Clinton Administration’s rhetorical strategy of engagement. The Bush
Administration’s approach can be traced to President Bush’s very recent (at that time)
and very clear repudiation of the Clinton Administration’s policy position regarding
China, shifting the country from a ‘strategic partner’ to a ‘strategic competitor.’ Denied
the ability to borrow from future Chinese democracy, the Bush Administration urged
patience and respect for the authority of the Executive Branch to handle the situation.

318

Public opinion polling paints a very mixed picture, with different polls presenting
contradictory results. In part, this may be due to the short duration of the incident, failing
to allow opinions to congeal. That said, the evidence from the case is broadly supportive
of H4 and H5, particularly the securitization moves of those in Congress (H4). The
support from the China cases also lines up well with other work examining the
securitization of Iran’s nuclear program (Hayes, 2009). In summary, the China cases
support the theoretical framework, suggesting that the dynamics that give rise to the
democratic peace may have effects on other aspects of democratic security behavior.
3
Theoretical contributions
Before delving into the contributions of the dissertation, a few limiting caveats are in
order. The approach here does not address why democratic states go to war. For
example, the approach has nothing to say about why Nixon and Kissinger constructed
India as a threat in 1971. Similarly, the approach does not address why members of
Congress might see China as a threat. It addresses the constraints placed on policy
options by the democratic public identity and the need for leaders in democracies to
garner public support for major security policies. In the context of the democratic peace,
it explains why democracies do not fight each other. In the context of nondemocracies, it
outlines a powerful securitization tool for policymakers who seek to make a securitization
move. Similarly, the approach does not speak to the day-to-day relations between

3
A conclusion similar to that presented by Owen (1997).

319

democracies, where leaders make policy largely out of public view. A second caveat
regards the applicability of the framework. Because this is a case-based study, the
generalizability of the approach is limited. Most directly, it speaks only to the security
behavior of the United States in the post-World War II era. Generalization outside this
context comes at some inferential risk.
4

With these reservations accounted for, it is safe to move on to the contributions of this
dissertation. Foremost, this dissertation and its findings suggest an important mechanistic
causal explanation for the democratic peace. In answer to the central puzzle of the
Democratic Peace—why do democracies refrain from using force against each other—the
dissertation finds the democratic identity of the public plays an important role. By
utilizing securitization theory, the dissertation sheds important insight on how security
within democracies is constructed. The dissertation also links what happens within the
state—where decisions of war and peace are made—to a decidedly international
phenomenon. In doing so, it suggests new avenues of work in other areas of international
relations, notably (Neo)Realism and (Neo)Liberalism, where theorizing centers on the
international system but lacks domestic level underpinnings. The dissertation highlights
the reality that the international system and its dynamics do not derive from nature but
from the actions of states, actions that are at least in part determined by what occurs
within the state. Thus, while Harrison (2004) argues for pushing the boundaries of the
democratic peace research program on the systemic level to challenge realism and reverse

4
Although as discussed in Chapter 3, the situation of this study within the broader democratic peace
research program imparts an ability to generalize that a stand alone study would lack.

320
attacks on the democratic peace literature designed to narrow its scope to inconsequence,
this study takes the opposite approach. By focusing on the within-state dynamics that
build the democratic peace, this study furthers the program by tackling a significant gap
in the democratic peace (indeed, in Neorealism itself), the domestic source of security
policy. By focusing on the domestic level mechanisms, the dissertation reconnects the
democratic nature of the state back to the democratic peace phenomenon.

This dissertation makes other contributions to the democratic peace literature. By
providing one of the only mechanistic explanations of the democratic peace, the
dissertation bolsters the field as a whole by demonstrating a plausible causal force. The
linkage of securitization with identity fuses norms (that inform democratic identity) and
structure into a coherent, meaningful single approach rather than artificially separating
them as many efforts at causal explanation do in the literature. Securitization theory
addresses the structure of democracies by highlighting the need of political leaders to
gain public support for major security policies while democratic identity accounts for the
role of democratic norms. Securitization coupled with identity also accounts for the
dyadic nature of the democratic peace by linking peace to shared identity. At the same
time, it explains one of the most troublesome complaints about the democratic peace—
that democracies, notably the United States, have exercised the covert use of force
against other (usually marginal) democracies (Forsythe, 1992; James & Mitchell, 1995).
Under this approach, we should expect political leaders disposed to use force against a
fellow democracy to attempt to do so ‘under the radar’ of the public. In doing so, they

321
avoid desecuritization narratives predicated on shared democracy, narratives that tap into
the democratic identity of the public and thus thwarting the preferred security policy.

The research here also resituates the democratic peace back within international security
studies more generally. Rather than framing the phenomenon as an anomaly in
international relations, this approach of this dissertation views it as a security (or lack
thereof) regularity that may shed light on other aspects in international security. In
particular, the combination of identity and securitization—with support from the data—
suggests a pathology of security within democracies. Democratic identity shapes
securitization moves with respect to democracies and nondemocracies. Moreover, a
better understanding on how securitization processes take place within the
interdemocratic context may generate insights, or at least potential avenues of
exploration, on the relationship between identity and securitization in other types of
states. The approach also makes some significant contributions to the literature on
securitization. It marks one of the first efforts to apply securitization theory—a European
framework—within a U.S. context. It also represents one of the first efforts to apply
securitization in a large scale (i.e. larger than article length), empirical project. Finally,
particularly in the work on determining securitization acceptance, the dissertation makes
important contributions to securitization theory itself.

The dissertation also indicates that securitization should not be viewed as singular event,
but rather as a process building on prior securitization arguments. In tracking public

322
opinion polling responses over time, the dissertation also makes a significant contribution
to a weak spot in securitization theory—the determination of audience acceptance of the
securitization move. The dissertation also makes a significant contribution to our
collective understanding of the role of facilitating conditions in the securitization
process—critical to understanding when securitization occurs. The research developed
here indicates that identity—in democracies, democratic identity—is an important
facilitator and limiter of securitization. The work here also implies that the policy
response attending securitization may be more nuanced than current securitization
accounts for. Several policymakers, in making their securitization arguments, explicitly
chose economic measures as the appropriate security policy response—not the use of
force. The coupling of securitization with the democratic peace strongly suggests more
work is needed on how securitization interfaces with policy options. The securitization
move may encompass two decisions: to securitize or not, and what policy response is
appropriate. Clearly, the existential threat nature of the securitization move suggests that
policy responses should be strong, but there is no temporal aspect to securitization. It
may be, for example, that a successful securitization move may be made with respect to
Iran—that the state poses an existential threat through Tehran’s efforts to develop nuclear
weapons and missile defense systems to the homeland of the United States. However, the
threat may not be immediate: it could be that, if left to its own devices, Iran may develop
a nuclear capability in five years. If so, there is time to eliminate the threat with policy
options aside from the use of force, i.e. economic sanctions, aggressive diplomacy, etc.
The variety of policy options coupled with securitization moves in the cases under review

323
in this dissertation suggest that more attention within securitization theory should be paid
to these and similar factors that shape security behavior.

In linking securitization with identity, the dissertation makes a significant contribution to
the general constructivist literature. Identity constructivism provides a context for
understanding the constraints on the ability of individuals or groups to construct concepts
like security in the political sphere. Speech act constructivism provides an avenue for
measuring the influence and role of identity. Bringing these two types of constructivism
together strengthens both.

The use of analogies in some of the securitization discourse also suggests an important
role for analogical reasoning outside the individual decision-maker context to which it
has largely been constrained (Houghton, 2001; Khong, 1992). In the cases, there were
several points when policymakers used analogies to communicate the construction of the
external state as a threat. In the case of India, one policymaker referred to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Tiananmen Square served as similar purpose in the Chinese case.
These examples suggest that analogical reasoning occupies important causal niches
outside the realm of elite foreign policymakers. By appealing to these historical events,
securitizers are seeking to take advantage of analogical reasoning processes in the general
public. The argument is, in effect, that the current event or situation is like the past
events or situations, and likewise the current event or situation should be similarly
securitized. Also intriguing is the use of these analogies by securitizing actors.

324
Desecuritizing actors did not use analogies to make their cases, suggesting that analogical
reasoning—at least at the second image level—operates in ways significantly different
from those theorized and observed at the individual level.

Finally, the dissertation and its novel theoretical approach within the context of the
democratic peace suggest new avenues of research by generating new questions about
how the world works. For example, what does securitization discourse look like—and
how does behavior change—as rivalrous dyads composed of one democracy and one
autocracy shift to an all democratic composition? How does the securitization discourse
play out between a firmly established democracy and a democracy on the fringes of the
democratic community? Do the identity dynamics that we observe within democracies
also play out in nondemocracies? The ability to raise these, and other, questions marks
the approach advocated by this dissertation as a significant contribution to the field.
Policy significance
Just as the importance of the democratic peace transcends academia into the ‘real world,’
so too does the significance of the dissertation. The foremost policy contribution lies in
the finding that the identity of the public plays an important role in the security policy
process in democracies. For policymakers who seek to take advantage of the democratic
peace, this finding should shift the perception of democracy away from a purely
organizational view (legislatures, voting, separation of powers) to a more holistic
conception. This reconceptualization indicates that policymakers seeking to pursue
democracy promotion policies—in order to take advantage of the democratic peace—

325

grounded in the use of force should reconsider. The role of identity suggests that—if the
democratic peace phenomenon is to spread—democracy needs to grow internally. This is
not to say that external forces cannot play a role. Evidence that socialization into the
global (liberal) culture can catalyze democratization suggests pathways for policymakers
who would like to predicate policy on the democratic peace without endangering the
identity dynamics that give rise to it (Lynch, 2006). However, Lynch’s discussion of
democratization in Asia also suggests how easily democratic identity can be undermined
if democracy comes to be defined in opposition to, rather than in synergy with, national
identity, as can be the case if it seen as imposed from the outside rather than developed
indigenously.
5

In this context, the U.S. policy of spreading democracy through the use of force after the
attacks of September 11, 2001 would be counterproductive to the spread of the
democratic peace. At the outset, it is worth asking how effective the use of force to
impose democracy will be in imposing norms of nonviolent conflict resolution—critical
to the operation of democracy—on the target society. More broadly, however, the U.S.
policy generated a ‘West versus Islam’ identity dynamic, pitting Western political
systems of democracy against Islamic identities. The generation of this identity conflict
does not bode well for the establishment of a democratic identity within the public
because it forces an either/or identity decision—either the individual is a member of the
Muslim identity/imagined community or the democratic identity/imagined community.

5
Lynch attributes part of the success the PRC has had against democratization pressures to its linkage of
democracy to Western domination. In Lynch’s words, the PRC “rigorously micromanages the process [of
global socialization] to prevent reconstitution at the level of collective identity” (2006, p. 13).

326
While it is not impossible to overcome this dichotomy, generating it in the first place
makes efforts to generate a public democratic identity increasingly difficult. Setting up
the oppositional identity dynamic also presents the possibility that a ‘hybrid’ regime that
is not democratic by most measures—similar to that found in Iran—may arise as a
compromise between the conflicting imagined communities. As evidenced by current
controversy over Iran’s nuclear program, such hybrid regimes would not further the zone
of democratic peace.

The use of force, and unilateralism more generally, also has the potential to damage the
existing democratic peace. Shared democratic identity blocks the existential threat
argument. This is only possible because there is an expectation or assumption that the
external democratic state will observe the same norms that inform the democratic identity
of the home state. If the external democratic state does not observe these norms—e.g. the
unprovoked use of force, disregard for international institutions, etc.—behavioral
expectations or assumptions are weakened. In effect, it becomes easier for securitizing
actors to credibly claim that the external democracy poses the possibility of an existential
threat.

The insight of the dissertation on the mechanistic underpinning of the democratic peace
also suggests important ways for defusing conflicts between democracies. Particularly in
the case of militarized interstate disputes—where the use of force has been suggested—
an emphasis on shared democracy both by desecuritizing actors within the participant

327
states as well as by mediators may serve to undermine the arguments of securitizing
actors pushing forceful responses. However, given the importance of public identity in
shaping security policy, the emphasis on shared democracy must be made publicly, not in
private to negotiating teams (although it may be beneficial there as well).

In the end, the true policy significance of this research lies in clarifying our
understandings of the democratic peace. The vision of the democratic peace—
sustainable, durable peace—can only be achieved (in a proactive sense) if policy is built
on firm theoretical and empirical foundations. Doing otherwise at best risks failure and
at worst undermines the very phenomenon the policy seeks to propagate. To that end, the
mechanistic framework here as well as the findings provides new ground on which to
build a policy predicated on the democratic peace. The paucity of convincing,
mechanistically oriented scholarship in the field made such endeavors risky; this
dissertation removes some of that risk, taking us one step closer to the promised peace.
Moving forward
As in most academic projects of this nature, time and resource constraints have forced
compromises in the empirical scope of this dissertation. Ideally, I would have traveled to
Presidential libraries in an effort to uncover more ‘smoking guns’ like the 1971 case to
bolster my argument. I would have also expanded the range of actors considered to
possess security gravitas to perhaps gain a better understanding of how different players

328

factor into the securitization dynamic.
6
I would have also included more cases, notably
Japan and South Korea (centered on South Korea’s transition to democracy), the
Falkland’s War (from Britain’s perspective), a long range analysis of securitization
discourse in India and Pakistan (where historical ‘othering’ is powerful), and threat
constructions of the Soviet Union/Russia as democratization has ebbed and flowed since
the end of the Cold War. These cases may prove useful for inclusion in a larger study, or
may stand alone as article length efforts. The amount of travel, along with language
issues, precluded their inclusion within this dissertation.

More immediately applicable to the dissertation—and more likely to be included as the
dissertation moves forward to the book stage—would be to obtain data on the Indian side
of the Indo-American dyad with respect to threat construction. With the exception of the
1971 case, there are no other circumstances where the United States posed a direct
possible threat to India, limiting casework along the methodological lines of the
dissertation in its current form. However, interviews with Indian policymakers and
foreign policy elite regarding their perception of a possible threat from the United States,
particularly during the Cold War, would prove very useful in rounding out the dyadic
construction of threat.
7
For example, interviews may shed insight on whether Indian
policymakers felt they could be bolder in their foreign policy vis-à-vis U.S. interests
because they felt shared democracy would constrain the range of U.S. policy (i.e.

6
The danger here lies in determining who has this security gravitas vis-à-vis the public. For elected
political leaders, the argument in favor is fairly clear. For other actors (newspaper editors or op-ed
contributors, think tanks, etc.) the question is far more difficult to decide.
7
I owe this idea to Michael Doyle.

329
eliminate the use of force as an option). These interviews may also shed light on the
strategic element of democratic peace, particularly the possibility that weaker states in the
democracy dyad may have more foreign policy options than they might otherwise
because they are aware that force is not an (easily) viable option for political leaders in
the stronger state. Interviews may also range into Indo-Pakistani relations and whether
Pakistani transitions to democracy had an impact on Indian construction of a Pakistan
threat.

The approach used by this dissertation also suggests several avenues of related research.
The identity component lends itself well to cases where two rivalrous states—one
democratic, one not—experience a transition to shared democracy. The relationship has
already been securitized, yet most if not all of the efforts aimed at identifying and dating
rivalries mark the rivalry in just such a situation as terminating either at the point of, or
shortly after, democratization by the nondemocratic member of the rivalry. What is it
about the advent of shared democracy that terminates these rivalries? What role does
shared democratic identity have on these already securitized relations? The questions beg
to be addressed.

Another research opportunity can be found in testing the limits of shared identity. This
can be done two ways. The first is to look at cases where one (or perhaps both) of the
states are either recently or weakly democratic, i.e. at the margins of the democratic
community. How do mature democracies interact with these states in a security context?

330
How do recently or weakly democratic states interact with each other in a security
context? A different approach to this same question highlights states (possibly, but not
necessarily jointly democratic) with strong alternative identities (i.e. religious, ethnic,
class, etc.). The relationship between India and Pakistan is one such case but there are
others. An understanding of identity dynamics in these cases, particularly how these
alternative identities interact with democratic identity, would be incredibly useful for
understanding how securitization dynamics develop.

The use of covert force by one democracy against another also provides a potentially rich
empirical mine. These cases offer the possibility of multiple ‘smoking guns,’ where the
democratic identity of the public forced policymakers to alter their security policy,
forcing it ‘underground.’ Indeed, these types of cases have the potential to be highly
significant for the theoretical approach outlined in this dissertation. One of the
advantages of the approach used here is that it accounts for this type of behavior where
other approaches—notably Owen’s similar elite norms approach outlined in his Liberal
Peace, Liberal War text—do not. Finding that the democratic identity of the public does
not play a strong role in the closed-door deliberations that lead to the covert use of force,
while not condemning the theory here to irrelevance, would raise some difficult
questions.

Finally, it is important to begin to develop a coherent model of the democratic peace.
The approach here provides an important mechanistic piece of the puzzle. However, the

331
puzzle is greater than a single piece, and it both plausible and likely that other
mechanisms play an important role in the security dynamic within democracies. For
example, how does democratic identity at the level of the public and the individual
interface with civil-military relations to shape democratic security (Choi & James, 2004)?
Others have begun to build a comprehensive theory of the democratic peace (Choi &
James, 2005a), but more work remains to be done.

332
Bibliography

ABC News, & Washington Post. (1996a). ABC News/Washington Post Poll; March 14-
17, 1996: As you may know, China has been making threatening moves toward
Taiwan, which it sees as a breakaway province, and the United States has
increased its naval presence in that part of the world. Do you approve or
disapprove of the way (Bill) Clinton is handling the situation involving China and
Taiwan? (Publication no. USABCWP.96MR20.R05). Retrieved March 18, 2009,
from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
ABC News, & Washington Post. (1996b). ABC News/Washington Post Poll; March 14-
17, 1996: Do you think America's vital interests are at stake in the situation
involving China and Taiwan? (Publication no. USABCWP.96MR20.R06).
Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
ABC News, & Washington Post. (2001a). ABC News/Washington Post Poll; April 5,
2001: As you may know, a US (United States) spy plane and a Chinese military
aircraft collided last Saturday (March 31, 2001) and the US plane had to land on a
Chinese island, where the plane and crew remain. Do you think this incident
poses a threat to US--China relations, or not? (If yes, threat, ask:) Would you
describe it as a serious threat or not serious? (Publication no.
USABCWP.040601.R04). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
ABC News, & Washington Post. (2001b). ABC News/Washington Post Poll; April 5,
2001: In order to try to recover the plane (a US spy plane and a Chinese military
aircraft collided last Saturday (March 31, 2001) and the US plane had to land on a
Chinese island, where the plane and crew remain) and crew, do you think the
United States should or should not...move to restrict US (United States) trade with
China if the crew and plane are not returned? (Publication no.
USABCWP.040601.R11B). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
ABC News, & Washington Post. (2001c). ABC News/Washington Post Poll; April 5,
2001: In terms of its overall relations with the United States, do you think of
China as a friendly country or an unfriendly country? (Publication no.
USABCWP.040601.R01). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Acharya, A. (2001). Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and
the problem of regional order. London: Routledge.

333
Adhikari, G. (2004). India and America: Estranged No More. Current History, 103(671),
158-165.
Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. European
Journal of International Relations, 3(3), 319-363.
Adler, E., & Barnett, M. N. (1998). Security communities. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ahlberg, K. L. (2007). "Machiavelli with a Heart": The Johnson Administration's Food
for Peace Program in India, 1965-1966*. Diplomatic History, 31(4), 665-701.
Albright, D., & Hinderstein, C. (2005). Unraveling the AQ Khan and Future Proliferation
Networks. The Washington Quarterly, 28(2), 111-128.
Alker, H. R. (2006). On securitization politics as contexted texts and talk. Journal of
International Relations and Development, 9(1), 70–80.
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., & Przeworski, A. (1996). Classifying political
regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 31(2), 3-36.
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism (Revised ed.). London ; New York: Verso.
Andrews, G. R., & Chapman, H. (1995a). The social construction of democracy, 1870-
1990. New York: New York University Press.
Andrews, G. R., & Chapman, H. (1995b). The social construction of democracy, 1870-
1990: An Introduction. In G. R. Andrews & H. Chapman (Eds.), The social
construction of democracy, 1870-1990 (pp. 1-28). New York: New York
University Press.
Aradau, C. (2004). Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation.
Journal of International Relations and Development, 7(4), 388-413.
Asal, V., & Beardsley, K. (2007). Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior. Journal
of Peace Research, 44(2), 139-155.
Associated Press. (1996a, February 6). Perry Voices Concern for Taiwan [Electronic
Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04EED91439F934A35751C0A
960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2.

334
Associated Press. (1996b, January 27). World News Briefs; U.S. Warship Cruises China-
Taiwan Passage [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5,
2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9805E1DF1639F934A15752C0A
960958260&scp=41&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Axelrod, R. M. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Babst, D. V. (1972). A Force for Peace. Industrial Research, 14(4), 55-58.
Bachteler, T. (1997). Explaining the democratic peace: The evidence from ancient Greece
reviewed. Journal of Peace Research, 34(3), 315-323.
Bacon, K. H. (1995a, August 1). DoD News Briefing: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD
(PA); August 1, 1995. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=156
Bacon, K. H. (1995b, August 15). DoD News Briefing: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ATSD
(PA); August 15, 1995. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=163
Baker, P. (2006, 19 December). Bush Signs India Nuclear Law [Electronic Version].
Washington Post. Retrieved 10 April, 2008 from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121800233.html.
Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and
Context. European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 171-201.
Banerjee, S. (1987). Explaining the American "Tilt" in the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis: A
Late Dependency Approach. International Studies Quarterly, 31(2), 201-216.
Barkawi, T., & Laffey, M. (1999). The imperial peace: Democracy, force and
globalization. European Journal of International Relations, 5(4), 403-434.
Barnard, G. A. (2006). Causation—1. In S. Kotz & N. L. Johnson (Eds.), Encyclopedia of
statistical sciences (Second ed., Vol. 2, pp. 780-782). New York: Wiley.
BBC News. (1999, October 28). US eases sanctions on India [Electronic Version]. BBC
News. Retrieved 11 April, 2008 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/491183.stm
BBC News. (2006, 6 April). Rice defends India nuclear deal [Electronic Version]. BBC
News.com. Retrieved 7 May 2006 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4880192.stm.

335
BBC News. (2007, January 19). Concern over China's missile test BBC News.com
Retrieved August 27, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6276543.stm
Beetham, D. (Ed.). (1994). Defining and measuring democracy. London: Sage.
Bennet, J. (1998, May 14). Clinton Calls Tests a 'Terrible Mistake' And Announces
Sanctions Against India [Electronic Version]. New York Times, A13. Retrieved
July 28, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=116669804&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Bennett, D. S. (2006). Toward a continuous specification of the democracy-autocracy
connection. International Studies Quarterly, 50(2), 313-338.
Bennett, D. S., & Stam, A. C. (2000). Research Design and Estimator Choices in the
Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 44(5), 653-685.
Benoit, K. (1996). Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining
Regime Type and War Involvement. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4), 636-
657.
Berger, S. (1994, December 7). Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor
Sandy Berger, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of Commerce Ron
Brown, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, and Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs Joan Spero [Electronic Version]. The American Presidency
Project. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59842.
Berger, T. (2000). Set for stability? Prospects for conflict and cooperation in East Asia.
Review of International Studies, 26(03), 405-428.
Berger, T. U. (1996). Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan. In P.
J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (pp. 317-356). New York: Columbia University Press.
Bernstein, R., & Munro, R. (1997). The coming conflict with China (1st ed.). New York:
A.A. Knopf : Distributed by Random House.
Bernstein, R., & Munro, R. H. (1997). China I: The coming conflict with America.
Foreign Affairs, 76(2), p18(15).
Bertsch, G. K., Gahlaut, S., & Srivastava, A. (1999). Engaging India : U.S. strategic
relations with the world's largest democracy. New York ; London: Routledge.

336
Blair, D. C., & Bonfili, D. B. (2006). The April 2001 EP-3 Incident: The U.S. Point of
View. In M. D. Swaine, T. Zhang & D. F. S. Cohen (Eds.), Managing Sino-
American crises : case studies and analysis (pp. 377-390). Washington, D.C.,
Baltimore, MD: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Hopkins
Fulfillment Service distributor.
Blood, A. K. (1971a, March 30). "Selective Genocide." th Cong., Session. Foreign
Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7,
Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Blood, A. K. (1971b, April 10). "Specific Areas of Dissent with Current U.S. Policy
Toward East Pakistan." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
Bollen, K. A. (1980). Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy.
American Sociological Review, 45(3), 370-390.
Bollen, K. A. (1991). Political democracy: conceptual and measurement traps. In A.
Inkeles (Ed.), On measuring democracy: Its consequences and concomitants (pp.
3-20). New Brunswick: Transaction.
Bollen, K. A., & Paxton, P. (2000). Subjective measures of liberal democracy.
Comparative Political Studies, 33(1), 58-86.
Boucher, R. A. (2006, 7 April). The U.S.-India Friendship: Where We Were and Where
We're Going. Retrieved 22 May, 2006, from
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/64230.htm
Brady, H. E., & Collier, D. (2004). Preface. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.),
Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards (pp. xvii-xx). Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Brady, H. E., Collier, D., & Seawright, J. (2004). Refocusing the Discussion of
Methodology. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), Rethinking social inquiry:
diverse tools, shared standards (pp. 3-20). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Braumoeller, B. F. (1997). Deadly doves: Liberal nationalism and the democratic peace
in the Soviet successor states. International Studies Quarterly, 41(3), 375-402.
Bremer, S. A. (1992). Dangerous Dyads - Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of
Interstate War, 1816-1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(2), 309-341.
Bremer, S. A. (1993). Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965.
International Interactions, 18(3), 231-249.

337
Brooks, S. G. (2003). Dueling Realisms. International Organization, 51(03), 445-477.
Brown, H., Prueher, J. W., & Segal, A. (2003). Chinese Military Power: Report of an
Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Maurice
R. Greenberg Center for Geostrategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: Council on
Foreign Relations.
Brown, J. P. (1971, October 30). India's Desperate Mission [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved May 30 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79695738&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Brzezinski, Z. (1998). Disruption without Disintegration. Journal of Democracy, 9(1), 4-
5
Bueno De Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An
institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science
Review, 93(4), 791-807.
Bueno De Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2004). Testing
novel implications from the selectorate theory of war. World Politics, 56(3), 363-
+.
Bumiller, E., & Sengupta, S. (2006, March 3). Bush and India Reach Pact That Allows
Nuclear Sales [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved August 1, 2008
from
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/international/asia/03prexy.html?scp=53&sq
=india+and+nuclear&st=nyt.
Bunge, M. (1996). Finding philosophy in social science. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale
University Press.
Bunge, M. (2000). Systemism: the alternative to individualism and holism. Journal of
Socio-Economics, 29(2), 147-157.
Bunge, M. (2004). How does it work? The search for explanatory mechanisms.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34(2), 182-210.
Burns, J. F. (1998a, May 12). Fear of Arms Race [Electronic Version]. New York Times,
A1. Retrieved August 1, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=116999149&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP

338
Burns, J. F. (1998b, March 19). Hindu Party Says It Will Reconsider Its Nuclear Policy
[Electronic Version]. New York Times, A1. Retrieved August 1, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=116658194&Fmt=7&clientId=52
39&RQT=309&VName=HNP.
Burns, N. (1995a, May 24). U.S. Department of State 95/05/24 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 11, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950524db.html
Burns, N. (1995b, May 26). U.S. Department of State 95/05/26 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 11, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950526db.html
Burns, N. (1995c, July 6). U.S. Department of State 95/07/06 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 13, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9507/950706db.html
Burns, N. (1995d, July 24). U.S. Department of State 95/07/24 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 13, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9507/950724db.html
Burns, N. (1995e, November 11). U.S. Department of State 95/11/08 Daily Press
Briefing. Retrieved March 13, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9511/951108db.html
Burns, N. (1996a, March 5). U.S. Department of State 96/03/05 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 14, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9603/960305db.html
Burns, N. (1996b, March 7). U.S. Department of State 96/03/07 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 14, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9603/960307db.html
Burns, N. (1996c, March 11). U.S. Department of State 96/03/11 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 14, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9603/960308db.html
Burns, R. N. (2006, 16 March). Ongoing Efforts To Implement the U.S.-India Civil
Nuclear Agreement. Retrieved 22 May, 2006, from
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63270.htm
Burns, R. N. (2007). America's Strategic Opportunity With India; The New U.S.-India
Partnership. Foreign Affairs, 86(6), 131.

339
Bush, G. W. (2000, May 18). In Bush's Words: 'Join Together in Making China a Normal
Trading Partner' [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 25,
2009 from http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/18/world/in-bush-s-words-join-
together-in-making-china-a-normal-trading-partner.html.
Bush, G. W. (2001a). Remarks by the President at American Society of Newspaper
Editors Annual Convention Retrieved March 22, 2009, from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010405-5.html
Bush, G. W. (2001b, April 3). Remarks Calling on China To Return the United States
Military Crew and Surveillance Aircraft [Electronic Version]. The American
Presidency Project. Retrieved March 25, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45675.
Bush, G. W. (2001c, April 10). Remarks Following Discussions With King Abdullah II
of Jordan and an Exchange With Reporters [Electronic Version]. The American
Presidency Project. Retrieved March 26, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45689.
Bush, G. W. (2001d, April 6). Remarks on Presenting the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Awards in Crystal City, Virginia [Electronic Version]. The American
Presidency Project. Retrieved March 26, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45681.
Bush, G. W. (2001e, April 9). Remarks Prior to a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange With
Reporters [Electronic Version]. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved
March 26, 2009 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45688.
Bush, G. W. (2003, November 6). President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle
East [Electronic Version]. Retrieved April 7, 2009 from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.
Bush, G. W. (2005, 18 July). President, Prime Minister of India Discuss Freedom and
Democracy. Retrieved 21 May, 2006, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-1.html
Bush, G. W. (2006, 24 February). Interview of the President by Doordarshan, India.
Retrieved 21 May, 2006, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060224-5.html
Bush, G. W., & Singh, M. (2005, 18 July). Joint Statement Between President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Retrieved August 1, 2008, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html
Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2000). International systems in world history : remaking the
study of international relations. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

340
Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and powers : the structure of international
security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis.
Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub.
Cable News Network, USA Today, & Gallup Organization. (1998). Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll; June 5-7, 1998: I'm going to read a list of countries, some of which
have and some of which do not have nuclear weapons. As I read each one, please
tell me whether you think possession of nuclear weapons by that country would
pose a serious threat to the United States or not... India (Publication no.
USGALLUP.806017.Q14D). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Callamari, P., & Reveron, D. (2003). China's Use of Perception Management.
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(1), 1 - 15.
Carpenter, T. G. (2005). America's coming war with China : a collision course over
Taiwan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Carter, A. B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner. Foreign Affairs, 85(4), 33.
Carter, J. (1978a). Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's
Republic of China: Address to the Nation (December 15, 1978). In Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978 (Vol. 4, pp. 2264-
2266). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and
Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Carter, J. (1978b). Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's
Republic of China: United States Statement (December 15, 1978). In Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978 (Vol. 4, pp.
2266). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and
Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
CBS News. (2001a). CBS News Poll; April 4-5, 2001: Are your feelings toward China
generally favorable, generally unfavorable, or neutral? (Publication no.
USCBS.040601.R26). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
CBS News. (2001b). CBS News Poll; April 4-5, 2001: Do you consider China an ally of
the United States, friendly but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United
States? (Publication no. USCBS.040601.R33). Retrieved March 26 2009, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

341
CBS News. (2001c). CBS News Poll; April 23-25, 2001: Do you consider China an ally
of the United States, friendly but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the
United States? (Publication no. USCBS.042601.R54). Retrieved March 26 2009,
from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Cederman, L.-E. (2001a). Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the democratic peace as a
macrohistorical learning process. American Political Science Review, 95(1), 15-
31.
Cederman, L.-E. (2001b). Modeling the democratic peace as a Kantian selection process.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(4), 470-502.
Cederman, L.-E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Conquest and regime change: An
evolutionary model of the spread of democracy and peace. International Studies
Quarterly, 48(3), 603-629.
Cederman, L.-E., & Rao, M. P. (2001). Exploring the dynamics of the democratic peace.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(6), 818-833.
Cederman, L. E., & Daase, C. (2003). Endogenizing corporate identities: The next step in
constructivist IR theory. European Journal of International Relations, 9(1), 5-35.
Chadda, M. (1986). India and the United States: Why Detente Won't Happen. Asian
Survey, 26(10), 1118-1136.
Chan, S. (1984). Mirror, Mirror on the Wall - Are the Freer Countries More Pacific.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28(4), 617-648.
Chan, S. (2002). Human Rights in China and the United States: Competing Visions and
Discrepant Performances. Human Rights Quarterly, 24(4), 1035-1053.
Chao, L., & Myers, R. H. (1998). The first Chinese democracy : political life in the
Republic of China on Taiwan. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Checkel, J. T. (2006). Tracing Causal Mechanisms. International Studies Review, 8(2),
362-370.
Chen, J., & Zhong, Y. (2008). Why Do People Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in
China? The Journal of Politics, 64(01), 178-197.
Cheng, M. (2002). The Standoff - what is unsaid? A pragmatic analysis of the conditional
marker 'if'. Discourse Society, 13(3), 309-317.
Chernoff, F. (2004). The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International
Relations. International Studies Review, 6(1), 49-78.

342
Chernoff, F. (2008). International Relations, Paleontology, and Scientific Progress:
Parallels between Democratic Peace Studies and the Meteor Impact Extinction
Hypothesis. International Studies Perspectives, 9(1), 90-98.
Childs, M. (1974, May 28). The Growing Membership in the Nuclear Club [Electronic
Version]. The Washington Post, A23. Retrieved July 20, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119865527&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Chilton, P. A. (2004). Analysing political discourse : theory and practice. London ; New
York: Routledge.
Choi, S.-W., & James, P. (2004). Civil-Military Relations in a Neo-Kantian World, 1886-
1992. Armed Forces & Society, 30(2), 227-254.
Choi, S.-W., & James, P. (2005a). Civil-military dynamics, democracy, and international
conflict : a new quest for international peace (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Choi, S.-W., & James, P. (2005b). Civil-military dynamics, democracy, and international
conflict : a new quest for international peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Choi, S. W., & James, P. (2003). No professional soldiers, no militarized interstate
disputes? A new question for neo-Kantianism. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
47(6), 796-816.
Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful adversaries : grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and
Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester: Princeton
University Press.
Christensen, T. J. (2001). Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and
Challenges for U.S. Security Policy. International Security, 25(4), 5-40.
Christensen, T. J. (2006). Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China
and U.S. Policy toward East Asia. International Security, 31(1), 81-126.
Christopher, W. (1995, July 28). "U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region",
address before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., July 28, 1995.
Retrieved March 13, 2009, from
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/950728.html
Clinton, B. (1994, January 25). 1994 State of the Union Address [Electronic Version].
Retrieved April 7, 2009 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou94.htm.

343
Clinton, W. J. (1998, 11 June). Remarks by the President on U.S.-China Relations in the
21st Century. Retrieved 1 June, 2006, from
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980611-18132.html
Clinton, W. J. (1994, May 26). The President's News Conference [Electronic Version].
The American Presidency Project. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50241.
Clinton, W. J. (1999a). Interview with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
by John King of the Cable News Network in Weston-under-Lizard, May 16,
1998. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton,
1998 (Vol. 7). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives
and Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Clinton, W. J. (1999b). The President's Radio Address, May 16, 1998. In Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1998 (Vol. 7).
Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records
Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Clinton, W. J. (1999c). Remarks Following Discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
Germany and an Exchange with Reporters in Potsdam, Germany, May 13, 1998.
In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1998
(Vol. 7). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and
Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Clinton, W. J. (2000). Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Continuation of the
National Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, November 12,
1998. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton,
1998 (Vol. 8). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives
and Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
CNN. (2001a, June 25). Disassembled U.S. plane could head home in early July
[Electronic Version]. CNN. Retrieved March 25, 2009 from
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/06/25/navy.china.plane/index.html.
CNN. (2001b, April 3). House members say standoff makes arms sales to Taiwan more
likely [Electronic Version]. CNN. Retrieved March 25, 2009 from
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/03/congress..china.navy/index.ht
ml.
CNN, & USA Today. (2001). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll; April 20-22, 2001: For each
of the following countries, please say whether you consider it an ally of the
United States, friendly, but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United
States. How about...China? (Publication no. USGALLUP.01AP20.R24B).
Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

344
Collier, D., & Mahoney, J. (1996). Insights and pitfalls - Selection bias in qualitative
research. World Politics, 49(1), 56-+.
Collier, D., Mahoney, J., & Seawright, J. (2004). Claiming Too Much: Warnings About
Selection Bias. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry:
Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (pp. 85-102). Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Collier, D., Seawright, J., & Munck, G. (2004). The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane,
and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.),
Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards (pp. 21-50). Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Copeland, D. C. (1996). Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade
Expectations. International Security, 20(4), 5-41.
Coppedge, M. (1990). Measuring Polyarchy. Studies in Comparative International
Development, 25(1), 51-72.
Coppedge, M. (2000). The Polyarchy and Contestation Scales for 1985 and 2000.
Retrieved October 11, 2007, from http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm
Copper, J. F. (1998). Taiwan's mid-1990s elections : taking the final steps to democracy.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
Cowan, E. (1974, May 28). Blast by India Prompts High-Level U.S. Review of Aid
[Electronic Version]. New York Times, A2. Retrieved June 25, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79332491&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven ; London: Yale
University Press.
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Danilovic, V., & Clare, J. (2007). The Kantian liberal peace (revisited). American
Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 397-414.
Davies, G. (1996, March 18). U.S. Department of State 96/03/18 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 14, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9603/960318db.html
Dixon, W. J. (1993). Democracy and the Management of International Conflict. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 37(1), 42-68.

345
Dixon, W. J. (1994). Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.
American Political Science Review, 88(1), 14-32.
Dixon, W. J., & Senese, P. D. (2002). Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(4), 547-571.
diZerega, G. (1995). Democracies and Peace: The Self-Organizing Foundation for the
Democratic Peace. The Review of Politics, 57(2), 279-308.
Donnelly, E. (2004). The United States-China EP-3 incident: legality and realpolitik. J
Conflict Security Law, 9(1), 25-42.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper.
Doyle, A. C., & Roden, C. (1993). The memoirs of Sherlock Holmes. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Doyle, M. W. (1983a). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign-Affairs. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 12(3), 205-235.
Doyle, M. W. (1983b). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign-Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy &
Public Affairs, 12(4), 323-353.
Doyle, M. W. (2005). Three pillars of the liberal peace. American Political Science
Review, 99(3), 463-466.
Dye, L. (1974, May 21). Plants can Provide Weapons: Atoms for Peace May Supply
Atoms for War, Experts Fear [Electronic Version]. Los Angeles Times, A1.
Retrieved July 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=603123772&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Ebbinghaus, B. (2005). When less is more - Selection problems in large-N and small-N
cross-national comparisons. International Sociology, 20(2), 133-152.
Eckstein, H. (1975). Case studies and theory in political science. In F. I. Greenstein & N.
W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science. Political science: Scope and
theory (Vol. 7, pp. 94-137). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Elman, M. F. (1997a). Preface. In M. F. Elman (Ed.), Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the
Answer (pp. vii-xi). Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Elman, M. F. (2000). Unpacking democracy: Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and
theories of democratic peace. Security Studies, 9(4), 91-126.

346
Elman, M. F. (Ed.). (1997b). Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Elster, J. (1998). A plea for mechanisms. In P. Hedström & R. Swedberg (Eds.), Social
mechanisms : an analytical approach to social theory (pp. 45-73). Cambridge
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Enterline, A. J. (1998). Regime Changes and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992. Political
Research Quarterly, 51(2), 385-409.
Eyerman, J., & Hart, R. A. (1996). An empirical test of the audience cost proposition -
Democracy speaks louder than words. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4), 597-
616.
Faison, S. (1995, July 24). Taiwan Reports Nearby Firing Of 4 Test Missiles by China
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE3D6163DF937A15754C0
A963958260&scp=9&sq=China+missile&st=nyt.
Faison, S. (1996a, March 22). Tension in Tawan: The Polemics; China Denounces U.S.
'Interference' in Dispute With Taiwan [Electronic Version]. The New York Times.
Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06EFD61739F931A15750C0
A960958260&scp=194&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Faison, S. (1996b, February 1). U.S. Warship Pays a Visit To Shanghai [Electronic
Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F01E4DD1739F932A35751C0
A960958260&scp=48&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Farber, H. S., & Gowa, J. (1995). Polities and Peace. International Security, 20(2), 123-
146.
Farber, H. S., & Gowa, J. (1997). Common interests or common polities? Reinterpreting
the democratic peace. Journal of Politics, 59(2), 393-417.
Farnham, B. (2003). The theory of democratic peace and threat perception. International
Studies Quarterly, 47(3), 395-415.
Farnsworth, C. H. (1974, June 15). 1.4-Billion Pledged To India by West [Electronic
Version]. New York Times, A39. Retrieved June 26, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79629282&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes. The American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577-592.

347
Fleischer, A. (2001, April 5). Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer. Retrieved March 24,
2009, from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/briefings/20010405.html
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative
Inquiry, 12(2), 219-245.
Forsythe, D. P. (1992). Democracy, War, and Covert Action. Journal of Peace Research,
29(4), 385-395.
Freedman, L. (1997). How Did the Democratic Process Affect Britain's Decision to
Reoccupy the Falkland Islands? In M. F. Elman (Ed.), Paths to Peace: Is
Democracy the Answer (pp. 235-266). Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press.
Freeman, C. W., Jr. (1996). Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics. Foreign
Policy(104), 3-17.
Friedberg, A. L. (1993). Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia.
International Security, 18(3), 5-33.
Friedberg, A. L. (2005). The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable?
International Security, 30(2), 7-45.
Friedman, E. (1997). Chinese nationalism, Taiwan autonomy and the prospects of a
larger war. Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 5 - 32.
Friedman, T. L. (1992, September 4). China Warns U.S. on Taiwan Jet Deal [Electronic
Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2DA133DF937A3575AC
0A964958260&scp=3&sq=Bush+Taiwan+f-16&st=nyt.
Frijda, N. H., & Mesquita, B. (2000). Beliefs Through Emotions. In N. H. Frijda, A. S. R.
Manstead & S. Bem (Eds.), Emotions and beliefs : how feelings influence
thoughts (pp. 45-77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaddis, J. L. (1986). The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System. International Security, 10(4), 99-142.
Gajwani, B. W. (1971, April 5). Civil War in Pakistan [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved May 26, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=82000958&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Gallucci, R. L. (1994). Non-proliferation and national security. Arms Control Today,
24(3), pp. 13-16.

348
Gallup Organization. (1971). Hopes And Fears; April 2-5, 1971: In the event a nation is
attacked by Communist backed forces there are several things the U.S. can do
about it. As I read the name of each country, tell me what action you would want
to see us take if that nation is actually attacked--send American troops or send
military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved at all.
How about India, what action would you want to see us take if India is attacked?
(Publication no. USGALLUP.71HF2.Q005F). Retrieved June 3, 2008, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (1973). Gallup Poll (AIPO); September 21-24, 1973: If another
world war were to break out, do you thinkg nuclear bombs and weapons are likely
to be used, or not? (Publication no. USGALLUP.878.Q05). Retrieved July 24,
2008, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (1995). Gallup Poll; August 11-14, 1995: Just your opinion, how far
up or down on a ten point scale would you rate each of the following nations in
terms of the individual freedom granted to its citizens. A ten means the highest
level of personal freedom and a one, the lowest. You can choose any number from
one to ten...China (Publication no. USGALLUP.95OCT.R04F). Retrieved March
18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (1998a). Gallup Poll; June 5-7, 1998: I'm going to read a list of
countries, some of which have and some of which do not have nuclear weapons.
As I read each one, please tell me whether you think possession of nuclear
weapons by that country would pose a serious threat to world peace, or not... India
(Publication no. USGALLUP.061998.R4F). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (1998b). Gallup Poll; June 5-7, 1998: I'm going to read a list of
countries, some of which have and some of which do not have nuclear weapons.
As I read each one, please tell me whether you think possession of nuclear
weapons by that country would pose a serious threat to world peace, or not...(Iraq,
Iran, Pakistan, China) (Publication no. USGALLUP.061998.R4A,
USGALLUP.061998.R4B, USGALLUP.061998.R4C,
USGALLUP.061998.R4D). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (1998c). Gallup Poll; June 5-June 7, 1998: Do you think it was a
good thing or a bad thing that the atomic bomb was developed? (Publication no.
USGALLUP.061998.R1). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

349
Gallup Organization. (2001a). Gallup Poll; April 6-8, 2001: As you may know, a US
(United States) Navy plane was involved in a mid-air collision with a Chinese
plane and had to land in Chinese territory. The plane and its 24 crew members are
currently being held by China...Do you consider the 24 US crew members to be
hostages of China or has the situation not yet reached the point where they can be
described as hostages? (Publication no. USGALLUP.01APR06.R54). Retrieved
March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (2001b). Gallup Poll; February 1-4, 2001: I'd like your overall
opinion of some foreign countries. For each one we'd like you to indicate your
opinion on a scale. If you have a favorable opinion of that country, name a
number between plus one and plus five--the higher the number, the more
favorable your opinion--with plus five being the most favorable. If you have an
unfavorable opinion of that country, name a number between minus one and
minus five--the higher the number the more unfavorable your opinion--with
minus five being the most unfavorable. What is your opinion of...China...on this
scale? (Publication no. USGALLUP.01FYR1.R28D). Retrieved March 26 2009,
from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (2001c). Gallup Poll; February 1-4, 2001: Is your overall opinion
of...China...very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very
unfavorable? (Publication no. USGALLUP.01FYR1.R27D). Retrieved March 26
2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization. (2002). Gallup Poll; February 4-6, 2002: Is your overall opinion
of...China very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very
unfavorable? (Publication no. USGALLUP.02FBA04.R33C). Retrieved March 26
2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today. (1995). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll;
November 6-8, 1995: Which country do you think poses the biggest military
threat to Japan: China or North Korea? (Publication no.
USGALLUP.95NOV6.R28). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today. (1996a). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll;
January 12-15 1996: I'd like you to rate China on a scale. If you have a favorable
opinion of China, name a number between plus one and plus five--the higher the
number, the more favorable your opinion. If you have an unfavorable opinion of
China, name a number between minus one and minus five--the higher the number
the more unfavorable your opinion. (Publication no. USGALLUP.96JAN.Q38).
Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

350
Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today. (1996b). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll;
March 8-10, 1996: I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. For
each one please indicate your opinion on a scale. If you have a favorable opinion
of that country, name a number between plus one and plus five--the higher the
number, the more favorable your opinion. If you have an unfavorable opinion of
that country, name a number between minus one and minus five--the higher the
number the more unfavorable your opinion with minus five being the most
unfavorable.) What is your opinion of...China...on this scale? (Publication no.
USGALLUP.960307.Q22I). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today. (1996c). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll;
March 8-10, 1996: I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. For
each one please indicate your opinion on a scale. If you have a favorable opinion
of that country, name a number between plus one and plus five--the higher the
number, the more favorable your opinion. If you have an unfavorable opinion of
that country, name a number between minus one and minus five--the higher the
number the more unfavorable your opinion with minus five being the most
unfavorable.) What is your opinion of...Taiwan...on this scale? (Publication no.
USGALLUP.960307.Q22O). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Gallup Organization, CNN, & USA Today. (1996d). Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll;
March 15-17, 1996: If China were to attack Taiwan, do you think the United
States should use its military forces to help defend Taiwan, or not? (Publication
no. USGALLUP.96MR15.R46). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL
Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Ganguly, S. (1999). India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New
Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program. International Security, 23(4), 148-177.
Ganguly, S., & Mistry, D. (2006). The Case for the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement. World
Policy Journal, 23(2), 11-19.
Gartzke, E. (1998). Kant we all just get along? Opportunity, willingness, and the origins
of the democratic peace. American Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 1-27.
Gartzke, E. (2000). Preferences and the democratic peace. International Studies
Quarterly, 44(2), 191-212.
Gartzke, E. (2007). The capitalist peace. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1),
166-191.
Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001). Investing in the Peace: Economic
Interdependence and International Conflict. International Organization, 55(2),
391-438.

351
Garver, J. W. (1997). Face off : China, the United States, and Taiwan's democratization.
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.
International Organization, 50(1), 109-139.
Geddes, B. (1990). How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection
Bias in Comparative Politics. Political Analysis, 2(1), 131-150.
Gelb, L. H. (1974, June 7). Kissinger Reassures Soviet Of Continued Mideast Role
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 26, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79628629&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Geller, D. S. (1990). Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 34(2), 291-310.
Gelpi, C. (1997). Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization
of Domestic Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2), 255-282.
Gelpi, C. F., & Griesdorf, M. (2001). Winners or losers? Democracies in international
crisis, 1918-94. American Political Science Review, 95(3), 633-647.
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social
sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Gerring, J. (2007). Is there a (viable) crucial-case method? Comparative Political Studies,
40(3), 231-253.
Gibler, D. M. (2007). Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict.
International Studies Quarterly, 51(3), 509-532.
Gilboy, G., & Heginbotham, E. (2001). China's Coming Transformation. Foreign Affairs,
80(4), 26-39.
Gilley, B. (2004). China's democratic future : how it will happen and where it will lead.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Gleditsch, N. P. (1995). Geography, Democracy, and Peace. International Interactions,
20(4), 297-323.
Goenner, C. F. (2004). Uncertainty of the liberal peace. Journal of Peace Research,
41(5), 589-605.
Gould, H. A., & Ganguly, S. (Eds.). (1992). The Hope and the Reality: U.S.-India
Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan. Oxford: Westview Press.

352
Gowa, J. (1995). Democratic States and International Disputes. International
Organization, 49(3), 511-522.
Gowa, J. S. (1999). Ballots and bullets : the elusive democratic peace. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Green, D. P., Kim, S. Y., & Yoon, D. H. (2001). Dirty Pool. International Organization,
55(2), 441-468.
Greenhouse, S. (1995, May 22). Aides to Clinton Say He Will Defy Beijing and Issue
Visa to Taiwan's President [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved
March 10, 2009 from http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/22/world/aides-to-
clinton-say-he-will-defy-beijing-and-issue-visa-to-taiwan-s-president.html.
Gries, P. H., & Peng, K. (2002). Culture Clash? Apologies East and West. Journal of
Contemporary China, 11(30), 173 - 178.
Guihong, Z. (2005). US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for China. International
Studies, 42(3-4), 277-293.
Gwertzman, B. (1971a, December 14). Firm Soviet Backing of India Is Said to Irk Nixon
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79168746&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Gwertzman, B. (1971b, December 11). Goldwater Identifies Kissinger as 'Sources'
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79168226&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Gwertzman, B. (1971c, December 7). U.S. Cuts Economic Aid to India [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90702695&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Gwertzman, B. (1971d, December 8). U.S. Says India Attacked After Concessions by
Foe [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90704388&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Gwertzman, B. (1972, January 15). Packard Opposed Kissinger on India [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 3, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79415986&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP

353
Gwertzman, B. (1974, September 24). Ford and Kissinger Warn Exorbinant Prices of Oil
Imperil World's Economy [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved July
11, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79339925&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Haas, M. L. (2005). The ideological origins of great power politics, 1789-1989. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Hall, R. B. (1999). National collective identity : social constructs and international
systems. New York: Columbia University Press.
Harding, H. (1992). A fragile relationship : the United States and China since 1972.
Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Harding, H. (1998). The Halting Advance of Pluralism. Journal of Democracy, 9(1), 11-
17
Harris Interactive. (2005). Harris Poll; August 9-August 16, 2005: Do you feel that...India
is a close ally of the U.S. (United States), is friendly but not a close ally, is not
friendly but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and is an enemy of the U.S.?
(Publication no. USHARRIS.091405.R1N). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Harris Interactive. (2006). Harris Poll; July 5-July 11, 2006: Do you feel that...India is a
close ally of the US (United States), is friendly but not a close ally, is not friendly
but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and is an enemy of the US? (Publication no.
USHARRIS.080306.R1Q). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Harrison, E. (2004). State Socialization, International Norm Dynamics and the Liberal
Peace. International Politics, 41(4), 521-542.
Hathaway, R. M. (2002). The US-India courtship: from Clinton to Bush. Journal of
Strategic Studies, 25(4), 6 - 31.
Hayes, J. (2009). Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States
and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs.
International Studies Quarterly.
Henderson, G. P. (2006). The Public and Peace: The Consequences for Citizenship of the
Democratic Peace Literature. The International Studies Review, 8(2), 199-224.

354
Herman, R. G. (1996). Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy
Revolution and the End of the Cold War. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture
of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 271-316). New
York: Columbia University Press.
Hermann, M. G., & Kegley, C. W. (1995). Rethinking Democracy and International
Peace - Perspectives from Political Psychology. International Studies Quarterly,
39(4), 511-533.
Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory.
International Security, 23(1), 171-200.
Hopf, T. (2002). Social construction of international politics : identities & foreign
policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Houghton, D. P. (2001). US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis. Cambridge ; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, T. L. (1969, February 11). "Ayub Seeks Talks with the Opposition on the
Political Crisis " th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12-34.
Huth, P. K., & Allee, T. L. (2002). The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the
twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huysmans, J. (1998). The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of
Horror in Political Realism. Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 27(3),
569-589.
Hyde, H. (2001, April 7). CNN Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields: Congressman Hyde
Discusses U.S.-China Standoff [Electronic Version]. CNN Transcripts. Retrieved
March 25, 2001 from
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/07/en.00.html.
Inkeles, A. (1991). On measuring democracy : its consequences and concomitants. New
Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2009a). Chapter Eight: East Asia and
Australasia. In The Military Balance (Vol. 109, pp. 363-424).
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2009b). Chapter Seven: Central and South
Asia. In The Military Balance (Vol. 109, pp. 329-362).

355
Jacobs, L. R. (2001). Manipulators and Manipulation: Public Opinion in a Representative
Democracy. Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law, 26(6), 1361-1374.
Jacobs, L. R., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2000). Politicians don't pander : political manipulation
and the loss of democratic responsiveness. Chicago, IL. London: University of
Chicago Press.
Jahn, E., Lemaitre, P., & Wæver, O. (1987). European security : problems of research on
non-military aspects. Copenhagen: Centre of Peace and Conflict Research
University of Copenhagen.
James, P. (2004). Systemism, Social Mechanisms, and Scientific Progress: A Case Study
of the International Crisis Behavior Project. Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
34(3), 352-370.
James, P., & Mitchell, G. E. (1995). Targets of Covert Pressure - The Hidden Victims of
the Democratic Peace. International Interactions, 21(1), 85-107.
James, P., Park, J., & Choi, S.-W. (2006). Democracy and conflict management:
Territorial claims in the western hemisphere revisited. International Studies
Quarterly, 50(4), 803-817.
James, P., Solberg, E., & Wolfson, M. (1999). An identified systemic model of the
democracy-peace nexus. Defence and Peace Economics, 10(1), 1-37.
Jha, N. K. (1994). Reviving U.S.-India Friendship in a Changing International Order.
Asian Survey, 34(12), 1035-1046.
Ji, Y. (1997). Making sense of war games in the Taiwan Strait. Journal of Contemporary
China, 6(15), 287 - 305.
Johnston, A. I. (1995). Cultural realism : strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese
history. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Johnston, A. I. (2003). Is China a Status Quo Power? . International Security, 27(4), 5-56
Johnston, A. I., & Ross, R. S. (1999). Engaging China : the management of an emerging
power. London: Routledge.
Jones, J. M. (2006, 23 February). Americans Rate Iran Most Negatively of 22 Countries.
Retrieved 15 April, 2008, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/21604/Americans-
Rate-Iran-Most-Negatively-Countries.aspx
Kacowicz, A. M. (1995). Explaining Zones of Peace - Democracies as Satisfied Powers.
Journal of Peace Research, 32(3), 265-276.

356
Kahl, C. H. (1999). Constructing a separate peace: Constructivism, collective liberal
identity, and democratic peace. Security Studies, 8(2-3), 94-144.
Kant, I. (1795/1983). Perpetual peace, and other essays on politics, history, and morals
(T. Humphrey, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
Kapur, S. P., & Ganguly, S. (2007). The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An
Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future. Asian Survey,
47(4), 642-656.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1996a). The culture of national security : norms and identity in world
politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1996b). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony : cooperation and discord in the world political
economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1988). Power and interdependence (2nd ed.). Glenview,
Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown College Division.
Khan, R. (1999). The American papers : secret and confidential India-Pakistan-
Bangladesh documents, 1965-1973. Karachi, Pakistan ; New York: Oxford
University Press.
Khong, Y. F. (1992). Analogies at war : Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam
decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kim, H. M., & Rousseau, D. L. (2005). The classical liberals were half right (or half
wrong): New tests of the 'liberal peace', 1960-88. Journal of Peace Research,
42(5), 523-543.
Kim, S. S. (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice. In S. S. Kim (Ed.),
China and the world : Chinese foreign policy faces the new millennium (4th ed.).
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry : scientific
inference in qualitative research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Kinsella, D., & Chima, J. S. (2001). Symbols of statehood: military industrialization and
public discourse in India. Review of International Studies, 27, 353-373
Kowert, P., & Legro, J. (1996). Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise.
In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (pp. 451-497). New York: Columbia University Press.

357
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. [Chicago]: University of
Chicago Press.
Kux, D. (1994). Estranged democracies : India and the United States, 1941-1991. New
Delhi ; London: Sage.
Kux, D. (2002). A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations. Foreign Service
Journal, 79.
Lake, A. (1994, May 26). Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake,
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary
of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy Bob Rubin [Electronic Version]. The American Presidency
Project. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59758.
Lam, W. W.-L. (1996). The Factional Dynamics in China's Taiwan Policy. The China
Journal(36), 116-118.
Lampton, D. M. (2001). Same bed, different dreams : managing U.S.-China relations,
1989-2000. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Layne, C. (1994). Kant or Cant. International Security, 19(2), 5-49.
Layne, C. (1997). Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Liberalism, the Balance
of Power; and Anglo-French Relations, 1830-1848. In M. F. Elman (Ed.), Paths
to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer (pp. 61-100). Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press.
Lebovic, J. H. (2004). Uniting for peace? Democracies and United Nations peace
operations after the cold war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 910-936.
Levine, S. I. (1998). Sino-American Relations: Practiciing Damage Control. In S. S. Kim
(Ed.), China and the world : Chinese foreign policy faces the new millennium (4th
ed., pp. 91-113). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Levy, J. S. (1988). Domestic Politics and War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
18(4), 653-673.
Levy, J. S. (2002). Qualitative Methods in International Relations. In F. P. Harvey & M.
Brecher (Eds.), Evaluating Methodology in International Studies (pp. 131-160).
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Levy, M. A., & Ferguson, C. D. (2006). U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for
Moving Forward (No. CSR 16): Council on Foreign Relations.

358
Lewis, A. (1971, December 6). The Wringing of Hands [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved June 9, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79167933&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Li, L. (2002). The Politics of Introducing Direct Township Elections in China. The China
Quarterly, 171(-1), 704-723.
Li, L. (2003). The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China. Asian Survey, 43(4),
648-662.
Lippmann, W. (1922/2004). Public opinion. New York, NY: Courier Dover Publications.
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105.
Lipson, C. (2003). Reliable partners : how democracies have made a separate peace.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lord, W. (1995). U.S. Department of State 95/05/30 Daily Press Briefing. Retrieved
March 11, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950530db.html
Los Angeles Times. (1974, May 19). India Detonates 1st Nuclear Shot for 'Technology'
[Electronic Version]. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved July 22, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=645157932&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Louis Harris & Associates. (1995a). Harris Poll; August 31-September 3, 1995: Do you
feel that...China...is a close ally of the U.S. (United States), is friendly but not a
close ally, is not friendly but not an enemy, or is an enemy of the U.S.?
(Publication no. USHARRIS.100295.R1M). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris & Associates. (1995b). Harris Poll; August 31-September 3, 1995: Do you
feel that...Taiwan...is a close ally of the U.S. (United States), is friendly but not a
close ally, is not friendly but not an enemy, or is an enemy of the U.S.?
(Publication no. USHARRIS.100295.R1H). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

359
Louis Harris & Associates. (1996a). Harris Poll; February 22-29, 1996: China is
threatening to hold military exercises off the coast of Taiwan in an attempt to
influence Taiwan's first democratic presidential election in March. Should the
United States send an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Straits to try to decrease
China's influence on Taiwan's election, or not? (Publication no.
USHARRIS.030896.R4). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris & Associates. (1996b). Harris Poll; February 22-29, 1996: From what you
know, or have heard or read, do you feel that Taiwan should eventually be
reunified with Mainland China under any circumstances or do you feel China and
Taiwan should be reunified only if the Taiwanese want to be reunified, or should
it never be reunified? (Publication no. USHARRIS.030896.R3). Retrieved March
18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris & Associates. (1996c). Harris Poll; February 22-29, 1996: If Mainland
China tried to invade Taiwan militarily, should America fight to defend Taiwan
against China, or not? (Publication no. USHARRIS.030896.R5). Retrieved March
18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris & Associates. (1996d). Harris Poll; February 22-29, 1996: Supporting
Taiwan's bid to become a member of the United Nations might well anger China.
Should the United States support Taiwan's U.N. bid, or not? (Publication no.
USHARRIS.030896.R2). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris and Associates. (1971). Harris Survey; October, 1971: For each woman on
the list, tell me if you respect her a great deal, somewhat, or not at all... Indira
Gandhi, Prime Minister of India (Publication no. USHARRIS.71VASL.R10H).
Retrieved June 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris and Associates. (1972a). Harris Survey; December 28-January 4, 1972: How
would you rate President Nixon on his handling of the war between India and
Pakistan--excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Publication no.
USHARRIS.012472.R2). Retrieved June 3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris and Associates. (1972b). Harris Survey; December 28-January 4, 1972: In
the recent war between India and Pakistan, did you feel more in sympathy with
India or with Pakistan? (Publication no. USHARRIS.012472.R1). Retrieved June
3, 2008, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html

360
Louis Harris and Associates. (1974a). Harris Survey; July 31-August 2, 1974: Now, let
me read you some statements about the situation on nuclear development. For
each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree...If too many countries get a nuclear
capability, some irresponsible country is bound to set off a bomb that could blow
up the earth in World War III (Publication no. USHARRIS.082674.R2D).
Retrieved July 24, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Louis Harris and Associates. (1974b). Harris Survey; July 31-August 2, 1974: Would you
approve or disapprove of the U.S. giving nuclear reactors and nuclear assistance
to...(Australia, Israel, Japan, West Germany)? (Publication no.
USHARRIS.082674.R3A, USHARRIS.082674.R1B, USHARRIS.082674.R3B,
USHARRIS.082674.R3C). Retrieved July 24, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Lupovici, A. (2009). Constructivist Methods: A Plea and Manifesto for Pluralism. Review
of International Studies.
Lynch, D. C. (2006). Rising China and Asian democratization : socialization to "global
culture" in the political transformations of Thailand, China, and Taiwan.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Lynch, D. C. (2007). Envisioning China's Political Future: Elite Responses to Democracy
as a Global Constitutive Norm. International Studies Quarterly, 51(3), 701-722.
Lynch, M. (2002). Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement.
European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 187-230.
MacMillan, J. (2003). Beyond the separate democratic peace. Journal of Peace Research,
40(2), 233-243.
Mahoney, J., & Goertz, G. (2004). The possibility principle: Choosing negative cases in
comparative research. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 653-669.
Malin, M. (1997). Is Autocracy an Obsticle to Peace? Iran and Iraq, 1975-1980. In M. F.
Elman (Ed.), Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer (pp. 373-404).
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Mann, J. (1999). About face : a history of America's curious relationship with China from
Nixon to Clinton (1st ed.). New York: Alfred Knopf : Distributed by Random
House.
Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (1995). Democratization and the Danger of War.
International Security, 20(1), 5-38.

361
Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (2002). Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and
War. International Organization, 56(2), 297-337.
Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. L. (2005). Electing to fight : why emerging democracies
go to war. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Maoz, Z., & Abdolali, N. (1989). Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(1), 3-35.
Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1992). Alliance, Wealth Contiguity, and Political Stability: Is
the Lack of Conflict Between Democracies A Statistical Artifact? International
Interactions, 17(3), 245-267.
Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. M. (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
Marder, M. (1974, October 29). U.S. Shifts View of India Role [Electronic Version]. The
Washington Post. Retrieved July 22, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119885682&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Marwah, O. (1977). India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy. International
Security, 2(2), 96-121.
May, J. D. (1978). Defining Democracy - A Bid for Coherence and Consensus. Political
Studies, 26(1), 1-14.
McCardle, D. (1974, July 16). Discussing India's Nuclear Capability [Electronic
Version]. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 20, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119803745&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
McClellan, S. (2001, April 2). Press Briefing by Scott McClellan. Retrieved March 24,
2009, from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/briefings/20010402.html
McCurdy, J. (1974, October 20). Scholars' Opinions Bode Ill for Nixon's Place in History
[Electronic Version]. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved July 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=644834472&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
McCurry, M. (1995, October 24). Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and Director of Asian Affairs Robert
Suettinger. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1995/10/1995-10-24-briefing-by-winston-lord-and-bob-
suettinger-nyc.html

362
McMahon, R. J. (1994). The cold war on the periphery : the United States, India, and
Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mehta, P. B. (1998). India: The nuclear politics of self-esteem. Current History, 97(623),
403.
Middleton, D. (1974, May 26). Who's Next in Atom Club? [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved June 25, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=93272822&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Midlarsky, M. I. (1995). Environmental Influences on Democracy-Aridity, Warfare, and
a Reversal of the Causal Arrow. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(2), 224-262.
Mitchell, S. M. (2002). A Kantian system? Democracy and third-party conflict resolution.
American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 749-759.
Mitchell, S. M., Gates, S., & Hegre, H. (1999). Evolution in democracy-war dynamics.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(6), 771-792.
Mitchell, S. M., & Prins, B. C. (1999). Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in
Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes. International Studies Quarterly,
43(1), 169-183.
Moore, D. W. (2001, 3 April). Americans Divided in Feelings About China. Retrieved
15 April, 2008, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/1837/Americans-Divided-
Feelings-About-China.aspx
Moore, D. W. (2004, 14 December). Iran or North Korea More of a Threat? It Depends.
Retrieved 14 April, 2008, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/14362/Iran-North-
Korea-More-Threat-Depends.aspx
Moore, D. W. (2005, 23 February). "Axis of Evil" Countries Seen as America's Greatest
Enemies. Retrieved 15 April, 2008, from
http://www.gallup.com/poll/15022/Axis-Evil-Countries-Seen-Americas-Greatest-
Enemies.aspx
Moravcsik, A. (1999). 'Is something rotten in the state of Denmark?' Constructivism and
European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), 669 - 681.
Morgan, D. (1974, May 21). India Used Own Material, U.S. Feels [Electronic Version].
The Washington Post. Retrieved July 20, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119791900&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP

363
Morgan, T. C., & Campbell, S. H. (1991). Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints,
and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2),
187-211.
Morgan, T. C., & Schwebach, V. (1992). Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the
Morning: A Prescription for Peace? International Interactions, 17(4), 305-320.
Morrow, J. D. (1991). Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2), 245-265.
Mousseau, M. (2002). An economic limitation to the zone of democratic peace and
cooperation. International Interactions, 28(2), 137-164.
Mousseau, M. (2003). The nexus of market society, liberal preferences, and democratic
peace: Interdisciplinary theory and evidence. International Studies Quarterly,
47(4), 483-510.
Mousseau, M., Hegre, H., & Oneal, J. R. (2003). How the wealth of nations conditions
the liberal peace. European Journal of International Relations, 9(2), 277-314.
Mousseau, M., & Shi, Y. H. (1999). A test for reverse causality in the democratic peace
relationship. Journal of Peace Research, 36(6), 639-663.
Müller, H., & Wolff, J. (2004). Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back: Reconstructing
the Social Constructivist Approach After the Monadic Renaissance. Paper
presented at the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference.
Munck, G. (1998). Canons of research design in qualitative analysis. Studies in
Comparative International Development (SCID), 33(3), 18-45.
Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy -
Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political Studies, 35(1), 5-34.
Nathan, A. J. (1996). China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait. The China Journal(36), 87-93.
Nathan, A. J. (1999). Forward. In S. Zhao (Ed.), Across the Taiwan strait : mainland
China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 crisis (pp. vii-x). New York ; London:
Routledge.
Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian Resilience Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6-17.
Nathan, A. J., & Ross, R. S. (1997). The great wall and the empty fortress : China's
search for security. New York ; London: W.W. Norton.

364
National Security Council. (1971, March 3). "Contingency Study on Pakistan -- East
Pakistan Seccession (NSSM-118)." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the
United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South
Asia, 1969-1972
Naughton, J. M. (1971, December 15). Nixon May Review Trip Unless Soviet Curbs
India [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79409623&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
NBC News, & Wall Street Journal. (1995a). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll; June 2-
6, 1995: Which one of the following do you think is the most serious foreign
policy issue facing the United States today...economic instability in Mexico, trade
relations with Japan, relations with China, North Korea's nuclear program, the
war in Bosnia, or relations between Israel and the Arab nations? (Publication no.
USNBCWSJ.060895.R24A). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
NBC News, & Wall Street Journal. (1995b). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll;
September 16-19, 1995: Which one of the following do you think is the most
serious foreign policy issue facing the United States today...economic instability
in Mexico, trade relations with Japan, relations with China, North Korea's nuclear
program, the war in Bosnia, or relations between Israel and the Arab nations?
(Publication no. USNBCWSJ.4062.Q22). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL
Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
NBC News, & Wall Street Journal. (2001). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll; April
20-22, 2001: Today, in general do you think of China as more of an ally or more
of an adversary? (Publication no. USNBCWSJ.01APR.R19A). Retrieved March
26 2009, from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
NBC News, Wall Street Journal, & Hart and McInturff Research. (2006). NBC
News/Wall Street Journal Poll; March 10-13, 2006: I'm going to read you a
number of actions and positions that George W. Bush and his administration have
taken over the past few years. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly
support that action or position, somewhat support it, somewhat oppose it, or
strongly oppose it...Signing a pact with India that allows India to buy technologies
from the United States to develop its non-military nuclear energy program
(Publication no. USNBCWSJ.06MAR.R18I). Retrieved August 3, 2008, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
New York Times. (1971a, June 23). Abetting Repression [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved May 29, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=81951650&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP

365
New York Times. (1971b, April 6). Aid to Democratic India [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved May 26, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=82001338&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1971c, April 21). An Internal Matter? [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved May 26, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=81879799&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1971d, December 12). McGovern Says India Was Justified in Action
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=91315346&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1971e, August 5). Transcript of the President's News Conference on
Foreign and Domestic Matters [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved
May 29, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90683102&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1972, January 6). Kissinger Parley Excerpts [Electronic Version].
New York Times. Retrieved June 3, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79413975&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1974a, November 5). Detente With India [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved July 11, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=87604121&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1974b, May 26). India's Nuclear Threat [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved June 25, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=93272849&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1974c, October 29). Kissinger Bids India Join In Curbing Atomic
Arms [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved July 11, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=80433049&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1974d, May 20). On To Armageddon [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved June 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=91440981&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP

366
New York Times. (1974e, May 19). Setback is Seen for Arms Parley [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved July 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=117536223&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1974f, May 19). U.S. Sees 'Adverse Impact' [Electronic Version].
New York Times. Retrieved June 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=117536225&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
New York Times. (1992, October 12). The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of First TV
Debate Among Bush, Clinton and Perot [Electronic Version]. New York Times.
Retrieved March 16, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE0D91138F931A25753C1
A964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.
New York Times. (1995a, May 26). China Warns U.S. Over Taiwan Visitor [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE1D6133FF935A15756C0
A963958260&scp=4&sq=Lee+Teng-hui+Cornell&st=nyt.
New York Times. (1995b, August 11). World News Briefs; China Plans War Games Off
Coast Near Taiwan [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved March 4,
2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEFDB1E3FF932A2575BC0
A963958260&scp=17&sq=China+missile&st=nyt.
Newman, A. (2001, April 3). Collision With China: The Families; A Frustrating Wait for
Crew Members' Anxious Relatives [Electronic Version]. New York Times.
Retrieved March 23, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/03/world/collision-with-china-families-
frustrating-wait-for-crew-members-anxious.html.
Nixon, R. M. (1971a). The President's News Conference of August 4, 1971. In Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 (Vol. 3, pp.
849-850). Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and
Records Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Nixon, R. M. (1971b). Remarks of Welcome to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India,
November 4, 1971. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Richard Nixon, 1971 (Vol. 3, pp. 1079-1080). Washington, D.C: Office of the
Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration : United States
Government Printing Office.

367
Nixon, R. M. (1971c). Statement About Additional Funds for Humanitarian Relief and
Refugee Rehabilitation in South Asia, October 1, 1971. In Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971 (Vol. 3, pp. 1017-1018).
Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records
Administration : United States Government Printing Office.
Nixon, R. M. (1972). Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign
Policy, February 9, 1972. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Richard Nixon, 1972 (Vol. 4, pp. 194-346). Washington, D.C: Office of the
Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration : United States
Government Printing Office.
Noorani, A. G. (1981). Indo-U.S. Nuclear Relations. Asian Survey, 21(4), 399-416.
O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2000). Accommodating 'Democracy' in a One-Party State:
Introducing Village Elections in China. China Quarterly, 162, 465-489.
O'Toole, T. (1974, May 19). Experts Fear India's A-Blast May Trigger New Rivalries
[Electronic Version]. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 18, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119590011&Fmt=7&clientId=15810&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Office of the Prime Minister. (1998, 18 May). Press conference given by Tony Blair,
President Clinton and President Santer. Retrieved 28 May, 2006, from
http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1164.asp
Ollapally, D., & Ramanna, R. (1995). US-India Tensions-Misperceptions on Nuclear
Proliferation. Foreign Affairs, 74, 13.
Oneal, J. R., Oneal, F. H., Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1996). The liberal peace:
Interdependence, democracy, and international conflict, 1950-85. Journal of
Peace Research, 33(1), 11-28.
Oneal, J. R., & Ray, J. L. (1997). New tests of the democratic peace: Controlling for
economic interdependence, 1950-85. Political Research Quarterly, 50(4), 751-
775.
Oneal, J. R., & Russet, B. M. (1997). The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985. International Studies Quarterly, 41(2),
267-294.
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1999a). Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war
interests? Assessing recent critiques. International Interactions, 25(3), 213-241.

368
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1999b). The Kantian peace - The Pacific benefits of
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. World
Politics, 52(1), 1-+.
Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2001). Clear and clean: The fixed effects of the liberal peace.
International Organization, 55(2), 469-+.
Oneal, J. R., Russett, B., & Berbaum, M. L. (2003). Causes of peace: Democracy,
interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. International
Studies Quarterly, 47(3), 371-393.
Onuf, N. G. (1989). World of our making : rules and rule in social theory and
international relations. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.
Oren, I. (1995). The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace - Changing US Perceptions of
Imperial Germany. International Security, 20(2), 147-184.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2000). STAN Bilateral
Trade Database 2000 edition (Publication. Retrieved 2 April, 2008, from STAN
Bilateral Trade Database:
http://lysander.sourceoecd.org/vl=4214908/cl=14/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/1608130
7/v264n1/s1/p1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006a). STAN Bilateral
Trade Database Vol 2006 release 01 (Publication. Retrieved November 1, 2008,
from SourceOECD STAN Structural Analysis Database:
http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=18828024/cl=12/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/1608130
7/v264n1/s1/p1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006b). STAN Bilateral
Trade Database Vol 2006 release 01 (Publication. Retrieved 2 April, 2008, from
STAN Bilateral Trade Database:
http://lysander.sourceoecd.org/vl=4214908/cl=14/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/1608130
7/v264n1/s1/p1
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2008). Country Statistical
Profiles: China (Publication. Retrieved November 1, 2008, from OECD.Stat:
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?usercontext=sourceoecd
Owen, J. M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security,
19(2), 87-125.
Owen, J. M. (1997). Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International
Security. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

369
Papayoanou, P. A. (1999). Power ties : economic interdependence, balancing, and war.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Peceny, M. (1997). A constructivist interpretation of the liberal peace: The ambiguous
case of the Spanish-American war. Journal of Peace Research, 34(4), 415-430.
Perkovich, G. (1998). Nuclear Proliferation. Foreign Policy(112), 12-23.
Perkovich, G. (2002). India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Perlez, J., & Sanger, D. E. (2001, April 6). Collision With China: The Overview; Bush
Aides Saying Some Hope Is Seen To End Standoff [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved March 23, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/06/world/collision-with-china-overview-bush-
aides-saying-some-hope-seen-end-standoff.html.
Perry, W. H. (1995, October 30). U.S. Strategy: Engage China, Not Contain It.
Retrieved March 12, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1023
Perry, W. J. (1996, March 18). DoD News Briefing: Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry; March 18, 1996. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=446
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. (2001a). Pew News Interest Index
Poll; May 11-20, 2001: All things considered, which of these descriptions comes
closest to your view of China today? Do you think China is...an adversary, a
serious problem, but not an adversary, or not much of a problem? (Publication no.
USPSRA.061101.R19). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. (2001b). Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press Foreign Threats Poll; May 11-20, 2001: I'd like your opinion
about some possible international concerns for the US (United States). Do you
think that... China's emergence as a world power is a major threat, a minor threat,
or not a threat to the well being of the United States? (Publication no.
USPSRA.01JN11.R01A). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Pinsker, R. (2003). Drawing a line in the Taiwan Strait: strategic ambiguity and its
discontents. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57, 353-368.
Potter, W. C. (2005). India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy. The
Nonproliferation Review, 12(2), 343-354.

370
Prueher, J. W. (2001, April 12). Collision With China; Envoy's Letter to Beijing
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved March 23, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/world/collision-with-china-envoy-s-letter-
to-beijing.html.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.
Quigley, C. R. (2001a, April 3). DoD News Briefing - Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley,
DASD PA; April 3, 2001. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1032
Quigley, C. R. (2001b, April 10). DoD News Briefing - Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley,
DASD PA; April 10, 2001. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1056
Ragin, C. C. (2004). Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges
Variable-Oriented Research. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), Rethinking
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (pp. 123-138). Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Rajamony, V. (2002). India-China-US Triangle: A Soft Balance of Power System in the
Making Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Ray, J. L. (1995). Democracy and international conflict : an evaluation of the democratic
peace proposition. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Ray, J. L. (2003). A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program. In C.
Elman & M. F. Elman (Eds.), Progress in international relations theory :
appraising the field (pp. 205-244). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Raymond, G. A. (1994). Democracies, Disputes, and 3rd-Party Intermediaries. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 38(1), 24-42.
Reagan, R. (1982). United States-China Joint Communique on United States Arms Sales
to Taiwan (August 17, 1982). In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Ronald Reagan, 1982 (Vol. 3, pp. 1052-1053). Washington, D.C: Office
of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration : United
States Government Printing Office.
Reiter, D. (2001). Does Peace Nurture Democracy? Journal of Politics, 63(3), 935-948.
Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at war. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.

371
Reiter, D., & Tillman, E. R. (2002). Public, legislative, and executive constraints on the
democratic initiation of conflict. Journal of Politics, 64(3), 810-826.
Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress
Regarding United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H2342-H2350.
Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA). (2001, April 4). "American's Held Hostage, Day
Four." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1478.
Representative Burton (R-IN). (1998, June 11). "India considers sanctions a blessing-
Indian villagers report side-effects from nuclear tests." 105th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record 144 E1123-E1125.
Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA). (1996a, March 21). "H.CON.RES.148: A
concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding missile tests and
military exercises by the People's Republic of China." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H2342.
Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA). (1996b, March 19). "United States Must Be
Clear About Its Position Regarding Democracy in Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd
Session. Congressional Record H2327.
Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ). (2001, April 3). "Urging Introduction of U.N.
Resolution Calling Upon the People's Republic of China to End Its Human Rights
Violations in China and Tibet." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record
H1371.
Representative Clifford Sterns (R-FL). (2001, April 3). "China: Friend or Foe?" 107th
Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1354.
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress
Regarding United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H2344.
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). (2001, April 24). "Wake Up, America:
Engagement With China Has Failed." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional
Record H1564-H1549.
Representative David Weldon (R-PA). (2001, April 24). "Defense of America's
Homeland." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1842-H1845.
Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA). (2001, April 24). "In Support Of A Missile
Defense Shield For America." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record
H1831-H1832.

372
Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA). (1995, October 17). "Supporting Taiwan." 104th
Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record E1957.
Representative Enid Waldholtz (R-UT). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress Regarding
United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional
Record H2345.
Representative Gallagher (D-NJ). (1971, December 8). "The Situation on the Indian
Subcontinent." 92th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 117 part 34:
45545.
Representative George Nethercutt (R-WA). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress
Regarding United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H2347.
Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY). (1996a, January 5). "China and Taiwan: The
Obvious Differences." 104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record E32.
Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY). (1996b, March 19). "Sense of Congress
Regarding United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H2344.
Representative Heather Wilson (R-NM). (2001, April 4). "Detention of 24 Crew
Members in China." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1465.
Representative James Traficant (D-OH). (2001, April 4). "China Testing American
Resolve." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1414.
Representative Jo Ann Davis (R-VA). (2001, April 24). "Our Servicemen and Women in
China." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1467.
Representative John Hayworth (R-AZ). (2001, April 4). "Brandon Funk of Show Low,
Arizona, Being Held By the PRC." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional
Record H1467.
Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA). (2001, April 4). "China Is At Fault." 107th Cong.,
1st Session. Congressional Record H1413-1414.
Representative Morse (R-MA). (1971, December 2). "The Subcontinent - A World
Responsibility." 92th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 117 part 34:
44355.
Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI). (2001, April 24). "United States Missile
Defense." 107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record H1668-H1669.

373
Representative Peter Deutsch (D-FL). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress Regarding
United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional
Record H2347.
Representative Peter T. King (R-NY). (1995, September 14). "The United States Must
Stand with Taiwan." 104th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record E1790-
E1791.
Representative Price (R-TX). (1974, May 22). "India's Test of a Nuclear Explosive." 93th
Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record 120 part 12: 16192-16194.
Representative Sherrod Brown (D-OH). (1996, January 25). "China Threatens Taiwan."
104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record E88.
Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA). (1996, February 1). "Think Twice, Communist
China, Before You Use Force Against Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record H1202-H1204.
Representative Toby Roth (R-WI). (1996, March 19). "Sense of Congress Regarding
United States Support of Taiwan." 104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional
Record H2345.
Reston, J. (1974, May 24). The Nuclear Nightmare [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved June 25, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79331830&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Reuters. (1996, March 5). World News Briefs; China Announces Tests Of Missiles Near
Taiwan [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07E1DF1F39F936A35750C0
A960958260&scp=118&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Reuveny, R., & Li, Q. (2003). The joint democracy-dyadic conflict nexus: A
simultaneous equations model. International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), 325-346.
Rigger, S. (1997). Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The irresolvable conflict
in cross-strait relations. Journal of Contemporary China, 6(15), 307 - 317.
Rigger, S. (1999). Politics in Taiwan : voting for democracy. London ; New York:
Routledge.
Rioux, J. S. (1998). A crisis-based evaluation of the democratic peace proposition.
Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique,
31(2), 263-283.

374
Risse-Kappen, T. (1995a). Cooperation among democracies : the European influence on
U.S. foreign policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Risse-Kappen, T. (1995b). Democratic Peace--Warlike Democracies?: A Social
Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument. European Journal of
International Relations, 1(4), 491.
Risse-Kappen, T. (1996). Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of
NATO. In P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (pp. 357–399). New York: Columbia University Press.
Rock, S. R. (1997). Anglo-U.S. Relations, 1845-1930: Did Shared Liberal Values and
Democratic Institutions Keep the Peace? In M. F. Elman (Ed.), Paths to Peace: Is
Democracy the Answer (pp. 101-150). Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press.
Rohrabacher, D. (2001, April 4). Hastert questions 'appropriateness' of congressional
trips to China [Electronic Version]. CNN. Retrieved March 25, 2009 from
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/04/congress.china.trips/index.htm
l.
Roper Organization. (1975a). Roper Report 75-2; January 11-25, 1975: The United States
has formed ties of varying degrees with different nations in the world. Here is a
list of a few countries. Would you read down that list and tell me for each country
what you think would be best for us in the long run--to strengthen our ties with
them, or to continue things about as they are, or to lessen our commitments to
them?...India (Publication no. USROPER.75-2.R05J). Retrieved July 24, 2008,
from iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Roper Organization. (1975b). Roper Report 75-6; June 14-21, 1975: There are many
problems facing our nation today. But at certain times some things are more
important than others, and need more attention from our Federal Government than
others. I'd like to know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is
something the government should be making a major effort on now, or something
the government should be making some effort on now, or something not needing
any particular government effort now... Trying to seek agreements with other
nations to limit nuclear weapons (Publication no. USROPER.75-6.R04D).
Retrieved July 24, 2008, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Rosato, S. (2003). The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. American Political
Science Review, 97(4), 585-602.

375
Rosenthal, E., & Sanger, D. E. (2001, April 2). U.S. Plane In China After It Collides
With Chinese Jet [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 23,
2009 from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-
collides-with-chinese-jet.html.
Rosenthal, J. (1972, January 6). Anderson Ready for Battle With Government, but
Appears Unlikely to Get One [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved
June 3, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79413967&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Ross, R. S. (1995). Negotiating cooperation : the United States and China, 1969-1989.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Ross, R. S. (1996). The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Lessons for the United States, China,
and Taiwan. Security Dialogue, 27(4), 463-470.
Ross, R. S. (1997). China II: Beijing as a conservative power. Foreign Affairs, 76(2), 33.
Ross, R. S. (2000). The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and
the Use of Force. International Security, 25(2), 87-123.
Rousseau, D. L. (2005). Democracy and war : institutions, norms, and the evolution of
international conflict. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Rousseau, D. L. (2006). Identifying threats and threatening identities : the social
construction of realism and liberalism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press.
Rousseau, D. L., Gelpi, C., Reiter, D., & Huth, P. K. (1996). Assessing the dyadic nature
of the democratic peace, 1918-88. American Political Science Review, 90(3), 512-
533.
Rubin, R. (1994, May 26). Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake,
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary
of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy Bob Rubin [Electronic Version]. The American Presidency
Project. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59758.
Rubinoff, A. G. (2005). The Diaspora as a Factor in U.S.-India Relations. Asian Affairs,
an American Review, 32(3), 169-187.
Rummel, R. J. (1975). Understanding conflict and war (Vol. 4). Beverly Hills, New
York: Sage Publications; distributed by Halsted Press.

376
Rummel, R. J. (1979). Understanding conflict and war (Vol. 4). Beverly Hills, New
York: Sage Publications; distributed by Halsted Press.
Rummel, R. J. (1983). Libertarianism and International Violence. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 27(1), 27-71.
Rummel, R. J. (1985). Libertarian Propositions on Violence within and between Nations:
A Test against Published Research Results. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(3),
419-455.
Rummel, R. J. (1995). Democracies are Less Warlike Than Other Regimes. European
Journal of International Relations, 1(4), 457-479.
Rush, K. (1974, May 18). "162. Telegram TOSEC 794/104621 From the Department of
State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, May 18, 1974,
2238Z." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Russett, B. (1970). International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation. In H.
S. Kariel & M. Haas (Eds.), Approaches to the study of political science (pp. x,
541 p.). Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Pub. Co.
Russett, B. M. (1993). Grasping the democratic peace : principles for a post-Cold War
world. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Saad, L. (2000, 14 June). Americans Agree that Mideast is Vitally Important to U.S.
Interests. Retrieved 15 April, 2008, from
http://www.gallup.com/poll/2821/Americans-Agree-Mideast-Vitally-Important-
To-US-Interests.aspx
Saad, L. (2008, 3 March). Americans Most and Least Favored Nations. Retrieved 15
April, 2008, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/104734/Americans-Most-Least-
Favored-Nations.aspx
Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of
a Bomb. International Security, 21(3), 54-86.
Sagan, S. D., & Waltz, K. N. (2003). The spread of nuclear weapons : a debate renewed
(2nd ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Sagar, R. (2004). What's in a Name? India and America in the Twenty-First Century.
Survival, 46(3), 115-135.
Salliday, R. (1998, June 29). Pelosi on China: A voice in the global wilderness?
[Electronic Version]. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved March 29, 2009 from
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/examiner/archive/1998/06/29/NEWS2190.dtl.

377
Sanger, D. E. (2001a, April 3). Collision With China: The Overview; Bush is Demanding
A 'Prompt Return of Plane and Crew' [Electronic Version]. The New York Times.
Retrieved March 23, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/03/world/collision-with-china-overview-bush-
demanding-prompt-return-plane-crew.html.
Sanger, D. E. (2001b, April 26). U.S. Would Defend Taiwan Bush Says [Electronic
Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 24, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/us-would-defend-taiwan-bush-
says.html.
Sanger, D. E., & Perlez, J. (2001, April 11). U.S. Sends Beijing Formal Statement
Expressing Regret [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March
23, 2009 from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/11/world/us-sends-beijing-
formal-statement-expressing-regret.html.
Sathasivam, K. (2005). Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan and US Foreign Policy.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Saunders, H. H. (1969a, July 12). "Memorandum of Conversation." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-
7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Saunders, H. H. (1969b, August 1). "Memorandum of Conversations: New Delhi
Advisers Meeting." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
Saunders, H. H. (1969c, August 1). "Memorandum of Coversation." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-
7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Schafer, M., & Walker, S. G. (2006). Democratic leaders and the democratic peace: The
operational codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. International Studies Quarterly,
50(3), 561-583.
Schaffer, T. C. (2002). Building a New Partnership with India. Washington Quarterly,
25(2), 31-44.
Schmitt, C. (1928). Die Diktatur : von den Anfängen des modernen
Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf (2. Aufl., mit
einem Anhang: Die Diktatur des Reichspr-asidenten nach Art. 48 der Weimarer
Verfassung. ed.). München: Duncker & Humblot.
Schmitt, C. (2007). The concept of the political (G. Schwab, Trans. Expanded ed.).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

378
Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What Democracy Is… and Is Not. Journal of
Democracy, 2(3), 75-88.
Schultz, K. A. (1998). Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises. The
American Political Science Review, 92(4), 829-844.
Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two
institutional perspectives on democracy and War. International Organization,
53(2), 233-+.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1966). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. London: Allen &
Unwin.
Schweller, R. L. (1992). Domestic Structure and Preventive War - Are Democracies
More Pacific? World Politics, 44(2), 235-269.
Sciolino, E. (1995, June 29). In Warning to U.S., China Cracks Down on 2 Dissidents
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEEDB173DF93AA15755C0
A963958260&scp=35&sq=China+OR+Taiwan&st=nyt.
Sciolino, E. (1996, February 2). China, Vying With Taiwan, Explores Public Relations
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 10, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E06E2DB1739F931A35751C0
A960958260&scp=191&sq=China+OR+Taiwan&st=nyt.
Scobell, A. (2000). Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis. Political Science Quarterly, 115(2), 227-246.
Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research:
A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly,
61(2), 294-308.
Senator Biden (D-DE). (2006, December 8). "Henry J. Hyde United States and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006-Conference Report." 109th Cong.,
2nd Session. Congressional Record 152 S11822-S11825.
Senator Brownback (R-KS). (1998, June 23). "National Defense Authorization Act of
1999." 105th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record 144 S6863-S6867.
Senator Byrd (D-WV). (February 13, 2002. "War on Terrorism." 107th Cong., 2 Session.
Congressional Record 148 S700-S708.

379
Senator Byrd (I-VA). (1974, May 22). "U.S. Participation in the International
Development Association." 93th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record 120
part 12: 16079-16096.
Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND). (2001, April 24). "National Missile Defense System."
107th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record S4051-S4052.
Senator Church (D-ID). (1971, December 6). "War Between India and Paksitan and the
Ineptitude of U.S. Policy." 92th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 117
part 34: 44849-44850.
Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK). (1996, March 6). "Senate Concurrent Resolution 43-
Relative to the People's Republic of China." 104th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record S1605-S1606.
Senator Harkin (D-IA). (1998, May 12). "India's Nuclear Tests." 105th Cong., 2nd
Session. Congressional Record 144 S4680-S4682.
Senator Harris (D-OK). (1971, December 6). "A New Low in American Diplomacy."
92th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 117 part 34: 44834-44835.
Senator Humphrey (D-MN). (1974, May 22). "U.S. Participation in the International
Development Association." 93th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record 120
part 12: 16079-16096.
Senator Kennedy (D-MA). (1974, May 22). "India and a Comprehensive Test Ban." 93th
Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record 120 part 12: 16020-16024.
Senator Kennedy (MA). (1971, December 7). "U.S. Policy Toward the Crisis in South
Asia." 92th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 117 part 34: 45124-45126.
Senator Mack (R-FL). (1998, June 16). "India-China." 105th Cong., 2nd Session.
Congressional Record 144 S6357-S6359.
Senator Paul Simon (D-Il). (1996, February 6). "China, Taiwan, and the United States."
104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record S1634-S1636.
Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). (1996, February 23). "The Relationship Between the United
States and China." 104th Cong., 2nd Session. Congressional Record S1285-
S1289.
Senator Specter (R-PA). (2007, January 16). "Recent Trip to India, Syria, and Israel."
110th Cong., 1st Session. Congressional Record 153 S536-S545.
Shambaugh, D. (1994). Growing strong: China's challenge to Asian security. Survival,
36(2), 43 - 59.

380
Shanker, T., & Mazzetti, M. (2009, March 10). China and U.S. Clash on Naval Fracas
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 19, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11military.html.
Shattuck, J. (1994, May 26). Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake,
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary
of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy Bob Rubin [Electronic Version]. The American Presidency
Project. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59758.
Shattuck, J. (1996, March 6). U.S. Department of State 96/03/06 Daily Press Briefing.
Retrieved March 14, 2009, from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9603/960306db.html
Shi, T. (1999). Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for
Democracy. World Politics, 51(3), 385-412.
Shively, W. P. (2006). Case selection: Insights from Rethinking Social Inquiry. Political
Analysis, 14(3), 344-U312.
Simons, L. M. (1974, May 19). India Explodes A-Device, Cites 'Peaceful Use'
[Electronic Version]. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 20, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119589970&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Singh, S. N. (1983). Can the U.S. and India Be Real Friends? Asian Survey, 23(9), 1011-
1024.
Sisson, R., & Rose, L. E. (1990). War and secession : Pakistan, India, and the creation of
Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Slantchev, B. L., Alexandrova, A., & Gartzke, E. (2005). Probabilistic causality, selection
bias, and the logic of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review,
99(3), 459-462.
Slingerland, E., Blanchard, E. M., & Boyd-Judson, L. (2007). Collision with China:
Conceptual Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Marking, and the EP-3 Incident.
International Studies Quarterly, 51(1), 53-77.
Small, M., & Singer, J. D. (1976). The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes.
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1(1), 50-69.
Small, M., & Singer, J. D. (1982). Resort to arms : international and civil wars, 1816-
1980 (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

381
Smith, C. S. (2001, April 11). Collision With China: Looking Homeward; China Releases
U.S. Plane Crew 11 Days After Midair Collision [Electronic Version]. The New
York Times. Retrieved March 23, 2009 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/world/collision-with-china-looking-
homeward-china-releases-us-plane-crew-11-days-after.html.
Smith, H. (1971, December 14). Moscow Assails U.S. Step [Electronic Version]. New
York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79168748&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Smith, T. (1971, December 2). U.S. Will Grant No New Permits for Indian Arms
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90701822&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Spiro, D. E. (1994). The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace. International Security,
19(2), 50-86.
Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.
European Journal of International Relations, 13(3), 357-383.
Susanna, S. (2002). Preventing the Smiling Buddha: British-Indian nuclear relations and
the Commonwealth Nuclear force, 1964-68. Journal of Strategic Studies, 25, 87-
108.
Szulc, T. (1971, December 16). Enterprise Is Flagship [Electronic Version]. New York
Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79410387&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Talbott, S. (1999). Dealing with the bomb in South Asia. Foreign Affairs, 78(2), 110-122.
Talbott, S. (2004). Engaging India : diplomacy, democracy, and the bomb : a memoir.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. Journal of
International Relations and Development, 9(1), 53-61.
Tempest, R. (1995, December 2). China TV Cautions Voters in Taiwan. Los Angeles
Times.

382
The Committee of 100. (2001a). Attitudes Toward Chinese-Americans & Asian-
Americans Survey; March 1-14, 2001: I'd like you to think about various
countries which may present a future threat to the US (United States)--perhaps ten
years in the future. For each one, please tell me if each country is an extreme
threat, somewhat of a threat, not much of a threat, or no threat at all?... China
(Publication no. USYANKP.01CHINE.R02B). Retrieved March 26 2009, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
The Committee of 100. (2001b). Attitudes Toward Chinese-Americans & Asian-
Americans Survey; March 1-14, 2001: What is your impression of the
government of...China? As of today, is it very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? (Publication no.
USYANKP.01CHINE.R03). Retrieved March 26 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
The Washington Post. (1974a, May 19). U.S. Dismayed at Blast, Soviet Union Uncritical
[Electronic Version]. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 18, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119590012&Fmt=7&clientId=15810&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
The Washington Post. (1974b, September 22). Uranium for India [Electronic Version].
The Washington Post. Retrieved July 22, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=120946872&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Thompson, W. R. (1996). Democracy and peace: Putting the cart before the horse.
International Organization, 50(1), 141-&.
Thornton, J. L. (2008). Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China.
Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 2-22.
Thornton, T. P. (1992). U.S.-India Relations in the Nixon and Ford Years. In H. A. Gould
& S. Ganguly (Eds.), The Hope and the Reality: U.S.-India Relations from
Roosevelt to Reagan (pp. 91-120). Oxford: Westview Press.
Tilly, C. (1995). Democracy is a Lake. In G. R. Andrews & H. Chapman (Eds.), The
social construction of democracy, 1870-1990 (pp. 365-387). New York: New
York University Press.
Tilly, C. (2001). Mechanisms in Political Processes. Annual Review of Political Science,
4(1), 21-41.
Timberg, T. A. (1998). The Impact of Indian Economic Liberalization on US-India
Relations. SAIS Review, 18(1), 123–136.

383
Times Mirror. (1995a). News Interest Index Poll; August 17-20, 1995: Do you think the
U.S. (United States) should try to promote democracy in China, even if it risks
worsening relations with China? Or, do you think the U.S. should not get involved
in China's domestic affairs, even if it means over-looking human rights abuses?
(Publication no. USPSRA.082495.R13A). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from
iPOLL Databank: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Times Mirror. (1995b). News Interest Index Poll; August 17-20, 1995: What is your
impression: These days are relations between the U.S. (United States) and China
improving, getting worse, or staying about the same? (Publication no.
USPSRA.082495.R13). Retrieved March 18, 2009, from iPOLL Databank:
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html
Trumbull, R. (1974, May 21). Canada Says India's Blast Violated Use of Atom Aid
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 15, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=99423661&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Tuosheng, Z. (2006). The Sino-American Aircraft Collision: Lessons for Crisis
Management. In M. D. Swaine, T. Zhang & D. F. S. Cohen (Eds.), Managing
Sino-American crises : case studies and analysis (pp. 391-422). Washington,
D.C., Baltimore, MD: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Hopkins
Fulfillment Service distributor.
Tyler, P. E. (1995a, November 18). China-U.S. Ties Warm a Bit as China-Taiwan
Relations Chill [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4,
2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE3DB1239F93BA25752C1
A963958260&scp=21&sq=China+military+exercises&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1995b, May 24). China Demands U.S. Cancel Visit by Taiwan's President
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEED91739F937A15756C0
A963958260&scp=16&sq=Lee+Teng-hui+Cornell&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1995c, August 19). China War Games Viewed as a Tactic to Press Taiwan
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE1D71538F93AA2575BC0
A963958260&scp=23&sq=China+missile&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1995d, August 23). Sound and Fury in East Asia [Electronic Version]. The
New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE4DC1730F930A1575BC0
A963958260&scp=25&sq=China+missile&st=nyt.

384
Tyler, P. E. (1995e, August 24). Taiwan President Throws His Hat in a Powder Keg
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE0DA1638F937A1575BC0
A963958260&scp=26&sq=China+missile&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996a, January 24). As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EEDC1F39F937A15752C0
A960958260&scp=31&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996b, March 7). Beijing Steps Up Military Pressure on Taiwan Leader
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E2DC1F39F934A35750C0
A960958260&scp=120&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996c, January 31). China Hints at a Timetable To Take Control of Taiwan
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E0D61639F932A05752C0A
960958260&scp=46&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996d, March 16). China Says Maneuvers Will Last Through Taiwan's
Elections [Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009
from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CEFDB1639F935A25750C0
A960958260&scp=165&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996e, March 13). China Signaling U.S. That It Will Not Invade Taiwan
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E7D71639F930A25750C0A
960958260&scp=151&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996f, March 12). China Warns U.S. to Stay Out of Taiwan Feud
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E0DA1639F931A25750C0
A960958260&scp=140&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996g, March 24). Taiwan's Leader Wins Its Election and a Mandate
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E1D91439F937A15750C0
A960958260&scp=208&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.
Tyler, P. E. (1996h, March 10). War Games Off Taiwan To Expand, Beijing Says
[Electronic Version]. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2009 from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E2DD1639F933A25750C0
A960958260&scp=130&sq=taiwan&st=nyt.

385
United States Census Bureau. (2006a). Selected Population Profile: Asian Indian alone or
in any combination (Publication no. S0201). Retrieved November 1, 2008, from
2006 American Community Survey:
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201PR&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201T&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201TPR&-
ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_&-
reg=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201:032;ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201PR:032;AC
S_2006_EST_G00_S0201T:032;ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201TPR:032&-
_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-format=
United States Census Bureau. (2006b). Selected Population Profile: Chinese, except
Taiwanese, alone or in any combination (Publication no. S0201). Retrieved
November 1, 2008, from 2006 American Community Survey:
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201PR&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201T&-
qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201TPR&-
ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_&-
reg=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201:036;ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201PR:036;AC
S_2006_EST_G00_S0201T:036;ACS_2006_EST_G00_S0201TPR:036&-
_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-format=
United States Central Intelligence Agency. (1971, April 12). "SNIE 32-71: Prospects for
Pakistan." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Congress. (1979, April 10). Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8
[Electronic Version]. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from
http://usinfo.org/docs/basic/tra_e.htm.
United States Congress. (1995). Major Actions on House Concurrent Resolution 53
(Publication no. H.CON.RES.53). Retrieved March 4, 2009, from Thomas:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HC00053:@@@R
United States Department of State. (1971a, December 8). "Conversation Among
President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, December 8, 1971,
4:20-5:01 p.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972

386
United States Department of State. (1971b, June 15). "Conversation Among President
Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the
Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13-5:40 p.m." th
Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971c, July 28). "Conversation Among President
Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the
Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland), Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21-4:54 p.m." th
Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971d, November 15). "Conversation Among
President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary (Sultan Khan), November 15,
1971, 4:31-4:39 p.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
United States Department of State. (1971e, November 5). "Conversation Among
President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), and the President’s Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington,
November 5, 1971, 8:15-9:00 a.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the
United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South
Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971f, December 12). "Conversation Among
President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Haig), Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45-9:42 a.m." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-
7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971g, September 30). "Conversation Among
President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), the British Foreign Secretary (Douglas-Home), and the British
Ambassador (Cromer), Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m." th
Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971h, December 9). "Conversation Between
President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),
Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44-1:27 p.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign
Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7,
Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

387
United States Department of State. (1971i, December 10). "Conversation Between
President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),
Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51-11:12 a.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign
Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7,
Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971j, June 4). "Conversation Between President
Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington,
June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United
States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia,
1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971k, May 26). "Conversation Between President
Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington,
May 26, 1971, 10:38-10:44 a.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the
United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South
Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971l, March 31). "Minutes of Senior Review Group
Meeting." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States XI, Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976: South Asia Crisis, 1971
United States Department of State. (1971m, December 3). "Minutes of Washington
Special Actions Group Meeting." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the
United States XI, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976: South Asia Crisis, 1971
United States Department of State. (1971n, Unknown date). "Pakistan - American
Relations ** A Reassessment." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the
United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South
Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971o, March 29). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
XI, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976: South Asia Crisis, 1971
United States Department of State. (1971p, December 23). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 23, 1971, 8 p.m."
th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations,
1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

388
United States Department of State. (1971q, November 24). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 23, 1971, 10:55
a.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971r, December 5). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 5,
1971." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Department of State. (1971s, December 8). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), Washington, December 8,
1971, 2:47 p.m." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
United States Department of State. (1972, August 1). "Joint Statement Following
Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume
XVII 812-816.
United States Department of State. (1974a, May 23). "164. Memorandum of
Conversation, Washington, May 23, 1974, 10:30 a.m." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976
United States Department of State. (1974b, June 3). "166. Memorandum of Conversation,
Washington, June 3, 1974." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United
States E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976
United States Department of State. (1974c, July 23). "170. Memorandum From the
Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon, Washington, July 23, 1974." th
Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States E-8, Documents on South
Asia, 1973-1976
United States Department of State. (1982, July). The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan
[Electronic Version]. Taiwan Documents Project. Retrieved March 30, 2009 from
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm.
United States Department of State Office of the Historian. (2008). Foreign Relations,
1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Docs 122-197.
Foreign Relations of the United States Retrieved 23 May, 2008, from
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/48213.htm

389
United States Department of the Treasury. (2008). Major Foreign Holders of Treasury
Securities. Retrieved November 2, 2008, from
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt
United States Embassy to Iran. (1969, May 26). "Secretary's Lahore Meeting with
President Yahya." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-
1972
United States Embassy to Pakistan. (1969, April 2). "Admiral Ahsan's Call on Under
Secretary." th Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign
Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Library of Congress. (2001, April 4). Cosponsors: H.R. 1467 To withdraw
nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) from the People's
Republic of China. Retrieved March 26, 2009, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01467:@@@P
United States Office of the President. (1970a, October 25). "Memorandum of
Conversation: Meeting Between President and Pakistan President Yahya." th
Cong., Session. Foreign Relations of the United States E7 Chapter 1:
United States Office of the President. (1970b, November 20). "Transcript of Telephone
Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Haldeman)." th Cong., Session.
Foreign Relations of the United States Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-
7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
United States Office of the President. (2006, 28 February). Press Gaggle by Secretary of
State Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley. Retrieved 20 May, 2006, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060228-7.html
Valencia, M. J., & Guoxing, J. (2002). The "North Korean" Ship and U.S. Spy Plane
Incidents: Similarities, Differences, and Lessons Learned. Asian Survey, 42(5),
723-732.
Van Hollen, C. (1980). The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South
Asia. Asian Survey, 20(4), 339-361.
Vaughn, P. S. (2000). Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology
of Norm Violation. International Studies Quarterly, 44(2), 293-316.
Voeten, E. Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly v1.0. Retrieved October
28, 2008, from http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm

390
Wachman, A. (1994). Taiwan : national identity and democratization. Armonk, N.Y.:
M.E. Sharpe.
Wæver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., & Lemaitre, P. (1993). Identity, migration, and the
new security agenda in Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Walker, W. (1998). International Nuclear Relations After the Indian and Pakistani Test
Explosions. International Affairs, 74(3), 505-528.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co.
Waltz, K. N. (1990). Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. American Political Science
Review, 84(3), 731-745.
Ward, M. D., Siverson, R. M., & Cao, X. (2007). Disputes, democracies, and
dependencies: A reexamination of the Kantian peace. American Journal of
Political Science, 51(3), 583-601.
Weart, S. R. (1998). Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another: Yale
University Press.
Weede, E. (1984). Democracy and War Involvement. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
28(4), 649-664.
Weede, E. (1992). Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement.
Journal of Peace Research, 29(4), 377-383.
Weinraub, B. (1974a, May 19). India Becomes 6th Nation to Set Off Nuclear Device
[Electronic Version]. New York Times from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=117536147&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT
=309&VName=HNP
Weinraub, B. (1974b, May 22). New Role Abroad is Likely for India [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 24, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79327720&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Weinraub, B. (1974c, October 30). U.S. Grain Pledge To India Reported In Kissinger
Visit [Electronic Version]. New York Times, 1. Retrieved July 18, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79881195&Fmt=7&clientId=15810&RQT
=309&VName=HNP

391
Welles, B. (1971a, November 7). Divided Attention From Mrs. Gandhi's Hosts
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved May 30, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=91311447&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Welles, B. (1971b, November 5). Mrs. Gandhi Meets Nixon, Asks Pressure on Pakistan
[Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved May 30, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90700465&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Welles, B. (1971c, December 4). U.S. Cancels Remaining Export Licenses for Shipment
of Military Goods to India [Electronic Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June
2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=79409318&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Welles, B. (1971d, December 5). U.S. Says Indians Bear Main Blame [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 2, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=91313560&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Welles, B. (1972, January 1). Anti-India Remark Is Laid to Kissinger [Electronic
Version]. New York Times. Retrieved June 3, 2008 from
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=90707045&Fmt=7&clientId=5239&RQT=
309&VName=HNP
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391-425.
Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Widmaier, W. W. (2005). The democratic peace is what states make of it: A
constructivist analysis of the US-Indian 'near-miss' in the 1971 South Asian crisis.
European Journal of International Relations, 11(3), 431-455.
Williams, M. C. (2001). The discipline of the democratic peace: Kant, liberalism and the
social construction of security communities. European Journal of International
Relations, 7(4), 525-553.
Wolfson, M., Madjd-Sadjadi, Z., & James, P. (2004). Identifying National Types: A
Cluster Analysis of Politics, Economics, and Conflict. Journal of Peace Research,
41(5), 607-623.

392
World Bank. (2007). Key Development Data & Statistics. Retrieved April 9, 2009, from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,content
MDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSite
PK:239419,00.html
World Trade Organization. (2007). Trade Profile: United States (Publication. Retrieved
November 1, 2008, from WTO Statistics Database:
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Co
untry=US
Xinbo, W. (2007). Understanding Chinese and U.S. Crisis Behavior. Washington
Quarterly, 31(1), 61-76.
Yang, C. M. (2001, April 5). GOP Divided on China Standoff [Electronic Version]. ABC
News. Retrieved March 22, 2009 from
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=93625&page=1.
Yee, A. S. (2004). Semantic Ambiguity and Joint Deflections in the Hainan Negotiations
China: an International Journal, 2(1), 53-82
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The democratic peace -- the finding that democracies do not use force against each other -- has emerged as one of the most promising research programs in the study of international relations. The vision the democratic peace offers of a world sustainably and durably at peace has universal significance. In academe, the democratic peace offers the prospect of a social ‘law’ as well as a solution to one of the central problématiques in the study of international relations: the causes and means to prevent war. In the policy world, the democratic peace offers the possibility of the elimination of a major source of insecurity and, in the process, a peace dividend unlike any other.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Institutional variance of the democratic peace, 1816-2002: electoral, executive, and federal institutions in time and space

PDF

Securitizing language: political elites and language policy securitization in South Korea

PDF

A two-level analysis of foreign policy decision making: an empirical investigation of the case of China-Taiwan

PDF

The resiliency of Arab authoritarianism and the Arab-Israeli conflict: the United States' role in the cases of Egypt and Jordan

PDF

Getting a new blanket: China’s conceptualization of “security” in the post-Deng Xiaoping era

PDF

The erosion of democracy in the post–Cold War world: understanding the phenomenon and its causes

PDF

The role of co-constructed community, school, and university partnerships in providing adult agents to support learner identities among urban youth

PDF

Flinging the boomerang: locating instability and the threat potential of identity-bias in US national security policy

PDF

Visual reasoning: representations in global politics, economics, and society

PDF

Classical eyeblink conditioning: the role of the cerebellum and its molecular bases

PDF

Studies of the biological relevance of Histone H4 Lysine 20 monomethylation: discovery of its role in the cell cycle and localization within the human genome

PDF

The partial Good Samaritan states: China and Japan in the international relations of autocracy and democracy

PDF

Emergency-war machine: national crisis, democratic governance, and the historical construction of the American state

PDF

Carnival in the birdcage: a study of the film and media industries' reforms in China after 1978 and its soft power

PDF

Updating mission and vision in an increasingly interconnected world: the role of the district

PDF

Investigating the role of SASH1 gene located on chromosome 6 in ovarian cancer

PDF

The role of framing in health social comparisons by multiple sclerosis patients

PDF

Carrying the fire home: performing nation, identity, indigenous diaspora and home in the poems, songs, and performances of Arigon Starr, Joy Harjo and Gayle Ross

PDF

Nation in uniform: Chicano/Latino war narratives and the construction of nation in the Korean War and Vietnam War

PDF

Research scientists in the service of public science education: ideal verses actual roles as perceived by secondary classroom teachers, scientists and other stakeholders

Asset Metadata

Creator Hayes, Jarrod (author)

Core Title Securitizing the democratic peace: democratic identity and its role in the construction of threat

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Politics

Publication Date 08/05/2009

Defense Date 05/12/2009

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Copenhagen school,democracy,democratic peace,identity,international security,OAI-PMH Harvest,securitization,War

Place Name China (countries), India (countries), USA (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor James, Patrick (committee chair), Cull, Nicholas (committee member), English, Robert D. (committee member), Lynch, Daniel C. (committee member)

Creator Email jarrod.hayes@gmail.com,Jarrod.Hayes@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2477

Unique identifier UC195263

Identifier etd-Hayes-2903 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-181812 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2477 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Hayes-2903.pdf

Dmrecord 181812

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Hayes, Jarrod

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu