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Critical reflection among school psychologists: an examination of content, cognitive style, and cognitive complexity
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Critical reflection among school psychologists: an examination of content, cognitive style, and cognitive complexity
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Content
CRITICAL REFLECTION AMONG SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGISTS:
AN EXAMINATION OF CONTENT, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND COGNITIVE
COMPLEXITY
by
Micah Raphael Cohen
______________________________________________________________
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
May 2010
Copyright 2010 Micah Raphael Cohen
ii
DEDICATION
To Mom and Dad
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project would not have been possible without the support of Dr. Noel
Lustig and Mr. Gregory Hernandez, and the guidance of my dissertation committee:
Dr. Rod Goodyear, Dr. Dennis Hocevar, and Dr. John Brady. I would particularly
like to acknowledge my chair, Dr. Rod Goodyear, for his intellect, patience, and
flexibility.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication………………………………………………………………………. ...ii
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………... ...iii
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………… ...v
List of Figures………………………………………………………………….. ...vi
Abstract………………………………………………………………………... ...vii
Chapter I: Conceptual and Empirical Foundations For The Study…….. ...1
Chapter II: Method…………………………………………………….. ...39
Chapter III: Results……………………………………………………... ...49
Chapter IV: Discussion…………………………………………………. ...57
References……………………………………………………………………... ...65
Appendices
Appendix A: Critical Reflection Survey…………………………………....80
Appendix B: 18-Item Need For Cognition Scale…………………………...93
Appendix C: Big Five Personality Inventory Items………………………...95
Appendix D: Criteria For The Recognition of Evidence For Different….....96
Types of Reflective Writing
Appendix E: Critical Reflection Survey Response Examples……………...98
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Theorists and Contributions……………………………………….. ...18
Table 2. Mean Cognitive Complexity Scores: by Level of Expertise………....50
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients………………………………….. ...51
Table 4. Regression ANOVA……………………………………………….....53
Table 5. Regression Coefficients…………………………………………… ...54
Table 6. Mean Need for Cognition Scores: Overall and Among…………… ...55
Professional Levels
Table 7. Mean Neuroticism Scores: Overall and Among Professional……......55
Levels
Table 8. Mean Openness Scores: Overall and Among Professional Levels... ...56
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Experiential Learning Model, Kolb (2009)………………………… ...9
Figure 2. ALACT Model, Korthagen (1997)…………………………………. ...9
Figure 3. Onion Model, Reflection Content Levels, Korthagen (1997)……......11
Figure 4. Atkins and Murphy Five-Stage Model, Atkins & Murphy (1995)... ...14
Figure 5. Cognitive Complexity Histogram Depicting Number of………….. ...49
Participants Assigned Each of the Four Scores
vii
ABSTRACT
This study examined two questions concerning the quality of critical
reflections of school psychologists. The first question concerned whether novice (N
= 9) and expert (N = 19) school psychologists differed in the quality of their critical
reflections on practice. Participants were asked to describe an incident from their
practice that left them feeling confused, upset, or wondering, then, through several
prompts were guided through a reflective process. Quality was assessed using the
four-level Hatton and Smith (1995) measure as a proxy for cognitive complexity.
The between-group difference (M = 1.44 for novices vs. 1.84 for experts) was not
statistically significant, probably as a function of the small number of novices in the
sample. The obtained effect size (Cohen’s d = .48), however, was what Cohen
(1992) would characterize as medium size. The second purpose of the study was to
examine whether particular cognitive variables (need for cognition, measured by the
Need for Cognition Scales (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984); openness to experience
and neuroticism [as a measure of worrying]; (John & Srivastava, 1999) predicted
reflection quality. When those variables were used in hierarchical multiple
regression, they were not statistically significant as predictors of cognitive
complexity.
1
CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE STUDY
At the turn of the 20th century Dewey (1910) wrote How We Think, which
provided the cornerstone for what has become a considerable literature in the
professions on the construct of reflection. Many theorists and investigators since
have offered definitions of reflection and the reflective process (Atkins & Murphy,
1993; Boud et al., 1985; Boyd & Fales, 1983; Clouder, 2000; Dewey, 1933; Lee,
2005; Mezirow, 1990; Ruth-Sahd, 2003), and despite the variance across these
conceptualizations, all converge on some core elements and purposes. Some of these
include the use of the reflective process to develop effective professional habits
(Dewey, 1933; Schön, 1987; Sparks-Langer et al., 1991); direct, inform, and
transform practice (Clarke, 1996; Goodman, 1984; Grimmett, MacKinnon, Erickson,
& Riecken, 1990; Van Manen, 1977; Zeichner & Liston, 1987); and use the process
as a learning tool (Brookfield, 1995; Mezirow, 1990; Van Manen, 1977; Schön,
1983, 1990).
These elements and purposes are present in the standards advanced by the
National Association of School Psychologists (NASP). In section 2.10 of NASP's
Standards for Training and Field Placement Programs in School Psychology is a
requirement that school psychologists maintain "career-long professional
development." This formal requirement then charges the professional with
recognizing the impact of his or her own learning and development on the
advancement of the organizational mission of NASP. More specifically, NASP
2
requires evidence that the school psychologist understands reflection, as documented
in the Domains of School Psychology Training and Practice. NASP’s national
standards make evident the critical role that subjective factors have on the
professional. End goals are crucial for the achievement of outcomes, which
demonstrate the utility of reflection. However, of equal importance are the school
psychologist’s conceptualizations, which comprise the bulk of the early literature
surrounding reflection (e.g. Dewey, 1910, 1933; Schön, 1983) which contains
examinations of the process, form, structure, and context of reflection.
Most have accepted Dewey’s (1933) conceptualization of the reflective
process as beginning with a state of doubt. Dewey suggested that, the person’s
experience of doubt triggers problem identification, hypothesizing and reasoning of
probable solutions and testing of those solutions. This formulation of the reflective
process is foundational to the present study.
Schön (1984) is credited with locating the concept of reflection in an applied,
professional context. Specifically, he introduced the concept of the reflective
practitioner, and spoke to two particular forms of reflection: reflection-in-action
(reflection in the moment) and reflection-on-action (reflection on past actions and
experiences). Killion and Todnem (1991) later introduced a third form of reflection
that complemented these two: reflection-for-action. Whereas Schön discussed in-
the-moment and past experiences, Killion and Todnem saw the value of proactive or
forward-looking reflection.
3
Lavender (2003) added to these temporal conceptualizations, addressing the
matter of focus: reflection-on-other and reflection-on-self. Mezirow (1990) spoke to
the quality of reflection in his six proposed, distinguishable levels: discriminant,
judgmental, conceptual, psychic, theoretical, and affective. More recently,
Korthagen (2005) discussed a more in-depth form of reflection: core-reflection,
which is intricately linked to levels of reflection content.
These and most other contributions to the literature of reflection have been
primarily theoretical. The empirical literature has been remarkably small. As a
result, there is much yet to learn about the reflective processes. That small literature
does, however, tell us that reflective practice can be learned, especially through role
modeling of expert practitioners (Coombs, 2001; Doty, 2001; Ferry & Ross-Gordon,
1998; Genor, 2001). Additionally, empirical findings suggest that reflection
influences and is influenced by the person’s level of professional expertise
(Brooksfield, 2000; Clouder, 2000; Crook, 2001; Ertmer, 2001), by his or her
cognitive factors (Day, 1993; Mott, 1994; Smith, 1998) and by personality
characteristics (Brooksfield, 2000; Johns, 1995). In this study, those personality
factors were neuroticism and openness to experience (henceforth referred to as
“openness”).
Reasonably, these factors will moderate the nature and quality of the
reflections of any professional. The specific focus of this study, though, was on
school psychologists. NASP (2007) lists the primary services of a school
psychologist as consultation, evaluation, intervention, prevention, and research and
4
planning. Reflection would be expected to occur with respect to each of these areas
of service. Critical reflection is an important mechanism in each type of service that
enables the school psychologist to self monitor and self correct (Atkins & Murphy,
1993; Clouder, 2000; Fook, 2002, 2004; Gore & Zeichner, 1991; Mezirow, 1990;
Noordhoff & Kleinfeld, 1988; Smyth, 1989; Van Manen, 1977). To the extent that
they are able to grow professionally through their reflections, school psychologists
will better serve teachers, school administrators, and students.
Implicit in the notion of an effective reflection though is quality, which in
this study was defined as level of cognitive complexity. Cognitive complexity, a
major dimension of cognitive style, is defined as the extent to which individuals
construct their world in a multidimensional and highly discriminating fashion
(Renzulli & Dai, 2001). Cognitive style is conceived as a stable attitude, strategy,
and preference of thinking, decision making and problem solving, and remembering.
As well, cognitive style is theorized to influence all realms of learning and
interpersonal interaction.
The current study utilizes a qualitative and quantitative methodology to
investigate differences in reflective practices of school psychologists, focusing
particularly on the following moderators: level of expertise; need for cognition;
degree of neuroticism and openness. For the purpose of this study, reflectivity will
be understood as a process a person uses while experiencing an awareness of
uncomfortable feelings and thoughts in response to a concrete situation. The person
then critically analyzes his thoughts, feelings, and knowledge peculiar to that
5
experience. Following the critical analysis, he or she forms a new perspective of that
experience. It should be noted that reflectivity is distinguished from mere thinking—
reflection is intentional, directional, and in the service of a desired outcome. This
process is keenly important among school psychologists.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this current study was to understand how particular individual
differences variables (expertise, need for cognition, and personality traits) predict
quality of the reflections of school psychologists. Quality was measured in terms of
cognitive complexity.
Participants were asked to identify a professional situation that in some way
left them feeling confused, upset, or wondering. Then, through a series of prompts,
they were guided through a reflective process. As well, they responded to survey
items intended to assess: need for cognition using the Need for Cognition scale
(Cacioppo, 1982) and neuroticism and openness using the Big Five Personality
Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999).
The dependent variable was cognitive complexity. This was determined by a
panel of raters who read each reflection and assigned a cognitive complexity score
using the system of Hatton and Smith (1995).
Literature Review
The literature review covers the theoretical framework of four concepts:
reflective practice, cognitive complexity, expertise, and the cognitive variables that
predict the quality of reflection. Each is addressed in turn. Theoretical definitions,
6
origins and models and measures are reviewed in each section.
Reflective Practice
The Online Etymology Dictionary (http://www.etymonline.com/) indicates
that reflection first was defined in 1605 as the act of turning one's thoughts back.
Similarly, Dewey defined reflection as inquiry into inquiry—an act of turning
inquiry on itself (Schön, 1992). In contrast, the term “practice” retains its original
meaning which is “to do, habitually, an act.” Each of the two words is critical in
understanding reflective practice, a term first used by Schön (1983).
In this section, the work of the major contributors to the reflection literature
(Dewey, Schön, Kolb, Korthagen, Boud, King and Kitchener, and Atkins and
Murphy and Mezirow) is summarized in turn. Each theorist is relevant for their
contribution to the conceptualization of the form, structure, definition, and process of
reflection and for the development of sophisticated models to more fully understand
reflection and its relation to other phenomena.
John Dewey. John Dewey endeavored to understand and account for the
processes which move an individual from a state of uncertainty to a state of clarity, a
process he called reflective transformation (Dewey, 1922). In his earlier paper, Some
Stages of Logical Thought, Dewey (1900) stated that the goal of thinking is to
maximize certainty. As such, a person’s state of doubt is followed by questioning of
varying intensity, with the goal of acquiring knowledge and returning to a preferred
equilibrium.
7
Contemporary theorists, though, saw the reflective attitude as a form of self-
involution and of lesser import than observations of external, worldly matters; as a
diversion from reality. To refute this belief, Dewey (1900) asserted that subjective
reflection is a requirement for empirical science: doubt stimulates inquiry which
spurs action. Dewey then rigorously sought to integrate thought and action. Schön
(1992) agreed and sought to further apply this to professional practice, though
substituting reflective practice for Dewey's reflective thought (Schön, 1992).
Donald Schön. Schön’s work (1983) has been the center of contemporary
research on reflective practice, particularly in education. His assertion of the value
of professional knowledge was an explicit counterbalance to the knowledge
professionals gained in academia (Schön, 1983). This, which he termed technical
rationality, concerns the application of scientific theory and technique to problems.
His purpose was to articulate an epistemology of practice.
Schön described one type of reflection as reflection-in-action – often called
“thinking on one’s feet.” It refers to a form of intuitive knowledge spurred by the
experience of surprise during the experience of performing the act. Once triggered,
the thoughts are specifically focused on the action, the implicit knowledge to
perform the action, and the outcomes of the action. Although reflection-in-action
involves cognition, it may be outside awareness and then occurs in what Schön
termed the "action-present."
The second of Schön’s types of reflection, reflection-on-action, centers on
past experiences. This reflection process is initiated after the practitioner
8
experiences an unexpected outcome (Schön, 1987). In contrast to reflection-in-
action, the practitioner is aware of and conscious of his or her thinking process
(Atkins & Murphy, 1993). This mode of reflection is thought to produce greater
insight and understanding (Clarke, 1996) and to be a valuable method to learn from
experience and alter future behavior (Kessels, 2001). The use of judgment is central
to the process of reflection-on-action, as the process requires a judgment of what the
preferable versus actual actions are (Hatton & Smith, 1995). Reflection-on-action
was the focus of this study.
Experiential Learning: David A. Kolb and Fred Korthagen. A third
important perspective on reflection is that of Kolb (2009) who advanced the
Experiential Learning Theory (ETL). This states that learning occurs from concrete
experiences, is cyclical in nature, and is affected by one's learning style and capacity
for experience, reflection, thought, and action. This model focuses on future rather
than current behavior. The ETL model is reproduced in Figure 1.
Korthagen (1997) criticized the ETL model for not accounting for
nonreflective learning and gestalt influences. To account for these processes,
Korthagen put forth the ALACT model which he believed was the ideal process of
experiential learning. The model is comprised of five distinct phases: Action,
Looking back on the action, Awareness of essential aspects, Creating alternative
methods of action, and Trial. The model is reproduced in Figure 2.
9
Figure 1. Experiential Learning Model, Kolb (2009)
Figure 2. ALACT Model, Korthagen (1997)
10
Korthagen's definition of reflection centered on mental processes; these
processes are conceptualized to be structured or restructured by experience,
problems, knowledge, or insights (Korthagen, 1997). He emphasized that creating
new structures (learning) is anchored in action and is conceptually different from
routine action. Korthagen and Kolb agreed on the cyclical nature of learning and
referred to the image of a spiral to describe the circular and ascending nature of
learning. However, Korthagen sought to further his conceptualization of reflection
by focusing on the content of reflections (Korthagen, 1997). He augmented the
ALACT model with the onion model (see Figure 3) which addresses the content and
levels of reflections. The goal of the addition was to address core reflection, which
includes strengths of the practitioner.
David Boud. Boud et al.’s (1985) initial model of the reflective process,
reflection on learning, was also part of the experiential learning framework and
focused on the enhancement of understanding (Norton, 2009). The model was
comprised of three main stages: return to experience (reflection upon significant
factors), attending to feelings (that help/hinder reflection), and re-evaluation
(reappraisal of experience). The final stage consisted of association (relating current
to past experience), integration (integrating new and past experiences), validation
(assessing the validity of integration), and appropriation (acceptance of experience).
11
Figure 3. Onion Model, Reflection Content Levels, Korthagen (1997)
12
Boud asserted that the primary purpose of reflection was to focus on past
experiences using positive emotions. However, in time he observed that the three-
stage model lacked components of reflection-in-action as well as a focus on barriers
to experience and learning (Boud, Cohen, & Walker, 1993). As Boud's (1998)
theories evolved, he emphasized the context of reflection and learning, concluding
that context is the single most important factor in experience.
King and Kitchener. King and Kitchener (1994) developed the Reflective
Judgment Model (RJM), utilizing the work of psychologists Perry, Piaget, Kohlberg,
Binet, and Wechsler as well as the theoretical foundations provided by Dewey. King
and Kitchener generated the RJM model using data from 1,700 interviews with
persons aged 14 to 65 to address the developmental nature of the process of
knowledge acquisition. Knowledge acquisition, as they conceived it, was focused on
individuals' belief justification (King & Kitchener, 1994).
The most important contribution King and Kitchener offered to the study of
reflection, however, was the distinction between reflective judgment and critical
thinking. They asserted that reflective judgment and critical thinking were similar in
that each was fundamentally oriented toward resolving problems. In the process of
problem solving, an individual engages in the evaluation of information, opinions,
and competing explanations. As well, the goal of each process is not the attainment
of absolute truth but rather the production of theories that are open to testing and
further improvement. The key difference between these processes is in their realm
of focus. Individuals use critical thinking to solve well-structured problems.
13
However, this type of thinking is insufficient for ill-structured problems and requires
reflective judgment (King & Kitchener, 1994).
Ill-structured problems are addressed using the seven-stage model of
reflective judgment—each stage is internally consistent and builds upon the
preceding stage; organized by level: pre-reflective reasoning (stages 1-3), quasi-
reflective reasoning (stages 4-5), and reflective reasoning (stages 6-7). The levels
represent distinct processes of knowledge which are developmentally related (King
& Kitchener, 1994).
Atkins and Murphy. Atkins and Murphy (1995) advocated that the process of
reflection is essential for learning and described a deliberate act of thinking about
experience so as to learn from it. They theorized that reflection emerged from an
unsettling feeling which surfaces as a reaction to knowledge that is insufficient for the
person's current experience. This occurs as the first stage of their five-part model
(Atkins & Murphy, 1995) (see Figure 4). Stage two involves the individual's
description and examination of the situation, associated thoughts, feelings, and
alternate actions; stage three consist of an analysis and summarization of feelings and
relevant knowledge; stage four includes the identification of learning; and the final
stage of the reflection results in action.
Jack Mezirow. Like King and Kitchener, Mezirow conceptualized reflection
as the process of attending to the justification of beliefs, where the act of reflecting is
brought about by dysfunctional beliefs—beliefs that do not work in one’s current
reality (Mezirow, 1994). As such, reflection, as a process, focuses on the origin,
14
nature, and consequences of one's beliefs (Mezirow, 1994). Further, reflection is a
function of problem solving: reflection centers on the content of the problem, the
process for problem resolution, and premise of the problem. His conceptualizations
were part of the larger framework of the Transformation Theory of adult learning
(Mezirow, 1994). In this framework, the process of reflection leads to the
development of meaning; meaning enables learning, which in turn produces action
(Mezirow, 1994).
Figure 4. Atkins and Murphy Five-Stage Model, Atkins & Murphy (1995)
15
In his earlier writings, Mezirow conceptualized reflection as hierarchical in
nature (Mezirow, 1990), with a hierarchy that included discriminant, judgmental,
conceptual, psychic, theoretical, and affective reflection. Discriminant reflection
involves an assessment of one’s perceptions and an ability to identify rational
reasons underlying reactions and actions in relationships. Judgmental reflection is a
realization of judgments as they relate to a person's perceptions. Conceptual
reflection is evidenced in a person's ability to critique his or her behavior. Psychic
reflection involves an awareness of the fact that all judgments of others are
contingent on limited information. Theoretical reflection is challenging one's
assumptions—the outcome is a transformation in perspectives. Finally, affective
reflection requires an awareness of feelings of self and recognition of one's own
thinking and acting.
In later writings Mezirow focused on the critical reflection of assumptions
(CRA)—fundamentally, a focus on adult learning with the goal of producing
independent thinkers (Mezirow, 1998). The essential purpose of CRA was to
comprehend the meaning in communication and identify subtextual assumptions to
consider the truthfulness, authenticity, and coherence of communication. In
summarizing the work of King and Kitchener, Mezirow supported their theory of the
seven stages of development and indicated their work was in line with
Transformation Theory (Mezirow, 1998). He described the movement from one
stage to the next as a progression of knowing—with time and greater educational
attainment, an individual's thinking evolves to be increasingly inclusive,
16
differentiating, and reflective. Further, he asserted that in the sixth and seventh stage
of reflective development, knowledge is dynamic and actively constructed.
However, Mezirow is distinguished from King and Kitchener by his promotion of
noncognitive factors (past emotional experiences, disposition, and emotional
stamina) which factor heavily into one's attainment of reflective goals (Mezirow,
1998).
Empirical Research Related to The Above Models. Beginning in the early
1980s, researchers began to study the benefits and value of reflection and to identify
methods to facilitate it. That research has shown reflection to influence practitioners'
level of: professional responsibility (Coombs, 2001; Johns, 1995), empowerment
(Rogers, 1996), critical thinking in ambiguous situations (Brookfield, 2000; Clouder,
2000; Coombs, 2001; Mott, 1994; Smith, 1998), self-esteem (Johns, 1995), learning
(Atkins & Murphy, 1993), and practice (Davies, 1995; Scanlan, Care, & Udod, 2002;
Wong et al., 1997).
To facilitate the reflective process, studies have investigated factors which
contribute to the effectiveness of reflection. These factors include learners’ reports
(Britzman et al., 1986); noncognitive components, including affect (Brookfield,
2000) and motivation (Glaze, 2001; Hyrkas, Tarkka, & Paunonen-Ilmonen, 2001);
use of varying strategies to promote reflection (Spalding & Wilson, 2002; Lee,
2004); context (Davies, 1995; Goodell, 2006; Kember, 1999; Lee, 2004; Wong et al.,
1997); systematic aids (Good & Whang, 2002; Schon, 1987; Schweiker-Marra et al.,
2003; Spalding & Wilson, 2002; Sparks-Langer & Colton, 1991; Taggart, 1996); and
17
reflective journals (Chandler, 2000; Plack, 2005; Schweiker-Marra et al., 2003;
Wong, Kember, Chung, & Kan, 1995).
Overall, the available empirical literature has demonstrated that reflection is
an important determinant to quality of practice and can influence the practitioner in
areas such as: responsibility, thinking, motivation, learning, and expertise. As well,
the empirical findings have provided evidence of the methods which are most
effective in influencing practitioners.
Summary of Reflective Practice
The standards of NASP ultimately embody the belief Dewey advocated—that
subjective reflection is a requirement for critical endeavors. School psychologists
are practitioners and require an understanding and application of reflection that is
effective in the real world. The utility of this reflection is heightened by the
historical works of the key theorists who laid the groundwork for understanding
when reflection is most appropriate, why reflection paired with action is valuable,
and which methods to use for engaging in varying levels and types of reflection.
Most important, the practitioner, in the tradition of the philosophy of psychology,
gains an understanding of his or her subjective role in the quality of reflection
undertaken and the methods to further reflective practice. The key points from the
reflection literature are summarized in Table 1.
18
Table 1. Theorists and Contributions
Theorist Contribution Reflective Process
Dewey Reflective Transformation A state of doubt is experienced
Doubt produces discomfort
The discomfort produces varying levels of questioning
Critical thinking produces action
Schön Reflective Practice Practitioner experiences surprise/unexpected outcome
Produces reflection-in/on-action
Thinking becomes focused on past/future actions
David A.
Kolb
Experiential Learning
Theory and Reflection
Experience generates reflective observation
Reflective observation produces abstract conceptualization of the
problem
Experimentation (action) is undertaken
The experimentation is experienced and the cycle replicates
Fred
Korthagen
Experiential Learning
Theory and Reflection
Experience and action spur reflection on varying levels of
reflective content
Reflection produces an awareness of essential elements of
experience
Alternate modes of action are created
Experimentation is initiated
David Boud Reflection on Learning Reflection is a return to experience
The reflection requires an attendance to feelings
The experience is reevaluated
King and
Kitchener
Reflective Judgment Model Reflection is a form of knowledge acquisition and distinguished
from critical thinking
Knowledge acquisition is dependent on an individual's level of
development
Reflective judgment is focused on ill-structured problems
Atkins and
Murphy
Five-Stage Model of
Reflection
An unsettling experience produces reflection
The full spectrum of experience is described and examined
The experience is analyzed and summarized
This process produces new learning
Learning is a requirement for action
Jack
Mezirow
Transformation Theory and
Reflection
Dysfunctional beliefs produce reflection
The reflection process assists with problem solving
Problem solving involves a critical assessment of assumptions
and attention to noncognitive factors
The problem-solving process leads to new or transformed
meaning
New meanings motivate the individual to act
19
Dewey advocated the value of reflection for the sake of reflection—
indicating the endeavor itself was invaluable. In the modern world, professional
organizations such as NASP indicate that reflection is valuable for the benefits
gained by engaged practitioners. The theoretical arguments advanced by Dewey are
just as valuable to the contemporary psychologist as they were in a historical context.
However, a substantially greater understanding is available today, and it has further
solidified the utility of reflection for its own purpose and in the interest of
continually improving the outcomes of practitioners.
Cognitive Complexity
Because cognitive complexity is an important indicator of the quality of
reflection, the following section provides an overview of the construct.
Origins - Personal Construct Theory. The antecedent to the development of
the concept of cognitive complexity has roots in George Kelly's tenets of personal
constructs (Bieri, 1971). The theory of personal constructs asserts that the individual
constructs reality which is the sum of his or her experience (Adams-Webber, 1979).
In this personal constructs framework, theorists fundamentally assume reality is open
to continuous revision. The theory of personal construct implies humankind is
“scientist-like”—inquiring about personal experience, acting on one's personal
environment, and anticipating future outcomes. Given these assumptions, Kelly
suggested people are best understood in terms of their anticipation of their future
experience. This thinking does not deviate far from Dewey's propositions, on which
Kelly based his initial theories of personal constructs.
20
A person’s personal construct system is one of opposing notions that he or
she organizes hierarchically to replicate and understand the world (Neimeyer, 1997).
To measure personal constructs, Kelly employed the repertory grid (RG); (Adams-
Webber, 1979), which makes use of mixed methodologies and collects data via a
structured interview (McQualter, 1986). The exercise requires subjects to associate
role titles with persons whom they are familiar with and to elaborate on how those
persons are similar or different. The similarities and differences constitute the
constructs. Determining the total number of constructs that persons produce became
the major focus of Bieri's (1956) empirical work. He focused on the degree of
differentiation between constructs, which later developed into the concept of
cognitive complexity.
In more current literature, cognitive complexity, which is closely related to
cognitive style, has been incorporated under the dual-processing theory of
information processing (Zhang & Sternberg, 2006). Cognitive style (in contrast to
learning style) refers to an individual's characteristic manner to approach learning
tasks. It is defined as a mode and property of his or her cognitive system; it is not
under the individual's personal control but is dynamic and develops over time
(Renzulli & Dai, 2001). Messick (1996) defines cognitive style as a stable attitude,
strategy, and preference of thinking, decision making, problem solving, and
remembering; cognitive style affects all realms of learning and interpersonal
interaction. The dimension of cognitive complexity is defined as the extent to which
21
individuals construct their world in a multidimensional and highly discriminating
fashion (Renzulli & Dai, 2001).
Conceptualization. The concept of cognitive complexity assumes that the
greater degree of abstraction an individual is capable of producing, the greater his or
her degree of cognitive complexity. Adams-Webber (1979) indicated that
cognitively simple persons have constructs that are highly correlated and redundant;
their constructs yield fewer distinctions between one and other. Quantity of
constructs is of key importance to distinguish degree of cognitive complexity;
however, the qualitative difference is equally important (Bieri, 1955).
Bieri (1955) uses the paranoid schizophrenic as an example of how quality is
as important as quantity: such a person may have elaborate constructs of a delusion,
but the elaboration is inappropriate and without meaning. The perceptions, although
abstract and differentiated, can be categorized as of a lower quality; the production
of each elaboration does not enhance the paranoid's experience but further diverts
him from reality. The concept of cognitive complexity and its connection to quality
of experience and learning are important factors for interpersonal development
(Messick, 1996).
Measurement. In early research, the measurement of cognitive complexity
centered on the differentiation index (Bieri, 1955). The index was derived as the
algebraic sum of similarities and discrepancies that subjects reported on a grid. Later
research by Adams-Webber (1969) produced a measure which was an adaptation of
the Bieri differentiation index; the focus of the investigation centered on the degree
22
of differentiation of construct systems and the skill in inferring another's construct
based on observation of another's behavior.
By the mid-1960s, Bonarius (1965) indentified 10 instruments to measure
cognitive complexity. Most of these measures, however, were variations of Kelly's
(1955) Role Construct Repertory Test and were consistent in measuring the
dimensions of a set of interpersonal constructs. In a review, Niemeyer et al. (1990)
found that over 1,000 studies had utilized a version of Kelly’s Role Construct
Repertory Test to measure cognitive complexity.
Olson and Partington (1977) used the Role Taking Task (RTT) instrument,
which required subjects to generate a story about an ambiguous scene. They used
four categories to evaluate the stories: (a) simple refocusing: isolating versions of the
story, (b) character elaboration: giving each character multiple points of view, (c)
perspective elaboration: assigning appropriate roles to each character—role
descriptions originate from both an inner and outer character perspective, and (d)
change of perspective: each character meets the criteria for perspective elaboration—
the internal orientation of one character is reflected in the external orientation of the
other character.
Crockett (1965) introduced an alternate measure of cognitive complexity, the
Role Category Questionnaire (RCQ) to measure the ascription of roles to personal
acquaintances. A current instrument to investigate thinking style centers on the use
of the Thinking Styles Inventory (Zhang, 2006). The inventory is composed of 65
self-report items where ratings are provided on a 7-point scale. The data are factor
23
analyzed to produce the three thinking types (Type I, Type II, and Type III).
Individuals categorized in Type I and II are grouped as cognitively simple and
complex, respectively. The final category, Type III, represents individuals who
constitute a mix of the attributes which distinguish the other two types.
This study employed a customized model of cognitive complexity whereby
cognitive complexity is inferred from level of reflection.
Empirical Findings. Early research on cognitive complexity was
measurement-centric and sought to use cognitive complexity to predict behavior
(Bieri, 1955; Leventhal, 1957; Honess, 1976; Meaders, 1957; Morse, 1965; Sechrest
& Jackson, 1961), total impressions formed and degree of similarity with others
(Crockett, 1965), and skills regarding the ability to infer the total personal constructs
of others (Adams-Webber et al., 1972; Craig & Duck, 1977). In non-measurement
related studies, Bieri (1955) found that levels of cognitive complexity influenced
predictive accuracy in social judgment. Similarly and with regard to social skill,
Craig and Duck (1977) found that cognitively complex subjects tended to display
greater social maturity toward strangers than did cognitively simple persons. Later
research, which is relative to the current study, focused on how different cognitive
types were distinguished in professional practice.
When comparing novice and expert practitioners, investigators demonstrated
that experts display greater levels of cognitive complexity than do novice performers
(Reynolds & Janzen, 1987; Salmon & Fenning, 1993). In other research, Burke et
al. (1992) found that levels of cognitive complexity and differentiation increased
24
with professional experience. Investigators who focused on decision-making abilities
found that cognitively simple participants rely, to a greater degree, on impulsive
decision making, whereas more cognitively complex individuals practice more in-
depth deliberation (Kortas, Neimeyer, & Prichard, 1992). In healthcare practice,
more cognitively complex persons have been found to exhibit greater diagnostic
accuracy and superior clinical judgment (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994). In that study,
Spengler and Strohmer (1994) investigated APA member counselors (n=119) using a
revised version of the RGT and found a positive relation between low levels of
cognitive complexity and increased levels of clinical bias. The authors reported that
findings were not moderated by training or years of experience. As with many
empirical studies, contradictions have been found. For example, Donahoe (1997)
found novice and expert practitioners were undistinguished in levels of cognitive
complexity; however, the limitations of the study included failure to use real experts
(average difference in experience was six years) as participants.
Expertise
Expertise is a key factor influencing level of reflection; as such, the following
section provides an overview of the major literature on expertise.
Origin. Sir Francis Galton is credited with the early recognition that
excellence in various fields of practice may have a common basis (Ericsson, 1993) in
factors such as innate ability, zeal, and power for labor. It was de Groot (1978),
however, who pioneered the empirical study of expertise with chess players. He
demonstrated that expertise was linked to exceptional memory abilities; specifically,
25
meaningful memories. To study this process, he altered the location of chess
positions and measured players’ ability to recall position location.
In scenarios where positions were arranged randomly, expert and novice
players demonstrated similar levels of recall; however, when positions were arranged
in a meaningful pattern, expert level players recalled substantially more positions
(Ericsson, 2003). This finding stressed visual-perceptual processes, not logical-
deductive thinking processes, as fundamental elements to mastery (Reynolds, 1992).
The finding indicated expertise was facilitated by an ability to recognize a larger
number of chess movement patterns. Following de Groot's method, Simon and
Chase (1973) advanced the general theory of expertise.
Definition. The general theory of expertise that Simon and Chase (1973)
proposed was based on factors of human information-processing theory:
accumulation of patterns and chunks of information explained superior memory and
performance (Ericsson, 2003). Though the theory influenced the study of expertise,
it defined expert performance as merely an example of an extreme case of skill
acquisition (Proctor & Dutta, 1995; Richman, Gobet, Staszewski, & Simon, 1996;
VanLehn, 1996). By the end of the 1980s, it was clear the general theory of
expertise was lacking. In response, Ericsson put forth the Expert Performance
Approach to advance the domain of expertise.
Ericsson's 1993 framework of expert performance is centered on identifying a
naturally occurring superior, repeatable performance during a situation that is
representative of activities the practitioner faces regularly. Also important is that the
26
performance under investigation represent the essence of expertise in the given
domain. These criteria allow for the standardization of tasks to simulate similar
conditions for measuring novice and experts. In the simulated condition, the task
must be carefully identified, as some tasks do not elicit superior performance from
skilled or expert performers. As an example, routine problem tasks typically do not
differentiate performance; however, unexpected problems are more likely to
illuminate differences (Ericsson, 1993).
Expertise was one of the individual differences examined in this study.
Experts were defined as professionals who had at least 10 years of experience in
their respective practice and who had specialized training and education within the
domain of school psychology.
Conceptualization. The Expert Performance Approach was intended to reject
Galton's theory of innate abilities (Ericsson, 1993). Through systematic
experimentation, Ericsson studied expert performers to determine the qualitative
difference between normal and exceptional performers. He found the key
differentiating factor was persistent motivation, which was a determining factor in
deliberate effort and practice for performance improvement (Ericsson, 1993).
Sternberg (1998), too, sought to refute the traditional notion that abilities are innate
and fixed.
Sternberg (1998) proposed the developing-expertise model, which assumes
abilities are malleable. The developing-expertise model builds on empirical research
demonstrating the flexibility of human ability (Ceci, 1996; Ceci, Nightingale, &
27
Baker, 1992; Ceci & Roazzi, 1994; Perkins, 1995; Snow, 1979, 1980, 1996; Snow &
Lohman, 1984; Renzuli, 1986). In this model, expert status is the product of genetic
endowment and experience, and expertise involves acquisition, storage, and
utilization of explicit knowledge of domain and tacit knowledge of field. Explicit
knowledge refers to facts, formulae, or principles of a domain of inquiry. Tacit
knowledge refers to informal knowledge gained through experience and required to
attain success in a domain of practice. In addition, individual differences in
developing expertise are a function of rate of learning and of a learning ceiling,
which in turn is a function of genetic and environmental factors.
The developing-expertise model is comprised of five elements: metacognitive
skills, learning skills, thinking skills, knowledge, and motivation (Sternberg, 1998).
The elements are hypothesized to be interactive and to mutually influence each other.
Metacognitive skills refer to the understanding and control of cognition. Learning
skills include explicit learning (based on systematic effort) and implicit learning
(learning with no effort). Thinking skills are critical, creative, and practical. Forms
of knowledge for expertise include declarative (facts, concepts, and laws) and
procedural (strategies). Motivation includes achievement motivation (desire for
challenges and risk) and self-efficacy motivation (belief in ability to solve problems).
The evolution from novice to expert entails the interaction of all elements in
the developing-expertise model. Like Ericsson, Sternberg (1998) indicated that
motivation is the driving force to overcome inertia and integrate the elements of the
developing-expertise model. He claims that although the definition of expertise is
28
without an end-stage, the developing-expertise process assumes that the highest stage
of expertise leads to the reflective practitioner. Therefore, Sternberg asserts, the
hierarchical nature of expert development means that practitioners move to
successively higher stages of expertise.
Empirical Findings. Proctor and Dutta (1995) indicated that most empirical
research on expertise has centered on understanding skill acquisition. More recent
research, however, has been centered on determining domain-specific characteristics
among experts.
Simon and Chase (1973) found that it often required a decade of experience
to become a master chess player. Other investigators have substantiated this finding
in other domains of study (Charness, Krampe, & Mayr, 1996; Simonton, 1999).
Specifically, Hayes (1985) estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 hours of study,
practice, and experience are required to achieve the level of expert in most practice
domains. This translates to approximately 5 to 10 years of experience, assuming a
normal work year schedule. Ericsson and Lehmann (1996) estimated a similar
timeframe to develop expertise. More recently, Bobay (2009) has found the highest
level of expertise is achieved with an average commitment of 14 years.
Beyond their time commitment, experts demonstrate specific abilities not
recognizable in nonexperts. They have “ready access” to an extensive array of
knowledge for specific contexts (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988), and their recall of that
knowledge is significantly greater than that of nonexperts (Berliner 1994; Cowley,
1996; Myford, 1991; Sternberg & Horvath, 1995). This ability is facilitated by the
29
process of chunking (processing several pieces of information as a single piece of
information), which produces recognition of meaningful patterns (Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1993; Berliner, 1994; Patel & Groen, 1991; Schmidt, Norman, &
Boshuizen, 1990). This finding has been demonstrated among chess players (Chi et
al., 1988; Reynolds, 1992) as well as healthcare professionals (Benner, 1982, 1984;
Daley, 1999; Feltovich, Johnson, Moller, & Swanson, 1984; Patel, Kaufman, &
Magder, 1996).
Experts are also distinguished in their ability to problem solve: they quickly
extract pertinent information for the problem’s solution, information which novice
practitioners cannot extract as quickly or at all (Benner, 1982; Berliner, 1994;
Etringer, Hillerbrand, & Claiborn, 1995). Further, experts are most distinguishable
from novices when faced with a novel situation (Ericsson, 1996; Swanson, 1990).
Beyond using measurements/tests/tasks to distinguish between expert and nonexpert
performers, researchers also rely on external sources of information where peers
collectively identify experts (Benner & Tanner, 1987; Kremer-Hayon, 1991; van der
Mars, 1991; Wren, 2001).
From a developmental perspective and within specific domains of expertise,
expertise is seen as a process. This developmental process has been seen in physical
education teachers (van der Mars, 1991), medical professionals (Benner, 1982; Gale
& Marsden, 1983; Schmidt et al., 1990; Wren, 2001), and elite sport professionals
(Ericsson, 1996).
30
Cognitive Variables that Predict Quality of Reflection
Several cognitive variables were used as predictors of quality of reflection.
These, described each in turn, are need for cognition, openness, and neuroticsm.
Need for Cognition. Need for cognition is a key differentiating factor
influencing individuals’ level of reflection; therefore the following section provides
an overview of the significant literature surrounding the need for cognition construct.
Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955) were the originators of the need for
cognition construct. They sought to establish the existence of this human need by
building on the need theory of McClelland et al. (1953).
Cohen (1954) defined the need for cognition as the human tendency to
organize experience in a meaningful and integrated fashion, and asserted that it arises
from an urge to transform experience into a reasonable reality. The nature of the
experience necessitates that the definition of what is deemed meaningful and
integrated is subjective and dependent on a person's past experience and capacity to
integrate experience. Cohen asserted that the need for cognition qualifies as a need
(1) if the need is capable of directing behavior toward a goal and (2) when the goal is
not achievable, negative feelings (tension and deprivation) are produced. He viewed
the strength of the need as subjective although measurable. Cohen further
distinguished the need for cognition as distinct from other needs, insofar as the need
is internal and the person does not have to act in or on the external environment to
demonstrate the need (Cohen, 1954). Cacioppo et al. (1996) have indicated that
Cohen's original definition and conceptualization surrounding the need for cognition
31
are consistent with contemporary research in tolerance of ambiguity, need for
structure, and need for cognitive closure.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) sought to further the investigation of need for
cognition with empirical studies. They defined it as the tendency to engage in and
enjoy effortful analytic activity, a definition distinct from Cohen's original
conception. But Cacioppo states that it aligns with other definitions; it was the
definition used in this study.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) asserted that the need for cognition (NFC) is a
cognitive motivational tendency that evolved through subjective experience of
complex cognitive endeavors and is experienced as rewarding. Cacioppo et al.
conceptualized NFC as a tendency unrelated to biological need (tissue-based
phenomenon). High need for cognition is conceptualized as an internal, consistent
preference for greater arousal in the form of thought activity and is theorized to be
related to arousal seeking. Therefore, persons with a high need for cognition exhibit
enjoyment from internally generated stimuli.
In contrast, low need for cognition is evidenced by a consistent aversion to
unnecessary thought activity. The inclusion of these distinctions between low and
high need for cognition individuals, made Cacioppo and Petty's conceptualization of
need for cognition more similar to Fiske's (1949) inquiring intellect and Murray's
need for understanding. Also, Cacioppo and Petty conceived need for cognition
parallel to White's (1959) theory of motivated, persistent behavior that is not fully
based on biological needs, drives, or instincts (Cacioppo, 1996). This
32
conceptualization fundamentally defines the need for cognition as a stable intrinsic
motivation that is malleable and can be developed, and is a construct apart from mere
ability.
Cohen (1954) undertook the first empirical study on need for cognition using
the Situations Checklist and Hierarchy of Needs Measure. Because this measure was
unavailable at the time Cacioppo and Petty (1982) began experimentation, developed
and validated their own measure.
The content format of their original tool was similar to the need for
achievement assessment and was also influenced by the Elaboration Likelihood
Model of Persuasion (ELMP). The ELMP conceptualizes information processing as
two-fold, including central and peripheral routes of processing. Individuals believed
to more frequently use central processing would correspondingly have a higher need
for cognition or greater ability to enjoy thinking about complex problems and engage
in more deliberate decision making.
To represent and measure the need for cognition construct, Cacioppo and
Petty (1982) generated a sample of statements. Any statements identified as
ambiguous were excluded. The final items (45 in total) in the need for cognition
measure were administered to two divergent groups: college professors and assembly
line workers (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). In the final revision, items that were
nondiscriminating between these groups were removed. As well, uncorrelated items
were excluded. The experiment resulted in the 34-item need for cognition scale
(NCS). A follow-up study was conducted to review the NCS for factor stability,
33
internal consistency, and item reliability (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Evidence
suggested a single factor as being reliably measured and not due to response
artifacts. Further testing was undertaken to ensure convergent, discriminant, content,
and predictive validity. The findings support each realm of validity of the NCS.
Tanaka et al. (1988) sought to further the differentiation provided by the
NCS. Tanaka et al. undertook a macro-level assessment of the NCS using new
developments in factor analytic techniques. The scale was altered to consist of a
true/false format, a diversion from the nine-point scale used by the original authors.
Tanaka et al.’s research provided evidence that the NCS was multidimensional and
contained three subscales: cognitive complexity, cognitive confidence, and cognitive
persistence. Tanaka et al. argued the findings shined a light on differences which
were previously obscured by the single factor structure. As well, the findings
indicated males and females may be fundamentally different in the domain of
cognitive persistence. The authors therefore suggested cognitive processing may
differ simply because of social orientation.
Cacioppo (1996) found in a review of the literature that the bulk of the
research supports a single factor for need for cognition and indicates the
dichotomous format employed by Tanaka et al. minimizes the information available
on the original item scale. In addition, Cacioppo found the subscales reported by
Tanaka et al. have yet to prove reliable or predictive. Overall, the evidence strongly
suggested the scale was gender neutral. Finally, the translated version for the Dutch
34
population provides evidence of a robust structure in populations within North
America and Europe and is a further indication of the scale's reliability.
Cacioppo et al. developed the short form of NCS (18 items) in the mid 1980s.
Factor analysis indicated the retained items explained the largest portion of variance
associated with the loadings from the original scale. Further, other factors explained
lesser but equal amounts of variance, and items loaded less on secondary factors.
These findings were sufficient to suggest the short form is a robust inventory and
measures the intended phenomenon (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). These findings
were verified in other research (Heesacker, 1985; Sadowski, 1993; Sadowski &
Gulgoz, 1992; Tolentino et al., 1990; Waters & Zakrajsek, 1990).
Early research conducted by Cohen (1954) indicated that students categorized
as having a high need for cognition scored ambiguous stories as less interesting
indicating degree of structure was crucial for high need individuals. However,
students grouped as having a low need for cognition demonstrated no difference in
ratings for ambiguous and structured stories. In each scenario, students reported
equivalent levels of effort expended to understand and read each story type. In
follow-up experimentation, Cohen (1954) found support that high need for cognition
students could organize, elaborate, and evaluate information relatively better than
low need for cognition students. Cohen (1954) also suggested high need for
cognition people produced greater discriminating judgments and exhibited greater
motivation to think about persuasive communication. In other research, Adams
(1959) found mothers with a comparatively higher need for cognition were more
35
likely to seek frequent information from physicians about child behavior problems
than were low need for cognition mothers.
Findings from Cacioppo et al. (1983) suggest the need for cognition construct
is not associated with intelligence. Further research also found no relation between
measures of need for cognition and intelligence, including abstract and verbal
reasoning (Cacioppo et al., 1983; Fletcher et al., 1986; Waters & Zakrajsek, 1990).
Beyond support for the construct being differentiated from intelligence, need for
cognition has been shown to be a stable individual need. This finding is apparent in
studies among college students (Manfredo & Bright, 1991; Talbot, 1990; Tanaka et
al., 1988; Ward, 1993) and among adolescents (Berzonsky, 1993; Berzonsky &
Sullivan, 1992). Other researchers measuring intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
support the notion that need for cognition is a form of motivation.
Amabile et al. (1994) used the Intrinsic Motivation scale and found large
correlations between the Intrinsic Motivation Enjoyment subscale and need for
cognition. This suggests scores are a manifestation of a motivational construct and
differentiate people in intrinsic motivation relative to cognitive engagement. Olson
et al. (1984) found evidence to further this premise using the Ontario Test of
Intrinsic Motivation. Other realms of research have focused on the differences
between subjects with low and high cognition needs.
In his review, Cacioppo et al. (1996) found support for influence of
individual differences in the realm of cognitive processing. The stability of
difference illuminates types of tendencies, including tendencies of 1) cognitive
36
misers who demonstrate low intrinsic motivation for effortful cognitive endeavors
and 2) chronic cognizers who demonstrate intrinsic motivation for using their mental
facilities. Individual differences in cognitive activity have been shown to derive
from personal experience (past and current), memory access, and influence
processing of information when confronted with a dilemma.
Differences in level of need for cognition are also associated with differences
related to meaning acquisition, adoption of positions, and problem solving. Those
with a high need for cognition illustrate cognitive processes that center around
information seeking, whereas those with a low need for cognition are reliant upon
others, trial and error, or social comparison. Further evidence suggests high need for
cognition individuals experience little difficulty articulating and communicating
feelings, are able to differentiate bodily sensations from emotions, and enjoy normal
levels of emotions and fantasy. Further, high need for cognition persons do not
display high levels of neuroticism. Finally, at the time of their review, Cacioppo et
al. (1996) did not uncover any reliable differences between need for cognition and
demographic variables (age, gender, education, or income).
Openness. In factor analytic studies, five core personality traits have been
identified. These dimensions have been supported by 50 years of empirical study
(e.g., Goldberg, 1993). Two of those were used in this study as predictors. The first
of those was openness. Individuals who score high on this trait have been shown to
demonstrate strong need for adventure, novelty, creativity, curiosity, and
insightfulness (John & Srivastava, 1999). McCrae (1987) provided evidence that
37
divergent thinking, a cognitive ability which is measured by one’s production on a
given task, is correlated with creativity and openness. This, along with the
relationship to the above mentioned attributes, provide support to the notion that
higher levels of openness would predict higher quality reflection.
Neuroticism. The second of the “big five” personality traits used as a
predictor was neuroticism. This dimension is related to negative emotional states,
including anxiety (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and worry, a cognitive activity that
has been shown to be related to psychological disturbance, specifically anxiety
(Gladstone & Parker, 2003). Worrying is associated with repetitive thinking.
Diefenbach et al. (2001) found worrying was highly related to future themes; but the
small available literature investigating worry states also finds that individuals who
worry excessively have a tendency to be self-evaluative, socially anxious,
perfectionist, feel very time-pressured, and report obsession-related symptoms
(Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). As well, they have a greater tendency
to worry, but show poor problem solving and interrupted task completion (Dugas,
Letarte, Rheaume, Freeston, & Ladoucer, 1995). Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
found worrying is characterized with self-focus and future oriented ideas. These
qualities all reasonably predict higher quality of reflection.
38
Research Questions
Two research questions will guide this study:
1. Given a sample of reflective behavior of school psychologists, will
novices differ from experts in the depth of their reflections, as measured
by levels of cognitive complexity?
2. Given a sample of reflective behavior of school psychologists, will need
for cognition, neuroticism, and openness scores each predict the cognitive
complexity score?
39
CHAPTER II
METHOD
This chapter reports characteristics of participants and raters. In addition, it
reports the study’s measures, stimulus material, procedures, and data analyses.
Participants
Forty-six (37 female; 8 male; 1 gender not specified) school psychologists
participated in the study. They ranged in age from 25 to 68 (M=42.47, SD=11.09);
69% were White, 11% Hispanic, 9% Asian-American, 2% African-American, 2%
Mixed, and 2% unknown. Twenty percent (N=9) of participants were categorized as
novice school psychologists (1 to 3 years of professional experience); 41% (N=19) as
experts (10+ years of professional experience). The remaining respondents met
qualifying criteria for neither novice nor expert categorization. Expert school
psychologists reported a range of 10 to 33 years of experience (M=17.4, SD=7.1);
novice school psychologists reported a range of 1 to 3 years of experience (M=1.6,
SD=.73). Finally, 80% (N=37) of participants had a Master's, 15% (N=7) a
Doctorate, and 2% (N=1) a Bachelor's degree; the remaining respondents did not
indicate their level of educational attainment.
Raters
The six raters were from the University of Southern California’s Rossier
School of Education who ranged in age from 27-60. Five were doctoral students
(including the dissertation author), and one was the supervising university professor.
Two were White males and the four women were Asian-American (N=1), African-
40
American (N=1), and White (N=2). Each doctoral student was part of the same
thematic doctoral group and engaged in similar, mixed-method dissertation research.
Prior to rating participants' reflections, each doctoral student had completed two
doctoral level inquiry courses and participated in a mock rating session of a pilot
critical reflection survey, in order to calibrate the rating procedure.
Measures
A demographic questionnaire, the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) and two
subscales from the Big Five Personality Inventory (BFPI) were administered to all
participants. A description of the questionnaire and scales are described below.
Participants were also provided stimulus material for the study, described in the next
section.
Demographic Questionnaire
The number of demographic questions varied across three versions of the
survey and depended on the on the target group (practicing California school
psychologists; recent school psychology graduates; and non-California school
psychologists). Five questions were consistent across all versions of the survey:
questions about age, gender, race, highest degree earned, and primary language. Age
data were collected using an open numeric format where participants entered their
age data as a whole number. Gender data were collected using a check box with two
response options: male and female. Respondents' race/ethnicity data were collected
using a single option format. The following categories were presented: Asian-
American, Pacific Islander, African-American, Native-American, Hispanic, White
41
non-Hispanic, Other, and Mixed. Participants' educational attainment was collected
by asking them to select their highest degree obtained: BA/BS, Masters, or
Doctorate. Finally, respondents were asked if English was their primary language;
they responded using a yes/no check box. Two other questions pertaining to
credentialing and years of service were included in the surveys given to the
practicing California school psychologists.
Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)
The short (18 item) version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) was used
in this study. The scale measures the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful
analytic activity. Participants were instructed to select the item that best described
his or her characteristic way of thinking. Each item was accompanied by a Likert
style scale where options included: “extremely characteristic of me,” “somewhat
characteristic of me,” “uncertain,” “somewhat uncharacteristic of me,” and
“extremely uncharacteristic of me" (underlining included in original presentation).
The specific items are available elsewhere (Cacioppo et al., 1984). In the current
study, the Cronbach's alpha for the NCS items, a measure of scale reliability, was .81
a sufficiently high measure (Cohen, 2003). The score is the sum of the items; high
scores indicate greater need for cognition.
Big Five Personality Inventory (BFPI; John & Srivastava, 1999)
The Big Five Personality Inventory (BFPI) has five subscales, each designed
to measure a core dimension of personality (John & Srivastava, 1999). Two
subscales from the BFPI were used in this study: those measuring Neuroticism and
42
Openness. The items for these subscales were presented directly after the NCS
items, without introduction.
Neuroticism. John and Srivastava (1995) indicate that neuroticism describes
an individual who tends to display an inability to manage unpleasant emotional
experiences, including anger, anxiety, and depression. John and Srivastava indicate
a high score on the Neuroticism inventory, is indicative of a person who tends to
respond to trigger events with greater intensity of emotion. In addition, these
persons tend to perceive and interpret negative emotional experiences as difficult and
frustrating. Further, highly neurotic personalities will experience negative emotions
for longer durations, which can hamper their decision-making and their ability to
effectively cope with stress. In contrast, low scores on the Neuroticism subscale are
indicative of an individual who does not become upset quickly or react
uncontrollably with emotion. These individuals tend to exhibit traits of calmness and
stability and are more capable of coping with a stressful event.
There were eight items related to Neuroticism, and participants were asked to
self-report using a Likert style scale with the following options: “Disagree strongly,”
“Disagree a little,” “Neither disagree or agree,” “Agree a little,” or “Agree strongly.”
The Neuroticism items are listed elsewhere (John & Srivastava, 1999). Three
Neuroticism items were designed as reverse score items. In the current study, the
Cronbach's alpha for the Neuroticism inventory was .82. The score is the sum of the
items (after correction for reverse scoring).
43
Openness. Openness is a personality trait that is associated with creativity,
appreciation for art, and a desire to be imaginative and adventurous (John &
Srivastava, 1999). In total, the subscale consists of 10 items. Higher scores on the
Openness subscale are related to persons with awareness and openness to a fuller
range of emotions, an interest in art, and greater intellectual curiosity; however, it
has also been found that these individuals may display an interest in learning and
exploring but not in the arts. Lower scores on the Openness subscale are associated
with persons who are considered to have minimal common interest with others, are
conservative, and prefer what is familiar over what is unfamiliar. Finally, those
scoring lower on the Openness scale are described as being simpler and tending to
feel art is not practical or interesting. In the current study, the Cronbach's alpha for
the Openness inventory was .78. The score is the sum of the items (after correction
for reverse scoring).
Framework for Evaluating Participants’ Level of Reflection (Hatton and Smith,
1995)
The current study followed the framework and procedures developed and
detailed by Hatton and Smith (1995). This includes reading participants' reflections
and scoring them into the four categories: Descriptive Writing, Descriptive
Reflection, Dialogic Reflection (Level Three), and Critical Reflection (Level Four).
For an elaborate description of each level, see Appendix D.
44
Stimulus Material
Reflection Task
The study's stimulus material consisted of seven open-ended questions. The
questions were the product of the thematic doctoral group and were developed under
the guidance of the supervising university professor.
The stimulus material was introduced to the participants in the second section
of the online survey immediately following the demographic questionnaire. The
material was preceded with an introduction to frame the limits of the reflection:
Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting that
meets the following criteria:
• you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
• your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
• it occurred within the past 90 days
If there has been more than one such experience during this period, please
choose the one that had the greatest impact on you.
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were doing,
(b) who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience left you
confused, upset, or wondering.
The open-ended questions were designed to have the respondents detail the
experience, its duration, their reaction(s), factors influencing the experience,
conclusions drawn, and how the experience would alter their future behavior. The
full introduction and open-ended questions are available in Appendix A.
45
Procedures
Recruitment
Recruitment was carried out in three distinct stages in order to maximize
participation. The recruitment effort directly affected instrument administration
where three different survey formats were used to target participants recruited from
various sources so as to ask them questions appropriate to their experience and
location of practice.
Stage 1. Participants were initially recruited from the California Association
of School Psychologists (CASP), specifically from the association's affiliates in
Regions IV-IX which includes the Los Angeles Unified School District, South and
East Los Angeles County, the Inland Empire, Way South Region, Central Coast
Region, and Orange County. The affiliate presidents were contacted; the dissertation
author asked to attend the region's monthly meeting to introduce the study and seek
participation from association members. In response to the affiliate presidents’
preference, members were contacted via email and directed to the online study.
To gather additional participation, seven colleagues of the investigator (all
school psychologists for the Claremont Unified School District) were contacted to
participate in the study. Thereafter, an additional effort was made to recruit CASP
members. The director of the 2008 CASP Summer Institute was requested to
introduce the study to members attending summer workshops. A total of 36 member
email addresses were collected, and each member was sent an invitation to the study;
follow-up emails were sent to unresponsive members.
46
Stage 2. The initial recruitment effort resulted in a skewed sample.
Specifically, few participants were novice level school psychologists. To address
this skew, 16 of 25 directors of graduate programs in school psychology that were
approved by the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing were presented
with an introduction to the study and its goals and asked to inform recent graduates,
those who had completed the program in the past three years, about the study. Five
of the 16 directors forwarded the introduction and goals, and the survey link, to their
students.
In total, 30 recent graduates responded to the survey, and 13 completed the
survey in full. These respondents were directed to a slightly modified version of the
original survey --the “years of experience” question was replaced by a question
asking respondents the year they completed their school psychology internship.
Additionally, the question asking the respondents the year they received their PPS
School Psychology credential was also removed.
Stage 3. A final effort involved seeking participation from school
psychologist consultants of the College Board (whose job it is to determine
eligibility for special accommodations on the SAT). A colleague of the author, who
is both a consultant of the College Board and a school psychologist for the
Claremont Unified School District, was asked to introduce the study to other
consultants who were practicing school psychologists, during an annual conference.
The organizer of the conference agreed to allow time to introduce the study in an
attempt to recruit additional respondents. In total, 7 consultants provided their
47
names and email addresses, and 3 of them completed the online survey.
These respondents were directed to a third survey which excluded the
question regarding PPS credential, because this question was only applicable to
credentialed school psychologists in the state of California.
Consistent with the IRB approval for this study, all participants who visited
the web survey were notified that their participation was completely voluntary and
were provided an explanation of the purpose of the survey.
Data Analyses
Descriptive Evaluation of Participants’ Level of Reflection
The six raters utilized the Hatton and Smith (1995) coding scheme. The
coding scheme originally was developed to score levels of reflection. However, for
the purpose of this study the score is described as one of cognitive complexity. That
is, the dimensionality and discriminating descriptions school psychologists produce
in their experience descriptions.
To reliably score participants’ reflections, the raters participated in a group
rating session. Each independently scored participants’ reflections on cognitive
complexity (range of 1 to 4). Then, results were shared with the group and
differences were resolved by consensus.
Statistical Analyses
Multiple regression analysis was used in the current study to determine the
amount of variance which could be predicted in the cognitive complexity score,
48
using scores from other constructs (need for cognition, neuroticism, and openness) as
inputs into the regression model.
In the current study, independent t tests were used to determine if need for
cognition and personality constructs were statistically different between expertise
levels. As well, correlations were run to examine strength of relationships.
Cohen's d was used to assess effect size (ES), the magnitude of the effect
observed and attributed to some systematic factor observed between mutually
exclusive groups. Cohen (1992), used a rational approach, asserted that the size of
the effect can be reported as: small (<.20), medium, or large (.80 or more).
49
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
This chapter reports the study’s findings. Each of the two chapter sections
begins with the salient research question. Before addressing them, though, it’s useful
to examine the frequency of the cognitive complexity scores (Figure 5), which was
the means by which depth of reflection was measured. The preponderance of scores
was at the lower end of the scale. In fact, more than half were assigned a score of 1;
two received 4, the highest score. These data are categorical (ordinal), but are
treated as interval data for subsequent analysis.
Figure 5. Cognitive Complexity Histogram Depicting Number of Participants
Assigned Each of the Four Scores
50
Research Question One
Given a sample of reflective behavior of school psychologists, will novices
differ from experts in the depth of their reflections, as measured by levels of
cognitive complexity?
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the cognitive complexity
score for each level of expertise. The average score for novice school psychologists
(M=1.44, SD=.73) and for expert school psychologists (M=1.84, SD=.90) indicates a
directional difference among these two groups. Although the between-group
difference was not statistically different (t=1.2, df=26, p=.26), the effect size
(Cohen’s d=.48) was what Cohen (1992) would characterize as a medium effect size.
Table 2. Mean Cognitive Complexity Scores: by Level of Expertise
N M SD
Novice 9 1.44 0.73
Expert 19 1.84 0.90
Total 46 1.67 0.87
Research Question Two
Given a sample of reflective behavior of school psychologists, will need for
cognition, neuroticism, and openness scores each predict the cognitive complexity
score?
51
In this section, the magnitude of correlation of relationships between all items
measured is reviewed (Table 3). Of the various relationships, only two are
statistically significant: the relationships between (1) the cognitive complexity score
and need for cognition score and (2) the need for cognition score and openness score.
The later was of sufficient magnitude to suggest these two measures are capturing a
common construct.
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Cognitive Complexity Need for Cognition Neuroticism
Need for Cognition .31*
Neuroticism .09 .18
Openness .02 .50** -.04
*p < .05, ** p < .01
Overall, the direction of each correlation was as expected. As well, cognitive
complexity demonstrated the strongest relationship to need for cognition, but the
personality traits of neuroticism and openness demonstrated relatively weak
relationships to level of cognitive complexity.
Multiple Regression
To determine the degree to which the need for cognition, neuroticism, and
openness to experience scores are together capable of predicting the cognitive
complexity score, a multiple regression analysis was employed.
52
Tabachnick (1989) has asserted that the ratio of cases-to-independent
variables should be 20:1. The current study includes three independent variables as
inputs into the regression model. Three IVs necessitate a minimum of 60 cases, but
this study has only 46. However, the alternate minimum assumption is to have a
multiple of five more cases than there are independent variables, which the current
study accomplishes (Tabachnick, 1989).
Outliers
A univariate outlier assessment was performed using bivariate scatterplots.
Overall, no data points were considered outliers, as no large deviations were
observed.
A multivariate outlier assessment is achieved by requesting Mahalanobis’
distance in SPSS during the production of the regression model. The Mahalanobis’
distance is evaluated using a chi square distribution, with degrees of freedom being
equal to the total number of independent variables used in the regression model. In
this case the critical value would be 7.81 (critical values are obtained from
Tabachnick, 1989). The largest statistic in the current data set is 7.3, indicating no
outlier data.
Assumptions of multiple regression analysis are met if the following are true:
residuals are normally distributed about the predicted cognitive complexity score,
residuals have a linear relationship with the predicted score, and residual variance
about the predicted scores is stable (Tabachnick, 1989). To determine if these
53
assumptions are met, a residuals scatterplot was produced. The graphical results
indicated no substantial departures from normality or heteroscedasticity.
The omnibus test indicates that the correlation coefficient (R) for the
regression is not significantly different from zero: F(3, 39)=1.61, p=.20 (Table 4).
Table 4. Regression ANOVA
SS DF MS F α
Regression 3.51 3.00 1.17 1.61 0.20
Residual 26.06 36.00 0.72
Total 29.56 39.00
The total amount of variance (R
2
) accounted for in the cognitive complexity
score using the current combination of predictors, was 12%. The adjusted R square,
which indicates the amount of variance expected to be accounted for in the
population, is 5%.
Only need for cognition had significant regression coefficients (t=2.1, p
<.05). This score had an unstandardized regression coefficient with a confidence
interval (CI) that ranged in value from .002 to .08. The CI range indicates this
predictor’s coefficient is different from zero. In Table 5 are: regression coefficients,
critical t values, significance levels, and confidence intervals for all predictors.
54
Table 5. Regression Coefficients
Β t Sig. Lower CI Upper CI
Constant -0.30 -0.19 0.85 -3.40 2.81
Need for Cognition 0.04 2.12 0.04 0.00 0.08
Neuroticism 0.00 0.08 0.94 -0.08 0.09
Openness -0.03 -0.96 0.34 -0.08 0.03
Secondary Questions
The analysis in the sections that follow concerned questions beyond the main
purpose of the current study. Even though there were no a priori hypotheses to guide
this inquiry, the relationships warranted exploring.
Secondary Question 1: Will novice school psychologists differ from expert
school psychologists in need for cognition, as measured by the NCS?
Need for cognition scores are reported by group in Table 6. Forty two
(91.3%) participants had sufficient responses to calculate a need for cognition score.
Scores ranged from a low of 52 to a high of 86 (M=70.2, SD=8.4). The novice
school psychologists had an average score of 67.8 (SD=5.7) whereas expert school
psychologists had a mean of 75.7 (SD=6.1). The difference between novice and
expert school psychologists average need for cognition score is statistically
significant (t=3.1, df=22, p <.005), Cohen’s d=1.34, a large effect size.
55
Table 6. Mean Need for Cognition Scores: Overall and Among Professional Levels
N M SD
Novice 9 67.8 5.7
Expert 19 75.7 6.1
Total 42 70.2 8.4
Secondary Question 2: Will novice school psychologists differ from expert
school psychologists in neuroticism?
Neuroticism scores are reported by group in Table 7. Across both groups,
scores ranged from 20 to 37 (M=26.7, SD=3.4). Novice and expert school
psychologists demonstrated no differences from one another, confirmed with a non-
significant independent sample t-test (t = .25, df=22, p=.81), Cohen’s d=.09, a small
effect.
Table 7. Mean Neuroticism Scores: Overall and Among Professional Levels
N M SD
Novice 8 26.3 1.8
Expert 16 26.6 4.1
Total 42 26.7 3.4
56
Secondary Question 3: Given a sample of reflective behavior of school
psychologists, will novices differ from experts in level of openness?
Openness scores are displayed by group in Table 8. Across both groups,
scores ranged from 19 to 50 (M=38.9, SD=6.1). Novice school psychologists had an
average score of 36.7 (SD=3.6) whereas expert school psychologists had an average
score of 41.1 (SD=7.4). The difference between expert level openness scores is not
statistically significant (t=1.7, df=23, p=.11). However, Cohen’s d (.76) indicated a
medium effect size.
Table 8. Mean Openness Scores: Overall and Among Professional Levels
N M SD
Novice 9 36.7 3.6
Expert 16 41.1 7.4
Total 43 38.9 6.1
57
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The study examined reflections on professional practice issues of expert
versus novice school psychologists, predicting that the former would be of higher
quality. Quality was measured by a form of cognitive complexity operationalized by
Hatton and Smith (1995). Although the small sample sizes provided insufficient
power to yield between-group statistical significance, the effect size was moderate
and in the expected direction. That is, expert school psychologists demonstrated
higher quality reflections, a result consistent with that of prior research (Brooksfield,
2000; Clouder, 2000; Crook, 2001; Ertmer, 2001).
Experts tend to cognitively process situations differently than do novices
(Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; van der Mars, 1991). This includes, for example, being
able to discern much more information from a professional situation and picking up
nuanced understanding, which was consistent with this study’s findings. Experts
also have greater recall of situations they have experienced (Berliner 1994; Cowley,
1996; Myford, 1991; Sternberg & Horvath, 1995) and to the extent that expert
participants in this study had greater recall, it may well have affected reflection
quality. These changes in the evolution of a professional’s expertise have been
observed across various disciplines, including physical education teachers (van der
Mars, 1991), medical professionals (Benner, 1982; Gale & Marsden, 1983; Schmidt
et al., 1990; Wren, 2001), elite sport professionals (Ericsson, 1996), and counselors
(Stoltenberg, 1981).
58
Stoltenberg's (1981) Counselor Complexity Model is useful in
conceptualizing these findings. He asserted that as the novice develops expertise,
she or he will show corresponding increases in awareness, autonomy, motivation,
confidence, and insight. In effect, the progression from one stage to the next reflects
advancement to greater complexity within each of these areas. The difference in
cognitive complexity scores of novice and expert school psychologists' could be
interpreted as evidence of that progression.
It is reasonable to wonder, though, whether other factors which were not
being considered in the analyses could have accounted for the findings. These
factors include participant anxiety, the greater volume of reflection provided by
experts, and the method by which the two groups were recruited.
Anxiety is an issue with respect to participant expansiveness which
reasonably affects quality. Reasonably, novices would demonstrate greater anxiety
about their performance and that anxiety would be exacerbated by thinking about
problems related to performance, which was the target of their reflections. This, in
turn, would affect expansiveness and therefore quality of reflections.
Logan (2008) found quality of reflection (using the same cognitive
complexity measures as in this study) was positively correlated to the number of
words in those reflections (i.e., expansiveness). Therefore the novice versus expert
differences in level of cognitive complexity may simply have been a function of
gregariousness in the study and, that, in turn would be a function of experience and
anxiety level.
59
Finally, the method of recruitment differed for the two groups under
investigation. The researcher personally recruited the expert school psychologists
and so they were more likely to engage with the task, providing more elaborate,
cognitively complex, reflections. In contrast, the researcher sent novice school
psychologists digital invitations to participate in the study, and so they had no
personal interaction with him. This recruitment difference may have affected the
type of reflections the school psychologists provided, and therefore become a study
confound.
The above mentioned factors: anxiety, expansiveness, and method of
recruitment, should be controlled in future studies investigating quality of reflections
provided by novice and expert school psychologists thereby ruling out those
influences.
Finally, though, there is this issue of outcome criteria. This study
operationalized quality of reflection as a form of cognitive complexity. Whereas this
seemed a very reasonable way to assess quality, it is unrelated to actual outcomes;
this was an indicator of proximal quality. But the goal of reflection is to improve
practice (Schön, 1983) and therefore the gold standard would be actual changes in
the person’s behavior. At this early stage in studying reflections, it seems
appropriate to study quality. Eventually, though, it would be important for
researchers to take on the much more difficult task of assessing outcomes.
60
Secondary Findings
The primary focus of the study was on quality differences between novice
and expert school psychologists' in the quality of their reflections. The secondary
focus, though, was on key individual differences factors which might predict
cognitive complexity. In fact, school psychologists’ need for cognition seemed
important in this regard, for it accounted for the most variance in the cognitive
complexity score. This is consistent with the literature (Burke et al. 1992; Reynolds
& Janzen, 1987; Salmon, 1993; Salmon & Fenning, 1993). That is, people who like
to think about ideas will tend to show higher quality ideas thinking about them.
Cacioppo et al. (1993) found that need for cognition was un related to
intelligence or other cognitive factors, but that it was related to the person’s intrinsic
motivation for engaging in analytic activity (validated, also by Berzonsky, 1993).
That motivation is a driving force to overcome inertia and integrate the elements of
the developing-expertise model (Ericsson, 1992; and, Sternberg, 1998). The
Cacioppo, Ericsson, and Sternberg hypotheses regarding intrinsic motivation aligns
with the Counselor Complexity Model, which postulates professionals in later stages
of development demonstrate healthier and more stable levels of motivation
(Stoltenberg, 1981). Drawing from these models, we assume expert school
psychologists have higher levels of intrinsic motivation in the form of need for
cognition which likely influences not only greater degrees of openness but higher
quality reflections measured in the form of greater cognitive complexity. Cognitive
style is a persistent attitude, strategy, preference of thinking, and way of interacting
61
(Zhang & Sternberg, 2006). This study may suggest that this particular cognitive
style develops with expertise.
Limitations
Sample bias is a form of systematic error. Therefore, the degree to which the
results in the current study are influenced by sample bias suggests that obtained
differences were an artifact of the sample selection method, already noted above.
These possible levels of engagement were noted because of recruitment method. But
perhaps that method also resulted in different “types” of people being recruited.
More specifically, it could be that the expert school psychologists simply were more
inherently curious than those in the novice group. This would account for between-
group differences in need for cognition.
It is difficult to determine if the study’s participants differed in ways relevant
to the study from those who chose not to participate (Polit & Hungler, 1999). If such
differences exist, findings in this study could be attributed to sample bias. Further,
of particular concern, is the degree to which recruitment methods may have
influenced sample bias and may have influenced the findings.
Finally, the sample participants were mostly from one state. There is no
reason to believe the results would differ if the samples had been drawn from other
areas of the country or even internationally. Nevertheless, this should be a caution in
generalizing results.
62
Suggestions for Future Research
There are three issues which researchers extending this work should address:
sample size, confounding factors, and method of capturing reflections.
Sample Size
According to Cohen (1992), statistical test outcomes depends on the degree
that the null hypothesis is false, effect size, and sample size. These inputs determine
the power of a statistical test. Future research should undertake a prospective power
analysis to determine the appropriate inputs to overcome the low power (small
sample size) of the current study.
To increase power, future studies that investigate similar phenomena among a
sample of school psychologists should consider collecting data on substantially
larger number of respondents.
Confounding Factors
Confounding factors are variables which are not measured or controlled in a
research study (Keppel et al. 1992). In the current study, confounding variables are
anxiety, volume of reflections provided by experts, and method of recruitment.
To account for the influence of anxiety as a function of training level, future
researchers should measure respondents' anxiety levels. To the extent that there are
between-group differences, anxiety should be used as a covariate.
To account for participant expansiveness, one possible strategy would be for
future investigators to count the total number of words provided in each participant's
reflection, and then, should use the count as a covariate to assess reflection quality
63
between novice and expert school psychologists. Controlling for total word count
will eliminate this factor as a source of variance and provide a direct method to
measure the level of influence associated with this reflection volume.
Finally, future researchers should utilize standard methods of recruitment
across novice and expert school psychologists. A methodological approach to
recruitment likely requires a substantial effort in planning, as data collection across
different audiences has various practical challenges. In the current study, low
response rate and participants' motivation were challenging areas influencing data
collection. These challenges require a strategic but standardized approach to
counterbalance influences on research results.
Method of Capturing Reflections
This study also relied on a particular method to capture the participants
reflections. It is not clear what ecological validity this had. That is, whether what
was presented accurately represented the types of reflection in which these
psychologists engaged in real life.
Implications for Practice
The implications of the findings for future practice primarily center on
training. As previously mentioned, the National Association of School Psychologists
(NASP) encourages professionals to engage in "career-long professional
development," and this would include the area of reflective practice. The current
study makes clear that professionals of varying experience are subjectively different
relative to need for cognition. Thus, reflective practice training would require
64
varying levels of content to address the inherent differences of each audience
member. Therefore, to effectively achieve NASP goals, producers and designers of
reflective practice training programs should design programs that account for
differences across need for cognition. Not doing so may result in programs that are
too elementary or advanced and thus ineffective programmatically and monetarily.
65
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APPENDIX A
CRITICAL REFLECTION SURVEY
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
1. Introduction to the study
Critical reflection is an important skill. It is a mechanism of self-
supervision that enables professionals to keep developing long after they
have completed their graduate programs. In fact, a number of professions
(e.g., teaching, nursing, and social work) stipulate that students preparing
for those professions learn reflection skills.
Many authors have described the reflection process. Although there are
some differences among them, they all agree that reflection begins with an
incident that somehow is confusing or upsetting. This stimulates critical
reflection that ends with a new understanding of the incident. Despite this
convergence of opinion about the importance of the process, there has been
curiously little actual research on it or its outcomes.
The first step in any domain of research is to examine the phenomena of
interest. In that spirit, I am interested in obtaining a sample of your
reflective process as part of my research, focusing on school psychologists.
Immediately following this first page, you will be asked to describe a recent
professional situation and your thoughts about it. That page is followed by
one with multiple choice questions that all concern your particular style of
thinking. Those questions should take about 7 minutes for you to complete
(based on my field testing).
If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete the questions
that follow. Your responses will help me to learn more about this
ubiquitous – but little-understood – practice of reflective practice.
Micah Cohen
Ed.D. Student
USC Rossier School of Education
81
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
1. Your age
2. Your gender
Female
Male
3. Your race or ethnicity
Asian-American
Pacific Islander
African-American
Native-American
Hispanic
White, nonHispanic
Other
Mixed
4. Number of years of employment as a school psychologist
5. Year you obtained your PPS School Psychologist credential?
6. Your highest degree
BA/BS
Masters
Doctorate
7. Is English your primary language
Yes
No
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Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
2. Reflective Practice
1. Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting
that meets the following criteria:
* you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
* your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
* it occurred within the past 90 days
If there has been more than one such experience during this period,
please choose the one that had the greatest impact on you.
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were
doing, (b) who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience
left you confused, upset, or wondering.
2. How long ago (in days) did this experience occur?
3. Please describe your immediate reactions (i.e., thoughts, and feelings)
to the experience.
4. What internal factors (i.e., your personality, traits, emotional reactions)
influenced your response to that experience?
83
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
5. What external factors (i.e., setting, other people, time of the event, and
so on) influenced your response to that experience?
6. What conclusions have you reached based on your subsequent thinking
about this experience?
7. If faced with a similar experience in the future, how do you thinkyou
would you react differently?
3. NFC Scale
Each of us has a characteristic way of thinking about problems we
encounter. The following items are designed to assess your particular style.
For each item, please check the single answer that best describes you.
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot
of thinking.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
84
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I
will have to think in depth about something.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
85
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects than long-term ones.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to
me.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to
problems.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
86
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one
that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required
a lot of mental effort.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or
why it works.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
87
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect
me personally.
Extremely characteristic of you
Somewhat characteristic of you
Uncertain
Somewhat uncharacteristic of you
Extremely uncharacteristic of you
19. I see myself as someone who is depressed, blue
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
20. I see myself as someone who is original, comes up with new ideas
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
21. I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles stress well
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
22. I see myself as someone who is curious about many different things
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
88
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
23. I see myself as someone who can be tense
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
24. I see myself as someone who is ingenious, a deep thinker
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
25. I see myself as someone who worries a lot
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
26. I see myself as someone who has an active imagination
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
27. I see myself as someone who is emotionally stable; not easily upset
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
89
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
28. I see myself as someone who is inventive
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
29. I see myself as someone who can be moody
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
30. I see myself as someone who values artistic, aesthetic experiences
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
31. I see myself as someone who remains calm intense situations
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
32. I see myself as someone who prefers work that is routine
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
90
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
33. I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
34. I see myself as someone who likes to reflect, play with ideas
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
35. I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
36. I see myself as someone who is sophisticated iart, music, or literature
Disagree strongly
Disagree a little
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree a little
Agree strongly
91
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
4. Final Page
1. On a 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all upsetting or confusing and 7 =
very upsetting or confusing, how would you rate this experience that
you have written about?
1 (not at all upsetting or confusing)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (very upsetting or confusing)
2. On a 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = constantly, how much
have you been thinking about this experience since it occurred?
1 (not at all)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (constantly)
3. On a 7-point scale, where 1 = not at all and 7 = completely how well
does the reflection you have just completed match the quality of
reflections in which you engage in your everyday professional practice?
1 (not at all)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (completely)
4. Have you received formal training in the use of reflection in your
professional practice?
No
Yes
92
Critical Reflections: School Psychologists
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. I appreciate your
input. If you would like the survey results, please click here to send request.
Your email will arrive independent of this survey, so the two will not be
linked.
93
APPENDIX B
18-ITEM NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE
Cacioppo, J., Petty, R.E., & Kao, C. F. (1984)
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of
thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is
sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have
to think in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects than long-term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of
mental effort.
94
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it
works.
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
95
APPENDIX C
BIG FIVE PERSONALITY INVENTORY ITEMS
John, O.P. & Srivastava, S. (1999)
Neuroticism
I see myself as someone who:
...is depressed, blue
...is relaxed, handles stress well
...can be tense
...worries a lot
...is emotionally stable; not easily upset
...can be moody
...remains calm in tense situations
...gets nervous easily
Openness
I see myself as someone who:
...is original, comes up with new ideas
...is curious about many different things
...is ingenious, a deep thinker
...has an active imagination
...is inventive
...values artistic, aesthetic experiences
...prefers work that is routine
...likes to reflect, play with ideas
...has few artistic interests
...is sophisticated in art, music, or literature
96
APPENDIX D
CRITERIA FOR THE RECOGNITION OF EVIDENCE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES
OF REFLECTIVE WRITING
Hatton, N. & Smith, D. (1995)
DESCRIPTIVE WRITING: COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE 1
Not reflective.
Description of events that occurred/report of literature.
No attempt to provide reasons/justification for events.
DESCRIPTIVE REFLECTION: COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE 2
Reflective, not only a description of events but some attempt to provide reason
justification for events or actions but in a reportive or descriptive way. For example,
"I chose this problem-solving activity because I believe that students should be
active rather than passive learners."
Recognition of alternate viewpoints in the research and literature which are reported.
For example, Tyler (1949), because of the assumptions on which his approach rests
suggests that the curriculum process should begin with objectives. Yinger (1979), on
the other hand argues that the "task" is the starting point.
Two forms: (a) Reflection based generally on one perspective/factor as rationale. (b)
Reflection is based on the recognition of multiple factors and perspectives.
DIALOGIC REFLECTION: COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE 3
Demonstrates a "stepping back" from the events/actions leading to a different level
of mulling about, discourse with self and exploring the experience, events, and
actions using qualities of judgements and possible alternatives for explaining and
hypothesising.
Such reflection is analytical or/and integrative of factors and perspectives and may
recognise inconsistencies in attempting to provide rationales and critique, for
example, "While I had planned to use mainly written text materials I became aware
very quickly that a number of students did not respond to these. Thinking about this
now there may have been several reasons for this. A number of students, while
97
reasonably proficient in English, even though they had been NESB learners, may
still have lacked some confidence in handling the level of language in the text.
Alternatively, a number of students may have been visual and tactile learners. In any
case I found that I had to employ more concrete activities in my teaching." Two
forms, as in (a) and (b) above.
CRITICAL REFLECTION: COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE 4
Demonstrates an awareness that actions and events are not only located in, and
explicable by, reference to multiple perspectives but are located in, and influenced
by multiple historical, and socio-political contexts. For example, "What must be
recognised, however, is that the issues of student management experienced with this
class can only be understood within the wider structural locations of power
relationships established between teachers and students in schools as social
institution based upon the principle of control" (Smith, 1992).
98
APPENDIX E
CRITICAL REFLECTION SURVEY RESPONSE EXAMPLES
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE: 1
Section 1
1. Your age
25
2. Your gender
Female
3. Your race or ethnicity
White, nonHispanic
4. Year you completed your school psychology internship
2008
5. Your highest degree
Masters
6. Is English your primary language?
Yes
Section 2
1. Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting that
meets the following criteria:
* you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
* your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
* it occurred within the past 90 days
99
If there has been more than one such experience during this period, please choose the
one that had the greatest impact on you.
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were doing, (b)
who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience left you confused,
upset, or wondering.
I was working on a very sensitive high school case for a emotionally disturbed
student, with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. There were a lot of complications with
this case and family issues. During the IEP, the translator began asking quesitons
about the family situations and did not remain inpartial. She upset/offended the
parent and created problems for the IEP team. I was not sure who to inform or how
to help ensure that this translator be better trained regarding her role
2. How long ago (in days) did this experience occur?
60
3. Please describe your immediate reactions (i.e., thoughts, and feelings) to the
experience.
I was upset that the translator how overstepped her boundaries and wondered what I
could do to ensure that she would not do this again
4. What internal factors (i.e., your personality, traits, emotional reactions)
influenced your response to that experience?
I am a new psychologist and was not sure what my role was in intervening (at the
IEP and later). I felt unsure and not confident about the best response.
5. What external factors (i.e., setting, other people, time of the event, and so on)
influenced your response to that experience?
Involvement of more seasoned professionals, it occurred on a high school campus (in
which I am not as familiar), it was the end of the year (hectic)
6. What conclusions have you reached based on your subsequent thinking about
this experience?
I think that the administrative designee of the meeting should have stepped in and
that it was not my responsibility to intervene
100
7. If faced with a similar experience in the future, how do you think you would
you react differently?
I would be more confident that it is not my place to intervene
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE: 2
Section 1
1. Your age
30
2. Your gender
Female
3. Your race or ethnicity
White, nonHispanic
4. Year you completed your school psychology internship
2008
5. Your highest degree
Masters
6. Is English your primary language?
Yes
Section 2
1. Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting that
meets the following criteria:
* you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
* your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
* it occurred within the past 90 days
101
If there has been more than one such experience during this period, please choose the
one that had the greatest impact on you.
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were doing, (b)
who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience left you confused,
upset, or wondering.
I was asked to write a manifestation determination for a student who was accused of
stealing. During the IEP, the parent and an extended family member questioned each
line of my report. The questioning was aimed at proving their child was not
responsible for the act, rather then the focus of the IEP. Included in the meeting were
a new Vice Principal, teacher, and program specialist. I was upset by the amount of
questioning from the parent and aunt, confused about the manifestation process, and
wondered if I had drawn the appropriate conclusion in my report. I also experienced
anxiety going into the meeting due to that being my first manifestation determination
report.
2. How long ago (in days) did this experience occur?
approximately 72 days ago
3. Please describe your immediate reactions (i.e., thoughts, and feelings) to the
experience.
I felt ashamed and frustrated that the meeting was constantly derailed by questions. I
questioned my own conclusions, including my process at arriving at my conclusion. I
also thought the situation I was in as an intern was unfair as there was no
psychologist in the meeting with me to review how I was going to talk about my
report or give me feedback on my presentation.
4. What internal factors (i.e., your personality, traits, emotional reactions)
influenced your response to that experience?
I internalize negative experiences, which lead to my questioning my own
competence. I am also anxious around people who express high levels of displeasure,
and tend to try and solve their problem at my own expense.
5. What external factors (i.e., setting, other people, time of the event, and so on)
influenced your response to that experience?
I knew the child as I had been seeing her in counseling for the year. The parent was
displeased because she had been told I would contact her immediately and I had not
done so. The meeting took 2 hours instead of the scheduled 45 minutes, and
102
proceeded through lunch, interrupting my plans for the day. And the VP reacted
strongly to accusations of unfairness and became defensive, which added to the
emotional tone of the conversation.
6. What conclusions have you reached based on your subsequent thinking about
this experience?
I need to come into the meeting with a stronger understanding of the manifestation
proceedings. It may help to talk more extensively with parents and staff before the
meeting, and have a plan for what to do if the meeting gets off track.
7. If faced with a similar experience in the future, how do you think you would
you react differently?
My behavioral reaction would be to maintain my composure and ask for patience
before answering questions. I don't think my emotional reaction would be different,
though I would continue to work on staying focused on the purpose of the meeting. I
would also like to be able to present my report and, if able, leave to continue my day.
Pre-meeting prep would include setting an agenda and encouraging staff members to
stay focused to the purpose of the meeting.
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE: 3
Section 1
1. Your age
48
2. Your gender
Female
3. Your race or ethnicity
White, nonHispanic
4. Number of years of employment as a school psychologist
15
103
5. Year you obtained your PPS School Psychologist credential?
1989
6. Your highest degree
Masters
7. Is English your primary language?
Yes
Section 2
1. Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting that
meets the following criteria:
* you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
* your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
* it occurred within the past 90 days
If there has been more than one such experience during this period, please choose the
one that had the greatest impact on you.
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were doing, (b)
who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience left you confused,
upset, or wondering.
I was at an IEP team meeting where I had been instructed that a child not return to
the same site. He had a dx of aspergers' and had bitten a teacher. The parents were
reluctant about him changing schools. I was uncomfortable with the reasoning
myself and unsure how to proceed with it as I didn't feel like I had a right to pressure
them into accepting the change. Present were the parents, the student, an RSP
teacher, a behavior specialist, an SLP. General ed teachers had been there but weren't
at the point placement was discussed. The direction to change his placement came
from a decision made with myself and director of special services to allow the site
administration to make placement recommendations.
2. How long ago (in days) did this experience occur?
12
104
3. Please describe your immediate reactions (i.e., thoughts, and feelings) to the
experience.
When dad was reluctant and somewhat angry, I thought "Oh Shit....how am I going
to push this when I don't really feel like it's necessarily right for the kid?" On the
other hand, I didn't feel that the change was inherently bad or wrong for the kid.
4. What internal factors (i.e., your personality, traits, emotional reactions)
influenced your response to that experience?
My tendency to try and "make" something work out, rather than let it happen. Desire
to resolve. Also anxiety.
5. What external factors (i.e., setting, other people, time of the event, and so on)
influenced your response to that experience?
Setting was really noisy (classroom noise coming through the door from a somewhat
out-of-control classroom on last day of school), presence of behavior specialist who
had more info than I about the other school site being recommended. That is what
made the circumstance work out well. SHe had concrete info about what
opportunities that site had that might work better for this student despite the issues
about change.
6. What conclusions have you reached based on your subsequent thinking about
this experience?
That particularly when asked to encourage a decision with which I am personally not
comfortable, that I do a bit more research about the alternative to see if it might have
some clear benefits of which I am unaware. That if someone feels strongly about a
change that I do not necessarily agree with, they will have to attend the meeting,
even if it is last day of school.
7. If faced with a similar experience in the future, how do you think you would
you react differently?
I'd hope to be better prepared either through my own research or by asking someone
else who has more personal/specific knowledge to take the lead in the certain area.
I'd ask the folks making the recommendation to specify what they think would work
better for the student elsewhere so that I could have the responsible folks provide
more reasoning and preparation.
105
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY SCORE: 4
Section 1
1. Your age
56
2. Your gender
Female
3. Your race or ethnicity
White, nonHispanic
4. Number of years of employment as a school psychologist
33
5. Year you obtained your PPS School Psychologist credential?
1975
6. Your highest degree
Masters
7. Is English your primary language?
Yes
Section 2
1. Please think of an experience that occurred in your professional setting that
meets the following criteria:
* you were left feeling confused, upset, or wondering
* your own behavior or reactions directly affected the experience
* it occurred within the past 90 days
If there has been more than one such experience during this period, please choose the
one that had the greatest impact on you.
106
Please describe the experience in detail, including (a) what you were doing, (b)
who else was involved, (c) and what about this experience left you confused,
upset, or wondering.
I recently evaluated a student who attends a private independent high school. The
student is a rising senior and the initial referral question pertained to whether or not
the student had an attentional problem which would explain her seeming under
performance in contrast to her obvious intellectual talents. Necessitating the
evaluation now, rather than in September, was the need for the family to consider
continuation at the student's current school or transfer to her school of residence.
After an extensive evaluation, I was left with still questions regarding the reasons for
this student's seeming under-achievement in grade performance, although she
possessed strong academic skills and competitive scores on College Board testing.
My own experiences with college bound students, my own as well as those of other
high school students, as well as my experience with adolescent females (my own),
and my experience in consultant work for college bound students with disabilities
provided a context for my assessment of my results and my discussion with family
and student. There is still much that is not known despite a very comprehensive
evaluation in which the sum of parts does not equal anything close to a clear picture
of this student. It was also apparent in this process that my other experiences, and
longitudinal experience with high school students played a part in my view of the
results. The student does appear possibly have mild attentional difficulty, a definite
penchant for structure and specific presentation of information, formidable intellect,
but little intellectual curiosity beyond what is specific to her experience. Although
non-compliant in certain behaviors, she is reminiscent of behaviors of two of my
children as adolescent females. I was also acutely sensitive to the stressors that I
know that she will go through in fall of her senior year in the college application
process, and concerned that she have support wherever she attend school, probably at
her current school. I felt somewhat angered, at least chagrined that a tony prep
school would not have counseled this student earlier than spring of her junior year to
consider help or possible transfer since her GPA presently does not serve her well in
the college admissions process. Finally, I had to confront my biases regarding the
private school experience and the cache that they promise to students, and yet had in
this case let this student down and my own feelings that had she been at my school I
would have sought not to have promised much at a high price without providing
guidance. So in assessing a student, I worked through some of my own working
class, upwardly mobile feelings, and my own experiences as parent and long time
psychologist.
2. How long ago (in days) did this experience occur?
3 days ago
107
3. Please describe your immediate reactions (i.e., thoughts, and feelings) to the
experience.
Chagrin, frustration that there were no easy answers, anger that the school and the
family had waited so long, frustration with myself that I could not provide a clear
understanding of the problem and clear cut resolution, finally hope that with some
guidance and counseling support and TIME this girl will use her talents and parents
will come to accept her abilities as she uses them
4. What internal factors (i.e., your personality, traits, emotional reactions)
influenced your response to that experience?
Please see above- #1 and 3 my tendency to see the wide ranging implications of traits
and behaviors and to not be so concerned about eligibility as the portrayal of an
individual, my hope and my expectation that I can usually find an answer and be able
to describe a situation
5. What external factors (i.e., setting, other people, time of the event, and so on)
influenced your response to that experience?
long time work at the high school, experience for five years as a College Board
consultant, work with college bound students for the past seven years, my own
children's experiences as high school and postsecondary learners and persons
6. What conclusions have you reached based on your subsequent thinking about
this experience?
there are no clear answers. The family will have to make a decision upon what will
be best in terms of graduation and college application for this student, even if it
means continuing at a school at which the student is struggling
7. If faced with a similar experience in the future, how do you think you would
you react differently?
No
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This study examined two questions concerning the quality of critical reflections of school psychologists. The first question concerned whether novice (N = 9) and expert (N = 19) school psychologists differed in the quality of their critical reflections on practice. Participants were asked to describe an incident from their practice that left them feeling confused, upset, or wondering, then, through several prompts were guided through a reflective process. Quality was assessed using the four-level Hatton and Smith (1995) measure as a proxy for cognitive complexity. The between-group difference (M = 1.44 for novices vs. 1.84 for experts) was not statistically significant, probably as a function of the small number of novices in the sample. The obtained effect size (Cohen's d = .48), however, was what Cohen (1992) would characterize as medium size. The second purpose of the study was to examine whether particular cognitive variables (need for cognition, measured by the Need for Cognition Scales (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Cohen, Micah Raphael
(author)
Core Title
Critical reflection among school psychologists: an examination of content, cognitive style, and cognitive complexity
School
Rossier School of Education
Degree
Doctor of Education
Degree Program
Education
Publication Date
04/19/2010
Defense Date
02/24/2010
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
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(digital)
Tag
cognitive style,cogntive complexity,expertise,OAI-PMH Harvest,reflective practice
Place Name
USA
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Language
English
Contributor
Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Goodyear, Rodney K. (
committee chair
), Brady, John T. (
committee member
), Hocevar, Dennis J. (
committee member
)
Creator Email
micahcoh@usc.edu,micahrcohen@yahoo.com
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Cohen, Micah Raphael
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Tags
cognitive style
cogntive complexity
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reflective practice