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Getting a new blanket: China’s conceptualization of “security” in the post-Deng Xiaoping era

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Getting a new blanket: China’s conceptualization of “security” in the post-Deng Xiaoping era

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Content GETTING A NEW BLANKET: CHINA’S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF “SECURITY” IN THE POST-DENG XIAOPING ERA by Ian Cameron Forsyth __________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) August 2010 Copyright 2010 Ian Cameron Forsyth ii DEDICATION This work is dedicated to the memory of Robert Thomas Forsyth (1941-1999) and Michael Robert Forsyth (1965-2009). You both left me far too early. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication ii List of Tables v List of Figures vi Abstract vii Introduction 1 Summary 1 Foundation and Structure 5 Methodology 10 Timeframe Rationale 12 Findings and Arguments of the Dissertation 13 Chapter One: The Contributions and Observations of Scholars 19 Evolution of the Theory & Literature of “Security” 19 The Sources of the Original Definition of “Security” 21 Critiques of Realism and the Traditional Definition of “Security” 26 COPRI’s Comprehensive Security 40 Assessments 48 CCP Securitization & Desecuritization Trends: The PRC Under Mao 50 and Deng Securitization Trends Conclusions 66 PRC Scholars and PRC National Security Policy 68 The Role of Scholars in PRC National Security Policymaking 69 Scholars’ Assessments of “Comprehensive Security” in China 74 A Buzan by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet: The Impact of 85 the Content of Comprehensive Security Scholars’ Identification and Analysis of China’s Primary Post-Deng 101 Military Sector Concerns Military Sector Threats 102 Scholars’ Views of the Chinese Political Sector 130 Scholars’ Views of the Chinese Socio-Cultural Sector 134 Scholars’ Views of Sustainable Development 144 Buzan’s Sectors and Beyond 153 Chapter Two: Speech-Acts 160 Military Sector Speech-Acts 160 Political Sector Speech-Acts 174 Socio-Cultural Speech-Acts 179 iv Economic Sector Speech-Acts 188 Environmental Sector Speech-Acts 189 Chapter Three: Policies 191 Military Sector Policies 191 Political Sector Policies 198 Socio-Cultural Sector Policies 211 Economic Sector Policies in the 1990s and Beyond 229 Economic Sector Subsets: Food Security 241 Economic Sector Subsets: Energy Security 242 Environmental Sector Policies 248 Chapter Four: Conclusions 259 Military Sector Conclusions 259 Political Sector Conclusions 265 Socio-Cultural Sector Conclusions 270 Sustainable Development (Economic plus Environmental 273 Sectors) Conclusions Overall Conclusions 283 Bibliography 287 Appendix A: Chinese Journals and Periodicals Utilized 324 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Sector Analysis questions 9 Table 2: Sector Analysis Questions and Answers 285 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Corruption Indexes, Selected Countries, 2001-2005 142 Figure 2: Incidents of “Mass Disturbances” in China 144 Figure 3: Shares of State & Non-public Sectors (%) 231 vii ABSTRACT In my dissertation, "Getting a New Blanket: China’s Conceptualization of Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era," I examine the debate of what form the PRC’s rise will take in the future. In grappling with this issue, I look at how this rising power is defining its national security threats. Consequently, I approached this dissertation with the goal of examining of how the PRC leadership is defining – and even not defining – its national security threats. While traditional, realist/materialist approaches to China’s definition of threats to national security have merit, so too do non-traditional, constructivist approaches. As such, I seek to examine the influence that national security ideas and theories have had in influencing contemporary PRC national security policies. Given the value and potential impact of such a theory on a state’s national security policies, I chose to examine whether the PRC scholarly community is cognizant of the content of these theories, how widespread and influential they are among academicians and policy analysts, and whether there is an observable influence of these theories on PRC national security policies. The findings reveal that although the PRC’s scholars are cognizant of the issues in COPRI’s Comprehensive Security, the PRC leaders’ national security policies are still predominantly attributed to traditional security theory, definitions, and dynamics. The findings also reveal that while the PRC is exhibiting constructivist tendencies by securitizing non-traditional security issues, the rationales behind these securitizations are borne of realist purposes. Overall, this project contributes to debates on the nature of the introduction of new theories of foreign policy into a country’s academic and policy-making viii communities, as well how the PRC has been developing and implementing its policies of national security since the early 1990s. It demonstrates through observation, assessment, and analysis that Realism and Realist assumptions still dominate the PRC security- policy-making process. Yet it also demonstrates that non-Realist assumptions and policies are growing and that the PRC is securitizing certain non-traditional security issues, which supports the intellectual value of COPRI’s comprehensive security, and other non-Realist images. This project also points to further research that can be done on the issue of whether the PRC is undergoing a peaceful revolution in its democratization process, whether reforming its currency is a securitized issue, and how and under what circumstances issues are de-securitized. 1 INTRODUCTION Summary The 60-year evolution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from a war-torn country to a major power with the world’s third largest GDP is striking. This rise has resulted in a large portion of its population being lifted out of poverty and in the creation of a more modern infrastructure, but it is also leading to domestic strife such as social unrest based on vast wealth disparity, environmental degradation, health concerns, and corruption. In the foreign affairs arena, we see a PRC that is making its neighbors nervous due to its modernizing military and more assertive territorial claims. A major debate within the intelligence, policy-making, and scholarly communities of the U.S. has arisen as to what form the PRC’s rise should take in the future. In grappling with this issue, one must examine how this rising power is defining the PRC’s national security threats. Consequently, I approached this dissertation with the goal of examining of how the PRC leadership is defining – and not defining – its national security threats. While traditional, realist/materialist approaches to China’s definition of threats to national security have merit, so too do non-traditional, constructivist approaches, such as the work of Alexander Wendt. 1 Wendt advocates the idea that many assumptions of traditional national security theories are socially constructed and therefore capable of being transformed through new ideas and concepts, which means that states’ national security policies are equally capable of such transformation. As a result, I seek to 1 See generally, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46.2 (Spring 1992): 391-426. 2 examine the influence that national security ideas and theories have had in influencing contemporary PRC national security policies. The end of the Cold War coincided with the end of the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, and the entrée of a new generation of PRC leadership. These factors make the early 1990s a logical point to begin an examination of how PRC leadership was defining and implementing its national security. As such, I chose to start with the sources of definition. As it was opening up to trade, investment, and overall greater engagement with the world, the PRC was also opening up to ideas. This pool of ideas includes scholarly works on theories of international relations, state behavior, and the notion of “national security.” Traditionally, “national security” was a narrow concept, in that it generally meant protecting the territory of the country against military threats. It was based on the assumptions of the theory of Realism (along with its offshoot, Neorealism). These assumptions include (but are not limited to): human nature is competitive, fearful, and power-hungry; an anarchical international system with no overarching executive authority to guide state behavior and enforce that guidance by punishing any violators; states, primarily big powers, are the main entities to examine because their acts set the tone of, and drive, international relations; states should and do act out of self-interest, which means obtaining power; and power and success are zero-sum, which usually precludes cooperation with other states. Yet alternative theories have emerged in both the scholarly and policy worlds. Notable alternatives include Liberalism, the English School, and Constructivism, all of 3 which I elaborate upon in the next chapter. One of the most useful of these alternatives is the theory of Comprehensive Security as conceived by Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). 2 Comprehensive Security expands the scope of the traditional definition of national security beyond military threats to a country’s territory. It lays out five sectors of national security to examine for the purpose of capturing various security dynamics. These sectors are military, political, socio-cultural, economic, and environmental. Another key facet of comprehensive security is the process of securitization. COPRI asserts that securitization occurs through “speech-acts.” 3 A speech-act is when a recognized authority openly designates something as an existential threat to national security. The state may then legitimately employ extraordinary means against this socially constructed threat. An issue of concern but not a true existential threat— and therefore cannot mobilize all national means to deal with it— is considered to be merely “politicized.” Regardless, securitization and even politicization of an issue depends on an audience accepting the securitizing speech- act. 4 COPRI’s Comprehensive Security theory stands out as a theory by virtue of its inclusiveness of a broader set of security sectors and threat referents allows it to better describe and explain national security theorizing and policy-making than do any other theories. 2 See generally, Barry Buzan, Peoples States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Col War Era (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 3 See generally, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998). 4 Ibid. 4 Given the value and potential impact of such a theory on a state’s national security policies, I chose to examine whether the PRC scholarly community is cognizant of the content of these theories, how widespread and influential they are among academicians and policy analysts, and whether these theories have an observable influence on PRC national security policies. More specifically, is there any possible connection between speech-acts and actual national security policies? I researched this question by interviewing 43 PRC security scholars on the state of international relations theory and practice in the PRC, with a focus on COPRI’s Comprehensive Security. I also examined scholarly writings on this question. I then examined PRC official security statements (i.e., speech-acts), and most importantly, actual national security policies to identify a connection among ideas, scholars, and policies. The findings reveal that although the PRC scholars are cognizant of the issues in COPRI’s Comprehensive Security, the PRC leaders’ national security policies are still predominantly attributed to traditional security theory, definitions, and dynamics. In other words, the PRC is securitizing non-traditional sectors of security, which points to a non-Realist worldview, but the reasons behind this securitization are Realist at their foundation. In the remainder of this introduction, I will briefly lay out the structure of each chapter, with an emphasis on how I am framing the analysis. I will then describe my methodology for conducting this research and then offer a brief explanation of the time 5 period that I chose for the data. I will conclude with a description of the findings and conclusions of my research. Foundation and Structure I have structured this dissertation into four chapters, not including this introduction. The first chapter is a description of the debates and contending theories on the concept of national security, with an emphasis on the development of Comprehensive Security as formulated by Buzan and COPRI. A look at securitization and desecuritization trends during the period of CCP leadership under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping follows. The chapter then moves into an account of how Chinese security scholars are writing about comprehensive security theories and how, in their assessments, these theories have come to the PRC and have – or have not – influenced PRC national security policy-makers. The second and third chapters examine the 1990s and early 21 st century, which is the era of Deng Xiaoping’s successors: Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The second chapter examines PRC policy-makers’ speech-acts, under the COPRI definition. The third chapter examines actual PRC national security policies as an assessment of whether the PRC is incorporating these comprehensive security elements into those policies, or those policies are more attributable to something else. For example, the current PRC leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is implementing social reforms known as “Harmonious Society,” which is evidence of PRC leadership identifying an existential threat to the PRC’s socio-cultural sector and enacting policies to mitigate that threat. These policies point to examples of non-traditional security ideas permeating the PRC’s security policy-making elite. However, the research will show that 6 the influencing factor on these policies is not insight from new scholarship or ideas, but rather a security policy-making leadership reacting to the tangible evidence of social strife and the resulting economic and political costs. The fourth and final chapter will be the conclusion. As stated before, COPRI goes beyond military threats to a country’s territorial integrity as the primary threat to protect against. 5 Moreover, Buzan and Little’s work looks for sources of explanation by examining interaction capacity, process, and structure. 6 Buzan and Little define interaction capacity as the level of transportation, communication, and organization capability in the unit/system that determines what types and levels of interaction are possible. 7 “Process” means the interactions that take place among units 8 ; “structure” refers to the principles by which units in a system are arranged. 9 Buzan and Little define a “unit” as: entities composed of various sub groups, organization, communities, and many individuals, sufficiently cohesive to have actor quality (i.e., to be capable of conscious decision-making), and sufficiently independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g., states, nations, transnational firms). 10 5 See generally, Barry Buzan, Peoples States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Col War Era (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 6 See generally, Barry Buzan, and Richard Little International Systems in World History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 7 Ibid. 441. 8 Ibid. 442. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 7 They define “structure” as “the principles by which units in a system are arranged. 11 Throughout the chapters I tried to bear in mind the “why” question as it relates to accounting for the evolution of the PRC’s concept of “security.” As I examined the practice of PRC security, I addressed seven questions, applying them in each of the different sectoral lines in the framework of analysis for national security conception and policy as theorized by Buzan and Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde of COPRI. 12 I chose to consolidate the economic and environmental sectors in my analysis because in the PRC economic growth and the physical environment have become intertwined. The PRC has embarked on a breakneck policy of economic growth since the early 1980s, but perhaps the most direct effect of this growth has been on China’s – and it’s neighbors – physical environment. By consolidating the economic and environmental sectors into a sustainable development sector, I hope to better illustrate this interdependent relationship. The specific questions were as follows: One, who or which entity is to be secured (i.e., the security referent)? Two, what core values and/or elements linked with the referent must be protected and/or enhanced to ensure its security? Three, what is the nature of the threats against which these core values must be protected? Four, what is the nature of the security problem in each case? Is the security problem zero-sum and distributional (i.e., relative gains wherein many parties may gain at an absolute level but one may gain more than another) in nature, or something else? Five, how was security defined? Six, what 11 Ibid. 12 See generally, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998). 8 was the source of the definition of security? Seven, what was the source of any change and if there was change why did it occur? Specifically, were the changes external?; were they caused by the international system or from more regional or even domestic, immediate concerns? Were these sources events, or perhaps even ideas, (which some argue was a major source of reform of the Soviet system). 13 Or did the changes originate in domestic sources? Perhaps it was the leaders involved – the personalities of Mao, Deng, Jiang Zemin, or Hu Jintao (i.e., “great man” view of history). 14 I have also tried to parse out issues that are part of the PRC security policy-maker’s security definition and those that may be in their national interests, but have not attained the status of national security. 13 Robert D. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth,” International Security 26.4 (Spring 2002): 70-92. 14 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In,” International Security 25.4 (Spring 2001): 107-146. 9 Table 1. Sector Analysis Questions Which entity is to be secured? What core values/element s linked w/ the referent must be protected /enhanced to ensure its security? Military Political Socio-Cultural Sustainable Development What is the nature of the threats against which these core values must be protected? What is the security problem in each case? How was security defined? What was the source of the security definition? What was the source of any change & why did it change? 10 Methodology The key purpose of my research is to shed light on how PRC security policy- makers are defining the notion of “national security” as seen in their speech-acts and, more importantly, their policies, and to track and assess the impact of new definitions of “security” in the scholarly world. Given that this process starts in the arena of scholarship and ideas, I first sought to obtain insight from Chinese scholars who are, in a sense, on the intellectual front lines of this debate and process. This effort took two forms: I first conducted hard-copy research of their writings on the issue of “national security” in the PRC context. I researched both Chinese-language and English press and the major PRC policy and international relations journals (an appendix of the major journals I consulted appears in Appendix A). I chose these journals based on their quality and their prestige. I focused primarily on PRC journals and periodicals to see what the core players, namely the PRC policy-researching elite, are writing and reading. However, given that certain ideological parameters restrict some of these writings, I looked at non-PRC journals and periodicals as well. To conduct this research, I took advantage of my employment with the U.S. government, examining the open press reporting and non-classified cables on these issues that come in through government channels. Much of this research was conducted at the University Services Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which is an excellent repository of Chinese journals. However, I knew I needed to supplement this information, so I also conducted interviews with 43 scholars and government officials. These inquiries provided updated insights into the nature and status of “security.” I also knew that many PRC scholars 11 would be willing to provide more frank and open insight in a private interview than in a vetted article. I also wanted the opportunity to ask follow-up questions and to create a fluid dialogue on the issue of security in the PRC. I interviewed individuals from Peking University, Tsinghua University in Beijing, People’s University in Beijing, the National Defense University in Beijing, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing (CICR), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Beijing office, Fudan University in Shanghai, the Shanghai Institute of American Studies, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Tongji University in Shanghai, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai Jiaotong University, East China Normal University in Shanghai, and the Shanghai International Studies University. I chose individuals from these institutions because the majority of the PRC’s top international security scholarship is produced in these institutions, and these individuals command a large amount of prestige. I wanted scholars from various cities and institutions within the PRC itself in order to hedge against any institutional biases that may result from being in a certain community (e.g., Beijing, a specific university, a specific think-tank, etc.). I also wanted the views of certain Chinese scholars who are based outside the PRC to ensure a wider swathe of intellectual observations and experiences. Consequently, I interviewed individuals at the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, and Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. I consulted these scholars in order to balance any bias that might be inherent in PRC scholars still working in the PRC. I finally scrutinized the actual PRC national security policies as well to determine how 12 much weight the notion of comprehensive security has had in forming of policy, and/or whether the substance of the theory is affecting national security policy. By conferring with a diverse group of individuals tracking security scholarship and policy in the PRC, I was able to get a clear sense of how PRC elites are defining security and implementing it at the policy level. Timeframe Rationale The rationales for commencing the study in the early 1990s are numerous, but they all center on that period being the transition of power from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. It is also roughly the end of the Cold War, which had a massive impact on international relations and foreign policies of many countries. Robert Suettinger observed that, “The Fourteenth Party Congress, held in October 1992, was both Deng’s last victory and Jiang’s coming-of-age on the leadership scene.” He continues: The important changes that took place within the party in 1992 were soon reflected in the government structure as well, with Li Peng stepping back, and Jiang [Zemin] and Zhu [Rongji] stepping forward. In March 1993, China’s National People’s Congress met to take up issues pertinent to China’s rapidly reforming economic, legal, and political structure…Jiang Zemin replaced eighty- five-year-old Yang Shangkun as China’s president…completing Jiang’s assumption of all the major positions in China: Communist Party general secretary, chairman of the Military Commission, and head of state. 15 Robert Scalapino characterized the 1990s as “Jiangism”: Just as “Maoism” has conventionally been applied to the 1946-76 period, so might “Jiangism” be coined to characterize Chinese politics from the mid-1990s 15 Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 148. 13 to the present, acknowledging that Jiang has in fact had greater impact on this time than anyone else. 16 That impact can be seen in Jiang’s political reform policies (e.g., allowing a broader swathe of individuals into the Chinese Communist Party) and economic reform policies (e.g., reform of State-Owned Enterprises). Joseph Fewsmith contends that the major divide in generations of PRC leadership is, “between the Deng Xiaoping generation – the revolutionary generation – and the Jiang Zemin (post-revolutionary generation) generation.” 17 This assumption makes 1992 a logical point at which to commence the research and analysis for this dissertation. The research will conclude with the 17 th Chinese Communist Party Congress of October 2007. Findings and Arguments of the Dissertation My research has yielded several findings. The findings entail insights about both Comprehensive Security and PRC national security policy-making. PRC as Realist The first and primary finding is that the research does not point to a direct cause- and-effect relationship between scholars of this theory and PRC national security policy- makers and their policies. Part of the evidence for this conclusion is found in the disparate nature of the evolution of the concept of “comprehensive security” in the PRC. Some Chinese scholars trace the source of PRC security policies in this era to the 16 Yun-han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo, and Ramon H. Myers, eds. The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16 th Party Congress (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 10. 17 Joseph Fewsmith, “Generational Transition in China,” The Washington Quarterly 24.4 (Autumn 2002): 23. 14 changing nature of the PRC’s role in global affairs as a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, along with the PRC’s being internationally ostracized in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre. 18 Others point to the growing domestic focus by PRC policy-makers on the PRC’s security conceptualization as a result of changing economic and societal realities in the PRC. 19 Many Chinese scholars link PRC security policies to the development of the concept of “comprehensive national strength.” Still other scholars see comprehensive security as a scholarly concept in a foreign policy setting only, for example, coping with transnational problems such as financial meltdowns, securing foreign energy supplies, and so forth. They claim that comprehensive security was a direct result of security policies and scholars in Japan in the early 1980s, and do not give much credit to Buzan and COPRI. 20 This research indicates that there is no perfect consensus on how the concept of comprehensive security flowed into the PRC, how it flowed once it was manifest within the PRC scholarly community, or what its true genesis was. This lack of consensus makes it exceedingly difficult to draw a pattern of influence, but does not diminish the intellectual value of this theory. 21 18 See generally, Yan Xuetong, “Security Interests are China’s Primary Interests,” trans. OSC, Huanqiu Shibao (30 May 2006): 1-5; and Zhang Yiping, “Scholar Advocates Comprehensive View of Security,” trans. OSC 97C17028, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] (20 February 1997). 19 See generally, Chu Shulong, “The Concept, Structure, and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Beijing Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] (20 May 2007). 20 See generally, A. Ying, “Safe Cooperation and Safety of Cooperation,” Renmin Ribao (16 July 1997): 6. 21 Zhang Yongjin, "The 'English School' in China: A Story of How Ideas Travel and are Transplanted," European Journal of International Relations 9.1 (2003): 87-114. 15 However, the evidence also shows the undeniable rise of non-traditional security concerns and policies in the PRC security policy-making community. The research yields the basic conclusion that in the contemporary PRC, the military sector is still the most important security threat for PRC leadership, but the other four security sectors are growing in importance. Moreover, despite the lack of a direct link between scholars’ ideas and PRC national security policy-makers, the findings show that the PRC policy- making elite has “securitized” (in the COPRI sense) the military, economic, and socio- cultural sectors and that they have “securitized” the political sector in some partial respects— but the environmental sector and some elements of the political sector are still only “politicized.” 22 This finding follows a trend, whereby during the rule of Mao, the CCP leadership had securitized the political and military sectors, but under Deng Xiaoping, those sectors were desecuritized to mere politicization and the economic sector became securitized. Furthermore, and most striking, is that a major element of the military sector – Taiwan – has been securitized less in the military sector, but more in the socio-cultural sector: Taiwanese de jure independence has indeed been securitized, but the existential threat it poses to PRC leadership affects not only the PRC’s perceived territorial integrity, but also—even more so— its socio-cultural identity and socio- cultural purpose. In other words, Taiwan’s independent, legal existence challenges PRC leadership’s definition of what China is on an existential level. A legally independent 22 As will be explained in greater depth in the following chapter, securitization is a process in which an issue is framed as a security problem via a securitizing actor using a speech-act to designate an issue as an existential threat to security and declares that it must be protected against because of its identified urgency and demanding extreme measures to protect against. Politicization is where a threat is identified but with less severity and urgency than a threat that is securitized. 16 Taiwan can never be a military threat to the PRC, but its legal independence undermines how PRC leadership designates what “China” is. Furthermore, the research yields differing conclusions regarding the political sector: When the political sector is defined by reform and improved CCP ruling efficiency, there is only politicization, yet when it is defined as unchallenged rule of the CCP, it indeed has been securitized. We see evidence supporting this along several lines. The first is the nature of the speech-acts. 23 A greater number of speech-acts surround the military, economic, and societal sectors than the others sectors; we see entire White Papers devoted to military security in the Jiang Zemin era and beyond. Second, the phraseology in these speech-acts is laced with greater urgency and more synonyms of “national security”; in the PRC’s case the most commonly used synonym is “stability.” Next, these concerns received the greatest amount of policy attention, both in terms of laws and regulations, and funding. Yet despite the securitization of non-military sectors, which is evidence of non-Realist thinking, the rationales for this securitization has roots in Realist worldviews. Therefore the evidence points to a heavy preponderance of Realism still dominating PRC leadership outlook. The next finding on PRC security policy-making is that, as sources of policy ideas and the policy-making process, scholars in the PRC still have only limited influence, though it is growing somewhat. Although a few notable individuals have excellent access to leadership, for the most part scholars are not yet quite as heavily involved in the 23 As will be explained in greater depth in the following chapter, a speech-act is when the security concern is actually identified and/or articulated as an existential threat from a securitizing actor to a mass audience. 17 policy formulation process as are their counterparts in the United States (U.S.). In the PRC context, I am defining security scholars to be individuals at the most prestigious and well-connected PRC universities and think-tanks who teach and/or publish on the issue of national security issues. Within the realm of ideas, certainly scholars have (and are doing so more and more) provided venues for articulating ideas and theories (such as Comprehensive Security), and have published writings from certain think tanks that have a policy-making audience. Yet they still do not yet quite wield the influence U.S. experts have vis-à-vis the U.S. government. 24 As such, the scholars’ limited power has hindered the chain of influence of scholarly ideas to national security policies in the PRC as a result. The PRC’s unique set of circumstances as a state that is both developing and powerful means that it is coping with interests often at odds with each other. The PRC leadership feels the imperative to modernize and improve the standard of living and quality of life. To this end, it has embarked on reforms to opening up its economy to greater foreign trade and investment. This increased national wealth can be put into military modernization as well, thereby improving the effectiveness of armed forces. However, there are costs. Openness means a certain loss of economic sovereignty. It contributes to increased wealth, but also leads to wealth polarization. A fast economic engine needs energy— literally and figuratively. This growth can create dependence on foreign sources and a military need to protect sea-lines of communication. Yet a more modern and robust military can heighten neighbors’ fears of an aggressive PRC military 24 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: 18 policy. Moreover, a growing, but unregulated national economy with an intense thirst for energy has resulted in massive environmental damages, along with the deteriorating health of the populace. This outcome, along with other factors, has led to internal unrest and even potential chaos. These problems force the national leadership to improve the efficiency of the government, which may entail government reform. However, undertaking the political and economic reforms necessary to cope with some of these ills could jeopardize the economic growth that modernized the PRC in the first place. The bottom line is that the PRC leadership must go through an intense balancing and weighing of factors as it chooses to securitize some threats and try to solve them at the expense of others. Yet none of these factors diminishes the value or importance of Comprehensive Security. This dissertation research finds an elegance of COPRI’s Comprehensive Security theory in how its inclusiveness of a broader set of security sectors and threat referents allows it to better describe and explain national security theorizing and policy-making in the PRC than does any other theory of national security. Furthermore, even if there is indeed limited impact of Constructivist ideas such as COPRI’s Comprehensive Security on PRC national security policy-making, the theory at the very least allows scholar and policy-maker alike to more insightfully and comprehensively identify problems and dynamics. The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise,” The China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291-310. 19 CHAPTER ONE THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS OF SCHOLARS Evolution of the Theory and Literature of “Security” “Security” has always been, and continues to be, one of the top priorities of the governing authorities of nation-states. Governing authorities have sacrificed vast amounts of blood and treasure to protect and maintain it. But what is “it,” exactly? In this chapter I will first attempt to trace the evolution of the definition and purpose of “security.” I start with a description of the traditional and common definition in the modern era. I will lay out some of the initial and fundamental critiques of that definition. I will then navigate some of the initial challenges that both academia and international organizations have presented to the traditional definition over the last 60 years. I will also show the defenses that advocates of the traditional definition of “security” mounted in response to these challenges. I will conclude with Buzan’s and COPRI’s theory of comprehensive security, 25 which is what I believe to be the most coherent and thought-out alternative definition to “security,” with a call to employ this framework in analyzing the rising, yet still developing country that is the PRC. The next portion of the chapter will be an analysis of the securitization and desecuritization trends of the PRC during the periods of rule under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The brief conclusion is that under Mao’s rule both the military and the 25 See generally, Barry Buzan, Peoples States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 20 political sectors were securitized as the CCP leadership saw the PRC as a revolutionary state. No other sectors were securitized at this point. Yet under the leadership of Deng, the military and political sectors were desecuritized and the economic sector was securitized to reflect Deng’s prioritization of the PRC’s needs in the late 1970s and 1980s. I believe this review is necessary for providing context for the post-Deng era. This analysis will be followed by an assessment of the general impact PRC scholarship has on PRC policy-making. This portion reviews research, both Chinese and American, on the role of scholars in the PRC and the PRC policy-making process. The general conclusion is that what influence Chinese scholars do have on security policy-making is still limited and what influence they do enjoy is a recent phenomenon. This writer will also show how Chinese scholars account for the development of the comprehensive security concept in the PRC, which turns out to be disparate and indirect. The next portion shows what Chinese scholars are writing and saying about non-traditional security threats to the PRC and presents how Chinese scholars are currently defining non- traditional security threats to the PRC. In other words, the content of COPRI’s comprehensive security is present. The argument is that the limited influence of scholars on security policy-making, combined with the non-linear and even conflicting definitions and attributions of “comprehensive security” and a general acknowledgment by Chinese scholars that traditional security still currently holds sway in PRC policy-makers’ minds, points to a lack of direct, major influence by Buzan and COPRI on the PRC’s post-Deng security policies. However, this research also reveals that even though there may be only limited 21 direct, specific impact by COPRI’s Comprehensive Security in the PRC, this idea’s content is still apparent—as seen in the form of non-traditional definitions of “security.” The Sources of the Original Definition of “Security” Traditionally, “security” has been couched and defined in a geo-political, "Realist" framework. 26 This approach is seen in the work of such philosophers and thinkers as Thucydides, 27 Niccolo Machiavelli, 28 and Thomas Hobbes. 29 Notable 20 th - century Realists who draw on this classical tradition are E.H. Carr 30 and Hans Morgenthau. 31 Twentieth-century practitioners of this doctrine include George Kennan 32 and Henry Kissinger. 33 Realism is best described as an “image” referring to a general perspective of international relations and world politics that consists of certain assumptions about actors 26 A good account of the pre-modern development of the concept of “security” can be found in S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006). 27 See generally, Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, England, and New York: Penguin Books, 1982). 28 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London, UK: Penguin Press, 2004). 29 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York and London: Collier Macmillan, 1974): Book 1, Chapters 13, 15. 30 See generally, E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939, revised edition, 1946). 31 See generally, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6 th ed. (New York, NY: Alfred Knopf, 1985). 32 See generally, Richard Russell, George F. Kennan’s Strategic Thought: The Making of an American Political Realist (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999). 33 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992): 53, 87, 107, 334, 723. 22 and processes. 34 Classical realists subscribe to an image that defines national security in terms of national interests— as opposed to ethics, ideals, or social constructions. This notion of national security, and the classical realist image that underpins it, rests on certain key assumptions. First and foremost is that the nature of humanity and its institutions are driven by fear, greed, and competition. This disposition is the primary driver of why states act the way they do. A second assumption is of an international system that is anarchic in that no supranational executive authority exists to regulate state-to-state relations, which means states must establish and maintain relations on their own. Human nature very often hinders international cooperation as a result. However, order can be achieved in this anarchical reality: States can band together and consolidate their capabilities and/or power whenever one state or group of states appears to be gathering a disproportionate amount of power, thus threatening to dominate the region or even the world. This dynamic is known as a balance of power. It is an equilibrium among states that Realists such as Thucydides and Kissinger believe is achieved via statesmen. 35 The third assumption is that sovereign states, notably the big powers, are the only entity to focus on. Realists are not as concerned with non-state actors. Moreover, these states are unitary actors focusing primarily on their own national interest and a definition of national security is essentially survival and territorial integrity. “Unitary actors” mean that states are whole and undivided, and ultimately speak with one voice. 34 Paul Viotti and Mark Kaupi, International Relations Theory, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Longman Press, 2010): 461. 35 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age (New York, NY: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964): 317-8. 23 Furthermore, pursuing policies based on morality or ethical concerns can lead to instability and even conflict. 36 States’ relations, in the view of classical realists, are determined by comparative levels of military, and to a lesser extent, economic power. Realism in this classical sense is not the only image for describing international relations. In recent decades the theory has spawned an outgrowth that incorporates structural elements in its analysis. This approach, known as Neorealism, departs from classical realism in that it focuses less on human nature and more on the structure of the international system itself and the constraints that this system imposes on states in a positivistic manner. 37 Neorealists explain both states’ foreign policies and world politics as being under conditions of global anarchy. They focus on the structure of the global system and the impact it has on a state’s behavior. Like its classical cousin, Neorealism is concerned with national security based on power and inter-state conflict as a consequence. Neorealists also see balance of power as a tool to foster international order, but unlike Realists believe it is an inherent characteristic of international politics and occurs independent of the will of statesmen. 38 A variation of this notion is the balance of threat theory, which posits that states do not balance against power per se, but rather 36 E.H. Carr, Supra. 37 “Structure” refers to the arrangement of parts of a whole, such as the structure of the international system in terms of the distribution of capabilities or power among states. As such, the international system structure may be bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. Realists and Neorealists see an anarchical structure that lacks a central authority. 38 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959): 209. 24 threat. 39 Power is acceptable if it is possessed by an ally – it is only threats (i.e., power held by a non-ally or partner) that states need to balance against. Also like its classical cousin, Neorealism sees states as unitary actors and as the primary unit of analysis. Neorealism examines the material structure (i.e., distribution of capabilities or power across states) as the primary explanatory variable of state behavior. It also posits that the fear of attack forces states to focus on relative power and relative gains, as opposed to absolute gains. 40 Perhaps the premier Neorealist is Kenneth Waltz. Waltz describes how this concern over relative power – both in the present and in the future – makes inter-state cooperation very unlikely. 41 Waltz also theorizes how the critical aims of state survival are primarily a preoccupation with potential conflict, followed by counteracting those potentialities, and third, never letting its guard down. 42 Other prominent Neorealists include Stephan Walt 43 and John Mearsheimer. 44 Walt, who is known as a Defensive Realist, illustrated the Realist definition of security when he said, "the main focus of security…is the phenomenon of war…Accordingly security studies may be defined as the 39 See generally, Stephan Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 40 Neorealists assert that states are driven by relative gains so if both states gain but one more than the other (thus changing their overall positions relative to each other) then conflict is likely. This contrasts with the belief that the international system is comprised of states that are satisfied as long as all entities receive some positive pay-off (absolute gains), making peace or stability more likely. 41 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 105. 42 Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in R. Rotberg and T. Rabb, eds. The Order and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 43. 43 See generally, Stephan Walt, Supra. 44 See generally, John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2001). 25 study of the threat, use and control of military force." 45 In other words, national “security” in the Realist sense means protecting the country’s territorial integrity from hostile military forces. Waltz points out that many countries believe that they “do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves.” 46 An inherent risk of achieving security, according to the image, is that as they acquire power, states provoke fear in other states, who in turn acquire military strength. The resulting mutual increase in military strength is what is termed a “security dilemma,” wherein states weaken international security in their efforts to strengthen it. 47 Mearsheimer’s work is noted for his theory of Offensive Realism, which, in contrast to Walt’s Defensive Realism, posits that given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for future security needs, great powers will seek to achieve hegemony as soon as possible in order to achieve security. This response, which eliminates any possibility of a challenge by another great power, is known as power maximization. Mearsheimer also assumes that states fear each other, assuming as they do that the intentions of other states are not benevolent. The states may have goals other than survival, but survival will always take precedence. The state may engage in cooperation and initiatives to create world order, but such initiatives are always unsuccessful or short- 45 Walt, Supra. 46 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959): 201. 47 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978): 58–113. 26 lived, as desire for power, security, and survival creates tensions that lead to their failure. 48 Critiques of Realism and the Traditional Definition of “Security” Focusing exclusively on state-to-state military issues downplays economic, societal, political, and environmental issues, as they have comparatively less bearing on the national security of the state than do military issues. At the fundamental level Realist assumptions are challenged by a number of other images. One prominent image is Liberalism, which finds its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant, among others. 49 The Liberalism image rests on four major assumptions: The first is that non-state and other transnational actors, as well as states themselves, are important units to focus on in world politics. Specifically, multinational corporations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), human rights and environmental rights groups, international terrorist organizations, criminal cartels, and even individuals may have a major impact on world politics, and therefore all merit analysis. In other words, liberalism is a pluralist image. The second assumption is that the state is not consistently a unitary actor. Calculations of interest or utility happen within a state in multiple venues. Liberals open the “black box” of the state’s policy-making process to dissect it. Therefore, certain venues or intra-state institutions may be receptive to the influence of non-state actors such as INGOs. Different bureaucratic entities within the state will have differing 48 Mearsheimer, Supra. 49 See generally, Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York, NY: Bobbs- Merrill, 1957). 27 interests and this diversity must be accounted for. 50 This multitude of intra-state units helps mitigate the worst aspects of anarchy, as ideas and non-state institutions can affect these sub-state units. Along these lines, Liberals often look beyond a top-down path of analyzing global politics (i.e., viewing how anarchy and the distribution of power affect state behavior), and instead look at an “inside-out” approach, which examines how elements at the state-society and individual levels of analysis affect international relations. This approach can lead to such revelations as the Democratic Peace Theory, which holds that democracies rarely go to war with each other. 51 The third assumption is that economic and other forms of interdependence and interconnectivity (e.g., cultural affinity) among both state and non-state actors affect states’ policies. The final assumption is that the relation between the state and the society is crucial to understanding international relations. This assumption opens the door to a wider definition of threats to security (i.e., beyond military threats). A consequence of this assumption is that this image holds that international organizations and international law can protect states’ interests and national security, and that the global system does not work in a zero-sum arrangement. Notable Liberals include Woodrow Wilson, Bruce Russett, and Richard Little. 52 An offshoot of Liberalism is Neoliberalism. Like Neorealism, Neoliberalism is rational, positivistic, and utilitarian in its approach. States 50 See generally, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971). 51 See generally, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 52 See generally, Richard Little, “The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 6.3 (2000): 395-422. 28 are considered rational actors and interstate cooperation happens when states have significant overlapping interests. A notable characteristic of Neoliberalism is the belief that nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other nation-states. Neoliberalism acknowledges an anarchic international system and the preeminence of the state as the unit of analysis, but often utilizes formal modeling in theorizing how states can form transnational institutions and other forms of cooperative, mutually beneficial arrangements to obtain absolute gains. 53 Neoliberals have examined how such institutions provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and aid in reciprocity and multilateralism among states. Noted Neoliberals are Joseph Nye, 54 Robert Keohane, 55 and Joseph Grieco. 56 Perhaps the most interesting alternative to realism and its security definitions comes from an image of international relations known as the English School. This school concedes a state of international anarchy yet also identifies a society of states at the international level existing within the anarchical structure. In other words, the School emphasizes the societal elements of global politics as opposed to viewing international 53 See generally, Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, “The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 729-743. 54 See generally, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). 55 See generally, Robert Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986). 56 Grieco, Supra. 29 relations in only systemic, abstract terms. As stated before there is anarchy, along with power and laws, but they are rooted in enlightened self-interest and emergent global norms that all are part of this international society. Elements of realism (notably the acceptance of an anarchical global structure) and liberalism exist in the international society. Evidence for this society is found in the ideas that propel the prime institutions that drive international relations (e.g., war, great powers, diplomacy, balance of power, international law, etc.). The English School believes that international systems will always simultaneously manifest anarchic, transnational, and anarchic dynamics. These ideas have historical roots in the Roman Empire, medieval Christianity, and the work of Locke, Rousseau, and Grotius. Ultimately, English School thinkers assert that not only material capabilities but also ideas shape foreign policy and state behavior, and therefore merit analysis. Prominent English School theorists include Martin Wight 57 and Hedley Bull. 58 A more fundamental challenge to Realist assumptions comes from an interpretive understanding known as Constructivism. An interpretive understanding is: an approach to knowledge that assumes that what we know is based on an interpretation of what we think we see, alerting us to the subjective character of all human beings, the institutions or units they construct, and the processes in which they engage. 59 57 See generally, Martin Wight, Brian Porter and Gabriele Wight, eds. International Relations Theory: The Three Traditions (London, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991). 58 See generally, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977). 59 Viotti, Kauppi, International Relations Theory, Supra, at 463. 30 Constructivism asserts that the basic structures of global relations are social as opposed to strictly material. These social structures shape actors’ behavior, along with their interests and identities. Social construction can come from such sources as culture, gender, class, ethnicity, and religion, to name a few. Perhaps the most prominent constructivist is Alexander Wendt. Wendt postulates that social structures are composed of shared knowledge, collective meanings, and material practices and resources. 60 The drive for power and power-based national security can be transformed because it is an intersubjective, socially constructed reality. In other words, these core realist assumptions are socially constructed and reproduced by human interaction, shared knowledge, and social practice, which means that human ideas and resulting actions can drive state behavior in ways that realists cannot predict. Other notable constructivists include Nicholas Onuf 61 and Martha Finnemore. 62 We see a number of articulate critiques of general Realist assumptions, but how does this carry over to its definition of “security”? On the precise issue of the definition of “security,” Muthiah Alagappa has collected a number of various critiques of the traditional/realist definition of security in the Asian context and artfully organized and 60 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 4.2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. 61 See generally, Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 62 See generally, Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 31 laid them out in his work. 63 Other issues of contestation over the meaning of “security” collected by Alagappa were over the composition of core values, the type and nature of threats, and the approach to security. 64 In other words, these voids in security prompted many scholars to ask what security is. Who is it for what must “they” be secured against? Challenges to the traditional (i.e., Realist) definition of security fall along all elements of that definition. 65 First, why can’t the referent of security be people, along with the state? Although it is not disappearing, the state is becoming less relevant; it is sharing authority with other actors and no longer provides an effective base to understanding the agenda of defense, politics, economics, and the environment that is increasingly made by popular social movements, not governments. 66 The state itself can also be an oppressor and therefore a source of insecurity. 67 Moreover, the state should be viewed as a means to protect the security of its people, not as an end unto itself. 68 Second, why can’t “security” be broadly defined and seen in a domestic context, not just in a narrow international scope? National identity (the ideational basis for delineating political community as well as the political organization of that community), political legitimacy 63 See generally, Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 64 Ibid. at 29-61. 65 Ibid. 66 Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” International Affairs 67.3 (1991): 527-45. 67 Simon Dalby, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse,” Alternatives 17 (1992): 95-134. 68 Ibid. 32 or the title to rule, and distributive justice have all been the source of internal conflicts and therefore security. 69 Lastly, in the post Cold-War world aren’t non-military threats – both domestic and international – the greatest long-term security threat to both the state and its people? The result of economic competition in the international arena will determine the future relative power positions of states in the international system, which may determine the welfare of their people. 70 Another problem of the traditional definition of “security” is its lack of context and circumstance. It ignores unique preferences and considerations that can only be understood with the proper grasp of history and culture. 71 The need to reexamine the traditional definition of “security” was not confined to the ivory tower. Given its policy relevance and potential to directly affect many lives, “security” and how it should be defined and applied became an issue that policy-makers have grappled with as well. A concern with the “security” of non-state actors can be seen in U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech of January 6, 1941 (Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear), the legal arguments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, and in the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its associated covenants (1966), and conventions on specific crimes (e.g., genocide) and the rights of specific groups (e.g., 69 Ibid. 70 See generally, Wayne Sandholtz, et al. Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the New Security System (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992). 71 See generally, J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allan Carlson, eds. Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). 33 refugees, women, racial groups). In his opening statement at the first session of the General Assembly, British Prime Minister (PM) Clement Atlee declared: I am glad that the Charter of the United Nations does not deal only with Governments and States with politics and war but with the simple elemental needs of human beings whatever be their race, their colour or their creed. 72 However, the Cold War crippled the prospect of real development of non- traditional security at the policy level. With a bipolar setting, the world saw a series of military crises, “limited” wars, and overt and covert interventions by the major powers (i.e., the U.S. and the USSR) to prop up clients under threat or to depose hostile leaders in the developing world. Given this setting, in which “security” remained narrowly state- based and military in its practical definition is hardly shocking. One of the first policy-makers to boldly redefine security in a more holistic sense and to apply it in policy was Olaf Palme, the late Swedish prime minister. Palme headed the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, created in 1981. 73 However, this effort was predominantly in the area of foreign policy, regional relations, and international cooperation. The efforts fostered the concept of Common Security and stated that security must be achieved “not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.” 74 The Commission recommended a positive approach to security 72 “Verbatim Record of the First Plenary Meeting” (General Assembly document A/PV.1, 41) (10 January 1946) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/a-pv1.pdf.> 73 Olaf Palme Commission, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, Report of the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1982). 74 Ibid. at xiii. 34 that essentially sought to retard and control the pursuit of security in a competitive fashion. 75 However, the Commission left untouched many of the critiques that have been articulated surrounding the traditional definition of “security.” Most notably, the Report did not address the notion of threats to national security arising from non-military, and/or domestic sources. These concerns were directly faced by the conceptual parent of a new security concept: Japanese PM Masayoshi Ohira. PM Ohira promoted an idea called sogo anzen hosho (“comprehensive security”), which had the following requirements: a vibrant industrial base, a robust economy, beneficial export relationships, and an active foreign assistance program. He articulated that comprehensive security must protect these vital ingredients. Japan, not coincidentally, was the first to develop "comprehensive security" as a policy. In July of 1980, the Study Group on Comprehensive National Security, appointed by PM Ohira, submitted a report to the administration. Comprehensive security in the Japanese sense at that time required not only the deployment of military power but also political power, dynamic economic strength, creative culture, and thoroughgoing diplomacy. 76 Bobrow described how much of this term was used for dealing with external threats and formulating an appropriate foreign policy, specifically foreign aid to other Asian countries. 77 Under PM Suzuki, this assistance was seen as "the 75 Ibid. 76 See generally, Nobutoshi Akao, Japan’s Economic Security (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). 77 D. B. Bobrow, "Hegemony Management: The United States in the Asia-Pacific," The Pacific Review 12.2 (1999): 172-96. 35 cost of building an international order so as to achieve the comprehensive security of Japan." 78 The Ministry of International Trade and Industry advocated promoting economic security as part of the country's comprehensive security, and for the use of a blend of economic, political, and military means to achieve this goal. Economic matters such as resource supply, trade, investment, and finance fell under a widening tent of "security" for Japan, as did environmental and public health concerns. Common security was also utilized to illustrate interdependent risks and needs of states in the global commons. In 1985, Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev announced a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium- range missiles in Europe until November of that year, and called on the U.S. to reciprocate and end space-based weapons research, all in the spirit of common security. 79 These contributions were immense. As a result the "human security" movement rose as an alternative to traditional “security” definitions in the scholarly community. Human Security argues that security is dependent on the conditions persons – both collectively and individually – face in their daily life (i.e., food, shelter, employment, health, human rights, and public safety). 80 The term “human security” was subsequently utilized in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report. 81 The report argues that: 78 Ibid. 79 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 444. 80 Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security 26.2 (Fall 2001): 88. 81 See generally, United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994 (New York: 36 The concept of security, has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust…Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. 82 This report outlined seven specific elements that comprise human security: (1) economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g., access to food); (3) health security (e.g., protection from diseases and access to health care); (4) environmental security (e.g., protection from dangers such as environmental depletion and pollution); (5) personal security (e.g., physical safety from torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g., survival of traditional ethnic groups and cultures along with the physical security of these groups); and (7) political security (e.g., enjoyment of political and civil rights and freedom from political oppression). It also identified six primary threats to human security: unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism. These various components were perceived as intertwined. In the words of the report, “Global poverty and environmental problems respect no national border. Their grim consequences travel the world.” 83 The Report’s concepts intended to serve three purposes: to propose a paradigm for sustainable human development that could serve the growing realm of human security; to seek a framework of development that brings Oxford University Press, 1994). 82 Ibid. at 23. 83 Ibid. at 3. 37 nation-states together through a more equitable sharing of global economic responsibilities and opportunities; and finally to seek a new role for the UN so that it can begin to meet humanity’s agenda for peace but also for development. This Human Security has been broadly defined to consist of two primary elements both inspired by FDR’s Four Freedom’s speech, which was driven by his wife Eleanor Roosevelt and advisor Jon Run: freedom from want and freedom from fear. We see such a conceptualization crystallized by the EU. 84 It is an ongoing priority of the UN as well. 85 How the PRC was influenced by these efforts will be addressed in the following chapters. Another critique leveled at the traditional definition of “security” is that by focusing only on major powers and military competition with other major powers, it effectively excludes countries that are not as developed and may not be concerned with military rivalries against other countries. As a result, many scholars asserted that so- called “weak states” fall completely outside traditional security definitions because the primary security problems of these states are internal. Buzan defines “weak states” as, “those having low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and generally high levels of internal political violence.” 86 Ayoob writes that although the security questions of weak states have global, regional, and domestic levels, the primary layer that flavors the entire cake is 84 Study Group on Europe’s Defence Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report (15 September 2006): 9-10, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%Security%20Report%20Full.pdf.> 85 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (General Assembly Document A/59/565) (2 December 2004) <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.> 86 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 492. 38 the domestic one. 87 Historically, many developing countries’ leaders realized early on that once their country obtained statehood, internal challenges to their leadership/rule were more pressing than, say, a nuclear war. 88 Job expands on this by asserting that internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to existence of the nation-state unit, are the major, if not sole, security concern of weak states. 89 One of the first “weak state” governments to articulate a policy that defined its security policy this way was Indonesia, with Ketahanan nasional. This policy posits that security has political, economic, sociocultural, and military aspects, that threats to security can come from domestic as well as international sources, that these are often interconnected, and that the approach to security must be multidimensional. 90 This is not to say that these scholarly and government efforts were flawless, nor that they have settled the debate over “security.” If human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing. 91 Paris writes that, "human security is like 'sustainable development' – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it 87 See generally, Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 88 Ibid. at 257-283. 89 See generally, Brian Job, The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992). 90 See generally, Robert Scalapino, et al., eds. Asian Security Issues Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988). 91 Giovanni Sartori, “Conceptual Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 64.4 (1970): 1033-1053. 39 means." 92 Such amorphous definitions can lead to analytical and conceptual incoherence, for the scholar and policy-maker alike. 93 Furthermore, just because there is a wide variety of threats does not means they should be categorized as a threat to “security,” nor should they be studied, researched, and approached the same way as military threats. 94 Another articulate argument over the unwieldy nature of a broad definition of “security” came from Richard Ullman: If national security encompasses all serious and urgent threats to a nation-state and its citizens, we will eventually find ourselves using a different term when we wish to make clear that our subject is the threats that might be posed by the military use of force of other states. The “war problem” is conceptually distinct from, say, problems like environmental degradation or urban violence, which are better characterized as threats to well being…Labeling a set of circumstances as a problem of national security when it has no likelihood of involving as part of the solution a state’s organs of violence accomplishes nothing except obfuscation. 95 Furthermore, Morrison writes, “The concept of human security is so broad that virtually any threat to individual well-being and livelihood can be included within it.” 96 What this assertion reveals is that it is easy to criticize but difficult to develop a cogent alternative. These critiques of the traditional definition of security all make relevant points but the key is to find an alternative that gives both scholars and policy- 92 Paris, Supra. 93 See generally, Arnold Wolfers, ed. Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). 94 Robert H. Dorff, “A Commentary on Security Studies for the 1990s as a Model Curriculum Core,” International Studies Notes 19.3 (1991): 23-31. 95 Richard H. Ullman, “Threats to Global Security: New Views or Old?” Seminar on Global Security Beyond 2000 at the University of Pittsburgh, 2-3 Nov. 1995. 96 Baker, Supra. 40 makers a tool to capture a broader set of threats to national security but that is still clear and defined so that it is applicable at the policy level. The work of COPRI best addresses these needs. COPRI’s “Comprehensive Security” COPRI identifies five general sectors of security: strategic (traditional military) security along with environmental, economic, socio-cultural, and political security. 97 These arenas also serve as an analytical device meant to identify various dynamics. As in Human Security, COPRI goes beyond military security, showing the links and interactions among the individual, the state, and the international system, but broadens and deepens the conceptual resources of each level. Buzan wrote: [Security is] primarily about the fate of human collectivities…about the pursuit of freedom from threat. [The] bottom line is about survival, but it also includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence…Security…is affected by factors in five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. 98 Looking beyond the state/military setting, Buzan specifically outlined three other units to be secured: the individual (as like Human Security), the region, and the overall international system. 99 Buzan posits: The “security” problem turns out to be a… security problem in which individuals, states and the system all play a part, and in which economic, societal and environmental factors are as important as political and military ones. 100 97 See generally, Barry Buzan, Peoples States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. at 363. 100 Ibid. at 368. 41 Each type of security is guided by the securitizing actors and the referent objects; the former are defined as "actors who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened" and can be expected to be "political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups." Referent objects are "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival." Implicitly, the referent objects and the kind of existential threats they face vary over security sectors; the threats can be ideological or sub-state, for example. Moreover, security threats are not synonymous with “harm” or the avoidance of whatever else might be considered damaging. 101 Buzan saw the referent to be human collectives, with the particular referent depending on the level of analysis. Specifically, referent objects can be the state and its territorial integrity (strategic security); national sovereignty or an ideology and the legitimacy of the governmental authority (political security); national economies (economic security); collective identities (societal security); and species or habitats (environmental security). Some in the COPRI have suggested adding a sacred or religious referent object. 102 Buzan refined that structure in his work with Richard Little. 103 In this work Buzan and Little refine their five categories of security as sectors, with the purpose being, “the function of sectors is the same as that of these physical lenses: each one gives a view of the whole that emphasizes some things, and de- 101 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998): 2-5, 203-12. 102 Bagge Lausten C. and O. Waever, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29.3 (2000): 705-739. 103 See generally, Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 42 emphasizes, or even hides completely, others.” 104 To his credit, Buzan does warn of the danger of performing sectoral analysis at the exclusion of other sectors, thereby underestimating sectoral interconnectivity and missing the greater overall. 105 At the international level, COPRI pointed to the state and society as the security referents (domestic issues have generally been seen as peripheral concerns and have thus been excluded from traditional security analysis). One of the major strengths of the COPRI’s Comprehensive Security is that its security framework allows for the broadening of the security definition without losing its coherence. Unlike the traditional definition of “security,” COPRI regards security as a socially constructed concept. According to Buzan and his colleagues, any public issue may be politicized, non-politicized, and/or securitized. Securitization, according to Buzan, is a process in which an issue is framed as a security problem. This exact process is where a securitizing actor enumerates a prior politicized issue as an existential threat to security and declares that it must be protected against because of its identified urgency. Consequently, securitization refers to the classification of certain issues, persons or entities as existential threats demanding extreme measures. Buzan et al. postulate that security: is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issues whether as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. 106 104 Ibid. at 73. 105 Ibid. at 75-6. 106 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Supra. 43 The opposite – desecuritization – is possible as well. Desecuritization is, in essence, the reverse process: the "shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere." 107 The transformation of many facets of European security as part of the end of the Cold War exemplifies this shift. 108 Securitization theory is enjoying a broad and deep research agenda, constituting, according to some, “possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for security studies.” 109 COPRI emphasizes the importance of the speech-act in the process of securitization. The importance of the speech-act lies in informing and influencing one's perception of reality. It directly impacts human behavior and outcomes. In essence, it does more than merely represent a "reality." Ralf Emmers notes how securitizing actors use language to articulate a problem in security terms and to persuade a relevant audience of its immediate danger. The articulation in security terms conditions public opinion and provides securitizing actors with the right to mobilize state power and move beyond traditional rules. 110 107 Ibid. 108 See generally, Waever, O., B. Buzan, M. Lestrup, and P. Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London, UK: Pinter Press, 1993). 109 J. Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen, or, About the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4.4 (1997): 488-506. 110 See generally, Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004). 44 Notably the security concern needs to be identified and articulated as an existential threat. The securitization process is successful when the securitizing actor convinces a relevant audience (e.g., public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites) that a referent object is existentially threatened. Under these conditions, standard political modus operandi is no longer perceived as sufficient and extreme means can be imposed to counter this threat. Consequently, the theory has applicability even in Leninist states. As a result of the urgency of this issue, constituencies tolerate the use of actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. As a result, extraordinary measures can be implemented. These measures go beyond rules that are normally abided by. What entails an existential threat is thus perceived by the school as a subjective question that is dependent on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a threat to security. COPRI argues that a successful act of securitization is not contingent upon the use of exceptional means. The act merely gives securitizing actors the unique right to execute such actions. Waever summarizes it: What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security itself is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. 111 111 R. Lipschutz, ed. On Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995): 46-86. 45 Williams further articulates: The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that “accept does not necessarily mean in a civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent,” it is nonetheless the case that “since securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case”, and that “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects.” 112 He further conducts an analysis of the strength of the speech-act in securitization, concluding: It is important to point out that the Copenhagen school readily acknowledges that a focus on speech alone is far too narrow for an understanding of the structure of communication involved in securitization. The analysis pursued in Security, for example, is at pains to point out that it is not the word “security” that is indispensable to the specific nature of the speech-act (though it often may play a vital role) but the broader rhetorical performance of which it is a part… “It is important to note” they stress, “that the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action of special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.” In this sense, therefore, the speech-act of securitization is not reducible to a purely verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric: it is a broader performative act which draws upon a variety of contextual, institutional, and symbolic resources for its effectiveness. 113 This analysis does not mean that Williams believes there are not challenges to this theory. He concludes that a key hurdle for securitization theory is that its “presentation of security as a speech-act is potentially too narrow to grasp fully the social contexts and 112 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47.4 (2003): 523. 113 Ibid. at 526. 46 complex communicative and institutional processes of securitization at work in contemporary politics.” 114 In the views of both Alagappa and Williams, Buzan’s position finds its roots in neorealism (as opposed to liberalism) but permits variations in the referent and broadens the scope of security. 115 However, in the broader sense, COPRI regards security as a socially constructed concept, and hence draws heavy influence from Constructivism. Joe Camilleri further defines this Comprehensive Security as: Particular practice or relationship may be deemed relevant to comprehensive security when it is likely to create new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones either between or within nations, especially to the extent that these are likely to involve the use or threat of force. As a corollary to this, a particular practice or relationship may be said to contribute to comprehensive security when it helps to resolve or obviate conflicts between and within nations, and especially armed conflicts. 116 Interestingly, there are advocates of Human Security who see COPRI’s Comprehensive Security as a sellout to traditional security definitions. While Comprehensive Security focuses on the state and society, Human Security focuses on the individual as the referent point of security. And whereas Comprehensive Security focuses on order and stability, Human Security is geared more to justice and emancipation. 117 However, Buzan identifies two problematic elements in Human 114 Ibid. 115 Alagappa, Practice, Supra, at 28. 116 David Dickens, ed. No Better Alternative: Toward Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington, 1997): 83. 117 See generally, Amitav Acharya and Arvind Acharya, “Human Security in the Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea, or Peril?” Working Paper 1/2000 (Bhubaneswar: Center for Peace and Development Studies, 2000). 47 Security. The first is that it essentially throws out the baby with the bathwater. Adding persons as a referent should not be at the expense of the state: Versions of human security that seek to reduce all security to the level of the individual have somehow to confront the dilemma that bypassing the state takes away what seems to be the necessary agent through which individual security might be achieved. 118 The second is that, “at the end of the day national security policy still has to be made by states.” And given that “security policy-making is very largely an activity of states, there is an important practical sense in which national security subsumes all of the other security considerations found at the individual and systemic levels.” 119 Buzan also puts forth arguments similar to that of Ullman regarding a pointlessly broad group of referents. He argues that, “attempts to securitise all of humankind have proved hard to sell. The referent object still seems too big and too vague to have popular appeal.” 120 He is not the only one to challenge the traditional definition of security and still carry this sentiment. 121 Even in the Palme Commission’s 1982 report, Common Security was concerned about the security of the state from nuclear weapons; it did not focus on sub-state actors. 122 118 Buzan, Supra, ch.1. 119 Ibid. 120 Barry Buzan, “Human Security in International Perspectives,” Paper presented at the 14 th Asia Pacific Round Table, Kuala Lumpur, 3-7 June 2000. 121 Jessica Tuchman Matthews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68.2 (1989): 162-177. 122 Palme Commission, Supra. 48 Assessments The “security” debate is not settled, at least not in the arena of academia and ideas. The debate over the meaning of “security” and how it should be used will no doubt continue. We see that “security” was essentially an extension of the Realist logic and worldview. It should come as no surprise that the flaws of this definition bear similar flaws to the Realist construct in general. Nor is it surprising that it bears the strengths as well. Traditional “security” soberly addresses military conflict between states and the fundamental need of states to protect their territorial integrity. It also provides clear terms of reference and a relatively organized set of principles, and strives to maintain consistency and coherence. The traditional definition seems to take great pride in what it is not. However, in researching this dissertation, I have supported the criticisms of traditional “security” laid out by Alagappa. There is no reason that “security”—if done with focus and precision— cannot encompass non-state referents such as groups of persons and other such communities. As stated by Booth and exemplified by the work of the UN Human Development Report and PM Ohira, threats to these referents can come from sources other than bullets and missiles. The well-being of a country’s economy and the resulting material well-being of its populace, along with its health and societal harmony, can damage the constitution of a country as much as any foreign military can. This threat is particularly the case in “weak states” as we see in the case of Indonesia. With this idea in mind, I have, in my research on the case of the PRC, noted the COPRI’s 49 and other new approaches’ influence, tracking and compare their relative influence in PRC security policy-making from the early 1990s onward. A variety of sources for reconsidering traditional notions of “security” exist. For the most part, the spark behind questioning the traditional definition of security was external circumstances. Mainstream scholars were affected by events like the oil shocks of the 1970s, pandemics such as AIDS, transnational problems such as environmental degradation, and non-state threats to state security such as terrorism. These epiphanies, however, are from a major power perspective. Many of these problems, particularly those affecting internal security, were already prevalent in “weak states.” It seems then, that undeniable changes to external circumstances for major powers, and leaders of some vision in developing countries, are two major sources of change in how “security” is defined and addressed. As a result, I find the COPRI’s framework the most useful. It keeps the state as the main referent, but does not exclude non-state actors. Most importantly it correctly defines threats to security in non-military forms. By filtering the threats down to five basic categories, the framework allows intelligence analysts and scholars to research and analyze a broad collection of threats to a confined, yet comprehensive set of referents— and it does so in a coherent way. Moreover, Buzan’s sectors have a clearer division than the UN Human Development Report’s. The UN Report’s areas often overlap and many of the categories seem more like subsets for the others. By laying out five clearly divisible threat categories, Buzan allows analyst and policy-maker alike to organize threats in a cohesive and streamlined fashion, while avoiding the flaws enumerated by 50 Ullman. Lastly, by laying out a defined process for securitization, policy-makers have a guideline for identifying threats to national security, with a sense of how to address and alleviate those threats. Buzan’s framework is the ideal approach for examining a state with ills afflicting its populace that are beyond the military encroachment of a foreign power, when the state and its policies might be threats to health and welfare of the populace, and when one is examining a state in transition along political, economic, or even sociological lines. CCP Securitization and Desecuritization Trends: The PRC Under Mao and Deng This debate over the security definitions and priorities of Chinese leadership along with securitization and desecuritization trends does not begin in 1992–notable trends can be observed as far back as when the CCP took power in 1949. The term "security" (anquan) in Chinese has traditionally referred to national military defense (guofang). Iain Johnston addresses Maoist strategic behavior, finding opposition to accommodation, with the CCP particularly likely to use force on what they viewed as high-value, zero-sum issues such as territorial disputes, particularly as the PRC grew in strength. He argues that China has historically exhibited a relatively consistent hard realpolitik or parabellum strategic culture that has existed over time into the Maoist period, and that China’s conflict management behavior after 1949 has been generally consistent with hard realpolitik axioms. 123 He also cites studies revealing that the PRC 123 Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996). 51 resorted to violence in 72% of its foreign policy crises (vs. 18% for the U.S. and 27% for the Soviet Union). 124 Johnston has even succinctly asserted, “Decision-makers can often view the world as neorealists would – inferring intentions from changing relative power. Mao certainly did.” 125 We can infer from this assertion that Mao was securitizing the military sector. Another supporter of a traditional sense of security, and therefore securitization of the military sector in the PRC, is Allen Whiting, who, after analyzing the PRC’s armed conflicts from 1950-1996, found clear elements of Offensive Realism: “deterrence; preemptive attacks, coercion and coercive diplomacy.” Writing in 2001, he claimed that, “Beijing gave priority to political goals of deterrence and coercive diplomacy in PLA deployments.” 126 Echoing this view is Tang Shiping. Writing in 2007, Tang points to three pieces of evidence to support the Mao-as-an-Offensive-Realist claim. 127 The first is Mao’s intolerant ideology of overthrowing all imperialist and/or reactionary regimes throughout the globe. Second is his Marxist-Leninist view of the inevitability of struggle and revolution. Third is Mao’s accounting for all of China’s woes as resulting from other countries’ evil policies, and not from interactions between China and other states. Tang 124 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992,” The China Quarterly 153 (1998): 1-30. 125 Suh, Supra, at 63. 126 Allen Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26.2 (2001): 103- 131. 127 See generally, Shiping Tang, “From Offensive Realism to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” State of Security and International Studies 3 (2007): 1-36. 52 believes that Mao’s Offensive Realist outlook made him blissfully unaware of the concept of a security dilemma and kept Mao from initiating any policies to assure China’s neighbors of its benign intentions (other than the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” a defensive realist doctrine that Mao did not carry forth on anyway). 128 Writing in 1980, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moon Hwang saw Mao’s foreign policy as most concerned with physical threats in the forms of foreign military attacks and infringement on territorial integrity. 129 Writing in 2002, Andrew Scobell describes China’s external security situation in the Mao years as China having few staunch friends other than Albania, North Korea, and Pakistan. As a result, Maoist China believed itself surrounded by enemies. 130 This perception implies not only securitization of the military sector, but also a lack of securitization of the other sectors (though they may have been politicized). Balancing is a policy reflecting a Realist and military sector securitization outlook. According to Wang Jisi of Peking University, Mao possessed this outlook. Wang insists Mao lived by a three world thesis, in which besides the two superpowers there were, variously comprised, a second world (capitalist developed states) and a third or revolutionary world (developing countries); the more powerful the second and third worlds were, the more constrained the superpowers would be. According to Wang, this 128 Ibid. at 16-17. 129 Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moon Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 130 Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: May, 2002). 53 belief traced back to Mao’s concept (developed in the 1940s) of an intermediate zone between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 131 Writing in 1994, Thomas Robinson asserts that Mao’s balancing strategy continued up until his death in 1976, though in three different applications: In the 1950s, China perceived a mortal danger posed by a hostile and powerful U.S.-led capitalist camp and therefore allied with the Soviet-led socialist bloc. In the mid-1960s, China perceived a growing threat of exploitation by the colluding American and Soviet superpowers and briefly attempted to forge a coalition of the “revolutionary forces of the third world.” And after 1969, when China saw the rising power of a more hostile Soviet Union as the main threat to its interests, it aligned with the United States and all others willing to resist the “socialist- imperialist hegemon.” This Maoist approach emphasizing the importance of flexibly rallying broad support against a principal enemy revealed not only for the four decades Mao dominated CCP politics, but also in the years immediately following his death in September 1976. 132 Writing in 1992, Shambaugh argues that, “[Mao] quickly grew distrustful of Soviet support (or lack thereof during the Korean War and two Taiwan Straits Crises) and saw dependency on the Soviet Union as a violation of China’s century-long struggle for national independence and dignity.” 133 Colonel Russ Howard believes that despite differing tactics, four goals of the CCP remained constant throughout the period of Mao. First and foremost was that after a century of occupation and conflict, China wanted to preserve its territorial integrity. Second, recovering the “lost” territories of Tibet, 131 Wang Jisi, “Multipolarity Versus Hegemonism: Chinese Views of International Politics Today,” Paper prepared for conference on Conflict or Convergence: Global Perspectives on War, Peace, and International Order, Harvard Academy of International and Area Studies, 13-15 Nov., 1997. 132 Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994): 555-602. 133 David Shambaugh, “China’s Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” Survival 34. 2 (Summer 1992): 89. 54 Xinjiang, and Taiwan was imperative. Third, the PRC demanded recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. Fourth, China wanted greater international stature; it wanted to regain its status as the Middle Kingdom after the bai nian guo chi (100 Years of Humiliation). 134 Ironically, one of the most thorough arguments for Mao securitizing the military sector came from an analysis that openly challenged Johnston’s. Writing in 2005, Huiyun Feng asserts that Mao was indeed a realist, but a defensive one— not an offensive realist as Johnston claims: Unlike the domination of a single strategic culture thesis advanced by Johnston, Chinese leaders’ beliefs are probably more complicated and display significant variance over time and settings. Mao himself varied within the realist tradition between defensive and offensive realism, a distinction underemphasized in Johnston’s analysis. 135 Yet there are scholars who do not see any Realist security outlooks whatsoever, which by extension means that the military sector was not securitized (though probably still politicized). Writing in 2001, Nan Li insists that until the reforms of Deng, Mao, the CCP, and the PLA defined security in terms of class struggle and that the PLA was seen and used as a revolutionary internationalist tool. 136 One could argue that given that the PLA was a revolutionary tool used for political means, the effect was securitization of the 134 This refers to the period from the loss of the first Opium War (1839-42) through the invasion and occupation by Japan (1937-1945). 135 Huiyun Feng, “The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?” Security Studies 14.4 (2005): 661. 136 Nan Li, “From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military’s Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era,” Peaceworks 39 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2001): 15-18. 55 political sector. One could also argue that in essence, no other sectors were securitized because as a revolutionary outlook mandates, all resources must serve the political needs of the leadership, and no other sector may be securitized for its own sake. The bottom line was that perhaps only the political sector was securitized, and no others could be at this stage. Since 1985 when the Central Military Commission promulgated a new policy on the role of the PLA, a professional, Realist priority has established prominence. Li insists that the source of this policy change was primarily domestic politics, as opposed to external events. 137 In essence, where there was once a sense of political security, modernization and professionalization have led to a defensive realist security. Another implication is that in Li’s view, the military sector evolved from politicization to securitization, but the political sector took the opposite course. Buzan also sees a CCP security policy based on revolution, which would mean political sector securitization at the expense of all others. He claims, “If a single theme can encompass China’s security policy during the Cold War, it probably hinges on an obsessive concern with the completion and consolidation of the communist revolution.” 138 Buzan elaborates by pointing out how although the Soviets were crucial allies to the CCP against the U.S. during the 1950s, Beijing and Moscow were never close. Moscow’s paternalistic and controlling view of its allies conflicted with Beijing’s goal of strong, revolutionary national independence, and this clash was amplified by widening ideological differences. Buzan notes: 137 Ibid. 138 Buzan, Waever, Supra at 140. 56 The apparent folly of China moving itself into a position of open hostility to both superpowers during the 1960s is inexplicable in both balance-of-power and bandwagon terms…Once the Sino-Soviet split opened up, China found itself playing a double game of containment against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Only during the 1970s did China’s strategic policy begin to make sense in balance-of-power terms. 139 Perhaps there is a way to reconcile the argument of whether the Mao era was defining security in the Realist sense or in an alternative sense, or whether there was an either/or relationship in terms of securitizing different sectors. Perhaps instead, the reality is a combination of many factors. William Tow concedes that that the PRC did allow ideological fervor to promote global revolution on many occasions yet he also contends that, “strategic calculations and decisions were usually made in Beijing on the basis of pragmatic national security considerations rather than ideological nationalistic pride.” 140 Wu Xinbo describes CCP security thinking and behavior as originally shaped by a sense of vulnerability stemming from the 100 Years of Humiliation and the combination of China’s material and technological weakness, its unfavorable position in the global balance of power, Marxist-Leninist theory that stressed contradictions, conflicts and the predatory nature of capitalism, and direct external military threats initially from the U.S. but later from the Soviets. 141 Some of this outlook may have also resulted from the fact 139 Ibid. 140 Robinson, Supra, at 123. 141 Alagappa, Supra, at 115. 57 that from the 1950s to the 1980s, the top CCP and state leaders were also members of the PLA. Overall, he characterizes it as largely Realist, though with some forms of idealism: The international environment was seen as inherently hostile; the nation-state and the regime were the crucial referents of security; political survival (of regime and nation) topped the security agenda; and security through power (national power, alignment, and alliance) and diplomacy was the dominant approach. Meanwhile, some aspects of Chinese security policy (such as the rift with the Soviet Union and support for international security movements) were obviously affected by ideological and moral considerations. 142 Wu Xinbo explains that the 100 Years of Humiliation, coupled with sufferings of World War II and China’s civil war, exacerbated its sense of weakness in terms of economics and technology. Mao knew the PRC had limited resources to enhance its national security in that he saw that the PRC was weak industrially, agriculturally, culturally, and militarily, which made the PRC vulnerable to foreign powers. 143 This interpretation of Mao’s outlook lends credence to the interpretation that Mao was securitizing all sectors, if this is possible. Mao’s attitudes revealed a preoccupation with global balance-of-power and the PRC’s role in it. Mao and the CCP leadership also viewed direct military threats as the key threat to China’s security during this period. Conflicts with/in Korea, India, and the frustration over Taiwan fed this view. The U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam further aggravated this sense. Zhou Enlai sent U.S. President Lyndon Johnson a message via Pakistan warning against another possible Sino-U.S. 142 Ibid. at 116. 143 Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji (Collected military works of Mao Zedong), vol. 6 (Beijing: Military Science Press and Central Document Press, 1993). 58 conflict. 144 Yet, the clash with the Soviets at Zhen Bao Island drove Mao to reassess the global arrangement and see war as not only inevitable but imminent. 145 According to Wu Xinbo, this view dominated China’s security thinking until Deng’s ascension. 146 Wu Xinbo also identifies China’s responses to its security challenges as linked to traditional Realism, ideology, and moralism, and as a combination of military (e.g., the Korean War and artillery fire against Jinmen and Mazu islands) and diplomatic (e.g., “lean to one side” and “united front” policies) approaches. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping was able to politically rehabilitate himself and to consolidate power. By 1979 Deng, via the Four Modernizations, put economic growth as a priority national interest, exceeding even military power. One could say that Deng desecuritized the military sector and securitized the economic sector. Perhaps the political sector was desecuritized as well. Writing in 1987, Harry Harding describes how Deng departed from Mao’s conceptualization by virtue of the change to the political, economic, and military content of the strategy that occurred along with Deng’s domestic reforms, initiated in 1979. Politically, with the absence of class struggle rhetoric, China no longer rested upon Marxist divisions of “revolution” versus “revisionism” to account for Soviet acts. Economically, with the departure of the Maoist model of development, China tried to combine domestic institutional changes with an 144 Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected diplomatic works of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1990). 145 Xu Yan, Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang Fazhan Shi (A history of the development of Mao Zedong’s military thoughts) (Beijing: PLA Press, 1991). 146 Alagappa, Supra, at 118. 59 opening to the outside world to spark rapid economic growth as a foundation for overall national strength. 147 Writing in 2004, Shiping Tang asserted that Deng redefined China’s security environment from external-threat-based to internal growth and modernization-based. 148 Deng’s ideas have proved successful, and Tang implies that China’s security definition was widened to achieve this. Tang also unequivocally states that China’s shift under Deng was clearly from Offensive to Defensive Realism. 149 His analysis flows from certain observations. First, China no longer espouses revolutionary rhetoric, and no longer supports revolutionary insurgencies. Second, it is recognizing its role in the regional security dilemma and seeks to mitigate the effects. Three, it is exercising greater self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by others (e.g., signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea). Fourth, it is enhancing its security via cooperation (e.g., the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Tang definitely sees China as learning, and not merely adapting. 150 Feng also characterizes Deng as a defensive realist with some Confucian characteristics. 151 147 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987). 148 Shiping Tang, “A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 27.1 (2004): 1-34. 149 Shiping Tang, “From Offensive Realism to Defensive Realism,” Supra, at 17-39. 150 Ibid. 151 Feng, Supra, at 661. 60 Wu Xinbo observes that starting in this period Chinese security thinking changed substantially, with the economic sector becoming securitized and the political and perhaps even military sector becoming desecuritized. The environment was perceived as relatively less hostile than before (even beneficial), economic modernization topped the national security agenda, and the value of international cooperation to national strength, survival, and status was increasingly recognized. Wu Xinbo does not think this change indicated an embrace of a Liberalist worldview per se; rather it was a softening of the hard realpolitik of the early Cold War period. He points out that the Mao’s policy of ensuring regime security through class struggle had given way to Deng’s view, which saw comparatively less vulnerability of CCP leadership. Instead, Deng worried about China’s backwardness, particularly its economic backwardness. Deng believed that the best way to preserve regime security was though improving the public welfare, not through political oppression. To this end, China promulgated the “Four Modernizations” (modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense). To improve modernization, Beijing adopted a reform and open door policy. Overall, a change in focus engendered a broader view of and new approaches to, security. Revision of the domestic agenda necessitated a reassessment of the international setting. Deng did not think war was imminent, nor even inevitable. Heping Yu Fazhan (“Peace and Development”) was Deng’s central theme. 152 Although Deng, like Mao, saw the international system as anarchic and believed security was achieved through 152 See generally, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1993). 61 competitive self-help, he departed from Mao on two key points: He viewed the international system as more of a source of opportunity than of danger, and he was more inclined toward cooperation than confrontations in pursuing national interests. 153 Cheng Ruisheng claims that the true origins of China’s evolving security concept sprang from the Third Plenum of the 11 th CCP Central Committee. The concept emphasized that national defense construction should be subordinate to and serve national defense construction, and economic construction should develop in a coordinated manner: After the Third Plenum if the 11 th CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping made a new judgment with regard to war and peace, pointing out that the past tendency to always worry about having to fight a war now seems to have been excessive. Everything, he pointed out repeatedly, will be fine if the economy is developed, and it is necessary to be subordinate to this overall concern for it will be possible to modernize armaments for the armed forces only after the establishment of a good foundation for the national economy. 154 Cheng also claims that China formed its new concept of security on the basis of serious reflection on its own historical experiences and full adoption of such new concepts as comprehensive security. 155 Shambaugh believes Deng reached the conclusion that: to pursue economic development, China needed a peaceful environment. In asserting his theory, Deng had rejected previous Chinese assessments of the inevitability of world war and the unstable nature of the international order. A corollary to Deng’s thesis was that the leading hegemon, the United States, had entered a period of gradual decline. 156 153 Alagappa, Supra, at 122. 154 Cheng Ruisheng, “On China’s New Policies Towards Asia-Pacific Security,” Beijing Wenti Yanjiu 3, (1999): 1-6. 155 Ibid. 156 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29.3 (2004/05): 71. 62 Another source of change was China’s improvement of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union (USSR). This change in relations downplayed the military element as both a security concern and a means to achieving security. However, this did not completely change China’s central security theme. Deng saw a long stretch in the future wherein the two superpowers would be comparatively evenly balanced, and in which that competition would result in a fairly stable stalemate. 157 Writing in 2005, Avery Goldstein characterizes the post-Mao era as a questioning of its prior realpolitik balancing policy: China was increasingly secure. It did not face the sort of direct and immediate great power military challenge it had confronted during the Cold War. Grave insecurity had previously required Beijing to subordinate other interests to the overriding need for a counterbalance to dire threats. Simply put, absent a clearly dangerous “principal adversary” and a serious risk of war, the argument for forging a united front had lost its urgency. 158 The early 1980s saw China forsaking its need to balance the Soviets via the U.S. 159 One reason, according to Goldstein, is that China perceived an easing of the Soviet threat. Beijing saw the USSR under Leonid Brezhnev as bogged down by a war in Afghanistan that was difficult to win. Moreover, Moscow’s policies had yielded a broad international coalition of states concerned about its Soviet expansionism, so its relations 157 Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Estimates of the U.S.-Soviet Balance of Power,” Occasional Paper, no. 33 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1988). 158 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005): 22. 159 Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). 63 with its Asian neighbors had reached a new low. 160 Another reason was U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s arms buildup vis-à-vis the Soviets. The decline of Soviet power was being mirrored by a revival of U.S. power in Chinese eyes. Reagan had been declaring open support for democratization in Eastern Europe and had strongly condemned martial law in Poland. 161 Third, Beijing developed its own rudimentary long-range nuclear deterrent. Lu Ning believes the result was that Deng’s anti-Soviet balancing was not as tightly dependent on the U.S. as was Mao’s. 162 By October 1982, Beijing even declared that it would pursue a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the USSR, and that it would resume the negotiations with Moscow on normalizing relations, which had been suspended since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 163 As one Chinese journal articulated, China: totally opposes hegemony, no matter who seeks it or where it is sought…On the Afghan and Kampuchean issues, both China and the United States oppose the Soviet Union and Vietnam…In another case, both China and the Soviet Union oppose the united States in supporting Israeli aggression and the South African apartheid rule. This does not mean that China “allies” with the United States under some circumstances, or becomes a Soviet partner under other circumstances. [Instead], this precisely proves that…China is independent of all the superpowers. 164 160 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992). 161 Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds. Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy (New York: Little, Brown, 1987). 162 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, 2 nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). 163 Hu Yaobang, “Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization,” in The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (September 1982) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1982): 58-64. 164 Liaowang, October 20, 1982, quoted in Xinhua, October 20, 1982, in FBIS, China (21 October 1982): A1-A2. 64 In the military realm, with Mao being somewhat demythologized, the PLA was able to reduce, if not terminate, the longstanding focus on tactics that had been fruitful during the 1930s and 1940s (i.e., the People’s War doctrine), and to modernize the army with equipment and personnel suited to the new battlefield. 165 Essentially, Deng set three priorities for China’s national agenda in the 1980s: economic development, national unification, and opposition to hegemonism. 166 These were intended respectively to improve China material strength, remove the holdovers from its past humiliations, and promote China position on the world arena as a major power. 167 These aims all served a central goal: to turn China into great power. China’s post-Mao leaders – even Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang – identified the keys to national strength, international stature, and even reunification with Taiwan lay in China modernizing its economic and technological base 168 —in other words, desecuritizing the military and political sectors, and securitizing the economic sector In viewing the securitization trends under Mao and Deng, Alagappa sees Communist China as having reexamined and reformed its security definitions and policies in three phases: the late 1960s to early 1970s; in the early 1980s; and, lastly, after 165 See generally, Larry M. Wortzel, ed. China’s Military Modernization (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1988). 166 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1994). 167 Alagappa, Supra, at 123. 168 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998). 65 the end of the Cold War. 169 He claims that changes in security policy in the first two phases cannot be explained through neorealist structural explanations because the global material structure was still the bipolar Cold War. The primary engine behind the first reexamination was ideological conflict with the USSR and the PRC’s recognizing its need to balance the Soviets vis-à-vis the U.S. The next reform resulted from a difference in leadership: the different worldviews of Mao as opposed to Deng. Deng’s focus on economic and scientific modernization and his belief that the global environment was comparatively benign and stable led him to abandon Mao’s views on the inevitability of war and, ultimately, to embrace a broader definition of security that encompassed economic, scientific, and technological modernization, along with a lowered priority for military modernization. The latest reassessments, which occurred in 1989-90, sprang from the collapse of the bipolar global system. 170 Another advocate of phases in the CCP security concept, and by extension securitization trends, is Wu Baiyi. 171 He asserts that China’s economic recovery (e.g., the Great Leap Forward) and national security requirements, rather than common ideology, drove the China-Soviet Union Accommodation Period of 1949 to 1957. During this timeframe China formulated and executed both the diplomatic and military elements of its national security strategy. In this era China achieved international stature by “standing up” to the world’s strongest power during the Korea War. He characterizes the next 169 Ibid. at 670-1. 170 Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings University Press, 2007). 171 Wu Baiyi, Paper at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/courier/articles/1999fall4.html 66 period as “Opposing Both Superpowers” (1958-1970), which was unique because China had no strategic partner. According to Wu Baiyi, China historically unites with, or “leans to one side” of, the weaker of its major adversaries in a “united front” or “strategic triangle” arrangement. Yet in this period, China “went it alone,” and reached its security goals under very trying external and internal circumstances. Wu Baiyi attributes the success of the PRC to its diplomatic and military campaigns and to a passive responding position. Wu Baiyi defines the next period as “The United Front of Counter-Hegemony” (1971-1981). In this period, China again leaned to one side, though this time it was to the U.S. Moreover, it was, as Wu Baiyi notes, a “pragmatic strategy,” as opposed to a revolutionary ideological one. The result was robust diplomatic activity and the promoting of China’s global prestige. The activity also set the stage for China’s subsequent economic reforms and growth. Wu Baiyi characterizes 1982-1991 as “Heading for a Balanced Policy.” He notes the détente between Washington and Moscow and U.S. involvement in Taiwan as the sources for China’s “not leaning to either side.” These phases are primarily linked to international orientation, but they also point to certain definitions of security, particularly when seeing how these outward orientations served inward needs. Securitization Trends Conclusions Although reasonable people can differ (and the evidence shows that they do), this writer is persuaded by the arguments put forth that the best assessments over the conceptualization of “security” and securitization and desecuritization trends during the 67 current rule (i.e., rule of the CCP) are the phase analyses offered by Alagappa, Wu Baiyi, and COL Howard. Johnston, Whiting, Scobell, Goldstein, and Feng provide powerful evidence that Mao possessed a realpolitik attitude and therefore a traditional security outlook for most of his rule – evidence that Li and Buzan do not completely overcome. Therefore to argue against the presence of Realist security sensibilities and the securitization of the military sector does not work. The phase analysis of Alagappa and Wu Baiyi is the most analytical and comprehensive assessment put forth. It incorporates the elements of Realism and Revolutionary Idealism present in the CCP’s security history. It displays the presence of securitizing the political and military sectors. Those works also correctly interpret the changing external circumstances as driving Mao and Deng to reexamine and reorient China’s security priorities, and to desecuritize the political and military sectors and securitize the economic sector. The best examples of this change in priorities are Deng’s Four Modernizations. While their Wu’s and Alagappa’s analyses insightfully highlights the impact of the changing global environment on Mao and Deng (i.e., the evolution of the Cold War), that many other Chinese leaders resisted these reforms points to the human factor and the personalities of these leaders themselves as sources of security policy reform. In other words, the combination of external events and unique individuals were the engine of Chinese “security” redefinition and securitization and desecuritization trends. 68 This historical path and sense of internal and external perception sets the foundation for analyzing the post-Deng era in the PRC. The analysis becomes harder as the PRC becomes more advanced. PRC Scholars and PRC National Security Policy As written before, a strategy to this research on the case of the PRC is to note the COPRI’s and other theories’ influences and to track and compare their relative impact on PRC security policy-making from the early 1990s onward. With this idea in mind, this section will be divided into three parts. This first part will examine research, both Chinese and American, on the role of scholars in the PRC and the PRC policy-making process. The general conclusion is that what influence Chinese scholars have on security policy-making is still limited and what influence they do enjoy is a recent phenomenon. The next part shows what Chinese scholars are writing and saying about non-traditional security threats to China. This writer will also elucidate how Chinese scholars account for the development of the comprehensive security concept in China. This writer will conclude by showing how Chinese scholars are currently defining non-traditional security threats to China. The argument is that the limited influence of scholars on security policy-making, combined with non-linear and even conflicting definitions and attributions of “comprehensive security” and the general acknowledgment by Chinese scholars that traditional security and Realism still currently holds sway in PRC policy- makers’ minds, point to a lack of direct, major influence of Buzan and COPRI on the PRC’s post-Deng security policies. 69 The next portion of this chapter will assess the influence of PRC scholars and scholarship on PRC policy-making. It reviews the research, both Chinese and American, on the role of scholars in the PRC and the PRC policy-making process. The conclusion is that what influence Chinese scholars have on security policy-making is still limited but has been growing in the last 10 years. The Role of Scholars in Chinese National Security Policymaking If "security" is indeed being examined in a comprehensive (i.e., non-traditional) light through the work of academicians, then China's “security” definition and resulting security policies may evolve as a result of scholarly influences. The role of scholars and think tanks in Chinese security policy-making is a subject of debate. Such scholars have been called China’s “influential elite.” 172 Most observers agree their role is evolving somewhat and is becoming more robust. 173 How influential are these elite and how has their influenced evolved? Opinions vary somewhat on the degree of influence scholars have on policy-makers. However, the majority of the evidence points to a limited influence on security policy-making. Some scholars believe there is scholarly influence on PRC security policy- making, thereby increasing the opportunities for ideas such as comprehensive security to have a direct impact. They point to a trend of growing influence on policy-making. Wang Shaoguang claims that, “the breadth and depth with which intellectuals today 172 See generally, David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America 1972-1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 173 See generally, Melissa Murphy, “Decoding Chinese Politics: Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter,” A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, (January 2008). 70 participate in politics in unprecedented…[I]n setting the orientation of their policies, the leaders listen to the intellectuals directly or indirectly.” 174 According to many Chinese scholars, the rise of the influence of scholars is a result of the nature of PRC leadership. A Shanghai-based scholar noted that Mao listened only to himself. Deng, in contrast, utilized a small, inner circle of advisors. Starting with Jiang, PRC leaders have been increasingly listening to scholars and other outside experts. Scholars, most commonly those in think tanks, have growing influence through conferences and publications, and their ideas on “security” get heard via such fora. As an example, he this scholar highlighted how many senior PLA leaders attend conferences at the SIIS. 175 Two security analysts based in Beijing claim that the importance of scholars in decision- making is growing, particularly on the issue of environmental security. 176 A Shanghai- based scholar highlighted that in the process of policy-making, there is an increasing government demand for foreign policy research from academicians due to the plethora of Chinese security concerns, both traditional and non-traditional. 177 However, he also says that some Chinese policy-makers have complained that these academic products are not useful or clear—and claims that China is having more policy-oriented discussions between the government and the ivory tower; the government is inviting scholars to more 174 “Wang Shaoguang Says Intellectuals Have Too Much Influence,” trans. Open Source Center Nanfang Chuang (25 January 2007), (OSC): CPP20070227456001. 175 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 14 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 3”). 176 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 20 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 5”). 177 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 15 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 6”). 71 meetings and vice versa. He observes that China does not have a tradition of a “revolving door” between academia and government for experts, though sometimes the government has sent scholars abroad to work at Chinese embassies. 178 Another Shanghai-based security scholar lays out the security policy-making process as a multi- way street: leadership, scholars and even the media feed off each other. 179 He sees an almost group lobbying-type dynamic, stating that, conveniently, a greater number of high-ranking Chinese leaders have social science backgrounds, making this kind of interaction smoother. 180 One Shanghai-based security scholar sees the role of scholars in the security policy-making process as growing because of the internet and the greater flow of information. 181 However, he qualifies that assertion by saying the information-to- analysis ratio is still quite large. He also warns that no scholar commands unregulated influence on the Chinese leadership. 182 Shiping Tang thinks that the influence of scholars increased after the Belgrade bombing, when Zhongnanhai felt unsure and needed fresh ideas to deal with this situation. 183 However, a majority of scholars I interviewed saw only a limited influence of scholarship on security policy-making. One Beijing-based scholar believes Chinese 178 Interview Number 6. 179 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 16 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 7”). 180 Interview Number 7. 181 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 21 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 8”). 182 Interview Number 8. 183 Personal interview, Singapore, 12 February 2008 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 22”). 72 leadership is influenced in only a loose, indirect sense. 184 A security scholar based in Shanghai describes scholarly impact as coming in two forms: the first is presenting findings to leadership, the other (and more important) when commissioned by authorities to research a specific issue. However, ultimately that particular scholar thinks that Chinese leaders formulate and make their policies more from their own observing of the undeniable facts on the ground, and less through the influence of scholars. 185 One Shanghai-based political scientist highlights that unlike in the U.S., China does not have a steady two-way flow of scholars going back and forth from the academy and government. 186 He mentions Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong as having some influence regardless of where they are, but adds that the main avenue for influence is via policy papers, editorials, attending conferences, and the like. He characterizes Beijing-based scholars as well-informed but more conservative, whereas Shanghai scholars are more liberal and sophisticated. He also mentioned that with Jiang and the Shanghai clique losing power, Shanghai scholars might lose some of their influence as well. 187 One Shanghai-based scholar believes that the more a scholar appears in the media in China, the less truly influential that scholar is with those that matter. He estimates that Wang Jisi, Lin Yifu (Justin Lin), and Hu Angang have the most influence in the government, 184 Personal interview, Washington, DC, 12 February 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 1”). 185 Personal interview, Washington, DC, 16 February 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 2”). 186 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 22 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 9”). 187 Interview Number 9. 73 whereas Yan Xuetong’s comments are often taken with a grain of salt. 188 A Shanghai- based security analyst says that the influence of scholars is growing but still limited. 189 He says there are opportunities via the small working groups and the government think tanks (e.g., his own SIIS), but that the impact is not major. He claims that most of the current leadership has engineering backgrounds so its members seek insight from social scientists. Most of the analysis performed by the government think tanks is long term. He also says that in general, Beijing-based scholars have more influence than do Shanghai-based scholars, owing to geographic proximity. He also believes that scholars focusing on non-traditional security issues have increasing opportunities to affect government policy. He thinks that as a community, scholars are more drawn to non- traditional security out of intellectual curiosity. 190 A Shanghai-based political scientist claims that only a few scholars have true influence on policy. 191 He says that Hu Jintao collected some of the best scholars on Taiwan for their opinions. He also states that the Politburo holds monthly meetings where scholars are invited to give lectures on various issues. He says that thinks tank scholars hold more sway than do most university professors due to better connections. 192 188 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 26 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 10”). 189 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 4 June, 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 12”). 190 Interview Number 12. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 74 Overall, security scholars and their concepts appear to have relatively limited influence on PRC policy-making. However, the evidence also points to an increasing policy-making influence on their (and presumably their ideas’) part. Scholars’ Assessments of “Comprehensive Security” in China The intellectual course of “comprehensive security” through Chinese academia is neither singular nor uniform. It has meant many things in the post-Deng era (1992- onward), not all directly linked to Buzan, though Buzan’s role and contributions are indeed being increasingly acknowledged, according to Richard Weixing Hu. 193 This disorganized nature points to a lack of clear, direct influence of Buzan’s ideas resulting on specific PRC security policies. This disorganized nature also limits the amount of measurable impact of his theories on PRC security policy-making in the post-Deng era. The post-Deng era has divergent views about how China is approaching “national security” and what path it will take. 194 Although a broad and genuine consensus exists that there is a move to address non-traditional security threats, the consensus is loose and does not point to true causation via theoretical, scholarly influence. Furthermore, despite the rise of nontraditional security writings, the consensus is still that traditional security concerns are the highest priority, for now. The research will show various accounts of how “comprehensive security” entered the PRC as a concept, and what issues it is meant 193 Personal interview, Hong Kong, 6 February 2006 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 23”). 194 Excellent research on this issue was performed by Susan Craig of the U.S. Department of Defense. Susan Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2007). 75 to address. There is no discernable pattern of certain scholars accounting for the entry and impact of “comprehensive security.” “National security,” according to many current Chinese scholars, is dependent upon three factors: the regional and global security situation (anquan xingshi), comprehensive national power (zonghe guoli) and national security strategy (anquan zhanlue). Chinese scholars are translating comprehensive security as zonghe anquan. It is part of a debate over a "new security concept" (xin anquan guan) that challenges the military-centric definition of security. 195 One Chinese scholar describes the new security concept as, “the organic whole of various elements including resources, economy, military, science and technology, education, politics, diplomacy, and national willpower and cohesive force.” 196 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi write in The Science of Military Strategy, comprehensive national power is “the source of combat effectiveness” and “the fundamental base for war preparations.” 197 195 Excellent work by U.S. scholars on this issue include Bates Gills, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy, published in 2007 by Brookings Press, and Avery Goldstein’s Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, published in 2005 by Stanford University Press. They trace the development of the “new security concept” to the failure to coerce Taiwan and the Philippines in 1995-6. 196 Li Changju, “Commentary: Augmenting Comprehensive National Strength, Safeguarding World Peace,” People’s Daily (30 June 1999) <english/people.com.cn/English/199906/30/enc_1999063001058_TopNews.html.> 197 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005): 177. 76 As early as 1991, Fu Mengzi, in articulating "new" security problems, stated that the means to achieve national security objectives has become "soft" (ruan hua) (i.e., nonmilitary). 198 Lei Shihai proclaimed: The development of new conditions has made it such that in protecting international security you cannot ignore categories beyond military security. In a time of economic globalization you cannot separate military security, economic security, and social security. As national interdependency deepens, countries become more closely bound by common causes. Because of this, it is only by establishing a comprehensive security concept that world peace can achieve a dependable guarantee.” 199 A Shanghai-based scholar declares that China is embracing a “new security concept” that incorporates traditional and non-traditional security issues. 200 In its foreign policy form the concept entails “common security,” which he defines as essentially cooperative diplomacy. He notes that even military leaders are beginning to think in comprehensive terms. As an example, he points out that PLA leaders are seeing the utility of Taiwan reunification problems being solved by economics and diplomacy, rather than missile-borne coercion. According to this scholar, the source of this conceptual and policy evolution was the end of the Cold War. It conceptually grew out of the concept of Comprehensive National Strength, which appeared in the early 1990s. This evolution was manifested in Jiang’s foreign policy via the Shanghai Five/Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the late-1990s, yet received its first true shot in the arm from 198 Fu Mengzi, "Chong jingji anquan jiaodu an dui feichuantong anquan de kanfa" [My Views on Nontraditional Security from the Perspective of Economic Security], Xiandai guoji guanxi 3 (1991): 1-2. 199 Lei Sihai, “Abandon Cold War Thinking, Establish as New Concept,” Beijing Fazhi Ribao (December 30, 1999): 4. 200 Interview Number 7. 77 the Asian Financial crisis of 1997-8 with the realization that globalization gives rise to completely new threats to security. He declared that the notion of comprehensive security – the incorporation of non-traditional security threats into the state’s security policy – is flowing deeper and wider into Chinese leaders’ views. 201 Ting Wai also sees the source of this integration being in China’s notion of Comprehensive National Strength, which he claims first gained footing in the 14 th National Party Congress of 1992. 202 He said the primary impetus was the end of the Cold War, which spurred debates in Chinese intellectual circles about China’s soft power and non-traditional security threats— but it was the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that made the political leadership truly wake up and take notice to these threats and threat referents. 203 However, scholars have written more about comprehensive security in its foreign policy form (à la Japan) than the theoretical, academic framework of Buzan, with its focus on domestic issues. Many scholars see comprehensive security primarily in the arena of foreign affairs— less so in dealing with domestic concerns. One Shanghai security scholar traces the origin of this theory in China to Japan, and also cites the Asian financial crisis as an inspiration. Yet he also cites the effect of the fall of the USSR as illustrating the pitfalls of devoting undue resources to military issues at the expense of civil issues. He points to Chinese research on Comprehensive National Strength in the early 1990s as Comprehensive Security’s intellectual forefather 201 Ibid. 202 Personal interview, Hong Kong, 14 February 2006 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 24”). 203 Interview Number 24. 78 in Chinese circles, though economic security’s foundation lies in Deng’s Four Modernizations and the focus on economic development. He also cited the 14 th Party Congress of 1992 as evidence of Zhongnanhai’s embryonic focus on non-traditional security issues. 204 A Beijing-based political scientist, on the other hand, asserts that it is Hu Jintao’s greater awareness of domestic concerns (primarily based on his professional experiences in Tibet), which contrasts to Jiang relative lack of interest, which drives the government focuses on domestic and non-traditional security. 205 A Shanghai-based scholar traced the path of “comprehensive security” from Deng’s greater shift to internal development over foreign involvement. 206 However, it the theory crystallized in the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, according to the second Beijing scholar. China needed a new and broader definition of “security.” He also points to globalization and greater international interdependence. He asserted that Jiang’s security concept was most influenced by the growth both of globalization and of transnational issues. The initial Chinese application of the security concept was in foreign policy; transnational issues that affected peoples of various countries fostered the sub-concepts of “common security” and “cooperative security.” Hu’s “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” embrace common peace 204 Interview Number 2. 205 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 12 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 4”). 79 and human security more than China’s prior policies. He observed that sometimes traditional security intersects and overlaps with non-traditional security. 207 Ying also makes a foreign policy emphasis, declaring that comprehensive security, in the context of the fourth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1997, is a concept of security embracing military and non-military factors; the concept of cooperation-based security, “which aims at replacing the security formula in the Cold War era which was based on containment and on balance of forces, with a multilateral security mechanism based on mutual trust and cooperation.” 208 One scholar produced a variation of comprehensive security for China. Wang Yizhou of the CASS made the prescription for a “stereoscopic security concept” based on Deng Xiaoping Theory. 209 According to Wang, the “stereoscopic security concept” has some similarities with but is actually different from comprehensive security. The core of this concept is military security, but the concept also comprises information security, economic security, financial security, and ecological security. He calls for modernized national troops, but also for modern information technology, a system for innovation in science and technology, measures and arrangements for fending off crises (e.g., financial 206 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 14 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 14”). 207 Interview Number 14 208 A Ying, “Safe Cooperation and Safety of Cooperation,” Renmin Ribao (16 July 1997). 209 Wang Yizhou, “Warning at the End of the Century: Hegemonism Characterized by ‘Human Rights Exceeding Sovereignty,’” Beijing Liaowang 21 (May 1999): 3-6. 80 crises), and a social environment for ensuring stability and development. He specifically cites the Asian financial crisis as a security threat to against which to prepare. 210 Taking a unique view is Tang Shiping. Being a constructivist, he insists that leaders perceive the state of their country and the world, and their perceptions drive policy-making. In the case of China and comprehensive security, he claims that the major turning point in leaders’ perceptions of “national security” was the Asian Financial Crisis, which made economic security – which was always a priority – into a an issue that eclipses even military security. 211 The Science of National Security (SNS) was published in 2004 by the Peking University Institute of International Relations. 212 In accounting for the evolution of the definition of “national security,” the SNS sees pre-revolutionary China as possessing a traditional, military definition of national security, as did all other powers during those times, with sovereignty as the ultimate content of the nation-state. 213 The SNS terms the post-Realist security definition as the “new national security perspective.” The SNS describes it as lacking: a uniform ideological system and it is not even a national security perspective that possesses the same perspectives. Rather, it is the general term for the various 210 Ibid. 211 Interview Number 22. 212 Liu Yuejin, ed. Guojia Anquan Xue (The Science of National Security) (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Publishing House, 2004). 213 Ibid. at 298. 81 national security perspectives that have appeared or have received attention and wide consideration during the latter part of the Cold War or after its conclusion. 214 This magnum opus traces the origins of comprehensive security to the Japanese government at the end of the 1970s, with some ASEAN members identifying with the concept in the 1980s. Japan’s concept was meant to address threats such as wars, energy crises, resource crises, and natural disasters. The means of doing so were the economy, politics, military, and diplomacy in an interlinked way to realize their comprehensive functions. Comprehensive security, according to the SNS, evolved in the ASEAN states because of their relative weak economies, complex ethnic and religious tensions, and political instabilities. The SNS highlights Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia as countries that openly incorporated nontraditional threats and unorthodox means of protecting their countries against those threats. Although the state was the primary referent, societal security was also prominent due to the ethnic and religious tensions in these countries. The SNS differentiates comprehensive security from the “common security concept,” which it traces back to Europe during the Cold War. The SNS attributed the origin of this species to the Olaf Palme Commission, with support from the UN General Assembly. In essence, the SNS claims that “common security” is an arms control strategy born in an age of potential global nuclear Armageddon. The final cousin in this family (according to the SNS) is the “cooperative security perspective.” The SNS credits the Brookings Institution as first articulating this concept in 1988. The SNS asserts that the next phase of development of this concept was in 1990 when the 214 Ibid. at 299. 82 Canadian government began to advocate implementing cooperative security in the Pacific Rim. Canada wanted to implement a “North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue” to deal with regional threats emerging at the end of the Cold War (the SNS does not elaborate as to what those threats were). Australia picked up this flag in 1993. Canberra had been attempting to establish a security coordination mechanism similar to the Helsinki cooperative security mechanism. It pushed ASEAN and the UN General Assembly to adopt its ideas. 215 Another major work through which comprehensive security entered the lexicon is Chen Yifu’s A Thorough Analysis of Questions Concerning China’s National Security, published by the Military Science Press of the Academy of Military Sciences in 2005. 216 In it, Chen writes: Entering a new century and a new phase, along with the expansion of China’s national interests China’s national security strategy has gradually transitioned from the past, when military security was taken as the main component, into comprehensive security, which takes into account politics, economics, science and technology, resources, information and other contents, as the main components….National security is not only national defense security but also comprehensive security. A nation that comes under military threats from abroad is no doubt insecure, but the splittist activities of certain types of domestic political powers are similarly insecure. In the same way, a nation that endures a serious natural disaster, a nation subject to blockades and economic sanctions, or a nation that suffers from the serious intrusion of environmental degradation, are all insecure. As such, in addition to natural factors (and natural disasters), the factors that affect, harm, and threaten national security also include domestic anxieties” and “foreign aggression,” and other man-made factors….China’s national security strategy is a comprehensive strategy that covers military, political, economic, talents, resources and information security and other realms. 215 Ibid. at 299-301. 216 Chen Yifu, A Thorough Analysis of Questions Concerning China’s National Security (Military Science Press, 2005). 83 Military and political security is the prerequisite and the guarantee of national security and economic security is the foundation of national security. 217 These varying accounts of theoretical impact reveal that there has indeed been an opportunity for ideas to flourish and to provide cogent theoretical descriptions and policy prescriptions. While admittedly being quite robust, this work still does not point to a chain of intellectual influence by Buzan or COPRI. Comprehensive Security has been defined in different ways in this community, and has been attributed to different sources. This lack of uniformity undermines a sense of clear and direct influence by a singular school of thought and a specific theory. Had there been more unequivocal evidence of direct connection, we could argue true causation, but that does not appear to be the case here. Many scholars argue that China must have a comprehensive security strategy similar to what Japan adopted in the 1970s. The PRC leadership, some Chinese scholars argue, is realizing that national security threats arise not only from abroad but also internally (e.g., domestic terrorism, deterioration of the ecological system, and natural calamities). Chinese scholars assert that China must ensure that its economic interests are free from interruptions or threats posed by any internal or external elements. Military security must be considered only one component in a comprehensive national security strategy. Chu Shulong states that: China's security notion is a comprehensive one. On one hand, it stresses the importance of the nation's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability. On 217 Ibid. at 9-11. 84 the other hand, it accepts and pays attention to the political and social stability of the nation, economic security, and other emerging security issues, such as energy and environment. 218 A Shanghai-based scholar describes a debate in China’s national security community over hard power, soft power, and national security. 219 He asserts that the answer among Chinese policy-makers is that China needs more sources of power (i.e., soft power) to deal with China’s new security concerns (e.g., terrorism and pandemics). He also remarks that comprehensive security issues overlap with one-another in Chinese decision makers’ eyes. One example is North Korea: Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and bluster creates a traditional security dilemma in the region vis-à-vis South Korea and the U.S., but the resulting influx of North Korean refugees into northern China in the event of a conflict is an issue of societal and economic security. He did concede that Taiwan as a traditional security concern can potentially trump all other security concerns. 220 Tang Yongsheng wrote that comprehensive security should be a state in which national political, economic, and military interests are free from threat and disruption, internal and external, traditional and nontraditional. 221 To achieve comprehensive security, a state must have a holistic way of coping with security problems. Chu Shulong states that, 218 Chu Sulong and Peng Chunyan, "Postwar New Developments in the International Security Theories," Xiandai gouji guanxi 4 (1999): 32. 219 Interview Number 6. 220 Ibid. 221 Tang Yongsheng and Cheng Hainan, "On Comprehensive Security," Ouzhou [Europe] 3 (1997): 43. 85 China's security notion is a comprehensive one. On one hand, it stresses the importance of the nation's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-inviolability. On the other hand, it accepts and pays attention to the political and social stability of the nation, economic security, and other emerging security issues, such as energy and environment. 222 In Chinese scholastic circles economic development has become indispensable to security (shengcun yu fazhan). Minxin Pei advocates China protecting its national interests by employing both "soft" and "hard" means (ran ying liang shou). 223 However, even if the “comprehensive security” theory as theorized by Buzan and COPRI is not getting due credit in the PRC, that does not mean it is not making an impact. The research shows that the substance and content of Buzan’s work is readily apparent in PRC security scholarship. This impact is seen in the plethora of work on “non-traditional security” in the PRC. A Buzan by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet: The Impact of the Content of Comprehensive Security There is an undeniable trend within the PRC toward viewing China’s security situation in transnational and non-traditional terms. The SNS outlines 10 key pillars of national security. Some of these pillars coincide with Buzan’s five sectors of comprehensive security (e.g., Economic Security, Political Security, Ecological Security), while others overlap: e.g., Security of Territory (i.e., Taiwan, North Korea; India; 222 Chu Sulong and Peng Chunyan, "Postwar New Developments in the International Security Theories," Xiandai gouji guanxi 4 (1999): 32. 223 Pei Minxin, "Chengli guojia anquan weiyuanhui he ran shili" [Establishing National Security Council and Soft Power], Xin Bao (Hong Kong) (24 January 2000): 7. 86 terrorism), Security of Sovereignty (i.e., non-interference), Security of the Military (i.e., modernizing the PLA, maintaining a nuclear second-strike capability), and Security of a Nation’s People (internal societal security and overseas Chinese security). Some pillars go beyond any of Buzan’s sectors: Science and Technology Security, and Information Security. China’s institutional structure and leadership focus areas demonstrate the importance of each pillar for national security: Looking from the historical perspective of the advancement and development of mankind, and understanding from the height of the essence and pattern of the national security activities it is clear that in the larger national security system the security and interest of the citizen are at the head of the national security and constitute the ultimate objective for the national security activities. Economic security is the foundation of the national security. Military security is the protective of the national security. Cultural security is the spiritual carrier of the national security. Science and Technology Security and Information security are the keys to the national security in the era of knowledge security. 224 In the first two sections of the SNS, the contributors categorize the threats to national security as either natural or social, and either internal or external. They see the mission of national security scholarship in the following way: “study and explore objective state, essence and laws of national security and its related subjects, interpret all national security phenomena, and support and guide national security activities.” 225 They also establish that the major referent of national security in the Chinese setting is meant to be the nation and the state, not just the state (emphasis added). They further establish that national interests are derived from national needs, that needs can sometimes be negative or even malignant, and that interests are always good and objectively measured 224 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 306-7. 225 Ibid. at 4. 87 (e.g., exist regardless of those in power and/or those whom the interests serve). In purest definition, this work claims that, “’National Security’ is achieved when the country is in an objective state of no external threat and encroachment but also no internal confusion and illness or problems. PRC scholars are actively researching and debating what they call “non- traditional” security issues. To a very large extent, the substance of these issues overlaps with COPRI’s five sectors. PRC scholars trace numerous geneses for the rise of this work (e.g., the Asian Financial crisis of 1996-7, the SARS crisis). However, many scholars assert that despite the increasing sense of non-traditional threats as part of security policies emanating from Zhongnanhai, traditional security concerns still command top priority. Furthermore, the scholars’ observations are that PRC security policy-makers are reacting to events more so than to ideas as sources of security policy formulation. Guo Xuetang of Shanghai’s Tongji University offered his definition of nontraditional security, which heavily incorporates a country’s internal problems: There are many differences of view in China and outside over defining the concept of “nontraditional security.” There are relatively many factors of nontraditional security; in general it refers to various conflicts closely linked to non-military threats; “apart from military, political, and diplomatic conflicts, it refers to other factors that compose a threat to the existence and development of sovereign states and the whole of mankind”….Hence, nontraditional security can also be called non-military security, and a country’s internal problems can also become national security problems. Compared with military threats whose content is relatively simple, nontraditional security factors are extremely wide- ranging, mainly including: environmental security, financial security, ecological [and] environmental security, information security, resource security, terrorism, weapon proliferation, the spread of epidemics, transnational crime, narcotics 88 smuggling, illegal immigration, piracy, money laundering, and so on. A country’s internal problems also come within the scope of national security. 226 One Beijing-based political scientist reflects that China has had no strong, consistent sense of “security” since 1842 (i.e., the end of the first Opium War). 227 He expounded on this idea by noting that even though the threat of invasion has decreased, general Chinese fear of territorial security threats has increased. He also claimed this anxiety has spilled over to non-traditional security threats as well (e.g., health issues, lack of education, labor problems, and so forth). He made the further point that older generations have a greater tolerance for security threats due to the greater instability facing China during their era. The end result, according to him, is that China’s conception of “security” has grown to include financial security, terrorism, and pandemics as threats. He also stated that the prior conception had only military, political, and ideological threats. He further added that common persons worry about non- traditional threats on a daily basis, but should a traditional threat become a crisis, it would eclipse all. 228 Two Beijing-based security analysts assert that the whole approach to “security” is changing. They claim that Mao and Deng used the term “struggle,” whereas the current generation of leadership uses the term “harmony” in its place. The international 226 Guo Xuetong, “Nontraditional Security and China’s Rise,” Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu (December 30, 2005): 24-28. 227 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 25 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 21”). 228 Interview Number 21. 89 environment resulting from the end of the Cold War has made economic security vitally important to comprehensive security; environmental security is rapidly becoming more important as well. They pointed to a debate within Beijing between “national security,” which they claimed encompassed traditional security plus economic, financial, and societal security, and “public security,” which they claimed entails pandemics and environmental concerns. Although economic, societal, and environmental security issues are rising in importance, traditional security will remain China’s primary security concern for at least 5-10 years. 229 One Beijing-based security expert asserted that non-traditional security threats have been a concern since 1989, when China felt itself politically and economically ostracized by the rest of the world. 230 A Shanghai-based scholar insists that there is no one hard and fast definition of “national security” that Chinese officials use. 231 Moreover, he claims that scholars have their own differences, and those, too, are fluid. He claims that ultimately, globalization and economic growth drive China’s security policies. He believes that China’s national security interests are somewhat unique; there is a dynamic tension between growing power and traditional culture. He says that Hu’s security focus is on domestic issues, and that “harmonious society” is a major manifestation of this domestic security priority. In effect, the policy is to take care of domestic affairs first. If this effort proves fruitful, foreign policy will follow suit. In the end, he believes that non-traditional security is as 229 Interview Number 5. 230 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 28 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 25”). 231 Interview Number 9. 90 important to leadership as is traditional security. He supports this belief by asserting that there is no longer a Soviet threat and that no Chinese soldier has died in combat since 1979. He concedes that Taiwan is still a major issue in the security realm, but that health and economic issues are greater because of their more significant impact on society at large. His second assertion is the undeniable presence and concern over non-traditional security issues such as SARS and the Asian Financial crisis, and that those have more true impact on Chinese citizens than does Taiwan. He claims that Taiwan is a long-term issue, and therefore not an urgent security problem, as these non-traditional problems are. Other threats to security are corruption and religious extremism. 232 A Shanghai-based security scholar declares that traditional security issues exist alongside non-traditional security issues, but that non-traditional security concerns are rising due to the increase of new problems. 233 However, he also believes that traditional security is still number one because of the Taiwan issue, and that China’s military capabilities (i.e., missiles) are what keep this problem controlled. He attributes China’s non-traditional security problems to its geography and regional location (e.g., separatist movements, terrorists, etc.). He describes how the transnational quality of many of these problems fosters regional cooperation, though some of the cooperation hurts more than helps. He also alludes to human rights violations being a problem. This scholar pronounces that China doesn’t face a major external traditional security threat; only the 232 Ibid. 233 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 30 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 11”). 91 Taiwan issue has the potential to lead to war. He thinks that both Japan and North Korea are long-term issues that can be solved diplomatically, and without the use of force. Although he acknowledges that Chen Shui-bian’s exit from the Presidential Palace in 2008 reduces tension somewhat, he describes the Taiwan “problem” as greater than any one individual – that it is an issue of territory and sovereignty. He says that as long as there are individuals like Lee Teng-hui, there will be problems. He does not believe that cross-Strait economic integration will lead to any type of political integration. This scholar also asserts there is no single definition of “national security,” and that dividing it into “traditional” and “non-traditional” security is perfunctory. He believes that it is all country-specific; the U.S. worries about terrorism, China worries about stability, and Europe worries about immigration. 234 Chinese scholars assert that China must ensure that its economic interests are free from interruptions or threats posed by any internal or external elements. Military security must be considered only one component in a comprehensive national security strategy." Some Chinese scholars even proclaim that any threat to China’s “national dignity” and “status of equality in the international community” are threats to national security. 235 Chinese scholars from the Center for National Strategy Studies at Shanghai Jiaotong University included the news media and the growing elderly population as nontraditional threats to China’s security. 236 Analysts at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies 234 Interview Number 11. 235 Peng, Science of Military Strategy, at 445. 236 Susan Craig, Supra, at 102. 92 included drug trafficking, piracy, and WMD. 237 One Shanghai-based scholar enumerated terrorism, WMD proliferation, drugs, environmental degradation, piracy, energy security, and pandemics such as HIV and SARS as nontraditional threats. 238 He claims that security issues – both traditional and nontraditional – are changing. 239 He also believes that the primary agent of change is globalization and the polarization of success among different countries in the globe. He listed pandemics and energy security (primarily oil) as the primary threats to “human security” that have emerged. He declared that China’s diplomacy now incorporates these non-traditional security concerns (using multilateral fora as an example). 240 One Shanghai-based scholar does not think that China has fully settled on its security priorities. 241 For the most part, traditional security issues – notably Taiwan – have been China’s primary security concern (he points to China’s Defense White Papers over the years as evidence). However, he declares that non-traditional security concerns are taking center stage, though not necessarily at the expense of traditional security concerns. He claimed the two are not mutually exclusive. 242 237 Ibid. 238 Interview Number 14. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 241 Interview Number 12. 242 Ibid. 93 Among the Chinese academic community and some other influential elite, the threat from nontraditional security crises is increasingly being seen as more likely than before. Wang Jisi claims that, overall, an excessively aggressive Chinese posture to the rest of the region is not likely because of China’s desire to concentrate on domestic development. 243 Or, as Yu Xintian of the SIIS sees it: The likelihood that China is hit by [a] nontraditional threat is fairly high. China is vulnerable to nontraditional threats due to its insufficient institutional and physical preparedness…Since the 1990s, China has been frequently hit be nontraditional security threats such as the threat to economic security (East Asian financial crisis), hygiene security (SARS, poultry flu, AIDS, and so on), and environmental security threat (flood, sandstorm, drought, and so on). Terrorism and transnational crimes have already done harm to China’s security, and the degree of which will only grow than drop. Diseases and environmental problems are not new for China, but their risks have remarkably increased thanks to globalization and liberalization. Their internal impacts and international domino effect will be great. Their shock and destruction will greatly exacerbate. What are particularly notable are the unpredictable crises and conflicts, which are most difficult to tackle. 244 A 2004 survey of influential elite asked what challenges and/or crises China would face before 2010 that are most likely to harm social and economic development. These experts believed that the major areas of crisis in China prior to 2010 would primarily be social, followed by economic; unemployment and public safety were listed as “high risk” areas. The environment was seen as the issue most likely to spur economic crises. Chu Shulong articulates terrorism, environmental degradation, energy supplies, 243 Ryosei, Supra, at 19. 244 Yu Xintian, “Understanding and Preventing New Conflicts and Wars: China’s Peaceful Rise as a Strategic Choice,” International Review 35 (Summer 2004) <www.siis.org/cn/english/journal/2004/2/Yu%Xintian.htm> 94 culture clashes, pandemics, and transnational crime as non-traditional security threats that merit the same attention as do traditional security threats. 245 Many scholars identify globalization and its resultant transnational issues as security threats to the PRC. Because it is yet to truly mature economically, China is “vulnerable to the impact of international monopoly capital expansion,” while its dependence on foreign resources, capital, technology, and markets makes it, “subject to the embroilment into the outside economic situation and the risks of manipulation and restriction by outside forces.” 246 Globalization has also had an effect on China’s security definitions. As Wang Jisi observes, “The factors that seriously may threaten China’s national security are the problems that can turn ‘external worries’ into ‘internal troubles.’” 247 To achieve comprehensive security, a state must have a holistic way to cope with security problems. In Chinese scholastic circles, economic development has become indispensable to security (shengcun yu fazhan). Minxin Pei advocates China protecting its national interests by employing both "soft" and "hard" means (ran ying liang shou). 248 245 Chu, “Security Challenges,” Supra. 246 Ibid. at 437. 247 Wang Jisi, “Some Evaluations of China’s International Environment and U.S. Strategic Direction,” Xiandai Gouji Guanxi 11 (November 20, 2002): 2-3. 248 Pei Minxin, "Chengli guojia anquan weiyuanhui he ran shili" [Establishing National Security Council and Soft Power], Xin Bao (Hong Kong) (24 January 2000): 7. 95 One Shanghai-based scholar stresses the importance of the middle-class as a driver of security policy. 249 This group is concerned with issues that affect them directly. They want less pollution and better health care. He asserts that 20 years ago, the average Chinese would have supported a nuclear test by North Korea. Now the opposite is true. Also, since the reforms of Deng, China’s general populace’s power has risen and is becoming more linked with the world economy than before, so globalized economic growth is important to them. The result is that China is focusing on non-traditional security issues at least as much as it attends to traditional security issues. 250 Along those lines, two Shanghai security scholars assert that in this day and age both scholars and policy-makers agree that non-traditional security issues (e.g., economic development) are more important than traditional security issues. They believe that the only disagreement on this point would come from some members of the PLA. However, they do concede that certain security issues cross the traditional/non-traditional border, notably Taiwan – which is both a military issue and an issue of identity and regime legitimacy. 251 One Shanghai-based professor believes that 9/11 lit the fire that made Chinese policy-makers clearly divide “national security” into traditional and nontraditional categories. 252 Traditional security (i.e., war with big powers and/or regional wars) is still 249 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 23 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 15”). 250 Interview Number 15. 251 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 24 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 16”). 252 Interview Number 8. 96 prevalent, but non-traditional threats such as terrorism, SARS, domestic poverty, and global warming have been commanding greater attention from Beijing. He asserts that big-power wars are virtually impossible and that regional wars are possible though still highly improbable. He does list certain traditional security threats to China, such as territorial disputes with Japan, war on the Korean peninsula, and Taiwan. He points out that the Korean peninsula and terror issues qualify as both traditional and non-traditional security threats. He also proclaims that China needs a favorable security environment, which is what Hu’s “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” aim to achieve. He observes that a negative side-effect of China’s rapid growth has been a polarization of wealth in China, hence the need for Hu’s “harmonious society” policy. As such, he asserts that economic development is vital to maintain stability, which is China’s top security priority. He said that Taiwan is important but secondary. 253 Another Shanghai-based political scientist defines traditional security as threats that require the PLA to defend the country. 254 The primary referent is the state; the means of protection is the standing military. One gap he points out in the traditional/non- traditional juxtaposition definition is that terrorism is a threat that is as old as any traditional threat to a state’s territorial integrity, yet is usually categorized as a non- traditional threat (he points to terrorist threats existing during the Qing Dynasty). However, in modern policy parlance, non-traditional threats are always seen as new, modern threats. He thinks there is an inconsistency in the categories. He continues by 253 Ibid. 254 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 2 June 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 18”). 97 stating that traditional threats during the Cold War were inter-state conflicts, whereas non-traditional threats are often intra-state. He declares that wending (stability) is indeed a major security priority for China, but that is not the top priority; the top priority is CCP survival. All other security priorities – economic growth, stability, Taiwan, and so on – feed into this. CCP rule is enshrined in the State constitution. Given that there is little democracy in China, the CCP does not concern itself with winning elections, but rather with generating wealth and fighting corruption to keep what would otherwise be a voting class in a democracy happy. He categorizes China as striving to be like Singapore – a “new authoritarian state.” These states are not truly democratic and allow little— if any— dissent, but the rulers are benign and the general populace enjoys a high standard of living. He says that China will allow a fair amount of reform and dissent except when it comes to challenging the rulership of the CCP. He goes so far to say that China’s military response to a Taiwan declaration of de jure independence is driven less by ideology and more by fear of looking illegitimate. In other words, because of the costs of entering a war over Taiwan, Zhongnanhai would refrain attacking Taiwan if the populace never called for military intervention and threatened CCP rule. 255 One Shanghai scholar does observe that non-traditional security priorities rose dramatically after 9/11 (due to the newfound concern over terrorism). However, he still asserts that despite this newfound high-profile, terrorism is still second fiddle to Taiwan as a security issue in Beijing’s eyes. He attributes much of China’s security issues to the 255 Interview Number 18. 98 need to secure its borders; India is an example he offers. He dismisses issues such as poverty, the environment, and energy as security issues. He claims that they are high priority concerns for China, but they are not “national security” issues per se. These issues and others, which some scholars call “human security,” are not true issues of “national security.” In that regard this particular scholar is very much a Realist. He puts forth that stable borders and territorial integrity are the prerequisites for focusing on non- traditional security issues. On a policy level, he believes that Hu is concerned with domestic economic and development problems, but according to this scholar, these are not considered to be issues of national security. He believes that Hu and most of the other leaders are worrying less about national security issues because of the effect of global economic interdependence as a disincentive to conflict. This scholar thinks that the next generation of Chinese leadership will not change much in terms of national security and other policies. He believes they will generally follow Hu’s policies. 256 One Shanghai-based scholar believes that China is at a strategic crossroads; it needs to decide what kind of “stakeholder” it will be. 257 Does it want to change the system or make the system work? In academic parlance, is it a Status Quo or a Revisionist power? He believes that non-traditional security concerns (his examples being global warming, energy security, and terror) are definitely rising, but traditional security still holds the number one spot, with Taiwan as the perfect illustrative case. 256 Interview Number 3. 257 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 6 June 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 13”). 99 However, he does concede that, for most Chinese, non-traditional security concerns are more important. 258 Despite these steps toward a focus on comprehensive security, one Shanghai scholar insists that traditional security is primary. 259 He points to the continuing rise of China’s military budget as proof. He also says that China’s education and health budgetary expenditures have not grown as fast as the military’s has. He lastly points to the shallowness of China’s non-traditional security scholarship; everything is “securitized,” and, if everything is an issue of “security,” then nothing truly is. This sloppy analysis on the part of China’s scholars reflects the immaturity and lack of concreteness of China’s non-traditional security thoughts and policies. He then asserts that Taiwan is still China’s top security concern, and that this concern falls under the rubric of traditional security. He does concede that for the Chinese man-on-the-street, non-traditional concerns such as health and economic growth were more important, but he claimed that this issue is not truly relevant: the Chinese leadership thinks about Taiwan and it is their opinion that counts. He refers to a 2003 order by Zhongnanhai to over 100 Chinese embassies abroad instructing them to convey the message that should Taiwan pass its 2004 security referendum, that act would constitute crossing a “red line” in Beijing’s eyes. He also claims that the development of the J-10 and the ASAT test were Taiwan-specific acts. He does concede that the economic interdependence between 258 Interview Number 13. 259 Interview Number 10. 100 China and Taiwan does inhibit tension, and that once Chen Shui-bian leaves office concerns over Taiwan independence will decrease, but he countered by saying that China still has traditional security concerns with Japan in the long-term (he said that China thinks of North Korea as more of a non-traditional security concern). 260 Agreeing with the Realist/traditional view is Li Mingjing of the Nanyang Technological Institute. He insists that traditional/Realist/military security is still the predominant priority for current Chinese leaders. He echoes Shen’s analysis that the CCP holds a Realpolitik view of its own rulership: that all other priorities are secondary to this imperative. 261 Jason Blazevic also writes that Tokyo perceives the PRC as being Offensive Realist in its regional foreign policies. 262 Bolstering this view is the work of Daniel Lynch, who applied English School analytical techniques to research that revealed “an unmistakably cynical Realism to be still at the core of Chinese thinking on the international future.” 263 The broad analysis reveals a pattern of growing focus on non-traditional security scholarship and an increasing sense of non-traditional threats as part of security policies emanating from Zhongnanhai, with traditional security concerns still holding a top priority. Furthermore, the scholars’ observations are that PRC security policy-makers are 260 Ibid. 261 Personal interview, Singapore, 12 February 2008 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 29”). 262 Jason Blazevic, “Japan and the East China Sea: Realism, Policy and the Security Dilemma,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 10.1 (Winter, 2010). 263 Daniel C. Lynch, “Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?” The China Quarterly 197 (March, 2009): 87. 101 reacting to events (e.g., the Asian financial crisis, the SARS crisis) more than to ideas as sources of security policy formulation. The practical result from this pattern is that even though PRC security policy-makers are displaying signs of non-Realist/traditional security viewpoints through certain policies, their reasons for doing so derive from realist worldviews. Scholars’ Identification and Analysis of China’s Primary Post-Deng Military Sector Concerns This section’s purpose is multi-fold. The first purpose is to lay out what Chinese scholars are writing about the PRC’s military sector (i.e., traditional/Realist security) and how and what they are defining as traditional threats/threat references within that sector. However, I will also try to introduce an analysis of actual policies, to provide further insight into actual Chinese security policies, and conclude with my findings on whether the securitization process as laid out by Waever is useful for understanding the post-Deng PRC. My argument will be that the COPRI structure is useful; in applying that method, I find that although Taiwan is articulated as a security threat to the PRC’s military sector, the core essence and details of what makes it such a threat lends it to actually being more of a socio-cultural security threat than to a military security threat. Clear definitions are vital at this point. Buzan defines the military sector as being: about relationships of forceful coercion, and the ability of actors to fight wars with each other. It usually focuses on the two-level inter-play of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of actors in the international system, and their perceptions of each other’s intentions. 264 264 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000): 73. 102 The SNS chapter on Territorial Security provides a very traditional Realist definition of Territorial Security: Territorial sovereignty is the core of national sovereignty and it is the basis of national security and establishing independent and equal international relations. The ownership of a country on its territory has regulations that the country is the sole owner of the entire territory in its international relations. 265 The SNS also has a chapter on Military Security, which defines its goal as: to apply military force to protect the fundamental interests and security of citizens, national sovereign independence, and territorial integrity and unification, to defend national borders against violation and military threat, and to guarantee the security and interests of citizens. Therefore, in peacetime, the core of military security is to stop war and to make military preparation, and to reserve strength for dealing with possible future war. Its basic form is to conduct national defense and military modernization within the frame of national economic development. 266 Military Sector Threats The SNS enumerates several threats to China’s military security: WMDs, weapons in outer space, increased global military modernization (particularly the Revolution in Military Affairs), and the role of the U.S. in frustrating China’s relations vis-à-vis Taiwan and the South China Sea. This chapter goes on to list policies aimed at strengthening China’s military security. The list includes developing strategic cooperation with major powers, integrating into regional multilateral cooperation, strengthening economic cooperation, modernizing China’s national defense, and improving intelligence collection capabilities. 267 One clue that the SNS provides on the 265 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 68. 266 Ibid. at 125. 267 Ibid. 103 prominence of traditional/military security is in its chapter on the National Security Support System. According to the SNS the Support System consists of, “the military, the police, the intelligence agencies, and the diplomatic agencies.” 268 Although cultural, commercial, and other such agencies can also play a part in the National Security Support System, the SNS defines their role as secondary and as having other priorities. Clearly the SNS displays a bias towards traditional security threats and referents in this list of agencies. Ni Feng asserts that China has undergone a major transformation in how it views itself and the world, explaining: “It no longer views itself as a country on the edge of the international community, but as a rising power, with limited but increasingly significant capacity to shape its environment.” 269 A Beijing-based political scientist insists that Traditional Security concerns still trump non-traditional security concerns. 270 Shiping Tang proclaims that: There is little doubt that China’s security strategy is still rooted in realism. In seeking to overcome a “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi) at the hands of the West and Japan, generations of Chinese have strived to build a strong, prosperous China. Many Chinese elites believe that because of its size, population, civilization, history and, more recently, its growing wealth, China should be rightly regarded as a great power (da guo). This strong belief in the utility of power and motivation to accumulate power firmly anchors China’s security strategy within the realist camp. 271 268 Ibid. at 279. 269 Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds. The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 151. 270 Interview Number 4. 271 Tang Shiping, “From Offensive Realism,” Supra, at 15. 104 For Tang the only question is, what kind of realism? He adamantly concludes it is a defensive realism currently in China. 272 The eclipsing element of China’s military/traditional sector according to most observers – Chinese and non-Chinese – is the Taiwan issue. Among my interviews conducted with Chinese scholars and government officials, territorial integrity, with Taiwan as the prime example, ranked highest on China’s security concerns in nearly 95% of my 43 interviewees. Almost none of the mainland-based scholars challenged the notion that Taiwan is a part of the PRC’s territory. On its face, Taiwan is described as a security threat to the PRC’s military sector and/or as a traditional military security threat. However, when analyzing the substance of how the scholars and policies are framing the Taiwan threat, one concludes that Taiwan as a security threat is not meeting the military sector definition outlined by Buzan and Little. Rather, the essence of what makes Taiwan a threat to be securitized falls more into a socio-cultural category. In other words, the referent that the PRC is protecting from this threat is not in Buzan’s military sector, but rather in the socio-cultural sector. Taiwan’s role as a traditional/military sector concern was most vivid during the Strait crisis of 1995-6. Suettinger summed up Taiwan’s presence in China’s national security consciousness as a: 105 core issue, one that involved the Chinese people’s sense of history and destiny, the Communist Party’s legitimacy, the pride of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the government’s claim to sovereignty, as well as regional and global prestige. 273 In October 1996, at the close of the Sixth Party Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee, Jiang Zemin gave a powerful speech that equated socialism and patriotism and spoke of a “greater China” that included Taiwan and Hong Kong. 274 However, the Taiwan factor, while most prominent, is also complex and even subtle. The research shows it goes deeper than a threat to territorial integrity. Taiwan’s prominence for the PRC’s territorial integrity does not necessarily mean that Taiwan is the front-burner security issue on a day-to-day basis. Perhaps the most prominent of the U.S. watchers is Wang Jisi, formerly of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and now a professor at and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University. According to Wang, a subtle change has taken place in how China conceptualizes its Taiwan policy since 2001. 275 First, he claims it is more apparent to Beijing that, despite open U.S. political support of Taiwan and its democratic system, Washington’s Taiwan policy is not one of encouraging de jure independence. Second, Beijing assesses that time is on its side vis-à-vis Taiwan and unification. Chu Shulong declared, “To all Chinese, it is crystal clear that the most serious threat that the People’s 272 Ibid. 273 Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 202-3. 274 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Jiang Theory Extols ‘Greater Civilisation,’” South China Morning Post (17 October 1996). 275 Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds. The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 14. 106 Republic faces now and in the future is Taiwanese independence.” 276 Yet Chu also believes that a rising Japan, and the U.S. regional military buildup are security challenges to China as well, but more so in the long-term. Chen Shifu, though paying lip-service to comprehensive security’s non-military security threats, devotes most of his efforts to outlining China’s threats along the military line. 277 His initial security threat is Taiwan. He of course insists that Taiwan is a part of China. He goes on to analyze that Taiwan public opinion is being manipulated by a rabid political culture that is causing internal problems on Taiwan, with the U.S. as the behind- the-curtain culprit in Taiwanese bold splitism, through its support. 278 A Shanghai-based security scholar believes that the government still holds traditional security issues as its primary problem. 279 His primary case is Taiwan; despite the increased recognition of non-traditional security problems, the government’s concern over Taiwan will never wane, according to this scholar. He says ignoring the Taiwan issue and/or letting it go awry can threaten domestic stability, which is the key prerequisite for regime legitimacy. Stability is the foundation for all other Chinese goals as well. 280 276 Chu Shulong, “The Security Challenges in Northeast Asia: A Chinese View,” Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (23 November 2007) <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB800.pdf> 277 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 40-64. 278 Ibid. 279 Interview Number 12. 280 Ibid. 107 A Shanghai-based security expert claims that Beijing’s Taiwan policy has relaxed considerably since the 1980s. 281 According to him, Beijing’s clear-cut “red lines” were: a declaration of de jure independence, assertive foreign military presence on Taiwan, and Taipei delaying reunification talks. Currently, only the independence declaration is a red line. Moreover, the Taiwan Affairs Office used to insist on Taipei’s acceptance of the “One China” principle before any of the “Three-Links” could occur, but that requirement has dropped as well. However, Lin claims that the U.S. Neoconservatives will defend Taiwan regardless because Taiwan is a democracy. He further claims that the U.S. likes Taipei because it never challenges Washington, whereas Beijing does. Lastly, he highlights a meeting with several high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials who repeated the U.S.’s Strait policy as one of “strategic ambiguity.” He recounted how they confessed that if China was seen as starting a conflict, the U.S. would defend Taiwan, and that the opposite is true: that if Taiwan were to start the hostilities, the U.S. would not run to its defense. He retorted that this is not “strategic ambiguity” but rather double-clarity! He goes on by saying that Beijing hopes that economics and culture, as opposed to missiles, will solve the Taiwan problem. He declares that the more the Taiwan problem is solved by non-military means happens, the greater China will emphasize non-traditional security concerns over traditional. 282 It begs the question of why Taiwan is even defined as a threat to the PRC. 281 Interview Number 13. 282 Ibid. 108 However, another Shanghai-based security expert claims that Beijing is more Realist about this issue than most people realize. 283 Beijing knows it cannot defeat the U.S. military should a conflict arise, and that the threat of U.S. intervention makes Beijing back down. He even states that should Taiwan ever declare independence, Beijing would still seriously pause because of the U.S. military. He points to the Anti- Secession Law (ASL) as an example of Realism trumping even an emotional issue like Taiwan; even though it makes Taiwan’s declaring independence effectively illegal, the ASL is still written openly enough to give the leadership plausible room not to intervene. Beijing can decide how and when to enforce the ASL because Beijing interprets it as law. He says, in reality, the decision to attack Taiwan will be made because of policy, not law. When asked about a scenario of the PRC leadership launching some sort of attack on Taiwan to save face, he does concede that the masses are the X-factor in such a scenario. Yet he still insists that if the CCP legitimacy and leadership isn’t threatened by not attacking, then they won’t attack. He also declares: “Going to war and losing is worse than not going to war at all. In such a situation Beijing faces a painful choice no matter what, but they will always choose the least damaging outcome.” He says that the Chinese way is to suffer, complain, but then pragmatically move on and take the long- term outlook. He brings up the F-16 sales to Taiwan in 1992 as an example: Beijing voiced its anger and dismay, and then moved on. He says that Beijing knows that neither it nor Taiwan is physically going anywhere, so it can afford to be patient, even in the face 283 Interview Number 18. 109 of losing Taiwan (temporarily). He insists that China no longer wants to be isolated, which could happen if it wages war against Taiwan. 284 There are some who have characterized Taiwan as a threat to the PRC, but not in a military sense. For example, Yinan He wrote: At stake in Taiwan’s sovereignty is China’s national identity and pride because the state propaganda of nationalism has made the recovery of such ‘lost territories as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan a symbol of national rejuvenation…The government would face a legitimacy crisis if it showed any signs of compromise in sovereignty disputes over Taiwan. 285 Yet, as we see, Taiwan itself is not a direct threat in terms of taking PRC territory by force— though it can defend itself by force, hence its presence in the traditional security/military sector. PRC policy-makers are not framing Taiwan in a balance of power context, which is what one would expect in a traditional military sector of national security threats. The U.S., by virtue of its relationship with both Taiwan and Japan, ranks as a major threat element to China’s territorial integrity and, by extension, the military sector. Identifying the U.S. as the primary threat to China’s place in the world took on new life after the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis. Xiong Lei writes in the emotional, 1996, anti-U.S. bestseller Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou (The Plot to Demonize China) that “we do not seek to foment hatred of Americans, only to restore justice.” 286 284 Ibid. 285 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of Contemporary China 16.50 (2007): 13. 286 Li Xiguang, Liu Kang et al., Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou [The plot to demonize China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996): 83. 110 The SNS, along with many leading America-watchers in China, identify the U.S. as the primary regional, if not global, hegemonic threat to peace. 287 Jin Canrong, the Vice President and Professor of International Relations at People’s University wrote: Generally speaking, the national strategic goal of the post-Cold War United States has been relatively stable, that is, to maintain the U.S. “world leadership status for as long as possible. 288 Former director of American Studies at CASS, Zi Zhongyun, wrote in 1999 that U.S. hegemony “has included two aspects – ‘letting those who are with it thrive and prosper,’ and ‘letting those who are against it come to their doom’ [shunzhi zechang nixzhi zewang]. 289 Liu Jianfei, professor at the CCP Central Party School, believes the war on terror has become a convenient way for the U.S. to extend its hegemonic reach: If the Afghan war was focused on fighting terrorism, and promoting hegemony was a case of “incidentally hitting a rabbit while taking the grass,” the Iraq war was to a very great extent fought in order to promote a hegemonic strategy, and fighting terrorism and preventing proliferation just became a pretext for launching the war. 290 Wang Pufeng, a senior officer with the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), sees a U.S. hegemonic strategy that threatens China’s peace and stability: “Once Sino-U.S. relations 287 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra. 288 Jin Canrong, “Uncertainties Brought About by Going Against Tradition,” Xiandai Guoju Guanxi trans. Open Source Center (August 20, 2003): 19-21, 289 Zi Zhongyun, “For the Maximum Interests of the Nation for the Long-term Welfare of the People,” Taipingyang Xuebao 21 (December 14, 1999): 10-15. 290 Liu Jianfei, “Trends in Changes in U.S. Strategy Toward China,” trans. Open Source, Center.Beijing Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi, 14 February 2005. 111 become strained, it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. may wantonly find an excuse and carry out a ‘strike first’ attack against China.” 291 At an experts’ forum sponsored by CICR in 2003, all of the participating Chinese scholars from a wide variety of research institutes concurred: there was “change brewing in the international order.” These changes were almost entirely attributed to U.S. actions. Ruan Zongze, of the China Institute for International Security, accused the U.S. philosophy of national security of being a, “grim assault on and challenge to the existing international order.” He described this assault thusly: In the eyes of the United States, international treaties mechanisms, and security arrangements get in the way of its right to act on its own. The Iraqi war shows that the modern international order, represented by the UN, has become a constraint on America’s pursuit of its single-pole strategy. 292 U.S. hegemonism has carried over into the economic realm as well. Chinese scholars have noted the irony of the U.S. advocating a free market but protecting its own market from Chinese foreign direct investment: “Ordinary Chinese people see a business environment full of hostility in a country which advocates a free market.” 293 Some Chinese nationalists even see their economic power over the U.S. as being stronger than it truly is. For example, the authors of Chaoyue Meiguo (Surpassing America) assert that the U.S. is dependent on the Chinese economy: “If America drops out of the China 291 Shen Weiguang, ed. On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs (Beijing: New China Press): 187-198. 292 Ruan Zongze, “Change and Constraint,” trans. Open Source Center, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, paper presented at the Contemporary International Relations Experts Forum on “Assessments of U.S. Global Strategy,” (20 August 2003): 17-19. 293 Fu Mengzi, “’China Threat’ or ‘Threatening China,’” Shijie Zhishi (1 September 2005): 38-40. 112 market…the blow to America would be huge and unprecedented.” Americans, they claim, “cannot do without Chinese products twenty-four hours a day.” 294 Peter Hays Gries highlights the role of the 1999 Belgrade bombing as an amplifier for China’s sense of victimhood as a national security identifier: Here, suffice it to say that with the reemergence in the mid 1990s of a victimization narrative of Chinese suffering at the hands of Western imperialism, most Chinese understood the Belgrade bombing as yet another in a long history of Western insults. Chinese thus experienced the bombing as an assault on their collective self-esteem as “Chinese.” 295 In practice, the PLA and its advocacy of traditional/military security concerns did not roll over quietly. In Spring of 1996, PLA leaders began openly to advocate what was in essence a reversal in China’s overall evolving “security concept”: from one positing a world in which “peace and development” were the primary aspirations of the big powers to one framing the U.S.’s “hegemonism and power politics,” as severely threatening China’s future. 296 Dr. David Finkelstein of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) has argued that in 1999 this debate, particularly juxtaposed against its U.S. policy, was ended at Beidaihe. As was the norm of both foreign and domestic policy compromises under Jiang’s steward, the consensus was a compromise between sharply differing positions, leaning toward a more ideologically conservative, and not especially pragmatic, position. The leadership decided that the essence of its foreign policy line would remain: “peace 294 Xi Yongjun and Ma Zhuhai, Chaoyue Meiguo: Meiguo shenhua de zhongjie, [Surpassing America: the end of the American myth], (Huhehaote: Neimenggu Daxue Chubanshe, 1996): 228, 231n50. 295 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds. New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006): 328. 296 Suettinger, Supra, at 365. 113 and development” was still the principal path in the world, economic globalization would continue, and all nations were seen to covet a reduction of world tensions. Yet the leadership unequivocally identified the U.S. as the principle source of global instability, noting that “hegemonsim and power politics” were ascendant and that there was a tendency toward “intervention” in the sovereign affairs of other countries, and that the preservation of economic inequality was deliberate. 297 Chen Shifu, in developing a mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S., observes that the U.S. is the global hegemon whose actions are focused on maintaining that hegemony. He thinks China should criticize the U.S. when appropriate, but that it should not seek to usurp U.S. prominence because it cannot yet do so, and that China is still economically and even politically linked to the U.S. Consequently, it is in China’s interests to cultivate better relations with Washington and meanwhile follow Deng’s dictum and bide its time. 298 The U.S., as a military threat to China’s territorial integrity and therefore national security, is seen in China’s growing fear of a U.S.-led “containment” of China. Qian Wenrong, in the journal published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described U.S. military activity in East Asia in this manner: The United States has taken further steps to build an even tighter strategic ring of encirclement in China’s neighboring regions. Over the past more than 1 year, the United States has significantly strengthened its network of military bases in the 297 David M. Finkelstein, “China Reconsiders Its National Security: The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999” (Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, December 2000): 6-7, 21-23. 298 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 65-81. 114 Asia Pacific region and its alliance relationship with China’s neighboring countries; further strengthened the U.S. Pacific Fleet; and established forward military bases in Central Asia, which is contiguous to China’s Western region, in the name of counterterrorism. 299 China’s trepidation is quite manifest in its analysis of what it sees as the “China threat theory”: the United States has whipped up an evil wave of the ‘China threat theory’ domestically and internationally, which has caught the widespread attention of the international community.” 300 Chinese scholars have advanced three versions of the “China threat theory” genesis. A Beijing Review article attributes its origin to an August 1990 article by a professor at Japan’s National Defense University. 301 A second account comes from Xu Xin, president of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and former deputy chief of staff of the PLA. He claims that while in Hong Kong, former U.S. Ambassador James Lilley made the theme coherent when he openly criticized China’s military expansion. 302 However, the official account, which most Chinese scholars subscribe to, dates the genesis in late 1992, when China’s economic resurgence contradicted many U.S. predictions that China would collapse after the Tiananmen Massacre. 303 China tried to counter this idea in its official documents: “China will 299 Qian Wenrong, “What Has Influenced Bush?” trans. Open Source Center, Shijie Zhishe (September 1, 2005): 43. 300 Qian Wenrong, “The Evil Waves of the ‘China Threat Theory’ Are Rising Again,” Beijing Shijie Zhishi, trans. Open Source Center (September 1, 2005): 41. 301 Wang Zhongren, “‘China Threat’ Theory Groundless,” Beijing Review 40 (14-20 July 2007): 7-8. 302 Fang Zhi, “Who Threatens Who After All,” Liaowang, n.d., in FBIS (21 March 1996) FTS199603210000061. 303 Guan Cha Jia, “China’s Development is Beneficial to World Peace and Progress – Refuting the ‘China Threat’ Theory,” Renmin Ribao, overseas edition (22 December 1995): I, 3. 115 unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development.” 304 The most prominent example of the U.S.’s China Threat policy is the DoD’s Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. 305 Major General Peng Guangqian of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences observed, “Cooking up this kind of report on the military power of the so-called major opponent or potentially major ‘challenger’ of the future reflects typical Cold War thinking.” 306 As an official response to the 2006 Report, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that China was, “strongly resentful and firmly opposed” to the report. 307 The People’s Daily harshly criticized the Report: “The carefully fabricated military strength report is…filled with groundless attacks…Those paranoia sufferers had better seek treatment to stop turning the world upside down with their ‘sick eyes.’” 308 Beijing further argues that the military modernization is solely for legitimate defensive needs. Chinese scholars also point to writings of their American counterparts as evidence of U.S. hegemonic aspirations: Whereas the previous clamors about the “China threat theory” mainly came from non-mainstream figures, this time round we can find voices of mainstream 304 White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing Information Office of China’s State Council (December 22, 2005). 305 Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2006): 1. 306 Interview of Major General Peng Guangqian by Chen Zewei, “The Development of China’s National Defense Capability Is Appropriate,” trans. by Open Source Center, Liaowang 30 (25 July 2005): 37-38. 307 “FM Spokesman: China ‘Strongly’ Opposes 2006 U.S. Annual Report on the PRC Military,” trans. by Open Source Center, Xinhua (26 May 2006). 308 Xin Benjian, “Pentagon’s ‘China Threat’ Paranoia,” People’s Daily (22 July 2005) <english.people.com.cn/200507/22/eng20050722_197800.html.> 116 figures, from Congress to government, from the nongovernmental sector organizations to the news media, and from academic circles to think tanks. 309 Fu Mengzi believes that the China threat theory must be strong to be so prominent in so many writings: “creators and supporters of the new round of the ‘China threat theory’ come from a wide range of think tanks, interest groups, university scholars, and individuals in the Pentagon. Their number is considerable…and they are continually expanding.” 310 Some of this fear of the PRC can come from the private sector. PLA Major General Peng Guangqian declared in a July 2005 interview that, “exaggerating China’s military power and regarding China as a strategic opponent can stimulate the research and development of U.S. military industrial enterprises and win high-profit orders for U.S. military industrial enterprises.” 311 This same military industrial complex has a profit motive in Taiwan as well. 312 Chinese commentary has identified three manners in which the China threat theory can adversely affect China’s security: One, creating political opinion to apply pressures upon China and to meddle in China’s domestic affairs…Two distorting China’s image and driving a wedge between China and its neighboring countries to limit China’s development. Three, playing the trick of a thief crying “Stop thief!” to divert public attention and to direct the spearhead at China to maintain their own hegemonic position.” 313 309 Yu Yongshan, Supra. 310 Fu Mengzi, Supra. 311 Interview by Chen Zewei, Supra. 312 “For What Does U.S. Over-estimate China’s Military Power?” People’s Daily Online (24 May 2004) <english.people.com.cn/200505/24/eng20050524_186532.html> 313 Ibid. at 5. 117 Beijing’s policy-level response to the “China Threat” theory was to promulgate the “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) idea in late 2003. 314 China has also turned the economic aspect on its head by pushing the “China opportunity” idea. Zhu Rongji popularized this concept during his Spring of 1999 visit to the U.S. 315 China also continuously points out that its troop reduction levels of the PLA are enormous, and that overall, China lags far behind both the U.S. and Japan in military expenditures. 316 For the PRC, its foreign policy behavior shows evidence of peaceful intentions, responsibility, and restraint, even on issues including Taiwan, the South China Sea, nuclear tests, and arms sales. 317 China has also issued responses to the China threat theory in the economic arena. Chinese responses essentially are that China is still a developing country and its growing competitiveness stems from conformity with free market principles: in other words, don’t blame the players, blame the game. These responses do not mean that the PRC populace is constantly seething with anti-Americanism. A multi-city poll conducted by the CASS has drawn a fair amount of attention for its positive results on the state of the U.S. According to news accounts, 71% of respondents was satisfied with the state of U.S.-Sino 314 Song Niansheng, “Heping jueqi, Zhongguo fazhan zhilu [Peaceful Rise China’s Road to Development], Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times] (23 April 2004): 3 <www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/11864/1069451.html.> 315 “The Rise of China – A Threat or an Opportunity,” People’s Daily, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/22/eng20021222_108925.shtml.> 316 Tian Xin, “China Threat Theory Collapses of Itself, as Military Spending of Both US and Japan Has Far Exceeded That of China,” Hong Kong Wen Wei Po 6 (March 2002): A6. 317 Guan Cha Jia, “China’s Development is Beneficial to World Peace and Progress – Refuting the ‘China Threat’ Theory,” Renmin Ribao, overseas edition (22 December 1995): I, 3. 118 relations; 66% said that they liked Americans; and 35.6% said that the U.S. was a cooperative partner. American support for Taiwan was given as the main reason for complaints about the U.S. government by 37.6% of respondents, but 31.7% cited the U.S. war against Iraq as the main reason. 318 Moreover, based upon longitudinal data from the Beijing Area Study (BAS) 319 conducted by Iain Johnston, results suggest a decline in amity toward the U.S. from 1998 to 2004. Johnston also concludes that given the relatively high starting point in 1998, the data also suggest that these short-term, recent events rather than some long-term cumulative effect of state propaganda are largely responsible for the decline. Another conclusion Johnston draws is that despite the slight dip in amity, only from 10 to 20% of respondents saw U.S. military power as the main threat to China. When respondents were given the option of a range of internal and external threats, U.S. military power ranked third overall in 2001 and fourth in 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, Johnston found that the “othering” of Americans as people has been relatively constant over the years covered in the survey. Basically, those who are wealthier, better educated, and have traveled abroad express lower degrees of “othering” toward Americans. Moreover, this degree of “othering” has mostly been significantly lower than that expressed toward the Japanese. Notably, from 2000 to 2004, perceptions of a Taiwan independence threat increased from 2002 to 2003 (from 26.3% to 35.8%), while the number of those choosing U.S. military power declined from 16.5 to 12% (indicating that respondents did not see these two choices as mutually substitutable). In 318 CASS Institute of American Studies poll, www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/14196/1264756.html. 319 BAS Data Report (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe). 119 other words, while amity toward the U.S. was declining, as of 2003, U.S. military power was not the threat that preoccupied most of the respondents. 320 Johnston’s analysis also revealed that the Beijing middle class is displaying a greater acceptance of free trade, international institutions, and the U.S. than do poorer income groups. The Beijing middle classes are also less nationalistic than are the poorer income groups. 321 One might argue that the PRC’s security policy-makers’ assessment of how the U.S. views China is sub-par by virtue of their inexperience in sober U.S.-watching. Shambaugh characterized it as “shallow” and lacking “subtlety and sophistication.” 322 Yet there are incontrovertible signs of understanding on the Chinese part. PRC observers are getting a better sense of American political dynamics, notably the short-term political cycle: “It often happens that when government power in the United States passes from one party to another, there is quite a long period of instability in Sino-U.S. relations.” 323 Chinese scholars carefully scrutinize candidates’ rhetoric over China and conclude that anti-China statements are often “a trick used by politicians of the two major parties to win votes” during a presidential campaign. 324 That analysis has been carried over to the 320 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds. New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006): 340-377. 321 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes Towards International Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?” The China Quarterly 179 (September, 2004): 603-628. 322 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America 1972-1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991): 41. 323 Jin Canrong, “An assessment of Two Types of New Factors in China’s International Environment,” Xiandai Guoju Guanxi 2 (20 November 2002): 7-9. 324 Shih Chun-yu, “Anti-China Sentiments Flooding Washington Again in the Lead-Up to the Presidential Election in November,” trans. Open Source Center, Ta Kung Pao (21 June 2004): 2. 120 U.S. public as well. Shi Yinhong remarked that, as a result of the national security panic triggered by 9/11, “the American public has so far given near ‘carte blanche’ support to an administration that…embraces an ‘offense-minded’…concept of international politics as well as strong nationalist, unilateralist, and even militaristic sentiments.” 325 Chinese analytical approach to the U.S. has been described as dialectical, 326 though the U.S. possesses moderating influences in its policies as well: “The United States is a country with a fairly strong capability to regulate itself.” 327 Moreover, Ruan Zongze points out that, “despite the sound and fury of neoconservatism, already there are signs it is overextended.” 328 Truly, the “American factor” is ever-present and accentuates all others traditional Chinese security concerns. 329 Lieberthal attributes China’s America policy since 2001 to four factors: a large array of domestic issues that Beijing does not want to exacerbate; Beijing’s belief that it has finally become a major player in the international arena, precluding the need to play victim politics; minimizing the PLA in national security policy-making; and incentives created by the Bush Administration’s own approach to foreign policy. 330 Wang Yuesheng has framed Sino-U.S. relations as an issue of relative face or status, which 325 Shi Yinhong, “China’s External Difficulties and Challenges faced by the New Leadership – International Politics, Foreign Policy, and the Taiwan Issue,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli 3 (1 May 2003): 34-39. 326 Craig, Chinese Perceptions, Supra. 327 Jia Zingguo, “Unilateralism or Multilateralism?” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 8 (20 August 2003): 8-10. 328 Ruan Zongze, Supra. 329 Dong Fangxiao, “Knowing and Seeking Change,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 4 (20 April 2003): 26-28. 330 Chu, Supra, at 184. 121 leads to a winner-take-all world of Hobbesian Realism: “A ‘zero-sum’ mentality holds that America’s gains (or losses) are China’s losses (or gains).” 331 Such Offensive Realist comparisons promote competition. An interesting collection of evidence on the contemporary Chinese worldview is offered by Andrew Bingham Kennedy. His research shows that most Chinese security scholars believe that the U.S. labors to preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence to check China’s rise. In these scholars’ eyes, the U.S. is behaving like a “nervous hegemon”; i.e., a hegemon acting to contain a rising hegemon (i.e., China). 332 Characterizing the U.S.’s worldview as a traditional security-driven Realist one, these Chinese scholars reveal a traditional-security worldview of their own. As mentioned before, one of the qualities of the U.S. being a military security threat is its security relationship with Japan. Li Xiushi declared, “Japan’s military strategy and the U.S.-Japan alliance are currently forming a new challenge and strategic threat to China.” 333 Japan’s alliance with the U.S., coupled with its own technological prowess and increasing military assertiveness, creates a dangerous mix in Chinese eyes. Many Chinese citizens view Japan’s wealth and power with a mix of intimidation, envy, and contempt. Japan’s military development is, “inseparably linked with its ample 331 Wang Yuesheng, “Shehui qingxu, wenming jiaowang yu gongtong jiazhi” [Social sentiment, the exchange of civilizations, and common values], in Zhongguo ruhe miandui xifang [How China faces the West], ed. Xiao Pang (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1997): 131. 332 Andrew B. Kennedy, “China’s Perceptions of U.S. Intentions Toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?” Asian Survey 47.2 (March/April 2007): 268-287. 333 Li Xiushi, “Discussion of the Outward Transformation of the U.S.-Japan Military Alliance and Japanese Military Strategy,” trans. Foreign Military Studies Office, Facing the Pacific 2 (2004): 84-91. 122 financial resources and ambitions, and it also is inseparable from the international support and encouragement from the United States.” 334 Wu Xinbo perceives that the “silver lining” in the U.S.-Japan alliance has ended; previously the U.S. constrained Japan’s rearmament, now it encourages it. 335 The emerging perspective among China’s influential elite is that Japanese support for the U.S. is moving from word to deed, particularly in containing China: Figuratively speaking, Japan was the “concubine” in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the past. As such it was basically at the beck and call of the United States and was totally dependent on the United States in security and defense matters. Today, its role has gradually been elevated to one of “lover” and its military independence and flexibility has been greatly strengthened. While shouldering more self- defense responsibilities, it also is enjoying substantially greater military freedom. As their military “integration” further deepens, Japanese and U.S. troops have virtually become two designations of a single armed service in Japan. 336 Japan’s more daring military posture is exacerbated (in China’s eyes) by its technological sophistication. Japan’s annual military budget is 1.62 times the size of China’s, according to China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, even though Japan’s forces protect a land area and population only 4 and 10% the size of China’s, respectively. 337 Moreover, China fears that Japan’s technological prowess makes it a candidate for quickly acquiring nuclear armament: “Japan possesses all conditions to develop nuclear 334 Xu Feng, “US Factor in Japan Becoming a Military Power,” trans. Open Source Center. Liaowang 32 (8 August 2005): 46. 335 Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining; A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly 29 (Winter 2005-6): 199-230. 336 “Japan-U.S. Relations: Japan Turns From ‘Concubine’ to ‘Lover,’” Xinhua (15 November 2005): 1. 337 “Japan Motive for Huge Military Expense Questioned,” China Daily (14 December 2005). 123 weapons” – an impressive collection of scientists, plutonium for thousands of warheads, a powerful and sophisticated nuclear energy capacity, and a long-range capability. 338 Furthermore, the probability that Japan would pursue nuclear weapons is growing as efforts to amend its constitution would remove legal obstacles, while Japan’s public opinion is shifting to tacit consent or even outright support for nuclear weapon capabilities. 339 Further evidence for this shift in Japan is found in implicit U.S. support, as the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review “unequivocally points out that the United States will increase its nuclear military presence in the East Asia region,” which would serve to “loosen the United States nuclear shackles on Japan [that have existed] for half a century.” 340 Chen Shifu diagnosed the Sino-Japan problems as stemming from former PM Koizumi’s paying homage at the Yasukuni shrine; from the inaccuracies in Japanese history texts; the dispute over the Senkaku Islands; contention over strategic resources in the East China Sea; and Tokyo’s alleged support of Taiwan independence. In trying to smooth relations, Chen lays the blame on Japan, notably the extreme right-wing elements in Japan, the “island-nation” mentality of the Japanese, and Tokyo’s willingness to serve as a strategic pawn to the U.S. Despite these offenses, Chen still emphasized the need to improve bilateral relations. He called for pulling Tokyo out of the U.S. strategic political 338 Yang Yunzhong, “Somebody is Behind ‘Nuclear Armament Talk’ Within Japan’s Political Circles,” Liaowang (17 June 2002). 339 Ibid. 340 Ibid. 124 orbit, for the mitigation of the extreme right’s influence in Japanese politics, the expansion of bilateral exchanges and associations, and the use of Chinese economic leverage over Japan. 341 One could argue that Japan makes the blood of the individual Chinese boil more than any other issue. Nowhere is this more seen than in the issue of the Nanjing Massacre of 1937. A public opinion poll conducted by a Japanese think tank, Peking University and China Daily revealed that the first thing that comes to Chinese minds when asked about Japan is the Nanjing Massacre (the second thing is appliances). 342 Japan’s perceived lack of penitence only confirms China’s fears that the Japanese possess a latent militarism. In essence, China fears that Japan will commit the same mistakes again as it allows rising militarism and nationalism to claw their way back into its “fundamentally ruthless” and “bloodthirsty” strategic culture. 343 Chinese venom towards Japan even seems impervious to any reconsideration of roles. In December 2002, just weeks after Hu Jintao assumed power, Ma Licheng of Renmin Ribao’s Commentary Department published an article entitled “New Thoughts for China-Japan Relations – Worrisome Problems Among Chinese and Japanese People.” It was a unique piece in that it was a personal account of the author’s travels to Japan. His message was equally 341 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 82-101. 342 Qin Jize, “Poll: China-Japan Ties Need Mending,” China Daily (24 August 2005) <www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/24/content_471671.htms> 343 Lieutenant General Li Jijun as quoted in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000) <www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%/20- %/202000/China%20Debates%20Future%20Sec%20Environ%20Jan%202000/pills2.htm.> 125 unique, both in its candor and in the unmistakable blame it placed on the Chinese for the problems in the relationship. Ma wished to give his readers an accurate portrayal of Japan, going so far as to confess: “To be honest, Japan is the pride of Asia.” 344 He even chastised the Chinese populace for confusing patriotism with ignorance and allowing nationalism to creep into foreign policy: “While we need to boost morale by publicizing the successes we have achieved in reforms and opening up, overdoing it is a sickness…” 345 The response to Ma’s piece was quite severe. Even attempts at viewing Japan in a more positive light have been met with blowback. 346 The media’s influence on public opinion might also be a reason why in another poll, 90% of the Chinese blame the Japanese for the strain in the relationship 347 , why another poll revealed that 64% of Chinese said they disliked Japan, and why nearly the same number knew nothing about Japan’s development assistance to China (totaling roughly Y3.3 trillion). In announcing the release of Japan’s Defense White Paper, Xinhua proclaimed, “Japan’s Official Paper Groundless in Exaggerating China Threat,” 348 and Ta Kung Pao declared that, “Japan’s Defense White paper Will Further 344 Ma Licheng, “New Thoughts for China-Japan Relations – Worrisome Problems Among Chinese and Japanese People,” Zhanlue yu Guanli (1 December 2002): 41-47. 345 Ibid. 346 Peter Hays Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ On Japan,” China Quarterly 184 (December, 2005): 831- 850. 347 Qin Jize, “Poll: Japan-China Ties Need Mending,” China Daily (24 August 2005) www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/24/content_471671.htm 348 Xinhua, 2 August 2005. 126 Worsen Sino Japanese Relations.” 349 The internet is growing as a medium of anti- Japanese expression. Websites that display strong anti-Japanese fervor include the Patriots’ Alliance Network, www.1931-9-18.org, China 18 September Patriotic Network, www.china918.net, and Wu Wang Guochi Net, www.wwgc.cc. It is ironic that for many Chinese scholars, China’s concern over a “rising Japan” seems to echo many Americans’ concerns over a rising China. Sun Cheng of the China Institute of International Studies complained that: The magnitude and nature of the changes in Japan’s security policies and the level and degree of its military buildup will have a major impact on the regional security situation and it is impossible for the countries in the region not to have doubts about where Japan’s security policies are headed while changes in political perceptions and the rise of nationalist feelings at home have exacerbated these concerns. 350 Exacerbating this relationship is the view of many in the PRC that Japan is responsible for Taiwan’s original separation from China. PRC belief of Japanese culpability for this state of affairs is captured in Jiang Zemin’s remarks in 1998: The idea of using Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier was first contrived by Japan (through its 50 years of occupation) and taken over by the United Sates. It can be said that it was initially Japan who put Taiwan in its current position, and it was the United States which has maintained it. 351 If the U.S. and Japan constitute the primary agent of containment of China’s territory, then India serves as the secondary yet growing agent. The traditional security 349 Ma Hao-liang, Ta Kung Pao, 3 August 2005. 350 Sun Cheng, “Lagging Security Relations and Ways Out,” trans. Open Source Center, Xiandai Gouji Guanxi 10 (20 October 2003): 5-7. 351 “Daily reports Jiang Zemin has anti-Japanese sentiment,” Sankei Shimbun (9 December 1998) FBIS- FTS19981211001641. 127 threat and competition centers around the disputed territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, along the Sino-Indian border. The relationship started off positively, when, at the Bandung Conference in 1954, China and India signed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. However, many Chinese scholars currently express concern over India’s policies and statements. 352 Zhou Gang explained that, “in March 1914, the British colonialists cooked up an illegal ‘McMahon Line’ behind the back of the representatives from the Chinese Central Government.” 353 China neither approved nor acknowledged this line, which was just more proof that the West was utilizing every opportunity to carve up China. 354 In 1962 the PLA and Indian forces engaged in a variety of skirmishes, which erupted into a full war as the PLA employed a, “blitzkrieg-type offensive” against India forces. 355 For years India enjoyed a beneficial relationship with the USSR, particularly in the area of arms purchases, and this relationship has been a thorn in Beijing’s side. China has become increasingly disconcerted in the wake of the U.S.-Indian deal regarding civilian nuclear cooperation that the U.S. has enlisted India to help contain 352 Ma Jiali, “Vajpayee’s China Tour and the Sino-Indian Relations,” Peace and Development 3 (2003): 62. 353 Zhao Gancheng, “China-India Ties: Simultaneous Rising and Peaceful Coexistence,” International Review 35 (Summer 2004) <www.siis.org.cn/english/journal/2004/2/Zhao%20Gancheng.htm> 354 Bruce Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001): 255. 355 Ibid. 128 China. Chinese media explained that, as a democracy, India is “deemed the best bargaining chip and a counterweight to China.” 356 That is not to say that Chinese scholars think that India is in perfect lock-step with Washington: “India will still maintain an independent and all-around diplomatic posture to gain its own maximum state interest. India will not easily board any ship because India itself is a large ship.” 357 The rise of Hindu nationalism also concerns Beijing. China also fears the growth of instability emanating from the disputed Kashmir territory. India is also seen as the safe-haven of the Dalai Lama and the politically active Tibetan exiles who threaten China’s territorial integrity. These Tibetans allegedly carry out, “splittist activities in India directly threatening the stability of Tibet and endangering China’s security in its southwest region.” 358 Overall, however, Chinese scholars marginalize the India-China relationship in Chinese security policy, compared to Taiwan, the U.S., or Japan. 359 The reason for this attitude is that, “China-India relations are neither on the basis of highly mutual trust with common strategic interests nor in a state of crisis that easily could lead 356 Lin Chuan, “Bush Will Start to Visit India Tomorrow to Woo India in Attempt to Contain China,” trans. the Open Source Center, Zhongguo Tongxun She (China News Agency) (28 February 2006), CPP20060228045016. 357 Zhao Yi, “Nuclear Cooperation, Anti-terrorism Top Bush Agenda During Trip,” Xinhua (4 March 2006), CPP20060304074060. 358 Ma Jiali, Supra, at 61. 359 Zhao, Supra. 129 to confrontation.” 360 Chinese scholars devote comparatively less time researching India as a result. 361 Beijing and New Delhi declared 2006 to be the Year of China-India Friendship. 362 Indian and Chinese leaders made exchanges and declarations of the “good neighborliness, friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation in which they are engaged.” 363 Zhang Chengming wrote in the International Strategic Studies journal that, “The friendly contacts between the two countries go back to ancient times.” 364 This new-found cooperation is necessary; Beijing knows it needs cooperation to achieve a “Win-Win” situation. 365 The recent warming trend is producing a fair amount of Chinese scholarship extolling the shared interests of the two giants, but fear of a rising India still exists in the minds of PRC security policy-makers. 366 Among other security threats/issues articulated by Chen Shifu are maintaining stable relations with the EU (i.e., preventing U.S. unilateralism), Russia (i.e., using Russia to balance U.S. pressure on China), and protecting China’s interests in the South 360 Ibid. 361 Lan Jianxue, “Sino-Indian Relations Need to Transcend,” trans. Open Source Center, Huanqiu Shibao (7 January 2005). 362 “Full Text of Joint Statement of China, India,” Xinhua (11 April 2005). 363 Ibid. p. 1. 364 Zhang Chengming and Cheng Xizhong, “Establishment of New Type of Sino-Indian Relation and Its Perspective,” International Strategic Studies 4 (October 2003): 24. 365 “China, India Achieve Win-Win Through Co-Op,” Xinhua (23 April 2006) <news.Xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/24/content_4464931.htm> 366 Rollie Lal, Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International Press, 2006): 131-143. 130 China Sea (i.e., preventing the U.S. and/or Japan from interfering with China’s interests therein). 367 The SNS lists North Korea as a threat to Territorial Security, along with reuniting lost elements of the motherland (i.e., Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). Disputes over claims of title in the South China Sea and issues of border security pertaining to Tibet and Xinjiang Province (aka East Turkistan) have also been articulated as security concerns in the military sector. 368 Scholars’ Views of the Chinese Political Sector How politically secure is the PRC? What are scholars saying about its political security (even if in not so many words)? What can one discern from Chinese post-Deng policies and speech-acts, and what do these say about China and the COPRI’s comprehensive security? This section will attempt to address these questions. Ultimately, this chapter reaches the conclusion that according to PRC security policy- makers, the political sector – specifically democratization – peaked as an existential threat to national security in the immediate wake of the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, and remained there through the 1990s, but that Hu Jintao has desecuritized it to the point of politicization only. Buzan defines the political sector as being: about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition, and concerns the organizational stability of systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Do actors accept other units as equals, or are relations hierarchical, with superior and inferior status acknowledged by both sides? Or do 367 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 102-122. 368 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008): 70-79, 156-160, 267-299. 131 actors deny each other recognition, in effect treating each other as unoccupied territory available for seizure? The political sector can be interpreted in a more realist, state-centric, sense as being about government, or in a looser, more liberal, sense as being about governance, including norms, rules, and institutions above the level of the state. 369 The SNS defines Political Stability as: the safeguarding of national sovereignty, maintaining social stability, and protecting ideological security. In the modern world, development of politics and level of political civilization directly affect social and political stability, quality and efficiency of government management, social firmness and justice, members of society’s ideology and enthusiasm and their developments of social economy and culture, and finally it will affect national security. 370 The SNS Political Security chapter goes on to outline several policies to protect Political Security. Among them are strengthening constructions of socialist political civilization, strengthening construction of ideology, working-styles and organizations, reformation and innovation of the political system, and studying environmental factors. The ideological threats and defenses feature prominently in this chapter. 371 The SNS declares that: When people are discussing national security, they often neglect one of the most basic and important core contents of national security system, that is, the citizens’ security. In fact, people are the main body of a society. Citizens are the main body of a nation. The citizens’ security and interests are the core of national security and basic objective of national security activities. This is a rational extension of the historical view of Marxism in national security domain. It is determined by the nature of socialism…Therefore, no matter how important are the securities of territory, sovereignty, politics, economy, and military, if we compare security of citizens with them, the latter will become the core of national 369 Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra, at 73. 370 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 108. 371 Ibid. at 109. 132 security and situate at the position of the nucleus People are the core of the world. Citizens are the core of a nation. Security of citizens is the core of national security. 372 Many scholars outside of China observe tensions within the PRC that may adversely affect its political stability. 373 Some China-watchers make arguments that despite years of economic progress and modernization, China’s politics and political security are in jeopardy and will not progress toward anything other than a systemic collapse. 374 Some see such a crisis as a collapse leading to a democratic future. 375 The result is a picture of the PRC with a national security threat to its political sector. However, Richard Weixing Hu asserts that China's political stability is not as tenuous as some Western analysts claim, though it does indeed possess some security concerns; they are 1) ethnic minority problems, such as possibilities of separatist movement, with or without external involvement, and terrorism; 2) problems of political dissidents and any forces that openly challenge the rule of the CCP; 3) social problems of overpopulation, poverty, massive unemployment, and income disparity between individuals and regions; 4) crimes, drug abuse and trafficking, and AIDS; 5) social 372 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra, at 54. 373 Elizabeth J. Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?” The China Journal 57 (January 2007): 12-3. 374 Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York, NY: Random House, 2001); Arthur Waldron, “The Chinese Sickness,” Commentary 116. 1 (July/August 2003): 36-42; See generally, Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 375 See generally, Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004). 133 menaces, such as corruption, that undermine the regime; and 6) high-tech crimes and Internet safety. 376 Other Chinese scholars echo this general sentiment. Some China scholars view the Chinese political system as strong after making prior predictions of demise. One crucial source of PRC continued strength may lie in the CCP’s ability to recruit, monitor, and reward the political elite. 377 Barry Naughton and Dali Yang highlight that “China has retained the core element of central control: the nomenklatura personnel system of personnel management” and argue that, “this nomenklatura personnel system is the most important institutions reinforcing national unity.” 378 Tianjian Shi of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Beijing office observes that in post-Mao China, rising education levels, increasing per capita income, exposure to foreign ideas, and greater transparency in government procedures have all fostered political activism. China’s citizens, in his view, have increasingly, “gone to trade unions, people’s congress delegates, higher governmental organizations, and complaint bureaus to express their opinions.” 379 The collapse of Communist parties in Eastern Europe and the former USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s have led to differing interpretations and prescriptions on what 376 Weixing Hu, "China's Security Agenda after the Cold War," Pacific Review 8.1 (1995): 117-135. 377 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds. Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore, Eastern University Press, 2004): 57-91. 378 Barry J. Naughton and Dali Yang, eds. Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 9. 379 Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds. The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 156. 134 the CCP must do vis-à-vis its internal political reforms. This subject constituted a major debate within the CCP in the Winter of 1991-2. China’s traditional left blamed the collapse on the “ideological errors” of Khrushchev and Gorbachev, notably because of the diversion from the “dictatorship of the proletariat” – a veiled attack on Jiang’s “Three Represents” policy. The arguments were waged between members of the CASS in the leftists periodical Huanqiu Shiye and more mainstream intellectuals in the more reformist Central Party School journal Xuexi Shibao. This latter group blames the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party on its “monopoly” in ideology, political power, and the economy. 380 Furthermore, at the China Society for Economic Reform meeting held in April 2006, intellectuals openly called for political reform, including multiparty elections. 381 Chen Shifu asserts that political stability can be achieved by reinforcing the Party construction, improving its administrative ability, building the legislation system to protect the legal rights and interests of the people, and further carrying out political reforms. 382 Scholars’ Views of the Chinese Socio-Cultural Sector The socio-cultural sector is, in a sense, a refinement of the human security concept. The research, as seen in the speech-acts and policies, reveals a clear and 380 “OSC Analysis: China: Lessons from CPSU Demise Reflect CPC Demise Reflect CPC Policy Debate,” in OSC: CPF20070615534001, (15 June 2007). 381 “PRC Reformist Scholars Call for Political, Legal Reform at Internal Meeting,” Pingkuo Jihpao (8 April 2006): 1. 382 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 123-173. 135 extreme concern on the part of the PRC securitizing actors over security in the socio- cultural sector and the festering threats to stability that fall within this sector. Buzan defines the societal or socio-cultural sector as being: about social and cultural relationships. It concerns collective identity, and the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, or traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom. Interactions in this sector are about the transmission of ideas between peoples and civilizations. They may involve ideas about technology, or about political and religious organization. 383 Hsiung defines this sector as the individual and collective sense of protection from perceived present and potential threats to physical and psychological well-being from all manner of agents and forces affecting lives, values, and property. 384 PRC scholars have identified and written about a plethora of threats to the PRC’s socio-cultural sector. A Beijing-based political scientist declared that China has always had grave concerns about stability, particularly since 4 June, 1989. 385 To protect stability they focused on economic development and modernization. As a result of this fear, the PRC’s leaders were concerned about ideological security and integrity. The economic reforms, he claims, help maintain balance among political stability, economic development, and society. This process is interactive and dynamic, according to this 383 Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra, at 73. 384 James C. Hsiung, Comprehensive Security: Challenges for Pacific Asia (Indianapolis, IN: University of Indianapolis Press, 2004). 136 scholar. Reforms have fostered a dynamic flux. He noted that the new property laws being promulgated reflect a concern with stability. 386 Although devoting much space to traditional military hegemonism as a threat to China’s national security, Chen Shifu also devotes a fair amount of work to domestic stability as a national security threat to China. In spite of, or because of, China’s achievements in the last 50 years, China still must protect its domestic security and stability in different aspects, such as ideological, political, economic, national information, and ethno-national. The ideological stability can be achieved by building a solid spiritual support for the people, strengthening the patriotism education and citizenship awareness, motivating the people with China’s restoration, and handling the religious issues correctly. The ethno-national issue can be taken care of by a good socialist ethno-national ideology, good legislation, economic development, and ending influence from the “Pan Islamism” extremists. 387 In this vein, the SNS also lists ethnic conflict/nationality and religious conflicts as threats to national security. Wealth disparity is another identified threat. Sun Liping argues that Chinese society is now more than just polarized: modernization and globalization has bifurcated society into two separate camps, incapable of morphing into a harmonious whole. These camps no longer share the same issues, values, or priorities. The socio-cultural sector is indeed threatened by income inequalities, and this gap is widening instead of narrowing 385 Interview Number 21. 386 Ibid. 387 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 123-173. 137 in mainland China. Such a widening disparity of wealth cannot be good for societal security. In this “era of differentiation of interests,” Sun also advocates for a system whereby persons can express their varying grievances, so that conflicts can be sidestepped: “If different groups have good channels… [to voice their wants, needs, and concerns] conflicts will not be escalated.” 388 The development gap largely results from the growing income gap. The World Bank uses a calculation (called the “Gini coefficient”) to determine the extent to which individual incomes deviate from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini coefficient is in essence a measure of statistical dispersion. It is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income or wealth. China’s Gini coefficient has increased 50% in the last two decades, reflecting huge disparities. 389 China’s own official report on the state of Chinese society, which is published annually by CASS as the Blue Book of Chinese Society, reaches a bleaker conclusion than does the World Bank. Its calculated Gini coefficient yielded an even more polarized distribution of income, producing growing instability as evidenced by increasing crime rates, land disputes, and public clashes with government officials. Zhu Qingfang, one of the study’s authors, wrote, “The rich-poor disparity has led to the intensification of social disputes, mass protests, and criminal cases.” 390 A journal sponsored by the Central Party School of the CCP also published a study with notably dark predictions. Citing a report 388 So A-ti, “Scholar Advocates System of Interest Expression,” trans. Open Source Center. Ta Kung Pao (25 March 2006). 389 Ibid. 390 Zhu Qingfang quoted in Josephine Ma, “China Wealth Gap Fueling Instability, Studies Warn, South China Morning Post (22 December 2005), CPP20051222506013. 138 from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the article warned of destabilizing social phenomena. It acknowledged that many of the nouveau riche population “gained wealth through collusion with officials in power-for-money deals” or “because they stole state assets.” 391 Moreover, the study concluded that China’s social troubles were only just starting, given that the period when a country’s economy is growing from US$1,000 per capita GDP to US$3,000 per capita GDP is likely to see increasing social conflicts; China is now in that stage. 392 In December 2001, Renmin Ribao reviewed a three-year study published by the CASS on the demarcation of the ten “social strata” in the nation’s rapidly changing society. 393 The study concluded: “The original social strata are disintegrating and new classes are taking shape and becoming stronger.” As a result, the CCP has lost its original social base. Does this loss mean that modernization and globalization and the inequalities they foster are existential threats to societal security? Yongnian Zheng and Yang Zheng argue that globalization per se does not lead to social conflict, and that the state functions as an intervening variable between globalization and social conflict. 394 They argue that the Chinese state has played a proactive role in promoting globalization, and has introduced 391 “Party School Warns Against China’s Widening Income Gap,” People’s Daily (21 September 2005) <english.people.com.cn/> 392 Ibid. 393 “CASS demarcates ten social strata in Chinese Society,” trans. OSC CPP20011218000049. Renmin ribao, (17 December 2001). 394 Yongnian Zheng and Yang Zhang, “Globalization and Social Conflict in China,” Issues and Insights 42.2 (June 2006): 85-129. 139 various reform programs to integrate the country with the rest of the world, which have ultimately benefited China. However, they also conclude that while it has enjoyed success in implementing “external reforms,” the state has not been able to implement “internal reforms.” The chasm between “external reform” and “internal reform” has made it difficult for China to cope with some of the “negative effects” of globalization, thus leading to the rise of social conflict in China. 395 Aging and a growing age-gap is a growing problem in China. Currently, roughly 10% of China's 1.2 billion people is over 60 years old. A People's University study found that by the mid-21st century, 20% of the Chinese population will be at least 60 years old, while 80 million (seven times the number in the year 2000) Chinese will be octogenarians. 396 Other socio-cultural security problems in China include racial/ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking and women's rights. Yu Xintian wrote: China is in a critical juncture when two transitions coincide, one is the taking off of modernization; the other is the transition from planned economy to market economy. Both are inundated with contradictions and highly vulnerable to the outbreak of conflicts. The two transitions being so intertwined further enlarge the urban-countryside disparity, regional disparity, wealth disparity, and ethnic disparity, which will evoke turmoil if treated unskillfully. 397 Peasants and urban workers are other groups that face socio-cultural threats. Peasants see village elections as an important step to empowerment, though by no means have they 395 Ibid. 396 Qiaobao [The China Press, New York] (20 October 2000): 5. 397 Yu Xintian, “Understanding and Preventing New Conflicts and Wars: China’s Peaceful Rise as a Strategic Choice,” International Review 35 (Summer 2004) <www.siis.org/cn/english/journal/2004/2/Yu%20Xintian.htm.> 140 eased tensions in the most disaffected rural areas. 398 Regarding the urban workers, Chinese authorities are paying increasing attention to their problems. In October 2002 Jiang Zemin told the National Conference on Re-Employment to solve five major contradictions involved in the current employment crisis. 399 The PRC’s oppression of dissident groups is also a result of threat perception. The CCP has maintained an iron fist over dissident groups in the PRC. The most notable of these is the Falun Gong. Since 1999, reports of torture, illegal imprisonment, beatings, forced labor, and psychiatric abuses of Falun Gong practitioners have been widespread. 400 Another such group is members of underground Christian churches in the PRC, also known as House Churches. The general estimation is that 4% of the PRC populace is Christian. These numbers reflect the loosening of certain restrictions and increase in numbers since the end of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s. However, the PRC bans churches and parishes it deems threatening to state security. 398 See generally, Larry Diamond and Ramon Myers, eds. Elections and Democracy in Greater China (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 399 “Promote the favorable interaction between economic development and the expansion of employment,” Renmin ribao (24 October 2002): 1. 400 James Tong, "Anatomy of Regime Repression in China: Timing, Enforcement Institutions, and Target Selection in Banning the Falungong, July 1999," Asian Survey 42. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 2002): 795-820. Falun Gong is a spiritual practice founded in China by Li Hongzhi in 1992. Clearwisdom.net, a Falun Gong website, asserts there are over 100 million practitioners of Falun Dafa in 114 countries and regions around the world. In April 1999 over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered at Zhongnanhai, in a silent protest against beatings and arrests in Tianjin. Two months later Jiang Zemin banned the practice, began a crackdown, and started a massive propaganda campaign to eliminate the movement. 141 Other heavily oppressed groups with the potential for massive unrest include minorities such as Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Hui. 401 Interestingly, the SNS includes security of Chinese working abroad in this sector, and this problem is a growing one. A Shanghai-based security scholar also made the point that the deaths of Chinese citizens in Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in 2007 are giving rise to Security of overseas Chinese citizens. 402 An article in a prominent Guangzhou biweekly described the security situation of Chinese oil workers in Sudan. The appearance of an article that describes the poor security situation is noteworthy. 403 Another interesting societal security problem is cyberspace security. China's Internet users have grown rapidly over the last 10 years – one conservative estimate placed the number of users at 30 million in 2002. The security threat, according to Richard Weixing Hu is two-fold: 1) "illegal border crossing" from the outside world with no way to keep sophisticated net users inside the screened area on the Internet, and 2) future dependence on Western information technology. 404 Sources of social tension are indeed numerous, but perhaps the most pervasive and damaging is government corruption. An example of how corruption can give rise to public incidents is the reallocation of land by local officials who receive kickbacks from 401 See generally, Dru Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 402 Interview Number 6. 403 CPP20071112050001 SUBJ: PRC PAPER VIEWS SECURITY PROBLEMS OF CNC OIL WORKERS IN SUDAN R 131646Z NOV 07. 404 Ibid. 142 developers but provide little or no compensation to those displaced. On numerous occasions the displaced residents have responded with public protests, some of which escalated into riots. 405 Figure 1. Corruption Indexes, Selected Countries, 2001–2005* (from less to more corrupt) Transparency International World Bank LESS CORRUPT Brazil 3.9 Poland .39 Poland 3.7 Brazil -.04 China 3.4 China -.27 India 2.8 India -.28 Argentina 2.8 Argentina -.38 Philippines 2.6 Philippines -.43 Russia 2.6 Russia -.82 Indonesia 2.0 Indonesia -.89 MORE CORRUPT 406 Unrest is another articulated threat. A CCP communiqué in December 2006 asserted, “Mass incidents triggered by contradictions among the people…have become the most conspicuous issue seriously affecting social stability.” 407 Ministry of Public Security (MPS) spokespersons cite statistics on unrest usually under one of two broad terms – “mass incident” or “public order disturbances.” The officials have not defined 405 OSC, CPP20071226968212, 20071226, CIRAS ID: FB4231678. 406 *Average for five reported years (Transparency International: 2001-05, World Bank; 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004); lower scores mean worse corruption. Note: Transparency International shows little change in indicators over survey period; World Bank shows sudden worsening in China’s corruption in 2004 such that it was worse than India’s and Argentina’s by that year. Sources: Transparency International, reported by International Center for Corruption Research, http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2005.html, and World Bank’s Corruption Control Index, data generated at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/. 143 the terms. Chinese reports suggest that “mass incidents” include riots, protests, demonstrations, and mass petitions that seriously affect social stability, and that these incidents involve at least 20 to several dozens of participants. Unrest estimates cited in early 2007 for 2006 are inconsistent with figures from 2005 and sharply contradict an eleven-year rise in discontent, from 8,700 “mass incidents” in 1993 to more than 83,000 in 2005. According to these new figures, China experienced an unprecedented 65% drop in “mass incidents” from 2005 to 2006. Beijing did not explain how “mass incidents” in 2006 dropped 65% while reported “public order disturbances” increased 6.6%. 408 Some PRC officials suggest that the level of social unrest has been exaggerated by the Western media. An agriculture minister stated: “If there are 30,000 villages having problems, that accounts for only one percent of the total. People have to look at this from a national perspective and against a backdrop of phenomenal social and economic changes taking place.” 409 407 FBIS, CPP20071017507001, 20071030, CIRAS ID: FB4091915, article by Zeng Shangquan, party committee secretary and director of the Sichuan Provincial Public Security Department: “Exploring Ways To Prevent and Handle Mass Incidents,” Beijing Gongan Yanjiu (Public Security Research). 408 Unclassified analysis performed U.S. government analysts, 27 April 2007. 409 Ibid. 144 Figure 2. Incidents of “Mass Disturbances” in China* % Change over Year Number previous year 1993 8,700 1994 10,000 15 1995 11,000 10 1996 12,000 9 1997 15,000 25 1998 25,000 67 1999 32,000 28 2000 40,000 25 2001 n/a 12 2002 50,400 12 2003 58,000 15 2004 74,000 28 2005 83,600 13 410 Scholars’ Views of Sustainable Development This section will combine the economic and environmental sectors of Buzan’s construct. The interconnectivity between the dynamics of these two sectors is unavoidable, which lends itself to combining them. The research appearing in this 410 Sources: 1993-1999 data from Quntixing shijian Lunwenji [Collected Research Essays on Mass Incidents] presented in M. Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly 27.3 (Summer 2004): 138-9; 2000 datum from Tanner estimate in Tanner, op. cit.; 2002 datum based on official 2003 growth rate reported in John Chan, “China: riot in Guangdong province points to broad social unrest,” International Committee of the Fourth International, World Socialist Web Site (30 November 2004) <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/nov2004/chin-n30.shtml>; 2003 datum from Chinese official Liaowang Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly] magazine (no citation details) reported in U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2004: China (28 February 2005) <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm>; 2004 datum from Frank Ching, “China’s Powder Keg,” South China Morning Post (24 August 2005); 2005 datum from Ministry of Public Security spokesman Wu Heping, reported in Irene Wang, “Incidents of Social Unrest hit 87,000,” South China Morning Post (20 January 2006). Note: numbers in italics indicate annual average growth from 2000 to 2002. * Involving fifteen or more persons. 145 chapter will point to a government that has securitized the economic sector of this entity but has only politicized the environmental sector. The various definitions of these sectors, particularly those from the PRC scholars, display a linkage between the sectors. Buzan defines the economic sector as being, “about relationships of trade, production, and finance, and how actors gain access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and political power.” 411 He defines the environmental sector as being, “about the relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” 412 In the context of Asian comprehensive security, Hsiung uses the term geo- economics to refer to manufacturing, marketing, financing, and research and development on the macro level and human and technological resources, exportable capital, efficient production of modern goods, influence over global economic decision making that affect one's own vital interests, and the will to mobilize economic capacity for national ends. 413 Hsiung defines eco-politics as the ecological and political elements of the environmental security concept. 414 411 Buzan, Little, Supra, at 73. 412 Ibid. 413 James C. Hsiung, Comprehensive Security: Challenges for Pacific Asia (Indianapolis, IN: University of Indianapolis Press, 2004). 146 As stated before, PRC scholarship makes definitions of Economic Security that incorporates Environmental Security issues. Specifically, the SNS definition of Economic Security is: whether or not the government of a state can effectively manage or regulate its own economy, can strongly resist the pressure and impact of competition from foreign capital and international markets, can fruitfully maintain its preponderance in the race in domestic and foreign markets, can forcefully guard its economic system, laws and rules, can validly protect and promote its people’s living standard and social welfare, can successfully safeguard the state’s properties, resources and ecological environment. 415 The SNS further subdivides elements of Economic Security into Security of Resources (i.e., natural resources, energy security), Security of Government-Owned Economy (i.e., protecting the financial integrity of the SOEs), Security of Government-Owned Finance (i.e., ferreting out corruption in financial institutions), Security of Banking (i.e., keeping banks solvent and thriving; protecting the RMB), Security of Farming Economy (i.e., modernizing agriculture), Security of Business Secrets (i.e., IPR protection), Security of Market (i.e., protecting trade rights under the WTO), and Preventing and Punishing Economic Crimes (i.e., improving white-collar crime prevention/enforcement in the penal code). 416 The SNS establishes what it calls “ecological security,” which it defines as an: environment in a good state unpolluted and not destroyed that mankind and state rely for survival and development. Security of ecology can be divided in three types: (1) Security of local ecology. It refers to the state of regional ecology 414 Hsiung, Comprehensive Security, Supra. 415 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 81. 416 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 84-90. 147 within a country. (2) Security of state ecology. It means that when a country is considered as a whole, its ecological environment threatens its people’s survival and its own development. (3) Security of international ecology. It includes security of bilateral, multilateral and worldwide ecology. It means that whether the behavior of one or several countries damages other country’s ecological environment and whether the global ecologic change impacts the whole mankind. In fact, it is difficult to clearly separate these three types because ecological security is integrated by characteristics, meaning that it is mutually reliant among different regions and countries. 417 Chen Shifu writes that economic security can be protected by adopting more creative and efficient production methods, maintaining economic independence, participating in the “new international economic order,” and avoiding financial crises. 418 Men Honghua thinks that, provided China can overcome certain challenges, its “high-speed economic development could be maintained in the foreseeable future.” 419 He believes that in the new stage of economic development that it has entered, China will need to focus on institutional innovation, the quality of growth, and structural adjustments. Wang Rongjun insists that since accession to the WTO, China’s reform and opening have entered a stage of institutionalization. 420 Some scholars write about “food security,” which may be translating into agricultural policy. Wang Shouchen, an NPC deputy and agricultural official from Jilin Province, noted that the current issue of food security refers to a broad range of concerns: 417 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 171. 418 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra at 123-173. 419 Ryosei, Supra at 104. 420 Ibid. at 119. 148 “It is about comprehensive security of foodstuffs, agricultural byproducts and even industrial materials which come from grain as raw resources.” 421 Much of China's economic sector threats result from growing energy needs due to its inadequate resources, although this threat is driven by geopolitical dynamics as well. In 2005 Wen Jiabao declared that, “The short supply of energy resources is a ‘soft rib’ in China’s economic and social development.” 422 Wen’s simple statement illustrates the issue of a secure energy supply is to China’s overall national security. It exists in both the economic sector and military sectors. The dependencies on foreign supply (the “reliance problem”) and the vulnerability of transport (“the Malacca dilemma”) are the main threats to China’s energy security, according to some Chinese scholars. 423 As indicated by an energy security expert based in Beijing, the threat of foreign reliance has only been a problem since 1993 when China became a net importer of oil. 424 He goes on to say that energy security results from and feeds into, high economic growth. Foreign oil imports now account for 40% of China’s energy market, with the gap between supply and demand continuing to widen. 425 As one scholar points out, “The expense of China on 421 “China Focus: Further Efforts Needed To Ensure Food Security,” Xinhua in English (7 March 2006), CPP20060307056022. 422 Wen Jiabao, Speech at National Teleconference on Building a Resource Saving Society, “Attach Great Importance to, and Strengthen Leadership over the Building of a Resource-Saving Society at an Accelerating Pace,” trans. Open Source Center, Xinhua (3 July 2005). 423 Sun Chao, “Develop Great Periphery Diplomacy, Participate Actively in Regional Cooperation,” Zhongguo Jingji Shibao, (6 December 2004): 3. 424 Interview Number 25. 425 Liu Jianfei and Qi Yi, “China’s Oil Security and Its Strategic Options,” trans. Open Source Center, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 12 (20 December 2002): 35-46. 149 the import of crude and refined oil is drastically increasing mainly resulting from the rise of oil prices, [which] has led to tremendous pressure on the economic development of China.” 426 Another expert noted, “Energy supply disruptions and unpredictable prices could undermine China’s rapid economic growth and job creation, and in turn national security.” 427 The Beijing-based energy security expert insists that Beijing still has no coordinated strategy on oil dependence. 428 The PRC’s thirst for energy to feed its economic engine has resulted in environmental degradation. The excellent scholarship of Elizabeth Economy has revealed the environmental costs of China’s spectacular economic growth over the past two decades: it has severely damaged the PRC’s natural resources and yielded striking pollution rates. Environmental degradation has also contributed to socials ills such as public health problems, mass migration, economic loss, and social unrest. Economy makes the case that PRC’s environmental protection policies are similar to its economic development program: devolving authority to local officials, opening the door to private individuals, and inviting participation from the international community, while retaining only weak central control. The result, according to Economy’s analysis, is a hodge- podge of environmental protection policies wherein only a few wealthy, well-connected 426 Xia Yishan, “China-U.S. Cooperation in Maintaining Energy Security,” A Presentation Collection for the International Conference on Energy Security: Implications for U.S.-China-Middle East Relations, Shanghai: Shanghai Institute for International Security (2005): 89. 427 Wang Jian, “Search for Oil: Confrontation and Cooperation Between China and the United States in the Middle East,” A Presentation Collection for the International Conference on Energy Security: Implications for U.S.-China-Middle East Relations, Shanghai: Shanghai Institute for International Security (2005): 54. 428 Interview Number 25. 150 regions improve their local conditions, while the rest of the country continues to deteriorate, with some regions suffering irreversible damage. 429 The environmental sector has been the source of notable PRC scholarship as well. The causes of the threat to the environmental sector, according to the SNS, are water shortages from pollution, pollution creating environmental refugees, and the general transnational nature of pollution. The SNS prescribes policies such as holding developed countries responsible for rectifying the problem— as it was their centuries of pollution that fostered this threat. Furthermore, the SNS highlights policies that the PRC has taken to protect the state and its ecological security: the 1995 fifth plenary session of the 14 th CCP Congress’s “The party Central on Setting the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and on Accepting the Recommendation of the Long- Range Objectives of the Year 2010”; the 1999 “Plan of Building National Ecological Environment” of the Standing Commission of the State Council; and the 2001 National People’s Congress’s “Summary of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development. 430 Most of these regulations are empty, which even the SNS implicitly acknowledges by imploring the common-citizen to participate in protecting China’s ecological security: Merely relying on the government’s enthusiasm and some governing measures is insufficient. We must have a wide social foundation and mass participation…Only the masses, especially the leading cadres at different levels 429 See generally, Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 430 Wang Jian Supra at 180. 151 who have sufficient and correct understanding of this problem, can generate high degree of sense of responsibility, sense of urgency and concept of crisis. 431 Challenges in waste management, desertification, and protection of nature and biodiversity are ever-present. 432 According to the PRC’s Ministry of Land and Resources, more than 10% of China’s arable land, or about 12.3 million hectares, is contaminated by pollution due to excessive fertilizer use, heavy metals, solid waste, and polluted water. 433 According to the head of China’s State Environmental Agency (SEPA), the largest Chinese environmental issue is clean water. Almost 300 million rural residents drink polluted water, and 90% of the water in the cities is polluted. 434 Friends of Nature, a Beijing-based environmental group conducting environmental issues scholarship, revealed that one-fourth of the Chinese population, or at least 320 million Chinese persons, is drinking unsafe water. 435 China’s air quality is equally bad. The issue of air pollution is a major problem for China. The monitoring of China’s air quality in 522 of China’s cities indicated that almost 40% of them has either “medium or serious” air pollution. 436 SEPA announced 431 Ibid. at 181-3. 432 See generally, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Environmental Performance Review of China (Paris, France: OECD, 2007). 433 “10% of arable land contaminated with pollutants: Situation Worsening,” Xinhua (22 April 2007). 434 SEPA Deputy Director Pan Yue as quoted in “On Energy, Pollution Control, Going Green,” The Straits Times (17 June 2006). 435 Bryan Walsh, “Choking on Growth,” Time (6 December 2004) <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 880308, 00.html.> 436 “Hard Battle on Pollution,” China Daily (1 June 2006). 152 that China was Earth’s largest producer of sulfur dioxide in 2005 and within only two years China passed the U.S. as Earth’s largest producer of carbon dioxide. 437 Even China’s office buildings aren’t safe. China Daily reported in its headline that, “In Posh Office Buildings, Plenty of Bad Air Days.” 438 SEPA estimates that resulting economic losses from this have totaled roughly US$63 billion. Other factors contributing to China’s severe air quality are construction and desertification from overgrazing. 439 Exposure to China’s polluted air is also leading to an alarming rate of premature deaths. A study by the Chinese Academy on Environmental Planning concluded that air pollution is culpable for 411,000 premature deaths in 2003. 440 Studies from the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology indicate that 50,000 infants may die every year as a result of air pollution. 441 China’s reliance on low efficiency and heavily polluting pulverized coal power plants has made China the world’s largest emitter of sulfur dioxide, a precursor to acid rain. 442 According to Chinese press reporting, in 2006 coal power plants accounted 437 John Vidal and David Adam, “China Overtakes U.S. as World’s Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter,” The Guardian (19 June 2007). 438 Jiao Xiaoyang, (21 February 2006). 439 Li Shi, “Rational Policy Making Vital,” China Daily (29 April 2006). 440 Jonathan Watts, “Satellite Data Reveals Beijing as Air Pollution Capital of World,” The Guardian (31 October 2005): 22. 441 “Choking on Growth,” Time (6 December 2004) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,880308,00.html. 442 [Open Source, Atsushi Fukushima, “Coal and Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia,” IEEJ (March 2004) (U), CIRAS ID:]. 153 for 62% of sulfur emissions. 443 Western experts estimate that less than 6% of power plants have desulphurization units. 444 Many PRC scholars are at the forefront of not just identifying these threats but also solving them. In 1998, two economists with the CASS published the book Grave Concerns, which posits that poor coordination, structural problems, and corruption were the real threats to China’s environment. Buzan’s Sectors and Beyond As stated before, PRC scholars have created more such categories of non- traditional security. For example, the SNS outlines 10 key pillars of national security. As we have seen, some fit into the Buzan framework. I will highlight those remaining. They do show a forward-looking approach in PRC security scholarship, but they fall into the trap of when everything is securitized then nothing truly is. Security of National Sovereignty At first glance one would assume that the security of national sovereignty is synonymous with the military sector or perhaps the political sector. The SNS definition does not provide much guidance on this sector, however: The safety of a state’s sovereignty is the basis of national security. Contemporary development and changes in world politics pose many challenges to national sovereignty…A state cannot exist without sovereignty. Sovereignty is a synonym of state sovereignty…The basic definition of sovereignty is that it is the ultimate authority and the basic right of a nation to maintain independence in conducting domestic and foreign affairs. In addition, sovereignty is also an authority and right – it is the highest authority in a nation’s internal governances and controls 443 [FBIS, CPP2006110472028, 20061104, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2688491]. 444 [Open Source, MIT, “The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World,” (March 2007) (U), CIRAS ID:]. 154 and incarnates the basic right of jurisdiction, the right of independence, the right of equality and the right of self-defense. 445 Throughout this chapter of the SNS, the framework is one of maintaining “sovereignty” in the face of greater globalization. There is a dearth of empirical examples, though resisting interference by INGOs and certain “developed states” comes closest. Notably, the state is the referent throughout this chapter. 446 Security of Science and Technology (S&T) The SNS defines S&T Security as: keeping practical knowledge confidential, and the true meaning of scientific security is keeping theoretical knowledge confidential. The true meaning of scientific technology security is keeping confidential the knowledge of scientific technology, which also means knowledge security…the core of scientific technology security is the security of scientific technology results and the core of scientific technology results security is the prevention of scientific technology results not being leaked or stolen. Therefore, scientific technology confidentially is a top priority in scientific technology results security 447 In the policy realm, the issues are tracking S&T development and trends and leaders worrying about falling behind the West in S&T. An April 2007 People’s Daily article by Li Goujie, an academic at the Chinese Academy of Engineering and Director of the Institute of Computing Technology, warned that, “many Chinese core technologies are, in fact, at least two generations behind some foreign countries.” Li also stressed that Chinese S&T personnel should be aware and concerned about this development. 445 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra, at 95. 446 Ibid. 447 Ibid. at 155. 155 Security of Information Security of Information refers to information warfare as well as to protecting China’s critical infrastructure. Specifically, the SNS defines Information Security as: the protection of the secrecy, completeness, feasibility, and controllability of information data…Broader sense information security not only refers to the security of information data but also refers to the security of the basic facilities of information, information software system, network, information users and managers, public information order, national information security, and multi- dimensions, multi-layers, multi-factors, and multi targets of the complete security system. 448 The sources of this threat, according to the SNS, are primarily the result of technological advances (particularly computers) and the information revolution. This definition translates into Information Operations/Information Warfare, on the practical level. The SNS subdivides Information Warfare into operations such as Computer System and Network Information Warfare, Information Weapons, the use of public opinion and the media as a form of warfare. The SNS goes on to list policies that address this security threat. Among them is the 1994 Chinese People’s Republic Computer Information Security System Information System Security Protection Regulations, promulgated by the State Council, which regulates the forbidden use of computer information systems to engage in activities that can harm national interests, group interests, and citizens’ legal interests. In 1997, it updated the penal code and intensified the clause on “Crime of illegal entry to Computer information system” and “Crime of Destroying Computer Information System.” In May and December of that same year, the 448 Ibid at 183. 156 State Council announced the “Chinese People’s Republic Computer Information Network International Internet Management Enforcement Regulations” and “Chinese People’s Republic Computer Information Network International Internet Security Protection management Method.” In February 1998, the State Council announced “Chinese People’s Republic Computer Information Network International Internet Management Temporary Regulation Implementation Method.” 449 Chen Shifu also writes about protecting national information. He prescribes establishing and perfecting the legal structure of information security protection, developing advanced information defense technologies and cultivating the proper technical talent in the labor force to protect these technologies. 450 Security of Culture The SNS lists several elements of Cultural Security, including language security, the security of customs and habits, the security of values, and the security of lifestyle. On the policy level, the issues become expanding Han Chinese presence to reduce Central Asian influence in parts of western China, and concern over foreign religious influence. In this sense, this theory is not unlike some of France’s policies to protect its culture: to maintain national cultural security is not to maintain the purity of traditional culture and existing culture, nor to reject the influence and infiltration of foreign culture. It is to ensure and promote traditional and existing national culture to move in advanced direction. To reject foreign culture and the renewal and reform of old culture were not effective means to maintain cultural security in the past, it will not really maintain national cultural security today, either. In today’s world, globalization is going on vigorously. Whether it is maintaining economic, scientific, and technical security, or maintaining political and military security, or 449 Ibid. at 192-5. 450 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 123-173. 157 maintaining cultural security, it is impossible to reject foreign stuff and it is impossible to reject renewing and reforming existing stuff. When we joined the World Trade Organization it was not only the need for developing the economy, but also the process of renewing and reforming the traditional culture. No matter whether we admit it or not or whether we are willing or not, joining in WTO made us facing more and more complicated “cultural infiltration,” and it will make us accept more good and advanced cultural fruits of any country and nation in the works faster. Of course, in this process, we should pay attention to the negative influence of foreign decadent and backward culture. But generally speaking a country can only really get its cultural security in the cultural exchange with other nations, especially with the developed countries and base on constant absorbing world advanced culture and reforming national culture to maintain some superiority of one’s own culture. 451 What is most visible in these categories (i.e., S&T Security, Information Security, and Cultural Security) is that they are reflections of a growing power, a country that is no longer a “weak state,” and in the case of Cultural Security, an ancient and grand civilization. Secondly, these categories mesh nicely with China’s post-Cold War theories about Comprehensive National Power. 452 Although not securitization per se, Comprehensive National Power is an early incarnation of seeing elements of the nation- state in a wide variety of definitions and compositions. Comprehensive national power is in sense the flip side of comprehensive security, as defined in the SNS. Just as there are numerous methods of defining and measuring state power that transcend the traditional definitions, there are numerous methods of defining and measuring state threats that transcend traditional definitions. Although seemingly innocuous, S&T, information, and even culture can become viable elements of state power and state threats. As the PRC 451 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra, at 140. 452 Wang Ling, ed. “Comparison of Comprehensive Power of Major World Countries,” Supra. 158 has modernized and become more technologically advanced, the SNS argues that these strengths become vulnerabilities because of the dependence they have fostered for the successful management of the PRC. Third, Cultural Security is an element of “soft power,” a concept developed by Joseph Nye. 453 Cultural Security examines a source of power that is derived from example and idealization. It is getting others to do what you want via persuasion and guidance. It manifests itself in others wanting to be like you. The PRC is attempting to develop and exercise “soft power” through such cultural entities as the Confucius Institutes. These are institutions in foreign countries that promote Chinese culture through education. Fourth, and most importantly, these secondary elements of comprehensive security boldly illustrate the points raised by critics of over-securitization, specifically, scholars such as Goodson, Greenwood, Schultz, Ullman, Dorff, Morrison, Matthews, and even Buzan. These and other scholars have advocated that certain strict parameters be established around the definition of “national security,” lest it become too intellectually unwieldy and ultimately useless. As was stated before, if everything is an issue of national security, nothing truly is. That is the case with the efforts in the SNS. That being said, no evidence suggests that the miscellaneous security threats identified in the SNS are being securitized. The securitizing actors of the PRC are not making the necessary speech-acts describing these as existential threats to the Chinese nation-state 453 See generally, Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990). 159 that necessitate all the means of state power; nor is there evidence of an audience, either the elites or the masses, being receptive to any speech acts on these security threats. Instead, this activity seems to be a military scholar attempting to think outside of the box in a quasi-academic environment. Yet this activity does not preclude the possibility that these threats will indeed become securitized some time in the future, but as of early 2008 that is not the case. 160 CHAPTER TWO SPEECH-ACTS Military Sector Speech-Acts In an authoritarian, Propaganda State such as the People’s Republic of China, government speech acts (especially those pertaining to national security policy), as envisioned by COPRI, are manifested in a number of particular ways: official White Papers; official statements and findings from National Party and National Peoples Congresses; and speeches and statements from high-level leadership. The PRC’s official national security strategy, as outlined by its semi-annual Defense White Papers, still perches territorial integrity and sovereignty as its top concerns, but is increasingly emphasizing economic and financial concerns as security threats. In 2000, China’s Defense White Paper directly criticized former Taiwan President Lee Teng Hui, and then in 2004 lambasted then president Chen Shui-bian. In its 2004 Defense White Paper, China declared that, “The separatist activities of the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces increasingly have become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as peace and stability.” 454 However, the 2006 Paper does not name any individual Taiwan leader. The 2006 Paper highlights how more active international military engagement can support “Harmonious World” by securing 454 China’s National Defense in 2004, Beijing, China: Information Office of China’s State Council (27 December 2004) <english.gov.cn/ooficial/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm.> 161 access to energy and resources, global markets, and technology and by furthering Taiwan’s international isolation. As stated in the 2004 Defense White Paper: Proceeding from the fundamental interests of the country, China’s national defense policy is both subordinated to and in service of the country’s development and security strategies. Firmly seizing and taking full advantage of the important strategic opportunities presented in the first two decades of this century, China sticks to keeping its development in pace with its security and makes great efforts to enhance its national strategic capabilities by using multiple security means to cope with both traditional and nontraditional security threats so as to seek a comprehensive national security in the political, economic, military, and social areas. 455 The 2004 Defense White Paper essentially elevated nontraditional issues, stating that, “traditional and nontraditional security issues are intertwined, with the latter posing a growing threat.” 456 An entire section of this paper is dedicated to focusing on the cooperation China has undertaken in the nontraditional field. Notably, some of the most prominent differences between the 2004 and 2006 Defense White Papers concern security issues: Globalization 2004: Peace and development remain the dominating themes of the times…The trends toward world multi-polarization and economic globalization is deepening amid twists and turns. 455 China’s National Defense in 2004, Beijing, China: Information Office of China’s State Council, (27 December 2004) <english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm.> 456 Ibid. 162 Globalization 2006: Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today…China is determined to remain a staunch force for global peace, security and stability. State of the World 2004: The current international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes…the international situation as a whole tends to remain stable. State of the World 2006: Peace and development remain the principal themes in today’s world, and the overall international security environment remains stable. Threats and Opportunities 2004: A panoramic view of the present-day world displays the simultaneous existence of opportunities for and challenges to peace and security. Threats and Opportunities 2006: World peace and stability face more opportunities than challenges. Taiwan 2004: The situation in the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is grim. The Taiwan authorities under Chen have recklessly challenged the status quo…Taiwan independence forces have increasingly become the biggest immediate threat. Taiwan 2006: Taiwan is a challenge that “must not be neglected.” The “struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence’” and their activities poses a “grave threat” and that Washington exacerbates the tension by selling weapons to Taiwan. 163 China’s security environment 2004: The ‘Taiwan independence’ forces, the technological gap resulting from [the revolution in military forces], the risks and challenges caused by the development of the trends toward economic globalization, and the prolonged existence of unipolarity…all…have a major impact on China’s security. China’s Security Environment 2006: China’s security still faces challenges that must not be neglected. The growing interconnectivity between domestic and international factors and interconnected traditional and nontraditional factors have made maintaining national security a more challenging task. North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapon tests are challenges to regional stability. Military 2004: To step up preparations for military struggle, the PLA takes as its objectives to win local wars under the conditions of informationization, and prioritizes developing weaponry and equipment to building joint operational capabilities, and making full preparations in the battlefields. Meanwhile, the PLA adheres to the people’s war concept and develops the strategies and tactics of the people’s war. Military 2006: Implementing the military strategy of active defense, the PLA ensures that its is well prepared for military struggle, with winning local wars under conditions of informationization and enhancing national sovereignty, security, and interests of development as its objective. It will upgrade and develop the strategic concept of people’s war, and work for close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavors, use strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way, and take the initiative to prevent and defuse crises, and deter conflicts and wars. China will “defend its maritime interests.” To execute this, the 164 PLAN “aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.” Moreover, the 2006 Defense White Paper highlights how more active international military engagement can support a “harmonious world” by securing access to energy and resources, global markets, and technology, and by furthering Taiwan’s international isolation. The Paper goes on to proclaim that, “world wars or all-out confrontation between major countries are avoidable for the foreseeable future” and that “peace and development remain the principal themes in today’s world.” 457 Realist/traditional security themes are still ever-present, however. Several significant statements and omissions in the Paper reinforce China’s concerns about Taiwan, provide additional details on PLA modernization, and raise questions about China’s commitment to preventing the weaponization of space. The Paper also expresses concern about the U.S. inhibiting China as it “peacefully develops” and declares “hegemonism and power politics remain key factors in undermining international security” and that a “small number of countries…have intensified their military alliances and resorted to force or threats of force in international affairs.” This work is China’s first Defense White Paper since President Hu Jintao replaced President Jiang Zemin, whose goals and ideology were reflected in the last several 457 China offered over US$85 million in aid to South and Southeast Asia following the December 2004 tsunami – a record amount for China. Although small compared to over US$1.4 billion from the U.S. and Japan, this package demonstrated a serious Chinese commitment to projecting humanitarian assistance as a regional leader and a responsible global player. According to the UN Word Food Programme, China surpassed Japan in 2005 to become the world’s third-largest food donor following the U.S. and the EU. 165 editions. Despite the undeniable military security rhetoric, the 2006 Paper still weaves in the “Harmonious World” policy in a sophisticated manner representative of Hu’s style of governance. The 2006 version is noticeably more mature in terms of its presentations and message for foreign consumption. This Paper methodically outlines China’s defense goals and strategies without numbing readers with Marxist-Leninist jargon or with references to Mao, Deng, Jiang, and their respective ideologies. The Paper’s biannual publication reflects China’s efforts to conform to modern norms by promoting transparency of defense strategy – a point Chinese officials emphasize to their foreign interlocutors. However, the Paper must not be seen as a tool for understanding China’s military capabilities and defense spending, nor does it provide an avenue for Chinese citizens to question – let alone challenge – Zhongnanhai’s defense plans. 458 Despite the growing awareness of non-traditional security threats, China’s 2006 Defense White Paper still indicated that China’s ultimate military development goal is one of fielding a capable, modern military. The paper further states that: the first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010. The second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21 st century. 459 The 2006 China Defense White Paper also asserts that China’s defense policy is “purely” defensive in nature. At the same time, the paper states that the PLA must maintain a 458 See generally, Christopher Griffin and Dan Blumenthal, “China’s Defense White Paper: What it Does (and Doesn’t) Tell Us,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 7, 2 (October 17, 2007). 459 CPP20061229968070 – “Xinhua Carries ‘Full Text’ of PRC White Paper ‘China’s National Defense in 2006.’” 166 “credible nuclear deterrent force” and uphold the principles of counterattack in self- defense.” 460 The Paper, however, remains opaque about China’s defense and research, development, and acquisition budget. Beijing is unlikely to provide greater transparency on those issues in future papers. China’s Arms Control White Paper of 2005 also warned of the confluence of traditional and nontraditional threats: The world is far from tranquil as traditional security issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up time and again, and hot-spot issues keep emerging. Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational crimes, and infectious diseases are on the rise. The intertwined traditional and nontraditional threats pose severe challenges to international security. 461 The second “speech act” one can see in China are the official statements coming from the Party and National Congresses. China’s 16 th CCP Congress of 2002 defined China’s international orientation for the following 20 years as building on the foundation established over the prior 20. First, China’s new leaders are to continue to integrate China into the single, globalized world, including on issues such as the environment. 462 Second, China’s new leaders continue to remain attentive to a world that maintains different ideological systems. Thirdly, China’s new leaders will continue to foster 460 Ibid. 461 China’s Endeavors for Arms Control Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 2005, available at www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/140320.htm. 462 Jiang Zemin, “Build a well-off society in an all-round way and create a new situation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics,” 16 th Chinese Party Congress, 8 November 2002, Section IX, “The international situation and our external work,” (8 November 2002): 1. 167 economic and political multipolarity. 463 Lastly, China’s new leaders will address issues of military preparedness and military budget priority in the context where “peace and development remain the themes of the era.” 464 Gerritt Gong claims that the worldview of the 16 th CCP Congress leadership was framed by three perceptions: One is that the central task of ‘building a well-off society’ is rooted in a deeply competitive view of the world. Engrained in the thinking of China’s new leaders is that there is no substitute for comprehensive national strength when operating in an increasingly competitive international system. 465 A second basic perception of these leaders is that China must continue both to “bring in” and “go out” as part of an active participation in international economic and technological cooperation and competition. 466 A third basic perception is that dealing with issues of rule by law and rule of law is vital to successful governance both at home and abroad. The 16 th CCP Congress also identified the goals for China in the first two decades of the 21 st century, a period the Congress defined as one of “important strategic opportunities.” These goals include: quadrupling the GDP of the year 2000 by 2020, as “China’s overall national strength and international competitiveness markedly increase”; further improving socialist democracy and the legal system so people “live and work in peace and contentment”; notably enhancing the ideological and ethical standards, 463 Ibid. 464 Ibid. 465 Chu, Supra, at 165. 466 Jiang Zemin, “Build a well-off society,” Section I, “Work of the past five years and basic experience of 13 years,” (8 November 2002): 3. 168 scientific and cultural qualities, and health; and steadily enhancing sustainable development. 467 As mentioned before, official statements from leaders can also be seen as “speech acts.” These particular speech acts also reveal an increasing acceptance of non-military security threats to China (i.e., a broadening of the threat reference). In the August 2006 Central Foreign Work meeting Hu stated: In managing our foreign affairs we must focus on economic construction manage it in close conjunction with the general needs of the work at home, and push forward with our foreign affairs while managing the general situations at home and abroad as a whole. Hu also stressed integrating “political, economic, and cultural affairs” and “unifying the interests of national sovereignty, security, and development.” According to Hu, “China must rely on a growing demand to promote development and continuously satisfy the people’s ever-growing material and cultural needs.” In August 2006, Hu emphasized that China: must strengthen peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries in the world and actively foster a stable and peaceful international environment – a peripheral environment that is neighborly and friendly, a security environment with mutual trust and cooperation, and a climate of public opinion that is objective and friendly. Hu also stated that China: must…participate in international economic and technological cooperation and competition to an even greater extent, in even more fields, and at an even higher level…develop foreign trade and economic and technological cooperation…[and] vigorously pursue cultural exchanges with the world, and introduce China’s outstanding culture to the world to make the world better understand China. 467 Jiang Zemin, Ibid at, Section III, “Objectives of building a well-off society in an all-round way,” (8 November 2002): 1. 169 While stating that leaders must “adhere to people-centered thinking by doing foreign work for the people, fulfilling the objective of serving the people, protecting the fundamental interests of the largest number of people and making sure that foreign work benefits the entire population,” Hu reiterated that “we must guide the rank-and-file cadres and the general public to correctly understand the international situation and treat peoples of all nations equally and in a friendly manner.” One of China’s primary strategic goals is to return to its rightful place as a great power. “Harmonious World” emphasizes diplomacy as the means to put China’s interests on an equal footing with other world powers. 468 Lastly, one must examine general speeches and statements as “speech acts.” Statements on Taiwan 1997 (Jiang): We shall stick to the principle of one China and oppose splittism; the independence of Taiwan; the attempt to create two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; and any interference by foreign forces. We shall not allow any forces whatsoever to change Taiwan’s status as part of China in any way. “We shall work for peaceful reunification, but we shall not undertake to renounce the use of force.” “The two sides can hold negotiations and reach an agreement on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides in accordance with the principle that there is only one China.” “We hope that the Taiwan authorities will earnestly respond to our suggestions and proposals and enter into political negotiations with us at an early date.” 468 Unclassified analysis performed by U.S. government analysts, 11 June 2007. 170 Statements on Taiwan 2002 (Jiang): “We will work with our compatriots in Taiwan to step up personnel exchanges and promote economic, cultural, and other interflows between the two sides and firmly oppose the Taiwan separatist force.” “Adherence to the one-China principle is the basis for the development of cross- Strait relations and the realization of peaceful reunification. There is but one China in the world and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” On the basis of the one-China principle, let us shelve for now certain political disputes and resume the cross—Strait dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible. On the principle of the one-China principle, all issues can be discussed. We may discuss how to end the cross-Strait hostility formally. “One position of never undertaking to renounce the use of force is not directed at our Taiwan compatriots.” “The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely.” “China will never promise to give up the use of force...” On the issue of peaceful reunification and “one country two systems,” Jiang only used the word “insist”: “adherence to the one-China principle.” Used the word “pre-condition” or “premise” when referring to the one-China principle. “To conduct dialogue and hold negotiations on peaceful reunification has been our consistent position.” Did not mention peace agreements or referendums. 171 “We may also discuss the international space in which the Taiwan region may conduct economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, or discuss the political status of the Taiwan authorities or other issues.” “Taiwan may keep its existing social system unchanged and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Our Taiwan compatriots may keep their way of life unchanged, and their vital interests will be fully guaranteed.” “The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely.” “The complete reunification of the motherland will be achieved at an early date.” Statements on Taiwan 2007 (Hu): “Although they have not yet reunified the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China cannot be changed.” “We are willing to hold dialogues, consultations and negotiations on any issue with any political party in Taiwan as long as it recognizes that both sides of the Strait belong to one China.” We solemnly call for consultations on: the one-China principle, formally ending the hostile situation across the Strait, reaching a peace agreement, building a cross-Strait peace development framework, and opening up a new situation in cross-Strait relations and peaceful development. “We will make every effort to achieve anything that serves the interests of our Taiwan compatriots, contributes to the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait and facilitates the motherland’s peaceful reunification.” “China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division, and any matter concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be jointly decided by the entire Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots.” 172 “We will never allow anyone to separate Taiwan from the motherland in any name and by any means.” Hu did not mention the use of force per se. Hu used the word “discuss” when referring to a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides. Hu talked about reaching a peace agreement, constructing a framework for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and thus ushering in a new phase of peaceful development. Hu did not mention that the complete reunification of the motherland will surely be achieved. Foreign Policy Statements 1997 (Jiang): The world is moving toward multipolarization, and it is possible to strive to have a peaceful international environment for a longer period… An independent foreign policy of peace has enabled us to further improve our external environment. Our international influence has increased day by day…It is possible to avert a new world war and secure a peaceful international environment…However, Cold War mentality still exists…Strengthening military alliance between various major military blocs is not conducive to safeguarding peace and ensuring security…; We shall not yield to any outside pressure or enter into alliance with any big power or group of countries…Even after China has developed in the future, it will never practice hegemonism…The Chinese people have suffered from the aggression, oppression, and bullying of the big powers over a long period and will never cause other peoples to suffer in the same way…The future of the world is bright, and yet the road is torturous. Foreign Policy Statements 2002 (Jiang): The international situation is undergoing profound changes. The trends toward multipolarization and economic globalization are developing among twists and turns…New prospects have opened up in out external work. In light of changes in the international situation we have adhered to the correct foreign policy…China’s international standing has risen still further…Strive for a 173 peaceful international environment and a “good climate” in areas around China…Uncertainties affecting peace and development are on the rise…Mankind is faced with many grave challenges…No matter how the international situation changes, we, as always, will pursue an independent foreign policy of peace…The world is marching toward brightness and progress. The road is torturous, but the future is bright. Foreign Policy Statements 2007 (Hu): The all-round diplomacy has achieved important progress. We uphold an independent and peaceful foreign policy. Exchanges and cooperation with various countries have been broadly enhanced. We have an important and constructive influence in international affairs and have achieved a favorable international environment…China’s international standing and influence in the world have increased noticeable…A socialist China still stands tall in the East, looking in the direction of modernization, the world, and the future…The multipolarization of he world is irreversible and economics globalization is growing in depth…Relations between contemporary China and the rest of the world have undergone historic changes, and China’s future is closely connected with that of the world. 469 In general, compared with Jiang’s report to the 16th CCP Congress in 2002, Hu’s 2007 approach was not as adamant and more flexible vis-à-vis Taiwan. The points he emphasized were: maintaining peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship; stressing the possibility of negotiating with both parties in Taiwan; and Taiwan and China sharing the same history and the future being decided by both sides together. In his report, he also struck verbiage on military intervention and instead stressed the need to promote peaceful coexistence and a viable cross-Strait solution. 470 However, again we see the placing of Taiwan in a traditional security/military sector setting, but its threat 469 These quotes cited from unclassified analysis performed the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. 470 Hu Jintao, “Report to the 17 th National Party Congress,” (24 Oct. 2007) <news.xinhuanet.com/English/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm> 174 comes not from its upsetting a military balance-of-power but rather as a threat to Chinese identity and sense of historical justice. Political Sector Speech-Acts An analysis of speech-acts shows not an embracing of democratic ideals, but a decrease in the fear of democratization and a drop in the level of threat perception, to the point where securitization becomes politicization. For most of Hu Jintao’s first four years, there was relatively sparse discussion on democracy, save in the variety of specialized CCP journals that discussed inner-party and consultative democracy. Yet for much of 2007, talk of democracy broadened and attracted much attention, along with considerable opposition. The genesis of discourse may be found in Hu Jintao’s speech to the report meeting called to launch Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works in August, 2006. Hu, after praising Jiang, declared that: We will continue to…actively and yet prudently advance reform of the political system; perfect the democratic system; enrich the forms of democracy; build a socialist country ruled by law; promote socialist democracy in the system, standards, and procedures; expand citizens’ orderly political participation; and guarantee the people’s conduct of democratic elections, democratic decision- making, democratic management, and democratic supervision of the law. 471 Four months later, Hu, at a collective study session of the Politburo where the issue of local governance was discussed, reportedly said: 471 Hu Jintao, “Speech at the Report Meeting to Study Selected Works of Jiang Zemin,” Xinhua (15 August 2006). 175 In developing socialist grassroots democratic politics, it is of utmost importance to guarantee the masses of people directly exercise their democratic rights to manage grassroots public affairs and public welfare undertakings and practice supervision over cadres according to the law. 472 Other government luminaries such as Premier Wen Jiabao, 473 Yu Keping, 474 the deputy director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, and Wang Changjiang, 475 the head of the Party Building Section at the Central Party School, have all published articles advocating, in varying degrees, some form of democratic reform. Does this effort reveal a growing intellectual trend toward democracy affecting Party/government policy? Joseph Fewsmith concludes that the discussion on democracy may promote experimentation on a local level, but that the CCP center has been firm on the importance of democratic centralism and scientific socialism – not democratic socialism: There are indeed areas in which political reform can be continued – public accountability in the budgetary process, reform of local people’s congresses, the “permanent representative system” (giving delegates to Party congresses greater functions between congresses), expanding “consultative democracy,” etc. – but it appears that the leadership missed a good opportunity to implement inner-Party democracy over the past year…Better leadership is, no doubt, a good thing. But it is not democracy. 476 472 “Hu Jintao, at the 36 th Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Political Bureau, Urges to Raise the Level of Socialist Grassroots Democratic Political Building to Ensure the Masses of People at the Grassroots to Directly Exercise Democratic Rights,” Xinhua (1 December 2006), translated by OSC: CPP20061201968160. 473 Wen Jiabao, “A Number Issues Regarding the Historic Tasks in the Initial Stage of Socialism and China’s Foreign Policy,” Xinhua (26 February 2007). 474 Yu Keping, “A Few Theoretical Issues Concerning Citizens Participation,” Xuexi shibao (18 December 2006). 475 Wang Changjiang, “Zhengzhong duidai defang he jiceng de minzhu chuangxin [Seriously treat the democratic innovations of the grassroots and localities] Zhongguo gongchangdang (June 2007): 87-89. This article was originally published in Xuexi shibao (19 March 2007). 476 Joseph Fewsmith, “Democracy Is a Good Thing,” China Leadership Monitor 22 (Fall, 2007): 8. 176 Heralding brakes on political reform, Hu repeated the CCP’s basic line established at the 13 th Party Congress of “one central task and two basic points.” 477 Nonetheless, Hu voiced the need to reform, “commensurate with the continuous rise of our people’s enthusiasm for political participation” in order to “enrich the form of democracy,” as well as to “broaden the democratic channel,” exemplified opinions existing in the ongoing debates. 478 In his June CPS speech, Hu referred to developing grass-roots democracy to ensure that people may exercise their “democratic rights directly.” 479 This remark possibly hints at more substantive, though still gradual political reform in some manner. 480 Melissa Murphy believes Hu’s harkening back to Deng’s “four cardinal principles” indicates an attempt to accomplish three goals simultaneously: 481 alerting the Right that economic reform will precede political reform in a incremental manner; alerting the New Left that market reform and opening-up remains the CCP’s prime, irreversible, task; and out-flanking the Old Left, which accused Hu of abandoning the CCP’s core principles. 482 477 The central task: economic construction; the two basic points: upholding reform and opening up; the four cardinal principles: upholding the socialist path, people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership, leadership of the CPC, and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong thought. 478 “Hu Jintao Addresses Senior Cadres on Democracy, Other Issues at Party School,” trans. OSC: CPP20070625045001. Xinhua (25 June 2007). 479 Ibid. 480 Murphy, Supra, at 14. 481 Murphy, Supra, at 20. 482 “Excerpts from PRC Leftists’ 17 September Open Letter to Hu Jintao,” Boxun News (21 September 2007). In this letter 170 CCP members challenged the CCP to defend Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and to uphold the four cardinal principles against the new “capitalist class.” 177 One month after this speech, in an interview with China’s largest weekly Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), Central Translation Bureau official, He Zhengke, and Beijing insider-scholar Wang Changjiang sang the praises of grass-roots democracy workers as forerunners in developing China’s democracy. 483 This same issue featured a major piece on a trailblazer of grass-roots democracy, Zhang Jinming, a local party official who oversaw the first direct election of town and township heads and election of county-level CCP representatives in Sichuan and who continues to push the envelope at the grass-roots level. The 17 th Party Congress of 2007 yielded some (though limited) insight on Chinese political security views. Hu urged the CCP to “adapt to the growing enthusiasm of the people for participation in political affairs.” The theme of “multiparty cooperation and political consultation under the CCP leadership,” entailing calls for growing numbers of non-CCP individuals for “leading positions” was featured openly, as was increasing grass-roots democracy, especially increasing transparency and wielding power “under the sunlight to ensure that it is exercised correctly.” 484 It is worth charting the highlights of speech-acts by Jiang and Hu from the 15 th to the 17 th National Party Congresses regarding what effectively is political security. By reviewing the highlights of these speech-acts, one sees a trend towards intra-party reform and modernization, but avoiding the vital elements of western-style democracy. 483 “Nanfang Zhoumo Interviews Party School Scholars on Democracy, Political Reform,” Nanfang Zhoumo (26 July 2007): 1-3. 484 “Full Text of Report Delivered by Hu Jintao at 17 th Party Congress,” CCTV (15 October 2007). 178 However, one also sees a drop in active resistance and threat perception to democratization. 1997-2007 National Party Congresses Comparison: On the issue of “Democracy,” in 1997 Jiang highlighted the following points: “Democratic dictatorship”; do not “mechanically copy Western political systems”; a socialist legal system by 2010; and discipline and inspection of party cadres, officials. On the issue of “Democracy,” in 2002 Jiang highlighted the following points: “Democratic dictatorship”; “do not mechanically copy Western political systems”; a socialist legal system by 2010; and fighting corruption. On the issue of “Democracy,” in 2007 Hu highlighted the following points: increasing dialogue and accountability within the Party; connecting with the people; raising public awareness of legal channels; and greater transparency. The influential Yu Keping, the Deputy Director of the CCP’s Translation Bureau, wrote an article in the 27 October issue of the widely read, independent magazine Caijing. While he concedes in his article that, “like economic development, China’s political development will also follow the path of incremental reform or incremental democracy,” he does predict that “breakthroughs” are around the corner. Yu acknowledges Hu’s work, but goes further, expanding on concepts such as grass-roots democracy and rights being exercised by the people, intra-party democracy, and implementing supervisory apparatus to help monitor cadres. Murphy takes this 179 acknowledgment as a sign that while accelerated political reform is not in the cards in the near future, the political debate of reform is by no means over. 485 In examining these CCP speech-acts, one sees a trend of desecuritizing democratization as a security threat to the political sector, to the point where it is politicized (i.e., still a danger but not an existential threat that mandates the full use of state power and resources to combat). Socio-Cultural Speech-Acts Beijing utilizes numerous methods to monitor challenges to stability. There are two notable political philosophies. The first is via the “neo-authoritarians” and their view of state-society relations. Party scholars and officials have devoted close study to what they perceive as successful one-party systems such as Singapore’s, which uses the trappings of electoral democracy to bolster public support for the ruling party. 486 The second approach is the “liberal” or “neo-liberal” reformers. Some current and retired Party officials assert that only a transition to European–style democratic socialism can solve the ills plaguing Chinese society and preempt regime-threatening unrest. 487 They advocate a rapid and extensive loosening of both economic and political controls. The CCP allowed this debate to continue in a variety of media, including official CCP 485 Murphy, Supra, at 22. 486 FBIS, 20080313622001, 20080314, CIRAS ID: FB4425250. 487 OSC, CPP20070301710007, 20070301, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2933033, HK Paper: Central Party School Ex-Vice President Calls for Political Reform. 180 journals, although the trend since has been strongly against accepting the social democratic model for China. 488 CCP surveys of local officials find that they list “upholding social stability” as the most critical task they face.” 489 In late 2005, Central Party Committee and State Council leaders issued an internal directive that made reducing the level of social unrest a major policy goal in 2006. 490 Chinese leaders have expressed various remedies to the growing social unrest in China. In 2005, Li Jingtian, deputy director of the CCP’s Organization Department, stated: Everyone knows that China’s reforms and modernization has entered a crucial period, where per capita income increased from US$1,000 to US$3,000 a year. This period is the “golden development period” and the “period of pronounced social conflict” 491 Ministry of Public Security leaders have reached similar conclusions and observed that, “the continual increase in Chinese public order problems is tightly linked to the increasing speed of modernization in China.” 492 488 FBIS, CPP200705227100015, 20070524, CIRAS ID: FB3116897. 489 Zhang Hui and Yuan Yue, “The Basic View if Leading Cadres as to the Situation of China in 2005- 2006,” in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li Peilin, eds. Analysis and Forecast on China’s Social Development (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2006): 47. 490 Circular of the General Offices of the Chinese Communist Central Committee and the State Council Regarding the Reissuance of the “Political and Legislative Affairs Committee and the Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security ‘Joint Opinion Regarding Carrying Out Stable and Secure Development,’” issued 21 October 2005. 491 “Communist Party Organization Bureau Introduces the State of the Advanced Education Campaign for Party Members,” Xinhua (7 July 2006) <http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2005-07/07/content_12660.htm> 492 Zong Shengli, Li Guoshong, “The Situation of Social Order in 2005, Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” Supra. 181 A Beijing-based academic strongly emphasized the overriding importance of wending, or stability. He expressed how stability is the rough equivalent to “national security” in the eyes and minds of China decision-makers. He attributes this prioritization to a lack of strong political institutions and values in China. Chinese leaders’ threat perceptions are understandable because there is no ideological adhesive. 493 A Shanghai-based academic made it a point to strongly emphasize that in Chinese writings and speeches, “stability” in the domestic context carries the same gravity as “national security.” 494 He says that for China, all things flow from stability, and that to achieve anything, China first needs stability. He claimed that Chinese leaders know this reality and craft national security policies around it; the SARS crisis epitomized this concern. He goes on to claim that China’s top means of maintaining stability was pure economic growth, but that after 25 years of growth and development, China is at a new stage. Social justice, manifested in Hu’s hexie shehui, policies, is now seen as the best way to serve stability. 495 A Shanghai-based scholar chimes in by insisting that, “It is not just a cliché – stability is Beijing’s top security priority.” 496 This view of stability was shared by members of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing 497 and a foreign correspondent in Beijing. 498 Another Shanghai-based scholar states that stability is a top priority for the 493 Interview Number 21. 494 Interview Number 6. 495 Ibid. 496 Interview Number 9. 497 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 24 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 27”). 498 Personal interview, Beijing, China, 26 April 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 28”). 182 leadership because it is necessary for all other policies to be successful. 499 He said stability is both a means and an end; if there is no stability then China can be exploited by foreigners (as was the case in recent Chinese history). 500 Ting Wai also makes internal stability the prime threat to China’s national security, Zhongnanhai’s eyes. 501 He asserts that the PRC places foreign subversion as a major threat to internal stability, and that Hu fears U.S human rights lawyers more than he fears U.S aircraft carriers. 502 One Shanghai scholar makes the differing point that China is actually shifting focus from wending to “harmony” – hexie. 503 Hu Jintao, according to this scholar, is the driving force of this new direction, whereas Deng and Jiang prioritized wending. He claims that stability was necessary in the early stages of China’s modernization and development. Now, however, Hu believes that China is developed enough to evolve into a harmony-based priority, albeit in a moderate, deliberate fashion. He characterizes the difference as wending being more static and status quo-oriented, whereas hexie is more progressive and even inspirational. 504 499 Personal interview, Shanghai, China, 29 May 2007 (hereinafter, “Interview Number 17”). 500 Interview Number 17 501 Interview Number 24. 502 Ibid. 503 Interview Number 15. 504 Ibid. 183 One Shanghai scholar sees harmony as the next, more advanced, stage of stability. 505 This policy is more justice-oriented. He claims that China learned from the fall of Eastern European communist countries in the late-1980s that maintaining stability and, ideally, social harmony would inoculate China from a similar fate. One way to do so is to control corruption. This scholar proclaimed that social reform began in the 1980s and that the next stage of reform will be political reform. Although not directly, he preached that democratization will be part of these reforms. He claimed that this will take time, but it inevitable. 506 Another Shanghai-based scholar advises that stability is indeed a top security concern for China, but that the key words to look for in terms of security policy priority are, “we will not be able to just sit and watch.” He also claims that harmony is an ideal but that stability is still the true priority. Harmony is still (in a policy sense) vague, abstract, and politically convenient. He believes that Hu is indeed concerned with the plight of the commoners in the west and less-developed areas of China. He thinks that Hu and Wen talk less than Jiang; they talk less but do more. Two notable Shanghai security scholars describe how Hu’s emphasis on “harmony” over “stability” resulted from the changing stability environment of 2002, compared to 1989, when Jiang came in to power. 507 He specifically mentions Hu’s emphasis on social justice, which resides in “harmony” more than “stability,” stems from the growing amount of labor unrest and the 505 Interview Number 11. 506 Ibid. 507 Interview Number 16. 184 widening Gini coefficient in early 21 st century China. He states that “stability” is indeed a fundamental prerequisite, but “harmony” is more advanced, both technically and spiritually. He described “harmony” as being like a “perfect recipe” for a particular dish. 508 One Shanghai-based security expert believes the real questions are what constitutes stability and how does one maintain stability? 509 He insists that Beijing is growing more confident that it can maintain stability. As a result, Hu is focusing more on “harmony.” Chen describes that over the last 20 years, China’s comprehensive national strength has increased; the average Chinese person feels better about his/her life than before. However, as a result, expectations have risen, and the government is feeling pressure to meet these expectations. In other words, stability is generally a settled issue and the populace wants something more; harmony is meant to provide that next step. 510 A Shanghai-based security expert thinks Hu’s “harmony” theme indicates a Chinese identity that is Status Quo Power-oriented, and not Revisionist Power- oriented. 511 He remarks that Hu can concentrate on “harmony” because the requisite amount of stability had been obtained; the government can ultimately exercise control over its country. He acknowledges the growing number of protests in China but said they are not an organized unit challenging the authority of the leadership in Beijing. He also 508 Ibid. 509 Interview Number 12. 510 Ibid. 511 Interview Number 13. 185 says that the elite in China is more-or-less satisfied. He says that corruption is indeed a problem, but that it is a matter of making the system work, not overhauling the system entirely; besides there is no alternative. He mentions that “harmony” also implied ruling by virtue. Hu, much more than Jiang, wants social justice for the Chinese masses. He also claimed that Harmonious Society is more advanced than the Well-Off Society policy of the early 1990s. Moreover, Xiaokang Shehui is better translated as “relatively prosperous society” than “well-off society.” 512 One particular Shanghai-based scholar has expressed the most unique, and cynical view, on this subject. 513 He describes Hu’s Harmonious Society policy as Hu’s instrument to define his leadership and his legacy. He also says it helps China look benign to counter the “red dragon rising” attitude. This scholar notes how impressive China’s rapid economic rise is— a rise that seems all the more rapid when applying PPP standards. He said that the U.S. could “realize too late that China could take over,” and that “new authoritarian” states are a threat to the U.S. He also says that Hu’s focus on harmony sets a standard of behavior for China. Should China not act multilaterally or use preventive force then it will have opened itself up to endless criticism and enduring mistrust. This scholar continues by concluding that “harmonious world” is too idealistic and ultimately impossible to work as conceived. Hu’s focus in harmony cannot work because, according to this scholar, one cannot be simultaneously harmonious and a new 512 Ibid. 513 Interview Number 18. 186 authoritarian. He says that China is becoming ever more non-harmonious internally. This scholar insists that corruption is the biggest impediment to harmony. He elaborates by saying that a one-party system has no checks and balances; it has no multiparty competition for power and therefore less party accountability. He thinks the role of the internet for spreading views and information can allow greater dissent, but that alone cannot threaten the rule of the CCP. This scholar criticizes the CCP’s for not allowing democracy or too much dissent because it will lead to chaos by retorting that controlled chaos can be good; he uses Taiwan protests as an example; the red-shirted anti-Chen protestors made their views known but there was still societal stability. He does not see the CCP as being able to trust fair laws, as opposed to force, to being able to maintain stability. This scholar says, “harmony has good intentions, but cannot work as a policy.” Interestingly, this particular scholar is a member of the CCP. 514 In the realm of enacting social protest and repressing it, Dr. Lauri Paltemma and Dr. Juha Vuori highlight the Chinese use of various identity frames as attempts to both legitimize protests and make them illegitimate through security discourses. They refine the securitization process identified by Waever. These authors boil down the authorities’ security discourse tactics as a divide and rule, (a minority of “bad elements” within a majority of hapless but innocent people being misled by a minority of degenerate 514 Ibid. 187 “troublemakers” and “counter-revolutionaries” with ulterior motives); and a threat to socialism and stability. 515 Statements by Hu and Wen have signaled a retrenchment from the breathtaking capitalist reforms promoted by Jiang, in an effort to redistribute national wealth to poorer regions and rural areas. This populist tilt may not only fit the ideological inclinations of Hu and Wen, but also provide a way of addressing some of the causes of social unrest without adopting political reforms. 516 1997-2007 National Party Congresses Comparisons for Socio-Cultural Sector Issues: On the topic of socialist ideology, in 1997 Jiang pointed to: Deng Xiaoping Theory; and Socialism with Chinese characteristics. On the topic of socialist ideology, in 2002 Jiang pointed to: the “Three Represents;” “Building a well-off society in an all-round way.” On the topic of socialist ideology, in 2007 Hu pointed to: “Scientific Development.” On the topic of social programs, in 1997 Jiang pointed to: social security program necessary with privatization; and “Encourage some people to get rich first.” On the topic of social programs, in 2002 Jiang pointed to: social security, social issues; and “Encourage some people to get rich first.” 515 Lauri Paltemaa and Juha Vuori, “How Cheap Is Identity Talk? A Framework of Identity Frames and Security Discourse for the Analysis of Repression and Legitimization of Social Movements in Mainland China,” Issues and Insights 42.3 (September 2006): 47-86. 516 Joseph Kahn, “A Sharp Debate Erupts in China over Ideologies,” New York Times (12 March 2005). 188 On the topic of social programs, in 2007 Hu pointed to: a major focus on social security; health income gap, unemployment; and “social management.” Other issues in 2007 by Hu: the environment; product safety, quality. Economic Sector Speech-Acts Applying the COPRI model, we can see the prominent role of the securitizing actors that have the authority to securitize as such. There is a trend in PRC speech-acts in the economic sector to continue with economic reforms as a solution to the PRC’s problems. There is also the trend in the speech-acts of prioritizing government economic policy as a means to deal with China’s problems. The Party congresses consistently made economic policy the highest priority in the agenda. 1997-2007 National Party Congresses comparisons: On the issue of economics, in 1997 Jiang Zemin focused on tentative privatization of large state-run enterprises; the CCP playing an important role in the economy. On the issue of economics, in 2002 Jiang focused on investment and export the economy; development for Western China; and “State owned enterprises are the pillar of the economy.” On the issue of economics, in 2007 Hu Jintao focused on consumption, investment and the export economy; service and high-tech sectors; and “Accelerate the growth of Chinese multinationals corporations.” On the issue of rural and agricultural policy, in 1997 Jiang focused on agriculture being the foundation of the economy; grain, forestry, and water. 189 On the issue of rural and agricultural policy, in 2002 Jiang focused on modernizing agriculture and increasing farmers’ incomes; using market forces and larger scale farms; and “Urbanization of the countryside.” On the issue of rural and agricultural policy, in 2007 Hu focused on the need for “educated” farmers who “understand technology;” increasing social programs; greater representation at people’s congresses. The speech-acts of the PRC policy-makers point to a need to continue reforms, despite resistance from within. During a news conference on 14 March, 2006, Wen Jiabao admitted that reform was going through a, “very difficult period,” but that, “backpedaling offers no way out” in solving China’s economic challenges and that reform will, “unswervingly push forward.” 517 Environmental Sector Speech-Acts In July 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration’s (SEPA’s) vice minister confessed that China’s policy of growth via industrialization had pushed the environment “close to its breaking point.” 518 In 2006 the head of the SEPA cited pollution as “a great threat to social stability,” and noted that there were 51,000 disputes over environmental pollution in 2005. 519 Even Chinese media has commented that the 517 Wen Jiabao news conference, March 14, 2006, CCTV, trans. by OSC: CPP20060314070001. 518 Jamil Anderlini and Mure Dickie, “Taking the Waters,” Financial Times (24 July 2007). 519 FBIS, CPP20071206968156, 20071206, CIRAS ID: FB4187375. 190 effects of China’s “pollute first, control later” philosophy are quite apparent, and it is directly affecting the lives and well-being of China’s citizens. 520 520 “Take the Law Seriously,” Opinion in China Daily (6 June 2006) 191 CHAPTER THREE POLICIES Military Sector Policies Speech-acts are indicators of policy, but are they policies in and of themselves? Do they accurately reflect the leadership’s national security priorities? The only way to answer these questions is to examine formal security policies and look for discrepancies. Dittmer reflects that Jiang’s foreign policy has been marked by two distinctive features: First, China for the first time openly pursued “great power diplomacy” (daguo zhanlue), carefully abandoning Deng’s 1989 advice to taoguang yanghui (“hide our capacities while biding out time”). Secondly, after years of suspicion of “bourgeois” international governmental organizations, China eventually became a more active participant in multilateral diplomacy. 521 Despite its growing activity in multilateral diplomatic fora, China under Jiang was willing to use military force to enforce its territorial claims, as evidenced in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-6, as well as in its use of naval vessels in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands. Chinese scholars have overwhelmingly stated that despite the rise of non- traditional referents, the Taiwan issue is the primary issue in the military security rubric. Chinese government policy bears them out. After decades of threats to “liberate” Taiwan and recurrent shelling of offshore islands, Deng and NPC Vice Chair Ye Jianying in 1981 521 Yun-han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo, and Ramon H. Meyers, eds. The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16 th Party Congress (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 25. 192 launched the PRC’s first substantive proposal for peaceful reunification. They offered the “one country two systems” formula later successfully used in negotiations with the UK on Hong Kong and with Portugal on Macau. This proposal offered Taiwan “a certain independence” following unification, including governance of “its own party, government, and army systems,” and “independence of its legal system.” Taiwan officials were promised posts in the central government. Although Beijing refused to formally renounce the use of force (despite U.S. pressure during normalization talks), the PRC’s assessment was that Taiwan would eventually recognize the attractiveness of this offer and accept Beijing’s model. Deng claimed publicly that China could wait for 50 years, 100 years, or even 1,000 years for Taiwan’s agreement. Upon Macau’s return in December of 1999 and at the following Chinese New Year, Jiang spoke of reunification at an early date, and in February at Spring Festival, Premier Zhu Rongji called for a resolution of the Taiwan issue as soon as possible. One could argue that the military presence on China’s senior decision-making bodies can be used to discern the priority of traditional military security. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992, the percentage of military members on Central Committee rose to almost 25%, with one-third of new members being PLA officers. 522 Yet, in ten years, PLA representation on the CCP Central Committee had fallen to a nearly all-time low (the gap is not that large: 26% at the 14 th Party Congress in 1992 to 21% in 2002). Furthermore, by the 16 th Party Congress of 2002, no uniformed military were appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). This case is not 193 unusual; over the past 20 years only one unformed officer – Liu Huaqing – has been elected to the PBSC. Another sign of waning PLA influence is the trimming of the Central Military Commission from 11 to nine members in 2002. David Shambaugh asserts that this change points to several implications for Chinese civil-military relations, and by extension, traditional military security. 523 Moreover, this change, in his view, is evidence of growing institutional “bifurcation” of Party and army. Shambaugh points to the PLA playing no apparent role in the civilian succession before or at the 16 th Party Congress. He further highlights the fact that no senior Party leader has any military experience, and none of the new military leaders have any experience in high-level politics. Moreover, the PLA, in its operations, is becoming more professional and corporate. Shambaugh also points to the lack of political indoctrination in the PLA, but the latest evidence for that is trending otherwise. Another manifestation of the prominence of traditional security is the amount the PLA gets in the annual national budget. Jiang’s and China’s traditional security policies were manifest in its military budget: after a decade of spending decreases, the post-1989 annual military budget began to increase by 11 to 23%, outpacing GDP growth. The 2002 Defense White Paper outlined five reasons for these increases: 1) the increase of personal expenses; 2) the establishment and gradual improvement of a social security 522 Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Army in Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends,” Asian Survey, 33.8 (1993): 758-9. 523 Chu, Supra, at 105. 194 system for servicemen; 3) increased expenses for operations; 4) increased expenses for international cooperation with the international community in anti-terrorism activities; and 5) increased expenses for the renovation and improvement of military equipment through technological improvements, especially through the use of more sophisticated technologies. 524 However, as James Mulvenon points out, not mentioned but equally important are the political and civil-military imperatives of keeping the military happy, as well as the strategic imperatives of a potential Taiwan contingency involving U.S. intervention. 525 Despite these modernization efforts, military expenditure as a percentage of central government spending has dropped from roughly 12% in 1992 to nearly 10% in 2004. In contrast, government administration and social spending have risen in that timeframe. 526 Xu Guanyu, a member of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, points out that a large percentage of the 2007 overall announced budget increase is going to personnel costs, China’s booming economy requires the PLA to increase personnel compensation enough to ensure that it can attract and keep the high- caliber personnel necessary to operate modern military equipment and to oversee the adoption of even more advanced information technologies. Compensation adjustments include sharp increases in wages, living expense allowances, quality-of-life-related 524 China’s National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2002). 525 James Mulvenon, “China’s Military Budgeting,” DGI Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (2006): 16. 526 Ibid at 19-20. 195 spending, and pensions of the 2.3 million PLA soldiers, civilians, and retirees. Officers from battalion-level down and non–commissioned officers received the largest pay increase – 100%; the pay of officers from regimental level and above, civilians and retirees increased by 80%. The living allowances for all rank and file soldiers increased. Personnel spending increases averaging 60% explain over 70% of the overall announced budget increase alone. In addition to personnel costs, the PLA’s modernization program is a significant driver of increased defense spending. The 2006 Defense White Paper outlines a three-step defense modernization program, which includes laying a firm foundation for modernization by 2010, executing major modernization progress by 2020, and building a force capable of winning “informationized” wars by 2050. Many of the reforms and preparations laying the foundation for modernization are within the scope of the announced budget. Money spent on training and exercise activities has also risen as the modernization process progresses. While these increases have a major impact on the budget, they pale in comparison to the increase in personnel expenditures. Spending on hardware, Research and Development, and weapons procurement and development has also increased— but are mostly funded outside the announced budget. What little public information is released about defense spending is further obscured by a veritable labyrinth of funding sources, subsidies and cutouts at all levels of government and in multiple ministries. Real spending on the military, therefore, is so disaggregated that even the Chinese leadership may have difficulty discerning the actual bottom line. The lack of detail of public military expenditures is an outgrowth of a political system in which military spending, 196 along with most aspects of its military posture, is treated as a state secret. While increasing China’s transparency in reporting military budgets and expenditures has long been a U.S. and international goal, to date Beijing has only provided the three-part, highly aggregated and poorly-defined breakouts included in past defense white papers. The announced military budget does not reflect the following additional funding sources: Foreign Weapons Sales, and Aid. Foreign weapon purchases are funded directly by the State Council and often are negotiated in commercial terms. The revenues generated by arms sales primarily go to military industries but the PLA receives a small commission of sales of new and used housed stocks. Paramilitary expenses. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is funded in peacetime by the Ministries of Finance and Public Security, although some sources indicate it is partially paid for out of Ministry of State Security accounts. Meanwhile employing PAP personnel and localities with PAP units also provide funding. In addition, the PAP earns income from economic activities such as mining and agriculture, as well as from fines and fees collected during its security activities. Strategic Rocket Programs. The PLA 2 nd Artillery is the only service with its own budget. Some analyses indicate it also probably receives some direct State Council funding outside the announced military budget. The size of this budget remains shrouded in secrecy. Even the exact number of people assigned to the 2 nd Artillery is a state secret. State Subsidies for the Military-Industrial Complex. Military factories under the General Armament Department (GAD), such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missile production receive direct state allocations for converting factory use between civil and military products. Many machinery upgrades from civilian production ultimately are 197 intended to improve military production as well. The State Council thus defrays weapon production costs through subsidies to the industry or corporation rather than through the military budget. Military-related industries also are encouraged to develop and produce civilian products in order to reduce overhead, acquire technology, end reliance on government subsidies, and be profitable. Military-Related Research and Development. Funding sources for military Research and Development include direct allocations from COSTIND; the PLA GAD; the Ministry of State Science and Technology; the industries themselves; research institute self-financing earnings; and local government funding. For example, more than three-quarters of government Science and Technology appropriations is not associated with overtly government-sponsored programs, making it difficult to account for the portion of expenditures directed toward military-related activities. Extra-budgetary Revenue. PLA divestiture of commercial enterprises in the late 1990s is not affecting traditional production enterprises (e.g., farms and uniform/material manufacturers). Almost 3,000 commercial firms belonging to the PLA and PAP were transferred to local governments and some 4,000 others were closed, but the remaining 8,000-10,000 production enterprises continues under PLA direction. Some sectors were exempted from divestment for security reasons, such as transportation and telecommunications. The PLA also maintains control of a variety of small-scale factories and agricultural enterprises that supplement unit funding and provide employment for dependents. The official justifications for the increases in total defense- related expenditures are numerous. Major General Fu Liqun, a member of the Military Science Academy Experts Group, explained the ten years of double-digit increases result 198 from the PLA needing to catch up from many previous years of negative real budget growth and from China’s late adoption of the RMA concepts, which resulted in a more costly reform due to its deteriorated military state. Modernization is still at the mechanization stage, the PLA is just now turning to the expensive integration of C4ISR phase. The PLA has also assumed more nontraditional roles, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, fighting transnational criminal activities as well as protecting longer trade routes in support of overseas energy and resource supply; foreign measures to deny China weapons technology, which further increases the costs of modernization, as China must depend on its own efforts to modernize; efforts to develop the means to successfully execute a Taiwan contingency; increasing international prices of oil and minerals driving up domestic costs. 527 The PRC’s military modernization is impressive and the systems are very much directed towards a contingency with the U.S. and/or Japan throughout the East and South China Seas. However, Taiwan is only a military threat when coupled with the U.S. Political Sector Policies in the 1990s The process of Chinese leadership addressing political security is drawn-out, but highlighted by spikes of certain reforms. 528 By far the largest threat to the PRC 527 Unclassified analysis performed by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (26 April 2007). 528 Excellent work on PRC political reforms of the 1980s appears in The Political Logic of Economic Reform by Susan Shirk. Shirk attributes the PRC’s successful reforms to developing an effective pro- reform coalition and render ineffective the groups that will lose as a result of the reforms. Deng Xiaoping chose to retain the traditional communist party state but to use provincial officials as a political counterweight to the conservative center without changing the basic rules of the system. This strategy was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese communist political system, although structurally similar to the Soviet one, was more decentralized because of Mao Zedong's previous, deliberate efforts at decentralization. The cornerstone of Deng's strategy was to build support for economic reform through 199 leadership’s sense of political security came from the Tiananmen uprising of 1989. 529 The policies of rulership and administrative reform that came in the wake of that crisis reflected a sense of threat within the PRC leadership of democratization. The reforms that were instituted centered on efficiency and modernization, but there also was a notable lack of democratization. In other words, the calls for democratization by the Tiananmen protestors were completely ignored, and were seen as an existential threat to the PRC’s political sector. This post-Tiananmen democratization concern is seen with fear by PRC leadership of the instability that it supposedly fosters. Dittmer has observed that, “In the realm of politics the Jiang regime has been associated with the slogan ‘stability over all’ (wending ya dao yiqie).” 530 Dittmer claims that the major contributions of the Jiang term to the ongoing institutionalization of the political arena were to consolidate Deng’s policies rather than to add bold new initiatives. He divides them into three categories: formal politics, informal politics, and ideology. 531 He further subdivides formal politics into two aspects – structural reform and personnel policy – both of which emphasized efficiency-enhancing reforms rather than democratizations. Structural reform has more revenue-sharing contracts between the central government and provincial governments, an approach that gave provincial officials a vested interest in promoting and sustaining the reform drive. This created a pro- reform political counterweight to the central bureaucracy and achieved market reform while preserving China's communist institutions. Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). 529 See generally, Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989- 2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 530 Chu, Supra, at 12. 531 Chu, Supra, at 16. 200 or less been limited to “elite democracy,” namely inducting “trustworthy experts” from a broader cross-section of society into the top strata, and recruiting officials into the mid- ranking bureaucratic levels. 532 Jiang’s personnel administration, like Deng’s emphasized egress and ingress, forming vacancies and improving turnover via increasingly strict enforcement of age and term limits, resulting in a comparatively young elite holding the highest educational achievements in the PRC’s history. 533 In the field of informal politics, Jiang maintained Deng’s efforts to bring factionalism to heel. Dittmer has identified two distinctive features of Jiang’s factionalism efforts. First, the gap between informal and formal organization has been narrowed, in contrast to the Deng years. Second, not only ideology but also policy and bureaucratic interests seem to have faded somewhat as a basis for factional organization. 534 Regarding Jiang’s work on the role of ideology, Dittmer thinks that Jiang: considered ideology a “useful mechanism for public agenda setting as well as legitimation and has striven to make his own contribution to the canon. Jiang’s contributions have been inspired by a conviction that for ideology to regain credibility it must bear some plausible relationship to the economic transformation of China. 535 Jiang rejected proposals for democratic reforms due to a sense of threat to the political sector from democratization. Specifically, Jiang rejected proposals for political reform offered by personal adviser Wang Huning, who was serving as a senior member 532 Ibid. 533 Chu, Supra, at 17. 534 Ibid. at 19. 535 Ibid. at 22. 201 of the State Council Research Office, according to a foreign government service. This rejection is in keeping with other signs that Jiang was reluctant to press far on political reform at this time; his periodic remarks on this topic seemed intended mainly to prevent others from seizing the initiative. Wang has been one of the few social scientists with a knack for pressing flexible and creative policy in the conservative atmosphere of the 1990s. He helped create Fudan’s Institute of Development as a policy think tank and was moved to Beijing as a reward for drafting Jiang’s 1995 “8-point” policy overture to Taiwan. Jiang’s most important reforms were focused on modernizing the party and broadening it, not on institutionalizing democratic reforms. Again, this priority was due to a perceived threat to national security stemming from outright democracy. A reformed Party helps diminish the call for outright democratization. The most prominent of these reforms was the san ge daibiao (“three represents”): the spirit behind this policy was that the CCP should represent the advanced culture, advanced relations of production and the interests of the broad masses of the people – with no clear mention of the workers or class struggle. Jiang announced this point in February 2000 during an inspection tour to Guangdong. At the Fifth Plenum of the 15 th CCP Congress in October of that same year, the three represents became part of the CCP dogma: “The Communist Party should stick to Marxism-Lenninsm, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, and follow the ‘Three Represents.’” 536 At the 16 th CCP Congress in 2002, the “three represents” was 536 Agence France Press (17 September 2001). 202 enshrined in the Party statute – though without personal reference to Jiang. 537 In his speech on the 80 th anniversary of the CCP’s birth on 1 July 2001, Jiang highlighted the political implications, proposing that the criteria for recruitment into the CCP be expanded to include members of the middle classes, even the bourgeoisie. 538 This time was not the first in CCP history that entrepreneurs had been admitted into the Party, but never in so explicit a manner. Moreover, Jiang’s formula initially caused a stir with the New Left, who not only objected to the CCP’s abandonment of the proletariat, but also viewed these reforms as an agent for Jiang’s personality cult, which peaked at his retirement. 539 These objections reflected concerns for not just power-political implications but also for vision of the CCP’s future in general. The primary theme in this work is the goal of quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui (“build a well-off society in an all- around way”), with the focus on quanmian, or all-around. William Overholt has characterized the “three represents” as a new mandate for the CCP that it, “should represent the elite rather than the masses and it should bind the country together rather than dividing it through struggle and class dictatorship.” 540 “What Jiang was proposing with the ‘three represents,’” a Party official told John Lewis and Litai Xue, “was a total reform of the Party,” and this interpretation was made explicit in internal documents to its more than 64 million members at that time. He continued: “What these members were 537 Washington Post (21 July 2001); CNN (28 July 2002). 538 Chung Kung Yen Chiu (September 2001). 539 Chu, Supra, at 23. 540 William H. Overholt, “China’s Party Congress: The New Vision,” South China Morning Post 16 (November 2002). 203 told was that the Party would no longer represent just the working classes. Jiang was challenging the historic ‘vanguard’ role of the Party and the special place of the proletariat in it.” 541 On 1 July Jiang gave a shot in the arm to his reform initiatives. His speech celebrating the 80 th anniversary of the CCP’s founding devoted more than an hour to the “three represents” and made them the focal point of his political strategy. 542 This speech was definitely a right turn in that it made scientists, intellectuals, engineers, managers, the representatives of the working class. Speaking to the CCP leadership on 31 May 2002, Jiang stressed that attaining a “moderately well-off society” meant that China must proceed with changes at an accelerated pace or face falling behind. To do this, the CCP would have to implement the necessities of the “three represents,” which meant “keeping with the times.” He added, the Chinese people “must be able to see the important changes that have taken place in the world’s political, economic, cultural, and scientific-technological fields” since the publication of the Communist Manifesto. 543 Overall, this reform was for the purpose of protecting the Party and making it work, not changing it or allowing democratization. Lewis and Xue sum up the social change and political reform of the Jiang era as: What we have learned about the transformations rocking China today and over the past quarter-century can now be summarized in terms of three interlocked and mutually reinforcing changes: modernization, political reform and globalization. Each of these changes has made possible and necessitated the others, and each has advanced to a new stage. At the 16 th Party Congress, Jiang called on China to 541 Chu, Supra, at 117. 542 The full English-language text of the speech is found in China Daily (2 July 2001): 4-6. 543 The text of this speech is found in Xinhua (31 May 2002). 204 “take the path of new industrialization” based on science and education, sustainable development, and the accelerated deployment of information technology. 544 These priorities reflect the interactions of policy declarations, institutional changes and new incentive structures. Such interactions may well decide whether and how the leadership can fundamentally restructure and revitalize the behavior of the governing institutions and political participation. 545 However, with the advent of a new generation of leadership, one sees a potential diminution of threat perception of democratization to the political sector. The 16 th Party Congress was a major success in China’s ability to maintain a smooth political transition, hence protecting political security: “the orderly and peaceful transfer of power, unprecedented in the 81-year history of the Chinese Communist Party, marks a new phase in China’s politics as it younger leaders grapple with the problems of modernization.” 546 All leaders over 70 years of age, except Jiang, retired from the Politburo at the 15 th Party Congress of 1997. Jiang, at 76 years old, stepped down and let the 59-year-old Hu take over the post of Party General Secretary at the 16 th Party Congress, though he remained Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission for another two years. The entire 15 th Politburo Standing Committee – except Hu – collectively retired and handed over to a new Standing Committee. The average age of Politburo members at the 16 th Congress was 60, in contrast to 72 at the 12 th Congress in 1982, and 63 at the 15 th Congress in 1997. Furthermore, most of these new leaders joined the CCP after the late 1950s (i.e., after the founding of the PRC), which means this 544 Jiang Zemin, “Build a well-off society,” part V. Previously, the Party had stressed only the underlying material and spiritual civilizations. 545 Chu, Supra, at 122. 546 Editorial, “Hu’s the new leader,” Straits Times (19 November 2002). 205 generation of leadership was the first with no significant personal memory of pre-1949 China. 547 Suisheng Zhao characterizes this new generation of leadership as follows: Concerned overridingly with political stability and economic modernization, the new leadership may take some fine adjustments in policy emphasis to balance out reform in the nation’s economic and social landscape, so that the rapid progress made to date in some sectors of the economy and society is matched in others. 548 Gerrit Gong noted that this generation of leadership has spent half its lives and most of its formative adult experiences after their mid-30s, in the era of China’s ongoing global involvement and integration. This generation is also more widely traveled than its predecessors. 549 Zhao also described how Hu Jintao’s initial message was not about distinguishing himself from Jiang so much as striking a balance between the needs for economic growth and narrowing the growing economic and social polarization. 550 At the opening speech introducing the new Politburo Standing Committee Members after the 16 th Congress, Hu only underscored the importance of Jiang’s “three represents” theory as the rudder for the CCP. 551 Hu’s colleagues in the Politburo are described by Li Chen as being more interested in discussing issues then defending “isms.” 552 Many are trained as engineers and “see political issues as problems to be solved based in hard data and hard interest, not 547 Fewsmith, Supra, at 24. 548 Chu, Supra, at 56. 549 Chu, Supra, at 162 550 Ibid. at 57. 551 Commentary, “Torch passing kindles higher hopes,” China Daily (17 November 2002). 552 Li Chen, “Mystery behind the Myths,” South China Morning Post (11 June 2001). 206 as conflicts driven by ideological principles.” 553 They tasted the cruelty of the Cultural Revolution and grappled with bureaucratic hierarchy in the reform years, so they are anything but idealists: “They had learned how to serve new bosses without rejecting the old ones; when to pay lip service to ideologues and when to keep mum; and when to duck power struggles and when to form new alliances.” 554 Reform was also an issue. Suisheng Zhao observes that when many Chinese scholars debate political reform, they are not so much proposing to democratize the policy but rather to make the single party rule more efficient and institutional or to provide it with a more stable legal base. He categorizes this top-down method as political reform, which “refers to all aspect of change that are deliberately and explicitly decreed or promulgated by the ruling elite to deviate from the established political system.” 555 He also notes that the direction of top-down political reform in China has progressed steadily in the 1990s largely in the form of the institutionalization of the leadership system by normative rules and the transformation of the CCP from a revolutionary to a conservative ruling party. 556 Zhao goes on to say how: institutional authority has advanced to take a more important position than personal authority since the complete demise of the senior revolutionary veterans in the 1990s. After the death of Deng in 1997, there have not been any retired 553 David M. Lampton, ed. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001): 136. 554 Jonathan Ansfield, “Mao’s sent-down youths to rise at China’s Congress,” Reuters English News Service (10 October 2002). 555 Suisheng Zhao, “Political reform and changing one-party rule in Deng’s China,” Problems of Post- Communism 44.5 (September/October 1997): 13. 556 Chu, Supra, at 63. 207 senior leaders who practiced footloose informal power as Deng and his cohorts did. 557 Teiwes insists that the technocrats are essentially interested in preserving the status quo and pursuing stability. 558 David Bachman believes the technocrats are products of an established system and its creators and/or builders. 559 Yu-Shan Wu of Taiwan National University highlights three defining characteristics of the 15 th and 16 th Party Congresses in terms of top-echelon politics: technocratic rule that concentrates on stability, generational replacement as mechanism of regime rejuvenation, and mentor politics that may lead to gerontocracy. 560 Some U.S. scholars even insist the rise of a technocrat era commenced with the death of Deng and the emergence of Jiang from Deng’s political shadow. 561 Regardless, the transfer of power from Jiang and his generation to Hu et al. at the 16 th Party Congress consolidated the rule of the technocrats. Hong Yung Lee believes that the post-Deng era has been marked by a technocratic rule, and stability has been enshrined as the ultimate goal. 562 Nathan characterizes the new generation of leaders’ 557 Ibid. at 64. 558 Hung–mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, eds. China under Jiang Zemin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 83. 559 David Bachman, “The Limits on Leadership in China,” Asian Survey 32.11 (November 1992): 1050. 560 Chu, Supra, at 69. 561 Cheng Li and Lynn White, “The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party: Full-fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin,” Asian Survey 48.3 (March 1998): 231-264. 208 current power struggles as taking a purely factional form, in which political leaders clash not over development strategy but rather over personal power and prestige. 563 Since the late 1980s, Chinese officials have allowed citizens to take part in local elections for village committees. But they have quashed local experiments aimed at expanding these initiatives to higher levels in the Chinese bureaucracy and have maintained tight control of the nomination and selection of candidates to screen out individuals who might challenge party control. 564 In the same vein, in the late 1990s, Chinese authorities formed a regulatory structure to administer the registration of civil society organizations with more attenuated links to the state. Yet when a group of social activists tried to employ these channels in 1998 to openly register branches of the Democracy Party, Chinese officials immediately suppressed the group and sentenced the leaders to long terms in prison. 565 Democratization, freedom of speech, and protest and assembly have all hit ceilings in the PRC. In 2005, Chinese authorities launched a national campaign directed by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) aimed at reducing the numbers of citizen petitions. 566 As per this campaign, the MPS promulgated regulations in October 2005 562 See generally, Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Bureaucrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991). 563 Andrew Nathan, “A factionalism model for CCP politics,” The China Quarterly 53 (March 1973): 34- 66. 564 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005 Annual Report (11 October 2005): 91-92. 565 Human Rights Watch, “Nipped in the Bud: The Suppression of the China Democracy Party,” (September 2000) < http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/china/> 566 Bergsten, Supra, at 75. 209 applying disciplinary sanctions to local MPS officials who fail to prevent outbreaks of citizen protests. Chinese authorities also issued amended 2005 national regulations governing the xinfang system and top-level circulars that call for the widespread implementation of xinfang responsibility systems as a means to address citizen petitions. Pressure has been placed on the Chinese judiciary to adopt similar systems that require judges to personally manage citizen petitions or suffer negative professional repercussions. 567 Beijing claims these policies have yielded success. In November 2006, Chinese public security authorities announced that the MPS handled a total of 17,900 mass incidents between January and September of 2006, a 22.1% decline over the previous year. 568 Chinese officials announced a similar decline for the number of citizens participating in collective petitions aimed at party and government authorities. 569 They further reported that the total number of petitions submitted by Chinese citizens to xinfang bureaus decreased from 13.73 million in 2004 to 12.66 million in 2005, the first such decline in twelve years. 570 Carl Minzner assesses that the true meaning of the reduction in official reports is not yet clear. He notes that it has been accompanied by more serious punishment for officials who experience mass petitions as well as official 567 Carl Minzner, “Xinfang: An alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,” Stanford Journal of International Law 42.1 (2006): 133-135, 178. 568 “From January to September, 380,000 Farmers Participated in Mass Incidents, Represent Largest Group,” Xinhua (6 November 2006) < http://news.sohu.com/20061106/n246226211.shtml.> 569 “The Tendency of Continual Increases in Numbers of Xinfang Cases Has Been Checked, Petitioning Trends More Reasonable,” Xinhua (29 April 2006) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006- 04/29/content_4490873.htm.> 570 Ibid. 210 efforts to control media reports of these protests more tightly. In his view, the decline may represent greater official success in resolving citizen grievances, efforts by local officials to hide data that might reflect poorly on their work, or temporary success by security officials in controlling manifestations of citizen discontent. He thinks that if the decline has resulted from greater repression, then there may merely be a temporary dearth in the process that is undermining the long-term stability of both the Chinese legal system and the state in general. 571 As the years have passed since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, PRC leaders are less fearful of democratic reforms. The evidence points to an allowance of certain reforms, notably at the village and intra-party level, which is an indication of democratization as an element of the political sector changing from being securitized to politicized. However, democratic reform has its limits in the foreseeable future. Lynch conducted research that revealed that the CCP still actively resists true democratization. 572 One rationale for this resistance, in its eyes, is that democratization would lead to what Lynch defines as “permanent decentering” in the global system. One may infer that “decentering” is a security threat to the CCP referent of unchallenged political rule, for example, political security. This decentering could even be a threat to the PRC’s cultural security insofar as it is a threat to the identity and rule of the PRC. The end result is similar to Joseph Fewsmith’s work in that the CCP may allow reform 571 Bergsten, Supra, at 75. 572 See generally, Daniel C. Lynch, Rising China and Asian Democratization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 211 and promote a smoother and less deterministic political process, but this progress is by no means democratization. That being said, Lynch does not rule out the potential for China to ultimately democratize in the longer term. 573 Socio-Cultural Sector Policies PRC leadership’s concern over socio-cultural security and stability is readily apparent in its policies. On addressing the specific concept of comprehensive security in the socio-cultural sector security context, Jiang Zemin undeniably paid more attention to social stability as a national concern than did his predecessors. As addressed before, a terrifying manifestation of the threat to the socio-cultural sector is the proliferation of mass incidents in China. Despite official CCP efforts to downplay and hide the level of domestic unrest, the number of mass incidents such as protests, riots, and mass petitioning rose to over 83,000 in 2005 574 from 74,000 in 2004, which is all the more dramatic when juxtaposed against the fact that this number was 8,700 in 1993. 575 Several notable recent incidents of rural unrest include: Huaxi village, Zhejiang province: April 2005 – up to 30,000 villagers riot against about 1,500 police and officials over factory pollution. Dongzhou village, Guangdong province: December 2005 – more than 1,000 villagers clash violently with hundreds of PAP over a dispute regarding compensation for land earmarked for a coal-fired power plant. Sanzhu village, 573 Ibid. at 8. 574 “Ministry of Public Security Holds Press Conference to Announce Public Security and Fire Situation for 2005,” Ministry of Public Security Web site (20 January 2006) <http://www.mps.gov.cn/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/common/article.jsp?infoid=ABC0000000000001018.> 575 M. Scott Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly 27.3 (Summer 2004): 138-40. 212 Guangdong province: November 2006 – thousands of villagers clash with riot police who came to rescue officials held hostage by residents over alleged land seizures and corruption. According to Minzner: Chinese authorities are seriously concerned about increasing social unrest. Some Chinese authorities believe economic reform alone will reduce levels of social unrest. Others are experimenting with a range of reform measures. But existing reforms remain firmly committed to the principle of centralized party control, undermining efforts to address the institutional factors driving social unrest. 576 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that the central government has acknowledged that the grievances of many citizens are legitimate, and occasionally has corrected local policies that violate the law and/or punish local officials for employing excessive force against the protesters. However, the CRS points out that the state has reserved the authority to arbitrarily determine which protest activities are acceptable. It The state has not developed adequate institutions that protect human rights, cede political power to social groups, ensure judicial independence, and resolve social conflict, in the CRS’s view. 577 Chinese officials are very worried about mounting social unrest, as reflected in the goals of “harmonious society.” 578 Beijing perceives challenges to stability with a watchful eye. An October 2007 article by the director of a provincial Public Security Department noted that “unending” unrest represented both “a big 576 C. Fred Bergsten, Nicholas Lardy, Bates Gill, and Derek Mitchell, eds. The Balance Sheet China: The China Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007): 57. 577 Ibid. at 8. 213 problem: for China’s national development and a means for “hostile forces” at home and abroad to conduct “disruption and sabotage” against China. 579 CCP leaders publicly acknowledged during a plenum in October 2006 that, “the factors of uncertainty affecting social stability” in China were “obviously increasing,” according to Chinese official media. 580 Jiang has been characterized overall as seeking to minimize risk by ensuring stability: no stability without change, but no positive, enduring change without stability. 581 An unprecedentedly large amount of the leaders that came into power in the 16 th Party Congress in 2002 were from poor inland regions such as Hebei, Sichuan, and Xinjiang, whereas most of the members of the 15 th Politburo were associated with coastal cities and provinces. This shift reflected a growing awareness of the problems in China’s inner provinces and an indication of its new willingness to aid its hinterland. Yu-Shan Wu describes the post-15 th Party Congress of 1998 CCP as a reforming communist party- state in pursuit of stability: “Indeed since its inception the Jiang regime has been obsessed with stability, and its relative success in political and economic stabilization set it apart from Deng Xiaoping’s regime in the 1980s. This overarching concern with stability, however, led paradoxically to more reform in specific areas, for continued reform was 578 Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Several Important Questions on the Construction of Socialism and a Harmonious Society, issued on 11 October 2006 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm.> 579 OSC, CPP20061208706002, 20061209, CIRAS ID: FB2761267. 580 OSC, CPP20061208706002, 20061209, CIRAS ID: 2761267. 581 Chu, Supra, at 12. 214 considered vital to high growth and thus to stability.” 582 Wu highlights the political stability efforts in the 1990s with Jiang’s neo-conservative jiang zhengzhi (“mindful of politics”) and the “three represents.” These policies, in Wu’s view, aimed to co-opt the emerging technological and capitalist elites into the regime. The passion to reform the political system so manifest in the intellectuals of the 1980s was channeled into a drive towards material improvement in the 1990s. Consistent with the priority on domestic beneficiaries and development, Jiang’s Zemin’s report to the 16 th Party Congress for the first time placed “developed countries” ahead of those in the “third world.” 583 One sees evidence of Beijing’s official attempts to grapple with these problems in The 11 th Five Year Plan. In drawing out the priorities and direction for the following five years, The 11 th Five Year Plan emphasizes “common prosperity,” “sustainable development,” and social services, rather than “growth rate.” For the first time, the plan incorporates the ideas that, “economic growth does not equal economic development, economic development does not necessarily result in society’s development, and…growth is not the goal, but the means of development.” 584 Many western scholars assert that the importance of socio-cultural security is not lost on the 4 th Generation leadership: “these new leaders feel that, for the CCP to win the hearts and 582 Ibid. at 69. 583 Jiang Zemin, “Build a well-off society in an all round way and create a new situation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics – a report to the 16 th Congress of Communist Party of China,” in Documents of the 16 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002): 58-59. 584 “The New Five Year Plan” (9 November 2005) <china.org.cn> 215 minds of the people, China must avoid chaos and maintain social stability. Moreover, Chinese citizens must have the opportunity to enhance their ‘life chances.’” 585 In February 2006, for the third year in a row, the central government released an important policy document citing rural problems a top priority. A rural expert noted that the document represents a broad government consensus that maintaining social stability will need a more holistic approach to rural problems. Land disputes are a major source of rural discontent. Corrupt local officials are making profitable deals with developers over land seized for economic development. These illegal seizures fuel unrest despite Beijing’s many failed efforts to punish and prevent land regulation violations by local officials. In August 2006, a five-year plan to expand rural access to clean water called upon local governments to prioritize safe drinking water for the people without specifying who will fund the program. Weak rule of law also hinders the New Socialist Countryside initiative. Beijing rarely enforces new regulations on issues such as land seizures and environmental restrictions, leaving regional officials responsible for oversight. Without stronger controls, local cadres who profit from unlawful activities at the expense of rural residents are likely to ignore central mandates without fear of punishments. Some Chinese leaders believe that economic development alone will be able to ultimately solve these problems. However, evidence indicates that the CCP thinks that underlying institutional reforms are needed to address the problems posed by increasing 585 Yun-han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo and Ramon Myers, eds. The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16 th Party Congress (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 2. 216 social distress. The section of the October 2006 plenum statement calling for officials to actively prevent “mass incidents” and resolve social tensions at the “grassroots level” specifically noted the need to “expand channels for public opinion to be expressed” and to “perfect systems for leaders of the party, government, and local people’s congresses to remain in contact with the masses.” 586 State-run media observed that these reforms were intended to address social unrest and to serve as a component to broader reform of the xinfang system. 587 The Chinese leadership has also been calling for the expansion of “intraparty democracy,” which allows a limited degree of public participation in the selection of local officials. 588 It has attempted to strengthen the system of party delegate conferences as a means of providing greater supervision of local party officials. Since 2000, Chinese officials have also experimented with hearings as a means of soliciting citizen input in the drafting of pending legislation. 589 Chinese leadership has also made progress in supporting the creation of professional farmers associations as a method of allowing peasants to pursue legal channels for collective organizations to protect their economic interests. 590 586 Decision, Supra. 587 Chai Hailiang, Sun Yingweim, and Liu Shen, “China to Open and Increase Channels to Citizens to Appeal Their Interests,” Xinhua (5 October 2006) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/05/content_5170062.htm.> 588 Bergsten, Supra, at 73. 589 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2006 Annual Report (20 September 2006): 129. 590 Ibid. 217 The PRC government, at the central and local levels, has applied a carrot and stick approach (or, perhaps, a good cop, bad cop approach), or a combination of appeasement and scare tactics, toward controlling restive social groups. One approach, associated with Hu Jintao, stresses fortifying police forces and cracking down hard on large, public demonstrations. According to some, Premier Wen has advocated treating the sources of social unrest, whereas Hu emphasizes law and order. 591 According to some experts, the escalation and vehemence of protests in the past year have convinced some top leaders to take a tougher line, particularly in light of the “color revolutions” that have taken place in post-Communist countries. 592 Some specialists debate that the PRC government’s common response to mass demonstrations, which is to appease protesters, punish organizers and do little about underlying causes – aka “buying stability” – and encourages civil disobedience as the only effective means of gaining redress. Many demonstrators in China now express the following mantra: “Making a big disturbance gets you a big solution; a little disturbance a little solution; and no disturbance gets you no solution.” 593 Beijing also makes increasing use of its security forces as a tool in responding to the increasing frequency and severity of protests, and as an overall tool of maintaining societal security. The flexible approach to protesters’ grievances was codified in a 2004 591 Jonathan Manthorpe, “Communist Party Divided on Dealing with Dissidents,” Vancouver Sun (30 January 2006). 592 “Chinese Delegate Says Social Unrest ‘Instigated by Foreign Forces,’” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (5 March 2006). 593 M. Scot Tanner, “China Rethinks Unrest,” The Washington Quarterly 27.3 (Summer 2004): 10. 218 joint Party-government directive, “Opinions on the Work of Actively Preventing and Handling Mass Incidents,” which laid out six principles for handling protests: give priority to prevention; give jurisdiction to the locality; handle the incident according to law and policy; use education and inducement to prevent aggravation of the situation; exercise discretion in the use of policy force, coercion and weapons; handle the incident promptly and decisively. 594 The use of force is acceptable in response to “assault on government organizations, looting, blockage of traffic or taking of hostages.” 595 Perhaps the primary entity in protecting the CCP’s interest’s vis-à-vis societal security is the People’s Armed Police: the PAP. The PAP is the primary responder if an incident grows beyond the capacity of local police forces. The PAP consists of a provincial guard force and a strategic or national force. The provincial PAP is located in each of the country’s provinces, while strategic PAP garrisons are primarily concentrated in the populous areas in eastern China. Estimates of the size of this force range from 660,000 to 1,000,000 troops. 596 Premier Wen’s remarks in March 2006 regarding the need to protect the “democratic rights” of farmers reportedly bolstered the spirits of many rural protesters. 597 Both Hu and Wen have stated that they are preoccupied with the problem of rural 594 OSC, CPP20071017507001, 20071030, CIRAS ID: FB4091915. 595 OSC, CPP20071107320001, 20071118, (U//FOUO), CIRAS ID: FB4140848. 596 FBIS, CPP20061229702005, 29961229, CIRAS ID: FB2800658. 597 “Chinese Villagers Protest overt Land Rights, Buoyed by Premier’s Remarks,” Xinhua Financial Network (17 March 2006). 219 unrest. 598 At the end of 2005, Beijing pledged a number of additional reforms aimed at rural unrest, including better management of land use, strengthening the legal system, protecting farmers’ land, raising rural incomes, increasing social spending on health care and education, and abolishing the national tax on farmers. Beijing announced that it spent about US$42 billion in 2006 on rural expenditures. Several major programs and costs include: elimination of the agricultural tax of at least US$48.75 billion in central transfers; free nine-year compulsory education of US$15.6 billion; improving access to drinking water of US$500 million; improving access to culture (libraries, exercise facilities, access to media of at least US$5,000 per village; improving rural healthcare facilities of at least US$2.5 billion; and road construction for US$12.5 billion, according to U.S. government analysis. 599 However, Jean Oi believes that policies such as these in general will likely be resisted by local officials, whose power remains unchecked, who are desperate to attract investment, and who are prone to corruption. 600 Focusing on corruption is becoming a hallmark for China under Hu. The September 4 th plenum expelled central committee alternate member Xu Yunhong, party secretary of Ningbo for assisting his son and wife in a variety of illegal economic activities. Xu’s was the highest corruption case publicly revealed since the 1995 arrest, and subsequent 16-year sentence, of former Beijing mayor and party secretary Chen 598 Joseph Kahn, “In Candor from China, Efforts to Ease Anxiety,” New York Times (17 April 2006). 599 Unclassified analysis performed by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (12 January 2007). 600 Jean C. Oi, “State Responses to Rural Discontent in China: Tax-for-Fee Reform and Increased Party Control,” Asia Program Special Report (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 108 (March 2003). 220 Xitong. Also, continuing investigations in Zhanjiang highlight efforts. More than 250 officials are said to be involved, with 80 already having been sentenced, including former party Chief Chen Tongqing (serving a life sentence). This corruption is the case in Leizhou as well. Several top officials in Leizhou, Guangdong, have been punished or transferred for dereliction of duty in allowing organized criminal activity to flourish in the city. Few details are available, but such activity likely included smuggling and other forms of corruption. The current strategy of protecting socio-cultural security and stability runs across the spectrum. Beijing also acknowledged its need to improve governance to maintain socio-cultural security. This issue was a key focus of a document issued at a 2004 plenum on the need to enhance the party’s “capacity to govern.” 601 Murray Scot Tanner, while testifying before the U.S. Congress, defined the PRC’s internal security strategy as rooted in a broader political strategy with threefold goals: 1) revive (or at least minimize challenges to) the popular legitimacy of the CCP’s leadership; 2) respond to burning popular anger over China’s political, economic, and social problems and contain it from flying out of control and causing nationwide or regional instability; and 3) isolate and repress any serious potential opposition, particularly organized foreign-backed, and/or ethno-religious opposition. 602 He defines several specific security elements in the PRC’s internal security strategy: 1) Contain, Manage and Defuse Protest Incidents; 2) 601 FBIS, CPP200409200000147, 20040920, CIRAS ID:1043181. 602 M. Scot Tanner, Testimony Presented to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, CT- 254 (3 February 2006): 2-4. 221 Professionalize Police Techniques to Avoid Turning Peaceful Protest into Sustained Mass Movements or Riots; 3) Prevent Emergence of Any Nationwide, Regional, or Ethno- Religious Organized Opposition or Politically Active Civil Society Group; 4) Keep a Firm Grip on “Keypoint” Security Areas Vital to National Unity Or Stability; 5) Pressure Local Party Officials to Monitor and Resolve Citizen Grievances; and 6) Encourage Angry Citizens to Blame Local Officials. 603 Economic measures are part of this effort as well. At the extremes, growth that is too slow could spark dissatisfaction, but overly rapid growth could drive inflation and exacerbate economic dislocation. 604 Since 2006, the central bank has raised interest rate six times and bank reserve requirements 13 times. In addition, since October 2007, the PRC has allowed the yuan to appreciate more quickly against the dollar, at a roughly 15% annualized rate, as compared to 6.9% appreciation in all of 2007. The typical Chinese saver, however, continued to lose money to inflation, which reached nearly 7% by the end of 2007 and exceeded 8% in February and March 2008. 605 Beijing has also imposed administrative restrictions on banks to slow fixed-asset investment; the central bank this year has privately directed commercial banks not to exceed last year’s total of 3.63 trillion yuan in new loans and to set quarterly lending quotas, according to PRC and Western press reports. 606 In May 2007, the government clamped down on speculation in 603 Ibid. 604 FBIS, CPP20080319968030, 20080319, CIRAS ID: FB437656. 605 BBC News (20 December 2008). 606 FBIS, CPP20080308094004, 20080308, CIRAS ID: FB4409334. 222 the Shanghai stock markets by tripling the tax on stock transactions. 607 In April 2008, however, it reversed the policy after stock prices fell 46%, underscoring weaknesses in Beijing’s interventionist and reactive approach to equity markets. 608 To maintain stability as Beijing manages the medium and long-term restructuring of the economy, the goal is to shift over time from export-led growth to a more “marketized” economy driven by domestic innovation and consumption. Besides creating a more durable basis for long- terms growth, Chinese leaders see this economic policy as a crucial step to better distribute the fruits of growth and to alleviate strains that could foster unrest. 609 Beijing makes extensive use of media controls against what it perceives to be threats to stability. Beijing has curtailed state funding for many publications, forcing them to make a profit to say in operation. This leads media outlets to increase coverage of local corruption and other popular issues to boost circulation and advertising revenue, which in turn helps the regime curb official malfeasance at the local level. Nonetheless, PRC leadership is far from embracing a free press and central policy oscillates between encouraging and reining in investigative journalism. 610 This control in cyberspace is a concern as well. Internet use in the PRC has risen rapidly in the past five years: the number of Internet users in the PRC was estimated at 225 million in March 2008. 611 As a response, the 607 STATE, SHANGHAI 000325, 20071130, (U), CIRAS ID: 2053357695. 608 Open Source, Wall Street Journal, “China Pares Tax to Boost Stock Market,” 20080424, CIRAS ID: OW5722455. 609 FBIS, CPP20080318424001, 20080318, CIRA ID: 207587023. 610 FBIS, CPP20070618968003, 20070618, CIRAS ID: FB3169519. 223 security services employ over 30,000 people to monitor and manage the internet, according to foreign press reports, although there is no independent confirmation of that number. 612 The PRC’s government is indeed struggling to restrain social change. Chinese leaders are increasingly concerned with changing social norms in the PRC and are attempting to address or contain perceived social degeneration. PRC security elite hope to encourage the resurgence of traditional cultural values and practices as well as to curb the PRC populace’s growing materialism, by rewarding socialist and taxing capitalist behavior. The PRC’s government is also trying to foster filial piety. The PRC’s State Administration of Radio, Film and Television is providing domestic television producers with subsidies of US$37,500 to US$100,000 (300,000 to 800,000 RMB) each to produce movies and television dramas that emphasize family ties and promote parental respect and devotion, according to a December 2006 open-source report. Filial piety is also apparently becoming a path to promotion: according to December 2006 and April 2007 open-source reports, city governments in Gansu, Shanxi, Henan, and Hebei Provinces now interview the family members, friends, neighbors, and colleagues of officials up for promotion to gauge their filial devotion and to test their respect for their parents. Beijing is also introducing a luxury consumption tax to help alleviate wealth polarization. In March 2006, China instituted a consumption tax aimed at yachts, luxury vehicles, and 611 Open Source, Wall Street Journal Asia, CIRAS ID: OW56826631, 20080314. 612 OSC, EUP20030513000153, 20030513, CIRAS ID: 194013183. 224 other high-end items to shift Chinese spending habits and to “contain the luxury lifestyle,” according to an April 2006 open-source report. 613 But the crown jewel policy being promulgated by the Chinese leadership is hexie shehui (“harmonious society”). This concept was first formally articulated by Hu Jintao at the fourth plenum of the CCP’s Sixteenth Central Committee in 2004, and was further elaborated upon by Wen Jiabao via his work report to the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in 2005. This report was the first time that Chinese leaders had put “building a harmonious society” over “promoting economic development.” “Harmonious society” is an extension of the “scientific concept of development,” which is the essence of Hu’s society-centered or “pro people” vision, wherein a balanced and comprehensive approach to development is favored over a single-minded obsession with economic growth. The fifth generation of Chinese leaders believes that economic development does not constitute a single “hard truth” in managing an increasingly polarized society. One Beijing-based security scholar described Hu as being more aware of, and concerned with, domestic strife than was Jiang (he also characterized Hu as more of a bureaucrat and Jiang as more of a politician). 614 Economic development has indeed improved the material well-being of the greater society, it is not the be-all-end-all for China, and it has created many dangerous side-effects. In the wake of disastrous economic policies through most of its Communist history, Deng led a Capitalist journey to rebuild and modernize the country. 613 Unclassified analysis performed by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (23 July 2007). 614 Interview Number 4. 225 Harmonious Society became official doctrine at the party plenum in October 2006. 615 As a guiding vision, Harmonious Society only consists of as yet vaguely defined programs and targets intended to correct social and economic inequalities by 2020. 616 Interestingly, there is dissent about Hexie Shehui’s conceptual birth. One Shanghai- based security expert insists that it is not linked to comprehensive security. 617 Rather, Hu’s policy sprang from an acknowledged need to balance the needs of groups representing social and economic interests; an almost interest group-lobbying dynamic is at play. Yuan Peng and Wu Hongying defined Harmonious Society as balancing: urban and rural; human and environmental needs; rich and poor needs; and the needs of the coastal and hinterland. 618 Hu has been explicit in public that China’s strategy abroad serves Hexie Shehui goals. 619 He sees Hexie Shehui envisioning the state, particularly at the local level, as emphasizing the provision of social services and public goods – rather than direct economic and political control – according to senior state advisors interviewed in Chinese media. 620 Party and media advocates of deeper reforms, however, have used U.S. doctrine to argue for going beyond Beijing’s current policies, for instance by 615 FBIS, CPP20061018705007, 20061025, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2669862. 616 FBIS, CPP20061018705007, 20061025, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2669862. 617 Interview Number 7. 618 Interview Number 5. 619 FBIS, CPP20060823308001, 20060824, (U), CIRAS ID: FB 2545351. 620 FBIS, CPP20061017050001, 20061023, (U), CIRAS ID: FB 2662793. 226 expanding local elections and promoting truly independent NGOs, according to a party journal 621 and U.S. diplomats. 622 Hu has been explicit in public that China’s strategy abroad serves Harmonious Society’s goals. 623 The doctrine envisions the state, particularly at the local level, as emphasizing the provision of social services and public goods – rather than direct economic and political control – according to senior state advisors interviewed in Chinese media. 624 This doctrine both gives cadres a clear and pragmatic mission to meet popular needs and counters their “ideological drift” away from core party values. 625 A Chinese vice minister told visiting U.S. officials that Harmonious Society already was the focus of policy-making at the ministerial level. 626 Beijing has sanctioned modest experiments such as one province’s attempt to create the appearance that the official labor union is holding popular elections as a proper display of local initiative to implement Harmonious Society, according to U.S. diplomats. 627 Conversely, leftwing hardliners in a party journal in September 2006 used Harmonious Society arguments to attack market reforms. 628 University students in Nanjing and Shanghai told U.S. diplomats in December, 2006 that they supported the 621 FBIS, CPP20061120308001, 20061121, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2722802. 622 STATE, GUANGZHOU 004104, 20060216, (U), CIRAS ID: 201332995. 623 FBIS, CPP20060823308001, 20060824, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2545351. 624 FBIS, CPP20061017050001, 20061023, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2662793. 625 FBIS, CPP20060912332002, 20060920, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2598499. 626 STATE, BEIJING 024227, 20061201, (U), CIRAS ID: 203938164. 627 STATE, BEIJING 021628, 20061012, (U), CIRAS ID: 203506101. 628 FBIS, CPP20061030332001, 20061108, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2694849. 227 Harmonious Society program and acknowledged the need for the central government to help impoverished regions and protect the environment. 629 Online discussions of the 2006 October’s Plenum’s decision on Harmonious Society reveal mixed reactions: some participants approved of Harmonious Society and its focus on real social problems, but many expressed doubt about the party’s ability to make meaningful progress toward Harmonious Society’s goals. 630 Harmonious Society articulates a broad, optimistic vision of China’s future that includes improvements in “rule by law,” policing, environmental protection and public health, higher education, scientific innovation, and the export of Chinese culture and products abroad. Beijing primarily trumpets Harmonious Society’s boosting of incomes and government services in China’s underdeveloped, rural hinterland, which the CCP worries is becoming increasingly unstable. In 2006, Beijing eliminated an unpopular agricultural tax intermittently imposed on peasants since the early Han Dynasty and increased transfer payments to local governments for which the tax had been the principal source of revenue. The central government also boosted farm subsidies by 14% in 2006 and vowed to boost them by another 16% in 2007. The Education Ministry has promised to eliminate tuition and fees for rural primary and junior high students and increase mandatory education from 6-9 years, enhancing the central government’s contribution to rural education overall by 87% in 2007. In addition, the government is seeking to 629 STATE, SHANGHAI 00493, 20060120, (U), CIRAS ID: 201115723. 630 FBIS, CPP20061205332003, 20061205, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2752820. 228 increase access to rural health insurance. Under a pilot program begun in 2005 and expanded sevenfold in 2006, central and local governments match set contributions per family member in a local pool that partially reimburses rural area patients for expenses in the event of catastrophic illness. In some areas, coverage also extends to routine care. Political reform, Harmonious Society’s second major component, aims to increase the CCP’s accountability without prompting its demise. Chinese academics believe the USSR’s Communist Party’s rapid swing from over centralized authority to extreme liberalization destroyed its ability to retain power. Beijing hopes to pursue a middle course using administrative reforms and limited notions of “deliberative” and “intra-party democracy” to produce a cleaner, “service-oriented” party that can adjust to the social challenges posed by three decades of rapid economic growth. Rural social spending also continued to represent a small portion of total central government spending in 2006, according to Beijing’s own figures. 631 Building a New Socialist Countryside involves creating a Chinese countryside characterized by “advanced production, improved livelihood, a civilized social atmosphere, clean and tidy villages, and efficient management.” A typical Hexie Shehui program, the “New Socialist Countryside” was initiated in fall 2005. This program seeks to improve rural living standards and development by boosting peasant incomes through tax relief and subsidies for expanding public services and investment in rural infrastructure. 632 The New Socialist Countryside initiative’s goal is to address the “three 631 Unclassified analysis performed by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (3 May 2007). 632 STATE, BEIJING 024338, 20061206, (U), CIRAS ID: 203976045. 229 rural issues” of promoting agriculture, promoting economic development, and increasing farmers’ income. The program seeks to counter growing rural unrest caused by China’s widening rural-urban inequality gap. Harmonious Society is the most visible manifestation of PRC leadership that sees an existential threat to the PRC’s national security via instability and unrest in its socio- cultural sector. Economic Sector Policies in the 1990s and Beyond The policies enacted point to the need for economic reform as a major tool of the state to grapple with a threat to national security that a weak economy poses. We also see a clear evolution in policies. Jiang kept Deng’s goal of privatization on track, and he, Zhu, and Hu have all made opening up to further trade and investment a priority for China to achieve economic security. The evidence will reveal the highest levels of government devoting vast amounts of time and resources to this issue. We saw over this time period that leaders’ success was measured in terms of handling the economy and economic reforms. We also see the relative sophistication of FDI policies, central government guidance over the reform process that can only result from being a top priority in Chinese policy-making. Jiang’s tenure was characterized as representing the “deepening” of economic reform, imposing greater central direction on the economy at the same time pushing China’s opening to the rest of the world. 633 Economic reform and modernization 633 Chu, Supra, at 12. 230 continued to be a high national priority – to the point of being an issue of national security – in the 1990s. When Deng – in line with his “southern tour” in March, 1992 to keep economic reforms on track – appointed Zhu Rongji as executive vice-premier and economic “czar” at the 14 th Party Congress – Jiang embraced him. The official “letter” to the people of China from the top leadership announcing Deng’s death and eulogizing him underscored the leadership’s commitment to his legacy of reform and to opening up to the outside. In particular, the letter affirms Deng’s 1992 speech on the relationship between socialism and market economics that unleashed China’s latest wave of growth and reform. Yet for much of the 1990s before the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, Jiang played political badminton over economic policies with reformer Zhu and conservative Li Peng. The resulting economic reform was somewhat different from that of the 1980s: marketization continued, dominating price reforms in the commodity sector, and with ruthless reform of small and medium SOEs, marketizing labor allocation as well. 634 Moreover, for the first time, despite initial resistance in the wake of the collapse of the communist bloc, privatization began to make significant headway. Furthermore, with SOEs downsized, private firms became the major source of new employment. By the end of Jiang’s term, private capital was accounting for 35% of total capital investment and contributed 60% of China’s GDP growth; at the end of 2000, the non-public economy accounted for 50.8 percent of industrial output. 635 634 Ibid. 231 Figure 3. Shares of State & Non-public Sectors (%) State Sector Non-public Sector Gross Industrial Fixed Capital Urban Gross Industrial Urban Output Investment Employment Output Employment 1978 77.6 78.3 0.2 1980 76.0 81.9 76.2 0.5 0.8 1985 64.9 66.1 70.2 3.1 3.9 1990 54.6 66.1 62.3 9.8 5.7 1995 34.0 54.4 59.0 29.4 24.5 1996 28.5 52.5 56.7 32.1 28.0 1998 28.2 54.1 43.8 40.0 46.7 636 Jiang was most distinguished from Deng in his greater emphasis on the role of central government apparatus in regulating and managing the reforms. 637 Starting in 1993, China’s massive reform of its financial and banking system included shifting from the particularistic, negotiable fiscal contract arrangement between center and province to a tax assignment system (assigning specific categories of tax collection to each level of government), in which the central government also established its own separate tax administration. This shift greatly strengthened the center’s fiscal power, whose share of budgetary revenue compared to the provinces rose from 33.7% in 1993 to 52.4% in 2001. After a long period of declining total government revenue, from 31.2% of GDP in 1978 635 Wang Jiahang, “Minying qiye chenwei; ziben shichang xin liangdian” (“Private enterprises have become the new spotlight in the capital market”), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) (10 September 2002). 636 Source, China Statistical Yearbook, various editions. Note, Non-public sector means all sectors other than state and collective ones. 232 to 10.9% in 1995, revenue collection seemingly made a modest turnaround, growing to 17.1% in 2001 (though still low in comparative historical terms). 638 Another major facet of Jiang’s economic strategy has been to accelerate opening up China to the rest of the world. The trade-to-GDP ratio has risen from 30% in 1990 to 49.3% in 2000. Trade has risen, as has foreign direct investment (FDI): from US$3.5 billion in 1990 to US$41.7 billion in 1996. When FDI sputtered in 1997 due to the Asian financial crisis (US$45.25 billion in 1997 to US$40.3 billion in 1999), Jiang’s regime successfully negotiated entry in to the WTO with a resulting upsurge in FDI (China received over US$100 billion in 2002). These economic reforms have also made China a trade juggernaut. Since it devalued its currency, eliminated its dual-currency system, and adopted a managed float in 1994, China has been in a perpetual account surplus, and its export sector has been dominated by foreign investment. 639 Yu-shan Wu has characterized China’s economic priority in the 1990s as being concerned with stability – a goal it achieved because economic instability in the 1980s bred political instability, and the leadership wanted to avoid that at all costs: If one takes a closer look at the economic performance of the two decades, one finds the regime in the 1990s more capable of managing the economic cycles that 637 Chu, Supra, at 13. 638 Dali Yang, “State capacity on the rebound,” Journal of Democracy (January 2003): 43-50. 639 Chu, Supra, at 15. 233 were the fundamental cause of instability in the previous decade. Jiang and his associates clearly learned from the inexperience and mistakes in the 1980s and adjusted their counter-cyclical policies accordingly. 640 Wu attributes the success of the soft landing in the mid-1990s to two main factors: a carefully designed contractionary policy that targeted selected sectors, and a structural change that gradually freed the economy from investment hunger. 641 Wu goes on to explain that in the late 1990s, with economic stability secured against the chances of the post-Asian financial crisis, the material base of social disturbances was essentially removed: It is true that many new economic reform measures in the 1990s such as shutting down unprofitable state enterprises did send the unemployed to the streets. However, almost all of the demonstrations were sporadic cases in which citizens registered their anger at specific policies or particular individual officials and not against the regime. The sustained high growth acted to relieve social pressure and provided alternative opportunities for employment and upward mobility. Social energy was effectively channeled away from political reform to economic opportunities opened up by continued growth and restructuring (witness xiahai). In short, the economic success of the 1990s contributed significantly to the political tranquility that was the overriding objective of Jiang’s leadership circle. In all one finds stability the hallmark of Jiang’s rule in both a political and an economic sense. 642 Some observers trace China’s incorporation of this security element in their overall definition of security to the Asian Security crisis. 643 In an article written in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Wu Jinglian argued that the crisis showed that 640 Lowell Dittmer and Yu-Shan Wu, “The modernization of factionalism in Chinese Politics,” World Politics, 47.4 (July 1995): 467-494. 641 Chu, Supra, at 73. 642 Ibid. at 74. 643 See generally, Craig, Chinese Perceptions, Supra. 234 investment-led growth strategies like China was pursuing lead to inefficiency and “cannot last.” 644 The Asian financial crisis also inspired Hu Angang and Fan Gang to urge that consumption be boosted to strengthen domestic demand. 645 Financial reforms were still slow on some fronts due to financial security and economic security concerns. Beijing decided to move slowly and cautiously in opening up the capital market, full Renminbi convertibility, and market access in the service sector. Approval of the use of shareholding as a primary tool in reform and restructuring required skillful ideological gymnastics. Property rights issues have been one of the major obstacles to enterprise reform as well as to reduce the state’s role in the economy. One prestigious government adviser explained that the state must focus its resources on national priorities – the modernization of strategic and defense industry construction of infrastructure development of large resource extraction projects, and research in strategic technology. Beijing’s emphasis on “optimizing” (i.e., regulating and in some cases even limiting) FDI inflows is driven by the belief that FDI is increasing excess savings, 646 exacerbating income inequality, 647 and generating wealth for foreigners rather than for China. 648 Wing Tai asserts Hu Jintao even had trepidation about allowing U.S. gambling 644 FBIS, 98C08058A, 19980406, (U), CIRAS ID: 179226011. 645 FBIS, OW2010085398, 19981020, (U), CIRAS ID: 180096153. 646 Open Source, Zhou Xiaochuan, “Remarks on China’s Trade Balance and Exchange Rate” (20 March 2006) (U), CIRAS ID: <www.pbc.gov.cn> 647 STATE, BEIJING 000912, 20070202, (U), CIRAS ID: 204463106. 648 STATE, SHANGHAI 006347, 20060926, (U), CIRAS ID: 203358191. 235 investment into Macao, as it might be a source of subversion or even control. Wing Tai points to the Asian Financial Crisis as the event that shocked Zhongnanhai into fears of financial control by foreign entities. 649 This fear of “economic colonization” and the loss of economic autonomy to foreigners has been a rallying cry with the Chinese New Left, particularly vis-à-vis financial liberalization and the sale of banks to foreigners. The intellectual leaders of the New Left have made their case about “economic patriotism” beyond economic journals. Government officials are finding themselves facing increasing scrutiny and even opposition in discussions over SOE reform and foreign participation in China’s financial system, and fighting (unsuccessfully) passage of the Property Law. 650 China’s external and internal macroeconomic imbalances were missing from a list of Chinese government policy priorities that Premier Wen Jiabao laid out in 2004. 651 China’s central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, argued in a March 2006 speech that expanded domestic demand, particularly higher consumption, would help trim these savings and the trade surplus. 652 In the annual government work report issued in March 2007, Wen used terms such as “irrational” and “unbalanced” to describe a host of 649 Interview Number 24. 650 Lesley Hook, “The Rise of China’s New Left,” Far Eastern Economic Review (April 2007) <http://www.feer.com/articles1/2007/0704/.html> 651 FBIS, CPP20040305000044, 20040305, (U), CIRAS ID: FB562600. 652 Open Source, Zhou Xiaochuan, “Remarks on China’s Trade Balance and Exchange Rate” (20 March 2006) (U), CIRAS ID:rom <www.pbc.gov.cn> 236 structural macroeconomic maladies, including China’s low levels of consumption. 653 A mid-March report from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing notes that Chinese officials were reluctant to talk about domestic imbalances in recent discussions with U.S. counterparts. 654 Some economists have cited surging corporate profits, which allowed the pace of investment to outstrip these double-digit increases in consumption, as the source of this statistical riddle. 655 Other economists, in turn, have ascribed part of the profit surge to a lag between wage growth and productivity increases. 656 With regard to stemming the rise in income inequality, the majority of Chinese economists and officials are convinced that China’s urban rich already own everything they want, but that the country’s rural poor lack the money to purchase necessities. 657 Given the challenging nature of these goals, Chinese economists and officials have concluded it will take a long time to turn personal consumption into a growth engine. 658 Chinese leaders have set 2020 as the target date for achieving an all-around society in which per capita incomes top US$3,000. 659 Chinese policy-makers accord currency appreciation a much smaller role in the process of upgrading the country’s economic 653 FBIS, CPP20070305050001, 20070305, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2941043. 654 STATE, BEIJING 001768, 20070316, (U), CIRAS ID: 204760418. 655 Open Source, “Can Pigs Fly?” The Economist (24 February 2007), (U), CIRAS ID. 656 Open Source, “World Bank,” China Quarterly Update (February 2007) (U), CIRAS ID: 6. 657 STATE, SHANGHAI 006347, 20060926, (U), CIRAS ID: 203358191. 658 FBIS, CPP20060819050002, 20060824, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2546990. 659 FBIS, CPP20021121000080, 20021121, (U), CIRAS ID: 192426490. 237 structure and consumption than do many, but not all, western economists. 660 Some question the government’s stress on rural development as a way to boost consumption, given that a 1999 government spending plan to develop the interior largely failed to live up to expectations. 661 A perception that rural development initiatives often end up simply funding prestige projects adds to this skepticism. 662 In addition, according to embassy reporting, prosperous eastern provinces feel they are being asked to bear an unfair burden to help fund rural initiatives designed to close the regional income gaps. 663 To try to reduce these concerns, the central government has decided to stop taking a cut of tax revenues collected from prosperous eastern areas and transferred to less developed inland regions. 664 Fan Gang, in a July 2006 article, asserted that such a policy of “subsidized consumption” has never been effective. 665 Finance Minister Jin has told U.S. officials that to achieve its goal of a socialist market economy, China must take a gradualist approach to reducing imbalances. 666 In a 2006 article, Wu Jinglian said that, “if the changes are too rapid, the dangers will also be great.” 667 2007’s annual government work 660 See generally, Open Source, Nicholas Lardy, “China: Toward a Consumption-Driven Growth Plan,” IIE Policy Brief Number PB 06-6, October 2006, (U). 661 STATE, BEIJING 005341, 20040401, (U), CIRAS ID: 196468640. 662 STATE, BEIJING 024338, 20061206, (U), CIRAS ID: 203976045. 663 STATE, BEIJING 019665, 20060918, (U), CIRAS ID: 203358076. 664 STATE, BEIJING 019665, 20060918, (U) CIRAS ID: 203358076. 665 FBIS, CPP20060819050002, 20060824, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2546990. 666 STATE, BEIJING 021214, 20061006, (U), CIRAS ID: 203456645. 667 FBIS, CPP20061122136007, 20061124, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2729144. 238 report calls for a “prudent” fiscal policy that cuts the budget deficit by roughly 15%. 668 Central government spending on rural initiatives and social security programs are thus slated only to grow by roughly the same amount as revenues in 2007; the percentage increases for education and health are much higher, but they are coming off a low base. 669 China’s envisioned upgrading of its economic structure is central to another of its policy priorities, namely, fostering independent innovation. 670 A 2006 World Bank research report estimates that such a policy shift to redistribute corporate savings by requiring SOEs to issue dividends to the government providing Beijing the wherewithal to expand funding for social programs could narrow the savings-investment imbalance by 1% of GDP. 671 The option of mandating SOE dividends is already being discussed in Beijing, according to Embassy reporting. 672 The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission is angling to use the dividends to further the restructuring of SOEs. 673 The previously mentioned World Bank research paper estimates that phasing out capital transfers and using the proceeds to boost capital spending on health and education would reduce China’s savings-investment imbalance by 4% of GDP. 674 668 FBIS, CPP20070305050001, 20070305, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2941043. 669 Ibid. 670 STATE, BEIJING 023856, 20061117, (U), CIRAS ID: 203827008. 671 Open Source, Louis Kuijs, “How Will China’s Saving-Investment Balance Evolve?” World Bank China Research Report 4 (May 2006): 18 (U), CIRAS ID: 672 STATE, BEIJING 001768, 20070316, (U), CIRAS ID: 204760418. 673 FBIS, CPP20070226334005, 20070313, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2959017. 674 Kuijs, Supra, at 19. 239 Premier Wen Jiabao, at the NPC in March 2007, said China’s goal is to increase credit support to Small-to-Medium-Sized-Enterprises (SMEs) – mostly private firms – and to support the development of the private sector. 675 The CASS in September 2006 predicted that in five years the non-state sector would contribute 75% of China’s GDP and that at least 70% of Chinese firms would be privately owned, according to the English-language newspaper. 676 A Western investment firm in 2005 said the private sector already accounted for 70%of China’s GDP and employed 75% of the work force. 677 Nonetheless, the opaque nature of Chinese statistics and company ownership structure has led some economists to question whether the private sector is really that large. 678 After Jiang in July 2001 said entrepreneurs should be admitted into the CCP, business leaders flocked to the Party to benefit their companies. 679 China’s official English-language newspaper in February 2007 reported that 32% of private firm owners that registered since 2001 were CCP members. 680 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) Chairman Ma Kai, at the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 2006, said one of China’s core development strategies was to encourage 675 FBIS, CPP20070316968117, 20070316, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2966147. 676 FBIS, CPP20060922053018, 20060922, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2602842. 677 Open Source, Financial Times CIRAS ID: ON42756840, 20061212, (U), CIRAS ID: ON42756840. 678 Open Source, Financial Times CIRAS ID: ON43045084, 20070202, (U), CIRAS ID: ON43045084. 679 Open Source, Wubiao Zhou, “Bank Financing in China’s Private Sector: From a Resource Dependence Perspective,” Nanyang Technological University (September 2006): 8 (U), CIRAS ID. 680 FBIS, CPP20070226042003, 20070226, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2924528. 240 private-sector development. 681 In 1992, China, at its 14 th Party Congress, set the goal of building a “socialist market economic system.” 682 In 1997 private enterprises were upgraded from a “supplement” to an “important component” of the socialist state-owned economy. 683 In 1999, the NPC passed a constitutional amendment that guarantees the legal rights and interest of the private sector – with the exception of property rights. 684 In 2002 China, at its 16 th Party Congress, granted party membership to entrepreneurs. 685 In 2007 the NPC adopted the property rights law, which boosts the protection of private property. 686 Beijing, for the first time in more than a decade, will require SOEs to pay the central government dividends, seeking to tap record SOE profits to help achieve the goals Premier Wen Jiabao outlined at the National People’s Congress in March 2007. One goal Wen mentioned at the NPC was that China needed to rebalance the economy away from fixed-asset investment-driven growth. Paying the government dividends would reduce SOE retained earnings, which finance more than half of China’s fixed-asset investments, according to a World Bank report. 687 SOE executives in 2002 at the 16 th CCP Congress 681 STATE, BEIJING 000259, 20070111, (U), CIRAS ID: 204238236. 682 FBIS, OW0610101494, 19941006, (U), CIRAS ID: 17999956. 683 FBIS, OW2811013197, 19971128, (U), CIRAS ID: 178651642. 684 Open Source, Dow Jones International News Service CIRAS ID: OW10499942, 19990315, (U), CIRAS ID: OW10499942. 685 FBIS, JPP20021118000007, 20021118, (U), CIRAS ID: 192390302. 686 FBIS, CPP20070501710009, 20070503, (U), CIRAS ID: FB3071249. 687 Open Source, Louis Kuijs, William Mako, and Chunlin Zhang, “SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom,” World Bank (October 2005): 2-3, 17, (U). 241 were for the first time formally recognized as an interest group and an area from which to choose future political leaders. For the first time an electoral bloc was created for an SOE party unit; this creation resulted in a total of 38 such groups sending delegations to the 16 th CCP Congress. 688 Economic Sector Subsets: Food Security A major threat to the economic sector is the ability for the PRC to feed itself, which is know as food security. The PRC’s agriculture policies have hurt the PRC’s ability to feed itself adequately. Jean Oi conducted research indicating that decollectivization and fiscal reforms inadvertently create excessive peasant burdens. In surveys of over 100 villages, all but the most highly industrialized, Communist local officials were forced to increase fees and taxes as other revenue sources declined. 689 She further argues that the central state successfully used some of the peasant demonstrations during this period to clean up corruption, while enhancing regime legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants. 690 Her findings showed that as in other cases of collective action, state response was a major factor in determining whether a serious situation becomes a crisis and whether the regime can maintain its legitimacy. 691 During the 1990s the CCP leadership undertook a number of reforms to cut peasant burdens and curb rural cadre 688 Lyman Miller, “The Road to the 17 th Party Congress”, China Leadership Monitor 18 (Spring 2006): 3. 689 Chu, Supra, at 141-155. 690 William Kirby, ed. Realms of Freedom in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 264-284. 691 See generally, Yongshun Cai, “The Silence of the Dislocated: Chinese Laid-off Employees in the Reform Period,” PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2001. 242 corruption, including instituting competitive village elections. Moreover, a tax-for-fee reform (feigaishui), which effectively cut peasant burdens, was instituted on the eve of the 16 th Party Congress. 692 Oi argues that this policy needs to better standardize and rationalize peasant burdens. 693 Economic Sector Subsets: Energy Security President Hu Jintao expressed his concern over the “Malacca dilemma,” worrying that, “certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control the navigation route through the strait.” 694 Hu realizes that normal oil imports, “may not be guaranteed and China’s daily life, economy, and even defense may be greatly impacted.” 695 China’s inability to rid itself of this foreign reliance compounds the problem. This factor is a major driver of China’s naval development: to secure the transport of Chinese energy from foreign sources. China needs the energy deposits that may exist in that part of the region and it will do what is necessary to extract them. One such shared resource that affects security is the Greater Mekong Sub-region. For Beijing, the Mekong promises a link with Southeast Asia and a chance to develop Yunan province, one of its poorest provinces. China is damming the main stream of the Mekong, and downstream countries are feeling understandable anxiety. 692 Chu, Supra, at 142. 693 Ibid. 694 Wen Han, “Hu Jintao Urges Breakthrough in ‘Malacca Dilemma,’” trans. Open Source Center, Wen Wei Po (14 January 2004), CPP20040114000049. 243 Wang Haiyun, a member of the State Council, argued that energy as an issue has risen in prominence and is being used increasingly as a “strategic weapon in the pursuit of national political, economic, and security interests.” 696 Wang also analyzed U.S. policies of promoting the “China energy threat theory,” which included critiquing Chinese energy cooperation with the Sudan and Iran, impeding the CNOOC purchase of Unocal, and maintaining its worldwide military presence as efforts “to control the energy lifeblood of a rising China.” 697 Many PRC government analysts conclude that the U.S. intends to use the “energy weapon” and “impose strategic energy containment” on China. 698 China’s leaders have undertaken some of these experts’ advice, in the form of reassuring the U.S. that China is not an energy threat: In order to prevent the possibility of some big power’s using the energy weapon to counter China’s further rise, China must thwart some countries’ attempts to contain us on the energy issue and hinder China’s rise. The method is to unfold effective bilateral or multilateral cooperation on energy sources. 699 This vulnerability has sparked domestic criticism of China’s energy policies (or lack thereof). One major critique lies in China’s poor energy governance. The government 695 Liu Jianfei and Qi Yi, “China’s Oil Security and Its Strategic Options,” trans. by Open Source Center, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 12 (20 December 2002): 35-46. 696 Wang Haiyun, “Energy Has Become ‘Diplomatic Currency,’” Huanqiu Shibao (25 April 2006). 697 Ibid. 698 Ma Xiaojun, “Conflict or Cooperation? Strategic Energy Choices Facing China and the United States, an Analysis of Factors in Potential Sino-U.S. Conflicts in the Field of Energy,” Xuexi Shibao, Study Times, (12 December 2005), pp. 4-5. 699 Pang Zhongying, “Peaceful Development and Energy Diplomacy,” trans. Open Source Center, Liaowang (13 February 2006): 95. 244 dismantled the Ministry of Energy in 1993, and energy policies have been amorphous and scattered ever since. The Development Research Centre of the State Council, after conducting two years of research, concluded that China’s energy challenges transcended soaring consumption and environmental degradation, and included “an inefficient decision making process, poor efficiency, and growing exposure to the global market.” 700 The Council recommended reestablishing a cabinet ministry to oversee energy security. A National Energy Leading Group chaired by Wen Jiabao was established to reinstate a comprehensive energy strategy. But the oft-mentioned “mechanisms” needed to regulate the market are still lacking. There are no means to stabilize market development of China’s energy industry, which was deregulated much later than most other markets. There is insufficient expertise to monitor and scrutinize market supply and demand, which is vital in regulating the market properly. 701 Chinese leaders still want the state to maintain as much control as possible over key facets of the country’s energy sector, particularly its oil supply chain. 702 The war in Iraq reinforced China’s zero-sum view of energy security, according to a diplomatic report from 2003. 703 Yang Jiemian, a high-level official at one of China’s leading think tanks, referred in a recent book to the current state of play in global oil markets as a 700 Fu Jing, “New Ministry Recommended to Handle Energy,” trans OSC, CPP20060602042008. China Daily (2 June 2006). 701 Chen Zhongtao, “Study of Prospect of China’s Energy Supply and Demand in the 11 th Five Year Program,” trans. Open Source Center, Zhongguo Nengyuan (25 May 2006): 16-23. 702 Open Source, Arthur Kroeber, “China’s Oil Quest,” (21 May 2004) <FT.com> 703 State, Beijing 005546, 200305210955, (U), CIRAS ID: 194084156. 245 “smoke-free war.” 704 Beijing contends it must pursue a strategy of striking deals in unstable regions where western oil companies are unwilling – or unable— to invest because its the PRC’s NOCs were latecomers to the overseas equity oil business. 705 Beijing is putting a premium on beefing up its oil transportation infrastructure by constructing a Chinese-flagged oil tanker fleet and by building oil pipeline networks at home. 706 China’s oil security initiatives are costly as well as ambitious, a fact that has led many Western observers to question their viability. 707 The first phase pipeline to transport oil from eastern Russia to China, for example, is projected to cost around US$7 billion by its completion in 2008, according to oil industry and Russian press articles. 708 China has also at times paid a premium in order to secure equity oil deals. 709 Beijing almost certainly will have the financial means to continue pursuing this ambitious strategy in the near term. Western investment banks expect China’s rapid growth and large trade surpluses to persist for the next few years. 710 China’s annual oil imports are expected to grow about 1 million barrels per day over the next three years, according to 704 FBIS, CPP20070618320001, 200706221853, (U), CIRAS ID: FB3182701. 705 FBIS, CPP20070212721049, 20070212, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2890596. 706 Open Source, Oil & Gas Journal, CIRAS ID: ON42401327, 20061009, CIRAS ID: ON42401327. 707 Open Source, New York Times, 20041212, CIRAS ID: OW4590339. 708 FBIS, CEP20070417950136, 20070417, (U), CIRAS ID: FB3035004. 709 Open Source, TIME CIRAS ID: ON37501208, 20041025, CIRAS ID: ON37501208. 710 Open Source, Qing Wang, “China: Our Views on the Economy in a Single Diagram,” Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum (25 June 2007), (U), CIRAS ID:. 246 the International Energy Agency. 711 Chinese firms have already enjoyed some success in buying up Western oil firms’ assets, as evidenced by the purchase in 2006 of the Kazakhstani assets of Canada’s Nations Energy. 712 China is also seriously looking at a number of energy alternatives to oil, such as biofuels and coal to liquids (CTL). However, neither biofuels nor CTL is likely to displace large amounts of oil in China. Beijing has a non-food-based biofuels initiative that optimistically could replace approximately 1-2% of total oil consumption by volume in China by 2020. In December 2006, Beijing stopped approving corn-based ethanol plants because increased demand for corn for ethanol raised feed prices, which increased pork prices by 30%. 713 Under the 11 th Five Year Plan, China promotes CTL development. However, in June the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced it will halt non-state-owned CTL projects because of concerns over water shortages and environmental impacts. 714 China’s electric capacity is increasing rapidly to meet demand – Beijing is completing 1-2 power plants each week – to meet a projected increase in capacity from 622 GW in 2006 to 1,330 GW by 2020. 715 In 2006 China added 100GW, as much generating capacity as total current installed capacity in the UK – which has the 10 th 711 Open Source, World Energy Outlook, 2006, International Energy Agency (7 August 2007): 88, 92, 712 STATE, ASTANA 000927, 20061226, (U), CIRAS ID: 204123846. 713 Open Source, INTER PRESS SERVICE (ENGLISH) CIRAS ID: ON44051186, 20070616, CIRAS ID: ON44051186. 714 Open Source, REUTERS CIRAS ID: OW53972068, 20070618, CIRAS ID: OW53972068. 247 largest capacity in the world. 716 China is constructing the equivalent of two megawatts coal-fired power plants per week, according to Western energy experts. 717 China’s Electricity Commission forecasts that 90 GW of capacity will be added in 2007, according to press reports. 718 A snag in this plan is coal supply. In January 2007, China became a net coal importer, a dramatic shift from being the world’s second-largest exporter just three years ago. 719 China has been reducing coal exports to meet rising demand and alleviate internal transportation bottlenecks through the elimination of the coal export taxation rebate and reduced export quotas, which is tightening regional coal markets. 720 While overall energy use has grown marginally slower than GDP, electricity use has grown faster than GDP since 2000, and in 2006 it grew at 14.4 percent, according to official Chinese statistics. 721 Beijing is likely to continue to seek foreign technological and economic assistance to achieve greater energy efficiency. 722 715 FBIS, CPP20070321968088, 20070321, (U), CIRAS ID:. 716 Open Source, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY CIRAS ID: ON43010703, 20070201, (U), CIRAS ID: ON43010703. 717 Open Source, MIT, “The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World,” (2007 March), (U), CIRAS ID: 718 Open Source, Interfax, China Energy Report Weekly 6.7 (March 2007) (U), CIRAS ID: 719 Open Source, DOW JONES INTERNAITONAL NEWS SERVICE SIRAS ID: OW52970547, 20070225, (U), CIRAS ID: OW52970547. 720 Open Source, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY CIRAS ID:ON43107593, 20070215, (U), CIRAS ID:ON43107493. 721 FBIS, CPP20070228968089, 20070228, (U), CIRAS ID: FB2931174. 722 Open Source, ASSOCIATED PRESS CIRAS ID:OW52807797, 20070206, (U), CIRAS ID: OW528807797. 248 In sum, the need to maintain stability via economic growth propels the Economic sector to full securitization. Moreover, the energy security subset reveals foreign policies that are devoting vast resources and commanding high priorities to ensure a smooth flow of energy. The comprehensive involvement to maintain a strong and efficient economy – often at the expense of other priorities – points to a sector that has indeed been securitized. Environmental Sector Policies The evidence under the rubric of government acts indicates that there may be no true securitization process – only politicization— at least not in the method put forth by the COPRI. The evidence yields a disconnect between the national and local levels of authority; a shifting of environmental clean-up policies to being primarily a developed- country responsibility; and a government that has not mobilized the necessary elements of state power and moved beyond traditional rules as described by Emmers. 723 Environmental Protection is now an “unswerving national policy” in China as a result of its undeniable environment-caused health problems. According to China’s National Environmental Statistics Bulletin, in 2004 around 1,441 “environmental pollution and destruction incidents” occurred, causing “direct economic losses of 363.657 million RMB,” which translates into some US$45 million. 724 Furthermore, 190 billion 723 See generally, Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization, Supra. 724 2004 PRC National Environmental Statistics Bulletin, trans. by Open Source Center (June 2005) available in Chinese at <www.lnepb.gov.cn/look.asp?id={144A0552-0A90-4A4B-8B4F-BB76740F383B> 249 RMB, or US$23 million, is spent on pollution management. 725 The unmeasured costs of environmental degradation are the rationale for some Chinese leaders to promote the concept of a “Green GDP.” By quantifying the costs of this environmental problem, these analyses reveal that between 15 and 25% of China’s GDP would, in effect, be cancelled out. Chinese officials have calculated that the equivalent of as much as 2% of China’s annual growth is canceled out by environmental degradation. 726 The highest level of Chinese leadership is aware of the economic costs of their deteriorating environment, and is looking to sustainable development-type policies to grapple with this. For example, the central government has made it mandatory to cut chemical oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by 10% during the 11 th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). 727 Moreover, SEPA has recently introduced a set of strict regulations to deal with worsening lake pollution. SEPA also lambasted China’s “bumpkin policies,” or sub-national government protectionist practices, which encourage economic profits at the expense of the environment. 728 Furthermore, a White Paper on Environmental Protection from 1996 to 2005 boasts of the country’s record of environmental protection policies over that 10-year period. 729 A commitment to 725 Ibid. 726 “Green GDP Calculation Piloted,” China Daily (1 March 2005) <www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Mar/121445.htm> 727 “Keep the green alert on,” China Daily. [Online] (7 August 2007). <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-08i/07/content_658476.htm.> 728 “New rules to curb ‘rampant’ violations of pollution laws,” Xinhua. [Online] (12 July 2007) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-07/12/content_6366544.htm.> 729 “Full Text: Environmental Protection in China, 1996-2005,” trans. by OSC, CPP20050605000068., Xinhua (5 June 2005). 250 “sustainable development” and tough compulsory environmental protection targets as part of the 11th Five-Year Plan also displayed the leadership’s priorities. The Chinese leadership is taking some undeniable steps. In mid-2007, the Chinese government announced the formation of a high-level leading group on climate change, to be chaired by Wen, and it issued a major report on the subject. The Foreign Ministry during that time announced that it had established a leading group to run international work on climate change, which was lead by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Subsequently, Beijing appointed Ambassador Yu Qingtai as China’s new “special representative of the Foreign Ministry for climate change negotiations.” His mission is to help solidify China’s domestic action plan in response to climate change, along with exhibiting “the government’s active participation in international cooperation on responding to climate change.” China has made recent concerted efforts to develop alternative nonpolluting energy, which has focused on hydropower, which accounts for 6% of China’s energy supply and continues to grow. The New York Times, in a feature article on 18 November, 2007 on Chinese dams, highlighted “disorderly and uncontrolled” efforts to construct power-generating dams. The social, environmental, and other problems of large dam projects such as the Three Gorges Dam are well known but the implications of ongoing Chinese dam construction projects along the Mekong (Lacang) and Salween (Nu) rivers are seen by international specialists as posing major negative risks for the lives and livelihoods of the 70 million people who thrive off of fishing and agriculture in the southeast Asian nations (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) that rely on 251 these rivers. A recent European parliament Report, Clouds Ahead: China’s Energy Policy in Light of Climate Change, took note of concerns with Chinese hydropower projects and also criticized Chinese purchases of large tracts (400,000-500,000 hectares) of land in the Philippines, and sales and proposed use of several million hectares of land in the Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for the production of crops to be used to produce bio-diesel and other bio-fuel. China also has one of the most ambitious nuclear and renewable energy development plans in the world. Nuclear capacity is projected to grow to 40 GW by 2020, according to state media. 730 Even if China meets its target, nuclear power will only make up about 5% of total electric capacity in 2020, according to Western experts. 731 Currently 7.5% of China’s total energy comes from renewable sources – primarily hydroelectric power – and Beijing’s goal is to increase it to 16% by 2020, according to press reporting. 732 Beijing’s plan to raise the share of gas-fired capacity from 3-7% in 2020 hinges on higher domestic gas production, emerging liquefied natural gas imports terminals, and proposed international pipeline projects. 733 China is seeking clean coal technologies (CCT), which will reduce sulfur emissions and increase efficiency, but these technologies are likely to have limited 730 Open Source, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY CIRAS ID:ON43248786, 20070310, (U), CIRAS ID: ON43248786. 731 Open Source, David Fridley, Nathanial Aden, Jonathan Sinton, Nan Zhou, Malini Ranganathan, Joanna Lewis, Jiang Lin, and Shyam Menon, “China Energy Future to 2020,” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (4 October 2006), (U), CIRAS ID. 732 Open Source, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE CIRAS ID:OW52016278, 20061026, (U), CIRAS ID: OW52016278. 733 Open Source, Gawdat Bahgat, “China Expands Energy Mix, Seeks Investment,” Oil & Gas Journal (23 April 2007): 20, (U), CIRAS ID. 252 impact on reducing Greenhouse Gases GHGs unless coupled with carbon sequestration – technology not yet commercially viable. 734 Although difficult to measure, the effects of extreme weather are also being considered by Chinese economic policy analysts. The Vice Minister of the Ministry of Water Resources commented that, “against the backdrop of global warming…the strength of typhoons [is] increasing, the destructiveness of typhoons that have made landfall is greater, and the scope in which they are traveling is farther than normal.” 735 While the Chinese coasts are hit by monster storms, its hinterland is suffering from droughts that are growing in severity as well. More than 17 million persons in southwest China suffered from an inadequate water supply as a result of drought and excessive heat. Economic losses were estimated at US$1.5 billion resulting from the lack of harvest. 736 A Chinese meteorologist predicts that if greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise, precipitation in China’s major river valleys will decline by 30% in 2040. 737 Research from another study, this one from the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning and the National Bureau of Statistics, reveals that China may have suffered a total loss of US$64 billion from environmental pollution in 2004, or more than 3.05% of China’s 734 Open Source, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING CIRAS ID:ON43558219, 20070401, (U), CIRAS ID:ON435558210. 735 Robert Saiget, “Global Warming Behind Disastrous Typhoon Season,” Hong Kong service of Agence France-Presse (14 August 2006). 736 “Over 17 Million People Suffer Drinking Water Shortage in SW China,” Xinhua (12 August 2006). 737 “Less Greenhouse Gases to Help Balance Precipitation in China’s Major Rivers: Expert,” Xinhua (8 July 2006). 253 GDP. 738 There are even reports that a more damning study has been postponed due to pressure from local officials and fear of a social backlash. 739 Hosting the XXIXth Olympiad also prompted Beijing to introduce green policies. One notable, yet not widely reported, example was the introduction of China Phase IV automotive gasoline and diesel fuel in the metro-Beijing region. 740 China Phase IV fuels are equivalent to Euro IV fuels and have less sulfur. 741 The recent introduction of China Phase IV fuels into its fuel distribution and supply system indicates that China is upgrading its fuel standards and quality. 742 By producing, distributing, and using cleaner automotive fuels, China hopes to meet its commitment to the WTO. Furthermore, China’s investment in upgrading and modernizing its refineries has enabled China to begin phasing in these cleaner fuels that are more compatible with the cleaner systems in the developed world. 743 Even the PLA has started adopting policies that reflect a concern for environmental security. Units within both the PLAN’s East and South Sea Fleets have 738 “Pollution costs China 511.8 billion Yuan in 2004,” Xinhua (7 September 2006), CPP200609072008. 739 “China postpones pollution report,” BBC [Online] (2007, July 23) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- /2/hi/asia-pacific/6911784.stm.> 740 “Beijing Euro IV Fuel Standards in Effect 1 January 2008,” Green Car Congress (2 January 2008). 741 “Euro IV Fuel Standard in Beijing” (16 January 2008) <BeijingAirblog.com> 742 “Fresh Start,” Beijing China Daily (in English), Beijing, China (21 January 2008). 743 Inside China, The Chinese View of Their Automotive Future, a technical study jointly produced by IBM Business Consulting Services in association with the University of Michigan Transportation Institute, 2005. 254 constructed “eco-friendly” port facilities. 744 A press report indicates that within the Beijing Military Region 745 the PLA engaged in reforestation efforts in 2006. 746 Perhaps the greatest hurdles facing China’s environmental security are structural— specifically, the disconnect between local and central levels, and the lack of effective public participation. 747 Local officials often do not share the same priorities as the central government, and many have not yet implemented the central government’s environmental plans as instructed. As Pan Yue, the director of SEPA declared: “Many provinces failed to meet the major environmental protection targets of the 10 th Five-Year Plan, although they have met and exceeded the plan’s GDP targets in advance.” 748 Despite local factory owners and governments signing “responsibility pledges” committing to reduce pollutants, the total volume of major pollutants discharged rose during the first six months of 2006. The mandatory reduction of major pollutants by 10% in the next five years seems unattainable at this point in time. China’s bureaucratic responses have been characterized as “uncoordinated” and “irresponsible.” 749 744 CCP20080130702004, JFJB” “SUBMARINE FLOTILLA BUILDS NEW-TYPE ECOLOGICAL NAVAL PORT,” 301103Z JAN 08; CPP20080107702007, JFJB: “PICTURESQUE AND ECOLOGY- FRIENDLY NAVAL PORT,” R 071625Z JAN 08. 745 The PRC is divided into seven “Military Regions” for the purpose of PLA command and control. 746 CPP20060427318009, BEIJING ZHANYOU BAO IN CHINESE 24 JAN 06, BEIJING MR LOGISTICS LEADERSHIP DISCUSS GOALS, COURSES OF ACTIONS IN 2006, R 041302Z MAY 06. 747 Ibid. at 11. 748 Pan Yue, “Take Urgent Measures to Protect our Environment,” China Daily (19 July 2006). 749 Xiaoqing Liu and Bates Gill, “Assessing China’s Response to the Challenge of Environmental Health”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, China Environment Series 2007 Feature Article. 255 One government success story is SEPA’s cooperation with the U.S.’s Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Environmental Strategies Initiative on hazardous waste management in 2006. In 2007 China and the U.S. agreed to cooperate on farm chemical pollution control. 750 Another example of international cooperation is the WHO/UNEP’s Regional Initiative on Environment and Health in Southeast and East Asian Countries. The goal of this effort is to actively collect environmental and health ministers from Asia and to provide a mechanism for sharing information, improving policy and regulatory frameworks, and promoting the implementation of integrated environmental health strategies and regulations. 751 China’s SEPA and MOH participate in this effort and are working on an environmental health action plan. Another potential success story is the collaboration of SEPA with China’s Ministry of Health (MOH). In August 2007 the two entities announced actions planned under this agreement, encompassing: (1) creating a leadership group with a joint secretariat chaired by MOH and SEPA ministers; (2) forming an expert advisory committee to help guide the creation of thematic working groups; (3) conducting joint environmental health monitoring, surveying, and research; and (4) jointly handling public environmental emergencies. Xiaoqing Liu and Bates Gill believe that: The creation of such an inter-agency mechanism holds promise of promoting better data-generation education and training. Nonetheless, due to the complexity 750 “China, U.S. ink document to facilitate cooperation on farm chemical pollution control,” Xinhua (20 April 2007). 751 For more information on this forum see: http://www.rrcap.un.p.eorg/envhealth/index.cfm. 256 of engaging two separate bureaucracies to cooperate translating the new plan into real action, particularly at local levels, remains challenging. 752 A more ambitious attempt at cooperation is to establish a larger interagency process to address environmental health problems, pulling in the Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of Construction. These agencies would lay out a 10-year plan focusing on environmental health, to include research and regulatory responses in areas such as: (1) air pollution and health; (2) water pollution and health; (3) the impact of climate change on health; and (4) health problems associated with inadequate solid waste treatment. 753 Approval of this initiative is pending. China’s environmental diplomacy has also taken large steps in recent years. Premier Wen Jiabao, on 21 November, 2007, signed the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, the zenith of the East Asian Summit (EAS). Pursuant to this agreement, China will carry out actions to address climate change, improve energy efficiency, and reduce deforestation. Wen told the summit that China is attempting to grapple with the issue of climate change by curbing energy consumption and emissions. Nonetheless, Wen pushed that the developed countries must carry the primary responsibility for harmful emissions. In a phone call to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the eve of the Bali conference, Wen stated that “while taking the lead in greatly cutting emissions, developed nations should also adopt relevant policies in accordance with their capacity, in order to make as much of a contribution as 752 Liu, Gill, Supra, at 10. 753 Ibid. 257 they can in combating climate change.” The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson clarified Beijing’s resistance to binding commitments on its energy use by asserting on 22 November that, “even if China’s own standards for energy reductions and emission controls coincide with global benchmarks, we still adhere to the principle that no sovereign nation should be forced to accept mandatory measures imposed by another country.” He added, “Third-world countries should not be forced to accept any mandatory measures.” China’s positions have been reinforced by notable Chinese editorials and media commentary, which highlight that developed countries “produced 95 percent of CO2 emissions from the 18 th century to 1950 and 77 percent from 1950 to 2001.” Consequently, according to the PRC leadership, developed countries bear the primary responsibility for dealing with global warming. Moreover, Chinese op-ed pieces have objected to mentioning China and the U.S. as the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases, proclaiming that China’s carbon footprint – the Co2 emissions per person per year – is about four tons for China and over 20 tons for the U.S. China’s trepidation in accepting binding laws on emissions and energy use coincides with China’s sluggish progress in energy efficiency and pollution controls, and hurdles in alternative energy efforts that include Southeast Asian countries, among others. Wen told a National University of Singapore audience on 19 November that China in 2007 had improved its energy consumption per unit of GDP and cut pollutant discharges; yet a deputy director of the SEPA informed an environmental forum in Beijing the prior day that the government was likely to fail to meet its emissions control targets for the current five- 258 year plan (2006-2010) due to the continuing expansion of energy-intensive sectors in Chinese industry. SEPA and some other PRC entities are facing and defining the environmental security threats with a sober eye, but this vigilance is not widespread enough to qualify as securitization, nor is it high enough as a priority when it competes for state resources with other sectors. 259 CHAPTER FOUR CONCLUSIONS Military Sector Conclusions The military sector, being the continuation of traditional security, is in a sense easier to grasp and analyze than many other sectors of comprehensive security. The security referent in this case, the entity to be secured is China’s territorial integrity and physical population. When looking upon the research, we see that for many, “China” is more than just the PRC, it also entails what is known as “greater China,” which means Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Taiwan is not a security threat per se to China. Rather, Taiwanese independence is. Linked to that threat is the accompanying security threat of the U.S., which ensures Taiwan’s protection from a PRC that forces unification. Japan, by virtue of its security alliance with the U.S., its contested territories such as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao in the PRC), its history of violence with China, its military modernization, and on-going political tensions over that history, and most importantly it being a rival for domination over Asia, has made it an existential threat to the territorial integrity and the military sector of the PRC in the view of its security policy-makers. A rising India also, by virtue of its size, its potential for economic, political, and strategic rivalry, and the issues over the Line of Control, make it a concern for China’s policy- makers and their sense of the PRC’s military security. The speech-acts on this issue vary. Interestingly, the comprehensive security securitizing actors in this, namely PRC leaders, are not as draconian as some of the scholars and commentators. When looking at the 260 evolution of the leaders’ speeches, along with the Defense White papers and Arms Control White Paper, this researcher notes that the official rhetoric has toned down in terms of intensity, and we even see greater preponderance of non-traditional security concerns in the papers and in official speeches. Hu even highlighted domestic concerns as security risks in the Central Foreign Work Meeting. However, traditional military concerns were still the top priority, with Taiwan being the most important case. That being said, the overall tone has been much less vitriolic compared to Mao-era PRC national security and foreign policy rhetoric; it seems that while there is a qualitative difference between politicization and securitization, degrees of intensity within securitization may exist as well. Still, no doubt this threat has been securitized, as described by the COPRI. It is framed by the securitizing actors as an existential threat to the national security of China, and the securitizing actors plan to deploy all means of the state to protect the referent from this threat, if need be. What core elements linked with the referent must be protected and/or enhanced to ensure its security? At first glance the elements are territorial integrity. As stated previously, the PRC considers Taiwan part of its national territory so any movement to violate that – either from within or without – is a national security threat. As such, Taiwanese “splittism” violates the element of territorial integrity. Furthermore, the U.S., via its military support to Taiwan, frustrates Beijing’s ability to protect its territorial integrity from “splittists,” hence the U.S. being listed as a threat to the military sector. One could argue that given that Taiwan de jure independence is in truth a threat to the PRC’s socio-cultural sector, the U.S. and its military assistance to Taiwan, is by 261 extension, a threat to the PRC’s socio-cultural sector as well. Regardless, PRC security policy-makers also do not want Taiwan “splittism” to encourage separatist movements in Tibet or Xinjiang. However, the values to be protected are more subtle, which is where the evidence points to a more unorthodox conclusion regarding the military sector and Taiwan. In this category the main value to be protected is the national identity and pride of the Chinese people. Much of Chinese modern identity is linked to past humiliations and sufferings at the hands of foreign powers. Mao once proclaimed that the Chinese people have stood up. To lose Taiwan or to be challenged by the U.S. and/or Japan would severely damage that national pride and sense of reemergence that is crucial to modern PRC identity. China can never again be seen as the “sick man of Asia.” These elements point to the conclusion that Taiwan is less a threat to the military sector than to the socio-cultural sector. Taiwan itself is not a military threat in terms of taking PRC territory via force of arms. PRC security policy-makers are not adopting a balance of power approach to Taiwan. The security threat Taiwan poses to the PRC does not fit the description of the military sector as outlined by Buzan and Little. On the contrary, it best fits the definition of the socio-cultural sector. 754 While the PRC is acquiring arms that are specifically designed to coerce Taiwan and deny regional access to U.S. forces, the rationale behind these actions is not one of response to a perceived threat to the military sector. The true core referent of securitization is not an army but a sense of pride and identity, an identity that Taiwan de jure independence threatens. The PRC might be reacting in a military 754 Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra, at 73. 262 manner, but ultimately the threat is not military. The threat is to the PRC leadership’s ability to dictate the terms of its national and cultural identity, regardless of the rights, wishes, or needs of others. What is the nature of the threats – military, political, societal, economic, or environmental – against which these core values must be protected? The ostensible answer is primarily military, as is to be expected in this sector of comprehensive security. The U.S. military forces protecting Taiwan and protecting independence moves are the most visible threat. There are also the U.S. and Japanese militaries protecting Senkaku claims or any other potential clashes. India’s comprehensive national power is also considered a threat, but it moves beyond military. India’s economic power is sometimes seen as a potential threat to China’s security. The threat nature in this case can also be national loss of face or even humiliation. If it loses territory, the PRC fears the cascading effect of emboldening other independence movers such as Tibetans or Uyghurs. 755 This kind of loss could spell a loss of legitimacy of the CCP to rule, which could lead to its removal. Again, however, in the case of Taiwan the nature of the threat is, at its core, societal and cultural, though it possesses military elements should the U.S. become militarily involved in a defense of Taiwan from a PRC attack. The nature of the security problem in this military sector is primarily zero-sum in nature. 756 The efforts PRC military planners are taking in military modernization, of 755 Interview Number 12. 756 Stephan D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (1991): 336-67. 263 increasing military-to-military joint training with countries like Thailand, the increase in military budget (even if its ostensibly for quality-of-life purposes) is to improve the effectiveness of the PLA relative to the militaries of Taiwan, the U.S., Japan, and perhaps India. How was security defined? It is protecting the territory and feelings of China, which are linked to how it views its own history. China was carved up by foreign powers during the 19 th century. 757 This “century of humiliation” left a permanent scar on China’s psyche. Consequently, many in China are especially sensitive to what it perceives as foreign “hegemonism”—and U.S. hegemonism ultimately frustrates China from reclaiming the totality of its lost territories during the “century of humiliation.” The source of the definition of security is multi-fold. In one instance Chinese leaders are dealing with the region. The source is a combination of both civilian and military leaders. Military leaders will have a comparatively large amount of influence over defining these threats (e.g., specific military capabilities of adversaries, and so forth). The civilian leadership, however, still guides the Chinese ship, and we have seen declining numbers of PLA in the upper-level CCP committees of power. These leaders, civilian and military, will have been educated and risen through the ranks, becoming aware of Chinese traditional, military threats, and have been for the most part been trained in a traditional view of security (according to Chinese academics). As a result, their threat perceptions are already mature by the time they become CCP General 757 John K. Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985 (New York, NY: Perennial Library, 1987): 84-99. 264 Secretary or Premier. Clearly the individual leadership of China was a factor in the evolution of its perceived security threat and how to mitigate it. On this issue, some scholars who were U.S. specialists (notably Wang Jisi) no doubt played a role in shaping threat definitions and perceptions of military security. However, relative to other comprehensive security sectors, they had more influence due to their established credentials. Moreover, under the Buzan/Little rubric, neorealists would point to a structural explanation of anarchy on the system level to explain these policies. Lastly, what was the source of any change, and if there was change why was there change? Was it the role of new ideas? 758 The security threat perceptions and definitions did not remain completely static while the leaders were in power. International events strongly influenced them. Among the most important was Taiwan political events of 1995-6, and the threat to PRC identity that de jure independence creates; 1995-6 re- ignited this fear. Another was the success of the U.S. military during Operation Desert Storm, along with its swift deployment of two Carrier Strike Groups to the Taiwan Strait in 1996, which propelled Jiang to modernize the military at a greater pace then had Deng. Moreover, the elections on Taiwan in 1996 and 2000 and the U.S. military posturing during that time provided incentive for Beijing to adopt more nuanced and restrained public stances vis-à-vis Taiwan elections. PRC leaders realized that they could not be as 265 blusterous with Taiwan. Furthermore, in 2004 Hu Jintao revised Jiang’s goal of compelling reunification with Taiwan to merely preventing independence. 759 Political Sector Conclusions How does the political sector in the PRC reflect on the COPRI’s comprehensive security model? How has the PRC grappled with the issue of security in the political sector? Many referents must be secured— but they all lead to one main referent. Security scholars have outlined these as safeguarding national sovereignty, and maintaining political and social stability, but ultimately, CCP/state power and its ability to function efficiently as the unchallenged entity over China serve as the overriding referent of political security. As in other elements of comprehensive security, the research shows that the only way for the speech-act part of the securitizing process to work in a propaganda state like China is when we use the broad definition of speech act as advocated by Dr. Williams. A speech act per se must be taken with a grain of salt in a society with restrictions on information and free speech. The research strongly supports William’s work on speech- acts. 758 Robert D. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth,” International Security 26.4 (Spring 2002): 70-92. 759 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In,” International Security 25.4 (Spring 2001): 107-146. 266 The evidence points to politicization in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre (i.e., in the 1990s), but a shift to securitization under the rule of Hu Jintao. We see evidence of the need for reform, but not the need to prepare the country for emergency action. Notably, on this point, general consensus exists on the stability of CCP rule over the PRC. Scholars such as Richard Hu, Yang Guangbin, and Tianjian Shi all believe that China’s political sector is nominally safe, and by extension, an issue of politicization, as opposed to securitization. This perception of safety may even point to an eventual process of peaceful evolution in the PRC’s democratization development. What is the nature of the threats – military, political, societal, economic, or environmental – against which these core values must be protected in these speech-acts? The speech-acts and the scholarly analysis reveal a certain lack of existential threat element in the speech-acts. Interestingly, most of the urgency around the security of China’s political institutions and mechanisms comes from Western scholars as opposed to Chinese scholars, whose work reveals a notable dearth of the use of “security,” “stability,” or similar key words to denote an existential threat to the PRC. One could argue that the issue of corruption falls under the political, not just the socio-cultural, sector. If we accept this idea, then political reform does become a national security threat as manifested in speech-acts and policies made by Chinese leadership focusing on the threat of corruption to stability; then, but only then, do we see a securitization process. 267 The nature of the security problem in this category of the political sector seems, in general, to be one of potential political market failure. 760 Jiang’s reforms addressed issues of modernization, efficiency, and competence. His Three Represents was, in a sense, meant to democratize the Party and make it more appealing to a more sophisticated and cosmopolitan society. He also realized that the CCP needed the talents within these collectives of persons to invigorate the CCP and for them to not feel oppressed or alienated by the CCP. In sum, the nature of this problem is similar to the economic sector: the need of a new, more streamlined system to face the challenges of ruling an increasingly complex nation-state How is security defined? Chen Shifu asserted political stability (and by association, Political Security) was achieved by reinforcing the Party construction, improving its administrative ability, building the legislation system to protect the legal rights and interests of the people, and further carrying out political reforms. 761 Certainly Jiang’s efforts at reforming elite politics at the formal and informal level, his Three Represents, and Hu’s technocratic approach to intra-party democracy and problem- solving in general bear out the prescriptive analysis offered by Chen. The source of the definition of security in sector is difficult to ascertain. However, the policies associated with this source involved departing from ideological identities and struggles, and focusing on government efficiency. The focus on improved 760 Stephan D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (1991): 336-67. 761 Chen Shifu, A Thorough Analysis, Supra, at 123-173. 268 efficiency, modernizing the elite system was a combination of Jiang’s experiences as an outsider to national, elite level politics. He obtained power in a quick stroke from Deng Xiaoping in the immediate wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. His success at handling student protests in Shanghai in 1986 and 1989 earned the respect of Deng. Consequently, he shot up to the top rather abruptly. Jiang was initially something of an outsider and recognized the need to reform certain elements of PRC elite politics, in this case ideological factionalism dynamics. Jiang’s personal sense of political vulnerability, plus his recognition of China’s growth and the complications that would arise from that, spurred him to view the security of China’s body politic as needing an upgrade in terms of people and process. The sources of explanation of the political sector appear to be a process explanation – in this case individual leadership and single-party rule dynamics – at the unit level. Though one could argue that a growing call for (and resistance to) democratization points to process at the subsystem level as a source of explanation. 762 This is not to say there were not changes in the sources of security definitions. The hows and whys are multitude. The collapse of the USSR and Eastern Bloc states illustrated to Jiang and Zhongnanhai writ large the need to adapt its ruling system, lest it suffer a similar fate. Was it ideational? Most likely not. In a sense, the evolution from “struggle,” to “reform” was a philosophical change set forth from Deng. Jiang, Zhu, Hu, and Wen were continuing a tradition, but it was not an ancient Chinese one— it was a relatively recent Chinese one. Along those lines, Jiang deserves a fair amount of credit, since many of the reforms were done on his watch, via his hand. Moreover, some of his 762 See generally, Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra. 269 reforms departed from Deng’s in terms of specifics, so he was not merely passing on Deng’s vision, which was more the case in economic reforms. Nonetheless, Jiang is not a “great man” in this arena, because of Deng’s stature. 763 Jiang’s efforts, however effective, are imbued with the same sense of vision as were Deng’s. Throughout my research, nearly all the Chinese scholars this writer interviewed asserted that the reforms implemented by Jiang and Hu still do not compare – in terms of impact or vision – to Deng’s. Overall, when considering China’s scholarly work on speech-acts from, and policies regarding, the political sector, the analysis yields a conclusion that the political sector has been politicized, but not securitized, when applying the COPRI criteria. Certainly the efforts at political reform reflect an awareness of the Byzantine and unresponsive nature of the Chinese political system and its bureaucracy, 764 and reforming them may be in its national interests, but it this issue still has not attained the status of national security. The trend of policies, reforms, and speech-acts are such that according to PRC security policy-makers, the political sector – specifically democratization – peaked as an existential threat to national security in the immediate wake of the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, and remained there through the 1990s, but that Hu Jintao has desecuritized it to the point of politicization only. Compared to the military and societal sectors, the political sector has not seen the same levels of urgency and gravity in 763 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back,” in Supra. 764 See generally, Eugene Cooper, Adventures in Chinese Bureaucracy: A Meta-Anthropological Saga, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2000). 270 speeches and writings. The research does not support that China has made its political situation a case of national security namely, the political sector. Socio-Cultural Sector Conclusions The socio-cultural sector has proven to be one of the most challenging categories of comprehensive security. It is also receiving some of the most attention, both by Chinese scholars and Chinese policy-makers, and points to definite securitization. Who, or which entity is to be secured (i.e., the security referent)? The research, in this writer’s opinion, reveals that the Chinese leadership has indeed securitized the socio- cultural sector, making it a national security priority equal to any other, including military security. As is being seen in an authoritarian system, the referent is again the ruling power – the CCP – and the survival of it as a regime. However, even an authoritarian leadership has enlightened goals of improving the lot of the masses, which is seen in the undeniable societal improvement efforts of Hexie Shehui – so the common society and its quality of life is also a major referent. Yet in the end, a content populace still serves the goal of maintaining the rule of the CCP. The core values or elements linked with the referent that must be protected and/or enhanced to ensure its security is clearly stability. The research shows unequivocally that the historical and cultural importance PRC policy-makers place on stability, or wending, goes beyond words. An overwhelming number of scholars has pointed to “stability” as the code word for PRC authorities who consider that issue an existential threat to the 271 Chinese nation-state. This research more than any other validates the contributions of Michael Williams on “security” synonyms in speech-acts for the securitization process. 765 The nature of the threats to the socio-cultural sector, and its values of stability that must be protected, are the most diverse of any of the threats to China’s comprehensive security. On one hand we see ethnic and religious strife. Yet the research also points to economic polarization along geographic (i.e., coastal vs. inland) and industrial (urban vs. rural) lines. Other threats to the socio-cultural sector and the value of stability are epidemics such as SARS, HIV, and Avian Influenza. Still more are drug abuse and crime. The most insidious of all, however, as stated by most scholars and by the priorities of Hu Jintao, is corruption. Corruption has been the source of dynastic upheaval and change in Chinese history, and was a major factor of the Tiananmen protests of 1989. Corruption hamstrings all efforts to cope with the myriad of China’s other threats to its comprehensive security. Hu, more than any other leader of Communist China, regards corruption as a threat to stability and therefore to the socio- cultural sector of the PRC. Due to the variety of threats to China’s socio-cultural sector, we see that ultimately the nature of the security problem is both security problem zero- sum and distributional (i.e., relative gains on the issue of uneven development and economic polarization) in nature, but also one of political market failure, such as corruption. 766 765 Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies,” Supra, at 526. 766 Stephan D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (1991): 336-67. 272 This insight leads back to the question regarding the source of the definition of security. Clearly the CCP leadership is leading the way in defining socio-cultural security as an existential threat to the PRC’s national security. This effort is seen in the work performed by CASS and the Central Party School on the massive Gini Coefficient and plague of corruption in the PRC, along with the MPS’s work on the rising unrest within the PRC, which should not come as a surprise given that Chinese leadership has long considered stability the highest priority of the Middle Kingdom. In other words, the leadership does not need to depend on foresighted scholars, foreign or domestic, to identify socio-cultural security as an existential threat to China and thus to mandate full use of all state power and resources. Regarding sources of explanation, the socio-cultural sector is best described as a process (i.e., governance and policy implementation), with some interaction capacity (i.e., dissidents and other aggrieved parties) at the subunit (i.e., groups above the individual but below the government or Party) level. 767 Was there a change or at least an evolution in this definition? What was the source of that change? And, if there was change, Why? Speech-acts evolving from Deng Xiaoping Theory and Socialism with Chinese characteristics and “Building a well-off society in an all-round way” to “Harmonious Society” chart a definite shift toward focusing on socio-cultural security and stability. The research reveals that some scholars (and many PRC citizens) blame external forces – notably globalization – as the major threat to the PRC’s socio-cultural security, yet the work of some scholars dispel that notion. More prevalent is the rising inequality and social disparity within the PRC, as 767 Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra. 273 highlighted by the work of Sun Liping, Xun Yintian, Yongnian Zheng, and Yang Zheng. This disparity is very much a result of the PRC’s rapid economic growth in the post-Deng era. As such, abstract ideas were probably less of a contributor to the socio-cultural sector being truly securitized in the PRC (unlike in the USSR). 768 The sources were also ideational. As stated before, Chinese leaders have consistently feared chaos and always highly valued stability. Consequently, these policies are not truly the result of a brilliant, visionary leader. 769 Social ills such as health and income gaps, unemployment, and “social management,” along with the environment, and corruption have fostered policies such as the New Socialist Countryside Initiative and, of course, Harmonious Society. These policies are impressive on their face, and represent a definite departure from Jiang’s grow-at-all-cost approach. Sustainable Development (Economic plus Environmental Sectors) Conclusions In applying the COPRI’s comprehensive security model to the economic sector, we see all the facets in play as described by Waever et al. First, we clearly see a front- and-center role of the securitizing actors that have the authority to do so. In this sense, one would expect this role from a single party, authoritarian state. As such we see the usefulness of this facet of the comprehensive security model. In the PRC case, the securitizing actors are what one should expect – the highest officials in the government, or in the case of a single-party state – the party. 768 English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” Supra. 769 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” Supra. 274 Second, we see clear speech-acts prioritizing government economic policy. The Party congresses always made economic policy the highest priority in the agenda. In the excerpts presented, we see policies that go beyond mere cheerleading or Leninist-style self-aggrandizement. We also see a clear evolution in policies. Jiang kept Deng’s goal of privatization on track, and he, Zhu, and Hu have all made opening up to further trade and investment a priority for China to achieve economic security. However, this information still begs the question, were these policies securitized? Did we see all means of state power devoted to this threat to China’s security? It would be easy to answer no, given that the actual term “national security” is not featured, nor is its Chinese equivalent, stability, featured. However, we do see the highest levels of government devoting vast amounts of time and resources to this issue. We saw over this time period leaders’ success measured in terms of handling the economy and economic reforms. We also saw the relative sophistication of FDI policies, central government guidance over the reform process that can only result from being a top priority in Chinese policy-making. Also, a unique quality of this element of comprehensive security is its age. More than any other element of comprehensive security in China, economic reform and self-strengthening predates the era of this research. One may argue that Jiang’s economic policies are in a general sense, a continuation of Deng’s opening-up and reform policies from the late 1970s-early 1980s. Therefore, the speech acts securitizing this threat would be most visible at the policies’ inception – for example in the late 1970s/early 1980s. By the time of Jiang, economic reform and opening up was a settled policy at the philosophical level; Jiang (along with Zhu and later Hu) refined it to fit the 275 current circumstances. The result is the lessening need for explicit speech-acts designating this economic issues as an existential threat to China’s national security. Also of note is the rise of subsets of this security element: food and energy security. As mentioned before, energy security is occupying the minds of China’s top leaders and top scholars. Becoming a net importer of oil in 1993, exhibiting double-digit growth for over 20 years, coupled with the stated goal of maintaining high growth has forced Zhongnanhai to look at energy as a strategic asset, and hence, a vital element of China’s national economic security. Clearly, coping with reliance on foreign sources of energy makes energy security one of those overlapping elements (in this case with traditional security) unique to the economic sector. Dealing with foreign reliance of energy sources, along with finding alternative energy sources is becoming as much of China’s economic sector policies as are its macroeconomic, microeconomic, and financial policies. Lastly, we see an emerging focus on food security as a sub-element of the economic sector. Again, we see clearly articulated speech-acts such as modernizing agriculture and increasing farmers’ incomes, using market forces and larger scale farms, urbanizing the countryside, and increasing social programs for farmers. This sub-element overlaps with the socio-cultural sector in reflecting a concern over the welfare of a certain segment of society that Beijing is concerned with protecting and keeping stable. Looking at the research and what it shows vis-à-vis the COPRI’s comprehensive security, we see certain elements immediately present themselves as a result. When we look at who or which entity is to be secured (i.e., the security referent), we see a number of overlapping entities in the economic sector. Scholars enumerated a wide range of 276 referents: manufacturing, marketing, financing, and research and development on the macro level, and human and technological resources, exportable capital, efficient production of modern goods, influence over global economic decision making that affect one's own vital interests, and the will to mobilize economic capacity for national ends. 770 Other referents include the government’s effective management or regulation of its own economy, whether it can strongly resist the pressure and impact of competition from foreign capital and international markets; fruitfully maintain its preponderance in the race in domestic and foreign markets; forcefully guard its economic system, laws and rules; validly protect and promote its people’s living standard and social welfare; and successfully safeguard the state’s properties, resources, and ecological environment. Moreover, can it protect its 771 natural resources, energy, the financial integrity of the SOEs, the integrity of its financial institutions, keep banks solvent and thriving, protect the RMB, modernize agriculture, protect IPR rights, trade rights under the WTO, and white-collar crime prevention/enforcement in the penal code. 772 The core values or elements linked with the referent that must be protected and/or enhanced to ensure its security are especially notable in the economic sector: food and energy security. In fact, one could easily make the argument that they are separate security elements in their own right. These elements represent China’s ability to feed itself and to keep its economic engine running, figuratively and literally. 770 Hsiung, Comprehensive Security, Supra. 771 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 81. 772 Liu Yuejin, Guojia Anquan Xue, Supra at 84-90. 277 Is the security problem zero-sum and distributional (i.e., relative gains) in nature, or is it one of political market failure? 773 The problem is distributional and one of market failure. The various elements of comprehensive security are interconnected. For example, the economic sector is vitally linked to the socio-cultural and environmental sectors, as seen in the CCP’s acknowledged need to have at least 8% growth per annum to maintain a certain level of employment. If this goal fails then China could face massive unemployment of migrant workers who could riot. Looking at the research as shedding light on China’s security policies, we first see a security threat that was designated as such prior to Jiang’s ascendance and then persisted into the current era of Hu and Wen. The need to reform the economy, privatize it, open up China to trade and FDI, become more integrated into the international system while maintaining a certain safe distance is considered vital to China’s national security. The research tends to see an almost diminishing role of each subsequent policy-maker (i.e., Deng made more impacts than Jiang/Zhu, who made more impacts than did Hu/Wen, whose impacts presumable will be more than Xi/Li). Moreover, maintaining this growth and dealing with its repercussions necessitates maintaining adequate food supply, protecting the livelihood of China’s agriculture, and maintaining a steady and reliable supply of energy to feed this much-needed economic growth. All are top security priorities for China leadership. One could argue that in this category, the “great man” 773 Stephan D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (1991): 336-67. 278 view of history has the most explanatory value. 774 Deng’s awareness of China’s need to shed its controlled economy and modernize via economic reform placed him at the vanguard of CCP leadership in the late 1970s. His visit to the Japan and the U.S. in the late 1970s exposed him to the fruits of a more open economy, along with the costs of being left behind. He fought for reforms in the face of much opposition throughout the 1980s. Furthermore, his “southern tour” in 1992 provided a shot in the arm to reforms after reformists like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were discredited in the immediate wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. More than any other category of comprehensive security, the economic sector is most linked to a single individual at its source. A second source of the security definition in this case was the Asian Financial Crisis, which spurred Chinese leaders to be even more careful in their reforms, particularly regarding currency and financial institutions. In this regard, we can attribute changes from an external source: specifically an immediate, regional concern, as opposed to ideas, (which many argue was the primary source of reform of the Soviet system). 775 When analyzing the securitization process of the environmental sector threats, we see the evidence first reveals no true securitization process— at least not in the manner put forth by the COPRI. Surely there is no shortage of open information about the threats that a deteriorating environment pose to the Chinese people, and by extension, the Chinese state. This insight is displayed in the excellent work performed by OECD, a 774 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” Supra. 775 English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End,” Supra. 279 number of Western scholars, and most notably, a number of Chinese scholars. In other words, a deteriorating environment is hardly an unacknowledged threat; however, substantial evidence still evinces the lack of true securitization. The first is the nature of the speech-act, or rather, lack thereof. The speech-act declaring environmental problems an existential threat to China’s national security is absent. Compared to the other elements of comprehensive security, less official policy commentary addresses this element; when it does, commentary does not characterize environmental issues as an existential threat, or even laced with the national security urgency seen in other elements as required by COPRI. We do not see it commanding a high level of concern in China’s Defense White Papers. Furthermore, taking into account Williams’ analysis, 776 also absent is China’s code word for national security/national security threats: a threat to “stability.” SEPA is vocal about its findings and concerns, but one would expect that to a certain degree from an entity whose mandate is to monitor and to protect the environment. The securitizing actor’s (i.e., the Chinese government’s) efforts in investigating, identifying, and diagnosing – all in an open sphere – the environmental degradation in China is laudable and perhaps even evidence of politicization, but the lack of national resource devotion to this problem, coupled with the refusal to sacrifice economic growth for environmental protection, means this issue has passed the threshold of national security. Second, what speech acts there are do not reach the levels of urgency at the national level that we see in other elements of comprehensive security. We do see 776 Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” Supra, at 526. 280 mention of the threat referents being both the Chinese people and the Chinese state in general. We even see a White Paper on this issue, which is clear evidence of environmental problems being a national priority, but that is not sufficient for being an issue of national security. Third is the disconnect between the national and local levels of authority. If COPRI defines establishing a security threat as the highest national priority, the lack of national-level initiative in enforcing environmental regulations at the sub-national level undermines any claim of securitization. That lack of activity translates to not using all the means of state power as envisioned by COPRI. Fourth is the shifting of environmental clean-up policies to primarily a developed- country responsibility, which displays a lack of threat perception on the part of the securitizing actor (i.e., Beijing). While establishing the duties the developed world holds in environmental controls, the fact that China’s policies are contingent upon fulfilling that duty undermines the claims that China prioritizes its environmental security as a highest level national priority. As with the lack of local enforcement issue, Beijing has not mobilized the necessary elements of state power and moved beyond traditional rules as described by Emmers, 777 nor is it using exceptional means. Lastly, other than the work of scholars, some protesters, and the work of NGOs, we do not see sufficient amount of concern for the environment being a security threat, as Williams prescribes. 778 777 Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization, Supra. 778 Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” Supra, at 523. 281 Environmental Security brings with it questions of the applicability of the comprehensive security theory to the PRC. That Beijing is making some good-faith efforts at environmental regulation is undeniable. The rub is that these efforts conflict with other elements of comprehensive security. Specifically, as China Daily and SEPA observe, this pollution results in large part from China’s grow-first-worry-about- everything-else-later policies of the post-Deng era. COPRI is not very illuminating on whether there can be mutually excusive security priorities in the national security agenda. For Beijing, the answer is clear: environmental issues are an issue of national concern but not national security while economic growth/security is a top national security priority. The question then becomes, if environmental problems lead to enough unrest and instability that they truly damage societal security, will Zhongnanhai finally make environmental concerns an issue of unequivocal national security? The sources of China’s policy views on environmental issues and the whys of Beijing’s environmental policies on this topic are relatively young. Although CASS has been writing about environmental problems since the late 1990s, most genuine government action has been in the Hu-Wen era (2002-present). The policies stem less from the influence of scholarly work on this issue than from the undeniable reality of the environmental costs China faces. China’s leaders experience the problems at a personal level (living in Beijing is a perfect example). One must also give some credit to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Although the government policies are notable, the analysis shows that they are lacking in boldness in terms of enforcement, international responsibility, or even prioritization vis-à-vis growth. 282 This lack of boldness precludes either Hu or Wen from being a “great man” in a view of history. The environmental sector in the PRC context again brings to light the problem inherent throughout analysis of comprehensive security in China: the binary securitizing actors, and speech acts in the propaganda state. As we have seen, the lack of enforcement of environmental regulations at the provincial/local levels calls into the question of the impact of the COPRI comprehensive security securitization theory in this sector. The disconnect of priorities between the national and sub-national level (at least on this issue) frustrates the theoretical logic of COPRI’s securitization work by introducing a layer of government that can often defeat the intentions of the higher layers. In China’s case it is essentially erecting another hurdle for a threat to become securitized. The central government must make extra efforts in using its entire means of power because of the conflict with local and provincial authorities. Ideally, the sub-national governments should implement the national governments polities no questions asked, but such policies are not the case in China. The primary reasons for this are 1) that sub- national governments’ success has been measured by economic growth. Considering that energy and development are often the primary drivers of this growth, the local governments have a stronger incentive to build plants that contribute to output and growth, yet have the side-effect of pollution. However they are not punished because they are not measured by environmental friendliness. Secondly, as was shown in the chapter on societal security, corruption is an epidemic on China. Local government officials are often bribed by developers. Development often results in severe local 283 environmental damage, but the local officials think the benefit is worth the risk. When one utilizes the sources of explanation tool, the sustainable development sector is best seen by observers in terms of the system level due to the influx of economic reforms adopting certain capitalist policies and the transnational nature of the physical environment. The growth of technology and industrialization points to an interaction capacity source as well. Process might also play a role due to the disconnect between national and local goals and the resulting problems. 779 Overall Conclusions Overall, as stated in the Introduction, the research yielded several findings, falling along the lines of PRC security policy-making and of the theory of comprehensive security. Briefly, they are: that Buzan’s and COPRI’s work have not had direct impact on how PRC security policy makers define “national security” and formulate security policies, yet there is also an undeniable rise of non-traditional security concerns and policies in the PRC security policy-making community; that despite the rise of non- traditional security concerns and policies that reflect securitization of this concerns, Realism is still the guiding outlook of PRC security policy-maker; that, as a source of policy ideas and the policy-making process, scholars in the PRC have limited influence, though it is growing; that the PRC policy-making elite has securitized the military, economic, and socio-cultural sectors, and that they have securitized the political sector in some partial respects but the environmental sector and some elements of the political sector are still only politicized, and that this response follows a trend of securitizing the 779 See generally, Buzan, Little, International Systems, Supra. 284 political (for revolutionary purposes) and military sectors under Mao and a desecuritization of these sectors accompanied by the securitization of the economic sector by Deng; that Taiwan has been securitized less in the military sector, but more in the socio-cultural sector, that there is an undeniable rise of non-traditional security concerns and policies in the PRC security policy-making community; and that “national security” is not the only term that a Securitizing Actor can utter and/or publish to designate a threat as an issue of national security; and that speech-acts are not sufficient to truly designate something a threat to national security in the PRC context. As stated in the Introduction there were several questions applied to each sector. The research yielded a variety of inputs and answers, many of which overlap, as displayed below. Sectors in bold indicate securitization in whole. 285 Table 2. Sector Analysis Questions and Answers Which entity is to be secured? What core values/element s linked w/ the referent must be protected /enhanced to ensure its security? Military Political Socio-Cultural Sustainable Development what is the nature of the threats against which these core values must be protected? what is the nature of the security problem in each case? China’s territorial integrity China’s national pride & identity Military (U.S., Taiwan, Japan, India) Zero-sum Unchallenged CCP/state rule Efficiency of CCP rule; modernized CCP to reflect changing PRC Corruption; internal inefficiency Potential political market failure Unchallenged CCP/state rule; welfare of CCP populace Stability Ethnic, religious strife; wealth disparity; disease; demographics; corruption Zero-sum, distributional; potential political market failure PRC ability to manage & regulate own economy & finances; ability to maintain growth; Health of populace; health of environment Ability to feed populace; ability to maintain energy supplies; China’s ability to sustain its eco-system Foreign energy supply logistics; U.S. military intervention; Rapid, unregulated development; foreign pollution; local-national disconnect Distributional; market failure; Distributional; market failure How was security defined? Protecting the territory & feelings of China Efficient & modern state apparatus Stability An economy that can provide employment; Healthy populace; clean environment What was the source of the security definition? Military & civilian leaders Tiananmen massacre; fall of other Communist party-led countries State agencies Pre-existing policies & values; Deng’s Southern tour; Living conditions; INGOs; state research; what was the source of any change & why did it change? Taiwan politics; U.S. military actions Fall of other Communist parties; Jiang’s experiences Fear of globalization; ideational fears of chaos; visible internal unrest Asian financial crisis; Living conditions; PRC leadership 286 Overall, this project contributes to debates on the nature of introducing new theories of foreign policy into a country’s academic and policy-making communities, as well how the PRC has been developing and implementing its policies of national security since the early 1990s. 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Zweig, David, and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs 84.5 (September/October 2005). 324 APPENDIX A CHINESE JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS UTILIZED Dangdai Yatai -publication of the Chinese Academy of Social Science Dangjian Yanjiu (Research in Party Building) -monthly journal of the Central Organization Department Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defense University Journal) -journal published by the National Defense University Guoji maoyi (International Trade) -journal published by the Ministry of Commerce Guoji wenti (International Review) -biweekly journal published by the Shanghai Institute of International Studies Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies) -journal published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute of International Studies Guoji xingshi nianjian (The Yearbook Survey of International Affairs) -Annual journal published by the Shanghai Institute of International Studies Guoji zhangwang (World Outlook) -biweekly journal published by the Shanghai Institute of International Studies Heping yu fada (Peace and Development) -journal published by the Peace and Development Center Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) -official daily newspaper of the PLA Jinri Zhongguo Luntan (China Today Forum) -monthly journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Jungong Bao (Military Industry News) -daily newspaper published by the Shanxi Provincial COSTIND office Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economic Research) 325 -monthly journal published by the PLA Military Economics Institute Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle) -Hong Kong-based monthly journal Liaowang (Outlook) -weekly magazine published by the CCP Lilun Qianyan (Theory Front) -weekly paper of the Central Party School Qiushi (Seeking Truth) -magazine published by the CCP propaganda department Shijie jingi yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) -journal published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo Yanjiu (Research in Ideological and Political Work) -published by the Society of Ideological and Political Work Taipingyang xuebao (Pacific Journal) -journal published by the China Society of the Pacific Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) -Monthly journal published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, think tank for the Ministry of State Security, China’s CIA. Xuexi Shibao (Study Times) -weekly paper of the Central Party School Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) -quarterly journal published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management Zhanshi Bao (Soldier News) -daily newspaper published by the political department of the Guangzhou Military Region Zhongguo Danzheng Ganbu Luntan (Chinese Cadres Tribune) -monthly journal of the Central Party School Zhongguo junshi kexue (China military science) 326 -journal published by the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) Zhongguo Junzhaunmin Bao (China Defense Conversion News) -newspaper published by the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

Abstract (if available)

Abstract In my dissertation, "Getting a New Blanket: China’s Conceptualization of Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era," I examine the debate of what form the PRC’s rise will take in the future. In grappling with this issue, I look at how this rising power is defining its national security threats. Consequently, I approached this dissertation with the goal of examining of how the PRC leadership is defining – and even not defining – its national security threats. While traditional, realist/materialist approaches to China’s definition of threats to national security have merit, so too do non-traditional, constructivist approaches. As such, I seek to examine the influence that national security ideas and theories have had in influencing contemporary PRC national security policies. Given the value and potential impact of such a theory on a state’s national security policies, I chose to examine whether the PRC scholarly community is cognizant of the content of these theories, how widespread and influential they are among academicians and policy analysts, and whether there is an observable influence of these theories on PRC national security policies. The findings reveal that although the PRC’s scholars are cognizant of the issues in COPRI’s Comprehensive Security, the PRC leaders’ national security policies are still predominantly attributed to traditional security theory, definitions, and dynamics. The findings also reveal that while the PRC is exhibiting constructivist tendencies by securitizing non-traditional security issues, the rationales behind these securitizations are borne of realist purposes.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Forsyth, Ian Cameron (author)

Core Title Getting a new blanket: China’s conceptualization of “security” in the post-Deng Xiaoping era

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publication Date 02/03/2011

Defense Date 05/03/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag china,OAI-PMH Harvest,Security

Place Name China (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Lynch, Daniel C. (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), English, Robert D. (committee member)

Creator Email ian4forsyth@yahoo.com,iforsyth@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3260

Unique identifier UC197136

Identifier etd-Forsyth-3951 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-373669 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3260 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Forsyth-3951.pdf

Dmrecord 373669

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Forsyth, Ian Cameron

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu