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An analysis of influence strategies within the competitive sports marketplace: how the discipline of "playmaking" can be applied to the competitive sports marketplace

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An analysis of influence strategies within the competitive sports marketplace: how the discipline of "playmaking" can be applied to the competitive sports marketplace

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Content AN ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCE STRATEGIES WITHIN THE COMPETITIVE SPORTS MARKETPLACE: HOW THE DISCIPLINE OF PLAYMAKING CAN BE APPLIED TO THE COMPETITIVE SPORTS MARKETPLACE by John M. Koval III A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS) May 2009 Copyright 2009 John M. Koval III ii Dedication This thesis is dedicated to those who advance the study influence strategies and practice the discipline of playmaking. That you may find a competitive advantage in your marketplace. -JMK III iii Acknowledgement A special thanks to Alan D. Kelly, an outstanding professor, mentor and visionary. iv Table of Contents Dedication ii Acknowledgement iii List of Figures vi Abstract vii Chapter 1: Introduction to Playmaking 1 Table 1: Factors at Play 6 My Introduction to Playmaking 7 Applying Playmaking to the Sports Industry 9 Methodology 13 Threats to Validity 14 Chapter 1 Endnotes 16 Chapter 2: Research 17 Chapter 2 Endnotes 22 Chapter 3: Case Study Analysis of Playmaking in the Sports Industry 24 The LPGA English-language controversy 26 The Summer of Favre 35 Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL 47 Barry Bonds During the Steroids Era 56 The Alpha and Beta Plays of Building a Dynasty: The Plays of San Francisco 49ers Owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. 66 Chapter 4 Endnotes 73 Chapter 4: Conclusion 74 Empirical Findings 74 Case Study Findings 78 Interview Findings 85 Final Thoughts 86 Chapter 5 Endnotes 89 Glossary of Key Terms 90 Bibliography 97 v Appendices Appendix A: The LPGA English-language controversy 100 Appendix B: The Summer of Favre 101 Appendix C: Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL 102 Appendix D: Barry Bonds v. Detractors 103 Appendix E: The Alpha and Beta Plays of Building a Dynasty: The Plays of San Francisco 49ers Owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. 104 vi List of Figures Figure 1: The Playmakers Table 4 Figure 2: The Playmakers Process 5 Figure 3: LPGA English Language Controversy 27 Figure 4: The Summer of Favre 37 Figure 5: Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL 48 Figure 6: Barry Bonds v. Detractors 58 vii Abstract I present this thesis as an analysis of the influence strategies of the competitive sports marketplace. I examine how the discipline of playmaking can be applied as a management philosophy and as framework for communication strategy whereby actors in the sports marketplace compete for a relative competitive advantage over an opponent. I propose to subject the discipline of playmaking to a research and case study based examination that discloses the merits and efficacy of an assortment of influence strategies in the competitive sports marketplace. 1 Chapter 1 Introduction to Playmaking Playmaking is a discipline first conceived in the 1990s by Alan D. Kelly, a Silicon Valley-entrepreneur. The discipline was introduced to the public when Kelly published his book entitled The Elements of Influence: The New Essential System for Managing Competition, Reputation, Brand and Buzz. i Most notable in the book was the introduction of The Playmakers Standard, a classification system of stratagems that people and organizations employ in business, politics and popular culture to develop a position or advance their agendas in competitive marketplaces; and, The Playmakers Table, a periodic table of influence strategies. To understand the playmakers system one must understand Alan Kelly. Kelly, in his own words, is the tortured son of a cell biologist, who was always envious of people in other disciplines that had reliable frameworks upon which to base their work. ii When Kelly began his career as a Silicon Valley communication strategist, he identified three fundamental truths in business and communication that would serve as the foundation of The Playmakers Standard: The first was that those with careers that centered upon the pursuit of strategy, positioning, influence and advocacy had virtually no standard or reliable reference for plotting and planning the movements and motives of actors in their marketplaces. iii As he would later say in the introduction of his book: Economists have game theory. Biologists have the phylogenetic tree. Chemists have the periodic table of elements. Software developers have object-oriented programming. But for those who work on strategy, positioning, or some form of marketplace spin there is nothing. There is nothing for those whose jobs involve the pursuit of influence and accordingly, the management of opinions, perceptions, behaviors, and decisions. iv 2 The second tenet was that communication and by association, all professions that involve some aspect of influence strategy, such as marketing, public relations, advertising, advocacy, sales, politics, leadership, and even decision-making is by nature a competitive discipline. For any actor be it a company, a brand, or an individual to achieve success in his or her marketplaces, he or she must seek a relative competitive advantage over rivalshowever collaborative or confrontational. v While Kellys second tenet had been articulated to some degree in past organizational communication literature, it had never been decoded, defined and organized into three classes and eight sub-classes in a table-based framework. Kellys third tenet evolved in 1995, when a client of his, Larry Ellison, the swashbuckling CEO of network software giant Oracle Corp., did something surprising at a very prestigious Paris technology conference. As Kelly recounts, [Ellison] was speaking immediately before Microsoft CEO Bill Gates. Ellison, who loves to throw verbal grenades, went to the lectern, in the presence of Bill Gates, called the PC a ridiculous device. Kelly and his team, who were listening to the conference in Silicon Valley, quickly realized that their client has just put his finger in the chest of the mighty Bill Gates. So they immediately went to their war-room, and Kelly instructed his team to draw what Ellison had just done. vi For Kelly, it was not good enough to simply interpret Ellisons remark. He wanted Ellisons ridiculous device quote to be decoded, defined and set within a framework so that he and his team would be able to predict in two or three moves deep how Microsoft might respond to Ellisons comment. And in that moment, Kellys third 3 tenet was born: Every move in a marketplace can be divided into strategic fundamental components, which he began calling plays, and set about decoding, defining and categorizing them in an organized table-based framework. vii According to Kelly, a play is a stratagem, one of a finite set of discrete strategic maneuvers a person or organization employs to improve its relative competitive advantage in a marketplace. viii Through this process, Kelly began creating the first periodic table of influence, which he called The Playmakers Table. The table features an easily interpreted and detailed classification of plays and their respective examples, risk-reward assessments, definitions, best users, and methods by which plays may be decoded and countered. ix It is, Kelly claims, the strategists most basic tool and the building block of the discipline of playmaking. It is potentially to those in the professions of influence what Dmitri Mendeleevs Periodic Table of Elements is to chemists. x Each play type is placed on the table according to its primary strategic function, assigned to one of three overarching classes (shown along the tables top row) and then to one of the eight underlying subclasses (shown in the tables second row). And each is represented by a distinctive square-shaped icon. xi 4 Figure 1: The Playmakers Table As Kelly states in, The Elements of Influence: The classes represent the first raw cuts in the classification process, a gathering of all eight subclasses and twenty-five plays into three broad categories called Assess, Condition, and Engage. These constitute a playmakers full and entire spectrum of activities and considerations. If a marketplace is worth a players time and attention, there is always some mixture of assessment, conditioning, or engagement to be planned and carried out, and because there is no such thing as a noncompetitive marketplace, the game is played around the clock, in real time and without breaks always assessing, conditioning, or engaging. xii 5 Kelly also diagramed the Playmakers Process, a five-step methodology that helps a player sequence and pattern his/her moves and countermoves. The Playmakers Process takes the practitioner from the conception of a differentiated idea to the identification of a play sequence to the commencement of play action to the countermeasures and back. xiii Figure 2: The Playmakers Process 6 Kelly then listed a quick reference resource that lists many, though not all, of the fundamental variables that influence a marketplace and help playmakers fine-tune their diagnoses and battle plans, called Factors at Play. Kellys Factors at Play will be vitally important in the case study portion of this thesis. Table 1: Factors At Play Also important to this thesis is the concept of fit and friction, as it will be referred to in the literature review, in the case studies, and in the conclusions of the case study. Kelly notes that: If theres an object lesson for playmakers, its this: You cant move a marketplace if you dont stand for somethingand what most of the cases in [The Elements of Influence] have in common is that they have all succeeded or failed to do just thatto stand for or stand against something. In playmaking, this is achieved through the principle of Fit and Friction. xiv 7 To exemplify his definition of friction, Kelly refers to Apple CEO Steve Jobs, who in his early days as a technology evangelist, would rail against IBM as an incompetent steward of early personal computing. xv He also offers Larry Ellison, CEO of software database giant Oracle, would mock Microsoft in a similar manner. As Kelly notes, this high-friction strategy excited customers, employees and investors to stand for something in the marketplace. xvi Kelly explains that the opposite approach to high-friction is high-fita strategy by which playmakers employ a concept or idea that is highly agreeable or popular, i.e., to fit smoothly into the marketplace discussion. Ultimately, Kelly believes that organizations and individuals who tow the middle line, those which are utterly fear- struck to compete within their markets xvii are the least successful in moving their marketplaces. With this foundation, laid and the pieces in place, Kelly created The Playmakers Standard. Throughout this thesis, when grouped together, the Playmakers Table, Factors at Play, the Playmakers Process, and the concept of Fit & Friction are jointly known as The Playmakers Standard, or the discipline of playmaking, or the playmakers system, which collectively refers to the process of running plays to achieve a relative competitive advantage in a marketplace. My Introduction to Playmaking In Spring 2008, as a graduate student at the University of Southern Californias Annenberg School for Communication, I was fortunate enough to be a participant in the 8 first graduate-level course taught by Kelly for planning and mapping communication strategy based on his concept of playmaking. Once I mastered the system, it became impossible to view the actions of actors, corporations and the media in the same manner. I can no longer watch a commercial on television, listen to a presidential debate, or witness an athletes post game interview without noting the plays they are runningplays found in The Playmakers Table. Likewise, as a current employee of The Playmakers Standard, LLC, a management strategy consulting firm owned by Kelly, I can also speak first-hand of the responses Ive witnessed when clients, journalists, analysts, politicos and regular people are first introduced to the discipline. Usually, a novice playmaker will say, So thats what Nike is doing, theyre running a Jam on Adidas; or, I see what the CEO of General Motors is doing in this speech, hes running a Filter on their recent poor earnings report by only focusing on sales within Europe, and not North American ; or, I cant believe John McCain ran another Crazy Ivan! Ive also discovered that the initial skeptic of the discipline usually becomes the sharpest playmaker. Most of the time, the skeptic is so shocked that such a system exists and sometimes even angry that theyve been unaware of it for so long that he does not want to blindly accept it without applying the disciple for himself. In fact, I was one of these initial skeptics. In my case, before accepting the discipline, I had to prove to myself that the system was legitimate. To assuage my doubts, I memorized each play of the Playmakers Table with its definition, related plays, counter-plays and real-life examples. In a short 9 time, it became obvious to me that every entity in the world was running playseven if they were unaware of the plays they were running. Kelly detailed examples in his book to demonstrate that this phenomenon exists for every play of The Playmakers Table: Its Karl Rove running a Bait on Howard Dean supporters by showing up at a Dean for America parade, exhorting the crowd and jeering, Come on, everybody! Go, Howard Dean! xviii Or, its the Ford Motor Company running a Red Herring during its Ford Explorer-Firestone tire controversy by initially blaming Firestone, and then attempting to make the Explorer problem a broader crisis for the industry by introducing into the media irrelevant facts and figures pointing to the poor stability inherent in all SUVs. xix What I find most interesting about playmaking as a discipline is that most playmakers are unaware that they are running plays. While some savvy organizations and individuals selectively utilize aspects of The Playmakers Standard, most of the time they do so either incompletely or unknowingly. They are unaware that their strategy can actually be defined, depicted and predicted, as well as managed, controlled and co-opted so that they are able to analyze the pros and cons and predict the likely moves and counter-moves of a marketplace rival. Applying Playmaking to the Sports Industry This thesis will use playmaking as a theoretical construct to examine and assess the influence strategies in the sports industry. For decades, those involved in professional sports have sought to gain a relative competitive advantage over their rivalsand have run plays in the process. It could be an ownership group against a citythink about Recasts and Jams run by the owners of the Seattle Supersonics versus the city of Seattle during their self-inflicted PR-nightmare as they sought to relocate the team to Oklahoma 10 City. Or, it could be an owner strategizing against his coachthink about the Crazy Ivans, Mirrors and Call Outs run by Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis as he justified his dismissal of coach Lane Kiffin. Likewise, it could be an owner trying to influence employees and players to join his organizationthink about New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, long known for his bombastic tirades but his dogged pursuit of high-profile free agents, running Labels and Call Outs. Or, think about an owner who has won the respect and admiration of those already within his organization, such as the Preempts and Screens run by former-San Francisco 49ers owner Eddie DeBartolo Jr. as he cultivated one of professional sports most trusted and well-respected owner-player environments during the 1980s and 1990s. Even more, it could be an organization against a player and his agentthink the variety of Fiats, Pauses and Mirrors run by Green Bay Packers management versus Brett Favre in the summer of 2008; or Drew Rosenhaus running Baits, Red Herrings and Recasts to create a feel-good story that would see his client, Willis McGahee, be drafted in the first round after a potentially career-ending knee injury. It could also be a player versus a commissionerthink of the Discos run by controversial Dallas Cowboys cornerback Adam Pacman Jones as he tried to influence NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell to reinstate him into the league. Or, it could be a player versus an entire media establishmentthink of the Passes, Pauses, Deflects and Jams run between Alex Rodriguez on Gothams back-page columnists during his divorce. We can even draw examples of multiple athletes or other sports-related entities running plays to gain a competitive advantage. Think about a group of flamboyant 11 wide-receivers, like Chad Ocho-Cinco, Terrell Owens, and Plaxico Burress running Peacocks to compete for airtime on SportsCenter. Or, it could be a new years draft talent running Frame-subclass plays, such as the Filter and Screen, to position themselves for endorsement dollars. Further, agents competing for the same sure-to-be first overall pick may run an assortment of Preempts, Crazy Ivans and Drafts to land the client. Even in so-called amateur sports, college coaches run plays from all three classes of The Playmakers Table. During the recruiting process, a coach may run Pings, Leaks and Trial Balloons during the periods of limited and restricted communication with recruits; Screens, Fiats and Labels on their institutions academic and athletic prestige during on- campus visits; and Filters, Mirrors and Call Outs against competing universities trying to land the same recruit. On the public stage, it goes without saying that professional athletes and amateurs too are increasingly being judged on more than their on-field performance. In both positive and negative lights, theyre being judged on reputation, marketability, credibility, and the way theyve dealt with adversity. In the run-up to the 2008 NFL Draft, the plays run on Darren McFaddens behalf by his management team notably the Recast and Disco plays minimized his perceived character issues prior to the NFL draft. Similarly, Kobe Bryant ran counter-intuitive Bear Hug and Disco plays to save his reputation and salvage his existing endorsements during and after his rape trial. Likewise, Dale Earnhardt Jr. delicately ran plays against his step-mother, Teresa Earnhardt such as the Deflect and Recast to position himself as the good-guy during his public falling out with DEI, controlled by his step-mother. 12 Likewise, leagues, teams, coaches and agents are also coming under increased public scrutiny, and plays are being run to ensure their future profitability, reputation and survival. Examples abound, such as the Red Herrings, Deflects, Passes and Fiats run by the New England Patriots during Spygate to shield Bill Belichick from criticism and protect the integrity of the organization. A particularly telling example is the plays run by LPGA commissioner Carolyn Bivens as she backtracked on her controversial English- only policy, which will be detailed in the case study portion of this thesis. For these reasons, and undoubtedly many more, the application of the playmakers standard to the sports industry is timely and relevant. Thanks in no small part to the 24-7 transparency-driven media culture that has enveloped the modern sports marketplace, sports-related organizations and individuals increasingly have to use influence strategies to protect their reputations, advance their positions, or de-position their rivals. As stakeholders demand more accountability, leagues are increasingly becoming involved in the actions of their member organizations, member organizations are increasingly becoming involved in the actions of their players, and in limited cases, notably during union-league negotiations, players are becoming increasingly involved in the actions of their organizations and leagues. Hence, the importance of running plays to achieve a competitive advantage has never been more important. Further, as consumers of media become more sophisticated and more informed, sports related entities will need to hone their ability to influence a savvy sports- consumer. 13 The common thread that unites all of these examples is that influence strategy is at play, particularly in a competitive marketplace. For one party to best the other, strategy must be adopted, managed, co-opted and controlled to achieve relative competitive advantage, which is what this thesis examines. Hence, for anyone with a stake in professional sports whether they plan on competing for influence publicly or privately the implications of this thesis are relevant. Those who learn, adapt to, and master The Playmakers Standard can achieve a level of relative competitive advantage over their rivals. Through a combination of interviews, secondary research, case studies, and the depiction of public and private strategy through patented Influence Strategy Maps, this thesis will use The Playmakers Standard to illuminate the influence strategies that are most effective in allowing a sports-related entity to compete for influence in its competitive marketplace by running plays. Methodology The primary methodology for this thesis divides into four parts. The first will be accomplished through secondary research, which will seek an empirical foundation upon which the discipline of playmaking can be applied to the competitive sports marketplace. The second is with case studies of sports influence strategies supported through the use of patented Influence Strategy Maps. Each case study will begin with a written introduction. The primary research of each case study will presented through Influence Strategy Maps, which are built with proprietary software owned by The Playmakers Standard, LLC that allow the researcher to assign and caption the most basic influence strategies of a competitive marketplace along a timeline. A brief case study analysis will 14 be then be presented within the synopsis of the first page of the Influence Strategy Maps, and a more detailed written analysis will follow each Influence Strategy Map. The third section uses interviews that will examine empirical and current examples of influence strategies at work in the competitive marketplace. The final draws conclusions, which will assert that The Playmakers Standard does indeed illuminate the influence strategies of the competitive sports marketplace. Threats to Validity The following is a preemptory disclosure designed to mitigate, assuage and admit potential flaws as they may apply to the findings, conclusions, and methodology of this thesis. Certain aspects of The Playmakers Standard, the playmakers system, the discipline of playmaking, the assigning of Alpha and Beta plays, and the interpretation of The Factors at Play and Playmakers Process resource tools are surely subjective, can and do have overlaps, and are subject to preferences and biases of the researcher. However, given the extensive documentation provided in all parts of the thesis, in particular, the considerable care placed upon an accurate and objective analysis of the Factors at Play resource as it applies to each case study, the case studies, findings and conclusions should be considered as the best and most accurate representation of the influence strategies available in the marketplace. The considerable accrued acumen of the author of the thesis as a graduate of a graduate-level course of the discipline of playmaking and as a certified research consultant employed by The Playmakers Standard, LLC should assuage any lingering doubts as to the application of certain play types to relevant information, as well as an accurate depiction of any and all other aspects of The 15 Playmakers Standard. Also of note is that Alan D. Kelly, the creator of The Playmakers Standard and author of the book, The Elements of Influence, was used in an ad-hoc advisory role to discuss and confirm details, issues and any other outstanding research questions as they arose in the research section of this thesis. It should be noted that Kelly neither sat on the thesis committee nor did he have contact with any members of the thesis committee during the production of this work. He was only used in an informal advisory role as a resource available to the author. 16 Chapter 1 Endnotes i Kelly, Alan. The Elements of Influence: The New Essential System for Managing Competition, Reputation, Brand, and Buzz. New York: Plume, Penguin Group, 2006. ii Kelly, Alan. Personal Inteview. 21 August 2008. iii (Kelly, 2) iv (Kelly, interview) v (Kelly, interview) vi (Kelly, interview) vii (Kelly, interview) viii (Kelly, 23) ix Glossary x (Kelly, interview) xi (Kelly, 43-50) xii (Kelly, 43-50) xiii (Kelly, 9-10) xiv (Kelly, 287) xv (Kelly, 287) xvi (Kelly, interview) xvii (Kelly, 289) xviii (Kelly, 194) xix (Kelly, 106) 17 Chapter 2 Research This research examines the extent to which sports authorities define, frame and position the role of sport within their respective disciplines. A representative sample of well-respected literature, which includes the role of the media within sports communication, brand communication strategies, and the roles of important actors within the field will be discussed. This research will be vital in building a conceptual framework and empirical framework that proves or disproves the role of playmaking as it might apply to the field of sports communication. In Media, Sports & Society, xx Lawrence A. Wenner attempts to meld the competing concerns of the scientific and cultural camps towards an understanding of what the study of mediated sport can be about. xxi In summarizing his work, Wenner describes it as the maiden journey for the communication of sport. xxii In it, he covers the relationship between the media, sports, and society, which as a whole, will be referred to as the mediated sports complex. He sets the research agenda for examining the tri-part relationship between sports, society, and the media by applying sociological concepts to many phenomena in the mediated sports complex, such as instinct, developmental/cognitive, mastery, and social integration. xxiii In detailing what was in 1989 the emerging sub-discipline of sports sociology, Wenner lists the numerous battling approaches between dominant and emerging paradigms of the social science disciplines; in particular, those which are evident in the ferment of the field of communication. xxiv Wenners list includes quantitative versus qualitative research, positivists versus humanists, administrative versus critical research, structural- 18 functional versus conflict theory, and instrumental versus consummatory approaches. xxv In The Elusive Fan: Reinventing Sports in a Crowded Marketplace, xxvi Irving J. Rein, Philip Kotler and Ben Shields devote Chapter 7 to communicating the sports brand. In this chapter, they seek to accomplish two criteriahow to differentiate the sports brand and how to connect with fans. They argue that, although there are more channels then ever to communicate with the fan, it is increasingly difficult to achieve a resonant message because the marketplace is full of messages, and the fan has become savvy in determining which message they wish to accept. xxvii To drive their point home, the authors begin the chapter with a case study of the Hartford Wolf Pack, a high-level minor league hockey team that, in the face of competitive pressures, is having difficulty connecting with its fan base. xxviii They explain that the Wolf Packs brand communication strategy was to work with local charitable foundations as part of a two-part overarching strategy: By working with charities, the organization tried to generate free media to help create the kind of excitement and interest in the team that did not appear to be bought. If members of the community found that the teams involvement and commitment were worthwhile, they might reciprocate by going to the games. xxix Unfortunately for the Wolf Pack, the strategy does not work. Attendance figures continue to suffer, and the community seems disinterested. Rein, Kotler and Shields begin with this case study to demonstrate the difficulties that exist within a crowded sports marketplace. They explain further that the Wolf Packs problem is not unique, and that the sheer number of sports and the amount of money being spent to communicate is growing yearly, forcing brands to navigate through a difficult maze to achieve brand 19 differentiation and distinction. xxx The authors conclude that a major task in many brand communication strategies is to understand fan expectations and deliver a differentiated brand that will persuade fans to support it. xxxi Also in The Elusive Fan, Rein, Kotler and Shields devote Chapter 9 to detailing successful case studies in sports branding. xxxii The authors analyze leagues, individual athletes, sports personalities, sports programs, and sports venues to determine what makes for a successful outcome. In Sports Marketing, xxxiii authors Bernard J. Mullin, Stephen Hardy, and William A. Sutton detail the pillars of every aspect of sports marketing into an all-encompassing text. The authors define sports marketing as follows: Sport marketing consists of all activities designed to meet the needs and wants of sport consumers through exchange processes. Sport marketing has developed two major thrusts: the marketing of sport products and services directly to consumers of sport, and marketing of other consumer and industrial products or services through the use of sport promotions. xxxiv In Chapter 6, Market Segmentation, the authors define four bases of segmentationthe consumers state of being (demographics); the consumers state of mind (psychographics); product usage; and product benefits. xxxv Further, in Chapter 9, Pricing Strategies, the authors list the basics of pricing that a sports marketer must take into considerationhard or soft goods; tickets; memberships; concessions; information; and signage. In Chapter 10, the authors detail six characteristics that a message should incorporatecreate benefits, communicate information about attributes and benefits; develop or change an image or personality; associate a brand with feelings and 20 promotions; create norm groups; and precipitate behavior. xxxvi In Chapter 15, the authors posit the role of public relations in sport as: An interactive marketing communications strategy that seeks to create a variety of mediums designed to convey the organizational philosophies, goals, and objectives to an identified group of publics for the purpose of establishing a relationship built upon comprehension, interest, and support. xxxvii They further define the functions of public relations as it relates specifically to sports marketing as Informing, shaping and enhancing image; promoting employee relations; gaining political or popular support; recruiting and developing business; launching new products or innovations; generating and collecting feedback; and coping with crisis. xxxviii In the seminal textbook The Dream Job: $port$ Publicity, Promotion and Marketing xxxix , Melvin Helitzer outlines an all-encompassing framework intended for the sports information director (SID) that details the framework of sports publicity, promotion and marketing. In Chapters 3-6, Helitzer outlines a basic framework by which an SID would go about applying his craft. xl He focuses primarily on style, structure and the various outlets available to SIDs. In Chapter 10, Helitzer focuses in greater detail on the strategies an SID could use to accomplish his objectives. xli In particular, Helitzer details 20 major techniques for creating news that are easily adaptable by any sports organization. xlii The first technique highlighted by Helitzer is the rivalry. Helitzer claims creating rivalries is mandatory in sports, and that fans believe the game between to arch rivals is the jewel that crowns the year. xliii Helitzer also lists 11 ways by which a SID could generate publicity through special events, such as having a street renamed for a player or the 21 team, staging a marching band competition at half time, holding a sporting event in an unusual place, and getting a dignitary to declare a special day and send his best wishes. xliv In Chapter 14, Creating Special Events, Helitzer is at his best in providing strategic recommendations to a SID on how to make the most out of a special event. Helitzer details many strategies, such as charity fundraisers, utilizing the Special Olympics, making hospital visits, and turning negatives into positives. xlv In Chapter 16, xlvi A Star is Made, Helitzer gives the Ten Commandments of when a SID can turn an athlete into a star, some of which are that an athlete has one distinctive talent that can be statistically evaluated; that the talent is physical, not mental, and can be exhibited often to a large crowd; that media interest can be stimulated; that the athlete can develop a unique persona; that commercial sponsorships underwrite the expense of star marketing through endorsements and advertising, and that the athlete stats healthyand out of trouble. In Chapter 17, xlvii Crisis Management, Helitzer details 12 Action Formula strategies for the SID to use in a sports crisis), which are: Prevent the problem; Do not respond; Agree with complaint; Deflect criticism with humor; Deny allegations; Investigate; Provide forum for credibility; Apologize; Find a scapegoat; Pass of responsibility; Make a secret pay-off; Punish. As will be demonstrated in the final conclusion of this thesis, many of these action formulas are directly akin to The Playmakers Table. 22 Chapter 2 Endnotes xx Wenner, Lawrence A.. Media, Sports, & Society. Newbury Park: Sage Publishing, Inc., 1989. xxi (Wenner, 8) xxii (Wenner, 8) xxiii (Wenner, 19-20) xxiv (Wenner, 17) xxv (Wenner, 19-21) xxvi Rein, Irving, Philip Kotler, and Ben Shields. The Elusive Fan: Reinventing Sports In A Crowded Marketplace. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. xxvii (Rein, 226) xxviii (Rein, 198) xxix (Rein, 198) xxx (Rein, 198) xxxi (Rein, 199) xxxii (Rein, 263-291) xxxiii Mullin, Bernard J., Stephen Hardy, and William Sutton. Sport Marketing. 2nd ed. Champain: Human Kinetics, 2000. xxxiv (Mullin, 9) xxxv (Mullin, 104) xxxvi (Mullin, 185-186) xxxvii (Mullin, 317) xxxviii (Mullin, 324-333) xxxix Helitzer, Melvin. The Dream Job: $port$ Publicity, Promotion and Marketing. 3rd. Athens, OH: University Sports Press, 2000. xl (Helitzer, 93-156) xli (Helitzer. 205-226) xlii (Helitzer, 207) 23 xliii (Helitzer, 207) xliv (Helitzer, 210) xlv (Helitzer, 306) xlvi (Helitzer, 353-392) xlvii (Helitzer, 397) 24 Chapter 3 Case Study Analysis of Playmaking in the Sports Industry As the introduction to this study explains, sports organizations and sports-related actors and athletes are constantly seeking a competitive advantage within their respective marketplaces. While influence strategies can be applied uniformly to all marketplace players, we can draw distinct conclusions of how organizations and sports-related actors run plays similarly and differently by examining case studies. Often, noteworthy findings of competitive advantage are well-delineated when examining the plays run from an organization-centric perspective. Therefore, the application of The Playmakers Standard will be evidenced by the LPGA English-language controversy of 2008 and the Green Bay Packers Brett Favre retirement saga of 2008. Other times, the use of influence strategies and their principal findings are better analyzed from an individual-centric perspective, therefore case studies of the Barry Bonds steroids controversy and the Drew RosenhausWillis McGahee 2003 draft will be covered. Lastly, an interview with former San Francisco 49ers owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. will provide anecdotal evidence as to how an owner uses influence strategies within their organization. But before examining these case studies, we must cover the concepts of Alpha plays, Beta plays and elevation as they apply to the discipline of playmaking so that the proper conclusions can be drawn. An Alpha play, as stated in the glossary of key terms, is a stratagem that broadly defines a players given position or the players intended plans. Alpha plays typically serve to guide or inform one or more lower-order beta plays. For example, a players Alpha play a Draft can be designed to stalk and overtake an incumbent. Beta plays are stratagems that support a high-order Alpha play. For example, a players Beta 25 plays a Preempt and Call Out can be designed to nip damaging speculation in the bud. Its Alpha play a Pass is designed to exit the market. Although not covered in the Elements of Influence, elevation is a strategic viewpoint that has subsequently been further defined by Kelly from which a playmaker must view his/her playing field. From a low-elevation perspective, a Red Herring may appear to be a Fiat. But from a high-elevation perspective, or a 30,000 ft. point-of- view, the Red Herring becomes more apparent in the larger scheme of mapping a players strategy. xlviii That is, the Red Herrings diverting strategy is only definable when it is viewed from a high-elevation perspective. At a low-elevation perspective, the Red Herring might appear to be a Fiat play, which is simply a declaration of information. A great example of the Red Herring is demonstrated by the Ford Explorer SUV controversy. In 2001, when Ford Explorers started tipping, Ford Motor sought to make it a larger problem for the auto industry, not just its popular Ford Explorer SUV. They flooded the media with irrelevant facts and figures and pointed at the inherent instability in all SUVs. xlix From a low-elevation perspective, Ford was simply making declarations or statements, a play known as the Fiat. But from a high-elevation perspective, Ford was trying to divert its critics, notably the press and consumer safety advocates, away from their preferred course of action, hence running a Red Herring. It is from this high-elevation approach that we will examine our case studies to pull the critical elements needed in the conclusions portions of this thesisnamely, how the proper selection of an Alpha play can determine success or failure from the outset; how Beta play execution can support the Alpha play and lead to the relative 26 competitive advantage a playmaker seeks to achieve in a marketplace; and how the Factors at Play resource is incorporated into the overall The Playmakers Process when a sports-related entity is running a play or series of plays in a marketplace. The LPGA English-language controversy On August 20, 2008, LPGA golfers were told by Commissioner Carolyn Bivens that by the end of 2009, all players who have been on the tour for two years would have to pass an oral evaluation of their English skills or face a membership suspension. The new requirement was communicated to the tour's growing South Korean membership in a mandatory meeting at the Safeway Classic in Portland, Oregon. l The Korean players who took part in the meeting felt as if Koreans were being singled out, and all left with the impression that if they did not comply with the policy, they would lose their tour cards rather than face suspension. Ironically, the initial group of Korean players to speak publicly about the meeting supported the requirement, although some felt that fines would be better than suspensions. li Shortly after being announced, the LPGAs English-only policy came under intense scrutiny from civil rights activists, sponsors and lawmakers, who questioned the policys intentions, applicability and legality. On September 7, 2008, the LPGA tour retracted its English-only policy. Using major media sources from March 2006 to September 2008, the following Influence Strategy Map, LPGA English Language Controversy, will map the discrete influence strategies or plays employed by the LPGA and its critics during the English-language controversy. lii 27 Figure 3: LPGA English Language Controversy 28 Figure 3: Continued 29 Figure 3: Continued 30 Figure 3: Continued 31 Figure 3: Continued 32 Figure 3: Continued 33 From playmakers perspective, the LPGAs English-language policy was destined to fail. LPGA officials, notably Commissioner Carolyn Bivens and Deputy Commissioner Libba Galloway, failed primarily on two fronts. First, tour officials either completely ignored, or completely misunderstood, the Playmakers Factors at Play resource, which represents the fundamental variables that influence a marketplace and help playmakers fine-tune their diagnoses and battle plans. In this case, under the Intangibles portion of Factors at Play, LPGA officials completely jeopardized their 1.) Culture The LPGA has always been open to players of all ethnic, racial, national, religious, sexual orientation, and linguistic backgrounds, and had always maintained an atmosphere of openness and acceptance. 2.) Loyalty Prior to the English language controversy, the organization, its members, and its sponsors maintained virtually a controversy-free track record. 3.) Goodwill and reputation It appears that LPGA officials felt that their long and proud history of bonhomie between tour officials, members, and sponsors could be wagered on the English-language policy. Under the Communications portion of Factors at Play: 1.) Speed LPGA enacted their English-language policy far too quickly (see Alpha play description in Influence Strategy Map.) 2.) Breadth Despite a general pressing of the importance of its members to communicate in English (see Play 2 of Influence Strategy Map) a lack of thorough and consistent explanation of expectations provided a missed opportunity for tour officials to slowly implement the policy. 3.) Balance Commissioner Givens decision to announce her policy in a meeting of Korean players only contributed significantly to a feeling that they were being targeted. 34 Under the Policies portion of Factors at Play: 1.) Legal The tour clearly did not anticipate legal challenges to its policy, or if it did, failed to incorporate them into its initial policy or communicate legal ramifications to its players. 2.) Ethics An organization which might suspend its members over an inability to communicate in a lingua-franca that was not expressly communicated prior to their joining can be perceived as unethical. Under the Stakeholders portion of Factors at Play: 1.) Sponsors, Partners, Investors Tour officials completely misunderstood the modern sports-economy relationship, whereby corporate sponsors cannot be associated with organizations that appear to be even the slightest bit discriminatory. 2.) Media Tour officials underestimated the reactions of not just the sports media, but the social media and various mainstream media. 3.) Fans While claiming that the policy was being implemented in order to be fan-friendly so that fans could understand acceptance speeches, tour officials risked alienating foreign-LPGA fans who may have been put off by the perceived xenophobia. While the primary reason for the failure of the LPGA English-policy was poor playmaking, the successful running of plays by LPGA critics compounded the effect and led to the policy retraction more quickly. LPGA critics were loosely-affiliated and were by-in-large unprepared for the LPGAs controversial English-policy. However, their victory proved that the proper choice of an Alpha play coupled with sound strategy execution could lead to a relative competitive advantage over a rival. 35 The critics use of the Mirror as an Alpha play was paramount. The Mirror, being a specialized form of the Call Out, injects the same tone of moral superiority as the Call Out but combines new information which contradicts a rivals point of view. This freezing strategy enabled the critics to not only take the moral high-ground, but also appear to be more informed of their position. Likewise, the use of Attack subclass plays, notably the threatening Preempts run by legislators to target tour sponsors and challenge the LPGA on legal grounds, allowed the critics to advance their position for competitive advantage. In addition, the use of meaningful Proxies, most notably well-known male golfers and well-respected activist groups who disagreed with the policy, gave the critics another credible voice with which to counter the LPGA. Finally, the English-language critics countered the LPGA on virtually every aspect of the Factors at Play Resource. Whereby the LPGA misunderstood most aspects under the Intangibles, Communications, Stakeholders and Policies sections, the critics essentially adopted the opposite position to the same sections, and by using the plays as demonstrated on the Influence Strategy Map, were able to achieve relative competitive advantage over their rival in the marketplace. The Summer of Favre After losing the NFC Championship game to the soon-to-be Super Bowl champions New York Giants, Green Bay Packers coach Mike McCarthy told his Hall of Fame quarterback Brett Favre that the team hopes to take a similar approach to Favres possible retirement decision as in the past, allowing Favre plenty of time to make his decision. The two parties agreed to talk regularly. However, throughout the month of 36 February, Favre and Green Bay management were not in regular contact. In late- February, Green Bay Packers General Manager Ted Thompson called Favre after hearing that he was upset that they hadnt been in communication. Favre reportedly told Thompson that he was not upset, and that he had no idea where this information was coming from. In early-March, Favre surprised Green Bay management with his decision to retire from football, saying that he wasnt 100 percent committed to playing football in 2008. However, Favres decision to retire would not be his final one, as he later decided that he would like to return. The first one-third of The Summer of Favre is an analysis of the plays run behind- the-scenes between Packer-affiliated parties and Brett Favre and his representation. Since the details that have emerged from this behind-the-scenes period have not been disputed be either side, they can therefore can be appropriately used for the academic research in this section. The second-two-thirds of The Summer of Favre is primarily a public deconstruction of the plays run by Green Bay Packer management and Brett Favre. They prove valuable because they show how two playmakers transition from their private playmaking to their public playmaking. Notably, we see how two opposed parties must account for and capitalize upon their use of private influence strategies once theyve been released to the public. Using major media sources from January 2008 to August 2008, the following Influence Strategy Map, The Summer of Favre, will map the discrete influence strategies or plays employed by the Green Bay Packers and Brett Favre in the summer of 2008 during Brett Favres protracted retirement saga. liii 37 Figure 4: The Summer of Favre 38 Figure 4: Continued 39 Figure 4: Continued 40 Figure 4: Continued 41 Figure 4: Continued 42 Figure 4: Continued 43 This case study is valuable because it illuminates how the use of sound influence strategies in private can be utilized to achieve relative competitive advantage in a marketplace once the private details are release to the public. The Green Bay Packers found themselves in a defensive posture during the initial stages of the Brett Favre retirement saga (from roughly early-June to July 12.) As the first principal finding of the Influence Strategy Map explains, Green Bays lack of a definitive public strategy initially gave Favre the upper hand in swaying public sympathy to his cause. However, what the media and the public did not know at that time was the extent to which Green Bay management had been trying to deal with Favre in a fair and amiable manner. Green Bays use of Ping and Proxies during the spring to relay messages that he would be welcomed back to the team were not yet known to the public. The seminal moment that turned public and media opinion was Green Bays decision to counter Brett Favres July 12 Bait with a Mirror + Preempt. Green Bays decision to release the details of its extensive negotiations with the quarterback during the off-season showed a level of good faith and engagement that had yet to be reported. Hence, Green Bays calculated risk to remain silent while Favre was commanding the initial public discussion was a calculated risk that set up the teams coup de grace in the running of the Mirror + Preempt. Not surprisingly, the Mirror is one of Kellys recommended countermoves to a Bait. As he states in his book, If your opposition-research is good, expose your opponents Bait as self-serving, which is the exact approach the Packers took when deciding to release this information. We can also comment on the merits of Green 44 Bays July 12 decision as expert execution of the Preempt. Packer management chose this moment to swiftly reverse Brett Favres competitive momentum, which in hindsight, we can now mark as the turning point in the Green BayBrett Favre tit-for-tat. We can also draw other conclusions from the Influence Strategy Map regarding Green Bay Packer management. Although the Mirror + Preempt was the play-harmonic that reversed competitive advantage, Green Bays Alpha play, the Fiat, was a curious selection, not least because it was never executed on a Beta-level. Green Bays decision to simply report the facts as the organization perceived them and rest on its laurels as a well-run, respected, and established organization that is, the Intangibles portion of the Factors at Play resource was a calculated risk that paid dividends once all of the information had been made public. Other notable plays that deserve attention were Green Bays July 30 th use of the Challenge. Initially, Green Bay ran this play in private, hoping it would not be made public. However, information of the play leaked, and the move was highly criticized by the national media at the time. But, the power of Green Bays July 12 Mirror + Preempt was enough to keep competitive advantage in the teams favor. Likewise, the decision of Green Bay management to allow Favre to show up at training camp, and their August 4 th Bear Hug, further ensconced the team as a decent franchise willing to publicly embrace a rival who had insulted them in an interview two weeks prior. Lastly, we cannot comment on Green Bays playmaking without taking into account the broader Policies from the Factors at Play resource that allowed Green Bay to leverage its position for competitive advantage along with running plays. Green 45 Bay always held Favres rights. Although Favre had a unique contract allowing him to void any potential trade by not reporting to the camp of the team he might be traded to if the Packers elected to go that route, Green Bay still held his rights, and could always hold onto him as a backup-QB without ever being forced to trade him in the first place or grant him his unconditional release. This fact also explains a great deal of Favres playmaking, which will now be discussed. It is impossible to declare Brett Favre as either a winner or a loser in this situation; however, his playmaking can still be analyzed given external circumstances that enabled him to effectively or ineffectively choose the proper influence strategies. Favres initial public playmaking deserves to be commended. Prior to Green Bays July 12 th Mirror + Preempt, Favres use of the Pause to maintain a strategic level of public silence allowed the media to work on his behalf. During this period, the press effectively Screened his past accomplishments to his strategic advantage; therefore portraying Green Bay management as ignorant and short-sighted in their efforts to move forward with the untested Aaron Rodgers as their starting QB and in their perceived mistreatment of Favre. During this time, it is doubtful that Favre thought that Green Bay would run its July 12 Mirror + Preempt to the game-changing effect that it did. After the July 12 Mirror + Preempt, Favres off-season vacillating and his seemingly flippant responses to Green Bays good-faith Pings and Trial Balloons, turned not only public opinion against him, but also gave Green Bay competitive advantage in its ability to either force him to accept the role as backup-QB or trade him to a team outside of the NFC. 46 As previously mentioned, although Favre had a unique no-trade clause built into his contract, it was not enough to give him the leverage he needed once Green Bay maintained the moral high-ground. Because Favre never maintained the contractual leverage he needed to force his outright release from the team, he was forced to adopt a high-risk strategy of running a high-risk Alpha play-Bait. However, it was not Favres use of the Bait that reversed his competitive advantage, but rather, his perceived disingenuous interaction with Packer management during the spring. As is now apparent from a high-elevation perspective, Favres use of Bait was most likely the appropriate selection for his Alpha-play given the circumstances. Favres greatest execution mistake came in his two-part interview with Greta van Sustern on Fox News on July 14 and July 16. Favre ran too many plays from the right- side of The Playmakers Table without focusing on one specific overarching strategy during this interview. His erratic selection of Call Out and Red Herrings during the interview, after his negotiating strategies from the spring were made public, only further turned public opinion against the star-QB, therefore giving Packer management more competitive advantage to further advance its agenda with the QB. Ultimately, both the Packers and Favre should be commended for their playmaking strategies once Favre reported to Green Bay camp. Green Bays decision to run a Bear Hug on Favres presence at camp, and Favres Bear Hug of the organization when he left on August 6 and was traded on August 7, put both entities in an amiable position to have an eventual rapprochement once Favre definitively retires. 47 Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL On January 3, 2003, University of Miami star running back Willis McGahee was playing in what was to be his final collegiate game at the Fiesta Bowl in Tempe, Arizona. Early in the fourth quarter against the Ohio State Buckeyes, McGahee ruptured three ligaments in his knee in a particularly brutal hit seen by millions on live-TV across the country, putting his NFL-career into jeopardy. Prior to his injury, McGahee was a lock to be drafted with one of the top five first round picks of the NFL draft; after the injury, many wondered if he would ever play football again. In February, McGahee signed with sports agent Drew Rosenhaus with the hope of just signing an NFL contract (at the time, McGahee was unsure if he would even be drafted.) Rosenhaus, known for his aggressive negotiating tactics while representing many University of Miami athletes, promised McGahee he would be drafted in the first round, and if he wasnt, Rosenhauss would drop his standard three percent commission. McGahee signed with Rosenhaus, who began to aggressively represent his client. Using major media sources from January 2003 to April 2003, the following Influence Strategy Map, Rosenhaus Recasts McGahee, will map the discrete influence strategies or plays employed by the Drew Rosenhaus as he positioned Willis McGahee for the 2003 NFL Draft. liv 48 Figure 5: Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL 49 Figure 5: Continued 50 Figure 5: Continued 51 Figure 5: Continued 52 Figure 5: Continued 53 Figure 5: Continued 54 The Drew Rosenhaus case study is one of the most famous and often cited examples of savvy representation of an athlete by an agent. Prior to Rosenhaus representation of McGahee, he was a respected and well-known agent; after McGahee was drafted in the first round, Rosenhaus cemented himself as one of the industrys super-star agents. lv From a playmakers perspective, plotting Rosenhaus plays is easy. He made clear play choices with a well-defined Alpha play. However, to this day, the subject of exactly whom Rosenhaus was running plays on is still controversial. Rosenhaus maintains that he ran plays solely on the media establishment at-large, lvi including NFL draft gurus, and did not target any specific NFL franchises. To that end, Buffalo Bills General Manager Tom Donahoe maintains that he was not directly influenced by any direct influence strategies used by Rosenhaus. Upon closer examination of the Rosenhaus Recasts McGahee Influence Strategy Map, it does appear that Rosenhaus targeted the media at-large, and not a specific NFL franchise, to drive his agenda and create a competitive advantage for his client. The sole reason that Rosenhaus was able to get his client drafted in the first round was his Alpha play selection. His two-part Bait, to convince the media to cover his McGahee "feel good story" and to convince a team to draft the running back despite the enormous risk enabled him to achieve a relative competitive advantage for his client. Interestingly, one of the most misunderstood aspects of the Rosenhaus-McGahee story comes from an admission that Rosenhaus made in an interview a few days after the draft. lvii Rosenhaus admitted that the trick was to get McGahee drafted was to 55 change the debate from whether he was going to play again to whether he was going to be a first-round pick, and from whether he was going to play this year to whether he was going to play at the start of the year. Rosenhaus believes that his overarching strategy was to Recast the situation, but from a playmakers perspective, his actual overarching strategy was a Bait, while the Recasting of McGahees situation was a high-level Beta play used throughout his positioning of the client. Subsequently, Rosenhaus Beta play execution, especially the use of the Peacock that McGahee, despite his injury, would be drafted in the first round was instrumental in driving media attention to the running backs story. Also of note is Rosenhaus constraint in his use of the Frame subclass plays of The Playmakers Table. Rosenhaus made strategic use of the Label and Filter in referring to McGahees rehab as a miracle, but he didnt overdo it. Rosenhaus was cocky enough to Bait the media and a host of NFL teams, confident enough in the soundness of his Beta play-Recasting of McGahees playing situation, and outrageous enough in the use of his Peacock to let the media do the rest of the work for him. The case study demonstrates that the playmakers standard can be applied on behalf of a client by an agent to achieve a relative competitive advantage in the marketplace. In this case, the proper Alpha play, coupled with a well-run series of Beta plays that support the Alpha play, led to Rosenhaus being able to co-opt the media for competitive advantage. The fact that all of Rosenhaus actions in the McGahee case can be decoded and applied into the framework of The Playmakers Table proves the systems strategic value to the sports industry. Undoubtedly, with a firm grasp of The 56 Playmakers Table, other sports agents could use the playmakers system to achieve similar effects on behalf of their clients. With respect to the Buffalo Bills, in particular, if General Manager Tom Donahoe was affected either directly by Rosenhaus playmaking or the medias covering of the story, we can only take him at his word that there was nothing that [Rosenhaus] or anyone in the media said that influenced our decision. However, we can prove that the extensive coverage that the sports media gave the McGahee story is proof of the old adage the press cant resist a great story, (plays 7, 10, 12 and 15.) In this case, it is not so much an indictment of the press that McGahee was drafted in the first round, as it is an endorsement of Rosenhaus playmaking. The media were simply covering a story that Rosenhaus had created; proving that sound playmaking can have a direct effect on the media establishment, and can be used to achieve a relative competitive advantage in the marketplace. lviii Barry Bonds During the Steroids Era San Francisco Giants All-Star and MLB all-time homerun leader Barry Bonds began to generate public suspicion for using performance-enhancing drugs in the latter- half of his career as he began hitting more home runs than he did in his prime. Added to the fact was that his head-size had reportedly grown (a product of HGH) and his physique was undeniably larger than it was in his youth and many began to suspect Bonds was using performance-enhancing drugs, including steroids. In 2003, Bonds personal trainer and the lab in which he received his supplements, BALCO, were implicated in dealing in performance-enhancing drugs, 57 corroborating public suspicion of the slugger. Like dominos, dozens of professional athletes, including Marion Jones, Bill Romanowski, Gary Sheffield, Jason Giambi and Dana Stubblefield all admitted to either having received illegal drugs from BALCO or tested positive for performance-enhancing drugs, further casting doubt on Bonds credibility and denials. Using major media sources from 2003 to 2008, the following Influence Strategy Map, Barry Bonds v. Detractors, demonstrates how Bonds reacted to media reports as BALCO-co-conspirators and other athletes began implicating Bonds as a steroids-user. lix 58 Figure 6: Barry Bonds v. Detractors 59 Figure 6: Continued 60 Figure 6: Continued 61 Figure 6: Continued 62 Figure 6: Continued 63 Figure 6: Continued 64 The Barry Bonds v. Detractors Influence Strategy Map primarily demonstrates how a playmakers lack of public engagement in a competitive marketplace allows his opponents to define his image, his message and his position. In the modern sports marketplace, where athletes are featured as extensively as movie stars and politicians, any protracted period of disengagement implies guilt by silence. Whenever a sports-related entity is not running plays to define itself in the marketplace or at least running plays to counter, bend and blunt the plays being run on him it will be at a distinct competitive disadvantage, as the Bonds case study proves. Before detailing the Beta plays of this case study, we must take into consideration the complicated web of legal considerations that needed to be considered every time Bonds made a public statement. Undoubtedly, he was receiving extensive legal counsel from at least 2003 and after regarding his public statements as they related to his and grand jury testimony in the BALCO case. However, that does not vindicate Bonds lack of playmaking, especially his over-reliance of the Pause. In April, June and September 2004, (plays 7, 8) we see Bonds and his attorneys begin to make statements to the public, in what appeared to be at the time a public relations offensive designed to clear Bonds name. However, just as quickly as they initiated this brief series of public statements, they abruptly went silent. Ironically, this brief period of public discourse may have actually damaged Bonds ability to achieve competitive advantage over his detractors. By appearing to partake in public dialogue, only to turn off the switch so rapidly, Bonds contributed to a marketplace sentiment that he was hiding something, which can be more aptly explained in relation to the 65 Communications portion of the Factors at Play resource. 1.) Consistency, Balance, Frequency Bonds had made virtually no public statements up to April 2004, and seemed content in allowing his critics to define him. At the time, although Bonds was being increasingly vilified by the media, he still had a solid base of public support. At this critical juncture in the summer of 2004, had Bonds either committed to a full-blown public relations campaign designed to clear his reputation, or had he maintained strategic silence and never said anything, he may not have been as vilified as he was for appearing to want to engage with the public, only to retreat back into his inner-circle. Another mismanaged aspect of the playmakers system underutilized and mismanaged by Bonds is the Condition class of The Playmakers Table. The Condition class demonstrates that there are 12 plays that can be run to encourage or suppress actions within a marketplace or reform market sentiments to a players advantage. Bonds made virtually no use of Condition class plays in positioning himself against his detractors. Certainly, a lack of playmaking by Bonds enabled his detractors to portray him as increasingly guilt from 2003 onwards even though he was never charged with a crime or admitted to knowingly having used performance enhancing drugs. The case against Barry Bonds, made primarily by members of the San Francisco Bay media, demonstrate the upsides of two plays on The Playmakers Table, the Mirror and the Leak. As previously mentioned, the Mirror, as a specialized form of the Call Out, credibly prevents a rival from pursuing an agenda by introducing new information into the marketplace that contradicts a rivals position. In this case, any time that Bonds publicly denied having used steroids, Bay Area reporters, through there well- 66 researched and aggressive reporting, made expert use of the Mirror + Leak harmonic, halting any momentum Bonds may be hoping to generate in silencing his critics or reforming his image. Taken together, solid reporting with well-placed sources by members of the San Francisco-based media, coupled with a lack of engagement by Barry Bonds and his representation, turned the national media and the collective American conscience against Barry Bonds. This case study, perhaps more than any other, demonstrates the importance of playmaking in a competitive sports marketplace, and proves first-hand the negative implications that can result from not running plays during times of crisis and increased marketplace interaction. The Alpha and Beta Plays of Building a Dynasty: The Plays of San Francisco 49ers Owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. Front-and-center during the San Francisco 49ers dynasty years of the 1980s and 1990s was its popular owner, Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. DeBartolo Jr. took control of a struggling 49ers franchise in 1977, and by 1980 had already made great strides into turning it into what many believe was the most well-run franchises of the 20 th century especially from a player-perspective. During the dynasty years of 1981 through 1998, DeBartolo Jr. developed and maintained one of professional sports most successful owner-player relationships in the modern sports era, and in the process won five super bowls, five conference championships, and 13 division titles. He became known as a players owner, and to this day, DeBartolo Jr. maintains the loyalty, respect and admiration of virtually all those who worked and played for him during his tenure. lx 67 I interviewed DeBartolo Jr. in October 2008 with the intention of discovering the ways in which he wielded influence i.e. ran plays during his time as owner of the San Francisco 49ers. I was interested in both the plays he ran to influence those within his organizationfor example, the plays he ran on his players that allowed him to win his players loyalty, trust and admiration; as well as the plays he ran when seeking to influence those outside his organizationfor example, how he would convince a free- agent to sign with the 49ers, how he got along and countered the personalities of other high profile owners, and how he positioned the 49ers as one of the keystone organizations not only of professional football, but of all professional sports. To understand DeBartolo Jr.s playmaking style is to first understand his background. His father, the late-Edward J. DeBartolo Sr., was the hard-working son of Italian immigrants who worked as a paving contractor during his teenage years. After the Second World War, DeBartolo Sr. began developing enclosed shopping malls, talking advantage of burgeoning suburban growth. The company he would later form, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, which his son, Edward Jr. would later inherit, was the undisputed leader in shopping mall construction from the 1960s into the 1990s. As president of The DeBartolo Corporation, DeBartolo Sr. treated all his employees as family, and style that his son would co-opt into his own management style as owner of the 49ers. DeBartolo Jr. was born and raised in Youngstown, OH, a gritty steel town whose people made an honest living through a hard days work in its steel mills. He attended the citys local Catholic high school, Cardinal Mooney, with the sons and daughters of 68 people from all socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. As DeBartolo Jr. recounted to me during our interview, Growing up in Youngstown, and going to Cardinal Mooney, exposed me to people from all walks of life, different ethnic racial and religious backgrounds. From a playmakers perspective, DeBartolos Jr.s upbringing was significant, because as owner of the 49ers, as the rest of this interview will demonstrate, DeBartolo Jr. was a master of the Factors at Play, mot notably his command of the Intangible section. His sixth-sense of these fundamental variables allowed him to build and nurture successful relationships with players, their families and other 49er employees, which translated directly into success on and off-the-field. Suffice to say, before DeBartolo Jr. ever ran a play, he had already sized up the Factors at Play, carefully determining exactly how these mitigating factors might affect a play he would run. Before DeBartolo Jr. was able to transform a struggling 49ers franchise into a dynasty, he needed an overarching strategy. DeBartolo Jr. correctly assessed the ways that free-agency and super-star athletes were changing the dynamic of the traditional organizational-player relationship in the 1980s. Despite the higher rates of player turnover due to free-agency, DeBartolo still treated every player as family. As he specifically noted during our interview, he simply worked in three-year cycles. While some players stayed for shorter and others longer periods, DeBartolo Jr. viewed his success and the growth of his owner-players relationship in three-year cycles. By allowing his players to be themselves, and supporting them virtually unconditionally in their on-the-field and off-the-field exploits and endorsements, DeBartolo Jr. created an environment in which his players could become superstars while still being part of the 69 family-oriented team. This enabled his early-batch of players, such as Joe Montana, Ronnie Lott and Jerry Rice, to become superstars while still remaining loyal to the 49er- brand. Likewise, the 49er organization took advantage of this dynamic as a way to attract even more high-profile players, and the cycle became self-perpetuating. After a few successful three-year cycles, the 49er organization became synonymous with the concept of winning as a team while also allowing individual athletes to become superstars, hence allowing it to attract more big-name talent. This phenomenon whereby both the organization and the individual athlete have benefited due to each others mutual success over a protracted period of time is so rare in the modern free-agent era of professional sports that it has only been emulated on a consistent scale by George Steinbrenners New York Yankees. When viewing DeBartolo Jr.s ownership ethos and actions from a high-elevation perspective, it is clear he ran a Preempt on other franchises in his unique strategy of combining organizational and player success. Therefore, when compared to other organizations, DeBartolo Jr. gave the 49ers a relative competitive advantage by being able to demonstrate to players that it was possible to be a teammate and a superstar in San Francisco. Consequently, for roughly 20-years, the San Francisco 49ers enjoyed a competitive advantage over other NFL franchises that allowed it to attract top-tier players, maintain a loyal fan-base and brand itself as the most well-run and successful sports franchise of the 1980s, and indeed, one of the most successful and well-run franchises in the history of professional sports. 70 While one can say that DeBartolo Jr.s Alpha play in turning the 49ers into a dynasty was a Preempt, one could write a thesis in itself on the Beta plays employed by DeBartolo Jr. to support his Alpha-Preempt. However, in the aggregate, there is one Beta play that was paramount in DeBartolo Jr.s ability to maintain his dynastythe Label + Proxy. After the 49ers first championship in 1981, word had begun to spread throughout the league by 49er players that San Francisco was a labeled a first-class organization. Consequently, 49er players became the organizations most important Proxy. The first- class organization-Label spread so quickly that when DeBartolo Jr. was on the field after games, players from the opposing team would approach him asking to be signed by or traded to the 49ers. Simply put, through DeBartolo Jr.s expertise in the Factors at Play, plus his expertly-executed Alpha play-Preempt, 49er players became credible Proxies, whose word was valued by other players. The 49er organization became so synonymous with the Labels first-class and Super Bowl Champions that DeBartolo Jr. was able to step back and let his players spread the word. And as for the dirty work, such as negotiating contracts and player-personnel moves, DeBartolo Jr. hired great and respected executives, such as Bill Walsh as coach and Carmen Policy as vice president and counsel, which allowed him to Deflect some criticism that may come his way as a result of such dirty work. Another example of an expert Beta play executed by DeBartolo Jr was the use of a Preempt to nip a potential problem in the bud before it mushroomed into a crisis. A particular story DeBartolo Jr. recounted happened in the mid-80s with a player who 71 will remain nameless. Around this time, DeBartolo Jr. and Coach Bill Walsh became worried about the players attitude and poor-decision making. They became worried that he was squandering a future-Hall of Fame career on drugs and other poor decisions. So DeBartolo Jr. adopted a tough-love paternal approach to the player, spending extra time with him, even taking him home with him to Youngstown a few times to keep him on the straight-and-narrow. DeBartolo Jr. made things clear that he was there to support him, while at the same time making it clear that the players actions were not in-line with the organizations expectations. Similarly, by taking the player to Youngstown, DeBartolo was able to Screen his familys background and the citys unique character as a tough- love blue-collar town to prove that it was possible to overcome his demons. As DeBartolo Jr. proudly beamed to me during our interview, not only did the player turn his act around, he will also most likely be inducted shortly in the Pro Football Hall of Fame in Canton. Prior to interviewing DeBartolo Jr., I assumed him to be an aggressive playmaker i.e., running plays mostly from the right-side of The Playmakers Table. Perhaps I entered the interview with this bias because I am the product of a 21 st century society in which a person is perceived as not being influential unless he runs aggressive and flamboyant right-sided plays. I mistakenly assumed that DeBartolo Jr. built his 49er dynasty by his personal dogged pursuit of free-agents, when in reality, he let his players and management do the heavy-lifting for him. That isnt to say that DeBartolo Jr. wasnt a hands-on owner. As he bemused during our conversations, he would sometimes become angry with the media and lose his cool; or other times, he would try to do too 72 much. Ultimately, what separated DeBartolo Jr. as an owner in his managerial execution of the playmakers standard was that he understood that in his role as owner, it was more important to execute the overarching strategy and keep stay current to current league and team sentimentsthat is to say, to maintain his expertise a master of the Factors at Play. In the end, DeBartolo Jr. executed his fair share of Beta plays when warranted more than could be recounted in this thesis but the collective sum indicates that the most effective approach an organizations leader can take is to understand his overarching role in DeBartolo Jr.s case, as owner, father-figure and as the teams ambassador to its fans and execute it to perfection. DeBartolo Jr.s correct assessment of the Factors at Play and his overarching Preempt employed in the early-1980s were the most important strategies in allowing the 49ers to blossom into one of professional sports most sustained and well-respected dynasties. 73 Chapter 3 Endnotes xlviii (Kelly, interview) xlix Kelly, Alan D.. "The Playmaker's Table Flash Version." The Playmaker's Standard. 15 Nov 2008. The Playmaker's Standard, LLC. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.plays2run.com/table/index.php>. l "LPGA Tour will suspend memberships if players don't learn English." ESPN.com. 27 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3553888>. li Baldry, Beth Ann. "LPGA to demand English proficiency." Golfweek. 25 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://www.golfweek.com/story/lpga-english-news-082508>. lii See Appendix A for sources of LPGA English Language Controversy Influence Strategy Map liii See Appendix B for sources of The Summer of Favre Influence Strategy Map. liv See Appendix C for sources of Rosenhaus Recasts McGahee Influence Strategy Map. lv Garber, Greg. "McGahee deal sparked Rosenhaus' ascension." ESPN.com. 07 June 2005. The New York Times. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=garber_greg&id=2077490>. lvi "The grand illusion: Rosenhaus admits to McGahee-related media manipulation." CNNSI. 28 Apr 2003. CNNSI. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2003/draft/news/2003/04/27/mcgahee_agent_ap/>. lvii "The grand illusion: Rosenhaus admits to McGahee-related media manipulation." CNNSI. 28 Apr 2003. CNNSI. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2003/draft/news/2003/04/27/mcgahee_agent_ap/>. lix See Appendix D for sources of Barry Bonds v. Detractors Influence Strategy Map. lx See Appendix E for transcript of interview with Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. 74 Chapter 4 Conclusion Empirical Findings The application of the discipline of playmaking into the competitive sports marketplace is not only possible, as these final conclusions will demonstrate, it is already taking place. As the literature review details, in Media, Sports & Society, Wenner lays the groundwork that allows a playmaker to view his pursuit of achieving relative competitive advantage in a marketplace as one of the battling approaches to which the mediated sports complex applies. Although absent from Wenners battling approaches is the concept of communications as a competitive pursuit, whereby two players seek to achieve a relative competitive advantage over each other in the marketplace, this does not mean that there are not significant aspects of Wenners work that indirectly lend credence to the application of playmaking into the sports dynamic. It is inferable that Wenners belief that critical positioning is necessary to traverse the macro and micro views needed to make sense of the media, sports, and society relationship lxi is related to the competitive aspects of communication. Likewise, his belief that a mediated sports culture is an inescapable reality, and that to some degree, [every individual in America] is influenced by the communication of sports culture lxii bode well for a theoretical application of playmaking to the mediated sports complex. In the case studies discussed in The Elusive Fan: Reinventing Sports in a Crowded Marketplace, the authors make their conclusions based on a four-part metric brand, transformation, involvement and ethos. They conclude that it is only when all four parts of the metric are adeptly mastered that a successful brand can be built. In most 75 of the case studies that the authors detail, an unusual degree of discordant stratagems i.e., high-friction stratagems are invoked that promote part-two transformation, of their four-part metric as a means of upsetting, provoking, intriguing, or otherwise contradicting the characteristics and conventions of a marketplace to achieve relative competitive advantage, one of the central tenets of playmaking. The authors also use the examples of Mark Cuban, who successfully mastered the discordant new kid on the block mentality in contrast to the staid persona of owners lxiii to achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace is detailed. Likewise, the world of aquariums and zoos integrated into the Daytona International Speedway complex explains how an unorthodox method of capturing fan attention lxiv can drive relative competitive advantage. In addition, legendary University of Vermont basketball coach Tom Brennans political rants, poetry readings, and 6:30 a.m. phone calls to opposing coaches on game-day mornings are outlined to prove how high-friction strategies are beneficial in communicating with, and connecting to, the sports fan. lxv A shortfall of the authors findings in The Elusive Fan is that they do not detail failed cases of transformation. Examples such as Al Davis and the Los Angeles/Oakland Raiders, Bill Parcells and his oft-strained relationships with players, Marge Schott and her tenuous tenure as owner of the Cincinnati Reds, and Isiah Thomas rocky career as President of Basketball Operations and coach of the New York Knicks would have been great examples of the manner by which high-friction transformation strategies can damage an organization, individual, or teams ability to run plays for competitive advantage. Nonetheless, even in their omission, we can see that 76 transformation, as it relates to high-fit and high-friction strategies, gives a further empirical base upon which the application of playmaking to the competitive sports marketplace can be analyzed. In Sports Marketing (2 nd Edition), authors Bernard J. Mullin, Stephen Hardy, and William A. Sutton detail several strategic avenues through which the sports management complex can be related to the discipline of playmaking. For example, in implementing a sports marketing program, lxvi the authors recommend that a sports marketer adapt a strategic and tactical ongoing, circular process lxvii to achieve resonance with a fan. This circular process by which a sports marketer is always creating a strategy, implementing it and analyzing its outcome is directly comparable to The Playmakers Process. Likewise, the six characteristics listed in Chapter 10 that a message should incorporate create benefits, communicate information about attributes and benefits; develop or change an image or personality; associate a brand with feelings and promotions; create norm groups; and precipitate behavior lxviii are directly comparable to the Tangibles, Intangibles, Stakeholders, and Communications sections of The Playmakers Factors at Play resource. In the conclusions of Chapter 10 and 15, the authors make heavy use of plays from the Frame and Press sub-classes of The Playmakers Table. Also, in covering crisis management, the authors make their recommendations based on strategies that exist within the Freeze sub-class of The Playmakers Table, in particular, the Disco and the Jam. In effect, Sports Marketing (2 nd Edition) goes beyond applying an empirical base for playmaking, and moves into the Beta play application of the discipline. 77 Lastly, Melvin Helitzers textbook The Dream Job: $port$ Publicity, Promotion and Marketing is a direct endorsement that proves the power that playmaking already has in the competitive sports marketplace. Of the four principal texts examined, Helitzers The Dream Job: $port$ Publicity, Promotion and Marketing is the most similar to the discipline of playmaking. For example, in Helitzers 20 major techniques for creating news that are easily adaptable by any sports organization in Chapter 10, he repeatedly adopts strategies that fall within the Frame sub-class of The Playmakers Tablein particular, the Screen and the Label such as honoring former sports stars, and attaching significance to certain special events. lxix Likewise, in Chapter 16, A Star is Made, Helitzer bases many of his strategies on making a star based on plays of the Frame sub- class, notably the Label and the Screen. Furthermore, the bulk of Helitzers stratagems in building a star are based on the Intangible Assets subset of The Factors at Play resource. Lastly, within his twelve formulas for dealing with a crisis in Chapter 17, seven of them are identical to prescribed plays of The Playmakers Table, which are as follows: lxx Agree with complaintthe Bear Hug; Deflect criticism with humor the Red Herring or the Deflect; Deny allegationsthe Fiat, the Filter, the Recast;; Investigatethe Red Herring and/or the Deflect; Provide a forum for criticismthe Deflect and/or the Red Herring; Apologizethe Disco and/or Bear Hug; Find a scapegoatthe Screen with the Red Herring; Pass on responsibilitythe Red Herring, the Recast, or Crazy Ivan, (or some combination of these three together; Punishthe Crazy Ivan, the Preempt, the Recast, or the Filter (or some combination of these four). 78 Case Study Findings An analysis of the Alpha plays of the four case studies leads to some interesting findings, that when taken into consideration with the Factors at Play, provide the playmaker with substantial conclusions that illuminate the use of influence strategies at the Alpha-level in the competitive sports marketplace. The first major finding confirms the power of the Mirror as one of the playmakers most valuable tools in blunting and countering the momentum of an opponent at the Alpha play-level. In Barry Bonds v. Detractors, the media makes expert use of the Mirror to introduce new information into the marketplace that contradicted Bonds position, or added a new dimension to any momentum Bonds might be making in attempting to clear his reputation. However, because of Bonds over-reliance on the Pause and lack of Frame subclass plays in Bonds v. Detractors, we cannot substantiate if any of Kellys recommended plays for countering a Mirror such as the Disco, Label, Deflect, Red Herring or Label were effective countermeasures to blunt, bend or counteract the medias influence. The second instance of the power of the Mirror as an Alpha play was aptly demonstrated in LPGA-English Language Controversy. The English-language critics use of the Mirror demonstrates its effectiveness as a quick-fire strategy to stop an opponent from credibly achieving its agenda. What is most noteworthy from this case study is how quickly a group of loosely affiliated entities made use of the Mirror to accomplish an objective. A central finding of this study is that a Mirror can be swiftly 79 and credibly used by unorganized players to strategic effect, so long as the players-in- opposition use credible information to support their Mirror. Another central Alpha play finding of the thesis is demonstrated in Rosenhaus Recasts McGahee. This case study shows that the successful use of the Bait as an overarching strategic component can singularly support a grouping of Beta plays that completely redefine a marketplace dynamic for competitive advantage. Due to either arrogance or naiveté on behalf of Rosenhaus in his boastful admission to the media of his Beat play-Recast, we can say definitively that the Bait and Recast, when properly employed, have the power to completely redirect the attention of the media for relative competitive advantage. Also, we can infer, although not prove, the effect that the media may have had on the Buffalo Bills front office by buying into Rosenhaus Bait, and covering his Beta-level plays, such as the Peacock and Label. A third principal Alpha play finding is that the Fiat can be applicable to Alpha play strategy, although its Alpha-level employment is risky. According to Kelly, the Fiat is one of the most over-utilized plays by organizations. lxxi It is often ineffectual because so many organizations that tow the middle line rely upon the Fiat, thinking that their organizations name or credibility will be powerful enough to successfully run the play. Upon closer examination of The Summer of Favre, we can see why the Fiat is a risky strategy, although not without reward. Throughout the entire Favre ordeal, the Green Bay Packers rested on their organizational credibility and reputation to simply report the facts as they saw fit, without attempting to publicly influence stakeholder audiences. Not surprisingly, this strategy was unsuccessful until Green Bay management ran the 80 Mirror + Preempt on July 12 th that proved their good-faith efforts in attempting to accommodate Favre in the off-season. Had the Green Bay Packers not run this Mirror + Preempt on the Beta play-level, their Alpha play-Fiat would have most likely failed. But the timing and nature of the Mirror + Preempt was expertly executed whereby it countered Favres Alpha play, the Bait, as self-serving and disingenuous. Hence, we can say with considerable assurance that the choice of an Alpha play-Fiat is primarily successful when a playmaker is buying time before quickly running a game-changing Attack subclass play, such as a Preempt or Crazy Ivan, or a powerful Frame subclass play, such as a powerful Recast, that shifts competitive advantage into his/her favor. The Summer of Favre also lends credence to the use of the Bait as an overarching strategy when a playmaker has the odds stacked against him. As mentioned in the case study findings, although Favre was able to initially leverage his status as one of the NFLs most beloved athletes to publicly control the tone and tempo of discussion, he was ultimately not able to overcome the specifics of his contract. Nonetheless, by using the Bait at both the Alpha and Beta-level, he was able to protract the length of the negotiations, and to some extent, briefly portray the Packers as the guilty party. While Favres Alpha play-Bait was not successful in accomplishing his ultimate objective to be released outright, it did buy him enough wiggle room to win some degree of public sympathy. A fourth key finding sheds light on the use of the Preempt as an Alpha play. As the Risk/Reward rubric of The Playmakers Table demonstrates, the Preempt is one of the highest-risk plays on The Playmakers Table. We should, therefore, not be 81 surprised that in LPGA English Language Controversy, the use of the Preempt failed so miserably. In fact, we can say with definitive assurance that had LPGA Commissioner Carolyn Bivens use of the Preempt succeeded, it would have quickly put the competitive advantage into her organizations corner. However, because the Preempt failed so miserably, we can say that use of the Preempt as an overarching strategy should be run with extreme caution, and only be employed with careful attention paid to The Factors at Play Resource. From a Beta play-level, we can also provide the playmaker with substantial conclusions that illuminate the use of influence strategies at the Betal-level in the competitive sports marketplace. In Bonds v. Detractors, we can show the futility of running half-hearted Beta plays, such as the Bear Hug and Call Out without maintaining a consistent and steady tone of plays to support them. Although Bonds was always vilified by certain members of the press for not being open to them and the public, this vilification intensified after he briefly opened up in 2004, only to retreat back into his cocoon of running Pauses. We can conclude with considerable assurance that the running of Pauses at a Beta-level after briefly opening up leads to public and media backlash, and makes further attempts at influencing constituent audiences less effective. Also in Bonds v. Detractors, we can prove the power of running Beta play Mirrors to support an Alpha play Mirror. As repeatedly demonstrated, the Mirror, when used properly, is one of the most powerful plays of The Playmakers Table. Not surprisingly, the Mirror is just as powerful at the Beta-level as it is at the Alpha-level. The persistent and powerful use of the Mirror by 82 Barry Bonds detractors froze the homerun king to the point where he was virtually powerless to effectively influence anybody. In Rosenhaus Recasts McGahee, the Beta play conclusions illuminate the upsides to the Peacock, Recast and the Label to collectively support a playmakers overarching strategy. Rosenhaus initial stunt, to promise McGahee to drop his customary three percent commission if McGahee were not drafted in the first round, provided the impetus for McGahee to sign with Rosenhaus, and then for the media to cover the story. Next, Rosenhaus use of the cautious but effectual re-issuing of the Peacock to the public after McGahee had signed with him further generated public interest in the running backs story. In effect, Rosenhaus used the Peacock in two separate yet interconnected ways to create a competitive advantage for his client, which is a very useful finding for any sports agent, marketer or promoter to generate attention on behalf of a client. Secondly, Rosenhaus strategic, yet limited use of the Label to paint McGahees recovery as remarkable was the perfect complement to his Beta-level Peacocks. As Kelly points out, one of the downsides of the Label is that it can appear shallow, self-aggrandizing, and dishonest. lxxii Hence, had Rosenhaus overused the Label, it might have backfired. But his limited use of the play demonstrated more of the upsides to running the play, such as allowing the player to capture the attention of the marketplace and draw further meaning to an issue or event. lxxiii In LPGA English Language Policy, the Beta play conclusions prove how the poor selection of an Alpha play can offset the strategic effect of planned Beta plays, and moreover, and can force a playmaker to run Beta plays that are perceived as out of 83 character and dishonest. As stated in the conclusions of the case study, the LPGA has benefited from a long stretch of bonhomie between players and tour leaders, especially with respect to issues of inclusion. Therefore, the LPGAs Red Herring-insinuation that special interest groups seeking to promote their official language of the U.S. agenda had hijacked the tours decision is a noteworthy Beta play that deserves further consideration. It seems that LPGA officials ran this play because their backs were so far up against the wall that it did not have many other options. Ironically, the anonymous LPGA official who made this claim may very well have been correct; but because the LPGA was already on the defensive, and because such a statement is so out-of-character for the organization, it was perceived as incorporating some of the downsides of the Red Herring, such as being improper and insensitive, even though it may have factually been a true statement. Another surprising Beta play finding apparent in LPGA English Language Policy is the lack of effectiveness of the Bear Hugs run by the high-profile inter-organizational Proxies, such as Se Ri Pak. This finding must be viewed within the already-discussed findings of the case studies portion of the thesis, which prove how LPGA Commissioner Carolyn Bivens complete misunderstanding of The Factors at Play resource, coupled with her poor choice of an Alpha play-Preempt, doomed her English- language policy from the outset. The combined sum of these findings demonstrates that the expected upsides of using a group of influential and well-respected Proxies can be completely negated due to a poor Alpha play selection, coupled with misguided Beta plays. 84 In The Summer of Favre, we can make several important Beta play conclusions that demonstrate the power of well-timed and expertly executed Beta-level stratagems. The most important finding of this case study, and one of the most important findings of this thesis, is the powerful effect of the game-changing play. From a high-elevation perspective, Green Bays July 12 Mirror + Preempt was the game-changing play of the entire summers saga. It shows that the successful execution of a high-risk but well- researched Beta play can completely change the competitive dynamic of a marketplace to the point where it is impossible for the players upon whom the play was run to ever gain back the competitive momentum. Prior to Green Bays expert execution of the July 12 Mirror + Preempt, Favre had the public momentum on his side; but after Green Bay ran this game-changing play, Favre was never able to recover. To prove just how powerful a play this was, we can look at Green Bay Presidents Mark Murphys ill-conceived July 30 Challenge. This play was so poorly conceived by Murphy that it briefly put Favre back into the publics goodwill, but even a devious Red Herring was unable to negate the power of the game-changing play. The second major finding that should be a lesson to all playmakers is that behind- the-scenes Beta plays can come back to haunt a playmaker once they are made public. To a large extent, Brett Favres ill-conceived mix of Passes, Baits and Trial Balloons allowed Green Bay to execute its own July 12 Mirror + Preempt game-changer. Had Favre been more consistent in his prior-Beta-level execution, Green Bay would have had less ammunition to draw upon to support their game-changing Mirror + Preempt. Another principal Beta-level finding is apparent in Brett Favres July 14 interview 85 with Greta van Sustern. While Favre made ample use of influence strategies in this interview, it is apparent that Favre may have employed too many influence strategiesor at a minimum, did not coordinate his Beta plays around a central theme. After viewing the interview, it is apparent that Favre was attempting to use the interview as an Alpha- level Mirror to tell his side of the story and cast doubt upon the characterizations of Green Bays efforts at reaching an agreement. But the All-Star QBs use of Recasts and Call Outs already seemed disingenuous in light of Green Bays July 12 th Mirror + Preempt game-changing play. It can be argued, although not proven, that a series of counter-intuitive stratagems, or contra-plays as referred to in the glossary of key terms, such as Discos, Bear Hugs, and Lanterns, might have been more effective in endearing Favre to the public and giving him more public support to leverage his Alpha play-Bait. Interview findings The interview with former San Francisco 49ers owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr demonstrates the success that an organization can have when an owner properly employs a trend-setting Alpha play. It also proves that the owner need not become too involved in the execution of Beta plays on a daily basis. In fact, given some of the recent problems of hands-on owners in the NFL notably Jerry Jones Dallas Cowboys and Daniel Snyders Washington Redskins we can begin to see a pattern whereby owners who interfere too much in the day-to-day Beta plays of their organization tend to interfere with their organizations success. Not only did DeBartolo Jr. show an expertise in the Factors at Play resource as it applied to his stewardship of the 49ers, he also demonstrated the fine line that an owner must walk in only running Beta plays when necessary. Perhaps 86 even more importantly, DeBartolo Jr. proved the importance in hiring qualified people to run Beta plays including controversial and unpopular Beta plays, such as negotiating contracts and cutting players to shield the owner from negative criticism. And most importantly, DeBartolo Jr. demonstrated how to effectively turn an organizations most important asset its players into Proxies. Final Thoughts The collective preponderance of evidence from this thesis lends credence to the notion that influence strategy and by association, The Playmaker Standard does occur within the competitive sports marketplace. Some of the most significant and overarching findings of this work reveal that the sports marketplace might be one of the most dynamic competitive environments in which to observe, detail and apply the discipline of playmaking. The literature review reveals that as early as 1989, there was a sports-related empirical foundation upon which playmaking could be based. From an empirical perspective, we might even consider it appropriate to apply playmaking into one of Wenners battling approaches. The interview with Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. shows that one particular owner was an expert at devising Alpha plays and balancing his involvement with the day-to-day Beta plays of his organization. Even though DeBartolo Jr. was not familiar with the discipline of playmaking prior to my interview, he was nonetheless a master playmaker on many levels. It also proves that a well-executed Alpha play in this case, the Preempt can put the competitive advantage in an organizations corner for almost two decades. 87 Lastly, and what I believe to be the most important finding, it shows how to utilize Proxies, in this case 49er players, to be the teams best and most influential asset. The case studies portion reveals some of the most important and definitive findings and conclusions that ultimately explain the presence of influence strategies within the competitive sports marketplace, and how The Playmakers Standard can be applied for competitive advantage. The Influence Strategy Maps demonstrate the precise manner by which the irreducibly simple stratagems of The Playmakers Table allow a player to gain a relative competitive advantage in his/her marketplace. Likewise, the point-counterpoint analysis of the Influence Strategy Maps prove how well-executed strategy or ill-executed strategy can be used to counter, bend and blunt the plays being run by one player against a rival. When the sum of this thesis collective parts are considered, sports-related entities of all disciplines including owners, front office professionals, coaches, players, marketers, communicators and media should be able to apply the discipline of playmaking to their respective sports marketplace subsets. In particular, the sports communicator should heed attention to the notion that when the competitive mindset to is adopted whereby an athlete and his representation seek to gain a relative competitive advantage over a competitor through the application of the playmakers standard the athlete and his/her representation is more akin to accomplish their objectives. The application of the playmakers standard to the milieu of competing interests in the competitive sports marketplace makes the adoption of such a process all the more 88 beneficialas it simplifies, codifies and standardizes a reliable metric by which sports communicators can more effectively leverage their trade. This thesis proves that seeking a relative competitive advantage through the act of running plays is an achievable and highly beneficial discipline for playmakers of all specializations in the sports industry to master, not least for the sports communicator. With its application now proven through timely and relevant data, it is the hope of this author that playmaking might find a home in decoding, depicting and predicting the influence strategies of the competitive sports marketplace for a relative competitive advantage. 89 Chapter 5 Endotes lxi (Wenner, 18) lxii (Wenner, 15) lxiii (Rein, 268) lxiv (Rein, 280) lxv (Rein, 269) lxvi (Mullin, 24) lxvii (Mullin, 24-25) lxviii (Mullin, 185-186) lxix (Mullin, 210) lxx Note: The play examples are dependent on an examination of each particular crisis, based on the Factors At Play resources as detailed in the introduction of the thesis. lxxi Kelly, Alan D.. Personal interview. 14 Sep 2008. lxxii Kelly, Alan D.. "The Playmaker's Table Flash Version." The Playmaker's Standard. 15 Nov 2008. The Playmaker's Standard, LLC. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.plays2run.com/table/index.php>.. lxxiii Kelly, Alan D.. "The Playmaker's Table Flash Version." The Playmaker's Standard. 15 Nov 2008. The Playmaker's Standard, LLC. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.plays2run.com/table/index.php>.. 90 Glossary of Key Terms Alpha Play: A stratagem that broadly defines a players given position or his/her intended plans. Alpha plays typically serve to guide or inform one or more lower-order beta plays. For example, a players alpha playa Draftwas designed to stalk and overtake the incumbent. Its beta playsa Bear Hug and Jam (see definitions below) were designed to freeze the opponent from moving ahead un-checked. Assess Class: One of the three foundation classes of The Playmakers Table. Assessing plays are characteristically subtle, typically passive, and are often used to monitor and profile other players and marketplaces. The Assess class encompasses four of the twenty-five plays in the two subclasses Detach and Test. Attack Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Engage class of The Playmakers Table. Attacking plays, which include Call Out, Preempt, Draft, and Crazy Ivan, describe a players attempt to compete directly for a desired position. Bait: BT The overt provocation of an opponent through action or information, usually intended to draw an emotional, rather than rational, response. This play typically compels an opponent to move in the direction of the playerlike a bull charging a capeagainst its better judgment (see Chapter 18). Bear Hug: BG The conspicuously public support or embrace of an opponents position or message (see Chapter 14). Beta Play: A stratagem that supports a high-order alpha play. For example, a players beta playsa Preempt and Call Outwere designed to nip damaging speculation in the bud. Its alpha playa Passwas to exit the market. Call Out: CT An overt public expression of doubt or concern, usually aimed at a competing person or organization, intended to call into question a flaw in the opponents position or message set. Call Outs often have a tone of moral authority; theyre judgmental and direct (see Chapter 22). Challenge: CH A public appeal, suggestion, or demand by a player, designed to mobilize and/or inspire a person, organization, or broader constituency to consent or take action. While Challenges may range from timid to caustic, they convey a benefit to the targeted player (see Chapter 17). Cluster Plays: Loosely organized and overlapping groups of plays that share various common abilities to contradict, decoy, link, or taunt other players in a marketplace. Such plays cut across the traditional boundaries of The Playmakers Table and 91 sometimes exist in multiple clusters (see Turning the Table, Play Type Clusters, p. 268). Compound Strategies: Plays that embody a multiplicity of strategic principles (e.g., Fan the Fire, Smoke Out a Competitor, Drive a Wedge, Flood a Market, Corner a Market, Create a Market, Re-brand a Product, or Enhance an Offering). Condition Class: One of the three foundation classes of The Playmakers Table. Conditioning plays are characteristically moderate, often indirect, and are frequently used to encourage or suppress actions or to influence or reform the sentiments of other players and marketplaces. The Condition class encompasses twelve of the twenty-five plays in the three subclasses Divert, Frame, and Freeze. Contra Plays: A cross-table cluster of five playsBear Hug, Crazy Ivan, Disco, Lantern, and Pausethat are innately contrary and go against a players instincts or a set of marketplace conventions (see Turning the Tables, Play Type Clusters, p. 268). Crazy Ivan: CZ Alters the course or circumstances of an impending attack by inviting or initiating the attack. It is most commonly employed as a last option (see Chapter 25). Crowd: CW The attempt by a player to match or adopt an opponents position in a marketplace or to affiliate with a trend, idea, or issue (see Chapter 20). Decoy Plays: A cross-table cluster of three playsBait, Red Herring, and Screen that pull a player into play action or drive a player from it but, in either case, with the intention of moving a player off its preferred position or intended course of action (see Turning the Table, Play Type Clusters, p. 268). Deflect: DF An attempt by a player to divert a rivals attack, either to avoid or minimize its impact. Deflects typically bendthey do not break or significantly alteran opponents play action. They are usually run under duress and on-the-fly by a player with inferior resources against a superior threat (see Chapter 5). Detach Subclass: One of two supporting subclasses of the Assess class of The Playmakers Table. Detaching plays, which include Pass and Pause, involve the exit by a player from a marketplace, briefly or even permanently. Disco: DX Requires a player to concede or sacrifice an element of its platform in order to preserve or advance its overall agenda or argument. The central tenet of a Disco is that forward progress cannot be achieved by the player unless or until the player first moves backward (i.e., one step back, two steps forward). Disco is a technique of argumentation, coined by debate teams in the 1980s (see Chapter 16). 92 Divert Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Condition class of The Playmakers Standard. Diverting plays, which include Deflect, Leak, and Red Herring, are generally designed to distract other players or reroute their intended course of action. Draft: DR An attempt by a player to feed off the energy of a developing marketplace, innovation, or best practice with the intent of overtaking incumbent leaders (see Chapter 24). Engage Class: One of the three foundation classes of The Playmakers Table. Engaging plays are characteristically active, usually overt strategies whose purposes are to destabilize players and marketplaces, assert a players leadership, or invite competitive responses. The Engage class encompasses nine of the twenty-five plays in the three subclasses Lure, Press, and Attack. Factors at Play: A reference table of more than fifty marketplace variables in six categories-tangibles, intangibles, communication, policies, stakeholders, and X- factorsthat help playmakers better understand how, in infinitely variable ways, marketplaces do what they do, and how plays, in infinitely variable sequences and combinations, drive relative competitive advantage. Factors are not plays, they influence plays (see p. 294). Fiat: FT The declaration of information or demonstration of capability to a marketplace. Fiats are characteristically run without fanfare and rely on the position of the player or the merits of the declaration to shift a competitive dynamic (see Chapter 19). Filter: FL The selective retransmission of information, where a player promotes and/or withholds information to build or defend its position. A Filter is typically employed to reshape characterizations so that their impact or relevance is minimized or, better, put to work for the player (see Chapter 8). Fit Plays: Resonating issues, ideas, policies, events, and developments that a playmaker deliberately invokes or promotes as a means of praising, appealing, condoning, or otherwise endorsing the characteristics and conventions of a marketplace and its players. Fit-based plays create a kind of rhetorical and ambient marketplace appeal that typically supports other players and embraces their preferred positions and agendas (for more information, see Finer Points of Playmaking, p. 287). Frame Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Condition class of The Playmakers Table. Framing plays, which include Filter, Recast, Label, and Screen, are typically used to adjust the criteria and context of discussions and actions in a marketplace. 93 Freeze Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Condition class of The Playmakers Table. Freezing plays, which include Mirror, Jam, Bear Hug, Lantern, and Disco, inhibit the movement and motives of a competitor, or prevent further erosion to the players position and agenda. Friction Plays: Discordant issues, ideas, policies, events, and developments that a playmaker deliberately invokes or promotes as a means of upsetting, provoking, intriguing, or otherwise contradicting the characteristics and conventions of a marketplace and its players. Friction plays create a kind of rhetorical and ambient marketplace heat that typically goes against the grain of competitive players and which questions or displaces their preferred positions and agendas (for more information see Finer Points of Playmaking, p. 287). Harmonic Play: A pair or trio of plays and surrogates that are run together to achieve a nuanced and more powerful effect. Like musical notes, plays can be combined into chords to blend the special character of one stratagem with another, all for a fuller and more competitively potent potential. Jam: JM An attempt to disable or disorganize a rivals activities or communications. A Jam is typically intended to obscure, slow, or stop the delivery or acquisition of ideas or information of a rival (see Chapter 13). Label: LB A word or phraseself-given by a player or attributed to an opponentthat reshapes or deepens the meaning of the recipients position, brand, or reputation. A Label, typically rooted in symbols and metaphors, is characterized by simplification, alliteration, and other semantic tricks (see Chapter 10). Lantern: LN The deliberate and preemptive disclosure by a player of its own flaw, mistake, or some source of potential embarrassment or controversy (see Chapter 15). Leak: LK The selective disclosure by a player of normally privileged or confidential information to a specified target (e.g., reporter, customer, prospect, colleague). A Leak is typically covert and employed to divert or accentuate a developing idea in the marketplace (see Chapter 6). Linker Plays: A cross-table cluster of five playsBear Hug, Crowd, Draft, Label, and Screenthat help playmakers associate their campaigns, promotions, and initiatives with meaningful symbols, public figures, issues, trends, and inanimate marketplace features (see Turning the Table, Play Type Clusters, p. 268). Lure Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Engage class of The Playmakers Table. Luring plays, which include Challenge and Bait, dare a rival player or players to take action. 94 Mirror: MI A specialized form of a Call Out, a Mirror introduces into a marketplace new facts or information that contradicts a rivals position or point of view. Like forcing someone to look at their own reflection, a Mirror typically prevents a rival from credibly pursuing its agenda (see Chapter 12). Partner: PN One of three surrogates on The Playmakers Table. A Partner is a third party whose interests are aligned with a host player but which operates as a co-equal. Partners typically receive reciprocal levels of support in pursuit of a common agenda or business purpose (see Chapter 26). Pass: PS The strategic withdrawal from a marketplace or play action. Typically a player will exit or bail out of a marketplace to preserve its resources and/or focus them elsewhere for competitive advantage (see Chapter 1). Pause: PZ The strategic suspension of activity by a player, intended to allow the player to assess the opposition and marketplace and let playing conditions ripen (see Chapter 2). Peacock: PK The unsolicited parading by a player of a novelty to generate attention in a marketplace. Peacocks typically hinge on an unusual action, innovation, or precedent-- setting developmentto spur market talk (see Chapter 21). Ping: PG An oblique reference or suggestion, enabled either by a players mere presence in a marketplace or its implied interest in topics, ideas, events, and developments (see Chapter 3). Plant: PT One of three surrogates on The Playmakers Table. A Plant is a trusted and confidential third partyusually disguised or undisclosed to opponent(s)that is placed by a host player to seed or sense information and movements in a marketplace (see Chapter 28). Play: A stratagem, one of a finite set of discrete strategic maneuvers a person or organization employs to improve its relative competitive advantage in a marketplace. Play Action: The presence and movement of plays as they are called and run by players in a bounded marketplace. Influence Strategy Map: Illustrated representations of playmaking activity (i.e., play action) that yield insights on the patterns, sequences, trends, and tendencies of players moves in a marketplace. 95 Playmaker: A strategist whose stock in trade is to call, run, decode, and counter competitive moves in a marketplace. Playmakers have influence over a players policy, position, and agenda and are stewards of its intangible assets. Playmakers Process, The: A five-step methodology that illustrates the fundamental steps of playmaking, from the conception of a differentiated idea to the identification of a play sequence to the commencement of play action to countermeasures and back. This proprietary circular process helps playmakers better understand how to apply so- called fit and friction to play-making plans, when to call and run plays, how to react to the prevailing play action, and, finally, whether to exit a marketplace or accelerate within it for competitive advantage (see Section III, p. 273). Playmakers Standard, The: The first classification system of moves and countermoves that people and organizations employ in business, politics, and popular culture to develop a position or advance their agendas in competitive marketplaces. Playmakers Table, The: A landmark taxonomy of twenty-five irreducible influence strategies. The table features an easily interpreted and detailed classification of plays and their respective examples, risk-reward assessments, definitions, best users, and methods by which plays may be decoded and countered. Playmaking: A discipline for deploying and systematically managing playsin combinations, sequences, and patternsto continually influence, control, and sustain the sentiments, discussions, and decisions of a marketplace. Preempt: PE Reverses competitive position, giving the player a superior advantage, limiting a rivals ability to exploit a players weakness, or both. Preempts are usually decisive and swift so as to surprise and disable the competition (see Chapter 23). Press Subclass: One of three supporting subclasses of the Engage class of The Playmakers Table. Pressing plays, which include Fiat, Crowd, and Peacock, employ authority, ability, or audacity to establish or assert a players position in a marketplace. Proxy: PX One of three surrogates on The Playmakers Table. A Proxy is a third party who advocates for and supports the agenda of a host player, usually for a fee or some form of consideration. It is allied with the player but credible to otherseven competitorsand conveys a sense of free will and independence (see Chapter 27). Recast: RC The reinterpretation of an action, event, information, message, or symbol by a player so as to lend support to that players position or agenda or to neutralize or weaken that of its rival (see Chapter 9). 96 Red Herring: RD The Red Herring is an action or communiqué that draws an opponentusually a competitoraway from its preferred position or intended course of action (see Chapter 7). Screen: SN An attempt by a player to borrow issues, ideas, events, or other symbolic references to advance its agenda or thwart a competitors movements (see Chapter 11). Surrogate: A person or organization that runs plays, either on behalf or in support of a host player and its position or agenda. Surrogates are not plays; theyre recruited Partners, Proxies, or Plants that expand the reach and influence of a players normal scope and capability. Taunter Plays: A cross-table cluster of four playsBait, Call Out, Challenge, and Labelthat help a player tease or provoke other players in a marketplace (see Turning the Table, Play Type Clusters, p. 268). Test Subclass: One of two supporting subclasses of the Assess class of The Playmakers Table. Testing plays, which include Ping and Trial Balloon, size up the issues, ideas, events, or developments of a marketplace and forecast a players needs or wishes. Trial Balloon: TB The preview and testing of preliminary ideas or tentative plans. To reduce a players exposure, Trial Balloons are often run without attribution to the player or are positioned as temporary (see Chapter 4). 97 Bibliography "BALCO leaker Ellerman gets 2½ years in prison." ESPN.com. 12 July 2007. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2934650>. Baldry, Beth Ann. "LPGA to demand English proficiency." Golfweek. 25 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://www.golfweek.com/story/lpga-english-news-082508>. "Barry Bonds Steroid Timeline." ESPN.com. 07 Dec 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3113127>. "Bonds testified that substances didn't work." ESPN.com. 04 Dec 2004. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1937594>. Clayton, John. "Favre wins this ugly contest." ESPN.com. 3 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/columns/story?columnist=clayton_john&i d=3517570>. Fainaru-Wada , Mark, and Lance Williams. Game of Shadows. New York: Penguin Publishing, 2006. "Favre thinks showing up at Packers camp 'tempting'." ESPN.com. 16 Jul 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3490792>. "Favre says of situation: 'This probably isn't going to work'." ESPN.com. 05 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/news/story?id=3520064>. "Favre: Packers' $20M offer to stay retired may be best." ESPN.com. 01 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3514071>. Garber, Greg. "McGahee deal sparked Rosenhaus' ascension." ESPN.com. 07 June 2005. The New York Times. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=garber_greg&id=2077490>. Hack, Damon. "PRO FOOTBALL; McGahee Hopes to Allay Concerns Before Draft ." New York Times Sports. 22 Apr 2003. The New York Times. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE6DF113AF931A15757C0A9659 C8B63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/M/McGahee,%20Willis>. Helitzer, Melvin. The Dream Job: $port$ Publicity, Promotion and Marketing. 3rd. Athens, OH: University Sports Press, 2000. 98 "Jets' Favre says Green Bay told him he couldn't be a Packer." ESPN.com. 30 Aug 2008. AP. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3561440>. "Jets set for Brett: Packers legend headed to New York." ESPN.com. 07 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/news/story?id=3522971>. Kelly, Alan. The Elements of Influence: The New Essential System for Managing Competition, Reputation, Brand, and Buzz. New York: Plume, Penguin Group, 2006. Kelly, Alan. Personal Inteview. 21 August 2008. Lee, Jaimy. "English-language rule puts heat on LPGA." PRWeek.com. 03 Sep 2008. PRWeek. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.prweekus.com/English-language-rule-puts-heat-on- LPGA/article/116228/>. "LPGA Tour will suspend memberships if players don't learn English." ESPN.com. 27 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3553888>. Mortensen, Chris. "Favre delays arrival to Packers camp at GM's request." ESPN.com. 28 Jul 2008. ESPN. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3507141>. Mortensen, Chris. "Favre seeks unconditional release from Packers, sources say." ESPN.com. 12 Jul 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3483521>. Mullin, Bernard J., Stephen Hardy, and William Sutton. Sport Marketing. 2nd ed. Champain: Human Kinetics, 2000. Rein, Irving, Philip Kotler, and Ben Shields. The Elusive Fan: Reinventing Sports In A Crowded Marketplace. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. Sirak, Ron. "Bivens speaks out about LPGA Tour's controversial English ruling." ESPN.com. 01 Sep 2008. Golf World. <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/columns/story?columnist=sirak_ron&id=3564106>. "Sources: Packers to open up QB job between Rodgers and Favre." ESPN.com. 04 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3517219>. "The grand illusion: Rosenhaus admits to McGahee-related media manipulation." CNNSI. 28 Apr 2003. CNNSI. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2003/draft/news/2003/04/27/mcgahee_agent_ap />. 99 Wenner, Lawrence A.. Media, Sports, & Society. Newbury Park: Sage Publishing, Inc., 1989. Williams, Lance. "What Bonds told BALCO grand jury." San Francisco Chronicle.com. 03 Dec 2004. San Francisco Chronicle. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/12/03/MNGGFA0UDU65.DTL>. Williams, Lance. "The Truth: About Barry Bonds and Steroids." CNNSI. 7 Mar 2006. San Francisco Chronicle. <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/magazine/03/06/growth0313/>. 100 Appendix A LPGA English-language controversy Baldry, Beth Ann. "LPGA to demand English proficiency." Golfweek. 25 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://www.golfweek.com/story/lpga-english-news-082508>. Lee, Jaimy. "English-language rule puts heat on LPGA." PRWeek.com. 03 Sep 2008. PRWeek. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.prweekus.com/English-language-rule-puts-heat-on-LPGA/article/116228/>. "LPGA Tour will suspend memberships if players don't learn English." ESPN.com. 27 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3553888>. "LPGA won't suspend players over English-speaking requirement." ESPN.com. 07 Sep 2008. AP. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3570957>. Sirak, Ron. "Bivens speaks out about LPGA Tour's controversial English ruling." ESPN.com. 01 Sep 2008. Golf World. <http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/columns/story?columnist=sirak_ron&id=3564106>. 101 Appendix B The Summer of Favre "Favre thinks showing up at Packers camp 'tempting'." ESPN.com. 16 Jul 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3490792>. "Jets set for Brett: Packers legend headed to New York." ESPN.com. 07 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/news/story?id=3522971>. "Favre says of situation: 'This probably isn't going to work'." ESPN.com. 05 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/news/story?id=3520064>. "Sources: Packers to open up QB job between Rodgers and Favre." ESPN.com. 04 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3517219>. "Favre: Packers' $20M offer to stay retired may be best." ESPN.com. 01 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3514071>. Mortensen, Chris. "Favre delays arrival to Packers camp at GM's request." ESPN.com. 28 Jul 2008. ESPN. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3507141>. Mortensen, Chris. "Favre seeks unconditional release from Packers, sources say." ESPN.com. 12 Jul 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3483521>. "Jets' Favre says Green Bay told him he couldn't be a Packer." ESPN.com. 30 Aug 2008. AP. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3561440>. Clayton, John. "Favre wins this ugly contest." ESPN.com. 3 Aug 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp08/columns/story?columnist=clayton_john&id=3517570>. 102 Appendix C Rosenhaus Baits the Media and the NFL "The grand illusion: Rosenhaus admits to McGahee-related media manipulation." CNNSI. 28 Apr 2003. CNNSI. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/2003/draft/news/2003/04/27/mcgahee_agent_ap/>. Hack, Damon. "PRO FOOTBALL; McGahee Hopes to Allay Concerns Before Draft ." New York Times Sports. 22 Apr 2003. The New York Times. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE6DF113AF931A15757C0A9659C8B63&n=Top/R eference/Times%20Topics/People/M/McGahee,%20Willis>. Garber, Greg. "McGahee deal sparked Rosenhaus' ascension." ESPN.com. 07 June 2005. The New York Times. 6 Nov 2008 <http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=garber_greg&id=2077490>. 103 Appendix D Barry Bonds v. Detractors "Barry Bonds Steroid Timeline." ESPN.com. 07 Dec 2008. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3113127>. "BALCO leaker Ellerman gets 2½ years in prison." ESPN.com. 12 July 2007. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2934650>. "Bonds testified that substances didn't work." ESPN.com. 04 Dec 2004. ESPN. <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1937594>. Fainaru-Wada , Mark, and Lance Williams. Game of Shadows. New York: Penguin Publishing, 2006. Williams, Lance. "What Bonds told BALCO grand jury." San Francisco Chronicle.com. 03 Dec 2004. San Francisco Chronicle. 6 Nov 2008 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/12/03/MNGGFA0UDU65.DTL>. Williams, Lance. "The Truth: About Barry Bonds and Steroids." CNNSI. 7 Mar 2006. San Francisco Chronicle. <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/magazine/03/06/growth0313/>. 104 Appendix E Interview transcript with Edward J. DeBartolo Jr., former owner of the San Francisco 49ers. October 6, 2008 Transcribers Note: All first-person references [I] and [me] refer to Edward J. DeBartolo Jr. speaking in the first-person. 1.) How did you influence people outside of the organization to join the 49ers, such as free agents, coaches and front office people? It was very easy to influence people, because all I had to do was surround myself with people who were great influencers as well. It mostly started when I hired Bill Walsh as President and General Manager. Bill was great with the players, and the word spread fast throughout the league that the 49ers was a players organization. I treated everyone in the organization like a family member, and that philosophy was embodied in Bill to the players on a daily basis. After games on the field, players from the opposing team, and not just one, but up to twenty or thirty of them, and ask me to bring them to the 49ers. The word-of- mouth spread quickly throughout the league. They wanted to come because they wanted to be part of a family. I ran the team like I ran the real-estate development company in Youngstown. I left the bargaining and tough negotiations to the people who I hired to do that kind of stuff, and was able to focus on the needs of the players. Today, its harder to do that with free agency, but there are those that still do it quite well, particularly Bob Kraft of the New England Patriots, Pat Bowlen of the Denver Broncos, and Jerry Jones of the Dallas Cowboys. Last year, we had a reunion party for the players from the five championship teams in the 80s and 90s, and 1,500 people showed up. Today, I field phone calls from dozens of ex- players wanting to meet me in Vegas for the weekend, or go on a golf trip. 2.) How did you encourage a particular person in your organization, or motivate them to move in your direction? Perhaps a player who had a reputation issue or was going through a hard time. There was a player in the mid-80s, whose name I will not use, who was having serious problems light drug related, overall attitude and personality, and was ruining what Bill Walsh and I thought was a hall of fame career. So I spent a lot 105 of personal time with him. I took him back to Youngstown in the off-season, and talked with him on the phone often. It was a combination of nurturing him, but also laying down the law. By bringing him back to Youngstown, he was able to see where I came from. Although I was born to a wealthy family, I was not raised as such, and my upbringing at a blue-collar high school with regular friends gave be a particular wave of credibility that let him know that I knew where he was coming from, but that I also wouldnt put up with it either. It all worked out for him, and he will be inducted into the Hall of Fame in a few years. . 3.) Give me one owner in each sport, and the traits that you admire about them. Why do you feel that they are successful in your eyes? And which owners do you parts of yourself in today? In football, theres no question that Jerry Jones, Pat Bowlen and Robert Kraft do it the right way, and have been vindicated for their efforts. They all treat their players as more than just players, which is probably the one thing, more than any other, that allows them to earn their respect, and which is also why theyre able to attract top talent. I also like Dan Snyder in Washington. Although he has maybe tried to hard and lacked some patience, his heart is in the right place, and he knows how to treat players. In basketball, I love Mark Cuban, and I think hes great for the sport. Hes extremely intelligent. Sure, he gets in trouble sometimes, but its not serious, and if anything, is probably good for the league. The Cubs need Mark Cuban, and I hope he gets the Chicago Cubs. I also appreciate Bill Davidson, the former owner of the Tampa Bay Lightning and current owner of the Detroit Pistons. Even though hes a bit older, hes very hands-on, and hes hired good people. In baseball, you have to give credit to George Steinbrenner, although lots will criticize him. Hes been very successful, and not just because of the money he spends. A lot of ex-players work for the Yankees, which is a sure sign of respect. In his own way, he has been very successful. 4.) Any last thoughts or comments? Looking back at it, it was really easy to do. I just did what came naturally. What you do with one player, you do with them all, and it snowballs. I treated them like family, and you go from one three-year-period to another, and before you know it, you have 200 players that are like your family.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract I present this thesis as an analysis of the influence strategies of the competitive sports marketplace. I examine how the discipline of "playmaking" can be applied as a management philosophy and as framework for communication strategy whereby actors in the sports marketplace compete for a relative competitive advantage over an opponent. I propose to subject the discipline of playmaking to a research and case study based examination that discloses the merits and efficacy of an assortment of influence strategies in the competitive sports marketplace.

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Creator Koval, John M., III (author)

Core Title An analysis of influence strategies within the competitive sports marketplace: how the discipline of "playmaking" can be applied to the competitive sports marketplace

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 03/06/2009

Defense Date 12/08/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Alan Kelly,Barry Bonds,Brett Favre,competitive communication,Drew Rosenhaus,Edward J. DeBartolo Jr.,influence strategies,LPGA English-language controversy,OAI-PMH Harvest,periodic table of influence strategies,Playmaker's Standard,Playmaker's Table,playmaking,sports communication,sports management,sports marketing

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Floto, Jennifer D. (committee chair), Durbin, Daniel (committee member), Kotler, Jonathan (committee member)

Creator Email jkoval@usc.edu,kovaljm3@yahoo.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2003

Unique identifier UC159333

Identifier etd-Koval-2500 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-214265 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2003 (legacy record id)

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Document Type Thesis

Rights Koval, John M., III

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu