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The underrepresentation of Asian American Pacific Islanders serving in the senior and executive leadership ranks in the U.S. Navy SEALs

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The underrepresentation of Asian American Pacific Islanders serving in the senior and executive leadership ranks in the U.S. Navy SEALs

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Content The Underrepresentation of Asian American Pacific Islanders Serving in the Senior and
Executive Leadership Ranks in the U.S. Navy SEALs
Reynaldo Baviera
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education
December 2023

© Copyright by Reynaldo Baviera 2023
All Rights Reserved

The Committee for Reynaldo Baviera certifies the approval of this Dissertation
Kimberly Hirabayashi
Jennifer Phillips
Courtney Malloy, Committee Chair
Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2023

iv
Abstract
The underrepresentation of Navy SEALs who identify as Asian American Pacific Islanders
(AAPIs) remains to be problem within the Naval Special Warfare Community (NSW), despite
many attempts to increase minority representation. Racial disparities in unique career disciplines
can be addressed if AAPI culture and experiences are taken into consideration in the Navy’s
recruitment and outreach programs. This study was focused on factors that influenced Navy
SEALs who identified as AAPIs to join the SEALs, what their perception was on advancement
opportunities, and why they ended their careers. The purpose of this study was to determine what
factors influenced the career decisions of AAPIs to become U.S. Navy SEALs and the factors
influenced their separation from the U.S. Navy. The study also focused on the perceptions of
AAPIs regarding support for their career advancement. This study used a qualitative design and
interviewed eight veteran Navy SEALs. There were three key findings. First, perceptual barriers
continue to exist within the AAPI community in terms of participants being unaware of Navy
SEALs and that they can become one until after college. Second, combination negative
stereotypes and the idea of a prototypical leader play a significant role in limiting advancement
opportunities for Navy SEALs who identify as AAPI. Third, the participants separated for
several reasons, most of which were associated with family and seeking other career
opportunities. To increase AAPI participation within the SEAL ranks, the recommendations
include (a) NSW needs to target their recruitment efforts in communities where AAPIs
geographically located, leverage AAPI’s motivation towards education and to partner with local
communities; (b) NSW needs to promote an active inclusion mentorship program tailored to
AAPI, by understanding what exactly APPIs need and want; (c) NSW needs to promote anti-

v
discrimination practices. Equal opportunity training towards understanding stereotypes that
affect AAPIs can help to improve performance and shortfalls that affect AAPIs.
Keywords: Asian American Pacific Islanders; Navy SEALs; stereotypes; discrimination

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Dedication
First and foremost, I want to thank the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ who died for the sins
of everyone, if they shall believe in Him. If it were not for Him, I would not have made it
through this program, which has challenged me spiritually, cognitively, and physically. When I
first applied to USC, I did not expect to be admitted due to its low acceptance rate; however,
when I received my acceptance letter it was no surprise to my biggest supporter, my wife. I do
not believe in coincidences and therefore I believe God was with me every step of the way. As
Jesus said in Matthew 22:37, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all
thy soul, and with all thy mind” (KJV). To which my acknowledgment of God will always come
first.
Next, I want to thank my beautiful wife Maria, who supported me throughout this
program, let alone throughout our 20-plus-year journey together. She is the toughest woman I
know, having to endure hours, days, weeks, and months away from one other during my time in
the military, having been deployed to dangerous locations globally, and during my studies in this
program. If it were not for her faith and belief in me, I would have likely quit out of this
program. She encouraged me along the way, and constantly reminded me that I could do it and
that she would never allow me to quit. Thank you, Maria, for your belief in me and your
continued support in my educational journey. I love you! In addition, I want to thank my 8-yearold daughter who endured the last 3-plus-years of her life without receiving 100 percent of my
time focused on her. She remained steadfast in my journey even though you may not have fully
understood what it was I was always doing. I recall you always saying my daddy is always doing
this, as you demonstrated me typing away on a keyboard. Now that this is all over, I can promise,
as long as I am still breathing and able, I will be there for you every step of the way. I love you!

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Acknowledgments
I want to thank all those who supported me at USC. From my classmates to my
professors in the OCL program. However, I want to send a shout out and an extra thanks to Dr.
Courtney Malloy! I honestly do not know how you do it. We often talk about the resilience of
students, but your resilience, persistence, patience, and never-ending support cannot go
unnoticed.

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Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication................................................................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables............................................................................................................................. x
List of Figures........................................................................................................................... xi
List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................ xii
Chapter One: Overview of the Study.......................................................................................... 1
Background of the Problem ............................................................................................ 2
Purpose of the Study....................................................................................................... 9
Significance of the Study...............................................................................................10
Definition of Terms.......................................................................................................11
Organization of the Study ..............................................................................................16
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature......................................................................................17
The Low Proportion of AAPIs in the U.S. Navy SEALs ................................................17
A Need to Remove Disincentives ..................................................................................24
Perceptual Barriers ........................................................................................................28
Perception of a Leader...................................................................................................38
Summary.......................................................................................................................41
Chapter Three: Methodology.....................................................................................................43
Overview of Design.......................................................................................................43
The Researcher..............................................................................................................44
Data Source ...................................................................................................................46
Data Collection Procedures............................................................................................47
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................48

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Validity and Reliability..................................................................................................49
Ethics............................................................................................................................50
Chapter Four: Themes...............................................................................................................51
Participants....................................................................................................................51
Results for Research Question One (RQ1): Which Factors Influenced the
Decision of AAPIs to Join as a U.S. Navy SEAL? .........................................................53
Results for Research Question 2 (RQ2): What Were The Perceptions of AAPI
Regarding Support For Career Advancement in The U.S. Navy SEALs? .......................57
Summary.......................................................................................................................71
Results for Research Question 3 (RQ3): What Factors Influenced The Retirement
or Separation of AAPIs in The Naval Special Warfare Community?..............................71
Summary.......................................................................................................................76
Chapter Five: Recommendations...............................................................................................77
Discussion of Findings ..................................................................................................77
Implications for Practice................................................................................................82
Future Research and Limitations....................................................................................93
Limitations and Delimitations........................................................................................94
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................94
References ................................................................................................................................96
Appendix A: Interview Protocol ..................................................................................117

x
List of Tables
Table 1: Participant Demographics 51

xi
List of Figures
Figure 1: White/AAPI Composition of Navy SEAL Enlisted and Their Source Population 8
Figure 2: White/AAPI Composition of Navy SEAL Enlisted and Their Source Population 8

xii
List of Abbreviations
ANAN American Native/Alaskan Native
BUD/S Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
DI Diversity and Inclusion
DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center
DONCNSWC Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command
NAVSOF Naval Special Operations Forces
NCO Non-commissioned officer
NSW Naval Special Warfare
MISO Military Information Support Operations
MLDC Military Leadership Diversity Commission
SOF Special Operations Forces
SQT SEAL Qualification Training
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

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Chapter One: Overview of the Study
The concept of diversity and inclusion (DI) is what allows the U.S. military to be
successful in being a global force for good, mainly if every racial demographic is represented
throughout the leadership ranks of every career (Garamone, 2022; Kamarck, 2016; USSOCOM,
2021). Therefore, not only is DI at the core of the U.S. military, but it is central to its success,
and this is especially true for the special operations forces (SOF) organization from which the
U.S. Navy SEALs community is a part (Moore & Parker, 2020; USSOCOM, 2021). The SOF
organization has gone through great strides to integrate ethnic minorities; however, there is still
an underrepresentation of minorities, especially among those who identify as Asian American
Pacific Islanders (AAPI). When examining minorities serving as Navy SEALs, they represent
approximately 30% of the total force (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2018; Department of
Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022). In addition, when examining and comparing
AAPI serving as Navy SEALs among their U.S. civilian (7%) and U.S. Navy (5%) counterparts,
it shows an underrepresentation of this group mainly at the non-commissioned officer (NCO)
ranks unlike commissioned officers (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021; Department of Navy Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2022). For example, in 2019, of the AAPIs who graduated from BUD/S
(Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL) Training, only 0.8% were NCOs, and 2.4% were
commission officers (Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022). See Figure
1 and Figure 2 for more detail.
So, while the Navy SEAL organization recognizes that having a diverse workforce is an
operational imperative, it continues to struggle in maintaining DI among AAPIs throughout its
leadership ranks (Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022; USSOCOM,
2021). In terms of ranking, based on several data points, as AAPIs steadily increase in rank, their

2
numbers significantly decline to dangerously low levels, even though data shows AAPIs are
projected to grow from 22,400 million in 2019 to 34,800 million by 2040 in the United States,
thus making them the fastest growing minority demographic next to Hispanic/Latinos (Budiman
& Ruiz, 2021; Defense Manpower Data Center, 2018; Department of Navy Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2022; Pew Research Center, 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).
Based on data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (2018) and other DoD
sources, they do suggest other influencing factors are affecting AAPIs from considering the
Navy SEALs career field, which this study sought to examine. This inequality uniformly
excludes AAPIs from within the workforce from ultimately reaching the senior leadership ranks.
The Commanding General of the Headquarters (HQ) United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), which includes SOF organizations from each service branch, Richard
Clarke stated, “We know that our force does not represent the diversity of our larger society; a
fact that should give us pause” (USSOCOM, 2021, p. 1). Additionally, of further concern,
research needs to examine the underrepresentation of AAPIs serving as SOF senior leaders but
more specifically those serving as SEALs. While this does affect AAPI participation, this also
affects other minority groups as well. As a result, the low proportion of AAPI SEALs will not
improve if this type of research is neglected. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the low
proportion of Navy SEALs who identify as AAPIs. In addition, this study will explore what
barriers prevent them from considering the U.S. Navy SEAL as an occupational choice as
stakeholders themselves.
Background of the Problem
The terms Naval Special Warfare (NSW) or Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF)
are interchangeable and are a small maritime force that consists of approximately 10,000

3
personnel, of which approximately 3,000 are U.S. Navy SEALs (Naval Special Warfare
Command, 2018). Navy SEAL takes its name from the elements of Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL)
in which they operate and is the U.S. Navy’s SOF premiere maritime component to the
USSOCOM (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018). To become a SEAL, candidates must
endure and complete a grueling 6-month selection and training (S&T) pipeline known as BUD/S.
Upon completing the BUD/S S&T, a SEAL candidate receives additional training, for an
additional 6 months, at the SEAL Qualification Training (SQT) course before becoming a
qualified SEAL operator. The NSW organization represents approximately 11% of USSOCOM
and less than 2% of U.S. Navy members (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018).
Navy SEAL operators are highly trained maritime commandos whose primary roles
include direct action, special reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, security force
assistance, foreign internal defense, and countering weapons of mass destruction (Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2018). Navy SEAL’s secondary roles include foreign humanitarian
assistance, hostage rescue, and unconventional warfare (Naval Special Warfare Command,
2018). Navy SEALs also support civil affairs and military information support operations, all of
which most of these responsibilities are done outside the United States (Naval Special Warfare
Command, 2018).
Navy SEALs do not operate unilaterally but bilaterally with foreign partners as part of a
more extensive joint military operation (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018). This allows
the Navy SEALs to maintain a level of readiness in response to a crisis, in building trust and
confidence and interoperability among coalition forces and engage with foreign allies and other
government agencies (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018). As a result of their small
operating size, Navy SEALs are versatile, allowing them to emphasize innovation through the

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diversity of their people (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018). Moreover, Navy SEALs
receive cultural engagement training, allowing them to understand the cultural differences and
nuances of countries where they will deploy. Therefore, this allows Navy SEALs to gain access
to where they can execute specific tasks demanded by U.S. interests (Naval Special Warfare
Command, 2018). Navy SEAL’s overarching roles and responsibilities are significant in a
collaborative environment with military operations that are ongoing worldwide, especially in
denied and politically sensitive environments requiring regional and cultural experts, giving SOF
an advantage (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018; USSOCOM, 2021). This aspect of being
regional and cultural experts lends itself to this study. If SEAL operators are to receive regional
and cultural training and be experts, yet they are homogenous in appearance and thought, then
they cannot be fully and operationally effective in operating in a complex asymmetric global
domain (USSOCOM, 2021). Therefore, to address the issue of regional and cultural experts, the
NSW organization needs to attract, recruit, select, train, and retain subject matter cultural experts
who look and can act the part, while still being able to conduct NAVSOF activities.
The issue concerning why minorities do not join SOF has been an ongoing challenge, for
which there is little research on this subject, for both the USSOCOM and the NSW organizations
since as early as 1992 in Martha Teplitzky’s report on Minority Representation in the Enlisted
Special Forces and the 1999 report on Barriers to Minority Participation in Special Operations
Forces by Harrell et al. Furthermore, several DI initiatives have been promulgated by
policymakers and high-ranking military officials, including the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Acts for the fiscal year 2009 (Kamarck, 2016). In addition, the U.S. Congress
authorized the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) to conduct a wide-ranging
appraisal and valuation of current DI policies that provide opportunities for minority members in

5
the Armed Services for promotion and advancement (Kamarck, 2016). Furthermore, in 2011, the
Obama Administration issued executive order 13583, which began a federal government-wide
promotion of DI at all levels of the federal workforce (Kamarck, 2016). According to Kamarck,
(2016),
Diversity contributes to the strength of the Armed Forces. Congress senses that the
United States should— (1) continue to recognize and promote diversity in the Armed
Forces and (2) honor those from all diverse backgrounds and religious traditions who
have made sacrifices in serving the United States through the Armed Forces (p. 2).
In contrast, the biographical data from the Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare
Command (DONCNSWC) (2022) and the DMDC (2018), along with Harrell et al.’s (1999)
recommendations, shows that not much progress has been made towards increasing AAPI
presence within the SEAL ranks. Harrel et al.’s 1999 report is brought back into attention,
linking several problems with why minority participation as SOF operators is low. The
recommendations Harrel et al. (1999) did provide seem to have made little headway when
examining USSOCOM’s Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2021, especially towards
addressing barriers in entry prerequisites and retention. Consequently, there needs to be more
priority for USSOCOM and NAVSOF regarding DI amongst all racial stakeholders. As a result,
this presents significant concerns regarding NSW’s operational capabilities regarding accessing
denied and politically sensitive regions mentioned earlier. When examining the 2022
DONCNSWC data, records indicate there has been very little progress towards increasing AAPI
participation for those serving as SEAL operators since 2011. See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for more
detail. This little increase is especially true for NCOs despite the initiatives and policies already

6
in place. However, those at the commission line-officer ranks have done slightly better. See
Table 2.
According to the Baldor (2023) and the DONCNSWC (2022), 75% to 80% of Navy
SEALs who graduated from BUD/S between 2011 to 2019 are White (see Figure 1 and Figure
2). With White people being the dominant demographic group, the homogeneity of SEAL
operators and those who make it to senior leadership levels indicate an ongoing and persistent
problem in the recruitment, selection, training, accession, and retention process for the AAPI.
Moreover, based on data, as the level of rank and responsibility increases, the number of AAPIs
drastically declines (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2018; Military OneSource, 2019;
Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022). Therefore, this implies that
underlying structural and perceptual barriers influences AAPIs from considering a career serving
as Navy SEALs and for them to remain long enough for promotion to senior leadership
positions.
Structural barriers include extrinsic factors such as policies and initiatives, which can
impede and or exclude AAPIs from considering a SEAL career (Harrell et al., 1999). On the
other hand, perceptual barriers consist of intrinsic factors built on personal beliefs, attitudes, and
perceptions that may influence AAPIs from considering or ignoring a career as a SEAL all
together (Harrell et al., 1999). Therefore, what this all means is that structural and perceptual
barriers can and do prevent AAPIs from considering a career as a U.S. Navy SEAL. In addition,
these barriers ultimately affect retention of AAPIs who are serving as SEAL operators due to a
lack of role models, identification, and perception over inclusion.
According to Baldor (2023), the NSW organization is not experiencing a shortage of
eligible and eager candidates attempting to be Navy SEALs. However, again, based on the

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DMDC’s (2018) and DONCNSWC (2022) data, most of these candidates are predominantly
White (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). In 2019, only 7% of U.S. Navy SEAL officers were
minorities compared with 23% of all Navy officers, and only 7% of Navy SEAL NCOs are
minorities compared with 41% of the enlisted personnel (Department of Navy Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2022; Military One Source, 2019). Again, in 2019, AAPIs serving as Navy
SEAL officers were 2.3%, and those serving in the enlisted ranks were 0.8% (see Figure 1 and
Figure 2) (Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022).
When examining and comparing the data of past studies to current data from the
DONCNSWC, there is a nearly 70% drop in those serving within the enlisted ranks (see Figure
1). In contrast, there was an increase of 0.1% among the officer ranks (see Figure 2) for AAPIs
who graduated from BUD/S and SQT in 2019. For further clarification, DONCNSWC did not
classify Asian Americans (AA), Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders (PI) as a homogeneous group,
as in older studies. However, for this study, AAs, Hawaiians, and PIs were aggregated, which
was no different than previous studies except for including American Native/Alaskan Native
(ANAN). For this study, the exclusion of ANANs was primarily based on the fact no ANAN
commissioned officer was recorded as having graduated in the CNSWC’s data, along with the
fact only one ANAN NCO graduated from BUD/S in 2009 (Department of Navy Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2022).

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Figure 1
White/AAPI Composition of Navy SEAL Enlisted and Their Source Population
Source: Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command (2022)
Figure 2
White/AAPI Composition of Navy SEAL Enlisted and Their Source Population
Source: Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command (2022)

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Figure 1 and Figure 2 show both the AAPI and White compositions of U.S. Navy SEAL
graduates on active duty and both the AAPI and White composition for the source population
from which NSW draws its recruits (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021; Department of Navy Naval Special
Warfare Command, 2022). Figure 1 and Figure 2 show data for fiscal year (FY) 1997 taken from
Harrel et al.’s 1999 report on ‘Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?’ for NCOs
and commission officers, respectively. The purpose of including Harrel et al.’s (1999) data was
to juxtapose the data alongside the DONCNSWC (2022) data ranging from FY 2011 to FY 2019.
That said, Harrel et al.’s (1999) data did not specifically identify or separate AAPI as a single
demographic group but categorized them as ‘other’ when comparing racial minorities (e.g.,
Black people and Hispanics/Latinos) for their study. The ‘other’ did consist of AAs, Hawaiians,
PI, and ANAN. Tables 1 and 2 suggest a stark reminder that while there is an
underrepresentation of minorities, the underrepresentation of AAPIs are much more severe.
To address this DI issue, in the SOF organizations, the HQ of USSOCOM implemented
their “Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2021.” The plan includes four main effort areas: (a)
Organizational Climate and Culture Vision - Leadership - Communication; (b) SOF Integration
Attraction - Assessment - Selection; (c) Education and Training Operational Effectiveness -
Cultural Competence - Organizational Engagement; and (d) Sustainment Infrastructure - Talent
Management - Retention.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine which factors influence the career decisions of
AAPIs to become U.S. Navy SEALs and the factors influencing their separation from the U.S.
Navy. The study also focused on the perceptions of AAPIs regarding support for their career
advancement.

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The following research questions guided this study:
1. Which factors influenced the decision of AAPIs to join as a U.S. Navy SEAL?
2. What were the perceptions of AAPI regarding support for career advancement in the U.S.
Navy SEAL?
3. Which factors influenced the retirement or separation of AAPIs in the Naval Special
Warfare community?
Significance of the Study
Notwithstanding the DI policies and initiatives propagated by policymakers in the U.S.
Congress, along with its senior military leaders to address the underrepresentation of minorities
over the years, there has been little movement to increase AAPIs serving as U.S. Navy SEALs,
which would better represent the U.S. population since Harrel et al.’s 1999 Rand Corporation
research (Kamarck, 2016; USSOCOM, 2021).
It is important to evaluate the Navy SEAL’s performance concerning its performance
goal of increasing DI among AAPIs for a variety of reasons. For example, the way in which the
U.S. will engage today and in future conflicts is constantly and rapidly changing, especially
regarding the polarization of nation-states. These types of issues create complex diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic problems extending beyond the conventional warfare
paradigms. When considering the Navy SEAL’s changing operational environment, which is to
train and operate during conventional, unconventional, and irregular warfare conditions on sea,
air, and land, the imperative of advancing DI initiates towards increasing AAPI stakeholdership
has never been more crucial for NSW’s success (Loughlin & Arnold, 2007; Phipps et al., 2014;
Schiena et al., 2013; Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2000;).

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This study is critical because if the NSW organization neglects increasing AAPIs through
their current DI policies and initiatives within the Navy SEAL ranks, along with their
advancement up the senior leadership positions, then this can affect its operational effectiveness
and result in placing its global operations at risk. According to a Pentagon diversity expert in
Washington, D.C.,
We are still determining where we will find ourselves in the future. One thing is for sure:
We will find ourselves around the globe. Moreover, around the globe, you have different
cultural backgrounds everywhere. Having that kind of diverse force can only increase
your operational capability (Vanden Brook, 2015, para. 4).
Additionally, a growing body of evidence shows that federal agencies in Washington,
D.C., are looking to diversify their ranks with a minority workforce, which reflects the U.S.
population (Riechmann, 2021; Thakur et al., 2021). Having said this, since 2017 SOF has been
deployed to over 70% of countries around the globe (Turse, 2017).
Definition of Terms
Several key terms are related to this area of diversity within the military leadership
organization. The following terms are defined and some of the terms are used frequently
throughout this study.
Asian Americans Pacific Islanders refers to a term typically used to describe all Asian
ethnicities as one demographical group based on the demographical location in which they
originated (Sandefur et al., 2004). For this study, Asian Americans Pacific Islanders will be an
umbrella term encompassing East Asians, Filipinos, Southeast Asians, and South Asians, Central
and Western Asia (Hsin & Xie, 2014).

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Basic Underwater Demolition/US NAVY SEAL Training (BUD/S) refers to the U.S.
Navy’s Special Warfare selection course designed to develop U.S. NAVY SEAL candidates to
become full-fledged U.S. Navy SEAL operators (Smith, 2021). The course is 24-weeks in length
and is divided into three phases: the first phase, which includes 7 weeks of physical conditioning;
the second phase involves combat diving using open and closed underwater breathing
apparatuses; and the third phase, when candidates learn land warfare skills such as basic
weapons, demolition, land navigation, and more (Smith, 2021). After graduating BUD/S,
graduates must then attend and complete U.S. Navy SEAL qualification training, where upon
graduating, they are qualified as a U.S. Navy SEAL and receive their qualification badge (Smith,
2021).
Commissioned officers (or “officers”) refers to individuals formally appointed who enter
through one of the military service academies (Air Force Academy, Naval Academy, West Point,
or Officer Candidate School). Commissioned officers generally possess a bachelor’s degree
(“Becoming a commissioned officer,” 2019; My Navy HR, 2021). Commissioned officers are
the leadership and management team of the U.S. Navy (“Becoming a commissioned officer,”
2019; My Navy HR, 2021). Commissioned officers consist of unrestricted line officers and
restricted officers. Unrestricted officers can lead and manage major combatant commands
including surface, aviation, nuclear, naval special warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal
(“Becoming a commissioned officer,” 2019; My Navy HR, 2021). Restricted officers are limited
to leadership and management of major combatant commands, including limited duty officers,
warrant officers, supply officers, and the like (My Navy HR, 2021).
Direction Action (DA) refers to “short-duration strikes, and other small-scale offensive
actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive

13
environments which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit,
recover, or damage designated targets” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–3).
Diversity refers to “Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of the
DoD’s Total Force, which are consistent with our core values, integral to overall readiness and
mission accomplishment, and reflective of the nation we serve” (U.S. Department of Defense,
2012, p. 3). In addition, some direct combat organizations define diversity as “diversity includes,
but is not limited to race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexuality, philosophical and spiritual
perspectives, language abilities, physical abilities, geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds,
cultural knowledge, life experiences, educational background, and cognitive diversity”
(USSOCOM, 2021, p. 3).
Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) refers to “actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil
affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of
the operational environment; identifying and mitigating underlying causes of instability within
civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility
of civil government” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–4).
Conventional military or general military refers to the conventional or general military is
a general-purpose force used to conduct conventional warfare between two or more states in
open confrontation (Marshall, 2021).
Counterinsurgency (COIN) refers to “comprehensive civilian and military efforts
designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root cause” (Naval
Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–3).
Counterterrorism (CT) refers to “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists
and their organizations and networks to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear

14
and coerce governments and societies to achieve their goals” (Naval Special Warfare Command,
2018, p. 1–3).
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) refers to “efforts against actors of
concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects
of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of
delivery” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–4).
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) refers to “Department of Defense activities
conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human
suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–4).
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) refers to “participation by civilian and military agencies
of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism,
and other threats to its security” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–3).
Hostage Rescue (HR) refers to “a personnel recovery method used to recover isolated
personnel who are specifically designated as hostages” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018,
p. 1–4).
Inclusion refers to:
A set of behaviors (culture) that encourages service members and civilian employees to
feel valued for unique qualities and to experience a sense of belonging. Inclusive
diversity is the process of valuing and integrating everyone’s perspectives, ideas, and
contributions into the way an organization functions and makes decisions, enabling
diverse workforce members to contribute to their full potential in a collaborative pursuit
of organizational objectives (USSOCOM, 2021, p. 5) [also] the process of addressing and

15
removing bias, creating environments where all members of the formation are integrated
to the organization and can wholly contribute to the success of the team while expressing
the best, truest version of themselves (USSOCOM, 2021, p. 3).
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) refers to “planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign insurgencies to influence their emotions, motives,
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives” (Naval Special Warfare
Command, 2018, p. 1–4).
Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) refers to a member of the military who does not have
a commission. NCOs are also known as the enlisted and must work through the enlisted ranks for
promotion. NCOs can enter the military without a college degree (Parker et al., 2017).
Security Force Assistance (SFA) refers to “the Department of Defense activities that
support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their
supporting institutions” (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2018, p. 1–3).
Senior NCOs, for this report, refers to officers with paygrades E-7 to E-9 for the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, while paygrade E-8 to E-9 for the Marines (Bajza, 2019a; Bajza, 2019b).
Special Operations Forces refers to using small units in direct or indirect military actions
focused on strategic or operational objectives. “They require units with combinations of trained
specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional
military forces” (Special Operations Forces Reference Manuel, 1999, para. 1).
Special Reconnaissance (SR) refers to “reconnaissance and surveillance actions
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and or politically sensitive
environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational importance, employing

16
military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces” (Naval Special Warfare
Command, 2018, p. 1–3).
Unconventional warfare (UW) refers to “activities conducted to enable a resistance
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (Naval
Special Warfare 2018, p. 1–4).
U.S. Navy SEAL (or Navy SEALs or SEALs) refers to the U.S. Navy’s premiere maritime
SOF component trained to “engage in direct raids or assaults on enemy targets, conduct
reconnaissance missions to report on enemy activity, and take action against terrorists”
(Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d., para. 1). U.S. NAVY SEAL is an acronym meaning Sea, Air, and
Land, which are the three domains in which they operate.
Organization of the Study
This research consists of five chapters. The design of this project begins with Chapter
One. It introduces the problem: the underrepresentation of AAPIs serving in the senior and
executive leadership ranks within the U.S. Navy SEALs. In addition, Chapter One consists of the
background of the problem, the organization in question, and the methodology of this study.
Chapter Two includes a literature review to help support and analyze the problem of practice.
Chapter Three describes the methodology used in this study, followed by Chapter Four, which
describes the results from the data collected. Finally, Chapter Five provides practice
recommendations based on the qualitative interview data and the literature, along with
recommendations for implementation.

17
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature
As indicated in Chapter One of this study, there is little research on minority participation
in the SOF career field. In addition, there is no research on AAPIs participation in SOF but, more
precisely, those serving as U.S. Navy SEAL operators. This review begins by examining a
seminal study conducted by Harrel et al. in 1999 on “Barriers to Minority Participation in Special
Operations Forces,” which is important to determine if their recommendations were taken for
action. The second section examines whether structural and perceptual barriers still exist in
Naval Special Warfare’s current S&T program, which was spoken of in Harrel et al.’s (1999)
report. The third section examines stereotypes and their role among AAPIs and the organization.
There is a substantial amount of literature indicating negative stereotypes and stereotype threats
exist towards AAPIs in many organizations. These biases are problematic since they affect the
way AAPIs are viewed as professionals and leaders within an organization like NSW. The last
section of this review will explore what a prototypical leader is, along with the structural and
perceptual expectations required, followed by a summary.
The Low Proportion of AAPIs in the U.S. Navy SEALs
U.S. Congress Diversity and Inclusion Efforts
The U.S. Congress is the only branch authorized to raise an Army, maintain a Navy, and
provide rules and regulations to ensure they are properly disciplined and trained (Kamarck,
2016). To ensure the military represents the public it serves, the U.S. Congress continues to
mandate greater access for minorities to increase their participation across the federal workforce
(Department of Defense, 2012; Kamarck, 2016). To address diversity and inclusion in the
military, U.S. Congress has authorized the Secretaries of Defense and the Military Departments
to develop criteria and standards to meet DI goals, which has been longstanding since Harrel et

18
al.’s RAND 1999 study. However, the Department of Defense’s lead appears to have made little
headway towards increasing DI among underrepresented groups, like AAPIs, in the senior
leadership ranks not only in the Navy SEALs, but in the whole of the U.S. military.
Despite the U.S. Congress’ attempt to address DI and exclusion for minorities, there are
still structural, cultural, and social barriers AAPIs continue to face in today’s military, especially
when it comes to awareness of a career in the U.S. Navy SEALs (Kamarck, 2017; USSOCOM,
2021). Moreover, despite the continual progress of minority integration in the U.S. military, there
continues to be a persisting disparity among AAPIs serving as U.S. Navy SEALs, which
ultimately affects the sustainment and promotion of this group into senior leadership positions
(Harris, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009).
Trends in Department of Defense Policies and Practices
The low proportion of Navy SEALs who identify as AAPIs in senior leadership positions
demonstrates there are significant structural and perceptual barriers not addressed in the
Congressional directives and the Department of Defenses’ official policy, which includes the
Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) mandated by the U.S. Congress, and the
USSOCOM’s 2021 Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. Of note, both the U.S. Navy and
USSOCOM do guide the DONCNSWC concerning DI initiatives. Again, this does not mean
their DI plan addresses underlying structural and perceptual barriers deeply embedded within
their plan, which ultimately affects the recruitment, assessment, training, retention, and ascension
of AAPIs to senior leadership positions (Harris, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009).
RAND Corporation Study
In 1997, the U.S. Congress commissioned RAND’s National Defense Research Institute
to conduct a study to determine whether there is an underrepresentation of minorities in SOF.

19
RAND’s goals for the study were to determine the extent to which minorities are in low
proportion to non-minorities, and if so, they sought to understand what the contributing factors
were (Harrel et al., 1999). The RAND study sought to answer three questions: (a) are minorities
underrepresented, (b) what can explain the small number of minority participation in SOF, and
(c) do current service policies address structural and perceptual issues (Harrel et al., 1999). The
outcome of the RAND study showed what members of Congress assumed all along; structural
and perceptual barriers did exist resulting in the underrepresentation of minorities. It is unclear
whether the DI policies and initiatives were acted on immediately after RAND’s findings were
handed to the U.S. Congress. However, more than a decade later, several policies and initiatives
to promote DI across the military force have been implemented, but to what extent is unknown.
Consequently, 25 years since the RAND study, minorities, specifically AAPIs, are still in
low proportion as compared to other minority groups within the SOF career field (Defense
Manpower Data Center, 2018; Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022;
USSOCOM, 2021). While such longstanding discrepancies may seem acceptable due to the
differences in mission requirements of each military service component, along with their
complete freedom to accept or reject RAND’s recommendations, this might explain why some of
the recommendations were not implemented (Harrel et al., 1999), thus resorting to the low
proportion of SEALs who identify as AAPIs. While some DI policies and initiatives were taken
for action, there needs to be a more precise way to measure DI policies and initiatives addressing
perceptual barriers among all stakeholders to determine whether they were successful or not.
Barriers To AAPI Participation as U.S. Navy SEALs
Structural Barriers

20
Since the 1997 RAND study (Harrel et al., 1999), this section examines and identifies
what recommendations were given to the U.S. Congress to determine if these policies reflect
today’s policies and practices in recruiting, training, assessing, and retaining AAPIs to serve as
U.S. Navy SEAL operators in both the NCO and commission officer tracks. Harrel et al. (1999)
defined structural barriers as requirements or conditions that relatively and essentially prevent
minorities from participating in an organization when compared to the dominant group and are
characterized by the policies and procedures of the organization. For instance, the RAND study
did provide several examples of structural barriers affecting minority participation which
include: the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) examination and its cutoff
scores, a clean military record clear of infractions, and physical and academic requirements (i.e.,
swimming and land navigation), which are all requirements of the BUD/S training course (Harrel
et al., 1999). It is important to note that while USSOCOM and NSW are mandated to increase
minorities and are expected to overcome structural barriers, which was addressed in the 1997
RAND study (Harrel et al., 1999), the study suggested it was acceptable for each SOF service
component to identify the best candidate for the job through their own S&T program. However,
how NSW attracts and screens candidates can affect minority participation and graduation rates,
and this begins with supporting minority youth programs.
Supporting Youth Programs
RAND’s study found swimming to be one of the significant factors related to why
minorities are not attracted to SOF (Harrel et al., 1999). Therefore, supporting youth programs in
minority communities, including water polo and swim teams, other extra-curricular activities like
the Boy Scouts, and more was Harrel et al.’s (1999) recommendation. Most of the component
services still do this today, but recruiters are not always SOF operators who are minorities

21
themselves and who go into minority communities to recruit. As a matter of fact, there are not
enough SEAL recruiters, since approximately 3,000 of them are on operational status. Moreover,
when taking stereotypes into consideration, this could affect AAPI communities, especially if
joining the military is not in their line of focus.
Minorities and Swimming. Sato and Hodge’s (2012) and Ito’s (2014) study asserted
there is a low proportion of minorities, such as African Americans, in aquatic sports because they
have less access to pools or are not encouraged to swim where they can build up their swimming
skills required for BUD/S or to join the U.S. Navy—in a study published by the USA
Swimming Organization (2016) found that, unlike African Americans and Hispanics or Latinos,
AAPIs are encouraged to swim. However, they disagreed on a statement on whether “swimming
was for them,” along with the fact they were fearful of drowning or sustaining an injury. The
USA Swimming Organization (2016) data also shows that approximately two-thirds of Asian
Americans could not swim. The USA Swimming Organization provided several reasons, based
on their research data, why Asian Americans could not swim, and they include: fear of
swimming, swimming ability, physical appearance, parental influence/encouragement, role
model recognition/influence, and access to facilities (USA Swimming Organization, 2016). Sato
and Hodge’s (2012) and the USA Swimming Organization’s (2016) findings both parallel the
concerns of minorities and further validate the findings found in the 1997 RAND study (Harrel et
al., 1999). This demonstrates that structural barriers still play a significant role at the state and
local levels where socialization begins.
Entry Requirements. Another of RAND’s (Harrel et al., 1999) recommendations
addressed entry requirements, which should be relevant to support SOF missions (Harrel et al.,
1999). For some of the other SOF service components, swimming may not be necessary (Harrel

22
et al., 1999). However, since SEALs are the U.S. Navy's SOF maritime component, it is a
requirement for all candidates. The BUD/S S&T requires their candidates to swim 2-mile ocean
swims under timed conditions each week, with improving scores (“Enlisted SEAL,” 2022;
Smith, 2021). Furthermore, NCO and commissioned officer BUD/S candidates must pass at least
70% and 80% of their academic and physical standards, respectively, before they can move to
the next phase of training (“Enlisted SEAL,” 2022; Smith, 2021). If students do not maintain
BUD/S’ swimming standards, they will attend an academic and performance review to determine
if they can continue with training. If BUD/S students are recommended to remain in training,
they will receive remedial training, which includes spending more time swimming in a pool and,
in some cases, ocean swims under mentorship and coaching from a BUD/S instructor. If a
student fails to meet the 2-mile swimming standard after being given a second attempt, they are
involuntarily disenrolled from BUD/S.
Valid Screening Requirements. After meeting entry requirements, NSW must maintain
and retain valid screening entry requirements for its S&T (Harrel et al., 1999). SOF members
from both the majority and minority ethnic groups were resolute towards ensuring the strictest
and highest standards were kept in place to enter SOF’s selection courses. All members agreed
that if they were to lower the standards for the sake of allowing more minorities to enter SOF,
this would be harmful to SOF’s missions and the minority group (Harrel et al., 1999). NSW has
gone to great lengths to maintain the same entry standards to enter and graduate from BUD/S
S&T (Laryf, 2019; “BUD/S Training,” 2021). However, NSW has adjusted their S&T program,
such as reducing the amount of running for a short period to reduce the number of injuries
resulting from running (i.e., shin splints and more) (“Hell Week,” 2021; Larryf, 2022; Obringer
& Guzman, 2021; Piette, 2022). It is difficult to determine the exact time period when BUD/S’

23
running program and the infamous ‘Hellweek’ were modified from the fourth week of phase one
training to the third week, with the goal of decreasing running related injuries to ensure more
students could graduate. However, based on available open-source data, this change occurred
sometime after 2020 (“Hell Week,” 2021; Larryf, 2022; Obringer & Guzman, 2021; Piette,
2022). Moving Hellweek from the fourth week to the third week reduced the stress BUD/S
candidates experience, decreasing injuries and reducing medical performance drops
(Frumentarius, 2023; Kessler, 2020;). Therefore, NSW is active in its effort to shift specific
training events to maintain valid, equitable training requirements for all candidates.
Review Entry Requirements. The ASVAB is a structural barrier from which all the SOF
components draw composite scores from potential candidates (Harrel et al., 1999). The ASVAB
is the first barrier any NAVSOF candidate must pass to join the military and they must score
high enough for consideration to the BUD/S S&T. While the ASVAB is sufficient, RAND’s
study suggested other subtests may be as effective in predicting good performance outcomes,
which could include more minorities (Harrel et al., 1999). It is not exactly clear what these other
subtests would be and if they would be made available to minorities since the ASVAB has 11
subtests, which consist of word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, mechanical comprehension,
shop information, automotive information, electronics information, mathematics knowledge,
general science, paragraph comprehension, assembling objects, verbal expressions, and coding
speed (“Enlisted SEAL,” 2022).
If an NCO candidate’s ASVAB scores are close to the cutoff of the total composite score,
they can submit a request to the U.S. Navy for a waiver on a case-by-case basis (“Enlisted
SEAL,” 2022; Harrel et al., 1999). However, Trust (2020) and the National Public Radio, (2021)
pointed out that nearly 25% of high school students who took the ASVAB did not pass.

24
Alarmingly, 30% to 40% of minorities who took the exam did not pass the ASVAB (National
Public Radio, 2021; Trust, 2020). Again, this means that minorities are already at a disadvantage
before entering the U.S. military, which can also affect their participation in the U.S. Navy
SEALs, especially if they come from a lower socioeconomic status (Buckingham et al., 2013).
Psychological research attributes educational attainment to one’s socioeconomic status, where
children from low-income homes and communities develop slower than those who do not
(Morgan et al., 2008). For example, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2019) most minorities
who joined the military came from lower socioeconomic neighborhoods, in contrast to Whites,
who came from higher socioeconomically well of neighborhoods (Lutz, 2008; Morgan et al.,
2008).
A Need to Remove Disincentives
NCO Pathways to SEAL Training
There are two ways a person who wants to be SEAL can attend BUD/S as an NCO
(“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023). The first pathway is to join the
U.S. Navy through a recruiting office, where they must meet the basic qualifications for the
Navy and the SEALs (“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023). Once the
individual has met all the academic (i.e., ASVAB), medical, and physical screening test (PST)
requirements at the recruiter’s office, they can apply for a U.S. Navy SEAL contract (“How to
Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023). After completing the U.S. Navy’s Bootcamp,
they immediately attend BUD/S S&T. Like all U.S. Navy careers, BUD/S S&T is considered a
U.S. Navy ‘A’ school or basic training (“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith,
2021, 2023). Once an individual completes the 6-month BUD/S S&T, they will receive advanced
training, or what is known as a ‘C’ school, in what is called SEAL qualification training for an

25
additional 6 months (“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023). Once the
members complete both BUD/S and SQT, they receive their SEAL qualification and become
qualified SEALs (“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023). Unlike new
recruits, active-duty NCOs who screen to attend BUD/S from a myriad of different naval careers
(i.e., engineering, medicine, aviation, and others), must apply for BUD/S training through their
current command and human resources (HR) officer or detailer (“How to Enlist,” 2021; Smith,
2023). For these types of sailors, they must: (a) Secure command approval, (b) pass the SEAL
physical standards test, (c) pass the medical examination, (d) pass a personal records review to
ensure the members have no disciplinary actions against them within a specified time frame, (e)
secure HR detailer approval “How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023).
Applying for BUD/S through this route is determined on several factors such as workforce
quotas, class start dates, and more “How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021; Smith, 2023).
One advantage of applying for BUD/S through this route is the sailor may likely have a job
designation (i.e., engineer, medicine, aviation, and others), unlike a recruit who might not have a
job guarantee if he fails to complete BUD/S (“How to Enlist,” 2021; “Navy SEALs,” 2021;
Smith, 2023). For AAPIs this could be seen as a drawback therefore preventing them from
considering a SEAL career altogether (Harrel et al., 1999).
Officer Pathways to SEAL Training
For commissioned officers, they can enter BUD/s through several ways: (a) the U.S.
Naval Academy (USNA), (b) Officer Candidate School (OCS), (c) Naval Reserve Officer
Training Corps (NROTC), or (d) direct from the fleet (“Only the Brave,” 2019). Notably, the
first three entry points resemble the first access point for an NCO. There are three additional
access points for officers which this study will mention, but will not provide a robust

26
explanation, and they include: (a) Inter-service Academies, (b) lateral transfers, and (c) interservice transfers (“Enlisted SEAL,” 2022; “Only the Brave,” 2019). That said, unlike NCOs,
officers have a chance to apply for a 2-week SEAL Officer Assessment and Selection (SOAS),
which prepares them for the rigors of BUD/S (“Only the Brave,” 2019). SOAS may also
contribute to the higher number of officers who graduate from BUD/S (see Figure 1 in Chapter
One). As for an officer who is in the fleet, they would need command and detailer approval,
similar to the NCO process (“Only the Brave,” 2019). Unlike NCOs who drop on request (DOR)
or quit BUD/S, the penalty for commissioned officers who DOR can affect their fitness reports
(evaluations) and ultimately affect their Naval careers more so than NCOs. One of these reasons
is there are not a lot of seats available for officers to attend BUD/S, thus earning a spot is highly
competitive. Therefore, if an officer DORs, that officer gave up a limited and much coveted seat,
which could have been filled by another officer who would have made it. As stated earlier with
NCOs, for AAPIs this could be a disincentive for them in avoiding a career as a SEAL (Harrel et
al., 1999).
High-Risk High Reward – High Reward High Risk
Prior to applying for BUD/S, both NCOs and commissioned officers are aware of
BUD/S’ high attrition rate, which is between 70% to 85% (Atlamazoglou, 2018). For recruits
who apply for BUD/S from a recruiter’s office, they risk not having another job guarantee if they
fail (Harrel et al., 1999). And, unlike sailors who apply to BUD/S from the fleet, if they fail to
graduate from BUD/S they either return to their previous job description or separate from the
Navy, which is dependent on the amount of time they have on their contract (Rochaksafar,
2023). Again, unlike NCOs who come from the fleet, recruits with a SEAL guarantee have more
to lose if they fail to graduate from SEAL training (Harrel et al., 1999). Therefore, this offers a

27
high risk and high reward for completing, arguably, the most arduous military training the
Department of Defense has to offer (Larryf, 2022; Smith, 2021).
As a result, failing to graduate from BUD/S for any reason, puts a sailor back in the
hands of their detailer, who will assign them anywhere based on the needs of the Navy (Larryf,
2022). There is a benefit of not having a job guarantee of a BUD/S drop, in that the member is
not stuck in any career field and can learn a new job skill through on-the-job training through the
Navy’s Professional Apprenticeship Career Tracks program, or PACT (My Navy HR, 2022;
“Professional Apprenticeship,” 2018). However, not having a definitive career path could
disincentivize AAPIs from applying for BUD/S to begin with who may have personal
reservations about completing the training (Harrel et al., 1999). The BUD/S program has a 90%
attrition rate from when the applicant steps into a recruiter’s office to the end of SQT
(Atlamazoglou, 2018), offering a high reward with high risk. Since RAND’s study (Harrel et al.,
1999), policymakers and military leaders implemented their recommendations, changing entry
requirements and the loss of any job guarantee. However, as of 2021, U.S. Navy SEALs who
identify as AAPIs remain extremely low at all levels of leadership, which demonstrates there are
still significant barriers to address.
While explaining why its recommendations were not promptly acted upon might be
understandable if the 1997 RAND study had been conducted recently, this is not the situation.
The DoD, USSOCOM, and CNSWC have had over two decades to implement the suggested
changes. As a result, persisting racial disparities may suggest other variables and not policies or
procedure could be adversely affecting the ascension and retention of AAPIs to senior leadership
positions as SEALs (Harris, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). Therefore, the implicit structural
barriers signify that concerns over diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity are not especially

28
explicit in official policies. According to Kamarck (2016), DI in senior leadership and
management positions positively impacts an organization’s performance and goals, which the
SEAL community is currently experiencing.
Studies also show when integrating minorities with the dominant group, the minorities
are more favorably accepted, allowing them to think in new and innovative ways (Krueger et al.,
2022). Moreover, studies indicate if more AAPIs are at top leadership levels, they are more
likely to remain in that organization due to the perception of how they see themselves fitting into
the organization (Bandura, 1989; Kamarck, 2016; Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008). In addressing
this problem of practice, leadership diversity or modeling is a considered factor contributing to
the attracting, training, and retaining of a qualified workforce (Kamarck, 2016; Purdie-Vaughns
et al., 2008).
This section addressed a few structural barriers contributing to the low proportion of U.S.
Navy SEALs identified as AAPIs. There has been some progress toward removing structural
barriers. Nevertheless, there remain structural barriers within current DI policies and initiatives at
all levels. As a result, these structural barriers continue to perpetuate the low numbers of AAPIs
serving as SEALs. That said, structural barriers are part of the equation. The next section will
examine and discuss the concept of perceptual barriers and why it may be contributing to the
underrepresentation of AAPIs in the U.S. Navy SEALs and their senior leadership positions.
Perceptual Barriers
In the previous section, the review of literature demonstrated that structural barriers are
quantifiable and can be addressed through policies and initiatives. However, unlike structural
barriers, perceptual barriers are more abstract. This section will examine some of the perceptual

29
barriers affecting the U.S. Navy from attracting, recruiting, training, assessing, and retaining
SEALs who identify as AAPIs in the NCO and commissioned officer tracks.
Harrel et al. (1999) defined perceptual barriers as barriers that comprise certain beliefs,
attitudes, and overall perceptions leaving AAPIs impartial towards pursuing a career as a SEAL.
In the simplest terms, perceptual barriers are mental blocks stemming from social cognitive
influences from interactions between personal, behavioral, and environmental factors (Bandura,
1989; Bandura, 2001; Bandura, 2018). This indicates perceptual barriers can manifest into and/or
perpetuate stereotypes, leading to discrimination and racism towards AAPIs. Perceptual barriers
affecting AAPIs are numerous and would exceed the scope of this study. Thus, this study will
focus on three dominant perceptual threats affecting AAPIs from enlisting to be SEALs and
leaving them with disinterest. These factors include cultural pressure and social identity,
preferential treatment, and a multitude of stereotypes.
Social Identity. The lack of AAPI SEALs contributes to the belief they are not welcome
and can further dissuade them from joining to the lack of identity and role models (Harrel et al.,
1999). Furthermore, with the contribution of stereotypes and social and cultural influences, these
perceptual barriers create knowledge barriers such as the transferability of Navy SEAL skills into
the civilian job market (Harrel et al., 1999). Overcoming perceptual barriers is a challenging task
for many organizations. DI initiatives can only easily undertake some possible perceptual
barriers. However, there are things the Navy and the SEAL enterprise can do to change the
perceptions of AAPIs, and it begins by recognizing what these perceptual barriers are, through
education and training.
AAPI Cultural Pressure. AAPI attitudes, values, and learning styles are learned through
culture, which can come into conflict with those outside their circles (Ronfeldt, 2006; Schneider

30
& Lee, 1990). The differences in values between AAPIs, Whites, and other minorities rest on
Confucian beliefs (Adams & Vernon, 2007; Model, 2020). This concept of Confucianism is the
belief, through persistence, determination, and focus, one can perfect their life (Adams &
Vernon, 2007). Confucian principles are practiced among some AAPI social classes due to the
benefits mentioned, which can serve as a structure and predictor of their child’s educational and
occupational attainment (Model, 2020; Ng & Wei, 2020). However, according to Parks and Yoo
(2016), the danger of this insular communal practice is it can contribute to the belief in what
researchers have dubbed as the “perpetual foreigner,” which is discussed later.
Many AAPI families believe education is the key driver toward economic and social
success, which the masses practice (Adams & Vernon, 2007; Model, 2020). In considering how
societies form, we see how culture can pressure group members to meet specific cultural
expectations (Bandura, 1989; Ronfeldt, 2006). Therefore, most AAPI cultures place a high
premium on education, believing education is the key to moving up the socioeconomic and
socio-political ladder of success (Model, 2020; Ng & Wei, 2020).
Perception and Preferential Treatment. Throughout U.S. history, society and
organizations have created, whether wittingly or unwittingly, a culture that tends to arrange or
separate social identities based on ethnicity, race, religion, and more (Gentile-Genitty et al.,
2021; Ronfeldt, 2006). As a result, those not adequately represented within or outside the
organization will possess skepticism due to perceived preferential treatment among those with
specific characteristics (Steele et al., 2002). Perception of preferential treatment can create longlasting aftereffects on a person’s behavior which can affect one’s environment, ranging from
different types of standardized tests to academic and physical performances, and therefore affect
the characteristics of personal and social identities (Steele et al., 2002). While Steele et al.’s

31
(2002) research focuses on school performance standards for women, the idea is that specific
negative stereotypes can also devalue women and AAPIs within and between different
organizational socio-ecosystems. In the case of AAPI SEALs who lack racial representation in
the senior leadership levels, negative stereotypes may serve as an extra burden on their abilities
and their potential achievements (Cohen & Garcia, 2008; Steele et al., 2002).
Stereotypes
Model Minority Stereotype. The principal concept of AAPIs as highly educated and
career-oriented high achievers has its roots in what was coined the Model Minority by
sociologist William Pettersen (1966). Pettersen’s theory is that if a minority group like AAPIs
can achieve socioeconomic success, other minority groups can reach a similar outcome
(Barringer et al., 1990; Ng et al., 2007). As a result of Pettersen’s theory, those who opposed the
civil rights movement would use AAPI’s success stories to argue that such high achievements
were evident inequality was non-existent (Osajima, 2007; Pettersen, 1996). The article served as
a turning point for AAPIs’ success in becoming a model for other minority groups to emulate,
despite the racism and negative stereotypes they endured (Barringer et al., 1990; Osajima, 2007).
To further propagate the model minority, in 1987, six AAPI children (three boys and
three girls) took the cover of Time Magazine and were labeled as “WHIZ KIDS” (Brand, 1987).
In 2012, a Pew Research Center (2012) study on “The Rise of AAPIs” (para. 2) indicated that
AAPIs are the highest-earning, best-educated, and fastest-growing racial group in the United
States (Pew Research Center, 2012). However, this perception of success among AAPIs does not
represent all AAPIs, especially as a disaggregated group who have different struggles and
experiences towards accessing different career fields (Moses et al., 2019; Pearce & Perrotte,
2021; Yan, 2022)

32
Criticism of the Model Minority is evident throughout most of the research concerning
this concept, and the data supporting this theory is misleading. For example, AAPI sub-groups
experience more poverty levels than the public, including Koreans, Vietnamese, and Chinese, to
name a few, while other AAPI sub-groups fare better (Pew Research Center, 2012). Moreover,
the data used to support the Model Minority does not capture the reality that AAPIs generally
have more workers per household than Whites and other minority groups, allowing them to pool
their financial resources together and live in more densely populated urban areas (Pew Research
Center, 2012; Zeng & Xie, 2004). Therefore, as a disaggregated group, despite AAPI educational
and vocational achievements, they still lag behind White people and other minorities regarding
income and the potential for upward mobility (Tang, 1997; Zeng & Xie, 2004). Therefore,
notwithstanding their hard work and educational acumen, AAPIs are discriminated against when
addressing career possibilities and upward mobility, such as obtaining security clearances
regarding national security (Yan, 2022), which is required to be a SEAL.
Stereotypes in the Workplace. Stereotypes of AAPIs widely view these groups as highly
educated, skilled, and competent (Museus & Kiang, 2009; Ng et al., 2007). Yet, according to
Weller and Thompson (2016), AAPIs with similar educational backgrounds as White employees
received lower salaries, despite doing the same work. Tang (1997) and Zeng and Xie (2004)
agreed and asserted in their studies that, unlike White employees, AAPI workers did not receive
equal pay relative to their level of education. These findings reflected racial disparities and
stereotypes within the AAPI community, regardless of their educational pedigree and career
pursuits (Tang, 1997; Weller & Thompson, 2016; Zhen & Xie, 2004).
According to AAPI stereotypes like the Model Minority, AAPIs are perceived as less
likely to express themselves emotionally and are generally seen as passive and non-aggressive in

33
both social and occupational settings (Okazaki, 2000; Poon et al., 2016). These types of
stereotypes harm AAPIs and impact how others treat them as both leaders and managers in a
vocational setting, such as the SEALs, which will be covered in more detail in the following
paragraphs (Burris et al., 2013; Yoo et al., 2010). Moreover, these stereotypes can be extremely
harmful, as they can be deeply entrenched in the organization’s culture (Poon et al., 2016). These
labels can have a long-lasting impact, resulting in AAPIs adopting this belief as well, thus
affecting their academic and vocational performance (Aronson et al., 2002; Riegle-Crumb et al.,
2019).
Most of the literature reviewed expresses this idea, especially in the private sector, which
serves as an example on how AAPIs are perceived in the U.S. military, especially since the U.S.
military is an extension of society and closely reflects the society which it serves (Litam & Chan,
2021). Research has demonstrated these stereotypes adversely affect how others perceive AAPIs
as leaders (Aronson et al., 2002; Poon et al., 2016; Riegle-Crumb et al., 2019). While it is true
AAPIs have the highest percentage of attending colleges, they represent only 2% of Chief-level
(e.g., chief executive officer, chief financial officer, etc.) positions (Burris et al., 2013), which
could lead to workplace discrimination.
Workplace Discrimination. Another model minority myth posits that AAPIs have greater
mobility between socioeconomic fault lines, unlike other minority groups (Hsin & Xie, 2014;
Parks & Yoo, 2016). Despite the intensification of xenophobic attitudes towards AAPIs, which is
increasing throughout the world (Human Rights Watch, 2020), AAPIs continue to access quality
education and career opportunities, which confers social prestige and is instrumental in
continued socioeconomic freedom of movement (Hsin & Xie, 2014; Parks & Yoo, 2016; Skop &
Li, 2005;). However, despite AAPI’s placement and access in academia and high-paying careers,

34
they struggled to maintain upward mobility to managerial positions beyond the proverbial glass
ceiling (Burris et al., 2013; Tang, 1997), what has been coined the ‘Bamboo ceiling’ by Hyun
(2005).
Bamboo Ceiling
As with the perpetual foreigner stereotype, which this study will discuss later, the
bamboo ceiling operates surreptitiously and affects AAPI’s mobility into management and
leadership positions due to an invisible and artificial barrier (Litam & Chan, 2021; Yu, 2020).
Perceptual barriers exist in academia and the private sector which prevents AAPIs from
advancing or shortening their employment through volunteer separation. For example, at Fortune
500 and S&P 500 companies, only 32 chief executive officers were of AAPI ancestry (Lee,
2019; Yu, 2020). A study by Gee et al. (2015) indicated that while AAPI professionals nearly
match White professionals in big tech companies (i.e., Google, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, LinkedIn,
and Yahoo), they were approximately 154% less likely to be in executive leadership roles next to
Whites.
The bamboo ceiling extends beyond the educational and private sector domains and does
exist within government organizations such as the U.S. Navy, as demonstrated in CNSWC’s
data. According to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (2018) and Defense Manpower
Data Center (2018), senior executives in the government comprised 3.5% of AAPIs.
Nevertheless, despite labor markets, stereotypes emanating from the model minority preclude
AAPIs from being seen as competent leadership material, which continues since Yu’s 2020
report. The model minority myth established a groundless argument that AAPIs have unfettered
upward mobility than other demographic groups. While there is some truth to this as an
aggregate group, it is in accurate among individual AAPI subgroups (Ko & Ton, 2020).

35
AAPI success in the Western world, let alone the United States, has been overestimated
by many in politics, social circles, academia, the media, business, and more, but less-so in the
U.S. military (Chao et al., 2013; Yoo et al., 2010). Consistent with most of the literature, there is
limited discussion of AAPI disparity within the Armed Forces unless there is a focus on mental
health (Chu et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2014). This does not negate the acceptance of these biases
and perceptions by U.S. military leaders, who write the policy on recruiting and outreach efforts,
unwittingly harming AAPI when considering the Model Minority stereotypes. A key part of the
Bamboo ceiling is the perpetual foreigner stereotype, which can severely impact how others and
other AAPIs perceive themselves.
The Perpetual Foreigner Stereotype
The U.S. military shapes its strategy to compete against foreign nations based on the
National Defense Strategy (NDS). The U.S. 2018 NDS (National Defense Strategy, 2018) and
2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (White House, 2021) summarized its longterm strategic plan to effectively compete with the Communist Party of China (Biden, 2021;
National Defense Strategy, 2018). The CPC is a global competitor using predatory economic
policies under its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), attracting weaker developing countries into
debt traps whereby harming neighboring nation-states in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean,
and in Africa (Gerstel, 2018; Green, 2019; National Defense Strategy, 2018; National Herald,
2018; Parkinson et al., 2020). Furthermore, considering the global COVID-19 pandemic
originating from Wuhan, China, has increased the bias and violence against AAPI people,
turning deadly in some cases (Sy et al., 2020; Suresh, 2020; Wang et al., 2020). As a result of
these two examples, many AAPIs, particularly those of Chinese ethnicity, have been seen with
suspicion and as less American (Escobar, 2020; Chia-Ming Liu, 2020; Parks & Yoo, 2016). Even

36
though the U.S. was founded upon the principles of equality for all and is a nation of immigrants,
such stigma existed (Huynh et al., 2011; Jen, 2011) long before China’s global economic
outreach and the COVID-19 pandemic.
According to Huynh et al. (2011), the perpetual foreigner stereotype is when members
from a specific ethnic or racial group are viewed as the ‘other’ outside the spectrum of White and
Black Americans. Unlike Hispanic/Latino people, the perpetual foreigner stereotype affects and
discriminates primarily those of Asian ancestry (Huynh et al., 2011). Furthermore, unlike other
stereotypes, the perpetual foreigner operates clandestinely by occurring inadvertently during
conversations (Armenta et al., 2013; Huynh et al., 2011). This innuendo is challenging to
recognize because it does not manifest in the same way physical descriptors do. For example, the
amount of melanin in one’s skin, the texture of their hair, the cultural clothing worn, the foods
consumed, and more. Therefore, the perpetual foreigner stereotype is when a person’s national
identity, in this case, American, is called into question (Huynh et al., 2011).
According to Kim et al. (2011) and Ronfeldt (2006), discrimination can manifest in
various forms, impacting how people identify with themselves due to the tribal mentality, the
people they socialize with, their academic and professional performance, and their psychological
well-being. When considered, these discrimination factors help shape perceptions, which then
influences individual behaviors and how people shape their cultural environment (Kim et al.,
2011; Parks & Yoo, 2016; Poon et al., 2016; Ronfeldt, 2006). Therefore, the model minority,
bamboo ceiling, and the perpetual foreigner stereotypes have profound psychological effects and
are deeply rooted in the mindset of most non-AAPIs. Additionally, organizations such as the
military are not immune. When examining Kim et al.’s (2011) research, it is clear the perceptions
and stereotypes of AAPIs are engrained into adolescents’ psyche, which carries on to adulthood.

37
The subtleness of the perpetual foreigner stereotype can produce a lifetime of negative
perceptions towards AAPIs, as individuals or as a social group. Still, compounding this perpetual
foreigner mindset with the model minority only serves to amplify derogatory remarks,
vandalism, physical attacks, and isolation against AAPI because of fear and jealousy (Fisher et
al., 2000; Harrell, 2000; Rosenbloom & Way, 2004).
Moreover, being labeled a perpetual foreigner is dehumanizing and un-American
(Armenta et al., 2013). The combination of this stereotype and others can develop a strong
aversion by Whites and other ethnicities regarding organizational DI. As a result, stereotypes can
inadvertently push AAPIs into self-seclusion and further exacerbate how others see them as
unsociable, confirming the aforementioned stereotypes (Burris et al., 2013; Chao et al., 2013).
Being seen as a perpetual foreigner carries with it a negative psychological impact and can lead
to isolation, depression, low self-esteem, and somatic distress (Armenta et al., 2013; Huynh et
al., 2011; Jen, 2011; Okazaki, 2000; Yoo et al., 2010). Additionally, the perpetual foreigner
stereotype can ultimately preclude AAPIs from socializing outside of their ethnic social circles
and lower hope and life satisfaction (Armenta et al., 2013; Huynh et al., 2011; Jen, 2011;
Okazaki, 2000; Yoo et al., 2010) and increase their avoidance of joining an organization such as
the U.S. military, and ultimately the SEALs. As a result, this study posits, these perceptions can
also extend to how AAPIs are viewed in other social domains (i.e., political, military, economic,
social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time), impacting their opportunities
for advancement to senior leadership and management roles, thereby creating a bamboo ceiling.
In sum, the inherent challenges of both the perpetual foreigner and the effects of a
bamboo ceiling culminate and adversely affects the ascension and sustainment of AAPIs serving
at the senior leadership and management levels in the U.S. Navy SEALs (Defense Manpower

38
Data Center, 2018; Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command, 2022; U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, 2018; Yu, 2020). While diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity have
increased in the U.S. military, socially constructed perceptual barriers still exist. Perceptual
barriers can affect AAPIs far more than structural barriers, especially in the U.S. Navy SEALs,
resulting in a low proportion of AAPIs serving in senior leadership levels. In the Navy SEALs,
the characterization of who and what a leader looks like significantly influences who is best
suited to climb to the senior leadership ranks (Rosette et al., 2008).
Moreover, according to Rosette et al. (2008), race also plays a significant role in the
leader’s identity. Considering the Navy SEALs are approximately 75% to 80% White, this can
harm all minority groups. The dominant racial group’s behavior can lead to identity group
behaviors ultimately suppressing other non-dominant groups, such as AAPIs (Rosette et al.,
2008). This form of suppression is critical to address, especially since the SEALs are involved in
the business of national defense, where success requires a multiethnic workforce who can
accomplish the most critical and sensitive missions. Thus, it is important to address leadership
perceptions which can generate barriers, because of social constructs, on who a prototypical
leader should be.
Perception of a Leader
It is important to examine how leaders are perceived by their peers in a multiethnic
organization such as in the U.S. military. While the belief that the U.S. military has gone to great
lengths to reduce structural barriers that discriminate against minorities is true, based on this
review, it is also true that little has been done to tackle perceptual barriers due to biases and
stereotypes that affect the very concept of what a leader is, what a leader should be, and what a
leader should look like (Harrel et al., 1999; Rosette et al., 2008). This section will address what a

39
prototypical leader is, its effects on AAPI participation as Navy SEAL operators, and their
ascension and retention to senior leadership positions.
Leadership Prototype
Unlike most organizations, the U.S. military has a unique role in defending the nation,
and, therefore, contrasting interpretations regarding a leader’s role are in its doctrine. For
example, Army Doctrine states that Army professional leaders are to be honorable servants of
the nation, ensuring regulations, policy, doctrine, and customs and traditions are maintained
(Department of the Army, 2017). In a study conducted by Rosette et al. (2008), in organizations
where there is more or equal distribution of minorities, Whites are seen as being the archetypal
leader. Moreover, influential leaders with more potential for upward mobility tend to be White
(Gündemir et al., 2014; Rosette et al., 2008). In the U.S. military and specifically in the SEAL
occupation, unlike AAPIs or other minority groups, Whites are seen as having leadership
qualities such as ambition, decisiveness, intelligence, self-confidence, and reliability (Gündemir
et al., 2014). Moreover, SEAL leadership requires a higher degree of aggressiveness and
assertiveness which, based on the negative attributes of the model minority stereotype, can affect
AAPIs (Armenta et al., 2013). Moreover, while negative stereotypes such as those mentioned are
wrongly associated with AAPIs, it is not solely isolated among this racial group. In a study by
Gündemir et al. (2014), they posited a pro-White leadership bias exists among Whites and other
minority groups based on their findings and the leadership categorization theory.
Leadership Categorization Theory. In the early eighties, researchers developed the
leadership categorization theory (LCT), which focused on the perception of leadership in
contrast to other forms of leadership, including transformational, transitional, charismatics, etc.
(Rosette et al., 2008). LCT is rooted in the traditional categorization theory and explains how

40
individuals develop categorical models for efficiency and simplicity when consuming complex
information (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). As a result, individuals will provide summarized labels to
images due to environmental variables, which can consist of similar and dissimilar factors
(Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Crocker et al., 1984). From these social constructs of categories,
individuals develop a prototype that best represents their paradigm (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
Therefore, the prototype is a generalization of an individual that best represents a specific
category (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981). For example, within the context of the
U.S. military, the title of a commander who has and directs soldiers demonstrates two
prototypical categorizations (Rosette et al., 2008). These categories are ‘leaders’ and ‘followers,’
respectively (Rosette et al., 2008). Within these categories, characteristics develop, shaping an
individual’s perception of a prototype (Rosette et al., 2008).
Rosette et al.’s (2008) findings demonstrated there is an implicit bias towards White
leaders as being the prototypical leader, not only among Whites, but among African Americans,
Hispanic/Latinos, and AAPIs because of social conditioning (Bandura & Walters, 1977).
Interestingly, when minorities violate prototypical stereotypes, they are disapproved of more
than those who conform to their prototypical roles (Knight et al., 2003). In Knight et al.’s (2003)
study, when Whites are subordinate to a leader who is a minority, they were seen more
negatively, irrespective of the degree of mistakes made if the role was reversed. When minorities
serve in senior and/or executive leadership roles, the implication is they receive severe judgment
when they do not adhere to prototypical stereotypes (Knight et al., 2003; Rosette et al., 2008).
Societal Perception of AAPI Leaders. Numerous studies show how the perception of
AAPIs affects their advancement to senior and executive leadership positions, which do not
necessarily align with the more traditional archetype leadership roles, especially in the SEALs

41
(Koenig et al., 2011). Despite Title II of the 1995 Civil Rights Act to identify and remove
artificial obstacles (structural barriers) preventing the advancement of minorities to senior
leadership and management positions, Whites are seen as the prototypical leader (Rosette et al.,
2008; Yu, 2020). Additionally, Rosette et al. (2008) concluded participants in their study viewed
Whites as more leaders than non-leaders despite the number of minority groups and
organizational roles and responsibilities. Moreover, AAPIs and other racial minorities are viewed
as less ideal leaders in comparison to Whites in similar leadership roles in the United States
(Ayman & Korabik, 2010; Gündemir et al., 2014; Sy et al., 2010).
Summary
A few of the factors mentioned between structural and perceptual barriers and their roles
in increasing the number of AAPIs participating in the U.S. Navy SEALs are significant. Policies
and initiatives help mitigate structural barriers that impede equal opportunities for AAPIs or
other minorities (Harrel et al., 1999). However, perceptual barriers are more difficult to identify,
and they are engrained into the social fabric of most organizations, according to Bandura and
Walters’ (1977) social cognitive theory. In the RAND study (Harrel et al., 1999), the
recommendations provided to lower perceptual barriers were challenging to delineate; since all
nine recommendations are connected in one way or another, identifying and modeling can be
challenging to overcome. Moreover, when adding in factors like negative stereotypes and the
definition of a prototypical leader, one encounters deeply rooted biases that policies and
initiatives cannot solve alone. Increasing AAPI participation as U.S. Navy SEALs would require
understanding their culture and their perceptions of the Navy SEALs and how they view the
stereotypes mentioned. In the next chapter, the methodology will help to explain this study by

42
providing a detailed explanation of why AAPIs are present in lower proportions to other racial
groups in the U.S. Navy and at the senior leadership levels.

43
Chapter Three: Methodology
This chapter introduces the research methodology for this qualitative study on the
underrepresentation of AAPIs serving in the senior leadership levels of the U.S. Navy SEALs.
This study’s plan includes the following: research questions, design overview, research setting,
the researcher, data sources, validity and reliability, ethics, and limitations. Each of these areas
will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
Research Questions
The research questions that guided this study are:
1. Which factors influenced the decision of AAPIs to join as a U.S. Navy SEAL?
2. What were the perceptions of AAPI regarding support for career advancement in the U.S.
Navy SEAL?
3. Which factors influenced the retirement or separation of AAPIs in the Naval Special
Warfare community?
Overview of Design
This study focused on qualitative research to gather and analyze data. To learn more
about why AAPIs joined and separated and to understand their perception of available
opportunities advance, eight AAPI former Navy SEALs that participated in this research.
According to Merriam and Tisdell (2016), a qualitative study’s primary purpose is to acquire
specific kinds of abstract information in the minds of the interviewee. Therefore, a qualitative
method was better suited to tease out data that would produce a raw, in-depth, and
comprehensive amount of data to address why the participants believed AAPIs are
underrepresented at the senior leadership levels of the U.S. Navy SEALs (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016).

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The Researcher
As the researcher, I identify as an Asian American Pacific Islander, but, more
specifically, as a Filipino-American. I am originally from Honolulu, Hawai’i and grew up mostly
in a non-military family household. Prior to graduating from high school, I was encouraged to
attend college by family, friends, and close associates. Instead, I decided to join the military.
During my military career, I attended college earning both my undergraduate and graduate
degrees. I attended SEAL training and retired after 24 years of active-duty service as a Navy
SEAL chief (E-7). As a Navy SEAL, I was the team leader of two cross-functional teams, and
was deployed on multiple combat deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific. At the
time of this study, I still maintain a relationship with the NSW community and work for NSW as
a program analyst. Additionally, I serve as an advisor to senior military and civilian leaders.
In totality, I am aware of how my inherent biases, positionality, and beliefs could impact
this study. As a former AAPI SEAL operator and senior leader, and with multiple combat
deployments, these combined characteristics could have influenced my beliefs and resulted in
confirmation bias. When I analyzed the data, I had to be conscious not to make it fit my
assumptions and be sure I included the data that may be incongruent with my beliefs. As the
researcher, I strongly believe the way in which NSW attracts and recruits future SEALs needs to
be interrogated for inherent inequities among underrepresented groups, like AAPI. Additionally,
the way in which NSW will engage in future conflict will require a more diverse force that will
allow it to increase its operational capability, especially in a strategic competition environment
among powerful nation states. These combined attributes have influenced my beliefs that
engaging in non-kinetic strategic competition among nation states can be successfully achieved
by maximizing the strength of the United States’ multicultural communities.

45
To mitigate my biases, I employed the recommendations provided by Creswell and
Creswell (2017) on reflexivity. I remained transparent about how my beliefs, perceptions, and
assumptions could affect the totality of this study’s direction and design, along with
interpretation of the data results. Merriam and Tisdell (2016) also agreed that a researcher’s
transparency about his position can help readers understand any biases that may arise and impact
this study. Moreover, because of my former career as a SEAL and current affiliation with NSW
the participants might be apprehensive towards answering this study’s research questions.
Likewise, because Navy SEALs are taught not to advertise their profession, this could have been
an added barrier to this study. The participants might have refrained from openly responding or
sharing more detailed feedback to aid this study (Burkholder et al., 2020). This study used three
strategies to make the participants comfortable during the interview: First, as I stated earlier, I
am a former Navy SEAL veteran and of AAPI ethnicity. Both factors offered a sense of common
ground, which would follow rapport building. Secondly, as the researcher, I had personal
connections with six out of the eight participants, having previously served alongside them in
various capacities. These pre-existing personal relationships fostered a sense of trust.
Consequently, one of these six participants recommended the remaining two participants. Once
more, the trust was already in place, as former mutual teammates of the remaining two
participants vouched for their inclusion. Lastly, I informed each participant that the interview
would be confidential and that their personal information would not be made available to anyone
except to myself, as the researcher.

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Data Source
Interview
In considering the purpose of this study which is to understand the underrepresentation of
AAPIs serving as senior leaders in the U.S. Navy SEALs, the research design was a qualitative
interview (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). Therefore, for this qualitative study, interviews were
employed to collect information concerning this study’s research questions that was in alignment
with the participants’ cultural and contextual perspectives. As noted by Merriam and Tisdell
(2016), interviews represent the most widely used data collection method, with person-to-person
interviews being the most common format. This study exclusively utilized the prevalent personto-person interview format; however due to the 2019 to 2020 pandemic this person-to-person
format was conducted over Zoom’s Video Teleconferencing. Furthermore, the decision to
interview participants who identified as AAPIs was based on the recognition that it offered the
most suitable approach for obtaining the necessary qualitative data related to diversity and
inclusion factors.
Participants
The participants in this study were all adult men. Despite the lift on the ban of women
filling combat roles in 2015 (Moore, 2020), at the time of this study, women have never
graduated from the Navy SEAL training. Thus, AAPI women did not participate in this study. In
terms of miliary tenure, around 10 to 15 years of service marks the point when NCOs and
officers start moving into senior leadership roles within the NSW organization, and it is a period
when they consider their future to remain in or out of the military (Faram, 2016; Smith, 2019).
Moreover, service members have generally obtained ranks at the senior levels at this point. These

47
senior ranks begin at E-7 for non-commissioned officers and O-5 for commissioned officers for
most service branches in the military (Faram, 2016; Smith, 2019).
In identifying the participants for this study, I reached out to known associates who have
served as Navy SEALs and meet the abovementioned criteria. In addition, I respectfully
petitioned the participants to reach out to their fellow U.S. Navy SEAL veteran peers. Through
that process, two additional Navy SEAL veterans took part in the interview.
Instrumentation
The research used the semi-structured interview protocol approach to gather the data
from the participants for this study. In addition, the three research questions used in this study
helped to create the interview protocol for this study. Therefore, to understand the underlying
contextual factors, this research’s interview protocol followed the interview guide approach
(Patton, 2002). According to Patton (2002), the interview guide approach is “topics and issues
that are specified in advance and the interviewer decides on sequencing of questions during the
course of the interview” (p. 13). This approach allows the researcher to gather data from the
participants’ perspectives based on their experiences. Therefore, the interview guide approach
was helpful as it remained flexible and allowed for adjustments and the introduction of probing
questions based each participant’s responses (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). This methodology
aimed to ensure the comprehensiveness of the interview would remain rich in detail (Patton,
2002).
Data Collection Procedures
Once I identified the participants, we worked together to set a convenient time to
interview via Zoom. All participants received individual calendar invites via Google with

48
individual reminders for the scheduled event 1 day before the interview. Also, each participant
received an email on the interview day to reconfirm the scheduled interview.
On the interview day, I logged in 15–minutes prior to the start time to ensure the Zoom
platform was operational. Once the interviewees logged in, I introduced myself and established
common ground and rapport, as per Merriam and Tisdell (2016). Before entering the official
discussion, I re-explained the study information sheet, the confidentiality of their identity, and
how this study would use the data (Rosenberg, 2017). Following this, I asked the interviewees if
it was okay to record the conservation. All interviewees provided permission to record the
conversation. In addition to the recording, I informed the interviewees that I would be taking
notes. Lastly, I informed the interviewees they could take breaks as needed if time permitted.
Data Analysis
Data from semi-structured qualitative interviews with eight AAPI former U.S. Navy
SEALs were the primary data source. Each interview was audio and video recorded utilizing the
Zoom video conferencing platform (Zoom) generating dictated transcripts from the interview.
The analysis of data was examined independently and commenced after instance of the data
collection. To ensure the data was accurate, I cross-checked the transcripts with the Zoom
recording to check for errors. If the dictated transcript needed clarification, I conducted a
respondent validation to ensure the interviewees data was correctly represented (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Upon completion of the interview, I transferred the transcribed data to a
Microsoft Excel codebook to quantify and evaluate the qualitative data searching for themes,
patterns, and answers to this study’s research questions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).

49
Validity and Reliability
To ensure the validity and reliability of this research, it was important that I did not
influence the participant’s responses. Also, it was important to evaluate the collection of the
qualitative data objectively to allow the data to answer its conclusion; otherwise, this could taint
the data for this research analysis (Maxwell, 2013). To ensure credibility and trustworthiness, I
understood my position and role, known as reflexivity, which is vital for this study (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Moreover, I was keenly aware of my role as a former senior leader in the U.S.
Navy SEALs and as someone who also identified as an AAPI, which could affect the quality of
participants’ responses. Also, because of reflexivity, it was important for me to be honest and
transparent about any biases and assumptions and how they could affect the study (Maxwell,
2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Miles et al., 2020). Therefore, following this guidance, I focused
on the research itself and only asked questions outlined in the interview protocol to solicit the
participant’s responses.
To ensure the credibility and trustworthiness of this qualitative study, I used the
following additional strategies to maintain the integrity of this research. First, to ensure the
collected data closely represented the participant’s words, I compared Zoom’s dictated
transcripts and the video to ensure they matched correctly. If there was any ambiguity between
the video recording and the transcripts, I contacted the participant to solicit feedback on the
initial findings from the interview (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Second, the qualitative interview provided rich contextual data from all eight participants.
Therefore, I analyzed this data to find similar themes corresponding to questions within the
interview protocol. This method allowed the data to speak for itself, highlighting the many
similarities between each interviewee’s responses for this study. In addition, each respondent

50
was separated by distance and location, with their identities unknown to one another (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016).
Ethics
The validity and reliability of this study relied upon the researcher’s ethics (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). Additionally, the eight former U.S. Navy SEAL participants who volunteered had
all the information they needed to make an informed decision to participate in this study (Glesne,
2011; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Since this study collected qualitative data from each participant
in a one-on-one video interview, the collection process followed three steps. First, protecting the
participant’s identities was held in high regard to safeguard them from harm. Therefore, a
pseudonym was used to conceal the participants’ real identity, along with any related information
that could be connected to the participants. Moreover, the researcher stored personal identifiers
on the Aegis Secure Key 3.0 FIPS 140-2 encrypted USB thumb drive with a six-digit numerical
passcode known only to the researcher. Second, the participants reviewed information to make
an informed decision before commencing the one-on-one qualitative interview. I reminded the
participants the interview was voluntary, and they could cease it at any time. Third, the concern
over fabrication was considered prior to the interviews (Glesne, 2011; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Therefore, I took steps to lower the power position of the researcher to the possibility of power
struggles which could coerce the participants to fabricate an unfavorable narrative, which would
taint the reliability of this study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).

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Chapter Four: Themes
This chapter examines what factors help to influence the career decisions of AAPIs to
become U.S. Navy SEALs and the factors that influence them to separate from the U.S. Navy.
When answering this question, qualitative data was collected using one-on-one semi-structured
interviews with eight AAPI former U.S. Navy SEALs, varying in education, rank, time-inservice greater than 8 to 10 years, and leadership experience. The study also focused on the
perceptions of AAPI regarding support for their career advancement. This chapter presents the
themes based on how the research question is presented. This chapter is organized in the ensuing
order: description of the participants, report of the themes, and summarization.
The following research questions guided this study:
1. Which factors influenced the decision of AAPIs to join as a U.S. Navy SEAL?
2. What were the perceptions of AAPI regarding support for career advancement in the U.S.
Navy SEAL?
3. Which factors influenced the retirement or separation of AAPIs in the Naval Special
Warfare community?
Participants
The participants of this study included eight Navy SEAL veterans living in various
locations within Virginia, California, and Hawai’i. The recruitment of the research participants
fell into two phases. In phase one, I directly contacted three known SEAL veteran associates who
identified as AAPIs and recruited them to participate in this study. In phase two of the study, I
reached out to the initial two recruited participants and asked if they could help me identify and
connect with other AAPI U.S. Navy SEAL veterans who might be interested in participating in
this research. Consequently, they introduced me to four additional U.S. Navy SEAL veteran

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participants of AAPI heritage. Out of the eight participants in total, I had prior personal
connections with six of them. Additionally, one of the newly introduced participants referred me
to two more participants, bringing the total number of participants to eight. These participants
represented diverse AAPI backgrounds, including Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Laotian, and
Japanese origins.
In addition to selecting the eight participants, all of them had completed over eight years
of active duty service. Half of the participants were retired, with over 20 years of active-duty
service. The participants’ ranks included two O-4s; one O-3; one Chief Warrant Officer-3, two
E-7s; and two E-6s. Six of the eight participants were college graduates. Two were U.S. Naval
Academy alums, while the remaining were graduates of various state or private universities. To
maintain the participant’s anonymity, they were given pseudonyms to conceal their true
identities (Table 1).
Table 1
Participant Demographics
Naming
convention
Rank Ethnicity Education
Level
SEAL
Veteran
Participant 1 O-4 Filipino Bachelor’s Yes
Participant 2 O-3 Hawaiian Bachelor’s Yes
Participant 3 O-4 Japanese/Hawaiian Bachelor’s Yes
Participant 4 CWO-3 Filipino Bachelor’s Yes
Participant 5 E-7 Filipino Some College Yes
Participant 6 E-6 Filipino High School Yes
Participant 7 E-6 Chinese Master’s Yes
Participant 8 E-7 Laotian Bachelor’s Yes

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Results for Research Question One (RQ1): Which Factors Influenced the Decision of
AAPIs to Join as a U.S. Navy SEAL?
This study used several sub-questions to supplement and expand on RQ1. These
questions included:
1. When did you first consider joining the Navy SEALs? Moreover, how did you learn
about the Navy SEALs as an option?
2. What were the primary reasons why you decided to join the U.S. Navy SEALs?
3. What factors most influenced your decision?
4. In what ways did the people around you influence your decision?
5. What were your career goals when you first joined?
There were three dominant themes regarding the factors influencing the participant’s
decision to join the U.S. Navy SEALs: (a) some of the participants stated they did not know
joining the U.S. Navy SEALs was a career option; (b) some of the participants stated they were
seeking excitement and adventure; (c) the participants were influenced by external influences,
not connected with the NSW organization.
Knowledge of Career Opportunities in the U.S. Navy SEALs
The interview data for this study revealed that 50% (four out of eight) participants were
unaware that a career as a Navy SEAL was an option. Based on the data collected for this study,
six of the eight participants demonstrated they had little to no knowledge of the special operation
forces. Moreover, six of the eight participants acknowledged they did not discover Navy SEALs
until later in their college careers or after graduation. For this study, the data revealed the
underrepresentation of AAPIs in the Navy SEALs is partly the result of lack of access to
information concerning the Navy SEAL and/or the SOF community among the participants of

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this study. For instance, Participant 7 specifically stated he became interested in the U.S. special
operations during his last year of college. He explained, “I think I was finishing my senior year
of college, and I just became interested in the SOF community … I think, once I had already
decided to join the military, it was just a matter of what branch.” Likewise, Participant 3 knew
little about what a Navy SEAL was under the impression they only recruited from within the
military. He stated, “I had no idea that you could actually go into the SEALs just straight off
from being a civilian … I always assume that they only take people from within [the military or
the Navy].”
Another respondent, Participant 1, did not consider the U.S. Navy as his first choice when
applying to different military service academies. He first applied to WestPoint, followed by the
U.S. Airforce Academy, and finally, the Naval Academy, where he was accepted. Furthermore,
he indicated he did not know the Navy had a SOF component. He remembered asking, “Well,
what kind of special operations do they [U.S. Navy] have there?” and learning, “Well, that’s
when I found out what a Navy SEAL was.” Participant 2 did not intend to join the U.S. Navy
like the previous three participants. Instead, before attending the U.S. Naval Academy, he
intended to join the U.S. Marines upon graduating from the Academy. He explained, “I never
heard of SEALs, I went to the U.S. Naval Academy to be a Marine as I thought at the time, or in
turn, they are the hardest…it was the toughest training.”
Another factor that lured and influenced the participants towards the SEALs was the
possibility of experiencing a career that offered adventure and excitement. According to Indeed
(2023), people join the military because it offers new experiences, travel, adventure, and
excitement. Participant 4 especially noted adventure and excitement as the critical factor in
pursuing a career as a U.S. Navy SEAL by stating, “The factors were … it was you know

55
adventure excitement so that was that … that’s what got me hook line and sinker pretty much.”
Another respondent, Participant 5, also described his reason for joining the Navy SEALs as
adventure. Additionally, Participant 5 shared, “I think one of the reasons why I joined was to get
away, and, you know, get outside your little bubble…getting out in an adventuring kind of way
from that safety bubble.” Participant 7 similarly responded that he grew up in a traditional
household. The idea of pursuing an exciting career and offering a sense of adventure was
appealing to him. He stated,
Well, you know I grew up in a pretty conventional … the idea of going off and jumping
into something that was an adventure was just so appealing to me, and I think it was me
thinking about you know the opportunity at something fun and exciting—a chance to take
advantage of my youth.
Participant 4 also expressed his reason for joining the U.S. Navy SEALs was for
excitement rather than being a beer salesperson. He explained, “I was selling beer … [I] didn’t
like that.” The results of the interview from each of the respondents mentioned indicated one
common theme among all of them – they were seeking a promising career that offered them
excitement and adventure.
Participants Were Strongly Influenced by a Third Party Not Affiliated With The Military
to Join The U.S. Navy SEALs
When examining the data, five of the eight participants were strongly encouraged to join
the SEALs by someone other than the Navy’s recruitment and outreach programs. According to
some of the participants, they were introduced to the Navy SEALs while in college or through a
friend or a family member or through books, magazines, or documentaries with no direct
affiliation to the SOF or the Navy. For instance, Participant 1 described his experience when he

56
initially learned what a U.S. Navy SEAL was during his first year at the U.S. Naval Academy.
Having never heard of a SEAL, his roommate provided him with a book explaining what being a
Navy SEAL is like and what they do. Participant 1 explained,
…my freshman year [at the U.S. Naval Academy], I had a roommate, and he had a book
on his shelf, and it said, Warrior elite…and I said, what’s that book? He said a book
about U.S. Navy SEALs, [and] their training, and I thought, I never heard of SEALs.
In answering a sub-question to RQ1, “How did you learn about the U.S. Navy SEALs as
an option?” Participant 2 stated, “through a friend [college roommate],” and Participant 7
likewise learned about the SEALs from an external source and read a story in the newspaper
which intrigued him to become interested in the military’s special operations. Specifically,
Participant 7 said:
I remember reading a story in the Philadelphia Inquirer written by Mark Bowden, which
turned out to be the precursor to Black Hawk Down, and that’s where I sort of read in
more detail about you know the military special operations. And just became interested in
the community.
Lastly, Participant 4 discovered what a Navy SEAL was when he graduated from college.
He explained,
It was after college [in] 1988. One of my roommates in college was living with a guy
who had gone through BUD/S in the 70s. So, he told me all about the SEAL teams. There
was not much information back in the day. So yeah, I was selling beer at the time, and
then I decided I didn’t want to sell beer anymore and decided to pursue becoming a
SEAL.

57
In contrast, Participant 8 mentioned he wanted to be a U.S. Navy SEAL since the 5th
grade. He said, “Yeah, I saw a news article in Newsweek about Navy SEALs. And that’s when I
wanted to be a SEAL.” In addition, Participant 5 had a direct connection with a U.S. Navy SEAL
who happened to be a family member. Participant 5 explained,
I heard about them [Navy SEALS]. I knew about them. And then my mom mentioned I
have a hanai (meaning adopted in Hawaiian) uncle that she used to babysit. It was her
cousin when she was younger. He’s a senior chief [E-8] in the SEAL Team. So, I had a
conversation with him.
As a result, this research found that most participants discovered the Navy SEALs during or after
college. The two participants who knew about the Navy SEALs most of their life were an
exception to the norm. After discovering and receiving further information about the Navy
SEALs, it intrigued them to pursue it as a career, many of them for similar reasons.
Summary
To summarize, RQ1’s focus was to understand what influences aided in the participants’
decisions to join the Navy SEALs, which was demonstrated by most of the participant’s
responses. According to the data, half of the participants would learn what a Navy SEAL was
and did either during or after college, and through different external sources. Once participants
learned what SEALs do, they were lured with the possibility of experiencing excitement and
adventure.
Results for Research Question 2 (RQ 2): What Were The Perceptions of AAPI Regarding
Support For Career Advancement in The U.S. Navy SEALs?
The results for this section came from an analysis of the participant’s responses on
whether they perceived advancement opportunities were available to them as SEALs. Some

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factors in this section include organizational support for advancement toward AAPIs,
discrimination towards AAPIs which affects advancement opportunities, and the significance of
role models. Like RQ1, this section will describe the themes from the qualitative data collected
related to Research Question 2. Overall, most of the participants, based on their responses, did
believe advancement opportunities were available to them, along with receiving organizational
support. One of the participants did express that discrimination may have affected his
advancement. However, the results were somewhat mixed for the other participants who did not
overtly express that discrimination was a factor.
Organizational Support
The interview results indicated that all participants believed they had support from their
leadership and the organization regarding career opportunities and advancement. However, the
interviews revealed that perceptions about career advancement varied between each participant
depending on whether they were an NCO or a commissioned officer. Participant 2 stated his
leadership supported him completely and his career was in his hands, but time and experience
impacted promotions. He stated, “I was definitely supported by every bit of my chain of
command … you know you kind of carve your own destiny” but also said, “time, experience,
seniority, all played a factor.” Likewise, Participant 3 said that opportunities were available and
based on time, passing an advancement test, and maintaining good evaluations, which he
believed to be fair, stating:
There are a lot of opportunities. I mean, it is a rank structure where you, you know, just
do your time, or you take a test. It was fairly cut and dry. You know you do your job.
You get decent evals. You’re gonna move up. It’s pretty objective.

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Similarly, Participant 4 also indicated he was supported by those he worked with, but
only once he proved himself, “I was supported by my superiors, the ones I worked closely with;
once I proved myself to my superiors, then they supported me in moving up. Regarding
opportunities for advancement, I selected my route, my path for promotion.”
Participant 5’s experience aligned with Participant 4’s position regarding leadership and
organizational support towards his advancement, stating, “I think it was pretty unlimited, to you
know, what I put my mind to. I wanted to do something. I’m sure I could have gone out and done
it.”
In contrast, Participant 8’s response indicated he did not experience issues advancing as
an NCO. That said, he believed his leadership was attempting to persuade from pursuing a
commission. Moreover, Participant 8 believed his senior enlisted leadership felt he was betraying
them when he submitted his OCS (Officer Candidate School) application and that he did not
want to be a master chief [E-9] when asked. Participant 8 explained,
As you know, I could be more of an influence as [an] O [Commissioned Officer]. So
those are a lot of factors where I drop [apply/submit] my OCS package, you know, and
once I dropped my OCS package and I dropped it as a chief [E-7] … I had two master
chiefs that pulled me in their office, and they were pissed … they were like, did you drop
an OCS package? And I said yes. And they were like, what don’t you want to be a master
chief? And as soon as I said ‘No’ because I watched the master chiefs, it’s like you’re
scrutinized for other guys’ actions and behavior. I’m like, I didn’t want it. I didn’t want to
be a master chief. So, when I said no, I didn’t want to be a master chief. I knew my career
was over just like that.

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While many of these responses provide ideal situations, Participant 2 is a commissioned
officer, and Participant 4 is a warrant officer. Unlike Participants 5 and 8 who both were senior
NCOs with career tracks different from officers. As a former NCO, Participant 4 shared similar
advancement opportunities with Participants 5 and 8, unlike Participant 2, whose advancement
opportunities were based on time, experience, and seniority, as previously mentioned.
Participant 7 shared he wanted to avoid advancing quickly. As a junior NCO (E-6), he
wanted to learn his craft and not reduce his chances of being selected for a premier national
mission force (NMF). In addition, he enjoyed his job and attending different professional
development schools. Participant 7 expressed,
Yeah, they [the organization/leadership] were like they gave me every opportunity to
advance in a timely manner, but it wasn’t a priority of mine … like if you made rank too
quick, that could screw me. It would reduce your chances of getting over there [NMF]. I
also really enjoyed kind of learning the craft. You know, there are other schools that you
could go to as a more junior guy that you wouldn’t have the chance to go to as a senior
[E-7 and above] guy, and you end up getting into the role of management.
The data shows that participants of this study believe they had the opportunity to advance
up the ranking structure, and their careers were generally in their hands. In addition, most
participants believed they received support from their leadership and the organization. As
Participant 2 stated, “You carve your own destiny.” In the case of Participant 7, despite receiving
leadership and organizational support, his decision to advance was on his terms.
Discrimination
Some participants hinted that discrimination may have affected their careers but were not
explicit about having experienced overt discrimination. However, Participant 1 contextualized

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his experience with the possibility of him being discriminated against, provided the fact that he
believed advancement opportunities were available to him.
I had lots of schools available to me. I mean, my XO [Executive Officer] at SEAL Team
X, his wife was Filipina, and he was very [supportive], I guess, once you got on his bad
side. Did I get blackballed? I see the fellows [former SEALs he served with] all the time,
and they say yeah, it’s [messed] up what happened to you.
While it is not entirely clear in the context of Participant 1’s statement what his interaction was
with his XO, he does indicate he was mistreated and “blackballed,” which indicates he was
disliked. However, he was willing to learn and work through his shortfalls, which did little to
change his XO’s perception of him, and who provided him with little support. Furthermore, his
fellow SEAL colleagues did point out how their XO wrongfully mistreated him and how it
affected Participant 1’s career progression. Participant 1 suggested that perhaps he was passed
over because he did not look like his XO: “Maybe it’s because, to me, I didn’t look like them?
As funny as it sounds right, but I’m like, come on. You guys will take care of this guy over
here?” When addressing mentorship later in this chapter, Participant 1 went on to say,
Maybe I didn’t look or feel, or look like the typical, intense type of [SEAL] operator they
wanted to have. Yeah, was there a level of, you know? I hate to say that there is
discrimination, but you know, it exists everywhere. Yeah, it is everywhere.
This was the only time an interviewee pointed out the explicit existence of discrimination within
Navy SEALs which could have affected any available advancement opportunities.
Modeling
Although there were opportunities for career advancement, the most of participants
struggled to identify with more than five other SEALs within the AAPI community. As

62
previously shown in Chapter One and Chapter Two, both DONCNSWC and DMDC data
indicated a significant underrepresentation of AAPI individuals among those serving as SEALs.
Moreover, participants themselves encountered difficulties in promptly identifying fellow
SEALs who identified as AAPI, including those holding senior leadership positions. When asked
how many SEALs participants saw that were of AAPI ancestry, most of the responses followed
with a long pause. After pausing, most of the participant’s responses were similar and uncertain.
For example,
1. Participant 2: “Trying to think.”
2. Participant 3: “There was one guy he was a senior chief [E-8].”
3. Participant 4: “Trying to think…not that I can come up on top of my head.”
4. Participant 5: “Not a lot…”
5. Participant 6: “Very few…”
With time, most of the participants were able to provide one or two names, most of them
belonging to the same people. Participant 2 stated, “I am trying to think. If I must put a number
to it, probably less than ten. Maybe less than that. Yeah, less than ten.” Participant 3 followed up
with, “There was one guy who was senior chief [E-8], and then there was an officer he’s half
Filipino. Yeah, those are the only two.” Participant 6 stated, “Very few so. I mean, I could
probably count them on two hands. I think I may have seen one or two officers. I don’t know, so
maybe one or two, at the most.”
Up to this point, the statements made by each of the participants do not necessarily
indicate AAPIs are underrepresented in senior leadership positions. Rather, a reason for each of
the participants inability to identify other AAPIs may be simply explained by Participant 5’s
following statement, which is that he was not going out of his way looking for other AAPIs or

63
other minority groups, and that he tried to avoid topics of race and discrimination. Specifically,
he shared:
Not much. Maybe as much as I see Black guys, you know? I never looked at [whether]
there, [or] aren’t any Blacks or Asian people here, or that not too much Spanish. I tried
my best to stay away from that kind of thought process. So, I never really thought much
of it.
Moving from general to more definitive, the researcher asked the participants how many
AAPI Navy SEALs they saw at the senior leadership levels. The participants repeated what they
had previously stated, again citing the same names, further validating an underrepresentation of
AAPIs serving as U.S. Navy SEALs. This underrepresentation of AAPIs is unsurprising when
examining the DONCNSWC’s (2022) data and the DMDC’s (2018) data, which quantitatively
shows that AAPIs are underrepresented as Navy SEALs. Examining the participants’ responses
regarding AAPIs serving in senior leadership roles also adds to the validation that AAPIs do not
have someone they can immediately identify with as a role model, which has been thoroughly
discussed in the literature review.
Mentorship
Based on the participant’s responses, the allegation of not having a mentor in the SEAL
Teams was surprising, especially for junior SEALs. Mentorship is an important practice for
NSW considering the high occupational hazard of the job. Mentorship begins at BUD/S once
candidates report to training. For example, a BUD/S class during each phase (four phases total)
of training is assigned to a proctor (BUD/S Instructor) who mentors their respective BUD/S
class. The class proctor ensures that the class (as a whole) and individual students properly
navigate the requirements needed to graduate from BUD/S.

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Moreover, mentorship is also the responsibility of the commissioned officers and the
more senior NCOs, who are to support and motivate junior sailors through the program as a
collaborative effort called teamwork. Mentorship is not unique to the SEAL Teams or BUD/S.
The entire Navy and the military use mentors for various reasons, as do many types of
organizations. Therefore, it was surprising that two of the participants in this study stated they
did not receive proper mentorship and support.
First, Participant 6 joined the SEAL teams later in his naval career, having served over
ten years in the Navy and was a senior E-6 when he graduated from BUD/S. Entering the SEAL
Teams at a higher (senior) rank presented Participant 6 with some significant challenges,
especially regarding advancement opportunities, such as advancing too quickly with little
operational experience as a SEAL. Earlier, Participant 7 (an E-6) mentioned he did not want to
advance too quickly because he wanted time to learn his craft rather than participate in
management. Considering Participant 6 entered the SEAL Team as an E-6, and closer to
management presented a dilemma in obtaining proper mentorship. Participant 6, when asked
what opportunities he wished he had regarding his career advancement as a SEAL, he stated he
wished he was assigned a mentor to help him navigate his career as a SEAL.
I wish a real mentor would watch what I do and put me under his wing if I mess up. I
never talked to anybody [when] I messed up. Maybe because I didn’t ask for it? I didn’t
know anything about having a mentor. I know they [leadership/the organization] talked
about it, but they assigned me one, but that guy just [did not] even talk to me. Maybe I
should [have] stepped up?
In this response, the participant indicated he was assigned a mentor but that his mentor
was not available. When further pressed by the researcher if Participant 6’s mentor was an AAPI

65
like himself, he said, “No. He was White.” The second respondent, Participant 1, was asked
whether he observed a change in AAPI participation during his time. His response was
intriguing, pointing to racial identity and a systemic bias on who receives proper grooming in the
SEAL teams through selective and active mentorship.
I recall you know my peers out of the [Naval] Academy. How much grooming and
mentorship they were receiving to not just be a [SEAL] platoon commander. But then,
okay, yeah, operations like. So, you know, just watching how the rest [of the guys], and
I’m like, man. How did you get it? How did you become friends with that guy? Nobody
took me under their wing, and I don’t know why. I didn’t think I was that much of a
clown [underachiever], right? Maybe I didn’t look or feel, or look like the typical, intense
type of [SEAL] operator they wanted to have. Yeah, was there a level of, you know? I
hate to say that there is discrimination, but you know, it exists everywhere. Yeah, it is
everywhere.
Participant 1, again, provided more context when it came to the possibility of
discrimination, which was discussed earlier in this section. During the interview, the researcher
observed the participant attempting to work out what to say when it came to the topic of
discrimination and NSW. Like any high-performing organization, mentorship in the SEAL teams
is vital. While these two participants mentioned they did not have the appropriate mentorship or
role modeling, it is uncertain whether the other five participants felt the same way. Likewise, it is
unclear whether stereotypes play a role in mentorship. Considering all of the stereotypes
discussed in the literature review, it is possible stereotypes played a role in who received
mentoring and who did not, as revealed by some of the participants.

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Cultural Influence
Many participants suggested that the lack of AAPI serving as SEALs may result from
their culture. This section analyzed the results related to the underrepresentation of AAPIs in the
U.S. Navy SEALs and AAPI culture. As explained in the literature review, perceptions do play a
role in how we understand the world around us (Bandura, 1989). In this section, the respondents
provided insight into how cultural influences contributed to their decision on whether to join the
military or pursue an education or a traditional career. In addition, the interview data revealed
culture plays a significant role, along with stereotypes, and can affect career progression. The
following narratives provided insight into four of this study’s participants’ feedback regarding
culture. Participant 1 stated AAPIs such as himself are happy people and dissimilar from the
quintessential SEAL who is White, aggressive, decisive, and intense:
I think it’s because, as funny as it sounds, we, as a people, culturally speaking, are not
assholes. We are a pretty happy type of culture. When you come across some team guys
[Navy SEALs] these days, you could look at him and say, well, that’s a typical team guy
because they’ve just got that intensity about them.
Next, Participant 5 describes his reason for leaving the military, which was to be closer to
family, return home, and to live a slower lifestyle, where he describes,
Well, for me, it’s like I wanted to go back to Hawai’i. And to do twenty years is a long
time away from you know [my] Hawai’i family. Asian Pacific Islanders from Hawai’i are
very family oriented, so they want to be close to their family. I feel more than you know
some other cultures. They probably don’t stay in [the Navy] as long. Being away from
Hawai’i for that long, and you know as much as San Diego, is nice. The culture is high
speed [and] not laid back, kind of individual mentality, like definitely push me away.

67
Participant 5 sought living circumstances more in line with his Hawaiian upbringing along with
closer connections to family.
Education
This next section examines what some of the participants mentioned about education and
its role in their career decisions, and according to the participants demographic data, six of the
eight participants were college educated. Four of the participants had graduated from college
prior to joining the Navy, while two participants attended the U.S. Naval Academy. Unlike those
who graduated from college, the family members of Participant 5, a senior NCO, tried to
influence him to go to college first. Instead, rather than attending college first, he joined the
Navy immediately after high school, stating, “They tried to persuade me to do schooling, but
school wasn’t for me at the time.”
Participant 8, another senior NCO, was one of the six who graduated from college before
joining the Navy, and he provided some insight into how AAPI culture perceives the military and
how his family members tried convincing him to attend college first stating,
I think it’s just the job [in] particular doesn’t attract Asians in general because of the
culture thing, whereas, like our [AAPI] culture, everything is all stressed, school, school,
school, school, school, school. In the military, it was like not an unless you’re from
different countries.
Participant 8 further explained that AAPI families generally encourage attending school
first rather than joining the military. In addition, Participant 8 also explained: “unless you’re
from different countries like the poor Asian countries, the military is like a status, you can use it
as a tool to move up in the social class.” This can result in fewer AAPIs joining the military
because they believe military-type skills are not transferable or marketable in the civilian

68
workforce. That concept is also seen in the literature review (Harrel et al., 1999). Aligned with
that thought process, AAPI culture exerts enormous pressure on AAPI to pursue traditional
careers (i.e., in medicine, management consulting, engineering, and more) rather than joining the
military. Lastly, Participant 7 stated,
Well, as you know, I grew up in pretty conventional immigrant households, and my
parents came over from China, became U.S. citizens, went to grad school, and they
expected me to be an engineer or a doctor or a lawyer.
The relationship between culture and RQ2 may not seem directly connected with this
study. However, it was a finding worth mentioning since AAPI family members do play an
influential part in whether a SEAL (one who identifies as AAPI) decides to stay in the military or
to separate, which both affects their career progression in the SEAL Teams and to senior
leadership positions.
Increase in AAPI Career Progression
In this section, each of the participants provided their perspective when it came to their
career progression. In addition, most respondents believed the number of AAPIs joining to be
SEALs had increased from when they joined until when they departed from active-duty service.
However, there was some ambiguity in participants’ responses. That said, two participants
explained why they believed AAPI participation as SEALs did not increase. Notably, it is
important to remember that each respondent’s explanation was simply anecdotal, and they did
not provide data to support their claims. Participant 4 stated, as a new guy in the SEAL Teams,
he never paid much attention to the number of AAPIs in the SEAL Teams, but after serving time
in the SEAL Teams, he noticed more:

69
As a new guy, I wasn’t so focused on it. So, I didn’t see a whole lot of Asians unless I
interacted with them, but after I did a couple [SEAL] platoons, I was able to widen my
perspective, and that’s when I noticed a lot more Asians were in the SEAL teams.
Furthermore, Participant 4 included that as the SEAL Teams became more publicly
known through movies and books, AAPIs became more informed about the possibility of
pursuing a career as a SEAL.
In BUD/S, the first book came out called “The Men in Green Faces,” and then slowly
[Richard] Marcinko’s book came out. I am already on the [SEAL] team at this point, and
then movies started coming out. Now SEALs have become more publicized. They’re
more mainstream, so I could see Asians say, you know, ‘I can do that.’ I think this is
where we’re [AAPI] educated.
That statement by Participant 4, “I think this is where we’re [AAPI] educated,” is an
intriguing one. First, it captures and further validates the themes from RQ1: AAPIs will generally
discover what a Navy SEAL is through alternative media or marketing sources not directly
connected to official Navy recruiting advertisements. Second, Participant 3’s comment, in
response to a different question, helps to support Participant 4’s statement, where Participant 3
stated, “There’s a lot of feisty Asians out there that can physically do it [be a U.S. Navy SEAL].
We need to know it’s an option.” In reading both participant’s statements together, they form a
contextual picture: “I think this is where we’re educated” (Participant 4) and “We need to know
it’s an option” (Participant 3) speaks volumes in terms of access and knowledge, and
opportunity. Moreover, the first half of Participant 3’s statement further contextualizes who
AAPIs are and rejects the Model Minority stereotypes, where others see AAPIs as quiet, meek,

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and non-aggressive, which is in contrast with Participant 3’s statement above where he states,
“there a lot of feisty Asians.”
Finally, Participant 2 believed the number of AAPIs serving had not changed in the
SEAL Teams. He stated that it might appear this way, especially in Hawai’i, where a larger
concentration of former Navy SEALs identifying as AAPIs are in a tiny location instead of being
spread across the United States. He argued he did not see many AAPIs serving in the SEAL
Teams and, now that he is out of the Navy, he is noticing more SEALs who are AAPIs in
Hawai’i. Participant 2 further clarified why he believed the percentile of AAPIs serving as
SEALs has not changed:
The percentage hasn’t changed. It’s the same. I didn’t notice much. But the fact that I
came back home here in Hawai’i, and then people from Hawai’i, you know, we all know
each other, and this was more of a connection with other local SEALs, you know, born
and raised in Hawai’i, and a lot of them are Asian right. See what I’m saying? So, in the
SEAL community [at large], I didn’t notice it. But now that I’m back home, I’m talking
to my buddies and friends, and I’m seeing everybody else that was born and raised, and
they’re Asian. And so that’s just an Asian connection.
This statement by Participant 2 is invaluable because he brings with him the experience
of having been assigned to SEAL Teams on both the West and East Coast, which gave him a
broader perspective on this subject. Like the previous respondents, Participant 3 also did not see
many AAPIs serving as SEALs. When he returned home to Hawai’i, a state with one of the
largest concentrations of AAPIs situated in one location (World Population Review, 2022), he
began to see more former SEALs who identified as AAPIs. To note, Participant 3’s response was
anecdotal and not based on hard evidence to support his claim.

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Summary
To summarize, Research Question 2 focused on understanding the respondents’
perceptions and several factors regarding support for their career advancement. This section
presented several results from participants believing they did receive organizational support to
advance their careers, to discrimination, role modeling, to recognizing AAPIs are not
proportionately represented, to lack of mentorship, culture, and finally, a division on whether
AAPIs numbers have increased or not for those SEALs who identify as AAPIs. The purpose of
this section was to identify, analyze, and provide the results from each respondent to bring
attention to some factors contributing to Research Question 2.
Results for Research Question 3 (RQ3): What Factors Influenced The Retirement or
Separation of AAPIs in The Naval Special Warfare Community?
This section explores factors influencing the participants of this study to retire or separate
from active-duty service. While all participants transitioned out of the military for varying
reasons, 50% (four of the eight) retired after at least 20 years. The remaining separated after
eight years of military service. Some factors that lead to retirement or early separation included
personal reasons, which consisted of family or physical/mental injuries, and professional reasons,
which included seeking other opportunities, lack of opportunity to advance in the Navy, and or
lack of leadership.
Family Influence: Stability, Presence, and Safety
For three of the participants, their family greatly impacted their decision to separate from
active-duty service. In Participant 1’s case, his family was a significant factor influencing him to
separate. In addition, a job opportunity presented itself, which provided him with a stable
schedule so he could spend more time with this family. Participant 1 said,

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family was a big part of it, because I knew that, you know, I’ve left them twice, and I’m
glad that I didn’t get a chance to, you know, continue my career in the teams [SEAL
Teams], because an opportunity presented itself where I took effectively a nine to five
job. It’s like, you know, I was up at 6:00 AM a couple of days ago, but you know, I can
do eight hours a day, and this job has given me lots of great opportunities to spend time
with my son.
Similarly, Participant 4 explained that his wife urged him to retire after he was severely injured
in a parachuting accident because she wanted him healthy and present for their family.
I burned in [parachuting accident] eight months before I retired, and pretty much, I
fractured my L1 and smashed L3 and fractured my tailbone….my wife’s like, now you’re
done, you know so. You know you have young children. You don’t need to be paralyzed
while they’re growing up.
Finally, Participant 7’s reason for separating from active duty included primarily his family, who
initially did not want him to join the military. Ultimately, his decision to leave was to respect his
grandfather’s dying wish.
In some ways, they [family] influenced me greatly. And my family and my grandfather in
particular. It was almost as if it was his dying wish that I get out. It was one of my last
moments, where I could come back when he was on his deathbed. That was a big
influence. My whole family never wanted me to be in the military.
For these three participants, their families played a significant role in their decision to
separate from the military. To note, the first two participants were married while serving as
active-duty SEALs, unlike Participant 7, who was a bachelor during his service. As stated earlier
in this study, AAPIs tend to very family oriented. Whether married or not, familial pressure can

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play a significant role in an AAPI’s decision to enlist in the military, what career they should
pursue, and retention. As Participant 5 asserted, “I think Asian Pacific Islanders… they’re very
family oriented, so they want to be close to their family. I feel more than you know some other
cultures.”
Personal and Professional Reflection
The following participants transitioned due to age, their view of life, and wanting to
separate while they were still young and able to move into another career field if necessary. For
this study, the interview data provided some insight into the participant’s reasons for separating,
but the final reason for separation varied from person to person.
For Participant 7, he separated for personal and professional reasons. During his career as
a SEAL, Participant 7 experienced the deaths of many of his friends and colleagues, who were
SEALs, because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which brought him to a crossroads. He
questioned his reasons for being a SEAL and whether it was worth his life or risking serious
bodily injury. Therefore, he decided he was still young enough to separate from the Navy to
pursue a different career path. Participant 7 said,
Well, age was a big one. I was about 30 or 31, and at the time, I remember I had just gone
to another funeral. And by that point, it had just been so many that I wondered, is this the
point of what am I doing here? Do I want to continue going to funerals until I’m broken
just to have that sort of sad ending? You know, what are we fighting for?
Participant 3 decided to separate from the Navy for similar reasons. After a long SEAL
career beginning as an NCO and later earning a commission and reaching the rank of O-4, he
was ready to leave the Navy. He expressed how he was mentally taxed and suffered from several
injuries he sustained during his career. After reflecting on his career, he decided it was time to

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leave and to pursue something else, even though he was recently promoted to the next higher
rank as a commissioned officer prior to his separation.
Once you get to that point like you contemplate [about your career], you think about it for
several years and then see it. And just after a while, once you mentally flick that switch
and say, I’m out. I don’t know if they offered me anything; I would have stayed. I don’t
think so. So, I picked up four [O-4], but I know what that meant. That meant I would
have to do at least four more years. But my mind was already made, so I didn’t want to
do just four more years. I also was thinking because I was about fifty years old when I
retired. I thought this was the time for me if I wanted to do another job. I’m young
enough to do another job. You know, at fifty-four, fifty-five, fifty-nine, if I continue to
stay in, [and] kick that can down the road. Who knows? I might be unable to walk back
[from kicking the can]. I might not be able to even lift and tie my shoes. And so right
now, if I’m gonna enjoy life, or if I’m gonna work another job. This is it.
Lack of Clear Purpose
Unlike the previous respondents, Participant 3’s reason for separating was mixed between
personal and professional reasons. He explained how he lost interest as a SEAL, based on how
the organization ran. He expressed, “I was just over it. Not only personally, I think, but maybe
just the whole system. Just sick and tired of the SEAL community, just kind of like over it.”
Participant 5 displayed similar sentiments as Participants 3 and 7. He needed a clearer
sense of the organization’s purpose and whether it was worth risking his life. He provided an
example, during a deployment he made to Afghanistan, where his SEAL platoon was conducting
daylight operations in a dangerous and hostile environment, customarily done by a conventional

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force like the U.S. Army or U.S. Marines. Participant 5 rationalized to himself that it was too
high a price and not worth his life.
On our deployment where we’re doing daytime present patrols walking around doing
conventional work. Um, just wasn’t what I signed up to do. And you know, risk my life
that way, I just left with a bad taste in my mouth after that time. But that was it. It was
that deployment; where, what are we doing here? Why? Why do we have to walk around
during the daytime? Then, watching that administration does not have your back. You
know that whole thing, like not being able to operate at night? Why are they using
SEALs for a conventional mission? That kind of stuff.
New Opportunities
Pursuing new and different opportunities, whether for familial reasons or disagreements
with the organization’s way of doing business, also surfaced during the interview with
Participant 2. He explained he knew it was time for him to move on and he separated from the
Navy seeking new career opportunities:
I wanted to do my own thing and take all that I had learned and accomplished in the
SEAL Teams and just build a new life, I guess, a path out in the civilian world, and I
found that kind of passion, a new role in entrepreneurship, which is what I need.
Lastly, and likewise, Participant 7 was intrigued in seeking new career possibilities
outside of the military. He had also rationalized that he was still young enough to pursue a
different career and, if necessary, he could still seek additional training (i.e., go back to college
or obtain a certification). He stated,

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Like, what else is out there? That sort of outlook spurred me to look at it from a timeline
point of view: I wanted to get out. It might be better to do it earlier rather than later so
that I could look and see if I needed to be retrained.
Summary
Research Question 3 addressed what factors helped to influence the participants of this
study to separate from the Navy. This section addressed the significance of family, the lack of
purpose, and the seeking of new opportunities. Family played a big part in the participants’
decisions to retire or separate. However, out of all the reasons provided, two or more of the
participants stated in their interviews that family significantly influenced their life and how they
made decisions. Moreover, other life-altering factors, such as injuries, the death of former
teammates, and the lack of purpose, also influence their decision to separate. Lastly, participants
separated to look for new opportunities while they were still able.

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Chapter Five: Recommendations
Chapter Five presents the findings and recommendations that resulted from this research
study. The problem of practice was the low underrepresentation of AAPIs serving within the
senior leadership ranks of the U.S. Navy SEALs. This study examined why AAPIs are
underrepresented in the U.S. Navy SEALs and their senior leadership ranks. This research used a
qualitative method and interviewed eight AAPI former Navy SEALs to explain their behaviors
and beliefs on why they believe AAPIs are largely underrepresented (Creswell & Creswell,
2017). Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the collected and analyzed data and compare the
data to specific factors addressed in the literature review. This chapter has been organized to
present the following order: discussion of findings, recommendations for practice, and research,
limitations, and conclusion.
Discussion of Findings
Three research questions guided this study. The first research question focused on factors
influencing the decision of AAPIs to join the U.S. Navy SEALs. The second research question
focused on factors on the perception of advancement for AAPIs and the support from their
organizational leadership. Lastly, the third research question focused on factors influencing
AAPIs to retire and or separate from the NSW Organization. The findings of this study will
follow the chronological flow of each research question.
Findings on Perception and Influence
While the U.S. Navy has gone to great lengths to reduce institutional structural barriers,
which reflect service policies and practices (Harrel et al., 1999), the findings, however, do
suggest perceptual and structural barriers continue to exist, which ultimately affects AAPI
participation in an occupational field like the Navy SEALs. These barriers may result from the

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USSOCOM’s and DONCNSWC 2022’s recruiting policy and practices, ultimately affecting its
recruiting and outreach programs to target AAPI communities. As the data demonstrated, six of
the participants were introduced to the idea of Navy SEALs while in college and through nonSOF affiliated sources. Prior to college, they did not know a career as a Navy SEAL was an
option, and two of the respondents attended the U.S. Naval Academy with no knowledge nor
intention of joining the SEALs. This indicates a lack of access and knowledge. For instance, one
of the participants who attended U.S. Naval Academy intended to transfer to the U.S. Marine
Corps because he perceived them to be the most demanding military branch, while the second
participant was looking to join the Special Operations Forces, but he only knew of the U.S.
Army SOF (also known as Green Berets). However, what all the participants had in common is
that they were all influenced by external factors not directly connected with the U.S. Navy’s or
NSW’s recruiting and outreach programs, which included books, movies, documentaries, and
more.
The literature points out that AAPIs are less likely than other racial groups to join the
military due to the culture’s traditional views on career options (Bempechat et al., 2018; Ng &
Wei, 2020; Yamamoto & Holloway, 2010). AAPI households tend to hold post-secondary
education in high regard, especially when it leads to professional fields like law, engineering,
management, medicine, and more (Bempechat et al., 2018; Ng & Wei, 2020; Yamamoto &
Holloway, 2010). Therefore, AAPIs generally do not socialize a career in the military within
their households or social circles. As a result, this stereotype can influence behaviors and
reinforce all stakeholder beliefs (Bandura, 1989). Moreover, stereotypes towards AAPIs, such as
the model minority or perpetual foreigner, can influence the perceptions and behaviors of U.S.
Navy and NSW recruiters who are at the forefront of recruiting and outreach (Aronson et al.,

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2002; Bandura, 1989; Poon et al., 2016; Riegle-Crumb et al., 2019). Therefore, dominant groups
could inadvertently exclude AAPIs, leading to isolation or discrimination (Crisp & Abrams,
2008; Huynh et al., 2011; Pettersen, 1966). In addition, the model minority stereotype’s
invasiveness also deceives AAPIs into believing in the stereotypes themselves (Aronson et al.,
2002; Riegle-Crumb et al., 2019). In the findings, all the participants believed that education was
essential. Their families reinforced this belief, influencing them to pursue education offering
high-paying professional careers. In the case of the participants who engaged in this study, six
participants were college graduates, which could suggest AAPIs may accept the stereotypes as
being true. However, despite notable AAPI academic achievements, the findings suggest that
they still face disparities compared to their peers in attaining senior leadership roles (Burris et al.,
2013; Tang, 1997; Zeng & Xie, 2004).
Direct Access to Navy SEALs
Based on the themes discussed in Chapter Four, how someone is socialized can determine
their life choices when picking a career. For instance, all eight participants had family members
who directly influenced them to attend college. The data showed that six participants attended
college first and would discover the SEAL career during or after college. Likewise, one of the
participants experienced a similar situation from family members pressuring him to attend
college. However, he did have the benefit of knowing a direct member of his family who
provided him with a different perspective, which ultimately influenced him to avoid college
altogether and to join the SEALs after he had graduated from high school.
Although his circumstances differ, the next participant came into direct contact with
SEALs, while he was on active duty, which inspired him to pursue a career as a Navy SEAL.
This participant, already in the US Navy, came into direct contact with SEALs during their

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assignment on a Navy ship. This interaction led to this participant’s decision to pursue a career
as a SEAL. In both cases, direct access to SEALs can influence AAPIs to consider this nontraditional career if they have prior knowledge and access to such opportunities (Moses et al.,
2019; Pearce & Perrotte, 2021; Yan, 2022).
Findings on Career Opportunities
The data revealed that 100% of the participants believed advancement opportunities were
available. That said, all three of the commissioned officers were under the rank of O-5
(commander), which is considered a senior ranking officer in the Navy. The fourth participant
was a warrant officer-three (CWO-3). CWOs in the Navy generally have served more than 10
years in the Navy as senior NCOs and have several years of leadership and managerial
experience. The remaining four participants were NCOs and equally split between the senior (E7 and above) and junior NCOs (E-6 and below).
The literature review points out two reasons why minorities do not progress up to senior
leadership positions, and the first is the leadership prototype. According to the leadership
categorization theory, leadership prototypes tend to develop into what best represents the cultural
perspective of the organization (Armenta et al., 2013; Rosch & Mervis, 1975;). Therefore, this
means the prototypical leader is White if the organization is predominantly White. According to
Armenta et al. (2013) and Bandura (1989), when these categorizations are created, they help to
shape the individual’s perception and behaviors, which can lead to discrimination or exclusion,
which one of the participants believed he had experienced.
The second reason AAPIs do not advance is the result of combining the leadership
prototype with stereotypes addressed in the literature review (i.e., Model Minority, perpetual
foreigner, and others). The leadership categorization theory also creates an organizational culture

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that may not view or appreciate AAPIs as ideal leaders because outsiders see them as a passive
and non-aggressive group of people (Armenta et al., 2013; Okazaki, 2000; Poon et al., 2016).
The negative stereotype of being seen as passive and non-aggressive harms AAPIs career
opportunities especially if they are in a leadership position, where if they made a mistake, they
would be seen unfavorably by their peers and direct reports (Rosette et al., 2008; Knight et al.,
2003). What this means, according to Knight et al. (2003), if AAPIs make a mistake, they are
seen more negatively, unlike their White counterparts, regardless of the severity of the error. As
mentioned in Chapter Two, regarding the AAPI stereotypes and leadership prototypes, the data
demonstrated that both factors persist, strongly influenced by the negative stereotypes and how
the organization perceives them.
Both factors deliver significant challenges for AAPIs when it comes to access, ascension,
and retention and how others see them as competent leaders in the NSW organization (Harris,
2009; Okazaki, 2000; Poon et al., 2016). Again, a few of the stereotypes listed can and do
operate unwittingly among all stakeholders: the dominant group, other minorities, and AAPIs
(Armenta et al., 2013; Huynh et al., 2011).
Findings on Separation
Participants cited assorted reasons for their separation, including a strong emphasis on
family, a lack of clear purpose within the NSW organization, and the pursuit of new
opportunities. One participant, in particular, chose to separate due to concerns that the
organization was jeopardizing his safety by conducting daylight missions, which diverged from
the usual SEAL practice of conducting missions under the cover of darkness. Additionally, the
potential transferability of Navy SEAL skills into the civilian job market, as discussed in the
literature review, was highlighted by two participants who opted to separate rather than retire.

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They believed they were still youthful and adaptable enough to undergo career retraining if
needed.
Implications for Practice
The findings from this study revealed several factors as to why there is an
underrepresentation of AAPI serving as U.S. Navy SEAL operators, which affects their
ascension to senior leadership positions and is attributable to stereotypes and their access to
knowledge and perceptions as stakeholders. Therefore, the recommendations for this section
result from strategies used to increase the recruitment and retention of minorities from various
articles.
There are a few reasons why people join the military. According to research, people
generally join the military because of patriotism, a desire to serve their country, or to seek
adventure and excitement (Bailey, 2009). The military, and particularly the U.S. Navy, have
capitalized on these motivational factors in many of their recruiting commercials throughout the
years. For example, the top six Navy recruitment commercials have exhibited both patriotism
and adventure to encourage and inspire all people to join (Malloy, 2021). While these are good
contributing motivators to get people to enlist, they may not be enough, nor will it always
resonate among different ethnic groups, to get them to join. Based on the findings, the following
section will discuss specific recommendations for practice intended to provide the Navy SEAL
organization with two courses of actions or recommendations they can chose to implement to
help them in their recruitment and outreach towards encouraging and inspiring more AAPIs to
join Navy SEAL ranks.
The primary recommendation is focused on recruitment efforts. First, the
recommendation will help to identify exactly where the target demographic is geographically

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located. Second, it identifies some key motivating factors for AAPI individuals, generally
heavily influenced by family and culture, that determine the type of careers they decide to
follow. Finally, the first recommendation will highlight what the Navy can employ in their
existing arsenal to help influence AAPIs to consider and join the Navy SEAL ranks. The second
recommendation will focus on role modeling and mentorship, and what the Navy can do to help
attract and recruit AAPIs to consider the SEALs as a career option. Lastly, the third
recommendation will focus on the promotion of anti-discrimination practices, equal opportunity
training, and reducing stereotypes.
Recommendation 1: Target Recruitment Efforts and Partnerships
This recommendation addresses the results associated with RQ1. As reported in the
findings, the data from the qualitative interviews revealed that most of the participants had no
idea what a Navy SEAL was until they were in college or had already graduated. Further, their
knowledge of what a Navy SEAL does was not directly connected to the U.S. Navy’s recruiting
and outreach efforts as mentioned earlier in this study. Therefore, one strategy the U.S. Navy can
implement to increase awareness is to target their recruiting efforts specifically towards AAPI
communities. Three prongs are recommended: a) geographic/location-based; b) educational; and
c) community partnerships.
Geographic/Location-Based. The Navy can focus its recruiting efforts within U.S. states
and cities that have large populations of AAPIs. For example, Participant 2, mentioned he did not
notice a large number of AAPIs as SEALs while serving on both the West and East coast. But,
when he returned home to Hawai’i, he began to notice there were more Navy SEALs who
identified as AAPIs and who were living in one location. Of the eight participants in this study,
three were from Hawai’i. Additionally, when asked to identify other AAPI SEALs, most of the

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participants identified AAPIs who also came from within the Hawaiian island chain. According
to the U.S. Census Bureau (2022), AAPIs are largely located in the following states: California,
Hawai’i, and New Jersey. The population in each of these three states is at least 10% Asianidentifying (U.S. Census, 2022). Based on the U.S. Census’ 2022 data there are large numbers of
AAPIs who are geographically dispersed among seven major metropolitan areas. First, one of the
largest concentrations of AAPIs, particularly those who identify as Asian Indians reside in both
the Atlanta (136,931) and Chicago (229,003) metro areas (U.S. Census, 2022). Second, those
who identify as Vietnamese reside in the Houston (136,813) metro area (U.S. Census, 2022).
Third, Los Angeles’ metro area includes many Native Hawaiian Pacific Islanders (NHPI)
(35,000), Samoans (11752), and Chamorros (4,469) (U.S. Census, 2022). Fourth, Hmong people
(83,132) are heavily concentrated in Minneapolis’ metro area (U.S. Census, 2022). Fifth, Boston
(152,274) and Seattle (124,204) host a large population of those who identify as Chinese (U.S.
Census, 2022). Sixth, San Diego’s metro area has 155,522 Filipinos, and lastly, Salt Lake City’s
population included 18,291 Native Hawaiian Pacific Islanders (NHPI) (U.S. Census, 2022).
Educational. With private college tuition fees increasing steadily each year (Martin,
2017), this is one of the areas the NSW community can leverage when reaching out to AAPI
communities. The AAPI participants from this study were encouraged to pursue education first
by their families with six of the eight having graduated from college before becoming SEALs.
Consequently, this study recommends the NSW community begin to leverage many of its
already existing educational scholarship and financial assistance programs, available to both
active-duty and veterans, when recruiting AAPIs who are culturally influenced to pursue
education and a high paying professional career. Moreover, there are at least two non-profit
organizations (i.e., Navy SEAL Foundation and Navy SEAL Future Fund) that help active and

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veteran SEALs, along with their families, with additional scholarships and financial aid. While
military educational benefits are generally known to the public, it is the non-profits which caters
to the Navy SEALs during and after service that is not general knowledge, and this could be one
of the key incentives to help influence more AAPIs to join the Navy SEAL ranks.
Community Partnership. After identifying states, metropolitan areas, and two key
motivational factors, the NSW community can partner with local AAPI community groups to
help promote and raise awareness of SEAL careers and opportunities in high schools and
colleges. The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) already have an established presence in
high schools and colleges, so NSW should work closely with them. Further, the NSW
organization can partner with The Asian American Foundation (TAAF), again, to help promote
SEAL careers, opportunities, and benefits. In addition, these types of engaged partnerships can
help dispel stereotypes of AAPIs in what the military has to offer, and breakdown cultural
barriers to become more inclusive. The TAAF is an organization that works to help educate
through core initiatives to establish anti-hate and cultivate empathy, while providing support
resources to AAPI communities (The Asian American Foundation, 2023). Moreover, TAAF’s
vision is to participate in all aspects of our society to reduce false stereotypes and discrimination.
A partnership between NSW and TAAF will be beneficial for both organizations.
Recommendation 2: Promote an Active Inclusion Mentorship Program
This recommendation begins by addressing the results associated with RQ2 with regards
to mentoring. Diversity matters, and it has several advantages for any organization. In fact, a lack
of diversity can cause harm to all stakeholders within the organization, especially in NSW, where
the diversity of their people is its strength (USSOCOM, 2021). If there is a lack of diversity and
a lack of diversity in mentors and role models, research has shown that a member’s morale and

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productivity will decline (Bandura, 1989; Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008). The lack of identity with
a mentor can trigger social cues and spur questions over the issue of trust and if AAPIs fit into
the organization (Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2017). Therefore, this next
recommendation will provide strategies on what the NSW organization can do to implement an
inclusive mentorship program to support AAPIs, which include: (a) Cultural understanding and
sensitivity, (b) targeted resource support, (c) leadership development, (d) mentorship training, (e)
mentor matching.
Cultural Understanding and Sensitivity
As stated in the literature review of this study and supported by the interview data,
culture does play a role in an AAPIs career decision making. Therefore, this study recommends
the NSW organization develops a deep understanding of AAPI culture, their history, and
experiences to create an inclusive mentorship program. This approach would also need to take
into consideration AAPI community backgrounds which includes different AAPI subgroups,
language, and practices. In addition, the mentorship program and its mentors will need to adopt
and nurture an environment that appreciates and respects these differences, ensuring mentors are
sensitive to cultural nuances and can provide support and guidance that line up with overarching
AAPI values and goals. For this consideration, NSW will not need to establish a focus group or
working group since it already has diversity and inclusion specialists on staff. The DI staff can
assist in conducting necessary research and draft DI policies and initiatives towards creating a
robust mentorship program with AAPIs in mind.
Provide Targeted Resource Support
While it is not always possible to match an AAPI with another AAPI, the organization
can provide targeted resources and support for both the mentor and mentee. This could include

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specific training that addresses the unique opportunities and challenges that AAPIs face as
individuals in society, professionally, and academically. Also, NSW can provide cultural
competency training to help educate mentors toward understanding AAPI experiences. Another
option, the NSW organization can create an online resources center that offers relevant materials,
articles, recorded media of successful stories from other Navy SEALs who identify as AAPIs,
which would resonate with the mentee. Lastly, NSW can foster community engagement by
assisting in connecting and providing network opportunities for AAPIs, where they can
personally connect with other successful AAPIs within the community.
Leadership Development
The NSW organization can promote leadership development within the AAPI community
by offering mentorship opportunities that specifically target career advancement. This would
include the NSW organization directing mentors to provide guidance on navigating the social
and political environment and understanding the challenges associated with it. In addition,
mentors would facilitate in helping AAPIs build a network that would help them to understand
what they need to know and who they need to know when advancing to leadership positions and
provide access to leadership development programs that are tailored to AAPIs. In addition,
mentors can introduce and establish a bridge and partnerships with other successful AAPIs, who
are SEALs, within the community who can also provide additional support.
Mentorship Training
In the U.S. Navy, there already exists equal opportunity (EO) officers, commandmanaged equal opportunity (CMEO), command climate specialist (CCS), and the command
resilience team (CRT), who receive both initial training and sustainment training once a year to
maintain knowledge (SECNAVINST 12713.14, 2017; OPNAVINST 4354.1G, 2017).

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Mentorship training should also be modeled in this same fashion for aspiring mentor; active and
inclusive mentors need to receive formal training on the issue of discrimination and especially
stereotypes. While it is nearly impossible to match every SEAL who identifies as AAPI with a
SEAL mentor who identifies as AAPI with the current population numbers, a good approach is
to provide AAPIs with mentors who fall in their job description. Mentors exist now, but these
mentors should all be SEALs with similar training as EO officers and understand issues of
prejudice, discrimination, or bias.
Mentor Matching
As stated earlier, it would be nearly impossible to match one-to-one an AAPI SEAL with an
AAPI SEAL mentor. However, some steps can facilitate pairing the correct mentee with the
correct mentor. For example, it would not make sense to match a SEAL who identifies as AAPI
with a non-SEAL who identifies as AAPI. Moreover, while both are AAPIs, their roles and
responsibilities may not always share the same career progression towards achieving senior
leadership positions. In addition, there may be better choices than matching a mentee who is
more senior in rank with a junior person. Therefore, matching mentee and mentor as best
possible should be the goal for the organization. According to Carruthers (2021), the following
points could facilitate the pairing process:
• Mentees need the choice to opt-in without being forced to have a mentor. Match the
mentee and the mentor according to professional job description, skills, and experiences.
As a result, this will help to establish rapport and common ground.
• Matching participants with similar personal backgrounds (i.e., hobbies and interests) is
also ideal.
• Allow the mentee to have a stake in choosing an available mentor.

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• If the mentee and mentor are not a match, create a process by which the mentorship ends
without causing professional and personal problems.
Incorporating these mentor/mentees pairing steps can avoid potential pitfalls between
individuals’ professional and personal relationships.
Recommendation 3: Promote Anti-Discrimination Practices
This recommendation addresses the results associated with RQ2. The U.S. Navy, which
oversees and encompasses all its subcomponents such as the NSW community, has had a longstanding policy towards discrimination outlined in its Department of the Navy (DON) AntiHarassment Policy Statement, the Equal Employment Opportunity Statement (EEOS), and
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) (2017) Instruction (INST) 12713.14. Each document
addresses how the DON is “committed towards ensuring all ethnics groups, religious beliefs, and
abilities are treated fairly and are valued, free from discrimination on any protected basis”
(SECNAVINST 12713.14, 2017). In addition, the DON is “committed to employing all persons
regardless of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic information, and
ensure that anyone who engages in protected EEO activity is free from reprisal” (SECNAVINST
12713.14, 2017, p. 2). Therefore, promoting anti-discrimination practices begins by adhering to
these policies and instructions. However, policy and instructions alone are not enough. An entire
course of instruction is needed to educate and train all Navy personnel on specific discriminating
factors (i.e., stereotypes).
Equal Opportunity Training
With that said, the Department of the Navy does provide an annual Equal Opportunity,
Harassment, and Resolution (EOHR) training for all sailors and civilian employees during their
annual general military training (GMT) (OPNAVINST 4354.1G, 2017). In addition, senior

90
NCOs and officers receive EO training through leadership training and leadership training
awareness seminars. At these training events and seminars, they receive instructions on “fully
understanding the importance of identifying and eliminating harassment and unlawful
discrimination and how it undermines our leadership abilities and impacts command climate”
(OPNAVINST 4354.1G, 2017, p. 6–1). If this is true, the data collected during the interview
presents a problem. In Chapter Four of this study, Participant 1 first alluded to and later stated
that discrimination may have been a factor:
Maybe I didn’t look or feel or look like the typical, you know, intense type of [SEAL]
operator that they wanted to have. Yeah, was there a level of you know? I mean, I hate to
say that there is discrimination, but you know, I mean, it exists everywhere. Yeah, I think
it is everywhere.
It is unknown whether this respondent reported this event to EO officials responsible for
collecting and reporting all complaints regarding discrimination practices as per the SECNAV
and OPNAV. These members include the CMEO, CCS, and CRT. In addition, despite
maintaining their anonymity, based on the interview data, several other participants avoided
discussing the topic of discrimination altogether. It is reasonable to assume that all the
participants were likely aware of the DON’s discrimination and harassment policy since it is
mandatory that they must participate in the annual required EO training. Regardless of their
feelings and potential backlash from reprisal, a leader is responsible for reporting any incident
violating EO initiatives and policies (SECNAVINST 12713.14, 2017).
Including Stereotypes in Education and Training
In addressing negative stereotypes of all kinds, a stereotype is mentioned only once in the
Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual (Department of the Navy, 2017), but with little

91
context as to how it affects another person who may be the target. Therefore, as a matter of
concern, anti-discrimination training, education, and practices should be expanded and tailored to
recognize the kinds of discriminating stereotypes that affect AAPIs. Some examples of
stereotypes mentioned in this study’s literature review are the model minority, perpetual
foreigner, and more. It is unknown whether these stereotypes have had any effect on the
participants of this study. Although, it is known is that most of the participants were collegeeducated and junior in rank, demonstrating the possibility of a bamboo ceiling, which was
mentioned in the literature review.
Since this type of training can bring attention to AAPIs, to avoid any reprisal from other
racial groups, it is recommended leaders and all stakeholders from each racial group should be
empowered to take part in a series of summits to establish priorities, procedures, and timelines
towards understanding the kinds of negative stereotypes affecting AAPIs and other minorities.
Reducing Stereotypes
Research has found several ways to improve performance shortfalls associated with
stereotype threats and their effects on social identity (Gresky et al., 2005; Purdie-Vaughns et al.,
2008). One of these techniques is to marginalize the effectiveness of a stereotype through
individuation (Ambady et al., 2004). Since social identity involves an intersection of multiple
identities (i.e., AAPI, father, brother, physician, and more), making any of these identities more
critical than another can improve the performance of those under a stereotype threat (Wilder,
1981). For example, if other people see SEALs who identify as AAPI in the context of being a
top performer rather than their identity as seen in the context of their stereotype, then the
stereotype is minimized (Ambady et al., 2004; Stryker & Statham, 1985; Tajfel & Turner, 2001).

92
Moreover, Wilder’s (1981) seminal study posits that individuation decreases stereotypes
by concentrating on the person as an individual rather than a larger racial category to which they
belong. Therefore, people inside an organization like NSW should focus on an AAPI as an
individual, along with their skills and talents, rather than associating them with their racial group
where negative stereotypes tend to manifest. Furthermore, it would invite and allow more AAPIs
to feel accepted and pursue a career as a SEAL without fear of a stereotype threat, thereby
increasing their representation within the SEAL ranks.
Therefore, the following recommendations, aligned with Smith’s (2019) suggestions
from the American Medical Association website, have been tailored to complement and promote
anti-discrimination practices:
• Clearly define negative stereotypes, stereotype threats, biases, and other
microaggressions within the NSW environment.
• Senior NSW leaders should provide a remedial course of action in case of an infraction
against the proposed guidelines, demonstrating their commitment to combat
discrimination.
• Ensure education and training requirements are provided to all members within the NSW
organization, highlighting negative stereotypes, stereotype threats, and other
discriminating factors.
• Senior NSW leaders should promote and prioritize a secure communication channel for
reporting and correcting discrimination.
This is not an all-inclusive list and can be expanded to fit the organization’s goals and
objectives. Furthermore, this study recommends addressing each of the stereotypes found in the
literature review, which needs to coalesce with the current findings of discrimination along with

93
the Navy Equal Opportunity Program Manual and the annual general military training course,
education, and training per the training and educational curriculum of the Navy’s annual EO
GMT. This study recommends that EO and EOHR training occur more frequently rather than
annually to ensure that negative stereotypes and stereotype threats are understood and brought to
the full awareness of all members of the U.S. Navy.
Future Research and Limitations
This study aligns with past research resulting in findings to support the
underrepresentation of AAPIs in the U.S. Navy SEALs and its connection to the low proportion
of this group reaching senior leadership positions. Moreover, the findings can shed more light on
the possibilities for future research to fully understand how AAPI culture plays a significant role
in their career decision-making process. In this research, the participants included only U.S.
Navy SEAL veterans who identified as AAPIs and therefore recruiting more participants to
partake in a similar study could be beneficial. Additionally, future research can segue over to
different groups of AAPIs and stakeholders: (a) U.S. Navy SEAL candidates before joining the
U.S. Navy; (b) U.S. Navy SEAL candidates in BUD/S training; (c) U.S. Navy recruits pursuing
other naval combat careers prior to joining the U.S. Navy; (d) U.S. Navy active-duty service
members currently on active-duty service in other career fields; (e) AAPI U.S. Navy veterans; (f)
family members of potential U.S. Navy SEAL candidates; (g) all non-AAPI, which would
provide a holistic perspective on why there is an underrepresentation of AAPIs in the U.S. Navy
SEAL career field and its senior leadership ranks and it may also shed light on what role
stereotypes play.

94
Limitations and Delimitations
According to Creswell and Creswell (2017), limitations are not in the control of the
researcher, which could affect the research outcome. Therefore, a key limitation in this study is
related to access to information. Specifically, among participants whose former careers required
a high level of secrecy and confidentiality, a limitation is not being able to control for the
interviewees’ truthfulness and or hesitancy to share private information that could be seen as
problematic for their reputation and/or organization.
This study examined data from U.S. Navy SEAL graduates from 2008 to 2020. The data
did not examine those who attended BUD/S training or were disenrolled from training for
whatever reasons (i.e., drop on request, failing to meet academic and physical standards and
more). Third, this research was only qualitative. Using mixed methods for future research could
make this research more holistic. The method for collecting data for the mixed methods study
could be to use surveys in conjunction with interviews and compare the data with the data
provided by the Department of Navy Naval Special Warfare Command.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the underrepresentation of Navy SEALs who
identify as AAPIs serving in senior leadership positions. Eight AAPI veteran SEALs provided
this study with some invaluable insight into how they learned about the Navy SEALs, their
perception of organizational support towards promotion once they became SEALs, and their
reasons for separating from the Navy. The three research questions in this study guided all data
collection and analysis. The findings of this study included: perception and influence of the Navy
SEALs, available career opportunities, and reasons for separating from the Navy. As a result of
these findings, the implications related to the research questions are as follows: include AAPI

95
SEALs in recruiting propaganda and high-profile teams to increase inclusion efforts; training on
equal opportunity with a focus on the specific negative stereotypes towards AAPIs, the need for
mentorship and mentorship training among NSW leadership, and appropriately matching
mentors with mentees. Therefore, this study provided three primary recommendations: (a) target
recruitment efforts and partnerships, (b) mentoring and role modeling, and (c) promote antidiscrimination practices.

96
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol
Thank you for meeting with me today to discuss the topic on the underrepresentation of
Asian American Pacific Islanders (AAPI) serving as U.S. Navy SEALs. As you are aware, I am a
doctoral student at the University of Southern California interested in understanding what
external influences affect AAPI’s decision to become U.S. Navy SEALs and their decision to
advance and or leave the U.S. Navy SEAL community, and I greatly appreciate the time you are
spending with me to conduct this interview. This interview is confidential so no one outside of
this will know your identity and will not have access to your personal information or will it be
shared in any reports. Please keep in mind, your perspective will be valuable to this overall
study. If, at any point during the interview you need to take a break and stop, please let me know.
Also, if you feel the questions are too intrusive, you do have the option to skip the question or
not answer. With your permission, I would like to record this session. The reason, I am recording
is to capture the information you provide accurately, so I do not misrepresent what you are
saying. In addition, I will be taking notes to help me recall what was discussed. Do I have your
permission to record?
Before we begin, could you please answer the following questions:
• Are you an Asian American Pacific Islander?
• Are you a U.S. Navy SEAL veteran, no longer on active duty?
• Did you serve in the U.S. Navy SEALs over 6 to 8 years? How long have you served?
• At what rank did you enter the U.S. Navy SEALS? What rank were you when you
separated?
I appreciate your answers. Let us begin with the interview questions.

118
Protocol Interview Questionnaire
RQ1: What factors influenced the decision of AAPI to join as U.S. Navy SEALs?
• When did you first consider joining the U.S. Navy SEALs?
o How did you learn about the U.S. Navy SEALs as an option?
• What were the primary reasons why you decided to join the U.S. Navy SEALs?
• What factors most influenced your decision?
• In what ways, if at all, did the people around you influence your decision?
• What were your career goals when you first joined?
What were the perceptions of AAPI regarding support for career advancement in the U.S.
Navy SEALs?
• When you first joined, how many AAPIs did you see throughout both the enlisted and
officer ranks?
o How did it make you feel? What were your thoughts?
o What are some of the reasons for this do you think?
• When you first joined, how many AAPIs did you see at the senior and executive
leadership levels (E7/05 and above)?
o How did it make you feel? What were your thoughts?
• What are some of the reasons for this do you think?
• To what extent do you feel like the numbers of AAPIs changed during your tenure in the
U.S. Navy SEALS?
• What rank were you hoping to achieve in your time with the U.S. Navy SEALS?
• To what extent would you say you were supported by your superiors to continue moving
up the ranks?

119
o In what ways?
o How did that make you feel?
o Why do you think that was the case?
• What career advancement opportunities do you feel were available to you as a U.S. Navy
SEAL?
• What, if any opportunities, did you wish you had in terms of career advancement as a
U.S. Navy SEAL?
o Why do you feel those were not available to you?
What were the factors that influenced the retirement or separation for AAPI in the Naval
special warfare community?
• What factors influenced you to leave or retire your U.S. Navy SEAL career?
o Of all the factors you mentioned, which were the most influential?
• In what ways, if at all, did the people around you influence your decision to separate?
• Could there have been anything that occurred that would have encouraged you to stay?
Closing
Well, [participant’s name], this concludes the interview. To respect your time, and I
know your time is valuable to you, but is there anything you want to add or something I may
have left out during this interview you believe will aid in this study? Again, thank you for your
time and have a great day.

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Creator Baviera, Reynaldo Emilio Querubin, II (author)

Core Title The underrepresentation of Asian American Pacific Islanders serving in the senior and executive leadership ranks in the U.S. Navy SEALs

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Degree Conferral Date 2023-12

Publication Date 10/13/2023

Defense Date 06/01/2023

Publisher Los Angeles, California (original), University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Asian American Pacific Islanders,Discrimination,Navy SEALs,OAI-PMH Harvest,stereotypes

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