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Army field-grade officer decisive action (DA) skill development: an evaluation study

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Army Field-Grade Officer Decisive Action (DA) Skill Development: An Evaluation Study

Justin Troy Zevenbergen

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education

August 2023

© Copyright by Justin Troy Zevenbergen, 2023
All Rights Reserved

The Committee for Justin Troy Zevenbergen certifies the approval of this Dissertation

Helena Seli
Edward J. Coss
Jennifer L. Phillips, Committee Chair

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2023

iv
Abstract
Modern warfare provides unique novel challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and
ambiguous (VUCQ) environment requiring an educated officer corp. Field-grade officers hold a
significant amount of responsibility, which involves the practice of problem-solving for mastery.
Officers who do not develop as experts risk life and property. Education equips them with the
skills to make informed decisions in stressful situations. This research sought to understand field-
grade officer knowledge learned at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and
motivations by exploring reported behaviors at the CTCs, and organizational influences that limit
field-grade officer DA mastery. The study adopted an interview instrument. Declarative and
metacognitive knowledge influences were validated as assets; procedural knowledge influences
were undetermined. Motivation influences were all determined to be assets. Organizational
influences were validated as gaps. Classroom learning is essential for theoretical knowledge and
understanding but must be complemented by rigorous application through simulation exercises.
This gap leaves an underdeveloped Army field-grade officer Corps. In relentless competition, the
military has a unique sense of urgency because an educated officer corps is essential to navigate
and respond to these challenges. Organizations with resilient field-grade officers who have
prepared and developed the right skills will be more successful in leading their forces effectively
to address combat challenges. This research contributes to the field of military education by
emphasizing the value of experiential learning in developing decisive action skills among field-
grade officers. It underscores the need for a holistic and balanced approach to officer education
by combining theoretical knowledge with practical experiences.
Keywords: decisive action, experiential learning, officer education

v
Dedication
To my wife, Christine, your support, understanding, and patience have been a source of strength,
motivation, and shared excitement throughout this journey. This dissertation reflects our shared
commitment and unconditional love.
To those that were called to be soldiers:
The centurion answered and said, “Lord, I am not worthy that You should come under
my roof. But only speak a word, and my servant will be healed. For I also am a man
under authority, having soldiers under me. And I say to this one, ‘Go,’ and he goes; and
to another, ‘Come,’ and he comes; and to my servant, ‘Do this,’ and he does it.”

When
Jesus heard it, He marveled, and said to those who followed, “Assuredly, I say to you, I
have not found such great faith, not even in Israel! (New King James Version Bible,
1982, Matthew 8:8–10)
As well as,
And it came to pass, when Joshua was by Jericho, that he lifted his eyes and looked, and
behold, a Man stood opposite him with His sword drawn in His hand. And Joshua went to
Him and said to Him, “Are You for us or for our adversaries?” So He said, “No, but as
Commander of the army of the Lord I have now come.” And Joshua fell on his face to the
earth and worshiped, and said to Him, “What does my Lord say to His servant?” Then the
Commander of the Lord’s army said to Joshua, “Take your sandal off your foot, for the
place where you stand is holy.” And Joshua did so. (New King James Version Bible,
1982, Joshua 5:13–15)

vi
Acknowledgments
I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to all those who have supported me throughout
this doctoral journey. Your unwavering encouragement, guidance, and assistance have been vital
in completing this research work.
First and foremost, I sincerely appreciate my Committee Chair, Dr. Jennifer Phillips, and
the committee: Dr. Helena Seli and Dr. Edward Coss. Your expertise, patience, and commitment
to excellence have been invaluable. Your guidance and constructive feedback have shaped this
research’s direction and contributed significantly to its quality. I am truly indebted to you for
your time, mentorship, and contributions.
I want to thank the faculty members, administrators, and staff at the University of
Southern California and Rossier School of Education. You provided a solid foundation for my
research endeavors, whether it was lectures, seminars, discussions, or administrative assistance.
Your dedication, professionalism, and support nurtured my academic growth.
My sincere thanks go to my family, friends, and colleagues, who have offered their
support, encouragement, and understanding throughout this journey. Your stimulating
conversations, moral support, and occasional distractions have provided the much-needed
balance in my life. I am truly grateful for your friendship.
I acknowledge and appreciate all those who have contributed to this doctoral dissertation
directly or indirectly. Your support and encouragement have been invaluable in this journey. I
am grateful for the opportunities for the knowledge and experiences gained along the way.

vii
Author Note
The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author. They do not necessarily
reflect or represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.

viii
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... vi
Author Note ...................................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xi
Table of Figures ........................................................................................................................... xiv
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................................ xv
Chapter One: Overview of the Study .............................................................................................. 1
Background of the Problem ................................................................................................ 2
Statement of the Problem .................................................................................................... 5
Organizational Context and Mission .................................................................................. 6
Organizational Goal ............................................................................................................ 7
Importance of Addressing the Problem .............................................................................. 9
Description of Stakeholder Groups ................................................................................... 10
Stakeholder Group for the Study and Stakeholder Performance Goal ............................. 13
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions .................................................................. 14
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework ......................................... 14
Organization of the Dissertation ....................................................................................... 15
Chapter Two: Literature Review .................................................................................................. 16
Past Research .................................................................................................................... 17
Field-Grade Officer Development Timeline ..................................................................... 17
Army Staff and Field-Grade Officer Education Background and Historical
Context .............................................................................................................................. 20
Current Army Field-Grade Officer Educational Environment ......................................... 35
Andragogy (Adult Learning) ............................................................................................ 41

ix
The CGSS Experiential Learning Model .......................................................................... 43
Criticisms of the Curriculum ............................................................................................ 45
Operational Organizations ................................................................................................ 49
Literature Review Summary ............................................................................................. 53
Clark and Estes’ Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences’
Framework ........................................................................................................................ 54
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 67
Chapter Three: Methodology ........................................................................................................ 69
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 69
Overview of the Methodology .......................................................................................... 69
Overview of the Design .................................................................................................... 70
Ethics and Role of Researcher .......................................................................................... 72
Method 1: Interview .......................................................................................................... 73
Method 2: Document Analysis ......................................................................................... 77
Credibility and Trustworthiness ........................................................................................ 79
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 79
Chapter Four: Findings ................................................................................................................. 81
Participating Field-Grade Officers .................................................................................... 82
Research Question 1: What Are CGSS Field-Grade Officers’ Knowledge and
Motivation Related to Achieving DA Mastery? ............................................................... 84
Research Question 2: How Do the Organizational and External Influences Impact
CGSS Field-Grade Officer Capacity to Exhibit DA Mastery? ....................................... 133
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 136
Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations....................................................................... 138
Discussion of Findings .................................................................................................... 139
Limitations and Delimitations ......................................................................................... 148

x
Recommendations for Future Research .......................................................................... 150
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 150
References ................................................................................................................................... 152
Appendix A: Definition of Terms ............................................................................................... 173
Appendix B: Interview Protocol ................................................................................................. 180
Demographic Data .......................................................................................................... 181
Interview Protocol Questions .......................................................................................... 182
Appendix C: Information Sheet for Exempt Studies .................................................................. 186

xi
List of Tables
Table 1 Army Field-Grade Officer Educational Mission ............................................................... 8
Table 2 Army Field-Grade Officer Goal ...................................................................................... 13
Table 3 Warfighting Functions ..................................................................................................... 33
Table 4 Fundamentals of the Operations Process ......................................................................... 34
Table 5 Major Promotion Board Analysis Expectation Management .......................................... 36
Table 6 Common Core Courses .................................................................................................... 37
Table 7 Advanced Operations Courses ......................................................................................... 38
Table 8 Ratings for Intermediate Level Education ....................................................................... 48
Table 9 Organizational Mission, Performance Goals, and Stakeholder Group Goal ................... 55
Table 10 Assumed Knowledge Influence, Type, and Knowledge Influence Assessment ............ 58
Table 11 Motivation Constructs and Influences ........................................................................... 61
Table 12 Assumed Organizational Influences and Assessment ................................................... 64
Table 13 Data Sources .................................................................................................................. 71
Table 14 Brigade Combat Team ................................................................................................... 74
Table 15 Document Data Sources................................................................................................. 78
Table 16 Field-Grade Officer Demographics ............................................................................... 20
Table 17 Assumed Knowledge Influence, Type, and Knowledge Influence Validation .............. 85
Table 18 Field-Grade Officer Significant Foundational Doctrine As Identified by Participants . 88
Table 19 Participants’ Key Quotes About Reconstitution ............................................................ 89
Table 20 Reconstitution Doctrine as Identified by Participants ................................................... 90
Table 21 Joint Forcible Entry Doctrine as Identified by Participants ........................................... 90
Table 22 Declarative Knowledge Code Crosswalk ...................................................................... 92
Table 23 Participants’ Key Quotes About the Nature of Operations Declarative Knowledge ..... 94
Table 24 Participants' Key Quotes About Decisive Action Declarative Knowledge ................... 96

xii
Table 25 Participants' Key Quotes About Combat Arms Declarative Knowledge ...................... 98
Table 26 Participants' Key Quotes About the Operations Process Declarative Knowledge ...... 101
Table 27 Participants' Key Quotes About the Warfighting Functions Declarative Knowledge . 103
Table 28 Participants’ Key Quotes About Demonstrating Procedural Knowledge .................... 107
Table 29 Procedural Knowledge Crosswalk ............................................................................... 108
Table 30 CGSS’s Significant Procedural Knowledge Application Development Activities
Reported by Participants ............................................................................................................. 109
Table 31 Participants' Key Quotes About CGSS Practical Application Development Procedural
Knowledge .................................................................................................................................. 111
Table 32 Participants’ Key Quote About the Culminating Training Event Procedural Knowledge
..................................................................................................................................................... 112
Table 33 Participants’ Key Quotes About the Leadership Training Program Procedural
Knowledge .................................................................................................................................. 114
Table 34 Participants’ Key Quotes About the Combat Training Center Procedural Knowledge
..................................................................................................................................................... 115
Table 35 Participants’ Key Quotes About the Warfighter Procedural Knowledge .................... 116
Table 36 Participants' Key Quotes About Preparation Procedural Knowledge .......................... 118
Table 37 Participants' Key Quote About Preparation ................................................................. 119
Table 38 Participants’ Key Quotes About the RDSP ................................................................. 122
Table 39 Participants’ Key Quotes About the Targeting Process............................................... 123
Table 40 Participants’ Key Quotes About Sustainment Operations ........................................... 124
Table 41 Participants’ Key Quotes About Assessment .............................................................. 125
Table 42 Metacognition Knowledge Code Crosswalk ............................................................... 126
Table 43 Participants' Key Quotes about Metacognition ............................................................ 128
Table 44 Motivation Constructs, Influences, and Validation ..................................................... 129
Table 45 Utility Motivation Code Crosswalk ............................................................................. 131
Table 46 Organizational Influences, Assessment, and Validation ............................................. 133

xiii
Table 47 Summary of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Validations ......................... 139
Table 48 Summary of Knowledge Influences and Context-Specific Recommendations ........... 141
Table 49 Utility Motivation and Army Leadership Model Crosswalk ....................................... 142
Table 50 Summary of Primary Influences and Context-Specific Recommendations ................ 144
Table B1 Demographic Data ...................................................................................................... 181
Table B2 Knowledge Influence Questions ................................................................................. 183
Table B3 Motivation Influence Questions .................................................................................. 184
Table B4 Organizational Influence Questions ............................................................................ 185

xiv
Table of Figures
Figure 1 Officer Development Timeline....................................................................................... 19
Figure 2 Decisive Action .............................................................................................................. 31
Figure 3 Comparison of the Perceived Effectiveness of the Army Leader Development
Domains ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Figure 4 Conceptual Framework .................................................................................................. 56
Figure 5 Brigade Warfighter Timeline ......................................................................................... 67
Figure 6 Field-Grade Officer Self-Reported Knowledge Development Timeline ....................... 86

xv
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAR After-action review
ABCT Armored brigade combat team
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADVON Advanced echelon
AIM Assignment interactive module
ARFORGEN Army force generation model
ATM Army talent management
BCT Brigade combat team
BWFX Brigade warfighter exercise
C2 Command and control
CALL Center for army lessons learned
CAR Combined arms rehearsal
CASAL Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership
CGSC Command and General Staff College
CGSS Command and General Staff School
COB Close of business
COIN Counterinsurgency
COP Common operating picture
CSL Command select list
CTC Combat training center
CTE Culminating training event
CUI Controlled unclassified information

xvi
D3A Decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA Decisive action
DATE Decisive action training environment
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DIV Division
DOD Department of Defense
ECG Exercise control group
ELM Experiential learning model
Equip Equipment
FA Field artillery
FAAR Final after-action review (AAR)
FASCAM Family of scatterable mines
FM Field manual
FOC Full operational capability
FOUO For official use only
FORSCOM Forces Command
FSO Fire support officer
GNI Generalize new information
GWOT Global war on terrorism
HRC Human Resources Command
IBCT Infantry brigade combat team
IL Impact level
ILE Intermediate level education

xvii
IOC Initial operational capability
IPB Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
JFE Joint forcible entry
JMRC Joint Multinational Readiness Center
JP Joint publication
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
KD Key developmental
LTP Leadership Training Program
MAAR Middle after-action review (AAR)
MB Main body
MCOO Modified combined obstacle overlay
MCTP Mission Command Training Program
MDMP Military decision-making process
NTC National Training Center
OCL Organizational change and leadership
OCT Observer, coach, trainer
OE Operational environment
OER Officer evaluation report
OES Officer education system
OG Operations Group
OPFOR Opposing force
OPMS Officer personnel management system
OCS Officer Candidate School

xviii
PCS Permanent change of station
PII Personally identifiable information
PME Professional military education
RC Red cell
RD Redeploy
RDSP Rapid decision-making synchronization process
Rec Receive
ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps
RSOI Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RQ Research question
SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SFAB Security forces assistance brigade
SOP Standard operating procedures
STARTEX Start of exercise
SRM Sustainment readiness model
TA Training audience
TDY Temporary duty
TLO Terminal learning objectives
TP Touchpoint
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures
UCMJ Uniform code of military justice

xix
ULO Unified land operations
U.S. United States
WC White cell
WfF Warfighting function
1

Chapter One: Overview of the Study
The United States faces increased security challenges and strategic uncertainty
(Department of the Army, 2019; U.S. Army, 2015). The U.S. Army is continuously under
pressure to adapt to the challenges of future conflict (Combined Arms Center, 2014). While war
continues to be the most chaotic and complex human endeavor, education and leadership
mitigate uncertainty (Command and General Staff College, 2015; Department of the Army,
2019). The U.S. Army continues to invest in human capital by developing cohesive teams that
thrive in ambiguity and chaos and are focused on preparing for the future operational
environment (OE) to maintain a decisive edge (U.S. Army, 2015).
According to the Army Human Dimension Strategy, the future operational environment
consists of the following characteristics: increased velocity and momentum of human interaction,
overmatch potential, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, cyberspace and counter-
space capabilities, and urban operations (U.S. Army, 2015). Educational investment reduces
uncertainty as cognitive, physical, and social demands grow in multiple domains with allies and
partners (The Army University, 2015).
Clausewitz stated that war is a clash of wills and intellect to alter behavior (Clausewitz,
1832/1976). The ability to outthink opponents to gain and maintain competitive advantages often
determines success (Boyd, 2018). The side that understands friction and predicts, learns, adapts,
decides, and reacts quickly stands the most probable chance to seize, maintain, and exploit the
initiative to succeed over opponents (Boyd, 2018; Department of the Army, 2019c). The
complexity and increasing dynamics of the modern battlefield require an educated officer corps
in the professional mastery of arms (U.S. Marine Corps, 2020). Because the nature of warfare
prevents military officers from practicing their profession, the officer corps must practice in the
2

most realistic simulations (Department of the Army, 2018; Heller & Stofft, 1986; Wilkinson,
1890).
Furthermore, there is always friction between theory and practice (McNab, 2009).
Current officer educational programs spend hours in the classroom, taking notes, listening to
lectures, watching presentations and videos, and taking tests (Combined Arms Center, 2019c).
Moreover, Officers are graded by tests, essay papers, briefings, quizzes, plans, and orders (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1991). Officers often can only practice those skills once they
participate in a warfighter or combat training center (CTC) designed to present realistic combat
simulations. The warfighter is a corps, division, or brigade-focused, “multi-echelon and
component expeditionary focused, realistic, demanding training, and leadership development
opportunity, in decisive action scenarios” (TRADOC, 2018, p. 5).
CTCs provide a highly realistic decisive action training environment (DATE) for brigade
combat teams (BCT). Real training is the foundation for developing and supporting army field-
grade officers’ growth as leaders and expert problem solvers (TRADOC, 2017). The army
educates its officer corps in realistic simulations to continuously reduce the gap between practice
and combat (Heller & Stofft, 1986; Sette, 1988). This study explored and sought to understand
field-grade officer decisive action (DA) mastery for increased unit performance at the CTCs to
lead organizations in combat.
Background of the Problem
Field-grade officers learn to be leaders across many competencies (Combined Arms
Center, 2020; Department of the Army, 2019i). Demands on field-grade officers and staff
continue to increase due to communications and information systems, complexity, mobility, and
force dispersion (Department of the Army, 2015a; Dupuy, 1980; Heller & Stofft, 1986; Van
3

Creveld, 1985). Combat training centers (CTCs) trends reveal that army field-grade officers are
ill-equipped, overly confident, and lack the mastery to meet their professional demands (Center
for Army Lessons Learned, 2019). Moreover, an analysis of Command and General Staff School
(CGSS) showed that CGSS grade percentages are compressed between 88% and 92% and do not
“reflect whether students mastered the course content” (Straus et al., 2014, p. xii). The 2010
Center for Army Leadership annual survey of army leadership (CASAL) also agreed that leaders
rated education worse than operational or personal development (Hatfield et al., 2011).
Furthermore, an Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report
reported that the army culture is not training focused and operates outside the band of excellence
(Combined Arms Center, 2003). Additionally, when overwhelmed with taskings, officers may
report misinformation and complete tasks with little effort to avoid reputation damage (Riley et
al., 2012; Saum-Manning et al., 2019). Organizational performance suffers because the skills
necessary for field-grade officers’ success remain unlearned due to inadequate mastery,
overconfidence, task saturation, and other distractions (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2018;
Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019a).
In 2012, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) produced the
decisive action training environment (DATE) using current intelligence to create authentic and
intense training environments (Bridgewater, 2012). The CTCs recently transitioned from
counterinsurgency (COIN), preparing soldiers for Iraq and Afghanistan, to DATE. DATE
increases the environment’s complexity with realism manifested by a well-trained opposing
force, training areas, and role players based on real-world scenarios (Bridgewater, 2012).
Furthermore, the CGSS has not conducted a command post exercise (CPX) since 1928 (Harding,
1956). According to Winton (2000):
4

The purpose of the command post exercise that culminated this course was to provide
instruction in command decisions, troop leading procedures at army and army group
levels, staff procedures, preparation of plans and orders, and ground and air
reconnaissance techniques. In other words, the students would get the opportunity to
learn by doing in a simulated environment. (p. 1048)
According to CTC trends, units need help to arrive at the CTCs prepared. The most
common challenges include (a) conducting the operations process, (b) conducting command post
operations, (c) conducting knowledge management and information management; (d) conducting
information collection, (e) executing command programs, (f) providing fire support, and (g)
providing logistics support (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019a). Lack of experience,
inadequate rehearsal and repetition, familiarity with organizational staff processes—incomplete
standard operating procedures, and insufficient leadership guidance and supervision contribute to
the root causes of common challenges (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019a). Performance
suffers from poor staff integration, ineffective meetings, and late reporting—standard formatting
and timely submission; all are essential to synchronizing planning and operations to mediate
friction points and allow crosstalk between leaders and enablers (Center for Army Lessons
Learned, 2019a).
Additionally, units fail to conduct full dress rehearsals during home-station training
before CTC attendance (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019a). The consequence of this is
that they fail to develop the common operating picture (COP), create shared understanding
across the staff, and execute battle drills effectively for command posts to provide the
commander with the correct information at the right time for decisions (Center for Army Lessons
5

Learned, 2019a). Units report training distractions such as lack of funds, equipment,
maintenance, and problems prioritizing taskings (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019a).
Statement of the Problem
This study explored and sought to understand field-grade officer decisive action (DA)
mastery for increased unit performance at the combat training centers (CTC) to lead
organizations in combat. The CTCs provide organizational training performance metrics and
feedback on ill-structured problem efficiency to develop expert problem solvers (Silber &
Foshay, 2009). The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) has evolved to meet the
educational and operational needs of the United States Army. The mission of CGSS states:
CGSS educates field-grade officers to be agile, innovative, and adaptive leaders within
increasingly complex and uncertain environments. Contemporary field grade officers are
those who communicate effectively, think critically, and can build and lead organizations
under mission command in unified land operations. (United States Army Combined Arms
Center, 2016, Command and General Staff School Section)
However, soldiers often cannot effectively operate in high-stress environments and do not
understand physiological stress (Grossman, 2009; 2013). The stress response is correlated with a
deterioration of cognitive functioning; at an extreme heart rate of 175, vasoconstriction reduces
oxygen to the brain (Grossman, 2013). Furthermore, 98% of soldiers engaged in combat for 60
or more days breakdown emotionally (Grossman, 2009). CGSS does not expose officers to
similar stress levels introduced in CTCs. As the Army’s premier combat training centers, the
CTCs aim to train soldiers and grow leaders to deploy, fight, and win in the most stressful,
realistic, joint, and combined arms training to validate readiness and deployment. CGSS and the
CTCs remain unsynchronized. The CGSS’s espoused mission statement is unaligned with the
6

theories-in-use. This study aimed to understand field-grade officers’ knowledge and skills,
motivations, and organizational barriers to improve organizational performance in a volatile,
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment.
Organizational Context and Mission
The United States Army’s learning goal is to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative
officers “with the learning competencies to generate and sustain mission-capable teams using a
learning environment enabled by an adaptive and continuous learning process” (TRADOC,
2017, p. 33). Education is a reliable hedge in uncertain times by adding knowledge and
developing competencies to adjust to future missions (The Army University, 2015).
Additionally, Clark and Estes (2018) state that people cannot be trained in advance to
accomplish unexpected, novel, and nonrecurring tasks and must be equipped through education.
The Army Leader Development Strategy framework utilizes three pillars to develop leaders: (a)
professional military education (PME), (b) experience in operational combat units and
institutional broadening assignments, and (c) self-development to contribute to leader
development (Department of the Army, 2019i). Similarly, the Army links these pillars to Kolb’s
experiential learning. Chapter Two will describe experiential learning in detail. The Army
education system leverages leadership experiences from operational units, institutional
education, and self-development to provide professional growth. Leader development enhances
leader capabilities for increasing positions of responsibility (Department of the Army, 2019i).
Additionally, the army officer personnel management system (OPMS) seeks to maximize
officer performance through assignments and self-development to develop agile and adaptive
leaders (Department of the Army, 2019i). The OPMS vision includes growing adaptive leaders
to accomplish missions using key developmental (KD) positions (Department of the Army,
7

2019i). A “key developmental position is deemed fundamental to the development of an officer’s
capabilities in their core branch or functional area competencies or deemed critical by the senior
Army leadership to provide experience across the Army’s strategic mission” (Department of the
Army, 2019i, p. 12). Personnel branch and functional areas code KD positions.
Field-grade officer development begins with a centralized board selection to major and
selection to the Command and General Staff School (CGSS). Following CGSS, officers are
assigned to KD positions within brigade combat teams (BCT) for approximately 24 months. In
2019, officers averaged 29 months in KD positions (Gathers, 2020). Units rotate through a
combat training center (CTC) during an officer’s KD time. Following an officer’s KD time,
officers are assigned a broadening assignment until the selection board for promotion to
lieutenant colonel.
Organizational Goal
The army educates grade officers through professional military education (PME),
assignment experience, and self-development (Department of the Army, 2019i). Field-grade
officers are selected to attend intermediate-level education (ILE) at the Command and General
Staff School (CGSS). CGSS trains field-grade officers in the art and science of the profession of
arms. The school aims to provide professional-level officer leadership training and education to
develop adaptive leaders and critical thinking skills and learn doctrine and military staff
processes (Combined Arms Center, 2016; Command and General Staff College, 2015). The
school’s vision includes striving to be an educational center of excellence, providing trained and
educated leaders, in-depth research, and planning (Command and General Staff College, 2015).
The army’s field-grade officer educational mission is shown in Table 1. The learning outcomes
for over 1,200 students annually are preparedness, appropriate knowledge,
8

understanding of complexity, self-awareness, critical and creative thinkers, and motivation for
life-long learning (Combined Arms Center, 2019a).
To accomplish the organization’s goal of developing officer mastery for improved unit
performance at the combat training centers (CTC), the Army must consider two goals:
1. CGSS curriculum optimized to increase decisive action training environment (DATE)
mastery by October 2024.
2. Implement a warfighter type culminating event at CGSS to optimize organizational
performance at the CTCs by October 2024.

Table 1
Army Field-Grade Officer Educational Mission

Army field-grade officer educational mission

The Army’s goal is to educate field-grade officers through professional military education
(PME), experience in assignments, and self-development to develop agile, adaptive, and
innovative officers (Department of the Army, 2019i).
9

Optimizing a curriculum that supports increased DATE mastery scaffolding through
experiential learning provides a sandbox environment for officers to practice, develop, rehearse,
and reflect on their experiences before a final capstone exercise. Additionally, implementing a
CGSS warfighter training exercise culminates a student’s experience in the last capstone exercise
before arriving at a BCT. Further, talent management identifies and aligns officers for the BCT’s
success to optimize effectiveness to achieve its mission. This study explored an aspect of the
army’s overall goals by focusing on the goal that by December 2024, CGSS will implement a
warfighter command post-exercise for experiential learning as a culminating exercise pilot
developed from the DATE and CTC feedback.
Importance of Addressing the Problem
The United States expects the army to focus on conducting operations to be lethal, agile,
and adaptive to prepare for, deter, and execute war. According to Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525–8–2, education is the foundation for training preparation
for experience and mission accomplishment (2017). Professional military education (PME) is a
foundation for accomplishing the organization’s mission and goals because education and
experience form crucial decisions involving human life, resources, and combat power
(Department of the Army, 2019i; The Army University, 2015; TRADOC, 2017). Field-grade
officers remain unexposed to the extreme physiological stress and cognitive overload they will
experience in combat until they attend a CTC (Department of the Army, 2018).
Field-grade officers hold a significant amount of responsibility, which requires the
practice of problem-solving through adversity, stress, and organizational friction for mastery.
Officers who do not develop as experts risk life and property (Department of the Army, 2019).
Leader education fosters mastery and unit readiness for uncertain operational environments
10

(Department of the Army, 2019). The problem is significant because an ill-prepared Army costs
the nation badly at the end of the first battle (Department of the Army, 2019; Fehrenbach, 1963;
Heller, 1983).
Description of Stakeholder Groups
The field-grade officer development process has many stakeholders contributing to the
learning process for improved organizational performance. Each stakeholder contributes to the
learning process for the officer. All stakeholder groups are vested in the performance of the
individual field-grade officer and organization.
The Command and General Staff School Faculty
The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) Faculty comprise over 200 civilian
educators, active duty and retired military specialists, and former military officers with
operational experience (The Army University, 2015; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991). In
July 2012, the faculty comprised 88 members with doctoral degrees, 58 former battalion
commanders, and 13 former brigade commanders (Davis & Martin, 2012). Course content is
learner-centered, and faculty use the experiential learning model and adult learning theory to
facilitate collaborative learning and discussion (Straus et al., 2014). Additionally, students brief
their instructors and peers with presentations, projects, and seminars. Faculty also grade
participation and written assignments. The faculty are empowered to achieve terminal learning
objectives (TLO) and invested in developing future leaders and advancing knowledge and
experience. Leaders return with improved communication, critical thinking, and research skills
(Straus et al., 2014; The Army University, 2015).
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Brigade Combat Team Leadership
Brigade combat team (BCT) leaders are responsible for developing future leaders for
organizational performance. Counseling provides the basis to maintain accountability through
performance objectives, enhancing trust and respect. Mentoring, teaching, coaching, and role
modeling also assist personal and professional potential (Department of the Army, 2019g;
2019i). Counseling provides feedback to meet performance standards and organizational training
objectives (Department of the Army, 2019g; 2019i). Leaders set achievable standards, demand
accountability, observe, evaluate, and provide performance feedback to develop subordinates to
fight and win future conflicts.
Combat Training Center Observer, Coach, Trainers
Observers, coaches, and trainers (OCT) are the combat training centers’ foundation
(CTC). OCTs have a duty to the rotational training unit. They are certified to observe unit and
leader performance, control engagements, teach doctrine, coach to improve unit performance,
monitor safety, and conduct professional after-action reviews (AAR; Combat Training Center,
2018). OCTs are expected to have the following characteristics: exercise common sense and
good judgment, be experts in the field and doctrine, be unemotional about rotational unit
performance and individual proficiency, react to contact, and go where the action is (Combat
Training Center, 2018). OCT observation provides shared trends, best practices, and lessons
learned as feedback to the force (Department of the Army, 2018). OCTs provide guided practice
and corrective feedback. “Team-based organizations need motivation, feedback, and access to
expert skills” (Clark & Estes, 2018, p. 120).
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Combating Training Center Opposing Force
The combat training center opposing force (OPFOR) provides a realistic, free-thinking,
capability-based “uncompromising sparring partner” (Department of the Army, 2015a, p. 1). The
OPFOR uses tactics, doctrine, and equipment to replicate a potential enemy (Department of the
Army, 2011). The OPFOR keeps the rotational units at risk of failure to maximize unit and
leader stress and learning. The OPFOR is proactive, agile, adaptable, and resourced to provide
regular, irregular, and hybrid threat signatures (Combat Training Center, 2018; Department of
the Army, 2010; 2014b). The OPFOR simulates specific threats for training and develops leaders
by providing feedback during after-action reviews (AAR).
Soldiers
The soldier is the U.S. Army’s most valued resource; General Milley, former Army Chief
of Staff, affirmed, “The professional soldier guarantees the nation’s strength, readiness, and
credibility” (Department of the Army, 2019, foreword). Today’s volunteer soldiers come from
every background, race, and ethnicity. Soldiers continually demonstrate their character,
commitment, and competence to protect our nation under complex and demanding conditions.
General Milley, the former Army Chief of Staff, stated, “we maintain our solemn commitment
never to send Soldiers into harm’s way unless they are fully trained, properly equipped, and most
importantly, properly led” (Department of the Army, 2019, foreword). Leaders must have trust
and confidence and be experts in making decisions. This care for soldiers is morally imperative
and what the American people trust the army to do. Well-trained soldiers that trust their
leadership increase unit and optimize human performance.
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Stakeholder Group for the Study and Stakeholder Performance Goal
The stakeholders in this study are officers promoted to major, selected to the resident
Command and General Staff School (CGSS), assigned to a key development (KD) brigade
combat team (BCT) position, and attended a combat training center (CTC) within 24 months of
graduating CGSS. This study explores and seeks to understand field-grade officer decisive action
(DA) mastery for increased unit performance at the CTCs to lead organizations in combat.
Evaluating the field-grade officers’ knowledge and motivation at the CTCs is essential to
accomplish the organizational goal. The CTC provides individual and unit performance
feedback, priorities, tactics, techniques, and procedures in a culminating training event. The
stakeholder population is approximately 234 field-grade officers, who will be known within this
study as “field-grade officers.” Meeting the field-grade officers’ performance goals requires
organizational support to increase organizational performance by transferring knowledge and
practicing their profession at CGSS. Field-grade officers must achieve DA mastery to manage
adversity and team friction to mitigate risk to life and property. Table 2 shows the army field-
grade officer goal.

Table 2
Army Field-Grade Officer Goal

Army field-grade officer goal

Field-grade officers exhibit DA mastery at CGSS to increase organizational performance
during a CTC.

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Purpose of the Study and Research Questions

This study aimed to explore and understand field-grade officer decisive action (DA)
mastery for increased unit performance at combat training centers (CTC) to lead organizations in
combat. This research study sought to understand field-grade officer knowledge learned at the
Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and motivations by exploring reported behaviors at
the CTCs; and organizational influences that limit field-grade officer DA mastery. The CTCs
serve as America’s first battles for future conflict; therefore, the CTCs are research laboratories.
Moreover, this study sought to learn if the stakeholders understand their professional growth,
knowledge transfer, motivation, and organizational influences on DATE mastery for unit
performance at the CTC.
The research asked the following questions to help answer these questions:
1. What are Command and General Staff School (CGSS) field-grade officers’
knowledge and motivation related to achieving decisive action (DA) mastery?
2. How do organizational and external influences impact the CGSS field-grade capacity
to exhibit DA mastery?
3. What organizational, knowledge, and motivational recommendations support CGSS
field-grade officer DA mastery?
Overview of the Conceptual and Methodological Framework
According to Clark and Estes (2008), organizational performance gaps result from
knowledge and skills, motivation for goal achievement, and organizational barriers. This study
explored and sought to understand field-grade officer decisive action (DA) mastery for increased
combat training center (CTC) performance to lead organizations in combat. The methodological
framework is a qualitative study of individual interviews and secondary data analysis.
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Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. This chapter provides U.S. Army field-
grade officer education concepts, terminology, and definitions. The study’s mission, goals,
stakeholders, and study framework were also introduced. Chapter Two presents a literature
review examining history, theory, field-grade officer development, and organization structure,
concluding with a conceptual gap analysis framework presenting knowledge, motivational, and
organizational influences. Chapter Three presents participant selection, data collection, and
analysis methodology. Chapter Four examines the data collected for analysis and provides an
assessment. Finally, Chapter Five provides evidence-based recommendations from data and
literature to mitigate the gaps.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
This literature review’s primary research was based on the premise that field-grade
officers are not developing skill mastery to lead combat organizations. The human in-extremis
dimension is the least studied element of war; researchers prefer to reduce the danger by
studying in simulations or post hoc (Hatfield et al., 2010). This research analyzed reported
performance at the combat training centers (CTC) with units in simulated conflict. Units conduct
intense training at the CTCs in realistic environments preparing for real-world application
(FORSCOM, 2019a)
This literature review aims to give the reader an overview of U.S. Army staff officer
development, history, education, operational organizations, and theory. A U.S. field-grade
officer develops through institutional education, operational units, and personal development.
This literature review featured an in-depth examination of staff officers, education history, and
organization and development processes. Finally, this review discussed the theory and
conceptual framework for the study.
In the U.S. Army, information systems, communications, and weapon systems have
dramatically increased field-grade officers’ scope, complexity, and specialization of
responsibilities. The modern officer requires education to mitigate uncertainty in the intricacies
of war (Command and General Staff College, 2015; Department of the Army, 2019f; TRADOC,
2017). Education is critical to teach officers how to adapt to battlefield demands and deal with
stress (Combined Arms Center, 2014). The U.S. Army requires that officers develop broadly by
changing positions throughout their careers through operational and instructional broadening
(Department of the Army, 2019i). Operational units train to thrive in harsh weather and terrain
and operate on minimal sleep, nutrients, and consequential decision-making (FORSCOM, 2019a;
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Hatfield et al., 2010). As the premier field-grade officer education center, the Command and
General Staff School (CGSS) increasingly became essential to the U.S. Army (Schifferle, 2010;
Weigley, 1984).
Past Research
Previous research into CGSS fell into history, critical thinking, issues with the current
curriculum, and distance education. A search through the literature indicated an existing gap in
the body of knowledge. The historical literature was informative and explained cultural models
and settings but did not assess curriculum effectiveness except anecdotally through biographies.
Moreover, critical thinking literature indicated inconsistent intervention for reflective judgment
(Civils, 2016). Qualitative studies included Gentzler (2018) studying CGSS as a learning
organization and Burket (2016) querying formative and summative assessment usage. The
school’s Master of Military Art and Science Theses (MMAS) and School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS) Monographs with students were mainly critical of the current curriculum.
Finally, there were many research papers on CGSS distance learning.
Field-Grade Officer Development Timeline
Before officers are selected and promoted to field-grade, they have held positions as the
second and first lieutenant and captain at the company-grade level. They consist of the lowest
tactical commissioned officer category of ranks. Officers commissioned in the U.S. Army have
earned degrees and completed training through an academy, the Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC), or the Officer Candidate School (OSC). Company-grade officers are morally and
ethically responsible for their soldiers’ training, health, welfare, and morale, deriving their
authority from the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Code Title 10, and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). Company-grade officers are accountable for up to 350 subordinate soldiers,
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noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers, with lieutenants in charge of about 50
personnel. Figure 1 shows the officer development timeline. Officers selected to field-grade
continue to higher positions of responsibility.
Field-grade officers included in this study’s scope have accomplished three milestones:
graduated in-residence Command and General Staff School (CGSS), assigned to a key
development (KD) position in a brigade combat team (BCT) and completed a combat training
center (CTC) rotation within 24 months of graduating resident CGSS. This process begins with
the Major promotion board. The major primary-zone and intermediate level education (ILE)
selection board for CGSS occur during the officer’s ninth year of commissioning (Department of
the Army, 2019i). Since 2016, this board has annually held in July, with the results released
between November and January (Gathers, 2020). Resident CGSS selectees conduct a permanent
change of station (PCS) move to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the summer move cycle
before CGSS begins in August. Officers are promoted to major during the course and graduate
11 months later, in June of the following year. Officers compete for key development (KD)
positions by interviewing and negotiating through the assignment interactive module version 2
(AIM 2) during the army talent management (ATM) process. Officers conduct a second move to
a brigade combat team (BCT) KD position. During this time, the BCT will train to attend a CTC
rotation. Staff officers may remain on a BCT staff until they conduct a permanent change of
station (PCS), whereas combat arms officers generally change positions in the BCT.

Figure 1
Officer Development Timeline

Note. From “Human Resources Command (HRC) Signal Branch Brief Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD)” by M.
Gathers, 2020. Copyright 2020 by Army Human Resources Command.
19
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Following CGSS graduation, majors are assigned to brigade combat teams to utilize skills
learned from CGSS to develop teams by training, planning, and executing to prepare for combat
operations. Units deploy to the CTCs to validate organizational readiness prepared for worldwide
deployment. The CTCs provide an environment to train against a thinking opposing force
(OPFOR) for collective unit readiness (FORSCOM, 2019a). The CTCs build readiness by
providing a crucible experience for units and leaders in a complex, highly realistic decisive
action training environment (DATE) under the most adverse conditions possible (FORSCOM,
2019a).
Army Staff and Field-Grade Officer Education Background and Historical Context
The following sections describe the historical, cultural, and organizational impact of the
problem of practice. This section incorporated the development of the modern staff, historical
evolution, impact, and current purpose of the Command and General Staff School (CGSS). This
section describes operational organizations comprising the brigade combat teams (BCT) and the
combat training center (CTC).
Modern Era Military Staff
Modern-era military staffs began organizing early in the 17th century (Hittle, 1961). The
literature discusses three types of staff: (a) the Governmental Staff, (b) the Departmental Staff,
and (c) the Field Staff (Hittle, 1961). This study focuses on the field staff.
Before the 18th century, unit commanders conducted all staff functions, including
elementary intelligence, operational, and quartermaster functions (Hittle, 1961; Wilkinson,
1890). The first military staff consisted of aides organized to relieve commanders of duties,
focusing on higher command questions or increased success (Tyler, 1951; Wilkinson, 1890).
Military organizational size and effectiveness limited an army’s ability to gather, transmit, and
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process information (Van Creveld, 1985). As the technology evolved, organizations increased
exponentially, dispersing over large areas (Vandergriff, 2019). Emerging technology and
managing large organizations called for specially qualified officers for the division of labor,
requiring greater education versus former military genius (Demeter, 1965; Hittle, 1961). As
military technology grew, managing, resourcing, and sustaining large professional armies
required additional skills, training, and education (Hittle, 1961; Vandergriff, 2019).
As army sizes grew, written orders became salient for personnel, logistics, and
operational planning (Wilkinson, 1890). The nobility was unskilled in strategy, sustainment,
initiative, and coordination but monopolized the officer corps (McNab, 2009). Soon
experimental staff colleges were developed and began publishing the first staff manuals
(Wilkinson, 1890). Field armies grew to 80,000 but could not be commanded effectively
(Bodart, 1916; Van Creveld, 1985).
While Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632) reinvigorated logistic preparation and adopted
sustainment not seen since the Roman era, the French under Napoleon organized the Grande
Armee into permanent combined arms with separate corps of staff and divisions (McNab, 2009;
Van Creveld, 1985). Each subordinate commander had his staff resolving immediate problems
allowing the general staff to focus on the campaign (McNab, 2009). Additionally, the Grande
Armee inherited ideas of merit, talent, and election from the French Revolution; men had to be
brave and educated with the skills to lead and plan (Bertaud, 1986; Leggiere, 2015).
Following the French defeat at Jean-Auerstedt, the Prussians reorganized the staff as the
organization’s brain (Hittle, 1961; Wilkinson, 1890). Reforms in 1809 emphasized leader
development, organizational restructuring, staff specialization, doctrine updates, training,
equipment, and education to integrate combined arms (Vandergriff, 2019). Scharnhorst (1755–
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1813) required that educated officers were foundational to staff (Hittle, 1961). The Prussians
initiated several education initiatives: the Prussian Staff College in 1810 and War Academy in
1867 (Millotat, 1992; Wilkinson, 1890). The Prussians understood the importance of
independence, flexibility, and initiative, thus empowering subordinate commanders and their
staff through the leadership philosophy: Auftragstaktik (Vandergriff, 2019). Auftragstaktik
required a rigorous curriculum focused on “map exercises, war games, and tactical decision
games” (Vandergriff, 2019, p. 31). The demanding educational requirements restricted
graduation to a small population (Vandergriff, 2019). Additionally, commanders were
responsible for developing their subordinates, and the training of their units focused on yearly
free-play force-on-force exercises and wargames (Vandergriff, 2019).
The Prussians contributed staff organization, educational systems, and officer
development to modern military theory. The Prussians developed one of the first officer
professional schools established in 1810. The Kriegsakademie was due to the efforts of
Scharnhorst. Additionally, Carl von Clausewitz, a world-famous military theorist, served as the
administrative head of the school early in its early years. The British opened the British Staff
College in 1858 as part of military reform following the Crimean War. Likewise, France opened
its Ecole Superieure De Guerre in response to its war with Prussia in 1870 (Donovan &
Burlbaw, 2007). In 1828, the corps organized the staff into four general staff, routine staff, legal,
and departmental sections (Hittle, 1961). Nearly all present-day armies have adopted the
European staff organization, personnel management system, and officer education system
(Weigley, 1984). The U.S. Army patterned its staff school after the Europeans in 1903 (Donovan
& Burlbaw, 2007).
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The U.S. Army staff remained relatively static compared to European counterparts due to
U.S. relative isolation from world affairs and civil-military debate (Gentile et al., 2017; Weigley,
1984). But, as early as 1783, George Washington, writing his Sentiments on a Peach
Establishment, recognized the advantages of training and sustaining a professional army (Gentile
et al., 2017). Following the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States adopted elements
from the French and Prussian systems while integrating management and organizational science
ideas during the Progressive Era (Bacevich, 1979; Millotat, 1992; Vandergriff, 2019). Elihu Root
(1845–1937), as the Secretary of War, reformed a “troubled, backward, 19th century Army into a
modern organization” (Bacevich, 1979, p. 68). According to Vandergriff, Root built his reforms
on Fredrick Taylor’s modern industrial production system, reducing people into unthinking
machine cogs (2019). Furthermore, the intelligence and administrative officers became co-equal
with the operations officer producing greater objectivity within the staff (Hittle, 1961).
Today, weapon ranges, speed, and advances in communication systems have caused the
dispersion of units requiring information systems for data processing. Limited resources have
forced substantial information requirements, synchronization, coordination, and planning to
anticipate an enemy’s actions (McNab, 2009). The growing size and sophistication of command
systems led to new and complex challenges requiring extensive staff. Staff cannot organize
spontaneously and must prepare for war during peace.
The Command and General Staff School History and Current Purpose
The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth has continuously
provided increasing educational importance to the U.S. Army since its founding (Barnard, 1964;
Schifferle, 2010; Weigley, 1984; Winton, 2007). CGSS resulted from the officer education’s
poor state, lack of professionalism, and continual technological advances (House, 1983; Winton,
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2007). In the 19th century, the Army commissioned officers directly from civilian life, which
lacked unit tactics and strategy (House, 1983). The first school focused on tactical training but
continually reformed its curriculum (Donovan & Burlbaw, 2007; Installation Management
Command, 2019).
After the Civil War, senior army officers realized a need for thorough officer preparation.
The School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, established in 1881, began preparing
officers for company-grade functions (Donovan & Burlbaw, 2007; Otis, 1882). As the school
continually improved instruction and facilities, it changed its name to the United States Infantry
and Cavalry School in 1886 (House, 1983). During the 1890s, Eben Swift and Arthur Wagner
became significant factors in developing theory, practice, and professionalism in tactics and
published works that remained the standard for many years (House, 1983; Nenninger, 1978;
Weigley, 1984). By 1898, the Infantry and Cavalry School required learning map exercises,
wargame simulations, and tactical problems to emphasize terrain to solve problems (Bell, 1904;
House, 1983). The school established practical exercises as the primary form of learning (Bell,
1904).
Deficiencies in the Spanish-American War exposed inadequate officer education to
prepare, mobilize, and administer organizations (Cosmas, 1986; House, 1983; Tyler, 1951). In
1901, Congress passed educational reform separating tactical, operational, and strategic. Elihu
Root’s vision became the U.S. Army’s modern officer educational system separating the
systematic study of the science of war into the tactical: post and service schools, operational: the
General Service and Staff College, and strategic: the War College (Heller, 1983; Nenninger,
1978; War Department, 1945; Weigley, 1984). The General Service and Staff College became a
postgraduate military institution preparing well-qualified officers for division staff functions and
25

selecting students for the second year of advanced education for corps and army staff
(Nenninger, 1978; Wilkinson, 1890). The General Service and Staff College consisted of two
schools:
1. The School of the Line trained officers in the combined use of all arms in the division
(Ely, 1922; Winton, 2000).
2. The General Staff School trained officers for high command and General Staff duty
(Ely, 1922; Winton, 2000).
The reform provided general staff education, becoming the foundation for the CGSS (Cosmas,
1986; Tyler, 1951). The curriculum emphasized military art encompassing tactics, strategy,
logistics, and military history (Nenninger, 1978).
Despite the General Service and Staff College closing in 1916 due to border issues with
Mexico, the Leavenworth school had established itself with high-quality instruction becoming
the focal point for Army doctrine and staff procedures, with graduates dominating the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF) staff during World War I (Donovan & Burlbaw, 2007; Heller &
Stofft, 1986; Winton, 2007). Quality staff officer education was essential, and an additional
General Staff School was established at Langres, France, to temporarily fill the demand until the
war’s end (Heller, 1983; Pershing, 1995; Schifferle, 2010). Staff education made a difference in
how an officer performed and improved from previous wars, and as a group, Leavenworth
graduates performed better (Nenninger, 1978). The end of World War I marked a new era for
Fort Leavenworth and officer education and reopened in 1919 (Heller, 1983). The National
Defense Act formally established a progressive Army educational system that included the Fort
Leavenworth schools (Heller, 1983). In 1923, the War Department directed consolidating two
schools into a single CGSS with a 1-year course of instruction, doubling the number of graduates
26

(Ely, 1923). The CGSS’s mission was to train field-grade officers for command and staff
assignments at divisions and corps to teach tactical principles through historical research and
examples (Heller, 1983).
The rapid expansion of the Army in the 1940s for World War II required trained and
educated officers to assume staff positions (Partin, 1983). World War II caused the school to
streamline courses to only the most basic materials graduating with knowledge of their next
assignment and taking only classes on their specialty (War Department, 1946). Furthermore, in
1942, school officials developed new courses to meet total war demand, including a division
course for commanders and staff officers before their assignment was organized as a college
(War Department, 1945). Following World War II, the postwar officer corps required more
profitable educational opportunities (Department of the Army, 1949; Partin, 1983).
Three separate review boards met during the years between World War II and the Korean
War, resulting in a fundamental reorganization of the Army education system and leading to
considerable debate on the selective system, constructive credit, limits on years of service, and
age on attendance (Partin, 1983; War Department, 1945). College officials raised educational
standards and expanded course offerings so that officer graduates could perform in various staff
positions (Harding, 1956). Additionally, the school hired civilian academic experts, specialists,
and instructors in psychology, politics, social sciences, humanities, and social science (Harding,
1956; Partin, 1983; (War Department, 1945).
Following the Korean War and into Vietnam, the school implemented limited warfare,
nuclear warfare, flexible response, and counterinsurgency (Department of the Army, 1966).
After completing the accelerated wartime program, the academic pace and pressure did not slow
(Barnard, 1964). The 1958 educational review board also defined education and training
27

(Department of the Army, 1958). The teaching methods expand the number of courses and
emphasize applying principles and doctrine, graduating officers capable of performing well in
any circumstance (Partin, 1983). CGSC continued to conduct a rigorous and challenging course
to the extent that it presents a real challenge to the student. Competition continued among
students through ongoing evaluation and students’ class ranking (Department of the Army,
1958). In 1964, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools accredited the
school to grant a master’s degree in military art and science (Department of the Army, 1966)
Creation of Training and Doctrine Command
The Vietnam War and Cold War Era crises, including the 1973 Israeli-Arab War,
required fundamental reorganization (Chapman, 2010; Moenk, 1973). Those efforts reorganized
the Army into a modernized, trained, and ready force against the political-military challenges
when the Cold War ended in 1991 (Chapman, 2010). The struggling Army required proper
training, coherent organization, modern weapons systems, and relevant doctrine (TRADOC,
2003). Operation STEADFAST created the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and
Forces Command (FORSCOM) (Partin, 1983). TRADOC realigned education, training, weapon
systems, and doctrine, including CGSS.
The changes included focusing on realistic training in combined arms warfare to prepare
for the next initial battle (Chapman, 2010). In 1976, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 subscribed that
readiness was the close interaction of weapon systems and training through mobilization and
annual cycles (Chapman, 2010). The most significant TRADOC initiative on unit readiness was
developing the Combat Training Centers (CTC). The CTCs increased unit readiness led to the
trained, professional Army whose combat units helped restore democratic government to Panama
28

in Operation Just Cause of 1989–1990 and expel the armies of Iraq from Kuwait in Operation
Desert Storm (Chapman, 2010).
By the early 1990s, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union had ushered in the United States as the world’s sole power. The Army transitioned to
peace operations and humanitarian relief in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, and Rwanda
(TRADOC, 2003). In the 2000s, the Army conducted counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The current operational environment in the post-Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is
reminiscent of the post-Vietnam War era. The U.S. Army is again transitioning from
counterinsurgency into multi-domain large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and decisive action
(DA).
Doctrine
Army doctrine guides army professionals in operations and training, providing a
theoretical and practical approach to military operations (Department of the Army, 2019a). ADP
1-01 defines Army doctrine as the fundamental principles, supporting tactics, techniques,
procedures, and terms and symbols used to conduct operations for actions of operating forces
that directly support operations to understand and address military challenges in support of
national objectives (2019a). Doctrine provides a framework for thinking and approaching these
challenges in study and reflection for the planning, execution, and assessment of operations
(Department of the Army, 2019a). Furthermore, BCTs develop and standardize their
organizational processes called standard operating procedures (SOP).
The Nature of Operations
The nature of war and warfare is ingrained in U.S. Army doctrine (Department of the
Army, 2019a). War is a violent clash between two or more forces to achieve political purposes
29

(Clausewitz, 1832/1976; Department of the Army, 2019a). The nature of operations encompasses
three elements of the Army’s vision of war: inherently chaotic, a human endeavor, and taking
place among populations (Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019e). Army doctrine provides an
adaptive methodology to operate in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA)
environment (Department of the Army, 2019a). Furthermore, since war fundamentally changes
human behavior, the organization that outthinks and competitively decides, acts, asses, and
operates comfortably and emotionally stands the best chance to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative (Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019c; 2019e).
Combined Arms Operations
Combined Arms operations integrate an effective combination of infantry, armor,
artillery, aviation, and engineers to unify efforts against an enemy (Department of the Army,
2019a; 2019c). “Combined arms integrate leadership, information, and each of the warfighting
functions through mission command” (Department of the Army, 2019c, p. 3-9). The goal
exploits each branch’s strengths and mitigates the weaknesses for simultaneous effects
(Department of the Army, 2019e). This approach significantly impacts defeating enemy ground
forces, seizing and occupying land areas, and using time, space, and psychological advantages
over the enemy (Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019c). Combined arms integration is essential
since no single branch can be decisive against a determined and adaptive enemy (U.S. Army
Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2018). Leaders must understand system equipment, capabilities,
employment, and integration methods beyond individual branch competencies, emphasizing
intelligence, fires, and sustainment (U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2018).
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Conduct of Operations
The conduct of operations encompasses the full range of Army activities involved in
planning, synchronizing, decision-making, executing, and assessing, including the warfighting
functions (Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019c). Moreover, the conduct of operations consists
of ethical and legal considerations involved in force, principles of distinction, proportionality,
and necessity. Furthermore, the conduct of operations covers soldier safety and health, non-
combatant protection, and environmental preservation linked to achieving objectives and
protecting national interests (Department of the Army, 2019a).
Decisive Action (DA)
Decisive action is the execution and synchronization of offense, defense, and stability
operations and defending the homeland to include defense support of civil authority tasks
(DSCA)—see Figure 2 (Department of the Army, 2019c). Units seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative synchronizing the elements (Department of the Army, 2019c). Decisive action begins
with the plan to execute the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The staff determines,
refines, and adjusts the allocation of resources and tasks (Department of the Army, 2019c).
During operations, changes in the environment cause the staff to recommend reallocating
resources and task adjustments. Brigades focus on specific elements during large-scale combat
operations (LSCO) but may simultaneously execute a combination of elements.
Historical experience demonstrated that forces trained solely for offense and defense are
not proficient at stability operations (Department of the Army, 2019c). Similarly, units trained in
stability operations require intensive training in offense and defense to resume LSCO.
Commanders assess risk and set priorities for the unit, collective, and individual tasks based on
the higher echelon’s guidance.
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Figure 1
Decisive Action

Note. From Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (p. 3-3), by Department of the Army, 2019. In the
public domain.

Mission Command
Mission command is the Army’s philosophy of command and control that empowers and
decentralizes subordinate initiative, decision-making, and execution applicable to the situation
(Department of the Army, 2019f). Because war is inherently chaotic and uncertain, the mission
command philosophy is the most effective means for leaders to respond to their commander’s
intent (Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019f). Army leaders establish this principle in their
training and educating their subordinates.

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Warfighting Functions
The elements of combat power. Combat power is the total means of destructive,
constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given
time (Department of the Army, 2019c, p. 5-1). The warfighting functions are tasks organized by
their common purpose that leaders use to accomplish missions and training objectives
(Department of the Army, 2019a; 2019c). The warfighting functions provide a conceptual
organization for standard capabilities (Department of the Army, 2019c). Leaders integrate,
synchronize, and direct the warfighting functions’ capabilities to achieve objectives and
accomplish missions in time, space, and purpose (Department of the Army, 2019c). Combined
arms operations fully integrate each warfighting function. Table 3 shows the warfighting
functions and definitions.

33

Table 3
Warfighting Functions
Warfighting function Definition
Movement and maneuver The related tasks, systems, and forces are moved
and employed to gain an advantage over an
enemy or threats (Department of the Army,
2019c).

Intelligence The related tasks, systems, and forces support
understanding the operational environment,
such as enemy, terrain, weather, or civil
considerations (Department of the Army,
2019b).

Fires The related tasks, systems, and forces “create and
converge effects in all domains against the
adversary or enemy to enable operations across
the range of military operations” (Department
of the Army, 2019k, p. 1-1).

Sustainment The related tasks, systems, and forces provide
support and services ensuring freedom of
action, operational reach, and endurance
(Department of the Army, 2019d).

Protection The related tasks, systems, and forces preserve the
force to “apply maximum combat power to
accomplish the mission” (Department of the
Army, 2019l, p. 1-1).

Command and control The related tasks, systems, and forces enable
“synchronization and converging all elements of
combat power” (Department of the Army,
2019f, pp. 1–19)

Operations Process
The Army’s doctrinal conceptual framework for organizing and executing command and
control is the operations process (Department of the Army, 2019c). The command and control
34

processes performed during operations are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing
(Department of the Army, 2019c). Leaders use the operations process for conceptual and detailed
planning and to understand their operational environment. They visualize and describe the end
states, operational approach, decision-making, and direct, lead, and assess operations. Definitions
of the operations process fundamentals are shown in Table 4.

Table 4
Fundamentals of the Operations Process
Fundamentals Definition
Plan The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired
future, and laying out effective ways of bringing the future.

Prepare Units and soldiers perform those activities to improve their ability to
execute an operation.

Execute Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the
mission.

Assess The continuous determination of the progress toward accomplishing a
task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective.

Note. Adapted from Army Doctrinal Publication 3–0 (p. 4–1), by Department of the Army, 31
July 2019. In the public domain.

35

Current Army Field-Grade Officer Educational Environment
The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) has supported the U.S. Army’s goal of
meeting training and educational needs for operational units (Schifferle, 2010; U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 2005). The CGSS’s priorities are (a) continued leadership
development, (b) ensuring faculty are immersed in the professional body of knowledge, and (c)
contributing to the professional body of knowledge. The CGSS is a regionally accredited
graduate-level school,
to develop highly competent and professional field-grade staff officers with the
warfighting, historical, leadership, and decision-making expertise to enable Army
combined arms formations to successfully execute multi-domain unified land operations
in contested environments against peer threats. (Combined Arms Center, 2020, CGSOC
Course Section)
CGSS is committed to continuously improving student learning with simulation-based
exercises, case studies, and seminar engagements for interaction and learning (Department of the
Army, 2019i). The program covers the educational requirements for a field-grade officer’s next
10 years of service (Department of the Army, 2019i; Gathers, 2020; U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 2005). The school produces officers with a joint and expeditionary
mindset grounded in doctrine, having demonstrated technical, tactical, and leadership
competencies (Combined Arms Center, 2019f; Department of the Army, 2019h; U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 2005). The CGSS consists of three phases: (a) common
core, (b) advanced operations course, and (c) electoral offered in three venues: (a) resident, (b)
satellite campus, and (c) distributed learning (Command and General Staff College, 2015;
Department of Distance Learning, 2017). The following sections describe the phases and venues.
36

Officer Selection to Attend Command and General Staff School
Officer selection to attend the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and venue
occurs during their major promotion board. Table 5 outlines promotion rates for Fiscal Years
1

2017 through 2019. Officers are promoted by identifying and advancing officers with the skills,
experience, competencies, manner of performance, and potential following the board
memorandum of instruction (Human Resources Command, n.d.).

Table 5
Major Promotion Board Analysis Expectation Management
Promotion Fiscal year 2017 Fiscal year 2018 Fiscal year 2019
Above-the-zone 20.20% 39.60% 31.70%
Primary-zone 56.90% 67.50% 67.50%
Below-the-zone 5.10% 2.10% 4.00%
Year group cohort average (Fiscal Year 2017)
Captain to major 55%
Resident Command and General Staff Course 30%
Selection to Command and General Staff Course venue
Resident ~50%
Satellite ~37%
Distributed learning ~13%

Note. Adapted from “Human Resources Command (HRC) Signal Branch Brief Officer Personnel
Management Directorate (OPMD)” by M. Gathers, 2020. Copyright 2020 by Army Human
Resources Command.

1
Fiscal Year starts October 1
st
and ends on September 30
th
.
37

Venues and Phases
The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) has three venues: resident, satellite, and
distributed learning (Command and General Staff College, 2015; Department of Distance
Learning, 2017; Straus et al., 2014). Furthermore, the course has three phases: common core
(Table 6), advance operations course (Table 7), and elective phase learning (Department of
Distance Learning, 2017; Straus et al., 2014). Generally, following CGSS, Officers conduct a
permanent change of station to an operation unit where they will remain for approximately 24
months for key development positions before another permanent change of station (Department
of the Army, 2019i; Gathers, 2020).

Table 6
Common Core Courses
Block Common core course Hours
C100 Foundations 36
C200 Strategic environment 34
C300 Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities 26
C400 Doctrine 54
C500 Joint functions 17
C600 Planning 62
F100 Force management 18
H100 History 18
L100 Leadership 26

Note. Adapted from Developing Army Leaders, by Straus et al., 2014. Copyright 2014 by the
RAND Corporation.

38

Table 7
Advanced Operations Courses
Course Advanced operations courses Hours
O100 Combined forces land component command planning 74
O200 Decisive action division operations 94
O300 Decisive action brigade operations 84
K200 Contracting 8
L200 Leadership applied 22
H200 Military innovation 20
H300 Roots of today’s operational environment 16

Note. Adapted from Command and General Staff Officer Course Distance Learning (AOC-DL),
by Department of Distance Learning, 2017. Copyright 2017 by the Command and General Staff
College.

Resident Program
Approximately 50% of Captains selected to major attend the resident course at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas (Department of Distance Learning, 2017). The academic resident course
contains the common core, advanced operations course, and elective phases (Combined Arms
Center, 2020; Command and General Staff College, 2015). The course is open to the Army’s
basic branches
2
(Department of the Army, 2019).
Education Program
The army has directed its education system to develop leaders with critical thinking for
future uncertainties and organizational change complexities (Mckinley, 2005). The army officer
education system (OES) has drawn on adult education practices, including theories on self-

2
Infantry, Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Engineers, Field Artillery, Special Forces, Chemical, Signal,
Military Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Adjutant General, Finance, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation
(Department of the Army, 2014).
39

directed learning and developing critical thinking skills (Mckinley, 2005). The traditional view
of training and education is that the Army trains for certainty and educates for uncertainty
(Command and General Staff College, 2015; TRADOC, 2017). The Army’s educational goal is
to develop critical thinkers that are agile, adaptive, and innovative officers to sustain mission-
capable teams through an adaptive and continuous learning process (TRADOC, 2017).
Moreover, according to Fastabend and Simpson, critical thinking developed by education
is the most effective lever of change (2004). The army learning model is a systematic approach
to learning, delivering an adaptive blend of learner-centric training and education, combining
experience to enable development in a complex world through instructional, operational, and
self-development training domains
3
(TRADOC, 2017). Additionally, learning provides army
officers with foundational capabilities for conducting joint combined arms operations
(TRADOC, 2017).
The army learning model is a departure from previous army educational philosophy and
methodology: (a) learner-centric performance and participation, (b) collaborative learning and
constructing knowledge from collective experiences, (c) redesign of training through analysis,
design, development, implementation, and evaluation, (d) increased relevance, and (e) considers
the cone of learning, experiential learning, and adult learning theory (Morales-Miranda, 2016).
According to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), education is a general body of
knowledge and habit of mind applicable to a broad range of activities, mainly relying on
experience (TRADOC, 2017, p. 22). Mayer (2010) suggested that strategy instruction can
transfer general strategies or principles used in various tasks.

3
Kolb (2015) links experience in education, personal development, and work as learning environments.
40

The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) leverages adult learning for
professional education and recent combat experience (Davis & Martin, 2012). Davis and Martin
(2012) reported that 90 percent of students have combat experience, with 70 percent having had
multiple combat tours bringing reflection and diverse experience into the classroom for leader
development and education. Knowledge, critical, creative, and collaborative thinking are
required (Fastabend & Simpson, 2004). The information age requires networked organizations
that feature cross-functional, task-focused, adaptive, and matrix teams removing bureaucratic
barriers to innovation (McChrystal et al., 2015).
In relentless competition, the military has a unique sense of urgency because “the choice
is clear, adapt or die” (Fastabend & Simpson, 2004). Davis and Martin agreed, “It is not the
strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but rather the most responsive to
change” (2012, p. 74). CGSS, by its very nature, must be an educational institution committed to
reflection and a center for accomplished practitioners prepared to engage in military missions
(U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005).
The foundation for the CGSS has always been experiential learning to provide officers
with practical knowledge (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005). The CGSS
Experiential Learning Model (ELM) shapes the curriculum and learning environments (U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 2016). The ELM derives from Tennant’s view of
Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016).
Generalizing new information compares and reconciles current learning objectives with student
knowledge (The Army University, 2016). Student development requires reconciling values with
deficient knowledge (The Army University, 2016). Finally, the student must demonstrate new
knowledge to complete the cycle (The Army University, 2016). CGSC uses direct measures of
41

learning such as papers, presentations, examinations, exercises, and participation in classroom
discussions to measure learning and surveys to indirectly measure knowledge transfer (Davis &
Martin, 2012)
The curriculum content begins with reviewing the organization and solving tactical
problems building toward the relationship between offense, defense, and stability operations
(Winton, 2007). The school’s curriculum emphasizes rigorous active learning to achieve
excellence (The Army University, 2018). The curriculum culminates with strategy, psychology,
leadership, and training methods (Winton, 2007). External review and accreditation also
maintain accountability (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005; 2016). Three
organizations perform accreditation: (a) Higher Learning Commission every 10 years for
master’s in military art and science, (b) Joint Staff J7 every 6 years for joint professional military
education, and (c) TRADOC every 6 years for military education level 4 (U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, 2005; 2016; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991). The school
produces two graduate certificates (Combined Arms Center, 2019a). The faculty comprises
officers and civilians with former operational staff, command experience, and senior service
college graduates (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991). In March 2005, the school reported
the student-to-faculty ratio at 3.91:1 (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005).
Andragogy (Adult Learning)
Andragogy theory developed from pedagogy (Glickman et al., 2004). Pedagogy consists
of teachers’ knowledge transfer to students with vicarious experience and knowledge (Knowles
et al., 2005). On the other hand, andragogy focuses on personal experience, social roles’
developmental tasks, practical application immediacy, and problem-centered education (Knowles
et al., 2005). Andragogy theory makes the following assumptions about adult learning: (a) need
42

to know, (b) self-concept, (c) the role of learners’ experiences, (d) readiness to learn, and (e)
orientation to learning (Glickman et al., 2004; Knowles et al., 2005; Mews, 2020; Pratt, 1988).
The learner’s experience is the most significant value in adult education (Zmeyov, 1998). Adult
self-directed learning is the most challenging assumption (Glickman et al., 2004).
Adult learning is fundamental for increasing human capital, productivity, and sustainable
growth (Cilasun et al., 2018). Additionally, technological changes require continuously updating
skill sets (Cilasun et al., 2018). Adult education is a process in that learners become aware of
significant experiences for meaning and evaluation (Knowles et al., 2005). There is equity in
adult learning with the student’s experience and the teacher’s knowledge (Knowles et al., 2005).
This assumes a wide range of individual experiences for the learning pool. Hence, adult
education emphasizes experiential techniques using the learners’ experiences through group
discussions, simulation exercises, problem-solving activities, and case studies instead of
transmittal techniques as pedagogy (Zmeyov, 1998).
Learners themselves characterize the learning process; thus, the students and teacher
cooperate in the learning process (Glickman et al., 2004). Zmeyov emphasizes the importance of
contextual, action learning, and application (1998). Additionally, transformational learning seeks
to challenge experiences, habits, biases, and presuppositions; rather than informational learning,
which changes what we know (Kegan, 2000). Adult educators help adults examine their
conditioning and indoctrinations through sensitivity training, value clarification, and mediation
(Knowles et al., 2005; Snook, 2010). Mezirow further describes transformation learning with a
disorientating dilemma, self-reflection, and working through new perspectives (Mezirow, 2002).
Kolb’s experiential learning model reflects inclusion in concrete experience and active
43

experimentation (Kolb, 2014). Brown et al. (1989) go one step further, discussing situated
cognition and learning through cognitive apprenticeship.
Other adult learning theorists have long supported Knowles’s theory of andragogy;
however, there is some debate about whether andragogy may apply under specific conditions
(Glickman et al., 2004). Pratt (1988) stated that the theory of andragogy had not been tested
empirically despite its adoption. Rachal (2002) asserts that the theory of andragogy relied on
extensive anecdotal, expository, and polemical writings. Additionally, education emphasizes
acquiring decontextualized, abstract knowledge, and lasting knowledge only emerges in
authentic activity embedded in specific situations (Pratt, 1988; Wilson, 1993). It is unclear
whether andragogical education is more effective than pedagogical education (Glickman et al.,
2004).
Army adult learning recognizes Knowle’s theory of andragogy as incomplete (The Army
University, 2016). Army adult learning compares training and education with Bloom’s cognitive
learning levels (Airasian et al., 2001; The Army University, 2016):
Training rarely moves students above fundamental knowledge and comprehension levels.
Education enables the higher learning levels (analysis, synthesis, and evaluation) required
for complex, critical, and creative thinking. Synthesis and evaluation levels are likely to
be achieved in settings beyond the classroom, such as the operational environment. These
higher levels may not be achieved by all. (The Army University, 2016, p. 3)
The CGSS Experiential Learning Model
According to the Command and General Staff School’s (CGSS) Assurance Argument,
“The CGSS Experiential Learning Model (ELM) shapes all CGSS curricula and classroom
learning environments” (p. 34). The ELM invests in faculty development to create learning
44

environments for students to connect curriculum content with experience, prior knowledge,
practical application, and critical reflection (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
2016).
GCSS’s ELM is particularly suited for graduate-level learning when facilitated within
14–16 member staff groups of mid-career military officers and civilian partners. As
highly experienced mid-career professionals, CGSS students bring a wealth of practical
and theoretical wisdom to seminar discussions. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, 2016, p. 34)
The CGSS has modified Kolb’s ELM based on the learning model process incorporating and
integrating ideas with other models (The Army University, 2016). Kolb refers to a dynamic view
of learning based on a learning cycle driven by dialectics of action, reflection, experience, and
abstraction (2014). Learning is knowledge creation through experience transformation (Kolb,
2014). Experience results from new information overlaid with experience, interpretation, and
behavior (Kolb, 2014). The CGSS ELM consists of five steps: (a) concrete experience, (b)
publish and process, (c) generalize new information, (d) develop, (e) apply.
The ELM describes a dynamic view of learning based on a learning cycle driven by the
dual dialectics of action/reflection and experience/abstraction (Kolb, 2014). The concrete
experience is an encounter situation or reinterpretation of an existing experience and triggers
understanding (The Army University, 2016; Kolb, 2014). The concrete experience brings
experience into awareness to support new learning content (The Army University, 2016).
Experience awareness serves to begin to connect reflection and new knowledge. The next step,
publish and process, connects the concrete experience using observation and reflection. The first
component, publish, is essential for learners to share or publish their experiences or observation
45

(Pfeiffer, 1998). Students then reconcile through analysis, dialogue, and reaction (The Army
University, 2016). As reflection continues, critical skills evaluate alternate perspectives,
assumptions, and biases (Kolb, 2014). The next step reduces information to develop principles
and generalizations from experience. The classroom portion of generalizing new information
(GNI) includes lectures, discussion, simulation, or other content delivery approaches (The Army
University, 2016). The develop phase finalizes the association of GNI with value. For example, a
student connects GNI with a suitable future need. This is an opportunity for the instructor to
observe the students’ critical thinking skills and significance (The Army University, 2016). The
final check, the Application confirms student understanding. Assessments measure students’
mastery (The Army University, 2016). An evaluation can be several appropriate instruments to
continue to scaffold. Additionally, questions or confusion with the assessment may require a
revisit to generalize new information.
Criticisms of the Curriculum
Official Army surveys, students, and instructors have criticized the course. The Annual
Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) between 2008 and 2016 has consistently rated Army
institutional education lower than operational experience and self-development (Riley et al.,
2012; Riley et al., 2017). Students and instructors have publicly criticized the course online. The
most common debate is that the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) consists of training
and little education (Ricks, 2015).
Similarly suggesting an inadequate value of Army institutional education, over 80% of
Army leaders have consistently rated operational experience and self-development higher (Riley
et al., 2012). Perception of operational and self-development is higher than institutional
education perceptions, but the perceptions of institutional education have been increasing (Riley
46

et al., 2017). Mckinley suggests the Army’s bureaucratic culture influence reduces the capacity
for critical thinking (2005). Furthermore, evidence suggests that organizations that provide
compulsory personal mastery may be self-defeating (Senge, 2006).
The 2010 CASAL found that many CGSS graduates arrive at their unit without the ability
to transfer and apply their recently acquired skills and knowledge to an operational setting
(Hatfield et al., 2011). Graduates could not anticipate, recognize change, adapt, or adjust to
uncertainty (Davis & Martin, 2012). Organizations expect recruitment will immediately fit the
organization’s strategies, values, and goals with little development investment (Reis, 2016).
McKinley suggested that Army learning may not fully embrace self-directed learning,
despite its importance to lifelong learning (2005). Field-grade officers view the CGSS common
core positively but assert that the program focuses more on training than education (TRADOC,
2017). Fastabend and Simpson (2004) criticized Army schools claiming to teach you what to
think rather than how to think. Figure 3 compares the perceived effectiveness of the Army leader
development domains.

47

Figure 3
Comparison of the Perceived Effectiveness of the Army Leader Development Domains

Note. Adapted from the 2011 and 2016 “Center for Army Leadership Annual Surveys of Army
Leadership” (CASAL) by Riley et al., 2012 and Riley et al., 2017. Copyright 2012 and 2016 by
the Army Combined Arms Center.

The highest leader development perception occurred with operational experience, with
self-development second. Leaders distinguish institutional education as the lowest below
operational experience and self-development. Perception of institutional education quality has
also been increasing; constructive feedback on leadership and course has appeared to challenge
2008 LAS
2009
CASAL
2010
CASAL
2011
CASAL
2012
CASAL
2013
CASAL
2014
CASAL
2015
CASAL
2016
CASAL
Operational Experience 81% 84% 80% 80% 79% 75% 74% 74% 75%
Self-Development 82% 84% 85% 78% 65% 62% 70% 69% 71%
Institutional Education 60% 51% 58% 65% 56% 60% 60% 59% 61%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Army Leader Development Domains (2008 - 2016)
Operational Experience Self-Development Institutional Education
48

learners to perform at a higher level (Riley et al., 2017). Table 8 shows ratings for intermediate
level education.

Table 8
Ratings for Intermediate Level Education
Survey Topic Percentage
The course met or exceeded expectations 80%
Quality of leader development (% good or very good) 67%
Course “of considerable use” or “extremely useful” 57%
Agreement course content was up to date 79%
Agreement course content is relevant 59%
Agreement course increased awareness of strengths and weaknesses 66%
Effectiveness in improving leadership capabilities 55%
Effectiveness in preparing learners to influence others 59%
Effectiveness in preparing learning to develop subordinates’ leadership skills 48%

Note. Adapted from the 2011 CASAL by Riley et al., 2012. Copyright 2012 by the Army
Combined Arms Center.

49

Murray, a CGSS instructor, compares the current officer education condition with France
in the Prussian war of 1870–71, which lost due to ineffective leadership contrasting with the
Prussian system emphasizing individual initiative and the ability to think (2013a). He continued:
Essential to our national security is that our officers are educated to be flexible
thinkers, able to adapt and deal with unfamiliar problems rather than current
emphasis on indoctrination in decision-making. The rigor of examination is
extremely patchy, with entire teaching teams never failing, even the poorest of
students.
The CGSS student achievement rates agree with Murray’s observation; during the
academic year 2017–2018, the school graduated 1133 of 1143 (99.1%) enrolled officers and 131
of 172 (76%) earning a master’s in military art and science (MMAS) (Combined Arms Center,
2019a). Reis (2016) suggests education generally produces professionalization rather than
critical thinking. Similarly, like other universities that also state they teach critical thinking, there
are often conversations about short stories and emotions that do not teach how to build supported
independent ideas but feelings and opinions (Reis, 2016). Moreover, comments mention that the
Program of Instruction (POI) calls for more than 70 hours of instructor-led and individual
training per week, not allowing much academic freedom (Murray, 2013a). Additionally, CGSS
does not recruit and is only available to individuals serving in the Armed Forces attend,
preventing exposure to other professions and disciplines (U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, 2005; 2016).
Operational Organizations
This section will cover the brigade combat team (BCT) and the combat training centers
(CTC). Field-grade officers spend a significant portion of their developmental time in a BCT
50

following CGSS. Following CGSS, field-grade officers apply their leadership to the BCT’s
training strategy toward planning, training, and executing a CTC rotation. The CTC is the
culminating event to validate a BCT’s deployment readiness and ability.
Brigade Combat Team
Since 2003, the Army’s primary combined arms, close combat force, has been the
brigade combat team (BCT; Congressional Budget Office, 2016; Dupuy et al., 2017; Johnson et
al., 2012). BCTs are combined arms organizations of maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment,
protection, and command and control warfighting functions. BCTs “include maneuver; field
artillery, intelligence; signal; engineer; chemical biological radiological, and nuclear (CBRN);
and sustainment capabilities” augmented with aviation, armor, civil affairs, military information
support elements, and information systems (Congressional Budget Office, 2016; Department of
the Army, 2015a, pp. 1–1). There are three types of BCTs, the infantry BCT (IBCT), Stryker
BCT (SBCT), and armor BCT (ABCT).
BCTs are task-organized to conduct offense, defense, and stability operations
(Department of the Army, 2015a). They are flexible, versatile, and effective for planning and
wide spans of control to employ subordinate units and integrate nonorganic units (Department of
the Army, 2015a; 2018; Johnson et al., 2012). Forces Command (FORSCOM) provides the
Army with available, trained, regionally aligned, and global responsiveness through the combat
training center program to maintain readiness in multi-domain decisive action (Department of the
Army, 2018; FORSCOM, 2019a). Modularity and the army force generation (ARFORGEN)
process supplied interchangeable units as a product of extended operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. BCTs have five characteristics: (a) doctrinal flexibility; (b) strategic mobility; (c)
modularity; (d) joint and multinational connectivity; and (e) versatility to function in war and
51

operations other than war (Johnson et al., 2012). The Army has continually updated the BCT
organization, doctrine, and equipment as the operational environment has evolved. Additionally,
BCTs are regionally aligned with a combatant command (Griffin, 2012). In 2014, the Army
began reducing BCTs from 45 to 33 while also task organization with an additional infantry
battalion, an engineering company, and fire batteries (AUSA Staff, 2013). Recently, in 2017, the
Army transitioned from ARFORGEN to the sustainable readiness model (SRM) (Walker, Jr,
2016)
Combat Training Centers
The Combat Training Centers (CTC) started their history in 1941 as the U.S. Army tested
assumptions about doctrine, organization, and equipment in the Louisiana and Carolina
maneuvers preparing for conflict in World War II (Gabel, 1992). Similarly, the National Training
Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin was established in 1981, and battalions began rotating through
(Chapman, 2010). In 1987, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) was established.
Additionally, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) is the third training center in
Germany. Generally, airborne, air assault, and light infantry BCTs conduct rotations at JRTC,
while armor and Stryker BCTs conduct training at the NTC. JMRC handles rotational units
aligned with the European theater.
The CTCs are the pinnacle of unit readiness evaluation (Chapman, 2010; Department of
the Army, 2018). The CTCs provide feedback on combat organization, employment of weapon
systems, and doctrine (Department of the Army, 2018). The CTCs prepare units for highly
realistic live-fire exercises and force-on-force engagements (Chapman, 2010).
In the 1980s, the opposing force (OPFOR) trained in Warsaw Pact doctrine, tactics, and
strategy (Chapman, 2010). More recently, the OPFOR’s actions and responses have been
52

customized and aligned with the current operational environment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
decisive action scenarios (Department of the Army, 2010a; 2011; 2015). The Army’s CTC
program remains the basis for unit collective training, building readiness, capacity, and leaders
through a crucible experience to win in complex environments (Department of the Army, 2014b;
2018; FORSCOM, 2018; 2019a; U.S. Army Europe, 2015). Furthermore, the CTCs serve as
America’s first battles
4
. The CTCs provide unit training for supporting offense, defense, and
stability operations through realistic combined arms training simulating combat against an
independent enemy (Department of the Army, 2018). A near-peer OPFOR adjusts its capability,
equipment, and tactics to stress rotational units during training. The CTCs allow units to focus on
performance-oriented training objectives assessed within the decisive action training
environment (DATE) (Department of the Army, 2010a; 2014b; FORSCOM, 2019a). The CTCs
support unit and leader training objectives using live and constructive simulations (Department
of the Army, 2010a). “The end state is units and leaders prepared to deploy worldwide, fight
with confidence, and win against an adversary” (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 1). The CTCs
are the Army’s change agent organizations for leader and unit collective training (Department of
the Army, 2018). CTC rotation learning and experience provides feedback for unit readiness
requirements and the force for doctrine and education as lessons learned (Department of the
Army, 2018; FORSCOM, 2019a; TRADOC, 2018; U.S. Army Europe, 2015). The feedback
mechanisms are Observer, Coach, Trainer (OCT) observation, feedback, and doctrinally based
after-action reviews (AAR) for leader development and increased organizational performance
(FORSCOM, 2019a). AARs allow leaders to reflect upon what happened and why it happened

4
“Underlying what has become America’s First Battles is the assumption that it makes a great deal of difference
how the U.S. Army prepares in peacetime, mobilizes for war, fights its first battle, and subsequently adapts to the
exigencies of conflict” (Heller & Stofft, 1986, p. ix).
53

and discuss changes for organizational learning. The CTCs are leader development facilities,
focusing on training, developing self-confidence, adaptive, and self-aware leaders assessing
ambiguous situations and making decisions (Department of the Army, 2018; FORSCOM, 2018;
2019a; TRADOC, 2018; U.S. Army Europe, 2015). The CTCs remain the Army’s investment for
unit training while concurrently developing leaders who understand applicable doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures (Department of the Army, 2018). The CTCs conduct final after-
action reviews (AAR) with the rotational unit before redeployment, including executive
summaries of each AAR with lessons learned (FORSCOM, 2019a). Finally, trends submitted to
the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and external organizations provide feedback for
the Army.
The CTCs provide sophisticated feedback from instrumentation systems and observers,
coaches, and trainers to provide analyzed data to assess a unit’s performance Army (Department
of the Army, 2018). Additionally, AARs enable learning strengths and weaknesses and
reflection. The CTC serves as a laboratory for officers to practice their profession, the
effectiveness of current and emerging doctrine, force structure, organization, materiel, systems,
and training management approaches (Chapman, 2010).
Literature Review Summary
This literature review was based on the foundation that field-grade officers are not
developing skill mastery to lead combat organizations. This literature review provided an
overview of U.S. Army staff officer development, history, education, operational organizations,
and theory and presented staff officer and education history and the organization and
development processes. The following section discusses Clark and Estes’ gap analysis theory
and conceptual framework.
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Clark and Estes’ Knowledge, Motivation, and Organizational Influences’ Framework
Maxwell (2013) reasoned that the conceptual framework is constructed to existing theory
and research and is a visual or written product that is a tentative theory informing the design and
justifying research. The conceptual framework was a research design element of concepts,
beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and theories (Robson & McCartan, 2016). According to Clark
and Estes, diagnosing an organizational performance gap results from issues in three categories:
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences (2008). This study’s knowledge,
motivation, and organization (KMO) gap analysis framework identified organizational
weaknesses and effective change implementation through KMO levers. Airasian et al. (2001)
identified four types of knowledge: factual, conceptual, procedural, and metacognitive, for
stakeholders to meet organizational performance goals.
Additionally, stakeholder motivation must access and use knowledge to accomplish
performance goals (Mayer, 2010). Motivation elements in this study include self-efficacy and
utility value. Finally, organizational influences comprise cultural models and settings. The
conceptual framework evaluates KMO influences preventing stakeholders from achieving their
goals leading to organizational entropy (Clark & Estes, 2008). Table 9 provides an overview of
the organizational mission, performance goals, and stakeholder group goals.

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Table 9
Organizational Mission, Performance Goals, and Stakeholder Group Goal

While the KMO influences are organized independently, the KMO categories are
directional, unequal, and overlapping influences (Clark & Estes, 2008). For example, the
organizational culture may resist KMO changes because of historical precedence and propensity.
This study’s conceptual framework suggests that organizational influences are more significant
than knowledge and motivation influences, but conversely, stakeholder knowledge and
motivation influence organizational culture.
The conceptual framework illustrates the interconnectedness and relationship between
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences affecting the stakeholder performance
goal’s successful accomplishment: field-grade officers exhibit DA mastery at CGSS to increase
Army field-grade officer educational mission

The Army’s goal is to educate field-grade officers through professional military education
(PME), experience in assignments, and self-development to develop agile, adaptive, and
innovative officers (Department of the Army, 2019i).

Organizational performance goals

To accomplish the organization’s goal of developing officer mastery for improved unit
performance at the CTCs, the Army must consider two goals:

1. CGSS curriculum optimized to increase decisive action (DA) mastery by October 2024.

2. Implement a warfighter-type culminating event at CGSS to optimize organizational
performance at the CTCs by October 2024.

Field-grade officer goal

Field-grade officers exhibit DA mastery at CGSS to increase organizational performance
during a CTC.

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organizational performance during a CTC. Organizational culture serves as the core component
surrounded by knowledge and motivation influences. The field-grade officers’ performance
goals require organizational support to increase organizational performance, with field-grade
officers transferring knowledge and practicing their profession at CGSS. Additionally, the field-
grade officers must achieve DA mastery to manage adversity and team friction to reduce risk to
life and property. Figure 4 shows the conceptual framework

Figure 4
Conceptual Framework

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Knowledge Influences
Identifying an individual’s knowledge is relational to individual success and
organizational performance since expertise and skills are necessary to accomplish goals (Rueda,
2011). Rueda (2011) referred to four knowledge types: factual, conceptual, procedural, and
metacognitive. Officers must possess factual knowledge of doctrine to accomplish the
organizational goal. Operating to solve problems and communication requires factual
information (Airasian et al., 2001). Officers must also understand the skills, tactics, techniques,
and methodologies to accomplish goals. These officers require context awareness and judgment
when solving problems (Combined Arms Center, 2014). For example, officers must weigh inputs
carefully, deliberately, and quickly without complete decision-making information (U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 2016).
Additionally, officers must quickly grow into their next position in greater organizational
responsibility. As discussed in the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) criticisms in the
literature review, many graduates arrive at their unit without transferring and applying their
recently acquired skills (Davis & Martin, 2012; Hatfield et al., 2011). According to Clark and
Estes, experts may not transfer knowledge and skills because experts cannot describe how they
perform those tasks (2008). Positive transfer is expected from the simulated experience (Merlo,
2010). Table 10 introduces the knowledge influences.

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Table 10
Assumed Knowledge Influence, Type, and Knowledge Influence Assessment
Assumed knowledge influence Knowledge type Knowledge influence
assessment
1. Field-grade officers need to have
the mastery of the conceptual
foundational of decisive action
(DA) doctrine.
Declarative Interview
Document analysis
2. Field-grade officers need to apply
the decisive action (DA) doctrine.
Procedural Interview
Document analysis
3. Field-grade officers need to reflect
on their ability to apply decisive
action (DA) doctrine to develop
skills performance strategies.

Metacognition Interview
Document analysis

Field-Grade Officers Need Mastery in Decisive Action Doctrine (Declarative Knowledge
Influence)
Declarative knowledge is commonly known as facts and refers to knowledge basic to
specific disciplines, contexts, or domains (Airasian et al., 2001). It includes terminology, details,
or elements one must know or be familiar with to effectively understand and solve a problem in a
given area (Rueda, 2011). Doctrine provides common concepts, ideas, theories, values, and
language for communication and general application (Department of the Army, 2019; 2019h).
Transfer refers to the effect of prior learning on new learning or performance (Mayer, 2010).
Mayer suggested specific transfer has higher success than general transfer, but strategies exist for
mixed (2010). Officers must learn and use appropriate decisive action doctrinal language in the
correct context once in the operational environment. Stakeholders at all levels must communicate
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clearly and effectively. Communication must reach beyond a common language of similar
vocabulary and extend to communicate similar concepts.
Army doctrine guides professionals in understanding the entire body of professional
knowledge and beliefs that shape the profession’s art and science based on war principles
(Department of the Army, 2019; 2019a). Decisive action doctrine is dynamic based on lessons
learned in current operations, training, adaptive enemies, force structure changes, technology,
and social values (Department of the Army, 2019c; 2019f). Doctrine serves many purposes for
the organization to establish a common language of the profession, operations, and
administration.
Field-grade officers must understand Army doctrine as the foundation of terms and
categorization of operational knowledge. Doctrine is written for different levels of warfare. It
allows each organization to develop specific policies about conduct—large organizations often
require more than one body of knowledge to address their various tasks (Department of the
Army, 2019a). This knowledge gives the force a philosophical framework for thinking about and
conducting operations and specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Field-Grade Officers Need Mastery in Applying Decisive Action Doctrine
Procedural knowledge refers to completing tasks (Airasian et al., 2001; Rueda, 2011).
Procedural knowledge refers to tactics, techniques, and procedures. Procedural knowledge is
often described in operations standard operating procedures (SOP) to support the commander,
assist subordinate commanders, staff, and units, and inform units and organizations outside the
headquarters (Department of the Army, 2014). According to Schoen, students must learn
substantive, procedural knowledge before claiming mastery (1984).
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Doctrine is foundational for thinking about and conducting operations contributing to
operations and mission effectiveness (Department of the Army, 2019a). Army professionals use
doctrine in three contexts: study for planning and preparing, application and executing, and
reflection or assessing (Department of the Army, 2019h). Doctrine is both theoretical and
practical. Additionally, doctrine is not a list of solutions to problems but rather fundamentals and
TTPs for thinking and solving problems to be applied and adapted to circumstances (Department
of the Army, 2019h).
Field-Grade Officer Reflection (Metacognition)
Metacognitive knowledge is an awareness of cognition and cognitive processes to apply
judgment to complex and ill-structured problems to analyze, evaluate, and create (Rueda, 2011).
Metacognition includes analysis, critical thinking, and reflection (Center for Applied Critical
Thinking, 2016). Indicators of strategic decision-making consider circumstantial and contextual
aspects in chaotic and complex problem sets (Rueda, 2011). Applying knowledge to well-defined
tasks does not remove complexity and uncertainty but requires the effective use of knowledge
akin to the art of choosing among competing paradigms (1984). Mastery functions through
cognitive dissonance and tension with intuitive recognition, action, and judgment of new patterns
under stress and limited time (Gonzalez & Liberzon, 2010).
Motivation Influences
Understanding doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and reflection is not the only
component of accomplishing the organization’s goals. Motivation consists of the emotional and
interpersonal relationship component contribution to achieving organizational goals (Worley et
al., 2014). Sociocultural contexts, performance feedback, and cognitive and affective beliefs
influence motivation (Clark & Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Moreover, high mental stress affects
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motivation with heightened activation reversing optimal performance with an “expert’s brain
processes more closely resemble the novice performer” (Hatfield et al., 2010, p. 168).
Motivation expresses behavior as an active choice, commitment, and mental effort (Clark
& Estes, 2008; Rueda, 2011). Mayer described motivation as personal, activating, energizing,
and directed (2010). One’s self-efficacy and utility value determine attempts to cope with
difficult situations (Bandura, 1976; Rueda, 2011). Competence beliefs reflect one’s views about
their ability and are related to expectancy beliefs. Superior human performance is characterized
by mental economy and effort reduction (Hatfield et al., 2010). Mastery goal orientation leads
one to approach a task to learn virtuously rather than performance goal orientation promoting
competition (Zimmerman et al., 2017). Individuals with higher self-efficacy, greater belief in
their competence, and higher expectancies for positive outcomes will be more motivated to
engage in, persist, and work hard at a task or activity (Rueda, 2011). Table 11 illustrates the
motivation constructs and influences evaluated in this study.

Table 11
Motivation Constructs and Influences
Motivation construct Motivation influence Motivation influence
assessment
Self-efficacy Field-grade officers are confident in
their ability to lead BCTs in
decisive action.

Interview
Utility value Field-grade officers must value
decisive action mastery as critical to
the mission by performing their best
during the CGSS simulation
exercises and the CTC.
Interview

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Field-Grade Officers Self-Efficacy in Their Abilities to Lead BCTs in Decisive Action
Self-efficacy refers to confidence in one’s capabilities to plan, organize, and execute
tasks to attain designed goals (Zimmerman et al., 2017). Individuals’ confidence affects their
motivation to complete a goal (Rueda, 2011). Self-efficacy is self-evaluating perceived abilities,
experiences, feedback, and others’ observations (Rueda, 2011). Team dynamics can also expand
an individual’s zone of proximal development in self-efficacy (Hatfield et al., 2010). Self-
efficacy impacts the accomplishment of organizational goals in novel environments. Conflict
leads to emergent goals that create disruption and friction, requiring quick, intuitive decisions
under extreme pressure and physical discomfort (Merlo, 2010). Field-grade officer knowledge,
talent assessment, and feedback influence their self-efficacy in their success in leading BCTs in
the decisive action training environment (DATE). Paradoxically, people calibrate their
competence resulting in an incorrect self-assessment of performance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
Field-Grade Officers Must Value Decisive Action Mastery
There are four values for individuals seeking task completion: attainment, intrinsic,
utility, and cost (Rueda, 2011; Wigfield, 1994). Some of these values concern achievement
(Wigfield, 1994). While these four facets of value may contribute to stakeholders’ motivation,
the utility value is most apt to accomplish the organizational goal. Officers may not find value
after determining risk, cost, and expectant outcomes for high-stress positions, uncertainty in
decision-making, and self-efficacy (Gonzalez & Liberzon, 2010). Low self-efficacy and
overconfidence result in adverse outcomes and low attainment values (Zimmerman et al., 2017).
Officers must perform their best during the Command and Staff School (CGSS) simulation
exercise and the combat training center (CTC) to demonstrate decisive action utility. Enhancing
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performance requires acquiring and applying self-regulatory processes during challenging tasks,
distractions, and stressors value (Zimmerman et al., 2017).
Organizational Influences
The organizational influences were described earlier in the literature review. The primary
cultural influences include the historical development of the staff, institutional education, and
field-grade officers. Additionally, the current field-grade officer development timeline and
organizational influences were discussed. Nevertheless, it is essential to define organizational
culture before discussing organizational influences. Schein (2004) defined culture as:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (p. 17)
Schein continues, “culture is an abstraction, yet the forces created in social and organizational
situations that derive from culture are powerful” (Schein, 2004, p. 3). Culture is difficult to
define and operationalize because of dynamic processes, transparency, automation, and relative
values (Rueda, 2011). Culture is a dominant force throughout an organization (Clark & Estes,
2008). Organizational culture and changes in organizational structure and education are related.
Gallimore and Goldenberg introduced cultural settings and models to understand
organizational culture more precisely (2001). Cultural models are the organization’s shared
mental schema influencing behavioral, cognitive, and affective elements, and cultural settings are
behavioral routines over time in specific social contexts (Gallimore & Goldenberg, 2001; Rueda,
2011). This literature review focuses on cultural models and settings influencing organizational
performance goals. The organizational cultural model and setting are relational and dynamic
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(Rueda, 2011). Table 12 refers to assumed organizational influences and influence assessments
identified in the literature review.

Table 12
Assumed Organizational Influences and Assessment
Assumed organizational influences Organizational
influence
Organizational influence
assessment
1. Field-grade officer decisive action
mastery develops through CGSS
education informed by CTC feedback.
Cultural setting 1 Interview
Document analysis
2. CGSS culminating exercise develops
decisive action mastery.
Cultural setting 2 Interview
Document analysis

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Organizational Feedback Loops (Cultural Setting)
Organizational feedback loops contribute to organizational knowledge creation, learning,
and innovation (Akbar et al., 2017). Knowledge management’s successful creation and
implementation are critical for organizational success and productivity. A learning organization
must require efficient knowledge dissemination (Information Resources Management
Association, 2012).
Organizational knowledge creation is making available and amplifying knowledge
created by individuals integrated into the organization’s knowledge system, skills, capabilities,
expertise, systems, and practices (Akbar et al., 2017). Organizational knowledge creation is a
dynamic and interactive process aiming for practical organizational knowledge—discovery,
innovation, learning, sense-making, and shared understanding (Akbar et al., 2017; Filos, 2018;
Information Resources Management Association, 2012). Equally important, knowledge feedback
loops are recursive, recurrent, and interactive deriving from individual and collective
contributions over time (Gottschalk, 2008). Innovation is essential for learning, reflecting, and
influencing feedback (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). Feedback synthesizes the conflict between
divergence and convergence (Akbar et al., 2017).
The Command and General Staff School Needs a Culminating Exercise Similar to
“Warfighter” (Cultural Setting)
The warfighter exercise (WFX) is a command post exercise (CPX) that provides realistic,
demanding training and leader development opportunities in decisive action scenarios for
commanders and their staff on the unit’s training objectives (TRADOC, 2018). The Warfighter,
like the combat training centers (CTC), provides commanders and staff realistic simulated
training that allows them to practice their profession. The Warfighter model offers an
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experiential learning environment for experimentation, knowledge application, and reflection
(TRADOC, 2018). Simulations provide realistic maneuver units, employment of weapon
systems, planning, coordinating fires, and planning and coordinating logistic activities
(Department of the Army, 1990). According to existing literature, CGSS has not conducted a
command post exercise since 1928 (Harding, 1956).
The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) currently conducts a ten-day brigade
warfighter (BFWX) consisting of seminars and exercise simulation (Combined Arms Center,
n.d.; TRADOC, 2018). Figure 5 illustrates the current BFWX model. This simulation allows a
brigade combat team (BCT) staff to plan, conduct, train, and educate on offense, defense, and
stability operations in the decisive action training environment (DATE) (Combined Arms Center,
n.d.; TRADOC, 2018). The interview questions will seek to understand CGSS graduates’
experience with CGSS, culminating training to know how this event aligns with and prepares
them for the skills needed at CTC.

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Figure 5
Brigade Warfighter Timeline

Note. Reprinted from The Warfighter Exercise, by the Combined Arms Center, 27 December
2016, slide 7. Copyright 2016 by the Army Combined Arms Center.

The CGSS has not held a command post exercise (CPX) since 1928 (Harding, 1956).
CGSS introduces decisive action concepts during the advanced operations course (AOC) but
does not apply them in a highly stressful environment. Still, modified courses are used during the
sergeants major academy during a CPX (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2021).
Summary
This literature review sought to identify academic and professional literature on staff
officer history, education, and development timeline. The research suggests that specific transfer
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is more successful than general transfer (Mayer, 2010). This implies that officers exposed during
a warfighter suggested possible increased organizational performance. The literature review also
included a gap analysis using Clark and Estes’ knowledge, motivation, and organizational
influences framework. The gap analysis identified declarative, procedural, and metacognitive
knowledge influences of decisive action doctrine mastery. The literature review identified
motivation influences, utility value, and self-efficacy related to high-stress positions. Finally, the
literature review identified a cultural model and many cultural settings of organizational
influences. The discussions from the literature used in this review provide context to understand
practice and research questions. The next chapter provided a methodology for evaluating the
field-grade officer development, including interview and document analysis designed to review
the literature.

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Chapter Three: Methodology
This research evaluated field-grade officer decisive action mastery at the Command and
General Staff School (CGSS) for increased organizational performance during a CTC. This
chapter describes the methodology used that examined the knowledge, organizations, and
motivation influences on organizational performance practices—next, an overview of the
interview and document analysis explaining why this approach was appropriate for this study.
The remainder of the chapter features a description of the sample and a description of data
collection and data analysis, followed by an ethical discussion. This chapter concludes with a
summary.
Research Questions
The research addressed the following questions:
1. What are CGSS field-grade officers’ knowledge and motivation related to achieving
DA mastery?
2. How do the organizational and external influences impact CGSS field-grade officer
capacity to exhibit DA mastery?
3. What are the organizational, knowledge, and motivational recommendations to support
CGSS field-grade DA mastery? Chapter five will address RQ3.
Overview of the Methodology
In the last chapter, the literature from Clark and Estes (2008) emphasized analyzing
knowledge and skills, motivation, and organizational influences to close individual performance
gaps and improve performance. This study used interviews and document analysis to answer the
research questions from the conceptual framework. The methodological framework in this study
was based on a qualitative phenomenological research design. According to Creswell and
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Creswell (2018), “phenomenological research is a design of inquiry coming from philosophy and
psychology in which the researcher describes the lived experiences of individuals about a
phenomenon as described by participants” (p. 13). The goal is the experience’s shared essence
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Merriam and Tisdel (2015) suggest a phenomenological qualitative
research design is ideal as the participants are brought back to their experience, reflection, and
essence as the object of study. The design is appropriate for this study because it is impossible to
separate the phenomenon’s context from practice and knowledge (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Furthermore, the design supported a constructivist worldview to describe an individual’s
subjective sense-making and complex perspectives to understand historical and cultural norms
and social interactions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Overview of the Design
This study consisted of an interview instrument and planned document analysis.
Documents were requested through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for analysis
but were not provided. I solicited majors that were resident CGSS graduates, assigned to a key
developmental (KD) position in a brigade combat team (BCT), and attended a CTC within 24
months of graduating CGSS. Data analysis occurred on a virtualized Windows 10 Professional
machine using Oracle VirtualBox 6.1.38 running on Ubuntu 20.04.1 using Linux kernel 5.15.0–
570. Coding and organizing to create the electronic codebook used ATLAS.ti 23. Microsoft
Office 365 products created word documents, spreadsheets, and presentations. Data was stored
on an encrypted 64 GB USB flash drive backed up daily. Later sections in this chapter describe
each method’s data analysis in detail.

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With the complex nature of this organization and the deeply embedded nature of
tradition, this study’s success produced valuable and accurate data that required carefully
selected methods to probe each layer of the organization. The value of this study also relied
heavily on asking appropriate research questions. Data analysis was compiled and presented
related to the research questions. The following sections discuss, in detail, the data collection
methods used in this study. Table 13 provides an overview of the research questions and method
of inquiry for each.

Table 13
Data Sources
Research questions Interview Document analysis
RQ 1. What are CGSS field-grade officers’
knowledge and motivation related to
achieving DA mastery?
X X

RQ 2. How do the organizational and external
influences impact CGSS field-grade officer
capacity to exhibit DA mastery?

X

Note. RQ 3 is omitted because it deals with recommendations. RQ3 will be addressed in Chapter
Five of the dissertation upon completion of the study.

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Ethics and Role of Researcher
I complied with the University of Southern California’s Institutional Review Board
procedures and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Additionally, I abided by the guidelines for ethical conduct in research specified in the Belmont
Report (1979). Additionally, the views expressed in this dissertation are my own and do not
reflect or represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.
I am a member of the U.S. Army, a CGSS graduate, a former BCT staff member, and a
former Observer, coach, and trainer at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). I was not a
supervisor of any research participants. I have no known competing financial interests or
personal relationships that may have influenced the work reported in this study.
Interview solicitation contained informed consent (Appendix C). Collected data via
interviews, phone conversations, email, or other electronic means was private. Moreover, data
collection and interviewing in qualitative research involved challenges. Stake (1994) stated,
“qualitative researchers are guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners should be
good and their codes of ethics strict” (p. 244). Because research participants may have been
anxious about providing honest information about their experiences, leadership, and unit climate,
their confidentiality was protected. All personally identifiable information (PII) that could
identify a specific individual was private. Interviewee transcripts were coded to preserve
confidentiality. Confidentiality was vital during and after the study to protect the research
participants by increasing honest and open dialogue during the interview for the study’s
credibility and trustworthiness (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The report of findings preserved
participant confidentiality. Researcher notes, audio recordings, and transcripts were protected to
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maintain the chain of custody. Furthermore, information was not shared without permission. This
study’s data was also unclassified; I did not collect or release for official use only (FOUO) or
controlled unclassified information (CUI).
Method 1: Interview
The interview focused on gaining perspectives into a field-grade officer’s experience
after CGSS graduation and completion of a CTC rotation. The inquiry focused on their
knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences impacting their capacity to develop
mastery of decisive action (DA). The sections below detail the participants, instrumentation, data
collection procedures, and data analysis for interviews.
Field-Grade Officer Participants (Stakeholders)
The research targeted Majors that were resident CGSS graduates, assigned to a key
developmental (KD) position in a brigade combat team (BCT), and attended a CTC within 24
months of graduating CGSS. Twelve field-grade officers participated in this research. XVIII
Airborne Corps published an order to identify potential research participants; seven volunteers
responded. The remaining five were recruited through email, telephone, or word-of-mouth. The
analysis searched for data intersections, unions, and disjunctions for findings and suggested
recommendations. The final sample included two women and 10 men of the following racial
demographics: one Multiracial, one Asian, two Hispanics, and Eight Caucasians.
This study’s sample successfully answered the research questions. The sample purposely
omitted graduates from the satellite and distributed learning venues because (a) the resident
course is the largest population at 50% and (b) students’ timelines become unaligned—for
example, students attending a nonresident venue may concurrently be assigned to an operational
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unit while also attending a CTC. All had attended the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
since 2016, with one also attending a National Training Center (NTC) rotation later.
The stakeholders represented seven BCTs—3/10, 4/25, 1/82, 2/82, 3/82, 1/101, and 3/101
from four Army Divisions—10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 82nd

Airborne
Division, and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Table 14 shows each brigade and its
specialty.

Table 14
Brigade Combat Team
Brigade combat team Division Specialty
3/10 10th Mountain Division Light infantry
4/25 25th Infantry Division Airborne
1/82 82nd Airborne Division Airborne
2/82 82nd Airborne Division Airborne
3/82 82nd Airborne Division Airborne
1/101 101st Airborne Division Air assault
3/101 101st Airborne Division Air assault

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This study’s sample is purposeful in answering the research questions (Maxwell, 2013).
As mentioned earlier, the field-grade officers are expected to develop decisive action (DA)
mastery at CGSS to increase organizational performance during their CTC (Center for Army
Lessons Learned, 2019a; FORSCOM, 2019a; 2018). While the researcher was not a supervisor
or within their chain of command, the participants were subordinate in rank, as the researcher
was a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army.
Instrumentation
The interview followed a predetermined semi-structured format for questions concerned
with the knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences determined during the literature
review. The semi-structured format allowed access to participant perspectives and
understandings (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). The semi-structured interview was not based on
previous research. It was customized to provide insight into the field-grade officer’s perceptions
of learning experience and application at the CTC to achieve their goal of attaining decisive
(DA) mastery. The interview protocol was domain-specific for military learning.
The interview explored the field-grade officers’ experience at CGSS learning DA,
applying knowledge, and individual and organizational performance at a CTC. The interview
consisted of a baseline set of questions, and additional questions for clarity and detail were based
on participant responses. The interview protocol is in Appendix D. Each interview’s goal was to
facilitate an in-depth discussion to answer the research questions and identify additional
information not previously conceived during the research design. This instrument provided the
researcher the qualitative data to assess knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences
related to the stakeholder’s performance goal.
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Data Collection Procedures
The recruitment strategy identified units on the Forces Command (FORSCOM) CTC
rotational calendar. The research targeted Majors that were resident CGSS graduates, assigned to
a key developmental (KD) position in a brigade combat team (BCT), and attended a CTC within
24 months of graduating CGSS. Twelve field-grade officers participated in this research. Seven
participants responded through an XVIII Airborne Corps order to identify potential research
participants, while five were recruited through email, telephone, or word-of-mouth.
Interviewee responses were recorded with permission and transcribed for use in the data
analysis phase. Ten interviews were conducted via Microsoft Teams, a video conferencing
software; two were conducted face-to-face as COVID-19 pandemic restrictions were loosened.
The interviews were conducted on Microsoft Teams meeting the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Impact Level 5 (IL5)
(Department of Defense, 2017). In-person interviews were conducted using Microsoft Voice
Recorder. Interviews were then transcribed by Microsoft Word and edited. Microsoft Teams
interviews were deleted after 90 days. Data was stored on an encrypted 64GB USB flash drive
backed up daily. Appendix D outlines the interview protocol. Each interview lasted between 60
to 90 minutes. This approach collected qualitative data as part of the initial research design while
allowing additional data not conceived as part of the initial research design.
Data Analysis
Data analysis is sense-making to answer the research questions (Merriam & Tisdell,
2015). Data analysis included notetaking during responses with follow-on analytic
memorandums with initial reflections, considerations, and thoughts concerning the conceptual
framework and research questions. First, unique identifiers were assigned to anonymize
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transcriptions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Next, data analysis involved three phases of open-coding
interview transcripts (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Coding and organizing created the electronic
codebook using ATLAS.ti 23. The first phase of this analysis identified a priori codes derived
during the literature review and conceptual framework. These codes are based on the knowledge,
motivation, and organizational influences identified in Chapter Two. The second phase began
refining and categorizing priori and open coding into axial codes (Gibbs, 2018). The final phase
tied coding into categories to address the research questions (Gibbs, 2018; Creswell & Creswell,
2018). Data analysis occurred on a virtualized Windows 10 Professional machine using Oracle
VirtualBox 6.1.38 running on Ubuntu 20.04.1 Long Term Support using Linux kernel 5.15.0–
570. Microsoft Office 365 products created supporting documents, spreadsheets, and
presentations. Chapter Four presents the validated influences and any emerging themes or
categories revealed during data analysis including frequency.
Method 2: Document Analysis
I submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the documents. Every
effort was made to obtain them through this means, but the government did not provide the
documents. Since these documents were not provided, this study only consisted of qualitative
interviews. The goal of document analysis was to triangulate field-grade officers’ experiences to
build on themes identified during interviews and corroborate knowledge and motivation
influences.
Additionally, the document analysis may have provided emergent data not part of the
initial research design (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The FOIA request asked for the unit
standard operating procedures (SOP), planning documents, after-action reviews (AAR), and
observer, coach, and trainers (OCT) assessments. Since Casey (2012) stated the combat training
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centers (CTC) introduced the decisive action training environment (DATE) in 2012, documents
were requested back to 2012. The data contained qualitative observations and quantitative
performance metrics for the phenomenon of interest. Table 15 shows the planned crosswalk of
the requested document with the influence and data type.

Table 15
Document Data Sources
Document Influence measured Data type
Unit standard operating
procedures (SOP)

Knowledge: Declarative, procedural Qualitative
Planning documents

Knowledge: Declarative, procedural,
metacognition
Qualitative

After-action reviews

Knowledge: Declarative, procedural,
metacognition

Quantitative
Observer, coach, trainer
(OCT) Assessments
Knowledge: Declarative, procedural,
metacognition

Qualitative

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Credibility and Trustworthiness
For the findings of this study to be considered valid, the results must be trustworthy. The
study’s conceptualization, methodology, findings, and presentation rigor deem its trustworthiness
(Merriam, 2009). This study also considered credibility. Internal validity and data credibility
requires several steps to be congruent with reality (Merriam, 2009). Researchers limit potential
bias in qualitative data analysis to establish credibility and trustworthiness (Gibbs, 2018). I was a
component of the data collection and analysis by collecting and conducting the interviews,
coding, and analysis. Microsoft Word autogenerated the transcripts, and I reviewed them for
precision to ensure no relevant data was lost. The interview transcripts produced rich data
improving coding for analysis (Gibbs, 2018).
Furthermore, I asked accompanying questions to clarify information. The interview
protocol questions were piloted to ensure they were bias-free and met interview question criteria.
Each participant was asked to review their interview after transcription for accuracy and provide
any needed clarification or missed content. Maintenance logs and audit trails documented the
data collection and analysis process to ensure trustworthiness, including decision process design
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Finally, the researcher was the sole interviewer.
Summary
This chapter detailed the research methodology to evaluate a Command and General Staff
School (CGSS) graduate performance at the combat training centers (CTC). This chapter
described the methods of examining the knowledge, organizations, and motivation that influence
organizational performance practices. The chapter also comprehensively developed methods for
instrumentation, data collection, and analysis. Furthermore, the chapter focused on credibility,
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trustworthiness, validity, and reliability. The chapter ended with ethics and the role of the
researcher. Chapter Four introduces the study’s findings.

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Chapter Four: Findings
This research sought to understand field-grade officer knowledge learned at the
Command and General Staff School (CGSS), motivations by exploring reported behaviors, and
organizational influences that limit mastery of field-grade officer Decisive Action (DA). The
research was conducted according to the methodology described in Chapter Three to answer the
study’s three research questions. Chapter Four is divided into four sections. The first section
discusses the research participant demographics. Sections two and three describe the findings in
answering the study’s research questions. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.
The research asked the following qualitative questions:
1. What are CGSS field-grade officers’ knowledge and motivation related to achieving
DA mastery?
2. How do organizational and external influences impact CGSS field-grade capacity to
exhibit DA mastery?
3. What organizational, knowledge, and motivational recommendations support CGSS
field-grade officer DA mastery?
This chapter focused on reported data captured in response to research questions 1 and 2;
Chapter Five addressed the third research question. This study used interview analysis to answer
the research questions from the conceptual framework.
A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was submitted, and every effort was made
to obtain documents as described in Chapter Three, but the government did not provide the
documents. Since these documents were not provided, this study only consisted of qualitative
interviews. The planned document analysis goal was to triangulate field-grade officers’
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experiences building on themes identified during interviews and corroborate knowledge and
motivation influences.
Participating Field-Grade Officers
Twelve field-grade officers participated in this research. The research targeted majors
that were resident CGSS graduates, assigned to a key developmental (KD) position in a brigade
combat team (BCT), and attended a CTC within 24 months of graduating CGSS. The research
cohort averaged 12 months of prior enlisted experience, just over 16 years of total service, 22
months of combat experience, two combat deployments, attended two CTCs and one Warfighter,
and had been assigned to a BCT for a total average of 54.7 months. Participants were from six
branches. One field-grade officer attended the equivalent of CGSS—the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Another participant attended the School of
Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) following CGSS, and two field-grade officers had follow-on
security forces assistance brigade (SFAB) experience. Additional demographics included four
participants promoted to Lieutenant Colonel; two former CTC observer, coach, and trainers
(OCT); five post-CTC deployments; and three selected for the command select list (CSL)—two
primaries and one alternate. The unique experiences with this cohort included out-load
operations and post-CTC rapid deployments to Kuwait in January 2020, Operation Allies Refuge
to Afghanistan from July 14–August 30, 2021, and Operation Atlantic Resolve to Europe in
February 2022. Table 16 shows the field-grade officer demographics.

Table 16
Field-Grade Officer Demographics
Participant
Prior
service
Current
service
Combat Deployments CTC Warfighter(s)
Total time in
BCT
Officer
ID months year months n n n months branch
01* 0 15 16 2 3 0 23 Signal
02* 0 17 40 4 2 2 63 Signal
03 48 25 31 3 1 0 30 Signal
04* 0 15 12 1 1 1 24 Fires
05 24 16 12 1 5 3 48 Engineer
06 0 14 18 2 2 1 68 Adjutant
07* 36 21 27 3 3 3 60 Adjutant
08** 0 14 34 3 3 3 107 Fires
09** 0 17 30 3 3 4 36 Engineer
10 11 13 12 1 1 1 62 Signal
11 0 14 12 1 3 1 84 Intelligence
12* 17 15 20 3 4 2 51 Logistics
Mean 12 16.3 22 2.2 2.6 1.6 54.7
Mode 0 15 12 3 3 1
Median 4.5 15 19 2.5 3 1 55.5
High 48 25 40 4 5 4 107
Low 0 13 12 1 1 0 23
Range 48 12 28 3 5 4 84

Note. *Post-CTC deployment. **Former OCT.

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Research Question 1: What Are CGSS Field-Grade Officers’ Knowledge and Motivation
Related to Achieving DA Mastery?
The first research question sought to uncover field-grade officer’s knowledge and
motivation for achieving DA mastery. All knowledge and motivation influences were assessed
through interviews. The determination to validate knowledge influences as a need or asset was
determined based on a response agreement among 75% of the interview participants. Based on
responses to the interview questions, the assumed declarative and metacognitive knowledge
influences were present among the 12 participants, but procedural knowledge was undetermined.
Moreover, participants were confident in their ability to lead BCTs in decisive action and had
utility value in personal development and leadership.
Knowledge Influences’ Findings
Several interview questions were asked to assess knowledge influences affecting
stakeholders’ comprehension of DA. Army professionals used doctrine in three contexts: study,
conducting operations, and reflection (Department of the Army, 2019a), aligning with
declarative, procedural, and metacognition knowledge. The findings suggested stakeholders
comprehend DA and connected themes, including the nature of operations, warfighting
functions, and combined arms operations. Furthermore, stakeholders reported experiencing a
transition at CGSS, primarily learning declarative and procedural knowledge through quizzes,
practical exercises, essay papers, and simulated exercises.
Stakeholders’ responses indicated the presence of procedural and metacognition
knowledge influences during their key developmental position as they matured through brigade
training activities, culminating training exercises, and
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at their CTC. Four stakeholders discussed their post-CTC learning. Declarative and
metacognitive knowledge influences were validated as assets; procedural knowledge influences
were undetermined. Table 17 highlights the summary of the knowledge influences and the
findings of this study.

Table 17
Assumed Knowledge Influence, Type, and Knowledge Influence Validation

Assumed knowledge
influence
Knowledge
type
Knowledge influence
assessment method
Validation
1. Field-grade officers need
to have mastery of the
conceptual foundation of
decisive action (DA)
doctrine.

Declarative Interview

Asset
2. Field-grade officers need
to apply the decisive
action (DA) doctrine.

Procedural Interview

Undetermined
3. Field-grade officers need
to reflect on their ability to
apply decisive action (DA)
doctrine to develop skills
performance strategies.

Metacognition Interview

Asset
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Two themes emerged in discussing knowledge influences with the research participants.
Participants noted that knowledge developed post-CGSS graduation and mastery occurred
several months after their unit CTC rotation when reflecting upon their experiences.
Furthermore, several participants identified declarative and procedural knowledge gaps upon
completion of CGSS that they later learned on-the-job while assigned to their BCT key
developmental (KD) position and personal development. Recommendations related to bridging
these gaps will be discussed in Chapter Five. Figure 6 shows the participants’ description of their
knowledge development timeline

Figure 6
Field-Grade Officer Self-Reported Knowledge Development Timeline

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Declarative Knowledge Theme: Field-Grade Officers Have the Foundational Conceptual
Mastery of the Decisive Action (DA) Doctrine
Interviews were used to assess field-grade officers’ declarative knowledge of
foundational mastery of decisive action doctrine; this influence was an asset. Twelve participants
understood the knowledge requirements and resources associated with a field-grade officer
assigned to a BCT KD position. This conclusion was evidenced by data gathered during the
interviews, as Participant 01 detailed:
I didn’t have anxiety in front of the maneuver folks when they were speaking infantry
and fires. I think it was beneficial for me to pay attention as we dug into the doctrine. I
knew how to use operational terms, so it helped employ the signal assets during the
offensive and defensive phases within the operational plan.
Participant 12 offered, “Reflecting upon the CGSS, my experience was really good; I attribute
my success as a brigade logistician directly with understanding MDMP.”
Likewise, all the participants noted that CGSS played a significant part in their
professional development in understanding foundational doctrine as key in preparing to become
a BCT staff officer. Furthermore, participants consistently pointed out that the CGSS, related to
their BCT and CTC experience, focused on the operations process planning and the warfighting
functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and sustainment.
Eight participants noted that CGSS inadequately informed their declarative knowledge in
their specific branch, and these participants reported they learned their craft while assigned to
their BCT KD position to prepare for a CTC (after CGSS). Participant 07 stated,
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The core [CGSS] lessons did not prepare me as an [BCT] adjutant general staff officer,
and the sustainment concept of support was logistics heavy. It did not incorporate human
resources support, but the electives provided helpful information to fill the gap.
Echoing this sentiment, Participant 10 stated, “Because you’re looking at all this doctrine and
reading and then applying to briefings, practical exercises, and capstones to create shared
understanding, but I felt that didn’t help with signal.” The participants identified fundamental
doctrine they believe is necessary for success in the BCT. These doctrine manuals are listed in
Table 18.

Table 18
Field-Grade Officer Significant Foundational Doctrine As Identified by Participants
Doctrine Title Date
ADP 2–0 Intelligence Jul 2019
ADP 3–0 Operations Jul 2019
FM 3–09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations Apr 2020
JP 3–09 Joint Fire Support Apr 2019
ADP 3–19 Fires Jul 2019
ATP 3–60 Targeting May 2015
ADP 3–37 Protection Jul 2019
ADP 4–0 Sustainment Jul 2019
FM 4–0 Sustainment Operations Jul 2019
ADP 5–0 The Operations Process Jul 2019
ADP 6–0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces Jul 2019
FM 6–0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations May 2022
ATP 6–0.5 Command Post Organization and Operations Mar 2017
FM 3–96

Brigade Combat Team

Jan 2021

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Five participants mentioned that reconstitution, a fundamental concept, was not learned at
CGSS. Those participants said that reconstitution was not known until the Leadership Training
Program (LTP), several weeks before their CTC, significantly degrading organizational
performance at the CTC. Table 19 shows participant responses regarding Reconstitution.
Furthermore, as participants discussed Reconstitution, they mentioned related doctrine shown in
Table 20.

Table 19
Participants’ Key Quotes About Reconstitution
Participant Key quotes
Participant 06 LTP was my first experience in the brigade, and I felt I lacked knowledge of
the reconstitution process in the sustainment rehearsal. I learned about
[CALL] at LTP. It’s the CALL Corps / Division Planners Guide to
Reconstitution Operations.

Participant 07

At CGSS, the sustainment concept of support was logistics focused
and did not incorporate HR support. At the CTC, I learned about
reconstitution, replacement, and casualty operations which were
not discussed at CGSS.

Participant 08

The focus at CGSS was maneuver focused on processes, inputs, and
outputs from a doctrine. So, the working groups, the boards, the
further you get away, the focus was just a little more on rehearsals
than doctrine. And just a bit further into the S1 realm, those
processes [such as reconstitution] were not learned until much
later.

Participant 11

Our biggest struggle [at the CTC] was maintaining tempo through
sustainment. Maneuver is always pushing forward, trying to gain
an advantage. Sustainment, particularly reconstitution was
difficult.

Participant 12 Reconstitution was just not taught [at CGSS], and when it became an
issue, it was too late.

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Table 20
Reconstitution Doctrine as Identified by Participants
Doctrine Title Date
CALL 20–01 Corps and Division Planner’s Guide to Reconstitution
Operations
Oct 2019
ATP 3–94.4

Reconstitution Operations

Mar 2021

Since the sample consisted of 11 participants in airborne and air assault units, they
perceived airborne and air assault joint forcible entry doctrine and specific unit standard
operating procedures (SOP) as necessary for success at their CTC, but they identified that these
concepts were not discussed at CGSS. These field-grade officers relied on on-the-job education
while assigned to airborne or air assault BCTs to gain exposure to these concepts during joint
forcible entry operations at the CTC. Participant 02 remarked,
I remember most of the concepts, including joint forcible entry, but at the time, I
don’t think there was a manual specifically talking about airborne and air assault
operations. So, the doctrine came out right as we prepared for the CTC; I
remember reading it, which provided our planning and execution framework.
Research participants provided JFE doctrine and associated unit SOPs in Table 21.

Table 21
Joint Forcible Entry Doctrine as Identified by Participants
Doctrine Title Date
JP 3–18 Joint Forcible Entry Operations May 2017
FM 3–99 Airborne and Air Assault Operations Mar 2015
Gold Book Air Assault Operations n.d.
ASOP Airborne Standard Operation Procedures n.d.

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Participants also mentioned specific concepts during interviews. Table 22 shows the
doctrinal terms, codes, and subcodes related to declarative knowledge supporting the conduct of
operations.

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Table 22
Declarative Knowledge Code Crosswalk
Declarative knowledge

Participant

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
Nature of operations-operational tempo
Friction X X X X X X X X X X X

11
Intensity X X X X X X

X X

X

9
Simulation X X X X X X

X X X X X 11
Real world feedback X X X X X X X 7
Decisive action-exercises
CTE X

X X X

X

X X X 8
LTP X X X X X X X X X

X X 11
CTC X X X X X X

X X X X X 11
Warfighter

X

X X X X X X X X X 10
Combined arms-relationships
Staff
X X X X X X

X X X X X 11
Warfighting function X X X X X X

X X X X X 11
Combined arms-operations
Synchronization
X X X X X X X X

X X X 11
Rehearsals X

X X X X

X X

7
Operations process
Planning X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Preparation X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Execution X X X X X X

X X X X

10
Assess X X X

X X

X X X X X 10
Mission Command X X X X X X X X X X X 11
Warfighting functions
Command and control X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
Intelligence X

X

X X

X X X X X 10
Sustainment X X

X X X X X X X X 10
Maneuver X

X X

X X X X X X X 10
Fires X X

X X

X X X X

8
Protection X X X X X X X X X 10

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The Nature of Operations
Based on the responses to interview questions, there was an understanding of the nature
of operations. As discussed in the literature review, ADP 1–01 lists the nature of operations as
war as inherently chaotic, a human endeavor, and conducted among people (2019a). Participants
described war as inherently chaotic through many themes discussing operational tempo through
friction, intensity, simulation, and real-world feedback subcodes. No participant directly
described the nature of operations as a human endeavor or as conducted among people. The
nature of operations sub-themes and key participant quotes are shown in Table 23.

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Table 23
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Nature of Operations Declarative Knowledge
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quote
Friction 11 Participant 01: “CGSS was not about dealing
with friction and stress. The CTC was a week
of 2 or 3 hours of nightly sleep; the CTC was
stressful because of all the requirements.”

Participant 02: “The CTC was more difficult
than how we did it at CGSS because you have
all these frictions hitting you with all the
emotions and frustrations.”

Intensity 9 Participant 06: “The CTC was a crucible event.
There are a lot of conflicting priorities that
were simple but had to be addressed before I
felt my attention could have been spared to do
the things I should have been doing.”

Participant 10: “The physical toll that the CTC
rotation takes when a whole battalion needs
water to remain effective while you’re not
sleeping or eating.”

Simulation 11 Participant 11: “I have scar tissue with the
simulation exercises versus what’s happening
on the ground in the CTC. The simulation will
never let you utilize some of your skills,
working through difficulties effectively like an
S4.”

Eleven participants discussed perceived discrepancies between the CTC simulation and
assumed real-world feedback increasing friction. Participant 11 commented on this frustration,
“The CTCs don't mimic enemy logistics all that effectively since everything just kind of rolls in
from outside the box.” The post-CTC deployment participants opined that CTC operational
tempo, friction, and intensity exceeded their deployment. Still, despite perceived real-world
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feedback discrepancies at the CTC, they mentioned the CTC prepared them well for
unanticipated problems during their deployments. For instance, Participant 01 stated that the
CTC cyber requirements were challenging as an assumed discrepancy; he noted the same
unforeseen problem existed during his post-CTC deployment to USCENTCOM. Finally,
Participant 12 similarly discussed the flexibility required during his USEUCOM deployment.
Participants at the BCT adequately understood the nature of operations.
Decisive Action
All participants referred to DA, and this section categorized their discussion of DA into
several themes. Participants described DA when discussing the following activities or programs:
brigade culminating training event (CTE), Leadership Training Program (LTP), combat training
center (CTC), and warfighter. Participants indicated that the CTC was most significant in their
understanding of DA particularly transitioning between the offense and defense phases of
operations.
Furthermore, participants described their personal development reflecting upon their
growth, beginning with their declarative knowledge of DA at CGSS through application at the
CTC. Additionally, each training iteration, CTE, LTP, CTC, and Warfighter, created an
environment for participants to work through the experiential and adult learning models.
Participant 01 described his personal development and maturity, “You don’t get that experience
at CGSS, but every experience scales up.” Participant 02 explained her experience, “I don’t think
the first thing that came to my mind was the transitions from offense to defense, but they
required careful planning, execution, and synchronizing across the staff to reassess end states.”
Table 24 shows key quotes and themes describing DA.

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Table 24
Participants’ Key Quotes About Decisive Action Declarative Knowledge
Sub-theme
(Program or event)
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
CTE 8 Participant 01: “The CTE focused
on planning and application of the
offense and defense. The CTE
was the next iteration in scaling
after CGSS.”

Participant 06: “The CTE was a
rehearsal focused on the offense
and defense to achieve our
commander’s intent and mission.”

Participant 08: “We’re probably at
the crawl phase of the offense and
defense since we didn’t do
awesome [at the CTE].”

LTP 11 Participant 04: “LTP MDMP was
intense and specifically focused
on planning the first phase of
operations—the airborne
operation [offense] and expanding
the lodgment.”

CTC 11 Participant 05: “I helped as the
brigade planner develop the
concept for approaching the CTC
grounded in DA, especially
offense and defense transitions. I
attribute a lot of that to my
foundation from the CGSS.”

Participant 09: “We dominated the
transitions during different
phases—defense input into the
offense and protection
integration: obstacles, targeting,
and integration.”

Participant 11: “[At the CTC], we
had transitioned to the offense
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Sub-theme
(Program or event)
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
after the defense. We were
attacked by an enemy company of
Boyevaya Mashina Pyekhoty
(BMPs) and tanks while
rebuilding our combat power.
And we missed windows of
[intelligence] collection, and the
enemy punched through our
forces.”

Participant 12: “When thinking
about the offense, on how would
we maneuver and support passage
of lines, I was not really familiar
because I had deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq [during
GWOT], and it was just different
[with a near-peer enemy].”

Warfighter 10 Participant 04: “Warfighter is one of
the best simulations, and as our
CTE, it set us up for success at
the CTC. We used what we
learned at Warfighter at LTP and
throughout the CTC rotation to
develop our skills in planning
fires in the offense to stay one
step ahead of maneuver.”

Combined Arms Operations
As discussed in the literature review, combined arms operations required “all branches to
mutually help and support one another in the common effort to attain the desired end”
(Department of the Army, 2019a, pp. 3–4). All participants discussed combined arms operations
in ways aggregated into several sub-themes: staff relationships and warfighting Function
integration, synchronization, and rehearsals. Participants universally agreed that staff
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relationships, warfighting function integration, and synchronization were important for
organizational success.
Twelve respondents discussed rehearsals, with eleven indicating rehearsals as more
important than doctrine but less important than leadership, suggesting a preference for the
following: (a) leadership presence at the point of the problem, (b) rehearsals, and (c) doctrine,
including SOPs. Participants discussed the combined arms rehearsal (CAR) as the BCT’s
primary rehearsal and scripted event for synchronization and integration across the warfighting
functions and the organization. Table 25 shows participants’ key quotes about combat arms.

Table 25
Participants' Key Quotes About Combat Arms Declarative Knowledge
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Relationship—
staff
11 Participant 08: “It’s the difference between
time-based versus trigger-based
organizations. The fires support officer
(FSO) finds themselves trying to ensure
that effects were synchronized with the
engineer, intel, and Air Force, who want
everything to be time-based. It’s really the
ability to work among many people and
systems.”

Participant 09: “Relationships with the staff
were critical to ensuring the engineers were
synchronized with fires, intel, maneuver,
and sustainment.”

Relationship—
warfighting functions
11 Participant 01: “I learned most about fires at
the CTC and how they integrate into
brigade roles—controlling brigade fires and
specifically the importance from my
warfighting perspective of maintaining the
brigade [communication] connection with
the fires battalion and aviation. We have a
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Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
massive role in the sensor-to-shooter
connection, which intel always talks
about.”

Participant 04: “Doctrine feeds your operation
because without having an understanding
of maneuver and how fires support them,
you don’t have that general understanding
and are not as effective.”

Operations—
synchronization
11 Participant 01: “We were synchronized and
integrated with the aviation battalion and
were able to clear air requirements for
fires.”

Participant 05: “In reality, from a factual
standpoint. One of the biggest things I
learned at the CTC was synchronization of
fires and intelligence. At CGSS, I took an
air-to-ground integration elective [course],
which helped with airspace management
and the fires and intelligence
synchronization—sensor to shooter chain;
this concept of targeting collection, fusion,
and ground sensor integration allowed us to
maintain tempo throughout the CTC.”

Operations—
rehearsals
7 Participant 03: “I learned that rehearsals,
understanding, and conveying as a leader,
are important—if you don’t rehearse it,
how are you going to do it?”

Participant 05: “Rehearsals are key to the
organization conducting a mission.”

Participant 10: “Rehearsals get the
organization together and then break out to
the warfighting function rehearsals.”

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Operations Process
As discussed in the literature review, the operations process is the army’s framework for
organization, command and control, and execution is the operations process (Department of the
Army, 2019e). Staffs supported their commanders by employing the operations process to
understand, visualize, and describe their operational environments, end state, and operational
approach (Department of the Army, 2019e). Participants used many themes to describe their
operations process knowledge, including planning, preparation, execution, assessment, and
mission command. Additionally, participants identified preparation with confidence building in
skills, awareness, and purpose.
All participants expressed knowledge about the operations process developed at CGSS.
However, three were neutral in how well CGSS contributed to their knowledge development, but
demonstrated they possessed the declarative knowledge this study sought to confirm.
Additionally, one participant indicated that CGSS did not prepare her to contribute to the
operations process at the CTC, stating that CGSS did not prepare her well in supporting the
sustainment process and operations process with human resources support. She described that
learning reconstitution at LTP rather than CGSS limited her from participating fully in the
operations process at the CTC because she could not develop as an expert in such a short time.
Likewise, the four signal officers also indicated frustration that the CGSS failed to offer a skill
development opportunity in their expertise with planning during the operations process. Fires
officers said their contributions to the operations process primarily relied on former experience
and depended on the small group instructor. Other non-fires officers indicated learning about the
targeting process while on-the-job after graduating from CGSS.
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Participants identified the different phases of the operations process planning, preparing,
execution, and assessment. The operations process is described in detail in the literature review.
All twelve participants mentioned planning and preparation beginning at CGSS, and 10
described execution and assessment at the BCT. Furthermore, eleven participants described
mission command as integral to performing operations. Table 26 shows participants’ key quotes
about the operations process.

Table 26
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Operations Process Declarative Knowledge
Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Planning 12 Participant 01: “I don’t know if you can
execute a planning exercise at CGSS that
is realistic, but that’s how you know you
learned it after the hard lessons [at the
CTC] happened after 24 to 72 hours after
hitting the drop zone and realizing this
hasn’t been planned out well.”

Participant 05 on current planning and
operating, “We’re developing trackers,
conducting MDMP with broad stroke
Army Design Methodology and defining
our systems—now how are we going to
lead and mission command this? How are
we going to battle track?”

Preparation 12 Participant 02: “Preparing for the CTC was
hard. I was confident in our training to
bring up the Tactical Communications
Nodes (TCN), but I held my breath for 12
days when the servers crashed and rebuilt
before the CTC, potentially limiting our
mission command. “

Participant 05: “thinking about the next
phase of operations and posturing
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Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
equipment and particular class IV and V
of supply or ultimately you’ll fail
execution.”

Participant 11: “I had people that I could
rely on and provide bottom-up refinement
in the warfighting function—so we
weren’t just flying by the seat of our
pants.”

Execute 10 Participant 03: “During execution, I asserted
myself into processes to reprioritize
resources and requirements to remain
aligned with the plan.”

Participant 11: “We struggled to maintain
tempo with sustainment, but we were
adamant about not letting one asset dictate
how we planned. Predicting intel and fires
to stay ahead of maneuver was difficult [in
the current ops fight].”

Assess 11 Participant 03: “During an airborne
operation—it’s very fast and chaotic. You
only have access to limited resources, so
you stick to the plan. I didn’t have much
room to reassess the situation.”

Participant 09: “The plan has to be solid.
Adjusting to a different enemy situation
after the plan is in motion without
thinking through branch plans and
decision points adds organizational
friction.”

Mission Command 11 Participant 02: “I was making decisions at
my level to meet [the commander’s]
intent.”

Participant 06: “Working toward the end
states, I had to know how to work with
other people—the S3 is always reluctant
to take instruction from the fire support
officer (FSO).”
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Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes

Participant 10: “Jumping and securing a drop
zone [in an airborne operation] required
Mission Command to meet the
[commander’s] intent and key tasks at
execution speed.”

Warfighting Functions
All participants described their warfighting function (WfF), integration, and relationship
with others. As described in the literature review, the WfFs integrate and synchronize to provide
unity of effort to direct combined arms operations (Department of the Army, 2019c). Participants
discussed the following: command and control, intelligence, sustainment, movement and
maneuver, protection, and fires. Participants described their experiences through their branch and
warfighting function lens, expressing individual and organizational unknowns.
Furthermore, according to the participants, the BCT training exercises, CTE, LTP, and
the CTC, provided feedback to develop awareness to reduce the unknowns. Participants
developed a post-CTC understanding aligned with the doctrine described in the literature review.
Table 27 shows participants’ key quotes about the warfighting functions.

Table 27
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Warfighting Functions Declarative Knowledge
Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Command and
control
12 Participant 02: “The data provided by the command-
and-control systems drives everything, including
decisions. The data and common operating
picture (COP) must be accurate for commanders
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Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
to make decisions. I need to know how the
systems were connected so if a fires mission had a
problem, we could correct it quickly.”

Participant 05: “We maintained analog and digital
systems to command and control our [command
post] nodes updating our SOPs on conducting
transitions.”

Intelligence 10 Participant 01: “At CGSS, we spent a good amount
of time working through IPB, but at LTP—the
prep for the CTC itself we went much deeper into
IPB because [at the CGSS] the officers may not
be in their assigned MOS—for instance, the intel
might be the logistician during the exercise.”

Participant 11: “Intelligence guided the operation by
choosing areas of interest for sensor placement to
locate high-payoff targets (HPT).”

Sustainment 10 Participant 06: “Convoys, for instance, we have so
many trucks, and we have so much fuel. How far
would that get us? And how long would it take to
travel? We tried to flex sustainment and how we
could achieve operational reach and maintain
tempo through support too?”

Participant 11 on targeting enemy sustainment:
“You’re looking at an assist from the S2 on
targeting their [enemy] sustainment. We bring
these target nominations to the division
depending on how deep their sustainment assets
were, but we’re looking to disrupt their ability to
transition to another phase of the operation, and
[enemy] sustainment is listed on the high-payoff
target list (HPTL)”.

Movement and
maneuver
10 Participant 05: “The biggest things I learned at the
CTC were airspace management and the kill
chain within a BCT—to do target collection
fusion integrated with ground sensors to achieve
tempo in the offense.”

105

Sub-theme
Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Participant 10: “Our MDMP was integrated into
targeting, and our fighting products were from 48
to 96 hours in advance. We backwards planned
maneuver and support—this is where you want to
be—ok, then I need a [communication]
RETRANs site established here to make that
work. To make this work, maneuver says we’ll
move here, and we’ll attach the RETRANs to this
unit to set it at this gird location.”

Participant 11: “Our BCT was comfortable in a 96-
hour timeline to synchronize Air Force, aviation,
and fires in the air tasking order (ATO) process to
support maneuver.”

Fires 8 Participant 04: “We developed our Main Command
Post (MCP) with fires integrated with current
operations and refined our battle drills during the
train-up to the CTC.”

Participant 11: “We almost overly adhered to our
targeting process to the point of shifting our focus
a little too much based on what we’re projecting.”

Protection 10 Participant 08: “I was reaching between the
engineers, fires, and maneuver to ensure that the
[protection] effects were synchronized as we
conducted the rotation.”

Participant 09: “CTC was the first time to putting it
all together through the protection working
group—obstacle integration with fires for the
defense.”

Participant 10: “And now we have to consider the
enemy cyber and electronic warfare effects such as
communications denial.”

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Procedural Knowledge Theme: Field-Grade Officers Apply the Decisive Action (DA)
Doctrine
Interviews were used to assess field-grade officers’ procedural knowledge related to
mastery of decisive action doctrine. Based on the interview responses, the military decision-
making process (MDMP) procedural knowledge for all participants was an asset. Participants
indicated procedural knowledge influences, but a limitation of the methodology chosen for this
study is that observations and document analysis were not incorporated that would have enabled
participants to demonstrate application or results through the interview; this procedural
knowledge was undetermined. Participants indicated that unit operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
emphasized leadership presence at the point of the problem rather than procedural knowledge.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the document analysis may have demonstrated participants’
understanding of procedural knowledge through participant-created SOPs; planning documents;
after-action reviews (AARs); and observer, coach, and trainer (OCT) assessments.
Data were gathered through interviews in which the 12 participants discussed challenges
in transitioning and maturing into their BCT KD position with process development and practical
application. The procedural knowledge to implement doctrine comes from experience, best
practices, and lessons learned because of its applicability for thinking about and conducting
operations and specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP; Department of the Army,
2019a). Table 28 demonstrates participants’ key quotes about procedural knowledge.
Participants indicated procedural knowledge at lower rates than declarative knowledge.
Participants also provided data that indicated greater procedural knowledge understanding due to
their specific branch and warfighting function through on-the-job specialization in their BCT
position compared to what they learned at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS).
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Table 28
Participants’ Key Quotes About Procedural Knowledge
Participant Key quotes
Participant 10 “The CTE was the first time we implemented these processes. Competing
priorities were frustrating. Especially since we hadn’t planned for the
emerging real-world operations in Europe that constrained our training
resources. The CTC allowed us to get too nuanced levels which increased
my understanding of DA that a simulated scenario could not have done.”

Participant 11 “The CTC caused units to apply processes using imperfect [and
asymmetric] information onto the CTC battlefield. At the BCT,
self-planned exercises were challenging, but we were relatively
untrained until getting to the CTC because we could not resource
the OCTs internally for a CTE.”

Participant 12 “I deployed as the brigade S4 to run the largest forward port. I relied
heavily on FM 4–0 Sustainment Operations and MDMP. It wasn’t
easy; I had to set the theater when I got there since the
infrastructure for support had not been established.”

Furthermore, participants indicated more critical requirements in procedural knowledge
to synchronization for mission accomplishment. Table 29 shows the procedural knowledge
crosswalk.

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Table 29

Procedural Knowledge Crosswalk

Procedural knowledge Participant

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
Practical application
CGSS X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
CTE X

X X X

X

X X X 8
LTP X X X X X X X X X

X X 11
CTC X X X X X X

X X X X X 11
Warfighter

X * X X X X X X X X X 11
Preparation
Lessons learned

X

X X X X X

X 7
SOP development

X X X X

X

X

X 7
Rehearsals X

X X X X

X X

7
Planning
MDMP X X X X X X X X X X X X 12
MCOO

X

X

X

3
IPB X

X

X

X

4
Mission analysis X

X

X X X X X X 8
Wargaming X X X X

X

X

X

8
Execution
RDSP

X

X 2
Intelligence process X

X X

X

X X 6
Targeting process X X

X X

X X X X

8
Sustainment operations X X

X X X X

X X X 9
Assessment
Assessment X X X X X X X X X X X X 12

Note. *Exercise Talisman Saber

Practical Application
Understanding doctrine requires more than declarative knowledge; doctrine requires
judgment in application. ADP 1–01 explains knowledge application of unified land operations,
decisive action, and the fundamentals of tactics (Department of the Army, 2019a). Practical
109

application executes procedural knowledge. Additionally, practical knowledge leads to an
understanding of implementing theoretical knowledge through application to personal
experience. Acquiring practical techniques is foundational for experiential learning. Army
professionals use doctrine in conducting planning, preparing, executing, and assessing
operations; thus, the doctrine is helpful as a collection of fundamentals, TTP for thinking about
military problems, which procedures are the most complex, and what actions best solve them
(Department of the Army, 2019a). Participants mentioned several ways in which they developed
procedural knowledge through practical application; the following sub-themes were identified
based on participant data: CGSS, CTE, LTP, CTC, and Warfighter.
CGSS
All participants indicated CGSS developed procedural knowledge application. Eight
specified that whiteboard exercises, specifically exercise Eagle Owl, and electives developed
procedural knowledge application. Participants discussed how these exercises allowed them to
develop procedural knowledge as groups to create and implement solutions. Related codes are
shown in Table 30.

Table 30
CGSS’s Significant Procedural Knowledge Application Development Activities Reported by
Participants
Activity Participants
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Total
Whiteboard X X X X 4
Eagle Owl

X

X

X

3
Electives X X X X 4

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Four participants signaled that whiteboard exercises quickly established a shared
understanding of planning processes, tasks, branches, and decision points. Participants also
indicated they continued rapidly sketching and debating plans using the whiteboard. Three
participants stated Eagle Owl, a 2-week multinational staff planning exercise with U.S. and
British field-grade officers, was essential to their learning procedural knowledge for performance
at the BCT and CTC. Four participants indicated electives were valuable for their branch and
warfighting function learning, predominantly supporting the operations process. Table 31 shows
participants’ key quotations about significant application development events at CGSS.

111

Table 31
Participants’ Key Quotes About CGSS Practical Application Development Procedural
Knowledge
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Whiteboard 4 Participant 02 described the whiteboard exercises
as the most valuable at CGSS, “The master
tactician was in my small group and was always
at the whiteboard, which was important in my
learning. We used the whiteboard to build out the
plan among the team, delegate tasks, and
execute.”

Participant 07 described the whiteboard primarily
for the steps for MDMP and to quickly create a
course of action sketch.

Eagle Owl 3 Participant 03 during Eagle Owl, “I learned how to
contribute to the IPB process as a member of the
staff. It was important that everyone contributed.”

Participant 11, “you’re surrounded by British
[Army] Officers during another repetition of
MDMP and get a chance on their perspective on
problems and processes.”

Electives 4 Participant 05, “At CGSS, I took an elective air-to-
ground integration, which was great. We talked
about the kill chain, sensor-to-shooter and fires,
intel, and aviation synchronization, but at the
BCT had to figure out how to conduct target
collection and fusion integrated with the sensors
on the ground and then achieve and maintain
tempo within the rotation.”

Participant 12: “I took the Theater Sustainment
Planners Course elective and used what I learned
to support opening the European theater in Poland
and set the conditions to RSOI the rest of the
brigade.”
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Culminating Training Event
The culminating training event (CTE) is a BCT’s final home station rehearsal that
integrated all collective training before deploying to a CTC. Eight participants discussed CTE
and perceived procedural knowledge development. Participants agreed that the CTE provided
space to further develop procedural knowledge through experience as a complete exercise
rehearsal to apply and refine battle drills and standard operating procedures for challenging
problems before their CTC rotation. Furthermore, participants agreed that the CTE scaffolded to
an intensity near the CTC. Table 32 displays participants’ key quotes about their CTE and
procedural knowledge.

Table 32
Participants’ Key Quote About the Culminating Training Event Procedural Knowledge
Participant Responses
Participant 01 His CTE focused on planning and operations process application. “The unit
didn’t get that experience until the CTE with reality providing feedback
that required SOP and battle drills refinement.”

Participant 08 We were not awesome at our CTE, probably at the crawl phase of
planning. A lot of problems existed with system integration on the
technical side. That was probably where we got the first iteration of
our targeting cycle, which we refined later at another Command
Post Exercise (CPX).

113

Leadership Training Program
The Leader Training Program (LTP) prepared training for BCTs and their rotational
support elements, building on previous brigade training exercises. Moreover, LTP focused on
preparing BCTs for planning and operations at a CTC. According to FORSCOM Regulation
350–50–1 (2018), the LTP focused on developing MDMP skills and applying the tasks and
conditions unique to the unit’s designated mission. Eleven participants echoed the FORSCOM
Regulation stating that LTP guided the BCT staff using their planning SOP through an
intense MDMP session ending with a combined arms rehearsal (CAR) to prepare for the
rotational scenario. Additionally, all participants mentioned that CGSS and LTP MDMP were
remarkably different, contrasting the scenarios and intensity in the academic environment against
a professional BCT staff preparing for a CTC rotation. Table 33 lists participants’ key quotes
about procedural knowledge at the LTP.

114

Table 33
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Leadership Training Program Procedural Knowledge
Participant Key quotes
Participant 04 “[CGSS] MDMP wasn’t as intense as LTP. What we learned from
warfighter we established at LTP; we had a couple of iterations of battle
drills, and this is how we planned and applied current operations.”

Participant 05 “LTP was faster and had a different focus [than CGSS MDMP]; we
cut and pasted the LTP fighting products and highly recommended
processes into our SOP to use at the CTC. The LTP team brought
many of the best techniques—proven beneficial, and LTP was the
first time we got the team together because we lacked experiential
knowledge but had great officers as examples.”

Participant 06 “LTP was my first experience in the brigade, and I felt I lacked
[procedural] knowledge in the sustainment rehearsal in the
reconstitution process.”

Participant 08 “They have different focuses; [at CGSS], I’m going to try to
understand all parts of MDMP, whereas, at LTP, you’re on a
running staff and focused on my piece of the pie. I need to ensure
my target lists are finalized, where I need to be pushing, and all the
touchpoints I need with the Field Artillery battalion staff as we are
parallel planning.”

Combat Training Center
The CTC is described in detail in Chapter Two: Literature Review. Eleven participants
mentioned the CTC as significant in their procedural knowledge development. Participants noted
the CTC as a crucible event giving them space for realistic missions for focus to refine their
TTPs for improved performance. This was the most significant event for seven participants in
their personal development, allowing them to apply their last 2 years of learning into practice.
Table 34 displays participants’ key quotes about the CTC regarding procedural knowledge.

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Table 34
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Combat Training Center Procedural Knowledge
Participant Key quotes
Participant 01 “The CTC is the first place I experience that stress level because of the
airborne forcible entry operation. The CTC was way more stressful
because of all the requirements.”

Participant 05 “At the CTC, I was kept at the point of failure for two weeks.”
Participant 09 “The CTC simulated real-world and knowledge application to
dominate the transitions—obstacles, targeting, and integration.”

Participant 08 “They have different focuses; [at CGSS], I’m going to try to
understand all parts of MDMP, whereas, at LTP, you’re on a
running staff and focused on my piece of the pie. I need to ensure
my target lists are finalized, where I need to be pushing, and all
the touchpoints I need with the Field Artillery battalion staff as
we are parallel planning.”

Participant 10 “I don’t think I understood DA until the CTC—there was this
moment of epiphany that I kind of figured out what was effective;
other things weren’t until after the CTC rotation.”

Participant 11
Our ability to plan against the simulation wasn’t successful since “the
CTCs don’t mimic enemy logistics all that effectively since
everything just kind of rolls in from outside the box.”

Warfighter
The warfighter exercise (WFX) was described in Chapter Two, the Literature Review.
Ten participants participated in a warfighter; several participants commented that warfighter was
used as their CTE providing system simulation as a command and staff exercise preparing for the
CTC. Participants universally agreed that warfighters provided an exercise that stressed all
systems and processes and provided feedback for them to readjust. Participants’ key quotes about
the warfighter are listed in Table 35.
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Table 35
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Warfighter Procedural Knowledge
Participant Key quotes
Participant 02 “The warfighter exercise allowed us to rehearse a full scenario before
attending our CTC—it was a really good exercise.”

Participant 03 “I participated in Talisman Saber [an exercise] representing our brigade in a
small team; I was exposed to strategic and operational level planning
similar to a warfighter.”

Participant 04 “We learned at warfighter as our CTE to develop the command post layout
and our fires integration with current operations. We this onto LTP and
continued refining them as we entered the [CTC] box.”

Participant 05 “I’ve participated in three warfighters—we used the last warfighter as
our CTE, slightly deviating from the scenario, and the
commander morphed the exercise into a fire support coordination
exercise.”

Participant 06 “The warfighter allowed us to practice achieving operational reach
and maintain a tempo of support.”

Preparation
Ten participants discussed preparing for operations. Participants described their
preparation by researching, developing, and rehearsing TTPs through the sub-themes: Center of
Army Lessons Learned (CALL), standard operating procedure (SOP) development, and
rehearsals, respectively. Participants also related preparation to confidence in motivation to lead
their section while assigned to a BCT staff.
Seven participants sought tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from the Center of
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publications to resolve gaps not covered in doctrine and
improve readiness to increase their performance. The CALL publications receive feedback from
117

previous CTC rotations to provide trends and unit best practices. Participants used the CALL
publications to develop and refine their processes.
Furthermore, seven participants discussed their preparation by developing internal
organizational SOPs to standardize their section’s planning, battle drills, and rehearsals. Standard
operating procedures standardized organizational processes, including battle drills executed
without a deliberate decision-making process (Department of the Army, 2020, p. 141–143).
These participants also discussed using the CTE, LTP, and CTC to refine their planning, tactical,
and section SOPs.
Finally, seven participants discussed rehearsals as preparation before executing an
operation. Seven participants addressed the need for shared understanding created by rehearsals.
Rehearsals created the space for the team to focus on achieving unity and coordination of effort.
Types of rehearsals were discussed in-depth in ATP 5–0.2–1. Table 36 lists participants’ key
quotes about preparation.

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Table 36
Participants’ Key Quotes About Preparation Procedural Knowledge
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Lessons
learned
7 Participant 03: “I used the CALL MDMP handbook
as a quick reference guide.”

Participant 06: “I learned about [CALL] at LTP. It’s
from the Center of Army Lessons Learned
(CALL). It’s the Corps / Division Planners Guide
to Reconstitution Operations. My commander is
working on an LPD to talk exclusively about
reconstitution because we’ve deviated from how
we fight.”

Participant 12: “At CGSS, we read a couple
of CALL articles based on sustainment at
the CTC that helped with SOPs. Later at
LTP, we were provided documents that
were a gold mine we implemented for the
CTC.”

SOP
development
7 Participant 02: “SOP development occurred while
building the training plan setting the battle drills
through the process preparing for the CTC.”

Participant 06: “The BCT may have an SOP, and
it might be utilized but must be prepared to do
more things than they think they ought to be
doing.”

Participant 12: “I took the products from CGSS as
a foundation to build SOPs.”

Rehearsals 7 Participant 04: “You know it’s game time. We
already had a couple of battle drill iterations, but
we needed to work on planning synchronizing
with current operations.”

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Planning
All 12 participants mentioned the military decision-making process (MDMP). Other
steps and sub-themes that emerged from the interviews included mission analysis, MCOO, IPB,
and wargaming. The literature review contained a section on MDMP. Seven of the participants
referred to Step 2: Mission Analysis of MDMP. Four mentioned a mission analysis sub-step,
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), with three discussing an IPB product, the
modified combined arms overlay (MCOO). Finally, eight participants discussed wargaming, a
Step 4: Course of Action Analysis sub-step, indicating that mission analysis and the wargame
execution steps are perceived to be the essential aspects of MDMP. Participants suggested that
the mission analysis builds the problem understanding and framework.
Participants indicated the wargame as the most significant sub-step in validating the
course of actions during MDMP. Furthermore, participants stated during the wargame that the
designated red team played a conceptual enemy against their COAs. Table 37 shows
participants’ key quotes about preparation.

Table 37
Participants’ Key Quote About Preparation
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
MDMP 12 Participant 04 described his experience, “MDMP
step-by-step at LTP was intense, planning fires for
the offense and defensive. But I specifically
remember, as the brigade [fire support officer]
FSO, planning the [Family of Scatterable Mines]
FASCAM for a successful defense.”

Participant 10 discussed participation and
engagement in MDMP, “CGSS does a good job at
putting us where we need to be, but now, I feel that
120

Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
a lot of the nonmanuever lacked an understanding
of IPB and MDMP because we don’t do it as
much.”

Participant 11 explained that every commander runs
MDMP slightly differently. Still, at CGSS, “it’s
very driven by doctrine, which is a solid
backbone.”

Mission
analysis
8 Participant 04 as the BCT FSO: “Mission analysis
had to be very detailed. I was focused on the
outputs and how that integrated with the staff.”

Participant 11: “Mission analysis is the most
important step in the process.”

IPB 4 Participant 01 contrasted MDMP at CGSS and the
CTC, “At CGSS, we spent a good amount of time
working through IPB, but at LTP, the prep for the
CTC itself, we went much deeper into IPB because
[at CGSS] the officers may not be in their assigned
MOS. For instance, the intel might be the
logistician during the exercise.”

Participant 10: “We looked at reverse IPB as the
enemy. What are their strengths and weaknesses?
What are their assets available, limitations, facts,
and assumptions? And that goes back into
additional analysis.”

MCOO 3 Participant 03: “At CGSS, during a practical exercise,
I was assigned as the Intel Officer putting together
the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
and MCOO; nobody was contributing, but it’s just
so important that everyone needs to contribute.”

Wargaming 8 Participant 02: “Wargaming is almost the execution
because it’s a very detailed thought experiment.”

Participant 04: “I thought wargaming was very, very
important. At CGSS, moves and countermoves
with a computer-simulated battle.”

121

Execution
Participants discussed execution procedural knowledge in sub-themes mainly through
their branch and the warfighting function’s contribution to the BCT command post during
operations. Participants discussed procedural knowledge of staff functions familiar to the
command post
5
to execute through the rapid decision-making synchronization process (RDSP),
the intelligence process, the targeting process, sustainment operations, and warfighting function
synchronization and integration. The BCT battle rhythm was the key to simultaneously and
deliberately synchronizing meetings, briefings, and other activities for current and future
operations (Department of the Army, 2014a).
The Rapid Decision-Making Synchronization Process. The RDSP was a decision-
making and planning technique that commanders and staff commonly used as a timely and
effective solution during execution (Department of the Army, 2019e). Only two formally
mentioned using the rapid decision-making synchronization process (RDSP). Rapid decision-
making provided a hasty informal analysis of the changing environment for recommendations
during execution. Table 38 shows participants’ key quotes about the RDSP.

5
Functions participants discussed common to a command post: 1) Conducing information management, 2) build
and maintain situational understanding, 3) controlling operations, 4) assessing operations, and 5) coordinating. with
internal and external organizations.

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Table 38
Participants’ Key Quotes About the RDSP
Participant Key quotes
Participant 08 “CGSS was a good place to work through the [MDMP] crawl phase, but
now, [in the BCT] as we go into the airborne timeline, we transitioned into
the rapid decision-making [synchronization] process to react to what’s
happening [in current operations].”

Participant 12 “We used more of the rapid decision-making [synchronization] process
because it’s more realistic and we’re faster and better than anyone else can
do it; sometimes, you’re not afforded the whole opportunity [for
MDMP].”

Intelligence Process. The intelligence process was integral to the operations process to
drive planning using information and intelligence (Department of the Army, 2019b). Participants
described interrelated categories of intelligence operations: plan, collect and process, analyze,
disseminate, and integration, but no detail. The fires officers were mainly concerned with
accurate analysis and integration into the targeting process. Furthermore, signal and logistics
officers referenced timely information dissemination. Participant 11, the sole military
intelligence officer, detailed the intelligence process regarding maintaining tempo, fusion,
collection platforms, transitions, the deep fight, and effects against the CTC simulation. While
the participants were aware of the intelligence process, participants showed a lack of detailed
procedural knowledge of the intelligence process.
Targeting Process. Eight participants discussed the targeting process through the decide,
detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology, targeting board, and targeting working
group to optimize integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions. But the
participants only discussed targeting in lethal effects and did not consider non-lethal effects-
123

electronic-warfare, space, cyberspace, and information operations. Participants identified that
targeting was not implemented into the CGSS core curriculum. Participant 08 indicated his
CGSS instructor discussed the targeting working group and decision board but did not conduct
either during the course. Fires, intelligence, and engineer officers were the most informed on the
targeting process. Table 39 discusses participants’ key quotes about the targeting process.

Table 39
Participants’ Key Quotes About the Targeting Process
Participant Key quotes
Participant 02 “It would take 12 minutes to get artillery down range because it is complex.
At CGSS, we cannot mimic the complexity until you’re in a rotation
because that was the first time you see those systems.”

Participant 04 Participant 04 discussed the complexity of the targeting process integrated
with operations, intelligence, and systems in the decide, detect, deliver,
and assess (D3A) framework, “I had a broad concept of what maneuver
wanted to do, but the CTC was fast, and our intelligence was having a
hard time finding the enemy, so it made it difficult to plan fires and get the
guns in position to support.”

Participant 08 Participant 08 examined synchronization and culmination of fires,
operations, intelligence, and sustainment, “As we closed on the objective,
maneuver was in place with a 50% fires solution. Our intelligence
collection was way off, and we’re running out of artillery ammo towards
the end of the night because we hadn’t forecasted correctly.”

Sustainment Operations. Sustainment operations enable, maintain, and equip the Army
with materiel and funding and provide force health protection linking sustainment to operations
(Department of the Army, 2019d, 2014d). Nine participants discussed sustainment through
logistics, with five also discussing personnel services and reconstitution. No participant
mentioned finance management, health services, or materiel support to the sustainment
124

operations. As discussed earlier, participants said that CGSS sustainment was logistics focused
and indicated that trend through the CTC. Participants did not discuss procedural knowledge
when reflecting upon sustainment operations and the operations process. Table 40 shows
participants’ key quotes about sustainment operations.

Table 40
Participants’ Key Quotes About Sustainment Operations
Participant Key quotes
Participant 05 “Continually thinking about the next phase of logistics operations including
I, III, IV, and V classes of supply, particularly in a JFE.”

Participant 06 “We have so many trucks and the limits of fuel or trucks worth of fuel. How
far would that get us? How long would it take to travel? We tried to flex as
far as a sustainment perspective to achieve operational reach and maintain
tempo.”

“We haven’t done well with the reconstitution process and the replacement
timelines, for instance, the training requirements for the new incoming
individuals. Human resource support may not be available.”

Participant 11 discussed maintaining operational tempo paced by sustainment, commenting,
“Sustainment is hard; simulations provide a near-perfect rather than the
amount of friction at a CTC.”

Participant 12 Reflected on his post-rotation deployment sustainment experience, Our
brigade put the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) on tranche two with the
brigade headquarters and a maneuver battalion. The Combat Sustainment
Support Battalion (CSSB) deployed pretty much as a BSB, which is not
their doctrinal job because the BSB probably should have deployed first to
conduct the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
for the rest of the brigade.

125

Assessment Process
Twelve participants discussed activities of the assessment process through themes related
to awareness and understanding. While categorized under procedural knowledge, participants
discussed assessment concurrent as reflection-in-action within the context of current operations.
Table 41 shows participants’ key quotes about the assessment.

Table 41
Participants’ Key Quotes About Assessment
Participant Key quotes
Participant 01 Described the difficulty assessing while conducting operations at the
CTC, “we’re working to readjust to get the plan back on course
because the enemy gets a vote.”

Participant 02 Assessing adversity, “The data provided by the mission command systems
drove everything, including decisions. The data and COP had to be
accurate for the commander to make decisions. The brigade’s server
stacks failed, and I held my breath for 12 days as we were getting them
ready before the CTC. We continually assessed our options to keep the
commander informed.”

Participant 03 “These critical variables hit your awareness every day that you haven’t
thought about.”

Participant 10 On assessment, “I thought I understood the task and purpose, but why were
we doing this? Setting the conditions required accurate reporting for a
shared understanding of the operational impact to provide
recommendations. I began to understand how I want to employ these
assets that we must make it one more manageable.”

126

Metacognitive Knowledge Theme: Field-Grade Officers Reflect on their Ability to Apply
Decisive Action (DA) Doctrine to Develop Skills Performance Strategies
Metacognition included analysis, critical thinking, and reflection (Center for Applied
Critical Thinking, 2016). Participants used learning, reflection, and visualization themes for
knowledge metacognition. Interviews were used to assess field-grade officers’ metacognition
knowledge to develop their skills. Participants noted their growth, adaptation, and maturity
demonstrating new behavior through learning and integrating new knowledge into experience.
The metacognition knowledge code crosswalk is listed in Table 42.

Table 42
Metacognition Knowledge Code Crosswalk
Code
Participants

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Total
Learning
X X X X X X X

X

8
Reflective
X X X X X X X X X X X
11
Visualization
X X X X X X
5

127

The 12 participants indicated the presence of metacognitive influences through their
descriptions of learning, reflection, and visualization. As participants described their experience,
their reflection flowed through the experiential learning model (ELM) as they reviewed their
experience, new information integration, behavior change and application, and feedback. Despite
the high operational tempo, eight participants indicated learning occurred during their CTC
rotation; one participant discussed reflection after his CTC experience thinking about similar
problem sets; and five participants mentioned visualization using experience, judgment, and
feedback. Table 43 displays participants’ key quotes on metacognition.

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Table 43
Participants’ Key Quotes About Metacognition
Sub-theme
# Participants
identifying concept
Key quotes
Learning 8 Participant 01 described his learning; the CTC
ensured you submitted cyber security scans to
connect to the network. The civilian left at 1600,
so I’m going another day without connecting to the
division. We were the immediate response force
(IRF), and when our brigade deployed, we ran into
a similar problem coordinating while deployed.

Reflective 11 Participant 09 said, “I didn’t realize how much I had
learned at the CTC until several months later,
reflecting upon similar problem sets.”

On reflection, Participant 10 said, “my level of
understanding and technical expertise and how to
do all these things increased after the CTC
rotation.”

Visualization 5 Participant 03 described visualization, “close your
eyes and picture the scene—visualize that rifle
company XYZ is in the correct blocking
position—shadowboxing different scenarios.”

Participant 04 on visualization, “as we’re planning,
we’re trying to visualize how the next 24 hours
will go, but that was as far as we could accurately
predict based on aircraft availability.”

Motivation Influences’ Findings
This research study evaluated two assumed motivational influences addressing utility and
self-efficacy. Several interview questions were asked to assess stakeholder self-efficacy and
utility value motivation influences. Document examination was not conducted for this influence.
Motivation influences were all determined to be assets.
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The validation of the two motivation influences as assets was determined based on
interview participant response agreement. Participants indicated high confidence in leading their
staff in the BCT. Furthermore, participants also described utility value through personal
development and leading teams. Table 44 highlights the summary of the motivation influences.

Table 44
Motivation Constructs, Influences, and Validation
Motivation
construct
Motivation influence Validation
Self-efficacy Field-grade officers must be confident in leading
BCTs in decisive action.

Asset
Utility value Field-grade officers must value decisive action
mastery as critical to the mission by performing
their best during the CGSS simulation exercises
and the CTC.
Asset

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Self-Efficacy Theme: Field-Grade Officers Are Confident in Their Ability to Lead BCTs in
Decisive Action
Several interview questions were used to uncover whether field-grade officers were
confident in their ability to lead BCTs in decisive action. Additionally, participants were asked
questions regarding CGSS’s impact on confidence, leading at a CTC, and confidence in their
leadership skills during the CTC. All participants indicated they had high confidence in leading
while assigned a key developmental position in a BCT. Participant 07 indicated that GCSS
impacted her success at the CTC very little but quantified her overall efficacy at 7 of 10.
Participant 08 described his confidence, “During CGSS, the field artillery officers and
instructors, because they had previous experience, taught the maneuver and logistics officers; we
did a targeting working group, and that greatly helped my confidence, but I don’t think everyone
got that experience.” Participant 09 indicated his confidence improved throughout the rotation
due to feedback. Furthermore, Participant 12 stated,
I was super confident coming out of CGSS; they taught me what to reference and the
tools for assistance. After the CTC, during our deployment, I didn’t think I had an expert
in anything, but I will tell you I was very confident to the point where we did RDSP and
MDMP [synergistically as a staff].
As participants indicated preparation as directly influencing their confidence, CGSS was
a contributing factor in increased performance for a field-grade officer.
Utility Value Theme: Field-Grade Officers Value Decisive Action Mastery
Field-grade officers self-reported their value for decisive action mastery as critical to
organizational performance at the CTC. Participants indicated their utility value through the
interviews while discussing questions related to knowledge influences and utility value,
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including their personal development. They expressed value for DA mastery in discussing their
self-awareness, reflection, and learning. Codes and subthemes are shown in table 45.

Table 45
Utility Motivation Code Crosswalk
Participant
Utility motivation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
Personal development

Self-awareness

X X X X X X X X X X 9

Reflective

X X X X X X X X X X X 11

Learning

X X X X X X X X X X 10

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Personal Development.
Participants indicated utility value in discussing their personal development in DA
mastery. Participants valued awareness, reflection, and learning to describe their personal
development to become experts and leaders in their branch to lead their team. Participant 05
explained his personal development, “from a discussion standpoint [at CGSS], our small group
instructor ran through a targeting cycle, not part of the standard curriculum, and that was
absolutely beneficial, but thinking back, I would conduct more targeting rehearsal—lots of
repetitions.” Participant 08, on his personal development, stated, “I benefited from the [CGSS]
analog practical exercises since they were significantly more useful because that’s what we
realistically used at the BCT.” Additionally, participants indicated preparation and perceptions of
efficacy influenced their personal development.
Nine participants described valuing self-awareness. Participant 03 appreciated self-
awareness, allowing him to manage themselves in a stressful environment competently, “so I
was not a burden to the team.” Participant 01 mentioned conscientiousness and social anxiety: “I
didn’t look silly when discussing FM 3–0 because I paid attention as much as I could digging
into the doctrine.” Furthermore, participants stated self-awareness as essential when navigating
staff relationships and leading their team’s strengths and weaknesses.
Eleven participants described valuing reflection. These participants stated that
examination allowed them to grow and confidently handle emerging problem sets. Most
participants explained their CTE’s influence on the CTC; five expressed their post-CTC
experience. Participant 12 valued reflecting upon his experience at CGSS, CTE, and CTC, which
led him to success in his post-CTC deployment to Poland. Participant 03 reflected that the CTC
directly led to his successful post-CTC deployment to Kuwait.
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Ten participants valued learning. These participants described excitement, maturing, and
growth with their effort in applying knowledge. Participant 12 stated, “I learned operations and
maneuver concepts by researching CALL products but learned more during application.”
Participant 02 explained, “the CTC-that’s where all the reps and sets came together into being a
good staff officer.”
Research Question 2: How Do the Organizational and External Influences Impact CGSS
Field-Grade Officer Capacity to Exhibit DA Mastery?
The second research question sought to discover organizational and external influences
that impact CGSS graduates’ capacity to exhibit DA mastery. All influences were assessed
through interviews. The 12 participants, via consensus, stated that CGSS education neither
appears to be informed by CTC feedback nor produce DA mastery. Document examination was
not conducted for this influence. Organizational influences, assessment, and validation are shown
in Table 46.

Table 46
Organizational Influences, Assessment, and Validation
Organizational influences Organizational influence
assessment
Validation
1. Field-grade officer decisive action
mastery develops through CGSS
education informed by CTC
feedback. (Cultural Setting)

Interview

Gap
2. CGSS culminating exercise develops
decisive action mastery. (Cultural
Setting)
Interview

Gap

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Cultural Setting Theme 1: Theme CGSS Education Does Not Appear to Be Informed by
CTC Feedback
Based on their experiences, the 12 participants indicated that CTC feedback does
not inform the core CGSS education. Many participants expressed that the CGSS course
curriculum gave them a foundation focused on developing as a general staff officer rather
than specificity in their field. All participants mentioned that learning MDMP at CGSS
was critically related to their CTC. Additionally, they indicated CGSS set the context for
on-the-job learning at the BCT.
All participants mentioned that CGSS education provided context but lacked detail and
application on BCT operations. Participant 06 explained the differences between CGSS and
CTCs, “[CGSS] is preparing for us for corps and division staffs, but the CTC that’s mainly
focused, in my experience, on the BCT.” Participant 08, on his unique CGSS experience,
We did a reasonably good job looking at the targeting process and synchronizing the
operations and targeting piece. I don’t think that was necessary due to the curriculum at
CGSC. Some of the talent we had in the room as we went through it between me, the
other field artillery (FA) officer, and then one of our instructors was an FA guy. I don’t
think everyone got that same experience. The FA folks were teaching the maneuver,
logisticians, and the other branches because we had actual knowledge.
Several participants mentioned CGSS electives that proved to have utility to them.
Specifically, the following two courses were mentioned by participants: the theater sustainment
planner and air-ground integration courses. These courses delivered value by providing
declarative and procedural knowledge that these participants later required. According to
Participant 12,
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I loved the elective piece at CGSS. My biggest one was the theater sustainment planner’s
course when I chose Norway and Russia, and that prepared me to deploy to Poland for
fuel requirements, the rail, working with Defense Logistics Agency, and host nation
support.
Participant 05 took the air-to-ground integration course, which proved supportive in their
opinion, “the concept of how you do target, intelligence collection, and fusion, and how do you
integrate that with sensors on the ground to achieve you know that heavier that heavy offense
and maintain tempo within your rotation?”
The most significant organizational feedback gap related to this influence was
associated with the concept of reconstitution. Five participants mentioned that
reconstitution was not learned until the Leadership Training Program (LTP), which
generally occurred after the unit culminating training event (CTE) and several weeks
before a CTC rotation.
In addition to the lack of apparent CTC feedback informing the CGSS curriculum,
participants described differing experiences with their CGSS instructors. Participant 02 described
an experience gap she observed:
The instructors had not been in the formation for 8 to 10 years, so they had no relevant
experience to draw upon. They did not talk specifically about the CTC and may have
never participated in a CTC.
Furthermore, Participants 08 and 10 stated that CGSS did not conduct working groups as part of
the curriculum, but Participant 08 had an instructor that did lead a targeting working group.
Participant 07 on her experience, “CGSS instructors discussed their experiences with the CTCs
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they attended; they provided their lessons learned and derived some information from the
CALL.”
Cultural Setting Theme 2: The CGSS Culminating Exercise Does Not Develop Decisive
Action Mastery
CGSS was the foundational beginning of developing decisive action mastery at the field-
grade level. Given the participants’ perspectives, CGSS does not develop mastery of DA as a
standalone course. Participants noted that CGSS was important in planning DA but lacked in
preparation, execution, and assessment portions of the operations process. Participants indicated
that the culminating exercise used wargaming as a pseudo-execution simulation, and not one
CGSS event led to DA mastery. Participants did not describe the CGSS culminating exercise as
significant to their learning. As discussed in the review of the procedural knowledge influence,
the culminating exercise is a step toward mastery by simulating the wargame step in MDMP.
CGSS did not conduct the preparation, execution, or assessment phases of the operations
process. Participants perceived that their DA mastery occurred after reflecting upon their CTE,
CTC, warfighter, or post-CTC deployment.
Summary
As introduced in Chapter One, this research sought to understand field-grade officer
knowledge learned at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS), motivations by exploring
reported behaviors, and organizational influences that limit field-grade officer Decisive Action
(DA) mastery. The research was conducted according to the methodology described in Chapter
Three to answer the study’s three research questions. Chapter Four presented in detail the
findings discovered from participant interview responses. The interviews analyzed in this
research study resulted in findings related to knowledge, motivation, and organizational
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influences. Documents were not analyzed due to a pending Freedom of Information Action
(FOIA) request.
Examining the knowledge influences revealed that field-grade offers were experienced in
the DA declarative and metacognition knowledge, but they did not provide enough data to
validate procedural knowledge as an asset. Declarative and metacognition knowledge were
identified as assets, while procedural knowledge was identified as undetermined. Self-efficacy
and utility value, as motivational influences, were examined and assessed as assets. The twelve
participants positively expressed CGSS influenced their confidence in their ability to lead at a
CTC. Furthermore, the twelve participants indicated utility value in personal development
toward DA mastery, including self-awareness, relationships, and learning. Lastly, organizational
influences were evaluated. Interview questions asked participants about understanding the
organizational culture settings. Two cultural settings were explored to uncover gaps that
hindered stakeholder knowledge and motivation. The first influence examined whether CGSS
education was perceived to be informed by CTC feedback. The second influence analyzed if the
CGSS culminating exercise develops decisive action mastery. Both organizational influences
were validated as gaps.
This chapter detailed the findings on CGSS graduate knowledge, motivation, and
organizational influences. The chapter found that participants’ knowledge and motivation led to
DA mastery. Moreover, the research uncovered gaps in organizational influences that prevent
DA mastery. Chapter Five will detail recommendations on the findings.
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Recommendations
This chapter provides recommendations and approaches for mitigating knowledge and
organization gaps that limit the education and performance of field-grade officers based on study
results. As presented in Chapter Four, the interview data analysis discovered gaps in knowledge
and organizational influences. This chapter also discusses this study’s limitations, delimitations,
and future research. This chapter provides approaches for recommendation implementation.
This study aimed to explore and understand field-grade officer decisive action (DA)
mastery for increased unit performance at combat training centers (CTC) to lead organizations in
combat. This research study sought to understand field-grade officer knowledge learned at the
Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and motivations by exploring reported behaviors at
the CTCs; and organizational influences that limit field-grade officer DA mastery. The CTCs
serve as America’s first battles for future conflict; therefore, the CTCs are research laboratories.
Moreover, this study sought to learn if the stakeholders understand their professional growth,
knowledge transfer, motivation, and organizational influences on DATE mastery for unit
performance at the CTC.
The research asked the following questions to help answer these questions:
1. What are CGSS field-grade officers’ knowledge and motivation related to achieving
DA mastery?
2. How do organizational and external influences impact CGSS field-grade capacity to
exhibit DA mastery?
3. What organizational, knowledge, and motivational recommendations support CGSS
field-grade officer DA mastery?
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Discussion of Findings
This study found that field-grade officer perceptions of knowledge and organizational
influences result in inefficient performance at the combat training centers (CTC). Field-grade
officers indicated assets and gaps in knowledge, motivation, and organizational influences that
impact their performance. Field-grade officers must demonstrate the required competencies as
the core of what is needed to be assigned to a brigade combat team (BCT) in a key
developmental (KD) position and to provide a basis for talent management. This study’s
knowledge, motivation, and organization validations are shown in Table 47.

Table 47
Summary of Knowledge, Motivation, and Organization Validations

Influence Validation
Knowledge
Declarative Asset
Procedural

Undetermined
Metacognition Asset
Motivation
Self-efficacy Asset
Utility value Asset
Organizational
Cultural setting 1 Gap
Cultural setting 2 Gap
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This study found participants’ perceptions, in decisive action (DA) mastery, of
declarative and metacognition knowledge and motivation influences as assets, procedural
knowledge influences as undetermined, and organizational influences as gaps. “Army
professionals used doctrine in two contexts: study and reflection as well as conducting (planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing) operations” (Department of the Army, 2019a, pp. 1–2).
Furthermore, doctrine was a theoretical and practical guide to thinking about military problems,
complex operations, and how best to solve them (Department of the Army, 2019a). First,
participants recommended many doctrinal publications necessary for success at the brigade
combat team (BCT). Secondly, participants could not demonstrate procedural knowledge
mastery because observation and document analysis were not incorporated into this study.
Finally, as participants reflected upon CGSS, they indicated organizational gaps between the
Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and the CTCs.
Discussion of Knowledge Findings
According to Clark and Estes (2008), increasing knowledge and skills focus on
organizational goals are crucial to success when people do not know how to accomplish
performance goals or novel problem-solving. Moreover, the most valuable workers adapt and
solve novel problems (Clark & Estes, 2008). “The more novel and complex a goal, the more
extensive the performance support required for people to achieve it” (Clark & Estes, 2008, p.
42). Knowledge influences include procedural knowledge (Clark & Estes, 2008; Mayer, 2011).
Thus, applying procedural knowledge influences assists in understanding how CGSS can
successfully increase the performance of field-grade officers per the stakeholder goal. Finally,
Kolb states that an important part of developing mastery is to link new information to prior
knowledge (2014).
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Procedurally, participants demonstrated a well-developed understanding of the planning
process compared to the preparation, execution, and assessment portions of the operation
process. Participants found that the CGSS’s relative focus on the warfighting Functions (WfF) of
movement and maneuver, intel, fires, and logistics limited their expertise development during
CGSS and effectiveness during the operations process at the CTC. Participants also indicated
that the CGSS wargaming was used as a pseudo-execution simulation, and the BCT focus on on-
the-job training impaired their performance. Participants also noted that high unit operational
tempo (OPTEMPO) and lack of rehearsals emphasized leadership presence at the point of the
problem rather than the development of procedural knowledge. Table 48 shows the summary of
knowledge influences and context-specific recommendations, which will be discussed in the
recommendations section of this chapter.

Table 48
Summary of Knowledge Influences and Context-Specific Recommendations
Assumed influence Principle and citation
Context-specific
recommendations
Field-grade officers must
apply the decisive action
(DA) doctrine.
1. Effective training must
provide specific procedures
to accomplish a
performance goal (Clark &
Estes, 2008).

2. Job aids contain essential
information to support
achieving performance
goals (Clark & Estes,
2008).
1. Command and General
Staff School Warfighting
Functions Process
Integration into the
Operations Process

2. Develop and integrate
Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP) into the
Command and General
Staff School curriculum.

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Discussion of Motivation Findings
This research study evaluated two assumed motivational influences addressing utility and
self-efficacy. Both were found as assets. Mayer defines motivation as an internal activity that
triggers the sustainment of goal-directed actions (2010). The participants described utility as
attributes and competencies as goals within the army leadership requirements model: “Be, know,
do” (Department of the Army, 2019g, pp. 1–15). Table 49 shows the participants’ utility value
motivation themes compared to an army leadership model crosswalk. Also, participants most
directly linked knowledge preparation with perceived efficacy. Trends from the CTCs suggest
Army field-grade officers are overly confident in meeting their professional demands (Center for
Army Lessons Learned, 2018; Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2019). Mitigating this
discrepancy requires removing organizational barriers at CGSS to better align the field-grade
officer’s perceived level of efficacy with CTC observation, which will be discussed in the
following section.

Table 49

Utility Motivation and Army Leadership Model Crosswalk
Participant utility themes Army leadership model
Character Presence Intellect Leads Develops Achieves
Personal development
Self-awareness X X X X
Reflective X X X X
Learning X X
Leadership
Teamwork/relationships X X X X X X
Priorities X X
Leading X X X X X
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Discussion of Organizational Findings
Both organizational influences were found to be gaps. Clark and Estes (2008) suggest
that organizational influences can undermine individuals with high levels of knowledge and
motivation. Participants remarked that CGSS education appears to be uninformed by CTC
feedback, and the CGSS culminating exercise does not develop decisive action mastery. Akbar et
al. (2017) found that organizational feedback loops are important to organizational knowledge
creation, learning, and innovation success. Furthermore, a knowledge management plan is
critical for organizational success and productivity (Akbar et al., 2017). Additionally, the combat
training centers (CTCs), as the basis for America’s first battles described in the literature review,
must provide organizational feedback to improve skills, systems, capabilities, expertise, and
practices for education. Recommendations to address the organizational cultural settings gaps are
represented in Table 50, which will be discussed in the recommendations section of this chapter.

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Table 50
Summary of Primary Influences and Context-Specific Recommendations
Primary assumed
influence
Principle and citation Context-specific recommendation
Organization
Cultural Setting 1
An organizational feedback
loop to increase
curriculum relevance
through analysis, design,
implementation, and
evaluation (Akbar et al.,
2017)

Integrate combat training center
feedback into the Command and
General Staff School
Organization
Cultural Setting 2
Adult learning theory for
learner-centric
performance,
participation, and
collaborative learning
(Knowles, 2005)

Experiential learning model
to construct knowledge
from collective cohort
experiences (The Army
University, 2016)
Establish a CGSS warfighter-type
culminating event.

Recommendations for Practice
Four primary recommendations emerged based on the study findings described in this
chapter to mitigate field-grade officer performance goals to answer research question 3.
Primarily, these recommendations moved on-the-job experiences participants reported obtaining
at CTC earlier into the education timeline by integrating them into the CGSS curriculum by
general knowledge transfer. Following a linear model, the first recommendation was to integrate
CTC feedback into CGSS. An organizational feedback loop is important for the organization and
field-grade officers for knowledge creation, learning, and innovating. The second
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recommendation used education to support knowledge and skill development to integrate the
WfF processes into the CGSS operations process to provide experiential learning to increase
field-grade officer declarative and procedural knowledge and perceived efficacy performance.
The third recommendation developed and integrated SOPs into the CGSS curriculum and used
education to support an additional experiential learning opportunity to develop procedural
knowledge for novel problem sets. The final recommendation is to establish a CGSS
warfighting-type culminating event integrating and scaffolding the previous three
recommendations into a culminating exercise to support field-grade officer knowledge and skill
development. Research postulated in the literature review, methodology, and results support
these recommendations.
Recommendation 1 (Organizational): Integrate Combat Training Center Feedback Into
Command and General Staff School
Participants perceived that CGSS did not appear to be informed by CTC feedback, but
they also reported that they desired the CGSS to provide information that assisted in the
preparation and execution of brigade combat team (BCT) operations at the CTC. Knowledge
management and feedback loops influence an organization’s knowledge creation cascading from
innovation through process development (Akbar et al., 2017, p. 445). The feedback loop
provides recursive interactive cycles to develop innovation and create organizational knowledge
(Akbar et al., 2017). Organizational knowledge creation is made, increased, matured, and
connected to the organization’s knowledge base, skills, capabilities, expertise, systems, and
practice (Akbar et al., 2017). While this feedback mechanism already existed through the CALL
publications, this is not formally integrated into the curriculum. Because the CTCs served as
America’s first battles, they were the Army’s combat innovation front-end for future conflict and
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for many field-grade officers to experience struggling through novel problem sets for the first
time. But, because the innovation front-end is considered difficult (Poskela & Martisuo, 2009),
CGSS can reduce the cognitive innovation load by providing vicarious novel examples from the
CTCs.
Participants indicated their most novel problem sets included Joint Forcible Entry (JFE)
planning and WfF contribution to the operations process involving working groups,
synchronizations, and operations for fires, protection, command and control, sustainment, and
intelligence. Participants indicated introduction to these concepts occurred late in their
development timeline during their brigade culminating training event (CTE) or the Leadership
Training Program (LTP). Participants perceived the existing formal framework was inadequate
for researching and integrating lessons learned, SOP development, and rehearsal conduct into
their personal development.
Recommendation 2 (Procedural Knowledge): Command and General Staff School
Warfighting Functions Process Integration Into the Operations Process
This recommendation requires the CGSS to integrate the WfF processes into the planning
and execution phases of the operations process to increase experiential learning to reduce the
cognitive load at the BCT with on-the-job training. Procedural knowledge for field-grade officers
must include explicit expertise of requirements and how to successfully tie their experience to
them. Training is appropriate when modeling, practice, and feedback are required because
training combines information, exercise, and feedback (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Improved integration of the WfFs reduces perceived inequalities in relative focus on
WfFs to value team contribution and increase performance. Participants in this study indicated
elective courses provide the foundation for specific education in the WfFs. Furthermore, as
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preparation influenced self-efficacy (Carroll et al., 2020), reduced perceived WfF disparities in
CGSS are expected to increase confidence. Most likely, field-grade officers are overly reporting
self-efficacy (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2018; Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2019).
CGSS must address field-grade officers’ preparation in their branch to improve motivation.
Clark and Estes (2008) described how motivation impacts performance gaps and how the
organization can improve motivation. CGSS incorporating WfFs processes into the operations
process requires training. This required a systematic approach to developing and guiding the
stakeholder’s skills and practices to improve the organization (Clark & Estes, 2008).
Recommendation 3 (Procedural Knowledge): Develop and Integrate Standard Operating
Procedures Into the Command and General Staff School Curriculum.
Participants indicated that their brigade’s culminating training event (CTE) or Leadership
Training Program (LTP) provided the first opportunity to think about specificity in their branch
or WfF at the field-grade level. Participants indicated they searched out publications available
from the Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to
develop their standard operating procedures (SOP) and battle drills while at the BCT. Five
participants stated that reconstitution integration into the sustainment and operations processes
was the most significant gap in procedural knowledge. The development and integration of SOPs
into the CGSS curriculum served as job-aids students can take when they leave. It provides an
experiential learning opportunity to think about how field-grade officers would develop and
apply solutions before assignment to a brigade combat team (BCT). Building job aids are
appropriate for performing tasks such as information checklists, reminders, or summaries (Clark
& Estes, 2008).
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Recommendation 4 (Organization): Establish a Command and General Staff School
Warfighter-Type Culminating Event
The final recommendation provided a culminating learning experience for field-grade
officers at CGSS to demonstrate their understanding and application of decisive action during all
phases of the operations process. Participants indicated that the CGSS decisive action (DA)
culminating exercise inadequately prepared field-grade officers who relied on on-the-job training
at the BCT to prepare for the CTCs. This culminating event allowed field-grade officers to work
through the experiential learning model with their peers through rigorous novel challenges that
simulated combat operations in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA)
environment at a CTC. The Mission Command Training Program’s (MCTP) 10-day brigade
warfighter (BFWX) model offered an experiential learning environment example for
experimentation, knowledge application, and reflection, simulating realistic maneuver units,
employment of weapon systems, planning, coordinating fires, and planning and coordinating
logistic activities (TRADOC, 2018). This simulation allowed a brigade combat team (BCT) staff
to plan, conduct, train, and educate on offense, defense, and stability operations in the decisive
action training environment (DATE) (Combined Arms Center, n.d.; TRADOC, 2018). The
experiential learning model provided a collective cohort experience to construct knowledge and
general knowledge transfer. Further, the adult learning theory delivered learner-centric
performance, participation, and collaborative learning (Knowles, 2005).
Limitations and Delimitations
The design of this study had limitations and delimitations. Limitations are outside the
researcher’s control and recognized as weaknesses, while delimitations are researcher decisions
that bind the study (Theofanidis & Fountouki, 2018). The study’s primary limitation was that
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CGSS is the U.S. Army’s sole source educational institution for ILE; it was not possible to
anonymize the school. A delimitation of this investigation was the sample of field-grade officers.
The sample purposely omitted graduates from the satellite and distributed learning venues
because a.) the resident course is the largest population at 50%, and b.) students attending
satellite and distributed learning are concurrently on-the-job training. For example, students
attending a nonresident venue may concurrently be assigned to an operational unit while
attending a CTC. Their contributions may have conflated knowledge and organizational
experiences gained solely from CGSS compared to their other operational experiences
concurrently with their educational pursuit.
Furthermore, volunteer participants were only from light, airborne, or air assault units
attending JRTC due to participant access. There were no participants from Stryker or Armored
BCTs nor attendance at NTC or JMRC. While there is a light, airborne, and air assault unit bias,
this study sought generalized performance findings reflective of similar CTC rotations.
Additionally, the length of the Organizational Change and Leadership (OCL) program limited
the time allotted for this study.
Moreover, the study relied on self-reported data from study participants. Limitations of
interviews arose because they focus on people’s perceptions rather than observation of what they
do (Pole & Morrison, 2003). Podsakoff et al. (2003) submitted that anonymous responses
decrease common method bias. Additionally, stakeholders did not directly know certain
information, such as if an organizational feedback loop exists between CGSS and the CTCs.
Interview questions were designed to gather the information indirectly. Furthermore, limitations
also arose due to the questions asked and not asked due to limits on the participants’ and my
time.
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The final limitation of this study is that it consisted only of qualitative interviews. I
requested documents from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but the government did not
provide copies. Observations and document analysis were not incorporated, which may have
enabled participants to demonstrate procedural knowledge.
Recommendations for Future Research
Future efforts of similar research should seek different samples of participants, such as a
broad sample of participants, including from armor and Stryker BCTs. This study’s biased
sample yielded general themes from participants assigned to light, airborne, and air assault units.
Future research should also consist of different sample populations to determine their specific
gaps, including targeting field-grade officers in particular types of organizations such as
intelligence, engineer, or signal brigades.
While the Army has provided observations from the Observer, coach, trainer (OCTs) at
the CTCs through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Army has not conducted
research from the perspective of CTC participants as stand-alone research or to triangulate OCT
observations on procedural knowledge. The Army may consider research using CTC participant
feedback to inform education and training across the force better.
Conclusion
Modern combat’s increasing complexity and dynamics require an educated officer corps
(U.S. Marine Corps, 2020). Modern warfare provides unique challenges in a volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. Unforeseen challenges require education for
knowledge and skill development (Clark & Estes, 2008). Furthermore, the nature of warfare
prevents field-grade officers from practicing their profession (Department of the Army, 2018;
Heller & Stofft, 1986; Wilkinson, 1890). Because there is always friction between theory and
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practice, officers spend hours in classrooms and do not practice and demonstrate their skills until
a realistic combat simulation. This gap in training leaves the application of theory into practice
underdeveloped among the Army’s field-grade officer corps. In relentless competition, the
military has a unique sense of urgency because “the choice is clear, adapt or die” (Fastabend &
Simpson, 2004). Organizations with field-grade officers that have prepared and have the right
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Appendix A: Definition of Terms
This appendix provides a comprehensive compilation of key terminologies and concepts
used throughout this research. Clear understanding and accurate interpretation of these terms are
essential for readers to engage effectively with the research findings and discussions presented in
the dissertation. The definitions offered here aim to promote clarity and consistency in the usage
of terminologies, thereby enhancing the overall quality of discourse.
• Army doctrine refers to the authoritative and comprehensive body of knowledge that
outlines the fundamental principles, concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
guidelines governing the organization, employment, and operations of a military
force, specifically the land forces of a nation. It serves as a common framework that
guides the planning, training, and execution of military operations while promoting
consistency, interoperability, and effectiveness across various units and echelons
within the army (Department of the Army, 2019a). Moreover, Army doctrine
encompasses a wide range of topics, including strategic and operational principles,
command and control structures, tactics for various types of warfare, logistics,
intelligence, leadership philosophy, and the integration of emerging technologies
(Department of the Army, 2019a). It evolves over time in response to changes in the
strategic environment, technological advancements, and lessons learned from past
conflicts, ensuring that the army remains adaptable and capable of addressing
contemporary challenges. The development of army doctrine involves the
collaboration of experienced military professionals, analysts, and researchers who
draw from historical experiences, empirical evidence, and theoretical frameworks to
formulate guidelines that reflect the best practices and strategies for achieving
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military objectives. As an essential tool for military education, training, and decision-
making, army doctrine provides a foundation upon which soldiers and commanders
can base their actions and responses in complex and dynamic operational contexts
(Department of the Army, 2019a).
• The Combat training centers (CTC) provide a crucible experience for units and
leaders in complex and highly realistic Decisive Action Training Environment
(DATE) to develop trained, proficient, combat-ready units and leaders (Department
of the Army, 2018). Furthermore, the combat training centers refer to specialized
military facilities and programs designed to provide realistic and intensive training
experiences for military units and personnel serving as vital tools for enhancing the
combat readiness, tactical proficiency, and operational effectiveness of armed forces.
CTCs are equipped with advanced training infrastructure, realistic environments, and
scenario-based exercises that simulate the complexities and challenges of modern
warfare. Key features of the combat training centers include: realistic environments,
scenario-based exercises, opposing forces (OPFOR), Observer, coach, trainers
(OCT), after-action reviews (AARs), and joint and combined training with allies.
The CTCs play a crucial role in preparing military units for a wide range of
operational challenges they may face during combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian
missions (Department of the Army, 2018).
• Command and Control (C2) refers to the framework of organizational structures,
processes, technologies, and procedures employed to manage and direct military
operations, resources, and personnel effectively. It encompasses the planning,
coordination, execution, and monitoring of activities within a military force, ensuring
175

that objectives are achieved while maintaining unity of effort and adherence to a
common mission. During execution, “the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission” (Department of the Army, 2019f, pp. Glossary–2).
• Command Post Exercise (CPX) is a command post-exercise is a military exercise
evolving from field exercises, military drills, and war-games (Rutherford, 1964). The
command post exercise allows staff and commanders to develop teamwork and
cohesion, process information, integrate the warfighting functions, employ tactical
communications, displace command posts, and prepare estimates, plans, and orders
(Department of the Army, 1990).
• Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the combination of measures undertaken by a
government and multinational partner support to defeat an insurgency. An effective
COIN operation will utilize all instruments of national power to integrate and
synchronize political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological
activities carried a nation (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, pp. I–2).
• Critical Thinking is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue to form a
judgment using observation, analysis, inference, communication, and problem-
solving (Center for Applied Critical Thinking, 2016).
• Decisive Action (DA) “is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive,
defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks”
(Department of the Army, 2019c, pp. 3–1).
• Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) provides details for scenario
designers to build plausible scenarios with flexible variations for a training
176

environment that simulates scalable economic, political systems, and infrastructure
that requires intervention (TRADOC, n.d.).
• Education emphasizes a change in an individual’s knowledge, skill, and attitudes by
an agent of change (Knowles et al., 2005). Education is a general body of knowledge
and habit of mind applicable to a broad range of activities, mainly relying on
experience (TRADOC, 2017a).
• Land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ends at the high-water mark and
overlaps with the maritime domain in the littorals’ landward segment (Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2019).
• Leader development is a deliberate, continuous, and progressive process to apply
problem-solving and decision-making skills to defeat enemies (Department of the
Army, 2019g; 2019i)
• Leadership is influencing others to accomplish the mission. Ability to set
subordinates’ goals and standards, maintain accountability, and care for subordinates.
(Department of the Army, 2019f).
• Learning behavioral change involves acquiring knowledge, skills, and attitudes
(Knowles et al., 2005).
• Levels of warfare is a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among
national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (Department of the
Army, 2019a).
• Mastery is development of skills including acquiring, practicing, understanding when
to apply, and reflecting; stages in the development of mastery: (a) unconscious
incompetence, (b) conscious incompetence, (c) conscious competence, and (d)
177

unconscious competence (Ambrose et al., 2010). Mastery requires more than
information and understanding to influence system dynamics (Roberts, 2019).
• Mission command is a leadership philosophy and operational approach within the
military that empowers subordinate leaders to exercise initiative, make independent
decisions, and adapt to evolving situations while pursuing the overarching mission
and intent set by higher command (Department of the Army, 2019f). It emphasizes a
decentralized command structure, where commanders provide guidance and
objectives while allowing their subordinates the autonomy to execute tasks creatively
and effectively based on their understanding of the situation. Key elements of mission
command include: (a) shared understanding, (b) trust and empowerment, (c)
decentralized decision-making, (d) unity of effort, (e) discipline and professionalism,
(f) adaptive leadership, (g) learning, (h) risk management, and communication and
collaboration (Department of the Army, 2019f).
• An operation consists of “a military action or the carrying out of a strategic,
operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative, military mission”
Department of the Army, 2019c, pp. Glossary–2).
• Operational environment (OE) is “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander” (Department of the Army, 2019c, pp. 4–3).
• Procedures are “standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks”
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021, p. 173).
178

• The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is used in time-constrained
conditions or with a direct problem (Department of the Army, 2022). The process is
less formal than the MDMP.
• Readiness is a unit’s personnel, training, equipment, and maintenance status that
determines the ability to fight and win (Milley, 2016). The Army achieves readiness
through sound doctrine, capable organizations, realistic training and education,
modernized equipment, inspired leadership, and disciplined soldiers (Department of
the Army, 2019a).
• Reconstitution is “an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units
to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements
and available resources.” (Department of the Army, 2021, p. 1–1).
• Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of forces concerning each other
(Department of the Army, 2019a).
• Talent management is the U.S. Army’s approach to creating a new personnel system
that capitalizes on the unique talents of its people. The Army defines talent as the
unique intersection of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences (KSB-Ps) in
every officer (Headquarters, Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-1, 2019a, para. 1).
• Techniques are “non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions,
functions, or tasks” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2021, p. 214)
• Torch party is when Greek soldiers during Alexander the Great moved toward a
combat zone, they marched by day and camped by night, sending ahead of them a
small group of soldiers called a torch party. They would set up camp and light fires
guiding their main troops to their campsite. Much like those torch parties of old, the
179

mission of the torch party for the Division Special Troops Battalion, 1st Cavalry
Division, involves guiding the battalion’s main body into the combat zone by making
sure things are ready for their arrival. (Cupp, 2009, para. 1)
• Warfighter (WFX) is a distributed, simulation, driven, multi-echelon, tactical
command post exercise fought competitively against a live, free-thinking adversary
designed to train and rehearse units in the sustainable readiness mission or committed
modules as well as a regionally aligned force as designed by FORSCOM (TRADOC,
2018, p. 26).
• Warfighting function are tasks and systems grouped by purpose to accomplish
missions and training objectives (Department of the Army, 2019c).

180

Appendix B: Interview Protocol
This appendix presents the interview protocol designed for this research. The interviews
are a vital component of the research methodology, aimed at capturing nuanced perspectives and
experiences. This interview protocol has been carefully crafted to guide the research process,
ensuring consistency, relevance, and depth in the data collected. This protocol was designed to
provide the researcher with an outline to guide the interview with a baseline of questions aligned
with the research questions. Gathering this information allowed the researcher to find the story,
strengths, and challenges.
This study aimed to explore and understand field-grade officer decisive action (DA)
mastery for increased unit performance at combat training centers (CTC) to lead organizations in
combat. This research study sought to understand field-grade officer knowledge learned at the
Command and General Staff School (CGSS) and motivations by exploring reported behaviors at
the CTCs; and organizational influences that limit field-grade officer DA mastery. The research
asked the following questions:
1. What are CGSS field-grade officers’ knowledge and motivation related to achieving
DA mastery?
2. How do the organizational and external influences impact CGSS field-grade officer
capacity to exhibit DA mastery?
3. What are the organizational, knowledge, and motivational recommendations to
support CGSS field-grade DA mastery?
Chapter Five addressees RQ3.
181

Demographic Data
Demographic data pertains to statistical information that characterized and described the
various attributes of the sample. This inclusion aligns with the dissertation's goal of presenting a
holistic perspective contributing to conclusions and implications from the research findings.
Demographic data collected is listed in Table B1.

Table B1
Demographic Data
Demographic data
Year attending the Command and General Staff School
Years of prior service
Years of total service
Combat experience in months
Number of deployments
Number of combat training centers
Number of warfighters
Time in BCT in months
Age
Gender
Officer branch
Race
Ethnicity

182

Interview Protocol Questions
The interview protocol questions served as a critical instrument in this research, enabling
exploration of the research topic from the participants' perspectives. These questions aimed to
elicit meaningful insights by delving into the nuances of the participants' experiences, opinions,
and emotions. The interview protocol encompassed a range of open-ended and focused inquiries
designed to uncover underlying motivations, thought processes, and contextual influences that
might not be apparent through quantitative data alone. By employing a thoughtfully constructed
interview protocol, this study sought to unravel layers of understanding to provide a broader data
analysis. Interview questions are listed in the following tables: B2 includes knowledge
questions, B3 includes motivation questions, and B4 includes organizational questions.
Furthermore, concluding questions were included:
1. What would you recommend, if anything, to future field-grade officers to prepare for
the CGSS, BCTs, and the CTCs?
2. Is there anything else I should know about?

183

Table B2
Knowledge Influence Questions
Declarative knowledge

Reflecting upon your combat training center (CTC) rotation as a field-grade office—

1. What decisive action (DA) doctrinal concepts did you learn in the brigade combat team (BCT)
during the train-up to the CTC that you did not learn at the Command and General Staff
School (CGSS)?

2. What DA doctrinal concepts did you learn during and after, if any, that you needed to perform
at the CTC?

3. What doctrine would you recommend to others as they prepare for their CTC?

Procedural knowledge

1. What processes did you learn during CGSS, if any, related to DA?

2. What activities support learning these processes, if at all?

3. How did you apply those processes, if at all, during the BCT train-up?

4. What activities support learning these processes, if at all?

5. How did you apply these processes, if at all, at your CTC?

Metacognition knowledge

1. At the CTC, how did you become aware of your level of knowledge about DA?

2. Following the CTC AARs, were there improvements in organizational performance, and
how effective were these improvements?

3. Reflecting on your CTC, what new understandings have you gained?

184

Table B3
Motivation Influence Questions
Utility value

1. Describe what you found most valuable in the CGSS practical exercises and simulations that
supported your skills in DA development.

2. Describe what you find most valuable, if anything, about your CTC rotation in helping to
develop your skills in DA.

Self-efficacy

1. What processes did you learn during CGSS, if any, related to DA?

2. What activities support learning these processes, if at all?

3. How did you apply those processes, if at all, during the BCT train-up?

4. What activities support learning these processes, if at all?

5. How did you apply these processes, if at all, at your CTC?

185

Table B4
Organizational Influence Questions
Cultural Setting 1

1. Describe how, if at all, CGSS instructors discuss the CTCs – related to course curriculum,
feedback loops, lessons learned, individual performance, unit performance, or DATE.

2. In what ways, if any, did CGSS prepare you for a CTC?

3. Compare and contrast the CGSS simulations and exercises versus your CTC rotation. How
would you reconcile those discrepancies?

Cultural Setting 2

1. In what ways, if any, was the CTC scenario similar or different from CGSS exercises? How
would you reconcile those discrepancies?

2. Reflecting on CGSS, would you value a warfighter exercise at the CGSS? Why? How
would it have changed your preparation?

186

Appendix C: Information Sheet for Exempt Studies
Study Title: An Evaluation Study of Field-Grade Officer Development Timeline
Principal Investigator: Justin Zevenbergen
Department: Rossier School of Education, Organizational Change and Leadership

INTRODUCTION

We invite you to take part in a research study. Please take as much time as you need to
read the consent form. You may want to discuss it with your family, friends, or doctor. If you
find any of the language difficult to understand, please ask questions. You will be asked to sign
this form if you decide to participate. A copy of the signed form will be provided for your
records.

KEY INFORMATION

The following is a summary of this study to help you decide whether you should participate.
More detailed information is listed later in this form.

1. Being in this research study is voluntary–it is your choice.

2. You are being asked to take part in this study because you meet the requirements of the
key stakeholder in this study—a field-grade officer meeting the following criteria:
Command & General Staff School (CGSS) resident graduate, assigned to a brigade
combat team, and attended a combat training center within 2 years of graduating
CGSS. Your participation in this study will include an interview lasting approximately
60 minutes.

3. There are risks to participating in this study. The most common risks are anxiety,
distress, and participant identification. More detailed information about the risks of
this study can be found under the “Risk and Discomfort” section.

4. You may not receive any direct benefit from participating in this study. However, your
participation in this study may help contribute to knowledge about the phenomenon of
leadership.

5. There are no penalties if you decide not to participate in this research.

187

DETAILED INFORMATION

PURPOSE

This study aims to explore and understand how the CGSS supports organizational performance
at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) by understanding and supporting an officer’s educational
performance. We hope to learn about a field-grade officer’s knowledge, skills, motivations, and
organizational challenges to improve performance in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and
ambiguous (VUCA) environment at a CTC. You are invited as a possible participant because
you have been promoted to Major, selected to the resident CGSS, assigned to a KD BCT
position, and attended a CTC within 24 months of attending CGSS. About 12 participants will
take part in this study.

PROCEDURES

If you decide to participate, you partake in an interview lasting approximately 60 minutes.
Research test results will be provided to you.

RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

Interviews: Some of the questions may make you feel uneasy or embarrassed. You can skip or
stop answering questions you do not want to.

Breach of Confidentiality: There is a small risk that people not connected with this study will
learn about your identity or personal information.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) RISK SECTION REQUIREMENTS

Protection of controlled information. Unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or
negligent handling of classified information could cause damage or irreparable injury to the
United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. Classified information is marked
or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the
standards of Executive Order 13526 or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits
the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified
information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification
determination as provided in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 13526, or under
any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest
of national security. Unintentional or intentional release of controlled information may revoke
clearance, credentials, or privileged access.

BENEFITS

There are no direct benefits to you from taking part in this study. However, your participation in
this study may help us learn about the phenomenon of leadership.

188

PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY

We will keep your records for this study confidential as far as permitted by law. However, if we
are required to do so by law, we will disclose confidential information about you. Efforts will be
made to limit the use and disclosure of your personal information, including research study
records, to people who are required to review this information. We may publish the data from
this study in journals or present it at meetings. If we do, we will not use your name.

The University of Southern California’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Human Subject’s
Protection Program (HSPP) may review your records.

The Department of Defense (DOD) or Federal representatives may also access research records
to protect human subjects.

Officials of the U.S. Army Research Protections Office and the Army Research Laboratory’s
Human Research Protection Program are permitted by law to inspect the records obtained in this
study to ensure compliance with laws and regulations covering experiments using human
subjects.

Your data collected as part of this research may be used or distributed for future research studies
without your additional informed consent. Any information that identifies you (such as your
name) will be removed from the data or specimens before being shared with others or used in
future research studies.

PAYMENTS / COMPENSATION

You will not be compensated for your participation in this research.

INJURY

If you are hurt or become sick due to this research study, you can receive medical care free from
an Army hospital or clinic. You will only be treated for injuries directly caused by the research
study. The Army will not pay for your transportation to and from the hospital or clinic. If you
have questions about this medical care, talk to the principal investigator for this study, Justin
Zevenbergen, at zevenber@usc.edu or 646–818–0564. Contact the principal investigator if you
pay out-of-pocket for medical care elsewhere for injuries caused by this research study. If the
issue cannot be resolved, contact the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
(USAMRMC) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (legal office) at 301–619–7663/2221. The
University of Southern California does not provide any monetary compensation for injury.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION
It is your choice whether to participate. If you choose to participate, you may change your mind
and leave the study anytime. If you decide not to participate or end up participating in this study,
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits you are otherwise entitled to.
189

Your personal information, including any identifiable information that has already been collected
up to the time of your withdrawal, will be kept and used to guarantee the integrity of the study
and to satisfy any legal or regulatory requirements.

CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have questions, concerns, complaints, or think the research has hurt you, talk to Justin
Zevenbergen at zevenber@usc.edu or 646.818.0564

This research has been reviewed by the USC Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB is a
research review board that reviews and monitors research studies to protect the rights and
welfare of research participants. Contact the IRB if you have questions about your rights as a
research participant or complaints about the research. You may contact the IRB at 323–442–
0114 or by email at irb@usc.edu.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Zevenbergen, Justin Troy (author)

Core Title Army field-grade officer decisive action (DA) skill development: an evaluation study

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Degree Conferral Date 2023-08

Publication Date 08/18/2023

Defense Date 06/22/2023

Publisher Los Angeles, California (original), University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag decisive action,experiential learning,OAI-PMH Harvest,officer education

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Phillips, Jennifer (committee chair), Coss, Edward (committee member), Seli, Helena (committee member)

Creator Email justin.zevenbergen@gmail.com,zevenber@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113298446

Unique identifier UC113298446

Identifier etd-Zevenberge-12267.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-Zevenberge-12267

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Zevenbergen, Justin Troy

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20230821-usctheses-batch-1086 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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