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Cross-strait diplomatic poaching: the role and motivation of PRC-led diplomatic poaching in contemporary cross-strait relations

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Cross-strait diplomatic poaching: the role and motivation of PRC-led diplomatic poaching in contemporary cross-strait relations

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CROSS-STRAIT DIPLOMATIC POACHING

THE ROLE AND MOTIVATION OF PRC-LED DIPLOMATIC POACHING IN
CONTEMPORARY CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

by

Joseph Frank Collins

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC DORNSIFE COLLEGE OF LETTERS, ARTS, AND SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)

August 2023

Copyright 2023 Joseph Frank Collins

ii
Table of Contents
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................................... iii
Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................................ v
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................................................ 4
Chapter 3: Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 4: Geopolitical Analysis .................................................................................................................... 15
Chapter 5: Domestic Political Analysis ......................................................................................................... 28
Chapter 6: Counterarguments and Alternative Explanations .................................................................... 33
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Commentary ..................................................................................................... 35
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 36

iii
List of Figures
Figure 1: Percentage of Countries Formally Recognizing the ROC vs PRC, 1971 ............................... 15
Figure 2: Percentage of Countries Formally Recognizing the ROC vs PRC, 2021 ............................... 15
Figure 3: Taiwanese Foreign Exports, 1980-2022 ....................................................................................... 18
Figure 4: Percentage of Exports Bound for PRC, 2000-2022, ROC MOFA ......................................... 19
Figure 5: Average Change in Total Trade Before and After Recognizing PRC or ROC ...................... 20
Figure 6: Taiwanese Passport Ranking, 2004-2022 ..................................................................................... 21
Figure 7: Mentions of "Republic of China" in United Nations, 1950-2020 ............................................ 23
Figure 8: Taiwanese Pineapple Consumption by Sector, 2020-2021 ....................................................... 24
Figure 9: Percentage of Taiwanese Opposed to One Country, Two Systems ........................................ 26

Abbreviations
PRC – People’s Republic of China; “China”
ROC – Republic of China; “Taiwan”
KMT – Guo Min Dang; “Nationalist Government”
USD – United States Dollar
DPP – Democratic Progressive Party
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
WTO – World Trade Organization
UN – United Nations
SOE – State Owned Enterprise

Abstract

The end of the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent creation of two competing China’s,
the PRC and ROC, has resulted in a prolonged geopolitical competition to secure official diplomatic
recognition. While the PRC has been substantially more successful in securing official diplomatic
recognition, this essay finds the tangible diplomatic benefits and long-term geopolitical goals vis-à-
vis Taiwan, namely pulling the ROC closer to reunification with the mainland, has not been achieved
for China. Instead, this paper finds the single most impactful benefit for the PRC in poaching
diplomatic relations from Taiwan is domestic – with it serving as a marker of authoritarian
performance legitimacy regarding the contentious and slow-moving issue of Taiwan, one that
Chinese leaders have consistently hyped up with little meaningful progress to show for. Despite
Taiwan objectively being further away from any non-violent reunification at any point since the
Chinese Civil War, the act of diplomatic poaching gives Chinese leaders a concrete performance
metric involving the Taiwan question suggesting progress towards reunification, while shielding
Chinese leaders from the potentially existential gamble of violent reunification. Additionally, this
diplomatic poaching provides opportunities and markets for Chinese firms, while economically
insignificant, present an additional opportunity for the PRC to project their increasing global clout
to domestic audiences.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2023, Taiwan has only 12 formal diplomatic relationships. Meanwhile North Korea, one
of the most politically and economically isolated countries on the face of the earth, has 47.
1
Despite
North Korea having over 30 more formal diplomatic relationships, in 2022 Taiwan exported goods
worth nearly USD 500 billion – North Korea, under USD 200 million.
2
This contradiction elicits a
fundamental question about the utility of formal diplomatic relations in contemporary geopolitics,
and further questions the relentlessness and effort expended by the PRC in seeking formal
diplomatic recognition. To unpack these contradictions, this research is structured around the
following question:
To what extent has the People’s Republic of China (PRC; “China”) achieved its
strategic geopolitical goals with the Republic of China (ROC; “Taiwan”) through poaching
formal diplomatic relations from the Republic of China?
Following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Nationalist government (KMT)
led by Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan – while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remained in
mainland China.
3
The resulting divide led to the de-facto creation of two sovereign nations, the
Republic of China in Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China in mainland China.
4
While direct
combat may have ended in 1949, both have sides have maintained a heated diplomatic rivalry to this
day, with the ROC and PRC expending enormous efforts vying over formal diplomatic relations
with other sovereign nations. Due to both the PRC and ROC officially maintaining there is only
“one” China, both side’s practice is to immediately suspend diplomatic relations with any country

1
Bicker, “North Korea fires missile into waters off Japan”
2
OEC, “North Korea Imports, Exports, and Trade Partners”
3
BBC, “What’s behind the China-Taiwan divide”
4
Ibid.,

2
that establishes relations with each other – forcing countries to recognize either one or the other. To
encourage countries to switch to PRC recognition, the PRC has primarily relied on aggressive
foreign aid and infrastructure spending – including nearly USD 5 billion in direct aid and an
estimated USD 85 billion in international development loans annually, compared to just USD 500
million spent per year by the ROC.
5
This steep chasm in spending between the two governments has
proven remarkably effective for the PRC, with the ROC only maintaining 13 formal diplomatic
relationships today versus 71 in 1970. A key strategic goal underpinning this rivalry is the isolation
of the ROC diplomatically, as the PRC hopes to diminish its status as a nation-state and compel the
ROC’s government to negotiate with the PRC for the island’s reunification. However, substantial
evidence shows that neither of these success criteria have been met – as the ROC appears to be
increasingly integrated with the rest of the world, and the ROC’s government and public opinion has
noticeably shifted further away from any cooperation with the PRC, let alone making reunification
politically feasible. Rather, this essay instead finds the single most important result for the PRC in
poaching the ROC’s formal diplomatic relations is most important to domestic PRC politics. By
poaching formal diplomatic recognition from the ROC, the PRC government can appear to make
progress towards these greater geopolitical goals, namely reunification, even if the possibility of
reunification is now further away more than ever. The appearance of this progress is especially
relevant to the PRC as a metric of performance legitimacy – allowing the CCP to take credit for
movement in the ultimate reunification of Taiwan into the PRC by purportedly further isolating the
ROC diplomatically. Further, autocratic governments have a greater need to justify their existence
through performance as they do not receive the same amount of popular legitimacy compared to
governments in a democracy, where winning an election is itself justification of political control.
Additionally, since a key element of the PRC’s diplomatic poaching incentive is the promise of

5
Kitano and Miyabayashi, “Estimating China’s Foreign Aid”, 2

3
infrastructure, they also serve as opportunities for firms within the PRC, especially state-owned
enterprises (SOE) and state-affiliated firms, to gain additional access to construction and
infrastructure projects for firms suffering from excess capacity and suffering from lackluster project
demand in mainland China. While these projects are relatively small, they help the PRC strengthen
an image of being a global power with an increased level of international clout.
These findings firstly question the traditional value associated with formal diplomatic
institutions – are they at all relevant in a global ecosystem where informal relations can be just as
impactful, if not more, than traditional diplomatic ties? Additionally, the situation of an ever-
dwindling amount of ROC diplomatic allies to poach portends a difficult situation when the ROC is
left with no diplomatic allies for the PRC to poach – how else will the PRC be able to elicit the
appearance of progress regarding Taiwan without the availability of a relatively low-stake, non-
violent solution in diplomatic poaching?
To illustrate my findings, this essay will first conduct a comprehensive literature review of
the topic, investigating the relationship across the strait, understanding why countries flip
recognition, and establishing the goals of the PRC when poaching diplomatic allies – namely
isolating the ROC diplomatically and spurring the ROC to negotiate reunification. These goals will
then form the basis of this research, determining whether the dramatic decrease in the ROC’s official
diplomatic allies have in fact increased Taiwan’s isolation or brought the ROC closer to negotiating
reunification. This essay will then examine the domestic factors motivating the PRC to continue
poaching ROC diplomatic relationships, specifically in the context of performance legitimacy and
additional project-access for Chinese SOEs with excess capacity.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Extensive research has been conducted on the diplomatic rivalry between the ROC and
PRC. In a 2010 article, University of Seoul professor Joel Atkinson outlined the diplomatic
competition over countries in the Pacific Islands, finding that the ROC and PRC have primarily
relied on foreign aid as a main tool of influence, but criticized the destabilizing and corruptive effect
this aid has on these Pacific Island governments.
6
Atkinson also highlighted the high costs of these
campaigns, noting both sides were actively trying to reduce overall expenses.
7
In addition to my
following arguments, this may also be additional room for reevaluating these expensive influence
campaigns. However, with these escalating costs, Beijing has a clear advantage. In a RAND
Corporation study published in 2019, Harold et. al. further found “even generous giving” by the
ROC can be readily “trumped” by Beijing’s financial resources.
8
In addition to vaster financial
resources, the PRC can also offer extensive infrastructure development and market access. In the
Journal of Chinese Political Science, Lem et. al. explored Central America as the “final frontier” in
diplomatic competition between the PRC, ROC, and the USA, crediting the PRC’s diplomatic
success in the region to “large-scale infrastructure” and market integration with the PRC.
9
In 2021,
researchers from the Technological University of Monterrey built on this by describing the
Salvadorean experience – detailing the important role of the US in its decision, in which El Salvador
granted significant immigration concessions to the US when switching their recognition to the

6
Atkinson, “China-Taiwan Diplomatic Competition in Pacific Islands”, 409
7
Ibid.,
8
Harold et al., “Countering China’s efforts to Isolate Taiwan”, 4
9
Lem et. al., “China, Taiwan, and the US in Central America”, 552

5
PRC.
10
In a series of articles published by the Lowy Institute, the authors, including Daniel Woker,
Kishan Rana, and Hadianto Wirajuda, argue that embassies play a role “for which there is no
substitute,” coming to the conclusion that a formal diplomatic presence is still necessary, even in a
globalized and incredibly integrated digital world.
11
This article helped form the basis for some of my
counterarguments, although I found the case of Taiwan is an exception to many of the factors
outlined by them. These articles collectively elucidate the factors critical to diplomatic switching, but
they all either assume or suggest similar success criteria for the PRC: that switching diplomatic
recognition is itself a success for the PRC. However, in the 2016 book China’s Foreign Aid and
Investment Diplomacy, John Copper argued the key geostrategic goals of this diplomatic rivalry for the
PRC vis-a-vi the ROC are:
1). To diminish the ROC’s status as a nation-state.
2). To isolate the ROC from the international community.
3). To compel the ROC government to negotiate with the PRC for the island’s
reunification.
12

Corroborating these goals was Thomas Shattuck, who argued in an Orbis publication that
this strategy of inducing countries away from recognizing the PRC was part of its “multi-pronged”
strategy to pressure Taiwan into negotiating reunification and eliminate its international legitimacy.
13

This is mostly corroborated in mainstream media as well, with Shannon Tiezzi from The Diplomat,
14

Chris Horton from The Atlantic,
15
and Lindsay Maizland from the Council on Foreign Relations all
concluding similar motivations for the PRC’s desire to “flip” countries to recognizing the PRC.
16

10
Lemus-Delgao et. al., “China or Taiwan? The Salvadorean Experience”, 45
11
Rana, “Why Embassies Persist in the Digital Age?”
12
Copper, “Using Aid and Investment to Isolate Taiwan,” 148
13
Shattuck, “China’s Poaching of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies,” 335
14
Tiezzi, “Did China Just Break its Diplomatic “Truce with Taiwan”
15
Horton, “Taiwan’s Status is Absurdity”
16
Maizland, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense”

6
Finally, these goals are also outlined in an official publication one the “One-China” principle from
the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating the PRC will “never permit” a separatist act of allowing
Taiwan to enter international organizations whose membership is “confined to sovereign states” –
highlighting the PRC’s goal to isolate the ROC in the international arena.
17
While greater research
could be undertaken to take a more critical view of these strategic goals, this essay will accept these
goals as is to better establish success criteria for the PRC poaching the ROC’s diplomatic
relationships
However, these goals highlighted by Copper and corroborated by others necessitate an
international lens, i.e. only examining the geopolitical and international goals rather than the
potential domestic ones. Further, Copper’s article also confounds the mechanism of switching with
the key strategic goals above, i.e, that switching from recognition of the ROC and PRC itself
diminishes the ROC’s status as a nation state, isolates the ROC from the international community,
and bring the ROC closer to reunification. In conjunction with other research mainly discussing the
factors causing countries to switch recognition, there is a clear research gap in assessing the greater
strategic success of the PRC’s campaign. Previous research almost always stops at the point of
switching recognition, highlighting the factors which have led to the swap itself but failing to assess
the broader strategic goals of such actions. This identified gap led me to reevaluate the perceived
success of the PRC’s strategy in persuading other countries to stop recognizing the ROC.
Further, this literature review also examined extant literature to better understand possible
motivations for the PRC in expending the effort to spur these switches in diplomatic recognition.
One such example is performance legitimacy, described by Bruce Dickson as when a regime's
legitimacy is largely tied to its effectiveness in delivering goods, services, and societal stability, as

17
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue”

7
opposed to a democracy where this legitimacy is inherently achieved through a popular vote.
18
In
Dickson’s 2021 book The Party and the People, Dickson examines the duality of CCP rule, arguing that
the CCP's rule is not solely upheld by repression or coercion, but rather its ability to deliver
economic growth and public goods.
19
He theorizes that the Party's survival depends on performance
legitimacy, i.e., its ability to maintain popular support by demonstrating effectiveness in managing
the economy and improving people's living standards.
20
Contrary to widespread assumptions,
Dickson underscores the importance of public opinion in authoritarian regimes. His survey-based
studies, as presented in The Dictator’s Dilemma, demonstrate that the CCP's efforts to gain
performance legitimacy have been largely successful.
21
While not explicitly mentioned or examined
in his book, the poaching of diplomatic relationships from Taiwan can be viewed as a type of public
good given the public desire for progress regarding the Taiwan issue.
However, performance legitimacy is also the subject of manipulation. In her 1999 essay
“What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Barbara Geddes presents a
classification of authoritarian regimes into military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships, and
personalist dictatorships.
22
While Geddes generally argues that democracy is more likely to prevail in
more developed countries and authoritarian governments are more likely to emerge or prevail in
economic downturns, the most relevant work to the PRC’s motivation for flipping diplomatic
recognition from the ROC is the manipulation of performance legitimacy.
23
Geddes is particularly
critical of the notion that authoritarian regimes can maintain legitimacy purely through performance.
In "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative
Politics" (1990), she posits that these regimes often engage in strategic manipulation of public

18
Dickson, Dictator’s Dilemma, 34
19
Dickson, The Party and the People
20
Ibid.,
21
Dickson, Dictator’s Dilemma
22
Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democracy”
23
Ibid.,

8
perception to create an illusion of performance. For instance, they may employ censorship,
propaganda, or selective distribution of benefits to appear more effective and legitimate than they
are.
24
This is especially relevant in the case of the PRC and Taiwanese diplomatic poaching, as the
performance legitimacy garnered through the flipping of diplomatic recognition is, as will be
demonstrated later in the thesis, is not actually an effective metric of China achieving its overall
geopolitical aims in regards to Taiwan.
However, while diplomatic poaching has not specifically been examined, there has been
extensive academic discussion regarding the role of Taiwan in the performance legitimacy of the
CCP, and how the call for reunification is an essential aspect of the national narrative promoted by
the CPC. Kastner's book Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait
demonstrates how Taiwan is portrayed as a 'lost territory' that needs to be returned to the
motherland, an essential element in the national rejuvenation narrative.
25
This narrative plays a
significant role in bolstering nationalism in the PRC with the Taiwan issue, but also places the CCP
in a difficult situation where progress is needed to satiate the nationalism spurred on by the rhetoric
of the CCP regarding Taiwan, while at the same time being unable or unwilling to engage in the
painful costs that would be associated with retaking Taiwan by military force.
Overall, this literature review identified several gaps within existing study of Cross-Strait
diplomatic poaching, including primarily focusing on the PRC’s international versus domestic
political goals, literature viewing the switching as inherently successful to the PRC’s greater goals,
and further failing to evaluate the long-term success of the PRC’s efforts to enact these switches in
formal diplomatic recognition. These issues will be addressed in the methodology of this paper.

24
Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get”
25
Kastner, “Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait”

Chapter 3: Methodology

This research is split into two main categories: domestic and foreign PRC political
considerations. Given the systems of diplomacy and formal diplomatic recognition are an inherently
international and transnational phenomenon, extant literature has naturally focused on the
geopolitical goals of the PRC. This paper takes a more critical view of the assumption that the act of
switching recognition to the PRC is a success for the PRC in it of itself, instead using the goals
established by Copper to evaluate the PRC’s success in achieving their greater international
objectives in relation to the ROC. However, given this research finds the greater geopolitical goals
have not been achieved, this research further explores the domestic benefits attained through the
process of enticing countries to stop formally recognizing the ROC. Firstly, the methodology of
understanding the extent to which the ROC has succeeded, using Copper’s three key strategic goals
as a framework, will be detailed.
As Copper wrote, the PRC has three key strategic goals regarding Taiwan. One, that this
diplomatic flipping has diminished the ROC as a nation state, two, that this formal decoupling from
diplomatic relations with the ROC seeks to isolate it in the international community, and three, that
it will compel the ROC government to negotiate for the island’s reunification. To evaluate these
criteria, this paper will employ a mixed-method approach including quantitative trend analysis of
various factors relating to these stated goals, including examining elements of trade, soft power, and
mentions in the United Nations to assess the extent to which the PRC has been successful in
achieving its geopolitical goals regarding Taiwan. Trade data is a particularly interesting metric to
analyze given how imperative trade has become to national economies in a globalized world. While

10
not international isolation and trade do not have a perfect negative correlation, trade data is a useful
window into understanding the extent to which other countries are willing to economically interact
with others and is therefore useful in helping understand the real picture of ROC isolation. This
research will specifically look at a few metrics involving trade to understand the extent of the PRC’s
isolation of the ROC. The first is total trade volume, which is useful in helping to understand the
broad picture of ROC’s trade behavior. At the most basic level, if Taiwanese trade volume has
dwindled, decreased, or shown any negative signs, then there could be some indication of the PRC
successfully isolating the ROC. However, there are some methodological flaws that require further
investigation into trade – namely, are absolute trade numbers included in the PRC’s isolation efforts,
or would the PRC prefer to reunify with a country with a much healthier economy. Further, an
increase in trade solely with the PRC could ensure a healthy economy in Taiwan while
simultaneously isolating the ROC from the rest of the world.
Therefore, it was important to then analyze the aspect of ROC trade further, specifically in
relation to evaluating the changes including and excluding the PRC from the analysis. Overall trade
for the ROC could be increasing, but if the percentage of trade with the PRC is proportionately
increasing then there is some argument that can be made that the PRC has been somewhat effective
in isolating the ROC, as it ties the Cross-Strait economies closer together and means the ROC is
fundamentally more dependent on the PRC. In a hypothetical scenario in which the PRC suspended
trade with the ROC, the ROC having a higher percentage of its trade conducted with the PRC
would be substantially more impactful than otherwise, and the relative economic interaction with the
outside world would be lower. Thus, highlighting the structure of the ROC’s trade partners is
particularly useful in understanding the extent to which the PRC has been successful in achieving its
geopolitical goals regarding Taiwan.

11
Further trade analysis was also done examining the actual effect of the diplomatic switching
itself. If it were to have a material impact, then there should be a noticeable shift in trade volume
between the target country, the ROC, and the PRC following the switching of formal diplomatic
recognition. To measure this change, this paper selects countries to flip from recognizing the ROC
to the PRC in the last 20 years, measuring trade levels 1 year prior to the switch to establish a
baseline, 1 year after the switch to measure the immediate impact, and 5 years after the switch (when
possible) to measure the long-term trade effects. These countries are:

Table 1:
County Year Switched from ROC to
PRC recognition
Nicaragua 2021
26

Kiribati 2019
Solomon Islands 2019
El Salvador 2018
Burkina Faso 2018
Dominican Republic 2018
Panama 2017
Sao Tome and Principe 2016
Gambia 2013
Malawi 2008
Costa Rica 2007

26
Given Nicaragua switched in 2021, a 5-year analysis of trade levels cannot be conducted.

12
Chad 2006
Senegal 2005
Grenada 2005
Dominica 2004
Liberia 2003
Table 1: List of Countries Flipping from ROC to PRC Recognition Since 2003
27

Limiting the range to the last 20 years ensures there are enough samples to make statistical
conclusions, while at the same time ensuring they all have well reported trade and economic data.
This analysis will indicate how much the process of flipping affects the level of trade between these
target countries and the PRC and ROC, highlighting if the transition of formal diplomatic
recognition is significantly impactful. It is still important to recognize there are flaws with this
methodology, for example the aggregate measure presented in the analysis does not weight the size
of the various target economies in question, i.e, Chad and Burkina Faso are both weighted the same
in measuring their relative changes in total trade with the PRC and ROC around the time of them
switching diplomatic recognition, even though the economy of Chad is substantially larger than that
of Burkina Faso. Additionally, this also helps substantiate evidence of the domestic PRC motivations
behind enticing countries to switch, as increased trade in the immediate year following would
indicate opened-up markets for Chinese firms and investment, though this will also be measured
with its own discreet measurement in chapter 4.
Moving on from trade, this research also analyzed other quantitative data, including passport
ranking data. Specifically, this paper measured the ranking of the Taiwanese passport over time,

27
Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs

13
measured via its visa-free access to other countries. This is a relevant metric as it indicates how
Taiwanese citizens are viewed in foreign countries in comparison to citizens of other countries,
enabling a metric of comparison between ROC passports and those of other nations. This is also
relevant given one of the main functions of an embassy is consular support, and thus examining
passport data is a direct window into the possible consular repercussions of the PRC attempting to
isolate the ROC.
The final quantitative aspect research is mentions of the “Republic of China” in various
bodies of the United Nations, measured by analyzing instances of key words mentioning the ROC in
various memos and publications. While the ROC is not a party of the UN, the inherently
international scope of the UN means that issues discussed typically involve international issues, and
rarely mention issues that are solely domestic. Taking this a step further, mentions of the “Republic
of China” is a political legitimization of the country, and if efforts to isolate the ROC have truly been
successful, then mentions of the ROC should decrease as the number of formal diplomatic
relationships held by the ROC dwindle.
This research will then incorporate 2021 case study of a PRC import ban of pineapples into
the ROC. This case is particularly relevant because it’s an indication of the ability of the PRC to
unilaterally impact a major ROC export. If the ROC were to be completely diplomatically isolated,
then such an action by the PRC should decimate the ROC’s export of pineapples and the industry
would experience serious consequences. However, if the ROC were able to quickly secure new
markets for pineapple export, then it’s clear the PRC has been less successful in isolating the ROC.
The case study is particularly relevant to the ROC given most growers are in the South of Taiwan,
where voters lean towards the DPP – the ROC political party that is the most hawkish towards a
relationship or reunification with the PRC.

14
Finally, the paper will conduct a meta-analysis of existing literature on performance
legitimacy, the CCP, and the PRC, to argue how the issue of diplomatic poaching can be explained
by the concept of performance legitimacy in China, showing how PRC progress with the Taiwan
issue has been remarkedly difficult, forcing leaders to demonstrate the appearance of some progress
to justify some amount of their autocratic rule. This is particularly well suited to a meta-analysis
because the concept of performance legitimacy is extremely difficult to measure, and instead this
research builds-off of existing research on authoritarianism in China to explain the motivation
behind continuing a policy of enticing countries to formally recognize the PRC while not actually
achieving the PRC’s geopolitical goals. Instead, this meta-analysis will show the possible
performance legitimacy argument through a meta-analysis, but not before examining the results in
the next section.

Chapter 4: Geopolitical Analysis

Before evaluating the evidence to assess the success of China’s diplomatic strategy, I will first
address what the outcomes of these goals should be considering the PRC’s unquestionable success
in poaching the ROC’s diplomatic allies, which can be visualized below:
28

In the above graphs, the major transition in diplomatic recognition is clear – in 1971, 66% of
countries recognized the ROC diplomatically, versus just 7% in 2021. When factoring in population
size, this represents less than 0.5% of the world population that lives in a country that recognizes the
ROC. With this success in flipping recognition, it should be reasonably expected that China has also
achieved/has begun to achieve its key strategic goals for doing so. In other words, given that China
has been so successful in the act of flipping diplomatic recognition to the PRC, it should have also

28
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
22%
66%
12%
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES THAT
FORMALLY RECOGNIZED ROC VS PRC,
1971
Recognize PRC Recognize ROC Recognize Neither
7%
88%
5%
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES THAT
FORMALLY RECOGNIZE ROC VS PRC,
2021
Recognize PRC Recognize ROC Recognize Neither
Figure 1: Percentage of Countries Formally Recognizing the ROC vs PRC, 1971 Figure 2: Percentage of Countries Formally Recognizing the ROC vs PRC, 2021

16
helped to diminish the ROC’s status as a nation state, isolate the ROC diplomatically, and bring the
island closer to negotiating reunification. However, despite China’s key victories in flipping many of
Taiwan’s important diplomatic allies, these ultimate goals have not come to fruition – questioning
the vast resources expended by both the PRC and ROC in these campaigns and questioning the
value of formal diplomatic relations in our current geopolitical system.
Firstly, these aggressive PRC campaigns to poach the ROC’s diplomatic allies have not
severely diminished the status of the ROC as a nation state. What is a nation state? According to
Cederman, a nation-state is comprised of 4 key components:
1. Territory
2. Population
3. Government
4. Sovereignty
29

In the case of Taiwan, there is no question the island has a clearly demarcated territory and a clearly
defined population within that territory. However, one key avenue through which the PRC seeks to
undermine the status of the ROC as a nation state is by degrading the legitimacy of the ROC
government, in this case by poaching the ROC’s diplomatic allies. In the 7
th
edition of his book
Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, John Copper argues that Taiwan’s very rapid and successful
democratization suggests the island should be considered independent and separate from China.
30

Another significant factor in the question of Taiwanese sovereignty is the “One-China” principle,
outlining the PRC’s policy that Taiwan is an inalienable territory of the PRC.
31
This principle has
been the precursor for any continued relations two sides, and is built on further by the “1992

29
Cederman, “How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve”, 39
30
Copper, “Nation-State or Province”, 56
31
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue”

17
consensus” – an understanding between the Guomindang (KMT) nationalist party of the ROC and
PRC that both sides believe there is one China that either party are the rightful governments of.
32

However the other dominant political party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has
refuted this consensus – arguing the principle diminishes Taiwanese sovereignty and is a “last
vestige” of Taiwan’s one-party dictatorship that existed until the early 1990’s.
33
In a 2020 RAND
publication, Derek Grossman details how the “One-China” principle and “1992 consensus” – the
alleged foundations of Cross-Strait relations and important signifiers of Taiwanese sovereignty – was
for the first time being reconsidered by the KMT, the ROC political party that had originally agreed
to it.
34
This reconsideration of the policies in question are an indication of how the key policies
currently undermining Taiwanese sovereignty have become politically unfeasible to such an extent
that the original party to the agreement is questioning its viability. The diminishing importance of
the “One-China” principle in Taiwan and its rapid democratization and self-sustained form of
government show how, in addition to the clear territorial boundaries and distinct population,
Taiwan’s government and claim to sovereignty have only become stronger in recent years –
indicating this goal of the PRC in poaching the ROC’s diplomatic allies has not been achieved. This
theme is continued when evaluating other goals of the PRC as well.
Despite the PRC’s drive to isolate the ROC, the island has become increasingly engaged in
the international community. While the ROC maintains just 15 formal diplomatic relationships, the
country has more than 112 diplomatic missions across the world as of October 2021 – the vast
majority being in countries with which the ROC only has “unofficial” relations.
35
Further, the depth
of these relationships is also increasing – one example being the increase in arms sales to the ROC

32
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue”
33
Grossman, “KMT May Have a Serious ‘1992 Consensus’ Problem”
34
Ibid.,
35
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Allies”

18
from the U.S., totaling nearly USD 20 billion in the 4-year Trump Administration versus just USD
14 billion during the 8-year Obama Administration.
36
The increasing value of arms sales to Taiwan is
especially notable given one of the expectations for maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC
includes not “providing arms to Taiwan” under any pretext.
37

There are a variety of other factors also indicating the PRC’s efforts to poach the ROC’s
diplomatic allies have not isolated the ROC. One such indication is the volume of Taiwanese foreign
exports.
38

In the time the ROC has lost most of its diplomatic allies, its exports have skyrocketed – exporting
nearly USD 400 billion in 2020, with some its largest trading partners (excluding the PRC) being
countries that do not recognize the ROC diplomatically, including the United States, Japan,

36
Maizland, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense”
37
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue”
38
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Taiwanese Foreign Exports
USD in 1000’s
Figure 3: Taiwanese Foreign Exports, 1980-2022

19
Singapore, and South Korea.
39
However, examining the Taiwanese trade volume by destination
reveals the PRC is by far the largest trading partner of the ROC, and has remained stable at nearly
40%:
40

Figure 4: Percentage of Exports Bound for PRC, 2000-2022, ROC MOFA

Figure 4 above shows the percentage of exports bound for the PRC from the ROC between
2000 and 2004. The proportion substantially increased between 2000 and 2005 and has remained
plus/minus 5% of 40% since then. Although the ROC has been incredibly prolific in increasing their
exports overall, the high proportion of their exports being bound for the PRC does suggest some
level of success in the PRC isolating the ROC. However, it is also important to consider the massive
size of the Chinese economy and its important and growing role in global trade – in addition to the
ROC, the PRC is the largest trading partner to more than 120 countries, including for Japan, South

39
Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Taiwan”
40
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
23.20%
37.60%
40.30%
38.97%
39.90%
40.50%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2022
Percent of Exports Bound for PRC, 2000-2022
Percent of Exports Bound for PRC

20
Korea, Vietnam, and Russia.
41
Further, given the % of total trade has plateaued in the last 15+ years,
it appears that the additional PRC diplomatic poaching of nearly 15 ROC formal diplomatic
relationships has not heavily swayed the relationship, and one possible further explanation for the
jump between 2000 and 2005 is the PRC’s entry into the WTO. Examining the immediate aftermath
of trade following switches in PRC or ROC diplomatic recognition also help further explain the
situation.
42

Figure 5: Average Change in Total Trade Before and After Recognizing PRC or ROC

By averaging the trade volumes of 15 countries 1 year before, 1 year after, and 5 years after
switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC, we can see that on average, countries that switch

41
Green, “China is the Largest Trading Partner for More Than 120 Countries”
42
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs; PRC Ministry of Commerce
0%
-3%
2%
0%
12%
3%
-1 1 5
X years from ROC to PRC diplomatic switch
Change in Total Trade with ROC Change in Total Trade with PRC

21
recognition to the PRC experience a substantial jump in total trade with the PRC in the first year
following the switch, and the ROC faces a relatively smaller but still significant decline in trade from
the target country. This indicates the clear immediate impact this diplomatic poaching has on import
and export volumes between the target country, the PRC, and the ROC. However, the 5-year
average shows that this short-term increase is typically not sustained, and trade levels usually regress
to slightly above their original levels for both the PRC and ROC. Therefore, it would appear as
though the long-run effect of this diplomatic switching is mostly unnoticeable. If the PRC were truly
successful in isolating the ROC through these efforts in the last 20 years, then the trade volumes
following years of this diplomatic poaching should reflect a much more drastic decrease in trade
with the ROC, however the data does not appear to support that. While the PRC does see some
short-term trade benefit, in the long run the PRC is still unable to increase ROC isolation.
This trend can also be seen in the Taiwanese position in the Henley Passport Index – an
index using International Air Transport Association data to rank passports based on the number of
destinations an individual an access visa-free with a given passport.
43

43
Henley Global, “The Henley Passport Index”
60
54 54 54
69
40
36
25
24
30
29
31
29
31
28
27
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Relative Passport Ranking
Year
Taiwanese Passport Ranking
Figure 6: Taiwanese Passport Ranking, 2004-2022

22

Despite the ROC hemorrhaging diplomatic allies to the PRC in recent years, the relative “power” of
the Taiwanese passport has drastically increased. Some of this can be attributed to increasing ease of
global mobility – Passportindex.org, a website that actively monitors visa access and passport has
argued even with the Covid-19 pandemic, global mobility is getting “easier” overall.
44
To account for
this, the data used was Taiwan’s relative passport ranking – illustrating how the ROC’s passport has
become more powerful relative to other countries, in addition to having more access overall. While
visa-free travel may seem like a trivial metric, in a study measuring country isolation by Molly Brown
et al, visa-free access and the integration of international travel was found to be a key metric in
reducing international isolation.
45
This further highlights how the ROC has become more integrated
with the rest of the world despite the PRC’s efforts to achieve otherwise.
One additional metric to elucidate Taiwan’s increasing global presence are mentions of the
term “Republic of China” in the United Nations general assembly, security council, and other
bodies:
46

44
Passport Index, “About Passport Index”
45
Brown et al, “National Metrics Measuring Isolation”
46
United Nations

23

Figure 7: Mentions of "Republic of China" in United Nations, 1950-2020
As seen from Figure 7 above, mentions have been somewhat sporadic since the inception of the
United Nations after WWII but has had consistent mentions in the UN even after its official
departure in the 1970s. The mentioning of the ROC in the UN is an important signifier because the
ROC is inherently a political term, as acknowledging the existence of the Republic of China directly
defies the “One-China” principle, thus mentions of the ROC in the UN, even as it’s not a member,
shows some level of international recognition. This is more evidence of the PRC’s inability to
increasingly isolate the ROC, despite their concrete ability to poach the ROC’s diplomatic
relationships. To further highlight the strength of Taiwan’s global integration, the case study of the
2021 pineapple import ban will be analyzed.
Perhaps the increasing strength of this global integration is clearest during times of
economic coercion from the mainland – in March of 2021, the PRC banned the importation of
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Mentions of ROC in UN
Decade
Mentions of "Republic of China" in UN GA, SC, and Other
Bodies

24
pineapple from the ROC due to an alleged bug infestation. As the RPC was the destination for 90%
of ROC pineapple exports, the ban had immediate consequences for the ROC.
47

Figure 8: Taiwanese Pineapple Consumption by Sector, 2020-2021
However, regional allies including Japan quickly replaced and exceeded the existing demand for the
fruit, proving the ability of the ROC’s allies to combat the PRC’s economic coercion.
48
In addition,
Taiwan was able to mobilize its domestic market to consume additional local pineapple. The
ultimate effect was the intended pressure from the PRC ended up having a much more limited effect
than expected – potentially exposing weaknesses in the many strengths associated with the PRC’s
relative economic might. Together, these factors highlight the ROC’s increasing integration with the
rest of the world despite the active campaigns and efforts by the PRC to isolate the island. Further,
the response to this crisis is in stark contrast to global response to Russia following its invasion of
Ukraine in early 2022.
The global response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March 2022 highlights the stark
contrast between a country that is truly isolated (in this case, Russia) versus one that is just

47
ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
48
Gorman, “Pineapple War Shows Taiwan Won’t Be Bullied”
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Pineapples to PRC
Pineapples to Japan
Domestic Consumption
Taiwanese Pineapple Consumption by Sector
2020 2021

25
purportedly so (Taiwan). Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has faced wide ranging sanctions
that have had the effect of isolating the country, including trade restrictions, oligarchic asset freezes,
airspace restrictions, and a removal from the global banking system SWIFT.
49
However, despite the
clear isolation, Russia has maintained most of its diplomatic relations with the rest of world. The
ROC seemingly has found itself in the opposite position – with little meaningful formal diplomatic
relations but with much deeper and meaningful integration globally, both diplomatically and
economically.
This essay also finds that the PRC goal of bringing the ROC closer to reunification via
diplomatic poaching has also not come to fruition. One statistical highlight to evidence this is the
support for “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan. “One Country, Two Systems” was initially
concepted by former PRC Premiere Deng Xiaoping as a realistic avenue through which the PRC
and ROC could reunify – under the umbrella of one country but accepting the differences between
the two sides necessitated two systems.
50
As recently as February 2021, the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and its embassies across the world have argued “Reunification with the mainland
under the policy of "one country, two systems" is the best mode to guarantee the freedom and
autonomy of Taiwan people.”
51
Thus, as the only realistic and proposed method of peaceful
reunification, the importance of the opinion of “One Country, Two Systems” cannot be
understated.

49
United States Treasury, “Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia”
50
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office, “The One-China Principle and Taiwan Issue”
51
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ ”One Country, Two Systems” Best for Taiwan”

26

The graph above shows the extreme increase in opposition towards “One Country, Two Systems”
in Taiwan over time, with it reaching nearly 90% in 2020. While some of this may be attributed to
the situation in Hong Kong, which currently operates under a “One Country, Two Systems” model,
it still shows that despite the PRC’s success in flipping diplomatic recognition away from the ROC,
the goal of ultimate reunification has only been pushed further away rather than become more
feasible. Moreover, any cooperation with the PRC has become politically unfeasible on the island, let
alone a contentious topic such as reunification.
Finally, the 2014 Sunflower Movement further illustrates how precarious any political
cooperation with the PRC has become. In 2014, following the secret negotiation and announcement
of a trade agreement between the PRC and KMT led ROC, thousands of students stormed the
Taiwanese Legislative Yuan in protest of an agreement they felt would bring them too close to
65%
79%
89%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2018 2019 2020
% of Taiwanese Population Opposed to OCTS
Figure 9: Percentage of Taiwanese Opposed to One Country, Two Systems

27
China, and help facilitate the eventual reunification by increasing economic links between the sides.
52

The 24-day movement ultimately led to the withdrawal of the agreement, and eventually the
sweeping KMT defeat in the following election cycle.
53
The incredibly negative and suspicious
opinion of the PRC has made any cooperation nearly impossible, and is a further indication of how
the PRC’s efforts to flip diplomatic recognition away from the ROC has not brought the ROC any
closer to reunification.
Overall, the evidence suggests the PRC has not achieved its 3 key strategic geopolitical goals
in relation to Taiwan, namely isolating the ROC internationally, diminishing the ROC’s status as a
nation state, and compelling the ROC to renegotiate reunification. While the PRC has been
successful in limited areas of isolating the ROC, such as still being the destination for nearly 40% of
the ROC’s total exports, it is clear the effort expended on diplomatically poaching the ROC’s formal
diplomatic relationships has not substantially altered that number since it has hovered around 40%
for nearly 15 years. Further, while measures examining trade before and after a target country flips
recognition indicate a substantial spread in levels of total trade from the ROC/PRC in the year after,
the 5-year analysis indicates the long-term effect is negligible.
While the research and analysis show the PRC has not achieved their strategic goals in
relation to the diplomatic poaching of the ROC’s diplomatic allies, a few counter arguments will be
addressed in the following section, in addition to better understand the domestic benefits and
motivation for continuing to poach the ROC’s formal diplomatic relationships.

52
Rowen, “Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement”
53
Ibid.,

Chapter 5: Domestic Political Analysis

Over the last 20 years, the PRC has spent an estimated USD 500 billion on foreign aid,
infrastructure projects, and other investment to poach the ROC’s formal diplomatic allies.
54
In 2017,
the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso claimed the PRC offered “USD 50 billion or more” if the
country flipped recognition to the PRC. However, while existing research has focused on the
geopolitical implications of the flip itself, the research presented in this paper has primarily found
that the PRC has mostly fallen short of achieving its greater long-term geopolitical ambitions in
relation to diplomatic poaching and Taiwan. However, these findings question the ultimate
motivation behind the continuation of these expensive strategies to convince nations of both small
population and economies to flip recognition; why does the PRC continue engaging in these active
efforts to flip recognition away from the ROC? The following research presents two domestic
arguments for the PRC continuing these policies – performance legitimacy and market/project
access.
Performance legitimacy is a term used in political science and sociology to describe a political
system where a government's legitimacy is largely derived from its ability to deliver and maintain
economic development, good governance, and improved living standards, rather than through
democratic processes like free and fair elections.
55
In the case of the PRC, performance legitimacy
has typically been associated with the PRC’s economic development, i.e., the country’s provision of
extensive economic opportunity for its citizen has justified the CCP’s single-party rule, thus
justifying the omission of any electoral system.
56
While economic development has been at the

54
Ponniah, “Taiwan: How China is poaching the island's diplomatic allies”
55
Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard”
56
Ibid., 15-16

29
certain of performance legitimacy in China, performance legitimacy has a much more far-reaching
impact in the calculus of CCP leadership. In Andrew Nathan’s “China’s Changing of the Guard,” in
addition to economic development, one factor detailed in the CCP’s performance legitimacy is their
ability to “respond to public opinion” on a range of issues.
57
One of these key “pillars” of Chinese
regime legitimacy is nationalism – especially areas of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
58
Naturally,
the issue of Taiwan, a runaway rogue province operating as de-facto independent state, is the single
most contentious political issue faced by Xi Jin Ping and the CCP.
59
In a march 2023 survey of
Chinese citizens, nearly 60% responded saying they would back a full-scale war for reunification
with Taiwan.
60
The Chinese public has increasingly demanded a solution to the Taiwan question, but
the fruition of such desires are an incredibly challenging reality for the CCP. As former Australian
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wrote in The Avoidable War, the CCP and Xi Jin Ping have hyped up the
issue to such an extent that any unsuccessful military action involving reunification would be a
“death spell” for Xi Jin Ping and likely the party as well.
61
Further, the military challenges Russia has
faced in its invasion of Ukraine highlight the difficulty of invasions and occupations by force.
Therefore, the PRC is in a uniquely precarious situation in attempting to solve the Taiwan issue. The
PRC government has been amplifying nationalism and vitriol in discussions involving the island, and
in turn the public have begun to seek progress – even by military action which could prove to be an
existential gamble for Xi Jin Ping and the PRC.
However, the poaching of the ROC’s formal diplomatic relationships is an especially enticing
option for the PRC. Instead of satiating Chinese popular demand for solving the Taiwan question by
potentially triggering a large-scale war between China, Taiwan, and in turn, the west, the PRC can

57
Ibid., 13
58
Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and Limits of Nationalism”
59
Wong, “Half of mainland Chinese people back full-scale war to take Taiwan”
60
Liu and Li, “Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan”
61
Rudd, “The Avoidable War”, 36

30
deliver concrete results regarding Taiwan in a realm with significantly lower stakes. Even if, as this
research has found, the PRC is not achieving or nearing achievement of its greater geopolitical goals
through the flipping of the ROC’s diplomatic relationships, the PRC is still maintaining the
appearance of making progress towards the ultra-contentious Taiwan issue while mitigating the
potentially severe risks of forceful confrontation. As Geddes writes, the “appearance of performance
is just as important performance itself.
62

Further, this diplomatic poaching is also a way for the PRC to signal to its citizens the
country’s cooperation or opposition to ROC behavior. For example, between 2008-2015 during the
Ma Ying-jeou’s (KMT) presidency of the ROC, the ROC pursued a policy of “flexible diplomacy”
(活路外交) that deepened Cross-Strait ties and brought the sides the closest they have been since
the end of the Chinese Civil War. In turn, the PRC agreed to a “diplomatic truce” (外交休兵)
where they stopped actively poaching the ROC’s allies in response to the KMT’s much more
cooperative approach with the PRC.
63
As seen in Table 1, Gambia officially ceased recognition of
the ROC in 2013 – during this alleged “truce.” However, the PRC did not officially recognize the
country until 2016 – during an election year in which the DPP candidate and eventual ROC
President Tsai Ying-wen refused to recognize the “1992 Consensus.”
64
The behavior from the PRC
in enticing these countries indicates the relative flexibility in engaging in the practice, as the PRC is
able to engage or disengage the levers of diplomatic poaching in response to specific political issues
with the ROC. For example, the PRC established relations with Sao Tome and Principe in 2016
following infamous Trump’s phone call with Tsai after his election, then then with Panama in 2017
as Taiwan sent a delegation to in US government’s “Summit for Democracy,” and finally with

62
Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democracy”
63
Drun, “Taiwan’s engagement with the world”
64
Ibid.

31
Honduras following Nancy Pelosi’s extremely controversial visit to Taiwan in 2022.
65
Given the
relative ease and expediency at which the PRC seems capable of poaching ROC diplomatic allies, it
is evident the PRC is strategically timing these switches to react to what the PRC perceives to be bad
behavior on the part of the ROC, but more importantly they are also being strategically used as a
pressure release-valve to relieve domestic frustrations and avoid high-stakes conflict with the ROC.
Certainly, the relatively smaller size of the remaining ROC formal diplomatic relationships allows the
PRC to be more confident in their ability to poach the countries at will – the two countries with the
largest GDPs recognizing the ROC are Guatemala and Paraguay, respectively, with the next largest
country, Haiti, having a GDP of just USD 20 billion.
66
The size of the remaining countries
recognizing the ROC and the strategic timing of previous PRC diplomatic poaching show how the
PRC uses diplomatic poaching as tactic in response to specific pressures, both domestic and
international, rather than as a method through which the PRC can reasonably assume will increase
the greater global isolation of the ROC. This suggests that, unlike what many pundits and observers
have predicted, the PRC is not necessarily in a race to zero in the realm of poaching the ROC’s
diplomatic ties.
67
Instead, the PRC is likely mulling each switch to alleviate specific pressure in
specific moments, especially domestic pressure to achieve more progress regarding Taiwan. It offers
PRC leadership a critical safety-valve in the ultra-nationalistic conversations involving Taiwan on the
mainland and offers a critical metric of performance legitimacy to satiate domestic demand for
movement on the Taiwan issue, especially as overall PRC clout increases along with expectation of a
reunification.
Another element of the calculus is increased market and project access for domestic Chinese
firms in the countries that the PRC forms new diplomatic relationships with. While expanded

65
Chin, “Academics say Sao Tome move linked to Trump”
66
Mishra, “The 13 countries still standing with diplomatic ties to Taiwan”
67
Shattuck, “The Race to Zero?”

32
market access would theoretically lead to increased economic prosperity and contribute to the
economic performance legitimacy of the CCP to some extent, the size of economies of countries the
PRC has flipped in recent years are relatively insignificant to the overall size of the Chinese
economy. However, they still play into the perception of performance being cultivated by the CCP,
and thus help to push forward the CCP’s most fundamental goal of maintaining power. For
example, in 2023, the PRC began funding and building subsidized housing units in Nicaragua – a
country that had only recently flipped to recognizing the PRC in 2021.
68
While the project is
relatively small, the PRC has been able to relentlessly share the project across all channels of media;
including social media, state-run media, and more.
69
A focal point mentioned by all of these channels
is the role of the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, a Chinese construction SOE, in the
planning, design, and building of these housing units, again highlighting how important performance
signaling is in the execution of the PRC’s diplomatic poaching. The true utility for the PRC of these
diplomatic switches is not grounded in any economic argument, rather, it’s the ability for the PRC to
extensively advertise their governance performance to its domestic audience, ultimately justifying
their existence and single-party rule. Thus, examining the framework of performance legitimacy and
infrastructure projects reveal the PRC’s true benefit in poaching ROC diplomatic allies is the
narrative it can create to its domestic audience in doing so.
The next section will address possible counterarguments and alternative explanations for the
arguments presented in the previous two chapters.

68
Global Times, “China-Nicaragua large project starts construction following resumption of diplomatic ties”
69
Ibid.,

Chapter 6: Counterarguments and Alternative Explanations

One possible counterargument is that this diplomatic poaching is a precursor to the PRC’s
ultimate goals. While this is likely true to some extent, it’s unclear how long of a timeframe
should be considered before determining the success of the policies. Some of the most significant
countries to have flipped to recognizing the PRC have done so upwards of 50 years ago, and
given the ROC appears to be further away from the PRC more now than ever, the argument that
these efforts have acted as a precursor to the PRC’s greater geopolitical goals is weak. Further, as
demonstrated in the research, the biggest economy of the remaining countries recognizing the
ROC, Guatemala, has an economy less than 1/10
th
the size of the ROC and less than 1/1000
th
the
size of the PRC, so any economic impact towards either country will be relatively limited.
A related counterargument is that the poaching of these countries also provides
immediate economic benefits to the PRC. This is an argument corroborated in many articles
discussing the successes and failures of the “Belt and Road Initiative,” writing that even though
the campaign has not resulted in overarching strategic goals, the initiative still exists in a
capacity that supports the immediate economic development goals of the PRC. In the case of this
essay, it can then be inferred that the PRC’s poaching of the ROC’s diplomatic allies can be
justified using this rationale – that by providing these various infrastructure projects, the PRC
helps maintain its own immediate economic existence. However, this short-term benefit is still
substantially less meaningful than the initial strategic goals mentioned Furthermore, given that so
few countries recognize the ROC, and the countries that do have relatively smaller economic
footprints, the possible economic benefit for the PRC is likely insignificant. However, as

34
mentioned in chapter 6, it’s not to say the PRC receives absolutely no benefit from the efforts
spent diplomatically poaching from the ROC, just that the main utility is in domestic appearance
rather than any economic or geopolitical reality.
A final counterargument is that increasing cross-strait trade has made the ROC more
economically dependent on the PRC. To some extent, this is true – since 2003, the share of
exports from the ROC bound for the PRC have stayed within plus/minus 5% of 40% since.
However, the timing of this uptick is more likely a signal of the PRC’s entry into the World Trade
organization rather than a result of successfully isolating the ROC diplomatically. However, this
is still a disconcertingly high proportion of Taiwanese exports that are dependent on whims of
the PRC – and while no large scale economic “trade wars” have commenced between the two
sides, the PRC has demonstrated some willingness to through its weight around, for example, the
2021 Taiwanese Pineapple Import ban, which demonstrated how Taiwan’s non-official allies can
provide the Taiwanese economy some resiliency in response to economic pressure from China.
Regardless, while the high proportion of ROC trade conducted with the PRC is a legitimate sign
of isolation for the ROC, it does not appear as though the flipping of the ROC’s formal
diplomatic relationships has played a significant part, especially given how the percentage of
ROC exports bound for the PRC has stayed stagnant since the early 2000’s.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Commentary

Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, both the ROC and PRC have dedicated
vast resources to influencing countries’ diplomatic recognition of them. However, while much
academic work has assumed the process of diplomatic poaching to be a success for the PRC,
most works fail to critically examine the long-term success criteria and geopolitical ambitions for
the PRC – namely isolating the ROC and convincing its government to negotiate for a
reunification. Despite the PRC’s great success in achieving diplomatic recognition from other
countries, the PRC has made little ground in achieving the strategic goals supposedly induced by
this recognition, including diminishing the ROC’s status as a nation state, isolating the ROC
internationally, and bringing the ROC closer to reunification. The PRC’s failure to achieve these
long-term geopolitical goals forces a reexamination of the possible motivations and perceived
benefits of these efforts to poach the ROC’s diplomatic relationships, ultimately revealing the
most critical benefit to be a contribution to the CCP’s domestic political legitimacy. Given how
contentious the issue of Taiwan is to the growing nationalist sentiment in the PRC, the poaching
of the ROC’s relationships enable the CCP to demonstrate the appearance of progress in
addressing the issue, even if the long-term geopolitical ambitions have not been met. Further,
research into recent examples of this diplomatic poaching indicate a strategic approach from the
PRC to time these recognition switches in times of particular heightened domestic discontent
with Taiwan, suggesting the PRC is limiting the extent to which they poach the ROC’s allies –
allowing the PRC to strategically poach the ROC’s allies at times best suited to demonstrating
the appearance of clout on the international stage to satiate the nationalist desires of its domestic
audience.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Collins, Joseph Frank (author)

Core Title Cross-strait diplomatic poaching: the role and motivation of PRC-led diplomatic poaching in contemporary cross-strait relations

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Degree Conferral Date 2023-08

Publication Date 07/11/2023

Defense Date 07/10/2023

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag china,diplomacy,diplomatic poaching,geopolitics,International Relations,OAI-PMH Harvest,One Country,PRC,reunification,ROC,Taiwan,Two Systems

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Bernards, Brian (committee chair), Wang, Jay (committee member), Wong, Audrye (committee member)

Creator Email collinj1998@gmail.com,joe.collins@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC113263618

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Legacy Identifier etd-CollinsJos-12063

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Format theses (aat)

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