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Simple majority or supermajority: what do California's special tax initiatives mean for local governance?
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Simple majority or supermajority: what do California's special tax initiatives mean for local governance?
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Content
SIMPLE MAJORITY OR SUPERMAJORITY: WHAT DO CALIFORNIA’S SPECIAL TAX
INITIATIVES MEAN FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE?
By
Jennifer L. King
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SOL PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT
December 2023
Copyright 2023 Jennifer L. King
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Though researching and writing a dissertation is a relatively solitary endeavor, I could not
have completed the task without the guidance and support of several people. I want to thank my
dissertation committee for its immense contribution to this project. I am extremely grateful to
have had the privilege to work with my chair, Dr. Juliet Musso, who provided me with the
benefit of her experience, offered vital and detailed feedback, and challenged me throughout the
process. I am also appreciative to have worked with the members of my dissertation
committee—Dr. Terry Cooper, Dr. Michael Thom, and Carolyn Coleman, Executive Director and
CEO of the League of California Cities—whose expertise and involvement greatly improved this
research.
I would also like to thank others involved in the DPPD program. The cohort model was
one of the key features that initially attracted me to the program, and traveling this journey with
other DPPD students, especially Tina Paddock and Sara Straubel, enriched my experience
beyond words. A big thank you also goes to Dr. Deborah Natoli, who reminded me about the
importance of being a life-long learner, and to Student Services Advisor Anna Parks, who
patiently answered all my questions over the years.
Finally, I am grateful for my family every day, and I am humbled by their unwavering
support and encouragement throughout these last four years. To my husband Steve and my
children Clara, Henry, and Greta, you are my world.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vii
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Direct Democracy in California .................................................................................................. 2
Research Objectives .................................................................................................................... 5
Examining Direct Democracy at the Local Level ................................................................... 5
Research Question Posed by this Study .................................................................................. 7
The Purpose of Focusing on Special Tax Initiatives ............................................................... 8
Overview of How the Research Question Will Be Answered ................................................. 9
Application of the Research Findings to Practice ..................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: Key Literature on Local Direct and Representative Democracy ................................. 13
Direct Democracy and the Initiative Process ............................................................................ 13
Local Initiatives in California .................................................................................................... 20
Legal Principles Relating to Initiatives ................................................................................. 20
Characteristics of Local Initiatives ........................................................................................ 24
Intersection of Special Tax Measures and the Initiative Process .......................................... 28
Local Democratic Governance .................................................................................................. 33
Dimensions of Democracy in Local Government ................................................................. 34
Citizen and Local Government Perceptions of One Another ................................................ 37
Local Government Roles ....................................................................................................... 41
Citizen Roles ......................................................................................................................... 47
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 50
Chapter 3: Methodology ................................................................................................................ 51
iv
Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 51
Data Collection .......................................................................................................................... 57
Institutional Review Board Approval .................................................................................... 57
Document Review ................................................................................................................. 58
Interviews .............................................................................................................................. 60
Direct Observations ............................................................................................................... 64
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 66
Data Familiarization .............................................................................................................. 66
Initial Coding ......................................................................................................................... 67
Theme Generation ................................................................................................................. 68
Theme Development and Review ......................................................................................... 68
Theme Refinement ................................................................................................................ 69
Writing ................................................................................................................................... 70
Methodological Reflection ........................................................................................................ 70
Researcher Perspective .......................................................................................................... 70
Internal Validity ..................................................................................................................... 72
External Validity .................................................................................................................... 74
Replication ............................................................................................................................. 75
Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................... 75
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 76
Chapter 4: Research Findings ........................................................................................................ 77
Commitment to Democracy ...................................................................................................... 78
The Role of Local Government in the Four Initiative Jurisdictions .......................................... 80
City and County of San Francisco ......................................................................................... 82
Mariposa County ................................................................................................................... 85
v
City of Los Angeles ............................................................................................................... 88
City of Manhattan Beach ....................................................................................................... 92
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 95
What Role Do Local Elected Officials Play in Connection with a Special Tax Initiative? ....... 96
The Elected Official’s Role Is Situational and Contextual .................................................... 96
Elected Officials and Initiative Proponents Maintain Distance from One Another .............. 99
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 104
What Role Does Municipal Staff Play in Connection With a Special Tax Initiative? ............ 105
Municipal Staff Is Receptive to Special Tax Initiatives ...................................................... 105
Municipal Staff Is Aware of Its Limited Role ..................................................................... 108
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 111
Who Are the Stakeholders Who Tend to Be Involved in the Development and Promotion
of Special Tax Initiatives? ....................................................................................................... 111
Policy Entrepreneurship in the Initiative Process ................................................................ 115
Reliance on Networks ......................................................................................................... 118
Building Off of Prior Efforts ............................................................................................... 121
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 124
How Significant is the Lower V oter Threshold in the Decision to Bring a Special Tax
Measure as an Initiative? ......................................................................................................... 124
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 129
How is Local Governance Being Affected by California Law Confirming That a Special
Tax Initiative has a Lower V oter Threshold for Approval Than a Special Tax Measure
Proposed by a Local Elected Body? ........................................................................................ 130
Chapter 5: Discussion .................................................................................................................. 134
Research Finding Implications ................................................................................................ 134
Initiative Stakeholder Roles ................................................................................................ 135
Initiative Stakeholders Moving Forward ............................................................................. 141
vi
Strengths and Limitations of the Study ................................................................................... 146
Opportunities for Future Research .......................................................................................... 148
Recommendations for Practice ................................................................................................ 151
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 155
References ................................................................................................................................... 157
Appendix A: California Special Tax Initiatives Interview Protocol ............................................ 171
Appendix B: Information Sheet for Exempt Research ................................................................ 173
Appendix C: California Special Tax Initiatives OBSERV ATION PROTOCOL ......................... 175
Appendix D: City of Los Angeles Measure ULA ....................................................................... 177
Appendix E: City of Manhattan Beach Measure A ..................................................................... 187
Appendix F: Mariposa County Measure O ................................................................................. 193
Appendix G: City and County of San Francisco PROPOSITION M ......................................... 199
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: California Appellate Decisions Regarding Special Tax Initiatives .................................. 32
Table 2: The Ladder of Government Participation ........................................................................ 43
Table 3: 2022 Special Tax Initiatives ............................................................................................. 54
Table 4: Interviewees by Role ....................................................................................................... 62
Table 5: Observations by Jurisdiction ........................................................................................... 65
Table 6: Proposition M .................................................................................................................. 82
Table 7: Measure O ........................................................................................................................ 85
Table 8: Measure ULA .................................................................................................................. 88
Table 9: Measure A ........................................................................................................................ 92
viii
ABSTRACT
Consistent with their longstanding protection of the initiative process, California courts
have interpreted the state constitution to provide that a special tax introduced via a citizens’
initiative requires a majority vote to pass, whereas the same special tax introduced by elected
officials requires a two-thirds supermajority vote to pass. Using the unique case of special tax
initiatives, this study explored the dynamics of representative and direct democracy by
examining how California’s initiative preference affects local decision making. The study
employed a qualitative, multiple case study research design and examined the attitudes and
experiences of local elected officials, municipal staff members, citizen initiative proponents and
opponents, and industry experts. The findings showed consistent support for the initiative
process and a varied application of the process across jurisdictions, driven in large part by
community history and context and the current legal framework. Variation was greatest among
elected officials, whose conduct ranged from active involvement to a hands-off approach.
Municipal staff members were generally supportive but not involved, heeding the legal
restrictions governing the use of public resources. Initiative proponents were effective and
resourceful, undertaking sophisticated activities to promote their policy solution, engaging
networks and utilizing the lessons of previous efforts. This research adds to the literature on the
relationship between representative and direct democracy and fills a gap in the literature
concerning the roles of and relationship between those involved in citizen-led ballot initiatives at
the local level. The study is designed to foster an understanding of the initiative process among
local government stakeholders by focusing on the perspectives of those involved in special tax
initiatives.
1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In his inaugural address after being sworn in as California’s Governor in 1911, Hiram
Johnson urged the adoption of state constitutional amendments to provide for the initiative,
referendum, and recall. He argued that such reforms were necessary “to preserve and perpetuate
popular government” because they would give “to the electorate the power of action when
desired, and they do place in the hands of the people the means by which they may protect
themselves” (Johnson, 1911, para. 5). He expressed his faith in the electorate, adding “those of
us who espouse these measures do so because of our deep-rooted belief in popular government,
and not only in the right of the people to govern, but in their ability to govern” (Johnson, 1911,
para. 5).
Those reforms were designed not to displace but to protect and operate together with the
existing system of representative government. This dissertation explores the longstanding
relationship between direct and representative democracy by examining California’s initiative
process at the local level. It focuses on the unique phenomenon of special tax initiatives, which
according to recent California judicial decisions, require fewer votes to pass than special tax
measures generated by a local government. Utilizing a multiple case study research design, the
study merges the fields of law and public policy by analyzing the impact of the appellate court
decisions on special tax initiatives and exploring the roles of and relationships between initiative
stakeholders in a sample of California cities and counties. As the first academic study to
qualitatively examine the meaning and impact of this differential, the dissertation both
contributes to the literature on local governance and informs local government stakeholders
about the how direct democracy interacts with representative government.
2
Direct Democracy in California
Consistent with Governor Johnson’s comments about the right of the people to govern,
Article II, section 1 of the California Constitution provides, “All political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.” Exercising their inherent power, in
1911, California voters amended the state constitution to codify their right to exercise direct
democracy by placing initiatives, referendums, and recall measures on the ballot (Allswang,
1996). The passage of Proposition 7 enabled voters at the state and local level to propose
legislation directly and accept or reject it at the polls, effectively bypassing their elected
representatives. California “courts have described the initiative and referendum as articulating
‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process’” (Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc., 1976, p. 591). Uniformly, California courts have announced it is their
duty to protect and broadly construe the right, resolving any doubts in favor of the exercise of
direct democracy whenever possible (Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc.,
1976, p. 591).
Local jurisdictions were at the forefront of the direct democracy movement in the state.
Prior to the constitutional amendment, the charter cities of San Francisco and Vallejo enacted the
initiative and referendum process in 1898 (Gordon, 2004). By 1910, at least 20 California charter
cities had adopted the initiative, referendum, or both (Allswang, 1996; Gordon, 2004).
California’s 1911 constitutional amendment expressly expanded the local process beyond charter
cities, providing that “[i]nitiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of
each city or county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide” (Cal. Const., art. II, §
3
11). Consequently, voters in all California cities, counties and special districts have access to the
initiative process (Gordon, 2004).
A defining characteristic of the initiative is the ability of the people to enact policy
through a majority vote (City and County of San Francisco, 2020). This power is in tension with
other key provisions of the California Constitution related to amendments restricting local
governments’ taxation power. According to the California Constitution, local tax measures fall
into one of two categories: a general tax, designed to generate revenue to be used at the
discretion of local elected officials and effective upon a majority vote, or a special tax, intended
to raise revenue for a specified purpose identified in the measure and effective only through a
two-thirds majority vote (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, §§ 2(a), (b) & (d)). In multiple provisions, the
California Constitution confirms that two-thirds of the voters must approve any special tax
proposed by a local government (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4 & art. XIII C, § 2(d)).
In 2020 and 2021, a series of California Court of Appeal decisions confronted the
question posed by a special tax measure placed on the ballot via the initiative process: May a
majority of voters approve the measure as part of their general initiative powers, or must the
measure be approved by two-thirds of the voters because it is a special tax? Unanimously, five
separate published appellate decisions concluded that a special tax introduced through the
initiative process requires only a majority vote to pass, whereas a special tax introduced by a
local elected body requires a two-thirds supermajority vote to pass.
1
The courts relied on a 2017
California Supreme Court case, California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland, which affirmed
1
Jobs & Housing Coalition, et al. v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505; City and County of San Francisco
v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition G (2021) 66 Cal.App.4th 1058; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 227; City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy
Communities (2020) 59 Cal. App. 5th 220; City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter
of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703.
4
the sanctity of the initiative power in a different context, holding that the constitutional
limitations on the ability of local governments to impose, extend, or increase any general tax did
not similarly apply to limit the power of voters seeking to raise local taxes through the initiative
process. The Court explained that “procedural requirements imposed on the Legislature and local
governments do not similarly constrain the electorate’s initiative power without evidence that
such was their intended purpose” (California Cannabis Coalition, 2017, p. 935).
In line with this reasoning, the first case to address the voter requirements for a special
tax initiative held that the supermajority approval required for a special tax proposed by local
government does not similarly apply to a special tax initiative (City and County of San
Francisco, 2020). In that case, a special tax in San Francisco proposed via an initiative garnered
61% of the vote, and certain groups challenged its passage. The appellate court reiterated the
long-held view of the initiative process as a valuable right embedded in our democracy and
emphasized its duty to “jealously guard” and “liberally construe” the right (City and County of
San Francisco, 2020, p. 710, internal quotations omitted). Examining the relevant constitutional
provisions, corresponding legislation, intent reflected in ballot pamphlets and prior judicial
decisions, the Court of Appeal agreed with the California Supreme Court that limitations
imposed on “local government” or “cities and counties” could not be construed to apply to the
electorate at large (City and County of San Francisco, 2020, p. 722). The Court of Appeal,
therefore, held that the supermajority requirement for special taxes proposed by a local
government did not displace the power of the electorate to enact a special tax initiative by a
majority vote (City and County of San Francisco, 2020).
By protecting the initiative process, the California courts created an incentive to utilize
the initiative process rather than rely on representative government to place a special tax measure
5
on the ballot. The consequence of the case law is that a special tax proposed through the
initiative process requires only a majority vote to pass, whereas the same special tax proposed by
a local elected body would require a supermajority to pass. The difference is significant. For
example, in November 2022, local revenue measures proposed by cities, counties and special
districts that required a majority vote had an 80% passage rate, whereas measures requiring a
two-thirds vote to succeed had only a 43% passage rate (Coleman, 2022). The disparity in
passage rates strongly suggests increasing reliance on the initiative process for the proposal of
special tax measures at the local level.
Research Objectives
The general objective of this research project is to use these expanded initiative powers to
explore the role of the initiative process in California’s system of democratic governance. When
courts construe a constitutional provision, their focus is on the plain language of the constitution
and giving effect to the intended purpose of that language as reflected by the words themselves,
or if the words are uncertain, by extrinsic sources demonstrating the words’ intended meaning
(California Cannabis Coalition, 2017). The court’s focus is not on the policy considerations
flowing from the decision. But now, as a result of California’s vigilant protection of the initiative
process in the context of special tax measures, there exists a governance issue and a question as
to how special tax initiatives will evolve going forward.
Examining Direct Democracy at the Local Level
Direct democracy does not operate in a vacuum. Garrett (2004) coined the phrase “hybrid
democracy” to explain that policy at the state and local levels tends to be determined by a
combination of direct and representative democratic processes. Matsusaka (2018) similarly
explained that direct democracy should not be construed as replacing representative government
6
but, rather, must be analyzed in conjunction with representative institutions. Likewise, Ferraiolo
(2023) acknowledged that direct democracy exists alongside representative democracy, enabling
citizens to participate in the policy-making process.
The literature broadly recognizes the relationship between the systems of direct and
representative democracy in multiple contexts, including policy implementation (Ferraiolo,
2023), historical development (Matsusaka, 2020), agenda setting (Vatter et al., 2019), and
intended and unintended policy consequences (Heidbreder et al., 2019). Highlighting that “direct
democracy effects do not materialize in a vacuum but are contingent on and interact with
elements of representative democracy,” Heidbreder et al. (2019) further observed “that direct
democracy is not, in reality something opposed to or separated from representative democracy”
(p. 374) and it therefore must be examined in conjunction with the characteristics of
representative democracy.
Nonetheless, the literature has not extended that examination to encompass the conduct
of and relationship between those involved firsthand in the local initiative process, including
local elected officials, municipal staff, and initiative proponents and opponents. For example, the
preeminent researcher on the initiative process, John Matsusaka (2020, 2018, 2005a, 2005b),
focused primarily on the statewide process and, most recently, advocated for a national process
(Matsusaka, 2020). The handful of studies on the local initiative process broadly addressed some
outward characteristics of initiative jurisdictions, topics, and advocates (Adams, 2012; Gordon,
2004, 2009). Other studies have focused on the connection between the initiative process and
civic engagement (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Tolbert et al., 2003). Some research has explored
how both local elected officials and public administrators view government-driven public
participation efforts (Barnes & Mann, 2011; Berner et al., 2011; Hagelskamp et al., 2013). More
7
recent research is beginning to explore the distinction between government-initiated citizen
participation and citizen-led activities that do not involve a popular vote (Igalla et al., 2019,
2020, 2021; Mees, 2022; Mees et al., 2019).
Yet there exists a gap in the research regarding how local jurisdictions, including local
elected officials, public administrators, and initiative proponents and opponents, view and handle
local initiative efforts. Particularly in view of California’s initiative preference, it is important to
understand whether and how this preference affects local decision-making. The initiative process
is a distinct form of citizen-led civic engagement that necessarily operates within the existing
framework of local representative government yet requires local government to occupy a
different and more facilitative role. The literature has yet to examine the strategies local
governments undertake to fill this role.
Research Question Posed by this Study
By asking the following research question, this study sought to explore how California’s
constitutional preference for the initiative process affects local representative government in
connection with the development, proposal, and promotion of special tax initiatives: How is local
governance being affected by California law confirming that a special tax initiative has a lower
voter threshold for approval than a special tax measure proposed by a local elected body?
The answer to this question was explored through sub-questions that specifically focus on
the roles and decisions of those involved in special tax initiatives:
• What role do local elected officials play in connection with a special tax initiative?
• What role does municipal staff play in connection with a special tax initiative?
• Who are the stakeholders who tend to be involved in the development and promotion
of a special tax initiative?
8
• How significant is the lower voter threshold in the decision to bring a special tax
measure as an initiative?
The Purpose of Focusing on Special Tax Initiatives
While popular media outlets and law firm updates have reported the California courts’
holding that the two-thirds voter threshold for the passage of special tax measures does not apply
to special tax initiatives, this research appears to be the first to explore the phenomenon from a
scholarly perspective, applying rigorous standards of academic research. This study considers
how local governance might be affected by increasing reliance on a direct democracy process to
propose and enact special taxes. Certainly, the dynamics could develop in different ways, with
local government partnering with citizen proponents to generate special tax measures designed to
serve the community, local government actors attempting to manipulate the process to avoid the
hurdle of a supermajority vote, or initiative proponents endeavoring to capitalize on the
advantageous treatment of initiatives to work around the limits of local government. Or it could
be, as borne out by the findings here, that there is no single model that currently typifies the
relationship between local government and citizen initiative proponents.
The purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between the local initiative
process and local government by exploring the attitudes and experiences of local elected
officials, local government staff members, and relevant community stakeholders involved with
the development and proposal of special tax initiatives. On the basis of these findings, the goals
of the study were to contribute to the literature regarding how representative and direct
democratic processes work together at the local level (Bandeira & Ferraro, 2017; Garrett, 2004;
Matsusaka, 2020) and to endeavor to inform an effective practice approach to ensure that special
tax measures serve the best interests of the community.
9
Overview of How the Research Question Will Be Answered
While a complete description of the study’s methodology is contained in Chapter 3, this
overview provides a summary of the project’s research design and data collection and analysis
processes. This study employed a qualitative approach, which is appropriate when the focus of
the research is on meaning, understanding, and describing how people interpret their own
experiences (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). While there are several different qualitative research
designs (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016), this research was structured using a case study design, a
method that fosters the exploration of a specific phenomenon within its own context using
multiple data sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Creswell, 2013). The defining characteristic of case
study research is an intrinsically bounded unit of inquiry (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016), which here
was a special tax initiative.
A multiple-case-study design was implemented to conduct analyses both within a case
and across cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Of the 17 special tax
initiatives that qualified for the ballot in 2022, four were selected as being representative of the
phenomenon and containing sufficient variation among several relevant dimensions (Seawright
& Gerring, 2008): Measure A, City of Manhattan Beach; Measure O, County of Mariposa;
Proposition M, City and County of San Francisco; and Measure ULA, City of Los Angeles.
In terms of data collection, multiple data sources were employed to enhance credibility
and trustworthiness and enable a greater understanding of the phenomenon from different
perspectives (Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The study relied on three sources of
information that are useful in case study research: document review, interviews, and direct
observations (Yin, 2018). Documents were particularly valuable here to provide context and
historical insight and to identify key stakeholders. Interviews were a significant source of case
10
study data and, importantly, captured the perspectives of those involved with special tax
initiatives (Patton, 2002). The research involved semi-structured interviews of individuals in the
four jurisdictions studied herein, including elected officials, municipal staff, initiative proponents
and opponents, and several ballot initiative professionals. Direct observations were the third
source of data, primarily in the form of public hearings, which provided yet another perspective
as a firsthand account of the phenomenon (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
The cases were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis, a process for identifying,
evaluating, and recording patterns or themes in the data that recognizes the researcher has a role
in interpreting the data (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Byrne, 2022). According to this approach,
themes do not exist apart from the researcher and are necessarily imbued with the researcher’s
experience and worldview (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). Consequently, as part of the data analysis,
the researcher necessarily relied on her professional experience as an attorney and public service
experience as a former local elected official. Pragmatism is the worldview stemming from those
experiences, which is a model of “practical rationality and problem solving in the face of
uncertainty” (Ansell & Boin, 2019, p. 1081). Pragmatism assumes that people act their way into
understanding and develop their goals through actions and reactions (Ansell & Boin, 2019). The
research findings are therefore colored by this lens and emphasize how individuals behaved
rather than on their underlying political or moral philosophy.
Application of the Research Findings to Practice
This study appears to be the first to explore the consequences of recent appellate
decisions holding that special tax initiatives are subject to a lower voter threshold than measures
generated by local government. Consistent with a pragmatic emphasis on actionable knowledge
(Kelly & Cordeiro, 2020), it will inform initiative stakeholders about how other communities
11
handle special tax initiatives and enable a sharing of effective practice approaches. It is designed
to describe the roles that all stakeholders—elected officials, municipal staff, and initiative
proponents and opponents—undertake and foster an understanding of the initiative process from
their perspectives. Some local jurisdictions may not be aware of the different voter thresholds,
and this study will, at a minimum, enable local government and citizens to appreciate the
difference and potentially open up new strategies for revenue measures.
On a broader level, an in-depth exploration of this issue could inform state legislators and
serve as a basis to consider the policy implications stemming from the current state of the law.
Moreover, the study could spur procedural changes in cities and counties regarding how special
tax measures are formulated and supported to the extent consistent with state law. Further, the
study could inform voters about how the majority vote threshold for these initiatives affects the
dynamics of local governance, which, in turn, could affect their position on the Taxpayer
Protection and Government Accountability Act that qualified for the November 2024 ballot. The
statewide initiative proposes restrictions on the ability to tax, including requiring supermajority
vote support for all special taxes in local jurisdictions, regardless of their source. Though the Act
will require only a majority vote to pass, it will eliminate the availability of a majority vote for
any special tax initiative in a local jurisdiction.
Finally, this research contributes to the literature on the interplay between direct and
representative democracy and the role of local government in citizen-led engagement. It offers a
unique perspective by qualitatively exploring these concepts with an emphasis on the
participants’ perspectives. In this way, the study will further augment the scant body of literature
that addresses the roles of those involved in citizen-led ballot initiatives. According to the
perceptions of those in the jurisdictions studied, there is strong support for the concept of direct
12
democracy, suggesting the continued or heightened use of the process in the context of special
tax initiatives. The findings further showed that local government’s response to this phenomenon
is varied, with elected officials occupying a range of roles depending largely on community
context. Municipal staff’s role was more consistent, with staff members generally supportive of
citizen-led efforts yet cognizant of their limited role. On the other hand, initiative proponents in
the jurisdictions studied undertook an expansive role, engaging in sophisticated activities to
promote their policy solution, utilizing networks, and employing the lessons of previous efforts.
While they considered the majority vote threshold a significant factor in their decision-making
process, other factors, including the ability to assume control over policy, led them to engage in
the initiative process.
13
CHAPTER 2: KEY LITERATURE ON LOCAL DIRECT AND REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Examining how direct democracy works in the context of local representative
government requires exploring two distinct bodies of literature, one addressing the historical and
political background of direct democracy and the other involving theories of local-level
democratic governance. For this study, relevant literature in the first category addresses
California’s statewide and local initiative processes, including the law governing the local
process and some characteristics of how that process evolved. Narrowing even further, the
discussion encompasses the current state of the law regarding special tax measures, highlighting
appellate court decisions dictating the majority vote threshold. This literature emphasizes the
longstanding tension between the roles of government and citizens in policymaking. The second
category of relevant literature specifically examines the roles of and relationships among elected
officials, municipal staff, and citizen advocates. While the literature on those roles in connection
with a citizens’ initiative is scare, research concerning other forms of government-led and
citizen-led civic participation and government’s perception of and involvement with these
provides insight into how local government might interact with a citizens’ initiative.
Direct Democracy and the Initiative Process
The key questions animating this study have to do with the roles that citizens and their
representatives should and do play in shaping public decision-making. In other words, how does
direct democracy relate to representative democracy? “Direct democracy” describes political
processes that enable voters to vote directly on policies rather than for their representatives
(Matsusaka, 2020). Specifically, it can be defined as “a publicly recognized, institutionalized
process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific
14
issues through a ballot with universal and secret suffrage” (Gherghina & Geissel, 2020, p. 5).
Contrary to the misconception that direct democracy is a “California-specific aberration”
(Matsusaka, 2020, p. 77), the concept dates to ancient Athens, when citizens would gather at a
central place to make public decisions (Matsusaka, 2018). However, the framers of the U.S.
Constitution were wary of pure direct democracy and minimized direct citizen participation by
establishing a republic that created a barrier between public will and governance in the form of
the legislature (Matsusaka, 2020; Roberts, 2004; Werdegar, 2012).
These tensions regarding the appropriate role of citizens in shaping policy have endured
even as direct democratic processes developed. Despite there being no national form of direct
democracy in the United States, the process appeared at the state level as early as 1780 when the
Massachusetts legislature asked voters to approve the state’s new constitution (Matsusaka,
2020). Throughout the 19th century, many states embraced direct democracy, both ratifying and
amending their constitutions through a popular vote (Matsusaka, 2020). Between 1880 and 1920,
both the Populist and Progressive reform movements fueled direct democracy’s rise (Ferraiolo,
2017; Matsusaka, 2020; Smith & Lubinski, 2002). The Populists sought to reject representative
democracy, viewing state legislatures as corrupt, beholden to certain economic interests, and
unresponsive to voters, while the more moderate Progressives sought to augment and enhance
representative democracy with the addition of the initiative process (Ferraiolo, 2017; Lawrence
et al., 2009). Bridges and Kousser (2011) maintain that the Progressives acted particularly
strategically by advocating for direct democracy only in states where they had sufficient
confidence that the median voter shared their policy preferences, which the legislature had
blocked. They argue that this element of self-interest explains why political elites would be
willing to surrender policy control to citizens (Bridges & Kousser, 2011).
15
Direct democracy maintains strong support among American voters. Citing a 2017 Pew
Research Center survey, Matsusaka (2020) found that two-thirds of Americans would support
the ability to vote directly on national policy. Bowler et al. (2007) similarly found consistent
support for direct democracy, relying on a host of surveys, including California polls measuring
voter support for ballot initiatives at 65% to 70%. Delving into the reasons for that support,
Bowler et al. (2007) studied California voters and found that they favored direct democracy as a
means to keep representatives attuned to public opinion.
Initiatives and referendums are the most common forms of direct democracy (Gherghina
& Geissel, 2020). Generally, an initiative is a new law proposed by citizens that reaches the
ballot by receiving a specified number of signatures from eligible voters, whereas a referendum
is a vote to repeal an existing law enacted by the legislature or local government, also requiring a
certain number of signatures to reach the ballot. (Matsusaka, 2018, 2020). In 1897, Nebraska was
the first state to permit the initiative and referendum process in municipalities, and in 1898 South
Dakota became the first state to codify a statewide initiative and referendum process (Ferraiolo,
2017; Matsusaka, 2020; Romero & Puza, 2018). During the next 20 years, 22 more states
adopted processes for the initiative, referendum, or both (Matsusaka, 2020). Direct democracy
took hold primarily in the western states. Scholars offer several explanations for this
phenomenon, including that Populism was stronger in the west, the economically homogenous
and primarily agrarian western states were more likely to call uniformly for reform in response to
an economic downturn, and the eastern states had more entrenched legislative processes and
political parties that could effectively block reform (Lawrence et al., 2009).
Today, 24 states allow for the initiative process, while 82% of the 1,500 largest cities in
the country permit initiatives (Ferraiolo, 2017; Matsusaka, 2020). Figure 1 shows the percentage
16
of American cities that allow local initiatives for ordinances or charter amendments. Today, 97%
of all cities in the Western United States have access to the initiative process (Matsusaka, 2020).
Some cities—Dallas, for example—allow for the initiative and referendum process even though
the state does not (Matsusaka, 2020). Notably, no state has ever terminated or voted to do away
with the process (Matsusaka, 2005b).
Figure 1
Percentage of Cities with the Initiative Process by Region
Note. From Let the people rule: How direct democracy can meet the populist challenge by J. G.
Matsusaka, 2020, p. 73. Princeton University Press. Copyright 2020 by Princeton University
Press.
This research focused specifically on a recent development involving the initiative
process in California, a state which has been at the forefront of direct democracy. In 1911,
California became the 10th state to adopt the initiative and referendum process when voters
amended the state’s constitution to specify that “[t]he initiative is the power of the electors to
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them” (Cal. Const.,
17
art. II, § 8(a); Romero & Puza, 2018). Progressives, including then Governor Johnson, and the
labor movement supported the amendment as a means to offset Southern Pacific Railroad’s
control of the state legislature (Romero & Puza, 2018; Simmons, 1997). Supporters argued that
the availability of the initiative process would return government control to the people, enhance
citizen participation, and increase government responsiveness (Minger, 1991; Simmons, 1997).
Generally, California’s statewide initiative process requires that a proponent submit the
proposed statute or constitutional amendment to the secretary of state, the attorney general
provide a title and summary, and the Office of the Legislative Analyst and department of finance
provide an analysis of the proposal’s fiscal impact. The proponents must then gather a specified
number of signatures from registered voters within 150 days, and once the secretary of state
determines their validity, the measure will be qualified for the ballot (Silva, 2000). Initiatives in
California were popular throughout much of the first half of the 20th century, then fell relatively
dormant starting in 1940 until the success of California’s well-known Proposition 13 in 1978
(Matsusaka, 2005b). California is the most active initiative state, with 379 statewide initiatives
reaching the ballot through 2018 (Matsusaka, 2020), covering a wide array of subjects that
include taxation, education, state governance, social policies, and health/medical science
(Romero & Puza, 2018). Initiative activity peaked in the 1990s, and though declining somewhat
in recent decades, remains at a historically elevated level (Matsusaka, 2020).
Creating the backdrop for the type of local initiatives that are the subject of this research,
Proposition 13 is arguably the most well-known statewide initiative in history and is credited
with commencing the modern era of direct democracy (Gordon, 2004; Manweller, 2005;
Matsusaka, 2020). Entitled the People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxes, Proposition 13’s
origins can be traced back decades, starting with the unprecedented government growth
18
following World War II that subsequently faced backlash in the 1960s (Matsusaka, 2020).
Property taxes were a particularly contentious issue, and during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
several unsuccessful tax-cutting measures appeared on the ballot in California (Matsusaka,
2020). By 1977, California property taxes had risen to approximately 52% above the national
average (Citrin, 2009). Overlaying this rise was the California Supreme Court decision, Serrano
v. Priest (1971), which reallocated property tax revenue among communities to help equalize
funding across school districts and led taxpayers to disassociate their payment from a perceived
local benefit (Danforth, 2021).
Following a spike in housing prices in the mid-1970s and the inability of elected
representatives to pass any tax relief plan, even in the face of an unprecedented budget surplus,
Howard Jarvis joined forces with Paul Gann to collect 1.2 million signatures—more than twice
those needed—to get Proposition 13 on the ballot (Danforth, 2021; Matsusaka, 2020).
Proposition 13 proposed dramatic cuts to property taxes and capping taxes going forward by
rolling back assessments to 1976 values, limiting the tax to one percent of a property’s assessed
value, capping future tax increases to two percent per year (absent a transfer of title), requiring a
supermajority vote in both houses of the legislature to increase taxes, and requiring a
supermajority popular vote for any special tax measure in a local jurisdiction (Citrin, 2009;
Danforth, 2021; Matsusaka, 2020). Despite opposition from then Governor Jerry Brown, leaders
of both political parties, and a host of business and civic interests, Proposition 13 passed with
65% of the vote in an election with a 70% voter turnout (Matsusaka, 2020).
The impacts of Proposition 13 were felt at all levels of government. Nationwide, many
states followed suit, with most passing some form of tax relief over the next 5 years and almost
half adopting laws to limit future taxes and spending (Danforth, 2021; Matsusaka, 2020).
19
Statewide, Governor Brown instituted severe spending cuts, and the legislature passed multiple
tax cuts and distributed some of the state’s surplus to offset the revenues lost under Proposition
13 (Matsusaka, 2020). Further, conservative interest groups were encouraged to use the
statewide initiative process to promote their policy goals, particularly those relating to tax issues
(Damore & Nicholson, 2014). Locally, Proposition 13 had a particularly devastating impact on
counties, cities, and school districts. In addition to imposing a two-thirds vote requirement for
certain local tax measures, it immediately reduced local property taxes by approximately $6.1
billion and transferred to state lawmakers the responsibility of allocating property tax revenues
among local jurisdictions, consequently limiting local control over those revenues (The
California Budget Project, 1997). Its effect remains significant; in 2018, California homeowners
paid approximately $30 billion less in property taxes because of Proposition 13’s limits
(Danforth, 2021).
California’s statewide initiative process remained largely unchanged from Proposition 13
until the Ballot Initiative Transparency Act of 2014 (BITA; Romero & Keidan, 2017). The goals
of the BITA were to expand the opportunity for legislative compromise on citizens’ initiatives
and create greater availability for public participation in the initiative process (Romero &
Keidan, 2017). Provisions designed to achieve these goals included giving voters a 30-day
window to offer online comments on a proposed initiative before signature-gathering begins and
thereafter giving proponents a subsequent 5-day period to amend the initiative within certain
limits; requiring proponents to report when they have secured 25% of the required signatures,
which triggers the further requirement that appropriate Senate and Assembly committees hold a
public hearing on the initiative; and allowing proponents to withdraw the initiative at any point
before it qualifies for the ballot (Romero & Keidan, 2017).
20
Local Initiatives in California
This dissertation concentrates on a recent development that enhances the power of
citizens in California’s initiative process, which had its start in local jurisdictions (Gordon,
2004). Municipal home rule, a Progressive-era reform, gave cities the power to develop and
modify their charters to regulate local matters (Gordon, 2004). In 1911, California voters
codified the statewide initiative process and the right of all cities and counties to exercise
initiative and referendum powers (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11).
Legal Principles Relating to Initiatives
A number of legal principles seek to structure and protect citizens’ role in the initiative
process and minimize intervention by government entities while allowing government’s
appropriate engagement in terms of administrative activities and information provision.
Procedurally, initiatives are limited to legislative as opposed to administrative acts, must address
only a single subject, and must comport with state law (Gordon, 2004). Initiative proponents
typically draft the initiative, sometimes with the help of professionals such as attorneys or
election consultants (Kashani & Stern, 2011). Generally, the process by which a local initiative is
placed on the ballot is similar to the statewide process, involving filing a notice of intention,
circulating an initiative petition, and obtaining signatures from at least 10% of the jurisdiction’s
registered voters (Gordon, 2004, 2009). Upon meeting the signature requirement, the local
legislative body has an integral role in the process of most types of initiatives and must take one
of three actions. It must adopt the initiative at a public meeting; submit the initiative, unchanged,
to the voters within a specified time frame; or order an agency report on the initiative and,
following receipt of the report, either adopt the initiative or order an election (Cal. Elec. Code, §
9215). However, because California’s constitution mandates that all tax measures be submitted
21
to the voters, local government’s ability to adopt the measure outright is not available for tax
initiatives (California Tax Foundation, 2021; Martin et al., 2019).
Local government’s role is further limited by state statutes and regulations that ban the
expenditure of public funds to campaign on an initiative (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009).
Section 54964 of the California Government Code expressly prohibits local government officers,
employees, and consultants from expending or authorizing the expenditure of public funds “to
support or oppose the approval or rejection of a ballot measure, or the election or defeat of a
candidate.” The prohibition is consistent with a fundamental principle of the democratic electoral
process that the government should not undermine the fairness of an election by taking a side or
distorting the debate (Stanson v. Mott, 1976; Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009). However, the law
allows for the expenditure of public funds to disseminate materials that provide voters with a fair
presentation of the relevant facts to enable them to make an informed decision (Vargas v. City of
Salinas, 2009).
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged that while the line between
campaigning and providing information is not unduly vague, it can be less than clear (Vargas v.
City of Salinas, 2009). Generally, using public funds expressly to advocate for a particular result,
purchase traditional campaign materials (like bumper stickers, television ads or billboards), or
distribute campaign materials prepared by others is prohibited (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009).
Such conduct can result in individual civil and/or criminal liability (Stanson v. Mott, 1976).
Courts distinguish between funds used for impermissible campaign activities and those used to
govern, finding that the Government Code “does not prohibit expenditure of local agency funds
to propose, draft or sponsor a ballot measure, including expenditures to marshal support for
placing the measure on the ballot, or to inform the public of need [for the measure]” (Santa
22
Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies, 2008). The law also does not prohibit a
government entity, including an individual elected official, from expressing an opinion on the
merits of a ballot initiative, including by authoring or signing ballot pamphlet materials (Vargas
v. City of Salinas, 2009).
By way of example, in League of Women Voters (1988), the Los Angeles County Board
of Supervisors established a standing committee composed of government officials to explore
changes to the criminal justice system, and the committee ultimately recommended the pursuit of
a ballot initiative to implement constitutional amendments. Going further, the committee tasked
employees of the district attorney’s office to develop and draft proposals for the initiative,
directed county employees to conduct research supporting the need for the proposals, approved
the final version of those proposals as a draft of the initiative, and identified two willing initiative
proponents (League of Women Voters, 1988). The Court of Appeal held these activities were a
permissible expenditure of public funds, reasoning that the power to draft an initiative and seek a
sympathetic sponsor fell within the board of supervisors’ legislative powers and did not amount
to campaigning activity:
Clearly, prior to and through the drafting stage of a proposed initiative, the action is not
taken to attempt to influence voters either to qualify or to pass an initiative measure; there
is as yet nothing to proceed to either of those stages. The audience at which these
activities are directed is not the electorate per se, but only potentially interested private
citizens; there is no attempt to persuade or influence any vote. [Citation.] It follows those
activities cannot reasonably be construed as partisan campaigning. (League of Women
Voters, 1988, p. 550).
23
Though characterizing the identification of an initiative sponsor as potentially
“problematical” (League of Women Voters, 1988, p. 553), the court concluded that the power to
draft a proposed initiative necessarily encompassed the authority to seek out a proponent.
Finally, the court clarified that government officials or employees were free to advocate for the
initiative as individuals, provided no public funds were used for that purpose (League of Women
Voters, 1988).
Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) extended these principles to a city’s efforts in connection
with an initiative it did not help to prepare, which proposed to reduce and ultimately repeal a
utility users’ tax. Prior to the election, the city publicized information during public hearings, on
its website, in a one-page flyer, and in its newsletter about what services the city council had
voted to eliminate if the measure passed. The initiative proponents argued these communications
were impermissible campaign materials because they failed to include the proponents’ position
that such cuts were unnecessary and any decrease in revenue could be addressed through less
dramatic service reductions. The Court disagreed, finding the law does “not preclude a
governmental entity from publicly expressing an opinion with regard to the merits of a proposed
ballot measure, so long as it does not expend public funds to mount a campaign on the measure”
(Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009, p. 36). The Court concluded that the city had not engaged in
campaigning given that it presented factual information (including the proponents’ position in
recorded meetings available on the city website), did not encourage residents to vote in any
particular way, and disseminated the information through typical means of communication
(Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009).
In cases where the line between campaign and informational materials is particularly thin,
courts have evaluated the content, style, tenor, and timing of the materials (Vargas v. City of
24
Salinas, 2009, pp. 33–34). Under this standard, it appears that governments may express an
opinion about a ballot measure so long as the message does not include a direction on how to
vote. Thus, government mailings about a ballot measure to approve an agreement to build a new
hospital were deemed permissible information even though they included statements that the
board was “proud of the final terms of the agreement” because it had “negotiated the best
possible agreement for the District” which was a “fair deal” that contained the “best possible
terms to build the new community hospital on District land with no new taxes” (Peninsula
Guardians, Inc., 2011). Moreover, it is important to remember that the courts’ focus is on the
expenditure of public funds. In Diquisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010), the court held that a
supervisor’s email to 1500 constituents attaching an editorial advocating against a ballot measure
was campaign activity, yet not punishable because it involved a de minimis expenditure of public
resources.
Characteristics of Local Initiatives
Local initiative use is the subject of this study, and some research has examined the
unique qualities of local initiatives. Compared to statewide measures, local initiatives are more
numerous and more likely to qualify for the ballot and pass (Gordon, 2004). For example,
between 1990 and 2000, over 730 local initiatives were circulated for signature in California
compared to 450 statewide measures (Gordon, 2004).
2
Despite this widespread use, there has
been relatively little study of initiative activity at the local level (Adams, 2012; Gordon, 2004;
Matsusaka, 2018). The exceptions are three studies on local initiatives focused on their use in
California (Adams, 2012; Gordon, 2004, 2009). That research identified some characteristics of
the jurisdictions in which local initiatives tend to be prevalent, outlined the topic areas they tend
2
Though several sources compile statewide initiatives on a regular basis, there does not appear to be a centralized
database that tracks local initiatives in California.
25
to cover, described the type of individuals or groups who are generally behind them, and
highlighted the unique relationship between the local initiative process and representative
government.
Historically, initiative use in California has been highest in larger cities with more
municipal employees (Gordon, 2004, 2009). Gordon’s study of California local initiatives in the
1990s identified other characteristics of high-use initiative jurisdictions—many were charter
cities, residents had higher levels of education and income, residents had fewer children, and
residents were more likely to be Democrats or independents (Gordon, 2004). Those jurisdictions
were also more likely to have higher income but not racial diversity, and residents were not
stable, meaning that 60% of them had moved within the previous 5 years (Gordon, 2004).
Gordon offered two alternative but complementary theories to explain the relationship between
these characteristics and initiative use. The first is that initiatives arise where governing is
difficult—in large, diverse, transient cities where it is more challenging for elected
representatives to ascertain public preferences and/or those preferences may not be uniform
(Gordon, 2004). The second is that initiatives arise because it is more difficult for residents to
monitor the conduct of elected officials in those large, diverse, transient communities (Gordon,
2004).
In terms of topic areas, local initiatives necessarily involve issues distinct from statewide
measures, given that the matters arising in local jurisdictions are unavoidably constrained by
state law (Gordon, 2009). Thus, while statewide initiatives in the 1990s primarily addressed
education, taxation, and public finance, local initiatives were more likely to focus on land use
and governance (Gordon, 2004, 2009). Notably, local tax initiatives were not as prevalent in the
1990s because California appellate courts had held that taxation was an essential government
26
function that could not be impaired through a local initiative (Gordon, 2004). In 1995, however,
the California Supreme Court upheld a local initiative that repealed a residential utility tax
(Gordon, 2004). The following year, California voters passed Proposition 218, which required a
vote of the electorate to increase certain property-related fees or assessments, clarified that all
special taxes (including in charter cities) were subject to a supermajority vote and expressly
permitted voters to seek to repeal or reduce taxes and assessments through the initiative process
(Coleman, 2019; Gordon, 2004). In a later study of local California initiatives between 2001 and
2008, land use remained the dominant issue, with taxation coming in second ahead of
governance issues (Adams, 2012).
Adams’ (2012) study specifically examined the characteristics of local initiative
proponents to test the hypothesis that local initiatives generally stemmed from grassroots
community organizing, adhering to the Progressive model and goal of enhancing citizen
participation (Adams, 2012). Adams contrasted this vision with statewide initiatives that
increasingly were supported by expensive, professionalized campaigns run by established
political actors (Adams, 2012). Though discovering wide variation among initiative jurisdictions,
the study found that approximately 80% of initiative sponsors were local, with the remaining
20% working on a test case to achieve a statewide or national goal (Adams, 2012). Over half of
the sponsors were groups, and among those, a large percentage were ad hoc, volunteer groups
formed specifically to advocate for the local initiative, thereby supporting the notion that local
initiatives fostered civic engagement (Adams, 2012). The level of volunteerism differed
depending on jurisdiction size. In jurisdictions with a population of over 500,000, just over half
of the groups were volunteer-based, whereas, in jurisdictions with fewer than 100,000 residents,
almost 90% of the groups were volunteer-based (Adams, 2012). Approximately 20% of the local
27
sponsors were individuals, most of whom were deeply involved in local politics as candidates or
current or former elected officials (Adams, 2012). Often initiative promotion would be used as
an element of individual campaign strategy (Adams, 2012).
Addressing the interplay between direct democracy and representative democracy,
Gordon (2009) touched on the role of local government in the initiative process by highlighting
initiative advocacy by local candidates. As an example of the relationship between candidates
and initiatives at the statewide level, Pete Wilson’s 1994 gubernatorial campaign leveraged
Proposition 187, a ballot measure that sought to limit the public services provided to
undocumented immigrants (Adams, 2012). In the context of local initiatives that do not involve
taxation, the local process is distinct and creates a relationship between direct and representative
democracy by providing the local elected body with a “right of first refusal” to adopt a measure
without submitting it to the voters (Gordon, 2004, p. 12). This feature of the process manifests
itself in at least two ways. First, negotiations between initiative proponents and elected officials
occur frequently, as costs, time and political capital can be saved through the “indirect initiative”
process enabling elected officials to enact the initiative without an election (Gordon, 2009, p.
47). Second, short of enacting an initiative, local elected officials may generate or modify
policies to correspond with voter preferences in response to the threat of an initiative being
proposed (Gordon, 2009). Though not available for tax initiatives because the constitution
provides the voters must approve them, this interaction is an example of hybrid democracy,
where policy is determined by a combination of direct and representative democratic processes
(Garrett, 2004).
28
Intersection of Special Tax Measures and the Initiative Process
Though local initiatives may cover a range of topics, local tax initiatives are the focus of
this study. Stemming in large part from the consequences of Proposition 13, local jurisdictions—
cities, counties, school districts, and special districts—increasingly have sought additional
revenue through fee hikes and a range of tax measures other than property tax (Holbrook &
Heideman, 2022; Stark, 2001). Initially, local jurisdictions raised revenue by classifying
property-related increases as “fees” and “special assessments” because Proposition 13 did not
expressly require voter approval for anything except taxes (Matsusaka, 2020, p. 144).
Proposition 218 eliminated that practice by redefining property-related fees and assessments and
confirming that voters must approve such measures (Matsusaka, 2020). It further provided in
relevant part that “[n]o local government may impose, extend or increase any special tax unless
and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote” (Cal. Const.,
art. VIII C, § 2(d)).
3
Even with these limitations, voters have been receptive to revenue measures.
According to one study, local jurisdictions in California placed over 4,000 local revenue
proposals (including taxes and bonds) before local voters between 2001 and 2018, with an
approximate 70% passage rate (Coleman, 2019). Approximately one-half of those measures were
taxes proposed by cities, counties, and special districts, including parcel taxes, sales taxes, transit
occupancy taxes, and assorted business operations taxes (Coleman, 2019).
This research explores the use of the initiative process to generate revenue through tax
measures at the local level. This practice has become more significant in light of recent appellate
court decisions construing the California Constitution and reconciling the seeming inconsistency
3
A separate constitutional provision similarly provides: “Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote
of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real
property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such City, County or special district”
(Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4).
29
between the voters’ broad initiative power and limits on local governments’ ability to impose
taxes. The courts’ reconciliation has affected the balance between direct democracy and
representative democracy in local jurisdictions, framing the question of the appropriate role of
citizens and government in policymaking under both forms of democracy. Notably, California
local tax initiatives between 2001 and 2008 were primarily directed at repealing or reducing
existing taxes (Adams, 2012). More recently, evidence regarding statewide initiatives suggests
that the number of tax-reducing initiatives (like Proposition 13) is declining while the number of
tax-raising initiatives is rising (Matsusaka, 2018). Though most local revenue-generating
measures continue to originate from local elected officials, California courts have acknowledged
that municipal voters are turning to the initiative process to impose new taxes or increase
existing taxes (City and County of San Francisco, 2020).
In a prescient California Supreme Court case addressing the provisions governing general
taxes that foreshadowed the unique case of special tax initiatives, California Cannabis Collation
v. City of Upland held in 2017 that the constitutional limitations on the ability of local
governments to impose, extend, or increase any general tax did not similarly apply to limit the
power of voters seeking to raise local taxes through the initiative process. There, a citizens’
initiative proposed a tax on medical marijuana dispensaries in the city of Upland. The city
council determined that the measure was subject to a state constitutional provision requiring that
the proposal must appear on the ballot during a general election for city council members and
therefore placed the measure on the November ballot instead of holding a special election as
requested by the initiative proponents (California Cannabis Coalition, 2017).
4
4
Article XIII C, section 2(b) of the California Constitution provides in relevant part: “No local government may
impose, extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a
majority vote. . . . The election required by this subdivision shall be consolidated with a regularly scheduled general
election for members of the governing body of the local government” (California Cannabis Coalition, 2017, p. 936).
30
The Supreme Court held that the city’s action was unsupported by the law, finding no
indication in constitutional language or ballot materials concerning the relevant amendments that
the constitutional limitations imposed on a local government were likewise intended to apply to
the electorate when proposing an initiative. The Court explained that “procedural requirements
imposed on the Legislature and local governments do not similarly constrain the electorate’s
initiative power without evidence that such was their intended purpose” (California Cannabis
Coalition, 2017, p. 935). The Court relied on a much earlier decision, Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization (1991), which held that Proposition 13’s supermajority vote
requirement for the legislature to impose new or increased taxes did not affect the power of the
voters to impose a new statewide tax by a majority vote through the initiative process.
Recognizing that the decision could be construed to affect the constitutional provisions
concerning special taxes, the Court’s majority tried to distinguish the special tax voter threshold
requirement from the general tax election requirement, characterizing the former as a
“procedural two-thirds vote requirement” the voters imposed on themselves and the latter as a
“timing” requirement (California Cannabis Coalition, 2017, p. 943). However, pointing out that
the critical language both defining local government and providing that “‘[n]o local government
may impose, extend, or increase’ a particular kind of tax” was identical for both special and
general taxes, the dissent found the majority’s characterization nothing more than an effort to
avoid the far-reaching implications of its decision (California Cannabis Coalition, 2017, p. 956
& fn. 7, Kruger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Acknowledging the logical
extension of the decision, the dissent stated, “If a local tax enacted by voter initiative is not a tax
‘impose[d]’ by ‘local government,’ as the majority insists, then from here on out, special taxes
can be enacted by a simple majority of the electorate, as long as proponents can muster the
31
necessary quantum of support to require consideration of the measure” (California Cannabis
Coalition, 2017, p. 956, Kruger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Following this decision, in 2018, voters in several California jurisdictions put special tax
measures on the ballot through the initiative process. The San Francisco City Attorney opined
that “it seems very likely that voters may now propose special taxes by initiative subject only to
a majority vote” (California Tax Foundation, 2021, p. 7). In the November 2018 election, some
of the initiatives passed by a majority but not a supermajority vote. There was no consensus as to
the validity of their passage, and litigation ensued.
In 2020 and 2021, five published California Court of Appeal decisions unanimously held
that the initiative power is not constrained by constitutional provisions requiring a supermajority
vote for special taxes. Reiterating their staunch protection of the initiative process, the appellate
courts found Proposition 13’s silence on the initiative power could not be construed as an intent
to change it, with one court positing the question, “If the voters who approved Proposition 13 (by
a majority vote) intended to constrain the constitutionally protected power of future voters to
approve initiatives by majority vote, would they not have manifested that intent by some express
reference to the initiative power?” (City and County of San Francisco, 2020, p. 715). Table 1
identifies the five published decisions confirming the majority vote threshold and summarizes
the type of tax involved, the level of voter support, and the appellate court’s reasoning.
32
Table 1
California Appellate Decisions Regarding Special Tax Initiatives
Case Initiative Vote Holding/Reasoning
City and County of
San Francisco v. All
Persons Interested in
the Matter of
Proposition C (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 703
Business tax
initiative
designed to fund
homeless
services
61% The constitution’s supermajority
requirements imposed by Proposition 13
and Proposition 218 must be construed to
coexist with and not displace the power
of the electorate to enact initiatives
through a majority vote.
City of Fresno v.
Fresno Building
Healthy Communities
(2020) 59 Cal.App.5th
220
Sales tax
initiative to fund
parks
52% The court adopted the reasoning of City
and County of San Francisco (2020).
Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Assn. v.
City and County of
San Francisco (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 227
Commercial
rents tax to fund
early childcare
and education
programs
51% The court found no basis to refute or
distinguish the two foregoing cases,
rejecting the argument that a different
result was required because of the
involvement of a member of the board of
supervisors in promoting the initiative.
The court stated that “neither the text nor
ballot materials provide the requisite
‘unambiguous indication’ that the
enactors of Propositions 13 and 218
intended to constrain the initiative power
when an official is involved in the
initiative process” (Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Assn., 2021, p. 242).
City and County of
San Francisco v. All
Persons Interested in
the Matter of
Proposition G (2021)
66 Cal.App.4th 1058
Parcel tax to
fund the school
district
61% The court agreed with the reasoning of
prior cases and rejected both the
argument that parcel taxes should be
subject to a different interpretation and
the contention that the rules associated
with the initiative process should not
apply because the school district and the
union were actively involved in the
initiative’s development.
Jobs & Housing
Coalition, et al. v. City
of Oakland (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 505
Parcel tax to
fund early
childhood
education and
college readiness
programs
62% The court rejected the new argument that
ballot materials indicating a two-thirds
vote requirement for passage amounted
to a fraud on the voters or a due process
violation.
33
As a result of these decisions, California law currently holds that prior statewide tax-
limiting initiatives were designed solely to constrain the ability of representative government to
impose taxes and were not intended to and did not limit the ability of the electorate to impose
taxes through the initiative process. Anticipating how the Courts of Appeal might rule on the
question of the initiative power, Carrillo and Shanske (2017) posited that the protection of the
initiative process could significantly influence the dynamics of local government. Typically, the
initiative process is not seen as a primary means of policymaking and instead is used as a
corrective mechanism when government declines to act (Boehmke et al., 2015). But now, the
California courts have expressed a preference for the initiative to bring a special tax measure in a
local jurisdiction. Consequently, the question becomes how this new balance between direct and
representative democracy will affect local policymaking and those stakeholders involved in
initiative efforts in local jurisdictions.
Local Democratic Governance
In “California’s hybrid republic,” the systems of direct and representative democracy
coexist in homeostasis, as overvaluing either form risks the extreme of mob rule (in the case of
direct democracy) or authoritarianism (in the case of government control; Carrillo et al., 2019, p.
559). While those extremes are not involved in this research, a shift toward citizen control has
occurred because of the courts’ shielding the initiative process from the supermajority vote
requirement imposed on local government. That shift could manifest in many ways. For
example, direct democracy can move the agenda-setting power to non-governmental actors,
enabling issues that government might otherwise ignore to move to the forefront and often
forcing government representatives to address issues they did not introduce into the public
debate (Heidbreder et al., 2019; Vatter et al., 2019). However, it appears that at least in some
34
circumstances, government entities (City and County of San Francisco, 2021) or individual
elected officials (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn., 2021) are behind the initiatives, thereby
suggesting a different dynamic. Understanding how citizens involved in direct democracy and
elected officials and staff members in local government navigate the development and promotion
of special tax initiatives requires examining the literature regarding how democracy operates at
the local level.
Dimensions of Democracy in Local Government
In local government, the notion of democracy encompasses at least three dimensions:
representative, where citizens vote for other individuals who then develop policy; direct, where
citizens vote on policy themselves; and participatory, where representatives and citizens work
together collaboratively on policy, though representatives retain their political power (Garcia,
2020). These dimensions are not mutually exclusive; rather, they tend to supplement each other
and work in tandem (Bandeira & Ferraro, 2017; Garcia, 2020; Garrett, 2004; Heidbreder et al.,
2019; Matsusaka, 2020). No single dimension functions in a vacuum, as “direct democracy
operates within representative democratic systems, meaning that its consequences depend on the
characteristics of the representative democracy” (Heidbreder et al., 2019, p. 374). Describing the
connection between direct and participatory democracy, Adams’ (2012) study of local initiatives
in California concluded that local efforts created opportunities for enhanced citizen participation.
He emphasized, however, that such participation generally supplemented rather than replaced
existing policymaking processes (Adams, 2012). Adams’ research aligns with studies finding
that participatory processes generally complement or supplement traditional representative
government (Bandeira & Ferraro, 2017; Wampler, 2012).
35
Illustrating the overlap among the dimensions, research tends to characterize direct
democracy as a distinct form of citizen participation (Bandeira & Ferraro, 2017; Igalla et al.,
2019). However, the literature is mixed on whether it is an effective form of participation.
Marien and Kern (2018) view direct democracy as a meaningful opportunity for citizens to
participate in policymaking, affording citizens a broader voice than they would have in a wholly
representational process. Other direct democracy research has focused on its causal relationship
to citizen participation, often measured by voter turnout and civic engagement (Bowler &
Donovan, 2002; Tolbert et al., 2003). Tolbert et al. (2003) found that direct democracy positively
affects voter turnout, though this effect is more salient in traditionally lower-turnout elections.
Bowler and Donovan (2002) concluded that voters with access to the initiative process tended to
be more confident in their own political abilities and viewed representative government more
favorably. Boehmke and Bowen (2010) concluded that individuals were more likely to
participate in interest groups in states with high to moderate levels of initiative use. On the other
hand, Ladner and Fiechter’s (2012) research on Swiss cantons found that the presence of direct
democracy had no meaningful impact on electoral participation, though jurisdictions with robust
forms of direct democracy also tended to promote other forms of civic participation.
Other research has explored a more symbiotic relationship between direct and
participatory democracy. Slaev et al. (2019) described an intertwined relationship between direct
democracy and citizen participation, characterizing such participation as a form of direct
democracy that connects the process to representative government. That study further contrasted
citizens’ initiatives, one-time incidents generated from the electorate, with public participation,
which is intended to be ongoing and often initiated by representative government (Slaev et al.,
2019). Examining a bikeway planning process throughout several major cities, Slaev et al.
36
(2019) concluded that concrete rules akin to those that guide direct democratic processes could
enhance public participation.
Most research on participatory democracy stresses the need for a deliberative element in
the process—an element that initiatives lack (Barber, 1984; Schlozman & Yohai, 2008). Indeed,
studies that focus on local forms of deliberative democracy emphasize the differences from
direct democracy (Cortés, 2019; Gherghina & Geissel, 2020; Rojon et al., 2019). One study
sharply distinguished “vote-centric” initiatives and referendums from “talk-centric” models of
deliberative democracy, such as community meetings that aim for consensus (Rojon et al., 2019,
p. 214). Survey results confirmed the researchers’ hypothesis that citizens prefer vote-centric
instruments. As compared to talk-centric processes, they are more inclusive because everyone
can participate; they are perceived as more democratic because everyone’s vote counts equally;
and they affirmatively implement citizen preferences versus merely considering them (Rojon et
al., 2019).
However, Garcia (2020) found that one of the key problems with the initiative process is
the lack of deliberation, which can lead to extreme and divisive policies. Aronin (2023) likewise
explained that the initiative power stands in tension with California’s steadfast commitment to
deliberation, earlier exhibited during California’s two constitutional conventions and, more
recently, in judicial decisions. He observed that initiatives tend to be singular, yes-no decisions
that voters make without having the time or expertise to understand the initiative’s larger context
or its complete consequences (Aronin, 2023). Cortés (2019) similarly distinguished deliberative
democracy, which prioritizes participation and voice, from direct democracy, which prioritizes
votes. That study further noted that incorporating a deliberative component could increase
citizens’ involvement in the initiative process (Cortés, 2019).
37
The scant research on whether and how direct democracy fosters civic participation
largely focuses on statewide initiatives. However, recent studies have focused on a type of
citizen participation that occurs at the local level—citizen-led initiatives, defined as collective
and self-organized activities by citizens to provide public goods or services independently of the
government (Igalla et al., 2019, 2020, 2021; Mees, 2022; Mees et al., 2019). These efforts
(hereafter described as community initiatives) are distinct from a citizen-led ballot initiative
because they do not require a vote of the electorate to be implemented (Igalla et al., 2019). For
example, a community initiative might involve a group of citizens seeking to develop and
maintain hiking trails throughout their community or to create and staff a job-training program in
an underserved area. The literature has described direct democracy as meaningfully less
participatory than a community initiative. Igalla et al. (2019) characterized ballot initiatives as
“passive” and “politically oriented” when compared to citizens’ mobilizing resources to carry out
a public service project (p. 1177). Similarly, Bosschaart et al. (2020) expressly distinguished
self-organized community initiatives from both government-initiated civic participation and “the
political term ‘citizen initiative,’ where citizens write a motion and collect signatures to put it on
the political agenda, thus, turning the action and responsibility back to the government” (p. 2).
Despite this distinction, research on community initiative provides a useful framework by which
to consider the relative roles of government and citizens in connection with a direct democracy
effort.
Citizen and Local Government Perceptions of One Another
Citizens’ perceptions of government are relevant to the relationship between direct and
representative democracy. Trust in government involves at least two levels of inquiry, the first
being an evaluation of current elected officials and the second involving a more basic and long-
38
term view of whether government is operating in a functionally competent manner (Dyck &
Lascher, 2019). Political trust is enhanced when constituents view elected officials as responsive,
competent, and professional. Not surprisingly, it is also fostered when they do not see
government as corrupt and perceive representatives as placing citizen interests above their own
(Rahn & Rudolph, 2005). Bengtsson and Wass (2010) found that voters’ perception of their
representatives was unaffected by their view of their representative as a delegate (reflecting the
public will) or a trustee (employing independent political judgment).
The impact of citizens’ initiatives on government trust is unclear (Christensen, 2019).
Smith and Tolbert (2004) found that voters living in initiative states expressed more confidence
in government responsiveness and were more likely to assert that public officials valued their
opinions, while Dyck and Lascher (2019) found that citizens’ initiatives tended to heighten
distrust of government by reminding voters of problems they believe their elected officials
should have addressed. Bauer and Fatke (2014) similarly found that the use of direct democratic
instruments can heighten distrust by fostering the belief that government authorities need direct
action to correct them; “[i]n short, political authorities that need correction cannot be trusted” (p.
53). The reaction of elected officials can compound the issue. If government is constantly being
corrected, representatives may not feel an obligation to honor the trust of being elected to office
and may, instead, follow a personal agenda (Bauer & Fatke, 2014).
Bowler et al. (2001) found that government representatives’ perception of direct
democracy was mixed. On the one hand, the initiative permits voters to make decisions on
matters that those officials may want to control, resulting in an unfavorable opinion of the
process (Bowler et al., 2001). On the other hand, elected officials may prefer not having to
decide certain controversial issues and, therefore, might support using the initiative (Bowler et
39
al., 2001). Ideological predilictions also likely influence officials’ views on the process. A recent
study found that support for direct democracy was higher among elected officials who lacked
confidence in traditional government institutions and decision-making processes, viewing direct
democracy as a viable alternative to the existing system (Gherghina et al., 2023).
At the local level, some limited research addresses how elected officials view and value
the public’s involvement more generally (Hendriks & Lees-Marshment, 2019). For example, a
2009 National League of Cities (NCL) survey found that local officials were ambivalent about
public engagement efforts. A majority (57%) of public officials responded they were satisfied
with the type and amount of public engagement in their communities, and 55% thought such
engagement fostered a stronger sense of community. Only 30% thought the public valued public
engagement processes to a great extent (Barnes & Mann, 2011), a result consistent with Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse’s (2002) conclusion that despite their disillusionment with and criticism of
representative government, most citizens do not desire to engage directly in policymaking. The
NCL survey respondents were split on whether citizens possessed the knowledge and skills to
engage effectively; they tended to believe that engagement efforts attracted the same core group
of individuals seeking to advocate only for issues that affected them directly (Barnes & Mann,
2011). Additionally, a study conducted in North Carolina found that elected officials across four
cities consistently believed that they were elected to and in the best position to represent the
entire community by balancing competing interests, viewing participating citizens as advocating
for their self-interest without considering the community’s needs (Berner et al., 2011).
Hagelskamp et al. (2013) surveyed approximately 900 local officials and 500 civic
leaders in California, finding that while local officials viewed themselves as offering ample
opportunity for citizens to engage in decision-making efforts, they perceived the public as largely
40
disengaged, uninformed, and increasingly angry with and distrustful of government (Hagelskamp
et al., 2013). Local officials conceded, however, that traditional public hearings tended to be
dominated by those with narrower agendas and negative viewpoints and, therefore, may not be
conducive to effective engagement. While over 40% of officials supported more deliberative and
less pro forma public engagement efforts, an equivalent number was more tentative, questioning
whether the potential benefits would outweigh the challenges associated with such engagement
(Hagelskamp et al., 2013). Local officials expressed concern that deliberative efforts would fail
to engage anyone except “the usual suspects” and that there would still be complaints from those
who felt unengaged despite increased effort (Hagelskamp et al., 2013. p. 24). Notably, most
officials changed their opinion about public engagement during their time in office, increasingly
appreciating the value of engagement and its impact on policymaking over time (Hagelskamp et
al., 2013).
While the foregoing literature focuses on elected officials’ perceptions, some scholars
have reasoned that a public administrator’s attitude toward public participation is the most
significant factor determining the efficacy of the engagement (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Yang
& Callahan, 2007). Public administrators or city managers exercise wide discretion over public
participation efforts, including whether and how such efforts are structured and implemented
(Yang & Callahan, 2007). Importantly, they are often the primary source of information for local
elected officials (Migchelbrink & Van de Walle, 2022). Public administrators who value citizen
participation may be more likely to recruit and retain public servants who support public
engagement, whereas administrators who do not value participation may both thwart
involvement at the citizen level and discourage elected officials from employing citizen input
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Liao & Schachter, 2018).
41
While some research suggests that government staff members support citizen
involvement, other work found the opposite. Evaluating public administrators’ support for social
entrepreneurship—defined as individuals or organizations taking the initiative to address local
social challenges—Korosec and Berman (2006) found that three-fourths of the jurisdictions
studied provided active or some support of private efforts, including by providing information
and raising community awareness, coordinating and supporting program implementation, and
helping with resource acquisition. In contrast, Cassia and Magno (2011) highlighted the
differences in opinion between public administrators and local elected officials, with the latter
more receptive to public engagement for formulating policy and viewing citizens as a more
important source of information than administrators. Two possible explanations for the
difference were the public administrators’ recognition that increased public engagement meant
an increased staff workload and/or the administrators’ unwillingness to cede power to the public
(Cassia & Magno, 2011). Regardless of the reason, however, a public administrator’s reluctance
to foster public participation could lead to a minimization of such efforts (Askim & Hanssen,
2008).
Local Government Roles
This research examines how direct and representative democratic processes operate in
connection with special tax initiatives. Because direct democracy is viewed as a means for
citizens to bypass traditional legislative institutions to enact their policy (Ferraiolo, 2023), few
studies have focused on the role of government in connection with citizens’ initiatives.
Consequently, this study adapts a framework from the literature on community initiatives to
structure the analysis. While community initiatives are distinct from those examined here, they
share the element of being citizen-led, which separates them from other forms of citizen
42
participation initiated and often overseen by governmental authority (Mees, 2022). Some
scholars likewise view community initiatives as distinct from the well-researched area of co-
production, which tends to involves collaborative, power-sharing arrangements between
government and nonstate actors to provide public services (Sorrentino et al., 2018). Though co-
production involves a heightened degree of citizen participation relative to other forms of civic
engagement, it nonetheless necessitates a level of government control in the creation of
conditions or removal of barriers to promote and oversee citizen involvement (Rosen & Painter,
2019; Sorrentino et al., 2018).
Mees et al. (2019) emphasized that a community initiative is a distinctive form of citizen
participation because such initiatives “are predominantly led by citizens and other nonstate
actors, who independently develop their own solutions and project to a policy problem,” which
“is fundamentally different from public participation, in which citizens participate in
policymaking that is initiated and structured by government” (p. 200). Edelenbos et al. (2018)
likewise contrasted traditional, government-led public participation with citizen self-
organization, the latter involving citizens engaging in collective action independently from
government, determining the priorities and content of their engagement, and harnessing public
processes to further their objectives. By controlling the initiative’s goals, means, and
implementation, citizens effectively achieve the highest level of involvement on Arnstein’s
(1969) ladder of citizen participation (Igalla et al., 2020).
Though research regarding the role of government in relation to community initiatives is
rare (Bakker et al., 2012; Edelenbos et al., 2018), the literature acknowledges that the
government’s role in relation to citizen-driven activity is necessarily unique (Igalla et al., 2020;
Mees et al., 2019). Because citizens function as empowered actors in a community initiative, the
43
role of government must shift from a model of regulation to facilitation. While specific activities
such as rule establishment and process management (Bakker et al., 2012); the provision of start-
up funds, marketing, and technical training (Igalla et al., 2020); and the provision of ongoing
financial and networking support (Chin & Mees, 2020) signify government facilitation, Mees et
al. (2019) recognized the absence of a thorough conceptualization of how the government might
facilitate and enable citizen action. Drawing on a framework first outlined by the Dutch Council
for Public Administration, an independent advisory body for the Dutch government, one study
developed a ladder of “government participation,” an analytical device to provide a model of
government roles in connection with a community initiative (Mees et al., 2019).
Fashioned after Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, which places citizen
control at the top, the ladder of government participation is inverted so that high levels of
government involvement are at the top; the goal is for government to descend the ladder or
lessen the scope of involvement to enable community initiatives to thrive. The ladder presumes
that government’s participation in connection with a community initiative should be
fundamentally different from its role in other types of public participation, meaning that it should
facilitate or enable, rather than regulate, to support but not interfere with a community initiative
(Mees et al., 2019). Table 2 outlines the various levels of government involvement:
Table 2
The Ladder of Government Participation
Rung Local government
role
Who initiates, coordinates
and decides
Local government
practices
5 Regulating Government regulates
interventions by the
community, so initiates,
coordinates and decides
(hierarchical government).
Policymaking, organizing
traditional public
participation such as
hearings and citizen
juries, checking, enforcing
regulations, and
44
Rung Local government
role
Who initiates, coordinates
and decides
Local government
practices
sanctioning in case of
noncompliance.
4 Network steering Government (co-) initiates and
creates a network of public and
private stakeholders; it
coordinates the decision-
making process. Decisions are
co-decided in the network.
Process coordination,
fostering of dialogue and
negotiation among
stakeholders, mediation of
interests, arbitrage of
conflicts, trust building,
creation of a level playing
field through rules of the
game.
3 Stimulating Government actively stimulates
the initiation and continuation
of community initiatives.
Initiatives coordinate and
decide independently from
government.
Provision of structural
(financial) support during
a longer period.
2 Facilitating/enabling Initiatives are self-initiated, and
the government has an interest
in making them happen.
Initiatives coordinate and
decide independently from
government.
Boundary spanning
activities that facilitate
free flows of ideas, people
and resources, while
maintaining a boundary
between the initiative and
its institutional
environment; process
facilitation, helping the
initiative to find its way in
the municipal
organization, providing a
(very) limited amount of
resources and relevant
information, schooling
and other forms of
capacity development.
1 Letting go Initiatives are self-initiated,
self-coordinated and self-
governed without the help of
government.
None, government is not
participating in any direct
way, but indirectly by
becoming ambassadors
for such initiatives
(“hands-off
metagovernance”).
45
Note. From “From Citizen Participation to Government Participation: An Exploration of the
Roles of Local Governments in Community Initiatives for Climate Change Adaptation in the
Netherlands” by H. L. P. Mees, C. J.Uittenbroek, D. L. T. Hegger, & P. P. J. Driessen, 2019,
Environmental Policy and Governance, 29, 198–208. (https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1847).
Copyright 2019 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Mees et al. (2019) acknowledged the ladder’s limitations, including that it categorizes
ideal roles that, in practice, overlap and blend and that it does not depict the individual
government leader’s role. Nonetheless, it enabled a systematic analysis of government
involvement in community initiatives. Studying several climate change adaptation initiatives,
Mees et al. (2019) found that network steering was the most common rung and that while there
was a range of involvement across initiatives, none had reached the letting go rung. Though local
governments were experimenting with moving down the ladder, local leaders expressed some
concerns, including the practical necessity of some government involvement, limited buy-in
from staff, and potential inequities among neighborhoods or regions (Mees et al., 2019).
In one study applying the government participation ladder, van de Griend et al. (2019)
highlighted that different rungs may be appropriate for different stages of an initiative and that
more government involvement might be necessary at the early, agenda-setting stage. The study
questioned the ladder’s implicit assumption that citizen participation will fill the gap created by
less government involvement, reasoning that government’s descending the ladder could just as
easily be construed to legitimize declining government action or to pave the way for special
interests (van de Griend et al., 2019). That study, however, involved urban food policy and
admitted that its central assumption was that strong municipal leadership was required in that
context (van de Griend et al., 2019).
46
Other literature can be read to question whether representative government’s optimal
position in connection with citizen-led activity is at the bottom of the ladder of government
participation. Specifically addressing ballot initiatives, Ferraiolo (2023) posited the notion that
government efforts to increase involvement by regulating or even interfering in the initiative
process should be viewed as another means of checks and balances as opposed to a threat to
direct democracy (Ferraiolo, 2023). In a study of several statewide initiatives involving
marijuana legalization and governance issues, Ferraiolo found that the presence of statewide
regulations dictating government’s role effectively limited legislative involvement and that
legislators were less likely to interfere with measures that passed with higher margins of victory
and more likely to intervene in initiatives that addressed their institutional power (Ferraiolo,
2023). Focusing on government efforts at the implementation stage, Ferraiolo found that
legislative efforts to amend or alter the initiatives were primarily modest and reasonable. The
author viewed legislative involvement as a complementary policymaking avenue to direct
democracy and explained that some level of reasonable and restrained government involvement
in the initiative process could lead to more effective policy (Ferraiolo, 2023).
Though not in the context of a ballot initiative, Aylett (2013) similarly found advantages
to a municipally supported yet community-led solar energy initiative, where government staff
members characterized their relationship with citizen activists as a partnership and provided
discrete technical and administrative assistance as well as some modest financial support to the
effort. Based on a systematic literature review of community initiatives worldwide, Igalla et al.
(2019) found that the top five factors influencing the outcomes of those initiatives were network
structure, organizational capacity, government support, nonprofit support, and leadership, with
government support including both institutional context and the attitudes of government
47
representatives. In subsequent research, Igalla et al. (2021) determined that over 96% of the
community initiatives studied received one or more forms of government support. Edelenbos et
al. (2018) also highlighted the necessity of some level of government involvement with a
community initiative, describing the importance of individuals who can span boundaries and
operate with both government and citizens’ groups.
Citizen Roles
Citizens are central to a direct democracy effort. In terms of the role of the citizen in
relation to an initiative, the literature has focused on voters rather than initiative proponents
(Boehmke & Bowen, 2010; Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Tolbert et al., 2003). Adams’ (2012)
study uniquely and broadly identified some of the features of local initiative proponents, finding
that local volunteer groups were the most prevalent advocates. Other literature asserted that
initiative proponents’ impatience with the legislative process leads them to bypass representative
government and bring a new law directly to the voting public (Greenfield, 2004).
Initiative proponents may be viewed as policy entrepreneurs, defined by Roberts and
King (1991) as those “who work from outside the formal governmental system to introduce,
translate, and implement innovative ideas into public sector practice” (p. 152). According to
Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework, policy entrepreneurs exploit opportunities that
arise with the opening of a policy window, which is the period when there is a convergence
between a specific problem, a policy idea potentially resulting in an effective solution, and
political conditions that enable the implementation of that solution. The window opening results
in the problem and solution receiving serious attention and a correspondingly more prominent
place on the policy agenda (Liu et al., 2010). A judicial opinion that disrupts a previously settled
48
area of the law may create a policy window for those who must interpret the decision (Lee,
2003).
Policy entrepreneurs recognize and facilitate the creation of these windows of
opportunity and use them to promote their preferred policy solution (Liu et al., 2010; Petridou et
al., 2015; Zahariadis, 2014). To effectuate their solution, policy entrepreneurs engage in a range
of activities, including working with advocacy coalitions, using policy networks, and
disseminating their knowledge to promote change (Mintrom & True, 2022). They are motivated,
dedicated, and persistent, skillfully able to harness resources (Saetren, 2016). Roberts and King
(1991) found they tended to engage in actions to effectuate their policy, including generating and
disseminating new policy ideas, formulating a political vision and strategy, mobilizing
individuals and groups in support of their ideas, and facilitating the implementation process. Per
Roberts and King (1991),
By virtue of their positions outside the formal governmental system and of being unable
to rely on any regular funding source or any permanent organization base, the policy
entrepreneurs had to be involved in a wide-ranging set of activities to empower
themselves and their ideas. (p. 168)
Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al. (2023) specifically acknowledged that local-level policy
entrepreneurs “are increasingly developing their distinctive narratives and strategies to cope
[with] local issues” (p. 241). For example, Hagenaars et al.’s (2020) study of three sweetened
beverage tax measures in local jurisdictions discussed the policy windows created by the
combination of local financial challenges and new public health information that enabled elected
officials who sponsored the taxes and citizen advocates who supported them to shift the policy
agenda. While Hagenaars et al. (2020) commented on policy windows in the context of a tax
49
measure, the role of a policy entrepreneur is generally to help set the policy agenda and secure
change via legislative—not voter—action (Anderson et al., 2020).
Some of the literature addressing community initiatives identifies certain qualities of
those initiative coordinators. In that context, Connelly et al. (2020) found initiative organizers to
be strategic networkers, working with the members of the public as individuals, with a variety of
interest groups, and with geographically defined communities. They likewise networked with
government organizations, with a core group of organizers strategically positioning themselves
as a knowledgeable and valuable government partner (Connelly et al., 2020). Bosschaart et al.
(2020) added that community initiatives can arise in response to dissatisfaction with the status
quo and represent the proponents’ effort to create a better society. The study stressed that
initiatives result from a combination of self-reliant behavior and a desire to do good (Bosschaart
et al., 2020).
An initiative’s subject matter can be a key factor triggering the type of coalition that
becomes involved. For example, after the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a
moratorium on the sale of certain e-cigarettes, JUUL Labs, an e-cigarette manufacturer and seller
that dominated the youth market, sponsored an initiative purporting to authorize and regulate the
use of e-cigarettes in the jurisdiction (Sircar & Glantz, 2021). In response, a coalition of
individuals with different interests and backgrounds formed the opposition committee. The group
included those who had worked on the e-cigarette ban effort that preceded the board of
supervisors’ action, public health advocates, influential parents, and wealthy individuals. The
core group comprised those involved in the previous effort, which led to high levels of trust
within the group and knowledge of the San Francisco political landscape. Partnering with the
local chapter of a national group of parents seeking to prevent e-cigarette use among youth
50
significantly enhanced the group’s resources (Sircar & Glantz, 2021). Though certain
recognizable categories—the public health industry, advocacy groups, and funders—combined
to oppose the initiative, there is no indication that an initiative addressing a different type of
issue would have motivated the involvement of this particular coalition.
Conclusion
In sum, direct democracy—specifically the initiative process—is enshrined in
California’s Constitution and a deeply held value in the state’s political culture. The local
process is unique and involves elements of representative government, civic participation and
citizen-led activity. However, current literature does not address how these dimensions of local
democracy work together in the context of a citizens’ initiative, and this study was designed to
fill that gap. Particularly now that California’s courts have created an incentive to use the
initiative process in the context of special tax measures, the roles of citizens have changed vis-à-
vis those in local government, and, in turn, the role of local government must adjust. Examining
how local jurisdictions deal with special tax initiatives under the new framework is the first step
to understanding how initiative stakeholders and representative government move forward
together.
51
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This study utilized a qualitative research methodology, in keeping with the goals of
qualitative research to understand how people make sense of their world and how they interpret
and give meaning to their experiences (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The inquiry in qualitative
research focuses on how individuals or a group experience an event or condition from their
perspective (Agee, 2009). Qualitative data offers grounded and rich descriptions of human
processes and interactions (Miles et al., 2014). In contrast to quantitative research, which is often
focused on enumeration and prediction, qualitative research is focused on how and why—
examining the meaning of a phenomenon (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Yin, 2018). Four key
characteristics of qualitative research are that it concentrates on meaning and understanding, the
researcher serves as the primary instrument for both data collection and analysis, the process is
inductive in that data is gathered to build theories and hypotheses, and the data results in a richly
descriptive account of the phenonon (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Research Design
This project employed a case study design, a recognized approach in qualitative research
and the most appropriate for this research (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Rashid et al., 2019).
Essentially, a case study is “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system” (Merriam
& Tisdell, 2016, p. 37). The case study method facilitates the exploration of a specific
phenomenon within its own context using various data sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Creswell,
2013). It is a particularly effective design when studying a process (Smith, 2018) and when an
understanding of the case is influenced by contextual conditions attendant to the issue (Yin,
2018). The case study design was appropriate here because the focus of this study is on how and
why questions related to the initiative process; those in the study—elected officials, municipal
52
staff, and local stakeholders—cannot be manipulated experimentally; and legal, political, and
economic conditions are relevant to and intertwined with an understanding of local initiatives
(Baxter & Jack, 2008; Rashid et al., 2019; Yin, 2018).
This research was designed as a multiple case study, which, as Yin (2018) discussed, has
the benefit of improved generalizability and an assurance that the results make sense and are not
entirely idiosyncratic (Miles & Huberman, 1984). The design allowed for conducting analyses
both within a case—a particular special tax initiative—and across cases in multiple jurisdictions
(Baxter & Jack, 2008; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). By analyzing processes and outcomes across
multiple cases, including how they were influenced by local conditions, the study yielded richer
descriptions and strengthened explanations (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Utilizing a multiple-case
design provided multiple perspectives, thereby adding depth and providing clarity to the
initiative process in each jurisdiction (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Those perspectives came from those
occupying different roles in the same jurisdiction and those occupying the same or similar roles
across jurisdictions. A multiple case study also allowed for an understanding of whether similar
results occurred among cases (literal replication) or whether contrasting results occurred but
possibly for predictable reasons (theoretical replication; Baxter & Jack, 2008; Rowley, 2002;
Yin, 2018).
The first stage of the study was case selection, which, as Koivu and Hinze (2017)
maintain, is a critical component of case study research. The goal was to select cases that were
representative of California special tax initiatives as a whole yet also exhibited variation among
relevant demographic dimensions (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Where, as here, there was a
fairly limited number of possible case candidates, the selection was performed in a single step
according to the streamlined screening procedure outlined by Yin (2018), involving the
53
application of a defined set of operational criteria to the features of each case. While a matrix
analysis can be used to interpret and report research findings (Averill, 2002), it was used here to
facilitate case selection by categorizing relevant information about each case to ensure a
desirable mix of typicality and diversity. By displaying specific features about each case in a
different cell, the matrix provided a systematic way for the researcher to see similarities,
differences, and trends among cases (Averill, 2002).
In 2022, California cities, counties, and special districts qualified 17 special tax initiatives
for the ballot.
5
Only one special tax initiative appeared on the ballot in 2020 when the law was
uncertain (and the pandemic made signature gathering especially challenging), and nine were on
the ballot in 2018 after the Supreme Court opened the door to the lower voter threshold. While
any of these initiatives between 2018 and 2022 could serve as a case study, a focus on 2022
initiatives ensured that the special tax initiative was proposed at a time when the incentive to
bring an initiative was clear. Table 3 presents a matrix containing the 2022 special tax initiatives
and the characteristics used to select a subset of four for a multiple case study.
5
Citizens in Calaveras County also qualified a general tax for the November 2022 ballot which has not been
included as part of this study.
54
Table 3
2022 Special Tax Initiatives
Jurisdiction Region Population and
Racial
Characteristics
6
Education
Level and
Median
Income
7
Political
Ideology
8
Initiative Initiative
Sponsor
Electio
n
Date
Outcom
e
City and
County of San
Francisco
Northern
California;
coastal;
urban
815,201
39.2% White
34.4% Asian
15.4% Latino
11% other
59.5%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$126,187
median
household
income
85.3%
Democrat
12.7%
Republican
Gross receipts tax to
fund guaranteed
income programs and
support small
business
John Elberling,
housing
advocate, and
Kaylah
Williams,
campaign
manager and
flight attendant
11/8/2
2
Pulled
from the
ballot
City and
County of San
Francisco
Northern
California;
coastal;
urban
815,201
39.2% White
34.4% Asian
15.4% Latino
11% other
59.5%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$126,187
median
household
income
85.3%
Democrat
12.7%
Republican
Proposition M,
vacancy tax for 30
years on residential
property, varying by
parcel size, to
provide housing
subsidies and
affordable housing
Maya Chupkov,
disability rights
advocate, and
Shanti Singh,
tenant organizer
11/8/2
2
Passed
54.51%
in
support
City and
County of San
Francisco
Northern
California;
coastal;
urban
815,201
39.2% White
34.4% Asian
15.4% Latino
11% other
59.5%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$126,187
median
household
income
85.3%
Democrat
12.7%
Republican
Proposition O, parcel
tax increase (varying
per parcel) to fund
community college
Mary
Bravewoman,
City College
teacher and
union leader
11/8/2
2
Failed,
36.67%
in
support
City of Los
Angeles
Southern
California;
coastal;
urban
3,849,297
48.4% Latino
28.1% White
11.7%Asian
11.8% other
36.2%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$69,778
median
household
income
78% Democrat
22%
Republican
Proposition ULA,
4% documentary
transfer tax on
property sales above
$5 million (and 5.5%
above $10 million) to
fund affordable
housing
United to House
LA
11/8/2
2
Passed,
57.77%
in
support
City of
Manhattan
Beach
Southern
California;
coastal;
urban
34,668
71.3% White
14.7% Asian
8.1% Latino
5.9% other
76.8%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$153,926
median
household
income
68.1%
Democrat
29.9%
Republican
Measure A, $1095
annual parcel tax for
12 years for schools
MB Citizens for
Schools
6/7/22 Failed,
31.98%
in
support
City of Morro
Bay
Central
California;
coastal,
suburban
10,696
74.5% White
15% Latino
5.3% Asian
5.2% other
42.8%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$80,808
median
household
income
52.3%
Democrat
42.2%
Republican
Measure B-22, $120
annual parcel tax to
maintain and
improve harbor
infrastructure
Friends of the
Morro Bay
Harbor
Department
11/8/2
2
Failed,
35.77%
in
support
City of
Oakland
Northern
California;
urban
430,553
28.6% White
27.2% Latino
22% Black
15.7% Asian
6.5% other
47.3%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$85,628
median
household
income
79.8%
Democrat
17.6%
Republican
Measure Y, $68
annual parcel tax to
support the Oakland
Zoo
Yes for Oakland
Zoo Committee
11/8/2
2
Passed,
63.07%
in
support
City of Santa
Monica
Southern
California;
urban
89,947
62.7% White
16.6% Latino
9.6% Asian
11.1% other
67.8%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$99,847
median
71% Democrat
26.9%
Republican
Measure GS,
documentary transfer
tax establishing a
new tier on sales over
$8 million to fund
Santa Monicans
for Renters
Rights, Michael
Soloff and
11/8/2
2
Passed,
53.49%
in
support
6
From QuickFacts by U.S. Census Bureau, 2021. (www.census.gov/quickfacts).
7
From QuickFacts by U.S. Census Bureau, 2021. (www.census.gov/quickfacts).
8
Political ideology is measured by the jurisdiction’s presidential vote in the 2020 election, though some smaller
cities’ figures are based on countywide data.
54
55
Jurisdiction Region Population and
Racial
Characteristics
6
Education
Level and
Median
Income
7
Political
Ideology
8
Initiative Initiative
Sponsor
Electio
n
Date
Outcom
e
household
income
homeless prevention
and education
Denny Zane,
chairs
City of South
San Francisco
Northern
California;
coastal,
urban
63,484
43.4% Asian
29.8% Latino
21.5% White
5.3% other
38.4%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$112,818
median
household
income
85.3%
Democrat
12.7%
Republican
Measure DD,
commercial parcel
tax of $2.50 per
square foot to fund
preschool education
Early Care and
Education for
All
11/8/2
2
Failed,
47.24%
in
support
Contra Costa
County
Northern
California;
suburban
1,156,966
39.8% White
27% Latino
20.2% Asian
9.5% Black
3.5% other
44.1%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$110,455
median
household
income
71.6%
Democrat
26.3%
Republican
Measure L, $50
annual parcel tax for
maintenance and
landscaping in the
Crockett Community
Services District
Crockett
Improvement
Association
11/8/2
2
Passed,
62.78%
in
support
County of
Fresno
Central
California;
urban
1,015,190
55% Latino
26.7% White
11.9% Asian
6.4% other
22.6%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$61,276
median
household
income
53% Democrat
44%
Republican
Measure E, 0.2%
increase in
transactions and use
tax for 20 years to
upgrade university
academic facilities
Developer
Richard
Spencer, Tim
Orman and
Measure E
Committee
11/8/2
2
Failed,
47.14%
in
support
County of
Mariposa
Central
California;
rural and
urban
17,020
77.5% White
13.8% Latino
4% two or
more races
4.7% other
28.9%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$53,304
median
household
income
39.8%
Democrat
57.9%
Republican
Measure O, 1% sales
tax for 40 years to
fund construction of
a new hospital
Citizens to Save
the Hospital
Committee,
Suzette Prue,
Beth Tomsick,
chairs
6/7/22 Passed,
69.62%
in
support
County of
Mendocino
Northern
California;
Coastal; rural
91,305
62.9% White
27.2% Latino
6.6%
American
Indian
3.3% other
24.5%
Bachelor’s
degree or more
$56.378
median
household
income
66.4%
Democrat
30.6%
Republican
Measure O, 0.25%
sales tax to fund
library services and
building
improvements
Citizens
Committee for
the Library
Initiative 2022,
Carolyn
Schneider, chair
11/8/2
2
Passed
60.82%
in
support
County of
Monterey
Central
California;
coastal;
urban and
agricultural
437,325
60.4% Latino
28.4% White
11.2% other
26.5%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$82.013
median
household
income
69.5%
Democrat
28.2%
Republican
Measure Q, $49
annual parcel tax for
10 years to fund
increased and
improved affordable
childcare
Care for
Monterey
County Kids –
Yes on Measure
Q Committee
11/8/2
2
Failed
41.10%
in
support
County of
Sacramento
Central
California;
central
valley; urban
and rural
1,588,921
42.1% White
24.4% Latino
17.8% Asian
15.7% other
31.4%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$70,684
median
household
income
61% Democrat
36%
Republican
Measure A, 0.5%
increase to existing
transactions and use
tax for transportation
infrastructure
improvement and
economic growth
support
A Committee
for a Better
Sacramento
11/8/2
2
Failed,
44.38%
in
support
Inverness
Public Utility
District
Northern
California;
coastal,
suburban,
rural
1660
88% White
6% Latino
6% other
67.2%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$72,292
median
household
income
82.3%
Democrat
15.8%
Republican
Measure O, 0.2%
annual parcel tax to
fund fire protection
measures
Inverness
Association
11/8/2
2
Failed,
28.01%
in
support
Kings County
Fire
Department
Central
California;
urban and
rural
153,443
56.6% Latino
30% White
7.4% Black
6% other
15%
bachelor’s
degree or more
$61,556
median
household
income
42.6%
Democrat
54.9%
Republican
Measure F, 0.5%
increase to existing
transaction and use
tax to support fire
services
Kings County
Firefighters
Union
6/7/22 Failed,
35.68%
in
support
While logistical constraints should not drive case selection, certain practical
considerations necessarily influence that selection (Koivu & Hinze, 2017). For example, San
56
Francisco’s proposed gross receipts tax was eliminated from consideration because the
initiative’s proponents suspended their campaign following criticism that the measure
unintentionally targeted small businesses while exempting larger companies, such as Amazon,
which it was designed to target (Tong, 2022). In examining the remaining 16 initiatives, four
jurisdictions (highlighted in Table 3) were selected as both representative, exemplifying the
special initiative tax process under current law, and diverse, exhibiting differences in key
variables (Seawright & Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2018): City of Manhattan Beach, City and County of
San Francisco (vacancy tax), City of Los Angeles, and County of Mariposa. The cases selected
for this multiple case study involved an exercise of discretion rather than a formulaic process
(Yin, 2018). Four cases were chosen based on research finding that a range of four to 10 cases
enables the researcher to capture complexity (Barratt et al., 2011), while a selection of cases at
the lower end of the range also affords a greater opportunity for in-depth exploration (Voss et al.,
2002).
Each case was typical in that it involved a special tax initiative sponsored by a citizen
group or individual citizens (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Each case likewise exhibited variation
among several key characteristics. The levels of government involved cities and counties and the
combination thereof in the case of San Francisco, as well as the involvement of a special district
in Mariposa and a school board in Manhattan Beach. The jurisdictions spanned Northern, Central
and Southern California, and populations ranged from just over 17,000 to just over four million.
Racial composition was primarily White in two jurisdictions and far more mixed in the other
two. One jurisdiction was solidly Democrat, two strongly leaned Democrat, and one leaned
Republican. Education level, median income, election date, and outcome likewise varied across
jurisdictions. Beyond variation, the cases were also considered diverse in some respects,
57
meaning they represented the outer range or maximum level of variance of certain variables,
including geographic region, population, and median income, and they were close to the outer
range on level of education (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Each jurisdiction also proposed a
different type of tax. Including the full range of variation enhanced variability with respect to
important case characteristics (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).
Data Collection
This study employed the multiple-source data collection that is the hallmark of a case
study design (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Yin, 2018). The use of multiple data sources enhanced
the study’s credibility and trustworthiness by enabling the triangulation of data collected through
different means (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Maxwell, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Collecting
data from multiple sources also provided a greater understanding of the phenomenon from
different perspectives (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Maxwell, 2013). This study utilized three sources of
information that are common to case study research: document review, interviews, and direct
observations (Yin, 2018).
Institutional Review Board Approval
This research involved human subjects and was therefore conducted in accordance with
guidelines established by the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative’s (CITI) human
research curriculum and the University of Southern California’s Office for the Protection of
Research Subjects. As a part of the university’s institutional review board (IRB) process, the
researcher initially received online training and completed exams issued by CITI. Following the
completion of all required CITI training, the researcher submitted an iStar application for IRB
review, which included a social behavioral protocol, proposed interview questions, and a
proposed observation protocol. This study qualified for an exempt level of review, as it proposed
58
research that involved less than a minimal risk of harm to the participants. It fell into the exempt
category of a benign behavioral intervention, meaning that it involved verbal responses from
adult participants who consented to their involvement, and any disclosure of their participation
would not place the participants at risk. Following IRB’s initial review and request for minor
changes to the application, the study received exempt approval on October 4, 2022.
Document Review
Document review began pending IRB review and approval, as no human subjects were
involved in that aspect of the research. Document analysis is an increasingly common method of
data collection in qualitative research, and it was particularly useful in this case study as a form
of data triangulation (Bowen, 2009). The word “document” is an overarching term that refers to
a range of written, digital, visual, and physical information that generally exists prior to the
commencement of the research (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 162). Documents can include
virtually anything that is written or stored physically or digitally, such as public records,
correspondence, newspaper articles, blogs, and campaign materials (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
In addition to constituting an independent form of evidence, documents provided context, offered
historical insight, and tracked the change or evolution of the phenomenon. They also aided in
identifying key stakeholders, suggesting questions to ask in interviews, identifying events to
observe, and corroborating other data sources (Bowen, 2009; Wood et al., 2020). Advantages to
document analysis included that it was efficient, cost-effective, and generally detailed (Bowen,
2009). Further, documents are static and cannot be manipulated by the research process (Bowen,
2009). However, there were limits to the utility of documents. Many documents did not address
the research question, given that they were produced for specific audiences and other purposes
(Bowen, 2009; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
59
Documents relevant to this case study included meeting agendas, municipal staff reports,
meeting minutes, resolutions, ballot pamphlets, digital news articles, campaign materials, and
social media posts. In securing the documents, the goal was to prioritize quality over quantity,
gathering those documents that offered information relevant to the research question while
triaging those documents that were duplicative or irrelevant to the study (Wood et al., 2020; Yin,
2018). Conducting a document review first was particularly helpful for obtaining background
and context. For each jurisdiction, the researcher first explored the municipal website for
information about each initiative and then searched the internet more generally using the name of
the tax, the type of tax (to capture information prior to the measure’s qualification for the ballot),
and the names of the campaign committee and/or individuals associated with each measure. The
researcher systematically kept track of each search to exhaust the relevant documentary
information available in each jurisdiction and ensure consistency across cases (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016).
To promote systematic collection and maintenance of the compiled documents, a case
study template was developed for each jurisdiction that categorized and summarized the
documents and included links to the full text of each. Categories included background
information about the city or county and the initiative’s development, as well as media coverage
of the initiative before it qualified for the ballot. Other categories pertained to materials
submitted to and produced by the city or county in connection with the measure’s qualification
and ballot materials, including arguments for and against the initiative. Media coverage of the
initiative after its qualification for the ballot, campaign materials, and post-election media
coverage of the initiative were also included. Some documents did not fit into a pre-defined
category and were labeled separately. One example is a report commissioned by a member of the
60
San Francisco Board of Supervisors concerning residential vacancies that was later used as an
evidentiary basis for the vacancy tax initiative in that jurisdiction (Brousseau & Xuereb, 2022).
For documents retrieved from a municipal website, it was relatively easy to ensure
authenticity, as the author, date, conditions under which the document was prepared, and the
reasons for its preparation were readily apparent (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Media reports were
confined to publications with a consistent online presence reporting about multiple aspects of
each jurisdiction. Verifying the authenticity of certain campaign materials occurred during
interviews with a respondent familiar with the document’s preparation. Except for campaign
sites verified through interviews, social media reports were not a meaningful source of data.
Social media posts were often created by idiosyncratic actors who tended to have a minor or no
role in connection with the initiative. Documents were particularly useful in providing context
and historical insight, tracking the development of each initiative over time, and identifying key
individuals to contact for interviews and key events to observe (Bowen, 2009).
Interviews
Interviews were an important source of the case study evidence gathered in this project
(Anyan, 2013; Yin, 2018). Interviews provide information about matters that cannot be
observed—including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, motivations, and events that have already
occurred (Anyan, 2013; Patton, 2002). They also capture another’s perspective and enable an
understanding of how that person makes sense of a phenomenon (Patton, 2002). It is important to
recognize that the quality of the data harnessed through an interview largely depends on the
interviewer (Patton, 2002). This research, therefore, utilized basic principles designed to produce
meaningful data, including ensuring that the environment was conducive to an honest answer,
61
asking questions designed to elicit the respondent’s articulable knowledge, and understanding the
phenomenon so that the answers had meaning to the interviewer (Krueger & Casey, 2015).
This study utilized a semi-structured interview approach, a middle point between highly
structured interviews with predetermined, standardized questions in a set order and an informal
conversation involving only a flexible list of topic areas (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Semi-
structured interviews involve the preparation of an interview guide with a mix of questions and
topics that need not be discussed in a specific order and that allows for follow-up based on the
respondent’s answers (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Hammer and Wildavsky (1993) characterized
the semi-structured interview as a “guided monologue,” meaning the interview is neither
completely controlled by the interviewer nor wholly free from her influence (p. 76). The goal
was to steer each interview participant in the direction of productive topics and away from
irrelevant subjects (Hammer & Wildavsky, 1993).
The interview questions were designed to elicit the experience or behavior of the
participants, to identify their opinions or values, to learn about their feelings and reactions, to
obtain their knowledge about a situation, and to learn about their background (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 2002). The questions were open-ended, used words and phrases with
which the participants were familiar, and were clear and direct (Krueger & Casey, 2015). The
IRB-approved interview protocol is attached as Appendix A. The questions in the protocol
included a mix of knowledge questions (eliciting factual knowledge about a phenomenon),
experience and behavior questions (enabling participants to discuss their role in a situation and
their actions and activities), and opinion questions (seeking information about participants’ views
on a particular topic; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
62
Twenty-one individuals participated in interviews. The group was a “purposeful
selection” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 97), composed primarily of elected officials, municipal staff
members, and proponents and opponents involved with the initiatives in each jurisdiction chosen
as a case. Four individuals from each jurisdiction participated in interviews. Within each group
of four, there was at least one elected official or government staff member, at least one initiative
proponent identified as a key stakeholder from the document review, and one initiative opponent
in jurisdictions where there was organized opposition. Interviewees identified another category
of individuals they believed were important to the local initiative process, and, as a result, the
remaining five participants were election attorneys and ballot initiative consultants who have
worked on special tax measures, including local initiatives, in California. A breakdown of the
role occupied by each interview participant is outlined in Table 4.
Table 4
Interviewees by Role
Jurisdiction Elected
Official
Municipal
Staff
Member
Key
Initiative
Proponent
Other
Initiative
Proponent
Initiative
Opponent
Consultant Attorney
Los Angeles X X X X
Manhattan
Beach
XX XX X
9
Mariposa X X XX
San
Francisco
XX X X
Unspecified XXX XX
Interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes each (with a range of 30 minutes to an hour
and 10 minutes) and were conducted via Zoom, which since the onset of COVID-19, has become
an increasingly common means of conducting qualitative research (Oliffe et al., 2021). Even
9
The Manhattan Beach elected official who was interviewed was also a key initiative opponent.
63
before Zoom became ubiquitous, however, scholars had begun studying the benefits and
drawbacks of using videoconferencing for qualitative interviews. For example, Deakin and
Wakefield (2014) found that synchronous, online interviews conducted via Skype afforded both
the interviewer and interviewee flexibility, facilitated rapport building, and were more cost-
effective than in-person interviews. Likewise, research directed specifically to Zoom
interviewing has found it to be a particularly effective form of qualitative data collection.
Multiple studies have concluded that Zoom enables interviewers to build a rapport with their
participants, sometimes facilitated by participants simultaneously feeling more relaxed and hence
open in their own environments (Oliffe et al., 2021) and by the equity created due to both parties
appearing similarly on screen (Irani, 2019). Both researchers and participants identify as key
benefits the accessibility, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness afforded by Zoom (Archibald et al.,
2019; Gray et al., 2020; Oliffe et al., 2021). Another frequently cited benefit is Zoom’s
simplicity and general ease of use (Archibald et al., 2019), including that participants need not
have an account or download any software (Gray et al., 2020). Finally, Zoom’s password
protection and cloud storage features enhance security and the participants’ privacy (Archibald et
al., 2019; Gray et al., 2020). The features and increasing use of Zoom effectively eliminated the
original concerns expressed about using videoconferencing in qualitative research, including
participants being unfamiliar with the technology or feeling uncomfortable on video (Deakin &
Wakefield, 2014).
Here, all participants were familiar with Zoom, and they appreciated the ease and
flexibility afforded by the technology. The use of Zoom enabled the researcher to conduct
interviews throughout the state, sometimes on short notice or accommodating a schedule change.
In terms of data storage, Zoom also enabled the researcher to maintain a video recording of each
64
interview and generate a rough audio transcript of each interview. Both by email prior to the
interview and verbally at the outset of each interview, each participant’s consent to being
recorded was secured. Also, prior to the interview, each participant received an information sheet
for exempt studies, attached as Appendix B, which described the nature of the research and the
participant’s involvement. The researcher watched the recording of each interview at least once
and conformed the audio transcript to what was said.
Direct Observations
The final data source for this study was direct observations, another common source of
evidence in case study research (Yin, 2018). Meetings are considered a source of observational
data (Yin, 2018), and online recordings of meetings have likewise become an acceptable source
of research data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Observational data can afford a different perspective
than interviews because it involves the place where the phenomenon naturally occurs and
represents a firsthand account of the phenomenon (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Observations were
useful in triangulating findings yielded through other data sources (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016)
and served as a complement to interviews (Yin, 2018).
The observations in this study comprised recordings of public hearings and other
meetings in each jurisdiction in which proposed initiatives were discussed. (Most jurisdictions
currently maintain recordings of their public hearings.) In research regarding the factors local
leaders considered in political decision-making, Capler (2020) conducted an in-depth case study
of a single jurisdiction utilizing interviews of elected officials and observations of public
meetings. Capler observed how local officials interacted with one another and debated and voted
on measures, which provided insight into the real-world process of local government decision-
making and the amount of time spent on those decisions (Capler, 2020).
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In line with Capler’s (2020) research and the observation features outlined by Merriam
and Tisdell (2016), the key elements that were studied during observations were the physical
setting; the chronology of the meeting; participant behaviors, including how the participants
engaged with the proposed special tax, how they engaged with one another, the language they
used and their nonverbal behavior; and what decisions were made during the meeting. To record
these features, the IRB-approved observation protocol was utilized to capture the relevant
elements and allow for a rich description of the meeting; the protocol is attached hereto as
Appendix C. The number and type of observations varied among jurisdictions for serval reasons,
including that more than one elected body was involved in two of the initiatives, one elected
official appeared at a public debate regarding one initiative, and a local ordinance in one
jurisdiction obviated the need for any hearing. Moreover, Mariposa County maintains audio-only
recordings of their meetings, meaning that any observation was confined to verbal behavior.
Table 5 describes the meetings that were observed.
Table 5
Observations by Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction Date Meeting Type
Los Angeles 6.15.22 City council meeting where Measure ULA is approved for the
ballot
Manhattan
Beach
2.2.22 School board meeting where the concept of a citizens’
initiative going forward in lieu of a school board measure is
discussed
3.8.22 City council meeting where Measure A is approved for the
ballot
5.3.22 City council meeting where an MOU between the city and the
school district is considered regarding the implementation of
Measure A
5.16.22 Public debate on Measure A; a Manhattan Beach Council
member speaks in opposition to the measure
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Jurisdiction Date Meeting Type
Mariposa 6.23.21 Public study session/workshop with the board of supervisors
and the John C. Fremont Healthcare District Board of
Directors, where an update on initiative efforts is provided
10.19.21 Board of supervisors meeting where Measure O is approved
for the ballot
San Francisco No date Pursuant to a local ordinance, San Francisco does not require a
hearing to verify whether an initiative petition has garnered a
sufficient number of signatures to go on the ballot. It has
delegated that authority to the department of elections.
Data Analysis
This research primarily utilized reflexive thematic analysis, which is a method for
identifying, analyzing, and recording patterns or themes in the data that acknowledges the
researcher’s role in interpreting the data (Braun & Clarke, 2022; Byrne, 2022). This research
generally followed Braun and Clarke’s (2021b, 2006) six steps: data familiarization, initial
coding, theme generation, theme development and review, theme refinement, and writing. The
multi-step methodological strategies outlined by Miles et al. (2014) and Houghton et al. (2015)
further enhanced the analysis. Throughout this process, it was important to remain mindful that
the steps are not intended to be linear but, rather, are to be flexibly applied depending on the data
and the research question (Byrne, 2022). The goal of the analysis was to make meaning of the
information that has been collected, which is another way of saying that the data was used to
answer the research question (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Data Familiarization
While the process of collecting data afforded some level of familiarization, during this
stage, the goal was to become immersed in the data by reading the entire data set (Braun &
Clarke, 2006; Byrne, 2022). The process of manually transcribing interviews is considered a
useful phase one activity, recognized as an interpretive rather than a mechanical act (Braun &
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Clarke, 2006; Byrne, 2022). Though Zoom provided a rough transcript of each interview, the
researcher carefully listened to each interview and conformed the transcripts, as sometimes large
swaths of conversation were omitted or inaccurately reported. This phase also involved re-
reading the document summaries and observation protocols and listening again to some of the
key stakeholder remarks made in public meetings. This phase can also involve preliminary
notetaking (Byrne, 2022), and the researcher did write some preliminary thoughts on the
transcripts.
Initial Coding
A code is a “descriptive or conceptual label that is assigned to excerpts of raw data”
(Houghton et al., 2015, p. 10). Codes serve as “prompts or triggers for deeper reflection on the
data’s meaning” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 73). The goal is to provide descriptive and interpretative
labels for pieces of data that are relevant to answering the research questions (Byrne, 2022).
Though it was initially hoped that transcript notes would be sufficient to generate themes, some
coding was necessary to organize and condense the data to retrieve the most meaningful material
and find commonality and diversity among the data (Byrne, 2022; Miles et al., 2014).
A predominately inductive coding approach was used—a bottom-up method in which the
codes stemmed from the data itself, as opposed to a deductive or top-down approach where
codes are predetermined from theory (Byrne, 2022; Miles et al., 2014). Byrne (2022)
acknowledged that a purely inductive approach is not possible, given that a researcher must have
some pre-existing framework in mind to know whether a piece of data is worth coding.
Consequently, codes necessarily bore some relationship to the research question and literature.
Both semantic (relying on the words in the data) and latent (applying some level of interpretation
to the data) coding were used (Byrne, 2022; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Because coding was
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performed manually rather than with the assistance of a software program, the codes were
written directly on the transcripts and on a separate list to track them and avoid redundancy.
Theme Generation
From the resulting long list of codes, pattern coding followed—a process that involved
analyzing the codes to consider how they might relate to one another to form themes (Miles et
al., 2014). Merriam and Tisdell (2016) described a comparable phase of analysis as breaking
down units of information and removing them from context to compare one unit to another in
search of “recurring regularities” or patterns in the data (p. 203). The researcher’s goal in
developing patterns to form themes was to capture the most meaningful answers to the research
question as opposed to focusing on the frequency of any particular code (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
According to Braun and Clarke (2013), “[a] theme ‘captures something important about
the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or
meaning within the data set’” (p. 224). It should capture multiple facets of a phenomenon or
experience (Braun & Clarke, 2021b). With this in mind, the researcher analyzed how different
codes might combine to form themes or subthemes, which involved finding relationships
between codes and grouping them into an organizing concept (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Byrne,
2022). Themes are neither found in nor emerge from the data; rather, they are created and
constructed by the researcher (Braun & Clarke, 2022). An initial collection of 10 potential
themes (four with subthemes) was generated and then revised into eight themes, half with
subthemes.
Theme Development and Review
The purpose of this phase was to refine themes by reviewing them in relation to the coded
data and the entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Byrne, 2022). To visualize whether the coded
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data fit within the proposed themes, the researcher developed a matrix display with the proposed
themes and subthemes on the vertical axis and both the participants (grouped by case and
identified by role) and observations on the horizontal axis. Data excerpts corresponding to
specific themes were entered, including meaningful quotations from participants. The vertical
axis also reserved a space for potential themes from further data analysis. Once the matrix was
complete, the researcher analyzed it utilizing some of the questions outlined by Byrne (2022): Is
this a theme or a code? What is the quality of the theme in relation to the research question? Is
the theme over or underinclusive? Is there sufficient meaningful data to support the theme? Is the
theme coherent?
Theme Refinement
To ensure that Chapter 4 focused on themes and findings rather than the factual
background of each case, before drafting the chapter, the researcher composed a synopsis of each
case using both the case study templates that captured the document review and the matrix
display containing both interview and observation highlights. The synopses are attached as
Appendices D, E, F and G. Thereafter, the researcher turned to Chapter 4 with the goal of
grouping the themes to create a coherent narrative (Byrne, 2022). The first task was to connect
the themes to the research question and sub-questions, and during that process, some themes
were collapsed into one another or set aside. Next, the researcher identified the data excerpts that
would be used to describe the theme, keeping in mind the importance of conveying both
cohesion and variability among the data, including within a role and a case and between roles
and cases (Byrne, 2022; Miles et al., 2014). The data excerpts were organized into a coherent and
internally consistent description of the themes, connected by an accompanying narrative
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explaining what was interesting about the excerpted data and why (Braun & Clarke, 2006;
Byrne, 2022).
Writing
This last phase of analysis involved developing each theme, supported by data and
literature, into a comprehensive analysis that ultimately became Chapter 4. Though the themes
had been defined in the prior phase, themes continued to shift slightly even during this phase,
and in many ways, the narrative became clearer and simpler. The researcher endeavored to
conceptualize the themes by capturing core ideas and telling an interpretative story about the
theme rather than merely summarizing a particular topic without delving into its meaning (Braun
& Clarke, 2022).
Methodological Reflection
The goal of this study was to produce trustworthy research results. Trustworthiness is
ensured when a study has been conducted with rigor, which in qualitative research is measured
by internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Ebneyamini & Sadeghi Moghadam, 2018;
Lock & Seele, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Moreover, the trustworthiness of the research
can be influenced by the researcher’s biases and assumptions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). For
these reasons, it is important to reflect on each aspect of the study’s methodology.
Researcher Perspective
The researcher is the primary instrument for qualitative data collection and analysis.
Consequently, the researcher’s philosophical assumptions and theoretical perspectives become
relevant (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Guba (1990) described a researcher’s orientation as a
“worldview,” which means “a basic set of beliefs that guide action” (p. 17). Worldviews can be
shaped by culture, education, experiences, political views, and more (Creswell, 2014).
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This researcher’s worldview in connection with this study has been shaped by
experience, including practicing law for over 30 years and serving as a city council member,
including a term as mayor. Tenure in local government heightened the researcher’s interest in the
connection between law and policy, a connection that is readily apparent in the Court of Appeal
decisions confirming the majority vote threshold for special tax initiatives. The specific interest
in special tax measures further stemmed from personal experience on the city council, during
which time two special tax measures were proposed, both continuations of an existing tax. Two
measures were necessary because the first failed to achieve supermajority support, while the
second (virtually identical to the first) passed with 69% of the vote. While neither measure
involved an initiative, the lesson gleaned from that experience was that active and transparent
collaboration between the city council and the public was a key to successful policy. Therefore,
while recognizing that a significant body of literature supports the notion that collaborative
governance is highly effective, it was important to be cognizant of a potential bias in favor of
government/citizen collaboration as the most effective initiative process.
Throughout a legal career and in local government, the researcher has self-identified as a
pragmatist. Pragmatism is a worldview that results from actions, situations, and consequences
and is concerned with finding workable solutions to problems (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). Stated
another way, “[p]ragmatism emphasizes the creation of actionable knowledge by recognizing
experiences as the foundation of policy making” (Noorland et al., 2021). A pragmatist is not
committed to a single philosophy or concept of reality and instead emphasizes the value and
meaning of research data through an exploration of its practical implications (Kelly & Cordeiro,
2020). Essentially, pragmatism is a reflexive research approach focused on the problem to be
researched and the consequences of the research findings (Feilzer, 2010).
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Highlighting the connection between worldview and methodology, three methodological
principles that enable researchers to conceptualize and undertake research using pragmatism as a
philosophical orientation are “(1) an emphasis on actionable knowledge, (2) recognition of the
interconnectedness between experience, knowing and acting and (3) a view of inquiry as an
experiential process” (Kelly & Cordeiro, 2020, p. 3). With these principles in mind, pragmatism
provides a framework that assists researchers in choosing the method or methods that will be
most appropriate (Feilzer, 2010; Kelly & Cordeiro, 2020). Pragmatism’s emphasis on the
interrelation of knowing, experience, and acting confirms the selection of a qualitative case study
for this research. The case study design’s strengths include that the phenomenon can be
examined in context, its full nature and complexity can be explored, and relevant theory can be
generated by the study of actual practice (Ebneyamini & Sadeghi Moghadam, 2018). Further, the
case study method is suited to an early and exploratory inquiry where, as here, factors
influencing the phenomenon are not yet fully known or understood (Ebneyamini & Sadeghi
Moghadam, 2018).
Internal Validity
A case study research design has limitations. Criticisms of the design include that it lacks
academic rigor and that the results are not necessarily generalizable; therefore, the
trustworthiness of a case study design depends on its internal and external validity (Ebneyamini
& Sadeghi Moghadam, 2018; Lock & Seele, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Internal validity
asks whether the research findings accurately capture the phenomenon (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). In a case study, the phenomenon was necessarily interpreted by those who were most
closely involved with it, and therefore rigorous methods of data collection and multiple sources
of data helped to ensure internal validity (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
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In terms of data collection, interviews were designed to harness each participant’s
construction of reality, specifically how each experienced the initiative process. One strategy to
strengthen internal validity was data triangulation, one form of which involves employing the
same interview protocol with individuals who participated in the initiative process in different
capacities to capture the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). Adding the perspective of outside consultants and attorneys was a particularly effective
form of triangulation, as they offered discrepant views that often differed from those of local
government and initiative advocates. One limitation was the refusal of anyone on the staff of the
San Francisco Supervisor who promoted the initiative in that jurisdiction to be interviewed,
despite multiple efforts and contacts through multiple individuals both within and outside
municipal government. Another form of data triangulation involved employing multiple methods
of data collection from multiple sources and cross-checking interview accounts against
observations and documents (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Further, to help ensure that participant
experiences were captured and conveyed accurately, the researcher provided each participant
with a list of the verbatim quotations that would be used in the research and an opportunity to
correct misstatements. As a result of this exchange, most participants reaffirmed their earlier
statements. A few participants changed or questioned their previous statements, and the
researcher, in turn, modified those statements accordingly or eliminated them from the study.
Finally, being cognizant of potential researcher bias was important to ensure that
interviews focused on the participants’ experiences with the initiative process and were not
designed to reflect the researcher’s personal experiences or perspective (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). This does not mean that the researcher’s perspective was removed from the data, as
reflexive thematic analysis recognizes that subjectivity as part of the data analysis (Braun &
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Clarke, 2022). Instead, it means that the researcher did not construe participant experiences
merely in comparison to personal experiences with special tax measures.
External Validity
External validity refers to the extent to which the study’s findings can be generalized and
applied to other situations (Lock & Seele, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Yin, 2018).
Generalizability in qualitative research might be better described as extrapolation, or a
consideration of the potential applicability of the research findings under analogous but not
identical circumstances. Further, this extrapolation might be performed by the reader rather than
the researcher, similar to how case law provides precedent for future disputes (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016).
This study has undertaken to secure external validity by providing “rich, thick
description” and detail—including quotes from interviews, documents and meetings—designed
to enhance the reader’s ability to assess the applicability of the research to a different situation
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 256). Ensuring variation and diversity among the cases further
allows for a greater range of application (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Miles & Huberman, 1984).
The cases studied here were diverse in multiple respects, including geographic region,
population, level of government, political partisanship and initiative outcome. The cities and
counties selected represent a cross-section of jurisdictions throughout California, thereby
enabling a variety of communities to rely on the findings. Nonetheless, the uniquely Californian
context in which these special tax measures have arisen, with the law’s current preference for an
initiative, limits the generalizability of this study beyond the state.
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Replication
The extent to which the research findings can be replicated is a measure of a study’s
reliability (Lock & Seele, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Given that a case study relies on
idiosyncratic human perceptions from a unique set of participants, complete replication is
unlikely, if not impossible (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Yin, 2018). For this reason, the literature
has evaluated qualitative reliability by examining whether the procedures employed minimize
the risk of error and bias to ensure that the findings are consistent with the data (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016; Yin, 2018).
The strategies utilized to assure internal validity are also techniques recognized to assure
reliability, including data triangulation involving multiple forms of data and multiple methods of
collection (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Further, maintaining a case study protocol and database
and concretely and consistently recording observations across cases are other techniques
employed to assure reliability (Lock & Seele, 2018; Riege, 2003). Here, the data has been
systematically collected and maintained. The same case study template was used to record all
document summaries, the same observation protocol was used to summarize each observation,
and the same interview protocol was used to conduct all semi-structured interviews. All
interviews were conducted and recorded utilizing the same Zoom format, and all participants
verified their statements that appear in the study.
Ethical Considerations
This study maintained an unwavering commitment to ethical integrity, and no ethical
dilemmas appeared to arise during this study. All documents reviewed were accessible to the
public. One public records request was made to ensure the absence of a ballot argument in
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opposition to Measure O in Mariposa County. Otherwise, all documents were located via internet
searches. Similarly, all observed meetings were recorded and available to the public.
Prior to their interviews, all participants received an information sheet for exempt studies
outlining the nature of the research and their participation and stating that the researcher intended
to record the interview. Each participant’s receipt of that document and confirmation of consent
to record were verbally confirmed at the outset of each interview. Though the researcher’s
friends or colleagues facilitated initial contact with a few interviewees, the researcher knew only
one of the participants before the interview. In that interview, like all others, the standard
interview protocol was used, and there is no indication that the professional relationship affected
the researcher’s interaction with the participant.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined the research design and data collection and analysis methods
utilized for this multiple case study. In short, the data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted in
an academically rigorous and ethical manner designed to secure internal and external validity
and reliability. This systematic design is intended to result in a study that is “anchored in
respondent experiences and, hence, ensure the research is of practical relevance” (Kelly &
Cordeiro, 2020, p. 3).
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS
This chapter examines the research findings from 21 semi-structured interviews,
documents, and observations in each of the four jurisdictions studied. An analysis of these
findings is designed to answer the research question posed in Chapter 1: How is local
governance being affected by California law confirming that a special tax initiative has a lower
voter threshold for approval than a special tax measure proposed by a local elected body?
A summary answer to that question is that the communities studied each embraced the
initiative process, albeit in disparate ways that largely depended on community context. The
range of roles was the greatest among elected officials, whose conduct spanned several rungs on
the ladder of government participation, from active initiation and involvement to a hands-off
approach (Mees et al., 2019). Municipal staff members tended to be supportive but leaned
toward the hands-off approach, mindful of the legal restrictions on using public resources.
Regardless of the level of local government involvement, citizen initiative proponents
proactively and effectively harnessed resources to develop and promote each special tax
initiative. This model of citizen-led engagement is consistent with the original aims of direct
democracy to return some level of government control to the citizens and to increase civic
participation (Minger, 1991; Simmons, 1997).
More pointedly, the data revealed several key themes about the roles of and relationships
between the stakeholders involved in the initiative process:
• The role of an elected official is situational and contextual
• Elected officials and initiative proponents do not work together
• Municipal staff is receptive to special tax initiatives
• Municipal staff is aware of its limited role
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• Initiative stakeholders are highly organized and sophisticated
o They operate as policy entrepreneurs
o They rely on networks
o They build off of prior efforts
With respect to how the appellate court decisions factored into the process, the data further
showed that the majority threshold is an important but not the only factor in the decision to bring
a special tax as an initiative.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore these findings in depth and discuss how they
manifested within and across each of the four jurisdictions studied: City of Manhattan Beach,
Mariposa County, City of Los Angeles, and City and County of San Francisco. To explore the
relationship between direct and representative democracy, the chapter is organized to first
address the participants’ commitment to democracy, followed by a discussion of government’s
conduct in each jurisdiction and how that activity related to the levels on the ladder of
government participation (Mees et al., 2019). Thereafter, the findings are used to answer each of
the research sub-questions posed in Chapter 1 and, finally, the research question.
Commitment to Democracy
Framing the context of this study, several participants grounded their responses by
expressing key democratic values. This sentiment permeated all findings and formed an
important backdrop for the rest of the data. Consistent with studies finding that voters strongly
support direct democracy (Bowler et al., 2007; Matsusaka, 2020), the interviews revealed that
those involved with the initiative process, as well as those in local government, value the
initiative process as a fundamental democratic principle.
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Participants were not asked about their overall view of the initiative process. However, in
the context of discussing the specific special tax initiative in each jurisdiction, some participants
volunteered thoughts about how they viewed the process as a core principle of democracy. Stated
succinctly, a Mariposa initiative proponent characterized a citizens’ initiative as “the purest form
of democracy.” Elaborating on that sentiment and explaining why it made sense that citizens’
initiatives are subject to a lower voter threshold, a Mariposa elected official stated,
I like the idea that citizens can make a stronger statement. … A citizens’ initiative sort of
goes with the old Sam Adams approach to life. The people in taverns in the back rooms
start talking about something, and then something happens because they get together and
force it to happen. It’s very American.”
A Los Angeles initiative proponent similarly thought that the democratic nature of the initiative
process justified a lower vote threshold, stating that he was “supportive of people developing
policy if they feel that’s the thing they want to do.” A Los Angeles elected official likewise
supported the notion of policy proposals emanating from outside of government.
A San Francisco staff member saw a populist appeal to the initiative process,
commenting that “I do support the idea that citizens can just create an initiative and do it on
their own. I think that’s a good escape valve for our system.” A Manhattan Beach initiative
proponent described the democratic appeal in commonsense terms:
Citizens’ initiatives have been around for more than 100 years, and they’ve always been
there. They’ve always been a tool and we should … use it to pass something that’s good
for the community and good for our kids. Why wouldn’t we do that? … I mean that’s how
this country was born—by a bunch of citizens getting together. I mean, if a bunch of
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citizens can’t get together and make something happen, what the heck are we doing
here?
Even those who had some criticisms of the initiative process recognized its inherent
democratic value. Two initiative opponents commented on the overuse of the process, but one
acknowledged that any elimination of the right would be viewed as voter disenfranchisement. An
initiative attorney lamented that such a large industry had developed around the initiative process
yet ultimately believed the initiative process remained rooted in essential democratic values:
There is something to be said about local citizens, activists and groups coming together
and building coalitions and bringing in the labor unions and business interests, and
basically trying to strike a deal to put a measure on the ballot to obtain voter approval.
That is kind of the root of our democracy, right? It is literally driven from the voters up.
These comments suggest that initiative stakeholders in local jurisdictions appreciate the broader
significance of direct democracy and remain committed to the initiative process.
The Role of Local Government in the Four Initiative Jurisdictions
The role of local government has meaning in the context of a special tax initiative, as a
direct democracy effort does not exist in a vacuum and must function in the context of
representative government (Ferraiolo, 2023; Heidbreder et al., 2019). However, where citizens
drive the policy effort, the role of elected officials and government staff is necessarily unique and
distinct from the role they would play in connection with a government-driven participatory
effort (Igalla et al., 2020; Mees et al., 2019). The research on government roles in connection
with citizen-led activity in the form of community initiatives contemplates several roles that
could be appropriate. According to the ladder of government participation discussed in Chapter
2, the local government role can range from the most intensive involvement to the least:
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regulating, network steering, stimulating, facilitating/enabling, or letting go (Mees et al., 2019).
The challenge for government officials is the extent to which they can move away from a classic
regulating model that is hallmark of government-sponsored public participation. Instead, where
citizens lead the effort, some literature suggests letting go can be empowering (Mees et al.,
2019), while other studies suggest that some level of government support is helpful to the
initiative (Edelenbos et al., 2018; Igalla et al., 2019). In California, the nature and extent of
support that government can provide in connection with a special tax initiative is further
influenced by the law governing the scope of that involvement, allowing the expenditure of
public funds to provide information but not for campaign activities (Vargas v. City of Salinas,
2009).
An examination of the roles that elected officials and municipal staff actually played in
each jurisdiction highlights the tension that has long existed regarding how direct democracy and
representative democracy operate in tandem.
10
The ladder of government participation (Mees et
al., 2019) provides a framework to evaluate the role of representative government in each of the
cases studied. The data showed that each jurisdiction achieved a distinct balance, with local
government operating at a range of levels on the ladder.
10
Additional background information about the demographics of each jurisdiction, the special tax at issue and the
stakeholders involved in each initiative is summarized separately in four appendices (Appendices D-G).
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City and County of San Francisco
Table 6
Proposition M
Proposition M Outcome
Shall the City tax owners of vacant residential units in buildings with three
or more units, if those owners have kept those units vacant for more than
182 days in a calendar year, at a rate between $2,500–5,000 per vacant unit
in 2024 and up to $20,000 in later years with adjustments for inflation, to
generate estimated annual revenue of $20–37 million, with the tax
continuing until December 31, 2053, and use those funds for rent subsidies
and affordable housing?
Passed, 54.5% in
support
Among the cases studied, Proposition M was unique in that government was actively
involved during all stages of the initiative process. Supervisor Dean Preston, a member of the
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), had long expressed interest in vacant housing. He
requested a staff report on the level of vacant housing in San Francisco and was interested in
what policies other jurisdictions had adopted to help reduce that level. Policy staff affiliated with
Supervisor Preston helped structure the tax, modeled after a Vancouver vacancy tax. A San
Francisco staff member explained that this type of interaction was typical in the community:
[Elected officials work] a little more behind the scenes. It’s not an official process, but the
elected people work with advocacy groups all the time.” Another staff member added that “if a
well-intentioned, savvy politician can partner with a private group and advance better policy
through that partnership, more power to that politician.” Describing the interaction more
generally, a staff member further stated,
Often ideas are generated at the board, and they work with citizen groups. Board
members work with citizen groups. There’s often interplay on issues, which is probably
appropriate. These are their constituents, and each member of the board works with a lot
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of different groups. So, it seems like a good breeding ground for ideas and proposed
legislation and initiatives. I think some involvement with it is good. Providing resources,
as with our reports, really helped.
Supervisor Preston was also involved in the campaign as a vocal supporter. He was quoted in
multiple newspaper articles and blogs about the campaign. According to a staff member, “Once
[the campaign] was underway, he was definitely out in public, making speeches in support of it
and so forth. It was very visible involvement in getting the initiative passed.” The staff member
thought Supervisor Preston’s involvement helped the effort because he brought visibility and
credibility to the initiative. Some of the other supervisors also endorsed the initiative and spoke
at rallies.
While this level of government involvement might suggest a network steering model,
which involves government initiating the decision-making process and further decisions being
made collaboratively among stakeholders (Mees et al., 2019), an initiative proponent denied such
collaboration. She clarified that although Supervisor Preston was behind the measure and a vocal
advocate,
He wasn’t running the campaign in any way, shape or form, or anything like that. It was,
at the end of the day, a citizens’ initiative, so he left it to the organizers. There wasn’t a
ton, in my opinion, of elected official involvement beyond just normal elected official
stuff.
This statement indicates the initiative proponents did not perceive that Supervisor Preston or his
policy staff acted as a collaborator, suggesting that government involvement was at the
stimulating rung, where government actively encourages and supports initial and ongoing
initiative efforts, but key decisions relating to the initiative are made independently from
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government (Mees et al., 2019). Moreover, Supervisor Preston provided the financial support
contemplated by that rung in the form of a $20,000 personal contribution and municipal staff
provided public resources in the form of the policy analysis on vacant housing.
Some of the initiative experts endorsed the model of an elected official being out in front
of a citizens’ initiative. An initiative consultant acknowledged that an elected official has
multiple options to pursue an agenda item: “If they can do it through the regular city budgetary
processes, more power to them. If they feel they have to go to an initiative, we provide that
opportunity in this state.” An initiative attorney similarly recognized that there are occasions
where elected officials must turn to the initiative process to enact their chosen policies:
There are times when I think elected leaders are doing their job by taking the lead on
issues that can only be accomplished through the voters. … I’m totally comfortable with
elected officials taking the lead when they think they can only accomplish it through the
initiative process and they think it’s important to do. In my mind, it’s a sign of leadership.
Another consultant explained that a current trend is for individual elected officials to employ the
initiative process to pass legislation that would not have sufficient support from the local elected
body to get on the ballot. Citing San Francisco specifically, the consultant stated that elected
officials are utilizing special tax initiatives “not only to skirt the two-thirds requirement but to
skirt the fact they could never get it through the board of supervisors.” An elected official’s
using the initiative process to promote a policy appeared unproblematic in that community, even
for an initiative opponent. During the campaign, the opponent had not considered whether it was
an issue for Supervisor Preston to serve as the face of the initiative, but upon reflection, thought
his involvement was appropriate despite the differing voter thresholds.
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Supervisor Preston’s role also resembles the three-part model outlined by one of the
initiative consultants, who said he counsels elected officials to examine all options, support and
provide resources to the initiative effort undertaken by citizens, and serve as a role model by
being an active volunteer. Another consultant highlighted the importance of being a role model
where, as here, the elected official is tied to a particular issue. The consultant explained that such
support becomes even more critical because people will trust the elected official on that issue.
Mariposa County
Table 7
Measure O
Measure O Outcome
Shall the initiative measure authorizing a 1% transactions and use (sales)
tax for a period of 40 years to generate the funds needed by the John C.
Fremont Healthcare District to design, construct and equip a new hospital
that meets all applicable seismic safety and other building standards, and
to modify and repurpose existing facilities to better satisfy the emergency
medical care and other healthcare needs of Mariposa County residents and
visitors be adopted?
Passed, 69.6% in
support
Mariposa’s Measure O came off the heels of an unsuccessful special tax measure,
Measure N, proposed by the board of supervisors. Both taxes were sales taxes designed to fund
the local public hospital, which is run through a separate special healthcare district with its own
governing board (hospital board). Consequently, two separate government entities were
necessarily involved with the measure at some level.
According to a Mariposa staff member, the board of supervisors’ role “was more of a
facilitator than a proponent or opponent” of the initiative. Individual supervisors had opinions,
but those stayed out of the board setting. Though the label “facilitator” is not determinative of
the level of government involvement, the board of supervisors’ support was consistent with the
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facilitation/enabling rung where initiatives are coordinated separately from government, yet
government has an interest in making them happen (Mees et al., 2019). The municipal
organization provides relevant information and limited resources, but a boundary remains
between the initiative and the municipal environment (Mees et al., 2019).
The Measure O proponents coordinated the initiative effort wholly apart from
government, yet the board of supervisors supported the effort. According to one initiative
proponent, “The board of supervisors was just happy somebody was doing it. Every person on
the Board was 100% supportive of our efforts.” The board of supervisors had recognized the
need for the funds, bringing its own measure seeking to impose a tax for hospital funding. A
Mariposa staff member explained the board of supervisors was initially conflicted about the
initiative process because residents had brought a referendum in 2019 seeking to overturn a
board measure that raised the supervisors’ salaries. But once Measure O was underway, the
board of supervisors expressed its support. Yet illustrating the board’s lack of participation, the
Citizens to Save the Hospital Committee provided a public update on its efforts at a study session
between the board of supervisors and the hospital board. A supervisor inquired about the
contents of the measure—asking whether it took account of some of the shortcomings of the
prior effort—thereby indicating her lack of involvement in the current effort.
At the hearing where the initiative was certified for the ballot, the supervisors expressly
thanked the citizens’ committee for its efforts and openly voiced support for the initiative.
Several members suggested they would adopt it outright if that were possible. A Mariposa staff
member characterized the board’s conduct as treating the initiative proponents as it would any
other citizen. Illustrating that further board of supervisors’ support took place outside the
institutional setting, one supervisor posted information about the initiative on her personal
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campaign website, concluding with, “I strongly support all voters carefully considering the full
impacts and voting yes on Measure O.”
According to a Mariposa elected official, the hospital board was not part of the initiative
effort, as the initiative proponents advised the board members they could not be involved. An
elected official explained that the hospital board started working on another measure after the
failure of Measure N. However, once it became clear that the measure would proceed as a
citizens’ initiative, the citizens’ committee was going to start from scratch “because they had to
do it from scratch if they wanted to get a simple majority.” Where an initiative is self-generated,
self-coordinated and self-managed without government assistance, government is operating at
the lowest rung of the ladder—letting go, where government is hands-off yet might offer some
indirect support (Mees et al., 2019). In general, hospital board members stayed away and did not
provide assistance. The hospital board did, however, express its support for the effort, thanking
the citizens’ group at the public study session and commenting that the citizens’ committee effort
highlighted that the hospital is for the citizens.
At least one hospital board member advocated for the initiative, yet in sharp contrast to
Supervisor Preston in San Francisco, she did so outside her capacity as an elected official. She
asserted she had a “dual role,” serving the hospital board on the one hand and quietly
campaigning for the initiative on the other. Her comments suggested she favored a letting go or
hands-off model, stating that she personally did less as the campaign went on, “and it was really
nice not to have to do anything. … If the citizens come forward and do it, that means less work
for you. If you are an official, this is always convenient.” An initiative proponent indicated there
might have been a role for the hospital board under other circumstances. One of the initiative
proponents was a former hospital board member familiar with the intricacies of the hospital. Had
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she not been a part of the committee, it would have been necessary for the hospital board and
staff to educate the committee about the hospital’s needs and the nuances of hospital construction
financing. A Mariposa staff member concurred that local government can be helpful in providing
information and education to those who are proposing the initiative.
While comments by the initiative consultants and attorneys did not support a hands-off
model where government does not participate in the initiative effort at all, some did suggest a
facilitation model. One consultant stated that it is important for an elected official to look at what
works best for that community, and another emphasized that the citizens will want a strong
showing of leaders behind the measure. Given the overwhelming support for Measure O, it
appears that local government’s involvement at a level somewhere between facilitation and
hands-off was appropriate for this community.
City of Los Angeles
Table 8
Measure ULA
Measure ULA Outcome
Shall an ordinance funding and authorizing affordable housing programs
and resources for tenants at risk of homelessness through a 4% tax on
sales/transfers of real property exceeding $5 million, and 5.5% on
properties of $10 million or more, with exceptions; until ended by voters;
generating approximately $600 million - $1.1 billion annually; be
adopted?
Passed, 57.8% in
support
Measure ULA was a transfer tax on the sale of properties above $5 million that was
projected to generate approximately $600 million to $1.1 billion annually to fund the
development and purchase of affordable housing and homelessness prevention measures
primarily in the form of tenant protection. Neither elected officials nor staff were involved in
creating the measure, though a former elected official from another city did help develop the
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concept. According to a Los Angeles initiative proponent, the citizens’ committee strategically
distanced itself from local government. Messaging included that the initiative was not
“something that was crafted in a back-room way.” Though conceding he did not have firsthand
knowledge about the initiative proponents’ motivation, a Los Angeles elected official
commented on the committee’s messaging: “My guess is—I did not confer with those who put
this together—but my guess is that they felt that the only credible way to present this to the voters
would be from outside of city government.” He thought the initiative proponents “were very
focused on trying to find a way that would not implicate city officials who were not as trusted as
others in the process of getting this thing to pass.” Beyond the development of the measure, an
initiative proponent added that signature gathering “was a volunteer effort. It wasn’t City Hall.”
When the time came for the city council to qualify the measure for the ballot, an initiative
proponent viewed that process as a formality since the requisite number of signatures had been
certified by municipal staff.
On the ladder of government participation, different rungs of involvement may be
appropriate for different stages of an initiative. Though van de Griend et al. (2019) considered
that more involvement might be needed in the early phases of an initiative, elected officials were
more involved with Measure ULA later, once it qualified for the ballot. At that point, initiative
proponents contacted individual city council members for support. Some elected officials were
actively supportive—attending events, making speeches and phone banking. One city council
member discussed the measure on his podcast and came to launch events. An initiative
proponent acknowledged that some who were most involved were not seeking re-election. Later
in the campaign, the mayor of Los Angeles was excited about and supported the effort. He met
with the citizens’ committee and had some of his staff help with fundraising.
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On the other hand, some other elected officials and the two mayoral candidates declined
to be involved. No elected official actively opposed the initiative. According to an initiative
proponent, these individualized efforts meant that local government was not a major factor in the
campaign: “I wouldn’t say local government really stepped in and mobilized around it.”
Though studies of government involvement in community initiatives tend to refer to
government collectively (Mees et al., 2019), here, the involvement of elected officials was
individualized, with some facilitating and others not being involved. Mees et al. (2019)
acknowledged that the government participation ladder could be further refined by integrating
and expanding on the research regarding the role of individual public leaders and public
administrators. The varied level of conduct among elected officials was consistent with the
framework outlined by a Los Angeles elected official, who described a range of appropriate roles
from no involvement to active engagement. Notwithstanding these individualized and relatively
limited roles, a Los Angeles initiative opponent believed that local government officials,
specifically the Los Angeles City Council, created the entire concept behind Measure ULA.
However, he was unaware of which specific city council members may have been behind the
initiative. He also believed that one of the mayoral candidates was signaling to people behind the
scenes that she supported the measure. One of the initiative attorneys shared the opponent’s
suspicion. He could not point to direct evidence of behind-the-scenes collaboration between local
government and initiative proponents but stated,
I suspect there’s massive collaboration between certain special interest groups and the
governing bodies around those measures. … My gut tells me, at least in many
jurisdictions that are favorable to unions or favorable to certain outside funding sources,
that there’s collaboration going on.
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Given these sentiments, as well as an actual city council scandal that ensued in Fall 2022,
11
a Los
Angeles initiative proponent’s opinion that the public would not have wanted further
involvement from the city council in connection with Measure ULA seems accurate for this
community.
Although the implementation of Measure ULA primarily involves municipal staff,
elected officials on the Los Angeles City Council further signaled their support for the initiative
after its passage. In January 2023, two council members brought a motion seeking a staff report
on resources and guidelines needed to effectively implement the measure and strategies for
continued consultation with community and advocacy organizations and experts in the field. This
behavior tracks the opinion of a Los Angeles initiative opponent, who opined it was important
for local government to communicate information to the public about a successful initiative,
stating: “It is incumbent upon whatever government is impacted by [the initiative] to definitely
communicate information about it for whatever period of time … and educate people about these
things.” It is also consistent with the conclusion reached by Ferraiolo (2023) that government
representatives are more likely to fully implement initiatives passing with a larger margin of
victory (here, almost 58%) because the margin serves as a sign of the initiative’s popularity and a
signal that a failure to implement would be met with disapproval. Thus, it appears that local
government will continue to be involved with the measure at a level approaching facilitation.
11
In October 2022, a leaked audio recording of a meeting between the Los Angeles City Council’s president, two
council members and a labor leader revealed the group made a number of racist and vulgar remarks, many directed
to other city council colleagues. The president resigned shortly after the release of the recording and all members
were censured (Toohey, 2023).
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City of Manhattan Beach
Table 9
Measure A
Measure A Outcome
Shall a measure imposing an annual flat tax of $1,095.00 on each real
property parcel within the City of Manhattan Beach, and adjusted
annually for inflation, for a period of 12 years, thereby generating an
estimated $11,000,000 to $13,000,000 annually for investment in
education, with an oversight committee and exemptions for (1) low-
income individuals and (2) seniors who use their property as a principal
residence, be adopted?
Failed, 31.98% in
support
Manhattan Beach’s Measure A, a 12-year parcel tax of $1,095 annually per parcel to fund
education, received only 32% of the vote. Similar to Mariposa, the initiative involved two
separate public entities: the City of Manhattan Beach, governed by a city council, and the
Manhattan Beach Unified School District, governed by a separate school board. The initiative
proponents qualified the measure through the city council, but the funds raised were to be fully
allocated to and spent by the school district.
Manhattan Beach had a history of supplementing its school district through additional
taxes. However, in 2008, a bond measure failed by a small margin because voters were
concerned the school board had mismanaged funds to build what was characterized as an
excessive administration building. Moving forward from that failure, the school board had put
more modest proposals on the ballot, including the existing parcel tax of $225 per parcel
annually. According to an elected official: “The strategy was always that, let’s show the
community what we can do with a smaller amount, and then let’s try to put that one back on in
perpetuity, and then go for another smaller amount.” The school board was engaging in this
piece-by-piece strategy when the initiative proponents suggested a special tax initiative. The
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school board provided its polling information to the group, and according to a Manhattan Beach
elected official, the citizens’ committee looked at it much differently than the school board had
and believed it would support a much higher amount.
While the initiative proponents moved forward to obtain signatures and qualify the
initiative for the ballot, the school board continued to pursue a parallel and more modest
measure. At a February 2, 2022, school board meeting prior to the initiative’s qualification, the
board publicly discussed the distinct challenges of a supermajority board measure versus a
citizens’ initiative, including questioning whether the initiative proponents could garner the
needed signatures in time for the June ballot. The school board ultimately determined that if the
initiative qualified for the June ballot, the board would not propose its own measure and would
“step back” to let the citizens do their work. In the meantime, though, the school board would
continue to work on its own measure.
Once Measure A qualified for the ballot, the school board stepped back as promised and
did not pursue another measure. It essentially acquiesced to the initiative proponents’ strategy.
An initiative proponent agreed with this approach, explaining that the school board was not
allowed to be part of the initiative process once the measure had qualified. Specifically, she
explained that individual elected officials could advocate for the measure, but no school district
resources could be used to support it. Engaging in individualized efforts, some school board
members offered some level of support to the initiative while others stepped back. According to
one elected official, she and her colleagues personally endorsed the initiative, but none was
actively involved in the campaign. This differed markedly from the prior 2018 measure initiated
by the school board, where all board members were actively engaged. A Manhattan Beach
elected official opined that the current process provided by California law hinders an elected
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official’s ability to work with a citizens’ group promoting an initiative. She believed the lack of
government support—in particular, the school board’s perceived inability specifically to describe
what the funds would be used for—was part of the initiative’s downfall.
In contrast to the school board’s absence from the initiative effort, the city council was
far more involved. Similar to the role of elected officials in Los Angeles, city council members
engaged in individualized efforts in connection with the initiative. However, those efforts
included active opposition to the initiative, which is a role not contemplated by the literature.
Two city council members openly voiced their opposition to the measure. One of the opponents
opined that as a resident of the community, he should be able to take a position in opposition and
explained that he did so to protect the community financially. An elected official recognized that
the opposition effort highlighted his participation, including in public debates, noting that “the
debates were pretty impactful.” Another elected official on the school board was surprised by the
active opposition expressed by some city council members. More broadly, it bothered her that
“our city council jumped out of their lane, and they were the ones as spokespeople for or against
the initiative when we as a board weren’t even being public speakers for the initiative.”
Despite the frustration of some of those in Manhattan Beach, an elected official’s
opposing an initiative is a role contemplated by both those in the initiative industry and other
elected officials. An initiative attorney described the broad role that he thought elected officials
should undertake, which would necessarily include opposing an initiative:
I think local elected officials are entrusted to help lead their local government. And, so, if
there is a local initiative, I think not that they should ever be required to take a position,
but they have a leadership role, and they should weigh in on those things. Is this the right
funding source for the right plan? Would that money be better spent somewhere else? I
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think they have a pretty significant role, and they’re more in tune because of their
position than the average voter to ask what is the financial condition of the city and what
are the needs. … Local elected officials should have a much clearer idea of what’s going
on, and their voice should help educate local voters.
More pointedly, a Los Angeles elected official explained that opposing an initiative is an
appropriate role for an elected official:
It’s also the case that elected officials choose to oppose such measures which they think
are unduly expensive or derived from the wrong funding source, whatever it might be.
That would be perfectly appropriate, too, as long as the elected officials who participate
in these campaigns abide by the various campaign finance rules associated with their
roles.
Similarly, Ferraiolo (2023) cautioned against viewing a government challenge to a ballot
initiative as a threat to direct democracy and instead suggested that it serves as another check and
balance consistent with our system of constitutional democracy.
Conclusion
The ladder of government participation contemplates that different situations can trigger
different roles for government in relation to citizen-led activity (van de Griend et al., 2019). The
four cases studied highlight the roles that local government played in connection with each
special tax initiative. San Francisco offered an example of a network steering model, Mariposa
modeled both a facilitation and a hands-off approach with different government entities, Los
Angeles could be characterized as a facilitation model, and Manhattan Beach’s school board
illustrated a hands-off approach while its city council could represent an anti-facilitation model
through the provision of information and resources designed to thwart the initiative.
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What Role Do Local Elected Officials Play in Connection with a Special Tax Initiative?
To explore representative government’s role in connection with an initiative, the
researcher asked questions designed to isolate the conduct of elected officials apart from
municipal staff. Participants responded to questions about the roles that elected officials actually
played in connection with the initiative in each jurisdiction and provided their opinions about
what the role of a local elected official should be in conjunction with an initiative. Though the
responses were widespread, two related themes emerged. First, the role of an elected official is
situational and contextual. There is no one-size-fits-all role, and the myriad roles studied here
exemplify the theme. Second, for varying reasons—again depending on context—elected
officials and initiative proponents desire to maintain a level of separation between them
throughout the initiative process, which necessarily limits the role of government.
The Elected Official’s Role Is Situational and Contextual
The findings outlined in the foregoing section describing what occurred in each
jurisdiction demonstrate that elected officials occupied a range of roles from actively supportive
to actively opposed. Several participants further outlined what they believed the role of an
elected official should be. Consistent with what occurred across jurisdictions, they emphasized
that no single role is either necessary or appropriate. A Los Angeles elected official described a
general role for an elected official in setting the groundwork for an initiative, stating that
government should promote whatever the needs of the people are based on an analysis by public
officials of competing priorities. Specifically, he outlined a range of roles for an elected official
once an initiative is underway:
The following roles would be appropriate: to be completely agnostic, to be opposing it, to
be supporting it, to be supporting it in a way that included raising money in addition to
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aggressively advocating for it. Elected officials can and should play any role that they
feel comfortable playing in the process.
He further thought that the public would likewise find any of those roles to be appropriate. An
initiative consultant offered a detailed yet slightly different description of an elected official’s
role, asserting that an appropriate role involves some level of facilitation. He stated that the first
step for an elected official is to look at all options with an open mind. Second, once the decision
has been made to move forward with an initiative, the elected official should be supportive and
provide resources to make the effort successful. Third, the elected official should be a role model
and work as a citizen volunteer. He conceded that this is not the model he sees most of the time.
Another initiative consultant similarly stated that the elected official’s role in connection with an
initiative “can be whatever they so choose,” though she added that, generally, the elected official
should be an advocate.
A Los Angeles initiative proponent opined that there is no single appropriate role for an
elected official. Instead, the role is “situational” and “contextual,” and the elected official’s level
of involvement should depend on the community landscape at the time of the initiative. Ideally,
she thought that an initiative should involve a coalition of citizens, elected officials, and
government staff working together, though again, the value of that partnership would depend in
part on the public’s perception of government. A San Francisco staff member similarly stated
that the role of an elected official in connection with an initiative is “as much or as little as he or
she wants.” A Mariposa staff member agreed that an elected official’s role should differ
depending on the initiative, though his opinion was grounded in the public’s perception of
government, noting that “different groups have very different perspectives on the role of local
government,” with some residents thinking government should be responsible for everything,
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others not wanting government to touch anything, and a range of individuals along the spectrum.
An initiative attorney concurred that the role of elected officials varies considerably. He had
observed many cases where an elected official took a public role. But he added that different
elected officials have different levels of willingness to put themselves in that role. He explained
that once an elected official puts himself out there, even if he is scrupulous about the use of
public funds and does not come close to close to crossing any line, he opens himself up to attack.
The attorney cited one initiative on which he worked where a citizen submitted hundreds of
public records requests to determine the involvement of elected officials and staff.
Even the initiative opponents agreed that no single role was appropriate. A San Francisco
initiative opponent thought that any role for an elected official in the context of an initiative was
appropriate. He explained that because there are multiple ways for a measure to get on the ballot
and because the law requires so many issues to go to the voters, it is acceptable for an elected
official to promote an initiative or to campaign against it if the elected official thinks it will hurt
city finances. A Los Angeles initiative opponent emphasized that elected officials should be
transparent about the role they undertake. As a political matter, he thought that an elected official
should take a position on an initiative. This view aligns with research finding that voters often
adopt their ballot initiative policy positions based on the position expressed by a candidate they
have supported (Collingwood et al., 2023). In his experience, the initiative opponent observed
that elected officials tended not to provide such cues and instead would sit back to wait and see
whether an initiative passed.
Other participants identified specific roles they thought an elected official should assume.
A San Francisco initiative proponent would like to see elected officials spend more time
considering long-term priorities, which could then translate into initiatives that would necessarily
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have government support. Related to that point, she added that an elected official should use the
initiative opportunity “to speak to the underlying issues and really dig into why this measure is
being pushed forward in the first place, what the concerns are.” A Manhattan Beach initiative
proponent thought that elected officials should both make sure processes are properly followed
and provide the community with the opportunity to ask questions. Another Manhattan Beach
initiative proponent thought government’s role was to educate the community about the need for
the initiative. A Manhattan Beach elected official echoed this sentiment, noting that one of her
favorite sayings is “educate, don’t legislate.” A San Francisco staff member favored some level
of involvement in the initiative process by an elected official, describing how government and
initiative proponents could balance one another:
I think bringing the political realities and the workings of the city into effect is probably
helpful to the groups. And the groups, on the other hand, come up with ideas and want to
push things. They don’t want to be cautious and incremental. So it’s probably a good
balancing to have them work together.
Elected Officials and Initiative Proponents Maintain Distance from One Another
Woven through the responses regarding the role of an elected official was a notion in
tension with the uniquely San Francisco sentiment that elected officials and initiative proponents
sometimes do and generally should collaborate. All categories of participants opined that elected
officials and initiative proponents should work independently of one another. However, the
intensity of the degree of separation and the bases for government distance differed among
jurisdictions. Moreover, in stark contrast to the importance of maintaining separation expressed
by on-the-ground initiative participants, the initiative consultants and attorneys described more
collaborative efforts in their experience.
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California law weighed heavily on participants’ minds, who understood the law
prohibited public funds from being used to campaign for or against an initiative. Nonetheless, the
law permits using public funds to help get an initiative on the ballot and to educate the public
about the measure (Santa Barbara County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies, 2008) and
further allows elected officials to express their opinion about an initiative (Vargas v. City of
Salinas, 2009). An initiative attorney confirmed that public resources are available to research
and draft an initiative and potentially identify proponents to move it forward. He described the
role of the elected official as “helping to create the foundation for a campaign to spring up.”
Initiative stakeholders in both Manhattan Beach and Mariposa expressed awareness of
the legal limitations but employed an even more hands-off approach than the law requires. In
Manhattan Beach, an initiative proponent accurately stated that school district resources could
not be used to support the initiative once it was certified for the ballot but construed that
limitation as requiring that the school board not be a part of the process at all. The school board,
likewise, believed it was appropriate to distance itself from the initiative effort. When the
initiative proponents shared their intentions with the school board, the response was: “Well, if
you think you can make this happen, if you have all this momentum, then we’re going to step
back.” Similarly, according to a Manhattan Beach elected official, even though the school board
was initially ambivalent about an initiative, members thought, “Who are we to stand in your way
to go do the research.” Consequently, the school board decided that “if we really had a group of
citizens that were willing to bring this forward that we would stand down. … As a board, we just
decided that we would stand down and let the citizens move forward.” Illustrating the school
board’s lack of involvement, members did not know what the initiative said at the time it went
out for signature. During the campaign, in response to the citizens’ committee’s desire for the
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school board to explain how the money raised from the parcel tax would be spent, the board
declined to do so because the measure was a citizens’ initiative:
The money would be directed by the citizens. … We didn’t feel like it was our place as a
school district, as a board or administration, to say these are all the things that we have
planned for this money because this wasn’t even brought forward by us.
A Manhattan Beach elected official acknowledged that voters complained about the lack of
school board involvement. But the board did not feel it could weigh in on an initiative, even
though it would ultimately be responsible for incorporating any revenue from the measure into
its budget.
In Mariposa, initiative proponents likewise thought the hospital board should have no
role in the initiative and told the hospital board it could not be involved. A Mariposa initiative
proponent understood she could not communicate with the hospital board about the initiative,
and she believed she needed to maintain that level of separation on an individual, personal level
with any hospital board member. Another initiative proponent explained that the hospital board
was not at all involved in the drafting of the initiative to avoid a conflict of interest. The hospital
board took the same approach. According to a Mariposa elected official, when the initiative
proponents took over,
I stepped out. We had nothing to do with it. If you want to say that I cheated a lot, I called
my friends and asked what was up, but I didn’t tell them what to do. I just asked what was
happening, so I did track what was going on. … We were not supposed to have anything
to do with it. It had to be a citizen-led issue.
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In written materials about the initiative, the proponents took care to inform voters of their
separation from government. An FAQ posted on the campaign website and distributed at
campaign events stated in part,
Did the committee consult with the healthcare district about the citizens initiative? No,
because the intent is for this to be a true citizens initiative that is not driven by or
coordinated with any government entity—in this case, the John C. Fremont Healthcare
District.”
12
The initiative stakeholders in Los Angeles and San Francisco did not concentrate on
maintaining a wall of separation between the initiative proponents and elected officials.
Nonetheless, the initiative proponents there worked to maintain distance from elected officials
due to distrust of and frustration with government. A Los Angeles initiative proponent explained
that working together with government presented issues in Los Angeles because of the deep
corruption that had been happening at city hall. Given voter distrust of the city council, it did not
make sense to try to partner with the council. She believed that the fact that the city council was
not involved with the initiative was a key to its success. Another initiative proponent added that
frustration with government was another reason to maintain distance. Early polling showed that
Los Angeles voters were dismissive of the initiative because “why would we give more money to
a feckless government that’s not doing what it’s supposed to be doing anyway?” A Los Angeles
elected official opined that Measure ULA was brought as an initiative because “there was a
sense that the people of the city lacked faith in the city’s ability to create a cost-effective
approach to creating housing for people experiencing homelessness.”
12
Citizens to Save the Hospital – Frequently Asked Questions https://citizenstosavethehospital.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/FrequentlyAskedQuestions-2021-06-24.pdf
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San Francisco had likewise experienced recent corruption scandals involving government
officials. Thus, a San Francisco staff member opined that the public’s response to an elected
official partnering with citizens in the context of an initiative, as was the case with Supervisor
Preston, would vary depending on who the elected was and what the partnership involved. A San
Francisco initiative opponent believed that frustration with government affirmatively contributed
to the increase in initiative activity in that community: “I honestly think citizens’ initiatives are a
failure of government. You can argue that people getting so frustrated with the system that
they’re taking things into their own hands is evidence that the system is not working correctly.”
Distrust of and frustration with government also factored into the initiative activity in
Manhattan Beach and Mariposa. Voters in Manhattan Beach had recently expressed frustration
with the school board regarding its treatment of COVID-19. Therefore, initiative proponents
assumed that voters would be supportive of a measure generated by citizens. However, the
initiative opponents used this frustration to their advantage, as one message was that a parcel tax
was needed but not controlled by the existing school board. In Mariposa, a staff member
explained why voters might view an initiative favorably: “It’s a generalized statement, but we
don’t like a lot of government or trust it as much, both because of state and federal politics and
also some of our local history.” That history included both a 2019 referendum directed to a
measure proposed by the board of supervisors to increase their own salaries and the recent failure
of a similar sales tax to fund the public hospital. A Mariposa initiative proponent summarized
how these issues related to the initiative:
People don’t trust the board of supervisors at all. And so something coming from them
would already have a cloud over it. The hospital board already tried it. It didn’t work.
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So, there was a cloud there. And, so, being from citizens, this is us trying to help our
fellow citizens had a better cache to it.
In contrast to the experiences in these jurisdictions, initiative consultants and attorneys
opined that there is always some connection and collaboration between initiative proponents and
local government. One initiative attorney stated that local government works “hand in glove”
with initiative proponents. An initiative consultant concurred that the jurisdiction’s leadership is
generally involved in the initiative: “It’s rare that I have seen it’s truly a citizens’ group that has
independently done this. … There’s always the connection there between the government and the
elected officials in city government and the committee.”
Conclusion
In the four jurisdictions studied, elected officials held a range of roles depending on
community context. Some elected officials steered the effort, others facilitated, others opposed,
and others stepped back completely. Perceptions expressed by interviewees reinforced themes in
the literature that differing roles short of regulating may be appropriate depending on context
(Mees et al., 2019; van de Griend et al., 2019). The literature and the participants differed,
however, with regard to an elected official’s opposition to an initiative, with the literature not
contemplating that role and several participants finding it a form of leadership. The possibility of
active opposition appears to stem, at least in part, from the further finding that both elected
officials and initiative proponents seek to maintain distance from one another. Initiative
stakeholders in the two smaller jurisdictions sought separation in part based on an arguably
overly cautious view of what California law permits, whereas all initiative proponents and some
government officials in the two larger jurisdictions viewed the need for distance as a
consequence of a perceived lack of trust in government. Elected officials and initiative
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proponents operating in two distinct spheres appears to be a new dynamic, as it is inconsistent
with the historical experiences of the industry experts.
What Role Does Municipal Staff Play in Connection With a Special Tax Initiative?
Public administration literature shows that while municipal staff generally supports
citizen-led efforts (Korosec & Berman, 2006), staff members tend to be less receptive to those
efforts than elected officials (Cassia & Magno, 2011). The literature does not specifically address
how local government staff views or interacts with a citizen-led ballot initiative. California law
regarding the expenditure of public resources for information but not campaigning applies
equally to municipal staff, but it is important to note that public resources include staff time and
municipal facilities, equipment, materials, and channels of communication (Stanson v. Mott,
1976; Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009).
Participants were asked how municipal staff was involved in the initiative process, if at
all. The data revealed two related findings about staff involvement: staff members are receptive
to citizens’ special tax initiatives, yet they are cognizant of their limited role in connection with
those efforts. These findings stand in tension with one another, as staff also has some desire to
have a larger role in the process.
Municipal Staff Is Receptive to Special Tax Initiatives
The majority of participants who discussed staff’s role found staff members to be helpful
with and supportive of the initiative process. A Los Angeles initiative proponent said that staff
was helpful and clear about the process and that any staff interactions were positive. A San
Francisco staff-generated report about vacancy tax efforts in other jurisdictions specifically
raised the availability of an initiative at the majority vote level to implement a vacancy tax in San
Francisco (Brousseau & Xuereb, 2022). One of the Manhattan Beach initiative proponents said
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that staff did what was required, though the Manhattan Beach participants did not comment any
further on staff support for the initiative process.
The most visible, albeit still minimal, level of staff support was in Mariposa, where the
public hospital director introduced the initiative to the board of supervisors at a public meeting.
A Mariposa elected official commented that staff had an open-door policy throughout the
initiative. A Mariposa initiative proponent stated that although staff was initially reluctant about
the initiative process, possibly because the endeavor involved a steep learning curve, during the
campaign staff members were willing to assist to the extent permitted by law. The proponent
added that staff worked hard during the initiative’s implementation phase to ensure that tax
collection could start as soon as possible. A Mariposa staff member agreed that it had been
necessary for staff to learn a few things about the initiative process once Measure O was
proposed. Emphasizing staff’s role to serve the public, the staff member commented that the role
of Mariposa staff was “to do what the folks want us to do. If they want us to do something
different and they’re willing to help us figure out how to pay for it, great, let’s do it.” One
consultant expressed a similar view, opining that municipal staff is open to the initiative process;
staff members understand it and see it as a way to fund projects that otherwise might not get
funded.
These comments stand in contrast to some assumptions expressed by other participants
regarding how staff members view the initiative process. A Los Angeles elected official
questioned whether staff would have problems with a citizen-generated measure that might
involve funding and spending that would not otherwise be on the government’s agenda:
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I think that when a measure emanates from outside of city government and then it
prioritizes this set of needs over other needs, that requires city staff to accommodate that
prioritization.
Though Vatter et al. (2019) did not isolate the role of staff, this concern is consistent with the
study’s observation that government’s willingness to implement an initiative is generally limited,
given that it would generally run counter to government’s political goals or policy commitments.
The elected official also opined that staff might have interpretive challenges with a measure that
stemmed from outside government and, therefore, was not vetted through the public hearing
process. The two initiative attorneys expressed similar concerns focused on the issue of control.
One stated that while municipal staff is ultimately supportive of the initiative process, staff
members would prefer a situation where they control everything. Another highlighted how staff
lacks control over the initiative product, given that a special tax brought by a governing body
would generally have been drafted in-house. One San Francisco initiative opponent likewise saw
a risk that staff would refuse to implement the initiative.
Countering these impressions of staff attitudes, a San Francisco staff member provided
the staff perspective that there is no meaningful difference between measures proposed by the
board of supervisors and those proposed by initiative:
It’s kind of all the same. It’s just new legislation. It may be a good idea or not, and
frankly, we don’t think about that much as well. Once it’s in place, the issues are how is
it going to be implemented and what are the implications.
Though Ferraiolo (2023) did not specifically address the role of staff in examining how state
legislators interact with initiatives, the staff member’s comments bear on her observation that an
initiative’s policy implications cannot be fully understood without considering the role of
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government in implementation. Here, it appears that staff is not merely accommodating the
initiative’s implementation but is, instead, working to make its implementation as effective as
possible. This is fully in line with the Mariposa staff member’s understanding of the staff role to
carry out what the public wants.
Municipal Staff Is Aware of Its Limited Role
While California law restricts the extent to which government staff can be involved in an
initiative, staff members tended to be even more hands-off than the law requires. Initiative
proponents in the two larger jurisdictions had little contact with staff. A San Francisco initiative
proponent identified minimal staff interaction, whereas one of the Los Angeles initiative
proponents had no interaction, commenting that current law precludes staff from becoming
involved with an initiative until the implementation phase. A San Francisco staff member
explained it is not appropriate for staff to take a position on an initiative and summed up the
limitations of the staff role:
Our customers are our members of the public who want to build something or have an
idea about wanting to build something. Do we provide information? Absolutely. Yes. Do
we help people advance their political interests? That’s not part of our portfolio of work.
In the two smaller jurisdictions, initiative proponents, elected officials, and staff members
were even more mindful of the limited staff role. According to a Manhattan Beach elected
official, the school board was particularly careful not to use any school district resources or
school district staff time to promote the initiative. The elected official also noted a practical
limitation on staff, remarking that most staff members did not live in the community and,
therefore, would have no reason to take a position. In Manhattan Beach, the public was confused
when staff’s role in the initiative was more visible. At a city council hearing on a memorandum
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of understanding between the city and the school district to facilitate the distribution of the
anticipated funds, the school district’s attorney attended to answer any questions about the
document. A member of the public questioned why the school district’s attorney would be so
involved in a citizens’ initiative.
In Mariposa, municipal staff at the county level did not have a significant role beyond
conveying some information about a prior measure to the hospital district. While the hospital
director spoke publicly about the initiative before the board of supervisors, he admonished that
no one from the hospital district was permitted to be involved in the initiative, adding that “we
need to be cautious and careful about entanglements and involvements.” Correspondingly,
initiative proponents were also careful to distance themselves from the hospital district. At the
same hearing, initiative proponents stated that no member of the citizens’ initiative committee
had any connection to the hospital district or was involved with hospital operations, as the
committee wanted to avoid entanglement or the appearance of entanglement.
Experts similarly highlighted municipal staff’s awareness of the legal limitations on staff
conduct. One initiative consultant stated that staff members are cautious about getting involved,
explaining that a city manager would be far less likely to raise money for an initiative effort
during her off hours than an elected official might be. An attorney added that staff members
worry about using public resources because they are tasked with ensuring that any elected
official or municipal employee involved with the measure abides by the rules.
In contrast to the perceptions of several participants in these cases, current law allows
staff to do more (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009). For example, one consultant pointed out that
nothing prevents staff from conveying objective information regarding municipal priorities,
which in turn could be used by initiative stakeholders. Other respondents—primarily staff
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members—advocated for an even broader staff role in the initiative process. For example, a San
Francisco staff member would like to be able to give policy guidance. The staff member shared
that the nonpartisan staff report on vacancy tax options was made possible because it was
requested by a San Francisco Supervisor, who was interested in how many vacant units there
were and what policy levers the city could adopt to reduce that amount. While initiative
proponents ultimately used that report to support the need for the measure, there is no current
procedural mechanism available for citizens to request similar types of policy analyses. Yet
staff’s providing a similar type of policy information to initiative proponents would appear to be
a permissible use of public resources as part of developing an initiative (Santa Barbara County
Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies, 2008). Another San Francisco staff member opined that
the public would like to see more staff involvement, perhaps even including actions that current
law would prohibit. He acknowledged that he provided more technical advice than policy
guidance in his current role, but believed that the public was interested in the staff perspective
and would like staff to weigh in on pending ballot measures. While elected officials may express
their opinion on an initiative, staff acting in the same manner poses some risk of running afoul of
California law prohibiting the use of public resources, including staff time, to campaign (Vargas
v. City of Salinas, 2009).
A Mariposa staff member described the desire for a different and more facilitative role
for staff involving a process where government and citizen groups could work together to have
conversations about what is needed, why it is needed, what the concerns are and what makes
sense, with the outcome being a compromise solution having community buy-in. He advocated
for collaboration, expressing some concern about the possibility of citizens bringing an initiative
that promised something that could not be achieved, which would likely result in local
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government being blamed for the lack of implementation even though it may never have had the
resources to succeed in the first place. A Los Angeles initiative opponent also supported greater
staff involvement. In the event of some collaboration between citizens and government, he
would trust the involvement of staff more than the involvement of elected officials because staff
members are obligated to carry out the measure “and they are the ones whose neck is on the line
when the money is going to start getting spent.” In the initiative opponent’s view, interesting
policy proposals could result from involving the bureaucrats, the people who are going to do the
work, in the development or sponsorship of an initiative.
Conclusion
These findings suggest that municipal staff members are even more receptive to the
initiative process than the literature on public participation would suggest. They are cognizant of
their limited role, however, and the staff members in these cases appeared to operate even more
cautiously than the law provides. Certainly, public comment at a Manhattan Beach hearing
suggests this caution is politically if not legally warranted, as the public questioned even limited
staff involvement. Yet despite this very circumscribed role, it appears that some staff members
would like to have a more active role in the policy process.
Who Are the Stakeholders Who Tend to Be Involved in the Development and Promotion of
Special Tax Initiatives?
At least one key initiative proponent in each jurisdiction was interviewed, as well as one
initiative opponent in jurisdictions where there was organized opposition to the measure.
Participants were asked about their backgrounds and roles throughout the initiative process,
including their involvement with the development of the initiative (or the response thereto) and
the initiative campaign. All other participants were likewise asked about the roles of initiative
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proponents and opponents. These interviews suggest that initiative stakeholders are highly
organized and sophisticated policy entrepreneurs who rely on political networks and build on
prior efforts.
Though there is a dearth of literature describing citizens’ initiative proponents, their
efforts have been characterized as “passive” when compared to a community initiative (Igalla et
al., 2019, p. 1177) and as ultimately relinquishing responsibility for the measure to the
government (Bosschaart et al., 2020). Those characterizations contrast sharply with the initiative
proponents in the four jurisdictions studied here. Behind each initiative were active and
organized advocates who methodically and strategically assumed responsibility for the initiative.
In some cases, the initiative proponent’s responsibility extended to the initiative’s
implementation by assuming public office with the board responsible for carrying out the
measure or working directly with municipal staff to effectuate the measure.
The initiative proponents in Los Angeles were a prime example of this organization and
sophistication. Representatives from supportive organizations, including housing and
homelessness nonprofits and labor unions, formed United to House LA to advocate for Measure
ULA. The group was highly structured. Two individuals involved in housing and tenants’ rights
issues co-chaired the group, and a 13-person steering committee composed of the committee
chairs met weekly to ensure all committees were coordinating with one another. Each committee
had a specific function and up to a dozen members. By way of example, the research committee
chair convened a group of esteemed academics in Los Angeles to write a white paper about how
the transit occupancy tax would work. External experts, such as attorneys, who worked on
isolated issues were also brought in. Daily, approximately 30 to 40 individuals dedicated
themselves to the initiative effort.
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According to an initiative proponent, beyond the committee members, over 300
volunteers supported United to House LA in its signature-gathering effort, assisted by some paid
signature gatherers. Though it raised sufficient funds to engage in some level of a media
campaign, United to House LA raised less money than the opposition. But with the help of over
800 volunteers, proponents relied on fieldwork and campaigning on the ground, including phone
banking and text banking, which were strategies the opposition did not undertake. An initiative
proponent described the campaign as “a very grassroots effort involving a lot of organizations.”
The opposition was highly organized in a different manner, as it was supported by two larger
statewide organizations: the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and the California Business
Roundtable. One opposition consultant was responsible for polling and focus groups and creating
the media campaign. A Los Angeles-based opponent was tasked with providing grassroots
opposition efforts, including distributing materials, raising money for a media campaign,
publishing articles and engaging speakers at a well-attended local conference.
After Measure ULA passed, key initiative proponents began talking regularly with the
City of Los Angeles Housing Department regarding implementation, including what the specific
guidelines should look like. The group also submitted names to be part of the measure’s required
citizen oversight committee. The campaign’s co-chair anticipated that the group would very
likely continue to be involved in implementation for years to come.
In San Francisco, the level of organization was dictated in large part by the framework
provided by the DSA, whose members spearheaded the initiative effort. A DSA member leading
the effort had significant experience with San Francisco politics and was skilled in fundraising,
securing endorsements, speaking with organizations and at rallies, and dealing with the press.
Because of the party affiliation, the citizens’ group also had access to policy resources from
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Supervisor Preston’s office. The report he commissioned on San Francisco vacancy rates and
how other jurisdictions had lowered their rates formed part of the underlying factual basis for
Proposition M. Even an initiative opponent commented on the proponents’ high level of
organization.
On a smaller scale, initiative proponents in Manhattan Beach and Mariposa likewise
demonstrated a high level of organization and professionalism. In Manhattan Beach, the
members of the MB Citizens for Schools committee were already actively involved in the
community. Part of the group was on the school board’s budget advisory committee, which was
exploring the possibility of a ballot measure, and those members decided to pursue an initiative
in part by interpreting and relying on the polling and other data secured by consultants working
for the school board. Like the core committee in Los Angeles, the core committee for MB
Citizens for Schools consisted of working professionals in key areas such as marketing, website
design and law. A committee co-chair explained it was “important for people to have their very
specific roles.” She also emphasized it was equally important to have “an army of people”
behind the effort, and this effort had over 150 volunteers in addition to using professionals to
help distribute campaign materials. Though the initiative did not pass, one of the group’s co-
chairs was elected to the school board in the next election and, therefore, would have had a role
in implementing the initiative.
In Mariposa, the core committee for Citizens to Save Our Hospital was co-chaired by
individuals who were familiar with campaigns. The group was intentionally composed of several
volunteers who possessed specific skills based on prior work experience and who filled specific
roles. Each committee member had both an interest in the community and a skill that was helpful
to the campaign. For example, the group included members with expertise in the hospital,
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finance, law, marketing, graphics, and technology. A co-chair described the committee members
as “real workhorses.” The all-volunteer group drafted the initiative, worked with the local
election office, and enlisted additional volunteers to gather signatures. Once the initiative
qualified for the ballot, the core committee directed a multi-faceted campaign involving speaking
engagements, rallies, a town hall, social media, an FAQ, mailers, and phone banking based on
precinct so that community volunteers would be calling voters who lived in their precinct.
Relying on the FAQ, they took care to make sure all answers were consistent with information
provided through the phone bank and posted on social media. A Mariposa elected official
recognized the level of effort, commenting that the citizens’ committee did a “remarkable job”
and included the “pick of the litter” in the community who “knew what they were doing.”
Following the passage of Measure O, one of the campaign co-chairs was appointed to a vacant
seat on the hospital board and later won election to that seat, thus assuming responsibility for
implementing the measure’s funding.
The initiative experts spoke only generally about the citizens’ role in initiative
campaigning, explaining that the fact that the voter threshold had changed did not mean that the
rest of the initiative process had changed. They emphasized that the process remains difficult and
time intensive, and requires a significant volunteer effort.
Policy Entrepreneurship in the Initiative Process
Further demonstrating the proactive nature of the initiative proponents studied here, in all
four cases, specific individuals instigated the initiative. These individuals might be considered
policy entrepreneurs, described as
a special kind of actor, embedded in the sociopolitical fabric, who is alert to opportunities
and acts upon them; he or she amasses coalitions for the purpose of effecting change in a
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substantive policy sector, political rules or in the provision of public goods. (Petridou et
al., 2015, p. 1)
While policy entrepreneurs generally do not rely on voters to implement change (Anderson et al.,
2020), the individuals here each saw an opportunity to effectuate change through the citizens’
initiative process.
In Manhattan Beach and Mariposa, attorneys brought the majority vote threshold
requirement to the attention of the citizens’ groups. They recognized that the Court of Appeal
decisions created a window of opportunity for citizens to effectuate special taxes under more
favorable conditions than a government-sponsored tax. A local attorney in Manhattan Beach
conveyed that an initiative “had become the acceptable way of doing it with the parcel tax and
having the 50% plus one.” The same attorney brought the majority threshold issue to the
attention of the school board subcommittee exploring parcel tax options, saying he was fairly
certain this could be done for the schools, as he had contacted attorneys in San Francisco to
inquire about their efforts. This individual ultimately worked with the initiative proponents to
draft the initiative and submit it to the city.
In Mariposa, a Fresno attorney who learned that citizens were contemplating another
measure after the failure of the board of supervisors-sponsored tax measure asked to speak to the
committee about undertaking a citizens’ initiative. At the same time, one of the individuals who
became the Citizens to Save Our Hospital co-chair learned about an initiative in Fresno and saw
that citizens could bring such initiatives at the majority vote threshold. She thought, “Bingo! I
think I just figured out how the hospital is going to get the money.” The attorney spoke to and
joined the citizens’ committee and eventually helped to write the measure.
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In Los Angeles, Measure ULA stemmed in large part from the efforts of Denny Zane, the
current executive director of MoveLA—a nonprofit organization dedicated to the development
of comprehensive, safe, affordable, and accessible public transit—who is also a former elected
official. He had been considering some type of tax to support housing for several years. Once he
had settled on proposing a measure for the 2022 ballot, he started shopping the initiative around,
going to organizations, including advocacy groups representing nonprofit affordable housing
developers. Ultimately, he partnered with Healthy LA, a coalition formed among housing and
tenants’ rights groups to protect tenants during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Because he was an elected official, Supervisor Preston could be considered to be a
political entrepreneur as opposed to a policy entrepreneur working outside of government
(Roberts & King, 1991). Yet, his conduct involved elements of policy entrepreneurship.
Supervisor Preston had a specific interest in vacant housing. While he worked within the
channels of government to secure a report on vacancy levels and possible policy responses, that
report expressly offered the option of a vacancy tax brought outside of government via a
citizens’ initiative requiring only a majority vote. Though Supervisor Preston had the option of
bringing the measure legislatively, he chose to work outside of the government framework and
support the initiative proponents. One of the citizens’ committee co-chairs was the legal
proponent of the initiative, yet he was the main proponent behind the scenes and became the
public face associated with the initiative. As one staff member noted, elected officials frequently
work behind the scenes with advocacy groups. But Supervisor Preston’s role was in public; he
appeared at rallies, provided interviews for numerous publications, and served as a visible and
vocal supporter of the initiative.
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These initiative proponents exhibited the hallmark traits of a policy entrepreneur. They
recognized the majority vote threshold as a window of opportunity and used it to promote a
specific policy solution (Petridou et al., 2015). They focused on a local issue and helped tailor a
solution relevant to their respective communities (Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2023). And they
engaged in activities designed to achieve that solution, including by sharing their knowledge and
engaging coalition partners (Mintrom & True, 2022).
Reliance on Networks
Building on the engagement of coalition partners, initiative stakeholders in the cases
studied relied heavily on networks. Beyond discussing the detrimental effect of special interest
groups on direct democracy (Bowler & Hanneman, 2006) or the problem of ideological
heterogeneity among coalitions (Manweller, 2005), literature on local direct democracy has
generally neglected to analyze the impact of coalitions or networks (Bernhard, 2019; Manweller,
2005). In the context of community initiatives, network structure was one of the top five factors
influencing the outcomes (Igalla et al., 2019). Here, initiative proponents in all four cases
effectively relied on networks. However, those networks looked different depending on whether
a large urban community or a smaller community was involved, with larger jurisdictions relying
on networks of organizations and smaller communities relying on networks of individuals.
These different network structures are consistent with the range of models the initiative
consultants and attorneys described. Though their examples were not always confined to special
tax initiatives, one consultant described an experience with an initiative that started with a
consortium of groups, including labor, housing advocates, nonprofit housing developers, and
some elected leaders. In contrast to that organization-led effort, she also discussed an experience
with a grassroots measure brought by some frustrated and organized parents. The parents started
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organically and built up their own volunteer base, though they may have hired paid signature
gatherers later in the process. An initiative attorney emphasized the need for coalition building
more generally, noting that most initiative proponents are not standing organizations, and thus,
the campaign tends to be run by a coalition that exists only for the purpose of the initiative. In the
context of special tax initiatives, he observed that activists and nonprofit organizations, together
with leaders in different fields, including often union leaders, tended to come together to build a
coalition that serves as the campaign committee or the organizing structure for the effort.
In both San Francisco and Los Angeles, the networks included of a host of organizations
supporting the initiatives at different levels. In San Francisco, a number of political and nonprofit
organizations endorsed the measure and provided volunteer support. But two principal
organizations were the driving force behind Proposition M: the DSA and Faith in Action, an
interfaith coalition focused on social justice issues. While those two organizations might not
seem like an obvious fit, an initiative proponent found that partnership to be one of the most
positive aspects of the initiative process. In contrast to literature suggesting that ideological
differences can be detrimental to a direct democracy campaign (Manweller, 2005), she explained
how important it was to associate with a partner that did not have the same political ideology and
form a coalition with an organization that was able to reach into different communities. For
example, while the DSA might have a booth at a farmer’s market, Faith in Action volunteers
might speak at a church or synagogue. She believed that branching out into new communities
was important to Proposition M’s success. Failing to rely on a network appeared to yield a less
effective effort; the San Francisco initiative opponent’s organization did not collaborate with
other organizations to oppose the initiative, and he did not even know if there was a coalition
formed around the opposition.
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Measure ULA relied on multiple, nested coalitions. A United to House LA co-chair was
the director of a permanent coalition, ACT-LA, a group of 42 organizations that work on housing
and transit justice issues. ACT-LA was a member of a larger coalition, Healthy LA, that had
developed to respond to the pandemic. The Healthy LA coalition ultimately partnered with
Denny Zane and MoveLA to develop Measure ULA. Members from key organizations formed
the 13-member core committee, and they brought in other organization leaders as committee
members. An initiative proponent stated that “having all these organizations own the process”
and being “invested in getting [the initiative] onto the ballot” was important. They were engaged
from the outset and took ownership of the initiative. According to one of the United to House LA
co-chairs, the process was synergistic in that it fostered the coalition building, which, in turn,
fostered voter trust in the coalition. During the campaign, over 200 organizations signed on to
support Measure ULA. Even with this expansive network, the groups supporting Measure ULA
tended to be ideologically homogenous, with the traditional breakdown of interests on each
side—more liberal or progressive interests and unions supporting the initiative and more
conservative interests and corporations opposing it (Bowler & Hanneman, 2006). An initiative
consultant confirmed that this is the typical breakdown when a tax initiative is involved, with
unions generally supportive and business interests generally opposed.
In contrast to these organization-based networks, initiative stakeholders in Manhattan
Beach and Mariposa relied on personal networks of individuals to promote their positions. An
MB Citizens for Schools co-chair understood the importance of a collaborative effort and relied
heavily on the network she developed through volunteering in multiple roles on behalf of the
schools. The effort opposing Measure A similarly included individuals who were not part of any
pre-existing organized group. In Mariposa, the co-chairs of Citizens to Save the Hospital
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likewise relied on their personal networks for volunteer support and fundraising. The co-chairs
personally sent hundreds of letters to people they knew asking for donations, cross-checking
their lists to ensure no one would be asked twice. In terms of organizational networking, the
campaign engaged local community groups by giving presentations about the initiative to
multiple social, political, business, and nonprofit groups.
Building Off of Prior Efforts
Community context was also important in that all initiative stakeholders in some way
utilized past efforts as a springboard for their current efforts. One consultant summed up this
finding by explaining that the first thing he would ask a community contemplating a special tax
initiative is what they have done in the past: “I would want to know the history. What have they
tried in the past? Have they failed?” Here, in each of the four cases, the history was unique, and
initiative stakeholders took that history into account in various ways.
Mariposa’s Measure O followed a failed hospital district-sponsored measure, Measure N,
that also sought to impose a sales tax for hospital funding. One of the Citizens to Save the
Hospital co-chairs had been part of the citizens’ committee responsible for the Measure N
campaign and desired to avoid some of the pitfalls of that measure in the next campaign. She
believed that the professionals responsible for that campaign had made some errors and that “the
citizens could easily fix those errors and design a campaign that would work.” Specifically, she
thought Measure N did not account for the unique aspects of the community. For example, the
area is large geographically and split in unusual ways in terms of healthcare services, with voters
to the north utilizing the hospital less frequently than voters in other parts of the community.
Thus, she determined the Measure O campaign should direct fewer resources to that northern
area. Politically, she also opined that the prior measure contained several omissions that deterred
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voters, including the absence of a sunset date, the lack of language limiting how the funds could
be used and insufficient financial accountability. Building on the lessons learned from Measure
N, Measure O contained a sunset date, included additional language restricting the use of the
funds, and added sections requiring that the funds be kept separately and publicly accounted for
every three months.
In San Francisco and Los Angeles, initiative proponents took into account prior similar
measures in different ways. San Francisco’s Proposition M was modeled after a vacancy tax in
Vancouver. The report commissioned by Supervisor Preston explored that effort in great detail,
including its specific mechanics and revenue yielded, and used the success of that measure as an
example of what the San Francisco initiative could accomplish. In addition, initiative proponents
considered the outcome of a prior transfer tax for rent relief that had been proposed as a general
tax to avoid the supermajority vote. After the measure passed, there were difficulties ensuring the
money was targeted as promised, and this implementation problem was one of the factors the
initiative proponents considered in bringing Proposition M as a special tax. In Los Angeles, the
Measure ULA proponents had to distinguish the perceived shortcomings of existing programs to
address homelessness. In 2017, Los Angeles voters overwhelmingly supported Proposition
HHH, a measure authorizing $1.2 billion in general obligation bonds to develop and acquire
supportive housing. While the initiative proponents involved in homelessness and housing issues
tended to believe the measure has been reasonably successful, they recognized both that the
measure had fallen short in some respects (Itchon, 2022) and that voters saw that the population
of people experiencing homelessness has continued to expand. As a result, much of the Measure
ULA messaging was designed to overcome voter skepticism about prior housing efforts.
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In Manhattan Beach, initiative proponents intentionally distanced the initiative from prior
and ongoing efforts. They were actively involved with school board efforts to determine the next
funding steps and knew the school board supported an incremental approach involving the
renewal of an existing $225 per parcel tax scheduled to sunset in 2024 and the proposal of an
additional tax ranging from $325 to $550 per parcel. Initiative proponents expressed hesitancy
about the school board “being safe.” Instead, they sought a “long-term, sustainable solution” and
proposed $1,095 per parcel, which was the amount that would have brought the schools up to the
state average of per-pupil funding. They believed that school board polling data directed to what
would pass at a supermajority level supported the idea that a tax of that amount would be
supported by a bare majority. In contrast, an elected official construed the polling differently,
judging that it did not support the amount proposed by the initiative.
The initiative proponents conceded the proposal was based on their hope for the
community. According to one of the initiative proponents:
We never thought it was a sure thing by any stretch of the imagination, but we thought it
was within the realm of possibility. And so, if it’s within the realm of possibility, why
wouldn’t we try? … I mean, it was obviously aspirational and obviously too ambitious,
but it was about vision. It was about let’s set our schools up for success and
sustainability.
Another initiative proponent echoed the identical sentiment, stating, “The citizens’ initiative was
too ambitious, and it became too aspirational because voters didn’t see a real need for the
funding given the supplemental state and federal funding for schools for COVID relief at the
time.” The proponent further acknowledged that the community might have embraced the more
balanced approach contemplated by the school board.
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Conclusion
Initiative proponents have been underestimated in the literature (Bosschaart et al., 2020;
Igalla et al., 2019). They are passionate advocates and display an unexpected level of
organization and sophistication, demonstrated by their ability to capitalize on the opportunity
created by the majority vote threshold, their coalition building and use of networks, and their
efforts to understand how prior action in their community and beyond could affect voter response
to their proposals.
How Significant is the Lower Voter Threshold in the Decision to Bring a Special Tax
Measure as an Initiative?
According to those having expertise with local initiatives, the judicial decisions holding
that special tax initiatives require only a majority vote were a watershed. Until the appellate court
decision underlying the California Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in California Cannabis
Coalition v. City of Upland, even the experts had no reason to think the initiative process
operated any differently than the usual ballot measure process. As one initiative attorney
explained,
Before the Court of Appeal decision came down in the Upland case, I’m not sure any of
us who practice in the area believed a voter-initiated special tax was subject only to a
majority vote. I think if any of us had said that, we probably would have been mocked at
the time. It was just an accepted idea that all special taxes, whether proposed by the
voters or placed on the ballot by a city council or board of supervisors, were subject to a
supermajority vote.
There was significant surprise among the industry that special tax initiatives were not subject to
the same procedural rules, including the supermajority requirement. But once the Supreme Court
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decision came down, the attorney read it as a clear sign that only a simple majority was required.
Given the five Court of Appeal decisions that followed, he concluded the Supreme Court meant
what it said. These decisions opened up an opportunity and “fundamentally changed the calculus
of whether organizations were willing to take the risk of putting a tax before the voters to fund
something that the polls showed would garner more than majority support but less than two-
thirds.”
While the experts understood the importance of this clarification in the law, the
researcher was interested in how those on the ground perceived the change or if they considered
it at all. Similar to Lee’s (2003) study about how intermediate appellate courts react to the policy
window created by a disruptive Supreme Court decision, this study endeavored to explore how
initiative stakeholders reacted to the appellate decisions, effectively creating a preference for the
initiative process in the context of special taxes. Initiative proponents were asked how the
majority vote threshold factored into the decision to bring the measure as an initiative, and those
participants not involved in that decision were asked about their perception of the majority vote
threshold’s significance. The finding that emerged from these inquiries was that the majority
vote threshold was an important factor in the decision but not the sole factor. However,
participants who were not involved in the decision of how to bring the measure tended to believe
it was the only factor.
All initiative proponents acknowledged that the majority threshold factored into the
decision to bring a special tax measure as an initiative. Indeed, the initiative proponents in the
cases studied kept abreast of the change in the law and understood the significance of the lower
vote threshold level. An initiative proponent in San Francisco broadly stated that the majority
threshold “did influence the decision to do more taxation in the first place.” In Los Angeles, the
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core committee for United to House LA had been tracking the appellate court decisions. When
the group decided to go forward with the measure, “we were clear that we wanted to be able to
do it with the 50 plus one of the vote, so we knew we needed to do a citizens’ initiative for that.
… [The court decisions] were definitely part of the thinking about how to do it, when to do it.”
Another Los Angeles initiative proponent stated that bringing the measure as an initiative “was a
calculated decision to circumvent the two-thirds required for raising new property taxes because
of Proposition 13.” A Manhattan Beach initiative proponent stated that the majority threshold
was “significantly more enticing” than a supermajority threshold. Proponents there added that the
majority threshold was the primary reason for bringing the measure as an initiative and opined
that the best part of a citizens’ initiative is the majority threshold. A Mariposa initiative
proponent recognized the clear benefit of a majority threshold is that a measure is easier to pass,
yet her message to the citizens’ committee was to secure a supermajority because of a threatened
statewide initiative that would have imposed a retroactive supermajority requirement.
Initiative opponents, as well as some elected officials, staff members and experts, tended
to presume the majority threshold was the only factor driving the determination to bring an
initiative. A Manhattan Beach elected official stated that absent the majority vote threshold, the
measure would not have been brought as an initiative, and a Manhattan Beach initiative
opponent said the reason the measure was brought as an initiative was because of the 50% plus
one threshold. A Los Angeles initiative opponent described the majority threshold as a
“loophole” that was a huge factor in deciding to bring an initiative. A San Francisco initiative
opponent and a San Francisco staff member both presumed Proposition M was proposed as an
initiative because of the majority vote threshold. An initiative attorney described examples of
measures that previously would not have gone through the initiative process either because of the
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signature-gathering cost or because the boards or councils in those cities would have supported
the measures going on the ballot. He opined, “The only reason that these measures ended up
appearing as voter-initiated special taxes was because of the window that Upland opened.” An
initiative consultant predicted a surge of local taxes because of the majority threshold for special
tax initiatives: “I think at a majority level, you’re going to see an explosion of these things.
They’ll be much easier to pass.” In contrast, one initiative consultant viewed the voter threshold
as a primary factor but identified other factors, such as election timing as it related to community
priorities. For example, a rain-capture initiative would likely do better when it is raining versus
when the weather is clear.
One initiative attorney warned that the majority threshold should not be seen as a panacea
for a group looking for a revenue source, as some measures still fail. Consistent with this
admonition, of the 16 special tax measures appearing on the ballot in 2022 at the majority vote
threshold level, fewer than one-half passed (Table 3). Other initiative stakeholders were careful
to recognize that the majority threshold is not dispositive. A Los Angeles initiative proponent
described the majority threshold as a positive thing and a powerful tool for citizens. However,
she further acknowledged that the lower vote threshold does not mean the process is easy; it still
requires a large campaign and the involvement of many organizations. A San Francisco initiative
proponent thought of the majority vote threshold as affording more leeway and flexibility in
determining how to bring a special tax measure. An initiative consultant pointed out that
although the majority threshold makes things easier, it remained important to mount a campaign
with effective messaging. She explained that proponents who gather the signatures to get
something on the ballot need to understand the mechanics of a campaign to succeed, describing
the campaign as “just a whole different animal.”
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Manhattan Beach might be viewed as a cautionary tale of what can happen when the
majority threshold overshadows other issues. There, polling secured by the school board showed
that a $1,125 annual parcel tax would pass by just over 50% but not by 67%. To the initiative
proponents, this meant Measure A’s proposed imposition of an annual parcel tax of $1,095 was
within the realm of possibility with a majority vote. The initiative proponents thought they could
propose a higher rate than the school board was willing to suggest, and they believed the
majority threshold provided the opportunity for the community to explore a larger parcel tax. In
contrast, an initiative opponent emphasized the importance of the supermajority vote
requirement, the level at which all other special tax measures in the community had been
approved. He opined perhaps the initiative proponents “thought they had an easy win” because
of “the new simple majority vote threshold.” In hindsight, the proponents acknowledged that the
measure was too aspirational, even with the majority vote. In line with this experience, an
initiative consultant observed that the supermajority requirement forces initiative proponents to
be selective and expressed concern about a greed factor creeping in at the majority vote level,
with proponents asking for more than is needed. He emphasized, “That’s where it takes real
discipline.”
Some initiative stakeholders described undertaking an initiative in terms of control,
explaining that citizens’ ability to bring a measure at a lower vote threshold than the government
effectively shifted control away from government to citizens. For initiative proponents, this was
another factor supporting the pursuit of an initiative. A San Francisco initiative proponent
emphasized the desire to maintain control to dictate policy and explained that when citizens go to
the board of supervisors to propose a measure, “there’s a degree to which it’s sort of out of your
control as advocates, as organizers.” A San Francisco staff member recognized that “certainly
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it’s easier with the majority, and that worked in this initiative’s favor. So, it shifts the power a
little to citizen initiatives.” A Manhattan Beach initiative proponent similarly pointed out that a
key difference with the initiative process is that citizens control what goes on the ballot. A Los
Angeles initiative proponent summed up that for most of the community organizations involved
in the initiative, “I think it’s a matter of kind of taking matters into their own hands.”
Those in government correspondingly recognized the need to relinquish control. A
Mariposa elected official expressed concern about maintaining control when the citizens’ group
first proposed bringing an initiative:
There was a period of time where we [the hospital board] were opposed to it, myself
included, because you’re giving up too much of the power of it, too much of the
responsibility. But then I started thinking about it. Idealistically, if you have people who
are willing to do that who are citizens, this is a hospital for the citizens.
Initiative experts similarly identified a shift in control related to the majority vote threshold, with
one initiative consultant noting that citizens necessarily control what goes into the measure and
that consultants who work with those citizens also tend to have more control than with a
government-sponsored measure. Another consultant thought that the majority threshold risks
governments losing control over their tax level.
Conclusion
Both those participants who work in the initiative industry and those directly involved
with special tax initiatives in the communities studied appreciated the significance of the
majority vote threshold, with initiative proponents considering it as an important factor in the
decision to pursue an initiative. However, there is some risk in viewing the vote threshold as the
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only factor weighing in the decision. Initiative proponents likewise desired some level of control
over the process, which can be another factor driving the decision.
How is Local Governance Being Affected by California Law Confirming That a Special
Tax Initiative has a Lower Voter Threshold for Approval Than a Special Tax Measure
Proposed by a Local Elected Body?
The case analysis and interviews suggest that the majority threshold has changed the
calculus for initiative stakeholders. A Mariposa elected official explained that before the law was
clarified, the fact that a special tax required a supermajority vote to pass did not affect the
hospital board’s decision to bring Measure N. Instead, the vote threshold was just seen as a
“huge risk” the board had to accept. An initiative attorney added that at the supermajority level,
only the well-funded and often foolish citizens’ group would pursue a special tax initiative that
had anything less than two-thirds’ support in early polling. Yet, other participants expressed
some concern about shifting away from a supermajority threshold. An initiative consultant
stated,
At least in my experience as a consultant, the higher the threshold on taxes, the more
collaboration. All the different groups have to come together to craft a tax and spending
plan that, in my opinion, is more reasonable because you accommodate so many different
interests.
Another initiative consultant noted that the supermajority threshold forced a level of selectivity.
Though a Manhattan Beach elected official expressed support for the majority threshold, she
speculated whether the point of the supermajority requirement was that only measures with
universal appeal would or should pass. An initiative consultant agreed that the value of the
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supermajority requirement was that it ensured only measures with something approaching
consensus would pass.
On balance, however, initiative stakeholders favored the majority threshold, with one
consultant emphasizing that it opens up opportunities for needed revenue in California and
another characterizing it as more democratic than the supermajority requirement. The data here
showed that the law’s preference for the initiative process and elimination of the supermajority
requirement for special tax initiatives have meaningful implications for the roles of those
involved in the process and the relationships between them. In the cases studied, the change in
the law appears to have mobilized initiative proponents, which in turn has affected elected
officials and municipal staff in different and unexpected ways.
The findings demonstrated important characteristics about each category of participants
involved in the initiative process. Initiative proponents were highly structured and
knowledgeable, purposefully exploiting the majority threshold, developing effective coalitions,
and being attuned to their own communities. In three jurisdictions, initiative proponents took the
lead by assuming control over all aspects of the measure. Even in San Francisco, where an
elected official was publicly and privately involved in the measure, initiative proponents worked
to maintain the character of the effort as citizen-led. The initiative proponents in the cases
studied appeared to understand the opportunity presented by the Court of Appeals’ decisions and
exhibited both a willingness and ability to work to secure the advantage presented by current
law.
The findings presented a more complex and varied depiction of elected officials. There is
a lack of certainty in the law and the literature to guide elected officials regarding what role they
should play. Though the law allows elected officials to engage in a host of activities short of
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campaigning to support an initiative (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009), elected officials appeared
hesitant to participate. Even in San Francisco, government was reluctant to acknowledge its
involvement, with a staff member of Supervisor Preston writing:
Our office laid some of the policy groundwork for the ballot measure, including
commissioning a January 2022 report prepared by the board’s Budget and Legislative
Analyst, but it was placed on the ballot by citizen signatures, not our office.
Consistent with the literature that supports a range of roles in connection with citizen-driven
activity (Bakker et al., 2012; Igalla et al., 2020; Mees et al., 2019), the roles that elected officials
undertook appeared to be individualized, even within a community. While many participants
likewise supported the notion that there is no one-size-fits-all role, having each elected official
fulfill a unique role makes the possibility of citizen and government collaboration described by
other participants more challenging. The unpredictable nature of an elected official’s role
likewise reinforces the control assumed by the initiative proponents, who behaved in a more
uniform and, consequently, predictable manner across the jurisdictions studied.
Finally, the staff members in the cases studied refuted the assumption held by some
participants that municipal staff is not receptive to initiatives. Municipal staff generally
expressed support for the process and a willingness to provide policy guidance or other forms of
support to the efforts. This finding is consistent with research determining that government
frequently offers support for citizen-led activity in the form of community initiatives (Igalla et
al., 2021) or social entrepreneurship (Korosec & Berman, 2006). While it might seem logical that
initiative proponents would reach out to municipal staff for support, there remains hesitancy on
staff’s part due to the legal restrictions on the use of public resources (Vargas v. City of Salinas,
2009). Because staff is mindful of actual expenditures, their time, and other government
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resources, municipal staff members are not as involved in the initiative process as those in the
cases studied suggested they would like to be.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
This research has explored the relationship between direct and representative democracy
at the local level by examining the conduct and perspectives of citizen advocates and government
officials in four jurisdictions engaged in a special tax initiative. The research focused on
California law’s unique preference for the initiative process in the context of special tax
measures and asked how the law is affecting local governance. The findings revealed that
communities are not utilizing the initiative process uniformly. There exists a complex and varied
relationship among the stakeholders involved in the initiatives that is driven by multiple factors,
including community history and context, the current legal framework, and an unexpected level
of resourcefulness among citizen initiative proponents that is generally unmatched by local
elected officials.
Research Finding Implications
Direct democracy remains entrenched in California’s political culture. Participants
expressed strong support for local-level democracy, particularly the notion of citizens being able
to develop and implement their chosen policies. This finding is consistent with literature
recognizing robust support for direct democracy generally (Bowler et al., 2007; Matsusaka,
2020;), as well as literature showing that citizens favor vote-centric processes that directly
implement citizen preferences over more deliberative processes that merely consider those
preferences (Rojon et al., 2019). The literature is equally clear that an effective system of direct
democracy does not operate in isolation, and it necessarily interacts with and supplements
representative democracy (Bandeira & Ferraro, 2017; Garcia, 2020; Garrett, 2004; Heidbreder et
al., 2019; Matsusaka, 2020). Consequently, direct democracy involves the participation of both
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citizen advocates and government representatives, and for that reason, this study encompassed
the perceptions of those operating both outside and inside of government.
Initiative Stakeholder Roles
With respect to the outward characteristics of local ballot initiative jurisdictions and
proponents, the findings are partially consistent with the literature. Initiative use tends to be
higher in cities with more municipal employees (Gordon, 2004, 2009), and San Francisco, the
most active initiative jurisdiction, has an “enormous local government” with over 30,000
municipal employees. One of Gordon’s (2004) explanations for that phenomenon is that it is
difficult for elected officials to determine voter preferences in such large communities. Related
to that point, a San Francisco staff member highlighted that the city is divided into 11 districts,
with each supervisor beholden to a particular district. Without commenting on the merits of any
particular policy, he opined that a policy offered by a community-wide citizens’ initiative did a
better job than government in addressing citywide issues. Other jurisdiction characteristics did
not line up so directly, as residents had higher levels of education and income or were more
likely to be Democrats in only some of the jurisdictions studied (Gordon, 2004). Moreover,
though cities have tended to be the highest initiative-use jurisdictions (Gordon, 2009), an
increasing number of counties and special districts appear to be utilizing the process. The
expansion of initiatives to communities whose characteristics diverge from the literature could be
due to the appeal of the majority vote threshold, which may have broadened the scope of the
jurisdictions undertaking citizens’ initiatives.
The literature likewise captured some of the outward attributes of initiative proponents in
the jurisdictions studied. The proponents were local volunteer groups formed specifically to
develop and advocate for the initiative (Adams, 2012). Also consistent with the literature, some
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stakeholders—here, initiative opponents in Los Angeles—were part of a larger organization
seeking to advocate for broader goals (Adams, 2012). Though Adams found that the level of
volunteerism declined in larger jurisdictions, the largest jurisdiction studied, Los Angeles,
involved a volunteer-led effort. Further consistent with Adams’ (2012) study, some initiative
proponents were involved in local politics as former or prospective elected officials.
These external characteristics tell only a small part of the story, however. What the local
ballot initiative literature fails to capture is the leadership and entrepreneurship exhibited by the
initiative proponents studied. Instead, the scholarship on policy entrepreneurs is more relevant,
describing groups or individuals who work outside of government to introduce new ideas into the
public sector (Roberts & King, 1991). In the cases studied, initiative proponents formulated new
policy ideas tailored to their communities’ needs. Manhattan Beach proponents created a long-
term, albeit aspirational, school funding mechanism. Mariposa proponents developed a tax to
fund the public hospital that was responsive to voter concerns voters about a prior failed
measure. Los Angeles proponents created a unique type of tax, potentially the largest in the
city’s history, to fund an intractable community problem. And San Francisco proponents utilized
public agency research to develop a new tax to address vacancy and housing issues documented
in that community. While this research did not focus on the personal motivations of the initiative
proponents, their conduct was likewise consistent with the literature on community initiatives
finding that citizen-led activity frequently implements the citizens’ “vision of creating a better
society” (Bosschaart et al., 2020, p. 2). Each of the initiatives was tailored to fund a public good
or address a societal issue for the benefit of the community as a whole. These efforts are contrary
to some perceptions of elected officials, who tend to view engaged citizens as self-interested and
failing to consider broader community needs (Barnes & Mann, 2011; Berner et al., 2011).
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In terms of promoting policy, initiative proponents were particularly effective at
developing networks (Mintrom & True, 2022), a skill likewise exhibited by citizens promoting
community initiatives (Connelly et al., 2020). For example, Los Angeles initiative proponents
secured the support of over 200 organizations and over 800 individual volunteers. On a smaller
scale, Manhattan Beach initiative proponents worked with over 150 individual volunteers. Some
literature suggests that networking with government officials is a key strength of both policy
entrepreneurs (Roberts & King, 1991) and community initiative organizers (Connelly et al.,
2020). While some of the networking in Los Angeles and San Francisco involved outreach to
individual elected officials, initiative proponents in those jurisdictions avoided creating a visible
partnership because of public distrust of government. Initiative efforts in Manhattan Beach and
Mariposa were wholly citizen-led and citizen-focused. Though some level of government distrust
likewise factored into the decisions in those jurisdictions, both the initiative proponents and the
elected officials believed that it was important for elected officials to avoid involvement with the
initiative if the measure were to be truly considered a citizen-led effort, and therefore elected
officials were not part of the citizen advocacy networks.
Contrary to the literature suggesting that ballot initiatives are less engaging than
community initiatives, in part because the former involves ceding responsibility for the measure
to the government once passed (Bosschaart et al., 2020), the initiative proponents who
participated in this research maintained a role in implementing the policy enacted by the special
tax initiative. However, the nature of this role differed, corresponding to how the participants
viewed the relationship between direct and representative democracy. In San Francisco and Los
Angeles, initiative proponents desired to maintain involvement as citizens, with San Francisco
proponents facilitating implementation through their DSA connection and Los Angeles
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proponents working directly with municipal staff. In contrast, initiative proponents in Mariposa
and Manhattan Beach secured responsibility for implementation by becoming political actors
themselves through appointment and election to the boards responsible for distributing the tax
revenue. This path is consistent with their belief that citizens and government must maintain
separate roles in the context of an initiative; in other words, as citizens, they could not have been
involved in implementation, a role traditionally reserved for government (Bosschaart et al.,
2020).
While initiative proponents in the jurisdictions studied behaved in a relatively uniform
manner, acting strategically in harnessing resources to enact their policies, the behavior of
elected officials varied significantly among the jurisdictions. These differences appeared to be
tethered to the specific environment in each community and appropriate for the conditions
surrounding each initiative. Emerging literature on community initiatives similarly identifies a
range of roles and activities that government officials might undertake in connection with an
initiative (Bakker et al., 2012; Chin & Mees, 2020; Igalla et al., 2020; Mees et al., 2019). Mees et
al.’s (2019) ladder of government participation provides the most relevant framework by which
to examine an elected official’s level of involvement in a special tax initiative. Studying
community initiatives, Mees et al. (2019) found that network steering was the most common
rung, a level that involves collaboration between government and initiative stakeholders
throughout the process. In contrast, in the context of a citizens’ ballot initiative, elected officials
in the four jurisdictions studied operated at lower levels on the ladder. Highlighting the cases of
Mariposa and San Francisco demonstrates how those different roles appeared appropriate for
each community.
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In Mariposa, the board of supervisors facilitated Measure O. At the level of facilitation,
initiatives are generated outside of government, yet government has an interest in their success
(Mees et al., 2019). Though the board of supervisors did not engage in active, affirmative
support, its support was implicit in that it had previously supported a similar measure, thereby
establishing that the initiative was consistent with its agenda. The hospital board operated
slightly lower on the ladder, due in part to all stakeholders’ caution about the legal limitations
governing the board’s ability to advocate, in part to the community’s skepticism about
government pointed out by both a Mariposa staff member and an initiative proponent, and in part
to the active and comprehensive efforts undertaken by the initiative proponents. A Mariposa
elected official highlighted the tension that can result from a direct democratic process,
expressing concern about having to relinquish some level of control but simultaneously
acknowledging the benefits of having a purely citizen-driven measure (Bowler et al., 2001). One
of the participants in Mees et al.’s (2019) study observed that “[a]s local government we should
tune our role with the pace and energy of the involved citizens” (p. 204). It appears the elected
officials in Mariposa attuned their role to be in harmony with the initiative proponents.
At least one elected official in San Francisco, on the other hand, operated at a higher level
on the ladder of government participation, actively stimulating the development of and
campaigning in support of Proposition M. His behavior was consistent with the literature finding
that some type of government involvement with a community initiative is beneficial, particularly
from someone who can span boundaries to deal with both government and citizen advocates.
(Edelenbos et al., 2018). Unlike the other jurisdictions studied, San Francisco staff members
emphasized that elected leaders frequently worked with citizens advocacy groups to develop
policy proposals. Also, unlike the three other jurisdictions, Supervisor Preston occupied a
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leadership role. This level of government involvement appears appropriate for this community,
given both the initiative’s favorable outcome and the San Francisco participants’ expressed
acceptance of government participation in direct democracy efforts. Among the jurisdictions
studied, San Francisco was the most experienced with the initiative process and, further, had a
history of visible government support for special tax initiatives (City and County of San
Francisco, 2021; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn., 2021). It could be that the relationship
between elected officials and initiative proponents develops over time, with increasing
experience with the initiative process. Relatedly, it could also be that government/citizen
collaboration is more imperative in jurisdictions that engage in the initiative process repeatedly.
Literature outside of case law has yet to address the activities in which an elected official
can and should engage in the context of a ballot initiative. Some literature on community
initiatives discusses the importance of ongoing financial support (Chin & Mees, 2020; Igalla et
al., 2020), which by law is not available for a special tax initiative in California. Examining the
range of activities in which elected officials engaged in the cases studied, it appears that prior to
the initiative qualifying for the ballot, some elected officials secured the provision of policy
information, shared polling and survey information, and met with initiative proponents. The
elected officials who chose to engage did not go as far as the law permits, which would include
drafting the initiative, identifying citizen proponents, financially supporting efforts to place the
initiative on the ballot, and educating voters about the need for the initiative (Santa Barbara
County Coalition Against Automobile Subsidies, 2008). Once the initiatives qualified for the
ballot, some of the elected officials in the cases studied engaged in activities that did not involve
public funds, such as speaking at rallies, phone banking, or contacting friends. Again, the law
permits greater involvement for both elected officials and municipal staff, including using public
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funds to direct informational materials to the public so long as the information cannot be
construed as advocacy (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009).
Municipal staff seemed especially hamstrung by the legal restrictions on their
involvement. A Manhattan Beach elected official further identified a practical limiting
consideration that staff members may not live in the jurisdictions they serve and, therefore, may
have less interest in any involvement. Some elected officials in the cases studied and some
initiative experts opined that staff members are unreceptive to citizen-led efforts, and some
literature supports that sentiment (Cassia & Magno, 2011; Vatter et al., 2019). However, the staff
members studied were supportive of the citizens’ initiatives. This finding is consistent with other
literature finding that jurisdictions tend to support citizen-led efforts through communication and
administrative assistance (Korosec & Berman, 2006). More interesting was that, in contrast to
the elected officials interviewed, municipal staff members expressed a desire to have more
involvement in the initiative process, particularly at the policy development stage. This is a
finding that the literature has not explored.
Initiative Stakeholders Moving Forward
On balance, in the jurisdictions studied, elected officials and municipal staff were not as
involved in the initiative process as the law allows. The initiative stakeholders intended this lack
of involvement, and a decreasing level of involvement is consistent with the recommended
trajectory on the ladder of government participation (Mees et al., 2019). However, mindful that
the researcher’s admitted bias is toward government/citizen collaboration, it should be
acknowledged that a few participants expressed support for some level of collaboration among
initiative proponents and local government.
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A San Francisco staff member emphasized the benefits of that community’s current
process, in which elected officials and citizen advocates regularly communicated to develop
policy proposals. He believed that elected officials sharing political realities could serve to
balance some of the more idealistic ideas proposed by citizen advocates. A Mariposa staff
member and a Los Angeles initiative opponent concurred that staff could be useful to help
initiative proponents understand what is realistic and what can work. Though emphasizing that
California law requires some level of separation between government and any citizens’
committee, a Mariposa initiative proponent acknowledged that some type of collaboration could
be beneficial. A Los Angeles initiative proponent posited that an ideal scenario would be a
coalition of citizens, elected officials, and government staff working together to develop a
special tax initiative, though she added that course of action was not advisable for Measure ULA
given the public’s view of the city council at that time.
On the basis of his experience, an initiative consultant stated that initiative proponents
generally collaborated with government, noting that cities tended to support special tax
initiatives because they are the beneficiaries of the funds to be raised. The different model found
in the majority of cases in this research—where initiative proponents and elected officials
generally did not work together and intentionally maintained distance from one another—could
be the result of the new majority threshold. It could be that jurisdictions less familiar with the
initiative process take a cautious approach to government involvement to maintain the direct
democratic character of their efforts. Alternatively, or additionally, it could be that the majority
threshold’s shifting the balance to citizen control empowered initiative proponents to work
independently of government. The separation between initiative proponents and local
government is distinct from what an experienced initiative attorney described as the unavoidable
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collaboration that resulted at the supermajority vote level because the support of so many
constituencies and the accommodation of multiple different interests were needed to secure
success.
In line with some of the participants’ thoughts, existing literature acknowledges there can
be advantages to government involvement with citizen-led activity at the mid-levels of the
government participation ladder (Edelenbos et al., 2018; Igalla et al., 2019). First, without the
cue of a prior similar measure, some level of collaboration akin to that in San Francisco can help
to coordinate the agendas emanating from both inside and outside of government (Vatter et al.,
2019). Such collaboration might have helped to mitigate the situation in Manhattan Beach of an
elected official actively opposing an initiative. A Measure A opponent advised there are
preliminary discussions among a coalition of government officials and citizens to craft a new
measure designed to be proposed through local government. Second, local government’s
involvement early in the initiative process would seem to foster its ability and incentivize its
willingness to educate the public about the need for the tax, both as the initiative is being
developed and after it is on the ballot (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009). Third, elected officials’
working with initiative proponents could enhance their opinion of public engagement efforts
more broadly and of citizen initiative advocates specifically. The initiative proponents in the
cases studied were organized and committed leaders advocating for measures beyond their own
self-interest, and government’s involvement with them could dispel the notion that public
participation engages only the “usual suspects” who tend to appear at public hearings
(Hagelskamp et al., 2013. p. 24) or citizens who advocate only for issues that personally affect
them (Barnes & Mann, 2011). Fourth, a special tax initiative is unlike a community initiative in
which citizens themselves take responsibility for the provision of public services (Chin & Mees,
144
2020). A special tax initiative is never self-executing and can only be implemented by
government officials (Ferraiolo, 2023). Consequently, the early involvement of government,
particularly municipal staff members, could facilitate implementation through the inclusion in
the initiative of provisions designed to ease that process. As Ferraiolo (2023) suggested,
government involvement should be viewed not as an encroachment on citizen advocates but as
another form of check and balance on the initiative process more broadly (Ferraiolo, 2023).
Finally, research has shown that in the context of community initiatives, some level of
government support is associated with a favorable outcome (Aylett, 2013; Edelenbos et al., 2018;
Igalla et al., 2019, 2021).
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, several participants expressed strong hesitation
about any further government involvement in the initiative process. Particularly in Manhattan
Beach and Mariposa, both elected officials and initiative proponents emphasized how important
it was to maintain a wall of separation between them. Some participants believed further
government involvement posed risks for an elected official, with a San Francisco staff member
thinking that such engagement could risk the elected official being beholden to special interests
and a Los Angeles elected official expressing a concern that an elected official might try to
influence something outside her purview. A San Francisco initiative opponent believed the
public might perceive it to be corrupt for elected officials and initiative proponents to work
closely together, while an initiative attorney thought public confusion could result from overt
government involvement in an initiative.
Other participants saw potential negative consequences to the initiative effort. A
Mariposa initiative proponent described the citizens’ initiative as having a sense of community
action and more buy-in from the community because it was wholly a citizens’ enterprise. A San
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Francisco staff member agreed that the grassroots nature of citizens’ initiatives appealed to the
public. A San Francisco initiative proponent noted that the board of supervisors would likely
want to water down a citizens’ proposal.
The literature on community initiatives has acknowledged some of these concerns, yet it
has concluded that the benefit of government support appears to outweigh them. For example,
Igalla et al. (2021) pointed out that even though a community initiative’s reliance on external
sources can be associated with risks “such as a loss of autonomy” (p. 804), local government
remained a valuable source of significant support, providing needed help with rules and
regulations and long-term implementation. Further, municipal staff supporting the Solarize
Portland community initiative described by Aylett (2013) developed a new manner of working
with citizens, providing background technical and administrative support to a community
initiative while studiously avoiding taking credit for the effort.
Essentially, the notion of some level of government collaboration with a citizens’
initiative need not and should not mean that the citizen-led nature of the activity is changed or
minimized. As Edelenbos et al. (2018) noted, “self-organized action emerges without direct
pressure, but not without the presence of governmental bodies” (p. 54). By acknowledging the
presence of government in the initiative process, initiative proponents can harness additional
resources and add to their existing networks. However, elected officials must exercise discipline
in maintaining their facilitative role. Edelenbos et al. (2018) further explained that elected
officials’ understanding of where their role began and ended in relation to a citizens’ group was
critical to effective collaboration. Government participation in connection with a citizens’
initiative should be to facilitate, meaning to serve in a supportive and responsive rather than a
leading role (de Haan et al., 2018; Mees et al., 2019). Citizens serve as the initiators while
146
“government acts as follower or facilitator” (Igalla et al., 2019, p. 1177). This facilitative role
may require municipal actors to be adaptive and responsive to the initiative proponents’ needs as
opposed to leading or co-opting the effort (Aylett, 2013).
In three of the four cases studied, citizens worked independently of local government to
develop and promote the initiative. Given that initiatives are a form of direct democracy that
enable citizens to bypass representative government to secure a policy goal (Bowler et al., 2001),
it is to be expected that elected officials and government staff would not have a meaningful role
in the initiative. Nonetheless, the literature on local direct and representative democracy and
community initiatives demonstrates that there can be a supportive role for local government in a
direct democracy effort. In some jurisdictions studied, initiative stakeholders perceived that the
law prohibited even a limited facilitative role for local government, while in others, a lack of
public trust in government fostered the distance between stakeholders. Community context
remains paramount and should dictate the nature and scope of any facilitative role that elected
officials, and municipal staff would play in connection with a special tax initiative. Appropriate
supportive roles for local government should not intrude on the role of citizens as leaders and
entrepreneurs but instead, enhance those roles by providing resources and expertise.
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
A strength of this study was its research design—a multiple case study utilizing four
cases that represented the phenomenon of special tax initiatives yet exhibited diversity among a
range of demographic characteristics and other features, including experience with the initiative
process and former special tax measures. Within each case, the interviewees were representative
of each type of stakeholder involved in the initiative process, thereby providing perspectives not
typically found in the literature and enabling analyses of both different roles within a case and
147
similar roles across cases. Another strength was the participants’ candor, which yielded the “rich,
thick description” that is the hallmark of trustworthy qualitative research (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016, p. 256). Further, being able to capture the participants’ perspectives in late 2022 and early
2023, relatively shortly after the June and November 2022 elections for the special tax initiatives,
contributed to the participants’ ability to provide a detailed account of their involvement as well
as their reasoned opinions about the process.
One limitation was the inability to secure an interview with anyone from Supervisor
Preston’s office to obtain a firsthand account of his involvement. A further limitation involved
the extent to which each special tax initiative had its own unique features in terms of the type of
tax and revenue purpose. While every effort was made to ensure reliability through rigorous data
collection and analytical processes, those differences could affect the makeup of the participants
(Sircar & Glantz, 2021) as well as their conduct and perspectives in ways that were not
necessarily captured by this research.
Potentially, a different type of limitation is the Taxpayer Protection and Government
Accountability Act (TPA), a statewide initiative that has qualified for the November 2024 ballot.
Among several tax-related constitutional amendments, the TPA proposes to eliminate the
majority threshold vote level for special tax initiatives by requiring a supermajority vote
threshold for all special tax measures, whether proposed by local government or the electorate.
The TPA additionally seeks to have retroactive application to January 1, 2022, which would
serve to repeal any special tax initiative passed after that date below the supermajority vote level.
The elimination of the vote differential and the repeal of several previously enacted special tax
initiatives could have a chilling effect on citizens seeking to bring a special tax initiative,
possibly limiting the impact of this research. Nonetheless, the research findings concerning the
148
perspectives of those involved in the initiative process could be applied to other types of local
initiatives, which would not be affected by the TPA.
Opportunities for Future Research
This is the first academic study of special tax initiatives in California that considers the
influence of judicial decisions holding that initiatives require only a majority vote to pass.
Additional research is needed to understand the full impact of this phenomenon. For example,
one might expect that the passage rate for such initiatives would be higher than those requiring a
two-thirds majority. Yet, though in the cases studied three of four initiatives passed, in 2022,
fewer than half of the special tax initiatives passed, a rate well below the over 80% passage rate
for majority-vote level local revenue measures and closer to the 43% passage rate for measures
needing a supermajority vote (Coleman, 2022). It could be that proponents are relying too
heavily on the majority threshold level and are bringing measures unlikely to pass at any
threshold, but more research is needed to determine why local jurisdictions have not fully
capitalized on the lower threshold. Further, to gain a greater understanding of initiative activity
and outcome, additional research on special tax initiatives could concentrate on literature not
considered here in areas including taxation, campaign messaging, election timing, voter
preferences, or voter turnout. Such research could also shed light on the balance that local
jurisdictions are negotiating between proposing measures requiring a supermajority vote and
undertaking the effort required to qualify and campaign for an initiative, as some jurisdictions
continue to propose special tax measures through their local elected bodies notwithstanding the
availability of an initiative at a lower vote threshold.
Beyond special tax initiatives, local citizens’ or ballot initiatives more generally remain
an understudied area. Local initiatives will likely continue to serve as a mechanism for citizens to
149
enact policies that government has not, with issues concerning governing, taxation, and land use
promising to be areas of continued activity in California. The research on local California
initiatives is limited (Adams, 2012; Gordon, 2004, 2009), and other direct democracy research
tends to highlight the impact of initiatives on the electorate (Boehmke & Bowen, 2010; Bowler
& Donovan, 2002; Tolbert et al., 2003). Citizens’ initiative research tends not to explore what
was studied here—the roles of and relationships between initiative stakeholders. Such research is
necessary to address the unsupported assumption in the literature on community initiatives that
citizens’ ballot initiatives involve more passive and political conduct (Igalla et al., 2019) and
involve relinquishing control to the government for implementation (Bosschaart et al., 2020).
Additional research on the relationship between the attributes of policy entrepreneurs
(Roberts & King, 1991) and initiative proponents could also shed light on the qualities and
characteristics exhibited by those proponents. With respect to elected officials, some research
addresses how they perceive public engagement (Barnes & Mann, 2011; Hendriks & Lees-
Marshment, 2019), but the literature does not examine their attitudes regarding local direct
democracy efforts. Research on government perceptions of direct democracy could help to
explain the varied level of involvement of elected officials in citizen initiative efforts. The role of
municipal staff in relation to a citizens’ initiative could also be explored, as the staff members in
the cases studied desired a broader role, particularly regarding policy development.
Further, while the ladder of government participation in connection with community
initiatives provides a useful framework (Mees et al., 2019), it does not take into account the
unique features of a citizens’ initiative, including that it requires some level of support to qualify
for the ballot and must go to the voters for approval. The ladder also does not consider that, in
California, both elected officials and municipal staff are subject to laws restricting government
150
involvement. For example, while local government may facilitate a community initiative through
marketing (Igalla et al., 2020), a citizens’ initiative requires advocacy, and elected officials and
municipal staff may advocate only on their own time without using public resources. More
pointedly, much of the literature on community initiatives cites the provision of public funding
as a type of government support (Chin & Mees, 2020; Igalla et al., 2020), whereas public funds
in California can be spent on a ballot initiative only for limited purposes. While California case
law provides examples of how the law is applied in local jurisdictions, academic research on how
elected officials and municipal staff construe the law and in what activities they engage could
provide local government and initiative proponents with an additional resource. Such research
could also be used to examine whether and how local government might fill a more facilitative
role in connection with a citizens’ initiative within the bounds of the law.
Finally, research is beginning to account for the role of government in implementing
citizens’ initiatives (Ferraiolo, 2023; Vatter et al., 2019). Some research assumes that
government will be reluctant to implement a policy that was not originally on its agenda (Vatter
et al., 2019), while other research finds that legislative efforts to block implementation are
limited and that cautious, deliberative action by elected officials and staff can serve to enhance
the workability of an initiative (Ferraiolo, 2023). Yet, as Vatter et al. (2019) recognized, “studies
are needed that provide insight into the necessary conditions of a successful implementation of
direct democratic decisions, focusing on the long-term direct and indirect effects” (p. 176). A
study of policy implementation is needed to understand the full effects of initiative efforts,
particularly at the local level.
151
Recommendations for Practice
At the beginning of this research, it was anticipated the findings would yield an effective
practice approach for bringing a special tax initiative that would best serve the community—any
community. But the findings were more complex, demonstrating that community context results
in myriad approaches based on each jurisdiction’s individualized history and characteristics.
Nonetheless, given that local jurisdictions will continue to seek revenue (Danforth, 2021), it is
important to discern how these research findings can be interpreted to enhance the special tax
initiative process. The overarching recommendation stemming from the findings is that there is
room for additional government support of special tax initiatives. While government
involvement could create new tensions between local-level direct and representative democracy,
the initiative proponents studied here employed sufficient structure in their efforts so as to
cordon government efforts into a supportive role. The question going forward would be how to
maintain the citizen-led nature of direct democracy efforts while developing a more collaborative
relationship with local government. Three specific recommendations could serve to foster
government’s facilitative role.
First, both citizen initiative proponents and local government officials would benefit from
education on the allowable and prohibited uses of public resources in initiative efforts. Many
participants were overly cautious in their construction of California election law, believing it
requires initiative proponents and local government to disassociate. While case law outlines the
legal limits on government involvement (Vargas v. City of Salinas, 2009) and local government
resources such as the Institute for Local Government provide practical guidelines, more is
needed. Initiative proponents would be served by understanding the types of resources that local
government can provide, such as the San Francisco policy analysis. Correspondingly, elected
152
officials and municipal staff would benefit from understanding the extent to which they can
provide resources for pre-ballot qualification efforts, which, in turn, could smooth later
implementation efforts. Beyond education within a jurisdiction, a platform that would enable
both citizens involved in initiative efforts and elected officials and local government staff to
share experiences and practices could help jurisdictions understand how to harness resources
most effectively and in consideration of the unique context of their communities.
In addition, participants offered two concrete suggestions about how to involve more of
the public in the initiative process. While the participants’ focus was on increased public
engagement, these efforts would likewise serve as modest and transparent means of
incorporating government facilitation into the initiative process. One suggestion involved
convening a community forum before an initiative is developed to discuss the community’s
revenue needs and potential revenue measures. This practice would be consistent with Liu et al.’s
(2010) study of the factors involved in local government policymaking, finding that consensus
and coalition building impacted local agendas more than other political factors. It would further
incorporate a deliberative element into direct democracy, as Garcia (2020) and Cortés (2019)
advocated. The goals of citizens and local government sharing priorities at an early stage would
be to generate community consensus for a special tax initiative, employ government resources to
support the policy bases for the initiative, and foster government transparency. Though this type
of citizen and government involvement might not be appropriate for every community—for
example, where government distrust is so entrenched that a collaborative effort would taint the
citizens’ initiative—an early process might have facilitated coalition building and mitigated the
type of division that occurred in Manhattan Beach.
153
A related suggestion involved creating a public vetting process in the form of a public
hearing on an initiative to receive input from both the public and local government on the
proposal. The statewide process provided by the BITA provides a model, allowing two distinct
opportunities for public input: prior to an initiative being circulated for signatures, voters have a
30-day online period to offer comments; and once an initiative has collected 25% of the required
signatures, relevant legislative committees must hold a public hearing at least 131 days before
the election where the initiative will be on the ballot (Romero & Keidan, 2017). While Romero
and Keidan (2017) found that the online comment process had more influence on initiative
language and content than did the public hearing process, that disparity could result from several
factors, including the ease of posting online comments, the corresponding difficulty of attending
a hearing in Sacramento, and the key fact that ballot language cannot be changed once signature
gathering begins.
A local process would not encounter the same hurdles. To aid both public participation
and government facilitation and transparency, a public hearing could occur before a special tax
initiative is circulated for signatures. This process could have the added benefit of addressing
potential unintended consequences. For example, property owners in Los Angeles have come up
with several ideas to avoid the Measure ULA tax, including by creating transactions that are
under the $5 million threshold by splitting their property into multiple parcels or valuing the
property’s furniture at a high enough level to bring the real property transaction below $5 million
(Fleming, 2022). While tax avoidance is nothing new, perhaps input from government and the
public could have led to the addition of some provisions in Measure ULA designed to
preemptively address some of the more obvious ways that property owners are using to escape
the tax.
154
These participatory efforts could be voluntarily implemented in any jurisdiction;
California Election Code changes would be needed for a mandatory process. The risk of either
process is the perception of government control or overreach, thereby infringing on one of the
key components of the direct democracy process: citizen control. Local governments would need
to consider community context in fashioning their level of involvement and take care to reinforce
the citizen-led nature of the initiative.
These recommendations do not depend on maintaining the majority vote threshold for
special tax initiatives. Nonetheless, the final recommendation is for voter education about the
TPA. Co-sponsored by the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, the TPA proposes
constitutional amendments designed to close loopholes in Proposition 13 assertedly developed
by legislators and judges, among them the majority threshold for special tax initiatives. The
initiative proposes to expressly make the supermajority vote requirement for special tax
measures applicable to both local governing bodies and electors. According to a political ad
supporting the TPA, the initiative reinforces the purpose of Proposition 13 to deter special
interests from gaming the system:
However, state courts have recently invented a loophole. They say special taxes proposed
by a ‘citizens’ initiative’ can pass with 50% plus one vote instead of 2/3. This loophole
enables special interest groups to pretend to be average citizens circulating an initiative,
when they’re really interested parties who will get all the money from the tax increase.
13
The involvement of labor unions and affordable housing developers in Measure ULA in Los
Angeles appears to be the type of activity the TPA is designed to prevent. However, special
13
Protect Proposition 13 (2023). Retrieved from https://righttovoteontaxes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/TPA-
flyer-2023-PP13.pdf.
155
interest groups were not involved in the other jurisdictions studied, nor was anyone in any
jurisdiction pretending to be a citizen. In all cases studied, grassroots citizen-led activity drove
the initiative effort. This research tends to challenge the TPA’s central assumption that outside
interests are manipulating the process, instead finding that citizens are capitalizing on the
majority threshold to fund local needs. Regardless of one’s views on taxation, voters need
accurate information about who supports and benefits from special tax initiatives to make an
informed choice on the TPA.
Conclusion
This research was undertaken to understand the relationship between direct and
representative democracy at the local level by examining that relationship through the vehicle of
special tax initiatives. Recent judicial decisions protecting the initiative process and confirming
that special tax initiatives require only a majority vote to pass presented an opportunity to study a
specific and unique form of direct democracy. Employing a qualitative multiple case study
research design presented the further opportunity to study those initiatives from the perspective
of those involved in the process—local elected officials, municipal staff members, citizen
initiative proponents and opponents, and industry experts.
The findings revealed that those involved in the cases studied generally respect the
process of direct democracy. However, jurisdictions are each striking their own balance in terms
of citizen control over policymaking, with the community with the most initiative experience
being more willing to engage government in the process and the other jurisdictions studiously
avoiding government involvement. The findings did not show that—as some have feared—the
different voter thresholds resulted in government manipulation of the process. Where local
government was most heavily involved, the supervisor’s support for the initiative was vocal and
156
transparent. In the other cases, initiative proponents took particular care to ensure their efforts
were wholly citizen-led.
Moving forward, the findings suggest that the availability of the majority threshold will
continue to be a factor in a community’s decision to raise and target revenue. The question for
each community will remain how to balance that direct democratic effort in the context of local
representative democracy. This research suggests that local policymaking will not be uniform
and will, instead, be dictated by community dynamics.
157
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6210.2007.00711.x
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Theories of the policy process (3d ed., pp. 25–58). Westview Press.
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APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA SPECIAL TAX INITIATIVES INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Purpose of Interview
Thank you again for agreeing to discuss your experience with the special tax initiative
proposed in [name of local jurisdiction]. Just to remind you, I’m currently working on my
doctorate of policy, planning and development at USC. My dissertation involves studying the
development and proposal of local special taxes through the initiative process. The purpose of
this interview is to gain a greater understanding of the experiences of individuals, like you, who
have been directly involved with a special tax measure proposed via the initiative process.
Of course, your participation is voluntary. I expect our conversation will last
approximately 45 minutes to one hour. Does that work for you? Also, I do not plan to use names
in my research and your name will be kept confidential. However, given the public nature of the
special tax initiative and the description of your role, it is possible that a reader familiar with
[name of local jurisdiction] will be able to ascertain your identity.
Finally, I would like to record our conversation, as it is the best way for me to ensure that
I am capturing your answers accurately. I won’t share the recording with anyone else. Do I have
your permission to record? I will also be taking a few notes to highlight your comments or
remind myself of areas I would like to explore further. Is that all right with you?
Do you have any questions?
Questions
In 2022, your community had a special tax measure on the ballot that was developed through the
initiative process. Let’s talk about that measure.
1. Tell me about how that measure developed.
a. Who initiated the measure?
b. To what extent were you involved in the development of the measure?
c. What factors contributed to the measure being developed as an initiative
as opposed to through the local government process?
d. How were the proponents of the tax similar to those citizens who are more
frequently engaged in local governance? How were they different?
e. What was your understanding of the substance of the measure?
f. At the time the measure was being proposed, what was your understanding
about the percentage of the vote that would be needed for the measure to
pass?
2. Please describe the campaign for the measure.
a. How would you describe the relationship between local government and
the initiative proponents? What about the opponents?
b. What was your involvement in the campaign?
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c. To what extent was your involvement known to the public?
d. If your involvement was not known to the public, how do you think
citizens would have reacted to your involvement?
e. What message do you think resonated with the public?
3. Were you involved in any conversations regarding the need for a majority versus a two-
thirds vote at any point in the initiative process? If so, please tell me about those
discussions.
4. To what extent do you believe the voter threshold requirement contributed to the measure
being brought as an initiative?
5. To what extent do you believe that the measure’s being brought as an initiative was
responsible for its success?
6. How was municipal staff involved with the initiative, if at all? Was any aspect of the
process particularly challenging for staff?
7. What is your opinion of the differing voter threshold levels for a citizens’ initiative and a
government-generated special tax measure?
a. What do you perceive to be some of the benefits arising from the
favorable voter threshold for a citizens’ initiative?
b. What do you perceive to be some of the drawbacks arising from the
favorable voter threshold for a citizens’ initiative?
8. What are your top three lessons learned from the initiative process?
9. Speaking broadly, what do you think is an appropriate role for a local elected official in
connection with the initiative process?
a. How do you think the public would answer that question?
b. How do you think municipal staff would answer that question?
10. If you could design a process for the development and proposal of a special tax that
utilized what you perceive to be the best aspects of the citizens’ initiative process and the
government-driven process, what would that look like?
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APPENDIX B: INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXEMPT RESEARCH
STUDY TITLE: SIMPLE MAJORITY OR SUPERMAJORITY: WHAT DO
CALIFORNIA’S SPECIAL TAX INITIATIVES MEAN FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE?
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Jennifer L. King
FACULTY ADVISOR: Dr. Juliet Musso, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, USC Sol Price
School of Public Policy
You are invited to participate in a research study. Your participation is voluntary, and you may
decline to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable. This document explains
information about this study. I encourage you to ask questions about anything that is unclear to
you.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to examine California’s initiative process, focusing on how
local governments are handling special tax measures in light of the California courts’ recent
conclusion that initiatives require fewer votes to pass than do measures generated by a local
government. The study will explore how local governance might be affected by increasing
reliance on a direct democracy process to propose and enact special taxes. You are invited as a
possible participant because you have been involved in a special tax initiative in a local
jurisdiction.
PARTICIPANT INVOLVEMENT
You will be asked to participate in a voluntary interview lasting approximately 45
minutes. The interview will be comprised of open-ended questions about the special tax
initiative, and you may decline to answer any or all questions. If you choose to take part, the
interview will be conducted via Zoom, and it will be audio and video recorded unless you
decline to be recorded.
PAYMENT/COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
You will not be compensated for your participation.
CONFIDENTIALITY
The members of the research team and the University of Southern California Institutional
Review Board (IRB) may access the data. The IRB reviews and monitors research studies to
protect the rights and welfare of research subjects.
As a measure to protect respondent privacy and confidentiality, all research data will be
stored on the Principal Investigator’s (PI) password protected computer to which only the PI has
access. Written material, including any handwritten notes taken during the interview, will be
stored in a locked file cabinet in the PI’s office. Only the PI will have access to these files.
Interview recordings will be erased after they are transcribed. You may review the transcription
of your interview. Written materials will be kept for three years after study completion, and then
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will be destroyed.
As another measure to protect confidentiality, I will not use your name or precise position
in the study. That said, the name of your jurisdiction will be identified in the study. As such, your
identity may be guessed by someone who is familiar with your jurisdiction and/or the special tax
initiative.
INVESTIGATOR CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about this study, please contact the PI, Jennifer L. King at
Jennifer.king@usc.edu or 310-433-5054.
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the
University of Southern California Institutional Review Board at (323) 442-0114 or email
irb@usc.edu.
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APPENDIX C: CALIFORNIA SPECIAL TAX INITIATIVES OBSERV ATION
PROTOCOL
Observation Date: _________________________
Time Observation Began: ____________________
Time Observation Ended: ____________________
1. Subject of the observation
2. Describe the meeting setting (color, size, shape, windows, furniture or equipment in
the room, noise level)
3. Describe the attendees (who, roles, how situated, power dynamics)
4. Describe how the meeting begins (what exactly was said at the beginning)
5. Describe the chronology of events in 15-minute intervals
15
mins
30
mins
45
mins
60+
mins
6. Describe the interactions that take place during the observation
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a. Who is interacting?
b. How do they interact?
c. Are there changes in the interaction throughout the meeting?
7. Describe how decisions are made during the meeting
a. Who makes decisions?
b. What is the decision-making process?
c. How are the decisions communicated?
8. Describe nonverbal communication (How do participants get attention? Do they
fidget or move around? How do participants dress? How do they physically place
themselves in the setting? Can certain relationships be observed through nonverbal
communication?)
9. Describe participant behaviors (What’s happening during the session
and how participants react and respond? Are all participants actively engaged?)
10. How does the meeting end? Are any issues left outstanding?
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APPENDIX D: CITY OF LOS ANGELES MEASURE ULA
November 8, 2022
Information about the Jurisdiction
Name: City of Los Angeles
Type of government: Charter city, strong mayor and city council
https://lacity.gov/government/city-charter-rules-and-code
Region: Southern California
Urban/rural: Urban
Population: 3,849,297
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/losangelescitycalifornia
Racial composition: 48.4% Latino, 28.1% white, 11.7% Asian, 11.8% other
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/losangelescitycalifornia
Political ideology: 78% Democrat, 22% Republican
https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/svc/4193_Community.pdf?v=5
Education level: 36.2% Bachelor’s degree or more
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/losangelescitycalifornia
Median household income: $69,778 median household income
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/losangelescitycalifornia
Voter turnout in 2022: 44.9%
https://content.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/svc/4300_community.pdf?v=2
The Initiative
Findings supporting the measure as stated on the Initiative Petition:
SECTION 1: The People of the City of Los Angeles hereby find:
a. Rising rents, widespread tenant evictions and a lack of affordable housing have made Los
Angeles the city with the worst housing and homelessness crisis in the country.
b. A household is considered cost burdened when they are paying more than 30% of their
household income on housing costs. In 2019, the City of Los Angeles (“the City” or “City”) had
a higher percentage of cost-burdened renter households (59%) than any other major American
city. About 32% of City renters are severely cost-burdened, meaning they spend over 50% of
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their income on rent. As families overspend on housing costs, they have less in their budget for
health care, childcare, education, healthy food, savings and retirement, and other household
costs. In addition to impacting the health, education, and economic outcomes of the City’s
residents, this has far-reaching economic impacts as Angelenos spend less at local businesses.
Furthermore, young people and people in Lower Income Households are leaving the region
specifically due to high housing costs, a dynamic that regional economists have cited as a key
concern for the City’s prospects for economic growth and that local businesses are contending
with as they search for employees.
c. Among the 42% of City seniors (people aged 65 years and older) who rent, 65% are cost
burdened. Among the 58% of seniors who own their homes, more than 38% are cost burdened.
Longstanding housing unaffordability strains residential stability particularly for young people,
seniors, people in Lower Income Households, and their communities. The two age groups in the
City with the highest rates of rent burden are young people aged 18-24 years and seniors aged 65
years and older.
d. One of the primary dynamics underlying the housing crisis is that rents are increasing faster
than wages. The median household income in 2019 was $62,142, less than that of the county or
state. Twenty-two percent of City families make less than $25,000/year and 42% make less than
$50,000/year. Wages have fallen far behind the cost of living in the City; the top five projected
occupations through 2028 all have a median income of less than $31,250, indicating an urgent
need for housing for people in Acutely, Extremely and Very Low Income Households.
e. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated housing instability among the City’s lowest
wage earners and makes them more susceptible to falling into homelessness.
f. In 2020, 41,290 people were experiencing homelessness in the City of Los Angeles. About
70% of this population remains unsheltered, living on the sidewalks, under the bridges, and in
the parks of the City. This has amounted to a humanitarian crisis, largely caused by government
inaction.
g. Despite a sustained increase in effectively housing people who are unhoused in the City of Los
Angeles, in 2020, there was a 16.1% increase (to 41,290) homeless persons in the City, largely
because of the economic pressures of lost jobs, evictions or rising rents. Effective preventative
interventions, including significantly increasing the production of affordable and supportive
housing and strengthening tenant protections, could dramatically reverse this pattern and reduce
the number of persons who are experiencing homelessness on our streets.
h. An estimated 30,000 formal evictions are filed in the City of Los Angeles each year and the
vast majority of tenants who receive an eviction notice do not have access to an attorney and do
not know how to exercise their rights. Eviction cases can be very complicated and technical; it is
difficult to successfully defend an eviction case without a lawyer. Providing counsel to people
facing eviction can prevent and reduce homelessness; in locales where a right to counsel exists,
approximately 86% of represented tenants stay housed.
i. As rents continue to rise across the City, the incentive is strong to push out tenants in rent-
stabilized apartments and harassment is a primary driver of informal evictions.
j. The lack of access to affordable, healthy, and stable housing is an ongoing issue that will
require serious policy interventions and sustained public funding. Despite the City’s historic and
continued effort to secure and allocate funding for affordable housing, one of the main drivers of
this crisis is lack of sufficient revenue to preserve and produce affordable homes and lack of
adequate funding to support tenants to stay in their homes.
k. The City of Los Angeles routinely falls far short of the affordable housing allocations in
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its Regional Housing Needs Assessment and will continue to do so without additional policy
interventions such as a dedicated funding source.
l. The City’s 2021-2029 Housing Element includes numerous affordable housing and
homelessness prevention goals and implementation programs, including: Program 20 to support
additional permanent sources of affordable housing and renter protection funding for the City,
including options for generating funds locally, including a progressive real estate documentary
transfer tax; Program 16 to prioritize public land for new models of affordable housing
development and control, including Community Land Trusts or social/public housing; and
Program 88 to implement an Eviction Defense Program and evaluate a tenant’s “Right to
Counsel” Program. New funding for these Programs will help the City comply with its 2021-
2029 Housing Element and meet its Regional Housing Needs Assessment obligations for this
housing element cycle and in future cycles.
m. Regular public transit riders primarily in the City of Los Angeles tend to be Acutely,
Extremely and Very Low Income; half of bus riders surveyed by the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (“LA Metro”) onboard LA Metro’s buses earned less than $18,000 per
year before the COVID-19 pandemic. Displacement of transit rider households from the City’s
transit-rich urban areas contributes to drops in transit ridership overall. This negatively impacts
the City’s air quality and traffic congestion and is a major obstacle in addressing our region’s
carbon emissions.
n. Areas of the City with the lowest rate of affordable housing production occur in the City’s
Highest and High Opportunity (“High Opportunity”) areas, which reflect those areas high level
of access to economic opportunities, resources, and amenities according to the Opportunity Area
Maps from the State of California Tax Credit Allocation Committee and the State of California
Housing and Community Development Department. A 2021 report by the City of Los Angeles’s
Department of City Planning and Housing Departments found that only 6% of subsidized
affordable housing was built in the City’s High Opportunity areas.
o. New funding and programs for affordable housing and homelessness prevention are needed to
supplement the City’s existing funding and programs.
p. Increasing the Real Property Transfer Tax on the highest priced properties in the City will
generate an ongoing revenue source which will allow the City to employ robust tenant
stabilization policies and practices to proactively keep vulnerable households from losing their
homes and instead build significant numbers of homes that are affordable to the City’s Lower
Income Households, thereby directly preventing and reducing homelessness across the City and
lowering the City’s housing costs.
q. The initiative will protect renters, including seniors in Lower Income Households and persons
with disabilities, from being forced into homelessness or otherwise displaced by (a) providing
short-term emergency funding to tenant households at risk of becoming homeless; (b) providing
income support for rent-burdened at-risk seniors and persons with disabilities; (c) providing
tenant outreach, education and navigation services; (d) providing legal services to tenants in
Lower Income Households threatened with eviction; and (e) monitoring, enforcing and
informing tenants of City protections against tenant harassment.
r. The initiative will increase the development and preservation of homes affordable to people in
Lower Income Households by: (a) Investing in new and existing models of affordable
multifamily development; (b) Building on current practices for public or community acquisition
of rental housing so as to provide permanent affordability and allow community and/or public
sector ownership; (c) Innovating housing production strategies that emphasize permanent
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affordability, utilize innovative funding strategies, expand ownership methods and use leading
edge construction technologies; (d) Using funds for development-based rent subsidies to help
create affordable housing options for Extremely Low Income Households; and (e) Ensuring that
program funds are invested to not only develop affordable housing but also to foster production
creativity and long-term goal setting.
s. The programs and policies funded through this initiative will be deployed in such a way as to
address racial segregation, dismantle racially exclusionary practices, and promote racial equity in
housing, academic, and economic opportunities.
t. Article XXXIV of the Constitution of the State of California (“Article XXXIV”) provides that
no low-rent housing project shall be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any
state public body until a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case
may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the project, voting upon such
issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose,
or at any general or special election;
u. The City of Los Angeles and its residents will directly benefit from the development,
construction, acquisition, and administration of additional dwelling units for families and
households of low income.
v. It is the intention of the voters in adopting this initiative to ensure that tax proceeds from the
Homelessness and Housing Solutions Tax be used to fund the purposes set forth in the House LA
Program.
https://unitedtohousela.com/app/uploads/2022/05/LA_City_Affordable_Housing_Petition_H.pdf
Question submitted to voters:
FUNDING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND TENANT ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS THROUGH A TAX ON REAL PROPERTY TRANSFERS OVER
$5 MILLION. INITIATIVE ORDINANCE ULA.
Shall an ordinance funding and authorizing affordable housing programs and resources
for tenants at risk of homelessness through a 4% tax on sales/transfers of real property
exceeding $5 million, and 5.5% on properties of $10 million or more, with exceptions;
until ended by voters; generating approximately $600 million - $1.1 billion annually; be
adopted?
https://clkrep.lacity.org/election/2022_Nov_General_Ballot_Measures_Eng.pdf, p. 29
Development of the Initiative
Los Angeles is the most populous city in California. It is primarily a Democratic city,
evidenced by the recent mayoral race involving a contest between two Democrats. It is a city of
tremendous wealth but also tremendous poverty.
Against this backdrop, Measure ULA stemmed from the convergence of two
conversations. Denny Zane, the executive director of MoveLA and a former elected official, had
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been convening people and organizations around the idea of a tax measure in 2022 that would be
directed toward housing. At the same time, a coalition called HealthyLA formed during the
pandemic to protect tenants’ rights and was composed primarily of housing and tenants’ rights
groups. HealthyLA was unsuccessful in obtaining meaningful financial support from the city.
Consequently, Zane’s tax idea and HealthyLA’s need coalesced into the idea for Measure ULA.
Representatives from homeless service providers, affordable housing nonprofits, labor
unions, and renters’ rights groups formed United to House LA. The group’s steering committee
was composed of approximately 13 representatives from these organizations and coalitions, and
met weekly. The members divided up their skills, both personal and relevant to their respective
organizations, and plugged those into various committees which they each chaired. Those
committees each had up to 12 additional members. The group determined that it was important to
bring the measure as an initiative because of several factors--the majority threshold, the ability to
control the nature of the measure, and the desire to be independent of any politicians. The tax
was modeled after successful taxes in San Francisco and Culver City, though those jurisdictions
had not targeted a use for the funds.
Building trades were a critical component of the coalition and were involved in the
measure’s drafting. Once the initiative was clear about how any construction financed by the
measure would involve labor, the campaign was able to move forward, financed largely by the
building trades which included labor unions and affordable housing developers.
The Initiative Campaign
The measure was marketed as having been drafted by housing and homelessness experts,
and the focus was on the use of the funds to protect existing affordable housing, create new
affordable housing, and provide supportive services for low-income renters. With respect to the
source of the funds, emphasis was placed on the idea that a transfer tax on transactions exceeding
$5 million would involve only a small number of transactions (approximately three percent of all
sales) and result in millionaires and billionaires paying their fair share. The phrase “mansion tax”
was used frequently.
Signature gathering began in mid-February 2022 and lasted approximately two months.
Over 300 volunteers and a number of paid teams gathered over 98,000 signatures, well above the
61,076 signatures required to qualify the initiative for the ballot. During signature gathering, the
citizens’ committee found that the measure was popular among voters and felt no push back
from City Hall.
At the June 15, 2022 City Council meeting where the initiative was certified for the
ballot, a number of supporters from nonprofit groups and labor unions spoke in support of the
measure. United to House LA launched a multi-faceted campaign that included live events,
conventional and social media, phone banking and mailers. Over 200 organizations endorsed the
measure, as well as the Los Angeles Times. Over 800 volunteers assisted with the campaign.
Much of the messaging was focused on multiple strategies that funding would provide, including
homelessness prevention or keeping people housed so they would not experience homelessness.
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The group believed they needed to distinguish this effort from prior citywide efforts to address
homelessness, including Measure HHH. While local government did not mobilize around the
effort, some individual City Council members actively supported the initiative. Mayor Eric
Garcetti was also an actively supportive partner. Nonetheless, the campaign generally distanced
itself from local government, even more so once a recording was leaked that involved some City
Council members making racist and crude statements.
Opposition to the initiative developed, backed by the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’
Association, the California Business Roundtable, the California Business Properties Association,
and National Association of Realtors. Asserting this was the largest tax hike in Los Angeles’
history, opponents argued the tax would necessarily be passed down to renters and consumers,
would create additional levels of bureaucracy, did not provide for adequate oversight, and served
as a disincentive to real estate investment. The challengers combined their opposition to Measure
ULA with opposition to Measure SP, a City Council-sponsored parcel tax to fund parks and
recreational facilities, which was ultimately defeated.
United to House LA engaged in efforts to dispute the assumptions underlying some of the
opposition’s claims. One of the group’s committees engaged academics from multiple
universities in Los Angeles to draft a white paper that found “the magnitude of Measure ULA’s
potential revenue, coupled with the program’s design and oversight, make this proposal likely to
have a strong positive impact on homelessness reduction and housing affordability in Los
Angeles.”
14
The Initiative Outcome
Measure ULA passed with 57.8 percent of the vote. Proponents were excited about the
victory, particularly since the opposition had outspent them two to one. One of the co-chairs of
United to House LA emphasized that “[t]his is really the community’s proposal.”
15
Following the
initiative’s passage, some real estate brokers noted that the measure had prompted a sell-off, with
owners of high-end properties anxious to complete sales transactions before the April 1, 2023
implementation date. Others reported that sellers were contemplating creative arrangements to
avoid the tax, such as splitting their lots or placing a high value on furniture included with the
transaction to bring the real property sale below the $5 million amount.
14
Drier, P., Ling, J., Phillips, S., Cummings, S., Pastor, M., Rodnyansky, S. & Loop, J. (2022,
Sept.). An analysis of Measure ULA, a ballot measure to reform real estate transfer tax in the
City of Los Angeles. UCLA Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies. Retrieved from
https://www.lewis.ucla.edu/research/an-analysis-of-measure-ula-a-ballot-measure-to-reform-
real-estate-transfer-taxes-in-the-city-of-los-angles/
15
Brey, J. (2022, Nov. 9). Mixed results for city initiatives as local election results trickle in.
Governing. Retrieved from https://www.governing.com/now/mixed-results-for-city-initiatives-
as-local-election-results-trickle-in
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In January 2023, City Council Members Nithya Raman and Eunisses Hernandez brought
a motion to facilitate the implementation of the initiative and sought a staff report on
“Foundational guidelines and resources needed to effectively implement Measure ULA,
including analysis of how to utilize existing vacant positions and any new positions required,
alongside a robust recruitment and hiring strategy to fill all positions; Strategies for continued
consultation with community-based organizations, advocacy groups, and experts in the field,
including the authors of the ballot measure; and Plans to begin collecting ULA revenue
beginning April 1, 2023.”
16
Measure ULA is being challenged in court as unauthorized
according to Proposition 13.
Key Takeaways from Initiative Stakeholder Interviews
Initiative Proponent
• The initiative developed from a grassroots effort involving many organizations.
The idea came together from the MoveLA executive director who had been
looking at a tax for housing, and a coalition of organizations formed during the
pandemic to address tenants’ rights issues.
• A steering committee comprising representatives from core organizations served
as committee chairs; they would meet weekly and share information. It was
important to start this effort early to leverage community and government
relationships.
• Unions and affordable housing developers were a key source of funding.
• United to House LA distanced itself from government because voters were
skeptical about prior measures designed to address homelessness and the City
Council had been dealing with corruption issues, resulting in community distrust.
Further, during her experience with the pandemic coalition, the City Council was
not transparent and did not enable the group to participate effectively.
• There is no single appropriate role for an elected official in an initiative effort.
The role is contextual and depends on the community landscape at the time. In
light of recent government scandals, she does not think the public would have
wanted to see more government involvement.
• The group knew they were interested in bringing a measure requiring a majority
vote and had been following the court decisions that confirmed initiatives
required only a majority. But while the majority threshold is a positive and
powerful tool for citizens, the process still requires a diligent campaign effort and
the involvement of many organizations and volunteers.
• Having the organizations own the process was important. They were engaged
from the outset and took ownership of the initiative. The initiative process itself
16
Los Angeles City Council Budget and Finance Motion presented by Nithya Raman and
Eunisses Hernandez (2023, Jan. 11). Retrieved from https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2023/23-
0038_misc_1-11.pdf?utm_id=87096&sfmc_id=5033182
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fostered the coalition building, which in turn fostered voter trust in the coalition.
She thinks the organizations were perceived as trusted messengers.
• City staff was helpful and clear about the process. The Housing Department could
not really do anything until after the initiative had passed.
• An ideal scenario would be citizens, elected officials, and municipal staff working
together on an initiative. She would like to see a partnership develop.
Initiative Proponent
• It was important for his organization (a non-profit affordable housing developer)
to be involved with the initiative. Based on their skill set, most people from his
organization served on a committee.
• Because the group had less money than the opposition, the campaign relied on
grassroots, on-the-ground efforts, including phone banking and text banking,
which were strategies the opposition did not employ.
• The campaign was funded by building trades, affordable housing developers, and
other coalition organizations. Individuals did not donate. It was important for the
building trades to be involved with the drafting to the measure to ensure how
labor would be involved with any construction financed in the measure.
• The group needed to distinguish itself from the perceived shortcomings of
existing measures designed to address homelessness.
• Frustration with government was a key reason the measure was brought as an
initiative. Early polling showed that voters were hesitant to give more money to
government. He believes that making it clear early on that government was not
involved in the development of the measure and having a strong oversight
provision contributed to the initiative’s success.
• There was an ongoing discussion among the steering committee regarding the
extent to which the campaign should distance itself from the City Council and city
government in general. The campaign affirmatively distanced itself, promoting
the message that this was not a back-room deal. Given that a scandal occurred
during the campaign, distancing was a wise decision.
• He does not believe an elected official should be involved in developing an
initiative, calling any involvement bordering on tampering.
• Some individual City Council members and the Mayor actively supported the
initiative. No elected official actively opposed it. He sees some risk in an elected
official having a disproportionate influence over the electorate and potentially
abusing her power.
• If there were to be some type of collaboration between citizens and government in
bringing an initiative, he would prefer that staff rather than elected officials be
involved, because staff members are those who actually have to do the work.
• Bringing the measure as an initiative was a calculated decision to avoid the
supermajority threshold and to enable the coalition to take matters into its own
hands. He supports the majority threshold for an initiative and supports citizens
having the ability to develop policy. Given the work that must go into an
initiative, he does not think the majority threshold is an unfair advantage, though
he acknowledges that special interests could take advantage of the threshold.
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Initiative Opponent
• It was his understanding that a City Council member was behind the initiative,
and he believed one of the mayoral candidates was signaling her support behind
the scenes.
• He viewed this tax as an attack on industry and a disincentive to develop property
in Los Angeles.
• Two large state-wide organizations were primarily responsible for the opposition,
including polling, focus groups and a media campaign. His role was to help with
grassroots efforts such as distributing mailers, promoting and funding a local
media campaign and publishing articles.
• He believes the opposition campaign did not start early enough.
• An elected official should be transparent about the role she undertakes. He
believes that an elected official should take a position on an initiative, though he
sees that most of them just wait to see whether the measure will pass or fail.
• Once an initiative passes, it is incumbent on government to educate the public
about the measure.
• He assumes the majority threshold was a key factor in why this measure was
brought as an initiative. He views the majority threshold as a “loophole” that
needs to be cleaned up with the pending state-wide initiative. He believes the
majority threshold makes it too easy to impose taxes.
• He thinks too much law is made via the initiative process. Often measures have
unintended consequences, and there is generally no way to fix those except to go
back to the electorate. He would like to see a process where a legislative body
would have some discretion to fix minor components of an initiative after it
passes.
Elected Official
• So long as they abide by campaign financing laws, elected officials can and
should play any type of role in connection with an initiative. This would include
remaining agnostic, endorsing it, opposing it, or aggressively supporting or
opposing it. He personally declined to be involved in this campaign.
• In the best case, elected officials would be promoting policies that meet the
community’s needs based on weighing competing priorities. But sometimes
government does not do that.
• For an initiative to succeed, it must have a broad coalition of support and a major
funding source. Measure ULA had both. It is his understanding that trade unions
were behind the measure.
• He believes this was brought as an initiative because the proponents felt that the
only credible way to present the measure to the voters would be from outside of
city government. He thinks the proponents worked to distance themselves from
city officials, who were not as trusted by the public.
• The initiative campaign successfully overcame skepticism about how government
was spending existing funds to deal with homelessness and affordable housing.
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• When a measure originates from outside of government, it prioritizes certain
needs over what government might have prioritized and requires staff to
accommodate this shift.
• It is also possible that staff will have interpretive issues with a measure that did
not go through the usual vetting process. Nonetheless, staff’s role will be to
implement the initiative.
• He supports the initiative process and the majority vote threshold. He thinks the
supermajority vote requirement is an unduly high threshold that enables one-third
of the electorate to veto a measure.
• He would support a local-level vetting process, similar to that at the state level,
where the initiative would go through a hearing process to receive input from the
public and elected officials before language is finalized. This process is preferable
to trying to fix a measure at the back end.
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APPENDIX E: CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH MEASURE A
March 7, 2022
Information about the Jurisdiction
Name: City of Manhattan Beach
Type of government: Five-person elected council/city manager
https://www.manhattanbeach.gov/government/city-council
Region: Coastal southern California
Urban/rural: Urban (suburban)
Population: 34,668
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/manhattanbeachcitycalifornia/PST045221
Racial composition: 71.3% white, 14.7% Asian, 8.1% Latino, 5.9% other
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/manhattanbeachcitycalifornia/PST045221
Political ideology: 68.1% Democrat, 29.9% Republican.
https://www.thembnews.com/2020/11/07/334629/manhattan-beach-voted-68-for-biden
Education level: 76.8% Bachelor’s degree or more
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/manhattanbeachcitycalifornia/PST045221
Median household income: $153,926 median household income
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/manhattanbeachcitycalifornia/PST045221
Voter turnout in 2022: 52.1%
https://www.manhattanbeach.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/50883/6379893879012
30000
The Initiative
Statement of the reasons for the measure as stated in the initiative petition:
California schools have suffered from consistent underfunding and Manhattan Beach is
one of the lowest funded school districts in the state.
The citizens of Manhattan Beach can counter ongoing and severe state funding shortfalls
with local control and stability by supporting a local parcel tax needed to maintain and protect
quality education in our schools, manageable class sizes, safe environments and the programs
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and learning tools needed to help prepare Manhattan Beach students for college and 21st century
jobs.
Great teachers are at the center of student achievement and this measure will further
provide the school district with the resources needed to compete with other school districts in
attracting and retaining high-quality teachers, so every Manhattan Beach student has the
opportunity to thrive.
All revenue from this measure will stay local, be spent right here in Manhattan Beach
public schools and cannot be taken away by the State. A mandatory independent citizens’
oversight committee will review all expenditures to ensure that the revenue is used only for the
purposes set forth in the measure.
https://manhattanbeach.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=10577084&GUID=EB97BBD
2-4292-47E4-849E-A7898F241EB5
Question submitted to voters:
INITIATIVE ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING FOR
MANHATTAN BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT. Shall a measure imposing an
annual flat tax of $1,095.00 on each real property parcel within the City of Manhattan
Beach, and adjusted annually for inflation, for a period of 12 years, thereby
generating an estimated $11,000,000 to $13,000,000 annually for investment in
education, with an oversight committee and exemptions for (1) low-income individuals
and (2) seniors who use their property as a principal residence, be adopted?
https://www.manhattanbeach.gov/departments/city-clerk/elections/parcel-tax-measure
Development of the Initiative
The City of Manhattan Beach is a wealthy enclave in the South Bay area of Los Angeles
County. Its population is fairly homogeneous and highly educated. The city has its own school
district that is governed by a five-member board. Funding for schools is augmented by a
nonprofit organization, the Manhattan Beach Education Foundation (MBEF).
In June 2018, voters approved Measure MB, a School-Board sponsored measure that
imposed a parcel tax of $225 per parcel annually for six years. The measure received 69.25
percent voter approval, exceeding the minimum requirement of two-thirds needed to pass. At the
time, the School Board recognized that the modest amount would not alleviate its financial
problems. The strategy was to show the community what could be done with a smaller amount
and that the School Board could be trusted to use the money wisely. Thereafter, the School
Board would seek to have that amount imposed into perpetuity, followed by a measure seeking
an additional amount.
In late 2021, a School Board subcommittee was studying a renewal of Measure MB and
the possibility of seeking additional revenue through a parcel tax in the range of $325 to $550
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per year. Polling secured by the committee showed that any higher amount would not have
supermajority support but could potentially yield majority support. An attorney approached the
committee and the MBEF with the idea of bringing the measure as a citizens’ initiative because
only a majority vote was required to pass. For some period of time, both School Board and
initiative efforts proceeded on parallel tracks. At a February 2, 2022 School Board meeting, the
Board publicly decided to stop pursuing its own measure and let the initiative proceed both
because of the voter threshold and the belief that voters would respond more favorably to a
citizens’ effort. A local newspaper reported: “The Manhattan Beach Unified School District had
been examining different proposals for a parcel tax but has now stepped back to allow this
citizen-led measure, which would require a simple majority vote to pass, to proceed.”
17
The Initiative Campaign
The initiative proponents formed a committee, MB Citizens for Schools, composed
primarily of active school community volunteers. The committee circulated the initiative petition
in January 2022. Using over 150 volunteers and no paid signature gatherers, the group was able
to gather 4087 signatures for the initiative in nine days.
A sufficient number of signatures was verified and in a March 8, 2022 public meeting,
the City Council unanimously determined the measure qualified for the June 2022 ballot. At the
meeting, several speakers supported the measure, but some speakers and two City Council
members expressed a number of reservations about the measure, questioning the large amount,
the level of proposed oversight, the senior citizen exemption, and the choice of a June election
date.
During the campaign, initiative proponents focused on the message that the amount of the
tax would address the School District’s structural deficit; raise the level of student funding to the
state average; and allow for stable, long-term budgeting. With the help of campaign
professionals, they distributed mailers, handed out flyers, placed advertisements in local papers,
and participated in community meetings. Neutral information about the measure appeared on the
city website. Active opposition to the measure also developed, distributing its own materials,
including lawn signs. This resulted in a complaint to the Fair Political Practices Commission
(FPPC) because none of the signs, flyers or advertisements opposing the measure included a
campaign name or an FPPC number as required for campaigns spending $1000 or more.
The measure was complicated by the fact that, as an initiative, the City Council needed to
qualify it for the ballot, yet the funds would be provided to and utilized by the School District.
As a result, attorneys for both the City and the School District prepared a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) that specified how the funds would be administered. At a May 3, 2022
City Council meeting to approve the MOU, two Council members raised a number of questions
about the measure more generally, including the lack of detail on how the money would be spent.
17
Fratello, J. (2022, Feb. 16). Manhattan Beach parcel tax effort reaches signature goal.
MBNews. Retrieved from https://www.thembnews.com/2022/02/16/390451/manhattan-beach-
parcel-tax-effort-reaches-signature-goal
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Public comment was mixed on the measure, reflecting the division on the City Council. When
the Mayor asked for final comments on the MOU, one Council member more broadly stated
“I’m a no on Measure A,” and specifically commented on the unfairness of the measure given
that all prior measures were approved by a supermajority.
18
The City Council approved the MOU
by a three to two vote.
Following that meeting, a local newspaper sponsored a debate on Measure A, and the
same Council member appeared as one of the three panelists on behalf of the opposition.
19
The
debate was attended by approximately 150 people and broadcast live on Facebook. In response
to criticism about the measure being brought as an initiative, one of the proponents observed that
citizen-led initiatives have been available for over 100 years and explained that recently courts
expressly permitted their use for parcel taxes to fund schools. He added the reason the measure
was brought as an initiative was because it creates more engagement, prevents apathy, and
allows citizens to work with their cities and schools to ensure transparency and accountability
around the measure’s funding.
The Initiative Outcome
Measure A did not pass, receiving slightly less than 32 percent support. Proponents were
surprised at the magnitude of the defeat and questioned the appropriateness of a Council member
acting as a vocal opponent. Proponents stated they would not consider another effort for at least a
year and would work to develop something that would be acceptable to the entire community,
including the opponents.
In the subsequent November 2022 election in Manhattan Beach, a Council member who
had voiced opposition to Measure A was defeated, and one of the co-chairs of the MB Citizens
for Schools Committee was elected to the School Board.
Key Takeaways from Initiative Stakeholder Interviews
Initiative Proponent
• The proponent’s view is that citizens’ initiatives are a long-standing tool that are
good for the community.
• The majority threshold was the primary reason for bringing the measure as an
initiative. A local attorney advised the initiative had become an acceptable way of
bringing a special tax, and the large amount sought by the measure was within the
realm of possibility given the majority threshold.
18
https://manhattanbeach.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=4&clip_id=3926
19
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17lkioYhzb8
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• It was important for the core initiative committee to have volunteers who filled a
number of specific roles and to have an army of volunteers behind that effort. The
proponent also relied heavily on her existing network.
• Public concern about the measure being brought as an initiative was surprising,
particularly in light of its distrust of the School Board. It was unclear whether
voters thought that citizens were not qualified to bring the measure.
• With an initiative effort, the role of elected officials will necessarily vary by
individual. At a minimum, an elected official should educate the public about the
need for the measure. Instead, the School Board expressly stepped back when the
initiative effort moved forward.
• Despite the public’s distrust of the School Board, perhaps the majority threshold
should belong to the elected officials who are the experts on these issues.
• The City Council’s split of opinion on the initiative led to the public being
divided, and City Council criticism of the initiative contributed to public
confusion.
Initiative Proponent
• The citizens’ group felt like it could do more than the School Board was
suggesting. But in hindsight, perhaps the group should have asked for the amount
the School Board was proposing.
• A local attorney advised of the majority threshold, which she thought was the best
part of a citizens’ initiative. It presented an opportunity for the community to
explore a significant parcel tax, even though the number ended up being too
aspirational.
• The proponent found it interesting that a citizens’ group could potentially pass a
measure at a lower threshold, even though the citizens’ group might not be as
informed or as educated on the issue as the elected officials might be.
• The City Council was divided on the initiative and their efforts in connection with
the measure differed. An elected official should work on behalf of the entire
community instead of fostering polarization.
• Current law hinders the ability of elected officials to work together with a
citizens’ group promoting an initiative, and the lack of government support
contributed to the measure’s loss. However, the group was able to use polling and
focus group research secured by the School Board.
• The School Board intentionally backed away from the measure when it looked
like the community would embrace the initiative. But in hindsight, it might have
been better for the measure to come from the body that was going to spend the
funds.
• She would have thought the community would support a citizens’ initiative,
particularly in light of public distrust of the School Board.
Elected Official
• The School Board was pursuing a parcel tax measure consistent with its long-
term strategy when the citizens’ group came forward. The School Board
provided its polling information to the citizens’ group, but the group construed it
differently than the Board.
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• Though the School Board was uncertain about the availability of an initiative, it
determined not to stand in the way of the citizens who wanted to pursue the
measure. It was appealing that the measure would be community-based.
• The School Board was careful not to use any School District resources to
promote the measure. She personally endorsed the measure and could not
understand why any elected official would oppose it.
• A public complaint was that the School Board did not get more involved in the
initiative, including explaining how the funds would be used, but it could not
because this was an initiative. Citizens therefore control what goes on the ballot
and it was their responsibility to direct the funds. There was a disconnect
between the School Board and the citizens’ committee.
• The role of an elected official is to educate the public and more time was needed
to provide education about the need for the measure. It was difficult when the
City Council became the spokespersons for the measure.
• Absent the majority threshold requirement, the measure would not have been
brought as an initiative. But even with the majority threshold, a collaborative
effort is needed for an initiative to pass. Perhaps the supermajority requirement
ensures that a measure has universal appeal.
Elected Official/Initiative Opponent
• He believed he was protecting the community financially when he took a position
against the initiative. It is fine for elected officials to take differing sides in an
initiative campaign, though it is important to distinguish points of procedure
which can be made on the dais versus opinions which cannot.
• He lent his name to the opposition, recognizing that his name would be
highlighted and his role could potentially influence the vote.
• He wishes the initiative proponents had contacted him to solicit his input. He
would have advised of the separation that has to exist between the citizens’ group
and the School Board.
• He recognizes that the initiative was sponsored by citizens active in the
community as opposed to a later cannabis initiative sponsored by industry.
• The key reason the measure was brought as an initiative was because of the
majority vote threshold. He believes all taxes should be subject to a supermajority
vote and that any tax in the city going forward should require a supermajority
vote, just as all taxes have for the past 30 years. The supermajority threshold
requires buy-in and forces the proponents to do a good job.
• The initiative proponents got ahead of themselves and were too aggressive
because they perhaps thought they would have an easy win with the simple
majority vote requirement.
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APPENDIX F: MARIPOSA COUNTY MEASURE O
June 7, 2022
Information about the Jurisdiction
Name: Mariposa County
Type of government: Five-member Board of Supervisors
https://www.mariposacounty.org/66/Board-of-Supervisors
Region: Central California
Urban/rural: Approximately half urban and half rural
Population: 17,020
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia
Racial composition: 77.5% white, 13.8% Latino, 4% two or more races, 4.7% other
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia
Political ideology: 39.8% Democrat, 57.9% Republican
https://www.bestplaces.net/voting/city/california/mariposa
Education level: 28.9% Bachelor’s degree or more
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia
Median household income: $53,304
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia
Voter turnout in 2022: 53.9%
https://www.mariposacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/92403/Scanned-complete-SOV
The Initiative
Statement of the reasons for the measure as stated on the citizens’ committee website:
John C. Fremont Hospital is facing closure in 2030 for not being in compliance with the state’s
seismic safety standards. Major earthquakes have caused many California hospitals to suffer
significant damage, forcing them to suspend some or all services, and some patients have died
either during or after these earthquakes. In 1994 Senate Bill 1953 (SB1953) changed the
California Health and Safety Code to require all hospitals to comply with the more stringent
seismic safety standards established by the Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (OSHPD) by 2030 or face closure. This initiative will provide the funds needed by
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the John C. Fremont Healthcare District to come into full compliance by constructing a new
seismically safe hospital.
If successful, this measure will provide the following benefits to the residents of Mariposa
County for generations to come:
● Ensure that your new hospital and its emergency room remain fully operationally during any
natural disaster to provide essential medical care 24/7
● Enable the expansion and/or enhancement of emergency and other medical care to treat more
patients more quickly and more effectively
● Fund the renovation of both the Mariposa and Northside clinics as needed
● Keep 200 well-paying jobs supporting the local economy while also keeping current residents
from feeling the need to move away to be close to emergency care
● Make it easier for the Healthcare District to attract and retain the highly qualified medical
professionals, including specialists, needed to better serve our community
https://citizenstosavethehospital.org/frequently-asked-questions/
Question submitted to voters:
Shall the initiative measure authorizing a 1% transactions and use (sales) tax for a period
of 40 years to generate the funds needed by the John C. Fremont Healthcare District to
design, construct and equip a new hospital that meets all applicable seismic safety and
other building standards, and to modify and repurpose existing facilities to better satisfy
the emergency medical care and other healthcare needs of Mariposa County residents and
visitors be adopted?
https://citizenstosavethehospital.org/ballot-language/
Development of the Initiative
One of California’s oldest counties, Mariposa County sits north of Fresno and is bordered
by the Western Sierras and Yosemite National Park. Its population is primarily white and has
become more conservative over time. Mariposa is governed by a five-member Board of
Supervisors, elected by districts. Its only hospital is the John C. Fremont Hospital (Hospital),
governed by the John C. Fremont Healthcare District that has its own five-member board.
In 1994, the California Legislature amended the California Health and Safety Code to
require all hospitals to comply with the more stringent seismic safety standards the state had
established. Non-compliance risked hospital closure. In large part to pay for these upgrades, in
November 2020 the Board of Supervisors placed Measure N on the ballot. It would have
authorized an additional sales tax of one percent, generating an estimated $2.6 million per year to
upgrade Hospital facilities, maintain access to medical care, and renovate facilities to attract
doctors, nurses, and specialists, thereby increasing the total sales tax rate in Mariposa from 7.75
percent to 8.75 percent. It required a supermajority vote and was defeated: 63.23 percent yes to
36.77 percent no.
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Shortly after that election in early 2021, some residents who had advocated for Measure
N learned about the possibility of citizens bringing a tax measure themselves. An attorney
familiar with the process spoke with them about bringing an initiative to raise funds for the
Hospital. Some of the initiative proponents believed that the Measure N campaign had not
considered the unique features of the community and thought they could mount a successful
campaign, particularly given only a majority vote would be required. The group consulted the
Healthcare District Board which was initially reluctant about the effort, but stepped away once it
was clear the initiative would proceed.
The attorney who had advised of the process helped to draft the initiative, specifically
taking into account the Measure N issues that had concerned voters such as the lack of a sunset
date and insufficient oversight. At a June 2021 Healthcare District Board meeting, the Hospital’s
executive director advised that a citizens’ effort was underway and therefore the Board could not
be involved. One of the initiative proponents also spoke about the effort, emphasizing that
citizens would be communicating to the community about the need for the funds. Though
acknowledging the majority vote threshold, the proponent stated the group was still aiming for
supermajority support. The Board expressed support for the initiative effort.
The Initiative Campaign
The initiative proponents formed a committee, Citizens to Save the Hospital, composed
of community volunteers, each of whom had a specific skill to dedicate to the campaign. The
committee developed an informative campaign website, which included a detailed, 10-page FAQ
that addressed not only the need for this specific measure but also explained the initiative process
more generally.
20
The committee relaunched the Measure N Facebook page to support Measure
O, which included personal testimonials by those who had been helped by the Hospital. After
that information was in place, volunteers began gathering signatures in July 2021.
Volunteers collected 1706 signatures, more than twice as many as the 823 signatures
needed. County staff verified the sufficient number. At the Board of Supervisors meeting to
place the initiative on the ballot, all supervisors expressed support for the measure.
After the initiative was approved for the ballot, the core citizens’ committee continued to
meet weekly. The primary message was that the hospital would be lost if the tax failed to pass. A
key campaign strategy was to meet with existing community groups and give presentations.
Proponents attended community events, hosted a town hall, spoke at a number of meetings such
as the Rotary Club and the Lions’ Club, and secured endorsements from both the Democratic and
Republican Central Committees. They also placed newspaper ads, provided mailers that were
designed to look like they had come from citizens (meaning not “slick”) and engaged volunteers
in phone banking. The FAQ was particularly helpful for this effort so that volunteers’ answers
20
https://citizenstosavethehospital.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FrequentlyAskedQuestions-
2021-06-24.pdf
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would be consistent. Proponents also used social media, including by personally answering any
message or post on Facebook so the whole community could see.
No formal opposition to the initiative developed, and no one made an argument in
opposition in the ballot pamphlet. The only wrinkle that developed was the possibility of a
statewide initiative requiring all special taxes to meet the supermajority threshold which was
written to apply retroactively. The citizens’ committee asked the Healthcare District Board if it
was interested in sponsoring the measure given the possibility state preemption and the Board
declined. Some citizens’ committee members left the group after that decision.
The Initiative Outcome
Measure O received supermajority support, winning with 69.6 percent of the vote. At a
June 2022 Board of Supervisors meeting, the Hospital’s executive director thanked the citizens’
group for its effort, the community for its vote, and the Board of Supervisors for its support. In
November 2022 one of the initiative proponents successfully ran for a seat on the Healthcare
District Board.
Key Takeaways from Initiative Stakeholder Interviews
Initiative Proponent
• The core citizens’ committee was composed of individuals who had specific work
experience designed to fill a specific need. Everyone on the committee was
passionate about the Hospital.
• An attorney from out of the area who was familiar with the initiative process and
the new law joined the initiative process and ultimately helped to draft the
initiative.
• Once the citizens’ committee decided to pursue an initiative, a co-chair advised
the Healthcare District Board that it could not be involved. She felt that she
needed to maintain a distance even from individual Board members.
• The extent of the Board of Supervisors’ involvement was to approve the initiative
for the ballot.
• Staff was initially reluctant but ultimately became helpful and supportive.
• She was involved with the campaign for the prior measure and relied on many of
those supporters to fund this campaign.
• That the measure was brought as an initiative was positive and resonated with the
voters more so than if the measure had been brought by a public entity. She
believes the fact that citizens brought the measure created more buy-in and
community cohesiveness.
Initiative Proponent
• She had previously worked on campaigns and knew how to organize. She
gathered individuals with different skills who had an interest in the community.
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She knew to concentrate the campaign efforts on those who used the Hospital the
most and focused on educating the public about the need for the Hospital.
• She knew the public’s criticism of the prior measure and sought to correct those
deficiencies. She also thought the prior campaign failed to account for unique
aspects of the community, including geography.
• Her goal was to design a campaign that worked. Campaign materials were
designed to be simple and look like they came from citizens. It was important to
distinguish themselves from the Board of Supervisors, which the community
distrusted, and from the Healthcare District Board, which now had a cloud over it
due to the prior failed measure.
• She engaged her network for fundraising and reached out to all community
groups.
• Though the Healthcare District Board was initially reluctant about the initiative, it
ultimately told the group to take the ball and run with it. The Board was not
involved in the initiative because legally there must a separation between the
citizens’ group and the Board. However, she can see where some amount of
collaboration could be helpful.
• The Board of Supervisors was supportive and happy that someone was trying to
raise the funds.
• Staff had a steep learning curve.
• Though the majority threshold makes an initiative easier to pass, the message to
the citizens’ committee was to secure supermajority support.
• She thinks if more people were aware of the majority vote threshold, the initiative
process would be an effective way for many communities to raise needed funds.
Elected Official
• The supermajority requirement was a risk the Healthcare District Board lived
with. However, things were tense when Measure N failed by a small margin—
approximately 354 votes.
• After the failure of Measure N, the Healthcare District Board and some citizens
began working on a second measure. When the citizens wanted to take over,
largely because of the majority threshold, the Board was initially reluctant
because it was giving up too much power and responsibility.
• Ultimately, the Healthcare District Board urged the group to move forward when
it realized this was a group of citizens seeking to advocate for a Hospital also run
by citizens. Once the citizens’ group took over, they started drafting the measure
from scratch.
• Much of being an elected official is trying to convince people you are acting on
their behalf. When citizens come forward to advocate for something, then there is
no need to convince the public it is the right thing. If citizens come forward to run
an initiative, then it is less work for the Healthcare District Board, which is a
positive.
• Even though the Healthcare District Board is made up of citizens acting on behalf
of citizens, that is not how they are perceived. Instead, they are viewed as an arm
of the Hospital, the big guy.
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• The Healthcare District Board was not involved with the initiative, though she
volunteered for the initiative on her personal time. The citizens’ committee
members knew what they were doing and ran an excellent campaign.
• She supports citizens being able to bring a measure at a lower voter threshold. It
is consistent with the American idea that a group of citizens can get together to
make something happen.
Staff Member
• Staff had to learn a few things about the initiative process, but for the most part
the process proceeded independently of government. He shared some information
with the Healthcare District, but otherwise did not have a role in the process.
• County staff is willing to do what the residents want, and if they want to try
something different then staff will be supportive. Staff tries to treat everyone
equally.
• The Board of Supervisors had mixed feelings about the initiative because a recent
citizens’ referendum had arisen in response to the Board voting themselves salary
increases, which they rescinded due to the referendum.
• Overall, government can and should be a good source of information, and it has a
role in educating the public, including initiative proponents. He sees
misunderstanding about what local government does, as well as a range of views
as to what government should do.
• In general, this is a community that does not like a lot of government, so it makes
sense that it would be receptive to a citizens’ initiative versus something coming
from government.
• The Board of Supervisors acted more as a facilitator of the initiative rather than a
proponent or opponent. He knows that individual Supervisors advocated for the
initiative on their own time, but never on the dais.
• The Board of Supervisors understood its role and did not politicize the initiative.
• He would like to see a process where citizens and government could get together
to talk about issues and try to reach consensus about solutions. He recognizes this
would not be efficient but it might be effective.
• He believes the primary reason the measure was brought as an initiative was
because of the majority threshold. Perhaps the fact that government was not the
messenger was another factor. Because this is the same threshold as a general tax,
he thinks the decision of whether to bring a tax through government or the
initiative process should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
• He thinks there was no opposition because no one felt as if they were losing
anything if the initiative passed. On the other hand, the proponents argued that
residents would lose the Hospital if the initiative failed.
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APPENDIX G: CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO PROPOSITION M
November 8, 2022
Information about the Jurisdiction
Name: City and County of San Francisco
Type of government: Consolidated city and county (only one in CA)
Elected “strong mayor” and 11-member board of supervisors that
also acts as the city council. Each member represents a district.
https://sfciti.org/sf-politics-101/sf-overview/
Region: Northern coastal California
Urban/rural: Urban
Population: 815,201
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocitycalifornia/BPS030221
Racial composition: 39.2% white, 34.4% Asian, 15.4% Latino, 11% other
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocitycalifornia/BPS030221
Political ideology: 85.3% Democrat, 12.7% Republican
https://sfelections.sfgov.org/november-3-2020-election-results-summary
Education level: 59.5% Bachelor’s degree or more
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocitycalifornia/BPS030221
Median household income: $126,187
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocitycalifornia/BPS030221
Voter turnout in 2022: 62.3%
https://sfelections.sfgov.org/november-8-2022-election-results-summary
The Initiative
Statement of the reasons for the measure as stated in the initiative petition:
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Residential vacancies are an ongoing concern in San Francisco. According to census data,
there were tens of thousands of vacant residential units in San Francisco as of 2019. A report
published in January 2022 by the Budget and Legislative Analyst found that the total number of
200
vacant units in San Francisco increased by about 20% between 2015 and 2019, to 40,500 units in
2019.
(b) According to the Budget and Legislative Analyst report, vacant units in 2019 were
concentrated in the South of Market area, downtown, and in the Mission District; generally the
same areas where new, large-scale housing construction has been concentrated. Such units are
disproportionately in multiunit buildings.
(c) The Empty Homes Tax is limited to buildings with more than two residential units
because such buildings are more likely to include one or more units held vacant by choice and
are more likely to include multiple vacancies.
(d) Prolonged vacancy restricts the supply of available housing units and runs counter to the
City’s housing objectives. Prolonged vacancies can also decrease economic activity in
neighborhoods and lead to blight.
(e) The Empty Homes Tax is intended to disincentivize prolonged vacancies, thereby
increasing the number of housing units available for occupancy, while also raising funds for rent
subsidies and affordable housing.
https://sfelections.sfgov.org/sites/default/files/20220207_ExciseTax.pdf
Question submitted to voters:
Shall the City tax owners of vacant residential units in buildings with three or
more units, if those owners have kept those units vacant for more than 182 days in a
calendar year, at a rate between $2,500–5,000 per vacant unit in 2024 and up to $20,000 in
later years with adjustments for inflation, to generate estimated annual revenue of $20–37
million, with the tax continuing until December 31, 2053, and use those funds for rent
subsidies and affordable housing?
https://voterguide.sfelections.org/en/tax-keeping-residential-units-vacant
Development of the Initiative
San Francisco is a culturally and politically progressive community with a strong
economic base that has long been at the forefront of initiative activity. The city has struggled
with an increasing number of people experiencing homelessness and a corresponding shortage of
affordable housing.
Since 2018, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) promoted several measures
designed to protect tenants’ rights and fund homeless programs. For several years, there had been
some discussion among tenants’ right and housing justice advocates about whether to add a
vacancy tax to that mix. In November 2020, San Francisco voters approved a commercial
vacancy tax, applicable to commercial spaces left vacant for more than one-half of the year.
201
San Francisco Supervisor Dean Preston, the DSA’s representative on the Board of
Supervisors and a long-time tenants’ rights advocate, commissioned a report addressing the
number of residential vacancies in San Francisco, the reasons for those vacancies, a comparison
to other cities, and policy options employed by other jurisdictions to address those vacancies.
Published in January 2022, the report suggested a vacancy rate of over eight percent and offered
a vacancy tax similar to those imposed in Oakland and Vancouver as an option.
21
An updated
report based on 2020 census figures showed that between 2019 and 2021 the number of vacant
units rose from 40,548 to 61,473.
22
After the report was published, there was some speculation that Supervisor Preston
intended to put a measure on the ballot through the Board of Supervisors. However, the DSA
was already partnering with social justice interfaith coalition Faith in Action to develop an
initiative. While the majority vote threshold was a factor in that decision, initiative proponents’
desire to maintain control over the measure was equally if not more significant. Policy experts,
including those affiliated with Supervisor Preston’s office, helped to draft the initiative, which
was modeled in large part after the Vancouver measure. The group consulted with tenants’ rights
groups to determine how the funds would be targeted.
The initiative imposed a tax on property owners who have at least three units that have
been vacant for more than six months. Single family homes were exempted. Depending on unit
size, the tax ranged from $2,500 to $5,000 per empty unit for the first two years of vacancy, with
up to $10,000 for any vacancy of three or more years. The City Controller estimated that 4,000
units would be subject to the tax initially, yielding approximately $9 million the first year and
increasing to $15.4 million by 2026. The tax revenue would go to a housing activation fund
designed to help pay subsidies for elderly and low-income residents and to purchase more
affordable housing units.
In February 2022, Supervisor Preston announced the launch of a campaign for an empty
homes tax that he hoped would be on the November 2022 ballot. The signature-gathering
campaign began shortly thereafter. By June 2022, the citizens’ group Activate Housing had
gathered 13,734 signatures, above the 8,979 signatures required. San Francisco does not require
a hearing to verify whether an initiative petition has garnered a sufficient number of signatures to
go on the ballot. Instead, it has delegated that authority to the Department of Elections, which
determined that the initiative qualified for the ballot.
21
Brousseau, F. & Xuereb, C. (2022, Jan. 31). Residential Vacancies in San Francisco. Budget
and Legislative Analyst’s Office. Retrieved from https://56a418ca-94d2-476c-9a45-
f491ca4a0387.usrfiles.com/ugd/56a418_74b82803e4fb434bb1b13010828a4c01.pdf
22
Barmann, J. (2022, Oct. 20). Depressingly, there are enough vacant housing units in SF to
house the homeless population eight times over. SFist. Retrieved from
https://sfist.com/2022/10/20/depressingly-there-were-about/
202
The Initiative Campaign
When the DSA runs a campaign, it has three goals in mind. The first is to promote a
measure with broad appeal using a simple message. The campaign focused on the message that
there is a need for money for affordable housing and there are vacant units. The tax would result
in more money and/or the availability of more housing. The second is a broader political purpose
to raise the profile of the DSA, and in that regard Proposition M was one of three initiatives on
the ballot in November 2022 that the DSA promoted. The third purpose is to train its members in
electoral politics.
A number of existing organizations and groups formed solely for the campaign (for
example, women leaders) to provide endorsements for the initiative. The initiative received a
significant amount of media coverage because it was a relatively new strategy. Funding for the
campaign came primarily from labor and the DSA. Of the $140,000 raised by the campaign,
$20,000 came from Supervisor Preston personally.
Some opposition developed, backed primarily by property owners’ associations and anti-
tax groups. The primary arguments asserted by the opposition were that the number of vacant
units was overblown, that enforcement would be difficult, and that small businesses and property
owners would ultimately pay the tax. Other opposition messaging specifically focused on the
DSA, asserting that the initiative was a DSA power grab and an effort at government control
over how private property is used.
The Initiative Outcome
Proposition M passed, receiving 54.5 percent of the vote. Voters approved a similar
measure in Berkeley. Proponents believed that voters liked the message that speculators should
be discouraged from letting housing units sit empty, but if they choose to do so, they should at
least contribute to raising money for housing programs. A group of San Francisco property
owners have filed suit, challenging the legality of the tax.
Key Takeaways from Initiative Stakeholder Interviews
Initiative Proponent
• The reason the measure was brought as an initiative was because the group knew
they could do it themselves and preferred to bring the measure themselves. She
called it the people power route. The majority vote threshold also influenced the
decision to seek a tax.
• The DSA’s reason for bringing an initiative were to promote its own policy, raise
the profile of the DSA and train volunteers in electoral politics.
• It was important for the DSA to find a coalition partner who could reach into
different communities. The DSA also considered who it would like to work with
long term, beyond the initiative.
203
• Initiative proponents used the signature-gathering effort to drum up support for
and excitement about the initiative. Personally, she did a lot of fundraising,
collecting endorsements, speaking with organizations, and meeting with the press.
• An elected official has a role in an initiative campaign. He should support the
measure by endorsing it and making appearances. The elected should not be too
involved in the campaign itself. On a broader level, the elected should think about
what underlying issue the initiative is trying to address and consider how to
address that issue in other contexts.
• Members of the Board of Supervisors were engaged with the initiative in different
ways. Some endorsed it and spoke at rallies. Others declined to endorse it but did
not actively oppose it. Though Supervisor Preston was the main proponent behind
the measure, he did not run the campaign in any way. Overall, there was not much
involvement by elected officials.
• While she believes voters are more receptive to tax initiatives because they realize
the magnitude of certain problems such as homelessness, she is concerned that
wealthy actors can buy signatures to get a measure on the ballot.
• After an initiative is passed, voters should demand accountability from their
elected officials. Voters become frustrated when they do not see the results from a
measure. She believes that sometimes elected officials exploit this frustration and
find opportunity in making things more confusing instead of clarifying them.
• The two-thirds voter threshold is undemocratic and gives the minority control.
Initiative Opponent
• He believes any role for an elected official in an initiative campaign is fine,
particularly since so many issues go to the voters. An elected can support or
oppose a measure. He is even fine with Supervisor Preston’s role, even though it
suggests the purpose was to circumvent the supermajority threshold.
• His gut reaction is that the public would be suspicious of collaboration between
initiative proponents and elected officials in an initiative campaign.
• He generally views initiatives as a failure of government in that people are so
frustrated, they are forced to take matters into their own hands. He also thinks an
initiative asks too much of people and would prefer a stronger representative
democracy model. He understands that voters would feel disenfranchised by the
elimination of the initiative.
• Here, the initiative proponents tapped into the Populist rhetoric that appealed to
renters, which comprise 62 percent of the San Francisco population.
• He views the majority threshold for a special tax initiative as a workaround that is
bad. However, he also thinks the two-thirds requirement for most taxes makes
governing difficult. He presumed the majority threshold was the reason the
measure was brought as an initiative. But as an opponent he has no control over
how a measure reaches the ballot.
• Even if he disagrees with a measure, he believes government’s obligation is to
enforce the measure once the voters pass it. He is concerned government will not
implement the measure or not implement it fully.
• His group did not collaborate with other groups in opposing the initiative, which
was likely detrimental to the opposition.
204
Staff Member
• San Francisco is small city with a large economic base and an enormous local
government. He would like to see the Board of Supervisors use the staff more for
policy input.
• The role of an elected official in relation to an initiative is as much or as little as
the elected desires. As a staff member, he is envious of the ability that elected
officials have to partner with citizens to implement policy.
• In view of recent corruption scandals, the public’s reaction to an elected official
being involved with an initiative would depend on who the elected official was
and what type of partnership was involved.
• San Francisco has long been an activist city with a penchant for initiatives. But
political gridlock among elected officials has contributed to the high number of
initiatives on the ballot. An elected official who wants to deliver policy may need
the initiative process.
• As a staff member, he advises more on the mechanics of a policy than the policy
itself. He has no role in connection with an initiative, nor would it be appropriate
for staff to have a role, even though he believes the public would appreciate staff
input.
• His role is to provide information to the public about how to do certain things. His
role is not to help people advance their political interests. He would like to see a
process where staff could take issues to the voters.
• He does not understand why the same measure would have different voter
thresholds depending on how it got on the ballot.
Staff Member
• He often sees members of the Board of Supervisors work with citizens’ groups on
prospective initiatives. He thinks this interplay is appropriate because those
groups are constituents, citizens benefit from the resources, and elected officials
can help temper more idealistic ideas and infuse them with political reality.
• While it is a positive and common thing for elected officials to work behind the
scenes with advocacy groups, more disclosure would be a good idea, particularly
when the relationship becomes more official and measure is headed for the ballot.
• Supervisor Preston’s vocal support of the initiative brought visibility and
credibility to it, and his advocacy garnered more attention than the opponents.
• Supervisor Preston had long been interested in vacant housing and commissioned
a staff report for more information, including what policy levers could be adopted
to reduce the vacancy level. The report garnered some attention, and he thought
perhaps helped create an opportune time for groups to mobilize. However, he
learned the initiative was well underway by the time the report was published. He
then realized staff was out of the loop.
• He knows the DSA and other organizations promoted the initiative. The group
seemed very organized early on.
• From a staff perspective, it makes no difference how a measure gets to the ballot.
The focus for staff is how to implement it and what are the implications of that
once it passes.
205
• In San Francisco, the Board of Supervisors and Mayor’s office operate separately,
and the initiative process gives each of them a way to get something to the ballot
when there is a conflict between them.
• He supports the initiative process, viewing it as a needed outlet when government
cannot move fast enough or is not responsive to community needs. The grassroots
nature of the process is also appealing. However, he thinks the process is
overused and believes the majority threshold will increase its use.
• The majority threshold shifts power to citizens.
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Consistent with their longstanding protection of the initiative process, California courts have interpreted the state constitution to provide that a special tax introduced via a citizens’ initiative requires a majority vote to pass, whereas the same special tax introduced by elected officials requires a two-thirds supermajority vote to pass. Using the unique case of special tax initiatives, this study explored the dynamics of representative and direct democracy by examining how California’s initiative preference affects local decision making. The study employed a qualitative, multiple case study research design and examined the attitudes and experiences of local elected officials, municipal staff members, citizen initiative proponents and opponents, and industry experts. The findings showed consistent support for the initiative process and a varied application of the process across jurisdictions, driven in large part by community history and context and the current legal framework. Variation was greatest among elected officials, whose conduct ranged from active involvement to a hands-off approach. Municipal staff members were generally supportive but not involved, heeding the legal restrictions governing the use of public resources. Initiative proponents were effective and resourceful, undertaking sophisticated activities to promote their policy solution, engaging networks and utilizing the lessons of previous efforts. This research adds to the literature on the relationship between representative and direct democracy and fills a gap in the literature concerning the roles of and relationship between those involved in citizen-led ballot initiatives at the local level. The study is designed to foster an understanding of the initiative process among local government stakeholders by focusing on the perspectives of those involved in special tax initiatives.
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Asset Metadata
Creator
King, Jennifer L.
(author)
Core Title
Simple majority or supermajority: what do California's special tax initiatives mean for local governance?
School
School of Policy, Planning and Development
Degree
Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development
Degree Program
Public Policy
Degree Conferral Date
2023-12
Publication Date
08/28/2023
Defense Date
08/09/2023
Publisher
Los Angeles, California
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University of Southern California
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University of Southern California. Libraries
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Tag
ballot initiative proponents,ballot initiatives,direct democracy,Local government,OAI-PMH Harvest,representative democracy
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Musso, Juliet (
committee chair
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committee member
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jennifer.king@usc.edu,jkinglaw@gmail.com
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Tags
ballot initiative proponents
ballot initiatives
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